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  GALLIPOLI DIARY

  BY GENERAL

  SIR IAN HAMILTON, G.C.B.

  AUTHOR OF "A STAFF OFFICER'S SCRAP-BOOK," ETC.

  WITH ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS

  IN TWO VOLUMES
  VOL. II

  NEW YORK
  GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
  1920

  PRINTED BY
  UNWIN BROTHERS, LTD.--WOKING--ENGLAND


       *       *       *       *       *


[Illustration: _"Central News" phot._

BRAITHWAITE, SIR IAN AND FREDDIE MAITLAND]




CONTENTS


  CHAPTER                                                            PAGE

  XIII. K.'S ADVICE AND THE P.M.'S ENVOY                               1

  XIV. THE FORCE--REAL AND IMAGINARY                                  25

  XV. SARI BAIR AND SUVLA                                             52

  XVI. KAVAK TEPE ATTACK COLLAPSES                                    86

  XVII. THE LAST BATTLE                                              120

  XVIII. MISUNDERSTANDINGS                                           144

  XIX. THE FRENCH PLAN                                               163

  XX. LOOS AND SALONIKA                                              196

  XXI. THE BEGINNING OF THE END                                      234

  APPENDIX I. STATEMENT ON ARTILLERY BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL
  SIR H. S. BAIKIE                                                   279

  APPENDIX II. NOTES BY LIEUT.-COL. C. ROSENTHAL RELATING
  TO ARTILLERY AT ANZAC                                              292

  APPENDIX III. SIR IAN HAMILTON'S INSTRUCTIONS RELATING
  TO THE SUVLA OPERATIONS                                            298

  APPENDIX IV. INSTRUCTIONS TO MAJOR-GEN. H. DE LISLE                335

  INDEX                                                              339




LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS


  BRAITHWAITE, SIR IAN, AND FREDDIE MAITLAND                _Frontispiece_

                                                              FACING PAGE

  MAJOR-GEN. SIR G. F. ELLISON, K.C.M.G.                               6

  LIEUT.-GEN. SIR A. G. HUNTER-WESTON, K.C.B., D.S.O                  22

  SUVLA FROM CHUNUK BAIR                                              54

  GENERAL SIR W. R. BIRDWOOD, BART., G.C.M.G., K.C.B.                 80

  LIEUT.-GEN. SIR A. J. GODLEY, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.                      84

  GENERAL BAILLOUD                                                   146

  FISH FROM THE ENEMY                                                170

  MARSHAL LIMAN VON SANDERS                                          182

  CREMATING THE ENEMY DEAD                                           256


  MAP

  SUVLA AND ANZAC         _At end of Volume_


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|original. They have been split, with the right hand side positioned|
|directly below the left hand side.                                 |
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GALLIPOLI DIARY




CHAPTER XIII

K.'S ADVICE AND THE P.M.'S ENVOY


_11th July, 1915._ Worked in my office from early morning till 12.45.
The whole scheme for to-morrow's attack is cut and dried, according to
our cloth: time tables fixed and every round counted.

Freddy Stopford and his Staff turned up from Mudros. Stopford in very
good form. The first thing he did was to deliver himself of a personal
message from Lord K. He (Stopford) wrote it down, in the ante-room, the
moment he left the presence and I may take it as being as good as
verbatim. Here it is:--

     "Lord Kitchener told me to tell you he had no wish to interfere
     with the man on the spot, but from closely watching our actions
     here, as well as those of General French in Flanders, he is certain
     that the only way to make a real success of an attack is by
     surprise. Also, that when the surprise ceases to be operative, in
     so far that the advance is checked and the enemy begin to collect
     from all sides to oppose the attackers, then, perseverance becomes
     merely a useless waste of life. In every attack there seems to be a
     moment when success is in the assailant's grasp. Both the French
     and ourselves at Arras and Neuve Chapelle lost the opportunity."

Well said! K. has made Stopford bring me in his pocket the very text for
what I wanted to say to him. Only my grumbling thoughts find expression
by my pen but I have plenty of others and my heart has its warm corner
for K. whenever he cares to come in.

As I told Stopford, K. has not only anticipated my advice but has dived
right down into this muddle of twentieth century war and finds lying at
the bottom of it only the old original idea of war in the year 1. At our
first landing the way was open to us for just so long as the _surprise_
to the Turks lasted. That period here, at the Dardanelles, might be
taken as being perhaps twice as long as it would be on the Western front
which gave us a great pull. The reason was that land communications were
bad and our troops on the sea could move thrice as fast as the Turks on
their one or two bad roads. Yet, even so, there was no margin for
dawdling. Hunter-Weston and d'Amade had tried their best to use their
brief _surprise_ breathing space in seizing the Key to the opening of
the Narrows--Achi Baba, and had failed through lack of small craft, lack
of water, lack of means of bringing up supplies, lack of our 10 per
cent. reserves to fill casualties. At that crucial moment when we had
beaten the local enemy troops and the enemy reinforcements had not yet
come up, we could not get the men or the stuff quick enough to shore.
Still, we had gained three or four miles and there were spots on the
Peninsula where, to-day, three or four miles would be enough. Also,
supposing he had to run a landing, his (Stopford's) action would take
place under much easier conditions than Hunter-Weston's on April 25th.

First and foremost, in our "beetles" or barges, conveying 500 men under
their own engines, we had an instrument which reduced the physical
effort three quarters. This meant half the battle. When we made our
original landing at Anzac we could only put 1,500 men ashore, per trip,
at a speed of 2-1/2 miles per hour, in open cutters. Were a Commander to
repeat that landing now, he would be able to run 5,000 men ashore, per
trip, at a speed of five miles per hour with no trouble about oars,
tows, etc., and with protection against shrapnel and rifle bullets. As
to the actual landing on the beach, that could be done--we had proved
it--in less than one quarter of the time. Each beetle had a "brow" fixed
on to her bows; a thing to be let down like a drawbridge over which the
men could pour ashore by fours; the same with mules, guns, supplies,
they could all be rushed on land as fast as they could be handled on the
beaches. Secondly, we had already been for some time at work to fix up
the wherewithal to meet our chronic nightmare, the water trouble.
Thirdly, the system of bringing up food and ammunition from the beaches
to the firing line had now been practically worked out into a science at
Helles and Anzac where Stopford would be given a chance of studying it
at first hand.

As to place, date, command, and distribution of forces, these were still
being considered; still undetermined; and I could say no more at
present. Braithwaite was away at Helles but, if he would go over to the
General Staff, he would find Aspinall, my G.S. (1), and the Q. Staff who
would give him the hang of our methods and post him in matters which
would be applicable to any date or place.

There was more in this message as taken down by Stopford. After going
into some details of trench warfare, K.'s message went on:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"It is not the wish of the Cabinet that Sir Ian Hamilton should make
partial attacks. They (the Cabinet) consider it preferable that he
should await the arrival of his reinforcements to make one great effort,
which, if successful, will give them the ridge commanding the Narrows.
It is not intended, however, that Sir Ian should do nothing in the
meantime and if he gets a really good opportunity he is to seize it."

There is something in this reminds me of Kuropatkin's orders to
Stakelberg, yet I am glad to find that our spontaneously generated
scheme jumps with the views of the Cabinet, for, there is only one
"ridge commanding the Narrows" (Kilid Bahr is a plateau), and it is that
ridge we mean to try for by "one great effort."

In my reply I shall merely acknowledge. Sari Bair is my secret; my Open
Sesame to the cave where the forty thieves of the Committee of Union
and Progress have their Headquarters. It makes me uneasy to think the
Cabinet are talking about Sari Bair.

A battle is a swirl of "ifs" and "ands." The Commander who enters upon
it possessed by some just and clear principle is like a sailing ship
entering a typhoon on the right tack. After that he lives from hand to
mouth. How far will wise saws cut ice? How much nearer do you get to
shooting a snipe by being _told_ how not to take your aim? Well thought
out plans and preparations deserve to win; order and punctuality on the
part of subordinates tend to make the reality correspond to the General
Staff conception; surprise, if the Commander can bring it off, is worth
all K. can say of it; the energy and rapidity of the chosen troops will
exploit that surprise for its full value--bar, always, Luck--the Joker;
and Wish to Fight and Will to Win are the surest victory getters in the
pack. The more these factors are examined, the more sure it is that
everything must in the last resort depend upon the _executive_
Commander; and here, of course, I am referring to an _enterprise_, not
to a huge, mechanically organized dead-lock like the western front.

Stopford was away in G.H.Q. Staff tents all afternoon; afterwards both
he and Adderley, his A.D.C., dined. Stopford likes Reed who is, indeed,
a very pleasant fellow to work with. Still, I stick to what I wrote
Wolfe Murray:--the _combination_ of Stopford and Reed is not good; not
for this sort of job.

_12th July, 1915. Imbros._ Had meant to start for Helles an hour before
daylight to witness the opening of the attack by the French Corps and
the Lowland Division. But am too bad with the universal complaint to
venture many yards from camp.

Stopford and Staff breakfasted. He has fallen in love with our ideas.
After lunch he and his party left for Mudros. Am forcing myself to write
so as to ease the strain of waiting: the battle is going on: backwards
and forwards--backwards and forwards--I travel between my tent; the
signal station, and the G.S. map tent.

A delightful message from K., thanking me for my letters: patting me on
the back; telling me that Altham is coming out to run the
communications, and Ellison to serve on my Staff.

Thank heavens we are at last to have a business man at the head of our
business! As to Ellison, K.'s conscience has for long been smiting him
for not having let me take my own C.G.S. with me in the first instance.
But Braithwaite has won his spurs now in many a hair-raising crisis, so
K. may let his mind rest at ease.

[Illustration: MAJ.-GEN. SIR G. F. ELLISON, K.C.M.G. _F.A. Swaine phot._]

Freddie Maitland and I dined with the Vice-Admiral who kept a signaller
on special watch for my messages from the shore--but nothing came in.
He, the Admiral, wants to take all the 600 stokers serving in the Royal
Naval Division back to the ships. This will be the last straw to the
Division. We had the treat of being taken off the _Triad_ in the
Admiral's racing motor boat and when we got ashore found good news which
I have just cabled home:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"In the southern section we attacked at daylight to-day with our right
and right centre. After heavy fighting lasting all day the troops
engaged, namely, the French Corps and the LIInd Lowland Division, have
succeeded in carrying the two strongly held and fortified lines of
Turkish trenches opposite to them. The ground covered by the advance
varies in depth from 200 to 400 yards, and if we can maintain our gains
against to-night's counter-attacks the effect of the action will be not
only to advance but greatly to strengthen our line. Full details
to-morrow."

_13th July, 1915. Imbros._ Still feeling very slack. Nothing clear from
Helles. My cable best explains:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"Troops have been continuously engaged since my last cable, but
situation is still too confused to admit of definition, especially as
telephone wires all cut by shell or rifle fire.

"So far as can be gathered the sum total of the engagements taking place
in a labyrinth of trenches is satisfactory up to the hour of cabling and
we have taken some 200 prisoners. I hope I shall be able to send
definite news to-morrow morning."

Oh, energy, to what distant clime have you flown? I used to be
energetic; not perhaps according to Evelyn Wood's standards--but
still--energetic! Yet, see me to-day, when a poor cousin to the
cholera--this cursed enteritis--lays me by the heels; fills me with
desperate longing to lie down and do nothing but rest. More than half my
Staff and troops are in the same state of indescribable slackness and
this, I think, must be the reason the Greeks were ten long years taking
Troy.

Some newspaper correspondents have arrived. I have told them they may do
whatever they d--d well please. Ashmead-Bartlett is vexed at his
monopoly being spoiled. Charlie Burn, who came with the King's bag,
lunched. The Vice-Admiral, Roger Keyes, and Flag-Lieutenant Bowlby
dined; very good of them to leave their own perfectly appointed table
for our rough and ready fare. The A.D.C.s between them managed to get
some partridges, opulent birds which lent quite a Ritzian tone to our
banquet.

As was expected, the Turks counter-attacked heavily last night but were
unable to drive us out except in one small section on our right. To-day,
fighting is still going on and the Naval Division are in it now. We have
made a good gain and taken over 400 prisoners and a machine gun. We are
still on the rack, though, as there are a lot of Turks not yet cleared
out from holes and corners of our new holding, and ammunition is running
very short. If our ammunition does not run out altogether and we can
hold what we have, our total gain will be 500 yards depth.

Since June 4th, when we had to whang off the whole of our priceless 600
rounds of H.E., we have had _none_ for 18-prs. on the Peninsula--not one
solitary demnition round; nor do we seem in the least likely to get one
solitary demnition round. Hunter-Weston and his C.R.A. explain forcibly,
not to say explosively, that on the 28th June the right attack would
have scored a success equally brilliant to that achieved by the 29th
Division on our left, had we been able to allot as many shell to the
Turkish trenches assaulted by the 156th Brigade--Lowland Division--as we
did to the sector by the sea. But we could not, because, once we had
given a fair quota to the left, there was not enough stuff in our
lockers for the right. Such is war! No use splitting the difference and
trying to win everywhere like high brows halting between Flanders and
Gallipoli. But I _am_ sick at heart, I must say, to think my brother
Scots should have had to catch hold of the hot end of the poker. Also to
think that, with another couple of hundred rounds, we should have got
and held H. 12. H. 12 which dominates--so prisoners say--the wells
whence the enemy draws water for the whole of his right wing.

To-day the old trouble is a-foot once again. Hunter-Weston tells us the
Turkish counter-attacks are being pressed with utmost fury and are
beginning to look ugly, as we can give our infantry no support from our
guns although the enemy offer excellent artillery targets. When K. is
extra accommodating it is doubly hard to be importunate, but it's got to
be done:--

       *       *       *       *       *

_General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener._

"With reference to my telegrams No. M.F. 328 of 13th June and No. M.F.
381 of 28th June. Each successive fight shows more clearly than the last
how much may hang on an ample supply of ammunition, more especially high
explosive howitzer ammunition. In my telegram No. M.F. 381 I said that I
hoped we might be able to achieve success with the ammunition already
promised, and I adhere to that opinion; but every additional 100 rounds
means some reduction of risks and greater assurance of success. I raise
this question again because I gather from what I hear that matters in
the other theatre of operations may possibly be at a standstill without
much prospect of any vital alteration before the autumn fairly sets in.
If this should be the case it is for you to consider whether a larger
and more regular supply of ammunition should be sent to me in order to
give this force the utmost chance of gaining an early success. Judging
from the increased effect of the bombardments before the last two
attacks on facilitating the Infantry advance I am led to hope that this
success would not be long delayed under the cumulative effect of
unremitting bombardment. If, therefore, any change in the general
situation should make it possible to allow me temporary preferential
claim to all the ammunition I should like, I would ask for the following
amounts to be here by 1st August, in addition to those accompanying the
troops and already promised, namely, 4.5-inch howitzer, 3,000 rounds;
5-inch howitzer, 7,000 rounds; 6-inch howitzer, 5,000, and 9.3-inch
howitzer, 500 rounds, all high explosive. I should also ask for a
monthly supply on the following scale, first consignment to arrive
before 15th August:--

  "18-pr.               300,000
  "4.5-inch howitzer     30,000
  "5-inch howitzer       30,000
  "6-inch howitzer       24,000
  "60-pr.                15,000
  "9.2-inch howitzer      6,000

"The howitzer ammunition to be all high explosive, the 60-pr. to be
one-third shrapnel and two-thirds high explosive, and the 18-pr. to be
half of each.

"The above monthly scale includes ammunition for the following
additional ordnance which I should like to get, namely, two batteries of
4.5-inch howitzers for each of the Xth and XIth Divisions (since 5-inch
howitzers are found to be too inaccurate to bombard the enemy trenches
even in close proximity to our own), one battery of 6-inch howitzers and
four 9.2-inch howitzers.

"On the assumption already made it might be possible for you to arrange
to forward to Ordnance Stores, Marseilles, the ammunition asked for to
be here by 1st August. Time would thus be gained to accumulate the
supply required, and I could arrange with the Vice-Admiral to send a
fast steamer of 1,000 tons hold capacity to bring the consignment of
high explosives from Marseilles. To get the steamer coaled, to arrive at
Marseilles, coal again and be ready to receive the ammunition, would
take seven days.

"Please understand that this suggestion is only prompted for the
following reasons: (1) My growing belief that ample artillery might,
within a limited period, lead to quite a considerable success in this
theatre, and (2) because the reports which reach me seem to indicate
that an offensive is not likely to be undertaken elsewhere at present
(and I have mainly asked for offensive ammunition).

"The monthly supply above detailed I should not expect would be required
for more than two months."

If our Government really--whole-heartedly--_will_ that there should be a
complete success in the East, they must, equally, with whole hearts and
braced-up _will_, resist (for a while) the idea of any offensive in the
West. In saying this I speak of the A.B.C. of war. The main theatre is
where the amphibious power wishes to make it so. This cable of mine sent
to a man like Lord K. is a very strong order. But now is the time to
speak up and let him realize that he must let the fields of France lie
fallow for the summer if he wishes to plough the Black Sea waves in
autumn.

_14th July, 1915. Imbros._ Wrote letters in the morning, and in the
evening went for a ride to the Salt Lake and there inspected the new
aeroplane camp on the far side of the water.

Last night more counter-attacks, all driven off. The French right is now
actually on the mouth of the Kereves Dere where it runs into the sea. We
have made about 500 prisoners and have captured a machine gun.
Hunter-Weston had to transfer the command of the 52nd Division,
temporarily, to Shaw, the new Commander of the 13th Division.

Baikie is crying out to us for shells as if _we_ were bottling them up!
There are none.


_15th July, 1915. Imbros._ The answer has come in from the War
Office:--the answer, I mean, to mine of the day before yesterday in
which it is suggested that _if_ our rich brethren were off their feed
for the moment, some crumbs of high explosive might be spared:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"We have great difficulty in sending you the amounts of ammunition
mentioned in our No. 5770, cipher, and even now the proportion of 18-pr.
high explosive will be less than stated therein. In response, however,
to your No. M.F. 444, we are adding 1,000 rounds 4.5-inch, 500--5-inch,
500--6-inch and 75--9.2-inch. It will be quite impossible to continue to
send you ammunition at this rate, as we have reduced the supply to
France in order to send what we have to you, and the amounts asked for
in the second part of your telegram could not be spared without stopping
all operations in France. This, of course, is out of the question."

"This, of course, is out of the question." "Stopping all operations in
France" is the very kernel of the question. If half the things we hear
about the Bosche forces and our own are half true, we have no prospect
of dealing any decisive blow in the West till next spring. And an
indecisive blow is worse than no blow. But we can _hold on_ there till
all's blue. Now H.E. is offensive and shrapnel is defensive. I ought to
attack at once; French mustn't. Therefore, we should be given, _now_,
dollops of H.E.

This talk does not come through my hat. Some of the best brains on the
Western field are in touch with those of some of my following here. The
winning post stares us in the face; my old Chief gallops off the course;
how can I resist calling out? And then I get this "of course" cable (not
written by K. I feel sure) which shows, if it shows anything, that "of
course" we ought never to have come here at all! Simple, is it not? In
war all is simple--that's why it's so complex. Never mind; my cable has
not been wasted. We reckon the 1,100 extra rounds it has produced may
save us 100 British casualties.

Rode over to "K" Beach and inspected the 25th Casualty Clearing Station,
Commandant Lieutenant-Colonel Mackenzie. Walked through the different
hospital wards talking to some twenty officers and two hundred men;
mostly medical cases. Did not think things at all up to the mark. Made
special note of the lack of mosquito nets, beds, pyjamas and other
comforts. For weeks past Jean has been toiling to get mosquito nets
bought and made up, which was simple, and to get them out to us, which
seems impossible. Too bad when so much money is being spent to see men
lying on the ground in their thick cord breeches in this sweltering
heat, a prey to flies and mosquitoes.

Discussing the landing of the New Divisions in Suvla Bay and the
diversion to be made by Legge on the right by storming Lone Pine,
Birdwood makes it clear in a letter just to hand, that he has told his
two Divisional Generals everything. I had not yet gone into some of
these details with Hunter-Weston, Stopford or Bailloud, all Corps
Commanders, for I am afraid of the news filtering down to the juniors
and from them, in the mysterious way news does pass, to the rank and
file of both services. Thence to the Turks is but a step. Were the Turks
to get wind of our plan, there would be nothing for it but to change the
whole thing, even now, at the eleventh hour.

Lieutenant-Colonel F. G. Fuller, my late G.S.O. (1) in the Central
Force, came over to lunch. He is now G.S.O. (2) of the 9th Corps.

At 5.30 p.m. rode over to "K" Beach for the second time and inspected
the Indian Brigade under Brigadier-General Cox. They had to be pulled
out some time ago and given a rest. On parade were the 5th, 6th and 10th
Gurkha Battalions with the 14th Sikhs. Walked down both lines and
chatted with the British and Indian Officers. The men looked cheerful
and much recovered. In the evening Charlie Burn, King's Messenger, and
Captain Glyn came to dinner. Glyn has been sent out as a sort of
emissary, but whether by K. or by the Intelligence or by the Admiralty
neither Braithwaite nor I are quite able to understand.

Cabled the War Office _insisting_ that the lack of ammunition is
"disturbing." Also, that "half my anxieties would vanish" if only the
Master-General of Ordnance would see to it himself that the fortnightly
allowance could be despatched regularly. I could hardly put it stronger.

_Midnight._--Just back from G.S. tent with the latest. So far, so good.
Bailloud and Hunter-Weston have carried two lines of Turkish trenches,
an advance of two to four hundred yards. But the ammunition question has
reached a crisis, and has become dangerous--very dangerous. On the whole
Southern theatre of operations, counting shell in limbers and shell
loaded in guns, we have 5,000 rounds of shrapnel. No high explosive--and
fighting is still going on!

  _Hi jaculis illi certant defendere saxis._

To whomsoever of my ancestors bequeathed me my power of detachment deep
salaams! How many much better men than myself would not close their eyes
to-night with a battle on the balance and 5,000 rounds wherewith to
fight it? But I shall sleep--D.V.; I can't create shell by taking
thought any more than Gouraud could retake the _Haricot_ by not drinking
his coffee.

_16th July, 1915. Imbros._ Forcing myself to work though I feel
unspeakably slack; wrangling with the War Office about doctors, nurses,
orderlies and ships for our August battles. A few days ago I sent the
following cable and they want to cut us down:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"It seems likely that during the first week of August we may have 80,000
rifles in the firing line striving for a decisive result, and therefore
certain that we shall then need more medical assistance. Quite
impossible to foresee casualties, but suppose, for example, we suffered
a loss of 20,000 men; though the figure seems alarming when put down in
cold blood, it is not an extravagant proportion when calculated on basis
of Dardanelles fighting up to date. If this figure is translated into
terms of requirements such a battle would involve conversion of, say, 30
transports into temporary hospital ships, and necessitate something like
200 extra medical officers, with Royal Army Medical Corps rank and file
and nurses in proportion. If my prognosis is concurred in, these should
reach Mudros on or about 1st August. Some would D.V., prove superfluous,
and could be sent back at once, and in any case they could return as
soon as possible after operations, say, 1st September. Medical and
surgical equipment, drugs, mattresses in due proportion. In a separate
message I will deal with the deficiencies in ordinary establishment, but
I think it best to keep this cable as to specified and exceptional
demands distinct."

_17th July, 1915. Imbros._ After lunch felt so sick of scribble,
scribble, scribble whilst adventure sat seductive upon my doorstep that
I fluttered forth. At 2 o'clock boarded H.M.S. _Savage_
(Lieutenant-Commander Homer) and, with Aspinall and Freddie, steered for
Gully Beach. We didn't cast anchor but got into a cockleshell of a small
dinghy and rowed ashore under the cliffs, where we were met by de Lisle.
Along the beach men were either bathing or basking mother-naked on the
hot sand--enjoying themselves thoroughly. I walked on the edge of the
sea, as far as the point which hides the gully's mouth from the Turkish
gunners, and was specially struck by the physique and class of the 6th
East Lancashires under Colonel Cole Hamilton. Then mounted and rode to
the Headquarters of General Shaw, commanding the 13th (new) Division.
Shaw was feeling his wounds; he had already been once round his lines;
so I would not let him come again. But Colonel Gillivan, G.S.O.1, Major
Hillyard, G.S.O.2, Captain Jackson, G.S.O.3, Colonel Burton, A.A. and
Q.M.G., joined us. First we went to the Headquarters of the 39th Brigade
commanded by Brigadier-General Cayley (the Brigade Major is Captain
Simpson). Then I went and looked at the trenches J.11-12-13, where I met
Colonel Palmer of the 9th Warwicks, Colonel Jordan, D.S.O., of the 7th
Gloucesters, Colonel Nunn of the 9th Worcesters, Colonel Andrews of the
7th North Staffordshires. We tramped through miles of trenches. The men
were very fit and cheery. It was the day when they were relieving one
another by companies from the reserve and there was a big crowd in the
Ravine. De Lisle told me that one week had made the most astonishing
difference to the savvy of these first arrivals of the New Army. At
first there was confusion, loss of energy and time; by the end of the
week they had picked up the wrinkles of the veterans. There was a good
lot of shelling from the Turks but, humanly speaking, we were all quite
snug and safe in the big gully or moving down the deep communication
trenches. No one, not even the new 13th Division, paid the smallest
deference to the projectiles.

Now began one of these semi-comic, semi-serious adventures which seem to
dog my footsteps. Just as I got into the little dinghy, two bluejackets
pulling and a Petty Officer steering, the Turks began to shell H.M.S.
_Savage_ as she lay about a hundred yards out. She did not like it, and,
instead of waiting to let us get aboard, Commander Homer thought it
wiser to sheer off about half a mile. When she quitted the Turks turned
their guns on to our cockleshell, and although none of the shot came
near us they still came quite near enough to interest the whole gallery
of some thousands of bathing Tommies who, themselves safe in the dead
ground under the cliff, were hugely amused to see their C.-in-C. having
a hot time of it. After ten minutes hard rowing we got close to the
destroyer and she, making a big circle at fairly high speed, came along
fast as if she was going to run us down, with the idea of baffling the
aim of the enemy. Not a bad notion as far as the destroyer was concerned
but one demanding acrobatic qualities of a very high order on the part
of the Commander-in-Chief. Anyway just as she was drawing abreast and I
was standing up to make my spring a shell hit her plump and burst in one
of her coal bunkers, sending up a big cloud of mixed smoke and black
coal dust. The Commander was beside himself. He waved us off furiously;
cracked on full steam and again left us in the lurch. We laughed till
the tears ran down our cheeks. Soon, we had reason to be more serious,
not to say pensive. The _Savage_ showed a pair of clean heels this time
and ran right away to Helles. So there we were, marooned, half a mile
out to sea, in a tiny dinghy on which the Turks again switched their
blarsted guns. The two bluejackets pulled themselves purple. They were
both of them fat reservists and the mingling of anxiety and exertion,
emotion and motion, made the sweat pour in torrents down their cheeks.
Each time a shell plunked into the water we brightened up; then,
gradually, until the next one splashed, our faces grew longer and
longer. At last we got so far away that the Turks gave us up in disgust.
How much I should like to see that battery commander's diary.
Altogether, by the time we had boarded the _Savage_, we had been in that
cursed little dinghy for just exactly one hour, of which I should think
we were being gently shelled for three quarters of an hour. On board the
destroyer no harm to speak of: only one man wounded.

Cast anchor at Imbros at 9 p.m. General Legge and Captain H. Lloyd came
over to stay the night. Mail from England.

Have cabled again to stir them up about the hospital ships.

_18th July, 1915._ Church Parade. Inspected troops. Wrote in camp all
the afternoon. Walked out to the lighthouse in the evening and watched
the shells bursting over Gully Beach where we were yesterday. How often
have I felt anxious seeing these shrapnel through the telescope. On the
spot, as I know from yesterday's experience, their bark is worse than
their bite. Colonel Ward of the Intelligence came to dinner and Captain
Doughtie, commanding H.M.S. _Abercrombie_, paid me a visit.

_19th July, 1915._ Too much office work. Mr. Schuler, an Australian
journalist and war correspondent, turned up. Seems a highly intelligent
young fellow. He had met me on tour in Australia. Gave him leave to go
anywhere and see everything. The Staff shake their heads, but the future
is locked away in our heads, and the more the past is known the better
for us.

Braithwaite has heard from the War Office that the Brigade of Russians
which had started from Vladivostock to join us here has been
counter-ordered. The War Office seem rather pleased than otherwise that
this reinforcement has fallen through. Why, I can't imagine. As they are
sending us a big fresh force of Britishers, they probably persuade
themselves that 5,000 Russians would be more trouble than they are
worth, but they forget the many thousands of shortage in my present
formations. Since they fixed up to send me the new Divisions I must have
lost ten thousand rifles, but as all my old Divisions remain at the
Dardanelles _in name_, they are being regarded at home, we strongly
suspect, as a sort of widow's cruse, kept full by miracles instead of
men and still, therefore,--Divisions!

In the evening the Vice-Admiral came over and we rode together down to
the Naval Seaplane Camp. The King's Messenger left at 5 p.m.

_20th July, 1915. Imbros._ Wrote double quick, then galloped over to
Kephalos to see the New Army, _sub rosa_. The men we struck were A.1.
They belong to the 32nd and 34th Brigades of the 11th Division. The 33rd
has gone to Helles to get salted.

Hunter-Weston is still staying with the Admiral. He has had a hard time
and a heavy responsibility and is quite worn out. I devoutly trust he
may be on his legs again ere long. Have put in Stopford to act for him
at Helles. This should teach the young idea how to shoot. With every
aspect of the command and administration of the Southern theatre of
operations thus under his immediate orders he has a rare chance of
learning how to do it and how not to do it.

_21st July, 1915._--Just signed a letter to the Chief of the Imperial
General Staff and as it gives the run of my thoughts at the moment I
spatchcock the opening and final paras:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"My dear Wolfe Murray,

"How do you manage to find time to write these charming letters of yours
with your own hand? They come like a gift from some oriental potentate
and carry with them the same moral obligations; i.e., that they ought to
be returned in kind. But to-day the time limit interposes, and I know
you will pardon me for once if I dictate.

[Illustration: _F. A. Swaine phot._ LIEUT.-GEN. SIR A. HUNTER-WESTON,
K.C.B., D.S.O.]

"I am immensely interested in what you say with reference to the 29th
Division being below strength, namely, that we are getting short of men.
Well,--though one of the keenest voluntary service people existing, I
have always envisaged the fact that during a war we might be driven
to compulsion. Also in writing out fully my views on this subject (views
which I was not permitted by late Chiefs of the General Staff to
publish) I have always, for that reason, pressed for National
Registration. It does no one any harm, and rubs into the mind of the
young man that, under certain conditions, the State has first pull on
his pocket, labour, life and everything else. But, of course, if your
own wish that the 29th Division should take out 10 per cent. extra for
drafts (like the regiments do in France), had been carried into effect,
they would never have fallen as low as they actually did.

       *       *       *       *       *

"Freddy Stopford and Reed have been staying with me for 24 hours, and
the former is now in command of the 8th Corps on the Peninsula,
Hunter-Weston having gone sick. He asked to stay with the Admiral for a
couple of days' rest, and the very moment he got safe on board ship the
overstrain of the past month told on him and he went down with a sharp
go of fever. I earnestly pray he will get right again quickly for there
are not many Commanders of his calibre. Freddy Stopford will now have a
good chance of getting the hang of this sort of fighting generally,
surrounded as he will be by Hunter-Weston's experienced Staff. After
sending my last letter I rather repented of one or two harsh things I
said about Reed. There is some truth in them, but I need not have said
them. I hope he will do very well out here."

Now since that letter was written (yesterday) in comes a cable from K.
saying Winston can't leave England but that Hankey starts in his place.

K. says he is sure I will give him every facility.

A pretty stuffy cable in from the War Office on the Hospital ships and
medical personnel and material wrangle which is still going on. I,
personally, have checked every item of my estimate with closest personal
attention, although it took me hours in the midst of other very pressing
duties. This is not Braithwaite's pidgin but Woodward's and there was no
help for it. Our first landing found out a number of chinks in our
arrangements, and now, my Director of Medical Services is (quite
naturally) inclined to open his mouth as wide as if ships were drugs in
the market. So I have tried very hard, without too much help, to hit the
mean between extravagance and sufficiency. Now the War Office, who would
be the first to round on me if anything went wrong with my wounded,
query my demands as if we had just splashed off a cable asking for the
first things that came into our heads!

I am all for thrift in ships, but thrift in the lives of my wounded
comes first; my conscience is clear and I have answered sticking to my
point,--firmly! They say the thing is impossible; I have retaliated by
saying it is imperative.




CHAPTER XIV

THE FORCE--REAL AND IMAGINARY


_22nd July, 1915. Imbros._ Had a jolly outing to-day. Left for Cape
Helles by trawler just before 10 o'clock. Aspinall, Bertier and young
Brodrick came with me. Lunched at 8th Army Corps Headquarters with
Stopford and handed him a first outline scheme of the impending
operations. We read it through together and he seems to take all the
points and to be in general agreement. Left Aspinall behind to explain
any questions of detail which might not seem clear, whilst I went a tour
of inspection through the Eski Lines of trenches held by the 6th and 7th
Manchesters of the 42nd Division. These Eski Lines were first held about
the 7th or 8th May and have since been worked up, mainly by the energy
of de Lisle, into fortifications, humanly speaking, impregnable. General
Douglas, Commander of the Division, came round with me. He reminds me
greatly of his brother, the late Chief of the Imperial General Staff;
excellent at detail; a conscientious, very hard worker. When I had seen
my Manchester friends I passed on into the Royal Naval Division Lines.
There General Paris convoyed me through his section as far as
Zimmerman's Farm, where I was joined by Bailloud with his Chief of Staff
and Chief of Operations. Together we made our way round the whole of
the French trenches winding up at de Tott's Battery.

After this whopping walk, we left by pinnace from below de Tott's
wondering whether the Asiatic Batteries would think us game worth their
powder and shot. They did not and so we safely boarded our trawler at
Cape Helles. Didn't get back to Imbros Harbour till 9 p.m. Being so
late, boarded the ever hospitable _Triad_ on chance and struck, as
usual--hospitality. Hunter-Weston is really quite ill with fever. He did
not want to see anyone. As we were sitting at dinner I saw him through
the half open door staggering along on his way to get into a launch to
go aboard a Hospital ship. He is suffering very much from his head. The
doctors prophesy that he will pull round in about a week. I hope so
indeed, but I have my doubts. Aspinall reports that Stopford is entirely
in accord with our project and keen.

_23rd July, 1915. Imbros._ Spent day in camp trying to straighten things
out: (1) the personal, (2) the strategical and (3) the administrative
arrangements.

(1) Hunter-Weston has to go home and I have begged for Bruce Hamilton in
his place, and have told them I would have a great champion in him. He
and Smith-Dorrien were my best Brigadiers in South Africa. They stood on
my right hand and on my left all the way between Bloemfontein and
Pretoria, and I never quite made up my mind as to which was the better.
Bruce is a fighting man with an iron frame, and, in Gallipoli, his
chief crab, his deafness, will be rather a gain to him.

(2) Bailloud, with his own War Minister in the background, is doing all
he knows to get 20,000 of my new troops allotted to a side show, not for
strategy's sake, but for the tactical relief of his troops from the
shelling. I quite sympathize with his reason as, after all, he is
responsible for his own troops and not for the larger issue. But, to
take one objection only, the Navy could not land a force at Besika Bay
and at the same time carry out landings at Suvla and Anzac. Again, since
Bailloud urged these views, the guns fixed up at de Tott's Battery have
already begun to gain mastery over the fire from the site of Troy. When
we have one of the new 14-inch gunned monitors moored off Rabbit Island
we shall get cross fire observations and give the Turkish Asiatic guns
the clean knock out. Amphibious operations are ticklish things: allied
operations are ticklish things: but the two together are like skating on
thin ice arm in arm with two friends who each want to cut a figure of
his own.

(3) Slovenly bills of lading. Bertie Lawrence, who was sent to Mudros in
June when things were growing desperate, was here yesterday and has made
a report on the present business situation which, though less chaotic,
is still serious. There are not launches enough to enable people to get
about. There are not lighters enough to work the daily transhipment of
300 tons. But the worst trouble lies in the bills of lading. Sometimes
they arrive a week after their ships. Usually cargo shipped at Malta or
Alexandria is omitted. Half the time we can't lay hands on vital plant,
tackle, supplies, munitions, because we have no means of knowing what
is, or is not, on board some ship in the harbour. The trouble is of old
date but has reached its climax owing to our shortage of rounds for our
18-pounders.

We were notified a new fuse key would be required for the new shells on
the 12th June. The shells arrived but the keys were not despatched till
the 15th July! The vouchers are all wrong, and there, in idleness, lies
the stuff that spells success. A soldier is not a conjurer that he
should be handed over a fully laden ship and told to ferret out a fuse
key.

_24th July, 1915._ Last night the Turkish Commander drove his troops
into their tenth attack upon our extreme left where they were beaten off
as usual with a loss of several hundreds--this time we only suffered
about a dozen casualties. Together with Braithwaite, I rode over to "K"
Beach at 11 a.m. to inspect part of the 11th Division there encamped.
General Hammersley, Divisional Commander, met me. Also Colonel Malcolm,
his General Staff Officer and Major Duncan. The first Brigade I looked
at was Sitwell's--the 34th. A fine looking lot of men:--

  8th Northumberland Fusiliers,
  5th Dorsets,
  9th Lancashire Fusiliers,
  1 Coy. 11th Manchester Fusilers.

Next I passed on to Haggard's Brigade--the 32nd. On parade were--

  9th West Yorkshires,
  6th Yorkshires,
  8th West Riding Regiment,
  6th York and Lancashires.

Lastly I inspected the 67th and 68th Companies R.E. of the 134th
Fortress Company, as well as the Field Ambulance. Officers and men
looked splendid. I was glad indeed to be able to congratulate Hammersley
on his command. The doctors tell me, that, short as has been their stay,
a large number of the men are already infected by the prevalent disease.
Well, they don't look like that,--and it won't kill them that's certain,
for I have had it on me strong for the best part of two months. But it
knocks out the starch from its victims, and if fair play existed in
moonlit lands, every white man here should be credited with 25 per cent.
extra kudos for everything that he does with his brains or his body
under the shadow of this pestilence.

Have got a reply from the War Office (Q.M.G.2) making light of my
shipping troubles and saying the War Office has always cabled full
advices. What can I say to that? As the lamb thought to himself when the
wolf began to growl.

_25th July, 1915._ Spent most of the day in camp. Church Parade at 9
a.m. Charles Lister came over from "K" Beach to lunch. He is a
fascinating creature and has made a name for himself with the Naval
Division, where standards are high, as being the keenest of the keen
and the bravest of the brave. Hammersley, Malcolm and Aitkin called in
the evening, but I had gone for a stroll and missed them.

The great Turkish attack timed by all our spies for the 23rd has never
come off but, as showing the fine spirit which animates the Anzacs, it
is worth noting that on that day not one soul reported sick. They would
not go near the doctors for fear they might be made to miss a battle.

Last night the French took a small trench, and though the Turks had a
dash at it in the morning, they were easily beaten off. Twice out of
three times we gain something when we fight and the third time we lose
no ground.

Given, therefore, the factors of the problem, men, munitions and the
distance to be covered (two to three miles), the result pans out like a
proposition by Euclid. No question of breaking through is involved as in
any other theatre, but merely a question of pushing back a very clearly
limited number of yards. The men have in their hearts a reservoir of
patience which will never run dry so long as they are sure of the Will
to Win at their backs. They need have no qualms about G.H.Q. here, but
politicians are more--shall we say, mercurial? And the experts from
France are throwing cold water on our cause by day and night. Therefore,
as the Fleet is not going to have a dash, it is just as well we are
about to try the one great effort and get it done quickly. We will gain
a lot of ground; so much is certain, and it's as sure as anything can
be in war that somewhere we shall make good a key to the position.

_26th July, 1915._ Stifling. Am sticking out about the lack of proper
advices of shipments. Ammunition _makes_ itself scarce enough without
being _made_ scarce. Rare and curious articles are worth careful
booking; that's the text of my cable.

_27th July, 1915. Imbros._ Hard at it. Altham came in to see me and
spent an hour and a half. A man of business! Mahon arrived at mid-day.
Very cheery but he feels that he is the only Lieutenant-General
executively employed with troops who has so small a command as a
Division. He says that either he should be given a Corps, or that
his Lieutenant-General's rank should be reverted to that of
Major-General. I quite agreed. I feel as strongly as he does that, as a
Lieutenant-General, he is clean out of his setting in a Major-General's
appointment and has blocked the way to a go-ahead young Corps Commander,
because that Corps Commander must, by K.'s decision, be his senior.
Still, there didn't seem to be anything to be done, so after my telling
him how things stood here, and hearing with great pleasure the fine
account he gave me of his Irish Division, we adjourned to lunch. Colonel
King, his G.S.O. (1), also lunched and seemed to be a very nice fellow.
After lunch they both went off to the G.S. to be posted.

Admiral Wemyss came over from Mudros and saw me. He is senior to de
Robeck but has waived that accident of rank seeing we are at war. An
interesting man and a Keyesite; i.e., he'd go right through the Straits
to-morrow,--or go under. He is one of those men, none too common in the
Services, whose mind has gained breadth in the great world without
losing its keenness. These rival tenets are straining the fabric of the
Fleet, but, as I constantly tell our General Staff, my course is as
clear to me as a pikestaff. I back the policy of the _de facto_ Naval
Commander-in-Chief--my own coadjutor. There is a temptation to do wrong,
but I resist it. What would it not be to me were the whole Fleet to
attack as we land at Suvla! But obviously I cannot go out of my own
element to urge the Fleet to actions, the perils of which I am
professionally incompetent to gauge.

At 5.30 p.m. I went off riding with de Robeck, Ormsby Johnson and
Freddie Maitland. We cantered over to Seaplane Camp; passed the time of
day to the men there and over-hauled some of the machines. Coming back,
we passed through part of the 11th Division Camp; all very ship-shape
and clean. Freddie Maitland and I dined on board the _Beryl_ with Sir
Douglas Gamble. He seems highly pleased with everyone and everything; I
wouldn't go quite so far! There we met de Robeck, Keyes, Altham, Ellison
and Captain Stephens. Got back at 11.

_28th July, 1915._ A cable from K. about Hunter-Weston's breakdown,
telling me the Prime Minister thinks that Bruce Hamilton is too old for
active work and heavy strain. Instead I am to have Davies. I know Joey
Davies--everyone does. But I also know Bruce Hamilton. There is no
tougher man or more resolute fighter in the Army. In my letter to K. I
said, "The only man I can think of who would really inspire me with full
confidence in these emergencies, excursions and alarms, would be Bruce
Hamilton. Bruce Hamilton is a real fighting man, and his deafness here
would be a great asset as he would be able to sleep through the shell
and rifle fire at night."

The older Officers will be sorry indeed to hear Bruce Hamilton is
barred. Shaw, the new Commander of the 13th Division, will be especially
disappointed.

Admiral Gamble came off to see me and afterwards dined. I was very
careful as I don't want to be quoted about the Sister Service. Gamble
sings praise of our outfit, but I can't help wondering how, when and
where he has got it into his head that we have small craft in abundance!

_29th July, 1915. Imbros._ Stuck to camp, and lucky I did so, for the
cipher of a queer cable from S. of S. for War came in and called for as
much thought as is compatible with prompt handling. The message begins
with a ripe sugar plum:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"At this stage of the operations which you have conducted with so much
ability and in which your troops have so greatly distinguished
themselves, we" (this "we" is a new expression; the S. of S. always says
"I") "consider it advisable to summarize what we are placing at your
disposal for the effort which we hope will bring your operations to a
successful termination.

"We have sent you out" and then the cable launches out into an inventory
of the forces entrusted to me which, though very detailed, is yet
largely based on what we call the widow's cruse principle. As to the
demnition total, "we" tells "me," categorically, (as the Lawyers say
when they describe the whiteness of soot) that I have "a total of about
205,000 men for the forthcoming operations." The A.G. who brought me the
cable could make nothing of it. Braithwaite then came over and he could
make nothing of it. We can none of us see the point of pretending to
_us_ that my force has been kept up to the strength all the time, or of
adding bayonets to the French or of assuming to _us_ that _we_ possess
troops which Maxwell has told me time and again he requires for Egyptian
defence. Were these figures going to the enemy Chief they might
intimidate him--coming here they alarm me. There is a "We" at the other
end of the cable which knows so little that it tells me, who know every
gun, rifle and round of ammunition I have at my disposal, that I have
double that number to handle. We won't defeat the enemy by paper
strengths. As far as sentiments go, the cable is by chalks the heartiest
handshake we poor relations to the West have had since we started. From
the outset we've been kicked by phrases such as, if you don't hurry up
we will have to "reconsider the position," etc., etc. Now, the "Wees"
wind up with a really wonderful paragraph:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"We should like to hear from you after considering your plans whether
there is anything further in the way of personnel, guns or ammunition we
can send you, as we are most anxious to give you everything you can
possibly require and use. You will realize that as regards ammunition we
have had to stop supplying France to give you the full output, which
will be continued as long as possible; in the short time available
before the bad weather intervenes the Dardanelles operations are now of
the highest importance."

The position seems now, to me, extraordinarily delicate. Are we to let
the mistakes in this flattering cable slide, and build upon its
promises, or, are we to pull whoever believes these figures out of their
fool's paradise? Well, I feel we must have it out and although deeply
grateful for the nice words and for the splendid effort actually being
made, we _cannot_ let it be assumed by _anyone_ that our vanishing Naval
and Territorial Divisions are complete and up to strength. As to
ammunition, I asked plainly over a fortnight ago, for what I thought was
necessary to rapid success. I was told in so many words that France
would not spare it; though it would have been a small affair to them.
Now; as if these cables had no existence, they ask if there is "anything
in the way of _personnel, guns or ammunition you can possibly require
and use_." The truth is, I don't like this cable; in spite of its
flowery opening I don't like it at all. As to personnel, I ask for young
and energetic commanders, Byng and Rawlinson, and am turned down. Next I
ask for an old and experienced Commander, Bruce Hamilton, and am turned
down. Next I say that Reed, who would be a good staff officer to some
Generals, is not well suited to Stopford; I am turned down. I try to get
a business man to run Mudros and have been turned down till just the
other day. In all these points the War Office are supreme and are acting
well within their rights. But they show some want of consistency in
talking to me all of a sudden, as if it was a matter of course I should
be met half way in my wishes.

So there and then we roughed out this reply:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"Your Nos. 6583 and 6588. Your appreciation of our efforts will afford
intense gratification and encouragement to everyone.

"In regard to what we should like if it is available in the shape of
guns and ammunition, please see my No. M.F. 444, of 13th July, which
still holds good. As to the final paragraph of your No. 6583, I did not
realize that you were stopping supplies to France in order to give us
full output, since a fortnight ago your No. 6234 stated that it was then
impossible for you to send the ammunition I asked for, and that it would
be impossible to continue supplies even on a much lower scale, since it
would involve the reduction of supplies to France. Naturally, I have
always realized that you, and not I, must judge of the comparative
importance of the demands from the Dardanelles and from France.

"With regard to numbers, the grand total you mention does not take into
account non-effectives or casualties; it includes reinforcements such as
LIVth and part of the LIIIrd Divisions, etc., which cannot be here in
time for my operation, and it also includes Yeomanry and Indian troops
which, until this morning, I was unaware were at my unreserved disposal.
For the coming operation, the number of rifles available is about half
the figure you quote, viz., 120,000. I am only anxious, in emphasizing
this point, to place the statement regarding my strength on the correct
basis, and one which gives a true view of the position.

"What I want in a hurry is as much additional high explosive shell as
you can send me up to amounts asked for in my No. M.F. 444, and as many
of the 4.5-inch and 6-inch howitzers asked for in that telegram as there
is ammunition for. I am despatching a ship immediately, and its time of
arrival at Marseilles will be telegraphed later.

"With regard to sending the IInd Mounted Division unmounted, I am at
once telegraphing Maxwell to obtain his views."

The Mail bag went out this morning.

Hankey is now busy going over the Peninsula. I have not seen much of
him. A G.S. Officer has been told off to help him along and to see that
he does not get into trouble. I am not going to dry nurse him. He showed
me of his own free will a copy of a personal cable he had sent to Lord
Kitchener in which he says, speaking of his first visit to Anzac,
"Australians are superbly confident and spoiling for a fight." This is
exactly true and I feel it is good that one who has the ear of the
insiders should say it. I wrote Wolfe Murray a week ago that he was a
successor to those Commissioners who were sent out by the French
Republic in its early days. Actually, I am very glad to have him. Lies
are on the wing, and he, armed with the truth, will be able to knock
some of them out hereafter when he meets them in high places.

I have been bothered as to how to answer a letter from a statesman for
whom I cherish great respect, who has always been very kind to me and
whom I like very much. He writes:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"It may interest you to know the Cabinet has entrusted the
superintendence of the Dardanelles business to a comparatively small and
really strong committee drawn equally from the two parties. We most
thoroughly understand the extreme difficulty of your task and the
special conditions of the problem in front of you and the Admiral. All
we ask from you is complete confidence and the exact truth. We are not
babes and we can digest strong meat. Do not think that we ever want
anything unpleasant concealed from us, nor do we want you ever to swerve
one hair's breadth from your own exact judgment in putting the case
before us, certainly never on the pleasant side; if you ever swerve pray
do so on the unpleasant side.... If you want more ammunition say so...."

"Could you eat a bun, my boy?" said the old gentleman to the little boy
looking in at the shop window. "Could I eat ten thousand b ... buns and
the baker who baked them?" So the dear little fellow answered. If I want
more ammunition indeed? If ...? I fear the "comparatively small and
really strong committee." They fairly frighten me. There they sit, all
wishing us well, all evidently completely bamboozled. "If you want more
ammunition, say so!" Anyway, my friend means me well but my path is
perfectly clear; I have only one Chief--K.--and I correspond with no one
but him, or his Staff, whether on the subject of ammunition or anything
else....

As to the letter, I know it is entirely kind, genuine and inspired by
the one idea of helping me. But I've got to say no thank you in some
unmistakable manner. So I have replied:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"I am grateful for your reassuring remarks about your Committee having
confidence in my humble self. For my part I have confidence in the
_moral_ of my troops and in the devotion of the Navy which are the two
great and splendid assets amidst this shifting kaleidoscope of the
factors and possibilities of war.

"I am not quite sure that I clearly understand your meaning about
cabling home the exact truth. Is there any occasion on which I have
failed to do so? I should be very sorry indeed to think I had
consciously or unconsciously misled anyone by my cables. There is
always, of course, the broad spirit of a cable which depends on the
temperament of the sender. It is either tinged with hope or it has been
dictated by one who fears the worst. If you mean that you would prefer a
pessimistic tone given to my appreciations, then I am afraid you will
have to get another General."

_30th July, 1915._ Gascoigne of "Q" branch lunched. On getting news of
the decisive victory on the Euphrates I caused a _feu de joie_ to be
fired precisely at 5 p.m. by all the troops on the Peninsula. At the
appointed hour I walked up the cliff's edge whence I clearly heard the
roll of fire. The question of whether musketry sounds will carry so far
is settled. Evidently the Turks have taken up the challenge for it was
quite a long time before the distant rumbling died away. In the cool of
the evening took a walk. Commandant Bertier and la Borde dined.

Stopford, now commanding at Helles, has endorsed a report from the
Commander of the 42nd East Lancs Division saying that out of a draft of
45 recruits just come from home three have been cast as totally unfit
and nine as permanently unfit through blindness. Stopford says that he
can't understand this, as the second line Battalion, from which these
poor fellows were selected, contained good soldiers and tall fellows
quite lately when they were under his command in England. Have cabled
the facts home; also the following, showing the result of the
Admiralty's attitude towards their own Naval Division now Winston has
departed:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"(No. M.F. 505). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to War Office. The
effective strength of the Marine Brigade is now reduced to 50 officers
and 1,890 rank and file. In addition, only five battalions, Royal Naval
Volunteer Reserve Battalions, are now remaining in the Division, as the
Anson Battalion has been withdrawn for special work in connection with
the forthcoming operations. Moreover, 300 men, stokers, from this
division have been handed over to the Navy for work in auxiliary
vessels, see my telegram No. M.F.A. 1377, of 11th July. I have
consequently decided to reduce the division to eight battalions and to
reorganize it into two brigades as a temporary measure. Can you give me
any idea when the reinforcements for this division are likely to be
despatched and when they may be expected here? I should like to see the
division again at its strength of 12 battalions, and do not want to lose
it, as it contains a very valuable war-trained nucleus, but unless it is
brought under army administration, it does not appear likely that it can
be maintained."

_31st July, 1915. Imbros._ Quiet day spent in trying to clear my table
before sailing for Mitylene to see the new Irish Division. The grand
army with which some War Office genius credited us appear to have served
their purpose. At our challenge they have now taken to their heels like
Falstaff's eleven rogues in buckram suits. The S. of S. (cabling this
time as "I" and not as "We,") says, "it is not worth while trying to
reconcile numbers by cable and it is difficult to make up accurate
states."

Do not let me forget, though, that a slice of solid stuff is sandwiched
into this cable--we are to get some 4.5 shell _via_ Marseilles; H.E. we
hope: also, two batteries of 4.5 howitzers: also that the A.G. has been
trying hard to feed the 29th Division. The Territorials are the people
who are being allowed to go to pot--not a word of hope even, and before
the eyes of everyone.

_1st August, 1915. Imbros._ The usual rush before leaving. No time to
write. Sent two cables, copies attached. The first to the War Office, in
answer to one from the A.G. wherein he plumes himself upon the
completeness of the 29th Division. That completeness, alas, is only so
relatively; i.e., in comparison with the sinking condition of the
Territorial Divisions:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"We are deeply grateful to you for the drafts you have despatched for
the XXIXth Division as the fighting existence of that fine formation has
been prolonged by their timely arrival, but I fear that you are very
wide of the mark in your assumption that these drafts have completed the
Division.

"As I have ventured to point out incessantly since my arrival here,
constant large numbers of casualties must occur between the demands for
and the arrival of drafts owing to the length of the sea voyage. It was
for this very plain reason that it was doubly necessary to have here the
10 per cent. margin granted in the case of battalions going to France.
We must always be considerably under establishment in the absence of
some such margin.

"I fully realize, in saying this, that it may be quite impossible to
meet such demands as I suggest, but I feel bound to let you know the
only possible terms on which any unit in this force can ever be up to
establishment.

"At the present moment, excluding 1,700 drafts coming on _Simla_ and
_Themistocles_, the actual infantry strength of the XXIXth Division is
219 officers and 8,424 other ranks."

The second cable is to K. The War Office Army has melted into thin air
and it only remains to express my heartfelt thanks for the real Army:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"With reference to your No. 6645. Very many thanks. You have done
everything for us that man can do. The ship will probably not reach me
in time but since I know that the ammunition is actually _en route_ for
me, and that it will (D.V.) arrive, I need not husband what we have, but
can fire freely if I see great results thus obtainable. The Turk, at any
rate, where he knows that he is fighting for Constantinople, is a
stubborn fighter, and the difficulty is not so much in the taking of
positions as in the maintaining of them.

"Hence the extra ammunition you are sending me will come in the nick of
time. The ship will arrive at Marseilles 7 p.m. 4th August, as I
telegraphed to the Quartermaster-General yesterday. Many thanks for the
two batteries of 4.5-inch howitzers, they are worth their weight in gold
to us."

At 5 p.m. embarked on H.M.S. _Chatham_ (Captain Drury Lowe) with George
Lloyd of the General Staff and young Brodrick. At 6 p.m. sailed for
Mitylene.

_2nd August, 1915. H.M.S. "Chatham," Mitylene._ We opened Mitylene
Harbour at 5.30 a.m. So narrow was the entrance, and so hidden, that at
first it looked as if the _Chatham_ was charging the cliffs; next as if
her long guns must entangle themselves in the flowering bushes on either
side of the channel; then, as we sailed out over a bay like a big
turquoise, I felt as though we were at peace with all men, making a
pilgrimage to the home of Sappho, and that we had left far behind us
these giant wars. But only for a moment!

After early breakfast, where I met Captain Grant of H.M.S. _Canopus_,
left in a steam pinnace to inspect the 30th Brigade under
Brigadier-General Hill.

Inspected:--

  H.M.T. _Alaudia_, 9.30 a.m.
      6th Royal Dublin Fusiliers,
      7th Royal Dublin Fusiliers,
          Col G. Downing, 7th R.D.F., in command.

  H.M.T. _Andania_, 10.30 a.m.
      6th R. Inniskilling Fusiliers,
      5th Royal Irish Fusiliers,
          Lt.-Col. M. Pike, 5th R.I.F., in command.

  H.M.T. _Canada_, 11.30 a.m.
      6th Royal Irish Fusiliers,
          Lt.-Col. F. A. Greer in command.

  H.M.T. _Novian_, 12 p.m.
      5th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers,
          Lt.-Col. H. Vanrennan in command.

The Royal Irish Fusiliers and Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers had not got
back on board ship by the time I was ready for them, so I hurried off
by motor launch to a landing in another part of the Bay and, walking
through a village, caught them resting by their piled arms after a route
march. All of these men looked very well and cheery. The villagers were
most friendly and had turned out in numbers, bringing presents of
flowers and fruit. Not more than 60 per cent. of the men are Irish, the
rest being either North of England miners or from Somerset.

In the evening, crossed the glassy bay and motored to pay a
double-barrelled visit to the Military and Civil Governors. Topping the
watershed, yet another pleasure shock. Through the sea haze Mitylene
shines out like an iridescent bubble of light. Never had I seen anything
so vivid in its colour and setting as this very ancient, very small,
very brilliant city of Mitylene. Rio de Janeiro, Sydney, the Golden Horn
are sprawling daubs to flawless Mitylene.

Hesketh Smith and Compton Mackenzie were with us. The Governors very
polite. The soldier man is a Cretan and seemed a good sort. We took tea
at the Hotel and then made our way back to the _Chatham_. Found messages
from G.H.Q. to say all's well and stuff being smuggled in without hitch
at Anzac. At 7 p.m. we sailed for Imbros; a breeze from the West
whipping up little waves into cover for enemy periscopes. So the moment
we left the harbour we took on a corkscrew course, dodging and twisting
like snipe in an Irish bog, to avoid winding up our trip in the dark
belly of a German submarine. Soon emerged from the sea a huge piled up
white cloud, white and clear cut at first as the breast of a swan upon
a blue lake, slowly turning to deep rose colour flecked here and there
with gold. As it swallowed up the last lingering colours of the sunset,
the world grew grey, then black, and we were, humanly speaking, safe.

_3rd August, 1915. Imbros._ Anchored at Imbros roadstead 5.30 a.m.
Braithwaite not up yet so Altham got first innings about transport and
supply.

Next the G.S. All our preliminaries are working on quite smoothly
towards the climax and, so far, it seems likely the Turks have no notion
of the scheme.

Girodon steamed over from Helles to see me and went back again in the
evening. He is the mirror of French chivalry, modesty and good form,
besides being an extraordinary fine soldier.

The 33rd Brigade, sent by me to gain wisdom at Helles, have now been
brought here so that the whole 11th Division can start off together.

Just as the peculiar foggy air of Lancashire is essential to the weaving
of the finer sorts of tissues, so an atmosphere of misunderstandings
would really seem to suit the War Office.

In the cable telling me I would have 205,000 troops for my push, the S.
of S. had informed me categorically that the 8,500 Yeomanry and mounted
troops in Egypt, as well as 11,500 Indian troops and the Artillery
stationed there _were mine_.

As the present garrison of Egypt numbers over 70,000 and as the old
peace garrison of Egypt was 5,000 and as, further, there is no question
of serious attack on Egypt from outside, it seemed to us there might be
men in this part of the message. Leaving the Indian troops out of the
account, for the moment, I therefore wired to Maxwell and asked him if
he thought he would be able to organize a _portion_ of the 8,500 mounted
men, in order that, at a pinch, they might be able to come and reinforce
us here. So the matter stood when I got another cable from the S. of S.
telling me 5,000 drafts are "_en route_ or under orders" to join the
29th Division and that the War Office are "unable to carry out your
views about additional marginal drafts." S. of S. then goes on:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"Maxwell wires that you are taking 300 officers and 5,000 men of his
mounted troops. I do not quite understand why you require Egyptian
Garrison troops while you have the LIIIrd Division at Alexandria, and
the LIVth, the last six battalions of which are arriving in five or six
days, on the _Aquitania_.

"When I placed the Egyptian Garrison at your disposal to reinforce at
the Dardanelles in case of necessity, Maxwell pointed out that Egypt
would be left very short, and I replied that you would only require them
in case of emergency for a short time, and that the risk must be run. I
did not contemplate, however, that you would take troops from the
Egyptian Garrison until those sent specially for you were exhausted. How
long will you require Maxwell's troops, and where do you intend to send
them? They should only be removed from Egypt for actual operations and
for the shortest possible time."

We may read this cable wrong but it seems to us to embody a topsy-turvy
tactic! To wait till one part of your forces are killed off (for that is
the plain English of "exhausted") before you bring up the other part of
your forces.

