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    | This document is volume three of the series "The Navy in  |
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THE NAVY
IN THE CIVIL WAR



THE GULF AND INLAND WATERS

BY
A.T. MAHAN
CAPTAIN U.S. NAVY


LONDON
SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON, & COMPANY, LTD.
St. Dunstan's House
FETTER LANE, FLEET STREET, E.C.
1898




Copyright, 1883, by Charles Scribner's Sons
for the United States of America


Printed by the Trow Directory, Printing and Bookbinding Company
New York, U.S.A.




PREFACE.


The narrative in these pages follows chiefly the official reports, and
it is believed will not be found to conflict seriously with them.
Official reports, however, are liable to errors of statement and
especially to the omission of facts, well known to the writer but not
always to the reader, the want of which is seriously felt when the
attempt is made not only to tell the gross results but to detail the
steps that led to them. Such omissions, which are specially frequent
in the earlier reports of the Civil War, the author has tried to
supply by questions put, principally by letter, to surviving
witnesses. A few have neglected to answer, and on those points he has
been obliged, with some embarrassment, to depend on his own judgment
upon the circumstances of the case; but by far the greater part of the
officers addressed, both Union and Confederate, have replied very
freely. The number of his correspondents has been too numerous to
admit of his thanking them by name, but he begs here to renew to them
all the acknowledgments which have already been made to each in
person.

                                                    A.T.M.

  JUNE, 1883.




CONTENTS.


                                          PAGE
LIST OF MAPS,                                             ix

CHAPTER I.
PRELIMINARY,                                               1

CHAPTER II.
FROM CAIRO TO VICKSBURG,                                   9

CHAPTER III.
FROM THE GULF TO VICKSBURG,                               52

CHAPTER IV.
THE RECOIL FROM VICKSBURG,                                98

CHAPTER V.
THE MISSISSIPPI OPENED,                                  110

CHAPTER VI.
MINOR OCCURRENCES IN 1863,                               175

CHAPTER VII.
TEXAS AND THE RED RIVER,                                 185

CHAPTER VIII.
MOBILE,                                                  218

APPENDIX,                                                251

INDEX,                                                   255




LIST OF MAPS AND PLANS.


                                                         PAGE

MISSISSIPPI VALLEY--CAIRO TO MEMPHIS,            _to face_  9

MISSISSIPPI VALLEY--VICKSBURG TO THE GULF,       _to face_ 52

BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS,                                     74

BATTLE AT VICKSBURG,                                       92

MISSISSIPPI VALLEY--HELENA TO VICKSBURG,        _to face_ 115

BATTLE AT GRAND GULF,                                     159

RED RIVER DAM,                                            208

BATTLE OF MOBILE BAY,                           _to face_ 229




THE GULF AND INLAND WATERS.




CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY.


The naval operations described in the following pages extended, on the
seaboard, over the Gulf of Mexico from Key West to the mouth of the
Rio Grande; and inland over the course of the Mississippi, and its
affluents, from Cairo, at the southern extremity of the State of
Illinois, to the mouths of the river.

Key West is one of the low coral islands, or keys, which stretch out,
in a southwesterly direction, into the Gulf from the southern
extremity of the Florida peninsula. It has a good harbor, and was used
during, as since, the war as a naval station. From Key West to the
mouth of the Rio Grande, the river forming the boundary between Mexico
and the State of Texas, the distance in a straight line is about eight
hundred and forty miles. The line joining the two points departs but
little from an east and west direction, the mouth of the river, in 25°
26' N., being eighty-three miles north of the island; but the shore
line is over sixteen hundred miles, measuring from the southern
extremity of Florida. Beginning at that point, the west side of the
peninsula runs north-northwest till it reaches the 30th degree of
latitude; turning then, the coast follows that parallel approximately
till it reaches the delta of the Mississippi. That delta, situated
about midway between the east and west ends of the line, projects
southward into the Gulf of Mexico as far as parallel 29° N.,
terminating in a long, narrow arm, through which the river enters the
Gulf by three principal branches, or passes. From the delta the shore
sweeps gently round, inclining first a little to the north of west,
until near the boundary between the States of Louisiana and Texas;
then it curves to the southwest until a point is reached about one
hundred miles north of the mouth of the Rio Grande, whence it turns
abruptly south. Five States, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana,
and Texas, in the order named, touch the waters bounded by this long,
irregular line; but the shore of two of them, Alabama and Mississippi,
taken together, extends over little more than one hundred miles. All
five joined at an early date in the secession movement.

The character of the coast, from one end to the other, varies but
slightly in appearance. It is everywhere low, and either sandy or
marshy. An occasional bluff of moderate height is to be seen. A large
proportion of the line is skirted by low sandy islands, sometimes
joined by narrow necks to the mainland, forming inland sounds of
considerable extent, access to which is generally impracticable for
vessels of much draft of water. They, however, as well as numerous
bays and the mouths of many small rivers, can be entered by light
vessels acquainted with the ground; and during the war small steamers
and schooners frequently escaped through them, carrying cargoes of
cotton, then of great value. There is but little rise and fall of the
tide in the Gulf, from one to two feet, but the height of the water is
much affected by the direction of the wind.

The principal ports on or near the Gulf are New Orleans in Louisiana,
Mobile in Alabama, and Galveston in Texas. Tallahassee and
Apalachicola, in Florida, also carried on a brisk trade in cotton at
the time of the secession. By far the best harbor is Pensacola Bay, in
Florida, near the Alabama line. The town was not at that time a place
of much commerce, on account of defective communication with the
interior; but the depth of water, twenty-two feet, that could be
carried over the bar, and the secure spacious anchorage within made it
of great value as a naval station. It had been so used prior to the
war, and, although falling at first into the hands of the
Confederates, was shortly regained by the Union forces, to whom, from
its nearness to Mobile and the passes of the Mississippi, as well as
from its intrinsic advantages, it was of great importance throughout
the contest.

The aim of the National Government in connection with this large
expanse of water and its communications was two-fold. First, it was
intended to enter the Mississippi River from the sea, and working up
its stream in connection with the land forces, to take possession of
the well-known positions that gave command of the navigation.
Simultaneously with this movement from below, a similar movement
downward, with the like object, was to be undertaken in the upper
waters. If successful, as they proved to be, the result of these
attacks would be to sever the States in rebellion on the east side of
the river from those on the west, which, though not the most populous,
contributed largely in men, and yet more abundantly in food, to the
support of the Confederacy.

The second object of the Government was to enforce a strict blockade
over the entire coast, from the Rio Grande to Florida. There were not
in the Confederate harbors powerful fleets, or even single vessels of
war, which it was necessary to lock up in their own waters. One or two
_quasi_ men-of-war escaped from them, to run short and, in the main,
harmless careers; but the cruise that inflicted the greatest damage on
the commerce of the Union was made by a vessel that never entered a
Southern port. The blockade was not defensive, but offensive; its
purpose was to close every inlet by which the products of the South
could find their way to the markets of the world, and to shut out the
material, not only of war, but essential to the peaceful life of a
people, which the Southern States were ill-qualified by their previous
pursuits to produce. Such a blockade could be made technically
effectual by ships cruising or anchored outside; but there was a great
gain in actual efficiency when the vessels could be placed within the
harbors. The latter plan was therefore followed wherever possible and
safe; and the larger fortified places were reduced and occupied as
rapidly as possible consistent with the attainment of the prime
object--the control of the Mississippi Valley.

Before the war the Atlantic and Gulf waters of the United States, with
those of the West Indies, Mexico, and Central America, were the
cruising ground of one division of vessels, known as the Home
Squadron. At the beginning of hostilities this squadron was under the
command of Flag-Officer G.J. Pendergrast, who rendered essential and
active service during the exciting and confused events which
immediately followed the bombardment of Fort Sumter. The command was
too extensive to be administered by any one man, when it became from
end to end the scene of active war, so it was soon divided into three
parts. The West India Squadron, having in its charge United States
interests in Mexico and Central America as well as in the islands,
remained under the care of Flag-Officer Pendergrast. Flag-Officer
Stringham assumed command of the Atlantic Squadron, extending as far
south as Cape Florida; and the Gulf, from Cape Florida to the Rio
Grande, was assigned to Flag-Officer William Mervine, who reached his
station on the 8th of June, 1861. On the 4th of July the squadron
consisted of twenty-one vessels, carrying two hundred and eighty-two
guns, and manned by three thousand five hundred men.

Flag-Officer Mervine was relieved in the latter part of September. The
blockade was maintained as well as the number and character of the
vessels permitted, but no fighting of any consequence took place. A
dashing cutting-out expedition from the flag-ship Colorado, under
Lieutenant J.H. Russell, assisted by Lieutenants Sproston and Blake,
with subordinate officers and seamen, amounting in all to four boats
and one hundred men, seized and destroyed an armed schooner lying
alongside the wharf of the Pensacola Navy Yard, under the protection
of a battery. The service was gallantly carried out; the schooner's
crew, after a desperate resistance, were driven on shore, whence, with
the guard, they resumed their fire on the assailants. The affair cost
the flag-ship three men killed and nine wounded.

Under Mervine's successor, Flag-Officer W.W. McKean, more of interest
occurred. The first collision was unfortunate, and, to some extent,
humiliating to the service. A squadron consisting of the steam-sloop
Richmond, sailing-sloops Vincennes and Preble, and the small
side-wheel steamer Water Witch had entered the Mississippi early in
the month of October, and were at anchor at the head of the passes. At
3.30 A.M., October 12th, a Confederate ram made its appearance close
aboard the Richmond, which, at the time, had a coal schooner
alongside. The ram charged the Richmond, forcing a small hole in her
side about two feet below the water-line, and tearing the schooner
adrift. She dropped astern, lay quietly for a few moments off the
port-quarter of the Richmond, and then steamed slowly up the river,
receiving broadsides from the Richmond and Preble, and throwing up a
rocket. In a few moments three dim lights were seen up the river near
the eastern shore. They were shortly made out to be fire-rafts. The
squadron slipped their chains, the three larger vessels, by direction
of the senior officer, retreating down the Southwest Pass to the sea;
but in the attempt to cross, the Richmond and Vincennes grounded on
the bar. The fire-rafts drifted harmlessly on to the western bank of
the river, and then burned out. When day broke, the enemy's fleet,
finding the head of the passes abandoned, followed down the river, and
with rifled guns kept up a steady but not very accurate long-range
fire upon the stranded ships, not venturing within reach of the
Richmond's heavy broadside. About 10 A.M., apparently satisfied with
the day's work, they returned up river, and the ships shortly after
got afloat and crossed the bar.

The ram which caused this commotion and hasty retreat was a small
vessel of three hundred and eighty-four tons, originally a Boston
tug-boat called the Enoch Train, which had been sent to New Orleans to
help in improving the channel of the Mississippi. When the war broke
out she was taken by private parties and turned into a ram on
speculation. An arched roof of 5-inch timber was thrown over her deck,
and this covered with a layer of old-fashioned railroad iron, from
three-fourths to one inch thick, laid lengthways. At the time of this
attack she had a cast-iron prow under water, and carried a IX-inch
gun, pointing straight ahead through a slot in the roof forward; but
as this for some reason could not be used, it was lashed in its place.
Her dimensions were: length 128 feet, beam 26 feet, depth 12½ feet.
She had twin screws, and at this time one engine was running at high
pressure and the other at low, both being in bad order, so that she
could only steam six knots; but carrying the current with her she
struck the Richmond with a speed of from nine to ten. Although
afterward bought by the Confederate Government, she at this time still
belonged to private parties; but as her captain, pilot, and most of
the other officers refused to go in her, Lieutenant A.F. Warley, of
the Confederate Navy, was ordered to the command by Commodore Hollins.
In the collision her prow was wrenched off, her smoke-stack carried
away and the condenser of the low-pressure engine gave out, which
accounts for her "remaining under the Richmond's quarter," "dropping
astern," and "lying quietly abeam of the Preble, apparently hesitating
whether to come at her or not." As soon as possible she limped off
under her remaining engine.

Although it was known to the officers of the Union fleet that the
enemy had a ram up the river, it does not appear that any preparation
for defence had been made, or plan of action adopted. Even the
commonplace precaution of sending out a picket-boat had not been
taken. The attack, therefore, was a surprise, not only in the ordinary
sense of the word, but, so far as appears, in finding the officer in
command without any formed ideas as to what he would do if she came
down. "The whole affair came upon me so suddenly that no time was left
for reflection, but called for immediate action." These are his own
words. The natural outcome of not having his resources in hand was a
hasty retreat before an enemy whose force he now exaggerated and with
whom he was not prepared to deal; a move which brought intense
mortification to himself and in a measure to the service.

It is a relief to say that the Water Witch, a small vessel of under
four hundred tons, with three light guns, commanded by Lieutenant
Francis Winslow, held her ground, steaming up beyond the fire-rafts
until daylight showed her the larger vessels in retreat.

During the night of November 7th the U.S. frigate Santee, blockading
off Galveston, sent into the harbor two boats, under the command of
Lieutenant James E. Jouett, with the object of destroying the
man-of-war steamer General Rusk. The armed schooner Royal Yacht
guarding the channel was passed unseen, but the boats shortly after
took the ground and were discovered. Thinking it imprudent to attack
the steamer without the advantage of a surprise, Lieutenant Jouett
turned upon the schooner, which was carried after a sharp conflict.
The loss of the assailants was two killed and seven wounded. The
schooner was burnt.

On November 22d and 23d Flag-Officer McKean, with the Niagara and
Richmond, made an attack upon Fort McRea on the western side of the
entrance to Pensacola Bay; Fort Pickens, on the east side, which
remained in the power of the United States, directing its guns upon
the fort and the Navy Yard, the latter being out of reach of the
ships. The fire of McRea was silenced the first day; but on the second
a northwest wind had so lowered the water that the ships could not get
near enough to reach the fort. The affair was entirely indecisive,
being necessarily conducted at very long range.

From this time on, until the arrival of Flag-Officer David G.
Farragut, a guerilla warfare was maintained along the coast, having
always the object of making the blockade more effective and the
conditions of the war more onerous to the Southern people. Though each
little expedition contributed to this end, singly they offer nothing
that it is necessary to chronicle here. When Farragut came the
squadron was divided. St. Andrew's Bay, sixty miles east of Pensacola,
was left in the East Gulf Squadron; all west of that point was
Farragut's command, under the name of the Western Gulf Blockading
Squadron. Stirring and important events were now at hand, before
relating which the course of the war on the Upper Mississippi demands
attention.

    [Illustration: MISSISSIPPI VALLEY--CAIRO TO MEMPHIS.]




CHAPTER II.

FROM CAIRO TO VICKSBURG.


At the 37th parallel of north latitude the Ohio, which drains the
northeast portion of the Valley of the Mississippi, enters that river.
At the point of junction three powerful States meet. Illinois, here
bounded on either side by the great river and its tributary, lies on
the north; on the east it is separated by the Ohio from Kentucky, on
the west by the Mississippi from Missouri. Of the three Illinois was
devoted to the cause of the Union, but the allegiance of the two
others, both slave-holding, was very doubtful at the time of the
outbreak of hostilities.

The general course of the Mississippi here being south, while that of
the Ohio is southwest, the southern part of Illinois projects like a
wedge between the two other States. At the extreme point of the wedge,
where the rivers meet, is a low point of land, subject, in its
unprotected state, to frequent overflows by the rising of the waters.
On this point, protected by dikes or levees, is built the town of
Cairo, which from its position became, during the war, the naval
arsenal and dépôt of the Union flotilla operating in the Mississippi
Valley.

From Cairo to the mouths of the Mississippi is a distance of ten
hundred and ninety-seven miles by the stream. So devious, however, is
the course of the latter that the two points are only four hundred and
eighty miles apart in a due north and south line; for the river,
after having inclined to the westward till it has increased its
longitude by some two degrees and a half, again bends to the east,
reaching the Gulf on the meridian of Cairo. Throughout this long
distance the character of the river-bed is practically unchanged. The
stream flows through an alluvial region, beginning a few miles above
Cairo, which is naturally subject to overflow during floods; but the
surrounding country is protected against such calamities by raised
embankments, or dikes, known throughout that region as levees.

The river and its tributaries are subject to very great variations of
height, which are often sudden and unexpected, but when observed
through a series of years present a certain regularity. They depend
upon the rains and the melting of the snows in their basins. The
greatest average height is attained in the late winter and early
spring months; another rise takes place in the early summer; the
months of August, September, and October give the lowest water, the
rise following them being due to the autumnal rains. It will be seen
at times that these rises and falls, especially when sudden, had their
bearing upon the operations of both army and navy.

At a few points of the banks high land is encountered. On the right,
or western, bank there is but one such, at Helena, in the State of
Arkansas, between three and four hundred miles below Cairo. On the
left bank such points are more numerous. The first is at Columbus,
twenty-one miles down the stream; then follow the bluffs at Hickman,
in Kentucky; a low ridge (which also extends to the right bank) below
New Madrid, rising from one to fifteen feet above overflow; the four
Chickasaw bluffs in Tennessee, on the southernmost of which is the
city of Memphis; and finally a rapid succession of similar bluffs
extending for two hundred and fifty miles, at short intervals, from
Vicksburg, in Mississippi, about six hundred miles below Cairo, to
Baton Rouge, in Louisiana. Of these last Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, and
Port Hudson became the scenes of important events of the war.

It is easy to see that each of these rare and isolated points afforded
a position by the fortification of which the passage of an enemy could
be disputed, and the control of the stream maintained, as long as it
remained in the hands of the defenders. They were all, except Columbus
and Hickman, in territory which, by the act of secession, had become
hostile to the Government of the United States; and they all, not
excepting even the two last-named, were seized and fortified by the
Confederates. It was against this chain of defences that the Union
forces were sent forth from either end of the line; and fighting their
way, step by step, and post by post, those from the north and those
from the south met at length around the defences of Vicksburg. From
the time of that meeting the narratives blend until the fall of the
fortress; but, prior to that time, it is necessary to tell the story
of each separately. The northern expeditions were the first in the
field, and to them this chapter is devoted.

The importance of controlling the Mississippi was felt from the first
by the United States Government. This importance was not only
strategic; it was impossible that the already powerful and
fast-growing Northwestern States should see without grave
dissatisfaction the outlet of their great highway pass into the hands
of a foreign power. Even before the war the necessity to those States
of controlling the river was an argument against the possibility of
disunion, at least on a line crossing it. From the military point of
view, however, not only did the Mississippi divide the Confederacy,
but the numerous streams directly or indirectly tributary to it,
piercing the country in every direction, afforded a ready means of
transport for troops and their supplies in a country of great extent,
but otherwise ill-provided with means of carriage. From this
consideration it was but a step to see the necessity of an inland navy
for operating on and keeping open those waters.

The necessity being recognized, the construction of the required
fleet was at the first entrusted to the War Department, the naval
officers assigned for that duty reporting to the military officer
commanding in the West. The fleet, or flotilla, while under this
arrangement, really constituted a division of the army, and its
commanding officer was liable to interference, not only at the hands
of the commander-in-chief, but of subordinate officers of higher rank
than himself.

On May 16, 1861, Commander John Rodgers was directed to report to the
War Department for this service. Under his direction there were
purchased in Cincinnati three river-steamers, the Tyler, Lexington,
and Conestoga. These were altered into gunboats by raising around them
perpendicular oak bulwarks, five inches thick and proof against
musketry, which were pierced for ports, but bore no iron plating. The
boilers were dropped into the hold, and steam-pipes lowered as much as
possible. The Tyler mounted six 64-pounders in broadside, and one
32-pounder stern gun; the Lexington, four 64s and two 32s; the
Conestoga, two broadside 32s and one light stern gun. After being
altered, these vessels were taken down to Cairo, where they arrived
August 12th, having been much delayed by the low state of the river;
one of them being dragged by the united power of the three over a bar
on which was one foot less water than her draught.

On the 7th of August, a contract was made by the War Department with
James B. Eads, of St. Louis, by which he undertook to complete seven
gunboats, and deliver them at Cairo on the 10th day of October of the
same year. These vessels were one hundred and seventy-five feet long
and fifty feet beam. The propelling power was one large paddle-wheel,
which was placed in an opening prepared for it, midway of the breadth
of the vessel and a little forward of the stern, in such wise as to be
materially protected by the sides and casemate. This opening, which
was eighteen feet wide, extended forward sixty feet from the stern,
dividing the after-body into two parts, which were connected abaft the
wheel by planking thrown from one side to the other. This after-part
was called the fantail. The casemate extended from the curve of the
bow to that of the stern, and was carried across the deck both forward
and aft, thus forming a square box, whose sides sloped in and up at an
angle of forty-five degrees, containing the battery, the machinery,
and the paddle-wheel. The casemate was pierced for thirteen guns,
three in the forward end ranging directly ahead, four on each
broadside, and two stern guns.

As the expectation was to fight generally bows on, the forward end of
the casemate carried iron armor two and a half inches thick, backed by
twenty-four inches of oak. The rest of the casemate was not protected
by armor, except abreast of the boilers and engines, where there were
two and a half inches of iron, but without backing. The stern,
therefore, was perfectly vulnerable, as were the sides forward and
abaft the engines. The latter were high pressure, like those of all
Western river-boats, and, though the boilers were dropped into the
hold as far as possible, the light draught and easily pierced sides
left the vessels exposed in action to the fearful chance of an
exploded boiler. Over the casemate forward was a pilot-house of
conical shape, built of heavy oak, and plated on the forward side with
2½-inch iron, on the after with 1½-inch. With guns, coal, and stores
on board, the casemate deck came nearly down to the water, and the
vessels drew from six to seven feet, the peculiar outline giving them
no small resemblance to gigantic turtles wallowing slowly along in
their native element. Below the water the form was that of a scow, the
bottom being flat. Their burden was five hundred and twelve tons.

The armament was determined by the exigencies of the time, such guns
as were available being picked up here and there and forwarded to
Cairo. The army supplied thirty-five old 42-pounders, which were
rifled, and so threw a 70-pound shell. These having lost the metal cut
away for grooves, and not being banded, were called upon to endure the
increased strain of firing rifled projectiles with actually less
strength than had been allowed for the discharge of a round ball of
about half the weight. Such make-shifts are characteristic of nations
that do not prepare for war, and will doubtless occur again in the
experience of our navy; fortunately, in this conflict, the enemy was
as ill-provided as ourselves. Several of these guns burst; their crews
could be seen eyeing them distrustfully at every fire, and when at
last they were replaced by sounder weapons, many were not turned into
store, but thrown, with a sigh of relief, into the waters of the
Mississippi. The remainder of the armament was made up by the navy
with old-fashioned 32-pound and VIII-inch smooth-bore guns, fairly
serviceable and reliable weapons. Each of these seven gunboats, when
thus ready for service, carried four of the above-described rifles,
six 32-pounders of 43 cwt., and three VIII-inch shell-guns; total,
thirteen.

The vessels, when received into service, were named after cities
standing upon the banks of the rivers which they were to
defend--Cairo, Carondelet, Cincinnati, Louisville, Mound City,
Pittsburg, St. Louis. They, with the Benton, formed the backbone of
the river fleet throughout the war. Other more pretentious, and
apparently more formidable, vessels, were built; but from thorough bad
workmanship, or appearing too late on the scene, they bore no
proportionate share in the fighting. The eight may be fairly called
the ships of the line of battle on the western waters.

The Benton was of the same general type as the others, but was
purchased by, not built for, the Government. She was originally a
snag-boat, and so constructed with special view to strength. Her size
was 1,000 tons, double that of the seven; length, 202 feet; extreme
breadth, 72 feet. The forward plating was 3 inches of iron, backed by
30 inches of oak; at the stern, and abreast the engines, there was
2½-inch iron, backed by 12 inches of oak; the rest of the sides of the
casemates was covered with 5/8-inch iron. With guns and stores on
board, she drew nine feet. Her first armament was two IX-inch
shell-guns, seven rifled 42s, and seven 32-pounders of 43 cwt.; total,
sixteen guns. It will be seen, therefore, that she differed from the
others simply in being larger and stronger; she was, indeed, the most
powerful fighting-machine in the squadron, but her speed was only five
knots an hour through the water, and her engines so little
commensurate with her weight that Flag-Officer Foote hesitated long to
receive her. The slowness was forgiven for her fitness for battle, and
she went by the name of the old war-horse.

There was one other vessel of size equal to the Benton, which, being
commanded by a son of Commodore Porter, of the war of 1812, got the
name Essex. After bearing a creditable part in the battle of Fort
Henry, she became separated by the batteries of Vicksburg from the
upper squadron, and is less identified with its history. Her armament
was three IX-inch, one X-inch, and one 32-pounder.

On the 6th of September Commander Rodgers was relieved by Captain A.H.
Foote, whose name is most prominently associated with the equipment
and early operations of the Mississippi flotilla. At that time he
reported to the Secretary that there were three wooden gunboats in
commission, nine ironclads and thirty-eight mortar-boats building. The
mortar-boats were rafts or blocks of solid timber, carrying one
XIII-inch mortar.

The construction and equipment of the fleet was seriously delayed by
the lack of money, and the general confusion incident to the vast
extent of military and naval preparations suddenly undertaken by a
nation having a very small body of trained officers, and accustomed to
raise and expend comparatively insignificant amounts of money.
Constant complaints were made by the officers and contractors that
lack of money prevented them from carrying on their work. The first of
the seven ironclads was launched October 12th and the seven are
returned by the Quartermaster's Department as received December 5,
1861. On the 12th of January, 1862, Flag-Officer Foote reported that
he expected to have all the gunboats in commission by the 20th, but
had only one-third crews for them. The crews were of a heterogeneous
description. In November a draft of five hundred were sent from the
seaboard, which, though containing a proportion of men-of-war's men,
had a yet larger number of coasting and merchant seamen, and of
landsmen. In the West two or three hundred steamboat men, with a few
sailors from the Lakes, were shipped. In case of need, deficiencies
were made up by drafts from regiments in the army. On the 23d of
December, 1861, eleven hundred men were ordered from Washington to be
thus detailed for the fleet. Many difficulties, however, arose in
making the transfer. General Halleck insisted that the officers of the
regiments must accompany their men on board, the whole body to be
regarded as marines and to owe obedience to no naval officer except
the commander of the gunboat. Foote refused this, saying it would be
ruinous to discipline; that the second in command, or executive
officer, by well-established naval usage, controlled all officers,
even though senior in rank to himself; and that there were no quarters
for so many more officers, for whom, moreover, he had no use. Later on
Foote writes to the Navy Department that not more than fifty men had
joined from the army, though many had volunteered; the derangement of
companies and regiments being the reason assigned for not sending the
others. It does not appear that more than these fifty came at that
time. There is no more unsatisfactory method of getting a crew than by
drafts from the commands of other men. Human nature is rarely equal to
parting with any but the worst; and Foote had so much trouble with a
subsequent detachment that he said he would rather go into action half
manned than take another draft from the army. In each vessel the
commander was the only trained naval officer, and upon him devolved
the labor of organizing and drilling this mixed multitude. In charge
of and responsible for the whole was the flag-officer, to whom, though
under the orders of General Fremont, the latter had given full
discretion.

Meanwhile the three wooden gunboats had not been idle during the
preparation of the main ironclad fleet. Arriving at Cairo, as has been
stated, on the 12th of August, the necessity for action soon arose.
During the early months of the war the State of Kentucky had announced
her intention of remaining a neutral between the contending parties.
Neither of the latter was willing to precipitate her, by an invasion
of her soil, into the arms of the other, and for some time the
operations of the Confederates were confined to Tennessee, south of
her borders, the United States troops remaining north of the Ohio. On
September 4th, however, the Confederates crossed the line and occupied
in force the bluffs at Columbus and Hickman, which they proceeded at
once to fortify. The military district about Cairo was then under the
command of General Grant, who immediately moved up the Ohio, and
seized Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee River, and Smithland, at
the mouth of the Cumberland. These two rivers enter the Ohio ten miles
apart, forty and fifty miles above Cairo. Rising in the Cumberland and
Alleghany Mountains, their course leads through the heart of
Tennessee, to which their waters give easy access through the greater
part of the year. Two gunboats accompanied this movement, in which,
however, there was no fighting.

On the 10th of September, the Lexington, Commander Stembel, and
Conestoga, Lieutenant-Commanding Phelps, went down the Mississippi,
covering an advance of troops on the Missouri side. A brisk cannonade
followed between the boats and the Confederate artillery, and shots
were exchanged with the gunboat Yankee. On the 24th, Captain Foote, by
order of General Fremont, moved in the Lexington up the Ohio River to
Owensboro. The Conestoga was to have accompanied this movement, but
she was up the Cumberland or Tennessee at the time; arriving later she
remained, by order, at Owensboro till the falling of the river
compelled her to return, there being on some of the bars less water
than she drew. A few days later this active little vessel showed
herself again on the Mississippi, near Columbus, endeavoring to reach
a Confederate gunboat that lay under the guns of the works; then again
on the Tennessee, which she ascended as far as the Tennessee State
Line, reconnoitring Fort Henry, subsequently the scene of Foote's
first decisive victory over the enemy. Two days later the Cumberland
was entered for the distance of sixty miles. On the 28th of October,
accompanied by a transport and some companies of troops, she again
ascended the Cumberland, and broke up a Confederate camp, the enemy
losing several killed and wounded. The frequent appearances of these
vessels, while productive of no material effect beyond the capture or
destruction of Confederate property, were of service in keeping alive
the attachment to the Union where it existed. The crews of the
gunboats also became accustomed to the presence of the enemy, and to
the feeling of being under fire.

On the 7th of November a more serious affair took place. The evening
before, the gunboats Tyler, Commander Walke, and Lexington, Commander
Stembel, convoyed transports containing three thousand troops, under
the command of General Grant, down the Mississippi as far as Norfolk,
eight miles, where they anchored on the east side of the river. The
following day the troops landed at Belmont, which is opposite Columbus
and under the guns of that place. The Confederate troops were easily
defeated and driven to the river's edge, where they took refuge on
their transports. During this time the gunboats engaged the batteries
on the Iron Banks, as the part of the bluff above the town is called.
The heavy guns of the enemy, from their commanding position, threw
easily over the boats, reaching even to and beyond the transports on
the opposite shore up stream. Under Commander Walke's direction the
transports were moved further up, out of range.

Meanwhile the enemy was pushing reinforcements across the stream below
the works, and the Union forces, having accomplished the diversion
which was the sole object of the expedition, began to fall back to
their transports. It would seem that the troops, yet unaccustomed to
war, had been somewhat disordered by their victory, so that the return
was not accomplished as rapidly as was desirable, the enemy pressing
down upon the transports. At this moment the gunboats, from a
favorable position, opened upon them with grape, canister, and
five-second shell, silencing them with great slaughter. When the
transports were under way the two gunboats followed in the rear,
covering the retreat till the enemy ceased to follow.

In this succession of encounters the Tyler lost one man killed and two
wounded. The Lexington escaped without loss.

When a few miles up the river on the return, General McClernand,
ascertaining that some of the troops had not embarked, directed the
gunboats to go back for them, the general himself landing to await
their return. This service was performed, some 40 prisoners being
taken on board along with the troops.

In his official report of this, the first of his many gallant actions
on the rivers, Commander Walke praises warmly the efficiency as well
as the zeal of the crews of the gunboats, though as yet so new to
their duties.

The flotilla being at this time under the War Department, as has been
already stated, its officers, each and all, were liable to orders from
any army officer of superior rank to them. Without expressing a
decided opinion as to the advisability of this arrangement under the
circumstances then existing, it was entirely contrary to the
established rule by which, when military and naval forces are acting
together, the commander of each branch decides what he can or can not
do, and is not under the control of the other, whatever the relative
rank. At this time Captain Foote himself had only the rank of colonel,
and found, to use his own expression, that "every brigadier could
interfere with him." On the 13th of November, 1861, he received the
appointment of flag-officer, which gave him the same rank as a
major-general, and put him above the orders of any except the
commander-in-chief of the department. Still the subordinate naval
officers were liable to orders at any time from any general with whom
they might be, without the knowledge of the flag-officer. It is
creditable to the good feeling and sense of duty of both the army and
navy that no serious difficulty arose from this anomalous condition of
affairs, which came to an end in July, 1862, when the fleet was
transferred to the Navy Department.

After the battle of Belmont nothing of importance occurred in the year
1861. The work on the ironclads was pushed on, and there are traces of
the reconnoissances by the gunboats in the rivers. In January, 1862,
some tentative movements, having no particular result, were made in
the direction of Columbus and up the Tennessee. There was a great
desire to get the mortar-boats completed, but they were not ready in
time for the opening operations at Fort Henry and Donelson, their
armaments not having arrived.

On the 2d of February, Flag-Officer Foote left Cairo for Paducah,
arriving the same evening. There were assembled the four armored
gunboats, Essex, Commander Wm. D. Porter; Carondelet, Commander Walke;
St. Louis, Lieutenant Paulding; and Cincinnati, Commander Stembel; as
well as the three wooden gunboats, Conestoga, Lieutenant Phelps;
Tyler, Lieutenant Gwin; and Lexington, Lieutenant Shirk. The object of
the expedition was to attack, conjointly with the army, Fort Henry on
the Tennessee, and, after reducing the fort, to destroy the railroad
bridge over the river connecting Bowling Green with Columbus. The
flag-officer deplored that scarcity of men prevented his coming with
four other boats, but to man those he brought it had been necessary to
strip Cairo of all men except a crew for one gunboat. Only 50 men of
the 1,100 promised on December 23d had been received from the army.

Fort Henry was an earthwork with five bastions, situated on the east
bank of the Tennessee River, on low ground, but in a position where a
slight bend in the stream gave it command of the stretch below for two
or three miles. It mounted twenty guns, but of these only twelve bore
upon the ascending fleet. These twelve were: one X-inch columbiad, one
60-pounder rifle, two 42- and eight 32-pounders. The plan of attack
was simple. The armored gunboats advanced in the first order of
steaming, in line abreast, fighting their bow guns, of which eleven
were brought into action by the four. The flag-officer purposed by
continually advancing, or, if necessary, falling back, to constantly
alter the range, thus causing error in the elevation of the enemy's
guns, presenting, at the same time, the least vulnerable part, the
bow, to his fire. The vessels kept their line by the flag-ship
Cincinnati. The other orders were matters of detail, the most
important being to fire accurately rather than with undue rapidity.
The wooden gunboats formed a second line astern, and to the right of
the main division.

Two days previous to the action there were heavy rains which impeded
the movements of the troops, caused the rivers to rise, and brought
down a quantity of drift-wood and trees. The same flood swept from
their moorings a number of torpedoes, planted by the Confederates,
which were grappled with and towed ashore by the wooden gunboats.

Half an hour after noon on the 6th, the fleet, having waited in vain
for the army, which was detained by the condition of the roads,
advanced to the attack. The armored vessels opened fire, the flag-ship
beginning, at seventeen hundred yards distance, and continued steaming
steadily ahead to within six hundred yards of the fort. As the
distance decreased, the fire on both sides increased in rapidity and
accuracy. An hour after the action began the 60-pound rifle in the
fort burst, and soon after the priming wire of the 10-inch columbiad
jammed and broke in the vent, thus spiking the gun, which could not be
relieved. The balance of force was, however, at once more than
restored, for a shot from the fort pierced the casemate of the Essex
over the port bow gun, ranged aft, and killing a master's mate in its
flight, passed through the middle boiler. The rush of high-pressure
steam scalded almost all in the forward part of the casemate,
including her commander and her two pilots in the pilot-house. Many of
the victims threw themselves into the water, and the vessel, disabled,
drifted down with the current out of action. The contest was
vigorously continued by the three remaining boats, and at 1.45 P.M.
the Confederate flag was lowered. The commanding officer, General
Tilghman, came on board and surrendered the fort and garrison to the
fleet; but the greater part of the Confederate forces had been
previously withdrawn to Fort Donelson, twelve miles distant, on the
Cumberland. Upon the arrival of the army the fort and material
captured were turned over to the general commanding.

In this sharp and decisive action the gunboats showed themselves well
fitted to contend with most of the guns at that time to be found upon
the rivers, provided they could fight bows on. Though repeatedly
struck, the flag-ship as often as thirty-one times, the armor proved
sufficient to deflect or resist the impact of the projectiles. The
disaster, however, that befell the Essex made fearfully apparent a
class of accidents to which they were exposed, and from which more
than one boat, on either side, on the Western waters subsequently
suffered. The fleet lost two killed and nine wounded, besides
twenty-eight scalded, many of whom died. The Essex had also nineteen
soldiers on board; nine of whom were scalded, four fatally.

The surrender of the fort was determined by the destruction of its
armament. Of the twelve guns, seven, by the commander's report, were
disabled when the flag was hauled down. One had burst in discharging,
the rest were put out of action by the fire of the fleet. The
casualties were few, not exceeding twenty killed and wounded.

Flag-Officer Foote, having turned over his capture to the army,
returned the same evening to Cairo with three armored vessels, leaving
the Carondelet. At the same time the three wooden gunboats, in
obedience to orders issued before the battle, started up river under
the command of Lieutenant Phelps, reaching the railroad bridge,
twenty-five miles up, after dark. Here the machinery for turning the
draw was found to be disabled, while on the other side were to be seen
some transport steamers escaping up stream. An hour was required to
open the draw, when two of the boats proceeded in chase of the
transports, the Tyler, as the slowest, being left to destroy the track
as far as possible. Three of the Confederate steamers, loaded with
military stores, two of them with explosives, were run ashore and
fired. The Union gunboats stopped half a mile below the scene, but
even at that distance the force of the explosion shattered glasses,
forced open doors, and raised the light upper decks.

The Lexington, having destroyed the trestle-work at the end of the
bridge, rejoined the following morning; and the three boats,
continuing their raid, arrived the next night at Cerro Gordo, near the
Mississippi line. Here was seized a large steamer called the Eastport,
which the Confederates were altering into a gunboat. There being at
this point large quantities of lumber, the Tyler was left to ship it
and guard the prize.

The following day, the 8th, the two boats continued up river, passing
through the northern part of the States of Mississippi and Alabama, to
Florence, where the Muscle Shoals prevented their farther progress. On
the way two more steamers were seized, and three were set on fire by
the enemy as they approached Florence. Returning the same night, upon
information received that a Confederate camp was established at
Savannah, Tennessee, on the bank of the river, a party was landed,
which found the enemy gone, but seized or destroyed the camp equipage
and stores left behind. The expedition reached Cairo again on the
11th, bringing with it the Eastport and one other of the captured
steamers. The Eastport had been intended by the Confederates for a
gunboat, and was in process of conversion when captured. Lieutenant
Phelps reported her machinery in first-rate order and the boilers
dropped into the hold. Her hull had been sheathed with oak planking
and the bulkheads, forward, aft, and thwartships, were of oak and of
the best workmanship. Her beautiful model, speed, and manageable
qualities made her specially desirable for the Union fleet, and she
was taken into the service. Two years later she was sunk by torpedoes
in the Red River, and, though partially raised, it was found
impossible to bring her over the shoals that lay below her. She was
there blown up, her former captor and then commander, Lieutenant
Phelps, applying the match.

Lieutenant Phelps and his daring companions returned to Cairo just in
time to join Foote on his way to Fort Donelson. The attack upon this
position, which was much stronger than Fort Henry, was made against
the judgment of the flag-officer, who did not consider the fleet as
yet properly prepared. At the urgent request of Generals Halleck and
Grant, however, he steamed up the Cumberland River with three
ironclads and the wooden gunboats, the Carondelet having already, at
Grant's desire, moved round to Donelson.

Fort Donelson was on the left bank of the Cumberland, twelve miles
southeast of Fort Henry. The main work was on a bluff about a hundred
feet high, at a bend commanding the river below. On the slope of the
ridge, looking down stream, were two water batteries, with which alone
the fleet had to do. The lower and principal one mounted eight
32-pounders and a X-inch columbiad; in the upper there were two
32-pounder carronades and one gun of the size of a X-inch smooth-bore,
but rifled with the bore of a 32-pounder and said to throw a shot of
one hundred and twenty-eight pounds. Both batteries were excavated in
the hillside, and the lower had traverses between the guns to protect
them from an enfilading fire, in case the boats should pass their
front and attack them from above. At the time of the fight these
batteries were thirty-two feet above the level of the river.

General Grant arrived before the works at noon of February 12th. The
gunboat Carondelet, Commander Walke, came up about an hour earlier. At
10 A.M. on the 13th, the gunboat, at the general's request, opened
fire on the batteries at a distance of a mile and a quarter,
sheltering herself partly behind a jutting point of the river, and
continued a deliberate cannonade with her bow guns for six hours,
after which she withdrew. In this time she had thrown in one hundred
and eighty shell, and was twice struck by the enemy, half a dozen of
her people being slightly injured by splinters. On the side of the
enemy an engineer officer was killed by her fire.

The fleet arrived that evening, and attacked the following day at 3
P.M. There were, besides the Carondelet, the armored gunboats St.
Louis, Lieutenant Paulding; Louisville, Commander Dove; and Pittsburg,
Lieutenant E. Thompson; and the wooden vessels Conestoga and Tyler,
commanded as before. The order of steaming was the same as at Henry,
the wooden boats in the rear throwing their shell over the armored
vessels. The fleet reserved its fire till within a mile, when it
opened and advanced rapidly to within six hundred yards of the works,
closing up later to four hundred yards. The fight was obstinately
sustained on both sides, and, notwithstanding the commanding position
of the batteries, strong hopes were felt on board the fleet of
silencing the guns, which the enemy began to desert, when, at 4.30
P.M., the wheel of the flag-ship St. Louis and the tiller of the
Louisville were shot away. The two boats, thus rendered unmanageable,
drifted down the river; and their consorts, no longer able to maintain
the unequal contest, withdrew. The enemy returned at once to their
guns, and inflicted much injury on the retiring vessels.

Notwithstanding its failure, the tenacity and fighting qualities of
the fleet were more markedly proved in this action than in the victory
at Henry. The vessels were struck more frequently (the flag-ship
fifty-nine times, and none less than twenty), and though the power of
the enemy's guns was about the same in each case, the height and
character of the soil at Donelson placed the fleet at a great
disadvantage. The fire from above, reaching their sloping armor nearly
at right angles, searched every weak point. Upon the Carondelet a
rifled gun burst. The pilot-houses were beaten in, and three of the
four pilots received mortal wounds. Despite these injuries, and the
loss of fifty-four killed and wounded, the fleet was only shaken from
its hold by accidents to the steering apparatus, after which their
batteries could not be brought to bear.

Among the injured on this occasion was the flag-officer, who was
standing by the pilot when the latter was killed. Two splinters struck
him in the arm and foot, inflicting wounds apparently slight; but the
latter, amid the exposure and anxiety of the succeeding operations,
did not heal, and finally compelled him, three months later, to give
up the command.

On the 16th the Confederates, after an unsuccessful attempt to cut
their way through the investing army, hopeless of a successful
resistance, surrendered at discretion to General Grant. The capture of
this post left the way open to Nashville, the capital of Tennessee,
and the flag-officer was anxious to press on with fresh boats brought
up from Cairo; but was prevented by peremptory orders from General
Halleck, commanding the Department. As it was, however, Nashville fell
on the 25th.

After the fall of Fort Donelson and the successful operations in
Missouri, the position at Columbus was no longer tenable. On the 23d
Flag-Officer Foote made a reconnoissance in force in that direction,
but no signs of the intent to abandon were as yet perceived. On March
1st, Lieutenant Phelps, being sent with a flag of truce, reported the
post in process of being evacuated, and on the 4th it was in
possession of the Union forces. The Confederates had removed the
greater part of their artillery to Island No. 10.

About this time, March 1st, Lieutenant Gwin, commanding the Lexington
and Tyler on the Tennessee, hearing that the Confederates were
fortifying Pittsburg Landing, proceeded to that point, carrying with
him two companies of sharpshooters. The enemy was readily dislodged,
and Lieutenant Gwin continued in the neighborhood to watch and
frustrate any similar attempts. This was the point chosen a few weeks
later for the concentration of the Union army, to which Lieutenant
Gwin was again to render invaluable service.

After the fall of Columbus no attempt was made to hold Hickman, but
the Confederates fell back upon Island No. 10 and the adjacent banks
of the Mississippi to make their next stand for the control of the
river. The island, which has its name (if it can be called a name)
from its position in the numerical series of islands below Cairo, is
just abreast the line dividing Kentucky from Tennessee. The position
was singularly strong against attacks from above, and for some time
before the evacuation of Columbus the enemy, in anticipation of that
event, had been fortifying both the island and the Tennessee and
Missouri shores. It will be necessary to describe the natural features
and the defences somewhat in detail.

From a point about four miles above Island No. 10 the river flows
south three miles, then sweeps round to the west and north, forming a
horse-shoe bend of which the two ends are east and west from each
other. Where the first horse-shoe ends a second begins; the river
continuing to flow north, then west and south to Point Pleasant on the
Missouri shore. The two bends taken together form an inverted S
[inverted S]. In making this detour, the river, as far as Point
Pleasant, a distance of twelve miles, gains but three miles to the
south. Island No. 10 lay at the bottom of the first bend, near the
left bank. It was about two miles long by one-third that distance
wide, and its general direction was nearly east and west. New Madrid,
on the Missouri bank, is in the second bend, where the course of the
river is changing from west to south. The right bank of the stream is
in Missouri, the left bank partly in Kentucky and partly in Tennessee.
From Point Pleasant the river runs southeast to Tiptonville, in
Tennessee, the extreme point of the ensuing operations.

When Columbus fell the whole of this position was in the hands of the
Confederates, who had fortified themselves at New Madrid, and thrown
up batteries on the island as well as on the Tennessee shore above it.
On the island itself were four batteries mounting twenty-three guns,
on the Tennessee shore six batteries mounting thirty-two guns. There
was also a floating battery, which, at the beginning of operations,
was moored abreast the middle of the island, and is variously reported
as carrying nine or ten IX-inch guns. New Madrid, with its works, was
taken by General Pope before the arrival of the flotilla.

The position of the enemy, though thus powerful against attack, was
one of great isolation. From Hickman a great swamp, which afterward
becomes Reelfoot Lake, extends along the left bank of the Mississippi,
discharging its waters into the river forty miles below Tiptonville. A
mile below Tiptonville begin the great swamps, extending down both
sides of the Mississippi for a distance of sixty miles. The enemy
therefore had the river in his front, and behind him a swamp,
impassable to any great extent for either men or supplies in the then
high state of the river. The only way of receiving help, or of
escaping, in case the position became untenable, was by way of
Tiptonville, to which a good road led. It will be remembered that
between New Madrid and Point Pleasant there is a low ridge of land,
rising from one to fifteen feet above overflow.

As soon as New Madrid was reduced, General Pope busied himself in
establishing a series of batteries at several prominent points along
the right bank, as far down as opposite Tiptonville. The river was
thus practically closed to the enemy's transports, for their gunboats
were unable to drive out the Union gunners. Escape was thus rendered
impracticable, and the ultimate reduction of the place assured; but
to bring about a speedy favorable result it was necessary for the army
to cross the river and come upon the rear of the enemy. The latter,
recognizing this fact, began the erection of batteries along the shore
from the island down to Tiptonville.

On the 15th of March the fleet arrived in the neighborhood of Island
No. 10. There were six ironclads, one of which was the Benton carrying
the flag-officer's flag, and ten mortar-boats. The weather was
unfavorable for opening the attack, but on the 16th the mortar boats
were placed in position, reaching at extreme range all the batteries,
as well on the Tennessee shore as on the island. On the 17th an attack
was made by all the gunboats, but at the long range of two thousand
yards. The river was high and the current rapid, rendering it very
difficult to manage the boats. A serious injury, such as had been
received at Henry and at Donelson, would have caused the crippled boat
to drift at once into the enemy's arms; and an approach nearer than
that mentioned would have exposed the unarmored sides of the vessels,
their most vulnerable parts, to the fire of the batteries. The fleet
of the flag-officer was thought none too strong to defend the Upper
Mississippi Valley against the enemy's gunboats, of whose number and
power formidable accounts were continually received; while the fall of
No. 10 would necessarily be brought about in time, as that of Fort
Pillow afterward was, by the advance of the army through Tennessee.
Under these circumstances, it cannot be doubted that Foote was
justified in not exposing his vessels to the risks of a closer action;
but to a man of his temperament the meagre results of long-range
firing must have been peculiarly trying.

The bombardment continued throughout the month. Meanwhile the army
under Pope was cutting a canal through the swamps on the Missouri
side, by which, when completed on the 4th of April, light transport
steamers were able to go from the Mississippi above, to New Madrid
below, Island No. 10 without passing under the batteries.

On the night of the 1st of April an armed boat expedition, under the
command of Master J.V. Johnson, carrying, besides the boat's crew,
fifty soldiers under the command of Colonel Roberts of the
Forty-second Illinois Regiment, landed at the upper battery on the
Tennessee shore. No resistance was experienced, and, after the guns
had been spiked by the troops, the expedition returned without loss to
the ships. In a despatch dated March 20th the flag-officer had
written: "When the object of running the blockade becomes adequate to
the risk I shall not hesitate to do it." With the passage of the
transports through the canal, enabling the troops to cross if properly
protected, the time had come. The exploit of Colonel Roberts was
believed to have disabled one battery, and on the 4th of the month,
the floating battery before the island, after a severe cannonade by
the gunboats and mortars, cut loose from her moorings and drifted down
the river. It is improbable that she was prepared, in her new
position, for the events of the night.

At ten o'clock that evening the gunboat Carondelet, Commander Henry
Walke, left her anchorage, during a heavy thunder-storm, and
successfully ran the batteries, reaching New Madrid at 1 A.M. The
orders to execute this daring move were delivered to Captain Walke on
the 30th of March. The vessel was immediately prepared. Her decks were
covered with extra thicknesses of planking; the chain cables were
brought up from below and ranged as an additional protection. Lumber
and cord-wood were piled thickly round the boilers, and arrangements
made for letting the steam escape through the wheel-houses, to avoid
the puffing noise ordinarily issuing from the pipes. The pilot-house,
for additional security, was wrapped to a thickness of eighteen
inches in the coils of a large hawser. A barge, loaded with bales of
hay, was made fast on the port quarter of the vessel, to protect the
magazine.

The moon set at ten o'clock, and then too was felt the first breath of
a thunder-storm, which had been for some time gathering. The
Carondelet swung from her moorings and started down the stream. The
guns were run in and ports closed. No light was allowed about the
decks. Within the darkened casemate or the pilot-house all her crew,
save two, stood in silence, fully armed to repel boarding, should
boarding be attempted. The storm burst in full violence as soon as her
head was fairly down stream. The flashes of lightning showed her
presence to the Confederates who rapidly manned their guns, and whose
excited shouts and commands were plainly heard on board as the boat
passed close under the batteries. On deck, exposed alike to the storm
and to the enemy's fire, were two men; one, Charles Wilson, a seaman,
heaving the lead, standing sometimes knee-deep in the water that
boiled over the forecastle; the other, an officer, Theodore Gilmore,
on the upper deck forward, repeating to the pilot the leadsman's
muttered "No bottom." The storm spread its sheltering wing over the
gallant vessel, baffling the excited efforts of the enemy, before
whose eyes she floated like a phantom ship; now wrapped in
impenetrable darkness, now standing forth in the full blaze of the
lightning close under their guns. The friendly flashes enabled her
pilot, William E. Hoel, who had volunteered from another gunboat to
share the fortunes of the night, to keep her in the channel; once
only, in a longer interval between them, did the vessel get a
dangerous sheer toward a shoal, but the peril was revealed in time to
avoid it. Not till the firing had ceased did the squall abate.

The passage of the Carondelet was not only one of the most daring and
dramatic events of the war; it was also the death-blow to the
Confederate defence of this position. The concluding events followed
in rapid succession. Having passed the island, as related, on the
night of the 4th, the Carondelet on the 6th made a reconnoissance down
the river as far as Tiptonville, with General Granger on board,
exchanging shots with the Confederate batteries, at one of which a
landing was made and the guns spiked. That night the Pittsburg also
passed the island, and at 6.30 A.M. of the 7th the Carondelet got
under way, in concert with Pope's operations, went down the river,
followed after an interval by the Pittsburg, and engaged the enemy's
batteries, beginning with the lowest. This was silenced in
three-quarters of an hour, and the others made little resistance. The
Carondelet then signalled her success to the general and returned to
cover the crossing of the army, which began at once. The enemy
evacuated their works, pushing down toward Tiptonville, but there were
actually no means for them to escape, caught between the swamps and
the river. Seven thousand men laid down their arms, three of whom were
general officers. At ten o'clock that evening the island and garrison
surrendered to the navy, just three days to an hour after the
Carondelet started on her hazardous voyage. How much of this result
was due to the Carondelet and Pittsburg may be measured by Pope's
words to the flag-officer: "The lives of thousands of men and the
success of our operations hang upon your decision; with two gunboats
all is safe, with one it is uncertain."

