Produced by Sandra K. Perry, with corrections and
supplementation by David McClamrock






SUMMA THEOLOGICA

PART II-II ("Secunda Secundae")

Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

BENZIGER BROTHERS
NEW YORK
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DEDICATION

To the Blessed Virgin
Mary Immaculate
Seat of Wisdom
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NOTE TO THIS ELECTRONIC EDITION

The text of this electronic edition was originally produced by Sandra
K. Perry, Perrysburg, Ohio, and made available through the Christian
Classics Ethereal Library <http://www.ccel.org>. I have eliminated
unnecessary formatting in the text, corrected some errors in
transcription, and added the dedication, tables of contents,
Prologue, and the numbers of the questions and articles, as they
appeared in the printed translation published by Benziger Brothers.
Each article is now designated by part, question number, and article
number in brackets, like this:

> SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 49, Art. 2]

> Whether the Supreme Good, God, Is the Cause of Evil?

In a few places, where obvious errors appeared in the Benziger
Brothers edition, I have corrected them by reference to a Latin text
of the _Summa._ These corrections are indicated by English text in
brackets. For example, in Part I, Question 45, Article 2, the first
sentence in the Benziger Brothers edition begins: "Not only is it
impossible that anything should be created by God...." By reference
to the Latin, "non solum _non_ est impossibile a Deo aliquid creari"
(emphasis added), this has been corrected to "Not only is it [not]
impossible that anything should be created by God...."

This electronic edition also differs from the Benziger Brothers
edition in the following details (as well as the obvious lack of the
original page numbers and headers):

* The repetitive expression "We proceed thus to the [next] Article"
does not appear directly below the title of each article.

* Italics are represented by underscores at the beginning and end,
_like this._ Quotations and other "quotable" matter, however, are
ordinarily set off by quotation marks with no underscores in this
edition, in accordance with common English usage, even where they
were set in italics with no quotation marks in the Benziger Brothers
edition. Titles of books are set off by underscores when they appear
in the text with no parentheses, but not when the books are cited in
parentheses.

* Bible chapters and verses are cited with arabic numerals separated
by colons, like this: "Dan. 7:10"--not like this: "Dan. vii. 10."
Small roman numerals have been retained where they appear in
citations to books other than the Bible.

* Any matter that appeared in a footnote in the Benziger Brothers
edition is presented in brackets at the point in the text where the
footnote mark appeared.

* Greek words are presented in Roman transliteration.

* Paragraphs are not indented and are separated by blank lines.

* Numbered topics, set forth at the beginning of each question and
at certain other places, are ordinarily presented on a separate line
for each topic.

* Titles of questions are in all caps.

Anything else in this electronic edition that does not correspond to
the content of the Benziger Brothers edition may be regarded as a
defect in this edition and attributed to me (David McClamrock).

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CONTENTS

SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART (QQ. 1-189)

Question

1.   Of Faith
2.   Of the Act of Faith
3.   Of the Outward Act of Faith
4.   Of the Virtue Itself of Faith
5.   Of Those Who Have Faith
6.   Of the Cause of Faith
7.   Of the Effects of Faith
8.   Of the Gift of Understanding
9.   Of the Gift of Knowledge
10.  Of Unbelief in General
11.  Of Heresy
12.  Of Apostasy
13.  Of the Sin of Blasphemy, in General
14.  Of Blasphemy Against the Holy Ghost
15.  Of the Vices Opposed to Knowledge and Understanding
16.  Of the Precepts of Faith, Knowledge, and Understanding
17.  Of Hope, Considered in Itself
18.  Of the Subject of Hope
19.  Of the Gift of Fear
20.  Of Despair
21.  Of Presumption
22.  Of the Precepts Relating to Hope and Fear
23.  Of Charity, Considered in Itself
24.  Of the Subject of Charity
25.  Of the Object of Charity
26.  Of the Order of Charity
27.  Of the Principal Act of Charity, Which Is to Love
28.  Of Joy
29.  Of Peace
30.  Of Mercy
31.  Of Beneficence
32.  Of Almsdeeds
33.  Of Fraternal Correction
34.  Of Hatred
35.  Of Sloth
36.  Of Envy
37.  Of Discord, Which Is Contrary to Peace
38.  Of Contention
39.  Of Schism
40.  Of War
41.  Of Strife
42.  Of Sedition
43.  Of Scandal
44.  Of the Precepts of Charity
45.  Of the Gift of Wisdom
46.  Of Folly Which Is Opposed to Wisdom

