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Transcriber's note:

   There are many typographical and orthographical errors in
   the original. They are listed at the end of this etext. No
   corrections have been made.

   In the second part of the book lines of dashes are used to
   represent omissions in excerpts. There are represented
   in this etext by [-- -- --] or [-- --].





THE SWEDISH-NORWEGIAN UNION CRISIS

A History With Documents

by

K. NORDLUND
PH D.







Upsala & Stockholm
Almqvist & Wiksell Ltd
Printed by Almqvist & Wiksell Ltd, Upsala 1905




Author's Introductory Remarks.


The following work is intended to give an insight into the
Swedish-Norwegian Crisis. It has been the Author's endeavour to attain
this object, partly by a condensed account of the events of the last few
years, partly by a collection of suitable extracts from documents
referring to this crisis. Choice in the last items has been confined to
the most important ones. Touching the Consular negotiations only the
discussions on the most disputed points are given.

In dealing with some of the statements in Nansen's brochure the author
does not intend a exhaustive criticism of the said work, but has only
tried to show, by a few instances, the treatment pure and distinct facts
have been submitted to, in these days, by Norwegian agitation. The number
of instances could be multiplied many times over. If the following
representation has caught the tone of present feeling in Sweden, it must
be excused. The Author is, however, convinced that this has not
disadvantageously affected his account of the actual facts of the case.

Upsala. August 1905.

  _The Author._





CONTENTS.


  A. History.
                                                                   Sid.
    I. Reasons for Union Crisis. Development of Sweden's
       and Norway's different reform programmes                     1-8

   II. Contents of the charge of 1885 in § 11 of Sweden's
       Constitution. First development of Consular Question.
       Union Committee 1895-98                                     8-19

  III. Consular Committee of 1902. Birth and contents of
       Communiqué                                                 19-28

   IV. Treaties on the identical laws                             29-38

    V. Norwegian accusations caused by breakdown of Consular
       Negatiations                                               38-46

   VI. Development of Crisis this year until the time of the
       Extra-Ordinary session of Swedish Riksdag                  46-64

  VII. Supposed and real causes of Norwegian revolution           64-67


  B. Acts.

   1. Acts from Norway's »Grundlov»                                  71

   2. Acts from »Riksakten». (Special laws relating to Union)        72

   3. Preparatory agreement, in Consular question, between Swedish
      and Norwegian Cabinet Councils (so called Communiqué)          73

   4. Extract from Norwegian Government's proposal referring to
      identical laws                                                 75

   5. Extract from Boström's reasons for identical laws              76

   6. Extract from Hagerup's Answer                                  77

   7. Extract from Swedish Government's proposal regarding identical
      laws                                                           78

   8. Extract from Norwegian Cabinet Council's Memorandum on account
      of this proposal                                               79

   9. Extract from Swedish Cabinet's answer                          82

  10. Report on proceedings of Cabinet Council held on 7th February
      1905                                                           83

  11. Crown Prince-Regent's address to Special Committee of
      Storthing                                                      85

  12. Report on proceedings of Cabinet Council held on 5th April
      1905                                                           86

  13. Motion on Union Question in Swedish Riksdag's Upper Chamber    87

  14. Motion on Union Question in Swedish Riksdag's Lower Chamber    88

  15. Norwegian Government's »proposal» of 17th April 1905           89

  16. Report on proceedings of Cabinet Council held on 25th April
      1905                                                           92

  17. Swedish Riksdag's Statement on Union Question                  93

  18. Norwegian Minister's Notice of resignation                     94

  19. Report on proceedings of Norwegian Cabinet Council 27th
      May 1905                                                       94

  20. King's telegraphic protest against Norwegian Government's
      Statement                                                      97

  21. Norwegian Ministers' announcement to King of resignation       97

  22. King's telegraphic protest                                     98

  23. Storthing's President's proposal for conclusion 7th June 1905  99

  24. Storthing's address to King Oscar                              99

  25. King's telegraphic protest                                    101

  26. Report of proceedings of Cabinet Council held on 9th June
      1905                                                          101

  27. King's letter to Storthing 10th June 1905                     102

  28. Storthing's reply                                             106




I.


[Sidenote: _The object of the Union dispute._]

Not till the present day has the Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis presented
itself in the eyes of Europe in a thoroughly acute phase. Its origin, in
reality, dates as far back as the foundation of the Union itself.

[Sidenote: _The efforts to give Norway a better position in the Union._]

The original cause of the agitating union disputes has been that Sweden,
from the very commencement of the Union, has internationally borne the
responsibility for the same, in other words, conducted the political
affairs of both Kingdoms. The inequality produced hereby, the Norwegians
on their part have striven to efface. Sweden has also for a long time
shown herself willing to establish full equality in the Union, at the
same time that she has accommodated herself to Norway in questions of
detail. As far back as 1835 it was acknowledged, on the part of Sweden,
that Norway's position in the Union was not in accordance with the claims
of equity. Thus by a Royal Decree that year the Norwegian Minister of
State at Stockholm was admitted into the Swedish so-called Ministerial
Council to take part in foreign matters which concerned Norway. In 1839
the first great Union-Committee was formed, and both in this one, and two
later--the last 1895-98--Norway was offered from the Swedish side
complete equality in the Union on certain conditions. Added to this
Sweden has on several occasions granted partial concessions. Some have
been accepted by Norway--as for instance the law passed in 1844
concerning equality in Government Symbols etc. etc.--others again were
refused--as the offer in 1885 and 1891 of increased influence in the
administration of Foreign affairs. If offers of equality worded in more
general terms are added--as in 1893 and during the present year--,
NANSEN'S characterising Sweden's Union policy as »90 years' labour to
procure a supremacy for Sweden»,--ought to appear in its true
colours[2:1].

[Sidenote: _Unauthorized accusations against Sweden for endeavouring to
gain the supremacy._]

The accusations against Sweden for endeavouring to acquire the supremacy
have, time after time, arisen from a mixture of various matters, partly
the different conceptions of the legal character of the existing Union,
partly the different programmes for the reformation of the Union.

Owing to the very indistinct and confused wording in the legal documents
of the Act of Union the Swedish and Norwegian conceptions of the Union
itself have finally become so antagonistic to each other, that the
unionistic transactions have, in an excessive degree, taken the character
of a continual judicial process, and the real questions have been more or
less ignored[2:2]. Swedish Policy on its part has always maintained that
Sweden's supremacy in the Union is based on legal grounds. It has
especially insisted that the administration of Foreign affairs was, from
the first, placed in Sweden's hands[2:3], and this Swedish standpoint has
also been acknowledged as the right one by the most eminent of Norwegian
writers on State law[3:1]. But of late those on the Norwegian Left Side
have made stronger and stronger efforts to prove, that the order existed
on no legal grounds, that Norway, as a Sovereign Kingdom, had the right,
for instance, to create an entire Foreign Office of its own. And under
this influence the Norwegian sensitiveness has in Sweden's defence of her
conception of Union Law persisted more and more in seeing insulting
»designs of supremacy».

Meanwhile future prospects and reform programmes have had little to do
with the Swedish conception of the legal character of the Union. The most
extreme representatives of the so-called supremacy partizans--to
mention one, the late professor OSCAR ALIN--have on different occasions
maintained reform programmes, built on the principle of perfect equality
within the Union, and it must be asserted that _no Swedish political
party in recent times has refused perfect equality to Norway_[3:2].

[Sidenote: _The different programmes of Sweden and Norway for reforming
the Union._]

That the result seems to become the rupture of the Union, and not the
reorganization of the same has depended on more and more insurmountable
oppositions in opinions concerning _the manner_ and _the aim_ for a
reform.

Sweden has, as a rule, preferred the _entire_ reorganization, Norway the
_partial_--the consequence being, for instance, the struggles in the
so-called Stadtholder disputes in the sixties of the last century. Sweden
has held her standpoint, especially as she has considered it to the
interest of the Union to insist on creating perfect equality by
concessions also from Norway, and it seemed that these demands could not
gain sufficient consideration unless the reorganization was
complete[4:1].

Sweden has furthermore insisted on _negotiations_ and _agreements_, as
the natural road to reform; how Norway has more and more allowed herself
to take matters into her own hands, shall now be more clearly explained.

Above all, however, the differences of opinion respecting the _aim_ of
the reform have become more and more pronounced. Sweden has adhered to a
Union, which outworldly represents a perfect unity, and tried to create a
safe and secure Union. Norway has, by degrees, in her ever increasing
overwrought sensitiveness, developed her reform programme towards a
purely personal union, behind which the rupture of the Union has stood as
the main object in view.

The connection of the Norwegian Union with the inner party struggles in
Norway, has had a disastrous effect on the development of the Norwegian
programme, especially since 1885.

Through the Constitutional Crisis in 1884, when the Royal Powers were
forced--practically if not legally--to capitulate in essentials to
the orthodox parliamentarism, the Norwegian party champions became in
need of new programmes upon which to fling themselves. It was then, that
the Norwegian radicals through the demand for their own Minister of State
for Foreign Affairs cast a firebrand into the very midst of the Norwegian
people[5:1], who to that time had stood unanimous towards the claim of a
mutual Foreign Minister of State for the Union. In the struggle for the
political ascendency chauvinistic strongwords became more and more rife.
The national sensitiveness, already considerable, became excited to the
utmost under the influence of the suggestive eloquence of BJÖRNSON and
other agitators. The suspiciousness disaffection towards Sweden
increased. The Swedish brethren were pointed at by BJÖRNSON as the only
enemy Norway had, and even in the schoolrooms and school-books their
(Swedish) hereditary enemy was spoken of with curses. Simultaneously the
»Norwegians of the Future» buried themselves deeper and deeper in the
study of »Ancient Glorious Norway». Imagination was fed on Norwegian
heroic Sagas and Viking exploits, and the ancient National Saint of
Norway, Olaf the Holy, was unearthed from his long-forgotten hiding place
for renewed worship[5:2].

This overwrought sentimental policy, of course, caused national pride and
all its requisite claims, to raise a cloud over Sweden and the Union, and
the essential principles in the Union Question became of less and less
importance. How totally void of essential principles the recent Norwegian
Union Policy has been, is most obvious in the matter of effacing the
Union Symbol from the mercantile flag having for a long period of years
played a dominating rôle in Norwegian party politics[6:1]. It became the
more and more hopeless task of Sweden and the Union King to maintain the
cause of the Union without support from the dominant left party in
Norway. The Norwegian radical party in their blind fanaticism were
scarcely capable of rational action with any feeling of real political
responsibility; the friendly attitude towards Russia as their friend in
need, of BJÖRNSON and other radicals, was quite sufficient proof of this.
It is true, that one party--the Norwegian Right Side--, for a long
time inclined to a more favourable view of the Union, has supported the
King in his efforts to oppose the dissolving of the Union, but in the
fight for the political supremacy, the power of nationalism over minds
has gradually undermined its position as a pillar of the Union, and at
the present period of violently agitated feeling, the party has almost
entirely vanished from the »national junction.»

[Sidenote: _Sweden's later Union policy._]

During the process of this chauvinistic hysteria, Swedish politicians
have naturally had an exceedingly delicate problem to solve. On one point
opinion in Sweden has been unanimous. It has emphatically refused to
accept a mere personal Union as a solution of the question. This on two
grounds: one for the Union, the other for the Nation. The interests of
the Union imperatively demanded outward unity, in order that the Union
might be able to fulfil its purpose preserving security to the
Scandinavian Peninsula in relation to Foreign powers. National interest
saw in a personal union, and generally in every more radical rupture of
the bonds of the Union, a risk that the influence of Sweden would thereby
become unduly lessened. For if Sovereign power became the only essential
bond of Union, there would be the risk of the balance of power drifting
into the hands of the Storthing (especially after the events of 1884 when
the Sovereign power of the King was weakened), a risk that has at the
present conjuncture of affairs already made itself felt.

But if Sweden has thus been unanimous in demanding a joint
administration of Foreign affairs, it might be found within the range of
possibilities, for the sake of peace and quietness, to grant concessions
in certain matters, which in reality from an union point of view seemed
both unnecessary and undesirable. They may have complain as much as they
like of the Norwegian national obstinacy, of their sickly fears of any
sort of »_confusion_»; their inability to comprehend the requirements of
the Union; it remained, however, a fact, that it was necessary to take
into account, and indeed, it was a duty to respect it to a certain
extent, as it originated in no slight degree from feelings fed by the
subordinate position Norway had always held in years gone by. Swedish
policy had thus to face two alternatives, either firmly and inexorably to
insist on the Swedish demands for the amendment of the Union, conscious
that they were in the interests of the Union, and like wise the real
interest of Norway; or make a compromise, be contented with a partially
disorganized Union, which by its bonds outwardly at least, preserved the
appearance of the Scandinavian Peninsula's unity to Europe. The currents
of the Union Policy in Sweden have swayed between these two
possibilities, but if we follow it along the whole of its course, we
shall see that Swedish Policy has always made a way for concessions. In
the Union Committee of 1867 the Swedish members insisted on a Union
Parliament as the stipulation of a joint Foreign Office; the Swedish
majority in the Committe of 1898 abandoned that decision and contented
itself with a joint Court of impeachment as a forum for appeal against
the mutual Foreign Minister of the Union, but it insisted on maintaining
the necessity of having mutual Consular representatives; during the
present year, the King and the Riksdag have unanimously approved of the
principles of a new arrangement with separate Consuls for Sweden and
Norway. It is perhaps too soon to now judge between the lines followed by
Swedish Union politicians, but in any case, it can scarcely be a matter
of surprise that Swedish Policy has but slowly and gradually given up its
claims. In order to preserve harmony, Sweden has been forced to do it, on
account of the responsibility she once undertook on behalf of the Union,
but no direct national interests have influenced the concessions and the
enticing reward--harmony within the Union, the prospect of getting
Norway honestly to meet her half way--has been sufficiently uncertain,
in fact, the above mentioned concessions have seemed to possess a
remarkable faculty for drawing forward new claims.


FOOTNOTES:

[2:1] NANSEN (English edition). The same author writes (page 62):
»Finally in 1903(!) the Swedish Government declared openly that the
present arrangement was not in accordance with Norway's just demands for
equality in the Union.» How such a statement can be made is simply
incomprehensible.

[2:2] How the Norwegian Storthing, made up as it is, of large numbers of
lawyers, has contributed to this, is well known to all.

[2:3] On this account, it has especially been vindicated that the Act of
Union plainly indicates a joint Foreign Policy, which is scarcely
possible without a joint Foreign Administration; that the same Act of
Union only acknowledges the Swedish Foreign Minister of State as the head
of the Foreign Administration for the Union; that in the »Eidswold
Constitution», at the commencement of the Union, the paragraph referring
to the Norwegian Foreign Minister of State was simply ignored. This last
inconvenient fact is interpreted by the modern Norwegian theory of State
Law as implying, that the Norwegian Constitution has left the
administration of Foreign affairs to the King personally, who, in his
turn on the grounds of this authority has placed it in the hands of the
Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs. NANSEN (page 49 and following.) The
artfulness of this legal construction becomes immediately obvious. It is
exceedingly remarkable also to find that Norwegian parliamentarism can
commit such a blasphemy towards the Constitution, that it has confered a
position of importance on the King Himself.

[3:1] The Norwegian Right Side (Conservative) has not either emphatically
disputed the Swedish conception.

[3:2] Illustrative of the Norwegian way of confusing the Swedish _legal
conception_ and the Swedish _amendment programme_ in the Union question
is an expression of NANSEN (page 61). According to him »the Swedish
government as late as 1891 appeared, as already mentioned, inclined to
deny Norway every right of taking part in the administration of foreign
affairs», while in 1893 the Swedish Government offered a joint Minister
for Foreign Affairs for the Union. The state of the case was, that the
Swedish Government in 1891 offered Norway _increase_ of influence in
Foreign affairs, but in motioning this offer the Swedish legal point of
view was maintained, that the administration of Foreign (diplomatic)
affairs for the Union by the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs was
founded on legal right. Reflections arise of themselves.

[4:1] Sweden has especially tried to annul the paragraph 25 of Norway's
fundamental law which limits the duty of its Union defence. According to
this paragraph, the Yeomanry and other Norwegian troops, that cannot be
reckoned as belonging to the line, may not be employed outside the
boundaries of the Kingdom. This law has proved so much the more
pernicous, as the Norwegians by their recruiting regulations have
illoyally withdrawn from the Union-defence part of their fighting forces,
by outrageously entering into the line a limited number only of the
annual classes of recruits.

[5:1] Mr HAGERUP also affirmed openly in the Storthing of 1904 that the
Union question had in quite too high a degree come to be regarded by the
Norwegian parties as a workshop of weapons for elections campaigns.

[5:2] We get a glimpse of this romance, in the midst of the ultra modern
»glorious» revolution. At a large meeting at Hamar it was decreed, that
the new King should bear a name after one on the ancient Kings of Norway.
In a festival number of a »Vordens Gang» in honour of the revolution we
find printed a »Psalm on Olaf's Day» written by BJÖRNSON.

[6:1] That Norway in carrying out the law (1899) respecting the flag,
broke an agreement with Sweden made in 1844, was of course only in
conformity with everything else.




II.


[Sidenote: _The Consul question._]

The Consular Question is a red thread running through the history of the
Union struggles during the last fourteen years--

[Sidenote: _The change in the Swedish Constitution of 1885._]

The Norwegians on their part in attempting to defend the way in which the
Left Side started the Union Policy in the beginning of 1890, always
allude to what happened in Sweden in 1885[8:1].

What was it then that happened in 1885?

[Sidenote: _Norway's attitude to the same._]

By the amendment of the Swedish Constitution, the Prime Minister was also
in the Ministerial Council (for Foreign affairs), so that the Council
instead of having only two members, ever after had three, the object
being to guarantee that the Cabinet Council should be more fully
represented in they the in administration of Foreign affairs. Now, as
previously mentioned, by a Royal Decree in 1835 the Norwegian Prime
Minister at Stockholm was admitted into the Ministerial Council when
foreign affairs affecting the two Kingdoms were negotiated. Thus Norway
by the proposed Constitutional amendment was supposed to occupy a
somewhat more unfavourable position than formerly. But Sweden immediately
offers a more extended representation in the Council for Foreign affairs,
which offer, however, is, for some inexplicable reason, refused by Norway
on formal grounds. In the year 1891 this offer was renewed, but then the
majority on the Left Side of the Storthing finds a very excellent reason
for refusing the proposition, by pointing out, that the Swedish Council
in motioning towards the proposed amendment in the Act of Union (not in
the proposed paragraph itself) maintains the stand-point that Sweden's
leadership in the administration of Foreign affairs is founded on legal
right[9:1].

But something else is said to have happened in 1885, which was not
discovered by the Norwegian side till several years later, and which,
being exposed by the Norwegian agitation in these days, offers to we
Swedes the delights of novelty. Formerly foreign affairs were supposed to
be administered chiefly by the Swedish King personally, and the Minister
for Foreign Affairs is said to have stood in a more personal relation to
the King. Foreign Affairs under such circumstances were supposed to be
more impartially treated, so that even Norway's lawful interests could
receive due attention. But by the amendment of the Constitution of 1885
the Swedish Foreign Minister would be entirely subservient to Swedish
Parliamentarism, which made the employment of the Swedish Minister for
Foreign Affairs, in the protection of Norwegian interests, still more
dissatisfactory for Norway than formerly. This is pretended to have
become the source of the last twenty year's Union struggle[9:2]. Now the
state of the case is this, _the Foreign Minister's parliamentary
responsibility has not been increased by the amendment of the
Constitution in 1885_. Formerly he was--just as he is now--
responsible, as reporter, in the first place for all _resolutions_ in
Foreign affairs. The point that was formally confirmed by law in 1885
was, that the Minister for Foreign Affairs should also _prepare_ matters
concerning foreign affairs. According to the older version of the
paragraph that was altered that year (1885), the King was invested with
greater rights in reference to that side of the administration of foreign
affairs. Thus the amendment of the Constitution in 1885 only effected
that the actual influence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs on Sweden's
foreign policy was brought into harmony with the formal responsibility he
held in all cases for Sweden's Foreign policy. It may be added that this
constitutional amendment only confirmed the old practice, as the Minister
for Foreign Affairs was formerly regularly employed to prepare matters
concerning foreign affairs, and that his previous employment in the
preparation of foreign affairs was naturally carried out under
observation of the responsibility in which he stood for the resolutions
taken, and was not inspired by any mysterious personal relations to the
King. The whole of this Norwegian notion of the fatal influence on the
Union in this constitutional amendment, is, in fact, nothing but a
manufactured theory containing no real grounds whatsoever.

Now it must be observed that Norway had formerly no regular parliamentary
control over foreign affairs, _but the Swedish offer of 1891 was just
intended to give the Norwegian Storthing the right to this control, to be
exercised under the same conditions as those in the Swedish Diet_. But
the Storthing refused (as previously mentioned) the Swedish offer; it
preferred to keep the quarrel alive, and in order to do this, it was
necessary to be able to refer to Swedish oppression.

[Sidenote: _The Norwegian radicals' method of taking matters into their
hands._]

The Swedish offer being thus refused, the Norwegian Union politics in
1891 took a new turn. The road was already pointed out by the veteran
leader of the Left Side (separatists) JOHAN SVERDRUP; it was indicated
»to take matters into our own hands». The system was founded on the
Norwegian Left Side State-law theory, according to which Norway, as a
Sovereign state, was entitled to its own Minister for Foreign Affairs,
its own diplomatic representatives and consuls, all of which was proved
with much craft by the Constitution of Norway and the Act of Union
between Sweden and Norway. The right to one and all to which Norway, as a
Sovereign power, was entitled, should now be realized, independently and
boldly, without consulting Sweden. By Royal Decree, the Storting having
granted the means, a Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Norwegian
Diplomatic Representatives and consuls should be appointed without delay
in the Norwegian Council. Thus the lines of the future politics of Norway
were fixed by the Separatists[10:1].

It is obvious, that the notion of the one Kingdom in a Union being able,
of its own accord without consulting the other Kingdom, to alter and
dissolve the bonds of Union, is theoretically inimical to the Union
itself, and in fact shows enormous disloyalty to the other half of the
Union. A _Union_ policy of this sort is, of course, in spirit, completely
revolutionary, and at the outset has no place within the Union.
Nevertheless it has been followed under continued official protestations
of fidelity to the Union--the last speech of this sort was heard a
short time ago, when the well known road was fully marked out, right away
to the object so long hovering in view. This is not the only piece of
duplicity in Norwegian Union policy of whech Sweden has had to complain.

There was a cautious beginning with »their own Consuls»; it was too
venturesome a task to begin the system at once with the question of their
own Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[Sidenote: _The real innecessity of having separate Consuls._]

On the side of Norway it has been claimed that the mercantile interests
of Norway demanded a Consular Service of its own[11:1]. In reality, it is
an indisputable fact, even acknowledged by Norwegians, that no
essentially practical inconvenience has been caused by the system of
having a joint Consular Service. The Circles most affected by the matter
in Norway, Commercial men and ship-owners--were in opposition for a
long time; not even in 1891 did the separatists venture to lay the
Consular Committee's deliberations on the subject before the mercantile
authorities. One Norwegian, who was well competent to judge of the
matter, acknowledged openly, when the question was first broached, that
»the grounds of the proposition for a complete separation as being of
benefit to the shipping, commerce, and industry of the country, are so
weak, that it would be impossible for them except, through persistent
agitation to gain conviction, either among the classes most interested,
or amongst the masses of the people». There are principally two reasons
for the proposed reform, first that Sweden and Norway have a different
Tariff-System, secondly, the frequent rivalry between Swedish and
Norwegian trade articles of export. The first reason is baseless, as the
different Tariff-Systems are of importance chiefly for the imports, and
not for the exports[12:1]; the second reason loses its chief point by the
fact that consuls are not commercial agents, that it is not their
business to promote trade for private individuals, but only to give
reports of the possibilities of trading with different countries. It is
also worthy of mention, that in Sweden not the slightest wish has been
expressed in this direction, though at present the majority of the
Consuls abroad are Norwegians. And as regards the much-talked of fears,
that in the administration of the Consular Service by the Foreign Office,
partiality might be exercised in the interests of Sweden, the fact _that
for a long time past the whole of the mercantile portion of the Consuls'
duties have, on Norway's side, been performed by one of the Norwegian
Government Departements_, proves how vain those fears were.

[Sidenote: _The real object of raising the consular question._]

Norwegian separatists, among others MICHELSEN himself, long ago, in a
moment of rare sincerity, have acknowledged that other motives besides
the practical have been at the root of the claim for reform. A Norwegian
Consular Service meant, in itself, a step in the direction of the rupture
of the bonds of Union, and was therefore even then an object worth
striving for. But it was also openly declared, that a Norwegian Consular
Service would necessarily be succeeded by a Norwegian diplomatic
representation and a Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs. »Directly
they have got the wedge fixed into the small end», wrote in 1892
President HANS FORSSELL, »they will try to persuade us that there will be
no danger in letting them drive it in a bit». Above all they considered
that a Norwegian Consular Service would by degrees disorganize the
administration of the Foreign Office, and on the grounds of the
dominating rôle interests of economy play in the Foreign politics of our
day, it would by degrees expand into a regular Norwegian Foreign Office.

