Produced by Ed Ferris





CHANCELLORSVILLE
AND GETTYSBURG


_CAMPAIGNS OF THE CIVIL WAR.--VI._

CHANCELLORSVILLE
AND
GETTYSBURG

BY
ABNER DOUBLEDAY
BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U.S.A., AND LATE MAJOR-GENERAL U.S.V.;
COMMANDING THE FIRST CORPS AT GETTYSBURG.

NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
743 AND 745 BROADWAY
1882


COPYRIGHT BY
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
1882

TROW'S
PRINTING AND BOOKBINDING COMPANY
210-213 _East 12th Street_

NEW YORK



PREFACE.

In writing ths narrative, which relates to the decisive campaign
which freed the Northern States from invasion, it may not be out
of place to state what facilities I have had for observation in
the fulfilment of so important a task.  I can only say that I was,
to a considerable extent, an actor in the scenes I describe, and
knew the principal leaders on both sides, in consequence of my
association with them at West Point, and, subsequently, in the
regular army.  Indeed, several of them, including Stonewall Jackson
and A. P. Hill, were, prior to the war, officers in the regiment
to which I belonged.  As commander of the Defences of Washington
in the spring of 1862, I was, owing to the nature of my duties,
brought into intimate relations with the statesmen who controlled
the Government at the time, and became well acquainted with President
Lincoln.  I was present, too, after the Battle of Gettysburg, at
a very interesting Cabinet Council, in which the pursuit of Lee
was fully discussed; so that, in one way and another, I have had
better opportunities to judge of men and measures than usually fall
to the lot of others who have written on the same subject.

I have always felt it to be the duty of every one who held a
prominent position in the great war to give to posterity the benefit
of his personal recollections; for no dry official statement can
ever convey an adequate idea to those who come after us of the
sufferings and sacrifices through which the country has passed.
Thousands of men--the flower of our Northern youth--have gone down
to their graves unheralded and unknown, and their achievements and
devotion to the cause have already been forgotten.  It is, therefore,
incumbent upon us, who were their comrades in the field, to do all
in our power to preserve their deeds from oblivion.

And yet it is no easy task to relate contemporaneous events.
Whoever attempts it must be prepared for severe criticism and the
exhibition of much personal feeling.  Some of this may be avoided,
it is true, by writing a colorless history, praising everybody,
and attributing all disasters to dispensations of Providence, for
which no one is to blame.  I cannot, however, consent to fulfill
my allotted task in this way, for the great lessons of the war are
too valuable to be ignored or misstated.  It is not my desire to
assail any of the patriotic men who were engaged in the contest,
but each of us is responsible for our actions in this world, and
for the consequences which flow from them; and where great disasters
have occurred, it is due both to the living and the dead that the
causes and circumstances be justly and properly stated.

Richelieu once exclaimed, upon giving away a high appointment:
"Now I have made one ingrate and a thousand enemies."  Every one
who writes the history of the Great Rebellion will often have
occasion to reiterate the statement:  For the military critic must
necessarily describe facts which imply praise or censure.  Those
who have contributed to great successes think much more might have
been said on the subject, and those who have caused reverses and
defeats are bitter in their denunciations.

Nevertheless, the history of the war should be written before the
facts have faded from the memory of living men, and have become
mere matters of tradition.

In a narrative of this kind, resting upon a great number of voluminous
details, I cannot hope to have wholly escaped error, and wherever
I have misconceived or misstated a fact, it will give me pleasure
to correct the record.

  A. D.
NEW YORK, January, 1882.



CONTENTS.

LIST OF MAPS

CHANCELLORSVILLE
CHAPTER I.
THE OPENING OF 1863--HOOKER'S PLANS
CHAPTER II.
FRIDAY, THE FIRST OF MAY
CHAPTER III.
THE DISASTROUS SECOND OF MAY
CHAPTER IV.
THE ROUT OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS
CHAPTER V.
JACKSON'S ADVANCE IS CHECKED
CHAPTER VI.
SICKLES FIGHTS HIS WAY BACK--ARRIVAL OF THE FIRST CORPS
CHAPTER VII.
THE BATTLE OF THE THIRD OF MAY
CHAPTER VIII.
MAY FOURTH--ATTACK ON SEDGWICK'S FORCE
CHAPTER IX.
PREPARATIONS TO RENEW THE CONFLICT
CHAPTER X.
BATTLE OF BRANDY STATION (FLEETWOOD)

GETTYSBURG
CHAPTER I.
THE INVASION OF THE NORTH
CHAPTER II.
HOOKER'S PLANS--LONGSTREET OCCUPIES THE GAPS IN THE BLUE RIDGE--
  ALARM IN RICHMOND--HOOKER SUPERSEDED BY MEADE
CHAPTER III.
STUART'S RAID--THE ENEMY IN FRONT OF HARRISBURG--MEADE'S PLAN
CHAPTER IV.
THE FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG, WEDNESDAY, JULY 1, 1863
CHAPTER V.
BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG--THE SECOND DAY
CHAPTER VI.
THE BATTLE OF THE THIRD DAY--JOHNSON'S DIVISION DRIVEN OUT
CHAPTER VII.
GENERAL RETREAT OF THE ENEMY--CRITICISMS OF DISTINGUISHED CONFEDERATE
  OFFICERS
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX B
INDEX


LIST OF MAPS.

FIELD OF OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA
OPERATIONS ON THE FIRST OF MAY, 1863
JACKSON'S ATTACK ON HOWARD, MAY 1
BATTLE OF THE THIRD OF MAY
SEDGWICK'S POSITION
FROM THE POTOMAC TO HARRISBURG
DIAGRAMS OF POSITIONS IN THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG:
  I.
  II.
  III.
  IV.
GETTYSBURG:  FINAL ATTACK OF THE FIRST DAY AND BATTLE OF THE SECOND
  DAY
DIAGRAM OF THE ATTACK ON SICKLES AND SYKES


CHANCELLORSVILLE.



CHANCELLORSVILLE.


CHAPTER I.
THE OPENING OF 1863.--HOOKER'S PLANS.

After the great disaster of Fredericksburg, General Burnside, the
Commander of the Union Army, was superseded by Major-General Joseph
Hooker, a graduate of West Point, who having formerly held a high
position on the staff of General Gideon J. Pillow in the war with
Mexico, was supposed to be well acquainted with military operations
on a large scale.  He had subsequently left the army, and had been
engaged in civil pursuits for several years.  He was a man of fine
presence, of great personal magnetism, and had the reputation of
being one of our most efficient and successful corps commanders.

When the campaign of Chancellorsville commenced, the Army of the
Potomac was posted on the left bank of the Rappahannock, opposite
Fredericksburg, among the Stafford hills, in a position which was
considered almost impregnable.  It rested upon the Potomac River,
and as all of its supplies came by water, they were not subject to
delay or interruption of any kind; nor were they endangered by the
movements of the enemy.

At the period referred to, General Hooker had under him a force of
about 124,500 men of all arms, 11,500 of which were cavalry.

On the opposite side of the river, the Army of Northern Virginia,
under General Robert E. Lee, numbered, according to their official
reports, about sixty-two thousand men, three thousand of which were
cavalry;* but the difference was amply compensated by the wide
river in front of the enemy, and the fact that every available
point and ford was well fortified and guarded.  General Thomas J.
Jackson, commonly called Stonewall Jackson, held the line below
Hamilton's crossing to Port Royal.  Two out of four divisions of
Longstreet's corps were absent.  The fourth, under Major-General
Lafayette McLaws, was posted from Hamilton's crossing to Banks'
Ford.  Still farther up and beyond the front of either army, the
crossing-places were watched by the rebel cavalry under Major-
General J. E. B. Stuart, supported by the Third Division of
Longstreet's corps, that of Anderson.

[* Napoleon says 100,000 men on the rolls are only equivalent to
about 80,000 muskets in action.  It is doubtful if Hooker had over
113,000 men for actual combat.  Lieut.-Colonel W. T. Forbes,
Assistant Adjutant General, who has had access to the records,
after a careful estimate, places the number as follows.  First
Corps, 16,000; Second Corps, 16,000; Third Corps, 18,000; Fifth
Corps, 15,000; Sixth Corps, 22,000; Eleventh Corps, 15,000; Twelfth
Corps, 11,000; total infantry and artillery, 113,000; Pleasanton's
cavalry, 1,500; total effective force, 114,500.  He estimates Lee's
army at 62,000, which the Confederate authorities, Hotchkiss and
Allan, place as follows:  Anderson's and McLaws' divisions of
Longstreet's Corps, 17,000; Jackson's Corps, 33,500; Stuart's
Cavalry, 2,700; Artillery, 5,000; add 4,000 on engineer, hospital
duty, etc.  This estimate is exclusive of Stoneman's force.]

Both armies had spent the winter in much needed rest, after the
toilsome and exhausting marches and bloody battles which terminated
Lee's first invasion of Maryland.  The discipline of our army was
excellent, and it would have been hard to find a finer body of men,
or better fighting material than that assembled on this occasion,
in readiness to open the spring campaign.  Hooker was justly popular
with his troops.  They had confidence in his ability as a general,
and he had gained their good will by anticipating their wants, and
by generously grating furloughs to those who were pining from home-
sickness; trusting that old associations and the honor of the men
would induce them to rejoin their colors when the leaves of absence
had expired.  In this way he almost stopped the desertion which
had been so prevalent under Burnside.  Only one portion of the army
was dissatisfied; the position recently occupied by General Franz
Sigel, the favorite commander of the Eleventh Corps, had been given
to General O. O. Howard.  The numerous Germans in that corps were
discontented at the change.  They cared little for Howard's reputation
as the Havelock of the army; an appellation he had gained from his
zeal as a Congregationalist.  They felt, when their countryman
Sigel was deprived of his command, that it was a blow to their
nationality, and therefore lost some of the enthusiasm which always
accompanies the personal influence of a popular leader.

The rainy season was nearly over, the time had come for action,
and it was essential to strike a decisive blow before the term of
service of the nine months' and two years' men had drawn to a close.
Hooker's plan of campaign was simple, efficacious, and should have
been successful.  The rebels occupied a long line and could not be
strong everywhere.  He resolved to make a pretence of crossing with
three corps, under Major-General Sedgwick, below Fredericksburg,
while the remaining four corps under Major-General Slocum made a
detour and crossed twenty-seven miles above at Kelly's Ford.  The
latter were then to march down the river against the left flank of
the rebel army and re-open Banks' Ford; thus re-uniting the two
wings of the army and giving a secure line of retreat in case of
disaster.  When this was accomplished it was proposed to give battle
in the open country near the ford, the position there being a
commanding one and taking the whole line of rebel works on the
heights of Fredericksburg in reverse.  Owing to his great preponderance
of force, Hooker had little reason to doubt that the result would
be favorable to our arms.  To carry out this plan and make it a
complete surprise to the enemy it became necessary to leave Gibbon's
division of Couch's corps behind, for as his encampment at Falmouth
was in full view of the Confederate forces on the opposite side,
to withdraw it would have been to notify them that some unusual
movement was going on.  So far the idea was simply to crush the
opposing army, but Hooker's plan went farther and involved the
capture of Lee's entire force.  To accomplish this he directed
Stoneman to start two weeks in advance of the main body with ten
thousand cavalry, cross at the upper fords of the Rappahannock,
and sweep down upon Lee's communications with Richmond, breaking
up railroads and canals, cutting telegraph wires, and intercepting
supplies of all kinds.  As the rebel commissariat found great
difficulty in keeping more than four days' rations on hand at a
time, Stoneman's raid would almost necessarily force Lee to fall
back on his depots and give up Fredericksburg.  One column under
Averell was to attack Culpeper and Gordonsville, the other under
Buford to move to Louisa Court House, and thence to the Fredericksburg
Railroad.  Both columns were to unite behind the Pamunkey, and in
case our army was successful Stoneman was directed to plant his
force behind some river in an advantageous position on Lee's line
of retreat, where he could detain the rebel army until Hooker could
again assail it and compel it to surrender.  A brave programme!
Let us see how it was carried out.

It was an essential part of Hooker's project that the cavalry should
begin operations two weeks before the infantry.  If they did their
work thoroughly, Lee would be out of provisions, and his retreat
would give us all the moral effect of a victory.  The rebel cavalry
at the time being reduced to about 3,000 men, it was not supposed
that Stoneman would encounter any serious resistance.  He accordingly
started on April 13th to carry out his instructions, but another
rain storm, which made the river unfordable, and very bad roads,
detained him until the 28th.  It has been suggested that he might
have crossed higher up, but cavalry officers who were there, tell
me that every ravine had become an impassable river.  Hooker became
impatient and refused to wait any longer; so when the water subsided,
all--infantry, artillery, and cavalry--were sent over together.
The result was that the battle was ended before Stoneman got fairly
to work, and his operations had little or no effect in obstructing
Lee's movements.

To confuse the enemy as much as possible, demonstrations had been
made at both ends of the line.  On April 21st a small infantry
force was sent to threaten Kelly's Ford.  On the same day, I went
with part of my division down the river to Port Conway, opposite
Port Royal, twenty miles below Fredericksburg, made a pretence of
crossing in pontoons, and built fires in every direction at night,
to give the impression of a large force.  On the 24th General
Wadsworth went on an expedition to the same place, and two regiments
under Colonel Morrow, 24th Michigan, crossed over in boats, and
returned.  Those movements caused Jackson to strengthen his force
in that quarter.  On the 27th, the storm having abated, Meade's
corps (the Fifth), Howard's corps (the Eleventh), and Slocum's
corps (the Twelfth), the whole being under the command of General
Slocum, left camp for Kelly's Ford, each accompanied by three
batteries.  A detachment was thrown over, in boats, on the evening
of the 28th, which dispersed the picket guard; and by the next
morning the entire force was across the river and on their way to
the Rapidan, the Fifth Corps taking the direction of Elley's Ford
and the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps that of Germania Ford.  Stoneman's
cavalry crossed at the same time with the others, and moved to
Culpeper, where he halted for a time to reorganize his force, and
get rid of surplus horses, baggage, etc., which were sent to the
rear.  The next day Averell kept on to Rapidan Station with 4,000
sabres, to engage W. H. F. Lee's rebel brigade, so that it could
not interfere with the operations of the main body, which moved
southeast across Morton's Ford and Raccoon Ford to Louisa Court
House, where the work of destruction was to begin.  Stoneman's
further movements will be related hereafter.  One small brigade of
three regiments with two batteries was placed under the command of
General Pleasonton and directed to report to General Slocum, to
precede the infantry on the different roads.

Stuart, who commanded two brigades of rebel cavalry, under Fitz
Hugh Lee and W. H. F. Lee, and whose duty it was to watch these
upper fords, received news of the crossing at 9 P.M., on the 28th.

The turning column reached Chancellorsville with but little
opposition, as both Lee and Stuart thought it was making for
Gordonsville and the Virginia Central Railroad.  In consequence of
this miscalculation, Stuart planted himself at Brandy Station.
When he found that he was out of position and that it was too late
to prevent the crossing at Germania Ford, he made a circuit with
Fitz Hugh Lee's brigade to get between Slocum and Lee, and sent W.
H. F. Lee's brigade to impede Stoneman's operations.  The passage
of Germania Ford turned Elley's Ford and United States Ford, and
Mahone's and Posey's brigades, who were on guard there, retreated
on Chancellorsville, where Anderson had come up with Wright's
brigade too late to prevent the crossing.

By 6 P.M. on the 30th, Hooker found himself in command of four
corps at Chancellorsville, with another--that of Sickles--near at
hand.  Anderson fell back to Tabernacle Church as our troops
advanced, and began to fortify a line there.  Stuart sent Fitz Hugh
Lee's brigade, which was very much exhausted, to Todd's Tavern for
the night, while he started with a small escort, to explain the
situation to General Lee at Fredericksburg.  On the road, not far
from Spottsylvania, he came unexpectedly upon one of Pleasonton's
regiments, the 6th New York Cavalry, numbering about 200 men, which
was returning from a reconnoissance it had made in that direction.
He avoided the encounter and sent back to Todd's Tavern, at first
for a regiment, but subsequently for the entire brigade.  When
there reinforcements came up a furious cavalry contest took place,
with charges and counter-charges, and hand to hand combats.  It
was not without an element of romance, in that lonely spot, far
from either army, under the resplendent light of the full moon;
recalling, in the words of a Southern chronicler, some scene of
knightly glory.  Our troops were surrounded, but cut their way out
with the loss of their gallant commander, Lieutenant-Colonel McVicar,
who led them in the charge.

Meanwhile the other portion of the contemplated movement had also
been going forward.  On the 28th, the Sixth Corps, under Sedgwick,
and the First Corps, under Reynolds, were moved down near the river,
three or four miles below Fredericksburg, and bivouacked there in
a pouring rain.  As it was possible that the two corps might be
attacked when they reached the other side, the Third Corps, under
Sickles, was posted in the rear as a reserve.

The next day two bridges were laid down at Franklin's old crossing
for the Sixth Corps, and two more a mile below for the First Corps.
Men in rifle-pits on the other side impeded the placing of the
pontoons for a while, but detachments sent over in boats stormed
their intrenchments, and drove them out.  Brooks' division of the
Sixth Corps and Wadsworth's division of the First Corps then crossed
and threw up _tête du ponts_.  The enemy made no other opposition
than a vigorous shelling by their guns on the heights, which did
but little damage.  A considerable number of these missiles were
aimed at my division and at that of General J. C. Robinson, which
were held in reserve on the north side of the river; but as our
men were pretty well sheltered, there were but few casualties.

It soon became evident that the enemy would not attack the bridge
heads, they being well guarded by artillery on the north bank, so
Sickles' corps was detached on the 30th and ordered to Chancellorsville.

Sedgwick used the remainder of his men to great advantage by marching
them back and forth among the hills in such a way as to lead Lee
to suppose that a very large force confronted him.  As, however,
Sedgwick did not advance, and more accurate reports were furnished
by Stuart in relation to what had taken place up the river, Lee
saw, on the night of the 30th, that the movement in front of
Fredericksburg was a feint, and his real antagonist was at
Chancellorsville.  He had previously ordered Jackson's corps up
from Moss Creek and now advanced with the main body of his army to
meet Hooker, leaving Early's division of Jackson's corps and
Barksdale's brigade of McLaws' division of Longstreet's corps to
hold the heights of Fredericksburg against Sedgwick.  Jackson, who
was always prompt, started at midnight, and at 8 A.M. the next day
stood by the side of Anderson at Tabernacle Church.  McLaws' division
had already arrived, having preceded him by a few hours.

The error in the movement thus far made is plain.  It is a maxim
in war that a single hour's delay, when an enemy is strengthening
his position or when reinforcements are coming up, will frequently
cost the lives of a thousand men.  In the present instance it was
simply suicidal for Hooker to delay action until Anderson had
fortified his lines and Lee had come forward with the main body to
join him.  Hooker should have pressed on immediately to seize the
objective.  Banks' Ford was almost within his grasp, and only a
portion of Anderson's division barred the way.  The possession of
that ford would have brought Sedgwick twelve miles nearer to him,
and would have forced Lee to fight at a great disadvantage both as
to position and numbers.  Hooker knew from a captured despatch
which Pleasonton placed in his hands, that Lee was still in
Fredericksburg on the 30th, uncertain how to act; for he did not
know the strength of Sedgwick's column, and feared that the main
attack might come from that direction.  The four corps at
Chancellorsville amounted to about forty-six thousand men; and
18,000 more were close at hand under Sickles.  The troops had made
but a short march, and were comparatively fresh.  Four miles further
on lay the great prize for which Hooker was contending.  He had
only to put out his hand to reach it, but he delayed action all
that long night and until eleven o'clock of the next morning.  When
he did make the effort the line he was about to occupy was well
fortified and held by all but one division and one brigade of Lee's
army.



CHAPTER II.
FRIDAY, THE FIRST OF MAY.

There are two excellent roads leading from Chancellorsville to
Fredericksburg--one a plank road, which keeps up near the sources
of the streams along the dividing line between Mott Run on the
north and Lewis Creek and Massaponax Creek on the South, and the
other called the old turnpike, which was more direct but more
broken, as it passed over several ravines.  There was still a third
road, a very poor one, which ran near the river and came out at
Banks' Ford.

On May 1st, at 11 A.M., Hooker moved out to attack Lee in four
columns.

Slocum's corps, followed by that of Howard, took the plank road on
the right.

Sykes' division of Meade's corps, followed by Hancock's division
of Couch's corps, went by the turnpike in the centre.

The remainder of Meade's corps--Griffin's division, followed by
that of Humphreys--took the river road.

Lastly, French's division of Couch's corps was under orders to turn
off and march to Todd's Tavern.

Each column was preceded by a detachment of Pleasonton's cavalry,
which, in fact, had been close to Anderson's pickets all the
morning.

Before these troops started, Sickles' corps arrived, after a short
march, from Hartwood Church, and were posted in rear of the
Chancellorsville House as a reserve, with one brigade thrown out
to Dowdall's Tavern, otherwise known as Melzi Chancellor's house.
Another brigade was left at the Ford to guard the passage against
Fitz Hugh Lee's cavalry.

Hooker, who was a very sanguine man, expected to be able to form
line of battle by 2 P.M., with his right resting near Tabernacle
Church, and his left covering Banks' Ford.  It did not seem to
occur to him that the enemy might be there before him and prevent
the formation, or that he would have any difficulty in moving and
deploying his troops; but he soon found himself hampered in every
direction by dense and almost impenetrable thickets, which had a
tendency to break up every organization that tried to pass through
them into mere crowds of men without order or alignment.  Under
these circumstances concert of action became exceedingly difficult,
and when attempts were made to communicate orders off the roads,
aids wandered hopelessly through the woods, struggling in the thick
undergrowth, without being able to find any one.  It was worse then
fighting in a dense fog.*  The enemy, of course, were also impeded
in their movements, but they had the advantage of being better
acquainted with the country, and in case they were beaten they had
a line at Tabernacle Church already intrenched to fall back upon.
The ravines also, which crossed the upper roads at right angles,
offered excellent defensive positions for them.

[* One brigade of Griffin's division was out all night trying to
find its way through the thickets, and did not reach the main army
until 4 A.M.  Wilcox's brigade, which came the next day from Banks'
Ford to reinforce the enemy, had a similar experience.]

McLaws, who had advanced on the turnpike, managed to form line of
battle with his division on each side of the pike, against Sykes,
who had now come forward to sustain his cavalry detachment, which,
in spite of their gallantry--for they rode up and fired in the
faces of the enemy--were driven in by the 11th Virginia Infantry
of Mahone's brigade.  Jackson on his arrival, had stopped the
fortifying which Anderson had commenced, and according to his
invariable custom to find and fight his enemy as soon as possible,
had moved forward; so that the two armies encountered each other
about two and half miles from Chancellorsville.  Sykes indeed, met
the advance of McLaws' division only a mile out, and drove it back
steadily a mile farther, when it was reinforced by Anderson's
division, and Ramseur's brigade of Rodes' division.  Anderson gave
Sykes a lively fight and succeeded in getting in on his flanks;
for, owing to the divergence of the roads, neither Slocum on the
right nor Meade's two divisions on the left were abreast with him.
He tried to connect with Slocum by throwing out a regiment deployed
as skirmishers, but did not succeed.  As the enemy were gaining
the advantage he fell back behind Hancock, who came to the front
and took his place.  Slocum now formed on the right, with his left
resting on the plank road, and his right on high ground which
commanded the country around.  Altogether the general line was a
good one; for there were large open spaces where the artillery
could move and manoeuvre, and the army were almost out of the
thickets.  The reserves could have struggled through those in the
rear, and have filled the gaps, so that there is no reason to
suppose our forces could have not continued to advance, or at all
events have held the position, which, from its elevation and the
other advantages I have stated, was an important one, especially
as the column on the river road was in sight of Banks' Ford, which
it could have seized and held, or have struck the right flank of
the enemy with great effect.  The troops had come out to obtain
possession of Banks' Ford, and all the surplus artillery was waiting
there.  To retreat without making any adequate effort to carry out
his plans made the General appear timid, and had a bad effect on
the morale of the army.  It would have been time enough to fall
back in case of defeat; and if such a result was anticipated, the
engineers with their 4,000 men, aided by Sickles' corps, could
easily have laid out a strong line in the rear for the troops to
fall back upon.  General Warren, the Chief Engineer on Hooker's
staff, thought the commanding ridge with the open space in front,
upon which Hancock was posted, a very advantageous position for
the army to occupy, and urged Couch not to abandon it until he
(Warren) had conferred with Hooker.  After the order came to retire,
Couch sent to obtain permission to remain, but it was peremptorily
refused.  Hooker soon afterward changed his mind and countermanded
his first order, but it was then too late; our troops had left the
ridge and the enemy were in possession of it.  There was too much
vacillation at headquarters.  Slocum, who was pressing the enemy
back, was very much vexed when he received the order, but obeyed
it, and retreated without being molested.  It is true, Wright's
brigade had formed on his right, but the advance of the Eleventh
Corps would have taken that in flank, so that the prospect was
generally good at this time for an advance.  The column on the
river road also retired without interference.  As Couch had waited
to hear from Hooker, Hancock's right flank became somewhat exposed
by the delay, but he fell back without serious loss.  French also,
who had started for Todd's Tavern, returned.  He encountered the
enemy, but was ordered in and did not engage them.

That portion of the country around Chancellorsville within the
Union lines on the morning of May 2d, may, with some exceptions,
be described as a plain, covered by dense thickets, with open spaces
in the vicinity of the houses, varied by the high ground at Talley's
on the west and by the hills of Fairview and Hazel Grove on the
south, and terminating in a deep ravine near the river.  Our general
line was separated from that of the enemy by small streams, which
principally ran through ravines, forming obstacles useful for
defensive purposes.  This was the case on the east and south, but
on the west, where Howard's line terminated, there was nothing but
the usual thickets to impede the enemy's approach.

As the narrative proceeds, the position of the Confederate army,
who held the broken ground on the other side of those ravines, will
be more particularly described.

After all, a defensive battle in such a country is not a bad thing,
for where there are axes and timber it is easy to fortify and hard
to force the line; always provided that free communications are
kept open to the central reserve and from one part of the line to
another.  It must be confessed that the concealment of the thickets
is also favorable to the initiative, as it enables the attacking
party to mass his troops against the weak parts without being
observed.  Hooker probably thought if Lee assailed a superior force
in an intrenched position he would certainly be beaten; and if he
did not attack he would soon be forced to fall back on his depots
near Richmond for food and ammunition.  In either case the prestige
would remain with the Union general.

The rebels followed up our army closely, and it is quite possible
that a sudden attack, when it was heaped up around Chancellorsville,
might have been disastrous to us.  Gradually, under the skilful
guidance of Captain Payne of the Engineers, who had made himself
well acquainted with the country, the different corps took the
positions they had occupied on the previous night, and order came
out of chaos.  The line, as thus established, covered all the roads
which passed through Chancellorsville.  The left, held by Meade's
corps, rested on the Rappahannock, near Scott's Dam; the line was
then continued in a southerly direction by Couch's corps, facing
east, French's division being extended to a point near to and east
of Chancellorsville, with Hancock's division of the same corps
holding an outpost still further to the east.  Next came the Twelfth
Corps under Slocum, facing south, and then, at some distance to
the west, in echelon to the rear along the Plank Road, Howard's
corps was posted.  The Third Corps under Sickles was kept in reserve,
back of the mansion.  The next morning two brigades and two batteries
of Birney's division were interposed between Slocum and Howard,
with a strong line of skirmishers thrown out in front.  The 8th
Pennsylvania Cavalry picketed the roads and kept the enemy in sight.
The thickets which surrounded this position were almost impenetrable,
so that an advance against the enemy's lines became exceedingly
difficult and manoeuvring nearly impracticable, nor was this the
only defect.  Batteries could be established on the high ground to
the east, which commanded the front facing in that direction, while
our own artillery had but little scope; and last, but most important
of all, the right of Howard's corps as "in the air," that is, rested
on no obstacle.

Hooker was sensible that this flank was weak, and sent Graham's
brigade of Sickles' corps with a battery to strengthen it; but
Howard took umbrage at this, as a reflection on the bravery of his
troops or his own want of skill, and told Graham that he did not
need his services; that he felt so secure in his position that he
would send his compliments to the whole rebel army if they lay in
front of him, and invite them to attack him.  As Hooker had just
acquiesced in the appointment of Howard to be Commander of the
Eleventh Corps, he disliked to show a want of confidence in him at
the very beginning of his career, and therefore yielded to his
wishes and ordered the reinforcements to return and report to
Sickles again.

Chancellorsville being a great center of communication with the
plank road and turnpike heading east and west, and less important
roads to the south, and southeast, Hooker desired above all things
to retain it; for if it should once fall into the hands of the
enemy, our army would be unable to move in any direction except to
the rear.

General Lee formed his line with Wickham's and Owens' regiments of
cavalry on his right, opposite Meade's corps, supported by Perry's
brigade of Anderson's division; Jackson's line stretched from the
Plank Road around toward the Furnace.

Before night set in, Wright and Stuart attacked an outlying part
of Slocum's corps and drove it in on the main body.  They then
brought up some artillery and opened fire against Slocum's position
on the crest of the hill.  Failing to make any impression they soon
retired and all was quiet once more.

The enemy soon posted batteries on the high ground a mile east of
Chancellorsville, and opened on Hancock's front with considerable
effect.  They also enfiladed Geary's division of Slocum's corps,
and became very annoying, but Knap's battery of the Twelfth Corps
replied effectively and kept their fire down to a great extent.

As the Union army was hidden by a thick undergrowth, Lee spent the
rest of the day in making a series of feigned attacks to ascertain
where our troops were posted.

When night set in, the sound of the axe was heard in every direction,
for both armies thought it prudent to strengthen their front as
much as possible.

The prospect for Lee as darkness closed over the scene was far from
encouraging.  He had examined the position of the Union army
carefully, and had satisfied himself that as regards its centre
and left it was unassailable.  Let any man with a musket on his
shoulder, encumbered with a cartridge-box, haversack, canteen,
etc., attempt to climb over a body of felled timber to get at an
enemy who is coolly shooting at him from behind a log breastwork,
and he will realize the difficulty of forcing a way through such
obstacles.  Our artillery, too, swept every avenue of approach, so
that the line might be considered as almost impregnable.  Before
giving up the attack, however, Stuart was directed to cautiously
reconnoitre on the right, where Howard was posted, and see if there
was not a vulnerable point there.



CHAPTER III.
THE DISASTROUS SECOND OF MAY.

At dawn of day General Lee and General Jackson were sitting by the
side of the plank road, on some empty cracker boxes, discussing
the situation, when Stuart came up and reported the result of his
reconnoissance.  He said the right flank of Howard's corps was
defenceless and easily assailable.  Jackson at once asked permission
to take his own corps--about 26,000 muskets--make a detour through
the woods to conceal his march from observation, and fall unexpectedly
upon the weak point referred to by Stuart.  It was a startling
proposition and contrary to all the principles of strategy, for
when Jackson was gone Lee would be left with but a few men to
withstand the shock of Hooker's entire army, and might be driven
back to Fredericksburg or crushed.  If the Eleventh Corps had
prepared for Jackson's approach by a line properly fortified, with
redoubts on the flanks, the men protected in front by felled timber
and sheltered by breastworks, with the artillery at the angles,
crossing its fire in front, Jackson's corps would have been powerless
to advance, and could have been held as in a vise, while Lee, one-
half of his force being absent, would have found himself helpless
against the combined attack of our other corps, which could have
assailed him in front and on each flank.

There was, therefore, great risk in attempting such a manoeuvre,
for nothing short of utter blindness on the part of the Union
commanders could make it successful.

Still, something had to be done, for inaction would result in a
retreat, and in the present instance, if the worst came to the
worst, Jackson could fall back on Gordonsville, and Lee toward the
Virginia Central Railroad, where they could reunite their columns
by rail, before Hooker could march across the country and prevent
the junction.  Jackson received the required permission, and started
off at once by a secluded road, keeping Fitz Hugh Lee's brigade of
cavalry between his column and the Union army to shield his march
from observation.

At 2 A.M., Hooker sent orders for the First Corps, under Reynolds,
to which I belonged, to take up its bridges and join him by way of
United States Ford, and by 9 A.M. we were on our way.

The first sound of battle came from some guns posted on the eminence
from which Hancock had retreated the day before.  A battery there
opened fire on the army trains which had been parked in the open
plain in front of the Chancellorsville House, and drove them pell
mell to the rear.

At dawn Hooker rode around, accompanied by Sickles, to inspect his
lines.  He approved the position generally, but upon Sickles'
recommendation he threw in a division of the Third Corps between
the Eleventh and Twelfth, as he thought the interval too great
there.

As soon as Jackson was en route, Lee began to demonstrate against
our centre and left, to make Hooker believe the main attack was to
be there, and to prevent him from observing the turning column in
its progress toward the right.  A vigorous cannonade began against
Meade, and a musketry fire was opened on Couch and Slocum; the
heaviest attack being on Hancock's position, which was in advance
of the main line.

In spite of every precaution, Jackson's column as it moved southward
was seen to pass over a bare hill about a mile and a half from
Birney's front, and its numbers were pretty accurately estimated.
General Birney at once reported this important fact at General
Hooker's headquarters.  It is always pleasant to think your adversary
is beaten, and Hooker thought at first Jackson might be retreating
on Gordonsville.  It was evident enough that he was either doing
that or making a circuit to attack Howard.  To provide for the
latter contingency the following order was issued:

  HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC
  CHANCELLORSVILLE, Va., May 2, 1863, 9.30 A.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL SLOCUM AND MAJOR-GENERAL HOWARD:

I am directed by the Major-General Commanding to say that the
disposition you have made of your corps has been with a view to a
front attack by the enemy.  If he should throw himself upon your
flank, he wishes you to examine the ground and determine upon the
positions you will take in that event, in order that you may be
prepared for him in whatever direction he advances.  He suggests
that you have heavy reserves well in hand to meet this contingency.
The right of your line does not appear to be strong enough.  No
artificial defences worth naming have been thrown up, and there
appears to be a scarcity of troops at that point, and not, in the
General's opinion, as favorably posted as might be.

We have good reason to suppose that the enemy is moving to our
right.  Please advance your pickets for purposes of observation as
far as may be safe, in order to obtain timely information of their
approach.

  (Signed)  JAMES H. VAN ALLEN,
  _Brigadier-General and Aide-de-camp_.

For what subsequently occurred Hooker was doubtless highly censurable,
but it was not unreasonable for him to suppose, after giving these
orders to a corps commander, that they would be carried out, and
that minor combats far out on the roads would precede and give
ample notice of Jackson's approach in time to reinforce that part
of the line.

When the enemy were observed, Sickles went out with Clark's battery
and an infantry support to shell their train.  This had the effect
of driving them off of that road on to another which led in the
same direction, but was less exposed, as it went through the woods.
A second reconnoissance was sent to see if the movement continued.
Sickles then obtained Hooker's consent to start out with two
divisions to attack Jackson's corps in flank and cut if off from
the main body.

Sickles started on this mission at 1 P.M. with Birney's division,
preceded by Randolph's battery.  As Jackson might turn on him with
his whole force, Whipple's division of his own corps reinforced
his left, and Barlow's brigade of the Eleventh Corps his right.
He was greatly delayed by the swamps and the necessity of building
bridges, but finally crossed Lewis Creek and reached the road upon
which Jackson was marching.  He soon after, by the efforts of
Berdan's sharpshooters, surrounded and captured the 23d Georgia
regiment, which had been left to watch the approaches from our
lines.  Information obtained from prisoners showed the Jackson
could not be retreating, and that his object was to strike a blow
somewhere.

Birney's advance, and the capture of the 23d Georgia were met by
corresponding movements on the part of the enemy.  A rebel battery
was established on the high ground at the Welford House, which
checked Birney's progress until it was silenced by Livingston's
battery, which was brought forward for that purpose.  Pleansonton's
cavalry was now sent to the Foundry as an additional reinforcement.
Sickles' intention was to cut Jackson off entirely from McLaws'
and Anderson's divisions, and then to attack the latter in flank,
a plan which promised good results.  In the mean time Pleasonton's
cavalry was sent forward to follow up Jackson's movement.  Sickles
requested permission to attack McLaws, but Hooker again became
irresolute; so this large Union force was detained at the Furnace
without a definite object, and the works it had occupied were
vacant.  While Sickles was not allowed to strike the flank, Slocum's
two divisions under Geary and Williams were sent to push back the
fortified front of the enemy in the woods; a much more difficult
operation.  Geary attacked on the plank road, but made no serious
impression, and returned.  Williams struck further to the south,
but was checked by part of Anderson's division.  A combined attack
against Lee's front and left flank, undertaken with spirit earlier
in the day, would in all probability have driven him off toward
Fredericksburg and have widened the distance between his force and
that of Jackson; but now the latter was close at hand and it was
too late to attempt it.  As the time came for the turning column
to make its appearance on Howard's right, a fierce attack was again
made against Hancock with infantry and artillery, to distract
Hooker's attention from the real point at issue.

Pleasonton, after dismounting one regiment and sending it into the
woods to reconnoitre, finding his cavalry were of no use in such
a country, and that Jackson was getting farther and father away,
rode leisurely back, at Sickles' suggestion, to Hazel Grove, which
was an open space of considerable elevation to the right of the
Twelfth Corps.  As he drew near, the roar of battle burst upon his
ears from the right of the line and a scene of horror and confusion
presented itself, presaging the rout of the entire army if some
immediate measures were not taken to stem the tide of disaster.



CHAPTER IV.
THE ROUT OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS.

Notwithstanding Hooker's order of 9.30 A.M. calling Howard's
attention to the weakness of his right flank, and the probability
that Jackson was marching to attack it, no precautions were taken
against the impending danger.  The simple establishing of a front
of two regiments toward the west when half his command would hardly
have been sufficient, unless protected by works of some kind, was
perfectly idle as a barrier against the torrent about to overwhelm
the Eleventh Corps.  So far as I can ascertain, only two companies
were thrown out on picket, and they were unsupported by grand
guards, so that they did not detain the enemy a moment, and the
rebels and our pickets all came in together.  Great stress has been
laid upon the fact that Howard did have a reserve force--Barlow's
brigade of 2,500 men--facing west, which Hooker withdrew to reinforce
Sickles; but is not shown that Howard made any remonstrance or
attached any great importance to its removal.  Even if it had
remained, as there were not strong intrenchments in front of it,
it is not probable that it would have been able to resist Jackson's
entire corps for any length of time.  There was no reason other
than Howard's utter want of appreciation of the gravity of the
situation to prevent him from forming a strong line of defence to
protect his right flank.  If made with felled timber in front and
redoubts on the flanks, Jackson could not have overleaped it, or
even attacked it without heavy loss.  If he stopped to do so,
Sickles' corps and Williams' division of the Twelfth Corps, with
the reserve forces under Berry and French, would soon have confronted
him.  If he had attempted to keep on farther down to attack the
United States Ford, he would have met the First Corps there, and
would have permanently severed all connection between himself and
Lee, besides endangering his line of retreat.  The apathy and
indifference Howard manifested in relation to Jackson's approach
can only be explained in the supposition that he really believed
that Jackson had fled to Gordonsville, and that the demonstrations
on his front and right proceeded merely from Stuart's cavalry; and
yet why any one should suppose that Lee would part with half his
army, and send it away to Gordonsville where there was no enemy
and nothing to be done, is more than I can imagine.  Jackson was
celebrated for making these turning movements; besides, it was
easy, by questioning prisoners, to verify the fact that he had no
surplus trains with him.  Nothing, in short, but ammunition wagons,
and ambulances for the wounded; a sure indication that his movement
meant fight and not retreat.

From 10 A.M., when Hooker's order was received, to 6 P.M., when
the assault came, there was ample time for Howard to form an
impregnable line.  His division commanders did not share his
indifference.  General Schurz pointed out to him that his flank
was in the air, but he seemed perfectly satisfied with his line as
it was, and not at all desirous of changing it in any particular.
Schurz, of his own volition, without the knowledge of his chief,
posted three regiments in close column of division, and formed them
in the same direction as the two regiments and two guns which were
expected to keep Jackson back, but the shock, when it came, was so
sudden that these columns did not have time to deploy.  Devens,
having two reserve regiments, also faced them that way, of his own
accord, behind the other two, but having no encouragement to form
line in that direction it is probable both generals hesitated to
do so.

Jackson, having debouched from the country road into the plank
road, was separated from Lee by nearly six miles of pathless forest.
He kept on until he reached the turnpike, and then halted his
command in order that he might reconnoitre and form line of battle.
He went up on a high hill and personally examined the position of
the Eleventh Corps.  Finding that it was still open to attack, and
that no preparations had been made to receive him, he formed Rodes'
and Colston's divisions two hundred yards apart, perpendicular to
the plank road, with the road in the centre, and with Hill's division
both on the plank road and turnpike as a support to the other two.
Fitz Lee's brigade of cavalry was left on the plank road to menace
Howard from that direction.

It will be seen by a glance at the map that his lines overlapped
that of the Eleventh Corps for a long distance, both in front and
rear.  The first notice our troops had of his approach did not come
from our pickets--for their retreat and his advance were almost
simultaneous--but from the deer, rabbits, and other wild animals
of the forest, driven from their coverts by his advance.  It is
always convenient to have a scape-goat in case of disaster, and
the German element in the Eleventh Corps have been fiercely censured
and their name became a byword for giving way on this occasion.
It is full time justice should be done by calling attention to the
position of that corps.  I assert that when a force is not deployed,
but is struck suddenly and violently on its flank, resistance in
_impracticable_.  Not Napoleon's Old Guard, not the best and bravest
troops that ever existed, could hold together in such a case, for
the first men assailed are--to use a homely but expressive word--
driven into a _huddle_; and a huddle cannot fight, for it has no
front and no organization.  Under such circumstances, the men have
but a choice of two evils, either to stay where they are and be
slaughtered, without the power of defending themselves, or to run;
and the only sensible thing for them to do is to run and rally on
some other organization.  The attempt to change front and meet this
attack _on such short notice_ would have been hopeless enough,
drawn up as Howard's men were, even if they had been all in line
with arms in their hands; but it is a beautiful commentary on the
vigilance displayed, that in many cases the muskets were stacked,
and the men lounging about some playing cards, others cooking their
supper, intermingled with the pack-mules and beef cattle they were
unloading.  It will be remembered that in the order previously
quoted, Howard was directed _"to advance his pickets for the purpose
of observation,"_ in order _that he might have ample time for
preparation._  The object of this injunction is plain enough.  It
was to make sufficient resistance to Jackson's advance to delay
it, and not only give time for the Eleventh Corps to form, but
enable Hooker to send his reserves to that part of the line.  The
pickets, therefore, should have been far out and strongly backed
with a large force which would take advantage of every accident of
ground to delay the rebel column as long as possible.  Howard seemed
to have no curiosity himself, as he sent out no parties; but Sickles
and Pleasonton had their spies and detachments on the watch, and
these came in constantly with the information, which was duly
transmitted to Howard, that Jackson was actually coming.  Schurz
also became uneasy and sent out parties to reconnoitre.  General
Noble, at that time Colonel of the Seventeenth Connecticut Infantry,
two companies of whose regiment were on the picket line there,
writes as follows:  "The disaster resulted from Howard's and Devens'
utter disregard and inattention under warnings that came in from
the front and flank all through the day.  Horseman after horseman
rode into my post and was sent to headquarters with the information
that the enemy were heavily marching along our front and proceeding
to our right; and last of all an officer reported the rebels massing
for attack.  Howard scouted the report and insulted the informants,
charging them with telling a story that was the offspring of their
imaginations or their fears."

If this be true, there has been but one similar case in our annals,
and that was the massacre of the garrison of Fort Sims, by the
savages, in 1813, near Mobile, Alabama; soon after a negro had been
severely flogged by the commanding officer for reporting that he
had seen Indians lurking around the post.

Adjutant Wilkenson, of the same regiment, confirms General Noble's
statement and says, "Why a stronger force was not sent out as
skirmishers and the left of our line changed to front the foe is
more than I am able to understand."

General Schimmelpfennig, commanding a brigade of Schurz's division,
says he sent out a reconnoissance and reported the hostile movements
fully two hours before the enemy charged.

The Germans were bitterly denounced for this catastrophe, I think
very unjustly, for in the first place less than one-half the Eleventh
Corps were Germans, and in the second place the troops that did
form line and temporarily stop Jackson's advance were Germans;
principally Colonel Adolph Buschbeck's brigade of Steinwehr's
division, aided by a few regiments of Schurz's division, who gave
a volley or two.  Buschbeck held a weak intrenched line perpendicular
to the plank road for three-quarters of an hor, with artillery on
the right, losing one-third of his force.  His enemy then folded
around his flanks and took him in reverse, when further resistance
became hopeless and his men retreated in good order to the rear of
Sickles' line at Hazel Grove where they supported the artillery
and offered to lead a bayonet charge, if the official reports are
to be believed.  Warren says he took charge of some batteries of
the Eleventh Corps and formed them in line across the Plank Road
without any infantry support whatever.

In reference to this surprise, Couch remarks that no troops could
have stood under such circumstances, and I fully agree with him.

An officer of the Eleventh Corps who was present informed General
Wainwright, formerly Colonel of the 76th New York, that he was
playing cards in the ditch, and the first notice he had of the
enemy was seeing them looking down upon him from the parapet above.

