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THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR

Neuve Chapelle
Battle of Ypres
Przemysl
Mazurian Lakes


VOLUME V







[Illustration: _A great French siege gun in action near the
much-contested battle field of Arras. During the terrific explosion
the gunners cover their ears_]




P. F. Collier & Sons, New York 




CONTENTS

PART I.--THE WESTERN FRONT

CHAPTER

       I. PREPARATIONS FOR AN OFFENSIVE
      II. BATTLE OF NEUVE CHAPELLE BEGINS
     III. OPERATIONS FOLLOWING NEUVE CHAPELLE
      IV. BEGINNING OF SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES
       V. THE STRUGGLE RENEWED
      VI. OTHER ACTIONS ON THE WESTERN FRONT
     VII. CAMPAIGN IN ARTOIS REGION
    VIII. BRITISH FORWARD MOVEMENT--BATTLE OF FESTUBERT
      IX. SIR JOHN FRENCH ATTEMPTS A SURPRISE
       X. ATTACKS AT LA BASSÉE
      XI. OPERATIONS AROUND HOOGE
     XII. FRANCO-GERMAN OPERATIONS ALONG THE FRONT
    XIII. CAMPAIGN IN ARGONNE AND AROUND ARRAS
     XIV. BELGO-GERMAN OPERATIONS

PART II.--NAVAL OPERATIONS

      XV. THE WAR ZONE
     XVI. ATTACK ON THE DARDANELLES
    XVII. GERMAN RAIDERS AND SUBMARINES
   XVIII. ITALIAN PARTICIPATION--OPERATIONS IN MANY WATERS
     XIX. STORY OF THE EMDEN
      XX. SUMMARY OF THE FIRST YEAR OF NAVAL WARFARE
     XXI. FIGHTS OF THE SUBMARINES
    XXII. SINKING OF THE LUSITANIA

PART III.--THE EASTERN FRONT--AUSTRO-RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN

   XXIII. THE CARPATHIAN CAMPAIGN--REVIEW OF THE SITUATION
    XXIV. BATTLE OF THE PASSES
     XXV. BATTLE OF KOZIOWA--OPERATIONS IN THE BUKOWINA
    XXVI. FALL OF PRZEMYSL
   XXVII. NEW RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE--AUSTRO-GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE

PART III--THE EASTERN FRONT--AUSTRO-RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN--_Continued_

CHAPTER

  XXVIII. CAMPAIGN IN GALICIA AND BUKOWINA--BATTLE OF THE DUNAJEC
    XXIX. RUSSIAN RETREAT
     XXX. AUSTRO-GERMAN RECONQUEST OF WESTERN GALICIA
    XXXI. CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN GALICIA AND THE BUKOWINA
   XXXII. RUSSIAN CHANGE OF FRONT--RETREAT TO THE SAN
  XXXIII. BATTLE OF THE SAN
   XXXIV. RECAPTURE OF PRZEMYSL
    XXXV. CAPTURE OF LEMBERG

PART IV.--RUSSO-GERMAN CAMPAIGN

   XXXVI. WINTER BATTLES OF THE MAZURIAN LAKES
  XXXVII. THE RUSSIANS OUT OF GERMANY
 XXXVIII. TIGHTENING OF THE NET--REPORT OF THE BOOTY
   XXXIX. BATTLES OF PRZASNYSZ--BEFORE MLAWA
      XL. FIGHTING BEFORE THE NIEMEN AND BOBR--BOMBARDMENT OF OSSOWETZ
     XLI. RUSSIAN RAID ON MEMEL
    XLII. GERMAN INVASION OF COURLAND--CAPTURE OF LIBAU
   XLIII. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE FROM KOVNO--FOREST BATTLES IN MAY AND JUNE
    XLIV. CAMPAIGN IN SOUTHERN POLAND--MOVEMENT UPON WARSAW
     XLV. BATTLE OF KRASNIK--CAPTURE OF PRZASNYSZ
    XLVI. GRAND OFFENSIVE ON THE WARSAW SALIENT
   XLVII. BEGINNING OF THE END
  XLVIII. WARSAW FALLS

PART V.--THE BALKANS

    XLIX. DIPLOMACY IN THE BALKANS

PART VI.--ITALY ENTERS THE WAR

       L. ITALY'S RELATIONS WITH THE WARRING POWERS
      LI. NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE CENTRAL POWERS




LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

  FRENCH GUN BEFORE ARRAS

  APPARATUS FOR DISCHARGING LIQUID FIRE
  MOROCCAN TROOPS IN CAMP AT ARCY
  BELGIAN SOLDIERS RE-FORMING FOR A FRESH ATTACK
  CANADIAN VOLUNTEERS AT BAYONET PRACTICE
  GERMAN SOLDIERS LIVING IN A CAVE IN FRANCE
  COMPLETING AN UNDERGROUND SHELTER
  FRENCH SOLDIERS LEAVING THEIR TRENCH FOR A CHARGE
  ARMORED AUTOMOBILE INTERCEPTING A TROOP OF CAVALRY

  SUBMARINE MAKING OBSERVATION ON SURFACE
  PRAYER IN A FRENCH CHURCH IN USE AS A HOSPITAL
  FRENCH SOLDIERS CARRYING WOUNDED MEN TO AMBULANCES
  CARING FOR A WOUNDED RED CROSS DOG
  DEATH OF A TRAITOR TO FRANCE
  NEW BRITISH MONITOR NEAR OSTEND
  SINKING OF THE FALABA
  LUSITANIA DISASTER

  GERMAN GUNNERS AIMING AT A RUSSIAN AEROPLANE
  RUSSIAN FLOATING MINE WASHED ASHORE ALONG THE WEICHSEL
  GERMAN SOLDIERS ON THE SANDS OF SKATRE
  OBSERVATION STATION IN A TREE NEAR THE MEMEL
  GERMAN CRUISERS NEAR MEMEL
  DISINFECTING CLOTHING IN A PETROGRAD HOSPITAL
  GERDAUEN, EAST PRUSSIA, BURNED IN THE RUSSIAN INVASION
  SERVICE IN A WAYSIDE CHAPEL IN GALICIA

  AUSTRIAN TELEPHONE STATION
  TRIUMPHAL ENTRY OF AUSTRIAN UHLANS INTO PRZEMYSL
  RUSSIAN BRIDGE DESTROYED IN THE RETREAT TOWARD WARSAW
  JAPANESE GUN AND AMMUNITION NEAR GRODNO
  TEMPORARY BRIDGE ACROSS THE DRINA
  AMERICAN DOCTORS IN SERBIA
  SERBIAN DEAD IN THE PLAGUE OF TYPHUS
  EFFECT OF TEUTON SHELLS ON THE FORTS AT PRZEMSYL, GALICIA




LIST OF MAPS

  POLAND AND THE RUSSO-GERMAN FRONTIER (_Colored Map_)
  WESTERN BATTLE LINE, JANUARY 1, 1915
  NEUVE CHAPELLE, BATTLE AT
  YPRES, GAS BATTLE OF
  FIGHTING IN ALSACE-HARTMANNSWEILERKOPF
  ARTOIS, BATTLES IN
  GERMAN SUBMARINE WAR ZONE
  EMDEN LANDING PARTY, CRUISE OF
  CARPATHIAN PASSES AND RUSSIAN BATTLE LINE
  PRZEMYSL, DETAIL MAPS OF THE FORTS OF
  GALICIAN CAMPAIGN FROM TARNOW TO PRZEMYSL
  GALICIAN CAMPAIGN FROM PRZEMYSL TO BESSARABIA
  RIGA, GERMAN ADVANCE ON
  WARSAW, GERMAN ATTEMPTS TO REACH, IN 1914
  WARSAW, ADVANCE AND CAPTURE OF
  NORTHERN ITALY, SHOWING THE WHOLE ITALIAN-AUSTRIAN FRONTIER
    AND THE PART OF AUSTRIA DEMANDED BY ITALY




PART I--THE WESTERN FRONT

       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER I

PREPARATIONS FOR AN OFFENSIVE

During the greater part of the winter of 1914-15, the fighting
along the western front had been almost constant, but had resulted
in little that either side could justly assert to be a success.
The rigors inevitable in such a mode of warfare had become almost
beyond human endurance, and commanders on both sides looked forward
to a more active campaign.

An immense amount of ammunition had been stored by the French in
and around Perthes in anticipation of a forward movement; and, by
the second week of February, a quarter of a million men of the
French army had been assembled near that place. They were opposite
a section of the German trenches which was about twelve miles long,
extending from Ville-sur-Tourbe in the Argonne to the village of
Souain. Early in the year this section had been held by only two
divisions of Rhinelanders. These two divisions had suffered severely
from the heavy gun fire which the French had directed against them
by means of the successful work of the French aviators. The French
infantry also had done effective work in the short rush which they
had been making, gaining on an average about twelve yards a day.
Following the concentration of French troops, the German commanders
brought up reenforcements to the number of 80,000. Some of these
were taken from La Bassée, and others from a contingent which had
been intended for a northern offensive movement.

Because of the chalk formation of the soil in this section of the
front, the excessive moisture of this season of the year drained
rapidly, leaving exposed an undulating section on which were small
forests of fir trees. The nature of the ground made it an easy
matter to move troops even in winter. General Joffre took advantage
of this fact, and assembled a quarter of a million men against the
German lines in Champagne. This caused the German commanders to
mass troops just in front of Perthes. The concentration continued
until there were 220,000 German soldiers packed there in close
formation. The French attacked, and quickly a rain of more than
a hundred thousand shells fell upon the Germans.

The Germans sought to reply by bringing up twenty-two batteries of
heavy guns and sixty-four field batteries; but the French gunners
kept command of the field. In the twenty days' battle--from February
16 to March 7, 1915--the French won scarcely a mile of ground;
but they found and buried 10,000 German dead. The French staff
estimated that 60,000 German soldiers had been put out of action.
The German staff admitted they had lost more men in this action
than in the campaign in East Prussia against the Russians, where
fourteen German army corps were engaged. The French lost less than
10,000 men.

In the last week of February, 1915, it had been learned by General
Joffre that General von Falkenhayn of the German forces had withdrawn
from Neuve Chapelle, and the section north of La Bassée six batteries
of field artillery, six battalions of the Prussian Guard, and two
heavy batteries of the Prussian Guard. These had been withdrawn for
the purpose of checking the supposed French advance at Perthes, as
already narrated. Hence, it was known that the English, in command
of Sir Douglas Haig, at Neuve Chapelle, were opposed by a thin line
of German troops who were making a demonstration of force for the
purpose of concealing the weakness of their line.

[Illustration: THE WESTERN BATTLE LINE, JANUARY 1, 1915]

The British officers in the region of Neuve Chapelle received complete
instructions on March 8, 1915, in regard to an offensive which they
were to start on the 10th. These instructions were supplemental to
a communication which had been sent on February 19 by the British
commander in chief to Sir Douglas Haig, the commander of the First
Army. Neuve Chapelle was to be the immediate objective of the
prospective engagement. This place is about four miles north of
La Bassée at the junction of main roads, one leading southward
to La Bassée, and another from Bethune on the west to Armentieres
on the northeast. It is about eleven miles west of Lille. These
roads formed an irregular diamond-shaped figure with the village
at the apex of the eastern sides, along which the German troops
were stationed. The British held the western sides of this figure.

The land in this part of France is marshy and crossed by dykes;
but, to the eastward, the ground rises slowly to a ridge, on the
western border of which are two spurs. Aubers is at the apex of
one; and Illies at the apex of the other. Both of these villages
were held by the Germans. The ridge extends northeast, beyond the
junction of the spurs, from Fournes to within two miles southwest of
Lille. Along the ridge is the road to Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing,
all of which are among the chief manufacturing towns of France.
The occupation of the ridge was a necessary step to the taking
of Lille; and Neuve Chapelle was at the gateway to the ridge. If
the Allies could take Lille they would then be in a position to
move against their enemy between that point and the sea.

The River Des Layes runs behind Neuve Chapelle to the southeast;
and, behind the river, a half mile from the straggling village,
is a wood known as the Bois du Biez. Almost at right angles to
the river, on the west, the main road from Estaires to La Bassée
skirts Neuve Chapelle. There is a triangle of roads north of the
village where there were a few large houses with walls, gardens,
and orchards. At this point the Germans had fortified themselves
to flank the approaches to the village from that section. These
trenches were only about a hundred yards from those of the British.
The Germans had machine guns at a bridge over the river; and they
had another post established a little farther up at the Pietre
mill. Farther down the stream, where the road into the village
joins the main road to La Bassée, the Germans had fortified a group
of ruined buildings which was known as Port Arthur. From there was
a great network of trenches which extended northwestward to the
Pietre mill. There were also German troops in the Bois du Biez,
and in the ruined houses along the border of the wood.

[Illustration: RUSSIAN-GERMAN FRONTIER, POLAND AND THE BALTIC PROVINCES]

The German trenches were in excellent positions, but were occupied
by only a comparatively few soldiers; it was the German plan to
keep large bodies of troops in reserve, so that they might be sent
to any sector where the need seemed most likely. They have asserted
they had only four battalions in the front line here; but that
statement is denied by the British.

The British plan of attack embraced a heavy bombardment to demoralize
their enemy and prevent reenforcement. This was to be followed
by an infantry attack. It was expected that the Germans would be
surprised to such an extent it would be impossible for them to
make much resistance. Units of the First Army were to make the
main attack, supported by the Second Army. The support included
a division of cavalry. Among the large force of heavy artillery
for the opening bombardment were a number of French guns manned
by French artillerymen.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER II

BATTLE OF NEUVE CHAPELLE BEGINS

Three hundred and fifty guns at short range began a most terrific
bombardment March 10, 1915, at 7.30 a. m. It is said that the discharges
of the artillery was so frequent that it seemed as if some gigantic
machine gun was in action. Shortly after this bombardment started,
the German trenches were covered by a great cloud of smoke and
dust and a pall of green lyddite fumes. The first line of German
trenches, against which the fire was directed, became great shapeless
furrows and craters filled with the dead and dying.

This was the condition all along the line except on the extreme
northern end where the artillery fire was less effective, owing,
it was said, to a lack of proper preparation by the British staff.
This terrific artillery fire was continued for thirty-five minutes;
and then the range was changed from the first line of German trenches
to the village of Neuve Chapelle itself. Thereupon the British
infantry advanced and made prisoners of the few Germans left alive
in the first line. The men found unwounded were so dazed by the
onslaught which the guns had made upon their position that they
offered no resistance. The bombardment had swept away the wire
entanglements; and the British had only the greasy mud with which
to contend, when they made their dash forward.

Where the wire entanglements had been swept away, the Second
Lincolnshire and the Berkshire regiments were the first to reach
the German trenches. These regiments then turned to the right and
left, and thus permitted the Royal Irish Rifles and the Rifle Brigade
to go on toward the village.

In order to understand the infantry attack in detail it is necessary
to know the manner in which the British troops were distributed
before they made their dash at the ruined trenches of the Germans.
Two brigades of the Eighth Division, the Twenty-fifth to the right
and the Twenty-third to the left, were due west of Neuve Chapelle.
On a front a mile and a half long to the south of them was the
Meerut Division, supported by the Lahore Division. The Garhwal
Brigade was on the left and the Dehra Dun Brigade was on its right.
In the first attack the Twenty-third dashed to the northeast corner
of the village, the Twenty-fifth against the village itself; and
the Garhwal Brigade charged on the southwest corner.

The trenches opposite the Twenty-fifth were taken with practically
no fighting. The Germans who had manned them were either killed
or too dazed to offer resistance. As has already been told, the
Second Royal Berkshires and the Second Lincolns took the first line
of trenches in front of them, and opened the middle of their line
to permit the Second Rifle Brigade and the First Irish Rifles to
dash on to the village. The British artillery range was lengthened,
thereby preventing the German supports from interference with the
well-defined plan of the British. Into the wrecked streets of Neuve
Chapelle swung two battalions of the Twenty-fifth Brigade. The few
of their enemy who offered resistance were soon overpowered--being
captured or slain.

These men of the Twenty-fifth Brigade found terrible scenes of
destruction. The village had been knocked literally into a rubbish
heap. Even the dead in the village churchyard had been plowed from
their graves by the terrific bombardment.

The Garhwal Brigade captured the first line of trenches on the
right, and the Third Gurkhas, on the southern outskirts of the
village, met the Rifle Brigade. Then it dashed on to the Bois du
Biez, passing another rubbish heap which once had been the hamlet
known as Port Arthur.

The attack on the left, however, resulted less successfully for
the British forces. As indicated above, the preparation for the
bombardment at this part of the line had been inadequate for the
purpose which the general in command had sought to achieve. Thus
on the northeast corner of Neuve Chapelle the German trenches and
the wire entanglements in front of them had been damaged but little.
The British forces on this part of the line included the Second
Devons, the Second West Yorks, the Second Scottish Rifles, and the
Second Middlesex, known as the Twenty-third Brigade. The Scottish
Rifles charged against intact wire entanglements which halted them
in the range of a murderous rifle and machine-gun fire. With daring
bravery the Scots sought to tear down the wire with their hands;
but were forced to fall back and lie in the fire-swept zone until
one company forced its way through an opening and destroyed the
barrier. The regiment, as a result of this mishap to the plans
of the commanding general, lost its commander, Colonel Bliss, and
fourteen other officers.

The Middlesex, on the right, met with the same obstruction and lost
many of its men and officers while waiting for the British artillery
to smash a way through for them. This the artillery did when word
had been carried back telling of the plight of the infantry.

The Twenty-fifth Brigade, to the south, had the good fortune to turn
the flank of the Germans north of Neuve Chapelle. Then the entire
Twenty-third Brigade forced its way to the orchard northeast of the
village, where it met the Twenty-fourth Brigade, which included the
First Worcesters, Second East Lancashires, First Sherwood Foresters,
and the Second Northamptons. The Twenty-fourth Brigade had fought its
way through from the Neuve Chapelle-Armentières road. As soon as
this had been accomplished by the British, their artillery proceeded
to send such a rain of shrapnel fire between the village and the
Germans that a counterattack was quite impossible. This gave the
victors an opportunity to intrench themselves practically at their
leisure. The plans of the British commander had embraced a forward
movement when the troops had reached this point, but they had not
included a means of keeping communication with the various units
intact. The telegraph and telephone wires had been cut by the shot
and shell of both sides; and there was no opportunity to repair
them until it was too late to take advantage of the demoralization
of the Germans. Moreover, the delay of the Twenty-third Brigade had
so disarranged the plans of the British that it is doubtful if they
would not have failed in part even if the means of communication had
not been destroyed. Nevertheless, Sir John French wrote: "I am
of the opinion that this delay would not have occurred had the
clearly expressed orders of the general officer commanding the
First Army been more carefully observed."

There was also an additional delay in bringing up the reserves
of the Fourth Corps. Thus it was not until 3.30 p. m. that three
brigades of the Seventh Division, the Twentieth, Twenty-first,
and Twenty-second Brigades were in their places on the left of
the Twenty-fourth Brigade. Then the left moved southward toward
Aubers. At the same time the Indian Corps, composed of the Garhwal
Brigade and the Dehra Dun Brigade, forced its way through the Bois
du Biez toward the ridge. Strong opposition was met with to such
an extent, however, that the Thirty-ninth Garhwals and the Second
Leicesters suffered severe losses on reaching a German position
which had practically escaped the heavy artillery fire. A German
outpost at the bridge held the Dehra Dun Brigade, which was supported
by the Jullundur Brigade of the Lahore Division, in its attack
farther to the south on the line of the River Des Layes. The First
Brigade of the First Corps was rushed forward by Sir Douglas Haig;
but it was dark before these troops arrived. Another fortified
bridge, farther to the left, checked the Twenty-fifth Brigade;
and machine-gun fire stopped the Twenty-fourth Brigade, this fire
being from the German troops at the crossroads northwest of Pietre
village. The Seventh Division was held by the line of the Des Layes,
and the defense of the Pietre mill.

By evening the British had gone forward as far as their artillery
fire had been effective; and it was found necessary for them to
stop to strengthen the new line which they had established. They had
won Neuve Chapelle. They had advanced a mile. They had straightened
their line, but they could go no farther.

On the following day, March 11, 1915, the British artillery was
directed against the Bois de Biez and the trenches in the neighborhood
of Pietre. The Germans, however, had recovered from the surprise
of the great bombardment, and they made several counterattacks.
Little progress was made on that day by either side. On that night,
March 11, the Bavarian and Saxon reserves arrived from Tourcoing,
and on the morning of March 12 the counterattack extended along the
British front. Because of the heavy mist, and the lack of proper
communications, it was impossible for the British artillery to
do much damage. The defense of the bridges across the Des Layes
kept the British forces from the ridges and the capture of Aubers.
The best that the British seemed to be able to do was to prevent
the German counterattack from being successful.

An attempt to use the British cavalry was unsuccessful on March 12.
The Second Cavalry Division, in command of General Hubert Gough,
with a brigade of the North Midland Division, was ordered to support
the infantry offensive, it being believed that the cavalry might
penetrate the German lines. When the Fifth Cavalry Brigade, under
command of Sir Philip Chetwode, arrived in the Rue Bacquerot at 4
p. m., Sir Henry Rawlinson reported the German positions intact,
and the cavalry retired to Estaires.

[Illustration: THE BATTLE AT NEUVE CHAPELLE]

The attack of the Seventh Division against the Pietre Fort continued
all the day of March 12, as did the attempt to take the Des Layes
bridges from the Germans, who were valiantly defending their second
line of trenches in the Bois du Biez. Probably the fiercest fighting
of that day fell to the lot of the Twentieth Brigade, composed of
the First Grenadiers, the Second Scots Guards, the Second Border
Regiment, and the Second Gordons, with the Sixth Gordons, a Territorial
battalion. This brigade fought valiantly around Pietre Mill. Position
after position was taken by them, but their efforts could not remain
effective without the aid of artillery, which was lacking. The Second
Rifle Brigade carried a section of the German trenches farther south
that afternoon, but an enfilading fire drove the British back to
their former position.

It was evident by the night of March 12 that the British could not
gain command of the ridge and that the Germans could not retake
Neuve Chapelle. Hence Sir John French ordered Sir Douglas Haig
to hold and consolidate the ground which had been taken by the
Fourth and Indian Corps, and suspend further offensive operations
for the present. In his report General French set forth that the
three days' fighting had cost the British 190 officers and 2,337
other ranks killed; 359 officers and 8,174 other ranks wounded,
and 23 officers and 1,728 other ranks missing. He claimed German
losses of over 12,000.

The British soldiers who had been engaged in the fighting about
Neuve Chapelle spent all of March 13, 1915, in digging trenches
in the wet meadows that border the Des Layes. On the following
day the two corps that had fought so valiantly were sent back to
the reserve.

The German commanders, in the meantime, had been preparing for a
vigorous counterattack. They planned to make their greatest effort
fifteen miles north of Neuve Chapelle, at the village of St. Eloi,
and trained a large section of their artillery against a part of
the British front, which was held by the Twenty-seventh Division.
The preparation of the Germans was well concealed on March 14 by
the heavy mist that covered the low country. The bombardment started
at 5 p. m., the beginning of which was immediately followed by the
explosion of two mines which were under a hillock that was a part
of the British front at the southeast of St. Eloi. The artillery
attack was followed by such an avalanche of German infantry that
the British were driven from their trenches. This German success
was followed up by the enfilading of the British lines to the right
and left, with the result that that entire section of the British
front was forced back.

That night a counterattack was prepared. It was made at 2 a. m.,
on March 15, by the Eighty-second Brigade, which had the Eightieth
Brigade as its support. The Eighty-second Brigade drove the Germans
from the village and the trenches on the east. The Eightieth Brigade
finished the task of regaining all of the ground that had been
lost except the crater caused by the explosion of the mines. Among
the regiments that made a most enviable record for themselves in
this action were Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, the
Fourth Rifle Brigade, the First Leinsters, the Second Cornwalls,
and the Second Royal Irish Fusiliers. The "Princess Pat's," as
the Canadian troops were known in the home land, were the first
colonial soldiers to take part in a battle of such magnitude in
this war. Their valor and their ability as fighting men were causes
of great pride to the British.

Before leaving the Neuve Chapelle engagement and what immediately
followed it, it is well to give a brief survey of the actions along
the line that supported it. To prevent the Germans from taking
troops from various points and massing them against the main British
attack, the British soldiers all along that part of the front found
plenty of work to do in their immediate vicinity. Thus, on March
10, 1915, the First Corps attacked the Germans from Givenchy, but
there had been but little artillery fire on the part of the British
there, and the wire entanglements stopped them from more than keeping
the German troops in the position which they had held. The Second
Corps, on March 12, was to have advanced at 10 a. m. southwest of
Wytschaete. The fog that prevailed on that day, however, prevented
a movement until 4 p. m. Then the First Wiltshires and the Third
Worcesters of the Seventh Brigade began a movement which had to
be abandoned when the weather thickened and night fell.

The attack on L'Epinette, a hamlet southeast of Armentières, was
much more successful on the same day. The Seventeenth Brigade of
the Fourth Division of the Third Corps advanced at noon, with the
Eighteenth Brigade as its support. It advanced 300 yards on a front
a half mile in length, carrying the village, which it retained in
spite of all the counterattacks.

The work of the artillery was not confined to the main attack,
for it was very effective in shelling the Quesnoy railway station
east of Armentières, where German reenforcements were boarding
a train for the front. The British artillery fire was effective
as far as Aubers, where it demolished a tall church spire.

The work of the aviators, from March 10 to 12 inclusive, deserves
special mention. Owing to the adverse weather conditions, it was
necessary for them to fly as low as from 100 to 150 feet above
the object of their attack in order to be sure of their aim.
Nevertheless they destroyed one of the piers of the bridge over
the Lys at Menin. This bridge carried the railroad over the river.
They also wrecked the railway stations at Douai, Don, and Courtrai.
The daring of the British aviators even took them over Lille, where
they dropped bombs on one of the German headquarters.

To summarize the fighting about Neuve Chapelle, it may be said that
the British had advanced something more than a mile on a three-mile
front, replacing the sag which had existed in their line by a sag
in that of the Germans. The British had not won the ridges which
were the key to Lille, but they had advanced their trenches close
to those ridges. The entire moral effect was a gain for the British;
but even that and the gain in advancing the front had been obtained
at a too great sacrifice of the life of their men. The words of
the Germans in characterizing the tremendous bombardment of the
British were: "That is not war; it is murder."

The belief in the supposed superiority of the German artillery
was so shaken in the minds of the General Staff as a result of
the fighting on the Neuve Chapelle front that they shortly after
issued an order to try a series of experiments on animals with
asphyxiating gases.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER III

OPERATIONS FOLLOWING NEUVE CHAPELLE

There was very little activity on the western front after the fighting
at Neuve Chapelle and St. Eloi until the beginning of a renewal
of the campaign between La Bassée and the sea. The importance of
success in this region was appreciated by both sides. The Germans
north of the Lys planned to cross the Comines-Ypres, Yperlee, and Yser
Canals, capture Ypres, take all of the ridge of the Mont-des-Cats,
and then continue west and take Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne. The
Allies in their plan included an advance south of the Lys on two
sides of Lille, the taking of the Aubers Ridge, and the turning from
the north the German salient at La Bassée. This much of the Allies'
plan was to be executed by the British. The work of the French was
to drive the Germans from the vicinity of Lens and threaten La
Bassée from the south and west. The reasons for making these plans
are obvious. The German salient was a source of much danger to the
joining of the British and French armies, and the possibility of the
Germans forcing their way through to Boulogne meant a possibility
of a cutting off of the entire British army and the French and
Belgian forces between Ypres and the sea near Nieuport. However, if
La Bassée was isolated and the Aubers Ridge taken by the British,
the chances that the Germans could retain Lille were materially
lessened; and if the British got Lille they might start to drive
their enemy from Belgium.

During the lull in the fighting on land, to which reference has
been made, there was much activity in the air. Reconnaissances and
raids were of almost daily occurrence. A Zeppelin dropped twenty
bombs on Calais, slaying seven workmen at the railroad station on
March 18, 1915. Three days later another, or possibly the same
Zeppelin, flew over the town, but this time it was driven away
before it could do any harm. "Taubes" bombarded the railroad junction
of St. Omer and made a similar attack on Estaires on March 23.
Four days after another attack was made on Estaires, and on the
same day, March 27, the German airmen did some damage to Sailly,
Calais, and Dunkirk. The next day a "Taube" made an attack on Calais,
Estaires, and Hazebrouck. A Zeppelin closed the month's warfare
in the air for the Germans by making a dash over Bailleul.

Aviators of the Allies, too, were busy. One of their aerial squadrons
proceeded along the coast on March 16 and attacked the military
posts at Ostend and Knocke. These aviators had as one of their
main objective points the German coast batteries at the latter
place. But the squadron was seen from a German observation balloon
at Zeebrugge, and a flock of "Taubes" made a dash for their enemy's
craft. The Germans were not as skillful airmen, however, and they
found it necessary to retire. Five British aviators made an attack
on the German submarine base at Hoboken, southwest of Antwerp,
and destroyed a submarine and wrecked two others. This raid was
made without injury to the aviators, the only accident being the
necessity of one of the aircraft to descend, which it did, only
to find it had landed on Dutch territory and must be interned. The
excellence of the Allies' flying was not confined to the English.
Belgian and French airmen, as well as British, flew almost constantly
over Ostend, Zeebrugge, Roulers, Aubers, and such other places as
German soldiers and their supplies were in evidence. The Belgian
airmen dropped bombs on the aviation field at Ghistelles on March
27, and on the following day a Zeppelin hangar was destroyed at
Berchem-Sainte-Agathe, near Brussels. On March 30, 1915, ten British
and some French aviators flew along the coast from Nieuport to
Zeebrugge and dropped bombs on magazines and submarine bases. The
last day of the month saw the destruction of the German captive
balloon at Zeebrugge and the death of its two observers. The Belgian
aviators on the same day threw bombs on the aviation field at Handzaeme
and the railroad junction at Cortemarck, and, south of Dixmude,
the famous birdman, Garros, fought a successful duel in the air
with a German aviator.

An aviator of the Allies flew over the aerodrome at Lille on April
1, 1915, and dropped a football. The Germans hastened to cover.
When the ball bounced prodigiously as a result of being dropped
from such a height, the Teutons thought it was some new kind of
death dealer, and remained in their places of safety. In fact,
they remained there quite a few minutes after the football had
ceased to bounce. When they finally emerged most cautiously and
approached the object of their terror, they read this inscription
on it: "April Fool--Gott strafe England."

Though the antiaircraft guns, or "Archibalds," as the soldiers
called them, were not especially effective except in keeping the
flyers at such a height that it was not easy for them to make effective
observations, a "Taube" was brought down at Pervyse, and near Ypres
another was damaged on April 8. But on April 12 a German flyer
inflicted some loss on the Allies' lines and escaped without being
even hit. On the following day, presumably emboldened by that success,
German aeroplanes threw flares and smoke balls over the British
trenches east of Ypres, with the result that the soldiers of King
George were subjected to a severe bombardment. All things considered,
however, the Allies had ground for their belief that they more
than held their own in the air.

Afloat the Allies continued to maintain the supremacy which had
been theirs. The French and British battleships held the left of
the Allies' line. Their great guns proved their effectiveness on the
Germans who were advancing from Ostend on Nieuport. They repeatedly
bombarded the position of the kaiser's men at Westende, east of
Nieuport. The Germans had trained one of their mammoth pieces of
artillery against that town presumably because it held the sluices
and locks which regulated the overflowing of the Yser territory.
If the means of flooding the land could not be seized, the next
best thing to do was to wreck them.

The Belgians, in the meantime, assumed the offensive, their left
being protected by the Allied fleet and the French forces in the
neighborhood of Nieuport. These troops captured one of the smaller
forts east of Lombartzyde on March 11, 1915. There was also fighting
at Schoorbakke, north of the Yser loop, where the German trenches
were shelled by French artillery. This was on the eastern border
of the inundated section. After destroying the German front in the
graveyard at Dixmude, the French artillerists battered a German
convoy on its way between Dixmude and Essen on March 17, 1915. By
March 23 the east bank of the Yser held a Belgian division. In
fact, from Dixmude to the sea the Allied troops were advancing.

The Germans, however, advanced south of Dixmude. On April 1, 1915,
they shelled the farms and villages west of the Yser and the Yperlee
Canals, and took the Driegrachten farm. Thereupon the Germans crossed
the canal with three machine guns. Their plan was to proceed along
the border of the inundated district to Furnes. But the French
balked the plan by shelling the farm, and the Belgians finished
the work by driving the Germans back to Mercken on April 6, 1915.

In the meantime, from March 15 to April 17, 1915, the bombardment
of Ypres was continued, destroying most of the remaining buildings
there. Engagements of importance had not as yet started on the
British front. The British had a supply of shrapnel, and the British
and French cannon, as well as the rifle- and machine-gun fire,
held the Germans in check until they had time to perfect their
plans for a vigorous offensive. Nevertheless the British needed
a much larger supply of ammunition before they could start on a
determined campaign, which was so much desired by the troops. One
of the German headquarters, however, was shelled effectively by
the British on April 1, 1915, and on the following day mortars in
the trenches did considerable damage in the Wood of Ploegsteert.
A mine blew up a hundred yards of the trenches that were opposite
Quinchy, a village to the south of Givenchy, on April 3, 1915. To
offset this the Germans bombarded the British line at that point.
They also shelled Fleurbaix, which is three miles southwest of
Armentières, on April 5, 1915. The British on the same day wrecked
a new trench mortar south of there. On April 6, 1915, the German
artillery began to be more active both north and south of the Lys,
and the British retaliated by shelling the railway triangle that
was near Quinchy. German soldiers were slain and others wounded
when a mine was exploded at Le Touquet, on the north bank of the
Lys. One of the kaiser's ammunition depots was blown up near Quinchy
on April 9, 1915, and his men were driven from their trenches in
front of Givenchy by mortar fire.

The comparative quiet along the front was broken by the fight for
the possession of Hill 60, which became famous because of the rival
claims as to victory. The mound, for it was little more, getting
its name on account of its height--sixty meters--was of importance
only because it screened the German artillery which was shelling
Ypres from the bridge to the west of Zandvoord. British trenches
had been driven close to this hill by the Bedfords, whose sappers
tunneled under the mound and there prepared three mines. At the same
time the Germans were tunneling to plant mines under the Bedfords'
trench. In this underground race the Bedfords won on the night
of April 17, 1915, when they blew three big craters in the hill,
killing almost to a man all of the 150 Germans who were on the
little rise of ground. The Bedfords then dashed forward to the
three craters they had opened up and took a quarter of a mile of
the German trenches.

The Germans were apparently unprepared for the attack which followed
the explosion of the British mines, with the result that the British
had to overcome little resistance, and had ample opportunity to
prepare a defense from the bombardment that followed. The next
morning, April 18, 1915, the German infantry in close formation
advanced on the hill. This infantry was composed of Saxons, who
continued on for a bayonet charge in spite of the downpour of lead
that the British rained upon them. But the Bedfords had been reenforced
by the West Kents and about thirty motor machine guns. The machine
guns raked the charging Saxons in front, and shrapnel tore their
flank. Only their dead and dying remained on the hill; but the
German commanders continued to send their men against the British
there, who were subjected to a murderous cross-fire, the hill forming
a salient. As a result of their persistence the German troops managed
to get a foothold on the southern part of the hill by 6 p. m. In the
meantime a battalion of Highlanders and the Duke of Wellington's
regiment had been sent to reenforce the Bedfords and the West Kents.
The Highlanders made a desperate charge, using bayonets and hand
grenades on the Germans who had gained the southern edge of the
hill. The Germans were driven back.

The Duke of Württemberg, the German commander, presumably believing
his troops had not only held what they had taken, but had advanced,
announced that another German victory had been gained in the capture
of Hill 60. Sir John French also sent out a message, but in his report
he set forth that Hill 60 was held by the British. Because there
had been similar conflict in official reports all too frequently,
it seemed as if a tacit agreement was made among the neutrals to
determine who was telling the truth. This resulted in making what
was a comparatively unimportant engagement one of the most celebrated
battles of the war. As soon as Duke Albrecht of Württemberg discovered
his mistake he did what he could to make good his statement by
attempting to take Hill 60 without regard to sacrificing his men.
Sir John French was just as determined to hold the hill. So he moved
large numbers of troops toward the shattered mound, the British
artillery was reenforced, and the hastily constructed sandbag
breastworks were improved with all possible speed.

The Germans then attacked with gas bombs. Projectiles filled with
gas were hurled upon the British from three sides. The East Surrey
Regiment, which defended the hill in the latter part of the battle
for it, suffered severely. Faces and arms became shiny and gray-black.
Membranes in the throats thickened, and lungs seemed to be eaten
by the chlorine poison. Yet the men fought on until exhausted,
and then fell to suffer through a death struggle which continued
from twenty-four hours to three days of suffocating agony.

The German artillery kept up its almost incessant pounding of the
British. In short lulls of the big gun's work the German infantry
hurled itself against the trenches on the hill, using hand grenades
and bombs. The fight continued until the morning of May 5, 1915,
when the wind blew at about four miles an hour from the German
trenches. Then a greenish-yellow fog of poisonous gas was released,
and soon encompassed the hill. The East Surreys, who were holding
the hill, were driven back by the gas, but as soon as the gas passed
they charged the Germans who had followed the gas and had taken
possession of the hill. Notwithstanding the machine-gun fire which
the Germans poured upon them, many of the trenches were retaken by
the Surrey soldiers in their first frenzied rush to regain what
they had lost because of the gas. The battle ended when there was
no hill left. The bombardment and the mines had leveled the mound
by distributing it over the surrounding territory. The British,
however, were accorded the victory, as they had trenches near where
the hill was and made them a part of the base of the salient about
Ypres.

That town has been likened to the hub of a wheel whose spokes are
the roads which lead eastward. It is true that one important road
went over the canal, at Steenstraate, but practically all of the
highways of consequence went through Ypres. Thus the spokes of the
wheel, whose rim was the outline of the salient, were the roads to
Menin, Gheluvelt, Zonnebeke, Poelcapelle, Langemarck, and Pilkem.
And the railroad to Roulers was also a spoke. Hence all of the
supplies for the troops on the salient must pass through Ypres,
which made it most desirable for the Germans to take the town. It
will be remembered that they had won a place for their artillery
early in November, 1914, which gave them an opportunity to bombard
Ypres through the winter. On February 1, 1915, a portion of the
French troops which had held the salient were withdrawn and their
places taken by General Bulfin's Twenty-eighth Division. Thus, by
April 20, 1915, that part of the Allies' front was held as follows:
From the canal to east of Langemarck was the Forty-fifth Division
of the French army, consisting of colonial infantry. On the French
right, to the northeast of Zonnebeke, was the Canadian division,
under the command of General Alderson, consisting of the Third
Brigade, under General Turner, on the left, and the Second Brigade,
under General Currie, on the right. The Twenty-eighth Division
extended from the Canadian right to the southeast corner of the
Polygon Wood. This division comprised the Eighty-third, Eighty-fourth,
and Eighty-fifth Brigades in order from right to left. The next
section of the salient was held by Princess Patricia's Regiment
of the Twenty-seventh Division, which division, under the command
of General Snow, guarded the front to the east of Veldhoek along
the ridge to within a short distance of Hill 60, where the Fifth
Division, under the command of General Morland, held the line.
The greater part of the German troops opposite the salient were
from Württemberg and Saxony.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER IV

BEGINNING OF SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES

What is called the second battle of Ypres began with a bombardment
of the little city on April 20, 1915. The rain of shells continued
on through April 22, 1915, on the evening of which the British
artillery observers reported a strange green vapor moving over the
French trenches. The wind was blowing steadily from the northeast.
Soon the French troops were staggering back from the front, blinded
and choking from the deadly German gas. Many of their comrades had
been unable to leave the spot where they were overtaken by the
fumes. Those who fled in terror rushed madly across the canal,
choking the road to Vlamertinghe. A part of the Zouaves and Turcos
ran south toward the Langemarck road, finally reaching the reserve
battalions of the Canadians. Ere long the Canadians caught the
deadly odor also.

But the work of the gas did a much more valuable thing for the
German troops than causing the agonizing death of many hundreds
and sending thousands in headlong flight. It made a four-mile-wide
opening in the front of the Allies. And the Germans were quick to
take advantage of that opening. They followed the gas, and were
aided in their advance by artillery fire. The French were forced
back on the canal from Steenstraate to Boesinghe. The Canadians
had not suffered so much from the gas as the French soldiers, but
their flank was too exposed for them to do much effective work
against the onrushing Teutons. The attempt to rally the Turcos
failed. The Third Brigade could not withstand the attack of four
divisions, and was forced inward from a point south of Poelcappelle
until its left rested on the wood east of St. Julien. There was
a gap beyond it, and the Germans were forcing their way around
its flank. Because the entire First Brigade of Canadians had been
held in reserve it could not be brought up in time to save the
situation. Two of the battalions, the Sixteenth and Tenth, were
in the gap by midnight. They charged and recovered the northern
edge, and the guns of the Second London Division, which had been
supporting the French in the wood east of St. Julien. But the British
could not hold all they retook, and were forced to abandon the guns
because the artillery horses were miles away. So parts of the guns
were made useless before the Germans had them again.

Then another counterattack was made by the First and Fourth Ontarios
of General Mercer's First Brigade. The Fourth Ontario captured the
German shelter trenches and held them for two days, when they were
relieved. The Third Canadian Brigade held its position in spite
of being opposed by many times their numbers and almost overcome
by the gas fumes. The Forty-eighth Highlanders, who had had to
withstand the gas, rallied after their retreat and regained their
former place in the front. The Royal Highlanders kept their original
position. Yet there was every indication of a rout. The roads were
clogged by the night supply trains going forward and the rush of men
trying to escape from the deadly gas. The staff officers found it
impossible to straighten out the tangle, and the various regiments
had to act almost as independent bodies, It was not until early the
following morning, April 23, 1915, that the first reenforcements
of British soldiers appeared to fill the breach. These men, for
the most part, were from the Twenty-eighth Division, and had been
east of Zonnebeke to the southeast corner of Polygon Wood. So great
was the pressure at the section where the break had been made in
the line that troops were taken from wherever available, so that
the units in the gap varied from day to day. For the men had to be
returned to their original positions, such as remained available,
as soon as possible. This composite body of troops has been called
Geddes's Detachment.

The Germans had captured Lizerne and Het Sas, and Steenstraate was
threatened by them. They bombarded with heavy artillery, located
on the Passchendaele ridge, the front held by the Canadians, the
Twenty-eighth Division, and Geddes's Detachment, on April 23, 1915.
The severest fighting was on that part of the front held by the
Third Brigade of Canadians. Many men had been killed or wounded in
this brigade, and those who survived were ill from the effects of
the gas. Furthermore, no food could be taken to them for twenty-four
hours. Moreover, they were subjected to a fire from three sides,
with the result that they were forced to a new position on a line
running through St. Julien. Finally the Germans forced their way
around to the left of the Third Brigade, establishing their machine
guns behind it.

A terrific artillery attack was started by the Germans on the morning
of April 24, 1915, and this was followed by a second rush of gas
from their trenches. It rose in a cloud seven feet high and was
making its attack on the British in two minutes after it started.
It was thickest near the ground, being pumped from cylinders. And
it worked with the same deadly effect. The Third Brigade, receiving
its second attack of this sort before it had recovered from the
first, retreated to the southwest of St. Julien, but soon after
regained most of their lost position. The Second Brigade had to
bend its left south. Colonel Lipsett's Eighth Battalion, however,
held fast on the Grafenstafel ridge, remaining in their position
two days in spite of the gas of which they got a plentiful supply.

By noon of April 24, 1915, the Germans made an attack on the village
of St. Julien and that part of the allied front to the east of the
village. Thereupon the Third Brigade retreated about 700 yards to
a new front south of the village and north of the hamlet of Fortuin.
But what remained of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Battalions was
forced by circumstances to remain in the St. Julien line until
late that night. Colonel Lipsett's Eighth Battalion at Grafenstafel,
in spite of its left being unsupported, held its position which
was of great importance to the British front. For, had that part
of the front been lost, the Germans in an hour could have worked
their way back of the Twenty-eighth Division and the entire eastern
sector.

In the meantime the French on the western section of the front
made a counterattack from the canal with partial success; but were
unable to drive the German troops from the sector entirely. The
Teutons took Steenstraate; but their victory there was marred by
the fact that the Belgian artillery smashed the bridge behind them.
By this time the British reenforcements began to arrive in fairly
large numbers. The Thirteenth Brigade of the Fifth Division was
placed to the west of Geddes's Detachment, between the Pilkem road
and the canal. Territorials who had arrived from England only three
days before, the Durham and York Brigades of the Northumbrian Division,
supported the Thirteenth Brigade. The Tenth Brigade of the Fourth
Division were rushed to support the Third Brigade of Canadians
who were south of St. Julien. Other British troops were sent to
relieve the tense situation at Grafenstafel.

An attempt to retake St. Julien was made early on Sunday morning,
April 25, 1915, by General Hull's Tenth Brigade and two battalions
of the Durham and York Brigade. The British worked their way to
the few Canadians who had continued on the former front when the
main British force had been driven back. There they were checked
by the German machine gun fire. The British lost many men here and
the efforts to save the day resulted in such a mixture of fighting
units that there were fifteen battalions under General Hull, as
well as the Canadian artillery.

At Grafenstafel the Eighth Battalion of the Durham Brigade were
bombarded with asphyxiating shells before the German infantry attack.
The fighting on this section of the front was fierce throughout
the afternoon, but finally the British were forced to retire. At
Broodseinde, the extreme eastern point of the allied front, the Germans
made a desperate attempt to take the salient, using asphyxiating
and other bombs again and again on the men of the Twenty-eighth
Division of the British. King George's men, however, repelled the
attacks with severe loss to the Teutons, taking many prisoners.

The French on the left, beyond the Yperlee Canal, prevented the
advance of the German troops; and, farther to the left, the Belgians
checked three attacks in which asphyxiating gas was used, south
of Dixmude. Thus it may be seen that the Germans had met with no
success worth while, when Sunday, April 25, 1915, closed, so far
as the ends of the salient were concerned; but in the center the
British situation was so critical that the Second Canadian Brigade,
reduced to less than 1,000 men, was once more called into action
on the following day. On the same day, April 26, 1915, the Lahore
Division of the Indian army was marched north of Ypres. The point of
the salient was pushed in on that day at Broodseinde, but the German
success there was short-lived. The brigade holding Grafenstafel was
attacked fiercely by the Germans. The Durham Light Infantry was
forced from Fortuin behind the Haanabeek River. The Teutons made
several attacks from the St. Julien district against the section
between the Yperlee Canal and the southern part of the village. By
this time Geddes's Detachment was almost exhausted, they, with the
Canadians, having withstood the heaviest fighting at the beginning
of the battle; and most likely saved the Allies a most disastrous
defeat. The detachment could stand no more, and the various units
of which it was composed were returned to their respective commands.

But the salient was growing smaller as a result of the repeated
hammering of the Germans; and that exposed the allied troops to a
more deadly fire from three sides. It was evident that the Allies
must make a counterattack. General Riddell's Brigade was sent to
Fortuin and with the Lahore Division on its left was told to retake
St. Julien and the woods to the west of the village. Beyond the
Yperlee Canal, on the left, the French made an assault on Lizerne,
supported by the Belgian artillery; while the French colonial soldiers
poured on Pilkem from the sector about Boesinghe. On the right the
allied troops were lined up as follows: the Connaught Rangers,
Fifty-seventh Wilde's Rifles, the Ferozepore Brigade, the 129th
Baluchis, the Jullundur Brigade, and General Riddell's battalions.
The Sirhind Brigade was held in reserve.

The German artillerymen apparently knew the distances and topography
of the entire region and poured a leaden hail upon the allied troops.
The Indians and the British in their immediate neighborhood charged
in short rushes, losing many men in the attempt to reach the German
trenches. Before the Germans were in any danger of a hand-to-hand
struggle, they sent one of their gas clouds from their trenches
and the attack was abandoned, the British and Indians getting back
to their trenches as best they could. In this action the British
gave great praise to their comrades from India. Riddell's Brigade
was stopped in its attack on St. Julien by wire entanglements;
and, though the outlaying sections of St. Julien were captured,
the brigade was unable to hold them; and the Germans continued to
hold the woods west of the village. Nevertheless the British front
had been pushed forward from 600 to 700 yards in some places.

By that night, the night of April 26, 1915, the allied front extended
from the north of Zonnebeke to the eastern boundary of the Grafenstafel
ridge; thence southwest along the southern side of the Haanabeek
to a point a half mile east of St. Julien; thence, bending around
that village, it ran to Vamhuele--called the "shell trap"--farm
on the Ypres-Poelcappelle road. Next it proceeded to Boesinghe
and crossed the Yperlee Canal, passing northward of Lizerne after
which were the French and the Belgians.

The work of the allied aviators on April 26, 1915, deserves more
than passing consideration in the record of that day's fighting.
They dropped bombs on the stations of Courtrai, Roubaix, Thielt,
and Staden. They discovered near Langemarck an armored train with
the result that it was shelled and thus forced to return. And they
forced a German aviator to the ground at Roulers.

The Lahore Division with the French on their left attacked the
Germans on April 27, 1915, but they met with little success because
of the gas which the Teutons sent into the ranks of the attacking
party. But the German troops had lost so heavily that they did
not seem to be inclined to follow up their apparent advantage.
Incidentally the Allies needed a rest as well. Hence there was
little fighting the next two days. On April 30, 1915, however,
General Putz attacked the Germans with so much force that they
were hurled back an appreciable distance near Pilkem. Seven machine
guns and 200 prisoners were taken, and the 214th, 215th, and 216th
German regiments lost more than 1,000 men. On the same day the
London Rifle Brigade, further east, drove back a German forward
movement from St. Julien.

West of the Yperlee Canal, however, it soon became known to the
commanders of the allied forces that the Germans were in such a
strong position that it would be impossible to dislodge their enemy
until much greater preparations had been made. In the meantime
the communications of the Allies were in danger. Hence Sir John
French on May 1, 1915, ordered Sir Herbert Plumer to retreat. The
wisdom of this order, the execution of which contracted the southern
portion of the salient, was seen when the Germans again attempted
to force their way through the allied front by the use of gas. The
attempt this time was made between Zonnebeke, on the Ypres-Roulers
railroad, and Boesinghe on the Yperlee Canal on Sunday, May 2,
1915. Though the British had been supplied with respirators of a
sort, these means of defense were not as effective as they should
have been nor as adequate as what was provided later. The Germans,
however, suffered large losses in this attack because, as soon
as the wall of gas began to approach the British trenches, the
men there fired into it, well knowing from past experience that
the Germans were following the gas. In this manner many of the
Teutons were slain. The Allies adopted other tactics which were
quite as effective. On seeing the gas approaching, the soldiers
in some parts of the line proceeded to execute a flank movement,
thereby getting away from the gas and subjecting the Germans to
a deadly fire from a direction least expected.

Between Fortuin and Zonnebeke and south of St. Julien the allied
line broke, but the supports with two cavalry regiments were rushed
from Potijze, a mile and a half from Ypres on the Zonnebeke Road,
and regained the lost ground. By night the Germans decided to
discontinue their attempt to advance and left their dead and wounded
on the field.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER V

THE STRUGGLE RENEWED

The Germans had only stopped the struggle for a breathing spell.
On the following morning, Monday, May 3, they made an attempt to
force the allied position back again. This attempt was made on the
British left, west of the Bois des Cuisenirs, between Pilkem and
St. Julien. The Germans cut their wire entanglements and, leaving
their trenches and lying down in front of those protecting places,
they were ready to advance; but, before they could start forward,
the artillery of their enemy did such effective work that the Teutons
returned to their trenches, and gave up an attack at that point.
But they made an assault against the northern side of the salient
which had by this time become very narrow. A German bomb wrecked a
section of the British trenches, and the defenders of that part of
the line had to go back of a wood that was a little to the northwest
of Grafenstafel, where they were able to stop the German onrush.

The Belgians were bombarded with asphyxiating gas bombs beyond
the French lines south of Dixmude. The Germans charged the Belgian
trenches only to be cut down by machine-gun fire. That night, the
night of May 3, 1915, an attack was made on the British front;
but it was stopped by the artillery.

Sir Herbert Plumer in the meantime had been executing the order he
had received from Sir John French, and shortened his lines so they
were three miles less in length than before starting the movement.
The new line extended from the French position west of the
Ypres-Langemarck Road and proceeded through "shell-trap" farm to
the Haanebeek and the eastern part of the Frezenberg ridge where it
turned south, covering Bellewaarde Lake and Hooge and bent around
Hill 60. This resulted in leaving to the Germans the Veldhoek,
Bosche, and Polygon Woods, and Fortuin and Zonnebeke. This new
front protected all of the roads to Ypres, and, at the same time,
it was not necessary to employ as many soldiers to hold this line.
Moreover the defenders of it could not be fired upon from three
sides as long as they held it. In some places the British and German
trenches had been no more than ten yards apart, but the difficulty
of evacuating the British position was completed in safety on the
night of May 3, 1915. The work included the taking with them 780
wounded. Sharpshooters were left in the trenches, however, and
they maintained such an appearance of activity and alertness that
the Germans kept on shelling the trenches all of the following
day.

The attempt of General Putz to force the Germans back across the
Yperlee Canal on May 4, 1915, was stopped by a combination of machine
guns, asphyxiating gas and fog. Then the French spent the next
ten days in tunneling to Steenstraate. Their tunnels toward their
objective point were through that territory between Boesinghe and
Lizerne. On May 5, 1915 the Germans made a careful advance on the
British front under the cover of fog and a heavy bombardment, to
find only that the British position had been changed. But they
intrenched opposite the new alignment, and brought up their big
guns. Then they used poisonous gas again with the result that the
British retreated and the Teutons followed, in spite of the many
men who fell because of the accurate work of the British artillery.
The greater part of this action took place around Hill 60, and some
of the British trenches to the north of the hill were captured by
the Germans. They then penetrated toward Zillebeke to the supporting
line. Up to midnight the Germans seemed to be victorious; then,
however, the British drove them from the hill only to be driven
away in turn by the use of asphyxiating gas. On the following day
the Teutons held Hill 60 and some of the trenches north of it.

Asphyxiating gas also had been used in an attempt to break the
British front on the left, on both the north and south sides of
the Ypres-Roulers railroad. Though this attack failed, the Teutons
were ready to make as near superhuman efforts as possible because
they knew that the French were getting ready for a decisive action
in the Arras territory, which would have the aid of a British attack
south of the Lys. Hence it was to the advantage of the Germans to
force Sir John French and General Foch to retain most of the British
and French soldiers north of the Lys. On May 8, 1915, they turned
their artillery on that part of the British front that was near
Frezenberg. It destroyed the trenches and killed or wounded hundreds
of the defenders. After three hours of this, the Germans commenced
an attack on that part of the British front between the Ypres-Menin
and the Ypres-Poelcappelle highways, the greatest pressure being
brought to bear along both sides of the Ypres-Roulers railroad.

The British fought bravely, but it was impossible for them to hold
out against the avalanche of lead. First the right of a brigade
went to pieces and then its center and the left of another brigade
south of it were forced back. Princess Patricia's Canadian Light
Infantry held fast. The Second Essex Regiment also made some little
success for their side by annihilating a small detachment of Germans;
but that was more than offset by the breaking of the center of
another brigade, after which the First Suffolks were surrounded
and put out of the fight. Finally the Germans pushed their way
on to Frezenberg. Sir Herbert Plumer realized by the middle of
the afternoon that a counterattack was necessary. He had held two
battalions in reserve along the Ypres-Menin Road. He also had five
battalions with him and reenforcements in the form of a brigade
of infantry had arrived at Vlamertinghe Château, back of Ypres.
He sent the First Royal Warwickshires, the Second Royal Dublin
Fusiliers, the Second Surreys, the Third Middlesex, and the First
York and Lancaster Regiments into the break in the line with the
result that Frezenberg was retaken. This victory was short-lived,
however; for the German machine-gun fire was too fierce for the
men to withstand. The British retired to a new front which ran
north and south through Verlorenhoek. The Twelfth London Regiment,
on the left, though it lost many men, managed to get to the original
line of trenches. Next the British were menaced from the north
and east. Great bodies of Teutons rushed from the woods south of
the Menin highway, when others rushed down the Poelcappelle Road
and took Wieltje, which is only about two miles from Ypres.

The fighting continued all night, but shortly after midnight the
British charged with the bayonet and retook Wieltje as well as
most of that section to the north of it which they had lost. Early
on May 9, 1915, the fighting was continued, and, in the afternoon,
the Germans charged from the woods in a vain attempt to take Ypres
after a severe bombardment of the British trenches. An attacking
party of five hundred was slain north of the town. On the eastern
side of the salient there were five distinct attacks. An attempt
to capture the Château Hooge was made early in the evening, only
to result in heaping the ground with German dead. The day closed
with 150 yards of British trenches in the hands of the Germans;
but they had been taken at a fearful cost to the kaiser's men.

The Germans began the next day, May 10, 1915, by shelling the British
north and south of the Ypres-Menin road. They followed the cannonade
with a cloud of asphyxiating gas. They then started for the opposing
trenches. Many of them, the British allege, wore British uniforms.
The British had by now been equipped with proper respirators and
could withstand a gas attack with comparative ease. When the Germans
were in close range they received a rifle and machine-gun fire
that mowed them down almost instantly. Those who had not been shot
fell to the ground to escape the leaden hail. But escape was not
for them. Shrapnel was poured upon them, and nearly all of the
attacking troops perished.

Another gas attack was made between the Ypres-Menin road and the
Ypres-Comines canal. There two batteries of gas cylinders sent
forth their deadly fumes for more than a half hour. The cloud that
resulted became so dense that it was impossible for the British
in the opposite trenches to see anything; so they were withdrawn
temporarily; but the troops to the left and right kept the Germans
from following up this advantage and the trenches were saved to the
British. When the gas had passed away the men returned to their
former position. North of the Menin road, however, the Germans
were successful in driving the Fourth Rifle Brigade and the Third
King's Royal Rifles to a new position, the trenches which the British
occupied having been battered by shell fire to such an extent that
some of the occupants were buried alive. Hence the British here
retreated to a new line of trenches west of the Bellewaarde Wood
where the trees had been shelled until they were part of a hopeless
entanglement rather than a forest.

The next day, May 11, 1915, was started by the Germans hurling
hundreds of incendiary shells into the already ruined town of Ypres.
They also fired almost countless high-explosive shells into the
British trenches. The British big guns replied with considerable
effect. One of the German cannon was rendered useless by the fire of
the Thirty-first Heavy Battery, and several howitzers were damaged by
the North Midland Heavy Battery. The German cannonade was especially
effective near the Ypres-St. Julien road. The Teutons, however,
did not confine their work to the artillery, for they made three
assaults on the British trenches south of the Menin road. This
part of the line was held by Scottish regiments, who, though they
were forced out of their trenches, regained them with the aid of
other Scots who were supporting them.

By now it was apparent to the British commanding officers that
they must still further lessen the projection of their salient.
So on May 12, 1915, the Twenty-eighth Division was sent to the
reserve. It had experienced continuous fighting since April 22,
1915, and had suffered severe losses. It had only one lieutenant
colonel. Captains were in command of most of its battalions. The
First and Third Cavalry Divisions took its place. They were under
the command of General De Lisle. From left to right the new line
was held as follows: The men of the Twelfth Brigade, the Eleventh
Brigade, and a battalion of the Tenth Brigade of the Fourth Division
guarded the new front to a point northeast of Verlorenhoek. Next
came the First Cavalry which held the line to the Roulers railroad.
From the railroad to Bellewaarde Lake the Third Division held the
line. From the lake to Hill 60 the Twenty-seventh Division had
its position. The British admitted that this new position was not
strong, because it lacked natural advantages, and the trenches
were more or less of hasty construction.

The Germans started a heavy bombardment of the cavalry on May 13,
1915, when the rain was pouring in torrents and a north wind was
adding to the discomforts of the British. The fiercest part of
this attack was on the Third Division. Some idea of the fierceness
of the bombardment can be gained when it is known that in a
comparatively short space of time more than eight hundred shells
were hurled on a part of the British line which was not more than
a mile in length. In places the British were buried alive. In spite
of the destructive fire, the North Somerset Yeomanry, commanded by
Lieutenant Colonel Glyn, charged the Germans who were advancing
on their trenches under cover of the bombardment. The charge was
effective, and the Teutons were driven headlong toward their own
trenches. But the German artillery had the range of the Seventh
Brigade on the right, and poured upon it such a fire that it retreated
several hundred yards, leaving the right of the Sixth Brigade exposed.
As soon as possible the British made an attempt to remedy the defect
in their line, and found it necessary to make a counterattack. In
this counterattack very satisfactory results were obtained by the
use of the Duke of Westminster's armored motor cars. The British
regained the lost ground, but they found it impossible to retain
it, for the Teuton's heavy artillery had the range of the position
so accurately that no man could live there. The result of the day's
fighting was a farther pushing back of the line of the British
so that it bent backward from Verlorenhoek and Bellewaarde Lake.
In addition to being forced back, the British suffered a large
loss of men, especially officers.

The infantry on the left had been fiercely attacked on this same
day; but it managed to keep from being driven from its position.
One of the defenders of this part of the line was a territorial
battalion, the London Rifle Brigade. There were only 278 men in the
battalion at the beginning of the day, it having suffered severe
losses previously. By night ninety-one more had been lost. Four
survivors, under command of Sergeant Douglas Belcher, and two hussars
whom the sergeant had added to his squad, held that part of the
line in the face of repeated attacks. These plucky men not only
made the Germans think the front was strongly defended there by
using quick-firing methods, but they undoubtedly saved the right
of the Fourth Division. Another especially gallant piece of work on
the part of the British was done by the Second Essex, the reserve
battalion of the Twelfth Brigade. With a bayonet charge they drove
the Germans from Shelltrap Farm, which was between the Langemarck
and Poelcappelle highways, and, though it was held by first one
side and then the other, the British had it at the close of the
day in spite of the bombardment it received.

[Illustration: GAS BATTLE OF YPRES]

The French met with better success on the British left. Under the
command of General Putz they made an attack on Het Sase and
Steenstraate. The sharpshooters of the Zouaves and Algerians took
a trench in front of the latter place and entered the village.
They fought on to the canal by the end of that day, which was May
15, 1915. More than six hundred Teuton dead were counted after
that engagement. At the same time the Zouaves captured Het Sase
with great ease, because the artillery had rendered its defenders
useless for more fighting. The Germans, however, were not inclined
to give up the town so easily. They bombarded Het Sase that night,
using asphyxiating shells. Nothing daunted, the Zouaves put on
their respirators and drove off with hand grenades and rifle fire
the Germans who followed in the wake of the poisonous shells. On the
following day it was said that the only Germans left alive on the
left side of the Yperlee Canal were either wounded or prisoners. The
French had destroyed three German regiments, taken three redoubts, and
captured four fortified lines and three villages. In this connection
it may not be amiss to note that the French reported that, on May
15, 1915, the German Marine Fusiliers who were attempting to hold
the Yperlee Canal concluded it was the better part of valor to
surrender. Before the Germans could relinquish their places they
were shot down by their comrades in the rear.

Fighting along the line of the salient continued with more or less
vigor for nearly ten days, but, until May 24, 1915, there were
no engagements that had much out of the ordinary. On that date,
however, the entire front from Bellewaarde Lake to Shelltrap, a
line three miles in length, was bombarded with asphyxiating shells.
This was followed by a gas cloud that was sent against the same
extent of trenches. The wind sent the cloud in a southwesterly
direction, so that the deadly fumes got in their work along nearly
five miles of the front. It is asserted that the cloud was 40 feet
in height, and that the Germans continued to renew the supply of
gas for four and a half hours. It had little effect wherever the
British used their respirators, for they managed to stay in their
positions without undue inconvenience. Those who suffered the most
from the gas cloud were the infantry of the Fourth Division on
the left. The cloud which had followed the asphyxiating shells
was in turn followed by a severe bombardment from three sides--the
east, northeast, and north. The principal attacks were made in the
neighborhood of Shelltrap, the British front along the Roulers
railroad, and along the Menin road in the vicinity of Bellewaarde Lake.
In those places the British were pushed back at least temporarily;
but counterattacks were delivered before nightfall, and the greater
part of the lost ground regained. Thus, to the disappointment of
the Germans, their extra effort, with all the means of warfare
at their disposal, had resulted only in reducing the salient at
an enormous cost in lives on both sides, but the gain had been
for the most part temporary.

Before leaving the consideration of the second battle of Ypres
it may be well to estimate what has been gained and lost by both
sides. In the attempt to wear down their opponents one side had
inflicted as much of a blow as the other, to all intents and purposes,
for there had been an almost prodigal waste of human life and
ammunition. The distinct advantage that Germany had gained was
in pushing back and almost flattening out the prow of the British
salient, and they had demonstrated the superiority of their artillery.
Britain, on the other hand, had lost no strategical advantage by
the change of her line. The knowledge that Germany had a superior
artillery acted as a stimulant in making the British provide a
better equipment of big guns. But the British had demonstrated
the great superiority of their infantry over that of Germany. In
fact there was comfort to be derived by the friends of each side
as a result of the second battle of Ypres. The fighting had to
stop, as far as being a general engagement was concerned. There
were other parts of the front in western Europe which were becoming
by far too active for either the Germans or the British to neglect
them. Hence it is necessary to leave Ypres and the brave men who
fell there, and consider what was being done elsewhere.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER VI

OTHER ACTIONS ON THE WESTERN FRONT

During the time in which the foregoing actions had been taking
place, there was activity on the part of the Allies and the Germans
in other sections of the great western front. It is true that not
much was accomplished in Alsace in either April or May; for the
fighting in the plains had been for the most part what may be termed
trench warfare. The most important engagement had been the effort
to take and hold Hartmannsweilerkopf, the spur of the Molkenrain
massif, which controls the union of the Thur and the Ill. The top
of this rise of ground, it will be remembered, had been won by
the Germans on January 21,1915; but the heights west of it and
their slopes were in the possession of the French, who desired
to add the spur to their possessions. For this purpose the French
artillery bombarded it on March 25, 1915, and continued their work
on the following day, March 26, 1915, when the Chasseurs stormed
the height, and, after fighting for six hours, gained the top and
captured 400 prisoners. But the Germans had no intention of giving
their opponents such a hold on the control of the valley of the
Ill, so there were many counterattacks.