[Sidenote: _Want of Union motives for Consular reform._]

The chief characteristic of this programme is the total absence of any
motive for it from a Union point of view. Modern Norwegian Nationalism
has only really thought of Sweden and Norway, but not of the Union and
its claims. Whenever Sweden has ventured to advocate the cause of the
Union, Norway has begun to talk of the interests of Sweden. If, at any
time, the claims of the Union have been discussed in Norway, they have
usually been identical with those of Norway. The interests of the Union
demanded that Norway, without further parley, got what its national
sensitive feeling was pleased to decree as the Sovereign Norway's right.
That is about the gist of the matter. The Norwegian policy has by degrees
become blind to the fact, that the interests of the Union ought to demand
a subordination of the inclination to decide arbitrarily on points
touching the Union, both for the sake of Sweden and--of Norway.

[Sidenote: _Misinterpretation of the King's opposition._]

When therefore the King, in the interests of _the Union_, at first
opposed both the Consular reform itself and the manner of carrying it
out, they did not see the King of Norway, or the King of the Union, only
the King of Sweden, the veto of the King of Norway was called the Swedish
veto against the rightful claims of Norway. This dishonest doctrine has
gradually poisoned the minds of the people of Norway, and it is this,
that has brought about the rupture of the Union.

[Sidenote: _The raising of the Consular question in 1891._]

Under strong protest from the Norwegian Right Side (Conservative), which
at that time looked upon a separate Consular Service under a mutual
diplomatic administration as introducing something hitherto unheard of in
the annals of history, the consular question was brought to the decision
by the Norwegian Left Side. By an order of the Storthing, the method was
established: the Consular question was exclusively a Norwegian matter,
which must be treated and decided upon by Norwegian authorities of State
alone; on the other hand the _winding up_ of the joint Consular Service
would be a cause of negotiations with Sweden. In plain words, the Royal
Decree must be given in a Norwegian Cabinet Council, not in a so-called
Joint Cabinet consisting of both Swedish and Norwegian members, which
according to the Act of Union must decide in all questions »concerning
the two Kingdoms[14:1].» And this one-sided right of decision was
maintained in spite of the common Consular statutes--the last in 1886
--having been confirmed by a Joint Cabinet, and in spite of the fact
that these statutes prescribed the settlement of Consular Affairs in that
Council alone. Added to this, the relations of the future Norwegian
Consular Service to the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs and
diplomatic representatives had also to be arranged. This matter might
certainly be considered, to belong to the negotiations relating to the
winding up of the joint Consular Service. But if Norway resolved that a
separate Consular Service should be established within a given time, it
would be Norway's prerogative to dictate the conditions of winding it up;
Norway might without further ceremony withdraw a portion of its Foreign
affairs from the joint Foreign administration.

Through its leader, EMIL STANG, the Norwegian Conservatives supported the
Union King's view that the matter was as yet too imperfectly developed,
and that it must be decided on in a joint Cabinet. But in 1892 the
Storthing resolved, with a majority of 14 votes, on the establishment of
a Norwegian Consular Service. The King was prepared to refuse the
sanction to this, in a Norwegian Cabinet Council, and then and there
began the conflict between King and Council, as witnessed by the events
of later times. The character of this conflict may be mentioned already
here, as Norway, in fact, was even then, in 1892, on the eve of the
revolution, which has now broken out.

[Sidenote: _»The King and the Ministry» according to the Norwegian
Constitution._]

When the Constitution of Norway was framed in 1814, the Continent was but
little acquainted with the pure parliamentarism, with a ruling Council
and a powerless King. The Constitution is instead based on the theory of
the division of the state power into three organs, and this is plainly
stated in the division of the Constitution. The King's veto over legal
questions is only suspensive, but he is not represented as the helpless
tool of Storthing and Council. The Cabinet Council is certainly
responsible to the Storthing, but only for its own advice, not for the
King's Decrees. The King is legally bound to listen to the opinions of
his ministers, but the right of making Decrees according to his own
judgment, is expressly reserved to him. Nor does the Constitution of
Norway recognize the law of refusing countersignature, which is found for
instance in the Swedish Constitution. In 1814 the Storthing explicitly
refused a proposition to give the Cabinet Council this right, declaring
that the King ought not to be deprived of all his privileges. All the
King's Decrees must be countersigned by one of the Prime Ministers, but
this countersignature implies only the responsibility for the agreement
of the records with the resolutions taken. The greatest Norwegian writers
on State Law, have acknowledged that this is Norwegian National
Law[15:1]. Furthermore the Constitution originally did not recognize
something else remarkable for modern parliamentarism: the Ministers were
not even allowed to attend the debates of the Storthing. Then came the
Crisis of 1884, when the Norwegian Radicals with the Court of impeachment
a weapon, forced the King to capitulate, forced him to summon a Radical
Ministry, and to sanction an amendment of the Constitution, by which the
Ministery were allowed to attend the debates in the Storthing. By this
means, the modern parliamentarism, with all its claims, elbowed its way
into Norwegian State life. But the old prescriptions as to the
responsibility of the Cabinet Council, were retained, and they must
naturally be interpreted as of old. The new parliamentary interpretation
of these prescriptions of responsibility, especially the right of
refusing countersignature, was opposed by the King, who adhered to the
old only possible forms.

[Sidenote: _The development of the Consular question._]

Even in 1892 the Radical Cabinet STEEN did not venture to carry the
Consular question to an extreme. They were contented to play with fire.
Before the King found an opportunity to give his definite answer to the
consular question, the Cabinet retired. The Ministerial strike recently
set on the political stage, was even then in the perspective. But the
King having vainly tried to form a Conservative Ministry and matters
becoming serious, a retreat was sounded, the Storthing itself taking the
initiative, this time, strange to say, receiving the hint from Mr
MICHELSEN. The requests of the Ministers to resign were withdrawn, and
the Consular Question was postponed to a future date. The Norwegian
masses were not as yet sufficiently impregnated with the gospel of the
dissolution of the Union--and Norway was not yet armed for defence.

The following year the same tale began afresh. The Storthing resolved on
having a separate Consular Service, the Ministers sent in their requests
to resign, to avoid, as they declared, rousing a constitutional dispute
on the countersignature question which might bring about consequences
»that scarcely any other political question had aroused in our present
constitution». This time the Conservatives stepped into the breach on
behalf of the King and the Union. For two years The Cabinet STANG opposed
a furious Storthing, while the King was powerless to form a parliamentary
Radical Ministry on reasonable terms. This conflict naturally produced
intense excitement, and the Radicals, of course, saw in the King's
opposition, Sweden's and the King's of Sweden, not the King's of the
United Kingdoms fighting a battle against the destruction of the Union.
It is in this way that the Consular Question became magnified into a
question of National honour. The blow given to their honour by the
disloyalty of the Radicals to the _Union_ was entirely ignored. The
Consular question became by degrees, the chief National question of the
country.

[Sidenote: _The position in 1895._]

In the Spring of 1895 the situation in Norway was such that a complete
standstill was threatened, and all sorts of extravagant plans were mooted
on the Norwegian Radical Side. It was then that in limited Swedish
Conservatives circles a plan was said to exist for making Norway come to
an agreeable settlement of the Union question, by main force. This is a
matter impossible to decide. These reports spread like wildfire, and had
the effect of oil upon fire. And now at last Norway begins to think of
her defence which of late years she has neglected.

[Sidenote: _The Union Committee 1895-1908._]

The Norwegians meanwhile gave in as Norway was not ready. The Storthing
in Norway also consented to what Sweden had all along endeavoured to
obtain, viz. a general settlement. The Union Committee 1895-1898 effected
a couple of year's truce; any real results were not to be expected. The
Norwegian Radicals had other plans than a reasonable settlement of the
Union question; its representatives in the Committee were bound by their
party programme, and insisted on having their own Minister for Foreign
affairs. On the other side, the two representatives of the Swedish
Conservatives maintained the demand for a Union Parliament which the
Norwegians in the previous Union Committee had refused. The Swedish and
Norwegian majorities were very nearly balanced. They were united in the
opinion that the Union necessarily demanded a joint Minister for Foreign
affairs, but differed in everything else on several points. For instance,
the Norwegian majority, characteristically would not agree to limit the
possibility for Norway (on the grounds of paragraph 25 in the
Constitution) of withdrawing of her own accord, a greater or smaller
portion of Norwegian troops from the defending forces of the Union[18:1].
In the Consular question there were also differences. The Swedish members
were unanimous in insisting on a joint Consular Service for both
Kingdoms. The Norwegian majority preferred, from all points of view, a
joint Consular Service to a separate one for each Kingdom, and strongly
emphasized the point that in all circumstances the consuls ought to be
personally and immediately under the control of the Minister for Foreign
affairs, as the limits in the sphere of operations between the Consuls
and the Diplomatic Officials became more and more indefined. But with
evident respect to the opposing Norwegian opinions, it tried to regulate
the Consular Service, by joint terminable laws, nevertheless, so worded,
that not till the lapse of 15 years, the Kingdom that so desired, might
have the right to dissolve the joint Consular Service[18:2].

[Sidenote: _Norway prepares again to the Consular Question._]

The Union Committee having failed, the Norwegian Radicals prepared for
another attack on the old lines. By passing the Flag Bill, they prepared
to renew negotiations on the Consular Question, while, at the same time,
they were busily engaged in strengthening their defence and raising on
the boundaries rumoured fortresses against Sweden. The Under Secretary of
State, Dr. SIGURD IBSEN, instituted an inquiry as to the feasibility of
having a separate Consular Service in conjunction with the existing
Foreign administration. It was on this point that the Minister for
Foreign affairs, for the time being, Mr. LAGERHEIM, made a proposal, the
consequences of which brought about the present crisis.


FOOTNOTES:

[8:1] Compare NANSEN (page 48 and following).

[9:1] The Norwegians, as aforesaid, have generally looked upon Sweden's
maintaining its conception of the Union law as something very criminal;
this has been Norway's right alone.

[9:2] Compare NANSEN (page 54). »The change in the Swedish Constitution
in 1885 has therefore become the principal cause of the last twenty
years' strife in the union.»

[10:1] On the Norwegian side, it has been said, that Sweden in 1885
adopted the same method, when, by changing the Swedish Constitution by
themselves, they reorganized the Council for Foreign affairs. It must,
however, be observed, that, in this, Sweden is supported by its own
right, as acknowledged by the foremost Norwegian writers on state law and
Norwegian Conservatives, to undertake the management of foreign policy.
This legal stand-point had been adopted in 1835, when a resolution was
passed in the _Swedish_ Cabinet to admit the Norwegian Minister of State
to the Ministeral Council. The Norwegian claim to participate in the
revision of the Swedish Constitution is, however, unwarrantable, as
Norway, in the indisputably unionistic Stadtholder question in 1860
maintained that Sweden was not warranted in interfering when revisions or
changes were made in the Norwegian Constitution.

[11:1] Compare NANSEN (page 68 and following).

[12:1] It is a singular coincidence, that Norway in these days, when it
has brought the Consular question to a climax, has begun to carry out a
general rise in the Fiscal rates; the mercantile interests of »the land
of Free Trade» Norway evidently do not lie so very deep after all.

[14:1] The question as to when a matter shall be discussed in a Joint
Cabinet or not, has not been the smallest of the stumbling blocks in the
thorny path of the Union negotiations. In Norway, to quote Mr HAGERUP,
there has been quite a »sickly» fear of having matters settled there. On
the Norwegian Left Side they have defended the opinion, that only those
matters which, being expressly mentioned in the Act of Union, as being
distinctively Union-matters ought to be brought there. In Sweden it has
been held, that the Act of Union has no power to give an exhaustive
account as to what matters belong to the Union and which do not. Whether
it can be considered a matter which concerns both the Kingdoms depends
entirely on the exact nature of the matter itself. _This latter
conception has been adopted of old._

[15:1] Compare No. I §§ 5, 15, 30, 31.

[18:1] The Swedish majority had contemplated a provision in the Act of
Union, wherevy it became incumbent for both Kingdoms to place a fixed
minimum of fighting forces to the disposition of the Union.

[18:2] NANSEN says (page 71) »Divisions arose partly over the resistance
from the Swedish side to the unanimous demand of the Norwegian delegates
for a separate Consular Service.» This is, as plainly apparent, an
extremely modified version of the truth.




III.


[Sidenote: _His Excellency Mr. Lagerheim's Proposal._]

His Excellency Mr. LAGERHEIM'S proposal implied an attempt to settle the
Consular Question itself, by retaining the existing Foreign
Administration and dissolving the joint Consular Service. By doing this,
he plainly foresaw that the Consular Question would inevitably be raised
afresh on the part of Norway. It was necessary therefore to lead the work
of reform in the quiet paths of Union negotiations, in order to prevent
the old attempts on Norway's side »to take matters into her own hands»,
to the detriment of the harmony in the Union. If results in that way
could be gained, negotiative operations might win more confidence from
distrustful Norwegian politicians. The Swedish government seems also to
have taken into account the contingency that, by making this offer, they
would get Norway to meet them half way, and agree sooner or later to a
definite solution of the Union conflict, by a reorganisation, on the
grounds of having a joint Minister for Foreign affairs.

In one respect, it was undeniably a good opportunity for such an attempt.
The violent Russianizing of Finland, and the undefined plots it
concealed, could not fail to open the eyes of many in Norway. Even
Norwegian Radicals were obliged to acknowledge that the integrity of the
Kingdoms of Scandinavia formed a necessary guarantee for their freedom
and independence[19:1]. It was certainly on that account that their
courage was not so fully shared by all, when the Norwegian Radicals
prepared to renew their old efforts to break the Union. An honourable
compromise with Sweden, on that occasion, would probably have been
acceptable.

But Mr LAGERHEIM'S experiment had, on all hands, almost insurmountable
difficulties through which to pilot its way.

[Sidenote: _The difficulties attending the satisfactory settlement of the
Consular Question._]

In Sweden it had always been feared that separate Consuls for Norway
without the reorganization of the Foreign administration, would act as a
wedge to rupture the Union, especially as leading Norwegian politicians
took no pains to hide their ulterior motives. Therefore, the Swedish Diet
in 1893 expressed a decided wish that the Consular question should not be
discussed except in connection with the question of Foreign
administration, and from this decision the Swedish Diet has not since
deviated in any way.

In order, therefore, that there might be some prospect of the Swedish
government gaining the approval of the Swedish Diet, of the result of the
negotiations, it was necessary that it contained safe guarantees that the
Consular reform would not react to the advantage of a Union programme to
which Sweden could never agree: i. e. a purely personal Union.

But on the other hand, it was expected that the efforts to get these
guarantees fixed on a firm basis would meet with opposition from the
Norwegian side. The old Norwegian traditions of the Radical party were as
deeply rooted as ever in the political life of Norway. It was hard for
the Norwegian Radicals to lose sight of the original political aims in
carrying out the reform of the Consular service. D:r IBSEN'S aforesaid
inquiry plainly hinted that Norwegian opposition would be raised against
the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs having direct control over the
Norwegian Consuls, a stipulation that was absolutely necessary both from
a Swedish and a Union point of view. And Norwegian policy had generally
with its sickly distrust and susceptibility an instinctive disinclination
to bind Norway to anything referring to the burning question of the day.
»As to one's rights, no one negotiates». This has become well nigh the
axiom for Norwegian politics. And Norway now considers she has a right to
one and all of her demands.--

[Sidenote: _The Consular Committee of 1902._]

In a joint Cabinet Council held on January 21et 1902, it was resolved to
convene a Union Consular Committee consisting of two Swedish and two
Norwegian authorities,[21:1] who were to institute an examination as to
how far a new arrangement with separate Consuls for each of the United
Kingdoms would practically work under the administration of the present
joint diplomatic representatives.

The Committee accepted its task in a purely administrative spirit. It
declared distinctly that it considered it was not compulsory for them to
give an opinion as to the suitability or desirability[21:2] of the
arrangement, or of the political importance that might be assigned to the
same. This limitation of the duty of the Committee is of importance in
order to understand the terms of its conclusions; it was meant simply to
describe the effect of the aforesaid arrangement under certain
circumstances and nothing more.

The Committee gave two alternatives; Norway should either have its own
consuls, subordinate, to a certain extent, to the Minister of Foreign
affairs, or a separate Consular Service, in which case, the consuls would
be entirely under Norwegian authority. As to the first of these
alternatives, the Norwegian members explain, that whichever way we look
at the arrangement, it would be at the outset in conflict with the spirit
of the Norwegian Constitution; a corps acting for the most part under
authority out of Norway, would, from an administrative point of view, be
an »anomaly». The Swedish members evidently ought not to confute the
Norwegian interpretation of the Constitution; they do not approve of it,
nor do they agree to it, though they declare that they see plainly the
advantages to be obtained, from an disciplinary point of view, by
continuing to allow the separate consuls to act under the administration
of the Minister for Foreign affairs.

The formal way in which the Committee acted naturally brought about very
imperfect results. The logical consequences of the issue being, for
instance, that the Minister for Foreign affairs was debarred from giving
instructions directly to the different consuls; his 'wishes' were first
to be communicated to the Norwegian Consular administration, on whom
rested the decision as to whether or not, the wishes of the Minister of
Foreign affairs should be complied with(!). And the Minister of Foreign
affairs, would not, of course, have any power to interfere disciplinary
when a consul compromised the relations of the United Kingdoms with
Foreign powers etc. etc. The Swedish members express their extreme doubts
on the critical points all through, and point out the necessity of an
extremely amicable co-operation between the Minister for Foreign affairs
and the Norwegian Consular Service, as the only guarantee against the
total disorganization of the administration for Foreign affairs; the
Norwegians tried to soothe their doubts by declaring that the Norwegian
Consular Service would »duly value the importance of a loyal
co-operation.»

It was evident that these statements from the Swedish side could not be
considered as contributing to the solution of the problem, so much the
more so, as the Swedish members had strong doubts. Neither could any
reference to them be made on Norway's part without further notice, the
Committee itself having shirked the most salient points, namely those of
a practical and political nature. And yet in Norway the committee's
conclusions were considered to be an acknowledged method from the Swedish
side for the solution of the question[22:1].

[Sidenote: _Negotiations 1902-1903 between Swedish and Norwegian
delegates._]

Mr. BOSTRÖM became Prime Minister in the summer of 1902, and in the
autumn of that year, negotiations on the Consular question were commenced
between the delegates of the Swedish and Norwegian Cabinets. The
conclusions of the Consular Committee were then preliminarily examined
and discussed. In February and March the negotiations were continued in
Christiania, and touched especially upon the political side of the
matter, particularly the nature and binding power of an eventual
agreement. In the middle of March negotiations were abruptly broken off
on the grounds of divergencies of opinion, but were resumed again by the
Norwegian side, the result being published on March 24th in the well
known so-called Communiqué[23:1].

[Sidenote: _The Communiqué._]

This much-dismissed Act must be regarded as a summary compendium of the
preliminary results of the negotiations in the Consular question, though
it must be especially observed that it is not issued by the governments
themselves[23:2], but only by different members in each, and that the
Swedish members, at any rate, had no official authority in the matter.

Its contents inform us that the Swedish negotiators prefer to have the
Consular question solved in conjunction with the entire question of
Foreign administration, in other words, _they plainly offered a general
agreement to separate Consular services under a joint Minister of Foreign
affairs_, but that the Norwegian negotiators _refused_ this offer. On the
Norwegian Radical Side it was considered that the time was not yet ripe
for such a solution, and a resolution in the Storthing affirmed this in
January 1903, with the consent of the government; the Radicals were
evidently determined not to give up their claim--so unreasonable from a
Union point of view--to a separate Minister for Foreign affairs.

With respect to the Consular Question, the Swedish negotiators declare
that a dissolution of the joint Consular Office, appears to them, in
itself, undesirable, but as an opposite opinion has long been prevalent
in Norway, and as during the preliminary negotiations, it was shown to be
»not impossible» that under certain circumstances a system with different
Consuls for each Kingdom could be established, in order to obtain the
most important advantage of the political agreement between the two
countries, they have found it expedient to advise a settlement of the
question on the following basis:

1. Separate Consular Services for Sweden and for Norway shall be
established. The Consuls of each kingdom shall be subordinate to the
authority of their own country which the latter shall have to determine.

2. The relations of the separate Consuls to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs and to the Embassies shall be regulated by laws of the same
wording which cannot be altered nor abolished without the consent of the
authorities of both Kingdoms.

It is furthermore stipulated that the Status quo with reference to the
position of the Minister for Foreign affairs and the Ambassadors should
remain intact. Each Kingdom is to have its right to decide on the
establishment of its own Consular service; the identical laws are only to
regulate the relations between the Consuls on the one side, and the
Minister for Foreign affairs and diplomatic representatives on the other.
The laws are especially designed to give a guarantee that the consuls do
not outstep the boundaries of their occupation and at the same time
secure the necessary cooperation between the Foreign Administration and
the Consular Services of the two Kingdoms[24:1].

When the Communiqué was issued, it was received with very great diversity
of feelings on both sides of the State boundaries. The lively discussions
which immediately sprung up concerning the actual contents of the
agreement, on which considerable divergence of opinion was held,
contributed in no small degree to the former. The debates were especially
concentrated on the contents of what was called the identical laws, and
as the different conceptions on this subject were without doubt of great
importance in the final issue of the negotiations, it is as well to give
some enlightenment on the point.

In the first part of the Communiqué, which decribes the offer of the
Swedish negotiators, it is mentioned, as aforesaid, that the relations of
the Separate Consuls to the Minister for Foreign affairs and Diplomatic
representatives should be regulated by identical laws, which could not be
_altered_ or _abolished_ without the consent of the Government powers of
both Kingdoms. In the mutual resolution reference is made to laws »which
cannot be altered by one of the parties», the word 'abolish' does not
occur. This already caused astonishment. It was asked if this omission
had any important significance. It was observed that Mr BOSTRÖM, in the
Swedish Diet, made use of the first form of expression, Mr BLEHR in the
Norwegian Diet of the second.[25:1] In reality, the difference depended
on some oversight in the final revision which was made in Christiania
under great excitement in political circles there; this seems to have
given a prominent place to the preliminary solution, before the full
contents were grasped. Mr HAGERUP acknowledged later that the expressions
in reality meant the same, as the conception of the word 'alter', must
necessarily include the conception of the word 'abolish'. It was
afterwards frequently proposed in debates, that the intended laws should
be terminable only by mutual agreement, and this question has been
significant only through the connection which may be found to exist
between it and the chief point of this discussion itself, as to the
extent to which the laws were to be changeable.

The divergencies referred especially to the conception of Union Law by
the Norwegian Radicals, according to which Norway had the right to have
her own Minister for Foreign affairs, and consequently was entitled to
appoint one without agreeing with Sweden. As the proposed laws were
based upon the presupposition that the Swedish Minister for Foreign
affairs would continue the administration of the Foreign affairs of the
Union, the question now arose as to whether a Norwegian Minister of
Foreign affairs could be appointed unless Sweden consented to the
suspension of the Consular Laws, or whether the Consular Laws would
become extinct of themselves, if Norway made use of her assumed rights in
the matter.

In other words, was it the intention of the Communiqué to force Norway to
a solution of the question of the foreign administration only through
negotiations with Sweden, or had the Norwegian Radicals the liberty to
continue to urge Norway to take matters into her own hands?

In Norway much anxiety was expressed lest the negotiations should prove
too binding,--Norwegian politicians hate, as previously mentioned, to
be bound in any way--His Excellency BLEHR meanwhile imagined that he
might be able to explain in the Storthing, in May 1903, that _the laws
will not include any restrictions for either of the two Kingdoms, in the
matter of their authority, in future, to decide on questions relating to
the regulation of foreign administration_; or be reckoned as a proof that
they had confirmed the existing terms, or bound themselves to carry them
out. This explanation produced a calming effect, and it was confirmed in
the following debate with satisfaction that the character of these laws
could not be referred to, as showing, that Norway was bound in any way
whatever. This interpretation was afterwards approved of by Mr HAGERUP,
and may be said to form the Norwegian official standpoint in all
negotiations.

Now, was this also the Swedish interpretation of the Communiqué? It is
evident that the Swedish standpoint in this respect must be of especial
importance, considering it plainly referred to a guarantee demanded by
Sweden[26:1], touching the nature of which the Swedish interpretation of
the Communiqué must, of necessity, in an especial degree be one of
authority.

On the part of the Swedish government, no opinion on the question has yet
been published. Buth it may nevertheless, with great certainty, be
assumed _that the Swedish negotiators for the identical laws really,
among other matters, intended to bind Norway not to take the question of
foreign administration »into her own hands_.» The great fear of such a
contingency, shown by the Norwegian Radicals, is sufficient proof of
this, for, as a rule, Norwegian politicians keep themselves pretty well
informed on matters of negotiation, even when they are of a more
confidential nature. Also, more or less direct references have been made
by the Norwegian government, that the interpretation of the Communiqué by
the Swedish government differed from its own[27:1]. This supposition is
vindicated by the political situation throughout. It is plain that to the
Swedish government the compensation demanded for concessions in the
Consular question, was the guarantee that the consequences of having a
Norwegian Consular Service would not pave the way for a Norwegian Foreign
Office. It was therefore first necessary to demand of Norway implicit
loyalty with reference to the future solving of the Foreign Minister
question. The Swedish delegates have therefore evidently tried to exact
from Norway, as an expression of implicit loyalty, a contract not to seek
to alter the Status quo with respect to the Foreign administration[27:2],
without an agreement with Sweden.