As for Devens, who was nearest the enemy, it is quite probable that
any attempt by him to change front to the west previous to the
attack would have been looked upon by Howard as a reflection upon
his own generalship and would have been met with disfavor, if not
with a positive reprimand.  The only semblance of precaution taken,
therefore, was the throwing out two regiments to face Jackson's
advance.  Devens could not disgarnish his main line without Howard's
permission, and it is not fair, therefore, to hold him responsible
for the disaster.  As it was, he was severely wounded in attempting
to rally his men.  The only pickets thrown out appear to have been
_two companies of the 17th Connecticut Infantry._

Just as Jackson was about to attack, a furious assault was made at
the other end of the line, where Meade was posted.  This was repulsed
but it served to distract Hooker's attention from the real point
of danger on the right.

It would seem from all accounts that nothing could vanquish Howard's
incredulity.  He appeared to take so little interest in Jackson's
approach that when Captain George E. Farmer, one of Pleasonton's
staff, reported to him that he had found a rebel battery posted
directly on the flank of the Eleventh Corps, he was, to use his
own language, _"courteously received, but Howard did not seem to
believe there was any force of the enemy in his immediate front."_
Sickles and Pleasonton were doing all they could to ascertain
Jackson's position, for at this time a small detachment of the
Third Corps were making a reconnoissance on the Orange Court House
Plank Road, and Rodes states that our cavalry was met there and
skirmished with Stuart's advance.  Farmer said _he saw no Union
pickets,_ but noticed on his return that Howard's men were away
from their arms, which were stacked, and that they were playing
cards, etc., utterly unsuspicious of danger and unprepared for a
contest.  Notwithstanding the reports of Jackson's movement from
spies and scouts, Howard ordered no change in his lines.

An attempt has been made to hold Colonel Farmer responsible for
this surprise, on the ground that he should have charged the battery
and brought in some prisoners, who would give full information;
but there had been warnings enough, and prisoners enough, and as
Colonel Farmer had but forty men, he would have had to dismount
half of them to make the assault, and with part of his force holding
the horses, he could only have used about twenty men in the attack,
which is rather too few to capture guns supported by an army.
Besides, Farmer was sent out by General Pleasonton with specific
instructions, and was not obliged to recognize the authority of
other officers who desired him to make a Don Quixote of himself to
no purpose.

If the two wings of the rebel army had been kept apart, the small
force left under Lee could easily have been crushed, or driven off
toward Richmond.  The commander of the Eleventh Corps, however,
far from making any new works, did not man those he had, but left
his own lines and went with Barlow's brigade to see what Sickles
was doing.

The subsequent investigation of this sad business by the Congressional
Committee on the Conduct of the War was very much of a farce, and
necessarily unreliable; for so long as both Hooker and Howard were
left in high command, it was absurd to suppose their subordinates
would testify against them.  Any officer that did so would have
soon found his military career brought to a close.

Howard was in one or two instances mildly censured for not keeping
a better lookout, but as a general thing the whole blame was thrown
on the Germans.  Hooker himself attributed the trouble to the fact
that Howard did not follow up Jackson's movements, and allowed his
men to stray from their arms.

A great French military writer has said, "It is permissible for an
officer to be defeated; but never to be surprised."

It is, of course, only fair to hear what Howard himself has to say
in relation to this matter.

He writes in his official report of the battle as follows:

"Now as to the cause of the disaster to my corps.

"_First_.--Though constantly threatened, and apprised of the moving
of the enemy, yet the woods were so dense that he was able to move
a large force, whose exact whereabouts neither patrols, reconnoissances,
nor scouts ascertained.

"He succeeded in forming a column opposite to and outflanking my
right.

"_Second_.--By the panic produced by the enemy's reverse fire,
regiments and artillery were thrown suddenly upon those in position.

"_Third_.--The absence of General Barlow's brigade, which I had
previously located in reserve, and in _echelon_ with Colonel Von
Gilsa's, so as to cover his right flank."

The first proposition implies that Howard did not know Jackson
intended to attack his right, and therefore did not prepare for
him in that direction, but as his front was well fortified, and
his flank unprotected, it was plainly his duty to strengthen the
weak part of his line.  To suppose that Jackson would run a great
risk, and spend an entire day in making this long circuit for the
purpose of assailing his enemy in front, is hardly reasonable; for
he could have swung his line around against it at once, had he
desired to do so.

The fierce rush of the rebels, who came in almost simultaneously
with the pickets, first struck General Von Gilsa's two small
regiments and the two guns in the road, the only force that actually
fronted them in line.

Von Gilsa galloped at once to Howard's Headquarters at Dowdall's
Tavern to ask for immediate reinforcements.  He was told, "he must
hold his post with the men he had, and trust to God;" information
which was received by the irate German with objurgations that were
not at all of an orthodox character.

Devens' division, thus taken in flank, was driven back upon Schurz's
division, and the being unable to form, was heaped up after some
resistance on Steinwehr's division, in the uttermost confusion and
disorder.  Steinwehr had only Buschbeck's brigade with him; the
other--that of Barlow--having been sent out to reinforce Sickles;
but he formed line promptly, behind a weak intrenchment, which had
been thrown across the road, and with the aid of his artillery kept
Jackson at bay for three-quarters of an hour.  Howard exerted
himself bravely then, and did all he could to rally the fugitives;
but Rodes' division, which attacked him, was soon reinforced by
that of Colston, and the two together folded around his flanks,
took his line in reverse, and finally carried the position with a
rush; and then Buschbeck's brigade retired in good order through
the flying crowd, who were streaming in wild disorder to the rear
past Hooker's headquarters.

And now, with the right of our line all gone, with a yawning gap
where Sickles' corps and Williams' division had previously been
posted, with Lee thundering against the centre and left, and Jackson
taking all our defences in reverse, his first line being close on
Chancellorsville itself, it seemed as if the total rout of the army
was inevitable.

Just before this attack, Hooker had decided to interpose more force
between the wings of the rebel army, in order to permanently dissever
Jackson from the main body.  If Sickles had been allowed to attack
the left flank of the enemy opposite the Furnace, as he requested
permission to do earlier in the afternoon, this co-operative movement
could hardly have failed to produce great results; afterward it
was too late to attempt it.  As already stated, Williams' division
struck Anderson in front on Birney's left, and Geary attacked McLaws
across the Plank Road to the right of Hancock.  Geary found the
enemy strongly posted, and as he made no progress, returned to his
works.  When the rout of the Eleventh Corps took place, Williams
also hastened back, but was fired upon by Jackson's troops, who
now occupied the intrenchments he had left.  Sickles thinks if this
had not occurred several regiments of the enemy would have been
cut off from the main body.



CHAPTER V.
JACKSON'S ADVANCE IS CHECKED.

The constantly increasing uproar, and the wild rush of fugitives
past the Chancellorsville House, told Hooker what had occurred,
and roused him to convulsive life.  His staff charged on the flying
crowd, but failed to stop them, and it became necessary to form a
line of fresh troops speedily, as Jackson was sweeping everything
before him.  It was not easy to find an adequate force for this
emergency.  The whole line was now actively engaged, Slocum being
attacked on the south, and Couch and Meade on the east.  Fortunately,
Berry's division was held in reserve, and was available.  They were
true and tried men, and went forward at once to the rescue.  Berry
was directed to form across the Plank Road, drive the rebels back,
and retake the lost intrenchments; an order easy to give, but very
difficult to execute.  The most he could do, under the circumstances,
was to form his line in the valley opposite Fairview, and hold his
position there, the enemy already having possession of the higher
ground beyond.

Before Berry went out, Warren had stopped several of the Eleventh
Corps batteries, and had formed them across the Plank Road, behind
the position of the infantry.  Winslow's Battery D, of the 1st New
York, and Dimick's Battery H, of the 1st United States, were already
there, with Hooker in person, having anticipated the movement.
These guns were very destructive, and were the principal agent in
checking the enemy.  As soon as they had formed in line, Warren
gave orders to Colonel Best, Chief of Artillery to the Twelfth
Corps, to post more batteries on the eminence called Fairview, to
the rear and left of the others.

Few persons appreciate the steadiness and courage required, when
all around is in flight and confusion, for a force to advance
steadily to the post of danger in front and meet the exulting enemy.
Such men are heroes, and far more worthy of honor than those who
fight in the full blaze of successful warfare.

The thickets being unfavorable to cavalry, Sickles had sent Pleasonton
back to Hazel Grove with two mounted regiments, the 8th and 17th
Pennsylvania and Martin's battery, while the 6th New York was
scouting the woods on his right, dismounted.  Upon reaching the
open space which he had left when he went to the front, Pleasonton
found the place full of the debris of the combat--men, horses,
caissons, ambulances--all hurrying furiously to the rear.  To close
the way he charged on the flying mass, at Sickles' suggestion, who
had ridden in advance of his troops, which were still behind at
the Furnace.  Sickles ordered Pleasonton to take command of the
artillery, and the latter took charge of twenty-two guns, consisting
of his own and the Third Corps batteries.  The latter had already
been rallied and formed in line by Captain J. F. Huntington, of
the Ohio battery.  As senior officer present he assumed command of
the Third Corps artillery.  Unfortunately there was not time to
load or aim, for the rebels were close at hand, and their triumphant
yells were heard as they took possession of the works which Buschbeck
had so gallantly defended.  This advantageous position, which was
on an eminence overlooking Chancellorsville and the Plank Road,
and which was really the key of the battle-field, was about to be
lost.  There was but one way to delay Jackson, some force must be
sacrificed, and Pleasonton ordered Major Peter Keenan, commanding
the 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry, to charge the ten thousand men in
front with his four hundred.  Keenan saw in a moment that if he
threw his little force into that seething mass of infantry, horses
and men would go down on all sides, and few would be left to tell
the tale.  A sad smile lit up his noble countenance as he said,
_"General, I will do it."_  Thus, at thirty-four years of age, he
laid down his life, literally impaled on the bayonets of the enemy,
saving the army from capture and his country from the unutterable
degradation of slave-holding rule in the Northern States.  The
service rendered on that occasion is worthy to be recorded in
history with the sacrifices of Arthur Winckelried in Switzerland,
and the Chevalier d'Assas in France.*

[* Major J. R. Carpenter, one of the officers who headed this
charge, asserts that Keenan made it without orders, his only
instructions being to report to General Howard to assist in rallying
the Eleventh Corps.  Pleasonton's testimony, however, is positive
on the subject, and is supported by that of his aide, Colonel
Clifford Thompson.  Perhaps Carpenter did not hear all the conversation
that passed between Pleasonton and Keenan.]

A large part of his command were lost, but the short interval thus
gained was of priceless value.  Pleasonton was enabled to clear a
space in front of him, and twenty-two guns, loaded with double
canister, were brought to bear upon the enemy.  They came bursting
over the parapet they had just taken with loud and continuous yells,
and formed line of battle within three hundred yards.  All his guns
fired into their masses at once.  The discharge seemed fairly to
blow them back over the works from which they had just emerged.
Their artillery, under Colonel Crutchfield, which had been brought
up, was almost annihilated by the fire of the battery on the Plank
Road.  This gave time to reload the guns.

The enemy rallied and opened a furious musketry fire from the woods
against Pleasonton and Berry.  Both stood firm, and then came two
charges in succession which reached almost to the muzzles of
Pleasonton's guns, which were only supported by two small regiments
of cavalry--the 6th New York, and a new and untried regiment, the
17th Pennsylvania.  The whole did not amount to over 1,000 men.
Archer's brigade, on Jackson's left, which had not been stayed by
Keenan's charge, gained the woods and the Plank Road, and opened
a severe enfilading fire.  Huntington changed front with his own
battery and repelled the assault.  The 110th Pennsylvania regiment,
of Whipple's division, arrived in time to strengthen the cavalry
support, and many of the Eleventh Corps men fell into line also.
The last charge of the enemy was baffled by the opportune arrival
of Birney's and Whipple's divisions, and Barlow's brigade.

By this time, too (about 9 P.M.), Hays' brigade of French's corps
had been posted on the right, in rear and oblique to Berry's second
line.  The latter had greatly strengthened his position with log
breastworks, etc.  Captain Best, of the 4th United States Artillery,
in the meantime had exerted himself to collect forty or fifty guns
belonging to the Twelfth, Third, and some he had stopped from the
Eleventh Corps, and had arranged them at Fairview, to fire over
the heads of Berry's troops into the thicket where the enemy were
posted and along the Plank Road.

Hooker was so disheartened at the unexpected success of the enemy,
that when the first shock came he sent word to Sickles to save his
command if he could.  There is little doubt that at one time he
thought of retreating and leaving the Third Corps to its fate; for
when the enemy charged there was an awful gap in our lines; Birney's,
Whipple's, and Williams' divisions and Barlow's brigade were all
absent.  Fortunately Jackson was unable to press his advantage.
The ardor of the charge, the darkness, the thickets and the abattis
in which his forces became entangled, caused Rodes' and Colston's
divisions to be all intermingled, creating such disorder and
confusion that military organization was suspended, and orders
could neither be communicated nor obeyed.  Jackson therefore halted
his men in the edge of the woods, about a mile and a half from
Chancellorsville, posted two brigades on the two roads that came
in from the south, and sent for Hill's division, which was in rear
and which had not been engaged, to take the front, while the other
two divisions fell back to the open space at Dowdall's Tavern to
reform their lines.  Pending this movement he rode out on the Plank
Road with part of his staff and a few orderlies to reconnoitre,
cautioning his pickets not to fire at him on his return.  When he
came back new men had been posted, and his approach was mistaken
for the advance of Pleasonton's cavalry.  His own troops fired into
him with fatal effect.  Nearly all his escort were killed or wounded
and he received three balls, which shattered both arms.  His horse
ran toward the Union lines, and although he succeeded in turning
him back, he was dashed against the trees and nearly unhorsed.  He
reached the Confederate lines about the time our artillery again
opened up on the Plank Road with a fire that swept everything from
its front.  Several of his attendants were killed and others wounded.
The rebels found the utmost difficulty in keeping their men in line
under this tremendous fire.  Sentries had to be posted, and great
precautions taken to prevent the troops from giving way.  General
Pender recognized Jackson as he was carried past, and complained
of the demoralizing effect of this cannonade, but Jackson replied
sharply and sternly, "You must hold your ground, General Pender."
He was removed to the Wilderness Tavern, and as General Lee was in
some fear that Averell's cavalry, then at Elley's Ford, would make
a dash and capture him, he was sent on to Guiney's Station, on the
Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, where he died on the 10th of
May.  Whether the rebels killed him, or whether some of his wounds
came from our own troops, the 1st Massachusetts or 73d New York,
who were firing heavily in that direction, is a matter of some
doubt.  While leaning over him and expressing his sympathy, A. P.
Hill was also wounded by the fire from a section of Dimick's battery,
posted in advance in the Plank Road,* and the command of his corps
was assigned at his request to the cavalry general, J. E. B. Stuart.

When our artillery fire ceased, Hill's troops took position in
front of the others.

[* Young Dimick was the son of a distinguished general of the
regular army.  Though wounded on this occasion he refused to leave
the field.  The next day he again sought the post of danger and
was mortally wounded while holding the Plank Road.]



CHAPTER VI.
SICKLES FIGHTS HIS WAY BACK.--ARRIVAL OF THE FIRST CORPS.

Sickles, with his ten thousand men heaped up at Hazel Grove, was
still cut off from the main body and could only communicate with
Hooker's headquarters by means of bypaths and at great risk.  The
last orders he received, at 5 P.M., had been to attack Jackson's
right flank and check his advance.  He determined to do this and
force his way back, and with the co-operation of Williams' and
Berry's divisions, retake the Plank Road with the bayonet.  Ward's
brigade was posted in the front line and Hayman's and Graham's
brigades a hundred yards in rear.  A special column, under Colonel
Egan of the 40th New York, was formed on the extreme left.  The
muskets were uncapped and at midnight the command moved silently
against the enemy, and in spite of a terrific outburst of musketry
and artillery from the open space at Dowdall's, the Plank Road and
the works which Buschbeck had defended were regained.  Berry at
once moved forward his line to hold them.  Many guns and caissons
taken from Howard's corps, and Whipple's ammunition train of pack
mules were also recovered.  The confusion into which the enemy were
thrown by this assault against their right, enabled Berry to easily
repulse the attack on him, and he continued to hold the position.
The result of this brilliant movement was the reoccupation of a
great part of the works Howard had lost, and the capture of two
guns and three caissons from the enemy.  It is said that in this
conflict some of Sickles' men, in consequence of the thickets and
confusion, finding themselves surrounded, surrendered as they
supposed to the enemy, but to their delight found themselves in
Berry's division, among their old comrades.

Soon after this fight was over Mott's brigade of the Third Corps,
which had been on duty at the Ford, rejoined the main body.

Both sides now rested on their arms and prepared to renew the
struggle at daylight.  Hooker, in view of a possible defeat, directed
his engineer officers to lay out a new and stronger line, to cover
his bridges, to which he could retreat in case of necessity.

At sunset the First Corps went into bivouac on the south side of
United States Ford, about four miles and a half from Chancellorsville.
The men were glad enough to rest after their tedious march on a
hot day, loaded down with eight days' rations.  General Reynolds
left me temporarily in charge of the corps, while he rode on to
confer with Hooker.  We heard afar off the roar of the battle caused
by Jackson's attack, and saw the evening sky reddened with the
fires of combat, but knowing Hooker had a large force, we felt no
anxiety as to the result, and took it for granted that we would
not be wanted until the next day.  I was preparing a piece of india-
rubber cloth as a couch when I saw one of Reynolds' aids, Captain
Wadsworth, coming down the road at full speed.  He brought the
startling news that the Eleventh Corps had fled, and if we did not
go forward at once, the army would be hopelessly defeated.  We were
soon on the road, somewhat oppressed by the news, but not dismayed.
We marched through the thickening twilight of the woods amid a
silence at first only broken by the plaintive song of the whip-poor-
will, until the full moon rose in all its splendor.  As we proceeded
we came upon crowds of Eleventh Corps fugitives still hastening to
the rear.  They seemed to be wholly disheartened.  We halted for
a time, in order that our position in line of battle might be
selected, and then moved on.  As we approached the field a midnight
battle commenced, and the shells seemed to burst in sparkles in
the trees above our heads, but not near enough to reach us.  It
was Sickles fighting his way home again.  When we came nearer and
filed to the right to take position on the Elley's Ford road, the
men struck up John Brown's song, and gave the chorus with a will.
Their cheerful demeanor and proud bearing renewed the confidence
of the army, who felt that the arrival of Reynolds' corps, with
its historic record, was no ordinary reinforcement.

We were now on the extreme right of the other forces, on the Elley's
Ford road, with the right flank thrown back behind Hunting Creek.

Hooker was very much discouraged by the rout of the Eleventh Corps.
An occurrence of this kind always has a tendency to demoralize an
army and render it less trustworthy; for the real strength of an
armed force is much more in _opinion_ than it is in _numbers_.  A
small body of men, if made to believe the enemy are giving way,
will do and dare anything; but when they think the struggle is
hopeless, they will not resist even a weak attack, for each thinks
he is to be sacrificed to save the rest.  Hence Hooker did not feel
the same reliance on his men as he did before the disaster.  He
determined, nevertheless, to continue the battle, but contract his
lines by bringing them nearer to Chancellorsville.  The real key
of the battle-field now was the eminence at Hazel Grove.  So long
as we held it the enemy could not advance without presenting his
right flank to our batteries.  If he obtained possession of it he
could plant guns which would enfilade Slocum's line and fire directly
into our forces below.  Birney's division at this time was posted
in advance of Best's guns on the left, Berry was on the right, with
Williams' division of the Twelfth Corps behind Birney, and Whipple's
division in rear of Berry.

The position of Hazel Grove commanded Chancellorsville, where all
the roads met, and which it was vital to Hooker to hold.  For if
he lost that, he could not advance in any direction, and only his
line of retreat to the Ford would remain open to him.  Pleasonton
spent the night in fortifying this hill, and placed forty guns in
position there; but it was of no avail, for it was outside of the
new line Sickles was directed to occupy at daylight, and Hooker
was not aware of its importance.  A request was sent to the latter
to obtain his consent to hold it, but he was asleep, and the staff-
officer in charge, who had had no experience whatever in military
matters, positively refused to awaken him until daylight, and then
it was too late, for that was the time set for the troops to fall
back to the new line.

At 9 P.M., Hooker sent an order to Sedgwick, who was supposed to
be at Falmouth and to have 26,000 men, to throw bridges over, cross,
drive away Early's 9,000, who held the heights of Fredericksburg,
and then to come forward on the Plank Road, and be ready at daylight
on the 3d to take Lee's force in reverse, while Hooker attacked it
in front.

This order was given under the impression that Sedgwick had not
crossed with his main body, but only with Howe's division, whereas
he was at the bridge heads, three miles below Fredericksburg, on
the south side of the river.  Hooker probably forgot that he had
ordered a demonstration to be made against the Bowling Green road
on the 1st, and that Sedgwick went over to make it.



CHAPTER VII.
THE BATTLE OF THE THIRD OF MAY.

The Eleventh Corps were now sent to the extreme left of the line
to reorganize.  There they were sheltered behind the strong works
thrown up by Humphrey's division, and were not so liable to be
attacked.

The new line laid out by Hooker's order was on a low ridge
perpendicular to the Plank Road, and opposite and at right angles
to the right of Slocum's front.  It was strongly supported by the
artillery of the Third, Twelfth, and part of the Eleventh Corps,
massed under Captain Best on the heights at Fairview, in the rear
and to the left.  Sickles was ordered to fall back to it at dawn
of day, Birney to lead the way, and Whipple (Graham's brigade) to
bring up the rear.  The Plank Road ran through the centre of the
position, Birney being on the left and Berry on the right, with
Whipple's division on a short line in rear, as a reserve.  French's
division of Couch's corps was posted on Berry's right, the other
division (that of Hancock) remained between Mott Run and
Chancellorsville.

When the movement began, Birney's division, on the left of Whipple's,
occupied the high ground at Hazel Grove, facing the Plank Road,
Graham's brigade being on the extreme left.  This was a very
aggressive position, since it took every column that advanced
against Sickles' new line directly in flank, and therefore it was
indispensable for the rebel commander to capture Hazel Grove before
he advanced against the main body of the Third Corps, which held
the Plank Road.  This hill was not quite so high as that at Fairview,
but our artillery on it had great range, and the post should have
been maintained at all hazards.  The cavalry who had so ably defended
it fell back, in obedience to orders, to the Chancellorsville House,
to support the batteries in that vicinity, and I think one regiment
was sent to report to Sedgwick.  Whipple commenced the movement by
sending off his artillery and that of Birney.  Graham's brigade
was the rear guard.  Its retreat was covered by the fire of
Huntington's battery on the right.  The moment the enemy saw that
Graham was retiring, Archer's brigade of A. P. Hill's division
charged, attained the top of the hill, and succeeded in capturing
four guns.  Elated by his success, Archer pressed forward against
Huntington's battery, but was rudely repulsed; for Sickles opened
on him also with a battery from Fairview.  He managed to hold the
four guns until Doles' brigade of Rodes' division came to his aid.
The two took the hill, for Whipple had no instructions to defend
it.  He retired in perfect order to the new position assigned him.
Huntington's battery, supported by two regiments sent out by Sickles,
covered the retreat, but suffered considerable loss in doing so,
as one regiment was withdrawn and the other gave way.  Ward's
brigade was then sent to the right and Hayman's brigade held in
reserve.

Stuart, who was now in command of Jackson's corps, saw at a glance
the immense importance of this capture, and did not delay a moment
in crowning the hill with thirty pieces of artillery, which soon
began to play with fatal effect upon our troops below; upon
Chancellorsville; and upon the crest occupied by Slocum, which it
enfiladed, and as McLaws' batteries also enfiladed Slocum's line
from the opposite side, it seems almost miraculous that he was able
to hold it at all.

Simultaneously with the attack against Hazel Grove came a fierce
onslaught on that part of Sickles' line to the left of the road,
accompanied by fierce yells and cries of _"Remember Jackson!"_ a
watch-word which it was supposed would excite the rebels to strenuous
efforts to avenge the fatal wound of their great leader.  It was
handsomely met and driven back by Mott's brigade, which had come
up from the Ford, and now held the front on that part of the line.
A brilliant counter-charge by the 5th and 7th New Jersey captured
many prisoners and colors.

Sickles' men fought with great determination, but being assailed
by infantry in front and battered almost in flank by the artillery
posted at Hazel Grove, the line was manifestly untenable.  After
an obstinate contest the men fell back to the second line, which
was but partially fortified, and soon after to the third line,
which was more strongly intrenched, and which they held to the
close of the fight.

McGowan's, Lane's, and Heth's brigades of A. P. Hill's division
charged resolutely over this line also; but they suffered heavily
from Best's guns at Fairview, and were driven back by Colonel
Franklin's and Colonel Bowman's brigades of Whipple's division,
which made an effective counter-charge.  Whipple's other brigade,
that of Graham, had been sent to relieve one of Slocum's brigades
on the left of the line, which was out of ammunition.  It held its
position there for two hours.

While this attack was taking place on the left of the road, Pender's
and Thomas' brigades, also of Hill's division, charged over the
works on the right; but when the others retreated they were left
without support and were compelled to retire also.  They reformed,
however; tried it again, and once more succeeded in holding temporary
possession of part of the line, but were soon driven out again.

French's division of Couch's corps was now brought up, and Carroll's
brigade struck the rebels on the left, and doubled them back on
the centre, capturing a great many prisoners and confusing and
rendering abortive Hill's attack in front.  Hill sent for his
reserves to come up, and three rebel brigades were thrown against
Carroll, who was supported by the remainder of French's division
and a brigade from Humphrey's division of Meade's corps, and French's
flank movement was checked.  Then another front attack was organized
by the enemy, under cover of their artillery at Hazel Grove, and
Nicholls', Iverson's, and O'Neill's brigades charged over everything,
even up to Best's batteries at Fairview, which they captured; but
our men rallied, and drove them headlong down the hill, back to
the first line Sickles had occupied at daylight.  It was a combat
of giants; a tremendous struggle between patriotism on the one hand
and vengeance on the other.

French now tried to follow up this advantage by again pressing
against the Confederate left, but it was reinforced by still another
brigade, and he could make no progress.

The struggle increased in violence.  The rebels were determined to
break through our lines, and our men were equally determined not
to give way.  Well might De Trobriand style it "a mad and desperate
battle."  Mahone said afterward:  "The Federals fought like devils
at Chancellorsville."  Again Rodes' and Hill's divisions renewed
the attempt and were temporarily successful, and again was the
bleeding remnant of their forces flung back in disorder.  Doles'
and Ramseur's brigades of Rodes' division, managed to pass up the
ravine to the right of Slocum's works and gain his right and rear,
but were unsupported there, and Doles was driven out by a concentrated
artillery and musketry fire.  Ramseur, who now found himself directly
on Sickles' left flank, succeeded in holding on until the old
Stonewall brigade under Paxton came to his aid, and then they
carried Fairview again, only to be driven out as the others had
been.

The battle had now lasted several hours, and the troops engaged,
as well as the artillery, were almost out of ammunition.  There
should have been some staff officer specially charged with this
subject, but there seemed to be no one who could give orders in
relation to it.

The last line of our works was finally taken by the enemy, who
having succeeded in driving off the 3d Maryland of the Twelfth
Corps, on Berry's left, entered near the road and enfiladed the
line to the right and left.  Sickles sent Ward's brigade to take
the place of the 3d Maryland, but it did not reach the position
assigned it in time, the enemy being already in possession.  In
attempting to remedy this disaster, Berry was killed, and his
successor, General Mott, was wounded.  The command then devolved
upon general Revere, who, probably considering further contest
hopeless, led his men out of the action without authority--an
offence for which he was subsequently tried and dismissed the
service.

As the cannon cartridges gave out, the enemy brought up numerous
batteries, under Colonel Carter, in close proximity to Fairview,
and soon overcame all resistance in that direction, driving the
troops and guns from the plain.

Anderson now made a junction with Stuart, and their combined efforts
drove the Third Corps and Williams' division of the Twelfth Corps
back, leaving only Geary and Hancock to maintain the struggle.
Geary was without support, but he still fought on.  He faced two
regiments west at right angles to his original line, and by the
aid of his artillery held on for an hour longer; his right brigade
facing south, west, and north.

The Third Corps left their last position at Chancellorsville slowly
and sullenly.  Hayman's brigade, not far from the Chancellorsville
House, finding the enemy a good deal disorganized, and coming
forward in a languid and inefficient manner, turned--by Sickles'
direction--and charged, capturing several hundred prisoners and
several colors, and relieving Graham, who was now holding on with
the bayonet, from a most perilous flank attack, enabling him to
withdraw in good order.  Sickles himself was soon after injured by
a spent shot of piece of shell, which struck his waist-belt.  His
corps and French's division had lost 5,000 out of 22,000.

Our front gradually melted away and passed to the new line in rear
through Humphrey's division of the Fifth Corps, which was posted
about half a mile north of the Chancellorsville House in the edge
of the thicket, to cover the retreat.  At last only indomitable
Hancock remained, fighting McLaws with his front line, and keeping
back Stuart and Anderson with his rear line.

The enemy, Jackson's Corps, showed little disposition to follow up
their success.  The fact is, these veterans were about fought out,
and became almost inert.  They did not, at the last, even press
Hancock, who was still strong in artillery, and he withdrew his
main body in good order, losing however, the 27th Connecticut
regiment, which was posted at the apex of his line on the south,
and was not brought back in time, in consequence of the failure of
a subordinate officer to carry out his orders.

Before Hancock left, his line was taken in reverse, and he was
obliged to throw back part of his force to the left to resist
Anderson, who was trying to force the passage of Mott Run.  The
line in that direction was firmly held by Colonel Miles of the 61st
New York, who was shot through the body while encouraging his men
to defend the position.

Stuart's command had lost 7,500 in his attack, and it could hardly
have resisted a fresh force if it had been thrown in.  General
William Hays, of the Second Corps, who was taken prisoner, says
they were worn out, and Rodes admits in his report that Jackson's
veterans clung to their intrenchments, and that Ramseur and others
who passed them, urged them to go forward in vain.

Before the close of the action Hooker was importuned for reinforcements,
but to no avail.  Perhaps he intended to send them, for about this
time he rushed out and made a passionate appeal to Geary's men to
charge and retake the works they had lost; promising to aid them
by throwing in a heavy force on the enemy's left flank.  At this
appeal the exhausted troops put their caps on their bayonets, waved
them aloft, and with loud cheers charged on the rebels and drove
them out once more; but sixty guns opened upon them at close range
with terrible effect; the promised reinforcements did not come;
they were surrounded with ever increasing enemies, and forced to
give up everything and retreat.  Stuart and Anderson then formed
their lines on the south of and parallel to the Plank Road, facing
north, and began to fortify the position.

Had they been disposed to follow up the retreat closely they would
have been unable to do so, for now a new and terrible barrier
intervened; the woods on each side of the Plank Road had been set
on fire by the artillery and the wounded and dying were burning in
the flames without a possibility of rescuing them.  Let us draw a
veil over this scene, for it is pitiful to dwell upon it.

There was no further change in Stuart's line until the close of
the battle; but Anderson's division was soon after detached against
Sedgwick.

The new line taken up by the Union Army was a semi-ellipse, with
the left resting on the Rappahannock and the right on the Rapidan.
Its centre was at Bullock's House, about three-fourths of a mile
north of Chancellorsville.  The approaches were well guarded with
artillery, and the line partially intrenched.  The enemy did not
assail it.  They made a reconnoissance in the afternoon, but Weed's
artillery at the apex of the line was too strongly posted to be
forced, and Lee soon found other employment for his troops, for
Sedgwick was approaching to attack his rear.


In the history of lost empires we almost invariably find that the
cause of their final overthrow on the battle-field may be traced
to the violation of one military principle, which is that _the
attempt to overpower a central force of converging columns, is
almost always fatal to the assailants_, for a force in the centre,
by the virtue of its position, has nearly double the strength of
one on the circumference.  Yet his is the first mistake made by
every tyro in generalship.  A strong blow can be given by a sledge-
hammer, but if we divide it into twenty small hammers, the blows
will necessarily be scattering and uncertain.  Let us suppose an
army holds the junction of six roads.  It seems theoretically
possible that different detachments encircling it, by all attacking
at the same time, must confuse and overpower it; but in practice
the idea is rarely realized, for no two routes are precisely alike,
the columns never move simultaneously, and therefore never arrive
at the same time.  Some of this is due to the character of the
commanders.  One man is full of dash, and goes forward at once;
another is timid, or at least over-cautious, and advances slowly;
a third stops to recall some outlying detachments, or to make
elaborate preparations.  The result is, the outer army has lost
its strength and is always beaten in detail.  One portion is sure
to be defeated before the others arrive.  We shall have occasion
to refer to this principle again in reference to the battle of
Gettysburg.  The history of our own war shows that an attack against
the front and rear of a force is not necessarily fatal.  Baird's
division at Chickamauga defended itself successfully against an
assault of this kind, and Hancock faced his division both ways at
Chancellorsville and repelled every attempt to force his position.
But Hooker thought otherwise.  He felt certain that if Sedgwick
assailed Lee in rear, while he advanced in front, the Confederate
army was doomed.  When the time came, however, to carry out this
programme, if we may use a homely simile borrowed from General De
Peyster, Hooker did not hold up his end of the log, and the whole
weight fell upon Sedgwick.

About this time a pillar of the Chancellorsville House was struck
by a cannon-ball, and Hooker, who was leaning against it at the
moment, was prostrated and severely injured.  He revived in a few
minutes, mounted his horse and rode to the rear, but it was some
time before he turned over the command to Couch, who was second in
rank.  After this stroke he suffered a great deal from paroxysms
of pain, and was manifestly unfit to give orders, although he soon
resumed the command.

The historian almost refuses to chronicle the startling fact that
37,000 men were kept out of the fight, most of whom had not fired
a shot, and all of whom were eager to go in.  The whole of the
First Corps and three-fourths of the Fifth Corps had not been
engaged.  These, with 5,000 of the Eleventh Corps, who desired to
retrieve the disaster of the previous day and were ready to advance,
made a new army, which had it been used against Stuart's tired men
would necessarily have driven them off the field; for there were
but 26,000 of them when the fight commenced.  To make the matter
worse, a large part of this force--the First and Fifth Corps--stood
with arms in their hands, as spectators, almost directly on the
left flank of the enemy; so that their mere advance would have
swept everything before it.  Hancock, too, says that his men were
fresh enough to go forward again.

Couch succeeded to the command after Hooker was wounded, and made
dispositions for the final stand around the Chancellorsville House,
where the battle lasted some time longer, and where a battery of
the Fifth Corps was sacrificed to cover the retreat of the troops.
He did not, however, take the responsibility of renewing the contest
with fresh troops, perhaps deterred by the fact that Anderson's
and McLaws' divisions had now effected a junction with Stuart's
corps; so that the chances were somewhat less favorable than they
would have been had Sickles and French had been reinforced before
the junction took place.  He says, at the close of the action, that
fifty guns posted to the right and front of the Chancellorsville
House would have swept the enemy away.

I think Hooker was beset with the idea of keeping back a large
portion of his force to be used in case of emergency.  It appears
from a statement made by General Alexander S. Webb, who had made
a daring personal reconnoissance of the enemy's movement, that he
was present when Meade--acting on his (Webb's) representations,
and speaking for himself and Reynolds--asked Hooker's permission
to let the First and Fifth Corps take part in the battle.  It is
fair, however, to state that Hooker, having been injured and in
great pain, was hardly accountable for his want of decision at this
time.  Indeed, General Tremaine, who was a colonel on Sickles'
staff, says that Hooker did intend to use his reserve force as soon
as the enemy were utterly exhausted.  President Lincoln seems to
have had a presentiment of what would occur, for his parting words
to Hooker and Couch were, to use all the troops and not keep any
back.

I have stated that both Meade and Reynolds wished to put their
corps in at the vital point, but were not allowed to do so.  General
Tremaine also states that, subsequently, when Hooker was suffering
a paroxysm of pain, he was the bearer of a communication to him
requesting reinforcements, which Hooker directed to be handed to
General Meade, who was present, for his action.  Meade would not
take the responsibility thus offered him at so late a period in
the action, though strongly urged to do so both by Tremaine and
Colonel Dahlgren, without the express order of General Hooker, or
the sanction of General Couch, who was his superior officer, and
who was absent.  Perhaps he was afraid that Hooker might resume
the command at any moment and leave him to shoulder the responsibility
of any disaster that might occur, without giving him the credit in
case of success.  Still he should have put the men in, for the
success of the cause was above all personal considerations.  A
single division thrown in at this time would have retrieved the
fortunes of the day.  The delay of finding Couch would have been
fatal; for immediate action was demanded.

Reynolds, indeed, considered himself obliged to wait for orders,
but was so desirous to go in that he directed me to send Colonel
Stone's brigade forward to make a reconnoissance, in the hope the
enemy would attack it and thus bring on a fresh contest; for he
intended to reinforce Stone with his whole corps.  Stone went close
enough to the rebels to overhear their conversation.  He made a
very successful reconnoissance and brought back a number of prisoners,
but as no hint was given him of the object of the movement, he did
not bring on a fight.  Had he received the slightest intimation
that such was Reynolds' wish, he would not have hesitated a moment,
for his reputation for dash and gallantry was inferior to none in
the army.


Sedgwick being on the south side of the river, three miles below
the town, was farther off than Hooker supposed, and did not meet
the expectations of the latter by brushing aside Early's 9,000 men
from the fortified heights, and coming on in time to thunder on
Lee's rear at daylight, and join hands with the main body at
Chancellorsville.

The Sixth Corps started soon after midnight to carry out the order.
General John Newton's division led the way, with General Shaler's
brigade in advance.  They were somewhat delayed by a false alarm
in rear, and by the enemy's pickets in front, but made their way
steadily toward Fredericksburg.  When they reached Hazel Run they
found a considerable body of the enemy on the Bowling Green Road
at the bridge in readiness to dispute the passage.  Colonel Hamblin,
who was in charge of Newton's skirmish line, left a few of his men
to open an energetic fire in front, while he assembled the others
and made a charge which took the bridge and secured the right of
way.  The command reached Fredericksburg about 3 A.M.  As the
atmosphere was very hazy, Newton found himself almost on the enemy
before he knew it; near enough in fact to overhear their conversation.
He fell back quickly to the town and occupied the streets which
were not swept by the fire from the works above.  He then waited
for daylight to enable him to reconnoitre the position in his front,
previous to making an attack; and that was the hour Hooker had set
for Sedgwick to join him in attacking Lee at Chancellorsville.

As soon as it was light Gibbon laid bridges, crossed over, and
reported to Sedgwick with his division.

At dawn Newton deployed Wharton's brigade and made a demonstration
to develop the enemy's line.  As the fortified heights commanded
the Plank Road by which Sedgwick was to advance, it became necessary
to attack immediately.  The plan of assault which was devised by
General Newton, and approved by General Sedgwick, was to attenuate
the rebel force by attacking it on a wide front, so that it could
not be strong anywhere, and to use the bayonet alone.  Accordingly,
Gibbon was directed to advance on the right to turn their flank
there if possible, while Newton was to demonstrate against the
centre and Howe to act against the left.  Newton deployed Wharton's
brigade, opened fire along his front and kept the enemy employed
there, but Gibbon was unable to advance on the right, because a
canal and a railway lay between him and the rebels, and they had
taken up the flooring of the bridges over the latter.  Howe did
not succeed any better on the left, as in attempting to turn the
first line of works he encountered the fire of a second line in
rear and in _echelon_ to the first, which took him directly in
flank.  A concentrated artillery fire was brought to bear on Gibbon,
Early sent Hays' brigade from Marye's Hill to meet him, and Wilcox's
brigade came up from Banks' Ford for the same purpose, so that he
was obliged to fall back.

It was now 10 A.M., and there was no time to be lost.  General
Warren, who was in camp to represent Hooker, urged an immediate
assault.  This advice was followed.  Newton formed two columns of
assault and one deployed line in the centre, and Howe three deployed
lines on the left.

Colonel Johns, of the 7th Massachusetts, who was a graduate of West
Point, led one of these columns directly against Marye's Hill, with
two regiments of Eustis' brigade, supported by the other two
regiments, deployed, while another column, consisting of two
regiments under Colonel Spear, of the 61st Pennsylvania, supported
by two regiments (the 82d Pennsylvania and 67th New York) in column,
under Colonel Shaler, was directed to act farther to the right,
and the Light Division, under Colonel Burnham of the 5th Massachusetts,
attached to Newton's command, was ordered to deploy on the left
against the intrenchments at the base of the hill.  Spear's column,
advancing through a narrow gorge, was broken and enfiladed by the
artillery--indeed almost literally swept away--and Spear himself
was killed.  Johns had an equally difficult task, for he was
compelled to advance up a broken stony gulch swept by two rebel
howitzers.  The head of his column was twice broken, but he rallied
it each time.  He was then badly wounded, and there was a brief
pause, but Colonel Walsh, of the 36th New York, rallied the men
again, and they kept straight on over the works.  Burnham with his
Light Brigade captured the intrenchments below, which had been so
fatal to our troops in the previous battle of Fredericksburg, and
went into the works above with the others.*  The fortified heights
on the right of Hazel Run, held by Barksdale's brigade, being now
occupied by our troops, those to the left were necessarily taken
in reverse, and therefore Sedgwick thought it useless to attack
them in front.  Howe, nevertheless, carried them gallantly, but
with considerable loss of life.

[* When Spear's column was broken, the 82d Pennsylvania, under
Colonel Bassett, came forward in support, but was crushed with the
same fire.  Colonel Shaler's remaining regiment, the 67th New York,
followed by the remnant of Bassett's regiment, forced their way
over the crest to the right of Colonel Johns' column.]

The coveted heights, which Burnside had been unable to take with
his whole army, were in our possession, together with about a
thousand prisoners; but the loss of the Sixth Corps was severe,
for nearly a thousand men were killed, wounded, and missing in less
than five minutes.  The attack was over so soon that Early did not
get back Hays' brigade, which had been detached to oppose Gibbon,
in time to assist in the defence.  Newton says if there had been
a hundred men on Marye's Hill we could not have taken it.

The rebel force was now divided, and thrown off toward Richmond in
eccentric directions.

All that remained for Sedgwick to do was to keep straight on the
Plank Road toward Chancellorsville.  Had he done so at once he
would have anticipated the enemy in taking possession of the strong
position of Salem Church, and perhaps have captured Wilcox's and
Hays' brigades.  But it was not intended by Providence that we
should win this battle, which had been commenced by a boasting
proclamation of what was to be accomplished; and obstacles were
constantly occurring of the most unexpected character.  After
directing Gibbon to hold the town and cover the bridges there,
Sedgwick, instead of pushing on, halted to reform his men, and sent
back for Brooks' division, which was still at its old position
three miles below Fredericksburg, to come up and take the advance.
It was full 3 P.M. before the final start was made.  This delay
gave Hays time to rejoin Early by making a detour around the head
of Sedgwick's column, and Wilcox took advantage of it to select a
strong position at Guest's House, open fire with his artillery,
and detain Sedgwick still longer.  Wilcox then retreated toward
the river road, but finding he was not pursued, and that Sedgwick
was advancing with great caution, he turned back and occupied for
a short time the Toll Gate, half a mile from Salem Church, where
McLaws' division was formed with one of Anderson's brigades on his
left.  When Sedgwick advanced Wilcox fell back and joined the main
body at the church.

The other brigades of Anderson's were sent to hold the junction of
the Mine road and the River road.

When the pursuit ceased, Early reassembled his command near Cox's
house and made immediate arrangements to retake the Fredericksburg
heights, and demonstrate against Sedgwick's rear.


McLaws formed his line about 2 P.M. in the strip of woods which
runs along the low ridge at Salem Church; two brigades being posted
on each side of the road about three hundred yards back.  Wilcox's
brigade, when driven in, was directed to take post in the church
and an adjacent school-house, which were used as citadels.  This
was a strong position, for the rebels were sheltered by the woods,
while our troops were forced to advance over an open country, cut
up by ravines parallel to McLaws' front, which broke up their
organization to some extent, and destroyed the _elan_ of the attack.
After a brief artillery contest, which soon ended, as the enemy
were out of ammunition, Brooks' division went forward about 4 P.M.,
and made a gallant charge, in which Bartlett's brigade, aided by
Willston's battery, captured the buildings and drove in part of
Wilcox's line.  The New Jersey brigade charged at the same time on
his right, and Russell's brigade on his left.  Wilcox placed himself
at the head of his reserve regiments, and aided by Semmes' brigade,
made a fierce counter-charge.  The combat for the school-house
raged with great fury, each party breaking the other's line and
being broken in turn.  Finally, after much desperate fighting,
Bartlett was obliged to yield the portion of the crest he had held
which was a key to the position; for as he was not strongly and
promptly reinforced, as he should have been, his withdrawal from
the church and school-house made a gap which forced the other
portions of the line to retreat to avoid being taken in flank.
Brooks was therefore driven back to the shelter of the guns at the
Toll House.  Then Newton's division came up and formed on his right
and part of Howe's division on the left.