TREATISE ON PRUDENCE AND JUSTICE

47.  Of Prudence Considered in Itself
48.  Of the Parts of Prudence
49.  Of Each Quasi-integral Part of Prudence
50.  Of the Subjective Parts of Prudence
51.  Of the Virtues Which Are Connected with Prudence
52.  Of the Gift of Counsel
53.  Of Imprudence
54.  Of Negligence
55.  Of Vices Opposed to Prudence by Way of Resemblance
56.  Of the Precepts Relating to Prudence
57.  Of Right
58.  Of Justice
59.  Of Injustice
60.  Of Judgment
61.  Of the Parts of Justice
62.  Of Restitution
63.  Of Respect of Persons
64.  Of Murder
65.  Of Injuries Committed on the Person
66.  Of Theft and Robbery
67.  Of the Injustice of a Judge, in Judging
68.  Of Matters Concerning Unjust Accusation
69.  Of Sins Committed Against Justice on the Part of the Defendant
70.  Of Injustice with Regard to the Person of the Witness
71.  Of Injustice in Judgment on the Part of Counsel
72.  Of Reviling
73.  Of Backbiting
74.  Of Tale-Bearing
75.  Of Derision
76.  Of Cursing
77.  Of Cheating, Which Is Committed in Buying and Selling
78.  Of the Sin of Usury
79.  Of the Quasi-integral Parts of Justice
80.  Of the Potential Parts of Justice
81.  Of Religion
82.  Of Devotion
83.  Of Prayer
84.  Of Adoration
85.  Of Sacrifice
86.  Of Oblations and First-fruits
87.  Of Tithes
88.  Of Vows
89.  Of Oaths
90.  Of the Taking of God's Name by Way of Adjuration
91.  Of Taking the Divine Name for the Purpose of Invoking It by
       Means of Praise
92.  Of Superstition
93.  Of Superstition Consisting in Undue Worship of the True God
94.  Of Idolatry
95.  Of Superstition in Divinations
96.  Of Superstition in Observances
97.  Of the Temptation of God
98.  Of Perjury
99.  Of Sacrilege
100. On Simony
101. Of Piety
102. Of Observance, Considered in Itself, and of Its Parts
103. Of Dulia
104. Of Obedience
105. Of Disobedience
106. Of Thankfulness or Gratitude
107. Of Ingratitude
108. Of Vengeance
109. Of Truth
110. Of the Vices Opposed to Truth, and First of Lying
111. Of Dissimulation and Hypocrisy
112. Of Boasting
113. Of Irony
114. Of the Friendliness Which Is Called Affability
115. Of Flattery
116. Of Quarreling
117. Of Liberality
118. Of the Vices Opposed to Liberality, and in the First Place,
     of Covetousness
119. Of Prodigality
120. Of "Epikeia" or Equity
121. Of Piety
122. Of the Precepts of Justice

TREATISE ON FORTITUDE AND TEMPERANCE

123. Of Fortitude
124. Of Martyrdom
125. Of Fear
126. Of Fearlessness
127. Of Daring
128. Of the Parts of Fortitude
129. Of Magnanimity
130. Of Presumption
131. Of Ambition
132. Of Vainglory
133. Of Pusillanimity
134. Of Magnificence
135. Of Meanness
136. Of Patience
137. Of Perseverance
138. Of the Vices Opposed to Perseverance
139. Of the Gift of Fortitude
140. Of the Precepts of Fortitude
141. Of Temperance
142. Of the Vices Opposed to Temperance
143. Of the Parts of Temperance, in General
144. Of Shamefacedness
145. Of Honesty
146. Of Abstinence
147. Of Fasting
148. Of Gluttony
149. Of Sobriety
150. Of Drunkenness
151. Of Chastity
152. Of Virginity
153. Of Lust
154. Of the Parts of Lust
155. Of Continence
156. Of Incontinence
157. Of Clemency and Meekness
158. Of Anger
159. Of Cruelty
160. Of Modesty
161. Of Humility
162. Of Pride
163. Of the First Man's Sin
164. Of the Punishments of the First Man's Sin
165. Of Our First Parents' Temptation
166. Of Studiousness
167. Of Curiosity
168. Of Modesty as Consisting in the Outward Movements of the Body
169. Of Modesty in the Outward Apparel
170. Of the Precepts of Temperance