The passage of a vessel before the guns of a fortress under cover of
night came to be thought less dangerous in the course of the war. To
do full justice to the great gallantry shown by Commander Walke, it
should be remembered that this was done by a single vessel three
weeks before Farragut passed the forts down the river with a fleet,
among the members of which the enemy's fire was distracted and
divided; and that when Foote asked the opinion of his subordinate
commanders as to the advisability of making the attempt, all, save
one, "believed that it would result in the almost certain destruction
of the boats, passing six forts under the fire of fifty guns." This
was also the opinion of Lieutenant Averett, of the Confederate navy,
who commanded the floating battery at the island--a young officer, but
of clear and calm judgment. "I do not believe it is impossible," he
wrote to Commodore Hollins, "for the enemy to run a part of his
gunboats past in the night; but those that I have seen are slow and
hard to turn, and it is probable that he would lose some, if not all,
in the attempt." Walke alone in the council of captains favored the
trial, though the others would doubtless have undertaken it as
cheerfully as he did. The daring displayed in this deed, which, to use
the flag-officer's words, Walke "so willingly undertook," must be
measured by the then prevalent opinion and not in the light of
subsequent experience. Subsequent experience, indeed, showed that the
danger, if over-estimated, was still sufficiently great.

Justly, then, did it fall to Walke's lot to bear the most conspicuous
part in the following events, ending with the surrender. No less
praise, however, is due to the flag-officer for the part he bore in
this, the closing success of his career. There bore upon him the
responsibility of safe-guarding all the Upper Mississippi, with its
tributary waters, while at the same time the pressure of public
opinion, and the avowed impatience of the army officer with whom he
was co-operating, were stinging him to action. He had borne for months
the strain of overwork with inadequate tools; his health was
impaired, and his whole system disordered from the effects of his
unhealed wound. Farragut had not then entered the mouth of the
Mississippi, and the result of his enterprise was yet in the unknown
future. Reports, now known to be exaggerated, but then accepted,
magnified the power of the Confederate fleet in the lower waters.
Against these nothing stood, nor was soon likely, as it then seemed,
to stand except Foote's ironclads. He was right, then, in his refusal
to risk his vessels. He showed judgment and decision in resisting the
pressure, amounting almost to a taunt, brought upon him. Then, when it
became evident that the transports could be brought through the canal,
he took what he believed to be a desperate risk, showing that no lack
of power to assume responsibility had deterred him before.

In the years since 1862, Island No. 10, the scene of so much interest
and energy, has disappeared. The river, constantly wearing at its
upper end, has little by little swept away the whole, and the deep
current now runs over the place where the Confederate guns stood, as
well as through the channel by which the Carondelet passed. On the
other shore a new No. 10 has risen, not standing as the old one, in
the stream with a channel on either side, but near a point and
surrounded by shoal water. It has perhaps gathered around a steamer,
which was sunk by the Confederates to block the passage through a
chute then existing across the opposite point.

While Walke was protecting Pope's crossing, two other gunboats were
rendering valuable service to another army a hundred miles away, on
the Tennessee River. The United States forces at Pittsburg Landing,
under General Grant, were attacked by the Confederates in force in the
early morning of April 6th. The battle continued with fury all day,
the enemy driving the centre of the army back half way from their
camps to the river, and at a late hour in the afternoon making a
desperate attempt to turn the left, so as to get possession of the
landing and transports. Lieutenant Gwin, commanding the Tyler, and
senior officer present, sent at 1.30 P.M. to ask permission to open
fire. General Hurlburt, commanding on the left, indicated, in reply,
the direction of the enemy and of his own forces, saying, at the same
time, that without reinforcements he would not be able to maintain his
then position for an hour. At 2.50 the Tyler opened fire as indicated,
with good effect, silencing their batteries. At 3.50 the Tyler ceased
firing to communicate with General Grant, who directed her commander
to use his own judgment. At 4 P.M. the Lexington, Lieutenant Shirk,
arrived, and the two boats began shelling from a position
three-quarters of a mile above the landing, silencing the Confederate
batteries in thirty minutes. At 5.30 P.M., the enemy having succeeded
in gaining a position on the Union left, an eighth of a mile above the
landing and half a mile from the river, both vessels opened fire upon
them, in conjunction with the field batteries of the army, and drove
them back in confusion.

The army being largely outnumbered during the day, and forced steadily
back, the presence and services of the two gunboats, when the most
desperate attacks of the enemy were made, were of the utmost value,
and most effectual in enabling that part of our line to be held until
the arrival of the advance of Buell's army from Nashville, about 5
P.M., allowed the left to be reinforced and restored the fortunes of
the day. During the night, by request of General Nelson, the gunboats
threw a shell every fifteen minutes into the camp of the enemy.

Considering the insignificant and vulnerable character of these two
wooden boats, it may not be amiss to quote the language of the two
commanders-in-chief touching their services; the more so as the
gallant young officers who directed their movements are both dead,
Gwin, later in the war, losing his life in action. General Grant says:
"At a late hour in the afternoon a desperate attempt was made to turn
our left and get possession of the landing, transports, etc. This
point was guarded by the gunboats Tyler and Lexington, Captains Gwin
and Shirk, United States Navy, commanding, four 20-pounder Parrotts,
and a battery of rifled guns. As there is a deep and impassable ravine
for artillery and cavalry, and very difficult for infantry, at this
point, no troops were stationed here, except the necessary
artillerists and a small infantry force for their support. Just at
this moment the advance of Major-General Buell's column (a part of the
division under General Nelson) arrived, the two generals named both
being present. An advance was immediately made upon the point of
attack, and the enemy soon driven back. In this repulse much is due to
the presence of the gunboats." In the report in which these words
occur it is unfortunately not made clear how much was due to the
gunboats before Buell and Nelson arrived.

The Confederate commander, on the other hand, states that, as the
result of the attack on the left, the "enemy broke and sought refuge
behind a commanding eminence covering the Pittsburg Landing, not more
than half a mile distant, under the guns of the gunboats, which opened
a fierce and annoying fire with shot and shell of the heaviest
description." Among the reasons for not being able to cope with the
Union forces next day, he alleges that "during the night the enemy
broke the men's rest by a discharge, at measured intervals, of heavy
shells thrown from the gunboats;" and further on he speaks of the army
as "sheltered by such an auxiliary as their gunboats." The impression
among Confederates there present was that the gunboats saved the army
by saving the landing and transports, while during the night the
shrieking of the VIII-inch shells through the woods, tearing down
branches and trees in their flight, and then sharply exploding, was
demoralizing to a degree. The nervous strain caused by watching for
the repetition, at measured intervals, of a painful sensation is known
to most.

General Hurlburt, commanding on the left during the fiercest of the
onslaught, and until the arrival of Buell and Nelson, reports: "From
my own observation and the statement of prisoners his (Gwin's) fire
was most effectual in stopping the advance of the enemy on Sunday
afternoon and night."

Island No. 10 fell on the 7th. On the 11th Foote started down the
river with the flotilla, anchoring the evening of the 12th fifty miles
from New Madrid, just below the Arkansas line. Early the next morning
General Pope arrived with 20,000 men. At 8 A.M. five Confederate
gunboats came in sight, whereupon the flotilla weighed and advanced to
meet them. After exchanging some twenty shots the Confederates
retreated, pursued by the fleet to Fort Pillow, thirty miles below, on
the first, or upper Chickasaw bluff. The flag-officer continued on
with the gunboats to within a mile of the fort, making a leisurely
reconnoissance, during which he was unmolested by the enemy. The fleet
then turned, receiving a few harmless shots as they withdrew, and tied
up to the Tennessee bank, out of range.

The following morning the mortar-boats were placed on the Arkansas
side, under the protection of gunboats, firing as soon as secured. The
army landed on the Tennessee bank above the fort, and tried to find a
way by which the rear of the works could be reached, but in vain.
Plans were then arranged by which it was hoped speedily to reduce the
place by the combined efforts of army and navy; but these were
frustrated by Halleck's withdrawal of all Pope's forces, except 1,500
men under command of a colonel. From this time the attacks on the fort
were confined to mortar and long-range firing. Reports of the number
and strength of the Confederate gunboats and rams continued to come
in, generally much exaggerated; but on the 27th news of Farragut's
successful passage of the forts below New Orleans, and appearance
before that city, relieved Foote of his most serious apprehensions
from below.

On the 23d, Captain Charles H. Davis arrived, to act as second in
command to the flag-officer, and on the 9th of May the latter, whose
wound, received nearly three months before at Donelson, had become
threatening, left Davis in temporary command and went North, hoping to
resume his duties with the flotilla at no distant date. It was not,
however, so to be. An honorable and distinguished career of forty
years afloat ended at Fort Pillow. Called a year later to a yet more
important command, he was struck down by the hand of death at the
instant of his departure to assume it. His services in the war were
thus confined to the Mississippi flotilla. Over the birth and early
efforts of that little fleet he had presided; upon his shoulders had
fallen the burden of anxiety and unremitting labor which the early
days of the war, when all had to be created, everywhere entailed. He
was repaid, for under him its early glories were achieved and its
reputation established; but the mental strain and the draining wound,
so long endured in a sickly climate, hastened his end.

The Confederate gunboats, heretofore acting upon the river at Columbus
and Island No. 10, were in the regular naval service under the command
of Flag Officer George N. Hollins, formerly of the United States Navy.
At No. 10 the force consisted of the McRae, Polk, Jackson, Calhoun,
Ivy, Ponchartrain, Maurepas, and Livingston; the floating battery had
also formed part of his command. Hollins had not felt himself able to
cope with the heavy Union gunboats. His services had been mainly
confined to a vigorous but unsuccessful attack upon the batteries
established by Pope on the Missouri shore, between New Madrid and
Tiptonville, failing in which the gunboats fell back down the river.
They continued, however, to make frequent night trips to Tiptonville
with supplies for the army, in doing which Pope's comparatively light
batteries did not succeed in injuring them, the river being nearly a
mile wide. The danger then coming upon New Orleans caused some of
these to be withdrawn, and at the same time a novel force was sent up
from that city to take their place and dispute the control of the
river with Foote's flotilla.

In the middle of January, General Lovell, commanding the military
district in which New Orleans was, had seized, under the directions of
the Confederate Secretary of War, fourteen river steamboats. This
action was taken at the suggestion of two steamboat captains,
Montgomery and Townsend. The intention was to strengthen the vessels
with iron casing at the bows, and to use them with their high speed as
rams. The weakness of the sterns of the ironclad boats, their slowness
and difficulty in handling, were well known to the Confederate
authorities. Lovell was directed to allow the utmost latitude to each
captain in fitting his own boat, and, as there was no military
organization or system, the details of the construction are not now
recoverable. The engines, however, were protected with cotton bales
and pine bulwarks, and the stems for a length of ten feet shod with
iron nearly an inch thick, across which, at intervals of about two
feet, were bolted iron straps, extending aft on either bow for a
couple of feet so as to keep the planking from starting when the blow
was delivered. It being intended that they should close with the
enemy as rapidly as possible, but one gun was to be carried; a rule
which seems not to have been adhered to. While the force was to be
under the general command of the military chief of department, all
interference by naval officers was jealously forbidden; and, in fact,
by implication, any interference by any one. Lovell seems to have
watched the preparations with a certain anxious amusement, remarking
at one time, "that fourteen Mississippi pilots and captains will never
agree when they begin to talk;" and later, "that he fears too much
latitude has been given to the captains." However, by the 15th of
April he had despatched eight, under the general command of Captain
Montgomery, to the upper river; retaining six at New Orleans, which
was then expecting Farragut's attack. These eight were now lying under
the guns of Fort Pillow; the whole force being known as the River
Defence Fleet.

When Foote left, the ironclads of the squadron were tied up to the
banks with their heads down stream, three on the Tennessee, and four
on the Arkansas shore, as follows:

           _Arkansas Shore._

  Mound City, COMMANDER A.H. KILTY.
  Cincinnati, COMMANDER R.N. STEMBEL.
  St. Louis, LIEUTENANT HENRY ERBEN.
  Cairo, LIEUTENANT N.C. BRYANT.

           _Tennessee Shore._

  Benton (flag-ship), LIEUTENANT S.L. PHELPS.
  Carondelet, COMMANDER HENRY WALKE.
  Pittsburg, LIEUTENANT EGBERT THOMPSON.

The place at which they lay on the Tennessee side is called Plum
Point; three miles lower down on the Arkansas side is another point
called Craighead's. Fort Pillow is just below Craighead's, but on the
opposite bank. It was the daily custom for one of the gunboats to tow
down a mortar-boat and place it just above Craighead's, remaining near
by during the twenty-four hours as guard. The mortar threw its shells
across the point into Pillow, and as the fire was harassing to the
enemy, the River Defence Fleet, which was now ready for action,
determined to make a dash at her. Between 4 and 5 A.M. on the morning
of the 10th of May, the day after Foote's departure, the Cincinnati
placed Mortar No. 16, Acting-Master Gregory, in the usual position,
and then made fast herself to a great drift pile on the same side,
with her head up stream; both ends of her lines being kept on board,
to be easily slipped if necessary. The mortar opened her fire at five.
At six the eight Confederate rams left their moorings behind the fort
and steamed up, the black smoke from their tall smoke-stacks being
seen by the fleet above as they moved rapidly up river. At 6.30 they
came in sight of the vessels at Plum Point. As soon as they were seen
by the Cincinnati she slipped her lines, steamed out into the river,
and then rounded to with her head down stream, presenting her
bow-guns, and opening at once upon the enemy. The latter approached
gallantly but irregularly, the lack of the habit of acting in concert
making itself felt, while the fire of the Cincinnati momentarily
checked and, to a certain extent, scattered them. The leading vessel,
the General Bragg, was much in advance of her consorts. She advanced
swiftly along the Arkansas shore, passing close by the mortar-boat and
above the Cincinnati; then rounding to she approached the latter at
full speed on the starboard quarter, striking a powerful blow in this
weak part of the gunboat. The two vessels fell alongside, the
Cincinnati firing her broadside as they came together; then the ram
swinging clear made down stream, and, although the Confederate
commander claims that her tiller ropes alone were out of order, she
took no further part in the fray.

Two other Confederates now approached the Cincinnati, the General
Price and General Sumter. One of them succeeded in ramming in the same
place as the Bragg, and it was at this moment that Commander Stembel,
who had gathered his men to board the enemy, was dangerously shot by a
rifle-ball through the throat, another officer of the vessel, Master
Reynolds, falling at the same time mortally wounded. The other
assailant received a shot through her boilers from the Benton, which
was now in action; an explosion followed and she drifted down stream.
The Cincinnati, aided by a tug and the Pittsburg, then steamed over to
the Tennessee shore, where she sank on a bar in eleven feet of water.

As soon as the rams were seen, the flag-ship had made a general signal
to get under way, but the morning being calm, the flags did not fly
out well. Orders were passed by hail to the Carondelet and Pittsburg,
and the former vessel slipped immediately and stood down. The Mound
City on the other side did not wait for signals, but, being in
advance, started at once, taking the lead with the Carondelet; the
Benton following, her speed being less. The Carondelet got up in time
to open fire upon the Bragg as she retreated, and to cut the
steam-pipe of the other of the two rams which had attacked the
Cincinnati after the Bragg's fatal assault.

The fourth Confederate, the General Van Dorn, passed by the Cincinnati
and her assailants and met the Mound City. The latter, arriving first
of the Union squadron on the Arkansas side of the river, had already
opened upon the Sumter and Price, and now upon the Van Dorn also with
her bow-guns. The Confederate rounded to and steered to ram
amidships, but the Mound City sheered and received a glancing blow in
the starboard bow. This disabled her, and to avoid sinking she was run
on the Arkansas shore.

Two of the Union gunboats and three rams were now disabled; the latter
drifting down with the current under the guns of Fort Pillow. Those
remaining were five in number, and only two gunboats, the Benton and
Carondelet, were actually engaged, the St. Louis just approaching. The
enemy now retired, giving as a reason that the Union gunboats were
taking position in water too shoal for the rams to follow.

There can be no denying the dash and spirit with which this attack was
made. It was, however, the only service of value performed by this
irregular and undisciplined force. At Memphis, a month later, and at
New Orleans, the fleet proved incapable of meeting an attack and of
mutual support. There were admirable materials in it, but the mistake
of withdrawing them from strict military control and organization was
fatal. On the other hand, although the gunboats engaged fought
gallantly, the flotilla as an organization had little cause for
satisfaction in the day's work. Stated baldly, two of the boats had
been sunk while only four of the seven had been brought into action.
The enemy were severely punished, but the Cincinnati had been
unsupported for nearly half an hour, and the vessels came down one by
one.

After this affair the Union gunboats while above Pillow availed
themselves of shoal spots in the river where the rams could not
approach them, while they could use their guns. Whatever the injuries
received by the Confederates, they were all ready for action at
Memphis a month later. The Cincinnati and Mound City were also
speedily repaired and again in service by the end of the month. The
mortar-boat bore her share creditably in the fight, levelling her
piece as nearly as it could be and keeping up a steady fire. It was
all she could do and her commander was promoted.

Shortly after this, a fleet of rams arrived under the command of
Colonel Charles Ellet, Jr. Colonel Ellet was by profession a civil
engineer, and had, some years before, strongly advocated the steam ram
as a weapon of war. His views had then attracted attention, but
nothing was done. With the outbreak of the war he had again urged them
upon the Government, and on March 27, 1862, was directed by the
Secretary of War to buy a number of river steamers on the Mississippi
and convert them into rams upon a plan of his own. In accordance with
this order he bought,[1] at Pittsburg, three stern-wheel boats, having
the average dimensions of 170 feet length, 31 feet beam, and over 5
feet hold; at Cincinnati, three side-wheel boats, of which the largest
was 180 feet long by 37 feet beam, and 8 feet hold; and at New Albany,
one side-wheel boat of about the same dimensions; in all seven boats,
chosen specially with a view to strength and speed. To further
strengthen them for their new work, three heavy, solid timber
bulkheads, from twelve to sixteen inches thick, were built, running
fore and aft from stem to stern, the central one being over the
keelson. These bulkheads were braced one against the other, the outer
ones against the hull of the boat, and all against the deck and floor
timbers, thus making the whole weight of the boat add its momentum to
that of the central bulkhead at the moment of collision. The hull was
further stayed from side to side by iron rods and screw-bolts. As it
would interfere with this plan of strengthening to drop the boilers
into the hold, they were left in place; but a bulwark of oak two feet
thick was built around them. The pilot-houses were protected against
musketry.

It is due to Colonel Ellet to say that these boats were not what he
wished, but merely a hasty adaptation, in the short period of six
weeks, of such means as were at once available to the end in view. He
thought that after striking they might probably go down, but not
without sinking the enemy too. When they were ready he was given the
command, and the rank of Colonel, with instructions which allowed him
to operate within the limits of Captain Davis's command, and in entire
independence of that officer; a serious military error which was
corrected when the Navy Department took control of the river work.

No further attack was made by the Confederate fleet, and operations
were confined to bombardment by the gunboats and constant reply on the
part of the forts until June 4th. That night many explosions were
heard and fires seen in the fort, and the next morning the fleet moved
down, found the works evacuated and took possession. Memphis and its
defences became no longer tenable after Beauregard's evacuation of
Corinth on the 30th of May.

On June 5th, the fleet with transports moved down the river, anchoring
at night two miles above the city. The next morning at dawn the River
Defence Fleet was sighted lying at the levee. They soon cast off, and
moved into the river, keeping, however, in front of the city in such a
way as to embarrass the fire of the Union flotilla.

The Confederate vessels, still under Montgomery's command, were in
number eight, mounting from two to four guns each: the Van Dorn, flag
steamer; General Price, General Lovell, General Beauregard, General
Thompson, General Bragg, General Sumpter, and the Little Rebel.

The Union gunboats were five, viz.: the Benton, Louisville,
Carondelet, St. Louis, recently taken charge of by Lieutenant
McGunnegle, and Cairo. In addition, there were present and
participating in the ensuing action, two of the ram fleet, the Queen
of the West and the Monarch, the former commanded by Colonel Ellet in
person; the latter by a younger brother, Lieutenant-Colonel A.W.
Ellet.

The Confederates formed in double line for their last battle, awaiting
the approach of the flotilla. The latter, embarrassed by the enemy
being in line with the city, kept under way, but with their heads up
stream, dropping slowly with the current. The battle was opened by a
shot from the Confederates, and then the flotilla, casting away its
scruples about the city, replied with vigor. The Union rams, which
were tied up to the bank some distance above, cast off at the first
gun and steamed boldly down through the intervals separating the
gunboats, the Queen of the West leading, the Monarch about half a mile
astern. As they passed, the flotilla, now about three-quarters of a
mile from the enemy, turned their heads down the river and followed,
keeping up a brisk cannonade; the flag-ship Benton leading. The
heights above the city were crowded by the citizens of Memphis,
awaiting with eager hope the result of the fight. The ram attack was
unexpected, and, by its suddenness and evident determination, produced
some wavering in the Confederate line, which had expected to do only
with the sluggish and unwieldy gunboats. Into the confusion the Queen
dashed, striking the Lovell fairly and sinking her in deep water,
where she went down out of sight. The Queen herself was immediately
rammed by the Beauregard and disabled; she was then run upon the
Arkansas shore opposite the city. Her commander received a pistol
shot, which in the end caused his death. The Monarch following, was
charged at the same time by the Beauregard and Price; these two
boats, however, missed their mark and crashed together, the Beauregard
cutting the Price down to the water-line, and tearing off her port
wheel. The Price then followed the Queen, and laid herself up on the
Arkansas shore. The Monarch successfully rammed her late assailant,
the Beauregard, as she was discharging her guns at the Benton, which
replied with a shot in the enemy's boiler, blowing her up and fatally
scalding many of her people. She went down near shore, being towed
there by the Monarch. The Little Rebel in the thickest of the fight
got a shot through her steam-chest; whereupon she also made for the
limbo on the Arkansas shore, where her officers and crew escaped.

The Confederates had lost four boats, three of them among the heaviest
in their fleet. The remaining four sought safety in flight from the
now unequal contest, and a running fight followed, which carried the
fleet ten miles down the river and resulted in the destruction of the
Thompson by the shells of the gunboats and the capture of the Bragg
and Sumter. The Van Dorn alone made good her escape, though pursued
some distance by the Monarch and Switzerland, another of the ram fleet
which joined after the fight was decided. This was the end of the
Confederate River Defence Fleet, the six below having perished when
New Orleans fell. The Bragg, Price, Sumpter, and Little Rebel were
taken into the Union fleet.

The city of Memphis surrendered the same day. The Benton and the
flag-officer, with the greater part of the fleet, remained there till
June 29th. On the 10th Davis received an urgent message from Halleck
to open communication by way of the White River and Jacksonport with
General Curtis, who was coming down through Missouri and Arkansas,
having for his objective point Helena, on the right bank of the
Mississippi. The White River traverses Arkansas from the Missouri
border, one hundred and twenty miles west of the Mississippi, and
pursuing a southeasterly and southerly course enters the Mississippi
two hundred miles below Memphis, one hundred below Helena. A force was
despatched, under Commander Kilty, comprising, besides his own ship,
the St. Louis, Lieutenant McGunnegle, with the Lexington and
Conestoga, wooden gunboats, Lieutenants Shirk and Blodgett. An Indiana
regiment under Colonel Fitch accompanied the squadron. On the 17th of
June, at St. Charles, eighty-eight miles up, the enemy were discovered
in two earthworks, mounting six guns. A brisk engagement followed, the
Mound City leading; but when six hundred yards from the works a
42-pound shell entered her casemate, killing three men in its flight
and then exploding her steam-drum. Of her entire crew of 175, but 3
officers and 22 men escaped uninjured; 82 died from wounds or
scalding, and 43 were either drowned or killed in the water, the
enemy, in this instance, having the inhumanity to fire on those who
were there struggling for their lives. Unappalled by this sickening
catastrophe, the remaining boats pressed on to the attack, the
Conestoga taking hold of the crippled vessel to tow her out of action.
A few minutes later, at a signal from Colonel Fitch, the gunboats
ceased firing, and the troops, advancing, successfully stormed the
battery. The commander of the post was Captain Joseph Fry, formerly a
lieutenant in the United States Navy, who afterward commanded the
filibustering steamer Virginius, and was executed in Cuba, with most
of his crew, when captured by the Spaniards in 1874. There being no
further works up the stream and but one gunboat of the enemy, the
Ponchartrain, this action gave the control of the river to the fleet.

After taking possession of St. Charles, the expedition went on up the
river as far as a point called Crooked Point Cutoff, sixty-three
miles above St. Charles, and one hundred and fifty-one miles from the
mouth of the river. Here it was compelled to turn back by the falling
of the water. The hindrance caused by the low state of the rivers led
Davis to recommend a force of light-draught boats, armed with
howitzers, and protected in their machinery and pilot-houses against
musketry, as essential to control the tributaries of the Mississippi
during the dry season. This was the germ of the light-draught
gunboats, familiarly called "tinclads" from the thinness of their
armor, which in the following season were a usual and active adjunct
to the operations of the heavier vessels.

On the 29th of June, Flag-Officer Davis, who had received that rank
but a week before, went down the river, taking with him the Benton,
Carondelet, Louisville, and St. Louis, with six mortar-boats. Two days
later, July 1st, in the early morning, Farragut's fleet was sighted,
at anchor in the river above Vicksburg. A few hours more and the naval
forces from the upper waters and from the mouth of the Mississippi had
joined hands.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Letter of Colonel Ellet to Lieutenant McGunnegle. United States
Navy.

    [Illustration: MISSISSIPPI VALLEY--VICKSBURG TO THE GULF.]




CHAPTER III.

FROM THE GULF TO VICKSBURG.


The task of opening the Mississippi from its mouth was entrusted to
Captain David G. Farragut, who was appointed to the command of the
Western Gulf Blockading Squadron on the 9th of January, 1862. On the
2d of February he sailed from Hampton Roads, in his flag-ship, the
Hartford, of twenty-four guns; arriving on the 20th of the same month
at Ship Island in Mississippi Sound, which was then, and, until
Pensacola was evacuated by the Confederates, continued to be the
principal naval station in the West Gulf. Here he met Flag-Officer
McKean, the necessary transfers were made, and on the 21st Farragut
formally assumed the command of the station which he was to illustrate
by many daring deeds, and in which he was to make his brilliant
reputation.

With the exception of the vessels already employed on the blockade,
the flag-ship was the first to arrive of the force destined to make
the move up the river. One by one they came in, and were rapidly
assembled at the Southwest Pass, those whose draught permitted
entering at once; but the scanty depth of water, at that time found on
the bar, made it necessary to lighten the heavier vessels. The
Pensacola, while at Ship Island, chartered a schooner, into which she
discharged her guns and stores; then taking her in tow went down to
the Pass. She arrived there on the 24th of March and made five
different attempts to enter when the water seemed favorable. In the
first four she grounded, though everything was out of her, and was got
off with difficulty, on one occasion parting a hawser which killed two
men and injured five others; but on the 7th of April, the powerful
steamers of the mortar flotilla succeeded in dragging her and the
Mississippi through a foot of mud fairly into the river. These two
were the heaviest vessels that had ever entered. The Navy Department
at Washington had hopes that the 40-gun frigate Colorado, Captain
Theodorus Bailey, then lying off the Pass, might be lightened
sufficiently to join in the attack. This was to the flag-officer and
her commander plainly impracticable, but the attempt had to be made in
order to demonstrate its impossibility. After the loss of a fortnight
working she remained outside, drafts being made from her crew to
supply vacancies in the other vessels; while her gallant captain
obtained the privilege of leading the fleet into action, as a
divisional officer, in the gunboat Cayuga, the commander of the latter
generously yielding the first place on board his own ship.

A fleet of twenty mortar-schooners, with an accompanying flotilla of
six gunboats, the whole under the command of Commander (afterward
Admiral) David D. Porter, accompanied the expedition. Being of light
draught of water, they entered without serious difficulty by Pass à
l'Outre, one of three branches into which the eastern of the three
great mouths of the Mississippi is subdivided. Going to the head of
the Passes on the 18th of March, they found there the Hartford and
Brooklyn, steam sloops, with four screw gunboats. The steam vessels of
the flotilla were at once ordered by the flag-officer to Southwest
Pass, and, after finishing the work of getting the heavy ships across,
they were employed towing up the schooners and protecting the advance
of the surveyors of the fleet.

The squadron thus assembled in the river consisted of four screw
sloops, one side-wheel steamer, three screw corvettes, and nine screw
gunboats, in all seventeen vessels, of all classes, carrying,
exclusive of brass howitzers, one hundred and fifty-four guns. Their
names and batteries were as follows:


-----------------------+------+-----+----------------------------------
      NAME.            | Tons.|Guns.|       Commanding Officer.
-----------------------+------+-----+----------------------------------
   _Screw Sloops._     |      |     |
                       |      |     |
Hartford               | 1990 |  24 | Flag-Officer David G. Farragut.
                       |      |     | Fleet-Captain Henry H. Bell.
                       |      |     | Commander Richard Wainwright.
Pensacola              | 2158 |  23 | Captain Henry W. Morris.
Brooklyn               | 2070 |  22 | Captain Thomas T. Craven.
Richmond               | 1929 |  24 | Commander James Alden.
                       |      |     |
   _Side-Wheel._       |      |     |
                       |      |     |
Mississippi            | 1692 |  17 | Commander Melancton Smith.
                       |      |     |
  _Screw Corvettes._   |      |     |
                       |      |     |
Oneida                 | 1032 |   9 | Commander S. Phillips Lee.
Varuna                 | 1300 |  10 | Commander Charles S. Boggs.
Iroquois               | 1016 |   7 | Commander John De Camp.
                       |      |     |
  _Screw Gunboats._    |      |     |
                       |      |     |
Cayuga                 |  507 |   2 | Lieutenant Napoleon B. Harrison.
Itasca                 |  507 |   2 | Lieutenant C.H.B. Caldwell.
Katahdin               |  507 |   2 | Lieutenant George H. Preble.
Kennebec               |  507 |   2 | Lieutenant John H. Russell.
Kineo                  |  507 |   2 | Lieutenant George M. Ransom.
Pinola                 |  507 |   2 | Lieutenant Pierce Crosby.
Sciota                 |  507 |   2 | Lieutenant Edward Donaldson.
Winona                 |  507 |   2 | Lieutenant Edward T. Nichols.
Wissahickon            |  507 |   2 | Lieutenant Albert N. Smith.
-----------------------+------+-----+----------------------------------

About ninety per cent. of the batteries of the eight larger vessels
were divided, as is usual, between the two sides of the ship, so that
only one half of the guns could be used at any one time, except in the
rare event of having an enemy on each side; and even then the number
of the crew is based on the expectation of fighting only one
broadside. A few guns, however, varying in number in different ships,
were mounted on pivots so that they could be fought on either side. In
estimating the number of available guns in a fleet of sea-going
steamers of that day, it may be roughly said that sixty per cent.
could be brought into action on one side. In the Mississippi Squadron
sometimes only one-fourth could be used. To professional readers it
may seem unnecessary to enter on such familiar and obvious details;
but a military man, in making his estimate, has fallen into the
curious blunder of making a fleet fire every gun, bow, stern, and both
broadsides, into one fort, a hundred yards square; a feat which only
could be performed by landing a ship in the centre of the works, in
which case it could enjoy an all-round fire. The nine gunboats carried
one heavy and one light gun, both pivots and capable of being fought
on either side. None of this fleet could fire right ahead. All the
vessels were built for ships of war, with the exception of the Varuna,
which was bought from the merchant service.[2]

The mortar-schooners each carried one XIII-inch mortar. Of the six
gunboats attached to this part of the expedition, one, the Owasco, was
of the same class as the Cayuga and others. The Clifton, Jackson, and
Westfield were large side-wheel ferry boats, of the ordinary
double-ended type; carrying, however, heavy guns. They were powerful
as tugboats and easily managed; whereas the Miami, also a
double-ender, but built for the Government, was like most of her kind,
hard to steer or manoeuvre, especially in a narrow stream and tideway.
The sixth was the Harriet Lane, a side-wheel steamer of 600 tons,
which had been transferred from the Revenue Service.

The tonnage and batteries of these steamers were:[3]

------------------------+-----+-----+----------------------------------
NAME.                   |Tons.|Guns.|   Commanding Officer.
------------------------+-----+-----+----------------------------------
  _Screw Gunboat._      |     |     |
                        |     |     |
Owasco                  | 507 | 2   |Lieutenant John Guest.
                        |     |     |
  _Paddle-Wheel         |     |     |
     Steamers._         |     |     |
                        |     |     |
Westfield }             | 891 | 6   |Commander William B. Renshaw.
Miami     }  Double-    | 730 | 5   |Lieutenant A. Davis Harrell.
Clifton   }  enders.    | 892 | 7   |Lieutenant Charles H. Baldwin.
Jackson   }             | 777 | 7   |Lieutenant Selim E. Woodworth.
Harriet Lane            | 619 | 3   |Lieutenant Jonathan M. Wainwright.
------------------------+-----+-----+----------------------------------

When the ships were inside, the flag-officer issued special
instructions for their preparation for the river service. They were
stripped to the topmasts, and landed all spars and rigging, except
those necessary for the topsails, jib, and spanker. Everything forward
was brought close in to the bowsprit, so as not to interfere with the
forward range of the battery. Where it could be done, guns were
especially mounted on the poop and forecastle, and howitzers placed in
the tops, with iron bulwarks to protect their crews from musketry. The
vessels were ordered to be trimmed by the head, so that if they took
the bottom at all it would be forward. In a rapid current, like that
of the Mississippi, a vessel which grounded aft would have her bow
swept round at once and fall broadside to the stream, if she did not
go ashore. To get her pointed right again would be troublesome; and
the same consideration led to the order that, in case of accident to
the engines involving loss of power to go ahead, no attempt should be
made to turn the ship's head down stream. If the wind served she
should be handled under sail; but if not, an anchor should be let go,
with cable enough to keep her head up stream while permitting her to
drop bodily down. Springs were prepared on each quarter; and, as the
ships were to fight in quiet water, at short range, and in the dark,
special care was taken so to secure the elevating screws that the guns
should not work themselves to too great elevation.

In accordance with these instructions the ships stripped at Pilot
Town, sending ashore spars, boats, rigging, and sails; everything that
was not at present needed. The chronometers of the fleet were sent on
board the Colorado. The larger ships snaked down the rigging, while
the gunboats came up their lower rigging, carrying it in and securing
it close to the mast. The flag-ship being now at the Head of the
Passes remained there, the flag-officer shifting his flag from one
small vessel to another as the requirements of the squadron called him
to different points. A detachment of lighter vessels, one of the
corvettes and a couple of gunboats, occupied an advance station at the
"Jump," a bayou entering the river on the west side, eight miles above
the Head of the Passes; the enemy's gunboats were thus unable to push
their reconnoissances down in sight of the main fleet while the latter
were occupied with their preparations. The logs of the squadron show
constant bustle and movement, accompanied by frequent accidents, owing
to the swift current of the river, which was this year exceptionally
high, even for the season. A hospital for the fleet was established in
good houses at Pilot Town, but the flag-officer had to complain of the
entire insufficiency of medical equipment, as well as a lack of most
essentials for carrying on the work. Ammunition of various kinds was
very deficient, and the squadron was at one time threatened with
failure of fuel, the coal vessels arriving barely in time.

The first and at that time the only serious obstacle to the upward
progress of the fleet was at the Plaquemine Bend, twenty miles from
the Head of the Passes, and ninety below New Orleans. At this point
the river, which has been running in a southeasterly direction, makes
a sharp bend, the last before reaching the sea, runs northeast for a
mile and three-quarters, and then resumes its southeast course. Two
permanent fortifications existed at this point, one on the left, or
north bank of the stream, called Fort St. Philip, the other on the
right bank, called Fort Jackson. Jackson is a little below St. Philip,
with reference to the direction of the river through the short reach
on which they are placed, but having regard to the general southeast
course, may be said to be lower down by 800 yards; the width of the
river actually separating the faces of the two works. At the time the
fleet arrived, the woods on the west bank had been cleared away below
Jackson almost to the extreme range of its guns, thus affording no
shelter from observation; the east bank was nearly treeless. Extending
across the river from below Jackson, and under the guns of both works,
was a line of obstructions which will be described further on.

The works of St. Philip consisted of the fort proper, a structure of
brick and earth mounting in barbette four VIII-inch columbiads and one
24-pounder; and two water batteries on either side of the main work,
the upper mounting sixteen 24-pounders, the lower, one VIII-inch
columbiad, one VII-inch rifle, six 42-pounders, nine 32s, and four
24s. There were here, then, forty-two guns commanding the river below
the bend, up which the ships must come, as well as the course of the
stream in their front. Besides these there were one VIII-inch and one
X-inch mortar in the fort; one XIII-inch mortar, whose position does
not appear; and a battery of four X-inch sea-coast mortars, situated
below and to the northeast of the lower water battery. These last
pieces for vertical shell-firing had no influence upon the ensuing
contest; the XIII-inch mortar became disabled at the thirteenth fire
by its own discharge, and the X-inch, though 142 shell were fired from
them, are not so much as mentioned in the reports of the fleet.

Fort Jackson, on the southern bank of the bend, was a pentagonal
casemated work, built of brick. In the casemates were fourteen
24-pounder smooth-bore guns, and ten flanking howitzers of the same
calibre. Above these, in barbette, were two X-inch and three VIII-inch
columbiads, one VII-inch rifle, six 42-pounders, fifteen 32s, and
eleven 24s; total in the fort, sixty-two. Just outside of and below
the main work, covering the approach to it, was a water battery
carrying one X-inch and two VIII-inch columbiads, and two rifled
32-pounders.[4] Of the guns in Jackson, the flanking howitzers and
half a dozen of the 24- and 32-pounders could, from their position,
have had little or no share in the battle with the fleet.

The number and calibre of the guns have been thus minutely stated
because it can scarcely fail to cause surprise that so many of them
were so small. Of 109 in the two works, 56 were 24-pounders. The truth
is that the Confederacy was very badly off for cannon, and the
authorities in Richmond had their minds firmly made up that the great
and dangerous attack was to come from above. General Lovell,
commanding the department, begged hard for heavy cannon, but to no
avail; not only were all available sent north, but constant drafts
were made upon the supplies he himself had. New Orleans, the central
point which he was called on to defend, was approachable, not only by
the Mississippi, but through a dozen bayous which, from Pearl River
on the east to the Atchafalaya Bayou on the west, gave access to firm
ground above Forts St. Philip and Jackson, and even above the city.
Works already existing to cover these approaches had to be armed, and
new works in some cases erected, constituting, in connection with St.
Philip and Jackson, an exterior line intended to block approach from
the sea. A second, or interior, line of works extended from the river,
about four miles below New Orleans, to the swamps on either hand, and
was carried on the east side round to Lake Ponchartrain in rear of the
city. These were for defence from a land attack by troops that might
have penetrated through any of the water approaches; and a similar
line was constructed above the city. The interior works below the
city, where they touched the river on the right bank, were known as
the McGehee, and on the left bank as the Chalmette line of batteries.
The latter was the scene of Jackson's defeat of the English in 1815.
All these works needed guns. All could not be supplied; but the
necessity of providing as many as possible taxed the general's
resources. In March, 1862, when it was determined to abandon
Pensacola, he asked for some of the X-inch columbiads that were there,
but all that could be spared from the north were sent to Mobile, where
the commanding officer refused to give them up. In addition to other
calls, Lovell had to spare some guns for the vessels purchased for the
navy on Lake Ponchartrain and for the River Defence Fleet.

General Duncan had general charge of all the works of the exterior
line, and was of course present at Plaquemine Bend during the attack.
Colonel Higgins was in command of both the forts, with headquarters at
Jackson, Captain Squires being in immediate command of St. Philip.

Auxiliary to the forts there were four vessels of the Confederate
Navy, two belonging to the State of Louisiana, and six of the River
Defence Fleet. The latter were commanded by a Captain Stephenson, who
entirely refused to obey the orders of Commander Mitchell, the senior
naval officer, while professing a willingness to co-operate. The
constitution of this force has already been described. There were also
above, or near, the forts five unarmed steamers and tugs, only one of
which, the tug Mosher, needs to be named.

The naval vessels were the Louisiana, sixteen guns; McRae, seven guns,
six light 32-pounders and one IX-inch shell-gun; Jackson, two
32-pounders; and the ram Manassas, now carrying one 32-pounder
carronade firing right ahead. Since her exploit at the Head of the
Passes in the previous October, the Manassas had been bought by the
Confederate Government, docked and repaired. She now had no prow, the
iron of the hull only being carried round the stem. Her engines and
speed were as poor as before. Lieutenant Warley was still in command.
The State vessels were the Governor Moore and General Quitman, the
former carrying two rifled 32s, and the latter two smooth-bores of the
same calibre; these were sea-going steamers, whose bows were shod with
iron like those of the River Defence Fleet and their engines protected
with cotton. The Moore was commanded by Beverley Kennon, a trained
naval officer, but not then in the Confederate Navy; the Quitman's
captain, Grant, was of the same class as the commanders of the River
Defence Fleet. The Manassas had some power as a ram, and the Moore, by
her admirable handling, showed how much an able man can do with poor
instruments, but the only one of the above that might really have
endangered the success of the Union fleet was the Louisiana. This was
an iron-clad vessel of type resembling the Benton, with armor strong
enough to resist two XI-inch shells of the fleet that struck her at
short range. Her armament was two VII-inch rifles, three IX-inch and
four VIII-inch shell-guns, and seven VI-inch rifles. With this heavy
battery she might have been very dangerous, but Farragut's movements
had been pushed on with such rapidity that the Confederates had not
been able to finish her. At the last moment she was shoved off from
the city on Sunday afternoon, four days before the fight, with workmen
still on board. When her great centre stern wheel revolved, the water
came in through the seams of the planking, flooding the battery deck,
but her engines were not powerful enough to manage her, and she had to
be towed down by two tugs to a berth just above Fort St. Philip, where
she remained without power of movement till after the fight.

When ready, the fleet began moving slowly up the river, under the
pilotage of members of the Coast Survey, who, already partly familiar
with the ground, were to push their triangulation up to the forts
themselves and establish the position of the mortars with mathematical
precision; a service they performed with courage and accuracy. The
work of the surveyors was carried on under the guns of the forts and
exposed to the fire of riflemen lurking in the bushes, who were not
wholly, though they were mostly, kept in check by the gunboats
patrolling the river. On the 16th the fleet anchored just below the
intended position of the mortar-boats on the west bank of the stream.
The day following was spent in perfecting the arrangements, and by the
morning of the 18th two divisions of mortar-boats were anchored in
line ahead, under cover of the wood on the right bank, each one
dressed up and down her masts with bushes, which blended
indistinguishably with the foliage of the trees. Light lines were run
as springs from the inshore bows and quarters; the exact bearing and
distance of Fort Jackson was furnished to each commander, and at 10
A.M. the bombardment began. The van of the fourteen schooners was at
this moment 2,950 yards, the rear 3,980 yards from Fort Jackson, to
which the mortar attack was confined; an occasional shell only being
sent into St. Philip.

The remaining six schooners, called the second division, from the
seniority of its commanding officer, were anchored on the opposite
side, 3,900 yards below Jackson. Here they were able to see how their
shell were falling, an advantage not possessed by those on the other
shore; but there were no trees to cover them. An attempt to disguise
them was made by covering their hulls with reeds and willows, but was
only partly successful; and as the enemy's fire, which began in reply
as soon as the mortars opened, had become very rapid and accurate, the
gunboats of the main squadron moved up to support those of the
flotilla and draw off part of it. Before noon two of the leading
schooners in this division were struck by heavy shot and were dropped
down 300 yards. The whole flotilla continued firing until 6 P.M., when
they ceased by signal. That night the second division was moved across
the river and took position with the others.

Until five o'clock the firing was sustained and rapid from both forts.
At that time the citadel and out-houses of Jackson were in flames, and
the magazine in great danger; so the enemy's fire ceased.

All the mortars opened again on the morning of the 19th and continued
until noon, after which the firing was maintained by divisions, two
resting while the third worked. Thus, about 168 shell were fired every
four hours, or nearly one a minute. At 10 A.M. of the 19th one
schooner was struck by a shot, which passed out through her bottom,
sinking her. This was the only vessel of the flotilla thus destroyed.

Although Jackson was invisible from the decks of the mortar-boats and
the direction given by sights fixed to the mastheads, the firing was
so accurate and annoying as to attract a constant angry return from
the fort. To draw off and divide this one of the corvettes and two or
three of the gunboats took daily guard duty at the head of the line,
from 9 A.M. one day to the same hour the next. The small vessels
advancing under cover of the trees on the west bank would emerge
suddenly, fire one or two shots drifting in the stream, and then
retire; the constant motion rendering the aim of the fort uncertain.
Nevertheless some ugly hits were received by different ships.

Every night the enemy sent down fire-rafts, but these, though
occasioning annoyance to the fleet, were productive of no serious
damage beyond collisions arising from them. They were generally
awkwardly started, and the special mistake was made of sending only
one at a time, instead of a number, to increase the confusion and
embarrassment of the ships. The crews in their boats towed them
ashore, or the light steamers ran alongside and put them out with
their hose.

Mortar-firing, however good, would not reduce the forts, nor lay New
Orleans at the mercy of the fleet. It was necessary to pass above.
Neither the flag-officer on the one hand, nor the leaders of the enemy
on the other had any serious doubt that the ships could go by if there
were no obstructions; but the obstructions were there. As originally
laid these had been most formidable. Cypress trees, forty feet long
and four to five feet in diameter, were laid longitudinally in the
river, about three feet apart to allow a water-way. Suspended from the
lower side of these logs by heavy iron staples were two 2½-inch iron
cables, stretching from one side of the river to the other. To give
the framework of trunks greater rigidity, large timbers, six by four
inches, were pinned down on the upper sides. The cables were secured
on the left bank to trees; on the right bank, where there were no
trees, to great anchors buried in the ground. Between the two ends the
raft was held up against the current by twenty-five or thirty
3,000-pound anchors, with sixty fathoms of chain on each. This raft,
placed early in the winter, showed signs of giving in February, when
the spring-floods came sweeping enormous masses of drift upon it, and
by the 10th of March the cables had snapped, leaving about a third of
the river open. Colonel Higgins was then directed to restore it. He
found it had broken from both sides, and attempted to replace it by
sections, but the current, then running four knots an hour, made it
impossible to hold so heavy a structure in a depth of one hundred and
thirty feet and in a bottom of shifting sand, which gave no sufficient
holding ground for the anchors. Seven or eight heavily built
schooners, of about two hundred tons, were then seized and placed in a
line across the river in the position of the raft. Each schooner lay
with two anchors down and sixty fathoms of cable on each; the masts
were unstepped and, with the rigging, allowed to drift astern to foul
the screws of vessels attempting to pass. Two or three 1-inch chains
were stretched across from schooner to schooner, and from them to
sections of the old raft remaining near either shore.

Such was the general character of the obstructions before the fleet.
The current, and collisions with their own vessels, had somewhat
disarranged the apparatus, but it was essentially in this condition
when the bombardment began. It was formidable, not on account of its
intrinsic strength, but because of the swift current down and the
slowness of the ships below, which, together, would prevent them from
striking it a blow of sufficient power to break through. If they
failed thus to force their way they would be held under the fire of
the forts, powerless to advance.

It is believed that, in a discussion about removing the obstructions,
Lieutenant Caldwell, commanding the Itasca, volunteered to attempt it
with another vessel, and suggested taking out the masts of the two.
The Itasca and the Pinola, Lieutenant-Commanding Crosby, were assigned
to the duty, and Fleet-Captain Bell given command of both; a rather
unnecessary step, considering the age and character of the commanders
of the vessels. To handle two vessels in such an enterprise,
necessarily undertaken on a dark night, is not easy, and it is a
hardship to a commander to be virtually superseded in his own ship at
such a time. This was also felt in assigning divisional commanders for
the night attack only, when they could not possibly manage more than
one ship and simply overshadowed the captain of the vessel.

On the afternoon of the 20th, the Itasca and Pinola each went
alongside one of the sloops, where their lower masts were taken out,
and, with the rigging, sent ashore. At 10 P.M. Captain Bell went
aboard both and addressed the officers and crews about the importance
of the duty before them. He remained on board the Pinola and the two
vessels then got underway, the Pinola leading. All the mortar-boats
now opened together, having at times nine shells in the air at once,
to keep down the fire of Jackson in case of discovery, although the
two gunboats showed for little, being very deep in the water.

As they drew near the obstructions two rockets were thrown up by the
enemy, whose fire opened briskly; but the masts being out, it was not
easy to distinguish the vessels from the hulks. The Pinola struck the
third from the eastern shore and her men jumped on board. The
intention was to explode two charges of powder with a slow match over
the chains, and a torpedo by electricity under the bows of the hulk,
a petard operator being on board. The charges were placed, and the
Pinola cast off. The operator claims that he asked Bell to drop astern
by a hawser, but that instead of so doing, he let go and backed the
engines. Be this as it may, the ship went rapidly astern, the operator
did not or could not reel off rapidly enough, and the wires broke.
This hulk therefore remained in place, for the timed fuzes did not
act.

The Itasca ran alongside the second hulk from the east shore and threw
a grapnel on board, which caught firmly in the rail; but through the
strength of the current the rail gave way and the Itasca, taking a
sheer to starboard, drifted astern with her head toward the bank. As
quickly as possible she turned round, steamed up again and boarded the
hulk nearest the east shore on its port, or off-shore side, and this
time held on, keeping the engine turning slowly and the helm aport to
ease the strain on the grapnel. Captain Caldwell, Acting-Masters Amos
Johnson and Edmund Jones, with parties of seamen, jumped on board with
powder-cans and fuzes; but, as they were looking for the chains, it
was found that they were secured at the bows, by lashing or otherwise,
to the hulk's anchor chain, the end of the latter being led in through
the hawse-pipe, around the windlass and bitted. When its windings had
been followed up and understood, Captain Caldwell was told that the
chain could be slipped. He then contemplated firing the hulk, but
while the materials for doing so were sought for, the chain was
slipped without orders. The vessels went adrift, and, as the Itasca's
helm was to port and the engines going ahead, they turned inshore and
grounded hard and fast a short distance below, within easy range of
both forts.

A boat was at once sent to the Pinola, which was steaming up to try
again, and she came to her consort's assistance. Two lines were
successfully run to the Itasca, but she had grounded so hard that both
parted, though the second was an 11-inch hawser. The Pinola now
drifted so far down, and was so long in returning, that the Itasca
thought herself deserted; and the executive officer, Lieutenant George
B. Bacon, was despatched to the Hartford for a more powerful vessel.
The hour for the moon to rise was also fast approaching and the fate
of the Itasca seemed very doubtful.

The Pinola, however, came back, having in her absence broken out a
13-inch hawser, the end of which was passed to the grounded vessel.
The third trial was happy and the Pinola dragged the Itasca off, at
the same time swinging her head up the river. Lieutenant Caldwell, who
was on the bridge, when he saw his ship afloat, instead of returning
at once, steadied her head up stream and went ahead fast with the
engines. The Itasca moved on, not indeed swiftly, but firmly toward
and above the line of hulks, hugging the eastern bank. When well above
Caldwell gave the order, "Starboard;" the little vessel whirled
quickly round and steered straight for the chains. Carrying the full
force of the current with her and going at the top of her own speed,
she passed between the third hulk, which the Pinola had grappled, and
the fourth. As her stem met the chain she slid bodily up, rising three
or four feet from the water, and dragging down the anchors of the
hulks on either side; then the chains snapped, the Itasca went
through, and the channel of the river was free.

The following morning the hulks were found to be greatly shifted from
their previous positions. The second from the east shore remained in
place, but the third had dragged down and was now astern of the
second, as though hanging to it. The hulk nearest the west shore was
also unmoved, but the other three had dragged down and were lying
more or less below, apparently in a quartering direction from the
first. A broad open space intervened between the two groups. The value
of Caldwell's work was well summed up by General M.L. Smith, the
Confederate Engineer of the Department: "The forts, in my judgment,
were impregnable so long as they were in free and open communication
with the city. This communication was not endangered while the
obstruction existed. The conclusion, then, is briefly this: While the
obstruction existed the city was safe; when it was swept away, as the
defences then existed, it was in the enemy's power."