How is it possible then, that the Norwegian government in the Storthing
could interpret the Communiqué as it did?

As long as the details in the protocol of negotiations are not known, it
is impossible to make any definite assertions.

The Norwegian government may possibly have felt assured that the
Communiqué did not intend a direct refusal to Norway of its assumed legal
right to its own Minister for Foreign affairs--that demand could
scarcely be expected to emanate from Sweden--and passed over the
Swedish delegates' plain intention to bind Norway to the _execution_ of
that right. But as this question has manifestly been an object of
protracted debates, the Norwegian government cannot possibly have
remained in ignorance of the Swedish delegates' intentions with regard to
the wording of the Communiqué on that point, and the Norwegian
governments attitude in the matter, is, to say the least, rather strange,
especially in the light of the apparently somewhat undiplomatic War
Minister STANG'S open declaration in the Storthing, that according to his
idea of the matter, _the decisions in respect to the identical laws were
scarcely in accordance with Mr_ BLEHR'S _interpretation of the
Communiqué_.

Now, however matters may have been in detail, one indisputable fact
remains clear, _that the guarantee the Swedish delegates sought to effect
by means of the identical laws, has been refused on the grounds of the
Norwegian interpretation of the Communiqué_. This must be kept strictly
in view, if any correct idea of the ensuing development of events is to
be obtained.


FOOTNOTES:

[19:1] It is undoubtedly Russia's proceedings in Finland which have
especially influenced the recent unionist-political views of BJÖRNSON.

[21:1] The most effective power in the Committee was D:r SIGURD IBSEN,
who is credited with having drawn up the drafts of the result of the
Committee's debates. The rest of the members were the Swedish Ambassador
BILDT at the Court of St James, the Consul General AMÉEN in Barcelona,
and the Consul General CHRISTOPHERSEN in Antwerp.

[21:2] The Swedish members of the Committee indicate, incidentally, that
they do not consider it to be altogether desirable.

[22:1] NANSEN evidently looks upon the matter in this light (page 64):
»No change in the Consular regulations was made, and it therefore,
follows that even the _Swedish Commissioners_ did not think it
incompatible with the terms of the Union, for Norway to have separate
Consuls». And, of course, he mentions, »the _unanimous conclusion_ of the
committee of experts from _both_ countries» (p. 72).

[23:1] N:o 3.

[23:2] The Swedish members were, the Premier, BOSTRÖM, the Minister for
Foreign Affairs Mr. LAGERHEIM, and State Secretary HUSBERG. The Norwegian
members were, Prime Ministers BLEHR and QVAM, and State Secretaries
KNUDSEN and IBSEN

[24:1] N:o 3 These latter decisions in the Communiqué, which are
conclusive in explaining the later standpoint taken by the Swedish
government, are, of course, omitted by NANSEN.

[25:1] The same difference also occurs in the drafts of laws which have
been proposed at more recent dates.

[26:1] It is manifest that it is on the part of Sweden that the idea of
identical laws has arisen. In Norway they afterwards complained,
especially the Radicals, of that »Massive instrument.»

[27:1] In the debate in the Storthing on April 27:th 1904 Mr CARL BERNER
said he had heard that Mr BLEHR'S explanation in the Storthing
respecting; the Communiqué before its publication was made known to the
Swedish government: that the latter, neither previously, nor later on,
had made any objections to it. To this State Secretary MICHELSEN sharply
replied, that »Mr BLEHR'S explanation was only the explanation of the
Norwegian government on the subject of the Communiqué.»

[27:2] Further affirmation is given by Mr IBSEN'S declaration in the
Storthing, that the negotiations fell through in consequence of Mr
BOSTRÖM'S opposition to the request of the Norwegian delegates that in
the Communiqué it should be mentioned that the identical laws were to be
valid only »so long as the present system of foreign administration
existed.» When, finally, the Norwegians consented to omit this condition,
it could only have been their intention that the laws should only be
valid until by mutual consent they were rescinded. Other explanations in
the Storthing of the divergencies of opinions on this point are to all
intents unacceptable.




IV.


[Sidenote: _The reception of the Communiqué in Sweden and Norway._]

Even without taking into consideration the indistinctness that was
supposed to characterise the Communiqué, its general contents roused no
unanimous approbation. In the Swedish Diet in May 1903, during a debate,
serious doubts were rife, and it was emphatically declared that the
Consular Question must be solved simultaneously with the Foreign Minister
Question as resolved by the Diet in 1893. The Second Chamber (lower Home)
was more leniently inclined towards the negotiations, but it nevertheless
referred to the resolution of 1893.

Nor did it get a promising reception in Norway at first. It was known
there that one of the chief stipulations of the negotiations had been the
cessation of the agitation for a separate Minister of Foreign affairs.
Meanwhile after the publication of the Communiqué, the Norwegian Radicals
immediately expressed their opinions at their large meeting by again
solemnly entering this old claim on their party programme.

However when the agitation for a new election for the Storthing was
started later on in the year, there was a strong inclination towards
negotiating, and even BJÖRNSON, among others, warmly advocated the cause
of the negotiation programme, and that too, in opposition to the Radical
Minister BLEHR, who, though having introduced the negotiations, was
suspected of being but a lukewarm partisan to the cause. The party for
negotiation conquered, and was in the majority in the Storthing, though
not in great numbers. The issue could scarcely be attributed to the
Swedish proposal alone, but also in no slight degree to the miserable,
impoverished condition to which the country had been brought by the old
Radical government. Mr BLEHR resigned in the autumn 1903, after the
elections. Professor HAGERUP, the leader of the Conservatives, then
became Prime Minister at Christiania in companionship with D:r IBSEN as
Prime Minister at Stockholm. The old Radical party retired from the
leadership, but exercised, by its criticising, suspicious attitude, a
powerful influence on the progress of the negotiations, and that too, in
no favourable direction.

[Sidenote: _Negotiations on the basis of the Communiqué._]

In a joint Council held on 11th Dec. 1903, the Cabinets of both Kingdoms
were commissioned to resume negotiations on the Consular question, on the
basis of the Communiqué. They were carried on slowly during the Spring
1904, but it was not till May that the first official break in the
proceedings was made by Mr. HAGERUP presenting to the Swedish government
the Norwegian gouvernment proposal for identical laws.

[Sidenote: _The problem of the relations of the Minister of Foreign
affairs to the Consular service._]

It was clear that the chief point of the question should concern the real
authority to be exercised by the Minister for Foreign affairs over the
Consuls in diplomatic matters. It must necessarily be the chief interest
of the Swedish government to insure a guarantee for this. It was partly a
purely practical matter, that the Minister for Foreign affairs, who was
responsible for the relations of both Kingdoms to Foreign powers, should
be able to exercise an efficient control over all matters in any way
connected with the Diplomatic service. And it was also necessary to
hinder the Norwegian Consular service, in its progressive development,
from acting in the direction of a division of the Foreign administration
within the Union.

The practical necessity of strict co-operation between the Foreign
Service and the Consular Service had previously been acknowledged in
Norway on certain sides. It may thus be of interest to recall the strong
efforts that were made by the Norwegian majority in the latest Union
Committee, to emphasize the importance of having the consuls under the
direct control of the Minister for Foreign affairs and Envoys in all
matters which are likely to assume a diplomatic character. The same
conclusions may also be drawn from the plan of some Norwegians to solve
the Consular question, by arranging for the separation of the mercantile
part of the joint Consular service, while the diplomatic part remained
intact[30:1].

But the problem now presented a somewhat different aspect from the one
it had for the Norwegian Majority of the last Union Committee, for it had
postulated a Union Minister of Foreign affairs. And, undoubtedly, a
deeper penetration into questions it included, had made clearly manifest
the impossibility of drawing a distinct line between the diplomatic and
mercantile functions of the Consuls. The question, for instance, now
arose, as to whether a Norwegian civil official, in certain cases, would
be subordinate to a Swedish Minister. In the face of this problem, the
Norwegians on their part lost sight of the real points at issue in a most
remarkable way. In the Consular Committee's deliberations, Norwegian
opinion on the question of subordination, that it would be an »anomaly»,
in conflict with the spirit of the Norwegian Constitution etc. etc. made
it evident that the Swedish claim would come into collision, on the part
of Norway, with the formal respect to which the abstract demand of State
Sovereignty, viewed logically, is entitled.

From this conflict, the Swedish government had no duty, nor even the
right to withdraw without protest. Facts are of more importance than mere
forms. The evasive talk of the »spirit» of constitutional law, and the
administrative anomalies could not be decisive. Many events both in
public annals and administrative legislature are very illogical, and very
great anomalies. The main fact which the Swedish government had to hold
in view, was this, _that the responsibility of the Swedish Minister of
Foreign affairs, for the joint Foreign policy of the two Kingdoms, must
presuppose a fully effective administration of the same in all its
branches_.

[Sidenote: _The Norwegian proposal. May 1904._]

The Norwegian proposal of the 28th May 1904 showed that the views of the
Swedish governement could not entirely be ignored. According to this
proposal[31:1] the Consular administration in Christiania should
regularly inform the Minister of Foreign affairs of nominations, orders
issued etc., etc. which it would be of importance for him to know.

Furthermore, when an affair seemed likely to assume a Diplomatic
character and required immediate treatment, the Consul should send the
report directly to the Minister for Foreign affairs, and the latter,
under similar conditions, would give direct instructions to the Consul.
Ambassadors were also empowered to give orders to the Consuls, but on no
account to exceed the instructions given by the Norwegian Authorities.

This was undoubtedly something, but manifestly not much. The connection
between the Diplomatic Service and the Norwegian Consular administration
was very unsatisfactorily provided for. There was no guarantee whatever
that the orders of the Norwegian Consular administration would not come
into conflict with those of the Minister for Foreign affairs, a
deficiency so much the more serious as the Act § 1--c allowed the
Norwegian Consular administration rather extensive powers of more or less
diplomatic significance, for instance, that of giving instructions to
Consuls respecting the regulations of International Law.

Furthermore it was deficient of any provisions that would entitle the
Minister of Foreign affairs and the Ambassadors to the authority to
secure a guarantee, by strict control, that the Consuls would not
compromise the Foreign administration, and, in fact, there was good cause
for declaring from the Swedish side, »that the proposition includes
scarcely any rules calculated to secure the guarantee referred to in the
Communiqué, that the Consuls would not exceed the proper limits of their
office», and _was therefore in that respect not in accordance with the
acknowledged principles of the Communiqué_.

[Sidenote: _Mr Bostrom's Conditions._]

From what has been already stated, it seems that in the Swedish Cabinet
there were divided opinions. But the Government was unanimous in not
accepting the Norwegian proposal, and even in the summer of 1904 it must
have been evident to the Norwegian Council, that the Swedish Cabinet cil
would not in any essentials comply with the Norwegian proposal. But the
question was not thoroughly discussed by the Swedish Cabinet in pleno,
till the autumn.

During the autumn Mr LAGERHEIM resigned on the grounds of difference of
opinion with the Prime Minister, though the real cause of his resignation
was said to have no direct connection with the Union negotiations. In
November His Excellency Mr BOSTRÖM went to Christiania and presented his
conditions, as to which the Swedish Cabinet had declared its approval if
the Norwegian government would approve of them[33:1]. These conditions
stipulated among other matters, that no orders should be issued from the
Consular Office that would come into conflict with the commands of the
Minister of Foreign affairs; that, if a Consul acted in any way likely to
disturb the relations between the United Kingdoms and the Foreign Powers,
the Minister of Foreign affairs could send in an appeal to the King,
recommending his dismissal; that the Ambassadors, in certain cases,
should also be empowered to suspend the Consul from his Office[33:2].

After personal consultations in Christiania His Excellency Mr HAGERUP
made a written statement of his objections.

[Sidenote: _Mr Hagerups Reply._]

In this, and the ensuing interpolations on the Norwegian side, the
Norwegian system of conducting negotiations appears in its typical
manner. Of real facts and reasons there is not a trace. For instance,
though the Norwegian majority itself, in the last Union Committee,
emphasized the danger of separating the Consular Service from the
Diplomatic administration, Mr HAGERUP does not make the slightest
acknowledgement that interminable practical difficulties would be the
results of acceding to the Norwegian proposition. Neither is there a
single proposal, which, from a Norwegian point of view, would be
acceptable, to make decisions that might in any possible degree remedy
the deficiences. On the contrary, Mr HAGERUP mentions that such decisions
would be calculated to stamp Norway as a dependency, according to
international and common law principles, and declared that from a
national point of view, it indicates a very great retrogression on the
present arrangement of the Consular Service[34:1]. In this, he forgets
that Mr BOSTRÖM'S conditions refer to exceptional decisions and do not
touch the Norwegian Consul's normal position as being a Norwegian civil
Official, and he omits to observe that the interference of the Diplomatic
Officials with Consular affairs, as proposed by Mr BOSTRÖM, would very
seldom occur.

[Sidenote: _The Swedish Government's proposal._]

It is, meanwhile, easy to understand that Mr BOSTRÖM'S demand, that the
King, on the Swedish Minister's representations, should be empowered to
dismiss a Norwegian civil official, would deeply injure the Norwegian
susceptibilities, and that it was therefore quite possible to be blind to
the fact that the Swedish Minister was also responsible for Norway's
Foreign politics. When therefore His Excellency Mr HAGERUP went to
Stockholm for further discussions, all the rest of the Swedish Ministers,
as will be seen, were ready to present a Swedish proposal[34:2] for
identical laws modified especially to meet the sensitive point.

The demand that the Consular Office should not issue orders in conflict
with those given by the Minister of Foreign affairs, remained, but it
naturally did not necessarily imply a formal subordination, as the
Minister could not give orders directly to the Consular Office. Further,
the decision remained, that the Ambassadors could, on especial occasions,
suspend the Consuls from their office, but this decision need not
necessarily offend the Norwegian susceptibility, as the Ambassadors,
though more directly under the influence of the Minister for Foreign
affairs, are nevertheless, according to the Norwegian legal point of
view, not only Swedish Officials, but Officials of the Union[35:1]. On
the other hand, the form for the interference of the Minister for Foreign
affairs with the Consuls was modified in a way which showed great
consideration for Norway; thus when a Consul had compromised the United
Kingdoms, the Minister of Foreign affairs was to bring the matter before
the joint or the Ministerial Council, after which it was laid before the
King for decision at a State Council especially dealing with the affairs
of that State.

[Sidenote: _The Norwegian government's Ultimatum._]

What reply now does the Norwegian government give to these apparently
perfectly fair and moderate demands?[35:2]

It declares that it »stands to reason» that the Norwegian Consular Office
would not issue orders in conflict with those of the Minister for Foreign
affairs, and remarks that it is not very appropriate in a form of law, to
presuppose want of loyalty in a Public Office[35:3]. If the Swedish
proposals had been accepted, the Norwegian Consular service would have
been very largely placed under the control of the Foreign Minister, who
is constitutionally a Swedish Minister. It claims for other more
important points the unsuitability of a »hierarchal» relation between
Swedish and Norwegian officials, and several times cites the decisions of
the Consular Committee, the one-sided formal views of which the
Norwegian government itself had abandoned. But when the Norwegian
government intends offering other guarantees of cooperation between the
Minister for Foreign affairs and the Norwegian Consular Office, and that
the Consuls shall not exceed the limits of their duties, it has only to
refer to the loyalty of the Norwegian Consular Office, and its interest
in keeping Norway from being compromised abroad, guarantees, which, of
course, have their significance, when reliable, but manifestly are not of
the legislative binding nature intended by the Communiqué. Finally the
Norwegian government declares these and sundry other Swedish conditions
unacceptable, and adds, that »if they should be adhered to further
discussion the Swedish draft about would be useless»[36:1]. Really a
formal ultimatum!

[Sidenote: _The Swedish government's reply._]

Before the Swedish government replied to the Norwegian government's
Ultimatum, the critical attitude of the Consular negotiations became the
subject of debate in the Lower Chamber of the Swedish Diet, and from the
liberal party's side, a strong appeal was made to the government to try,
if possible, to avoid any interruption of the negotiations. The reply of
the Swedish Cabinet is dated Jan. 30th 1905[36:2]. Its tone is one af
decision tempered with undoubted moderation and good-will. The Cabinet
firmly maintains the real grounds of the disputed claims. It especially
emphasizes the importance of the Minister for Foreign affairs having the
power in exceptional cases to interfere in Consular matters, as the
limits between the Diplomatic and Consular operations are exceedingly
indistinct and, on both sides, there is a natural tendency to extend
operations into departments that had previously been considered as
belonging to the other party. The reference, made by the Norwegian
Cabinet, to the Consular Committee's resolution that the Norwegian
Consuls should be entirely under the control of Norwegian authority, was
met by the Norwegian Cabinet's own admissions, that the Minister for
Foreign affairs should be authorised to give the separate Consuls
instructions, and, herewith the claim that, in the Diplomatic branch of
affairs, the Norwegian Consuls should be solely under the control of
Norwegian authority may be considered void. Furthermore it points out the
unsatisfactory attitude of the Norwegian proposal with reference to the
guarantees presupposed by the Communiqué that the Consuls shall not
exceed the proper limits of their duty, and the objection made only on
Norway's side, that the best guarantee would be the control exercised by
the Norwegian Consular Office, is met on the grounds that a guarantee of
that kind was not intended in the Communiqué, as it had nothing to do
with the internal relations between Norwegian Consuls and the Norwegian
Consular Office.

On the whole the Swedish Cabinet maintains its claims, but it offers to
modify them, if they can be proved to be in conflict with the provisions
of the Communiqué. Furthermore the possibility is not excluded, of making
on other accounts changes and modifications in the proposed resolutions,
but their essential items must »be adhered to». The Cabinet does not
consider itself entitled, in the interests of the Union, unconditionally
to refuse the points designated by the Norwegian Cabinet.

[Sidenote: _The Norwegian government breaks off negotiations._]

To this document from the Swedish Cabinet, is immediately despatched the
reply, »that the Norwegian Cabinet finds no grounds for further
communication on the matter.»


FOOTNOTES:

[30:1] Thus, their claim for a separate Consular service was worded in
the Norwegian Moderate party's programme as follows: »Our own Norwegian
Consular Service with the exception of all matters connected with the
relations between the Consular Service and Diplomatic administration is
hereby declared established».

[31:1] N:o 4.

[33:1] N:o 5.

[33:2] Some other points in Mr BOSTRÖM'S Memorandum were rejected by the
Norwegian side. They ran as follows:

1:o Before a Consul was nominated, opportunity should be given to the
Minister for Foreign affairs to make such observations as he might think
necessary.

2:o In the Consular Diploma, the King shall be styled King of Sweden and
Norway--not King of Norway and Sweden, as was the case in Norway--as
these Diplomas are intended for presentation to Foreign powers, and the
King always makes use of this title abroad Foreign powers.

3:o As long as the appointment of separate consuls was not approved of by
Foreign powers and so long as ambassadors in a Foreign conntry had not
been stationed, the joint Consular Service should continue its functions.
--Mr HAGERUP did not refer to these points in his reply partly because
the difficulties of his agreeing on them with Mr BOSTRÖM were not,
according to his own account, so very insurmountable.

[34:1] N:o 6.

[34:2] N:o 7.

[35:1] They are mentioned, for instance, in the Act of Union.

[35:2] It is characteristic that NANSEN in his review of the negotiations
(page 76 and following) does not mention one of the Swedish demands. It
can, however, be safely referred to all, who are impartial on the
subject, as to whether its decisions, as NANSEN (page 77) insists, imply
the subordination of the Norwegian Consular Service to the Swedish
Minister for Foreign affairs on a very extensive scale.

[35:3] In that case, what numbers of legislative rules and regulations
would have remained unwritten!

[36:1] N:o 8.

[36:2] N:o 9




V.


[Sidenote: _Norwegian accusations aganist the Swedish government._]

The breaking off of the negotiations caused great depression in Norway,
and even in wide circles in Sweden the issue was deeply deplored.

Norwegian policy had always been a policy of strong feelings, and now it
made it an object systematically to work up illwill against Sweden.
Strong expressions were not wanting, and soon the whole of Europe--
thanks to the indefatigable manner in which the Norwegians cultivated the
European Press--resounded with accusations against the Swedish
government, and the entire Swedish nation of unreasonableness, fickleness
etc. etc.; it was important now to make good cause for the plans then
already existing in Norway, plans which had probably been laid years ago.

Now in what does the truth of their accusations lie?

[Sidenote: _The responsibility of breaking off the negotiations._]

The accusations implied in the mildest form that the attitude of the
Swedish government had caused the break down in the negotiations. To this
it must be first pointed out, that the side which first formulated its
demands as an ultimatum formally bears the responsibility. Formally,
therfore, the Norwegian government is unquestionably the responsible
party, so much the more so, that not even after the Norwegian Ultimatum,
did the Swedish government maintain its standpoint as being absolutely
inflexible. It must also be observed that the first Norwegian proposition
in May 1904, in fact, propounded the essentials contained in the
Ultimatum. It was certainly held to be only the grounds for further
negotiations, but it was proclaimed afterwards on the Norwegian side,
that the Norwegian Cabinet had found it possible that divergencies in the
form and contents of the law, would be limited to a very slight number of
points of minor importance.

The formal responsibility for the breaking off of the negotiations may
now, on the whole, be considered of slight importance. It is interesting
only on the grounds that it illustrates the Norwegian method of
negotiating, which all but commences with the ultimatum, for it explains
to a great extent the difficulties of the opposite party in gaining their
lawful rights.

The accusations on the Norwegian side, of course, imply, that the Swedish
government, in making unreasonable conditions, had practically caused the
breaking off of the negotiations, and even wished to bring about that
result. As regards the former, an impartial examination of the Swedish
final proposal is the best refutation. And as regards the latter, it may
assuredly be affirmed, that there was no want of good will, on the part
of Sweden, to come to a good understanding on the point, the last letter
on the question written by Sweden is a sufficient proof of this. But the
government could not reasonably be expected to go further in granting
concessions.

It was indisputably clear to the Norwegian government, that they could
not make greater concessions. During the proceeding of the negotiations
it had become intimately acquainted with the opinions in Norwegian
political circles, and it knew that if it went further, it would risk a
defeat in the Storthing. But with equal right, it behoved the Swedish
government to take into consideration the prospects of getting the
proposal approved of by the Swedish Diet, so much the more so, as the
Swedish government, in respect to this question, occupied a more insecure
position than the Norwegian. The Norwegian government was supported in
the Storthing by a majority on the side of the negotiations. The Swedish
government had no support at all. The Diet had certainly not insisted on
the breaking off of the negotiations, but it firmly maintained its old
standpoint, that the Consular question should be solved in conjunction
with the Foreign Minister question. It must therefore be of importance to
the Swedish government, to have the proposition worded in such a way that
it would remove the doubts of the Diet regarding an isolated solution of
the Consular question. In the matter of the immutability of the identical
laws, it had sought an effectual guarantee that the independent Consular
office would not disloyally--when the time was ripe for it--be
provided by Norway with its own Minister for Foreign affairs. This
question had been shirked by Norway. It was therefore necessary to cling
to other guarantees, in order, if possible, to prevent the Norwegian
Consular Office from drifting away from under the direction of the
Minister for Foreign affairs, and thus, paving the way by degrees to its
original goal--the breaking op of the joint administration for Foreign
affairs. It is in this light that his Excellency BOSTRÖM'S demands ought
undoubtedly to be seen.

It may in short be said: If during the negotiations the Norwegian
government was bound by Norwegian Union-political traditions, the Swedish
government had the same right to refer to its attachment to Swedish
Union-political traditions. And, it must be added: That if any of the
Swedish conditions, which the Norwegian government pointed out, were an
expression for a suspicion of Norway's implicit loyalty in conducting its
own Consular affairs, _it was Norwegian traditional Radical Policy from
the beginning of 1890 which cast its shadow before it_. And that the old
Norwegian Radical traditions had to be taken into account was prowed by
the number and length of the discussions in the Storthing, which were
dinned into the ears of the negotiators, during the whole period of the
negotiations. That even Mr MICHELSEN, one of the parties to the
negotiations on the Norwegian government side, in a debate at the
Storthing, during the Spring 1904, cast friendly glances on the old
lines, showed plainly how little they had forgotten the old talk of
taking matters into their own hands.

[Sidenote: _The question as to whether the Swedish government had broken
the covenant of the Communiqué._]

But the Norwegian accusations were not limited to the negotiators'
(especially Mr BOSTRÖM'S) bringing about the breaking off of the
negotiations by their unreasonable demands. They went further; it was
loudly proclaimed that the Swedish government had not kept their word,
had broken their agreement etc. etc., and, when all of a sudden Sweden
became identical with the government of Sweden she was pathetically
pointed at as untrustworthy etc. etc. The amount of moral indignation
contained in these Norwegian accusations has plainly been made manifest
by late events. Their object--to throw on Sweden the responsibility of
plans that were designed to be executed in Norway--was too transparent,
but just on that account they must be explained, in order that the
responsibility of Sweden for what happened in Norway, may appear in its
true light.