It is not easy to know what to do. The very best we can do, it sometimes
seems to me, is to keep quiet rather than add one iota to the anxieties
of people staggering under a load of responsibilities and cares. In the
good old days the Gordons fought in two decisive battles in two
Continents within a few months and no one worried the War Office about
drafts! The 92nd carried on--had to carry on; they fell to quarter
strength--still they were the Gordons and they carried on, just as if
they counted a thousand rifles in their ranks. Now, I am quite prepared
to do that to-day--_if that is the policy_. If that _were_ the policy;
not one grouse or grumble should ever cross my lips. But that is _not_
the policy. Press and People believe a Division is a unit made up in
scientific proportions of different branches and numbering a certain
number of rifles. They are told so; the War Office keep telling them so;
they believe it, and, in fact, it is an absolute necessity of this
modern trench war that it should be so. Although the Gordons got no
_drafts_ between the battle of Kandahar and the battle of Majuba Hill,
they got six months' _rest_; which was even better. In those days, apart
from sieges, a battle was an event, here it is the rest or respite that
is an event. Even British soldiers can't stick day and night fighting
for ever. The attack spirit begins to ebb _unless_ it is fed with fresh
blood. Whether K.'s mind, big with broad views, grasps this new factor
with which he has never himself come into personal contact, God knows.
But for his sake, every bit as much as for my own, it is up to me to
keep hammering, hammering, hammering at drafts, drafts, drafts.

Dined with the ever hospitable and kind hearted de Robeck on _Triad_.
The Navy are still divided. Some there are who would wish me to urge the
Admiral to play first fiddle in the coming attack. This _I will not do_.
I have neither the data nor the technical knowledge which would justify
me to my conscience in doing so.

_4th August, 1915. Imbros._ Have been out seeing the New Army at work.
Some of the XIth Division were practising boat work in the evening and
afterwards a Brigade started upon a night march into the mountains. The
men are fit, although just beginning to be infected with the Eastern
Mediterranean stomach trouble; i.e., the so-called cholera, which saved
Constantinople from the Bulgarians in the last war.

_5th August, 1915. Imbros._ The day so longed for is very near now. O
that it had come at the period of our victories! But there is time
enough still, and the first moves of the plan are working smooth as
oiled machinery. For the past few nights there has been steady flow
into Anzac of troops, including a Division of the New Army. This has
taken place, without any kind of hitch, under the very noses of the
Turkish Army who have no inkling of the manoeuvre--as yet! The Navy
are helping us admirably here with their organization and good sea
discipline. Also, from what they tell me, Shaw and the 13th Division of
the New Army are playing up with the clockwork regularity of veterans.
All this marks us up many points to the good, before even the flag
drops. For, given the fine troops we have, the prime factors of the
whole conception; the factors by which it stands or falls; are:--

       *       *       *       *       *

(1) Our success in hoodwinking the Turks; i.e., surprise.

(2) Our success in getting the 13th Division and the Indian Brigade
unnoticed into Anzac.

(3) Our success in landing the Divisions from Imbros, Lemnos and
Mitylene, at moments fixed beforehand, upon an unknown, unsurveyed,
uncharted shore of Suvla. Of these three factors (1) and (2) may already
be entered to our credit; (3) is on the knees of the Navy.

The day before the start is the worst day for a Commander. The operation
overhangs him as the thought of another sort of operation troubles the
minds of sick men in hospitals. There is nothing to distract him; he has
made his last will and testament; his affairs are quite in order; he has
said _au revoir_ to his friends with what cheeriness he can muster.
Looking back, it seems to me that during two months every conceivable
contingency has been anticipated and weighed and that the means of
dealing with it as it may arise is now either:--embodied in our
instructions to Corps Commanders, or else, set aside as pertaining to my
own jurisdiction and responsibility. To my thinking, in fact, these
instructions of ours illustrate the domain of G.H.Q. on the one hand and
the province of the Corps Commander on the other very typically. The
General Staff are proud of their work. Nothing; not a nosebag nor a
bicycle has been left to chance.[1]

Davies and Diggle, his A.D.C., lunched and the Admiral came to haul me
out for a walk about 6 p.m.

Have written K. by this evening's Mail bag about the sickness of the
Australians, and indeed of all the troops here, excepting only the
native Indian troops, and also about our Medical _band-o-bast_ for the
battle. No question about it, the Dardanelles was the theatre of all
others for our Indian troops.

Have now seen all the New Army units except six Battalions of the 10th
Division.

French has written me a very delightful letter.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: See Appendix III containing actual instructions, together
with a brief explanatory heading.--IAN H., 1920.]




CHAPTER XV

SARI BAIR AND SUVLA


_6th August, 1915. Imbros._ O! God of Bethel, by whose hand thy people
still are fed,--I am wishing the very rare wish,--that it was the day
after to-morrow. Men or mice we will be by then, but I'd like to know
which. K.'s New Army, too! How will they do? What do they think? They
speak--and with justice--of the spirit of the Commander colouring the
_moral_ of his men, but I have hardly seen them, much less taken their
measure. One more week and we would have known something at first hand.
Now, except that the 13th Division and the 33rd Brigade gained good
opinions at Helles, all is guess work.

Went down to "K" Beach to see the 11th Division go off. Young Brodrick,
who was with us, proved himself much all there on the crowded pier and
foreshore; very observant; telling me who or what I had not noticed,
etc. First the destroyers were filling up and then the lighters. The
young Naval Officers in charge of the lighters were very keen to show me
how they had fixed up their reserves of ammunition and water. Spent
quite a time at this and talking to Hammersley and Malcolm, his G.S.O.
(1); also to Coleridge, G.S.O. (2), and to no end of Regimental
Officers and men. Hammersley has been working too hard; at least he
looked it; also, for the occasion, rather glum. Quite natural; but I
always remember Wolseley's remark about the moral stimulus exerted by
the gay staff officer and his large cigar. The occasion! Yes, each man
to his own temperament. Some pray before battle; others dance and drink.
The memory of Cromwell prevails over that of Prince Rupert with most
Englishmen but Prince Rupert, _per se_, usually prevailed over Cromwell.
To your adventurous soldier; to our heroes, Bobs, Sir Evelyn, Garnet
Wolseley, Charles Gordon (great psalm-singer though he was) an occasion
like to-night's holds the same intoxicating mixture of danger and desire
as fills the glass of the boy bridegroom when he raises it to the health
of his enigma in a veil. But I don't know how it is; I used to feel like
that; now I too am terribly anxious. Disappointed not to see Stopford
nor Reed. They were to have been there. Besides the men on the beetles
there are men packed like herrings upon the decks of the destroyers. I
had half a mind to cruise round in the motor launch and say a few words
to them Elandslaagte fashion, but was held back by feeling that the rank
and file don't know me and that there was too long an interval before
the entry into the danger zone.

The sea was like glass--melted; blue green with a dull red glow in it:
the air seemed to have been boiled. Officers and men gave me the "feel"
of being "for it" though over serious for British soldiers who always,
in my previous experience, have been extraordinarily animated and gay
when they are advancing "on a Koppje day." These new men seem subdued
when I recall the blaze of enthusiasm in which the old lot started out
of Mudros harbour on that April afternoon.

The _moral_ of troops about to enter into battle supplies a splendid
field of research for students of the human soul, for then the blind
wall set in everyday intercourse between Commander and commanded seems
to become brittle as crystal and as transparent. Only for a few
moments--last moments for so many? But, during those moments, the
gesture of the General means so much--it strikes the attitude of his
troops. It is up to Stopford and Hammersley to make those gestures.
Stopford was not there, and is not the type; Hammersley is not that type
either. How true it is that age, experience, wisdom count for less than
youth, magnetism and love of danger when inexperience has to be
heartened for the struggle.

Strolled back slowly along the beach, and, at 8.30, in the gathering
dusk, saw the whole flotilla glide away and disappear ghostlike to the
Northwards. The empty harbour frightens me. Nothing in legend stranger
or more terrible than the silent departure of this silent Army, K.'s new
Corps, every mother's son of them, face to face with their fate.

But it will never do to begin the night's vigil in this low key. Capital
news from the aeroplanes. Samson has sent in photographs taken
yesterday, showing the Suvla Bay area. Not more than 100 to 150 yards
of trenches in all; half a dozen gun emplacements and, the attached
report adds, no Turks anywhere on the move.

[Illustration: SUVLA FROM CHUNUK BAIR]

_7th August, 1915. Imbros._ Sitting in my hut after a night in the G.S.
tent. One A.D.C. remains over there. As the cables come in he runs
across with them. Freddie Maitland runs fast. I am watching to see his
helmet top the ridge of sand that lies between. The 9th Corps has got
ashore; some scrapping along the beaches but no wire or hold-up like
there was at Sedd-el-Bahr: that in itself is worth fifty million golden
sovereigns. The surprise has come off!

I'd sooner storm a hundred bloody trenches than dangle at the end of
this wire. But now, thank God, the deadliest of the perils is past. The
New Army are fairly ashore. That worst horror of searchlights and of the
new troops being machine gunned in their boats has lifted its dark
shadow.

At Anzac, the most formidable entrenchment of the Turks, "Lone Pine,"
was stormed yesterday evening by the Australian 1st Brigade; a desperate
fine feat. At midnight Birdie cabled, "All going on well on right where
men confident of repelling counter-attack now evidently being prepared:
on left have taken Old No. 3 Post and first ridge of Walden Point,
capturing machine gun: progress satisfactory, though appallingly
difficult: casualties uncertain but on right about 100 killed; 400
wounded."

At Helles a temporary success was scored, but, during the early part of
the night, counter-attacks have brought us back to "as you were."
Fighting is going on and we ought to be pinning the enemy to the South
which is the main thing.

From Suvla we have no direct news since the "All landings successful"
cable but we have the repetition of a wireless from G.H.Q. IXth Corps to
the Vice-Admiral at 7.58 a.m. saying, "Prisoners captured state no fresh
troops have arrived recently and forces opposed to us appear to be as
estimated by G.H.Q. Apparently one Regiment only was opposed to our
advance on left."

I have caused this cable to be sent to Stopford:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"4.20 p.m. G.H.Q. to 9th Corps. Have only received one telegram from
you. Chief glad to hear enemy opposition weakening and knows you will
take advantage of this to push on rapidly. Prisoners state landing a
surprise so take every advantage before you are forestalled."

_8th August, 1915. Imbros._ Another night on tenter hooks: great news: a
wireless from a warship to tell us the Suvla troops are up on the
foothills: two cables from Stopford: many messages from Anzac and
Helles.

"2.12 a.m. IXth Corps to G.H.Q. As far as can be ascertained 33rd
Brigade hold line the sea about 91.I.9 to Suvla East corner[2] of Salt
Lake to Lala Baba inclusive. North of Salt Lake 31st and 32nd Brigade
extended East of Asmak 117.U. preparatory. 34th Brigade advancing having
followed retreating enemy towards line diagonally across 117.X. and
117.D. One battalion latter Brigade occupy high ground about square
135.X."

"5.10 a.m. IXth Corps to G.H.Q. Yilghin Burnu is in our hands. No
further information."

Awful work at Lone Pine. Desperate counter-attacks by enemy, but now
Birdie thinks we are there to stay. Bulk of Turkish reserves engaged
there whilst Godley's New Zealanders and the new 13th Division under
Shaw are well up the heights and have carried Chunuk Bair. Koja Chemen
Tepe not yet; but Chunuk Bair will do: with that, we win!

At Helles we have pushed out again and the East Lancs Division have
gallantly stormed the Vineyard which they hold. The Turks are making
mighty counter-attacks but their columns have been cut to pieces by the
thin lines of the Lancashire Fusiliers. Neither from Helles nor from the
Southern area of Anzac are the enemy likely to spare men to reinforce
Sari Bair or Suvla.

At 11.30 I ordered the _Arno_ for mid-day sharp. Then happened one of
those aquatic incidents which lend an atmosphere all their own to
amphibious war. Rear-Admiral Nicholson, in local naval command here, had
ordered the _Arno_ to fill up her boilers. Some hitch arose, some d--d
amphibious hitch. Thereupon, without telling me, he ordered the
Commander of the _Arno_ to draw fires, so that, when my signal was sent,
a reply came from the Rear-Admiral saying he was sorry I should be
inconvenienced, but he thought it best to order the fires to be drawn;
otherwise the boilers might have suffered. When, at a crisis, a boiler
walks into the middle of his calculations, a soldier is simply--boiled!
I could not altogether master my irritation, and I wrote out a reply
saying this was not a question of convenience or inconvenience but one
of preventing a Commander-in-Chief from exercising his functions during
battle. I sent the signal down to the signal tent and about an hour
later Braithwaite came over and said he had taken it upon himself to
tone it down.[3] Just as well, perhaps, but here I was, marooned upon an
island!

No other ship could be signalled. As a rule there was a destroyer on
patrol about Helles which could be called up by wireless, but to-day
there was no getting hold of it. I began to be afraid we should not get
away till dark when, at about 3.30 p.m. Nicholson signalled that the
_Triad_ was sailing for Suvla at 4.15 p.m., and would I care to go in
her, the _Arno_ following after she had watered. We were off like a
shot, young Brodrick, Captain Anstey and myself for Suvla. Braithwaite
remained to carry on with Anzac and Helles. The moment I quit my post I
drop out and he takes up the reins. His hands are capable--fortunately!
To-day's cables before I left were right from Helles; splendid from
Anzac and nothing further from Suvla.[4]

As we sailed in, that bay, always till now so preternaturally deserted
and silent, was alive and bustling with ships and small craft. A launch
came along from the _Chatham_ and I jumped in whilst we were still going
pretty fast and shot off to see de Robeck. He seemed to think things
naval were going pretty well and that Rear-Admiral Christian had been
coping quite well with his share, but suggested that, as he was under a
severe strain, I had better leave him alone. As to the soldiers' show,
he said what Turks were on the ground, and there weren't many, had been
well beaten--but--but--_but_; and all I could get him to say was that
although he was well aware the fighting at Helles and Anzac demanded my
closest attention; still, that was in practised hands and he had felt
bound to wireless to beg me to come up to Suvla and see things for
myself.

Roger Keyes said then that the landings had come off, on the whole, A.1.
Our G.H.Q. idea, which the Navy had shared, that the whole of the troops
should be landed South of Lala Baba had been sound. The 33rd Brigade had
landed there without shot fired; the 32nd had been sharply, but not
very seriously opposed; the Brigade (the 34th) which we, to meet the
wish of the Corps, had tried to land for them opposite Hill 10 inside
the Bay, instead of with the others as we had originally arranged, had
only been able to find depth at the mouth of the Salt Lake; had suffered
loss from rifle fire and had been thrown into disorder by the grounding
of some lighters. The long wade through the water and mud had upset the
cohesion of the Brigade.

Aspinall now turned up. He was in a fever; said our chances were being
thrown away with both hands and that he had already cabled me strongly
to that effect. Neither the Admiral's message nor Aspinall's had reached
me.[5]

Not another moment was to be lost, so Keyes took us both in his motor
boat to H.M.S. _Jonquil_ to see Stopford. He (Stopford) seemed happy and
said that everything was quite all right and going well. Mahon with some
of his troops was pressing back the Turks along Kiretch Tepe Sirt. There
had been a very stiff fight in the darkness at Lala Baba and next
morning the Turks had fought so hard on a little mound called Hill 10
that he (Stopford) had been afraid we were not going to be able to take
it at all. However, it had been taken, but there was great confusion and
hours of delay in deploying for the attack of the foothills. They were
easily carried in the end but by that time the men were so thirsty and
tired that they did not follow up the beaten enemy.

"And where are they now?" I asked.

"There," he replied, "along the foot of the hills," and he pointed out
the line, north to south.

"But they held that line, more or less, yesterday," I said.

"Yes," said Stopford, and he went on to explain that the Brigadiers had
been called upon to gain what ground they could without serious fighting
but that, actually, they had not yet occupied any dominating tactical
point. The men had been very tired; he had not been able to get water up
to them or land his guns as quickly as he had hoped. Therefore, he had
decided to postpone the occupation of the ridge (which might lead to a
regular battle) until next morning.

"A regular battle is just exactly what we are here for" was what I was
inclined to say, but what I did say was that most of this was news to
me; that he should have instantly informed me of his decision that he
could not obey my cabled order of yesterday afternoon to "push on
rapidly." Stopford replied that he had only made up his mind within the
past hour or so; that he had just got back from the shore and was going
to send me a full message when I arrived.

Now, what was to be done? The Turks were so quiet it seemed to me
certain they must have taken the knock-out. All along the beaches, and
inland too, no end of our men were on the move, offering fine targets.
The artillery which had so long annoyed Anzac used to fire from behind
Ismail Oglu Tepe; i.e., within point blank range of where our men were
now strolling about in crowds. Yet not a single shell was being fired.
Either, the enemy's guns had been run back over the main ridge to save
them; or, the garrison of Ismail Oglu Tepe was so weak and shaken that
they were avoiding any move which might precipitate a conflict.

I said to Stopford, "We must occupy the heights at once. It is
imperative we get Ismail Oglu Tepe and Tekke Tepe _now_!" To this he
raised objections. He doubted whether the troops had got their water
yet; he and Reed were agreed we ought to get more guns ashore; the
combination of naval and military artillery was being worked out for the
morning; orders would all have to be re-written. He added that, whilst
agreeing with me on principle as to the necessity for pushing on, there
were many tactical reasons against it, especially the attitude of his
Generals who had told him their men were too tired. I thought to myself
of the many, many times Lord Bobs, French, every leader of note has had
to fight that same _non possumus_; of the old days when half the victory
lay in the moral effort which could impel men half dead with hunger,
thirst and sleeplessness to push along. A cruel, pitiless business, but
so is war itself. Was it not the greatest of soldiers who said his
Marshals could always find ten good reasons for putting off an attack
till next day!

So I said I would like to see the G.O.C. Division and the Brigadiers
personally so as to get a better grip of things than we could on board
ship in harbour. Stopford agreed; nothing, he said, would please him
more than if I could succeed where he had failed, but would I excuse him
from accompanying me; he had not been very fit; he had just returned
from a visit to the shore and he wanted to give his leg a chance. He
pointed out Hammersley's Headquarters about 400 yards off and said he,
Hammersley, would be able to direct me to the Brigades.

So I nipped down the _Jonquil's_ ladder; tumbled into Roger Keyes'
racing motor boat and with him and Aspinall we simply shot across the
water to Lala Baba. Every moment was priceless. I had not been five
minutes on the _Jonquil_ and in another two I was with Hammersley.

Under the low cliffs by the sea was a small half-moon of beach about 100
by 40 yards. At the North end of the half-moon was Hammersley. Asked to
give me an idea of the situation he gave me much the same story as
Stopford. The 9th West Yorks and 6th Yorks had done A.1 storming Lala
Baba in the dark. There had been marching and counter-marching in the
move on Hill 10. The Brigadier had not been able to get a grip of his
Battalions to throw them at it in proper unison and form. A delay of
precious hours had been caused in the attack on Yilghin Burnu by a
Brigadier who wanted to go forward finding himself at cross purposes
with a Brigadier who thought it better to hold back. At present all was
peaceful and he expected a Staff Officer at any moment with a sketch
showing the exact disposition of his troops. He could not, he feared,
point me out the Brigade Headquarters on the ground. The general line
held followed the under features of the hills.

Malcolm, G.S.O.1, was then called and came up from the far end of the
little beach. He was in the act of fixing up orders for next morning's
attack. I told both Officers that there had never been a greater crisis
in any battle than the one taking place as we spoke. They were naturally
pleased at having got ashore and to have defeated the Turks on the
shore, but they must not fly away with the idea that with time and
patience everything would pan out very nicely. On the contrary, it was
imperative, absolutely imperative, we should occupy the heights before
the enemy brought back the guns they had carried off and before they
received the reinforcements which were marching at that very moment to
their aid. This was no guess: it _was_ so: our aeroplanes had spotted
Turks marching upon us from the North. We might be too late now; anyway
our margin was of the narrowest.

Hammersley assured me that sheer thirst, and the exhaustion of the
troops owing to thirst, had been the only reason why he had not walked
on to Ismail Oglu Tepe last night. After Yilghin Burnu had been
carried, there was nothing to prevent the occupation of the heights as
the Turks had been beat, but no one could fight against thirst.

I asked him how the water question stood. He said it had been solved by
the landing of more mules; there was no longer any serious supply
trouble. All the troops were now watered, fed and rested. They had been
told they should gain as much ground as they could without committing
themselves to a general action, but they had not, in fact, made much
progress. Thereupon, I pressed again my view that the Division should
get on to the ridge forthwith. Let the Brigade-Majors, I said, pick out
a few of their freshest companies and get on to the crest right now.
Hammersley still clung to the view that he could not get any of his
troops under weigh before daylight next morning. The units were
scattered; no reconnaissance had been made of the ground to their front;
that ground was jungly and blind; it would be impossible to get orders
round the whole Division in time to let the junior ranks study them.
Hammersley's points were made in a proper and soldierly manner. Every
General of experience would be with him in each of them, but there was
one huge danger rapidly approaching us; already casting its shadow upon
us, which, to me as Commander-in-Chief, outweighed every secondary
objection. We might have the hills at the cost of walking up them
to-day; the Lord only knew what would be the price of them to-morrow.
Helles and Anzac were both holding the Turks to their own front, but
from Asia and Bulair the enemy were on the march. Once our troops dug
themselves in on the crest no number of Turks would be able to shift
them. But; if the Turks got there first? If, as Colonel Malcolm said, it
was impossible to get orders round the Division in time,--a surprising
statement--was there no body of troops--no Divisional reserve--no
nothing--which could be used for the purpose of marching a couple of
miles? Seemingly, there was no reserve! Never, in all my long soldiering
had I been faced with ideas like these. I have seen attack orders
dictated to a Division from the saddle in less than five minutes. Here
was a victorious Division, rested and watered, said to be unable to
bestir itself, even feebly, with less than twelve hours' notice! This
was what I felt and although I did not say it probably I looked it, for
Malcolm now qualified the original _non possumus_ by saying that
although the Irish and the 33rd and 34th Brigades could not be set in
motion before daylight, the 32nd Brigade, which was concentrated round
about Sulajik, would be ready to move at short notice.

The moment had now come for making up my mind. I did so, and told
Hammersley in the most distinct terms that I wished this Brigade to
advance _at once and dig themselves in on the crestline_.[6] If the
Brigade could fix themselves upon the heights overlooking Anafarta Sagir
they would make the morning advance easy for their comrades and would be
able to interfere with and delay the Turkish reinforcements which might
try and debouch between the two Anafartas during the night or march down
upon Suvla from the North. Viewed from the sea or studied in a map there
might be some question of this hill, or that hill, but, on the ground it
was clear to half an eye that Tekke Tepe was the key to the whole Suvla
Bay area. If by dawn, I said, even one Company of ours was well
entrenched on the Tekke Tepe height we should have the whip hand of the
enemy in the opening moves next morning.

Hammersley said he understood my order and that the advance should be
put in hand at once. Malcolm hurried off; I left a little before 6.30
and went, _via_ the _Chatham_, back to the _Triad_. The _Arno_ had by
now come in, but de Robeck has kindly asked me not to shift quarters if
Anzac and Helles troubles will permit me to stay the night at Suvla.

All was dead quiet ashore till 11 p.m. I was on the bridge until then
and, seeing and hearing nothing, felt sure the Brigade had made good
Tekke Tepe and were now digging themselves in.

Captain Brody dined. The scraps of news picked up from the sailormen,
mainly by young Brodrick, confirm what the soldiers had told us about
the landing inside Suvla Bay along the narrow strip of land West of the
Salt Lake. The attacks on Hill 10 went to pieces, not against the Turks,
but by mishap. The first assault made by one or two Companies succeeded,
but the assailants were taken for Turks and were attacked in turn and
driven off by others of our men. A most distressing affair.

If there was hesitation and mix-up in the general handling, the
Regimental folk atoned and there were many incidents of initiative and
daring on the part of battalions and companies.

Mahon with some of his Irish and a Manchester Battalion are fighting
well and clearing Kiretch Tepe Sirt. Until this morning bullets from
that ridge were falling on "A" Beach; now the working parties are not in
any way disturbed.

_9th August, 1915. Imbros._ With the first streak of dawn I was up on
the bridge with my glasses. The hills are so covered with scrub that it
was hard to see what was going on in that uncertain light, but the
heavyish shrapnel fire was a bad sign and the fact that the enemy's guns
were firing from a knoll a few hundred yards East of Anafarta Sagir was
proof that our troops were not holding Tekke Tepe. But the Officer of
the Watch said that the small hours passed quietly; no firing ashore
during the hours of darkness. Could not make head or tail of it!

As the light grew stronger some of ours could be seen pushing up the
western slopes of the long spur running out South-west from Anafarta.
The scrub was so thick that they had to climb together and
follow-my-leader along what appeared to be cattle tracks up the hill. On
our right all seemed going very well. Looking through naval telescopes
we thought--we all thought--Ismail Oglu Tepe height was won. Very soon
the shrapnel got on to those bunches of men on our left and there was
something like a stampede from North to South. Looking closer we could
see the enemy advancing behind their own bursting shrapnel and rolling
up our line from the left on to the centre. Oh for the good "Queen
Bess," her high command, and her 15-inch shrapnel! One broadside and
these Turks would go scampering down to Gehenna. The enemy
counter-attack was coming from the direction of Tekke Tepe and moving
over the foothills and plain on Sulajik. Our centre made a convulsive
effort (so it seemed) to throw back the steadily advancing Turks; three
or four companies (they looked like) moved out from the brush about
Sulajik and tried to deploy. But the shrapnel got on to these fellows
also and I lost sight of them. Then about 6 a.m., the whole lot seemed
suddenly to collapse:--including the right! Not only did they give
ground but they came back--some of them--half-way to the sea. But others
made a stand. The musketry fire got very heavy. The enemy were making a
supreme effort. The Turkish shell fire grew hotter and hotter. The
enemy's guns seemed now to be firing not only from round about Anafarta
Sagir, but also from somewhere between 113 and 101, 2,500 yards or so
South-west of Anafarta. Still these fellows of ours; not more than a
quarter of those on the ground at the outset--stuck it out. My heart
has grown tough amidst the struggles of the Peninsula but the misery of
this scene well nigh broke it. What kept me going was the sight of Sari
Bair--I could not keep my eyes off the Sari Bair ridge. Guns from all
sides, sea and land, Turks and British, were turned on to it and
enormous explosions were sending slices off the top of the high mountain
to mix with the clouds in the sky. Under that canopy our men were
fighting for dear life far above us!

Between 7.30 and 8.0 the Turkish reinforcements at Suvla seemed to have
got enough. They did not appear to be in any great strength: here and
there they fell back: no more came up in support: evidently, they were
being held: failure, not disaster, was the upshot: few things so bad
they might not be worse. By 8.0 the musketry and the shelling began to
slacken down although there was a good deal of desultory shooting. We
were holding our own; the Welsh Division are coming in this morning; but
we have not sweated blood only to hold our own; our occupation of the
open key positions has been just too late! The element of
surprise--wasted! The prime factor set aside for the sake of other
factors! Words are no use.

Looked at from the bridge of the _Triad_--not a bad observation
station--the tendency of our men to get into little groups was very
noticeable: as if they had not been trained in working under fire in the
open. As to the general form of our attack against the hills on our
right, it seemed to be what our French Allies call _décousu_. After a
whole day's rest and preparing, there might have been more form and
shape about the movement. Yet it was for the sake of this form and shape
that the Turkish reinforcements have been given time to get on to the
heights. Our stratagems worked well, but there is a time limit set to
all make-believes; the hour glass of fate was set at forty-eight hours,
and now the sands have run out.

Before going over to Anzac I had to get hold of Stopford so as to hear
what news had come in from Hammersley and from Mahon. If only Mahon is
pushing forward to Ejelmer Bay and can occupy the high range to the East
of it that would make amends for much. After breakfast, therefore, at
8.30 got into a launch and landed at Ghazi Baba with young Brodrick as
my only companion. Our boat took us into a deep, narrow creek cut by
nature into the sheer rock just by Ghazi Baba--a name only; there is
nothing to distinguish that spot from any other. Along the beach
feverish activity; stores, water, ammunition, all the wants of an army
being landed. Walking up the lower slope of Kiretch Tepe Sirt, we found
Stopford, about four or five hundred yards East of Ghazi Baba, busy with
part of a Field Company of Engineers supervising the building of some
splinter-proof Headquarters huts for himself and Staff. He was absorbed
in the work, and he said that it would be well to make a thorough good
job of the dug-outs as we should probably be here for a very long time.
I retorted, "Devil a bit; within a day or two you will be picking the
best of the Anafarta houses for your billet."

From the spot he had selected the whole of Suvla Bay and the Salt Lake
lay open; also the Anafartas and Yilghin Burnu. But, being on a lower
spur of Kiretch Tepe Sirt, his post was "dead" to the fighting taking
place along the crest of Kiretch Tepe Sirt itself. I remarked on this
and asked what news of the Irish, saying that now we were certainly
forestalled at Yilghin Burnu and, apparently, on Tekke Tepe also, it was
doubly essential Mahon should make a clean sweep of the ridge. Stopford
said he was confident he would be able to do so, aided as he would be by
the fire from the ships in the harbour--a fire which enfiladed the whole
length of this feature.

As to this morning's hold up, Stopford took it philosophically, which
was well so far as it went, but he seemed hardly to realize that the
Turks have rushed their guns and reinforcements here from a very long
way off whilst he has been creeping along at the rate of a mile a day.
Stopford expected Hammersley would be in to report progress in person;
he will keep me well posted in his news and he understands that the
Welsh Division will be at his disposal to help the 11th Division.

As Stopford could give me no recent news from Mahon I suggested I should
go and find out from him personally how matters then stood. Stopford
said it was a good idea but that he himself thought it better not to
leave his Headquarters where messages kept coming in. I agreed and
started with George Brodrick to scale the hill.

About half a mile up we struck a crowd of the Irish Pioneer Regiment
(Granard's) filling their water bottles at a well marked on the map as
Charak Cheshme. In their company we now made our way Northwards along a
path through fairly thick scrub as high as a man's waist. We were moving
parallel to, and about 300 yards below, the crestline of the ridge. When
we had gone another mile a spattering of "overs" began to fall around
like the first heavy drops of a thunderstorm. So wrapped in cotton wool
is a now-a-days Commander-in-Chief that this was the first musketry fire
I could claim to have come under since the beginning of the war. To sit
in a trench and hear flights of bullets flop into the sandbag parapet,
or pass harmlessly overhead, is hardly to be under fire. An irregular
stream of Irishmen were walking up the path along with us; one of them
was hit just ahead of me. He caught it in the thigh and stretcher men
whipped him off in a jiffy. At last we got to a spot some 2-1/2 miles
from Suvla and had not yet been able to find Mahon. So I sat down behind
a stone, somewhere about the letter "K" of Kiretch Tepe Sirt, and sent
young Brodrick to espy the land. He found that we had pulled up within a
couple of hundred yards of the Brigade Headquarters, where portions of
the 30th, 31st and 34th Brigades (sounds very formidable but only five
Battalions) were holding a spur and preparing to make an attack. General
Mahon was actually in the Brigade Headquarters (a tiny ditch which only
held four or five people) and came back to where I was sitting. He is
angry, and small wonder, at the chaos introduced somehow into the Corps.
He is commanding some of Hammersley's men and Hammersley has the bulk of
his at the far extremity of the line of battle. He besought me to do my
utmost to get Hill and his troops back to their own command.

I told him G.H.Q. had always understood Stopford would land his,
Mahon's, two Brigades intact at A Beach. When the naval people could not
find a beach at A, they, presumably with Stopford's concurrence, had
most unluckily dumped them ashore several miles South at C Beach. This
was the cause of the mix-up of his Division which Stopford, no doubt,
would take in hand as soon as he could. Mahon seemed in fighting form.
He said he could clear the whole of Kiretch Tepe Sirt, but that he did
not want to lose men in making frontal attacks, so he was trying to work
round South through the thick scrub so as to shift the enemy that way.
He had reckoned five or six hundred men were against him--gendarmes. But
there were more than there had been at daylight. My talk with Mahon made
me happier. Here, at least, was someone who had an idea of what he was
doing. The main thing was to attack before more Turks came down the
coast. My own idea would certainly have been to knock the Turks out by a
bayonet charge--right there. So far they had not had time to dig a
regular trench, only a few shallow scrapings along a natural fold of the
ground. If Mahon wished to make a turning movement, then, I think, he
would have been well advised to take it by the North where the ground
over which he must advance was not only unentrenched and clear of brush,
but also laid quite open to the supporting fire of the Fleet. But I kept
these views to myself until I could see Stopford; said good-bye to Mahon
and wished him luck; found Brodrick had wandered off on his own to see
the fun at close quarters; legged it, all alone, down the open southern
slope of the Kiretch Tepe Sirt and got down into ground less open to
snipers' fire from the scrub-covered plain.[7] Then, still quite alone,
I made my way back South-west towards Ghazi Baba on Suvla Bay. After a
little I was joined by two young Irish soldiers. I don't know who or
what they took me for; certainly not for the Generalissimo. They came
along with me and discussed identical adventures from diametrically
different standpoints. One, in fact, was an optimist; the other a
pessimist. One found fault with the war for not giving him enough
hardship and adventure; the other was entirely fed up with adventures
and hardships. This seems a trivial incident to jot down amidst issues
so tremendous, but life is life, and my chat with these youngsters put
some new life into me. Nearing the shore, I again struck Stopford's
Headquarters, now beginning to look habitable. Braithwaite, and one or
two others of my Staff turned up from Imbros at that moment. He shoved
some cables into my hand and hastened off to interview Reed. Helles and
Anzac have been duly warned we are both here for a few hours; all the
component parts of my machine, its cranks, levers, pulleys, are
assembled at Imbros, and G.H.Q. simply cannot be left under a junior
much longer. Meanwhile I told Stopford about Mahon and the gendarmes.
When I said that the sooner the Kiretch Tepe nettle was grasped the less
it would sting, he informed me he had issued an order that Commanders
were not to lose men by making frontal attacks on trenches but were to
turn them.

So here is a theory which South African practice proved to be more often
wrong than right being treated as an axiom at Gallipoli!

We next went into the question of digging a defensive line of trenches
half-way between Corps Headquarters and Mahon's force. Here we were in
accord. No man knows his luck and the tide may turn any moment. Both at
Liao-Yang and the Shaho the Japanese began to dig deep trenches directly
they captured a position.

Young Brodrick rejoined me here; rather anxious at having lost me. He
had found Mahon with the Brigade Staff. He had been shown the exact
positions on a rough sketch map made by one of the Officers. We had
three Battalions in the firing line and two in reserve. The gendarmerie
had been reinforced and were now estimated at 700 without machine guns
or artillery. We had a mountain battery shelling the gendarmes and a
monitor occasionally gave them a big fellow. The Brigade Staff had said
nothing to him about a battalion working round to the South. I repeated
this to Stopford and begged him to make a push for it here.

By now Braithwaite had finished with Reed, so we hurriedly discussed his
budget of news. Hammersley is expected but he has not turned up yet.
Indeed the situation is still by no means free from anxiety although the
arrival of the Welsh Division gives confidence. A battalion of the 32nd
Brigade did get up on to Tekke Tepe last night, it seems, but were
knocked off this morning before they had time to entrench.[8] Seeing
they should have had several hours time to dig in, that seems strange.
Braithwaite handed me a bunch of signals and wires; also the news of
what I had known at the back of my mind since morning,--the fact that we
had not got Sari Bair! Then we started back to see de Robeck and Keyes.
For the first time in this expedition Roger Keyes seemed down on his
luck: we had often before seen him raging, never dejected. These awful
delays:--delay in landing the Irish; delay in attacking on the 7th;
delay all night of the 7th; delay during the day of the 8th and night of
the 8th, have simply deprived him of the power of speech,--to soldiers,
that is to say, though, to shipmates, no doubt...!

Now for Anzac. Since dawn a fever about Anzac had held me. Shades of
Staff College Professors, from you no forgiveness to a Chief who runs
about the mountain quitting his central post. But the luminous shade of
Napoleon would better understand my desperation. Some Generals are just
accumulators of the will of the C.-in-C. When that is the case, and when
they run down, there is only one man who can hope to pump in energy.

Exact at noon Roger Keyes and I pushed off in the racing motor boat. On
our way we stopped at "C" beach and picked up Commander Worsley. Next to
Anzac, but at the Cove, found that Birdwood had left word he would meet
me at the ex-Turkish Post No. 2,--so, as the water was shoal in spots,
we rowed down there in a dinghy, along the shore where our lives would
not have been worth half a minute's purchase just three days ago.

After scrambling awhile over the new trenches, Birdwood, Godley and I
sat down on a high spur above Godley's Headquarters which gave us a
grand outlook over the whole Suvla area, and across to Chunuk Bair. Here
we ate our rations and held an impromptu council of war; Shaw,
commanding the new 13th Division, joining in with us. All three Generals
were in high spirits and refused to allow themselves to be damped down
by the repulse of the morning's attack on the high ridge. They put down
that check to the lethargy of Suvla. Had Stopford taken up any point on
the watershed yesterday when it was unoccupied except by some fugitives,
the whole Turkish position on the Peninsula would have become so
critical that they could not have spared the numbers they have now
brought up to defend "Q" and Koja Chemen Tepe. The Anzac Generals
allowed that they themselves had got into arrears in their time tables,
but they had been swift compared to Suvla.

Even as Godley was holding forth, messages came to hand to say that the
Turks were passing from the defensive to the offensive and urging fresh
attacks on the New Zealanders holding Chunuk Bair. Godley is certain the
Turks will never make us quit hold. Shaw, who also has some of his men
up there, is equally confident. Birdwood thinks Chunuk Bair should be
safe, though not so safe as it would have been had we held on to that
ridge at "Q" where Baldwin's delay from causes not yet known, lost us
the crestline this morning. Birdie said he could have cried, and is not
quite sure he didn't cry, when the bombardment stopped dead and minute
after minute passed away, from one minute to twenty, without a sign
of Baldwin and his column who had been booked to spurt for the top on
the heels of the last shell. Unaided, the 6th Gurkhas got well astride
the ridge, but had to fall back owing to the lack of his support. None
the less, these Anzac Generals are in great form. They are sure they
will have the whip hand of the Narrows by to-morrow.

[Illustration: GENERAL SIR W. R. BIRDWOOD, G.C.M.G., K.C.B. _"Elliott and
Fry" phot._]

Birdie was offered my last reserves, the 54th Essex Territorials under
Inglefield. But he can't water them. The effort to carry food, water and
cartridges to the firing lines is already overtaxing the Corps. If
Inglefield's men were also pushed in they simply could not be kept
going. When communication trenches have been dug and brushwood and rocks
flattened out, it will be easier. Till then, the Generals agreed they
would rather the extra pressure was applied from Suvla. Birdwood and
Godley were keen, in fact, that the Essex Division should go to Stopford
so that he might at once occupy Kavak Tepe and, if he could, Tekke Tepe.
All that the Anzacs have seen for themselves, or heard from their own
extreme left or from aeroplanes, leads them to believe that the Turkish
reinforcements to the Suvla theatre came over the high shoulder of Tekke
Tepe or through Anafarta Sagir about dawn this morning and that the
enemy are in some strength now along the ridge between Anafarta Sagir
and Ismail Oglu Tepe with a few hundred on Kiretch Tepe Sirt: the
Turkish centre was a gift to us yesterday; certainly yesterday forenoon;
now it can only be won by hard fighting. But the Turks have not yet had
time to work round on to the high ridges east of Suvla Bay and although
a few Turks did pass over Kavak Tepe, it seems to be now clear of any
enemy. There is no sign of life on the bare Eastern slope of that
mountain. Probably one half of the great crescent of hills which
encircles the Suvla plain and, in places, should overlook the Narrows,
still lies open to an advance.

So together we composed a message to Stopford and Godley sent it off by
telephone--now rigged up between the two Corps Headquarters: the form
was filled in by Godley; hence his counter signature:--

       *       *       *       *       *

  TO:--G.O.C., IXth Corps.

  Sender's number. Day of month.  In reply to
  N.Z.G. 103            9         number AAA

  After speaking to Birdwood and Godley
  think most important use fresh troops could
  be put to if not urgently required to reinforce
  would be the occupation as early as possible
  of the commanding position running through
  square 137-119 AAA Ismail Oglu Tepe are
  less vital to security of base.
                          SIR IAN HAMILTON.

  _From_
  _Place_ Fisherman's Hut.
  _Date_ 2 p.m. 9th August, 1915.

                              A. J. GODLEY,
                                  Maj. Gen.

       *       *       *       *       *

Took leave of the Anzacs and the Anzac Generals about 4.30 p.m. The
whole crowd were in tip-top spirits and immensely pleased with the
freedom and largeness of their newly conquered kingdom. We of the G.H.Q.
were bitten by this same spirit; Suvla took second place in our minds
and when we got on board the _Arno_ the ugly events of the early morning
had been shaken, for the moment, out of our minds. But, on the sail
home, we were able to look at the Peninsula as a whole. Because the
Anzacs, plus the 13th Division of the New Army, had carried through a
brilliant stroke of arms was a reason, not for shutting our eyes to the
slowness of the Suvla Generals, but for spurring them on to do likewise.
There is nothing open to them now--not without efforts for which they
are, for the time being, unfit--but Kavak Tepe and the Aja Liman
Anafarta ridge. So, on arrival at 6 p.m., wrote out the following
message from myself to General Stopford:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"I am in complete sympathy with you in the matter of all your Officers
and men being new to this style of warfare and without any leaven of
experienced troops on which to form themselves. Still I should be wrong
if I did not express my concern at the want of energy and push displayed
by the 11th Division. It cannot all be want of experience as 13th have
shown dash and self-confidence. Turks were almost negligible yesterday
once you got ashore. To-day there was nothing to stop determined
commanders leading such fine men as yours. Tell me what is wrong with
the 11th Division. Is it the Divisional Generals or Brigadiers or both?
I have a first-rate Major General I can send at once and can also supply
two competent Brigadiers. You must get a move on or the whole plan of
operations is in danger of failing, for if you don't secure the AJA
LIMAN ANAFARTA ridge without delay the enemy will. You must use your
personal influence to insist on vigorous and sustained action against
the weak forces of the Turks in your front, and while agreeing to the
capture of W Hills and spur mentioned in C.G.S. letter to you of to-day,
it is of vital importance to the whole operation that you thereafter
promptly take steps to secure the ridge without possession of which
SUVLA BAY is not safe. You must face casualties and strike while the
opportunity offers and remember the AJA LIMAN ANAFARTA ridge is your
principal and dominant objective and it must be captured. Every day's
delay in its capture will enormously multiply your casualties. I want
the name of the Brigadier who sent the message to say his left was
retiring owing to a strong attack and then subsequently reported that
the attack in question has never developed. Keep Birdwood informed as he
may be able to help you on your right flank."

[Illustration: LIEUT. GEN SIR A. J. GODLEY, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. _"Elliott
and Fry phot."_]

This message seemed so important that it was sent by hand of
Hore-Ruthven and another Officer by special destroyer. Braithwaite tells
me that, when he was at 9th Corps Headquarters to-day he showed General
Stopford the last two paragraphs of this memo which I had written when
toning down the wording of a General Staff draft:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"C.G.S.

"(1) I do not think much good rubbing it into these fellows, there are
very few Turks opposed to them. We have done it, and that was right, but
we must not overdo it.

"(2) But the men ought to be made to understand that really the whole
result of this campaign may depend on their quickly getting a footing on
the hills right and left of Anafarta. Officers and rank and file must be
made to grasp this.

"(3) If Lindley and his new men were kept intact and thrown in on the
Anzac flank, surely they ought to be able to make a lodgment.

                                         (_Initialled_), "IAN H."

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 2: Must have meant south-east?--IAN H., 1920.]

[Footnote 3: Long afterwards--long after the Dardanelles Commission had
finished their Report--I had the curiosity to get permission to look at
the log of the _Exmouth_ (Rear-Admiral Nicholson) to see how my cable
had been translated. Here it is, very much Bowdlerized:--"Sent 11.45,
received 11.59. Sir I. Hamilton to Rear-Admiral 3. Urgent. 'Understand
_Arno_ drawing fires. Can this be stopped and _Arno_ sent (to)
_Mercedes_ to water at once? _Arno_ specially put at my disposal by
Vice-Admiral and I may require her at any moment.'" The _Mercedes_ was
the ship with our military drinking water.]

[Footnote 4: There is a hiatus in my diary here which I must try and
bridge over by a footnote especially as my story seems to run off the
rails when I say that "nothing further" had come in from Suvla. At 10.50
a.m. a further cable did come in from Suvla:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"Approximate position of troops under General Hammersley this morning.
Two battalions 33rd Brigade sea to S.E. corner of Salt Lake: will be
moved forward shortly to connect if possible with Anzac troops. Two
battalions 33rd holding Yilghin Burnu. Position on Hill 500 yards East
Yilghin Burnu not yet certain. From Yilghin Burnu 31st Brigade holds
line through Baka Baba crossroads, thence North to about 118 0 2. 32nd
and 34th Brigades ordered forward from Hill 10 (117 R) where they spent
night to line 118 M.R.W. to fill gap with Tenth Division. Detailed
information of Tenth Division not yet definite: will report later.
Consider Major-General Hammersley and troops under him deserve great
credit for result attained against strenuous opposition and great
difficulty."

Manifestly, the data in this cable were not enough to enable me to form
any opinion of my own as to the credit due to anyone; but every soldier
will understand that it was up to me to respond:

  "To G.O.C. 8th Corps.

  "From General Sir Ian Hamilton.

"You and your troops have indeed done splendidly. Please tell Hammersley
how much we hope from his able and rapid advance."

I made no written note of this 10.50 a.m. cable (or of my reply to it)
at the time and, eighteen months later, no mental note of it remained,
probably because it had only added some detail to the news received
during the night. But I had reason to regret this afterwards when I came
to read the final Report of the Dardanelles Commission, paragraph 89.
There I see it stated that "with regard to this message" (my pat on the
back for Hammersley) "Sir Frederick Stopford informed us that the result
of the operations on the night of the 6th and day of the 7th was not as
satisfactory as he would have liked but he gathered from Sir Ian
Hamilton's congratulations that his dispositions and orders had met with
the latter's approval"

As to my actual feelings that forenoon, I do remember them well. At
sunrise victory seemed assured. As morning melted into mid-day my mind
became more and more uneasy at the scant news about the Irish Division
and at the lack of news of a further advance of the 11th Division. This
growing anxiety drove me to quit my headquarters and to take ship for
Suvla.]

[Footnote 5: The Admiral's wireless had said, so I was told:--"It is
important we should meet--shall I come to Kephalos or are you coming to
Suvla?" As stated in text I did not get this cable at the time nor did I
ever get it. Four years later the signal logs of the only ships through
which the message could have passed; viz., _Triad_, _Exmouth_,
_Chatham_, were searched and there is no trace of it. So I think it must
have been drafted and overlooked.--IAN H., 1920.

Aspinall's cable:--"Just been ashore where I found all quiet AAA. No
rifle fire, no artillery fire and apparently no Turks AAA. IXth Corps
resting AAA. Feel confident that golden opportunities are being lost and
look upon the situation as serious." I received this next morning from
Braithwaite.--IAN H., 1920.]

[Footnote 6: Looking to the distance of Sulajik, the Brigade might have
been expected to move in about an hour and a half. But, as I did not
know at the time, or indeed till two years later, this Brigade was _not_
concentrated. Only two battalions were at Sulajik; the other two, the
6th East Yorks and the 9th West Yorks, were in possession of Hill 70,
vide map.--IAN H., 1920.]

[Footnote 7: My Aide-de-Camp, George Brodrick, has permitted me to use
the following extract from a letter of his written to his father, Lord
Midleton, at the time.

       *       *       *       *       *

"I went to Suvla with Sir Ian in the afternoon of August 8th, and we
arrived to find 'Nothing doing.' The beaches and hillsides covered with
our men almost like a Bank Holiday evening at Hampstead Heath. Vague
shelling by one of our monitors was the only thing which broke the peace
of a most perfect evening--a glorious sunset.

"We went over to the Destroyer where General Stopford had his
Headquarters, and I fancy words of exhortation were spoken to him. We
slept on the Triad, Admiral de Robeck's Yacht. I had a camp bed on the
Bridge, so as to hear any happenings during the night. About dawn our
Monitors started to shell the heights behind Anafarta and a sort of
assault was made; the Turkish battery opened with shrapnel, and our
fellows did not seem to get very far.

"We went ashore on 'A' beach about 8 a.m. and walked up to Stopford's
Headquarters, as he had gone ashore the night before. They all seemed a
very lifeless crew, with but little knowledge of the general situation
and no spirit in them. We made our way on across some rocky scrubby
country towards Brigade Headquarters; fairly heavy rifle fire was going
on, and after about two miles bullets began to ping unpleasantly all
round us. I persuaded Sir Ian to lie down behind a rock, much against
his will, and went on myself another 150 yards to where the Brigade
Staff were sitting in a dip behind a stone wall. They told me that about
800 Turks were in front of them with no machine guns. We had 3
Battalions in the firing line and two in reserve and yet could not get
on."]

[Footnote 8: Only one Company we hear now.--IAN H., 15.8.15.]




CHAPTER XVI


KAVAK TEPE ATTACK COLLAPSES


_10th August, 1915. Imbros._ Had to remain at G.H.Q. all day--the worst
of all days. My visit to Anzac yesterday had infected me with the hopes
of Godley and Birdwood and made me feel that we would recover what we
had missed at Suvla, and more, if, working from the pivot of Chunuk
Bair, we got hold of the rest of Sari Bair.

They believed they would bring this off and then the victory would have
been definite. Now--Chunuk Bair has gone!

The New Zealand and New Army troops holding the knoll were relieved by
two New Army Battalions and, at daylight this morning, the Turks simply
ran amok among them with a Division in mass formation. Trenches badly
sited, they say, and Turks able to form close by in dead ground. Many
reasons no doubt and lack of swift pressure from Suvla. The Turks have
lost their fear of Stopford and concentrated full force against the
Anzacs. By Birdie's message, it looks as if the heavy fighting was at an
end--an end which leaves us with a fine gain of ground though minus the
vital crests. Next time we will get them. We are close up to the summit
instead of having five or six hundred feet to climb.

News from Suvla still rotten. Here is the result of Hammersley's visit
to Stopford after I left:--

       *       *       *       *       *

  "August 9.    5.35.    Suvla Bay.

  "DEAR BRAITHWAITE,

"I have had a talk with Hammersley and he tells me that his troops are
much exhausted, have had very heavy fighting, severe losses and have
felt the want of water very much. He does not consider that they are fit
to make a fresh attack to-morrow.

"I have decided after consultation with him to make an attempt on the
ridge about Abrikja with three fresh Territorial Battalions and six
which have been used to-day. I am afraid from what I hear that the Naval
guns do not have much effect on account of difficulty of accurate
observation but I will arrange a programme, to be carefully timed, with
Brigadier-General Smith, my Brigadier R.A., and of course all the field
guns will also help. I _must_ see Smith so please ask the V. Admiral to
place a boat at Smith's disposal to bring him here to see me and then to
see Generals Hammersley and Lindley. General Lindley will be in
immediate command of the operations as all troops engaged in the attack
will be Territorials.

"I trust the attack will succeed though to-day's did not, but in view of
the urgency of the matter I feel the attempt ought to be made.

"It is absolutely necessary that I should see Smith.

                        "Yours sincerely,
                              (_Sd._) "FRED W. STOPFORD."

At mid-day, got a cable from the 9th Corps saying that Lindley's
Division had duly gone at Hill 70, a key feature on the ridge, about
1,500 yards North-east of Yilghin Burnu--and had failed!

In giving me this news, Stopford proposes to make a second attack this
afternoon with the same Division. Have caused Braithwaite to cable:

       *       *       *       *       *

"Hear you propose attacking again. Chief doubts advisability with tired
troops after morning's failure; if you agree consolidate where you are
and rest and reorganize."

In a letter from Stopford in answer to my signal of yesterday from
Fisherman's Hut, he says:--

  "No. 1.   _Date_, Aug. 9.   _Time_, 4 p.m.

  _Place_, Suvla Bay.

  "To:

  "DEAR SIR IAN,

"I have received your message from Fisherman's Hut. Hammersley has not
been able to advance to-day, but the Turks have been counter-attacking
all day and he has had to put in one of the Territorial Brigades to
prevent being driven back.

"I quite realize the importance of holding the high ground East of Suvla
Bay, but as the Turks advance through the gap between the two Anafartas
where all the roads are, it is absolutely necessary to keep sufficient
troops between Anafarta Sagir and Ismail Oglu Tepe, as otherwise if I
were to seize the high ground between Anafarta Sagir and Ejelmer Bay
without securing this gap, I might find myself holding the heights and
the Turks pouring down to the harbour behind me. I will bear what you
say in mind, and if I get an opportunity with fresh troops of taking the
heights whilst holding on tight to my right flank I will do so. I
understand that one reason why it was necessary to go for Ismail Oglu
Tepe was that if I did not hold the Turks there they would fire into the
rear of Birdwood's troops attacking Hill 305.

                              "I am, Sir,
                                  "Yours sincerely,
                               (_Sd._) "FRED W. STOPFORD."

For myself I wish the Turks would try to pour down over that flat, open
country by the Salt Lake to seize the beaches under the guns of the
warships.

       *       *       *       *       *

Well, we had Chunuk Bair in our hands the best part of two days and two
nights. So far the Turks have never retaken trenches once we had fairly
taken hold. Have they done so now? I hope not. Birdie and Godley are at
work upon a scheme for its recapture. The Turks are well commanded: that
I admit. Their Generals knew they were done unless they could quickly
knock us off our Chunuk Bair. So they have done it. Never mind: never
say die. Meanwhile we have the East Anglian Division available
to-morrow, and I have been over in the G.S. marquee working out ways and
means of taking Kavak Tepe which may also give us an outlook, more
distant, but yet an outlook, on to the Dardanelles.

_11th August, 1915. Imbros._ Did not dare to break away from the wire
ends. A see-saw of cardinal events between Suvla and Anzac.

A workable scheme of attack has now been put into such shape as to let
Stopford dovetail his Corps orders into it, and first thing sent him
this cable:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"G.H.Q. to IXth Corps. General Commanding wishes 54th Division Infantry
to attack line Kavak Tepe peak 1195.5. at dawn to-morrow after night
march to foothills; G.S.O. proceeding with detailed instructions. See
Inglefield, make arrangements and give all assistance possible by
landing 53rd Signal Company, water gear and tools. 53rd Division becomes
general reserve."

At 4.30 p.m., a letter from Stopford anent the failure of the 53rd
Division,--depressing in itself but still more so in its inferences as
to the 54th Division. He says these troops showed "no attacking spirit
at all. They did not come under heavy shell fire nor was the rifle fire
very severe, but they not only showed no dash in attack but went back at
slight provocation and went back a long way. Lots of the men lay down
behind cover, etc. They went on when called upon to do so by Staff and
other Officers but they seemed lost and under no leadership--in fact,
they showed that they are not fit to put in the field without the help
of Regulars. I really believe that if we had had one Brigade of Regulars
here to set an example both the New Army and Territorials would have
played up well with them but they have no standard to go by."

Worse follows, for Stopford takes back his assurance given me after my
cable of the 9th when he said, "given water, guns and ammunition, I have
no doubt about our being able to secure the hills." He tells me straight
and without any beating about the bush, "I am sure they" (the
Territorials) "would not secure the hills with any amount of guns, water
and ammunition assuming ordinary opposition, as the attacking spirit was
absent; chiefly owing to the want of leadership by the Officers."

Ignoring our Kavak Tepe scheme, he goes on then to ask me in so many
words, not to try any attack with the 54th Division but to stick them
into trenches.

This letter has driven me very nearly to my wits' ends. Things can't be
so bad! None of us have any complaint at all of the New Army troops;
only of their Old Army Generals. Stopford says the 13th Division were
not reliable when they were at Helles, whereas now, under Godley at
Anzac they have fought like lions.

Rushed off in this, the good tub _Imogene_ (Lieutenant-Commander Potts).
There the rushing ceased as she steamed along so slowly that we didn't
get to Suvla till 7 p.m. Walked up with Braithwaite and Freddie to the
9th Corps Headquarters. Saw Stopford. Wrestled with him for over an
hour; Braithwaite doing ditto with Reed.

Stopford urged that these last two Territorial formations sent out to us
were sucked oranges, the good in them having been drafted away into
France and replaced by rejections. He says he would have walked on to
the watershed the first day had we only stiffened his force with the
29th Division. There happened to be some pretty decisive objections but
there was no use entering into them then. So I merely told him that the
9th Corps and the Territorials being now well ashore we may be able to
bring up the 29th. No doubt--had we a couple of Regular Divisions
here--British or Indian--at full strength--no doubt we could astonish
the world. Having the 53rd and the 54th Divisions, half-trained and at
half strength, I tried to make Stopford see we must cut our coats with
the stuff issued to us. The 54th were good last winter, and, even if the
best have been picked out of them, the residue should do well under
sound leadership: Inglefield was a practised old warrior, and would not
let him down.

There was nothing solid to go upon in crying down the credit of the 54th
beyond hearsay and the self-evident fact that they are half their
nominal strength. To assume they won't put up a fight is a certain way
of making the best troops gun-shy. We are standing up to our necks in a
time problem, and the tide is on the rise. There is not a moment to
spare. The Turks have reinforced and they have brought back their guns;
that is true. Now they will begin to dig trenches--indeed they are
already digging--and more and more enemy troops will be placed in
reserve behind the Anafartas and to the East of the Tekke Tepe--Ejelmer
Bay range. On the 10th the Helles people reported that, in spite of
their efforts to hold the Turks, they had detached reinforcements to the
North. These extra reinforcements may arrive to-morrow at Anzac or on
the Anafartas; but, for at least another twenty four hours, they will
not be able to get round to the high ridge between Anafarta and Ejelmer
Bay. So far as can be seen by aeroplane scouting, this ridge is still
unoccupied; certainly it is unentrenched.

Stopford who, at first, was dead set on digging agreed to have a dart at
Kavak Tepe. He will throw the 54th at it. He will turn out the 9th Corps
and, if chance offers, they will attack along their own front. His chief
remaining ghost inhabits the jungly bit of country between Anafarta Ova
and the foothills. In that belt he fears the Turkish snipers may harass
our line of supply so that, when the heights are held, we may find it
hard to feed and water our garrison. The New Armies and Territorials
have no trained counter-snipers and are much at the mercy of the skilled
Anatolian shikarris who haunt the close country.

So I suggested blockhouses on the South African system to protect our
line where it passed through the three quarters of a mile or so of close
country. The enemy artillery would not spot them amongst the trees. I
promised him also one hundred picked Australian bushmen, New Zealand
Maoris and Gurkhas to act as scouts and counter-snipers.

Stopford took to this idea very kindly; has fixed up a Conference of 9th
Corps and Territorial Generals early to-morrow morning to discuss the
whole plan, and will make every effort to occupy Kavak Tepe to-morrow
night. Stopford seemed in much better form to-night; I think he is more
fit: there has been 24 hours' delay but by waiting that time Inglefield
and the Essex will have the help of a body of first-class scouts--quite
a luminous notion. Stopford, himself, presides at to-morrow's
Conference. Inglefield is a good, straight fellow, not so young as we
were in South Africa, but quite all right.

Boarded the _Imogene_. Dropped anchor at 11 p.m. at Imbros.

_12th August, 1915. Imbros._ Last thing last night Stopford promised to
let me know the result of the conference to be held at his Headquarters,
and upon the plans for the lines of supply. Sent him a reminder:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"G.H.Q. to IXth Corps. Have you arranged practical system for supplying
troops in the event of Tekke Tepe ridge being secured?"

A cable from K.:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"I am sorry about the Xth and XIth Divisions in which I had great
confidence. Could you not ginger them up? The utmost energy and dash
are required for these operations or they will again revert to trench
warfare."

K.'s disappointment makes me feel _sick_! I know the great hopes he has
built on these magnificent Divisions and I know equally well that he is
not capable of understanding how he has cut his own throat, the men's
throats and mine, by not sending young and up-to-date Generals to run
them. K. in this, and this alone, is with Tolstoi. The men are
everything; the man nothing. Have cabled back saying, "I am acting
absolutely as you indicate by 'ginger'; I only got back at 11 last night
from a further application of that commodity. As a result a fresh attack
will be made to-morrow morning by the IXth Corps and the LIVth
Division."

As to the New Army I point out to K. that "they are fighting under
conditions quite foreign to their training and moreover they have no
regulars to set them a standard": also, (and pray Heaven it is truth)
"Everyone is fully alive to the necessity for dash, so I trust the
attack of to-morrow will be much better done than were the two previous
attempts."

Hardly had my cable to K. been despatched when Stopford gives us a
sample specimen of "dash" by his answer to my reminder. He wires:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"IXth Corps to G.H.Q. I foresee very great difficulty. The only system
possible at first probably will be convoy under escort."

Twelve hours ago, more or less, Stopford had agreed that there was a
difficulty which it was up to him to solve and that, at first, (i.e.,
till blockhouses had been built) the system would be convoy under
escort. We ask him what he had done, expecting to get the particulars
worked out by his Staff after the conference of Generals, and this is
the reply!

Five minutes later, in came another wire giving the general situation at
Suvla; saying the 53rd Division had failed to clear ground from which
the right of the advance of the 54th Division might be threatened, and
that Stopford wished to postpone his night march another four and twenty
hours.

So this is the result of our "ginger," and Braithwaite or I must rush
over to Suvla at once. Meanwhile, tactics and Kavak Tepe must wait.

Wired back:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"In the circumstances the operation for to-morrow is postponed. Chief
sending C.G.S. over now to see you."

Braithwaite went: is back now: has seen both Stopford and Reed: has
agreed (with a sad heart) on my behalf to the night march being put off
another twenty four hours.