The bombardment continued on the 21st, 22d, and 23d with undiminished
vigor, but without noteworthy incident in the fleet. The testimony of
the Confederate officers, alike in the forts and afloat, is unanimous
as to the singular accuracy of the mortar fire. A large proportion of
the shells fell within the walls of Jackson. The damage done to the
masonry was not irreparable, but the quarters and citadel, as already
stated, were burned down and the magazine endangered. The garrison
were compelled to live in the casemates, which were partially flooded
from the high state of the river and the cutting of the levee by
shells. Much of the bedding and clothing were lost by the fire, thus
adding to the privations and discomfort. On the 21st Jackson was in
need of extensive repairs almost everywhere, and the officers in
command hoped that the Louisiana, which had come down the night
before, would be able to keep down the mortar fire, at least in part.
When it was found she had no motive power they asked that she should
take position below the obstructions on the St. Philip side, where she
would be under the guns of the forts, but able to reach the schooners.
If she could not be a ship of war, at least let her be a floating
battery. Mitchell declined for several reasons. If a mortar-shell
fell vertically on the decks of the Louisiana it would go through her
bottom and sink her; the mechanics were still busy on board and could
not work to advantage under fire; the ports were too small to give
elevation to the guns, and so they could not reach the mortars. If
this last were correct no other reason was needed; but as the nearest
schooner was but 3,000 yards from Jackson, it seems likely he deceived
himself, as he certainly did in believing "on credible information"
that a rifled gun on the parapet of Jackson, of the same calibre as
that of the Louisiana, had not been able to reach. Three schooners had
been struck, one at the distance of 4,000 yards, during the first two
days of the bombardment, not only by rifled, but by VIII-and X-inch
spherical projectiles; and the second division had been compelled to
shift its position. Looking only to the Louisiana, the decision of the
naval officers was natural enough; but considering that time pressed,
that after five days' bombardment the fleet must soon attack, that it
was improbable, if New Orleans fell, that the Louisiana's engines
could be made efficient and she herself anything but a movable
battery, the refusal to make the desired effort looks like caring for
a part, at the sacrifice of the whole, of the defence. On the last day
Mitchell had repeated warnings that the attack would soon come off,
and was again asked to take a position to enfilade the schooners, so
that the cannoneers of Jackson might be able to stand to their guns.
Mitchell sent back word that he hoped to move in twenty-four hours,
and received from Higgins, himself an old seaman and naval officer,
the ominous rejoinder: "Tell Captain Mitchell that there will be no
tomorrow for New Orleans, unless he immediately takes up the position
assigned to him with the Louisiana."[5]

That same day, all arrangements of the fleet being completed, the
orders to be ready to attack the following night were issued. Every
preparation that had occurred to the minds of the officers as tending
to increase the chance of passing uninjured had been made. The chain
cables of the sheet anchors had been secured up and down the sides of
the vessels, abreast the engines, to resist the impact of projectiles.
This was general throughout the squadron, though the Mississippi, on
account of her side-wheels, had to place them inside instead of out;
and each commander further protected those vital parts from shots
coming in forward or aft, with hammocks, bags of coal, or sand, or
ashes, or whatever else came to hand. The outside paint was daubed
over with the yellow Mississippi mud, as being less easily seen at
night; while, on the other hand, the gun-carriages and decks were
whitewashed, throwing into plainer view the dark color of their
equipment lying around. On some ships splinter nettings were rigged
inside the bulwarks, and found of advantage in stopping the flight of
larger fragments struck out by shot. Three more of the gunboats,
following the example of the Pinola and Itasca, had their lower masts
removed and moored to the shore. Of the four that kept them in three
had their masts wounded in the fight, proving the advantage of this
precaution. Thus prepared, and stripped of every spare spar, rope, and
boat, in the lightest fighting trim, the ships stood ready for the
night's work.

The flag-officer had at first intended to advance to the attack in two
columns abreast, each engaging the fort on its own side and that only.
On second thought, considering that in the darkness and smoke vessels
in parallel columns would be more likely to foul the hulks on either
side, or else each other, and that the fleet might so be thrown into
confusion, he changed his plan and directed that the starboard column
should advance first, its rear vessel to be followed by the leader of
the port column; thus bringing the whole fleet into single line ahead.
To help this formation, after dark on the 23d, the eight vessels of
the starboard column moved over from the west bank and anchored in
line ahead on the other side, the Cayuga, bearing the divisional flag
of Captain Theodorus Bailey, in advance. Their orders remained to
engage St. Philip on the right hand, and not to use their port
batteries. The signal to weigh was to be two vertical red lights.

Meanwhile, during the days that had gone by since breaking the line of
hulks, some officers of the fleet had thought they could see the water
rippling over a chain between the two groups; and, although the
flag-officer himself could not make it out, the success of the attack
so depended upon having a clear thoroughfare, that he decided to have
a second examination. Lieutenant Caldwell asked to do this in person,
as his work was in question. Toward nightfall of the 23d, the Hartford
sent a fast twelve-oared boat to the Itasca. Caldwell and
Acting-Master Edmund Jones went in the boat, which was manned from the
Itasca's crew, and after holding on by the leading mortar-schooner
till dark, the party started ahead. Fearing that pickets and
sharpshooters on either shore might stop them, they had to pull up in
the middle of the river against the heavy current, without availing
themselves of the inshore eddy. Before they came up with the chain, a
fire was kindled on the eastern bank throwing a broad belt of light
athwart the stream. To pull across this in plain view seemed madness,
so the boat was headed to the opposite side and crawled up to within
a hundred yards of the hulks. Then holding on to the bushes, out of
the glare of the fire, and hearing the voices of the enemy in the
water battery, the party surveyed the situation. Though tangled chains
hung from the bows of the outer and lower hulk it seemed perfectly
plain that none reached across the river, but, after some hesitation
about running the risk merely to clear up a point as to which he had
himself no doubt, the necessity of satisfying others determined
Caldwell; and by his orders the cutter struck boldly out and into the
light. Crossing it unobserved, or else taken for a Confederate boat by
any who may have seen, the party reached the outer hulk on the west
side. Pausing for a moment under its shelter they then pulled up
stream, abreast the inshore hulk, and Jones dropped from the bow a
deep-sea lead with ten fathoms of line. The boat was then allowed to
drift with the current, and the line held in the hand gave no sign of
fouling anything. Then they pulled up a second time and again dropped
down close to the hulk on the east shore with like favorable result;
showing conclusively that, to a depth of sixty feet, nothing existed
to bar the passage of the fleet. The cutter then flew on her return
with a favoring current, signalling all clear at 11 P.M.

At 2 A.M. the flag-ship hoisted the appointed signal and the starboard
column weighed, the heavy vessels taking a long while to purchase
their anchors, owing to the force of the current. At 3.30 the Cayuga,
leading, passed through the booms, the enemy waiting for the ships to
come fairly into his power. In regular order followed the Pensacola,
Mississippi, Oneida, Varuna, Katahdin, Kineo, Wissahickon, the
Confederate fire beginning as the Pensacola passed through the breach.
The Varuna, Cayuga, and Katahdin steamed rapidly on, the one heavy
gun of the gunboats being ill-adapted to cope with those in the works;
but the heavy ships, keeping line inside the gunboats, moved slowly
by, fighting deliberately and stopping from time to time to deliver
their broadsides with greater effect.

    [Illustration: Battle of New Orleans.]

The Pensacola, following the Cayuga closely and keeping a little on
her starboard quarter, stopped when near Fort St. Philip, pouring in
her heavy broadside, before which the gunners of its barbette battery
could not stand but fled to cover; then as the big ship moved slowly
on, the enemy returned to their guns and again opened fire. The
Pensacola again stopped, and again drove the cannoneers from their
pieces, the crew of the ship and the gunners in the fort cursing each
other back and forth in the close encounter. As the ship drew away and
turned toward the mid-river, so that her guns no longer bore, the
enemy manned theirs again and riddled her with a quartering fire as
she moved off. At about this time the ram Manassas charged her, but,
by a skilful movement of the helm, Lieutenant Roe, who was conning the
Pensacola, avoided the thrust. The ram received the ship's starboard
broadside and then continued down, running the gauntlet of the Union
fleet, whose shot penetrated her sides as though they were pasteboard.

The Mississippi, following the Pensacola and disdaining to pass behind
her guns, was reduced to a very low rate of speed. As she came up with
and engaged Fort St. Philip, the Manassas charged at her, striking on
the port side a little forward of the mizzen-mast, at the same time
firing her one gun. The effect on the ship at the time was to list her
about one degree and cause a jar like that of taking the ground, but
the blow, glancing, only gave a wound seven feet long and four inches
deep, cutting off the heads of fifty copper bolts as clean as though
done in a machine. Soon after, moving slowly along the face of the
fort, the current of the river caught the Mississippi on her starboard
bow and carried her over to the Fort Jackson side.

The Oneida, having shifted her port guns to the starboard side,
followed the Mississippi. She shared in the delay caused by the
Pensacola's deliberate passage until the Mississippi's sheer gave her
the chance to move ahead. She then steamed quickly up, hugging the
east bank, where the eddy current favored her advance. As she passed
close under the muzzles of St. Philip's guns she fired rapidly
canister and shrapnel, the fire from the fort passing for the most
part harmlessly over the ship and the heads of her crew.

The two rear gunboats, the Kineo and Wissahickon, were both delayed in
passing; the Kineo by a collision with the Brooklyn, the two vessels
meeting between the hulks, and the Wissahickon by fouling the
obstructions. The difficulty of finding the breach was already felt,
and became more and more puzzling as the vessels were nearer the rear.
The Wissahickon was one of the last that succeeded in getting through.

The port column was under way in time to follow close in the wake of
its predecessor; indeed, it seems certain that, in impatience to be
off, or from some other reason, the leading ships of this division
doubled on the rear ships of the van. By the report of the captain of
the Hartford, which led, that ship was engaged only twenty minutes
after the enemy opened on the leading vessels of the starboard column.
She steered in near to Jackson, but a fire raft coming down on her
caused her to sheer across the river, where she took the ground close
under St. Philip; the raft lying on her port quarter, against which it
was pushed by the tug Mosher,[6] a small affair of thirty-five tons,
unarmed, with a crew of half a dozen men commanded by a man named
Sherman. On that eventful night, when so many hundreds of brave men,
each busy in his own sphere, were plying their work of death, surely
no one deed of more desperate courage was done than that of this
little band. The assault threatened the very life of the big ship, and
was made in the bright light of the fire under the muzzles of her
guns. These were turned on the puny foe, which received a shot in her
boilers and sunk. It is believed that the crew lost their lives, but
the Hartford had caught fire and was ablaze, the flames darting up the
rigging and bursting through the ports; but the discipline of her crew
prevailed over the fury of the element, while they were still
receiving and returning the blows of their human antagonists in both
forts; then working herself clear, the Hartford passed from under
their fire.

The Brooklyn and Richmond followed the Hartford, and behind them the
gunboat division Sciota, Iroquois, Pinola, Kennebec, Itasca, and
Winona, Fleet-Captain Bell having his divisional flag flying on board
the Sciota. By this the enemy had better range, and at the same time
the smoke of the battle was settling down upon the face of the river.
The good fortune which carried through all the vessels of the leading
column therefore failed the rear. The Brooklyn lost sight of her next
ahead and, as she was passing through the hulks, using both broadsides
as they would bear, came violently into collision with the Kineo, next
to the last ship of the starboard column--another indication that the
two columns were lapping. The gunboat heeled violently over and nearly
drove ashore; but the two vessels then went clear, the Brooklyn
fouling the booms of the eastern hulks, breaking through them but
losing her way. This caused her to fall off broadside to the stream,
in which position she received a heavy fire from St. Philip. Getting
clear and her head once more up river, the Manassas, which had been
lying unseen close to the east bank, came butting into the starboard
gangway. The blow was delivered with slight momentum against the chain
armor, and appeared at the time to have done little damage; but
subsequent examination showed that the Brooklyn's side was stove in
about six feet below the water-line, the prow having entered between
the frames and crushed both inner and outer planking. A little more
would have sunk her, and, as it was, a covering of heavy plank had to
be bolted over the wound for a length of twenty-five feet before she
was allowed to go outside. At the same time that the Manassas rammed
she fired her single gun, the shot lodging in the sand bags protecting
the steam-drum. Groping on by the flash of the guns and the light of
the burning rafts, the Brooklyn, just clearing a thirteen-foot shoal,
found herself close under St. Philip, from whose exposed barbette guns
the gunners fled at her withering fire, as they had from that of the
Pensacola.

The Richmond, a slow ship at all times, was detained by her boilers
foaming, and was much separated from her leaders. Still she engaged
Fort Jackson and passed through the fire with small loss. The little
Sciota followed with equal good fortune, having but two men wounded.

The Pinola, which had taken her place next to the Iroquois, was not so
fortunate. She engaged first Fort Jackson, from whose fire she
received little injury. Then she passed over to the other side within
one hundred and fifty yards of St. Philip, from which she at first
escaped with equal impunity; but coming then within the light of the
fire-rafts, and the greater part of the squadron having passed, the
enemy were able to play upon her with little to mar their aim. She was
struck fourteen times, and lost three killed and eight wounded, the
heaviest list of casualties among the gunboats.

The Iroquois, which was on picket duty, fell into her station behind
the Sciota as the fleet went by. After passing through the
obstructions, and when already some distance up the stream, as the
current round the bend was throwing her bow off and setting her over
on the east bank, the order "starboard" was given to the wheel. As too
often happens, this was understood as "stop her," and the engines were
stopped while the wheel was not moved. In consequence of this mistake
the Iroquois, then a very fast ship, shot over to the east (at this
point more precisely the north) bank, past the guns of St. Philip, and
brought up against the ironclad steamer Louisiana that was lying
against the levee a short distance above the fort. This powerful,
though immovable, vessel at once opened her ports and gave the
Iroquois every gun that would bear, and at the same time a number of
her people ran on deck as though to repel what seemed to be an attempt
to board. This gave the Iroquois an opportunity of returning the
murderous fire she had received, which she did with effect. Some of
the guns of the Louisiana had been double-shotted, the second shot
being in two cases found sticking in the hole made by the first. This
unfortunate collision made the loss of the Iroquois amount to 8 killed
and 24 wounded, in proportion to her complement the heaviest of the
whole fleet. It was as she slowly drew away that Commander Porter
noted her as "lingering," standing out in full relief against the
light of the burning rafts; then she went her way, the last to pass,
and the fight was won.

The three gunboats at the rear of the second column failed to get by.
The Itasca, on coming abreast of Fort Jackson, was pierced by several
shot, one of them entering the boiler. The steam issuing in a dense
cloud drove every one up from below, and the vessel deprived of her
motive power, drifted helplessly down the stream. The Winona following
her, fouled the obstructions, and before she could get clear the
Itasca backed on board of her. After a half hour's delay she proceeded
under a heavy fire, at first from Jackson. Thinking the burning raft,
in whose light the Pinola suffered, to be on that side of the river,
she tried to pass on the St. Philip side, receiving the fire of the
latter fort at less than point-blank range. Shooting over to the other
side again, so thick was the smoke that the ship got close to shore,
and her head had to be turned down stream to avoid running on it. By
this time day had broken, and the Winona, standing out against the
morning sky, under the fire of both forts, and with no other vessel to
distract their attention, was forced to retire. The Kennebec also
fouled the rafts and was unable to get by before the day dawned.

The steamers of the mortar flotilla, and the sailing sloop Portsmouth,
as soon as the flag-ship had lifted her anchor, moved up into the
station which had been assigned them to cover the passage of the
fleet, about five hundred yards from Jackson, in position to enfilade
the water battery commanding the approach to the fort. The vessels
kept their place, firing shrapnel and shell, until the last of the
fleet was seen to pass the forts. They then retired, the
mortar-schooners at the same time ceasing from the shelling, which had
been carried on throughout the engagement.

An hour and a quarter had elapsed from the time that the Cayuga passed
the obstructions. The fleet, arriving above the forts, fell in with
the Confederate flotilla, but in the absence of the Louisiana the
other Confederate steamers were no match for their antagonists. The
Cayuga indeed, dashing forward at a rate which left her but fifteen
minutes under the fire of the forts, found herself when above them in
hot quarters; and in a not unequal match rendered a good account of
three assailants. The Varuna, passing with yet greater rapidity,
steamed through with her guns trained as far ahead as they could be,
and delivered her fire as opportunity offered. She soon passed beyond
them, unsupported, and continued up the river, coming close upon a
steamer called the Doubloon, in which were General Lovell and some of
his staff, who narrowly escaped being captured. After the Varuna came
the Governor Moore, which had been down among the Union fleet,
receiving there the fire of the Oneida and Pinola. Finding the berth
too hot for him, and catching sight of the Varuna thus separated from
her fleet, Kennon hoisted the same lights as the latter vessel and
followed on up. The lights deceived the Varuna and also the
Confederate steamer Jackson, which had been up the river on duty and
was at quarantine as the two others drew near. Taking them for enemies
the Jackson opened a long-range fire on the two impartially, one of
her shots wounding the fore-mast of the Moore; she then steamed
hastily away to New Orleans, where she was destroyed by her commander.
The only other vessel in sight was the Stonewall Jackson[7] of the
River Defence Fleet, carrying one gun. She was behind the two, trying
to escape unseen to New Orleans. Kennon now opened fire, hoping that
the Jackson, undeceived, would turn back to help him, but she kept on
her upward course; the Varuna, however, was no longer in ignorance.
Finding that the height of the Moore's forecastle out of water and the
position of the bow gun would not let it be depressed enough to fire
with effect, Kennon resorted to the old-time heroic treatment for such
defects; loading the gun with percussion shell he fired it through the
bows of his own ship, and used the hole thus made for a port. The
next shot raked the Varuna's deck, killing three and wounding nine of
the crew. Boggs then put his helm hard aport, bringing his starboard
battery to bear and doubtless expecting that the enemy would follow
his motion to avoid being raked, but Kennon knew too well his own
broadside weakness, and keeping straight on ran into the Varuna before
her head could be gotten off again. The powerful battery of the Union
vessel, sweeping from stem to stem, killed or wounded a large part of
the enemy's crew; but her own fate was sealed, her frame being too
light for such an encounter. The Moore having rammed again then hauled
off, believing the Varuna to be in a sinking condition, and tried to
continue up stream, but with difficulty, having lost her wheel-ropes.
The Stonewall Jackson, now coming up, turned also upon the Varuna and
rammed her on the port side, receiving a broadside in return. The
Union vessel then shoved her bow into the east bank and sank to her
top-gallant forecastle.

The Varuna's advance had been so rapid that there seems to have been
some uncertainty in the minds of Captains Bailey and Lee of the Cayuga
and Oneida as to where she was. It being yet dark they were very
properly inclined to wait for the rest of the fleet to come up. In a
few moments, however, the Oneida moved slowly ahead as far as
quarantine, whence the Varuna and her enemies were made out. The
Oneida then went ahead at full speed. When she came up the Varuna was
already ashore, her two opponents trying to escape, but in vain. The
Stonewall Jackson ran ashore without offering resistance, on the right
bank nearly opposite the Varuna; the Moore on the left bank, some
distance above, where her captain set her on fire, but received the
broadsides of the Oneida and Pensacola with his colors still flying,
and so was taken.

The Cayuga followed the Oneida, but more slowly, and about five miles
above the fort came upon a Confederate camp upon the right bank of the
river. She opened with canister, and in a few moments the troops, a
part of the Chalmette regiment, surrendered.

After ramming the Brooklyn, the Manassas had quietly followed the
Union fleet, but when she came near them the Mississippi turned upon
her. It was impossible to oppose her three hundred and eighty-four
tons to the big enemy coming down upon her, so her commander dodged
the blow and ran her ashore, the crew escaping over the bows, while
the Mississippi poured in two of her broadsides, leaving her a wreck.
Soon after, she slipped off the bank and drifted down past the forts
in flames. At 8 A.M. she passed the mortar-fleet and an effort was
made to secure her, but before it could be done she faintly exploded
and sank.

The Iroquois, steaming up through the mêlee, saw a Confederate gunboat
lying close in to the east bank. Having slowed down as she drew near
the enemy, some one on board the latter shouted, "Don't fire, we
surrender." This was doubtless unauthorized, for as the ship passed
on, the Confederate, which proved to be the McRae, discharged a
broadside of grape-shot and langrage, part of the latter being copper
slugs, which were found on the Iroquois's decks in quantities after
the action. The fire was promptly returned with XI-inch canister and
32-pounder shot. The McRae's loss was very heavy, among the number
being her commander, Thomas B. Huger, who was mortally wounded. This
gentleman had been an officer of reputation in the United States Navy,
his last service having been as first-lieutenant of the very ship with
which he now came into collision. This was but a few months before,
under the same commission, the present being, in fact, her first
cruise; and the other officers and crew were, with few exceptions,
the same as those previously under his orders. There is no other very
particular mention of the McRae, but the Confederate army officers,
who were not much pleased with their navy in general, spoke of her
fighting gallantly among the Union ships.

As for the General Quitman and the River Defence Fleet, there seems to
have been but one opinion among the Confederate officers, both army
and navy, as to their bad behavior before and during the fight.[8]
They did not escape punishment, for their enemies were among them
before they could get away. The Oneida came upon one crossing from the
right to the left bank, and rammed her; but it is not possible to
recover the adventures and incidents that befell each. Certainly none
of them rammed a Union vessel; and it seems not unfair to say that
they gave way in disorder, like any other irregular force before a
determined onslaught, made a feeble effort to get off, and then ran
their boats ashore and fired them. They had but one chance, and that a
desperate one, to bear down with reckless speed on the oncoming ships
and ram them. Failing to do this, and beginning to falter, the ships
came among them like dogs among a flock of sheep, willing enough to
spare, had they understood the weakness of their foes, but thinking
themselves to be in conflict with formidable iron-clad rams, an
impression the Confederates had carefully fostered.

When the day broke, nine of the enemy's vessels were to be seen
destroyed. The Louisiana remained in her berth, while the McRae, and
the Defiance of the River Defence Squadron, had taken refuge under the
guns of the forts. The two first had lost their commanders by the fire
of the fleet. During the three days that followed, their presence was
a cause of anxiety to Commander Porter, who was ignorant of the
Louisiana's disabled condition.

The Union fleet anchored for the day at quarantine, five miles above
the forts. The following morning, leaving the Kineo and Wissahickon to
protect, if necessary, the landing of General Butler's troops, they
got under way again in the original order of two columns, not,
however, very strictly observed, and went on up the river.

As they advanced, burning ships and steamers were passed, evidences of
the panic which had seized the city, whose confidence had been
undisturbed up to the moment of the successful passage of the forts.
Four miles below New Orleans, the Chalmette and McGehee batteries were
encountered, mounting five and nine guns. The Cayuga, still leading
and steaming too rapidly ahead, underwent their fire for some time
unsupported by her consorts, the Hartford approaching at full speed
under a raking fire, to which she could only reply with two bow guns.
When her broadside came to bear, she slowed down, porting her helm;
then having fired, before she could reload, the Brooklyn, compelled to
pass or run into her, sheered inside, between her and the works. The
successive broadsides of these two heavy ships drove the enemy from
their guns. At about the same moment the Pensacola engaged the
batteries on the east bank, and the other vessels coming up in rapid
succession, the works were quickly silenced.

The attack of the fleet upon the forts and its successful passage has
been fitly called the battle of New Orleans, for the fate of the city
was there decided. Enclosed between the swamps and the Mississippi,
its only outlet by land was by a narrow neck, in parts not over
three-quarters of a mile wide, running close by the river, which was
at this time full to the tops of the levees, so that the guns of the
fleet commanded both the narrow exit and the streets of the city. Even
had there been the means of defence, there was not food for more than
a few days.

At noon of the 25th, the fleet anchored before the city, where
everything was in confusion. Up and down the levee coal, cotton,
steamboats, ships, were ablaze, and it was not without trouble that
the fleet avoided sharing the calamity. Among the shipping thus
destroyed was the Mississippi, an ironclad much more powerful than the
Louisiana. She was nearing completion, and had been launched six days,
when Farragut came before the city. His rapid movements and the
neglect of those in charge to provide tow-boats stopped her from being
taken to the Yazoo, where she might yet have been an ugly foe for the
fleet. This and the fate of the Louisiana are striking instances of
the value of promptness in war. Nor was this the only fruit snatched
by Farragut's quickness. There is very strong reason to believe that
the fall of New Orleans nipped the purpose of the French emperor, who
had held out hopes of recognizing the Confederacy and even of
declaring that he would not respect the blockade if the city held out.

Captain Bailey was sent ashore to demand the surrender, and that the
United States flag should be hoisted upon the public buildings. The
rage and mortification of the excitable Creoles was openly manifested
by insult and abuse, and the service was not unattended with danger.
The troops, however, being withdrawn by the military commander, the
mayor, with some natural grandiloquence, announced his submission to
the inevitable, and Captain Bailey hoisted the flag on the mint. The
next day it was hauled down by a party of four citizens; in
consequence of which act, the flag-officer, on the 29th, sent ashore a
battalion of 250 marines, accompanied by a howitzer battery in charge
of two midshipmen, the whole under command of the fleet-captain. By
them the flags were rehoisted and the buildings guarded, until General
Butler arrived on the evening of May 1st, when the city was turned
over to his care.

Meanwhile Commander Porter remained in command below the forts. The
morning after the passage of the fleet he sent a demand for their
surrender, which was refused. Learning that the Louisiana and some
other boats had escaped the general destruction, and not aware of
their real condition, he began to take measures for the safety of his
mortar-schooners. They were sent down the river to Pilot Town, with
the Portsmouth as convoy, and with orders to fit for sea. Six were
sent off at once to the rear of Fort Jackson, to blockade the bayous
that ramify through that low land; while the Miami and Sachem were
sent in the other direction, behind St. Philip, to assist the troops
to land.

On the 27th, Porter, having received official information of the fall
of the city, notified Colonel Higgins of the fact, and again demanded
the surrender, offering favorable conditions. Meanwhile
insubordination was rife in the garrison, which found itself hemmed in
on all sides. At midnight of the 27th, the troops rose, seized the
guard and posterns, reversed the field pieces commanding the gates,
and began to spike the guns. Many of them left the fort with their
arms; and the rest, except one company of planters, firmly refused to
fight any longer. The men were largely foreigners, and with little
interest in the Secession cause; but they also probably saw that
continued resistance and hardship could not result in ultimate
success. The water-way above and below being in the hands of the
hostile navy, all communication was cut off by the nature of the
country and the state of the river; there could therefore be but one
issue to a prolonged contest. The crime of the men was heinous, but it
only hastened the end. To avoid a humiliating disaster, General Duncan
accepted the offered terms on the 28th. The officers were permitted to
retain their side arms, and the troops composing the garrison to
depart, on parole not to serve till exchanged. At 2.30 P.M. the forts
were formally delivered to the navy, and the United States flag once
more hoisted over them.

The Confederate naval officers were not parties to the capitulation,
which was drawn up and signed on board Porter's flag-ship, the Harriet
Lane. While the representatives were seated in her cabin, flags of
truce flying from her masthead and from the forts, the Louisiana was
fired by her commander and came drifting down the river in flames. Her
guns discharged themselves as the heat reached their charges, and when
she came abreast Fort St. Philip she blew up, killing a Confederate
soldier and nearly killing Captain McIntosh, her former commander, who
was lying there mortally wounded. This act caused great indignation at
the time among the United States officers present. Commander Mitchell
afterward gave explanations which were accepted as satisfactory by Mr.
Welles, the Secretary of the Navy. He said that the Louisiana was
secured to the opposite shore from the fleet, three-quarters of a mile
above, and that an attempt had been made to drown the magazine. As
proof of good faith he had sent a lieutenant to notify Porter of the
probable failure of that attempt. It remains, however, a curious want
of foresight in a naval man not to anticipate that the hempen fasts,
which alone secured her, would be destroyed, and that the vessel thus
cast loose would drift down with the stream. Conceding fully the
mutual independence of army and navy, it is yet objectionable that
while one is treating under flag of truce, the other should be sending
down burning vessels, whether carelessly or maliciously, upon an
unsuspecting enemy.

When taken possession of, Fort Jackson was found to have suffered
greatly. The ground inside and out was plowed by the falling shell;
the levee had been cut in many places, letting water into the fort;
the casemates were shattered, guns dismounted and gun-carriages
destroyed; all the buildings within the walls had been burned. Yet it
was far from being reduced to an indefensible condition by six days'
bombardment, could it have continued to receive supplies and
reinforcements. The loss of the garrison had been 14 killed and 39
wounded.

The question of the efficacy of mortar-firing was raised in this as in
other instances. Granting its inability to compel the surrender, it
remains certain that Fort Jackson, though the stronger work, inflicted
much less damage upon the passing fleet than did St. Philip. The
direct testimony of Commander De Camp of the Iroquois, and an
examination of the injuries received by the ships, when clearly
specified, shows this. As both posts had been under one commander, it
may be inferred that the difference in execution was due partly to the
exhaustion of the garrison, and partly to the constant fire of the
mortar flotilla during the time of the passage; both effects of the
bombardment.

The exterior line of the defences of New Orleans being thus pierced in
its central and strongest point, the remaining works--Forts Pike and
Macomb guarding the approaches by way of Lake Pontchartrain,
Livingston at Barrataria Bay, Berwick at Berwick Bay, and others of
less importance--constituting that line were hastily abandoned. Such
guns as could be saved, with others from various quarters, were
hurried away to Vicksburg, which had already been selected as the next
point for defence, and its fortifications begun. The whole delta of
the Mississippi was thus opened to the advance of the Union forces.
This was followed a few days later by the evacuation of Pensacola, for
which the enemy had been preparing since the end of February, when the
disaster at Donelson had made it necessary to strip other points of
troops. The heavy guns had been removed, though not to New Orleans.
The defenceless condition of the place was partly known to the officer
commanding at Fort Pickens, but no one could spare him force enough to
test it. At the time of its final abandonment, Commander Porter, who
after the surrender of the forts had proceeded to Mobile with the
steamers of the mortar flotilla, was lying off that bar. Seeing a
brilliant light in the direction of Pensacola at 2 A.M. on the 10th of
May, he stood for the entrance, arriving at daylight. The army and
navy took possession the same day, and this fine harbor was now again
available as a naval station for the United States.

After New Orleans had been occupied by the army, Farragut sent seven
vessels, under the command of Captain Craven of the Brooklyn, up the
river. Baton Rouge and Natchez surrendered when summoned; but at
Vicksburg, on the 22d of May, Commander S.P. Lee was met with a
refusal. On the 9th of June the gunboats Wissahickon and Itasca, being
sent down to look after some earthworks which the Confederates were
reported to be throwing up at Grand Gulf, found there a battery of
rifle guns completed, and were pretty roughly handled in the encounter
which followed. On the 18th of June the Brooklyn and Richmond anchored
below Vicksburg, and shortly after the flag-officer came in person
with the Hartford, accompanied by Commander Porter with the steamers
and seventeen schooners of the mortar flotilla. The flag-officer did
not think it possible to reduce the place without a land force, but
the orders of the Department were peremptory that the Mississippi
should be cleared. From Vicksburg to Memphis the high land did not
touch the river on the east bank, and Memphis with all above it had
now fallen. Vicksburg at that time stood, the sole seriously defended
point.

The condition of the fleet was at this time a cause of serious concern
to the flag-officer. The hulls had been much injured by the enemy's
fire, and by frequent collisions in the lower river, due to the rapid
current and the alarms of fire-rafts. The engines, hastily built for
the gunboats, and worn in other ships by a cruise now nearing its
usual end, were in need of extensive repairs. The maintenance of the
coal-supply for a large squadron, five hundred miles up a crooked
river in a hostile country, was in itself no small anxiety; involving
as it did carriage of the coal against the current, the provision of
convoys to protect the supply vessels against guerillas, and the
employment of pilots; few of whom were to be found, as they naturally
favored the enemy, and had gone away. The river was drawing near the
time of lowest water, and the flag-ship herself got aground under very
critical circumstances, having had to take out her coal and shot, and
had even begun on her guns, two of which were out when she floated
off. The term of enlistment of many of the crews had ended and they
were clamoring for their discharge, and the unhealthy climate had
already caused much illness. It was evident from the very first that
Vicksburg could only be taken and held by a land force, but the
Government in Washington were urgent and Farragut determined to run
by the batteries. This was the first attempt; but there were
afterward so many similar dashes over the same spot, by fleets or
single vessels, that the scene demands a brief description.

    [Illustration: Battle at Vicksburg.]

Vicksburg is four hundred miles above New Orleans, four hundred below
Memphis. The river, after pursuing its irregular course for the latter
distance through the alluvial bottom lands, turns to the northeast
five miles before reaching the Vicksburg bluffs. When it encounters
them it sweeps abruptly round, continuing its course southwest,
parallel to the first reach; leaving between the two a narrow tongue
of low land, from three-quarters to one mile wide. The bluffs at their
greatest elevation, just below the point where the river first touches
them, are two hundred and sixty feet high; not perpendicular, but
sloping down close to the water, their nearness to which continues,
with diminishing elevation, for two miles, where the town of Vicksburg
is reached. They then gradually recede, their height at the same time
decreasing by degrees to one hundred and fifty feet.

The position was by nature the strongest on the river. The height of
the banks, with the narrowness and peculiar winding of the stream,
placed the batteries on the hill-sides above the reach of guns on
shipboard. At the time of Farragut's first attack, though not nearly
so strongly and regularly fortified as afterward, there were in
position twenty six[9] guns, viz.: two X-inch, one IX-inch, four
VIII-inch, five 42- and two 24-pounder smooth-bores, and seven 32-,
two 24-, one 18-, and two 12-pounder rifled guns. Of these, one
IX-inch, three VIII-inch, and the 18-pounder rifle were planted at the
highest point of the bluffs above the town, in the bend, where they
had a raking fire upon the ships before and after they passed their
front. Just above these the four 24-pounders were placed.[10] Half a
mile below the town was a water battery,[11] about fifty feet above
the river, mounting two rifled 32s, and four 42s. The eleven other
guns were placed along the crest of the hills below the town,
scattered over a distance of a mile or more, so that it was hard for
the ships to make out their exact position. The distance from end to
end of the siege batteries was about three miles, and as the current
was running at the rate of three knots, while the speed of the fleet
was not over eight, three-quarters of an hour at least was needed for
each ship to pass by the front of the works. The upper batteries
followed them for at least twenty minutes longer. Besides the siege
guns, field batteries in the town, and moving from place to place,
took part in the action; and a heavy fire was kept up on the vessels
from the rifle-pits near the turn.

On the 26th and 27th of June the schooners were placed in position,
nine on the east and eight on the west bank. Bomb practice began on
the 26th and was continued through the 27th. On the evening of the
latter day Commander Porter notified the admiral that he was ready to
cover the passage of the fleet.

At 2 A.M. of the 28th the signal was made, and at three the fleet was
under way. The vessels advanced in two columns, the Richmond,
Hartford, and Brooklyn in the order named, forming the starboard
column, with intervals between them long enough to allow two gunboats
to fire through. The port column was composed of the Iroquois, the
leading ship, and the Oneida, ahead of the Richmond on her port bow,
the Wissahickon and Sciota between the Richmond and the Hartford, the
Winona and Pinola between the flag-ship and the Brooklyn, and in the
rear, on the port quarter of the Brooklyn, the Kennebec and the
Katahdin. At four o'clock the mortars opened fire, and at the same
moment the enemy, the vessels of the fleet replying as their guns
bore. As the Hartford passed, the steamers of the mortar flotilla,
Octorara, Miami, Jackson, Westfield, Clifton, Harriet Lane, and
Owasco, moved up on her starboard quarter, engaging under way the
water battery, at a distance of twelve hundred to fifteen hundred
yards, and maintaining this position till the fleet had passed. The
leading vessels, as far as and including the Pinola, continued on,
silencing the batteries when fairly exposed to their broadsides, but
suffering more or less severely before and after. The prescribed order
was not accurately observed, the lack of good pilots leading the ships
to hug the bank on the town side, where the shore was known to be
bold, and throwing them into line ahead; the distances also lengthened
out somewhat, which lessened the mutual support.

The flag-ship moved slowly, and even stopped for a time to wait for
the vessels in the rear; seeing which, Captain Palmer, of the
Iroquois, who had reached the turn, also stopped his ship, and let her
drift down close to the Hartford to draw a part of the enemy's fire,
and to reinforce that of the flag-officer. The upper batteries, like
all the others, were silent while the ships lay in front of them; but
as soon as the Hartford and Iroquois moved up they returned to their
guns, and followed the rear of the fleet with a spiteful fire till out
of range.

The cannonade of the enemy could at no time have been said to be
discontinued along the line. The Brooklyn, with the two gunboats
following, stopped when above the mortar-steamers, and engaged the
batteries within range at a great disadvantage; those ahead having a
more or less raking fire upon them. The three remained there for two
hours and then retired, the remainder of the fleet having passed on
beyond and anchored above, at 6 A.M.

Having thus obeyed his orders, the flag-officer reported that the
forts had been passed and could be passed again as often as necessary,
a pledge frequently redeemed afterward; but he added, "it will not be
easy to do more than silence the batteries for a time." The feat had
been performed with the steady gallantry that characterized all the
similar attempts on the river. Notwithstanding the swift adverse
current, the full power of the vessels was not exerted. The loss was
15 killed and 30 wounded, eight of the former being among the crew of
the Clifton, which received a shot in her boiler, scalding all but one
of the forward powder division. The Confederates reported that none of
their guns had been injured, and they mention no casualties.

The action of the three commanders that failed to pass was severely
censured by the flag-officer; nor is it surprising that he should have
felt annoyed at finding his fleet separated, with the enemy's
batteries between them. It seems clear, however, that the smoke was
for a time so thick as to prevent the Brooklyn from seeing that the
flag-ship had kept on, while the language of the flag-officer's
written order governing the engagement was explicit. It read thus:
"When the vessels reach the bend of the river, should the enemy
continue the action, the ships and Iroquois and Oneida will stop their
engines and drop down the river again, keeping up the fire until
directed otherwise." In view of these facts, Captain Craven was
certainly justified in maintaining his position until he saw that the
flag-ship had passed; then it may be doubtful whether the
flag-officer's action had not countermanded his orders. The question
will be differently answered by different persons; probably the
greater number of officers would reply that the next two hours, spent
in a stationary position under the batteries, would have been better
employed in running by and rejoining the fleet. The error of judgment,
if it was one, was bitterly paid for in the mortification caused to a
skilful and gallant officer by the censure of the most distinguished
seaman of the war.

Above Vicksburg the flag-officer communicated with one of the rams
under Lieutenant-Colonel Ellet, who undertook to forward his
communications to Davis and Halleck. The ships were then anchored.

On the 1st of July Davis's fleet arrived. On the 9th an order was
received from Washington for Commander Porter to proceed to Hampton
Roads with twelve mortar-schooners. The next morning he sailed in the
Octorara with the schooners in company. On the way down he not only
had experience of the increasing difficulty of navigation from the
falling of the water, but also his active mind ascertained the extent
of the traffic by way of the Red River, and its worth to the
Confederacy; as also the subsidiary value of the Atchafalaya Bayou,
which, extending through the delta of the Mississippi from the Red
River to the Gulf, was then an open highway for the introduction of
foreign supplies, as well as the transport of native products. The
object and scope of the next year's campaign are plainly indicated in
a letter of his addressed to Farragut during his trip down the river.
It was unfortunate that an attempt was not made to hold at once the
bluffs below the point where those two highways meet, and blockade
them both, instead of wasting time at Vicksburg when there was not
then strength enough to hold on.

FOOTNOTES:

[2] For particulars of batteries, see Appendix.

[3] For detailed account of these batteries, see Appendix.

[4] These threw projectiles weighing from sixty to eighty pounds.

[5] Mitchell's conduct was approved by a Naval Court of Inquiry.
Higgins, who was most emphatic in his condemnation, could not appear as
a witness, the War Department not being willing to spare him from his
duties. The difference was one of judgment and, perhaps, of
temperament. From Higgins's character it is likely that, had he
commanded the naval forces, the Louisiana would either have done more
work or come to a different end. As the old proverb says, "He would
have made a spoon or spoiled the horn."

[6] As this feat has been usually ascribed to the Manassas, it may be
well to say that the statement in the text rests on the testimony of
the commander of the ram, as well as other evidence.

[7] There were two Jacksons, the naval steamer Jackson and the River
Defence boat Stonewall Jackson.

[8] Colonel Lovell of the Confederate army, who was ordnance and
disbursing officer of the River Defence Fleet, and had been twelve
years an officer in the United States Navy, testified there was no
organization, no discipline, and little or no drill of the crews. He
offered to employ a naval officer to drill them, but it does not appear
that the offer was accepted. He also testified that he had examined the
Ellet ram, Queen of the West, and considered most of the River Defence
boats better fitted for their work. The night before the fight, one of
them, with Grant, captain of the Quitman, went on board the Manassas,
and there told Warley that they were under nobody's orders but those of
the Secretary of War, and they were there to show naval officers how to
fight. There is plenty of evidence to the same effect. It was
impossible to do anything with them.

[9] Quarterly Return of the ordnance officer of the post, June 30,
1862.

[10] The writer is inclined to think these were not ready on June 28th,
but were the _new_ battery mentioned in Union and Confederate reports
of July 15th.

[11] This, known to the fleet as the hospital battery, was commanded by
Captain Todd, a brother-in-law of President Lincoln.




CHAPTER IV.

THE RECOIL FROM VICKSBURG.


The position now occupied by the combined fleets of Farragut and Davis
was from three to four miles below the mouth of the Yazoo River, near
the neck of the long tongue of land opposite Vicksburg. The armed
vessels were anchored on the east side, the transports tied up to the
opposite bank. It was known that up the Yazoo was an ironclad ram,
similar to one that had been building at Memphis when the capture of
that city led to its destruction. The one now in the Yazoo, called the
Arkansas, had been taken away barely in time to escape the same fate,
and, being yet unfinished, had been towed to her present position. She
was about 180 feet long by 30 feet beam, of from 800 to 1,000 tons
burden, with a casemate resembling that of other river ironclads,
excepting that the ends only were inclined, the sides being in
continuation of the sides of the vessel. The deck carrying the guns
was about six feet above water. The armor was of railroad iron
dovetailed together, the rails running up and down on the inclined
ends and horizontally along the sides. The iron thus arranged formed
nearly a solid mass, about three inches thick, heavily backed with
timber; and in the casemate between the ports there was a further
backing of compressed cotton bales firmly braced. The cotton was
covered within by a light sheathing of wood, as a guard against fire.
Her battery of ten guns was disposed as follows: in the bow, two
heavy VIII-inch columbiads; in the stern, two 6.4-inch rifles; and in
broadside two 6.4-inch rifles, two 32-pounder smooth-bores and two
IX-inch Dahlgren shell-guns. The hull proper was light and poorly
built. She had twin screws, but the engines were too light, and were
moreover badly constructed, and therefore continually breaking down.
Owing to this defect, she sometimes went on shore, and the commanding
officer could not feel sure of her obeying his will at any moment.
Besides her battery she had a formidable ram under water. She was at
this time commanded by Commander Isaac N. Brown, formerly of the
United States Navy, and had a complement of trained officers.

Notwithstanding the reports of her power, but little apprehension had
been felt in the Union fleet, but still a reconnoissance was ordered
for the 15th of July. The vessels sent were the Carondelet, Commander
Walke, the Tyler, Lieutenant-Commanding Gwin, and the Queen of the West
of the ram fleet; they carried with them a number of sharpshooters
from the army.

The Yazoo having been entered early in the morning, the Arkansas was
met unexpectedly about six miles from the mouth. At this time the ram
and the Tyler were over a mile ahead of the Carondelet, the Tyler
leading. The latter, having no prow and being unarmored, was wholly
unfit to contend with the approaching enemy; she therefore retreated
down stream toward the Carondelet.

The latter also turned and began a running fight down stream. The move
was not judicious, for she thus exposed her weakest part, the
unarmored stern, to the fire of the enemy, and directed her own
weakest battery, two 32-pounders, against him. Besides, when two
vessels are approaching on parallel courses, the one that wishes to
avoid the ram may perhaps do so by a movement of the helm, as the
Pensacola avoided the Manassas at the forts; but when the slower ship,
as the Carondelet was, has presented her stern to the enemy, she has
thrown up the game, barring some fortunate accident. The aggregate
weight of metal discharged by each ironclad from all its guns was
nearly the same,[12] but the Arkansas had a decided advantage in
penetrative power by her four 6.4-inch rifles. Her sides, and probably
her bow, were decidedly stronger than those of her opponent; but
whatever the relative advantages or disadvantages under other
circumstances, the Carondelet had now to fight her fight with two
32-pounders opposed to two VIII-inch shell-guns, throwing shell of 53
pounds and solid shot of 64, and with her unarmored stern opposed to
the armored bow of the ram. The Tyler took and kept her place on the
port bow of the Carondelet; as for the Queen of the West, she had fled
out of sight. "We had an exceedingly good thing," wrote one of the
Arkansas' officers, and for a long time, Walke's report says one hour,
they kept it. During that time, however, a shot entered the
pilot-house, injuring Commander Brown, mortally wounding one pilot and
disabling another. The loss of the latter, who was pilot for the
Yazoo, was seriously felt as the Arkansas came up and the order was
given to ram; for the Carondelet was hugging the left bank, and as
the enemy was drawing thirteen feet, the water was dangerously shoal.
She accordingly abandoned the attempt and sheered off, passing so
close that, from the decks of the Tyler, the two seemed to touch. Both
fired their broadsides in passing.

After this moment the accounts are not to be reconciled. Captain
Walke, of the Carondelet, says that he continued the action broadside
to broadside for some minutes, till the Arkansas drew ahead, and then
followed her with his bow guns until, his wheel-ropes being cut, he
ran into the bank, while the ram continued down the river with her
colors shot away. The colors of the Carondelet, he says, waved
undisturbed throughout the fight. On the other hand, Captain Brown, of
the Arkansas, states explicitly that there were no colors flying on
board the Carondelet, that all opposition to his fire had ceased, and
was not resumed as the ram pursued the other vessels; the Arkansas'
flag-staff was shot away. The loss of the Carondelet was 4 killed and
6 wounded; that of the Arkansas cannot well be separated from her
casualties during the same day, but seems to have been confined to the
pilot and one other man killed.

The ram now followed the Tyler, which had kept up her fire and
remained within range, losing many of her people killed and wounded.
The enemy was seen to be pumping a heavy stream of water both in the
Yazoo and the Mississippi, and her smoke-stack had been so pierced by
shot as to reduce her speed to a little over a knot an hour, at which
rate, aided by a favoring current, she passed through the two fleets.
Having no faith in her coming down, the vessels were found wholly
unprepared to attack; only one, the ram General Bragg, had steam, and
her commander unfortunately waited for orders to act in such an
emergency. "Every man has one chance," Farragut is reported to have
said; "he has had his and lost it." The chance was unique, for a
successful thrust would have spared two admirals the necessity of
admitting a disaster caused by over-security. The retreating Tyler was
sighted first, and gave definite information of what the firing that
had been heard meant, and the Arkansas soon followed. She fought her
way boldly through, passing between the vessels of war and the
transports, firing and receiving the fire of each as she went by, most
of the projectiles bounding harmlessly from her sides; but two XI-inch
shells came through, killing many and setting on fire the cotton
backing. On the other hand, the Lancaster, of the ram fleet, which
made a move toward her, got a shot in the mud-receiver which disabled
her, scalding many of her people; two of them fatally. The whole
affair with the fleets lasted but a few minutes, and the Arkansas,
having passed out of range, found refuge under the Vicksburg
batteries.

The two flag-officers were much mortified at the success of this
daring act, due as it was to the unprepared state of the fleets; and
Farragut instantly determined to follow her down and attempt to
destroy her as he ran by. The execution of the plan was appointed for
late in the afternoon, at which time Davis moved down his squadron and
engaged the upper batteries as a diversion. Owing to difficulties in
taking position, however, it was dark by the time the fleet reached
the town, and the ram, anticipating the move, had shifted her berth as
soon as the waning light enabled her to do so without being seen. She
could not therefore be made out; which was the more unfortunate
because, although only pierced twice in the morning, her plating on
the exposed side had been much loosened by the battering she received.
One XI-inch shot only found her as the fleet went by, and that killed
and wounded several of her people. All Farragut's fleet, accompanied
by the ram Sumter,[13] detached for this service by Flag-Officer
Davis, passed down in safety; the total loss in the action with the
Arkansas and in the second passage of the batteries being but 5 killed
and 16 wounded. None of this fleet ever returned above Vicksburg
again.

The Upper Mississippi flotilla in the same encounter had 13 killed, 34
wounded, and 10 missing. The greater part of this loss fell on the
Carondelet and the Tyler in the running fight; the former having 4
killed and 10 wounded, besides two who, when a shot of the enemy
caused steam to escape, jumped overboard and were drowned. The Tyler
lost 8 killed and 16 wounded. The commanding officer of the Arkansas
reported his loss as 10 killed and 15 badly wounded.

The ram now lay at the bend of the river between two forts. On the 22d
of July, Flag-Officer Davis sent down to attack her the ironclad
Essex, Commander W.D. Porter, with the ram Queen of the West,
Lieutenant-Colonel Ellet. They started shortly after dawn, the Benton,
Cincinnati, and Louisville covering them by an attack upon the upper
batteries. As the Essex neared the Arkansas the bow fasts of the
latter were slacked and the starboard screw turned, so that her head
swung off, presenting her sharp stem and beak to the broad square bow
of the assailant. The latter could not afford to take such an offer,
and, being very clumsy, could not recover herself after being foiled
in her first aim. She accordingly ran by, grazing the enemy's side,
and was carried ashore astern of him, in which critical position she
remained for ten minutes under a heavy fire; then, backing and
swinging clear, she ran down the river under fire of all the
batteries, but was not struck. When Porter saw that he would be unable
to ram, he fired into the Arkansas' bows, at fifty yards distance,
three solid IX-inch shot, one of which penetrated and raked her decks,
killing 7 and wounding 6 of her small crew, which then numbered only
41; the rest having been taken away as she was not fit for immediate
service. The Queen of the West rammed, doing some injury, but not of a
vital kind. She then turned her head up stream and rejoined the upper
fleet, receiving much damage from the batteries as she went back.

Two days later, Farragut's fleet and the troops on the point opposite
Vicksburg, under the command of General Williams, went down the river;
Farragut going to New Orleans and Williams to Baton Rouge. This move
was made necessary by the falling of the river and the increasing
sickliness of the climate. Porter, on his passage down a fortnight
before, had expressed the opinion, from his experience, that if the
heavy ships did not come down soon they would have to remain till next
season. But the health of the men, who had now been three months up
the river, was the most powerful cause for the change. On the 25th of
July forty per cent. of the crews of the upper flotilla were on the
sick list. The troops, who being ashore were more exposed, had but 800
fit for duty out of a total of 3,200. Two weeks before the Brooklyn
had 68 down out of 300. These were almost all sick with climatic
diseases, and the cases were increasing in number and intensity. The
Confederates now having possession of the point opposite Vicksburg,
Davis moved his fleet to the mouth of the Yazoo, and finally to
Helena. The growing boldness of the enemy along the banks of the
Mississippi made the river very unsafe, and supply and transport
vessels, unless convoyed by an armed steamer, were often attacked. One
had been sunk, and the enemy was reported to be establishing batteries
along the shores. These could be easily silenced, but to keep them
under required a number of gunboats, so that the communications were
seriously threatened. The fleet was also very short-handed, needing
five hundred men to fill the existing vacancies. Under these
circumstances Flag-Officer Davis decided to withdraw to Helena,
between which point and Vicksburg there was no high land on which the
enemy could permanently establish himself and give trouble. By these
various movements the ironclad Essex and the ram Sumter, now
permanently separated from the up-river fleet, remained charged with
the care of the river below Vicksburg; their nearest support being the
Katahdin and Kineo at Baton Rouge.

On the 5th of August the Confederates under the command of
Breckenridge made an attack upon General Williams's forces at Baton
Rouge. The Arkansas, with two small gunboats, had left Vicksburg on
the 3d to co-operate with the movement. The Union naval force present
consisted of the Essex, Sumter, Cayuga, Kineo, and Katahdin. The
attack was in superior force, but was gallantly met, the Union forces
gradually contracting their lines, while the gunboats Katahdin and
Kineo opened fire as soon as General Williams signalled to them that
they could do so without injuring their own troops. No Confederate
gunboats came, and the attack was repelled; Williams, however, falling
at the head of his men.

The Arkansas had been prevented from arriving in time by the failure
of her machinery, which kept breaking down. After her last stop, when
the order to go ahead was given, one engine obeyed while the other
refused. This threw her head into the bank and her stern swung down
stream. While in this position the Essex came in sight below.
Powerless to move, resistance was useless; and her commander,
Lieutenant Stevens, set her on fire as soon as the Essex opened, the
crew escaping unhurt to the shore. Shortly afterward she blew up.
Though destroyed by her own officers the act was due to the presence
of the vessel that had gallantly attacked her under the guns of
Vicksburg, and lain in wait for her ever since. Thus perished the most
formidable Confederate ironclad that had yet been equipped on the
Mississippi.

By the withdrawal of the upper and lower squadrons, with the troops
under General Williams, the Mississippi River, from Vicksburg to Port
Hudson, was left in the undisputed control of the Confederates. The
latter were not idle during the ensuing months, but by strengthening
their works at the two ends of the line, endeavored to assure their
control of this section of the river, thus separating the Union forces
at either end, maintaining their communication with the Western
States, and enjoying the resources of the rich country drained by the
Red River, which empties into the Mississippi in this portion of its
course. On the 16th of August, ten days after the gallant repulse of
the Confederate attack, the garrison was withdrawn from Baton Rouge to
New Orleans, thus abandoning the last of the bluffs above the city;
the Confederates, however, did not attempt to occupy in force lower
than Port Hudson. Above Vicksburg, Helena on the west side was in
Union hands, and the lower division of the Mississippi flotilla
patrolled the river; but Memphis continued to be the lowest point held
on the east bank. The intercourse between the Confederates on the two
sides, from Memphis to Vicksburg, though much impaired, could not be
looked upon as broken up. Bands of guerillas infested the banks,
firing upon unarmed vessels, compelling them to stop and then
plundering them. There was cause for suspecting that in some cases the
attack was only a pretext for stopping, and that the vessels had been
despatched by parties in sympathy with the Confederates, intending
that the freight should fall into their hands. Severe retaliatory
measures upon guerilla warfare were instituted by the naval vessels.