The Union artillery was well served and destructive, and as Newton
had arrived, McLaws found his farther progress checked and was glad
to get back to the ridge.  Bartlett's attack should have been
deferred until Newton's division was near enough to support it.
In that case it would undoubtedly have succeeded.

Sedgwick's left now rested on a point nearly a mile from Salem
Church, while his right under Wheaton was somewhat advanced.

Up to this time the fight had been between Brooks' division and
McLaws' mixed command.  It was now decided that a second attempt
should be made by Newton's division, but Newton states that the
design was abandoned because Howe's division, which was to support
him, had gone into camp without orders, and was not immediately
available.  Before new arrangements could be made darkness came
on, and both armies bivouacked on the ground they occupied.  Brooks'
division in the assault just made had lost 1,500 men, and Sedgwick
no longer felt confident of forcing his way alone through the
obstacle that beset him.  Nevertheless, trusting to the speedy and
hearty co-operation of Hooker, he stood ready to renew the attempt
on the morrow, although he foresaw the enemy would fortify their
line during the night and make it truly formidable.

When Wilcox left Banks' Ford to aid in the defence of Salem Church,
General H. W. Benham of the United States Engineer Corps, who
commanded an engineer brigade there, threw over a bridge at Scott's
dam, about a mile below Banks' Ford, to communicate with Sedgwick,
enable him to retreat in case of disaster, and connect his headquarters
with those of Hooker by telegraph.

Hooker disapproved the laying of the bridges, which he thought
superfluous, as Sedgwick's orders were to keep on to Chancellorsville.
Warren took advantage of this new and short route to return to the
main army, in order to give Hooker information as to Sedgwick's
position.  He promised to send back full instructions for the
guidance of the latter.

As soon as the bridge was laid, General J. T. Owens with his brigade
of the Second Corps, which had been guarding the ford, crossed over
and reported to Sedgwick.

Warren found Hooker in a deep sleep, and still suffering from the
concussion that took place in the morning.  He gathered from the
little he did say, that Sedgwick must rely upon himself, and not
upon the main body for deliverance, and he so informed Sedgwick.



CHAPTER VIII.
MAY FOURTH.--ATTACK ON SEDGWICK'S FORCE.

As Hooker seemed disposed to be inactive, Lee thought he might
venture to still further augment the force in front of Sedgwick,
with a view to either capture the Sixth Corps or force it to recross
the river.  He therefore directed Anderson to reinforce McLaws with
the remainder of his division, leaving only what was left of
Jackson's old corps to confront Hooker.  Anderson had gone over to
the right, opposite the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, and had opened
with a battery upon the wagon trains which were parked in that
vicinity, creating quite a stampede, until his guns were driven
away by the Twelfth Corps.  In this skirmish, General Whipple,
commanding the Third Division of Sickles' corps, was killed.  In
the meantime, Early had retaken the heights of Fredericksburg,
which were merely held by a picket guard of Gibbon's division, so
that, when Anderson arrived and took post on the right of McLaws,
parallel to the Plank Road, Sedgwick found himself environed on
three sides by the enemy; only the road to Banks' Ford remained
open, and even that was endangered by bands of rebels, who roamed
about in rear of our forces.  At one time it is said they could
have captured him and his headquarters.  Fortunately the tents
which constituted the latter were of so unpretending a character,
that they gave no indication of being tenanted by the commanding
general.

Hooker had resumed the command, although manifestly incapable of
directing affairs; for the concussion must have affected his brain.
At all events, although he had almost thirty-seven thousand fresh
men, ready and desirous of entering into the combat, and probably
only had about seventeen thousand worn out men in front of him, he
failed to do anything to relieve Sedgwick's force, which was now
becoming seriously compromised.  A feeble and ineffectual reconnoissance
was indeed attempted, and as that was promptly resisted, Hooker
gave up the idea of any advance, and left Sedgwick to get out of
the difficulty the best way he could.  At 11 A.M., Sedgwick wrote,
stating the obstacles which beset him, and requesting the active
assistance of the main army.  He was directed, in reply, not to
attack, unless the main body at Chancellorsville did the same.
All remained quiet until 4 P.M.  The Sixth Corps were then formed
on three sides of a square inclosing Banks' Ford, with the flanks
resting on the river.  Howe's division faced east toward Fredericksburg,
against Early, who confronted him in that direction, and his left
stretched out to Taylor's Hill on the Rappahannock.  Newton's
division, together with Russell's brigade of Brooks' division,
faced McLaws on the west, and Brooks' other two brigades--those of
Bartlett and Torbert--were opposed to Anderson on the south.  The
entire line was very long and thin.

Early and McLaws had been skirmishing on their fronts all day, but
it was 6 P.M. before everything was in readiness for the final
advance.  An attempt had, however, been made by Early to turn Howe's
left and cut Sedgwick off from the river; but it was promptly met
and the enemy were repulsed with a loss of two hundred prisoners
and a battle-flag.

Sedgwick felt his position to be a precarious one.  His line was
six miles long, and he had but about twenty thousand men with which
to hold it against twenty-five thousand of the enemy.  He thought,
too, that reinforcements had come up from Richmond and that the
enemy's force far exceeded his own.  It was evident he could not
recross the river in broad daylight without sacrificing a great
part of his corps, and he determined to hold on until night.  Benham
took the precaution to throw over a second bridge, and this prudent
measure, in Sedgwick's opinion, saved his command.  Lee, after
personally reconnoitring the position, gave orders to break in the
centre of the Sixth Corps so as to defeat the two wings, throw them
off in eccentric directions, and scatter the whole force.  When
this was attempted, Sedgwick detached Wharton's brigade from Newton's
right, and sent it to reinforce that part of the line.  At 6 P.M.
three guns were fired as a signal from Alexander's battery and the
Confederate forces pressed forward to the attack.  Newton's front
was not assailed, and the right of Brooks' division easily repulsed
the enemy who advanced in that direction, with the fire of the
artillery and the skirmish line alone.

The main effort of the evening was made by Early's division, which
advanced in columns of battalions, to turn Howe's left, and cut
that flank off from the river.  Howe's artillery, under charge of
Major J. Watts de Peyster, a mere youth, was admirably posted and
did great execution on these heavy columns.  De Peyster himself
rode out and established a battery, a considerable distance in
advance of the main line, and the enemy pressed forward eagerly to
capture it; after doing so they were suddenly confronted by several
regiments in ambush, which rose up and delivered a fire which threw
Hays' and Hoke's brigades into great confusion, and caused them to
make a precipitate retreat.  An attack against Howe's right was
also repulsed.  In the ardor of pursuit, Howe swung that flank
around and captured the 8th Louisiana Regiment, but in doing so,
he exposed his rear to Gordon, who came down a ravine behind him,
so that he was compelled to fall back and take up a new line.  Howe
had carefully selected a reserve position and made dispositions to
hold it.  Fresh assaults on his left finally forced General Neill
to retreat to it with his brigade.  The enemy followed him up
promptly, but were driven back in disorder by Grant's Vermont
brigade, two regiments of Newton's division and Butler's regular
battery of the 2d United States Artillery.  Newton thinks this last
attack on Howe was local and accidental, for as the other divisions
were not assailed, a concentrated attack on Howe would have destroyed
him.

Darkness at last put an end to the strife.  Newton, being an engineer
officer by profession, had previously been sent by Sedgwick to
select a new line to cover the bridges, and the army was ordered
to fall back there.  It did so without confusion, the roads having
been carefully picketed.  Brooks took position on Newton's left,
after which Howe's division, whose right flank for a time had been
"in the air," withdrew also an hour later than the others, and
prolonged the line to the left.  Howe complained that he was deserted
by Sedgwick, but the latter appears to have sent Wheaton's brigade
and other reinforcements to aid his retreat.  The movement to the
rear was favored by the darkness and a thick fog, which settled
over the valleys, but did not extend to the high ground.  As Benham
and Sedgwick, who were classmates at West Point, walked on the
slope of the hill where the men were lying--the crest above being
held by thirty-four guns on the opposite side of the river--Benham
cautioned Sedgwick not to recross under any circumstances without
his entire command, nor without Hooker's express sanction, advice
which Sedgwick was wise enough to follow.

The enemy did not assail the new position or attempt to interfere
with the crossing which soon after took place.  When it was nearly
concluded, an order came from Hooker countermanding it, but it was
then too late to return.

Howe thinks Sedgwick should not have crossed, as the last attack
on the left, which was the vital point, had been repulsed.  This
may be so, in the light of after-consideration, but it was very
doubtful at the time, and as Sedgwick had lost a fraction under
five thousand men in these operations, and was acting under the
false information that additional forces had come up from Richmond,
he felt that he had fully borne his share of the burden, and that
it was better to place his corps beyond the risk of capture, than
to run the chances of renewing the battle.  It would, undoubtedly,
have been of immense advantage to the cause if he could have
continued to hold Taylor's Hill, which dominated the country round,
and was the key of the battle-field; for in that case Hooker might
have withdrawn from Lee's front and joined Sedgwick, which would
have been attaining the object for which our main army left Falmouth,
and made the turning movement.  He would thus have gained a strategic
if not a tactical victory; his shortcomings would have been forgotten,
and he would have been regarded as one of the greatest strategists
of the age.  Hooker, however, had left so many things undone, that
it is by no means certain he would have carried out this policy,
although he expressed his intention to do so.  Sedgwick's movement,
in my opinion, added another example to the evil effects of converging
columns against a central force.

There is little more to add in relation to Hooker's operations.
On the night of the 4th, he called a council of war, and after
stating the situation to them, absented himself, in order that they
might have full liberty to discuss the subject.  Reynolds was
exhausted, and went to sleep, saying that his vote would be the
same as that of Meade.  Meade voted to remain, because he thought
it would be impossible to cross in the presence of the enemy.
Sickles and Couch voted to retreat.  Howard voted to remain, without
reference to the situation of the army, because in his opinion his
corps had behaved badly, and he wished to retrieve its reputation.
Slocum was not present.  The final result was that Hooker determined
to cross, although the majority of votes were against it.  The
votes of Meade and Howard, however, were qualified in such a way
as to give the impression they were in favor of a retreat.

Owing to a sudden rise in the river the bridges became too short,
and there was some doubt as to the practicability of passing over
them, but by taking down one, and piecing the others with it, the
difficulty was overcome and the army retired, without being followed
up, under cover of thirty-two guns posted on the heights on the
opposite bank.  Meade's corps acted as rear guard.

Hooker left his killed and wounded behind, and had lost 14 guns
and 20,000 stand of arms.

It only remains to give a brief statement of the operations of
Stoneman's cavalry.  These were of no avail as regard the battle
of Chancellorsville, for our army was defeated and in full retreat
before Lee's main line of communication with Richmond was struck,
and then all the damage was repaired in three or four days.  There
seems to have been a lack of information as to where to strike;
for the principal depot of the rebel army was at Guiney's station
on the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad.  The supplies there
were but slightly guarded, and could easily have been captured.
Had this been done, Lee would have been seriously embarrassed,
notwithstanding his victory, and forced to fall back to obtain
subsistence.

Stoneman, upon setting out on the expedition, left one division of
4,000 men under Averell to do the fighting, and dispose of any
force that might attempt to interfere with the movements of the
main body.  Averell accordingly followed W. H. F. Lee's two regiments
to Rapidan Station, and remained there skirmishing on the 1st of
May.  His antagonist then burned the bridge, and fell back on
Gordonsville.  As Averell was about to ford the river and follow,
he received orders from Hooker to return; he came back to Elley's
Ford on the 2d, which he reached at half past ten at night.  As
his return was useless and unnecessary, he has been severely
censured, but it was not made of his own volition.  Soon after Fitz
Hugh Lee made a dash at his camp, but was repulsed.  On the 3d
Averell made a reconnoissance on Hooker's right, with a view to
attack the enemy there, but finding the country impracticable for
cavalry, returned to Elley's Ford.  Hooker, who was not in the best
of humor at the time, became dissatisfied with his operations,
relieved him from command, and appointed Pleansonton to take his
place.

In the meantime, the main body under Stoneman pressed forward, and
reached Louisa Court House early on the morning of the 2d.  Parties
were at once ordered out to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad
above and below that point.  One of W. H. F. Lee's regiments drove
back a detachment of Union cavalry which was moving on Gordonsville,
but reinforcements went forward and Lee was driven back in his turn.

In the evening Stoneman made his headquarters at Thompson's Cross
Roads, and from there despatched regiments in different directions
to burn and destroy.

One party under Colonel Wyndham, 1st New Jersey, was engaged all
day on the 3d in injuring the canal at Columbia, and in attempts
to blow up the aqueduct over the Rivanna.

Colonel Kilpatrick moved with his regiment, the 2d New York, across
the country, passing within two miles and a half of Richmond, and
creating great consternation there.  He struck and destroyed a
portion of the Fredericksburg Railroad--Lee's main line of supply
--on the 4th, at Hungary Station, ten miles from Richmond, and
burned Meadow Bridge, over the Chickahominy at the railroad crossing.
He then turned north again, crossed the Pamunkey, and ended his
long ride at Gloucester Point, which was garrisoned by our troops.

Another regiment--the 12th Illinois, under Colonel Davis--went to
Ashland and moved up and down the railroad, doing a good deal of
damage.  It captured a train full of Confederate wounded and paroled
them.  After a brief encounter with an infantry and artillery force
at Tunstall's Station, it also turned north, and made its way over
the Pamunkey and Mattapony rivers to Gloucester Point.

Two regiments, the 1st Maine and 1st Maryland, under General Gregg,
started down the South Anna River, burning bridges over common
roads and railroads.  After destroying Hanover Junction, it returned
to headquarters.

One of two other small parties were sent on flying excursions to
assist in the work of destruction.

On the 5th, Stoneman started to return, and the entire command with
the exception of that portion which was at Gloucester Point,
recrossed at Kelly's Ford on the 8th.

The losses in each army were heavy.  An extract is here given from
the official reports, but it is said the Confederate statement is
far from being accurate.

LOSSES AT CHANCELLORSVILLE.

UNION.
                                Killed and
                                Wounded.    Missing.   Total.
First Corps (Reynolds). . . . .     192        100        292
Second Corps (Couch). . . . . .   1,525        500      2,025
Third Corps (Sickles) . . . . .   3,439        600      4,089
Fifth Corps (Meade) . . . . . .     399        300        699
Sixth Corps (Sedgwick). . . . .   3,601      1,000      4,601
Eleventh Corps (Howard) . . . .     568      2,000      2,508
Twelfth Corps (Slocum). . . . .   2,383        500      2,883
Cavalry, etc. . . . . . . . . .     150                   150

  Total . . . . . . . . . . . .  12,197      5,000     17,197

CONFEDERATE.
                                Killed and
                                Wounded.    Missing.   Total.
Early's Division  . . . . . . .     851        500      1,351
A. P. Hill's Division . . . . .   2,583        500?     3,083
Colston's Division  . . . . . .   1,868        450?     2,318
Rodes' Division . . . . . . . .   2,178        713      2,891
Anderson's Division . . . . . .   1,180        210      1,390
McLaws' Division  . . . . . . .   1,379        380      1,759
Artillery and Cavalry . . . . .     227                   227

  Total . . . . . . . . . . . .  10,266      2,753     13,019

The following extract from Harpers' "History of the Great Rebellion"
states the causes of Hooker's defeat in a very able manner, but I
do not agree with the author in his estimate of the great danger
Lee ran from the converging columns of Sedgwick and Hooker.  It is
true Lee tried the same system, and succeeded, by sending Jackson
around to attack Hooker's right, but the success was due solely to
the utter lack of all preparations on the part of Howard to meet
the emergency, and to Hooker's failure to make use of the ample
means at his disposal to prevent the junction of Stuart and
Anderson.

Mr. Alden, the author of the work in question, says:

"There was not, in fact, any moment between Thursday afternoon and
Tuesday morning when success was not wholly within the grasp of
the Union army.  The movement by which Chancellorsville was reached,
and the Confederate position rendered worthless, was brilliantly
conceived and admirably executed.  The initial error, by which
alone all else was rendered possible, was that halt at Chancellorsville.
Had the march been continued for an hour longer, or even been
resumed early in the following morning, the army would have got
clear of the Wilderness without meeting any great opposing force,
and then it would have been in a position where its great superiority
of numbers would have told.  The rout of Howard's corps was possible
only from the grossest neglect of all military precautions.  Jackson,
after a toilsome march of ten hours, halted for three hours in open
ground, not two miles from the Union lines.  A single picket, sent
for a mile up a broad road would have discovered the whole movement
in ample time for Howard to have strengthened his position, or to
have withdrawn from it without loss.  The blame of this surprise
can not, however, fairly be laid upon Hooker.  He had a right to
presume that whoever was in command there would have so picketed
his lines as to prevent the possibility of being surprised in broad
daylight.  But even as it was, the disaster to the Eleventh Corps
should have had no serious effect upon the general result.  That
was fully remedied when the pursuit was checked.  On Sunday morning
Hooker was in a better position than he had been on the evening
before.  He had lost 3,000 men and had been strengthened by 17,000,
and now had 78,000 to oppose to 47,000.  The Confederate army was
divided, and could reunite only by winning a battle or by a day's
march.  The only thing which could have lost the battle of that
day was the abandonment of the position at Hazel Grove, for from
this alone was it possible to enfilade Slocum's line.  But surely
it is within the limits of military forethought that a general who
has occupied a position for two days and three nights should have
discovered the very key to that position, when it lay within a mile
of his own headquarters.  The disabling of Hooker could not, indeed,
have been foreseen; but such an accident might happen to any
commander upon any field; and there should have been somewhere some
man with authority to have, within the space of three hours, brought
into action some of the more than 30,000 men within sound, and
almost within sight, of the battle then raging.  How the hours from
Sunday noon till Monday night were wasted has been shown.  Hooker,
indeed, reiterates that he could not assail the Confederate lines
through the dense forests.  But Lee broke through those very woods
on Sunday, and was minded to attempt it again on Wednesday, when
he found that the enemy had disappeared.  The golden opportunity
was lost, never to be recovered, and the Confederate Army of Northern
Virginia gained a new lease of life."

It may not be out of place, as indicating the kind of service in
which we were engaged, to quote the following letter, written after
the retreat:

"I am so cut, scratched, and bruised that I can hardly hold a pen
in my hand.  My limbs are covered with swellings from the bites of
insects and torn from forcing my way through briers and thorny
bushes; my eyes close involuntarily from lack of sleep and excessive
fatigue.  My legs are cramped from so much riding, and I have not
yet succeeded in getting rid of the chill caused by sleeping on
the wet ground in the cold rain.  My clothes, up to last night,
had not been taken off for a week.  As I lay down every night with
my boots and spurs on, my feet are very much swollen.  I ought to
be in bed at this moment instead of attempting to write."

The others must have suffered in the same way.  Warren, especially,
as a medium of communication between Hooker and Sedgwick, made
almost superhuman exertions to do without sleep and perform the
important duties assigned him.

Each army now felt the need of rest and recuperation, and no military
movements of importance took place for several weeks.  Soon after
the battle of Chancellorsville, Longstreet's two divisions, which
had been operating in front of Suffolk, rejoined Lee at Fredericksburg.
That portion of Stoneman's cavalry which had taken refuge at
Gloucester Point also succeeded, by great boldness and skilful
manoeuvring on the part of Colonel Kilpatrick, in outwitting the
enemy and getting to Urbanna, after crossing Dragon River, rebuilding
a bridge there, and repulsing the rebel forces who tried to prevent
them from reaching the Rappahannock.  The command, when it arrived
at Urbanna, passed over on the ferry-boat, under cover of a gunboat
sent there for that purpose, and rejoined the Army of the Potomac
at Falmouth, on the 3d of June, bringing in about 200 prisoners,
40 wagons, and 1,000 contrabands, as slaves were usually styled at
that time.



CHAPTER IX.
PREPARATIONS TO RENEW THE CONFLICT.

The close of the battle of Chancellorsville found the Union army
still strong in numbers, defeated, but not disheartened, and ready,
as soon as reinforcements and supplies arrived, and a brief period
of rest and recuperation ensued, to take the field again.  To resist
the effects of this defeat and recruit our armies required, however,
great determination and serious effort on the part of the
Administration; for a large and powerful party still clogged and
impeded its efforts, and were allowed full liberty to chill the
patriotism of the masses, and oppose, with tongue and pen and every
species of indirection, all efficient action which looked to national
defence.  This opposition was so strong and active that the President
almost preferred the risk of losing another battle to the commotion
which would be excited by attempts to enforce the draft; for hitherto
we had relied entirely on voluntary enlistments to increase our
strength in the field.  Men are chilled by disaster and do not
readily enlist after a defeat; yet the terms of service of thirty
thousand of the two years' and nine months' men were expiring, and
something had to be done.  Our army, however, at the end of May
was still formidable in numbers, and too strongly posted to be
effectually assailed; especially as it had full and free communication
with Washington and the North, and could be assisted in case of
need by the loyal militia of the free States.

The rebels had obtained a triumph, rather than a substantial victory,
at Chancellorsville.  It was gained, too, at a ruinous expense of
life, and when the battle was over they found themselves too weak
to follow up our retreating forces.  While the whole South was
exulting, their great commander, General Lee, was profoundly
depressed.  The resources of the Davis Government in men and means
were limited, and it was evident that without a foreign alliance,
prolonged defensive warfare by an army so far from its base, would
ultimately exhaust the seceding States, without accomplishing their
independence.  It became necessary, therefore, for General Lee to
chose one of two plans of campaign:  Either to fall back on the
centre of his supplies at Richmond, and stand a siege there, or to
invade the North.  By retiring on Richmond he would save the great
labor of transporting food and war material to the frontier, and
would remove the Northern army still further from its sources of
supply and its principal depots.  One circumstance, however, would
probably in any event, have impelled him to take the bolder course.
The situation in Vicksburg was becoming alarming.  It was evident
the town must fall and with its surrender the Federal fleet would
soon regain possession of the Mississippi.  The fall of Vicksburg,
supplemented by the retreat of Lee's army on Richmond, would
dishearten the Southern people, and stimulate the North to renewed
efforts.  It was essential, therefore, to counterbalance the
impending disaster in the West by some brilliant exploit in the
East.

There was perhaps another reason for this great forward movement,
founded on the relation of the Confederacy to the principal European
powers.  England still made a pretence of neutrality, but the
aristocracy and ruling classes sided with the South, and a large
association of their most influential men was established at
Manchester to aid the slaveholding oligarchy.  The rebels were
fighting us with English guns and war material, furnished by blockade
runners; while English Shenandoahs and Alabamas, manned by British
seamen, under the Confederate flag, burned our merchant vessels
and swept our commercial marine from the ocean.  The French Government
was equally hostile to us, and there was hardly a kingdom in Europe
which did not sympathize with the South, allied as they were by
their feudal customs to the deplorable system of Southern slavery.
Russia alone favored our cause, and stood ready, if need be, to
assist us with her fleet; probably more from antagonism to England
and France, than from any other motive.  The agents of the Confederate
Government stated in their official despatches that if General Lee
could establish his army firmly on Northern soil England would at
once acknowledge the independence of the South; in which case ample
loans could not only be obtained on Southern securities, but a
foreign alliance might be formed, and perhaps a fleet furnished to
re-open the Southern ports.

While thus elated by hopes of foreign intervention, the Confederate
spies and sympathizers who thronged the North greatly encouraged
the Davis Government by their glowing accounts of the disaffection
there, in consequence of the heavy taxation, rendered necessary by
the war, and by the unpopularity of the draft, which would soon
have to be enforced as a defensive measure.  They overrated the
influence of the _Copperhead_ or anti-war party, and prophesied
that a rebel invasion would be followed by outbreaks in the principal
cities, which would paralyze every effort to reinforce the Federal
forces in the field.

These reasons would have been quite sufficient of themselves to
induce Lee to make the movement, but he himself gives an additional
one.  He hoped by this advance to draw Hooker out, where he could
strike him a decisive blow, and thus ensure the permanent triumph
of the Confederacy.  He was weary of all this marching, campaigning,
and bloodshed, and was strongly desirous of settling the whole
matter at once.  Having been reinforced after the battle of
Chancellorsville by Longstreet's two divisions and a large body of
conscripts, he determined to advance.  On May 31st, his force,
according to rebel statements, amounted to 88,754, of which 68,352
were ready for duty.  Recruits, too, were constantly coming in from
the draft, which was rigidly enforced in the Southern States.


Hooker having learned from his spies that there was much talk of
an invasion, wrote to the President on May 28th, that the enemy
was undoubtedly about to make a movement of some kind.  On June
3d, McLaws' and Hood's divisions of Longstreet's corps started for
the general rendezvous at Culpeper.  A change in the encampment on
the opposite side of the river was noted by the vigilant Union
commander, who at once ordered Sedgwick to lay two bridges at the
old crossing place, three miles below Fredericksburg, pass over
with a division, and press the enemy to ascertain if their main
body was still there.  Fresh indications occurred on the 4th, for
Ewell's corps followed that of Longstreet.  The bridges being
completed on the 5th, Howe's division of the Sixth Corps was thrown
over and Hill's corps came out of their intrenchments to meet it.
Some skirmishing ensued, and Sedgwick reported, as his opinion,
that the greater portion of the enemy's force still held their old
positions.  Hooker, however, was determined to be prepared for all
contingencies, and therefore, on the same day, detached the Fifth
Corps to be in readiness to meet the enemy should they attempt to
force a passage anywhere between United States Ford and Banks'
Ford.  Resolved to obtain certain information at all hazards, on
the 7th of June he ordered Pleasonton to make a forced reconnoissance
with all the available cavalry of the army, in the direction of
Culpeper, to ascertain whether the Confederate forces were really
concentrating there, with a view to an invasion of the North.

Should this prove to be the case, Hooker desired to cross the river,
to envelop and destroy Hill's corps, and then follow up the main
body as they proceeded northward, thus intercepting their communications
with Richmond.  The authorities at Washington, however, did not
look with much equanimity upon the possibility of finding Lee's
army interposed between them and the Army of the Potomac, so they
refused to sanction the plan and it was abandoned.

Nevertheless, in my opinion it was about the best method that could
have been devised to check the invasion, provided that Hooker did
not lose his water-base; for Lee always showed himself very sensitive
whenever his communications with Richmond was threatened.  If that
was severed no more _ammunition_ or military supplies would reach
him.  The amount of cartridges on hand was necessarily limited.
It would soon be expended in constant skirmishes and engagements,
and then he would be helpless and at the mercy of his antagonist.
Consequently, the moment he heard that a portion of the Sixth Corps
had crossed and confronted Hill, he directed Ewell and Longstreet
to halt at Locust Grove, near Chancellorsville, and be in readiness
to return to Fredericksburg to assist Hill in case there was any
danger of his being overpowered.  Finding Sedgwick's advance was
a mere reconnoissance, the two rebel corps resumed their march to
Culpeper.

Hooker deemed it essential to success, that all troops connected
with the theatre of invasion should be placed under his command,
so that they could act in unison.  In his opinion most of their
strength was wasted in discordant expeditions, which were useless
as regards the general result.  He referred more particularly to
General Dix's command at Old Point Comfort, General Heintzelman's
command in Washington, and General Schenck's troops posted at
Baltimore, along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and in the Valley
of the Shenandoah.  This request was reasonable and should have
been granted.  Hooker's demands, however, were not considered
favorably.  There was no very good feeling between General Halleck,
who was commander of the army, and himself; and as he felt that
his efforts were neither seconded nor approved at headquarters, he
soon after resigned the command.

The main body of the Union cavalry at this time was at Warrenton
and Catlett's Station.  Hooker, having been dissatisfied with the
result of the cavalry operations during the Chancellorsville
campaign, had displaced Stoneman in favor of Major-General Alfred
Pleasonton.



CHAPTER X.
BATTLE OF BRANDY STATION (FLEETWOOD).

The 8th of June was a day of preparation on both sides.  Pleasonton
was engaged in collecting his troops and getting everything in
readiness to beat up the enemy's quarters the next morning, and
Stuart was preparing to cross for the purpose of either making a
raid on the railroad, as Pleasonton states, or to take up a position
to guard the right flank of the invading force as it passed by our
army.  Major McClellan, Stuart's adjutant-general, asserts the
latter.  Pleasonton's information was founded on captured despatches,
and on interviews held by some of our officers with the Confederates
under a flag of truce.

The four batteries of Jones' cavalry brigade moved down near the
river opposite Beverly Ford on the 7th, to cover the proposed
crossing.  They were imperfectly supported by the remainder of
Stuart's force.  Jones' brigade was posted on the road to Beverly
Ford, that of Fitz Lee* on the other side of Hazel River; that of
Robertson along the Rappahannock below the railroad; that of W. H.
F. Lee on the road to Melford Ford, and that of Hampton in reserve,
near Fleetwood Hill--all too far off to be readily available.  In
fact, the batteries were entirely unsuspicious of danger, although
they were a quarter of a mile from the nearest support and there
was only a thin line of pickets between their guns and the river.

[* A familiar abbreviation for Fitz Hugh Lee, adopted in the rebel
reports.]

In the meantime Pleasonton's three divisions, "stiffened"--to use
one of Hooker's expressions--by two brigades of infantry, stole
down to the fords and lay there during the night, quietly, and
without fires, ready at the first dawn of day to spring upon their
too-confident adversaries and give them a rude awakening.

Pleasonton in person remained with Buford's division--the First--
which was lying near Beverly Ford with Ames' infantry brigade.

The other two divisions, the Second, under Colonel Duffie, and the
Third, under General Gregg--supported by Russell's infantry brigade,
were in bivouac opposite Kelly's Ford.

As each commander is apt to overstate the enemy's force and underrate
his own, it is not always easy to get at the facts.  Pleasonton
claims that the rebels had about twelve thousand cavalry and twelve
guns.  Major McClellan of Stuart's staff, puts the number at nine
thousand three hundred and thirty-five men, on paper, and twenty
guns; but states there were nearly three thousand absentees.

General Gregg estimates the Union cavalry at about nine thousand
men and six batteries, but--as will be seen hereafter--a third of
this force was detached toward Stevensburg, and their operations
had little or no effect on the general result.  The batteries do
not seem to have been brought forward in time to be of much service.

At daybreak Pleasonton's troops began to cross; Buford's division
and Ames' infantry at Beverly Ford; the other two divisions, under
Gregg and Duffie, with Russell's infantry at Kelly's Ford, six
miles below.  Each division was accompanied by two light batteries.

Pleasonton's plan was founded on the erroneous supposition that
the enemy were at Culpeper.  He used the infantry to keep the lines
of retreat open, and directed the cavalry to rendezvous at Brandy
Station.  They were to arrive there at the same time, and attack
together.  Duffie's column was to make a circuit by way of Stevensburg.
Unfortunately, Stuart was not at Culpeper, but at Brandy Station;
that is, he occupied the point where they were to rendezvous, and
the plan therefore appertained practically to the same vicious
system of converging columns against a central force.  What happened
may be briefly stated as follows:  The First Division, under Buford,
came upon the enemy between Brandy Station and Beverly Ford.  A
battle ensued at St. James' Church, and as their whole force
confronted him, and they had twenty pieces of artillery, he was
unable to break their line.  After fighting some hours he was
obliged to turn back with a portion of his command to repel an
attempt against his line of retreat.  Gregg next appeared upon the
scene, and succeeded in getting in Stuart's rear before the rebel
general knew he was there.  Buford having gone back toward Beverly
Ford, as stated, Gregg in his turn, fought the whole of Stuart's
force without the co-operation of either Buford or Duffie.  It can
hardly be said that Duffie's column took any part in the action,
for he did not reach Brandy Station until late in the day.  And
then, as the rebel infantry were approaching, Pleasonton ordered
a retreat.

For the future instruction of the reader it may be well to state
that every cavalry charge, unless supported by artillery or infantry,
is necessarily repulsed by a counter-charge; for when the force of
the attack is spent, the men who make it are always more or less
scattered, and therefore unable to contend against the impetus of
a fresh line of troops, who come against them at full speed and
strike in mass.

Stuart's headquarters were twice taken by Gregg's division, and a
company desk captured with very important despatches, but the enemy
had the most men, and most artillery near the point attacked, and
therefore always regained, by a counter-charge, the ground that
had been lost.

Stuart claims to have repulsed the last attack of Pleasonton against
Fleetwood Hill, and to have taken three guns, besides driving our
cavalry back across the river.

Pleasonton claims to have fully accomplished the object of his
reconnoissance, to have gained valuable information which enabled
Hooker to thwart Lee's plans; and to have so crippled the rebel
cavalry that its efficiency was very much impaired for the remainder
of the campaign; so that Lee was forced to take the indirect route
of the valley, instead of the direct one along the eastern base of
the Blue Ridge, behind his cavalry as a screen; his original
intention having been to enter Maryland at Poolesville and Monocacy.



GETTYSBURG.


CHAPTER I.
THE INVASION OF THE NORTH.

An invasion of the North being considered as both practicable and
necessary, it only remained to select the most available route.

There was no object in passing east of Hooker's army, and it would
have been wholly impracticable to do so, as the wide rivers to be
crossed were controlled by our gunboats.

To attempt to cross the Rappahannock to the west, and in the
immediate vicinity of Fredericksburg, would have been hazardous,
because when an army is crossing, the portion which is over is
liable to be crushed before it can be reinforced.

It would seem that Lee's first intention was to move along the
eastern base of the Blue Ridge directly toward Washington.*  The
appearance of his army on Hooker's flank would be a kind of taunt
and threat, calculated to draw the latter out of his shell, and
induce him to make an attack.  In such a case, as the rebels were
in the highest spirits, in consequence of their recent victory at
Chancellorsville, their commander had little doubt of the result.
This plan was feasible enough, provided his cavalry could beat back
that of Pleasonton and act as a screen to conceal his movements.
This they were not in a condition to do after the battle of Brandy
Station, and Lee was thus forced to take the route down the Shenandoah
Valley, which had many advantages.  The mountain wall that intervened
between the two armies, was a sure defence against our forces, for
it was covered by dense thickets, and the roads that lead through
the gaps, and the gaps themselves, were easy to fortify and hold
against a superior force.  If Hooker had attempted to assail these
positions, one corps could have held him in check, while the other
two captured Washington.

[* See map facing page 1.]

The movement also favored the subsistence of the troops, for the
valley being a rich agricultural region, Lee was enabled to dispense
with much of his transportation and feed his army off the country.

There was one serious obstacle, however, to his further progress
in that direction, and that was the presence of a gallant soldier,
Milroy, with a very considerable Union garrison intrenched at
Winchester.

It was essential to Lee's advance that the valley should be cleared
of Union troops, otherwise they would sally forth after he passed
and capture his convoys.

With this object in view, on the 10th Ewell's corps passed through
Gaines' Cross Roads, and halted near Flint Hill on their way to
Chester Gap and Front Royal.

The possibility of an invasion had been discussed for some days in
Washington, and Halleck had come to the conclusion that it was
better to withdraw the stores and ammunition from Winchester, and
retain the post there merely as a lookout, to give warning of the
enemy's approach.  Accordingly, on the 11th, Milroy received orders
from his department commander, General Schenck, to send his armament
and supplies back to Harper's Ferry.  Milroy remonstrated, saying
that he could hold the place against any force that would probably
attack him, and that it would be cruel to sacrifice the Union men
who looked to him for protection.

In reply to this Schenck telegraphed him that he might remain, but
must be in readiness to retreat whenever circumstances made it
necessary.

Milroy, in answer to another inquiry, reported that he could move
in six hours.

On the 12th he sent out two scouting parties, and learned there
was a considerable force at Cedarsville, which he thought might
form part of Stuart's raid, information of which had been communicated
to him.

He could not believe it possible that an entire rebel corps was
near him, for he supposed Lee's army was still at Fredericksburg.
His superiors had not informed him, as they should have done by
telegraph, that a large part of it had moved to Culpeper.  He
thought if Lee left Hooker's front at Fredericksburg, the Army of
the Potomac would follow and he would receive full information and
instructions.  He telegraphed General Schenck late that night for
specific orders, whether to hold his post or to retreat on Harper's
Ferry, stating there appeared to be a considerable force in front
of him.  As the enemy soon after cut the wires, he never received
any answer.  He sent a messenger the same night to notify Colonel
McReynolds, at Berryville, that there was a large body of the enemy
on the Front Royal road, and directed him to send out scouts to
Millwood, and keep himself advised of its approach, in order that
he might prepare to fall back on Winchester the moment he was
attacked by superior numbers.

On the 13th Ewell marched with two divisions directly on Winchester,
while he sent the third--that of Rodes--to take Berryville.  Thanks
to the timely warning McReynolds had received, his brigade got off
in time, his rear being covered by Alexander's battery, the 6th
Maryland Infantry, and part of the 1st New York (Lincoln) Cavalry.
These detained the enemy two hours, and then caught up with the
main body.  Jenkins' cavalry came upon the retreating force at
Opequan Creek, where he made a fierce attack, which was promptly
repulsed by the rear guard, aided by the artillery with canister.
After this there was no further molestation, and McReynolds' command
reached Winchester at 10 P.M.--a march of thirty miles.

Soon after the affair at the Opequan, Major Morris, with 200 men,
was attacked at Bunker Hill, an outlying post of Winchester.  He
occupied a fortified church, but moved out to meet the enemy, under
the impression it was only a small raiding party.  When he found
two thousand men in line of battle he retreated, fighting, to the
church again.  There, as the doors were barricaded, and the walls
loopholed, the rebels could make no impression, and were obliged
to fall back to a respectful distance.  In the night Morris managed
to steal away, and soon rejoined the main body at Winchester.

The arrival of these reinforcements seriously embarrassed Milroy;
and it will be seen hereafter that it would have been much better
for all concerned if they had retreated to Harper's Ferry at once.
They acted, however, strictly in obedience to orders.

Rodes' division, after the taking of Berryville, kept on towards
Martinsburg, and bivouacked at a place called Summit Point.

On the morning of the 13th Milroy had sent out a detachment under
General Elliot on the Strasburg road, and another under Colonel
Ely on the Front Royal road, to reconnoitre.  Eliott found no enemy,
and returned.  An attempt was made to cut him off from the town,
but it was repulsed.  His troops were then massed on the south side
behind Mill Creek and a mill-race which ran parallel to it, and
were protected by stone fences.  Colonel Ely had a brisk artillery
skirmish with Ewell's advance, and then fell back to Winchester,
taking post at the junction of the Front Royal and Strasburg roads.
The enemy did not attempt to cross the creek that night, but at 5
P.M. they advanced and captured a picket-post which commanded the
Strasburg road, but were soon driven out.

From a prisoner captured in this skirmish Milroy learned the highly
important intelligence that he was confronted by Ewell's corps and
that Longstreet was rapidly approaching.

The most natural course under the circumstances would have been
for him to retreat at once, but McReynolds' brigade had just arrived,
exhausted by their forced march, and could go no further, without
some hours' rest.  To move without them would be to sacrifice a
large part of his force.  He still cherished the hope that Hooker's
army would follow Lee up closely and come to his relief.

Ewell at night directed Early's division to attack the works on
the north and west of the town at daylight the next morning, while
Johnson's division demonstrated against the east and southeast.

Early on Sunday, the 14th, Milroy sent out a detachment to see if
the enemy had established themselves on the Pughtown or Romney
roads.  The party returned about 2 P.M. and reported the roads
clear, but soon after the rebels came in great force from that
direction, so that Milroy's hopes of escaping by the routes leading
to the northwest were dissipated.  Immediately west of Winchester,
and parallel with Applebie Ridge, on which the main forts were
situated, there is another ridge called Flint Ridge, where rifle
pits had been commenced to command the Pughtown and Romney roads.
These were held by one regiment, and part of another under Colonel
Keifer of the 110th Ohio, together with Battery "L" of the 5th
United States Artillery.  Early's division made a sudden attack
there, preliminary to which he opened fire with four batteries.
He charged into these rifle-pits and took them, but the garrison
retreated successfully, under cover of the fire, from the main
works above, which were held by Elliot's and McReynolds' brigades.
This was followed by an artillery duel, which was kept up until 8
P.M. without any special results.

Johnson's division at daybreak attacked the eastern side of the
town, held by Colonel Ely's brigade, but was gallantly met and
repulsed by the 8th Pennsylvania and 87th Pennsylvania.  These two
regiments, by Milroy's order, made a bold charge against the enemy
as they were retiring, but the latter were so suddenly and strongly
reinforced that the two regiments were glad to get back to their
shelter in the fortified suburbs.  They were followed up however,
and after severe fighting Johnson gained possession of a part of
the town.  This apparent success proved of no avail, for the forts
above shelled him out.  He therefore retired and made no further
attempt in that direction.

Darkness ended the struggle for the day.  Johnson then left one
brigade to prevent Milroy from escaping toward the east and went
off with the remainder of his division to form across the Martinsburg
pike, about three miles north of Winchester, to intercept Milroy's
retreat in that direction.

While these events were going on in the Valley, Imobden's cavalry
was engaged in breaking up the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad near
Romney, to prevent Milroy from receiving any reinforcements from
the west.

The latter now found himself in a perilous situation.  His cannon
ammunition was nearly exhausted, and he had but one day's rations
for his men.  He resolved to give up all further attempts to defend
the place, to abandon his wagon train and artillery, and to force
his way through the hostile lines that night; taking with him only
the horses and small arms.  This involved his leaving also his sick
and wounded, but it was unavoidable.  He ordered all the guns
spiked, and the ammunition thrown into the cisterns.

At 1 A.M. on the 15th, he moved silently out through a ravine and
was not molested until he struck the Martinsburg road, about four
miles from the town.  There Elliot, who was in the advance with
his brigade, met a rebel skirmish line, and soon ascertained that
their main body were formed, partly on high ground in a woods east
of the road, and partly in an open field east of and adjoining the
woods.  The enemy were in effect sheltered by a stone fence which
bordered a railroad cut, with their reserve and artillery principally
posted on elevated ground in the rear.

The only thing to do was to break through their lines as soon as
possible.  It was now about 3:30 A.M.  Elliot, whose record of
long, careful, and brilliant service in the regular army is an
exemplary one, formed line of battle with his three regiments and
fought the six regiments that held the road for about an hour with
varied success, encountering a severe artillery fire and driving
back their right in disorder by a gallant charge of the 110th Ohio
and 122d Ohio; but unfortunately their left held firm, in spite of
repeated attacks made by Colonel Shawl with two regiments, reinforced
with two more and by part of Colonel Ely's brigade.  Their force
in front, too, was sustained by heavy reserves both of infantry
and artillery.

A signal-gun fired at Winchester showed that the enemy there were
aware of the flight and were in full pursuit.  The main road being
blocked, Milroy determined to try another, and directed the troops
to fall back a short distance and turn to the right.  Part of them
did so, but the greater number, through some misunderstanding,
filed to the left, and took the road to Bath.  It was no longer
possible to reunite the two columns and as Milroy's horse was shot
under him about this time, he could use no personal exertions to
remedy the disaster.  A portion of the command who were not pursued
reached Harper's Ferry by way of Smithfield late in the afternoon.
Those who moved out on the Bath road also made good their escape,
crossed the Potomac at Hancock, and rallied at Bloody Run.  The
greater part of Colonel Ely's brigade, and Colonel McReynolds'
brigade, however, were captured.  Milroy claims to have brought
off 5,000 men of the garrison, and that the 2,000 paroled by Early,
consisted principally of the sick and wounded.  Early says he sent
108 officers and 3,250 enlisted men as prisoners to Richmond.
Johnson, who intercepted the retreat, says he captured 2,300
prisoners, 175 horses, and 11 battle flags.

While two-thirds of Ewell's corps were attacking Winchester, the
other division under Rodes, preceded by Jenkins' brigade of cavalry,
pursued McReynolds' wagon train to Martinsburg, arriving there late
in the afternoon of the 14th.  The town was held as an outlying
post of Harper's Ferry by a small detachment of all arms under
Colonel Tyler, a subordinate of General Tyler, who formed his men
outside of the place and resisted Rodes' attack until night, when
his infantry escaped to Shepherdstown, and his artillery and cavalry
to Williamsport.  In carrying out these movements, however, he lost
five guns and five caissons.  He passed the river and rejoined the
main body at Harper's Ferry.  The latter place is wholly indefensible
against an enemy holding the hills around it.  It is like fighting
at the bottom of a well.  General Tyler had therefore very wisely
moved across the river to Maryland Heights, where he had a strong
fortified post.  From that commanding eminence he could very soon
shell out any force that attempted to occupy the town.

The Shenandoah valley was now clear of Union troops, and soon became
the great highway of the invasion.  However disastrous Milroy's
defeat may be considered on account of the losses incurred, it was
not without its compensation.  The detention of Ewell's force there
gave time to the general Government and the Governors of the loyal
States to raise troops and organize resistance, and it awakened
the entire North to the necessity of immediate action.

Hooker, having learned that Ewell had passed Sperryville, advanced
his right to prevent any crossing in his immediate vicinity, and
confine the enemy to the Valley route.  He sent the Third Corps to
hold the fords opposite Culpeper, and the Fifth Corps to guard
those lower down.

On the 13th he gave up his position opposite Fredericksburg, and
started north toward Washington, giving orders to Sedgwick to
recross and follow on to Dumfries.  That night the First Corps
reached Bealeton, and the Eleventh Catlett's station.  Reynolds
was placed in command of the left wing of the army (the First,
Third, and Eleventh Corps) and I relieved him in command of the
First Corps.  The right wing (that is the Second, Fifth, Twelfth,
and Sixth Corps) was accompanied by Hooker in person, who reached
Dumfries on the 14th.