Have had, therefore, to cable K. again, shouldering the heavy blame of
this further delay:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"(No. M.F. 545). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. After
anxiously weighing the pros and cons, I have decided that it is wiser to
wait another 24 hours before carrying out the general attack mentioned
in my No. M.F. 543. Braithwaite has just returned from the IXth Corps,
and he found that the spirit and general organization were improving
rapidly. A small attack by a Brigade, which promised well, was in
progress. This morning the Xth Division captured a trench."

The story of the Suvla Council of War:--At first the Generals were for
fighting. Inglefield, of the LIVth, who is told off for the attack, was
keen. All he asked was, a clean start from Anafarta Ova. If his Division
could jump off, intact and fresh, from that well-watered half-way house,
Kavak Tepe was his. The LIIIrd Division for their part agreed to make
good Anafarta Ova; to clear out the snipers and to hold the place as a
base for the LIVth.

So at 10 a.m. Stopford issued orders saying the LIVth must march off at
4 p.m. moving East of Anafarta Ova. Then,--when at last all seemed
settled, in came a message from the G.O.C. LIIIrd Division, saying he
could not undertake to clear Anafarta Ova of snipers and to hold it as a
cover to the advance of the LIVth.

Stopford thereupon cancelled his first order, and, at 1.15 p.m., issued
fresh orders directing the LIVth Division _to send in one of their own
Brigades_ as an advance guard to clear the ground up to a point East of
Anafarta Ova. Braithwaite stayed at Corps Headquarters at Suvla until
this Brigade, the 163rd, was moving on Anafarta Ova driving the snipers
before them. Mahon, too, after sitting for three days where I left him
on the morning of the 9th, has got tired of looking at the gendarmes
and has carried their trenches by the forbidden frontal bayonet charge
without much trouble or loss although, naturally, these trenches have
been strengthened during the interval.

Amidst these tactical miss-fires entered Hankey. He has had a cable from
his brother Secretary, Bonham Carter, saying the Prime Minister wishes
him to stay on longer and that Lord K. would like to know if he can do
anything to give an impetus to the operations. Hankey showed me this
cable; also his answer:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"Reference your 6910. I am glad to stay as desired. The chief thing you
could send to help the present operations would be more ammunition. For
supplies already sent everyone is most grateful. It is also important
that units should be kept up to strength.

"As General Officer Commanding has already apprised you fully of the
situation I have nothing to add."

In the Gordons' Mess "a Marine" used to stand as synonym for emptiness.
Asquith's "Marine"[9] is the reverse. Into two sentences totalling 27
words he boils down the drift of hundreds of cables and letters.

_13th August, 1915. Imbros._ Well, I must put it down. Worked till
lunch. In the afternoon, left in H.M.S. _Arno_ and sailed over to Suvla
to have a last look over the _band-o-bast_ for to-morrow's twice
to-morrowed effort. First, saw the Admiral and Commodore who are simply
dancing with impatience. No wonder. Whether or no Kavak Tepe summit
gives a useful outlook on to the back of Sari Bair and the Dardanelles,
at least it will give us the whip hand of the guns on the Anafarta ridge
and save our ships from the annoying attentions they are beginning to
receive. The sailors think too they have worked out an extra good scheme
for ship and shore guns.

Stopford then came aboard; in the mood he was in aboard the _Jonquil_ on
the 8th,--only more so! The Divisional Generals are without hope, that
is the text of his sermon. Hopeless about to-night, or to-morrow, that
is to say; for there are rosy visions and to spare for next week, or the
week after, or any other time, so long as it is not too near us. There
is something in this beats me. We are alive--we are quite all right--the
Brigade of the LIVth sent on to Kuchuk Anafarta Ova made good its point.
True, one battalion got separated from its comrades in the forest and
was badly cut up by Turkish snipers just as was Braddock's force by the
Redskins, but this, though tragic, is but a tiny incident of a great
modern battle and the rest of the 163rd Brigade have not suffered and
hold the spot whence, it was settled, the attack on Kavak Tepe should
jump off. Nothing practical or tactical seems to have occurred to force
us to drop our plan.

But no; Stopford and Reed count the LIIIrd Division as finished: the
LIVth incapable of attack; the rest of the IXth Corps immovable.

If I accept; we have lost this battle. We are not beaten now--the men
are not--but if I accept, we are held up.

There is no way out. Whether there is any good looking back even for one
moment, God knows; I doubt it! But I feel so acutely, I seem to see so
clearly, where our push for Constantinople first began to quit the
rails, that I must put it down right here. The moment was when I asked
for Rawlinson or Byng, and when, in reply, the keen, the young, the fit,
the up-to-date Commanders were all barred, simply and solely that Mahon
should not be disturbed in his Divisional Command. I resisted it very
strongly: I went so far as to remind K. in my cable of his own sad
disappointment at Bloemfontein when he (K.) had offered him a Cavalry
Brigade and he returned instead to his appointment in the Sudan. The
question that keeps troubling me is, ought I to have fought it further;
ought I to have resigned sooner than allow generals old and yet
inexperienced to be foisted on to me?

These stories about the troops? I do not accept them. The troops have
lost heavily but they are right if there were leaders.

I know quite well both Territorial Divisions. I knew them in England
that is to say. Since then, they have had their eyes picked out. They
have been through the strainer and the best officers and men and the
best battalions have been serving for months past in France. The three
show battalions in the 54th (Essex) Division are in France and their
places have been taken by the 10th and 11th London and by the 8th Hants.
Essex is good; London is good and Hants is good; but the trinity is not
Territorial. The same with the Welshmen.

Yet even so; taking these Territorials as they are; a scratch lot; half
strength; no artillery; not a patch upon the original Divisions as I
inspected them in England six months ago; even so, they'd fight right
enough and keen enough if they were set fair and square at their fence.

In the fight of the 10th the Welshmen were not given a chance. Sent in
on a narrow front--jammed into a pocket;--as they began to climb the
spur they caught it from the guns, rifles and machine guns on both
flanks.

We might still do something with a change of commanders. But I have been
long enough Military Secretary both in India and at home to realize that
ruthlessness here is apt to be a two-edged sword. You can't clap a new
head on to old shoulders without upsetting circulation and equilibrium.
Still, I would harden my heart to it now--to-night--were not my hands
tied by Mahon's seniority. Mahon is the next senior--in the whole force
he stands next to myself. Had not Bruce Hamilton been barred by the P.M.
when I wanted to put him in vice Hunter-Weston at Helles, the problem
would be simple enough. Even if I had not, at the outset, given that
well-tried, thrusting old fighter the conduct of the Suvla enterprise,
at least I would have brought him in on the morning of the 9th instant
quite easily and without causing any upset to anyone or anything. He
ranks both Stopford and Mahon and nothing would have been simpler than
to let him bring up a contingent of troops from Helles, when,
automatically, he would have taken command in the Suvla area. What it
would have meant to have had a man imbued with the attack spirit at the
head of this IXth Corps would have been just--victory!

Anchored at 9 p.m. and, before going to bed, sent following cable:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Secretary of State for War.

"The result of my visit to the IXth Corps, from which I am just back,
has bitterly disappointed me. There is nothing for it but to allow them
time to rest and reorganize, unless I force Stopford and his Divisional
Generals to undertake a general action for which, in their present frame
of mind, they have no heart. In fact, these generals are unfit for it.
With exceeding reluctance I am obliged to give them time to rest and
reorganize their troops.

"Though we were to repeat our landing operations a hundred times, we
would never dare hope to reproduce conditions so favourable as to put
one division ashore under cover of dark and, as the day broke, have the
next division sailing in to its support. No advantage was taken of these
favourable conditions and, for reasons which I can only explain by
letter, the swift advance was not delivered,--therefore, the mischief is
done. Until we are ready to advance again, reorganized and complete, we
must go slow."


_14th August, 1915. Imbros._ Before breakfast, Braithwaite brought me a
statement of our interview of last night with Stopford. He dictated it,
directly he got back last night; i.e., about three hours after the
event. I agree with every word:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"Notes of an interview which took place on board H.M.S. _Triad_ between
6 and 7 p.m. on the 13th August, 1915, between the General Commanding
and Sir Frederick Stopford, commanding 9th Corps.

_Present_:--

  General Sir Ian Hamilton, G.C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C.,
  Lieut.-General Hon. Sir Frederick Stopford,
  K.C.M.G., etc.,
  Major-General Braithwaite, C.B.

       *       *       *       *       *

"Sir Frederick represented that the 9th Corps were not fit to undertake
an advance at the present moment. Questioned why, he replied that the
losses had been considerable, that the disorganization of units was very
great, and that the length of the line he had to hold was all too thinly
held as it was. He stated that his Divisional Generals were entirely of
the same opinion as himself; in fact, he gave us completely the
impression that they were 'not for it,' but he only specifically
mentioned Hammersley and Lindley. He said water was no difficulty. He
implied that the troops were getting better every day, and given time to
rest and reorganize, he thought they would be able in time to make an
advance. But he was very emphatic on the point that at present such a
thing as an attack had practically no chance of success. He told us that
the opposition in the centre about Anafarta Ova could no longer be
classed as sniping, but that it was regular opposition. But as he also
told us that his landing was an opposed landing, I think perhaps that
during the short time he has been on active service in this country he
has not quite realized what opposition really means. But the salient
fact remains that none of his Divisional Generals who would be employed
in the attack thought that that attack would have any chance of success
whatever. Indeed, he saw every difficulty, and though he kept saying
that he was an optimist, he foresaw every bad thing that could possibly
happen and none of the bright spots. It was a most depressing interview,
but it left no doubt in the minds of the hearers that it would be quite
useless to order an attack to be undertaken by a Commander and
Divisional Generals whose hearts were confessedly not in it, who saw a
Turk behind every bush, a battalion behind every hill, and a Brigade
behind every mountain."

At lunch time Lord K. answered my last night's cable:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"If you should deem it necessary to replace Stopford, Mahon and
Hammersley, have you any competent Generals to take their place? From
your report I think Stopford should come home.

"This is a young man's war, and we must have commanding officers that
will take full advantage of opportunities which occur but seldom. If,
therefore, any Generals fail, do not hesitate to act promptly.

"Any Generals I have available I will send you."

Close on the top of this tardy appreciation of youth, comes another
cable from him saying he has asked French to let me have Byng, Horne and
Kavanagh. "I hope," he says, "Stopford has been relieved by you
already."

Have cabled back thanking him with all my heart; saying I shall be glad
of the Generals he mentions as "Byng, Kavanagh and Horne are all
flyers."

Between them, these two messages have cleared the air. Mahon's seniority
has been at the root of this evil. K.'s conscience tells him so and,
therefore, he pricks his name now upon the fatal list. But he did not
know, when he cabled, that Mahon had done well. I shall replace Stopford
forthwith by de Lisle and chance Mahon's seniority.

De Robeck came over for an hour in the evening.

Lord and Lady Brassey arrived in the _Sunbeam_, together with two young
friends. They have both of them shown great enterprise in getting here.
The dear old man gave me a warm greeting, but also something of a shock
by talking about our terrible defeat: by condoling and by saying I had
been asked to do the impossible. I have _not_ been asked to do anything
impossible in taking Constantinople. The feat is perfectly feasible. For
the third time since we began it trembled in the balance a week ago. Nor
is the capture of Suvla Bay and the linking up thereof with Anzac a
defeat: a cruel disappointment, no doubt, but not a defeat; for, two
more such defeats, measured in mere acreage, will give us the Narrows. A
doctor at Kephalos, it seems, infected them with this poison of
despondency. In their _Sunbeam_ they will make first class carriers.

_15th August, 1915. Imbros._ De Lisle has come over to relieve Stopford.
He has got his first instructions[10] and is in close communication with
myself and General Staff on the preparations for the next move which
will be supported by the Yeomanry from Egypt and by some more artillery.
I had meant to make time to run across to Suvla to-day but Stopford may
wish to see me on his way to Mudros so I shall sit tight in case he
does.

Cables to and from K. about our new Generals. Byng, Maude and Fanshawe
are coming. A brilliant trio. All of the three Fanshawe brothers are
good; this one worked under me on Salisbury Plain. Maude is splendid!
Byng will make every one happy; he never spares himself. K. has agreed
to let de Lisle hold the command of the 9th Corps until Byng turns up.
He wants Birdie to take over the control of the whole of the Northern
theatre, i.e., Anzac and Suvla. I must think over this. Meanwhile, have
cabled back, "I am enchanted to hear Byng, Maude and Fanshawe are
coming--I could wish for no better men."

Sent also following which explains itself:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"When I appointed de Lisle to command temporarily the IXth Corps I sent
the following telegram to Mahon:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"'Although de Lisle is junior to you, Sir Ian hopes that you will waive
your seniority and continue in command of the Xth Division, at any rate
during the present phase of operations.'

"To this Mahon sent the following reply:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"'I respectfully decline to waive my seniority and to serve under the
officer you name. Please let me know to whom I am to hand over the
command of the Division.'

"Consequently, I have appointed Brigadier-General F. F. Hill to command
temporarily the Division and have ordered Mahon to go to Mudros to await
orders. Will you please send orders as to his disposal. As Peyton is not
due from Egypt till 18th August, he was not in any case available."

Also:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"Personal. You will like to know that the XIIIth Division is said to
have fought very well and with great tenacity of spirit. In many
instances poor company leading is said to have been responsible for
undue losses."

_16th August, 1915. Imbros._ A great press of business. Amongst other
work, have written a long cable home giving them the whole story up to
date. Lots of petty troubles. Stopford goes to Mudros direct. De Lisle
makes a thorough overhaul at Suvla.

Glyn and Hankey both looked in upon me. It is a relief to have an
outsider of Hankey's calibre on the spot. He said, "Thank God!" when he
heard of K.'s cable, and urged Birdie should be told off to take Suvla
in hand, in his stead. I suppose the G.S. have let him get wind of K.'s
identical suggestion. As I told Hankey, I have not yet made up my mind.
But it would be an awkward job for Birdie with all the Anzacs to run,
and no nearer Suvla really--in point of time--than we are. Nor is he
staffed for so big a business. Hankey has been too long away from
executive work to realize that difficulty. But the decisive factor is
this; that having been closely associated with him and with his work for
a good many years, I know as Hankey cannot know, how much of his
strength lies in his personal touch and presence:--spread his powers too
wide he loses that touch. Felt the better for my talk with Hankey. He
can grasp the bigness of what we are up against and can yet keep his
head and see that the game is worth the candle and that it is in our
hands the moment we make up our minds to pay the price of the
illuminant.

Have written to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff saying:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"I have just been through a horrible mental crisis quite different from
the ordinary anxiety of the battlefield, where I usually see what I
think to be my way and chance it. I refer to Freddy Stopford. Here is a
man who has committed no fault; whose life-long conscientious study of
his profession has borne the best fruits in letting him see the right
thing to do and how it should be done. And yet he fails when many a man
possessing not one quarter of his military qualifications carries on
with flying colours. For there is no use beating about the bush now and,
simply, he was not big enough in character to face up to the situation.
It overwhelmed him.

       *       *       *       *       *

"A month ago we had the Turks down, undoubtedly and, whenever we could
get a little ammunition together, we were confident we could take a line
of trenches. As for their attacks, it was obvious their men were not for
it. Now their four new Divisions of fine fighting material seem to have
animated the whole of the rest of the force with their spirit, and the
Turks have never fought so boldly as they are doing to-day. They are
tough to crack, but D.V., we will be the tougher of the two."

_17th August, 1915. Imbros._ From his cable of the 14th, K. seems
prepared to see me relieve Mahon of his command. But Mahon is a fighter
and if I give him time to think over things a bit at Mudros, he'll be
sure to think better. I am sure the wisest course to take, is to take
time. A Lieutenant-General in the British Army chucking up his command
whilst his Division is actually under fire--is a very unhappy affair.
Lord Bobs used to say that a soldier asked, for the good of the cause,
to serve as a drummer boy under his worst enemy should do so not only
with alacrity but with joy. Braithwaite agrees with me that we must
just take the responsibility of doing nothing at all and of leaving him
quietly to cool down at Mudros. Hill, who carries on, was the General in
command at Mitylene when I inspected there; he is a good fellow; he was
anxious to push on upon that fatal 7th August at Suvla and everyone says
he is a stout fellow.

Have got the name of the doctor who upset the Brasseys with his yarns.
He declares he only retailed the tales of the wounded youngsters whom he
tended. No more to be said. He has studied microbes extensively but one
genus has clearly escaped his notice: he has never studied or grasped
the fell methods of the microbes of rumour or panic. Am I sure that I
myself have not crabbed my own show a bit in telling the full story of
our fight to K. this afternoon? No, I am by no means sure.

"(No. M.F. 562.) From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. Have
thought it best to lay the truth fully before you, and am now able to
give a complete _résumé_ of the past week's operations, and an
appreciation of the situation confronting me.

"In broad outline, my plan was to hold the Turks in the Southern zone by
constant activity of French and VIIIth Corps, and to throw all the
reinforcements into the Northern zone with the object of defeating the
enemy opposite Anzac, seizing a new base at Suvla, and gaining a
position astride the narrow part of the peninsula. With this object, I
reinforced General Birdwood with the XIIIth Division, 29th Brigade, Xth
Division, and 29th Indian Brigade, all of which were secretly dribbled
ashore at Anzac Cove on the three nights preceding commencement of
operations. This was done without arousing the suspicions of the enemy.
Arrangements were made for the XIth Division to land at Suvla Bay on the
same night as General Birdwood commenced his attack. Meanwhile, the
Turks were deceived by ill-concealed preparations for landings on
Asiatic coast near Mitylene, at Enos, South of Gaba Tepe.

"Following is detailed plan of operations:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"On the afternoon of 6th August the VIIIth Corps were to attack Krithia
trenches, and simultaneously General Birdwood was to attack Lone Pine
trenches on his right front, as though attempting to break out in this
direction. In this way it was hoped to draw the Turkish reinforcements
towards Krithia and Gaba Tepe and away from Anzac's left and Suvla Bay.
At 10 p.m. General Birdwood's main attack was to develop on his left
flank, the Turkish outposts were to be rushed and an advance made in
several columns up the precipitous ravines leading to Chunuk Bair and
the summit of Hill 305, which it was hoped might be captured before
daybreak.

"As soon as the high ridge was in our hands an advance was to be made
down the Hill 305 to take in the rear the trenches on Baby 700 (see
enlarged map of Anzac positions) and at the same time the troops in the
original Anzac position were to attack all along the line in an
endeavour to break out and hurl the enemy off the Sari Bair. Meanwhile
the XIth Division was to commence landing 10.30 p.m. on 6th August, one
brigade inside Suvla Bay, two brigades on shore to South were to seize
and hold all hills covering Bay and especially Yilghin Burnu and Ismail
Oglu Tepe on which enemy were believed to have guns which could bring
fire to bear either on back of General Birdwood's advance on Hill 305,
or on Suvla Bay. The ridge from Anafarta Sagir to Aja Liman was also to
be lightly held. The Xth Division, less one brigade, was to follow XIth
Division at daybreak and LIIIrd Division was held in general reserve.
The LIVth Division had not arrived and could not be employed in the
first instance.

"The moment Stopford had fulfilled the above tasks, which, owing to the
small number of the enemy in this neighbourhood and the absence of any
organized system of trenches, were considered comparatively easy, he was
to advance South-west through Biyuk Anafarta with the object of
assisting Birdwood in the event of his attack being held up.

"Reliable information indicated the strength of the enemy about Suvla
Bay to be one regiment, one squadron and some Gendarmerie with at most
twelve guns, and events have shown that this estimate was correct. It
was also believed that the enemy had 36,000 in the Southern zone, 27,000
against Anzac, and 37,000 in reserve. Also 45,000 near Keshan who could
not arrive for three days and 10,000 on Asiatic shore.

"The attack by the VIIIth Corps opposite Krithia took place as arranged,
but was met by determined opposition. Some enemy trenches were
captured, but the Turks were found in great strength and full of fight.
They counter-attacked repeatedly on the night of 6th/7th, and eventually
regained the ground we had taken. Prisoners captured stated that the
Turks had planned to attack us that night in any case which accounts for
their strength.

"In the Northern zone General Birdwood's afternoon attack was successful
and Lone Pine trenches were captured by a most gallant Australian
assault. Throughout the day, and for three successive days the enemy
made repeated attempts to recapture the position, but each time were
repulsed with severe loss. At 10 p.m. the main advance on the left flank
by the New Zealanders, XIIIth Division, 29th Brigade and Cox's Brigade
began, and in spite of stupendous difficulties, moving by night in most
difficult country, all enemy's posts in foot of hills were rushed and
captured up to and including Damakjelik Bair. The enemy was partly
surprised, but his reinforcements were all called up, and this, coupled
with the extreme difficulty of the country, made it impossible to reach
the crest of the hill that day or the following. The position
immediately below the crest, however, was reached, and on the morning of
the 8th, after severe fighting, two battalions of the XIIIth Division
and Gurkhas reached the top of Kurt Ketchede, and two battalions of New
Zealanders established themselves on the crest of the ridge at Chunuk
Bair.

"Unfortunately, the troops on Kurt Ketchede were shelled off the ridge
by our own gun fire, and were unable to recapture it; and 48 hours
later two battalions of the XIIIth Division, who had relieved tired New
Zealanders on Chunuk Bair, were driven back by determined daybreak
assault, carried by the Turks in many successive lines, shoulder to
shoulder. Our troops were too weary, and much too disorganized to make a
counter-attack at that time, and could only maintain positions below
crest. Water supply, which had always been an anxiety, began to fail,
and grave difficulties arose which prevented the possibility of
reinforcing Birdwood, and almost necessitated our giving up our gains.
All this, however, has now been put right.

"Meanwhile, Stopford's Corps at Suvla had landed most successfully, but,
owing to lack of energy and determination on the part of leaders, and,
perhaps, partly to the inexperience of the troops, had failed to take
advantage of the opportunities as already reported.

"The result is that my coup has so far failed. It was soon realized that
it was necessary to give impetus to the IXth Corps, and the LIIIrd
Division was put in on 8th-9th. By this time the LIVth Division was
available as general reserve. Unfortunately, the LIIIrd Division broke
in my hand, leaving me like a fencer with rapier broken, and by the time
the LIVth Division arrived the remaining troops of the Corps were too
tired and disorganized for further immediate effort.

"The IXth Corps holds the position from Kiretch Tepe Sirt, bench mark 2;
Sulajik; Yilghin Burnu, with right flank thrown south to connect with
Birdwood at Kazlar Chair. Godley has picket between Kazlar Chair and
Damakjelik Bair, whence his line runs South-east to the spur South of
Abdel Rahman Bair, thence South-west to square 80 D, South-east again to
within 300 yards of Point 161 on Chunuk Bair, and thence back to the
left of the Anzac position.

"De Lisle has at his disposal the Xth Division, less one brigade, the
XIth, LIIIrd and LIVth Divisions; total rifles, owing to casualties,
under 30,000. The Suvla losses have been too severe considering extent
and nature of the fighting that has taken place, and can only be
attributed to the inexperience of the troops and their leaders, and the
daring way in which the enemy skirmishers presumed upon it in the broken
and wooded country. Birdwood has lost about 13,000 since the action
began, and has now available some 25,000 rifles. The VIIIth Corps has
23,000 rifles, and the French 17,000 rifles.

"The Turks have continued to be most active in the South, no doubt with
the object of preventing us moving troops, but apparently they have now
no more than 35,000 in this zone. The majority of the enemy Commander's
troops are against Anzac and in reserve in the valley between Hills 305
and 261, his strategic flank.

"In the Northern zone, in the fighting line at Suvla and Anzac and in
reserve he may now have in all 75,000, and can either reinforce Hill 305
or issue through the gap between the two Anafartas to oppose any attack
on Ismail Oglu Tepe or on the ridge running thence to Anafarta Sagir. He
has guns on Hill 305, on Ismail Oglu Tepe, and on the ridge North of
Anafarta Sagir from which he can shell landing places at Suvla Bay, but
is not holding the latter ridge in strength, nor do I think he has
enough troops to enable him to do so.

"The position regarding the Turkish reinforcements from Keshan is not
clear. Only small parties have been located by aeroplanes marching
South, and it appears that either this information was incorrect or that
the enemy's forces had already got as far as the peninsula before
fighting began.

"I consider it urgently necessary to seize Ismail Oglu Tepe and Anafarta
Sagir at the earliest possible moment, and I have ordered de Lisle to
make the attempt at the earliest opportunity. I have also ordered
Birdwood to make a fresh attack on Hill 305 as soon as troops are
reorganized and the difficulties of water supply solved, but for this he
will require drafts and fresh troops. I have great hopes that these
attacks may yet be successful, but it is impossible to disguise the fact
that owing to the failure of the IXth Corps to take advantage of
opportunities and the fact that surprise may now be absent, and that the
enemy is prepared and in much greater strength, my difficulties are
enormously increased. In any case my cadres will be so depleted as a
result of action that I shall need large reinforcements to enable me to
bring the operations to a happy conclusion.

"The Turkish losses have been heavier than ours, and the total number of
prisoners taken is 702, but I estimate that they have now in the
peninsula at least 110,000 rifles to my 95,000 and they have all the
advantage of position. They have, apparently, all the ammunition they
need and obtain reinforcements as they are wanted. In particular, we
have had no news of the arrival of the 45,000 troops reported to be at
Keshan, and only one of the Asiatic Divisions has as yet come over. I
had hoped that their reinforcements would be of poor quality and not a
match for ours but this is not the case, and unfortunately the Turks
have temporarily gained the moral ascendency over some of our new
troops. If, therefore, this campaign is to be brought to an early and
successful conclusion large reinforcements will have to be sent to
me--drafts for the formations already here, and new formations with
considerably reduced proportion of artillery. It has become a question
of who can slog longest and hardest.

"Owing to the difficulty of carrying on a winter campaign, and the
lateness of the season, these troops should be sent immediately. My
British Divisions are at present 45,000 under establishment, exclusive
of about 9,000 promised or on the way. If this deficit were made up, and
new formations totalling 50,000 rifles sent out as well, these, with the
60,000 rifles which I estimate I shall have at the time of their
arrival, should give me the necessary superiority, unless the absence of
other enemies allows the Turks to bring up large additional
reinforcements.

"I hope you will realize how nearly this operation was a success
complete beyond anticipation. The surprise was complete, and the army
was thrown ashore in record time, practically without loss, and a little
more push on the part of the IXth Corps would have relieved the pressure
on Anzac, facilitated the retention of Chunuk Bair, secured Suvla Bay as
a port, and threatened the enemy's right in a way that should have
enabled Anzac to turn a success into a great victory.

"We are up against the Turkish Army which is well commanded and fighting
bravely."

After all's said and done the troops at Helles and Anzac are still
perfectly game and we have got nearer our goal. We started forth to:--

       *       *       *       *       *

(1) Seize Suvla Bay;

(2) Break out of Anzac and join on to Suvla;

(3) Seize Sari Bair crestline;

(4) Hold enough of the hinterland of Suvla Bay to make it a comfortable
harbour.

       *       *       *       *       *

(1) and (2) we have carried through handsomely. We have trebled our
holding at Anzac and we have put Suvla Bay in our pocket. (3) we have
not done; we are short of it by a couple of hundred yards; (4) we have
not done; it is a practicable harbour but subject certainly to
annoyance. In honest, gambler's language, we have won a good stake but
we have not broke the Ottoman Bank.

De Lisle reports confusion throughout Suvla Bay area. He _must_ have
three or four days to pull the troops together before he organizes a
fresh offensive. The IXth Corps has been _un corps sans tête_.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 9: Hankey belonged to the Royal Marine Artillery.--IAN H.,
1920.]

[Footnote 10: See Appendix IV containing actual letter of
instructions.--IAN H., 1920.]




CHAPTER XVII

THE LAST BATTLE


_18th August, 1915. Imbros._ Freddie and I left in the _Arno_ this
morning; Braithwaite and his boy Val came with us. We sailed for Suvla
_via_ Anzac and held a meeting which was nearer a Council of War than
anything up to date. Dawnay, Deedes and Beadon stood by; so did Generals
Skeen, Hammersley and Peyton. Reed, C.G.S., IXth Corps, was also
present. The discussion of the steps to be taken within the next two or
three days lasted an hour and a half. Every one who spoke had studied
the data and the ground and there was no divergence of view, which was a
comfort. Our attack will have as its objective the seizure of a foothold
on the high ground. Anzacs will co-operate. As I explained to the
Generals, we hardly dare hope to make a clean break through till drafts
and fresh munitions arrive as the Turks now have had too long to dig in.
But if we can seize and keep a point upon the watershed (however small)
from which we can observe the drop of our shell, we can knock out the
landing places of the Turks. At the end, I told them I had asked for
95,000 fresh rifles, 50,000 in new formations, 45,000 to bring my
skeleton units up to strength, adding, that if I was refused that help
then I felt Government had better get someone cleverer than myself to
put their Fleet into the Marmora. The Generals seemed satisfied with my
demands and sympathetic towards my personal attitude.

As to the coming attack, the tone of the Conference was hopeful. They
agreed that the nut was hard for our enfeebled forces to crack, but they
seemed to think that if we were once to get the enemy on the run, with
the old 29th Division and the new, keen Yeomanry on their heels, we
might yet go further than we expected. One Brigade of the 29th Division
has been brought round from Helles to put shape and form into the 53rd
Division. Peyton's men are to be attached to the Irish Division. There
is a new spirit of energy and hope in the higher ranks but the men have
meanwhile been aimlessly marched and counter-marched, muddled, and
knocked about so that their spirit has suffered in consequence.

No end of Yeomen on the beaches; the cream of agricultural England. Many
of them recognized me from my various home inspections. Would like very
much to have had a war inspection, but the enemy gunners are too
inquisitive.

De Lisle tells me he has now been round every corner of Suvla and that
the want of grip throughout the higher command has been worse than he
dared to put on paper. To reorganize will take several weeks; but we
have to try and act within two or three days.

Skeen told us that when the Turks stuck up a placard saying Warsaw had
fallen, the Australians gave three hearty cheers.

The chief trouble in making plans for the coming attack lies in the want
of cover on, and for a mile inland of, the Suvla Bay beaches. The whole
stretch of the flat land immediately East and South of the Bay lies open
to the Turkish gunners. This is no longer a serious drawback if the men
are holding lines of trenches. But when the trench system is not yet in
working order, and they want to deploy, then it is so awkward a factor
that I would have been prepared to turn the whole battle into a night
attack. The others were not for it. They thought that the troops were
not highly enough trained and had lost too many officers to be able to
find their way over this country in the darkness. They are in immediate
touch with the men: I am not.

Lindley asked if he might walk with me to the Beach, and on the way down
he told me frankly his Division had gone to pieces and that he did not
feel it in himself to pull it together again. Very fine of him to make a
clean breast of it, I thought, and said so: also advised him to put what
he had told me into writing to de Lisle, when we will relieve him and I
promised for my part, to try and fit him with some honourable but less
onerous job.

On Hammersley's report, Sitwell, Brigadier of the 34th Brigade, 11th
Division, has just been relieved of his command.

_19th August, 1915. Imbros._ Sat sweating here, literally and
metaphorically, from morn till dewy eve. King's Messenger left in the
evening. Altham came over from Mudros. He stays to-night and we will
work together to-morrow when the mails are off my mind.

Hankey dined and left with the King's Messenger by the _Imogene_. He has
been a real help. The Staff has never quite cottoned to the chief among
us takin' notes, but that is, I think, from a notion that it is not
loyal to Lord K. to press the P.M.'s P.S. too closely to their bosom.
From my personal standpoint, it will be worth anything to us if, amidst
the flood of false gossip pouring out by this very mail to our
Dardanelles Committee, to the Press, to Egypt and to London Drawing
Rooms, we have sticking up out of it, even one little rock in the shape
of an eye-witness.

A shocking aeroplane smash up within a few yards of us. A brilliant
young Officer (Captain Collet of the R.F.C.) killed outright and three
men badly hurt.

_20th August, 1915._ Stayed in my tent keeping an eye on to-morrow. Put
through a lot with Altham. Am pressing him to hurry up with his canteens
at Helles, Anzac and Suvla. In May I cabled the Q.M.G. begging him
either to let me run a canteen on the lines of the South African Field
Force Canteen, myself; or, to run it from home, himself; or, to put the
business into the hands of some private firm like the Mess and Canteen
Company, or Lipton's, or Harrods or anything he liked. In South Africa
we could often buy something. In France our troops can buy anything.
Here, had they each the purse of Fortunatus, they could buy nothing. A
matter this, I won't say of life and death, but of sickness and health.
Now, after three months without change of diet, the first canteen ship
is about due. A mere flea bite of £10,000 worth. I am sending the whole
of it to the Anzacs to whom it will hardly be more use than a bun is to
a she bear. Only yesterday a letter came in from Birdie telling me that
the doctors all say that the sameness of the food is making the men
sick. The rations are A.1., but his men now loathe the very look of them
after having had nothing else for three months. Birdie says, "If we
could only get this wretched canteen ship along, and if, when she comes
she contains anything like condiments to let them buy freely from her, I
believe it would make all the difference in the world. But the fact
remains that at present we cannot count on anything like a big effort
from the men who have been here all these months."

De Robeck came over at 4 p.m., by formal appointment, to talk business,
and deadly serious business at that! He has heard, by cable I suppose,
that the people at home will see him through if he sees his way to
strike a blow with the Fleet. He takes this as a pretty strong hint to
push through, or, to make some sort of a battleship attack to support
us. De Robeck knows that when the Fleet goes in our fighting strength
goes up. But he can gauge, as I cannot, the dangers the Fleet will
thereby incur. Every personal motive urges me to urge him on. But I have
no right to shove my oar in--no right at all--until I can say that we
are done unless the Fleet do make an attack. Can I say so? No; if we
get the drafts and munitions we can still open the Straits on our own
and without calling on the sister Service for further sacrifice. So I
fell back on first principles and said he must attack if he thought it
right from the naval point of view but that we soldiers did not call for
succour or ask him to do anything desperate: "You know how we stand," I
said; "do what is right from the naval point of view and as to what _is_
right from that point of view, I am no judge."

The Admiral went away: I have been no help to him but I can't help it.

Hardly had he gone when Braithwaite (who had heard what was in the wind
by a side wind) came and besought me to try and induce the Admiral to
slip his battleships at the Straits. All the younger men of war are
dying to have a dash, he said. That's as it may be but my mind is clear.
If a sailor on land is a fish out of water, a soldier at sea is like a
game cock in a duckpond. When de Robeck said on March 22nd he wanted the
help of the whole Army that was quite in order. He would not have been
in order--at least, I don't think so--had he said in what manner he
wanted the Army to act after it had got ashore. We are being helped now
by the Navy; daily, hourly: we could not exist without the Fleet; but it
is not for me to say I think the battleships should or should not take
chances of mines and torpedoes.

Brodrick is quite seedy. We are all afraid he won't be able to stick it
out much longer although he is making the most heroic efforts. In the
morning I attended the funeral of young Collet, killed yesterday so
tragically. A long, slow march through heavy sand all along the beach to
Kephalos; then up through some small rocky gullies, frightfully hot,
until, at last, we reached a graveyard. The congregation numbered many
of the poor boy's comrades who seemed much cut up about his untimely
end.

The P.M. has answered my cable to Lord K. asking for 45,000 rifles to
fill up and for 50,000 fresh rifles. K. is in France, he says, and I
will have my answer when he gets back. The 5th Royal Scots are down to
289 rank and file. I have just cabled about them. Something must be
done. Certainly it must be "out" for that particular unit if they don't
very soon get some men. The War Office still refer to them as a
Battalion!

_21st August, 1915._ Sailed for Suvla about 1 o'clock with Braithwaite,
Aspinall, Dawnay, Deedes, Ellison, Pollen and Maitland. The first time I
have set forth with such a Staff. Not wishing to worry de Lisle, I
climbed up to the Karakol Dagh, whence I got something like a bird's eye
view of the arena which was wrapt from head to foot in a mantle of
pearly mist. Assuredly the Ancients would have ascribed this phenomenon
to the intervention of an Immortal. Nothing like it had ever been seen
by us until that day and the cloud--mist--call it what you will--must
have had an unfortunate bearing on the battle. On any other afternoon
the enemy's trenches would have been sharply and clearly lit up, whilst
the enemy's gunners would have been dazzled by the setting sun. But
under this strange shadow the tables were completely turned; the outline
of the Turkish trenches were blurred and indistinct, whereas troops
advancing from the Ægean against the Anafartas stood out in relief
against a pale, luminous background.

As a result of our instructions; of conferences and of the war council
we had got our plan perfectly clear and ship-shape. Everyone understood
it. The 10th Division was Corps reserve and was lying down in mass about
the old Hill 10 in the scrub. We had to trust to luck here as they were
under the enemy's fire if they were spotted. But very strict orders as
to keeping low and motionless had been issued and we had just to hope
for the best. The Yeomanry were also Corps reserve at Lala Baba where
they were safe. But when they advanced, supposing they had to, they
would have to cross a perfectly open plain under shell fire. This was
the special blot on the scheme but there was no getting away from it.
There was no room for them in the front line trenches and communication
trenches to the front had not yet been dug.

As to the attack:--on the extreme right the Anzacs and Indian Brigade
were to push out from Damakjelik Bair towards Hill 60. Next to them in
the right centre the 11th Division was to push for the trenches at
Hetman Chair. On the left centre the 29th Division were to storm the now
heavily entrenched Hill 70. Holding that and Ismail Oglu Tepe we should
command the plateau between the two Anafartas; knock out the enemy's
guns and observation posts commanding Suvla Bay, and should easily be
able thence to work ourselves into a position whence we will enfilade
the rear of the Sari Bair Ridge and begin to get a strangle grip over
the Turkish communications to the Southwards. From the extreme left on
Kiretch Tepe Sirt by the sea, to Sulajik where they joined the 29th
Division the 53rd and 54th Divisions were simply holding the line.

Only the broad outline of the fighting was visible through the dim
twilight atmosphere and I have not yet got any details. Our bombardment
began at 2.30 and lasted till 3 p.m., very inadequate in duration but
the most our munitions would run to. Then, to the accompaniment of quick
battery salvoes of shrapnel from the enemy and a heavy rattle of
musketry, the whole line from about a mile due East of the Easternmost
point of the Salt Lake down to Damakjelik Bair, nearly two miles, began
to stir and move Eastwards. We had the joy of seeing the Turks begin to
clear out of the trenches on Hill 70, and by 3.30 p.m. it seemed as if
distinct progress was being made: about that time it was I saw the
Yeomen marching in extended order over the open ground to the South of
the Salt Lake in the direction of Hetman Chair. The enemy turned a
baddish shrapnel fire on to them, and although they bore it most
unflinchingly, old experience told me that their nervous fighting energy
was being used up all the time. If only these men could have been
brought within charging distance, fresh and unbroken by any ordeal! But
here was just one of the drawbacks of the battlefield and no getting
over it.

After a bit, I went down to de Lisle and found him sitting on a little
spur about fifty yards from his own Headquarters with one of his Staff
Officers. He was smoking a pipe--quite calm. There is usually nothing to
be said or to be done once our war dogs have been slipped. A soldier
might as well try to correct the aim of his bullet after he has pulled
the trigger! Whilst I was there we heard--probably about 4.30--that the
11th Division had captured the Turkish first line trenches which run
North and South of Hetman Chair. Real good news this. We were
considerably bucked up. Climbed back to Karakol Dagh but, from that time
onwards, could make out nothing of the course of the battle save that
Ismail Oglu Tepe was not yet taken. As to Knoll 70, it was completely
shrouded in dust and smoke. Sometimes it seemed as if the Turkish guns
were firing against it; sometimes we thought they were our own. Far away
by Kaiajik Aghala things looked well as many enemy shrapnel were
bursting there or thereabouts showing our men must have got home. By
6.30 it had become too dark to see anything. The dust mingling with the
strange mist, and also with the smoke of shrapnel and of the hugest and
most awful blazing bush fire formed an impenetrable curtain.

As the light faded the rifles and guns grew silent. So I clambered down
off my perch and went again to de Lisle's post of command where I found
him still sitting. He had seen no more than I had seen. The bulk of our
reserves had been thrown in. No more news had come to hand. All was
quiet now. Our _rôle_, in fact, was finished, and Marshall, the man on
the spot, by now held our destinies in his hands. Firm hands too. The
telephone was working all right and I told de Lisle to try and get a
message through to him quickly saying that I hoped he would be able to
dig in and hold fast to whatever he had gained. I have no fears about de
Lisle's nerve; nor of Marshall's.

Went on board and sailed for Headquarters, through darkness made visible
by the fires blazing on the battlefield. No shooting. Got on the wires
and found no news from Anzac nor more from de Lisle. Crossed backwards
and forwards the best part of the night between my tent and the G.S.
tent, but de Lisle had heard nothing definite enough to report. Brodrick
still has fever. Ruthven has been wounded.

_22nd August, 1915._ Suvla gone wrong again; Anzac right. Left G.H.Q. at
11 o'clock with Braithwaite, Commodore Keyes, Captain Phillimore,
Aspinall, Beadon, Freddy and Val in the _Arno_ and went direct to Anzac.
There I picked up Birdie and heard the Anzac part of the battle. The
Indian Brigade have seized the well at Kabak Kuyu, and that fine
soldier, Russell, fixed himself into Kaiajik Aghala and is holding on
there tooth and nail. There was fighting going on there at the moment
but Russell is confident. How delightful it is to have to deal with men
who are confident!

This success of old Cox's is worth anything. The well alone, I suppose,
might be valued at twenty or thirty thousand a year seeing it gives us
beautiful spring water in free gift from Mother Earth instead of very
dubious fluid conveyed at God only knows what cost from the Nile to
Anzac Cove. If we can only hold on to Kaiajik Aghala, then the road
between Anzac and Suvla will be freed from the sniper's bullet.

Went on to Suvla and landed with all my posse, remaining in consultation
with Corps Headquarters till 3.30.

Our attack on Hill 70 and Ismail Oglu Tepe has failed. The enemy has dug
himself well in by now and, therefore, we depended far more on our gun
fire than we did on the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th. Unfortunately, the
bombardment seems to have been pretty near futile--not the fault of the
gunners, but simply because, on the one hand, the mist interfered with
the accuracy of their aim, on the other, shortage of shell prevented
them from making up for inaccuracy by quantity. Then the bush fires seem
to have come along in the most terrible fashion and interposed between
our brave 29th and the Turks. The ancient Gods fought against us
yesterday:--mist and fire, still hold their own against the inventions
of man. Last but not least, all are agreed the fine edge of the 11th
Division has been at last blunted--and small wonder: there is no use
attacking any more with the New Army until it has been well rested and
refreshed with new drafts.

So far de Lisle has no clear or connected story of the battle. The 29th
Division say they were shouldered off their true line of attack by the
11th Division, then driven in by the fire; the 11th Division, on their
side, say that the Yeomen barged into them and threw them off their
line. Had we been able to dig in we would have made good a lot of
ground. But Marshall, not showy or brilliant but one of my most sound
and reliable soldiers, decided, although he knew my wishes and hopes,
that the troops had got themselves so mixed up and disorganized that it
would be imprudent. So orders were issued by him, on the battlefield, to
fall back to the original line. There was neither use nor time to refer
back to de Lisle and he had to come to the decision himself. I am quite
confident he will be able to give good reasons for his act. Many of the
men did not get the order and were still out at daylight this morning
when they were heavily attacked by the Turks and fell back then of
themselves into their old trenches. Another case of "as you were." We
have lost a lot of men and can only hope that the Turks have lost as
many. I don't think for a moment they did, not at least in the Suvla Bay
sphere, but Cox and Russell claim to have accounted for a very great
number of them in their first retreat and in their counter-attacks in
the Southern sector of the battle.

_23rd August, 1915. Imbros._ Not one moment, till to-day, to weigh
bearing of K.'s message of the 20th instant,--the message sent me in
reply to my appeal for 50,000 fresh troops and 45,000 drafts. In it K.
tells me that a big push is going to take place in the Western theatre,
and that I "must understand that no reinforcements of importance can be
diverted from the main theatre of operations in France." Certain named
transports are carrying, he says, more troops to Egypt, and he hopes
Maxwell will be able to spare me some. If we can't get through with
these we must hang on as best we may.

To-day it has been up to us to try and bring home to the Higher
Direction the possible effects of trying to do two things at once; i.e.,
break through in France and break through here. We are to stand aside
for a month or so just when we have made a big gain of ground but not
the decisive watershed gain; when the Turks, despite their losses in
life, shell, trenches and terrain, are shaken only; not yet shattered.

K. sees all the Allied cards--we don't. But we do know our own hand. We
know that our Navy have now come clean down on the Ægean side of the
fence, and have determined once for all to make no attack on their own.
We have the _feel_ of the situation in our bones and it was up to us--I
_think_ it was--to rub it in that although the British War Direction may
decree that the Dardanelles are to hang on without further help,
indefinitely, yet sickness is not yet under their high command, nor are
the Turks.

So Dawnay, who is making a name for himself as a master of plain
business diction, was told off to draft me an answer to the War Office
which should remove as many beams as possible out of their optics. He
overdid it: the whole tone of it indeed was despondent, so much so that,
as I told Braithwaite, a S. of S. for War getting so dark a presentment
of our prospects would be bound to begin to think it might be better to
recall the whole expedition. So I rewrote the whole thing myself:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"(No. M.F. 578). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Secretary of State for
War. We will endeavour to do the best possible with forces at our
disposal; we quite understand reason for your inability to send us
reinforcements necessary to bring operations to a successful conclusion,
and thank you for putting it so plainly. After the failure of the IXth
Corps to take prompt action after landing I took immediate steps to
persevere with plan in spite of absence of surprise and reinforced
northern wing with 2nd Mounted Division from Egypt and XXIXth Division
from Cape Helles. These movements and the necessary reorganization of
the IXth Corps formations which had become very mixed took time, so that
I was not able to renew the attack until 21st August.

"By then enemy positions in Ratilva Valley had been immeasurably
strengthened and I was confronted with the difficulty that if I could
not drive the Turks back between Anafarta Sagir and Biyuk Anafarta my
new line from right of old Anzac position to sea coast North-east of
Suvla Bay would be more than I could hold with the troops at my
disposal. It would thus be a case of giving up either Anzac Cove or
Suvla Bay. Therefore, as a preliminary step to my fresh offensive I
determined to mass every man available against Ismail Oglu Tepe which
position it was necessary for me to capture whether as a first step
towards clearing the valley, or, if this proved impossible and I was
thrown on the defensive, to secure comparative immunity from shell fire
either for Suvla Bay or Anzac Cove.

"De Lisle planned the attack well. The LIIIrd and the LIVth Divisions
were to hold enemy from Sulajik to Kiretch Tepe Sirt, and XXIXth
Division and XIth Division were to attack Ismail Oglu Tepe with two
Brigades of Xth Division and the IInd Mounted Division (5,000 rifles) in
corps reserve. I arranged that General Birdwood should co-operate by
swinging his left flank to Susak Kuyu and Kaiajik Aghala.

"The troops attacked with great dash and stormed the lower slopes of the
hill in spite of strong entrenchments, but I regret to say they were not
able to attain their objective nor even to consolidate the position
gained and yesterday found the whole line back in their original
trenches except the left of the Australians where one battalion of
Gurkhas and new Australian Battalion continue to hold Susak Kuyu.
Casualties not yet to hand, but I fear they amounted to some 6,000 in
all. This renewed failure combined with the heavy total casualties since
6th August, and the fact that sickness has been greatly on the increase
during the last fortnight has profoundly modified my position, and as
you cannot now give me further reinforcements it is only possible for me
to remain on the defensive. Naturally, I shall keep on trying to harry
the Turks by local attacks and thus keep alive the offensive spirit but
it must be stated plainly that no decisive success is to be looked for
until such time as reinforcements can be sent.

"The total casualties including sick since 6th August amount to 40,000,
and my total force is now only 85,000, of which the fighting strength is
68,000. The French fighting strength is about 15,000. Sick casualties
are becoming abnormal chiefly owing to troops other than late arrivals
being worn out with hardship and incessant shell fire, from which even
when in reserve they are never free. Where Anzac evacuated 100 a day
they are now evacuating 500, where Royal Naval Division evacuated 10
they are now evacuating 60. The result is that I have only some 50,000
men in the North to hold a line from the right of Anzac to the sea
North-east of Suvla, a distance of 23,000 yards.

"When there is no serious engagement, but only daily trench fighting,
the average net wastage from sickness and war is 24 per cent. of
fighting strength per month. The Anzac Corps, the XXIXth Division and
the XLIInd Division are very tired and need a rest badly. Keeping these
conditions in view, it appears inevitable that within the next fortnight
I shall be compelled to relinquish either Suvla Bay or Anzac Cove, and
must also envisage the possibility of a still further reduction of my
front in the near future. Taking the first question of abandoning Anzac
Cove and closing to the North, Suvla Bay is now netted and comparatively
secure from torpedo attack. Further, it offers certain facilities for
disembarkation in winter gales. It has, therefore, some decided
advantages but though I should be able to hold it safely at present, it
would present no facilities for further contraction of my line to meet
the future wastage of my force. On the other hand, by retiring South of
Suvla I could first hold a line Lala Baba--Yilghin Burnu--Kaiajik
Aghala, and then, when normal wastage diminished my strength below this
limit I could, if necessary, withdraw into the original Anzac position.
For these reasons it must probably be Suvla and not Anzac which must be
given up, though on account of its advantages as indicated above, and on
account of the moral effect of retiring, you may rely on my not
relinquishing it a single day before I am compelled.

"I do not wish to paint a gloomy picture. It is a simple problem of
arithmetic and measurement. On the basis of normal wastage and the
present scale of drafts my total fighting strength by the middle of
December, including the French, will be only, say, 60,000. Of this
force, a certain percentage must of necessity be resting off the
peninsula, and the remainder will only suffice to hold Cape Helles and
the original Anzac line unless, of course, the enemy collapses. Until
now, however, the Turks replace casualties promptly, although frequently
by untrained men. Also our other foe, sickness, may abate, but seeing
how tired are the bulk of my force, I doubt if it would be wise to
reckon on this."

At 11.15, red hot from France, there arrived in camp Byng (to command
the 9th Corps), Maude and Fanshawe (to command Divisions); also Tyrrell
and Byng's A.D.C., Sir B. Brooke, nephew of my old friend, Harry Brooke.
All three Generals remained for lunch and then the two Divisionals made
off respectively to the 11th and 13th Divisions. Byng and Brooke stayed
and dined. These fellows seem pretty cheery. Maude especially full of
ardour which will, I hope, catch on.

_24th August, 1915. Imbros._ Been resolving yesterday's long cable. How
often it happens that a draft letter, if only it is well put, fixes the
mind into its grooves. My words were brighter than Dawnay's but the
backbone was not really me. No one knows better than myself that a great
deal more than arithmetic or measurement will be needed to make me give
ground at Suvla. The truth is, it is infinitely difficult to spur these
high folk on without frightening them; and then, if you frighten them,
you may frighten them too much. That's why cables are no substitutes for
converse.

To a Commander standing in my shoes, the forces of the infidels are not
one half of the battle. The wobblers sit like nightmares on my chest.
"Tell them the plain truth" cries conscience. What is the plain truth?
Where is it? Is it in Dawnay's draft, or is it in my message, or does it
lie stillborn in some cable unwritten? God knows--I don't! But one thing
at least is true:--to steer a course between an optimism that deprives
us of support and a pessimism that may wreck the whole enterprise, there
indeed is a Scylla and Charybdis problem, a two-horned dilemma, or
whatever words may best convey the notion of the devil.

The blessed cable is now lying on the well-known desk where K. will
frown at it through his enormous spectacles. Then he calls the
Adjutant-General and tells him Hamilton must be mad as all his
formations are full to overflowing and yet he says he is 45,000 short.
Next enters the Master-General of the Ordnance with a polite bow and K.
tells him Hamilton must be delirious as he keeps on raving for shell,
bombs, grenades although as he, Von Donop, knows well, he has been sent
more guns and explosives than any man has ever enjoyed in war.
Impossible to be so disrespectful to the Field Marshal or so
inconsiderate to their department as to reject the soft impeachment. How
easily do the great ones of this world kid themselves back into a
comfortable frame of mind! Then K. stalks off to the Dardanelles
Committee.

Turns out that Cox and Russell did even better than Birdwood had thought
in the fighting on the 21st and the morning of the 22nd. They have
killed more Turks and the line held runs well out to the North-east and
quite a good long way to the North of Kaiajik Aghala.

Byng left to take over his command. Davies came over from Helles and
stayed for dinner.

The _Imogene_ sailed in with Mails. News by wireless of German Naval
defeat in the Baltic and Italian declaration of war against Turkey.
Well, that part at least of K.'s aspirations has come off; we have
dragged in Italy. Now--will she send us a contingent?

Davies dined. With his ideas still framed on Western standards he puts
it forcibly, not to say ferociously, that we must, must, _must_ be given
our fair share of trench mortars, bombs and gun ammunition. Fresh from
France he watched the artillery preparation at Helles and (although we
had thought it rather grand) says we simply don't know what the word
bombardment means. Instead of seeing, as in the Western theatre, an
unbroken wall of flame and smoke rising above the enemy trenches about
to be stormed, here he saw a sprinkling of shells bursting at intervals
of 20 yards or so--a totally different effect. And yet the Turks are as
tough as the Germans and take as much hammering!

When I read the British Press, starved and yet muzzled, I feel as if I
could render my country no better service than to kill my friend the
Censor and write them one or two articles.

By surprise either Army can bulge in a sector of the opposing lines but,
until one Army loses its _moral_, neither Army can break through. An
engine will be found to restore marches and manoeuvres but, at this
historic moment, our tactics are at that stage. To break through, Armies
must advance some six or seven miles; otherwise they can't bag the
enemy's big guns. But, the backbone of their attack, their own guns,
can't support them when they get beyond five or six miles. The enemy
reserves come in; they come at last to a stop. A three or four mile
advance _should_ be easy enough, but, in the West, that would mean just
three or four miles of land; nothing more. But _here_, those three or
four miles--nay, two or three miles--(so ineffective in France) are an
objective in themselves; they give us the strategical hub of the
universe--Constantinople!

Suppose even that by paying the cost in lives we did succeed in driving
the Germans over the Rhine, still we stand to gain less than by taking
this one little peninsula! A quarter of the energy they are about to
develop for the sake of getting back a few miles of _la belle France_
could give us Asia; Africa; the Balkans; the Black Sea; the mouths of
the Danube: it would enable us to swap rifles for wheat with the
Russians; more vital still, it would tune up the hearts of the Russian
soldiery to the Anglo-Saxon pitch.

Victory by killing Germans is a barbarous notion and a savage method. A
thrust with small forces at a weak spot to bring the enemy to their
knees by loss of provinces, resources and prestige is an artistic idea
and a scientific stroke: the one stands for a cudgel blow, the other for
rapier play.

We take it for granted that we have to "push" in France and Flanders;
that we _have_ to exhaust ourselves in forcing the invaders back over
their own frontiers. Whereas, content to "hold" there, we might push
wherever else we wished.

I can well understand that a Frenchman should say, "Let the world go
hang provided I get back my _Patrie_, whole; undivided and at once."
Indeed, only the other day, one of the best French Generals here, after
speaking of the decisive, world-embracing consequences of a victory at
the Dardanelles, went on to say, "But we ought to be in France." Seeing
my surprise he added, "Yes, I am quite illogical, I admit, but until our
nine _departements_ are freed from the Boche, world strategy and tactics
may go to the devil for me."


Have been writing my weekly budget. Part of my letter to K. harks back
to the first Suvla landing, and tries to give him a better notion of the
failure to profit by the enemy's surprise. Not that I have yet got any
very clear conception of the detail myself. No coherent narrative does,
in fact, exist. New troops, new Staff, new Generals, heavy losses, have
resulted in the confusions, gaps and contradictions still obscuring the
story of those first few days.

Now that I am getting more precise news about what fighting there was,
it seems clear that this great mass of young, inexperienced troops
failed simply because their leaders failed to grasp the urgency of the
time problem when they got upon the ground, although, as far as orders
and pen and ink could go, it had been made perfectly clear. But, in face
of the Turk, things wore another and more formidable shape. Had Lord
Bobs been Commander of the 9th Corps; yes, just think of it! How far my
memory carries me back. Every item needed for the rapid advance: water,
ammunition, supplies and mules closely and personally checked and
counter-checked. Once the troops landed a close grip kept on the
advance. At the first sign of a check nothing keeps him from the spot.
The troops see him. In an hour they are up upon the crest.

So far, so good. We had not another Lord Bobs and it would not have been
reasonable of us to expect him. But when I come to the failure of the
21st, where I have a seasoning of Regulars--as well as a commander of
energy--still we do not succeed. This time, no doubt, the enemy were on
the scene in force and had done ten days' digging; the non-success, in
fact, may be traced to the loss of the element of surprise; energy, in
fact, was met by preparation. The battle had to be fought like a
manoeuvre battle and yet the enemy were ready for us, more or less,
and already fairly well entrenched. Since the morning of the 7th the
chances had been rising steadily against us. Still, even so, the lack of
precise detail baffles me almost as much as in the case of the first
Suvla landing.




CHAPTER XVIII

MISUNDERSTANDINGS


_25th August, 1915. Imbros._ Davies left for Helles at mid-day. Was to
have gone with him but heard that Bailloud with Captain Lapruin would
like to see me, so stayed to receive them.

Have got K.'s answer to my cable pointing out the probable results of
his declared intention of sending us no "reinforcements of importance"
during an indeterminate period.

"(No. 7315, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton.
Your No. 578. You will, I hope, fully discuss the situation described by
you with Birdwood and the Generals who have just joined you, and, when a
thorough examination on the ground of the whole state of affairs has
been made, give me the opinion at which you arrive.

"It has been a sad disappointment to me that the troops have not been
able to do better, and that the drafts and reinforcements sent out to
you and Egypt, excluding any you have drawn from Egypt, amounting from
6th August to 47,000, have not proved sufficient to enable you to
contemplate holding your positions."

Braithwaite and I have been electrified by this reference to 47,000
drafts and reinforcements: it is so much Greek to us here: had there
been any question of reinforcements coming to us on that scale, my 578
of 23rd August would never have been sent.

On the heels of this has followed another:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"(No. 7319, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton. My
No. 7315. I hope that the result of your deliberations will reach me by
Friday morning, as the decision to be taken is one of considerable
importance."

I have replied off the reel:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"(No. M.F. 588). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. With
reference to your telegrams Nos. 7315 and 7319. I feel sure you cannot
think I would be capable of sending a telegram of such import as my No.
M.F. 578 without the deepest consideration and sense of my personal
responsibility which remains unaffected by any amount of conferences
with my subordinate commanders. I was careful in this instance, however,
to discuss the situation on the spot with both Corps Commanders
concerned and I then cabled you my considered opinion. I constantly
visit both Suvla and Anzac and have personally thoroughly examined the
state of affairs. In view of your telegram No. 7172, cipher, I do not
understand your allusion to 47,000 drafts and reinforcements from 6th
August as we have not been advised of any such number as 47,000. I felt
bound to lay the case plainly before you as to what might have to be
undertaken, though I do not contemplate giving up any position one hour
before I need. If the present wastage from sickness continues, however,
and if my cadres are allowed to fall below their present attenuated
strength I may be compelled to undertake such a step as I have
indicated."

Bailloud arrived at tea time. Away from Piépape he is another person. At
dinner, he cracked jokes even about serious things like the guns of
Asia.

Brodrick was carried off to the Hospital ship. The doctors think there
should be no real danger. We shall all miss him very much; as an aide he
has been A.1.; sympathetic and thoughtful.

Braithwaite dined to meet Bailloud.

_26th August, 1915._ After clearing my table and taking early lunch,
started off in the _Arno_ with C.G.S., Pollen, Freddie and Val. Sailed
for Suvla and went up straight to see Byng, brought by the whirl of
Fortune's wheel from a French chateau to a dugout. During the two days
he has been here, he has been working very hard. I hope he may not too
regretfully look back towards _la belle France_. Our old "A" Beach was
being briskly shelled as we walked down to our boats. Between Hill 10
and the sea there were salvoes of shrapnel falling and about every
thirty seconds a big fellow, probably a six incher, made a terrible
hullaballoo. The men working at piling up stores "carried on."

[Illustration: GENERAL BAILLOUD _"Exclusive News" phot._]

When we got back to G.H.Q. there was a heavy thunderstorm in progress.
Mail bag closed 9.30.

During our inspection at Suvla this "Personal" from K. to myself has
been deciphered:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"(No. 7337, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton.
Personal. I considered it advisable, that as the decision the Government
may have to come to on your No. 578 is one of grave importance, the
Generals out there should previously fully consider the situation on the
Gallipoli Peninsula; hence my No. 7315. It was intended to obviate any
possibility of overlooking points and in such cases two or more heads
sometimes elucidate matters that might otherwise be missed or not given
due weight to. It was in no way intended thereby to detract from the
importance of your views on the subject or to minimise your personal
responsibility for them.

"I have no idea of the French Generals' views on the matter, and you
were apparently not fully considering the drafts and reinforcements that
were being sent out.

"A detailed telegram is being sent you from the office of the 47,000 men
mentioned in my No. 7315.

"I hope that the return of Younghusband's Brigade from Aden to Egypt
will still further increase these in a day or two (less one battalion).

"But you should look on the forces in Egypt and your own as a whole,
allowing, of course, for the proper defence of Egypt, when you take the
general situation at the Dardanelles into consideration.