The most naive accusations of having broken their agreement, are based on
the supposition that the Swedish government was bound by the Communiqué
to bring the negotiations to a definite conclusion, which means about the
same as, that Sweden had beforehand promised to accept the Norwegian
demands which in future would be presented by the Norwegian side. This
supposition requires no serious reflection, the Communiqué naturally
implying only a promise _to try_ to come to a conclusion that would be
satisfactory to both parties. This system of reasoning is, however,
typical of Norwegian politics all through. It is illustrated in one way
by the Norwegian government's peculiar way of practically commencing
negotiations with an Ultimatum, and it has been characterised, in a very
amusing manner, by professor TRYGGER in a debate in the First Chamber of
the Swedish Diet, immediately after the publishing of the Communiqué.
»Norwegians», he said, »are very fond of negotiations. I have sat with
them in the Union Committee, for three years, and they have always taken
great pleasure in negotiating with us, so long as we acceded to their
demands».

Far more serious is the accusation that the Swedish government had
violated the grounds of the negotiations by exceeding the terms of the
Communiqué[41:1]. It has evidently been privately expressed by the
negotiating party in Norway, during the latter stage of the negotiations,
and it was indirectly referred to by Prime Minister HAGERUP when he
announced in the Storthing, that the negotiations were broken off. The
Swedish government contradicted it, however, in their last letter, and
offered to modify their proposition if it were proved that it exceeded
the terms of the Communiqué. But the Norwegian government failed to
produce the proofs, they preferring to cut off negotiations.

What the Norwegians point out over and over again is the provision of the
Communiqué that the Consuls of each Kingdom shall be under the authority
of the country to which they belong, which matter the country concerned
shall decide. Against this, it has been mentioned, is opposed the Swedish
government's evident plans to arrange a »hierarchal» relationship between
the Foreign Minister and the Norwegian Consuls. This decision, in itself,
undoubtedly seems to speak for the Norwegian notion of the affair. But an
honest method of interpretation tries to see individual particles in the
light of their relation to the whole matter.

Now, on the contents of the identical laws, the Communiqué confirms among
other things that they shall »give guarantee that the Consuls do not
exceed the proper limits of their occupation.» What guarantee? The
Norwegian negotiators, who scarcely paid any attention to this provision
in their proposition, are said to have maintained verbally, that the best
guarantee was the control exercised over the Consuls by the Norwegian
Consular Office. But to this the Swedish government may justly object:
»that was not the kind of guarantee intended by the Communiqué, as this
had nothing to do with the internal relations between the Norwegian
consuls and the Norwegian Consular service. The guarantee which the
Communiqué mentions, can refer to nothing but the control to be exercised
by the Foreign Minister and Ambassadors over the Consuls».

If this interpretation is acknowledged as correct--and it is difficult
to find any other--it is plain that the presupposition cited by the
Norwegians only referred to _normal_ conditions and that it did not
exclude in exceptional cases--as for instance, when Consular affairs
were in any way connected with the Diplomatic Office--a hierarchal
relationship between the Foreign Minister and the Consuls. Conclusive
for the correctness of this interpretation, as represented by the Swedish
government, _is the approval the Norwegian government itself gave this
interpretation_ by conceding that the Foreign Minister might give direct
orders to the Norwegian Consuls, which, in certain cases, implied a
hierarchal relationship between the Foreign Minister and the Norwegian
Consuls. This admission on the Norwegian side must not be regarded as a
concession _beyond_ the demands of the Communiqué. It had already been
made before the Communiqué was compiled, and must therefore absolutely be
included in the frame of the Communiqué. The so much-disputed claims of
Sweden imply nothing but an extension of the above hierarchal exceptional
conditions, especially in an disciplinary sense, and are therefore within
the frame of the Communiqué.

In close connection with the Norwegian accusations against Sweden for
breach of faith, are the Norwegian governments insinuations that the
Swedish government, by its later shaped demands, had strayed from the
agreement which had previously been decided on, both by the Swedish and
Norwegian sides. The Norwegian government especially refers to the
preliminary agreements, which, under necessary reservations, had been
made in the negotiations between the delegates of the two Cabinets,
before the Communiqué existed.

It is clear that these accusations especially touched matters in the
negotiations, of which outsiders cannot, of course, form a quite distinct
opinion. Meanwhile it would not be impossible to gain an idea of the
breadth of the case on the grounds of the statements of the Cabinets, the
references in the papers, and the debates in the Swedish Diet and the
Norwegian Storthing.

The matter that first demands our attention is the communication of the
Swedish Cabinet dated Jan. 30:th 1905, in which it is distinctly declared
that, when the Norwegian Cabinet had assumed that its proposition of the
28:th May 1904 would, without any alteration worth mentioning, be
accepted by the Swedish Cabinet »it would find no support from
admissions either of the Swedish Cabinet or its delegates.» Now, there
were hardly any negotiations between the governments concerning the
contents of the Consular laws till the time when the first definite
Norwegian proposition was presented. The agreements which the Norwegian
Cabinet considers would more nearly refer to the negotiations before the
origin of the Communiqué, to the feigned conclusions of which the
Norwegian government tried to attach the greatest importance. What was
the character of these negotiations in relation to the contents of the
proposed laws? They were in reality free discussions, during which the
contents of the deliberations of the Consular Committee were inquired
into. They were regarded by the negotiators themselves as a
»preliminary», as the first preparatory step to negotiations, and that
the results of many points were indistinct, is evident, as the Swedish
Cabinet gave to understand that, on one or two occasions before the
origin of the Communiqué, fresh negotiations were proposed, but in vain.
The preliminary act of agreement to which the Norwegian Council referred,
seems to have involved one or two particular points to which they firmly
adhered, especially the one concerning the power of the Foreign Minister
to give direct orders to the Consuls: in all the rest, they confined
themselves to a general impression that there was a prospect of their
agreeing. According to the authenticated assertion of the Swedish Cabinet
with respect to the protocol, the materially new claims as the Norwegian
Cabinet styled them, had been touched upon in their debates, though not
even a preliminary agreement had been decided on, either with respect to
them or any of the other points of the question. It is a generally
understood fact, not even disputed on the Norwegian side, that his
Excellency BOSTRÖM brought forward casually several of the questions
which afterwards raised so many disputes, and reserved to himself the
right, later on, to shape his opinion on points to which be made
objections. After first dealing with the deliberations of the Consular
Committee, they proceeded to debate on the terms of the agreement, and
during this last stage of the negotiations the contents of the intended
laws were discussed only by special delegates from the two
Cabinets[45:1].

Mr LAGERHEIM was uncontradicted by the Norwegian side when he explained
in the Swedish Diet that in all these preliminary negotiations respecting
the contents of the laws, matters concerning them, »must be subjected to
further examination of a very minute and exhaustive nature».

According to just reasoning, it is therefore rather audacious of the
Norwegian side to cite these preliminary negotiations, to which they also
add a decided admission on the part of Sweden, and on which they build
the accusations against the Swedish government, and especially Mr BOSTRÖM
of breach of agreement[45:2].

With reference to the connection of these negotiations with the
Communiqué and its interpretation, it is firstly clear that neither the
Swedish nor the Norwegian government had from the first intended by the
Communiqué to cut off the possibility of pursuing, from different
quarters, the points on which they had not expressed themselves to be in
unity. And secondly, it is plain that by the same Communiqué it was not
intended to cut off the possibility of advancing claims which during
these very formless negotiations had not been brought forward, so long as
the general decisions of the Communiqué, sensibly interpreted, were
observed.

To this may be added one important circumstance. It is manifest that if
it was considered necessary to come to some definite conclusion before
the existence of the Communiqué, it was on account of the binding nature
of the final agreement. It is evident that the Swedish government has
endeavoured to secure the surest guarantee from a Swedish point of view,
that Norway, of her own accord, would make no changes in respect to the
Foreign Administration. Now the negotiation on the vital contents of the
laws, were _succeeded_ by this, and there is strong reason to suppose
that the Swedish negotiators expressed their hopes of an eventual
termination of the negotiations with respect to the detailed decisions of
the laws, _under the express supposition_ that safe guarantee would be
granted by the Norwegians, against a one-sided disturbance of the Status
quo in reference to the Foreign Minister. As meanwhile, through the
interpretation which the Norwegian side chose to give the Communiqué,
these--to Sweden--very desirable guarantees became an illusion, it
may very reasonably be asked if the Norwegian side was entitled to exact
too much from the Swedish delegate's possible optimism respecting the
prospects of coming to a definite conclusion on the rest of the points.

Further demonstrations for the manifestation of the baseless grounds of
the moral indignation which was eventually to give the Norwegian
revolution an essential justification before an enlightened public, are
unnessary. The terrible breach of agreement, on the part of Sweden, which
was trumpeted all over Europe, on closer examination, vanishes into thin
air.


FOOTNOTES:

[41:1] NANSEN (page 76): »The Swedish draft contained a number of demands
quite unacceptable to Norway as they were opposed to the very basis and
object of the negotiations.»

[45:1] Different drafts of laws were especially to be discussed in this
way. These outlines are, however, characterised by the ever well informed
Norwegian politician Mr C. BERNER as »quite preliminary».

[45:2] In an earlier stage of the negotiations, the Norwegian Cabinet
were evidently not under the impression that the most important of these
preliminary negotiations was brought to a successful conclusion. C.
BERNER says--in the Storthing debate Feb. 13th 1904--he had heard
both from Norwegian and Swedish negotiators that to frame this laws in a
quite satisfactory manner would be a very difficult thing.




VI.


[Sidenote: _Norwegian policy after the grounding of the Consular
negotiations._]

The breaking off of the Consular negotiations undoubtedly put Norwegian
politicians into a very difficult situation. Thanks to the close
connection between the Union policy and the internal party disputes in
Norway, a popular interest has arisen for Union Politics which in
comparison with the realities disputed over, may be regarded as
extremely abnormal[47:1]. With the lack of consideration which in
critical moments distinguishes a similarly excited state on the people's
part, it was to be expected that the issue of the negotiations on the
Consular question would rouse their passions

It can hardly be said that Norwegian politics stood the trial in the
situation. To a Norwegian, that which followed may appear as a powerful
and magnificent achievement. Outsiders can content themselves by stating
that _the high-flown Radical politics of the last 20 years now bear their
fruit_.

In these days much is said of »necessity» in the development of events.
»Necessity», it is said, »has been stronger than the wishes of
individuals». To those who in any degree believe in personal influence
and personal responsibility, and not only the _needs_ in the progress of
history, it may be of interest to observe how those who now advance to
the front in Norway--MICHELSEN, LÖVLAND, BERNER, ARCTANDER--belong to
the old ranks of radicals from the beginning of 1890. Scarcely any
leading men have more strongly emphasized the importance of _creating_
public opinion than the Norwegian radical leaders, and few, with regard
to this, have better conformed their conduct to their views. The road to
do so these men pointed out was now followed at an unchecked pace. The
Norwegian radical policy had reached a climax.

The following events in Norway point decidedly to an energetic and
designing leadership organised from the beginning. It may be left unsaid
how far back the plans that where brought to light after the foundering
of the Consular question, were in existence. That they had already been
discussed long before that period can hardly be doubted. Neither can it
be doubted that just in reference to these plans, strong efforts had been
set at work on the Norwegian side to get the Consular negotiations broken
off[47:2]. And it is an indisputable fact that those men of action in
Norway had scarcely dared to take the step, if the ever threatening
danger in the east had not been allayed for a time; the real importance
of the Union to which they had for some years been alive, could be laid
to rest.

That the old traditions of the radicals now took the most prominent place
became manifest in innumerable ways. One symtom of this, was the
systematic labour of exciting opinions against Sweden. The orgies of
Swedish hatred and »national persecution», which in Christiania were held
in the Spring of 1905, far outstepped the limits of decency which even a
Norwegian ought to feel. The coarsest invectives were flung against the
government and people of Sweden. All Europe rang with accusations of
breach of agreement, ambitions for the supremacy spread from Christiania.
A few sensible and intelligent Norwegians, who really comprehended that
the Swedish government's claims had legal grounds, and were not meant as
an insult to Norway, made themselves heard[48:1] in the beginning, but
their voices were soon silenced in the tumultuons confusion that reigned.
In Norway feelings were excited, which more than ever gave Norwegian
opinion a tone of unreasonableness.

Another symptom was the distinctness with which the Union separation
shone as the goal. This was shown in the Cabinet meeting by the very
tactless, but very Norwegian expressions when the break-down of the
negotiations was officially announced. The old King was pleased to
express his hearty wishes, »that the two Kingdoms which could soon
celebrate the centenary of their Union, would never let any differences
of opinion break their bonds, as it was the safest security for the
independency, safety and happiness of the Scandinavian country and its
two peoples». To this, the Norwegian Cabinet replied that they had taken
the liberty in all humble submission to dissuade His Majesty from making
this speech[48:2].

A third symptom, and the one most significant of the spirit that now
dominated Norwegian politics was the road that they were soon unanimous
on taking. One cannot help feeling that it is a punishment for old sins,
that when Norway has to take a decisive step, and goes from words to
actions, it is not done openly and with honest intent. Norway does not
choose the straight road, it chooses winding crooked paths, which the
peculiar advocacy of Norwegian politicians long ago staked out. Norway's
breaking out of the Union is not a manly act committed under a sense of
personal responsibility, it is a miserable judicial process, in which
Norway, at the same time party to and self made judge in the case,
artfully tries to establish the guilt of their opponents--Sweden and
the Union King--in order to throw the burden of responsibility on them.

[Sidenote: _The question of resuming negotiations._]

In the Cabinet meeting held on Feb. 7:th 1905[49:1] the Swedish Minister
for Foreign affairs, Count GYLDENSTOLPE, pointed out that the chief cause
of the wrecking of the negotiations was, that the Swedish Minister for
Foreign affairs was supposed still to be at the head of the Foreign
policy of the Union, and he advocated the desirability of resuming
negotiations on this phase of the Union problem. The Minister for Foreign
affairs only expressed what had in fact been the wish of the Swedish side
all along, and what especially the Swedish negotiators during the first
stage of the negotiations, had urgently insisted on. The opinion that the
break down of the Consular negotiations ought to be immediate cause of
the renewal of negotiations which were also to include the question of
Foreign Administration, seemed at first to be regarded with favour from
the Norwegian side. The majority of the Norwegian government led by Mr
HAGERUP shared this opinion, though with one reservation. Evidently under
the influence of the general feelings in Norway, Mr HAGERUP considered
that if fresh negotiations respecting a revision of the Act of Union led
to no results, the old state of things could not possibly be allowed to
continue, but by voluntary agreements they must instead try to obtain
»more independent bases for the Co-operation of the two Nations», in
other words, prepare for the disssolution of the Union. In this way, said
he, it will be possible to establish a peaceful and honorable Union
Treaty. This was the programme he proposed in the Storting when he
announced the termination of the negotiations, and he further developed
it when he resigned in March.

A policy on those lines would at least have been open and honest, and
even if the results had brought about the rupture of the Union, it would
not have roused strong ill-will; it would, in fact, have preserved the
possibility of establishing conditions of Co-operation on more
independent lines. Though Sweden which, in the eyes of all Europe, was
responsible for the Union, could never take the _initiative_ in the
matter of dissolving the Union, a Norwegian proposal in the terms
presented by Mr HAGERUP had certainly not been refused without further
consideration[50:1].

But it soon appeared that Mr HAGERUP'S programme was not likely to be
favourably received in Norway. Immediately after the announcement of the
termination of the negotiations, the Storthing had summoned a so called
Special Committee to examine the conditions of the Union. The members of
this Committee soon went against the majority of the government, and
therefore, when the State Secretaries MICHELSEN and SCHÖNING at the end
of February protested against Mr HAGERUP'S proceeding, in sending in his
resignation, a complete crisis within the Cabinet was reached.

The king had, meanwhile, immediately after the termination of the
negotiations, resigned the government to the Crown Prince in the capacity
of Regent. After the Crown Prince Regent had conferred with the leading
politicians in Christiania, he made known his personal opinion on the
matter in a document adressed to the President of the Special Committee
appointed by the Storthing[50:2] He earnestly expresses his conviction
that the strength and prosperity of the two Kingdoms lies in the
preservation of the Union. He emphatically declared that the Union was
not the chief object for the _dynasty_, but it ought to be so to _the two
peoples_ concerned. He expressed warnings against the dissolution of the
Union, and urged that fresh negotiations, on a broader basis, should be
entered into for the settlement of all matters concerning the Union.

The persuasive tone of this document could not fail to make an effect,
but the Norwegian press tried hard to explain away the contents by
informing the public of their wonderful discovery, that the document was
of no »Constitutional importance», and shrewdly trying to prove that the
Crown Prince had no legal right to make known his opinion in that
manner[51:1].

Those who now held the reins in Norway, had to carry out their plans
before the worked up excitement cooled down. Therfore the way of the
negotiations was so dangerous. The Crown Prince found it necessary to
consent to a change of Ministry. Mr MICHELSEN, who was pointed out as the
man equal to the situation, was summoned, also a so called mixed Cabinet
consisting of Ministers of different parties; the two Prime Ministers,
however, Mr MICHELSEN und Mr LÖVLAND, were rank radicals. In the
beginning of March the Special Committee appointed by the Storthing were
able preliminarily to communicate the plan to be followed; it was not a
novel one, it was the old method from the beginning of the nineties to
take matters, especially those relating to the Consular service, into
»their own hands».

In the middle of March the Crown Prince returned to Stockholm, and here
twelve members of the Diet were immediately summoned, according to
decrees in the government regulations, in order to confer with the Crown
Prince Regent on the matter.

On the 5th April the Crown Prince, as Regent, dictated a proposal in the
joint Cabinet[51:2] that the two governments should immediately open
negotiations in view of the settlement of all matters concerning the
Union on the basis of the programme for a mutual Minister for Foreign
affairs and separate Consular services. He, at the same time, declared
himself willing to accept other proposals for the settlement of the
matter so long as the joint control of Foreign affairs was allowed to
remain undisturbed, as that was an indispensable guarantee for the
continuance of the Union[52:1].

On the publication of the Crown Prince-Regent's proposal, the Prime
Minister BOSTRÖM, against whom the wrath of the Norwegians had especially
been directed, resigned his office, which was immediately placed in the
hands of State Secretary RAMSTEDT. The Crown Prince's proposal was
immediately unanimously adopted on motions from the leading men in both
Chambers of the Diet[52:2].

_In this we thus find a clear and unevasive offer from Sweden to Norway,
for the establisment of full equality within the Union, and that too in
terms to which Sweden would never have consented but a few years
back_[52:3].

But the course of Norwegian politics could not be obstructed. The goal
was already in sight. In a communication from the Norwegian government of
the 17th April the reasons for the refusal are set forth. They are
typically Norwegian. It refers to preceding negotiations, the failure of
which is solely accountable to the circumstance that on the part of
Sweden it has been found impossible to accede to all the Norwegian
demands. The termination of the Consular negotiations had especially
»given ground for great disappointment, and if increased by a renewal of
similar unfortunate experiments, will threaten the gravest danger to the
good relations existent between the two peoples». The Norwegian
government knows what means to employ to produce »these good relations»,
namely, establishing its own Consular Service in the way prognosticated
in the past. This accomplished, »that confidence, which is the mainspring
of every friendly and fruitful inquiry into difficult and delicate
relations in a Union, will have revived». Norway is thus always the
injured one, and there is never a thought that Sweden on her part might
have or possibly _could find_ cause for displeausure over Norwegian Union
Policy[53:1].

In a joint Cabinet in Stockholm on April 23rd the aforementioned
statements were carried[53:2]. The Swedish Cabinet found it impossible,
for the present, to resume negotiations. The Norwegian Cabinet stated
imperatively--to those who would believe it--that it is not the
object of Norwegian action to have the present Union dissolved(!), but
they were in unity with the Swedish Cabinet. The Crown Prince deeply
deplored being forced to let these decisions remain final.

In the beginning of May the Swedish Diet resolved, on the basis of the
above mentioned motions, to address the King respecting the support they
had given the Crown Prince's resolution[54:1]. The Diet deeply deplored
the refusal already given by the Norwegians, but considered it possible
that their unanimous support of the Crown Prince's programme would lead
eventually to more favourable results.

[Sidenote: _Norwegian agitation._]

While these efforts on the part of the Regent and Sweden were being made
to bring Norway to reason, an energetic and designing agitation was being
carried on from Christiania. The press went over almost entirely to the
side of the programme; from Trondhjem alone, where union partisanship was
not altogether inclined to submit to the dictates from Christiania, were
heard hesitations.

Strong efforts were made in the Storthing to win over the doubting and
unwilling ones, and they were in the main successful. Then followed a
most energetic propaganda in order to win European opinion on Norway's
side. The European press was well supplied with materials for forming an
opinion of the situation, and with articles in German and English
newspapers, it became possible to persuade the doubting ones at home,
that Norway's cause was a righteous one,--all Europe saw that.

[Sidenote: _Proposal from the Special Committee of the Storthing._]

When the ground was thus well prepared the Special Committee of the
Storthing presented their proposals.

This recommends as before mentioned the old well-known tactics of the
first days of the Consular dispute. The modifications which were added
were only designed to hasten events, so that agitated minds should not
have time to reflect, and reason in some way be restored. In the
beginning of the 90's the so-called State subsidy line was followed, that
is, a certain sum of money was voted for the purpose of establishing a
separate Consular Service within a given time. This measure had meanwhile
shown that a delay would occur which would under present circumstances be
exceedingly inconvenient. Therefore the so-called legal measure was
adopted. The Resolution on the Norwegian Consular Service should be
presented to the King in the form of a law, the advantage in this being
that according to the Norwegian Constitution, a law shall be laid before
the King immediately after the resolution passed by the Storthing. But
there was an obstacle to this: the King's right of veto! On the ground of
the fundamental law, that if the King refuses his sanction to a bill
three successive times after it has been passed by the unaltered
resolution of the Storting, it becomes the law of the land without his
assent, the personal wishes of the king with regard to legal matters had
of recent times been to a certain extent respected. Thus so recently as
1900 the law applying to Consular Fees had been refused sanction by the
Crown Prince-Regent against the decision of the Ministry, and the Prime
Minister had countersigned the decision. But now the last vestige of
Sovereign power was refused. By a resolution that the law should commence
to act on April 1st 1906 all possibility of the King pronouncing his veto
was cut off beforehand. The settlement of affairs should immediately be
brought to a climax.

The proposed law made no provisions as to the relations of the Consuls to
the Minister of Foreign affairs. That matter was to be settled by a
Norwegian State Ordinance, dictated by the Ministry. It is easy to
imagine its intended basis by the Special Committee emphatically
declaring it to be their opinion that the Norwegian Cabinet had made too
many concessions in the last Consular negotiations. To begin with, it was
intimated in the Norwegian papers, that the matter referring to the
Consular Service and Diplomatic Department would be settled by treaty
with Sweden, a most illusive moderation, considering Norway, as
previously mentioned[55:1], by fixing the date when the laws would first
be in force, had alone the power of considering the basis of the possible
agreement. But this intimation was very soon contradicted; Norway would
take matters entirely into her own hands. And it was openly hinted, that
if the King found that he ought to sanction the law, they would then
proceed further with the question of their own Minister for Foreign
affairs.

[Sidenote: _The revolutionary basis of the proposal._]

The tactics in the whole of the procedings are characterised as being
revolutionary against the Union, its object being by one sided Norwegian
resolutions to dissolve the joint Foreign Administration. And as regards
the Consular question it has been explained that to withdraw without
consulting Sweden a part of the Foreign affairs from the Minister of
Foreign affairs who was mainly responsible for them, was utterly
unreasonable.

To what then did the Storthing invite the King? Simply this, _to take a
revolutionary step against the Union, to an initiatory dissolution of the
Union, to a protracted undermining of the foundation of the Union_, far
more dangerous than severing it at one blow. And the ugly thought in the
background was this: If the King did not submit to this, it would be
shouted out all over the world, that the King was faithless to the
interests of Norway, and had denied Norway's Sovereign rights; then he
should bear the blame for what would happen, the revolutionary rupture of
the bonds of Union. But not alone on him would the blame be thrown. The
King in the first place should be put to the proof. But, if the King said
'No', »it cannot», Mr NANSEN says, »be the result of Norwegian influence,
_but on account of Swedish pressure_»[56:1]. Here we are met by the
dishonourable train of thought that has formed the foundation on which
the Norwegian Radicals have built the whole of their work for undermining
the Union, that is, never to acknowledge the true motive--piety towards
the Union--when the King opposed the one-sided disloyal demands of
Norway, but instead always point to Swedish interests as the ruling
motive. And nevertheless, it is certain, that no Swedish-Norwegian King
has kept in view the Union, and _all it implied on all sides_, more
faithfully than King OSCAR II.

_They closed all roads by which the King would be able to decide the
Consular Question in a manner acceptable from a Union point of view; by
this means, they forced the King to exercise his veto--and then they
cast the responsibility of the revolution on him and Sweden._ This is the
basis of the tactics of the Norwegian Revolution. The characteristicness
of this is sufficiently evident.

[Sidenote: _The decision in the Storthing._]

The debate on the proposal of the Special Committee in the Storthing was
fixed for the day after the National Anniversary, May 17th. National
revelries were to precede to encourage and excite. In Christiania,
especially, the day was celebrated in such a manner, that there could be
no doubt as to what was in the wind. NANSEN used big words about Norway,
and big words against Sweden, and in the presence of several thousand
persons, a memorial wreath was laid--as on several previous years--on
a Colonel KREBS' grave; during the short strife between Sweden and Norway
in 1814, the man had succeeded in repulsing a Swedish regiment!