TREATISE ON ACTS WHICH PERTAIN ESPECIALLY TO CERTAIN MEN

171. Of Prophecy
172. Of the Cause of Prophecy
173. Of the Manner in Which Prophetic Knowledge Is Conveyed
174. Of the Division of Prophecy
175. Of Rapture
176. Of the Grace of Tongues
177. Of the Gratuitous Grace Consisting in Words
178. Of the Grace of Miracles
179. Of the Division of Life into Active and Contemplative
180. Of the Contemplative Life
181. Of the Active Life
182. Of the Active Life in Comparison with the Contemplative Life
183. Of Man's Various Duties and States in General
184. Of the State of Perfection in General
185. Of Things Pertaining to the Episcopal State
186. Of Those Things in Which the Religious State Properly Consists
187. Of Those Things That Are Competent to Religious
188. Of the Different Kinds of Religious Life
189. Of the Entrance into Religious Life
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SUMMA THEOLOGICA

SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART
["II-II," "Secunda Secundae"]
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TREATISE ON THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (QQ. 1-46)
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QUESTION 1

OF FAITH (In Ten Articles)

Having to treat now of the theological virtues, we shall begin with
Faith, secondly we shall speak of Hope, and thirdly, of Charity.

The treatise on Faith will be fourfold: (1) Of faith itself; (2) Of
the corresponding gifts, knowledge and understanding; (3) Of the
opposite vices; (4) Of the precepts pertaining to this virtue.

About faith itself we shall consider: (1) its object; (2) its act;
(3) the habit of faith.

Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?

(2) Whether the object of faith is something complex or incomplex,
i.e. whether it is a thing or a proposition?

(3) Whether anything false can come under faith?

(4) Whether the object of faith can be anything seen?

(5) Whether it can be anything known?

(6) Whether the things to be believed should be divided into a
certain number of articles?

(7) Whether the same articles are of faith for all times?

(8) Of the number of articles;

(9) Of the manner of embodying the articles in a symbol;

(10) Who has the right to propose a symbol of faith?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 1]

Whether the Object of Faith Is the First Truth?

Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not the First
Truth. For it seems that the object of faith is that which is
proposed to us to be believed. Now not only things pertaining to the
Godhead, i.e. the First Truth, are proposed to us to be believed, but
also things concerning Christ's human nature, and the sacraments of
the Church, and the condition of creatures. Therefore the object of
faith is not only the First Truth.

Obj. 2: Further, faith and unbelief have the same object since they
are opposed to one another. Now unbelief can be about all things
contained in Holy Writ, for whichever one of them a man denies, he is
considered an unbeliever. Therefore faith also is about all things
contained in Holy Writ. But there are many things therein, concerning
man and other creatures. Therefore the object of faith is not only
the First Truth, but also created truth.

Obj. 3: Further, faith is condivided with charity, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 62, A. 3). Now by charity we love not only God, who is the
sovereign Good, but also our neighbor. Therefore the object of Faith
is not only the First Truth.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is
about the simple and everlasting truth." Now this is the First Truth.
Therefore the object of faith is the First Truth.

_I answer that,_ The object of every cognitive habit includes two
things: first, that which is known materially, and is the material
object, so to speak, and, secondly, that whereby it is known, which is
the formal aspect of the object. Thus in the science of geometry, the
conclusions are what is known materially, while the formal aspect of
the science is the mean of demonstration, through which the
conclusions are known.