While the Germans were attempting to retake the summit, the French
were making desperate efforts to drive the Teutons from the eastern
slopes. The Germans were temporarily successful, but their success
was short-lived, for the French retook the top on April 28, 1915.
During the next month, May, both sides made claims of success;
but what each actually possessed was as follows: The French had
the top and all of the western portion; the Germans possessed the
summit ridge, and the east and northeast portions. But, until the
French held the entire mountain, they could make little use of
it in controlling the Ill Valley.

The fighting in the other part of the Vosges had to do principally
with the valley of the Fecht. The stream runs from Schlucht and
Bramont east, and proceeds past Münster and Metzeral. On its right
bank is the railroad from Colmar to Metzeral. The heights in the
upper part of the valley were held by the Chasseurs Alpins; and
they desired to take both towns. Throughout the month of April
the French were fairly successful on both banks of the river. The
spur above Metzeral to the northwest was taken by them. The ridge
between the two valleys was captured by the French on April 17,
1915. The fighting here was continued throughout May, 1915.

The next scene of activity was north, where there was a wooded
plateau between the Moselle and the Meuse. Here the Germans had a
salient which was long and quite narrow. The point of this salient
was at St. Mihiel, the other side of the Meuse. This point was well
protected by the artillery at Camp des Romains, which controlled
the section for ten miles in any direction. To the north of the
salient there was a railroad from Etain to Metz. There was another
line twenty miles to the south. This ran from Metz to Thiaucourt
by the Rupt de Mad. The village of Vigneulles was about in the
center of the narrow part of the salient, and on the road to St.
Mihiel. There was a better road to the south through Apremont. A
strategic railroad had been built from Thiaucourt by Vigneulles
to St. Mihiel, down the Gap of Spada, which is an opening between
the hills of the Meuse Valley. The plateau of Les Eparges is north
of Vigneulles. The plateau is approximately 1,000 feet above the
sea level, and forms the eastern border of the heights of the Meuse.
There was high land on the southern side of the salient, along
which ran the main road from Commercy to Pont-a-Mousson. Within the
salient the land was rough and, to a considerable extent, covered
with wood.

The French did not plan to make an attack on the salient at its
apex. The artillery at Camp des Romains would be too effective. The
French plan was to press in the sides of the salient and finally
control the St. Mihiel communications. The southeastern side of
the salient, at the beginning of April, 1915, extended from St.
Mihiel to Camp des Romains, thence to Bois d'Ailly, Apremont,
Boudonville, Regnieville, and finally to the Moselle, three miles
north of Pont-a-Mousson. The northwestern side was marked by an
imaginary line drawn from Etain in the north past Fresnes, over
the Les Eparges Heights, and thence by Lamorville and Spada to
St. Mihiel. The place of most importance, from a military point
of view, was the Les Eparges plateau, which controlled the greater
part of the northern section of the salient. The taking of this
plateau would naturally be the first step in capturing Vigneulles.
But the Germans had converted Les Eparges into what had the appearance
of being an impregnable fort, when they took it on September 21,
1914. Their trenches lined the slopes, and everything had been
made secure for a possible siege. The French in February and March,
1915, however, had taken the village of Les Eparges and a portion
of the steep side on the northwest. But of necessity they made
progress slowly, because they were in such an exposed position
whenever they sought the top. They had planned an assault for April
5, 1915, and, in a heavy rain, with the slope a great mass of deep
mud, the French gained some territory. This they were unable to hold
when the Germans made a counterattack on the following morning,
April 6, 1915. That night the soldiers of the republic forced their
way up with the bayonet, taking 1,500 yards of trenches, by the
morning of April 7, 1915. Thereupon the Germans brought up
reenforcements, which were rendered useless by the French artillery,
which prevented them from going forward to the battle line. The
German artillery used the same tactics, with the result that the
French reenforcements were kept out of the fight. After the cannons
had completed their work, both sides were apparently willing to
rest for the remainder of the day. But on the morning of April
8, 1915, two regiments of infantry and a battalion of Chasseurs
forced their way to the top, which they took after an hour's hard
fighting. That pushed the Germans back to the eastern slope. Then
the battle was fought on during the remainder of the day, which
found the French, at its close, in possession of all except a little
triangle in the eastern section.

[Illustration: THE FIGHTING IN ALSACE--HARTMANNSWEILERKOPF]

Some idea of the conditions confronting those who attempted the
ascent may be gained when it is learned that fourteen hours were
required by the hardy French troops to go up to relieve their comrades
who gained the top. This relief was not sent until the following
day, April 9, 1915. On that day the Germans in the little triangle
were driven off or slain. One of the sudden and dense fogs of the
region appeared later and made a cover for a German counterattack.
The French were at a disadvantage, but they quickly rallied, and,
the fog suddenly lifting, they employed a bayonet charge with such
good effect that the Germans were driven off with large losses.
The importance of this achievement to the Allies is not likely to
be overestimated. The height of Les Eparges dominated the Woevre
district, and its capture by the French was one of the most heroic
feats of the war. The Germans placed as high a value on the height
for military purposes as the French. They had spent the winter in
adding to what nature had made nearly perfect--the impregnability
of the entire sector. They intrusted its defense, when an attack
seemed likely, only to first-line troops, the Tenth Division of
the Fifth Corps from Posen holding it when the French made their
successful attack. To gain the height it was necessary for the
French to climb the slimy sides, which were swept by machine-gun
fire. The Germans knew the exact range of every square foot of
the slopes. There was no place that offered even a slight shelter
for the attacking force. The weather was at its worst. Yet, in
spite of the many difficulties which seemed insurmountable, the
French soldiers had won the most decisive engagement in this part
of the campaign.

It is true the Teutons occupied the lesser spur of Combres; but
that gave them little or no advantage, for no attack could be made
from it without subjecting the attacking party to a leaden hail from
St. Remy and Les Eparges. But the German salient still remained,
and the French continued their pressure on it. They pushed forward
in the north to Etain, and took the hills on the right bank of the
Orne, which hampered their enemy in his use of the Etain-Conflans
railroad. They closed in on the reentrant of the salient to the
north--Gussainville; and they used the same tactics in regard to
Lamorville, because it dominated the Gap of Spada; and to the north of
it they exerted a pressure on the Bois de la Selouse. The engagements
on the south of the salient were fought desperately. The part of the
top which falls away to the Rupt de Mad was held by the French. That
section is covered with a low wood, which develops into presentable
forests in the region toward the Moselle Valley to the east. The
Teutons had taken every advantage of the ground in constructing
their fortifications, and the French found a hard task before them.
They proceeded against their opponents in the Bois d'Ailly, the Forest
of Apremont, the Bois de Mont-Mare, the village of Regnieville,
and the Bois le Pretre. Though each success was not large, the
entire effort was effective in pushing in the southern side of
the salient. This brought the soldiers of the republic to within
about four miles of Thiaucourt, which, with the control of Les
Eparges, threatened St. Mihiel.

The French heavy artillery shelled the southern front of the trenches
at Metz on May 1, 1915. The great desire to take Alsace and Lorraine,
however, was set aside early in the month. The plight of Russia
at this time made it imperative for the Allies to make a great
movement on the western front to prevent as much as possible the
pressure on the czar's line. Hence the campaign which seemed to
be planned by the French was abandoned for a larger opportunity.
This was the advance of the Tenth Army in the Artois over the plain
of the Scheldt in the direction of Douai and Valenciennes, thereby
threatening the communications of the entire Teuton line from Soissons
to Lille. Hence the French started a vigorous movement against
Lens, while the British sought to take Lille.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER VII

CAMPAIGN IN ARTOIS REGION

To understand properly the campaign in the Artois, it is necessary
to have at least a fair knowledge of the geography and the topography
of the territory between La Bassée and Arras.

The valley of the Scarpe is held in on the south by low hills, and
on the north by a low plateau, which descends in long ridges to the
valley of the Lys and the plains about Lens. The greatest altitude
in this section is the ridge known as Notre-Dame de Lorette, running
east and west, and containing numerous ravines. To the south of it,
in a little valley, is the town of Albain St. Nazaire. Carency
is opposite on the next ridge. Next is the Bois de Berthonval in
the middle of a wide depression. Beyond, the land ascends to Mont
St. Eloi. The valley of the Lys is to the north of the Lorette
ridge. To the east the land descends to the long, narrow valley
in which is the highway between Arras and Bethune. La Targette
and Souchez are along the way. Again the land rolls upward to the
hills of Vimy with the Lens-Arras highway beyond them.

The Teutons held a salient in this region at the beginning of May,
1915. The line which bounded this salient ran east of Loos over
the Bethune-Lens road, east of Aix-Noulette, and appeared on the
Lorette plateau considerably to the west of its tallest spur, where
was situated the Chapel of Our Lady; running out to the prow of
the salient, it took in Albain; and then proceeded to Carency;
bending closely, it ran east of the Bois de Berthonval, taking
in La Targette and the Arras-Bethune highway. That part of the
German line was called by the French the "White Works," on account
of the chalk with which the breastworks were constructed. To the
southeast of it was a section known as the Labyrinth. Ecurie was
inside the line which finally ran back east of Arras. The salient
was constructed for the guarding of Lens, which was considered the
entrance to the upper valley of the Scheldt and the lowlands in
the direction of Douai and Valenciennes. Of more importance than
Lens itself was the railroad back of this front, the capture of
which would naturally be a source of great danger to the Germans.

The French had won some ground in the region of the Lorette plateau
early in 1915. The Tenth Army in the Artois received enough additional
men to give it seven corps. More than 1,100 pieces of artillery,
of varying caliber, were taken to this region by the French. The
entire preparation for the campaign was under the personal direction
of General Foch. In the meantime the Germans, becoming aware that
their enemy was becoming more and more active, proceeded to strengthen
the front by the addition of three divisions which were known as
"divisions of assault." The men composing these additions were
from Bavaria, Saxony, and Baden. Even this reenforcement left the
Teutons outnumbered, and with less artillery than their opponents;
but they held a position which was considered more impregnable
than any other on either front. The Germans here had a chain of
forts linked together by an elaborate series of trenches, these
latter so arranged that the taking of one of the series placed
its captors within the zone of fire of several others. Moreover
there was an elaborate series of underground works, including mines
and wolf pits, the latter being covered over with a thin layer
of turf and thickly studded with stakes whose points awaited the
charging French.

General Foch was ready on Sunday morning, May 9, 1915, and his
artillery began one of the heaviest bombardments in history. The
1,100 French cannon hurled 300,000 shells on the German fortifications
that day. The reverberations were deafening and terrifying. They
startled the British engaged at the Aubers Ridge. The deluge of
projectiles crashed their way through the supposedly impregnable
work of engineering that the Germans had erected, and buried their
mangled defenders in chaotic ruins. The preliminary work of the
artillery was continued for three hours, accompanied by the plaudits
of the French infantrymen. Then the infantry were sent to take the
wrecks of what had been the pride of the German engineers. They
took what was still in existence at La Targette, and the important
crossroads there. They waged a fierce fight in and around the village
of Neuville St. Vaast, which was stoutly defended by German machine
guns. Here there was house-to-house fighting. The French center,
farther north, charged over the remnants of the White Works, and
went on beyond the Arras-Bethune road. This section of the advance
took more than two and a half miles of trenches in an hour and a
half. On the left the French were unable to maintain such speed,
because of the many ravines. They took the outlying sections of
Carency, and worked their way eastward, cutting the road to Souchez.
At the end of the first day the French had to their credit three
lines of German trenches on a five-mile front, 3,000 prisoners,
10 field guns, and 50 machine guns.

The bombardment was continued all night by the French gunners,
while the men who had taken the trenches did their best to make
such repairs as were necessary for the protection of the victors.
On the morning of the following day, May 10, 1915, the soldiers of
the republic had forced their way into the center of the German
position. North of the plateau of Notre Dame de Lorette a feint
attack was made to hold the German reserves. When the first French
line was about to dash forward to complete their work of the day
before, they suddenly received an order to remain where they were
and seek all cover possible. One of the French aviators had seen
a German counterattack getting under way near the sugar factory
at Souchez. Preparatory to the Teuton advance the German artillery
hurled hundreds of high-explosive shells on the section where the
French would have been had they not received the order to keep
under cover. To be exposed under such conditions would have meant
annihilation. Believing their plans for the counterattack were
working favorably, the Germans advanced, only to be mowed down
by the French guns. Then the French infantry charged and gained
another trench line. So eager were the younger French soldiers
that some of those who charged from the south were not content with
taking the trench which was their objective point, but dashed on
into a ravine that extended in the direction of Ablain. There they
killed or made prisoners of the Germans they found. This dash was
extremely hazardous in the face of a possible German counterattack,
which luckily for the French did not occur as the Teutons retired to
Souchez in confusion and were unable to rally for any counterattack.
A summary of the day's fighting includes the taking of all of the
German trenches across the Bethune-Loos road; the attack on the
fortified chapel of Notre Dame de Lorette, and the gaining of the
trenches to the south of it, these connecting with Ablain and Souchez;
the capture of the cemetery of Neuville St. Vaast; and the defeat
of the German reserves who were rushed in motor cars from Lens and
Douai. The trenches and approaches being too narrow and deep to
allow freedom of action in using rifle and bayonet, the rifle is
generally slung on the man's back in bandolier, and the fighting
within the trenches is done with short weapons, especially with
hand grenades, hence the new military expressions "bombing" and
"bombing parties," as the squads are called that are especially
detailed for bomb work during the charges.

The fighting continued fiercely throughout May 11, 1915. Late in
the day the French took the lower part of the Arabs' Spur. An
unsuccessful counterattack was made that night from the Spur of
the White Way. But the French were harried by the artillery in
Angres and the machine guns in Ablain, and their discomforts were
added to by the work of the bursting shells which opened the graves
of soldiers who had been slain in previous months.

Carency, surrounded on the east, south and west, and wrecked by
the 20,000 shells which had been fired upon it, surrendered on
the afternoon of May 12, 1915. The Germans captured there made
a total of more than 5,000 prisoners taken by the French. Notre
Dame de Lorette with its chapel and fort was also taken this same
day, as was Ablain which was in flames when it was surrendered.
Thus all of the highland to the west of Souchez was held by the
French except a few fortins on eastern ridges.

A north wind and a heavy rain added to the discomforts of the soldiers
on May 13, 1915. But physical discomforts were not all that made
for more or less unhappiness. The Germans had little reason to
be happy; but the French had the edge taken from their elation,
because of their victory, by the fact that it seemed as if it must
be won again before it would be of use to them. According to the
rules of the war game the German line had been broken and the French
had made for themselves a right of way; but there were many instances
in this war where the rules were not followed; and this was one
of the exceptions. It is true the German line had been smashed,
but it had not fallen back. Instead the remnants of the line had
collected themselves in the series of independent redoubts which
had seemingly been prepared for just such an emergency. They were
so situated that it was well-nigh impossible to destroy them at
long range; but it was impossible to make any forward movement
which would not be enfiladed by them. Hence it became necessary
for the French, if they were to be really victorious, to reduce
each separate redoubt. The most prominent of these were the sugar
factory at Souchez, the cemetery at Ablain, the White Road on a
spur of the Lorette, the eastern portion of Neuville St. Vaast,
and the Labyrinth. The last named was so called because it was
an elaborate system of trenches and redoubts in an angle between
two roads. The White Road surrendered on May 21, 1915. Ablain was
taken on May 29, 1915. The Souchez sugar factory fell on May 31,
1915. Neuville St. Vaast was captured on June 8, 1915. The Labyrinth,
however, remained under German control. Part of it was fifty feet
below the surface of the earth, much of the fighting there being
carried on in underground galleries and by means of mines. It finally
was entirely in the hands of the French on June 19, 1915, after
being taken to a considerable extent foot by foot. The last of
the fighting there was in what was known as the Eulenburg Passage,
where the entire 161st German Regiment, consisting of 4,000 men,
were slain and a Bavarian regiment suffered a heavy loss in killed
and wounded. The French took 1,000 prisoners; and only 2,000 of
their own men were unable to answer roll call after the fight,
of whom many were only slightly wounded.

[Illustration: THE BATTLES IN ARTOIS]

In concluding the account of the battle of the Artois it may be
admitted that the French had won what has been called a brilliant
victory, but it had not been a complete success. They had made
an end of the German salient; and only the last defense of Lens
remained. How much they had reduced the pressure on Russia is
problematical; but there is little doubt they had prevented the
Germans from continuing the offensive on the Ypres front. They
estimated the German loss at 60,000; and, by a peculiar coincidence,
the Crown Prince of Bavaria, whose armies they fought, estimated
the French loss at the same figure--60,000. It is known they lost
many men in the hand-to-hand struggles; but their great forward
movement was so well protected by their artillery that the French
loss there was comparatively slight. Some idea can be gained from
the fact that one French division killed 2,600 of their enemy and
captured 3,000 prisoners with a loss of only 250 slain and 1,250
wounded. But the greatest gain to the French was probably the fact
that the battle of the Artois had proved to the soldiers of the
republic that their artillery was the equal of the German, which
had been the arm in which the Teutons excelled. It also proved
that the Germans could not intrench themselves in any manner that
was impregnable to the French; for they had taken the Labyrinth,
a most complicated series of military engineering feats which were
supposed to be able to withstand any assault. And lastly, and perhaps
of most importance to the French, the belief in the superiority
of the German soldier, as a result of 1870, was shattered in the
mind of the Frenchman.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER VIII

BRITISH FORWARD MOVEMENT--BATTLE OF FESTUBERT

To aid the French in the Artois, the British made a forward movement
in the Festubert region in May, 1915. Its purpose was to prevent the
Seventh German Corps from sending troops and artillery to reenforce
Lens. Moreover the British, if they succeeded, would take the Aubers
ridge, which they had tried to gain in the battle of Neuve Chapelle.
If they could capture the Aubers ridge, the way would be opened to
Lille and La Bassée. The action began on Sunday morning, May 9,
1915, in the region between Bois Grenier and Festubert, and was
a part of the forward movement of the British from Armentières
to La Bassée. Part of the First Corps and the Indian Corps marched
forward on the right from the Rue du Bois toward the southern part
of the Bois du Biez, where there had been much fighting before.
The principal attack was made by the Eighth Division on Rouges
Banes, not far from Fromelies and the Aubers ridge, near where
the British had been stopped in the battle of Neuve Chapelle. At
approximately the same time that General Sir Douglas Haig with
the British First Army reached the slightly elevated plateau in
front of Lille, General Foch with a large body of French troops
made a desperate attack on the Germans on their front from La Bassée
to Arras. The French and British had joined their efforts here,
not only to relieve the pressure which was being exerted on Ypres
and to take Lille, which dominated a region rich in coal, but also
for the purpose of keeping the Germans so busy on the western front
that none could be sent to the eastern front and further embarrass
Russia. The artillery of both the British and French attempted to
wreck the German trenches before their infantry should be sent
against their foe. In this effort the British, using principally
shrapnel, made little headway; but their ally, using high-explosive
shells, such as they had been hurling at the Germans for weeks at
the rate of a hundred thousand a day, was successful. Soon the
Teutons' front was screened by clouds of yellow, green, black and
white smoke. But this was not to be a one-sided artillery engagement,
and the Germans soon had their artillery in action. They trained
it on their enemies' trenches, believing from the size of the
bombardment that an assault was soon to be made and that the trenches
would be filled with troops. Their surmise was correct, but the
Allies had suspected their opponents would reason thus, so the
French and British infantry were in covered positions. Of course
the Germans did not know how well their opponents were protected,
so they sent thousands of shells against the allied positions.
And again the allied artillerists replied in kind. This time they
caught the German reenforcements, with the result that many of
them were slain before they could reach their own front. In this
work the British shrapnel was more effective than the French
high-explosive shells.

The bombardment was continued vigorously for three-quarters of an
hour. That the allied range finders had been doing accurate work was
evidenced by the appearance of the German trenches when the British
and French fire was turned against the supporting German trenches;
but the Teutons' wire entanglements remained intact. Heretofore the
big guns had been able to sweep such obstructions away. When the
infantry reached the barbed wire, it found the Germans had improved
this particular method of defense by using specially manufactured
wire cable, well barbed, which was from one and one-half to two
inches in diameter. And, to protect their cable entanglements,
the Germans had built parapets in front of the entanglements. Their
enemy's charging infantry coming upon such an obstruction could
not cut it, and the only means of circumventing this new device
was for the attacking force to throw their overcoats on the
entanglements and crawl across the wire in the face of rifle and
machine-gun fire.

For a considerable distance along this part of the front the distance
between the German and British trenches was not more than two hundred
yards. At not a few sections the opposing trenches were near enough
to permit the soldiers to converse with their opponents. The trenches
for the most part were built on the marshland with sandbags, those
of the British being khaki-colored, and the German being black and
white. When the inevitable order to charge was given, the British
artillery shifted its range to the German rear and the Eighth Division
dashed over the black and white sandbags behind which the Germans
were crouching. Beyond them was a ridge, in horseshoe formation,
which was the last barrier that lay between the Allies and the
plains that led to Lille. This ridge trails off in a northeasterly
direction at Rouges Banes. Near the hamlet there was a small wood
which had been taken by the Pathans and Gurkhas before the cannonade
started. Among the regiments that led the attack of the Eighth
Division were the Kensington Battalion of the London Regiment,
the First Gloucesters, the Second Sussex, and the Northamptons.
They were supported by the Liverpool Territorials, the First North
Lancashires, the Second King's Royal Rifles, and the Sussex
Territorials. The Germans had large bodies of reenforcements held
at Lille, but they were unavailing; and the British took the first
line of trenches though it required fifteen and a half hours to do
it. Then they went on until they were on the slope of the ridge.
Beyond that, however, it seemed impossible to proceed, for the
Germans had such an array of machine guns trained on the approach
to their second line of trenches that no human being could live
in the face of their deadly fire. The British needed an equipment
with which to bombard their enemy with high-explosive shells. Such
an equipment they did not possess.

The German commander played a clever trick on the British when
their First Army Corps and their Indian Division attempted to make
progress in the triangle to the west of La Bassée. He evacuated
his first two lines of trenches while the artillery was doing what
it could to demolish his parapets; but his men were drawn up in
the third line of trenches waiting for the inevitable advance of
the British. This third line of trenches was protected with armor
plate and concrete. Moreover he had planted a large number of machine
guns in the brickfield near La Bassée. The British dashed forward
until they were in range of the machine guns. Then they suffered
such severe losses that they were forced to retreat, even though
they had almost taken the inviting German trenches. The Highlanders
and the Bedfords had made a gallant charge and felt especially
humiliated to have to withdraw when victory was about to perch
on their banners. They believed that a lack of reenforcements was
responsible for their nonsuccess.

The day's fighting ended with the First Army of the British driven
back except in the center. There the Kensington Territorial Battalion
made a remarkable record for itself. In the morning when the British
artillery ceased firing, the Kensington men dashed from their trenches
and captured three lines of the German trenches at the point of
the bayonet. A part of the battalion, in its eagerness to win the
day, went on up the ridge. At the same time one of its companies
turned to the left and another to the right, and with bayonet and
bomb drove the Germans from the trenches for a distance of 200
yards. The Kensingtons were doing the work that had been set for
them to do; but two regular battalions, one to their left and the
other to their right, were not as able to comply with the orders
they had received. The regulars were stopped by wire entanglements
that the artillery had failed to smash, and, at the same time,
they were raked by machine-gun fire. Hence they were unable to
keep up with the Territorials. In fact the regulars never got up
to the Kensington men; but were forced to retire. This left the
Territorials in a most precarious condition. They had gained such
an important point on the German line that a heavy fire was directed
against them. But the British would not give up what they had taken.
Instead of retiring, they sent for reenforcements which were promised
to them. In the meantime the Germans gave up trying to blow the
Kensingtons out of their position and made a counterattack. The
left wing of the plucky Territorial battalion used bombs effectively
to hold their enemy at bay. The right wing at the same time was
kept busy in its attempt to prevent being enveloped. In spite of
all the Germans could do with their artillery and their repeated
counterattacks the West London men maintained their small wedge in
the Teuton front. Finally trench mortars were brought against them.
Then the Kensington battalion, or what was left of it, received the
order to retire. To do that necessitated fighting their way back
through the thickening line of their enemy. Those British Territorials
had held their peculiar position several hours, and had suffered
severely in consequence; but their loss was undoubtedly much larger
when retiring to their former line. They fought the greater part of
the afternoon and well into the evening in endeavoring to get back;
and finally a comparatively few of them succeeded. The last dash to
the British trenches was made over a barren piece of ground which
was so flat that there was no opportunity for concealment. And
here the Germans raked what was left of the battalion with rifle
and machine-gun fire. Ultimately, however, a portion of the brave
band returned to the British trenches. Previous to withdrawing
the survivors from the front, General Sir Henry Rawlinson told
them that their gaining the position which they took and holding
it as long as they did had not only relieved the pressure on Ypres
but had aided General Foch's army to advance between Arras and La
Bassée. In conclusion he said: "It was a feat of arms surpassed
by no battalion in this great war."

The Sussex and Northampton troops made a desperate effort to get
into the German trenches on the morning in which this action started,
but they never got nearer than forty yards, being stopped by the
deluge of shrapnel, rifle, and machine-gun fire to which they were
subjected. When they were ordered to return to the British trenches,
those who remained able to make the attempt found it quite as dangerous
as trying to go forward. That afternoon the Black Watch and the
First Cameronians charged where the Sussex and Northamptons had
been repulsed, but the Scotchmen had but little more success. It
is true some of the men from the land of the heather got into the
German trenches; but they did not survive. The determination of
the British was shown when men, who had been wounded in the first
charge and been unable to return to their own line, joined the Scots
in their mad rush to death. Those men had lain under fire twelve
hours before making their dying assault on the German trenches.
It had been expected the Scotchmen would get into the opposing
trenches and bomb and bayonet the Teutons out. Then reenforcements
would be sent from the British line. But the artillery of King
George was unable to check the devastating work of the kaiser's
big guns and give the reenforcements a clear field through which
to go to the aid of the attacking force. The result was that the
Germans continued such a leaden hail between the lines that it
was sending soldiers to certain death to order them to cross the
zone of fire. The remnant of the Scottish regiments was recalled,
and it lost as many men on its return as it had in its desperate
struggle to reach the German trenches.

Both the Kensingtons and the Scots found groups of German machine
guns, doing most destructive work, that could have been rendered
useless if the British had had a supply of high-explosive shells.
Under the circumstances there was nothing for Sir Douglas Haig to
do but to order his men all along the line to retire. They obeyed
the order sullenly, and many of them were slain in their attempt to
get back to their own trenches. But their comrades felt they had
not died wholly in vain; for the woeful lack of lyddite shells thus
became known in England and the indignation thus aroused resulted
in the appointment of a minister of munitions who organized the
manufacture of the necessary explosives on a scale heretofore
unattempted by the British. A lesson had been learned, but at a
fearful cost to life.

The same lesson was being taught the British public at another
section of the battle front. Its soldiers not only were unable
to maintain a successful artillery fire, but the fact became so
impressed on the German mind that the Teutons in the Ypres and
Lille regions felt assured that their infantry had the British
at their mercy. Sir John French, however, had a clever knowledge
of human nature. He began his efforts to remedy the difficulty
by telling the war correspondents his troubles. They spread the
news. Then he secretly collected all of the available artillery
in the Ypres region, together with his limited supply of shells,
and was ready to deal such a blow to the Duke of Württemberg's
army when it marched on Ypres the latter part of May, 1915, that
it was necessary for the Germans to get reenforcements through
Belgium. This was a great surprise to the Teutons and cost them
dearly.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER IX

SIR JOHN FRENCH ATTEMPTS A SURPRISE

The operation of this plan of Sir John French had an excellent
effect in the Ypres region, but it had the opposite effect on the
British who were trying to take Lille. Moreover it was necessary
for the British to continue to occupy the attention of the left
wing of the German army, under the command of the Crown Prince of
Bavaria, in order to keep him from using his men against General
Foch, who was attempting to push his way between Arras and Lille.
Inasmuch as the British artillery had proved ineffective because
of its lack of enough and the proper kind of ammunition, Sir John
French planned another surprise for the Germans. This time he selected
the weapon which the Teutons seemed most to fear when it was in the
hands of the British--the bayonet. The salient on the German front
at Festubert, between La Bassée and Neuve Chapelle, was chosen for
the proposed military feat. The territory occupied by the Teutons
had the appearance, to the casual observer, of being lowlands on
which were wrecked homes, farms, and trees. The actual conditions
of this section of the country were much more serious for any body
of troops which planned to make an attack. The ground was moist
and muddy, in many places being crossed by treacherous ditches
filled with slimy water. Moreover the exact range of practically
every square foot of it was known to the German artillerymen, whose
guns were on the high ground to the west of the lowlands. The British
were in trenches from seventy to three hundred yards from those of
their enemy. If the men there could dash across the intervening
space and get into the German trenches before being annihilated
by the kaiser's cannon, they would use the bayonet with deadly
effect, and, from past experiences, have reasonable hope of gaining
a victory. It was decided to make such an attempt first on that
part of the line between Richebourg on the left and Festubert on
the right.

The British Seventh Division was sent south to support the attack
which was to have been made on May 12, 1915. On that day it was
too foggy for the aviators to see with any degree of accuracy; so
the movement was delayed. This gave time for the Canadian Division
to be sent south and add their strength to the support. The German
trenches, at this point where the attack was to be made, were occupied
by the Seventh Westphalian Army Corps. This corps had lost many of
its men at Neuve Chapelle; and their places had been taken by youths
who had not reached the development of manhood and whose immaturity
and lack of military training greatly lessened the efficiency of
this famous body of troops.

Finally, on Saturday night, May 15, 1915, all conditions for the
attack seemed favorable to the British. There was no moon and the sky
was dark, though there was not that inky blackness that occasionally
occurs under similar weather conditions. The Indian Corps stole from
their trenches and began to go forward from Richebourg l'Avoué.
But the Germans were alert, and they illumined the movement with
innumerable flares which made the Indians easy targets for the
machine guns and rifles of the Teutons in that part of the line.
So quick was the work to repel the attack that many of the Indians
were slain as they were climbing out of their own trenches. As
a surprise attack at night, the British were not making much of
a success of their plan, but as a method of gaining ground and
keeping their enemy busy on that particular part of the line the
men of their Second Division were effective. They dashed into the
first line of German trenches and cleared them out with the bayonet
and hand grenade. The furor of the attack took them on into the
second line. By dawn the soldiers of the Second Division had driven
a wedge into the German line.

This wedge was widened and driven in harder by Sir Douglas Haig's
old command--the First Corps. This corps had suffered heavy losses
at the first battle of Ypres; but the men who filled the gaps in
the line were hardy young men who made excellent soldiers from
the start. Added to their enthusiasm was a desire to show their
ability as fighters, with the result that the British right wing was
so effective that it, in a great measure, made up for the failure of
the Indian troops. The center and the right, with bomb and bayonet,
drove the Germans from the trenches; and then together they forced
their way into the Teutons' position 600 yards along a front 800
yards in length. Early the next morning, before daylight on May
16, 1915, the British Seventh Division forced its way into the
German salient at Festubert. In the meantime the Germans were making
hasty preparations for a counterattack. Sir John French's plan,
however, had proved effective. It would have required a large supply
of high-explosive shells to have made much of an impression on the
excellent defenses which the German soldiers had constructed on
this part of the front. The British had no such supply of ammunition,
and, even if they had had it, it is doubtful if they would have been
able to demolish the formidable wire entanglements. Yet in this
night attack with the bayonet the British troops had accomplished
all they could have done if supplied with proper ammunition. In
the desperate charge which they made no wire entanglement could
stop the British soldiers. They threw their overcoats or blankets
over the barbed wire and then climbed across the obstruction. The
Seventh Division took three lines of trenches in this manner, until
it was 12,000 yards back of the original line of its enemy.

[Illustration: ATTACKS BY THE ALLIES IN THE ARTOIS

FRENCH, BRITISH, BELGIAN, CANADIAN AND MOROCCAN SOLDIERS AND THEIR
GERMAN ENEMIES

Liquid fire--a chemical which bursts into flame on contact with
the air--is discharged from an apparatus that resembles a fire
extinguisher. It is effective in fighting at close quarters]

[Illustration: Moroccan troops in camp at Arcy. France, like Great
Britain, has been able to draw upon her colonies for soldiers]

[Illustration: These Belgian soldiers are weary and covered with
mud from the trenches, but they are rallying for a fresh resistance
to German attacks]

[Illustration: Canadian volunteers at bayonet practice. From the
beginning of the war, the drilling of young Canadians for service
in Europe has gone on incessantly]

[Illustration: This large cave in the chalk hills of France furnishes
homes for three companies of German soldiers. It is divided by
partitions into many living rooms]

[Illustration: These soldiers have completed their underground
shelter by constructing a fireplace and are now adding the finishing
touches to the chimney]

[Illustration: A remarkable picture of French soldiers leaving
their trenches at the beginning of a spirited bayonet charge on
the German positions]

[Illustration: An armored automobile intercepting a troop of cavalry.
In the opening of the war in particular, automobile raiders played
a dashing part]

There were now two wedges driven into the German front, and the
British desired to join them and make what might be termed a
countersalient, or a salient running into the original salient of
the Germans. But the space between the two horns of the British
force was a network of trenches. The horns might prod and irritate
the Teutons, but they needed artillery again to rid the German
breastworks of machine guns and demolish the obstructions which
would cost too many lives to take in the same manner in which the
British success had been won in its night attack. Nevertheless
the British started in to bomb their way toward Festubert, and
they even gained forty yards in this hazardous undertaking before
they were forced to stop. If they had seemed to be an irresistible
force, they had met what had every appearance of being an immovable
body--and there was a limit to human endurance.

By May 17, 1915, the British concluded that their most advisable
offensive was to clear the space between their two wedges by cutting
off the Germans who held that part of their line. To do this the
British attempted to cut off the German communication to the north
from La Quinque Rue; but, by that time, the Teutons had received
reenforcements; and they rained such a shower of lead on the attacking
force that the attempt had to be abandoned, but not until many
heroic efforts had been made by the British to succeed in their
purpose.

Many Germans were made prisoners at all stages of the fighting.
The British bayonet seemed to strike them with terror, and the
bombs were more potent in scattering them than were the orders of
their commanders to repel the attacking force. Between Richebourg
l'Avoué and Le Quinque Rue is the farm Cour de l'Avoué. In front
of this farm the remains of a battalion of Saxons attempted to
surrender. They had arrived on the line as reenforcements to the
Westphalians, and had been fighting valiantly until their numbers
were so decreased that they were unable to hold out against their foes
longer. Whether their commanding officer ordered them to surrender
or a common impulse dictated their action, they left their position
and advanced toward the British. Not understanding their action,
the attacking force fired upon the Saxons who were sufficiently
numerous to give the impression that they might be leading a
counterattack. Thereupon the Saxons dropped their guns and the
firing from the British side ceased, only to be taken up on the
German side by the Westphalians. This was followed by an attack on
the would-be prisoners by the German artillery until every soldier
in the surrendering party was slain. This action horrified the
British, but the Germans considered it a means of discipline which
would have a salutary effect on any who might prefer the comforts
of a prison camp to dying for the Fatherland.

The British Seventh Division at Festubert continued to work south
along the German trenches. Its bayonets and bombs cleared the way
before it. The plan was for them to continue toward Rue d'Ouvert,
Chapelle St. Roch, and Canteleux. In the meantime the Second Division,
on the left of the Seventh Division, was to fight its way to Rue du
Marais and Violaines. The Indian contingent had received orders
to keep in touch with the Third Division. The Fifty-first Division
was sent to Estaires to act as a support to the First Army. By the
night of May 17, 1915, the British held all of the first line of
German trenches from the south of Festubert to Richebourg l'Avoué.
For a part of that distance the second and third lines of trenches
had been taken and held; and still farther forward the British
possessed many important points. Moreover the British soldiers
were so inspired with their success that they desired to press
on in spite of the fact that the nature of the country was such
that they were wet through and covered with mud. It was not all
enthusiasm, however. Mingled with the desire for victory was a desire
for revenge. The British on this part of the line were enraged by
the use of gas at Ypres and the sinking of the _Lusitania_.

On the night of May 17, 1915, the Fourth Cameron Highlanders, a
Territorial battalion, met with disaster. The men composing this
unit were from Inverness-shire, Skye, and the Outer Islands. Many
of them had been gamekeepers and hence were accustomed to outdoor
life and the handling of guns, all of which aided them in saving
the remnant of their command. They had been ordered to take some
cottages, occupied by German soldiers as a makeshift fortification.
The Cameronians on the way to the attack fell into a ditch which
was both deep and wide. It was necessary for them to swim to get
across the ditch in some places. In the meantime Highlanders were
being slain by German shells and the rifle fire that the men in
the cottages rained upon the Scots. One company was annihilated.
Another company lost its way. The rear end of a German communicating
trench was reached by a third company. Long before midnight this
company was almost without ammunition. Two platoons reenforced it
at midnight; but the reenforcements had no machine guns, which
would have given at least temporary relief. Under the circumstances
the only thing for the Territorials to do was to retreat. The Germans
made that quite as perilous a venture as the advance had been.
Only half of those who started for the cottages returned. Among
the slain was the commander, and twelve other officers were also
killed.

The British, in spite of a cold rain, pushed on 1,200 yards north
of the Festubert-La Quinque Rue road; and took a defense 300 yards
to the southeast of the hamlet. Two farms west of the road and
south of Richebourg l'Avoué, the farm du Bois and the farm of the
Cour de l'Avoué, in front of which latter the surrendering Saxons
were slain, had been held by the Germans with numerous machine guns.
The British took both farms by nightfall and found, on counting
their prisoners, that they then had a total of 608 as well as several
machine guns.

The Second and Seventh Divisions were withdrawn by Sir Douglas
Haig on the following day, Wednesday, May 19, 1915. The Fifty-first
Division and the Canadians took the places of the men who were sadly
in need of relief from active duty. Lieutenant General Alderson
received the command of both divisions together with the artillery
of both the Second and Seventh Divisions. The cold, wet weather
hampered operations and there was comparatively little activity,
though hostilities by no means altogether ceased. Each side needed
a little rest and time to fill in gaps in their respective lines.
Hence it was not until Sunday, May 23, that any fighting on a large
scale took place. On that day the Seventh Prussian Army Corps made
a desperate effort to break through that part of the British line
held by the Canadians near Festubert. The Prussians used their
old tactics with the result that the British shrapnel, rifle, and
machine-gun fire plowed great holes in their ranks. The Teutons in
this instance were without adequate artillery support, for many
of their batteries had been made useless by the British. From then
on to May 25, 1915, there were several small engagements in which
the British made gains. Then Sir John French concluded to end the
activity of his men on this part of the front. In that connection
he made the following statement: "I had now reasons to consider
that the battle which was commenced by the First Army on May 9 and
renewed on the 16th, having attained for the moment the immediate
object I had in view, should not be further actively proceeded
with.

"In the battle of Festubert the enemy was driven from a position
which was strongly intrenched and fortified, and ground was won
on a front of four miles to an average depth of 600 yards."


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER X

ATTACKS AT LA BASSÉE

The British had discovered the futility of attempting to smash through
the German lines without an adequate supply of high-explosive shells
with which to destroy the heavy wire entanglements. Moreover, in
maintaining a curtain of fire between the German lines and potential
reenforcements, it was necessary to increase the artillery arm
of the service. At this time the Germans could fire four shells
to one by the British. Another very essential equipment in which
the British were lacking was machine guns. The German army had
developed machine-gun warfare apparently to its highest power.
They not only used it to increase their volume of fire, but also
as a means of saving their infantry. When, for any reason, it was
found expedient to move infantry, a few machine-gun crews would
take the place of the soldiers with the rifle and maintain a fire
which would be almost as effective in checking the British advance
as the infantry had been. The British had no such number of machine
guns. They lacked this necessary part of their equipment just as
they lacked shells, cannon, aircraft, and other war material which
the Germans had developed and accumulated in large quantities under
the supervision of the German General Staff.

The German munition factories had been making and storing enormous
supplies for an army of several millions of men. On the other hand
the British had believed in the excellence of their comparatively
small army to such an extent that it required all of the fighting
from the time their troops landed on the Continent up to Festubert
to convince them that they must make and maintain a military machine
at least equal, if not superior, to the one her foes possessed.
It is true the British needed more men in the ranks, but what was
needed more was large additions to the supply of machine guns,
artillery, and ammunition.

For those reasons the British generals avoided clashes with the
Germans after the battle of Festubert, except when it was necessary
to hold as many of the Germans as possible to the British part of
the western front. This plan was maintained throughout the summer
of 1915. In the meantime the Germans were constructing, beyond
their trenches, the most elaborate series of field fortifications
in the history of warfare. The German staff realized that the time
was coming when the British would again take the offensive. When
that time arrived the Germans would thus be prepared to make every
foot of ground gained as costly as possible to their foes. In fact
they had reason for believing that it would be almost impossible for
their opponents to gain ground where it was held by such seemingly
impregnable works.

An attack at La Bassée in the first weeks in June, 1915, started
with the British Second Army making a pretended advance in the
Ypres region. The British in the forest of Ploegsteert drove a
mine into the German lines and blew it up. The explosion followed
by a British charge, which resulted in the taking of a part of
the German trenches. This forest extended northwest of Lille and
south of Messines. Under the ground in this section the sappers
had built a city, whose streets were named for the thoroughfare
of London. Thus there was "Regent Street," "Piccadilly Circus,"
"Leicester Square," and many others. There was also a "Kensington
Garden," in which grew wild flowers transplanted from the forest
by the soldiers.

The Germans had been driven out of the forest in the fall of 1914
when they made their dash to reach Calais; but their trenches were
only about 400 yards beyond the eastern edge. The earth here was
especially adaptable for mines, and both sides made many attempts
to work destruction by tunneling forward. In this activity it was
soon found necessary to have men in advanced positions in the tunnels
to listen to the mining operations of their opponents. As soon as
such operations were discovered, a countertunnel was driven in
that direction and a mine exploded, thereby destroying the enemy's
tunnel and burying his sappers. Sometimes, however, the men in the
countertunnel cut through to the other excavation and engaged in
a hand-to-hand conflict beneath the surface of the earth. Then
primitive methods were used. Though mining had taken place on other
sections of the western front, as at Hill 60, it was in this forest
area that it was probably brought to its highest development.

The British mine here, as noted above, on June 6, 1915, blew up
the German trenches, and the British charged into the crater and
drove the Germans out with bayonet and bomb. A similar crater was
the result of the mining at La Bassée. Five mines at the end of
tunnels constructed by the Germans did not go far enough toward
the British trenches, and when the explosions occurred the trenches
remained intact.

The sappers, however, had other things to contend with; this was
the case when a tunnel was driven toward the German trenches between
Rue du Bois and Rue d'Ouvert, near the La Bassée Canal. Water was
found below the German intrenchments. The British managed to keep
the water out of the tunnel by using sandbags. Then they planted
enough dynamite to blow up a large part of the German force. The
two trench lines were very close together on this part of the front;
and, to prevent accidents, the British left their trenches near
the mine before it was fired.

On the night of June 6, 1915, the mine tore open the trenches of
both sides, and buried one of the British magazines which was filled
with hand grenades and killed several British bomb throwers. At about
the same moment another supply of British bombs was exploded when
it was struck by a shell from a German howitzer. This occurred at
a place on the line called Duck's Bill, and resulted in the British
being without an adequate supply of hand grenades. The British troops
in this action were the soldiers of a British division and a Canadian
brigade. The latter included the First Ontario Regiment, the Second
and Fourth Canadian Battalions, the Third Toronto Regiment, and
the East Yorkshires.

The Ontario regiment was directed against a fortified part of the
German line which was called Stony Mountain. To the south of Stony
Mountain, about 150 yards, was another fortified position called
Dorchester. This also was to be taken by the Ontario men. If they
succeeded in their work the right flank of the British division
would be protected. But it was Stony Mountain that was of most
importance to the British. Its machine guns and its northern defenses
menaced the route which the British must take to make an advance. In
order to prevent the Germans from giving their undivided attention
to the Canadians, the British division on the left made an advance
against the Teutons north of Stony Mountain. The British artillery
had been shelling this part of the German line day and night many
days as a preparation for this advance. Its projectiles crashed
into the brick fields near La Bassée, and in front of the wrecked
village of Quinchy.

The German machine-gun crews were hidden behind the brick stacks
which were square blocks of burned clay upon which the British
shells burst without perceptible effect. The shells that went over
the stacks, however, did much damage. Beyond the brick field to
the north were the ruins of farm buildings which were also hiding
places for the Germans and their machine guns. All the buildings
back of the German line had been turned into fortresses whose
underground works were concreted and connected with their headquarters
by telephone. While the British artillery was attempting to destroy
these fortresses it was also hurling lyddite shells into the trenches.

The German artillery fire greatly exceeded the British in volume.
Nevertheless the British forces were in the more comfortable position.
They had comparatively little to do except wait until they were needed,
which would be when their artillery had completed the preparation
for the inevitable charge. On the other hand the German soldier
had a nerve-racking part to play. He knew from the preparation
that an attack in force was about to be made; but he did not know
when it would occur nor where. Hence it was necessary for him to
be constantly on the alert. Many of the Germans were under arms
at all hours of the day and night. In fact few of them on that
part of their line got any real rest during the week in which the
bombardment continued. The section between the two lines of trenches
was illuminated at night, and the cannonade kept up so that there
was no opportunity for the Germans to repair the havoc made by
the British shells.

The suspense was terminated on the evening of June 15, 1915, by
an additional flight of projectiles from the British guns. Every
piece of British ordnance on that part of the line was worked at
top speed. The Germans, knowing that this immediately preceded an
infantry charge, used their artillery to stop it. But the British
charge formed in their trenches, with the Canadians on their right.
In addition to the shrapnel the Germans made breaks in the lines of
their foes by the use of machine guns, but the breaks were quickly
filled. On some parts of the front the British and Canadians were
successful and reached the trenches. In all the captured trenches
extended from Rue du Bois to Rue d'Ouvert.

In the meantime those Canadians who had been directed against Stony
Mountain and Dorchester were doing heroic work. The First Company
of the Ontario Regiment charged through the débris of the mine
explosion, only to run into the deadly hail sent at them by the
machine guns. But the Canadians were determined to complete their
task, and they took Dorchester and the connecting trench. The fire
was too heavy for them to reach Stony Mountain. A group of bombers
made a dash forward, but were shot down before they could get near
enough to use their weapons.

The second and third companies rushed forward, suffering severely
from the deluge of lead, but some of their men got into the German
second line and then began to bomb their way to right and left. The
captured first trench was utilized by the attacking force. From
that vantage the advance was led by a machine gun which was followed
by a group of bomb throwers. In working forward the machine-gun
base became lost when the man who had it was slain. Thereupon a
Canadian "lumberjack" named Vincent became the base, the machine
gun being fired from his back. But the German bomb throwers drove
the attacking force out of the trench. The Germans kept a rain
of lead between the Canadians and the British line of trenches
with the result that it was almost suicide for a man to attempt
to return for bombs. Nevertheless many braved the ordeal. Only
one was successful. He, Private Smith of Southampton, Ontario,
seemed to bear a charmed life, for he made the trip five times.
The Third Canadian Battalion was sent forward to reenforce the
Ontario Regiment which had lost most of its officers, but such a
pressure of German forces were brought to bear on the Canadians
that the reenforcements were unavailing, and the Canadians were
forced to relinquish all they had gained, and return to their own
trenches that night.

The retreat was a desperate undertaking; the Germans then had the
Canadians in the open and added heavily to the Canadian's death
roll. On the other side of Stony Mountain the British had met with
no better success than the Canadians. Having started their enemies
back, the Germans massed for a counterattack and drove them back
a mile, but not without a terrific struggle. The battle field was
lighted by the peculiar fireworks used for such purposes and bursting
of shells. Jets of flame shot forth from machine guns and rifles.
In many places the intermittent light disclosed deadly hand-to-hand
conflicts. Suddenly the Germans concentrated their fire on a portion
of their lost first line of trenches, and the trenches of their
enemies who held them were no more. Having the British and Canadians
defeated, as they believed, the Germans proceeded to add to their
victory by storming the British and Canadian trenches. They met
with resistance, however, that drove them back.

At daybreak on June 16, 1915, the artillery on both sides resumed
firing on a large scale. Suddenly, in the afternoon, the British
fire increased preparatory to another charge. This time the British
commander had selected a smaller section for his attack. This was
at Rue d'Ouvert, and the men who had been selected to make the
charge were the Territorials and the Liverpool Irish. They got
into the first line of German trenches which the Teutons shelled
to such an extent that the remnant of the attacking force had to
retreat. Then the Second Gordon Highlanders and other Scotch soldiers
made a gallant charge at the same place, Rue d'Ouvert, on June 18,
1915, but were forced to retire to their own trenches.

These attacks on this part of the German front resulted in repulses
for those who made them; but, at the same time, they helped the
Allies win victories elsewhere by keeping the German troops on
that part of the line from going to reenforce those who were being
hard pressed by the French. In this manner the British and Canadians,
who fought so valiantly and with so little apparent success at
Stony Mountain and Rue d'Ouvert, were in a measure responsible
for the French victories at Angres, Souchez, and the Labyrinth.
The Crown Prince of Bavaria could not hold out against both the
French and British, but he believed it was more important for him
to check the British, because a victory for them would threaten
Lille to a greater extent.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XI

OPERATIONS AROUND HOOGE

The next action of importance on the British front occurred at
the Château of Hooge on the Menin road about three miles east of
Ypres. Here had been the headquarters of Sir John French and Sir
Douglas Haig at the first battle of Ypres. From the Château Sir
John French had seen the British line break at Gheluvelt, thereby
opening the road for the Germans to Calais. That opening, however,
had been closed by the Worchsters. After the Germans began to use
their deadly gas in the spring of 1915 they again took possession
of Hooge, and used the Menin road for a forward movement which
threatened what was left of Ypres.

The Duke of Württemberg was in command of that part of the line
opposed to the British, and his forces extended from near Pilkem in
the north to near Hill 60 in the south, in the form of a crescent.
He made use of the asphyxiating gas cloud and gas bombs so frequently
on this part of the front that the British soldiers became expert in
donning their hood like masks and in using respirators. Moreover,
the British were constantly on the alert for the appearance of the
poison gas. So that this method of attack was much less effective.
Before the Germans discovered how well the British had prepared
themselves against the gas, they met with disaster twice when using
it. On both occasions they had followed their gas cloud expecting
to find their foes writhing on the ground in choking agony--an
easy prey for an attack.

But the British had put on their curious-appearing headgear, and
were waiting for the men whom they knew would be following the
cloud at a safe distance. As soon as the Germans were near enough
the British turned loose everything that would hurl a projectile
large or small. By the time the gas cloud had cleared, or, to be
more accurate, passed on to the rear of the British line and spent
itself, the only Germans to be seen were in the piles of dead and
wounded in front of the British most advanced trenches. The first
time this occurred did not teach the Germans its lesson sufficiently
well. A second time the Germans did not follow their gas cloud so
closely. The gas-filled shells, however, the British found more
difficult. They did not give warning of their coming as did the
appearance of the comparatively slow-moving gas cloud. Thus in
the first week of May, 1915, Hill 60 was taken by the Germans in
a bombardment of asphyxiating shells. The bombardment had been
immediately followed by a charge of bomb throwers who made an assault
on the hill from three sides at once. That forced the British to
retreat to a trench line at the foot of the hill, and gave the
top of the hill to the Germans who immediately set up a lookout
post for their artillery back of the Zandvoord ridge.

This part of the British line was under the command of Sir Herbert
Plumer. His troops occupied themselves from the first week in May
to the middle of August, 1915, in fighting in the Hooge district.
Most of this fighting was important only because it kept the Germans
busy on that section of the line, and prevented them from being
able to reenforce the Crown Prince of Bavaria or adding men to
the force that was driving the Russians eastward.

The men, fresh from the training camps, fought alongside of hardened
veterans and learned much from them. From being what amounted to
auxiliaries in these actions the new troops became hardened to
actual fighting conditions. For this reason the personnel of the
British troops on this part of the line was changed frequently.
This was especially true at Hooge. Princess Patricia's Canadian
Regiment occupied the Château and village of Hooge on May 8, 1915.
The "Princess Pats," as they were known at home, turned over their
quarters to the Ninth Lancers who were followed by the Fifteenth
Hussars and the Second Camerons.

On May 24, 1915, the Germans made a great gas attack. They had
placed along the line from St. Julien to Hooge a great number of
gas tanks. They then started a bombardment with asphyxiating shells.
When the bombardment was well under way the tanks were opened.
The ensuing cloud was five miles long and forty feet high; and
it floated over the British trenches from 3 a. m. to 7 a. m. The
cloud was followed by three columns of infantry, who dashed forward
under the protection of the shells of their artillery. But the
Germans made gains in only two places--at Hooge and to the north of
Wieltje. For the most part the British regained by counterattacks
what they lost; but they were unable to retake the Château of Hooge,
though the Ninth Lancers and the Fifteenth Hussars made a heroic
attempt to regain it. Thereupon the Third Dragoons received orders
to attempt to retake the Château of Hooge. They went into the second
line of the British trenches to the south of the Menin road on May
29, 1915. The Germans bombarded the trenches with high-explosive
shells while from the German trenches a torrent of small arms fire
poured. In spite of the continued hail of lead, the Dragoons held
to their position though their trenches were wrecked.

Early in the morning of May 31, the British charged and drove their
enemy from the ruins of the Château and its stables. The Germans
turned all of their artillery on that part of the line against
Hooge, and when the bombardment was finished there was only a heap
of ruins left. The British withdrew from the Château, but only
for a short distance.

The bombardment was renewed on June 1; on that day the German infantry
tried to dislodge the Dragoons, but the attempt was unsuccessful.
Again, on June 2, the artillery was used, the German shells being
hurled a part of the time at the rate of twenty a minute. Under the
cover of this terrific bombardment a part of the German infantry
charged from the Bellewaarde Lake region. They got to the Château
before a British battery opened fire on them. Again they entered
the ruins and made a dash out on the opposite side, where they were
met by more machine-gun fire. Three times they tried to escape,
but practically all of them were slain. Other attempts were made
by the Germans that afternoon, but none of them was successful.

The Dragoons were relieved on June 3, 1915, and their places were
taken by a much larger force. It included the Third Worcesters,
the First Wiltshires, the First Northumberland Fusiliers, the First
Lincolnshires, the Royal Fusiliers, the Royal Scots Fusiliers,
and the Liverpool Scottish, a territorial organization.

The British artillery was concentrated in the neighborhood of Hooge
and started a bombardment on June 16. After a fairly adequate
preparation by cannonade, the infantry charged the German line for
a thousand yards near the Château, and took a part of the second
line of trenches. Again the British bayonet and bomb had won, though
in this attack the greater credit must be given to the bomb. The
Germans made an attempt to retrieve the day by battering the British
out of the trenches they had won. To do this the German artillery
used a plentiful supply of high-explosive shells. They continued
the attempt for twenty-four hours; but all they succeeded in doing
was driving the British back to the first line of German trenches
where they waited for the inevitable attack of the infantry which
was repulsed. Finally the Germans seemed inclined to give up trying
to accomplish much on this part of their front.

In the first week of July, 1915, the British took two hundred yards
of German trenches, eighty prisoners and three trench mortars.
The German commander now turned once more to Hooge. An additional
reason for his renewed interest in that place was the fact that the
British engineers, on July 20, blew up a mine west of the Château,
thereby making a great crater in which the British infantry made
themselves comparatively secure. The crater was one hundred and
fifty feet wide and fifty feet deep.

The Germans made an unsuccessful attempt to take the crater on
July 21, 1915; and tried again on July 24. The Duke of Württemberg
found his men making comparatively little progress. It is true that
the British had not made much more. The gas attacks had gained ground
before the British had learned how to avoid the more severe effects
of the poison. The result of experience brought into existence
a new device. It has been called a flame projector, and has been
described as a portable tank which is filled with a highly inflammable
coal-tar product. The contents of the tank were pumped through a
nozzle at the end of which was a lighting arrangement. The flame
could be thrown approximately forty yards.

A large supply of these flame projectors arrived in the German
trenches on July 30, 1915. The action began with the usual bombardment
of high-explosive shells. Other shells filled with the burning
liquid were also used. At the height of the bombardment, the British
lines were flame swept. No preparation had been made for such an
attack; and the only thing that the British could do was to get
out of the way of the flame. Thus they lost their trenches in the
crater and at the Château and village of Hooge. The method of attack
so infuriated the British that they made a desperate counterattack
with the result that they regained most of what they lost with
the exception of about five hundred yards of trenches.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XII

FRANCO-GERMAN OPERATIONS ALONG THE FRONT

We have thus far dealt chiefly with the British operations in the
western front, but it must not be assumed that the French, in the
meantime, were idle. On the contrary, their operations, covering
the far greater territory, were proportionally more important than
those of their allies.

During the winter months artillery duels along the entire Franco-German
front were kept up without intercession. These were varied by assaults
on exposed points which were in many cases repeatedly taken and
lost by the opposing forces.

The French staff applied itself with the utmost vigor to the
accumulation of large stacks of munitions and supplies for the
production of active movements when weather conditions should permit.
For the most part, however, the Franco-German operations were desultory
movements occurring in various portions of the long line. Actions
of the first importance began with the attacks in the St. Mihiel
salient in April, 1915.

On the night of February 6, 1915, Germans exploded three mines
at La Boisselle in front of the houses in the village which the
French occupied, but the attempt of the Germans to advance was
checked after a small amount of ground had been gained. The next
day a counterattack carried out by a French company retook this
ground, and inflicted a loss of 200 men. The French seized a wood
north of Mesnil-les-Hurles on the night of February 7. Here the
Germans had strongly established themselves.

During the first part of February, 1915, the Germans made a series
of assaults on the Marie Therese works in the Argonne. Their force
comprised about a brigade; but the French repulsed all attacks.
Both sides suffered severe losses. On the night of February 9,
there was an infantry engagement at La Fontenelle in the Ban de
Sapt. Two battalions of Germans took part in the action and gained
some ground which the French regained by counterattacks on the
following day.

Actions in the Vosges continued in spite of heavy snow. The French
carried Hill 937, eight hundred meters northwest of the farm of
Sudelle, in the region north of Hartmannsweilerkopf.

About February 9, 1915, there was considerable activity on the part
of the German artillery in Champagne, especially before Rheims.
The city being again bombarded. There was also a lively cannonade
in the region of Lens, around Albert, between the Avre and Oise, in
the neighborhood of Soissons, and at Verneuil, northeast of Vailly.
In Lorraine the Germans, after having pushed back the French main
guard, succeeded in occupying the height of the Xon beacon and
the hamlet of Norroy. The Germans were repulsed by a counterattack
as far as the slopes north of the beacon.

The French on February 18 made some progress in the region of
Boureuilles on Hill No. 263. They also gained a wood south of the
Vois de Cheppy. At the same time French troops took four hundred
meters of trenches north of Malancourt and about as much south
of the Bois de Forges. The Germans made five unsuccessful
counterattacks, near Bolincourt, to retake the trenches which the
French had captured. On the same day, the French recaptured the
village of Norroy. In the Vosges, the French repulsed two infantry
attacks north of Wisembach, in the region of the Col de Bonhomme,
and consolidated their positions, progressing methodically north
and south of the farm of Sudelle. The bombardment of Rheims was
continued during these days. On the heights of the Meuse, at Les
Eparges, three German counterattacks on the trenches which the
French had won on February 17 were stopped by the French artillery
fire.

In the Vosges, between Lusse and Wisembach, in the Bonhomme region,
the Germans, after succeeding in getting a footing on Hill 607,
were dislodged on the morning of February 19, 1915. The French held
their position on the height notwithstanding the violent efforts
to dislodge them. An attack by the Germans on Le Sattel north of
the Sudelle farm was also repulsed.

In the evening of February 19, 1915, the Germans delivered their
fourth counterattack against the trenches which the French took
at Les Eparges, but the French artillery again beat them back.
The Germans were also unsuccessful in a counterattack on Hill 607,
at Sattel, south of the Fecht. They succeeded in gaining a footing
on the eastern spur of Reichsackerkopf.

After having repulsed a sixth counterattack by the Germans at Les
Eparges, the French on February 10, 1915, delivered a fresh attack
which enabled them to enlarge and complete the progress they made
on the day before. They took three machine guns, two trench mortars,
and made two hundred prisoners, among whom were several officers.

They also repulsed a counterattack of the Germans and then took all
of their trenches to the north and east of the wood which had been
captured by the French on the day before. Two other counterattacks
were repulsed, and the French made fresh progress, particularly
to the north of Mesnil, where they captured two machine guns and
one hundred prisoners. The Germans made their seventh unsuccessful
counterattack on Les Eparges on February 21. The French advanced
posts fell back on the main line in Alsace on both banks of the
Fecht; but the main line was strongly held, and the Germans, attacking
in serried and deep formations, suffered heavy losses.

On the Belgian front the French batteries demolished one of the
German heavy guns near Lombaertzyde on February 22, 1915. On the
same day the French artillery dispersed German troops and convoys
between the Lys and the Aisne. The French made progress on the
Souain-Beausejour front, taking a line of trenches and two woods,
and repulsed two particularly violent counterattacks. Many prisoners
were taken by the French in this action. In the Argonne the French
artillery and infantry had the better of the almost continuous
fighting. This was especially true near Fontaine-aux-Charmes and
Marie Therese, as well as at the Bois Bolante.

The bombardment of Rheims continued on February 22, lasting for
a first period of six hours, and a second period of five hours.
One thousand five hundred shells were fired into all quarters of
the town. The cathedral was made a special target and suffered
severely. The interior of the vaulted roof, which had resisted
up to this time, fell. Twenty houses were set on fire and twenty
of the civilian population were killed.

The French captured more trenches in the region of Beause-jour
and held their gains of previous fighting, on February 23, 1915.
Their batteries blew up a German ammunition store to the northwest
of Verdun at Drillancourt, in the region of the Bois de Forges, on
the same day, February 23, 1915, and stopped an attempted German
attack in Alsace from the village of Stossweiler.

There was an action of some importance in the Wood of Malancourt,
on February 26, 1915, when the Germans sprayed the French advanced
trenches with burning liquid. The French troops evacuated them,
the soldiers being severely burned before they could escape. A
counterattack was immediately made. This checked the German advance.
On the same day, in the region of Verdun and on the heights of the
Meuse, the French heavy artillery enveloped with its fire the German
artillery, wrecked some guns, exploded about twenty wagons or depots,
annihilated a detachment, and destroyed an entire encampment.

In Champagne the French on the night of February 26, 1915, captured five
hundred meters of German trenches to the north of Mesnil-les-Hurles.

On February 28, 1915, Rheims was again bombarded and still again on
March 2, 1915. About fifty shells fell on the town. In the Argonne,
on March 2, 1915, in the Bagatelle-Marie Therese sector, there
was mine and infantry fighting in an advanced trench which the
French reoccupied after they had been forced to abandon it. At the
same time in the region of Vauquois, the French made some progress
and held the ground captured in spite of the counterattacks of the
Germans. The French also took some prisoners. In the Vosges, at
La Chapelotte, they captured trenches and gained three hundred
meters of ground.

The bombardment of Rheims was continued on March 4, 1915, and lasted
all day, a shell falling about every three minutes. While the
bombardment was in progress the Germans captured an advanced trench
from the French to the north of Arras, near Notre Dame de Lorette;
but in the Argonne the French made fresh progress in the region of
Vauquois. On the following day, March 5, however, the French made
successful counterattacks in the region of Notre Dame de Lorette.
The Germans lost the advanced positions which they had taken from
the French and held them for two days. At Hartmannsweilerkopf,
in Alsace, the French captured a trench, a small fort, and two
machine guns. They also repulsed a counterattack opposite Uffholz,
and blew up an ammunition store at Cernay. On the same night, the
French drove back the German advanced posts which were trying to
establish themselves on the Sillakerkopf, a spur east of Hohneck.

The French continued to gain ground, on March 7, to the north of
Arras in the region of Notre Dame de Lorette, where their attacks
carried some German trenches. The German losses were considerable.
During this first week in March, 1915, the French carried successively,
to the west of Münster, the two summits of the Little and the Great
Reichaelerkopf. The Germans made two counterattacks starting from
Mühlbach and Stossweiler; but they were unsuccessful. On the right
bank of the Fecht the French captured Imburg, one kilometer southeast
of Sultzern. This success was completed farther to the north by the
capture of Hill 856 to the south of the Hutes Hutles. Finally, at
Hartmannsweilerkopf the French repelled a counterattack delivered
by a German battalion which suffered heavy losses and left numerous
prisoners in the hands of the French.

On March 8, 1915, the French gained two hundred meters on the ridge
northeast of Mesnil which they added to the gains of the previous
day. Here the French carried a German redoubt, took a revolver
gun and three machine guns, and made some prisoners. The Germans
had armored shelters supplied with revolver guns and very deep
subterranean chambers. In the Argonne, between Four-de-Paris and
Bolante, the French delivered an attack which made them masters of
the first line of German trenches of more than two hundred meters
in length.