These imposing preparations were followed by the decision of the
Storthing. It was first proposed to decide unanimously without any
debate. But there were a few members in the Storthing who ventured to
protest in words--in actions no one dared to protest.

With a frankness evidently embarrassing to all present, Mr HAGERUP
pointed out the two only possible alternatives with reference to the
decision; to retract, or to rupture. The latter alternative he evidently
found most acceptable, and in Norway's real interest, he warned them as
to what the issue might be. He proposed that the decision with respect to
these eventualities--which might exceed both the Constitution and the
Act of Union--should be deferred till after the new elections, as the
Constitution with an almost torturing emphasis insists on caution when a
change in the government system is contemplated. Even the rest of the few
in the minority made known their different views, and among them the
Shipowner JÖRGEN KNUDSEN openly confessed that he saw no forcible reasons
for dissolving the joint Consular Service.

But the issue was plain. After Mr HAGERUP'S proposal for an adjournment
was voted against with a minority of few the Consular law was passed
unanimously.

[Sidenote: _King Oscar's position in regard to the Consular law._]

Nothing remained now but to continue. The uncertainty in various quarters
as to how king OSCAR would express himself, simply implied ignorance of
the political situation in an historical light. No Norwegian acquainted
with the real facts of the case, could be in doubts as to the King's
reply. Norway herself had dictated it and the innocent distrust of
NANSEN[58:1] and Norwegian newspapers, that the King, as they said,
»would really refuse Norway her right» seemed rather unnatural.

[Sidenote: _The Cabinet meeting. 27th May 1905_]

On the 27th May a Cabinet meeting was held at the Royal Palace in
Stockholm[58:2]. To the Norwegian Cabinet's appeal for sanction to the
Consular law, the King replied that the present regulations for the joint
Consular service as resolved in a joint Cabinet according to the Act of
the Union § 5, also under the same conditions, that is to say, by treaty
with Sweden, must be dissolved, and refused his sanction. The Cabinet
raised the strongest objections to this, and referred to Norway's
loyal(!) endeavours to advance the cause. The King's decree implied a
violation of Norway's independence and Sovereign right, and would
undoubtedly lead to the dissolution of the Union. The Cabinet thereupon,
sent in their resignations[58:3], which the King, meanwhile, refused to
allow, as he had _at present_ no prospect of forming a new Ministry. Then
ensued a discussion between the King and the Ministers. The King
maintained his right based on the Constitutional law, to exercise his
veto according to his own judgment and maintained the duty of the
Minister of State to countersign his decision. The Cabinet sought, on
their side, to defend the interpretation given in later years to the
fundamental law, that it presupposed the right of refusing
countersignature, but could, as a precedent, for present circumstances,
only quote the not altogether applicable opinion--after full
consideration--of the Norwegian Cabinet in 1847[58:4].

[Sidenote: _The situation after the 27nd May._]

Now the situation was as follows: The King had been forced to the
extremity of exercising his undoubted right, according to Constitutional
law, to form his decision according to his own judgment. It was
furthermore the Prime Minister's undoubted duty to countersign his
decree, the Cabinet, by raising protestations, were released from
constitutional responsibility for the royal decree according to the rules
of the fundamental law. But the Cabinet maintained another interpretation
of the fundamental law, and sent in their resignations, which the King,
meanwhile, refused to grant as he could not _for the present_--»now»--
form a new Ministry.

This word 'now' in the King's refusal to the Cabinets appeal to resign,
undoubtedly implies a reminder of earlier similar situations in the
beginning of 1890, when the Ministry--on one or two occasions _Radical_
--had remained in office some time after they had tendered their appeals
to resign, as the King was unable to form a new ministry. It was also
without doubt the legislative duty of the Ministry to remain at their
post till the King released them. For, according to the general
constitutional and administrative ideas of justice, it is the King who
releases his Ministers; they have no legal right to retire of themselves.

It is not Norway's _King_ who has transgressed the law, in spite of all
the accusations to that effect from Norway's government[59:1]. _The law
was transgressed on June 6th by the Norwegian Cabinet, when they informed
the King that they resigned office_[59:2].

[Sidenote: _The Norwegian Revolution._]

Their chief reason for this proceeding they declared to be their
inability to be a party to the King's policy, which according to their
opinion, was not in accordance with the Norwegian Constitution, and
declared themselves to be 'free men' entitled to the right to resign
office[60:1]. King OSCAR immediately sent protestations against this
proceeding on the part of the Ministers, both to the Storthing and the
Premier[60:2]. But before these came to hand, the next act was played
out.

On the 7th June the Cabinet informed the Storthing of their
resignation[60:3]. The Storthing forgetful of the very important little
word _now_ categorically recorded the fact that the King had declared
himself incapable of forming a new government, and came to the conclusion
that the Constitutional Royal Power was »no longer effectual», on which
the late Ministers were admonished to take up the reins of government,
which, according to Constitutional law, was the King's prerogative alone.
The King was therefore deposed. But Norwegian logic went boldly further.
King OSCAR having ceased to act as Norway's King, the declaration
followed, that the Union with Sweden was dissolved[60:4]. This was all
communicated in an address which the Storthing prayed to be allowed to
deliver to King OSCAR by a deputation[60:5]. The King of course replied
that he would not receive any deputation from the revolutionary
Storthing[60:6].

It is now these resolutions which are not called revolutionary in Norway.
They are, on the contrary, perfectly legal[60:7]!

The King was dethroned, because, supported by rights given by the
Constitution, he refused to sanction a resolution in conflict with the
principles of the Union, to which Norway, according to the first
paragraph of her Constitution, is bound.

The Union with Sweden was declared dissolved without reference to Sweden,
or observation of the terms in which the slightest change in the
Constitution and the Act of Union must be carried out[61:1]. And this
last resolution was carried in spite of the Constitutional prescription
that changes in the same must not come in strife with the principles of
State law, to which, if ever, the Union with Sweden belongs; as the
freedom and independence of Norway, according to the first paragraph of
the Constitution, are inseparably connected with this Union[61:2].

As aforementioned, all this is not revolution in Norway. Conceptions of
laws and rights have long shown themselves in strange lights in that
country.

[Sidenote: _Protestations of Sweden and the Union King._]

On June 9th Sweden declared her protest against the Norwegian revolution.
In the Cabinet Council to which the Swedish Chambers were summoned to
meet in on Extraordinary session[61:3], the Prime Minister strongly
emphasised the fact that the Norwegian Storthing's proceedings had deeply
violated Sweden's rights.

The following day, June 10th, King OSCAR issued his protest in an address
to the Norwegian Storthing[62:1]. In clear and convincing terms the King
maintains his formal legal right to form his resolution in opposition to
the Cabinet's opinion. And he, as forcibly, maintains that it was in the
capacity of the chief representative of the _Union_ that he had
considered it his duty to refuse his sanction to the Consular law. As
Union-King, he emphasizes his right and prerogative, even in opposition
to Norwegian public opinion in general, to maintain the principles of the
Union, and he finally refers to the decisions of himself and Sweden »if
Norway's attack on the existing Union should lead to its _legal_
dissolution».

[Sidenote: _Address of the Storthing 19th June 1905._]

The reply to this address of the King was an address[62:2] from the
Storthing on June 19th formally to His Majesty the King, but in reality
to the Swedish nation. In this it is explained that the Norwegian people
entertain no feelings of dislike or ill-will to the Swedish people, and
appeals to the Swedish State powers to promote a peaceful agreement on
both sides. The Storthing addressed this appeal to the people who by
their magnanimity and chivalry had won such a prominent place in the
ranks of Nations.

The Swedish nation had good cause for thinking that it might have
received this compliment _a little sooner_, instead of the overwhelming
mass of infamous accusations which it had formerly had to accept with a
good grace. And above all, it is their opinion that if Norway had
formerly adjusted its actions in accordance with their present ideas of
the Swedish nation, the present situation would now have been different
in all respects.

The document of the 19:th June contains also one detail, which has since,
step by step, been forced to the front by the Norwegian agitation, and
therefore deserves its separate explanation. This said that the Swedish
government on the 25:th April had emphatically refused to resume
negotiations, with the dissolution of the union as an alternative, in
case unity on the new forms of the union could not be arrived at, and on
this account, from Norway's side they have tried to cast the blame on
Sweden for the revolution of June 7:th under the pretext that Sweden had
already refused settlement by negotiation. What are the real conditions?

In the Norwegian Government's proposal of the 17:th April negotiations
are firmly _refused_, before the Consular question has been settled.
Therefore Norway has never proposed negotiations respecting the
situation which followed upon the 27:th May, when the King exercised his
veto against the Consular law. Furthermore, attention must be drawn to
the Norwegian government's wording of the _presuppositions_ for an
eventual negotiation. It should be carried on »_on an entirely free basis
with full recognition of the Sovereignty of each country without any
reservation or restriction whatever_», and among other matters, it was
stipulated, that, if the negotiations fell through, each Kingdom should
be able to decide, of its own accord, »the future form of its national
existence.» Thus the Swedish government was to accept in advance the
Norwegian Radicals legal conception of the Union, driven, to it by the
contingency that if Norway did not get her will in the matter, she would
break out, on her own accord, of the Union. It is manifestly against this
_method_ of negotiating matters, with its legal grounds and its premature
threat to rupture the Union on Norway's side, that the Swedish Prime
Minister appeals, when he speaks of a presupposition for negotiations on
the Norwegian side »as incompatible with the Union and the Act of Union.»
The Prime Minister can never have intended to contest the absurdity, that
the Union cannot legally be dissolved, so that it was not on that account
that he refused to negotiate.

But the Norwegian Cabinet hastened, craftily, to construe the contents af
the Prime Minister's speech, by maintaining that there was a possibility
for dissolving the Union[63:1]. Of all the cunning devices, the object of
which has been, on Norway's side, cowardly to cast the blame on Sweden,
this has been one of the most disgusting, so much the more so as the
majority of the Storthing itself opposed Mr HAGERUP'S proposal, and this
was certainly not previous to, nor after the Council of the 25:th April,
when it was seriously proposed, that a treaty for the dissolution of the
Union should be drawn up, in the event of the King exercising his veto;
the tactics that were adopted on 7:th June were made up a long time
beforehand.--

On the 20:th June the Diet assembled.


FOOTNOTES:

[47:1] It must be remembered that in reality Norway had an almost
entirely equal influence in the joint Consular service, as questions
refering to Consular matters were decided in a joint Cabinet, and a
Norwegian government department conducted the mercantile part of affairs.

[47:2] It does not follow, however, that at least the majority of the
members of the Norwegian government tried to come to an agreement.

[48:1] A very sensible and intelligent article written by Mr FRITZ
HANSEN, member of the last Union Committee, may especially be brought to
notice.

[48:2] N:o 10.

[49:1] N:o 10.

[50:1] This is proved by the motion on the Union question brought forward
in the Lower Chamber of the Swedish Parliament. See N:o 14.

[50:2] N:o 11.

[51:1] NANSEN does not even mention the document in his book.

[51:2] N:o 12.

[52:1] This last alternative was considered to imply proposals for a
compromise, which had now and then been hinted at, namely, that a
Chancellor of the Union should direct all matters concerning Union
policy, but each of the Kingdoms should have its own Minister for Foreign
affairs, chiefly with Consular affairs under their especial direction.
The proposal was said to have been brought forward in the first place at
the meeting of the last Union Committee by one of the Norwegian radical
representatives.

[52:2] N:o 13 and 14.

[52:3] NANSEN (page 87) rouses suspicion in every possible way against
this Swedish offer. He implies that the new offer, made immediately after
the breaking off of the negotiations, which, of course, was caused by
Swedish perfidy, was not likely to inspire confidence, and especially as
it did not include »the same guarantees we had before». It must
nevertheless be observed that this treaty contained far _greater_
guarantees, partly on account of the unanimous decision of the Diet,
partly on the grounds that the Crown Prince's programme was far easier to
carry out than the programme of the Communiqué, which implied that the
Consular question would solve itself. NANSEN also mentions that »the last
Union Committee worked on a similar basis without being able to come to a
decision, as the Swedish proposals were not acceptable to any section of
the Norwegian Commissioners». To this it must be observed that this
Swedish offer was more conciliatory towards the Norwegian wishes, than
the Norwegian majority's proposal had been in the last Union Committee.
Why therefore could it not be accepted by the Norwegians?

[53:1] N:o 15.

[53:2] N:o 16.

[54:1] N:o 17.

[55:1] Page 14.

[56:1] NANSEN (pag. 93).

[58:1] NANSEN page 93.

[58:2] There is no protocol of this Cabinet meeting, only a complete
report, communicated to the government of Christiania by the delegates of
the Cabinet.

Compare with N:o 19.

[58:3] N:o 18.

[58:4] Compare N:o 27.

[59:1] N:os 18, 19 and 21.

[59:2] On the Norwegian side they attach great praise to themselves for
having given the King a few day's grace in order to form a new Ministry.
The Norwegian Cabinet also blame the King (Compare with N:o 21) for not
having made use of this truce, and plainly imply hereby, that the King in
fact abdicated of his own accord. The King replied to this by alluding to
the Cabinets open threats (Compare with N:o 19) that the man who, after
being warned by the King, dared to approach the King as adviser, from
that moment lost his national rights; in other words, however the King
might act, the Revolution would come. The King is therefore reproached
for not endeavouring to form a new Ministry, after he had been threatened
with the revolution if the attempt had shown any sign of success. How
truly Norwegian!

[60:1] N:o 21.

[60:2] N:o 22.

[60:3] The terms of this communication are almost word for word the same
as in the address to the King.

[60:4] N:o 23.

[60:5] N:o 24.

[60:6] N:o 25.

[60:7] One reeds, for exemple, NANSENS arguments in real exaggerated
Norwegian logic. (page 94).

[61:1] Compare N:o 1 § 112 and N:o 2 § 12.

[61:2] »The kingdom of Norway is a free, independent, indivisible and
inalienable realm, united with Sweden under one King.»

[61:3] N:o 26.

[62:1] N:o 27.

[62:2] N:o 28. They are careful not to confute the King's defence of the
legality of his action.

[63:1] Compare, with N:os 15 and 16.




VII.


[Sidenote: _The question of the Justification of the Norwegian
Revolution._]

Revolutions are not to be condemned under all conditions. History--even
the history of Sweden--records many revolutions, which are said to have
been a vital necessity. But a revolution can only be morally defended on
the grounds of its having been _the extreme means of protecting most
important interests_.

[Sidenote: _The Swedish »oppression»._]

In these days there have been numerous comparisons made between Norway's
breaking out of the Union, and Sweden's struggle for freedom from Denmark
in the middle ages. Sweden's way of using its power has been stamped as
an intolerable _oppression_. It can scarcely be necessary to give a more
powerful confutation to these very idle fancies, than simply to refer to
the fact that Norway's »struggle for freedom» has had for its object the
enormously important cause--their own consuls!

[Sidenote: _Sweden's loyalty in conducting the Foreign policy of the
Union._]

The dominating position of Sweden within the Union has consisted simply
in its administration of Foreign affairs of the Union; _in everything
else Norway has had an independent right of decision in full equality
with that of Sweden_. An Norway cannot complain that Sweden has conducted
the administration of Foreign policy in a manner that has been injurious
to the interests of Norway. This was emphatically conceded during the
hottest days of the Stadtholder conflict in 1861. It is remarkable that
in the present day, when the want to prove an antithesis in Norway, they
can never produce anything but the episode from the beginning of the
Union--the well known Bodö affair in 1819-1821--an episode concerning
which _Norwegian_ investigations of recent date, have served to place
Swedish Foreign administration in a far better light than what Norwegian
tradition had done. The advantage given to Norway by the Swedish
administration of Foreign affairs, is the inestimable gift of a 90 years'
uninterrupted peace, which has given the people of Norway an opportunity
of peacefully devoting themselves to the labour of material and
spiritual development. Sweden has furthermore especially tried to insure
interests so far that, in the direction of Foreign affairs, Norwegian
assistance has been employed as far as the regulations in the
organisation of the same would permit. It has already been mentioned that
Norwegian counsels have used their influence in the council for Foreign
affairs, that Norwegian influence on The Consular system has, for a long
time, been as near as possible equal to that of Sweden. It may also be
added, that Norwegians have always been appointed to posts in connection
with those offices under the Foreign Office. In the Foreign Office itself
Norwegians have always held office: even as Under Secretary of State--
the next in rank to the Minister for Foreign affairs--a Norwegian has
lately been in office. the posts at the Embassies at Foreign Courts, even
the most important, have to a great extent been held by Norwegians. Of
those Consuls sent abroad, by far the greater number are Norwegians.
Norway has herself given the best proof that the Swedish administration
of Foreign affairs has been conscientiously carried out to the interests
of Norway, by, time after time, refusing the Swedish offers to give
Norway greater influence in the settlement of Foreign affairs, offers,
which even if they did not accede to all Norway's demands, would, if
realised, have given Norway a far better position than it had previously
held.

[Sidenote: _Has Norway been denied its prerogative._]

But it has been said on the Norwegian side--and this has been brought
forward as the main point--Norway has been denied her prerogative, as a
»free and independent Kingdom». If by that, they mean that Norway has
been denied equality in the Union, it is _not true_.

Sweden's only condition, that Norway, as they say, should enjoy her
prerogative, has been, that this prerogative in its application should be
subordinate to the demands stipulated by the Union, demands which Sweden
on her side was quite prepared to submit to. That a right should be
maintained under the consciousness that it has its limits in necessary
obligatory respects, has been almost lost sight of by Norway. The chief
impetus of the Revolution has been a reckless desire on the part of the
Norwegians to be absolutly their own masters, that and nothing else.
Norway has bragged about her prerogatives without any feeling of
responsibility, like an unreasoning whimsical child. It must be
_declared_, both on historical and psychological grounds, that it can
never be politically _defended_. Norway must already have made the
discovery that the great era of universal politics, is entitled, if ever,
_to political action under a strict sense of responsibility_.

[Sidenote: _Faults on Sweden's side._]

By this it is by no means our intention to deny that Sweden herself is to
a certain extent to blame for things going as they have done. Looking
back over the Union Policy of Sweden, it must, in the first place, be
noticeable that there has been, to a certain extent, a lack of firmness
and authority. And it cannot either be denied that there have been
mistakes that have unnecessarily roused opposition. For instance, in the
so-called Stadtholder question, in the sixties, Sweden's policy was
undoubtedly too harsh. But whatever faults may be laid at the door of the
Union Policy of Sweden, when the Swedish nation in these days tries to
make a searching self examination, opinions are not little likely to be
unanimous because Sweden has been _too conciliatory_ towards Norways'
demands.

[Sidenote: _Swedish opinion._]

It is said that a foreigner recently travelling in the Scandinavian
countries made the observation that Swedes always spoke kindly of the
Norwegians, and the Norwegians always spoke ill of the Swedes. The
observation doubtless contains a good deal of truth. It is, at least,
true that Swedish public opinion, at large, has been distinguished by
kindliness both to Norway and its people, and that every honest effort to
smooth discussions has had the sympathy of an overwhelming majority of
the people of Sweden. Swedes have been very unwilling to listen to the
prophets of evil who have pointed to the deficiencies and deformities of
Norwegian policy, and prognosticated trouble. It is just on that account
that indignation from one end of Sweden to the other is so much the more
intense when the veil is so rudely torn aside, and Norwegian politics are
shown in their true light, such as they are and--have been. The
revolutionary act of Norway has like a flash of lightning illuminated the
past background of Norwegian politics, and exhibited to the people of
Sweden all the unreasonableness, the craftiness and dishonesty which
Sweden has had to put up with from Norway during the past decennials.

In this way, the memories of the history of the Union of the latest
periods are revived with indignation among the people of Sweden. If the
indignation is at times expressed in unnecessarily strong and ill-chosen
terms, Norway has in truth no manner of right to complain.






ACTS TOUCHING THE SWEDISH-NORWEGIAN CRISIS.




1.

Extracts from the Constitution of Norway.


[-- -- --]

§ 1. The Kingdom of Norway is a free, independent, indivisible, and
inalinenable realm united with Sweden under one King.

[-- -- --]

§ 5. The King's person is sacred. He must not be blamed nor accused. The
responsibility is incumbent on His Council.

[-- -- --]

§15. [-- --] The Prime Minister reports the matters and is responsible
for the documents issued being in accordance with the resolutions
adopted.

[-- -- --]

§ 30. All matters dealt with in the Cabinet Council should be recorded.
Each number of the Cabinet Council is bound to express, fearlessly, his
opinion which the King is obliged to listen to. But it is reserved for
the latter to take these resolutions according to His own judgment.

If a member of the Cabinet Council should find the Kings' resolution
incongruous with the form of government, or the public laws of the
country, or else obviously harmful to the realm, it is his duty to make
strenuous remonstrance and to have his opinon recorded. He who has not
issued a protest in this way, is considered to have agreed with the King
and is responsible for it in the way subsequently indicated, and the
Odelsthing can proeced against him before the Court of impeachment.

§ 31. All orders (ezcepting matters of military command) issued by the
King himself, should be countersigned by one of the Prime Ministers.

[-- -- --]

§ 76. Each law shall first be moved in the Odelsthing, either by its own
members or by the Government through a Cabinet Minister. [-- --]

§ 77. When a resolution passed by the Odelsthing has been approved of by
the Lagthing, or by the assembled Storthing, it is sent to the King if
present, or else to the Norwegian Government with the request of
obtaining the sanction of the King.

§ 78. If the King approves of the resolution he shall attach His
signature to it, through which it passes into law. If He does not approve
of it, He shall send it back to the Odelsthing with the declaration that
He does not find it suitable, at present, to sanction it. In this case
the resolution must not again be laid before the King by the Storthing
then assembled.

§ 79. If a resolution has, in unaltered form, been passed by three
ordinary Storthings constituted after three different consecutive general
Elections and separated from each other by at least two intermediate
ordinary Storthings without that, in the interval between the first and
the last adoption of the resolution, a divergent resolution has been
passed by a Storthing, and if it is then submitted to the King with the
request that His Majesty may be pleased not to negative a resolution
regarded as useful by the Storthing after mature consideration, then it
passes into law, even if the King's sanction should not be obtained
before the break-up of the Storthing.

[-- -- --]

§ 112. If experience should teach that some part of the Constitution of
the realm of Norway ought to be altered, the motion for it shall be made
at the first ordinary Storthing after a new general election and be
issued from the press. But it can only to be one of the ordinary
Storthings after the next general election, to decide as to whether the
amendment moved should be accepted or not. Such an amendment, however,
must never be contrary to the principles of this Constitution, but should
only regard a modification of particular regulations, not affecting the
spirit of this Constitution, and such an amendment should be seconded by
two thirds of the Storthing.

[-- -- --]




2.

Extracts from the Act of Union.


[-- -- --]

§ 4. The King shall have the right to concentrate troops, commence war
and to conclude peace, enter into and annul alliances, dismiss and
receive ambassadors. [-- --]

§ 5. Both the Norwegian Prime Ministers and the two Cabinet Ministers
accompaning the King shall have a seat and vote in the Swedish Cabinet
Council, whenever matters affecting both countries are there transacted.
In such cases the opinion of the Government residing in Norway shall be
consulted unless such a speedy decision be required that time does not
allow of it.

When, in the Norwegian Cabinet Council, matters affecting both countries
are transacted, three members of the Swedish Cabinet Council shall there
have a seat and vote.

[-- -- --]

§ 7[72:1]. [-- --] Matters concerning both the Kingdoms, but which in
consequence of their nature, do not belong to the administration of any
special Department, are reported by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and
are despatched to each Kingdom, drawn up in its own language; to Sweden
by the above mentioned reporter Minister and to Norway by her Prime
Minister.

Diplomatic (Cabinet) matters are reported by the Minister for Foreign
affairs, and are entered into a separate protocol[73:1]. [-- --]

[-- -- --]

§ 12. Whereas the regulations contained in this Act of Union partly are
copied from the Constitution of the realm of Norway, partly are additions
to it, based on the right awarded to the present Storthing by the
Constitution, they shall, with regard to Norway, have and retain the same
authority as the Constitution of that realm, and they must not be altered
but in the way indicated in § 112 of that same Constitution.

[-- -- --]


FOOTNOTES:

[72:1] This paragraph describes the joint so-called provisional
Government.




3.

Preliminary settlement of the Consular question between members of the
Swedish and the Norwegian Cabinet Council, on March 24, 1903. (The
so-called Communiqué).


The negotiations carried on in Stockholm during the last months of
October, December, and January between the members of the Swedish and the
Norwegian Government here subjoined, and regarding the Consular question,
have been continued in Christiania during February and March.

During these negotiations the Swedish members maintained that the
establishment of a separate Consular service for each of the United
Kingdoms did not seem to them desirable in itself, and that they were not
convinced that a dissolution of the existing community, in this respect,
would convey any important practical advantages to either of the
Kingdoms. On the contrary, there were reasons to apprehend lest this
arrangement should lead to inconveniences.