Accordingly if we consider, in faith, the formal aspect of the
object, it is nothing else than the First Truth. For the faith of
which we are speaking, does not assent to anything, except because it
is revealed by God. Hence the mean on which faith is based is the
Divine Truth. If, however, we consider materially the things to which
faith assents, they include not only God, but also many other things,
which, nevertheless, do not come under the assent of faith, except as
bearing some relation to God, in as much as, to wit, through certain
effects of the Divine operation, man is helped on his journey towards
the enjoyment of God. Consequently from this point of view also the
object of faith is, in a way, the First Truth, in as much as nothing
comes under faith except in relation to God, even as the object of
the medical art is health, for it considers nothing save in relation
to health.

Reply Obj. 1: Things concerning Christ's human nature, and the
sacraments of the Church, or any creatures whatever, come under
faith, in so far as by them we are directed to God, and in as much
as we assent to them on account of the Divine Truth.

The same answer applies to the Second Objection, as regards all
things contained in Holy Writ.

Reply Obj. 3: Charity also loves our neighbor on account of God, so
that its object, properly speaking, is God, as we shall show further
on (Q. 25, A. 1).
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 2]

Whether the Object of Faith Is Something Complex, by Way of a
Proposition?

Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not something
complex by way of a proposition. For the object of faith is the First
Truth, as stated above (A. 1). Now the First Truth is something
simple. Therefore the object of faith is not something complex.

Obj. 2: Further, the exposition of faith is contained in the symbol.
Now the symbol does not contain propositions, but things: for it is
not stated therein that God is almighty, but: "I believe in God . . .
almighty." Therefore the object of faith is not a proposition but a
thing.

Obj. 3: Further, faith is succeeded by vision, according to 1 Cor.
13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to
face. Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known."
But the object of the heavenly vision is something simple, for it is
the Divine Essence. Therefore the faith of the wayfarer is also.

_On the contrary,_ Faith is a mean between science and opinion. Now
the mean is in the same genus as the extremes. Since, then, science
and opinion are about propositions, it seems that faith is likewise
about propositions; so that its object is something complex.

_I answer that,_ The thing known is in the knower according to the
mode of the knower. Now the mode proper to the human intellect is to
know the truth by synthesis and analysis, as stated in the First Part
(Q. 85, A. 5). Hence things that are simple in themselves, are known
by the intellect with a certain amount of complexity, just as on the
other hand, the Divine intellect knows, without any complexity,
things that are complex in themselves.

Accordingly the object of faith may be considered in two ways. First,
as regards the thing itself which is believed, and thus the object of
faith is something simple, namely the thing itself about which we
have faith. Secondly, on the part of the believer, and in this
respect the object of faith is something complex by way of a
proposition.

Hence in the past both opinions have been held with a certain amount
of truth.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the object of faith on the part
of the thing believed.

Reply Obj. 2: The symbol mentions the things about which faith is, in
so far as the act of the believer is terminated in them, as is
evident from the manner of speaking about them. Now the act of the
believer does not terminate in a proposition, but in a thing. For as
in science we do not form propositions, except in order to have
knowledge about things through their means, so is it in faith.

Reply Obj. 3: The object of the heavenly vision will be the First
Truth seen in itself, according to 1 John 3:2: "We know that when He
shall appear, we shall be like to Him: because we shall see Him as He
is": hence that vision will not be by way of a proposition but by way
of a simple understanding. On the other hand, by faith, we do not
apprehend the First Truth as it is in itself. Hence the comparison
fails.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 3]

Whether Anything False Can Come Under Faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that something false can come under faith.
For faith is condivided with hope and charity. Now something false can
come under hope, since many hope to have eternal life, who will not
obtain it. The same may be said of charity, for many are loved as
being good, who, nevertheless, are not good. Therefore something false
can be the object of faith.

Obj. 2: Further, Abraham believed that Christ would be born,
according to John 8:56: "Abraham your father rejoiced that he might
see My day: he saw it, and was glad." But after the time of Abraham,
God might not have taken flesh, for it was merely because He willed
that He did, so that what Abraham believed about Christ would have
been false. Therefore the object of faith can be something false.

Obj. 3: Further, the ancients believed in the future birth of Christ,
and many continued so to believe, until they heard the preaching of
the Gospel. Now, when once Christ was born, even before He began to
preach, it was false that Christ was yet to be born. Therefore
something false can come under faith.