Flag-Officer Davis and General Curtis also arranged that combined
naval and military expeditions should scour the banks of the
Mississippi from Helena to Vicksburg, until a healthier season
permitted the resumption of more active hostilities. One such left
Helena on the 14th of August, composed of the Benton, Mound City, and
General Bragg, with the Ellett rams Monarch, Samson, and Lioness, and
a land force under Colonel Woods. Lieutenant-Commanding Phelps
commanded the naval force. The expedition landed at several points,
capturing a steamer with a quantity of ammunition and dispersing
parties of the enemy, and proceeded as far as the Yazoo River.
Entering this, they took a newly erected battery twenty miles from the
mouth, bursting the guns and destroying the work. Going on thirty
miles farther, the rams were sent twenty miles up the Big Sunflower,
one of the principal tributaries of the Yazoo. The expedition returned
after an absence of eleven days, having destroyed property to the
amount of nearly half a million.

The lull during the autumn months was marked by similar activity on
the Tennessee and Cumberland, for which a squadron of light vessels
was specially prepared. During the same period the transfer of the
flotilla from the army to the navy was made, taking effect on the 1st
of October, 1862. From this time the flotilla was officially styled
the Mississippi Squadron.

During the rest of the summer and the autumn months Admiral Farragut's
attention was mainly devoted to the seaboard of his extensive command.
The sickly season, the low stage of the river, and the condition of
his squadron, with the impossibility of obtaining decisive results
without the co-operation of the army, constrained him to this course.
Leaving a small force before New Orleans, he himself went to
Pensacola, while the other vessels of the squadron were dispersed on
blockading duty. Pursuing the general policy of the Government, point
after point was seized, and the blockade maintained by ships lying in
the harbors themselves. On the 15th of October, Farragut reported that
Galveston, Corpus Christi, and Sabine Pass, with the adjacent waters,
were in possession of the fleet, without bloodshed and almost without
firing a shot. Later on, December 4th, he wrote in a private letter
that he now held the whole coast except Mobile; but, as so often
happens in life, the congratulation had scarcely passed his lips when
a reverse followed.

On the 1st of January, 1863, a combined attack was made upon the land
and naval forces in Galveston Bay by the Confederate army and some
cottonclad steamers filled with sharpshooters, resulting in the
capture of the garrison, the destruction of the Westfield by her own
officers, and the surrender of the Harriet Lane after her captain and
executive officer had been killed at their posts. The other vessels
then abandoned the blockade. This affair, which caused great
indignation in the admiral, was followed by the capture of the sailing
vessels Morning Light and Velocity off Sabine Pass, also by cottonclad
steamers which came out on a calm day. Both Sabine Pass and Galveston
thenceforth remained in the enemy's hands. An expedition sent to
attempt the recovery of the latter failed in its object and lost the
Hatteras, an iron side-wheel steamer bought from the merchant service
and carrying a light battery. She was sent at night to speak a strange
sail, which proved to be the Confederate steamer Alabama, and was sunk
in a few moments. The disproportion of force was too great to carry
any discredit with this misfortune, but it, combined with the others
and with yet greater disasters in other theatres of the War, gave a
gloomy coloring to the opening of the year 1863, whose course in the
Gulf and on the Mississippi was to see the great triumphs of the Union
arms.

The military department of the Gulf had passed from General Butler to
General Banks on the 17th of December, shortly before these events
took place. It was by Banks that the troops were sent to Galveston,
and under his orders Baton Rouge also was reoccupied at once. These
movements were followed toward the middle of January by an expedition
up the Bayou Teche, in which the gunboats Calhoun, Estrella, and
Kinsman took part. The enterprise was successful in destroying the
Confederate steamer Cotton, which was preparing for service; but
Lieutenant-Commander Buchanan, senior officer of the gunboats, was
killed.

FOOTNOTES:

[12] The Carondelet, by returns made to the Navy Department in the
following month, August, had four VIII-inch guns, six 32-pounders, and
three rifles--one 30, one 50, and one 70-pound. Assuming her rifles to
have been in the bows, the weight and distribution of battery would
have been--

                Carondelet.   Arkansas.
  Bow               150          106
  Broadside         170          165
  Stern              64          120
                    ---          ---
                    384          391

The Arkansas' battery, as given, depends upon independent and agreeing
statements of two of her division officers. A third differs very
slightly.

[13] Commanded by Lieutenant Henry Erben.




CHAPTER V.

THE MISSISSIPPI OPENED.


Flag-Officer Davis had been relieved in command of the Mississippi
flotilla on the 15th of October, by Commander David D. Porter, holding
the local rank of acting rear-admiral. The new commander was detained
in Cairo for two months, organizing and equipping his squadron, which
had been largely increased. A division of vessels was still stationed
at Helena, patrolling the lower river, under the command of Captain
Henry Walke.

During the fall of 1862 and the following winter, two new types of
vessels were added to the squadron. The first, familiarly called
tinclads, but officially light-draughts, were river stern-wheel
steamers purchased for the service after the suggestion of
Flag-Officer Davis, and covered all round to a height of eleven feet
with iron from half to three-quarters of an inch thick, which made
them proof against musketry. The protection around the boilers was
increased to resist the light projectiles of field artillery. They
quartered their crew comfortably, and could on a pinch, for an
expedition, carry 200 men. The usual battery for these vessels was six
or eight 24-pound brass howitzers, four on each side, with sometimes
two light rifled guns in the bows. This armament was of little use
against works of any strength, but with canister or shrapnel could
keep off the riflemen, and meet on equal terms the field artillery
brought against them on the banks of the narrow streams, often
thickly timbered or covered with underbrush, into which they were
called to penetrate and engage in that kind of warfare significantly
called bushwhacking. For this service their light draught, not
exceeding three feet when deep, and diminishing to eighteen or twenty
inches when light, peculiarly fitted them; but they were also useful
in connection with the operations of the larger vessels, and some of
them generally went along as a kind of light force fitted for raids
and skirmishing.

The other vessels, which were not completed till later, were of an
entirely different kind, being intended to supply a class of fighting
ships of superior power, armor, and speed to those which had fought
their way down to Vicksburg from Cairo. The fighting power of the
Confederates had increased, and the successes of the Union arms, by
diminishing the extent of their line to be defended, had enabled them
to concentrate their men and guns. The defences of Vicksburg, both on
the Mississippi and Yazoo, had become greatly stronger. The new
armored vessels that were ready for some part of the coming operations
were the Lafayette, Tuscumbia, Indianola, Choctaw, and Chillicothe. Of
these the Tuscumbia, of 565 tons, the Indianola, of 442, and the
Chillicothe, of 303, were specially built for the Government at
Cincinnati. They were side-wheel, flat-bottomed boats, without keels;
the wheels being carried well aft, three-fourths of the entire length
from the bow, and acting independently of each other to facilitate
turning in close quarters. The Indianola and Tuscumbia had also two
screw propellers. On the forward deck there was a rectangular
casemate, twenty-two feet long in each vessel, but of differing
widths, as the vessels were of different size. Thus that of the
Tuscumbia was sixty-two feet wide, that of the Chillicothe only
forty-two. The sides of the casemate sloped at an angle of thirty
degrees from the perpendicular, and they, as well as the hull before
the wheels, were plated with two-or three-inch iron, according to the
locality; the heaviest plating being on the forward end of the
casemate. In the Tuscumbia this forward plating was six inches thick.
The casemates were pierced with ports for all their guns at the
forward end only; on each beam one port, and two aft. The ports were
closed with two three-inch iron shutters which slid back on tracks on
either side. In these casemates the Tuscumbia carried three XI-inch
guns, the Indianola and Chillicothe each two XI-inch. In the two
larger vessels there was also, between the wheels, a stern casemate
seventeen feet long, built of thick oak, not armored on the forward
end, but having two-inch plating aft and one-inch on each side. In
this stern casemate, pointing aft and capable of being trained four
points (45°) on each quarter, the Tuscumbia carried two 100-pound
rifles, and the Indianola two IX-inch guns. The hulls inside and abaft
the wheels, and the decks, except inside the main casemate, were
plated, but more lightly than the forward parts. In the Tuscumbia and
Indianola, iron bulwarks, half an inch thick and pierced with
loop-holes for musketry, extended all round the boats, except against
the wheelhouses; they were so arranged as to let down on deck when
desired. When ready for service, with guns and stores on board, these
boats drew from five to seven feet of water; but they were so weakly
built as to be dangerous and comparatively inefficient vessels,
quickly "disabled," as is apt to be the case with such preparations
for war as are postponed to the time of its outbreak. The contingency
of civil war on our inland waters was not indeed to be anticipated nor
prepared for; but what was the history of the ocean navy, on whose
hasty creation such harmful boasts and confidence were and are based?
They served their turn, for that enemy had no seamen, no navy, and
few mechanics; but they were then swept from the list, rotten and
broken down before their time. At this day nearly every ship that can
carry the United States flag was built before the war or long after
it.

The Lafayette and Choctaw, of one thousand tons each, were purchased
by the Government and converted into ironclad gunboats with rams.
Built deliberately, they were strong and serviceable vessels, but not
able to carry as much armor as had originally been intended. They were
side-wheel steamers, the wheels acting independently, but had no
screws. The Choctaw had a forward turret with inclined sides and
curved top, armored with two inches of iron on twenty-four inches of
oak, except on the after end and crown, where the iron was only one
inch. Just forward of the wheels was a thwartship casemate containing
two 24-pound howitzers pointing forward and intended to sweep the
decks if boarders should get possession. Over this casemate was the
pilot-house, conical, with two inches of iron on twenty-four of oak.
From turret to wheelhouses the sides were inclined like casemates and
covered with one-inch iron, as was the upper deck. Abaft the wheels
there was another thwartship casemate, sides and ends also sloping, in
which were two 30-pound Parrott rifles training from aft to four
points on the quarter. It had been at first proposed to carry in the
forward casemate two guns on a turn-table; but as this did not work,
four stationary guns were placed, three IX-inch and one 100-pound
rifle, two of which pointed ahead and one on each beam. The Lafayette
had a sloping casemate carried across the deck forward, and as far aft
as the wheels, covered in the lower part with one inch of iron over
one inch of indiarubber; the upper part of the bulwarks had
three-quarter-inch plating, and the deck half-inch. She carried two
XI-inch bow guns, four IX-inch in broadside but well forward, two
24-pound brass howitzers, and two 100-pound stern guns. The draught
of these two boats was about nine feet.

Besides these vessels may be mentioned the Black Hawk, a fine steamer,
unarmored, but with a battery of mixed guns, which had been remodelled
inside and fitted as a schoolship with accommodations for five hundred
officers and men. She carried also syphon-pumps capable of raising any
vessel that might sink. The old ram Sampson had been fitted as a
floating smithery. The two accompanied the fleet, the former taking
her place often in battle and serving as a swift flag-ship on
occasions.

Active operations again began toward the end of November, when the
rivers were rising from the autumnal rains. The great object of the
combined Union forces was the reduction of Vicksburg, upon which the
authorities at Washington preferred to move by way of the river, as it
gave, under the convoy of the navy, an easy line of communication not
liable to serious interruptions. The Confederate line of which
Vicksburg was the centre then faced the river, the right resting on
Haines's Bluff, a strongly fortified position twelve miles away, near
to and commanding the Yazoo; while the left was on the Mississippi at
Grand Gulf, sixty miles below Vicksburg by the stream, though not over
thirty by land. The place, in the end, was reduced much in the same
way as Island No. 10; the troops landing above it on the opposite
bank, and marching down to a point below the works. The naval vessels
then ran by the batteries and protected the crossing of the army to
the east bank. A short, sharp campaign in the rear of the city shut
the Confederates up in their works, and the Union troops were able to
again secure their communications with the river above the town. There
were, however, grave risks in this proceeding from the time that the
army abandoned its water-base, adding to its line of communication
thirty miles of bad roads on the river bank, and then throwing itself
into the enemy's country, leaving the river behind it. It was
therefore preferred first to make every effort to turn the position
from the north, through the Yazoo country.

    [Illustration: MISSISSIPPI VALLEY--HELENA TO VICKSBURG.]

The Yazoo Valley is a district of oval form, two hundred miles long by
sixty wide, extending from a short distance below Memphis to
Vicksburg, where the hills which form its eastern boundary again reach
the Mississippi. The land is alluvial and, when not protected by
levees, subject to overflow in ordinary rises of the river, with the
exception of a long narrow strip fifteen miles from and parallel to
the eastern border. It is intersected by numerous bayous and receives
many streams from the hills, all of which, from the conformation of
the ground, find their way first to the Yazoo River, and by it to the
Mississippi. The Yazoo is first called, in the northern portion of the
basin, the Cold Water, then the Tallahatchie, and, after receiving the
Yallabusha from the east, the Yazoo. In the latter part of its course
it is a large stream with an average width of three hundred yards, and
navigable always, for vessels drawing three feet of water, as far as
Greenwood, a distance of two hundred and forty miles. It flows in a
southerly direction along the eastern side of the basin, between the
hills and the narrow strip of dry land before mentioned, receiving the
streams from the former, which it does not touch except at Yazoo City,
eighty miles from its mouth. After passing Yazoo City the river makes
several successive bends to the west, and then begins to receive the
various bayous which have been pursuing their own southerly course on
the other side of the strip of dry land, the principal one of which is
the Big Sunflower. At the present day the Yazoo enters the Mississippi
eight miles above Vicksburg, but formerly did so by another bed, now
a blind lead known as the Old River, which diverges from the existing
channel about six miles above its mouth.

Neither rivers nor bayous are the simple streams thus described.
Separating at times into two or more branches which meet again lower
down, having perhaps undergone further subdivisions in the meanwhile,
connected one with the other by lateral bayous, they form a system of
watercourses, acquaintance with which confers the same advantage as
local knowledge of a wild and desolate country. Opposite Helena, in
the natural state of the ground is a large bayou called Yazoo Pass,
leading from the Mississippi to the Cold Water, by which access was
formerly had to Yazoo City; but before the war it had been closed by
the continuation of the levees across its mouth.

When not under cultivation, the land and the banks of the streams are
covered with a thick growth of timber. Where the troops or gunboats
penetrated, it was found that there was abundance of live stock,
stores of cotton, and rich harvests of grain. The streams carried on
their waters many steamers, the number of which had been increased by
those that fled from New Orleans when the city fell; and at Yazoo City
the Confederates had established a navy yard, where at least three
powerful war vessels were being built for the river service.

The first step by the navy was undertaken early in December, when the
autumn rains had caused the rivers to rise. Admiral Porter issued
orders, dated November 21st, to Captain Walke to enter the Yazoo with
all his gunboats, except the Benton and General Bragg left at Helena,
and to destroy any batteries that he could. The object was to get
possession of as much of the river as possible and keep it clear for
General McClernand, who was to land and make the first attempt on
Vicksburg by that way.

In accordance with his orders, Walke, on arriving off the mouth of the
river, sent two light-draught gunboats, the Signal and Marmora, which
made a reconnoissance twenty miles up, where they fell in with a
number of torpedoes, one of which exploded near them. Having received
their report, Captain Walke determined, as the river was rising, to
send them up again with two of the heavy boats, the Cairo and
Pittsburg, to cover them while they lifted the torpedoes. The ram
Queen of the West also went with them.

These vessels left the main body at 8 A.M., December 12th. When the
torpedoes were reached they began removing them, the two
light-draughts in advance, the ram next, the two heavy boats bringing
up the rear. While thus engaged the Marmora began firing musketry, and
Lieutenant-Commander Selfridge, in the Cairo, pushed ahead to support
her. It was found that she was firing at an object floating in the
water, which turned out to be a torpedo that had already been
exploded. The Marmora was then ordered to proceed slowly again, the
Cairo following; but before the latter had gone her length two sharp
explosions occurred in quick succession, one under the bow and one
under the stern, the former so severe as to lift the guns from the
deck. The ship was at once shoved into the bank, and hawsers run out
to keep her from slipping off into deep water; but all was useless.
She filled and sank in twelve minutes, going down in a depth of six
fathoms, the tops of her chimneys alone remaining visible. The work of
destroying the torpedoes was continued after the accident, in which no
lives were lost. Thus, at the very beginning of operations, the
flotilla was deprived of one of its best vessels, the first to go of
the original seven.

The torpedoes by which the Cairo was sunk were merely demijohns filled
with powder and ignited by a common friction primer rigidly secured
inside. To the primer was fastened a wire passing through a
water-tight cork of gutta percha and plaster of Paris. The first very
primitive idea was to explode them by pulling from the shore, and it
is possible that the first to go off near the light-draughts was thus
fired. The matter was then taken in hand by a Confederate naval
officer, who arranged them in pairs, anchored twenty feet apart, the
wire leading from the primer of one to that of the other. Torpedoes
had hardly yet come to be looked on as a respectable mode of warfare,
especially by seamen, and the officer who laid these, and was looking
on when the Cairo went down, describes himself as feeling much as a
schoolboy might whose practical joke had taken a more serious shape
than he expected.

The work of removing the torpedoes was continued by the boats under
Lieutenant-Commander John G. Walker, of the Baron de Kalb, formerly
the St. Louis. Two landing-places were at the same time secured. After
the arrival of the admiral the work went on still more vigorously from
the 23d to the 26th of December. A bend in the river was then reached,
which brought the vessels under fire of the forts on Drumgoold's
Bluff. Every step of the ground so far gained had been won under a
constant fire of musketry, which the armored portion of the
light-draught gunboats resisted, but their upper works were badly cut
up. The batteries of the enemy being now only twelve hundred yards
off, the flag-ship Benton took position to cover the lighter vessels,
having to tie up to the bank because the wind blowing up stream
checked the current and threw her across it. She remained in this
position for two hours, receiving the enemy's fire and being struck
thirty times, but without serious injury. Unfortunately her captain,
Lieutenant-Commander William Gwin, a valuable officer, who had
distinguished himself at Shiloh and in the fight with the Arkansas,
was mortally wounded; having, in his anxiety to see how effective was
the fire of the vessels, left the armored pilot-house, saying, with a
noble rashness, that the captain's place was on his quarterdeck.

The army, 32,000 strong, under General W.T. Sherman, had arrived on
the 26th, and landed on the low ground above the old mouth of the
Yazoo, the gunboats occupying the sweep of river around them for a
length of eight miles. Heavy rains had set in, making the ground
almost impassable and causing the water to rise. After various
preliminary operations the troops assaulted the works on the hills in
front on the 29th, but the attack failed entirely. Sherman considered
the works too strong to justify its renewal at the same point, but
determined to hold his ground and make a night assault with 10,000 men
higher up the river, upon the right of the Confederate works at
Haines's Bluff, where the navy could get near enough to try and
silence the batteries. Colonel Charles Rivers Ellet,[14] of the ram
fleet, volunteered to go ahead with the ram Lioness and attempt to
blow up a raft which was laid across the stream. Everything was ready
on the night of the 31st, but a dense fog setting in prevented the
movement.

The continued rains now rendered the position of the army dangerous,
and it was re-embarked on the 2d of January. The enemy apparently did
not discover the movement till it was nearly finished, when they sent
down three regiments with field pieces to attack the transports, a
movement quickly checked by the fire of the gunboats.

When Sherman's army was embarked, the transports moved out into the
Mississippi and anchored five miles above Vicksburg, where General
McClernand joined and assumed the chief command. Soon after his
arrival he determined upon a movement against Fort Hindman, on the
Arkansas River, fifty miles from its mouth. This point, better known
as Arkansas Post, commanded the approach to Little Rock, the capital
of Arkansas, but was specially obnoxious to the Union forces at this
time, as being the base from which frequent small expeditions were
sent out to embarrass their communications by the line of the
Mississippi, from which it was but fifteen miles distant in a straight
line. A few days before, the capture of the Blue Wing, a transport
loaded with valuable stores, had emphasized the necessity of
destroying a work that occupied such a menacing position upon the
flank and rear of the projected movement against Vicksburg.

The admiral detailed the three ironclads, De Kalb, Louisville, and
Cincinnati, and all the light-draught gunboats to accompany the
expedition; the gunboats, on account of their low speed, being taken
in tow by the transports. Passing by the mouth of the Arkansas, to
keep the enemy as long as possible uncertain as to the real object of
the movement, the fleet entered the White River and from the latter
passed through the cut-off which unites it with the Arkansas.

On the 9th of January the army landed about four miles below the fort.
This was a square bastioned work of three hundred feet on the side,
standing on ground elevated above the reach of floods on the left
bank, at the head of a horse-shoe bend. It had three casemates, one in
the curtain facing the approach up the bend, and one in the face of
the northeast and southeast bastions looking in the same direction. In
each bastion casemate was a IX-inch, and in that of the curtain an
VIII-inch shell-gun. These were the special antagonists of the navy,
but besides them there were four rifled and four smooth-bore light
pieces on the platform of the fort, and six similar pieces in a line
of rifle-pits exterior to and above it. Some trenches had been dug a
mile and a half below the fort, but they were untenable in presence of
the gunboats, which enfiladed and shelled them out.

While the army was moving round to the rear of the fort the admiral
sent up the ironclads to try the range, and afterward the light-draught
Rattler to clear out the rifle-pits, which was done at 5.30 P.M.
Hearing from General McClernand that the troops were ready, the
Louisville, Lieutenant-Commander Owen; De Kalb, Lieutenant-Commander
Walker, and Cincinnati, Lieutenant Bache, advanced to within four
hundred yards of the work and opened fire; the Louisville in the
centre, the De Kalb on the right and the Cincinnati on the left, each
having one of the enemy's casemate guns assigned to it. The vessels
fought bows on, three guns each; the odds being thus three guns afloat
to one in casemate on shore, leaving the advantage by the old
calculation, four to one, rather with the fort, without counting the
light pieces in the latter. When the ironclads were hotly engaged the
admiral brought up the light-draught vessels, with the Black Hawk and
Lexington, to throw in shrapnel and light rifled shell. Later, when the
battery was pretty well silenced, the Rattler, Lieutenant-Commander
Watson Smith, was ordered to pass the fort and enfilade it, which he
did in handsome style, suffering a good deal from the enemy's fire;
when above, however, he became entangled in snags and was obliged to
return. No assault was made this day by the army.

The following day, at 1.30 P.M., the army again being reported ready,
the attack was renewed in the same order by the navy, the artillery on
shore in rear of the fort opening at the same time. The guns opposed
to the fleet were silenced by 4 P.M., when the Rattler and Glide,
with the ram Monarch, Colonel Ellet, pushed by the fort and went up
the river, destroying a ferry ten miles above, so that not over thirty
or forty of the enemy escaped by it. At 4.30 P.M., when the army had
worked its way close to the intrenchments and orders had been issued
for a general assault, but before it could be made, white flags were
displayed on the face of the works. The commanding officer of the
fort, Colonel Dunnington, formerly an officer in the United States
Navy, surrendered to Admiral Porter; General Churchill, commanding the
troops, to General McClernand. The total number of Confederate troops
taken was 5,000.

It was impossible that the work of the navy could be done more
thoroughly than in this instance. Every gun opposed to it was either
destroyed or dismounted, and the casemates were knocked to pieces, the
fire of the X-inch guns of the De Kalb being in the opinion of the
enemy most injurious. In performing this service the vessels did not
come off scatheless. The De Kalb had one 32-pounder gun dismounted and
one X-inch destroyed, besides undergoing severe damage to the hull.
The other vessels were repeatedly struck, but none were rendered unfit
for immediate service. The armor was found to protect them well, the
injuries to the crew being by shot entering the ports. The casualties,
confined to the Louisville and De Kalb, were 6 killed and 25 wounded.

The next morning, January 12th, the admiral despatched the De Kalb and
Cincinnati, under Lieutenant-Commander Walker, to the White River;
transports and troops, under General Gorman, accompanying. St. Charles
was reached at 11 A.M. of the 14th, and found to be evacuated; the
garrison, having left on the evening of the 12th, in the Blue Wing,
taking with them two VIII-inch guns and a field battery. Leaving the
Cincinnati here, the De Kalb with the troops pushed on to Duvall's
Bluff, fifty miles further up, where is the crossing of the railroad
to Little Rock, on the Arkansas River. The transports were left four
miles below, while the De Kalb steamed up to the bluff, arriving there
at 3 P.M. of the 16th. She was close on the heels of the Blue Wing,
which got away fifteen minutes before her arrival, but the two
VIII-inch guns were seized in the act of being loaded on the cars for
Little Rock. At this point of his progress, the orders issued by
General Grant for the return of McClernand's forces to before
Vicksburg were received. The dépôt buildings and captured rolling
stock having been destroyed, the gunboats and transports rejoined the
main body in the Mississippi.

The naval vessels, on the 24th of January, lay off the mouth of the
Yazoo, and from there to the neck of land opposite Vicksburg, where
the army under Grant's orders was disembarking. A few days before
Porter had been obliged to withdraw the gunboats, because the coal
supply of the fleet was exhausted. During their absence eleven
Confederate transports that had been employed on the river between
Vicksburg and Port Hudson went up the Yazoo for supplies, and were
there caught by the unexpected return of the squadron, a serious
embarrassment to the enemy.

At this time the vessels of the squadron near Vicksburg, or within
easy reach, were: The Benton, Cincinnati, De Kalb, Louisville, Mound
City, Pittsburg, and Chillicothe, ironclads; Rattler, Glide, Linden,
Signal, Romeo, Juliet, Forest Rose, Marmora, light-draughts; the Tyler
and Black Hawk, wooden armed steamers; Queen of the West, Monarch,
Switzerland, Lioness, rams. During the following month the Carondelet
and Indianola, ironclads, joined the fleet. The heavy vessels remained
near the army and the principal scene of operations, but some of
these lighter vessels and rams, with others farther up, were scattered
at intervals along the river from Island No. 10 downward, cruising up
and down, keeping off guerillas, preventing contraband traffic, and
convoying transports and supply boats; in a word, keeping open the
communications of the army. A small squadron of five light-draughts
performed the same service constantly in the Tennessee and Cumberland
Rivers.

General Grant arrived on the 30th of January. The army were busy
digging on the canal across the neck, which had been begun the
previous summer, and the various plans as yet discussed had mainly
reference to turning the right flank of the Confederates. Meantime
there was no hindrance to the complete control of the river between
Vicksburg and Port Hudson by the enemy, who continued their traffic
across it and by the Red River unmolested.

Porter, therefore, determined to send some vessels below. The
batteries were much stronger than when Farragut had last passed, but
the importance of the step justified the risk. Once below, the
possession of the west bank by the Union troops gave a safe base to
which to retreat. The honor of leading in such an enterprise was given
to Colonel Charles R. Ellet, of the ram fleet, a man of tried daring.
Many considerations pointed to the rams being the fittest to make such
an attempt. They had greater speed, were well able to cope with any
vessel they were likely to meet, their greater height gave them more
command of the levees, and they were not needed to fight batteries,
which the heavier boats might be. The Queen of the West was chosen and
prepared with two thicknesses of cotton bales. Her commander received
minute orders as to his undertaking, and was directed to proceed by
night, under low speed until near the town, or discovered, to ram a
steamer called the Vicksburg lying at the wharf, at the same time
firing turpentine balls into her, and then to pass on down under the
guns of the army. She started on what was to prove a chequered career
at 4.30 A.M. of the 2d of February. Unfortunately it was found that a
recent change in the arrangement of her wheel kept her from being
steered as nicely as was needful, and the delay to remedy this defect
brought daylight upon her as she rounded the point. A heavy fire
opened at once, but still she went straight on, receiving three shots
before she reached the Vicksburg. Rounding to partly, she succeeded in
ramming, and at the same time firing the enemy with her turpentine
balls. Just then two shells from the Confederate batteries passed
through her cotton armor, one of them setting it on fire near the
starboard wheel, while the discharge of her own bow guns produced the
same effect forward. The flames spread rapidly, and the dense smoke
was suffocating the men in the engine-room. Seeing that, if he delayed
longer in order to ram again, he would probably lose his vessel, Ellet
turned her head down stream and arrived safely abreast the army below.
The fire was subdued by cutting her burning bales adrift and throwing
them overboard.

In this gallant affair the Queen of the West was struck twelve times
by heavy shot, besides undergoing a steady fire from the Confederate
sharpshooters. One of her guns was dismounted, but the other harm was
trifling, and none of her company were hurt. The Vicksburg was badly
injured.

The ram was at once sent down the river, starting at 1 P.M. of the
same day. At Warrenton, just below Vicksburg, she encountered two
batteries, which fired upon without hurting her. The following day,
when fifteen miles below the mouth of the Red River, she captured two
Confederate steamers, one of which was loaded down with provisions for
the army; and when returning up stream, a third, similarly loaded,
was taken coming out of the Red River. The coal supply running short,
it became necessary to burn them. A quantity of meal on a wharf,
awaiting transportation, was also destroyed, and seven Confederate
officers captured. The Queen returned from this raid on the 5th.

On the night of the 7th a barge, with coal enough to last nearly a
month, was set adrift from the fleet above and floated safely by the
batteries to the ram. Having filled up, she took the barge in tow and
again went down the river on the 10th, accompanied by the De Soto, a
small ferryboat which the army had seized below and turned over to the
navy; she was partly protected with iron and cotton. At 10.15 P.M. of
the 12th the admiral sent down the ironclad steamer Indianola,
Lieutenant-Commander George Brown. Taking with her two coal barges,
she proceeded slowly and quietly, and was not discovered till she had
passed the upper batteries. When the first gun was fired, she started
ahead full speed, and, though under fire for twenty minutes longer,
was not struck. With justifiable elation the admiral could now write:
"This gives us complete control of the Mississippi, except at
Vicksburg and Port Hudson. We have now below two XI-inch guns, two
IX-inch, two 30-pounder rifles, six 12-pounders, and three vessels."
Yet, with the same mockery of human foresight that followed Farragut's
satisfaction when he felt he controlled the whole Gulf coast, on the
same day that these lines were penned two of the three passed out of
Union hands, and the third had but a few days' career before her.

The Queen of the West went down the Mississippi, destroying skiffs and
flatboats whenever found, as far as the Red River, which was reached
on the morning of the 12th. Going up the Red River to the point where
the Atchafalaya Bayou branches off on its way to the Gulf, the De
Soto and barge were secured there, while the Queen went down the bayou
destroying Confederate Government property. In performing this service
one of her officers was wounded by a party of guerillas. Returning to
the De Soto, the two started up Red River. On the morning of the 14th
a transport, called the Era No. 5, was captured with two Confederate
officers. Hearing that there were three large boats lying, with steam
down, at Gordon's Landing, thirty miles higher up (about seventy-five
miles from the mouth of the river), Colonel Ellet decided to attempt
their capture. On rounding the bluff above which they were lying, the
Queen was fired upon by a battery of four 32-pounders. Orders were
immediately given to back down behind the bluff, but by some mishap
she ran aground on the right side, in plain view of the battery,
within easy range and powerless for offence. Here she received several
shots, one of which, cutting the steam-pipe, stopped the engines, that
had been backing vigorously. Nothing further in the way of escape was
tried, and the commanding officer was deterred from setting fire to
the ship by the impossibility of removing the wounded officer.

The Queen and the De Soto each had but one boat, and in the panic that
followed the explosion a party took possession of the Queen's and made
off with it to the De Soto, under the pretext of hurrying that vessel
up to the assistance of her consort; so the remainder of the ship's
company, including her commander, made their escape to the other
steamer on cotton bales. The De Soto sent up her yawl, which took off
one load, getting away just before the Confederates boarded their
prize.

The De Soto now started on a hurried retreat down the river, but
running into the bank she lost her rudder. Deprived of the power of
directing her motions, she was allowed to drift with the stream,
picking up, from time to time, a fugitive on a bale, and was rejoined
by her yawl about ten miles lower down. Shortly after this the parties
fell in with the prize of the morning, when the De Soto was burned and
the hasty flight continued in the Era. The following morning the
Mississippi was reached, and the day after, the 16th, they met the
Indianola eight miles below Natchez.

The Queen of the West had thus passed practically unhurt into
Confederate hands, the manner of her loss giving another instance of
how lack of heed in going into action is apt to be followed by a
precipitate withdrawal from it and unnecessary disaster. Colonel
Ellet's only reason for not burning the Queen was that he could not
remove one of her officers, who had been wounded the day before. If he
had transferred him to the De Soto before going under the battery with
the Queen, the fighting ship, this difficulty would not have existed.
No one seems to have been hurt, by the Union and Confederate reports,
and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Ellet's rashness in
exposing his vessel, though he knew the Indianola was to be sent down,
was not atoned for by sticking to her until he had destroyed her. The
accidents were of a kind most likely to happen, and very simple
appliances that might have been all ready would have ensured her
burning. It is to be remembered, however, that Colonel Ellet was at
this time not twenty years old.

On receiving the news of the disaster, Lieutenant-Commander Brown
decided to go down as far as the mouth of the Red River. The same day
was met off Ellis's Cliff the Confederate gunboat Webb, which had been
lying at Alexandria and had started in hot pursuit of the fugitives
from the Queen of the West. Upon making out the Indianola, which she
had not expected, the Webb at once turned, and having greater speed
easily escaped; the Indianola following down to the mouth of the Red
River. Here she anchored and remained three days, while the Era, on
the 18th, returned to the neck below Vicksburg.

Brown now learned that the Queen of the West had not been so much
injured as her late commander had thought, and that a combined attack
would probably be made by her and the Webb upon the Indianola. Two
cottonclad boats were also in preparation by the Confederates for the
same purpose. In view of these facts he determined to go up the
Mississippi and get cotton, with which better to protect the Indianola
against boarders by filling up the gangways between the casemates and
the wheels. By the time this was done, having as yet met no other
vessel of the squadron, though he had hoped for reinforcements when
the loss of the Queen became known, he had reached the decision to
return and communicate with the admiral.

With two barges alongside, the progress of the Indianola against the
current was slow--too slow, for the swift rams of the enemy were
already on her track; but although Brown had kept the bunkers of the
Indianola full, he confidently expected to meet another boat which
would need the coal, and was unwilling to sink it. The smoke of the
pursuers had been seen throughout the day, and at 9.30 P.M. of the
24th four steamers were made out. These were the rams Queen and Webb,
the former in charge of Captain McCloskey, the latter of Captain
Pierce; Major J.L. Brent, of General Taylor's staff, having command of
this part of the expedition, which was fitted out in Alexandria and
accompanied by a tender called the Grand Era. These had been joined
before leaving the Red River by the cottonclad steamer Batey from Port
Hudson, carrying 250 riflemen under Lieutenant-Colonel Brand, whose
rank entitled him to command the whole.

The enemy used the advantage of their greatly superior speed to choose
the night for attacking, that the Indianola might not fire with the
certainty of clear sight. They first saw her near Palmyra Island, a
little above New Carthage, and were themselves made out at the same
instant. The Indianola at once went to quarters and cleared for
action, continuing up stream till her preparations were made; then she
turned and stood down. The channel above Palmyra Island at that time
hugged the eastern shore, crossing to the western just above the
island, and the Indianola seems to have been in this place when the
enemy coming up describes her as "with her head quartering across and
down river," presenting the port bow to their approach. The order of
advance was with the Queen leading, the Webb five hundred yards
astern, and the two other boats lashed together some distance in the
rear. The Queen dashed up, firing her light pieces to no purpose when
one hundred and fifty yards off, and endeavored to ram the Indianola
abaft the port wheel; but the latter, backing, received the blow on
the barge, through which the enemy's sharp bow passed but without
injuring her opponent. The barge went adrift and sunk. The Webb
followed, and, the Indianola standing for her at full speed, the two
came together bows on with a crash that knocked down most of their
crews. The Webb's bow was cut in for a distance of eight feet,
extending from two feet above the water-line to the keelson, but as
she was filled in solid for more than eight feet she did not sink. The
Indianola received no damage.

A third blow was delivered on the starboard side by the Webb, in what
manner does not appear precisely, with the effect of crushing the
other barge, leaving it hanging by the lashings, which were then cut
adrift. The Webb passed up following the Queen. The latter, having
gained sufficient distance, turned and charged down, but as the
Indianola was turning up at the same moment the blow on the starboard
bow glanced, the vessels rasping by each other; and as the Queen
cleared the stern of her enemy, the latter planted two IX-inch shot
successfully, killing 2 and wounding 4 of her crew and disabling two
guns. During all this time the Indianola kept firing her guns whenever
they could be made to bear, but, as the enemy had calculated, the
darkness of the night prevented them from doing as much execution as
they otherwise would. The rams also kept up a constant firing with
their musketry and light guns. In the uncertain light it was very
difficult to watch the two assailants through the peep-holes in the
pilot-house of the gunboat, but yet a fifth blow was received forward
of the wheels without injury. At last, however, the Queen was able to
strike just abaft the starboard wheel-house, crushing the wheel,
disabling the starboard rudder, and starting a number of leaks abaft
the shaft. The starboard engine was thus useless and the Indianola
helpless to avoid the onset of the Webb, which struck her fair in the
stern, starting the timbers and starboard rudder-box so that the water
poured in in large volumes. This settled the fight, and Brent reported
to Colonel Brand that the enemy was disabled. The Batey then dashed up
to board, but the Indianola, after delaying a few moments in mid
river, till the water had risen nearly to the grate-bars, to assure
her sinking, had run her bows into the west bank, and surrendered as
soon as the cottonclads came alongside. The enemy, finding that she
must sink and not willing that this should happen on the side where
the Union army was, made fast at once two steamers and towed her down
and over to the east bank, where she sank in ten feet of water near
the plantation of the President of the Confederacy. The loss of the
Indianola was 1 killed, 1 wounded, and 7 missing. The latter probably
got ashore on the west bank, for 3 were captured there the following
day and more than one got through to Porter's squadron. The loss of
the enemy was officially stated at 3 killed and 5 wounded, but a
Confederate officer admitted to the commander of the Indianola that it
was much greater.

This ended Porter's sanguine hopes of blockading the river by detached
vessels while he kept the body of the fleet above. After being
harassed and stirred up during three weeks, the Confederates again
found themselves masters of the line from Vicksburg to Port Hudson for
a few days longer, and with two Union vessels in their hands, one of
which was serviceable, while the other, badly damaged and partly sunk,
it is true, had still her armament intact and was possibly not beyond
repair. Their possession of the Indianola, however, was of short
duration. The second day after the capture, a detail of 100 men with a
lieutenant was sent to try and save her, by the army officer
commanding near by, while the Queen of the West went up to Warrenton,
to act as picket for the fleet, and with despatches to General
Stevenson, commanding at Vicksburg, asking for pumps and other help.
In a short time, the Queen returned in great haste and reported a
gunboat approaching. All the vessels that had behaved so gallantly two
nights before got under way in a panic and went hurriedly down,
leaving the working party and the lieutenant. The gunboat did not come
nearer than two miles and a half, and seemed very apprehensive of an
attack herself, sticking close to the bank. The lieutenant stood his
ground for one day; but then finding himself deserted by his own
fleet, which by this time was up Red River, and the gunboat still
lying, terrible though inert, just above him, he, the next evening,
laid the two XI-inch guns muzzle to muzzle, and so fired them. One
was burst, the other apparently only kicked over. He next threw
overboard two field pieces he had with him, made an attempt to blow up
the vessel, which resulted in destroying the forward casemate and
burning most of the wreck above water, and then fled with his command.

The gunboat which caused all this consternation with such happy
results to the Union fleet was a mock monitor, built upon the hull of
an old coal barge, with pork barrels piled to resemble smoke-stacks,
through which poured volumes of smoke from mud furnaces. She went down
swiftly with the current, passing the Vicksburg batteries just before
daylight, and drawing from them a furious cannonade. As day broke she
drifted into the lower end of the canal, and was again sent down
stream by the amused Union soldiers, who as little as the admiral
dreamed of the good service the dummy was to do. Such was the end of
the Indianola, a striking instance of the moral power of the gunboats.
The Queen of the West was subsequently sent through the Bayou
Atchafalaya to Grand Lake, and there destroyed two months later by the
gunboats of the Gulf Squadron.

When the news of these reverses reached New Orleans, Admiral Farragut,
who had for some time contemplated a movement up the river, felt that
the time was come. On the 12th of March he was at Baton Rouge, where
he inspected the ships of the squadron the next day; and then moved up
to near Profit's Island, seven miles below the bend on which Port
Hudson is situated. On the 14th, early, the vessels again weighed and
anchored at the head of the island, where the admiral communicated
with Commander Caldwell, of the Essex, who for some time had occupied
this station with a half dozen mortar-schooners.

As one ascends the river to Port Hudson, the course pursued is nearly
due north; then it takes a sharp turn to the west-southwest for a
distance of one or two miles. The little town of Port Hudson is on the
east bank just below the bend. The bluffs on which the batteries were
placed begin at the bend, extending for a mile and a half down the
river, and are from eighty to one hundred feet high. From the opposite
bank, at and just below the point, a dangerous shoal spot makes out.
At the time of the passage of the fleet there were mounted in battery
nineteen heavy guns,[15] viz.: two X-inch and two VIII-inch
columbiads; two 42-, two 32-, and three 24-pound smooth-bores; and
eight rifles, varying from 80- to 50-pounders.

The object of the admiral was simply to pass the batteries with his
fleet, so as to blockade the river above. The vessels he had with him
were the Hartford (flag-ship), twenty-four guns, Captain James S.
Palmer; Monongahela, ten guns, Captain J.P. McKinstry; Mississippi,
seventeen guns, Captain Melancton Smith; Richmond, twenty-four guns,
Commander James Alden; Genesee, eight guns, Commander William H.
Macomb; Albatross, six guns, Lieutenant-Commander John E. Hart; Kineo,
six[16] guns, Lieutenant-Commander John Watters.

The larger ships, except the Mississippi, were directed to take a
gunboat on the port side, securing her well aft, so as to leave as
much of the port battery as possible clear. Each was to keep a little
to starboard of her next ahead, so as to be free to use her bow guns
as soon as possible with the least danger from premature explosions of
projectiles. In accordance with this order, the Hartford took the
Albatross, the Monongahela, the Kineo, and the Richmond the Genesee;
the Richmond being the slowest ship and the Genesee the most powerful
gunboat. The ships were prepared as at the passage of the lower forts,
and in the Hartford the admiral had placed his pilot in the
mizzen-top, where he could see more clearly, and had arranged a
speaking-tube thence to the deck. The Essex and Sachem were not to
attempt the passage, but with some mortar-boats to engage the lower
batteries to cover the movement.

Shortly before 10 P.M. the ships weighed and advanced in the following
order: Hartford, Richmond, Monongahela, Mississippi. At eleven, as
they drew near the batteries, the lowest of which the Hartford had
already passed, the enemy threw up rockets and opened their fire.
Prudence, and the fact of the best water being on the starboard hand,
led the ships to hug the east shore of the river, passing so close
under the Confederate guns that the speech of the gunners and troops
could be distinguished. Along the shore, at the foot of the bluffs,
powerful reflecting lamps, like those used on locomotives, had been
placed, to show the ships to the enemy as they passed; and for the
same purpose large fires, already stacked on the opposite point, were
lit. The fire of the fleet and from the shore soon raised a smoke
which made these precautions useless, while it involved the ships in a
danger greater than any from the enemy's guns. Settling down upon the
water, in a still damp atmosphere, it soon hid everything from the
eyes of the pilots. The flag-ship, leading, had the advantage of
pushing often ahead of her own smoke; but those who followed ran into
it and incurred a perplexity which increased from van to rear. At the
bend of the river the current caught the Hartford on her port bow,
sweeping her round with her head toward the batteries and nearly on
shore, her stem touching the ground slightly; but by her own efforts
and the assistance of the Albatross she was backed clear. Then, the
Albatross backing and the Hartford going ahead strong with the
engines, her head was fairly pointed up the stream, and she passed by
without serious injury. Deceived possibly by the report of the
howitzers in her top, which were nearly on their own level, the
Confederates did not depress their guns sufficiently to hit her as
often as they did the ships that followed her. One killed and two
wounded is her report; and one marine fell overboard, his cries for
help being heard on board the other ships as they passed by, unable to
save him.

The Richmond, with the Genesee alongside, following the Hartford, had
reached the last battery and was about to make the turn when a
plunging shot entering about four feet above the berth-deck, passed
through a barricade of clothes-bags and hawsers into the engine-room,
upsetting the starboard safety-valve; then glancing a little upward,
it displaced the port safety-valve weight and twisted the lever,
leaving the valve partly opened. The steam escaped so rapidly as to
reduce the pressure at once to nine pounds, while filling the
fire-room and berth-deck. Deprived thus of her motive force, it was
found that the Genesee was not able to drag both vessels up against
the strong current then running. Commander Alden was therefore
compelled to turn down stream, and after some narrow escapes from the
fire of his own fleet, was soon carried by the gunboat out of range.
The two vessels lost 3 killed and 15 wounded; among the latter the
first lieutenant of the Richmond, A. Boyd Cummings, mortally.

The Monongahela and Kineo were third in line. While under the fire of
the principal batteries, musketry opened upon them from the west bank,
which was soon silenced by shrapnel and grape from the Kineo. A few
moments later a chance shot lodged between the stern-post and
rudder-post of the gunboat, wedging the rudder and making it
completely useless. The density of the smoke, complained of by all the
officers of the fleet that night, caused the pilots to miss their way;
and the larger ship took the ground on the spit opposite the town. The
Kineo, not touching, with the way she had tore clear of her fasts,
and, ranging a short distance ahead, grounded also. Both vessels
received considerable though not serious damage from the violence of
the separation. The Kineo was soon able to back clear and, though
disabled, managed to get a hawser from the Monongahela and pull that
ship off after she had been twenty-five minutes aground. The latter
then went ahead again, while the Kineo, unable to steer properly,
drifted down stream out of range. While aground a shot came in,
cutting away the bridge under Captain McKinstry's feet, and throwing
him to the deck below; the fall incapacitated him from remaining at
his station, and Lieutenant-Commander N.W. Thomas took command of the
Monongahela. Meanwhile the Mississippi had passed, unseen and
unseeing, in the smoke, and had herself grounded a little farther up
near the head of the spit. She was observed to be on fire as the
Monongahela again drew near the bend, and at the same moment the
latter vessel's engines ceased to move, a crank-pin being heated. Thus
unmanageable she drifted down within thirty yards of the batteries,
and had to anchor below. Her loss was 6 killed and 21 wounded; the
Kineo, though repeatedly struck, had no one hurt.

The Mississippi had passed the lower batteries and had reached the
bend, going fast, when she struck, heeling at once three streaks to
port. The engines were reversed and backed to the full extent of their
power, and the port battery run in to bring the ship on an even keel.
After working for thirty-five minutes it was found impossible to get
her off. The port battery and pivot gun were then ordered to be thrown
overboard, but before that was done Captain Smith decided that the
ship would have to be abandoned, as three batteries had her range and
were hulling her constantly.

The sick and wounded were brought up, and three small boats, all that
were left, were employed in landing the crew. The fire of the
starboard battery had been kept up until this time, but now ceased.
The ship was then set on fire in the forward store-room; but before
the fire had gained sufficient headway, three shot entering there let
in water and put it out. She was then fired in four different places
aft, and as soon as it was sure that she would be destroyed, the
captain and first lieutenant left her, passing down to the Richmond in
safety. The Mississippi remained aground till 3 A.M., when she floated
off and drifted down the river, passing the other ships without
injuring them. At 5.30, being then some distance below, she blew up,
thus meeting the same fate that had befallen her sister ship, the
Missouri, twenty years before, in the harbor of Gibraltar.

From the circumstances of the case the exact number of killed and
wounded of the Mississippi could not be ascertained. Upon mustering
the ship's company after the action, 64 were found missing out of a
total of 297. Of these 25 were believed to have been killed.

It is sufficiently apparent, from the above accounts of the
experiences of each vessel, that the failure of the greater part of
the fleet to pass was principally due to other circumstances than the
Confederate fire. The darkness of the night, the stillness of the air,
which permitted the smoke to settle undisturbed, the intricacy of the
navigation, the rapidity of the current, then running at the rate of
five knots, the poor speed of the ships, not over eight knots, were
known beforehand, and were greater elements of danger than the simple
fire of the enemy. To these is to be added the difficulty of making
the turn, with the swift current of the river round the bend tending
to throw the ship bodily on to the hostile shore before she could be
brought to head in the new direction. The Hartford and her consort
alone reached this final trial, and were by it nearly involved in the
common disaster.

Nearly, but not quite; and the success of the two vessels, though it
placed them in a trying and hazardous position, ensured the attainment
of the object for which the risk had been run. The Red River was
blockaded, not again to be open to the Confederates during the war;
and though nearly four months were still to elapse before the
Mississippi would be freely used throughout its length by Union
vessels, it slipped finally from the control of the enemy as Farragut
with his two ships passed from under the batteries at Port Hudson.

The morning after the action the flag-ship dropped down nearly within
range of the enemy, to communicate, if possible, by signal with the
fleet below, but they could not be seen from her mast-heads; therefore
after firing three guns, as before concerted with General Banks, the
admiral went on up the river. The following morning he anchored off
the mouth of the Red River, remaining twenty-four hours; and then went
on to below Vicksburg to communicate with Porter, arriving there on
the 20th. On the way the ships engaged a battery of four rifled pieces
at Grand Gulf, losing 2 men killed and 6 wounded, but met with no
other opposition. Porter was absent in Deer Creek, one of the bayous
emptying into the Yazoo, when Farragut's messenger arrived, but
communication was held with General Grant, Captain Walke, the senior
naval officer present, and General A.W. Ellet, commanding the ram
flotilla. Farragut, deprived of the greater part of his own fleet, was
very desirous of getting reinforcements from above; asking specially
for an ironclad and a couple of rams to assist him in maintaining the
blockade of Red River and to patrol the Mississippi. In the absence of
Porter he was not willing to urge his request upon the subordinate
officers present, but General Ellet assumed the responsibility of
sending down two rams, without waiting to hear from the admiral, of
whose concurrence he expressed himself as feeling assured; an opinion
apparently shared by the others present at the consultation. It would
seem, however, that Porter did not think the rams actually sent fit to
be separated from a machine-shop by enemies' batteries; and his
ironclads could not be spared from the work yet to be done above. The
rams Switzerland and Lancaster, the former under command of Colonel
Charles E. Ellet, late of the Queen of the West, the latter under
Lieutenant-Colonel John A. Ellet, were detailed for this duty and
started during the night of the 24th, but so late that they did not
get by before the sun had risen. The batteries opened upon them
between 5.30 and 6 A.M. of the 25th. The Lancaster, an old and rotten
boat, received a shell in her boilers; and her hull was so shattered
by the explosion that she went to pieces and sank, the officers and
crew escaping on cotton bales. The Switzerland was hulled repeatedly
and received two shots in her boilers; but being a stronger boat
survived her injuries and drifted down safely to her destination,
where a week's labor put her again in fighting condition. The
recklessness of the daring family whose name is so associated with the
ram fleet had thus caused the loss of two of them, and led Porter to
caution Farragut to keep the one now with him always under his own
eye.

Soon after the coming of General Grant, while the army was digging
canals at two or three different points, with the view of opening new
waterways from above to below Vicksburg, Admiral Porter had suggested
that by cutting the levee across the old Yazoo Pass, six miles below
Helena, access might be had to the Yazoo above Haines's Bluff and
Vicksburg turned by that route. Grant ordered the cutting, and Porter
sent the light-draught Forest Rose to stand by to enter when open.

There are two entrances from the Mississippi to the pass, the upper
one direct, the lower one turning to the left and running parallel to
the course of the river. Just within their junction the levee, built
in 1856, crosses the pass, which is here only seventy-five feet wide
between the timber on either side. At the distance of a mile from the
great river the pass enters the northern end of Moon Lake, a
crescent-shaped sheet of water, probably an old bed of the
Mississippi. The lake is seven or eight miles long and from eight
hundred to a thousand yards wide, with a uniform depth enough to float
the largest steamboats. Two or three plantations were then on the east
shore, but the rest was unbroken forest, quiet and isolated, abounding
in game as the waters did in fish. The pass issues again half way down
the eastern side, through an opening so shut in with trees that it can
scarcely be seen a hundred yards away, and pursues a tortuous course
of twelve or fourteen miles to the Coldwater River, the upper portion
of the Yazoo. In this part of the route, which never exceeds one
hundred feet in width and often narrows to seventy-five or less, the
forest of cyprus and sycamore trees, mingled with great cottonwoods
and thickly twining wild grape-vines, formed a perfect arch overhead,
shutting out the rays of the sun; and, though generally high enough to
allow the tall smoke-stacks to pass underneath, sometimes grazed
their tops and again swept them down to the deck as the swift current
bore the vessels along.

Digging on the levee was begun on the 2d of February, under the
direction of Lieutenant-Colonel James H. Wilson, of the Engineers. At
this time the difference of level between the water inside and out of
the levee was eight and a half feet. At seven the next evening, the
digging having gone far enough, a mine was exploded and the water
rushed in. By eleven the opening was forty yards wide and the water
pouring in like a cataract, tearing aways logs, trees, and great
masses of earth with the utmost ease. Owing to the vast tract of
country to be flooded before the waters could attain their level, it
was not possible to enter for four or five days; during that time they
were spreading north and south and east, driving the wild animals from
their lairs and the reptiles to take refuge in the trees.