As soon as Hill saw Sedgwick disappear behind the Stafford hills,
he broke up his camp and started for Culpeper.

Some changes in the meantime had occurred in the Army of the Potomac,
and General Hancock was assigned to the Second Corps instead of
General Couch, who had been sent to organize the department of the
Susquehanna at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

The teamsters and fugitives from Winchester, making for Chambersburg
in all haste, told the inhabitants of the towns through which they
passed that the rebels were close behind them.  This created the
wildest excitement.  As many cases had occurred in which negroes
had been seized, and sent South to be sold as slaves, the whole
colored population took to the woods and filled up the roads in
all directions.  The appearance of Jenkins' brigade, who crossed
at Williamsport on the morning of the 15th and reached Chambersburg
the same day, added to the alarm.

Jenkins was at the head of 2,000 cavalry, and soon became a terror
to the farmers in that vicinity by his heavy exactions in the way
of horses, cattle, grain, etc.  It must be confessed he paid for
what he took in Confederate scrip, but as this paper money was not
worth ten cents a bushel, there was very little consolation in
receiving it.  His followers made it a legal tender at the stores
for everything they wanted.  Having had some horses stolen, he
sternly called on the city authorities to pay him their full value.
They did so without a murmur--_in Confederate money._  He pocketed
it with a grim smile, evidently appreciating the joke.  He boasted
greatly of his humanity and his respect for private property, but
if the local papers are to be believed, it must be chronicled to
his everlasting disgrace that he seized a great many negroes, who
were tied and sent South as slaves.  Black children were torn from
their mothers, placed in front of his troops, and borne off to
Virginia to be sold for the benefit of his soldiers.  There was
nothing out of character in that, he thought, for it was one of
the sacred rights for which the South was contending.

Prompt measures were taken by the Northern States to meet the
emergency.  Mr. Lincoln called on the Governors of West Virginia,
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New York to raise 120,000 men for
temporary service.  It was easy to get the men, but difficult to
arm them, as nearly all serviceable muskets were already in possession
of the Army of the Potomac.  As early as the 9th two new departments
had been created for Pennsylvania:  That of the Monongahela, with
headquarters at Pittsburg, was assigned to Major-General W. T. H.
Brooks; and that of the Susquehanna, with headquarters at Carlisle,
to Major-General Darius N. Couch.

On the 15th Ewell reached Williamsport with a force estimated at
twelve thousand men and sixteen guns.

Before Couch could reach Carlisle it was already occupied by Jenkins'
cavalry, and the terrified farmers of that section of country were
fleeing in crowds across the Susquehanna, driving their horses and
cattle before them.



CHAPTER II.
HOOKER'S PLANS--LONGSTREET OCCUPIES THE GAPS IN THE BLUE RIDGE--
  ALARM IN RICHMOND--HOOKER SUPERSEDED BY MEADE.

A shower of telegrams came to Hooker, notifying him of these untoward
events, and demanding protection; but he simply moved one step
toward the enemy.  On the 15th he had three corps--the First, Sixth,
and Eleventh--grouped around Centreville, with the Third Corps at
Manassas, and the Second, Fifth, and Twelfth Corps in reserve at
Fairfax Court House.  The left flank of the army was guarded by
Pleasonton's cavalry, posted at Warrenton.  Hooker was not to be
drawn away from the defence at Washington by any clamorous appeal
for his services elsewhere; his plan being to move parallel to
Lee's line of advance and strike his communications with Richmond
at the first favorable opportunity.  He obtained some reinforcements
at this time, Stannard's Second Vermont brigade being assigned to
my division of the First Corps, and Stahel's cavalry division,
about six thousand strong, being directed to report to General
Pleasonton for duty.

As Harrisburg lay directly in the track of the invading army,
Governor Curtin made strenuous efforts to collect a force there.
He called upon all able-bodied citizens to enroll themselves, and
complained that Philadelphia failed to respond.  New York acted
promptly, and on the 15th two brigades arrived in Philadelphia on
their way to the front.

On the same day Longstreet, having been relieved by Hill, left
Culpeper with his corps and marched directly across the country
east of the Blue Ridge to occupy Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps.
Stuart's cavalry were to guard his right flank, but did not leave
until the next day.  The object of Longstreet's movement was to
tempt Hooker to abandon his strong position in front of Washington
and march against the Gaps, in which case it was hoped some
opportunity might occur by which the rebels could either crush the
Army of the Potomac in the open country or possibly outmanoeuvre
it, so as to intervene between it and Washington; but Hooker remained
stationary.

Rodes' division of Ewell's corps reached Williamsport and remained
there during the 16th, 17th, and 18th, to support Jenkins, and
receive, and transmit to the rear, the cattle, horses, negroes,
and provisions, taken by him.

The commotion created by the approach of the invader was not all
one-sided.  General Dix, who commanded at Fortress Monroe, received
orders to advance on Richmond, which was weakly defended at this
time.  As through their manifold offences in the way of starving
our prisoners, etc., the rebel President and his cabinet were afraid
of reprisals, there was great dismay at the weakness of the garrison
there, and bitter denunciations of Lee for leaving so small a force
behind.  The Union troops for this counter-invasion were landed at
Yorktown and sent on to the White House.  General Getty, in command
of one column of about seven thousand men, moved on the 13th as
far as Hanover Junction to destroy the bridge over the North and
South Anna, and as much of the railroad as possible, in order to
make a break in Lee's communications.  At the same time General
Keyes, with another column of about five thousand men, moved from
the White House to secure Bottom's Bridge on the Chickahominy, and
thus leave a clear road for Getty's column to advance on the city.
The Davis Government, however, called out the militia and concentrated
enough men for defence by weakening the garrisons in South Carolina
and elsewhere; but there is no doubt the fright at one time was so
serious that it was in contemplation to recall Lee's forces;
especially on the 15th of June, when it was learned that General
Keyes' column was at New Kent Court House within fifteen miles of
the city.

On the 16th Stuart's cavalry left the Rappahannock--with the
exception of the 15th Virginia, which remained with Hill--and
bivouacked at Salem with Fitz Lee's brigade at Piedmont.  Their
orders were to keep along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge, and
guard the front of Longstreet's corps in the Gaps.

Our own cavalry were concentrated at Warrenton and Catlett's.

On the 17th Fitz Lee's brigade was sent forward from Piedmont to
Aldie, via Middleburg, to anticipate our troops in holding the Gap
there; it being considered important to occupy the Bull Run range
of mountains as a screen for Lee's further operations.  Fitz Lee's
brigade was supported by that of Robertson which was moved to
Rectortown, where it was also available as a reserve to W. H. F.
Lee's brigade which had gone forward to occupy Thoroughfare Gap.
No opposition was anticipated in the latter place, Pleasonton having
moved to Centreville, with his main body.  Stuart made his headquarters
at Middleburg on the 17th.

Fitz Lee halted near Dover to close up his command, and sent his
pickets on to Aldie Gap.  Pleasonton, who was scouting in the
vicinity, had no orders to go through the pass, but felt prompted
to do so by one of those presentiments which rarely deceive.  He
pushed on, therefore, with Gregg's division until about 2.30 P.M.,
when he came upon the rebel pickets, who fell back on the main
body.  The latter had made a march of forty miles to reach the Gap,
and Fitz Lee chose a strong position on a hill directly west of
Aldie, in which to fight a defensive battle.  His line covered the
road to Snicker's Gap, but could be turned by the road to Middleburg
and Ashby's Gap.

A sanguinary contest ensued, which, including the pursuit, lasted
until 9 P.M.  The rebel front was strengthened by a ditch and a
line of hay-stacks.  After fighting for three hours the battle was
finally decided by a gallant charge of the 1st Maine Cavalry, who,
after our line had been broken and driven back, were led by Kilpatrick
in person, against a regiment of mounted infantry on the Ashby's
Gap road, capturing four guns.  The Harris Light Cavalry had been
in disfavor for having failed in an attack at Brandy Station, but
on the present occasion they redeemed themselves, made several
brilliant charges, and greatly contributed to the success of the
day.

The rebels claim to have taken 134 prisoners, and some flags in
this affair, and state that they only fell back to Middleburg in
obedience to Stuart's orders.  Ascertaining that Colonel Duffie
was advancing on that place with his division, Stuart thought, by
concentrating his entire force there, he could overwhelm him.  This
may account for the retreat, but it is very certain that the loss
of the pass at Aldie was a serious blow to the rebel cause.  This,
supplemented by Colonel Duffie's operations, which will be described
hereafter, gave Hooker possession of Loudon County, and threw the
invading column far to the west.  If the enemy had succeeded in
posting forces in the gaps of the Bull Run range of mountains, and
in occupying the wooded country between Thoroughfare Gap and
Leesburg, they would not only have hidden all their own movements
from view, but would have had command of the Potomac from Harper's
Ferry to within thirty miles of Washington, so that they could have
operated on either side of the river.

While Gregg's division were thus engaged, Colonel Duffie started
under orders with his regiment from Centreville for Middleburg, by
way of Thoroughfare Gap.  The enemy (W. H. F. Lee's brigade) were
already there, but he forced them out, and kept on to Middleburg,
which was reached about 9.30 A.M.  He found Stuart's rear guard or
escort there, and drove them out.  Stuart fell back to Rector's
Cross Roads, and sent word to all his forces to concentrate against
Duffie.  Duffie barricaded the streets of the town and prepared to
hold it until reinforcements could reach him from Aldie, not being
aware that there was any impediment in that direction.  At 7 P.M.
the different rebel brigades advanced on him from the direction of
Aldie, Union, and Upperville.  By sheltering his men behind stone
walls and barricades, he repelled several assaults, but at last
was surrounded by overwhelming forces, and compelled to retreat by
the road upon which he had advanced in the morning.  He fell back
until he crossed Little River, picketed the stream and halted there
to get some rest.  This gave time to the enemy to surround him,
and by half past one the next morning all the roads in the neighborhood
were full of cavalry; an entire brigade being formed on that which
led to Aldie.  He tried to force his way through the latter, but
was received with heavy volleys on both flanks, and with loud calls
to surrender.  He directed Captain Bliss and Captain Bixby, who
were in advance, to charge through everything in front of them,
and the way was cleared for the main body, which at last gained
the junction of the Aldie road with that which leads to White
Plains.  He then retreated on the latter, with his men all intermixed
with those of the enemy and fighting every step of the way.  He
finally disengaged his force from this _mélée_ and made his way
through Hopewell Gap back to Centreville, losing two-thirds of his
command.

In this affair at Middleburg, Stuart states that he was unable with
his entire force to drive the 1st Rhode Island regiment from a
position it had chosen, and speaks with admiration of the gallantry
it displayed.

On the 18th, Stuart took post outside of that town with Robertson
and W. H. F. Lee's brigade.  Fitz Lee's brigade was on his left at
Union, and Jones' brigade was ordered up as a reserve.

Pleasonton moved forward with all his available force and occupied
Middleburg and Philemont on the road to Snicker's Gap; releasing
some of Duffie's men who had been captured the day before.  Gregg's
division encountered the enemy a short distance beyond Middleburg
and drove them five miles in the direction of Ashby's Gap.  There
was no regular line formation, but the Indian mode of fighting was
adopted on both sides, by taking advantage of every stone, fence,
bush, or hollow, to shelter the men.  Before the action was over
Kilpatrick's command came up and took a prominent part.

Buford's division, which had advanced beyond Philemont on the
Snicker's Gap road, also became warmly engaged.  They turned the
left flank of the rebels and pressed on successfully, but the
squadron left to guard the bridge over Goose Creek was overpowered
by numbers and the bridge was burned.  Part of Pleasonton's force
made a reconnoissance toward Warrenton and engaged Hampton's brigade
there.

On the 19th Pleasonton held the positions he had gained and sent
back for an infantry support.

As there were indications that the whole of Stuart's cavalry would
be thrown on Gregg's division at Upperville, Pleasonton went forward
with his entire force and a brigade of infantry to support it.
After a series of brilliant engagements he drove Start steadily
back into Ashby's Gap, where he took refuge behind Longstreet's
Corps, a portion of which came up.  Pleasonton then returned to
Upperville and next day to Aldie.  The object of these movements--
to gain possession of Loudon County--having been attained, Hooker
was wary, and did not propose to be lured away from his strong
position, to take part in cavalry battles at a distance without a
definite object.  He still found it difficult to realize that Lee
would still further lengthen out his long line from Richmond, and
endanger his communications, by invading Pennsylvania; and he
therefore waited for further developments.  Lee, however, impelled
by public opinion behind him, which it was hardly safe to brave,
still went forward, and directed Ewell to cross the Potomac with
his main body and Longstreet to fall back behind the Shenandoah to
act in conjunction with Hill, who had relieved Ewell at Winchester
on the 17th, against any attempt to strike the rear of his long
column.  Like Achilles he felt that he was only vulnerable in his
heel.

Several small skirmishes occurred about this time between detachments
of General Schenck's command, which picketed the north bank of the
Potomac, and bands of rebel partisans.  The former were surprised
and captured in two or three instances.  In one of these expeditions
a locomotive and twenty-three cars were disabled on the Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad.  Imboden, too, who occupied Cumberland on the
17th, in order to favor the general plan of invasion, tore up some
miles of the track west of that town, with a view to prevent any
reinforcements coming from that direction.

It would have been much better for the interests of the Southern
Confederacy if Lee, instead of making a downright invasion, had
been content to remain in the valley and threaten Hooker with two
corps, while he used the third to procure unlimited supplies in
Pennsylvania, and to sever all connection between the East and
West, by breaking up the railroads and cutting the telegraph wires.
Such a result, however, would hardly have been sufficient to meet
the expectations of the Southern people, who were bent upon nothing
else than the entire subjugation of the North and the occupation
of our principal cities.

Pleasonton's operations having cleared the way, Hooker moved forward
promptly on the 18th to occupy the gaps.  The Twelfth Corps were
sent to Leesburg, the Fifth to Aldie, and the Second to Thoroughfare
Gap.  The other corps formed a second line in reserve.  This covered
Washington and gave Hooker an excellent base of operations.

In answer to his demand for reinforcements, Crawford's division of
Pennsylvania Reserves, and Abercrombie's division were sent to him.
As the latter was just going out of service, it was of no use.
Hooker contended that his army constituted the proper defence of
Washington, and that it was not necessary to keep a large force
inactive there, who could be of much more service at the front.
The authorities were timid, however, did not see the force of this
reasoning and therefore refused to place Schenck's and Heintzelman's
commands under his orders.

The enemy made a feeble attempt about this time to occupy Harper's
Ferry, but were promptly shelled out by our batteries on Maryland
Heights.

Lee having failed, on account of the discomfiture of his cavalry,
in crossing the Potomac at Edwards' Ferry, was forced either to
remain where he was or go forward.  Impelled by public opinion he
kept on his way up the Cumberland Valley.  Hooker being very desirous
of keeping the invasion west of the Blue Ridge, asked Heintzelman
to co-operate with him by sending the 2,000 men which seemed to be
of no service at Poolesville to the passes of South Mountain, which
is an extension of the same range; but Heintzelman said those passes
were outside of his jurisdiction, and the men were needed in
Poolesville.  Hooker replied somewhat angrily that he would try
and do without the men.  The two generals had quarreled, and there
was not the best feeling between them.

All of Ewell's corps were across the river on the 22d, and Jenkins'
cavalry pushed on to Chambersburg.  He was ordered to remain there
until reinforced, but failed to do so, as Union troops were
approaching from the direction of Carlisle.

Longstreet and Hill were left behind to prevent Hooker from striking
the rear of this long column.  Hooker still remained quiescent,
engaged in trying to obtain 15,000 men as reinforcements.  He was
but partially successful, for as soon as the New York regiments
reached Baltimore, Lockwood's brigade of Maryland troops, about
three thousand, was ordered to join the Army of the Potomac, and
was assigned to the Twelfth Corps.

The Army of the Potomac at this time was posted as follows:  The
Twelfth Corps at Leesburg, supported by the Eleventh on Goose Creek,
between Leesburg and Aldie; the Fifth Corps near Aldie, and the
Second at the next pass below, both supported by the Third Corps
at Gum Springs.  The First Corps was behind the Eleventh and Twelfth
Corps, near Guilford, on the Loudon and Hampshire Railroad.  Our
cavalry, which had left Aldie, covered the approaches to Leesburg.
On the 23d they had a sharp engagement at Dover, on the road from
Aldie to Leesburg, with part of Stuart's force, who beat up their
quarters, but they drove off their assailants without much
difficulty.

Lee now, with a prudent regard to a possible defeat, requested the
authorities at Richmond to have a reserve army under Beauregard
assemble at Culpeper; a request which was looked upon by Davis as
one quite impossible to carry out, owing to the scarcity of troops,
and the necessity of reinforcing Johnston in the West and Beauregard
in the South.

Two of Ewell's divisions, those of Rodes and Johnson, reached the
frightened town of Chambersburg on the 23d.  The other, under Early,
took the road to York, _via_ Gettysburg, and halted on that day at
Waynesborough.

By this time twenty regiments of militia were on their way from
New York to Baltimore and Harrisburg.

Longstreet crossed the Potomac at Williamsport, and Hill at
Shepherdstown, on the 24th.  Their columns united at Hagerstown
the next day.  Thus supported, Ewell's main body resumed its march
to Carlisle, which it occupied on the 27th; gathering large supplies
there and along the road by means of foraging parties sent out to
depredate on the farmers.  As soon as they reached the town, Jenkins'
brigade left for Harrisburg.

Hooker having now satisfied himself that the Capital was safe from
a _coup-de-main_, and that the main body of the rebels were still
marching up the Cumberland Valley, determined to move in a parallel
line on the east side of South Mountain, where he could occupy the
gaps at once, in case the enemy turned east, toward Washington and
Baltimore.  To carry out this design his army began to cross the
Potomac at Edwards' Ferry on the 25th, and at night Reynolds' corps
was in front and Sickles' corps in rear of Middletown, in readiness
to hold either Crampton's or Turner's Gap.  Howard's corps was
thrown forward to Boonsborough.

On the 26th Slocum's corps was sent to Harper's Ferry to act in
conjunction with the garrison there--supposed to be 10,000 strong
--against the enemy's line of communication with Richmond.  The
Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps were advanced to Frederick, Md., as
a support to the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps.  Gregg's cavalry
division remained behind to cover the crossing, which was all
completed the next day, after which they too marched to Frederick.

On the 25th, Early, leaving his division at Greenwood, went to
Chambersburg to consult Ewell, who gave him definite orders to
occupy York, break up the Central Railroad, burn the bridge over
the Susquehanna at Wrightsville, and afterward rejoin the main body
at Carlisle.

It seems strange that Lee should suppose that the Union army would
continue inactive all this time, south of Washington, where it was
only confronted by Stuart's cavalry, and it is remarkable to find
him so totally in the dark with regard to Hooker's movements.  It
has been extensively assumed by rebel writers that this ignorance
was caused by the injudicious raid made by Stuart, who thought it
would be a great benefit to the Confederate cause if he could ride
entirely around the Union lines and rejoin Lee's advance at York.
He had made several of these circuits during his military career,
and had gained important advantages from them in way of breaking
up communications, capturing despatches, etc.  It is thought that
he hoped by threatening Hooker's rear to detain him and delay his
crossing the river, and thus give time to Lee to capture Harrisburg,
and perhaps Philadelphia.  His raid on this occasion was undoubtedly
a mistake.  When he rejoined the main body, his men were exhausted,
his horses broken down, and the battle of Gettysburg was nearly
over.  As cavalry are the eyes of an army, it has been said that
Stuart's absence prevented Lee from ascertaining the movements and
position of Hooker's army.  Stuart has been loudly blamed by the
rebel chroniclers for leaving the main body, but this is unjust;
Lee not only knew of the movement, but approved it; for he directed
Stuart to pass between Hooker and Washington, and move with part
of his force to Carlisle and the other part to Gettysburg.  Besides,
Stuart left Robertson's and Jones' brigades behind, with orders to
follow up the rear of the Union army until it crossed, and then to
rejoin the main body.  In the meantime they were to hold the gaps
in the Blue Ridge, for fear Hooker might send a force to occupy
them.  These two brigades, with Imboden's brigade, and White's
battalion, made quite a large cavalry force:  Imboden, however,
was also detached to break up the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad to
prevent forces from the West from taking Lee in rear; all of which
goes to show how sensitive the Confederate commander was in regard
to any danger threatening his communications with Richmond.

At 1 A.M. on the 25th, Stuart started on his expedition and advanced
to Haymarket, where he unexpectedly came upon Hancock's corps,
which had left Thoroughfare Gap, and was on its way to Gum Springs.
He opened fire against them but was soon driven off.  He then
returned to Buckland and Gainesville; for to keep on, in presence
of our troops, would have frustrated the object of his expedition
by indicating its purpose.

This was the day in which Longstreet and Hill united their columns
at Hagerstown.  Some Union spies who counted the rebel forces as
they passed through the town made their number to be 91,000 infantry,
280 guns and 1,100 cavalry.  This statement, though much exaggerated,
gained great credence at the time, and added to the excitement
among the loyal people throughout the Northern States, while the
copperhead element were proportionally active and jubilant.

On the 26th, General French assumed command of the garrison at
Harper's Ferry, then posted at Maryland Heights.

On the same day the Richmond Government were much alarmed by the
unexpected appearance of Colonel Spear's 11th Pennsylvania Cavalry
within eleven miles of the city.  Spear had made quite a successful
and very destructive raid on the railroads and other lines of
communication.  He made, too, a very important capture by bringing
in General W. H. F. Lee, who was wounded at the battle of Brandy
Station, and who was a son of General Robert E. Lee.  The Davis
Government had determined to hang one of our captains who was a
prisoner in Libby, and the fact that a son of General Robert E.
Lee was in our power prevented them from carrying out their intention
for fear he might be hanged by way of retaliation.

Early's division of Ewell's corps stopped at Gettysburg on its way
to York.  The other two divisions kept on toward Carlisle.

These movements at once caused Governor Curtin of Pennsylvania to
call out 60,000 men for the defence of the State.  They were styled
the emergency militia.  As there was little else than shot-guns
for them, these hasty gatherings did not promise to be very
effective.

The Governor still complained of a lack of zeal in Philadelphia.
The people there, said "Isn't this awful!" but very few volunteered.
They soon awoke from their apathy, however, and took prompt measures
to defend the city.

On the 27th the commands of Longstreet and Hill reached Chambersburg,
and Ewell's two divisions occupied Carlisle, while Jenkins pushed
on to Kingston, within thirteen miles of Harrisburg.  At the same
time Early was engaged in wreaking destruction upon the Northern
Central Railroad, and by night he entered York.  About the only
opposition he encountered came from a militia regiment at Gettysburg,
but this was soon driven away.

There was wild commotion throughout the North, and people began to
feel that the boast of the Georgia Senator Toombs, that he would
call the roll of his slaves at the foot of Bunker Hill Monument,
might soon be realized.  The enemy seemed very near and the Army
of the Potomac far away.

On the same day Stuart succeeded with great difficulty in crossing
the Potomac in the vicinity of Drainsville.  He found our troops
were now all north of this river, so that one object of his expedition
--to detain them on the south side--had failed.

On the 28th he resumed his march, and as he passed close to Washington
and Baltimore, he created considerable excitement in those cities.
At Rockville he came upon a large train full of supplies, on its
way to Frederick, Maryland, and captured it with its slender escort,
after which he kept on in a northerly direction through Brookeville
and Cookesville, travelling all night.

On this day the Adjutant-General at Richmond telegraphed for troops
to be sent there at once from the Carolinas and elsewhere, for he
estimated the Union forces at the White House at thirty thousand
men, and considered the capital to be in great danger.  Neither
Davis nor his cabinet had the slightest desire to have any successes
Lee might obtain at the North supplemented by their own execution
at the South, a result they felt was not wholly improbable, in the
excited state of public feeling at that time, if the city should
be taken.

Lee, ignorant that Hooker was following him up, continued his
aggressive advance.  Early took prompt measures to seize the bridge
over the Susquehanna at Wrightsville.  If successful, he intended
to cross over and amuse himself by destroying all direct connection
between Philadelphia and the West, by railroad and telegraph.  This
done, he proposed to march along the north side of the river,
capture Harrisburg and rejoin Ewell at Carlisle.  As Gordon's
brigade approached the bridge, after driving away some militia,
they found it in flames, the Union commander at Columbia, Colonel
Frick, having given orders for its destruction.  Early gained some
compensation for his failure in this respect by levying a contribution
on York of one-hundred thousand dollars in cash; two hundred barrels
of flour; thirty thousand bushels of corn; one thousand pairs of
shoes, etc.

The Union army still remained in Frederick, with the left wing
(three corps) under Reynolds thrown out toward the enemy, the
Eleventh Corps under Howard at Boonsborough, the First Corps under
my command at Middletown, supported by the Third Corps under Birney,
two or three miles in rear, with Buford's division of cavalry
holding the passes of South Mountain, the remainder of the cavalry
being at Frederick.

Hooker thought it useless to keep a garrison of 10,000 men in a
passive attitude at Harper's Ferry.  I think he was quite right,
for the war could not be decided by the possession of military
posts or even of cities, for hostilities would never cease until
one army or the other was destroyed.  He therefore applied to
Washington for permission to add this force to that of Slocum, in
order that the two might act directly against Lee's communications
by following up his rear while preserving their own line of retreat.
Slocum had been already ordered there, for this purpose, but Halleck
would not consent that the garrison of Harper's Ferry should be
withdrawn under any circumstances, and positively refused Hooker's
request.  Hooker then considering himself thwarted in all his plans
by the authorities at Washington, offered his resignation.  It was
promptly accepted, and Major-General George G. Meade, then the
commander of the Fifth Corps, was assigned to the command of the
Army of the Potomac.  He was a general of fine intellect, of great
personal bravery, and had had a good deal of experience in the war
in handling troops, but had never achieved any brilliant success,
or met with any serious reverse.

Upon ascertaining that the enemy were at York and Carlisle, Hooker
had determined to throw out his different corps in a fan shape
toward the Susquehanna, and advance in that direction with three
corps on the left to defend that flank, in case Longstreet and Hill
should turn East, instead of keeping on toward the North.  At the
same time it was his intention to have Slocum follow up Lee's
advance, by keeping in his rear, to capture his trains and couriers,
and to cut off his retreat should he be defeated.

General Meade's first order was for all the troops to concentrate
in Frederick, where he proposed to have a grand review; but at the
urgent remonstrance of General Butterfield, who had been Hooker's
Chief of Staff, and who stated that this delay would give Lee time
to cross the Susquehanna, and capture Harrisburg and Philadelphia,
Hooker's orders were allowed to stand, with some exceptions.  Meade
appears to have disapproved all movements against Lee's line of
retreat, for he ordered Slocum to rejoin the main army, and had
the hardihood to break up the post at Harper's Ferry, in spite of
the fact that Hooker had just been relieved from command for
requesting permission to do so.  The bulk of the garrison, under
Major-General French, was directed to take post as a reserve at
Frederick, when our forces moved forward.  The general idea of our
advance was to interpose between the enemy and Philadelphia if he
went north, or between him and Baltimore and Washington in case he
turned back.  The orders at night were for Buford's division of
cavalry to take post on the left flank, in the direction of Fairfield;
Gregg's division on the right flank at Westminster; and Kilpatrick's
division in advance of the centre, at Littlestown, the different
corps to be posted between New Windsor and Emmetsburg.

Ewell's corps, as stated, were at Carlisle and York, Lee and
Longstreet's at Chambersburg, and Hill's corps at Fayetteville.

Lee was startled to learn from a countryman who came in on the 28th
that Hooker was at Frederick, and not south of the Potomac, as he
had supposed.  He saw at once that his communications with Richmond,
about which he was so solicitous, were greatly endangered, for the
Union army could be formed to interpose between him and Williamsport,
and still keep a safe line of retreat open to Washington.  This
might not be so great a misfortune to the enemy as regards food
and forage; for he could probably live on the country for some
time, by making predatory excursions in different directions, but
when it came to obtaining fresh supplies of ammunition, the matter
would become very serious.  An army only carries a limited amount
of this into the field and must rely upon frequent convoys to keep
up the supply, which is constantly decreasing from the partial
engagements and skirmishes, so prevalent in a hostile country.

The wisdom of Hooker's policy in desiring to assail the rebel
communications is demonstrated by the fact the Lee immediately
turned back.  The head of the serpent faced about as soon as its
tail was trodden upon.  He came to the conclusion to prevent an
attack against his rear by threatening Baltimore with his whole
force.  This would necessarily cause the Union army to march further
east to confront him, and thus prevent it from operating in heavy
force in the Cumberland Valley.  Accordingly on the night of the
28th, Lee sent expresses to all his corps commanders to concentrate
at Gettysburg.  If he had known that Meade was about to withdraw
all the troops acting against his line of retreat he would probably
have gone on and taken Harrisburg.

As the new commander of the Union army was a favorite of General
Halleck, no notice was taken of his disregard of instructions in
detaching the garrison of Harper's Ferry.  General Couch, who
commanded the Department of the Susquehanna, was also placed under
his orders, a favor which had been denied to Hooker.  The troubles
of the latter were not quite over, for on his appearing in Washington
to explain his action, he was immediately put under arrest for
visiting the Capital without his (Halleck's) permission; a piece
of petty persecution which might have been spared under the
circumstances.  It was, however, a short and easy method of settling
all complaints that were inconvenient to answer.



CHAPTER III.
STUART'S RAID--THE ENEMY IN FRONT OF HARRISBURG--MEADE'S PLANS.

At dawn of day on the 29th, Stuart's command, after riding all
night, reached the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and commenced
disabling it, so far as the limited time at their disposal would
allow, by burning a bridge at Sykesville and tearing up a portion
of the track at Hood's Mill.  They remained at the latter place
during the day to rest, but started again in the afternoon, and
reached Westminster about 5 P.M.  At this place they were gallantly
attacked by the 1st Delaware Cavalry, which Stuart says was driven
off after hard fighting and pursued some distance toward Baltimore,
adding very much to the panic there.  At night the head of his
column halted at Union Mills, half way between Westminster and
Littlestown.  It may as well be stated here that Stuart found
himself greatly embarrassed by attempting to hold on to the long
train he had captured at Rockville.  It lengthened out his column
to such an extent that it became difficult to defend all parts of
the line without scattering and weakening his command.  As Kilpatrick's
division was waiting to intercept him at Littlestown, this
consideration became a matter of considerable importance.  Gregg's
division also moved in the morning to head him off at Westminster,
but owing to the roads being very much blocked up by our infantry
and trains marching in that direction, Gregg did not succeed in
reaching his destination until some hours after Stuart had passed.

At night two brigades of Buford's division of cavalry covered the
left flank of the Union army near Fairfield, with one brigade at
Mechanicstown.  The First and Eleventh Corps were at Emmetsburg,
the Third and Twelfth at Middleburg, the Fifth Corps at Taneytown,
the Second Corps at Uniontown, and the Sixth Corps at New Windsor.

The advance of the rebel cavalry under Jenkins were now within
sight of Harrisburg, and skirmishing only four miles from the town.
Jenkins' object was to make a thorough reconnoissance in order to
ascertain the best positions to be taken for an attack.  There was
a perfect exodus from the city.  All business was suspended, too,
in Philadelphia, and the authorities there busied themselves in
hastening the work on the fortifications in the suburbs of the
city.  They were active enough now, and large numbers were enrolled.
Pleasonton, who was under general orders to guard the flank nearest
the enemy, directed Buford on the 29th to occupy Gettysburg the
next day, and hold it until the Army of the Potomac came to his
relief.  He realized the importance of the position to the future
success of our arms.

Hill's corps was at Fayetteville on the 29th, but one division,
that of Heth, was thrown forward on that day to Cashtown, within
eight miles of Gettysburg.  The object of the movement was to join
Ewell at York, and co-operate with him in the destruction of the
railroads on the other side of the Susquehanna, etc.  This plan,
as I have already stated, was suddenly changed on the evening of
the 28th, when Lee found his communications endangered, and now
all the advanced troops under his command turned back to concentrate
at Gettysburg.  Longstreet left Chambersburg and marched to
Fayetteville, leaving Pickett's division behind to guard the trains.
Early received the order to return in the afternoon of the 28th,
recalled Gordon's brigade from Wrightsville, and made preparations
to start the next morning.  Rodes' and Johnson's divisions left
Carlisle and marched on Gettysburg; the former by the direct route,
and the latter by way of Greenwood, to convoy the trains full of
stolen property.

A number of partisan skirmishes took place during the day, which
were creditable to our troops, particularly that at McConnellsburg,
to the west of Chambersburg.

The raid against Richmond ended by the return of Colonel Spear's
regiment to the White House.  Hooker had urged that General Dix
assume command of all his available troops, march against Richmond,
and plant himself firmly on Lee's line of communication, but his
recommendations were slighted by Halleck.  There was much disappointment
in the North at this failure to make a serious attack on the rebel
capital, for it was generally believed that it might have been
captured by a _coup de main_.

On the 30th General Meade advanced his army still nearer the
Susquehanna.  At evening his extreme left, the First Corps, was at
Marsh Creek, on the Emmetsburg road, while the extreme right, the
Sixth Corps, was away off at Manchester.  The intermediate corps
were posted, the Eleventh at Emmetsburg; the Second at Uniontown;
the Third at Taneytown; the Fifth at Union Mills, and the Twelfth
at Frizzelburg.  General French moved from Harper's Ferry with the
bulk of the garrison and occupied Frederick.  The First Corps was
ordered to Gettysburg, but General Reynolds halted it at Marsh
Creek, as the enemy were reported to be coming from the direction
of Fairfield.

Meade now resolved to take up a defensive position on Pipe Creek.
He threw out his forces as before in a fan shape, but any corps
encountering the enemy was expected to fight in retreat until it
reached the new line, where all the corps were to assemble.  This
line as laid out was a long one, extending from Manchester to
Middleburg, a distance of about twenty-five miles.  Falling back
to fight again, is hardly to be commended, as it chills the ardor
of the men; nor is it certain that Lee would have attacked the
intrenchments at Pipe Creek.  If he found them formidable he might
have preferred to fight on the defensive with two corps, while the
Third Corps took Harrisburg, and broke up the railroad lines to
the west, or marched directly against Philadelphia; or, as Pipe
Creek did not interfere with his communications in any way he might
have chosen to let it severely alone, and have kept on depredating
in Pennsylvania, after capturing Harrisburg.  This would have forced
Meade sooner or later to attack him.

On the night of the 30th Ewell's corps had reached Heidlersburg,
nine miles from Gettysburg, with the exception of Johnson's division,
which was at Greenwood.  Rodes' division had marched direct from
Carlisle by way of Petersburg.  Longstreet with two divisions was
at Fayetteville; the other division, that of Pickett, was left at
Chambersburg to guard the trains.  Hill's corps had reached Cashtown
and Mummasburg, except Anderson's division, which was still back
at the mountain pass on the Chambersburg road.

Stuart, ascertaining that Early was no longer at York, and not
knowing that the army was concentrating on Gettysburg, turned toward
Carlisle.  He had bivouacked half way between Westminster and
Littlestown, but having ascertained that Kilpatrick was waiting
for him at the latter place, attempted to avoid the encounter by
going through cross roads to Hanover.  He found Farnsworth's brigade
of cavalry there, however, and charged their rear, driving them
back and capturing some prisoners and ambulances.  The 5th New York
made a counter-charge under Major Hammond and drove him out again.
He claims to have taken the town by the aid of Hampton's brigade,
which arrived in time to reinforce him.  Custer's brigade then came
up from Abbotstown.  The battle lasted until night, when Stuart
gave up the contest and retreated, leaving Kilpatrick in possession.

Part of his cavalry also attacked the 5th and 6th Michigan regiments
at Littlestown, but were repulsed.  He then, having no time to
spare, kept on his way toward York to find the army he had lost.
He passed within seven miles of Ewell's column on its way to
Gettysburg, and neither knew that the other was near.  Had they
effected a junction it would have saved the rebel cavalry a long,
fruitless, and exhausting march, which kept them out of the battle
on the first day.  It was one of those accidental circumstances
which seemed to favor us in this campaign, while almost every
incident at Chancellorsville was against us.

Finding Ewell had left York, Stuart turned and marched on Carlisle,
which he found occupied by our troops.  He demanded the surrender
of the place under a threat of bombardment.  General W. F. Smith,
one of the heroes of the Peninsula, was not to be affected by
menaces; and Stuart, whose time was precious and who had no ammunition
to spare, turned off in hopes of reaching Gettysburg in time to
take part in the battle.  He arrived there on the afternoon of the
2d, with horses and men worn out by their extraordinary exertions;
on their way whole regiments slept in the saddle.  This force when
it reached the field found Robertson's, Jones', and Jenkins'
brigades, and White's battalion ready to join it.

By evening Meade was fully apprised, by telegrams and Buford's
scouts, that the enemy were concentrating on Gettysburg.  He knew
that Reynolds at Marsh Creek was only about six miles from Hill at
Cashtown, but he sent no orders that night.  He simply stated that
the enemy were marching on Gettysburg, and he would issue orders
when they developed their intentions.  Thus the opposing forces
were moving in directions that would necessarily bring them in
contact, and a fight or retreat was inevitable.

Reynolds had the true spirit of a soldier.  He was a Pennsylvanian,
and, inflamed at seeing the devastation of his native State, was
most desirous of getting at the enemy as soon as possible.  I speak
from my own knowledge, for I was his second in command, and he told
me at Poolesville soon after crossing the river, that it was
necessary to attack the enemy at once, to prevent his plundering
the whole State.  As he had great confidence in his men, it was
not difficult to divine what his decision would be.  He determined
to advance and hold Gettysburg.  He directed the Eleventh Corps to
come up as a support to the First, and he recommended, but did not
order, the Third Corps to do the same.

Buford, with two of his cavalry brigades, reached the place that
night, but not without considerable difficulty.  He left Fountaindale
Gap early in the morning and attempted to move directly to his
destination, but he came upon Pettigrew's brigade of Hill's corps,
and was obliged to fall back to the mountains again.  Later in the
day he succeeded, by going around by way of Emmetsburg.  Before
evening set in, he had thrown out his pickets almost to Cashtown
and Hunterstown, posting Gamble's brigade across the Chambersburg
pike, and Devin's brigade across the Mummasburg road, his main body
being about a mile west of the town.

While these great movements were going on, some minor affairs showed
great gallantry on the part of partisan officers.  Captain Ulric
Dahlgren made a raid upon the rebel communications, capturing some
guns and prisoners, and gaining very important information which
will be referred to hereafter.

The two armies now about to contest on the perilous ridges of
Gettysburg the possession of the Northern States, and the ultimate
triumph of freedom or slavery, were in numbers as follows, according
to the estimate made by the Count of Paris, who is an impartial
observer, and who has made a close study of the question:

_The Army of the Potomac under General Meade_, 82,00 men and 300
guns.

_The Army of Northern Virginia under General Lee_, 73,500 men and
190 guns.

Stuart had 11,100 cavalry and 16 guns.

Pleasonton had about the same number of cavalry, and 27 guns.



CHAPTER IV.
THE FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG, WEDNESDAY, JULY 1, 1863.

On the morning of the 1st of July, General Buford, as stated, held
the ridges to the west of Gettysburg, with his cavalry division,
composed of Gamble's and Devin's brigades.  His vedettes were thrown
far out toward the enemy to give timely notice of any movement for
he was determined to prevent the rebels from entering the town if
possible, and knew the First Corps would soon be up to support him.
The enemy were not aware that there was any considerable force in
the vicinity, and in the morning sent forward Heth's division of
Hill's corps to occupy the place, anticipating no difficulty in
doing so.  Buford in the meantime had dismounted a large part of
his force, had strengthened his line of skirmishers, and planted
his batteries at the most commanding points.

General Reynolds, in consequence of the duties devolving upon him
as commander of the Left Wing of the army, that is of the First,
Third, and Eleventh Corps, had turned over the command of the First
Corps to me.  He now made immediate dispositions to go forward to
assist Buford.

As my corps was largely engaged in the first day's operations, I
must be excused for having a good deal to say in the first person
in relation to them.  Reynolds sent for me about six o'clock in
the morning, read to me the various despatches he had received from
Meade and Buford, and told me he should go forward at once with
the nearest division--that of Wadsworth--to aid the cavalry.  He
then instructed me to draw in my pickets, assemble the artillery
and the remainder of the corps, and join him as soon as possible.
Having given these orders, he rode off at the head of the column,
and I never saw him again.

The position of the two armies on the morning of the 1st of July,
was as follows:  The First Corps at Marsh Creek; the Second and
Third Corps at Taneytown; the latter being under orders to march
to Emmetsburg, to relieve the Eleventh Corps, which was directed
to join the First Corps at Gettysburg; the Twelfth Corps was at
Two Taverns; the Fifth Corps at Hanover, and the Sixth Corps about
thirty-five miles off to the right at Manchester.  Kilpatrick's
and Gregg's divisions of cavalry were also at Hanover.  The
Confederate army was advancing on Gettysburg from the west and
north.  The concentration of their troops and the dispersion of
ours are indicated on the map.

It must be remembered that the enemy had but _three_ corps, while
the Union army had _seven_.  Each of their corps represented a
_third_, and each of ours a _seventh_, of our total force.  The
same ratio extended to divisions and brigades.

Heth's division, which started early in the morning to occupy the
town, soon found itself confronted by Buford's skirmishers, and
formed line of battle with Archer's and Davis' brigades in front,
followed by those of Pettigrew and Brockenborough.  At 9 A.M. the
first gun was heard.  Buford had three cannon-shots fired as a
signal for his skirmish line to open on the enemy, and the battle
of Gettysburg began.*

[* Lt.-Col. Kress, of General Wadsworth's staff, entered Gettysburg
about this time and found General Buford surrounded by his staff
in front of the tavern there.  Buford turned to him and said, "What
are you doing here, sir?"  Kress replied that he came on to get
some shoes for Wadsworth's division.  Buford told him that he had
better return immediately to his command.  Kress said, "Why, what
is the matter, general?"  At that moment the far off sound of a
single gun was heard, and Buford replied, as he mounted his horse
and galloped off, _"That's the matter."_]

As the rebels had had several encounters with militia, who were
easily dispersed, they did not expect to meet any serious resistance
at this time, and advanced confidently and carelessly.  Buford gave
way slowly, taking advantage of every accident of ground to protract
the struggle.  After an hour's fighting he felt anxious, and went
up into the steeple of the Theological Seminary from which a wide
view could be obtained, to see if the First Corps was in sight.
One division of it was close at hand, and soon Reynolds, who had
preceded it, climbed up into the belfry to confer with him there,
and examine the country around.  Although there is no positive
testimony to that effect, his attention was doubtless attracted to
Cemetery Ridge in his rear, as it was one of the most prominent
features of the landscape.  An aide of General Howard--presumably
Major Hall--soon after Reynolds descended from the belfry, came up
to ask if he had any instructions with regard to the Eleventh Corps.
Reynolds, in reply, directed that General Howard bring his corps
forward at once and _form them on Cemetery Hill_ as a reserve.
General Howard has no recollection of having received any such
orders, but as he did get orders to come forward, and as his corps
was to occupy _some place_ in rear, as a support to the First Corps,
nothing is more probable than that General Reynolds directed him
to go there; for its military advantages were obvious enough to
any experienced commander.  Lieutenant Rosengarten, of General
Reynolds' staff, states positively that he was present and heard
the order given for Howard to post his troops on Cemetery Ridge.
The matter is of some moment, as the position in question ultimately
gave us the victory, and Howard received the thanks of Congress
for selecting it.  It is not to be supposed that either Howard or
Rosengarten would mistake the matter.  It is quite probable that
Reynolds chose the hill simply as a position upon which his force
could rally if driven back, and Howard selected it as a suitable
battle-field for the army.  It has since been universally conceded
that it was admirably adapted for that purpose.

It will be seen from the above map, that there are two roads coming
to Gettysburg from the west, making a considerable angle with each
other.  Each is intersected by ridges running north and south.  On
that nearest to the town, and about three-fourths of a mile from
the central square, there is a large brick building, which was used
as a Lutheran Theological Seminary.  A small stream of water called
Willoughby's Run winds between the next two ridges.  The battle on
the first day was principally fought on the heights on each side
of this stream.

Buford being aware that Ewell's corps would soon be on its way from
Heidlersburg to the field of battle, was obliged to form line facing
north with Devin's brigade, and leave Gamble's brigade to keep back
the overpowering weight of Hill's corps advancing from the west.

While this fighting was going on, and Reynolds and Wadsworth were
pressing to the front, I was engaged in withdrawing the pickets
and assembling the other two divisions, together with the corps
artillery.  As soon as I saw that my orders were in process of
execution, I galloped to the front, leaving the troops to follow,
and caught up with Meredith's brigade of Wadsworth's division,
commonly called "The Iron Brigade," just as it was going into
action.