To the north of Rheims in front of the Bois de Luxembourg, the
Germans attempted, on March 14, to carry one of the French advanced
trenches, but were repulsed. On the same day, between Four-de-Paris
and Bolante in the Argonne, the French gained three hundred meters
of trenches, and took some prisoners. Two counterattacks which
the Germans made were unsuccessful.

In the region of Lombaertzyde on March 15, the French artillery very
effectively bombarded the German works. When the Germans attempted
to recapture the small fort which was taken from them on the night
of March 1 they were repulsed and left fifty dead. The French losses
were small. To the north of Arras, a brilliant attack by the French
infantry enabled them to capture, by a single effort, three lines
of trenches on the spur of Notre Dame de Lorette, and to reach the
edge of the plateau. The French captured one hundred prisoners
including several officers. They also destroyed two machine guns and
blew up an ammunition store. Farther to the south, in the region of
Eeurie-Roclincourt, near the road from Lille, they blew up several
German trenches and prevented their reconstruction. In Champagne
the French made fresh progress. They gained ground in the woods
to the northeast of Souain and to the northwest of Perthes. They
also repulsed two German counterattacks in front of Ridge 196,
northeast of Mesnil, and extended their position in that sector. In
the region of Bagatelle in the Argonne two German counterattacks were
repulsed. The French demolished a blockhouse there, and established
themselves on the site of it. Between Four-de-Paris and Bolante the
Germans attempted two counterattacks which failed. At Vauquois
the French infantry delivered an attack which gave it possession
of the western part of the village. Here they made prisoners. At
the Bois-le-Prêtre, northeast of Pont-à-Mousson, the Germans blew
up with a mine four of the French advanced trenches which were
completely destroyed. The Germans gained a footing there, but the
French retook the first two trenches and a half of the third. Between
the Bois-le-Prêtre and Pont-à-Mousson, in the Haut de Rupt, the
Germans made an attack which was repulsed.

In Champagne, before Hill 196, northeast of Mesnil, on March 19,
1915, the Germans, after violently bombarding the French position,
made an infantry attack which was repulsed with heavy losses.

In the Woevre, in the Bois Mortmore, on March 20, 1915, the French
artillery destroyed a blockhouse and blew up several ammunition
wagons and stores. At La Boisselle, northeast of Albert, the Germans,
after a violent bombardment, attempted a night attack which was
repulsed with large losses.

The Germans bombarded the Cathedral of Soissons again on March
21, 1915, firing twenty-seven shells and causing severe damage to
the structure. On the same day Rheims was bombarded, fifty shells
falling there.

Near Bagatelle the French, on March 22, blew up three mines; and
two companies of their troops stormed a German trench in which
they maintained their position in spite of a strong counterattack.
Five hundred yards, from there, the Germans, after exploding two
mines, and bombarding the French trenches, rushed to an attack on
a front of about two hundred and fifty yards. After some very hot
hand-to-hand fighting the assailants were hurled back in spite of
the arrival of their reenforcements. The French artillery caught
them under its fire as they were falling back, and inflicted very
heavy losses.

The French then retreated some fifteen meters at Vauquois on March
23, 1915, when the Germans sprayed one of their trenches with
inflammable liquid.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XIII

CAMPAIGN IN ARGONNE AND AROUND ARRAS

There were some weak places in the French line from Switzerland to
the North Sea; and one of them was that part in the region between
the Forest of the Argonne and Rheims. General Langle de Cary was
in command of the army which held this section. It requires no
military genius to comprehend that the French center and the right
wing from Belfort to Verdun were not safe until the Germans had been
forced back across the Aisne at every place. The French general
had made an effort to drive the Germans under General von Einem
from Champagne Pouilleuse. The preliminary effort had been to stop
the Germans from using the railroad which ran from near the Nort
to Varennes through the Forest of the Argonne and across the upper
Aisne to Bazancourt.

After the battle of the Marne, the crown prince's army, severely
handled by the Third French Army under General Sarrail, pushed
hastily toward the north and established itself on a line running
perpendicularly through the Argonne Forest, at about ten or fifteen
kilometers from the road connecting Ste. Ménéhould with Verdun. Almost
immediately there developed a series of fights that lasted during a
whole year and were really among the bloodiest and most murderous
combats of the war. The German army in the Argonne, commanded by the
crown prince, whose headquarters had long been established at Stenay,
consisted of the finest German troops, including, among others, the
famous Sixteenth Corps from Metz, which, with the Fifteenth Corps
from Strassburg, is considered the cream of the Germanic forces.
This corps was commanded by the former governor of Metz, General von
Mudra, an expert in all branches of warfare relating to fortresses
and mines. Specially reenforced by battalions of sharpshooters
and a division of Württembergers, the Twenty-Seventh, accustomed
to forest warfare, this corps made the most violent efforts from
the end of September, 1914, to throw the French troops back to
the south and seize the road to Verdun. The crown prince evidently
meant to sever this route and the adjoining highway, leading from
Verdun to Ste. Ménéhould. The road then turns to the south and
joins at Revigny, the main line of Bar-le-Duc to Paris via Chalons,
forming, in fact, the only possible line of communication for the
fortress of Verdun. The other line, running from Verdun to St.
Mihiel, was rendered useless after the Germans had fixed themselves
at St. Mihiel in September, 1914.

Up to the first months of 1916 there was only a small local railway
that could be used between Revigny and Ste. Ménéhould by Triaucourt.
Of the two big lines, one was cut by the Germans, and the other
was exposed to the fire of their heavy artillery.

The violence of the German attacks in the Argonne prove that so
long ago as September, 1914, they already dreamt of taking Verdun.
Their aim was to force the French troops against Ste. Ménéhould
and invest the fortress on three sides to bring about its fall.

These Argonne battles were invested with a particular interest and
originality. They were in progress for a whole year, in a thick
forest of almost impenetrable brushwood, split with numerous deep
ravines and abrupt, slippery precipices. The humidity of the forest
is excessive, the waters pouring down from high promontories. The
soldiers who struggled here practically spent two winters in the
water.

One can hardly imagine the courage and heroism necessary to bear
the terrible hardships of fighting under such conditions. All the
German soldiers made prisoners by the French describe life in the
Argonne as a hideous nightmare.

From the end of September, 1914, the Germans delivered day and night
attacks, generally lasting ten days. These attacks were made with
forces of three or four battalions up to a division or a division
and a half. In each attack the Germans aimed at a very limited
objective--to capture the first or second line of trenches, to seize
some particular fortified point. That object once attained, the
Germans held on there, consolidated the occupied terrain, fortified
their new positions and prepared for another push forward. It was
thus by a process of nibbling the French trenches bit by bit that
the Germans hoped to attain the Verdun-Ste. Ménéhould line.

The tactics employed in these combats were those suited to forest
fighting; sapping operations methodically and minutely carried out
to bring the German trenches as near as possible to the French;
laying small mines to be exploded at a certain hour. Two or three
hours before an attack the French positions were bombarded by trench
mortars and especially heavy mine throwers.

At the short distances the effect would naturally be to cause
considerable damage; trenches and their parapets were demolished,
shelters, screening reserves, were torn open. At that moment when
the attack is to be launched, the German artillery drops the "fire
curtain" behind the enemy trenches to prevent reenforcements from
arriving. Such are the tactics almost constantly employed by the
Germans.

Despite their most furious efforts during the winter of 1914 and
the spring and summer of 1915, in at least forty different attacks,
the German gains were very insignificant, and if one considers
the line they held after the battle of the Marne and compares it
with their present position, one may gather some idea of how little
progress they have made.

It was in June and July, 1915, that the Germans displayed their
main efforts in the Argonne. Their three great attacks were made
with greater forces than ever before (two or three divisions), but
the results were as profitless as their predecessors. The heroism
of the French barred the way.

At Arras in June, there was almost as much activity as at Ypres.
During the last part of the campaign in the Artois, General d'Urbal
began an advance between Hebuterne and Serre. The former had been
held by the French and the latter by the Germans. The two villages
were each on a small hill and not quite two miles apart. There were
two lines of German trenches in front of the farm of Tout Vent
which was halfway between the villages.

The trenches were held by the Seventeenth Baden Regiment which was
attacked by the French on June 7, 1915. The French troops consisted
of Bretons, Vendeans, and soldiers from Savoy and Dauphiné. The
work of the infantry was preceded by a heavy bombardment to which
the German artillery replied. Then the French charged with a dash
that seemed irresistible.

On the following day, June 8, 1915, the French gained more ground
to the north in spite of the activity of the German artillery.
June 9, 1915, saw desperate fighting in the German communicating
trenches, and on June 10, 1915, several hundred yards of trenches
to the south were taken. The Seventeenth Baden Regiment was only a
name and a memory when the fighting ceased; and two German battalions
had fared but little better. Of the five hundred and eighty prisoners
taken ten were officers.

General de Castelnau, on the day before the fighting at Hebuterne,
made a break in the German line east of Forest of l'Aigle which is
a continuation of the Forest of Compiègne but is separated from
it by the Aisne. Within the French lines were the farms of Ecaffaut
and Quennevieres. The Germans held Les Loges and Tout Vent. There
was a German salient opposite Quennevieres with a small fort at
the peak of the salient. Defenses had been built also where the
northern and southern sides of the salient rested on the main line
of trenches. There were two lines of trenches on the arc of the
salient with three lines on a portion of the arc. An indented trench
held the chord of the arc. The Germans had placed several guns in
a ravine which ran down toward Tout Vent. Four companies of the
Eighty-sixth Regiment had held the salient.

On June 5, 1915, the reserve troops were taken from the Tout Vent
ravine for reenforcements. Their places were occupied then by other
German troops. The French artillery bombarded the fort at the peak
of the salient, and all of the trenches and defenses of the Germans
in that neighborhood and the French infantry kept up a rifle and
machine-gun fire which was an aid in preventing the Germans from
repairing the damage done their defenses. The bombardment continued
all day and all night and increased in volume and intensity on the
morning of June 6, 1915. Then it was continued intermittently. A
mine under the fort at the peak of the salient blew up. The Germans
who sought refuge in their dugouts found them unavailing. The shells
had blown the roofs from those places of supposed safety. In many
instances their occupants had been buried in the débris and suffocated.
The French artillery lengthened its range and made a curtain of
fire between the Germans on the front and the German supports in
the rear. Then the French infantry charged. The men had dispensed
with knapsack that they might not be hampered with unnecessary
weight. All had three rations and two hundred and fifty rounds
of ammunition. They were also provided with two hand grenades and
a sack. The last was to be filled with earth. The filled sacks
were sufficient to form breastworks with which any place taken
might be held. With a cheer the French infantry ran across the
two hundred yards between the two lines. The German infantry's
nerves had been so badly shaken by the bombardment that only a
scattering fire, badly directed, greeted the French. It was but
the work of minutes to take the first line of German trenches.
The two hundred and fifty survivors of two German battalions were
made prisoners. The German reserves in the ravine on the Tout Vent
farm made a dash to aid their fire line; but the French artillery
shells accounted for them before the reserves ever reached those
whom they would have relieved. Thus in less than an hour 2,000
Germans were put out of the fight. The French who had been selected
for this work included Bretons, Zouaves, and chasseurs.

The Zouaves then made a dash for the ravine on the Tout Vent front.
There they came upon a field work equipped with three guns. This
work was protected by wire entanglements. The German artillerymen
retreated to their dugouts, but the Zouaves captured them and their
fortification. At that stage of the fighting the French aviators
saw German reenforcements on their way to take part in the battle.
The aviators signaled to their troops this information. Two German
battalions were being hurried in motor cars from Roye to the east
of the Oise; but before they reached the scene of the fighting the
Germans managed to mass for a counterattack. It was ill-planned
and executed. French shrapnel and machine guns annihilated those
making the counterattack. In the meantime the French sappers were
fortifying with sacks of earth the ends of the salient, so that by
night the French were in a position to hold what they had gained.
The precautions which the French had made were shown to be extremely
timely, for that night the reenforcements from Roye made eight
desperate attacks.

The lack of success throughout the night did not prevent the Germans
from making a reckless attack on the French works at both ends
of the salient on the morning of June 7. The Germans made their
advance along the lines of the communicating trenches. They were
greeted with a shower of hand grenades. By nightfall the Germans
seemed to have wearied of the attacks. The total German loss in
killed in this engagement was three thousand. The French had lost
only two hundred and fifty killed and fifteen hundred wounded.
They captured a large amount of equipage and ammunition, besides
twenty machine guns.

The French front south of Pont-à-Mousson, on the Moselle, through
the gap of Nancy to the tops of the Vosges experienced only slight
changes during the spring and summer of 1915. The Germans assumed
the offensive in the region of La Fontenelle, in the Ban-de-Sapt,
in April and June. The French engineers had built a redoubt to the
east of La Fontenelle on Hill 627. The Germans found they could
not take it by an assault; so their sappers went to work to tunnel
under it; but they had to bore through very hard rock and the work
was necessarily slow. The French, learning of the mining operations
of their foes, started a countereffort with the result that there
was a succession of fierce skirmishes under the surface of the
earth. Finally the German sappers were lured into a communicating
tunnel which had been mined for the purpose and they all perished.
The greatest activity of the sappers was between April 6 and April
13, 1915. On the night of the latter date the officers of the Germans
tried to rally their men for further operations, but their soldiers
had had enough and refused to renew their work.

The Germans, however, did not give up in their attempts to take
Hill 627, which they called Ban-de-Sapt, and in an assault they
made upon it on June 22 they took the hill. Thereupon the general
in command of the Thirtieth Bavarian Division made the following
announcement:

"I have confidence that the height of Ban-de-Sapt will be transformed
with the least possible delay into an impregnable fortification
and that the efforts of the French to retake it will be bloodily
repulsed."

On the night of July 8 the French began a bombardment which was
followed by an infantry charge which forced its way through five
lines of trenches and gained the redoubt on the top of the hill,
in spite of its corrugated iron and gun-shield defenses to which
had been added logs and tree trunks. At the same time the French
made an attack on the German trenches on the left and surrounded
the hill from the eastward. The Germans on the right flank of the
French were kept busy by another attack. In this battle two battalions
of the Fifth Bavarian Ersatz Brigade were taken from the German
ranks either by death or as prisoners. The French captured eight
hundred and eighty-one, of whom twenty-one were officers, who,
for the most part, were men of more than ordinary education.

The principal work of the French troops at this time was in the
valley of the Fecht and the neighboring mountains. They planned
to go down through the valley to Münster and take the railroad
to which the mountain railroads were tributaries. In connection
with this campaign in the mountains the achievement of a company
of French Chasseurs serves to illustrate, the heroic and hardy
character of these men. They were surrounded by German troops on
June 14, 1915, but refused to surrender. Instead they built a square
camp which they prepared to hold as long as one of them remained
alive. When their ammunition began to give out, they rolled rocks
down on their enemy and hurled large stones at the advancing foe.
At the same time the French artillery aided them by raining shells
on the Germans, though the artillery was miles from the scene of
action. Thus the Chasseurs were able to hold their position until they
were relieved on June 17, 1915. In the meantime the French proceeded
down the valley of the Fecht and up the mountains overlooking the
valley. An assault was made on the top of Braunkopf and an attack
was made on Anlass on June 15 and 16, 1915. The French captured
Metzeral on June 19, 1915, the Germans having set fire to it before
being driven out. The soldiers of the republic then began to bombard
Münster with such success that they destroyed a German ammunition
depot there. The Sondernach ridge was held by the French about
the middle of July, 1915, and they continued to gain ground so
that they were near Münster by the end of July, 1915. In these
actions the French mountaineers were pitting their skill against
the mountaineers from Bavaria.

By midsummer the lines on both sides of the western front were
an elaborate series of field fortifications. The shallow trenches
of the preceding fall were practically things of the past. And
these fortifications extended from the Vosges to the North Sea.
They naturally varied with the nature of the region in which they
were built. The marshy character of the soil along the Yser and
about the Ypres salient made it impossible to go down very deep.
Hence it was necessary to build up parapets which were easy marks
for the artillery. The Germans had the better places on the higher
levels from Ypres to Armentières; but the British line opposing them
showed remarkable engineering skill. The advances of the Allies
had resulted in making the first line of trenches somewhat temporary
in character in the sections about Festubert, La Bassée, and the
Artois; but in these regions there were strong fortifications in
the rear of both lines. The condition of the ground from Arras to
Compiègne was excellent for fortification purposes. The Teutons
had the better position in the chalky region along the Aisne, though
the chalk formation did not add to the comfort of the men. In the
northern part of Champagne trench life was more bearable. The forests
in the Argonne, the Woevre, and the Vosges made the trenches the best
of all on the western front. The greater part of these so-called
trenches, the like of which had never before been constructed,
could not be taken without a bombardment by heavy artillery. And,
in the rear of each line there was a series of other fortifications
quite as impregnable. This condition was a gradual growth which had
developed as a result of the increasingly new methods of attack.
As new means of taking life were invented, new means of protection
came into existence, until, for the present, the inventive genius
of man seemed to be at a standstill. But all this activity and
preparation at the front meant a greater activity in the rear of the
opposing lines. Fighting men were a necessity; but, under existing
conditions of warfare, they were useless unless they were kept
supplied by an army of artisans and another army or men to transport
munitions to the soldiers on the firing line. In fact it was being
forced on the minds of the commanding officers that the war could
be won in the workshop and laboratory rather than on the battle
field.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XIV

BELGO-GERMAN OPERATIONS

For the most part the activity of the Belgian army in February, 1915,
consisted of a continuous succession of advanced-post encounters,
in which detachments of from thirty to forty soldiers fought with
the Germans on the narrow strips of land which remained inundated,
while the artillery of the contending forces bombarded the trenches
and the machine-gun forts. The intermittent artillery duel continued
through the forepart of February, 1915, and on February 14, 1915,
the Germans bombarded Nieuport, Bains and the Dune trenches, and
continued the bombardment on February 15, 1915, and again on February
20, 1915.

Near Dixmude on February 28, 1915, the Belgian artillery demolished
two of the German trenches, and their infantry occupied a farm on
the right bank of the Yser. One of their aviators dropped bombs
on the harbor station at Ostend.

By the beginning of March, 1915, strips of dry land began to be
seen in the flooded region; and, along these, the Belgians advanced
at Dixmude and the bend of the Yser. They won additional bridgeheads
on the northern bank of the river. By the middle of the month, March,
1915, the Belgians had obtained a strategical point by possessing
Oudstuyvenkerke on the Schoorbakke highway. From there they could
force the Germans back until they were in a position that would
prevent any German action against the Dixmude bridgehead.

On March 18, 1915, the Belgian army continued its progress on the
Yser, and on March 23, 1915, the artillery destroyed several German
observation points. A division of the Belgian army made some progress
on the right bank of the Yser on March 24, 1915; while another was
taking a German trench on the left bank. The almost continuous
artillery fighting was more active in the Nieuport region on March
26, 1915; and farther south a farm north of St. Georges in advance
of the allied lines was taken and held.

But the Belgian army was unable to take any decisive action against
the left wing of the German army during the spring and summer of
1915, both on account of the wetness of the land and the activity
of the German artillery. Yet it harassed the Germans by so much
activity that the Teutons continued to add to their heavy howitzers
and large caliber naval guns. Nevertheless the Belgian strategy
gained for its little army many advantages of tactical importance.
It seemed to be a part of the plan of the Belgian generals to give
their new troops, which were filling up the previously thinned
ranks, a training under heavy bombardments without risking the
lives or liberty of many of their men. They held the old cobbled
roads which remained about the waters, using an almost innumerable
number of trenches for that purpose.

The Germans sought to obviate this check to their activities by
approaching on rafts on which were machine guns, from which attempts
were made to pour an enfilading fire on the trenches. Thereupon the
Belgian sharpshooters became especially active and exterminated
the machine-gun crews before the Germans could take advantage of
the position they had gained by using the rafts.

Finally the waters subsided and the mud which remained dried. As
soon as the ground became firm enough to support troops the Belgians
became so active that the Germans desired more men, but their soldiers
were also needed in many other sections of the western front, and
for the time being none could be sent against the Belgians. Hence
King Albert's troops continued to make progress.

The Germans made an attack between Nieuport and the sea on May
9, 1915, but were repulsed. To the north of Dixmude the Belgians
were violently attacked during the night of May 10, 1915, by three
German battalions. They were repulsed and suffered large losses.

On the night of May 16, 1915, the Germans threatened with complete
envelopment by the successful attacks of preceding days, evacuated
the positions which they had occupied to the west of the Yser Canal,
and they gained nothing on the eastern bank. The Germans left about
two thousand dead and many rifles when they were forced from the
western bank. On the following night, May 17, 1915, the positions
on the eastern bank were consolidated, and a German counterattack,
which was preceded by a bombardment, was repulsed. The Germans
gained a footing in the trenches to the east of the Yser Canal in
an attack made on the night of May 20, 1915, but they were driven
out and lost some of the ground they had held before making the
attack.

The Germans made a violent attack on the edge of the Belgian front
at Nieuport in order to prevent the Belgians from aiding in the
defense of Ypres, but the Belgians defended Nieuport with one army
corps and made an advance on Dixmude with another corps, with the
result that they assisted the Zouaves in taking the German bridgeheads
on the western bank of the canal above Ypres. These bridgeheads
were protected by forts manned by machine guns, and the approaches
were commanded by heavy artillery fire, but defense was destroyed
in the middle of May, 1915.

The Germans concentrated their efforts against the Belgians at one
point between Ypres and Dixmude. They bombarded the trenches, using
bombs filled with poisonous gas. When they believed the Belgians had
been overcome by the gas the German infantry charged. The Belgians,
however, had kept their faces close to the ground, thus escaping
most of the fumes from the shells. When the Germans arrived within
easy range they were greeted with machine-gun fire to such an extent
that the companies leading the charge were slain.

A battalion of Belgian troops on June 14, 1915, gained the east bank
of the Yser south of the Dixmude railroad bridge, and established
themselves there. The Belgians also destroyed a German blockhouse
in the vicinity of the Château of Dixmude. The Belgian troops,
south of St. Georges, captured a German trench, all the defenders
of which were killed or made prisoners on June 22, 1915.

After the canal line was won, and the Belgians were in position
to hold it, they could make little headway eastward. Their advance
was checked by a series of batteries which were concealed in the
Forest of Houthulst. These batteries, containing many guns of large
caliber, continued to shell the Belgian trenches to such an extent
that it was necessary for their inhabitants to keep close to the
bomb-proof chambers with which the trenches were liberally supplied.
But the Belgians kept so many of the German troops occupied that,
in this way, they gave great aid to their allies, and enabled the
French and British to regain much of the territory which was lost
in the first attack which the Germans made with poisonous gas. The
remainder of the summer was occupied with intermittent artillery
duels and minor engagements between the opposing trench lines.
In the meantime the Belgian army was adding to the number of its
troops and gathering munitions for an aggressive movement.




PART II--NAVAL OPERATIONS


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XV

THE WAR ZONE

The war on the seas, with the long-expected battle between the fleets
of the great nations, developed during the second six months of the
war into a strange series of adventures. The fleets of the British
and the Germans stood like huge phantoms--the first enshrouded in
mystery somewhere in the Irish and North Seas; the second held
in leash behind the Kiel Canal, awaiting the opportune moment to
make its escape.

These tense, waiting days were broken by sensational and spectacular
incidents--not so much through the sea fights of great modern warships
as through the adventures of the raiders on the seven seas, the
exploits of the submarines, and the daring attempt of the allied
fleets to batter down the mighty forts in the Dardanelles and bombard
their way toward Constantinople--the coveted stronghold of the
Ottoman Empire. The several phases of these naval operations are
described in special chapters in this volume, therefore we will
now confine ourselves to the general naval developments.

In the spring of 1915 the threat made by Admiral von Tirpitz that
Germany would carry on war against British and allied shipping by
sinking their vessels with submarines, was made effective. The
submersible craft began to appear on all the coasts of the British
Isles. It infested the Irish Sea to such an extent that shipping
between England and Ireland was seriously menaced.

A particularly daring raid took place on the night of February
1, 1915, when a number of submarines tried to scuttle ships lying
at Dover. The attack failed, but drew fire from the guns of the
fort here.[*]

[Footnote *: See chapter on "Exploits of the Submarines."]

On the 5th of February, 1915, the German Naval Staff announced
that beginning February 18, 1915, the waters around Great Britain
would be considered a "war zone." This was in retaliation for the
blockade maintained against Germany by the British navy. The
proclamation read as follows:

"The waters round Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole
of the English Channel, are herewith proclaimed a war region.

"On and after February 18, 1915, every enemy merchant vessel found
in this war region will be destroyed without its always being possible
to warn the crew or passengers of the dangers threatening.

"Neutral ships will also incur danger in the war region, where,
in view of the misuse of the neutral flags ordered by the British
Government and incidents inevitable in sea warfare, attacks intended
for hostile ships may affect neutral ships also.

"The sea passage to the north of the Shetland Islands and the eastern
region of the North Sea in a zone of at least thirty miles along
the Netherlands coast is not menaced by any danger.

"(Signed) Berlin, February 4, 1915, Chief of Naval Staff,
                                              VON POHL."

The effect of this proclamation, which was in truth nothing more
than official sanction for the work that the submarines had been doing
for some weeks, and which they continued to do, was to bring Germany
into diplomatic controversy with neutral countries, particularly
the United States; such controversy is taken up in a different
chapter of this history. In connection with the naval history of
the Great War it suffices to say that such a proclamation constituted
a precedent in naval history. The submarine had heretofore been
an untried form of war craft. The rule had formerly been that a
merchantman stopped by an enemy's warship was subject to search
and seizure, and, if it offered no resistance, was taken to one
of the enemy's ports as a prize. If it offered resistance it might
be summarily sunk. But it was impossible for submarines to take
ships into port on account of the patrols of allied warships; and
the limited quarters of submarines made it impossible to take aboard
them the crews of ships which they sank.

[Illustration: THE GERMAN SUBMARINE WAR ZONE]

Reference made to the use of neutral flags quoted in the German
proclamation had been induced by the fact that certain of the British
merchant ships, after Germany had begun to send them to the bottom
whenever one of its submarines caught up with them had gone through
the waters where the submarines operated flying the flag of the
United States and other neutral powers in order to deceive the
commanders of the submarines. The latter had little time to do
more than take a brief observation of merchantmen which they sank,
and one of the first things they sought was the nationality of the
flag that the intended victims carried; unless they could be sure
of the identity of a ship through familiarity with the lines of
her hull, they ran the risk, in attacking a ship flying a neutral
flag, of sinking a vessel belonging to a neutral power.

Here was another matter that opened up diplomatic exchanges between
Germany and the United States, and between the United States and
England. It suffices here to give not only the controversy or the
points involved, but the record of events. The first use of the flag
of a neutral country by a ship belonging to one of the belligerents
in the Great War occurred on January 31, 1915, when the Cunard liner
_Orduna_ carried the American flag at her forepeak in journeying
from Liverpool to Queenstown. She again did so on February 1, 1915,
when she left the latter port for New York. And another notable
instance was on February 11, 1915, when the _Lusitania_, another
Cunard liner, arrived at Liverpool flying the American flag in
obedience to orders issued by the British admiralty. It was only
the prominence of these vessels which gave them notoriety in this
regard; the same practice was indulged in by many smaller ships.

"What will happen after the 18th?" was the one important question
asked during February, 1915, by the public of the neutral as well
as belligerent countries.

February 18, 1915, arrived and saw Von Pohl's proclamation go into
effect, and from that date onward the toll of ships sunk, both
of neutral and belligerent countries, grew longer daily.

But before the German submarines could begin the new campaign,
those of the British navy became active, and it was admitted in
Berlin on February 15, 1915, that British submarines had made their
way into the Baltic, through the sound between Sweden and Denmark,
where they attacked the German cruiser _Gazelle_ unsuccessfully.

Nor was the British navy inactive in other ways, though it had
been greatly discredited by the fact that the German submarines
were playing havoc with British shipping right at England's door. A
fleet of two battleships and several cruisers drew up off Westende
and bombarded the German trenches on the 4th of February, 1915.

Only one day after the war-zone proclamation went into effect the
Allies brought out their trump card for the spring of 1915.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XVI

ATTACK ON THE DARDANELLES

By the middle of February, 1915, the Allies completed the arrangement
for the naval attack on the Dardanelles. The military part of the
campaign in these regions is treated in the chapter on the "Campaign
in the Dardanelles"; hence we must confine ourselves at present
to the general naval affairs. The naval operations began with the
concentration in the adjacent waters of a powerful fleet consisting
of both French and British ships.

The ships engaged were the _Queen Elizabeth_, with her main battery of
15-inch guns, the _Inflexible_, veteran of the fight off the Falkland
Islands, the _Agamemnon, Cornwallis, Triumph_, and _Vengeance_. In
addition to these British ships there were the French battleships
_Suffren, Gaulois_, and _Bouvet_, and a fleet of destroyers. The
senior British officer was Vice Admiral Sackville Carden, and the
French commander was Admiral Guepratte. A new "mother ship" for
a squadron of seaplanes was also part of the naval force; this
was the ship _Ark Royal_. At eight in the morning on February 19,
1915, this powerful fleet started "The Great Attempt."

After bombarding the Turkish forts till three in the afternoon
without receiving a single reply from the guns of the forts, the
warships ceased firing and went in closer to the shore, the allied
commanders believing that the forts had not replied because they
all had been put out of action. The fallacy of this belief was
discovered when, at the shortened range, shells began to fall about
the ships. None was hit; when dusk came on they retired.

Stormy weather prevented further action on the part of the warships
for almost a week, but on February 25, 1915, they resumed their
bombardment. The _Irresistible_ and _Albion_ had by then joined
the other British ships, and the _Charlemagne_ had augmented the
French force.

At ten o'clock in the morning of February 25, 1915, the _Queen
Elizabeth, Gaulois, Irresistible_, and _Agamemnon_ began to fire
on the forts Sedd-el-Bahr, Orkanieh, Kum Kale, and Cape Hellas--the
outer forts--at long range, and drew replies from the Turkish guns.
It was out of all compliance with naval tradition for warships
to stand and engage land fortifications, for lessons learned by
naval authorities from the Spanish-American and Russo-Japanese
wars had established precedents which prohibited it. But here the
larger warships were carrying heavier guns than those in the forts.
Whereas the _Queen Elizabeth_ carried 15-inch guns, the largest
of the Turkish guns measured only 10.2 inches.

At 11.30 o'clock in the morning of February 25, 1915, the _Agamemnon_
was hit with a shell which had traveled six miles, but it did not
damage her beyond repair. Meanwhile the _Queen Elizabeth_ had silenced
Cape Hellas, firing from a distance far beyond the range of the
forts' guns. And then, just before noon, and after the larger ship
had silenced the main battery at Cape Hellas, the ships _Vengeance_
and _Cornwallis_ dashed in at shorter range and destroyed the minor
batteries there. The _Suffren_ and _Charlemagne_ also took part
in this phase of the engagement, and later, in the afternoon, the
_Triumph_ and _Albion_ concentrated fire on Sedd-el-Bahr, silencing
its last guns by five o'clock in the evening.

The larger ships needed the respite during the night of February
25, 1915, while trawlers, which had been brought down from the
North Sea for the purpose, began to sweep the entrance to the forts
for mines, and cleared enough of them out by the morning of the 26th
to enable the _Majestic_--which had by then joined the fleet--and
the _Albion_ and _Vengeance_ to steam in between the flanking shores
and fire at the forts on the Asiatic side. It was known by the allied
commanders that they might expect return fire from Fort Dardanos,
but this they did not fear, for they knew that its heaviest gun
measured but 5.9 inches. But they had a surprise when concealed
batteries near by, the presence of which had not been suspected,
suddenly began to fire. Believing now that the Turks were abandoning
the forts at the entrance, the allied ships covered the landing
of parties of marines.

Long-range firing had by the end of February 26, 1915, enabled
the allied fleets to silence the outer forts and to clear their
way to the straits. They now had to take up the task of destroying
the real defenses of the Dardanelles--the forts at the Narrows,
and this was a harder task, for long-range firing was no longer
possible. The guns of the forts and those of the ships would be
meeting on a more equal basis.

But this was not to be essayed at once, for more rough weather
kept the fleets from using their guns effectively, their trawlers
continued to sweep the waters for mines near the Narrows. By March
3, 1915, however, the commanders were ready to resume operations.
The _Lord Nelson_ and the _Ocean_ had by then also arrived on the
scene, and in the subsequent operations were hit a number of times
by the Turkish guns; and the _Canopus, Swiftsure, Prince George_,
and _Sapphire_, though they did not report being hit, were also
known to have been present.

The new "eyes" of the fleets located new and concealed batteries
placed in position by the Turks, and at two o'clock in the afternoon
of February 3, 1915, they ascended to direct the fire of the ships'
guns by signal. The bombardment was kept up till darkness fell,
but it was resumed on the next day.

On March 4, 1915, the _Queen Elizabeth_, so great was the range
of her guns, was able to reach the forts Hamadieh I, Tabia, and
Hamadieh II, firing across the Gallipoli Peninsula. Three times
she was hit by shells from field pieces lying between her and her
target, but no great damage was done to her. While her guns roared
out, the _Suffren, Albion, Prince George, Vengeance_, and _Majestic_
went inside the straits and had attacked the forts at Soundere,
Mount Dardanos, and Rumili Medjidieh Tabia, and were fired upon
by Turkish guns from the forts and from concealed batteries which
struck these ships, but not a man was killed or a ship put out
of action.

March 7, 1915, the _Agamemnon_ and _Lord Nelson_ attacked the forts
at the Narrows, their bombardment being covered by the four French
battleships. All of the ships were struck, but again none of them
was put out of action. After heavy shelling forts Rumili Medjidieh
Tabia and Hamadieh I were silenced.

While these operations were going on, another British fleet, consisting
of battleships and cruisers, on March 5, 1915, began an attack
on Smyrna. For two hours, and in fine, clear weather, Fort Yeni
Kale was damaged after being subjected to heavy bombardment, but
it was not silenced when dusk interrupted the attack.

Little was accomplished for some days afterward. Some of the forts
which had been reported silenced were getting ready to resume firing;
their silence had been due to the fact that the defenders often had
to leave their guns while the gases generated by the firing cleared
off, and they had also thought it wiser to conserve ammunition
rather than fire-ineffective shots. Sedd-el-Bahr and Kum Kale were
able to resume firing in a few days, for though the shells of the
allied fleets had damaged the structural parts of these defenses,
they had not landed troops out to occupy them, with the result
that the Turks were enabled to intrench near the ruins and there
reset their guns.

On the morning of March 15, 1915, the small British cruiser _Amethyst_
made a dash into the Narrows, which when reported led the British
and French public to believe that the defense had been forced, but,
as a matter of fact, this exploit was a bit of stratagem, being
only designed to draw the fire of concealed batteries.

On March 18, 1915, "The Great Effort" was made to force the defenses
with naval operations, all previous work having been preliminary.
The battleships _Agamemnon, Prince George, Queen Elizabeth, Lord
Nelson, Triumph_, and _Inflexible_ steamed right up to the Narrows.
Four of them bombarded Chanak and a battery which lay opposite
it, and the forts at Saghandere, Kephez Point, and Dardanos were
kept busy by the _Triumph_ and the _Prince George_. After the fleet
had been at it for an hour and a half they received the support
of the four French ships which steamed in close and attacked the
forts at a shorter range. When the forts ceased firing the six
battleships _Ocean, Swiftsure, Majestic, Albion, Irresistible_,
and _Vengeance_ came in and tried to carry the attack further.
While the French squadron maneuvered to allow freedom of action
for this newer British squadron the Turkish guns resumed fire.
Then came the first of a series of disasters. Three shells struck
the _Bouvet_, and she soon began to keel over. When the underwater
part of her hull came into view it was seen that she had been hit
underneath, probably by one of the mines which the Turks had floated
toward the crowded ships. She sank almost immediately, carrying
the greater part of her crew down with her. Only two hours later
another mine did damage to the _Irresistible_, and she left the
line, listing heavily. While she floated and while she was under
heavy fire from Turkish guns a destroyer took off her crew. She
sank just before six o'clock. Not fifteen minutes later the _Ocean_
became the third victim of a floating mine, and she also went to
the bottom. Destroyers rescued many of her crew from the water.
The guns from the forts were also able to do damage; the _Gaulois_
had been hit again and again, with the result that she had a hole
in her hull and her upper works were damaged badly. Fire had broken
out on the _Inflexible_, and a number of her officers and crew
had been either killed or wounded. The day ended with the forts
still able to return a lively fire to all attacks, and "The Great
Attempt" on the part of the allied fleets had failed.

On the other end of the passage there had also been some naval
operations, when, on March 28, 1915, the Black Sea Fleet of the
Russian navy had bombarded the forts on the Bosphorous. Smyrna was
again attacked on April 6, 1915. The operations of allied submarines
were the next phases of the attack on the Dardanelles to be reported.
The _E-5_ grounded near Kephez Point on April 17, 1915, but before
she could be captured by the Turks picket boats from the allied
fleet rescued her crew and then destroyed her. It was just two
months now since the naval operations had begun at the Dardanelles;
it was seen then that all attempts to take them by naval operations
alone must fail as did the attack of March 18, 1915.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XVII

GERMAN RAIDERS AND SUBMARINES

The next important event in the naval history of the war occurred
in far-distant waters. On March 10, 1915, there ended the wonderful
career of the German auxiliary cruiser _Prinz Eitel Friedrich_,
Captain Thierichens, which on that date put in at the American
port of Newport News, Va., for repairs, after making the harbor
in spite of the watch kept on it by British cruisers. She brought
with her more than 500 persons, 200 of them being her own crew,
and the remainder being passengers and crews of French, British,
Russian, and American ships that had been her victims in her roving
over 30,000 miles of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans since leaving
Tsing-tau seven months before.

She had sent eight merchant ships to the bottom, one of them being
the _William P. Frye_, an American vessel carrying wheat, three
British ships, three flying the French flag, and one Russian ship.
Their total tonnage came to 18,245. The fact that she had sunk an
American ship on the high seas opened up still another diplomatic
controversy between Germany and the United States, which cannot
be treated here.

When she left Tsing-tau she took as her crew the men from the German
gunboats _Tiger_ and _Luchs_, and had their four 4.1-inch and some of
their one-pounder guns as her armament. Soon afterward she stopped
the British ship _Schargost_ and expected to refill her coal bunkers
from those of the merchantman, but in this she was disappointed,
for those of the latter were almost empty. Her next victim was
a French sailing vessel, _Jean_, and on board this was found a
pleasant surprise for the German raider, for the vessel was laden
with coal. Captain Thierichens had her towed 1,500 miles, to Easter
Island, where the coal was transferred to the bunkers of the _Eitel
Friedrich_, and the crews of her first three victims were put ashore.
These marooned men were burdens to the white inhabitants of the
island, for there was not too much food for the extra forty-eight
mouths. Finally, on February 26, 1915, the Swedish ship _Nordic_
saw them signaling from the island and took them off, landing them
at Panama on the day after the _Prinz Eitel Friedrich_ entered
Newport News.

By the beginning of December, 1914, the German raider was in the
South Atlantic, and while there heard wireless messages exchanged
between the ships of the British fleet that took part in the battle
off the Falkland Islands. The bark _Isabella Browne_, flying the
Russian flag, was the next ship overtaken by the _Eitel Friedrich_,
on January 26, 1915. She was boarded and all of her provisions
and stores were removed to the German ship; after her crew and
their personal effects were taken aboard the German ship she was
dynamited and sank. On that same morning the French ship _Pierre
Loti_ was sighted, and while the _Prinz Eitel Friedrich_ put an
end to her, after first taking off her crew, the captive crew of
the _Isabella Browne_ was sent below, but was allowed to come on
deck to watch the sinking of the French ship. The American ship
_William P. Frye_ was sunk soon afterward, and her crew, also,
was made part of the party on board the raider. After sinking the
French bark _Jacobsen_ the _Prinz Eitel Friedrich_ stopped the
_Thalasia_ on February 8, 1915, and let her go on her way, but
on February 18 the British ships _Cindracoe_ and _Mary Ada Scott_
were sunk. On the 19th the French steamer _Floride_ was overtaken
off the coast of Brazil; all persons aboard her were transferred to
the German ship and most of her provisions were also taken aboard
the latter; the _Floride_, the largest steamer destroyed by the
German ship, was set afire and left to burn. On February 20, 1915,
the British ship _Willerby_ was overtaken and nearly sank the _Prinz
Eitel Friedrich_ before being boarded. As the German ship passed
across the stern of the other at a short distance the British captain,
knowing that the end of his own ship was near, decided to take his
captor down with him. He tried to ram the German ship with the
stern of his ship, but failed in the attempt.

On the evening of February 20, 1915, the wireless operator of the
_Prinz Eitel Friedrich_ heard British cruisers "talking" with each
other, one of them being the _Berwick_. The German captain now saw
that his long raiding cruise was up, for though he could replenish
his stores and bunkers from captured ships he could not make the
many repairs which his vessel needed. To put them off at a neutral
port or to let them go in one of the ships he captured would mean
that his position would be reported to British ships within a week.
He therefore decided to end his raiding and put in at Newport News.
His vessel was interned in the American port.

We may now return to the story of the blockade against Germany
and the retaliation she sought. The Allies were now stopping as
much shipping on its way to Germany as they dared without bringing
on trouble with neutral powers. The _Dacia_, formerly a German
merchantman, was taken over, after the outbreak of the war, by an
American citizen and sailed from New Orleans for Rotterdam with a
cargo of cotton on February 12, 1915. She was stopped by a French
warship and taken to a French port February 27, 1915, and there
held till the matter of the validity of her transfer of registry
could be settled.

On the other hand the German submarine exploits continued and found
among their victims a British warship, along with the many merchantmen.
On March 11, 1915, the British auxiliary cruiser _Bayano_, while on
patrol duty became the victim of a German torpedo off the Scotch
coast. She went down almost immediately, carrying with her the
greater part of her crew.

But not always were the submarines immune. Only the day before
the British destroyer _Ariel_ rammed the German submarine _U-12_
and sent her to the bottom, after rescuing her crew. She was of an
older type, built in 1911, of submarine, and had played an active
part in the raiding in British waters. On February 21, 1915, she
had sunk the Irish coasting steamer _Downshire_ in the Irish Sea,
and her destruction was particularly welcome in British shipping
circles.

Once more an incident in the naval warfare of the Great War was
to involve diplomatic exchanges between the belligerents and the
United States. The African liner _Falaba_, a British ship on her
way from Liverpool to Lisbon, was torpedoed in St. George's Channel
on the afternoon of March 28, 1915. She had as one of her passengers
an American, L. C. Thrasher, who lost his life when the ship sank.

The naval warfare was proceeding like a game of checkers. When on
March 14, 1915, there came the end of still another of the German
raiding cruisers, the _Dresden_. She was a cruiser built in 1907
and having a displacement of 3,544 tons. Her speed was good--24.5
knots--and her armament of ten 4.1-inch guns and eight 5-pounder
guns made her quite a match for enemy warships of her class and
superior as for merchantmen. She was a sister ship to that other
famous raider the _Emden_. In 1909 she had taken her place among
the other foreign warships in the line in the Hudson River,
participating in the Hudson-Fulton Celebration. In the spring of
1914 she was in the neighborhood of Central America and rescued
a number of foreign refugees who fled from Mexico, and also took
Senor Huerta from Puerto Mexico.

She was still in that neighborhood when the war broke out, and
was immediately sought after by British and French warships which
were near by. She managed to get away from these pursuers and sank
the British steamers _Hyades_ and _Holmwood_ off the Brazilian
coast during the latter part of August, 1914. She then went south,
rounded the Horn and joined the other ships under command of Admiral
Von Spee, taking part in the battle off Coronel, on November 1,
1914.

She remained with that squadron and took part in a second battle--that
off the Falkland Islands--on December 8, 1914. When Admiral von
Spee saw that he had little chance of winning the battle he gave
orders that the lighter ships should leave the line and seek safety
in flight. The _Dresden_ was one of the ships which escaped, to
the chagrin of the British Admiral. She then turned "raider."

Five days later, on December 13, 1914, she had appeared off Punta
Arenas, in the Straits of Magellan, stopped at that port long enough
to take on some provisions and put to sea again, with British and
Japanese warships on her trail. She was too closely hunted to be
able to sink many ships, but during the week of March 12, 1915,
she sank the British steamer _Conway Castle_, off the coast of
Chile, and took coal and provisions from the two German steamers
_Alda_ and _Sierra Cordoba_.

On March 14, 1915, she was sighted by the British cruisers _Glasgow,
Kent_ and _Orama_ near Juan Fernandez Island. What then ensued is
in doubt, owing to conflicting reports made by the senior British
officer and by the captain of the German cruiser. The latter insisted
that, seeing his ship was at the end of her career, he ordered his
men to leave her and then blew her up. The former declared that
shots were exchanged, that she was set afire and was otherwise
badly damaged by the British fire. At any rate, she was destroyed,
and all of her men were saved. It was estimated that the amount
of damage she inflicted on allied trade amounted to $1,250,000.

Thus at the end of March, 1915, only the _Karlsruhe_ and _Kronprinz
Wilhelm_, of the eleven German warships that were detached from the
main German fleet in the North Sea at the outbreak of the war, and
of the few ships which slipped out of various ports as converted
auxiliary cruisers, were still at large on the high seas.

Naval activity in the northern waters of Europe did not abate.
The British admiralty on March 25, 1915, had announced that the
German submarine _U-29_, one of the most improved craft of the
type in use, had been sunk. This loss was admitted by the German
admiralty on April 7, 1915. It was a serious loss to the German
navy, for its commander was Otto von Weddigen, he who in the _U-9_,
had sent the _Cressy, Aboukir_ and _Hogue_ to the bottom in September,
1914.

The naval warfare at the Dardanelles proceeded in the same desultory
fashion. A Turkish torpedo boat caught up with the British transport
_Manitou_, and opened fire on her, killing some twenty of the soldiers
on board.

In answer to calls for help from the _Manitou_ the British cruiser
_Minerva_ and some torpedo boats went to the scene and attacked the
Turkish craft on April 7, 1915, driving it ashore off Chios and
destroyed it as it lay beached. But during April, 1915, it seemed
as though there would be another pitched fight between British and
German warships in the North Sea. On April 23, 1915, the German
admiralty announced that "the German High Sea Fleet has recently
cruised repeatedly in the North Sea, advancing into English waters
without meeting the sea forces of Great Britain." The British admiralty
had undoubtedly been aware of this activity on the part of their
enemy, but for reasons of their own did not choose to send British
ships to meet the German fleet, and the expected battle did not
take place.

France, on April 26, 1915, was to sustain a severe loss to her
navy; she had up to this time not lost as many ships as her ally,
England, or her enemy, Germany, but her navy was so much smaller
than either of them that the sinking of the _Leon Gambetta_ on
that date was a matter of weight. The _Gambetta_ was an armored
cruiser, built in 1904, and carrying four 7.6-inch guns, sixteen
6.4-inch guns and a number of smaller caliber. She had a speed
of twenty-three knots. While doing patrol duty in the Strait of
Otranto she was made the victim of the Austrian submarine _U-5_,
and sank, carrying with her 552 men.

On April 28, 1915, there occurred another incident which gave rise
to diplomatic exchanges between Germany and the United States.
On that date a German seaplane attacked the American merchantman
in broad daylight in the North Sea, but fortunately for its crew
the ship was not sent to the bottom. The first American ship to
be struck by a torpedo in the war zone established by the German
admiralty's proclamation of February 5, 1915, was the _Gulflight_.
This tank steamer was hit by a torpedo fired by a German submarine
off the Scilly Islands, on the 1st of May, 1915.

But of more importance, because of the number of American lives lost,
the standing of the matter in international law and the prominence
of the vessel, was the sinking of the Cunard liner _Lusitania_, on
May 7, 1915. This is fully described in the chapter on submarines,
and in the diplomatic developments discussed in the chapter on
the United States and the War. The _Lusitania_ had left New York
for Liverpool on the 1st of May, 1915. She was one of the fastest
ships plying between the Eastern and Western Hemispheres. Larger
than any warship afloat at the time, she was able to make the trip
from Liverpool to New York in a little under five days. On her
last crossing she carried 2,160 persons, including passengers and
crew, many of the former being Americans, some of them of great
prominence. While off Old Head of Kinsale, on the southeastern
end of Ireland, at about half past two, on the afternoon of May
7, 1915, with a calm sea and no wind, she was hit by one or more
torpedoes from a German submarine without warning.

Those on board immediately went to the life boats, but it was only
twenty minutes after she had first been hit that she sank, and not
enough of the small craft could be gotten over her side in that
time to rescue all those on board. Out of the 2,160 souls aboard
at least 1,398 were lost. Of these 107 were American citizens. Small
boats in the neighborhood of the disaster hurried to the scene
and rescued those whom they could reach in the water and brought
them to Queenstown. The sacks of mail which the liner carried and
which went down with her were the first American mail sacks ever
lost at sea as a result of war. The controversies which this disaster
gave rise to between England, Germany and the United States are
given elsewhere.

Against British warships the submarine warfare was also effective
during the month of May, 1915. On the 1st day of that month the
old British destroyer _Recruit_ was sent to the bottom of the North
Sea by a German submarine, but the two German destroyers which had
accompanied the submarine that did this were pursued immediately
by British destroyers and were sunk. On the same day that the
_Lusitania_ went down a German mine ended the career of the British
destroyer _Maori_.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XVIII

ITALIAN PARTICIPATION--OPERATIONS IN MANY WATERS

The month of May, 1915, saw new characters enter the theatres of
naval warfare. Italy had now entered the war and brought to the
naval strength of the Allies a minor naval unit.

At the time Italy entered the war she possessed six dreadnoughts,
the _Caio Duilio_ and the _Andrea Doria_, completed in 1915, the
_Conte di Cavour, Giulio Cesare_, and _Leonardo da Vinci_, completed
in 1914, and the _Dante Alighieri_, completed in 1912. Each of
these dreadnoughts had a speed of 23 knots. The _Dante Alighieri_
displaced 19,400 tons and had a main battery of twelve 12-inch guns,
and a complement of 987 men. Each of the other five had thirteen
12-inch guns and a complement of 1,000 men. The displacement of
vessels of the 1914 type was 22,340 tons; that of the 1915 type
23,025 tons. There were many lesser craft flying the Italian flag,
but these larger ships were the most important additions to the
naval forces of the Allies in southern waters.

The chief operations of the Italian navy were directed against
Austria. On May 28, 1915, the Italian admiralty announced the damage
inflicted on Austrian maritime strength up to that date. On May
24, 1915, the Austrian torpedo boat _S-20_ approached the canal
at Porto Corsini, but drew a very heavy fire from concealed and
unsuspected batteries which forced her to leave immediately. The
Austrian torpedo boat destroyer _Scharfschütze_, the scout ship
_Novara_ and the destroyer _Ozepel_, all of the Austrian navy, came
to the assistance of the _S-20_ and also received salvos from the
Italian land batteries. But on the same day the Italian destroyer
_Turbine_, while scouting gave chase to an Austrian destroyer and
the Austrian cruiser _Helgoland_. The strength of these Austrian
ships was too much for the _Turbine_ and she put on speed with
the intention of escaping from their fire, but she was severely
damaged by Austrian shells, and not having enough ammunition aboard
to give a good account of herself, she was scuttled by her own
crew.

It is now necessary to take up again the story of the German raiding
ships at large on the high seas. As has been told above, after the
_Prinz Eitel Friedrich_ ended her career by putting in at Newport
News the only German ships of the kind remaining at large were
the _Karlsruhe_ and _Kronprinz Wilhelm_. But on the 1st of April,
1915, the _Macedonia_, a converted liner which since November,
1914, had been interned at Las Palmas, Canary Islands, succeeded
in slipping out of the harbor laden with provisions and supplies
for use of warships and made her way to South American waters in
spite of the fact that she had run through lines patrolled by British
cruisers.

The _Kronprinz Wilhelm's_ career as a raider ended on April 11,
1915, when, like the _Prinz Eitel Friedrich_, she succeeded in
getting past the British cruisers and slipped into Newport News,
Virginia. How this former Hamburg-American liner had slipped out
of the harbor of New York on the night of August 3, 1914, with
her bunkers and even her cabins filled with coal and provisions,
with all lights out and with canvas covering her port holes has
already been told. From that date until she again put in at an
American port she captured numerous merchant ships, taking 960
prisoners and doing damage amounting to more than $7,000,000. She
kept herself provisioned from her captives, and it was only the
poor condition of her plates and boilers that made her captain
give up raiding when he did. Her movements had been mysterious
during all the time she was at large. She was known to have
reprovisioned the cruiser _Dresden_ and to have taken an almost
stationary position in the South Atlantic in order to act as a
"wireless station" for the squadron of Admiral von Spee. But when the
latter was defeated off the Falkland Islands, she resumed operations
as a raider of commerce. When she came into Newport News more than
60 per cent of her crew were suffering from what was thought to
be beri-beri; she had but twenty-one tons of coal in her bunkers
and almost no ammunition.

The total damage inflicted on the commerce of the Allies by the
_Emden, Karlsruhe, Kronprinz Wilhelm, Prinz Eitel Friedrich, Königsberg,
Dresden_ and _Leipzig_ amounted, by the end of May, 1915, to
$35,000,000. Sixty-seven vessels had been captured and sunk by them.

In the Dardanelles the naval operations were resumed, to some extent,
during the month of May, 1915. For a number of weeks after the
allied fleet had made the great attempt to force the Dardanelles
on March 19, 1915, their commanders attempted no maneuvers with
the larger ships, but the submarines were given work to do. On
April 27, 1915, the British submarine _E-14_, under command of
Lieutenant Commander Boyle, dived and went under the Turkish mine
fields, reaching the waters of the Sea of Marmora. In spite of
the fact that Turkish destroyers knew of its presence and hourly
watched for it in the hope of sinking it, this submarine was able
to operate brilliantly for some days, sinking two Turkish gunboats
and a laden transport. Similar exploits were performed by Lieutenant
Commander Nasmith with the British submarine _E-11_, which even
damaged wharves at the Turkish capital.

But when the military operations were getting under way during
May, 1915, the larger ships of the fleets were again used. The
Germans realizing that these great ships, moving as they did slowly
and deliberately while they fired on the land forts, would be good
targets for torpedoes, sent some of their newest submarines from
the bases in the North Sea, down along the coasts of France and
Spain, through the passage at Gibraltar and to the Dardanelles.
Destroyers accompanying the allied fleets kept diligent watch for
attacks from them. The _Goeben_, one of the German battle cruisers
that had escaped British and French fleets in the Mediterranean
during the first weeks of the war, and which was now a part of
the Turkish navy, was brought to the scene and aided the Turkish
forts in their bombardment of the hostile warships.

On May 12, 1915, the British battleship _Goliath_, of old design
and displacing some 12,000 tons, was sunk by a torpedo. This ship had
been protecting a part of the French fleet from flank attack inside
the straits, and under the cover of darkness had been approached by
a Turkish destroyer which fired the fatal torpedo. It sank almost
immediately.

The submarines of the German navy which had made the long journey
to participate in the action near the Dardanelles got in their
first work on May 26, 1915, when a torpedo fired by one of them
struck the British battleship _Triumph_ and sent her to the bottom.
Of interest to naval authorities all over the world was the fact
that this ship at the time she was struck had out torpedo nets
which were supposed to be torpedo-proof; but the German missile
tore through them and reached the hull. A hunt was made for the
hostile submarine by the British destroyers, but she was found
by the British battleship _Majestic_; but before the British ship
could fire a shot at the German submarine, the latter fired a torpedo
that caught the battleship near her stern and sank her immediately.
Apprehension was now felt for the more formidable ships such as
the _Queen Elizabeth_ and others of her class which were in those
waters; inasmuch as the operations at the Dardanelles assumed more
and more a military rather than a naval character, the British
admiralty thought it wiser to keep the _Queen Elizabeth_ in safer
waters; she was consequently called back to England. Only old
battleships and cruisers were left to cooperate with the troops
operating on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

Naval warfare in southern waters was continued against British
warships by the Austrian navy. On June 9, 1915, the Austrian admiralty
announced that a cruiser of the type of the _Liverpool_ had been
struck by a torpedo fired by an Austrian submarine while the former
was off San Giovanni di Medua, near the Albanian coast. Reports of
the incident issued by the Austrian and British naval authorities
differed, the former claiming that the cruiser had sunk, and the
latter that it had remained afloat and had been towed to an Adriatic
port.

Most unique was an engagement between the Italian submarine _Medusa_
and a similar craft flying the Austrian flag on June 17, 1915.
This was the first time that two submarines had ever fought with
each other. On that day the two submarines, the presence of each
unknown to the other, lay submerged, not a great distance apart.
The _Medusa_, after some hours, came up, allowing only her periscope
to show; seeing no enemy about, her commander brought the rest of
her out of the water. She had not emerged many moments before the
Austrian vessel also came up for a look around and the commander
of the latter espied the Italian submarine through his periscope.
He immediately ordered a torpedo fired; it found a mark in the
hull of the _Medusa_ and she was sent to the bottom. One of her
officers and four of her men were rescued by the Austrian submarine
and made prisoners.

Italy's navy was not to continue to act as a separate naval unit
in the southern naval theatre of war, for on June 18, 1915, the
Minister of Marine of France announced that the "Anglo-French forces
in the Mediterranean were cooperating with the Italian fleet, whose
participation made possible a more effective patrol of the Adriatic.
Warships of the Allies were engaged in finding and destroying oil
depots from which the enemy's submarines had been replenishing
their supplies." This effective patrol did not, however, prevent
an Austrian submarine from sinking an Italian torpedo boat on June
27, 1915.

In the Baltic Sea the naval activity had at no time during the
first year of the war been great, but during the month of June,
1915, there was a minor naval engagement at the mouth of the Gulf
of Riga, during which the Germans lost a transport and the Russians
an auxiliary cruiser. In the other northern waters the Germans
lost the submarine _U-14_, which was sunk on June 9, 1915. The
crew were brought to England as prisoners. Three days later the
British admiralty admitted that two torpedo boats, the _No. 10_
and the _No. 12_ had been lost. The loss of two such small boats
did not worry Britain as much as did the loss of many merchant
ships in the war zone right through the spring and summer of 1915,
and to show that British warships were not immune from submarine
attack, in spite of the fact that many of the underwater craft of
Germany were meeting with disaster, the British cruiser _Roxburgh_
was struck by a torpedo on June 20, 1915, but was able to get away
under her own steam. The rest of the month saw small losses to
nearly all of the fleets engaged in the war, but none of these were
of importance.

The twelfth month of the first year of war was not particularly
eventful in so far as naval history was concerned. On July 1, 1915,
the Germans maneuvered in the Baltic Sea with a small fleet which
accompanied transports bearing men who were to try to land on the
northern shores of Russia. The port of Windau was the point at
which the German bombardment was directed, but Russian torpedo
boats and destroyers fought off the invading German fleet--which
must have been small--and succeeded in chasing the German mine-layer
_Albatross_, making it necessary for her captain to beach her on
the Swedish island of Gothland, where the crew was interned on
July 2, 1915. On the same, day a German predreadnought battleship,
believed to have been the _Pommern_, was sunk at the mouth of Danzig
Bay by a torpedo from a British submarine.

In the Adriatic Austria lost a submarine, the _U-11_, through a
unique action. The submersible was sighted on July 1, 1915, by a
French aeroplane. The aviator dropped two bombs which found their
mark on the deck of the submarine and sank her. Austria had, during
that month, made an attempt to capture the Austrian island of Pelagosa,
which had been occupied by the Italians on July 26, 1915. But July
29, 1915, the fleet of Austrian cruisers and destroyers, which
made the attack, was driven off by unnamed units of the Italian
navy. But a loss by the latter had been incurred on July 7, 1915,
when the armored cruiser _Amalfi_, while scouting in the upper
waters of the Adriatic Sea, was sighted and torpedoed by an Austrian
submarine. She sank, but most of her men were saved. Another Austrian
submarine had the same success on July 17, 1915, when it fired a
torpedo at the Italian cruiser _Giuseppe Garibaldi_, and saw her
go down fifteen minutes later. Italy endeavored to imitate the
actions of Germany when, on July 6, 1915, she proclaimed that the
entire Adriatic Sea was a war zone and that the Strait of Otranto
was in a state of blockade. All the ports of Dalmatia were closed
to every kind of commerce.

Near the coasts of Turkey, toward the end of the first year of
war, there was fought the second duel between submarines. This time
the vanquished vessel was the French submarine _Mariotte_, which,
on July 26, 1915, was sunk by a torpedo from a German submarine in
the waters right near the entrance to the Dardanelles. Britain
ended the first year of naval warfare by destroying the German
cruiser _Königsberg_, which, since the fall of the year before,
had been lying up the Rufiji River in German East Africa, after
having been chased thence by a British cruiser. It was decided to
destroy her in order that she might not get by the sunken hulls
that the British had placed at the mouth of the river in order to
"bottle her up." Consequently, on the morning of July 4, 1915,
after her position had been noted by an aviator, two British river
monitors, _Severn_ and _Mersey_, aided by a cruiser and minor vessels,
began to fire upon the stationary vessel. Their fire was directed
by the aviator who had discovered her, but it was at first almost
ineffective because she lay so well concealed by the vegetation
of the surrounding jungle. She answered their fire and succeeded
in damaging the _Mersey_, but after being bombarded for six hours
she was set on fire. When the British monitors had finished with
her she was a total wreck.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XIX

STORY OF THE "EMDEN"

We now return to the exploits of the _Emden_, its mysterious
disappearance and the narrative of its heroes--a great epic of the
sea.

When in Volume III the story of the sinking of the German cruiser
_Emden_ was related, mention was made of the escape of the landing
party belonging to that ship from Cocos Island. This party consisted
of fifty men, headed by Captain Mücke, and from the time their ship
went down on November 9, 1914, until they reported for duty again
at Damascus, Syria, in May, 1915, they had a series of adventures
as thrilling as those encountered by the heroes in any of the
Renaissance epics.

Before the _Emden_ met the Australian cruiser _Sydney_, and had
been sunk by the latter, she had picked up three officers from
German steamers which she had met. This proved to be a piece of
good fortune, for extra officers were needed to board and command
the prize crews of captured vessels. The story of the raiding of the
_Emden_ has already been given; but here the story of the landing
party is given as told by Captain Mücke himself on May 10, 1915,
at Damascus:

"On November 9, 1914," he said, "I left the _Emden_ in order to
destroy the wireless plant on Cocos Island. I had fifty men, four
machine guns, about thirty rifles. Just as we were about to destroy
the apparatus it reported, 'Careful; _Emden_ near.' The work of
destruction went smoothly. The wireless operators said: 'Thank God.
It's been like being under arrest day and night lately.' Presently
the _Emden_ signaled us, 'Hurry up.' I packed up, but simultaneously
the _Emden's_ siren wailed. I hurried to the bridge and saw the
flag 'Anna' go up. That meant 'Weigh anchor.' We ran like mad to
our boat, but already the _Emden's_ pennant was up, the battle
flag was raised, and they began to fire from the starboard."

"The enemy," explained Captain Mücke, "was concealed by the island
and therefore not to be seen, but I saw the shells strike the water.
To follow and catch the _Emden_ was out of the question, as she
was going at twenty knots, and I only four with my steam pinnace.
Therefore I turned back to land, raised the flag, declared German
laws of war in force, seized all arms, set up my machine guns on shore
in order to guard against a hostile landing. Then I ran out again in
order to observe the fight. From the splash of the shells it looked
as though the enemy had 15-centimeter guns, bigger, therefore, than
the _Emden's_. He fired rapidly but poorly. It was the Australian
cruiser _Sydney_."

According to the account of the Englishmen who saw the first part
of the engagement from the shore, the _Emden_ was cut up rapidly.
Her forward smokestack lay across the deck, and was already burning
fiercely aft. Behind the mainmast several shells struck home.

"We saw the high flame," continued Captain Mücke, "whether circular
fighting or a running fight now followed, I don't know, because
I again had to look to my land defenses. Later, I looked on from
the roof of a house. Now the _Emden_ again stood out to sea about
4,000 to 5,000 yards, still burning. As she again turned toward
the enemy, the forward mast was shot away. On the enemy no outward
damage was apparent, but columns of smoke showed where shots had
struck home. Then the _Emden_ took a northerly course, likewise
the enemy, and I had to stand there helpless, gritting my teeth and
thinking; 'Damn it; the _Emden_ is burning and you aren't aboard!'"

[Illustration: THE CRUISE OF THE "EMDEN" LANDING PARTY]

Captain Mücke, in relating his thrilling adventure, then explained:
"The ships, still fighting, disappeared behind the horizon. I thought
that an unlucky outcome for the _Emden_ was possible, also a landing
by the enemy on the Keeling Island, at least for the purpose of
landing the wounded and taking on provisions. As there were other
ships in the neighborhood, according to the statements of the
Englishmen, I saw myself faced with the certainty of having soon
to surrender because of a lack of ammunition. But for no price
did I and my men want to get into English imprisonment. As I was
thinking about all this, the masts again appeared on the horizon,
the _Emden_ steaming easterly, but very much slower. All at once
the enemy, at high speed, shot by, apparently quite close to the
_Emden_. A high white waterspout showed amidst the black smoke of
the enemy. That was a torpedo. I saw how the two opponents withdrew,
the distance growing greater and greater between them; how they
separated, till they disappeared in the darkness. The fight had
lasted ten hours.