"Do you think the Navy could do anything more than they are already
doing to help the situation? I hear it is thought that they could land
heavy naval 6-inch guns on positions such as those in square 92 M and
other points, and might threaten from Aja Liman the main road of Turkish
supplies between Karna Bili and Solvili (by gunfire from ships) and also
bring a heavy and effective shell fire on the Turkish positions at and
behind Anafarta. There is a cabinet to-morrow."

I would much like to sleep over this cable--so plain seemingly; really
so obscure. At face value, how splendidly it simplifies the Dardanelles
problem! Had I been, all along, as this cable seems to make me, the
C.-in-C. of the Eastern Mediterranean with Maxwell administering my
Egyptian Base, then, humanly speaking, this entry would have been dated
from Constantinople. But am I? I can't believe it even now, with the
words before me. Anyway, whether by my own fault or those of others, one
thing is certain, namely, that up to date there has been
misunderstanding. Now, the Cabinet of to-morrow forces me to send a
momentous wire without too much time to think it over. To clear my brain
let me set down the sequence of facts as they have so far appeared to
me:--

       *       *       *       *       *

Less than a week ago--20th inst.--K. cables me he is sending certain
units to Egypt and certain other units to the Dardanelles. The units and
their ships are named. He says there is going to be a big push in
France and that I must look to these troops, earmarked for the
Dardanelles, plus any I "can obtain from Egypt" to carry on. He winds up
by saying, "It is hoped the troops going to Egypt will enable Maxwell to
send you more fighting men on your demand."

This same assumption that the G.O.C., Egypt, and myself are two equals
each having equal command over his own troops, is fully borne out by
another cable of the 21st August. My cable of 23rd August is based on
these messages; i.e. on the idea that we must carry on here for a good
long time to come with very little to help us. Then comes K.'s of the
25th telling me he is sorry 47,000 drafts and reinforcements he has sent
to Maxwell and myself since 6th August are not going to be enough to
enable me to hold on. But no one can make head or tail of these 47,000
drafts and reinforcements; no one can run them to ground. He has
notified me the units and the ships, but the total coming to Maxwell
_and_ myself don't tot up to that figure, much less the portion of them
detailed for the Dardanelles.[11] Now comes to-day's cable in which
Egypt is spoken of as being mine, and the fatness thereof. Taking this
message _per se_, any one might imagine I could draw any troops I liked
from that country provided that _I_ thought _I_ was leaving enough to
defend the Suez Canal: and, apparently, the 47,000 men are about to
make an effort to materialize inasmuch as we are told that details are
being wired us. Finally, Younghusband's Brigade sails to help us!

_27th August, 1915. Imbros._ As there is a Cabinet to-day I had to get
off my answer last night. In it I have made a desperate effort to
straighten out the tangle:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"(No. M.F. 589). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. On
returning from Suvla I have just found your No. 7337, cipher. I hope
there may be no misunderstanding as to meaning or intention of my No.
M.F. 578. I asked in my No. M.F. 562 for such drafts and reinforcements
as I considered necessary for the campaign to be brought to a conclusion
before the winter began. You told me in your No. 7172 that you could
spare no more reinforcements beyond those mentioned therein, and that if
I could not achieve success with these I must remain on the defensive
for some considerable time. I explained situation in my No. M.F. 578,
and said that the question was one of arithmetic and measurement. I was
anxious to hold all I had got and to gain more, but I required all my
available force at the present time merely to hold what I had got. I
pointed out that meanwhile a large proportion of my troops were urgently
in need of rest, and sickness was so great that unless reinforcements
were sent out my force would soon be too small for the number of yards
of front to be held. In that case, i.e., if reinforcements could not be
spared, but in that case only, it would be necessary to contract my
line. This welcome news of 47,000 reinforcements, however, alters the
whole situation. Such a number will do much to complete my diminished
cadres, and should materially lessen sick rate by giving more chance of
taking tired troops out of the trenches. Byng can certainly remain where
he is at present, and will even be able to rest some of the tired XXIXth
Division, while the arrival of the Australian Brigade will give General
Birdwood a similar chance of resting some of his troops.

"General Birdwood meanwhile is to make a further advance to-morrow on
the left flank, to gain possession of important tactical feature, which
will eventually help an advance when the time arrives. Byng is getting
everything in order and has infected all around him with his own energy
and cheeriness and has quickly grasped the whole situation.

"In communication with Maxwell I find I can have seven Territorial Force
units and the Scottish Horse, and now I have your welcome news of
Younghusband's Brigade. Please believe I am the last man in the world to
give up anything we have gained except under direct necessity, which I
trust may now never arise. The Navy is supporting me to its full
capacity. The guns of the four ships in Suvla Bay take on the Turkish
positions you mention almost as well as and certainly more safely than
if they were landed and placed where you suggest. Moreover, Navy cannot
lend those guns unless I supply the detachments to work them from the
Naval Division, and the latter is fully employed at present and cannot
spare the men. We are constantly sending ships round to Aja Liman to
fire at enemy positions from there, but I know you realize that one must
not rely too much upon effective fire on land targets from ships which
are not moored, as is the case in Suvla Bay.

"I have not consulted the French General about the situation in the
North as he is at the Southern end and on the right of the line there.
He thinks more of Asia than of these operations in which he has no
troops engaged, but I discussed the matter with him only last night.
Before I sent my No. M.F. 578 I discussed every point closely for two
hours with the Corps Commanders."

In the evening my A.G. brought me the promised details of the 47,000
drafts and reinforcements. He has gone into the detail in proper A.G.
spirit, namely, as an arithmetician rather than a tactician. The result
has given us a shock! 10,000 men of the 54th Division and 4,000 drafts
are shown in the War Office cable as being still due to come to me as
reinforcements whereas they had actually landed on the Peninsula; had,
indeed, been shown in my total fighting strength of 68,000 in my
original cable, M.F. 578 of 23rd August, and are, too many of them, alas
already _hors de combat_. Here is the passage sent four days ago:--"The
total casualties including sick since 6th August amount to 40,000, and
my total force is now only 85,000 of which the fighting strength is
68,000." In this 68,000 were included 14,000 of the men shown in
_subsequent_ War Office cables as being drafts and reinforcements on
their way to the Dardanelles!

So my A.G. has become a bit suspicious about the balance of the 47,000.
On paper, he says, it looks as if I might expect to draw from Egypt and
England 30,000 reinforcements, but--he remarks sententiously--"we know
by now that paper is one thing and men are different." As to
Younghusband's Brigade, it turns out they cannot be employed here: too
many Mahomedans. Have sent the following reply:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"(No. M.F. 595). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Secretary of State for
War. With reference to your telegram No. 7337, cipher. Have now received
details of the 47,000 drafts and reinforcements in your No. 7354 cipher,
and I find that this figure includes nearly 10,000 men of the LIVth
Division and 4,234 drafts, all of whom had been landed on the peninsula
when I wrote my No. M.F. 578, and were reckoned in the total fighting
strength of 68,000 mentioned in that telegram. The statement, however,
shows that I can expect from England and Egypt during the next six weeks
a total of some 29,000 reinforcements, including new formations and two
battalions of non-fighting lines of communication troops.

"This is a better situation than I was led by your 7172, cipher, to
expect, and you may rely on me to do the best I can with this addition
to my present very depleted strength. I hope, however, you realize that
whereas my British Divisions are now more than 55,000 rifles below their
establishment only 17,000 of these 29,000 are drafts, and before the
last of the drafts can arrive these divisions will have lost another 25
per cent. of their remaining number by normal wastage.

"In regard to Younghusband's Brigade, I learn that the three battalions
are practically half Mahomedans, and I am advised that it is better if
it can be avoided not to use Mahomedans so near the heart of Islam.
Would it not be possible to exchange these for some Hindu regiments in
France?"

These cables give us an uncomfortable feeling that the people at home
wish to regard us as stronger than we are--a different thing from
wishing to add to our strength.

On the other hand, another sort of message has come in which sheds a ray
of hope across our path so darkened at many other points:--

"(No 7372, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton.
Although it is understood that we do not at present see our way to
change the recent decision not to send any fresh complete divisional
units, we wish to have all the material possible on which to form a
judgment from time to time. Therefore, will you please telegraph me your
opinion, from the point of view of the military and strategical
situation now existing on the peninsula, as to the prospects there are,
after the experience you have recently had, of our achieving the main
objective of turning the Turks out and what force you would consider
would be required to do this."

Taylor of the G.S. lunched. A big parcel mail came in. Brodrick is to be
sent to Alexandria.

_28th August, 1915. Imbros._ Braithwaite and I both feel we must take
time to think over last night's last cable and I have wired to say so.

Cox's attack on Knoll 60 to the North-east of Kaiajik Aghala came off
well. The New Zealanders under Russell and the Connaught Rangers did
brilliantly. Fighting is still going on.

A reply from the War Office to mine of last week wherein I pointed out
that the once splendid 5th Battalion Royal Scots had fallen from a
strength of 1,000 down to 289. They have had no one since the campaign
began. To-day the Battalion is just over 250--a Company! Now I am
officially told that "no reinforcements can be found for the 1/5th
Battalion of Royal Scots." This is the Battalion which did so well about
11 o'clock on the dreadful night of the 2nd May. I shall cable the Lord
Provost of Edinburgh. If we could get into touch with the human beings
of Edinburgh they would help us to keep a battalion like the Royal Scots
on their legs even if they had to break up half a dozen new formations
for the purpose.

Freddie and I dined with de Robeck on board H.M.S. _Triad_. The V.A. was
well pleased with my cable of the 26th.

_29th August, 1915. Imbros._ Last night two cables:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"(No. 7414, cipher. C.I.G.S.). From War Office to General Headquarters,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. Reference your No. M.F.Q.T. 2737.
The two Territorial Force battalions originally detailed--_see_ my No.
7172 of 20th August--to sail in the _Orsova_ will be taken by the
_Ceramic_. Of these, the 2/5th Devons is only about 700 strong and
contains a large percentage of recruits, while the 1/6th Royal Scots
contains about 40 per cent. partially trained men and a new Commanding
Officer who has only just been appointed. Until it has had further
training neither battalion is fit for anything more than garrison duty.
I suggest that under these circumstances the _Ceramic_ should proceed
direct to Egypt."

"(No. 7401, cipher, 554/A.3.). From War Office to Inspector-General of
Communications, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. We are receiving from
Malta and Alexandria very large demands for materials and explosives for
making grenades. The supply of these seriously interferes with our
manufacture of grenades. At present we are hoping to send you 30 to
40,000 grenades weekly and this figure will be increased. When the
materials already sent out to Malta and Alexandria have been used up,
can the manufacture of grenades at those places cease? Please reply at
once; the matter is urgent."

Do what I will my pen carries me away and I find myself writing like an
ill-conditioned "grouser." As an old War Office "hand" I ought to
know--and I do know--the frightful time of stress under which Whitehall
labours. But, just look at these two cables, you innocent and peaceful
citizen of a thousand years hence! The residue of the famous 47,000
rifles sent me by the Adjutant-General are now being valued by the
official valuer, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. In all our
calculations the 2/5th Devons has hitherto masqueraded as an efficient
battalion at full strength. Figures are sometimes more eloquent than
words!

As to the second cable, that deals us a worse blow. Seeing clearly, at
last, we should extract no hand grenades from the War Office, we turned
to Maxwell and Methuen, who have interested themselves in our plight and
have been making us so many that, with what we ourselves can add to
their manufacture, we are at last beginning to make things hum in the
Turkish trenches. Then in comes this War Office cable to crush our
nascent industry and give us in exchange some pious aspirations.

There is no good making any trouble about the hand grenades. As to the
two raw battalions, I am asking they be sent, raw and weak as they are,
as I can train them in the trenches much better and more quickly than
they could be trained in Egypt or England.

Church Parade; office work; sailed over to "K" Beach; inspected Clearing
Stations and walked up to site for new camp. Then back to G.H.Q., to
meet the V.A. and Roger Keyes. They remain the best of friends always.

This evening we were all in good form owing to the news from Anzac.
Knoll 60, now ours throughout, commands the Biyuk Anafarta valley with
view and fire--a big tactical scoop.

_30th August, 1915. Imbros._ Still good news from Anzac. Seeing that the
stunt was on a small scale, we seem to have got into the Turks with a
vengeance. In falling back as well as in counter-attacking after we had
taken Hill 60, the enemy were exposed to the fire from our trenches
along the Kaiajik Dere. Birdie declares that they have lost 5,000. We
have taken several machine guns and trench mortars as well as some fifty
prisoners. Have sent grateful message to all on the spot.

At 10.30 four Russian Officers made their salaams. They are to report
how things are going, and they seem to have the usual quick Slav faculty
for grasping essential points combined, no doubt, with the usual Slav
slackness which lets them go again. I told them everything I knew. They
told us that our landing had saved the whole Army of the Caucasus; that
the Grand Duke knew it and that His Imperial Highness bitterly regretted
that, first of all, sheer lack of supplies; afterwards the struggles in
Galicia and Poland, had prevented Istomine and his Army Corps from
standing by to help.

At 1.30 the C.G.S., Deedes, Val., Freddy and I crossed to Helles in the
_Arno_. Had a hard afternoon's walking, going first to 8th Corps
Headquarters; next to the Royal Naval Division and last to the 52nd
Divisional Headquarters. Returned to the 8th Corps Headquarters and
there met Bailloud. He is now full of good cheer. Got back to
Headquarters without adventure or misadventure.

Have cabled home a suggestion made to me by Mahon, that the 16th Irish
Division at home might be used to fill up the gaps in the units of the
10th Division out here.

_31st August, 1915._ After early lunch, left in the _Arno_ for Suvla. With
me were Braithwaite, Manifold, Freddy and Val. Walked up to the 9th
Corps Headquarters and saw Byng. I am very anxious indeed he should work
his men up into the mood for making a push. He charms everyone and he is
fast pulling his force together. Maude, Fanshawe, and de Lisle seem to
be keen to do something, but Byng, though he also is keen, has the
French standards for ammunition in his head. He does not think we have
enough to warrant us in making an attack. Also, he does not realize yet
that if he is going to wait until we are fitted out on that scale he
will have to wait till doomsday.

Walked to de Lisle's Headquarters and saw him, and on to the 11th
Divisional Headquarters where I met Fanshawe and Malcolm. With them I
climbed back on to Karakol Dagh and sat me down on the identical same
stone whereon I sweated blood during that confused and indecisive battle
of the 21st August. From the Karakol Dagh I got a very fair idea of our
whole trench system. On either flank we hold the hills; elsewhere we are
on the flat. The 11th Division have recovered and only need drafts to be
as good a formation as any General could wish to command. In the evening
I left in the _Arno_ carrying off with me de Lisle and Captain Hardress
Lloyd to dine and stay the night. Quentin Agnew also dined.

My first feeble little attempt to act on K.'s assumption that Egypt and
its army are mine has fallen a bit flat. The War Office promptly agreed
to my taking these two weak, half-trained battalions, the 1/6th Royal
Scots and 2/5th Devons, to be trained in my trenches. That was
yesterday. But the Senoussi must have heard of it at once, for Maxwell
forthwith cables, "The attitude of the Senoussi is distinctly dangerous
and his people have been latterly executing night manoeuvres round our
post at Sollum." To me, the night manoeuvres of these riff-raff seem
ridiculous. But distance, perhaps, has lent its enchantment to my view.

The quibble that the troops in Egypt are mine has been broken to pieces
by my first touch! I have renounced the two battalions with apologies
and now I daresay the Senoussi will retire from his night manoeuvres
round Sollum and resume his old strategic position up Maxwell's sleeve.

_1st September, 1915. Imbros._ Remained at Headquarters working. Wrote,
amongst other things, to K. as follows:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"I have just finished two days' hard physical exercise going round
visiting Egerton and Paris with Davies, and Fanshawe and de Lisle with
Byng. At Helles everything is quite right although they have only troops
enough there for the defensive. They are getting a lot of stores in,
and the really only anxious feature of the situation is the health of
the men who are very, very tired right through, having had no sort of
relief for months, and who go sick in large numbers.

       *       *       *       *       *

"Fanshawe is first class. Full of go and plans, he will, if the Lord
spares him, be a real treasure. Maude and Mahon I am going to see after
Mail-day, and then I shall hope to inspect our new captured position on
the left of Anzac.

"I do not know if they showed you the cable saying Hammersley has gone
home very ill with a clot of blood in his leg. He has to lie perfectly
prostrate and still, so I am told, as the least movement might set it
loose and it would then kill him. Evidently he was not really fit to
have been sent out on service. And this was the man, remember, on whom,
under Stopford, everything depended for making a push.

"This Suvla Bay country, a jungle ringed round by high mountains, is
essentially a country for Boers or for Indian troops. De Lisle and
others who have watched them closely in India, say that a native soldier
on the Peninsula (although there, too, he goes to pieces if he loses his
Officers and under too prolonged a strain) is worth at least two Indian
soldiers in France. The climate suits him better, but, most of all, the
type of enemy is more or less the sort of type they are accustomed to
encounter. Not _Sahibs_ and _Ghora Log_ in helmets but _Mussalman Log_
in turbans. As to the South Africans there can be no two opinions, I
think, that they would stand these conditions better than those of
Northern Europe. Indeed, we have one or two Boers serving now with the
Australians, and they have done extremely well."

Some of K.'s questions take my breath away. I wish very much indeed he
could come and spend a week with me. Otherwise I feel hopeless of making
him grasp the realities of the trenches. On the 30th of August he
cables, "If required, I could send you a fresh consignment of junior
Officers. Or have you sufficient supernumerary Officers to fill all
casualties?" I have replied to him that, in my four regular Divisions, I
am short of 900 effective Officers in the Infantry alone. To meet my
total shortage of 1,450 Officers I have twenty-five young gentlemen who
have lately been sent out here to complete their training!

De Lisle and Hardress Lloyd sailed back to Suvla in the evening.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 11: As will be seen further on the 47,000 actually panned out
at 29,000, of whom two battalions were at once diverted to Egypt, whilst
two other battalions turned out to be non-fighting formations.--IAN H.,
1920.]




CHAPTER XIX

THE FRENCH PLAN


_2nd September, 1915. Imbros._ An ugly dream came to me last night. My
tent was at Imbros right enough, and I was lying in my little camp bed,
and yet I was being drowned, held violently under the Hellespont.

The grip of a hand was still on my throat; the waters were closing over
my head as I broke away and found myself wide awake. I was trembling and
carried back with me into the realms of consciousness an idea that some
uncanny visitor had entered my tent. Already the vision was fading. I
could visualize the form of the presence, but the face remained hidden
in shadow. Never had I suffered from so fearful a dream. For hours
afterwards I was haunted by the thought that the Dardanelles were fatal;
that something sinister was a-foot; that we, all of us, were pre-doomed.

Dreams go by contraries. Strange that so black a night should be
followed by a noon so brilliant--so brilliant beyond compare.

K. cables the French are going to send three or four Divisions to work
with us along the Asiatic mainland. From bankrupt to millionaire in 24
hours. The enormous spin of fortune's wheel makes me giddy!

These French Divisions will be real Divisions: _must_ be; they have no
others.

O, Hallelujah!

"The sending of a force of three or four Divisions to operate on the
Asiatic mainland, independent as regards command, but in close relation
with the British forces on the Peninsula, is being considered by the
French Government. They will require an exclusively French military base
at Mitylene, and us to help with transport and fleet.

"So far I have not discussed any details with the French, and have
simply told them we shall be delighted to have the help, which would be
given by such an expedition, towards the solution of the Dardanelles
problem.

"Presumably they would require their two divisions now at Cape Helles.
What forces would you require to relieve them? I have asked Sir John
French if the XXVIIth and XXVIIIth Divisions could be spared for this
purpose.

"Wire me any points that you think I had better settle with the French
authorities."

_Deo volente_ we are saved; Constantinople is doomed. How clearly stand
forth the mosques and minarets of the Golden Horn.

Mr. Murdoch, an Australian journalist, paid me a visit to thank me for
having stretched a point in his favour by letting him see the
Peninsula. Seemed a sensible man.

Glyn and Holdich dined: both clever fellows in different ways. Dawnay
and Glyn after dinner left for England. Dawnay goes to explain matters
first hand to K. Next to my going home myself, or to K. himself coming
out here, this is the best I can do. Dawnay is one of the soundest young
officers we have, but he is run down physically (like most of us) and
jaded. He should benefit by the trip and so should the rumour-mongers at
home.

_3rd September, 1915. Imbros._ Two cables: one to say that the news
about the French Divisions must be kept dark; the other, in reply to a
question by me, refusing to let me consult de Robeck on the matter. So
Braithwaite and I had to make out our cable expressing our delight and
thankfulness, and advising how the troops might best be used entirely on
our own.

The cable took some doing but got it off my chest by mid-day and then
sailed with Ellison, Braithwaite and Val by the _Arno_ to Suvla. We
landed this time on Lala Baba instead of at our usual Ghazi Baba. Every
five minutes the Turks plumped one six-incher on to the beach. But
nobody now seems to mind. A lot of Generals present; Byng, Mahon,
Marshall, Maude and Peyton. Mahon took me up to the top of Lala Baba and
showed me the disposition of his division. He kindly asked us all to tea
at his Headquarters but as someone added that Ashmead-Bartlett was
going to take a cinema photo of the scene I thought I would not be thus
immortalized. The Scottish Horse were bivouacking on the beach; they
have just landed but already they have lost a member or two of their
Mess from shell fire. No wonder they looked a little bewildered, but
soon they will shake down. When we got back to the _Arno_ we found she
had been hit by shrapnel, but no damage.

Things at Suvla are pulling together. No one gave me more confidence
than Maude. His mind travels beyond the needs of the moment. He is
firmly convinced that no very out-of-the-way effort by the Allies is
needed to score a big point in the War Game and that our hold-up here is
not a reality but only a hold-up or petrefaction of the brains of the
French and of our Dardanelles Committee. I longed to tell him he was
doing them both, especially the French, an injustice, and that four
splendid divisions were as good as on their way, but I had to content
myself with saying to him and to all the Generals that I was overjoyed
at a piece of news received yesterday.

_4th September, 1915. Imbros._ Life would be as ditchwater were it not
stirred to its depths by K.'s secret cable. Sailed over with Freddie at
11.30 to "K" Beach and inspected the 88th Brigade. Had given orders to
the _Arno_ to stand by and to take me over to Anzac in the afternoon,
but the weather was so bad that I could not get off to her in the motor
boat.

At 7.15 p.m. the V.A. sent his picket boat for me and Freddie and I went
on board the _Triad_. At 10 p.m. she started for Mudros.

_5th September, 1915. H.M.S. "Triad." Mudros._ Anchored at Mudros at 6
a.m. Breakfast over, was met by Altham, Colonel McMunn and Captain
Stephens who took me ashore. There I met Lindley, now commanding the
troops on the island; also General Legge (commanding the 2nd Australian
Division); Lord Dudley and Colonel Forster. Lindley seems pleased at
having been given this command; says he feels like a man out hunting who
has a bad fall but alights on his feet, and Altham tells me he is doing
the work very well. Dudley, too, seemed full of business and contented
with his lot.

The moment I got through the reception stunt I set myself to work like a
nigger at the Red Cross stunt:--that's how people talk now-a-days. Saw
the 15th Stationary Hospital; the 110th Indian Field Ambulance; "C"
Section of No. 24 British Indian Hospital; ate a hearty lunch; inspected
1st Australian Stationary Hospital. Walking round a Hospital and seeing
whether things are clean and bright is a treat but trying to cheer
people up and give a fillip to all good works--that implies an
expenditure of something vital and leaves a man, after a few hours,
feeling the worse for wear.

By 4.45 the day's task was well over so refreshed myself by some right
soldier business reviewing the 4th Gurkhas under Major Tillard--a
superb battalion--1,000 strong!!! Had forgotten what a full battalion
looks like. At 5.45 wound up by inspecting a huge Convalescent Depot
under Colonel Forde and got back to the _Triad_ just in time for dinner.
Wemyss dined also.

_6th September, 1915. H.M.S. "Triad." Mudros._ After breakfast sailed
over to Mudros West; Lindley met me, also a host of doctors. Walked to
No. 3 Australian Hospital with an old acquaintance whose Italian name
slips my memory at the moment; then to No. 2 Australian Stationary
Hospital; then to Convalescent Depot of Lowland Division. At 12.30 ran
down to my launch and was swiftly conveyed to lunch on board the
_Europa_ with Admiral Wemyss. Such a lunch as a lost voyager may dream
of in the desert. Like roses blooming in a snowdrift, so puffs and pies
and kickshaws of all rarest sorts appeared upon a dazzling white
tablecloth, and then--disappeared. We too had to disappear and sail back
to Mudros West again. Horses were waiting and I rode to No. 18
Stationary Hospital and made a thorough overhaul of it from end to end;
then tea with the Officers of No. 1. In No. 3 Australian General were
eighty nurses; in No. 3 Canadian Stationary seven nurses; in No. 1
Canadian Stationary twenty-four nurses. Since Lady Brassey descended in
some miraculous manner upon Imbros, they were the first white women I
had seen for six months. Their pretty faces were a refreshing sight: a
capable crowd too: all these Hospitals were in good order, but the sick
and wounded in charge of the girls looked the happiest--and no wonder.
The Canadian Medicos are fresh from France and discoursed about
_moral_. Never a day passed, so they said, in France, but some patient
would, with tears in his eyes, entreat to be sent home. Here at Mudros
there had never been one single instance. The patients, if they said
anything at all, have showed impatience to get back to their comrades in
the fighting line. We discussed this mystery at tea and no one could
make head or tail of it. In France the men got a change; are pulled out
of the trenches; can go to cafes; meet young ladies; get drinks and
generally have a good time. On the Peninsula they are never safe for one
moment (whether they are supposed to be resting or are in the firing
line) from having their heads knocked off by a shell.

Returned to the _Triad_ in time for dinner.

Admiral vexed as his motor boat has gone ashore. Bowlby is with it
trying to get it off.

The French Admiral commanding the Mediterranean Fleet has just sailed
in.

_7th September, 1915. Imbros._ At 9.30 left the _Triad_ to call on
Admiral de la Perriera on board the _Gaulois_. Thence to _H.M.S. Racoon_
(Lieutenant-Commander Hardy) and started back for Imbros, where we
arrived in time for tea.

_8th September, 1915. Imbros._ Trying to clear a table blocked with
papers as a result of my two days' trip. Have written to K. as the Mail
bag goes to-morrow. Have told him I have had a nice letter from Mahon,
thanking me for allowing him to rejoin his Division and saying he hopes
he may stay with them till the end. Have given him all my Mudros news
and have sent him a memo. submitted to me by Birdwood showing how much
of the sickness on the Peninsula seems due to the War Office having hung
up my first request for a Field Force Canteen.

Here is one of the enclosures to Birdwood's memo.:--

       *       *       *       *       *

  "N. Z. and A. Division.

I desire to draw attention to the remarkable drop in the sick
evacuations from this Brigade as shown by the following figures:--

  August 28 -- 59.
     "   29 -- 64.
     "   30 -- 58.
     "   31 -- 17.
  Sept.   1 --  2.
     "    2 --  6.

I am convinced that this amelioration, and the observable improvement in
the condition of the men are largely to be attributed to the
distribution, on August 30 and 31 of Canteen Stores, providing a welcome
change of dietary.

I strongly recommend that every effort be made to maintain such Canteen
supplies.

                                                (_Sd._), MONASH."

_9th September, 1915. Imbros._ At 9.30 Admiral de la Perriera returned
my call. At 11.50 Braithwaite, Freddy and I went aboard the _Gaulois_.

[Illustration: FISH FROM THE ENEMY, _"Central News" phot._]

A five course lunch and I had to make a speech in French.

When I got back I found that General Marshall, commanding the 53rd
Division, had come over from Suvla to stay with me. Lancelot Lowther
dined; he told us all the important things he was doing.

_10th September, 1915. Imbros._ Lancelot Lowther left with the Mails at
7 a.m., glad, I suspect, to shake from his feet the sand of these
barbaric Headquarters.

Not easy to get Marshall to loosen his tongue about the battle of the
21st, and he would not, or could not, add much to my knowledge. The
strength of Marshall depends not on what he seems but upon what his
officers and men know. He has got his chance amidst the realities of
war. In peace, except by a miracle, he would never have risen above the
command of a Battalion. The main reason I cannot draw him about the
battle of the 21st is, beyond doubt, that he does not want to throw
blame on others.

Marshall is a matter-of-fact, unemotional sort of chap, yet he told the
sad tale of young O'Sullivan's death in a way which touched our hearts.
O'Sullivan was no novice where V.C.s were the stake and the forfeit
sudden death.

_11th September, 1915. Imbros._ Ran across in the motor boat to see the
86th Brigade under Brigadier-General Percival. Went, man by man, down
the lines of the four battalions--no very long walk either! These were
the Royal Fusiliers (Major Guyon), Dublin Fusiliers (Colonel O'Dowda),
Munster Fusiliers (Major Geddes), Lancashire Fusiliers (Major Pearson).

Shade of Napoleon--say, which would you rather not have, a skeleton
Brigade or a Brigade of skeletons? This famous 86th Brigade is a
combination. Were I a fat man I could not bear it, but I am as
unsubstantial as they themselves. A life insurance office wouldn't touch
us; and yet--they kept on smiling!

_12th September, 1915. Imbros._ The C.O.'s, Geddes, Pearson, Guyon and
O'Dowda, lunched: an ideal lot; young, ardent, on the spot. Marshall
left by the Suvla trawler. Windy day, but calmer in the evening and at
night rained a little.

_13th September, 1915. Imbros._ Crossed again with Freddie Maitland and
inspected the 87th Field Ambulance (Highland Territorials from Aberdeen)
under Colonel Fraser. Became so interested the dinner hour was
forgotten--a bad mark for a General. Much pleased with the whole show:
up to date, and complete in all respects. Got back lateish. Altham
dined. Sat up at business till midnight.

Dictated a long letter to Callwell, Director of Military Operations at
the War Office, on the suicidal behaviour of the Military Censor. In
South Africa, my Chief of the Staff's latchkey let many a clandestine
tit-bit slip through to keep interest alive in England. K. regularly,
when the mails came back to roost, went for me, but the messages had got
home and done their duty as good little tit-bits should. The B.P. cannot
work up the full steam of their war energy when the furnaces of their
enthusiasms are systematically damped down; shut off from any breath
from outside. Your sealed pattern censor sees nothing beyond the
mischief that may happen if the enemy gets to know too much about us; he
does not see that this danger is negligible when compared with the
keenness or dullness of the nation.

                       General Headquarters,
                           Medtn. Expeditionary Force,
                                 13th September, 1915.

  "Dear Callwell,

"I am about to commit an atrocity by writing to an overworked man on a
subject which may seem to him of secondary importance. Still, to the
soldiers out here, the said subject means encouragement or
discouragement coming to them through the medium of their home
letters,--so vital a factor in victory or failure that the thought
emboldens me to proceed.

"Our misfire of last month came within only a fine hair's breadth of the
grand coup and caused us proportionately bitter disappointment at the
moment. Yet, looking back over the whole affair in a more calm and
philosophical spirit, any General, I think, would now be bound to admit
that in some respects at least fortune had not been too unkind.

"The Australians and New Zealanders have been extricated from what by
all the laws and traditions of war, was, in theory, an untenable
position; their borders have been enlarged; the heights they hold have
become more elevated and commanding; they have been entirely released
from shelling on the one flank and, on the other, the shelling has
dwindled away to next door to nothing. North of them again we have
captured a more or less practicable winter harbour, and have extended
our grip on the coastline. From the extreme South point of Anzacs to
their extreme North was formerly 2-3/4 miles. From the extreme South
point of Anzacs to our extreme North point (along which there is
inter-communication) is now 13 miles. Thus we force the enemy to
maintain a much larger number of troops on the Peninsula (where he is
already slowly bleeding to death under the stress of his supply and
transport difficulties) or else dangerously to weaken parts of his line.

"As to the fighting by which this has been accomplished, there is
nothing from beginning to end that any army need be ashamed of. Every
word I sent home in my Proemial cables might have been published without
raising a blush to the cheek of the most ardent Imperialist. In saying
this I do not, of course, assume that raw troops could tackle a totally
strange and uncomfortable proposition with the swift directness and
savvy of veterans. The feat performed by the Australians and New
Zealanders was of the class of the storming of the heights of Abraham,
only it was infinitely, infinitely more difficult in every respect.

"On the other side, still assuming the philosophical mantle, consider
what might have happened. Had the Australians and New Zealanders been
average troops, they would perhaps have burst through the first series
of wire entanglements and trenches, but they would not have stormed the
second, still less the third, fourth, fifth or sixth lines. Again, had
the Turks got the smallest inkling of our intention, the landing at
Suvla Bay would have failed altogether, and the New Armies would have
been virtually smashed to pieces without being able to show any _quid
pro quo_.

"We soldiers out here have then it seems to me, much for which to thank
God on our bended knees. That, at least, is my personal attitude.

"How is it then that our letters from home are filled with lamentations
and that, having just gained a proportionately very large accretion of
territory, we see headlines in the papers such as 'The Gallipoli
standstill,' whereas it does not seem to occur to anyone to speak about
'The French standstill'?

"Well, I will tell you. The system upon which the Press Bureau
approaches the eagerly attentive ear of the British Public is the
reason.

"Why I begged the War Office to change the method by which I sent copies
of my Proemial cables to Maxwell was that I found he (animated, of
course, by the best intentions) was improving the successes and
minimising the failures. The finishing touch was given when, one day, he
inserted the phrase 'The enemy is demoralized and has to submit by day
and by night to our taking his trenches.' Obviously, even the most
stupid fellaheen after reading such a sentence must, in the course of
time, begin to ask himself how, if trenches are being easily taken by
day and by night, we still remain on the wrong side of Achi Baba!

"Turning now to the Press Bureau and our landing, there was nothing in
that landing, as I have just said, which need have caused sorrow to a
soul in the British Isles excepting, of course, the deplorable heavy
casualties which are inseparable now from making any attack. But, on the
23rd of August a correspondent cables to an American paper a sensational
story of a decisive victory, which the Press Bureau must have known to
be a tissue of lies. Had the lies taken the shape of disasters to the
British there would not, from the point of view of us soldiers, have
been the smallest objection to publishing them. Suppose Mr. X, for
instance, had said that the landing did not succeed, and had been driven
off with immense slaughter? Apart from the fact that such a cable would
have made many poor women in England unhappy for a few hours, the
fabrication would have done us positive good: when the truth was known
the relief would have been enormous, we would have gained handsome
recognition of what had actually been done, and German inspired lies
would have been discounted in future.

"But there is no _moral_ in the world that can stand against a carefully
engineered disappointment. When you know perfectly well that the spirits
of the people are bound to be dashed down to the depths within a few
days, it is unsound statesmanship surely so to engineer the Press that
you raise those selfsame spirits sky high in the meantime. To climb up
and up is a funny way to prepare for a fall! If you know that your
balloon must burst in five minutes you use that time in letting out gas,
not in throwing away ballast. If you want to spoil a man's legacy of
£500 tell him the previous evening he has been left £50,000!

"As I began by saying, do please forgive me, my dear Callwell, for
taking up your most precious time. But you are more in touch with this
particular business than anyone else at the War Office and, from your
large mindedness, I feel sure you will be able to spare me some
sympathy, and perhaps even get some recognition for the general
principle I herewith put forward:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"(1). Do not too curiously censor false alarmist reports put about by
the enemy. Let the papers publish them with a query and then smash them
as soon as this can be done with positive certainty.

"(2). Mercilessly censor any report which you think is, even in the
smallest degree, overstating your own case.

"The system needs courage but, with the British Public, it would pay!

                           "Yours sincerely,
                              (_Sd._), "IAN HAMILTON."

As suspense had, by now, become unbearable, cabled home asking S. of S.
to "let me know, as soon as you can safely do so," when the new
divisions may be expected. I tell him I have "informal" news from the
French but dare not take action on that.

_14th September, 1915. Imbros._ Mails in with Ward as King's Messenger.
Captain Vitali (Italian liaison officer) and Captain Williams dined.
Vitali is worried about his status. He was told in the first instance he
was to be liaison officer between General Cadorna and myself. On this
understanding we agreed to his coming to our Headquarters. Once he was
here the Italian Government (not Cadorna he is careful to explain) said
he must be permanently attached to us. Vitali feels himself in a false
position as he thinks that,--had we known, we might not have let him
come. Personally, I am quite glad to have him; but we did not have much
talk as, immediately after dinner, Braithwaite brought me the decipher
of Lord K.'s answer to my reminder to him. This has greatly saddened me
and takes up the whole of my thoughts.

"(No. 7843, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton.
Reference your No. M.F. 630. I have just returned from France where I
went to settle up the questions asked in that telegram which were in a
very indefinite state owing apparently to a decision having been arrived
at by the French Government without reference to their military
advisers. The outcome of my meeting with Millerand, Joffre and Sarrail
was that the French force of four Divisions proposed to be sent to the
Dardanelles cannot leave until the result of the approaching offensive
in France is determined. If it be as successful as hoped for your
position in the Dardanelles would naturally be affected favourably. It
is hoped that the issue will be clear in the first few days of October,
and if indecisive, that by 10th October two of our Divisions may be at
Marseilles for embarkation to be followed closely by the four French
Divisions. The embarkation and transport of so large a force would, it
is thought, take about a month, but this has still to be worked out in
detail, so that by about the middle of November would be the time when
all would be ready.

"In the meantime, as transport is available, I shall continue to send
you reinforcements and drafts of which you are fully informed, up to
20th instant, and on which you should alone calculate.

"Sarrail, backed by General Bailloud, is greatly in favour of the French
expedition being employed independently on the Asiatic shore.

"Joffre greatly doubts the wisdom of this course, and Millerand
requested me to ask you to state fully and confidentially, for his
personal information, your opinion on this matter.

"Joffre's objections appear to be that a landing in Asia opens up a very
wide field if the force be not immediately successful, and that in that
case more troops, munitions and drafts would be eventually required than
he could spare with due regard to the safety of France.

"Secondly, he is not very confident of Sarrail's leadership,
particularly as the plans Sarrail has made seem to be worthless. Joffre
is having careful plans worked out by his Staff for the expedition on
the Asiatic shore which, he says, though unfinished, do not look
promising. The same objection on his part would not, I gather, be felt
if the French troops were given a definite area and objective on the
Gallipoli Peninsula, where the scope of their activities, and
consequently the support required from France, could be limited."

Where's the use of M. Millerand's consulting me over what lies on the
far side of a dead wall? Had he asked me to show why action here should
have priority over action in France, then I might have been of some use.
But that is settled: the four French Divisions earmarked for the East
will not now be sent until _after_ "the results of the coming offensive
in France have been determined." "If the success of this push equals
expectations you will reap the benefit." If indecisive then, "by the
10th October," two British Divisions and four French Divisions will be
at Marseilles ready to sail out here: "about the middle of November
would be the time when everything would be ready." There are altogether
too many ifs and ands and pots and pans about Millerand's question.
When a man starts going West who can foretell how long it will take him
to arrive at the East?

(1) If the push in the West is victorious we will score, says K. That is
so. Far as the Western battlefield lies from the scene of our struggle,
the report of a German defeat in France would reverberate Eastwards and
would lend us a brave moral impetus. But the point I would raise is
this:--did K., as representing a huge Eastern Empire, press firmly upon
Millerand and Joffre the alternative,--_if the push in the East is
victorious the West will score_?

What express strategical gain do they expect from pushing back the
Germans? A blow which merely destroys a proportion of men and material
without paralysing the resources of the enemy is a blow in the air. War
cannot be waged by tactics alone. That is a barbaric method. To bend
back the German lines in the West, or to push the first line back on to
the second or third, or twentieth, has of itself but slight strategical
or economic import.

Here, on the other hand, we have literally in our grasp a clear cut gift
offered us by the Gods. The impossible part, the landing, is done. All
that remains is so many fresh men and so many thousand shell. The result
is not problematical, but mathematical. Napoleon is the only man who has
waged a world war in the world as we know it to-day. Napoleon said, I
think it was on the famous raft, "Who holds Constantinople is master of
the world." And there it lies at the mercy of the Briton--could he only
convince Joffre that the shortest cut to freeing his country from the
Germans lies through the Dardanelles.

The principles which should underlie Entente strategy will be clear to
military historians although obscured to-day by jealousies and
amateurishness: just the usual one, two, three they are, in this
order:--

       *       *       *       *       *

(a) Hold the sea.

(b) Hold the West.

(c) Smash the Turk.

A couple of miles won by us here gives England wheat and Russia rifles;
gives us the whip hand in the Balkans plus security in a couple of
Continents. A couple of miles lost by us here leaves the German with a
strengthened grip upon all the real world objectives for which he went
to war: it leaves us with a ruined prestige in Asia. But what is all
that to Joffre to whom, as a good Frenchman, the Balkans; the bracing up
of the Russian Army; all the Odessa corn; Asia and Africa thrown in, do
not count against _one departement_ of _la Patrie_.

(2) If the push in the West is indecisive then our push is only to be
postponed. Postponed! The word is like a knell. To write it gives me a
feeling of sick despair. Only postponed! As well cable at once, _only_
ruined!!

(3) But there is a third eventuality not mentioned by Lord K. How if our
attack upon the main strength of the entrenched Germans is beaten off?
To Joffre France comes first and the rest nowhere--every time: that
is natural. But our Higher Direction are not Frenchmen--not yet!
Armageddon is actually being fought _here_, at the Dardanelles, and the
British outlook is focused on France. We are to sit here and rot away
with cholera, and see the winter gales approach, until the big push has
been made in the West where men can afford to wait--where they are
healthy--where time is all on their side. And this push in the West is
against the whole German Empire linked to all its own vast resources by
a few miles of the best railways in the world. We _can_ attack here with
more men and more munitions than the enemy the very moment we care to
accept the principle that, _at this moment_, Constantinople and the
heartening up of Russia and ascendency amongst the Balkan States are not
only the true positive objectives of our strategy, but are the sole
strategical stunts upon the board. We can do so because of our sea
power. We can borrow enough howitzers, aeroplanes, munitions and drafts
from the West; apply them here and then, if necessary, return them. We
are not exploiting our own special characteristics, mobility and sea
power!

[Illustration: MARSHALL LIMAN VON SANDERS _"Exclusive News" phot._]

Easy to preach patience to a nation in agony? Yes, for the whole agony
of the whole world is more important even than the agonies of France.
We've got to win the war and win it quick. There's only one way to do
that. The resources of the Entente are not equal to carrying on two
offensives at the same moment. If our Army in the West will just sit
tight awhile, we here will beat the Turks, and snip the last economic
lien binding the Central Powers to the outside world.

Once more, our game is to _defend_ in the West until the _attack_ in the
East has borne economic fruit in the shape of ships and corn: political
fruit in the sentiment of the Balkans: military fruit in the fillip
given to the whole force of the Entente by actual tactical contact
between the British soldiers and the rank and file of the Ruskies. The
collapse of the Central Powers,--eclipsed in full view of all Asia and
Africa by the smoke from the funnels of the British Fleet at anchor in
the Golden Horn is what we are after here. Even if French and Joffre do
drive the German main hordes back to the Rhine the scope of their scoop
would be far less than ours, for we by getting to Constantinople can
starve those main armies stiff.

How few of our people know anything of the Russians. At least, I have
been attached for eight months to the Armies which fought against them
in the field; have visited Russia and Siberia and have done two peace
manoeuvres as their guest. To send superior officers to Russia only
produces jealousy; to send supplies only breeds dishonesty. But with
50,000 British soldiers as yeast we could leaven 5,000,000 Muscovites;
we could fire their inert masses with our ardour; this is the best of
all uses to which 50,000 British soldiers could at present be put.

From the early days when he told me the New Army should go to Salonika,
K. had an intuition at the back of his big mind that victory would dawn
in the East. But he is no longer the K. of K., the old K. of Khartoum
and Pretoria. He still has his moments of God-sent intuition. First, he
had _absolute_ knowledge that the Germans would come through Belgium: I
repeat this. The assumption was not uncommon perhaps, but he _knew the
fact_! Secondly, when everyone else spoke of a six weeks' war; when
every other soldier I can think of except Douglas Haig believed he'd be
back before the grouse shooting was over; K. went nap on a three years'
war. Pray heaven he was wrong; but, right or wrong, he has already
proved himself to have been nearer the mark than anyone else. Thirdly,
he had a call (by heavenly telepathy, I suppose) that his New Armies
must go out to the East. There is no more question about this than there
is about Belgium and the three years' duration. He has told me so; time
and again.

Why then does he not act accordingly if he's in the Almighty know?
Because he can't. With the one exception of the Battle of Paardeberg, he
never in his palmiest days pretended to be a man of action. But now he
has lost his faculty of forcing others to act. He makes a spurt but he
can't stay the distance. He has met Millerand, French and Joffre in
Council and allowed the searchlights of his genius to be snuffed out!
That is what surprises me:--He, who once could deflect Joe Chamberlain
and Milner from their orbits; who twisted stiff-necked Boers round his
little finger; who bore down Asquith, Winston, Prince Louis and Beatty
in Valetta Harbour--East _versus_ West--Mediterranean _versus_ North
Sea--who, from 8 p.m. to 2 a.m., withstood, wrestled with and overthrew
Haldane's arguments in favour of his taking up the succession to the
Duke of Connaught, and that although he had one arm tied to his side by
having taken the King's shilling. What a marvel he was and now--

  Ichabod!

There is something so tragical in what home letters let us guess that
the pity of it almost makes me forget our own stillborn projects.

_15th September, 1915. Imbros._ Altham and Major Hood left G.H.Q. for L.
of C. Headquarters. Had another hour with Altham before he got aboard
his destroyer. Gave an interview to Buchanan, A.M.S. After lunch,
Braithwaite, Val, Wells, Deedes, Freddie and myself went off to Suvla
aboard H.M.S. _Scourge_ (Lieutenant-Commander Tupper). On landing,
Braithwaite branched off to see the G.S. Byng has a keen sense of
humour; is energetic and by his looks and manner attracts all ranks. No
one could wish a better corps commander and I have never in all my
experience known anyone take greater and more minute trouble with his
field days and manoeuvres than he did in Egypt the year before the
war. But his sojourn on the Western front has given him inflated
standards as to the number of guns and stocks of H.E. shell which are
essential to success; especially with troops who have suffered heavy
losses. Perhaps he is right. This para. from a letter written to the
great man to-night explains more generally what I feel:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"Maude is burning to get on and do something and I heard him myself ask
Byng when he was going to let him have a dash. As to Byng, I think
myself he is not quite sure yet about the spirit of his men. I have been
trying to spur him on for the last day or so, although only by very
gentle hints, as I think, with a man of Byng's great reputation, one
must leave him to himself for as long as possible. I daresay he may be
quite right and very wise. Still, these reinforcements have brought the
Suvla Bay troops up to no less than 37,000 men, and I am most anxious
they should do something soon a little more rapid than sapping out
slowly towards the enemy's lines--which they are doing."

After my talk with Byng, we went on to meet Fanshawe and de Lisle. Maude
came along with me as far as the crestline. I asked him about his
Division. He replied: "Sir Ian, may I be frank with you about the
Division?" At these ominous words I shivered. They positively gave me
the shivers. So I braced myself up when I answered, "But of course!"
Maude then said, "If you give the order now, and will arrange for a
little artillery support, my Division will storm and hold on to any
thousand yards of Turkish trench you like to point out; to-morrow." I
could have embraced him, but I had to go steady and explain to him that
a Corps Commander must judge all his Divisions and that, taking the
situation as a whole, Byng did not think it fair on the men to let them
have a dart yet--not, at least, till they had more munitions at their
back. Byng has had wide experiences in the West and he looks on it as
trying the men unfairly to ask them to attack without a preliminary
bombardment on a scale which we cannot at present afford. "Yes," said
Maude, "that is all very well but after all you must remember the Turks
have neither the artillery nor the munitions the Germans have at their
command on the Western front."

"Well," I replied, "you put your points to Byng and you know I am a man
who never yet in my life refused a good brave offer like yours." He has
a great admiration for Byng and so, though sadly, he went away.

Fanshawe met me at the South end of the Division trenches, as bright and
keen as a new nail. His men, too, seem full of go. Fanshawe hopes to
carry the whole ridge whenever he gets the order. The 11th Division
promise to be as fine a unit as any in the Army once they get their gaps
filled in.

_16th September, 1915. Imbros._ We had quite a lively morning here. At
7.30 an enemy's biplane dropped four bombs on our Headquarters camp and
got away with hardly a shot fired at it. At 7.50 an enemy's Taube came
over and dropped bombs near my Signal Tent, also a little summer shower
of small steel darts: five men were wounded. At 8.10 a.m. yet another
enemy biplane circled round but was kept at a respectful distance by the
ship's guns.

Gave an interview to Colonel Stewart, Armoured Car Squadron.

Vice-Admiral Foumet and Staff called on me in the forenoon. He replaces
Admiral Nicol gone sick. Mails went out this evening. Freddie and I
gave tone to our debilitated constitutions by dining with the ever
hospitable V.A. on the _Triad_.

A cable from Dawnay saying Lord K. "would not regard unfavourably" a
withdrawal from Suvla Bay.

Dawnay left under the cloud of the 21st August. He it was who
rough-drafted the cable (in very much stronger terms than my final
version) suggesting that we might have to draw in our horns if we were
not kept up to strength. Since then our skies have cleared; the spirit
of the men has risen to set fair and we have got drafts enough, not for
a big push but certainly to enable us to be delighted should the Turks
attempt any sort of an attack, either at Suvla or anywhere else. The
Turks, in fact, are strictly on the defensive both actually and in their
spirit.

_17th September, 1915. Imbros._ Had been going to Anzac to inspect and
then to bring Birdie back to stay with me. But the weather was too bad.
He got here all right as the wind is from the North and he was able to
climb aboard under the lee of Nibrunesi Point. Just as well, perhaps, we
did not go, for one way or another a good deal of extra work had to be
got through. One thing; two cables from Maxwell to the War Office have
been repeated to us here; inadvertently we think; divertingly for sure.
The story is this:--

       *       *       *       *       *

A few days ago we were offered the 51st and 53rd Sikhs who, despite
their titles, are half Mahomedan. After consulting Cox, Birdie and
other Indian Army Officers I cabled back saying we would gladly have
them "as soon as transport can be arranged," unless French is willing to
exchange them for two purely non-Mahomedan units. Here are the
collateral cables from Maxwell to the War Office:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"Both the 51st and 53rd Sikhs have already been disembarked. They had
better remain off ship as long as possible, I think, since they are
reported to be feverish. The troopship can wait at Port Said. The men on
the canal, I should like to point out, barely get two nights in bed per
week."

"I have been asked by Hamilton to send him a double Company of Patiala
Sikhs to reinforce the 14th Sikhs. I can do this, and if you concur I
think it is a better arrangement than to send him the 51st and 53rd
Sikhs."

The Sikhs meant for Gallipoli are gone; we shall never see them more;
they mount guard by night against the ghosts of the Suez Canal.

Another thing; a Correspondent writes in and tells us that for the
honour of his profession he feels bound to let us know that Mr.
Ashmead-Bartlett has secretly sent home an uncensored despatch _per_, of
all people in the world, Mr. Murdoch!

I had begun to wonder what had come over Mr. Murdoch and now it seems he
has come over me!

The next paper on the table was my draft cable of advice for M.
Millerand. Joffre wants his four Divisions to land on the Peninsula;
Sarrail wishes them to work along the Asiatic side. No doubt the views
of the French Generals are being coloured by their wish to stand as
clear as they can of British command. So I have been careful to sweep
away _that_ obstacle by offering to stand down. Now they can fix up the
problem on its merits:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"Closest consideration has been given to your No. 7843, cipher. Until
now I have consistently opposed a landing on the Asiatic side of the
Straits with less than 6 divisions--see my telegram No. M.F. 349 of 19th
June. On Gallipoli Peninsula area and difficulties of supply limited
liabilities of the opposing forces whereas mainland of Asia gave scope
for the deployment of large forces by the enemy. Now, however, the
situation is clearing up and there has been a great change in the
conditions.

"The Turks had formerly 10,000 to 12,000 men on Asiatic shore with large
reserves on the Peninsula available to cross over there if necessary.
Now Anatolia and Syria have been drained of troops to oppose us on the
Peninsula where the Turks have far longer front to hold, namely, 9-1/2
miles instead of 2-1/2, whilst our position and strength at Suvla and
Anzac are more threatening to their communications than was our position
at Anzac in June. If, therefore, we can be strong enough to maintain
pressure on whole Turkish line on the Peninsula it is unlikely that
Turks could detach troops to oppose French landing on Asiatic shore.
Assuming even that the Turks were enabled to release every soldier from
Thrace by a definite understanding being arrived at with Bulgaria, I
calculate they might gather a total of five divisions but of these
probably only one or at most two would be on Asiatic side at beginning
of the operations and would probably be scattered so that opposition in
strength to surprise landing is improbable. Moreover, only one of the
divisions is composed of good Nizam troops, others believed to be not up
to establishment. The Asiatic coast down to Yukeri Bay is now heavily
trenched but I do not think much has been done below that point.
Supposing, therefore, French bring good divisions at war strength and
succeed in keeping their destination secret, they appear to have a good
chance of obtaining good covering positions without much loss and of
thence advancing on Chanak defeating any Turkish forces sent against
them. Degree of their success would depend on whether the entrenched
positions which have been prepared on the Kum Kale--Ehren Keui road
could be turned by the good road which leads from Yukeri through Ezine
and Ishiklar to Chanak, as it is unlikely that Turks would be able to
quickly organize new defensive positions with entirely new line of
supply. The distance of landing place from objective is a secondary
consideration. It is easier to march and fight 100 miles than to take
three lines of trenches. In the one case there is room for manoeuvre
at which Turks are bad while in the other case siege warfare results at
which the Turks stand supreme. Once Ehren Keui reached, the Turks
between that place and Kum Kale would be forced to retire and Kum Kale
would become our base, thereby greatly shortening line of supply.
Supposing Turks endeavoured to make bridgehead on Chanak promontory, the
country is so big that large forces would be necessary and once the
Turks were cut off from North their supply difficulties would be most
serious. French possession of Chanak should be equivalent to victory,
but as Turks are stubborn fellows it is better to confine anticipations
to commencement of results which I consider would be as
follows:--Cutting off of Turkish supply line Chanak to Akbashi Liman.
Narrows would be useless to Turks. Nagara communications could be cut.
Our 15-inch howitzer could be used to batter Kilid Bahr forts. Allied
Fleets should be able to enter Marmora without loss.

"Turning to alternatives. If French were held up and unable to reach
Chanak, at least the last Turkish reserves would have been used up and I
think happy termination of operations though postponed would begin to
come clearly into view. Supposing the worst happened and that the French
were compelled to fall back after landing. In that case a clear road for
retirement to a bridgehead would be open. Positions covering landing
could be taken up and there they would continue to draw towards them
considerable Turkish forces which would otherwise be available for use
on Peninsula.

"Finally, greater difficulties beset all other schemes. The notorious
military disadvantages of independent command would be less harmful if
the respective armies were separated by the Straits than if they were
mixed up together on Peninsula. As Achi Baba is now one of the
strongest fortresses in Europe, it would be unpopular to palm off the
Cape Helles end upon the French. Moreover, all the French here are, and
always have been, dead set on Asia. If the French were employed at Suvla
they would have to fight side by side with the British, a situation
which, with co-equal commanders, would be a military absurdity. Were
that course decided upon, I would ask the Allied Governments to make up
their minds which General had the most daring, brains and experience,
and if it were the Frenchman I would serve under him loyally.

"As to making the attempt to the North of the Gulf of Xeros: a landing
there is certain to be opposed, and the Turkish reinforcements which are
always held ready in the neighbourhood of Uzunkiupru and Keshan could
arrive in strength very quickly and imperil the whole project. A further
objection lies in the distance of the French intermediate base and great
strain it would throw on Allied Fleets. Finally, it is all-important
that absolute secrecy should be maintained. I suggest that it should be
allowed to leak out that the destination of the French is Enos, this
would probably have the effect of tricking Turkish troops in Thrace, as
Enos is a destination which would gain most credence."

Birdie has at last worn off the fine edge of his keenness; he looks a
little tired: General Russell, the New Zealander, dined also and was in
great form.

_18th September, 1915. Imbros._ A cable to say that the French
Government are anxious to form two bases each capable of supplying three
Divisions: one to be at Mudros, the other at Mitylene. Is it business?
In spite of delay, in spite of lost chances, is it business?




CHAPTER XX

LOOS AND SALONIKA


Left G.H.Q. at noon to-day, 18th, sailed to Helles; lunched with Davies;
went up to inspect the East Lanes Division. The trenches are in
apple-pie order and the men are in good heart, but the stomach has
always been held to be the mainstay of the fighting man, and theirs are
in the grip of enteritis. Stopped at 5th Corps Headquarters on my way
back.

De Putron and la Borde came back with me. Struck an interesting
scientist called Lawes whilst I was in the Lancashire trenches. As we
were entering the harbour at Kephalos an enemy Taube tried to drop a
bomb aboard. No harm.

Dined with the V.A. together with Birdie, Lord Anglesey and Freddie.

When we got back found this from War Office. Rather amusing to be in the
know of the counter moves and to see their outcome:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"The exchange of battalions mentioned in No. 7873, cipher, of 14th
September cannot be effected, so that at present the 51st and 53rd Sikhs
will not proceed to France. From the General Officer Commanding,
Egypt's, telegram No. 1854. E. of 15th September, it is understood that
he can send you another double company of Patiala Sikhs to reinforce the
14th Sikhs. Possibly this will suffice for your requirements in the
meantime, and the 51st and 53rd Sikhs will be left at the disposal of
General Officer Commanding, Egypt. If so, will you please make
arrangements with him accordingly?

"Repeated to General Officer Commanding, Egypt."

Our defeat is a foregone conclusion: the Senoussi is too strong for us.
All the same I am determined to press the matter to an issue, if only to
have a clean cut precedent as to whether we do have a first call on
troops in Egypt or whether it is the other way about. We want these men
so badly. They don't get sick here; are worth four European Battalions
at present, and Birdie has become most anxious to get them, especially
the 53rd. So I am cabling to Maxwell just to send us our troops (for
they are ours) forthwith and have cabled to the War Office:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"With reference to your telegram No. 8012, cipher. In accordance with
your telegram No. 8711, of 11th September, I am asking General Officer
Commanding, Egypt, to send here, at once, the 51st and 53rd Sikhs, as I
cannot do without them. I shall be very glad to receive the Patiala
Sikhs as well, as the 14th Sikhs are badly in need of a reinforcement."

Imagine had we been sent Indian Divisions for Suvla and if the New Army,
Territorials and Yeomen had been sent instead to France! Each category
would have given (let me put it mildly) double value. The heat, the
thirst, the scrub, the snipers, all so disconcerting to our fresh
contingents would have been commonplaces of frontier warfare to our
Indian troops. See what the handful with us here have achieved. Yet in
vain do I write and cable my personal entreaties to Beauchamp Duff, the
all-powerful Commander-in-Chief in India, and a very old friend, for two
hundred Sikhs: first he offers me a couple of hundred Brahmins wherewith
to fill the ranks of the famous 14th Sikhs and then, when I hesitate
before a proposal which appears monstrous, withdraws even that offer.
Again, I beg for 200 recruits for the 14th, saying I will train them
myself; I am refused--very politely and at great length--refused,
because it would be "politically inexpedient" to send them. In vain do
we try to get our own two battalions through the Egyptian morass; they
are going to stick and do sentry go over nothing. Why; were there any
real trouble in Egypt I could land a whole Division there within four
and a half days!

As for the New Army and Territorials, gradually entered with their
veteran comrades in the trenches of France and Flanders, they too would
have had more familiar surroundings and fairer play--as everyone here
now recognizes, too late!

The crystals of history take shape while we fight. As in a glass darkly
the outlines begin to appear to anyone who has a moment wherein to peer
beyond the end of the war. Everything has gone by the contrary. Our
people have done as well as their neighbours, and better, with their
imaginations, whether in diplomacy, strategy or tactics. Where the
Gibbon or Plutarch who survives the War Office Censor is going to damn
their reputations into heaps is over their failure in business
commonsense. Under their noses, parts of their system, were two great
live organisms; the Indian Army and the Territorial Force. From the
moment the mobilization flag was dropped it was up to them to work tooth
and nail to treble or quadruple these sound, vigorous existing entities.
What have they done? After a year of war, the Indian Army and the
Territorial Army are staggering on their last legs instead of being the
best part of our forces. Compare the East Lanes Division, who had the
good fortune to escape from War Office clutches by getting right out to
Egypt at the outbreak of the war, with Territorial Divisions which have
remained since then under the eyes and in the hands of the War Office!

The Turks are still withdrawing troops from the Caucasus front to ours.
Good for the Russians. Whilst I was at Helles, the enemy guns started a
heavy bombardment along the whole of our nine mile front from the right
of Anzac to the left of Suvla; a heavy musketry fire also along the
Turkish trenches. An attempt was then made to launch infantry assaults
against our lines, but these fizzled out, the rank and file having no
heart for the job. There is no doubt the Turks have had enough of it.
They can still hold on, but that's about all.

_19th September, 1915. Imbros._ News in to say that the Turkish rank and
file at Suvla are not equal to any attack. At the end of the bombardment
yesterday a few officers jumped on to the parapet and waved their
swords; the men shouted from the safety of the trenches--that was all.
Alec McGrigor arrived from Alexandria as A.D.C. _vice_ Brodrick. At 9
p.m. an enemy aeroplane dropped a couple of bombs. Very jolly having
Birdie here. He says that his latest returns show a daily sick list of
ten per battalion of British or Australian troops and of one per
battalion of Indian troops.