In the meantime the enemy approaching from the west were pressing
with great force against Buford's slender skirmish line, and Reynolds
went forward with Cutler's brigade to sustain it.  He skilfully
posted Hall's 2d Maine battery in the road, and threw forward two
regiments, the 14th Brooklyn and the 95th New York, a short distance
in advance on the left.  At the same time he directed General
Wadsworth to place the remaining three regiments of the brigade,
the 147th New York, the 76th New York, and the 56th Pennsylvania,
on the right of the road.  When this formation was completed the
cavalry brigade under Gamble, which had been fighting there, withdrew
and formed in column on the left of the infantry; but the other
cavalry brigade, under Devin, which was not facing in that direction,
still held the position, awaiting the advance of Ewell's corps from
the north.

As Davis' rebel brigade of Heth's division fronting Wadsworth were
hidden behind an intervening ridge, Wadsworth did not see them at
first, but formed his three regiments perpendicularly to the road,
without a reconnoissance.  The result was that Davis came over the
hill almost directly on the right flank of this line, which being
unable to defend itself was forced back and directed by Wadsworth
to take post in a piece of woods in rear on Seminary Ridge.  The
two regiments on the right accordingly withdrew, but the 147th New
York, which was next to the road, did not receive the order, as
their Colonel was shot down before he could deliver it.  They were
at once surrounded and very much cut up before they could be rescued
from their perilous position.

The two regiments on the right, which were forced back, were
veterans, conspicuous for gallantry in every battle in which the
Army of the Potomac had been engaged since the Peninsula campaign.
As Wadsworth withdrew them without notifying Hall's battery in the
road, or the two regiments posted by Reynolds on the left, both
became exposed to a disastrous flank attack on the right.  Hall
finding a cloud of skirmishers launched against his battery which
was now without support, was compelled to retreat.  The horses of
the lost gun were all shot or bayonetted.  The non-military reader
will see that while a battery can keep back masses of men it cannot
contend with a line of skirmishers.  To resist them would be very
much like fighting mosquitoes with musket-balls.  The two regiments
posted by Reynolds, the 14th Brooklyn and 95th New York, finding
their support gone on the right, while Archer's rebel brigade was
advancing to envelop their left, fell back leisurely under Colonel
Fowler of the 14th Brooklyn, who assumed command of both as the
ranking officer present.

I reached the field just as the attack on Cutler's brigade was
going on, and at once sent my adjutant-general, Major Halstead,
and young Meredith L. Jones, who was acting as aide on my staff,
to General Reynolds to ask instructions.  Under the impression that
the enemy's columns were approaching on both roads, Reynolds said,
"Tell Doubleday I will hold on to this road," referring to the
Chambersburg road, "and he must hold on to that one;" meaning the
road to Fairfield or Hagerstown.  At the same time he sent Jones
back at full speed to bring up a battery.

The rebels, however, did not advance on the Fairfield road until
late in the afternoon.  They must have been in force upon it some
miles back, for the cavalry so reported, and this caused me during
the entire day to give more attention than was necessary to my
left, as I feared the enemy might separate my corps from the Third
and Eleventh Corps at Emmetsburg.  Such a movement would be equivalent
to interposing between the First Corps and the main army.

There was a piece of woods between the two roads, with open ground
on each side.  It seemed to me this was the key of the position,
for if this woods was strongly held, the enemy could not pass on
either road without being taken in flank by the infantry, and in
front by the cavalry.  I therefore urged the men as they filed past
me to hold it at all hazards.  Full of enthusiasm and the memory
of their past achievements they said to me proudly, _"If we can't
hold it, where will you find men who can?"_

As they went forward under command of Colonel Morrow* of the 24th
Michigan Volunteers, a brave and capable soldier, who, when a mere
youth, was engaged in the Mexican War, I rode over to the left to
see if the enemy's line extended beyond ours, and if there would
be any attempt to flank our troops in that direction.  I saw,
however, only a few skirmishers, and returned to organize a reserve.
I knew there was fighting going on between Cutler's brigade and
the rebels in his front, but as General Reynolds was there in
person, I only attended to my own part of the line; and halted the
6th Wisconsin regiment as it was going into the action, together
with a hundred men of the Brigade Guard, taken from the 149th
Pennsylvania, to station them in the open space between the Seminary
and the woods, as a reserve, the whole being under the command of
Lieut.-Colonel R. R. Dawes, of the 6th Wisconsin.

[* I sent orders to Morrow under the supposition that he was the
ranking officer of the brigade.  Colonel W. W. Robinson, 7th
Wisconsin, was entitled to the command, and exercised it during
the remainder of the battle.]

It is proper to state that General Meredith, the permanent commander
of the brigade, was wounded as he was coming up, some time after
its arrival, by a shell which exploded in front of his horse.

Both parties were now trying to obtain possession of the woods.
Archer's rebel brigade, preceded by a skirmish line, was crossing
Willoughby's Run to enter them on one side as the Iron Brigade went
in on the other.  General Reynolds was on horseback in the edge of
the woods, surrounded by his staff.  He felt some anxiety as to
the result, and turned his head frequently to see if our troops
would be up in time.  While looking back in this way, a rebel
sharpshooter shot him through the back of the head, the bullet
coming out near the eye.  He fell dead in an instant, without a
word.  The country sustained great loss in his death.  I lamented
him as almost a life-long companion.  We were at West Point together,
and had served in the same regiment--the old 3d Artillery--upon
first entering service, along with our present Commander-in-Chief,
General Sherman, and General George H. Thomas.  When quite young
we had fought in the same battles in Mexico.  There was little
time, however, to indulge in these recollections.  The situation
was very peculiar.  The rebel left under Davis had driven in Cutler's
brigade and our left under Morrow had charged into the woods,
preceded by the 2d Wisconsin under Colonel Fairchild, swept suddenly
and unexpectedly around the right flank of Archer's brigade, and
captured a large part of it, including Archer himself.  The fact
is, the enemy were careless and underrated us, thinking, it is
said, that they had only militia to contend with.  The Iron Brigade
had a different head-gear from the rest of the army and were
recognized at once by their old antagonists.  Some of the latter
were heard to exclaim:  "There are those d----d black-hatted fellows
again!  'Taint no militia.  It's the Army of the Potomac."

Having captured Archer and his men, many of the Iron Brigade kept
on beyond Willoughby's Run, and formed on the heights on the opposite
side.

The command now devolved upon me, with its great responsibilities.
The disaster on the right required immediate attention, for the
enemy, with loud yells, were pursuing Cutler's brigade toward the
town.  I at once ordered my reserve under Lieutenant-Colonel Dawes
to advance against their flank.  If they faced Dawes, I reasoned
that they would present their other flank to Cutler's men, so that
I felt quite confident of the result.  In war, however, unexpected
changes are constantly occurring.  Cutler's brigade had been
withdrawn by order of General Wadsworth, without my knowledge, to
the suburbs of Gettysburg.  Fortunately, Fowler's two regiments
came on to join Dawes, who went forward with great spirit, but who
was altogether too weak to assail so large a force.  As he approached,
the rebels ceased to pursue Cutler, and rushed into the railroad
cut to obtain the shelter of the grading.  They made a fierce and
obstinate resistance, but, while Fowler confronted them above,
about twenty of Dawes' men were formed across the cut by his
adjutant, E. P. Brooks, to fire through it.  The rebels could not
resist this; the greater number gave themselves up as prisoners,
and the others scattered over the country and escaped.

This success relieved the 147th New York, which, as I stated, was
surrounded when Cutler fell back, and it also enabled us to regain
the gun which Hall had been obliged to abandon.

The enemy having vanished from our immediate front, I withdrew the
Iron Brigade from its advanced position beyond the creek, reformed
the line on the ridge where General Reynolds had originally placed
it, and awaited a fresh attack, or orders from General Meade.  The
two regiments of Cutler's brigade were brought back from the town,
and, notwithstanding the check they had received, they fought with
great gallantry throughout the three days' battle that ensued.

There was now a lull in the combat.  I was waiting for the remainder
of the First Corps to come up, and Heth was reorganizing his
shattered front line, and preparing to bring his two other brigades
forward.  The remnant of Archer's brigade was placed on the right,
and made to face south against Buford's cavalry, which, it was
feared, might attack that flank.  What was left of Davis' brigade
was sent to the extreme left of the line, and Pegram's artillery
was brought forward and posted on the high ground west of Willoughby's
Run.

Thus prepared, and with Pender's strong division in rear, ready to
cover his retreat if defeated, or to follow up his success if
victorious, Heth advanced to renew the attack.

As I had but four weak infantry brigades at this time against eight
larger brigades which were about to assail my line, I would have
been justified in falling back, but I determined to hold on to the
position until ordered to leave it.  I did not believe in the
system, so prevalent at that time, of avoiding the enemy.  I quite
agreed with Reynolds that it was best to meet him as soon as
possible, for the rebellion, if reduced to a war of positions,
would never end so long as the main army of the Confederates was
left in a condition to take the field.  A retreat, too, has a bad
effect on the men.  It gives them the impression that their generals
think them too weak to contend with the enemy.  I was not aware,
at this time, that Howard was on the ground, for he had given me
no indication of his presence, but I knew that General Meade was
at Taneytown; and as, on the previous evening, he had informed
General Reynolds that the enemy's army were concentrating on
Gettysburg, I thought it probable he would ride to the front to
see for himself what was going on, and issue definite orders of
some kind.  As Gettysburg covered the great roads from Chambersburg
to York, Baltimore, and Washington, and as its possession by Lee
would materially shorten and strengthen his line of retreat, I was
in favor of making great sacrifices to hold it.

While we were thus temporarily successful, having captured or
dispersed all the forces in our immediate front, a very misleading
despatch was sent to General Meade by General Howard.  It seems
that General Howard had reached Gettysburg in advance of his corps,
just after the two regiments of Cutler's brigade, which had been
outflanked, fell back to the town by General Wadsworth's order.
Upon witnessing this retreat, which was somewhat disorderly, General
Howard hastened to send a special messenger to General Meade with
the baleful intelligence that the First Corps had fled from the
field at the first contact with the enemy, thus magnifying a forced
retreat of two regiments, acting under orders, into the flight of
an entire corps, two-thirds of which had not yet reached the field.
It is unnecessary to say that this astounding news created the
greatest feeling against the corps, who were loudly cursed for
their supposed lack of spirit and patriotism.

About 11 A.M., the remainder of the First Corps came up, together
with Cooper's, Stewart's, Reynolds', and Stevens' batteries.  By
this time the enemy's artillery had been posted on every commanding
position to the west of us, several of their batteries firing down
the Chambersburg pike.  I was very desirous to hold this road, as
it was in the centre of the enemy's line, who were advancing on
each side of it, and Calef--exposed as his battery was--fired over
the crest of ground where he was posted, and notwithstanding the
storm of missiles that assailed him, held his own handsomely, and
inflicted great damage on his adversaries.  He was soon after
relieved by Reynolds' Battery "L" of the 1st New York, which was
sustained by Colonel Roy Stone's brigade of Pennsylvania troops,
which I ordered there for that purpose.  Stone formed his men on
the left of the pike, behind a ridge running north and south, and
partially sheltered them by a stone fence, some distance in advance,
from which he had driven the rebel skirmish line, after an obstinate
contest.

It was a hot place for troops; for the whole position was alive
with bursting shells, but the men went forward in fine spirits and,
under the impression that the place was to be held at all hazards,
they cried out, _"We have come to stay!"_  The battle afterward
became so severe that the greater portion did stay, laying down
their lives there for the cause they loved so well.  Morrow's
brigade remained in the woods where Reynolds was killed, and Biddle's
brigade was posted on its left in the open ground along the crest
of the same ridge, with Cooper's battery in the interval.  Cutler's
brigade took up its former position on the right of the road.
Having disposed of Wadsworth's division and my own division, which
was now under the command of Brigadier General Rowley, I directed
General Robinson's division to remain in reserve at the Seminary,
and to throw up a small semicircular rail intrenchment in the grove
in front of the building.  Toward the close of the action this
defence, weak and imperfect as it was, proved to be of great
service.

The accompanying map shows the position of troops and batteries at
this time.

It will be seen that Heth's division is formed on the western ridge
which bounds Willougby's Run and along a cross-road which intersects
the Chambersburg road at right angles.

Pender's division, posted in the rear as a support to Heth, was
formed in the following order by brigades:  Thomas, Lane, Scales,
and McGowan (under Perrin); the first named on the rebel left and
Perrin on the right.  To sustain Heth's advance and crush out all
opposition, both Pegram's and McIntosh's artillery were posted on
the crest of the ridge west of the Run.

While this was going on, General Howard, who was awaiting the
arrival of his corps, had climbed into the steeple of the seminary
to obtain a view of the surrounding country.  At 11.30 A.M. he
learned that General Reynolds was killed, and that the command of
the three corps (the First, Eleventh, and Third) constituting the
Left Wing of the army devolved upon him by virtue of his rank.  He
saw that the First Corps was contending against large odds and sent
back for the Eleventh Corps to come up at double-quick.  Upon
assuming command of the Left Wing he turned over his own corps to
Major-General Carl Schurz, who then gave up the command of his
division to General Barlow.  Howard notified General Meade of
Reynolds' death, but forgot to take back or modify the false
statement he had made about the First Corps, now engaged before
his eyes, in a most desperate contest with a largely superior force;
so that General Meade was still left under the impression that the
First Corps had fled from the field.

Howard also sent a request to Slocum, who was at Two Taverns, only
about five miles from Gettysburg, to come forward, but Slocum
declined, without orders from Meade.  He probably thought if any
one commander could assume the direction of other corps, he might
antagonize the plans of the General-in-Chief.

Upon receiving the news of the death of General Reynolds and the
disorder which it was supposed had been created by that event,
General Meade superseded Howard by sending his junior officer,
General Hancock, to assume command of the field, with directions
to notify him of the condition of affairs at the front.  He also
ordered General John Newton of the Sixth Corps to take command of
the First Corps.

The head of the Eleventh Corps reached Gettysburg at 12.45 P.M.,
and the rear at 1.45 P.M.  Schimmelpfennig's division led the way,
followed by that of Barlow.  The two were directed to prolong the
line of the First Corps to the right along Seminary Ridge.  The
remaining division, that of Steinwehr, with the reserve artillery
under Major Osborne, were ordered to occupy Cemetery Hill, in rear
of Gettysburg, as a reserve to the entire line.  Before this
disposition could be carried out, however, Buford rode up to me
with the information that his scouts reported the advance of Ewell's
corps from Heidlersburg directly on my right flank.  I sent a staff
officer to communicate this intelligence to General Howard, with
a message that I would endeavor to hold my ground against A. P.
Hill's corps if he could, by means of the Eleventh Corps, keep
Ewell from attacking my right.  He accordingly directed the Eleventh
Corps to change front to meet Ewell.  As it did so, Devin's cavalry
brigade fell back and took up a position to the right and rear of
this line just south of the railroad bridge.

The concentration of Rodes' and Early's divisions--the one from
Carlisle and the other from York--took place with great exactness;
both arriving in sight of Gettysburg at the same time.  The other
division, that of Johnson, took a longer route from Carlisle by
way of Greenwood, to escort the trains, and did not reach the battle-
field until sunset.  Anderson's division of Hill's corps was also
back at the pass in the mountains on the Chambersburg road.  It
had halted to allow Johnson to pass, and then followed him to
Gettysburg, reaching there about dusk.

The first indication I had that Ewell had arrived, and was taking
part in the battle, came from a battery posted on an eminence called
Oak Hill, almost directly in the prolongation of my line, and about
a mile north of Colonel Stone's position.  This opened fire about
1.30 P.M., and rendered new dispositions necessary; for Howard had
not guarded my right flank as proposed, and indeed soon had more
than he could do to maintain his line.  When the guns referred to
opened fire, Wadsworth, without waiting for orders, threw Cutler's
brigade back into the woods on Seminary Ridge, north of the railroad
grading; a movement I sanctioned as necessary.  Morrow's brigade
was concealed from the view of the enemy, in the woods where Reynolds
fell, and Biddle's brigade, by my order, changed front to the north.
It could do so with impunity, as it was behind a ridge which
concealed its left flank from Hill's corps, and was further protected
in that direction by two companies of the 20th New York State
Militia, who occupied a house and barn in advance, sent there by
the colonel of that regiment, Theodore B. Gates, whose skill and
energy were of great service to me during the battle.

It would of course have been impossible to hold the line if Hill
attacked on the west and Ewell assailed me at the same time on the
north; but I occupied the central position, and their converging
columns did not strike together until the grand final advance at
the close of the day, and therefore I was able to resist several
of their isolated attacks before the last crash came.

Stone's brigade in the centre had a difficult angle to defend, but
was partially sheltered by a ridge on the west.  His position was
in truth the key-point of the first day's battle.  It overlooked
the field, and its possession by the enemy would cut our force in
two, enfilade Morrow's and Biddle's brigades, and compel a hasty
retreat.

After Hall's battery was driven back, no other artillery occupied
the ground for some time, then General Wadsworth borrowed Calef's
regular battery from the cavalry, and posted it in rear of the
position Hall had occupied.  When the remainder of the division
came up, Captain Reynolds' Battery "L" of the 1st New York Artillery,
as already stated, was sent to assist Calef in keeping down the
fire of two rebel batteries on the ridge to the west; but when
Ewell's artillery also opened, the cross fire became too severe.
Calef was withdrawn, and Reynolds was severely wounded.  The rebel
batteries soon after ceased firing for the time being; and at
Wadsworth's request, Colonel Wainwright, Chief of Artillery to the
First Corps, posted a section of Reynolds' battery, under Lieutenant
Wilbur, on Seminary Ridge, south of the railroad cut; Stewart's
Battery "B" 4th United States being on a line north of the cut.
Cooper's battery was directed to meet Ewell's attack from the north,
and Stevens' 5th Maine battery was retained behind the Seminary in
reserve.

Barlow's division on the right and Schimmelpfennig's on the left,
formed somewhat hastily against Ewell, whose line of battle faced
south.  Barlow rested his right on a wooded knoll, constituting
part of the western bank of Rock Creek.  As there was an open
country to the east he considered that flank secure, for no enemy
was in sight then, and if they came from that direction, there
would be time to make fresh dispositions.  After the formation
there was an interval of a quarter of a mile between their left
and the First Corps, which might have been avoided by placing the
two divisions further apart.  This was a serious thing to me, for
the attempt to fill this interval and prevent the enemy from
penetrating there, lengthened and weakened my line, and used up my
reserves.  It seems to me that the Eleventh Corps was too far out.
It would have been better, in my opinion, if the left had been
_echeloned_ in rear of the right of the First Corps, and its right
had rested on the strong brick buildings with stone foundations at
the Almshouse.  The enemy then could not have turned the right
without compromising the safety of the turning column and endangering
his communications; a movement he would hardly like to make,
especially as he did not know what troops might be coming up.
Still they had a preponderating force, and as their whole army was
concentrating on Gettysburg, it was not possible to keep them back
for any great length of time unless the First and Eleventh Corps
were heavily reinforced.  The position of our forces and those of
the enemy, will be best understood by a reference to the map on
page 125.

About 2 P.M., after the Eleventh Corps line was formed, General
Howard rode over, inspected, and approved it.  He also examined my
position and gave orders, in case I was forced to retreat, to fall
back to Cemetery Hill.  I think this was the first and only order
I received from him during the day.

Rodes' division of five brigades was formed across Seminary Ridge,
facing south, with Iverson on the right, supported by Daniel and
O'Neill in the centre, and Doles on the left, Ramseur being in
reserve.  Iverson was sent to attack the First Corps on Seminary
Ridge, and O'Neill and Doles went forward about 2.45 P.M., to keep
back the Eleventh Corps.  When the two latter became fairly engaged
in front, about 3.30 P.M., Early came up with his whole division
and struck the Union right.  This decided the battle in favor of
the enemy.

Barlow had advanced with Von Gilsa's brigade, had driven back
Ewell's skirmish line, and with the aid of Wilkinson's battery was
preparing to hold the Carlisle road.  He was not aware that Early
was approaching, and saw Doles' advance with pleasure, for he felt
confident he could swing his right around and envelop Doles' left;
a manoeuvre which could hardly fail to be successful.

Schimmelpfennig now threw forward Von Amberg's brigade to intervene
between O'Neill and Doles, and to strike the right flank of the
latter; but Doles avoided the blow by a rapid change of front.
This necessarily exposed his left to Barlow, who could not take
advantage of it as he was unexpectedly assailed by Early's division
on his own right, which was enveloped, and in great danger.  His
men fought gallantly, and Gordon, who attacked them, says, made
stern resistance until the rebels were within fifty paces of them.
As Barlow was shot down, and their right flank enveloped, they were
forced to retreat to the town.  This isolated Von Amberg's brigade,
and Doles claims to have captured the greater portion of it.

The retrograde movement of the Eleventh Corps necessarily exposed
the right flank of the First to attacks from O'Neill and Ramseur.

Howard sent forward Coster's brigade, of Steinwehr's division, to
cover the retreat of the Eleventh Corps; but its force was too
small to be effective; its flanks were soon turned by Hays' and
Hoke's brigades, of Early's division, and it was forced back with
the rest.

We will now go back to the First Corps and describe what took place
there while these events were transpiring.

When the wide interval between the First and Eleventh Corps was
brought to my notice by Colonel Bankhead of my staff, I detached
Baxter's brigade of Robinson's division to fill it.  This brigade
moved promptly, and took post on Cutler's right, but before it
could form across the intervening space, O'Neill's brigade assailed
its right flank, and subsequently its left, and Baxter was forced
to change front alternately, to meet these attacks.  He repulsed
O'Neill, but found his left flank again exposed to an attack from
Iverson, who was advancing in that direction.*  He now went forward
and took shelter behind a stone fence on the Mummasburg road, which
protected his right flank, while an angle in the fence which turned
in a southwesterly direction covered his front.  As his men lay
down behind the fence, Iverson's brigade came very close up, not
knowing our troops were there.  Baxter's men sprang to their feet
and delivered a most deadly volley at very short range, which left
500 of Iverson's men dead and wounded, and so demoralized them,
that all gave themselves up as prisoners.  One regiment, however,
after stopping our firing by putting up a white flag, slipped away
and escaped.  This destructive effect was not caused by Baxter
alone, for he was aided by Cutler's brigade, which was thrown
forward on Iverson's right flank, by the fire of our batteries,
and the distant fire from Stone's brigade.  So long as the latter
held his position, his line, with that of Cutler and Robinson's
division, constituted a demi-bastion and curtain, and every force
that entered the angle suffered severely.  Rodes in his report
speaks of it as "a murderous enfilade, and reverse fire, to which,
in addition to the direct fire it encountered, Daniel's brigade
had been subject to from the time it commenced its final advance."

[* General Robinson states that these changes of front were made
by his orders and under his personal supervision.]

While Iverson was making his attack, Rodes sent one of his reserve
brigades--the one just referred to, that of Daniel--against Stone.
This joined Davis' brigade of Hill's corps, and the two charged on
Stone's three little regiments.  Stone threw forward one of these
--the 149th Pennsylvania, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dwight, to the
railroad cut, where they were partially sheltered.  Colonel Dana's
regiment, the 143d Pennsylvania, was posted on the road in rear of
Dwight and to the right.  When I saw this movement I thought it a
very bold one, but its results were satisfactory.  Two volleys and
a bayonet charge by Dwight drove Daniel back for the time being.*
In this attack Colonel Stone was severely wounded, and the command
of his brigade devolved upon Colonel Wister of the 150th
Pennsylvania.

[* Dwight was a hard fighter, and not averse to plain speaking.
Once, when Secretary of War Stanton had determined to grant no more
passes to go down to the army, Dwight applied for permission for
an old man to visit his dying son.  The request was refused;
whereupon Dwight said:  _"My name is Dwight, Walton Dwight, Lieutenant-
Colonel of the 149th Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers.  You can
dismiss me from the service as soon as you like, but I am going to
tell you what I think of you,"_ and he expressed himself in terms
far from complimentary; whereupon Stanton rescinded the order and
gave him the pass.]

This attack should have been simultaneous with one from the nearest
troops of Hill's corps, but the latter were lying down in a sheltered
position, and Daniel urged them in vain to go forward.

Not being able to force his way in front on account of Dwight's
position in the railroad cut, Daniel brought artillery to enfilade
it, and threw the 32d North Carolina across it.  The cut being no
longer tenable, Dwight retreated to the road and formed on Dana's
left.

Daniel had been originally ordered to protect Iverson's right, but
Iverson swung his right around without notifying Daniel, and thus
dislocated the line.

Ramseur now came forward to aid Iverson, and I sent Paul's brigade
of Robinson's division, which was preceded by Robinson in person,
to assist Baxter, and, if possible to fill the interval between
the First and Eleventh Corps, for I feared the enemy would penetrate
there and turn my right flank.

When Paul's brigade arrived, Baxter was out of ammunition, but
proceeded to refill his cartridge-boxes from those of the dead and
wounded.

General Howard has stated that the interval referred to was filled
by Dilger's and Wheeler's batteries of the Eleventh Corps, but a
glance at the official map will show that, before Paul's advance,
these batteries were several hundred yards distant from the First
Corps.

Another attack was now made from the north and west by both Daniel's
and Davis' brigades.  Colonel Wister faced his own regiment, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Huidekoper, to the west, and the other two
regiments to the north.  The enemy were again repulsed by two
volleys and a gallant bayonet charge, led by Huidekoper, who lost
an arm in the fight.  Colonel Wister having been shot through the
face, the command devolved upon Colonel Dana, another veteran of
the Mexican war.

There had been a great lack of co-ordination in these assaults,
for they were independent movements, each repulsed in its turn.
The last attack, however, against Wister by extended by Brockenborough's
and Pettigrew's brigades to Morrow's front in the woods, but Morrow
held on firmly to his position.

I now sent my last reserve, the 151st Pennsylvania, under Lieutenant-
Colonel McFarland, to take post between Stone's and Biddle's
brigades.

So far I had done all that was possible to defend my front, but
circumstances were becoming desperate.  My line was very thin and
weak, and my last reserve had been thrown in.  As we had positive
information that the entire rebel army was coming on, it was evident
enough that we could not contend any longer, unless some other
corps came to our assistance.  I had previously sent an aide--
Lieutenant Slagle--to ask General Howard to reinforce me from
Steinwehr's division, but he declined to do so.  I now sent my
Adjutant-General, Halsted, to reiterate the request, or to obtain
for me an order to retreat, as it was impossible for me to remain
where I was, in the face of the constantly increasing forces which
were approaching from the west.  Howard insisted that Halstead
mistook rail fences for troops in the distance.  The lorgnettes of
his staff finally convinced him of his error; he still, however,
refused to order me to retire, but sent Halsted off to find Buford's
cavalry, and order it to report to me.  The First Corps had suffered
severely in these encounters, but by this additional delay, and
the overwhelming odds against us, it was almost totally sacrificed.
General Wadsworth reported half of his men were killed or wounded,
and Rowley's division suffered in the same proportion.  Hardly a
field officer remained unhurt.  After five color-bearers of the
24th Michigan Volunteers had fallen, Colonel Morrow took the flag
in his own hands, but was immediately prostrated.  A private then
seized it, and, although mortally wounded, still held it firmly in
his grasp.  Similar instances occurred all along the line.  General
Robinson had two horses shot under him.  He reported a loss of
1,667 out of 2,500.  Buford was in a distant part of the field,
with Devin's brigade, covering the retreat of the Eleventh Corps,
and already had all he could attend to.  He expressed himself in
unequivocal terms at the idea that he could keep back Hill's entire
corps with Gamble's cavalry brigade alone.

As Howard seemed to have little or no confidence in his troops on
Cemetery Hill, he was perhaps justified in retaining them in line
there for the moral effect they would produce.

About the time the Eleventh Corps gave way on the right, the
Confederate forces made their final advance in double lines, backed
by strong reserves, and it was impossible for the few men left in
the First Corps to keep them back, especially as Pender's large
division overlapped our left for a quarter of a mile; Robinson's
right was turned, and General Paul was shot through both eyes in
the effort to stem the tide.  They could not contend against Ramseur
in front, and O'Neill on the flank, at the same time.

Under these circumstances it became a pretty serious question how
to extricate the First Corps and save its artillery before it was
entirely surrounded and captured.

Biddle, Morrow, and Dana were all forced back from the ridge they
had defended so long, which bordered Willoughby's Run.  Each brigade
was flanked, and Stone's men under Dana were assailed in front and
on both flanks.  Yet even then Daniel speaks of the severe fighting
which took place before he could win the position.

What was left of the First Corps after all this slaughter rallied
on Seminary Ridge.  Many of the men entered a semi-circular rail
entrenchment which I had caused to be thrown up early in the day,
and held that for a time by lying down and firing over the pile of
rails.  The enemy were now closing in on us from the south, west,
and north, and still no orders came to retreat.  Buford arrived
about this time, and perceiving that Perrin's brigade in swinging
around to envelop our left exposed its right flank, I directed him
to charge.  He reconnoitered the position they held, but did not
carry out the order; I do not know why.  It was said afterward he
found the fences to be an impediment; but he rendered essential
service by dismounting his men and throwing them into a grove south
of the Fairfield road, where they opened a severe fire, which
checked the rebel advance and prevented them from cutting us off
from our direct line of retreat to Cemetery Hill.

The first long line that came on us from the west was swept away
by our artillery, which fired with very destructive effect, taking
the rebel line _en echarpe_.

Although the Confederates advanced in such force, our men still
made strong resistance around the Seminary, and by the aid of our
artillery, which was most effective, beat back and almost destroyed
the first line of Scales' brigade, wounding both Scales and Pender.
The former states that he arrived within seventy-five feet of the
guns, and adds:  "Here the fire was most severe.  Every field
officer but one was killed or wounded.  The brigade halted in some
confusion to return the fire."  My Adjutant-Generals Baird and
Halstead, and my aides Lee, Marten, Slagle, Jones, and Lambdin had
hot work carrying orders at this time.  It is a marvel that any of
them survived the storm of bullets that swept the field.

Robinson was forced back toward the Seminary, but halted notwithstanding
the pressure upon him, and formed line to save Stewart's battery
north of the railroad cut, which had remained too long, and was in
danger of being captured.

Cutler's brigade in the meantime had formed behind the railroad
grading to face the men who were pursuing the Eleventh Corps.  This
show of force had a happy effect, for it caused the enemy in that
direction to halt and throw out a skirmish line, and the delay
enabled the artillery soon after to pass through the interval
between Cutler on the north and Buford's cavalry on the south.

As the enemy were closing in upon us and crashes of musketry came
from my right and left, I had little hope of saving my guns, but
I threw my headquarters guard, under Captain Glenn of the 149th
Pennsylvania, into the Seminary and kept the right of Scales'
brigade back twenty minutes longer, while their left was held by
Baxter's brigade of Robinson's division, enabling the few remaining
troops, ambulances, and artillery to retreat in comparative safety.
It became necessary, however, to abandon one gun of Captain Reynolds'
battery, as several of the horses were shot and there was no time
to disengage them from the piece.  Three broken and damaged caisson
bodies were also left behind.  The danger at this time came
principally from Hoke's and Hays' brigades, which were making their
way into the town on the eastern side, threatening to cut us off
from Cemetery Hill.  The troops in front of the Seminary were stayed
by the firm attitude of Buford's cavalry, and made a bend in their
line, apparently with a view to form square.

I waited until the artillery had gone and then rode back to the
town with my staff.  As we passed through the streets, pale and
frightened women came out and offered us coffee and food, and
implored us not to abandon them.

Colonel Livingston of my staff, who had been sent on a message,
came back to the Seminary, not knowing that we had left.  He says
the enemy were advancing toward the crest very cautiously, evidently
under the impression there was an ambuscade waiting for them there.
They were also forming against cavalry.

On the way I must have met an aide that Howard says he sent to me
with orders to retreat, but I do not remember receiving any message
of the kind.

I observe that Howard in his account of the battle claims to have
handled the First and Eleventh Corps from 11 A.M. until 4 P.M.;
but at 11 A.M. his corps was away back on the road, and did not
arrive until about 1 P.M.

The map previously given on page 125 demonstrates that we were a
mere advance guard of the army, and shows the impossibility of our
defending Gettysburg for any length of time.

The First Corps was broken and defeated, but not dismayed.  There
were but few left, but they showed the true spirit of soldiers.
They walked leisurely from the Seminary to the town, and did not
run.  I remember seeing Hall's battery and the 6th Wisconsin regiment
halt from time to time to face the enemy, and fire down the streets.
Both Doles and Ramsey claim to have had sharp encounters there.
Many of the Eleventh Corps, and part of Robinson's division, which
had been far out, were captured in the attempt to reach Steinwehr's
division on Cemetery Hill, which was the rallying point.

When I arrived there I found General Howard, surrounded by his
staff, awaiting us at the main gate of the cemetery.  He made
arrangements to hold the road which led up from the town, and which
diverged to Baltimore and Taneytown, by directing me to post the
First Corps on the left in the cemetery, while he assembled the
Eleventh Corps on the right.  Soon after he rode over to ask me,
in case his own men (Steinwehr's division) deserted their guns, to
be in readiness to defend them.  General Schurz about this time
was busily engaged in rallying his men, and did all that was possible
to encourage them to form line again.  I understood they were told
that Sigel had just arrived and assumed command, a fiction thought
justifiable under the circumstances.  It seemed to me that the
discredit that attached to them after Chancellorsville had in a
measure injured their morale and _esprit-de-corps_, for they were
rallied with great difficulty.

About 3.30 P.M., General Hancock arrived with orders from General
Meade to supersede Howard.  Congress had passed a law authorizing
the President to put any general over any other superior to rank
if, in his judgment, the good of the service demanded it, and
General Meade now assumed this power in the name of the President.
Owing to the false despatch Howard had sent early in the day, Meade
must have been under the impression that the First Corps had fled
without fighting.  More than half of them, however, lay dead and
wounded on the field, and hardly a field officer had escaped.

Hancock being his junior, Howard was naturally unwilling to submit
to his authority and, according to Captain Halstead of my staff,
who was present, refused to do so.  Howard stated in a subsequent
account of the battle that he merely regarded General Hancock as
a staff officer acting for General Meade.  He says "General Hancock
greeted me in his usual frank and cordial manner and used these
words, 'General Meade has sent me to represent him on the field.'
I replied, 'All right, Hancock.  This is no time for talking.  You
take the left of the pike and I will arrange these troops to the
right.'  I noticed that he sent Wadsworth's division, without
consulting me, to the right of the Eleventh Corps to Culp's Hill,
but as it was just the thing to do I made no objection."  He adds
that Hancock did not really relieve him until 7 P.M.  Hancock,
however, denies that he told Howard he was merely acting as a staff
officer.  He says he assumed absolute command at 3.30 P.M.  I know
he rode over to me and told me he was in command of the field, and
directed me to send a regiment to the right, and I sent Wadsworth's
division there, as my regiments were reduced to the size of
companies.

Hancock was much pleased with the ridge we were on, as a defensive
position, and considered it admirably adapted for a battle-field.
Its gentle slopes for artillery, its stone fences and rocky boulders
to shelter infantry, and its ragged but commanding eminences on
either flank, where far-reaching batteries could be posted, were
great advantages.  It covered the principal roads to Washington
and Baltimore, and its convex shape, enabling troops to reinforce
with celerity any point of the line from the centre, or by moving
along the chord of this arc, was probably the cause of our final
success.  The enemy, on the contrary, having a concave order of
battle, was obliged to move troops much longer distances to support
any part of his line, and could not communicate orders rapidly,
nor could the different corps co-operate promptly with each other.
It was Hancock's recommendation that caused Meade to concentrate
his army on this ridge, but Howard received the thanks of Congress
for selecting the position.  He, doubtless, did see its advantages,
and recommended it to Hancock.  The latter immediately took measures
to hold it as a battle-ground for the army, while Howard merely
used the cemetery as a rallying point for his defeated troops.
Hancock occupied all the prominent points, and disposed the little
cavalry and infantry he had in such a way as to impress the enemy
with the idea that heavy reinforcements had come up.  By occupying
Culp's Hill, on the right, with Wadsworth's brigade, and posting
the cavalry on the left to take up a good deal of space, he made
a show of strength not warranted by the facts.  Both Hill and Ewell
had received some stunning blows during the day, and were disposed
to be cautious.  They, therefore, did not press forward and take
the heights, as they could easily have done at this time, but not
so readily after an hour's delay, for then Sickles' corps from
Emmetsburg, and Slocum's corps from Two Taverns, began to approach
the position.  The two rebel divisions of Anderson and Johnson,
however, arrived about dusk, which would have still given the enemy
a great numerical superiority.

General Lee reached the field before Hancock came, and watched the
retreat of the First and Eleventh Corps, and Hancock's movements
and dispositions through his field-glass.  He was not deceived by
this show of force, and sent a recommendation--not an order--to
Ewell to follow us up; but Ewell, in the exercise of his discretion
as a corps commander, did not do so.  He had lost 3,000 men, and
both he and Hill were under orders not to bring on a general
engagement.  In fact they had had all the fighting they desired
for the time being.  Colonel Campbell Brown, of Ewell's staff,
states that the latter was preparing to move forward against the
height, when a false report induced him to send Gordon's brigade
to reinforce Smith's brigade on his extreme left, to meet a supposed
Union advance in that direction.

The absence of these two brigades decided him to wait for the
arrival of Johnson's division before taking further action.  When
the latter came up, Slocum and Sickles were on the ground, and the
opportunity for a successful attack had passed.

In sending Hancock forward with such ample powers, Meade virtually
appointed him commander-in-chief for the time being, for he was
authorized to say where we would fight, and when, and how.  In the
present instance, in accordance with his recommendation, orders
were immediately sent out for the army to concentrate on Cemetery
Ridge.  Two-thirds of the Third Corps, and all of the Twelfth came
up, and by six o'clock the position became tolerably secure.
Stannard's Second Vermont brigade also arrived, and as they formed
part of my command, reported to me for duty; a very welcome
reinforcement to my shattered division.  Sickles had taken the
responsibility of joining us without orders, knowing that we were
hard pressed.  His command prolonged the line of the First Corps
to the left.  Slocum's Corps--the Twelfth--was posted, as a reserve,
also on the left.

Hancock now relinquished the command of the field to Slocum and
rode back to Taneytown to confer with Meade and explain his reasons
for choosing the battle-field.

Longstreet's corps soon arrived and joined Ewell and Hill; so that
the whole rebel army was ready to act against us the next morning,
with the exception of Pickett's division.

At the close of the day General John Newton rode up and took charge
of the First Corps by order of General Meade, and I resumed the
command of my division.  Several incidents occurred during the
severe struggle of the first day which are worthy of record.

Colonel Wheelock of the 97th New York was cut off during the retreat
of Robinson's division, and took refuge in a house.  A rebel
lieutenant entered and called upon him to surrender his sword.
This he declined to do, whereupon the lieutenant called in several
of his men, formed them in line, took out his watch and said to
the colonel, "You are an old gray-headed man, and I dislike to kill
you, but if you don't give up that sword in five minutes, I shall
order these men to blow your brains out."  When the time was up
_the Colonel still refused to surrender._  A sudden tumult at the
door, caused by some prisoners attempting to escape, called the
lieutenant off for a moment.  When he returned the colonel had
given his sword to a girl in the house who had asked him for it,
and she secreted it between two mattresses.  He was then marched
to the rear, but being negligently guarded, escaped the same night
and returned to his regiment.

Another occurrence recalls Browning's celebrated poem of "An Incident
at Ratisbon."  An officer of the 6th Wisconsin approached Lieutenant-
Colonel Dawes, the commander of the regiment, after the sharp fight
in the railroad cut.  The colonel supposed, from the firm and erect
attitude of the man, that he came to report for orders of some
kind; but the compressed lips told a different story.  With a great
effort the officer said, _"Tell them at home I died like a man and
a soldier."_  He threw open his breast, displayed a ghastly wound,
and dropped dead at the colonel's feet.

Another incident was related to me at the time, but owing to our
hurried movements and the vicissitudes of the battle, I have never
had an opportunity to verify it.  It was said that during the
retreat of the artillery one piece of Stewart's battery did not
limber up as soon as the others.  A rebel officer rushed forward,
placed his hand upon it, and presenting a pistol at the back of
the driver, directed him not to drive off with the piece.  The
latter did so, however, received the ball in his body, caught up
with the battery and then fell dead.

We lay on our arms that night among the tombs at the Cemetery, so
suggestive of the shortness of life and the nothingness of fame;
but the men were little disposed to moralize on themes like these
and were too much exhausted to think of anything but much-needed
rest.



CHAPTER V.
BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG--THE SECOND DAY.

The ridge upon which the Union forces were now assembling has
already been partially described.  In two places it sunk away into
intervening valleys.  One between Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill;
the other lay for several hundred yards north of Little Round Top,
as the lesser of the two eminences on the left was called to
distinguish it from the higher peak called Round Top.

At 1 A.M. Meade arrived from Taneytown.  When I saw him, soon after
daylight, he seemed utterly worn out and hollow-eyed.  Anxiety and
want of sleep were evidently telling upon him.  At dawn he commenced
forming his line by concentrating his forces on the right with a
view to descend into the plain and attack Lee's left, and the
Twelfth Corps were sent to Wadsworth's right to take part in the
movement.  It seems to me that this would have been a very hazardous
enterprise, and I am not surprised that both Slocum and Warren
reported against it.  The Fifth and Sixth Corps would necessarily
be very much fatigued after making a forced march.  To put them in
at once, and direct them to drive a superior force of Lee's veterans
out of a town where every house would have been loop-holed, and
every street barricaded, would hardly have been judicious.  If we
had succeeded in doing so, it would simply have reversed the battle
of Gettysburg, for the Confederate army would have fought behind
Seminary Ridge, and we would have been exposed in the plain below.
Nor do I think it would have been wise strategy to turn their left,
and drive them between us and Washington, for it would have enabled
them to threaten the capital, strengthen and shorten their line of
retreat, and endanger our communications at the same time.  It is
an open secret that Meade at that time disapproved of the battle-
ground Hancock had selected.

Warren and Slocum having reported an attack against Lee's left as
unadvisable, Meade began to post troops on our left, with a view
to attack the enemy's right.  This, in my opinion, would have been
much more sensible.  Lee, however, solved the problem for him, and,
fortunately for us, forced him to remain on the defensive, by
ordering an assault against each extremity of the Union line.

There has been much discussion and a good deal of crimination and
recrimination among the rebel generals engaged as to which of them
lost the battle of Gettysburg.

I have already alluded to the fact that universal experience
demonstrates that columns converging on a central force almost
invariably fail in their object and are beaten in detail.  Gettysburg
seems to me a striking exemplification of this; repeated columns
of assault launched by Lee against our lines came up in succession
and were defeated before the other parts of his army could arrive
in time to sustain the attack.  He realized the old fable.  The
peasant could not break the bundle of fagots, but he could break
one at a time until all were gone.

Lee's concave form of battle was a great disadvantage, for it took
him three times as long as it did us to communicate with different
parts of his line, and concentrate troops.  His couriers who carried
orders and the reinforcements he sent moved on the circumference
and ours on the chord of the arc.

The two armies were about a mile apart.  The Confederates--Longstreet
and Hill--occupied Seminary Ridge, which runs parallel to Cemetery
Ridge, upon which our forces were posted.  Ewell's corps, on the
rebel left, held the town, Hill the centre, and Longstreet the
right.

Lee could easily have manoeuvred Meade out of his strong position
on the heights, and should have done so.  When he determined to
attack, he should have commenced at daybreak, for all his force
was up except Pickett's division; while two corps of the Union
army, the Fifth and Sixth, were still far away, and two brigades
of the Third Corps were also absent.

The latter were marching on the Emmetsburg road, and as that was
controlled by the enemy, Sickles felt anxious for the safety of
his men and trains, and requested that the cavalry be sent to escort
them in.  This was not done, however.  The trains were warned off
the road, and the two brigades were, fortunately, not molested.

There has been a great deal of bitter discussion between Longstreet,
Fitz Lee, Early, Wilcox, and others as to whether Lee did or did
not order an attack to take place at 9 A.M., and as to whether
Longstreet was dilatory, and to blame for not making it.  When a
battle is lost there is always an inquest, and a natural desire on
the part of each general to lay the blame on somebody else's
shoulders.  Longstreet waited until noon for Law's brigade to come
up, and afterward there was a good deal of marching and countermarching
to avoid being seen by our troops.  There was undoubtedly too much
delay.  The fact is, Longstreet saw we had a strong position and
was not well pleased at the duty assigned him, for he thought it
more than probable his attempt would fail.  He had urged Lee to
take up a position where Meade would be forced to attack him, and
was not in very good humor to find his advice disregarded.  The
rebel commander, however, finding the Army of the Potomac in front
of him, having unbounded confidence in his troops, and elated by
the success of the first day's fight, believed he could gain a
great victory then and there, and end the war, and determined to
attempt it.  He was sick of these endless delays and constant
sacrifices, and hoped one strong sword-thrust would slay his
opponent, and enable the South to crown herself queen of the North
American continent.