Meanwhile news of the project had reached the Confederates, who,
though they could have little idea of the magnitude of the force which
intended to penetrate where few but flat-boats had gone before, had
taken the easy precaution of felling large trees across the stream. On
the 10th Colonel Wilson had passed through Moon Lake and into the pass
beyond. Then it took three days of constant labor to get through five
miles of felled timber and drifted wood. Some of the trees reached
quite across the stream, and were four feet in diameter. To add to the
difficulties of the pioneers, the country all around was overflowed,
except a mere strip a few inches out of water on the very bank. Still
they persevered, and the way was opened through to the Coldwater.

Porter detailed for this expedition the ironclads Chillicothe,
Lieutenant-Commander James P. Foster, and De Kalb, Lieutenant-Commander
John G. Walker; light-draught steamers Rattler, Marmora, Signal, Romeo,
Petrel, and Forest Rose; rams Lioness and Fulton; the whole being
under Lieutenant-Commander Watson Smith, of the Rattler. The expedition
went through Yazoo Pass, meeting many obstructions and difficulties,
despite the work of Wilson's corps.

Three and a half days were consumed in making the twelve miles from
the lake to the Coldwater; for, though the current ran swiftly--five
or six miles an hour--the low, overhanging trees threatened the
chimneys, and big projecting limbs would come sweeping and crashing
along the light upper works, making a wreck of anything they met. The
great stern-wheels were constantly backing, and a small boat lay on
either quarter in readiness to run a line to the trees to check the
way of the vessels and to ease them round the sharp bends, which were
so frequent it was impossible to see ahead or astern one hundred yards
in any part of the route. Huge rafts of driftwood still remained to be
dislodged.

On the 28th of February the vessels entered the Coldwater. Here the
stream was wider and the current slacker, the trees rarely meeting
overhead; but the channel was nearly as crooked, and accidents almost
as frequent. Six days were consumed in advancing thirty miles through
an almost unbroken wilderness. The stream widened and the country
became more promising in the lower part of the Coldwater and the upper
part of the Tallahatchie, into which the vessels steamed on the
evening of the 6th in a sorely damaged condition. The Petrel had lost
her wheel and was wholly disabled; both smoke-stacks of the Romeo were
gone; the Chillicothe had run upon the stump of a tree and started a
plank in her bottom, which was now kept in place by being shored down
from the beams of the deck above; and though none, except the Petrel,
were unfit for fighting, all had suffered greatly in hull and upper
works. The transports, which had joined with 6,000 troops, were yet
more roughly handled.

The lower part of the Tallahatchie again became narrow and crooked,
and for forty or fifty miles no break appeared in a wild and
forbidding wilderness until they began to draw near Fort Pemberton,
when the stream grew to a fair size. Tokens of the enemy now were seen
in burning piles of cotton, and a Confederate steamer, which was
picking up what she could, was so closely pressed as to be burned by
her crew. The position of the Confederates had been chosen but a few
days before, and the works were only partially up. The Tallahatchie
here sweeps sharply to the east, and then returns again, forming a
horseshoe bend thirteen miles long, the two parts of the stream
approaching each other so closely that the neck of the enclosed
peninsula is less than a quarter of a mile wide. It is in this bend
that the Yallabusha enters, the river then taking the name of Yazoo;
so that the works erected across the neck were said to be between the
Tallahatchie and Yazoo, though the stream is one. The fort, which was
called Pemberton, was built of cotton and earth; in front of it was a
deep slough, and on its right flank the river was barricaded by a raft
and the hull of the ocean steamer Star of the West, which, after
drawing the first shots fired in the war, when the batteries in
Charleston stopped her from reinforcing Fort Sumter in January, 1861,
had passed by some chance to New Orleans, where she was seized by the
Government of Louisiana when that State seceded. When Farragut took
New Orleans, she, with many river steamers, was taken to the Yazoo,
and now met her end sunk in the swollen waters of a Southern creek.
The cannon mounted in the works were one six-and-a-half-inch rifled
gun, three 20-pounder Parrott rifles, and some field pieces, among
which was a Whitworth rifle. Lieutenant F.E. Shepperd, of the
Confederate Navy, who had been busy felling trees in the upper river,
was put in charge of these pieces because none of the army officers
present, except General Loring, were familiar with the use of great
guns. The heavy rifle, the main reliance of the fort, was only got
into position by blocking it up from the ground, no other appliances
being at hand; and as there was not enough blocking, the attempt had
nearly failed. It was in place barely in time to meet the gunboats.

The Chillicothe, at 10 A.M. of the 11th of March, steamed round the
bend above and engaged the battery. She was twice struck on the
turret, being materially injured, and withdrew to fortify with cotton
bales. At 4.25 P.M. she again went into action, at a distance of eight
hundred yards, with the De Kalb, but after firing four times, a shell
from the Confederate battery struck in the muzzle of the port XI-inch
just as the loaders had entered a shell and were stripping the patch
from the fuze; both projectiles exploded, killing 2 and wounding 11 of
the gun's crew, besides injuring the gun. The Chillicothe was then
withdrawn, after receiving another shot, which killed one of her
ship's company, and showing her unfitness for action through scamped
work put upon her. The stream was so narrow that two vessels could
with difficulty act, and therefore a 30-pound rifled gun was landed
from the Rattler on the 13th and an VIII-inch from the De Kalb on the
15th. The action was renewed again on the 13th, by both ironclads at
10.45 A.M., at a distance of eight hundred yards, and was severe until
2 P.M., when the Chillicothe was forced to retire, her ammunition
running short. The De Kalb remained in position until dark, firing
every fifteen minutes, but receiving no reply from the enemy. In this
day's fight the fort was much damaged, the earth covering and bales
being knocked away and the cotton set on fire in many places. None of
the guns were dismounted, but the large rifle was struck on the side
of the muzzle. The greater part of the powder was in a powder-boat a
mile away in the Yazoo, but small supplies for the immediate service
of the battery were kept in temporary receptacles in the fort. One of
these was struck by a shot and the cotton bale covering it knocked
off; before it could be replaced a bursting shell exploded the powder,
killing and wounding a number of the garrison.

On the 16th another attack was made by the two boats, but the
Chillicothe was disabled in a few minutes and both were withdrawn. The
difficulty of handling when fighting down stream prevented the vessels
from getting that nearness to the enemy which is so essential in an
attack by ships upon fortifications. Besides the damage sustained by
the Chillicothe, the De Kalb was much cut up, losing ten gun-deck
beams and having the wheel-house and steerage badly knocked to pieces,
but was not rendered unfit for service as the Chillicothe was. The
latter lost 4 killed and 16 wounded; the De Kalb 3 killed and 3
wounded. On the 17th, the troops being unable to land because the
country was overflowed and the ships unable to silence the fort, the
expedition fell back. On the 22d General Quimby and his command was
met coming down, and at his desire the whole expedition returned to
Fort Pemberton; but after remaining twelve days longer without effect
the attempt was finally abandoned.

Though thus inconclusive, the attempt by Yazoo Pass has an interest of
its own from the unique character of the difficulties encountered by
the ships. Although forewarned, the enemy were taken unawares, and
there is reason to believe, as we have seen, that had a little more
feverish energy been displayed the vessels might have got possession
of Fort Pemberton before its guns were mounted. As it was, by the
Confederate reports, "notwithstanding every exertion the enemy found
us but poorly prepared to receive him." There was no other favorable
position for defensive works down to Yazoo City.

While the result of the Yazoo Pass expedition was uncertain and the
vessels still before Fort Pemberton, an enterprise of similar
character was undertaken by Admiral Porter in person, having for its
object to reach the Yazoo below Yazoo City but far above the works at
Haines's Bluff. The proposed route was from the Yazoo up Steele's
Bayou, through Black Bayou to Deer Creek, and thence by Rolling Fork,
a crooked stream of about four miles, to the Big Sunflower, whence the
way was open and easy to the Yazoo River. Fort Pemberton would then be
taken between two divisions of the fleet, and must fall; while the
numerous steamers scattered through the streams of the Yazoo country
would be at the mercy of the gunboats.

After a short preliminary reconnoissance as far as Black Bayou, which
indicated that the enterprise was feasible, though arduous, and having
received encouraging accounts of the remainder of the route, the
admiral started on the 16th of March with five ironclads: the
Louisville, Lieutenant-Commander E.K. Owen; Cincinnati, Lieutenant
George M. Bache; Carondelet, Lieutenant J.M. Murphy; Mound City,
Lieutenant Byron Wilson; Pittsburg, Lieutenant W.B. Hoel; four
mortars, and four tugs. All went well till Black Bayou was reached.
This is about four miles long, narrow, and very crooked, and was then
filled with trees. Here the crews had to go to work, dragging the
trees up by the roots, or pushing them over with the ironclads, and
cutting away the heavy overhanging branches. Having done this the
ironclads were able to force their way through the bushes and trees
which lined the banks and clung closely to the bows and sides of the
vessels, but the way remained impracticable for transports and wooden
boats. In twenty-four hours the ironclads had gotten through these
four miles to Hill's plantation, at the junction of Black Bayou and
Deer Creek.

General W.T. Sherman had been directed to support the movement with
one division of his corps and a body of pioneers. The number of
steamers fit for the bayou navigation being limited, the division was
landed on the east bank of the Mississippi and crossed by land to
Steele's Bayou, which there approaches to within a mile of the river.
The pioneers followed the admiral up Black Bayou, and when the
gunboats entered Deer Creek remained to further clear the bayou. On
the 20th the work had progressed so that two transports entered as far
as a mile and a half below Hill's, where was the first piece of dry
land between that point and the mouth of the Yazoo, the country
generally being under water.

Meanwhile the admiral had pushed on up Deer Creek, where the water was
deep but the channel narrow, crooked, and filled with young willows,
which bound the boats and made progress very difficult. The bends were
sharp, and much trouble was experienced in heaving the vessels around
them, while the banks were lined with heavy trees and overhanging
branches that would tear down the chimneys and demolish boats and
light woodwork. Still they worked on, making from half a mile to a
mile an hour. The enemy, notwithstanding what had been done at Yazoo
Pass, were taken by surprise, not having believed that even gunboats
would try to penetrate by those marshy, willowy ditches. On the night
of the 17th, Colonel Ferguson, commanding the district, first received
word at his headquarters on Deer Creek, forty miles above Rolling
Fork, that the gunboats had entered the creek. He at once hurried a
battalion of sharpshooters and some artillery on board a steamer and
hastened down to Rolling Fork, being so lucky as to get there before
the vessels, on the afternoon of the 19th. A small detached body of
cavalry were ahead of him, and, acting on their own account, had begun
to cut down trees across the stream. Anticipating this, the admiral
had sent Lieutenant Murphy ahead in a tug and he had come up in time
to stop the felling of the first; but the horsemen galloped across
country faster than the tug could force her way through the channel
and at last got down a large tree, which arrested the tug till the
rest of the force came up. Then the slaves, with muskets to their
breasts, were compelled to ply their axes to stop the advance of those
to whom they looked for freedom.

The situation was critical, and the crews turned to with a will,
working night and day to clear away these obstacles, without sleep and
snatching their food. They were now five or six miles from Rolling
Fork, and hearing that the enemy were landing, Lieutenant Murphy was
sent forward with 300 men and two howitzers to hold the stream until
the gunboats could cover it with their guns; which he did, occupying
an Indian mound sixty feet high. After working all night and the next
day, the 19th, the squadron had hewed its way by sundown to within
eight hundred yards of Rolling Fork. They rested that night, and the
morning of the 20th again started to work through the willows, but the
lithe trees resisted all their efforts to push through, and had either
to be pulled up one by one or cut off under water, both tedious
processes. Meanwhile Ferguson, having collected 800 men and six pieces
of artillery, attacked Murphy's little body of men, who had to be
recalled. At three in the afternoon Featherstone's brigade, with a
section of artillery, arrived from Vicksburg to reinforce the enemy,
and toward sundown opened a sharp fire upon the gunboats from a
distance. Though this was easily silenced by the vessels, the
difficulty of throwing out working parties in the presence of the
enemy's force was apparent. Word was at once sent to Sherman of the
state of things, and reached him at 3 A.M. of the 21st; but before
that time the admiral, learning that some of the enemy had reached his
rear and had begun felling trees behind him to prevent his retreat,
had decided to withdraw. Advance through Rolling Fork was no longer
possible, it having been so obstructed that two or three days' labor
would have been needed to clear it, even if unopposed.

Having but ten or twelve feet to spare on either side it was
impossible to turn the boats, so the rudders were unshipped and they
began that night to back down, rebounding from tree to tree on either
bank as they struck them. The country from Rolling Fork to Black Bayou
was mostly a chain of plantations, in which the trees at few points
came down to the bank of the stream thickly enough to afford cover for
troops in numbers; but yet there was shelter for sharpshooters at such
a distance as enabled them to pick off any of the crews that exposed
themselves. The guns were three feet below the levee, depriving them
of much of their power to annoy the assailants. At 4 P.M. of the 21st,
however, Colonel Giles A. Smith, of Sherman's command, arrived with
800 men; Sherman, as soon as he heard of the admiral's dilemma, having
sent every man he had by the east bank of Deer Creek, remaining
himself alone at Hill's until nightfall. Three steamboat loads of
troops then arrived below, and were conducted by him, with lighted
candles, through two and a half miles of dense cane-brake to the
plantation.

When Smith reached the vessels, they had been stopped for an hour or
two by a coal barge sunk across the creek, and were kept from sending
out working parties by the enemy's sharpshooters. Smith now took
charge of the banks, being reinforced with 150 men and two howitzers
from the fleet, and before midnight the barge was blown up. The
retreat continued next day, the boats backing, and the Louisville,
which was the farthest down, clearing away the obstructions while the
troops kept the enemy from molesting the workers. Owing to the number
of trees to be removed, only six miles had been gained by 3 P.M., at
which hour a large body of the enemy were seen passing by, along the
edge of the woods, and taking position about a mile ahead of the
advance of the troops. The gunboats opened upon them, and at this time
General Sherman himself opportunely came up with his reinforcements
and drove the Confederates well back to the north and rear of the
squadron, thus finally freeing it from a very anxious and critical
dilemma. On the 24th Hill's plantation was reached, and the vessels
returned without further adventure to the mouth of the Yazoo, where
Porter communicated with Farragut, who still remained near the lower
end of the canal.

On the 29th and 30th it blew a gale of wind from the north, during
which the steamer Vicksburg, that had been rammed two months before by
the Queen of the West, broke adrift from her moorings at the city, and
went ashore on the bank opposite the Hartford. Upon examination it was
found that her machinery had been removed, and before any further
action had been taken by Farragut, the Confederates sent down and
burned her. Meanwhile coal from the army and provisions from the upper
squadrons were floated down in barges, and on the 31st, having waited
for the completion of the repairs on the Switzerland, the admiral got
under way, with the Albatross and the ram in company, and went down
the river. At Grand Gulf the batteries again opened on the ships,
striking the Switzerland twice and the Hartford once; the latter
losing one man killed. On the evening of April 1st the little squadron
reached Red River, having destroyed on its passage down a large number
of skiffs and flat-boats, available for the transport of stores across
the Mississippi from the western country, on which Vicksburg now
mainly depended for supplies.

In their isolated condition, and occupying a position so obnoxious to
the enemy, there was reason to expect a repetition on a larger scale
of the attack made upon the Indianola. The Hartford was specially
prepared for such a meeting. The lower yards were lowered down to the
rail and the stream-chain, lashed to the bowsprit end, was carried
aft, clove-hitched to the yard-arms and brought in again at the
warping chocks. This barrier, while it remained intact, would keep an
assailant fifteen to twenty feet from the ship; then, if it were
passed, as a further protection against boarders, hawsers were
stretched along fore and aft by the lower rigging, thirty feet above
the deck, carrying a heavy boarding netting which extended from that
height to the ship's rail. The hammock-cloths were kept triced up, and
the poop-deck and topgallant-forecastle, which were flush with the
rail of the ship, were barricaded with hammocks and sails. For
protection against rams large cypress logs were slung around the
vessel, a foot above the water line. During the time they were thus
alone the guns' crews always slept by the guns and the ship was kept
in a constant state of preparation for instant action.

On the 6th Farragut went down again to Port Hudson, anxious for news
about his other ships, from which he had now been for three weeks
separated, and desiring to communicate with General Banks. The
ordinary methods of signalling having failed to attain these objects,
the admiral's secretary, Mr. Gabaudan, volunteered to pass Port Hudson
in a skiff by night. The boat was covered with twigs, arranged to
resemble one of the floating trees not uncommon in the Mississippi.

At a quarter past eight on the evening of the 7th Mr. Gabaudan stepped
into his ark, and lying down in the bottom of it, with a paddle and
revolver by his side, was committed to the current. This bore him
safely by; but once grazing the shore, the sentinels were heard
commenting on the size of the log, and a boat put out to make an
examination. Fortunately the men were contented with a glance, which
satisfied them that the object was what it seemed; and Gabaudan's safe
arrival was signalled from the vessels below at 10 P.M.

The next morning the admiral returned to Red River and caught two
steamers outside, one of which managed to get in again; but the other
was captured, and with her a Confederate commissary, who was making
arrangements for crossing a large number of cattle from the West at
various points. Red River was effectually closed, but the smallness of
his force made it necessary to keep them all together, in case of
attack, and though intercourse across the Mississippi was seriously
impaired, it was not wholly checked. On the 15th the admiral again
returned to the bend above Port Hudson, and communicated by signal
with the Richmond, which had come up in accordance with instructions
transmitted through Mr. Gabaudan. This officer at the same time
returned to the ship, under protection of an escort, overland, there
being no regular Confederate force on the right bank.

Meanwhile General Grant had been maturing his plans for the movement
by which Vicksburg was eventually reduced. The bayou expeditions had
failed, and with them every hope of turning the enemy's right flank.
The idea had been entertained of opening a water route by cutting a
channel from the west bank of the Mississippi, seventy-five miles
above Vicksburg, to Lake Providence, from which there was
communication by bayous to the Tensas, Wachita, and Red Rivers, and so
to the Mississippi below Vicksburg. Yet another water-way by bayous
was contemplated from Milliken's Bend, twenty miles above, through the
Tensas, to New Carthage, thirty miles below, Vicksburg. Work was done
upon both these routes by the army; but the rapid falling of the river
toward the middle of April at once made them less desirable and the
roads on the west bank passable. Three army corps had already moved,
one after the other, beginning on the 29th of March, toward New
Carthage on the west bank; but though not over twenty miles by land in
a straight line, the condition of the country from broken levees and
bad roads made necessary a circuit of thirty-five miles to reach this
point. As soon as the movement was definitely decided upon, Admiral
Porter made his preparations for running the batteries of Vicksburg
with the greater portion of his fleet. To assure a supply of fuel
below, the vessels detailed for the duty took each a coal barge on the
starboard side, leaving the port guns, which would bear upon the
batteries, clear for firing. There being no intention to engage the
enemy except for the purpose of covering the passage, every precaution
was taken to avoid being seen or heard. All lights were extinguished,
ports carefully covered, and the fires well lighted before starting,
so as to show, if possible, no smoke; while to lessen the noise, the
steam, as with the Carondelet at Island No. 10, was to exhaust into
the wheel, and the vessels were to proceed at low speed. To avoid
collisions, fifty yards were prescribed as the interval to be
observed, and each boat was to keep a little to one side of its next
ahead, so that, in case of the latter stopping, the follower would be
able to pass without change of course. The sterns of the
vessels--their weakest part--were to be specially protected against
raking shots, which was done by piling wet bales of hay and slinging
heavy logs near the water line.

At a quarter past nine of the night of April 16th, the fleet destined
for this service got under way from the mouth of the Yazoo River, the
flag-ship Benton, sixteen guns,[17] Lieutenant-Commander James A.
Greer, leading, and the other vessels in the following order:
Lafayette, eight guns, Captain Henry Walke; Louisville, twelve guns,
Lieutenant-Commander Elias K. Owen; Mound City, fourteen guns,
Lieutenant Byron Wilson; Pittsburg, thirteen guns, Lieutenant W.R.
Hoel; Carondelet, eleven guns, Lieutenant J. McLeod Murphy; Tuscumbia,
five guns, Lieutenant-Commander James W. Shirk. The Lafayette carried
with her, lashed to the other side of her coal barge, the ram General
Price, Lieutenant S.E. Woodworth, which had continued in the service
after being taken from the Confederates at Memphis. After the
Carondelet, between her and the Tuscumbia, came three army transports,
the Silver Wave, Henry Clay, and Forest Queen, unprotected except by
bales of hay and cotton round the boilers. They carried stores, but no
troops.

A month later, and probably at this time also, the river batteries
before which the fleet was to pass contained thirty-one pieces of
heavy artillery and thirteen of light.[18] Among them were eight
X-inch, one IX-inch, and one VIII-inch columbiad, smooth-bore guns;
and eleven rifled guns of a calibre of 6.5 inches and upward.

At 11.10 P.M., the fleet then moving at a speed scarcely exceeding the
drift of the current, a musketry fire began from the upper batteries
of the enemy. At 11.16 the great guns began, slowly at first, but soon
more rapidly. A few moments later a large fire was lit on the point,
bringing the vessels, as they passed before it, into bold relief, and
serving to confuse, to some extent, the pilots of the fleet. Each ship
as she brought her guns to bear on rounding the point, opened her
fire, first from the bow and then from the port battery. The
engagement thus soon became general and animated. The confusion of the
scene was increased by the eddying currents of the river, which,
catching the slowly moving steamers, now on the bow, now on the
quarter, swung them round with their broadside to the stream, or even
threw the bow up river again. Unable to see through the smoke and
perplexed by the light of the fire, the majority of the vessels, thus
cut around, made a full turn in the stream under the guns of the
enemy, and one, at least, went round twice. The flag-ship Benton,
though heavily struck, passed through without special adventure
escaping this involuntary wheel. The Lafayette, in the smoke, found
her nose nearly on shore on the enemy's side, and her coal barge
received a shell in the bow which reduced it to a sinking condition.
The Louisville, next astern, coming up, fouled the Lafayette's
consort, the General Price; which, being already badly cut up by shot
and shell, cast off her fasts and made the rest of the journey alone.
The Lafayette then let go her barge and went down without further
adventure. The Louisville also lost her barge, apparently, at this
time, but picked it up again while still under fire. The Mound City
following came down upon the three vessels thus sported with by the
current and the difficulties of the night, and to avoid a like
disaster passed them by. The Pittsburg came next in her appointed
station; like the Mound City, she escaped the pranks of the eddy, and
both vessels, steaming leisurely on, used their guns with good effect;
receiving, while passing the burning pile ashore, several shot from
the enemy. The Pittsburg was struck on the quarter, where the logs
alone prevented the shot from entering the magazine. The Carondelet
met with no other mishap than making an involuntary circle in the
river. The Tuscumbia remained in rear of the transports, which had a
hard time. Either swung by the eddy, or daunted by the tremendous fire
which they were certainly ill-fitted to resist, two of them at one
time pointed up stream. The Tuscumbia stopped, prepared to compel
their passage down; but force was not needed. The Henry Clay caught
fire, was burnt and sank; the other resumed her course. When rounding
the point, the Tuscumbia touched, and as she backed off fouled the
Forest Queen, causing great hurrahs among the enemy. The vessels soon
got apart, but the transport had a shot through her steam-pipe; so the
Tuscumbia stuck to her, the two drifting down together until out of
range, when the gunboat towed the other ashore. The Tuscumbia had a
shot in the bows under water, starting seven planks and causing her to
leak badly.

Though repeatedly hulled, the armed vessels received no injury
unfitting them for instant service, and of their crews lost only 13
wounded. By three o'clock in the morning they were all anchored twelve
miles above New Carthage, ready to co-operate with the movements of
the army.

Encouraged by the comparative success of the transports on the 16th,
Grant directed six more to run the batteries, which was done on the
night of the 22d. One got a shot under water, and sank after getting
by; the others were more or less damaged, but were repaired by the
orders of Admiral Porter. Still the number was so limited, in
proportion to the amount of transportation required, that the general
decided to move the troops by land to Hard Times Landing, twenty-five
miles below New Carthage by the course of the river. The ships of war
and transports followed, the latter carrying as many men as they
could.

Five miles below Hard Times, on the opposite shore, is Grand Gulf,
where a battery had fired upon Farragut, both on his passage to
Vicksburg and return from there, after the fight at Port Hudson. The
Confederates had begun to strengthen the works immediately after that
time to prevent him from going by with impunity; but as he considered
his task limited to the blockade of the Red River and the Mississippi
below, to which alone his force was adequate, he had not again come
within their range. Immediately above Grand Gulf is the mouth of the
Big Black River, a considerable stream, by which supplies from the Red
River country were transported to the interior of the Confederacy on
the east of the Mississippi.

Eight hundred yards below the mouth of the Big Black is the Point of
Rocks, rising about seventy-five feet above the river at its then
height. On this was the upper battery, mounting, at the time of
attack, two VII-inch rifles, one VIII-inch smooth-bore, and a 30-pound
rifled gun on wheels. A line of rifle-pits and a covered way led from
there to the lower fort, three-quarters of a mile farther down, in
which were mounted one 100-pound rifle, one VIII-inch smooth-bore, and
two 32-pounders. There were in addition five light rifled guns, 10-and
20-pounders, in different parts of the works. The Point of Rocks
battery was close over the river, but the bluffs below receded so as
to leave a narrow strip of land, three to four hundred yards wide,
along the water and in front of the lower fort. All the fortifications
were earthworks.

    [Illustration: Battle at Grand Gulf.]

The intention was to silence the works by the fleet, after which the
army was to cross in transports, under cover of the gunboats, and
carry the place by storm. The orders prescribing the manner of attack
were issued by the admiral on the 27th. On the 29th, at 7 A.M., the
fleet got under way, the Pittsburg leading; her commander, Lieutenant
Hoel, a volunteer officer, being himself a pilot for the Mississippi,
obtained the honor of leading through his local knowledge. The
Louisville, Carondelet, and Mound City followed in the order named,
firing upon the upper fort so long as their guns bore, but passing by
it to attack the lower work, which was allotted to them. The Pittsburg
rounded to as she reached her station, keeping up her fire all the
time, and took position close into the bank with her head up stream.
The Louisville, following the Pittsburg's motions, passed her, rounded
to and took her station immediately astern. The Carondelet and Mound
City successively performed the same manoeuvre. All four then went
into close action with the lower fort, at the same time directing any
of their guns that would bear upon other points of the works. The
remaining vessels, Lafayette, Tuscumbia, and flag-ship Benton,
followed the first four, but rounded to above the town to engage the
upper fort; the Lafayette taking position at first in an eddy of the
river, and using her two stern guns, 100-pound rifles. The Benton and
Tuscumbia fought their bow and starboard guns; all the vessels keeping
under way during the engagement, and being at times baffled by the
eddies in the stream. At eleven o'clock, the admiral signalled the
Lafayette to change her position to the lower battery, which she did.
About eleven, a shot came into the Benton's pilot-house, wounding the
pilot and shattering the wheel. The vessel was for a moment
unmanageable, got into an eddy, and was carried down three-quarters of
a mile before she could again be brought under control; but her place
was promptly supplied by the Pittsburg, which had just moved up with
that division of the fleet, the lower fort being silenced. The whole
squadron now concentrated its fire upon the Point of Rocks battery,
keeping under way, and from the difficulties of the stream and the
eddying current, at varying ranges. The Lafayette took again her
position in the eddy to the north of the battery. Half an hour after
noon, the Tuscumbia's port engine was disabled, and being unable to
stem the stream with her screws, she was compelled to drop down below
Grand Gulf. The action was continued vigorously until 1 P.M., when the
enemy's fire, which had not been silenced in the upper fort, slackened
materially. The admiral then passed up the river to consult with
Grant, who had seen the fight from the deck of a tug and realized, as
did Porter, that the works had proved themselves too high and too
strong to be taken from the water side. He therefore decided to land
the troops, who were already on board the transports waiting to cross,
and march down to the point immediately below Grand Gulf, while Porter
signalled his ships to withdraw, which they did, after an action
lasting four hours and a quarter, tying up again to the landing at
Hard Times. The limitation to the power of the vessels was very
clearly shown here, as at Fort Donelson; the advantage given by
commanding height could not be overcome by them. On a level, as at
Fort Henry, or with slight advantage of command against them, as at
Arkansas Post, the chances were that they would at close quarters win
by disabling or silencing the guns; but when it came to a question of
elevation the guns on shore were too much sheltered. Even so, it may
be looked upon as an unusual misfortune that after tearing the works
to pieces as they did, no gun of the Confederates was seriously
injured. On the other hand, though the gunboats were roughly handled,
it could be claimed for them, too, that they were not silenced, and
that, like the earthworks, they were not, with one exception,
seriously injured. The loss of the fleet was: the Benton, 7 killed and
19 wounded; Tuscumbia, 5 killed and 24 wounded; Pittsburg, 6 killed
and 13 wounded. The Lafayette had one man wounded, while the remaining
vessels lost none.

In the afternoon the Confederates were observed to be repairing their
works, so the Lafayette was ordered down to stop them. She soon drove
off the working parties, and then kept up a steady fire at five-minute
intervals against the upper battery until 8 P.M., getting no reply
from a work which had responded so vigorously in the morning.

That evening the fleet got under way at 8 P.M., the Benton leading,
followed by the other gunboats and the transports, the Lafayette
joining as they reached her station. The armed vessels again engaged
the batteries and the transports slipped safely by under cover of this
attack, receiving no injury; in fact, being struck not more than two
or three times. As soon as they had passed, the gunboats followed, and
tied up again on the Louisiana shore, four miles below Grand Gulf. One
life only was lost in the night action, on board the Mound City.

At daylight the following morning the work of carrying the army across
the Mississippi to Bruinsburg began, the gunboats as well as the
transports aiding in the operation.

The same day, April 30th, a feigned attack was made at Haines's Bluff
by the vessels of the squadron remaining above Vicksburg, under
Lieutenant-Commander K.R. Breese, in conjunction with the Fifteenth
Army Corps, under General W.T. Sherman. The object of General Grant in
ordering this demonstration was to hinder the Confederates at
Vicksburg from sending heavy reinforcements to Grand Gulf to oppose
the troops on their first landing. The expedition was most successful
in attaining this end, but the vessels were very roughly handled,
having been much exposed with the wish to make the attack appear as
real as possible. The Choctaw, Lieutenant-Commander F.M. Ramsay, was
struck as often as forty-six times. Despite the heavy fire of the
enemy, no serious casualties occurred on board the fleet in an action
which lasted three hours, from 11 A.M. to 2 P.M. The demonstration was
continued during the following day, but at 8 P.M. General Sherman
withdrew his troops to the other side of the Mississippi, taking up
his march to join the main body of the army; and the vessels returned
to their anchorage off the mouth of the Yazoo.

On the morning of the 3d Porter advanced upon Grand Gulf with his
fleet below, intending to attack if the enemy were still there; but
the place was found to be evacuated, as had been expected, the march
of the army inland having rendered it untenable. The earthworks were
torn to pieces by the fire of the fleet, and Colonel Wade, the
commandant, had been killed; but the guns were still in position,
except two 32-pounders in the lower battery, which were dismounted and
broken. A large quantity of ammunition was also obtained, showing that
lack of it was not the cause of the fire slackening on the 29th of
April. The same day General Grant arrived, and made the necessary
arrangements for transferring his base of supplies to Grand Gulf
instead of Bruinsburg.

On the day that Porter ran by the batteries of Vicksburg, April 16th,
Farragut, having received his secretary and the despatches brought by
him, went back from Port Hudson to the mouth of the Red River. During
the next fortnight he kept up the blockade of the Mississippi between
those two points, twice catching stores crossing in flat-boats,
besides destroying a number of boats along the river and a large
quantity of commissary stores at Bayou Sara. Besides cutting off Port
Hudson from the west bank of the Mississippi, his presence in this
position prevented reinforcements from that place being sent by the
Red River, as they otherwise might have been, to the Confederate
General Taylor, who was now being pressed by Banks toward Alexandria.
Farragut had also in view blockading the Black River, a tributary of
the Red, which enters it from the north and northwest about thirty
miles from the Mississippi and by which it was reported that
reinforcements to Taylor were expected to arrive from Arkansas.

These military movements in Western Louisiana were due to the
operations of General Banks, who had abandoned the demonstration
made from Baton Rouge against Port Hudson, at the time Farragut passed,
and resumed his operations by the Bayous Teche and Atchafalaya. This
expedition was accompanied by four light gunboats, the Calhoun, Clifton,
Arizona, and Estrella, under the command of Lieutenant-Commander A.P.
Cooke, of the latter vessel. The land forces reached Opelousas near the
Teche, sixty miles from Alexandria, on the 20th of April; and the same
day the gunboats took Butte-à-la-Rose, on the Atchafalaya, sixty miles
from Brashear City, a fortified place, mounting two heavy guns. Banks
continued his advance upon Alexandria, and the gunboats pushed on
through the Atchafalaya for the mouth of the Red River.

On the evening of the 1st of May the Arizona arrived where the
Hartford was then lying, bringing with her despatches from Banks to
Farragut, asking his co-operation against Alexandria. The Estrella
coming a few hours later, the admiral sent the two, with the
Albatross, under Lieutenant-Commander John E. Hart, senior officer, up
the Red River on the 3d. The little detachment reached the mouth of
the Black River that afternoon, and there learned that none of the
Confederate reinforcements expected by that stream had as yet passed.
At sunset they anchored thirteen miles below Gordon's Landing. The
next day, at 5 A.M., they again went up the stream, reaching, at 8.40,
the bluff and bend which had been the scene of the capture of the
Queen of the West ten weeks before. When the Albatross, which was
leading, looked out from behind the bluff her people saw a battery
with three casemates, now called Fort De Russey, commanding the river,
covering two river steamers with steam up; alongside one of these was
a flat-boat loaded with a heavy gun, believed to be one of those taken
from the Indianola. Below the battery was a heavy raft, stretching
across the stream and secured by chains to both banks. The Albatross
went at once into action at a distance of five hundred yards, having,
at that distance, to deal not only with the battery but with
sharpshooters sheltered behind cotton barricades on board the
steamers. The ship was much embarrassed by the eddies and the
intricacy of the channel, touching several times; but the fight was
maintained for forty minutes, after which she withdrew, having been
hulled eleven times, her spars and rigging seriously injured, and
having lost two men killed and four wounded. The force was too small
to grapple successfully with the work, so Lieutenant-Commander Hart
gave the order to return.

On the way down the vessels met Admiral Porter, who had delayed at
Grand Gulf no longer than was necessary to take possession. Leaving
there at noon of the day of its occupation he reached the mouth of the
Red River on the 4th, and communicated with Farragut. The next day he
went up the Red River, taking with him, besides the flag-ship Benton,
the Lafayette, Pittsburg, and Price. The ram Switzerland, which
Farragut no longer needed, and the tug Ivy accompanied him.

When he fell in with Hart's expedition, Porter took the Estrella and
Arizona in addition to his own force, leaving the Albatross to rejoin
Farragut alone. On the 5th, toward sundown, Fort De Russey was
reached, but found to be abandoned and the guns removed, except one
64-pounder. Losing no time in destroying the abandoned works, the
squadron pushed on at once for Alexandria; a passage through the raft
being opened by the Price's ram. The Arizona having speed was sent
ahead to surprise any steamer that might be at the town, where she
arrived the evening of the 6th, the rest of the vessels coming up the
following morning. Most of the Confederate public property had been
already removed to Shreveport, three hundred and fifty miles farther
up, in the northwest corner of Louisiana, where the gunboats in that
stage of the river could not follow. General Banks arrived on the
evening of the 7th from Opelousas.

As the river was beginning to fall, Porter went down again on the 8th
with all the vessels but the Lafayette, Captain Walke, who was left at
Alexandria to co-operate with the army. The Benton stopped for a short
time at Fort De Russey, while a detached expedition, consisting of the
Price, Switzerland, Pittsburg, and Arizona was sent up the Black
River. They got as far as Harrisonburg, seventy miles up, where were
found batteries on high hills too heavy for the force, which was
recalled after communicating with the admiral, having succeeded in
destroying $300,000 worth of the enemy's provisions. The Switzerland,
Estrella, and Arizona were now sent up to Captain Walke at Alexandria,
and the admiral returned to Grand Gulf on the 13th. The Black River
expedition was in itself of no great consequence; but, taken in
connection with others of the same character through these waters,
after the fall of Vicksburg, and the expected reinforcements of Taylor
by the same route, it illustrates the facilities for rapidly
traversing the enemy's country afforded by the navigable streams, and
the part played by them in the conduct of the war by either party.

Farragut now felt that his personal presence was no longer required
above Port Hudson, and returned to New Orleans by one of the bayous;
leaving Commodore Palmer with the Hartford, Albatross, Estrella, and
Arizona to maintain the blockade above until Porter was ready to
assume the entire charge. The Hartford, however, did not come down
till after the surrender of Port Hudson, two months later.

After the capture of Alexandria and the dispersal of the enemy in that
quarter, General Banks moved down with his army to Simmesport, on the
Atchafalaya Bayou, five miles from the Red River, and thence across
the Mississippi at Bayou Sara, five or six miles above Port Hudson.
General Augur of his command at the same time moved up from Baton
Rouge. The two bodies met on the 23d of May, and Port Hudson was
immediately invested. An assault was made on the 27th, but proved
unsuccessful, and the army settled down to a regular siege. A battery
of four IX-inch shell-guns from the navy was efficiently served
throughout the siege by a detachment of seamen from the Richmond and
Essex under Lieutenant-Commander Edward Terry, executive officer of
the former vessel. The Essex, Commander Caldwell, and the half dozen
mortar-schooners under his orders maintained a constant bombardment
and succession of artillery fights with the river batteries of the
enemy, being exposed to the fire of four VIII-and X-inch columbiads
and two heavy rifles. Between the 23d of May and 26th of June Caldwell
estimated that one thousand shot and shell had been fired at him from
these guns. During these daily engagements the Essex was hulled
twenty-three times, besides being frequently struck above her decks,
and had received severe injury. The mortar-schooners also came in for
their share of hard knocks, and their captains were all specially
commended both by Caldwell and Farragut.

On the 15th of May Porter went to the Yazoo and there awaited news
from the army. On the 18th heavy firing in the rear of the city
assured him of Grant's approach. That afternoon the advance of
Sherman's corps came in below Snyder's Bluff, between the city and
Haines's Bluff. The works at the latter point had been abandoned the
evening before on the approach of the army; a small party only being
left to destroy or remove whatever they could. Upon the appearance of
the troops the admiral sent up a force of gunboats under
Lieutenant-Commander K.R. Breese, whereupon the party ran off, leaving
everything in good order. The works mounted fourteen heavy guns,
VIII-and X-inch smooth-bores, and VII½-inch rifles; the carriages of
these were burned, as were the Confederate encampments, and the
magazines blown up. Porter now received letters from Grant, Sherman,
and Steele, informing him of the entire success of the campaign in the
rear of Vicksburg, and asking that provisions might be sent up, the
army having lived off the country almost entirely during a fortnight
of constant marching and fighting. Lieutenant-Commander J.G. Walker
in the De Kalb was sent up to Yazoo City with sufficient force to
destroy the enemy's property which he might find, and the gunboats
below Vicksburg were moved up to fire on the hill batteries, an
annoyance to the garrison which they kept up off and on during the
night. On the 19th six mortar-boats were got into position, with
orders to fire night and day as rapidly as possible.

Grant, having completed the investment of Vicksburg, sent word on the
evening of the 21st that he intended to make a general assault upon
the enemy's works at 10 A.M. the following day, and asked that the
fleet might shell the batteries from 9.30 to 10.30. Porter complied by
keeping up his mortar fire all night and sending up the gunboats to
shell the water batteries, and other places where he thought the enemy
might find rest. At 7 A.M. the next day the Mound City, followed at
eight by the Benton, Tuscumbia, and Carondelot, moved up abreast the
lower end of the canal, opening upon the hill batteries; then they
attacked the water batteries, the duel between them and the ships at a
range of four hundred and fifty yards being maintained incessantly for
two hours. The Tuscumbia proved, as before, too weak to withstand such
close action and had to drop down. The admiral wrote that this was the
hottest fire that the gunboats had yet endured, but the water
batteries having little elevation, the ships contended on more even
terms than at Grand Gulf, and fighting bows on, received little
damage.

The fire was maintained for an hour longer than Grant had asked, when
the vessels dropped out of range, having lost only a few wounded. The
assault of the army was not successful and regular siege operations
were begun. Vicksburg and Port Hudson, the two extremes of the
Confederate line, were thus formally invested by the 27th of May. On
that day, Porter, having received a request from Grant and Sherman to
try whether the enemy had moved from the batteries the guns on their
extreme left, as they had from many of the other hill batteries, sent
down the gunboat Cincinnati, Lieutenant George M. Bache, to draw their
fire if still there; and, if possible, to enfilade the enemy's
rifle-pits in that quarter and drive them out. The Cincinnati started
from the upper division of the squadron at 7 A.M.; the vessels of the
lower division, Price, Benton, Mound City, and Carondelet, steaming up
at the same time to cover her movement by engaging the lower
batteries, which might have played upon her. General Sherman took a
position upon a hill at the extreme right of the Union lines,
overlooking the river, so as to see the affair and take advantage of
any success gained by the Cincinnati's attack. The gunboat, protected
as usual by logs and hay, came within range shortly after nine
o'clock, and the enemy began firing rapidly from all their batteries,
the guns whose position had been doubted proving to be in their old
place. When abreast the position assigned her for enfilading the
rifle-pits the Cincinnati rounded to, and as she did so a shot pierced
her side and entered the shell-room, capsizing nearly all the boxes on
one side of the alley. As she came to with her head up stream, another
ball entered the shell-room below the water-line, and a third pierced
her stern, always the weakest part of these vessels, going into the
magazine, also below the water-line, flooding it instantly and causing
the vessel to fill rapidly. A heavy shot drove through the
pilot-house, and shortly afterward the starboard tiller was carried
away. The plunging fire of many big guns, concentrated on a single
vessel, wrought great injury in a short time; penetrating her light
deck, five of her guns were disabled by it. All three flag-staffs were
shot away, carrying the colors down with them; upon which, a
quartermaster, Frank Bois by name, went out and nailed a flag to the
stump that was left of the forward staff. Finding the vessel must
sink, Lieutenant Bache kept running up stream, hugging the east bank
to be as far as possible out of the enemy's range, and about ten
minutes before she went down sheered in, ran out a hawser, and a plank
by which the wounded were landed. Unfortunately the men who went
ashore with the hawser did not secure it properly, the boat began
drifting out into the stream, and the officers and crew had to swim
for their lives. She sank in three fathoms of water within range of
the enemy's batteries, the second to go down of the seven first built.
The loss was 5 killed, 14 wounded, and 15 missing; supposed to have
been drowned.

The detached expedition to Yazoo City, under Lieutenant-Commander
Walker, had returned on the evening of the 23d. On the approach of the
vessels, the Confederates had set fire to the navy yard and three
steamers on the stocks building for ships of war, one a very large
vessel, 310 feet long by 70 feet beam and intended to carry 4½-inch
plating. All that had not been destroyed or removed by the enemy the
gunboats finished, the loss being estimated at two million dollars. An
attack was made upon the gunboats at a bend of the river by a small
force of riflemen with three field pieces, but was repelled without
trouble, one man only being killed and eight slightly wounded. The
morning after their return the same vessels were again sent up. One of
the light-draughts, the Signal, met with the curious accident of
knocking down her smoke-stacks, an incident which again illustrates
the peculiar character of this bayou warfare. Sending her back, and
leaving his own vessel, the De Kalb, to follow as rapidly as possible,
Walker pushed on with the Forest Rose, Linden, and Petrel to within
fifteen miles of Fort Pemberton, by which the Yazoo Pass expedition
had been baffled. Here four fine steamers had been sunk on a bar,
stopping farther progress. Having no means of raising them, they were
fired and burned to the water's edge. The vessels then passed down the
Yazoo, burning a large saw-mill twenty-five miles above Yazoo City,
till they came to the Big Sunflower River. They ascended this stream
one hundred and eighty miles, branch expeditions being sent into the
bayous that enter it, destroying or causing the destruction of four
more steamers. Transportation on the Yazoo by the Confederates was now
broken up below Fort Pemberton, while above it a few steamers only
remained.

From this time until the surrender of Vicksburg little occurred to
vary the routine siege operations. Thirteen heavy cannon, from IX-inch
to 32-pounders, were landed from the fleet to take their place in the
siege batteries, in charge, at different points of the lines, of
Lieutenant-Commander T.O. Selfridge, and Acting-Masters C.B. Dahlgren
and J.F. Reed; and as many officers and men as could be spared were
sent with them. Three heavy guns, a X-inch, IX-inch, and 100-pound
rifle, under the command of Lieutenant-Commander F.M. Ramsay, of the
Choctaw, were placed in scows close to the point opposite the town,
but where they were protected by the bank, enfilading the batteries
and rifle-pits on the enemy's left, against which the Cincinnati had
made her unsuccessful attack. The gunboats below were constantly under
fire and the mortars steadily shelling. On the 19th of June Grant
notified the admiral that he intended to open a general bombardment at
4 A.M. the following day and continue it till 10 A.M. The lower
division, the scow battery, and the mortars joined in this, shelling
the hill batteries and the city, but no reply was made by the enemy
from the water front.

The great service of the navy during the siege was keeping open the
communications, which were entirely by the river from the time that
Sherman's corps reached Snyder's Bluff. The danger of Vicksburg
thrilled from the heart of the Confederacy through every nerve to its
extremities. It was felt that its fall would carry down Port Hudson
also, leave the Mississippi open, and hopelessly sever the East and
West. Every man, therefore, that could be moved was in motion, and
though the enemy had no vessel on the river, the banks on either side
swarmed with guerillas, moving rapidly from spot to spot, rarely
attempting to attack any body of troops, but falling back into the
interior and dispersing when followed up. Provided with numerous field
pieces, they sought to cut off the transports carrying reinforcements
and the steamers carrying supplies. The tortuous course of the stream
in many places enabled those who knew the ground to move rapidly
across the country and attack the same vessel a second time if she
escaped the first assault. On several occasions batteries were built,
and a large force attempted the destruction of transports. From these
dangers the navy was the only, as it was the best protection. The long
line from Cairo to Vicksburg was patrolled by the smaller class of
gunboats, and, thanks to their skilful distribution and the activity
and courage of the individual commanders, no serious interruption of
travel occurred. One steamer only was badly disabled and a few men
killed or wounded.

On the 4th of July, 1863, Vicksburg surrendered, and on the 9th the
garrison of Port Hudson also laid down its arms. The Mississippi was
now open from Cairo to the Gulf, and the merchant steamboat Imperial,
leaving St. Louis on the 8th, reached New Orleans on the 10th of this
month without molestation.

The Navy Department now directed that the command of the river as far
down as New Orleans should be assumed by Porter, Farragut to confine
himself henceforth to the coast operations and blockade. Toward the
end of July the two admirals met in New Orleans, and, the transfer
having been made, Farragut sailed on the 1st of August for the North
to enjoy a short respite from his labors. Porter then returned to
Cairo, where he at once divided the long line of waterways under his
command into eight districts,[19] of which six were on the
Mississippi. The seventh extended on the Ohio from Cairo to the
Tennessee, and thence through the course of the latter river, while
the eighth embraced the upper Ohio and the Valley of the Cumberland.
Each district had its own commander, who was responsible to the
admiral, but was not to interfere with another unless in case of great
need. For the present all was quiet, but there were already rumors of
trouble to come when the enemy should recover from the stunning blows
he had just received.

FOOTNOTES:

[14] A son of Colonel Charles Ellet, Jr., the first commander of the
ram fleet.

[15] Confederate Return of March 27, 1863. A large number of field
pieces, reported to be as many as 35, took part in the action of the
15th.

[16] Of these, four were 24-pounder brass howitzers, usually not
counted in ships' batteries.

[17] For particulars of batteries of Mississippi Squadron of 1662 and
1863, see Appendix.

[18] Report of Colonel Higgins, C.S.A., commanding the river batteries.

[19] The number of districts was afterward increased to ten.




CHAPTER VI.

MINOR OCCURRENCES IN 1863.


On the 4th of July, the same day that Vicksburg surrendered, an attack
was made upon Helena, in Arkansas, by the Confederates in force. The
garrison at the same time numbered 4,000 men, the enemy were variously
estimated at from 9,000 to 15,000. Having attacked the centre of the
position, the Confederates carried the rifle-pits and a battery upon
the hills, in rear of the town, which commanded all the other
defensive works as well as the town itself. They then began pushing
masses of troops down the hill, while their sharpshooters were picking
off the artillerists in the main fort, called Fort Curtis. Guns had
also been placed in commanding positions near the river, both above
and below the town, and opened fire upon the line of defensive works
across the river bottom, there about a thousand yards in width.
Lieutenant-Commander Pritchett, of the Tyler, seeing how the assault
was about to be made, placed his vessel in front of the town, so that
her broadside played upon the enemy descending the hills, while their
artillery above and below were exposed to her bow and stern guns. From
this advantageous position the Tyler opened fire, and to her powerful
battery and the judgment with which it was used must be mainly
attributed the success of the day; for though the garrison fought with
great gallantry and tenacity, they were outnumbered two to one. The
enemy were driven back with great slaughter. General Prentiss,
commanding the post, took occasion to acknowledge, in the fullest and
most generous manner, Pritchett's care in previously acquainting
himself with the character of the ground, as well as the assistance
afterward rendered by him in the fight. Four hundred of the enemy were
buried on the field and 1,100 were made prisoners.

While Grant was occupied at Vicksburg and Banks at Port Hudson,
General Taylor, commanding the Confederate forces in West Louisiana,
had concentrated, on the morning of the 6th of June, a force of three
brigades at Richmond, about ten miles from Milliken's Bend and twenty
from Young's Point. At Milliken's there was a brigade of negro troops,
with a few companies of the Twenty-third Iowa white regiment, in all
1,100 men; and at Young's a few scattered detachments, numbering 500
or 600. Taylor determined to try a surprise of both points, having
also a vague hope of communicating with Vicksburg, or causing some
diversion in its favor. At sundown of the 6th one brigade was moved
toward Milliken's, and one toward Young's Point, the third taking a
position in reserve six miles from Richmond. The force directed
against Young's Point blundered on its way, got there in broad
daylight, and, finding a gunboat present, retired without making any
serious attempt. The other brigade, commanded by McCulloch, reached
its destination about 3 A.M. of the 7th, drove in the pickets and
advanced with determination upon the Union lines. The latter were
gradually forced back of the levee, the Iowa regiment fighting with
great steadiness, and the negroes behaving well individually; but they
lacked organization and knowledge of their weapons. Accordingly when
the enemy, who were much superior in numbers, charged the levee and
came hand to hand, the colored troops, after a few moments of
desperate struggle, broke and fled under the bank of the river.
Nothing saved them from destruction but the presence of the Choctaw,
which at 3.30 A.M. had opened her fire and was now able to maintain it
without fear of injuring her friends. The Confederates could not, or
would not face it, and withdrew at 8.30 A.M. What the fate of these
black troops would have been had the Confederates come upon them in
the flush of a successful charge seems somewhat doubtful, in view of
Taylor's suggestive remark that "_unfortunately_ some fifty of them
had been taken prisoners."

Immediately after the surrender of Vicksburg, Porter followed up the
discomfiture of the Confederates by a series of raids into the
interior of the country through its natural water-ways.
Lieutenant-Commander Walker was again sent up to Yazoo City, this time
in company with a force of troops numbering 5,000, under Major-General
Herron. During the month that had passed since Walker's last visit,
the enemy had been fortifying the place, and the batteries were found
ready to receive the vessels. General Herron was then notified, and
when his men were landed, a combined attack was made by the army and
navy. The Confederates made but slight resistance and soon fled,
abandoning everything. Six heavy guns and one vessel fell into the
Union hands, and four fine steamers wore destroyed by the enemy.
Unfortunately, while the De Kalb was moving slowly along she struck a
torpedo, which exploded under her bow and sunk her. As she went down
another exploded under her stern, shattering it badly. This gunboat,
which at first was called the St. Louis, was the third to be lost of
the seven. The Cincinnati was afterward raised; but the De Kalb was so
shattered as to make it useless to repair her.

At this same time Lieutenant-Commander Selfridge, with a force of
light-draught gunboats, entered the Red River, turned out of it into
the Black, and from the latter again into the Tensas; following one of
the routes by which Grant had thought to move his army below
Vicksburg. This water-line runs parallel with the Mississippi.
Selfridge succeeded in reaching the head of navigation, Tensas Lake
and Bayou Macon, thirty miles above Vicksburg, and only five or six
from the Mississippi. The expedition was divided at a tributary of the
Black, called Little Red River; two going up it, while two continued
up the Tensas. Afterward it went up the Washita as far as
Harrisonburg, where the batteries stopped them. Four steamers were
destroyed, together with a quantity of ammunition and provisions.

A few weeks later, in August, Lieutenant Bache, late of the
Cincinnati, went up the White River with three gunboats, the
Lexington, Cricket, and Marmora. At a second Little Red River, a
narrow and crooked tributary of the White, the Cricket was sent off to
look for two steamers said to be hidden there. Bache himself went on
to Augusta, thirty miles further up the White, where he got certain
news of the movements of the Confederate army in Arkansas; thus
attaining one of his chief objects. He now returned to the mouth of
the Little Red, and, leaving the Marmora there, went up himself to see
how the Cricket had fared. The little vessel was met coming down;
bringing with her the two steamers, but having lost one man killed and
eight wounded in a brush with sharpshooters. On their return the three
vessels were waylaid at every available point by musketry, but met
with no loss. They had gone two hundred and fifty miles up the White,
and forty up the Little Red River.