"I had made up my mind to leave the island as quickly as possible.
The _Emden_ was gone; the danger for us growing. In the harbor I
had noticed a three-master, the schooner _Ayesha_. Mr. Ross, the
owner of the ship and of the island, had warned me that the boat
was leaky, but I found it quite a seaworthy tub. Now provisions
for eight weeks, and water for four, were quickly taken on board.
The Englishmen very kindly showed us the best water and gave us
clothing and utensils. They declared this was their thanks for our
'moderation' and 'generosity.' Then they collected the autographs
of our men, photographed them and gave three cheers as our last
boat put off. It was evening, nearly dark, when we sailed away.

"The _Ayesha_ proved to be a really splendid boat. We had only one
sextant and two chronometers on board, but a chronometer journal
was lacking. Luckily I found an 'Old Indian Ocean Directory' of
1882 on board; its information went back to the year 1780.

"I had said: 'We are going to East Africa.' Therefore I sailed
at first westward, then northward. There followed the monsoons,
but then also, long periods of dead calm. Only two neutral ports
came seriously under consideration; Batavia and Padang. At Keeling
I had cautiously asked about Tsing-tau, of which I had naturally
thought first, and so quite by chance I learned that it had fallen.
Now I decided for Padang, because I knew I would be more apt to
meet the _Emden_ there, also because there was a German consul
there, because my schooner was unknown there and because I hoped to
find German ships there, and learn some news. 'It'll take you six
to eight days to reach Batavia' a captain had told me at Keeling.
Now we needed eighteen days to reach Padang, the weather was so
rottenly still."

The suffering of the crew of the _Emden_ on their perilous voyage
is here told in the captain's words: "We had an excellent cook
aboard; he had deserted from the French Foreign Legion. We had to
go sparingly with our water; each man received but three glasses
daily. When it rained, all possible receptacles were placed on
deck and the main sail was spread over the cabin roof to catch the
rain.

"At length as we came in the neighborhood of Padang, on the 26th
of November, 1915, a ship appeared for the first time and looked
for our name. But the name had been painted over, because it was
the former English name. As I thought, 'You're rid of the fellow'
the ship came up again in the evening, and steamed within a hundred
yards of us. I sent all my men below deck, and I promenaded the
deck as the solitary skipper. Through Morse signals the stranger
gave her identity. She proved to be the Hollandish torpedo boat
_Lynx_. I asked by signals, 'Why do you follow me?' No answer.
The next morning I found myself in Hollandish waters, so I raised
pennant and war flag. Now the _Lynx_ came at top speed past us.
As it passed I had my men line up on deck, and gave a greeting.
The greeting was answered. Then, before the harbor at Padang, I
went aboard the _Lynx_ in my well and carefully preserved uniform
and declared my intentions. The commandant opined that I could run
into the harbor, but whether I might come out again was doubtful.

"Three German ships were in the harbor at Padang," continues Captain
Mücke. "The harbor authorities demanded the certification for pennant
and war flag, also papers to prove that I was the commander of
this warship. For that, I answered, I was only responsible to my
superior officer. Now they advised me most insistently to allow
ourselves to be interned peacefully. They said it wasn't at all
pleasant in the neighborhood. We'd fall into the hands of the Japanese
or the English. As a matter of fact, we again had great luck. On
the day before a Japanese warship had been cruising around here.
Naturally, I rejected all the well-meant and kindly advice, and
did this in the presence of my lieutenants. I demanded provisions,
water, sails, tackle, and clothing. They replied we could take on
board everything which we had formerly had on board, but nothing
which would mean an increase in our naval strength.

"First thing, I wanted to improve our wardrobe, for I had only
one sock, a pair of shoes, and one clean shirt, which had become
rather threadbare. My comrades had even less. But the master of the
port declined to let us have, not only charts, but also clothing
and toothbrushes, on the ground that these would be an increase in
armament. Nobody could come aboard, nobody could leave the ship
without permission. I requested that the consul be allowed to come
aboard. The consul, Herr Schild, as also did the brothers Bäumer,
gave us assistance in the friendliest fashion. From the German
steamers boats could come alongside and talk with us. Finally, we
were allowed to have German papers. They were, to be sure, from
August only. From then until March, 1915, we saw no papers.

"Hardly had we been towed out of the harbor again after twenty-four
hours, on the evening of the 28th of November, 1914, when a searchlight
flashed before us. I thought, 'Better interned than prisoner.' I
put out all lights and withdrew to the shelter of the island. But
they were Hollanders and didn't do anything to us. Then for two
weeks more we drifted around, lying still for days. The weather was
alternately still, rainy, and blowy. At length a ship, a freighter,
came in sight. It saw us and made a big curve around us. I made
everything hastily 'clear for battle.' Then one of our officers
recognized her for the _Choising_. She showed the German flag. I
sent up light rockets, although it was broad day, and went with
all sails set, that were still setable, toward her. The _Choising_
was a coaster from Hongkong to Siam. She was at Singapore when
the war broke out, then went to Batavia, was chartered, loaded
with coal for the enemy, and had put into Padang in need, because
the coal in the hold had caught fire. There we had met her.

"Great was our joy now. I had an my men come on deck and line up
for review. The fellows hadn't a rag on. Thus, in nature's garb,
we gave three cheers for the German flag on the _Choising_. The
men of the _Choising_ told us afterward 'We couldn't make out what
that meant, those stark-naked fellows all cheering.' The sea was
too high, and we had to wait two days before we could board the
_Choising_ on December 16, 1914. We took very little with us; the
schooner was taken in tow. In the afternoon we sank the _Ayesha_ and
were all very sad. The good old _Ayesha_ had served us faithfully
for six weeks. The log showed that we had made 1,709 sea miles
under sail since leaving Keeling. She wasn't at all rotten and
unseaworthy, as they had told me, but nice and white and dry inside.
I had grown fond of the boat, on which I could practice my old
sailing maneuvers. The only trouble was that the sails would go
to pieces every now and then, because they were so old.

"But anyway, she went down quite properly. We had bored a hole
in her; she filled slowly and then all of a sudden disappeared.
That was the saddest day of the whole month. We gave her three
cheers, and my next yacht at Kiel will be named _Ayesha_, that is
sure.

"To the captain of the _Choising_ I had said, when I hailed him,
'I do not know what will happen to the ship. The war situation
may make it necessary for me to strand it.' He did not want to
undertake the responsibility. I proposed that we work together,
and I would take the responsibility. Then we traveled together
for three weeks, from Padang to Hodeida. The _Choising_ was some
ninety meters long, and had a speed of nine miles, though sometimes
only four. If she had not accidentally arrived I had intended to
cruise along the west coast of Sumatra to the region of the northern
monsoon. I came about six degrees north, then over toward Aden
to the Arabian coast. In the Red Sea the northeastern monsoon,
which here blows southeast, could bring us to Djidda. I had heard
in Padang that Turkey was still allied with Germany, so we would
be able to get safely through Arabia to Germany.

"I next waited for information through ships, but the _Choising_
did not know anything definite, either. By way of the _Luchs_, the
_Königsberg_ and _Kormoran_ the reports were uncertain. Besides,
according to newspapers at Aden, the Arabs were said to have fought
with the English; therein there seemed to be offered an opportunity
near at hand to damage the enemy. I therefore sailed with the _Choising_
in the direction of Aden. Lieutenant Cordts of the _Choising_ had
heard that the Arabian railway already went almost to Hodeida,
near the Perin Strait. The ship's surgeon there, Docounlang, found
confirmation of this in Meyer's Traveling Handbook. This railway
could not have been taken over by the Englishmen, who always dreamt
of it. By doing this they would have further and completely wrought
up the Mohammedans by making more difficult the journey to Mecca.
Best of all, we thought, 'We'll simply step into the express train
and whizz nicely away to the North Sea.' Certainly there would be
safe journeying homeward through Arabia. To be sure, we had maps
of the Red Sea; but it was the shortest way to the foe whether in
Aden or in Germany.

"On the 7th of January, 1915, between nine and ten o'clock in the
evening, we sneaked through the Strait of Perin. It lay swarming
full of Englishmen. We steered along the African coast, close past an
English cable layer. That was my greatest delight--how the Englishmen
will be vexed when they learn that we passed safely by Perin. On
the next evening we saw on the coast a few lights near the water.
We thought that must be the pier of Hodeida. But when we measured
the distance by night, three thousand meters, I began to think
that must be something else. At dawn I made out two masts and four
smokestacks; that was an enemy ship and, what is more, an armored
French cruiser. I therefore ordered the _Choising_ to put to sea,
and to return at night.

[Illustration: WAR ZONE

AROUND

THE BRITISH ISLES

AND

THE RED CROSS SERVICE · A BRITISH MONITOR · THE DEATH OF A TRAITOR

The conning tower and periscope of a submarine whose officers are
taking observations on the surface. In the War Zone submarines
sank merchantmen and passenger ships]

[Illustration: Prayer in a French church which the exigencies of
war have converted into a Red Cross hospital]

[Illustration: French soldiers bringing up wounded Germans found
in captured trenches and putting them in ambulances to be carried
to the nearest military hospitals]

[Illustration: A Red Cross dog has been hurt while performing invaluable
service in seeking out the wounded. Now the dog's own injuries are
being carefully dressed]

[Illustration: The death of a traitor to France. It was believed
that he used the wings of a windmill for signalling information
to the Germans]

[Illustration: One of the new British monitors bombarding the German
base at Ostend, Belgium. The monitor is armed with one powerful
15-inch gun]

[Illustration: Lifeboats and drowning passengers from the "Falaba,"
a passenger ship torpedoed by a German submarine March 28, 1915.
More than 140 people were drowned]

[Illustration: The Great liner, "Lusitania," which was torpedoed
by a German submarine, not far from Old Kinsald Head, Ireland,
May 7, 1915]

"The next day and night the same; then we put out four boats--these
we pulled to shore at sunrise under the eyes of the unsuspecting
Frenchmen. The sea reeds were thick. A few Arabs came close to us;
then there ensued a difficult negotiation with the Arabian coast
guards. For we did not even know whether Hodeida was in English
or French hands. We waved to them, laid aside our arms, and made
signs to them. The Arabs, gathering together, began to rub two
fingers together; that means 'We are friends.' We thought it meant
'We are going to rub against you and are hostile.' I therefore
said: 'Boom-boom' and pointed to the warship. At all events, I
set up my machine guns and made preparations for a skirmish. But,
thank God, one of the Arabs understood the word 'Germans'; that
was good.

"Soon a hundred Arabs came and helped us and as we marched into
Hodeida the Turkish soldiers who had been called out against us
saluted us as Allies and friends. To be sure, there was not a trace
of a railway, but we were received very well and they assured us
we could get through by land. Therefore, I gave red-star signals
at night, telling the _Choising_ to sail away, since the enemy
was near by. Inquiries and deliberations concerning a safe journey
by land proceeded. I also heard that in the interior about six
days' journey away, there was healthy highland where our fever
invalids could recuperate. I therefore determined to journey next
to Sana. On the kaiser's birthday we held a great parade in common
with the Turkish troops--all this under the noses of the Frenchmen.
On the same day we marched away from Hodeida to the highland.

"Two months later we again put to sea. The time spent in the highland
of Sana passed in lengthy inquiries and discussions that finally
resulted in our foregoing the journey by land through Arabia, for
religious reasons. But the time was not altogether lost. The men
who were sick with malaria had, for most part, recuperated in the
highland air.

"The Turkish Government placed at our disposal two sambuks (sailing
ships), of about twenty-five tons, fifteen meters long and four
wide. But, in fear of English spies, we sailed from Jebaua, ten
miles north of Hodeida. That was on March 14, 1915. At first we
sailed at a considerable distance apart, so that we would not both
be captured if an English gunboat caught us. Therefore, we always
had to sail in coastal water. That is full of coral reefs, however."

Captain Mücke had charge of the first sambuk. Everything went well
for three days. On the third day the order was given for the sambuks
to keep near together because the pilot of the first one was sailing
less skillfully than the other. Suddenly, in the twilight the men
in the second sambuk felt a shock, then another, and a third. The
water poured into it rapidly. It had run upon the reef of a small
island, where the smaller sambuk had been able to pass on account
of its lighter draft. Soon the stranded boat began to list over,
and the twenty-eight men aboard had to sit on the gunwale.

"We could scarcely move," narrated Lieutenant Gerdts, who commanded
the stranded boat. "The other boat was nowhere in sight. Now it
grew dark. At this stage I began to build a raft of spars and old
pieces of wood that might keep us afloat. But soon the first boat
came into sight again. The commander turned about and sent over
his little canoe; in this and in our own canoe, in which two men
could sit at each trip, we first transferred the sick. Now the
Arabs began to help us. But just then the tropical helmet of our
doctor suddenly appeared above the water in which he was standing
up to his ears. Thereupon the Arabs withdrew: We were Christians,
and they did not know that we were friends. Now the other sambuk
was so near that we could have swum to it in half an hour, but
the seas were too high. At each trip a good swimmer trailed along,
hanging to the painter of the canoe. When it became altogether
dark we could not see the boat any more, for over there they were
prevented by the wind from keeping any light burning. My men asked:
'In what direction shall we swim?' I answered: 'Swim in the direction
of this or that star; that must be about the direction of the boat.'
Finally a torch flared up over there--one of the torches that was
still left from the _Emden_. But we had suffered considerably through
submersion. One sailor cried out: 'Oh, psha! It's all up with us
now, that's a searchlight.' About ten o'clock we were all safe
aboard, but one of our typhus patients wore himself out completely
by exertion and died a week later. On the next morning we went over
again to the wreck in order to seek the weapons that had fallen
into the water. You see, the Arabs dive so well; they fetched up
a considerable lot--both machine guns, all but ten of the rifles,
though these were, to be sure, all full of water. Later they frequently
failed to go off when they were used in firing.

"Now we numbered, together with the Arabs, seventy men on the little
boat. Then we anchored before Konfida and met Sami Bey. He had
shown himself useful, even before, in the service of the Turkish
Government, and had done good service as a guide in the last months
of the adventure. He procured for us a larger boat of fifty-four tons.
We sailed from the 20th of March, 1915, to the 24th, unmolested to
Lith. There Sami Bey announced that three English ships were cruising
about in order to intercept us. I therefore advised traveling a bit
overland. I disliked leaving the sea a second time, but it had to
be done."

Captain Mücke explained that Lith is nothing but desert, and therefore
it was very difficult to get up a caravan at once. They marched away
on March 28, 1915, with only a vague suspicion that the English
might have agents here also. They could travel only at night, and
when they slept or camped around a spring, there was only a tent for
the sick men. Two days' march from Jeddah, the Turkish Government
having received word about the crew, sent sixteen good camels.

"Suddenly, on the night of April 1, 1915, things became uneasy,"
said Captain Mücke. "I was riding at the head of the column. All
our shooting implements were cleared for action, because there was
danger of an attack from Bedouins, whom the English had bribed.
When it began to grow a bit light I thought: 'We're through for
to-day'; for we were tired--had been riding eighteen hours. Suddenly
I saw a line flash up before me, and shots whizzed over our heads.
Down from the camels! We formed a fighting line. You know how quickly
it becomes daylight there. The whole space around the desert hillock
was occupied. Now we had to take up our guns. We rushed at the enemy.
They fled, but returned again, this time from all sides. Several of
the gendarmes that had been given to us as an escort were wounded;
the machine-gun operator fell, killed by a shot through the heart;
another was wounded. Lieutenant Schmidt was mortally wounded. He
received a bullet in the chest and another in the abdomen.

"Suddenly, they waved white cloths. The sheik, to whom a part of
our camels belonged, went over to them to negotiate, then Sami
Bey and his wife. In the interim we quickly built a sort of wagon
barricade, a circular camp of camel saddles, of rice and coffee
sacks, all of which we filled with sand. We had no shovels, and had
to dig with our bayonets, plates, and hands. The whole barricade
had a diameter of fifty meters. Behind it were dug trenches, which
we deepened even during the skirmish. The camels inside had to
lie down, and thus served very well as cover for the rear of the
trenches. Then an inner wall was constructed, behind which we carried
the sick men. In the very center we buried two jars of water, to
guard us against thirst. In addition we had ten petroleum cans full
of water; all told, a supply for four days. Late in the evening
Sami's wife came back from the futile negotiations, alone. She had
unveiled for the first and only time on this day of the skirmish,
had distributed cartridges and had acted faultlessly.

"Soon we were able to ascertain the number of the enemy. There
were about 300 men; we numbered fifty, with twenty-nine machine
guns. In the night Lieutenant Schmidt died. We had to dig his grave
with our hands and with our bayonets, and to eliminate every trace
above it, in order to protect the body. Rademacher had been buried
immediately after the skirmish with all honors.

"The wounded had a hard time of it. We had lost our medicine chest
in the wreck; we had only little packages of bandages for skirmishes;
but no probing instrument, no scissors, were at hand. On the next day
our men came up with thick tongues, feverish, and crying: 'Water,
water!' But each one received only a little cupful three times
each day. If our water supply became exhausted we would have to
sally forth from our camp and fight our way through. At night we
always dragged out the dead camels that had served as cover and
had been shot.

"This continued about three days. On the third day there were new
negotiations. Now the Bedouins demanded arms no longer, but only
money. This time the negotiations took place across the camp wall.
When I declined the Bedouin said, 'Lots of fight.' I said, 'Please
go to it.'

"We had only a little ammunition left, and very little water. Now
it really looked as if we would soon be dispatched. The mood of
the men was pretty dismal. Suddenly, at about ten o'clock in the
morning, there bobbed up in the north two riders on camels, waving
white cloths. Soon afterward there appeared, coming from the same
direction, far back, a long row of camel troops, about a hundred;
they drew rapidly nearer, rode singing toward us, in a picturesque
train. They were the messengers and the troops of the Emir of Mecca.

"Sami Bey's wife, it developed, had in the course of the first
negotiations, dispatched an Arab boy to Jeddah. From that place
the governor had telegraphed to the emir. The latter at once sent
camel troops with his two sons and his personal surgeon; the elder,
Abdullah, conducted the negotiations, and the surgeon acted as
interpreter in French. Now things proceeded in one-two-three order,
and the whole Bedouin band speedily disappeared. From what I learned
later I know definitely that they had been corrupted with bribes by
the English. They knew when and where we would pass, and they had
made all preparations. Now our first act was a rush for water; then
we cleared up our camp, but had to harness our camels ourselves, for
the camel drivers had fled at the very beginning of the skirmish.

"Then, under the safe protection of Turkish troops, we got to Jeddah.
There the authorities and the populace received us very well. From
there we proceeded in nineteen days by sail boat to Elwesh, and
under abundant guard with the Suleiman Pasha, in a five-day caravan
journeyed to El Ula."

"Have I received the Iron Cross?" was the first question Captain
Mücke asked when he got to that place, and old newspapers which
he found there told him that he had. A few days later the party
was on train, riding toward Germany.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XX

SUMMARY OF THE FIRST YEAR OF NAVAL WARFARE

The first year of the war came to an end in August, 1915, with
the naval situation much the same as it stood at the end of the
first six months. The navy of practically every belligerent was
intact; the Allies enjoyed the freedom of the seas, but the fact
that a German fleet lay intact in the North Sea, and an Austrian
fleet lay intact in the Adriatic Sea, indicated only the naval
supremacy of the Allies, but not that they had won decisive naval
victories.

As there had been no victory there had been no defeat, yet there
had been losses to all concerned. The mine and the submarine had
changed somewhat the methods of naval warfare--the enemies "nibbled"
at their opponents' fleets. Battleships were lost, though the first
year of the Great War had seen no pitched battle between ships of
that class.

During the second six months of the war England lost the five old
battleships _Irresistible, Ocean, Goliath, Triumph_, and _Majestic_;
the destroyers _Recruit_ and _Maori_; and the submarine _E-15_ and
another unidentified; and the auxiliary cruisers _Clan McNaughton,
Bayano_, and _Princess Irene_. Her ally France had lost, during the
same period, the old battleship _Bouvet_, the cruiser _Leon Gambetta_,
the destroyer _Dague_, and the submarines _Joule, Mariotte_, and
one unidentified.

The losses on the other side were confined to the German navy,
with the exception of the Turkish cruiser _Medjidieh_. Germany lost
the battleship _Pommern_; the cruisers _Dresden_ and _Königsberg_;
the submarines _U-12, U-29, U-8_, one of the type of the _U-2_,
and another unidentified; two unidentified torpedo boats; and the
auxiliary cruisers _Prinz Eitel Friedrich_ (interned), _Holger,
Kronprinz Wilhelm_ (interned), and _Macedonia_. Also the destroyer
_G-196_, the mine layer _Albatross_, and the auxiliary cruise _Meteor_.

In retaliation for having her flag swept from the seas, Germany's
submarines, during the second six months of the war, had sunk a
total of 153 merchant ships, including those belonging to neutral
countries as well as to her enemies. The total tonnage of these
was about 500,000 tons; 1,643 persons died in going down with these
ships.

Not of the least importance were the precedents that were established,
or attempted to be established, by Germany in conducting naval
warfare with her submarine craft. In a note delivered to the United
States Government, the German Government declared that British
merchant vessels were not only armed and instructed to resist or
even attack submarines, but often disguised as to nationality.
Under such circumstances it was assumed to be impossible for a
submarine commander to conform to the established custom of visit
and search. Accordingly, vessels of neutral nations were urgently
warned not to enter the submarine war zone. The war zone which she
proclaimed about Great Britain had no precedent in history, and
it immediately brought to her door a number of controversies with
neutrals, particularly the United States. The sinking of liners
carrying passengers claiming citizenship in neutral countries was
another precedent, which had the same effect with regard to diplomatic
exchanges.

Predictions that had been made long before the war came were found
to be worthless; there were those who had predicted that Germany
in the event of war with England would give immediate battle with
her largest ships; but twelve months went by without an actual
battle between superdreadnoughts. "Der Tag" had not come. There
were those who had predicted that the British navy would force
the German ships out of their protected harbors. "We shall dig
the rats out of their holes," said Mr. Winston Churchill, British
Secretary of State for the Navy in the early months of the war.
Mr. Churchill was removed from his position, and twelve months
passed by with the German ships still in their "holes."

Certain lessons had been taught naval authorities of all nations
through the actual use of the modern battleship in war. The first
year showed that the largest ships must have very high speed and
long gun range. To some extent the fact that the fighting ships of
nearly all of the belligerent countries were thus equipped changed
battle tactics.

When the allied fleets had started their bombardment of the Turkish
forts at the Dardanelles they were breaking certain well-defined
rules which had been axiomatic with naval authorities. The greatest
of modern battleships were designed to fight with craft of their
like, but not to take issue with land fortifications. For weeks,
while the fleets succeeded in silencing for a time some of the
Turkish forts, it was thought that this rule no longer held good.
But when, after March 19, 1915, the fleets ceased attempting to
take the passage without military cooperation, the worth of the
rule was reestablished. The ease with which the bombarding ships
were made victims of hostile submarines was greatly instrumental
in making the rule again an axiom.

The naval supremacy of the allied powers brought them certain
advantages--advantages which they had without winning a decisive
victory. Germany and Austria were cut off from the Western Hemisphere,
and were troubled, in consequence, by shortage in food for their
civilian populations to a greater or lesser degree. This was perhaps
a negative benefit derived by the Allies from their naval supremacy;
the affirmative benefit was that their own communications with
the Western Hemisphere were maintained, enabling them not only to
get food for their civilian populations, but arms and munitions
for their armies; and even financial arrangements, which, if their
emissaries could not pass back and forth freely could not have
been made, depended on their control of the high seas.

They were able to keep the Channel clear of submarines long enough
to permit the passage of the troops, which England from time to
time during the first year of the war sent to the Continent, and
permitted the participation of the troops of the British overseas
dominions, the troops from Canada joining those in France, and
the troops from New Zealand and Australia taking their places in
the trenches along the Suez Canal and on the Gallipoli Peninsula.
Thus, to a certain extent, the advantage of continuous railroad
communication which was enjoyed by the Teutonic allies "inside" the
arena of military operations was offset by the naval communication
maintained by the Entente Powers "outside" the arena of military
operations.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXI

FIGHTS OF THE SUBMARINES

When, on the 5th of February, 1915, the German admiralty proclaimed
a "war zone" around the British Isles and announced that it would
fight the sea power of the Allies with submarines, a new era in
naval warfare had opened. In all previous wars, and in the earlier
months of the Great War, submarines were employed as auxiliaries
to the larger naval units. The Germans were the first to use them
as separate units. The idea of sending a fleet of submarines out on
to the high seas was a new one, and had been impossible in the last
war in which they had been used--that between Russia and Japan. But
the improvements which had been made in their design and equipment
since then had made an actual cruising submarine possible, and
made possible the new phase of naval warfare inaugurated by the
German admiralty.

While Germany was the last great sea power to adopt the submarine
as a weapon, both England and Germany, in the years immediately
preceding the war, had spent the same amounts of money on this
sort of craft--about $18,000,000--but while the Germans had later
given as much attention to them as to any other sort of naval craft,
the British authorities did not figure on employing the submarine
as a separate offensive tactical unit being sufficiently equipped
in large ships carrying large guns. And being weaker in capital
ships Germany was compelled to rely upon underwater warfare in
her campaign of attrition. Not only were the naval authorities
of the rest of the world uninformed about the improvements that
German submarines carried, but they were fooled even as to the
actual number which Germany had built.

The most modern of the German submarines at the time had a length
of 213 feet and a beam of twenty feet, these dimensions giving
them sufficient deck space to mount thereon two rapid-fire guns,
one of 3.5 inches and another of 1.4 inches. Their displacement was
900 tons, and they could make a speed of 18 knots when traveling
"light" (above water), and 12 knots when traveling submerged. These
speeds made it possible for them to overtake all but the fastest
merchantmen, though not fast enough to run away from destroyers,
gunboats, and fast cruisers. Their range of operation was 2,000
miles, and in the early months of 1915, it was possible for Germany
to send two or three of them from their base in the North Sea to
the Mediterranean. Germany was at the same time experimenting with
a larger type, with a displacement of 1,200 tons and an operating
distance of 5,000 miles.

The ordinary submarine in service at the beginning of the war could
remain below the surface for twenty-four hours at least. Reserve
amounts of air for breathing were carried in tanks under pressure,
and in the German type there were also chemical improvements for
regenerating air. Contrary to the opinion of laymen, submerging
was accomplished both by letting water into ballast tanks, and
also by properly deflecting a set of rudders; every submarine had
two sets of rudders, one of which worked in vertical planes and
pointed the prow of the ship either to the left or the right; the
other pair worked in horizontal planes and turned the prow either
upward or downward. A pair of fins on the sides of the hull assisted
action in both rising and diving. The action of water against the
fins and rudders when the ship was in motion was exactly the same
as that of the air against the planes of a kite; to submerge one
of the craft it was necessary to have it in motion and to have
its horizontal rudders so placed that the resistance of the water
would drive the ship downward; the reverse operation drove it upward.
And here lay a danger, for if the engines of a diving submarine
stopped she was bound to come to the surface. Her presence, while
moving entirely submerged could be detected by a peculiar swell
which traveled on the water above; if submerged only so much as
to leave the tip of her periscope still showing, the latter left
an easily discernible wake.

The periscope was merely a tube in which there were arranged mirrors
so that anything reflected in the first mirror, the one above the
surface of the water, was again reflected till it showed in a mirror
at the bottom of the tube, within the hull of the vessel, where
its commander could observe it safely. A crew of about twenty-five
men was necessary to operate one of these crafts, and theirs was
an unpleasant duty, first because of the danger that accompanied
each submergence of their vessel; second because of the discomforts
abroad. The explosive engines which drove the craft, whether burning
oil or the lighter refinements such as gasoline, gave off gases
that caused headaches and throbbing across the forehead; and it
was almost impossible to heat the interior of the craft.

Though merchantmen had gone to the bottom as victims of German
submarines before, the proclamation of a "war zone" was issued
they were individual cases; the first instance of a merchant ship
being sunk as a result of the new policy of the German admiralty
was the sinking of the British steamer _Cambark_ on the 20th of
February, 1915. This ship was bound for Liverpool, from Huelva,
Spain. While off the north coast of Wales, on the morning of the
20th, the periscope of a hostile submarine was sighted only 200
yards ahead. The engines of the steamship were immediately reversed,
but she had no time to make off, for a torpedo caught her amidships
and she started to sink immediately. Her crew managed to get off
in small boats, but all of their personal belongings were lost.

The small Irish coasting steamer _Downshire_ was made a victim
on the 21st of February, 1915, but instead of sending a torpedo
into her hull, the commander of the _U-12_, the submarine which
overhauled her, resorted to boarding. After trying to elude the
submarine by steering a zigzag course, the _Downshire_ was finally
overtaken. The crew was ordered to take to the small boats, while
nineteen men of the submarine, which had come above water, watched
the operations from the deck. A crew from the submarine took one of
the small boats of the steamship and rowed toward her. They placed
a bomb in a vital spot and set it off, sinking the merchantman.
In this way the submarine's commander had saved a torpedo. A
conversation which took place between the captains of the two craft
revealed the methods by which the submarine commanders were able,
not only to steal up on their intended victims, but to elude being
sighted by the patrolling British warships. Some fishing smacks
had been in the vicinity while the _Downshire_ was sunk, and the
British captain asked the German captain why they had not been
attacked. The latter hinted that his plans worked best if the fishing
boats were unmolested. When asked whether he had hidden behind
one these little boats he changed the subject, but it was learned
later that the commanders of the submarines made a practice of
coming to the surface right near fishing boats and bade them act
as screens while they lay in wait for victims. By keeping the small
boats covered with a deck gun or by putting a boarding crew aboard,
it was possible for the commanders of the submarines to keep their
periscopes or the hulls of their vessels behind the sails of the
fishing boats, unobservable to lookouts on larger ships.

By the 23d of February, 1915, the success of German submarines
had been so marked that the insurance rates on merchantmen went
up. Lloyd's underwriters announced that the rate on transatlantic
passage had gone up nearly one per cent. And on the same day it
was announced that the British Government would thereafter regulate
steamship traffic in the Irish Sea. Certain areas of the Irish
Sea were closed to all kinds of traffic; lines of passage were
defined and had to be followed by all merchantmen, and vessels
of all descriptions were ordered to keep away from certain parts
of the coast from sunset to sunrise.

The comparatively small size of the submarines made it possible
for the German admiralty to load them on to trains in sections
and transport them where needed, and in this manner some were sent
from the German ports on the North Sea to Zeebrugge, there assembled
and launched. Others were sent to the Adriatic, arriving at Pola
on the 25th of February, 1915. These were intended for use in the
Mediterranean as well as in the Adriatic Sea.

Neutral ships, in order to escape attack by German submarines had
to resort to unusual methods of self-identification. The use of flags
belonging to neutral countries by the merchantmen of belligerent
powers made the usual identification by colors almost impossible,
the German admiralty claiming that the commanders of submarines were
unable to wait long enough, after stopping a vessel, to ascertain
whether she had a right to fly one flag or another. Consequently
the ships belonging to Dutch and American lines had their names
painted with large lettering along their sides. At night, streamers
of electric lights were hung over the sides to illuminate these
letterings; and on the decks of many of the neutral ships their
names and nationalities were painted in large letters so that they
might be identified by aircraft. Owing to such precautions the
Dutch steamship _Prinzes Juliana_ escaped being sunk by a torpedo
on the 3d of March, 1915. A submarine ran a parallel course to
that followed by the Dutch ship, but after examining the lettering
on her sides the commander of the German craft saw that she was
not legitimate game and turned off.

Not always did the German submarines themselves succeed in escaping
unharmed in their raiding of allied merchantmen. Rewards were offered
in Great Britain for the sinking of German submersibles by the
commanders of British merchantmen. Instructions were issued in
the British shipping periodicals, showing how a submarine might
be sunk by being rammed. It was officially announced on the 5th
of March, 1915, by the British admiralty, that the _U-8_ had been
rammed and sunk by a British warship. The crew of twenty-nine was
rescued and brought to Dover. For the British this was a stroke
of good fortune, for while the _U-8_ was of an earlier type it
was a dangerous craft, having a total displacement of 300 tons,
a radius of operation of 1,200 miles, a speed of 13 knots when
traveling "light" and a speed of 8 knots when submerged. On the
same day the French minister of marine announced that a French
warship had come upon a German submarine of the type of the _U-2_
in the North Sea and that after firing at the hull of the vessel
and hitting it three times it was seen to sink and did not reappear.

During the last week of February and the first week of March, 1915,
bad weather on the waters surrounding the British Isles hampered
the operations of German submarines to an extent which led the
British public to believe that the submarine warfare on merchantmen
had been abandoned, but they were disillusioned when on the 9th
of March, 1915, three British ships were sunk by the underwater
craft. The steamship _Tangistan_ was torpedoed off Scarborough, the
_Blackwood_ off Hastings and the _Princess Victoria_ near Liverpool.
Part of this was believed to be the work of the _U-16_.

In the three days beginning March 10, 1915, eight ships were made
victims of German submarines in the waters about the British Isles.
Most novel was the experience of a crowd gathered on the shore of
one of the Scilly Islands on March 12, 1915, when two of these
eight ships, the _Indian City_ and the _Headlands_, were torpedoed.
At about eight in the morning the islanders on St. Mary's Island
saw a German submarine overtake the former and sink her. The German
vessel then remained in the adjacent waters to watch for the approach
of another victim, while two patrol boats near by put out and opened
fire on her. The crowd saw the enemies exchange shots at a distance
of ten miles off shore. But neither side put in any effective shots,
and the combat ended when the submarine dived and retired.

The steamship _Headlands_ was then sighted by the commander of the
submarine and he immediately started to pursue her. The steamship
steered a zigzag course, but the submarine got in a position to
launch a torpedo, and at about half past ten in the morning the
crowd on the shore saw steam escaping from her in large quantities.
Some time after they saw a large volume of black smoke and débris
fly upward and they knew that another torpedo had found its mark. She
then settled, her crew and the men from the _Indian City_ reaching
St. Mary's in small boats.

To keep British harbors free from the German submarines the British
admiralty had to set their engineers to work to devise some method
of trapping the underwater craft automatically, for there seemed
to be no sort of patrol which they could not elude. Steel traps,
not unlike the gill nets used by fishermen, were finally hit upon
as the best thing to use against the submarines, and by March 13,
1915, a number of these were installed at entrances to some of
the British harbors. They were made of malleable iron frames, ten
feet square, used in sets of threes, so arranged that they might
hold a submarine by the sides and have the third of the set buckle
against its bottom. They were suspended by buoys about thirty feet
below the surface of the water. When a submarine entered one of
these it was held fast, for the frame which came up from the bottom
caught the propeller and made it impossible for the submarine to
work itself loose. The disadvantage to the submarine was that,
while traveling under water, it traveled "blind"; the periscopes
in use were good only for observation when the top of them were
above water; when submerged the commander of a submarine had to
steer by chart. By the end of March, 1915, a dozen submarines had
been caught in nets of this kind.

By the 18th of March, 1915, three more British ships had been made
the victims of German torpedoes. The _Atlanta_ was sunk off the
west coast of Ireland only a day before the _Fingal_ was sunk off
Northumberland. And the _Leeuwarden_ was sunk by being hit from
the deck guns of a German submarine off the coast of Holland. There
was no loss of life except during the sinking of the _Fingal_,
some of whose men were drowned when she dragged a lifeboat full
of men down with her.

By way of variety the Germans attempted to sink a British ship
in the "war zone" with bombs dropped from an airship, the news
of which was brought to England by the crew and captain of the
_Blonde_ when they reached shore on March 18, 1915. This ship had
been German originally, but being in a British port when the war
started was taken over and run by a British crew. Two or three
mornings before the men landed they had noticed a Taube aeroplane
circling over their ship at about 500 feet altitude. It then swept
downward and took a close look at the vessel. Two bombs, which fell
into the water near the ship, were droppd by the German aviator.
The captain of the _Blonde_ ordered that the rudder of his ship be
fastened so that she might drive in a circle and her engines were
set at full speed, with the intention of making a more difficult
target for the airship's bombs. The whistle of the ship was set
going and continued to blow in the hope of attracting help from
other ships. More bombs were near the vessel, but none of them
found its mark. After one more attempt, when only 300 feet above
the ship's deck, the aviator let go with his last supply, but again
being unsuccessful he veered off to the north and allowed the _Blonde_
to escape.

The naval attack on the Dardanelles is told in another chapter,
but the work of the Allies' submarines there included the use of
French submarines, which is not narrated elsewhere. On the 19th
of March, 1915, Rear Admiral Guepratte of the French navy reported
that one of his submarines had attempted, without success, to run
through the Dardanelles. The object of the attempt was to sink
the Turkish battle cruiser _Sultan Selim_, formerly the _Goeben_.
The submarine submerged and got as far as Nagara. But she had to
travel "blind" and her captain, being unfamiliar with those waters,
struck some rocks near the shore and immediately brought her to
the surface. She became a target for the land guns of the Turks at
once and was sunk, only a few of her men, who were taken prisoners,
escaping death.

On the 19th of March, 1915, the British admiralty reported that
the three British ships, _Hyndford, Bluejacket_, and _Glenartney_
had been torpedoed in the "war zone" without warning, with the
loss of only one man. Beachy Head in the British Channel had been
the scene of most of the operations of German submarines against
British ships, and consequently, when on the 21st of March, 1915,
the collier _Cairntorr_ was torpedoed in that region, no unusual
comment was made by the admiralty. Heretofore the scene of the
latest attack had been thought worthy of mention on account of the
unusual and unexpected places that submarines chose for action.

A new phase of the submarines' activities was opened on March 21,
1915, when two Dutch ships _Batavier V_ and _Zaanstroom_ were held
up and captured. The _U-28_ had for some days been hiding near the
Maas Lightship, and had been taking shots with torpedoes at every
ship which came within range. The _Batavier V_ had left the Hook of
Holland on March 18, 1915. At about five o'clock that morning she
came near the Maas Lightship on her way to England, whence she
was carrying provisions and a register of fifty-seven persons,
including passengers and crew; among the former there were a number
of women and children. Suddenly a submarine appeared off her port
bow, and her captain was ordered to stop his ship. This he did
readily, for he had been thus stopped before, only to be allowed to
proceed. But this time the commander of the submarine, the _U-28_,
shouted to him through a megaphone: "I am going to confiscate your
ship and take it to Zeebrugge."

While the two commanders were arguing over the illegality of this,
the _Zaanstroom_ was sighted, and was immediately overtaken by the
submarine. An officer and a sailor from the submarine had been
placed on the _Batavier V_, and this prevented her escaping while
the pursuit of the _Zaanstroom_ was on. A similar detail was now
placed on the latter, and her captain was ordered to follow the
_U-28_ which returned to the _Batavier V_. "Follow me to Zeebrugge"
was the order which the commander of the submarine gave the two
ships, and their captains obeyed. They arrived at Zeebrugge at
noon, and were immediately unloaded. Those of the passengers and
crews who were citizens of neutral countries were sent to Ghent
and there released, while all those aboard, such as Belgians and
Frenchmen, were detained.

When possible, the commanders of the German submarines saved their
costly torpedoes and used shell fire instead to sink their victims.
This was done in the case of the steamship _Vosges_, which was
sunk on March 28, 1915. For two hours, while the engines of the
steamship were run at full speed in an attempt to get away from
the submarine, she was under fire from two deck guns on board the
submersible. Though the latter made off at the approach of another
vessel, her shells did enough damage to cause the _Vosges_ to sink
a few hours later.

Up to the middle of March, 1915, all the ships which had become
victims of German submarines had been of the slower coasting variety.
There had been numerous unconfirmed reports that the faster
transatlantic ships had been chased, but no credence had been given
to them. On the 27th of March, 1915, however, when the _Arabic_
arrived at Liverpool it was reported by those on board that she
had given a submarine a lively chase and had gotten away safely.
At about nine o'clock the evening before the submarine was sighted
off Holyhead. She was only 200 yards ahead, and while her commander
jockeyed for a position from which he could successfully launch a
torpedo, the commander of the _Arabic_ gave the order "Full speed
ahead." His passengers lined the rail of the ship to watch the
maneuvers. Soon the steamship had up a speed of 18 knots, which
was a bit too fast for the submarine, and she fell to the rearward.
Her chance for launching a torpedo was gone, but she brought her deck
guns into action, firing two shots which went wild. The _Arabic_
proceeded to port unmolested.

At times even the cost of shell fire was figured by the commanders
of German submarines, and pistol and rifles were used instead.
This was done in the case of the _Delmira_ on the 26th of March,
1915. This steamship was sunk off Boulogne. Ten minutes were given
by the crew of the submarine to the crew of the steamship for them
to get off. The submarine had come up off the bow of the _Delmira_,
and men standing on the deck of the former had fired shots toward
the bridge of the latter to make her captain bring her to a stop.
The latter ordered his engines started again at full speed, with the
intention of ramming the enemy, but his Chinese stokers refused to
obey the order, and his ship did not move. The crew of the steamship
got into their small boats, and for an hour and a half these were
towed by the submarine so that their row to shore would not be
so long. Though torpedoed, the _Delmira_ did not sink, and was
last seen in a burning condition off the French coast near Cape
de la Hogue.

The sinking of the steamship _Falaba_, which is mentioned, though
not narrated in full, in another chapter, was the last act of German
submarines during the month of March, 1915. This ship on the 29th
of March, 1915, was overtaken by a German submarine in St. George's
Channel. She was engaged in the African trade, voyaging between
the African ports and Liverpool. On her last journey she carried
a crew of 90 men and some 160 passengers, many of the latter being
women and children. The commander of the submarine brought his
craft to the surface off the bow of the _Falaba_, and gave the
captain of the steamship five minutes in which to put his crew and
passengers into lifeboats. A torpedo was sent against her hull and
found the engine room, causing a tremendous explosion. One hundred
and eleven persons lost their lives because they had not been able
to get off in time, or because they were too near the liner when
she went down. This was the most important merchantman which had
been sent to the bottom by a submarine since the proclamation of
February 15, 1915.

The next two victims of this sort of warfare were the steamships
_Flaminian_ and the _Crown of Castile_, one of which was sunk by
the _U-28_, and the other by an unidentified submarine on April
1, 1915. They went down off the west coast of England with no loss
of life, though the _Crown of Castile_ was torpedoed before her
crew could get off. The _Flaminian_ had tried to get away, but
had to stop under fire from deck guns on the submarine. The shells
did not hit her in vital spots, however, and it was necessary to
send a torpedo into her hull to sink her.

The ease with which submarines had been able to bob up in unexpected
places and to sink British merchantmen, in spite of the patrols
maintained by British warships, caused the captains of merchant
vessels to petition the British Government to be allowed to arm
their vessels on April 1, 1915. This was not granted, because their
being armed would have made the steamship legitimate prey for the
submarines, nor was any attention paid to the demand made by the
British press that the crews and officers of captured German submarines
be treated, not as prisoners of war, but as pirates. Reprisals on
the part of the Germans was feared.

Beachy Head on the 1st of April, 1915, was again the scene of two
successful attacks on merchantmen by submarines. On that day the
French steamship _Emma_, after being torpedoed, went to the bottom
with all of the nineteen men in her crew. The same submarine sank
the British steamer _Seven Seas_, causing the deaths of eleven
of her men.

In order to indicate the amount of harm which the submarine warfare
caused British shipping, the admiralty on April 1, 1915, announced
that though five merchantmen had been sent to the bottom and one
had been only partially damaged by submarines during the week ending
March 31, 1915, some 1,559 vessels entered and sailed from British
ports during the same period.

Efforts were made to damage the base, from which many of the German
submarines had been putting out at Zeebrugge, with aircraft. On the
1st of April, 1915, the British Government's press bureau announced
that bombs had been dropped, with unknown success, on two German
submarines lying there, and that on the same day a British airman
had flown over Hoboken and had seen submarines in building there.

The steamship _Lockwood_, while off Start Point in Devonshire,
was hit abaft the engine room by a German torpedo on the morning
of April 2, 1915, and though she went down almost immediately,
her crew was able to get off in small boats and were picked up by
fishing trawlers.

The _U-28_, which had done such effective work for the Germans
during the month of March, 1915, was relieved of duty near the
British Isles during the first week of April by the _U-31_, which
sank the Russian bark _Hermes_ and the British steamship _Olivine_
off the coast of Wales on April 5, 1915.

The British admiralty decided in April, 1915, to use some other
means besides the employment of torpedo boats and destroyers to
keep watch for German submarines, and innocent-looking fishing
trawlers were used for the purpose. While these could give no fight
against a submarine, it was intended that they would carefully make
for land to report after sighting one of the hostile craft. The
Germans, discovering this strategy, then began to sink trawlers
when they found them. On the morning of April 5, 1915, one of these
small craft was sighted and chased by the _U-20_. After a pursuit
of an hour or more the German ship was near enough for members of
her crew to fire on the trawler with rifles. Her crew got into
the small boat and were picked up later by a steamer. The trawler
was sent to the bottom.

The _U-20_ still kept up her raiding. On the 5th of April, 1915,
she overtook the steamer _Northland_, a 2,000-ton ship, and torpedoed
her off Beachy Head. The crew of the steamer were able to escape,
although their ship went down only ten minutes after the submarine
caught up with it.

The use of nets to catch submarines was vindicated, when on the 6th
of April, 1915, one of these vessels became entangled in a steel
net near Dover and was held fast. The loss of the _U-29_, which
was commanded by the famous Otto von Weddigen, who commanded the
_U-9_ when she sank the _Hogue, Cressy_, and _Aboukir_ in September,
1914, was confirmed by a report issued by the German admiralty on
April 7, 1915, after rumors of her loss had circulated throughout
England and France for a number of weeks.

In order to encourage resistance on the part of crews of British
vessels attacked by German submarines, the British Government rewarded
the crew of the steamship _Vosges_. It was announced on April 9,
1915, that the captain had been given a commission as a lieutenant
in the Royal Naval Reserve and the Distinguished Service Cross;
the remaining officers were given gold watches, and the crew were
given $15 per man.

Rumors had reached the outside world that the German submarines
were using hidden spots to store fuel and provisions so that they
might go about their raiding without having to return to German
ports for reprovisioning. Neutral nations, such as the Netherlands
and Norway, found it necessary, to maintain their neutrality, to
keep watch for such action. On the 9th of April, 1915, Norwegian
airmen reported to their Government that such a cache had been
discovered by them behind the cliffs in Bergen Bay. Submarines
found there were ordered to intern or to leave immediately, and
chose to do the latter.

Certain acts of the commanders of German submarines seemed to make it
evident that their intention was to sink ships of every description,
no matter where found, in order to make the "war zone" a reality,
and to make it shunned by neutral as well as belligerent ships.
Thus the Dutch steamship _Katwyk_, which lay at anchor seven miles
west of the North Hinder Lightship off the Dutch coast, was sunk.
This lightship was maintained by the Netherlands Government and
stood at the mouth of the River Scheldt, forty-five miles northwest
of Flushing. The _Katwyk_ was stationary there on the night of
April 14, 1915, when the crew felt a great shock and saw that their
ship was rapidly taking water. They managed to reach the lightship
in their lifeboats just as their vessel sank. The same submarine
sank the British steamer _Ptarmigan_ only a few hours later.

Among victims flying the flags of neutral nations the next ship
was of American register. This was the tank steamship _Gulflight_,
which was torpedoed off the Scilly Islands on the 29th of May,
1915. The hole made in her hull was not large enough to cause her
to sink, and she was able to get to port. But during the excitement
of the attack her captain died of heart failure and two of her
crew jumped into the sea and were drowned. Three days later the
French steamship _Europe_ and the British ship _Fulgent_ were sent
to the bottom, probably by the same submarine.

The month of May, 1915, had opened with greater activity on the part
of German submarines than had been shown for many weeks previous.
Between the 1st and the 3d of that month seven ships were torpedoed,
four of them being British, one Swedish, and two Norwegian. By
the 5th of May, 1915, ten British trawlers had been sunk; some of
these were armed for attack on either German submarines or torpedo
boats.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXII

SINKING OF THE "LUSITANIA"

On the 7th of May, 1915, came the most sensational act committed
by German submarines since the war had started--the sinking of
the Cunard liner _Lusitania_. The vessel which did this was one
of the _U-39_ class. In her last hours above water the giant liner
was nearing Queenstown on a sunny day in a calm sea. When about
five miles off shore, near Old Head of Kinsale, on the southeastern
coast of Ireland, a few minutes after two o'clock, while many of
the passengers were at lunch and a few of them on deck, there came
a violent shock.

Five or six persons who had been on deck had noticed, a few moments
before, the wake of something that was moving rapidly toward the
ship. The moving object was a torpedo, which struck the hull to
the forward on the starboard side and passed clean through the
ship's engine room. She began to settle by the bows immediately,
and the passengers, though cool, made rushes for lifebelts and
for the small boats. The list of the boat made the launching of
some of these impossible.

The scenes on the decks of the sinking liner were heartrending. Members
of families had become separated and ran wildly about seeking their
relatives. The women and children were put into the lifeboats--being
given preference.

"I was on the deck about two o'clock," narrated one of the survivors,
"the weather was fine and bright and the sea calm. Suddenly I heard
a terrific explosion, followed by another, and the cry went up
that the ship had been torpedoed. She began to list at once, and
her angle was so great that many of the boats on the port side
could not be launched. A lot of people made a rush for the boats,
but I went down to my cabin, took off my coat and vest and donned
a lifebelt. On getting up again I found the decks awash and the
boat going down fast by the head. I slipped down a rope into the
sea and was picked up by one of the lifeboats. Some of the boats,
owing to the position of the vessel, got swamped, and I saw one
turn over no less than three times, but eventually it was righted."

Not all of the women and children got off the liner into the small
boats. "Women and children, under the protection of men, had clustered
in lines on the port side of the ship," reported another survivor.
"As the ship made her plunge down by the head, she finally took
an angle of ninety degrees, and I saw this little army slide down
toward the starboard side, dashing themselves against each other
as they went, until they were engulfed."

Even under the stress of avoiding death the sight of the sinking
hull was one that held the attention of those in the water. One
of the sailors said afterward: "Her great hull rose into the air
and neared the perpendicular. As the form of the vessel rose she
seemed to shorten, and just as a duck dives so she disappeared. She
went almost noiselessly. Fortunately her propellers had stopped,
for had these been going, the vortex of her four screws would have
dragged down many of those whose lives were saved. She seemed to
divide the water as smoothly as a knife would do it."

Twenty minutes after the torpedo had struck the ship she had disappeared
beneath the surface of the sea. "Above the spot where she had gone
down," said one of the men who escaped death, "there was nothing
but a nondescript mass of floating wreckage. Everywhere one looked
there was a sea of waving hands and arms, belonging to the struggling
men and frantic women and children in agonizing efforts to keep
afloat. That was the most horrible memory and sight of all."

Fishing boats and coasting steamers picked up many of the survivors
some hours after the disaster. The frightened people in the small
boats pulled for the shore after picking up as many persons as
they dared without swamping their boats. Some floated about in
the waters for three and four hours, kept up by their lifebelts.
Some, who were good swimmers, managed to keep above water till
help came; others became exhausted and sank.

Probably the best story, covering the entire period from the time
the ship was hit till the survivors were landed at Queenstown, was
told by Dr. Daniel V. Moore, an American physician: "After the
explosion," said Dr. Moore, "quiet and order were soon accomplished
by assurances from the stewards. I proceeded to the deck promenade
for observation, and saw only that the ship was fast leaning to
the starboard. I hurried toward my cabin below for a lifebelt,
and turned back because of the difficulty in keeping upright. I
struggled to D deck and forward to the first-class cabin, where
I saw a Catholic priest.

"I could find no belts, and returned again toward E deck and saw
a stewardess struggling to dislodge a belt. I helped her with hers
and secured one for myself. I then rushed to D deck and noticed
one woman perched on the gunwale, watching a lowering lifeboat
ten feet away. I pushed her down and into the boat, then I jumped
in. The stern of the lifeboat continued to lower, but the bow stuck
fast. A stoker cut the bow ropes with a hatchet, and we dropped
in a vertical position.

"A girl whom we had heard sing at a concert was struggling, and
I caught her by the ankle and pulled her in. A man I grasped by
the shoulders and I landed him safe. He was the barber of the
first-class cabin, and a more manly man I never met.

"We pushed away hard to avoid the suck, but our boat was fast filling,
and we bailed fast with one bucket and the women's hats. The man
with the bucket became exhausted, and I relieved him. In a few
minutes she was filled level full. Then a keg floated up, and I
pitched it about ten feet away and followed it. After reaching
the keg I turned to see what had been the fate of our boat. She
had capsized. Now a young steward, Freeman, approached me, clinging
to a deck chair. I urged him to grab the other side of the keg
several times. He grew faint, but harsh speaking roused him. Once
he said: 'I am going to go.' But I ridiculed this, and it gave
him strength.

"The good boat _Brock_ and her splendid officers and men took us
aboard.

"At the scene of the catastrophe the surface of the water seemed
dotted with bodies. Only a few of the lifeboats seemed to be doing
any good. The cries of 'My God!' 'Save us!' and 'Help!' gradually
grew weaker from all sides, and finally a low weeping, wailing,
inarticulate sound, mingled with coughing and gargling, made me
heartsick. I saw many men die. Some appeared to be sleepy and worn
out just before they went down."

Officials of the Cunard Line claimed afterward that three submarines
had been engaged in the attack on the liner, but, after all evidence
had been sifted, the claim made by the Germans that only one had
been present was found to be true. The commander of the submarine
had evidently been well informed as to just what route the liner
would take. Trouble with her engines, which developed after she
had left New York, had brought her speed down to 18 knots, a
circumstance which was in favor of the attacking vessel, for it
could not have done much damage with a torpedo had she been going
at her highest speed; it would have given her a chance to cross
the path of the torpedo as it approached. No sign of the submarine
was noticed by the lookout or by any of the passengers on the
_Lusitania_ until it was too late to maneuver her to a position
of safety. A few moments before the white wake of the approaching
torpedo was espied, the periscope had been seen as it came to the
surface of the water. From that moment onward the liner was doomed.

The German admiralty report of the actual sinking of the ship,
which was issued on the 14th of May, 1915, was brief. It read:
"A submarine sighted the steamship _Lusitania_, which showed no
flag, May 7, 2.20 Central European time, afternoon, on the southeast
coast of Ireland, in fine, clear weather.

"At 3.10 o'clock one torpedo was fired at the _Lusitania_, which
hit her starboard side below the captain's bridge. The detonation
of the torpedo was followed immediately by a further explosion
of extremely strong effect. The ship quickly listed to starboard
and began to sink.

"The second explosion must be traced back to the ignition of quantities
of ammunition inside the ship."

One of the effects of the sinking of the _Lusitania_ was to cut
down the number of passengers sailing to and from America to Europe
on ships flying flags of belligerent nations. Attacks by submarines
on neutral ships did not abate, however, for on the 15th of May,
1915, the Danish steamer _Martha_ was torpedoed in broad daylight
and in view of crowds ashore off the coast of Aberdeen Bay.

The sinking of ships in the "war zone" continued in spite of rumors
that the German admiralty was expected to discontinue operations
of the submarines against merchantmen on account of the unfriendly
feeling aroused in neutral nations, particularly the United States.
On the 19th of May, 1915, came the news that the British steamship
_Dumcree_ had been torpedoed off a point in the English Channel. A
torpedo fired into her hull failed to sink her immediately, and a
Norwegian ship came to her aid, passing her a cable and attempting
to tow her to port. But the submarine returned, and fearing attack,
the Norwegian ship made off. A second torpedo fired at the _Dumcree_
had better effect than the first one, and she began to settle.
When the submarine left the scene the Norwegian steamship again
returned to the _Dumcree_ and managed to take off all of her crew
and passengers. Three trawlers, one of them French, were sunk in
the same neighborhood during the next forty-eight hours.

As soon as Italy entered the war an attempt was made by the Teutonic
Powers to establish the same sort of submarine blockade in the
Adriatic which obtained in the waters around Great Britain. This
was evinced when the captain of the Italian steamship _Marsala_
reported on May 21, 1915, that his ship had been stopped by an
Austrian submarine, but the latter not wishing to disclose its
location to the Italian navy, allowed his ship to proceed unharmed.

The suspicion that the German admiralty maintained bases for their
submarines right on the coasts of Great Britain where the submersible
craft could obtain oil for driving their engines, as well as supplies
of compressed air and of food for the crew, was confirmed on the
14th of May, 1915, when it was reported that agents of the British
admiralty had discovered caches of the kind at various points in
the Orkney Islands, in the Bay of Biscay, and on the north and
west coasts of Ireland.

In order to damage shipping in the "war zone" by having ships go
wrong through having no guiding lights an attack was made by a
German submarine on the lighthouse at Fastnet, on the southern
coast of Ireland, on the night of May 25, 1915. Shortly after nine
in the evening the submarine was sighted in the waters near the
lighthouse by persons on shore. She was about ten miles from Fastnet,
near Barley Cove. When she came near enough to the lighthouse to
use her deck guns, men on shore opened fire on her with rifles,
and she submerged, not to reappear in that neighborhood again.

But this same submarine managed to do other damage. The American
steamship _Nebraskan_ was in the neighborhood on its way to New
York. The sea was calm and the ship was traveling at 12 knots, when
some time near nine o'clock in the evening a shock was felt aboard.
A second later there came a terrific explosion, and a subsequent
investigation showed that a large hole, 20 feet square, had been
torn in her starboard bow, not far from the water line. When she
began to settle the captain ordered all hands into the small boats.
They stayed near the damaged ship for an hour and saw that she was
not going to sink. When they got aboard again they found that a
bulkhead was keeping out the water sufficiently to allow her to
proceed under her own steam. In crippled condition she made for
port, being convoyed later by two British warships which answered
her calls for help.

In spite of the sharp diplomatic representations which were at
the time passing back and forth between Germany and the United
States over the matter of the German submarine warfare, the craft
kept up as active a campaign against merchant ships as they did
before the issues became pointed. On May 28, 1915, there came the
news that three more ships had been sent to the bottom. The
_Spennymoor_, a new ship, was chased and torpedoed off Start Point,
near the Orkney Islands. Some of her crew were drowned when the
lifeboat in which they were getting away capsized, carrying them
down. On the same day the large liner _Argyllshire_ was chased
and fired upon by the deck guns of a hostile submarine, but she
managed to get away. Not so fortunate, however, was the steamship
_Cadesby_. While off the Scilly Islands on the afternoon of May
28, 1915, a German submarine hailed her, firing a shot from a deck
gun across her bows as a signal to halt. Time was given for the
crew and passengers to get into small boats, and when these were
at a distance from the ship the deck guns of the submarine were
again brought into action, and after firing thirty shots into her
hull they sank her. The third victim was the Swedish ship _Roosvall_.
She was stopped and boarded off Malmoe by the crew of a German
submarine. After examining her papers they permitted her to proceed,
but later sent a torpedo into her, sinking her.

A new raider, the _U-24_, made its appearance in the English Channel
during the last week in May, 1915. On the twenty-eighth of the
month this submarine sank the liner _Ethiope_. The captain of the
steamship attempted some clever maneuvering, which did not accomplish
its object. He paid no attention to a shot from the deck guns of
the submarine which passed across his bow. The hostile craft then
began to circle around the liner, while the rudder of the latter
was put at a wide angle in an effort to keep either stern or bow
of the ship toward the submarine, thus making a poor target for a
torpedo. But the commander of the submarine saw through the movement
and ordered fire with his deck guns. After shells had taken away
the ship's bridge and had punctured her hull near the stern the
crew and passengers were ordered into the small boats. They had
hardly gotten twenty feet from their ship when she was rent by
a violent explosion and went down.

The transatlantic liner _Megantic_ had better luck, for she managed
to escape a pursuing submarine on May 29, 1915, as she was nearing
Queenstown, Ireland, homeward bound. A notable change in the methods
adopted by the commanders of submarines as a result of orders issued
by the German admiralty in answer to the protests throughout the
press of the neutral nations after the sinking of the _Lusitania_
was the giving of warning to intended victims. By the end of May,
1915, in almost every instance where a German submarine stopped
and sank a merchantman the crew was given time to get off their
ship and the submarine did not hesitate to show itself. In fact,
warning to stop was generally given when the submarine's deck was
above water and the gun mounted there had the victim "covered."
This was done in the case of the British steamship _Tullochmoor_,
which was torpedoed off Ushant near the most westerly islands of
Brittany, France.

On the 1st of June, 1915, there came the news of the sinking of
the British ship _Dixiana_, near Ushant, by a German submarine
which approached by aid of a clever disguise. The crew managed to
get off the ship in time; when they landed on shore they reported
that the submarine had been seen and on account of sails which she
carried was thought to be an innocent fishing boat. The disguise
was penetrated too late for the _Dixiana_ to make its escape.

The clear and calm weather which came with June, 1915, made greater
activity on the part of German submarines possible. On the 4th
of June, 1915, it was reported by the British admiralty that six
more ships had been made victims, three of them being those of
neutral countries. In the next twenty-four hours the number was
increased by eleven, and eight more were added by the 9th of June,
1915.

On that date Mr. Balfour, Secretary of the British admiralty, announced
that a German submarine had been sunk, though he did not state what
had been the scene of the action. At the same time he announced
that Great Britain would henceforth treat the captured crew of
submarines in the same manner as were treated other war prisoners,
and that the policy of separating these men from the others and
of giving them harsher treatment would be abandoned.

On the 20th of June, 1915, the day's reports of losses due to the
operations of German submarines, issued by the British Government,
contained the news of the sinking of the two British torpedo boats,
the _No. 10_ and the _No. 20_. No details were made public concerning
just how they went down.

On the same day the Italian admiralty announced that a cache maintained
to supply submarines belonging to the Teutonic Powers and operating
in the Mediterranean, had been discovered on a lonely part of the
coast near Kalimno, an island off the southwest coast of Asia Minor.
Ninety-six barrels of benzine and fifteen hundred barrels of other
fuel were found and destroyed. It was believed that this supply had
been shipped as kerosene from Saloniki to Piraeus. How submarines
belonging to Germany had reached the southern theatre of naval warfare
had been a matter of speculation for the outside world. But on the
6th of June, 1915, Captain Otto Hersing made public the manner in
which he took the _U-51_ on a 3,000 mile trip from Wilhelmshaven on
the North Sea to Constantinople. He was the commander who managed
to torpedo the British battleships _Triumph_ and _Majestic_.

He received his orders to sail on the 25th of April, 1915, and
immediately began to stock his ship with extra amounts of fuel
and provisions, allowing only his first officer and chief engineer
to know the destination of their craft. He traveled on the surface
of the water as soon as he had passed the guard of British warships
near the German coast; traveling "light" allowed him to make six
or seven knots more in speed. As he passed through the "war zone"
he kept watch for merchantmen which might be made victims of his
torpedo tubes. His craft was sighted by a British destroyer, however,
off the English coast and he had to submerge to escape the fire
of the destroyer's guns. He then proceeded cautiously down the
coast of France, encountering no hostile ships. When within one
hundred miles of Gibraltar he was again discovered by British
destroyers, but again managed to escape by submerging his craft.

Passage through the Strait of Gibraltar was made in the early morning
hours, while a mist hung near the surface of the water and permitted
no one at the fort to see the wake of the _U-51's_ periscope. Once
inside the Mediterranean he headed for the south of Greece, escaping
attack from a French destroyer and proceeding through the Ægean
Sea to the Dardanelles. The journey ended on the 25th of May, just
one month after leaving Wilhelmshaven.

The British ships _Triumph_ and _Majestic_ were sighted early in
the morning, but attack upon them was difficult on account of the
destroyers which circled about them; one of the destroyers passed
right over the _U-51_ while she was submerged. Captain Hersing
brought her to the surface soon afterward and let go the torpedo
which sank the _Triumph_. For the next two days the submarine lay
submerged, but came up on the following day and found itself right
in the midst of the allied fleet. This time the _Majestic_ was taken
as the target for a torpedo and she went down. Again submerging his
vessel Captain Hersing kept it down for another day, and when he
again came to the surface he saw that the fleets had moved away.
He then returned to Constantinople.

On the 23d of June, 1915, the British cruiser _Roxborough_, an
older ship, was hit by a torpedo fired by a German submarine in
the North Sea, but the damage inflicted was not enough to prevent
her from making port under her own steam.

The deaths of a number of Americans occurred on the 28th of June,
1915, when the Leyland liner _Armenian_, carrying horses for the
allied armies, was torpedoed by the _U-38_, twenty miles west
by north of Trevose Head in Cornwall. According to the story of
the captain of the vessel, the submarine fired two shots to signal
him to stop. When he put on all speed in an attempt to get away
from the raider her guns opened on his ship with shrapnel, badly
riddling it. She had caught fire and was burning in three places
before he signaled that he would surrender. Thirteen men had meanwhile
been killed by the shrapnel. Some of the lifeboats had also been
riddled by the firing from the submarine's deck guns, making it
more difficult for the crew to leave the ship. The German commander
gave him ample time to get his boats off.

To offset the advantage which the Germans had with their submarines
the British admiralty commissioned ten such craft during the week
of June 28, 1915. These vessels were of American build and design
and were assembled in Canada. During the week mentioned they were
manned by men sent for the purpose from England. Each was manned by
four officers and eighteen men, to take them across the Atlantic.
Never before in history had so many submarines undertaken a voyage as
great. They got under way from Quebec on July 2, 1915, and proceeded
in column two abreast, a big auxiliary cruiser, which acted as
their escort steaming in the center.

The next large liner which had an encounter with the German submarine
_U-39_ was the _Anglo-Californian_. She came into Queenstown on
the morning of July 5, 1915, with nine dead sailors lying on the
deck, nine wounded men in their bunks, and holes in her sides made
by shot and shell. She had withstood attack from a German submarine
for four hours. Her escape from destruction was accomplished through
only the spirit of the captain and his crew, combined with the
fact that patrol vessels came to her aid forcing the submarine to
submerge.