_20th September, 1915. Imbros._ Nothing doing. There is still scope for
action at Suvla but we can't get them to take up any little schemes we
may suggest. Shell shortage is the invariable answer. At 5 p.m. Birdie
and Anglesey went back to Anzac.

_21st September, 1915. Imbros._ Further development of the Sikh
comedy:--Maxwell cables, "No. 1883 E. Your No. M.F. 648. I have received
no orders to send these regiments. According to my last information from
the War Office they were to remain here, as I require them, but that I
should send you a double company of Patiala Sikhs to reinforce the 14th
Sikhs."

I have cabled this on to the War Office, saying, "As I understand it,
your No. 8012 of 18th September does not mean that the War Office have
withdrawn the offer of these two regiments, which are urgently required
here. I therefore hope that you will give early authority to General
Officer Commanding, Egypt, to send them on to Mediterranean
Expeditionary Force."

The battalions were thrown at my head when that grand statement was made
as to the grand army I commanded; now where are they?

Started off with Taylor, Freddie and Colonel Napier (British Military
Attaché to Bulgaria) for Anzac. No shelling. Went round the whole left
centre and left of Birdie's position to right and left of Cheshire
Point, and saw the new Australian Division--very fine fellows. Bullets
were on the whistle and "the boys" were as keen and happy as any real
schoolboys. Memories of the Khyber, Chitral and Tirah can hardly yield
samples of a country so tangled and broken. Where the Turks begin and
where we end is a puzzler, and if you do happen to take a wrong turning
it leads to Paradise. Met various Australian friends--a full-blown Lord
Mayor--many other leading citizens both of Melbourne and of Sydney.

At 5 p.m. re-embarked. Napier gave birth to a happy thought on our way
back. His idea is that we should transfer the troops on the Gallipoli
Peninsula to Salonika so as to hearten up the Serbians and Greeks and
dishearten our enemies at Sofia. He has pressed his view, he said, on
the Foreign Office. I asked him if his Chief, the Minister at Sofia,
stood behind him. He said he could not vouch for his Minister's views,
but that he, Napier, had power in his capacity as Military Attaché to
correspond with the British Government direct.

K. himself did at one time toy with the thought of sending his New Army
to Serbia either under Rundle or myself, and was only restrained by the
outbreak of typhus in that country. But, keen as I was for the warpath,
a very little study of the terrain and supply question was enough to
cool my ardour.

Salonika is ruled out by history. In all the campaigns waged of old in
these very regions the part played by Salonika has been naval, not
military. There must have been some reason for this: there was; it still
exists--geography! You could not, and cannot, carry out anything big
_via_ a couple of narrow cracks through a trackless labyrinth of
mountains. The problem is a repetition of the Afghanistan dilemma. A big
army would starve at Nisch and along the Danube; a small army would be
swallowed up by the enemy. Unless they are going to trust to Bulgaria
and Roumania for supplies, one British Army Corps is about as much as
can manage to live and fight in Serbia. If they want to make Serbia safe
their only possible chance is to push through to Constantinople! There
is no other way. I said all this to Napier and a lot more besides and
left him keener on Salonika than ever.

He actually thinks that from Salonika we could do what could be done by
us at any time at the Dardanelles! Salonika is no alternative to the
Dardanelles. I wish the War Office could hear Gouraud; Gouraud, that big
sane man with local knowledge. How strong he used to be on the point
that Greece lay altogether outside the sphere of any military action by
the Entente. We can't feed Russia with munitions through Salonika, nor
can we bring back Russian wheat _via_ Salonika,--not much, seeing we
would not be able to feed ourselves were we fifty miles into the
mountains. Salonika is a military mare's nest.

Scatters Wilson and Captain Cheape dined and stayed the night. The
King's Messenger arrived with the Mails.

Three cables:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"(No. M.F. 654). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to War Office. Only two
machine guns per battalion are being brought by the City of London
battalions, the balance, by order of General Officer Commanding, Egypt,
being handed over to Chief Ordnance Officer, Egypt. The former
telegraphs that this has been done by your order. There is nothing that
is more important to my force than an ample supply of these guns. I
would therefore request that early authority should be given to General
Officer Commanding, Egypt, to send on these guns."

"(No. I.D. 116). From General Headquarters, Mediterranean Expeditionary
Force, to War Office. My No. I.D. 110. Please inform me whether Murdoch
has arrived, and whether my information was correct as regards his
carrying a despatch for Sir Harry Lawson from Ashmead-Bartlett."

"(No. 8108, cipher). From War Office to General Headquarters,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. Your No. I.D. 116. A despatch
answering the description has been taken from Murdoch at Marseilles. You
should delay action, however, until we have seen it and you hear from us
further."

The despatch should have been censored here and ought, therefore, to be
sent back here for censoring. The War Office, I suppose, want to have
first look in!

_22nd September, 1915._ Scatters and Cheape sailed back for Suvla at
6.45 a.m.--just in good time to avoid a raid on our Headquarters carried
out by three Taubes between 7.50 and 8 a.m. A dozen bombs dropped; no
serious harm done.

Heseltine, King's Messenger, came to dinner.

Bad news from Bulgaria. She is mobilizing, not, we may be sure, for the
sake of helping those who do not help themselves. Well do I remember
Ferdinand, as long ago as 1909, turning to me and saying as he pointed
to a picture of himself in the robes of a Byzantine Emperor, "_Quand
vous arrivez au Bosphore, pensez à moi_." Well, there is one good side
to working over a narrow Peninsula, under the guns of your own Fleet,
all the Bulgars in the Balkans cannot add a rifle to the number of enemy
troops on Gallipoli, who already, can only be munitioned, watered and
fed with the greatest difficulty. The more targets the enemy cram on to
their present narrow front the merrier for our gunners; the better the
chance for our submarines starving the lot of them. So long as our Fleet
holds the Ægean, we may snap our fingers at the Bulgarians, whereas
they, were they fools enough to come here, would live on tenter hooks
lest haply some fine morning our Fleet should sail into the Marmora.

Yes, two or three battleships in the Marmora! Think of it! The sea
communications, Constantinople-Gallipoli and Asia-Gallipoli, would
cease, _ipso facto_, to exist. The railways between Europe and
Constantinople and Asia and Constantinople must shut down. In a
fortnight the Turks on the Peninsula begin to pack up; in a month the
Turks in Constantinople move bag and baggage from Europe to Asia.
Ferdinand watching the cat's jump, prepares to turn those 400,000
bayonets of his against the Kaiser. So wags my world in the might-be;
very much "might-be" for the Navy are turning down the "to be" for the
third time of asking. Three times the Sibyl makes her prodigious offer:
May--August--September a new world for old battleships:--two--four--six!

_23rd September, 1915._ Stormy weather: the _Imogene_ could hardly crawl
out. Have written K. to tell him how day succeeds day, never without
incident, but never with achievement; how we are burnt up with longing
to get on and how we know that he is as anxious. Yet, as I tell him,
_we_ "can't force the pace." How can we? We have not the
wherewithal--the stuff. "Byng would like to have four days' successive
bombardment for an hour, and then attack, and speaks of one H.E. shell
per yard as pat as if they were shells we could pick up on the seashore.
I have assured him it is no earthly use; that he shall have his share of
what I have got, but that stuff for bombardment is simply not in
existence,--not here, at least."

_24th September, 1915. Imbros._ Fought against exasperation all day. As
I thought:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"(No. 8193, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton. In
the existing situation, the two battalions referred to in your No. M.F.
655 of 21st September, should remain for the present in Egypt. I have
informed Maxwell to this effect."

K. has re-opened the idea of giving up Suvla, saying, "it might become
necessary in certain eventualities to abandon that area." In my reply I
have said, "I hope there will be no question now of the abandonment of
Suvla.... In the Northern zone I have now more troops than at the time
of my telegram, my line is stronger, the old troops are resting, the new
troops are improving, and preparations are being made for a local
advance. At this stage withdrawal will be a great moral victory for the
Turks. Moreover, it would release a large number of enemy divisions to
oppose the Russians in Asia, or for other enterprises."

Another cable also sent dealing with the ever present, ever pressing,
ever ghastlier shortage upon the Peninsula generally:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"My present shortages, 21st September, of infantry rank and file are
2,645 in the XXIXth Division, 17,166 in the three New Army Divisions,
and 23,986 in the four Territorial Divisions, totalling 43,797; out of
respective establishments of 11,652, 37,869 and 44,824, total, 97,345."

Were the Royal Naval Division included the percentage would be worse.

Peter Pollen and I dined with the Admiral. After dinner, we discussed
Fox-Ferdinand's little tricks. The Admiral had heard a lot about his
flirtations with the Duke of Mecklenburg lately sent from Berlin on some
sort of an ambassadorial mission to the Balkans. I told him of my visit
to Sofia during the interval which took place between Prince Ferdinand
proclaiming himself Tsar, and the tardy and unenthusiastic recognition
of his new rank by Great Britain. Ferdinand's Court Chamberlain asked me
to dine. I wanted to refuse as I had meant to go on to Constantinople,
but Sir George Buchanan, our Minister, begged me to accept. Diplomatic
relations were broken off; he had not seen Ferdinand for a month: he
wanted to know what that Prince would say to me: "_but_," he added, "you
must on no account go in uniform. Seeing you are on the Army Council it
would almost amount to a recognition of his Kingship if you went there
in uniform." I thought this a little far-fetched; however, I wrote back
and said that I had the honour to accept, but that, as I was travelling,
I had only my _kleine Uniform_; i.e., undress kit, handy. I proposed,
therefore, with permission to take the liberty of presenting myself in
evening dress, wearing miniature medals and decorations and the ribbon
of the Grand Cross of the Bath. By return messenger an answer came back,
"His Majesty particularly wished once more to see the admirable British
uniform:" would I come in _kleine Uniform_; meanwhile, to put me quite
at my ease, H.M. had commanded the Court also to wear undress. I showed
this to Sir George, who laughed and said, "He is too sharp; he has done
us; you must go now--there is no help for it." So I went in my grubby
blue serge and found Ferdinand and the whole of his Court blazing with
orders in the fullest of full dress!

_25th September, 1915._ To Anzac in the _Arno_. Birdie met me and we
walked along the lower part of the left of the Australian trenches until
we reached the New Zealanders and were joined by Godley. Lunched with
General Inglefield; then plodded through the trenches held by his
Division (the 54th; nice-looking boys) and by the Indian Brigade. On the
left of the Indian Brigade I was met by Peyton who did pilot to me
through the Scottish Horse section. The Bard joined us here and was in
great form, full of administrative good works as in South Africa. The
Scottish Horse are as keen as schoolboys out for their first shoot. They
were very proud of themselves and of the effect their rifles with
telescopic sights had produced when put into the hands of gillies and
deer stalkers, and at every twenty yards or so there was a Scottish
Horseman looking along his sights, finger on trigger, and by his side a
spotter whose periscope was fixed on the opposite loophole. The moment a
Turkish shadow darkened the loophole the word was given, the bullet
sped. Not a very big mark a loophole at over 100 yards but they got it,
they said, one try out of three.

At the end of the Scottish Horse we came to the Worcester Yeomanry
trench. But time was up[12] and I had to make tracks for Anzac where we
had tea with Birdie, who had stuck to us throughout the tour. Imbros by
dinner-time. The quietest day, bar none, we have had on the Peninsula
since we first landed. Not a shot was fired anywhere except by our own
snipers.

_26th September, 1915. Imbros._ Last night, after dinner, Braithwaite
came across with a black piece of news in his pocket:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"(No. 8229, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton. On
account of the mobilization of the Bulgarian Army Greece has asked the
Allies to send a force to Salonika in order to enable her to support
Serbia should the latter be attacked by Bulgaria, as well as by German
forces from the North. No doubt you realize that if by such action
Bulgaria joins hands with the Central Powers they will have a clear road
to Constantinople and Gallipoli, and be able to send large quantities
of ammunition or troops, rendering your position very hazardous.

"Both France and ourselves have promised to send between us the troops
asked for, viz., 150,000 men, and urgency is essential. It is evident
that under these circumstances some troops will have to be taken from
the Dardanelles to go to Salonika, but it must be clearly understood
that there is no intention of withdrawing from the Peninsula or of
giving up the Dardanelles operations until the Turks are defeated. Your
staff officer has suggested to me that you saw no difficulty in reducing
the length of your line and concentrating your forces by withdrawing
from the position now held around Suvla Bay to the neighbourhood of the
Kaiajik Aghala position whence a line might be drawn to the sea.

"Before the situation was changed by the Bulgarians' action we
considered that, owing to the marshy nature of the country now occupied
at Suvla and the approaching winter, this reduction of front would be
strategically advantageous. Hence my telegram No. 8162 to which your No.
M.F. 664 replies.

"An offensive along practically the whole line in France has now
commenced. The infantry are attacking to-day. Far-reaching results are
anticipated which, if secured, should greatly affect your situation.

"The projected dispatch of reinforcements of French and British
divisions for Asiatic operations must be in abeyance until a decision
in the Western theatre can be reached. The troops now at the Dardanelles
which are required for Salonika would be two divisions, preferably the
Xth and XIth. The French would also have to withdraw either a brigade or
a division from their force at Helles for the same purpose. The Yeomanry
now _en route_ to you would also have to be diverted to Salonika and we
should have to arrange to mount them from Egypt after their arrival.

"Cable me at once your ideas as to meeting these requirements. The
Dardanelles Committee consider a withdrawal from Suvla to be advisable
under the circumstances, but they had not seen your telegram No. 664. We
have been asked to send the 15-inch howitzer, now on board ship at
Mudros, to Belgrade as soon as possible."

Amen--so be it! Our mighty stroke at the vitals of the enemy is to break
itself to pieces against the Balkans. God save the King! May the Devil
fly away with the whole of the Dardanelles Committee!!

What arguments--what pressure--I wonder can have moved K. to swap horse
in mid-Dardanelles? In December K. as good as told me I was "for it" if
the day should come along for his New Army to help the Serbians. G.H.Q.
in France had belittled his effort to create it; they had tried to throw
cold water on it (the New Army) and now we should see how they liked it
going to Salonika! The reason why K., at that time, turned the project
down was his view that one Army Corps was too small a force to launch
into those regions of great armies and that, if the Germans turned
seriously in that direction, it would be gobbled up. But two Army Corps
would starve, seeing we had no pack transport and that the railway would
only feed 40,000 men. Nor had we any mountain guns. In February he
resurrected the question but that time he was put off by the typhus.
"Whatever destroys my New Army," he said, "it shall not be the Serbian
lice." Now he cables as if he was being quite consistent and sensible,
_now_, when in every aspect, the odds have turned against the
undertaking. As to the Bulgarians having "a clear road to Constantinople
and Gallipoli" my memorable dinner with Ferdinand, and his insistence on
his "pivotal" position, makes me perfectly certain that the bones of no
Bulgarian grenadier will fertilize the Peninsula--whatever happens. And
if the inconceivable were conceivable and Ferdinand were to work for
anything but his own immediate gain--there is no room for them here!
That fact is cast iron. The Turkish Empire is _here_ in full force.
Enver can't feed more! These numbers cause us no alarm. Since the last
abortive effort of the Turkish Command to get their men to attack every
soldier in the trenches knows well that the enemy are afraid of us. They
dare not attack, they will not attack, and they cannot attack. We know
that quite well. If K. would only come out here he would realize that
the Turk has lost his sting. I don't mean to say he is not still a
formidable fellow to turn out of his trench, but he can't attack any
more: and that is just the moment we have chosen to sit down and do
nothing; now, when the enemy has been brought to a standstill!

During my absence Bailloud has wired saying he had received orders from
his own Minister of War to arrange for sending away one Division of the
C.E.O. and Braithwaite has cabled the startling news to our S. of S. for
War.

Well, well. If the Greeks and ourselves are going to push through the
mountains to help the Serbs to hold Belgrade and the line of the Danube,
why then, no doubt, we are embarking upon something that would be fine
were it feasible--something more hopeful than sitting at Salonika and in
its salubrious suburbs, the "political" advantages of which were
preached to us by Napier.

But let no man hereafter talk of Dardanelles adventures. _Mon Dieu!_

Once again see the dupes of maps preparing to dash out their brains, or
rather the brains of others, against the rocks. If only Joffre and K.
had looked at Belgrade over the guns of an Austrian Battery in Semlin,
as I did in 1909! The line of the Danube is untenable except by a very
large force against the very large forces that can, and will, be brought
against it and there is no Fleet there to feed a large force. Also, the
communications of such a defending force will not only be mechanically
rotten but will also be strategically at the tender mercy of the most
cunning Prince in Europe. We may think we have squared Ferdinand. But it
is easier to square the circle than square a fox.

On the Danube, the Central Powers can put _and keep_ six men to our one,
_unless_ we control the river from its mouth to Belgrade. This we can
only do by forcing the Dardanelles.

After outlining an answer for Braithwaite to draft, I started off at
10.45 for Anzac and Suvla. With me were Taylor, Gascoigne, Lieutenant
Moore and Freddie. From Anzac I walked along the old communication
trench for a couple of miles, and then went round General Taylor's
Brigade along the front by Green Hill and the Chocolate Hills. The heat
was very exhausting.

Yesterday's calm has proved to be the prelude to an attempted storm. At
5 a.m. there was a big bombardment of the front line trenches, and the
Turks made a gesture of defiance. The gesture did not go beyond fixing
bayonets and shouting "Allah!" and the only result has been to render
Suvla more convinced than ever that the Turks are absolutely fed up.

After invigorating myself with a good draught of regimental spirit, set
forth to walk back to Anzac. Half way I halted at the Indian Brigade
Headquarters, and, on the invitation of the hospitable Colonel Palin,
had a square meal. Met Allanson, the brave commander of the 6th Gurkhas;
Allanson who scaled the heights of Sari Bair and entered for a few
hectic hours into the promised land. Oh, what a wonderful adventure his
has been! To have seen the Dardanelles and their defences lying flat at
his feet! To feel--as he says he did--that he held the whole Turkish
Army by the throat!

To-day's inspection has once more brought me into personal touch with
the perfect confidence felt both at Anzac and Suvla in the
demoralization of the Turks. This has nerved me to cable agreeing to
spare the 10th and 53rd Divisions from Suvla as well as a Brigade of
French from Helles and four and a half Brigades of British Field
Artillery:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"(No. M.F. 675). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Secretary of State for
War. Reference your No. 8229. Let me begin by saying that I quite
realize that, to you, playing for your large stakes, the Dardanelles
operation may temporarily become of a secondary nature. In spite of the
Salonika scheme I am, however, particular to note that it is not
intended to withdraw from the Gallipoli Peninsula, nor to give up here
until the Turks are beaten. Bearing this in mind it becomes my duty to
point out the objection to the abandonment of Suvla Bay, the
consequences of which at this stage would, I consider, be so grave that
I am warranted in running much risk to get you your two divisions by
other means. The situation has greatly changed since I first suggested
the possibility of abandoning the Bay, and its abandonment at this stage
would, I feel convinced, enormously accentuate the difficulties of any
subsequent attempt to capture the Narrows; unless, as a result of our
landing troops at Salonika, Bulgaria were induced to side with us and
not against us. Even when I told you in my No. M.F. 578 of 23rd August
that the diminution of my forces might compel me to contract my line, I
could not view the project without misgiving, in spite of the fact
that, at that time, I had landed few reinforcements and little artillery
in the new zone, and my views are not rightly interpreted when it is
said that I saw no great difficulty in the enterprise. After I had
received the reassuring news of reinforcements I sent you my No. M.F.
589 of 26th August and I have from that date been pouring in large
quantities of reinforcements and supplies in anticipation of winter, and
have landed a large additional amount of artillery. Therefore, I could
not hurriedly evacuate the Bay without sacrificing the majority of
supplies and warlike stores. I might also have very considerable losses,
for the Turks, who were previously 700 yards away, are now within
bombing distance in places. They have a large number of guns in the
northern zone and a retirement could only be effected under heavy fire,
which with unseasoned troops would make the retreat a hazardous one. As
explained in my No. M.F. 664 evacuation of the Bay would involve with it
the _eventual_ evacuation of all but the original Anzac position. But
even if this last step were not necessary the withdrawal of British
soldiers from Suvla would be an overwhelming victory for the Turks. Our
position in the Dardanelles would be entirely altered for the worse and
even the effect of our landing of troops at Salonika might be discounted
in Bulgarian eyes. At the present moment the Turkish commissariat
difficulties and tales of starving families which the wounded bring back
from Constantinople are having a bad effect on their _moral_ and the
number of desertions is on the increase. Two Turkish attempts at the
offensive have broken down completely during the last week as their
troops refused to leave cover. If I give ground the Turkish _moral_ will
immediately recover and instead of containing over 60,000 Turks in the
Northern Zone there would be large numbers set free to go elsewhere. All
these arguments seem to prove plainly that to evacuate a yard of Suvla
would be a most serious, and might prove a disastrous step. I would
therefore prefer to run the risk of holding the line defensively with
fewer troops in order to spare two divisions for the new enterprise.

"I have at present one division in Corps Reserve at Suvla and the 1st
Australian Division resting at Mudros and also one brigade resting at
Imbros. By bringing the tired Australians back and making them replace
the Mounted Division in the section north of Susak Kuyu I could spare
Xth and LIIIrd Divisions or else Xth and XIth. I could also spare one
French brigade from Cape Helles without replacing it by troops from
Suvla, and a total of 4-1/2 British Field Artillery brigades. This would
at any rate enable me to postpone any evacuation at Suvla and if the
withdrawal became necessary later on there would be less loss involved
in supplies and stores, as I could gradually make necessary preparations
for this deplorable contingency.

"The 15-inch howitzer is at Alexandria and can be sent whenever you
desire on the receipt of instructions. To-morrow I am having a
conference here with the Corps Commanders concerned to consider the
details. I hope that you realize that though the IXth Corps consists of
Xth, XIth and XIIIth Divisions there are attached to it LIIIrd Welsh
Division, Mounted Division and XXIXth Division, and I therefore
sincerely trust you will not contemplate the withdrawal of the Corps
Staff and Corps Commander to accompany the two divisions destined for
Salonika, for I have absolutely no one to replace them."

_27th September, 1915._ After breakfast a dove, the German sort, flew
across from Chanak and dropped four bombs on our Headquarters; all wide;
no damage. At 11 o'clock Birdwood and Byng came over for a confab on the
last upset. Both Generals went word by word through my M.F. 657 of the
26th September,--(1) as to drawing in our horns at Suvla,--(2) as to our
power of holding on after we lose the 10th and 53rd Divisions. They
concur in my cables and are emphatic as to the futility of making a gift
of ground to any enemy who are shaking in their shoes. What the Turks
want is a gift, not of ground but of high explosive shell. A few
thousand pounds worth of that and Byng would go ahead and settle their
hash for good. Birdie stayed to lunch during which meal I got a message
from Bailloud telling me flat that he had orders from his Government to
get one Division over to Mudros forthwith. As long as I am in command no
soldier but myself shall handle the troops entrusted to me. I have sent
the following reply:--"Sorry that as my orders already telegraphed to
you this morning are specific, I cannot permit any movement of troops
away from the Peninsula pending further instructions."

Ross and Nevinson (Press Correspondents), who have been away on a jaunt,
called on me and had tea. Lord William Percy and Sir Walter Barttelot
dined.

_28th September, 1915._ Office. At midnight an enemy aeroplane let us
have a taste of his high explosive--no harm done. At 10.30 this morning
another came over and dropped a couple of bombs into the aerodrome close
by--two men hit.

Colonel Dorling reported himself to me as Senior Paymaster.

A cable from K. saying he is glad to meet me as to holding on at Suvla.
He agrees in fact that to draw in our horns would merely set free six
Turkish Divisions to attack us elsewhere. He agrees also with my choice
of Divisions for Salonika. K. seems astonished at the behaviour of the
French Government in sending tactical orders direct to Bailloud. Most
extraordinary, he calls it. He wants Byng to go to Salonika and winds up
gloriously by telling me of the great things they are doing in France;
that, up to the present, 23,000 prisoners and over 40 guns have been
taken, and that he hopes there are more of each to follow. This fine
success, he says, should help us along in the East. So it should. I have
cabled the good news across and ordered a _feu de joie_ to be fired
everywhere on the Peninsula in honour of the victory. The ball was
opened at Helles at 7 p.m., the Turks replied vigorously with every gun
and rifle they could bring to bear, and rarely, I imagine, has a
"furious joy" expressed itself more furiously.

Nowhere in the Empire has this fine victory brought more heartfelt
relief and joy than at the Dardanelles: to have been brought to a
standstill, for the third time of asking, for _nothing_; that was the
fear which had haunted us.

_29th September, 1915._ Work. At 11 a.m. tore myself away from my papers
to play principal part in a gay little ceremony. Outside my office a
guard of honour of Surrey Yeomanry, Naval Division and Australians
formed three sides of a square. Bertier, de la Borde and Pelliot were
led in smiling like brides going up to the altar, and, after a tiny
speech, I decorated the first with the D.S.O. and the other two with the
Military Cross. All three Officers are most popular, and there were loud
cheers. De la Borde had tea and Mitchell came in at the same time to say
good-bye. We are all distressed at losing Mitchell. He is a very fine
specimen of the sailor of the modern school. Efficient, modest, untiring
at his work. He has collaborated in the most loyal and devoted manner
with the G.S., and I don't know how we should ever have got on without
him.

Nevinson, the Correspondent, came again with Maxwell, the Press Censor.
Nevinson wants to find out whether it would be worth his while to go to
Salonika. I would like to lend him a hand for he is such a nice fellow,
but the matter is about as secret as can be, and I don't feel myself
free to say much. The Captains of H.M.S. _Cornwall_ and _Cornwallis_
dined; also Flight Commander Samson and Ward, King's Messenger. The last
named starts to-morrow night and carried off with him my letter to K.
Amongst other things I write:--"In the cables which have passed between
us, I have found it anything but an easy business to strike the happy
mean between executing your wishes promptly and cheerfully on the one
hand, and, on the other, giving you a faithful impression of how we
should stand here once your orders had been carried out.

"If I make too little of the dangers which surround me, then you may be
encouraged to weaken me still further, thereby jeopardizing the whole of
this enterprise. But if I allow my anxieties to get too much the upper
hand, why then I may be ruining some larger enterprise, the bearing of
which I have no means of gauging."

I then explain the situation and wind up:--"In the small hours of the
morning, before I have had my matutinal cup of tea, the immediate
outlook gives me a feeling of cold feet in a more aggravated form than I
have hitherto experienced. The whole plan of the French Asiatic
subsidiary operation has gone, for the meantime, by the board. England
and France between them cannot find men enough, I should think, to send
considerable forces to Asia as well as run an entirely new show
elsewhere. Indeed, Naval requirements alone would seem entirely to
forbid it. But I must not worry you any more with surmises. After all,
nothing great in this world was ever easily accomplished. Never has
there been such an example of that as in the Dardanelles Expedition. How
many times has success seemed to be on the point of crowning our
efforts, and yet, on each occasion, just as we are beginning to see
light through the tangle of obstacles, preparing for an assault, or
whatever it may be, something occurs to upset the apple-cart. None the
less we do advance, and we will succeed in the end. I feel I am playing
it rather low down inflicting on you the outline of my own trouble at a
moment when your own must be infinitely greater.

"Reading over this letter which I have not now time to re-write or
correct, it strikes me that in concentrating my mind purely on the
Dardanelles I may have given a wrong impression of my general attitude
towards your latest demand. No one can realize, I believe, more clearly
than I do that the Dardanelles operations themselves hinge for their
success to a very large extent upon the maintenance of a barrier between
the Central Powers and Constantinople. As far as reinforcements of men
to the enemy in the field are concerned, such inter-communication would
not be so fatal as might perhaps be imagined. The Gallipoli Peninsula is
a limited area, and if the Germans had a million men at Constantinople
they could not, under present conditions, add many, if any, to the
numbers already opposed to us. But the free transit of coal, flour,
ammunition and big guns might well put us all in the cart--the cart
being in this instance, the sea."

My A.D.C. has brought me an irritated message from the A.G., War
Office:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"Your No. M.F.A. 4003 of the 24th instant. Are you aware that your
telegram was really a demand for 60,000 men with a weekly supply in
addition. We do not see how to meet such large numbers in view of the
present situation in France. Have the numbers at Base, Alexandria, and
men returning from hospital, etc., been taken into account? Please state
what are your minimum requirements to carry on with."

Am I aware, etc.? Why certainly; _and so is the A.G._ To ignore facts is
one thing; to be ignorant of them is another. These facts are, or should
be, the daily bread of his Department. I resent this surprise; it is not
genuine. If, as the A.G. says, they have not got the men to send, why in
God's name do they go on telling the people they _have_ got them?

Have drafted out this answer:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"A.G. My telegram No. M.F.A. 4003 told you the number required to bring
and keep all formations up to establishment and, as an estimate, the
numbers given therein are accurate. There is nothing new in that
telegram; it is only the culmination of many demands, the deficiency,
which was serious enough before, being aggravated by the prevailing
epidemic. I took into account the numbers in Base depots and men
returning from hospital. I certainly hope that there may be a decrease
in the sick rate and that there will be an increase in the numbers
returning from hospital, but that cannot make any difference to my
present shortage of establishment though it would affect the strength of
monthly drafts required.

"I would like further to point out that only 750 of the 20,000 drafts
now coming are for the Territorial Force, the remainder being for the
Regulars. Hence assuming that wastage will be equally distributed over
all the eight divisions, the estimated shortage of 30,490 on 9th October
will be constituted as follows:--Four Territorial Force divisions,
26,583; four Regular divisions, 3,907.

"When my No. M.F.A. 4003 was sent no question had arisen of denuding my
force for a fresh expedition elsewhere. I fully realize that you cannot
send what does not exist and I will do the best possible with what you,
knowing my situation, are able to send; but I do not consider that it is
possible to view my position in winter with any equanimity unless I am
to receive substantial drafts and unless a normal flow of reinforcements
for all divisions can be arranged so as to counter the difficulties that
are inherent in keeping a force operating so far from England up to
establishment."

_30th September, 1915. Imbros._ Peace on the Peninsula; trouble at
G.H.Q. The 10th Division is taking its departure from Suvla undisturbed
by the enemy. Not a shot is being fired. Some say this denotes
extraordinary skill in the conduct of the withdrawal; others,
extraordinary delight on the part of the Turks to see them clearing
out. I don't believe in either theory. The Turks have been fought to a
standstill and there is no attack left in them--not under _any_
circumstances or temptation; that is what I believe in my heart,
otherwise I would refuse point blank to strip myself of two full
divisions under their noses. Still, it is nervous work presuming to this
extent upon their fatigue and I will not agree to the 53rd going too, as
the loss of three Divisions would leave an actual hole in our line.
Meanwhile, it is a relief to hear that the move is going on just like
peacetime. As to G.H.Q., all is held up by uncertainty. Our whole
enterprise hangs still in the balance. No date for the sailing of our
troops for Salonika can yet be fixed, and we may get them back. Am glued
to the cable terminus waiting, waiting, waiting. I have agreed to let
the 2nd Brigade of the French go!

This cable sent to-day to Lord K. explains itself:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"The following has just been received from Bailloud:--'I have the honour
to inform you that I have received a telegram from the French Minister
of War ordering me (1) to embark one division of the Corps
Expéditionnaire immediately for Salonika; (2) to organize this division,
which will be placed under my command, into two brigades of Metropolitan
Infantry with two groups of 75 mm., one group of mountain artillery, one
battery of 125 mm. howitzer and four 120 mm. guns. I am taking steps to
execute this order and to hold the present section of the French line
with the force remaining in the Peninsula, which will be placed under
General Brulard.'

"I said in my telegram No. M.F. 675, that I could only spare one brigade
of the French. I desire to place on record that if this order of the
French Government is carried out the LIIIrd Division cannot possibly be
spared without seriously endangering the safety of this force and the
whole future of the Dardanelles enterprise. Even if I were to keep the
LIIIrd Division it would not relieve me of intense anxiety. The fact
will not escape your notice that the division to go is being
re-constructed so that nothing but European troops are included, thus
leaving an undue proportion of Senegalese. This constitutes such a grave
danger that, if I had the power, I would refuse to allow Bailloud to
carry out this order of his Government. It need hardly be pointed out
that all your hopes of success in the Balkans would be upset by a
disaster at Cape Helles. Even when I said that I could spare one French
Infantry Brigade the Commander of the VIIIth Corps, who is one of the
last men in the Army to express alarmist views, represented to me, in
view of the physical condition of a large proportion of his troops, the
gravity of the case in the strongest terms."

A reminder of mine _re_ the Ashmead-Bartlett incident has drawn an
amusing and highly unexpected answer from the War Office:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"Murdoch was found to be carrying a despatch for the Prime Minister
criticizing military operations in Gallipoli. He carried nothing for
Lawson."

I could not help laughing heartily at the blue looks of Tyrrell, the
Head of our Intelligence. After all, this is Asquith's own affair. I do
not for one moment believe Mr. Asquith would employ such agencies and
for sure he will turn Murdoch and his wares into the wastepaper basket.
I have reassured Tyrrell. Tittle-tattle will effect no lodgment in the
Asquithian brain.

Lieutenant Moore from the Military Secretary's office in London dined.
He has been useful to us. During the night there was rain and heavy fog.
The evacuation of Suvla by the 10th Division goes on without the
smallest hitch and is almost finished--all except the guns. Whether the
Turks have fallen asleep or only closed an eye is the question of the
hour but Birdwood's Intelligence are certain they are stone cold and
cannot be dragged to the attack.

_1st October, 1915. Imbros._ S. of S. cables he will not overlook our
wants in the matter of ammunition but that "at the present moment all he
can get has to be sent to France." I have thanked him. Not a word from
France since we fired the _feu de joie_.

K. believes in the East and sends shell to the West. The reason is that
K.'s _beliefs_ are only intuitions; he believes in the same sort of way
that Elijah knew certain things.

The principle underlying the world war seems to me this:--that wherever
the new system of trenches, dug-outs, barbed wire, can reach its fullest
development, _there_ we should prefer the defensive. Wherever this new
system cannot be fully developed, there the old ideas hold good and
there are the theatres for the offensive. In France and Flanders where
both sides are within a few hours' run, on good railways, from their own
chief arsenals and depôts the new system attains prodigious power. In
the Turkish Empire almost all the conditions; railways, material,
factories, etc., are favourable to the old and unfavourable to the new
conditions.

To me these views appear as clear as crystal and as unanswerable as
Euclid. The tenacity of the new system of defence; the pressure of
France; the apathy of a starved military opinion; the fact that all our
most powerful soldiers are up to their necks in the West, combine to
keep us ramming our heads against the big pile of barbed wire instead of
getting through by the gate called strait.

Next Braithwaite with the following electrical bombshell:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"By Bailloud's report I see that he considers that the French line can
be held by one division. If, on reconsideration, you agree with this
view can you spare the LIIIrd Division?"

K. has pounced like a hawk on Bailloud's statement (which I cabled to
him yesterday) that he is taking steps for Brulard to hold the French
section with one division.

Have answered:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"(No. M.F. 703). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. Your
No. 8409, cipher. Not one word of my No. M.F. 693 can I take back. The
situation at Cape Helles cannot be fully realized. May I remind you that
when on 20th August I moved the XXIXth Division to Suvla, I left at Cape
Helles only the minimum garrison compatible with safety. Since that date
the total British troops there have decreased in strength from 15,300 to
13,300 rifles, and now I am losing a French composite division which is
made up of the only troops of the Corps Expéditionnaire on whom I can
rely, as well as 44 guns. It is my considered opinion that to leave
protection of Cape Helles to one division of Colonial troops, plus
13,300 worn-out British Territorials and Naval Volunteers, is running
too serious a risk. To-day, therefore, I am moving one brigade of XXIXth
Division back from Suvla to reinforce VIIIth Corps in order to have some
regular troops there on whom I can rely. This makes it impossible to
spare the LIIIrd Division. The change of opinion on the part of
Bailloud, when he gets away from a position which I have found it
difficult to persuade him to hold with two divisions, and which he now,
as you say, thinks can be held with one division composed largely of
blacks, is startling enough to need no comment. If you want to get at
his real opinion, suggest that he stays here with one division while
Brulard goes to Salonika.

"A despatch from Bailloud has _just_ reached me on the situation in
French section after his own departure with one division. It is as
follows:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"'One division will then be defending our present line with an effective
strength reduced by half, and with Infantry which comprises only
Colonial contingents, half European and half native. I feel it to be my
duty to expose the situation to you in order that you may be able to
decide whether the time has not now arrived to reduce the present
section of the C.E.O., making part of it occupied by British troops and
holding a solid reserve in rear of the Allies' first line capable of
dealing with any situation.'

"I believe this indicates Bailloud's real opinion; it is a curious
contrast to that quoted in your No. 8409, cipher, dated 30th September."

At 11.30 crossed to "K" and inspected the 87th Brigade of the 29th
Division. Lucas, of the Berks Regiment, commanded. Saw the Border
Regiment under Colonel Pollard; then the renowned Royal Inniskilling
Fusiliers under Major Pierce, the full strength of the Battalion on
parade "all present" was 220! Next the K.O.S.B.s; they were under the
command of Major Stoney; last the South Wales Borderers under the
command of Captain Williams.

The men were in rags and looked very tired. This is the first time in
the campaign our rank and file have seemed sorry for themselves. Ten
days of rest had been promised them and now they are being hurried back
to the trenches before they have had a week. My heart goes out to them
entirely. Were I they I would feel mad with me. The breaking of my word
to the 29th Division has to be shouldered by me just like all the other
results of this new Balkan adventure; the withdrawal of the Irish and
the French for Salonika leaves no margin of rest for what's left.

Inspected also the West Riding Field Company of Royal Engineers under
Major Bayley, and the West Lancashire Field Ambulance.

A long letter from Maxwell putting his point of view about the 51st and
53rd Sikhs. Were we both sealed-pattern Saints we'd be bound to fall
foul of one another working under so perverse a system. He has written
me very nicely; nothing could be nicer. I have replied by return:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"Yours of 24th just received. As to the wires about the 51st and 53rd
between myself and the War Office, and your remarks thereon, we stand so
much on one platform, and are faced so much by the same difficulties,
that I think it ought to be fairly easy for us to come to an
understanding in most conceivable circumstances, as indeed our
co-operation up to date has shown.

"If Egypt goes, then I shall not last very long. If I am wiped out, I
think it will be the preface to trouble in Egypt.[13]

"As to myself I am 60,000 below strength. I had a cable from the War
Office a day or two ago expressing naïve astonishment at this figure. I
replied that the figure was accurate and that there was nothing new
about it as it only denoted the accumulation of a state of things which
had been continuously reported since the very first day when we started
off from England minus the ten per cent. margin of excess given to every
unit going across to France. This is the essential cause of our repeated
failure to make that last little push which just differentiates partial
from conclusive success. In every case this has been so. Had I been able
to throw in my ten per cent. margin on the third day after landing,
there is no doubt in the world we would have got right up on to Achi
Baba. Afterwards, each engagement we fought, although our total numbers
may have been largely increased, the old formations were always at half
strength or something less. However, I won't bother you about this as
your time is too precious to enter into 'might-have-beens' and so is
mine.

"Meantime, my line is very, very thin, and the men are getting entirely
worn out. In the midst of this I am called upon to send away two
Divisions, the French and the Irish, to ---- you know where. I have done
so without a murmur, although it puts me into a ticklish position.
Reinforcements are now to be diverted elsewhere and my command is not an
enviable one. I quite understand the necessity of trying to maintain a
barrier between Essen and Constantinople. I quite understand also the
danger of doing so at the expense of this attenuated, exhausted force. I
have represented the facts home, and it is for them to decide."

Dined with the Admiral.

_2nd October, 1915._ The despatch of the Salonika force and their outfit
are absorbing all my energies. Our whole Expeditionary Force is being
drawn upon to send the 10th Division creditably turned out to the new
theatre. The twenty-four hours' delay caused by the political crisis at
Athens has been a godsend in enabling me to reclothe and re-equip the
detachment from top to toe. The supplies for my own force are now
exhausted, but,--on the principle of the starving garrison who threw
loaves over the ramparts at the besiegers, we must try and make a good
first impression on the Greeks.

The submarine catcher, or the "Silver Baby" as the men call it, has been
flying about all day, without luck. Gascoigne and Bertier dined. Blazing
hot; quite a setback to August temperatures.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 12: We had to get into Kephalos Harbour before dark; otherwise
the submarine indicator nets were damaged.--IAN H.]

[Footnote 13: The last time this subject was broached between Lord
Kitchener and myself was immediately after the evacuation of Helles.
Everyone was intensely relieved, especially Lord Kitchener, for he had
realized better than our politicians the desperate stakes we had planked
down in our gamble with the Clerk of the Weather. Yet in that very
moment when the burden of an intolerable anxiety had just been lifted
from his shoulders he took the occasion to declare to me that he stood
by every word he had said. What he "had said," was that any withdrawal
from the Dardanelles must react in due course upon Islam, and especially
upon Egypt. Cairo, he held to be the centre of the Mahomedan doctrine
and the pivotal point of our great Mahomedan Imperium. An evacuation of
the Dardanelles would serve as an object lesson to Egypt just as our
blunders in the Crimea had served as a motive to the Indian mutineers.
Ultimate success was not the point in either case. The point was that
the legend of the invincibility of British troops should be shattered in
some signal and quite unmistakable fashion. "The East," he said, "moved
slowly in the fifties, and it will move slowly now. We've had a
wonderful delivery but--depend upon it--the price has yet to be
paid!"--IAN H., 1920.]




CHAPTER XXI

THE BEGINNING OF THE END


_3rd October, 1915. Imbros._ Church Parade. Inspected escort, men of the
Howe and Nelson Battalions and a contingent from the 12th and 26th
Australian Infantry. At 12.15 Bailloud, Brulard and Girodon arrived from
Mudros for a last conference. Everything is fixed up. We are going to
help the derelict division of French in every way we can. Bailloud, for
his part, promises to leave them their fair share of guns and trench
mortars. Whenever I see him I know he is one of the best fellows in the
world. We went down and waved farewells from the pier. He was quite
frank. He does not think the Allies have either the vision or the heart
to go through with Gallipoli: he begins to suspect that the big push on
the Western Front is going to yield no laurels: so Salonika hits his
fancy.

Lieutenants Weston and Schemallach of the Australians and Lieutenant
Gellibrand of the Naval Division lunched. A Mr. Unsworth came to talk
over gifts for the Australian troops. He seems a capital chap; full of
go and goodwill to all men.

_4th October, 1915. Imbros._ Vague warnings have taken shape in an
event. A cable from K. telling me to decipher the next message myself. I
have not drafted out an average of fifty telegrams a day for Lord K. for
six months at a stretch without knowing something of his _modus
scribendi_. The Staff were pleasantly excited at the idea that some new
move was in the wind. I knew the new move--or thought I did.

Well, not that: not exactly that; not this time. But the enemies of our
enterprise have got our range to a nicety and have chucked their first
bomb bang into the middle of my camp.

A "flow of unofficial reports from Gallipoli," so K. cables to me, is
pouring into the War Office. These "unofficial reports" are "in much the
same strain" (perhaps they spring from the same source?). "They
adversely criticize the work of the Headquarters Staff and complaints
are made that its members are much out of touch with the troops. The War
Office also doubt whether their present methods are quite satisfactory."
K. therefore suggests "some important changes in your Headquarters
Staff; for instance, if you agreed, Kiggell from home to take
Braithwaite's place with you. Should you, however, decline and desire to
remain as at present, may we assume that we are quite safe in regarding
these unofficial reports as not representing the true feelings of the
troops?"

So----! On the face of it this cable seems to suggest that a man widely
known as a straight and capable soldier should be given the shortest of
shrifts at the instance of "unofficial reports"; i.e., camp gossip.
Surely the cable message carries with it some deeper significance!

I am grateful to old K. He is trying to save me. He picked out
Braithwaite himself. Not so long ago he cabled me in his eagerness to
promote him to Major-General; he would not suggest substituting the
industrious Kiggell if he didn't fear for me and for the whole of this
enterprise.

K. wants, so he says, "some important change"; that cannot mean, surely,
that he wants a sufficiently showy scapegoat to feed the ravenous
critics--or does it? Perhaps, he's got to gain time; breathing space
wherein to resume the scheme which was sidetracked by the offensive in
France and smashed by the diversion to Salonika. Given time, our scheme
may yet be resumed. The Turks are in the depths. Sarrail with his six
divisions behind him could open the Narrows in no time. I see the plan.
K. must have a splendid sacrifice but by the Lord they shan't have the
man who stood by me like a rock during those first ghastly ten days.

The new C.R.E., General Williams, and Ellison turned up for lunch.
Williams gave us the first authentic news we have had about those Aden
excursions and alarms.

An amusing aftermath of the evacuation by the French and Irish
Divisions. When the last of Bailloud's troops had embarked the Turks
dropped manifestoes from aeroplanes along the lines of the Senegalese
calling upon these troops to make terms and come over now that their
white comrades had left them to have their throats cut. I have cabled
this queer item to the S. of S. Evidently the enemy were quite well
aware of our withdrawal. Then _why_ didn't they shell the beaches? At
French Headquarters they believe that the Turks were so glad to see our
backs that they hardly dared breathe (much less fire a shell) lest we
should change our minds.

_5th October, 1915._ First thing another cable from K. saying, "I think
it well to let you know" that it is "quite understood by the Dardanelles
Committee that you are adopting only a purely defensive attitude at
present." Also:--"I have no reason to imagine you have any intention of
taking the offensive anywhere along the line seeing I have been unable
to replace your sick and wounded men." But, if he knows I _can't_ take
the offensive, why trouble to cable me that the Dardanelles Committee
expect me to adopt "only a purely defensive attitude"? I realize where
we stand; K., Braithwaite and I,--on the verge. We are getting on for
two months now since the August fighting--all that time we have been
allowed to do nothing--literally, allowed to do nothing, seeing we have
been given no shell. What a fiasco! The Dardanelles is not a sanatorium;
Suvla is not Southend. With the men we have lost from sickness in the
past six weeks we could have beaten the Turks twice over. Now Government
seem to be about to damn everything--themselves included.

But after all, who am I to judge the Government of the British Empire?
What do I know of their difficulties, pledges, and enemies--whether
outside or inside the fold?

I have no grouse against Government or War Office--still less against
K.--though many hundred times have I groused.[14]

Freely and gratefully do I admit that the individuals have done their
best. Most of all am I indebted--very deeply indebted--to K. for having
refrained absolutely from interference with my plan of campaign or with
the tactical execution thereof.

But things are happening now which seem beyond belief. That the
Dardanelles Committee should complacently send me a message to say we
"quite understand that you are adopting only a purely defensive
attitude at present" is staggering when put side by side with the carbon
of this, the very last cable I have sent them. "I think you should know
immediately that the numbers of sick evacuated in the IXth Corps during
the first three days of October were 500 men on the 1st instant; 735 men
on the 2nd instant and 607 men on the 3rd instant. Were this rate kept
up it would come to 45 per cent. of our strength evacuated in one
month."

Three quarters of this sickness is due to inaction--and now the
Dardanelles Committee "quite understand" I am "adopting only a purely
defensive action at present." I have never adopted a defensive attitude.
They have forced us to sit idle and go sick because--at the very last
moment--they have permitted the French offensive to take precedence of
ours, although, on the face of it, there was no violent urgency in
France as there is here. Our men in France were remarkably healthy; they
were not going sick by thousands. But I feel too sick myself--body and
soul--to let my mind dwell on these miseries.

Sealed my resolution (resignation?) by giving my answer about
Braithwaite. Though the sins of my General Staff have about as much to
do with the real issues as the muddy water had to do with the death of
the argumentative lamb, I begin by pointing out to the War Office wolf
that "no Headquarters Staff has ever escaped similar criticism."

Grumblings are an old campaigner's _vade mecum_. Bred by inaction;
enterprise and activity smother them. A sickness of the spirit, they
are like the flies that fasten on those who stay too long in one place.
Was Doughty Wylie "much out of touch with the troops" when he led the
Dublins, Munsters and Hampshires up from "V" beach and fell gloriously
at their head? Was Williams "out of touch" when he was hit? Was Hore
Ruthven? "As to Braithwaite," I say, "my confidence in that Officer is
complete. I did not select him; you gave him to me and I have ever since
felt most grateful to you for your choice."

Now--I feel better.

The plot thickens. A cable just come in from the S. of S. for War:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"The following statement has been made in letter to Prime Minister,
Australia, by Mr. Murdoch: 'The fact is that after the first day at
Suvla an order had to be issued to officers to shoot without mercy any
soldier who lagged behind or loitered in advance.' Wire me as to the
truth or otherwise of this allegation."

Murdoch must be mad. Or, is there some method in this madness?

Mr. Murdoch was not a war correspondent; he is purely a civilian and
could hardly have invented this "order" on his own. No soldier could
have told him this. Someone not a soldier--someone so interested in
discrediting the Dardanelles Campaign that he does not scruple to do so
even by discrediting our own troops must have put this invention about,
_per_ Murdoch. Doubtless we strike here upon the source of these
"unofficial statements" which have been flowing into the War Office.
All I remember of his visit to me here is a sensible, well-spoken man
with dark eyes, who said his mind was a blank about soldiers and
soldiering, and made me uncomfortable by an elaborate explanation of why
his duty to Australia could be better done with a pen than with a rifle.
He was one week at the Press Correspondents' camp and spent, so they
tell me, a few hours only at Anzac and Suvla, never once crossing to
Helles. If then his letter to his Prime Minister is a fair sample of the
grounds upon which Braithwaite has been condemned, Heaven help us all!

As a relief to these disagreeable thoughts, a Taube dropped a couple of
bombs into camp. She flew so high that she was hard to see until the
bursting shrapnel gave us her line. As she made tracks back through the
trackless blue, the ships gave her a taste of some big projectiles,
12-inches or 9.2. The aerial commotion up there must have been
considerable.

At noon, sailed over to Suvla in H.M.S. _Savage_. We took our lunch on
board. As we came into harbour the Turks gave us a shell or two from
their field guns, then stopped. Young Titchfield, the Duke of Portland's
son, met us at the beach and brought us along to Byng's Headquarters,
where I met also de Lisle and Reed. After hearing their news I started
off with the whole band to make a tour of the trenches held by the 88th
Brigade, under General Cayley. On the way I was taken up to "Gibraltar"
observation post to get a bird's-eye view of the line. Besides my old
friends of the 29th Division I saw some of the new boys, especially the
1st Newfoundland Battalion under Colonel Burton, and the 2/1st Coy. of
the London Regiment. This was the Newfoundlanders' first day in the
trenches and they were very pleased with themselves. They could not
understand why they were not allowed to sally forth at once and do the
Turks in. The presence of these men from our oldest colony adds to the
extraordinary mix-up of people now fighting on the Peninsula. All the
materials exist here for bringing off the biblical coup of Armageddon
excepting only the shell.

In the course of these peregrinations I met Marshall of the 53rd
Division, Beresford, commanding the 86th Brigade, and Colonel Savage,
R.E.

After tea with Byng, including the rare treat of a slice of rich cake,
we went down to our friend H.M.S. _Savage_. The wind had risen to a
fairly stiff gale, and the sea was beginning to get very big. Those
field gun shells had caused the _Savage_ to lie a desperate long way out
to sea; we had a very stiff pull in the teeth of the waves, and every
one of us began to think that salt water rather than the bullet was
going to end our days. However, we just managed by the skin of our teeth
and the usual monkey tricks, to scramble up on board. As I said in my
wrath when I first stood on the firm deck, I would sooner have a hundred
shells fired at me by the Turks.

Captain Davidson commanding H.M.S. _Cornwallis_ dined; everyone liked
him very much.

_6th October, 1915._ Left General Headquarters soon after 11 o'clock for
Helles, taking with me Aspinall and Freddie. Lunched with Davies at 8th
Corps Headquarters.

Afterwards rode across to Royal Naval Division and saw Paris. Then went
with Bertie Lawrence, commanding 52nd Division, to his lines. Our route
lay up Achi Baba Nallah and along the trenches to the Horse Shoe; then
along Princes Street trench up the Vineyard, and back along the Krithia
Nallah to the Headquarters of the 156th Brigade. There we mounted our
horses and rode back to Corps Headquarters. I brought Steward back with
me to dine and sleep the night. Colonel Tyrrell and Major Hunloke
(King's Messenger) also dined.

_7th October, 1915._ Wasted energy brooding over the addled eggs of the
past. Are the High Gods bringing our new Iliad to grief in a spirit of
wanton mischief? At whose door will history leave the blame for the
helpless, hopeless fix we are left in--rotting with disease and told to
take it easy?

That clever fellow Deedes dined; also Rowan Hamilton, son of my old
Simla friend the Colonel of that name.

_8th October, 1915. Imbros._ At 11 a.m. Ellison, Taylor, Gascoigne and
Freddie sailed with me for Anzac. There we lunched with the ascetic
Birdie and Staff off bully beef, biscuits and water. Then, the whole lot
of us, together with de Crespigny, Birdie's Staff Officer, hurried five
miles an hour down the communication trench to the Headquarters of the
Indian Brigade. After greetings we shoved on and saw the 2nd Lovat
Scouts under Lieutenant-Colonel Stirling and met, whilst going round
their line, Major Morrison Bell and Captain Oppenheim. They seemed in
very good fettle, and it would have been hard to find a finer lot of
men. Taking leave of the 2nd Lovat Scouts, we worked along the trenches
of the Fife and Forfar Yeomanry, under Colonel Mitchell, until we came
to the 1st Lovat Scouts under Colonel Bailey. Lovat himself was sick,
but Peyton commanding the 2nd Mounted Division turned up just when the
inspection was at an end. He had got lost in the trenches, or we had.
Next time the way was lost there was no mistake as to who had made the
mistake. Birdie and I were pushing along as fast as we could leg it back
towards Anzac. In the maze of trenches we came to a dividing of the
ways. Two jolly old Sikhs were sitting at the junction. I asked if the
road to the left led to the Headquarters of the Indian Brigade. They
said, "Yes," so on we went, I leading, Birdie following. The trench got
shallower and shallower until, in a little grove of trees, it petered
out entirely. But it seemed to begin again in the other side and so we
crossed through the trees. Once there we found that the supposed trench
was only a shallow scratching up of the earth, and that we were standing
within a hundred yards of the Turkish lines just about half way between
them and the Lovat Scouts! I shouted to Birdie and we turned and ran for
it--for our lives, I mean. Luckily the Turks were slow at spotting us,
all except one who was a rank bad shot: so tumbling back into the
trenches from which we had emerged, we saved ourselves by the skin of
our teeth. I could not have been smarter about dodging two or three
bullets had it been the beginning of our enterprise and had the high
minarets of Constantinople glittered before my eyes.

When we got back to where the two old Sikhs were sitting, as placid as
idols, Birdie gave them his opinion of their ancestors. On reaching the
Australian and New Zealand Division we were done to a turn, but Godley
revived us with tea and then we made our way back to our destroyer and
to Headquarters. It was dark when we arrived and a bad storm was setting
in--wind and rain--which went on till midnight.

Replies have come in to our enquiries as to Mr. Murdoch's statement to
the Prime Minister of Australia that British Officers had been ordered
to "shoot without mercy any soldier who lagged behind or loitered." As
the Secretary of State seems to take this charge seriously, I thought it
well, before I sent my answer, just to make sure that no subordinate had
said, or done, or written anything which could plausibly be twisted into
this lie. The Generals have denied indignantly; are furious, in fact, at
the double insult to their men and to themselves.

Have cabled accordingly:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"(No. M.F.A.B. 4491). From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Secretary of
State for War. With reference to your No. 8554 M.O. 414 of the 5th inst.
I have _pro forma_ made full enquiries and I find that there is no
truth whatever in the allegation made by Murdoch."

_9th October, 1915._ Had made my _band-o-bast_ for running over to
Helles, but the Vice-Admiral cabled he wanted to see me if he could at
11.45. Anyway the sea is still a bit rough for the crossing and landing.
A lot of damage was done last night to the Anzac piers, two of them
being clean washed away. Peter Pollen is off colour. Freddie and I dined
on board the _Triad_.

Whilst at dinner got full reports both from Suvla and Anzac as to the
effects of the storm. The southerly gale, which not only washed away the
piers but sunk the water lighters at Anzac, has done no harm at Suvla
except that three motor lighters have been driven ashore. The Admiral is
clear that, during southerly gales we shall have to supply both Anzac
and Suvla by the new pier just north of Ari Burnu. The promontory is
small but last night it gave complete protection to everything in its
lea. By sinking an old ship we can turn Ari Burnu into quite a decent
little harbour.

_10th October, 1915._ Made my deferred visit to Helles, going over this
morning in the _Arno_ with Braithwaite, Val and Alec McGrigor. Looked in
at the Clearing Hospital and cast an eye over Lancashire Landing. Then,
in company with Jimmy Watson and Colonel Ayres, walked up to Corps
Headquarters where we had a fine lunch with Davies, de Rougemont and the
melancholy Yarr. Afterwards rode across to the Headquarters of the
Royal Naval Division and on to their trenches, some 3-1/2 miles.
Generals Mercer and Paris followed us through their trenches. The Hood
and Hawke Battalions were in the firing line where we talked to great
numbers of old comrades of all ranks. Glad to meet Freyberg again (the
man who swam to light the flares at Enos). Kelly of the Hood Battalion
too, I saw, and Fairfax of the Hawke, also Commander King of the Drake
Battalion and Burrows, a gunner who was running a bombing school with
much zeal on a piece of ground specially patronized by the Turks as a
target for their own shelling practice. Got back to Helles by the Saghur
Dere and the Gulley. Going down the Gulley, nearly lost two of our
attendant Generals, a shrapnel bursting between them with a startling
loud report caused by the high banks of the Gulley on either side.

In the Gulley we met a swarm of old friends from Kent; Brigadier-General
Clifton-Browne, an officer whose command I had inspected both at
Potchefstroom and near Canterbury, with a Brigade of West and East Kent
and Sussex Yeomen. They made a brave showing, but he tells me some of
them have caught this wretched enteritis already. Amongst others, I
spoke to Douglas, commanding the East Lancashire Division, Major Edwards
of the Sussex Yeomanry, Major Sir S. Scott and Colonel Whitburn of the
West Kent Yeomanry, Colonel Lord Guilford, East Kent Yeomanry. A
cheerier crowd no one could wish to meet. If these are the type of men
who spin black yarns for home wear, I can only say that not the most
finished actors could better disguise their despair. General King, R.A.,
rode part of the way back with us.

After all this hard exercise, got back to the _Arno_ in a lather of
sweat about 6 o'clock carrying Davies with me. Leslie Wilson, commanding
the Hawke Battalion, had gone sick to-day, so sent him a telegram after
dinner to the Hospital ship _Somali_, telling him his trenches had been
found in apple-pie order.

_11th October, 1915._ Bad night with this beastly complaint. De Robeck
came up at 11 o'clock to see me. He has had a message from the Admiralty
asking him what number of extra troops could be maintained on the
Peninsula if the units there now were brought up to strength. The
Admiral asked me for the figures and the A.G. brought them over. My
force as a whole is as near as may be to half strength. Half of that
half are sick men. We have 100,000 men on the Peninsula, 50,000 of whom
are unfit: if the unfits were up to strength there would be 200,000 men
on the Peninsula as well as excitement and movement which would greatly
reduce the disease. Bearing in mind that the Anzacs have been well
supported by their Governments and that their units are fairly strong,
these figures show what wait-and-see-sickness has meant to British
Regiments.

The tone of this Admiralty question had seemed cheerful: almost as if
the Higher Direction were thinking of putting us on our legs but, in
the evening, another cable from K. gave a different and a very ominous
complexion to the future:--

"From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian Hamilton. What is your estimate
of the probable losses which would be entailed to your force if the
evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula was decided on and carried out in
the most careful manner?

"No decision has been arrived at yet on this question of evacuation, but
I feel that I ought to have your views.

"In your reply you need not consider the possible future danger to the
Empire that might be thus caused."[15]

If they do this they make the Dardanelles into the bloodiest tragedy of
the world! Even if we were to escape without a scratch, they would stamp
our enterprise as the bloodiest of all tragedies! K. has always sworn by
all his Gods he would have no hand in it. I won't touch it, and I think
he knew that and calculated on that when he cabled. Anyway, let K., cat
or Cabinet leap where they will, I must sleep upon my answer, but that
answer will be NO!

Just as I am turning in, a cable from the S. of S. saying, "there is an
idea that Sir John Maxwell is not sending you as many troops as he might
from Egypt. Have you any complaints on this score?" Rather late in the
day this "idea." Certainly, I have never made any "complaints" and I
don't mean to do so now. The War Office have only to look up their
returns and see how many men are being maintained to defend us from the
Senoussi!

Maxwell has never had less than 70,000 troops in Egypt, a country which
might have been held with 10,000 rifles--ever since we landed here, that
is to say. My troops can sail back to Egypt very much faster than the
Turks--or the Senoussi for that matter--can march to the Canal.