During a great part of 1863, Tennessee and Kentucky, beyond the lines
of the Union army, were a prey not only to raids by detached bodies of
the enemy's army, but also to the operations of guerillas and light
irregular forces. The ruling feeling of the country favored the
Confederate cause, so that every hamlet and farm-house gave a refuge
to these marauders, while at the same time the known existence of some
Union feeling made it hard for officers to judge, in all cases,
whether punishment should fall on the places where the attacks were
made. The country between the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers early in
the year harbored many of these irregular bodies, having a certain
loose organization and a number of field-pieces. The distance between
the two streams in the lower part of their course being small, they
were able to move from the banks of one to the other with ease. It was
necessary, therefore, to keep these rivers patrolled by a force of
gunboats; which, though forming part of Porter's fleet, were under the
immediate orders of Captain Alexander M. Pennock, commanding the naval
station at Cairo. West of the rivers, between them and the great
river, the western parts of Kentucky and Tennessee and the northern
part of Mississippi were under control of the Union troops, though
inroads of guerillas were not unknown. Nashville was held by the Union
forces; but the Confederates were not far away at Shelbyville and
Tullahoma. The fights between the gunboats and the hostile parties on
these rivers do not individually possess much importance, but have an
interest in showing the unending and essential work performed by the
navy in keeping the communications open, aiding isolated garrisons,
and checking the growth of the guerilla war.

On the 30th of January Lieutenant-Commander S.L. Phelps, having been
sent by Captain Pennock in the Lexington to make a special examination
of the condition of affairs on the Cumberland River, reported that, a
transport having been fired upon twenty miles above Clarksville, he
had landed and burned a storehouse used as a resort by the enemy. As
he returned the vessel was attacked with some Parrott rifles and
struck three times; but the heavy guns of the Lexington drove the
enemy off. Going down to Clarksville he met there a fleet of
thirty-one steamers, having many barges in tow, convoyed by three
light-draught gunboats. These he joined, and the enemy having tested
the power of the Lexington, did not fire a shot between Clarksville
and Nashville. As a result of his enquiries he thought that no
transport should be allowed to go without convoy higher than Fort
Henry or Donelson, situated on either river on the line separating
Kentucky and Tennessee. The Lexington was therefore detained, and for
a time added to the flotilla on those rivers.

Four days later, Lieutenant-Commander Le Roy Fitch, in active charge
of the two rivers, was going up the Cumberland with a fleet of
transports, convoyed by the Lexington and five light-draughts. When
twenty-four miles below Dover, the town on the west bank near which
Fort Donelson was situated, he met a steamer bearing a message from
Colonel Harding, commanding the post, to the effect that his pickets
had been driven in and that he was attacked in force. Fitch at once
left the convoy and pushed ahead as fast as he could. A short distance
below the town he met a second steamer with the news that Harding was
surrounded. At 8 P.M. he arrived, and found the Union forces not only
surrounded by overwhelming forces but out of ammunition.

The enemy, not thinking about gunboats, had posted the main body of
his troops in a graveyard at the west end of the town, the left wing
resting in a ravine that led down to the river, thus enabling the
vessels to rake that portion of his line. The gunboats opened fire
simultaneously up the ravine, into the graveyard and upon the valley
beyond. Taken wholly by surprise, the Confederates did not return a
shot, but decamped in haste. Leaving two boats to maintain the fire
through the ravine, Fitch hastened up with the other four to shell the
main road, which, after leaving the upper end of the town, follows
nearly the bank of the stream for some distance. The attacking force
in this case was 4,500 strong, composed of regular Confederate troops
under Generals Wheeler, Forrest, and Wharton. By 11 P.M. they had
disappeared, leaving 140 dead. The garrison, which numbered only 800,
had defended itself gallantly against this overwhelming force since
noon, but was _in extremis_ when the gunboats arrived.

On the 27th of March, Fitch was at Fort Hindman, on the Tennessee,
where he took on board a force of 150 soldiers and went up the river.
On reaching Savanna he heard of a cotton-mill four miles back being
run for the Confederate army. The troops and a force of sailors were
landed and took the mill, although a regiment of the enemy's cavalry
was but two or three miles away. Finding no sure proof of its working
for the army, they did not destroy the building, but removed some of
the essential parts of the machinery. Going on to Chickasaw, south of
the Tennessee line, as the water was too low for the Lexington, he
sent on two light-draughts as far as Florence, where they shelled a
camp of the enemy. The rapid falling of the river obliged them to
return. On the way a quantity of food and live stock belonging to a
noted abettor of guerilla warfare were seized.

Having returned to the mouth of the Cumberland to coal, Fitch received
a telegram on the 3d of April that a convoy had been attacked at
Palmyra, thirty miles above Dover, and the gunboat St. Clair disabled.
He at once got under way, took five light-draughts besides his own
vessel, the Lexington, and went up the river. When he reached Palmyra
he burned every house in the town, as a punishment for the firing on
unarmed vessels and harboring guerillas. A quick movement followed
against a body of the enemy higher up the stream, but they had notice
of his approach, and had disappeared.

On the 24th a steamer was fired upon in the Tennessee, and three men
badly wounded. Fitch went at once to the scene, but the enemy were
off. On the 26th, cruising up the river, he found the vessels of
General Ellet, commanding what was now called the Marine Brigade,
fighting a battery and body of infantry 700 strong. Fitch joined in,
and the enemy were of course repulsed. The Marine Brigade landed and
pursued the enemy some distance, finding their commander mortally
wounded.

On the 26th of May Lieutenant-Commander Phelps, with the Covington and
two other gunboats, was at Hamburg, on the Tennessee, a few miles from
the Mississippi State line. Here he ferried across 1,500 cavalry and
four light field-pieces from Corinth, in Mississippi, under Colonel
Cornyn. This little body made a forced march upon Florence, forty
miles distant, in rear of the left of the Confederate army at
Columbia, captured the place and destroyed a large amount of property,
including three cotton-mills. An attempt was made by the enemy to cut
this force off on its return to the boats, but without success.

Early in July a very daring raid was made by General J.H. Morgan of
the Confederate army into the States of Kentucky, Indiana, and Ohio.
Crossing the Ohio River at Brandenburg, he moved in an easterly
direction through the southern part of Indiana and Ohio, burning
bridges, tearing up railroads, destroying public property, capturing
small bodies of troops, and causing general consternation. Fitch
heard of him, and at once started up the river with his lightest
vessels to cut off the retreat of the raiders. Leaving some boats to
patrol the river below, he himself, in the Moose, came up with them on
the 19th, at a ford a mile and a half above Buffington Island, and two
hundred and fifty miles east of Cincinnati. The retreating enemy had
placed two field-pieces in position, but the Moose's battery of
24-pound howitzers drove them off with shell and shrapnel. The troops
in pursuit had come up, so the Confederates, finding their retreat
stopped, broke and ran up the stream in headlong flight, leaving their
wounded and dismounted men behind. The Moose followed, keeping always
on their right flank, and stopping two other efforts made to cross.
Only when the water became too shoal for even his little paddle
steamer of one hundred and sixty tons to go on, did Fitch stop the
chase, which had led him five hundred miles from his usual station.
His efforts and their useful results were cordially acknowledged by
Generals Burnside and Cox, at Cincinnati.

During the siege of Port Hudson the enemy on the west bank of the
Mississippi made several demonstrations against Donaldsonville and
Plaquemine, with a view to disturbing General Banks's communications;
threatening also New Orleans, which was not well prepared for defence.
Farragut stationed the Princess Royal, Commander Woolsey, at
Donaldsonville; the Winona, Lieutenant-Commander Weaver, above at
Plaquemine, and the Kineo, Lieutenant-Commander Watters, some distance
below. The Confederates attacked the fort at Donaldsonville in force
at midnight of June 27th. The Princess Royal kept under way above the
fort, engaging the assailants, the Winona arriving at 4 A.M. and
joining with her. The Kineo also came up from below, but not in time
to take part. The storming party of the enemy succeeded in getting
into the fort, but the supports broke and fled under the fire of the
gunboats, leaving the advance, numbering 120, prisoners in the hands
of the garrison. On the 7th of July, as the Monongahela was coming up
the river, some field batteries of the enemy attacked her, and her
commander, Abner Read, an officer of distinguished activity and
courage, was mortally wounded. Her other loss was 1 killed and 4
wounded; among the latter being Captain Thornton A. Jenkins, on his
way to assume command of the Richmond and of the naval forces off Port
Hudson.




CHAPTER VII.

TEXAS AND THE RED RIVER.


Upon the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson two objects in the
Southwest were presented to the consideration of the Government at
Washington--Mobile and Texas. General Banks, commanding the Department
of the Gulf, was anxious to proceed against the former; a desire fully
shared by the navy, which knew that sooner or later it must be called
upon to attack that seaport, and that each day of delay made its
defences stronger. Considerations of general policy, connected with
the action of France in Mexico and the apparent unfriendly attitude of
the Emperor Napoleon III. toward the United States, decided otherwise.
On the 10th of June, 1863, just a month before the fall of the
strongholds of the Mississippi, the French army entered the city of
Mexico. On the 24th of July General Banks was instructed to make
immediate preparations for an expedition to Texas. This was speedily
followed by other urgent orders to occupy some point or points of
Texan territory, doubtless as an indication that the course of
interference begun in the weaker republic would not be permitted to
extend to lands over which the United States claimed authority, though
actually in revolt. The expectation that France would thus attempt to
interfere was far from lacking foundation, and was shared, with
apprehension, by the Confederate Government. A year before, M. Theron,
a French consul in Texas, acting in his official capacity, had
addressed a letter to the Governor of the State, suggesting that the
re-establishment of the old republic of Texas, in other words, the
secession of the State from the Confederacy, might be well for his
"beloved adopted country;" and ended by saying that the Governor's
answer would be a guide to him in his political correspondence with
the government he represented. In consequence of this letter, M.
Theron and the French consul at Richmond, who had also been meddling
with Texan affairs, were ordered to leave the Confederate States. The
object evidently was to set up an independent republic between the new
empire in Mexico and whichever power, Union or Confederacy, should
triumph in the Civil War.

The Commander-in-Chief, General Halleck, expressed his own preference
for a movement by the Red River to Shreveport, in the northwest corner
of Louisiana, and the military occupation from that point of northern
Texas, but left the decision as to taking that line of operation, or
some other, to General Banks. The latter, for various reasons,
principally the great distance of Shreveport, seven hundred miles from
New Orleans, and the low state of the Red River, which entirely
precluded water transportation, chose to operate by the sea-coast, and
took as the first point of attack Sabine Pass and city, three hundred
miles from Southwest Pass, where the river Sabine, separating the
States of Louisiana and Texas, enters the Gulf. If he could make good
his footing here at once, he hoped to be able to advance on Beaumont,
the nearest point on the railroad, and thence on Houston, the capital
and railway centre of the State, which is less than one hundred miles
from Sabine City, before the enemy could be ready to repel him.

Owing to lack of transportation, all the troops for the destined
operations could not go forward at once. The first division of 4,000,
under Major-General Franklin, sailed from New Orleans on the 5th of
September. Commodore Henry H. Bell, commanding the Western Gulf
Squadron in the absence of Farragut, detailed the gunboats Clifton,
Sachem, Arizona, and Granite City to accompany the expedition,
Lieutenant Frederick Crocker of the Clifton being senior officer. With
the exception of the Clifton they were all of very light armament, but
were the only available vessels of sufficiently small draught, the
naval-built gunboats of the Cayuga class drawing too much water to
cross the bar.

The transports arrived off the Pass on the morning of the 7th, the
gunboats coming in the same evening. The next morning at eight the
Clifton, followed soon after by the other gunboats and the transports,
crossed the bar and anchored inside about two miles from the fort. At
3.30 P.M. the Clifton, Sachem, and Arizona advanced to attack the
works. At four the Sachem received a shot in her boilers and was at
once enveloped in steam. A few minutes later the Clifton grounded and
also was struck in the boilers, but kept up her fire for twenty or
thirty minutes longer; then both the disabled vessels hauled down
their flags. The army now abandoned the expedition, and the transports
with the remaining gunboats withdrew during the night. In this
unfortunate affair the Clifton lost 10 killed and 9 wounded, the
Sachem 7 killed, the wounded not being given. There were 39 missing
from the two vessels, many of whom were drowned.

The hopes of success being dependent upon a surprise, this route was
now abandoned. Banks entertained for a little while the idea of
advancing from Berwick Bay by land, crossing the Sabine at Niblett's
Bluff; but the length of the communication and difficulty of the
country deterred him. The Red River Route would not be available
before the spring rise. To carry out the wish of the Government he
next determined to land at the extreme end of the Texas coast line,
near the Rio Grande, and work his way to the eastward. A force of
3,500 men, under General Dana, was organized for this expedition,
which sailed from New Orleans on the 26th of October, Banks himself
going with it. The transports were convoyed by the ships-of-war
Monongahela, Owasco, and Virginia, Captain James H. Strong of the
Monongahela being senior officer. The fleet was somewhat scattered by
a norther on the 30th, but on the 2d of November a landing was made on
Brazos Island at the mouth of the Rio Grande. The next day another
detachment was put on shore on the main-land, and Brownsville, thirty
miles from the mouth of the river, was occupied on the 6th. Leaving a
garrison here, the troops were again embarked on the 16th and carried
one hundred and twenty miles up the coast to Corpus Christi, at the
southern end of Mustang Island, where they landed and marched to the
upper end of the island, a distance of twenty-two miles. Here was a
small work, mounting three guns, which was shelled by the Monongahela
and surrendered on the approach of the army. The troops now crossed
the Aransas Pass and moved upon Pass Cavallo, the entrance to
Matagorda Bay. There was here an extensive work called Fort Esperanza,
which the army invested; but on the 30th the enemy withdrew by the
peninsula connecting with the main-land, thus leaving the control of
the bay in the hands of the Union forces. The light gunboats Granite
City and Estrella were sent inside.

So far all had gone well and easily; the enemy had offered little
resistance and the United States flag had been raised in Texas. Now,
however, Banks found powerful works confronting him at the mouth of
the Brazos River and at Galveston. To reduce these he felt it
necessary to turn into the interior and come upon them in the rear,
but the forces of the enemy were such as to deter him from the
attempt unless he could receive reinforcements. Halleck had looked
with evident distrust upon this whole movement, by which a small force
had been separated from the main body by the width of Louisiana and
Texas, with the enemy's army between the two, and the reinforcements
were not forthcoming; but recurring to his favorite plan of operating
by the Red River and Shreveport, without giving positive orders to
adopt it, the inducement was held out that, if that line were taken
up, Steele's army in Arkansas and such forces as Sherman could detach
should be directed to the same object. The co-operation of the
Mississippi squadron was also promised.

It was necessary, however, that this proposed expedition should be
taken in hand and carried through promptly, because both Banks's own
troops and Sherman's would be needed in time to take part in the
spring and summer campaigns east of the Mississippi; while at the same
time the movement could not begin until the Red River should rise
enough to permit the passage of the gunboats and heavy transports over
the falls above Alexandria, which would not ordinarily be before the
month of March.

The two months of January and February were spent in inactivity in the
Department of the Gulf, but frequent communications were held between
the three generals whose forces were to take part in the movement. On
the 1st of March Sherman came to New Orleans to confer with Banks, and
it was then arranged that he should send 10,000 men under a good
commander, who should meet Porter at the mouth of the Red River,
ascend the Black, and strike a hard blow at Harrisonburg, if possible,
and at all events be at Alexandria on the 17th of March. Banks on his
part was to reach there at the same date, marching his army from
Franklin by way of Opelousas, and to conduct his movement on
Shreveport with such celerity as to enable the detachment from
Sherman's corps to get back to the Mississippi in thirty days from the
time they entered the Red River. General Steele was directed by Grant
to move toward Shreveport from Little Rock, a step to which he was
averse, and his movements seem to have had little, if any, effect upon
the fortunes of the expedition. Having finished his business, Sherman
went back at once, resisting the urgent invitation of General Banks,
whose military duties seem to have been somewhat hampered by civil
calls, to remain over the 4th of March and participate in the
inauguration of a civil government for Louisiana, in which the Anvil
Chorus was to be played by all the bands in the Army of the Gulf, the
church bells rung, and cannons fired by electricity.

General Franklin, who was to command the army advancing from Franklin
by Opelousas, did not receive his orders to move till the 10th, which
was too late to reach Alexandria, one hundred and seventy-five miles
away, by the 17th. Moreover, the troops which had been recalled from
the Texas coast, leaving only garrisons at Brownsville and Matagorda,
had just arrived at Berwick Bay and were without transportation; while
the cavalry had not come up from New Orleans. The force got away on
the 13th and 14th and reached Alexandria on the 25th and 26th.

Meanwhile, Sherman, having none but military duties to embarrass him,
was in Vicksburg on the 6th, and at once issued his orders to General
A.J. Smith, who was to command the corps detached up the Red river. On
the 11th Smith was at the mouth of the River, where he met Porter, who
had been there since the 2d, and had with him the following vessels:
Essex, Commander Robert Townsend; Eastport, Lieutenant-Commander S.L.
Phelps; Black Hawk, Lieutenant-Commander K.R. Breese; Lafayette,
Lieutenant-Commander J.P. Foster; Benton, Lieutenant-Commander J.A.
Greer; Louisville, Lieutenant-Commander E.K. Owen; Carondelet,
Lieutenant-Commander J.G. Mitchell; Osage, Lieutenant-Commander T.O.
Selfridge; Ouachita, Lieutenant-Commander Byron Wilson; Lexington,
Lieutenant G.M. Bache; Chillicothe, Lieutenant S.P. Couthouy;
Pittsburg, Lieutenant W.B. Hoel; Mound City, Lieutenant A.R.
Langthorne; Neosho, Lieutenant Samuel Howard; Ozark, Lieutenant G.W.
Browne; Fort Hindman, Lieutenant John Pearce; Cricket, Master H.H.
Gorringe; Gazelle, Master Charles Thatcher.

Most of these vessels will be recognized as old acquaintances. The
last three were light-draughts, the Cricket and Gazelle being but
little over 200 tons. The Ouachita was a paddle-wheel steamer,
carrying in broadside, on two docks, a numerous battery of howitzers,
eighteen 24-pounders and sixteen 12-pounders (one of the latter being
rifled); and besides these, five 30-pounder rifles as bow and stern
guns. The Ozark, Osage, and Neosho, were ironclads of very light
draught, having a single turret clad with 6-inch armor in which were
mounted two XI-inch guns. They were moved by stern paddle-wheels
covered with an iron house, of ¾-inch plates, which was higher than
the turret, and from a broadside view looked like a gigantic beehive.
The Essex did not go farther than the mouth of the river.

Early on the morning of March 12th the gunboats started up, the
transports following. There was just enough water to allow the larger
boats to pass. The transports, with the Benton, Pittsburg, Louisville,
Mound City, Carondelet, Chillicothe, Ouachita, Lexington, and Gazelle
turned off into the Atchafalaya, the admiral accompanying this part
of his squadron; while Lieutenant-Commander Phelps with the other
vessels continued up the Red River to remove obstructions, which the
enemy had planted across the stream eight miles below Fort de Russy.

The army landed at Simmesport on the 13th, taking possession there of
the camping-ground of the enemy, who retreated on Fort de Russy. The
next day at daylight they were pursued, and Smith's corps, after a
march of twenty-eight miles, in which it was delayed two hours to
build a bridge, reached the fort in time to assault and take it before
sundown. The Confederate General Walker had withdrawn the main body of
his troops, leaving only 300 men, who could offer but slight
resistance. Eight heavy guns and two field-pieces were taken.

The detachment of vessels under Lieutenant-Commander Phelps were at
first delayed by the difficulty of piloting the Lafayette and Choctaw,
long vessels of heavy draft, through the narrow and crooked river. The
13th thus wore away slowly, and on the 14th they reached the
obstructions. Two rows of piles had been driven across the channel,
braced, and tied together; immediately below them was a raft well
secured to either bank and made of logs which did not float. Finally a
great many trees had been cut and floated down upon the piles from
above. The Fort Hindman removed a portion of the raft, and then the
Eastport got to work on the piles, dragging out some and starting
others by ramming. By four o'clock in the afternoon a large enough gap
had been made, and the Eastport, followed by the Hindman, Osage, and
Cricket, hastened up the river. Rapid artillery firing was heard as
they drew near the works, but being ignorant of the position of the
Union troops, few shots were fired for fear of injuring them. The
slight engagement was ended by the surrender, a few moments after the
boats came up. An order from the admiral to push on at once to
Alexandria was delayed five hours in transmission. When it was
received, the fastest vessels, the Ouachita and Lexington, were sent
on, followed by the Eastport, but got there just as the last of the
Confederate transports passed over the Falls. One of them grounded and
was burnt.

These advance vessels reached Alexandria on the evening of the 15th,
the admiral with the rest on the 16th; at which time there had also
come up from 7,000 to 8,000 of Smith's corps, the remainder being left
at Fort de Russy.

Alexandria was the highest point reached by the fleet the May before.
Shreveport, the object of the present expedition, is three hundred and
forty miles farther up the Red River. It was the principal dépôt of
the Confederates west of the Mississippi, had some machine-shops and
dockyards, and was fortified by a line of works of from two to three
miles radius, commanding the opposite bank. Between the two places the
river, which gets its name from the color of its water, flows through
a fertile and populous country, the banks in many places being high,
following in a very crooked channel a general southeasterly direction.
In this portion of its course it has a width of seven hundred to eight
hundred feet, and at low water a depth of four feet. The slope from
Shreveport to Alexandria at high water is a little over a hundred
feet, but immediately above the latter place there are two small
rapids, called the Falls of Alexandria, which interrupt navigation
when the water is low. The annual rise begins in the early winter, and
from December to June the river is in fair boating condition for its
usual traffic; but water enough for the gunboats and transports to
pass the Falls could not be expected before the spring rise in March.
The river, however, can never be confidently trusted. For twenty years
before 1864 it had only once failed to rise, in 1855; but this year
it was exceptionally backward, and so caused much embarrassment to the
fleet.

General Banks came in on the 26th of March and the last of Franklin's
corps on the 28th. Smith's command was then moved on to Bayou Rapides,
twenty-one miles above Alexandria. The slow rise of the river was
still detaining the vessels. There was water enough for the lighter
draughts, but, as the enemy was reported to have some ironclad vessels
not far above, the Admiral was unwilling to let them go up until one
of the heavier gunboats had passed. The Eastport was therefore sent up
first, being delayed two or three days on the rocks of the rapids, and
at last hauled over by main force. She at once passed ahead of Smith's
corps. The Mound City, Carondelet, Pittsburg, Louisville, Chillicothe,
Ozark, Osage, Neosho, Lexington, and Hindman also went above the
Falls, as did some thirty transports. At this time the Marine Brigade,
which was now under the army and formed part of Smith's command, was
summoned back to Vicksburg, taking 3,000 men from the expedition. The
river continuing to rise slowly, it was thought best to keep two lines
of transports, one above and one below the Falls, and to transship
stores around them. This made it necessary to establish a garrison at
Alexandria, which further reduced the force for the field.

Banks's own army marched by land to Natchitoches, eighty miles
distant, arriving there on the 2d and 3d of April; but Smith's command
went forward on transports convoyed by the gunboats and reached Grand
Ecore, four miles from Natchitoches, on the 3d. Here it landed, except
one division of 2,000 men under General T. Kilby Smith, who took
charge of the transports, now numbering twenty-six, many of them large
boats. These Smith was directed to take to the mouth of Loggy Bayou,
opposite Springfield, where it was expected he would again
communicate with the army. So far the water had been good, the boats
having a foot to spare; but as the river was rising very slowly, the
admiral would not take his heavy boats any higher. Leaving
Lieutenant-Commander Phelps in command at Grand Ecore, with
instructions to watch the water carefully and not be caught above a
certain bar, a mile lower down, Porter went ahead with the Cricket,
Hindman, Lexington, Osage, Neosho, Chillicothe, and the transports, on
the 7th of April.

The army marched out on the 6th and 7th, directed upon Mansfield. The
way led through a thickly wooded country by a single road, which was
in many places too narrow to admit of two wagons passing. On the night
of the 7th Banks reached Pleasant Hill, where Franklin then was; the
cavalry division, numbering 3,300 mounted infantry, being eight miles
in advance, Smith's command fifteen miles in the rear. The next day
the advance was resumed, and, at about fifteen miles from Pleasant
Hill, the cavalry, which had been reinforced by a brigade of infantry,
became heavily engaged with a force largely outnumbering it. After
being pushed back some little distance, this advanced corps finally
gave way in confusion. Banks had now been some time on the field. At
4.15 P.M. Franklin came up, and, seeing how the affair was going, sent
word back to General Emory of his corps, to form line of battle at a
place he named, two miles in the rear. The enemy came on rapidly, and
as the cavalry train of one hundred and fifty wagons and some eighteen
or twenty pieces of artillery were close in rear of the discomfited
troops, it was not possible, in the narrow road, to turn and save
them. Emory, advancing rapidly in accordance with his orders, met
flying down the road a crowd of disorganized cavalry, wagons,
ambulances, and loose animals, through which his division had to force
its way, using violence to do so. As the enemy's bullets began to
drop among them, the division reached a suitable position for
deploying, called by Banks Pleasant Grove, three miles in rear of the
first action. Here the line was formed, and the enemy, seemingly not
expecting to meet any opposition, were received when within a hundred
yards by a vigorous fire, before which they gave way in about fifteen
minutes. By this time it was dark, and toward midnight the command
fell back to Pleasant Hill, where it was joined by A.J. Smith's corps.

The following day, at 5 P.M., the enemy again attacked at Pleasant
Hill, but were repulsed so decidedly that the result was considered a
victory by the Union forces, and by the Confederates themselves a
serious check; but for various reasons Banks thought best to fall back
again to Grand Ecore. The retreat was continued that night, and on the
night of the 11th the army reached Grand Ecore, where it threw up
intrenchments and remained ten days. As yet there was no intention of
retreating farther.

Meanwhile the navy and transports had pressed hopefully up the river.
The navigation was very bad, the river crooked and narrow, the water
low and beginning to fall, the bottom full of snags and stumps, and
the sides bristling with cypress logs and sharp, hard timbers. Still,
the distance, one hundred and ten miles, was made in the time
appointed, and Springfield Landing reached on the afternoon of the
10th. Here the enemy had sunk a large steamer across the channel, her
bow resting on one shore and her stern on the other, while the body
amidships was broken down by a quantity of bricks and mud loaded upon
her. Porter and Kilby Smith were consulting how to get rid of this
obstacle, when they heard of the disaster and retreat of the army.
Smith was ordered by Banks to return, and there was no reason for
Porter to do otherwise. The following day they fell back to
Coushattee Chute, and the enemy began the harassment which they kept
up throughout the descent to, and even below, Alexandria. The first
day, however, the admiral was able to keep them for the most part in
check, though from the high banks they could fire down on the decks
almost with impunity. The main body of the enemy was on the southern
bank, but on the north there was also a force under a General Liddell,
numbering, with Harrison's cavalry, perhaps 2,500 men.

On the 12th a severe and singular fight took place. At four in the
afternoon the Hastings, transport, on which Kilby Smith was, having
disabled her wheel, had run into the right bank for repairs. At the
same moment the Alice Vivian, a heavy transport, with four hundred
cavalry horses, was aground in the middle of the stream; as was the
gunboat Osage, Lieutenant-Commander Selfridge. Two other transports
were alongside the Vivian, and a third alongside the Osage, trying to
move them. Another transport, called the Rob Roy, having on her decks
four siege guns, had just come down and was near the Osage. The
Lexington, gunboat, Lieutenant Bache, was near the northern shore, but
afloat. The vessels being thus situated, a sudden attack was made from
the right bank by 2,000 of the enemy's infantry and four field pieces.
The gunboats, the Rob Roy with her siege guns, and two field pieces on
the other transports all replied, the Hastings, of course, casting off
from her dangerous neighborhood. This curious contest lasted for
nearly two hours, the Confederate sharpshooters sheltering themselves
behind the trees, the soldiers on board the transports behind bales of
hay. There could be but one issue to so ill-considered an attack, and
the enemy, after losing 700 men, were driven off; their commander,
General Thomas Green, a Texan, being among the slain. The large loss
is accounted for by the fact that besides the two thousand actually
engaged there were five thousand more some distance back, who shared
in the punishment.

The following day an attack was made from the north bank, but no more
from the south before reaching Grand Ecore on the 14th and 15th. The
admiral himself, being concerned for the safety of his heavy vessels
in the falling river, hurried there on the 13th, and on his arrival
reported the condition of things above to Banks, who sent out a force
to clear the banks of guerillas as far as where the transports lay.
Lieutenant-Commander Phelps had already moved all the vessels below
the bar at Grand Ecore, but had recalled four to cover the army when
it returned. The admiral now sent them all below to move slowly toward
Alexandria. His position was one of great perplexity. The river ought
to be rising, but was actually falling; there was danger if he delayed
that he might lose some of the boats, but on the other hand he felt it
would be a stain upon the navy to look too closely to its own safety,
and it was still possible that the river might take a favorable turn.
He had decided to keep four of the light-draughts above the bar till
the very last moment, remaining with them himself, when he received
news that the Eastport had been sunk by a torpedo eight miles below.
The accident happened on the 15th, the vessel having been previously
detained on the bar nearly twenty-four hours. The admiral left
Lieutenant-Commander Selfridge in charge at Grand Ecore and at once
went to the scene, where he found the Eastport in shoal water but sunk
to her gun-deck, the water on one side being over it. The Lexington
and a towboat were alongside helping to pump her out. Giving orders
that she should be lightened, he kept on down to Alexandria to start
two pump-boats up to her and to look after the affairs of the squadron
both along the Red River and in the Mississippi. On his return, two
days later, he found her with her battery and ammunition out and the
pump-boats alongside. By this time it was known that the army would
not advance again, and that Banks was anxious to get back to
Alexandria. The officers and crew of the Eastport worked night and day
to relieve her, and on the 21st she was again afloat, with fires
started, but as yet they had not been able to come at the leak. That
day she made twenty miles, but at night grounded on a bar, to get over
which took all the 22d. Four or five miles farther down she again
grounded, and another day was spent in getting her off. Two or three
times more she was gotten clear and made a few more miles down the
river by dint of extreme effort; but at last, on the 26th, she
grounded on some logs fifty miles below the scene of the accident, in
a position evidently hopeless.

Selfridge's division of light ironclads had been compelled by the
falling water to drop below the bar at Grand Ecore, and, as they were
there of no further use to the army, had continued down to Alexandria,
except the Hindman, which was kept by the Eastport. On the 22d the
army evacuated Grand Ecore and marched for Alexandria. On this retreat
the advance and rear-guard had constant skirmishing with the enemy. At
Cane River the Confederates had taken position to dispute the
crossing, and the advance had a serious fight to drive them off. The
rear-guard also had one or two quite sharp encounters, but the army
reached Alexandria without serious loss on the 26th.

The Eastport and Fort Hindman were now in a very serious position,
aground in a hostile river, their own army sixty miles away, and
between it and them the enemy lining the banks of the river. The
admiral, having seen the rest of his fleet in safety, returned to the
crippled boat, taking with him only two tinclads, the Cricket and
Juliet; but the Osage and Neosho were ordered to move up forty miles,
near the mouth of Cane River, so as to be in readiness to render
assistance. On the 26th, the commander of the Eastport, whose calmness
and hopefulness had won the admiral's admiration and led him to linger
longer than was perhaps prudent, in the attempt to save the vessel,
was obliged to admit that there was no hope. The river was falling
steadily, the pilots said there was already too little water for her
draught on the bars below, and the crew were worn out with six days of
incessant labor. The attempt was made to remove her plating, but it
was not possible to do so soon enough. Orders were therefore given to
transfer the ship's company to the Fort Hindman, whose captain,
Lieutenant Pearce, had worked like her own to save her, and to blow
the Eastport up. Eight barrels of powder were placed under her forward
casemate, a like number in the stern, and others about the machinery,
trains were laid fore and aft, and at 1.45 P.M. Phelps himself lit the
match and left the vessel. He had barely time to reach the Hindman
before the explosions took place in rapid succession; then the flames
burst out and the vessel was soon consumed.

The three remaining gunboats and the two pump-boats now began a
hazardous retreat down the river. Just as the preparations for blowing
up the Eastport were completed, a rush was made by twelve hundred men
from the right bank to board the Cricket, which was tied up. Her
captain, Gorringe, backed clear, and opening upon them with grape and
canister, supported by a cross fire from the other boats, the attack
was quickly repelled. They were not again molested until they had gone
twenty miles farther, to about five miles above the mouth of Cane
River. Here they came in sight of a party of the enemy, with eighteen
pieces of artillery, drawn up on the right bank. At this time the
Cricket was leading with the admiral's flag; the Juliet following,
lashed to one pump-boat; the Hindman in the rear. The Cricket opened
at once, and the enemy replied. Gorringe stopped his vessel, meaning
to fight and cover those astern, but the admiral directed him to move
ahead. Before headway was gained the enemy was pouring in a pelting
shower of shot and shell, the two broadside guns' crews were swept
away, one gun disabled, and at the same instant the chief engineer was
killed, and all but one of the men in the fire-room wounded. In these
brief moments the Juliet was also disabled by a shot in her machinery,
the rudder of the pump-boat lashed to her was struck, and the boiler
of the other was exploded. The captain of the latter, with almost the
entire ship's company, numbering two hundred,[20] were scalded to
death, while the boat, enveloped in steam, drifted down and lodged
against the bank under the enemy's battery, remaining in their power.
The pilot of the boat towing the Juliet abandoned the wheel-house--an
act unparalleled among a class of men whose steadiness and devotion
under the exposure of their calling elicited the highest praise from
Porter and others; the crew also tried to cut the hawsers, but were
stopped by Watson, the captain of the gunboat. A junior pilot named
Maitland, with great bravery and presence of mind, jumped to the wheel
and headed the two boats up river. This confusion in the centre of the
line prevented the Hindman from covering the admiral as Phelps wished,
but he now got below the Juliet and engaged the enemy till she was out
of range. Meanwhile the admiral had found the pilot of the Cricket to
be among the wounded, and taking charge of the vessel himself, ran by
the battery under the heaviest fire[21] he ever experienced. When
below he turned and engaged the batteries in the rear, but seeing that
the Hindman and the others were not coming by he continued down to the
point where he expected to meet the Osage and Neosho.

In this truly desperate fight the Cricket, a little boat of one
hundred and fifty-six tons, was struck thirty-eight times in five
minutes, and lost 25 killed and wounded, half her crew. Soon after
passing below she ran aground and remained fast for three hours, so
that it was dark when she reached the Osage, lying opposite another
battery of the enemy, which she had been engaging during the day.

During that night the vessels still above were busy repairing damages
and getting ready for the perils of the next day. Fearing the enemy
might obstruct the channel by sinking the captured pump-boat across
it, a shell was fired at her from time to time. The repairs were made
before noon, but the Juliet being still crippled, the Hindman took her
alongside, and so headed down for the batteries. Before going far the
Juliet struck a snag, which made it necessary to go back and stop the
leak. Then they started again, the remaining pump-boat following. When
within five hundred yards the enemy opened a well-sustained fire, and
a shot passed through the pilot-house of the Hindman, cutting the
wheel-ropes. This made the vessel unmanageable, and the two falling
off broadside to the stream drifted down under fire, striking now one
shore and now the other but happily going clear. The guns under these
circumstances could not be used very effectively, and the pump-boat
suffered the more from the enemy's fire. Maitland was still piloting
her, and when nearly opposite the batteries he was wounded in both
legs by a shell. He dropped on his knees, unable to handle the wheel,
and the boat ran into the bank on the enemy's side. Another shell
struck the pilot-house, wounding him again in several places, and a
third cut away a bell-rope and the speaking-tube. Rallying a little,
Maitland now got hold of and rang another bell and had the boat backed
across the river. The crew attempted to escape, but were all taken
prisoners, the captain and one other having been killed. In the two
days encounters the Juliet was hit nearly as often as the Cricket and
lost 15 killed and wounded; the Hindman, though repeatedly struck and
much cut up, only 3 killed and 5 wounded. The fire of the enemy's
sharpshooters was very annoying for some miles farther down, but
twelve miles below the batteries they met the Neosho going up to their
assistance.

The main interest of the retreat of the squadron centres in the
Eastport and her plucky little consorts, but the other vessels had had
their own troubles in getting down the river. The obstacles to be
overcome are described as enough to appal the stoutest heart by the
admiral, who certainly was not a man of faint heart. Guns had to be
removed and the vessels jumped over sand-bars and logs, but the
squadron arrived in time to prevent any attack on the reserve stores
before the main body of the army came up.

At Alexandria the worst of their troubles awaited them, threatening to
make all that had yet been done vain. The river, which ordinarily
remains high till June, had not only failed to reach its usual height
but had so fallen that they could not pass the rapids. General W.T.
Sherman, who had lived at Alexandria before the war, thought twelve
feet necessary before going up, a depth usually found from March to
June. At the very least seven were needed by the gunboats to go down,
and on the 30th of April of this year there were actually only three
feet four inches. The danger was the greatest that had yet befallen
the fleet, and seemingly hopeless. A year before, in the Yazoo bayous,
the position had been most critical, but there the peril came from the
hand of man and was met and repelled by other men. Here Nature herself
had turned against them, forsaking her usual course to do them harm.
Ten gunboats and two tugs were thus imprisoned in a country soon to
pass into the enemy's hands by the retreat of the army.

Desperate as the case seemed, relief came. Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph
Bailey, of the Fourth Wisconsin Volunteers, was at this time acting as
Chief Engineer of the Nineteenth Army Corps, General Franklin's. He
was a man who had had much experience on the watercourses of the
Northwestern country, and had learned to use dams to overcome
obstacles arising from shallow water in variable streams. The year
before he had applied this knowledge to free two transport steamers,
which had been taken when Port Hudson fell, from their confinement in
Thompson's Creek, where the falling water had left them sunk in the
sand. As the army fell back, and during its stay at Grand Ecore, he
had heard rumors about the scant water at the Falls, and the thought
had taken hold of his mind that he might now build a dam on a greater
scale and to a more vital purpose than ever before.

His idea, first broached to General Franklin, was through him conveyed
to Banks and Porter, and generally through the army. Franklin, himself
an engineer, thought well of it, and so did some others; but most
doubted, and many jeered. The enemy themselves, when they became aware
of it, laughed, and their pickets and prisoners alike cried
scoffingly, "How about that dam?" But Bailey had the faith that moves
mountains, and he was moreover happy in finding at his hands the
fittest tools for the work. Among the troops in the far Southwest were
two or three regiments from Maine, the northeasternmost of all the
States. These had been woodmen and lumbermen from their youth, among
their native forests, and a regiment of them now turned trained and
willing arms upon the great trees on the north shore of the Red River;
and there were many others who, on a smaller scale and in different
scenes, had experience in the kind of work now to be done. Time was
pressing, and from two to three thousand men were at once set to work
on the 1st of May. The Falls are about a mile in length, filled with
rugged rocks which, at this low water, were bare or nearly so, the
water rushing down around, or over, them with great swiftness. At the
point below, where the dam was to be built, the river is 758 feet
wide, and the current was then between nine and ten miles an hour.
From the north bank was built what was called the "tree dam," formed
of large trees laid with the current, the branches interlocking, the
trunks down stream and cross-tied with heavy timber; upon this was
thrown brush, brick, and stone, and the weight of water as it rose
bound the fabric more closely down upon the bottom of the river. From
the other bank, where the bottom was more stony and trees less plenty,
great cribs were pushed out, sunk and filled with stone and brick--the
stone brought down the river in flat-boats, the bricks obtained by
pulling down deserted brick buildings. On this side, a mile away, was
a large sugar-house; this was torn down and the whole building,
machinery, and kettles went to ballast the dam. Between the cribs and
the tree dam a length of 150 feet was filled by four large coal
barges, loaded with brick and sunk. This great work was completed in
eight working days, and even on the eighth, three of the lighter
vessels, the Osage, Neosho, and Fort Hindman, were able to pass the
upper falls and wait just above the dam for the chance to pass; but
the heavier vessels had yet to delay for a further rise. In the
meantime the vessels were being lightened by their crews. Nearly all
the guns, ammunition, provisions, chain cables, anchors, and
everything that could affect the draught, were taken out and hauled
round in wagons below the falls. The iron plating was taken off the
Ozark, and the sides of our old friends the Eads gunboats, the four
survivors of which were here, as ever where danger was. This iron, for
want of wagons, could not be hauled round, so the boats ran up the
river and dumped it overboard in a five-fathom hole, where the
shifting sand would soon swallow it up. Iron plating was then too
scarce and valuable to the Confederates to let it fall into their
hands. Eleven old 32-pounders were also burst and sunk.

The dam was finished, the water rising, and three boats below, when,
between 7 and 10 A.M. of the 9th, the pressure became so great as to
sweep away two of the barges in midstream and the pent-up water poured
through. Admiral Porter rode round to the upper falls and ordered the
Lexington to pass them at once and try to go through the dam without a
stop. Her steam was ready and she went ahead, passing scantly over the
rapids, the water falling all the time; then she steered straight for
the opening, where the furious rushing of the waters seemed to
threaten her with destruction. She entered the gap, which was but 66
feet wide, with a full head of steam, pitched down the roaring
torrent, made two or three heavy rolls, hung for a moment on the rocks
below, and then, sweeping into deep water with the current, rounded to
at the bank, safe. One great cheer rose from the throats of the
thousands looking on, who had before been hushed into painful silence,
awaiting the issue with beating hearts. The Neosho followed, but
stopping her engine as she drew near the opening, was carried
helplessly through; for a moment her low hull disappeared in the
water, but she escaped with a hole in her bottom, which was soon
repaired. The Hindman and Osage came through without touching.

The work on the dam had been done almost wholly by the soldiers, who
had worked both day and night, often up to their waists and even to
their necks in the water, showing throughout the utmost cheerfulness
and good humor. The partial success, that followed the first
disappointment of the break, was enough to make such men again go to
work with good will. Bailey decided not to try again, with his limited
time and materials, to sustain the whole weight of water with one dam;
and so, leaving the gap untouched, went on to build two wing-dams on
the upper falls. These, extending from either shore toward the middle
of the river and inclining slightly down stream, took part of the
weight, causing a rise of 1 foot 2 inches, and shed the water from
either side into the channel between them. Three days were needed to
build these, one a crib-and the other a tree-dam, and a bracket-dam a
little lower down to help guide the current. The rise due to the main
dam when breached was 5 feet 4½ inches, so that the entire gain in
depth by this admirable engineering work was 6 feet 6½ inches. On the
11th the Mound City, Carondelet, and Pittsburg came over the upper
falls, but with trouble, the channel being very crooked and scarcely
wide enough. The next day the remaining boats, Ozark, Louisville, and
Chillicothe, with the two tugs, also came down to the upper dam, and
during that and the following day they all passed through the gap,
with hatches closely nailed down and every precaution taken against
accident. No mishap befell them beyond the unshipping of rudders, and
the loss of one man swept from the deck of a tug. The two barges which
had been carried out at the first break of the dam stuck just below
and at right angles to it, and there staid throughout, affording an
excellent cushion on the left side of the shoot. What had been a
calamity proved thus a benefit. The boats having taken on board their
guns and stores as fast as they came below, that work was completed,
even by the last comers, on the 13th, and all then steamed down the
river with the transports in company. The water had become very low in
the lower part, but providentially a rise of the Mississippi sent up
so much back-water that no stoppage happened.

    [Illustration: Red River Dam.]

For the valuable services rendered to the fleet in this hour of great
danger, Lieutenant-Colonel Bailey was promoted to the rank of
brigadier-general and received the thanks of Congress. The stone cribs
of the dam have long since been swept away, but the tree-dam has
remained until this day, doubtless acquiring new strength from year to
year by the washing of the river. Its position has forced the channel
over to the south shore, encroaching seriously upon the solid land,
especially when the water is high. A very large part of the front of
Alexandria, at the upper suburb, has thus been washed away, and the
caving still continues.

While the fleet and army were at Alexandria, the enemy had passed
round the city and appeared on the banks below, where they made the
passage of light steamers very dangerous. Two light-draught gunboats,
the Covington and Signal, were thus lost to the service. They had gone
down convoying a transport called the Warner. The Warner was put in
advance, the gunboats following in line ahead. The enemy began with
heavy musketry and two field pieces, by which the Warner's rudders
were disabled; she continued on a short distance till a bend was
reached, and here, being unable to make the turn, she went ashore,
blocking also the channel to the two armed vessels. A heavy force of
infantry with artillery now opened on the three, the gunboats replying
for three hours, when the Warner hoisted a white flag. Lieutenant Lord
of the Covington still kept up his fire and sent to burn the
transport; but learning from the colonel in charge that there were
nearly 125 killed and wounded on board he desisted. Soon after this
the Signal was disabled. The Covington then rounded to and took the
others in tow up stream, but her own rudders were disabled and the
Signal went adrift. The latter then anchored, and the Covington
running to the left bank tied up with her head up stream. In this
position the action was continued with the enemy, reinforced now by
the first battery which had been brought down, till the steam-drum was
penetrated and a shot entering the boilers let out all the water; the
ammunition gave out and several guns were disabled, one officer and
several men being killed. Lord set the vessel on fire and escaped with
the crew to the banks. On mustering, 9 officers and 23 men were found
out of a crew of 76. Most of those who reached the banks escaped
through the woods to Alexandria. The Covington was riddled, having
received some fifty shots. The disabled Signal was fought with equal
obstinacy by her commander, Lieutenant Morgan, but after the
destruction of the Covington was surrendered, not burned; it being
found impossible to remove the wounded under the fire of the enemy.

The army marched out of Alexandria on the 14th toward Simmesport,
which they reached on the 16th. Having no regular pontoon train, the
Atchafalaya, which is here about six hundred yards wide, was crossed
by a bridge of transport steamers moored side by side; an idea of
Colonel Bailey's. The crossing was made on the 20th, and on that same
day General Banks was relieved by General Canby, who had been ordered
to command the Department of the West Mississippi, with headquarters
at New Orleans. A.J. Smith's corps embarked and went up the river, and
the expedition was over. The disastrous ending and the lateness of the
season made it impracticable to carry out Grant's previous plan of
moving on Mobile with force sufficient to insure its capture.

After the Red River expedition little is left to say, in a work of
this scope, of the operations of the Mississippi Squadron during the
rest of the war. Admiral Porter was relieved during the summer,
leaving Captain Pennock in temporary charge. Acting Rear-Admiral S.P.
Lee took the command on the 1st of November. The task and actions of
the squadron were of the same general character as those described in
Chapter VI. Guerillas and light detached bodies of the enemy continued
to hover on the banks of the Mississippi, White, Arkansas, Tennessee,
and Cumberland Rivers. The Red River was simply blockaded, not
occupied, and much of the Yazoo Valley, having no present importance,
had been abandoned to the enemy. The gunboats scattered throughout
those waters were constantly patrolling and convoying, and often in
action. The main operations of the army being now far east of the
Mississippi, the work and exposure of the boats became greater. Masked
batteries of field pieces were frequently sprung upon them, or upon
unarmed steamers passing up and down; in either case the nearest
gunboat must hasten and engage it. Weak isolated posts were suddenly
attacked; a gunboat, usually not far off, must go to the rescue.
Reconnoissances into the enemy's country, as the Yazoo Valley, were to
be made, or troops carried in transports from point to point;
gunboats went along with their heavy yet manageable artillery,
feeling doubtful places with their shells and clearing out batteries
or sharpshooters when found. The service was not as easy as it sounds.
It would be wrong to infer that their power was always and at once
recognized. Often they were outnumbered in guns, and a chance shot in
a boiler or awkward turn of a wheel, throwing the vessel aground,
caused its loss. Even when victorious they were often hardly used. The
limits of this book will permit the telling of but two or three
stories.

In the latter part of June, 1864, General Steele, commanding the Union
troops in Arkansas, wished to move some round in transports from
Duval's Bluff on the White River to the Arkansas, hoping to reach
Little Rock in this way. One attempt was made, but, the enemy being
met in force on the Arkansas, the transports were turned back.
Lieutenant Bache assured him that the trip could not be made, but as
the General thought otherwise, he consented to try again and left the
Bluff with a large convoy on the 24th, having with him of armed
vessels the Tyler, his own, the Naumkeag and Fawn. The two latter were
tinclads, the first an unarmored boat. When about twenty miles down,
two men were picked up, part of the crew of the light-draught Queen
City, which had been captured by the Confederates five hours before.
It was then nine o'clock. Bache at once turned the transports back and
went ahead fast himself to take or destroy the lost boat before her
guns could be removed. Before reaching Clarendon two reports were
heard, which came from the Queen City, blown up by the enemy when the
others were known to be coming. The three boats formed line ahead, the
Tyler leading, Naumkeag second, and Fawn third, their broadsides
loaded with half-second shrapnel and canister. As they drew near, the
enemy opened with seven field pieces and some two thousand infantry
and put one of their first shots through the pilot-house of the Tyler,
the vessels being then able to reply only with an occasional shell
from their bow guns. As they came nearly abreast they slowed down and
steamed by, firing their guns rapidly. When under the batteries the
Fawn received a shot through her pilot-house, killing the pilot and
carrying away the bell gear, at the same time ringing the engine-room
bell, causing the engineers to stop the boat under fire. Some little
delay ensued in fixing the bells, the paymaster took the wheel, and
the Fawn, having another shot in the pilot-house, passed on. As soon
as the Tyler and Naumkeag were below they turned and steamed up again,
delivering a deliberate fire as they passed, in the midst of which the
enemy ran off, leaving behind them most of their captures, including a
light gun taken from the Queen City. The boats were struck twenty-five
times, and lost 3 killed and 15 wounded. The Queen City had been taken
by surprise, and her engines disabled at the first fire. She lost 2
killed and 8 wounded, including her commander; and, while many of her
crew escaped to the opposite bank, many were taken prisoners.

The main course of the war in the West having now drifted away from
the Mississippi Valley to the region south and southeast of Nashville,
embracing Southern and Eastern Tennessee and the northern parts of
Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, the convoy and gunboat service on
the Tennessee and Cumberland assumed new importance. An eleventh
division was formed on the upper waters of the Tennessee, above Muscle
Shoals, under the command of Lieutenant Moreau Forrest;
Lieutenant-Commander Shirk had the lower river, and Fitch still
controlled the Cumberland. When Hood, after the fall of Atlanta, began
his movement toward Tennessee in the latter part of October, General
Forrest, the active Confederate cavalry leader, who had been stationed
at Corinth with his outposts at Eastport and on the Tennessee River,
moved north along the west bank, and with seventeen regiments of
cavalry and nine pieces of artillery appeared on the 28th before Fort
Heiman, an earthwork about seventy-five miles from Paducah. Here he
captured two transports and a light-draught called the Undine. On the
2nd of November he had established batteries on the west bank both
above and below Johnsonville, one of the Union army's bases of
supplies and a railway terminus, thus blockading the water approach
and isolating there eight transports, with barges, and three
light-draughts, the Key West, Elfin, and Tawah. Nevertheless, the
three boats went down and engaged the lower battery, and though they
found it too strong for them they retook one of the transports.
Meantime Shirk had telegraphed the Admiral and Fitch, and the latter
came to his assistance with three of the Cumberland River
light-draughts. Going on up the Tennessee Fitch picked up three other
light-draughts, and on the morning of the 4th approached the lower
battery from below, Lieutenant King, the senior officer above, coming
down at the same time. The enemy then set fire to the Undine, but the
channel was so narrow and intricate that Fitch did not feel justified
in attempting to take his boats up, and King was not able to run by.
Fitch, whose judgment and courage were well proved, said that the
three blocked gunboats were fought desperately and well handled, but
that they could not meet successfully the heavy rifled batteries then
opposed to them in such a channel. All three were repeatedly struck
and had several of their guns disabled. They then retired to the fort,
where the enemy opened on them in the afternoon with a battery on the
opposite shore. After firing away nearly all their ammunition, and
being further disabled, Lieutenant King, fearing that they might fall
into the enemy's hands, burnt them with the transports. The place was
relieved by General Schofield twenty-four hours later, so that if King
had patiently held on a little longer his pluck and skill would have
been rewarded by saving his vessels. At about the same time, October
28th, General Granger being closely pressed in Decatur, Alabama, above
the Muscle Shoals, the light-draught General Thomas, of the Eleventh
Division, under the command of Acting-Master Gilbert Morton, at great
risk got up in time to render valuable service in repelling the
attack.