Obj. 4: Further, it is a matter of faith, that one should believe
that the true Body of Christ is contained in the Sacrament of the
altar. But it might happen that the bread was not rightly
consecrated, and that there was not Christ's true Body there, but
only bread. Therefore something false can come under faith.

_On the contrary,_ No virtue that perfects the intellect is related
to the false, considered as the evil of the intellect, as the
Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 2). Now faith is a virtue that
perfects the intellect, as we shall show further on (Q. 4, AA. 2, 5).
Therefore nothing false can come under it.

_I answer that,_ Nothing comes under any power, habit or act, except by
means of the formal aspect of the object: thus color cannot be seen
except by means of light, and a conclusion cannot be known save
through the mean of demonstration. Now it has been stated (A. 1)
that the formal aspect of the object of faith is the First Truth; so
that nothing can come under faith, save in so far as it stands under
the First Truth, under which nothing false can stand, as neither can
non-being stand under being, nor evil under goodness. It follows
therefore that nothing false can come under faith.

Reply Obj. 1: Since the true is the good of the intellect, but not of
the appetitive power, it follows that all virtues which perfect the
intellect, exclude the false altogether, because it belongs to the
nature of a virtue to bear relation to the good alone. On the other
hand those virtues which perfect the appetitive faculty, do not
entirely exclude the false, for it is possible to act in accordance
with justice or temperance, while having a false opinion about what
one is doing. Therefore, as faith perfects the intellect, whereas
hope and charity perfect the appetitive part, the comparison between
them fails.

Nevertheless neither can anything false come under hope, for a man
hopes to obtain eternal life, not by his own power (since this would
be an act of presumption), but with the help of grace; and if he
perseveres therein he will obtain eternal life surely and infallibly.

In like manner it belongs to charity to love God, wherever He may be;
so that it matters not to charity, whether God be in the individual
whom we love for God's sake.

Reply Obj. 2: That "God would not take flesh," considered in itself
was possible even after Abraham's time, but in so far as it stands in
God's foreknowledge, it has a certain necessity of infallibility, as
explained in the First Part (Q. 14, AA. 13, 15): and it is thus that
it comes under faith. Hence in so far as it comes under faith, it
cannot be false.

Reply Obj. 3: After Christ's birth, to believe in Him, was to believe
in Christ's birth at some time or other. The fixing of the time,
wherein some were deceived was not due to their faith, but to a human
conjecture. For it is possible for a believer to have a false opinion
through a human conjecture, but it is quite impossible for a false
opinion to be the outcome of faith.

Reply Obj. 4: The faith of the believer is not directed to such and
such accidents of bread, but to the fact that the true body of Christ
is under the appearances of sensible bread, when it is rightly
consecrated. Hence if it be not rightly consecrated, it does not
follow that anything false comes under faith.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 4]

Whether the Object of Faith Can Be Something Seen?

Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is something
seen. For Our Lord said to Thomas (John 20:29): "Because thou hast
seen Me, Thomas, thou hast believed." Therefore vision and faith
regard the same object.

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle, while speaking of the knowledge of
faith, says (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through a glass in a dark
manner." Therefore what is believed is seen.

Obj. 3: Further, faith is a spiritual light. Now something is seen
under every light. Therefore faith is of things seen.

Obj. 4: Further, "Every sense is a kind of sight," as Augustine
states (De Verb. Domini, Serm. xxxiii). But faith is of things heard,
according to Rom. 10:17: "Faith . . . cometh by hearing." Therefore
faith is of things seen.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that "faith is the
evidence of things that appear not."

_I answer that,_ Faith implies assent of the intellect to that which
is believed. Now the intellect assents to a thing in two ways. First,
through being moved to assent by its very object, which is known
either by itself (as in the case of first principles, which are held
by the habit of understanding), or through something else already
known (as in the case of conclusions which are held by the habit of
science). Secondly the intellect assents to something, not through
being sufficiently moved to this assent by its proper object, but
through an act of choice, whereby it turns voluntarily to one side
rather than to the other: and if this be accompanied by doubt or fear
of the opposite side, there will be opinion, while, if there be
certainty and no fear of the other side, there will be faith.