In the same cable the S. of S. asks what is the cause of the sick rate
and remarks that, "some accounts from the Dardanelles indicate that the
men are dispirited." Small wonder if they were! When they see two
Divisions taken away from the Peninsula; when their guns can't answer
those of the enemy; when each unit finds itself half-strength, and
falling--why then, tumbling as they do to the fact that we won't get
through till next year, they _ought_ to be unhappy. But the funny thing
is that the Cabinet, the Secretaries of State, are the people who are
"dispirited" and _not_ the people out here. If the P.M. could walk round
the trenches of the Naval Division at Helles, or if K. could exchange
greetings with the rank and file at Anzac and Suvla, they would find a
sovereign antidote for the blues and would realize that it was they who
were down-hearted and _not_ the men at the Dardanelles. There was an
old French Colonel, killed at Gravelotte; he had studied the classic
world battles and he shows that it was never the front line who gave way
first, but always the reserves:--they, the reserves, watched bloodshed
in cold blood until they could stand it no longer and so took to their
heels whilst the fighting men were still focussed upon victory. Not the
enemy in front but the friends behind are the men who spread despondency
and alarm.

Charley Burn has arrived on the _Imogene_ with Dawnay.

Davies went back to Helles after tea. Dawnay says K. was most interested
in him and most charming to him all through his stay until his last
interview just before he started on his return journey. K.'s manner
then, he said, had changed--so much so as to give him an impression that
the great man was turning, or was being turned, against all of us out
here. K.'s conduct at the first meetings is in full harmony with his
message sent to Braithwaite for me by Fitz about a fortnight ago, saying
I possessed his fullest confidence. The change of manner was marked and
Dawnay is sure he made no mistake about it. But nothing has happened
since the date of Dawnay's arrival and departure save a very well
engineered withdrawal of the 10th and the French Divisions for which, in
point of fact, we have all been rather expecting congratulations. Dawnay
thinks some queer things are happening. He could--or would--say nothing
more.

_12th October, 1915. Imbros._ Early in the morning got off my answer to
K.'s evacuation cable. The elements, the enemy and ourselves are the
three factors of the problem. Were I to measure my problem by the night
flitting of the Irish and French Divisions (who lost neither man nor
beast in the process), I could guarantee that we would shoot the moon
with the balance of the force smoothly, swiftly and silently. That is to
say, supposing the Turks and the weather remain constant. But these are
two most inconstant things: no one can tell how a Turk will behave under
any given conditions; the Turks themselves do not know how they will
behave: the weather now is written down by the meteorologists for sudden
changes; for storms. Unsettled weather is due and ought to be reckoned
upon. Imagine a blow coming up from the South when the evacuation is
half way through. That does not seem to be, and is not, any great
stretch of imagination. Well then, having so imagined, we get a disaster
only equalled in history by that of the Athenians at Syracuse: a
disaster from which the British Empire could hardly hope to recover.

Twice backwards and forwards to the General Staff Marquee with the draft
of my guesses, my first being that we would probably lose 35 to 45 per
cent. But the General Staff have also been consulting their oracle and
were clear for 50 per cent. Months of the most anxious calculations will
not get a white man one whit forrarder in seeing into the brains of an
Asiatic Army or in forecasting Mediterranean weather. Safest to assume
that both brains and weather will behave as the German General Staff
would wish them to behave rather than as they chanced to behave when the
French and Irish went off a few days ago. So have ended by taking the
Staff's figure because any figure being, in any case, the wildest of
shots, their shot best suits my views on the issue.

"From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. Our losses would
depend on such uncertain factors, enemy's action or inaction, weather,
question whether we could rely on all troops covering embarkation to
fight to the last, that impossible to give you straight answer
especially until I have permission to consult Admiral. Once discussing
this very problem with General Gouraud, we came to the conclusion that
at Cape Helles we must sacrifice two divisions out of total of six
divisions and Cape Helles easiest of three places to get away from. My
opinion now is that it would not be wise to reckon on getting out of
Gallipoli with less loss than that of half the total force as well as
guns, which must be used to the last, stores, railway plant and horses.
Moral of those who got off would fall very low. One quarter would
probably get off quite easily, then the trouble would begin. We might be
very lucky and lose considerably less than I have estimated. On the
other hand, with all these raw troops at Suvla and all these Senegalese
at Cape Helles, we might have a veritable catastrophe."

Do the men toying with the idea of bringing off our men not see that
thereby the Turks will be let loose somewhere; not nowhere? Do they not
see that if they are feeling the economic pinch of keeping their side of
the show in being, the Turks, much weaker economically, must be feeling
it much more--!

       *       *       *       *       *

It was a relief to get this perilous stuff off my chest, and in a
brighter frame of mind, sailed for Anzac on the destroyer _Lewis_. We
took biscuits and bully beef with us but the hospitable sailors insisted
on regaling us with a hot meal. Sat in cabin all the way as usual
writing up my record. Freddie tells me that these studious habits of
mine have started the shave that I spend my time composing poetry,
especially during our battles!

At Anzac Birdwood took us round the trenches and underground passages
about Russell's Top and Turk's Head, held by the 5th Brigade, 2nd
Division, under Legge. Half way up to Russell's Top was the 3rd Battery
Australian Field Artillery:--talked with Major King, the C.O. Next unit
was the 20th Infantry Battalion under Major Fitzgerald. Colonel Holmes,
commanding the 5th Infantry Brigade, and Wilson, his Brigade Major, took
us through their cave dwellings. Ex-westerners say that in France they
have nothing to touch these Australian tunnellings. In one place they
are boring into a crater only 20 feet from the Turkish trench. There is
nothing unusual in the fact, but there is in the great depth they are
going down so as to cross the danger zone far below the beaten track of
mines and counter-mines. On the steep slope in another place there is a
complete underground trench running parallel to, and only a short
bomb-throw from, a Turkish trench. We went through it with a lantern.
Sandbags, loopholes, etc., all are there, but blind! They are still
veiled from view by several feet of clay. To-morrow night the Anzacs are
going to chip off the whole upper crust of earth, and when light dawns
the Turks will find a well equipped trench, every loophole manned,
within bombing range of their own line.

Other notables met with were Major Murphy of the 20th Infantry
Battalion, Major Anderson (an old friend) commanding the Australian
Field Artillery, and Captain Perry Oakdene, the Engineer Officer on the
job. Saw Birdie and returned in the destroyer about 6.30. The day had
been so quiet that it would have been almost dull had it not been for
the sightseeing--hardly a shot was fired by Turk or Anzac with either
gun, trench mortar or rifle.

Bishop Price, the Bishop of North China, and Charlie Burn, King's
Messenger, dined. The quietness of the Bishop was remarkable.

Have cabled the S. of S. for War in answer to his enquiries about the
causes of the sickness, and as to whether Maxwell is not holding up my
share of troops in Egypt, saying:--(1) that "constant strain and
infection by dust and flies" have caused the sickness but that the men
are getting better; (2) that "we have been under the impression that
drafts meant for us and due to us have been retained in Egypt; also,
that men discharged fit from Hospitals have been held back, but I have
represented this last point to Maxwell personally as I always feel I am
not the person to gauge Maxwell's needs. On 27th September, I asked him
to send up all available Australian--New Zealand Army Corps drafts and
reinforcements, and, as you already know, am at present in telegraphic
correspondence about these reinforcements coming straight here without
being kept in Egypt for training at all."

At 10.40, after clearing my table, went with Ellison, Taylor, and
Freddie on board H.M.S. _Lefroy_ (Commander Edwards) and steamed for "V"
Beach. Enjoyed a fine luncheon with Brulard and then started off for the
trenches. At Morto Bay we were met by Captain de Bourbon, a big handsome
man with the characteristic Bourbon cut of countenance. He took us first
to the _château_ whence we worked down along the trenches to where our
extreme right overlooks the Kerevez Dere. General Faukard was here and
he thinks that we ought easily to get complete mastery of both sides of
the Kerevez Dere as soon as we get the means and the permission to shove
ahead again. When we do that the advance will let our Fleet another half
mile up the Straits and the "spotting" for the ships' guns will double
their value in the Narrows. From the Kerevez Dere we worked along the
fire trenches towards the French centre and then, getting to a sheltered
strip of country, walked back across the open to the second line. From
the second line we made our way, still across the open, to the third
line, over a heather covered strip. No one ever moves here by daylight
except in double quick time as there is always danger of drawing a shell
either from Asia or from Achi Baba and so it was that "Let the dead
bury the dead" had been the motto and that we met many corpses and
skeletons. Merciful God, what home tragedies may centre in each of these
sinister bundles. But it is the common lot--only quicker. Here, too, we
found excavations made by the French into a burial ground believed to be
of the date 2,500 B.C. The people of that golden age had the sentimental
idea of being buried in couples in big jars. A strange notion of our
Allies unburying quiet people who had enjoyed dreamless rest for 2,000
years whilst, within a few yards, their own dead still welter in the
parching wind.

[Illustration: CREMATING THE ENEMY DEAD _"Central News" phot._]

Had meant to run across and see Davies but time had slipped away and so
we made tracks for H.M.S. _Lefroy_, and on back here to G.H.Q., where a
letter from Callwell was laying in wait as a refresher after my
fatigues.

Callwell begins by saying he encloses a document written by my late
visitor, Mr. K. A. Murdoch, although "there are certain statements in
this which are palpably false," and although Dawnay has pointed out to
him at the War Office "a number of passages in it which are wholly
incorrect as matters of actual fact." He says, Lord K., "who has not had
time to read it yet," thinks I ought to be given a chance of defending
myself.

Callwell goes on to write about the Press Censorship and my plea for
publicity and then says he dislikes the Salonika stunt "because I am not
quite clear of where we are going to, and the immediate result at the
present is to take away from you troops that you can ill spare." Also,
because "we may be involving ourselves in operations on a great scale in
the heart of the Balkans, the result of which it is very difficult to
foresee."

Godley dined. Captain Davidson, R.N., the Senior Naval Officer in
harbour now, is a real Godsend. He looks after us as if we were Admirals
of the Fleet.

Have now read, marked, learnt and inwardly indigested Callwell's
enclosure; viz., the letter written by Mr. K. A. Murdoch to the Prime
Minister of Australia. Quite a Guy Fawkes epistle. Braithwaite is "more
cordially detested in our forces than Enver Pasha." "You will trust me
when I say that the work of the General Staff in Gallipoli is
deplorable." "Sedition is talked round every tin of bully beef on the
Peninsula." "You would refuse to believe that these men were really
British soldiers ... the British physique is very much below that of the
Turks. Indeed, it is quite obviously so. Our men have found it
impossible to form a high opinion of the British K. men and
Territorials. They are merely a lot of childlike youths, without
strength to endure or brains to improve their conditions." "I shall
always remember the stricken face of a young English Lieutenant when I
told him he must make up his mind for a winter campaign." "I do not like
to dictate this sentence, even for your eyes, but the fact is that after
the first day at Suvla an order had to be issued to Officers to shoot
without mercy any soldier who lagged behind or loitered in an advance."

Well, Well! I should not worry myself over the out-pourings of our late
guest, who has evidently been made a tool of by some unscrupulous
person, were it not that Mr. Asquith has clothed the said out-pourings
in the title, number, garb and colour of a verified and authentic State
paper. He has actually had them printed on the famous duck's egg
foolscap of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and under his authority,
as President and Prime Minister, they have been circulated round the
Government and all the notables of the Empire without any chance having
been offered to me (or to K.) of defending the honour of British
Officers or the good name of the British Rank and File. K. tells
Callwell I should be given the opportunity of making a reply. Not having
read it himself he has not yet grasped the fact that he also should have
been given the opportunity of making a reply to the aspersions upon his
selections. As for me, by the time my answer can get home and can be
printed and circulated the slanders will have had over a month's start
in England and very likely two months' start in Australia, where all who
read them will naturally conclude their statements must have been tested
before ever they were published in that impressive form.

Here we see an irresponsible statement by an ignorant man and I
instinctively feel as if it were being used as one more weapon to force
Asquith's hand and to ruin our last chance. I only hope it may not prove
another case of, "Behold, how great a matter a little fire kindleth!"

Certain aspects of this affair trouble my understanding. The covering
note (dated 25th September) which encloses the letter to the Prime
Minister of Australia (dated 23rd September) is addressed by Mr. Murdoch
to Mr. Asquith by name. In that covering note Mr. Murdoch says, "I write
with diffidence, and only at Mr. Lloyd George's request." Within three
days (so great the urgency or pressure) Mr. Asquith causes--as he,
President of the Committee of Imperial Defence, alone can cause--the
covering note as well as the seven or eight thousand words of the letter
to be printed and circulated round the big wigs of Politics, as well as
(to judge by the co-incident hardening of the tone of this mail's
papers) some of the Editors. Not one word to me as to Mr. Murdoch's
qualifications or as to the truth or falsity of his statements, until
these last have been a week in circulation. Then, I receive; first, a
cable saying unofficial reports had come in censuring my General Staff
and that I had better, therefore, let Braithwaite go; secondly, a cable
asking me whether the absurd story of my having ordered my own soldiers
to be shot "without mercy " is well-founded; thirdly, a bad last, the
libellous letter itself.

Yet Mr. Asquith did know the paper contained _some_ falsehoods. He _may_
have attached weight to Mr. Murdoch's tale of the feelings of French
soldiers at Helles (although he never found time to go there): he _may_
have believed Mr. Murdoch when he says that Sir John Maxwell "has a poor
brain for his big position"; that "our men feel that their reputation is
too sacred to leave in the hands of Maxwell"; that Sir William Birdwood
"has not the fighting quality or big brain of a great General"; that
General Spens was "a man broken on the Continent" (although he never was
broken and never served on the Continent); that "Kitchener has a
terrible task in getting pure work from the General Staff of the British
Army, whose motives can never be pure, for they are unchangeably
selfish"; that "from what I saw of the Turk, I am convinced he is ... a
better man than those opposed to him" (although, actually, Mr. Murdoch
saw nothing of the Turks). The P.M. may have taken these views at their
face values: even, he _may_ have swallowed Mr. Murdoch's picture of the
conscientious Altham "wallowing" in ice whilst wounded were expiring of
heat within a few hundred yards; but _Mr. Asquith has seen the K. Army_
and, therefore, _he cannot have believed_ that these soldiers have
suddenly been transformed into "merely a lot of childish youths without
strength to endure or brains to improve their conditions."

Once more; these reckless scraps of hearsay would not be worth the paper
they are printed on were it not that they are endorsed with the letters
C.I.D., the stamp of the ministerial Holy of Holies. Only the Prime
Minister himself, personally, can so consign a paper. Lord K. and I were
both members of the C.I.D., and members of long standing. For the
President to circularize our fellow members behind our backs with
unverified accusations is a strange act, foreign to all my ideas of Mr.
Asquith. On this point Callwell is quite clear: the Murdoch letter was
published to the C.I.D. on the 28th ult. and Callwell writes on the 2nd
inst., and says Lord K. "has not had time to read it yet."[16] But
nothing else is clear. In fact, the whole thing is foreign to all my
ideas of Mr. Asquith. He does not need to work the C.I.D. oracle in this
way. As P.M. he has only to speak the word. He does not work the Press
oracle either: not his custom: also he likes K. The whole thing is a
mystery, of which I can only say with Hamlet--"miching mallecho; it
means mischief."

_14th October, 1915. Imbros._ Colder than ever. We are told that the
winter will kill the flies and that with their death we shall all get
hearty and well. Meanwhile, they have turned to winged limpets.

Being Mail day as well as rough, stuck to camp. My friend England sailed
into harbour in the _Chelmer_ and came up to lunch. In the evening he
took Godley back to Anzac. Duncannon came to dinner. I have made him
liaison officer with the French in place of de Putron who has gone to
Salonika with Bailloud.

As to the Murdoch unpleasantness, I began an _exposé_ to be sent to the
Governor General of Australia; another to the Secretary of the C.I.D.
But Pollen, Braithwaite and Dawnay (the last of whom had been shown the
document whilst he was at home, though he had said nothing to me about
it) thought this was to make much ado about nothing. They cannot believe
Lord K. will trouble himself about the matter any further and they think
it best handled in lighter vein. Is K. still the demi-God, that is the
question? Anyway, there is simply no time this Mail to deal with so many
misstatements, so that has settled it.

                        "GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
                          "MEDTN. EXPEDITIONARY FORCE,
                                 _"14th October, 1915._

  "DEAR CALLWELL,

"I have read Mr. Murdoch's letter with care, and I have tried to give it
my most impartial consideration and not to allow myself in reply to be
influenced in any way by the criticisms he may have felt himself bound
to make upon myself personally.

"What does this letter amount to? Here we have a man, a journalist by
profession, one who is quick to seize every point, and to coin epithets,
which throw each fleeting impression into strongest relief. He comes
armed with a natural and justifiably enthusiastic admiration for
everything connected with the Commonwealth to which he belongs, and
ready to retail to his Minister or his public anything that can
contribute to show the troops they have sent in an heroic light.

"Here he obtains his first sight of war and of the horrors and hardships
inseparable from it. He finds men who have just been through some of
the hardest fighting imaginable and who have suffered terrible losses;
he finds probably that very many of those whom he hoped to see,
certainly many of those of whose welfare their motherland would wish to
hear, are killed, wounded or laid up with illness,--he finds all this
and he becomes very deeply depressed. In such an atmosphere Mr. Murdoch
composes his letter, a general analysis of which shows it to be divided,
to my mind, into two separate strata.

"First an appreciation in burning terms of the spirit, the achievements,
the physique and all soldierly qualities of the Australian Forces.
Secondly, a condemnation, as sweeping and as unrelieved as his praise in
the first instance is unstinted, of the whole of the rest of the force.
I myself as C.-in-C., my Generals, my Staff, Lines of Communication, Sir
John Maxwell and General Spens at the Base, even the British soldiers
collectively and individually, are all embraced in this condemnation
which is completed by the inclusion of the entire direction of the
Forces at home, both Naval and Military.

"Where all are thus tarred with the same brush, I am content to leave it
to the impartial reader to decide what reliance can be placed on Mr.
Murdoch's judgment. My own feeling certainly is that in his admiration
for the Australian Forces, and in his grief at their heavy losses (in
both of which feelings I fully share) he has allowed himself to belittle
and to criticize us all so that their virtues might be thrown into even
bolder relief.

"With Mr. Murdoch's detailed points I do not propose to deal, nor do I
think you expect me to do so. On every page inaccuracies of fact abound.
The breaking of Spens on the Continent, a theatre of war he has never
visited; the over-statement of our casualties by more than 40 per cent.;
the acceptance as genuine of a wholly mythical order about the shooting
of laggards--really the task would be too long. As to the value of Mr.
Murdoch's appreciation of the strategical and tactical elements of the
situation you can yourself assess them at their true value.

"Finally, I do not for one moment believe the general statement put
forward to the effect that the troops are disheartened. Neither that
statement nor the assertion that they are discontented with the British
Officers commanding them has the slightest foundation in fact.

                              "Believe me,
                                 "My dear Callwell,
                              "Yours very sincerely,
                                   (_Sd._) "IAN HAMILTON.

"P.S.--I attach correspondence showing how Mr. Murdoch's visit arose. I
believe I exceeded my power in giving him permission to come but I was
most anxious to oblige the Australian Prime Minister and Senator Pearce.
You will see that he promises faithfully to observe any conditions I may
impose. The only condition I imposed was that he should sign a
declaration identical with that which I attach. He signed and the paper
is in my possession."


CORRESPONDENCE.


"Dear Sir,

"On the advice of Brigadier-General Legge I beg to request permission to
visit Anzac.

"I am proceeding from Melbourne to London to take up the position of
managing editor of the Australian news cable service in connection with
the _London Times_ and at the Commonwealth Government's request am
enquiring into mail arrangements, dispositions of wounded, and various
matters in Egypt in connection with our Australian Forces. I find it
impossible to make a complete report upon changes that have been
suggested here until I have a better knowledge of the system pursued at
base Y, and on the Mainland, and I beg of you, therefore, to permit me
to visit these places.

"I should like to go across in only a semi-official capacity, so that I
might record censored impressions in the London and Australian
newspapers I represent, but any conditions you impose I should, of
course, faithfully observe.

"I beg to enclose (_a_) copy of general letter from the Prime Minister
and (_b_) copy of my instructions from the Government. I have a personal
letter of introduction to you from Senator Pearce, Minister of Defence.

"May I add that I had the honour of meeting you at the Melbourne Town
Hall, and wrote fully of your visit in the Sydney _Sun_ and Melbourne
_Punch_; also may I say that my anxiety as an Australian to visit the
sacred shores of Gallipoli while our army is there is intense.

"Senator Millen asked me to convey his most kindly remembrances to you
if I had the luck to see you and in case I have not I take this
opportunity of doing so.

"As I have only four weeks in which to complete my work here and get to
London a 'collect reply by cable to C/o Colonel Sellheim, Australian
Intermediate Base, Cairo, would greatly oblige.

                       "I have the honour to be,
                                     "Sir,
                                 "Your obediently,
                                    (_Sd._) "KEITH A. MURDOCH.

  "C/o Colonel Sellheim, C.B.,
  "A.I.F. Intermediate Base,
  "Cairo.
  "_August 17, 1915._"


                  "COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA,
                        "PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT,
                                "MELBOURNE.
                                     _"July 14th, 1915._

"This letter will serve to introduce Mr. Keith Arthur Murdoch, a well
known journalist, of Melbourne, who is proceeding to Europe to undertake
important duties in connection with his profession.

"Mr. Murdoch is also undertaking certain inquiries for the Government of
the Commonwealth in the Mediterranean Theatre of War. And for any
facilities which may be rendered him to enable him the better to carry
out these duties I shall be personally obliged.

                   (_Sd._) "ANDREW FISHER,
                         "_Prime Minister._"


                                "DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE,
                                            "MELBOURNE,
                                      "_July 2nd, 1915._

  "Mr. Keith A. Murdoch,

  "Alfred Place, Melbourne.

"The Minister desires that you furnish a report upon the following
matters together with any suggestions for improvements.

"1. Arrangements for the receipt and delivery of letters, papers and
parcels to and from members of the Australian Imperial Force.

"2. Arrangements for the receipt and delivery of cablegrams to and from
members of the Australian Imperial Force.

"3. Arrangements for notifications to the Department in Australia of the
disposition of Australian Wounded in Hospitals.

"4. Suggested despatch of special expert corps to Hospitals.

"5. Frauds by impersonation at cable offices.

                         (_Sd._) "T. TRUMBLE,
                     "_Acting Secretary for Defence._"

When I got this, I hesitated. Evidently the writer was not accredited as
a war correspondent and his remark about having written me up in the
_Sun_ and in _Punch_ did not count for much. But I was anxious then, as
ever, that as many journalists as possible should be put into a position
for seeing the fine things the troops had done and were doing; I noted
the emphasis laid by the writer upon his acceptance of the censorship,
and so I took upon myself to exceed my powers and asked Braithwaite to
cable to Mr. Murdoch:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"This cable is your authority to come to G.H.Q. at once whence you will
be sent to Anzac.

  C.G.S., Medforce."

Mr. Murdoch landed on the 2nd instant and on that date signed the
following declaration:--

       *       *       *       *       *

DECLARATION TO BE USED BY WAR CORRESPONDENTS.

I, the undersigned, do hereby solemnly undertake to follow in every
particular the rules issued by the Commander-in-Chief through the Chief
Field Censor, relative to correspondence concerning the forces in the
Field, and bind myself not to attempt to correspond by any other route
or by any other means than that officially sanctioned.

Further, in the event of my ceasing to act as correspondent with the
British Forces, I will not during the continuance of the War join the
forces of any other Power in any capacity, or impart to anyone military
information of a confidential nature or of a kind such that its
disclosure is likely to prejudice military operations, which may have
been acquired by me while with the British Forces in the Field, or
publish any writing, plan, map, sketch, photograph or other picture on
military subjects, the material for which has been acquired by me in a
similar manner, unless first submitted by me to the Chief Field Censor
for censorship and passed for publication by him.

(_Signature of Correspondent_)................

       *       *       *       *       *

_15th October, 1915. Imbros._ Bitter cold. The whole camp upside down
and all the Staff busy with their shift of quarters to the other side of
the Bay.

Altham has been at Salonika and came over to report how things were
going there. Remembering the accusation of "wallowing" in ice, I nearly
touched him for a Vanilla cream.

As to Salonika, he tells me that, so far, the occupation has been a
travesty of any military operation. No plan; no administration; much
confusion; troops immobile and likely to sit for weeks upon the beach.
The Balkan States Intelligence Officers are on the spot and grasp the
inferences. Until the troops landed they were not quite sure whether
some serious factor was not about to be sprung upon them: now they are
quite sure nothing can happen, big or small, beyond our letting a lot of
our bayonets go rusty. Sarrail has been implored by the Serbians to push
his troops up into their country, but he has been wise enough to
refuse. How can he feed them? On the top of it all, the conduct of the
Greeks seems fishy. As to the Bulgarians, they have already thrown off
the mask. Although Salonika is going to be our ruin, I can still spare
some pity for Sarrail.

Have heard from Birdie who at last gives me leave to see his Lone Pine
section. Until now I have never been able to get him to let me go there.
Too many bombs, he says, to make it quite healthy for a
Commander-in-Chief.

_16th October, 1915. Imbros._ Had just got into bed last night when I
was ferreted out again by a cable "Secret and personal" from K. telling
me to decipher the next message myself. The messenger brought a note
from the G.S.--most of whom have now gone across to the other side of
the Bay--to ask if I would like to be awakened when the second message
came in. As I knew the contents as well as if I had written it out
myself, I said no, that it was to be brought me with the cipher book at
my usual hour for being called in the morning. When I had given this
order, my mind dwelt awhile over my sins. Through my tired brain passed
thought-pictures of philosophers waiting for cups of hemlock and various
other strange and half-forgotten antique images. Then I fell asleep.

Next morning, Peter Pollen came in with the cipher book and the
bow-string. I got K.'s message pat in my dreams last night and here it
is, to a word, in black and white:--

       *       *       *       *       *

"The War Council held last night decided that though the Government
fully appreciate your work and the gallant manner in which you
personally have struggled to make the enterprise a success in face of
the terrible difficulties you have had to contend against, they, all the
same, wish to make a change in the command which will give them an
opportunity of seeing you."

How far we have travelled, in spirit, since K. sent me his September
greetings with spontaneous assurances of complete confidence! Yet, since
then, on the ground, I have not travelled at all--have indeed been under
the order of the Dardanelles Committee to stand still.

Charles Munro is to relieve me and brings with him a Chief of Staff who
will take Braithwaite's place. On my way back I "might visit Salonika
and Egypt" so as to be able to give the Cabinet the latest about the
hang of things in these places.

When I go, Birdie is to take my place pending Munro's arrival.

De Robeck must give me a cruiser so that we may start for home
to-morrow. The offer of a jaunt at Government expense to Salonika and
Egypt leaves me cold. They think nothing of spending some hundreds of
pounds to put off an awkward moment. What value on earth could my views
on Salonika and Egypt possess for people who have no use for my views on
my own subject!

After breakfast, read K.'s cable over once more. "A War Council," it
seems, decided to make the change. Did the War Council also appoint
Munro? K. did not appoint him--anyway. Munro succeeded me at Hythe. In
1897 I was brought home from Tirah to Hythe by Evelyn Wood in order that
I might keep an eye on the original ideas which, from India under Lord
Roberts, had revolutionized the whole system of British musketry. I left
Hythe on the outbreak of the South African War and during that war Munro
went there.

He was born with another sort of mind from me. Had he been sent out here
in the first instance he would never have touched the Dardanelles, and
people who have realized so much may conclude he will now clear out. But
it does not follow. Munro's refusal to attempt a landing in the first
instance would have served as the foundation stone for some totally
different policy in the Near East. That might perhaps have been a good
plan. But to start a campaign with me and try to carry it on with Munro
has already been tried and found hardly fair to either of us. The
intention of whoever selected Munro is so to use him as to force K. to
pull down the blinds. But they may be mistaken in his character.

One thing is sure: whenever I get home I shall do what I can to convince
K. that the game is still in his hands if only he will shake himself
free from slippery politics; come right out here and run the show
himself. Constantinople is the only big big hit lying open on the map at
this moment. With the reinforcements and munitions K., as
Commander-in-Chief, would have at his command, he can bring off the coup
right away. He has only to borrow a suitable number of howitzers and
aeroplanes from the Western front and our troops begin to advance.
Sarrail has missed the chance of twenty generations by not coming here.
Let K. step in. In the whole of the Near East his name alone is still
worth an Army Corps. My own chance has gone. That is no reason why my
old Chief should not himself make good. I told the War Council we held
at Suvla before the battle of the 21st August that if the Government
persisted in refusing me drafts and munitions--if they insisted on
leaving my units at half-strength--then they would have to get someone
cleverer than myself to carry out the job. Well, it has come to that
now. K. looms big in the public eye and can insist on not being starved.
He must hurry up though! Time enough has been lost, God knows. But even
to-day there is time. Howitzers, trench mortars, munitions, men, on a
scale France would hardly miss,--the Asiatic side of the Straits would
be occupied--and, in one month from to-day, our warships will have
Constantinople under their guns. If K. won't listen to me, then, having
been officially mis-informed that the War Council wish to see me (the
last thing they _do_ wish), I will take them at their word. I will
buttonhole every Minister from McKenna and Lloyd George to Asquith and
Bonar Law,--and grovel at their feet if by doing so I can hold them on
to this, the biggest scoop that is, or ever has been, open to an
Empire.

Rather a sickly lunch. Not so much the news as the Benger's on which we
all feasted for our stomach's sake. Birdie came over at 4 p.m. with
Ruthven. Both his A.D.C.s are sick. I am going to ask him to take on
young Alec McGrigor. Peter and Freddie will come home with Braithwaite
and myself. What a true saying,--a friend in need is a friend indeed.
Were I handing over to Birdie for good I should feel unalloyed happiness
in his well-deserved success.

At tea Ellison, Braithwaite, Bertier, Colonel Sykes and Guest appeared.
They looked more depressed than I felt. I had to work like a beaver
before I could brighten them up. "I'm not dead yet," I felt inclined to
tell them, "no, not by long chalks." What I did say to one or two of
them was this:--"My credit with Government is exhausted; clearly I can't
screw men or munitions out of them. The new Commander will start fresh
with a good balance of faith, hope and charity lodged in the Bank of
England. He comes with a splendid reputation, and if he is big enough to
draw boldly on this deposit, the Army will march; the Fleet will steam
ahead; what has been done will bear fruit, and all our past struggles
and sacrifices will live."

Dined with Freddie on the _Triad_. De Robeck and Keyes were all that
friends can be at such a moment.

_17th October, 1915. H.M.S. "Chatham"_ (_At sea_). A pretty beastly day
within and without. For the within part, all sorts of good-byes to put
pain into our hearts; for the without, a cold drizzle chilling us all to
the bone.

At 10.30 Brulard and his Staff came over; also Generals Byng and Davies
with their Staffs. After bidding them farewell; a function whereat I was
grateful to the French for their lightness of touch, I rode over with
Braithwaite and the A.D.C.s to the new Headquarters at Kephalos to say
good-bye to my own Staff. Although I had meant to live there until we
drove the Turks far enough back to let us live on the Peninsula, I had
found time to see my little stone hut built by Greek peasants on the
side of the hill:--deliciously snug. To-day, this very day, I was to
have struck my tent and taken up these cosy winter quarters; now I move,
right enough, but on the wrong road.

The adieu was a melancholy affair. There was no make-belief, that's a
sure thing. Whatever the British Officer may be his forte has never lain
in his acting. So, by 2.30, I made my last salute to the last of the old
lot and boarded the _Triad_. A baddish wrench parting from de Robeck and
Keyes with whom I have been close friends for so long. Up to midnight de
Robeck had intended coming home too. Keyes himself is following me in a
day or two, to implore the Cabinet to let us at least strike one more
blow before we haul down our flag, so there will be two of us at the
task.

I wrung their hands. The Bo'sun's whistle sounded. The curtain was
falling so I wrung their hands once again and said good-bye; good-bye
also to the Benjamin of my personal Staff, young Alec, who stays on with
Birdie. A bitter moment and hard to carry through.

Boarded the _Chatham_ (Captain Drury-Lowe) and went below to put my
cabin straight. The anchor came up, the screws went round. I wondered
whether I could stand the strain of seeing Imbros, Kephalos, the camp,
fade into the region of dreams,--I was hesitating when a message came
from the Captain to say the Admiral begged me to run up on to the
quarter deck. So I ran, and found the _Chatham_ steering a corkscrew
course--threading in and out amongst the warships at anchor. Each as we
passed manned ship and sent us on our way with the cheers of brave men
ringing in our ears.

       *       *       *       *       *

FAREWELL ORDER BY GENERAL SIR IAN HAMILTON.


                    "GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
                 "MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE,
                             _"October 17th, 1915._

"On handing over the Command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force to
General Sir C. C. Munro, the Commander-in-Chief wishes to say a few
farewell words to the Allied troops, with many of whom he has now for so
long been associated. First, he would like them to know his deep sense
of the honour it has been to command so fine an Army in one of the most
arduous and difficult Campaigns which has ever been undertaken;
secondly, he must express to them his admiration at the noble response
which they have invariably given to the calls he has made upon them. No
risk has been too desperate; no sacrifice too great. Sir Ian Hamilton
thanks all ranks, from Generals to private soldiers, for the wonderful
way they have seconded his efforts to lead them towards that decisive
victory, which, under their new Chief, he has the most implicit
confidence they will achieve."

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 14: I think I hardly knew _how_ often till I came to read
through my diary in cold print. But all the time I was conscious, and am
still more so now, of K.'s greatness. Still more so now because, when I
compare him with his survivors, they seem measurable, he remains
immeasurable.

I wish very much I could make people admire Lord K. understandingly. To
praise him wrongly is to do him the worst disservice. The theme can
hardly be squeezed into a footnote, but one protest must be made all the
same. Lord Fisher gives fresh currency to the fable that K. was a great
organizer. K. hated organization with all his primitive heart and soul,
because it cramped his style.

K. was an individualist. He was a Master of Expedients; the greatest
probably the world has ever seen. Whenever he saw _any_ organization his
inclination was to smash it, and often--but not always--he was right.
This may sound odd in Anglo-Celtic ears. But most British organizations
are relics of the past. They are better smashed than patched, and K.
loved smashing.--IAN H., 1920.]

[Footnote 15: Lord K.'s reason for putting in this last paragraph may be
obscure unless I make it clear. As explained in a previous footnote,
Lord K. knew that I knew his strong personal view that the smashing blow
to our military reputation which would be caused by an evacuation of the
Dardanelles must, in course of time, imperil our hold upon Egypt.
Therefore, for the moment, it was necessary to warn me that the problem
must be considered in the purely military, tactical, aspect.--IAN H.
1920.]

[Footnote 16: Lest anyone should imagine there is any privilege or
secrecy attached to this document it may be well to explain that all the
best passages came back to me from Melbourne in due course; often with
marginal comment.--IAN H., 1920.]




APPENDIX I

STATEMENT ON ARTILLERY BY BRIGADIER GENERAL SIR HUGH SIMPSON BAIKIE,
EX-COMMANDER OF THE BRITISH ARTILLERY AT CAPE HELLES.


The first landing of British troops at Cape Helles took place on 25th
April, 1915. On arriving at that place during the first week in May, I
found that heavy fighting had occurred without ceasing from the time of
the disembarkation. Having come straight from the Headquarters Staff of
the 2nd Army in France, where the question of artillery ammunition was a
constant source of anxiety to all the higher commanders, I at once set
to work to discover what reserves remained in the hands of G.H.Q. and
what the daily expenditure had been since the landing. The greatest
difficulty was experienced in obtaining figures of expenditure from the
units, so constant had been the fighting, which still continued, and so
great the casualties, and consequent confusion in reckoning expenditure.
Yet, after some delay, sufficient information was obtained to enable me
to demonstrate with certainty that, if such severe fighting continued,
the Force would soon be in danger of losing their artillery support.

On the 4th May a cable was sent, I believe, to Lord Kitchener saying
that ammunition was becoming a very serious matter owing to the
ceaseless fighting; pointing out that 18 pr. shell were a vital
necessity and that a supply promised by a certain ship (I believe the
S.S. _Funia_) had not turned up. A day or two later, a cable was
received by G.H.Q. saying munitions were never calculated on a basis of
prolonged occupation of the Peninsula, and that the War Office would
have to reconsider the whole position, if more was wanted. If I remember
aright, the cable finished by saying, "It is important to push on." A
few days later a cable was received saying the War Office would not give
us more ammunition until we submitted a return of what was in hand. The
compilation of that cut-and-dried return in the midst of a desperate
battle was a distracting and never-to-be-forgotten effort, but there was
no help for it: no return, no shells; that was the War Office order. The
ammunition still in hand lay mostly in the holds of the ships at Mudros,
60 miles away, and did not lend themselves to easy counting; while the
actual expenditure was, for reasons already given, an intricate problem
indeed.

Continuous cables on the subject of ammunition passed during the next
few days between G.H.Q. and the War Office, all of which passed through
my hands and some of which I drafted for superior authority. I cannot
remember their sequence and not always their purport, but I distinctly
remember about the 10th or 11th May a cable being received from Lord
Kitchener saying ammunition for Field Artillery was being pushed out
_via_ Marseilles. I think the figures given were about ten or twenty
thousand rounds of 18-pr. and some one thousand rounds of 4.5 howitzer
H.E., but I am not sure.

The fact that does remain indelibly impressed on my mind is that I am
convinced from the cables that passed through my office that no
provision had been made by the War Office to keep up a regular supply of
artillery ammunition to the Dardanelles Expedition. The W.O. authority
appeared to have given a bonus of ammunition when the Expedition sailed,
and to have been somewhat taken aback and annoyed by the fact that a
sure and continuous supply should afterwards be demanded.

On 29th May I left G.H.Q. on appointment as Brigadier-General to command
all the artillery at Cape Helles, in which capacity I served till
September, i.e. through all the big attacks and counter-attacks of June,
July and August. In this capacity I was brought face to face with all
the deficiencies in artillery _matériel_ and ammunition, of which the
following were the most important.

Although there was only one Battery of 4.5 and one Battery of 6-in.
howitzers at Helles there was always an extreme deficiency of howitzer
H.E. ammunition. So great was the shortage that immediately on taking up
my command I found it necessary to issue a most stringent order that no
howitzer on Cape Helles was ever to fire H.E. without my personal
authority. When the Turks attacked, 18-prs. and 15-prs. were to support
the Infantry with shrapnel; howitzers were only to be used with my
personal permission and then were only to fire shrapnel. All howitzer
H.E. was to be used exclusively for supporting British attacks by
bombarding the Turkish trenches before and during such activities.
Throughout the above months, constant appeals were made to me by
Infantry Commanders to bombard the Turkish trenches with H.E. in order
to retaliate for the loss our men had suffered from the Turkish guns
using H.E. Such requests I had invariably to refuse.

There were fifty-six 18-prs. at Helles, when I assumed command on the
29th May, and subsequently they were increased to seventy-two at the end
of July. Except for 640 rounds of H.E., which was fired off during the
4th June battle, no more H.E. arrived till the end of July.

Never during my command did the total number of rounds of 18-pr.
ammunition at Helles ever reach 25,000. Before one of our attacks, with
very careful previous husbanding, the total used perhaps to reach 19,000
to 23,000. The total amount I could therefore allot justifiably for the
artillery preparation before an attack of our four British Infantry
Divisions never exceeded 12,000 rounds; as from 6,000 to 7,000 must
necessarily be kept in reserve to assist in beating off the determined
hostile counter-attacks. As I remarked at the beginning of this paper,
artillery ammunition was a constant anxiety to the higher commanders on
the Western Front also, but never, I believe, had Infantry to attack
with so little artillery support as the above. My position in France did
not give me any inside knowledge of the details of artillery supply, but
in one action at St. Eloi (near Ypres) on 14th or 15th February, in
which only 27th Division was concerned, the artillery of this Division
(so the C.R.A. informed me) alone fired 10,000 18-pr. rounds in one
night. At a similar action at the same place by the same division about
a month later the divisional artillery fired, I believe, a slightly
larger amount. Again, at Neuve Chapelle, in February, 1915, each
Division had its own divisional artillery and the ammunition expenditure
worked out to 150 rounds per 18-pr. gun. These official figures were
shown me a few days after the battle by the G.O.C., 2nd Army.

In comparing the ammunition expenditure of France in 1915 and in the
Dardanelles, the enormous discrepancy in the number of 18-prs. per
Division must be taken into account. Reckoning on the scale of the
number of 18-prs. allotted to a British Division in France, we had at
Helles little more than sufficient 18-prs. for one Division, yet with
this number we had to give artillery support to four Divisions. As to
the French artillery at Helles, they could always reckon on being able
to expend 40,000 to 45,000 rounds when their two Divisions attacked.

The complete absence of H.E. was severely felt, as shrapnel were of
little use for destroying trenches, machine gun emplacements, etc.
Therefore, in each and every British attack, success was jeopardized and
our infantry exposed to cruel losses, because, firstly, there was not
sufficient ammunition to prepare their attack, and, secondly, there was
no H.E. (except for howitzers) to destroy the machine guns in their
emplacements. The latter, therefore, inflicted great losses on our
Infantry in their advance.

Our unfortunate position did not escape the notice of the French, who
used at times generously to place under my command some of their field
guns and howitzers, but in the latter they were also lamentably
deficient, and in ammunition they were, themselves, during May and early
June, none too well provided, although towards July their reserves grew
more sufficient. The British deficiency in ammunition, however, was so
great, and created so much merriment among the French that they
christened the British Artillery, "Un coup par pièce"; with which term
of endearment I was always personally greeted by the French Artillery
General and his Staff, with all of whom I was great friends.

At the battle of 28th June the French were unable to spare us the
howitzers or ammunition we begged of them. The failure of the gallant
156th Brigade of the 52nd Division to take the H.12 trenches was
essentially due to lack of artillery ammunition, especially of H.E.
Allowing for losses that must have been suffered under any condition, I
believe that some 700 or 800 Scottish casualties were due to this cause.
Before the action the Corps Commander sent for me to say that he did not
consider that enough guns and ammunition had been allotted to this
portion of the Turkish trenches. I replied that I agreed, but that there
were no more available and that to reduce the bombardment of the
hostile trenches on the left of our front would gravely prejudice the
success of the 29th Division in that quarter and that I understood
success there was more vital than on our right flank. After consultation
with the G.O.C. 29th Division, the Corps Commander agreed with my
allotment of the artillery. We then did our utmost to obtain the loan of
more guns, howitzers or ammunition from the French without success and
with the result that the attack was beaten off.

So successful had been the attack on our left with its capture of five
successive lines of Turkish trenches that we had actually some
ammunition to spare. In the afternoon it was agreed that there should be
another attack on H.12, preceded by a very short but very intense
bombardment from every gun and howitzer we possessed. All artillery
arrangements for this were completed before 2.30 p.m., from which hour
all the guns waited alert and ready for the Infantry to inform us of the
hour they wished us to commence fire. I was in direct telephonic
communication with the commander of the 52nd Division, having had a
private wire laid on to his Headquarters the previous day. Suddenly, to
my horror, I received a telephone message from my Artillery Group
Commander, Colonel Stockdale, saying the Infantry were making the
assault and that he had no time to do more than fire half a dozen shots!

In the attacks of 12th and 13th July, the French placed some thirty or
forty guns and howitzers under British command, and on account of the
shortage of British ammunition their guns undertook the whole of the
artillery preparation, our artillery confining itself to covering fire
during and after the Infantry advance. The counter-attacks were so
violent and the calls for artillery support were so incessant that
towards the afternoon of the 13th July the British gun ammunition began
to get alarmingly low, until finally only about 5,000 rounds of 18-pr.
ammunition, including all rounds in Battery charge, remained at Helles.
The French were reluctant to supply further artillery support, fearing
further attacks on themselves. This was the most anxious night I spent
on the Peninsula--all but a limited number of rounds were withdrawn from
most Batteries and were placed in horsed ammunition wagons, which
perambulated from one side of the British position to the other
according to where it seemed most likely the next Turkish attack would
take place. These measures were successful and no Battery actually was
left without one round at a critical moment, but the position throughout
that night was a most dangerous one. Every hour a wire was sent to
G.H.Q. giving expression to our crying needs, but there was next to
nothing at Mudros, while desperate fighting still went on without a
minute's respite. At 11 p.m. that night a trawler did, to the joy of
every gunner, reach Helles with 3,000 rounds of 18-pr., but on the
arrival of my Staff Officer to unload it, it was found that the fuses
were of a new pattern never issued before and that the existing fuse
keys would not adjust the fuses. As no new pattern fuse keys had been
sent from home the Batteries had to manufacture their own, which was
successfully accomplished after two days' delay.

During June two Batteries, and during July two more Batteries of 5-inch
howitzers, manned by Territorials, arrived at Helles. During the last
week of July the first two Batteries were sent to Anzac. Some of these
howitzers were very old and worn by corrosion, and were consequently
inaccurate.

The Gun History sheets of some of them showed they had been used at the
Battle of Omdurman, seventeen years before, and had been in use ever
since. After the big British attacks of 6th and 7th August, their
ammunition began to run short. On demand about 500 or 700 rounds were
sent up from Mudros--on arrival each shell was found to be of only 40
lb. weight, whereas former shells were of 50 lb. weight. Their fuses
were also of new pattern, which existing fuse keys would not fit and, to
crown all, no range tables had been sent for this new pattern of shell.
In spite of continual letters and telegrams to the War Office, when I
left Helles in September no new pattern fuse keys or range tables had
ever arrived from England; consequently these shells remained stacked on
the Peninsula while the Batteries only fired occasionally for want of
ammunition!

On another occasion, when we were in the greatest straits for 15-pr.
ammunition, many hundreds of rounds arrived at Helles, which on being
landed were discovered by my Staff only to be suitable for the Ehrhardt
R.H.A. guns in Egypt, no such guns being in the Dardanelles.

As for heavy artillery, practically speaking, there was none! Only one
6-inch Howitzer Battery (4 howitzers) and one 60-pr. Battery (4 guns)
were in action at Helles up to July when four more guns of the latter
calibre were landed. Unfortunately, however, the 60-prs. were of little
use, as the recoil was too great for the carriages and the latter broke
down beyond repair by our limited resources after very few rounds. At
the beginning of August only one 60-pr. gun remained in action.
Consequently, we had no heavy guns capable of replying to the Turkish
heavy guns which enveloped us on three sides, and from whose fire our
infantry and artillery suffered severely.

As to spare parts, spare guns and carriages, such luxuries were
practically non-existent. No provision appears to have been made by the
War Office to replace our guns or their parts, which became
unserviceable through use or through damage by the hostile artillery. As
the British were holding the lower slopes of the Achi Baba position, and
as all our gun positions could be seen into by the Turks with powerful
spectacles from their observation posts on the top of Achi Baba, our
equipment suffered severely. During June and July one 6-inch howitzer
and twenty-five 18-prs. (out of a total of seventy-two) as well as one
or two 60-prs., were put out of action by direct hits from the hostile
artillery. Such guns were withdrawn to the field workshops on "W" Beach,
but as these workshops were exposed to the enemy's artillery fire from
three sides, the guns were often further damaged while under repair.
Damaged guns had sometimes to wait for days in this workshop until other
guns had been damaged in a different place by the hostile artillery.
Then possibly one efficient gun could be made up of the undamaged
portions of one, two or more guns. Batteries often, therefore, remained
for days short of guns on account of the lack of spare parts.

When I assumed command of the artillery at Helles, there were two
Batteries of mountain guns (10-prs.) in action, but they were of a
prehistoric pattern. In 1899 the Khedive of Egypt possessed in his Army,
in which I was then serving, mountain guns which were more up-to-date in
every respect. So inaccurate were these 10-prs. that they had to be
placed close behind the front trenches lest they should hit our own
Infantry, the result being a very heavy casualty list in officers and
men amongst their Territorial personnel. Many of these lives could have
been saved, had reasonable modern weapons been supplied. These obsolete
old guns wore out so quickly that the two Batteries quickly melted into
one Battery, and when they finally left Helles for Anzac at the end of
July, I believe only 3 guns and their detachments were left in being.

As for anti-aircraft guns, they did not exist at all and the hostile
aeroplanes used to fly over and drop bombs _ad lib._ without fear of
molestation, the only saving clause being that the enemy appeared to
possess almost as few aeroplanes as the British.

In no point of their equipment did the force at Helles suffer so much in
comparison with their comrades in France as in the matter of aeroplanes
which, at the Dardanelles, were hopelessly deficient not only in the
numbers but also in quality. There were not sufficient pilots and there
were no observers at all. Brave and efficient as the naval pilots were,
they could not be expected to be of any use as artillery spotters unless
they had been thoroughly trained for this important duty. This
deficiency had to be made good at all costs by drafting young artillery
subalterns from their Batteries and sending them to the Air Force, where
their lack of training and experience in operation was at first severely
felt, although later these lads did magnificent work. Thus Batteries
were deprived of their trained subalterns just at the moment when the
latter were most required on account of the severe casualties suffered
in the landing and during the subsequent early operations. But few of
the aeroplanes were fitted with wireless and the receivers on the ground
could not take in messages over a distance longer than 5,000 yards.
Consequently, each aeroplane had to return within this radius of the
receiver, before its observation could be delivered, thus immensely
curtailing the usefulness and efficiency of the aeroplane observation.
Owing to the above conditions, aeroplanes could only be used for the
counter-batteries firing on hostile artillery.

As regards trench mortars, the supply was hopelessly inadequate. I
cannot give the exact figures, but I believe there were not a dozen at
Helles during the whole period I was there, and these were of such an
indifferent type as to be practically useless, and for this reason no
one bothered about them. No provision appears to have been made for the
supply of such necessities of trench warfare by the Home Authorities.
This appears to be indefensible, as I believe very early in the
operations their provision was specially asked for by G.H.Q. The
absolute failure to supply such articles of vital necessity eventually
led to the French C.-in-C. at Helles lending the British two demizel
trench mortars and large quantities of ammunition. These were manned by
artillery detachments, and by their magnificent work and the constant
demand from the Infantry for their services, it was conclusively proved
what an invaluable aid a sufficient supply of these weapons would have
been.

From the very first it was apparent to me that the number of British
guns at Helles was not sufficient to prepare and support simultaneous
Infantry attacks of the whole British Force at this end of the
Peninsula. In June I drew up a memorandum to G.H.Q. pointing this out
and asking for a big increase of guns, howitzers and ammunition. What
happened to this I cannot say. I only know that the guns and ammunition
asked for never materialized.

The whole story of the artillery at Helles may be summed up in the
following sentences: insufficiency of guns of every nature;
insufficiency of ammunition of every nature, especially of H.E.;
insufficient provision made by the Home Authorities for spare guns,
spare carriages, spare parts, adequate repairing workshops, or for a
regular daily, weekly or monthly supply of ammunition; guns provided
often of an obsolete pattern and so badly worn by previous use as to be
most inaccurate; lack of aeroplanes, trained observers and of all the
requisites for air observation; total failure to produce the trench
mortars and bombs to which the closeness of the opposing lines at Helles
would have lent themselves well--in short, total lack of organization at
home to provide even the most rudimentary and indispensable artillery
requisites for daily consumption; not to speak of downright carelessness
which resulted in wrong shells being sent to the wrong guns, and new
types of fuses being sent without fuse keys and new types of howitzer
shells without range tables. These serious faults provoked their own
penalties in the shape of the heavy losses suffered by our Infantry and
artillery, which might have been to a great measure averted if
sufficient forethought and attention had been devoted to the "side-show"
at the Dardanelles.

After commanding the starved artillery at Helles it was my good fortune
to command the artillery of the 21st Army Corps at the third Battle of
Gaza, in November, 1917, and also at the great Battle of 19th
September, 1918, in which the Turks in Palestine were finally crushed,
and I think it may add emphasis to what I have said if I contrast the
artillery support of the two campaigns and show the results which
ensued. On the night before the third Battle of Gaza, the artillery
under my command (to support three Divisions) consisted of the
following, viz.:--19-1/2 Batteries (i.e., 78 guns and howitzers) of
heavy artillery, comprising 8-inch howitzers, 6-inch guns, 6-inch
howitzers and 60-pr. guns--all of the most modern and up-to-date type.

The Field Artillery comprised 108 18-prs. and 36 4.5 howitzers while in
addition there were 8 modern mountain howitzers and guns. There was not
an artillery weapon in the whole Army Corps that was not efficient and
up-to-date, while immediately behind the front line existed perfectly
organized workshops capable of executing any repairs. There was ample
provision of spare guns, carriages and parts, and an abundance of trench
mortars which, though they would have changed the whole face of the
Peninsula conflict, could not be used in Palestine owing to the breadth
of No Man's Land. Ammunition for every nature of gun and howitzer was
pressed upon us in profusion--over a thousand rounds per gun was buried
and concealed near every Battery, while immediately behind the fighting
line huge reserves were available for immediate use if required. At the
advanced railhead, G.H.Q. literally built mountains of ammunition as a
further supply; all this in addition to vast quantities stored in depôts
in Egypt and on the banks of the Suez Canal. So great was the
superabundance of shell, that hundreds of tons were left lying on the
ground after the nine days' Battle at Gaza; which it took months to
remove. At the battle of the 19th September, 1918, in Palestine
conditions were exactly the same. There was an absolute _embarras de
richesse_ of every artillery requisite. This wealth of artillery
material was supported in Palestine by a full complement of artillery,
aeroplanes, pilots and observers, the latter being all thoroughly
trained and efficient. In addition, by a sufficiency of fighting
aeroplanes with most efficient pilots, our artillery were adequately
guarded from sunrise to sunset from any hostile aeroplane observation.

In short, our air supremacy was undisputed and absolutely protected our
own artillery against damage and molestation from the hostile guns. On
the other hand, the enemy's artillery lay at our mercy directly their
gun positions were discovered.

The whole science of artillery and aeroplane co-operation had, of
course, been vastly extended and perfected since Gallipoli days, but the
point I wish to make is this: that in 1917 and 1918 the Palestine Front
was fitted out on the same scale, proportionately, as the Western Front;
whereas in 1915 this was not the case in the Dardanelles as regards
artillery, for instance, only one Division (the 29th) at Helles having
18-pr. guns and the Naval Division having been given no artillery at
all!

To put the matter shortly, whereas at Helles I had under my command no
more than 88 to 95 guns and howitzers of all natures with scarcely any
ammunition or aeroplanes to support four British Divisions; in Palestine
at Gaza I had at least 230 guns and howitzers (one-third of which were
of heavy calibre) with an abundance of ammunition and a sufficiency of
aeroplanes to support the attack of one and a half Divisions, the
remaining one and a half Divisions at Gaza being in reserve. At the
battle of 19th September, 1918, in Palestine I had, to the best of my
recollection, about 360 guns of all calibres to support four Divisions.
The terrible casualties suffered by our Infantry at Helles are well
known, and my feelings as Artillery Commander unable to give them
anything like the support they would have had in France or Flanders may
be guessed. But this was made up to me afterwards when I commanded the
artillery at Gaza, that strong fortress which was captured by the 21st
Army Corps, with certainly under 3,000 casualties and I believe with
under 2,000 killed and wounded. At Gaza the Turks were simply crushed by
our overwhelming artillery, fed from inexhaustible Ordnance parks and
dumps. Before the Infantry attack commenced the position was subjected
to a continuous bombardment night and day for six days and six nights
from every available gun and howitzer. The Infantry then attacked and
took a large portion of the position with a loss of, I believe, under
1,000 men. The Turks counter-attacked, but they melted away under the
tremendous artillery barrage and never attempted another during this
battle. Next night our Infantry tried to extend their conquest but the
Turks had meanwhile brought up an old Gallipoli Division, the 7th, which
held them at bay and inflicted upon them serious losses which, I
believe, increased their casualties to between two and three thousand.
The Corps Commander then decided to let the Infantry stand where they
were, to submit the Turks to a further three days' and three nights'
bombardment, at the end of which our Infantry advanced again only to
find that the Turks were evacuating the whole of the Gaza position.
After the Battle of 19th September, 1918, many Infantry commanders of
Divisions, Brigades and Battalions have told me the Turks appeared
crushed by the terrific artillery bombardment (under cover of which our
men advanced) and offered a resistance which, in comparison with our
experiences of Gallipoli, can only be called feeble.

The cardinal fact that remains in my mind is that in Palestine the 21st
Army Corps always had enough (and more than enough) of every artillery
requisite for whatever number of Divisions the Army Corps was composed
of; whereas, in Gallipoli, the VIIIth Army Corps at Helles, which was
composed of four British Divisions, never had enough Field Artillery or
ammunition to support more than one Division, and never possessed
sufficient heavy artillery to support more than one Infantry Brigade.

The material part of my statement ends here, and it only remains for me
to remind you that all the grievous shortcomings I have exposed were
actually made good by the heroism, devotion and sufferings of the
Officers and men of the Artillery at Helles, both Regular, Territorial,
Australian and New Zealand. Rest was impossible, as no Battery could
ever be withdrawn from the line and all field Batteries were under rifle
fire. If placed outside that range, they were destroyed by flanking fire
from Turkish guns in Asia. No dug-outs were possible, as dug-outs were
understood in France, as there was no timber or roofing for their
construction. All ranks were thus exposed night and day to continuous
fire, and were sometimes killed as they slept in their valises by stray
bullets, thousands of which were fired unaimed every night by the Turks
in the hopes of inflicting casualties; water for drinking and washing
was almost as precious as guns and shells. The joys of a canteen, as was
at that time supplied by the War Office to our Army in France, were
unknown; bare rations washed down by a limited allowance of water were
our only form of food; everyone suffered more or less from dysentery,
spread by the millions of flies which settled on every mouthful we ate
and made life almost insupportable by day. No Man's Land was one vast
litter of unburied corpses. Yet no man's spirit ever wavered and all
ranks remained as bright, as hopeful and as cheerful as on the day of
the first great landing. If shells were scarce, complaints were
non-existent; all were upheld by the wonderful religion of
self-sacrifice. It will ever remain my greatest pride that I had the
astonishing good fortune to be associated with such a body of officers
and men; to them I owe a debt of gratitude that is beyond redemption,
and to them alone is due the credit for any success which the artillery
at Helles may have attained in what was one of England's greatest
tragedies, but was also one of England's greatest glories.




APPENDIX II

DARDANELLES EXPEDITION

     NOTES BY LIEUT.-COLONEL CHARLES ROSENTHAL,[17] COMMANDING 3RD
     AUSTRALIAN FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE, 1ST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION,
     RELATING TO ARTILLERY AT ANZAC, FROM 25TH APRIL TO 25TH AUGUST,
     1915. (_Compiled from personal diary._)


During the early hours of 25th April, 1915, the 3rd Australian Infantry
Brigade landed on Gallipoli Peninsula, close to Gaba Tepe, at a point
now known as Anzac Beach, followed by other troops of 1st Australian
Division and Australian and New Zealand Division.

Arrangements had been made for artillery to land about 10 a.m. on the
same morning, but owing to delays in disembarkation of Infantry, and
enemy shelling of transports necessitating ships temporarily leaving
their allotted anchorage, it was after mid-day before the vessels
carrying guns were actually in correct position for disembarkation.

I did not wait for the naval boats to come alongside, but after issuing
necessary instructions to Battery Commanders concerning the landing of
the guns, I disembarked in a ship's boat manned by a volunteer crew from
my Brigade Ammunition Column, accompanied by two officers and sixteen
men of my Headquarters' Staff.

Immediately on landing I reported to my C.R.A., and was by him informed
that the Divisional Commander had decided no artillery should land
during the day. This decision absolutely nonplussed me, and on asking
the reason I was informed the position was not considered sufficiently
secure to ensure the safety of guns, if emplaced. With this decision I
did not agree and urged, without result, that the safety of guns was
surely secondary to the proper supporting of the troops already
committed.

In view of the above decision instructions were at once sent off to the
ships ordering Colonel Johnstone, Commanding 2nd A.F.A. Brigade, and
Major Hughes, acting for me in command of 3rd A.F.A. Brigade, to defer
disembarkation of guns. Colonel Johnstone, however, by this time had one
18-pr. gun well on the way to the shore. Permission was given for it to
be landed and it was brought into action close to the beach against guns
at Gaba Tepe, undoubtedly temporarily silencing them.

In the meantime the Indian Mountain Battery attached to 1st Australian
Division, which had landed early in the day, was in action doing
splendid work though suffering severe casualties.

By the order of Colonel White, G.S.O. (1), 1st Australian Division, I
spent the afternoon in collecting Infantry stragglers and getting them
forward again to the firing line. At 5 p.m. I reported completion of
this task and then proceeded to thoroughly reconnoitre the right flank,
overlooking Gaba Tepe, which had seemed to me, from observations made
from the ship, to be a suitable area for emplacing of guns.

I returned to Divisional Headquarters just before dark, and informed the
C.R.A. and Divisional Commander that I had found suitable places for
batteries and could use them effectively.

I had in my reconnaissance conferred with three Battalion Commanders
(one of whom was killed a couple of days later), who were delighted to
hear that the artillery they were so anxiously waiting for was to come
up in support.

After much discussion and persuasion the Divisional Commander agreed to
allow me to land two of my three 18-pr. batteries. This approval was
shortly afterwards altered to permission to land two guns only, and
finally all approval was cancelled, though no information of these
decisions officially reached me.

During the night, in anticipation of early arrival of guns, my
Headquarters personnel worked untiringly in preparing a track from the
beach to the selected sites for guns, and it was not till 5.30 a.m. on
26th that I learned approval to land guns had been cancelled overnight.

During the morning of 26th April one gun of 1st Battery, 1st Brigade,
and one gun of 4th Battery, 2nd Brigade, were landed, hauled up the
steep hill to their positions, and came into action on the extreme right
of ridge overlooking Gaba Tepe.

Later in the day the 7th Battery of my Brigade came into action on the
same ridge and the single guns of 1st and 4th Batteries were withdrawn
for return to their respective Brigades.