The Union forces continued to fall back upon Nashville before the
advance of Hood, who appeared before the city on the 2d of December,
and by the 4th had established his lines round the south side. His
left wing struck the river at a point four miles below by land, but
eighteen by the stream, where they captured two steamers and
established a battery. Fitch, receiving word of this at 9 P.M., at
once went down with the Carondelet and four light-draughts to attack
them. The boats moved quietly, showing no lights, the Carondelet and
Fairplay being ordered to run below, giving the enemy grape and
canister as they passed in front, and then to round to and continue
the fight up stream, Fitch intending to remain above with the other
boats. The Carondelet began firing when midway between the upper and
lower batteries, and the enemy replied at once with heavy musketry
along the whole line and with his field pieces. The river at this
place is but eighty yards wide, but the enemy, though keeping up a hot
fire, fortunately aimed high, and the boats escaped without loss in an
action lasting eighty minutes. The two steamers were retaken and the
enemy removed their batteries; but they were shortly reestablished.
On the 6th Fitch again engaged them with the Neosho and Carondelet,
desiring to pass a convoy below, but the position was so well chosen,
behind spurs of hills and at a good height above the river, that only
one boat could engage them at one time and then could not elevate her
guns to reach the top without throwing over the enemy. The Neosho
remained under a heavy fire, at thirty yards distance, for two and a
half hours, being struck over a hundred times and having everything
perishable on decks demolished; but the enemy could not be driven
away. The river being thus blockaded the only open communication for
the city was the Louisville Railroad, and during the rest of the time
the gunboats, patrolling the Cumberland above and below, prevented the
enemy's cavalry from crossing and cutting it.

When Thomas made his attack of the 15th, which resulted in the entire
defeat and disorganization of Hood's army, Fitch, at his wish, went
down and engaged the attention of the batteries below until a force of
cavalry detached for that special purpose came down upon their rear.
These guns were taken and the flotilla then dropped down to the scene
of its previous fights and engaged till dark such batteries as it
could see. The routed and disorganized army of the enemy were pressed
as closely as the roads allowed down to the Tennessee, where
Lieutenant Forrest of the Eleventh District aided in cutting off
stragglers. Admiral Lee, who was at once notified, pressed up the
river with gunboats and supply steamers as far as the shoals; but the
low state of the river prevented his crossing them. The destruction of
boats and flats along the river, however, did much to prevent
stragglers from crossing and rejoining their army.

This was the last of the very important services of the Mississippi
Squadron. Five months later, in June, 1865, its officers received the
surrender of a small naval force still held by the Confederates in the
Red River. Our old friend, the ram Webb, which had heretofore escaped
capture, ran out of the Red River in April with a load of cotton and
made a bold dash for the sea. She succeeded in getting by several
vessels before suspected, and even passed New Orleans; but the
telegraph was faster than she, and before reaching the forts she was
headed off by the Richmond, run ashore, and burned. On the 14th of
August, 1865, Admiral Lee was relieved and the Mississippi Squadron,
as an organization, ceased to be. The vessels whose careers we have
followed, and whose names have become familiar, were gradually sold,
and, like most of their officers, returned to peaceful life.

FOOTNOTES:

[20] These were mostly slaves who were running from their masters.

[21] Colonel Brent, Taylor's Chief of Artillery, reported that there
were only four Confederate pieces, two 12-pounders and two howitzers,
in this attack; instead of eighteen, as stated by Porter. Brent was not
present, and Captain Cornay, commanding the battery, was killed. The
pilot Maitland, who was captured the next day, states, in a separate
report made two months later, that he heard among the enemy that the
number was eighteen. Phelps, who, like the admiral, was hardened to
fire, speaks of them as numerous. The reader must decide for himself
the probability of four smooth-bore light pieces striking one small
boat thirty-eight times in five minutes, besides badly disabling three
others.




CHAPTER VIII.

MOBILE.


Admiral Farragut resumed the command of his squadron on January 18th,
1864. His wish was to attack at once the defences of Mobile before the
Confederates had finished the ironclads they were building; but troops
were needed for the reduction of the forts, and the Red River
expedition had diverted those that might have been available.

The city of Mobile is thirty miles from the Gulf, at the head of a
great bay of the same name. The width of the bay varies from fifteen
miles at the lower end to six at the upper; the depth throughout the
greater part is from twelve to fourteen feet, shelving gently near the
shores, but at the lower end there is a deep hole extending from the
mouth north-northwest for six miles, with an average width of two and
a half. In this the depth is from twenty to twenty-four feet. The
principal entrance is from the Gulf direct, between Mobile Point, a
long low projection from the mainland, on the east, and Dauphin Island
on the west, the latter being one of the chain which bounds
Mississippi Sound. The distance between these points is nearly three
miles, but from Dauphin Island a bank of hard sand makes out under
water both east and south, defining one side of the main ship channel,
which closely skirts Mobile Point, and narrowing it to a little less
than two thousand yards. Near the southeast point of this bank there
rise two small islands, called Sand Islands, distant three miles from
Mobile Point. The channel on the other side is bounded by a similar
sand bank running seaward from the Point, the two approaching so that
at Sand Islands they are not more than seven hundred and fifty yards
apart. Vessels of very light draught could also enter the bay from
Mississippi Sound, but it was not practicable for the fleet.

The entrance from the Gulf was guarded by two works, Fort Morgan on
Mobile Point and Fort Gaines on Dauphin Island. The approach by
Mississippi Sound was covered by Fort Powell, a small earthwork on
Tower Island, commanding the channel which gave the most water, known
as Grant's Pass. Gaines was too far distant from the main ship channel
to count for much in the plans of the fleet. It was a pentagonal work
mounting in barbette[22] three X-inch columbiads, five 32-, two 24-,
and two 18-pounder smooth-bore guns, and four rifled 32-pounders;
besides these it had eleven 24-pounder howitzers, siege and for flank
defence. In Fort Powell there were[23] one X-inch, two VII-inch and
one 32-pounder smooth-bore and two VII-inch Brooke rifles; these bore
on the sound and channels, but the rear of the fort toward the bay was
yet unfinished and nearly unarmed. The third and principal work, Fort
Morgan, was much more formidable. It was five sided, and built to
carry guns both in barbette and casemates; but when seized by the
Confederates the embrasures of the curtains facing the channel were
masked and a heavy exterior water battery was thrown up before the
northwest curtain. The armament at this time cannot be given with
absolute certainty.[24] The official reports of the United States
engineer and ordnance officers, made after the surrender, differ
materially, but from a comparison between them and other statements
the following estimate has been made: Main fort seven X-inch, three
VIII-inch and twenty-two 32-pounder smooth-bore guns,[25] and two
VIII-inch, two 6.5-inch and four 5.82-inch rifles.[26] In the water
battery there were four X-inch and one VIII-inch columbiads and two
6.5-inch rifles.[27] Of the above, ten X-inch, three VIII-inch,
sixteen 32-pounders and all the rifles, except one of 5.82 calibre,
bore upon the channel. There were also twenty flanking 24-pounder
howitzers and two or three light rifles, which were useless against
the fleet from their position.

Such were the shore defences. In the waters of the bay there was a
little Confederate squadron under Admiral Franklin Buchanan, made up
of the ram Tennessee and three small paddle-wheel gunboats, the
Morgan, Gaines, and Selma, commanded respectively by Commander George
W. Harrison, and Lieutenants J.W. Bennett and P.U. Murphy. They were
unarmored, excepting around the boilers. The Selma was an open-deck
river steamer with heavy hog frames; the two others had been built for
the Confederate Government, but were poorly put together. The
batteries were: Morgan, two VII-inch rifles and four 32-pounders;
Gaines, one VIII-inch rifle and five 32-pounders; Selma, one VI-inch
rifle, two IX-inch, and one VIII-inch smooth-bore shell-guns. Though
these lightly built vessels played a very important part for some
minutes, and from a favorable position did much harm to the Union
fleet in the subsequent engagement, they counted for nothing in the
calculations of Farragut. There were besides these a few other
so-called ironclads near the city; but they took no part in the fight
in the bay, and little, if any, in the operations before the fall of
Mobile itself in the spring of 1865.

The Tennessee was different. This was the most powerful ironclad
built, from the keel up, by the Confederacy, and both the energy shown
in overcoming difficulties and the workmanship put upon her were most
creditable to her builders. The work was begun at Selma, on the
Alabama River, one hundred and fifty miles from Mobile, in the spring
of 1863, when the timber was yet standing in the forests, and much of
what was to be her plating was still ore in the mines. The hull was
launched the following winter and towed to Mobile, where the plating
had already been sent from the rolling mills of Atlanta.

Her length on deck was 209 feet, beam 48 feet, and when loaded, with
her guns on board, she drew 14 feet. The battery was carried in a
casemate, equidistant from the bow and stern, whose inside dimensions
were 79 feet in length by 29 feet in width. The framing was of yellow
pine beams, 13 inches thick, placed close together vertically and
planked on the outside, first with 5½ inches of yellow pine, laid
horizontally, and then 4 inches of oak laid up and down. Both sides
and ends were inclined at an angle of forty-five degrees, and over the
outside planking was placed the armor, 6 inches thick, in thin plates
of 2 inches each, on the forward end, and elsewhere 5 inches thick.
Within, the yellow pine frames were sheathed with 2½ inches of oak.
The plating throughout was fastened with bolts 1¼ inch in diameter,
going entirely through and set up with nuts and washers inside. Her
gunners were thus sheltered by a thickness of five or six inches of
iron, backed by twenty-five inches of wood. The outside deck was
plated with two-inch iron. The sides of the casemate, or, as the
Confederates called it, the shield, were carried down to two feet
below the water-line and then reversed at the same angle, so as to
meet the hull again six to seven feet below water. The knuckle thus
formed, projecting ten feet beyond the base of the casemate, and
apparently filled in solid, afforded a substantial protection from an
enemy's prow to the hull, which was not less than eight feet within
it. It was covered with four inches of iron, and being continued round
the bows, became there a beak or ram. The pilot-house was made by
carrying part of the forward end of the shield up three feet higher
than the rest. The casemate was covered with heavy iron gratings,
through whose holes the smoke could rise freely, and it was pierced
with ten ports, three in each end and two on each side. The vessel
carried, however, only six guns; one VII-1/8-inch rifle at each end
and two VI-inch rifles on each broadside. These were Brooke guns, made
in the Confederacy; they threw 110-pound and 90-pound solid shot. The
ports were closed with iron sliding shutters, five inches thick; a bad
arrangement, as it turned out.

Though thus powerfully built, armored, and armed, the Tennessee must
have been a very exasperating vessel to her commander. She had two
grave defects; the first, perhaps unavoidable from the slender
resources of the Confederacy, was lack of speed. Her engines were not
built for her, but taken from a high-pressure river steamboat, and
though on her trial trip she realized about eight knots, six seems to
be all that could usually be got from her. She was driven by a screw,
the shaft being connected by gearing with the engines. The other
defect was an oversight, yet a culpable one; her steering chains,
instead of being led under her armored deck, were over it, exposed to
an enemy's fire. She was therefore a ram that could only by a
favorable chance overtake her prey, and was likely at any moment to
lose the power of directing her thrust.

Such as she was the Tennessee was ready for service early in March,
1864, when Commander J.D. Johnston was ordered as her captain. She was
taken from the city, through one of the arms of the Alabama, to the
mud flats which reach to a point twenty miles down the bay, and are
called Dog River Bar. The least depth of water to be traversed was
nine feet, but throughout the whole distance the fourteen feet
necessary to float the vessel could not be counted upon. She was
carried over on camels, which are large floats made to fit the hull
below the water line, and fastened to it, on either side, by heavy
chains passing around them and under the keel, while the camels are
filled with water. When the water was pumped out the buoyancy of the
camels lifted the ram five feet, reducing her draught enough to let
her go over the bar. Two months were taken up in building and placing
the camels, during all which time Farragut was begging either for
ironclads or for co-operation by the land forces, in reducing the
forts. In either case he was willing to enter the bay, but he did not
like to run the risk of getting inside with his wooden ships crippled,
the forts intact in his rear, and the enemy's ironclads to contend
with as well. Neither assistance was given, and he was therefore
compelled to look on while the Tennessee was moved from a position in
which she could do no harm to one in which she became the principal
menace to the attacking fleet. On the 18th of May she was finally
towed across and anchored in the lower bay six miles from the
entrance. That night the camels were removed, steam raised, and
everything made ready to cross the outer bar and attack the fleet;
but when the anchor was weighed the ship was found to be hard aground.
The intended attack was given up, and when the tide rose enough to
float her, she was moved down to Fort Morgan, near which she remained
from that time.

The preparations for defence of the enemy were not confined to the
forts and the ships. From the point of Dauphin Island a line of pile
obstructions extended across the sand bank, in the direction of Fort
Morgan, blocking the passage of any light vessels that might try to
pass that way. Where the piles ended, near the edge of the bank, a
triple line of torpedoes in échelon began, extending across the main
ship channel to a red buoy, distant two hundred and twenty-six yards
from the water battery under Fort Morgan. This narrow passage, not
much exceeding one hundred yards from the beach, was left open for
blockade-runners, and through it the admiral intended his fleet to
pass; for the reports of refugees and the examinations made by
officers of the fleet who dared at night to push their search thus
close under the enemy's guns, alike affirmed that there at least no
torpedoes were.

The torpedoes planted in this part of the defences of Mobile were
principally of two kinds, both of the class known as floating
torpedoes. One was made of an ordinary barrel, lager-beer kegs being
preferred, pitched inside and out and with wooden cones secured to the
two ends to keep it from tumbling over. The barrel was filled with
powder and furnished with several, generally five, sensitive primers,
placed near together in that part of the bilge which was to float
uppermost. The primers were exploded by a vessel striking them and
communicated their flame to the charge. The other torpedo was made of
tin, in the form of a truncated cone, the upper diameter being the
greater. It was divided into two parts, the upper being an
air-chamber and the lower containing the charge. On top was a
cast-iron cap so secured that a slight blow, like that from a passing
vessel, would knock it off. The cap was fast to a trigger, and as it
fell, its weight pulled the trigger and exploded the charge. In July,
1864, there were planted forty-six of the former and one hundred and
thirty-four of the latter kind. Besides these which exploded on
contact there are said to have been several electrical torpedoes.

The first six months of 1864 wore away in the monotonous routine of
the blockade, broken only by an attack upon Fort Powell, made from
Mississippi Sound by the admiral with the light-draught vessels. These
could not get nearer than four thousand yards, but at the time,
February 28th, Sherman was on his raid into Mississippi and the attack
was believed to be of service as a diversion. During this half of the
year none but wooden vessels lay before Mobile. Toward the end of July
the co-operation of Canby's forces was assured and the monitor
ironclads began to arrive.

The root idea from which the monitor type of ironclads grew was a raft
carrying a fort; their hulls, therefore, floated low in the water, the
deck being but a foot or two above it. Upon the deck were one or more
circular turrets, made of one-inch rolled wrought-iron plates, the
whole thickness depending upon the number of these thin plates bolted
together. The decks, and the hulls to some distance below the
water-line, were also armored, but less heavily. In the turret two
guns were mounted, of a size varying with the size of the vessel. They
could be moved in and out, but the aim from side to side was changed
by turning the whole turret, which revolved on a central spindle.
After firing, the ports were turned away from the enemy and the
unbroken iron toward him, until the guns were reloaded. Above and
concentric with the turret was another circular structure, of much
less diameter and similarly armored. This, called the pilot-house,
contained the steering-wheel, and was the station in battle of the
captain, helmsman, and pilot if there were one. It was stationary, not
sharing the revolving motion of the gun-turret, and could be entered
only by a hole opening down into the latter, the top being closed by
iron plates, which had been given greater thickness since a shot in
one instance had struck and broken them, killing the captain of the
vessel. Narrow horizontal slits were cut in the armor of the
pilot-house, through which the captain peered, as through the bars of
a helmet, to see his enemy and direct the course of his ship. The
gun-turret could be entered or left by the hull below, which contained
the living rooms of the officers and crew and all the usual and
necessary arrangements of a ship of war, or by the gun-ports, which
were large enough for a man to pass through. In action the hatches
were down, and ordinarily the only exit from the hull below was
through the turret and its ports. Four of these vessels were sent to
Farragut after many askings and months of delay; two from the Atlantic
coast, the Tecumseh and Manhattan, having ten-inch armor on their
turrets, and two from the Mississippi River, the Chickasaw and
Winnebago, with eight-and-a-half-inch armor. The former carried two
XV-inch guns in one turret; the latter four XI-inch guns in two
turrets. They were all screw ships, but the exigencies of the
Mississippi service calling for light draught, those built for it had
four screws of small diameter, two on each quarter. The speed of the
monitors was poor and, as they had iron hulls, varied much as their
bottoms were clean or foul. From a comparison of differing statements
it may be taken at from five to seven knots.

During these six months, though the admiral paid frequent visits to
the fleet off Mobile, the immediate direction of affairs was left to
the divisional commander, Captain Thornton A. Jenkins, of the
Richmond. In the last week of July, however, Farragut took charge in
person, and sent the Richmond, and others of the blockading force that
were to attempt the entry of the bay, to Pensacola to complete their
preparations. The Manhattan had arrived on the 20th and the Chickasaw
came in from New Orleans on the 1st of August. These, with the
Winnebago, were anchored under the lee of Sand Island; but the
Tecumseh did not get down until the Richmond, with the others,
returned on the night of the 4th; and it was only by the untiring
efforts of her commander and Captain Jenkins that she was ready even
then. With her, and the return of the blockaders, the admiral's force
was complete.

The understanding with General Granger, in immediate command of the
troops, was that he should land on the 4th on Dauphin Island and
invest Gaines, as he had not men enough to attack both forts at once.
The admiral was to pass Morgan and enter the bay the same morning.
Granger landed, but Farragut could not fulfil his part of the bargain,
because so many of his ships were still away. The delay, though he
chafed under it, was in the end an advantage, as the enemy used that
last day of his control of the water to throw more troops into Gaines,
who were all taken two days later.

In forming his plan of attack the admiral wanted two favors from
nature; a westerly wind to blow the smoke from the fleet and toward
Morgan, and a flood-tide. In regular summer weather the wind from
sunrise till eight o'clock is light from the southward and then hauls
gradually round to the west and northwest, growing in strength as it
does so. The tide was a matter of calculation, if no exceptional wind
modified its direction. The admiral wished it flood for two reasons:
first, because, as he intended to go in at any cost, it would help a
crippled ship into the harbor; and secondly, he had noticed that the
primers of the barrel-torpedoes were close together on top, and
thought it likely that when the flood-tide straightened out their
mooring-lines the tops would be turned away from the approaching
ships.

As at New Orleans, the preparations were left very much to the
commanders of ships. A general order directed spare spars and boats to
be landed, the machinery protected, and splinter-nettings placed. As
the fleet was to pass between the eastern buoy and the beach, or two
hundred yards from Morgan, little was feared from Gaines, which would
be over two miles away; the preparations[28] were therefore made
mainly on the starboard side, and port guns were shifted over till all
the ports were full. The boats were lowered and towed on the port
side. The admiral himself and the captain of the Brooklyn preferred to
go in with their topsail yards across; but the Richmond and Lackawanna
sent down their topmasts, and the other vessels seem to have done the
same.

    [Illustration: BATTLE OF MOBILE BAY.]

In the order of battle the wooden ships, as at Port Hudson, were to be
lashed in couples, the lighter vessels on the off hand; the four
monitors in a column inshore and abreast of the leading ships, the
Tecumseh, which led, slightly in advance of the van of the other
column. The admiral had intended to lead the latter himself in the
Hartford, but the representations of many officers led him to yield
his own judgment so far as to let the Brooklyn, whose captain
earnestly wished it, go ahead of him. The order of attack, as it stood
at last, was as follows:

               MONITORS--STARBOARD COLUMN.

Tecumseh    1,034 tons, 2[29] guns, Commander T.A.M. Craven.
Manhattan   1,034 tons, 2 guns, Commander J.W.A. Nicholson.
Winnebago     970 tons, 4 guns, Commander Thomas H. Stevens.
Chickasaw     970 tons, 4 guns, Lieut.-Com'r George H. Perkins.

               WOODEN SHIPS--PORT COLUMN.

{Brooklyn    2,070 tons, 24 guns, Captain James Alden.
{Octorara      829 tons,  6 guns, Lieut.-Com'r Chas. H. Greene.

{Hartford    1,900 tons, 21 guns, {Rear-Admiral David G. Farragut,
{                                 {Captain Percival Drayton.
{Metacomet     974 tons,  6 guns, Lieut.-Com'r Jas. B. Jouett.

{Richmond    1,929 tons, 20 guns, Captain Thornton A. Jenkins.
{Port Royal    805 tons,  6 guns, Lieut.-Com'r Bancroft Gherardi.

{Lackawanna  1,533 tons,  8 guns, Captain John B. Marchand.
{Seminole      801 tons,  8 guns, Commander Edward Donaldson.

{Monongahela 1,378 tons,  8 guns, Commander James H. Strong.
{Kennebec      507 tons,  5 guns, Lieut.-Com'r Wm. P. McCann.

{Ossipee     1,240 tons, 11 guns, Commander William B. Le Roy.
{Itasca        507 tons,  5 guns, Lieut.-Com'r George Brown.

{Oneida      1,032 tons,  9 guns, Commander J.R.M. Mullany.
{Galena        738 tons, 10 guns, Lieut.-Com'r Clark H. Wells.

The Octorara, Metacomet, and Port Royal were side-wheel double-enders;
the others were screw ships. All had been built for the naval service.

The evening before the action it was raining hard, but toward midnight
stopped and became clear, hot, and calm. The preparations were all
made and the vessels lay quietly at their anchors; the wooden ships
outside, the monitors behind Sand Island. Later a light air sprung up
from the southwest, thus fulfilling the admiral's wish. He was not
well, sleeping restlessly, and about three in the morning sent his
steward to find out how the wind was. When he learned it was
southwest, he said: "Then we will go in this morning." Soon after, the
hands were turned up and hammocks stowed. Between 4 and 5 o'clock the
lighter vessels came alongside and were lashed to their consorts. At
5.30 the signal was made to get under way and the Brooklyn weighed at
once, the other vessels following in order, the monitors at the same
time standing out from their anchorage. The fleet steamed slowly in to
the bar, to allow its members to take and keep their stations, the
crews in the meantime going to quarters and clearing for action. At
6.10 the bar was crossed by the flag-ship, and by 6.30 the order for
battle was fairly formed and the monitors taking their stations; in
doing which a slight delay occurred. At this time all the ships
hoisted the United States flag at the peak and the three mastheads,
and the Tecumseh fired the first two shots at the fort. At five
minutes before seven the fleet went ahead again, and at five minutes
past the fort opened upon the Brooklyn, the leading ship, which
answered at once with her bow rifle, and immediately afterward the
action became general along the line between the fort, the monitors
(except the Tecumseh), and the bow guns of the fleet; at the same time
the enemy's gunboats moved out from behind Morgan and formed in line
ahead, east and west, across the channel just inside the lines of
torpedoes. From this position they had a raking fire upon the fleet,
which was confined to a nearly north course (north by east), until it
had passed the fort and the buoy. At half-past seven the leading ships
had their broadsides bearing fairly on the works, and while they
maintained that position their heavy fire so kept down the enemy's
that the latter did little harm.

The Tecumseh, after firing the two first guns, as stated above, had
turned her turret from the enemy and loaded again with steel shot and
the heaviest charge[30] of powder. Intent only upon the Tennessee, she
steamed quietly on, regardless of the fort, a little ahead of the
Brooklyn, the other monitors following her closely. As they drew near
the buoy, Craven from the pilot-house of his ship saw it so nearly in
line with the beach that he turned to his pilot and said, "It is
impossible that the admiral means us to go inside that buoy; I cannot
turn my ship." At the same moment the Tennessee, which till that time
had lain to the eastward of the buoy, went ahead to the westward of
it, and Craven, either fearing she would got away from him or moved by
the seeming narrowness of the open way, gave the order "Starboard" and
pushed the Tecumseh straight at the enemy. She had gone but a few
yards and the lockstring was already taut in the hands of an officer
of the enemy's ship, Lieutenant Wharton, waiting to fire as they
touched, when one or more torpedoes exploded under her. She lurched
from side to side, careened violently over, and went down head
foremost, her screw plainly visible in the air for a moment to the
enemy, that waited for her, not two hundred yards off, on the other
side of the fatal line. It was then that Craven did one of those deeds
that should be always linked with the doer's name, as Sidney's is with
the cup of cold water. The pilot and he instinctively made for the
narrow opening leading to the turret below. Craven drew back: "After
you, pilot," he said. There was no afterward for him; the pilot was
saved, but he went down with his ship.

When the Tecumseh sank, the Brooklyn was about three hundred yards
astern of her and a little outside; the Hartford between one and two
hundred yards from the Brooklyn, on her port quarter; the Richmond
about the same distance from the Hartford and in the Brooklyn's wake.
The Winnebago, the second astern of the Tecumseh, was five hundred
yards from her, and the Manhattan in her station, two hundred yards
ahead of the Winnebago; both, however, skirting the beach and steering
to pass inside of the buoy, as they had been ordered. The sunken
vessel was therefore well on their port bow. Unmoved by the fate of
their leader, the three remaining ironclads steamed on in line ahead,
steadily but very slowly, being specially directed to occupy the
attention of the guns ashore, that were raking the approaching ships.
As they passed, the admiration of the officers of the flag-ship and
Metacomet was aroused by the sight of Commander Stevens, of the
Winnebago, walking quietly, giving his orders, from turret to turret
of his unwieldy vessel, directly under the enemy's guns. Five minutes
later were seen from the Brooklyn certain objects in the water ahead,
which were taken at the moment for buoys to torpedoes. The ship and
her consort were stopped and then began to back, coming down upon the
next astern; at the same time their bows fell off toward the fort and
they soon lay nearly athwart the channel. The Hartford's engines were
at once stopped, but, as she held her way and drifted on with the
flood-tide, her bow approached dangerously near the Brooklyn's stern
and the Richmond was close behind; fortunately the rest of the fleet
had opened out somewhat. While the vessels were thus close the admiral
hailed to know what was the matter. "Torpedoes ahead," was the reply.
Farragut, who did not go heedlessly into action, had reckoned on
torpedoes and counted the cost. Without any seeming hesitation, though
in the story of his life it appears that for a moment he felt overcome
till he could throw himself on a Power greater than his own, he
ordered his own ship and his consort ahead, at the same time making
the signal "Close order." From the position of the Brooklyn it was no
longer possible to pass inside, and accordingly, backing the Metacomet
and going ahead with the flagship, their heads were turned to the
westward and they passed outside of the fatal buoy, about five hundred
yards from the fort. As they went over the line the torpedo cases were
heard knocking against the bottom of the ship and the primers
snapping,[31] but none of the torpedoes themselves exploded and the
Hartford went safely through.

Yet, in the midst of Farragut's grave anxieties about the great issues
touching his fleet, the drowning men on board the Tecumseh had not
been forgotten, and, while still fettered by the Brooklyn's action, he
hailed Captain Jouett, of the Metacomet,[32] to know if he had not a
boat that he could send to save them. Jouett, having seen the
disaster, and not having the other cares on his mind, had by a few
instants forestalled the admiral, and the boat was about leaving the
port quarter of the Metacomet, in charge of Ensign H.C. Nields, an
officer of the Volunteer Navy. She pulled round under the Hartford's
stern and broadside, across the bows of the Brooklyn, toward the
wreck, where she saved the pilot, John Collins, and nine of the ship's
company. While on his way Nields, who was but a lad, did one of those
acts, simple in intention, which appeal strongly to the feelings and
imagination and indicate the calm self-possession of the doer. He was
steering the boat himself, and his captain, who was watching, saw him,
after pulling some fifty yards, look up and back to see if the flag
was flying; missing it, he stooped down, took it out of the cover in
which it is habitually kept and shipped it, unfurled, in its place in
the boat before the eyes of friends and foes. His heroic and merciful
errand was not accomplished without the greatest risk, greater than he
himself knew; for not only did he pass under the continued and furious
fire of the fort and the fleet, but the ensign of the forecastle
division of the Hartford, seeing the boat without a flag and knowing
nothing of its object, but having torpedoes uppermost in his mind,
connected its presence with them, trained one of his hundred-pounders
upon it,[33] and was about to pull the lockstring when one of the
ship's company caught his arm, saying: "For God's sake, don't fire! it
is one of our own boats!" The Hartford had passed on when Nields had
picked up the survivors, and, after putting them aboard the Winnebago,
he pulled down to the Oneida, where he served during the rest of the
action. Two officers and five men had also escaped in one of the
Tecumseh's boats, which was towing alongside, and four swam to the
fort, where they were made prisoners; so that twenty-one were saved
out of a complement of over one hundred souls.

Meanwhile the Brooklyn was lying bows on to the fort, undergoing a
raking fire and backing down upon the starboard bow of the Richmond,
whose engines were stopped, but the vessel drifting up with the young
flood-tide. Her captain, seeing a collision in such critical
circumstances imminent, gave the order to back hard both his own ship
and her consort; fearing that, if the four became entangled, not only
would they suffer damage themselves, but, if sunk by the fire of the
fort, would block the channel to the rest of the squadron. As she
backed, the Richmond's bow fell off to port, bringing her starboard
broadside fairly toward the fort and batteries, on which she kept up a
steady and rapid fire, at a distance of from three hundred to one
hundred and fifty yards, driving the enemy out of the water-battery
and silencing it; being at the same time wrapped in a cloud of smoke
which hid her hull and rose above her lower mast-heads.

As her topmasts were down, the ship was thus so completely hidden that
Buchanan, the Confederate admiral, who had had her captain under him
as a midshipman in days long gone by, and again as first lieutenant of
a corvette during the war with Mexico, asked after the surrender:
"What became of Jenkins? I saw his vessel go handsomely into action
and then lost sight of her entirely." While thus backing and fighting
the ship was in great danger of getting aground, having at times less
than a foot of water under her keel; but her commander thought the
situation so critical as to necessitate the risk. During the same time
the Brooklyn, from her unfortunate position, was unable to use any but
her bow guns, and, even when her hull was obscured by the smoke of the
battle, her position was shown to the gunners of the fort by her tall
spars towering above. These moments of anxiety were ended when she
brought her head once more in the right direction and steamed on; the
Richmond followed with the other ships of the port column, which had
closed up and joined in the action during the delay. Their fire, with
the monitors', kept down that of the fort until the bulk of the fleet
had gone by, but when the heavier ships were out of range the enemy
returned to their guns and severely punished the rear of the line; the
last ship, the Oneida, receiving a VII-inch rifle shell, which passed
through her chain armor and into the starboard boiler, where it burst,
the larger part of the watch of firemen being scalded by the escaping
steam. About the same moment a similar projectile burst in the cabin,
cutting both wheel-ropes, while her forward XI-inch gun and one of the
VIII-inch were disabled. In this condition the Oneida was pulled past
the forts by her consort, the Galena.

As the Hartford advanced over the line of torpedoes the three smaller
gunboats of the enemy took their position on her starboard bow and
ahead, whence they kept up a raking and most galling fire, to which
the Hartford, confined to the direction of the channel, could only
reply with her bow guns, one of which was speedily disabled by a shell
bursting under it. As the flag-ship advanced they retreated, keeping
their distance and range about the same, from one thousand to seven
hundred yards, and fighting mainly the stern guns. At no period of the
action did she suffer as now, and the quarters of her forward division
became a slaughter-pen; a single shot killing ten and wounding five
men, while the splinters and shreds of bodies were hurled aft and on
to the decks of her consort. The greater part of the ship's company
had never been in action, but so admirable was their spirit and
discipline that no wavering was seen, nor was there any confusion even
in reorganizing the more than decimated crews of the guns. The
Tennessee meantime waited for her, Buchanan having set his heart on
sinking the enemy's admiral, but as the ram stood down the Hartford
put her helm to starboard and, having the greater speed, avoided the
thrust without difficulty. Two shots were fired by the ram at the same
moment at such short range that it seemed wonderful they missed. The
Tennessee then followed up the bay till her opponent was about a mile
from his own fleet, when for some reason she gave up the pursuit and
turned to meet the other wooden ships, which were advancing in close
order, the Brooklyn still leading. The Tennessee stood for the latter
vessel, as though intending to ram, but sheered off and went by on her
starboard side, at less than one hundred yards, firing two shots,
which struck and went through and through, and receiving the contents
of the Brooklyn's guns in return. She passed on down the line to the
Richmond, which was ready with her broadside and a party of
musketeers, who kept up a brisk fire into the ram's ports. Whether the
aim was thus disordered or there was not time to lay the guns properly
after reloading, the two shots flew high and no harm was done. The
Tennessee passed the next ship, the Lackawanna, also on the starboard
side, but then made a determined sheer toward the line as though
certainly intending to ram. Captain Strong of the Monongahela seeing
this, headed for her, putting his helm to port and then shifting it so
as to strike at right angles, but the Monongahela could not get her
full speed, from having the gunboat Kennebec in tow alongside; she
therefore struck the ram somewhat glancing and on her port quarter.
The blow threw the Tennessee's stern around and she passed close along
the port side of the Kennebec, injuring the planking on the latter's
bow and leaving one of her boats and its iron davit with the gunboat
as a memento of the collision. As she went by she fired a shell which
entered the berth-deck and exploded, seriously wounding an officer and
four men. The Ossipee, which was on the port quarter of the
Monongahela when the collision took place, seeing how the ram was
heading, also put her helm to port following the Monongahela's motion;
but when the ram swung round under the blow she righted it and the
Tennessee passed between the two, giving the Ossipee two shots, which
entered nearly together below the spar-deck abreast the forward pivot
gun. The ram then passed on the starboard side of the crippled
Oneida, about a hundred yards off, and tried to fire her broadside;
but the primers snapped several times, and she only succeeded in
getting off one gun, the shot from which hit the after XI-inch pivot,
which had just been fired at and struck her. She then passed under the
Oneida's stern, delivering a raking fire, and severely wounding
Commander Mullany, who lost an arm. At this moment the Union
iron-clads which, in obedience to their orders, had delayed before the
fort, occupying its guns until the fleet had passed, drew near the
rear wooden ships and opened their fire on the Tennessee. As the enemy
passed under the stern of the Oneida the Winnebago came up and took
position between the two, upon which the crew of the crippled ship,
who were expecting to be rammed, leaped upon the rail and cheered
Commander Stevens, lately their own captain,[34] he having left them
but a few days before.

About the time that the Tennessee gave up her pursuit of the Hartford,
the flag ship reached the point where she was able to keep away a
little to the westward. As she did so her starboard broadside came to
bear and the Confederate gunboats edged off, though still keeping up a
hot fire from their stern guns. A shot soon struck the Gaines under
the port counter below water, and a shell striking soon after near the
same place on the starboard side exploded, also below water, and
started a heavy leak in the magazine. At this time the admiral
directed the Metacomet to cast off and chase the gunboats, specially
cautioning her commander to let none of them escape to Mobile; and a
signal to the same effect was made to the lighter vessels in the
rear. Jouett, who had been impatiently waiting, cut his fasts, backed
clear, and pressed hard after the three, who retreated up the bay. The
Gaines had to haul off toward Morgan at 8.30, the leak increasing
rapidly, but the other two kept on still. The Metacomet, not being
able to fire straight ahead, yawed once or twice to discharge her bow
gun; but finding she lost too much ground by this discontinued it,
though the enemy were still keeping up a harassing fire. The chase led
her into shoal water, the leadsman in the chains reporting a foot less
than the ship drew. The executive officer, having verified the
sounding, reported it to the captain, who, intent simply upon carrying
out his orders, and seeing that the bottom was a soft ooze, replied:
"Call the man in; he is only intimidating me with his soundings." Soon
after this a heavy squall accompanied by rain and dense mist came up,
and during it the Morgan, which was on the starboard bow of the
Metacomet, first got aground, and then getting off ran down to the
southeastward toward Fort Morgan. The Selma kept straight on, as did
the Metacomet; and when the squall lifted the latter found herself
ahead and on the starboard bow of her chase. One shot was fired,
killing the executive officer and some of the crew of the Selma, and
then the latter hauled down her flag, having lost five killed and ten
wounded. The other Union gunboats being far in the rear and
embarrassed by the mist did not succeed in cutting off the
others--both of which escaped under Fort Morgan. The Gaines being
wholly disabled was burnt; the Morgan made good her escape to Mobile
the same night.

After passing down the Union line, Buchanan said to his flag-captain,
it being then about half-past eight: "Follow them up, Johnston, we
can't let them off that way." Five minutes later the Hartford anchored
four miles from Morgan, and the crew were sent to breakfast. Captain
Drayton went up on the poop and said to the admiral: "What we have
done has been well done, sir; but it all counts for nothing so long as
the Tennessee is there under the guns of Morgan." "I know it," said
the admiral, "and as soon as the people have had their breakfasts I am
going for her."[35] Buchanan by his move thus played directly into
Farragut's hands. From some difficulty in the ground it was found
necessary to bring the head of the Tennessee round toward Morgan, and
this, with the length of time occupied in the manoeuvre and the
improbability of her attacking the whole fleet by daylight, caused the
admiral to think that she had retired under the guns of the fort. He
was soon undeceived. At ten minutes before nine, when the crew had
hardly got seated at their breakfast, the Tennessee was reported
approaching. The mess-gear was hustled aside, and the flag-ship at
once got under way, as did the other vessels that had anchored, and
signal was made to the monitors to destroy the ram and to the
Monongahela, Lackawanna, and Ossipee to ram the enemy's principal
vessel. These ships took ground to carry out their orders, and when
the Tennessee was about four hundred yards from the fleet the
Monongahela struck her fairly amidships on the starboard side. Just
before the blow the ram fired two shells, which passed through her
enemy's berth-deck, one exploding and wounding an officer and two men.
She then passed on the starboard side of the Monongahela and received
a broadside at the distance of ten yards, but without harm. The
Lackawanna followed, striking a square blow on the port side at the
after end of the casemate. The Tennessee listed over heavily and swung
round, so that the two vessels lay alongside head and stern, the port
sides touching; but as the Lackawanna's battery had been mostly
shifted to the starboard side to engage the fort she had only one
IX-inch gun available, the shot from which struck one of the enemy's
port shutters driving fragments into the casemates. The Lackawanna
then kept away, making a circuit to ram again. She had her stem cut
and crushed from three feet above the water-line to five below,
causing some leakage, and the Monongahela had her iron prow carried
away and the butt ends of the planking started on both bows; but the
only damage caused to the Tennessee, protected by her sponsons, was a
leak at the rate of about six inches an hour. The flag-ship now
approached to ram, also on the port side; but the Tennessee turned
toward her so that the bluff of the port bow in each ship took the
blow. The Hartford's anchor was hanging from the hawse-pipe, there not
having been time to cat it, and acted as a fender, being doubled up
under the blow, and the two vessels rasped by, the port sides
touching. Most of the Hartford's battery was also on the starboard
side, but there were still seven IX-inch guns which sent out their
solid shot with their heaviest charge of powder; yet at a distance of
ten feet they did the Tennessee no harm. The primers of the latter
again failed her, being heard by the flagship's people to snap
unsuccessfully several times; one gun finally went off, and the shell
exploding on the berth-deck killed and wounded an officer and several
men. This was the last shot fired by the Tennessee. The Hartford put
her helm to starboard and made a circle to ram again, but in mid
career the Lackawanna ran into her, striking near the person of the
admiral, who had a narrow escape from being killed, and cutting the
flag-ship down to within two feet of the water.

Meanwhile the monitors had come up. The Manhattan had lost the use of
one of her XV-inch guns early in the day by a fragment of iron which
dropped into the vent and could not be got out; she was therefore able
to fire only six of her heavy shot, one of which broke through the
port side of the casemate leaving on the inside an undetached mass of
oak and pine splinters. The Winnebago's turrets could not be turned,
so the guns could only be trained by moving the helm and her fire was
necessarily slow. The Chickasaw was more fortunate; her smoke-stack
had been pierced several times by the fort, so that her speed had run
down and she had not yet reached the anchorage when the Tennessee came
up, but by heaping tallow and coal-tar on the furnaces steam was
raised rapidly and she closed with the enemy immediately after the
Hartford rammed and fired. Passing by her port side and firing as she
did so, she took position under her stern, dogging her steadily during
the remainder of the fight, never over fifty yards distant, and at
times almost touching, keeping up an unremitting fire with her four
XI-inch guns.[36]

The bow and stern port shutters of the Tennessee were now jammed, so
that those guns could not be used. Soon her smoke-stack came down and
the smoke rising from its stump poured through the gratings on to the
gun-deck, where the thermometer now stood at 120°. At about the same
time the tiller-chains were shot away from their exposed position over
the after-deck. Losing thus the power of directing her movements, the
Tennessee headed aimlessly down the bay, followed always by the
unrelenting Chickasaw, under the pounding of whose heavy guns the
after-end of the shield was now seen, by those within, to be
perceptibly vibrating. The Manhattan and Winnebago were also at work,
and the Hartford, Ossipee, and other vessels were seeking their chance
to ram again. During this time Buchanan, who was superintending in
person the working of the battery, sent for a machinist to back out
the pin of a jammed port shutter; while the man was at work a shot
struck just outside where he was sitting, the concussion crushing him
so that the remains had to be shovelled into buckets. At the same
moment the admiral received a wound from an iron splinter, breaking
his leg. The command then fell upon Captain Johnston, who endured the
hammering, powerless to reply, for twenty minutes longer; then, after
consultation with the admiral, he hauled down the flag which was
hoisted on a boat-hook thrust through the grating. As it had before
been shot away the fire of the fleet did not stop, and Johnston
accordingly went on the roof and showed a white flag. As he stood
there the Ossipee was approaching at full speed to ram on the
starboard side, passing the sluggish Winnebago, whose captain, still
outside his turret, exchanged greetings with his more fortunate
competitor. Her helm was put over and engines backed at once, but it
was too late to avoid the collision. As they came together her captain
appeared on the forecastle and, along with the blow, Johnston received
a genial greeting from the most genial of men: "Hallo, Johnston, old
fellow! how are you? This is the United States Steamer Ossipee. I'll
send a boat alongside for you. Le Roy, don't you know me?" The boat
was sent and the United States flag hoisted on board the Tennessee at
ten o'clock.[37]

The fight had lasted a little over an hour. The loss of the Tennessee
was 2 killed and 10 wounded, that of the Union fleet, from the forts
and the enemy's squadron, 52 killed and 170 wounded.[38] Besides the
loss of the smoke-stack and steering-gear, the injuries to the
casemate of the ram were very severe. On the after-side nearly all the
plating was found to be started, the after gun-carriage was disabled
and there were distinct marks of nine XI-inch solid shot having struck
within a few square feet of that port. The only shot that penetrated
the casing was the one XV-inch from the Manhattan. Three port shutters
were so damaged as to stop the firing of the guns.

The Chickasaw, which had so persistently stuck to the ram, now took
her in tow and anchored her near the flag-ship. At half-past two of
the same afternoon the Chickasaw again got under way and stood down to
Fort Powell, engaging it for an hour at a distance of three hundred
and fifty yards. The fort had been built to resist an attack from the
sound and was not yet ready to meet one coming like this from the
rear. That same night it was evacuated and blown up.

On the 6th the Chickasaw went down and shelled Fort Gaines, and the
following day it was surrendered. Fort Morgan still held out. The army
under General Granger was transferred from Dauphin Island to Mobile
Point and a siege train, sent from New Orleans, was landed three miles
in rear of the fort on the 17th. In the meantime batteries had been
constructed; and thirty-four guns had been put in position, with
everything ready for opening, on the evening of Saturday the 20th. On
Monday the 22d, at daylight, the bombardment began from the batteries,
the three monitors, and the ships outside as well as inside the bar.
On the 23d the fort surrendered.

Mobile as a port for blockade-running was thus sealed by the fleet
holding the bay; but the gigantic struggle going on in Virginia,
Tennessee, and Georgia hindered for the time any attempt to reduce the
city. That would have withdrawn from more important fields a large
force for a secondary object, which was put off till the following
spring. In the meantime Admiral Farragut went north in December,
leaving Commodore Palmer in command of the squadron till the following
February, when he was relieved by Acting Rear-Admiral H.K. Thatcher.
Palmer, however, stayed by his own wish until the city fell.

Several streams having a common origin and communicating with one
another enter the head of the bay. Of these the chief and most western
is the Mobile River, formed by the junction of the Alabama and
Tombigbee. It empties by two principal branches, of which the western
keeps the name Mobile, the eastern one being called Spanish River; the
city of Mobile is on the west bank of the former. On the east side of
the bay the Tensaw[39] enters, also by two mouths, of which the
western keeps the name and the eastern is called the Blakely River.
The Tensaw and Spanish Rivers have a common mouth about a mile from
the city. It is therefore practicable to go from the Mobile to Spanish
River, and thence to the Tensaw and Blakely without entering the bay.

The works around the city inland were very strong, but it was not
approached from that side. General Canby, commanding the Army of the
West Mississippi, began to move against it in March 1865. One corps
marched from Fort Morgan up the east side of the bay to a small stream
called Fish River, where a landing was secured; the remainder of the
army were then brought to this point in transports. At the same time a
column under General Steele left Pensacola, directing its march upon
Blakely, a point near the mouth of the Blakely River on the east bank.
A short distance below Blakely was Spanish Fort, upon the defence of
which the fate of the city turned.

The gunboats had not hitherto crossed Dog River Bar, partly on account
of the low water and partly because of the torpedoes, which were known
to be thickly sowed thereabouts. It now became necessary for the navy
to cut off the communication of the fort with Mobile by water, while
the army invested it by land. On the 27th of March the fleet moved up
and the bar was safely crossed by the double-ender Octorara, Lieutenant
Commander W.W. Low; and the ironclads, Kickapoo, Lieutenant-Commander
M.P. Jones; Osage, Lieutenant-Commander William M. Gamble; Milwaukee,
Lieutenant-Commander James H. Gillis; Winnebago, Lieutenant-Commander
W.A. Kirkland; and Chickasaw, Lieutenant-Commander George H. Perkins.
They opened that day on the enemy's works, which were invested by the
army the same night.

Before and after crossing, the bay had been thoroughly swept for
torpedoes, and it was hoped that all had been found; but,
unfortunately, they had not. On the 28th the Winnebago and Milwaukee
moved up toward Spanish Fort, shelling a transport lying there from a
distance of two miles. As the enemy's works were throwing far over,
they were ordered to return to the rest of the fleet when the
transport moved off. The Milwaukee dropped down with the current,
keeping her head up stream, and had come within two hundred yards of
the fleet when she struck a torpedo, on her port side forty feet from
the stern. She sank abaft in three minutes, but her bow did not fill
for nearly an hour. No one was hurt or drowned by this accident. The
next day, the Winnebago having dragged in a fresh breeze too near the
Osage, the latter weighed and moved a short distance ahead. Just as
she was about to drop her anchor, a torpedo exploded under the bow
and she began to sink, filling almost immediately. Of her crew 5 were
killed and 11 wounded by the explosion, but none were drowned. The
place where this happened had been thoroughly swept and the torpedo
was thought to be one that had gone, or been sent, adrift from above.
The two vessels were in twelve feet water, so that the tops of the
turrets remained in sight. Lieutenant-Commander Gillis, after the loss
of his vessel, took command of a naval battery in the siege and did
good service.

On the 1st of April the light-draught steamer Rodolph, having on board
apparatus for raising the Milwaukee, was coming near the fleet when
she too struck a torpedo, which exploded thirty feet abaft her stem
and caused her to sink rapidly, killing 4 and wounding 11 of the crew.

The siege lasted until the evening of the 8th of April, when Spanish
Fort surrendered. Up to the last the enemy sent down torpedoes, and
that night eighteen were taken from Blakely River. Commander Pierce
Crosby, of the Metacomet, at once began sweeping above, and so
successfully that on the 10th the Octorara and ironclads were able to
move abreast Spanish Fort and shell two earthworks, called Huger and
Tracy, some distance above. These were abandoned on the evening of the
11th, when the fleet took possession. Commander Crosby again went on
with the work of lifting torpedoes, removing in all over one hundred
and fifty. The way being thus cleared, on the 12th Commander Palmer
with the Octorara and ironclads moved up the Blakely to the point
where it branches off from the Tensaw, and down the latter stream,
coming out about a mile from Mobile, within easy shelling distance. At
the same time Admiral Thatcher, with the gunboats and 8,000 troops
under General Granger, crossed the head of the bay to attack the city,
which was immediately given up; the Confederate troops having already
withdrawn. The vessels of the enemy, which had taken little part in
the defence, had gone up the Tombigbee.

The navy at once began to remove the obstructions in the main ship
channel and lift the torpedoes, which were numerous. While doing the
latter duty, two tugs, the Ida and Althea, and a launch of the
ironclad Cincinnati were blown up. By these accidents 8 were killed
and 5 wounded. The gunboat Sciota was also sunk in the same manner on
the 14th of April, the explosion breaking the spar deck beams and
doing much other damage. Her loss was 6 killed and 5 wounded.

The rebellion was now breaking up. Lee had laid down his arms on the
9th, and Johnston on the 24th of April. On the 4th of May General
Richard Taylor surrendered the army in the Department of Alabama and
Mississippi to General Canby; and the same day Commodore Farrand
delivered the vessels under his command in the waters of Alabama to
Admiral Thatcher, the officers and crews being paroled. Sabine Pass
and Galveston, which had never been retaken after their loss early in
1863, were given up on the 25th of May and the 2d of June.

In July, 1865, the East and West Gulf Squadrons were merged into one
under Admiral Thatcher. Reasons of public policy caused this
arrangement to continue until May, 1867, when the attempt of the
French emperor to establish an imperial government in Mexico having
been given up, the Gulf Squadron as a distinct organization ceased to
be. Thus ended the last of the separate fleets which the Civil War had
called into existence. The old cruising ground of the Home Squadron
again became a single command under the name, which it still retains,
of the North Atlantic Squadron.

FOOTNOTES:

[22] Report of the United States Ordnance Officer of Department, dated
October, 1864.

[23] Report of the United States Ordnance Officer of Department, dated
October, 1864.

[24] See Appendix.

[25] Of these guns twelve 32-pounders were at the southwest angle of
the covered way. This is believed by the writer to be the battery known
to the fleet as the lighthouse battery.

[26] 24-pounder smooth-bore guns rifled.

[27] In a paper read in 1868, before the Essayons Club, at Willett's
Point, N.Y., by Captain A.H. Burnham, U.S. Engineers, it is stated that
there were three VII-and VIII-inch rifles in this battery. If this is
correct, they had probably been moved from the barbette of the main
work.

[28] The Richmond, while at Pensacola, built a regular barricade of
sand-bags, extending from the port bow round the starboard side to the
port quarter, and from the berth to the spar-dock. Three thousand bags
of sand were used for this defence which was in places several feet
thick.

[29] For particulars of batteries, see Appendix.

[30] Sixty pounds; one hundred pounds have since been used in these
guns.

[31] The evidence for this singular and striking incident is, both in
quality and quantity, such as puts the fact beyond doubt. The same
sounds were heard on board the Richmond. The tin torpedoes were poorly
lacquered and corroded rapidly under the sea-water. There is good
reason to believe that those which sunk the Tecumseh had been planted
but two or three days before. A story recently current in the South,
that she was sunk by a torpedo carried at her own bow, is wholly
without foundation.

[32] Farragut was in the port main rigging of the Hartford, Jouett on
the starboard wheel-house of his ship, so that there were but a few
feet between them.

[33] This was told the writer by the officer himself.

[34] Commander Stevens had given up the command of the Oneida at the
request and in favor of Commander Mullany, whose own ship was not
fitted for such an engagement, and who had heretofore been less
fortunate than his friend in having opportunities for distinction
thrown in his way by the war. Stevens, being an old ironclad captain,
took the command of the Winnebago, which was vacant.

[35] This was said in the hearing of Lieutenant-Commander (now Captain)
Kimberley, the executive officer of the Hartford. Commodore Foxhall A.
Parker (Battle of Mobile Bay) mentions that Farragut had written in a
note-book after the engagement: "Had Buchanan remained under the fort,
I should have attacked him _as soon as it became dark_ with the three
monitors." The statements are easily reconciled, the latter
representing the second thought.

[36] Lieutenant-Commander Perkins and the executive officer of the
Chickasaw, Volunteer Lieutenant William Hamilton, were going North from
other ships on leave of absence, the latter on sick leave, but had
offered their services for the battle. The fire of the Chickasaw was
the most damaging to the Tennessee. In her engagement with the ram she
fired fifty-two XI-inch solid shot, almost all into the stern, where
the greatest injury was done. The Metacomet went to Pensacola that
night under a flag of truce with the wounded from the fleet and the
Tennessee, and was taken out by the pilot of the latter. He asked
Captain Jouett who commanded the monitor that got under the ram's
stern, adding: "D----n him! he stuck to us like a leech; we could not
get away from him. It was he who cut away the steering gear, jammed the
stern port shutters, and wounded Admiral Buchanan."

[37] It is not easy to fix the exact times of particular occurrences
from the notes taken in the heat of action by different observers, with
watches not necessarily running together; yet a certain measure of
duration of the exciting events between 7 and 10 A.M. in this battle
seems desirable. From a careful comparison of the logs and reports the
following table of times has been compiled:

  Fort Morgan opened                       7.07 A.M.
  Brooklyn opened with bow guns            7.10 A.M.
  Fleet generally with bow guns            7.15 A.M.
  Fleet generally with broadside guns      7.30-7.50 A.M.
  Tecumseh sunk                            7.45 A.M.
  Hartford took the lead                   7.52 A.M.
  Hartford casts off Metacomet             8.05 A.M.

At this time the rest of the fleet were about a mile astern of the
flag-ship, crossing the lines of torpedoes, and the Tennessee turned to
attack them.