Whereas, however, an opposite opinion has long been upheld by Norway and
whereas, during the negotiations resulting from the report of the latest
Consular committee made up by members from both countries, it has turned
out not to be impossible to arrange, on certain conditions, such a system
with separate consuls for each Kingdom as could, while it was meant to
satisfy the desires expressed by Norway, also remove the principal
apprehensions on the part of Sweden, the Swedish negotiators in order to
attain the most important advantage of political concord between the two
Kingdoms, have found it possible to recommend an agreement on the
following terms:

1. Separate Consular services for Sweden and for Norway shall be
established. The Consuls of each Kingdom shall be subordinate to the
authority of their own country which the latter shall have to determine.

2. The relations of the separate consuls to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs and to the Embassies shall be regulated by laws of th seame
wording which cannot be altered nor abolished without the consent of the
authorities, of both Kingdoms.

The Swedish negotiators have added to this that they realise in full and
acknowledge that the position held for the present by the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, does not correspond to the equality within the Union
that Norway is entitled to claim. They have held forth the desirability
of this question being made an object of negotiations, which, however, at
present has not met with approval on the part of Norway. They have,
however, declared themselves prepared to advise the King, whenever such a
desire is expressed on the side of Norway, to lay before the Riksdag and
the Storthing a proposition about such alterations of the Act of Union as
can clear the way for the King to appoint a Swede or a Norwegian-Minister
for Foreign affairs and render it possible to institute the minister's
constitutional responsibility before the national assemblies of both
Kingdoms.

To this the Norwegian negotiators have answered that they naturally
concur in the opinion that the existing arrangement for the
administration of Foreign affairs does not agree with Norway's justified
claims on equality within the Union. It was therefore all the more
evident that, on the part of Norway, no regulations could be accepted
that were meant to bind it to this arrangement. At the same time,
however, they wanted to express the hope that the question about a
satisfactory arrangement of the administration of Foreign affairs might
soon be made an object of negotiations between the Kingdoms.

When the present negotiations had been carried on by Norway under the
supposition that the question about a change of this unsatisfactory state
of things should be left untouched, it had been done so out of regard to
the fact that the opinions about the best way of correcting this state of
things were so different in the two countries that, for the present, an
agreement could not be expected.

We Swedish and Norwegian negotiators, having thus been confined to try to
bring about such an arrangement of the Consular question as will leave
_status quo_ undisturbed with respect to the position of the Minister for
Foreign affairs and of the Embassies, have agreed upon that the relation
between the Minister and the Diplomacy on the one hand, and the separate
Consular Services on the other, should be regulated by laws of the same
wording which cannot be altered by one of the parties alone and which
both shall guarantee that the Consuls do not overstep the limits of their
authority and at the same time shall add security to the necessary
co-operation between the management of foreign affairs and the Consular
Services of both Kingdoms.

In conclusion we also want to express the hope that the time shall not
be remote when, by conciliatory advances on both sides, the question of
arranging the management of Foreign affairs can be made an object of
negotiations and find such a solution as can produce satisfaction in both
countries and enduringly secure the futurity of the Union.


FOOTNOTES:

[73:1] These enactsments show plainly that the Act of Union only
recognizes the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs as the leader of the
Foreign Policy of the Union.




4.

Extracts from the Norwegian Government's draft of laws of the same
wording in order to regulate the relations between the Minister for
Foreign Affairs and the legations on the one hand, and the separate
Consular services of the two countries on the other hand. Dated May 28,
1904.


I.

The Consular administration by which is understood the authority the
Consuls are subordinate to, has to inform the Minister for Foreign
affairs of:

a) the establishment, the suppression, the alteration, or the division of
Consular Services, the appointement or employment of Consuls, their power
of attorney, leave of absence, suspension, recall, or discharge:

b) the general regulations and precepts issued with regard to the
Consular Service;

c) measures particularly regarding the relations to Foreign Powers, as e.
g. regulations to be observed by Consuls in time of war; orders to, or
proceedings against Consuls owing to complaints lodged by a Foreign Power
against their actions; instructions to Consuls as to the interpretation
and the application of international laws or agreements and as to matters
simultaneously subject to Diplomatic and to Consular treatment.

[-- -- --]


III.

Of matters that have assumed or may be anticipated to assume a diplomatic
or political aspect and that seem to require a speedy decision, the
Consul has to send the Minister for Foreign affairs an exact statement.
This proceeding shall particularly be observed in case of an infringement
of international agreements; of obstacles raised by the local authorities
to the Consul's discharge of his official duties; of troubles for
warships in foreign ports; of illegitimate confiscation of traders; of
arbitrary imprisonment of citizens; of difficulties originating from
outbreak of war or insurrection; and of reclamations already committed to
diplomatic treatment, but requiring a speedy acquirement of additional
information.

In matters of this kind where there is reason to apprehend lest a
negligence of immediate interference should convey considerable
inconveniences, the Minister for Foreign affairs can make direct
inquires of, and give direct injunctions to a Consul concerning the
diplomatic or political side of the matter.

The Consul must not refuse to submit to an inquiry or an injunction
addressed to him by the Minister for Foreign affairs, because of finding
the matter in question not to be of the kind alluded to above.


IV.

When the interest of the country or its citizens require being looked
after, the legation is entitled to gather information from, and to give
orders to the Consul concerned. Such orders must not conflict with actual
law and statute, nor with instructions or other regulations given by the
Home authority.

With regard to a Consul's duty to obey the injunctions mentioned above,
the last passage of § 3 should be applied.

[-- -- --]




5.

Extracts from the outlines for laws of the same wording drawn up by His
Excellency Boström, in November 1904.


[-- -- --]

[-- -- --]

With regard to the relations between the Minister for Foreign affairs and
the Consular administration, and in addition to general precepts as to
their duty of mutual cooperation and of mutual interchange of information
about such resolutions and steps, etc. as may be of importance for them
to know it should be directed:

that a new Consulate must not be established until the Minister for
Foreign affairs has stated as to whether any obstacles to its
establishment are raised on the part of Foreign Powers;

that, before the appointment of a Consul, the Foreign Minister shall have
an opportunity of making the remarks he may find appropriate, as to the
persons possible to be taken into consideration for the appointment;

that, for obtaining a Foreign Power's recognition of a Consul, the
Consular administration has to make a proposition of it to the Foreign
Minister just as is the case when, in other matters belonging to the
province of the Consular administration the question arises about
applying to the Government of a Foreign Power;

and that if, in matters being dealt with by the Consular administration,
the Minister for Foreign affairs has given instructions to a Consul, the
Consular administration must not give the Consul an order conflicting
with such an instruction.

As to the Foreign Minister's relation to the Consuls and _vice versâ_,
the law should say that the Consuls are subordinate to the Minister for
Foreign affairs in such a way:

that, in matters belonging to his province, he has the right to request
information directly from the Consul and to give him instructions;

and that the Consul on his part is bound not only to execute implicitly
what he is thus requested to do, but also, in such matters dealt with by
him as, owing to their nature and other circumstances, may be supposed to
affect the relation to a Foreign Power, to send of his own accord a
report of the origination of the matter as well as of its further
development.

Besides it should be instituted:

[-- -- --]

that, in case a Consul should act in such a way as may have a disturbing
effect upon the friendly relations between the United Kingdoms and the
Foreign Power concerned, and also in case a Consul should neglect to
execute the instructions of the Minister for Foreign affairs or the
Legation, the Foreign Minister shall have the right to address a humble
request to the King about the Consul's revocation, whereupon the Consular
administration concerned should be informed of the resolution.

In order to regulate the relations between the Legation and the Consuls
concerned, it should, apart from the general precept of their duty of
mutual cooperation, be laid down in the law:

that the legation is bound to guard the Consul's rights and to lend him
necessary assistance and, in matters belonging to the province of the
legation, entitled to demand information from the Consul and to give him
instructions;

that the Consul has the same duties towards the Legation as towards the
Minister for Foreign affairs;

and that, if the Consul, by participating in political demonstrations or
in another way, should openly disregard the consideration he is bound to
have for the authorities of the country he is employed in, or if an
action affecting his civil repute should he brought against him, the
legation has the right to suspend him from his office until further
notice.




6.

Extract from the answer given by His Excellency Hagerup to the preceeding
draft, on November 26, 1904.


[-- -- --]

2. No approval on the part of Norway can be expected for an arrangement
that would give Swedish authorities the possibility of interfering with
measures taken by a Norwegian authority. Also in this respect we merely
adhere to the Communiqué and the Protocols of December that, as a basis
of agreement, give prominence to the establishment of a separate Consular
service for Sweden and for Norway, in which case »the Consuls of each
Kingdom shall be subordinate to the authority of their own country which
the latter shall have to determine.» This arrangement does not however
preclude, as is also presupposed in the Norwegian draft, a certain
possibility for the Foreign Minister to address direct requests to the
consuls.

[-- -- --]

With particular regard to the demand expressed in the »outlines» that the
Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs shall have the right--this is the,
intention according to your Excellency's verbal declaration--to
discharge in ministerial--consequently in Swedish--Cabinet Council a
consul appointed in Norwegian Council, I ventured to point out 1) that
this demand was entirely contrary to the Norwegian Constitution, 2) that
an arrangement by which a Swedish authority of state might nullify a
resolution adopted by a Norwegian authority of state would, according to
the general principles of political and international law, impress upon
Norway the stamp of a dependency, and 3) that it would therefore from a
national point of view signify an enormous retrograde step as compared
with the present arrangement of the Consular service.

[-- -- --]




7.

Extracts from the draft of laws of the same wording made by the Swedish
Government in December 1904.


[-- -- --]

§ 8.

If in a matter being dealt with by the Consular administration, the
Minister for Foreign affairs has informed that he has taken such a
measure as is alluded to in § 9, it is for the Consular administration to
observe that, from its side, no such instructions are given to the consul
concerned as are conflicting with any reorder relating to this matter
given by the Minister for Foreign affairs and known to the Consular
administration.

§ 9.

The Minister for Foreign affairs has, in a matter belonging to his
province, to request immediate information from the Consul of the country
concerned and also give him instructions about what he has to observe in
such a matter; and a consul is absolutely bound to fullfill what is thus
requested of him.

[-- -- --]

§ 11.

If the Minister for Foreign Affairs should learn that a Consular employé
has not acted with good and worthy behaviour towards the authorities of
the country where he is employed, or that he has participated in
political demonstrations, or secretely, or openly encouraged or supported
attacks on the existing Government, or else behaves in a way that may
have a disturbing effect upon the good relations between the United
Kingdoms and the Foreign Power concerned, then the minister has humbly to
give notice of it to the King in Joint or in Ministerial Cabinet Council
whereupon the matter is submitted to the King's consideration in the
Cabinet Council of the country concerned.

[-- -- --]

§ 16.

If a legation should find a Consul guilty of a proceeding or a neglect
alluded to in § 11, or if a Consul should be prosecuted for a crime
affecting his civil repute, the legation, if finding it justified by
circumstances, has to suspend the Consul from his office; and the matter
should immedately be reported both to the Minister for Foreign affairs
and to the Consular administration concerned.

A Consul thus suspended from his office, must not again come into office
until the King, after hearing the Minister for Foreign affairs, has
resolved upon it.

[-- -- --]




8.

Extracts from notes made, in consequence of the Swedish Government's
draft of laws of the same wording by the Norwegian Cabinet Council, on
January 11, 1905.


[-- -- --]

To § 8. It is stated here that, when. in a matter being dealt with by the
Consular administration, the Foreign Minister has given a Consul an
order, it is for the Consular administration to observe that, from its
side, no order conflicting with it is given to the Consul. It is
difficult to understand what is meant by this paragraph, which is without
a parallel in the present Consular statutes which do not direct any
similar injunction to the Norwegian Consular department. To judge from
reference to § 4, it does not seem to have been intended to give the
Foreign Minister the right, in whatever be which matter being dealt with
by the Consular administration, to stop the function of the latter and to
assert his own authority instead; for this would be equivalent to
instituting a relation of subordination that no Governmental department
can submit to. The intention, then, can only be supposed to have been
the following:--to try, in a consular matter, that has assumed a
diplomatic aspect or that is simultaneously subject to a consular and a
diplomatic treatment, to prevent the Consular administration from
arbitrarily trespassing upon the province of the Foreign Minister. It
stands to reason that this must not occur. But just because it stands to
reason, the precept is superfluous. And what is of more importance: it is
calculated to excite indignation. For, as it is obvious that an
interference of the said kind must be a manifestation either of want of
judgment or of disloyalty, it should be admitted that it is not very
appropriate to give in a law, even in an indirect way, an expression to
the thought that such qualities may prevail in the department concerned.

[-- -- --]

To § 11. [-- --] We should not however dwell upon these formal
considerations which are of a merely secondary importance as compared
with the far-reaching question: exclusively Norwegian or partly joint
treatment of matters concerning the relations of Norwegian Consuls
wheteher to the Foreign Minister, or to legations, or to Foreign
authorities. In this connection we want to quote a passage from the
report of the last Consular Committee made up of members from both
countries where we read (Norwegian edition, p. 16): »Furthermore the
Norwegian Consular administration has to leave it to the Foreign Minister
(and the legations) to receive and reply to reclamations from Foreign
Governments in the rare cases when subjects of contention arise by the
actions of Norwegian Consuls. For this kind of correspondence, although
dealing with the behaviour of Consuls, is owing to its nature diplomatic
and not consular, and in as much as the matter has a political moment,
the Foreign Minister should continue to keep the management of it; if the
matter should become critical so as to grow into a real international
conflict, he should report it to the King and procure the instructions
necessary for its treatment. It stands to reason that he should not be
debarred from influencing the course of the matter by informing the
Norwegian Consular administration of his opinion as to the steps suitable
to take with regard to the consul Concerned. But the very instructions to
the latter or the disciplinary steps occasioned by the matter belong to
the home consular management and should therefore be issued from the
Norwegian department.» We concur in the opinion expressed here and the
demand for an exclusively Norwegian treatment of questions concerning
measures against Norwegian Consuls, appears still more justified in the
cases when the matter is without a political moment, but the question
regards the consul's relation to the Foreign Minister and the legations.
In the last-mentioned respect we want again to refer to the statement of
the Consular Committee (Norwegian edition, pp. 25-26), from which it is
evident that they did not intend any joint treatment of matters relating
to the Consul's disobedience of instructions or omission of duties; nor
was this intention expressed during the negotiations that took place
before the appearance of the Communiqué. Such a joint treatment that
should precede the treatment from the Norwegian side, can only imply one
of two things. Either it means to be a mere formality only calculated to
delay matters perhaps requiring a speedy decision. Or else it means to be
a real treatment, in which case, the Foreign Minister is intended to get
influence on the settlement of the matter; but in this case it will
signify an encroachment upon a department which, as it maintained, should
be exclusively reserved for a Norwegian authority of State. Besides, it
is self-evident that the Consular administration which may justly be
supposed to be equally interested as the Foreign Minister in Norway not
being compromised by her agents abroad, cannot forbear, when demands for
a Consul's revocation are made on the part of diplomacy, to make the
matter the object of a humble report.

[-- -- --]

To § 16. It is proposed here that the legation shall have the right to
suspend a Consul guilty of such conduct as is spoken of in § 11, or
prosecuted for a crime affecting his civic reputation. In this connection
it should be remembered that, according to the present consular statute,
the right to suspend a consular official does not lie with the legations,
but with the Foreign Minister who, after having taken his measures, has
to submit the matter to his Majesty. As to the right to suspend future
Norwegian consular officials, this right, just as is done with regard to
other state officials, shall according to the Constitution be exercised
by the King (see the Constitution, § 22 and Aschehoug, Norges nuværende
statsforfatning, ii, 474.) To transfer this right upon the legations
would be incongruous with the Constitution. But not even with regard to
consular functionaries who are not state officials, and who, during the
present community in Consular service, are suspended, by the superior
consul concerned, the right of suspension should be granted to the
legations. For, the view is held, in accordance with the Consular
Committee of the joint Kingdoms (see their report, Norwegian edition, pp.
24, 25) that between consular functionaries exclusively subject to
Norwegian authonity and ambassadors exclusively subject to a Swedish
minister, there is no possibility of establishing truly hierarchic
relations: [-- -- --]

[-- -- --]

After the considerations made above, it will be obvious that from a
Norwegian point of view, these paragraphs appear as unacceptable, partly
because they are incongruous with the Constitution of Norway or with the
claims that in this country are put upon the contents and the forms of
independecy, partly because, by this, the aim cannot be gained, that is
intended by the whole negotiation, viz--to use the words of the Swedish
negotiators--to establish a separate Consular service for Sweden and
for Norway The Consuls of each Kingdom are subject to the home authority
that each country decides for itself. (see the Communiqué of March 24,
1903).

On this account we recommend to omit from the Swedish draft the
paragraphs 5, 6, 8, 11, 16, and 19. If they should be adhered to, further
discussion about the Swedish draft will be futile.




9.

Extracts from the answer of the Swedish Cabinet Council to the memorandum
made by the Norwegian Cabinet Council on January 11, 1905. Dated January
30, 1905.


[-- -- --]

In the memorandum of the Norwegian Cabinet Council it is suggested that §
8 of the Swedish draft can be interpreted so as to be meant with regard
to any matter being treated by the Consular administration, to give the
Foreign Minister the right to stop the function of the latter and to
assert his own authority instead. But as it is expressly indicated in the
draft that the precept concerned is meant to be relevant only to a
certain case specially mentioned, the opinion expressed does not seem to
be justified. The precept has in view to regulate the relations between
the Foreign Minister and the Consular administration, if, in a matter
subject to consular treatment, the Foreign Minister, owing to the
origination of diplomatic or political circumstances, has found reason to
interfere by virtue of the right the laws are meant to bestow upon him.
When thus a matter is simultaneously treated by different authorities,
that each within its province has to treat it, the possibility of a
conflict can hardly be denied, and still less so as the limits between
the diplomatic and the consular province, as is generally acknowledged,
are extremely uncertain, and as on both sides there is a natural tendency
to extend the sphere of activity to departments formerly looked upon as
exclusively belonging to the other party. It cannot therefore be
incongruous with the laws now being under discussion to insert
regulations for the case alluded to; on the contrary, it seems to be
entirely in consistency with the basis of these laws and with the end of
their institution that such regulations should be given. And it can
hardly be denied that in this case that authority, is the Foreign
Minister, who represents both countries, and in the present case it must
be considered that attention to the interests most important to the joint
countries should be preferred.

The precepts of §§ 11 and 16 contain the particular instructions meant to
guarrantee that the Consuls shall not transgress the due limits of their
province. Such a guarrantee cannot be dispensed with in the opinion of
the Swedish Cabinet Council. For, cases may be imagined when in a foreign
country a Consul behaves in a way threatening to disturb the good
relations between the Government of the country and the United Kingdoms.
To deprive the representatives of the United Kingdoms, as to their
relations to Foreign Powers; i. e. the Foreign Minister and the
legations, of all possibility of interfering against the Consul under
such circumstances would, in the opinion of the Swedish Cabinet Council,
hardly be compatible with the dignity of the United Kingdoms and might,
with regard to the Foreign Power, involve a danger that should be
escaped. The Norwegian and the Swedish draft alike contain regulations
enjoining upon the Consul the duty of obedience towards the Foreign
Minister and the legation. Also in case the Consul should violate his
duty of obedience, the proper consideration and regard for the position
held by the Foreign Minister and the legation seem to demand the
possibility for them to interfere. For this interference, however, such a
form has been proposed that the decision of the Consul's conduct, of his
remaining in office or his dismissal would be made by the King in the
Cabinet Council of that country represented by the Consul.

In support of his standpoint that »a joint treatment of matters
concerning the Consul's relations whether to the Foreign Minister, or the
legations or the Foreign Authorities» must not occur, the Norwegian
Cabinet Council refers to the contents of the report of the Consular
Committee and quotes especially a passage terminating in these words.
»But the very instructions to the latter (i. e. the consul) or the
disciplinary steps that may be occasioned by the matter, belong to the
internal consular management and must therefore be issued by the
Norwegian department.» To this the objection should be made that the
opinion of the Consular committee is naturally not binding to the Swedish
Cabinet Council, and that besides the Norwegian Cabinet Council has
itself given up the same opinion in granting in its draft the Foreign
Minister and the legations, the right to address »injunctions» that the
Consul cannot forbear to pay heed to. This seems to imply a giving-up of
the claim that, in the diplomatic part of a matter, Norwegian consuls
shall be exclusively subject to Norwegian authorities.

[-- -- --]

From the detailed statement given it may be gathered that the Swedish
Cabinet Council considers itself neither bound nor, out of regard to the
welfare of the Union, justified to cancel outright, in the way demanded
in the Norwegian memorandum, the abovementioned paragraphs of its draft.
This does not however imply that from the Swedish side alterations and
modifications of the precepts proposed cannot be granted, but what is
important in them must however be adhered to; and concerning possible
modifications, which can be exactly stated only by continued
negotiations, there is at present no occasion for entering into
particulars.

[-- -- --]




10.

Record of Foreign Office affair, made before H. M. the King in the
presence of H. R. H. the Crown Prince in Joint Cabinet Council at
Stockholm Palace, on February 7, 1905.


His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs gave, in all humility, an
account of a humble report about terminating the negotiations for the
establishment of a separate Consular service for Sweden and for Norway.
In answer to the Foreign Minister's recommendation in Joint Swedish and
Norwegian Cabinet Council of the 6th inst., this proposal had been made
by Royal Norwegian Government on the same day, and a copy of it has been
appended to this Protocol.

After having given an account of the contents of the report of the
Norwegian Government, the Minister proceeded to say:

»The report of the Norwegian Government does not lead to any alteration
of the recommendation[84:1] previously made by me. I venture however, to
draw attention to the fact that, if it has been impossible to come to
terms about the present question, the principal cause of it should be
sought in the present arrangement for treating questions affecting the
relations between the United Kingdoms and Foreign Powers. That this
arrangement does not satisfy the positions of the two countries within
the Union, has long been admitted.

In connection with what was expressed by all the Swedish and the
Norwegian Cabinet Ministers who signed the above-mentioned document of
March 24, 1903, I want therfore, to emphasize the desirability that the
question as to arranging on other principles the management of Foreign
affairs should again be taken up for negotiations between the two
countries. I do not, however, find any reason now to make proposal as to
taking steps to that end; I only refer to what I have previously
advocated».

What the Minister had thus stated and recommended, was endorsed by the
other members of the Swedish Cabinet Council.

The Norwegian part of the Cabinet Council referred to the Norwegian
Government's humble report of the 6th inst. and proceeded to state that
in its opinion a solution of the question at issue might, in the way
expressed by the Swedish Cabinet ministers in the document of March 24,
1903, also have been found with the present arrangement for treating
Foreign affairs. The Norwegian part of the Cabinet Council naturally
agreed upon the opinion that this arrangement did not harmonize with the
positions of the two countries within the Union. Whereas, however, the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the plea of the document of March 24,
1903, had pointed out the desirability that the question as to arranging
on other principles the management of Foreign affairs should again be
taken up for negotiation between the two countries, the Norwegian part of
the Cabinet Council could not forbear to hold forth, partly that the said
document presupposed a solution of the question as an independent case,
partly that, after the recent occurrences in the Consular question, the
chances of further negotiations between the two countries, concerning the
above-mentioned matters, were considerably clouded.

_His Majesty the King_ was hereupon pleased to dictate:

»In the present state of things I find Myself unable to take any other
resolution than to assent to what has been recommended to Me by the
Minister for Foreign Affairs. But I cannot forbear to express to My
peoples My heart-felt desire that the two Kingdoms, united almost a
century ago, shall never suffer any differences of opinion to endanger
the Union itself. The latter is truly the safest security for the
independence, the safety and the happiness of the Scandinavian Peninsula
and her two peoples».

Upon this, the Norwegian part of the Cabinet Council stated that they, in
all humility, had ventured to dissuade His Majesty from making this
dictate.

In accordance with the recommendations made by the Swedish and the
Norwegian Cabinet Council, _His Majesty the King_ was pleased to resolve
that the commission entrusted to the Swedish and the Norwegian Cabinet
Council in persuance of the King's resolution of December 21, 1903, shall
not lead to any further steps, and also to decree that the Protocols of
the Cabinet Council regarding this matter shall be published!


FOOTNOTES:

[84:1] In Joint Cabinet Council of February 6 the Foreign Minister had
recommended that the task of negotiation, entrusted by the King to the
Cabinet Councils of the two countries, should not lead to any further
steps.




11.

The note of the Crown-Prince-Regent to the special committee of the
Storthing. Dated February 28, 1905.


It is my wish to make the following declaration to the Committee. In
these fatal days I feel it a necessity to open My heart to you and I do
so now only in the capacity of Norway's Regent.

I fully understand the sentiments the Norwegian people, in these days,
are animated with and that you as the loyal sons of the Fatherland in
passing your resolutions will solely have in view the welfare of Norway.
But what is Norway's welfare, nay, I say with the same emphasis, what is
the welfare of both countries? I do not hesitate a moment to answer this
question with the one word: Union.

It is therefore my sincerest hope and my strongest exhortation to you not
to enter upon a way that leads to a rupture between the two peoples. It
has so often been said that the dynasty tries to look after its own
interests, but this is not true. The Union is not of paramount interest
to the _dynasty_, but it should be so to the two _peoples_, for it is a
vital condition for their happiness and future.