By 9 A.M. our skirmish line, in front of the Peach Orchard, was
actively engaged with that of the enemy, who were making a
reconnoissance toward the Emmetsburg road.  No serious affair,
however, occurred for some hours.  Meade, as stated, was forming
his lines on the right of the position he afterward occupied.  The
Fifth Corps, which came up about 1 P.M., was posted, as a reserve,
south of the Twelfth Corps, with a view to the attack which has
already been referred to.  About 3 P.M. the Sixth Corps began to
arrive from its long and toilsome march of thirty-four miles, and
its tired troops were placed on the Taneytown road in the rear of
Round Top, to reinforce the other corps in case our troops made an
attack on the left.  Lee, however, did not wait for Meade to advance
against him, but boldly directed that each flank of the Union army
should be assailed at the same time, while constant demonstrations
against our centre were to be kept up, to prevent either wing from
being reinforced.  It was another attempt to converge columns with
an interval of several miles between them upon a central force,
and, like almost all such enterprises, failed from want of proper
co-operation in the different fractions of his line.


[Map]
GETTYSBURG.--Final Attack of the First Day, and Battle of the Second
Day.*
[* The first day's battle is represented north of the Fairfield
and Hanover roads.  The second day's battle south of the same
roads.]

REFERENCES TO THE FIRST DAY'S BATTLE.
_Union Troops,_ [filled rectangle]
MAJOR GENERAL O. O. HOWARD commanding the First and Eleventh Corps.
FIRST CORPS.
MAJOR-GENERAL ABNER DOUBLEDAY commanding.
FIRST DIVISION--MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES S. WADSWORTH commanding.
  _a. First Brigade._  Colonel Henry A. Morrow, 24th Michigan.
  _b. Second Brigade._  Brigadier-General Lysander Cutler.
SECOND DIVISION--MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN C. ROBINSON.
  _c. First Brigade._  Brigadier-General Gabriel R. Paul.
  _d. Second Brigade._  Brigadier-General Henry Baxter.
THIRD DIVISION--BRIGADIER-GENERAL THOS. A. ROWLEY.
  _e. First Brigade._  Colonel Chapman Biddle, 121st Pennsylvania.
  _f. Second Brigade._  Colonel Roy Stone, 149th Pennsylvania.
ELEVENTH CORPS.
MAJOR-GENERAL CARL SCHURZ commanding.
FIRST DIVISION--BRIGADIER-GENERAL F. C. BARLOW commanding.
  _g. First Brigade._  Colonel Von Gilsa.
  _h. Second Brigade._  Brigadier-General Adelbert Ames.
SECOND DIVISION--BRIGADIER-GENERAL ALEXANDER SCHIMMELPFENNIG.
  _k. First Brigade._  Colonel Von Arnsberg.
  _l. Second Brigade._  Colonel Kryzanowski.
  _m. Coster's Brigade,_ of Steinwehr's Division.

_Confederate Troops,_ [open rectangle]
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL A. P. HILL commanding Third Corps.
MAJOR-GENERAL HENRY HETH commanding Division.
  1. Archer's Brigade.        3. Brockenborough's Brigade.
  2. Davis' Brigade.          4. Pettigrew's Brigade.
MAJOR-GENERAL W. D. PENDER commanding Division.
  6. McGowan's Brigade.       8. Thomas' Brigade.
  7. Scales' Brigade.         9. Lane's Brigade.
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL BENJ. EWELL commanding Second Corps.
MAJOR-GENERAL R. E. RODES commanding Division.
  10. Daniel's Brigade.       12. Iverson's Brigade.
  11. Ramseur's Brigade.      13. O'Neill's Brigade.
              14. Doles' Brigade.
MAJOR-GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY commanding Division.
  15. Gordon's Brigade.       17. Hoke's Brigade.
  16. Hays' Brigade.          18. Smith's Brigade.


Longstreet's attack was over before Ewell came into action, and
although Ewell succeeded in temporarily establishing himself on
our extreme right, it was due to an unfortunate order given by
General Meade, by which the force in that part of the field was
withdrawn just as Ewell advanced against it.  But we are anticipating
our narrative.

Hood, who commanded the division on the right of Longstreet's corps,
complains that he was not allowed to go past Round Top and flank
us on the south, as he might have done, but was required by his
orders to break in at the Peach Orchard and drive Sickles' line
along the Emmetsburg road toward Cemetery Hill; but it seems to
me, as he started late in the afternoon, if he had made the detour
which would have been necessary in order to attack us on the south,
he would have met Sedgwick in front, while Sickles and Sykes might
have interposed to cut him off from the main body.

Before describing Longstreet's attack we will give the final
disposition made by General Meade when it became necessary to fight
a defensive battle.  The ridge was nearly in the shape of a horseshoe.
The Twelfth Corps was on the extreme right; next came one division
of the First Corps on Culp's Hill, then the Eleventh Corps on
Cemetery Hill, with two divisions of the First Corps at the base;
next the Second Corps; then the Third, and the Fifth Corps on the
extreme left, the Sixth Corps being posted in rear of Round Top as
a general reserve to the army.  Sickles, however, denies that any
position was ever marked out for him.  He was expected to prolong
Hancock's line to the left, but did not do so for the following
reasons:  _First,_ because the ground was low, and _second,_ on
account of the commanding position of the Emmetsburg road, which
ran along a cross ridge oblique to the front of the line assigned
him, and which afforded the enemy an excellent position for their
artillery; _third,_ because the ground between the valley he was
expected to occupy, and the Emmetsburg road constituted a minor
ridge, very much broken and full of rocks and trees, which afforded
excellent cover for an enemy operating in his immediate front.  He
had previously held an interview with General Meade and asked that
an experienced staff officer be sent with him to assist in locating
a suitable position for his corps.  At his request, General Hunt,
the Chief of Artillery, was sent for that purpose.  They rode out
to the ridge and Sickles directed that his troops should be posted
along that road, with his centre at the Peach Orchard, which was
about a mile from and nearly opposite to Little Round Top; his
right wing, under Humphreys, extending along the road, while his
left wing, under Birney, made a right angle at the Peach Orchard
with the other part of the line, and bent around, so as to cover
the front of Little Round Top at the base.  The disadvantages of
this position are obvious enough.  It is impossible for any force
to hold its ground when attacked at once on both sides which
constitute the right angle.  The diagram shows that the force _A_
will have both its lines _a1_ and _a2_ enfiladed by batteries at
_b1 b2_, and must yield.  The ground, however, may be such that
the enemy cannot plant his guns at _b1_ or _b2_; but under any
circumstances it is a weak formation and the enemy easily penetrate
the angle.  When that is the case, and it was so in the present
instance--each side constituting the angle is taken in flank, and
the position is no longer tenable.

[Diagram]
  _________________________
  |       _b2_
  |
  |_b1_   _________________
  |       |     _a1_
  |       |
  |       |     _A_
  |       |_a2_
  |       |
  |       |

If one side of the right angle lies behind a ridge where it cannot
be enfiladed, a temporary formation of this kind is sometimes
permissible.

Sickles claimed that he acted with the implied sanction of General
Meade, who, however, censured the movement afterward.  As soon as
Sickles took position, General Buford's division of cavalry was
sent to the rear at Westminster, to guard the trains there; and
Kilpatrick's division was ordered to Hunterstown to attack the
rebel left.

Sykes' corps--the Fifth--came up from the right about 5 P.M., soon
after Longstreet's attack on Sickles was fairly under way, and
formed along the outer base of Little Round Top, with Crawford's
Pennsylvania Reserves at their right and front.

There had been a Council of War, or Conference of Corps Commanders,
called at Meade's headquarters, and it was universally agreed to
remain and hold the position.  As the Third Corps, in answer to
the guns of Clark's battery, was suddenly assailed by a terrible
concentrated artillery fire, General Sickles rode back to his
command and General Meade went with him.  The latter objected to
Sickles' line, but thought it was then too late to change it.

The severe artillery fire which opened against the two sides of
the angle at the Peach Orchard was a prelude to a furious attack
against Ward's brigade on the left.  This attack soon extended to
the Peach Orchard.  The fight became very hot against Birney's
division from the left to the centre, but the troops on the right
of the centre--Humphreys' division--were not at first actively
engaged, and Humphreys reinforced Birney with one of his brigades,
and subsequently with a regiment.

The battle which now raged among these trees, rocks, and ravines
was so complicated that it is hard to follow and difficult to
describe the movements of the contestants.  Some idea of it can
probably be gained by an examination of the following diagram:

It will be seen that a long line of rebel batteries bears upon A,
and that one of them was brought up to enfilade the side AB.  The
angle at A, attacked by Barksdale on the north and Kershaw on the
west, was broken in.  In consequence of this, several batteries on
the line EF were sacrificed, and Wofford's brigade soon came forward
and took the position DE.

The Confederate line being very long, and overlapping Ward's brigade
on the left, the latter was forced back, and the exulting rebels
advanced to seize Little Round Top.  They attacked the force there
with great fury, assailing it in front and rear, but they were
ultimately repulsed, and finally took up the line GL.  Two divisions
of the Fifth Corps and one of the Second Corps were sent in, one
after the other, to drive back the strong rebel force posted from
D to G, but each one had a bitter contest in front, and was flanked
by the rebel line at DE, so that ultimately all were obliged to
retreat, although each performed prodigies of valor.  Indeed,
Brooks' brigade charged almost up to the enemy's line of batteries,
HI.  The rebels gained the position LG, confronting our main line
and close to it; but a fine charge made by Crawford's division of
the Pennsylvania Reserves drove them farther back, and as part of
the Sixth Corps came up and formed to support Crawford, the rebels
gave up the contest for the night as regards this part of the field.

The attack against Humphreys' division which followed the breaking
in of the angle at A will be described further on.  The general
result was that Sickles' entire line, together with the reinforcements
sent in at different times to sustain it, were all forced back to
the ridge which was our main line of battle, with the exception of
Crawford's division which maintained a somewhat advanced position.

The details of this contest are full of incident, and too important
to be wholly omitted.

About 3.30 P.M. the rebels commenced the movement against our left,
by sending a flanking force from Hood's division, formed in two
lines, around to attack Sickles' left, held by General J. Hobart
Ward's brigade, which occupied the open ground covering the approaches
to Little Round Top; Ward's line passing in front of the mountain,
and his flank resting on a rocky depression in the ground called
the Devil's Den.  The right extended to the minor spur or wooded
ridge beyond the wheat-field.  The engagement was furious; commencing
on the rebel right, it extended to the left, until it reached the
Peach Orchard, where it became especially violent.  This central
point of Sickles' line was held by eleven regiments of Birney's
and Humphreys' divisions.  Birney's two brigades, commanded by
Graham and De Trobriand, held on bravely, for the men who fought
with Kearney in the Peninsula were not easily driven; but the line
was too attenuated to resist the shock very long, and reinforcements
became absolutely necessary to sustain that unlucky angle at the
Peach Orchard.  Sickles had authority to call on Sykes, whose corps
was resting from a long and fatiguing march, but the latter wished
his men to get their coffee and be refreshed before sending them
in; and as those who are fighting almost always exaggerate the
necessity for immediate reinforcements, Sykes thought Sickles could
hold on a while longer, and did not respond to the call for three-
quarters of an hour.

It would seem that Lee supposed that Meade's main line of battle
was on the Emmetsburg pike, and that the flank rested on the Peach
Orchard, for he ordered Longstreet to form Hood's division
perpendicular to that road, whereas Sickles occupied an advanced
line, and Sykes the main line in rear.  McLaws says that Lee thought
turning the Peach Orchard was turning the Union left.  With this
idea, he directed Longstreet to form across the Emmetsburg road,
and push our troops toward Cemetery Hill.  Kershaw, after the minor
ridge was taken, reported to Longstreet that he could not carry
out these orders without exposing his right flank to an attack from
Sykes' corps.

Ward fought bravely against Benning's and Anderson's brigades on
the left, driving back two attacks of the latter, but his line was
long and weak, and the enemy overlapped it by the front of nearly
two brigades.  Being concealed from view, from the nature of the
ground they could concentrate against any point with impunity.  He
attempted to strengthen his forces at the Devil's Den by detaching
the 99th Pennsylvania from his right, and, although De Trobriand
had no troops to spare, he was directed by General Birney to send
the 40th New York, under Colonel Egan, to reinforce that flank.
Egan arrived too late to perform the duty assigned to him, as Ward
had been already driven back, but not too late to make a gallant
charge upon the rebel advance.

The fighting soon extended to the Peach Orchard, but as it commenced
on the left, we will describe that part of the engagement first.

General Warren, who was on Meade's staff as Chief Engineer, had
ridden about this time to the signal station on Little Round Top,
to get a better view of the field.  He saw the long line of the
enemy approaching, and about to overlap Ward's left, and perceived
that unless prompt succor arrived Little Round Top would fall into
their hands.  Once in their possession they would flank our whole
line and post guns there to drive our troops from the ridge; so
that this eminence was in reality the key of the battle-field, and
must be held at all hazards.  He saw Barnes' division, which Sykes
had ordered forward, formed for a charge, and about to go to the
relief of De Trobriand, who held the centre of Birney's line, and
who was sorely beset.  Without losing a moment he rode down the
slope, over to Barnes, took the responsibility of detaching Vincent's
brigade, and hurried it back to take post on Little Round Top.  He
then sent a staff officer to inform General Meade of what he had
done and to represent the immense importance of holding this
commanding point.

The victorious column of the enemy was subjected to the fire of a
battery on Little Round Top, and to another farther to the right;
but it kept on, went around Ward's brigade and rushed eagerly up
the ravine between the two Round Tops to seize Little Round Top
which seemed to be defenceless.  Vincent's brigade rapidly formed
on the crest of a small spur which juts out from the hill, and not
having time to load, advanced with the bayonet, in time to save
the height.  The contest soon became furious and the rocks were
alive with musketry.  General Vincent sent word to Barnes that the
enemy were on him in overwhelming numbers, and Hazlett's regular
battery, supported by the 140th New York under Colonel O'Rorke of
Weed's brigade, was sent as a reinforcement.  The battery was
dragged with great labor to the crest of Little Round Top, and the
140th were posted on the slope on Vincent's right.  They came upon
the field just as the rebels, after failing to penetrate the centre,
had driven back the right.  In advancing to this exposed position,
Colonel O'Rorke, a brilliant young officer who had just graduated
at the head of his class at West Point, was killed and his men
thrown into some confusion, but Vincent rallied the line and repulsed
the assault.  In doing so he exposed himself very much and was soon
killed by a rebel sharpshooter.  General Weed, who was on the crest
with the battery, was mortally wounded in the same way; and as
Hazlett leaned over to hear his last message, a fatal bullet struck
him also and he dropped dead on the body of his chief.  Colonel
Rice of the 44th New York now took command in place of Vincent.
The enemy having been foiled at the centre and right, stole around
through the woods and turned the left of the line; but Chamberlain's
regiment--the 20th Maine--was folded back by him, around the rear
of the mountain, to resist the attack.  The rebels came on like
wolves, with deafening yells, and forced Chamberlain's men over
the crest; but they rallied and drove their assailants back in
their turn.  This was twice repeated and then a brigade of the
Pennsylvania Reserves and one of the Fifth Corps dashed over the
hill.  The 20th Maine made a grand final charge and drove the rebels
from the valley between the Round Tops, capturing a large number
of prisoners.  Not a moment too soon, for Chamberlain had lost a
third of his command and was entirely out of ammunition.  Vincent's
men in this affair took two colonels, fifteen officers, and five
hundred men prisoners, and a thousand stand of arms.  Hill in his
official report says "Hood's right was held as in a vise."

We will now return to the Peach Orchard.  In answer to a shot from
Clark's battery a long line of guns opened from the eleven batteries
opposite.  Graham's infantry were partially sheltered from this
iron hail, but the three batteries with him in the beginning, which
were soon reinforced by four more from the reserve artillery, under
Major McGilvery, were very much cut up; and at last it became
necessary to sacrifice one of them--that of Bigelow--to enable the
others to retire to a new line in the rear.  Graham still held the
Peach Orchard, although he was assailed on two fronts, by Barksdale's
brigade on the north and Kershaw's brigade on the west.  A battery
was brought forward to enfilade Sickles' line on the Emmetsburg
road, and under cover of its fire Barksdale carried the position,
but was mortally wounded in doing so.*  Sickles lost a leg about
this time (5.30 P.M.), and Graham, who was also badly wounded, fell
into the enemy's hands.  The command of the Third Corps now devolved
upon General Birney.

[* Barksdale soon after was brought into my lines and died like a
brave man, with dignity and resignation.  I had known him as an
officer of volunteers in the Mexican war.  As a member of Congress
he was very influential in bringing on the Rebellion.]

The batteries under Major McGilvery, which lined the cross road
below the Peach Orchard, were very effective, but were very much
shattered.  Kershaw captured them at one time but was driven off
temporarily by a gallant charge of the 141st Pennsylvania of Graham's
brigade, who retook the guns, which were then brought off by hand.
Bigelow was ordered by Major McGilvery to sacrifice his battery to
give the others time to form a new line.  He fought with _fixed
prolonge_ until the enemy were within six feet of him, and then
retired with the loss of three officers and twenty-eight men.
Phillips' battery, which adjoined his, had a similar experience.
McLaws bears testimony to the admirable manner with which this
artillery was served.  He says one shell killed and wounded thirty
men, out of a company of thirty-seven.

The capture of the Peach Orchard necessarily brought the enemy
directly on Humphreys' left flank and De Trobriand's right.  The
disaster then became irremediable, because every force thrown in
after this period, had to contend with a direct fire in front, and
an enfilading fire from the right.

While the Peach Orchard was assailed, several combats took place
in the vicinity, which had a general relation to the defence of
Sickles' line.  A little stream runs through a ravine parallel to
the cross road, and about five hundred yards south of it, and then
turns abruptly to the south at the corner of a wheat-field, passing
through a rocky wooded country, to empty in Plum Run.  De Trobriand
held the north bank of this stream with a very insufficient force
--a front of two regiments--and his contest with Semmes' brigade
in front and Kershaw's brigade, which was trying to penetrate into
the Peach Orchard, on his right, was at very close range and very
destructive.  At the same time as Ward's left was turned and driven
back the enemy came in on the left and rear of De Trobriand, and
occupied the wheat-field.  Barnes' division of the Fifth Corps,
composed of Sweitzer's and Tilton's brigades, soon came to his
assistance.  The former, by wheeling to the left and retaining
several lines, kept up the fight successfully against the enemy
who came up the ravine, but the latter was flanked and obliged to
give way.  De Trobriand's two regiments in front had a most determined
fight, and would not yield the ground.  When relieved by Zook's
force they fell back across the wheat-field.  There Birney used
them as a basis of a new line, brought up two fresh regiments,
charged through the field, and drove the enemy back to the stone
fence which bounded it.

Caldwell's division of Hancock's corps now came on to renew the
contest.  Caldwell formed his men with the brigades of Cross and
Kelly in front, and those of Zook and Brooke in rear.  In the
advance Colonel Cross was killed, and the front line being enfiladed
in both directions, was soon so cut up that the rear line came
forward in its place.  Zook was killed, but Brooke made a splendid
charge, turning Kershaw's right and driving Semmes back through
the supporting batteries.  Sweitzer's brigade then came up a second
time to aid Brooke, but it was useless, for there was still another
line of batteries beyond, and as the Peach Orchard by this time
was in possession of the enemy, Brooke's advanced position was
really a disadvantage, for both his flanks were turned.  Semmes'
brigade, together with parts of Benning's and Anderson's brigades,
rallied behind a stone wall, again came forward, and succeeded in
retaking the knoll and the batteries they had lost.  Caldwell,
under cover of our artillery, extricated his division with heavy
loss, for both Zook's and Kelly's brigades were completely
surrounded.

Then Ayres,* who had been at the turning-point of so many battles,
went in with his fine division of regulars, commanded by Day and
Burbank, officers of courage and long experience in warfare.  He
struck the enemy in flank who were pursuing Caldwell, and who would
have renewed the attack on Little Round Top, doubled them up, and
drove them back to the position Caldwell had left; but his line,
from the nature of things, was untenable, for a whole brigade with
ample supports had formed on his right rear, so that nothing remained
but to face about and fight his way home again.  This was accomplished
with the tremendous loss of fifty per cent. of his command in killed
and wounded.  His return was aided by the artillery on Little Round
Top, and by the advance of part of the Sixth Corps.  When the troops
were all gone, Winslow's battery still held the field for a time,
and withdrew by piece.

[* General Ayres, whose service in the war commenced with the first
Bull Run and ended at Appomattox, may almost be called an impersonation
of the Army of the Potomac, as he took part in nearly all its
battles and minor engagements.]

The enemy, Wofford's, Kershaw's, and Anderson's brigades, now
swarmed in the front of our main line between the wheat-field and
Little Round Top.  General S. Wiley Crawford, who commanded a
division composed of two brigades of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps,
was ordered to drive them farther back.  This organization, which
at one time I had the honor to command, were veterans of the
Peninsula, and were among the most dauntless men in the army.
Crawford called upon them to defend the soil of their native State,
and headed a charge made by McCandless' brigade, with the colors
of one of the regiments in his hand.  The men went forward with an
impetus nothing could withstand.  The enemy took shelter behind a
stone fence on the hither side of the wheat-field, but McCandless
stormed the position, drove them beyond the field, and then, as it
was getting dark, both sides rested on their arms.  The other
brigade of Crawford's division--that of Fisher--had previously been
sent to reinforce Vincent in his desperate struggle on the slope
of Little Round Top.  The enemy retired before it, so that it was
not engaged, and it then took possession of the main Round Top on
the left of Little Round Top and fortified it.

As Crawford charged, two brigades of Sedgwick's corps, those of
Nevin and Eustis, formed under Wheaton on the right and below Little
Round Top.  The sight of the firm front presented by these fresh
troops thoroughly discouraged Longstreet, who went forward to
reconnoitre, and he gave up all attempts at making any farther
advance.

The enemy at night took post at the western base of the ridge, and
held a fortified line as far south as the Devil's Den, in which
rocky cavern they took shelter.

It remains now to describe the effect of the loss of the Peach
Orchard and the wounding of Sickles and Graham--which took place
soon after--upon the fate of Humphreys' division, posted on the
right along the Emmetsburg road.  When Sickles lost his leg, Birney
assumed command of the corps, and ordered Humphreys to move his
left wing back to form a new oblique line to the ridge, in connection
with Birney's division.  Humphreys, up to the loss of the Peach
Orchard, had not been actively engaged, as the enemy had merely
demonstrated along his front; but now he was obliged, while executing
the difficult manoeuvre of a change of front to rear, to contend
with Barksdale's brigade of McLaws' division on his left at the
Peach Orchard, and enfilading batteries there also, while his entire
front was called upon to repel a most determined assault from
Anderson's division, which hitherto had not been engaged, and which
now pressed with great force on his right, which still clung to
the road.  Four regiments were thrown in by Hancock to support that
part of the line, but the attack was so sudden and violent that
they only had time to fire a few volleys before Humphreys received
orders to give up his advanced position and fall back to the ridge
itself.  There he turned at bay.  Hancock, who had been placed in
command of the First, Second, and Third Corps, was indefatigable
in his vigilance and personal supervision, "patching the line"
wherever the enemy was likely to break through.  His activity and
foresight probably preserved the ridge from capture.  Toward the
last Meade brought forward Lockwood's Maryland brigade from the
right and sent them in to cover Sickles' retreat.  Humphreys was
followed up by the brigades of Wilcox, Perry, and Wright--about
the best fighting material in the rebel army.  Perry was driven
back by the fire of our main line, and as his brigade was between
the other two, his retreat left each of them in a measure unsupported
on the flanks.  Posey's and Mahone's brigades were to advance as
soon as the others became actively engaged, but failed to do so,
and therefore Pender, who was to follow after them, did not move
forward.  Hence the great effort of Wilcox and Wright, which would
have been ruinous to us if followed up, was fruitless of results.
Both were repulsed for lack of support, but Wright actually reached
the crest with his Georgians and turned a gun, whose cannoneers
had been shot, upon Webb's brigade of the Second Corps.  Webb gave
him two staggering volleys from behind a fence, and went forward
with two regiments.  He charged, regained the lost piece, and turned
it upon them.  Wright, finding himself entirely isolated in this
advanced position, went back again to the main line, and Wilcox
did the same.  On this occasion Wright did what Lee failed to
accomplish the next day at such a heavy expense of life, _for he
pierced our centre,_ and held it for a short time, and had the
movement been properly supported and energetically followed up, it
might have been fatal to our army, and would most certainly have
resulted in a disastrous retreat.  It was but another illustration
of the difficulty of successfully converging columns against a
central force.  Lee's divisions seemed never to strike at the hour
appointed.  Each came forward separately, and was beaten for lack
of support.

Wright attained the crest and Wilcox was almost on a line with him.
The latter was closely followed up and nearly surrounded, for troops
rushed in on him from all sides.  He lost very heavily in extricating
himself from his advanced position.  Wilcox claims to have captured
temporarily twenty guns and Wright eight.

As they approached the ridge a Union battery limbered up and galloped
off.  The last gun was delayed and the cannoneer, with a long line
of muskets pointing at him within a few feet, deliberately drove
off the field.  The Georgians manifested their admiration for his
bravery by crying out "Don't shoot," and not a musket was fired at
him.*  I regret that I have not been able to ascertain the man's
name.

[* As it is well to verify these incidents, I desire to state that
this is a reminiscence of Dr. J. Robie Wood, of New York, a Georgian,
a relative of Wendell Phillips, who was in the charge with Wright.
Wood fell struck by six bullets, but recovered.]

In the morning General Tidball, who was attached to the cavalry as
Chief of Artillery, rode along the entire crest from Little Round
Top to Culp's Hill to make himself familiar with the line.  As he
passed by headquarters he noticed some new troops, the Second
Vermont brigade under General Stannard, which formed part of my
command.  They were a fine-looking body of men, and were drawn up
in close column by division, ready to go to any part of the field
at a moment's notice.  After inquiring to what corps they belonged
he passed over to the right.  On his return late in the day he saw
Sickles' whole line driven in and found Wright's rebel brigade
established on the crest barring his way back.  He rode rapidly
over to Meade's headquarters and found the general walking up and
down the room, apparently quite unconscious of the movements which
might have been discerned by riding to the top of the hill, and
which should have been reported to him by some one of his staff.
Tidball said, "General, I am very sorry to see that the enemy have
pierced our centre."  Meade expressed surprise at the information
and said, "Why, where is Sedgwick?"  Tidball replied, "I do not
know, but if you need troops, I saw a fine body of Vermonters a
short distance from here, belonging to the First Corps, who are
available."  Meade then directed him to take an order to Newton
and put the men in at once; the order was communicated to me and
I went with my division at double quick to the point indicated.
There we pursued Wright's force as it retired, and retook, at
Hancock's instigation, four guns taken by Wright earlier in the
action.  When these were brought in I sent out two regiments, who
followed the enemy up nearly to their lines and retook two more
guns.  I have been thus particular in narrating this incident as
Stannard's Vermont brigade contributed greatly to the victory of
the next day and it is worthy of record to state how they came to
be located in that part of the field.

It is claimed that unless Sickles had taken up this advanced position
Hood's division would have turned our left, have forced us from
the shelter of the ridge, and probably have intervened between us
and Washington.  The movement, disastrous in some respects, was
propitious as regards its general results, for the enemy had wasted
all their strength and valor in gaining the Emmetsburg road, which
after all was of no particular benefit to them.  They were still
outside our main line.  They pierced the latter it is true, but
the gallant men who at such heavy expense of life and limb stood
triumphantly on that crest were obliged to retire because the
divisions which should have supported them remained inactive.  I
must be excused for thinking that the damaging resistance these
supports encountered on the first day from the men of my command
exerted a benumbing influence on the second day.

It is said, that Hood being wounded, Longstreet led the last advance
against Little Round Top in person, but when he saw Sedgwick's
corps coming into line he gave up the idea of capturing the heights
as impracticable.  This eminence should have been the first point
held and fortified by us early in the day, as it was the key of
the field, but no special orders were given concerning it and
nothing but Warren's activity and foresight saved it from falling
into the hands of the enemy.

Meade was considerably startled by the fact that the enemy had
pierced our centre.  He at once sent for Pleasonton and gave him
orders to collect his cavalry with a view to cover the retreat of
the army.  Indeed, in an article on the "Secret History of Gettysburg,"
published in the "Southern Historical Papers," by Colonel Palfrey,
of the Confederate army, he states that the movement to the rear
actually commenced, and that Ewell's pickets heard and reported
that artillery was passing in that direction.  After a short time
the noise of the wheels ceased.  He also says that in a conversation
he had with Colonel Ulric Dahlgren of our cavalry, who had lost a
leg, and was a prisoner in Richmond, he was told that while the
battle of Gettysburg was going on he (Dahlgren) captured a Confederate
scout with a despatch from Jefferson Davis to General Lee, in which
the former wrote of the exposed condition of Richmond owing to the
presence of a large Union force at City Point.  Dahlgren said a
retreat had been ordered, but when Meade read this despatch, he
looked upon it as a sign indicating the weakness of the enemy, and
perhaps thinking it would not do to supplement the probable capture
of Richmond by a retreat of the Army of the Potomac, countermanded
the order.  Sedgwick, who was high in the confidence of General
Meade, told one of his division commanders that the army would
probably fall back on Westminster.  General Pleasonton testifies
that he was engaged, by order of General Meade, until 11 P.M. in
occupying prominent points with his cavalry, to cover the retreat
of the army.  Nevertheless it has been indignantly denied that such
a movement was contemplated.

Although it was General Lee's intention that both flanks of the
Union army should be assailed at the same time, while the intermediate
forces made demonstrations against the centre, Ewell did not move
to attack the right of our line at Culp's Hill until Longstreet's
assault on the left had failed.  Longstreet attributes it to the
fact that Ewell had broken his line of battle by detaching two
brigades up the York road.  There is always some reason why columns
never converge in time.  Johnson's division, which was on the
extreme left of the rebel army, and had not been engaged, made
their way, sheltered by the ravine of Rock Creek, to assail the
right at Culp's Hill, held by Wadsworth's division of the First
Corps, and that part of the line still farther to the right where
Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps was posted.

In his desire to reinforce the Fifth Corps at the close of the
conflict with Longstreet, General Meade made the sad mistake of
ordering the Twelfth Corps to abandon its position on the right
and report to General Sykes for duty on the left.  General Slocum,
sensible that this would be a suicidal movement, reported that the
enemy were advancing on his front, and begged permission to keep
Geary's division there to defend the position.  General Meade
finally allowed him to retain Greene's brigade, and no more, and
thus it happened that Ewell's troops, finding the works on the
extreme right of our line defenceless, had nothing to do but walk
in and occupy them.  If Meade was determined to detach this large
force, there seems no good reason why two of Sedgwick's brigades
should not have been sent to take its place, but nothing was done.

Johnson's division, as it came on, deployed and crossed Rock Creek
about half and hour before sunset.  It suffered so severely from
our artillery, that one brigade, that of Jones, fell back in
disorder, its commander being wounded.  The other, however, advanced
against Wadsworth, and Greene on his right; but as these generals
had their fronts well fortified, the attack was easily repulsed.
Nevertheless, the left of Johnson's line, not being opposed, took
possession of Geary's works about 9 P.M. and thus endangered our
communications.

Gregg's division of cavalry which was posted east of Slocum's
position saw this movement of Johnson.  Gregg opened fire on the
column with his artillery and sent out his men dismounted to skirmish
on the flank of the enemy.  Johnson detached Walker's brigade to
meet him, and the contest continued until after dark.  Greene, in
the meantime, swung his right around on the edge of a ravine,
perpendicular to the main line and fortified it, to avoid being
flanked.  He was an accomplished soldier and engineer, having
graduated second in his class at West Point, and knew exactly what
ought to be done and how to do it.  He held on strongly, and as it
was dark, and the enemy did not exactly know where they were, or
where our troops were posted, they waited until daylight before
taking any further action.  Yet they were now but a short distance
from General Meade's headquarters, and within easy reach of our
reserve artillery.  A night attack on the rear of our army, in
conjunction with an advance from the opposite side on Hancock's
front, would have thrown us into great confusion and must have
succeeded.

During the night Ewell sent Smith's brigade to reinforce Johnson.
Geary, after all, did not reach Little Round Top or report to Sykes,
and if he had done so, his troops would have been of no use, as
the battle was over in that part of the field.  There was a mystery
about his movements which needs to be cleared up.

To supplement this attack on the extreme right, and prevent
reinforcements from being sent there, Early's division was directed
to carry Cemetery Hill by storm.  Before it advanced, a vigorous
artillery fire was opened from four rebel batteries on Benner's
Hill, to prepare the way for the assault, but our batteries on
Cemetery Hill, which were partially sheltered by earthworks, replied
and soon silenced those of the enemy.  Then Early's infantry moved
forth, Hays' brigade on the right, Hoke's brigade on the left,
under Colonel Avery, and Gordon's brigade in reserve.  It was
supposed Johnson's division would protect Early's left flank, while
Rodes' and Pender's divisions would come forward in time to prevent
any attack against his right.  The enemy first struck Von Gilsa's
brigade, which was posted behind a stone fence at the foot of the
hill.  Still farther to its left, at the base of the hill, was
Ames' brigade, both enclosing Rickett's and Weidrick's and Stevens'
batteries, which had been a good deal cut up on the first day, were
now brought to bear on the approaching enemy.  Colonel Wainwright,
Chief of Artillery of the First Corps, gave them orders not to
attempt to retreat if attacked, but to fight the guns to the last.
The enemy advanced up the ravine which was specially commanded by
Stevens' battery.  Weidrick, Ricketts, and Stevens played upon the
approaching line energetically.  The rebel left and centre fell
back, but the right managed to obtain shelter from houses and
undulating ground, and came on impetuously, charging over Von
Gilsa's brigade, and driving it up the hill, through the batteries.
In doing so Hays says the darkness and smoke saved his men from a
terrible slaughter.  Weidrick's battery was captured, and two of
Ricketts' guns were spiked.  The enemy, in making this movement,
exposed their left flank to Stevens' battery, which poured a terrible
fire of double canister into their ranks.  The 33d Massachusetts
also opened a most effective oblique fire.  The batteries were
penetrated but would not surrender.  Dearer than life itself to
the cannoneer is the gun he serves, and these brave men fought hand
to hand with handspikes, rammers, staves, and even stones.  They
shouted, _"Death on the soil of our native State rather than lose
our guns."_  Hancock, all this time should have been kept busy on
his own front repelling an attack from Rodes and Pender, but as
they did not come forward, and as he felt that there was great
danger that Howard would lose Cemetery Hill and his own right be
turned, he sent Carroll's brigade to the rescue.  Carroll was joined
by the 106th Pennsylvania and some reinforcements from Schurz's
division.  For a few minutes, Hays says, there was an ominous
silence and then the tramp of our infantry was heard.  They came
over the hill and went in with a cheer.  The enemy, finding they
were about to be overwhelmed, retreated, as no one came to their
assistance.  When they fell back our guns opened a very destructive
fire.  It is said that out of 1,750 men of the organization known
as "The Louisiana Tigers," only 150 returned.  Hays attributes his
defeat to the fact that Gordon was not up in time to support him.

The failure to carry the hill isolated Johnson's division on our
extreme right.  As it could only be reached by a long circuit it
was not easy for Lee to maintain it there, without unduly weakening
other parts of his line.  That Rodes' division did not reach Cemetery
Hill in time to co-operate with Early's attack was not owing to
any lack of zeal or activity on the part of that energetic officer.
He was obliged to move out of Gettysburg by the flank, then change
front and advance double the distance Early had to traverse, and
by the time he had done so Early had made the attack and had been
repulsed.

The day closed with the rebels defeated on our left, but victorious
on our right.  Fortunately for us, this incited Lee to continue
his efforts.  He could not bear to retreat after his heavy losses,
and acknowledge that he was beaten.  He resolved to reinforce
Johnson's division, now in rear of our right, and fling Pickett's
troops, the _élite_ of his army, who had not been engaged, against
our centre.  He hoped a simultaneous attack made by Pickett in
front and Johnson in rear, would yet win those heights and scatter
the Union army to the winds.  Kilpatrick, who had been resting the
tired men and horses of his cavalry division at Abbotsford after
the conflict at Hanover, went on the afternoon of the 2d to circle
around and attack the left and rear of the enemy by way of Hunterstown.
This plan was foiled, however, by the sudden arrival of Stuart's
cavalry from its long march.  They reached that part of the field
about 4 P.M.  After a fierce combat, in which Farnsworth's and
Custer's brigades and Estes' squadron were principally engaged
against Hampton's brigade supported by the main body, darkness put
an end to the fight.  Kilpatrick then turned back and bivouacked
at Two Taverns for the night.

Gregg's division of cavalry left Hanover at noon and took post
opposite and about three miles east of Slocum's Corps on the right.
There, as stated, he saw Johnson's division moving to the attack
and after throwing some shells into their ranks deployed his own
skirmish line and advanced against the one they threw out to meet
him.  At 10 P.M. he withdrew and took post on the Baltimore pike
where it crosses Cress Run, near Rock Creek.  By so doing he guarded
the right and rear of the army from any demonstration by Stuart's
cavalry.

At night a council of war was held, in which it was unanimously
voted to stay and fight it out.  Meade was displeased with the
result, and although he acquiesced in the decision, he said angrily,
"Have it your own way, gentlemen, but Gettysburg is no place to
fight a battle in."  The fact that a portion of the enemy actually
prolonged our line on the right and that our centre had been pierced
during the day, made him feel far from confident.  He thought it
better to retreat with what he had, than run the risk of losing
all.*

[* Since the above was written, the discussion has been renewed in
the public prints as to whether General Meade did or did not intend
to leave the field.  So far as the drawing up of an order of retreat
is concerned, it ws undoubtedly right and proper to do so, for it
is the duty of a general to be prepared for every emergency.  It
is easy to criticise, and say what should have been done, after a
battle has been fought, after the position of troops is all laid
down on the maps, and the plans of every commander explained in
official reports; but amid the doubt and confusion of actual combat,
where there has been great loss of men and material, it is not
always so easy to decide.  On the night of the 2d the state of
affairs was disheartening.  In the combats of the preceding days,
the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps had been almost annihilated;
the Fifth Corps and a great part of the Second were shattered, and
only the Sixth Corps and Twelfth Corps were comparatively fresh.
It was possible therefore that the enemy might gain some great
success the next day, which would stimulate them to extra exertions,
and diminish the spirit of our men in the same proportion.  In such
a case it was not improbable that the army might be destroyed as
an organization, and there is a vast difference between a _destroyed_
army and a _defeated_ army.  By retiring while it was yet in his
power to do so, General Meade felt that he would assure the safety
of our principal cities, for the enemy were too exhausted to pursue;
and being out of ammunition, and far from their base of supplies,
were not in a condition to do much further damage, or act very
energetically.  Whereas our troops could soon be largely reinforced
from the draft which had just been established, and, being in the
centre of their resources, could be supplied with all that was
necessary for renewed effort.

There is no question in my mind that, at the council referred to,
General Meade did desire to retreat, and expressed fears that his
communications with Taneytown might be endangered by remaining at
Gettysburg.

It has also been stated that both General Gibbon and General Newton
objected to our position at Gettysburg, but this is an error.  They
merely recommended some additional precautions to prevent the enemy
from turning our left at Round Top, and thus intervening between
us and Washington.  Hancock, in giving his vote, said the Army of
the Potomac had retreated too often, and he was in favor of remaining
now to fight it out.]



CHAPTER VI.
THE BATTLE OF THE THIRD DAY--JOHNSON'S DIVISION DRIVEN OUT.

At dawn on the 3d the enemy opened on us with artillery, but the
firing had no definite purpose, and after some hours it gradually
slackened.

The principal interest early in the day necessarily centred on the
right, where Johnson's position not only endangered the safety of
the army, but compromised our retreat.  It was therefore essential
to drive him out as soon as possible.  To this end batteries were
established during the night on all the prominent points in that
vicinity.  Geary had returned with his division about midnight,
and was not a little astonished to find the rebels established in
the works he had left.  He determined to contest possession with
them at daylight.  In the meantime he joined Greene and formed part
of his line perpendicular to our main line of battle, and part
fronting the enemy.

On the other hand, Ewell, having obtained a foothold, swore he
would not be driven out, and hastened to reinforce Johnson with
Daniel's and O'Neill's brigades from Rodes' division.

As soon as objects could be discerned in the early gray of the
morning our artillery opened fire.  As Johnson, on account of the
steep declivities and other obstacles, had not been able to bring
any artillery with him, he could not reply.  It would not do to
remain quiet under this fire, and he determined to charge, in hopes
of winning a better position on higher ground.  His men--the old
Stonewall brigade leading--rushed bravely forward, but were as
gallantly met by Kane's brigade of Geary's division and a close
and severe struggle ensued for four hours among the trees and rocks.
Ruger's division of the Twelfth Corps came up and formed on the
rebel left, taking them in flank and threatening them in reverse.
Indeed, as the rest of our line were not engaged, there was plenty
of support for Geary.  Troops were sent him, including Shaler's
brigade, which took the front, and was soon warmly engaged in re-
establishing the line.

At about 11 A.M., finding the contest hopeless, and his retreat
threatened by a force sent down to Rock Creek, Johnson yielded
slowly and reluctantly to a charge made by Geary's division, gave
up the position and withdrew to Rock Creek, where he remained until
night.

Our line was once more intact.  All that the enemy had gained by
dogged determination and desperate bravery was lost from a lack of
co-ordination, caused perhaps by the great difficulty of communicating
orders over this long concave line where every route was swept by
our fire.

Lee had now attacked both flanks of the Army of the Potomac without
having been able to establish himself permanently on either.
Notwithstanding the repulse of the previous day he was very desirous
of turning the left, for once well posted there he could secure
his own retreat while interposing between Meade and Washington.
He rode over with Longstreet to that end of the line to see what
could be done.  General Wofford, who commanded a brigade of McLaws'
division, writes in a recent letter to General Crawford, United
States Army, as follows:  "Lee and Longstreet came to my brigade
Friday morning before the artillery opened fire.  I told him that
the afternoon before, I nearly reached the crest.  He asked if I
could not go there now.  I replied, 'No, General, I think not.'
He said quickly, 'Why not?'  'Because,' I said, 'General, the enemy
have had all night to intrench and reinforce.  I had been pursuing
a broken enemy and the situation was now very different.'"

Having failed at each extremity, it only remained to Lee to retreat,
or attack the centre.  Such high expectations had been formed in
the Southern States in regard to his conquest of the North that he
determined to make another effort.  He still had Pickett's division,
the flower of Virginia, which had not been engaged, and which was
full of enthusiasm.  He resolved to launch them against our centre,
supported on either flank by the advance of the main portion of
the army.  He had hoped that Johnson's division would have been
able to maintain its position on the right, so that the Union centre
could be assailed in front and rear at the same time, but Johnson
having been driven out, it was necessary to trust to Pickett alone,
or abandon the whole enterprise and return to Virginia.

Everything was quiet up to 1 P.M., as the enemy were massing their
batteries and concentrating their forces preparatory to the grand
charge--the supreme effort--which was to determine the fate of the
campaign, and to settle the point whether freedom or slavery was
to rule the Northern States.

It seems to me there was some lack of judgment in the preparations.
Heth's division, now under Pettigrew, which had been so severely
handled on the first day, and which was composed in a great measure
of new troops, was designated to support Pickett's left and join
in the attack at close quarters.  Wilcox, too, who one would think
had been pretty well fought out the day before, in his desperate
enterprise of attempting to crown the crest, was directed to support
the right flank of the attack.  Wright's brigade was formed in
rear, and Pender's division on the left of Pettigrew, but there
was a long distance between Wilcox and Longstreet's forces on the
right.

At 1 P.M., a signal gun was fired and one hundred and fifteen guns
opened against Hancock's command, consisting of the First Corps
under Newton, the Second Corps under Gibbon, the Third Corps under
Birney, and against the Eleventh Corps under Howard.  The object
of this heavy artillery fire was to break up our lines and prepare
the way for Pickett's charge.  The exigencies of the battle had
caused the First Corps to be divided, Wadsworth's division being
on the right at Culp's Hill, Robinson on Gibbon's right, and my
own division intervening between Caldwell on the left and Gibbon
on the right.  The convex shape of our line did not give us as much
space as that of the enemy, but General Hunt, Chief of Artillery,
promptly posted eighty guns along the crest--as many as it would
hold--to answer the fire, and the batteries on both sides suffered
severely in the two hours' cannonade.  Not less than eleven caissons
were blown up and destroyed; one quite near me.  When the smoke
went up from these explosions rebel yells of exultation could be
heard along a line of several miles.  At 3 P.M. General Hunt ordered
our artillery fire to cease, in order to cool the guns, and to
preserve some rounds for the contest at close quarters, which he
foresaw would soon take place.

My own men did not suffer a great deal from this cannonade, as I
sheltered them as much as possible under the crest of the hill,
and behind rocks, trees, and stone fences.

The cessation of our fire gave the enemy the idea they had silenced
our batteries, and Pickett at once moved forward, to break the left
centre of the Union line and occupy the crest of the ridge.*  The
other forces on his right and left were expected to move up and
enlarge the opening thus made, so that finally, the two wings of
the Union Army would be permanently separated, and flung off by
this entering wedge in eccentric directions.

[* The attack was so important, so momentous, and so contrary to
Longstreet's judgment, that when Pickett asked for orders to advance
he gave no reply, and Pickett said proudly, "I shall go forward,
sir!"]