A variety in the methods used by the commanders of German submarines
was revealed in the stopping of the Norwegian ship _Vega_ which
was stopped on the 15th of July, while voyaging from Bergen to
Newcastle. The submarine came alongside the steamship at night
and the commander of the submarine supervised the jettisoning of
her cargo of 200 tons of salmon, 800 cases of butter, and 4,000
cases of sardines, which was done at his command under threat of
sinking his victim.

The week of July 15, 1915, was unique in that not one British vessel
was made the victim of a German submarine during that period, though
two Russian vessels had been sunk. Figures compiled by the British
admiralty and issued on the 22d of July, 1915, gave out the following
information concerning the attacks on merchantmen by German submarines
since the German admiralty's proclamation of a "war zone" around
Great Britain went into effect on the 18th of February, 1915.

The official figures were as follows:

   Week ending     Vessels lost     Lives lost
  Feb. 25, 1915         11               9
  March 4,   "           1             None
  March 11,  "           7              38
  March 18,  "           6              13
  March 25,  "           7               2
  April 1,   "          13             165
  April 8,   "           8              13
  April 15,  "           4             None
  April 22,  "           3              10
  April 29,  "           3             None
  May 6,     "          24               5
  May 13,    "           2           1,260
  May 20,    "           7              13
  May 27,    "           7               7
  June 3,    "          36              21

   Week ending     Vessels lost     Lives lost
  June 10, 1915         36              21
  June 17,   "          19              19
  June 24,   "           3               1
  July 1,    "           9              29
  July 8,    "          15               2
  July 15,   "          12              13
  July 22,   "           2             None
                       ----          ------
                       235           1,641

The first year of the Great War came to an end with the German
submarines as active in the "war zone" as they had been during
any part of it. On the 28th of July, 1915, the anniversary of the
commencement of the war, there was reported the sinking of nine
vessels. These were the Swedish steamer _Emma_, the three Danish
schooners _Maria, Neptunis_, and _Lena_, the British steamer _Mangara_,
the trawlers _Iceni_ and _Salacia_, the _Westward Ho_, and the
Swedish bark _Sagnadalen_. No lives were lost with any of these
vessels.

The first year of the war closed with a cloud gathered over the heads
of the members of the German admiralty raised by the irritation the
submarine attacks in the "war zone" had caused. Germany's enemies
protested against the illegality of these attacks; neutral nations
protested because they held that their rights had been overridden.
But the German press showed the feeling of the German public on
the matter--at the end of July, 1915, it was as anxious as ever
to have the attacks continued. Conflicting claims were issued in
Germany and England. In the former country it was claimed that
the attacks had seriously damaged commerce; in the latter it was
claimed that the damage was of little account.




PART III--THE EASTERN FRONT--AUSTRO-RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXIII

THE CARPATHIAN CAMPAIGN--REVIEW OF THE SITUATION

In the beginning of 1915 comparative calm reigned over the
Austro-Russian theatre of war, so far as actual hostilities were
concerned. But it was not altogether the variable climatic conditions
of alternate frost and thaw--the latter converting road and valley
into impassable quagmires--that caused the lull. It was a short
winter pause during which the opposing forces--on one side at
least--were preparing and gathering the requisite momentum for the
coming storm.

During January, 1915, the Russian armies were in a decidedly favorable
position. In their own invaded territory of Poland, as we have seen,
they held an advanced position in front of the Vistula, which
circumstance enabled them to utilize that river as a line of
communication, while barring the way to Warsaw against Von Hindenburg.
Lemberg, the capital of Galicia, which they had captured in September,
1914, was still in their hands. Sixty miles away to the west there
lay the great fortress of Przemysl, invested by the Russians under
General Selivanoff, and completely cut off from the outer world since
November 12, 1914. At least 150,000 troops and enormous quantities
of stores and munitions were locked up in the town and outlying
forts, together with a population of 50,000 inhabitants, mostly
Polish. In addition to these material advantages, the Russians
held all the Carpathian passes leading from Galicia into the vast
plains of Hungary, and a strong advanced position on the Dunajec
in the west, which, besides threatening Cracow, the capital of
Austrian Poland, served also as a screen to the mountain operations.
Finally, to the far east of the range, they had occupied nearly
the whole of the Bukowina right up to the Rumanian frontier.

Such, briefly, was the situation on the Austro-Russian front when
the second winter campaign opened. For Austria the situation was
extremely critical. Her armies, broken and scattered after a series
of disastrous reverses, could scarcely hope by their own efforts to
stem the threatened invasion of Hungary. General Brussilov, however,
made no serious attempt to pour his troops through the passes into
the plain below; although what was probably a reconnaissance emerged
from the Uzsok Pass and penetrated as far as Munkacs, some thirty
miles south, while on several occasions small bands of Cossacks
descended from the Dukla and Delatyn (Jablonitza) passes to raid
Hungarian villages. General Brussilov evidently regarded it inadvisable
to risk an invasion of the plain, especially as he did not hold
control of the southern exits from the passes, beyond which he
would be exposed to attack from all sides and liable to encounter
superior forces. The main Austrian anxiety for the moment was the
precarious position of Przemysl, to relieve which it was first
essential to dislodge Brussilov or to pierce his line. Again, in
the hour of her extremity, Austria's powerful ally came to the
rescue.

[Illustration: THE CARPATHIAN PASSES AND RUSSIAN BATTLE LINE]

Under the command of the Archduke Eugene the Austrian troops--all
that were available--were formed into three separate armies. For
convenience sake we will designate them A, B, and C. Army A, under
General Boehm-Ermolli, was ordered to the section from the Dukla
Pass to the Uzsog. It was charged with the task of cutting a way
through to relieve Przemysl. Army B, under the German General van
Linsingen, who also had some German troops with him, was to assail
the next section eastward, from the Uzsog to the Wyszkow Pass; and
Army C, under the Austrian General von Pflanzer-Baltin, likewise
supplied with a good "stiffening" of German soldiers, was accredited
to the far-eastern section--the Pruth Valley and the Bukowina.
These three armies represented the fighting machine with which
Austria hoped to retrieve the misfortunes of war and recover at
the same time her military prestige and her invaded territories.
We have no reliable information to enable us to estimate the exact
strength of these armies, but there is every reason to believe that
it was considerable, having regard to the urgency of the situation
and the bitter experience of the recent past. Hence the figure of
400,000 men is probably approximately correct. Somewhere about
January 23, 1914, after a period of thaw and mud the weather settled
down to snow and hard frost. Then the machine began to move. A
snow-clad mountain rampart lay spread before; over 200 miles of
its length embraced the area of the projected operations. Here
we may leave this army for a while in order to review some of the
political and strategic considerations underlying the campaign,
which is the scope of this chapter.

The Russian occupation of the Bukowina, which was undertaken and
accomplished by a force far too small to oppose any serious resistance,
appears to have been carried out with the definite political object
of favorably impressing Rumania, and to guide her into the arms
of the Allies. From her geographical position Rumania commands
nearly the whole western frontier of the Dual Monarchy. Her fertile
soil supplied the Central Powers with grain, dairy produce, and
oil. Furthermore, Rumania's foreign policy leaned to the side of
Italy, and the general European impression was, after the death
of King Carol, October 10, 1914, that if one of the two countries
entered the war, the other would follow suit. As subsequent events
have shown, however, that expectation was not realized. Rumania, too,
had aspirations in the direction of recovering lost territories, but
her grievance in this respect was equally divided between Russia
and Austria, for, while the one had despoiled her of Bessarabia, the
other had annexed Transylvania (Siebenbürgen). Hence the Russian
tentative conquest and occupation of the Bukowina paved the way for
Rumania, should she decide on intervention. The road was clear for
her to step in and occupy the Bukowina (which Russia was prepared
to hand over), and probably Transylvania as well, which latter
the proximity of a Russian force might--at the time--have enabled
her to do. But the bait failed, no doubt for weighty reasons. Even
if Rumania had favored the Triple Entente, which there is strong
ground to presume she would, by entering the war, have found herself
in as perilous a position as Serbia, with her Black Sea littoral
exposed to hostile Turkey and her whole southern boundary flanked by
a neighbor--Bulgaria--whose intentions were as yet unknown. However,
on January 27, 1915, the Bank of England arranged a $25,000,000 loan
to Rumania--an event which further heightened the probability of
her entry into the arena.

We may safely take it for granted that these considerations were
not overlooked by the German staff, in addition to the patent fact
that the Russians were persistently gaining ground against the
Austrians. German officers and men were therefore rushed from the
eastern and western fronts to the south of the Carpathians to form
the three armies we have labeled A, B, and C. The points of attack
for which they were intended have already been stated; but the
roundabout manner in which they traveled to their respective sections
is both interesting and worthy of notice. At this stage a new spirit
seemed to dominate Austro-Hungarian military affairs; we suddenly
encounter greater precision, sounder strategy, and deeper plans: a
master mind appears to have taken matters in hand. It is the cool,
calculating, mathematical composite brain of the German General
Staff. As the formation and dispatching of three great armies can
hardly be kept a secret, especially where hawk-eyed spies abound,
a really astute piece of stage management was resorted to. Wild
rumors were set afloat to the effect that the Austrian Government had
decided to undertake a great offensive--for the third time--against
Serbia, and erase her from the map, with the assistance of four
German army corps. The concentration one for operations against
either Serbia or the Russian front in the Carpathians was naturally
in the central plains of Hungary. But to cover the real object
of Austro-German concentration active demonstrations were made
on the Serb border in the form of bombardments of Belgrade, and
occupation of Danube islands. These demonstrations made plausible
the Teutonic assertion that the concentration of troops was being
carried out with a view to an invasion of Serbia. So successful
was the ruse, and so well had the secret been kept that on February
1, 1914, a Petrograd "official" gravely announced to an eagerly
listening world: "The statement is confirmed that the new Austro-German
southern army, intended for the third invasion of Serbia, consists
of six Austrian and two German corps or 400,000 men, under the
command of the Archduke Eugene(!)" At the very time this appeared
the new Austro-German "southern" army had been already, for quite a
week, making its presence severely felt in the eastern and central
sections of the Carpathians, and still the Russian authorities
had not recognized the identity of the forces operating there.

A brief description of the battle ground will enable the reader
to follow more easily the course of the struggle. Imagine that
length of the Carpathian chain which forms the boundary between
Galicia and Hungary as a huge, elongated arch of, roughly, 300
miles. (The whole of the range stretches as a continuous rampart
for a distance of 900 miles, completely shutting in Hungary from
the northwest to the east and south, separating it from Moravia
[Mähren], Galicia, the Bukowina, and Rumania.) Through the curve
of this arch run a number of passes. Beginning as far west as is
here necessary, the names of the chief passes eastward leading from
Hungary are: into Galicia--Beskid, Tarnow, Tilicz, Dukla, Lupkow,
Rostoki, Uzsok, Vereczke (or Tucholka), Beskid[*] (or Volocz),
Wyszkow, Jablonitza (or Delatyn); into the Bukowina--Strol, Kirlibaba,
Rodna; into Rumania--Borgo. In parts the range is 100 miles in
width, and from under 2,000 to 8,000 feet high. The western and
central Carpathians are much more accessible than the eastern,
and therefore comprise the main and easiest routes across. The
Hun and Tartar invasions flooded Europe centuries ago by this way,
and the Delatyn is still called the "Magyar route." The passes vary
in height from under a thousand to over four thousand feet. The
Dukla and Uzsok passes were to be the main objective, as through
them lay the straightest roads to Lemberg and Przemysl. The former
is crossed by railway from Tokay to Przemysl, and the latter by rail
and road from Ungvar to Sambor. A railroad also runs through the
Vereczke from Munkacs to Lemberg, and another through Delatyn from
Debreczen to Kolomea. So far as concerned means of communication,
matters were nearly equal, but geographical advantage lay with the
Russians, as the way from Galicia to Hungary is by far an easier
one than vice versa.

[Footnote *: There are two passes named Beskid.]


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXIV

BATTLE OF THE PASSES

Before proceeding with the opening of the second winter campaign
in the Carpathians, the reader should remember that, as stated
in the beginning of this narrative, a Russian army under General
Radko Dmitrieff (a Bulgarian), held an advanced position on the
Dunajec-Biala line, extending from the Vistula to Zmigrod, northwest
of Dukla. This force was consequently beyond the zone of the
Austro-German offensive, but, as events proved, it had not been
overlooked, for it was here that the heaviest blow was finally
to fall. It is also important to bear in mind that the Russian
armies occupying Galicia and the northern slopes of the Carpathians
were not conducting an isolated campaign on their own account;
they formed an integral part of the far-flung battle line that
reached from the shores of the Baltic down to the Rumanian frontier,
a distance of nearly 800 miles. Dmitrieff's force represented a
medial link of the chain--and the weakest.

Over the slushy roads of the valleys and into the snow-laden passes
the Germanic armies advanced, each of the widely deployed columns
with a definite objective: From Dukla, Lupkow, and Rostoki to relieve
Przemysl; from Uzsok through the valley of the Upper San to Sambor;
through Beskid and Vereczke northward to Stryj, thence westward
also to Sambor; over Wyszkow to Dolina; via Jablonitza to Delatyn;
and across Kirlibaba and Dorna Vatra into the Bukowina. Opposed to
them were the Russian Generals Brussilov, Ivanoff, and Alexieff,
respectively.

Correspondents with the Teutonic troops in these weeks wrote in
wonderment of the scenes of the slowly forward toiling advance
into the mountains which they had seen. On every road leading into
Galicia there was the same picture of a flood rolling steadily on.
Everywhere could be seen the German and Austro-Hungarian troops
on the move, men going into the firing line to fight for days,
day after day, with the shedding of much blood, among the peaks
and valleys, under changing skies.

Here is a word picture of the supply columns winding upward into
the Carpathians to the support of the Teutonic troops furnished
by a German correspondent:

"Truly fantastic is the appearance of one of these modern supply
caravans, stretching in zigzag, with numerous sharp corners and turns,
upward to the heights of the passes and down on the opposite side.
Here we see in stages, one above the other and moving in opposite
directions, the queerest mixture of men, vehicles, machines and animals,
all subordinated to a common military purpose and organization by
military leadership, moving continually and regularly along. The
drivers have been drummed up from all parts of the monarchy, Serbs,
Ruthenians, Poles, Croats, Rumanians, Hungarians, Slovaks, Austrians,
and turbaned Mohammedans from Bosnia. Everyone is shouting to his
animals and cursing in his own language. The whole mix-up is a
traveling exhibition of most variegated characteristic costumes,
for the most part, of course, extremely the worse for wear. Common
to all these are the little wagons adapted to mountain travel,
elastic and tough, which carry only half loads and are drawn by
little ponylike, ambitious horses. In between are great German
draft horses, stamping along with their broad high-wheeled baggage
and ammunition wagons, as though they belonged to a nation of giants.

"Gravely, with a kind of sullen dignity, slow-stepping steers drag
at their yokes heavily laden sledges. They are a powerful white
breed, with broad-spreading horns a yard long. These are followed
in endless rows by carefully stepping pack animals, small and large
horses, mules and donkeys. On the wooden packsaddles on their backs
are the carefully weighed bales of hay or ammunition boxes or other
war materials. Walking gingerly by the edges of the mountain ridges
they avoid pitfalls and rocks and walk round the stiff, distended
bodies of their comrades that have broken down on the way. At times
there ambles along a long row of working animals a colt, curious and
restlessly sniffing. In the midst of this movement of the legs of
animals, of waving arms, of creaking and swaying loaded vehicles of
manifold origin, there climbs upward the weighty iron of an Austrian
motor battery, with an almost incomprehensible inevitableness,
flattening out the broken roads like a steam roller.

"From the first pass the baggage train sinks down into the depths,
again to climb upward on the next ridge, to continue striving upward
ever toward higher passages, slowly pushing forward toward its
objective against the resistance of numberless obstacles.

"The road to the battle field of to-day crosses the battle field
of recent weeks and months. Here there once stood a village, but
only the stone foundations of the hearths are left as traces of
the houses that have been burned down. Sometimes falling shots or
the terrors of a brief battle in the streets have reduced to ruins
only a part of a village. The roofs of houses have been patched
with canvas and boards to some extent, and now serve as quarters
for troops or as stables. In the narrow valleys the level places
by the sides of streams have been utilized for encampments. Here
stand in order wagons of a resting column and the goulash cannons
shedding their fragrance far and wide, or the tireless ovens of a
field bakery. Frequently barracks, hospital buildings, and shelters
for men and animals have been built into the mountain sides. Here
and there simple huts have been erected, made of a few poles and
fir twigs. Often they are placed in long rows, which, when their
inmates are warming themselves by the fire at night turn the dark
mountain road into a romantic night encampment, and everywhere
fresh crosses, ornamented at times in a manner suggestive of the
work of children, remind us of our brothers now forever silenced,
who, but a short time before went the same road, withstood just
such weather and such hardships, talked perhaps in these same huts
of the war, and dreamt of peace.

"The saddest spectacle, however, were the lightly wounded, poor
fellows, who might under ordinary conditions have readily walked
the distance from the first aid station to the central gathering
point, but who here on account of the ice or muddy roads require
double and three times the usual time."


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXV

BATTLE OF KOZIOWA--OPERATIONS IN THE BUKOWINA

Owing to the topographical conditions under which fighting must be
carried on in the central Carpathians, some weeks might be expected
to elapse before a general engagement developed along the entire
front. Lateral communication or cooperation between the advancing
columns was out of the question; the passes were like so many parallel
tunnels, each of which must first be negotiated before a reunion
can take place at the northern exits.

We will follow the achievements of the three groups in separate
order. Army A, under Boehm-Ermolli, crossed Uzsok and Rostoki, and
forced part of the Russian line back upon Baligrod, but Brussilov
held it fast on Dukla and Lupkow, strongly supported by Dmitrieff on
his right. Here the attack failed with severe losses; the Germanic
forces were thrown back into Hungary, and the Russians commanded
the southern ends of the passes around Dukla. The Uzsok Pass was of
small strategical value to the Austrians now that they had it. It
is extremely vulnerable at every point; steep, narrow, and winding
roads traverse its course nearly 3,000 feet high, with thickly
wooded mountains up to 4,500 feet overlooking the scene from a close
circle. Regarded merely as a short cut to Przemysl and Lemberg, the
Uzsok was a useful possession provided always that the northern
debouchment could be cleared and an exit forced. But the Russians held
these debouchments with a firm grip, and the pass was consequently
of no use to the Austrians. About February 7, 1915, the Russians
attempted to outflank the Austrian position in the Lupkow Pass
from the eastern branch of the Dukla by pushing forward in the
direction of Mezo-Laborc on the Hungarian side. The movement partially
succeeded; they took over 10,000 prisoners, but failed to dislodge
the Austrians from the heights east of the pass. Severe fighting
raged round this district for over a month, the Russians finally
capturing Lupkow, as well as Smolnik at the southern exit of Rostoki.
Had the Russians succeeded in getting between Uzsok and the Austrian
line of communication, as was undoubtedly their aim, the Austrians
would have been compelled to relinquish the pass without even a
fight. However, General Boehm-Ermolli's mission proved a failure.

Army B, under Von Linsingen, succeeded in traversing all the passes
in its appointed section. Crossing by the railway pass of Beskid
and the two roads leading through Vereczke and Wyszkow, they pushed
forward in the direction of Stryj and Lemberg, but never reached
their destination. Barely through the passes, the Germans struck
upon Lysa Gora, over 3,300 feet high. This mountain range is barren
of all vegetation--no sheltering trees or shrubs adorn its slopes.
The route of the Germans crossed Lysa Gora south and in front of the
ridge of Koziowa, where the Russian lines, under General Ivanoff,
lay in waiting. Passing down the bald slopes of Lysa Gora toward the
valley of the Orava River, the advancing German columns presented
a conspicuous target for the Russians on the opposite slopes of
Koziowa, screened by thick forests. Here one of the most desperate
battles of the campaign ensued on February 6, 1915, between Von
Linsingen's Austro-German army and Brussilov's center.

In close formation and with well-drilled precision the Germans
attempted to storm the position at the point of the bayonet. Again
and again they returned to the charge, only to be repulsed with
severe losses. As many as twenty-two furious bayonet charges were
made in one day, February 7. Wherever a footing was gained in the
Russian lines, there a few minutes ferocious hand-to-hand _mêlée_
developed--Saxon and Slav at death grips--the intruders were expelled
or hacked down. Great masses of Austro-German dead and wounded
were strewn over the lower slopes of Koziowa. For five weeks Von
Linsingen hammered at the Russian front without being able to break
through. So long as the Russians held the heights it was impossible
for their enemy to emerge from the passes. These two, Vereczke
and Beskid, so close together, may literally be described as twin
tunnels. Owing to the highland between them, the two columns moving
through could not cooperate; if one side needed reenforcements from
the other, they had to be taken back over the range into Hungary
to the junction where the roads diverged. It was sound strategy
on the Russian side to select Koziowa as the point from which to
check the Germanic advance. For the time being, with Dukla and
Lupkow in their hands and the exits of Uzsok and Rostoki strongly
guarded, the defense of Koziowa held Galicia safe from reconquest.
The attacks against Koziowa continued beyond the middle of March,
1915. On the 16th of that month the Russians captured a place called
Oravcyk, about four miles westward, from where they could threaten
the German left, which had the effect of keeping Von Linsingen
still closer to his mountain passages. The fighting in this region
represents one of the important phases of the war, for it prevented
the relief of Przemysl; temporarily saved Stryj and Lemberg for the
Russians; enabled them to send reenforcements into the Bukowina,
and, finally, inspired the German General Staff to plan the great and
decisive Galician campaign, which was to achieve the task wherein
Boehm-Ermolli and Von Linsingen had both failed.

Meanwhile, what had Von Pflanzer-Baltin accomplished with Army
C--the third column? His path lay through Jablonitza, Kirlibaba,
and Dorna Vatra; his task was to clear the Russians out of the
Bukowina, and either to force them back across their own frontiers,
or to turn the extreme end of their left flank. We have seen that
the Russian occupation of the Bukowina was more in the nature of
a political experiment than a serious military undertaking, and
that their forces in the province were not strong enough to indulge
in great strategical operations. Hence we may expect the Austrian
general's progress to be less difficult than that of his colleagues in
the western and central Carpathians. To some extent this presumption
is correct, for on February 18, 1915, after launching out from the
southern corner of the Bukowina at Kimpolung and via the Jablonitza
Pass down the Pruth Valley, they captured Czernowitz, and after that
Kolomea, whence the railway runs to Lemberg. Within three days
they reached Stanislawow, another important railway center, defended
by a small Russian force, and a big battle ensued. Altogether,
the Germanic troops in the Bukowina were reported at 50,000 in
number, though these were split up into two columns, one of which
was making but slow progress farther east.

Russian reenforcements were thrown into the town, and the struggle
for the railway, which lasted a week, appears to have been of a seesaw
nature, for no official reports of the fighting were issued by either
side. Still the Austrians pushed westward in the hope of reaching
the railways which supplied those Russian armies which were barring
the advance through the central passes. The Russians were forced to
withdraw from Stanislawow, and their opponents now held possession
of the line running to Stryj and Przemysl--a serious menace to the
Russian main communications. This meant that Von Pflanzer-Baltin
had succeeded in getting to the rear of the Russians. But assistance
came unexpectedly from the center, whence Ivanoff was able to send
reenforcements to his colleague, General Alexeieff, who was continually
falling back before the Austrians. Furious counterattacks were
delivered by the Russians at Halicz and Jezupol, the bridgeheads
of the southern bank of the Dniester. If the Austrians could not
force a victory at these points, their position in Stanislawow
would be untenable, since the Russians still had a clear road to
pour reenforcements into the fighting area between the Dniester and
the Carpathians. On March 1, 1915, the Austrians were defeated at
Halicz in a pitched battle, and on the 4th the Russians reentered
Stanislawow. According to their official communiqué the Russians
captured nearly 19,000 prisoners, 5 guns, 62 machine guns, and
a quantity of stores and munitions. About March 16 the opposing
forces came again into touch southeast of Stanislawow on the road
to Ottynia, but nothing of importance appears to have happened.
To sum up the results of the Germanic offensive, we must remember
what the objectives were. Of the latter, none was attained. The
Russians had not been expelled from Galicia; Przemysl was no nearer
to relief than before, and Lemberg had not been retaken. With the
exception of Dukla and Lupkow, all the passes were in Austrian
hands; but the Russians dominated the northern debouchments of all
of them excepting Jablonitza.

[Illustration: DETAIL MAP OF THE FORTS OF PRZEMYSL]


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXVI

FALL OF PRZEMYSL

The town and fortress of Przemysl formally surrendered to the Russian
General Selivanoff on Monday, March 22, 1915. The first investment
began at the early stages of the war in September, 1914. On the
27th of that month the Russian generalissimo announced that all
communications had been cut off. By October 15, 1914, the Russian
investment had been broken again, and for a matter of three weeks,
while the road was open, more troops, provisions, arms, and munitions
were rushed to the spot. As we have seen, however, the Russians
recovered their lost advantage, for, after the fall of Jaroslav,
the fortress to the north of Przemysl, their troops were hurried
up from east, north, and west, and within a few days the Austrians
were sent back along the whole front. From the region of Przemysl
three railroads cross the Carpathians to Budapest, along all of
which the Russians had pushed vigorously, besides advancing on the
west. As regarded railroad communications, the fate of Przemysl
was sealed by the capture of Chyrow, an important junction about
twenty miles south of the fortress. Przemysl itself was important
as a road junction and as a connecting link with the Uzsok and
Lupkow passes. The garrison prepared to make a stubborn resistance
with the object of checking the Russian pursuit. A week later the
Russians had broken up their heavy artillery and had begun a steady
bombardment. By November 12, 1914, Przemysl was once more completely
besieged by General Selivanoff with not more than 100,000 troops.

Przemysl is one of the oldest towns of Galicia, said to have been
founded in the eighth century. It was once the capital of a large
independent principality. In the fourteenth century Casimir the Great
and other Polish princes endowed it with special civic privileges,
and the town attained a high degree of commercial prosperity. In
the seventeenth century its importance was destroyed by inroads
of Tatars, Cossacks, and Swedes. Przemysl is situated on the River
San, and was considered one of the strongest fortresses of Europe.

The original strategic idea embodied in the purpose of the fortress
was purely defensive; in the event of war with Russia only the
line of the San and Dniester was intended to be held at all costs,
while the whole northeastern portion of Galicia was to be abandoned.
With the fortress of Cracow guarding the west, Przemysl was meant
to be the first defense between the two rivers and to hold the
easiest roads to Hungary through the Dukla, Lupkow, and Uzsok passes.
Within the last ten years, however, the Austrian War Staff altered
its plans and decided upon a vigorous offensive against Russia
should occasion offer, and that Eastern Galicia was not to be
sacrificed. Hence a network of strategic railways was constructed
with a view to attacking the prospective enemy on a wide front
extending from the Vistula near Cracow on the west to the Bug on
the east, where the latter flows into Austrian territory and cuts
off a corner of eastern Galicia. The plan does not appear to have
worked successfully, for, before the war was many days old, the
Russians had taken Lemberg, swept across the Dniester at Halicz,
across the San at Jaroslav, just north of Przemysl, and had already
besieged the fortress, which at no time imposed any serious obstacle
in the path of their progress. Perhaps the only useful purpose that
Przemysl served was that it restrained the Russians from attempting
an invasion of Hungary on a big scale, by holding out for nearly seven
months. Not having sufficient siege artillery at their disposal,
the Russians made no attempt to storm the place. General Selivanoff
surrounded the forts with a wide circle of counterdefenses, which
were so strongly fortified that the garrison would have found it an
almost hopeless task to attempt a rush through the enemy's lines.
The Austrian artillery was naturally well acquainted with the range
of every point and position that lay within reach of their guns;
and Selivanoff wisely offered them little opportunity for effective
practice. Considering it too expensive to attack by the overland
route, he worked his way gradually toward the forts by means of
underground operations. To sap a position is slow work, but much
more economical in the expenditure of lives and munitions. The
weakness of Przemysl lay in the fact that its garrison was far
too large for its needs, and that provisions were running short.
In the early part of the campaign the Germanic armies operating
in the San region had drawn freely on Przemysl for supplies, and
before these could be adequately replaced the Russians had again
forged an iron ring around the place. The Russian commander, moreover,
was aware that a coming scarcity threatened the town, and that he
had only to bide his time to starve it into submission. Whilst he
was simply waiting and ever strengthening his lines, the Austrians
found it incumbent on them to assume the offensive. Several desperate
sorties were made by the garrison to break through the wall, only to
end in complete disaster. General Herman von Kusmanek, the commander
in chief of the fortress, organized a special force, composed largely
of Hungarians, for "sortie duty," under the command of a Hungarian,
General von Tamassy. These sorties had been carried out during
November and December, 1914, especially during the latter month,
when the Austro-German armies were pouring across the mountains.
So critical was the Russian position at the time that the relief
of Przemysl was hourly expected. According to an officer of General
Selivanoff's staff, "The Austrians in the fortress were already
conversing with the Austrians on the Carpathians by means of their
searchlights. The guns of Przemysl could be heard by the Austrian
field artillery. The situation was serious, and General Selivanoff
took prompt measures. He brought up fresh troops to the point of
danger and drove the sortie detachments back to the fortress." It
is stated from the Austrian side that one of the sortie detachments
had succeeded in breaking through the Russian lines and marching
to a point fifteen miles beyond the outer lines of the forts. A
Russian official announcement states that during two months of
the siege the Austrian captures amounted only to 4 machine guns
and about 60 prisoners, which occurred in an engagement where two
Honved regiments fell on a Russian company which had advanced too
far to be reenforced in time. On their part in repulsing sorties by
the garrison, frequently made by considerable forces, the Russians
made prisoners 27 officers and 1,906 soldiers, and captured 7 machine
guns, 1,500,000 cartridges, and a large quantity of arms. In two
sorties the garrison in the region of Bircza had more than 2,000
killed and wounded, among them being many officers. No further
sorties were undertaken in that particular region. During January
and February, 1915, very little fighting took place around Przemysl;
sorties were useless as there was no Austro-German force anywhere
near the fortress, and the Russians were tightening the pressure
around it. The only means of communication with the outer world
was by aeroplane, so that, despite the rigid investment, the
Austro-German war staff were kept fully informed of the straits in
which Przemysl found itself. General Boehm-Ermolli, with Army A,
was making desperate efforts to extricate himself from the Russian
grip round Uzsok, Lupkow, and Dukla; he did not get beyond Baligrod,
as the crow flies, thirty miles south of Przemysl.

On March 13, 1915, the Russians stormed and captured the village
of Malkovise, on the northeast, breaking through the outer line
of the defense. From this position they began to bombard parts of
the inner ring. About the beginning of the third week in March,
1915, a new spirit of activity appeared to seize the beleaguered
garrison: they commenced a terrific cannonade which, however, elicited
no response. It was but the energy of despair: they were firing
to get rid of their ammunition, hoping at the same time to hit
something or somebody. The end was at hand.

On March 18, 1915, a Petrograd "official" laconically reports that:
"In the Przemysl sector the fortress guns continue to fire more
than a thousand heavy projectiles daily, but our troops besieging
the fortress lose only about ten men every day." It is also on
March 18 that General von Kusmanek issued the following manifesto
to the defenders of Przemysl:--"Heroes, I announce to you my last
summons. The honor of our country and our army demands it. I shall
lead you to pierce with your points of steel the iron circles of
the enemy, and then march ever farther onward, sparing no efforts,
until we rejoin our army, which, after heavy fighting, is now near
us."

Just before the surrender two Austrian officers escaped from the
fortress in an aeroplane. These reported concerning the last days
of the siege:

"On the 18th of March the last provisions had been dealt out and
at the same time the last attempt at breaking through the line
of the besiegers had been ordered. This was carried out on the
night of the 19th of March. It was shattered, however, against the
unbreakable manifold ring of the Russian inclosing lines and against
the superior forces which were brought in time to the threatened
points. Our men were so weakened by their long fasting that it
took them fully seven hours to make the march of seven kilometers,
and even in this short stretch many of them had to lie down from
exhaustion, yet they fought well and were bravely led by their
officers.

"In spite of all this," Captain Lehmann, one of the escaped officers,
reported, "the heroic garrison fought on, after their last sortie,
for fully forty-eight hours, against assaults of the Russians which
now set in with terrific violence. The men of the fortress were fully
informed of the situation by an announcement of the commander. They
knew that the provisions were at an end and this very knowledge
spurred them on to make their last sacrifice. Practically all the
nations of the monarchy were represented in the fortress. Tyrolese
Landsturm held the south, Hungarians the west, Ruthenians and Poles
the north, and lower Austrians the east. To this last battle the
troops marched out singing, striving thus to master their weakness.
On this occasion the above mentioned notice had fallen into the
hands of the Russians and the prospect had thus been opened to
them to seize the fortress with little effort. For two days and
nights all the works of Przemysl were taken under, an uninterrupted
terrible artillery fire, including that of modern howitzers of all
calibers, up to eighteen centimeters. Then followed an assault
at night on the east front, which, however, was again bloodily
repelled."

Starvation is conducive neither to good feeling nor heroism, especially
when it is superimposed upon an unbroken series of more or less
disastrous experiences. Misfortune and the so-called "tradition of
defeat" had dogged the steps of Austria's troops from the beginning
of the war; unlucky generals--Dankl, Auffenberg, and others--had been
relieved of their commands and replaced by "new blood"--Boehm-Ermolli,
Boroyevitch von Bojna, and Von Pflanzer-Baltin. Of these three, two
had as yet failed in carrying to success the German plans which
had taken the place of those of their own strategists. Hence it
is not at all improbable that the reports of dissensions among
the garrison, which leaked out at the time, were substantially
accurate. That jealousies broke out among the numerous races forming
the Austrian Army--especially between the Slavonic and Germanic
elements--is supported by strong evidence. The sentiments of the
Slav subjects of Austria leaned more toward Russia than the empire
of which they formed a considerable portion, while there was never
any love lost between them and the Magyars. However that may be,
the Slav regiments were reported to have refused obedience to the
general's order for the last sortie, which was eventually undertaken
by a force composed of the Twenty-third Hungarian Honved Division,
a regiment of Hussars, and a Landwehr brigade, altogether about
30,000 men. Everything depended upon the venture, for not only
were all their food supplies used up, but they had already eaten
most of their horses. Instead, therefore, of making southward to
where their comrades were fighting hard to tear themselves away
from the Carpathian passes, the sortie turned toward the east, in
the direction of Mosciska, twenty miles off, which was supposed to
be the Russian supply base. This attempted foraging expedition--for
it was nothing else--can only be defended on the broad general
principle that it is better to do something than nothing as a last
resort. Supplies were essential before any more could be undertaken
to cut a passage through the strong double set of Russian lines that
lay between the Carpathians and Przemysl; but that these supplies
were stored at Mosciska was a pure speculation. Further, considering
that the whole country was in their opponents' hands, a strength of
30,000 men was insufficient to attempt so hazardous an adventure.
Even if they succeeded in breaking through, their return to the
fortress was not assured. In that case, if they could not get back,
they would have to go forward: eastward lay Lemberg, held by the
Russians; northward was the Russian frontier, and southward stood
the Russian forces holding the passes. Thus, in any case, however
successful the expedition might prove, it meant breaking at least
twice through lines which the enemy had spent months in strengthening
or fortifying. Undeterred by the almost certain possibility of
failure, the expedition of the "forlorn hope" set out across the
plain of the San--and speedily came to grief. They had to pass by
the strongest Russian artillery position, which was stationed in
the low hollow through which the railway runs to Lemberg. Here a
terrific hail of shells burst over their heads; rattle of machine
guns and rifle fire tore great holes in their ranks; the stoutest
courage and bravest hearts were unavailing against an enemy who could
not be reached nor even seen. The number of killed and wounded in
that fatal sortie has not been made public; that it was an enormous
figure is certain. The Russians took 4,000 prisoners of those who
survived the ordeal, and captured the forts on the western side
directly after the struggling remnants had regained their starting
place. General von Kusmanek issued his manifesto in the morning, and
by the same night the sortie ended in disaster. Like the misdirected
charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava in 1854, it was "brilliant,
but it wasn't war."

One more attempt was made on Saturday, March 20, 1915, toward Oikovice,
but it was easily frustrated by the vigilant Russians. On Sunday and
Monday, the 21st and 22d of March, a number of explosions were heard
in and around Przemysl. The Austrians were destroying everything
possible previous to surrendering. Large quantities of explosives were
thrown in the river; all kinds of arms were destroyed or rendered
useless; three bridges were crippled; the few remaining horses
were shot, and a railway bridge over the Wiar, which possessed no
strategic value, was also destroyed. These tactics of destroying
approaches naturally isolated the town more than ever, and made
it exceedingly difficult afterward to convey food supplies to the
starving population.

On Monday morning, March 22, 1915, the Austrian chief of staff
appeared outside the lines of Przemysl under a flag of truce. He
was blindfolded, driven by automobile to Russian headquarters, and
ushered into the presence of General Selivanoff. When the bandage
had been removed from his eyes, the Austrian officer handed over
a letter of capitulation from General von Kusmanek, which ran as
follows:

"In consequence of the exhaustion of provisions and stores, and
in compliance with instructions received from my supreme chief,
I am compelled to surrender the Imperial and Royal Fortress of
Przemysl to the Imperial Russian Army."

The Russians took charge without any triumphal display. Some officers
were sent to receive the surrender and take stock of the spoils.
General von Kusmanek himself supplied the inventory, in which were
listed 9 generals, 93 superior officers, 2,500 "Offiziere und Beamten"
(subalterns and officials), and 117,000 rank and file, besides
1,000 pieces of ordnance, mostly useless, and a large quantity of
shells and rifle cartridges.

General Artamoff was appointed military governor and to superintend
the process of dispatching the prisoners into Russian territory, which
was carried out at the rate of 10,000 a day. Extensive arrangements
were set on foot to supply the inhabitants with food, drink, and
other necessaries of life. As the Russians had not bombarded the
town, its natural and artificial beauties had suffered no damage
beyond that which the Austrians had themselves inflicted; only
the outskirts and the fortifications had been injured by fire and
explosion.

Thus fell, on March 22, 1915, Przemysl, "by its own momentum like
an overripe fruit," and with a garrison twice as large as would
have been adequate to defend it. To Austria the blow was a severe
one, for it cost her about four army corps; the immediate advantage
it brought to the Russians was the release of Selivanoff's army of
100,000 men, who were urgently required elsewhere. It was only a
week earlier that the commander in chief of all the Austro-Hungarian
armies, the Archduke Frederick, had granted an interview to an
American journalist (Dr. J. T. Roche), in the course of which he
stated: "We have only recently reached the point where we are really
prepared to carry on a campaign as it should be carried under modern
conditions of warfare. Now that our organization has been completed
and all branches of the service are working harmoniously, we entertain
no doubts as to our ability to hold the enemy at all points and
to drive him back from that section of Galicia which is still in
his possession."


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXVII

NEW RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE--AUSTRO-GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE

Three days before the fall of Przemysl the Russians abandoned the
defensive and commenced a vigorous attack on the Carpathian front.
Active preparations for the advance had been completed when the
capitulation of the fortress was to be expected any hour. Having
so far held the Germanic armies in check, it was necessary for the
Russians to regain complete control of the Carpathians and the passes
before the snow should begin to melt, especially if they decided on
an invasion of Hungary. On the other hand, before any offensive
could be undertaken against the Germans in Poland, or the Austrians
at Cracow, it was imperative to secure the southern flank in Galicia.
They had by this time partially grasped one particular feature of
German strategy, namely, to parry a blow from one direction by
striking in another. A further consideration may have been the
absolute certainty that Germany would dispatch more reenforcements
to the aid of her ally. Selivanoff's siege army was distributed
between Dmitrieff, Brussilov, and Ivanoff, but they could not be
employed to full advantage owing to the restricted area presented
by the Germanic front. Being largely composed of siege artillery
as well as cavalry, a considerable portion of Selivanoff's army
was unsuited for mountain warfare. Cavalry were converted into
infantry, but could not be supplied with the necessary equipment;
they had no bayonets, and most of the fighting was hand-to-hand.

Great masses of Germanic reserves were concentrating in northern
Hungary, into which the Russians had driven a thin wedge south
of Dukla, where they held an isolated outpost near Bartfeld. To
leave this position undeveloped meant compulsory withdrawal or
disaster. With the continual influx of reenforcements on both sides,
the struggle for the main passes gradually develops into an
ever-expanding and unbroken battle front: all the gaps are being
filled up. From Dukla westward to the Dunajec-Biala line and the
Carpathian foothills a new link is formed by the Fourth Austrian
Army, commanded by the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, with two and a
half army corps and one German division. In the Central Carpathians
a fifth army, under the command of the Austrian General von Bojna,
appears between the forces of Boehm-Ermolli and those of Von Linsingen.
Right away eastward the purely Austrian army of Von Pflanzer-Baltin
was holding the Pruth Valley. The Germanic chain was complete,
with every link welded together.

When the Russian offensive opened on March 19, 1915, the entire
battle line still rested on the northern side of the Carpathians,
and here the struggle was resumed. The Russian grand attack was
directed between the Lupkow and Uzsok passes, where great forces
of the enemy, concentrated for the purpose of relieving Przemysl,
were stationed. In the western sector, facing Dmitrieff, the Archduke
Joseph Ferdinand held the roads leading from Novy-Sacz and Grybow
to Tarnow, covering Cracow; and from south of the range the two
roads diverging from Zboro to Gorlice and Jaslo were in Russian
possession, though the Austrians held their junction at Zboro,
eight miles north of Bartfeld. Of the actual fighting that took
place in this region very few details were published by the Russian
official communiqué. One of these documents, dated April 18, 1915,
announced that on March 23, "our troops had already begun their
principal attack in the direction of Baligrod, enveloping the enemy
positions from the west of the Lupkow Pass and on the east near the
sources of the San. The enemy opposed the most desperate resistance
to the offensive of our troops. They had brought up every available
man on the front from the direction of Bartfeld as far as the Uzsok
Pass, including even German troops and numerous cavalrymen fighting
on foot. The effectives on this front exceeded 300 battalions.
Moreover, our troops had to overcome great natural difficulties at
every step. In the course of the day, March 23, 1915, we captured
more than 4,000 prisoners, a gun, and several dozen machine guns."

On March 24, 1915, the battle was in full progress: "Especially
severe is the fighting for the crest of the mountain south of Jasliska
and to the west of the Lupkow Pass. The forests which cover these
mountains offer special facilities for the construction of strong
fortifications." March 25: "The woods in the Lupkow region are
a perfect entanglement of barbed wire... surrounded by several
layers of trenches, strengthened by deep ditches and palisades. On
this day our troops carried by assault a very important Austrian
position on the great crest of the Beskid Mountains." The Russian
captures for the day amounted to 100 officers, 5,600 men, and a
number of machine guns. Advancing from Jasliska the Russians seriously
threatened the Austro-German position in the Laborcza Valley, to
which strong reenforcements were sent on March 25. With terrific
violence the battle raged till far into the night of the 27th, the
Russians forcing their way to within seven miles of the Hungarian
frontier.

In eight days they had taken nearly 10,000 prisoners. By the night
of March 28, 1915, the entire line of sixty miles from Dukla to
Uzsok was ablaze--the storm was spreading eastward. Like huge ant
hills the mountains swarmed with gray and bluish specks--each a human
being--some to the waist in snow, stabbing and hacking at each other
ferociously with bayonet, sword, or lance, others pouring deadly fire
from rifle, revolver, machine gun, and heavy artillery. Over rocks
slippery with blood, through cruel barbed-wire entanglements and into
crowded trenches the human masses dash and scramble. Here, with heavy
toll, they advanced; there, and with costlier sacrifice, they were
driven back. Fiery Magyars, mechanical Teutons and stolid muzhiks
mixed together in an indescribable hellbroth of combative fury and
destructive passion. Screaming shells and spattered shrapnel rent
the rocks and tore men in pieces by the thousand. Round the Lupkow
Pass the Russians steadily carved their way forward, and at the close
of the day, March 29, 1915, they had taken 76 officers, 5,384 men, 1
trench mortar, and 21 machine guns. Along the Baligrod-Cisna road
the fighting proceeded, up to March 30, by day and night.

Gradually the Russians pushed toward Dvernik and Ustrzyki south
of Lutoviska, threatening the Austrian position in the Uzsok and
lines of communications to the south. German reserves were hurried
up from the base at Ungvar, but could not prevent the capture of 80
Austrian officers, over 5,000 men, 14 machine guns, and 4 pieces of
cannon. Ivanoff had been careful to hold his portion of Selivanoff's
army in reserve; their presence turned the scale.

On the day and night of March 31, 1915, the Russians stormed and
carried the Austrian positions 4,000 feet high up on the Poloniny
range during a heavy snowstorm. So deep was the snow in places that
movement was impossible; the trampling of the charging battalions
rushing down over the slopes dislodged avalanches of snow, overwhelming
both attackers and defenders. By April 1, 1915, the Russians approached
Volosate, only twelve miles from the rear of the Uzsok Pass, from
which they were now separated by a low ridge. Holding full possession
of the Poloniny range farther west, they commanded the road from
Dvernik to Vetlina. From the north other Russian columns captured
Michova on the Smolnik-Cisna railroad, crossed the Carpathians,
and penetrated into the Virava Valley. Occupying the entire loop of
the Sanok-Homona railway north and south of Lupkow, and Mezo-Laborcz
toward Dukla, the Russians now threatened the Austrian mountain
positions between Lupkow and the Vetlina-Zboj road from the western
flank as well. Violent winter storms raged across the Carpathians
on April 2 and 3, 1915; nature spread a great white pall over the
scenes of carnage. While the elements were battling, the weary
human fighting machine rested and bound its wounds. But not for
long. Scarcely had the last howls of the blizzard faded away when
the machine was again set in motion.

South of Dukla and Lupkow and north of Uzsok fighting was resumed
with intense vigor. Painfully digging through the snowdrifts the
Austrians retired from the Smolnik-Kalnica line, now no longer
tenable. Storm hampered the pursuing enemy, who captured the Cisna
railway station on April 4, 1915, with all its rolling stock and
large stores of munitions.

On April 6, 1915, a Russian communiqué announced that "during the
period from March 20 to April 3, 1915, we took prisoners in the
Carpathians, on the front from Baligrod to Uzsok, 378 officers,
11 doctors, and 33,155 men. We captured 17 guns and 101 machine
guns. Of these captives 117 officers, 16,928 men, 8 guns, and 59
machine guns were taken on a front of fifteen versts (10 miles)."

The Russians again advanced along their whole front on April 4,
1915; forcing their way along the Rostoki stream, they carried
the village of Rostoki Gorne with the bayonet and penetrated the
snow-bound Rostoki Pass. Their first line arrived at a Hungarian
village called Orosz-Russka, five miles from Nagy Polena, at the
foot of the pass. The Austrians attempted to drive them back, but
they held their ground.

While fortune was steadily following the efforts of the czar's troops
in the Lupkow-Uzsok sector, the German War Staff were preparing
their plans for the great decisive blow that was soon to be struck.
South of the Carpathians, barely thirty miles away, formidable
reenforcements were collecting; they arrived from the East Prussian
front, from Poland, and even from the west, where they had faced
the French and British. There were also new formations fresh from
Germany. General von der Marwitz arrived in the Laborcza Valley
with a whole German army corps. These gigantic preparations were
not unknown to the Russians; they, also, strained every nerve to
throw all available reenforcements behind and into the battle line,
strengthening every position _except one_. South of the Lupkow the
Germanic forces opened their counteroffensive on April 6, 1915.
Official reports on the first day's fighting differ somewhat. The
Russians admit a slight German advance, but assert that they were
able to withstand all further attacks. The Germans, on the other hand,
claim great successes and the capture of 6,000 Russian prisoners.

The Germanic armies in this case, however, certainly did advance,
for the Russians withdrew from the Virava Valley, which they had
entered four days earlier. The first object of the counteroffensive
was to save the Austrians who were holding the frontier south of
Lupkow from being enveloped and cut off. But on April 9, 1915,
the Russians again moved forward, and recovered part of the Virava
Valley. By this day the whole mountain crest from Dukla to Uzsok, a
distance of over seventy miles, had been conquered by the Russians.
By the same night they had repulsed a counterattack near the Rostoki
and captured a battalion of Austrian infantry. The Russian report
sums up thus: "We seized Height 909 (909 meters=3,030 feet) with
the result that the enemy was repulsed along the entire length
of the principal chain of the Carpathians in the region of our
offensive."

For the next three days Brussilov attempted to work his way to the
rear of the Uzsok position with his right wing from the Laborcz
and Ung valleys, while simultaneously continuing his frontal attacks
against Boehm-Ermolli and Von Bojna. Cutting through snow sometimes
more than six feet deep, the Russians approached at several points
within a distance of three miles from the Uzsok Valley. But the
Austrians still held the Opolonek mountain group in force. Severe
fighting then developed northwest of the Uzsok on the slopes between
Bukoviec and Beniova; the Russians captured the village of Wysocko
Nizne to the northeast, which commands the only roads connecting
the Munkacz-Stryj and the Uzsok-Turka lines. Though both sides
claimed local successes, they appear to have fought each other to
a deadlock, for very little fighting occurred in this zone after
April 14, 1915. Henceforth Brussilov directed his main efforts
to the Virava and Cisna-Rostoki sector. From here and Volosate,
where there had been continuous fighting since the early days of
April, the Russians strove desperately for possession of the Uzsok.
They were now only two or three days' march from the Hungarian
plains.

Between April 17 and 20, 1915, a vigorous Austrian counterattack
failed to check the Russian advance. Between Telepovce and Zuella,
two villages south of the Lupkow, the Russians noiselessly approached
the Austrian barbed-wire entanglements, broke through, and after
a brief bayonet encounter gained possession of two heights and
captured the village of Nagy Polena, a little farther to the east.
During the night of April 16-17, 1915, the Russians took prisoners
24 officers, 1,116 men, and 3 machine guns.

On April 18, 1915, the Austrians directed several fierce attacks
against the heights south of Telepovce, but were compelled to evacuate
the approaches to their positions. Here, also, an Austrian battalion
was cut off and forced to surrender. Meanwhile the fighting was
gradually decreasing in intensity; the great Carpathian campaign
had reached the end of another chapter. The Austro-German offensive
had failed in its purpose. From Uzsok eastward there had been but
little fighting after the Russian recapture of Stanislawow.

[Illustration: DRIVES AND RETREATS ON THE VARIOUS EASTERN FRONTS

GERMANS ON THE WEICHSEL, THE MEMEL AND THE BALTIC COAST · A PETROGRAD
HOSPITAL · AN OPEN-AIR SERVICE

A German machine gun mounted for bringing down aeroplanes. The
gunners have sighted a Russian battle plane and are preparing to
bring it down]

[Illustration: A Russian floating mine brought ashore along the
River Weichsel. The German soldiers are inspecting it and listening
to an explanation of its design]

[Illustration: German soldiers resting on the sands of Skatre.
They are on their way to capture the Baltic port of Libau, Russia]

[Illustration: A German observation station in a tree overlooking
the valley of the River Memel, or Niemen, which flows through Poland
and East Prussia]

[Illustration: Two German cruisers--the "Themis" and the "Lubeck"--in
the harbor of the Baltic port of Memel, not far from the Russian
frontier]

[Illustration: A disinfecting apparatus used in one of the large
hospitals in Petrograd. Bags containing patients's clothing are
inserted in a huge cylinder, where the disinfecting takes place]

[Illustration: The town of Gerdauen, East Prussia, which was burned
during the Russian invasion, when for a time East Prussia suffered
like Belgium and Poland]

[Illustration: Austrian soldiers reverently listening to an open-air
religious service in front of a wayside chapel in Galicia]


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXVIII

CAMPAIGN IN GALICIA AND BUKOWINA--BATTLE OF THE DUNAJEC

While the struggle for the passes was raging in the central Carpathians
an interesting campaign was being conducted in Eastern Galicia and
the Bukowina between Von Pflanzer-Baltin and Lechitsky. There we
left the Russians in possession of Stanislawow, which they had
reoccupied on March 4, 1915. Two days before, an Austrian detachment
of infantry and two divisions of cavalry attempted a raid into
Russian territory near the Bessarabian frontier. Within forty-eight
hours they were hurled back. Beyond local skirmishes and maneuvering
for positions, nothing of importance happened from March 4 till the
15th, when the Russians attacked the main Austrian forces southeast
of Czernowitz. Crossing the River Pruth opposite Ludihorecza, which
lies about 600 feet high, and where the Czernowitz waterworks are
situated, the Russians occupied the place and threatened the Austrian
position in the town, around which pressed laborers were digging
trenches night and day for the defenders. Along the line between
Sadagora and Old Zuczka the Russians had been settled for over six
months. The Austrians attacked this position on March 21, 1915,
with the aid of reenforcements and compelled the Russians to evacuate
Sadagora. While falling back in the south the Russians endeavored
to advance in the north, from the direction of Czerniavka, and
outflank the Austrians. Violent fighting raged for several days,
especially northeast from Czernowitz to beyond Rarancze, with the
result that the Russians were compelled to withdraw toward Bojan,
near their own frontier, on March 27. Three days later some Hungarian
Honved battalions, who had penetrated into Russian territory near
Szylowce, were surrounded by Cossacks and severely handled. Besides
many killed and wounded the Austrians lost over 1,000 prisoners,
and by April 2, 1915, the Russians had thrown the remainder back
across their borders. On April 10, 1915, the Russians withdrew
from Boyan, but returned on the 14th. Here, at the close of April,
they concentrated large reenforcements and recovered most of the
ground they had lost since the middle of March.

Some twenty miles northwest of Czernowitz, sheltered in a loop of
the Dniester, lies an important fortified town called Zaleszczyki.
It had a population of over 76,000, and is a station on the branch
line connecting Czortkow junction with the Kolomca-Czernowitz railway.
From the dense forests east of the town an Austrian column commanded
by Count von Bissingen had attempted during the night of March 22-23,
1915, to turn the adjacent Russian positions, held by Cossacks and
Siberian fusiliers. A furious fight developed, and the Austro-Hungarian
column, which included some of the finest troops, was repulsed with
heavy loss. Two other attempts were made here, on April 10 and
17, 1915. On the latter date a detachment of Tyrolese sharpshooters
were trapped in the wire entanglements and annihilated.

One more battle on a big scale remains to be chronicled from the far
eastern sector; it may also serve to illustrate the wide divergence
that not infrequently exists between official communiqués recording
the same event. Early in April, 1915, a Russian force threw a bridge
across the Dniester near the village of Filipkowu and moved along
the road running from Uscie Biskupie via Okna and Kuczurmik on to
Czernowitz, the intention being to turn the Austrian positions
south of Zaleszczyki from the rear. We will let the rival communiqués
relate what happened:

      _Austrian Version_             _Russian Version_
  Annihilated two battalions     Annihilated two battalions
  of Russian infantry belonging  of the Honveds; captured 21
  to the Alexander Regiment;     officers, over 1,000 rank and
  took 1,400 prisoners, and      file, and 8 machine guns.
  drove Russians back beyond
  the Dniester.

The curtain was about to rise for the next act, wherein will be
played one of the most terrific reversals of fortune ever produced
in military history.

For quite a month it had been an open secret that considerable
masses of German troops were being transported to the Carpathian
front. What was not known, however, was the magnitude or the plan
of these preparations. Never was a greater concentration of men
and machinery more silently and more speedily accomplished. All
along the south of the range, on the great Hungarian plains, there
assembled a gigantic host of numerous nationalities. But it was
away to the west, in that narrow bottle neck where the Dunajec
flows from the Polish frontier down to the Tarnow Pass, that the
mighty thunderbolt had been forged. Thousands of heavy guns were
here planted in position, and millions of shells conveyed thither
under cover of night. Countless trains carried war materials, tents,
pontoons, cattle, provisions, etc. Finally the troops arrived--from
the different fronts where they could be spared, and new levies
from Germany and Austria-Hungary. Smoothly and silently men and
machines dropped into their respective places: All was ready; not
a detail had been overlooked; German organization had done its
part. The commander was Von Mackensen, nominally Commander of the
Eleventh German Army, but in reality supreme director of the whole
campaign.

During April, 1915, a number of changes had taken place among the
commanding officers of the Austro-German armies; the new dispositions
of groups along the battle line differ considerably from those
which obtained during the fighting for the passes. The line was
now enormously strengthened, and more compact. This applies only
to the Germanic side; there is little change on the Russian. At
this stage the Russian front on the west of Galicia extended from
Opatovie on the Polish frontier along the Dunajec, Biala, and Ropa
Rivers by Tarnow, Ciezkovice, and Gorlice down to Zboro in Hungary;
from here it runs eastward past Sztropko, Krasnilbrod, Virava,
and Nagy Polena to the Uzsok Pass, a distance of about 120 miles.
Ewarts commanded the army on the Nida; the Dunajec-Biala line was
still held by Dmitrieff, Commander in Chief of the Eighth Russian
Army; Brussilov still commanded the main army of the Carpathians,
and Lechitsky in the Bukowina in the place of Alexeieff, who had
succeeded General Russky in the northern group. The whole southern
group, from the Nida to the Sereth inclusive, was under the supreme
command of General Ivanoff. Facing Dmitrieff on the Dunajec front
stood now the Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army under the Archduke Joseph
Ferdinand, about five army corps, including a German cavalry division
under General von Besser; then the Ninth and Fourteenth Austrian
Army Corps; to their right, several Tyrolese regiments; the Sixth
Austro-Hungarian Army Corps of General Arz von Straussenburg, with
the Prussian Guards on his left and Bavarian troops under Von Emmich
on his right; the Eleventh German Army Corps under Von Mackensen; the
Third Austro-Hungarian Army under General Boroyevitch von Bojna; the
Tenth Army Corps under General Martiny. This formidable combination
now confronted the Dunajec-Biala positions, which Dmitrieff had
held without exertion for four months. Only a mile or two away he
still inspected his trenches and conducted his minor operations,
totally unconscious of the brewing storm specially directed against
him. The Laborza district was held by the Archduke Joseph with the
Seventh Army Corps; on his left stood a German corps under Von
Marwitz, and on his right the Tenth Army Corps, north of Bartfeld,
with some additional forces in between. Around the Lupkow and Uzsok
passes the Second Austro-Hungarian Army under Boehm-Ermolli was
stationed where it had been since February, 1915. Next, on the
right, the Austro-Hungarian army corps under Von Goglia; in the
Uzsok lay an army under Von Szurmay, nearly all Magyars, of whom
the chief commander was Von Linsingen. Farther eastward stood a
Prussian corps, embodying a division of Prussian Guards and other
regiments commanded by General Bothmer, a Bavarian, who had been
reenforced with a Hungarian division under Bartheldy; then followed
the corps of Generals Hofmann and Fleischman, composed of all Austrian
nationalities, intrenched in the mountain valleys. More German troops
held the next sector, and, finally, came Von Pflanzer-Baltin's
army groups in the Bukowina and Eastern Galicia. Against this huge
iron ring of at least twenty-four Germanic corps (about 2,000,000
men) and a great store of reserves, the Russians could not muster
more than about fourteen of their own corps. As has already been
pointed out, the greatest disparity of strength existed on the
Dunajec line, where Dmitrieff stood opposed to about half of the
enemy's entire force with only five corps of Russian troops. The
Austro-German forces, moreover, were infinitely better equipped with
munitions and heavy artillery. The lack of big guns was undoubtedly
the reason why the Russians had not attempted an invasion of Hungary.
Hence they stuck to the mountain passes where their opponents were
unable to carry their artillery, although they were amply supplied
with the same. It is true that the Russians could have produced
an equal--or even greater--number of men, but they had not the
arms and accouterments.

Speaking from safe knowledge after the event, it is possible to
indicate with moderate accuracy at least one of the ingenious stratagems
adopted by the Germans to disguise their tremendous preparations
against the Dunajec line. For months the fighting in this region had
never been severe. When, therefore, local attacks and counterattacks
on a small scale started on the Biala, as far back as April 4, 1915,
Dmitrieff and his staff regarded this activity on the Austrians
part as merely a continuation of the sporadic assaults they had
grown accustomed to. Besides holding his own, Dmitrieff had on
several occasions been able to assist Brussilov on his left. Until
the big German drive commenced they had only been opposed to three
Austro-German army corps and a Prussian division; now there were
twelve corps on their front, supplied with enormous resources of
artillery, shells, and cavalry. Most serious of all, Dmitrieff had
neglected to construct second and third lines to which he could
retire in an emergency. Of the rivers that lay behind him--the
Wisloka, the Wistok, and the San--the first would be useful to
cover Brussilov's position at the western passes, but beyond that
he could not retreat without imperiling the whole Carpathian right
flank. It was on this very calculation that the German plan--simple
but effective--was based. The Russian grip on the Carpathians could
only be released either by forcing a clear road through any pass
into Galicia, or by turning one of the extreme flanks. Had the
Austrians succeeded in breaking through as far as Jaslo, Dmitrieff
would have been cut off and Brussilov forced to withdraw--followed
by the whole line. The same result would follow if a thrust from
the Bukowina succeeded in recapturing Lemberg. Both methods had been
attempted, and both had failed. Germany's overwhelming superiority
in artillery could not be effectively displayed in mountain warfare,
but Dmitrieff's position on the Dunajec offered an easy avenue of
approach.

At the eleventh hour Dmitrieff grasped the situation and applied
to Ivanoff for reenforcements. Owing to some blunder the appeal
never reached the Russian chief, and Dmitrieff had to do the best
he could. Nothing now could save his small force from those grim
lines of gaping muzzles turned against his positions. The overture
began on April 28, 1915, with an advance on the Upper Biala toward
Gorlice, by Von Mackensen's right. Here some minor attacks had been
previously made, and the gradually increasing pressure did not
at first reveal the intent or magnitude of the movement behind it.
Meanwhile the German troops about Ciezkovice and Senkova--respectively
northwest and southeast of Gorlice--were moving by night nearer to
the battle line. The Russian front line extended from Ciezkovice in
a southeasterly direction. Hence it soon became clear that Gorlice
itself was to be the main objective of the attack. A Russian official
announcement of May 2, 1915, boldly states:

"During the nights of April 30 to May 1 strong Austrian forces
opened an offensive in the region of Ciezkovice. Our fire forced the
enemy to intrench 600 paces in front of our trenches." Furthermore,
the Germans at the same time had directed artillery fire and bayonet
attacks against various points on the Rava, Pilica, Nida, and the
Dunajec. These, however, were merely movements aiming at diversion,
meant to mask the intentions of the main attack and to mislead
the Russians. On the evening of May 1, 1915, the German batteries
began experimenting against the Russian positions. This was kept up
all night while the engineers attempted to destroy the first line of
the Russian wire entanglements. During the same night the Austrians
dragged several heavy howitzers across the road from Gladyszow to
Malastow, and got them into position without the knowledge of the
Russians. In the morning of May 2, 1915, the great batteries began
to roar against the Russian line--a fire such as had perhaps never
been witnessed before. A spectator thus describes the scene: "In
one part the whole area was covered with shells till trenches and
men were leveled out of existence." It was reported that 700,000
shells had been fired in the space of four hours, for which period
this preliminary bombardment lasted. The Russian line was turned
into a spluttering chaos of earth, stones, trees, and human bodies.
The German and Austrian batteries then proceeded to extend the
range, and poured a hurricane or shells behind the enemy's front
line. This has the effect of doubly isolating that line, by which
the survivors of the first bombardment cannot retreat, neither can
reenforcements be sent to them, for no living being could pass
through the fire curtain. Now is the time for the attacker's infantry
to charge. Along the greater part of the Ciezkovice-Walastow line
this stage was reached by ten o'clock in the morning or May 2,
1915.

A German writer tells us that "in this part or the front infantry
fighting has given place for the time being to the action of our
heavy artillery, which is subjecting to a terrible fire the positions
of the enemy. These positions had been carefully reconnoitered during
the lull in the fighting which prevailed during the last few months.
Only after all cover is destroyed, the enemy's infantry killed or
forced to retire, we take up the attack against the positions;
the _élan_ of our first attack now usually leads to a favorable
result."

At Ciezkovice the Germans pushed bridges across the Biala under
cover of a furious cannonade. Troops were thrown over, and after
a very short struggle the village was taken. The huge oil tanks
soon were in flames and Ciezkovice a heap of smoldering ruins.
The Russian defense crumpled up like smoke; their position blown
out of existence. Their guns were toys compared with those or the
Germans and Austrians. North of Ciezkovice the Prussian Guard and
other German troops under General von François fell upon the Russians
and forced them to retire toward the Olpiny-Biecz line. The ground
of the Russian positions on Mount Viatrovka and Mount Pustki in
front of Biecz had been "prepared" by 21-centimeter (7-inch) Krupp
howitzers and the giant Austrian 30.5-centimeter (10-inch) howitzers
from the Skoda-Werke at Pilsen. The shells of the latter weigh
nearly half a ton, and their impact is so terrific that they throw
the earth up 100 feet high. Whatever had remained of the town of
Gorlice in the shape of buildings or human beings was meanwhile
being wiped out by a merciless spray of shells. Being the center
or an important oil district, Gorlice possessed oil wells, great
refineries, and a sulphuric-acid factory. As the flames spread from
building to building, streets pouring with burning oil, huge columns
of fire stretching heavenward from the oil wells in full blaze,
and, over all, the pitiless hail of iron and explosives pouring
upon them, the horror of the situation in which the soldiers and
civilians found themselves may be faintly imagined. Gorlice was an
inferno in a few hours. When the German infantry dashed into the
town they found the Russians still in possession. Fighting hand
to hand, contesting every step, the Russians were slowly driven
out.