The Royal power has never tried to prevent Norway from obtaining her own
Consular service. The only condition for the fulfilment of this desire
is, and must be, that the relation to the joint administration of Foreign
affairs should be arranged in a way securing the Union and that this
matter regarding both countries cannot be definitively settled until
after being treated in accordance with § 5 of the Act of Union. From My
standpoint as the Regent of the United Kingdoms I can never act otherwise
than as I consider useful to the existing Union to which I hold Myself
bound to adhere.

An attempt has now been made on the way to partial reform, which I am
sorry to say has been unsuccessful. But one should not therefore give up
everything and enter into a way that, at any rate, cannot lead to the
obobject preserved. But the logical consequence of this is to enter into
new negotiations with Sweden on a larger basis. And to such negotiations
on the basis of complete equality between the countries I declare Myself
fully prepared to lend my assistance.

I consider it my imperative duty openly to hold forth to you the great
dangers and the fatal consequences for each people to follow their own
course. United, we have at any rate a certain power and importance in the
European system of states but separated--how much the less the word of
Norway or of Sweden would _then_ weigh! Therefore, may these peoples
assigned by nature itself to hold together, also do so for the future!

When I see all this stand out clearly to My inward eye, you, too will
understand with what sincere and intense, and heart-felt sorrow I
consider thesituation we are in and the threatening turn matters now seem
to take.

In conclusion I want only to add this: when you go to your task, do so
with entirely open eyes and consider carefully _all_ consequences of your
actions. Each one may act according to his best convictions! God leads
the destinies of the peoples. May He give you and us all prudence so as
to enter into the way that leads to the true welfare of the Fatherland
and of the North.

I want this my address to be published.

  GUSTAF




12.

Record of Justice-Department affair held at Stockholm Palace, on
Wednesday the 5th of April 1905 before His Royal Highness the
Crown-Prince Regent in Joint Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council.


[-- -- --]

His Royal Highness the Crown-Prince Regent declared:

»I have to-day summond you to Joint Cabinet Council in order to make the
following address to you:

I herewith exhort the Cabinet Councils of the United Kingdoms, on both
sides without an one-sided adherence to standpoints formerly held, to
immediately enter into free and friendly negotiations concerning a new
arrangement of all matters affecting the Union, upon the fundamental
principle that full equality between the countries should be tried to be
established.

The way which, in My opinion, ought to be chosen and in which, as far as
I know, with a little good intention on both sides a solution of the
difficulties satisfactory to all parties can be attained is this: Foreign
Minister in common, be he a Swede or a Norwegian, responsible to both
countries or to a joint institution; separate Consular service for each
country arranged however, in such a way that the Consuls, in everything
regarding the relations to Foreign Powers, should be under the Foreign
Minister's direction and control.

If, in the course of the negotiations, another form could be found for
arranging the affairs affecting the Union, always however with the
preservation of the community in the management and charge of Foreign
affairs, which is an indispensable condition to the existence of the
Union, I herewith declare myself, prepared to take also this form into
earnest consideration.»

Mr. Berger, Chief of the Swedish Justice-Department, made the following
statement:

»In connection with what your Royal Highness has been pleased to declare
and while emphasizing the desirability of opening further negotiations as
to arranging the Union affairs, I recommend in all humility to request in
persuance of § 5 of the Act of Union, a report from the Norwegian
Government as to the proposition of opening such negotiations.»

What the president of the Justice-Department had thus stated and
recommended, was endorsed by the other members of the Swedish Cabinet
Council.

The Norwegian section of the Cabinet Council stated that, at present, it
did not find any reason to give its opinion on the reality of the matter,
but, with reference to § 15 of the Norwegian Constitution and to § 5 of
the Act of Union, it confined itself in recommending the request of a
report from the Norwegian Government.

His Royal Highness the Crown-Prince Regent was graciously pleased to
decree that the Norwegian Government's report of the matter should be
requested.




13.

Motion on the Union question in the First Chamber of the Swedish Riksdag.


According to notification made in the »Post-och Inrikes Tidningar» of
April 6, this year, the Crown-Prince Regent has on the 5th of the same
month in Joint Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council made the following
declaration:

[-- -- --]

Whereas, through the exhortation thus addressed by the Crown-Prince
Regent to the Cabinet Councils of the United Kingdoms, a suggestion of
new negotiations has been made, which ought to be able to lead to such a
solution of the Union affairs as may be approved of by both peoples, and
whereas the present state of things seems to occasion the Riksdag to give
already its opinion on the matter, we move,

     that the Riksdag, in an address to His Majesty, may announce its
     support of the declaration made by the Crown-Prince Regent in Joint
     Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council on April 5th this year with a
     view to bring about negotiations between the Swedish and Norwegian
     Governments concerning, a new arrangement of the Union affairs.

Stockholm, April 12, 1905.

  _Gustaf Ax. Berg._     _Gottfrid Billing._     _Gustaf Björlin._
  _Hj. Palmstierna._    _Fredrik Pettersson._    _Gust. Tamm._
          _R. Törnebladh._                 _Wilh. Walldén._




14.

Motion on the Union question in the Second Chamber of the Swedish
Riksdag.


The declaration made by the Crown-Prince Regent in Joint Cabinet Council
of the 5th inst. and published the day after in the »Post-och Inrikes
Tidningar», has given great satisfaction to us and certainly also to
other friends of the Union, to whom the relation arisen between the
sister countries after the failure of the consular negotiations, has
caused a great deal of anxiety. That new negotiations if brought about,
will have a decisive influence on the future of the Union, is obvious.
The worth of the Union, as well as the prospect of maintaining it for a
considerable time to come, depend upon the two peoples voluntary
adherence to it in the conviction that the Union involves advantages well
worth of those restrictions in each peoples absolute right of self
determination as are necessarily conditioned by it. Again, the failure of
the negotiations would evidently produce among the two peoples a general
and settled opinion that an arrangement satisfactory to both cannot be
found within the Union, and such a conviction is sure to undermine its
existence.

Because of this, it proves to be of importance for the Riksdag not to
pass in silence the suggestion of negotiations given in the
above-mentioned declaration, but to second it, if found satisfactory.

It seems to us that the Riksdag should not hesitate to take the latter
alternative, since the declaration, while holding in wiew the necessary
communion in the management of Foreign affairs and in the two peoples'
control of it, at the same time in consideration of its latter portion,
has the bearing that it should not preclude the possibility to attain a
solution satisfactory to both peoples.

On that account we beg leave to move:

     that the Riksdag, in an address to His Majesty, may announce its
     support of the declaration made by the Crown-Prince Regent in Joint
     Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council on April 5th this year with a
     view to bring about negotiations between the Swedish and Norwegian
     Governments concerning a new arrangement of the Union affairs.

  Stockholm, April 12, 1905.

     _Carl Persson._     _Hans Andersson._     _Sixten von Friesen._
  _Ernst Lindblad._  _D. Persson i Tällberg._  _K. H. Gez. von Schéele._
                         _T. Zetterstrand._




15.

The Norwegian Governments' report of April 17th 1905.


His Excellency Michelsen, Prime Minister, and Chief of the
Justice-Department, has in all humility made the following statement:

In making this matter the subject of a humble report the Department
desires to state: As is well known the Norwegian people have made a
unanimous demand for the establishment of a separate Norwegian Consular
service and have with equal unanimity asserted that the decision of this
matter, as lying outside the community established between the countries
through the Act of Union, should be reserved to the Norwegian
constitutional authorities. For the treatement of this matter the
Norwegian Storthing has appointed a special Committee and in the
immediate future, this committee will prepare a motion that, in the
present sitting of the Storthing, a bill be to passed with regard to the
establishment of a separate Consular service.

Inasmuch as the scheme propounded in Joint Cabinet Council should be
based on the supposition that the further advancement of the Consular
question should, for the present, be deferred Norway's approval of such a
supposition would, in the opinion of the Department be equivalent to
giving up of the Norwegian people's unanimous desire to now see a just
right carried through which is due to Norway in her capacity of a
Sovereign realm and is secured in her Constitution, and for a reform
requested with cumulative force by the development and the conditions of
industry, instead of entering into negotiations between the countries,
which, after renewed experience, may unfortunately be apprehended to
prove fruitless or at best, to delay the realisation of the matter.

For there is no denying the fact that the scheme for negotiations now
propounded is nothing new, but that similar schemes in the earlier
history of the Union have repeatedly been tried in vain. The three
Committees affecting the Union and made up of Norwegian and Swedish men,
that in the past century, after previous treatment in 1844, in 1867, and
in 1898 propounded schemes for new regulations concerning the mutual
relations of the countries did not lead to any positive result. The
report of the first Committee was in 1847 subject to a treatment on the
part of the Norwegian Government, but was afterwards not favoured by the
Swedish Government; the report of the second Committee, which did not
give expression to Norway's equality in the Union was rejected by the
vast majority of the Storthing in 1871 and in the third Committee no
proposal of a future arrangement could obtain plurality among the
Norwegian and the Swedish members.

With regard to the last-mentioned Committee we beg leave to draw
particular attention to the fact, that all the Swedish members of the
Committee certainly agreed upon founding the Union on the principle of
parity and equality, inasmuch as they proposed that the Foreign affairs
should be entrusted to the charge of a joint Foreign minister of
Norwegian or Swedish nationality. But at the same time the two fractions
wherein the Swedish members of the Committee were divided, proposed such
an arrangement of the constitutional responsibility not only for those
members of the separate Cabinet Councils of the countries, who at the
side of the Foreign Minister take part in the treatment of diplomatic
affairs, but also for the Foreign Minister himself, so that no member of
the Norwegian Committee could in this respect support any of the Swedish
schemes. In addition to the establishment of a joint Foreign Minister
office, all the Swedish members recommended an extension of the
constitutional community between the countries which no member of the
Norwegian Committee could second and lastly, the scheme for a separate
Foreign Office for each country which already was the expression of the
opinion prevailing among the Norwegian people, could not gain any support
from the Swedish side.

In this connection it should also be remembered that equally fruitless
proved the negotiations about the arrangement of the ministerial Cabinet
Council, carried on between the two Governments in 1885-86 and in
1890-91.

If thus the results of the above-mentioned efforts have been but little
encouraging, this can, in a still higher degree, be said to have been the
case with the negotiations just now terminated concerning questions
connected with the establishment of a separate Consular service for each
country. After these negotiations, brought about on Swedens initiative,
had led to a preliminary agreement presupposing a separate Consular
service for each country, subject to the home authority which each
country decided for itself, and after this agreement had been approved of
by the King and the Governments of the two countries in Joint Cabinet
Council on December 21, 1903, the matter, as is well known, fell through
owing to the so called bills of the same wording that were meant to
regulate the relations between the separate Consular services on the one
hand, and the Foreign Minister and the legations on the other hand. This
negative result was attributed to the circumstance that from the Swedish
side a number of demands were finally made and adhered to, which are
partly considered as incongruous with the Constitution of Norway and
with our rights as a Sovereign realm, partly would exclude what had been
presupposed in the preliminary agreements viz. that the Consuls of each
country should be subject to that home authority which each country
decided for itself. Through this, a deep disappointment has arisen in
Norway which, if strengthened by new unsuccessful schemes, will imply the
greatest danger to the good relations between the two peoples which in a
far higher degree than agreements laid down in treatises or juridical
forms are the basis of the concord and the strength of both peoples.

Under these circumstances the Department finds it necessary to dissuade
from entering into new negotiations on the Union affairs ere a separate
Norwegian Consular service has been established. Not until this has been
done, will the confidence return which is the condition of any friendly
and successful consideration of embarrassing and delicate Union affairs,
and the Department will then be able to recommend the opening of
negotiations for arranging the management of Foreign affairs and of the
diplomacy and about the present Union based on the Act of Union, and
questions connected with this matter. But, if so, these negotiations must
be carried on an entirely free basis with full recognition of the
Sovereignity of each country without any reservation or restriction
whatever and consequently also--in conformity with what occurred in
1898--embrace the arrangement proposed by the Norwegian side as to the
establishment of a separate Norwegian and a separate Swedish Foreign
Office administration in such forms as each country will consider
necessary for its objects and interests. In harmony with this it should,
besides, be agreed upon that, if also new negotiations should prove
fruitless one must not return to _status quo_ so as to adhere to the
present untenable state of Union affairs. There should be a binding
presumption that the present state of things must not prevent either
country from exercising its right of self-determination, but that instead
each country can freely decide upon the future forms of its national
existence. For not a coercive union but only the mutual confidence and
feeling of solidarity of the free and independent nations can safeguard
the future and the happiness of both peoples and the independence and
integrity of their countries.

With reference to the above-mentioned statement endorsed in substance by
the other members of the Cabinet Council, it is recommended in all
humility:

     that a copy of the present humble report made in Joint Cabinet
     Council on April 5th this year, concerning new negotiations
     affecting the Union may graciously be ordered to be delivered over
     to the Swedish Iustice-Department.




16.

Record of Justice-Departement affair held at Stockholm Palace on Tuesday
the 25th of April, 1905 before His Royal Highness the Crown-Prince Regent
in Joint Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council.


[-- -- --]

Mr Berger, Cabinet Minister and Chief of the Swedish Justice-Department
gave, in all humility, a notice of the Norwegian Government's humble
report in consequence of the question raised in Joint Cabinet Council on
the 5th inst. vith regard to opening new negotiations concerning the
arrangement of the Union question; this report is appended to this
Protocol.

After the chief of Department had given an account of the contents of the
report, His Excellency Ramstedt, Prime Minister made the following
statement:

»What in the Norwegian Governments report has been said about the reason
why the latest negotiations, regarding the Union did not lead to any
result, does not, in my opinion, now require a reply, but in this
respect, I only refer to the Swedish Cabinet Council's declaration of
January 30, 1905, appended to the Protocol made in Joint Cabinet Council
on the 6th of February last.

In the declaration made by your Royal Highness on the 5th inst. and put
on record, the Swedish Cabinet Council expected to find a method of
settling the differences of opinion as to the Union affairs. Therefore
the Swedish Cabinet Council gave its support to your Royal Highness's
declaration.

The condition of the new negotiations, however, was, according to the
same declaration, that the negotiations should embrace all matters
affecting the Union and consequently also the Consular question.

Whereas now from the Norwegian side the thought of further negotiations
is rejected, ere a separate Norwegian Consular service has been
established and whereas besides, for eventual new negotiations, such a
condition is made from the Norwegian side as incompatible with the Union
and the Act of Union, it is obvious that negotiations on the basis
indicated by your Royal Highness cannot now be opened with any chance of
success».

This statement was endorsed by the other members of the Swedish Cabinet
Council.

The Norwegian part of the Cabinet Council stated:

»The section of the Cabinet Council refers to the report of the Norwegian
Government from which it appears that on the Norwegian side there is
willingness to bring about negotiations between the countries on the
conditions put forward in the report. It is also obvious from the report
that from the Norwegian side the intention is not to try to dissolve the
present Union. On the other hand, one finds it necessary to demand that
such a dissolution should be within the bounds of possibility and that
negotiations presupposing this eventuality with the consent of the
Constitution authorities of both countries, should be compatible with the
Act of Union.

Under these circumstances, however, the section of the Cabinet Council
that negotiations concerning the Union affairs cannot, agree for the
present, opened with any chance of success.»

His Royal Highness the Crown-Prince Regent was hereupon pleased he to
declare:

»Whereas the Norwegian Government has unfortunately been unwilling to
accept my proposition of new negotiations concerning all the affairs
affecting the Union, I must, while sincerely regretting it, let the
matter abide by the declarations made by the Cabinet Councils.»




17.

The Riksdags address to the King on the Union question, on May 15, 1905.


  TO HIS MAJESTY THE KING.

In both Chambers of the Riksdag resolutions have been submitted with the
object of expressing, in an address, to your Majesty the Riksdag's
support of the declaration published in the »Post-och Inrikes Tidningar»
and made by the Crown-Prince Regent in Joint Swedish and Norwegian
Cabinet Council on the 5th of April last.

This declaration is to the following effect:

[-- -- --]

The Riksdag realizes to the full the importance of this declaration of
the Crown-Prince Regent, as involving a possibility of bringing about a
new satisfactory arrangement of the Union affairs.

It is therefore with an expression of regret that the Riksdag has learned
from the publishment of the Protocol drawn up in Joint Swedish and
Norwegian Cabinet Council on the 25th of April last, that negotiations
founded on the basis indicated in the above-mentioned declaration of the
Crown-Prince Regent cannot now be opened with any chance of success.

Although thus the question of such negotiations seems to have been
dropped for the present, the Riksdag, however, considers itself bound to
express its opinion on a question of such a far-reaching importance as
the present one, and consequently the Riksdag has resolved to announce
herewith its support of the declaration made by the Crown-Prince Regent
in Joint Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Council on April 5th this year,
and recommending the opening of negotiations between the Swedish and
Norwegian Governments concerning a new arrangement of the Union affairs.

Stockholm, May 13, 1905.

  With all loyal veneration.




18.

The resignation of the Norwegian Government. Dated Christiania, May 26,
1905.


  TO HIS MAJESTY THE KING.

In case Your Majesty should find yourself unable to acquiesce in the
Norwegian Government's recommendation to sanction the Storthing's
resolution for the establishment of a separate Norwegian Consular
service, we venture, in all humility, to apply for permission to
immediately resign our posts as members of Your Majesty's Cabinet, since
none of us well be able to countersign a resolution considered by us as
noxious to the country. A rejection of this unanimous recommendation of
the Government concerning a Norwegian law unanimously adopted by the
Storthing and issued by the whole Norwegian people to be carried through
cannot, in our opinion, be grounded on regards paid to the interests of
Norway, but would involve an abnegation of the Sovereignity of the
country, and would be a manifestation of a personal Royal power in
opposition to the Constitution and to constitutional practice.

Christiania, May 26, 1905.




19.

Report of the Cabinet Council held in Stockholm May 30th 1905, given by
the Norwegian Section of the Council.


  To the President of the Norwegian Government.

The Section of the Cabinet Council herewith presents the following
report.

In the Cabinet Council held by the King at the Royal Palace in Stockholm
on May 27th the Norwegian Government presented their proposal respecting
the sanction of the Storthing to the Norwegian Consular law. After which
the members of the Section expressed their unanimity respecting the
proposals, and urgently appealed to the King to sanction them. They
emphasized the reform in question for the development of the country in a
national and economical respect, which was unanimously approved of both
by the National Assembly and also the whole of the people of Norway.
There might be many differences of opinion and divergencies on various
public affairs, but in this case, there was complete unanimity among all
parties and communities. The Storthing, in conjunction with the
government, had omitted from the law such questions as might have
reference to the points that touched upon the Foreign and Diplomatic
administration and dealt with the Consular question alone.

Therefore it was thought that all cause of opposition would, on this
side, be removed. It was therefore the nation's sincere hope, that His
Majesty would graciously incline to their appeal.

  The King

thereupon read the following reply.

»The Crown-Prince as Regent in a joint Cabinet Council on the 5th April
has already pointed out the only way, in which this important matter can
be presented, and all difficulties thereby be removed, that is, by
negotiation. I give this decision my entire approval, and do not find the
present moment suitable for sanctioning the law, which implies a change
in the existing partnership in the Consular Service, which cannot be
dissolved except by mutual agreement. The present regulation is
established in consequence of a resolution in a Joint Cabinet Council,
and therefore a separate Consular Service cannot be established either
for Sweden or for Norway before the matter has been dealt with in the
same Constitutional forms prescribed by the Act of Union § 5. In refusing
now to give My sanction to this law, I am supported by §§ 30 and 78 in
the Constitutional law, which give the King this right. The equal love I
bear to my two peoples, makes it my duty to exercise this right.»

The Section of the Cabinet Council resolved first to institute further
negotiations in the Cabinet Council in Christiania, in order that His
Majesty might deal with this important matter, which might lead to a
serious crisis in the government then in office.

  The King

declared Himself unwilling to assent to this appeal and pointed out that
the Norwegian government's proposal was received and dealt with.

Thereupon the Section of the Cabinet Council made the strongest
representations in reference to His Majesty's decision, which would rouse
complaints in Norway, where they had hoped that the persistent and loyal
efforts to solve the problem through negotiations with Sweden, would have
led to happy results in reference to the rights and claims of the
Kingdom. In this case Norway's interests in the Union were equal with
those of Sweden. For that Norway's rights were respected, was a necessary
condition for a safe guarantee of the Union. A resolution after His
Majesty's decision against the unanimous proposal of the government, and
after a declaration which was given with Norwegian advice, would have
incalculable results. It was in conflict without Constitutional law, it
was denial of the right according to fundamental law of independent
decision on the matter, and a violation of its liberty, independence, and
Sovereignty. It would inevitably lead to the dissolution of the Union.

The Section of the Cabinet Council further stated that no member of the
present Council would countersign such a resolution, and thus give it
constitutional legality. They must therefore tender their letters of
resignation.

  His Majesty the King

then read the following reply:

»As it is evident to Me that a new government cannot now be formed I
cannot consent to he resignation of the Ministers.»

Furthermore His Majesty referred to the Constitution § 30, and affirmed
that the Ministers had now dutifully »expressed their opinions with
boldness», and »made strong representations» against His decision;
therefore they were free from responsibility. But the same paragraph
reserved to the King the right to make his decisions, »according to His
own judgment.» He was therefore entitled, according to fundamental law,
to make the above mentioned decision, and it was the duty of the
Ministers to draw up and countersign the protocol respecting the
negotiations and agreements on the matter.

The Section of Ministers hereupon alleged that according to the
Constitutional law § 15 the Prime Minister was the responsible executive
for the accepted resolutions. Until the decision had been countersigned,
it was not obligatory; a report could, naturally, be given of the
negotiations, but not the customary protocol, including also a Royal
decree.

Countersignature implied responsibility for the King's decisions, but in
this case the government could not take that responsibility. It was
prescribed in the Constitution § 31 for all commands issued by the King
(except affairs relating to military orders). But this conclusion was not
a regular rule for the members of the Cabinet; it was a prescription for
the forms to be observed in order to give a command legal validity.
Occasions might therefore occur when it was not only right, but also a
duty to refuse countersignature. The Section of the Cabinet Council had
appealed to the Justice-Departement for enlightenment on the subject, and
they knew that there had been several occasions when the Norwegian side
had maintained the same opinions as those now presented.

The Departement now comes to the same conclusion as in 1847 when it
discussed the question in another agreement namely in a Resolution on the
intended proposal for a new Act of Union; in this there is a reference to
the Norwegian conception that there is nothing to prevent a member of the
Council from refusing countersignature and resigning his office. This
Resolution is accepted by the Government then in office: Lovenskiold,
Krog, Sibbern, Schmidt, Pettersen, Herm. Foss and Fr. Stang and by the
members then forming the Section of the Cabinet Council, Due, J. H. Vogt
and Fleischer.

The Section of the Cabinet Council finally decided that as a refusal to
sanction would manifestly not be only injurious to the Kingdom, but also
a denial of its Self-dependence, it had become a necessity to refuse
countersignature, in order to avoid being a party in the matter. The
Norwegian who did countersign would from that moment lose all national
rights.

After which the letters of resignation from the Norwegian Government, and
from the Section of the Cabinet Council were delivered and read in the
presence of the King. Respecting this matter, the customary protocol has
been drawn up.

Kristiania 30:th May 1905.

  _J. Lovland._    _E. Hagerup Bull._    _Harald Bothner._




20.

The King's telegraphic protest against the declarations of the Norwegian
Government. Dated Stockholm, May 29, 1905.


Stockholm, May 29. On account of what the Norwegian Government has
declared--not only in writing in their resignations, but also verbally
in the Cabinet Council of May 27 after my rejection of the Consular
service law--I must declare that I, most decidedly, protest against the
comments made there on Me and my method of action. I adhere to everything
I have stated to the assembled Cabinet Council as to my constitutional
right. I beg the Premie minister to give publicity to this as soon as
possible.

  _Oscar._




21.

The Norwegian Cabinet Minister's notification to the King that they
resigned their posts. Dated Christiania, Juni 6, 1905.


In response to our humble resignations, Your Majesty has in Cabinet
Council at the Palace of Stockholm on May 27th, decreed: »As it is clear
to me that no other Cabinet can at present be formed, I decline to accept
the resignations tendered by the Cabinet Ministers.»

According to Norway's Constitution it is incumbent on the King to procure
a constitutional Government for the country. In the same moment as the
Kings policy is an obstacle to the formation of a responsible Council the
Norwegian Royal power has become in-operative.

By your Majesty's resolution therefore, the constitutional relation
between Your Majesty and the responsible Ministers of the Crown has
assumed such an aspect as cannot be maintained. No Government and none of
its members individually can, in a constitutional country, be forced
against their wishes to remain in office with a Ministers responsibility,
when their responsible advice in great questions decisive to the
Fatherland is not followed by the King who, in persuace of the
constitution, is exempt from responsibility whereas under these
circumstances it is the undoubted right of each member individually as a
free man to resign his post, this will also, as a rule, be a duty towards
the Fatherland in order to maintain its constitutional rights.

Your Majesty has declared that no Government can, at present, be formed.
Your Majesty has found this so clear that Norway's King in these fatal
days has remained at the Palace of Stockholm without making an attempt at
bringing the country back to constitutional conditions.