This great column of attack, it was supposed, numbered about
seventeen thousand men, but southern writers have a peculiar
arithmetic by which they always cipher down their forces to nothing.
Even on the left, on the preceding day, when our troops in front
of Little Round Top were assailed by a line a mile and a half long,
they figure it almost out of existence.  The force that now advanced
would have been larger still had it not been for a spirited attack
by Kilpatrick against the left of Longstreet's corps, detaining
some troops there which otherwise might have co-operated in the
grand assault against our centre.

It necessarily took the rebels some time to form and cross the
intervening space, and Hunt took advantage of the opportunity to
withdraw the batteries that had been most injured, sending others
in their place from the reserve artillery, which had not been
engaged.  He also replenished the ammunition boxes, and stood ready
to receive the foe as he came forward--first with solid shot, next
with shell, and lastly, when he came to close quarters, with
canister.

General Meade's headquarters was in the centre of this cannonade,
and as the balls were flying very thickly there, and killing the
horses of his staff, he found it necessary temporarily to abandon
the place.  Where nothing is to be gained by exposure it is sound
sense to shelter men and officers as much as possible.  He rode
over to Power's Hill, made his headquarters with General Slocum,
and when the firing ceased rode back again.  During his absence
the charge took place.  He has stated that it was his intention to
throw the Fifth and Sixth Corps on the flanks of the attacking
force, but no orders to this effect were issued, and it is questionable
whether such an arrangement would have been a good one.  It would
have disgarnished the left, where Longstreet was still strong in
numbers, and in forming perpendicular to our line of battle the
two corps would necessarily have exposed their own outer flanks to
attack.  Indeed, the rebels had provided for just such a contingency,
by posting Wilcox's brigade and Perry's brigade under Colonel Lang
on the left, both in rear of the charging column under Pickett and
Pettigrew.  Owing to a mistake or misunderstanding, this disposition,
however, did not turn out well for the enemy.  It was not intended
by Providence that the Northern States should pass under the iron
rule of the slave power, and on this occasion every plan made by
Lee was thwarted in the most unexpected manner.

The distance to be traversed by Pickett's column was about a mile
and a half from the woods where they started, to the crest of the
ridge they desired to attain.  They suffered severely from our
artillery, which opened on them with solid shot as soon as they
came in sight; when half way across the plain they were vigorously
shelled; double canisters were reserved for their nearer approach.

At first the direction of their march appeared to be directly toward
my division.  When within five hundred yards of us, however, Pickett
halted and changed direction obliquely about forty-five degrees,
so that the attack passed me and struck Gibbon's division on my
right.  Just here one of those providential circumstances occurred
which favored us so much, for Wilcox and Lang, who guarded Pickett's
right flank, did not follow his oblique movement, but kept on
straight to the front, so that soon there was a wide interval
between their troops and the main body, leaving Pickett's right
fully uncovered.

The rebels came on magnificently.  As fast as the shot and shell
tore through their lines they closed up the gaps and pressed forward.
When they reached the Emmetsburg road the canister began to make
fearful chasms in their ranks.  They also suffered severely from
a battery on Little Round Top, which enfiladed their line.  One
shell killed and wounded ten men.  Gibbon had directed his command
to reserve their fire until the enemy were near enough to make it
very effective.  Pickett's advance dashed up to the fence occupied
by the skirmishers of the Second Corps, near the Emmetsburg road,
and drove them back; then the musketry blazed forth with deadly
effect, and Pettigrew's men began to waver on the left and fall
behind; for the nature of the ground was such that they were more
exposed than other portions of the line.  They were much shaken by
the artillery fire, and that of Hays' division sent them back in
masses.*

[* The front line of Hays' division, which received this charge,
was composed of the 12th New Jersey, 14th Connecticut, and 1st
Delaware.  The second line was composed of the 111th, 125th, 126th,
and 39th New York.]

Before the first line of rebels reached a second fence and stone
wall, behind which our main body was posted, it was obliged to pass
a demi-brigade under Colonel Theodore B. Gates, of the 20th New
York State Militia, and a Vermont brigade under General Stannard,
both belonging to my command.  When Pickett's right became exposed
in consequence of the divergence of Wilcox's command, Stannard
seized the opportunity to make a flank attack, and while his left
regiment, the 14th, poured in a heavy oblique fire, he changed
front with his two right regiments, the 13th and 16th, which brought
them perpendicular to the rebel line of march.  In cases of this
kind, when struck directly on the flank, troops are more or less
unable to defend themselves, and Kemper's brigade crowded in toward
the centre in order to avoid Stannard's energetic and deadly attack.
They were closely followed up by Gates' command, who continued to
fire into them at close range.  This caused many to surrender,
others to retreat outright, and others simply to crowd together.
Simultaneously with Stannard's attack, the 8th Ohio, which was on
picket, overlapping the rebel left, closed in on that flank with
great effect.  Nevertheless, the next brigade--that of Armistead--
united to Garnett's brigade, pressed on, and in spite of death-
dealing bolts on all sides, Pickett determined to break Gibbon's
line and capture his guns.

Although Webb's front was the focus of the concentrated artillery
fire, and he had already lost fifty men and some valuable officers,
his line remained firm and unshaken.  It devolved upon him now to
meet the great charge which was to decide the fate of the day.  It
would have been difficult to find a man better fitted for such an
emergency.  He was nerved to great deeds by the memory of his
ancestors, who in former days had rendered distinguished services
to the Republic, and felt that the results of the whole war might
depend upon his holding of the position.  His men were equally
resolute.  Cushing's battery, A, 4th United States Artillery, which
had been posted on the crest, and Brown's Rhode Island Battery on
his left, were both practically destroyed by the cannonade.  The
horses were prostrated, every officer but one was struck, and
Cushing had but one serviceable gun left.

As Pickett's advance came very close to the first line, young
Cushing, mortally wounded in both thighs, ran his last serviceable
gun down to the fence, and said:  _"Webb, I will give them one more
shot!"_  At the moment of the last discharge he called out, _"Good-
by!"_ and fell dead at the post of duty.

Webb sent for fresh batteries to replace the two that were disabled,
and Wheeler's 1st New York Independent Battery came up just before
the attack, and took the place of Cushing's battery on the left.

Armistead pressed forward, leaped the stone wall, waving his sword
with his hat on it, followed by about a hundred of his men, several
of whom carried battle-flags.  He shouted, "Give them the cold
steel, boys!" and laid his hands upon a gun.  The battery for a
few minutes was in his possession, and the rebel flag flew triumphantly
over our line.  But Webb was at the front, very near Armistead,
animating and encouraging his men.  He led the 72d Pennsylvania
regiment against the enemy, and posted a line of wounded men in
rear to drive back or shoot every man that deserted his duty.  A
portion of the 71st Pennsylvania, behind a stone wall on the right,
threw in a deadly flanking fire, while a great part of the 69th
Pennsylvania and the remainder of the 71st made stern resistance
from a copse of trees on the left, near where the enemy had broken
the line, and where our men were shot with the rebel muskets touching
their breasts.

Then came a splendid charge of two regiments, led by Colonel Hall,
which passed completely through Webb's line, and engaged the enemy
in a hand-to-hand conflict.*  Armistead was shot down by the side
of the gun he had taken.  It is said he had fought on our side in
the first battle at Bull Run, but had been seduced by Southern
affiliations to join in the rebellion; and now, dying in the effort
to extend the area of slavery over the free States, he saw with a
clearer vision that he had been engaged in an unholy cause, and
said to one of our officers who leaned over him:  "Tell Hancock I
have wronged him and have wronged my country."

[* Colonel Norman J. Hall, commanding a brigade in Hancock's corps,
who rendered this great service, was one of the garrison who defended
Fort Sumter at the beginning of the war.  At that time he was the
Second Lieutenant of my company.]

Both Gibbon and Webb were wounded, and the loss in officers and
men was very heavy; two rebel brigadier-generals were killed, and
more prisoners were taken than twice Webb's brigade; 6 battle-flags,
and 1,463 muskets were also gathered in.

My command being a little to the left, I witnessed this scene, and,
after it was over, sent out stretcher-bearers attached to the
ambulance train, and had numbers of wounded Confederates brought
in and cared for.  I was told that there was one man among these
whose conversation seemed to indicate that he was a general officer.
I sent to ascertain his rank, but he replied:  "Tell General
Doubleday in a few minutes I shall be where there is no rank."  He
expired soon after, and I never learned his name.

The rebels did not seem to appreciate my humanity in sending out
to bring in their wounded, for they opened a savage fire against
the stretcher-bearers.  One shell burst among us, a piece of it
knocked me over on my horse's neck, and wounded Lieutenant Cowdry
of my staff.

When Pickett--the great leader--looked around the top of the ridge
he had temporarily gained, he saw it was impossible to hold the
position.  Troops were rushing in on him from all sides.  The Second
Corps were engaged in a furious assault on his front.  His men were
fighting with clubbed muskets, and even banner staves were intertwined
in a fierce and hopeless struggle.  My division of the First Corps
were on his right flank, giving deadly blows there, and the Third
Corps were closing up to attack.  Pettigrew's forces on his left
had given way, and a heavy skirmish line began to accumulate on
that flank.  He saw his men surrendering in masses, and, with a
heart full of anguish, ordered a retreat.  Death had been busy on
all sides, and few indeed now remained of that magnificent column
which had advanced so proudly, led by the Ney of the rebel army,
and those few fell back in disorder, and without organization,
behind Wright's brigade, which had been sent forward to cover the
retreat.  At first, however, when struck by Stannard on the flank,
and when Pickett's charge was spent, they rallied in a little
slashing, where a grove had been cut down by our troops to leave
an opening for our artillery.  There two regiments of Rowley's
brigade of my division, the 151st Pennsylvania and the 20th New
York State Militia, under Colonel Theodore R. Gates, of the latter
regiment, made a gallant charge, and drove them out.  Pettigrew's
division, it is said, lost 2,000 prisoners and 15 battle-flags on
the left.

While this severe contest was going on in front of Webb, Wilcox
deployed his command and opened a feeble fire against Caldwell's
division on my left.  Stannard repeated the manoeuvre which had
been so successful against Kemper's brigade by detaching the 14th
and 16th Vermont to take Wilcox in flank.  Wilcox thus attacked on
his right, while a long row of batteries tore the front of his line
to pieces with canister, could gain no foothold.  He found himself
exposed to a tremendous cross fire, and was obliged to retreat,
but a great portion of his command were brought in as prisoners by
Stannard* and battle-flags were gathered in sheaves.

[* As Stannard's brigade were new troops, and had been stationed
near Washington, the men had dubbed them _The Paper Collar Brigade_,
because some of them were seen wearing paper collars, but after
this fight the term was never again applied to them.]

A portion of Longstreet's corps, Benning's, Robertson's, and Law's
brigades, advanced against the two Round Tops to prevent reinforcements
from being sent from that vicinity to meet Pickett's charge.
Kilpatrick interfered with this programme, however, for about 2
P.M. he made his appearance on our left with Farnsworth's brigade
and Merritt's brigade of regulars, accompanied by Graham's and
Elder's batteries of the regular army, to attack the rebel right,
with a view to reach their ammunition trains, which were in the
vicinity.  The rebels say his men came on yelling like demons.
Having driven back the skirmishers who guarded that flank, Merritt
deployed on the left and soon became engaged there with Anderson's
Georgia brigade, which was supported by two batteries.  On the
right Farnsworth, with the 1st Vermont regiment of his brigade,
leaped a fence, and advanced until he came to a second stone fence,
where he was checked by an attack on his right flank from the 4th
Alabama regiment of Law's brigade, which came back for that purpose
from a demonstration it was making against Round Top.  Farnsworth
then turned and leaping another fence in a storm of shot and shell,
made a gallant attempt to capture Backman's battery, but was unable
to do so, as it was promptly supported by the 9th Georgia regiment
of Anderson's brigade.  Farnsworth was killed in this charge, and
the 1st Vermont found itself enclosed in a field, with high fences
on all sides, behind which masses of infantry were constantly rising
up and firing.  The regiment was all broken up and forced to retire
in detachments.  Kilpatrick after fighting some time longer without
making much progress, fell back on account of the constant
reinforcements that were augmenting the force opposed to him.
Although he had not succeeded in capturing the ammunition train,
he had made a valuable diversion on the left, which doubtless
prevented the enemy from assailing Round Top with vigor, or detaching
a force to aid Pickett.

The Confederate General Benning states that the prompt action of
General Law in posting the artillery in the road and the 7th and
9th Georgia regiments on each side, was all that saved the train
from capture.  "There was nothing else to save it."  He also says
that two-thirds of Pickett's command were killed, wounded, or
captured.  Every brigade commander and every field officer except
one fell.  Lee and Longstreet had seen from the edge of the woods,
with great exultation, the blue flag of Virginia waving over the
crest occupied by the Union troops.  It seemed the harbinger of
great success to Lee.  He thought the Union army was conquered at
last.  The long struggle was over, and peace would soon come,
accompanied by the acknowledgment of the independence of the Southern
Confederacy.  It was but a passing dream; the flag receded, and
soon the plain was covered with fugitives making their way to the
rear.  Then, anticipating an immediate pursuit, he used every effort
to rally men and officers, and made strenuous efforts to get his
artillery in position to be effective.

The Confederate General A. R. Wright criticises this attack and
very justly says, "The difficulty was not so much in reaching
Cemetery Ridge or taking it.  My brigade did so on the afternoon
of the 2d, but the trouble was to hold it, for the whole Federal
army was massed in a sort of horse shoe, and could rapidly reinforce
the point to any extent; while the long enveloping Confederate line
could not support promptly enough."  This agrees with what I have
said in relation to the convex and concave orders of battle.

General Gibbon had sent Lieutenant Haskell of his staff to Power's
Hill to notify General Meade that the charge was coming.  As Meade
approached his old headquarters he heard firing on the crest above,
and went up to ascertain the cause.  He found the charge had been
repulsed and ejaculated "Thank God!"

When Lee learned that Johnson had yielded his position on the right,
and therefore could not co-operate with Pickett's advance, he sent
Stuart's cavalry around to accomplish the same object by attacking
the right and rear of our army.  Howard saw the rebel cavalry moving
off in that direction, and David McM. Gregg, whose division was
near White's Creek where it crosses the Baltimore pike, received
orders about noon to guard Slocum's right and rear.

Custer had already been contending with his brigade against portions
of the enemy's force in that direction, when Gregg sent forward
McIntosh's brigade to relieve him, and followed soon after with J.
Irvin Gregg's brigade.  Custer was under orders to join Kilpatrick's
command, to which he belonged, but the exigencies of the battle
soon forced Gregg to detain him.  McIntosh, having taken the place
of Custer, pushed forward to develop the enemy's line, which he
found very strongly posted, the artillery being on a commanding
ridge which overlooked the whole country, and covered by dismounted
cavalry in woods, buildings, and behind fences below.  McIntosh
became warmly engaged and send back for Randol's battery to act
against the rebel guns on the crest, and drive the enemy out of
the buildings.  The guns above were silenced by Pennington's and
Randol's batteries, and the force below driven out of the houses
by Lieutenant Chester's section of the latter.  The buildings and
fences were then occupied by our troops.  The enemy attempted to
regain them by a charge against McIntosh's right flank, but were
repulsed.  In the meantime Gregg came up with the other brigade,
and assumed command of the field.  The battle now became warm, for
W. H. F. Lee's brigade, under Chambliss, advanced to support the
skirmish line, and the 1st New Jersey, being out of ammunition,
was charged and routed by the 1st Virginia.  The 7th Michigan, a
new regiment which came up to support it, was also driven in; for
the enemy's dismounted line reinforced the 1st Virginia.  The latter
regiment, which had held on with desperate tenacity, although
attacked on both flanks, was at last compelled to fall back by an
attack made by part of the 5th Michigan.  The contending forces
were now pretty well exhausted when, to the dismay of our men, a
fresh brigade under Wade Hampton, which Stuart had kept in reserve,
made its appearance, and new and desperate exertions were required
to stem its progress.  There was little time to act, but every
sabre that could be brought forward was used.  As Hampton came on,
our artillery under Pennington and Randol made terrible gaps in
his ranks.  Chester's section kept firing canister until the rebels
were within fifty yards of him.  The enemy were temporarily stopped
by a desperate charge on their flank, made by only sixteen men of
the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, under Captains Triechel and Rogers,
accompanied by Captain Newhall of McIntosh's staff.  This little
band of heroes were nearly all disabled or killed, but they succeeded
in delaying the enemy, already shattered by the canister from
Chester's guns, until Custer was able to bring up the 1st Michigan
and lead them to the charge, shouting "Come on, you wolverines!"
Every available sabre was thrown in.  General McIntosh and his
staff and orderlies charged into the _mélée_ as individuals.
Hampton and Fitz Lee headed the enemy, and Custer our troops.
Lieutenant Colonel W. Brooke-Rawle, the historian of the conflict,
who was present, says, "For minutes, which seemed like hours, amid
the clashing of the sabres, the rattle of the small arms, the
frenzied imprecations, the demands to surrender, the undaunted
replies, and the appeals for mercy, the Confederate column stood
its ground."  A fresh squadron was brought up under Captain Hart
of the 1st New Jersey, and the enemy at last gave way and retired.
Both sides still confronted each other, but the battle was over,
for Pickett's charge had failed, and there was no longer any object
in continuing the contest.

Stuart was undoubtedly baffled and the object of his expedition
frustrated; yet he stated in his official report that he was in a
position to intercept the Union retreat in case Pickett had been
successful.  At night he retreated to regain his communications
with Ewell's left.

This battle being off of the official maps has hardly been alluded
to in the various histories which have been written; but its results
were important and deserve to be commemorated.

When Pickett's charge was repulsed, and the whole plain covered
with fugitives, we all expected that Wellington's command at
Waterloo, of _"Up, guards, and at them!"_ would be repeated, and
that a grand counter-charge would be made.  But General Meade had
made no arrangements to give a return thrust.  It seems to me he
should have posted the Sixth and part of the Twelfth Corps in rear
of Gibbon's division the moment Pickett's infantry were seen emerging
from the woods, a mile and a half off.  If they broke through our
centre these corps would have been there to receive them, and if
they failed to pierce our line and retreated, the two corps could
have followed them up promptly before they had time to rally and
reorganize.  An advance by Sykes would have kept Longstreet in
position.  In all probability we would have cut the enemy's army
in two, and captured the long line of batteries opposite us, which
were but slightly guarded.  Hancock, lying wounded in an ambulance,
wrote to Meade, recommending that this be done.  Meade, it is true,
recognized in some sort the good effects of a counter-blow; but to
be effective the movement should have been prepared beforehand.
It was too late to commence making preparations for an advance when
some time had elapsed and when Lee had rallied his troops and had
made all his arrangements to resist an assault.  It was ascertained
afterward that he had twenty rounds of ammunition left per gun,
but it was not evenly distributed and some batteries in front had
fired away all their cartridges.  A counter-charge under such
circumstances is considered almost imperative in war; for the beaten
army, running and dismayed, cannot, in the nature of things, resist
with much spirit; whereas the pursuers, highly elated by their
success, and with the prospect of ending the contest, fight with
more energy and bravery.  Rodes says the Union forces were so long
in occupying the town and in coming forward after the repulse of
the enemy that it was generally thought they had retreated.  Meade
rode leisurely over to the Fifth Corps on the left, and told Sykes
to send out and see if the enemy in his front was firm and holding
on to their position.  A brigade preceded by skirmishers was
accordingly sent forward, but as Longstreet's troops were well
fortified, they resisted the advance, and Meade--finding some hours
had elapsed and that Lee had closed up his lines and was fortifying
against him--gave up all idea of a counter-attack.



CHAPTER VII.
GENERAL RETREAT OF THE ENEMY--CRITICISMS OF DISTINGUISHED CONFEDERATE
  OFFICERS.

Lee was greatly dispirited at Pickett's failure, but worked with
untiring energy to repair the disaster.

There was an interval of full a mile between Hill and Longstreet,
and the plain was swarming with fugitives making their way back in
disorder.  He hastened to get ready to resist the counter-charge,
which he thought was inevitable, and to plant batteries behind
which the fugitives could rally.  He also made great personal
exertions to reassure and reassemble the detachments that came in.
He did not for a moment imagine that Meade would fail to take
advantage of this golden opportunity to crush the Army of Virginia
and end the war.

The most distinguished rebel officers admit the great danger they
were in at this time, and express their surprise that they were
not followed up.

The fact is, Meade had no idea of leaving the ridge.  I conversed
the next morning with a corps commander who had just left him.  He
said:  "Meade says he thinks he can hold out for part of another
day here, if they attack him."

This language satisfied me that Meade would not go forward if he
could avoid it, and would not impede in any way the rebel retreat
across the Potomac.  Lee began to make preparations at once and
started his trains on the morning of the 4th.  By night Rodes'
division, which followed them, was in bivouac two miles west of
Fairfield.  It was a difficult task to retreat burdened with 4,000
prisoners, and a train fifteen miles long, in the presence of a
victorious enemy, but it was successfully accomplished as regards
his main body.  The roads, too, were bad and much cut up by the
rain.

While standing on Little Round Top Meade was annoyed at the fire
of a rebel battery posted on an eminence beyond the wheat-field,
about a thousand yards distant.  He inquired what troops those were
stationed along the stone fence which bounded the hither side of
the wheat-field.  Upon ascertaining that it was Crawford's division
of the Fifth Corps, he directed that they be sent forward to clear
the woods in front of the rebel skirmishers, who were very annoying,
and to drive away the battery, _but not to get into a fight that
could bring on a general engagement._  As Crawford unmasked from
the stone fence the battery opened fire on his right.  He sent
Colonel Ent's regiment, deployed as skirmishers, against the guns,
which retired as Ent approached.  McCandless, who went forward with
his brigade, moved too far to the right, and Crawford ordered him
to change front and advance toward Round Top.  He did so and struck
a rebel brigade in flank which was behind a temporary breastwork
of rails, sods, etc.  When this brigade saw a Union force apparently
approaching from their own lines to attack them in flank, they
retreated in confusion, after a short resistance, and this disorder
extended during the retreat to a reserve brigade posted on the low
ground in their rear.  Their flight did not cease until they reached
Horner's woods, half a mile distant, where they immediately intrenched
themselves.  These brigades belonged to Hood's division, then under
Law.

Longstreet says, "When this (Pickett's) charge failed, I expected
that, of course, the enemy would throw himself against our shattered
ranks and try to crush us.  I sent my staff officers to the rear
to assist in rallying the troops, and hurried to our line of
batteries as the only support that I could given them." . . . "I
knew if the army was to be saved these batteries must check the
enemy." . . . "For unaccountable reasons the enemy did not pursue
his advantage."

Longstreet always spoke of his own men as invincible, and stated
that on the 2d they did the best three hours' fighting that ever
was done, but Crawford's* attack seemed to show that they too were
shaken by the defeat of Picket's grand charge.

[* Crawford was also one of those who took a prominent part in the
defence of Fort Sumter, at the beginning of the war.  We each
commanded detachments of artillery on that occasion.]

In regard to the great benefit we would have derived from a pursuit,
it may not be out of place to give the opinion of a few more
prominent Confederate officers.

Colonel Alexander, Chief of Longstreet's artillery, says in a
communication to the "Southern Historical Papers":

"I have always believed that the enemy here lost the greatest
opportunity they ever had of routing Lee's army by a prompt offensive.
They occupied a line shaped somewhat like a horseshoe.  I suppose
the greatest diameter of this horseshoe was not more than one mile,
and the ground within was entirely sheltered from our observation
and fire, with communications by signals all over it, and they
could concentrate their whole force at any point and in a very
short time without our knowledge.  Our line was an enveloping semi-
circle, over four miles in development, and communication from
flank to flank, even by courier, was difficult, the country being
well cleared and exposed to the enemy's view and fire, the roads
all running at right angles to our lines, and, some of them at
least, broad turnpikes where the enemy's guns could rake for two
miles.  Is it necessary now to add any statement as to the superiority
of the Federal force, or the exhausted and shattered condition of
the Confederates for a space of at least a mile in their very
centre, to show that a great opportunity was thrown away?  I think
General Lee himself was quite apprehensive the enemy would _riposte_,
and that it was that apprehension which brought him alone out to
my guns, where he could observe all the indications."

General Trimble, who commanded a division of Hill's corps, which
supported Pickett in his advance, says, "By all the rules of warfare
the Federal troops should (as I expected they would) have marched
against our shattered columns and sought to cover our army with an
overwhelming defeat."

Colonel Simms, who commanded Semmes' Georgia brigade in the fight
with Crawford just referred to, writes to the latter, "There was
much confusion in our army so far as my observation extended, and
I think we would have made but feeble resistance, if you had pressed
on, on the evening of the 3d."

General Meade, however, overcome by the great responsibilities of
his position, still clung to the ridge, and fearful of a possible
disaster would not take the risk of making an advance.  And yet if
he could have succeeded in crushing Lee's army then and there, he
would have saved two years of war with its immense loss of life
and countless evils.  He might at least have thrown in Sedgwick's
corps, which had not been actively engaged in the battle, for even
if it was repulsed the blows it gave would leave the enemy little
inclination to again assail the heights.

At 6.30 P.M. the firing ceased on the part of the enemy, and although
they retained their position the next day, the battle of Gettysburg
was virtually at an end.

The town was still full of our wounded, and many of our surgeons,
with rare courage, remained there to take charge of them, for it
required some nerve to run the risk of being sent to Libby prison
when the fight was over, a catastrophe which has often happened to
our medical officers.  Among the rest, the chief surgeons of the
First Corps, Doctor Theodore Heard and Doctor Thomas H. Bache,
refused to leave their patients, and in consequence of the hasty
retreat of the enemy were fortunately not carried off.

After the battle Meade had not the slightest desire to recommence
the struggle.  It is a military maxim that to a flying enemy must
be given a wall of steel or a bridge of gold.  In the present
instance it was unmistakably the bridge of gold that was presented.
It was hard to convince him that Lee was actually gone, and at
first he thought it might be a device to draw the Union army from
its strong position on the heights.

Our cavalry were sent out on the 4th to ascertain where the enemy
were, and what they were doing.  General Birney threw forward a
reconnoitering party and opened fire with a battery on a column
making their way toward Fairfield, but he was checked at once and
directed _on no account to bring on a battle._  On the 5th, as it
was certain the enemy were retreating, Sedgwick received orders to
follow up the rear of the rebel column.  He marched eight miles to
Fairfield Pass.  There Early, who was in command of the rear guard,
was endeavoring to save the trains, which were heaped up in great
confusion.  Sedgwick, after a distant cannonade, reported the
position too strong to be forced.  It was a plain, two miles wide,
surrounded by hills, and it would not have been difficult to take
it, but Sedgwick knew Meade favored the "bridge of gold" policy,
and was not disposed to thwart the wishes of his chief.  In my
opinion Sedgwick should have made an energetic attack, and Meade
should have supported it with his whole army, for our cavalry were
making great havoc in the enemy's train in rear; and if Lee, instead
of turning on Kilpatrick, had been forced to form line against
Meade, the cavalry, which was between him and his convoys of
ammunition, in all probability might have captured the latter and
ended the war.  Stuart, it is true, was following up Kilpatrick,
but he took an indirect route and was nearly a day behind.  I do
not see why the force which was now promptly detached from the
garrisons of Washington and Baltimore and sent to Harper's Ferry
could not have formed on the Virginia side of the Potomac opposite
Williamsport, and with the co-operation of General Meade have cut
off the ammunition of which Lee stood so much in need.  As the
river had risen and an expedition sent out by General French from
Frederick had destroyed the bridge at Falling Waters, everything
seemed to favor such a plan.  The moment it was ascertained that
Lee was cut off from Richmond and short of ammunition the whole
North would have turned out and made a second Saratoga of it.  As
it was, he had but few roads for his cannon, and our artillery
could have opened a destructive fire on him from a distance without
exposing our infantry.  It was worth the effort and there was little
or no danger in attempting it.  Meade had Sedgwick's fresh corps
and was reinforced by a division of 11,000 men under General W. F.
Smith (Baldy Smith).  French's division of 4,000 at Frederick, and
troops from Washington and Baltimore were also available to assist
in striking the final blow.  The Twelfth Corps was also available,
as Slocum volunteered to join in the pursuit.  Meade, however,
delayed moving at all until Lee had reached Hagerstown and then
took a route that was almost twice as long as that adopted by the
enemy.  Lee marched day and night to avoid pursuit, and when the
river rose and his bridge was gone, so that he was unable to cross,
he gained six days in which to choose a position, fortify it, and
renew his supply of ammunition before Meade made his appearance.

In consequence of repeated orders from President Lincoln to attack
the enemy, Meade went forward and confronted Lee on the 12th.  He
spent that day and the next in making reconnoissances and resolved
to attack on the 14th; but Lee left during the night, and by 8 A.M.
the entire army of the enemy were once more on Virginia soil.

The Union loss in this campaign is estimated by the Count of Paris,
who is an impartial observer, at 2,834 killed, 13,700 wounded, and
6,643 missing; total, 23,186.

The rebel loss he puts at 2,665 killed, 12,599 wounded, 7,464
missing; total 22,728.

Among the killed in the battle on the rebel side were Generals
Armistead, Barksdale, Garnett, Pender, and Semmes; and Pettigrew
during the retreat.

Among the wounded were Generals G. T. Anderson, Hampton, Jenkins,
J. M. Jones, Kemper, and Scales.

Archer was captured on the first day.

Among the killed on the Union side were Major-General Reynolds and
Brigadier-Generals Vincent, Weed, and Zook.

Among the wounded were Major-Generals Sickles (losing a leg),
Hancock, Doubleday, Gibbon, Barlow, Warren, and Butterfield, and
Brigadier-Generals Graham, Stannard, Paul (losing both eyes),
Barnes, Brooke, and Webb.


APPENDIX A.
_Roster of the Federal Army engaged in the Battle of Gettysburg,
Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, July 1st, 2d, and 3d, 1863._

MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. GORDON MEADE
_STAFF._
MAJOR-GENERAL DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, Chief of Staff.
BRIG.-GENERAL M. R. PATRICK, Provost Marshal-General.
  "     "     SETH WILLIAMS, Adjutant-General.
  "     "     EDMUND SCHRIVER, Inspector-General.
  "     "     RUFUS INGALLS, Quartermaster-General.
COLONEL HENRY F. CLARKE, Chief Commis'y of Subsistence.
MAJOR JONATHAN LETTERMAN, Surgeon, Chief of Medical Department.
BRIG.-GENERAL G. K. WARREN, Chief Engineer.
MAJOR D. W. FLAGLER, Chief Ordnance Officer.
MAJOR-GENERAL ALFRED PLEASONTON, Chief of Cavalry.
BRIG.-GENERAL HENRY J. HUNT, Chief of Artillery.
CAPTAIN L. B. NORTON, Chief Signal Officer.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN F. REYNOLDS,* Commanding the First, Third, and
Eleventh Corps on July 1st.
[* He was killed and succeeded by Major-General O. O. Howard.]
MAJOR-GENERAL HENRY W. SLOCUM, Commanding the Right Wing on July
2d and July 3d.
MAJOR-GENERAL W. S. HANCOCK, Commanding the Left Centre on July 2d
and July 3d.

FIRST CORPS.
MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN F. REYNOLDS, PERMANENT COMMANDER.
MAJOR-GENERAL ABNER DOUBLEDAY, Commanding on July 1st.
MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN NEWTON, Commanding July 2d and 3d.
  FIRST DIVISION.
  BRIGADIER-GENERAL JAMES S. WADSWORTH
    _First Brigade._--(1) Brigadier-General SOLOMON MEREDITH
(wounded); (2) Colonel HENRY A. MORROW (wounded);* (3) Colonel W.
W. ROBINSON.
[* See page 130.]
       2d  Wisconsin, Colonel Lucius Fairchild (wounded), Lieut.-
Colonel George H. Stevens (wounded), Major John Mansfield (wounded),
Captain Geo. H. Otis
       6th Wisconsin, Lieut.-Colonel R. R. Dawes
       7th Wisconsin, Colonel W. W. Robinson
      24th Michigan, Colonel Henry A. Morrow (wounded), Lieut.-
Colonel Mark Flanigan (wounded), Major Edwin B. Wright (wounded),
Captain Albert M. Edwards
      19th Indiana, Colonel Samuel Williams
    _Second Brigade_.--Brigadier-General LYSANDER CUTLER
       7th Indiana, Major Ira G. Grover
      56th Pennsylvania, Colonel J. W. Hoffman
      76th New York, Major Andrew J. Grover (killed), Captain John
E. Cook
      95th New York, Colonel George H. Biddle (wounded), Major
Edward Pye
     147th New York, Lieut.-Colonel F. C. Miller (wounded), Major
George Harney
      14th Brooklyn, Colonel E. B. Fowler
  SECOND DIVISION.
  BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN C. ROBINSON
    _First Brigade_.--Brigadier-General GABRIEL R. PAUL (wounded);
Colonel S. H. LEGNARD; Colonel RICHARD COULTER.
      16th Maine, Colonel Charles W. Tilden (captured), Lieut.-
Colonel N. E. Welch, Major Arch. D. Leavitt
      13th Massachusetts, Colonel S. H. Leonard (wounded)
      94th New York, Colonel A. R. Root (wounded), Major S. H.
Moffat
     104th New York, Colonel Gilbert G. Prey
     107th Pennsylvania, Colonel T. F. McCoy (wounded), Lieut.-
Colonel James McThompson (wounded), Captain E. D. Roath
      11th Pennsylvania, Colonel Richard S. Coulter, Captain J. J.
Blerer.*
[* The 11th Pennsylvania was transferred from the Second Brigade.]
    _Second Brigade_.--Brigadier-General HENRY BAXTER
      12th Massachusetts, Colonel James L. Bates
      83d New York, Lieut.-Colonel Joseph R. Moesch
      97th New York, Colonel Charles Wheelock
      88th Pennsylvania, Major Benezet F. Faust, Captain E. Y.
Patterson
      90th Pennsylvania, Colonel Peter Lyle
  THIRD DIVISION.
  MAJOR-GENERAL ABNER DOUBLEDAY PERMANENT COMMANDER on July 2d and
3d.
  BRIGADIER-GENERAL THOMAS A. ROWLEY, July 1st.
    _First Brigade_.--Brigadier-General THOMAS A. ROWLEY, July 2d
and 3d; Colonel CHAPMAN BIDDLE, July 1st.
     121st Pennsylvania, Colonel Chapman Biddle, Major Alexander
Biddle
     142d Pennsylvania, Colonel Robert P. Cummings (killed), Lieut.-
Colonel A. B. McCalmont
     151st Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel George F. McFarland (lost
a leg), Captain Walter L. Owens
      20th New York S. M., Colonel Theodore B. Gates
    _Second Brigade_.--(1) Colonel ROY STONE Commanding (wounded);
(2) Colonel LANGHORNE WISTER (wounded); (3) Colonel EDMUND L. DANA
     143d Pennsylvania, Colonel Edmund L. Dana, Major John D. Musser
     149th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel Walton Dwight (wounded),
Captain A. J. Sofield (killed), Captain John Irvin
     150th Pennsylvania, Colonel Langhorne Wister (wounded), Lieut.-
Colonel H. S. Huidekoper (wounded), Major Thomas Chamberlain
(wounded), Capt. C. C. Widdis (wounded), Captain G. W. Jones
    _Third Brigade_.--Brigadier-General GEO. J. STANNARD (wounded)
      12th Vermont, Colonel Asa P. Blunt (not engaged)
      13th Vermont, Colonel Francis V. Randall
      14th Vermont, Colonel William T. Nichols
      15th Vermont, Colonel Redfield Proctor (not engaged)
      16th Vermont, Colonel Wheelock G. Veazey
    _Artillery Brigade_.--Colonel CHARLES S. WAINWRIGHT
       2d  Maine, Captain James A. Hall
       5th Maine, G. T. Stevens
       Battery B, 1st Pennsylvania, Captain J. H. Cooper
       Battery B, 4th United States, Lieutenant James Stewart
       Battery L, 1st New York, Captain J. A. Reynolds
[NOTE.--Tidball's Battery of the 2d United States Artillery, under
Lieutenant John H. Calef, also fought in line with the First Corps.
Lieutenant Benj. W. Wilber, and Lieutenant George Breck, of Captain
Reynolds' Battery, and Lieutenant James Davison, of Stewart's
Battery, commanded sections which were detached at times.]

SECOND CORPS.
MAJOR-GENERAL WINFIELD S. HANCOCK, PERMANENT COMMANDER (wounded).
MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN GIBBON (wounded).
BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN C. CALDWELL.
  FIRST DIVISION.
  BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN C. CALDWELL
  COLONEL JOHN H. BROOKE (wounded)
    _First Brigade_.--Colonel EDWARD E. CROSS (killed); Colonel H.
B. McKEEN
       5th New Hampshire, Colonel E. E. Cross, Lieut.-Colonel C.
E. Hapgood
      61st New York, Lieut.-Colonel Oscar K. Broady
      81st Pennsylvania, Colonel H. Boyd McKeen, Lieut.-Colonel
Amos Stroho
     148th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel Robert McFarland
    _Second Brigade_.--Colonel PATRICK KELLY
      28th Massachusetts, Colonel Richard Byrnes
      63d New York, Lieut.-Colonel R. C. Bentley (wounded), Captain
Thos. Touhy
      69th New York, Captain Richard Maroney (wounded), Lieutenant
James J. Smith
      88th New York, Colonel Patrick Kelly, Captain Dennis F. Burke
116th Pennsylvania, Major St. Clair A. Mulholland
    _Third Brigade_.--Brigadier-General S. K. ZOOK Commanding
(killed), Lieut.-Colonel JOHN FRAZER
      52d  New York, Lieut.-Colonel Charles G. Freudenberg (wounded),
Captain Wm. Scherrer
      57th New York, Lieut.-Colonel Alfred B. Chapman
      66th New York, Colonel Orlando W. Morris (wounded), Lieut.
Colonel John S. Hammell (wounded), Major Peter Nelson
     146th Pennsylvania, Colonel Richard P. Roberts (killed), Lieut.-
Colonel John Frazer
    _Fourth Brigade_.--Colonel JOHN R. BROOKE Commanding (wounded)
      27th Connecticut, Lieut.-Colonel Henry C. Merwin (killed),
Major James H. Coburn
      64th New York, Colonel Daniel G. Bingham
      53d  Pennsylvania, Colonel J. R. Brooke, Lieut.-Colonel
Richard McMichael
     145th Pennsylvania, Colonel Hiram L. Brown (wounded), Captain
John W. Reynolds (wounded), Captain Moses W. Oliver
       2d  Delaware, Colonel William P. Bailey
  SECOND DIVISION.
  BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN GIBBON, PERMANENT COMMANDER (wounded).
  BRIGADIER-GENERAL WILLIAM HARROW.
    _First Brigade_.--Brigadier-General WILLIAM HARROW, Colonel
FRANCIS E. HEATH
      19th Maine, Colonel F. E. Heath, Lieut.-Colonel Henry W.
Cunningham
      15th Massachusetts, Colonel George H. Ward (killed), Lieut.-
Colonel George C. Joslin
      82d  New York, Colonel Henry W. Hudson (killed), Captain John
Darrow
       1st Minnesota, Colonel William Colvill (wounded), Captain
N. S. Messick (killed), Captain Wilson B. Farrell, Captain Louis
Muller, Captain Joseph Perham, Captain Henry C. Coates
    _Second Brigade_.--Brigadier-General ALEX. S. WEBB (wounded)
      69th Pennsylvania, Colonel Dennis O. Kane (killed), Lieut.-
Colonel M. Tschudy (killed), Major James Duffy (wounded), Captain
Wm. Davis
      71st Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel Richard Penn Smith
      72d  Pennsylvania, Colonel De Witt C. Baxter
     106th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel Theo. Hesser
    _Third Brigade_.--Colonel NORMAN J. HALL Commanding
      19th Massachusetts, Colonel Arthur F. Devereaux
      20th Massachusetts, Colonel Paul J. Revere (killed), Captain
H. L. Abbott (wounded)
      42d  New York, Colonel James E. Mallon
      59th New York, Lieut.-Colonel Max A. Thoman (killed)
       7th Michigan, Colonel N. J. Hall, Lieut.-Colonel Ames E.
Steele (killed), Major S. W. Curtis
    _Unattached_.--Andrew Sharpshooters.
  THIRD DIVISION.
  BRIGADIER-GENERAL ALEXANDER HAYS
    _First Brigade_.--Colonel SAMUEL S. CARROLL
       4th Ohio, Lieut.-Colonel James H. Godman, Lieut.-Colonel L.
W. Carpenter
       8th Ohio, Colonel S. S. Carroll, Lieut.-Colonel Franklin
Sawyer
      14th Indiana, Colonel John Coons
       7th West Virginia, Colonel Joseph Snyder
    _Second Brigade_.--Colonel THOMAS A. SMITH (wounded); Lieut.-
Colonel F. E. PIERCE
      14th Connecticut, Major John T. Ellis
      10th New York (battalion), Major Geo. F. Hopper
     108th New York, Colonel Charles J. Powers
      12th New Jersey, Major John T. Hill
       1st Delaware, Colonel Thomas A. Smyth; Lieut.-Colonel Edward
P. Harris, Captain M. B. Ellgood (killed), Lieutenant Wm. Smith
(killed)
    _Third Brigade_.--Colonel GEORGE L. WILLARD (killed); Colonel
ELIAKIM SHERRILL (killed); Lieut.-Colonel JAMES M. BULL
      39th New York, Lieut.-Colonel James G. Hughes
     111th New York, Colonel Clinton D. McDougall (wounded), Lieut.-
Colonel Isaac M. Lusk, Captain A. P. Seeley
     125th New York, Colonel G. L. Willard (killed), Lieut.-Colonel
Levi Crandall
     126th New York, Colonel E. Sherrill (killed), Lieut.-Colonel
J. M. Bull
    _Artillery Brigade_.--Captain J. G. HAZARD
       Battery B, 1st New York, Captain James McK. Rorty (killed)
       Battery A, 1st Rhode Island, Lieutenant William A. Arnold
       Battery B, 1st Rhode Island, Lieutenant T. Fred. Brown
(wounded)
       Battery I, 1st United States, Lieutenant G. A. Woodruff
(killed)
       Battery A, 4th United States, Lieutenant A. H. Cushing
(killed)
[NOTE.--Battery C, 4th United States, Lieutenant R. Thomas, was in
the line of the Second Corps on July 3d.  Some of the batteries
were so nearly demolished that there was no officer to assume
command at the close of the battle.]