During the afternoon there also came ashore, apparently without order,
two guns of 3rd Battery, 1st Brigade, and 8th Battery, 3rd Brigade, but
were returned to their respective ships by the C.R.A.

My guns were placed absolutely in the Infantry front trenches, on the
sky line, no troops of any kind being in advance of them. It would have
been quite useless to take up positions behind the Infantry line in the
normal way, owing to the configuration of the ground, for in such cases
the lowest range at which the crest could be cleared was 3,000 yards,
while our targets were from 500 to 1,000 yards distant. Indeed at night,
shrapnel shell with fuse set at zero was frequently used.

Each gun fired during the 26th about 400 rounds, over open sights, and
caused very heavy casualties to the enemy.

The whole battery covered a front of 187°, necessitating each gun being
personally controlled by an officer and each with its own particular arc
of fire.

The supply of ammunition was very difficult. It had to be delivered by
hand to the guns over a bullet-swept area, the distance from the beach
to the guns being about half a mile, while in this distance the hills
rose 400 feet.

By the afternoon of the 3rd May, two guns of 8th Battery, 3rd Brigade,
were in action, and 2nd Brigade also had guns in position on the left
flank of 1st Australian Divisional Front.

The Australian and New Zealand Division also had 18-prs. in action
together with two 4.5-inch Howitzer Batteries, the latter being the only
howitzers available up to this time at Anzac.

I was wounded on 5th May, evacuated to Cairo, and did not rejoin my
command at Anzac till 26th May. During this interval gun positions, as
well as Infantry trenches, had been much improved, and the enemy country
in our immediate front which, when I left on 5th May, gave no signs of
life, was now well traversed by trenches.

I found in my sector that the guns of my Brigade were now all in action,
and the remainder of the artillery of the Division was also emplaced.

About this time 6-inch howitzers were made available and later emplaced,
one for left sector, one for the centre, and one for the right, but with
very limited quantities of ammunition. Another 6-inch howitzer was
landed on 17th June.

I had made continual urgent representations for two 4.7-inch guns for
right flank to deal with innumerable targets beyond the range of
18-prs., but it was not till 11th July that one very old and much worn
gun arrived, and was placed in position on right flank, firing its first
round on 26th July.

On 24th June a Scottish Territorial Howitzer Battery (the 5th Battery,
City of Glasgow Lowland Howitzer Brigade) arrived and came under my
command.

On 14th July a heavy battery was organized for right flank, consisting
of the two 6-inch howitzers and the 4.7-inch gun before mentioned, but
ammunition was still very scarce.

On 15th July a 5-inch Howitzer Brigade under Colonel Hope Johnstone
commenced to arrive and was complete in position by 18th July.

On 28th July the 4th Battery of Lowland Brigade arrived.

About this time some alterations were made in artillery dispositions and
grouping in preparation for impending battle at Suvla Bay and Lone Pine,
commencing on 6th August, and on 30th July the artillery of right sector
under my command was as follows:--

  3rd A.F.A. Brigade (18-prs.).
  Heavy Battery (two 6-inch howitzers and one 4.7-inch gun).
  2 Mountain Guns.
  Two 5-inch Howitzer Batteries, Lowland Brigade.
  One 5-inch Howitzer Battery, 69th Brigade.

When leaving Australia in 1914 I had urged that a battery of 5-inch
howitzers (which I commanded prior to the outbreak of war), together
with stocks of ammunition held by Australia, should accompany 1st
Australian Division. This was not approved. On arrival at Gallipoli
Peninsula, when the need for howitzers was at once apparent, I again
re-opened the question, particularly on the 29th May, when the C.R.A.
agreed to press for them to be sent forward. The Divisional Commander,
on 25th June, cabled Australia definitely asking for this battery, which
was at once forwarded, but arrived at the Peninsula too late to be of
any service.

Two Australian Field Batteries (together with a Brigade of Infantry)
were transferred to Cape Helles on 5th May and did not rejoin the
Australian Division at Anzac till 18th August.

With the limited number of guns available it was exceedingly important
that transfers might be made very rapidly from one part of our front to
another, and on 2nd June I put forward a proposal which was approved
immediately to make a road along the entire front just behind the crest
on which infantry trenches were sited. This road was completed in about
two weeks and was a great boon alike to gunners and Infantry.

Up to 24th August no anti-aircraft guns had been provided, but specially
constructed emplacements had been made for 18-prs. to be used against
aircraft, and though never successful in bringing down an enemy 'plane
they certainly made good enough shooting to cause enemy aviators to
treat them with respect. About 20th August three 3-pr. Hotchkiss arrived
for anti-aircraft purposes. They were of obsolete pattern and had been
manufactured for the Japanese Government many years before. In fact the
only range tables provided were printed in Japanese, but thanks to the
fact that one of my Sergeants (who was a Master Mariner) spoke Japanese,
we succeeded in preparing serviceable range tables.

Two Japanese trench mortars were also used from Infantry trenches with
excellent effect, but owing to ammunition supply becoming soon exhausted
and no fresh supplies being available they had to be discarded. A good
supply of these weapons, together with full supplies of ammunition,
would have been invaluable in bombarding enemy front line trenches.

The ammunition supply at all times up to the operation of 6th August was
a difficult problem. Frequently we had to be rationed to a very small
allowance per battery per day, and the guns of the heavy battery were
for some time not permitted to fire more than two rounds per day and
then only by special permission of the C.R.A.

On 20th June I was first informed that H.E. for 18-pr. was to be
supplied, and shortly afterwards a small supply for experiment was
landed at Anzac. I think I am right in saying my share was 15 rounds per
battery.

On 2nd August our first supply of H.E. arrived, but only 150 rounds per
battery.

During the first few months of the campaign, when our stocks of
ammunition were desperately low, our guns and gunners had to suffer
considerable casualties without being able to effectively reply.

Our batteries were of necessity in many cases under direct observation
of the enemy, and only the splendid work of the detachments in building
earthworks for their protection made it possible to carry on.

Under the protection of the banks of a small ravine near the beach, our
artificers established a workshop, and the extraordinary ingenuity and
skill displayed in the repairing and replacing of damaged guns earned
for the artificers our most grateful appreciation and thanks.

On 25th August I was evacuated suffering from enteric.

These notes only apply to the right sector, which I commanded.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 17: Now Major-General Sir Charles Rosenthal, K.C.B., C.M.G.,
D.S.O.--IAN H. 1920.]




APPENDIX III


The Dispatch of a Commander-in-Chief is not a technical document. In it
the situation should be set forth, as briefly and clearly as may be,
together with a few words indicative of the plan of G.H.Q. for coping
with it. After that comes a narrative which ends with thanks to those
individuals and units who have earned them. A Dispatch should be so
written that civilians can follow the facts stated without trouble: it
should not be too technical. But when the Military Colleges and
Academies at Camberley, Duntroon, Kingston, West Point and in the
European and Japanese capitals set to work in a scientific spirit to
apportion praise or blame they are more influenced by the actual
instructions and orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief _before and
during the battle_, than by any after-the-event stories of what
happened. They are glad to know the intentions of the Commander, but his
instructions i.e., the actual steps he took to give practical effect to
those intentions, are what really interest them.

When I came to write my Dispatch of the 11th December, so much about the
actual course of events at Suvla was still obscure, that it had become
desirable either to write the narrative in a more technical form than
was customary or else to publish my actual instructions simultaneously
with the Dispatch. I chose the latter course. The authorities had raised
objections to several passages in the Dispatch, and in every case but
one, where they had wished me to add something which was not, in my
opinion, correct, I had met them. No objection had been raised to the
inclusion of my instructions. At 9 p.m. on the night of the 6th January
(the Dispatch being due to appear next morning) I received a letter by
Special Messenger from the War Office telling me the Press Bureau were
wiring to all those to whom the Dispatch had been issued to suppress the
instructions!

Whatever the reason of this action may have been, its result was clear
enough: my Dispatch was eviscerated at the very moment it was stepping
on to the platform. Had I known that these instructions, now given, were
to have been cut out, my Dispatch would have been differently written.

                                                    IAN H., 1920.


SIR IAN HAMILTON'S INSTRUCTIONS.


  TO VICE-ADMIRAL, COMMANDING
  EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON,

                                                _17th July, 1915._

SIR,--I have the honour to forward a series of tables drawn up to show
in detail the men, animals, vehicles, stores, etc., which it will be
required to land in connection with the forthcoming operations. I shall
be grateful if you will let me know as early as possible if you consider
that any part of the programme indicated presents especially serious
difficulties or is likely to require modification.

In informing me of the results of your consideration, I shall be obliged
if you will let me know what craft you intend to use in carrying out the
disembarkations referred to in tables B, C, D and E, so that detailed
arrangements with regard to embarkation and to the allocation of troops,
etc., to boats may be prepared.

2. Immediately after the disembarkation of the details referred to in
the attached tables it will be necessary, if the operations are
successful, to land 5,000 to 7,000 horses in order to render the force
sufficiently mobile to carry the operations to a conclusion. Details as
to disembarkation of these horses will be forwarded to you later. In the
meantime the horses will be collected at Alexandria, and should
subsequently be brought up to Mudros or Imbros, to begin arriving on
August 6th.

It will also be necessary to land the remaining portions of the units
referred to in the tables (first line transport, etc.), and, further,
the remaining units of the formations to which they belong. In this
latter category will be included three batteries of heavy artillery with
mechanical transport. It will not be required to land any of the above
until after August 7th, and details as to numbers, order of
disembarkation, etc., will be forwarded to you later.

                    I have the honour to be, Sir,
                                 Your obedient Servant,
                                    (_Signed_) IAN HAMILTON,

                                            _General, Commanding_
                              _Mediterranean Expeditionary Force._


       *       *       *       *       *


TABLE A.

TABLE SHOWING UNITS AND DETAILS WHICH IT IS REQUIRED TO LAND GRADUALLY
AT ANZAC COVE BEFORE THE MORNING OF THE 3RD OF AUGUST. IT WILL BE
NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THESE DISEMBARKATIONS BY NIGHT, AND THE MOVEMENTS
CAN BEGIN AS SOON AS IT IS CONVENIENT TO THE NAVAL TRANSPORT
AUTHORITIES.


 +------------------------+------------+--------+----------+
           Unit.          |    From    |   To   |Personnel.|
 +------------------------+------------+--------+----------+
 69th Howitzer  Bde.      |Mudros      |Anzac   |    312   |
 R.F.A.                   |            |Cove    |          |
                          |            |        |          |
 1/3rd City of Glasgow 5" | Helles     |Anzac   |     78   |
                          |            |        |          |
 10th Heavy Battery       |On board    |Anzac   |     11   |
 R.G.A.                   |ship at     |Cove    |          |
                          |Mudros      |        |          |
                          |            |        |          |
                          |            |        |          |
                          |            |        |          |
 One F.A. Bde. (11th      |On board    |Anzac   |     33   |
 Division, "A" Bde.)      |ship at     |Cove    |          |
                          |Mudros      |        |          |
                          |            |        |          |
                          |            |        |          |
                          |            |        |          |
 Reinforcements for Units |Alexandria  |Anzac   |  7,000   |
 of A.N.Z.A.C.            |            |Cove    |   to     |
                          |            |        |  8,000   |
                          |            |        |          |
 Mule Corps               |Helles      |Anzac   |     50   |
                          |            |Cove    |          |
                          |            |        |          |
 Ammunition Park          |Mudros      |Anzac   |     65   |
                          |            |Cove    |          |
                          |            |        |          |
                          |            |        |          |
                          |            |        |          |
                          |            |        |          |
                          |            |        |          |
                          |            |        |          |
                          |            |        |          |
                          |            |        |          |
                          |            |        |          |
 +------------------------+------------+--------+----------+

 +--------------------+--------+------------------------------+--------------
 |     Vehicles.      |Animals.|           Stores.            |   Remarks.
 +--------------------+--------+------------------------------+--------------
 |16 guns, 16 wagons, |   Nil  |                              |
 |4 water carts       |        |                              |
 |                    |        |                              |
 |4 guns, 4 wagons, 1 |   Nil  |                              |
 |water cart          |        |                              |
 |                    |        |                              |
 |4 guns, 4 wagons, 1 |   Nil  |                              |I.G.C. has
 |water cart, 2       |        |                              |already been
 |G.S. wagons         |        |                              |instructed to
 |                    |        |                              |arrange for
 |                    |        |                              |this move.
 |                    |        |                              |
 |16 guns, 32 wagons, |   Nil  |                              |I.G.C. has
 |telegraph cart, 4   |        |                              |already been
 |water carts         |        |                              |instructed to
 |                    |        |                              |arrange for
 |                    |        |                              |this move.
 |                    |        |                              |
 |        Nil         |   Nil  |                              |
 |                    |        |                              |
 |                    |        |                              |
 |                    |        |                              |
 |        Nil         |   200  |                              |By August 1st.
 |                    |        |                              |
 |                    |        |                              |
 |        Nil         |   Nil  |S.A. Ammn. 5,500,000 rounds   |
 |                    |        |Mk. VII (_a_) (225 tons),     |
 |                    |        |760,000 rounds Mk. VI (30     |
 |                    |        |tons)                         |
 |                    |        |Gun Ammunition (_b_) 10 pr.   |
 |                    |        |2,700 (19 tons), 18 pr. 5,500 |
 |                    |        |(70 tons), 4.5" How. 1,600    |
 |                    |        |(45 tons), 5" How. 10,000     |
 |                    |        |(330 tons), 6" How. 1,200     |
 |                    |        |(70 tons), 60 pr. 1,000 (30   |
 |                    |        |tons)                         |
 +--------------------+--------+------------------------------+---------------

 _a_ If possible, an additional 3,000,000 S.A.A. should be
 landed, so that half the reserve for the whole Northern Force may be ashore
 before operations begin (see Table "C" Remarks).

 _b_ If possible, the following additional gun ammunition should
 also be landed, so that the full reserve for the whole Northern Force may be
 ashore before operations begin:--

 10 pr.         3,000 rounds}
 18 pr.        10,000 rounds}  See Table "C" Remarks.
 6" Howitzer    1,000 rounds}


TABLE B.

TABLE SHOWING UNITS AND DETAILS WHICH IT IS REQUIRED TO LAND AT ANZAC
COVE ON THE NIGHTS OF AUGUST 3RD/4TH, AUGUST 4TH/5TH AND AUGUST 5TH/6TH.

 ---------------------+------+-------+----------+---------+---------------------
         Unit.        | From.| Date. |Personnel.|Vehicles.|      Remarks.
 ---------------------+------+-------+----------+---------+---------------------
 6 Battalions (_a_),  |Mudros|Night, |  4,650   |   Nil   |Machine guns and
 13th Division        |      |August |          |         |other equipment
                      |      |3rd/4th|          |         |carried by hand.
                      |      |       |          |         |
 Bearer Sub-Division, |Mudros|Night, |    100   |   Nil   |      --
 personnel Anzac      |      |August |          |         |
                      |      |3rd/4th|          |         |
                      |      |       |          |         |
 7 Battalions (_a_),  |Mudros|Night, |  5,425   |   Nil   |Machine guns and
 13th Division        |      |August |          |         |other equipment
                      |      |4th/5th|          |         |carried by hand.
                      |      |       |          |         |
 Bearer Sub-Division, |Mudros|Night, |    125   |   Nil   |      --
 1 Field Ambulance,   |      |August |          |         |
 13th Division        |      |4th/5th|          |         |
                      |      |       |          |         |
 4 Battalions, 10th   |Mudros|Night, |  3,100   |   Nil   |Machine guns and
 Division             |      |August |          |         |other equipment
                      |      |5th/6th|          |         |carried by hand.
                      |      |       |          |         |
 29th Indian Brigade  |Imbros|Night, |  2,000   |   Nil   |     Ditto.
 and Field Ambulance  |      |August |          |         |
                      |      |5th/6th|          |         |
                      |      |       |          |         |
 Bearer Sub-Divisions,|Mudros|Night, |    255   |   Nil   |      --
 2 Field Ambulance,   |      |August |          |         |
 13th Division        |      |5th/6th|          |         |
                      |      |       |          |         |
 3 Field Companies    |Mudros|Night, |    525   |   Nil   |Machine guns and
 R.E. (_a_), 13th     |      |August |          |         |other equipment
 Division             |      |5th/6th|          |         |carried by hand. All
                      |      |       |          |         |tools carried by hand.
 ---------------------+------+-------+----------+---------+---------------------

 _a_ These units to move from Helles to Mudros as follows:--

 1 Brigade      }   Night,
 1 Field Company}   28th/29th July.

 1 Brigade      }   Night,
 1 Field Company}   29th/30th July.

 1 Brigade      }   Night,
 1 Field Company}   30/31st July.


TABLE C.

TABLE SHOWING UNITS AND DETAILS WHICH IT IS REQUIRED TO LAND AT NEW
BEACH DURING THE NIGHT OF AUGUST 6TH/7TH, BEGINNING ONE HOUR AFTER DARK
(9.30 P.M.). ALL TROOPS WILL COME FROM IMBROS, BUT HORSES WILL COME
DIRECT EXCEPT WHERE OTHERWISE STATED.

 -----------------+----------+-------+---------------+--------------------------
        Unit.     |Personnel.|Horses.|   Vehicles.   |         Remarks.
 -----------------+----------+-------+---------------+--------------------------
 1 Inf. Bde. and  |  3,050   |   36  |      Nil      |Personnel only to be
 Sig. Sec.(_a_)   |          |       |               |disembarked in the order
                  |          |       |               |shown. Animals of Mountain
 1 Bearer Sub-Div.|     40   |  Nil  |      Nil      |Batteries as soon as there
                  |          |       |               |is sufficient light,
                  |          |       |               |followed by horses of one
 1 Inf. Bde. and  |  3,065   |   36  |      Nil      |18-pr. Battery (82) and of
 Sig. Sec. and 1  |          |       |               |H.Q. F.A. Brigade (10).
 W/T Station      |          |       |               |Animals of remaining units
                  |          |       |               |to follow in the order
 1 Bearer Sub-Div.|     40   |  Nil  |      Nil      |shown. Supplies and forage
                  |          |       |               |for 7 days for these
 Field Co. R.E.   |    175   |   16  |4 tool carts   |troops and animals to be
                  |          |       |               |dumped on the beach as
 2 Mountain Batts.|    100   |   80  |      Nil      |soon as possible, will
 (_b_)            |          |       |               |amount to about 250 tons.
                  |          |       |               |S.A.A. 4,000,000 will also
 Div. H.Q. and    |    125   |   28  |2 cable wagons,|have to be landed besides
 Sig. Co.         |          |       |1 water cart,  |that carried by the
                  |          |       |2 limbd. R.E.  |troops, say, 150 tons.
                  |          |       |wagons         |
                  |          |       |               |
 1 Inf. Bde. and  |  3,840   |   44  |      Nil      |Artillery reserve
 Pioneer Bn. and  |          |       |               |ammunition will also be
 Sig. Sec. and 1  |          |       |               |required as follows:--
 W/T Station      |          |       |               |To come by trawler from
                  |          |       |               |Mudros
 7 Bearer Sub-Divs|    300   |  Nil  |      Nil      |  10 pr.  3,000 rds. (20  tons)
                  |          |       |               |  18 pr. 10,000 rds. (130 tons)
                  |          |       |               |  60 pr.  1,000 rds. (30  tons)
 2 Platoons Div.  |     62   |  Nil  |62 bicycles    |(See notes to Table A.) If
 Cycl. Co.        |          |       |               |reserve S.A.A. and gun
                  |          |       |               |ammunition can be put
 2 Field Cos. R.E.|    350   |   32  |8 tool carts   |ashore at Anzac Cove
                  |          |       |               |before operations begin
 1 F.A. Bde. ("L" |    550   |  251  |16 guns, 44    |this will also be done.
 Bde.) (_c_)      |          |       |wagons, 1      |But the above-mentioned
                  |          |       |telephone      |reserves must also be
                  |          |       |wagon, 5 water |landed at New Beach in
                  |          |       |carts          |case the congestion on the
                  |          |       |               |road from Anzac makes its
                  |          |       |               |forwarding a matter of
                  |          |       |               |great difficulty.
 Ammn. Park       |     65   |  Nil  |     Nil       |
 Personnel (11    |          |       |               |
 Div.)            |          |       |               |
                  |          |       |               |
 9 Tent Sub.-Divs.|    350   |84     |30 ambulance   |
                  |          |horses |wagons, 9 water|
                  |          |or     |carts, 3       |
                  |          |144    |Maltese carts  |
                  |          |mules  |               |
                  |          |       |               |
 4 Casualty       |    360   |  Nil  |     Nil       |
 Clearing Stations|          |       |               |
                  |          |       |               |
 Bde. Ammn. Col.  |     60   |   62  |8 ammunition   |
                  |          |       |wagons, 1 water|
                  |          |       |cart, 4 S.A.A. |
                  |          |       |wagons         |
 2 Bns. for Beach |  1,000   |  Nil  |     Nil       |
 Parties          |          |       |               |
                  |          |       |               |
 Mule Corps       |    150   |  300  |150 mule carts |
                  |          |       |               |
 Wireless Sec.    |     18   |   16  |2 two-horse    |
                  |          |       |vehicles       |
 -----------------+----------+-------+---------------+--------------------------

 _a_ Helles to Imbros, night July 31st/August 1st.

 _b_ Helles to Imbros, night August 1st/2nd.

 _c_ Animals in remarks columns (82 and 10) come from Imbros, remainder
 from Mudros in horse-ships.


TABLE D.

TABLE SHOWING UNITS AND DETAILS WHICH IT IS REQUIRED TO LAND AT ANZAC COVE
BEGINNING AT DAWN AUGUST 7TH.

ORDER OF LANDING AS SHOWN. ALL THESE TROOPS WILL COME FROM MUDROS.

 ----------------------------+----------+-------+---------+---------------------
             Unit.           |Personnel.|Horses.|Vehicles.|      Remarks.
 ----------------------------+----------+-------+---------+---------------------
 Medical personnel, tent sub-|    900   |  Nil  |   Nil   |All spare stretchers
 divisions A. and A.N.Z.A.C. |          |       |         |to be carried by
 Field Ambulance             |          |       |         |hand.
                             |          |       |         |
 Bearer Sub-Divisions of 1   |    125   |  Nil  |   Nil   |
 Field Ambulance, 10th Div   |          |       |         |
                             |          |       |         |
 One 18-pr. Battery and H.Q. |    120   |   92  |   Nil   |
 F.A. Bde. ("A" Bde.)        |          |       |         |
                             |          |       |         |
 10th Heavy Battery R.G.A.   |    110   |   70  |   Nil   |
                             |          |       |         |
 Three 18-pr. Batteries ("A" |    300   |  246  |   Nil   |Guns and personnel
 Brigade)                    |          |       |         |already ashore, (See
                             |          |       |         |Tables A and B.)
 Mules of Mule Corps         |     *    |  400  |   Nil   |* Sufficient personnel
                             |          |       |         |to look after mules.
 ----------------------------+----------+-------+---------+---------------------


TABLE E.

TABLE SHOWING UNITS TO BE READY TO LAND IMMEDIATELY AFTER THOSE SHOWN IN
TABLES A, B, C AND D. UNITS WILL PROBABLY BE REQUIRED IN THE ORDER SHOWN EITHER
AT NEW BEACH OR ANZAC COVE AS CIRCUMSTANCES MAY DICTATE.

 -----------------+------+----------+--------+---------------+------------------
        Unit.     | From |Personnel.|Animals.|   Vehicles.   |Remarks.
 -----------------+------+----------+--------+---------------+------------------
 Divl. H.Q. 10th  |Mudros|    125   |   28   |2 limbered R.E.|
 Divn.            |      |          |        |wagons, 1 water|
                  |      |          |        |cart, 2 cable  |
                  |      |          |        |wagons         |
                  |      |          |        |               |
 3 Battalions 10th|Mudros|  2,325   |   40   |6 water carts  |S.A.A. 2,600,000
 Divn.            |      |          |        |               |rounds besides
                  |      |          |        |               |that carried on the
                  |      |          |        |               |men.
                  |      |          |        |               |
 6 Battalions 10th|Port  |  4,650   |   76   |12 water carts |
 Divn.            |Iero  |          |        |               |
                  |      |          |        |               |
 H.Q. Divl. R.E.  |Mudros|    525   |   30   |12 tool carts, |
                  |      |          |        |3 water carts  |
                  |      |          |        |               |
 3 Field Cos. R.E.|  --  |    --    |   --   |      --       |
 10th Division    |      |          |        |               |
                  |      |          |        |               |
 Bearer Sub-      |Mudros|    250   |   --   |      --       |
 Divisions of 2   |      |          |        |               |
 Field Ambulances,|      |          |        |               |
 10th Divn.       |      |          |        |               |
                  |      |          |        |               |
 15th Heavy       |On    |    121   |   70   |4 guns, 4      |
 Baattery R.G.A.  |board |          |        |wagons, 1 water|
                  |ship--|          |        |cart, 2 G.S.   |
                  |Mudros|          |        |wagons         |
                  |      |          |        |               |
 Tent Sub-Division|Mudros|    350   |54      |15 ambulance   |
 of 10th Divn.    |      |          |horses  |wagons, 12     |
                  |      |          |or 84   |carts          |
                  |      |          |mules   |               |
                  |      |          |        |               |
 Mule Corps       |Mudros|    150   |  300   |150 carts      |
 -----------------+------+----------+--------+---------------+------------------


  GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING,

  AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS.

With reference to your G.288 of 15th July, the Navy is being asked to
provide transport for the following ammunition to be landed at Anzac by
the 3rd August:--

       *       *       *       *       *

_For A. and N.Z.A.C._--Sufficient S.A.A. to bring the amount on shore up
to 500 rounds per rifle and 27,500 per machine-gun.

_For other Troops._--300 rounds per rifle and 24,000 rounds per
machine-gun (in addition to what the troops will carry on landing).

These will come to 10,000,000 rounds in all, and arrangements are being
made to begin landing this ammunition as soon as possible.

2. The following artillery ammunition will also have to be gradually
landed and stored, and should all be ashore, if possible, by August
3rd:--

  10 pr.                                  5,700 rounds
  18 pr. (probably 15 per cent. H.E.)    15,500 "
  4.5-in. Howitzer probably half H.E.     1,600 "
  5-in. Howitzer majority H.E.           10,000 "
  6-in. Howitzer majority H.E.            1,200 "
  60 pr. probably two-thirds H.E.         1,000 "

All of this ammunition is not yet arrived, and the proportion of H.E.
shell is not yet ascertainable from England. The arrangements suggested
in your paragraph 2 (iii.) of your letter are noted, and will be
followed as far as possible.

3. With regard to the marking of ammunition-boxes, the necessary
arrangements are being prepared. You will be informed of the
arrangements and of the system of marking in due course.

Consignments of Mark VI. and Mark VII. will be sent separately as you
suggest.

4. The above figures do not include the periodical replenishment
referred to in paragraph 2 (iv.) of your letter. Dispatch of
consignments on this account and consignments for the reserve will be
notified to you separately.

                                    (_Signed_) W. P. BRAITHWAITE,

                                          _Major-General, C.G.S.,_
                             _Mediterranean Expeditionary Force._

Enclosed a copy of tables forwarded to Vice-Admiral, showing troops,
animals, stores, etc., which the Navy is being asked to land at Anzac.

                                               _22nd July, 1915._

  GENERAL OFFICES COMMANDING,
         9TH CORPS.

The General Commanding wishes me to send you the following outline of
his plans for the next general attack, for the exclusive information of
yourself, your Divisional Generals, and such Officers of your Corps
Headquarters and Divisional Headquarters as you may consider it
necessary to take into your confidence. I am to add that it is Sir Ian's
wish that as few officers as possible should be made acquainted with it.

2. The general plan is, while holding as many of the enemy as possible
in the southern theatre, to throw the weight of our attack on the
Turkish forces now opposite the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.
It is hoped, by means of an attack on the front and right flank of these
forces, to deal them a crushing blow, and to drive the remnants south
towards Kilid Bahr. It will then be the object of the General Commanding
to seize a position across the peninsula from Gaba Tepe to Maidos with a
protected line of supply from Suvla Bay.

3. The strength of the enemy north of Kilid Bahr at the present time is
about 30,000 men. Of these some 12,000 are permanently maintained in the
trenches opposite the Anzac position, and the majority of the remainder
are held in reserve at Boghali, Kojadere and Eski-Keui. It is believed
that there are about three battalions in the Anafarta villages, a
battalion at Ismail Oglu Tepe (New map 1/20,000), a battalion near
Yilghin Burnu, and small parties of outposts at Lala Baba (Sq. 104.L.)
and Ghazi Baba (Sq. 106.N.). The hills due east of Suvla Bay towards Aji
Liman are believed to be held only by a few Gendarmerie, but
information on this point is at present not precise. The hills near
Yilghin Burnu and Ismail Oglu Tepe are known to contain one 4.7-in. gun,
one 9.2-in. gun, and three field guns, protected by wire entanglements
and infantry trenches, but it is believed that the main defences are
against attack from the south or west, and that there is no wire on the
northern slopes of the hills; also that the guns can only be fired in a
southerly direction.

4. The success of the plan outlined in paragraph 2 will depend on two
main factors:--

  (a) The capture of Hill 305 (Sq. 93.W.).

  (b) The capture and retention of Suvla Bay as a base
  of operations for the northern army.

5. The operations from within the present Anzac position against the
enemy on Hill 305 will be carried out by the Australian and New Zealand
Corps, temporarily reinforced by the following units of the 9th Army
Corps:--

  13th Division (less 66th, 67th and 68th Brigades, R.F.A.).

  29th Infantry Brigade (10th Division).

  29th Indian Brigade.

  69th Howitzer Brigade, R.F.A.

6. The landing near Suvla will be entrusted to you, and you will have at
your disposal:--

  11th Division.

  10th Division (less 29th Brigade).

  Highland Mountain Artillery Brigade.

  1st/4th Lowland Howitzer Brigade.

The disembarkation of your command, which may be expected to be opposed,
though not in great strength, will be after dark at a point immediately
south of Lala Baba. The first troops to disembark will be the 11th
Division, which will have been concentrated at Imbros previously to the
attack, and will be brought across under cover of darkness in destroyers
and motor-lighters. It is expected that approximately 4,000 men will be
disembarked simultaneously, and that three infantry brigades and the
mountain artillery brigade will be ashore before daylight.

Your first objectives will be the high ground at Lala Baba and Ghazi
Baba, and the hills near Yilghin Burnu and Ismail Oglu Tepe. It will
also be necessary to send a small force to secure a footing on the hills
due east of Suvla Bay. It is of first importance that Yilghin Burnu and
Ismail Oglu Tepe should be captured by a coup-de-main before daylight in
order to prevent the guns which they contain being used against our
troops on Hill 305 and to safeguard our hold on Suvla Bay. It is hoped
that one division will be sufficient for the attainment of these
objectives.

Your subsequent moves will depend on circumstances which cannot at
present be gauged, but it is hoped that the remainder of your force will
be available on the morning of the 7th August to advance on Biyuk
Anafarta with the object of moving up the eastern spurs of Hill 305 so
as to assist General Birdwood's attack.

7. The operations from within the present Anzac position will begin
during the day immediately preceding your disembarkation (the
reinforcements for General Birdwood's force having been dribbled ashore
in detachments at Anzac Cove on the three previous nights). The
operations will begin with a determined attack on the Turkish left
centre, Lonesome Pine and Johnston's Jolly (see enlarged map of Anzac
position), with the object of attracting the enemy's reserves to this
portion of the line. The Turks have for long been apprehensive of our
landing in the neighbourhood of Gaba Tepe, and it is hoped that an
attack in force in this quarter will confirm their apprehensions. At
nightfall the Turkish outposts on the extreme right of the enemy's line
will be rushed, and a force of 20,000 men will advance in three or more
columns up the ravines running down from Chunuk Bair. This advance,
which will begin about the same time as your first troops reach the
shore, will be so timed as to reach the summit of the main ridge near
Chunuk Bair about 2.30 a.m. (soon after moon-rise).

Latest photographs show that the Turkish trenches on this ridge do not
extend further north than Chunuk Bair, and it is unlikely that the
higher portions of the ridge are held in great strength.

As soon as a lodgement has been effected on this ridge a portion of the
attacking force will be left to consolidate the position gained and the
remainder will advance south-west against the enemy's trenches near Baby
700, which will be attacked simultaneously by a special detachment from
within the Anzac position.

An advance by your force from the east will, as already indicated in
paragraph 6, be of great assistance in the event of this attack being
checked.

8. The landing of sufficient transport to secure the mobility of your
force will be a matter of considerable difficulty. No animals or
vehicles of any kind will be able to land in the first instance, and
machine-guns, tools and necessary medical and signalling equipment must
be carried by hand. All men will land with two iron rations (one day's
meat ration only is advised); infantry will carry 200 rounds S.A.A. and
machine-gun sections 3,500 rounds in belt boxes. Packs and greatcoats
will not be taken ashore. Before dawn it is hoped to land enough horses
to secure the mobility of the mountain artillery brigade and one battery
R.F.A., and it is hoped that within the first 24 hours the
disembarkation of all the personnel, horses and vehicles enumerated in
the attached table will be complete.

One brigade R.F.A. 11th Division, 1/4th Lowland 5th Howitzer Brigade
(two batteries) and the 10th Heavy Battery, will be landed at Anzac
before the operations commence, and their personnel and horses will
disembark on the morning following your disembarkation, and will then be
directed along the beach to join your command.

Water is plentiful throughout the Anafarta Valley, but pending the
disembarkation of water carts a number of mules with special 8-gallon
water bags will be attached to the units of your command.

                                 (_Signed_) W. P. BRAITHWAITE,

                                      _Major-General, C.G.S._,
                          _Mediterranean Expeditionary Force_.

P.S.--This letter is never to be out of an officer's possession, and if,
as is probable, you require to send it to your Brig.-Gen. G.S., it must
be sent to Mudros in charge of an officer.


  TABLE.

                                    |Animals.  |     Vehicles.
  ---------------------------------------------------------------------
  11TH DIVISION.

  Divl. H.Q. and Signal Co.            28      1 cart, 2 cable wagons.

  3 Infantry Brigades                 108      Nil.

  Pioneer Battalion                     8      Nil.

  2 F.A. Brigades                     506      32 guns, 88 wagons, 2
                                               telegraph wagons,
                                               10 carts.

  1 Heavy Battery R.G.A.               45      4 guns, 4 wagons, 2
                                               G.S. wagons, 1 cart.

  3 Field Coys. R.E.                   48      12 tool carts.

  2 Platoons Divl. Cyclist Co.         Nil     62 bicycles.

  3 Field Ambulances                  144      30 ambulances, 12 carts.

  10TH DIVISION.

  Divl. H.Q. and Signal Co.   }        --      Transport on
  1-1/2 Infantry Brigades     }                approximately the same
  Pioneer Battalion           }                scale
  3 Field Cos. R.E.           }                as that for 11th
  3 Field Ambulances          }                Division.

  29th Indian Brigade and Indian Field Ambulance.
  2 Mountain Batteries (80 mules).
  2 Battalions (of 500 men each) for Beach parties.
  Mule Corps with 300 mules and 150 carts.
  3 Casualty Clearing Stations.

Organization Orders for Troops Landing at Anzac.

1. Troops landing at Anzac are to land equipped as follows:

       *       *       *       *       *

F.S. equipment, including respirator;

Pack and waterproof sheet;

No blanket.

Officers' kit reduced to what they can carry.

No transport of any kind will be available to move baggage or equipment.

Ammunition S.A.A. 200 rounds per rifle or person; 3,500 rounds per
machine-gun in belt boxes.

No regimental reserve S.A.A.

Gun, limbers and wagons filled with fused shell.

Water bottles--filled.

Rations--iron rations one day meat and biscuit, two days' groceries.

Sufficient to provide breakfasts.

(Fuel will be issued on shore.)

Tools--infantry. Regimental reserve distributed to individuals and
carried on person; Brigade reserve entrenching tools distributed to
units, by them to individuals and carried on person.

Engineers--tools for road making and entrenching work--carried on
person.

Other arms--usual allotment.

Signal company cable and equipment usually carried in carts to be
transferred to barrows.

Ambulances--all available stretchers and equipment of dressing stations
only. Tent sub-divisions in readiness to rejoin early.

A.S.C.--Small allowance of distributing equipment, to be brought by
advance parties of S. and T. personnel.


Establishments.

2. No horses, attendants or drivers are to land. Brigade Sections of
Signal Companies are to land with the brigades they serve.

Tent sub-divisions of field ambulances are not to land.

Equipment carried in technical vehicles is to be transferred to vehicles
which can be hand-propelled or else carried on person.

3. Troops should disembark into lighters, etc., in complete units,
companies, platoons, and so on, unless much space is sacrificed in so
doing.

4. All troops should land wearing two white 6-inch armlets and a white
patch on back of right shoulder.

5. No lights or noise are to be permitted while disembarking; troops
will move into the lighters or horseboats as quickly as possible.

6. On disembarking troops will be met by staff officers and guides, and
will be marched off direct to the ground allotted to them--in no case
more than 1,200 yards from the beach. All kit brought must be removed by
the troops, and must be taken out of the lighters at the same time as
the troops leave.

Special parties to assist with the machine-gun and other loads are to be
detailed in the load of each lighter.

7. No lights or talking are permitted on the beach or till the troops
reach their allotted area. Fires are not to be lit in any area till 4.15
a.m., and must be extinguished by 8 p.m. Green wood is not to be used;
the smoke it causes will draw shell fire.

8. No troops are to leave the area allotted to them between 4 a.m. and 8
p.m. except on special duty with the authority of the Brigade Commander.
Piquets will be placed under area arrangements at intervals round the
area to prevent men straying independently.

9. Troops may be exposed to desultory shelling during the day or night.
This is never aimed, and the best protection against it is to move into
the bottom of the gully in which the troops are bivouacked.

10. Troops are not to use any portion of the iron ration with which they
land. Issues will be made under brigade arrangements of rations and
extras to last the period of their stay.

11. Water is issued on ration at one gallon fresh water per day. This
includes water for all purposes. For bathing, the sea is available, but
may only be visited after 9 p.m. daily.

12. Latrines for immediate use are dug and marked in each area;
additional latrines are to be prepared by units and the strictest
orders issued to prevent fouling the ground. Latrines are to be made
very deep, as space is much restricted.

13. Casualties of any kind after treatment in the field ambulance
affiliated to the brigade will be taken to the casualty clearing station
in Anzac Cove for removal to Hospital Ship.

Urgent cases at any time; others as far as possible between 7.30 and
8.30 p.m. and between 6 and 9 a.m.

14. The following is to be practised by all troops after landing:--

       *       *       *       *       *

Falling in once during the night in any close formation, and to remain
so closed up for a period of at least half an hour, during which passing
of commands (messages from front to rear and back again and to the
flanks) is to be practised.

The troops must be accustomed to the starlight, which may be expected
during night operations.

15. If aeroplanes pass overhead troops are not to look up, as this will
give away the position of bodies of troops and probably draw shell fire.

16. Troops landing should be provided with Maps 1/20,000 of the area in
which operations are to take place. These maps to be in bulk, and not
issued till after landing.

Maps 1/10,000 of the Anzac area showing roads and bivouacs will be
issued to unit commanders on arrival.

17. Telephone lines will be found laid from Anzac Headquarters to points
suitable for Brigade or higher Headquarters. On arrival brigades will
join up these points to Anzac.

An officer and two orderlies per brigade will also be detailed to remain
at Anzac Headquarters.

Staffs of formations higher than brigades will be located within easy
reach of Anzac Headquarters.

       *       *       *       *       *

G.S.R. Z. 18/2.

_Instructions for G.O.C. 9th Army Corps._

Reference Sheet Anafarta Sagir Gallipoli Map 1/20,000.

1. The intentions of the General Commanding for the impending
operations, and a rough outline of the task which he has allotted to the
troops under your command, were communicated to you in my G.S.R. Z. 18,
dated 22nd instant.

2. In addition to the information contained in paragraph 3 of the above
quoted letter, small numbers of Turkish mounted troops and Gendarmerie
have been reported in the country north of Anzac, and three guns with
limbers, each drawn by six oxen, have been seen moving into Anafarta
Sagir. An aeroplane photograph has also disclosed the presence of a few
trenches on Lala Baba. A sketch of these trenches, which have apparently
been constructed for some months, is attached. It is believed that the
channel connecting the Salt Lake with Suvla Bay is now dry.

3. Your landing will begin on the night 6th/7th August. Your primary
objective will be to secure Suvla Bay as a base for all the forces
operating in the northern zone. Owing to the difficult nature of the
terrain, it is possible that the attainment of this objective will, in
the first instance, require the use of the whole of the troops at your
disposal. Should, however, you find it possible to achieve this object
with only a portion of your force, your next step will be to give such
direct assistance as is in your power to the G.O.C. Anzac in his attack
on Hill 305, by an advance on Biyuk Anafarta, with the object of moving
up the eastern spurs of that hill.

4. Subject only to his final approval, the General Commanding gives you
an entirely free hand in the selection of your plan of operations.

He, however, directs your special attention to the fact that the hills
Yilghin and Ismail Oglu Tepe are known to contain guns which can bring
fire to bear on the flank and rear of an attack on Hill 305, and that on
this account they assume an even greater importance in the first
instance than if they were considered merely part of a position covering
Suvla Bay. If, therefore, it is possible, without prejudice to the
attainment of your primary objective, to gain possession of these hills
at an early period of your attack, it will greatly facilitate the
capture and retention of Hill 305. It would also appear almost certain
that until these hills are in your possession it will be impossible to
land either troops or stores in the neighbourhood of Suvla Bay by day.

5. The troops at your disposal will be:--

11th Division (less one Brigade R.F.A., at Helles).

10th Division (less 29th Infantry Brigade).

Three squadrons R.N. Armoured Car Division, R.N.A.S. (one squadron motor
cycles, six machine guns; one squadron Ford cars, six machine guns; one
squadron armoured cars, six machine guns).

Two Highland Mountain Artillery batteries.

An endeavour will be made to release for your force one or more 5-in.
howitzer batteries, now at Anzac, during the day following your initial
disembarkation.

6. In order that you may be able to arrange for the disembarkation of
your force to agree, so far as Naval exigencies will admit, with the
plan of operations on which you decide, the allocation of troops to the
ships and boats to be provided by the Navy is left to your decision.

With this object, tables have been drawn up, and are enclosed with these
instructions, showing the craft which can be placed at your disposal by
the Navy, their capacity, and the points at which the troops can be
disembarked. The tables also show what numbers of troops, animals,
vehicles, and stores can be landed simultaneously.

The beaches available for your landing on the first night are (1) a
frontage of 600 yards in Suvla Bay (sq. 117 Q.V.); (2) a frontage of
1,800 yards S. of Kuchuk Kemikli (sq. 9, 103 z, 104 V; 91 A.B.), called
"New Beach" in the tables. It will not be possible in the first instance
to land more than one brigade of your force in Suvla Bay, though other
vessels can simultaneously be discharging their passengers on New Beach.

7. As regards the time at which the disembarkation may be expected to
commence, no craft will be allowed to leave Kephalos Harbour till after
dark, and the passage across will take from one and a half to two hours.
It is unsafe, therefore, to count on any troops being ashore before
10.30 p.m., and in no case must your approach be disclosed to the enemy
till 10 p.m., the hour at which the outposts on the left flank of the
Anzac position are to be rushed.

8. No allowance has been made in the tables for the disembarkation of
your headquarters, as it is not known at what period of the operations
you will wish them to land.

9. Special attention is directed to paragraph 8 of my letter G.S.R. Z.
18, dated 22nd July.

10. The infantry of the 53rd Division will be available as Army Reserve,
and will be at the disposal of the General Commanding.

11. Special instructions regarding signal communications will be issued
later. In general terms the arrangements will be as follows:--

       *       *       *       *       *

There is a submarine cable between Imbros and Anzac, and a cable will be
laid as soon as practicable from Imbros to Suvla Bay. A submarine cable
and a land cable will also be laid between Anzac and Suvla Bay as soon
as circumstances permit, probably before dawn. Pending the completion of
this work inter-communication between Anzac and Suvla Bay will be
carried out by lamp, and, subject to Naval approval, between Suvla Bay
and Imbros by wireless telegraphy.

Two[18] military pack W.T. stations and one R.N. Base W.T. station will
be provided at Suvla Bay, four naval ratings will be attached to each
station as visual signalling personnel. One of these military pack W.T.
stations will be disembarked with the second brigade to land, and will
act as a base station pending the arrival of the R.N. Base wireless
station. The second military pack W.T. station will be disembarked with
the third brigade to land; it will be placed on a flank and used mainly
for fire control under the B.G.R.A.

A wagon wireless station at G.H.Q., Imbros, will be in communication
with both these pack W.T. stations.

One officer and 23 other ranks, with two pack animals from the Brigade
Signal Section, will be landed with each Infantry Brigade.

These parties will lay their cable by hand and establish telephone and
vibrator communication from the beach forward. No vehicles will be
landed in the first instance, all necessary stores being man-handled.

Three officers, 74 other ranks, 28 animals and five vehicles will be
landed with Divisional Headquarters.

The advance parties will release the brigade sections from the beach and
be prepared to lay cable lines by hand.

Two cable wagons will be included in the five vehicles, and should be
the first of those vehicles to be disembarked.


 ----------------------+----------------------+--------------------+
    Time of Arrival    |                      |                    |
       off Coast.      |        Craft.        |     Capacity.      |
 ----------------------+----------------------+--------------------+
 In time to disembark  |10 motor lighters     |500 infantry        |
 all troops,           |(10 steamboats        |each (and           |
 vehicles, horses,     |accompanying)         |400,000 rds.        |
 stores, etc., by      |                      |S.A.A. if necessary)|
 night                 |                      |                    |
                       |                      |                    |
                       |10 destroyers         |530 infantry        |
                       |                      |each                |
                       |                      |                    |
                       |                      |                    |
                       |                      |                    |
                       |                      |                    |
                       |                      |                    |
                       |1 sloop, towing       |600 men             |
                       |1 motor lighter       |88 horses           |
                       |and 4 horseboats      |8 mtn. guns         |
                       |(1 steamboat          |30 bicycles         |
                       |accompanying)         |                    |
                       |                      |                    |
                       |                      |                    |
                       |                      |                    |
                       |1 sloop, towing       |500 men             |
                       |4 horseboats (1       |24 horses           |
                       |steamboat             |4 18-pr. guns       |
                       |accompanying)         |or wagons           |
                       |                      |                    |
                       |1 trawler, towing     |250 men             |
                       |4 horseboats          |24 horses           |
                       |(1 steamboat          |4 18-pr. guns       |
                       |accompanying)         |or wagons           |
                       |                      |                    |
                       |                      |                    |
                       |                      |                    |
                       |H.M.S.                |1,000 men           |
                       |_Endymion_            |                    |
                       |                      |                    |
                       |H.M.S.                |1,000 men           |
                       |_Theseus_             |                    |

 -------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------
                    |       Method of       |
   Landing Place.   |    Disembarkation.    |         Remarks.
 -------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------
 7 lighters at      |Land direct on beach   |Ammunition if necessary
 New Beach,         |                       |may be left on motor
 3 lighters at      |                       |lighters until convenient
 Suvla Bay          |                       |to land it, according to
                    |                       |circumstances.
                    |                       |
 One attending      |Motor lighters take    |The disembarkation from
 each motor         |off troops and land    |the destroyers cannot
 lighter            |them on beach          |begin until the 10 motor
                    |                       |lighters have landed
                    |                       |their complement and
                    |                       |returned.
                    |                       |
 New Beach          |Motor lighters and     |The sloops and trawler,
                    |horseboats loaded      |after casting off their
                    |with guns, horses of   |tows, will return to
                    |mountain and 18-pr.    |Kephalos. Other
                    |batteries. Sloop       |horseboats
                    |loaded with men and    |boats will be there,
                    |bicycles               |ready filled with the
                    |                       |remainder of the horses
 New Beach          |Horseboats loaded      |required in the first
                    |with guns, vehicles,   |instance for the two
                    |and horses of 18-pr.   |Mountain Batteries,
                    |battery. Sloop         |the 18-pr. Battery, and
                    |loaded with men        |the Signal Company.
                    |and bicycles           |They will pick up these
 New Beach          |Horseboats loaded      |horseboats and tow
                    |with guns, vehicles,   |them over to the beach
                    |and horses of 18-pr.   |immediately.
                    |battery. Trawler       |
                    |available to carry men |
                    |                       |
 New Beach          |Landed either from     |         --
 or Suvla           |cutters towed by       |
 Bay, as may        |steamboats, or from    |         --
 be convenient      |motor lighters         |
                    |                       |
 -------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------

The above would admit of the disembarkation before dawn at and in the
neighbourhood of Suvla Bay of:--

Divisional Headquarters.
Signal Co. with 40 horses.
1 W.T. Section and 2 W.T. Stations.
H.Q. F.A. Bde. (18-pr.) with 10 horses.
1 F.A. Battery (18-pr.) with 82 horses.
2 Mountain Batteries with 80 horses.
3 Field Companies R.E.
3 Infantry Brigades and part of remainder of F.A. Bde. (personnel).
1 Pioneer Battalion.
2 Battalions for Beach parties and part of Ammn. Park personnel.
2 Platoons Divl. Cyclist Co. and part of Tent Sub-divisions of Field
Ambulances.
Bearer Subdivisions of 3 Field Ambulances and part of Casualty Clearing
Stations.

The 10 motor lighters will land their complements first, and then the troops
from the 10 Destroyers, the two sloops and their tows, and the trawler and her
tows, can proceed simultaneously on a front of about 600 yards in Suvla Bay and
1,800 on the beach south of Suvla Bay, directly beach secured. The two landing
places are about 2 miles apart. The landing of the troops from H.M.S.
_Endymion_ and _Theseus_ may be able to take place simultaneously, or
may have to be deferred until the motor lighters have cleared the destroyers.


 ----------------------+----------------------+---------------------+
    Time of Arrival    |                      |                     |
       off Coast.      |        Craft.        |     Capacity.       |
 ----------------------+----------------------+---------------------+
 At or immediately     |1 horse transport     |All horses enumerated|
 after dawn            |                      |in Table C appended  |
                       |                      |to letter G.S.R. Z.  |
                       |                      |18 of 23rd July,     |
                       |                      |except those already |
                       |                      |provided for. Water  |
                       |                      |bags and pumps       |
                       |                      |                     |
                       |1 mule transport      |All mules and mule   |
                       |                      |carts provided for in|
                       |                      |Tables C and E       |
                       |                      |appended to G.S.R. Z.|
                       |                      |18 of 23rd July      |
                       |                      |                     |
                       |6 small transports    |5,000 Infantry       |
                       |                      |                     |
                       |                      |                     |
                       |                      |                     |
                       |                      |                     |
                       |                      |                     |
                       |                      |                     |
 Called up from        |1 supply ship         |7 days' supplies for |
 Kephalos as soon after|                      |troops and animals   |
 dawn as circumstances |                      |in Tables C and E    |
 permit                |                      |appended appended to |
                       |                      |G.S.R. Z. 18 of 23rd |
                       |                      |July                 |
                       |                      |                     |
 Called up from        |4 small transports    |2,700 Infantry       |
 Kephalos as soon after|                      |                     |
 dawn as circumstances |                      |                     |
 permit                |                      |                     |
                       |                      |                     |
                       |1 horse transport     |All horses and       |
                       |                      |vehicles enumerated  |
                       |                      |in Table E, appended |
                       |                      |to G.S.R. Z. 18 of   |
                       |                      |23rd July            |
                       |                      |                     |
 ----------------------+----------------------+---------------------+

 -------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------
                    |       Method of       |
   Landing Place.   |    Disembarkation.    |         Remarks.
 -------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------
 Suvla Bay          |Six of the horseboats  |Transport comes from
                    |from which the 18-pr.  |Mudros.
                    |and mountain batteries |
                    |will previously have   |
                    |been landed            |
                    |                       |
                    |                       |
                    |                       |
 Suvla Bay          |Six of the horseboats  |Transport comes from
                    |from which 18-pr. and  |Alexandria.
                    |mountain bateries will |
                    |previously have been   |
                    |landed                 |
                    |                       |
 _Suvla Bay_or      |Landed from motor      |Six battalions 10th
 _New Beach_ if     |lighters as soon as    |Division coming from
 necessary)         |they have finished     |Port Iero.
                    |clearing the destroyers|
                    |and (if necessary)     |
                    |H.M.S. _Endymion_ and  |
                    |_Theseus_              |
                    |                       |
 Suvla Bay          |Landed from motor      |
                    |lighters as soon as    |
                    |the Port Iero troops   |
                    |are cleared            |
                    |                       |
                    |                       |
                    |                       |
 _Suvla Bay_ (or    |Landed from motor      |Three  battalions 10th
 _New Beach_ if     |lighters as soon as    |Division from Mudros.
 necessary)         |the Port Iero troops   |
                    |are cleared.           |
                    |                       |
 Suvla Bay          |Landed from horseboats |
                    |brought up on second   |
                    |trip by the trawler and|
                    |two sloops, as soon as |
                    |the horseboats have    |
                    |been emptied           |
 -------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------


The above will provide for the disembarkation of the remainder of the
troops, etc., enumerated in Tables C and E, appended to letter G.S.R. Z.
18 of 23rd July, that is those not already detailed to be landed before
dawn, viz.:--

Remainder of F.A. Brigade (18 pr.).
Remainder of Ammunition Park Personnel.
15th Heavy Battery R.G.A.
Brigade Ammunition Column.
Remainder of Casualty Clearing Stations.
Mule Corps.
Also 4,000,000 rds. S.A.A. Reserve Gun Ammunition
(by special trawlers from Mudros) 7 days' supplies
for the above troops and animals.

As soon as possible after Corps Headquarters go ashore, the personnel of
the Divisional Signal Companies will be released from work at the beach.

Arrangements will be made subsequently to disembark an air line
detachment and a cable section to provide and pole local lines.

The remainder of the Corps Headquarters Signal Company will be kept in
readiness to be forwarded as soon as Corps Headquarters reports that
circumstances admit of its disembarkation.

12. Two Military Landing Officers and their assistant military landing
officers will be placed at your disposal from units other than those
under your command.

13. In addition to the units mentioned in Tables A-E forwarded to you
with my letter G.S.R. Z. 18, dated 23rd July, the following are being
dispatched from Alexandria in this order:--

Three Squadrons Armoured Car Division R.N.A.S. (These will be available
to land on the morning after your disembarkation begins, if you so
desire.)

(1) H.Q.R.A. 10th Division.

Two F.A. Brigades 10th Division (modified scale of horses).

R.A. personnel and ammunition of 10th Divisional Ammunition Park.

(2) One F.A. Brigade 11th Division (modified scale of horses). One F.A.
Brigade 10th Division (modified scale of horses).

(3) Two F.A. Brigades 13th Division.

(4) Horses for 11th Division.

and the following will be assembled at Imbros to land when required:--

11th Divisional Cyclist Company (less two Platoons).

10th Divisional Cyclist Company.

13th Divisional Cyclist Company.

14. You are requested to submit your proposed plan of operations to
G.H.Q. for approval at the earliest possible date.

                        (_Signed_) W. P. Braithwaite,

                                      _Major-General, C.G.S.,
                                 Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.
                                                 29th July, 1915._


  G.S.R. Z. 18/2.                                    _July 29th._

  GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING,
          8TH CORPS.

The General Commanding has decided that his next main attack shall be
made in the vicinity of Anzac with the object of placing ourselves
astride the Peninsula to the north of Kilid Bahr.

2. The 8th Corps with attached troops is to assist this main operation
by offensive action in the south, the scope and form of this action
being determined solely with reference to its effects on the main
operation.

As the decisive point will be in the neighbourhood of Anzac, all
reinforcements will be utilized in that theatre, and it is improbable
that any will be available for the southern zone before the middle of
August, except such drafts for the 8th Corps and the Corps Exp. Orient
as may reach the Peninsula in the next ten days.

3. In order to free sufficient troops to enable the 8th Corps to take
the offensive, the French will take over part of the line as defined in
Force Order No. 22.

4. In addition to the troops of the 8th Corps and R.N.D. at present at
your disposal, the following reinforcements may be expected:--

  29th Division       280 due 29th July.
  29th Division       900 due 4th August.
  42nd Division       100 due 29th July.
                    -----
  Total             1,280

which, allowing for normal wastage, should give an effective total of
24,780 on 5th August. These numbers, with the shorter line you will be
called upon to hold, should leave you with sufficient troops to
undertake a limited offensive operation on or about that day.

5. Assuming that you are not attacked in the meanwhile, the total amount
of ammunition which should be available at Helles early in August for
offensive action, and to maintain a reserve is:--

  18 pr.       36,000   }
  4.5 inch      2,000   }    Plus any amounts saved
  5 inch        4,000   }    from normal daily expenditure.
  6 inch          545   }
  60 pr.        3,000   }

but it must be borne in mind that no replacements can be looked for
before August 16th.

6. The scope of your offensive action must be based upon these figures,
and it is thought that the most suitable objective will be the capture
of the Turkish trenches up to the line F. 13, G. 13, H. 13, and H. 12.
Plans for this operation should, therefore, be undertaken at once.

7. Pre-supposing that this attack is successful, and that the numbers at
your disposal admit of a further advance, the capture of the trenches on
the line H. 14 to H. 15, followed perhaps by the capture of Krithia
could then be undertaken, and plans for this action should be prepared
beforehand. But as the launching of this further attack must be entirely
dependent on unknown factors, a definite decision on this point cannot
be arrived at beforehand. It is, moreover, essential that the plan of
your first attack should not definitely commit your troops to a further
advance unless the trend of events should render such a course
desirable.

8. As regards the date for launching your first attack, it is thought
that the most favourable time would be shortly before the main
operations at Anzac begin, and you should therefore arrange for your
first attack to take place on the 4th August.

9. Beyond holding the enemy in front of them to their positions and
assisting you with artillery fire, the French will not be asked to take
part in your first attack, but, in the event of your reaching Krithia,
they will be directed to conform to your movements and to establish
themselves on the spurs leading up to Achi Baba.

I will ascertain the amount of artillery support and lean you can expect
from the C.E.O., and if the information arrives in time will attach it
as an appendix to this letter.

10. The possibility of the southern force being able to capture Achi
Baba has not been dealt with in this memorandum, as the attempt should
only be made in the event of large reinforcements being available for
the southern zone, and these must depend on the course of events in the
main theatre.

                         (_Signed_) W. P. BRAITHWAITE,

                                  _Major-General, C.G.S.,
                              Mediterranean Expeditionary Force._

It will be apparent to you how necessary it is not to allow any
suspicion of the reason for the date mentioned in paragraph 8 being told
to any person other than your Brigadier-General G.S.

                                               (_Intd._) W. P. B.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 18: All W.T. arrangements are subject to alteration, as they
have not yet been confirmed by the Vice-Admiral.]




APPENDIX.

_French Artillery Support for 8th Corps._

1. One Brigade of 75's will be placed at the disposal of the 8th Corps
for the attack on 4th-5th August.

Of these

(_a_) One battery will be moved to support closely the attack on
Krithia.

(_b_) One battery will fire up the Nullah E. of Krithia.

2. In addition, six French howitzers will be so disposed as to open fire
upon Turkish artillery north of the ridge 150--Achi Baba peak.


INSTRUCTIONS FOR G.O.C. A. AND N.Z. ARMY CORPS.

Reference Map Anafarta Sagir Gallipoli Map 1/20,000.

1. The General Commanding has decided to mass the whole of his
reinforcements in and immediately north of the area occupied by the
corps under your command, with a view to securing Suvla Bay as a base of
operations, driving the enemy off the Sari Bair, and eventually securing
a position astride the Gallipoli Peninsula from the neighbourhood of
Gaba Tepe to the straits north of Maidos.

2. The general outline for your proposals for the action of the A. and
N.Z. Army Corps contained in your G a 89 of 1st July are approved.

3. (_a_) The General Commanding wishes your operations to begin on
August 6th with a strong and sustained attack on Hill 125 (Plateau 400),
every effort being made to deceive the enemy as to the locality against
which our main effort is to be made, and to induce him to believe that
it will be directed against his lines opposite the southern portion of
your position. In pursuance of this object the Vice-Admiral has arranged
that H.M. ships shall in the meantime display increased activity off
the coast between Gaba Tepe and Kum Tepe. It has been arranged that
soundings shall be taken by night off the coast south of Gaba Tepe; and,
on the evening of August 6th, a naval demonstration will be made off
this part of the coast, H.M. ships being accompanied by a number of
trawlers as if a landing were to be undertaken.

(_b_) The General Commanding further concurs in the subsequent sequence
of the operations outlined by you, namely:--

(i) The clearing of the enemy's outposts from the ridges facing Nos. 2
and 3 posts, to be undertaken after nightfall.

(ii) An attack in as great strength as possible up the Sazli Beit Dere,
the Chailak Dere and the Aghyl Dere, against the Chunuk Bair ridge, by
night.

(iii) When the Chunuk Bair ridge is gained, a converging attack from
that ridge, and from the north-eastern section of your present position,
against Hill 180 (Baby 700).

4. (_a_) For the above operations the following troops will be at your
disposal:--

A. and N.Z. Army Corps. 13th Division, less all artillery except 69th
F.A. (Howitzer) Brigade. 29th Brigade (10th Division). 29th Indian
Brigade.