The policy manifested in Your Majesty's attitude towards the question of
sanctioning the Consular service law is, in our opinion, incompatible
with the Norwegian Constitution. But no more than a new Government is
able to take upon itself the responsibility of this policy, no more are
we able in office to render us participant of it by remaining in office.
It is therefore our duty to resign our posts and to immediately give the
Storthing the necessary communication of it.

This shall now be done. Deep and discordant political divergencies have
thus burst the frame of the constitutional Norwegian Monarchy.
Circumstances have been stranger than the desire of the individual. But
the final settlement on the dissolution of the Union, that through Your
Majesty's resolution--no doubt passed with a heavy heart, but also with
full knowledge of its consequences--has now been started, will however,
--this is our hope--turn out before long to have been the introduction
to better and happier days for the two peoples, whose happiness and
welfare have always been dear to Your Majesty's heart.

In conclusion we venture to tender Your Majesty our humblest thanks for
the personal kindness and amiability shown to us during the time we have
had the honour of being members of Your Majesty's Council.

We beg Your Majesty to accept the assurance of our full recognition of
Your Majesty's difficult position and of our invaried esteem. But
paramount are our duties towards the Fatherland.

Christiania, June 6, 1905.

   _Chr. Michelsen._  _J. Lövland._  _Sofus Arctander._  _Gunnar Knudsen._
   _W. Olssön._   _E. Hagerup Bull._   _Chr. Knudsen._   _Harald Bothner._
                       _A. Vinje._      _Kr. Lehmkuhl._




22.

The King's telegraphic protests against the abdication of the Norwegian
Government.


  To _the Prime Minister_.

I have received the communication of the Cabinet Ministers and I record a
most decided protest against the method of action of the Government.

  _Oscar._

       *       *       *       *       *

  To _the President of Storthing_.

Having this morning received from the Government the communication of the
Cabinet Minister's resolution to resign their posts and to inform the
Storthing of it I want herewith to make known that, in a telegram to M.
Michelsen, Prime minister, I have recorded a most decided protest against
their method of action.

  _Oscar._




23.

The Reasons for the decision proposed by the President, in the Storting,
on the 7th June 1905.


Having on behalf of the Storthing received open information from the head
of the Government that the several members of the Cabinet council have
one and all resigned hereby declare: We were all prepared for the
situation in which we now find ourselves. In meetings of the
representatives, the question has therefore been discussed as to what
measures would be taken by the Storthing to meet the necessities of such
a situation. Every representative has had an opportunity for making known
his personal opinions at these meetings respecting the situation and its
demands. On this day the Storthing must make known its decisive
resolutions. I must also permit myself to express the wish, that these
resolutions may be unanimously accepted, and without debate.

In respect to the communication given by the head of the Government I
propose that the Storthing shall make the following resolutions:

The different members of the Council having resigned office,

His Majesty the King having declared Himself unable to form a new
government, and the Constitutional Sovereign having resigned his powers,

the Storthing authorizes the members of the Council who resigned this
day, to assume until further notice, as the Norwegian government, the
authority granted the King in accordance with the Constitution of the
Norwegian Kingdom and its valid law--with the changes that become
necessary through the fact that the Union with Sweden under one King is
dissolved as a consequence of the King having ceased to act as King of
Norway.




24.

The address of the Storthing to King Oscar, dated Christiania, June 7,
1905.


  Your Majesty,

Whereas all the members of the Cabinet have to-day, in the Storthing,
resigned their posts, and whereas Your Majesty in the Protocol of May 27
officially declared that Your Majesty did not see your way clear to
create a new Government for the country, the Constitutional Regal power
in Norway has thereby become inoperative.

It has therefore been the duty of the Storthing, as the representative
of the Norwegian people, without delay to empower the members of the
resigning Cabinet to exercise until further notice as the Norwegian
Government the power appertaining to the King in accordance with the
Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway and the existing laws with the
changes which are necessitated by the fact that the union with Sweden,
which provides that there shall be a common King, is dissolved in
consequence of the fact that the King has ceased to act as King of
Norway.

The course of developments, which proved more powerful than the desire
and will of the individual, has led to this result.

The union entered into in 1814 has from its first hour been differently
interpreted by the two nations both as regards its spirit and letter.
Efforts have been made on the Swedish side to extend the Union, and on
the Norwegian side to confine it within the limits laid down in the Act
of Union, and otherwise to assert the independent power of both States in
all matters which are not defined in that Act as coming under the Union.
The difference of principle in the interpretation of the character of the
Union has provoked much misunderstanding between the two peoples, and has
caused much friction. In the interpretation which, during the last
negotiations between the two countries, has been laid down by the Swedish
Government as against Norway, the Norwegian people were bound to perceive
an injury to their constitutional right, their independence, and their
national honour.

The Union was justified as long as it could contribute to promoting the
welfare and happiness of both peoples, while maintaining their
independence as Sovereign States. But above the Union their stands for us
Norwegians our Norwegian Fatherland, and for the Swedes their Swedish
Fatherland. And more valuable than a political union are the feelings of
solidarity and voluntary cohesion of both peoples. The union has become a
danger to this feeling of solidarity between the Norwegian and Swedish
people which should secure the happiness of both nations and constitute
their strength abroad.

When the union is now severed, the Norwegian people have no loftier wish
than to live in peace and good harmony with all, not least with the
people of Sweden and the dynasty under the direction of which our
country, despite many and bitter disputes affecting the union, has
attained such important intellectual and material development.

As evidence of the fact that the work and the struggle of the Norwegian
people for the full independence of the Fatherland have not been formed
on any ill-feeling towards the Royal House or the Swedish people, and
have not left behind any bitterness towards any of these, the Storthing
respectfully solicits your Majesty's co-operation to the end that a
Prince of your Majesty's house may be permitted, while relinquishing his
right of succession to the Throne of Sweden, to accept election as King
of Norway.

The day upon which the Norwegian people elect their own King to ascend
the ancient throne of Norway will open up an era of tranquil conditions
of industry for Norway, of good and cordial relations to the Swedish
people, and of peace and concord and loyal co-operation in the north for
the protection of the civilization of the people and of their freedom and
independence.

In full assurance of this, the Storthing ventures to express the sincere
hope, that the present events, will turn out to be for the good of all,
also for their Majesties, for whom personally the Norwegian people will
preserve their respect and affection.




25.

The King's telegraphic protest against the resolution of the Storthing.
Despatched June 8th 1905.


As We hereby declare that We do not approve of the revolutionary measures
which have been deplorably taken by the Storthing in violation of the
Constitution and Act of Union, and in revolt against their King, We
refuse to receive the deputation proposed by the Storthing.

  _Oscar._




26.

Extract of the protocol of Civil business held in Council before His
Majesty in the presence of His Royal Highness The Crown Prince at the
Royal Palace Stocholm June 9th 1905.


[-- -- --]

His Excellency Mr. Ramstedt, Prime Minister, stated:

»According to information received from Norway the Norwegian Storthing
has, on the 7th inst. passed the following resolutions:

'The members of the Cabinet having resigned their office and the King
having declared himself unable to form a new government; and the
Constitutional Sovereign thereby having resigned His powers, the
Storthing authorises the members of the Council who resigned this day, to
assume until further notice, as the Norwegian Government, the authority
granted to the King according to the Constitution of the Norwegian
Kingdom and its valid law--with the changes that become neccessary
through the fact that the Union with Sweden under one King is dissolved,
in consequence of the King having ceased to Act as King of Norway.'

Through this revolutionary measure, the Storthing has not only without
the King's assistance, but also without referring to Sweden arbitrarily
passed a resolution respecting the dissolution of a Union which has
existed on the grounds of legal mutual agreements between the two
countries and cannot without mutual consent be broken.

The Storthing, having thus by this resolution, violated Sweden's
prerogative it becomes undeniably necessary that an extra session of the
Diet be immediately summoned in order to debate as to what measures
should be taken on Sweden's side, with reference to what has thus
occurred. Herewith I appeal that Your Majesty will resolve on the
summoning of the Diet, at the same time Your Majesty intimates
disacknowledgement of the government, proclaimed by the Storthing».

In this address the rest of the members proclaimed themselves unanimous;

And His Majesty the King consented to this, and in accordance with the
Prime Minister's recommendation was graciously pleased to decree, by open
letter and edict, the import of which are contained in the appendage to
this protocol, that the members of both Chambers of the Diet be summoned
to an extra session in Stockholm on Tuesday June 20th.




27.

Address from the King to the President of the Storthing.


  To the President of the Storthing!

To you, and through you to the Storthing and the entire population of
Norway, I address the following words, in answer to the address and
decision both of the Norwegian Cabinet and the Storthing:

The oath that the King of Norway takes according to the Constitution § 9
on his accession to the throne, »that he will rule the Kingdom of Norway
in accordance with its constitution and law», makes it a kingly duty for
Me not to pay any attention to the statement of the Norwegian Cabinet in
reference to my decree on May 27th ult., in which I declared, that, for
the present, I did not find it suitable to sanction the Storthing's
proposal respecting the establishment of a separate Norwegian Consular
Service. The Cabinet thereby declared that this decree, being in conflict
with the unanimous recommendation of the Norwegian Cabinet would imply a
depreciation of a right in accordance with the Norwegian fundamental law,
independently to settle the matter in question, and also implied a
violation of Norway's freedom, independence and Sovereignty, and at the
same time the Cabinet declared that no member of the Ministry then
sitting would be willing to countersign My Decree, and thereby, according
to the opinion of the Cabinet, give it legislative validity.

The Norwegian King's prerogative, when he thinks the welfare of the
kingdom demands it, to refuse His sanction to a proposal presented in due
form by the Storthing is unconditional. From this rule, there is no
exception even though the Storthing were to present the same resolution
ever so many times in precisely the same terms. Meanwhile according to
the fundamental law (Constitution § 79) the decision of the Storthing
becomes the law of Norway without the sanction of the King, but in order
to accomplish this, are required unaltered resolutions from three
Storthings drawn up after three consecutive elections, which resolution
must be laid before the King, »with an appeal, that His Majesty will not
refuse to sanction the resolution, which the Storthing after the most
careful considerations, believes to be advantageous. In the case now in
hand, there was no question of any such resolution from the Storthing,
and therefore the regulation in the fundamental law § 78: could be
suitably applied: »If the King sanctions the resolution, He signs it with
His superscription, on which it becomes the law. If He does not sanction
it, He returns it to the Odelsthing (Lower House) with the declaration
that for the present He finds it unsuitable to sanction.» And the
paragraph continues: »The resolution may not again on that occasion be
laid before the King by the members of the Storthing then assembled.» By
this last mentioned prescription the Constitution has evidently meant to
protect the Norwegian King's liberty in the exercise of the legislative
powers which are his indisputable right.

My resolve, not to sanction a law providing for a separate Norwegian
Consular Service, can consequently not be considered to imply any
transgression whatever of the legislative power, which according to the
fundamental law is the King's right, not even, if the matter in question
happened to be an affair which concerned Norway alone. But on the grounds
of the valid Union agreement between Norway and Sweden, it was not only
My right, but also My duty as King of Norway to refuse My sanction, for
the dissolution of the existing identical Consular Office could only be
effected through Norway's consent to free and friendly negotiations
concerning agreements for altering the Union on the basis of full
equality between the United Kingdoms, to which not only the _Powers
Royal_, but also the Diet of Sweden had unanimously themselves agreed.
That such a respect to the demands of the existing Union should imply an
attack on Norway's independence and sovereignty, is so much the more
unfounded, as the fundamental law explicitly connects Norway's
independence with its Union with Sweden. Norway's King must ever hold in
sight the 1:st paragraph of its Constitution:

»The Kingdom of Norway is a free, self-dependant, integral and
independent Kingdom, united with Sweden under one King.»

The statement made by the Council that My resolve, not to sanction the
Consular law, proposed by the Storthing, would have no legal validity, as
none of the members of the Cabinet had found themselves able to
countersign the Royal Decree supplies a supposition which I must declare
is in conflict with fundamental law. The question of the significance of
contrasignature according to Norwegian State law, is not a new question
brought up to day, but is older than the present Norwegian Constitution.
It was already solved at the Convention of Eidsvold. A proposal was then
made that Countersignature was requisite in order that the King's
commands should become valid, but was opposed on the grounds that it was
against the general principles of the Constitution for the division of
supreme power. The same standpoint was taken in the fundamental law of
the 4th November. This opinion was also expressed by the Constitutional
Committee without contradiction on two occasions, 1824 and 1839, when the
Storthing had even opposed a proposal concerning another matter. The
change, which § 32 in the Constitution has since undergone, gives
increased support to the opinion that the Prime Minister's
Countersignature is intended for nothing else than a witness that the
King has made a Decree of certain import.

And that § 31 is unconditional in its prescription of the duty of the
authorised countersignature of the Prime Minister is a conception that is
acceded to by those writers on State law who have framed the
Constitution. When the Cabinet quoted an opinion of the Norwegian
government in 1847 when the proposal for a new Act of Union was under
consideration, the Cabinet has overlooked, firstly, that this opinion, in
a manner that applies to Swedish government regulations § 38, was
intended only to refer to orders issued but not the Decree of the King
included in the protocol, secondly that the Norwegian Government could
not prove that the Norwegian Constitution really provided any law
respecting the right to refuse countersignature. The Constitution on the
contrary emphatically prescribes in § 30: »But to the King it is reserved
the right to form his decision according to His own judgment», and in §
31: »All Commands issued by the King himself (Military Orders excepted)
shall be countersigned by the Prime Minister (before 1873 the Norwegian
Prime Minister).

That under these circumstances I feel Myself entitled to demand respect
for a Decree formed by the King of Norway in a Constitutional manner, is
a matter for which no one can blame me. The powers which the Constitution
grants the King, in order to further the good of the country to the best
of his convictions, are not greater than that they ought to be preserved
to the supreme power, so that no constitutional practices in conflict
with the principles of the fundamental law are introduced, which,
according to the explicit prescriptions in § 112 may not be done, even by
an alteration of the fundamental law.

One of the chief principles of the Constitution--the most important of
all, in point of fact--is that Norway shall be a Constitutional
Monarchy. It is incompatible with this, that the King should sink to be a
helpless tool in the hands of His Ministers. If, meanwhile, the members
of the Council should have the power, by refusing countersignature, to
hinder every future Royal Decree, the Norwegian King would be deprived of
participating in the government. This position would be as lowering to
the Monarch as injurious to Norway herself.

To the circumstances that can thus be adduced against the validity,
according to fundamental law, of the Prime Minister's refusal of
Countersignature, and against the efficacy of the dogma that the King's
Decree in order to be valid, must bear the responsibility of some member
of the Cabinet, can be added, in questions touching the Union situation,
two more reasons, which have their foundation in the fact that the King
of Norway is also King of the Union.

However opinions may have varied, respecting the conception of the unity
which the Union agreements have created for the binding together of the
two Kingdoms, one fact remains clear, that Royal power is also an
institution of the Union. This position of the King's as being not only
King of Norway or of Sweden, but also as Monarch of the United Kingdoms,
makes it the King's duty, not to form decisions in conflict with the Act
of Union § 5, respecting the settlement of matters in one country, which
would also affect the other. The King's duty in the aforesaid respect is
incompatible with the opinion that the one Kingdom, by the refusal of
Countersignature by its Prime Minister or otherwise, could undo a Royal
Decree, by which he refused to make a resolution prejudicial to the other
Kingdom or injurious to the Union. In Norway, when they endeavoured to
adhere to an opposite opinion, when the Norwegian people claimed the
right to force the King to form his decision in conflict with what he
considers his right as King of the Union to concede, there was no other
way of attaining this object than making the Union, and also the King of
Sweden, in his actions, totally dependent on the will of the Norwegian
people, its Storthing and its Cabinet.

A Sovereign power of this kind I must characterize as being in strife
with the Union between the Kingdoms as confirmed by the Act of Union

It has been My constant endeavour to give Norway that position within the
Union to which it has a just claim. My Royal duty has forced Me, even in
conflict with general opinion in Norway, to try to maintain the legal
principles of the Union.

My coronation oath and the good of the United Kingdoms prompted My Decree
concerning the settlement of the Consular question, but in this I have
been met, not only by the Norwegian Cabinet's refusal of
Countersignature, but also the resignation of its members. When I
declared, »As it is clear to Me, that no other government can now be
formed therefore I cannot consent to the resignation of the Cabinet», the
Cabinet answered by the threat that the Norwegian who assented to My
Decree would in the same moment lose all national rights. I was therefore
placed in such a situation that I must either break the oaths I took
under the Act of Union, or expose Myself to being without Ministers. I
had no choice. After having in conflict with the fundamental law, tried
to undo the King's lawfully made resolution, the Council, by resigning
their office at the Storthing, have left the King without advisers. The
Storthing has approved of this breaking of the law, and by a
Revolutionary proceeding declared that the lawful King of Norway has
ceased to reign, and hat the Union between the Kingdoms is dissolved.

It now becomes the bounden duty of Sweden and Myself as King of the
Union to decide whether Norway's attack on the existing Union shall lead
to the legal dissolution of the same.

May the opinions of our contemporaries and also those of posterity judge
between Me and the People of Norway!




28.

The Norwegian Storthings documentary address to the King. Dated
Christiania June 19th 1905.


  To the King's Most Excellent Majesty!

Norway's Storthing appeals, in all humility, to Your Majesty and through
the Your Majesty to the Diet and the People of Sweden to be allowed to
express the following:

That which has now happened in Norway is the necessary results of the
late events in Union politics, and cannot be undone. And as it is certain
that the nation does not wish to return to the old conditions of the
Union, the Storthing considers it impossible to resume negotiations on
the different constitutional and state-law questions, which in Your
Majesty's address to the President of the Storthing are referred to, in
connection with the settled decisions, and on which the Storthing and
Government have previously fully expressed themselves. The Storthing
fully understands the difficult position of Your Majesty, and has not for
a moment doubted that Your Majesty's decree is made with the full
conviction that Your Majesty has considered it to be the right and duty
of Your Majesty.

But it is the desire of the Storthing to address an appeal to Your
Majesty, to the Swedish Diet and Nation, to assist in a peaceful
arrangement for the dissolution of the Union, in order to secure
relations of friendship and cooperation between the two peoples of the
Peninsula. From statements made in Sweden, the Storthing finds that the
resolution the Storthing considered it its duty towards the fatherland to
adopt, by declaring the Union between the United Kingdoms to be
dissolved, has, in its form and the manner of carrying it out, been
looked upon as an insult to Sweden. This has never been our intention.
What has now happened and must happen in Norway, was simply done in order
to maintain Norway's constitutional rights. The nation of Norway never
intended an insult to the honour of Sweden.

Your Majesty having on the 27th May declared it impossible to sanction
the unanimous decision of the Storthing to establish a separate Norwegian
Consulate, and as no Norwegian Government could be formed by Your
Majesty, the constitutional situation became out of joint, so dislocated
that the Union could no longer be upheld. The Norwegian Storthing
therefore found the position untenable and was forced to get a new
government for the country. Every other resource was excluded, so much
the more so as the Swedish government of Majesty had already in April
23:rd emphatically refused fresh negotiations, he alternative of which
was the dissolution of the Union, if new regulations for the continuance
of the Union could not be arranged.

The Storthing has already, before hand, stated that the Norwegian people
do not entertain any feelings of bitterness or ill-will towards Your
Majesty and the people of Sweden. Expressions to the contrary which may
possibly on different occasions have been heard, have alone been caused
on the grounds of the displeasure of Norway at her position in the Union.
When the cause of this bitterness and ill-will on account of the
dissolution of the Union has been removed, its effects will also
disappear. A ninety years' cooperation in material and spiritual culture
has inspired in the Norwegian people a sincere feeling of friendship and
sympathy for the Swedish people. The consequences will be, that when
Norway no longer stands in a position so insulting to its national sense
of independence, a friendship will be established that will serve to
confirm and increase the mutual understanding between the two peoples.

With the confidence that the Swedish people will also share these
opinions, the Storthing appeals to the authorities of State in Sweden, in
acknowledging the new situation in Norway, and its rights as a Sovereign
State, to consent to the negotiations which are necessary for the final
agreements in connection with the now dissolved Union. The Storthing is
ready, on its part, to accede to any fair and reasonable wish, that, in
this respect, may contribute to the guarantee of self dependence and
integrity of the two Kingdoms.

In a legislative sense the two peoples are hereafter separated. But the
Storthing has a certain conviction that happy and confidential relations
will arise to the benefit of the interests of both. If the above
statement can find support, without prejudice and without bitterness, the
Storthing is firmly convinced that what has now happened will be to the
lasting happiness of Europe. On behalf of the welfare of the countries of
the North, the Storthing addresses this appeal to the people who, by
their magnanimity and chivalry, have won such a prominent place in the
ranks of Nations.




       *       *       *       *       *




Transcriber's notes

There are many typographical and orthographical errors in the original.
They are listed below. No corrections have been made.

Storthing is sometimes spelled Storting; the use of apostrophes for
possessives is inconsistent; and a number of words are inconsistently
hyphenated. Neither these nor the frequent neologisms are noted
explicitly.

  Title page
    Ph D.

  Table of Contents
    Consular Negatiations

  Footnote 2-3
    that it has confered

  Page 4
    which outworldly represents

  Footnote 4-1
    the more pernicous

  Page 5
    political ascendency chauvinistic strongwords

  Page 7
    They may have complain
    in the Committe of 1898

  Page 8
    represented in they the in administration

  Footnote 10-1
    Ministeral Council

  Page 11
    policy of whech

  Page 12
    Government Departements

  Page 16
    by which the Ministery

  Footnote 18-1
    wherevy it became incumbent

  Page 21
    January 21et 1902
    an disciplinary

  Footnote 23-2 is missing a full stop at the end.

  Page 25
    which decribes

  Page 27
    Buth it may nevertheless

  Page 30
    Norwegian gouvernment

  Page 31
    Swedish governement

  Page 32, side note
    Mr Bostrom's

  Page 33, "Coun" omitted before "cil" at the start of the page

  Footnote 33-2
    Foreign conntry

  Page 34
    remedy the deficiences

  Page 36
    tone is one af decision

  Footnote 36-2 is missing a full stop at the end.

  Page 38, side note
    accusations aganist

  Page 38
    illwill against Sweden
    Formally, therfore,

  Page 40
    the breaking op
    was prowed by

  Page 43
    an disciplinary sense

  Footnote 45-2
    frame this laws

  Page 46
    are unnessary

  Page 47
    There is a missing a full stop after "rouse their passions"

  Footnote 47-1
    as questions refering

  Page 48
    One symtom of this
    the tumultuons confusion

  Page 50
    disssolution of the Union
    a document adressed
    There is a missing full stop after "appointed by the Storthing"

  Page 51
    Therfore the way
    und Mr LÖVLAND

  Page 52
    for the establisment

  Page 53
    cause for displeausure

  Page 55
    whole of the procedings

  Page 58 side note
    There is a missing full stop after "27th May 1905"

  Page 59 side note
    27nd May

  Footnote 60-7
    One reeds, for exemple
    There is an extra full stop after "logic"

  Page 61
    on Extraordinary session

  Footnote 62-1
    The marker for this footnote is on page 61

  Page 63
    the contents af

  Page 64
    An Norway cannot complain

  Page 65
    been in office. the posts

  Page 66
    absolutly their own

  Page 67
    such as they are and--have been

  Document 1, § 1
    inalinenable realm

  Document 1, § 30
    his opinon recorded
    proeced against him

  Document 1, § 31
    ezcepting matters of military command

  Document 2, § 5
    accompaning the King

  Footnote 73-1
    These enactsments

  Document 3
    th seame wording

  Document 4, I
    the appointement or employment

  Document 4, III
    make direct inquires

  Document 5
    should he brought against him

  Document 6
    the preceeding draft

  Document 6, 2
    this is the, intention

  Document 7, § 9
    bound to fullfill

  Document 7, § 11
    or secretely

  Document 7, § 16
    immedately be reported

  Document 8, to § 8
    when. in a matter

  Document 8, to § 11
    wheteher to the

  Document 8, to § 16
    Norwegian authonity

  Document 8
    forms of independecy
    There is a missing full stop after "viz"
    There is a missing full stop after "Sweden and for Norway"
    (see the Communiqué  (should have upper case S)

  Document 9
    to guarrantee that the Consuls
    Such a guarrantee cannot
    the abovementioned paragraphs

  Document 10
    I want therfore
    in persuance of

  Document 11
    lead to the obobject
    thesituation we are in

  Document 12
    I have to-day summond you
    an one-sided adherence
    request in persuance of

  Document 14
    while holding in wiew

  Document 15
    For the treatement
    the Sovereignity of each country
    Swedish Iustice-Department

  Document 16
    Justice-Departement
    vith regard to

  Document 18
    well be able to
    Sovereignity of the country

  Document 19
    May 30th 1905 (should read May 27th)
    I cannot consent to he resignation
    J. Lovland (spelled Lövland elsewhere)

  Document 20
    the Premie minister

  Document 21
    Juni 6, 1905.
    in persuace of the constitution
    been stranger than

  Document 26
    Royal Palace Stocholm
    become neccessary

  Document 27
    There is a missing full stop after "as confirmed by the Act of Union"
    and hat the Union
    The quotation marks opened with "»with an appeal," are not closed
    The quotation marks opened with "»All Commands issued by the King" are
      not closed

  Document 28
    he alternative of which