THIRD CORPS.
MAJOR-GENERAL DANIEL E. SICKLES (wounded)
MAJOR-GENERAL DAVID B. BIRNEY
  FIRST DIVISION.
  MAJOR-GENERAL DAVID B. BIRNEY PERMANENT COMMANDER.
  BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. H. H. WARD
    _First Brigade_.--Brigadier-General C. K. GRAHAM (wounded,
captured); Colonel ANDREW H. TIPPIN
      57th Pennsylvania, Colonel Peter Sides, Lieut.-Colonel Wm.
P. Neeper (wounded), Captain A. H. Nelson
      63d  Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel John A. Danks
      68th Pennsylvania, Colonel A. H. Tippin, all the Field Officers
wounded
     105th Pennsylvania, Colonel Calvin A. Craig
     114th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel Frederick K. Cavada
(captured)
     141st Pennsylvania, Colonel Henry J. Madill, Captain E. R.
Brown.*
[* Colonel Madill commanded the 114th and 141st Pennsylvania.]
[NOTE.--The 2d New Hampshire, 3d Maine, and 7th and 8th New Jersey
also formed part of Graham's line on the 2d.]
    _Second Brigade_.--Brigadier-General J. H. H. WARD, Colonel H.
BERDAN
       1st U. S. Sharpshooters, Colonel H. Berdan, Lieut.-Colonel
C. Trapp
       2d  U. S. Sharpshooters, Major H. H. Stoughton
       3d  Maine, Colonel M. S. Lakeman (captured), Captain William
C. Morgan
       4th Maine, Colonel Elijah Walker (killed), Major Ebenezer
Whitcombe (wounded), Captain Edwin Libby
      20th Indiana, Colonel John Wheeler (killed), Lieut.-Colonel
William C. L. Taylor
      99th Pennsylvania, Major John W. Moore
      86th New York, Lieut.-Colonel Benjamin Higgins
     124th New York, Colonel A. Van Horn Ellis (killed), Lieut.-
Colonel Francis M. Cummings
    _Third Brigade_.--Colonel PHILIP R. DE TROBRIAND
       3d  Michigan, Colonel Byron R. Pierce (wounded), Lieut.-
Colonel E. S. Pierce
       5th Michigan, Lieut.-Colonel John Pulford (wounded), Major
S. S. Matthews
      40th New York, Colonel Thomas W. Egan
      17th Maine, Lieut.-Colonel Charles B. Merrill
     110th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel David M. Jones (wounded),
Major Isaac Rogers
  SECOND DIVISION.
  BRIGADIER-GENERAL ANDREW A. HUMPHREYS
    _First Brigade_.--Brigadier-General JOSEPH B. CARR
       1st Massachusetts, Colonel N. B. McLaughlin
      11th Massachusetts, Lieut.-Colonel Porter D. Tripp
      16th Massachusetts, Lieut.-Colonel Waldo Merriam
      26th Pennsylvania, Captain Geo. W. Tomlinson (wounded),
Captain Henry Goodfellow
      11th New Jersey, Colonel Robert McAllister (wounded), Major
Philip J. Kearny (killed), Captain Wm. B. Dunning
      84th Pennsylvania (not engaged), Lieut.-Colonel Milton Opp
      19th New Hampshire, Captain J. F. Langley
    _Second Brigade_.--Colonel WILLIAM B. BREWSTER
      70th New York (1st Excelsior), Major Daniel Mahen
      71st New York (2d Excelsior), Colonel Henry L. Potter
      72d  New York (3d Excelsior), Colonel Wm. O. Stevens (killed),
Lieut.-Colonel John S. Austin
      73d  New York (4th Excelsior), Colonel William R. Brewster,
Major M. W. Burns
      74th New York (5th Excelsior), Lieut.-Colonel Thomas Holt
     120th New York, Lieut.-Colonel Cornelius D. Westbrook (wounded),
Major J. R. Tappen, Captain A. L. Lockwood
    _Third Brigade_.--Colonel GEORGE C. BURLING
       5th New Jersey, Colonel William J. Sewall (wounded), Captain
Virgel M. Healey (wounded), Captain T. C. Godfrey, Captain H. H.
Woolsey
       6th New Jersey, Colonel George C. Burling, Lieut.-Colonel
S. R. Gilkyson
       7th New Jersey, Colonel L. R. Francine (killed), Lieut.-
Colonel Francis Price
       8th New Jersey, Colonel John Ramsey (wounded), Captain John
G. Langston
     115th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel John P. Dunne
       2d  New Hampshire, Colonel Edward L. Bailey (wounded), Major
Saml. P. Sayles (wounded)
    _Artillery Brigade_.--Captain GEORGE E. RANDOLPH
       Battery E, 1st Rhode Island, Lieutenant John K. Bucklyn
(wounded), Lieutenant Benj. Freeborn
       Battery B, 1st New Jersey, Captain A. J. Clark
       Battery D, 1st New Jersey, Captain Geo. T. Woodbury
       Battery K, 4th U. S., Lieutenant F. W. Seeley (wounded),
Lieutenant Robt. James
       Battery D, 1st New York, Captain George B. Winslow
       4th New York, Captain James E. Smith

FIFTH CORPS.
MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE SYKES
  FIRST DIVISION.
  BRIGADIER-GENERAL JAMES BARNES
    _First Brigade_.--Colonel W. S. TILTON
      18th Massachusetts, Colonel Joseph Hayes
      22d  Massachusetts, Colonel William S. Tilton, Lieut.-Colonel
Thomas Sherman, Jr.
     118th Pennsylvania, Colonel Charles M. Prevost
       1st Michigan, Colonel Ira C. Abbot (wounded), Lieut.-Colonel
W. A. Throop
    _Second Brigade_.--Colonel J. B. SWEITZER
       9th Massachusetts, Colonel Patrick R. Guiney
      32d  Massachusetts, Col. Geo. L. Prescott (wounded), Lieut.-
Colonel Luther Stephenson (wounded), Major J. Cushing Edmunds
       4th Michigan, Colonel Hamson H. Jeffords (killed), Lieut.-
Colonel George W. Lombard
      62d  Pennsylvania, Colonel J. B. Sweitzer, Lieut.-Colonel
James C. Hall
    _Third Brigade_.--Colonel STRONG VINCENT (killed); Colonel
JAMES C. RICE
      20th Maine, Colonel Joshua L. Chamberlain
      44th New York, Colonel James C. Rice, Lieut.-Colonel Freeman
Conner
      83d  Pennsylvania, Major William H. Lamont, Captain O. E.
Woodward
      16th Michigan, Lieut.-Colonel N. R. Welch
  SECOND DIVISION.
  BRIGADIER-GENERAL ROMAYN B. AYRES
    _First Brigade_.--Colonel HANNIBAL DAY, 6th U. S. Infantry
       3d  U. S. Infantry, Captain H. W. Freedley (wounded), Captain
Richard G. Lay
       4th U. S. Infantry, Captain J. W. Adams
       6th U. S. Infantry, Captain Levi C. Bootes
      12th U. S. Infantry, Captain Thomas S. Dunn
      14th U. S. Infantry, Major G. R. Giddings
    _Second Brigade_.--Colonel SIDNEY BURBANK, 2d U. S. Infantry
       2d  U. S. Infantry, Major A. T. Lee (wounded), Captain S.
A. McKee
       7th U. S. Infantry, Captain D. P. Hancock
      10th U. S. Infantry, Captain William Clinton
      11th U. S. Infantry, Major De L. Floyd Jones
      17th U. S. Infantry, Lieut.-Colonel Durrell Green
    _Third Brigade_.--Brigadier-General S. H. WEED (killed); Colonel
KENNER GARRARD
     140th New York, Colonel Patrick H. O'Rorke (killed), Lieut.-
Colonel Louis Ernst
     146th New York, Colonel K. Garrard, Lieut.-Colonel David T.
Jenkins
      91st Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel Joseph H. Sinex
     155th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel John H. Cain
  THIRD DIVISION.
  BRIGADIER-GENERAL S. WILEY CRAWFORD
    _First Brigade_.--Colonel WILLIAM McCANDLESS
       1st Pennsylvania Reserves, Colonel William Cooper Talley
       2d  Pennsylvania Reserves, Colonel William McCandless, Lieut.-
Colonel George A. Woodward
       6th Pennsylvania Reserves, Colonel Wellington H. Ent
      11th Pennsylvania Reserves, Colonel S. M. Jackson
       1st Rifles (Bucktails), Colonel Charles J. Taylor (killed),
Lieut.-Colonel A. E. Niles (wounded), Major William R. Hartshorn
    _Second Brigade_.--Colonel JOSEPH W. FISHER
       5th Pennsylvania Reserves, Colonel J. W. Fisher, Lieut.-
Colonel George Dare
       9th Pennsylvania Reserves, Lieut.-Colonel James McK. Snodgrass
      10th Pennsylvania Reserves, Colonel A. J. Warner
      12th Pennsylvania Reserves, Colonel M. D. Hardin
    _Artillery Brigade_.--Captain A. P. MARTIN
       Battery D, 5th United States, Lieutenant Charles E. Hazlett
(killed), Lieutenant B. F. Rittenhouse
       Battery I, 5th United States, Lieutenant Leonard Martin
       Battery C, 1st New York, Captain Albert Barnes
       Battery L, 1st Ohio, Captain N. C. Gibbs
       Battery C, Massachusetts, Captain A. P. Martin
    _Provost Guard_.--Captain H. W. RYDER.  Companies E and D, 12th
New York.

SIXTH CORPS.
MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN SEDGWICK
  FIRST DIVISION.
  BRIGADIER-GENERAL H. G. WRIGHT
    _First Brigade_.--Brigadier-General A. T. A. TORBERT
       1st New Jersey, Lieut.-Colonel William Henry, Jr.
       2d  New Jersey, Colonel Samuel L. Buck
       3d  New Jersey, Colonel Henry W. Brown
      15th New Jersey, Colonel William H. Penrose
    _Second Brigade_.--Brigadier-General J. J. BARTLETT
       5th Maine, Colonel Clark S. Edwards
     121st New York, Colonel Emory Upton
      95th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel Edward Carroll
      96th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel William H. Lossig
    _Third Brigade_.--Brigadier-General D. A. RUSSELL
       6th Maine, Colonel Hiram Burnham
      49th Pennsylvania, Colonel William H. Irvin
     119th Pennsylvania, Colonel P. C. Ellmaker
       5th Wisconsin, Colonel Thomas S. Allen
  SECOND DIVISION.
  BRIGADIER-GENERAL A. P. HOWE
    _Second Brigade_.--Colonel L. A. GRANT
       2d  Vermont, Colonel J. H. Walbridge
       3d  Vermont, Colonel T. O. Seaver
       4th Vermont, Colonel E. H. Stoughton
       5th Vermont, Lieut.-Colonel John B. Lewis
       6th Vermont, Lieut.-Colonel Elisha L. Barney
    _Third Brigade_.--Brigadier-General T. A. NEILL
       7th Maine, Lieut.-Colonel Seldon Conner
      49th New York, Colonel D. D. Bidwell
      77th New York, Colonel J. B. McKean
      43d  New York, Colonel B. F. Baker
      61st Pennsylvania, Major Geo. W. Dawson
  THIRD DIVISION
  BRIGADIER-GENERAL FRANK WHEATON
    _First Brigade_.--Brigadier-General ALEXANDER SHALER
      65th New York, Colonel J. E. Hamblin
      67th New York, Colonel Nelson Cross
     122d  New York, Lieut.-Colonel A. W. Dwight
      23d  Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel John F. Glenn
      82d  Pennsylvania, Colonel Isaac Bassett
    _Second Brigade_.--Colonel H. L. EUSTIS
       7th Massachusetts, Lieut.-Colonel Franklin P. Harlow
      10th Massachusetts, Lieut.-Colonel Jefford M. Decker
      37th Massachusetts, Colonel Oliver Edwards
       2d  Rhode Island, Colonel Horatio Rogers
    _Third Brigade_.--Colonel DAVID I. NEVIN
      62d  New York, Colonel D. L. Nevin, Lieut.-Colonel Theo. B.
Hamilton
     102d  Pennsylvania,* Colonel John W. Patterson
      93d  Pennsylvania, Colonel James W. McCarter
      98th Pennsylvania, Major John B. Kohler
     139th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel William H. Moody
[* Not engaged.]
    _Artillery Brigade_.--Colonel C. H. TOMPKINS
       Battery A, 1st Massachusetts, Captain W. H. McCartney
       Battery D, 2d United States, Lieutenant E. B. Williston
       Battery F, 5th United States, Lieutenant Leonard Martin
       Battery G, 2d United States, Lieutenant John H. Butler
       Battery C, 1st Rhode Island, Captain Richard Waterman
       Battery G, 1st Rhode Island, Captain George W. Adams
       1st New York, Captain Andrew Cowan
       3d  New York, Captain William A. Harn
    _Cavalry Detachment_.--Captain WILLIAM L. CRAFT Commanding.
H, 1st Pennsylvania; L, 1st New Jersey.

ELEVENTH CORPS.
MAJOR-GENERAL OLIVER O. HOWARD PERMANENT COMMANDER.
MAJOR-GENERAL CARL SCHURZ, July 1st.
  FIRST DIVISION.
  BRIGADIER-GENERAL FRANCIS C. BARLOW (wounded)
  BRIGADIER-GENERAL ADELBERT AMES
    _First Brigade_.--Colonel LEOPOLD VON GILSA
      41st New York, Colonel L. Von Gilsa, Lieut.-Colonel D. Von
Einsiedel
      54th New York, Colonel Eugene A. Kezley
      68th New York, Colonel Gotthilf Bonray de Ivernois
     153d  Pennsylvania, Colonel Charles Glanz
    _Second Brigade_.--Brigadier-General ADELBERT AMES, Colonel
ANDREW L. HARRIS
      17th Connecticut, Lieut.-Colonel Douglass Fowler (killed),
Major A. G. Brady (wounded)
      25th Ohio, Lieut.-Colonel Jeremiah Williams (captured),
Lieutenant William Maloney (wounded), Lieutenant Israel White
      75th Ohio, Colonel Andrew L. Harris (wounded), Lieut.-Colonel
Ben Morgan (wounded), Major Charles W. Friend
     107th Ohio, Captain John M. Lutz
  SECOND DIVISION.
  BRIGADIER-GENERAL A. VON STEINWEHR
    _First Brigade_.--Colonel CHARLES R. COSTER
      27th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel Lorenz Cantador
      73d  Pennsylvania, Captain Daniel F. Kelly
     134th New York, Colonel Charles R. Coster, Lieut.-Colonel
Allan H. Jackson
     154th New York, Colonel Patrick H. Jones
    _Second Brigade_.--Colonel ORLANDO SMITH
      33d  Massachusetts, Lieut.-Colonel Adin B. Underwood
     136th New York, Colonel James Wood, Jr.
      55th Ohio, Colonel Charles B. Gambee
      73d  Ohio, Colonel Orlando Smith, Lieut.-Colonel Richard Long
  THIRD DIVISION.
  MAJOR-GENERAL CARL SCHURZ PERMANENT COMMANDER.
  BRIGADIER-GENERAL ALEXANDER SCHIMMELPFENNIG Commanding on July
1st.
    _First Brigade_.--Brigadier-General A. VON SCHIMMELPFENNIG
(captured); Colonel GEORGE VON ARNSBURG.
      45th New York, Colonel G. Von Arnsburg, Lieut.-Colonel Adolpus
Dobke
     157th New York, Colonel Philip F. Brown, Jr.
      74th Pennsylvania, Colonel Adolph Von Hartung (wounded),
Lieut.-Colonel Von Mitzel (captured), Major Gustav Schleiter
      61st Ohio, Colonel S. J. McGroarty
      82d  Illinois, Colonel J. Hecker
    _Second Brigade_.--Colonel WALDIMIR KRYZANOWSKI
      58th New York, Colonel W. Kryzanowski, Lieut.-Colonel August
Otto, Captain Emil Koenig, Lieut.-Colonel Frederick Gellman
     119th New York, Colonel John T. Lockman, Lieut.-Colonel James
C. Rogers
      75th Pennsylvania, Colonel Francis Mahler (wounded), Major
August Ledig
      82d  Ohio, Colonel James S. Robinson (wounded), Lieut.-Colonel
D. Thomson
      26th Wisconsin, Colonel Wm. H. Jacobs
    _Artillery Brigade_.--Major THOMAS W. OSBORN
       Battery L, 1st New York, Captain Michael Wiedrick
       Battery I, 1st Ohio, Captain Hubert Dilger
       Battery K, 1st Ohio, Captain Lewis Heckman
       Battery G, 4th United States, Lieutenant Bayard Wilkinson
(killed), Lieutenant E. A. Bancroft
       13th New York, Lieutenant William Wheeler

TWELFTH CORPS.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL ALPHEUS S. WILLIAMS
  FIRST DIVISION.
  BRIGADIER-GENERAL THOMAS H. RUGER
    _First Brigade_.--Colonel ARCHIBALD L. McDOUGALL
       5th Connecticut, Colonel Warren W. Packer
      20th Connecticut, Lieut.-Colonel William B. Wooster
     123d  New York, Colonel A. L. McDougall, Lieut.-Colonel James
G. Rogers
     145th New York, Colonel E. L. Price
      46th Pennsylvania, Colonel James L. Selfridge
       3d  Maryland, Colonel J. M. Sudsburg
    _Second Brigade_.*--Brigadier-General HENRY H. LOCKWOOD
     150th New York, Colonel John H. Ketcham
       1st Maryland (P. H. B.), Colonel William P. Maulsby
       1st Maryland (E. S.), Colonel James Wallace
[* Unassigned during progress of battle; afterward attached to
First Division as Second Brigade.]
    _Third Brigade_.--Colonel SILAS COLGROVE
       2d  Massachusetts, Colonel Charles R. Mudge (killed), Lieut.-
Colonel Charles F. Morse
     107th New York, Colonel Miron M. Crane
      13th New Jersey, Colonel Ezra A. Carman (wounded), Lieut.-
Colonel John R. Fesler
      27th Indiana, Colonel Silas Colgrove, Lieut.-Colonel John R.
Fesler
       3d  Wisconsin, Lieut.-Colonel Martin Flood
  SECOND DIVISION.
  BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN W. GEARY
    _First Brigade_.--Colonel CHARLES CANDY
      28th Pennsylvania, Captain John Flynn
     147th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel Arlo Pardee, Jr.
       5th Ohio, Colonel John H. Patrick
       7th Ohio, Colonel William R. Creighton
      29th Ohio, Captain W. F. Stevens (wounded), Captain Ed. Hays
      66th Ohio, Colonel C. Candy, Lieut.-Colonel Eugene Powell
    _Second Brigade_.--(1) Colonel GEORGE A. COBHAM, JR.; (2)
Brigadier-General THOMAS L. KANE
      29th Pennsylvania, Colonel William Rickards
     100th Pennsylvania, Captain Fred. L. Gimber
     111th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel Thomas M. Walker, Lieut.-
Colonel Frank J. Osgood
    _Third Brigade_.--Brigadier-General GEORGE S. GREENE
      60th New York, Colonel Abel Godard
      78th New York, Lieut.-Colonel Herbert Von Hammerstein
     102d  New York, Lieut.-Colonel James C. Lane (wounded)
     137th New York, Colonel David Ireland
     149th New York, Colonel Henry A. Barnum, Lieut.-Colonel Charles
B. Randall
    _Artillery Brigade_.--Lieutenant EDWARD D. MUHLENBERG
       Battery F, 4th United States, Lieutenant E. D. Muhlenberg,
Lieutenant S. T. Rugg
       Battery K, 5th United States, Lieutenant D. H. Kinsie
       Battery M, 1st New York, Lieutenant Charles E. Winegar
       Knap's Pennsylvania Battery, Lieutenant Charles Atwell
    _Headquarter Guard_.--Battalion 10th Maine.

CAVALRY CORPS.
MAJOR-GENERAL ALFRED PLEASONTON
  FIRST DIVISION.
  BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN BUFORD
    _First Brigade_.--Colonel WILLIAM GAMBLE
       8th New York, Colonel Benjamin F. Davis
       8th Illinois, Colonel William Gamble, Lieut.-Colonel D. R.
Clendenin
       two squadrons 12th Illinois, Colonel Amos Vos
       three squadrons 3d Indiana, Colonel George H. Chapman
    _Second Brigade_.--Colonel THOMAS C. DEVIN
       6th New York, Colonel Thomas C. Devin, Lieut.-Colonel William
H. Crocker
       9th New York, Colonel William Sackett
      17th Pennsylvania, Colonel J. H. Kellogg
       3d  Virginia (detachment)
    _Reserve Brigade_.--Brigadier-General WESLEY MERRITT
       1st United States, Captain R. S. C. Lord
       2d  United States, Captain T. F. Rodenbough
       5th United States, Captain J. W. Mason
       6th United States, Major S. H. Starr (wounded), Captain G.
C. Cram
       6th Pennsylvania, Major James H. Hazeltine
  SECOND DIVISION.
  BRIGADIER-GENERAL D. McM. GREGG
    (HEADQUARTERS GUARD--Company A, 1st Ohio.)
    _First Brigade_.--Colonel J. B. McINTOSH
       1st New Jersey, Major M. H. Beaumont
       1st Pennsylvania, Colonel John P. Taylor
       3d  Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel Edward S. Jones
       1st Maryland, Lieut.-Colonel James M. Deems
       1st Massachusetts at Headquarters Sixth Corps.
    _Second Brigade_.*--Colonel PENNOCK HUEY
       2d New York, 4th New York, 8th Pennsylvania, 6th Ohio.
[* Not engaged.]
    _Third Brigade_.--Colonel J. I. GREGG
       1st Maine, Colonel Charles H. Smith
      10th New York, Major W. A. Avery
       4th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel W. E. Doster
      16th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel John K. Robison
  THIRD DIVISION.
  BRIGADIER-GENERAL JUDSON KILPATRICK
    (HEADQUARTER GUARD--Company C, 1st Ohio.)
    _First Brigade_.--(1) Brigadier-General E. J. FARNSWORTH; (2)
Colonel N. P. RICHMOND
       5th New York, Major John Hammond
      18th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel William P. Brinton
       1st Vermont, Colonel Edward D. Sawyer
       1st West Virginia, Colonel N. P. Richmond
    _Second Brigade_.--Brigadier-General GEORGE A. CUSTER
       1st Michigan, Colonel Charles H. Town
       5th Michigan, Colonel Russell A. Alger
       6th Michigan, Colonel George Gray
       7th Michigan, Colonel Wm. D. Mann
  HORSE ARTILLERY.*
[* A section of a battery attached to the Purnell Legion was with
Gregg on the 3d.]
    _First Brigade_.--Captain JOHN M. ROBERTSON
       Batteries B and L, 2d United States, Lieutenant Edw. Heaton
       Battery M, 2d United States, Lieutenant A. C. M. Pennington
       Battery E, 4th United States, Lieutenant S. S. Elder
       6th New York, Lieutenant Jos. W. Martin
       9th Michigan, Captain J. J. Daniels
       Battery C, 3d United States, Lieutenant William D. Fuller
    _Second Brigade_.--Captain JOHN C. TIDBALL
       Batteries G and E, 1st United States, Captain A. M. Randol
       Battery K, 1st United States, Captain Wm. M. Graham
       Battery A, 2d United States, Lieutenant John H. Calef
       Battery C, 3d United States

ARTILLERY RESERVE.
(1) BRIGADIER-GENERAL R. O. TYLER (disabled)
(2) CAPTAIN JOHN M. ROBERTSON
    _First Regular Brigade_.--Captain D. R. RANSOM (wounded)
       Battery H, 1st United States, Lieutenant C. P. Eakin
(wounded)
       Batteries F and K, 3d United States, Lieutenant J. C.
Turnbull
       Battery C, 4th United States, Lieutenant Evan Thomas
       Battery C, 5th United States, Lieutenant G. V. Weir
    _First Volunteer Brigade_.--Lieut.-Colonel F. McGILVERY
       15th New York, Captain Patrick Hart
       Independent Battery Pennsylvania, Captain R. B. Ricketts
       5th Massachusetts, Captain C. A. Phillips
       9th Massachusetts, Captain John Bigelow
    _Second Volunteer Brigade_.--Captain E. D. TAFT
       Battery B, 1st Connecticut;*
       Battery M, 1st Connecticut;*
       5th New York, Captain Elijah D. Taft
       2d  Connecticut, Lieutenant John W. Sterling
[* Not engaged.]
    _Third Volunteer Brigade_.--Captain JAMES F. HUNTINGTON
       Batteries F and G, 1st Pennsylvania, Captain R. B. Ricketts
       Battery H, 1st Ohio, Captain Jas. F. Huntington
       Battery A, 1st New Hampshire, Captain F. M. Edgell
       Battery C, 1st West Virginia, Captain Wallace Hill
    _Fourth Volunteer Brigade_.--Captain R. H. FITZHUGH
       Battery B, 1st New York, Captain Jas. McRorty (killed)
       Battery G, 1st New York, Captain Albert N. Ames
       Battery K, 1st New York (11th Battery attached), Captain
Robt. H. Fitzhugh
       Battery A, 1st Maryland, Captain Jas. H. Rigby
       Battery A, 1st New Jersey, Lieutenant Augustin N. Parsons
       6th Maine, Lieutenant Edwin B. Dow
  _Train Guard_.--Major CHARLES EWING Commanding.  4th New Jersey
Infantry.
  _Headquarter Guard_.--Captain J. C. FULLER Commanding.  Battery
C, 32d Massachusetts.

DETACHMENTS AT HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
    _Command of the Provost-Marshal-General_.--Brigadier-General
M. B. PATRICK
      93d  New York*
       8th United States*
       1st Massachusetts Cavalry
       2d  Pennsylvania Cavalry
       Batteries E and I, 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry
       Detachment Regular Cavalry
       United States Engineer Battalion,* Captain Geo. H. Mendel,
United States Engineers
[* Not engaged.]
    _Guards and Orderlies_.--Captain D. P. MANN
       Independent Company Oneida Cavalry.


APPENDIX B.
_Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia, June 1, 1863._

GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE
_STAFF._
COLONEL W. H. TAYLOR, Adjutant-General.
   "    C. S. VENABLE, A.D.C.
   "    CHARLES MARSHALL, A.D.C.
   "    JAMES L. CORLEY, Chief Quartermaster.
   "    R. G. COLE, Chief Commissary.
   "    B. G. BALDWIN, Chief of Ordnance.
   "    H. L. PEYTON, Assistant Inspector-General.
GENERAL W. N. PENDLETON, Chief of Artillery.
DOCTOR L. GUILD, Medical Director.
COLONEL W. PROCTOR SMITH, Chief Engineer.
MAJOR H. E. YOUNG, Assistant Adjutant-General.
  "   G. B. COOK, Assistant Inspector-General.

FIRST CORPS.
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JAMES LONGSTREET
  McLAWS' DIVISION.
  MAJOR-GENERAL L. McLAWS
    _Kershaw's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General J. B. KERSHAW
      15th South Carolina, Colonel W. D. De Sausssure
       8th South Carolina, Colonel J. W. Mamminger
       2d  South Carolina, Colonel John D. Kennedy
       3d  South Carolina, Colonel James D. Nance
       7th South Carolina, Colonel D. Wyatt Aiken
       3d (James') Battalion South Carolina Infantry,
                           Lieut.-Colonel R. C. Rice.
    _Benning's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General H. L. BENNING
      50th Georgia, Colonel W. R. Manning
      51st Georgia, Colonel W. M. Slaughter
      53d  Georgia, Colonel James P. Somms
      10th Georgia, Lieut.-Colonel John B. Weems
    _Barksdale's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General WM. BARKSDALE
      13th Mississippi, Colonel J. W. Carter
      17th Mississippi, Colonel W. D. Holder
      18th Mississippi, Colonel Thomas M. Griffin
      21st Mississippi, Colonel B. G. Humphreys
    _Wofford's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General W. T. WOFFORD
      18th Georgia, Major E. Griffs
      Phillips' Georgia Legion, Colonel W. M. Phillips
      24th Georgia, Colonel Robert McMillan
      16th Georgia, Colonel Goode Bryan
      Cobb's Georgia Legion, Lieut.-Colonel L. D. Glewn
  PICKETT'S DIVISION
  MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE E. PICKETT COMMANDING.
    _Garnett's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General R. B. GARNETT
       8th Virginia, Colonel Eppa Hunton
      18th Virginia, Colonel R. E. Withers
      19th Virginia, Colonel Henry Gantt
      28th Virginia, Colonel R. C. Allen
      56th Virginia, Colonel W. D. Stuart
    _Armistead's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General L. A. ARMISTEAD
       9th Virginia, Lieut.-Colonel J. S. Gilliam
      14th Virginia, Colonel J. G. Hodges
      38th Virginia, Colonel E. C. Edmonds
      53d  Virginia, Colonel John Grammer
      57th Virginia, Colonel J. B. Magruder
    _Kemper's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General J. L. KEMPER
       1st Virginia, Colonel Lewis B. Williams, Jr.
       3d  Virginia, Colonel Jospeh Mayo, Jr.
       7th Virginia, Colonel W. T. Patton
      11th Virginia, Colonel David Funston
      24th Virginia, Colonel W. R. Terry
    _Toombs' Brigade_.--Brigadier-General R. TOOMBS
       2d  Georgia, Colonel E. M. Butt
      15th Georgia, Colonel E. M. DuBose
      17th Georgia, Colonel W. C. Hodges
      20th Georgia, Colonel J. B. Cummings
    _Corse's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General M. D. CORSE
      15th Virginia, Colonel T. P. August
      17th Virginia, Colonel Morton Marye
      30th Virginia, Colonel A. T. Harrison
      32d  Virginia, Colonel E. B. Montague
  HOOD'S DIVISION
  MAJOR-GENERAL J. B. HOOD.
    _Robertson's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General J. B. ROBERTSON
       1st Texas, Colonel A. T. Rainey
       4th Texas, Colonel J. C. G. Key
       5th Texas, Colonel R. M. Powell
       3d  Arkansas, Colonel Van H. Manning
    _Law's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General E. M. LAW
       4th Alabama, Colonel P. A. Bowls
      44th Alabama, Colonel W. H. Perry
      15th Alabama, Colonel James Canty
      47th Alabama, Colonel J. W. Jackson
      48th Alabama, Colonel J. F. Shepherd
    _Anderson's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General G. T. ANDERSON
      10th Georgia Battalion, Major J. E. Rylander
       7th Georgia, Colonel W. M. White
       8th Georgia, Lieut.-Colonel J. R. Towers
       9th Georgia, Colonel B. F. Beck
      11th Georgia, Colonel F. H. Little
    _Jenkins' Brigade_.--Brigadier-General M. JENKINS
       2d  South Carolina Rifles, Colonel Thomas Thompson
       1st South Carolina, Lieut.-Colonel David Livingstone
       5th South Carolina, Colonel A. Coward
       6th South Carolina, Colonel John Bratton
       Hampton's Legion, Colonel M. W. Gary
  ARTILLERY OF THE FIRST CORPS.
  COLONEL J. B. WALTON COMMANDING.
    _Battalion_.--Colonel H. C. CABELL, Major HAMILTON
      Batteries:  McCarty's, Manly's, Carlton's, Fraser's.
    _Battalion_.--Major DEARING
      Batteries:  Macon's, Blount's, Stribling's, Caskie's.
    _Battalion_.--Major HENRY
      Batteries:  Bachman's, Rielly's, Latham's, Gordon's.
    _Battalion_.--Colonel E. P. ALEXANDER, Major HUGER
      Batteries:  Jordan's, Rhett's, Moody's, Parker's, Taylor's.
    _Battalion_.--Major ESHLEMAN
      Batteries:  Squires', Miller's, Richardson's, Norcom's.
  Total number of guns, Artillery of the First Corps, 83.

SECOND CORPS.
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL R. S. EWELL.
  EARLY'S DIVISION.
  MAJOR-GENERAL J. A. EARLY
    _Hays' Brigade_.--Brigadier-General H. S. HAYS
       5th Louisiana, Colonel Henry Forno
       6th Louisiana, Colonel William Monaghan
       7th Louisiana, Colonel D. B. Penn
       8th Louisiana, Colonel Henry B. Kelley
       9th Louisiana, Colonel A. L. Stafford
    _Gordon's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General J. B. GORDON
      13th Georgia, Colonel J. M. Smith
      26th Georgia, Colonel E. N. Atkinson
      31st Georgia, Colonel C. A. Evans
      38th Georgia, Colonel W. H. Stiles
      61st Georgia, Colonel J. H. Lamar
    _Smith's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General WILLIAM SMITH
      13th Virginia, Colonel J. E. B. Terrill
      31st Virginia, Colonel John S. Hoffman
      49th Virginia, Colonel Gibson
      52d  Virginia, Colonel Skinner
      58th Virginia, Colonel F. H. Board
    _Hoke's Brigade_.--Colonel J. E. AVERY Commanding (General R.
F. HOKE being absent, wounded)
       5th North Carolina, Colonel J. E. Avery
      21st North Carolina, Colonel W. W. Kirkland
      54th North Carolina, Colonel J. C. T. McDowell
      57th North Carolina, Colonel A. C. Godwin
       1st North Carolina Battalion, Major R. H. Wharton
  RODES' DIVISION.
  MAJOR-GENERAL R. E. RODES
    _Daniel's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General JUNIUS DANIEL
      32d  North Carolina, Colonel E. C. Brabble
      43d  North Carolina, Colonel Thomas S. Keenan
      45th North Carolina, Lieut.-Colonel Saml. H. Boyd
      53d  North Carolina, Colonel W. A. Owens
       2d  North Carolina Battalion, Lieut.-Colonel H. S. Andrew
    _Doles' Brigade_.--Brigadier-General GEORGE DOLES
       4th Georgia, Lieut.-Colonel D. R. E. Winn
      12th Georgia, Colonel Edward Willis
      21st Georgia, Colonel John T. Mercer
      44th Georgia, Colonel S. P. Lumpkin
    _Iverson's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General ALFRED IVERSON
       5th North Carolina, Captain S. B. West
      12th North Carolina, Lieut.-Colonel W. S. Davis
      20th North Carolina, Lieut.-Colonel N. Slough
      23d  North Carolina, Colonel D. H. Christie
    _Ramseur's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General S. D. RAMSEUR
       2d  North Carolina, Major E. W. Hurt
       4th North Carolina, Colonel Bryan Grimes
      14th North Carolina, Colonel R. T. Bennett
      30th North Carolina, Colonel F. M. Parker
    _Rodes' Brigade_.--Colonel E. A. O'NEILL
       3d  Alabama, Colonel C. A. Battle
       5th Alabama, Colonel J. M. Hall
       6th Alabama, Colonel J. N. Lightfoot
      12th Alabama, Colonel S. B. Pickens
      26th Alabama, Lieut.-Colonel J. C. Goodgame
  JOHNSON'S DIVISION.
  MAJOR-GENERAL ED. JOHNSON
    _Steuart's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General GEO. H. STEUART
      10th Virginia, Colonel E. T. H. Warren
      23d  Virginia, Colonel A. G. Taliaferro
      27th Virginia, Colonel T. V. Williams
       1st North Carolina, Colonel J. A. McDowell
       3d  North Carolina, Lieut.-Colonel Thurston
    _"Stonewall" Brigade_.--Brigadier-General JAMES A. WALKER
       2d  Virginia, Colonel J. Q. A. Nadenbousch
       4th Virginia, Colonel Charles A. Ronald
       5th Virginia, Colonel J. H. S. Funk
      27th Virginia, Colonel J. K. Edmondson
      33d  Virginia, Colonel F. M. Holladay
    _Jones' Brigade_.--Brigadier-General JOHN M. JONES
      21st Virginia, Captain Moseley
      43d  Virginia, Lieut.-Colonel Withers
      44th Virginia, Captain Buckner
      48th Virginia, Colonel T. S. Garnett
      50th Virginia, Colonel Vanderventer
    _Nicholls' Brigade_.--Colonel J. M. WILLIAMS Commanding (General
F. T. NICHOLLS being absent, wounded)
       1st Louisiana, Colonel William R. Shirers
       2d  Louisiana, Colonel J. M. Williams
      10th Louisiana, Colonel E. Waggaman
      14th Louisiana, Colonel Z. York
      15th Louisiana, Colonel Edward Pendleton
  ARTILLERY OF THE SECOND CORPS.
  COLONEL S. CRUTCHFIELD
    _Battalion_.--Lieut.-Colonel THOMAS H. CARTER, Major CARTER M.
BRAXTON
      Batteries:  Page's, Fry's, Carter's, Reese's.
    _Battalion_.--Lieut.-Colonel H. P. JONES, Major BROCKENBOROUGH
      Batteries:  Carrington's, Garber's, Thompson's, Tanner's.
    _Battalion_.--Lieut.-Colonel S. ANDREWS, Major LATIMER
      Batteries:  Brown's, Dermot's, Carpenter's, Raine's.
    _Battalion_.--Lieut.-Colonel NELSON, Major PAGE
      Batteries:  Kirkpatrick's, Massie's, Millege's.
    _Battalion_.--Colonel J. T. BROWN, Major HARDAWAY
      Batteries:  Dance's, Watson's, Smith's, Huff's, Graham's.
  Total number of guns, Artillery of the Second Corps, 82.

THIRD CORPS.
LIEUT.-GENERAL A. P. HILL
  R. H. ANDERSON'S DIVISION.
    _Wilcox's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General C. M. WILCOX
       8th Alabama, Colonel T. L. Royster
       9th Alabama, Colonel S. Henry
      10th Alabama, Colonel W. H. Forney
      11th Alabama, Colonel J. C. C. Saunders
      14th Alabama, Colonel L. F. Pinkhard
    _Mahone's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General WILLIAM MAHONE
       6th Virginia, Colonel G. T. Rogers
      12th Virginia, Colonel D. A. Weisiger
      16th Virginia, Lieut.-Colonel Joseph H. Ham
      41st Virginia, Colonel W. A. Parham
      61st Virginia, Colonel V. D. Groner
    _Posey's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General CARNOT POSEY
      46th Mississippi, Colonel Jos. Jayne
      16th Mississippi, Colonel Saml. E. Baker
      19th Mississippi, Colonel John Mullins
      12th Mississippi, Colonel W. H. Taylor
    _Wright's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General A. R. WRIGHT
       2d Georgia Battalion, Major G. W. Ross
       3d  Georgia, Colonel E. J. Walker
      22d  Georgia, Colonel R. H. Jones
      48th Georgia, Colonel William Gibson
    _Perry's Brigade_.--Brigadier-General E. A. PERRY
       2d  Florida, Lieut.-Colonel S. G. Pyles
       5th Florida, Colonel J. C. Hately
       8th Florida, Colonel David Long
  HETH'S DIVISION
    _First, Pettigrew's Brigade_.--42d, 11th, 26th, 44th, 47th,
53d, and 17th North Carolina.
    _Second, Field's Brigade_.--40th, 55th, and 47th Virginia.
    _Third, Archer's Brigade_.--1st, 7th, and 14th Tennessee, and
13th Alabama.
    _Fourth, Cook's Brigade_.--15th, 27th, 46th, and 48th North
Carolina.
    _Fifth, Davis' Brigade_.--2d, 11th, 42d Mississippi, and 55th
N. Carolina.
  PENDER'S DIVISION
    _First, McGowan's Brigade_.--1st, 12th, 13th, and 14th North
Carolina.
    _Second, Lane's Brigade_.--7th, 18th, 28th, 33d, and 37th
Georgia.
    _Third, Thomas' Brigade_.--14th, 35th, 45th, and 49th Georgia.
    _Fourth, Pender's Old Brigade_.--13th, 16th, 22d, 34th, and
38th North Carolina.
  ARTILLERY OF THE THIRD CORPS.
  Colonel R. LINDSEY WALKER
    _Battalion_.--Major D. G. McINTOSH, Major W. F. POAGUE
      Batteries:  Hurt's, Rice's, Luck's, Johnson's.
    _Battalion_.--Lieut.-Colonel GARNETT, Major RICHARDSON
      Batteries:  Lewis', Maurin's, Moore's, Grandy's.
    _Battalion_.--Major CUTSHAW
      Batteries:  Wyatt's, Woolfolk's, Brooke's.
    _Battalion_.--Major WILLIE P. PEGRAM
      Batteries:  Brunson's, Davidson's, Crenshaw's, McGraw's,
Marye's.
    _Battalion_.--Lieut.-Colonel CUTTS, Major LANE
      Batteries:  Wingfield's, Ross', Patterson's.
  Total number of guns, Artillery of the Third Corps, 83.
Total number of guns, Army of Northern Virginia, 248.

LIEUT.-GENERAL J. E. B. STUART'S CAVALRY CORPS.
  Brigadier-General Wade Hampton's Brigade.
  Brigadier-General Fitz Hugh Lee's Brigade.
  Brigadier-General W. H. F. Lee's Brigade, under Colonel Chambliss.
  Brigadier-General B. H. Robertson's Brigade.
  Brigadier-General William E. Jones' Brigade.
  Brigadier-General J. D. Imboden's Brigade.
  Brigadier-General A. G. Jenkins' Brigade.
  Colonel White's Battalion.
  Baker's Brigade.
[NOTE.--The regimental roster of this Cavalry Corps is unfortunately
unobtainable.]


INDEX. [omitted]


MESSRS. CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
are publishing, under the general title of THE
CAMPAIGNS OF THE CIVIL WAR
a series of volumes, contributed at their solicitation by a number
of leading actors in and students of the great conflict of 1861-
'65, with a view to bringing together, for the first time, a full
and authoritative military history of the suppression of the
Rebellion.


The final and exhaustive form of this great narrative, in which
every doubt shall be settled and every detail covered, may be a
possibility only of the future.  But it is a matter for surprise
that twenty years after the beginning of the Rebellion, and when
a whole generation has grown up needing such knowledge, there is
no authority which is at the same time of the highest rank,
intelligible and trustworthy, and to which a reader can turn for
any general view of the field--for a strong, vivid, concise by
truly proportioned story of the great salient events.

The many reports, regimental histories, memoirs, and other materials
of value for special passages, require, for their intelligent
reading, an ability to combine and proportion them which the ordinary
reader does not possess.  There have been no attempts at general
histories which have supplied this satisfactorily to any large part
of the public.  Undoubtedly there has been no such narrative as
would be especially welcome to men of the new generation, and would
be valued by a very great class of readers;--and there has seemed
to be great danger that the time would be allowed to pass when it
would be possible to give to such a work the vividness and accuracy
that come from personal recollection.  These facts led to the
conception of the present work.

From every department of the Government, from the officers of the
army, and from a great number of custodians of records and special
information everywhere, both authors and publishers have received
every aid that could be asked in this undertaking; and in announcing
the issue of the work the publishers take this occasion to convey
the thanks which the authors have had individual opportunities to
express elsewhere.


The volumes of the series will be duodecimos of about 250 pages
each, illustrated by maps and plans prepared under the direction
of the authors.  They will appear, as far as possible, in the
chronological order of the Campaigns of which they treat; and by
their preliminary and concluding chapters will be so far connected
that the completed work will practically cover the entire field of
the war.

The price of each volume will be $1.00.


_The following volumes are now ready:_

I.--THE OUTBREAK OF THE REBELLION.  By JOHN G. NICOLAY, Esq.,
Private Secretary to President Lincoln; late Consul-General to
France, etc.

A preliminary volume, describing the opening of the war, and covering
the period from the election of Lincoln to the end of the first
battle of Bull Run.

II.--FROM FORT HENRY TO CORINTH.  By the Hon. M. F. FORCE, Justice
of the Superior Court, Cincinnati; late Brigadier-General and Bvt.
Maj. Gen'l, U.S.V., commanding First Division, 17th Corps:  In
1862, Lieut. Colonel of the 20th Ohio, commanding the regiment at
Shiloh; Treasurer of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee.

The narrative of events in the West from the Summer of 1861 to May,
1862; covering the capture of Fts. Henry and Donelson, the Battle
of Shiloh, etc., etc.

III.--THE PENINSULA.  By ALEXANDER S. WEBB., LL.D., President of
the College of the City of New York; Assistant Chief of Artillery,
Army of the Potomac, 1861-'62; Inspector General Fifth Army Corps;
General commanding 2d Div., 2d Corps; Major General Assigned, and
Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac.

The history of McClellan's Peninsula Campaign, from his appointment
to the end of the Seven Days' Fight.

IV.--THE ARMY UNDER POPE.  By JOHN C. ROPES, Esq., of the Military
Historical Society of Massachusetts, the Massachusetts Historical
Society, etc.

From the appointment of Pope to command the Army of Virginia, to
the appointment of McClellan to the general command in September,
1862.

V.--THE ANTIETAM AND FREDERICKSBURG.  By FRANCIS WINTHROP PALFREY,
Bvt. Brigadier Gen'l, U.S.V., and formerly Colonel 20th Mass.
Infantry; Lieut. Col. of the 20th Massachusetts at the battle of
the Antietam; Member of Military Historical Society of Massachusetts,
of the Massachusetts Historical Society, etc.

From the appointment of McClellan to the general command, Sept.
1862, to the end of the battle of Fredericksburg.

VI.--CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG.  By ABNER DOUBLEDAY, Bvt.
Maj. Gen'l, U.S.A., and Maj. Gen'l, U.S.V.; commanding the First
Corps at Gettysburg, etc.

From the appointment of Hooker, through the campaigns of Chancellorsville
and Gettysburg, to the retreat of Lee after the latter battle.

VII.--THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND.  By HENRY M. CIST, Brevet Brig.
Gen'l U.S.V.; A.A.G. on the staff of Major Gen'l Rosecrans, and
afterwards on that of Major Gen'l Thomas; Corresponding Secretary
of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland.

From the formation of the Army of the Cumberland to the end of the
battles at Chattanooga, November, 1863.

IX.--THE CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA.  By the Hon. JACOB D. COX, Ex-Governor
of Ohio; late Secretary of the Interior of the United States; Major
General U.S.V., commanding Twenty-third Corps during the campaigns
of Atlanta and the Carolinas, etc., etc.

From Sherman's first advance into Georgia in May, 1864, to the
beginning of the March to the Sea.

X.--THE MARCH TO THE SEA.--FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE.  By the Hon.
JACOB D. COX.

From the beginning of the March to the Sea to the Surrender of
Johnston--including also the operations of Thomas in Tennessee.


The following volumes, now preparing for early publication, will
complete the series:

VIII.--THE MISSISSIPPI.  By FRANCIS VINTON GREENE, Lieut. of
Engineers, U. S. Army; late Military Attaché to the U. S. Legation
in St. Petersburg; Author of "The Russian Army and its Campaigns
in Turkey in 1877-78," and of "Army Life in Russia."

An account of the operations--especially at Vicksburg and Port
Hudson--by which the Mississippi River and its shores were restored
to the control of the Union.

XI.--THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY in 1864.  The Campaign of Sheridan.  By
GEORGE E. POND, Esq., Associate Editor of the _Army and Navy
Journal_.

XII.--THE CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT IN VIRGINIA.  By ANDREW A. HUMPHREYS,
Brigadier General and Bvt. Major General, U.S.A.; late Chief of
Engineers; Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac, 1863-'64; commanding
Second Corps, 1864-'65, etc., etc.

Covering the Virginia Campaigns of 1864 and '65, to Lee's surrender.


[Asterism] _The above books for sale by all booksellers, or will
be sent, post-paid, upon receipt of price by_

  CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS,
  743 AND 745 BROADWAY, NEW YORK.


Transcriber's note:

  Footnotes follow the paragraph in which they are referenced.

  Small caps have been set as caps.

  Regimental numbers, which were all spelled out in the text (but
  not the Appendixes), have been converted to numerals.

  Personal names have been corrected, place names have not when they
  could be a contemporary variant.  The possessives ending in "s's"
  or "s'" have been made uniformly the latter.

  The Appendixes have been rearranged from paragraph to tabular style;
  the words "Commanding" and "Regiment" have been deleted when
  possible.  It seems that the end of Appendix B was originally
  shortened to fit the signature.

  LoC call number:  E468.C2 v.6






End of Project Gutenberg's Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, by Abner Doubleday