(_b_) At the date of commencement of the operations the following troops
belonging to or attached to the 9th Army Corps will be at Anzac, but
will not, except so far as is stated hereunder, be at your disposal:--

One F.A. Brigade, 11th Division: To rejoin 9th Army Corps as soon as
horses are landed.

10th Heavy Battery, R.G.A.: Ditto.

14th Lowland (Howitzer) Brigade (two Batteries): Arrangements must be
made so that these batteries may be free to rejoin the 9th Army Corps
before nightfall on August 7th.

5. The operations carried out by the Corps under your command will form
part of a general combined offensive undertaken by the whole of the
forces of the Gallipoli Peninsula and by the 9th Army Corps, which will
be disembarked in the neighbourhood of Suvla Bay, beginning on the night
of August 6th-7th.

(_a_) The 8th Army Corps, in conjunction with the Corps Expéditionnaire,
will attack the Turkish lines south of Krithia on August 4th and 5th.
The attack will be made on a large scale, and will be vigorously
pressed, and it is hoped that by its means the enemy will be induced to
move part of his central reserves southward into the Cape Helles zone
during the 5th and 6th, so that they may not be available in the
northern zone on the 6th and 7th.

(_b_) The 9th Army Corps will begin landing in and close to Suvla Bay
during the night of August 6th-7th. Three infantry brigades, with one
field and two mountain batteries, engineers and medical services, should
be ashore before dawn, and will be closely followed by two more infantry
brigades and additional artillery and engineers.

The G.O.C. 9th Army Corps has been informed:--

(i) That his mission is to secure Suvla Bay as a base of operation for
all the forces in the northern zone.

(ii) That the seizure of Yilghin Burnu and Ismail Oglu Tepe ("W" and
Chocolate Hills), on account of the presence there of artillery which
may interfere with your operations, must be considered as of very
special importance.

(iii) That so far as is possible after the fulfilment of his primary
mission, he is to render you such direct assistance as may be
practicable by moving any available troops via Biyuk Anafarta up the
eastern slopes of the Sari Bair.

(_c_) At the commencement of these operations the infantry of the 53rd
Division will be available as Army Reserve and will be at the disposal
of the General Commanding.

6. The Vice-Admiral has agreed provisionally to the following allotment
of ships affording naval support to the operations:--

In Suvla Bay: One 6-in. monitor.

South of Kuchuk: H.M.S. _Endymion_.

Kemliki (Nibrunesi Point): H.M.S. _Edgar_, H.M.S. _Talbot_, one 6-in.
monitor, one 9.2-in. monitor. These ships would be in position at
daylight on August 7th, and would mainly be required to support the
operations of the 9th Army Corps.

     West of Gaba Tepe: H.M.S. _Baccanto_, H.M.S. _Humber_, H.M.S.
     _Havelock_, one 6-in. monitor.

These ships would be in position at 3 p.m. on August 6th, except H.M.S.
_Havelock_, which would be in position at daylight on August 7th. They
would be detailed for support of the right flank of the A. and N.Z. Army
Corps.

     Off Kum Tepe: One 6-in. monitor.

A separate communication is being sent to you with regard to the final
settlement of details as to the support of the operations by naval guns,
allocation of targets, etc.

7. Special instructions regarding signal communication will be issued
later. In general terms the arrangements will be as follows:--

A submarine cable and a land cable will be laid between Anzac and Suvla
     Bay as soon as circumstances permit.

A submarine cable will also be laid as soon as practicable between
     Imbros and Suvla Bay. Pending the completion of connection between
     Anzac and Suvla Bay, inter-communication will be carried out by
     lamp.

Two military pack W/T stations and a R.N. Base W/T station will be
     established in the vicinity of Suvla Bay. The W/T station at Anzac
     will be able to intercept messages from seaplanes, but must not
     attempt to reply.

W/T via the ships will be an alternative means of communication between
     G.H.Q. and the troops ashore in case of interruption of cable
     communication.

A system of flares will be arranged for employment on the left flank of
     your position at dawn on August 7th to indicate to the ships the
     positions reached by the troops.

8. G.H.Q. will in the first instance be at Imbros.

                          (_Signed_) W. P. BRAITHWAITE,

                                  _Major-General, C.G.S.,
                             Mediterranean Expeditionary Force._

  G.H.Q., _30th July, 1915_.



FORCE ORDER No. 25.

                                            GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

                                               _2nd August, 1915._


1. The total forces of the enemy in the Gallipoli Peninsula are
estimated at 100,000.

Of these, 27,000 are in the neighbourhood of Anzac (5th, 19th, 16th
Divisions, and 18th and 64th Regiments); 36,000 are in the Southern zone
(1st, 4th, 6th Division less one regiment, 7th Division, 11th Division
less one regiment, and one regiment each of the 12th, 25th and 3rd
Divisions); and 37,000 are in Reserve (9th Division less one regiment,
12th less one regiment, 13th, 14th, and 25th less one regiment, and 10th
Divisions). Of this reserve force two Divisions are in the Bulair
district and one Division in the Eyerli Tepe zone. There are 12,000 on
the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles (2nd Division and 8th Division less
one regiment). There are believed to be five Divisions (45,000 men) in
the Keshan area belonging to the 5th and 6th Corps.

All reports tend to show that though the enemy may be expected to fight
well in trenches, their _moral_ has suffered considerably as a result of
their recent heavy casualties, and that their stock of ammunition is
low.

2. The General Commanding intends to carry out a combined and
simultaneous attack on the enemy in the northern and southern zone
commencing on 6th August, in accordance with the special instructions
already issued to the Corps Commanders concerned.

During the first phase of these operations the 13th Division (less three
18-pdr. Bdes. R.F.A.), the 29th Infantry Brigade will be attached to the
A. and N.Z. Army Corps. Three squadrons R.N. Armoured Car Division and
two batteries Highland Mounted Artillery will be attached to 9th Corps.
86th Brigade R.F.A. and 91st Heavy Battery R.G.A. will be attached to
8th Corps.

3. Special instructions regarding embarkation and disembarkation are
issued to G.O.C. 9th Corps, G.O.C., A. and N.Z. Corps, and I.G.C., as
appended to this order.

4. The 53rd Division will remain at the disposal of the General
Commanding as general reserve.

5. G.H.Q. will remain in the first instance in its present situation.

                                    _(Signed)_ W. P. BRAITHWAITE,

                                        _Major-General, C.G.S.,
                                 Mediterranean Expeditionary Force._

Issued to: G.O.C. Corps Expéditionnaire; G.O.C. A. and N.Z. Army Corps;
G.O.C. 8th Army Corps; G.O.C. 9th Army Corps; G.O.C. 53rd Division;
I.G.C.; Vice-Admiral.


APPENDIX TO FORCE ORDER NO. 25.

_Embarkations._

1. The embarkation of units of the 9th Corps concentrated at Imbros will
be carried out under the orders of G.O.C. 9th Corps, commencing for
personnel on 6th August, for vehicles and stores at such earlier date as
may be convenient. The necessary ships and boats (lists of which have
already been handed to the G.O.C. Corps) will be assembled in the
harbour beforehand; and the embarkation programme will be worked out in
consultation with Commander Ashby, R.N., who has been detailed by the
Vice-Admiral for this purpose, and who will arrange for the various
vessels to be in their allotted positions at the hours arranged.

G.O.C. 9th Corps will also be responsible for the allocation to ships or
lighters, and for the embarkation of the following units:--

       *       *       *       *       *

At Imbros: One W.T. Section (Nos. W. 10 and W. 11 Pack Wireless
Stations); Two Anson Battalions R.N.D. (for duties on the beach); No. 16
Casualty Clearing Station.

In transit from Mudros to Imbros: One Casualty Clearing Station.

Units and formations concentrated at Mudros and Mitylene will be
embarked for their various destinations under the orders of I.G.C. in
accordance with the programme already issued to that officer.


_Military Transport Officers._

2. G.O.C. 9th Corps and I.G.C. respectively will ensure that an officer
is appointed Military Transport Officer on every ship for the
embarkation of which they are severally responsible (_vide_ paragraph
1).


_Landing Places._

3. The landings of the 9th Corps will be referred to as "A," "B," and
"C" Beaches.

"A" Beach--Square 117.q. and v.

"C" Beach--Square 103.u.z.

"B" Beach--Square 91.b, i, o.

"C" and "B" Beaches are practically contiguous.


_Beach Control Personnel._

4. The following naval and military beach control personnel have been
appointed for the landing places of the 9th Corps:--

       *       *       *       *       *

Principal Beach Master: Captain H. F. G. Talbot, R.N.

Beach Masters: Commander I. W. Gibson, M.V.O. ("A" Beach), Captain C. P.
Metcalfe, R.N. ("B" Beach), Commander C. Tindal-Carril-Worsley ("C"
Beach).

Assistant Beach Masters and Beach Lieutenants: Four Lieutenant
Commanders, ten Lieutenants, R.N.

Principal Mil. L.O.: Colonel W. G. B. Western, C.B.

Mil. L.O.'s: Major F. W. Pencock, Derbyshire Yeomanry, Major Sir R.
Baker, Dorset Yeomanry, Captain Tylsen Wright, A.S.C.

Assistant Mil. L.O.'s: Captain Wade Palmer, Derbyshire Yeomanry, Captain
B. A. Smith, South Notts Hussars, Lieutenant H. V. Browne, Dorset
Yeomanry, Lieutenant Krabbe, Berks Yeomanry.

The allocation of the above military officers to the various landing
places will be detailed by the P.M.L.O. in consultation with the P.B.M.

Special instructions with regard to beach fatigue parties have already
been issued to the G.O.C. 9th Corps.

G.O.C., A. and N.Z. Army Corps will detail such military landing
officers, assistant military landing officers, and beach parties for
A.N.Z.A.C. as he may consider necessary. The names of officers so
appointed will be reported as early as possible to V.A. and to G.H.Q.

The following special service officers are attached to H.Q., A. and N.Z.
Army Corps, for such duties in connection with the landing as the G.O.C.
may direct:--

       *       *       *       *       *

Major P. R. Bruce, S. Notts Hussars.

Captain C. R. Higgens, County of London Yeomanry.

Captain Sir E. Pauncefort Duncombe, Royal Bucks Hussars.


_General Instructions for Landing._

5. All troops will land with two iron rations (one day's meat only in
case of troops disembarking at Anzac). Infantry will carry 200 rounds of
S.A.A., machine-gun sections 3,500 rounds. Packs will not be worn. A
proportion of heavy entrenching tools, signalling and medical gear will
be carried by hand. Camp kettles will be handed to the Ordnance Officer
of the camp at which units concentrate before embarkation. They will be
forwarded and reissued at the first opportunity.

6. Horses will be landed harnessed, and with nosebags filled to their
full capacity.

Poles of G.S. wagons will be removed before slinging and made fast to
the body of the wagon. Poles of carts, limbers, and limbered wagons will
not be removed; these vehicles should be so placed in the boats that
they can be landed pole leading.


_Ammunition._

7. The G.O.C. 9th Corps will depute an officer to arrange, in
consultation with the P.M.L.O., for the storing of reserve ammunition in
convenient localities near the beach. Guards for these stores may be
found from the beach fatigue parties.


_Water._

8. The strictest economy must be exercised with regard to drinking
water. Under arrangements already made by G.H.Q., receptacles filled
with water will be landed as early as possible from the ships carrying
the mule corps, and will be conveyed to the troops as transport becomes
available. Waterproof tanks (2,300 gallon capacity) and lift and force
pumps will be available on the _Prah_--R.E. Storeship--in Kephalos
Harbour, and will be forwarded by D.Q.M.G., G.H.Q., on request of G.O.C.
Corps.


_Transport._

9. Transport to supplement that in possession of units will be provided
for the 9th Corps and the A.N.Z. Corps by the Indian Mule Corps. The
amount of transport for each formation has been calculated to carry
rations, water, and S.A.A., making one or two trips a day, according to
the anticipated distance of the various units from the beach.

This transport will be handed over, as it is landed, by an officer
appointed by the D.S.T., to transport officers of Brigades and
divisional troops for allotment as circumstances may require.

Senior transport officers of Divisions will be ordered to report to the
following representatives of the D.S.T. immediately on landing:--

       *       *       *       *       *

At Anzac: Lieutenant-Colonel Streidinger, A.D.T.

At "A" Beach: Major Badcock, D.A.D.T.


_Supplies._

10. A supply depôt has been formed at Anzac, and it is in charge of
Major Izod, A.S.C. A supply depot will be formed by D.S.T. at "A" Beach
as soon as supplies can be landed, and will be in charge of Major
Huskisson, A.S.C. Senior supply officers of Divisions will be ordered to
place themselves in communication with the officer in charge of the
nearest supply depôt and to keep him informed of their daily
requirements. Supplies will, so far as possible, be handed over to them
in bulk at the depôt. Owing to the difficulty in landing sufficient
animals in the first instance it is possible that only half rations may
be available on the third and fourth days after the operations begin.
All units should be specially ordered to husband their rations.


_Medical._

11. Arrangements have been made to establish on the beach at Anzac two
casualty clearing stations, which will be embarked by I.G.C., and two
at "A" Beach, which will be embarked under orders of G.O.C. 9th Corps
(_see_ paragraph 1). Medical officers will be appointed by G.H.Q. to
control these units, and to take charge of the arrangements for
evacuation of the wounded from the beach.

                                  (_Signed_) C. F. ASPINALL,
                                            _Lieutenant-Colonel,

                                  For Major-General, C.G.S.,
                              Mediterranean Expeditionary Force._




APPENDIX IV

INSTRUCTIONS TO MAJOR-GENERAL H. DE LISLE, C.B., D.S.O.


1. The operations of the northern wing of the Army have only been
partially successful.

(_a_) The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, with the 13th Division
and the 29th Brigade of 10th Division attached, has greatly extended the
area occupied, and now holds a position under the Chunuk Bair Ridge,
which the G.O.C. considers a favourable one from which to launch the
final attack on the ridge. The necessity for reorganization after the
recent operations, and for establishing a satisfactory system of
forwarding water, ammunition and supplies, will involve a delay of some
days before the attack on the main ridge can be made.

(_b_) The 9th Army Corps, less the 13th Division and 29th Brigade, but
with the 53rd and 54th Divisions attached, holds the Yilghin Burnu
hills, and a line northwards from the easternmost of these two hills
roughly straight across the Kuchuk Anafarta Ova to the highest point of
the Kiretch Tepe Sirt. Attacks by the 11th Division against the Ismail
Oglu Tepe and the Anafarta spur from the north-west have been made
without any success. In the course of the operations the 9th Corps
became very much disorganized, and since August 11th the work of
reorganization and consolidation has been proceeding.

2. At present the enemy has shown no great strength north of an east and
west line through Anafarta Sagir. He has a force operating on and near
the Kiretch Tepe Sirt, the strength of which cannot yet be accurately
estimated. From present indications this appears to be a detachment
which is known to have guarded the coast from Ejelmer Bay to Suvla Bay;
it does not appear to have been reinforced to any extent. Across the
Kuchuk Anafarta Ova there appear to be no more than snipers. In the
region Anafarta Sagir--Ismail Oglu Tepe and the Biyuk Anafarta Valley
the enemy has developed considerable strength--his intention being, no
doubt, to protect the right of his main force which opposes the
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, and to prevent our advance on the
Anafarta gap.

3. The General Commanding has decided to strike as quickly and in as
great strength as possible against the enemy's on the line Ismail Oglu
Tepe--Anafarta Sagir with the objects, first, of driving in this flank
and preparing a further enveloping advance; and, secondly, by clearing
the Anafarta spur to deny to the enemy the gun positions and facilities
for observation therefrom, which would otherwise endanger Suvla Bay. He
considers it imperative to effect this with the least possible delay. In
his view the left flank of this advance will require comparatively
little protection, at all events in the first instance, in view of the
difficulty which the enemy may be expected to find in throwing any
considerable force round our left over the high and difficult country
north of Anafarta Sagir. It appears that the double purpose of defeating
the enemy and securing Suvla Bay as a port for the northern wing of the
Army can best be served by an attack on the enemy's right on the
Anafarta spur, made with all the strength at our command, while leaving
a comparatively small force as left flank guard to clear the enemy's
snipers out of the Kuchuk Anafarta Ova and to occupy and press back his
detachment in the Ejelmer Bay region.

4. You will have at your disposal the following troops:--

  11th Division,
  10th Division (less 29th Brigade),
  53rd Division,
  54th Division,

and there is on its way from Egypt to join you the 2nd Mounted Division
(5,000 men dismounted), which should be available by August 18th. The
10th, 11th and 53rd Divisions are considerably depleted, and the _moral_
of the latter at present leaves much to be desired. There are at present
ashore, belonging to the above two F.A. Brigades (three batteries of
which are awaiting horses to bring them up from Anzac) and two Heavy
Batteries. In addition, two Highland Mountain Batteries, attached to the
9th Corps, are ashore, and the 1/4th Lowland Brigade (two batteries
5-inch howitzers) are at your disposal when they can be brought up from
Anzac. It has only been possible to land a bare minimum of horses owing
to difficulties in respect of water and the landing of forage.

Three further F.A. Brigades and the 57th Brigade (two batteries)
4.5-inch howitzers are at Mudros ready to be brought up as soon as it is
possible to land them. These Brigades will probably have to be landed
without any horses in the first instance, and taken into position by the
artillery horses already ashore.

5. For the purpose of an early attack in accordance with the plan
indicated in paragraph 3, the A. and N.Z. Army Corps will probably not
be able to co-operate directly with more than one Infantry Brigade, and
it is possible that it may be able to do no more than swing up its left
into line with the right of your advance. It is improbable that the 8th
Corps and the C.E.O. will be in a position to do more than undertake
vigorous demonstrations.

6. With the above in view, you will proceed at once to Suvla Bay and
take over command of the 9th Corps. Your immediate and most urgent
concern will be to complete the reorganization of the Corps and to
prepare as large a force as possible for the offensive against Ismail
Oglu Tepe and the Anafarta spur, bearing in mind that time is of vital
importance. You will then consider and report at the earliest moment:--

     (_a_) What force you consider that you will be able to employ for
     this purpose.

     (_b_) The date on which you will be ready to undertake the
     offensive.

     (_c_) The method by which you purpose to carry out your task.

  (_Signed_) W. P. BRAITHWAITE,

  _Major-General, Chief of the General Staff,

  Mediterranean Expeditionary Force._




INDEX


  "A" Beach, II. 69, 75, 146.

  Abdel Rahman Bair, II. 115.

  Abrikja, II. 87.

  Achi Baba, I. 272, 362; II. 194.

  Adderley, Lieut., II. 5.

  Adrianople, I. 10.

  Aeroplanes, I. 110.

  Agnew, Col. Quentin, II. 160.

  Air Service, I. 8, 287, 384.

  Aitkin, Capt., II. 30.

  Aja Liman, II. 112, 148, 152.

  Aja Liman Anafarta Ridge, II. 83, 84.

  Akbashi Liman, I. 291; II. 193.

  _H.M.T._ Alaudia, II. 44.

  Alexandretta, I. 9.

  Allanson, Col., II. 214.

  Altham, Genl., II. 6, 32, 123, 167, 172, 186, 261, 270.

  Ambulance--
    87th Field, II. 172.
    110th Indian Field, II. 167.
    3rd R.N.D. Field, I. 317.
    West Lancs. Field, II. 231.

  Amery, Col., I. 342.

  Ammunition, I. 62, 196, 286, 289, 308; II. 9, 10, 11, 13, 35, 41, 140.

  Anafarta, II. 148.

  Anafarta Ova, II. 93.

  Anafarta Sagir, II. 68, 69, 70, 81, 89, 112.

  Anatolia, II. 191.

  _H.M.T._ Andania, II. 44.

  Anderson, Maj., II. 255.

  Andrews, Col., II. 18.

  Anglesey, Lord, II. 196, 200.

  Anson Bn., I. 73, 271, 274, 333.

  Anstey, Capt., II. 58.

  Anzac Cove, II. 111.

  _S.S._ Arabian, I. 316.

  _H.M.S._ Arcadian, I. 84, 185, 248.

  Ari Burnu, II. 246.

  Armistice, I. 248, 387.

  Armoured Car Section, I. 106; II. 188.

  _H.M.S._ Arno, II. 57, 58, 98, 146, 158, 159, 165, 166, 246.

  Artillery, I. 48, 307, 374; II. 35.
    Australian, I. 117.
    _See_ also Appendices I. and II.

  Ashmead-Bartlett, Mr., I. 106, 253, 334; II. 8, 165, 190, 204, 226.

  _H.I.M.S._ Askold, I. 106, 135.

  Aspinall, Lt.-Col., I. 152, 169, 383; II. 4, 17, 25, 26, 61, 64, 126,
     130, 243.

  Asquith, Rt. Hon. H. H., I. 54, 247; II. 227, 259, 260, 261, 262, 274.

  Asquith, Lieut. Arthur, I. 20, 71.

  Australian F.A., 3rd Battery, II. 254.

  Australian Light Horse, I. 285, 359.

  Australians--
    9th Bn., I. 49.
    12th Bn., II. 234.
    15th Bn., I. 216.
    16th Bn., I. 216.
    20th Bn., II. 254, 255.
    26th Bn., II. 234.

  Ayres, Col., II. 246.


  Babtie, Genl., I. 367.

  Baby 700, II. 111.

  _H.M.S._ Bacchante, I. 154.

  Backhouse, Commodore, I. 333.

  Bailey, Col., II. 244.

  Bailloud, Genl., I. 192, 207, 243, 371, 379; II. 25, 27, 146, 158,
     179, 213, 218, 219, 225, 226, 228, 229, 230, 234.

  Baldwin, Genl., I. 386; II. 80, 81.

  Balkans--
    C.-in-C.'s views on, I. 115.

  Bard, _see_ Tullibardine.

  Barttelot, Sir W., II. 219.

  _H.M.S._ Basilisk, I. 328, 370, 372.

  Battle--
    Kum Kale, I. 135, 150.
    Landing, I. 126.
    Naval, I. 30.
    Quinn's Post, I. 255.
    Sedd-el-Bahr, I. 131.
    "V" Beach, I. 135.
    "W" Beach, I. 130.
    "X" Beach, I. 130.
    "Y" Beach, I. 129 _et seq._
    Yeni Shahr, I. 151.
    6th-9th May, I. 206.
    4th June, I. 270 _et seq._
    28th June, I. 344 _et seq._
    12th July, II. 6 _et seq._
    21st August, II. 127 _et seq._

  Bayley, Maj., II. 231. (Should read "Baylay.")

  Beadon, Lt.-Col., II. 120, 130.

  Beetleheim, Capt., I. 273.

  Bell, Maj. Morrison, II. 244.

  Benbow Bn., I. 333.

  Beresford, Genl., I. 242.

  Berks Regt., II. 230.

  Bertier, Maj., I. 119, 379; II. 25, 40, 220, 233, 275.

  _Beryl_, II. 32.

  Besika Bay, I. 9.

  Birmingham, I. 326

  Bishop, Maj., I. 320.

  Biyuk Anafarta, II. 112, 157.

  Blockhouses, II. 93.

  Bluff Redoubt, I. 225.

  Boers, II. 161, 162.

  Bombs, I. 43, 258, 321, 383; II. 140.

  Bonham-Carter, Mr., II. 98.

  Bonsor, Maj., I. 370.

  Boomerang Redoubt, I. 344, 352.

  Border Regt., I. 352; II. 230.

  _Bouvet_, I. 36.

  Bowlby, Flag-Lt., II. 8, 169

  Boyle, R.N., Capt., I. 38.

  Boyle, R.N., Lt.-Comr., I. 234, 240.

  Braithwaite, Capt. V., II. 120, 130, 146, 158, 159, 165, 186, 246.

  Brassey, II. 110.

  Brassey, Lady, II. 105, 168.

  Brassey, Lord, II. 105.

  Bridges, Genl., I. 118, 179, 229, 256.

  Brigade--
    1st (Australian), II. 55.
    2nd (French), II. 225.
    2nd (Naval), I. 333.
    3rd (Australian), I. 336.
    3rd (Marine), I. 303.
    4th (Australian), I. 249, 256.
    5th (Australian), II. 254.
    30th, II. 44.
    32nd, II. 22, 29, 60.
    33rd, II. 22, 46, 60.
    34th, II. 22, 28, 61.
    39th, II. 18.
    86th, I. 82, 220, 302, 345, 352; II. 171, 172.
    87th, I. 82, 209, 210, 224, 301, 345, 352; II. 230.
    88th, I. 170, 209, 210, 293, 353; II. 166, 241.
    127th, I. 317.
    155th, I. 303.
    156th, I. 303, 346, 352, 371; II. 9, 243.
    Indian, I. 301; II. 15, 127, 130, 208.
    Light Horse, I. 336.
    Manchester, I. 272, 273.
    Younghusband's, II. 147, 150, 151, 153, 154.

  Brodrick, Capt. Hon. G., I. 357; II. 24, 52, 68, 72, 74, 76, 78,
     125, 130, 146, 154.

  Brody, Capt., II. 68.

  Brooke, Sir B., II. 138.

  Brooke, Rupert, I. 71, 122, 124.

  Brown, Percy, I. 371.

  Browne, Maj., I. 336.

  Bruce, Col., I. 74, 301, 359, 361.

  Bruce, Maj., I. 74.

  Brulard, Genl., II. 225, 228, 229, 234, 256, 276.

  Bryant, Lt.-Col., I. 323.

  Buchanan, Col., II. 186.

  Buchanan, Sir G., II. 207, 208.

  Bulair Lines, I. 9, 29, 130, 275, 290, 291, 292, 361.

  Bulgaria, I. 116; II. 192, 202, 204, 209.

  Bulgarians, II. 212.

  Burleigh, Bennett, I. 339.

  Burmeister, Flag-Capt., I. 71.

  Burn, Col. C., I. 121; II. 8, 15, 251, 255.

  Burrell, Lieut., I. 370.

  Burrows, Capt., II. 247.

  Burton, Col., II. 18, 242.

  Bush-fires, II. 131.

  Byng, Genl., I. 303; II. 35, 105, 106, 137, 138, 139, 146, 151, 159,
     160, 165, 186, 206, 218, 219, 241, 242, 276.


  "C" Beach, II. 75.

  Cadorna, Genl., II. 178.

  Callwell, Genl., I. 6, 241; II. 172 _et seq._ , 257, 259, 261, 263.

  Camel Corps, Bikaner, I. 74.

  Cameron, R.N., Capt., I. 8, 31.

  Campbell, Col., I. 74.

  _H.M.T._ Canada, II. 44.

  _H.M.S._ Canopus, II. 44.

  Canteen, II. 123, 170.

  Carden, Admiral, I. 17, 19.

  Carruthers, Genl., I. 142.

  Carter, Capt., I. 280.

  _Carthage_, I. 371.

  Casualty Clearing Station, 25th, II. 14.

  Cayley, Genl., II. 18, 241.

  Censorship, I. 320, 327, 332; II. 140, 172 _et seq._ , 257.

  _H.M.T._ Ceramic, II. 156.

  Chanak, I. 291, 292, 293; II. 192.

  Charak Cheshme, II. 74.

  _H.M.S._ Chatham, II. 43, 45, 60, 275, 277.

  Chauvel, Genl., I. 285, 359.

  Cheape, Capt., II. 203, 204.

  _H.M.S._ Chelmer, II. 262.

  Cheshire Point, II. 201.

  Chocolate Hill, II. 214.

  Christian, Admiral, II. 60.

  Chunuk Bair, I. 330, 361; II. 57, 86, 111, 113.

  Churchill, Rt. Hon. W., I. 44, 161, 240, 242, 247; II. 24.

  Churchill, Maj. J., I. 153, 178; II. 155.

  Church Parade, I. 370; II. 20, 29, 157, 234.

  Clarke, Lt.-Comr., I. 335.

  Clifton-Browne, Genl., II. 247.

  Coddan, Capt., I. 121.

  Coleridge, II. 52.

  Collet, Capt., II. 123, 126.

  Collingwood Bn., I. 333.

  Collins, Lt.-Col., I. 317.

  _H.M.S._ Colne, I. 112, 178, 180, 343.

  Conference---
    17th March, I. 21.
    22nd March, I. 41.
    18th April, I. 118.
    Midnight, 25th April, I. 142.

  Connaught Rangers, II. 155.

  Constantinople, I. 10.

  Convalescent Depôt, II. 168.

  _H.M.S._ Cornwall, II. 221.

  _H.M.S._ Cornwallis, I. 134, 138; II. 221, 242.

  Cowans, Genl., I. 365, 366.

  Cox, Genl., I. 73, 174, 186; II. 15, 132, 139, 155, 190.


  d'Amade, Genl., I. 3, 21, 64, 78, 118, 222, 223, 226.

  Damakjelik Bair, II. 113, 127, 128.

  Danube, I. 11; II. 202.

  _H.M.S._ Dartmouth, I. 106.

  Davidson, R.N., Capt., II. 242, 258.

  Davies, R.N.A.S. Capt., I. 109.

  Davies, Genl., II. 33, 51, 139, 140, 144, 160, 196, 243, 246, 248,
     251, 276.

  Dawnay, Capt., I. 152, 178, 343; II. 120, 126, 133, 165, 189, 251, 262.

  De Bourbon, Capt., II. 256.

  De Crespigny, Capt., II. 243.

  Deedes, Capt., I. 344; II. 120, 126, 158, 186, 243.

  De la Borde, Lieut., I. 119; II. 40, 196, 220.

  De la Fontaine, Capt., I. 185.

  De Lisle, Genl., I. 274, 280, 293, 356; II. 17, 18, 25, 106, 119, 121,
     129, 130, 132, 159 _et seq._, 241.

  De Lothbinière, Genl., I. 259, 357.

  Dent, R.N., Capt., I. 118, 122.

  De Putron, Maj., II. 196, 262.

  De Robeck, Admiral, I. 21, 41, 48, 142, 383; II. 60, 124, 275, 276.

  De Rougemont, Col., II. 246.

  Des Coigns, Col., I. 183, 185.

  De Tott's Battery, I. 134; II. 26, 27.

  Devon Regt., 2/5th, II. 156, 157, 160.
  Dick, Col., I. 105, 385.

  Diggle, Capt., II. 51.

  Division--
    1st (Australian), II. 217.
    1st (French), I. 323, 324.
    2nd (Australian), II. 167.
    2nd (French), I. 323, 324.
    2nd (Mounted), II. 37.
    10th, I. 306, 328; II. 97, 127, 159, 217, 224, 227, 233.
    11th, I. 328; II. 49, 52, 60, 83, 127, 129, 131, 132, 159, 188.
    11th (Turkish), I. 373.
    13th, I. 328, 386; II. 18, 57, 83, 91, 107.
    16th (Irish), II. 159.
    42nd, I. 386; II. 40.
    52nd, I. 386; II. 158, 243.
    53rd, II. 90, 128, 217, 225, 226.
    54th (Essex), II. 81, 90, 92, 100, 128, 208.
    East Lancs., I. 58, 314; II. 57, 196.
    Irish, II. 31, 41, 60.
    Lowland, I. 355; II. 6.
    Mounted, II. 217.
    Naval, I. 272, 303, 318, 377; II. 8, 25, 40, 158.
    Welsh, II. 101.

  Djavad Pasha, I. 20.

  Dod, Col. Wolley, I. 302.

  Doran, Genl., I. 280, 282.

  _H.M.S._ Doris, I. 68.

  Dorling, Col., II. 219.

  Dorset Regt., 5th, II. 28.

  Doughtie, R.N., Capt., II. 21.

  Douglas, Genl., I. 282, 337, 382; II. 25, 247.

  Downing, Col., II. 44.

  Drafts, I. 368; II. 16, 35, 42, 46, 126, 132, 139, 223.

  Drake Bn., I. 73.

  Drury-Lowe, R.N., Capt., II. 43, 277.

  _H.M.S._ Dublin, I. 109, 146.

  Dublin Fusiliers, I. 157, 224; II. 172.

  Dudley, Lord, II. 167.

  Duff, Genl. Beauchamp, II. 198.

  Duncan, Major, II. 28.

  Duncannon, Lord, II. 262.


  _H.M.S._ E 11, I. 282, 284.

  _H.M.S._ E 14, I. 234, 240.

  East Kent Yeomanry, II. 247.

  East Lancs. Regt., 6th, II. 18.

  East Yorks, 6th, II. 67.

  Edinburgh, Lord Provost of, II. 155.

  Edwards, Maj., II. 247.

  Edwards, Comr., II. 256.

  Edwards, Lieut., I. 370.

  Egerton, Genl., I. 371; II. 160.

  Egyptian Gazette, I. 77.

  Ehren-Keui, II. 192.

  Ejelmer Bay, II. 72.

  Elliot, Genl., I. 353.

  Elliot, Lieut., I. 336.

  Ellison, Genl., I. 7, 280, 366; II. 6, 32, 126, 165, 236, 243, 256, 275.

  Engineers, I. 43, 48.

  Enos, I. 275; II. 194.

  Enver Pasha, I. 12, 363; II. 212, 258.

  Erskine, Genl., I. 303.

  Eski Lines, II. 25.

  Essex Regt., I. 136, 220.

  _H.M.S._ Europa, II. 168.

  _H.M.S._ Euryalus, I. 133.

  Ewart, Genl., I. 306.

  _H.M.S._ Exmouth, II. 58.

  Ezine, II. 192.


  Fairfax, Comr., II. 247.

  Fallowfield, R.N., Lieut., I. 328, 370.

  Fanshawe, Genl., II. 106, 138, 159, 160, 161, 188.

  Faukard, Genl., II. 256.

  Ferdinand, Tzar, II. 204, 205, 207, 208, 212, 213.

  Fife and Forfar Yeomanry, II. 244.

  Fisher, Lord, I. 44, 240, 247.

  Fitz, _see_ FitzGerald.

  FitzGerald, Col., I. 320, 321; II. 251.

  Fitzgerald, Maj., II. 254.

  Fitzmaurice, R.N., Capt., I. 112.

  Fitzmaurice, Mr., I. 114.

  Forde, Col., II. 168.

  _H.M.S._ Foresight, I. 16.

  Forster, Col., II. 167.

  Forts, I. 6.

  Foumet, Admiral, II. 188.

  _H.M.S._ Franconia, I. 36.

  Fraser, Col., II. 172.

  Freddie, see Maitland.

  French, Sir John, I. 269, 289, 305, 306, 311, 374.

  French Corps, I. 78.

  French Mission, I. 119.

  Freyberg, Lieut., II. 247.

  Fuller, Lieut.-Col., I. 178; II. 15.


  Gamble, Sir D., II. 32, 33.

  Gascoigne, Lieut.-Col., II. 39, 214, 233, 243.

  _Gascon_, I. 228.

  _Gaulois_, I. 35, 36, 169, 170.

  Geddes, Maj., II. 172.

  Gellibrand, Lieut., II. 234.

  George, Rt. Hon. Lloyd, II. 260, 274.

  Ghazi Baba, II. 72, 77.

  Gillivan, Col., II. 18.

  Girdwood, Capt., I. 372.

  Girodon, Genl., I. 234, 244, 260, 325, 379; II. 46, 234.

  Glyn, Capt., II. 15, 108, 165.

  Godfrey, Maj., I. 152, 326.

  Godley, Genl., I. 118, 179, 309, 331, 386; II. 80, 82, 208, 245,
    258, 262.

  _Goeben_, I. 162.

  _H.M.S._ Goliath, I. 146, 152, 156, 224.

  Gouraud, Genl., I. 226, 244, 260, 270, 281, 288, 295 _et seq._, 304,
     305, 333, 346, 355, 359, 385; II. 203, 253.

  Graives, Mr., I. 385.

  _H.M.S._ Grampus, I. 293.

  Grand Duke Nicholas, I. 230; II. 158.

  Grant, R.N., Capt., II. 44.

  Greece, I. 116; II. 203.

  Greeks, II. 201.

  Green Hill, II. 214.

  Greer, Lieut.-Col., II. 44.

  Guépratté, Admiral, I. 21, 101, 118, 157.

  Guest, Capt. (?), II. 275.

  _Guildford Castle_, I. 217.

  Guilford, Col. Lord, II. 247.

  Gully Ravine, I. 376.

  Gurkhas, Bde. of, I. 43, 55, 56, 59, 75, 83, 193, 225, 226, 352, 359,
     361, 362, 364; II. 94.

  Gurkhas--
    4th Bn., II. 167.
    5th Bn., II. 15.
    6th Bn., I. 74, 76; II. 15, 81, 214.
    10th Bn., II. 15.

  Guyon, Maj., II. 172.


  H. 12, I. 355, 372; II. 9.

  Haig, Sir Douglas, I. 306; II. 185.

  Haldane, Lord, I. 240, 289.

  Hamilton, Genl. Bruce, II. 26, 32, 36, 101.

  Hamilton, Col. Cole, II. 18.

  Hamilton, Lieut. Rowan, II. 243.

  Hammersley, Genl., I. 328; II. 28, 52, 59, 64 _et seq._, 72, 87, 103,
     104, 120, 161.

  Hampshire Regt., I. 155, 157, 220.
    8th Bn., II. 101.

  Hand grenades, I. 43, 48, 356; II. 156, 157.

  Hankey, Col., II. 24, 37, 98, 108, 123.

  Harding, Col., I. 74.

  Hardy, Lieut.-Comr., II. 169.

  Hare, Mr., I. 338.

  Haricot Redoubt, I. 244, 271, 272, 324.

  Hawke Bn., II. 247, 248.

  Heliopolis, I. 61.

  Herbert, Aubrey, I. 239, 243.

  Herts Yeomanry, I. 58.

  Heseltine, Capt., II. 204.

  Hetman Chair, II. 128, 129.

  Hill, Genl., II. 44, 107, 110.

  Hill 10, II. 61, 62, 64, 69, 146.

  Hill 60, II. 127, 155, 157, 158.

  Hill 70, II. 88, 127, 128, 129, 131.

  Hill 305, I. 330; II. 89, 111.

  Hillyard, Maj., II. 18.

  Hindlip, Lord, I. 166.

  Hogg, Capt., I. 74.

  Holdich, Lt.-Col., II. 165.

  Holmes, Col., II. 254.

  Homer, Lt-Comr., II. 17.

  Hood, Maj., II. 186.

  Hood Bn., I. 206, 274, 333; II. 247.

  Hope, R.N., Capt., I. 26, 116.

  Horne, Genl., II. 105.

  Horse Shoe, II. 243.

  Hospital Ships, II. 24.

  Hospital--
    No. 1 Stationary, I. 323; II. 168.
    No. 1 (Australian) Stationary, II. 167.
    No. 2 Stationary, I. 322.
    No. 2 (Australian) Stationary, II. 168.
    No. 3 (Canadian) Stationary, II. 168.
    No. 3 (Australian) Stationary, II. 168.
    No. 15 Stationary, I. 322; II. 167.
    No. 16 Stationary, I. 322.
    No. 18 Stationary, II. 168.
    No. 24 (British-Indian), II. 167.

  Howe Bn., I. 71, 73, 274, 333; II. 234.

  Howitzers, I. 48. _See also_ Appendices I and II.

  Hunloke, Maj., II. 243.

  Hunter-Weston, Genl., I. 3, 61, 62, 89, 118, 260, 280, 288, 346;
     II. 22, 26.


  _Imogene_, II. 91, 123, 139, 205, 251.

  _H.M.S._ Implacable, I. 52.

  Indian troops, II. 161.

  _H.M.S._ Inflexible, I. 33.

  Inglefield, Genl., II. 81, 90, 94, 97, 208.

  Inniskilling Fusiliers, I. 224, 361.

  Irish Pioneer Regt., II. 74.

  _H.M.S._ Irresistible, I. 35, 36, 51.

  Ishiklar, II. 192.

  Ismail Oglu Tepe, II. 63, 70, 81, 89, 112, 127, 129, 131.

  Istomine, Genl., I. 70, 108, 186; II. 158.

  Italy, II. 140.

  Ivanoff, Capt., I. 106.


  J. 13, I. 362.

  Jackson, Capt., II. 18.

  _Jeanne d'Arc_, I. 135.

  Joffre, Genl., I. 269, 289, 305, 374; II. 179, 180, 190, 213.

  Johnson, R.N., Lieut. Ormsby, I. 326; II. 32.

  Jones, Col., I. 322.

  _H.M.S._ Jonquil, II. 61.

  Jordon, Col., II. 18.

  _Junia_, I. 196.


  Kabak Kuyu, II. 130.

  Kahn, Capt., I. 184.

  Kaiajik Aghala, II. 129, 130, 139, 155, 210.

  Kaiajik Dere, II. 158.

  Kantara, I. 73.

  Karabingha, I. 292.

  Karakol Dagh, II. 126, 129, 159.

  Karna Bili, II. 148.

  Kavak Tepe Sirt, II. 81, 82, 90.

  Kavanagh, Genl., II. 105.

  Kelly, R.N., Capt., I. 109.

  Kelly, Comr., II. 247.

  _H.M.S._ Kennett, I. 176.

  Kephalos Camp, I. 317; II. 21, 126, 196, 209, 276.

  Kereves Dere, I. 324, 362; II. 256.

  Kereves Dere Ravine, I. 211.

  Keshan, II. 112, 194.

  Keyes, Commodore, I. 21, 48, 56, 142, 253; II. 60, 64, 79, 275, 276.

  Keyes, Sir C., I. 56.

  Keyes, Lady, I. 56.

  Keyes, Lt.-Comr., I. 254, 270.

  Kiggell, Genl., II. 235, 236.

  Kìlia Liman, I. 291.

  Kilid Bahr, I. 330, 362; II. 193.

  King, Col., II. 31.

  King, Comr., II. 247.

  King, Genl., II. 248.

  King, Maj., II. 254.

  King's Own Scottish Borderers, I. 129; II. 230.

  Kiretch Tepe Sirt, II. 61, 69, 72, 75, 77, 81, 128.

  Koja Chemen Tepe, II. 57.

  Krithia, I. 330, 362.

  Kum Kale, I. 135, 150, 159; II. 192.

  Kurt Ketchede, II. 113.


  Lala Baba, II. 61, 64.

  Lancashire Division, I. 198.

  Lancashire Fusiliers, I. 136, 220, 352; II. 172.

  Lancashire Fusiliers--
    1st Bn., I. 320.
    5th Bn., I. 272.
    9th Bn., II. 28.

  Lancashire Fusilier Brigade, I. 207.

  Lancashire Landing, I. 371, 376; II. 246.

  Lapruin, Capt., II. 144.

  Laverton, Lieut., I. 371.

  Law, Rt. Hon. Bonar, II. 274.

  Law, Capt., I. 372.

  Lawes, Capt., II. 196.

  Lawrence, Genl., I. 382; II. 27, 243.

  Lawson, Sir H., II. 204, 226.

  _H.M.S._ Lefroy, II. 256, 257.

  Legge, Genl., II. 15, 20, 167, 254, 266.

  Lemnos, I. 26.

  _H.M.S._ Lewis, II. 254.

  Liman von Sanders, Genl., I. 95, 246, 357, 358.

  Lindley, Genl., II. 85, 87, 103, 122, 167, 168.

  Lines of Communication, I. 354, 365, 380; II. 264.

  Lister, Hon. C., II. 29.

  Lloyd, Capt., II. 20, 160, 162.

  _H.M.S._ London, I. 154.

  London Regt., 2/1st Coy., II. 242.
    10th Bn., II. 101.
    11th Bn., II. 101.

  Lone Pine, II. 55, 57, 111, 271.

  Long, Capt., I. 279.

  _H.M.S._ Lord Nelson, I. 228, 248.

  Loring, R.N., Capt., I. 119.

  Lovat, Lord, II. 244.

  Lovat's Scouts--
    1st Bn., II. 244.
    2nd Bn., II. 244.

  Lowland Division, I. 219.

  Lowther, Lancelot, II. 171.

  Lucas, Maj., II. 230.


  Mackenzie, Lieut.-Col., II. 14.

  Mackenzie, Compton, I. 234; II. 45.

  Maclagan, Col., I. 336.

  Maclean, Maj., I. 371.

  Maher, Col., I. 322.

  Mahon, Genl., I. 285, 289, 306, 328; II. 31, 61, 69 _et seq._, 100
     _et seq._, 159, 161, 165, 169.

  Maidos, I. 291, 330.

  Maitland, Capt. F., I. 323, 336, 383; II. 17, 32, 55, 92, 126, 130, 146,
     158, 159, 166, 167, 170, 172, 186, 189, 196, 214, 243, 254, 256, 275.

  _H.M.S._ Majestic, I. 154, 252.

  Makalinsky, I. 121.

  Malcolm, Col., II. 28, 52, 65 _et seq._, 159.

  Mal Tepe, I. 130.

  Manchester Bde., I. 207.

  Manchester Regt.--
    6th Bn., II. 25.
    7th Bn., II. 25.
    11th Bn., II. 28.

  Manifold, Col., II. 159.

  _Manitou_, I. 116.

  Maoris, I. 234; II. 94.

  Marmora, II. 193, 205.

  Marshall, Genl., I. 224; II. 130, 132, 165, 171, 172, 242.

  Matthews, Lt.-Col., I. 72.

  Maude, Genl., II. 106, 137, 138, 159, 161, 165, 166, 186.

  Maxwell, Sir J., I. 58, 73, 306; II. 149, 176, 231, 250, 255, 260, 264.

  Maxwell, Capt., II. 220.

  McClay, Lieut., I. 372.

  McGrigor, Capt., II. 200, 246, 275, 277.

  McKenna, Rt. Hon. R., II. 274.

  McMahon, Sir H., I. 66, 77.

  McMunn, Col., II. 167.

  Mecklenburg, Duke of, II. 207.

  Mena Camp, I. 60.

  _H.M.S._ Mercedes, II. 58.

  Mercer, Genl., I. 73; II. 247.

  Methuen, Lord, I. 73, 259, 326.

  Mewes, Maj., I. 72.

  Micklem, Col., I. 243.

  Millen, Senator, II. 267.

  Millerand, M., II. 179, 180, 190.

  Mitchell, Col., II. 244.

  Mitchell, Commodore, II. 220.

  Mitylene, II. 43, 45.

  Monash, Col., I. 249; II. 170.

  Moore, Lieut., II. 214, 227.

  _H.M.S._ Mosquito, I. 335, 337.

  Mountain Battery, 29th, I. 74.

  Mudge, Col., I. 371.

  Mudros, I. 322; II. 167.

  Mudros West, II. 168.

  Munro, Genl., II. 272, 273, 277.

  Munster Fusiliers, I. 157; II. 172.

  Murdoch, Mr. K. A., II. 164, 190, 203, 204, 226, 227, 240, 245, 246,
     257, 260 _et seq._

  Murphy, Maj., II. 255.

  Murray, Genl. Wolfe, II. 5, 22, 37.


  Nagara Point, I. 290; II. 193.

  Nallah--
    Achi Baba, II. 243.
    Krithia, II. 243.

  Napier, Genl., I. 150.

  Napier, Col., I. 115; II. 201, 202.

  Nasmith, Comr., I. 234, 284.

  Nelson Bn., I. 73; II. 234.

  Nevinson, Mr., II. 219, 220.

  Newfoundland Bn., 1st, II. 242.

  New Zealand Mounted Rifles, I. 250, 256, 359.

  Nibrunesi Point, II. 189.

  Nicholas, Grand Duke, I. 108, 230; II. 158.

  Nicholls, Admiral, II. 260.

  Nicholson, Admiral, I. 57.

  Nicol, Admiral, I. 247; II. 188.

  Nisch, II. 202.

  Nogués, Col., I. 135, 151, 325.

  Northcliffe, Lord, I. 66, 340.

  Northumberland Fusiliers, II. 28.

  _H.M.T._ Novian, II. 44.

  Nuillon, Col., I. 383.

  Nunn, Col., II. 18.


  Oakdene. Capt. Perry-, II. 255.

  _H.M.S._ Ocean, I. 35, 36, 51.

  Odessa, I. 11.

  O'Dowda, Col., II. 172.

  Olivant, Lt.-Col., I. 71.

  Onslow, Capt., I. 360.

  Oppenheim, Capt., II. 244.

  Order to the Troops--
    21st April, I. 120.
    22nd April, I. 121.
    28th April, I. 171.
    9th May, I. 213.
    12th May, I. 222.
    25th May, I. 250.
    Farewell, II. 277.
    By Genl. Gouraud, I. 324.
    Turkish Divisional, I. 372.

  _H.M.T._ Orsova, II. 156.

  O'Sullivan, V.C., II. 171.

  Owen, Genl., Cunliffe-, I. 143.


  Palin, Col., I. 74; II. 214.

  Pallin, Genl., I. 372.

  Palmer, Col., II. 18.

  Palmer, Maj., I. 72.

  Palmer, Mr. F., I. 338.

  Panderma, I. 292, 293.

  Paris, Genl., I. 3, 71, 93, 166, 303, 333; II. 25, 160, 243, 247.

  Paterson, Col, I. 106.

  Pearce, Senator, II. 265, 266.

  Pearson, Maj., II. 172.

  Peebles, Col., I. 372.

  Peel, Col., I. 117.

  Pelliot, Lieut., I. 119; II. 220.

  Percival, Genl., II. 171.

  Percy, Lord William, II. 219.

  Periscopes, I. 43, 48.

  Perriera, Admiral de la, II. 169, 170.

  Peter, _see_ Pollen.

  Peyton, Genl., II. 107, 120, 165, 208, 244.

  _H.M.S._ Phaeton, I. 18, 35, 36.

  Phillimore, R.N., Capt., I. 118, 178; II. 130.

  Piépape, Col., I. 379; II. 146.

  Pierce, Admiral, I. 71.

  Pierce, Maj., II. 230.

  Pike, Lt.-Col., II. 44.

  _H.M.S._ Pincher, I. 335.

  Plan of attack--
    C.-in-C.'s on Peninsula, I. 95.
    Sari Bair, I. 329.
    Suvla Landing, I. 329; II 3.

  Plymouth Bn., I. 72, 129, 221.

  Pollard, Capt., II. 230.

  Pollen, Capt., I. 21, 41, 178; II. 126, 146, 207, 246, 262, 271, 275.

  Porter, Sir James, I. 367.

  Potts. Lt.-Comr., II. 91.

  Press, I. 320, 327, 332, 337; II. 140, 175 _et seq._

  Price, Bishop, II. 255.

  _H.M.S._ Prince of Wales, I. 154.

  Princes Street, II. 243.

  Punjabis--
    69th Bn., I. 74.
    89th Bn., I. 74.


  Q., II. 80.

  Quadrilateral, I. 355, 358.

  _H.M.S._ Queen, I. 35, 52, 154.

  _H.M.S._ Queen Elizabeth, I. 21, 32, 35, 103.

  Queensland Bn., I. 346, 358.

  Queen Victoria's Own Sappers, I. 74.

  Quinn's Post, I. 255, 256, 257, 259.


  Rabbit Island, I. 35; II. 27.

  _H.M.S._ Racoon, II. 169.

  Ratilva Valley, II. 134.

  _H.M.S._ Rattlesnake, I. 228.

  Rawlinson, Genl., I. 303; II. 35.

  Reconnaissance of Peninsula, I. 28.

  Régiment de marche d'Afrique, 175th, I. 79.

  Régiment, 4th Colonial, I. 79.

  Régiment, 6th Colonial, I. 135.

  Reed, Genl, II, 5, 36, 53, 63, 77, 96, 99, 120, 241.

  Reinforcements, I. 368; II. 144 _et seq._

  Rhodes, Lieut., I. 386.

  Rifaat, Col., I. 373.

  _H.M.T._ River Clyde, I. 131, 254.

  Rochdale, Lord, I. 317.

  Rodosto, I. 293.

  Roper, Genl., I. 178.

  Rosomore, Comr., I. 31.

  Ross, Mr. Malcolm, II. 219.

  Roumania, I. 116; II. 202.

  Royal Dublin Fusiliers--
    6th Bn., II. 44.
    7th Bn., II. 44.

  Royal Engineers, II. 72.
    West Riding Field Coy., II. 231.
    67th Coy., II. 29.
    68th Coy., II. 29.
    134th Fortress Coy., II. 29.

  Royal Field Artillery, 10th By., I. 364. _See also_ Appendix I.

  Royal Fusiliers, I. 136, 345; II. 172.
    2nd Bn., I. 352.

  Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, II. 230.
    5th Bn., II. 44.
    6th Bn., II 44.

  Royal Irish Fusiliers--
    5th Bn., II. 44.
    6th Bn., II. 44.

  Royal Scot, wounded, I. 356.

  Royal Scots, I. 352, 355.
    4th Bn., I. 372.
    5th Bn., I. 190, 220, 318; II. 126, 155.
    6th Bn., II. 156, 160.
    7th Bn., I. 372.

  Ruef, Col, I. 186.

  Rundle, Genl., I. 14; II. 202.

  Russell, Genl., I. 359; II. 130, 132, 139, 155, 194.

  Russell's Top, II. 254.

  Russian Corps, I. 255, 375; II. 21.

  Russian Officers, II. 158.

  Ruthven, Maj. Hore-, I. 357; II. 84, 130, 240, 275.

  Ryrie, Col., I. 336.


  Saghir Dere, I. 351, 352; II. 247.

  _St. Louis_, I. 325.

  Salonika, II. 184, 201 _et seq._

  Salt Lake, I. 329; II. 69, 128.

  Samson, Comr., I. 109, 181, 238, 383; II. 54, 221.

  _H.M.S._ Sapphire, I. 146.

  Sari Bair, I. 330, 360; II. 71, 111, 128.

  Saros, I. 28, 349.

  Sarrail, Genl., II. 179, 180, 191, 236, 270, 271.

  Savage, Col., II. 242.

  _H.M.S._ Savage, I. 303; II. 17, 19, 20, 241, 242.

  Scatters, _see_ Wilson.

  Schemallach, Lieut., II. 234.

  Schröder, I. 95.

  Schuler, Mr., II. 21.

  Sclater, Genl., I. 365.

  _H.M.S._ Scorpion, I. 253, 344, 351, 356, 364.

  Scott, Maj. Sir S., II. 247.

  Scottish Horse, II. 151, 166, 208, 209.

  Scottish Rifles, 8th Bn., I. 372.

  Scott-Moncrieff, Genl., I. 303.

  _H.M.S._ Scourge, I. 346; II. 186.

  Seaplane Camp, II. 21, 32.

  Sedd-el-Bahr, I. 131.

  Sellheim, Col., II. 267.

  Senegalese, I. 104, 192, 195, 212; II. 226, 237, 253.

  Serbia, II. 202, 209.

  Serbians, II. 201, 213.

  Seymour, Comr., I. 343.

  Shaw, Genl., I. 328; II. 13, 18, 33, 80.

  Sheppard, Lieut., I. 370.

  Sickness, II. 136, 170, 239, 255.

  Signal Coy., 53rd, II. 90.

  Sikhs, II. 244, 245.
    14th Bn., I. 73, 74; II. 15, 190, 197, 198, 200.
    51st Bn., II. 189, 190, 196, 197, 231.
    53rd Bn., II. 189, 190, 196, 197, 231.

  Silver Baby, II. 233.

  _H.M.T._ Simla, II. 42.

  Simpson, Capt., II. 18.

  Simpson-Baikie, Genl., I. 286, 344, 376, 387.

  Sinclair, Capt., I. 372.

  Sitwell, Genl., II. 122.

  Skeen, Col., I. 288, 319; II. 120, 121.

  Smith, Col., I. 336.

  Smith, Genl., II. 87.

  Smith, Hesketh, II. 45.

  Smith, R.N., Lieut., I. 134.

  Sofia, II. 207.

  Soghan Dere, I. 290, 362.

  Solvili, II. 148.

  _Somali_, II. 248.

  _Southland_, I. 118.

  South Wales Borderers, I. 134, 318, 370; II. 230.
    2nd Bn., I. 138.

  Spens, Genl., II. 261, 264, 265.

  Stanley, Capt., I. 322.

  Stephens, Capt., II. 32, 167.

  Steward, (Col. ?), II. 243.

  Stewart, Col., II. 188.

  Stewart, Lieut. Shaw-, I. 387.

  Stirling, Lt.-Col., II. 244.

  Stockdale, Lt.-Col., I. 186.

  Stoney, Maj., II. 230.

  Stopford, Genl., I. 306; II. 1, 5, 25, 26, 40, 53, 61 _et seq._, 72,
     77, 82, 87, 99, 102, 104, 106, 108.

  Street, Col., I. 182.

  Stuart, Lt.-Col. Crauford-, I. 274.

  Stuart, Maj. Villiers-, I. 234.

  Sulajik, II. 67, 70, 128.

  Sultan of Egypt, I. 58, 60.

  _Sunbeam_, II. 105.

  Surrey Yeomanry, I. 370; II. 220.

  Susak Kuyu, II. 135, 217.

  Sussex Yeomanry, II. 247.

  Suvla Bay, I. 328; II. 84, 111.

  Sykes, Sir Mark, I. 335; II. 275.

  Syria, II. 191.


  Tactics, I. 363.

  Talaat, I. 12.

  _H.M.S._ Talbot, I. 344, 351.

  Taube, I. 102, 171, 194, 196, 302; II. 188, 196, 204, 218, 219, 241.

  Taylor, Genl., II. 214.

  Taylor, Col., II. 154, 201, 214, 243, 256.

  Tekke Tepe, II. 63, 68, 69, 70, 79, 81.

  Tenedos, I. 21, 227, 331, 384.

  _H.M.T._ Themistocles, II. 42.

  Thomson, Col. Courtauld, I. 260.

  Thursby, Admiral, I. 52, 118, 142, 179, 239.

  Tillard, Maj., II. 167.

  Titchfield, Lord, II. 241.

  Tollemashe, Capt., I. 371.

  Trench mortars, I. 43, 48, 288, 317, 326, 352; II. 140.

  _H.M.S._ Triad, I. 284, 316, 357; II. 58, 71, 155, 167, 168, 275, 276.

  Trotman, Genl., I. 303.

  _H.M.S._ Triumph, I. 112, 154, 247, 248.

  Trumble, Mr. T., II. 268.

  Tullibardine, Lord, II. 208.

  Tupper, R.N., Lieut., I. 346; II. 186.

  Turkish Regt.--
    13th, I. 356.
    16th, I. 356.
    33rd, I. 356.
    127th, I. 373.

  Turk's Head, II. 254.

  Tyrrell, Col., II. 226, 227, 243.

  Tyrrell, Capt., II. 138.


  Unsworth, Mr., II. 234.

  Usborne, Neville, I. 384.

  Uzunkiupru, II. 194.


  Val, _see_ Braithwaite.

  Valley of Death, I. 256.

  Vandenberg, Genl., I. 185.

  Vanrennan, Lieut.-Col., II. 44.

  "V" Beach, I. 135, 360.

  Venezelos, M., I. 316.

  _H.M.S._ Vengeance, I. 248.

  Vineyard, II. 57, 243.

  Viont, Col., I. 324.

  Vitali, Capt., II. 178.

  Von Donop, Genl., I. 197, 305; II. 139.

  Vyvian, R.N., Capt., I. 118.


  Walden Point, II. 55.

  Wallace, Genl., I. 279, 353, 354, 382.

  _Waratah_, I. 371.

  War Correspondents, I. 320, 334, 338; II. 190, 269.

  Ward, Lt.-Col., I. 284, 343; II. 20, 178, 221.

  Wardian Camp, I. 84.

  Watson, Col. Jimmy, I. 344; II. 246.

  "W" Beach, I. 130, 177, 293.

  Weber Pasha, I. 387.

  Wedgwood, Comr., I. 106, 206, 228.

  Wells, Col., II. 186.

  Wemyss, Admiral, I. 21, 38, 41, 48, 118; II. 31, 168.

  West Kent Regt., 8th, II. 29.

  West Kent Yeomanry, II. 247.

  Westminster Dragoons, I. 58.

  Weston, Lieut., II. 234.

  West Yorks Regt., 9th, II. 29, 64, 67.

  Whitburn, Col., II. 247.

  White, Lt.-Col., I. 323.

  Wigram, Col. Clive, I. 208.

  Williams, Capt., II. 178, 230.

  Williams, Col., I. 17, 266; II. 240.

  Williams, Genl. Hanbury, I. 255.

  Williams, Genl., II. 236.

  Wilson, Bde.-Maj., II. 254.

  Wilson, Col. "Scatters," II. 203, 204, 248.

  Winter, Genl., I. 17, 118, 165, 353, 354.

  _H.M.S._ Wolverine, I. 254, 270, 344, 351, 356.

  Woodward, Genl., I. 17, 80, 118, 165; II. 24.

  Worcester Regt., I. 136, 318.

  Worcester Yeomanry, II. 209.

  Worsley, Comr., II. 79.

  Wyld, Lt.-Comr., I. 335.

  Wylie, Col. Doughty-, I. 53, 156; II. 240.


  "X" Beach, I. 135.

  Xeros, II. 192.


  Yarr, Col., II. 247.

  "Y" Beach, I. 129, 146, 163.

  Yeni Shahr, I. 151.

  Yeomanry, II. 121, 127, 128, 132, 211, 244, 247.

  Yilghin Burnu, II. 57, 65, 112.

  Yorks Regt., 6th Bn., II. 29.

  York and Lancs Regt., 6th Bn., II. 29.

  Younghusband, Genl., II. 147.

  Yukeri, I. 331; II. 192.


  Zimmerman's Farm, II. 25.

  Zion Mule Corps, I. 84.

  Zouaves, I. 212.


       *       *       *       *       *


_Printed in Great Britain by_

UNWIN BROTHERS, LIMITED

WOKING AND LONDON





End of Project Gutenberg's Gallipoli Diary, Volume 2, by Ian Hamilton