We have mentioned that German troops were moving on Senkova, southeast
of Gorlice, by night. During the last two days of April the Bavarians
captured the Russian position in the Senkova valley. A further
move was made here during the night of May 1-2, 1915, preparatory
to dislodging the Russians from the ground they still held. At
seven o'clock in the morning the big howitzers started to "prepare"
that ground. By ten o'clock it was deemed that every living thing
had perished, when the "fire curtain" was drawn behind the Russian
position. Infantry were then thrown forward--some Bavarian regiments.
To their intense astonishment they were received with a most murderous
fire from Russian rifles, and machine guns. The first attack failed
and many were killed, few getting beyond the wire entanglements.
Cautiously other troops advanced to the battered Russian trenches
cut off from the rear by the artillery screen behind. Yet here
again they met with strenuous resistance in the Zamczysko group of
hills. The Austrian artillery shelled the heights, and the Bavarians
finally took possession. The Tenth Austrian Army Corps had meanwhile
conquered the Magora of Malastow and the majority of the heights
in the Ostra Gora group. On Sunday, May 2, 1915, the Austro-German
armies pierced the Dunajec-Biala line in several places, and by
nightfall the Russians were retreating to their last hope--the line
of the Wisloka. The operations round Gorlice on that day resulted
in breaking the Russian defenses to a depth of over two miles on
a front of ten or eleven miles. Mr. Stanley Washburn wrote from
the battle field at the time: "The Germans had shot their last
bolt, a bolt forged from every resource in men and munitions that
they could muster after months of preparation." Of the Russian
army he said, "it was outclassed in everything except bravery,
and neither the German nor any other army can claim superiority
in that respect."

With the center literally cut away, the keystone of the Russian
line had been pulled out, and nothing remained but to retire. Ten
miles north of Ciezkovice lies the triangle formed by the confluence
of the Dunajec and Biala rivers and the Zakliczyn-Gromnik road.
Within this triangle, commanding the banks of both rivers up to
the Cracow-Tarnow line, the Russians held the three hills marked
402, 419, and 269 which figures express their height in meters.

During February and March, 1915, the Austrians attempted to dislodge
the enemy, but without success. It was now necessary to take those
positions before advance could be made against Tarnow, and the
Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army, commanded by the Archduke Joseph
Ferdinand, undertook the task. At six A. M. on May 2 the Austrian
artillery opened fire against Hill 419 from Mount Val (also within
the triangle), and the opposite bank of the Dunajec. After three
hours' bombardment some regiments of Tyrolese fusiliers, who had
crossed the valley between Mt. Val and 419 and had taken up positions
at the foot of the latter, about 400 yards from the Russian trenches,
were ordered to charge. Dashing up the open, steep slope the fusiliers
were suddenly enfiladed from their right by a spray of machine gun
and rifle fire, killing many and driving back the survivors. Next
day Hill 419 was again fiercely shelled, this time with deadly
effectiveness; but even then the Russians still clung to their
battered ground.

The Austrians now charged the trenches on Hill 412, whence the
fusiliers had been ambushed the previous day. A desperate hand-to-hand
encounter, in which they had to force their way step by step, finally
gave the position to the attackers. The few Russians still left on
419 could not hold out after the loss of 412. They retired northward
on to Height 269, but subsequently followed the general retreat
of the line. Still farther north, almost at the right flank of
Dmitrieff's line, the Austrians effected a crossing of the Dunajec
opposite Otfinow, thus breaking the connection between the West
Galician Army of Dmitrieff, and the neighboring Russian Army on the
Nida--the left wing of the northern groups commanded by Alexeieff.

Just below Tarnow, however, the Russians still held out; losing the
three hills had not quite broken their defense on the Biala. The
right wing of Von Mackensen's army, which had smashed the Russian
front around Gorlice, rapidly moved east in an almost straight line
to reach the Dukla Pass and cut off the retreat of the Russian
troops stationed south of the range between Zboro and Nagy Polena,
in northwest Hungary. The left wing, on the other hand, advanced
in a northeasterly direction, ever widening the breach made in
the enemy's domain. This clever move brought the Germans to the
rear of Tarnow and onto the lines of communications of the Russians
holding it. It also prevented reenforcements from reaching the
truncated end of Dmitrieff's right--or what had been his right--wing.
By pushing on to Dembica and Rzeszow, along which route assistance
could otherwise have been sent to the Russians, Von Mackensen opened
a wide triangle into Western Galicia, by drawing an almost horizontal
line from Gorlice to Radymno, between Jaroslav and Przemysl, and
from there perpendicular down to the Uzsok Pass.

From Uzsok to the Lupkow westward stood the Second Austro-Hungarian
Army under Boehm-Ermolli on the north of the Carpathians. To his left,
southwest of the Magora of Malastow, and adjoining the formidable
Germanic array facing the Dunajec-Biala line lay the Third
Austro-Hungarian Army under General Boroyevitch von Bojna. These
two armies, it will be remembered, took part in the first offensive
in January, and had been there ever since. Both of these armies now
began to advance into the triangle, and the brilliant simplicity
of Von Mackensen's geometrical strategy becomes clear. Let one
imagine Galicia as a big stone jar with a narrow neck lying on
the table before him, neck pointing toward the left hand, and he
will obtain an approximately accurate idea of the topographical
conditions. That side of the jar resting on the table represents
the Carpathian range, solid indeed, but with numerous openings:
these are the passes. The upper side of the jar represents the
Russian frontier, across which the invaders had swarmed in and
taken possession of the whole inside, lining themselves right along
the mouths of the passes at the bottom and across the neck upwards.

For months the Austrians vainly endeavored to force an entrance
through the thickest walls--from the lower edge, and from the base
or bottom of the jar (the Bukowina), apparently overlooking the
rather obvious proposition that the cork was the softest part and
_that_ was Dmitrieff's Dunajec-Biala line. Here at least no mountain
range stood in the way. It may also be regarded as a mathematical
axiom that, given sufficient artillery power, the strongest defense
the wit of man could devise can be smashed. What Mackensen did,
thererore, was to blow a hole through the cork, push in a pair of
scissors up to the rivet, meanwhile opening the blades to an angle
of about forty-five degrees. From the lower or southern shoulder
of the jar the Third Austro-Hungarian Army pushes forward inside,
supported on its right by Boehm-Ermolli, who had been just inside
a long time, but could get no farther. They began to shepherd the
Russian troops around and in the western passes toward the lower
double-edged blade of Von Mackensen's terrible scissors. The Russian
retreat to the Wisloka was a serious disaster for Dmitrieff; he
had been caught napping, and had to pay dearly in men and guns for
not having created a row of alternative positions. His force had
been a cover for Brussilov's operations on both sides of the western
passes as well as for the whole Russian line in the Carpathians. Now
that Von Mackensen had pried the lid off, Brussilov's men in the
south encountered enormous difficulties in extricating themselves
from the Carpathian foothills, suddenly transformed from comparative
strongholds into death-traps and no longer tenable. They suffered
severely, especially the Forty-eighth Division.

Besides the menace from the northwest of Von Mackensen's swiftly
approaching right, a third blade was gradually growing on the deadly
scissors, in the shape of Boehm-Ermolli's and Von Bojna's forces,
threatening to grind them between two relentless jaws of steel. It
is Sunday, the second day of May, 1915; to all intents and purposes
the battle of the Dunajec, as such, was over, and the initial aim
of the Germanic offensive has been attained. The Russian line was
pierced and its defense shattered. Von Mackensen's "Phalanx" was
advancing two mighty tentacles guided by a master mind, remorselessly
probing for the enemy's strongest points. Its formation comprised,
in the northeastern tentacle, the Sixth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps
and the Prussian Guards; in the southern, the Bavarians under Von
Emmich and the Tenth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps under General
Martiny.

On May 3, 1915, Dmitrieff's troops were falling back farther every
hour, continuously fighting rear-guard actions and compelling the
pursuers to conquer every foot of ground. There was a powerful reason
for this stubborn retirement: it was to gain time for Brussilov
to get his men out of their perilous positions and to join the
main line again with Dmitrieff's receding ranks. If this could
be effected, the fatal gap between them--made by Von Mackensen's
battering-ram--would be repaired, and they could once more present
a united front to the enemy. It was mentioned a little farther
back that the Austrians had pierced the Dunajec line at Otfinow,
north of Tarnow, by which was cut in two the hitherto unbroken
Russian battle front, from the Baltic to the Rumanian frontier
(900 miles); the "scissors" at Gorlice had made it three; if
Boehm-Ermolli's drive from the Uzsok upward along the "triangle
line" to Jaroslav succeeds, there will be four separate pieces
of Russian front. But from Tarnow southward to Tuchow, a small
twenty-mile salient on the Biala, the Russians are still in possession
on May 4, 1915, defying the Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXIX

RUSSIAN RETREAT

It is a matter for speculation whether the numerous successes achieved
by the Russians against the Austrians and Germans in Galicia and the
Carpathians during the first seven months of the war had begotten
a spirit of overconfidence among the Russian commanders, or whether
it was not in their power to have made more effective preparations
than they had done. We have seen that Dmitrieff had not provided
himself with those necessary safety exits which were now so badly
needed. As no artificially prepared defenses were at hand, natural
ones had to be found. The first defense was irretrievably lost;
the second line was a vague, undefined terrain extending across
the hills between Biala in the west and the River Wisloka in the
east. Between Tuchow and Olpiny, the Mountain Dobrotyn formed one
of the chief defensive positions, being 1,800 feet high and thickly
covered with woods.

Southward, the Lipie Mountain, about 1,400 feet, formed another
strong point. Just below Biecz, close to the road and railroad
leading to Gorlice, a mountain of 1,225 feet, called Wilszak, is the
strategical key to the valley of the lower Ropa. Between Biecz and
Bednarka, the line of defense followed the heights of the Kobylanka,
Tatarovka, Lysa Gora, and of the Rekaw; hence to the east, as the
last defense of the Jaslo-Zmigrod road, lay the intrenched positions
on the Ostra Gora, well within Brussilov's sector. Southward of
the Gorlice-Zmigrod line lay the mountain group of the Valkova,
nearly 2,800 feet high, the last defense of the line of retreat
for the Russian forces from Zboro.

The Wisloka was the third line of defense, only a river, and without
intrenchments. From Dembica to Zmigrod it runs roughly parallel
with the Dunajec-Biala line; its winding course separates it in
places from fifteen to thirty-five miles from the latter river.
Strong hopes were entertained that the Russians would be able to
stem the Germanic torrent by a firm stand on the Wisloka.

A fierce battle raged on the third and fourth of May, 1915, for the
possession of the wooded hills between the Biala and the Wisloka.
The Prussian Guard stormed Lipie Mountain and captured it on the
third; on the fourth they took Olpiny, Szczerzyny and the neighboring
hills at the point of the bayonet.

The Thirty-ninth Hungarian Division, now incorporated in the Eleventh
German Army under the direct command of Von Mackensen himself, had
advanced from Grybow via Gorlice on the Biecz railway line, and
were making a strong attack on the Russian positions on Wilczak
Mountain with a tremendous concentration of artillery. It seems the
Russians simply refused to be blown out of their trenches, for it
required seven separate attacks to drive them out. That accomplished,
the fate of Biecz was decided and the road to Jaslo--the "key" to
the Wisloka line of defense--was practically open to General Arz
von Straussenburg. Lying at the head of the main roads leading
into Hungary through the Tilicz, Dukla, and Lupkow passes, Jaslo
is the most important railway junction in the whole region between
Tarnow and Przemysl. It was at Jaslo that Dmitrieff had held his
headquarters for four months.

Just south of him, barely fifteen miles away, General von Emmich
and General Martiny, with the "Bayonet Bavarians" and the Tenth
Austro-Hungarian Army Corps, went pounding and slashing a passage
along the Bednarka-Zmigrod road and the auxiliary road from Malastow
to Krempna. They were striving hard to reach the western passes
before Brussilov had time to withdraw. He began that operation
on the fourth. On the same night Von Emmich and Martiny reached
Krempna, and the last line of retreat for the Russians around Zboro
was imperiled. They have yet to cross the range from Hungary back
into Galicia. So subtly potent and effective was the pressure on
a flank that the whole line--be it hundreds of miles long--is more
or less influenced thereby, as witness:

On the same night, May 4, 1915, the retreat spread like a contagion
to the entire west Galician front, compelling the Russians to evacuate
northern Hungary up to the Lupkow Pass; in that pass itself preparations
are afoot to abandon the hard-earned position. It is not fear, nor
the precaution of cowardice that prompted this wholesale removal
of fighting men: the inexorable laws of geometry demanded it. The
enemy was at Krempna; as the crow flies the distance from Krempna to
the northern debouchment of Lupkow is eighty miles; yet Lupkow was
threatened, for the "line" or "front" is pierced--the vital artery
of the defense is severed. The strength of a chain is precisely
that of its weakest link.

[Illustration: GALICIAN CAMPAIGN FROM TARNOW TO PRZEMYSL]

The course of events become complex; fighting, advancing and retreating
occurred over a widespread area. Apparently disconnected movements
by the Austro-Germans or the Russians fall into their proper places
in accordance with the general scheme or objective either side may
have in view. It is necessary to follow the scattered operations
separately. We will therefore return now to the Tarnow-Tucho sector,
where we left a small Russian force holding the last remnant of
the Dunajec-Biala front. Tarnow had been the supply base for that
front, and great stores of provisions and munitions still remained
in the town. These the Russians succeeded in removing entirely.
The main forces had already withdrawn in perfect order and fallen
back beyond the Wisloka. During the night of May 4-5, 1915, two
regiments of the Ninth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps crossed the
Biala near Tuchow and moved northward in the direction of the road
leading from Tarnow to Pilzno, along which the remainder of the
garrison would have to pass in order to retreat. On the hills west
of Pilzno the Russians still held a position to protect that road.
By the morning of the sixth everything had gone eastward, and the
Austrians had surrounded the town.

The small cavalry detachment that had been left behind as rear
guard cut through the Austrian lines and rejoined the main forces
on the Wisloka. The Austrians had been bombarding Tarno for months
with their heaviest artillery, destroying parts of the cathedral
and the famous old town hall in the process.

On May 7 the Russians withdrew from the Pilzno district, and the
Dunajec-Biala Russian front had ceased to exist. From the hour that
the Austro-Germans had broken through the line at Ciezkovice, on
May 2, 1915, the Russian retreat on the Wisloka had begun. Yielding
to the terrible pressure the line had increasingly lost its shape as
the various component parts fell back, though it gradually resumed
the form of a front on the Wisloka banks, where most determined
fighting continued for five days.

The Russians lost much of their artillery; they had to reverse the
customary military practice of an army in retreat. If the retreating
army is well equipped with artillery and munitions, its guns cover
the retreat and are sacrificed to save the men. During their retreat
the Russians had often to sacrifice men in order to save their
guns for a coming greater battle at some more important strategic
point. Many prisoners fell to the Germanic armies; according to
their own official reports they took 30,000 in the fighting of
May 2-4, 1915. What the Austro-German side lost in that time was
not made public.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXX

AUSTRO-GERMAN RECONQUEST OF WESTERN GALICIA

By the time the retreating Russians had reached the Wisloka they had to
some extent recovered from the first shock of surprise, and were better
able to attempt a determined stand against the overwhelming onrush
of the Austro-Germanic troops. Ivanoff hurriedly sent reenforcements
for Dmitrieff and Ewarts which included the Caucasian Corps of General
Irmanoff from the Bzura front. The heavy German guns belched forth with
terrible effect, and the Russians could not reply at the same weight
or distance. Bayonets against artillery means giving odds away, but
the attempt was made. With a savage fury that seems to belong only
to Slavs and Mohammedans--fatalists--the Russians hurled themselves
against the powerful batteries and got to close quarters with the
enemy. For nearly twenty minutes a wild, surging sea of clashing
steel--bayonets, swords, lances and Circassian daggers--wielded
by fiery mountaineers and steady, cool, well-disciplined Teutons,
roared and flowed around the big guns, which towered over the lashing
waves like islands in a stormy ocean. A railway collision would
seem mild compared with the impact of 18,000 desperate armed men
against a much greater number of equally desperate and equally
brave, highly-trained fighters. But machinery, numbers and skillful
tactics will overcome mere physical courage. The Russian avalanche
was thrown back with terrific slaughter; the Caucasian Corps alone
lost over 10,000 men, for which, it is estimated, they killed and
wounded quite as many. More remarkable still was the fact that they
captured a big battery and carried off 7,000 prisoners. For five
days the storm raged backward and forward across the river; during
the more violent bombardments the Russians left their trenches to be
battered out of shape and withdrew into their shelter dugouts; when
the enemy infantry advanced to take possession, the Russians had
returned to face the charge. Whereas cool, machinelike precision
marks the German soldier in battle as on the parade ground, an
imperturbable obstinacy and total disregard of mortal danger
characterizes the Russian.

During the night of May 6-7, 1915, the Austrians sent two regiments
across the Wisloka, north and south of Brzoctek, about midway between
Pilzno and Jaslo, under cover of artillery posted on a 400-foot hill
near Przeczyca on the opposite bank, _i.e._, the left. Austrian
engineers constructed a bridge across the river, and on the morning
of May 7 the Austrian advance guard were in possession of the hills
north of the town. Infantry were then thrown across to storm Brzostek.
Here, again, they met with resolute opposition from the Russian
rear guards covering the retreat of the main armies, which had
already fallen back from the Wisloka. Desperate bayonet fighting
ensued in the streets, each of which had to be cleared separately
to dislodge the Russians--the civilians meanwhile looking out of
their windows watching the animated scenes below. Hungarian troops
in overwhelming masses poured across the river and finally captured
the town. Once more on the backward move, the Russians established
themselves along the western and southern fringe of the forests by
Januszkovice, only eight miles away, and prepared to make another
stand. More fighting occurred here, and during May 7 and 8, 1915,
the Russians fell back farther toward Frysztak, on the river Wistok.

We left Von Emmich and General Martiny with the Bavarians and the
Tenth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps on their arrival at Krempna on
the night of the 4th, during which time the Russians were making
desperate efforts to evacuate northern Hungary and the western
passes. The main forces of Von Mackensen's "phalanx" were meanwhile
pushing on toward Jaslo, still in Russian possession. On the hills
west of the Wisloka the Russian rear guards had intrenched themselves
and held their positions till nightfall on May 5, 1915, all with
the object of delaying the Germanic advance sufficiently for their
comrades to clear the passes. Then they fell back again and made
a stand near Tarnoviec, about six or seven miles east of Jaslo,
where they dominated an important strategic position. Between them
and Jaslo two railways ran along the valley of the River Jasliska,
forming a serious obstacle to Von Mackensen's advance so long as
the Russians could hold it. It was imperative that they should be
cleared out, but the task of carrying it through was a difficult
one. The undertaking fell to the Hungarian troops of the Thirty-ninth
Honved Division, who advanced to the attack again and again only to
be driven back each time by the Russian fire from the heights. Big
howitzers were called into play and soon demolished the positions.

The Russians retired east of the Wistok, followed by Von Mackensen's
Austro-Hungarian corps, while the Prussian Guards moved on toward
Frysztak, where the Russian troops from the Tarnow sector had taken
up positions after the retreat from Brzostek.

On May 7, 1915, the Prussian Guards had passed over the railway
at Krosno, and at night fell upon the Russian lines east of the
Wistok. Particularly fierce encounters took place near Odrzykon
and Korczina, ten to fourteen miles southeast of Frysztak. A little
farther westward Van Mackensen delivered his main attack against
the railway crossing at Jaslo, which fell on the same day, May 7.
The Russians retreated in confusion with Von Mackensen close upon
their heels. The whole defense on the Wisloka collapsed, and nothing
apparently could now save the Dukla and those troops struggling
through to escape from the net that was gradually being tightened
around them. Meanwhile, General Ewarts's Army of the Nida, which
formed the connecting link between the Russian northern and southern
armies, had fallen back above Tarnow to the River Czarna in order
to keep in touch and conformity with Dmitrieff's shrinking line,
which was now actually broken by the Wisloka failure. The Russian
position was extremely critical, for it seemed that the German
general would roll up the two halves and thereby inflict a crushing
and decisive defeat. General Ivanoff appears to have recognized Van
Mackensen's intentions in time to devise measures to counteract
the peril and save his left (Brussilov's army) from disaster. By
pushing forward strong columns from Sanok on the Upper San to impose
a temporary check upon the advancing tide, he gained a brief respite
for the troops entangled in the passes. To that sector we will
now turn to review the course of events.

On May 4, 1915, the Russians began to evacuate the positions they
held south of the range when Von Mackensen's extreme right approached
Krempna. Forging along at high speed the Germans and Austrians
occupied the towns of Dukla and Tylava, and arrived at Rymanow--still
farther east--on the following day. The town of Dukla lies some
fifteen miles due north of the Galician debouchment of the pass
of that name, and Rymanow is about another fifteen miles east of
that. Hence the German strategic plan was to draw a barrier line
across the north of the Carpathians and hem the Russians in between
that barrier and the Austro-Hungarian armies of Boehm-Ermolli and
Von Bojna. It must distinctly be borne in mind that these two forces
are also north of the passes: that of Von Bojna being stationed
at the elbow where the Germanic line turned from the Carpathians
almost due north along the Dunajec-Biala front, or across the neck
of our hypothetical jar. The Dukla and Lupkow passes were still in
Russian hands; these were the only two that the Germanic offensives
of January, February, and March, 1915, had failed to capture; all
the others, from Rostoki eastward, were held by the Austrians and
Germans. It was through the Dukla and Lupkow that the Russians
obtained their foothold in northern Hungary, and it was the only
way open to them now to get back again. Around the Laborcza district
stood the Seventh Austro-Hungarian Army Corps under the command
of the Archduke Joseph, who now began to harass them, aided by
the German "Beskid Corps" under General von Marwitz. This was the
only section in the range where the Russians held both sides.
Boehm-Ermolli had forced the Rostoki and Uzsok, but hitherto had
been unable to get very far from their northern exits--not beyond
Baligrod. During the fighting on the Dunajec these three armies
merely marked time; it was their object to keep the Russians in
Hungary and in the two passes until Von Mackensen had thrown the
right of his "phalanx" across their only avenue of escape. That time
was now rapidly approaching, and Von Bojna was gradually squeezing
Brussilov from the west, while Boehm-Ermolli was following from the
east and south. It appears that the commanders of the Twelfth Russian
Army Corps and the Third Russian Army, which stood on Hungarian soil
from Zboro to Nagy Polena, did not grasp the full significance to
them of the Dunajec catastrophe.

Germanic troops were building a wall against their exits before
they had seriously thought of withdrawing. Escape was impossible
for many of them; some had managed to get across the Dukla in time,
while those left behind would either have to surrender or fight their
way through the lines across their path in the north. At the same
time they would have Von Bojna and Boehm-Ermolli on their tracks.
To make matters worse, they were also being pressed severely from
the Hungarian plains by the troops which hitherto stood inactive.
The Second Austro-Hungarian Army (Boehm-Ermolli) was fighting on
both sides of the range. Through Rostoki they attempted to separate
the Russians around Zboro from those situated farther east at Nagy
Polena. We have stated elsewhere that the Forty-eighth Division
was severely handled. They were surrounded in the Dukla by an
overwhelming superior force, but General Korniloff, the commander,
with a desperate effort and no little skill, succeeded in hacking
his way through the enemy's lines and bringing a large portion of
his force safely out of the trap. Inch by inch the Russian rear
guards retreated, fighting tooth and nail to hold the pass while their
comrades escaped. No less brave were the repeated charges made by
the Austrians--clambering over rocks, around narrow pathways hanging
high in the air, dizzy precipices and mountain torrents underneath.
On Varentyzow Mountain, especially, a fierce hand-to-hand battle
was fought between Hungarians and Cossacks, the latter finally
withdrawing in perfect order. To conduct a successful retreat in
the face of disaster is a no less difficult military achievement
than the gaining of a decisive victory, and Brussilov's retreat
from the passes deserves to rank as a masterly example of skillful
tactics.

On May 8, 1915, the Third Russian Army and the Forty-eighth Division
had reunited with Brussilov's main army in the neighborhood of
Sanok, twenty miles north of the Lupkow. When the commanders of a
retreating army lose their heads the rank and file will inevitably
become demoralized and panic-stricken. The retreat became a rout,
and the possibility of making a stand, and to some extent retrieving
the lost fortune of war, was extremely remote. A deeper motive
than the mere reconquering of Galicia lay behind Von Mackensen's
plan--he aimed at nothing less than the complete overthrow and
destruction of the Russian armies. It was a gigantic effort of the
Germanic powers to eliminate at least one of their most dangerous
enemies. Once that was accomplished it would release some millions
of troops whose services were needed in the western theatre of war.
The original plan had fallen through of crushing Russia quickly
at the beginning of the war, before she would have had time to
get ready, and then to turn against France in full force. The
Austro-German Galician campaign was planned and undertaken with that
specific object, and now, although defeated and in full retreat, the
Russian troops still formed an army in being, and not a fugitive,
defenseless rabble. So long as an army is not captured or annihilated,
it can be reorganized and again put in the field. It is on this
consideration that so much importance attaches to the handling
of an army in retreat. The Russians did not, of course, run away;
on the contrary, they fought desperately and stubbornly throughout
the retreat, for their pursuers did not average more than six miles
per day--a fact which testifies to the steady and orderly character
of the Russian retirement. They suffered from the consequences of
inadequate preparation and lack of foresight on the part of their
leaders.

The Russian troops on the Lower Wisloka held their positions longest,
but they also fell back about May 8, 1915, and for the next two days
engaged the enemy near some villages southwest of Sanok. Here a strong
force had collected, which not only offered a powerful resistance,
but even attempted a counterattack against their pursuers. Over
a front of 145 miles, extending from Szczucin near the Vistula
north of Tarnow, down almost to the Uzsok Pass, a fierce battle
progressed between May 8 and 10, 1915. In the region of Frysztak,
where the Russian line was weakest, the main German offensive was
developing its strongest attack. Reenforcements were on the way,
but could not arrive in time. For the moment disaster was averted
by an aggressive Russian counteroffensive halfway between Krosno
and Sanok, from the Besko-Jacmierz front, by which move sufficient
time was gained to enable the main forces to retreat. The Russian
defense in the Vistok Valley collapsed on May 10, 1915; the German
center had almost arrived within striking distance of the important
railway line from Tarnow via Dembica and Rzeszow to Jaroslav north
of Przemysl. At Sanok the battered remnants of the Russian troops
who had escaped from the passes maintained themselves with the
greatest difficulty. Heavy German artillery followed the Bavarians
to Rymanow, five miles from the Russian line at Besko, and were
now playing fiercely upon the positions west of Sanok. The Tenth
Austro-Hungarian Army Corps as well as the Seventh were making
their presence felt from the southwest against Odrzechova and from
the south, whence Von Marwitz with the German Beskid Corps was
rapidly advancing. To the southeast, Boehm-Ermolli was battering
the Baligrod-Lutoviska front, almost in the same position he occupied
at the end of January in the first attempt to relieve Przemysl.

The battle was practically over by the night of May 10, 1915; the
Russians could hold out no longer against the ever-increasing flood
of Austrians and Germans pouring across every road and pathway
against their doomed line. Blasted and scorched by artillery,
machine-gun and rifle fire; standing against incessant bayonet
and cavalry charges; harassed by the Austrians from the south, the
Russians were indeed in sore straits. Yet they had fought well;
in the losing game they were playing they were exhausting their
enemies as well as themselves in men and munitions--factors which
are bound to tell in a long, drawn-out war. Above all, they still
remained an army: they had not yet found their Sedan. No alternative
lay before them--or rather behind them--other than retreat to the
next possible line of defense--toward Przemysl.

Between May 11-12, 1915, the Germanic troops occupied the districts
of Sendziszow, Rzeszow, Dynow, Sanok, Lisko, Lancut, and Dubiecko.
Przevorsk was deserted by the Russians on the 13th. The Seventh
Russian Railway Battalion, under Captain Ratloff, brought up the
rear of the retreat to the Dembica-Jaroslav line. From Rzeszow
onward this battalion were employed in destroying stations, plants,
tunnels, culverts, rolling stock, and railway bridges, to hamper as
much as possible the German advance. It took the Austro-Hungarian
engineers between two and three weeks to repair the road and put
it into sufficient working order to transport their heavy siege
artillery. With uninterrupted labor and the most strenuous exertions
they could only reconstruct about four miles per day. Repairs and
renovations other than those of the railway system were necessary.
The wounded had to be sent back to hospital, and fresh troops had
to be brought up to fill the gaps torn in the Austro-German ranks
during all the severe fighting since May 2, 1915. It is not known
exactly what the series of victories cost the Germanic armies in
casualties, but it is known that their successes were dearly bought.
One fairly competent authority places the loss at between 120,000 to
130,000. From May 2 to May 12, 1915, the forces of Von Mackensen,
the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, and Boroyevitch von Boyna claim
to have captured 103,500 men, 69 guns, and 255 machine guns. A
retreating army must inevitably lose many of their number as prisoners,
besides their wounded must also be abandoned. Furthermore, the
Russian line of retreat led through rough and mountainous country,
where large bodies of troops could not be kept in touch with each
other. Thus it frequently happened that isolated detachments were
captured _en bloc_ without being able to offer any resistance. In
the neighborhood of Sanok and the watering places of Rymanow and
Ivonicz some of the biggest Russian base hospitals were situated.
These, of course, could not have been evacuated in time, and the
patients consequently swelled the number of prisoners. Most of
the guns captured by the Austro-Germans were those of the Russian
troops whose retreat from northern Hungary and the passes had been
intercepted.

They often sacrificed large bodies of troops to save their guns.
The lack of artillery was the main cause of their defeat; what
little they could save from the wreck was therefore husbanded with
jealous care. The German staff accurately calculated on the
preponderance of heavy artillery, and that Russia would be compelled
to bow low before the superior blast of cannon fire. Though it
involved the sacrifice of many miles of territory, it was now the
Russian object to draw the enemy's line out to the fullest extent.
After the retreat from the Wistok the Russian Generalissimo, Grand
Duke Nicholas, was concerned only to save the most for his country
at the greatest expense to her enemies. It meant continual retreat
on a gigantic scale. Przemysl, captured ten weeks ago, lay behind
Ivanoff's line, and Lemberg was but sixty miles beyond. Two hundred
miles northward the Germans were hammering at the gates of Warsaw.
A retreat such as the grand duke contemplated might involve the loss
of all three of these places, but it would stretch the Germanic
lines enormously and enable the Allies in the west to strike with
better effect. No territorial considerations must stand in the way
against the safety of the Russian armies. It was the same policy
that had crippled Napoleon in 1812.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXXI

CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN GALICIA AND THE BUKOWINA

In order to keep the narrative abreast of the steadily advancing
Austro-German line, we must change occasionally from one sector to
another to watch the progress of operations over the huge battle
field. In accordance with the details laid down in the great strategic
plan, each of the different Germanic forces had a distinct task to
perform. Turning then to eastern Galicia and the Bukowina, we find
that on May 1, 1915, the Austro-Hungarian and Russian armies were
facing each other along almost the same front where we left them
in the middle of March. That front extended to the north of Nadvorna
and Kolomea, by Ottynia across to Niczviska on the Dniester, and
from there eastward along the river toward Chotin on the Russian
frontier of Bessarabia.

By the beginning of May, 1915, the spring floods had subsided,
when operations became again possible. General Lechitsky, on the
Russian side, probably aimed at recovering the Pruth Valley, while
the Austrian commander, General von Pflanzer-Baltin, directed his
efforts to establishing himself on the northern bank of the Dniester.
He would then be able to advance in line with the Germanic front that
was pressing on from the west, and northward from the Carpathian
range between Uzsok and the Jablonitza passes; otherwise his force
would lag behind in the great drive, a mere stationary pivot. At
that time he held about sixty miles of the Odessa-Stanislau railroad
(which runs through the valley via Czernovice and Kolomea) with
the Russians only twenty miles north of the line. If that position
could be taken the Austrians would have the South Russian line of
communications in their hands, for it was along this line that
supplies and reenforcements were being transported to Ivanoff's front
on the Wisloka from the military centers at Kiev and Sebastopol.
Thus the railway was of tremendous importance to both belligerents.
What it meant to the Austrians has been stated; to the Russians its
possession offered the only opportunity for a counteroffensive in
the east that could possibly affect the course of the main operations
on the Wisloka, San, and later the Przemysl lines. But however
successful such a counteroffensive might prove, it could not have
exerted any immediate influence on the western front. With the
Transylvania Carpathians protecting the Austro-German eastern flank,
there would still be little hope of checking the enemy's advance on
Lemberg even if Lechitsky succeeded in reconquering the whole of
the Bukowina and that part of eastern Galicia south of the Dniester.
Every strategic consideration, therefore, pointed to the Dniester
line as the key to the situation for the Austrian side, and Von
Pflanzer-Baltin decided to stake all on the attempt.

[Illustration: GALICIAN CAMPAIGN FROM PRZEMYSL TO BESSARABIA]

On May, 6, 1915, the machine was set in motion by a violent bombardment.
By the 8th the Austrians captured the bridgehead of Zaleszczyki;
on the 9th the Russians drove them out again, capturing 500 men,
3 big guns, 1 field gun, and a number of machine guns. On May 10
the Russians took the initiative and attacked a front of about
forty miles, along the entire Dniester line from west of Niczviska
to Uscie Biskupic, crossed into the Bukowina and advanced to within
five miles of Czernowitz from the east. A little stream and a village
both named Onut are situated southwest of Uscie Biskupic. Here a
detachment of Don Cossacks distinguished themselves on May 10,
1915. Advancing toward the Austrian wire entanglements in face of
a terrific fusilade, they cut a passage through in front of the
Austrian's fortified positions. Before the latter realized what was
happening the Cossacks were on top of them, and in a few minutes a
ferocious bayonet struggle had cleared out three lines of trenches.
Russian cavalry poured in after them, hacking the Austrian's rear,
and compelling them to evacuate the entire district. The Cossacks
charged into the hurriedly retreating masses--on horse and on foot,
with saber, lance, and bayonet, capturing 4,000 prisoners, a battery
of machine guns, several caissons and searchlight apparati.

The entire northern bank of the Dniester was in Russian possession
by the night of May 10, 1915; several desperate counterattacks
attempted by the Austrians on the 11th completely failed to recover
the lost ground. Two days later a Russian official reported: "In this
operation the Austrian units which led the offensive were repulsed
near Chocimierz with heavy losses. Our artillery annihilated two
entire battalions and a third surrendered. Near Horodenka the enemy
gave way about seven o'clock in the evening of the same day and began
a disorderly retreat. We again captured several thousand prisoners,
guns, and some fifty ammunition caissons." Being a junction of
six roads and a railway station on the curved line from Kolomea
to Zaleszczyki, Horodenka is considered to be the most important
strategic point along the Dniester-Czernowitz front. It was undoubtedly
a severe blow to the Austrians.

During the night of May 11, 1915, and the next day they evacuated
a front of about eighty-eight miles, and retired south of the Pruth.
General Mishtchenko led his Cossacks on the Austrian trail, taking
several towns on their way to Nadvorna, which they captured after a
fierce fight. From here they took possession of part of the railway
line from Delatyn to Kolomea, and completely severed the connection
between Von Pflanzer-Baltin's forces and those of Von Linsingen
lying along the north of the range. Larger bodies of Russian troops
were on the way to Kolomea; on May 13, 1915, they stormed and carried
some strongly fortified Austrian positions eight miles north of the
town, in front of which the Austrians had placed reenforcements
and all their last reserves. By dint of great efforts they held
their position here, but from May 9 to May 14, 1915, the Russians
drove them back elsewhere on a front of over sixty miles for a
distance of about twenty miles, also capturing some 20,000 prisoners
with many guns and valuable stores of munitions. About the middle of
May matters quieted down in the eastern sector; the only fighting
of importance consisted of severe artillery combats around Czernowitz
and Kolomea. The issue of the conflict hung in the west with Von
Mackensen's armies; fighting in the Bukowina at this stage became
an unnecessary expenditure of strength and energy. The fate of
eastern Galicia was being decided 140 miles away, on the banks
of the River San, to which region we will now direct the reader's
attention.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXXII

RUSSIAN CHANGE OF FRONT--RETREAT TO THE SAN

After the Russian troops retreated from the Lower Wisloka northward
toward the confluence of that river with the Vistula they held
the two important bridgeheads of Sandomierz and Rozvadov.

On May 14, 1915, Ivanoff's right was being forced toward the Vistula
in the vicinity of Opatow. This right wing was the army under General
Ewarts, which since December, 1914, had been stationed in strongly
fortified positions on the Nida in Russian Poland. The front extended
across the frontier into western Galicia and joined on to the right
wing of Dmitrieff's Dunajec-Biala front, which was shattered between
Otfinow and Gorlice. The retreat of Dmitrieff's army was in an
easterly direction along Tarnow, Pilzno, Dembica, Rzeszow, and
Lancut to Przevorsk on the San; from the region of Gorlice and
Ciezkovice along Biecz, Jaslo, Frysztak, Krosno to Dynow, Dubiecko,
and Sanok, the latter also on the San. The troops that Brussilov
extricated from the passes and those with which he held the northern
part of the western Carpathians against Boehm-Ermolli were now
likewise concentrated on the San. A glance at the map will show
that the Russian front on the San from Przevorsk down to Sanok
forms a shield between the Germanic advance and the two towns of
Jaroslav and Przemysl. It will also be observed that General Ewarts's
forces about Rozvadov are on the west side of the San, that is
to say, nearer toward the advancing Austrians under the Archduke
Joseph Ferdinand.

The retreat in Galicia necessitated modifications in the Russian
front in Poland on the way to Warsaw. The line south of the Pilica
had to be withdrawn and positions on the Nida abandoned to conform
with the retreating line in Galicia. New positions were taken up along
Radom and across the Kamienna River. The pivot or hinge from which
the line was drawn back was the town of Ivanlodz, about fifty-five
miles southwest of Warsaw. North of Ivanlodz the front remained
unaltered. While this line shifting was in progress (in Poland) the
German troops hung closely to the heels of the retiring Russians,
evidently mistaking the motive behind the change of position. Mr.
Stanley Washburn thus summarizes the results of these retreating
battles:

"Regarding the movement as a whole, suffice it to say that in the
two weeks following the change of line one (Russian) army inflicted
upon the enemy a loss of nearly 30,000 in killed, wounded, and
prisoners. The Russian losses were comparatively trifling." The
Austro-German forces were following up leisurely the retreating
Russian corps, not expecting any serious fighting to occur until
the lines behind the Kamienna were reached.

Instead of that, however, on May 15, 1915, the Russian commander
suddenly halted the main body of his troops in front of his fortified
positions on a line extending from Brody by Opatow toward Klimontow.
Between May 15-17, 1915, a battle developed on this front, which
is the more notable as it is one of the few in this war fought in
the open without trenches. To quote Mr. Washburn: "In any other
war it would have been called a good-sized action, as from first
to last more than 100,000 men and perhaps 350 to 400 guns were
engaged."

The Austro-Germans came on in four groups. The Third German Landwehr
was moving from the southwest by Wierzbnik against Ilza, slightly
to the north of Lubienia. Next to it, coming from the direction
of Kielce, was the German Division of General Bredow, supported
by the Eighty-fourth Austrian Regiment. This body was advancing
against Ostroviec, the terminus of a railway which runs from the
district of Lodz to the southeast by Tomaszow and Opoczno, and
crosses the Ivangorod-Olkusz line halfway between Kielce and Radom.
Farther to the south three Austro-Hungarian divisions were also
advancing--namely, the Twenty-fifth Austrian Division against Lagow,
and the Fourth Austrian Landwehr Division, supported by the Forty-first
Honved Division, against Ivaniska; they moved along roads converging
on Opatow. The Twenty-fifth Austrian Division, commanded by the
Archduke Peter Ferdinand, was composed of crack regiments, the
Fourth Hoch and Deutschmeisters of Vienna, and the Twenty-fifth,
Seventeenth, and Tenth Jäger battalions. The Russians were outnumbered
about 40 per cent. The supposedly demoralized Russians were not
expected to give any battle short of their fortified line, to which
they were thought to be retiring in hot haste. The Russian general
selected the Austrians on whom to spring his first surprise, but
commenced by making a feint against the German corps, driving in
their advanced guards by vigorous attacks which caused the whole
force to halt and begin deployment for an engagement.

This occurred on May 15, 1915. On the same day, with all his available
strength, he swung furiously with Opatow as an axis from both north
and south, catching in bayonet charge the Twenty-fifth Division on
the road between Lagow and Opatow. Simultaneously another portion
of his command swept up on the Fourth Division coming from Ivaniska
to Opatow. "In the meantime a strong force of Cossacks had ridden
round the Austrians and actually hit their line of communications
at the exact time that the infantry fell on the main column with a
bayonet charge, delivered with an impetuosity and fury that simply
crumpled up the entire Austrian formation. The Fourth Division was
meeting a similar fate farther south, and the two were thrown together
in a helpless mass, losing between 3,000 and 4,000 casualties and
nearly 3,000 in prisoners, besides a large number of machine guns
and the bulk of their baggage. The remainder, supported by the
Forty-first Honved Division, which had been hurried up, managed
to squeeze themselves out of their predicament by falling back on
Uszachow, and the whole retired to Lagow, beyond which the Russians
were not permitted to pursue them, lest they should break the symmetry
of their own line." It is admitted by the Austrians themselves
that their losses were very severe in this battle. An Austrian
source at the time stated that on May 16, 1915, not a single officer
and only twenty-six men were left of the entire Fourth Company,
First Battalion of the Tenth Austrian Infantry Regiment. By the
17th of May the Austrians had withdrawn more than twelve miles
from the scene of the disaster.

During the following night, May 25, 1915, an Austrian division
was moving from the line of advance of General Bredow's troops
along the Lagow-Opatow road where it is separated by a spur of
the Lysa Gora, the highest mountain group in Russian Poland. The
Russians, elated over their recent victory, crossed the mountains by
a forced march, and fell on the right flank of the German formation,
while other troops opened a general frontal attack against it.
Bredow was compelled to fall back in haste in the direction of
Bodzentyn and to call for assistance from the adjoining Fourth
German Landwehr Division. The sudden withdrawal of that division
had the effect of weakening the German line southwest of Radom
near the Radom-Kielce and the Konsk-Ostroviec railway crossings.
The opportunity of thinning the enemy's line in that sector was
too good to be lost, for a Russian communiqué of May 17, 1915,
states that "near Gielniow, Ruski-Brod, and Suchedniov our sudden
counterattacks inflicted severe losses on the enemy's advance guards."
Having thus checked the German advance for the time being, the
Russians ceased from further troubling to await developments on
the San.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXXIII

BATTLE OF THE SAN

When the Austro-German armies reached the line of the San on May
14, 1915, the battle for mid-Galicia was over, and a fresh chapter
of the campaign opened with the battle of the San, which might more
fittingly be described as the battle for Przemysl. The position
of Ivanoff's right has been shown; his right center lay west of
the Lower San; the center east of the river covered Przemysl; his
left center extended along the Upper Dniester, while his left,
under Lechitsky, was keeping Von Pflanzer-Baltin employed. Von
Mackensen's "phalanx" was slowly coming into action again, directing
its course toward the Russian center. The "phalanx" was compelled
to travel slowly, for it carried about 2,000 pieces of artillery
with ample munitions, and the railroads had been wrecked by the
retreating Russians. What has been described by military writers
as "Von Mackensen's phalanx" was a concentration of troops along
the lines on which the strongest resistance was expected or where
the quickest advance was intended. No special group of forces appear
to have been set apart for that purpose; there was very little
shifting about or regrouping necessary during the campaign, and
so well was the plan arranged that the concentrations occurred
almost automatically wherever and whenever they were most needed.
The infantry marched in successive lines or echelons, about forty
yards apart, while in the ranks the men were allowed about four
feet elbow room apiece. For frontal attacks this might be considered
fairly close formation, but Von Mackensen calculated more upon the
disintegrating effect of his artillery to first demoralize the
enemy and wreck his position, after which the infantry came into
play to complete the destruction. Without an overwhelming supply
of artillery the "phalanx" plan would have been unworkable--machine
guns would exact too heavy a sacrifice of life.

Ivanoff's chief object for the moment was to hold the enemy in
check long enough to allow Przemysl to be cleared of ammunitions
and supplies, and to withdraw the troops in possession of the place.
Already, on May 14, 1915, the German troops of Von Mackensen's
army had occupied Jaroslav, only twenty-two miles north of the
fortress. Ivanoff had concentrated his strongest forces on the
line between Sieniava, north of Przevorsk, and Sambor, thirty miles
southeast of Przemysl. Here he had deployed the three armies which
had held the entire front from the Biala to Uzsok in the beginning of
May, 1915, nearly twice as long as the line they were now guarding.
These were to fight a holding battle on the center while he adopted
a series of vigorous counterthrusts on his right and left wings.
By the retirement of the center Ewarts had been compelled to fall
back from the Nida to the Vistula with Woyrsch's Austrian army
against him. When Ewarts dropped behind Kielce in Russian Poland,
Woyrsch seized the junction of the branch line to Ostroviecs in
front of the Russian line. Ivanoff decided to venture a counterattack
which would at the same time relieve the pressure on his center
and also check the move on Josefov, dangerously near to the
Warsaw-Ivangorod-Lublin line. The result of this plan was the brilliant
surprise attack on the Austrians and Germans previously described.
Along the San the troops just south of Ewarts delivered a fierce
attack and drove the Archduke Ferdinand back to Tarnobrzeg on the
Vistula. Ivanoff next drew as many reenforcements from that flank
to strengthen his center as was compatible with safety. What had
happened meanwhile on Ivanoff's extreme left--in eastern Galicia
and the Bukowina--has already been stated. These counterattacks
may be regarded as merely efforts to gain time, but the hour of
another great battle was at hand.

The battle of the San, one of the greatest of the war, opened on May
15, 1915. Jaroslav was in German hands; the Fourth Austro-Hungarian
Army (Archduke Joseph Ferdinand) reached the western side of the
San on the 14th; by the 16th the Austro-German armies held almost
the entire left bank of the river from Rudnik to Jaroslav, about
forty miles. They crossed at several points on the same day and
enlarged their hold on the right bank between Jaroslav and Lezachow
near Sieniava, which they captured. A German division arrived at
Lubaczovka, due north of Jaroslav, and half of the Germanic circle
around Przemysl was now drawn. The German plan was an advance in
force from the Sieniava-Jaroslav front against the Przemysl-Lemberg
railway, the most vulnerable point of the Russian line of retreat
from the fortress. Fifteen bridges were accordingly erected over the
San in that sector between May 20-24, 1915, across which the German
battering ram was to advance on Przemysl. South of the town mounted
patrols came into touch with Russian cavalry; four Austro-Hungarian
and one German army corps were standing prepared between Dobromil
and Sambor; Sambor was occupied by them. The Russians held the left
bank close to the river from Sieniava to Jaroslav, and northward of
the former and to the west as far as Tarnobrzeg. From Jaroslav their
front ran in almost a straight line for thirty miles southeastward
to the outer and northern forts around Przemysl, described nearly a
complete circle around the western and southern forts to Mosciska
on the east, thence south to Sambor, and from Sambor to Stryj. From
Stryj eastward to the Bukowina the line remained unaltered. In
that region Lechitsky and Von Pflanzer-Baltin had been conducting a
campaign all by themselves; they were now resting, waiting, watching.

While great Germanic preparations for the capture of Przemysl were
proceeding north of the town, the battle opened on Saturday, May 15,
1915, in the south, against the Russian front between Novemiasto and
Sambor. Here the Austro-German troops were thrown against Hussakow
and Krukenice to hack their way through trenches and barbed-wire
entanglements in order to reach the Przemysl-Lemberg railway and
thereby complete the circle. "At the cost of enormous sacrifices the
enemy succeeded in capturing the trenches of our two battalions."

But on May 17, 1915, these trenches near Hussakow were recaptured
by the Russians. The Austrians returned to the charge, however,
and by May 19 were within six miles of Mosciska. By May 21 they
had overcome the main Russian defenses to the east of Przemysl and
were threatening the garrison's line--their only line--of retreat
to Grodek, for other Germanic forces were advancing upon Mosciska
from the north.

On May 21, 1915, the Russians opened a sudden counteroffensive along
the whole line in a desperate effort to save, not the fortress,
but the garrison. The Austrians had destroyed most of the forts
before they surrendered the town on March 22; and forts cannot
be built or reconstructed in a few weeks. Besides, the Austrians
knew the ground too well. Von Mackensen's "phalanx" was meanwhile
advancing against the Jaroslav-Przemysl front with Von Bojna's
corps on his right; Boehm-Ermolli deserted the passes which had
so long occupied him and was now pressing against the south of
the town while Von Marwitz on his right attempted to seize the
railway between Sambor and Dobromil. Von Linsingen was forging
ahead toward Stryj and the Dniester; he had finally worked through
the ill-fated Koziova positions, and was now able to rest his right
upon Halicz. From there his connection with Von Pflanzer-Baltin
had been broken by Lechitsky, and was not repaired till June 6,
1915.

The Russian counteroffensive was a homeopathic remedy, on the principle
of "like curing like:" an enveloping movement against being enveloped
themselves at Przemysl; but the case was hopeless. Yet they met with
some successes of a temporary nature. Between the Vistula and the
San they captured some towns and villages; they also got very close
to Radava, north of Jaroslav, and forced the Austro-German troops to
fall back on to the left bank of the river on a considerable line
of front north of Sieniava, where they captured many prisoners
and guns.

The counteroffensive reached its zenith on May 27, 1915, when Irmanow's
Caucasian Corps stormed Sieniava and captured something like 7,000
men, six big guns, and six pieces of field artillery. Von Mackensen
resumed the offensive on May 24, by advancing due east of Jaroslav,
capturing Drohojow, Ostrov, Vysocko, Makovisko and Vietlin all
in one day. Radymno was occupied by the Austro-Hungarians under
General Arz von Straussenburg, still further narrowing the circle and
compelling the Russians to fall beyond the San. On the twenty-fifth
the Austrians followed them over, captured the bridgehead of Zagrody,
the village of Nienovice and the Heights of Horodysko, while Von
Mackensen's troops farther north captured Height 241. South of
the village of Naklo, between Przemysl and Mosciska, a hill 650
feet high was violently attacked; it commanded the only line of
retreat from the fortress still left open. To the south of the
town the Russian counteroffensive tried to outflank the Austrian
troops which had approached close to the fortress and the railroad
to Lemberg. With the assistance of strong reenforcements the Russians
were able to check the advance here and make 2,200 prisoners, besides
capturing ammunitions and machine guns.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXXIV

RECAPTURE OF PRZEMYSL

The counteroffensive ended--of necessity--on May 24, 1915. The
Russians could still offer an effective resistance between Krukienice
and Mosciska, but the pressure of continuous attack against their
positions around Hussakow grew fiercer every hour. The enemy was
knocking at the outer ring of the forts; from the west the heaviest
cannons were pouring shot and shell with such violence that the
fall of Przemysl could no longer be prevented. Most of the troops
had already been withdrawn, as well as the supplies and munitions;
only a small garrison remained behind to man the guns of the forts
to the last moment; the little avenue to safety on the east was
still open.

On May 30, 1915, the Austrian batteries began their deadly work on
the Grodek line near Medyka. The exit was under fire; since May 17,
Przemysl had been invested from three sides, and the fourth was all
but closed. From the northern side, guarded by the Bavarians under
General Kneusel, twenty-one centimeter Krupp howitzers bombarded
the Russian positions round Korienice and Mackovice, drawing ever
nearer the forts commanding the road and railway to Radymno. The
Tenth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps, approaching from Krasiczyn,
endeavored to rush some of the outer works, but paid heavily for
the venture. They settled down before the forts of Pralkovice,
Lipnik, Helicha and Grochovce, and those round Tatarovka mountain.
General Artamoff, the Russian commander of Przemysl, had laboriously
reconstructed some of the old Austrian forts and equipped them with
Russian 12-centimeter howitzers. As the Austrians had brought only
their 15-centimeter howitzers, they were obliged to wait until their
30.5 batteries arrived before they could undertake any serious
attack.

These batteries came on the scene about May 25, 1915, it took five
days' preparation, and the final bombardment began on the 30th. It
was an ironical circumstance that the Austrians and Germans were
in numerous places sheltering themselves behind the very earthworks
which the Russians had constructed when they were besieging the
place two months earlier. There had been no time to destroy them
on the retreat.

The northern sector of the outer ring of forts fell on May 30, 1915,
when the Bavarians captured the Russian positions near Orzechovce. A
terrific bombardment was directed against the entire northern and
northwestern front; great columns of infantry were pushed forward
to finish the cannons' work--still the Russians hung on, ever bent
on doing all possible damage to the enemy.

During the night of May 30-31, 1915, the enemy succeeded in approaching
within 200 paces, and at some points even in gaining a footing
in the precincts of Fort No.7, around which raged an obstinate
battle that lasted until two in the afternoon of the 31st, when
he was repulsed after suffering enormous losses. The remnants of
the enemy who had entered Fort No.7, numbering 23 officers and
600 men, were taken prisoners.

Since the 20th of May, 1915, the clearing of the road had been
going on; Von Mackensen battering the western forts and the river
line as far as Jaroslav, and Boehm-Ermolli struggling to force
the southern corner to get within range of the Lemberg railway.
On his right, Von Marwitz had become stuck in the marshes of the
Dniester between Droholycz and Komarno. The Bavarians on the north
again let fly their big guns against the forts round Dunkoviczki on
May 31, 1915. At four in the afternoon they ceased fire; the forts
and defenses were crumpled up into a shapeless mass of wreckage. Now
Prussian, Bavarian and Austrian regiments rushed forward to storm
what was left. They still found some Russians there, severely mauled
by the bombardment; but they could no longer present a front. They
retreated behind the ring. The Tenth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps
now made another attempt on Pralkovice and Lipnik. Von Mackensen's
men captured two trenches near Fort No. 11--"they had to pay a heavy
price in blood for every yard of their advance." Heavy batteries are
also spitting fire against Forts Nos. 10 and 12. When the curtain
of night fell over the scene of carnage and destruction, two breaches
had been made in the outer ring of the forts.

June 2, 1915, dawned--a bright, warm summer's day; the sun rose
and smiled as impassively over the Galician mountains, and valleys,
and plains as it had smiled through countless ages before the genius
of man had invented even the division of time. From all sides of the
doomed fortress eager, determined men were advancing; Fort No. 10
was captured at noon by the Twenty-second Bavarian Infantry Regiment;
later in the day the Prussian Grenadier Guards took possession of
Fort No. 12; during the night the besieger's troops marched into
the village of Zuravica, within the outer ring. Austrian troops
had broken through from the southwest and also penetrated the inner
circle.

June 3, 1915, dawned and again the sun smiles over Galicia and sees
the same iron belt of machinelike men still nearer the fortress;
but the haggard defenders, where are they? Gone! Flown! They have
vanished during the night. Austrians and Bavarians march into the
town early in the morning. The only enemies they meet are the dead.

Przemysl has fallen again--fallen before twenty times as powerful
a blow as that which struck it down seventy-two days earlier.

Before proceeding with the progress of Von Mackensen and his mighty
"phalanx," let us briefly trace the progress of Von Linsingen,
whom we left on the road to Stryj and the Dniester, or rather,
attempting to force that road. While the forts of Przemysl were
being smashed in the north, Von Linsingen was pounding and demolishing
the Russian positions between Uliczna and Bolechov. Heavy mortars
and howitzers were at the same time being placed into position
in front of the Russian trenches between Holobutow and Stryj.

On May 31, 1915, they began to roar, and before long the trenches
were completely pulverized--the very trenches that thousands of
Germans and Austrians had died in vain attempts to carry by assault.
The Thirty-eighth Hungarian Honved Division were sent to finish
the work of clearance and take possession of Stryj. The entire
Russian line withdrew to the Dniester, step by step, ever fighting
their favorite rear guard actions, killing and capturing thousands
of their enemies. They retired behind the Dniester, but maintained
their hold on any useful strategical position south of the river,
so far as was possible without imperiling the continuity of their
line.

We must also consider two more Austro-German sectors in order to
bring the combatants stationed there into line with the Germanic
advance--the Uzsok Pass and the Bukowina-_cum_-Eastern Galicia
sectors. In the former the army of Von Szurmay stood beside that
of Von Linsingen opposite the Ninth Russian Army. Von Szurmay led
his men out of the pass and advanced northward on May 12, after
the fall of Sanok had forced the Russians away from their positions
in the vicinity of it. Their line of retreat was threatened by
the Austrian approach to Sambor.

On May 16, 1915, Von Szurmay moved across the upper Stryj near
Turka and passed along secondary roads in the direction of the
oil districts of Schodnica, Drohobycz and Boryslav, arriving on
May 16-17, 1915. Von Linsingen's troops had started their advance
on the same day as those of Von Szurmay, when the Russians found
Koziowa had to retire for the purpose of keeping in touch with
their line: the same pressure that Sambor exerted on the Uzsok.
Here again the Russians adopted rearguard tactics and considerable
fighting occurred during their retreat to Stryj and Bolechow, both
of which were eventually captured by Von Linsingen.

In Eastern Galicia and the Bukowina matters had come almost to a
standstill between Lechitsky and Von Pflanzer-Baltin about the middle
of May, 1915. When the former had cut the latter's connection with
the main line, the brigade of General von Blum and other adjoining
German troops on the extreme right of Von Linsingen tried hard
to relieve the pressure of Lechitsky on the Austrian forces. Not
till after the fall of Przemysl was the connection restored, when
the Russians had to fall back from Kalusz and Nadvorna; on June 9
they evacuated Obertzn, Horodenka, Kocman and Sniatyn. Lechitsky
was also compelled to withdraw from the Bukowina between Zaleszczyki,
Onut, and Czernowitz, where the Austrians were moving along the
Dniester in the north, the Pruth in the south, and over the hills
in the center against the village of Szubraniec. Here the Russians
once more inflicted severe losses on the Austrians, but being in
danger from a flanking movement by the Forty-second Croatian Infantry
through the Dniester forests, they retired from the Bukowina on
to Russian territory on June 12, 1915.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXXV

CAPTURE OF LEMBERG

The capture of Przemysl and of Stryj terminates the second stage
of the Austro-German offensive in Galicia. The third stage may
be described as the battle for Lemberg, or Lwow. Lemberg is the
ancient capital of Galicia, and formerly bore the name of Lwow.
The Austrians many years ago had changed it to "Lemberg." When the
Russians captured the town on September 3, 1914, they had given
it back the old Slavonic name, which, however, was destined soon to
be transformed back again into the more pronounceable appellation
of "Lemberg."

It is estimated that between April 28, 1915, and the recapture
of Przemysl the Russian forces in Galicia had been diminished by
at least a quarter of a million casualties. The heaviest losses
occurred among Dmitrieff's troops in the first days of May, 1915,
but in the battles on the San, at the close of the month, the forces
of Von Mackensen's "phalanx" were also greatly reduced. Along the
entire Galician front, it is computed that quite 600,000 Austro-German
troops were put out of action.

While the fight for Przemysl was in full swing an important event
of the war occurred--Italy joined the enemies of Austria on May
3, 1915; the Dual Monarchy had now to defend her western frontier
as well. Dankl and Von Bojna were transferred to the Italian front
with a considerable portion of their Galician troops. A general
redistribution of units was effected among the Austrian and German
armies. The army of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand was held along
the lower San as far as Sieniava. Von Mackensen was advancing east
of Jaroslav along the railway toward Rawa-Ruska. Boehm-Ermolli
was fighting on the road to Lemberg from Mosciska. An army under
Count Bothmer was operating near the Dniester marshes, beyond which,
farther south, a group of armies under Von Linsingen (mainly German)
had forced the passage of the Dniester at Zuravno, and was trying
to advance on Lemberg and catch Ivanoff's main forces on the flank.
This last movement, if successful, would be the most effective method
of crushing the retreating Russian armies: being thus outflanked,
some of their lines of retreat would be cut and a dissolution of a
large portion of the retiring forces could hardly have been avoided.
However, all attempts in this direction failed. The Russians gradually
rolled up their line on the Dniester from west to east, keeping
step with the retreat of the armies which were facing west. With
strong reenforcements from Kiev and Odessa Brussilov commanded
the Dniester front under the direction of General Ivanoff. If only
the ponderous advance of Von Mackensen could have been arrested,
Brussilov would have had little difficulty in sweeping Von Linsingen
back to the Carpathian barrier. A somewhat similar condition existed
in the north, where the Austrians were at the mercy of Ivanoff's
strong right wing.

The archduke's front was smashed at Rudnik early in June, 1915; his
forces were driven back a day's march and lost 4,000 men in prisoners,
besides many guns. The Second, Third and Fourth Tyrolese regiments
were almost annihilated. German troops were hurried to the rescue.
Boehm-Ermolli also got into serious difficulties at Mosciska, where
the Russians held him up for a week with a furious battle. Ivanoff
was scoring points against all his individual opponents excepting
only Von Mackensen. The "phalanx," always kept up to full strength
by a continuous influx of reserves and provided with millions of
high-explosive shells, not only pursued its irresistible course
eastward, but had to turn now right, now left, to help Austrian
and German commanders out of trouble. Heavy howitzers lumbered
along the way to Rawa-Ruska--not to Lemberg, but to the north of
it, on the flank of the Russian army still holding the Lower San.
This army had therefore to retire northward to the river line of
the Tanev stream, cautiously followed by the archduke's forces.
The "phalanx" had again saved them from disaster. Similarly, at
Mosciska, when Boehm-Ermolli tried to storm the Russian position
by mass attacks, his infantry was driven back with such terrible
punishment that they could not be induced to make another advance.
There was nothing to be done here, but wait till Von Mackensen
turned the flank of the Russian position for them, which he did in
one of the most stubborn conflicts of the war--the battle of the
Lubaczovka, a tributary of the San between Rawa-Ruska and Lemberg.
Never were the fighting abilities of Slav and Teuton more severely
tested. For over a week the struggle raged; a half million men
were brought up in groups and flung against the Russian front.
Shell, shrapnel, bullets and asphyxiating bombs finally wore down
the Russian resistance.

Incapacitated by physical exhaustion and outnumbered by three to
one, the Russian infantry gave way on June 13, 1915. The "phalanx"
drove into their ranks and advanced rapidly in a northerly direction
on its great flanking movement. But the Russian spirit was not
broken, for at this critical moment General Polodchenko rode out
with three regiments of cavalry--the Don Cossacks, the Chernigov
Hussars, and the Kimburn Dragoons. They dashed into the unbroken
lines of the triumphant German infantry like a living hurricane,
sabered the enemy, and put thousands on the run. Swerving aside,
they next charged deep into the German rear, mauled the reserves into
confusion, hacked their way out again and captured several machine
guns. The most remarkable feature about this extraordinary exploit
was the fact that the losses sustained by the cavalry amounted only
to 200 killed and wounded. The effect on the "phalanx," however,
was such that no more attacks were made that day, and the Russians
were able to retire to the hills near Rawa-Ruska. Ivanoff was now
compelled to draw reenforcements from other parts of the line to
strengthen his front at Rawa-Ruska. This meant weakening Ewarts's
against the archduke and Brussilov against Boehm-Ermolli. The downfall
of the Dunajec-Biala front had been attributed by the Russian War
Staff to overconfidence or neglect on the part of General Dmitrieff,
who was subsequently relieved of his command and replaced by General
Lesch. At an official inquiry Dmitrieff was exonerated and reinstated
on the reasonable ground that, whatever precautions of defense he
might have taken, they would have proved ineffective against the
preponderance of the German artillery.

After the battle of Lubaczow the Russian line drew back about twenty
miles. For the defense of Lemberg the front ran in a concave form
from along the River Tanev, five miles from Rawa-Ruska, down to
Grodek and Kolodruby; then eastward behind the Dniester to Zuravno
and Halicz. The marshes of the Dniester, then swollen by heavy
rains, formed a good natural defense; the intrenchments on the
hills north of Grodek to Rawa-Ruska protected the approaches to
Lemberg from that direction. The weakest spot lay around Janov,
fifteen miles north of Grodek, where the level ground would permit
the easy transport of heavy artillery. This position had been fortified
with trenches and wire entanglements. Here also were concentrated
the troops withdrawn from other parts of the line, and four armored
trains with quick-firing guns from the depot at Rovno. General
Ivanoff had no intention of making any decisive stand against the
"phalanx"; neither did he think of risking his armies in a battle
for Lemberg. That town was certainly of great military and political
importance--worth a dozen Przemysls--and worth fighting for. But for
that he would need artillery in enormous quantity. Von Mackensen
carried 2,500 guns with him, as well as siege trains of heavy howitzers.
Ivanoff possessed none of these, and could therefore hope only to
fight rear-guard actions while retiring before Von Mackensen. In
any other part of the Galician line except the center he had little
to fear. We left Von Linsingen forcing the Dniester at Zuravno. He
got the bulk of his army across, the main advance commanded by
Von Bothmer, who captured the northern heights and penetrated the
forests near the Stryj-Tarnopol railway. They were less than fifty
miles from Lemberg.

The "retreating" Brussilov suddenly turned round and fell on Von
Bothmer's advance. The fight lasted three days, with the result that
the Austro-Germans were obliged to fall back across the Dniester,
leaving behind 2,000 killed and wounded, besides 17 guns, 78 machine
guns, 348 officers and 15,430 men as prisoners, June 8-10, 1915.

On June 11, 1915, however, the Germans renewed the attack on Zuravno,
recaptured the town, and on June 12 were five miles north of it. By
June 13 they had made ten miles, when Brussilov lashed out again.
Within two days the Germans were back on the Dniester. Von Mackensen
had meanwhile concentrated a new series of heavy batteries around
Jaroslav and formed a new "phalanx" (with reenforcements) west
of the San between Piskorovice and Radymno. Another attempt was
preparing to break through Ivanoff's right wing.