  Tennessee passed rear ship (Oneida)      8.20 A.M.
  Hartford anchored                        8.35 A.M.
  Tennessee sighted coming up              8.50 A.M.
  Monongahela rammed                       9.25 A.M.
  Lackawanna rammed                        9.30 A.M.
  Hartford                                 9.35 A.M.
  Tennessee surrendered                   10.00 A.M.

[38]

                   Killed.      Wounded.
  Hartford           25            28
  Brooklyn           11            43
  Lackawanna          4            35
  Oneida              8            30
  Monongahela         0             6
  Metacomet           1             2
  Ossipee             1             7
  Richmond            0             2
  Galena              0             1
  Octorara            1            10
  Kennebec            1             6

[39] The Tensaw branches off from the Alabama thirty miles up, and the
whole really forms a bayou, or delta, system.




APPENDIX.


BATTERIES (EXCEPT HOWITZERS) OF VESSELS AT NEW ORLEANS, APRIL, 1862.

-------------------+----+----+----+-----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
                   |XI- |X-  |IX- |VIII-|32- |100-|80- |50- |30- |20- |
                   |in. |in. |in. |in.  |pdr.|pdr.|pdr.|pdr.|pdr.|pdr.|
  NAMES            |        sm.-bore.        |        rifled.         |
-------------------+----+----+----+-----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
Hartford           |    |    | 22 |     |    |    |    |    |    |  2 |
Brooklyn           |    |    | 20 |     |    |    |  1 |    |  1 |    |
Richmond           |    |    | 22 |     |    |    |  1 |    |  1 |    |
Pensacola          |  1 |    | 20 |     |    |  1 |  1 |    |    |    |
Mississippi        |    |  1 |    |  15 |    |    |    |    |    |  1 |
Oneida             |  2 |    |    |     |  4 |    |    |    |  3 |    |
Iroquois           |  2 |    |    |     |  4 |    |    |  1 |    |    |
Varuna             |    |    |    |   8 |    |    |    |    |  2 |    |
Cayuga[40]         |  1 |    |    |     |    |    |    |    |  1 |    |
Clifton            |    |    |  2 |     |  4 |    |    |    |  1 |    |
Jackson[41]        |    |  1 |  1 |     |  4 |    |    |    |    |    |
Westfield          |    |    |  1 |   4 |    |  1 |    |    |    |    |
Harriet Lane       |    |    |  3 |     |    |    |    |    |    |    |
Miami              |    |    |  2 |     |    |  1 |  1 |    |  1 |    |
-------------------+----+----+----+-----+----+----+----+----+----+----+


BATTERIES (EXCEPT HOWITZERS) OF VESSELS[42] AT PORT HUDSON, MARCH,
1863.

-------------------+-----+-----+-----+------+------+------+------+
                   | XI- | X-  | IX- | 32-  | 150- | 100- | 30-  |
                   | in. | in. | in. | pdr. | pdr. | pdr. | pdr. |
  NAMES            |     smooth-bore.       |     rifled.        |
-------------------+-----+-----+-----+------+------+------+------+
Monongahela        |  2  |     |     |  5   |   1  |      |      |
Genesee            |     |  1  |  4  |      |      |   2  |      |
Albatross          |     |     |     |  4   |      |      |  1   |
-------------------+-----+-----+-----+------+------+------+------+


BATTERIES (EXCEPT HOWITZERS) OF VESSELS AT MOBILE, AUGUST, 1864.

---------------+----+----+----+----+-----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
               |XV- |XI- |X-  |IX- |32-  |150-|100-|60- |50- |30- |20- |
               |in. |in. |in. |in. |pdr. |pdr.|pdr.|pdr.|pdr.|pdr.|pdr.|
  NAMES        |         sm.-bore.       |           rifled.           |
---------------+----+----+----+----+-----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
Tecumseh       |  2 |    |    |    |     |    |    |    |    |    |    |
Manhattan      |  2 |    |    |    |     |    |    |    |    |    |    |
Winnebago      |    |  4 |    |    |     |    |    |    |    |    |    |
Chickasaw      |    |  4 |    |    |     |    |    |    |    |    |    |
Hartford       |    |    |    | 18 |     |    |  2 |    |    |  1 |    |
Brooklyn       |    |    |    | 20 |     |    |  2 |  2 |    |    |    |
Richmond       |    |    |    | 18 |     |    |  1 |    |    |  1 |    |
Lackawanna     |    |  2 |    |  4 |     |  1 |    |    |  1 |    |    |
Monongahela    |    |  2 |    |    |   5 |  1 |    |    |    |    |    |
Ossipee        |    |  1 |    |    |   6 |    |  1 |    |    |  3 |    |
Oneida         |    |  2 |    |    |   4 |    |    |    |    |  3 |    |
Galena         |    |    |    |  8 |     |    |  1 |    |    |  1 |    |
Seminole       |    |  1 |    |    |   6 |    |    |    |    |  1 |    |
Port Royal     |    |    |  1 |  2 |     |    |  1 |    |  2 |    |    |
Metacomet      |    |    |    |  4 |     |    |  2 |    |    |    |    |
Octorara       |    |    |    |  3 |   2 |    |  1 |    |    |    |    |
Itasca         |    |  1 |    |    |   2 |    |    |    |    |    |  2 |
Kennebec       |    |  1 |    |    |   2 |    |    |    |    |    |  2 |
---------------+----+----+----+----+-----+----+----+----+----+----+----+


BATTERIES (EXCEPT HOWITZERS) OF MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON, AUGUST[43], 1862.

-------------------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+
                   |      |      |      |      | Army |      |      |
                   |      |      |      |      | 42's |      |      |
                   | X-   | IX-  | VIII-| 32-  | 70-  | 50-  | 30-  |
                   | in.  | in.  | in.  | pdr. | pdr. | pdr. | pdr. |
  NAMES            |         smooth-bore.      |     rifled.        |
-------------------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+
Benton             |      |   2  |      |   8  |   4  |   2  |      |
Cairo              |      |      |   3  |   6  |   3  |      |   1  |
Carondelet         |      |      |   4  |   6  |   1  |   1  |   1  |
Cincinnati         |      |      |   3  |   6  |   2  |      |   2  |
Louisville         |      |      |   3  |   6  |   2  |      |   2  |
Mound City         |      |      |   3  |   6  |   2  |   1  |   1  |
Pittsburg          |      |      |   3  |   6  |   2  |      |   2  |
St. Louis          |      |      |   3  |   6  |   2  |      |   2  |
Essex*             |   1  |   3  |      |   1  |      |   2  |      |
Conestoga          |      |      |      |   4  |      |      |      |
Lexington          |      |      |   4  |   1  |      |      |   2  |
Tyler              |      |      |   6  |      |      |      |   3  |
Eastport*          |      |      |      |   4  |      |   2  |   2  |
Gen. Bragg*        |      |      |      |   1  |      |      |   1  |
Sumter*            |      |      |      |   2  |      |      |      |
Price*             |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
Little Rebel       |      |      |      |      |      |      |   1  |
-------------------+------+------+------+------+------+------+------+
* Rams.


BATTERIES (EXCEPT HOWITZERS) OF MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON, JANUARY, 1863.

---------------+----+----+-----+-------+-----+----+----+----+----+----+
               |    |    |     |       |32-  |    |    |    |    |    |
               |XI- |IX- |VIII-|42-    |pdr. |100-|80- |50- |30- |20- |
               |in. |in. |in.  |pdr.   |sm.- |pdr.|pdr.|pdr.|pdr.|pdr.|
  NAMES        |    sm.-bore.  |rifled.|bore.|      rifled.           |
---------------+----+----+-----+-------+-----+----+----+----+----+----+
Benton         |    |  8 |     |       |   4 |  2 |    |  2 |    |    |
Cairo          |    |    |   3 |    1  |   6 |    |    |    |  1 |    |
Carondelet     |    |  3 |   4 |    1  |   1 |    |    |  1 |  1 |    |
Cincinnati     |    |  3 |   2 |       |   6 |    |    |    |  2 |    |
De Kalb[44]    |    |    |   4 |       |  12 |    |    |    |    |  2 |
Louisville     |    |  2 |   2 |       |   6 |    |    |    |  2 |    |
Mound City     |    |  3 |   3 |       |   3 |    |  2 |    |  3 |    |
Pittsburg      |    |  2 |   3 |       |   6 |    |    |    |  2 |    |
Tuscumbia      |  3 |    |     |       |     |  2 |    |    |    |    |
Indianola      |  2 |  2 |     |       |     |    |    |    |    |    |
Choctaw        |    |  3 |     |       |     |  1 |    |    |  2 |    |
Lafayette      |  2 |  4 |     |       |     |  2 |    |    |    |    |
Chillicothe    |  2 |    |     |       |     |    |    |    |    |    |
Black Hawk     |    |    |     |       |   4 |    |    |    |  2 |    |
---------------+----+----+-----+-------+-----+----+----+----+----+----+


RETURNS OF THE ARMAMENT OF FORT MORGAN, MOBILE HARBOR.

-----------------------------+--------+--------+-----------+-------------
                             |        |        |Confederate|  Report of
                             |January,|January,|  return,  |U.S. Ordnance
                             |  1863. |  1864. | January,  |  Officer,
                             |        |        |   1864.   |  October,
                             |        |        |           |    1864.
-----------------------------+--------+--------+-----------+-------------
X-inch Columbiad             |    5   |    7   |     5     |       7
VIII-inch Columbiad          |    5   |    1   |     1     |       3[44]
32-pounder smooth-bore       |   30   |   18   |    16     |      11
24-pounder smooth-bore       |    4   |        |     4     |
VIII-inch rifle              |        |    2   |     2     |       2
VII-inch rifle               |    1   |        |           |       2
6.5-inch rifle               |    3   |    4   |     7     |       7
5.82-inch rifle              |        |    4   |     3     |
30-pounder rifle, R.P.P.     |    1   |        |           |       1
24-pounder rifle (Dahlgren)  |        |        |           |       1
Whitworth (calibre 2.71)     |    1   |        |           |       1
-- Rifles (calibre not given)|    2   |        |           |
                             |        |        |           |
   WATER BATTERY             |        |        |           |
X-inch                       |    4  }|        |{Not       |}
VIII-inch                    |    1  }|Not     |{separately|}Not
6.5-inch rifle               |    2  }|given.  |{given.    |}mentioned.
-----------------------------+--------+--------+-----------+------------

The return for January, 1863, is taken from a captured Confederate
plan showing position of the guns at that date, concerning which
Captain M.D. McAlester, U.S. Engineers, says that he found some
changes, but not material, when he inspected the works within a week
after the surrender, and while nothing had yet been disturbed.
January, 1864, is from reports of deserters to officers of United
States fleets verified by reconnoissances from tugs on clear days and
by reports of spies. The indications seem to be that the lighter guns
were partially withdrawn, perhaps for the landward defences of Mobile,
and their place supplied by heavier and rifled guns. The estimate in
the text gives for all the forts one hundred cannon, including flank
howitzers. General Grant's report as Commander-in-Chief, December,
1864, says one hundred and four pieces of artillery were taken; there
were a few field pieces.

FOOTNOTES:

[40] Batteries of Katahdin, Kennebec, Kineo, Owasco, Pinola, Sciota,
Winona, and Wissahickon were the same as of Cayuga. The Itasca had a
X-inch instead of XI-inch.

[41] The Jackson carried also one VI-inch Sawyer rifle.

[42] The other vessels not having been North are assumed to have had
the same batteries as in the preceding April.

[43] The batteries in January, 1862, are given in the text, pp. 16-17.

[44] The De Kalb's battery was changed before the end of the month. See
p. 122.

[45] Two of these are inventoried as "smooth-bore Brooke,
double-banded," which seems unlikely.

       *       *       *       *       *




INDEX.


Alabama, the, 108

Albatross, the, 134 et seq., 152, 165 et seq.

Alden, Commander James, 54, 134, 136, 229

Alexandria, dam built at, 203 et seq.

Alice Vivian, the, U.S. transport, 197

Althea, the, 249

Apalachicola, Fla., 3

Arkansas Post (Fort Hindman), 120, 161

Arkansas, the, Confederate ram, 98 et seq.;
  destruction of, 105, 119

Arizona, the, 164, 166 et seq., 187

Augur, General, 167

Averett, Lieutenant, 35


Bache, Lieutenant George M., 121, 147, 170, 178, 191, 197, 212

Bacon, Lieutenant George B., 68

Bailey, Captain Theodorus, 53, 72, 82, 86 et seq.

Bailey, Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph, builds a dam at Alexandria, 204 et
  seq., 207;
  promoted to Brigadier-General, 209, 211

Baldwin, Lieutenant Charles H., 56

Banks, General, succeeds Butler in Gulf Department, 109, 139, 153;
  toward Alexandria, 164 et seq., 176, 183;
  sent to Texas, 185 et seq., 194 et seq.;
  on the Red River, 198 et seq., 204;
  relieved by Canby, 211

Baron de Kalb, the, see De Kalb.

Batey, the, Confederate steamer, 129, 131

Baton Rouge, La., surrender of, 90, 104 et seq., 109

Batteries: Chalmette, the, 60, 83, 85;
  McGehee, the, 60, 85

Beauregard's evacuation of Memphis, 47

Bell, Captain H.H., 54, 66, 77, 187

Belmont, Mo., Union victory at, 19, 21

Bennett, Lieutenant J.W., 220

Benton, the, Union gunboat, 15;
  before Island No. 10, 31, 42, 44 et seq., 47 et seq., 51, 103, 107,
  116, 123, 155 et seq., 160 et seq., 166, 169 et seq., 191

Black Hawk, the, U.S. steamer, 114, 121, 123, 191

Blake, Lieutenant, 5

Blockade, purpose of, 3 et seq.

Blodgett, Lieutenant, of the Conestoga, 50

Blue Wing, the, U.S. transport, 120, 122

Boggs, Commander Charles S., 54, 82

Bois, Frank, 170

Bowling Green, Ky., 21

Brand, Lieutenant-Colonel, 129, 131

Breckenridge, General, commands an attack on Baton Rouge, 105 et seq.

Breese, Lieutenant-Commander K.R., 163, 168, 191

Brent, Major J.L. (afterward Colonel), 129, 131, 201 (note) et seq.

Brooklyn, U.S. sloop, 53 et seq., 76 et seq., 83, 85, 90, 94 et seq.,
  104, 228 et seq., 237, 244 (note)

Brown, Commander Isaac N., 99 et seq.

Brown, Lieutenant-Commander George, of the Indianola, 126, 128 et
  seq., 229

Browne, Lieutenant G.W., 191

Bryant, Lieutenant N.C., of the Cairo, 42

Buchanan, Admiral Franklin, 220, 235 et seq., 239 et seq.;
  wounded, 242 et seq.

Buchanan, Lieutenant-Commander, 109

Buell, Major-General, 37 et seq.

Burnham, Captain A.H., 220 (note)

Burnside, General, 183

Butler, General B.F., at New Orleans, 85, 87;
  succeeded by General Banks in Department of Gulf, 109


Cairo, Ill., 9 et seq.

Cairo, the, Union gunboat, 14, 42, 48, 117

Caldwell, Lieutenant C.H.B., 54, 66 et seq.;
  before New Orleans, 72 et seq., 133, 168

Calhoun, the, Confederate gunboat, 40, 109, 164

Canal, cut by Pope, 31;
  around Vicksburg, 141

Canby, General, commands Department of West Mississippi, 211, 225,
  246, 249

Carondelet, the, Union gunboat, 14, 21, 24;
  before Donelson, 26 et seq.;
  her passage to New Madrid in thunder-storm, 32 et seq., 36, 42, 44
  et seq., 48, 51;
  fights with the Arkansas, 99 et seq.;
  losses on, 102, 123, 147, 154 et seq., 157, 160, 168, 170, 191, 194,
  207, 215 et seq.

Cayuga, U.S. gunboat, 53 et seq., 72 et seq., 80, 82 et seq., 85, 105

Chickasaw, the, 226 et seq., 229, 242 et seq., 245, 247

Chillicothe, the U.S. vessel, 111 et seq., 123, 142 et seq., 145 et
  seq., 191, 194 et seq., 207

Choctaw, the, U.S. vessel, 111, 113, 163, 172, 177, 192

Churchill, General, surrenders to McClernand, 122

Cincinnati, the, Union gunboat, 14, 21 et seq., 42 et seq., 103, 120
  et seq., 147;
  loss of, 170, 172, 177 et seq., 249

Clifton, the, U.S. gunboat, 55 et seq., 95 et seq., 164, 187

Collins, John, 233

Colorado, flag-ship, 5, 53, 57

Columbus, Ky., fortified by Confederates, 11, 18, 21;
  fall of, 28 et seq.

Conestoga, the, Union gunboat, 12, 18, 21, 27, 50

Confederate navy, commanded by Hollins, 40;
  fourteen river steamboats seized for, 41 et seq.;
  spirited attack by, 43 et seq.;
  ten vessels before New Orleans, 60 et seq.;
  condemnation of, 84 et seq.

Cooke, Commander A.P., 164

Cornay, Captain, 202 (note)

Cornyu, Colonel, 182

Corpus Christi, Texas, 108

Cotton, the, Confederate steamer, 109

Couthony, Lieutenant S.P., 191

Covington, the, 182, 209 et seq.

Cox, General, 183

Craven, Captain Thomas T., 54;
  commands a fleet from New Orleans, 90, 96;
  heroic death of, 231

Craven, Commander T.A.M., 229

Cricket, the, 178, 191 et seq., 195, 199 et seq.

Crocker, Lieutenant Frederick, 187

Crosby, Lieutenant Pierce, 54, 66, 248

Cummings, A. Boyd, 136

Curtis, General, 49, 107


Dahlgren, Acting-Master C.B., 172

Dana, General, 188

Davis, Captain Charles H., 40, 47, 49;
  made flag-officer, 51;
  in the Yazoo, 97 et seq.;
  follows the Arkansas, 102 et seq.;
  arranges an expedition, 107;
  relieved in command, 110

Davis, Jefferson, 131

De Camp, Commander John, 54, 89

Defiance, the, Confederate vessel, 85

DeKalb, the, U.S. ironclad, 118, 120 et seq., 142, 145 et seq., 169,
  171, 177.
  See the St. Louis.

De Soto, the, 126 et seq.

Donaldson, Lieutenant Edward, 54, 229

Donelson, Fort, see Fort Donelson.

Doubloon, the, Confederate steamer, 81

Dove, Commander, of the Louisville, 27

Drayton, Captain Percival, 229, 240

Duncan, General, 60, 88

Dunnington, Colonel, surrenders to Admiral Porter, 122


Eads, James B., 12

Eastport, the, Confederate gunboat, 24 et seq., 191 et seq., 198 et
  seq., 203

Elfin, the, 214

Ellet, Colonel Charles, jr., 46 et seq., 119 (note)

Ellet, Colonel Charles Rivers, 119, 124 et seq.;
  rashness of, 127 et seq., 140

Ellet, Lieutenant-Colonel A.W., of the Monarch, 48, 97, 103, 122;
  reckless daring of, 140

Ellet, Lieutenant-Colonel John A., 140

Emory, General, 195

Enoch Train, the, Confederate ram, 5 et seq.

Era No. 5, the, 127 et seq.

Erben, Lieutenant Henry, 42

Essex, the, 15, 21;
  disaster to, 23 et seq., 103, 105, 133, 135, 167 et seq., 190

Estrella, the, 109, 164 et seq., 188


Fairplay, the, 215

Farragut, Flag-Officer David G., commands the Western Gulf Blockading
  Squadron, 8, 35 et seq.;
  before New Orleans, 40, 42;
  at Vicksburg, 51 et seq., 54, 62;
  prompt action of, 86, 90 et seq.;
  in the Yazoo, 97 et seq., 101 et seq.;
  on the Gulf, 107 et seq., 124, 126;
  moves up the river, 133 et seq.;
  his advice respecting the Ellet family, 139 et seq., 144;
  Porter communicates with, 151 et seq., 158;
  in the Red River, 164 et seq.;
  returns to Gulf, 174, 183, 187;
  resumes command, 218, 221;
  begs for co-operation, 223, 226 et seq.;
  in action, 232 et seq.;
  his attack on the Tennessee, 240 et seq.;
  goes North, 246

Fawn, the, 212 et seq.

Featherstone, brigade of, 149

Ferguson, Colonel, 148 et seq.

Fitch, Colonel, 50

Fitch, Lieutenant-Commander Le Roy, 180 et seq., 213 et seq.

Foote, Flag-Officer A.H., 15 et seq.;
  his views on manning ships, 17 et seq.;
  promotion of, 20 et seq.;
  returns to Cairo, 24 et seq.;
  wounded, 28, 31, 35 et seq.;
  at Fort Pillow, 39 et seq.

Forest Queen, the, 155, 157

Forest Rose, the, 123, 141 et seq., 171

Forrest, General, 181, 214

Forrest, Lieutenant Moreau, 213, 216

Fort Donelson, Ky., 23;
  plan of attack on, 25 et seq., 90, 161, 180

Fort Henry, Ky., expedition against, 21 et seq., 161, 180

Fort Hindman, see Arkansas Post.

Fort Hindman, the, 191 et seq., 194 et seq., 199 et seq., 206 et seq.

Fort Jackson, 58 et seq., 63, 66, 69 et seq., 76, 78 et seq., 87, 89

Fort McRae, 8

Fort Pickens, 8

Fort Pillow, 31, 39 et seq.;
  force at, 42 et seq., 45

Fort St. Philip, 58, 60, 62 et seq., 69, 72, 75 et seq., 78 et seq.,
  87 et seq.

Fort Sumter, 144

Foster, Lieutenant-Commander Joseph P., 142, 191

Franklin, General, 187, 190, 194 et seq., 204

Fremont, General, 17 et seq.

Fry, Captain Joseph, 50

Fulton, the, U.S. ram, 143


Gabaudau, Mr., 153

Gaines, the, Confederate gunboat, 220, 239

Galena, the, 229, 236, 244 (note)

Galveston, Tex., 3, 8;
  disaster at, 108 et seq., 188, 249

Gamble, Lieutenant-Commander William M., 247

Gazelle, the, 191

General Beauregard, the, Confederate ram, 47 et seq.

General Bragg, the, Confederate ram, 43, 47;
  capture of, 49, 101, 107, 116

General Lovell, the, Confederate ram, 47 et seq.

General Price, the, Confederate ram, 44, 47 et seq., 155 et seq., 166, 170

General Quitman, the, Confederate vessel, 61, 84

General Rusk, Confederate steamer, 8

General Sumter, the, Confederate ram, 44, 47;
  capture of, 49, 102, 105

General Thompson, the, Confederate ram, 47;
  destruction of, 49

General Van Dorn, the, Confederate ram, 44, 47, 49

Genesee, the, 134 et seq.

Gherardi, Lieutenant-Commander Bancroft, 229

Gillis, Lieutenant-Commander James H., 247

Gilmore, Theodore, 33

Glide, the, 122 et seq.

Gorman, General, 122

Gorringe, Master H.H., 191, 200

Governor Moore, the, Confederate vessel, 61, 81 et seq.

Grand Era, the, Confederate tender, 129

Grand Gulf, 11, 163 et seq.

Granger, General, 34, 215, 227, 245, 248

Granite City, the, 187 et seq.

Grant, Captain of the General Quitman, 61, 84 (note)

Grant, General U.S., commands military district about Cairo, 18 et seq.;
  at Fort Donelson, 25 et seq.;
  at Pittsburg Landing, 36 et seq.;
  at Vicksburg, 123 et seq., 139;
  orders the levee cut, 141, 153, 157, 161;
  at Grand Gulf, 163, 168 et seq., 172, 176, 178;
  directions to Steele, 190, 211

Greene, Lieutenant-Commander Charles H., 229

Greene, General Thomas, 197

Greer, Lieutenant-Commander James A., 155, 191

Gregory, Acting-Master, 43

Guest, Lieutenant John, 56

Gunboats, contract for seven, given to Eads, 12 et seq.;
  delay in equipping for lack of money, 15

Gwin, Lieutenant, of the Tyler, 21;
  invaluable service at Pittsburg Landing, 28 et seq., 37 et seq.;
  in the Yazoo, 99;
  mortally wounded, 118 et seq.


Haines's Bluff, 119, 148

Halleck, General, his orders unsatisfactory to Captain Foote, 16 et
  seq., 25;
  orders to Foote, 28;
  withdraws Pope's forces from Fort Pillow, 40, 49, 91, 186, 189

Hamilton, Lieutenant William, 242 (note)

Harding, Colonel, 180

Hart, Lieutenant-Commander, John E., 134, 165 et seq.

Harrell, Lieutenant A.D., 56

Harriet Lane, the, U.S. gunboat, 55 et seq., 88, 94 et seq., 108

Harrison, cavalry of, 197

Harrison, Commander George W., 220

Harrison, Lieutenant Napoleon B., 54

Hartford, the, U.S. flag-ship, 52 et seq., 68, 72, 77, 85, 90, 134 et
  seq., 139, 151 et seq., 165, 228 et seq., 231 et seq., 236, 238 et seq.

Hastings, the, U.S. transport, 197

Hatteras, the, 108

Helena, Ark., 49 et seq., 110, 116

Henry Clay, the, 155, 157

Henry, Fort, see Fort Henry.

Herron, General, 177

Hickman, Ky., fortified by Confederates, 11, 18, 29 et seq.

Higgins, Colonel, 60, 65;
  condemns Mitchell's course, 70 et seq., 87, 155 (note)

Hill, plantation of, 148, 150 et seq.

Hoel, Lieutenant William R., 33, 147, 155, 160, 191

Hollins, Commodore George N., 7, 35;
  commands Confederate navy, 40 et seq.

Hood, General, 213, 215 et seq.

Hospital fleet, at Pilot Town, 57

Howard, Lieutenant Samuel, 191

Huger, Thomas B., mortally wounded, 83

Hurlburt, General, 37;
  report of, 39


Ida, the, 249

Illinois, her devotion to the Union, 9

Illinois, regiment of: Forty-second, 32

Imperial, the, 173

Indianola, the, U.S. vessel, 111 et seq., 123, 126, 128 et seq., 152, 165

Iowa, regiment of: Twenty-third, 176

Iroquois, the, U.S. corvette, 54, 77 et seq., 83, 89, 94 et seq.

Island No. 10, 28 et seq., 31 et seq.;
  surrender of, 34;
  disappearance of, 36, 39 et seq., 124

Itasca, the, U.S. gunboat, 54, 66 et seq., 71 et seq., 77, 79, et
  seq., 90, 229

Ivy, the, Confederate gunboat, 40, 166


Jackson, Fort, see Fort Jackson.

Jackson, the, Confederate gunboat, 40, 61, 81

Jackson, the, U.S. gunboat, 55 et seq., 95

Jenkins, Captain Thornton A., 184, 227, 229, 235

Johnson, Acting-Master Amos, 67

Johnson, Master J.V., 32

Johnston, Commander J.D., 223, 239;
  surrenders, 243 et seq., 249

Jones, Acting-Master Edmund, 67, 72 et seq.

Jones, Lieutenant-Commander M.P., 247

Jouett, Lieutenant James E., burns schooner Royal Yacht, 8, 229, 233,
  239, 242 (note)

Juliet, the, 123, 199, 201 et seq.


Katahdin, the, U.S. gunboat, 54, 73, 95, 105

Kennebec, U.S. gunboat, 54, 77, 80, 95, 229, 237, 244 (note)

Kennon, Beverley, of the Governor Moore, 61;
  encounter with the Varuna, 81 et seq.

Kentucky, neutrality of, 17

Key West, description of, 1

Key West, the, 214

Kickapoo, the, 247

Kilby, Commander A.H., 42, 50

Kimberley, Captain, 240 (note)

Kineo, U.S. gunboat, 54, 73, 76 et seq., 85, 105, 134 et seq., 183

King, Lieutenant, 214 et seq.

Kinsman, the, 109

Kirkland, Lieutenant-Commander W.A., 247


Lackawanna, the, 228 et seq., 237, 240 et seq., 244 (note)

Lafayette, the, U.S. vessel, 111, 113, 155 et seq., 160 et seq., 166,
  191 et seq.

Lancaster, the, 102, 140

Langthorne, Lieutenant A.R., 191

Lee, Admiral S. Phillips, 54, 82, 90, 211, 216 et seq.

Lee, General Robert E., 249

Le Roy, Commander William E., 229, 243 et seq.

Lexington, the, Union gunboat, 12, 18 et seq., 24, 28, 37 et seq., 50,
  121, 178 et seq., 191, 193 et seq., 197 et seq., 206

Liddell, General, 197

Lincoln, President A., 94 (note)

Linden, the, 123, 171

Lioness, the, U.S. ram, 107, 119, 123, 143

Little Rebel, the, 47;
  taken into Union fleet, 49

Livingston, the, Confederate gunboat, 40

Lord, Lieutenant, 210

Loring, General, 145

Louisiana, the, Confederate vessel, 61, 69 et seq., 79 et seq., 85 et
  seq., 88

Louisville, the, Union gunboat, 14;
  injury sustained by, 27, 51, 103, 120 et seq., 147, 151, 155 et
  seq., 160, 191, 194, 207

Lovell, Colonel, 84 (note)

Lovell, General, 41 et seq.;
  at New Orleans, 59 et seq., 81

Low, Lieutenant-Commander W.W., 247


McCann, Lieutenant-Commander William P., 229

McClernand, General, 20, 116;
  at Vicksburg, 120 et seq.

McCloskey, Captain, 129

McCulloch, General, 176

McGunnegle, Lieutenant, 46 (note), 48, 50

McIntosh, Captain, 88

McKean, Flag-Officer W.W., succeeds Mervine, 5;
  commands an indecisive affair in Pensacola Bay, 8;
  at Ship Island, 52

McKinstry, Captain J.P., 134, 137

Macomb, Commander William H., 134

McRae, Fort, see Fort McRae.

McRae, the, Confederate gunboat, 40, 61, 83 et seq.

Maitland, pilot, 201 et seq.

Manassas, the, Confederate ram, 61, 75, 78, 83, 84 (note), 100

Manhattan, the, 226 et seq., 229, 232, 242 et seq., 245

Marchand, Captain John B., 229

Marmora, the, U.S. gunboat, 117, 123, 142, 178

Maurepas, the, Confederate gunboat, 40

Memphis, Tenn., 47 et seq.;
  surrender of, 49

Mervine, Flag-Officer William, 4 et seq.

Metacomet, the, 229, 232 et seq., 238 et seq., 242 (note), 244 (note), 248

Mexico, Gulf of, 1 et seq.

Miami, the, U.S. gunboat, 55 et seq., 87, 95

Milwaukee, the, 247 et seq.

Mississippi, doubtful allegiance of, 9

Mississippi River, Government's object in entering, 3;
  Union humiliation in, 5 et seq.;
  description of, 9 et seq.;
  importance of controlling, 11 et seq.;
  successes on, 23 et seq.;
  encounter between gunboats on, 43;
  Confederate rams, 43 et seq.;
  Confederate fleet conquered, 49 et seq.;
  naval forces from Gulf and upper river meet in, 51;
  obstructions in, 64 et seq.;
  cleared by Caldwell, 68 et seq.;
  unhealthiness of, 104;
  controlled by Confederates from Vicksburg to Port Hudson, 106;
  change of commanders in, 110;
  successes and disasters in, 125 et seq.;
  open from Cairo to Gulf, 173

Mississippi, the, tonnage of, 54, 71, 73 et seq., 76, 83, 86, 134, 137
  et seq.

Missouri, doubtful allegiance of, 9

Missouri, the, U.S. ship, 138

Mitchell, Commander, 61, 69 et seq., 88

Mitchell, Lieutenant-Commander J.G., 191

Mobile, Ala., 3, 218 et seq.

Monarch, Union ram, 48 et seq., 107, 122 et seq.

Monongahela, the, 134 et seq., 184, 188, 229, 237, 240 et seq., 244 (note)

Montgomery, Captain, 41 et seq., 47

Moose, the, 183

Morgan, General J.H., daring raid of, 182

Morgan, Lieutenant, 210

Morgan, the, Confederate gunboat, 220, 239

Morning Light, the, 108

Morris, Captain H.W., 54

Morton, Acting-Master Gilbert, 215

Mosher, the, Confederate tug, 61, 76

Mound City, the, Union gunboat, 14 et seq., 42, 44 et seq.;
  catastrophe to, 50, 107, 123, 147, 155 et seq., 160, 162, 168, 170,
  191, 194, 207

Mullany, Commander J.R.M., 229, 238

Murphy, Lieutenant J.M., 147, 149, 155

Murphy, Lieutenant P.M., 220


Napoleon III., unfriendly attitude toward the United States, 185, 249

Natchez, surrender of, 90

Naumkeag, the, 212 et seq.

Naval, operations, extent of, 1

Nelson, General, 37 et seq.

Neosho, the, 191, 194 et seq., 200, 202 et seq., 206 et seq., 216

New Madrid, Mo., 20;
  taken by Pope, 30 et seq.

New Orleans, 2, 59 et seq.;
  bombardment of, 69 et seq.;
  surrender of, 86 et seq.

Niagara, the, 8

Nichols, Lieutenant Ed. T., 54

Nicholson, Commander J.W.A., 229

Nields, Ensign H.C., 233 et seq.


Octorara, the, U.S. steamer, 95, 97, 229, 244 (note), 247 et seq.

Oneida, the, U.S. corvette, 54, 73, 76, 81 et seq., 94, 96, 229, 234
  et seq., 238, 244 (note)

Osage, the, 191 et seq., 194 et seq., 197, 199, 202, 206 et seq., 247

Ossipee, the, 229, 237, 240, 243 et seq.

Ouachita, the, 191, 193

Owasco, the, U.S. gunboat, 55, 95, 188

Owen, Lieutenant-Commander E.K., 121, 147, 155, 191

Ozark, the, 191, 194, 206 et seq.


Paducah, Ky., seized by Grant, 18, 21

Palmer, Captain James S., of the Iroquois, 95;
  of the Hartford, 134

Palmer, Commodore of the Hartford, 167;
  left in command, 246, 248

Parker, Commodore Foxhall A., 240 (note)

Paulding, Lieutenant, of the St. Louis, 21;
  before Donelson, 27

Pearce, Lieutenant John, 191, 200

Pendergrast, Flag-Officer G.J., commands Home Squadron, 4

Pennock, Captain Alexander M., 179, 211

Pensacola Navy Yard, 3, 5, 8, 52, 60, 90, 107, 227 et seq., 242
  (note), 246

Pensacola, the, U.S. vessel, 52 et seq., 73, 75, et seq., 78, 85, 100
  (note)

Perkins, Lieutenant-Commander George H., 229, 242 (note), 247

Petrel, the, U.S. steamer, 142 et seq., 171

Phelps, Lieutenant-Commander S.L., of the Conestoga, 18, 21, 24 et
  seq., 28;
  of the Benton, 42;
  commands an expedition from Helena, 107, 179, 182;
  at Grand Ecore, 195, 198, 200 et seq.

Pickens, Fort, see Fort Pickens.

Pierce, Captain, 129

Pillow, Fort, see Fort Pillow.

Pinola, the, U.S. gunboat, 54, 66 et seq., 71, 77 et seq., 80 et seq., 95

Pittsburg Landing, 36 et seq.

Pittsburg, the, Union gunboat, 15, 27, 34, 42, 44, 117, 123, 147, 155,
  157, 160 et seq., 166, 191, 194, 207

Point of Rocks, 158, 161

Polk, the, Confederate gunboat, 40

Ponchartrain, the, Confederate gunboat, 40, 50

Pope, General, at New Madrid, 30 et seq., 34, 36;
  at Fort Pillow, 39 et seq.

Porter, Admiral David D., 53, 79, 85, 87;
  relieves Captain Davis, 110;
  his orders to Walke, 116;
  Colonel Dunnington surrenders to, 122 et seq.;
  success and disasters in Mississippi, 126 et seq.;
  hopes frustrated, 132, 139 et seq.;
  undertakes to reach the Yazoo, 147 et seq.;
  before Vicksburg, 154, 158, 161;
  at Grand Gulf, 163, 165 et seq.;
  assumes command of river, 174;
  inaugurates raids, 177, 179, 189 et seq.;
  in the Red River, 194 et seq., 200 et seq., 204;
  at Red River Dam, 206;
  relieved by Porter, 211

Porter, Commander William D., 15, 21, 23, 88, 90 et seq., 94;
  ordered to Hampton Roads, 97, 103 et seq.

Port Hudson, 11, 173

Port Royal, the, 229

Portsmouth, the, U.S. sloop, 80, 87

Preble, Lieutenant George H., 54

Preble, the, sailing sloop, 5, 7

Prentiss, General, 176

Princess Royal, the, 183

Pritchett, Lieutenant-Commander, 175 et seq.


Queen City, the, 212 et seq.

Queen of the West, Union ram, 48, et seq., 84 (note);
  "lives to fight another day," 99 et seq., 103 et seq., 117, 123 et
  seq., 140, 151, 165


Ramsay, Lieutenant-Commander F.M., 163, 172

Ransom, Lieutenant George M., 54

Rattler, the, 121 et seq., 142 et seq., 145

Read, Abner, 184

Reed, Acting-Master J.F., 172

Reynolds, Master, 44

Richmond, steam sloop, 5 et seq., 54, 77, 90, 94 et seq., 134 et seq.,
  138, 153, 167, 217, 227 et seq., 232 et seq., 237, 244 (note)

River Defence Fleet, 42 et seq., 47, 49, 60 et seq., 81, 84 et seq.

Roberts, Colonel, 32

Rob Roy, the, 197

Rodgers, Commander John, 12;
  relieved by Captain Foote, 16

Rodolph, the, 248

Roe, Lieutenant, 75

Royal Yacht, Confederate schooner, 8

Romeo, the, 123, 142 et seq.

Russell, Lieutenant J.H., 5, 54


Sabine Pass, 106

Sachem, the, U.S. schooner, 87, 187

St. Charles, 50 et seq.

St. Clair, the, 181

St. Louis, the, Union gunboat, 15, 21;
  injury sustained by, 27, 42, 45, 48, 50 et seq., 118, 177.
  See the DeKalb.

St. Philip, Fort, see Fort St. Philip.

Samson, the, U.S. ram, 107, 114

Santee, U.S. frigate, 7 et seq., 42

Schofield, General, 215

Sciota, the, U.S. gunboat, 54, 77 et seq., 95, 249

Selfridge, Lieutenant-Commander, 117, 172, 177 et seq., 191, 197 et seq.

Selma, the, Confederate gunboat, 220, 239

Seminole, the, 229

Shepperd, Lieutenant, F.E., 145

Sherman, General W.T., at Haines's Bluff, 119;
  directed to support Porter, 148, 150 et seq., 163, 168, 170, 173;
  confers with Banks, 189 et seq.;
  at Alexandria, 203, 225

Sherman, of the tug Mosher, 77

Shirk, Lieutenant J.W., of the Lexington, 21;
  gallant service at Pittsburg Landing, 37 et seq.;
  at Memphis, 50, 155, 213 et seq.

Ship Island, 52

Signal, the, U.S. gunboat, 117, 123, 142, 171, 207, 210

Silver Wave, the, U.S. transport, 155

Smith, Colonel Giles A., 150

Smith, Commander Melancton, 54, 134, 138

Smith, General A.G., 190, 192 et seq., 211

Smith, General M.L., 69

Smith, General T. Kilby, 194, 196 et seq.

Smithland, Ky., seized by Grant, 18

Smith, Lieutenant Albert N., 54

Smith, Lieutenant-Commander Watson, 121, 143

Sproston, Lieutenant, 5

Squadron, Atlantic, 4, 249

Squadron, East Gulf, 8, 249

Squadron, Home, 4, 249

Squadron, Mississippi, 55, 107, 211, 216 et seq.

Squadron, Western Gulf Blockading, 8, 52, 187, 249

Squadron, West India, 4

Squires, Captain, 60

Star of the West, the, 144

Steele, General, 168, 189 et seq., 212, 246

Stembel, Commander, of the Lexington, 18 et seq., 21;
  of the Cincinnati, 42;
  dangerously shot, 44

Stephenson, Captain, 61

Stevens, Commander Thomas H., 229, 232, 238

Stevens, Lieutenant, 105

Stevenson, General, 132

Stonewall Jackson, the, Confederate vessel, 81 et seq.

Stringham, Flag-Officer, commands Atlantic Squadron, 4

Strong, Captain James H., 188, 229, 237

Sumter, Fort, see Fort Sumter.

Switzerland, the, Union ram, 49, 123, 140, 151 et seq., 166 et seq.


Tallahassee, Fla., 3

Tawah, the, 214

Taylor, General Richard, 129, 164, 167;
  engages a negro brigade, 176 et seq., 249

Tecumseh, the, 226 et seq., 244 (note)

Tennessee, the, Confederate ram, 220 et seq., 231, 236 et seq., 240
  et seq.

Terry, Lieutenant-Commander Edward, 167

Thatcher, Master Charles, 191

Thatcher, Rear-Admiral H.K., 246, 248 et seq.

Theron, Monsieur, French Consul in Texas, 185 et seq.

Thomas, General, 216

Thomas, Lieutenant-Commander N.W., 137

Thompson, Lieutenant E., of the Pittsburg, 27, 42

Tilghman, General, surrenders Fort Henry to Union fleet, 23

Tinclads, description of, 110

Tiptonville, Tenn., 29 et seq., 35

Todd, Captain, 94 (note)

Torpedoes, 117, 224

Townsend, Captain, 41

Townsend, Commander Robert, 190

Tuscumbia, the, U.S. vessel, 111 et seq., 155, 157, 160 et seq., 168

Tyler, the, Union gunboat, 12, 19 et seq., 24, 27 et seq., 37 et seq.,
  99 et seq., 123, 175, 212 et seq.


Undine, the, 214

United States Navy, anomalous position of, 17, 20 et seq.;
  seventeen vessels in, and their tonnage, 54;
  six gunboats, 55 et seq.;
  tinclads, 110 et seq.


Varuna, U.S. corvette, 54 et seq., 73, 81 et seq.

Velocity, the, 108

Vicksburg, Miss., 11, 51, 90 et seq.;
  description, 93 et seq.;
  surrender of, 173

Vicksburg, the, 125, 151

Vincennes, the, sailing-sloop, 5 et seq.

Virginia, the, 188

Virginius, the, Confederate steamer, 50


Wade, Colonel, 163

Wainwright, Commander Richard, 54

Wainwright, Lieutenant Jonathan M., of the Harriet Lane, 56

Walke, Commander Henry, of the Tyler, 19 et seq.;
  commands the Carondelet, 26;
  his gallant passage down the river, 32 et seq., 42;
  in the Yazoo, 99 et seq.;
  at Helena, 110;
  in the Yazoo, 116 et seq., 139, 155;
  at Alexandria, 166 et seq.

Walker, General, 192

Walker, Lieutenant-Commander John G., 118, 121 et seq., 142, 169, 171;
  sent to Yazoo City, 177

Warley, Lieutenant A.F., commands the Enoch Train, 5, 61, 84 (note)

Warner, the, 209 et seq.

Water Witch, the, steamer, 5, 7

Watson, captain, 201

Watters, Lieutenant-Commander John, 134, 183

Weaver, Lieutenant-Commander, 183

Webb, the, Confederate gunboat, 128 et seq., 217

Welles, Secretary of Navy, 88

Wells, Lieutenant-Commander Clark H., 229

Westfield, the, U.S. gunboat, 55 et seq., 95, 108

Wharton, General, 181

Wharton, Lieutenant, 231

Wheeler, General, 181

Williams, General, at Baton Rouge 104 et seq.

Wilson, Charles, 33

Wilson, Lieutenant Byron, of the Mound City, 147, 155, 191

Wilson, Lieutenant-Colonel James H., 142 et seq.

Winona, the, U.S. gunboat, 54, 77, 80, 95, 183

Winnebago, the, 220 et seq., 229, 232, 234, 238, 242 et seq., 247

Winslow, Lieutenant Francis, holds his ground in Water Witch, 7

Wisconsin, regiment of: Fourth, 204

Wissahickon, the, U.S. gunboat, 54, 73, 76, 85, 90, 95

Woods, Colonel, 107

Woodworth, Lieutenant Selim E., 56, 155 et seq.

Woolsey, Commander, 183


Yankee, the, Confederate gunboat, 18

Yazoo Valley, description of, 115 et seq., 141 et seq.

       *       *       *       *       *




=THE NAVY IN THE CIVIL WAR.=


The work of the Navy in the Suppression of the Rebellion was certainly
not less remarkable then that of the Army. The same forces which
developed from our volunteers some of the finest bodies of soldiers in
military history, were shown quite as wonderfully in the quick
growth--almost creation--of a Navy, which was to cope, for the first
time, with the problems of modern warfare. The facts that the Civil
War was the first great conflict in which steam was the motive power
of ships; that it was marked by the introduction of the ironclad; and
that it saw, for the first time, the attempt to blockade such a vast
length of hostile coast--will make it an epoch for the technical
student everywhere. For Americans, whose traditions of powers at sea
are among their strongest, this side of the four years struggle has an
interest fully equal to the other--perhaps even with the added element
of romance that always belongs to sea fighting.

But while the Army has been fortunate in the number and character of
those who have contributed to its written history, the Navy has been
comparatively without annalists. During a recent course of
publications on the military operations of the war, the publishers
were in constant receipt of letters pointing out this fact, and
expressing the wish that a complete naval history of the four years
might be written by competent hands. This testimony was hardly needed
to suggest the want; but it was a strong encouragement to ask the
co-operation of naval officers in supplying it. An effort made in this
direction resulted in the cordial adoption and carrying out of plans
by which Messrs. CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS are enabled to
publish a work of the highest authority and interest, covering this
entire field, in the following three volumes, giving the whole
narrative of Naval Operations from 1861 to 1865.

=_I.--The Blockade and the Cruisers._=
  By Professor J. RUSSELL SOLEY, U.S. Navy.

    =_II.--The Atlantic Coast._=
      By Rear-Admiral DANIEL AMMEN, U.S. Navy.

        =_III.--The Gulf and Inland Waters._=
          By Commander A.T. MAHAN, U.S. Navy.


The Volumes are uniform in size with the Series of "Campaigns of the
Civil War," and contain maps and diagrams prepared under the direction
of the authors.

=_Price per volume, $1.00._=

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, PUBLISHERS,
743 AND 745 Broadway, NEW YORK.


MESSRS. CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
publish, under the general title of

THE CAMPAIGNS OF THE CIVIL WAR,

A Series of volumes, contributed by a number of leading actors in and
students of the great conflict of 1861-'65, with a view to bringing
together, for the first time, a full and authoritative military
history of the suppression of the Rebellion.

    The final and exhaustive form of this great narrative, in which
    every doubt shall be settled and every detail covered, may be a
    possibility only of the future. But it is a matter for surprise
    that twenty years after the beginning of the Rebellion, and when
    a whole generation has grown up needing such knowledge, there is
    no authority which is at the same time of the highest rank,
    intelligible and trustworthy, and to which a reader can turn for
    any general view of the field.

    The many reports, regimental histories, memoirs, and other
    materials of value for special passages, require, for their
    intelligent reading, an ability to combine and proportion them
    which the ordinary reader does not possess. There have been no
    attempts at general histories which have supplied this
    satisfactorily to any large part of the public. Undoubtedly
    there has been no such narrative as would be especially welcome
    to men of the new generation, and would be valued by a very
    great class of readers;--and there has seemed to be great danger
    that the time would be allowed to pass when it would be possible
    to give to such a work the vividness and accuracy that come from
    personal recollection. These facts led to the conception of the
    present work.

    From every department of the Government, from the officers of
    the army, and from a great number of custodians of records and
    special information everywhere, both authors and publishers have
    received every aid that could be asked in this undertaking; and
    in announcing the issue of the work the publishers take this
    occasion to convey the thanks which the authors have had
    individual opportunities to express elsewhere.


The volumes are duodecimos of about 250 pages each, illustrated by
maps and plans prepared under the direction of the authors.

The price of each volume is $1.00.

       *       *       *       *       *

_The following volumes are now ready_:

  _=I.--The Outbreak of Rebellion.=_ By JOHN G. NICOLAY,
        Esq., Private Secretary to President Lincoln; late
        Consul-General to France, etc.

    A preliminary volume, describing the opening of the war, and
    covering the period from the election of Lincoln to the end of
    the first battle of Bull Run.


  =_II.--From Fort Henry to Corinth._= By the Hon. M.F.
        FORCE, Justice of the Superior Court, Cincinnati; late
        Brigadier-General and Bvt. Maj. Gen'l, U.S.V., commanding
        First Division, 17th Corps; in 1862, Lieut. Colonel of the
        20th Ohio, commanding the regiment at Shiloh; Treasurer of
        the Society of the Army of the Tennessee.

    The narrative of events in the West from the Summer of 1861 to
    May, 1862; covering the capture of Fts. Henry and Donelson, the
    Battle of Shiloh, etc., etc.


  =_III.--The Peninsula._= By ALEXANDER S. WEBB, LL.D.,
        President of the College of the City of New York: Assistant
        Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, 1861-'62;
        Inspector General Fifth Army Corps; General commanding 2d
        Div., 2d Corps; Major General Assigned, and Chief of Staff,
        Army of the Potomac.

    The history of McClellan's Peninsula Campaign, from his
    appointment to the end of the Seven Days' Fight.


  =_IV.--The Army under Pope._= By JOHN C. ROPES. Esq., of
        the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, the
        Massachusetts Historical Society, etc.

    From the appointment of Pope to command the Army of Virginia, to
    the appointment of McClellan to the general command in
    September, 1862.


  =_V.--The Antietam and Fredericksburg._= By FRANCIS WINTHROP
        PALFREY, Bvt. Brigadier Gen'l, U.S.V., and formerly
        Colonel 20th Mass. Infantry; Lieut. Col. of the 20th
        Massachusetts at the Battle of the Antietam; Member of the
        Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, of the
        Massachusetts Historical Society, etc.

    From the appointment of McClellan to the general command,
    September, 1862, to the end of the battle of Fredericksburg.


  =_VI.--Chancellorsville and Gettysburg._= By ABNER
        DOUBLEDAY, Bvt. Maj. Gen'l, U.S.A., and Maj. Gen'l,
        U.S.V.; commanding the First Corps at Gettysburg, etc.

    From the appointment of Hooker, through the campaigns of
    Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, to the retreat of Lee after the
    latter battle.


  =_VII.--The Army of the Cumberland._= By HENRY M. CIST,
        Brevet Brig. Gen'l U.S.V.; A.A.G. on the staff of Major
        Gen'l Rosecrans, and afterwards on that of Major Gen'l
        Thomas; Corresponding Secretary of the Society of the Army
        of the Cumberland.

    From the formation of the Army of the Cumberland to the end of
    the battles at Chattanooga, November, 1863.


  _=VIII.--The Mississippi.=_ By FRANCIS VINTON GREENE,
        Lieut. of Engineers, U.S. Army; late Military Attaché to
        the U.S. Legation in St. Petersburg; Author of "The Russian
        Army and its Campaigns in Turkey in 1877-78," and of "Army
        Life in Russia."

    An account of the operations--especially at Vicksburg and Port
    Hudson--by which the Mississippi River and its shores were
    restored to the control of the Union.


  _=IX.--Atlanta.=_ By the Hon. JACOB D. COX, Ex-Governor
        of Ohio; late Secretary of the Interior of the United
        States; Major General U.S.V., commanding Twenty-third Corps
        during the campaigns of Atlanta and the Carolinas, etc.,
        etc.

    From Sherman's first advance into Georgia in May, 1864, to the
    beginning of the March to the Sea.


  _=X.--The March to the Sea--Franklin and Nashville.=_ By the Hon.
        JACOB D. COX.

    From the beginning of the March to the Sea to the surrender of
    Johnston--including also the operations of Thomas in Tennessee.


  _=XI.--The Shenandoah Valley in 1864. The Campaign of Sheridan.=_
        By GEORGE E. POND, Esq., Associate Editor of the
        _Army and Navy Journal_.

  _=XII.--The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65. The Army of the
        Potomac and the Army of the James.=_ By ANDREW A.
        HUMPHREYS, Brigadier General and Bvt. Major General,
        U.S.A.; late Chief of Engineers; Chief of Staff, Army of
        the Potomac, 1863-64; commanding Second Corps, 1864-'65,
        etc., etc.

  _=Statistical Record of the Armies of the United States.=_ By
        FREDERICK PHISTERER, late Captain U.S.A.

    This Record includes the figures of the quotas and men actually
    furnished by all States; a list of all organizations mustered
    into the U.S. service; the strength of the army at various
    periods; its organization in armies, corps, etc.; the divisions
    of the country into departments, etc.; chronological list of all
    engagements, with the losses in each; tabulated statements of
    all losses in the war, with the causes of death, etc.; full
    lists of all general officers, and an immense amount of other
    valuable statistical matter relating to the War.

The complete Set, thirteen volumes, in a box. Price,  $12.50
Single volumes,                                         1.00

_The above books for sale by all booksellers, or will be sent,
post-paid, upon receipt of price, by_

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, PUBLISHERS,
743 AND 745 BROADWAY, NEW YORK.




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End of Project Gutenberg's The Gulf and Inland Waters, by A. T. Mahan