A violent bombardment began on June 12, 1915, and Austro-Hungarian
troops crossed the river and occupied both Sieniava and Piskorovice.
Next day the advance spread along the whole line, extending from
Tarnoviec on the Zlota to the Radymno-Javorov road, pressing north
and eastward against the Russian front. Pivoting on Sieniava, Von
Mackensen swung his right toward Mosciska, which Von Marwitz captured
on June 14, 1915. The same night the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's
entire army was slowly wheeling from the San toward the Tanev,
facing due north.

On June 16, 1915, the left of this line was already inside the
borders of Russian Poland, and its right wing along the entire
Tanev front. By June 16 numerous towns and villages were taken
by the Germans. The Wolff Telegraphic Bureau announced that Von
Mackensen's army had captured 40,000 men and 69 machine guns, which
undoubtedly referred to all the Galician groups, for on June 12,
1915, Von Mackensen had "replaced" the Archduke Frederick as
generalissimo of the Austro-Hungarian armies. The "phalanx" was
pressing against Rawa-Ruska, Magierow, and Janov; Boehm-Ermolli
against Grodek, part of which he captured by a midnight assault
on June 16. In five weeks the Russian line or front in Galicia
had shrunk from 300 miles to about 100. Before Dunajec, when it
was united with the northern groups, it had represented the longest
battle line in the history of the world.

The Russians began to evacuate Lemberg about June 17, 1915, the day
Von Mackensen's right entered Javorov. On the 19th his advance guard
was approaching Rawa-Ruska. Boehm-Ermolli was meanwhile undergoing
severe punishment near Komarno, where an Austrian advance force
endeavored to get through the Grodek Lakes. The Russian artillery
drove them back; for three days there were furious bayonet and
cavalry charges and countercharges; despite the most terrific
bombardments the Austrian attacks were broken by the desperate
Russians. On this occasion, at least, the Russians were well supplied
with shells hurriedly sent by rail from Kiev, which enabled them to
repulse the Austrians on the lakes. Boehm-Ermolli is said to have
lost half of his effectives in his attempt to penetrate through
Grodek and Dornfeld, fifteen miles south of Lemberg.

Von Mackensen again came to the rescue by making a great turning
movement in the district of Zolkiev, about sixteen miles north of
Lemberg, and attacking the Russian positions about Janov, forcing
the Russians over the hills and the Rawa-Ruska railway to Zolkiev.
His left wing, resting on Lubaczov, swung northward in a wheeling
movement to envelop Rawa-Ruska. But the Russians intercepted the
move; ferocious encounters and Cossack charges threw the Germans
back to their pivot with heavy losses on both sides. Von Mackensen's
center, however, was too strong, and Ivanoff desired no pitched
battle--the only way to check its advance. He therefore fell back
between Rawa-Ruska and Lemberg, yielding the former to Von Mackensen
and the latter to Boehm-Ermolli, who was able to lead his battered
troops into the town on June 22, 1915, without further resistance.
Brussilov now had to withdraw from the Dniester. As at Przemysl,
the Russian garrison departed with all stores and baggage before
the victors arrived. Lemberg had been in Russian possession for
293 days.

A German attack near Rawa-Ruska was repulsed by the Russians on
June 25, 1915. For two days the "phalanx" rested to replenish its
stock of shells; when these had arrived along the Przemysl line,
Von Mackensen turned northward in the direction of Kholm on the
Lublin-Brest-Litovsk railway. On his left marched the Austro-Hungarian
army of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand. These two armies drop out of
the Galician campaign at this stage and become part of the great
German offensive against the Polish salient. The gigantic enveloping
movement had failed in the south; it was now to be attempted against
the Russian line in front of Warsaw, conducted by Von Hindenburg
and Von Gallwitz in the northern sector, and by Von Mackensen,
assisted by General Woyrsch and Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, in the
southern. These operations are described in the pages following.

More than three-fourths of Galicia had now been reconquered, and it
was left to the Austrians and the Germans to complete the conquest.
The campaign was one of the greatest operations of the war. An
English military writer thus describes the achievement: "Only a
most magnificent army organization and a most careful preparation,
extending to infinite detail, could execute a plan of such magnitude
at the speed at which it was done by the Austrian and German armies
in May, 1915."

Not yet, however, were the Russian armies destroyed; to the German
War Staff it was not now a question of taking or retaking territory,
but of striking a final and decisive blow at the vitals of Russia.
The continuous series of reverses suffered by Boehm-Ermolli and Von
Linsingen exerted an important effect on the end of the Galician
campaign: it frustrated the plan of eliminating the Russian forces.
The battle lines in France and Flanders could wait a while till
the Russian power was annihilated.

After the fall of Lemberg, Ivanoff withdrew the main body of his
troops toward the river line of the Bug, Boehm-Ermolli following up
behind. Again that unfortunate general was roughly handled--another
of his divisions was annihilated southeast of Lemberg in a rear-guard
action. Von Linsingen directed his efforts against the Gnila Lipa and
Halicz, while Von Pflatzer-Baltin still operated on the Dniester.
For many months the Russians and Austrians faced each other in
eastern Galicia; they were still skirmishing at the end of the
year. Both Russia and Austria had more important matters on hand
elsewhere: the former against Germany in the north, and the latter
with her new enemy--Italy. Galicia became a side issue.

The Galician campaign will rank as one of the most instructive
episodes in military history, an example of unparalleled calculation,
scientific strategy, and admirable heroism, involving, it is computed,
the terrible sacrifice of at least a million human lives.




PART IV--RUSSO-GERMAN CAMPAIGN


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXXVI

WINTER BATTLES OF THE MAZURIAN LAKES

The battle known in the German official accounts as the "Winter
Battle in Mazurian Land" is sometimes described as the "Nine Days'
Battle." In this sense it is to be considered as beginning on the
7th of February, 1915, and ending on the 16th, when the German
Great Headquarters reported that the Tenth Russian Army, consisting
of at least eleven infantry and several cavalry divisions, had
been driven out of its strongly fortified positions to the east of
the Mazurian Lake district, forced across the border, and, having
been almost completely surrounded, had been crushingly defeated.
In fact, however, fighting continued as part of the same action
until the 21st of February, 1915, when the pursuit of the defeated
army ended.

The forces engaged in this titanic conflict were the Russian Tenth
Army, consisting, according to the Russian version, of four corps,
under General Baron Sievers, and the German East Prussian armies,
under General van Eichhorn, operating on the north on the line
Insterburg-Lötzen, and General van Bülow on the line Lötzen-Johannisburg
to the south of Van Eichhorn. Sources favorable to the Allies represent
the strength of General Sievers's army as 120,000 men. They assert
that the total German force consisted of nine corps, over 300,000
men. These are said to have included the Twenty-first Corps, which
had been with the Crown Prince of Bavaria in the west; three reserve
corps, also from the west; the Thirty-eighth and Fortieth Corps,
new formations, from the interior of Germany; the equivalent of
three corps from other sections of the eastern front; and a reserve
corps of the Guard. The German official description of the battle
credits the Russians with having had in this sector of the battle
front in East Prussia at the beginning of February six to eight
army corps, or about 200,000 men.

For months the heavy fighting in the east had centered on other
sections of the immense battle line, running from the Baltic to
the Carpathians. The second general Russian offensive, the great
forward thrust of the Grand Duke Nicholas toward Cracow in the
direction of Berlin, aimed through the center of the German defense,
had been met, and the German counterthrust toward Warsaw had come to
a standstill in the mud of Poland and before the stone-wall defensive
of the Russians on the Bsura and the Rawka. Attacks launched by the
Russians against the East Prussian frontier, centering at Lyck,
in January, 1915, seemed to forebode a fresh Russian offensive
intended to sweep back the German armies in this section whose
position on the Russian right wing was a continual threat to the
communications of the Russian commander in chief.

The Germans, disposing of comparatively weak forces, estimated at
three army corps, were compelled to yield a strip of East Prussian
territory, and had fallen back to positions of considerable natural
strength formed by the chain of Mazurian Lakes and the line of
the Angerapp River. They reported their forces standing on the
defensive here as 50 per cent Landwehr, 25 per cent Landsturm,
and only 25 per cent other troops not of the reserve. Repeated
attempts of the Russians to gain possession of these fortified
positions had, however, broken down. They had been directed especially
against the bridgehead of Darkehmen and the right wing of the German
forces in the Paprodtk Hills. Wading up to their shoulders in icy
water, the hardy troops of the Third Siberian Corps had attempted
in vain to cross the Nietlitz Swamp, between the lakes to the east
of Lyck.

At the beginning of February, 1915, finally Von Hindenburg had been
able to obtain fresh German forces and to put them in position for
an encircling movement against the Russians lying just to the east
of the lakes, from near Tilsit to Johannisburg. With the greatest
secrecy the reenforcements, hidden from observation by their fortified
positions, and the border forces maintaining the defense, were
gathered behind the two German wings. The Russians apparently gained
an inkling of the big move that was impending about the time the
advance against their wings was under way. The first news of the
opening of the battle came to the public in a Russian official
announcement of the 9th of February, 1915, to the effect that on
the 7th the Germans had undertaken the offensive with considerable
force in the Goldap-Johannisburg sector. The northern group of
Germans began its movement somewhat later from the direction of
Tilsit.

Extensive preparations had been made by the German leaders to meet
the difficulties of a winter campaign under unfavorable weather
conditions. Thousands of sleighs and hundreds of thousands of sleigh
runners (on which to drag cannon and wagons), held in readiness,
were a part of these preparations for a rapid advance. Deep snow
covered the plain, and the lakes were thickly covered with ice. On
the 5th of February, 1915, a fresh snowstorm set in, accompanied
by an icy wind, which heaped the snow in deep drifts and made
tremendously difficult travel on the roads and railways, completely
shutting off motor traffic.

The Germans on the south, in order to come into contact with the
main Russian forces, had to cross the Johannisburg Forest and the
Pisseck River, which flows out of the southernmost of the chain of
lakes. The attacking columns made their way through the snow-clad
forests with all possible speed, forcing their way through barriers
of felled trees and driving the Russians from the river crossings.

Throughout the 8th of February, 1915, the marching columns moved
through whirling snow clouds, the Germans driving their men forward
relentlessly, so that, in spite of the drifted snow which filled
the roads, certain troops covered on this day a distance of forty
kilometers. The Germans under General von Falck took Snopken by
storm; those under General von Litzmann crossed the Pisseck near
Wrobeln. The immediate objectives of these columns were Johannisburg
and Biala, where strong Russian forces were posted.

On the 9th the southern column, under Von Litzmann, was attacked on
its right flank by Russians coming from Kolna, to the south of them.
The German troops repelled the attack, taking 2,500 prisoners, eight
cannon, and twelve machine guns. General Saleck took Johannisburg,
and Biala was cleared of the Russians. The advance of these southern
columns continued rapidly toward Lyck.

The German left wing at the same time fell overwhelmingly on the
northern end of the Russian line. On the 9th they took the fortified
Russian positions stretching from Spullen to the Schorell Forest
and nearly to the Russian border. They had here hard work to force
their way through wire entanglements of great strength. Having
noticed signs of a retreat on the part of their opponents, these
German forces had on the preceding day begun the attack without
waiting for the whole of their artillery to come up. The Russians
retreated toward the southeast.

Swinging forward toward the Russian border, the German left wing
now exerted itself to the utmost to execute the sweeping encircling
movement for which the strategy of Von Hindenburg had become famous.
The Russian right wing had been turned and was being pressed continually
toward the southeast. The German troops rushed forward in forced
marches, ignoring the difficulties which nature put in their way. By
the 10th of February these columns reached the Pillkallen-Wladislawow
line, and by the 11th the main highway from Gumbinnen to Wilkowyszki.
The right wing, up to the capture of Stallupohnen, had taken some
4,000 prisoners, four machine guns, and eleven ammunition wagons.
The center of this army, at the capture of Eydtkuhnen, Wirballen,
and Kibarty, took 10,000 prisoners, six cannon, eight machine guns,
numerous baggage wagons, including eighty field kitchens, three
military trains and other rolling stock, a large number of gift
packages intended for the Russian troops, and, of chief interest
to the fighting men, a whole day's provisions.

On the afternoon of February 10 some one and a half Russian divisions
had come to a halt in these three neighboring villages: Eydtkuhnen,
Kibarty, and Wirballen. Although it was known that the Germans
were approaching, it was apparently regarded by the Russians as
impossible that pursuers would be able to come up with them in
the raging snowstorm. So certain were they of their security that
no outposts were put on guard. Only thus could it happen that the
Germans, who had not allowed the forces of nature to stop their
advance, arrived right at the Russian position on the same day,
though with infantry alone and merely a few guns, everything else
having been left behind, stuck in the snowdrifts.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXXVII

THE RUSSIANS OUT OF GERMANY

It was evening when the Germans made their surprise attack on Eydtkuhnen
and midnight when they fell upon Wirballen. On the roadway stood two
Russian batteries with twelve guns and a considerable number of
ammunition wagons. The German infantry approached without firing
a shot until they were within fifty yards. Then all the horses
were shot down and the guns and ammunition seized. The men of the
battery fled. In both these towns there was street fighting in
the night, lit up by burning houses which had been fired by the
Russians in their retreat.

One of the captured trains was the hospital train of the czar.
This was utilized as headquarters for the night by the staff of
General von Lauenstein.

By the 12th of February, 1915, the German troops of the left wing,
sweeping down from the north and pressing the Russians back from
village to village, were entirely on Russian soil. Wizwiny, Kalwarja,
and Mariampol were occupied on this day. The number of guns taken by
these troops had been increased by seventeen, according to German
reports. The German Headquarters Staff declared that by this time
the Russian Seventy-third and Fifty-sixth Divisions had been as good
as annihilated, and the Twenty-seventh division nearly destroyed.
The Russians lying before the Angerapp line and the defenses of
Lötzen had in the meantime also begun to retreat toward the east.
German troops, consisting chiefly of reserves of the Landwehr and
Landsturm which up to this time had been held back within the German
fortified line, now advanced to attack the yielding army, whose
long marching column could be observed by the German flyers. While
General von Eichhorn's troops, coming from the neighborhood of
Tilsit and making their way through snow and ice, were advancing
upon Suwalki and Sejny, and the German right wing was fighting its
way through Grajewo, toward Augustowo, the center of the troops of
General von Bülow for several days fought the Russians in furious
battle in the vicinity of Lyck. From all sides the Germans were
closing in. To protect the withdrawal of this main army to Suwalki
and Augustowo, the Russians endeavored by all means to hold the
narrows of the lakes before Lyck, where they were favored by the
nature of the ground and aided by strong defensive works, for the
most part well provided with wire entanglements. The best of the
Russian troops, Siberian regiments, here fought with great energy
under a determined leadership, and the Russians, in fact, at some
places took the offensive. By the 12th of February, 1915, however,
the Germans had taken these positions and the Russians had withdrawn
to the narrow passages among the lakes before Lyck. The battles
around this town were carried on under the eye of the German Emperor.
The German soldiers were still occupied in hunting through the
houses for scattered Russians as the emperor stepped from his motor
car. He was received with hurrahs, and the soldiers surrounded
him, singing "Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles." The emperor,
standing amid the blackened ruins of burned homes, delivered a
short address to the soldiers gathered about him, giving special
recognition to Infantry Regiment No. 33, an East Prussian unit
which had especially distinguished itself and suffered great losses.
On the same day the Germans advanced beyond Lyck, and by the 15th
of February no Russian remained on German soil.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXXVIII

TIGHTENING OF THE NET--REPORT OF THE BOOTY

The Russian right, retiring to avoid envelopment, sought the natural
line of retreat along the railway to Kovno. In executing this movement
it turned toward the northeast, and exceeding in speed of movement
the corps to the south of it, the Twentieth, under the command of
General Bulgakov, the latter was left out of the line. In consequence
its right wing was turned and it was pressed down toward the south
with the enemy on three sides of it. It speedily became a broken
force in the forest north of Suwalki. The Russians endeavored to
reach the protection of their great fortress of Grodno. It was the
task of the German division coming down from the north in forced
marches to cut off this way of escape and prevent the Russians
coming out of the forest toward the southeast.

The march of these German troops carried them through great woodlands,
amid frozen lakes, when suddenly a thaw set in. The sleighs which
had been used had to be abandoned and wagons requisitioned on the
spot wherever possible.

An officer with these troops relates that infantrymen were sent
forward on wagons, and on the night following the 15th of February
took Sopozkin, to the east of Augustowo, on the line of the Russian
retreat, capturing the baggage of an entire Russian army corps. "The
morning," he writes, "presented to us a unique picture. Hundreds
of vehicles, baggage carts, machine guns, ammunition, provision
and ambulance wagons stood in a vast disorder in the market place
of the town and in the street. In between were hundreds of horses,
some harnessed, some loose, dead Russians, dead horses, bellowing
cattle, and sounding over it all the words of command of our troops
endeavoring to create order in this mad mix-up, and to take care of
the rich booty. Many an interesting find did we make--'mementos'
which the Russians had taken with them from Prussia and which now
were to find their way back."

A German commander tells how, in their efforts to cut off the Russian
retreat, the artillery were compelled to cross many brooks running
through deep gullies, so that it was necessary frequently to lower
guns and wagons by means of ropes on one side and pull them up
on the other.

One of the German leaders, describing this encircling movement
to the southeast from the north in which he played a part, says:
"The roads and the weather were beyond all description--twelve to
fifteen degrees Reaumur, with a cutting wind and driving snow,
with nothing to eat, as the field kitchens on these roads could
not follow. During pauses in the march one could but lean against
the wall of a miserable house or lie down in the burned-out ruins,
without straw to lie on and no covering. Men and horses sank to
their hips in the snow, and so we worked our way forward, usually
only about two kilometers an hour. Wagons and horses that upset
had to be shoveled out of the drifts. It was a terrible sight,
but we got through. We had to go on without regard for anything,
and the example of the higher officers did much."

Two Russian corps from the southern wing of the army retreating by
the Suwalki-Sejny causeway and by the Ossowetz Railway, according
to accounts from Russian sources, made their way out of the trap
under heavy rear-guard fighting.

The escaped portions of the Russian army crossed the Bobr toward
Grodno. From the direction of this Russian stronghold a desperate
effort was made to relieve the four corps which were endeavoring to
escape toward the fortress from the forest southeast of Augustowo
into which they had been pressed by the Germans from the west and
north. On the 21st of February came the final act in the great
drama. The German troops pushed forward at their best speed from
all directions toward the forest. The help that had been intended
for them came too late. Concerning the captures of this day, the
German Great Headquarters reported: "On the 21st of February the
remnants of the Tenth Army laid down their arms in the forest of
Augustowo after all attempts of the Russian commander of this army,
General Sievers, to cut a way out for the encircled four divisions
by means of those parts of his army which remained to him after
escaping over the Bobr to Grodno failed with extremely heavy losses."

Summarizing the results of the entire battle in an announcement of
the 22d of February, the German Great Headquarters said: "The pursuit
after the winter battle in Mazurian Land is ended. In cleaning up
the forests to the northwest of Grodno, and in the battles reported
during the last few days in the region of the Bobr and the Narew,
there have been captured to date one commanding general, two division
commanders, four other generals, and in the neighborhood of 40,000
men, seventy-five cannon, a quantity of machine guns, whose number
is not yet determined, and much other war material.

"The total booty of the winter battle in Mazurian Land, therefore,
up to to-day rises to seven generals, more than 100,000 men, more
than 150 cannon, and material of all sorts, inclusive of machine
guns, which cannot yet be approximately estimated. Heavy guns and
ammunition were in many cases buried by the enemy or sunk in the
lakes; thus eight heavy guns were yesterday dug out or hauled out
of the water near Lötzen and Lake Widmin.

"The Tenth Russian Army of General Baron Sievers may, therefore,
now be considered as completely annihilated."

This summary was corrected in a later announcement, which stated
that the number of guns taken as booty in the pursuit after the
winter battle in Mazurian Land had risen to 300, including eighteen
heavy guns. This was published on the 23d of February. In an
announcement of the 26th of February the Great Headquarters amplified
its account of the victory with this statement:

"In the Russian official report the extent of the disaster in the
winter battle of Mazurian Land is either concealed or an attempt
is made to obscure it. It is unnecessary to go further into these
denials. As evidence of the extent of the defeat, the following
list of the positions held by the captured generals, however, may
serve:

"Of the Twentieth Army Corps: the commanding general, the commander
of the artillery, the commander of the Twenty-eighth and Twenty-ninth
Infantry Divisions, and of the First Brigade of Infantry of the
Twenty-ninth Infantry Division. The commander of this latter division
succumbed to his wounds soon after being made prisoner.

"Of the Third Army Corps: the commander of the Twenty-seventh Infantry
Division and the commander of the artillery and of the Second Infantry
Brigade of this division.

"Of the Fifty-third Reserve Division: the division commander and
the commander of the First Infantry Brigade.

"Of the First Siberian Cossack Division: a brigade commander."

This brought the total of Russian generals captured up to eleven.

This account of one of the greatest battles of the European War
is necessarily based to a large extent on reports of the Germans,
owing to the fact that material from this source is virtually the
only official account available of the operation as a whole. The
Russian General Staff has contented itself with the following
announcement, made public on February 21, 1915:

"When the Germans, after a series of extraordinary obstinate and
persistent attacks which caused them heavy losses, had recognized
the impossibility of pressing in our front on the left bank of the
Vistula, they turned at the end of January to the execution of a
new plan. After the creation or several new corps in the interior of
the country, and the bringing up of troops from their west front, the
Germans threw important forces into East Prussia. The transportation
of troops was made easier by the extraordinarily developed net of
railways which Germany has at its disposal.

"The task of the new troops sent to East Prussia was to defeat
our Tenth Army, which held strongly constructed positions along
the Angerapp. To assure the success of the undertaking the Germans
brought a portion of their forces from the Bzura and Rawka fronts
to the right bank of the Vistula. A movement of the Germans in
East Prussia already became noticeable on the 4th of February,
1915. But the extent of this movement could only be recognized a
few days later. As our leaders, because of the lack of railroad
lines, could not collect the necessary forces on the East Prussian
front with the necessary speed to meet the hostile attack adequately,
they decided to take back the above-mentioned army of East Prussia
to the border. In this movement of the right wing the Tenth Army,
which was pressed by heavy hostile forces and threatened with being
surrounded from the right, was forced to make a rapid change of
alignment in the direction of Kovno. In this rapid movement a corps
was separated from the rest of the army. The other corps which
continued the battle obstinately without interruption, slowly drew
back in the prescribed direction, bravely repelling the enemy and
inflicting upon him heavy losses. Our troops overcame unbelievable
difficulties, which were caused by the snow which filled all roads.
As the streets were impassable, automobiles could not run. Trains
were delayed and frequently failed to arrive at their destination.
Our corps which formed the left wing of the Tenth Army held the
enemy, while drawing back step for step for nine days on a stretch
of territory which ordinarily is covered in four days. On the 19th
of February these corps withdrawing by way of Augustowo left the
battle field and took the position assigned to them. Further battles
developed in the region before Ossowetz, on the roads from Lomza
to Jedwabno and to the north of Radislow, also halfway between
Plozk and Plonsk. These battles were in places very intense."

An English authority says: "The chief Russian loss was in General
Bulgakov's Twentieth Corps, which the German staff asserted they
had completely destroyed. But during the fortnight which ended
on Saturday the 20th, at least half of that corps and more than
two-thirds of its guns safely made their way through the Augustowo
and Suwalki woods to the position which had been prepared for the
Russian defense. The total Russian losses may have been 80 guns and
30,000 men; they were no more. The two southern corps, in spite of
their stubborn action at Lyck, crossed the woods between Augustowo
and Ossowetz without serious disaster."


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXXIX

BATTLES OF PRZASNYSZ--BEFORE MLAWA

The shattering of the Tenth Russian Army in the "winter battle" of
the Mazurian Lakes was part of a greater conflict which in February,
1915, extended far down the armies on the right flank of the great
Russian battle line which ran from the Baltic to the Dniester. A
"new gigantic plan" of the Slavs was involved. As interpreted by the
German General Staff it meant that while the extreme northern wing
of the Russian armies was to sweep westward through the projecting
section of Germany, East Prussia, along the Baltic another Russian
army was to advance in force from the south against the corner
formed by West Prussia and the Vistula. With vast masses of cavalry
in the van, it was to break through the boundary between Mlawa and
Thorn, and pushing northward, come into the rear of those German
forces which were facing eastward against the attack aimed at East
Prussia from the northeast. For operations in this section the
Russians had favorable railway connections. Two railways terminating
at Ostrolenka permitted the rapid unloading of large masses of
troops at this point, and the line Warsaw-Mlawa-Soldau led straight
into the territory aimed at by such an invasion. It seemed easily
credible that the Russian commander in chief did, as reported,
give orders that Mlawa should be taken be the cost what it might.

The northern Russian armies based upon the fortresses of Kovno and
Grodno on the Niemen had not fully started on their part of this great,
well-planned undertaking when the German counteroffensive was suddenly
launched with tremendous strength from the Tilsit-Insterburg-Mazurian
Lakes line. The disaster which followed, and which banished all hope
of an advance of the Russians on this wing, has been described on
a preceding page. While the Germans, using to the best advantage
their net of railroads for the swift accumulation of troops, had
gathered large forces on the Mazurian Lakes line, they had at the
same time strengthened the troops standing on the southern boundary
of West and East Prussia. An artillery officer, General von Gallwitz,
was placed in command of this army with orders to protect the right
flank of the German armies attacking in Mazurian Land, and to prevent
the expected Russian attempt at invasion in his own sector of the
front.

While the "winter battle" was raging to the east of him, Von Gallwitz
in the characteristic German fashion of defense by a strong offensive
moved forward up the right bank of the Vistula to Plozk. A cavalry
division and regiments of the Guard at Sierpe and Racionz, February
12-18, 1915, won well-earned laurels for themselves by driving
an enemy of superior strength before them. At Dobrin, according
to German report, they took 2,500 prisoners.

General von Gallwitz's plan, however, was of more ambitious scope.
It was his intention, by encircling the Russians in the territory
before him from both wings, to sweep clear of enemies the entire
stretch of country in the Polish triangle between the Vistula and
the Orczy rivers. The right wing of his troops that had come down
the bank of the Vistula was to swing to the eastward in behind the
Russians. German troops which had arrived at Willenberg inside
of the East Prussian boundary, one of the German concentration
points on the line of railroad lying behind their front, on the
other hand, received orders to descend the valley of the Orczy
and to come in behind the Russian right flank from the east. These
troops, making a wide detour, swept past Przasnysz on the east,
and swinging round to the south of the city attacked the Russians
holding the place from this direction. The Germans had understood
that only small Russian forces were in the city. Anticipating the
German movement, however, a Russian division, as the Germans learned
later, had hastened to Przasnysz. The Russians also had collected
large forces on the Narew, and were hurrying them toward Przasnysz
on roads covering a wide front. Two full Russian corps from this
line were flung upon the German left wing.

The forces of Von Gallwitz which had carried out the encircling
movement from the east and south of Przasnysz now found themselves
caught between two Russian armies. However, they were unwilling to
relinquish the booty which they had planned to seize. A part of the
German forces was disposed in a half circle as a defense against the
Russians coming up from the south, and a division of reserves, February
24, stormed Przasnysz. The German Great Headquarters announced that
the Germans captured 10,000 prisoners, including 57 officers, and
took 36 cannon, 14 machine guns, and much war material of various
sorts. However, the Russian troops were now pressing forward from
the south with irresistible force. The Germans, in consequence,
slowly fell back, fighting under great difficulties, and moving
northward toward their defensive lines, carrying with them their
prisoners and booty.

The Russian General Staff on the first of March, 1915, devoted
an explicit account to the fighting about Przasnysz which differs
but slightly from the narrative by the German Great Headquarters
which has in general been followed in the preceding description.
Both sides apparently considered the operation of special importance,
and as reflecting credit upon their respective troops. The Russian
story emphasizes the attacks made by their force on the line
Lyssakowo-Chainovo simultaneously from north and south, that is,
both in the flank and in the rear of the Germans to the west of
Przasnysz. They represent their troops in the city as having consisted
of only a brigade of infantry and some insignificant cavalry units.
On the 25th of February, when the Germans had established themselves
in the town, the Russians, according to their account, were pressing
their enemies hard upon a long front from Krasnoseltz through
Vengerzinovo, Kolatschkowo to Voliaverlowska.

On the evening of this day they drove the Germans into positions
close to the city. The Thirty-sixth German Reserve Division on the
same evening is said to have met serious disaster after a determined
resistance at the crossings of the Anetz. On the evening of the next
day the Russians began to reenter Przasnysz, but did not completely
occupy the town until the night after the 27th. "The Germans," the
Russian account continues, "hereupon began a disorderly retreat,
endeavoring to withdraw in the direction of Mlawa-Chorgele. Regardless
of the exhaustion consequent upon the marching they had undergone and
four days of battle, our troops energetically took up the pursuit
of the enemy. On the 28th of February they inflicted serious losses
upon his rear guard. In these battles we seized a large amount of
booty. The total number of prisoners amounts to at least 10,000."
The Russians maintain that they had defeated no less than two German
army corps and thrown them back to the border.

On the 12th of March, 1915, the German Great Headquarters protested
against this version of the affair, and pointed to the fact that
within a few days their troops were again threatening Przasnysz,
and that since giving up the city they had captured on the battle
fields between the Vistula and the Orczy no less than 11,460 Russians.

The city of Przasnysz itself suffered heavily in these attacks and
counterattacks. For days and nights it had lain under bombardment
and repeatedly fierce, hand-to-hand combats had been fought in its
streets. Most of the houses of the place were left mere heaps of
smoking ruins.

From the German point of view this offensive just north of the
Vistula which included the temporary capture of Przasnysz was a
success, especially in this, that it had prevented the big Russian
forward movement against the West Prussian boundary which the impending
great Russian offensive had foreboded. It had been impossible for
the Russians seriously to endanger the German flank in this section,
while the Germans had struck to the east in the "winter battle,"
and had definitely spoiled the Russian appetite for invasion from
the Kovno-Grodno line.

As though determined to avenge their defeat to the east of the
lakes, the Russians now continued to direct a series of fierce
attacks in the direction of Mlawa, intending apparently to break
through the German line of defense between Soldau and Neidenburg.
It was said that the Russians believed General von Hindenburg in
person to be in charge of the German forces in this sector. In
consequence the German troops for the most part were forced to
stand upon the defensive. In the beginning of March the Russian
attacks increased steadily in violence. They broke against the
German positions to the east and south of Mlawa, according to German
reports, with enormous losses. At Demsk, to the east of Mlawa, long
rows of white stones mark common graves of masses of Russians who
perished before the German barbed-wire entanglements. The Germans
point to these as dumb witnesses of the disaster that overtook
forty-eight Russian companies that assaulted ten German ones. The
cold weather at this time had made possible the swampy regions in
which the Orczy rises, and had enabled the Russians to approach
close to the German line of defense.

The Russian attack at this point in the night of the 7th of March,
1915, was typical of the fighting on this line in these weeks.
After a thousand shells from the Russian heavy guns had descended
upon and behind Demsk, a seemingly ceaseless series of infantry
attacks set in. They were carried close up to the lines of wire of
the German defense. Enough light, however, was shed by the searchlights
and light balls shot from pistols to enable the Germans to direct
a destructive infantry and machine-gun fire on the approaching
lines. Those of the Russians who did not fall, fled to the next
depression in the ground. There they were held by the beams of the
searchlights until daybreak. Then they surrendered to the German
patrols. Of another attack a few kilometers farther to the north, at
Kapusnik, the Germans reported that after the enemy had penetrated
into their trenches and had been driven out in a desperate bayonet
fight, they buried 906 Russians and 164 Germans.

[Illustration: RUSSIAN RETREAT BEFORE THE TEUTON DRIVE TO WARSAW

TRIUMPHAL ENTRY · WRECKED BRIDGE · GUNS AT GRODNO · BRIDGE OVER
THE DRINA · AMERICAN DOCTORS · SERBIAN DEAD · FORT AT PRZEMYSL

An Austrian telephone station in a bombproof shelter. Efficient
telephone service is a most important detail in conducting a campaign]

[Illustration: The triumphal entry of the Austrian uhlans and artillery
into Przemysl. Their horses are decorated with sprays of leaves]

[Illustration: A bridge on the Kalesch-Warsaw line blown up by
the Russians in their retreat toward Warsaw. At the left is the
pontoon bridge built by the Germans]

[Illustration: German artillerymen at Grodno, Russia, digging out
a carefully concealed Japanese gun, together with other supplies
of Japanese ammunition]

[Illustration: In the foreground is a temporary bridge across the
Drina, while on the west bank there is a long row of gun positions
and of dugout shelters]

[Illustration: These two Americans, Dr. Richard P. Strong (left)
and Dr. Edward Ryan, aided in stamping out the plague of typhus
in Serbia]

[Illustration: Serbians who died from typhus. American doctors and
nurses aided in stamping out this dreaded disease, which followed
the horrors of invasion in Serbia]

[Illustration: The effect of Teuton shells on the forts of Przemysl,
Galicia. This fortress fell to the Russians after a long siege,
but was recaptured by Teuton troops]

On the 8th of March, 1915, General von Gallwitz again tried an
offensive with fresh forces which he had gathered. It was thwarted,
however, on the 12th, to the north of Przasnysz. The Germans estimated
the Russian forces which here were brought up for the counterattack
at some ten army corps and seven cavalry divisions. The Russians in
advancing this time, instead of directing their thrust at Mlawa,
pushed northeastward of Przasnysz along the rivers Orczy and Omulew.
In this sector the Germans counted from the 13th to the 23d of
March forty-six serious assaults, twenty-five in the daytime and
twenty-one at night. With special fury the battles raged in the
neighborhood of Jednorozez. This attempt to break into Prussia
was also unsuccessful, and in the last week of March the Russian
attacks slackened, quiet ensuing for the weeks following Easter.

For six weeks the armies had struggled back and forth in this bloody
angle, fighting in cold and wet, amid snow and icy rains. The Germans
asserted that in these six weeks the troops of General von Gallwitz
had captured 43,000 Russians and slain some 25,000. They estimated
the total losses of the enemy in this sector during the period
at 100,000. Countless graves scattered about the land, and the
ruins of cities and villages were left to keep awake the memory
of some of the fiercest fighting of the war in the east.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XL

FIGHTING BEFORE THE NIEMEN AND BOBR--BOMBARDMENT OF OSSOWETZ

The winter battles of the Mazurian Lakes had forced the armies at
the northern end of the Russian right flank back into their great
fortresses Kovno and Grodno, and behind the line of the Niemen
and the Bobr. A great forest region lies to the east and north of
Grodno, and between the Niemen and the cities of Augustowo and
Suwalki which the Germans, after their successful offensive, used
as bases for their operations. A strip of country including these
forests, and running parallel to the Niemen was a sort of no-man's
land in the spring of 1915. Movements of troops in the heavily wooded
country were difficult to observe, and the conditions lent themselves
to surprise attacks. This resulted in a warfare of alternate thrusts
by Russians and Germans aimed now at this point, now at that, in
the disputed territory. Several actions during the spring stand out
beyond the rest in importance, both because of the numbers engaged
and their effects. In what follows will be described a typical
offensive movement in this district undertaken by the Russians,
and the way it was met by the Germans.

A new Russian Tenth Army had been organized by the end of February,
1915, with Grodno for its base. General Sievers, his chief of staff,
and the general in command of the Third Russian Army Corps had
been demoted from their commands, and three new army corps (Two,
Three, and Fifteen) had been brought to Grodno. The ranks of the
remaining corps that had suffered in the "winter battle" had been
filled up with fresh recruits. Hardly had the German pursuit in the
forest of Augustowo come to an end when the freshly strengthened
Russians moved forward from their defensive lines in a counterattack.
The Germans had been engaged in the task of gathering and carting
away their enormous booty which lay scattered about the forest.
They now drew back from in front of the Russian fortified lines
to prepare positions close to Augustowo, and on a line running
roughly north and south from this place, with the forest in front
of them.

The Third Russian Army Corps advanced from Simno toward Lozdsisjo,
their Second Army Corps from Grodno by way of Kopiewo and Sejny
toward Krasnopol and other Russian corps advanced through the forest
of Augustowo. Here they soon struck strong German resistance, and
for several days vainly attacked German fortified positions.

On the 9th of March, 1915, a German offensive began against the
Russian Third Corps which held the right wing of the advancing
army. When this corps suddenly found itself threatened in the flank
from the north and in danger of being surrounded it hastily began
to retreat toward the east and southeast, leaving several hundred
prisoners and several machine guns in the hands of the Germans.
This withdrawal exposed the right flank of the adjoining Second
Army Corps, which by this time, March 9, 1915, had reached Berzniki
and Giby. The German attack was now continued against this corps.
It was cold weather, the thermometer was considerably below the
freezing point, and the roads were slippery with ice, so that dozens
of horses fell, completely exhausted, and the infantry could march
only two or three kilometers an hour.

On March 9 and 10, 1915, the battle flamed up at Sejny and Berzniki,
the Russian corps, which had developed its front toward the west,
being forced to swing about and face the north, whence the Germans
were driving down upon it. At Berzniki two Russian regiments made
up entirely of young troops were, according to the German account,
completely annihilated, and the commanders of the regiments captured.
It seemed as though the leader of the Russian armies saw approaching
a repetition of the encircling movements that had proved fatal
to the Russians in the Mazurian "winter battle," for on the 10th
of March he gave orders for the withdrawal of his entire army.
The German airmen on this day reported the Russian columns on the
march through the forest in full retreat toward Grodno all along
the line from Giby to Sztabiz, far to the south.

On the 11th of March, 1915, the German troops vigorously pushed
the pursuit. They occupied Makarze, Froncki, and Giby. On the same
night a German cavalry division took Kopciovo by assault. At this
place alone they counted 300 dead Russians, and more than 5,000
prisoners, 12 machine guns, and 3 cannon, fell into the hands of
the Germans.

The threatened envelopment of this Russian army was typical of
the method employed by the leaders under Von Hindenburg in local
operations, as it was of German method in general when applied to
operations extending over the entire field of action. It could be
applied with special success where the German information service was
superior to that of the Russians, as it usually was, and the movements
of German troops were facilitated by good railway connections. In
the Augustowo forests, however, rapidity of movement had to be
achieved by the legs of the German soldiers to a large extent,
and on this they prided themselves not a little. The operation just
described was regarded by the German Great Headquarters as being
of great significance, valuable for its moral effect in establishing
in the German troops a sense of superiority, and confidence in
their leadership, and for its infliction of material losses of
considerable moment on the Russians.

The Russians likewise claimed advantages from their forward thrust
from Grodno. As represented by the Russian General Staff the withdrawal
of the Germans from a front close to the line of the fortress in
the first place was not a voluntary one, as it is pictured in the
German account, but was forced by the strong pressure exerted by
the Russian attacks following upon their retreat after the "winter
battle." Thus they report the complete defeat of two German army
corps, resulting in the seizure by the Russians of Height 100.3,
which they described as dominating the entire region of the operations
before Grodno. "In this battle," says the Russian report of March
5, 1915, "we took 1,000 prisoners and six cannon and a machine gun.
Height 100.3 was defended by the Twenty-first Corps, the best of
them all which lost during the battle 12,000 to 15,000 soldiers,
as can be estimated from the dead left behind. After the shattering
of the German counterattack at Height 100.3 the operations of the
enemy became entirely passive. We, on the other hand, took village
after village, and everywhere made prisoners."

The fortress of Ossowetz on the Bobr River proved inconquerable by
the 42-centimeter mortars which had worked such terrific effects
on the forts of Belgium and France. It was continually under German
artillery fire through the months of February and March, 1915,
without suffering appreciable damage. The great mortars were brought
up within range of the fortress with much difficulty, owing to the
fact that the place is almost completely surrounded by swamps.
The Germans apparently had counted seriously at first on making a
breach in the Russian defensive lines at this place. After persistent
attempts to make an impression on the fortress with their heaviest
guns they were obliged, however, to content themselves with keeping
the garrison in check so as to forestall offensive moves.

A German artillery officer who took part in the bombardment relates
that the chief obstacle to the pressing home of an attack were
several heavily armored batteries which lay concealed outside the
visible works of the fortress itself in the broad strip of swampland
surrounding it. These were built deep into the ground, protected by
thick earthworks, and very effectively screened from observation.
They were a constant menace and apparently could not be destroyed by
the German fire. Even though the main fort itself had been destroyed
they would have prevented the approach of the enemy's troops, for
they commanded the only causeway leading through the swamps to the
fortress and would have blown to pieces any infantry that ventured
to push along this road.

Furthermore, even the intense cold did not make the swamp passable
except by the roadway because warm springs here and there prevented
the ice from freezing sufficiently strong to bear the troops. The
German gunners noted too that their shots fell practically without
effect, plunging quietly into the mud to a great depth so that
they did not even throw up earth or mud.

The result was that the 42-centimeter monsters were hastily withdrawn
after a few trial shots and the bombardment was continued with a
battery of 28-centimeter coast defense guns, an Austrian motor
battery, a 30.5-centimeter mortar and some other heavy batteries.
The fire rose to considerable intensity in the last days of February
and the first days of March.

On the 3d of March the Russians in their official report dwelt
on the fierceness of the bombardment and its ineffectiveness. On
the 16th they reported that the Germans were pushing several of
their batteries up into closer range, as they had recognized the
uselessness of shooting from a greater distance and on the 18th
they stated that the fire was falling off. On the 22d, finally,
they reported that beginning with the 21st the Germans had been
withdrawing their heavy batteries. They added that a 42-centimeter
mortar had been damaged by the Russian fire, and that "not a single
shot of these mortars has reached the fortress, not a redoubt has
been penetrated. The superiority of the artillery fire evidently
rests with us. The German attack was not only far removed from
placing the fortifications of Ossowetz in a critical position,
it did not even succeed in driving our infantry out of the field
works."

On the 27th of March there was a resumption of the bombardment on
a small scale and another effort began on April 11 with some heavy
guns, ending in an attempted advance which was repulsed without
difficulty by the Russians.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XLI

RUSSIAN RAID ON MEMEL

An event in which no great number of troops were concerned, but
which is of importance, because of the feeling which it aroused
in Germany and because it was the first of a series of operations
in what was practically a new theatre of the war was the Russian
invasion of the very northernmost tip of East Prussia. On Thursday,
the 18th of March, 1915, the Russians coming simultaneously from
the north and the east across the border of Courland, moved on the
Prussian city of Memel in several columns. Their troops included
seven battalions of militia with six or eight guns of an old model,
several squadrons of mounted men, two companies of marines, a battalion
of a reserve regiment, and border defense troops from Riga and
Libau, a total of some 6,000 to 10,000 men. The German Landsturm
troops at the Prussian boundary fell back on Memel, not being in
sufficient force to resist the advance. They were finally driven
through the city and across the narrow strip of water known as
the Kurische Haff to the dunes along the shore of the Baltic. The
Russians burned down numerous buildings along the roads on which
they approached, according to the German report, inflicting heavy
damage on fifteen villages. A considerable number of the inhabitants,
including women and children, were removed to Russia, and a number
of civilians were killed. The troops entered the city on the evening
of March 18 and took the mayor and three other men of the town as
hostages. Apparently the Russian commander made some efforts to
restrain his men, but plundering of stores and dwellings nevertheless
occurred. On the 20th of March, 1915, the city was for a time cleared
of Russian troops, but on Sunday, the 21st, other soldiers entered
the town from the north. These were met by German patrols, which
were followed by stronger German forces that had come up from the
south to drive back the invaders. Street fighting followed, and
the Russians were finally thrown out, losing about 150 dead.

The Russians were pursued on March 22 and 23, 1915, and in passing
through Polangen, close to the shore of the Baltic, came under the
fire of German cruisers. They lost some 500 prisoners, 3 guns, 3
machine guns, and ammunition wagons. With the German troops which
cleared the Russians out of Memel was the son of the emperor, Prince
Joachim of Prussia.

Concerning this raid the following official announcement was made
by the Germans on March 18, 1915: "Russian militia troops have
gained a cheap success in the northernmost corner of East Prussia
in the direction of Memel. They have plundered and burned villages
and farms. As a penalty, we have ordered the cities occupied by
us in Russian territory to pay considerable sums in damages. For
every village or farm burned down by these hordes on German soil
three villages or farms of the territory occupied by us in Russia
will be given over to the flames. Each act of damage in Memel will
be answered by the burning of Russian Government buildings in Suwalki
and other capitals of governments."

To this the following Russian official reply was made on March 21,
1915: "The official communiqué of the German Great Headquarters
of the 18th of March concerning the movement of Russian troops
against Memel contains a threat of reprisals to be exacted on Russian
villages and cities held by the enemy on account of the losses
which might be suffered by the population in the neighborhood of
Memel. The Russian General Staff gives public notice that Memel
was openly defended by hostile troops, and that battle was offered
in the streets. Since the civil population took part in this fight
our troops were compelled to reply with corresponding measures.
If, therefore, the German troops should carry out their threat
against the peaceful inhabitants of the Russian territory which
they hold, such acts should be considered not as reprisals but
as independent acts. Responsibility for this, as well as for the
consequences, would rest upon the Germans."

The move against Memel was apparently part of a Russian operation
which was intended also to strike at the city of Tilsit. The German
Great Headquarters reported that for operations intended to seize
the northern regions of East Prussia a so-called Riga-Shavli army
group had been formed under the command of General Apuchtin. While
portions of these troops were active in Memel on March 18, 1915,
the fourteen German Landsturm companies holding Tauroggen, just to
the north of the East Prussian boundary, were attacked by superior
forces and practically surrounded. They fought their way through
to Langszargen with some difficulty, and were being pressed back
on the road to Tilsit when on March 23 German reenforcements came
up and General von Pappritz, leading the Germans, went over to
the offensive.

A heavy thaw made movement of troops anywhere except on the main
roads extremely difficult. Guns were left stuck in the mud, and the
infantry waded to the knee in water, and sometimes to the waist.
It is reported that one of the horses of the artillery literally
was drowned on the road. Germans attacked Tauroggen, where the
enemy had intrenched himself, under an artillery fire directed
from the church tower of the place. On the 28th the town was taken,
after a difficult crossing of the Jura River in front of it, on
the ice. The Germans then exulted in the fact that not a Russian
was left on German soil.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XLII

GERMAN INVASION OF COURLAND--CAPTURE OF LIBAU

On the 20th of April, 1915, an announcement was made by the German
Great Headquarters which took the Russians and the world in general
more or less by surprise. It gave the first glimpse to the public
of a group of operations which caused no little speculation in
the minds of strategists. It read:

"The advance troops of our forces operating in northwestern Russia
yesterday reached on a broad front the railway running from Dunaburg
(Dvinsk) to Libau. Thus far the Russian troops present in that
region, including also the remnants of those which took part in the
raid against Memel, have attempted no serious resistance anywhere.
Fighting is now in progress near Shavli."

The advance into Courland here announced had been made by the German
troops at high speed. The forces were under the command of General
von Lauenstein. They had begun to move early on the 27th of April,
in three columns. One of these crossed the Niemen at Schmalleningken,
forming the right wing of the troops engaged in the movement. The
columns of the left wing broke out of East Prussia at its northernmost
point, and moved along the dunes of the Baltic. On the second day
of the forward march it was learned by the leaders of the advancing
troops that the Russians had hastily left their position at Skawdwile,
on the main road from Tilsit to Mitau, to escape being surrounded
on their left flank, and had withdrawn to Shavli by way of Heilmy.
On the third day the German right column crossed the Windawski
Canal under the enemy's fire, and on the afternoon of the 30th
of April this column entered Shavli, which had been set on fire
by the Russians.

[Illustration: GERMAN ADVANCE ON RIGA]

The Germans had now crossed at several points the Libau-Dunaburg
railway. They were in Telsche and Trischki. Their cavalry pushed
ahead at full speed with orders to destroy the railways wherever
it found them. On the road to Mitau they captured Russian machine
guns, ammunition wagons, and baggage, and broke up the railway
tracks to the southwest and northwest of Shavli. The Russians who
had been taken by surprise by this movement had apparently only
weak forces in Courland, and these had retired while reenforcements
were being rushed up by railway. The German infantry, upon the
receipt of reports that the Russians were moving up by rail from
Kovno on their right flank, was ordered to stop its advance and
prepare to hold the Dubissa line, taking up a front running a little
east of south. Cavalry moving forward in the center of the German
advance on the 3d of May, 1915, got within two kilometers of Mitau,
going beyond Grünhof and capturing 2,000 Russians. At Skaisgiry on
the day before 1,000 prisoners had been taken, and Janischki and
Shagory had been occupied far beyond the Libau-Dunaburg railway.
By this time Russian reenforcements were arriving at Mitau in huge
numbers. The German cavalry ultimately fell back after indicting
all possible damage to the communications in their reach.

The Germans prided themselves a good deal on the marching of their
troops in this swift advance. They pointed out that the roads were
in extremely bad condition, the bridges for the most destroyed, and
the population to a large extent hostile. A military correspondent
figured that for a daily march of fifty kilometers, such as was
frequently made in Courland, 62,000 steps of an average of eighty
centimeters were required. This for a day's march of from nine to
ten hours gives an average of five to six kilometers per hour,
some 6,000 to 7,000 steps. That makes in the neighborhood of 100
steps per minute, which the correspondent regarded as a considerable
accomplishment when allowance is made for the fact that this was
kept up hour after hour in full marching equipment.

The column coming from Memel, directed along the Baltic shores,
had been steadily moving on Libau. In preparation for the land
attack German naval vessels on the 29th of April had bombarded the
forts defending the town. On the 6th of May the Russians themselves
blew up one of the forts on the eastern front. The shore batteries
were soon after silenced by German fire. The German troops advancing
from the land side took the forts on the south almost without
opposition. Russian troops which had been unloaded at Mitau and
sent forward toward the southwest were unable to come up in time
to offer any obstacles to the German advance, and on the 8th of
May, at six o'clock in the morning, the German soldiers marched
into Libau, where they took about 1,500 prisoners, twelve guns,
and a number of machine guns.

The Germans immediately turned the metal-working plants of the
city to their uses in the manufacture of chains, barbed wire, etc.
They also found here a large supply of tools for intrenching work.
Most of the Russians of the city had fled. One motive for the German
advance into Courland advanced by their enemies was that it was an
attempt to include a rich section of country in foraging operations,
and it is a fact that the German authorities gave expression to their
satisfaction at seizing a region that was of considerable economic
value. It is apparent, however, in regarding these operations in
the retrospect that they had no small bearing on the German plan
of campaign as a whole. It was at the time that the inroad into
Courland was started that the signal was about to be given for
the great onslaught far to the south on the Dunajec, as described
in the account of the Austro-Russian campaign. As the vast campaign
along the whole eastern front developed, it became more and more
apparent that the position of the German troops in Courland placed
them advantageously for taking the Russian line of defenses, of
which the fortress of Kovno represented the northern end in the flank
in this carrying out of an important part of the vast encircling
movement which took all Poland in its grasp. They were a constant
threat to the all-important Vilna-Petrograd Railway.

In hostile and neutral countries the Courland invasion provoked
comment indicating astonishment at the resources of the Teutonic
powers in being able to extend their lines while already fully
engaged on an enormous front.

The Russians, awakening from their first astonishment, made vigorous
attempts to obtain permanent possession of the Dubissa line. Along
this line the German troops were for a time forced to yield ground
and to go into the defensive and to resist heavy Russian attacks.
Shavli was given up under Russian pressure. By May 14, all the
territory east of the Dubissa and Windau (Vindowa) was reported
free of Germans.

Especially noteworthy among the struggles for the Dubissa was the
fight at Rossiennie, a town which was of special importance because
of its command of the roads centering in it. On the 22d of May, 1915,
an attack was delivered against this place by the First Caucasian
Rifle Brigade with artillery and assisted by the Fifteenth Cavalry
Division. On the 23d the German cavalry which had resisted their
crossing the river drew back, and the Russians here crossed the
Dubissa, approaching Rossiennie from the north. The Germans during
the night moved the greater part of their troops around the western
wing of their opponents and placed them in position for attack.

At daybreak heavy artillery fire was poured upon the Russians from
the German position to the north of Rossiennie, while at the same
time the German infantry fell upon the Russian flank and rolled it
up, with the result that the Russians were compelled to recross
the Dubissa. In the crossing numerous wounded were drowned in the
river. The Germans took 2,500 prisoners and fifteen machine guns.
Similar counterattacks were delivered by the Germans on the River
Wenta. Then, on the 5th of June, 1915, a general offensive was
entered upon by the whole German line on orders from the General
Staff, which carried it beyond the Dubissa, and after heavy fighting
finally secured for the Germans the Windawski Canal, which they
had had to relinquish before. Their troops now slowly pushed their
way back toward Shavli until the city came within reach of their
heavy guns, and took Kuze, twelve kilometers to the northwest of
Shavli on the railway. On the 14th of June, 1915, this series of
operations came to a temporary halt. German official reports pointed
to the fact that among 14,000 prisoners which they had taken there
were only a few officers, and that with these not a single cannon
was captured. They regarded it as showing that the Russians were
getting very cautious in the use of their artillery and were short
of officers.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XLIII

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE FROM KOVNO--FOREST BATTLES IN MAY AND JUNE

Offensives on a large scale such as that which had been prevented
by the "Winter Battle of the Mazurian Lakes" were not attempted by
the Russians on their northern wing after the short counterattack
that had pushed their lines into the Mlawa angle in the corner of
the Vistula and the Prussian boundary beyond Przasnysz, to the
east of Thorn. They virtually remained in their strongly fortified
positions along the Narew, the Bobr, and the Niemen, except for
the sending out of occasional attacking columns against the German
lines lying opposite to them.

These forward thrusts were made especially from the fortresses
Grodno and Kovno, and the fortified place Olita. We have already
dealt with one such operation which came to grief in the forest
of Augustowo in March. The German invasion of Courland had taken
place, and the extension of the German lines to the north invited
a thrust at their communications when, in the middle of May, the
Russians attempted to break through the German lines with columns
starting from the great forest to the west of Kovno. Here German
troops under General Litzmann, acting under the command of General
von Eichhorn, stood on guard. When Litzmann received information
that the Russians were advancing in force he was obliged hastily
to gather such troops as he could find to stem the Russian attack.
Troop units from a large variety of different organizations were
freshly grouped practically on the battle field. At Szaki and
Gryszkabuda, on May 17-20, they struck the Russians with such force
that the Slavs were driven back into the forests.

The German general now decided to clear this territory of his enemies,
as it had given them a constant opportunity for the preparation of
moves which could not be readily observed, because of the protection
of the thick woods. Again he executed the favorite maneuver of Von
Hindenburg's armies. He gathered as heavy a weight of troops as
possible on his left wing and pushed them forward in an extended
encircling movement. From the south a strong column from Mariampol
and the line of the Szsczupa moved upon the fortified position of
the Russians and the southern corner of the great forest, meeting
with strong resistance at Dumbowa Ruda. The troops moving down
from the northern part of the woods swung to their right to cut
off the Russians from their retreat toward Kovno. By the time the
operations had reached this stage it was the second week in June,
1915, and in the great pine forests extending for miles there was
an oppressive heat with perfect absence of breeze. Three Russian
positions lying in the river valleys in the forest were encircled
one after another from the north and had to be given up.

The Russians recognized the danger of the concentric attack directed
at them and fought with great bravery. They strove to keep open the
road of their retreat toward Kovno as long as possible. However,
the ring of the German troops closed swiftly. At Koslowa Ruda, in
the southern part of the forest, they found at night a sleeping
army; something like 3,000 Russians had lain down exhausted in
order on the next day to find the last opening through which to
make their escape. They were now saved the trouble and were led
away prisoners. The great forest was cleared of Russians. The German
move had served to insure the safety of the lines connecting the
troops in Courland with their bases to the south of the Niemen.

In an official announcement of the 18th of March, 1915, the German
Government sketched the line held in the east by the German troops
northward of the front covered by joint German and Austrian forces.
It read: "The line occupied by us in the east runs from the Pilica,
along the Rawka and Bzura to the Vistula. North of the Vistula
the line of our troops is continued from the region to the east
of Plozkz by way of Zurominek-Stupsk (both south of Mlawa). From
there it runs in an easterly direction through the region to the
north of Przasnysz--south of Mystinez, south of Kolno--to the north
of Lomza, and strikes the Bobr at Mocarce. From here it follows the
line of the Bobr to northwest of Ossowetz, which is under our fire,
and runs by way of the region to east of Augustowo, by Krasnopol,
Mariempol, Pilwiszki, Szaki, along the border through Tauroggen to
the northwest. This is from beginning to end entirely on hostile
soil." This long line, it appears, was under the supreme command
of Von Hindenburg, while Von Mackensen had charge of the great
drive to the south.

The statement here quoted was issued as reassurance to Germans
who had been made nervous by reports of a Russian invasion of East
Prussia, and was connected with the Russian raid on Memel.

Until June there was practically no change in this great line,
except that on its northern end it was swung outward into Russian
territory to include a large part of Courland, the River Dubissa
roughly forming the dividing line until the front swung eastward
toward Libau, in the line of the Libau-Dunaburg Railway.

The tasks of both German and Russian troops were similar. Comparatively
weak German forces held the front in the region of the Niemen, the
Bobr, and the Narew, safeguarding such Russian territory as had
been seized by the Germans, and protecting East Prussia against
invasion. Opposed to them lay considerable Russian forces whose task
it was, supported by the fortresses of the Narew and the Niemen,
especially Grodno, to protect the flank and rear of the Russians
standing in Warsaw and southward in the bend of the Vistula, with
the Warsaw-Vilna Railway behind them, while great decisions were
fought for in the Carpathians and Galicia.

In Poland, between the lower and the upper courses of the Vistula,
the Germans about the middle of February, 1915, having occupied
the Rawka-Sucha ridge of upland, had developed fortified positions
along the rivers Bzura, Rawka, Pilica, and Nida. The bad weather of
the winter and early spring, which had turned the roads of Poland
into pathless morasses, made against extensive operations, and the
momentous undertakings carried out on the wings of the eastern front
led the German General Staff to refrain from important movements in
this section, where the Russians had strongly fortified themselves
for the protection of Warsaw. It was not until the Teutonic allies had
gone over to the offensive in the Carpathians and in western Galicia,
and the Russians had withdrawn to the Polish hills of Lysa-Gora early
in May, that, favored by improved weather conditions, operations in
this part of Poland again took on larger scope. Especially along
the Bzura the German attacks again became violent in an effort
to hold the Russian forces in the district to the west of Warsaw
while thrusting at their wings from the south and north. However,
fighting was not of great consequence in this middle sector until
the middle of June, 1915.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XLIV

CAMPAIGN IN SOUTHERN POLAND--MOVEMENT UPON WARSAW

By the 1st of July, 1915, the stupendous enveloping campaign of
the Teuton armies on the eastern front had advanced to a point
where the Allies were forced to recognize the imminence of a
catastrophe, which could be averted only by the most decisive action
of the Russian armies.

Far in the north, on the extreme right wing of the Russians, the
army of General von Bülow was hammering at the defenses of the Dubissa
line. Off and on fighting was taking place in the neighborhood of
Shavli. Russian counterattacks, reported from day to day through
June, with difficulty had held in check this army, which evidently
was aiming at the Warsaw-Petrograd Railway on the sector between
Vilna and Dvinsk. On the right flank of these forces operated the
troops of General von Eichhorn, with the line of the Niemen for
their objective. Next to these on the south, aiming at the Bobr
River and the Upper Narew, were the forces of General von Scholtz,
and on their right the army of Von Gallwitz, based on Mlawa with
Przasnysz in front of it. Below the line of the Vistula, before
the Bzura and down to the middle course of the Pilica, operated
the Ninth German Army, commanded, at least in the later stages
of the Warsaw campaign, by Prince Leopold of Bavaria. The whole
group of northern and central armies was acting under the general
direction of Field Marshal von Hindenburg.

The armies to the south of this group, cooperating in the drive
under Field Marshal von Mackensen which had gained the Teutons
Przemysl and Lemberg, had as their left flank the forces of Generals
von Woyrsch and Kövess between the Pilica and the Vistula mouth
of the San. The troops of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand were pushing
forward on the right of these, and the army directly under Mackensen
himself came next in line to the eastward, joining up with the
armies still operating in Galicia at the extreme right of the great
German battle line.

The chief danger to the Russians at this stage still threatened
from the south, where the archduke and Mackensen had pushed forward
irresistibly in their advance to the east of the Vistula toward
the railway running from Warsaw through Ivangorod, Lublin, Cholm,
and Kovell to Kiev and Moscow.

The advance of these Austro-German armies, which had operated in
the neighborhood of Lemberg, was extremely rapid in the last days
of June, 1915. In four days they covered from thirty to forty miles
in pursuit of the Russians. By the 1st of July, having swept out of
Galicia, their right, under Mackensen, entered the upper valley of
the Wieprz, a marshy country which presented considerable difficulty
to the advance of troops where a tributary of the Wieprz, the Por,
afforded the Russians a natural line of defense. Drasnik, on the
Wyznica, which here extended the Russian defensive line westward,
was occupied by the archduke's forces on Mackensen's left on the
1st of July, 1915.

The drive of the Austro-German armies through Galicia has been
dealt with in the account of the Austro-Russian campaign. As we
carry forward the account of the activities of the greatest part
of the forces concerned in that series of operations from the point
where they crossed over the boundary between Galicia and Poland
out of Austrian territory, it will be well to glance backward a
moment to enumerate here briefly the gains of these armies on Polish
soil up to the 1st of July.

On June 16, 1915, the Teutonic allies forced the Russians to fall
back upon Tarnograd from north of Siemandria, thus pushing this
section of the front across the boundary into Poland about to the
line of the Tanev. Tarnograd itself was occupied by the Teutons
on the 17th, and on the 18th the Russians retreated behind the
Tanev. There was little change in this particular sector during the
fighting which was crowned for the Austro-Germans by the capture
of Lemberg on June 22, 1915. Further to the east, however, to the
south of the Pilica and west of the Vistula, Von Woyrsch was exerting
pressure, and on the 20th of June Berlin announced the capture of
several Russian advance posts by these troops. By the 24th the
Slavs had begun to retreat before Von Woyrsch in the forest region
south of the Ilza on the left bank of the Vistula; thus rear guards
had been thrown across the Kamienna, and Sandomir was occupied
by the Austro-Hungarians. On the 25th the fighting developed on
the line Zarvichost-Sienno-Ilza, to which the Russians had fallen
back.

Defeats of the Russian rear guards on June 29, 1915, to the northeast
and west of Tomaszow, where Teutonic forces had now also crossed
into Poland, caused the Slavs to begin the relinquishment of the
Tanev forest district and the lower San. Tomaszow itself was occupied
by the pursuing troops. By the 30th the Teutonic allies had swept
forward beyond the Tanev region to Franpol, Zamoez, and Komarovo,
and on the same evening they threw the Russians out of their strong
defenses on the Zavichost-Ozarow-Sienno line, west of the Vistula.
The pursuit was pushed energetically on both sides of the Kamienna.
The important bridgehead on the Vistula, Josefovo, was taken on
the 1st of July.

The Russians between the Bug and the Vistula were now offering strong
resistance with large forces on the line Turobin-Krasnik-Josefovo,
the rivers Por and Wyznica forming roughly their defensive front,
as previously pointed out.

In its daily bulletins of July 1, 1915, the German Great Headquarters
made this announcement for the eastern theatre of war (from the
Baltic to the Pilica): "The booty for June is: Two colors, 25,595
prisoners, including 121 officers, seven cannon, six mine throwers,
fifty-two machine guns, one aeroplane, also a large amount of war
material." For the southeastern theatre of war (from the Pilica to
Bukowina) the headquarters announced: "The total booty for June
of the allied troops fighting under the command of General von
Linsingen, Field Marshal von Mackensen, and General von Worysch
is 409 officers, 140,650 men, 80 cannon, 268 machine guns." The
Austro-Hungarian General Staff on the same day reported: "The total
booty for June of the troops fighting under Austro-Hungarian command
in the northeast is 521 officers, 194,000 men, 93 cannon, 364 machine
guns, 78 ammunition wagons, 100 field railway carriages, etc."


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XLV

BATTLE OF KRASNIK--CAPTURE OF PRZASNYSZ

On July 2, 1915, the forces of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand which
had passed through Krasnik, on the Lublin road, struck serious
resistance from the Russian army of General Loesche which held
strong positions across the highway, just to the north of the town,
and was now evidently determined to stop once for all the Teuton
advance toward the railway at its back, connecting Warsaw with
Kiev, through Lublin and Cholm.

On July 3, 1915, the Austrian report, however, announced that 4,800
prisoners and three machine guns had been taken in the neighborhood
of Krasnik and along the Por stream, and the next day they reported
that they had occupied the heights which run along to the north of
the city, having pierced the enemy's main position on both sides
of Studzianki, and taken more than 1,000 prisoners, three machine
guns and three cannon.

The Russian front was turned to such an extent that they had to
fall back some three miles on the Lublin road. The Austrians on the
5th of July summed up their enemy's losses as twenty-nine officers,
8,000 men, six cannon, five ammunition wagons, and six machine
guns. As the result of this Austrian advance the adjoining enemy
forces to the eastward along the Wieprz River had been obliged to
fall back beyond Tarnograd, and by the 6th of July Vienna summarized
the Austrian captures in these battles as having grown to forty-one
officers, 11,500 men.

The Austrians, however, could make no further headway. On July
5, 1915, they were heavily attacked, being forced back to their
intrenched lines on a ridge of hills to the north of Krasnik. The
Russians now reported that they had taken 15,000 prisoners and a
large number of machine guns. Two thousand bodies were reported by
the Russians to have been found before their front. More prisoners
were taken by the Russians on the 7th and it was only on the afternoon
of July 9 that the Austrians were able to stem the tide. The total
loss of the Austrians in this action was given by their opponents
as 15,000 men.

The Austrian explanation of their retirement in front of Krasnik
issued on July 11, 1915, pointed out that the relative subsidence
of activity of the Teutonic allies was due to the fact that the
goal set for the Lemberg campaign had now been attained. This,
they explained, was the taking of the city and the securing of
strong defensive positions to the east and north. The ridge to
the northward of Krasnik was a natural choice for this purpose on
the north, while the line of the Zlota Lipa and Bug rivers served
the purpose toward the east (see Austro-Russian campaign). The
Austrian explanation pointed out further that some of their troops
had rushed beyond the positions originally selected to meet heavy
reenforcements brought up by the Russians from Lublin, and that
these had to withdraw to the ridge, where they were successfully
resisting all attacks.

The battle of Krasnik was regarded by the Russians as an effective
victory, for it seemed to have halted the advance on Lublin. The
army of Von Mackensen had now also come to a stop about halfway
between Zamosc and Krasnostav, an artillery duel on July 7, 1915,
being the last activity noted on the front of this army for some
time.

Their comparative quiet in the region between the Vistula and the
Bug where the main advance of the Teutonic forces on the south
had been under way with great vigor for several weeks until the
check at Krasnik was not interrupted until July 16, 1915. Day after
day the Teutonic headquarters reported "nothing of importance"
in this quarter. When the quiet was finally broken it appeared
that it had been the lull before the storm. Before taking up again
the activities on this section of the front, it will be necessary
to take a glance toward the northern half of the great arc that
enveloped the Warsaw salient on two sides.

In these early days of July, 1915, considerable uncertainty prevailed
among those who were watching the progress of the campaign in Poland
as to where the heaviest blow of the Teutons would fall, whether
from the south or the north. The decisive stroke came with lightning
suddenness. A tremendous attack was launched in the direction of
the Narew by the army of General von Gallwitz.

A laconic announcement of the German General Staff on July 14,
1915, bore momentous news, although its modest wording scarcely
betrayed the facts. It read: "Between the Niemen and the Vistula,
in the region of Walwarga, southwest of Kolno, near Przasnysz and
south of Mlawa, our troops have achieved some local successes." The
Russian report referring to the beginning of the same action was
equally noncommittal, though possibly more misleading. This states:
"Considerable enemy forces between the Orczy and the Lidynja adopted
the offensive and the Russians declining a decisive engagement
retreated during the night of the 13th to the second line of their
positions."

On July 15, 1915, the Germans announced that the city of Przasnysz,
for which such hot battles had been fought in February, and which
had since been strongly fortified by the Russians, had been occupied
by them. The German summary of this action given out a few days
later stated that three Russian defensive lines lying one behind
the other northwest and northeast of Przasnysz had been pierced
and taken, the troops at once rushing forward to Dzielin and Lipa,
respectively west and east of the town. Under attack from these
two points the Russians after yielding Przasnysz, on the 14th,
retired to their defensive line Ciechanow-Krasnosielc which had been
prepared long beforehand. On the 15th the German troops pressing
closer upon the retiring Slavs stormed this line and broke through
it to the south of Zielona on a breadth of seven kilometers, forcing
the Russians again to retire. General von Gallwitz's troops in
this assault were supported by the forces of General von Scholtz,
on their left, who were pressing the Russians from the direction
of Kolno. On July 16, 1915, the Russians were retreating on the
whole front between the Pissa and the Vistula, toward the Narew.

The German summary of the fighting during these days reported the
capture by the army of General von Gallwitz of eighty-eight officers,
17,500 men, thirteen cannon (including one heavy gun), forty machine
guns, and seven mine throwers; and by the army of General von Scholtz
of 2,500 prisoners and eight machine guns.

This great attack in the north, to which may be ascribed the final
breaking of the lines that had so long protected Warsaw, had been
carefully planned and undoubtedly was timed in coordination with
the movements of Mackensen's armies on the south, striking the
Russians just when Mackensen and the Archduke Josef, having had
time for recuperation and preparation for another push forward after
the check administered at Krasnik, were in readiness to inflict
a heavy blow on their side of the Warsaw salient. When it began
the German lines all along the front burst into fresh activity. It
was the signal for a simultaneous assault along nearly a thousand
miles of battle front.

In the Mlawa sector to the north of Przasnysz the Russians had
developed an exceedingly strong system of fortified positions between
their advance lines and the Narew fortresses. For miles, to a depth
of from fifteen to twenty kilometers, there ran some three or four
and at certain points even five systems of trenches, one behind
the other. Hundreds of thousands of thick tree trunks had been
worked into these defensive works and millions of sand bags piled
up as breastwork. Bombproof dugouts had been constructed deep in
the ground. Everywhere there were strong wire entanglements before
the front, sometimes sunk below the level of the earth, arranged in
from two to three rows. Projecting bastions and thoroughly protected
observation posts gave these systems of trenches the character of
permanent fortifications.

The country in this region is hilly, with here and there steep
declivities and peaks of considerable elevation. The Russians had
cut down whole stretches of forest in order to afford them a free
field for their fire and an opportunity to observe the advance of
their opponents. Enveloping tactics on the part of the Germans
were here quite excluded as the two lines ran uninterruptedly close
to one another. Przasnysz which had become a heap of ruins had
been converted virtually into a fortress by strong defensive works
built while the Germans and Russians lay opposite each other in
front of it throughout the spring. The country round about had
been drenched with much German and Russian blood.

General von Gallwitz, to capture a place with the least possible
loss, decided to break through the Russian defenses at two points
at both sides of the town sufficiently close to each other so that
the intervening lines would be immediately affected. His attacks
were therefore directed at the first line Russian positions, which
formed projecting angles to the northwest and northeast of Przasnysz
so that instead of taking the city directly from the front he would
seize it as with a gigantic pair of pincers from both sides and
behind. The plan succeeded to the full. The Russian lines were
broken on both sides of the city and the German troops, rushing
through, met behind it, forcing the Russian defenders hastily to
evacuate the place to avoid being caught within the circle.

Strong infantry forces were collected opposite the points of attack,
and enormous masses of artillery were placed in position with abundance
of ammunition in readiness. The preparations had been made with
all possible secrecy and even when the German batteries had begun
gradually to get their range by testing shots no serious assault
seems to have been expected by the Russians. On the morning of the
attack they were just to inaugurate service on a small passenger
railway line they had constructed behind their front.

On the morning of July 13, 1915, soon after sunrise, a tremendous
cannonade was let loose from guns of all calibers. Although the
weather was rainy and not well fitted for observation the German
guns seem to have found their marks with great accuracy. When the
German infantry stormed the first line of works which had been
shattered by the artillery fire they met with comparatively little
resistance and their losses were small. The bombardment apparently
had done its work thoroughly. The German infantry rushes were started
in successive intervals of a quarter of an hour, line following
line. Swarms of unarmed Russians could be seen coming out of the
trenches seeking to save themselves from the terrible effect of
the shell fire by surrendering. During the course of the forenoon
the sun came out and illuminated a scene of terrific destruction.
The Russian positions on the heights northwest of Przasnysz had
been completely leveled. In their impetuous forward rush the German
troops did not give the enemy time to make a stand in his second
line of trenches and overrunning this, by night began to enter
the third Russian defensive line. Przasnysz was flanked in the
course of twenty-four hours and could no longer be held. A fine
rain was falling as the German columns marched through the deserted,
smoke-blackened city, a melancholy setting for a victory.

On July 14, 1915, the German troops had broken through on both sides
of the city, met to the south of it and forming a mighty battering
ram, on the next day, forced the next Russian line, the last, to the
north of the Narew. This ran through Wysogrod-Ciechanow-Zielona
to Kranosiele. The Russians here made a desperate defense and the
German advance pushed forward but slowly. The effect of the German
artillery fire seems not to have been as striking as on the first
day of battle. The German report of the attack on this line points
out that the regiment of the Guard holding the right wing of a
division which was to attack the heights to the south and southeast
of Zielona was impatient to go forward, and was allowed to advance
before the reserves which were to be held in readiness to support
the move had come up.

However, confident of the accuracy with which the "black brothers"
(shells from the big guns) struck the enemy's trenches, the riflemen
leapt forward through fields of grain as soon as they saw that a
gust of their shells had struck in front of them. By means of signs
which been agreed upon they then signaled their new positions and
the guns laid their fire another hundred meters farther forward. The
infantrymen then stormed ahead into the newly made shell craters.
Thus they went forward again and again. Neither Russian fire nor the
double barbed wire entanglements were able to check their assaults.

As the German shouts rolled forth the Russians ran. A neighboring
division consisting of young men who had enlisted in the course
of the war, in a brilliant charge took a bastion at Klosnowo. The
effect of this first penetration of the Russian main position made
itself felt in the course of the afternoon and night along the
whole front. Further German forces were thrown into the breach and
strove to widen it.

The Russians at many points resisted obstinately, but under the
pressure from the front and in the flank they were finally unable
to hold their ground. The German account speaks with admiration
of the ride to death of a Russian cavalry brigade which attacked
the German infantry southeast of Opinozura without achieving any
results. Cossacks and Hussars were mowed down in an instant.

The German advance taking several intermediate places did not halt
until it stood before the fortification of the Narew line itself.
As a result or this stroke the German troops had advanced some
forty to fifty kilometers into hostile territory on a breadth of a
hundred and twenty kilometers and had captured some 10,000 prisoners
and much war material. By the 18th of July, 1915, German trains
were running as far as Ciechanow.

Advances were likewise made by the Germans to the right of the attack
on the Przasnysz positions on both sides of the Mlawa-Ciechanow
Railway, rolling up the Russian positions as far as Plonsk. On
the left progress had also been made and heavy fighting done, but
the German great headquarters pointed out that in times to come
history will assign the important place to the central feature of
this great offensive by General von Gallwitz, that is the enveloping
attack at Przasnysz and the ramming thrust at Zielona.

The report issued by the Russian General Staff on July 19, 1915,
admitted that to the west of Omulev their troops had withdrawn
to the Narew bridgeheads on the 17th. The points of some of the
German columns on this day, in fact, came within the range of the
artillery of the fortress of Novo-Georgievsk and the army of General
von Scholtz reached the line of the Bobr and the Narew between
Osowice and Ostrolenka. The action at Przasnysz had been decisive.
It resulted ultimately in the relinquishing by the Russians of the
lines of the Rawka and Bzura which had been so stubbornly held
against the Germans in the long defense of Warsaw. The troops directly
charged here with defending the capital fell back to the Blonie
lines about fifteen miles from the city.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XLVI

GRAND OFFENSIVE ON THE WARSAW SALIENT

The great stroke at Przasnysz was the most dramatic feature of a
grand offensive all around the German lines that were endeavoring
to close in upon the Russian armies. On July 16, 1915, the Archduke
Joseph struck hard at the Russians on the Krasnik-Lublin road in
an endeavor to carry the fortified positions at Wilkolaz. His men,
however, were thrown back after ten furious assaults. Krasnostav,
on the road to Cholm, was attacked on the same day by the army or
General von Mackensen, and after a series of desperate rear-guard
actions had been fought by the Russians was swept over by the German
Allies. By the close of the day the Germans had taken twenty-eight
officers, 6,380 men, and nine machine guns.

The Germans, prepared in the recent pause in the fighting, by the
bringing up of their artillery on the long lines of communication
which now stretched behind them, with troops reenforced by such
fresh forces as they could muster, were hurling themselves upon
the Russian defensive positions everywhere along the line. Thus,
on the forenoon of July 17, 1915, the army of General von Woyrsch,
whose objective was the mighty fortress Ivangorod, operating just
to the west of the upper Vistula, broke through the Russian wire
entanglements and stormed the enemy's trenches on a stretch of
2,000 meters. The breach was widened in desperate hand-to-hand
combat. The Teutons by evening inflicted a heavy defeat on the
Moscow Grenadier Corps at this point and the Russians were forced
to retreat behind the Ilzanka to the south of Swolen. Some 2,000
men were taken prisoners by the Germans in this battle and five
machine guns were captured.

Far in the northeast in Courland the army of General von Bülow,
on July 17, 1915, defeated Russian forces that had been rushed up
at Alt-Auz, taking 3,620 prisoners, six cannon and three machine
guns, and pursuing the Slavs in an easterly direction. Desperate
fighting was also taking place to the northeast of Kurschany.

Notes of anxiety mixed with consoling speculations had begun to
appear in the press of the allied countries when the vast German
offensive had thus become plainly revealed and had demonstrated
its driving force. A Petrograd dispatch to the London "Morning
Post" on the 15th of July, 1915, said of the German plan that it
was to catch the Russian armies like a nut between nut crackers,
that the two fronts moving up from north and south were intended
to meet on another and grind everything between them to powder.
The area between the attacking forces was some eighty miles in
extent, north to south, by 120 miles west to east. The writer offered
the consolation that this space was well fortified, the kernel of
the nut "sound and healthy, being formed of the Russian armies,
inspired not merely with the righteousness of their cause, but
the fullest confidence in themselves and absolute devotion to the
proved genius of their commander in chief."

The dispatch pointed out that it was all sheer frontal fighting,
that the Germans had been twelve months trying frontal attacks
against Warsaw on a comparatively narrow front and in vain. What
chance had they, he added, "of success by dividing their forces
against the united strength of Russia." This sort of argument is
typical of the endeavor to sustain the hopes of Russia's friends
during these days. Doubts, however, began to creep in more strongly
as to the possibility of holding Warsaw.

In Berlin the announcement of the Teutonic victories that began
with the successful assault at Przasnysz was received with general
rejoicing, and the appearance of flags all over the city. The Russian
retreat toward the Narew River in particular was regarded by the
military critics as threatening momentarily to crumble up the right
flank of the positions of the Russians before the capital of Poland.

[Illustration: GERMAN ATTEMPTS TO REACH WARSAW IN 1914]

Cholm and Lublin on the southern line of communication of the Russian
armies were now in imminent danger. On July 19, 1915, came the
announcement that the troops under Field Marshal von Mackensen,
which had pierced the Russian line in the region of Pilaskowice and
Krasnostav, had increased their successes, and that the Russians
were making the most desperate effort to prevent complete defeat.
All day the battle had swayed in a fierce struggle for mastery.
The Russians threw a fresh division of the Guards into the fight,
but this too had to yield to the overwhelming force of the Teuton
onslaught. Farther to the east as far as the neighborhood of Grabowiec,
Austro-Hungarian and German troops forced the crossing of the Wolica,
and near Sokal in Galicia Austro-Hungarian troops crossed the Bug. (See
Austro-Russian Campaign.) In consequence of these Teuton successes
the Russians on the night of the 18th to the 19th of July retreated
along the whole front between the Vistula and the Bug--practically
the last line of defense, for the Warsaw-Kiev railway had been
broken down. The German troops and the corps under the command
of Field Marshal von Arz alone from the 15th to the 18th of July,
1915, took 16,250 prisoners and 23 machine guns.

It was announced by the Germans that according to written orders
captured during this action the Russian leaders had resolved to
hold the positions here conquered by the Germans to the utmost,
regardless of losses.

The same day that brought the report of this Russian retreat on
the south brought the news that in the adjoining sector to the
west of the Upper Vistula the army of General von Woyrsch had met
resistance from the Russians behind the Ilzanka after the Russian
defeat on July 13, 1915, that, however, Silesian Landwehr on the
18th had captured the Russian defenses at Ciepilovo by storm, and
that the Russian line at Kasonow and Barenow was beginning to yield.
The army of General von Gallwitz had now taken up positions along the
whole Narew line from southwest of Ostrolenka to Novo Georgievsk.
The Russians, however, as already indicated, were still holding
fortified places and bridgeheads on the right bank of the river.
In this sector the number of prisoners taken by the Germans had
risen to 101 officers and 28,760 men.

In the sector next adjoining, passing onward around the enveloping
lines, that lying between the Pissa and the Szkwa, the Russians
likewise had retreated until they stood directly on the Narew.
Here the Slavs had been favored by forests and swampy land which
made pursuit difficult.

At the extreme left end of the German line a magnificent success
had been achieved in the occupation of Tukkum and Windau. This
capture brought the Germans to within fifty miles of Riga, seat of
the governor general of the Baltic provinces. They were, however,
destined not to make any substantial progress in the direction of
that city for many months to come.

Blow fell upon blow. The question "Can Warsaw be held?" began to
receive doubtful answers in the allied capitals. The colossal coordinate
movement of the Teutonic forces in these July days had received so
little check from the Russian resistance that the British press
had begun to discount the fall of the Polish capital. Shortness
of ammunition and artillery was ascribed as the cause of Russia's
failure to make a successful stand against the onrushing Teutons.

On July 20, 1915, Berlin announced the capture of those fortifications
of Ostrolenka lying on the northwest bank of the Narew River. This was
one or the strong places designed to protect the Warsaw-Grodno-Petrograd
railway. The threatened fall was highly significant. To the south
of the Vistula the Teuton troops had advanced to the Blonie-Grojec
lines. Blonie is some seventeen miles west of Warsaw and Grojec
twenty-six miles south of the city.

Farther eastward and to the south troops of the army of General
von Woyrsch had completely turned the enemy out of the Ilzanka
positions, having repulsed the counterattacks of the Russian reserves
which had been quickly brought up, and captured more than 5,000
prisoners. Von Woyrsch's cavalry had now reached the railway line
from Radom to the great fortress of Ivangorod, the objective point
of this army, and Radom itself had been seized.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XLVII

BEGINNING OF THE END

So uncertain had grown the positions of Lublin on the southern
railway line leading to Warsaw that the Russian commander in chief
had issued an order that in case of a retreat the male population
of the town was to attach itself to the retiring troops.

On July 21, 1915, the Russians throughout the empire were reported
to be joining in prayer. "Yesterday evening," telegraphed the London
"Daily, Mail's" Petrograd correspondent on the 21st, "the bells in
all the churches throughout Russia clanged a call to prayer for a
twenty-four hours' continual service of intercession for victory.

"To-day, in spite of the heat, the churches were packed. Hour after
hour the people stand wedged together while the priests and choirs
chant interminable litanies. Outside the Kamian Cathedral here an
open-air Mass is being celebrated in the presence of an enormous
crowd."

The chronicle of the closing days of July, 1915, is an unbroken
narrative of forward movements of German armies on all parts of
the great semicircle. The movement now, however, was slow. The
Russians were fighting desperately, and the Germans had to win
their way inch by inch. By the 21st the Russians were withdrawing
in Courland to the east of the line Popeljany-Kurtschany, and the
last Russian trenches westward of Shavly had been taken by assault.
To the north of Novgorod the capture of Russian positions had yielded
2,000 prisoners and two machine guns to the Germans on the 20th.

Farther south on the Narew a strong work of the fortress Rozan
defending an important crossing was stormed by the Germans, and
desperate fighting was going on at Pultusk and near Georgievsk.
Already the Russians were beginning to yield their positions to
the west of Grojec, which meant that the Teuton armies were about
to push into the opening between Warsaw and Ivangorod and divide the
Russian forces. The armies of Von Woyrsch on July 20, 1915, seized
a projecting bridgehead to the south of Ivangorod, and captured the
lines that had been held by the Russians near Wladislavow.

In the positions defending the railway between Cholm and Lublin,
Russian resistance was once more marked, and was checking the progress
of the armies of Von Mackensen and Archduke Joseph Ferdinand.

By noon of July 21, 1915, the Silesian troops of Von Woyrsch had
stormed the bridgehead on the Vistula between Lagow and Lugawa-Wola,
with the result that Ivangorod was now inclosed from the south,
while to northwest of the fortress Austro-Hungarian troops were
fighting on the west bank of the Vistula. Austro-Hungarian troops
too were battling their way close up to the fortress directly from
the west. Line after line was giving way before the Teutons. The
Russian retreat over the bridge at Novo Alexandria to the south
of Ivangorod was carried on under the fire of German artillery.
Numerous villages set afire by the Russians were now sending great
clouds of smoke into the sky over all this region.

The troops of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, after a stubborn resistance
on the part of the Russians, seized enemy positions on July 21,
1915, near Chodel and Borzechow, advancing another step toward
Lublin. Eight thousand Russian prisoners, 15 machine guns, and 4
ammunition wagons were taken.

By the 23d of July, 1915, the Teutonic troops were close up to
the encircling forts of Ivangorod and stood on the Vistula all
the way between the fortress and the mouth of the Pilica. On the
24th the Teutons announced a victory over the Fifth Russian Army
by General von Bülow at Shavli. The report read: "After ten days
of continuous fighting, marching, and pursuit, the German troops
yesterday succeeded in bringing the Russians to a stand in the
regions of Rozalin and Szadow and in defeating them and scattering
their forces. The booty since the beginning of this operation on
the 14th of July consists of 27,000 prisoners, 25 cannon, 40 machine
guns, more than 100 loaded ammunition wagons with their draft animals,
numerous baggage wagons and other material."

This day brought the announcement also of the capture of the fortresses
of Rozan and Pultusk on the Narew, after violent charges by troops
of General von Gallwitz. The crossing of the Narew between these
places was now in German hands, and strong forces were advancing
on the southern shore. The Russians had been resisting obstinately
in this quarter, and the Germans had made their way only by the
most heroic efforts. German headquarters announced at this time
that in the battles between the Niemen and the Vistula covering
the ten days since July 14, 1915, more than 41,000 prisoners, 14
cannon, and 19 machine guns had been captured. The German troops
now also attained the Vistula to the north of the Pilica. In their
summing up of results since the 14th of July the Teutons recounted
further on this day, the 24th, that some 50,000 prisoners had been
taken by the armies of General von Woyrsch and Field Marshal von
Mackensen during the period.

The army of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand had been making rapid progress.
On July 24, 1915, under the attacks of these troops the Russians
retreated on a front of forty kilometers, between the Vistula and the
Bistritza, from eight to ten kilometers northward to prepared lines,
their attempts to halt in intermediate positions being frustrated
by the onrush of the victorious Teutonic forces in pursuit.

By July 25, 1915, the Narew had been crossed by the Germans along
its whole front, southward from Ostrolenka to Pultusk, and by the
26th they had gained the farther side of the Narew above Ostrolenka
likewise. The troops moving southeast from Pultusk now approached
the Bug, getting toward the rear of Novo Georgievsk and Warsaw, and
threatening to close the Russians line of escape, the Warsaw-Bielostok
railway.

On July 26, 1915, the Russians made a determined counteroffensive
from the line of Goworowo-Wyszkow-Serock in an effort to remove the
threat to the rear of Warsaw. This, however, had little success,
the Russians losing 3,319 men to the Germans in prisoners.

To the south of Warsaw the Germans had seized the villages of Ustanov,
Lbiska, and Jazarzew, which brought them nearly to the Vistula,
just below the capital.

The great attacks of the Germans on the troops defending Warsaw were
being hampered to some extent by the laying waste of the country
by the retiring Russians. Difficulty in moving heavy artillery on
roads had also interfered with their progress, but on the morning
of July 28, 1915, Von Woyrsch crossed to the eastern shore of the
Vistula between the mouth of the Pilica and Kozienice at several
places, and was threatening the Warsaw-Ivangorod railway.

Novo Georgievsk was steadily being inclosed. The Russian counterthrusts
in the neighborhood of Warsaw both on the north and the south of the
city were repelled by night and day. To the south near Gora-Kalvaria
a desperate attempt of the Russians to push forward toward the west
on the night from July 27th to the 28th, 1915, was shattered.

The armies of Field Marshal von Mackensen, breaking through Russian
positions to the west of the Wieprz, captured thousands of prisoners
and many guns, and once more thrust back the Russian front between
the Vistula and the Bug. On the evening of the 29th they attained
the Warsaw-Kiev railway at Biskupice, about halfway between Lublin
and Cholm, thus crowning their efforts to get astride their important
line of communications. The Russians were destroying everything
of value in the country as they retired, even burning grain in
the fields.

On the afternoon of July 30, 1915, Lublin at last was occupied
by the army of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, and on the 31st the
Germans of Von Mackensen passed through Cholm. Thus the Teutonic
armies were now across the important railway from Warsaw and Ivangorod
to Kiev, on a broad front, running all the way down to the Vistula at
Novo Alexandria. In Courland the Germans continued to push forward,
so that on the 12th of August they were enabled to seize the important
railway center Mistan.

Hope in Russia died hard. Press correspondents up to July 29, 1915,
still spoke of the possibility of the Russians standing a siege
in their principal fortress on the Warsaw salient. On the 29th,
however, reports came from Petrograd that the fortresses of the
Warsaw defense were to be abandoned and the capital of Poland given
up to the army.

The correspondent of the New York "Times" on July 29, 1915, in
a special cable summed up the situation in an announcement that
the fate of Europe hung on the decision that Russia might make
on the question: "Shall Russia settle down to a war of position
in her vast fortifications around Warsaw, or shall she continue
to barter space against time, withdrawing from the line of the
Vistula and points on it of both strategic and political importance,
in order to gain the time which Germany has already stored in the
form of inexhaustible gun munitions?" The reply was the evacuation
of Warsaw.

The decisive blow to Russia's hopes came with the crossing of the
Vistula about twenty miles north of Ivangorod on July 28, 1915,
already noted. It showed that Warsaw was being rapidly surrounded.
The Russian communiqué of the 30th of July told of the crossing
over of the Teutons on both sides of the Radomka, a tributary of
the Vistula, to the right bank of the Vistula on pontoons, and of
attempts to throw bridges across the great rivers. Von Woyrsch's
troops that had crossed over were irresistibly pursuing still farther
east on the 30th, defeating troops hastily brought up to stop their
advance. By August 1 two entire German army corps reached the right
bank of the Vistula. Ivangorod, now threatened from all directions,
could evidently not be held much longer.

The fortress surrendered on August 4, 1915, after a violent bombardment
of the outer forts had taken place, beginning on the first of the
month. Austro-Hungarian troops under General von Koevess especially
distinguished themselves in the attack on the west front.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XLVIII

WARSAW FALLS

The retreat from Warsaw began during the night of August 3 and 4,
1915. Already the city had been stripped as far as possible, to
judge by reports from Petrograd, of metals, such as church bells
and machinery that might possibly be of use to the Germans. A portion
of the civilian population left the city. The Blonie line just
to the west of the capital was given up under pressure from the
Teutons on the 3d. While the retreat was taking place the Russians
gave all possible support to their forces defending the Narew lines,
so far as they still were maintained.

Desperate charges were hurled by the Russians against the Germans
moving forward all along the front Lowza-Ostrow-Wyszkow. The bravery
of the Russians, especially in their counterattacks on both sides
of the road from Rozan to Ostrow on the 4th of August, won the
admiration of the Germans.

The correspondent of the London "Times" reports that on August 4,
1915, there was probably not over one Russian corps on the west
side of the Vistula. "Half of that crossed south of Warsaw before
6 p. m.," he writes, "and probably the last division left about
midnight, and at 3 a. m. on August 5 the bridges were blown up.
The Germans arrived at 6 a. m." The formal entry of the Polish
capital was made by Prince Leopold of Bavaria as Commander in Chief
of the army which took the city.

The formal announcement issued by the German Great Headquarters
on the 5th of August read: "The army of Prince Leopold of Bavaria
pierced and took yesterday and last night the outer and inner lines
of forts of Warsaw in which Russian rear guards still offered stubborn
resistance. The city was occupied to-day by our troops."

[Illustration: ADVANCE AND CAPTURE OF WARSAW]

In the capture of Warsaw seven huge armies had been employed. The
German northern army, operating against the double-track line which
runs from Warsaw to Petrograd, 1,000 miles in the northeast, via
Bielostok and Grodno; the army operating in the Suwalki district,
threatening the same line farther west; the army aimed at the Narew
based on Mearva; the army directly aimed at Warsaw, north of the
Vistula; the (Ninth) army directly aimed at Warsaw, south of the
Vistula; ten or twelve Austrian army corps attempting to reach the
single- and double-track railway from Ivangorod to Brest-Litovsk
and Moscow, and the line from Warsaw to Kiev via Lublin and Cholm,
which is for the most part a single track, and, finally, the army
of Von Linsingen, operating on the Lipa east of Lemberg.

The campaign for Warsaw had been fought along a front of 1,000
miles, extending from the Baltic to the frontier of Rumania. An
estimate which lays claim to being based upon authoritative figures
placed the number of men engaged in almost daily conflict on this
long line at between 6,000,000 and 7,000,000. The attacks upon
the sides of the lines on which the defense of Warsaw depended
had been the most furious in the course of the war on the eastern
front. The losses on both sides undoubtedly were enormous, though
they can be ascertained only with difficulty, if at all.

The following summary of captures was issued by the German Great
Headquarters on August 1, 1915: "Captured in July between the Baltic
and the Pilica, 95,023 Russians; 41 guns, including two heavy ones;
4 mine throwers; 230 machine guns. Taken in July in the southeastern
theatre of war (apparently between Pilica and the Rumanian frontier):
323 officers; 75,719 men; 10 guns; 126 machine guns."




PART V--THE BALKANS


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XLIX

DIPLOMACY IN THE BALKANS

In discussing the causes of the Great War in Vol. I we have already
shown how important a part the little Balkan States played in the
long chain of events leading up to the final catastrophe. When
two mighty lords come to blows over the right of way through the
fields of their peasant neighbors, it is only natural that the
peasants themselves should be deeply concerned. While it is not
likely that any of them would feel especially friendly toward either
of the belligerents, it might, however, be to their advantage to
take a hand in the struggle on the side of the victor. But until
each thought he had picked the winner he would hold aloof.

This was, in fact, the situation of all the Balkan States when
the Great War began, with the exception, of course, of Serbia,
which had been directly attacked. Rumania, Bulgaria, and Greece
very hastily announced their complete neutrality to each other
as well as to the world at large, though Greece was in the very
awkward position of having signed a defensive treaty with Serbia.

Though the Balkan situation has always been considered very complicated,
certain broad facts may be laid down which will serve as a key to
a fair understanding of the motives behind each of the various
moves being made on the Balkan chess board.

First of all, it must be realized that popular sentiment plays a
much smaller part in Balkan politics than it does in such countries
as England, France and our own country. Though each is more or less
democratic in form, none of these governments is really controlled
by its people in matters requiring such quick decisions as war. At
the head of each of the Balkan States is a monarch surrounded by a
governing clique who have full authority in military matters. Each
of these cliques has only one aim in mind: How shall it increase
the area of its territory, or at least save itself from losing any
of what it already controls?

Rumania, being of Latin blood, has no natural affinity with either
of the big fighting powers that concern her: Austria or Russia.
In her case, therefore, sympathy may be entirely eliminated. She
does, however, covet a piece of Austrian territory, Transylvania,
in which there is a substantial Rumanian population which has always
been rather badly treated by Austria.

Bulgaria, like Russia, is Slavic. Added to that, Bulgaria owes
her freedom to Russian arms. Because of these two reasons there
is a very strong sentiment among the people in favor of Russia.
Russian political intrigues during the past thirty years have done
a great deal, however, in undermining this kindly feeling among
the more intelligent Bulgarians. And then Russia's ambition to
possess herself of the Bosphorus as an outlet into the Mediterranean
is directly contrary to the ambitions of the governing clique of
Bulgaria, which also has its eyes on Constantinople.

Toward the Austrians the Bulgarians feel nothing but dislike: "Schwabs,"
they call them contemptuously. Moreover, Austria's contemplated pathway
to Saloniki would cut down through Macedonia, another territory
coveted by Bulgaria. Ferdinand, King of Bulgaria, however, is a
German by birth and training.

Greece, like Rumania, is also racially isolated. She fears Russia
for the same reason that Bulgaria does; Greece is determined that
Constantinople shall one day be hers. And she fears Austria because
Austria's pathway would even take Saloniki from her. And finally she
fears Italy because Italy has ambitions in Asia Minor and Albania.
All the belligerents seem to be treading on the toes of Greece.

It will be seen, therefore, that the diplomatic game was an especially
delicate one in the Balkans. Being comparatively weak, these small
states cannot fight alone for themselves. Their selfish ambitions,
or of their governing cliques rather, make a combination impossible.
Their only chance is to bargain with the winner at the right moment.

During the first half year of the war there was very little for
the Balkan diplomats to do but lie low and watch; watch for the
first signs of weakening of either the Allies or the Teutons. To be
sure, Turkey threw in her lot with the Teutons during this period,
but German control of the Turkish machinery of government and the
army appears to have been so strong that it seems doubtful whether
Turkish initiative was much of a factor in the move.

One of the first moves by the Teutonic Powers through Austria-Hungary
was the attempted invasion of Serbia, by which they hoped to eliminate
her from the field and also to swing the other Balkan States, especially
Bulgaria, over to their side. And had Austria succeeded in penetrating
the peninsula through Serbia, there can hardly be any doubt that
the effect would have been immediate.

But the invasion by Austria, attempted three times, was an abject
failure. At the end of five months a whole Austrian army corps had
been annihilated by the Serbians and the rest of the huge invading
armies had been driven back across the Danube and Save. Following
close upon this came the extraordinary success of the Russians in
Bukowina and in the Carpathians, which placed Hungary in immediate
danger of being invaded. The cause of the Allies began to look
promising and the machinery of Balkan diplomacy began slowly to
revolve.

Meanwhile the principal efforts of the Entente statesmen had been
directed toward effecting a reconciliation between Bulgaria and
the other Balkan States which, she maintained, had robbed her of
Macedonia. Indeed, it may well be said that the Treaty of Bucharest,
whereby the Macedonian Bulgars were largely handed over to Serbia,
and Greece was, and continued to be, the main stumbling block in
the path of the Allies to bring Bulgaria around to a union with
Serbia and Greece and Rumania, for Rumania had also picked Bulgaria's
pockets while she was down, by taking a strip of territory at the
mouth of the Danube. In this she had not even had the excuse of
reclaiming her own people, for here were none but pure Bulgarians.

In January, 1915, Rumania began to show signs of shaping a definite
policy that might later lead her to taking sides. Her King, Carol,
a Hohenzollern by blood, had died shortly after the war and his
nephew, Ferdinand, ascended the throne on October 11, 1914. Possibly
he may have had something to do with the change. At any rate, though
Rumania had previously accepted financial assistance from Austria, in
January she received a loan of several millions from Great Britain,
most of which was spent on the army, then partly mobilized.

At the same time negotiations of a tentative nature were opened
by the Foreign Office with Russia offering to throw the Rumanian
troops into the conflict on the side of the Allies for a certain
consideration. This consideration was that she receive Bukowina,
part of the province of Banat, and certain sections of Bessarabia
populated by Rumanians, The Allies considered these demands
extortionate, and the negotiations were protracted. When the Austrians
and Germans, later in the spring, succeeded in driving the Russians
out of the Carpathians, Rumania hastily dropped these negotiations
and seated herself more firmly on top of the fence. And so, under
the guidance of Bratiano, her prime minister, she has continued
throughout the whole year, listening to proposals, first from one
side, then from the other, but always carefully maintaining her
neutral position.

Bulgaria had, at about the same time, accepted a loan from Germany.
Attempts were made at the time to explain away the political
significance of the transaction by representing the advance as an
installment of a loan the terms of which had been arranged before
the beginning of the war, but the essential fact was that the cash
came from Germany at a time when she was herself calling in all
the gold of her people into the Imperial treasury.

Bulgaria now plainly let it be understood under what conditions
she would join a union of the Balkan neutrals against the Teutonic
Powers. Her premier, Radoslavov, head of the Bulgarian Liberal Party,
whose policy has always been anti-Russian, is one of the most astute
politicians in the Balkans, and this description is equally true of
King Ferdinand as a monarch. These two stated definitely Bulgaria's
price; that part of Macedonia which was to have been allowed to
her by the agreement which bound her to Serbia and Greece during
the first Balkan War; the Valley of the Struma, including the port
of Kavalla, that part of Thrace which she herself had taken from
Turkey, and the southern Dobruja, the whole of the territory Rumania
had filched from her while her back was turned during the two Balkan
wars.

The Entente Powers held council with the other Balkan States, each
of which had taken its share of booty from Bulgaria. In order to
persuade them to consent to Bulgaria's terms, they suggested certain
compensations for the concessions they were asked to make. To Serbia,
which, in spite of her very precarious situation at the time, was
very averse to returning any part of her Macedonian territory,
they pointed out that she could find compensation in adding to
her territory Bosnia, Herzegovina and the other Slav provinces of
Austria, where the population was truly Serb. To Rumania, which was
already willing to meet Bulgaria half way, they promised Transylvania
and Bukowina. To Greece, which had done less and gained more than
any of the other states during the two Balkan Wars and so could
afford to be generous, they held out the prospect of gaining a
considerable area in Asia Minor, thickly populated by Greeks.

These changes naturally all depended on the complete defeat of
the Teutonic Powers, but Bulgaria demanded that at least some,
and especially Serbian Macedonia, should be handed over to her at
once.

This latter demand brought about strong opposition. The other Balkan
States considered that, granting even that all these concessions were
to be promised to Bulgaria, she should not expect their fulfillment
until she had earned them by helping to defeat the Teutonic Powers.

Venizelos, the premier of Greece, and probably the most broad-minded
statesman in the Balkans, stated that, on the part of Greece,
concessions to Bulgaria were possible, though, as developed later,
in this he did not have the backing of the King and the rest of the
governing clique. In February no progress in the negotiations had
been made, though a special French Commission, headed by General
Pau, visited all the Balkan capitals and tried to bring about a
mutual agreement.

At about that time another important military event occurred, especially
affecting the Balkans; the warships of the Entente began bombarding
the forts in the Dardanelles and it seemed that Constantinople was
presently to fall into their hands. Not long after Venizelos stated,
in an interview, that he was privy to this action and proposed to
send 50,000 Greek soldiers to assist the Allies by a land attack
on the Turks.

The Greek General Staff, however, immediately declined to support
Venizelos. Such a campaign, it declared, was impossible unless
Greece first had strong guarantees that Bulgaria would not take
the opportunity to invade Greek Macedonia and fall on the flank
of the Greek army operating against the Turks. Venizelos thereupon
approached Bulgaria and was told that Bulgaria would remain neutral
if Greece would cede most of her Macedonian conquests, which would
include Kavalla, Drama, and Serres, which stretch so provokingly
eastward along the coast and hold Bulgaria back from the sea.

Venizelos attempted to compromise, and here he was caught between
two obstacles. Bulgaria absolutely refused to recede one inch from
her demand; and, on the other hand, the Greek governing clique
suddenly refused to consider any proposal that would mean the cession
of any territory at all to the hated Bulgars. What probably stiffened
the opposition of the other members of the Greek Government to the
Turkish campaign was the growing suspicion on their part that the
Allies were also negotiating with Italy for her support. Now it
was obvious that if Italy was to fight in the Near East, she meant
to demand a good price. And this looked bad for Greece. Greece
and Italy had already nearly come to blows over their clashing
interests in southern Albania, yet even this was a small matter
compared to rivalry in the Ægean and Asia Minor. What deepened
these suspicions was the fact that the Allies refused to indicate
definitely just what territory Greece was to have in return for her
support against the Turks. Their promise of "liberal compensation"
was not at all definite enough. Only Venizelos was satisfied with
this promise; he was in favor of trusting implicitly to Anglo-French
gratitude.

To bring this deadlock to a conclusion King Constantine called a
Royal Council, and by this body the matter was thoroughly discussed
during the first few days of March. The Council, together with
the king, decided against supporting the Allies actively on such
terms. On the morning of March 6 Venizelos called at the British
legation in Athens to say that the opposition of the king made
it impossible to fulfill his promise. That night he resigned.

The fall of Venizelos was, naturally, a heavy blow to the Allies. He
was succeeded by Gounaris, an ex-Minister of Finance, who announced
his policy as one of strict neutrality. Venizelos was so deeply
mortified that he declared that he would withdraw permanently from
public life, and then left Greece.

April, 1915, opened with an occurrence that seemed to throw a strong
light on the attitude of Bulgaria. On the night of the second day
of the month a large force of Bulgar Comitajis made a raid over the
southeastern frontier of Serbia, and, after attacking successfully the
Serbian outposts and blockhouses, in an attempt to cut the railroad,
by which Serbia was getting war supplies from the Allies, they were
repelled by the Serbians, though only after severe fighting.

Serbia and Greece both protested loudly, but Bulgaria affirmed that
she had had nothing to do with the matter.

As has developed since, Bulgaria had by this time definitely decided
to strike for the Teutonic allies when the right moment should come.
Already back in January, 1912, a secret treaty had been negotiated
between Bulgaria and Germany. This was signed a little later by
Prince Bülow and M. Rizoff at Rome. There were more reasons than
one for keeping this secret. For within the Bulgarian Parliament
there was a strong opposition to the German policy of Ferdinand
and Radoslavov, led by Malinoff, chief of the Democratic party,
and Stambulovski, chief of the Agrarian party, an opposition so
bitter and determined that the king had good reason to fear an
open revolution should he openly declare himself for the Germans.

On May 29, 1915, the Allies again sent a note to Bulgaria, making
proposals which comprised the results of their efforts to obtain
concessions from the other Balkan States. On June 15 Radoslavov
sent a reply, asking for further information, obviously drawn up
in order to gain time.

Meanwhile, on June 11, Venizelos had again appeared in Athens,
where he received a warm welcome from the populace, with whom he
was the prime favorite. Within a few days he resumed the leadership
of the Greek Liberal party and, at a general election, which was held
shortly after, he showed a popular majority support of 120 seats
in the Popular Assembly, notwithstanding a determined opposition
made by his opponents. Before the Balkan wars the Greek Parliament
had consisted of 180 members, but by according representation to
the districts in Macedonia annexed after the wars the number was
brought up to 316. Venizelos and his policy in favor of the Allies
were emphatically indorsed by the Greek suffrage. Naturally this
expression of the people's voice was a smart blow at the king and
his councillors. On the other hand, they were encouraged by an
unfavorable turn that was now taking place in the military operations
of the Allies.

The attack on the Dardanelles by the warships had been a decided
failure. Nor were the operations of the British troops on the peninsula
of Gallipoli meeting with any real success. The Austrians and the
Germans had driven the Russians back from the Carpathians and had
retaken Przemysl and Lemberg. In fact, the situation of the
Austro-German armies had now become so favorable that it was possible
for the Teutonic allies to make proposals to the Balkan States
with a fair chance of being listened to.

During July, 1915, Serbia was approached by Germany with an offer
of a separate peace, but Serbia would not even consider the terms.

On July 8 Austria delivered a note to Rumania, through the Austrian
Minister in Bucharest, Count Czernin, which contained two sets of
proposals. One was contingent upon the continued but "friendly"
neutrality of Rumania, the other on her active participation in
the war on the side of Austria-Hungary.

In the first proposal Rumania was promised all of Bukowina south
of the Seret River, better treatment of the Rumanian population
of Austrian territory, the establishment of a Rumanian university
in Brasso, large admissions of Rumanians into the public service
of Hungary, and greater liberty of administration to the Rumanian
churches in Austria.

The second proposal specified that Rumania should put five army corps
and two cavalry divisions at the disposal of the Austro-Hungarian
General Staff to operate against the Russians. In return Rumania
should receive all of Bukowina up to the Pruth River, territory
along the north bank of the Danube up to the Iron Gate, complete
autonomy for the Rumanians in Transylvania and all of Bessarabia that
the Rumanian troops should assist in conquering from the Russians.

Just a week after this note was received in the Rumanian capital,
Prince Hohenlohe-Langenburg, whose wife was a sister of the Queen of
Rumania, arrived in Bucharest and tried to induce King Ferdinand to
come to terms with Austria, or at least to allow the transportation
of war munitions through the country to the Turks, who were then
running short of ammunition. The king refused this concession. How
important it would have been, had it been granted, may be judged
from the many efforts the Germans had made to smuggle material down
to Turkey. In one case the baggage of a German courier traveling
to Constantinople had been X-rayed and rifle ammunition had been
found. Again, cases of beer had been opened and found to contain
artillery shells.

Rumania, however, could not yet make up her mind which was going
to be the winner. She accepted neither of the Austrian proposals,
and protracted making any definite answer as long as possible.

There was another reason why Rumania wished to continue her neutrality
until the following winter, at least. The harvesting of her great
wheat crops would begin soon, and this wheat could, as had been
done the previous year, be sold to the Germans and Austrians at big
prices, the blockade of the British fleet having already produced
a pressing shortage in foodstuffs. And then, her conscience being
uneasy regarding her robbery of territory from Bulgaria, she must
also be quite certain how Bulgaria was going to turn.

Having failed at Bucharest, the German agent, Prince
Hohenlohe-Langenburg, moved on to Sofia. At that moment King Ferdinand
of Bulgaria was endeavoring to get Turkey to sign a treaty, for
which negotiations had been going on secretly for some months,
by which Bulgaria was to obtain all the Turkish land on the west
side of the Maritza River, and so free the Bulgarian railroad to
Dedeagatch from Turkish interference. On July 23 this treaty was
finally signed, and Bulgaria acquired a full right of way along
the line.

Bulgaria was now frankly asking bids for her support from both
sides. In an interview which the Premier, Radoslavov, granted to
the correspondent of a Budapest newspaper on August 3, 1915, and
who remarked to the premier that it was at least strange for a
nation to carry on such negotiations simultaneously with two groups
of powers, he replied:

"It is these negotiations which give us the chance to make a decision.
Our country seeks only her own advantages and wishes to realize
her rights. We have decided to gain these in any case. The only
question is: How can we achieve this with the least sacrifices?
As regards the internal situation of Bulgaria, I may proudly say
that our conditions have improved, and that everybody in the country
looks forward to the great national undertaking we are about to
embark on with immense joy and enthusiasm."

So far as Bulgaria was concerned things did not look well for the
Allies in the beginning of August, 1915. Prince Hohenlohe-Langenburg
was warmly received. As was afterward made known, he effected a
further treaty between Germany and Bulgaria, which promised Bulgaria
practically all of Greek and Serbian Macedonia. Unaware then of the
existence of this or the earlier compact, the Entente Powers made
further efforts to secure the support of the Bulgarians. Early in
August they made a collective representation to the Balkan States,
and delivered to Bulgaria a reply to her note of June 14, in which
she had asked for further details in regard to the concessions
promised.

In the collective presentation they spoke of the desirability of
making further concessions to Bulgaria, and in the special note
to Bulgaria they stated that it was probable that the causes of
friction would be removed and a union brought about. Bulgaria,
however, was not satisfied, and Radoslavov, the Premier, in an
interview to an American correspondent, said that she would enter
the war only on receiving absolute guarantees of obtaining all
of what she demanded.

The chief obstacle in the path toward an agreement that would satisfy
the demands of Bulgaria now seemed to be Serbia, and, on behalf
of the cause, she was again pressed by the Allies to surrender
all of southeastern Macedonia. Finally, in a secret session of
her Parliament, which was held toward the middle of August, she
consented.

On the 16th of August the Greek Parliament assembled. The Venizeloists
were in a large majority. The next day the Gounaris government
felt that it could no longer maintain itself, and consequently
resigned. A few days later Venizelos was again Prime Minister of
Greece, and the Allies, who were still ignorant of the fatal treaties
between Bulgaria and Germany, believed that the difficulties in
the Balkan situation had finally been smoothed out.

Thus the beginning of the second year of the war opened in the Balkans
very favorably in aspect to the Allies.




PART VI--ITALY ENTERS THE WAR


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER L

ITALY'S RELATIONS WITH THE WARRING POWERS

After nearly ten months of kaleidoscopic changes in the diplomatic
situation, which kept the outside world constantly uncertain as
to her ultimate determination, Italy declared war upon Austria
May 23, 1915. The bare official explanation of these negotiations
gave the impression of selfish bargaining, and a broad survey of
conditions on the Italian peninsula before and during the first
months of the war is necessary to a proper understanding of the
causes that led Italy to take sides with Great Britain, France,
and Russia.

Behind these long diplomatic exchanges, their foundation rather
than the result of them, lay Italy's national aspirations and a
gradual crystallization of public sentiment. Officially, Italy
went to war with Austria over an alleged violation of the Triple
Alliance; but to most Italians the hope of the war meant the return
to the Italian flag of Italians living south of the Austrian Alps,
realignment of their northern and eastern frontier on better national
and military principles, the possession of certain territory on
the eastern shore of the Adriatic as would secure her harborless
eastern coast from hostile attack, a reduction of Austrian control
over Trieste, and the repatriation of thousands of Italians living
in the "unredeemed" portions of southern Austria, which despite many
years of Austrian domination was essentially Italian in traditions,
customs, language, and loyalty.

Negotiations were prolonged, also, by the fact that at the outbreak
of the war Italy was, in a military sense, quite unprepared to
engage in a desperate struggle. When Italian Alpine troops finally
moved out and took possession of Austrian mountain outposts, the
army had undergone regeneration. In both men and munitions Italy
was equipped to play a part in the war worthy of a first-class
power, and befitting her wide ambitions.

Although Italy was allied with the Central Powers, her peculiar
situation dictated a national policy of cordial relations with all
Europe. Geographically, she forms a unified mass with Germany and
Austria, but the barrier of the Alps across her northern frontier
diverts her interests from the north to the south. She is essentially
a Mediterranean power, the one great nation on the inland sea with
a long coast line and a number of ports. Her hope of the future lay
along the Mediterranean shore, but her national unity was gained
almost too late to enable her to realize the aspiration of African
colonies. It was the disappointment of obtaining possessions in
Tunis by the establishment of French control there in 1881 that found
expression in the Triple Alliance. Her antagonism against Austria
and the Hapsburgs was still unmitigated, but as a practical matter
of statesmanship she had to choose between two antagonists--Austria
opposing her on the Adriatic, and France on the Mediterranean.
Since Africa presented the larger field for expansion, she enlisted
the aid of Austria and Germany against France. At the same time she
became friendly with England, and largely through this understanding
gained her hold upon Tripoli. Cordial relations with France were
reestablished in 1903. The sum of her efforts made her a link between
the rival groups of European powers. This will explain the peculiar
obligations of neutrality incumbent upon the nation when the Triple
Entente went to war with her associates in the Triple Alliance.

Alliance with Germany and Austria was a necessity of statesmanship
and diplomacy; but at no time was it generally popular with the
mass of Italian population. It gave no support to Italian aims
in the Mediterranean; it failed to hold the balance between Italy
and Austria in the Balkans; it seemed to promise nothing for the
future, except, perhaps, immunity from Austrian attack. In fact,
it is doubtful whether the alliance would have been renewed in 1912
but for an unexpected outbreak of resentment against France due
to a clash over rival interests in northern Africa and increasing
suspicion of French action in Tunis. At the same time Italy took
offense at the attitude of France toward her position in the war
with Turkey, which resulted in the Italian occupation of Tripoli.

[Illustration: NORTHERN ITALY, SHOWING THE WHOLE ITALIAN-AUSTRIAN
FRONTIER AND THE PART OF AUSTRIA DEMANDED BY ITALY]

This better understanding between Italy and her allies soon was
disturbed by their attitude toward Serbia, resulting from the successes
of that country and Greece in the Balkan wars. For the sake of
maintaining the equilibrium between Italy and Austria, the former
sympathized with Serbia's aspirations for a port on the Adriatic.
In August, 1913--this incident was not revealed until the Premier of
Italy told it to the Chamber of Deputies on December 5, 1914--Austria
proposed that Italy should consent to an Austrian attack on Serbia.
Italy refused to countenance any such action. Revelations made
after the beginning of the Great War showed that during the twenty
months that elapsed between the renewal of the Triple Alliance and
the outbreak of the war, Italy was constantly engaged in combating
the policy of Austria-Hungary toward Serbia and striving to maintain
the balance of power in the Balkans. The notes exchanged in this
period emphasized particularly Articles III, IV, and VII of the
Alliance, and since these portions of the treaty were the basis
of subsequent negotiations leading up to the final severance of
Italo-Austrian relations, their text may be set down here:

"III. In case one or two of the high contracting parties, without
direct provocation on their part, should be attacked by one or
more of the great powers not signatory of the present treaty, and
should become involved in a war with them, the _casus foederis_
would arise simultaneously for all the high contracting parties.

"IV. In case a great power not a signatory of the present treaty
should threaten the state security of one of the high contracting
parties, and in case the threatened party should thereby be compelled
to declare war against that great power, the two other contracting
parties engage themselves to maintain benevolent neutrality toward
their ally. Each of them reserves its right, in this case, to take
part in the war if it thinks fit, in order to make common cause
with its ally.

"VII. Austria-Hungary and Italy, who have solely in view the
maintenance, as far as possible, of the territorial _status quo_
in the East, engage themselves to use their influence to prevent
all territorial changes which might be disadvantageous to the one
or the other of the powers signatory of the present treaty. To
this end they will give reciprocally all information calculated to
enlighten each other concerning their own intentions and those of
other powers. Should, however, the case arise that, in the course
of events, the maintenance of the _status quo_ in the territory of
the Balkans or of the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic or
the Ægean Sea become impossible, and that, either in consequence of
the action of a third power or for any other reason, Austria-Hungary
or Italy should be obliged to change the _status quo_ for their
part by a temporary or permanent occupation, such occupation would
only take place after previous agreement between the two powers
which would have to be based upon the principle of a reciprocal
compensation for all territorial or other advantages that either
of them might acquire over and above the existing _status quo_,
and would have to satisfy the interests and rightful claims of
both parties."

When Austria-Hungary sent her ultimatum to Serbia in July, 1914,
Italy had lost no time in making her position clear. Premier Salandra
and the Marquis di San Giuliano, the Italian Foreign Minister,
conferred with Herr von Flotow, German Ambassador at Rome, on July
5, and dispatched the following memorandum to the Duke d'Avarna,
the Italian Ambassador at Vienna:

"Salandra and I called the special attention of the ambassador
to the fact that Austria had no right, according to the spirit of
the Triple Alliance Treaty, to make such a move as she has made
at Belgrade without previous agreement with her allies. Austria,
in fact, from the tone in which the note is conceived, and from
the demands she makes--demands which are of little effect against
the pan-Serb danger, but are profoundly offensive to Serbia and
indirectly to Russia--has shown clearly that she wishes to provoke
a war. We therefore told Flotow that, in consideration of Austria's
method of procedure, and of the defensive and conservative nature of
the Triple Alliance, Italy is under no obligation to help Austria
if as a result of this move of hers she should find herself at
war with Russia. For in this case any European war whatever will
be consequent upon an act of aggression and provocation on the
part of Austria."

When Austria failed to yield to this suggestion and declared war
on Serbia, Italy, on July 27 and 28, 1914, had notified Austria
and Germany that if she did not receive compensation for Austria's
disturbance of the Balkan equilibrium, "the Triple Alliance would
be irreparably broken."

While the Italian statesmen declare that they had made their position
at the opening of the war perfectly clear to Germany and Austria,
the world at large lacked knowledge of these negotiations upon
which to base satisfactory judgment of Italy's action--or lack
of action--at this time. Italy was in no position to go further
than this. The unsettled state of political and popular opinion
and her lack of equipment for war forced her to wait; but while
she temporized she made ready. In reality, the Italian diplomats
maintained that they took a definite position upon their charge
that Austria had violated the terms of the Triple Alliance, and
that from this stand they never receded. Negotiations with the
other members of the alliance received a check, also, through the
death of San Giuliano on October 16, 1914. On his deathbed the
foreign minister declared his sole regret was that he had not lived
to see the day of Italy's entrance into complete national unity.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER LI

NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE CENTRAL POWERS

During the fall and winter of 1914, the Italians had seemed about
equally divided in favor of intervention and neutrality. While a
large majority of the common people clamored for war, the neutralists
probably included the larger proportion of influential citizens.
Among the latter were the extreme clericals, who distrusted France
and Russia on religious grounds, aristocrats who viewed Germany
as a bulwark against socialism; bankers with German connections,
and a great body of the middle class who dreaded a war that would
interfere with their comfort and prosperity. A genuine admiration for
Germany's military prowess, exemplified in the successive victories
of 1914, offset to a large extent traditional antipathy to Austria.
Nevertheless, interventionist sentiment steadily gained, and Germany,
recognizing the trend, organized a determined effort to keep Italy on
the side of the alliance. German agents invaded Italy and conducted
a campaign of propaganda through the neutralist newspapers and
through more secret labors among various organizations influential
in their control of public sentiment.

This German campaign reached its climax in December with the arrival
at Rome of Prince von Bülow, one of the most skillful diplomats at
the call of the German Foreign Office. Von Bülow's capabilities
were particularly adapted to a task of this kind among a people
that set store upon the niceties of international relations. As
an aristocrat and a politician, he ranked among the first of the
empire. He had been foreign minister and later imperial chancellor.
But his chief qualification for the work was that, before returning
to Berlin for greater honors, he had been ambassador at Rome. He
had married a Sicilian lady, and was accustomed to spend part of
each year in Rome and on his wife's Sicilian estates. The prince
was a finished courtier and a charming host. At this juncture his
house in Rome became a center of neutralists, and Von Bülow began
overtures to Baron Sonnino, the new Italian Foreign Minister, to
discover what territorial concessions the Italian Government would
demand as recompense for the action of Austria and as the price
of adherence to the alliance.

It is remarkable that, throughout the critical period pending Italy's
decision, Italian statesmen negotiated mainly with German and not
Austrian diplomats. Although the Italians believed that Germany
had dictated Austria's war policy, in the end it developed that
the kaiser and his ministers were unable to control Austria to
the full extent that they considered desirable in the matter of
yielding to the Italian demands. The purpose of Prince von Bülow was
to find out the minimum terms acceptable to Italy, and meanwhile,
by making small concessions, create the impression that Italy could
gain without firing a shot all that she could hope for through
successful war. In fact, the Teutonic agents did bring against
the Italian Cabinet the accusation that they were not acting for
the best interests of their country, and were determined to fight
regardless of proffered concessions. This charge was denied by the
Italian premier in a speech wherein he asserted that the offers
of Germany were not in good faith.

Germany asked if the Italian claims would be satisfied by the cession
of Trentino. To this Baron Sonnino replied that he "did not consider
that Italian popular sentiment would be content with the Trentino
alone." A stable condition of accord between Austria and Italy, he
said, could be effected only by satisfaction of the old Irredentist
formula, "Trent and Trieste." Von Bülow answered that Austria certainly
would prefer war to the surrender of Trieste. Here the negotiations
stuck fast, the Italian ministry declining to define their demands
any further until Austria agreed to the cession of Italian territories
actually in the possession of the Hapsburg monarchy.

On February 12, 1915, Sonnino addressed a solemn warning to
Austria-Hungary. He declared that any military action undertaken by
that monarchy in the Balkans against either Serbia or Montenegro,
without previous arrangement with Italy, would be considered an
open infringement of Article VII of the Triple Alliance. Disregard
of this declaration, he added, would lead to grave consequences for
which the Italian Government henceforth declined all responsibility.

Five days later, February 17, 1915, he repeated the warning. "It is
necessary," he said, "to state very clearly that any other procedure
on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government could only be interpreted
by us as an open violation of the terms of the treaty, and as clear
evidence of its intention to resume its liberty of action; in which
case we should have to regard ourselves as being fully justified
in resuming our own liberty of action for the safeguarding of our
interests."

At this time there were rumors of a fresh attack on Serbia by both
Austria and Germany, and there is little doubt that the Serbs for
the time being were saved by Italy's firm stand. Germany redoubled
her efforts at Vienna. Baron Burian, who had recently succeeded Count
Berchtold as Foreign Secretary of the Dual Kingdom, had adopted a
much more intransigent position than his predecessor. He clung to
the contention that it was impossible to settle the question of
compensation for Austria's invasion of Serbia until it had become
clear how that enterprise would result. Military action, he argued,
could not afford to wait upon diplomatic discussion.

Early in March, 1915, it looked for a time as if the Central Powers
and their ally would find a satisfactory way out of the tangle. On
March 9, 1915, Baron Burian accepted the principle that compensation
to Italy must be made from Austrian territory. Italy demanded that
negotiations begin at once, and that they should be between Italy
and Austria without German interference. Prince von Bülow, still
acting for his country, protested, but finally, on March 20, 1915,
notified Baron Sonnino that he had been authorized to guarantee
in the name of Germany the execution of any agreement which Italy
and Austria might conclude.

As announced by the German imperial chancellor, the concessions
Austria was willing to make were as follows:

Cession to Italy of that part of Tyrol and the western bank of the
Isonzo inhabited by Italians, and of the town of Gradisca.

Trieste to be made an imperial free city, receiving an administration
insuring an Italian character to the city, and to have an Italian
university.

Recognition of Italian sovereignty over Avlona and the sphere of
interests belonging thereto.

Austria-Hungary to declare her political disinterestedness regarding
Albania.

National interests of Italian nationals in Austria-Hungary to be
particularly respected.

Austria-Hungary to grant amnesty to political or military criminals
who were natives of the ceded territories.

The further wishes of Italy regarding general questions to be assured
of every consideration.

Austria-Hungary, after the conclusion of the agreement, to give
a solemn declaration concerning the concessions.

Appointment of mixed committees for the regulation of details of
the concessions.

After the conclusion of the agreement Austro-Hungarian soldiers,
natives of the occupied territories, should not further participate
in the war.

At last Germany, weighed down by the burden of war and anxious to
keep Italy neutral, appeared to believe that the difficulty had
been settled. But Baron Sonnino's reply proved disappointing. He
found the proposals too vague. They did not settle the Irredentist
problem; above all they made no appreciable improvement in Italy's
military frontier; finally, they did not offer adequate compensation
for the freedom of action Austria would enjoy in the Balkans. "A
strip of territory in the Trentino," he concluded, would not satisfy
any of Italy's requirements.

On April 2, 1915, Austria, spurred on by Germany, endeavored to
meet the Italian objections by offering more specific concessions.
She expressed willingness to cede the districts of Trento, Roveredo,
Riva, Tione (except Madonna di Campiglio and the neighborhood),
and Borgo. This readjustment would give Italy a frontier cutting
the valley of the Adige just north of Lavis. These districts Baron
Burian considered far more than a "strip of territory," and he
hoped Italy would be satisfied.

But Italy was far from satisfied, and six days later, in response
to an invitation for counterproposals, Baron Sonnino drafted the
following demands:

I. The Trentino, with the boundaries fixed for the Kingdom of Italy
in 1811.

II. A new eastern frontier, to include Gradisca and Gorizia.

III. Trieste and its neighborhood, including Nabresina and the
judicial districts of Capo d'Istria and Pirano, to be formed into
an autonomous state with complete independence from Austro-Hungarian
rule. Trieste to be a free port.

IV. The cession by Austria-Hungary of the Curzolari Islands off
the coast of Dalmatia.

V. The immediate occupation by Italy of the ceded territories and
the immediate evacuation by Austria-Hungary of Trieste and the
neighborhood.

VI. The recognition by Austria-Hungary of Italian sovereignty over
Valona and district.

VII. The renunciation by Austria-Hungary of any claims in Albania.

VIII. A complete amnesty for all political or military prisoners
belonging to the territories mentioned in I to IV.

The next three articles provided:

IX. That Italy should pay to Austria-Hungary as indemnification
for the loss of government property, as a share of the public debt,
and against all money claims, the sum of 200,000,000 lire.

X. That Italy should pledge herself to maintain neutrality throughout
the war, this pledge applying to both Germany and Austria-Hungary.

XI. That Italy should renounce any further claims under Article
VII of the Triple Alliance for the whole duration of the war, and
that Austria-Hungary should renounce any claim to compensation
for Italy's occupation of the Dodecannesus.

These demands were pressed by Italy in the face of disquieting
rumors that Austria-Hungary was on the point of concluding a separate
peace with Russia, which would leave her free to devote her whole
attention to Italy and Serbia if the former refused to make terms.
They were rejected by Austria, April 16, with a few unimportant
exceptions: Article VIII was accepted. As regards Article IX, Baron
Burian asserted that the amount offered was totally insufficient, but
suggested that the question of pecuniary indemnity be referred to The
Hague. He held that the pledge of neutrality should be extended to
Turkey as well as to Germany and Austria, and asked for the insertion
of an extra clause in Article XI, providing that Italy's renunciation
of further claims under Article VII of the Triple Alliance should
cover all such advantages, territorial and otherwise, as Austria
might gain from the treaty of peace which should terminate the war.
The only cardinal point on which Austria offered concessions was
in regard to the proposed Trentino frontier. This she agreed might
follow a course more advantageous for Italy than that suggested in
Austria's former proposals.

Baron Sonnino's reply was sent from Rome on April 21, 1915. It
declared that these additional concessions failed to "repair the
chief inconveniences of the present situation, either from the
linguistic and ethnological or the military point of view." Austria,
he pointed out, seemed determined to maintain positions on the
frontier that were a perpetual threat to Italy. There were three
more conversations between Baron Burian and the Italian Ambassador
at Vienna before negotiations were broken off, and on April 29, 1915,
the Italian Ambassador telegraphed to Rome that Austria virtually
negatived all the Italian demands, especially those contained in the
first five articles. The real break, which made war inevitable,
came on May 3 when Baron Sonnino sent to Vienna a formal denunciation
of the Italo-Austrian alliance.

It must be remembered that behind the text of these formal proposals
and counterproposals lay a belief in the minds of many Italians that
Austria made even the slight concessions she granted unwillingly
and under pressure from Germany, and that if the war resulted
successfully for the Central Powers, Austria would immediately begin
to scheme for a restoration of her old frontiers.

Since it is an axiom of diplomatic bargaining that each side asks
more than it expects to receive, there is no doubt that Italy would
have been willing to modify her demands if her statesmen and people
had been sure that the concessions obtained from Austria under
these circumstances would not have been disturbed in the event of
a Teutonic victory.