Now those things are said to be seen which, of themselves, move the
intellect or the senses to knowledge of them. Wherefore it is evident
that neither faith nor opinion can be of things seen either by the
senses or by the intellect.

Reply Obj. 1: Thomas "saw one thing, and believed another" [*St.
Gregory: Hom. xxvi in Evang.]: he saw the Man, and believing Him to
be God, he made profession of his faith, saying: "My Lord and my God."

Reply Obj. 2: Those things which come under faith can be considered
in two ways. First, in particular; and thus they cannot be seen and
believed at the same time, as shown above. Secondly, in general, that
is, under the common aspect of credibility; and in this way they are
seen by the believer. For he would not believe unless, on the
evidence of signs, or of something similar, he saw that they ought to
be believed.

Reply Obj. 3: The light of faith makes us see what we believe. For
just as, by the habits of the other virtues, man sees what is
becoming to him in respect of that habit, so, by the habit of faith,
the human mind is directed to assent to such things as are becoming
to a right faith, and not to assent to others.

Reply Obj. 4: Hearing is of words signifying what is of faith, but
not of the things themselves that are believed; hence it does not
follow that these things are seen.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 5]

Whether Those Things That Are of Faith Can Be an Object of Science
[*Science is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through
its demonstration]?

Objection 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith can be
an object of science. For where science is lacking there is
ignorance, since ignorance is the opposite of science. Now we are not
in ignorance of those things we have to believe, since ignorance of
such things savors of unbelief, according to 1 Tim. 1:13: "I did it
ignorantly in unbelief." Therefore things that are of faith can be an
object of science.

Obj. 2: Further, science is acquired by reasons. Now sacred writers
employ reasons to inculcate things that are of faith. Therefore such
things can be an object of science.

Obj. 3: Further, things which are demonstrated are an object of
science, since a "demonstration is a syllogism that produces
science." Now certain matters of faith have been demonstrated by the
philosophers, such as the Existence and Unity of God, and so forth.
Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of science.

Obj. 4: Further, opinion is further from science than faith is, since
faith is said to stand between opinion and science. Now opinion and
science can, in a way, be about the same object, as stated in Poster.
i. Therefore faith and science can be about the same object also.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that "when a
thing is manifest, it is the object, not of faith, but of
perception." Therefore things that are of faith are not the object of
perception, whereas what is an object of science is the object of
perception. Therefore there can be no faith about things which are an
object of science.

_I answer that,_ All science is derived from self-evident and
therefore "seen" principles; wherefore all objects of science must
needs be, in a fashion, seen.

Now as stated above (A. 4), it is impossible that one and the same
thing should be believed and seen by the same person. Hence it is
equally impossible for one and the same thing to be an object of
science and of belief for the same person. It may happen, however,
that a thing which is an object of vision or science for one, is
believed by another: since we hope to see some day what we now
believe about the Trinity, according to 1 Cor. 13:12: "We see now
through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face": which
vision the angels possess already; so that what we believe, they see.
In like manner it may happen that what is an object of vision or
scientific knowledge for one man, even in the state of a wayfarer,
is, for another man, an object of faith, because he does not know it
by demonstration.

Nevertheless that which is proposed to be believed equally by all, is
equally unknown by all as an object of science: such are the things
which are of faith simply. Consequently faith and science are not
about the same things.

Reply Obj. 1: Unbelievers are in ignorance of things that are of
faith, for neither do they see or know them in themselves, nor do
they know them to be credible. The faithful, on the other hand, know
them, not as by demonstration, but by the light of faith which makes
them see that they ought to believe them, as stated above (A. 4, ad
2, 3).

Reply Obj. 2: The reasons employed by holy men to prove things that
are of faith, are not demonstrations; they are either persuasive
arguments showing that what is proposed to our faith is not
impossible, or else they are proofs drawn from the principles of
faith, i.e. from the authority of Holy Writ, as Dionysius declares
(Div. Nom. ii). Whatever is based on these principles is as well
proved in the eyes of the faithful, as a conclusion drawn from
self-evident principles is in the eyes of all. Hence again, theology
is a science, as we stated at the outset of this work (P. I, Q. 1, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 3: Things which can be proved by demonstration are
reckoned among the articles of faith, not because they are believed
simply by all, but because they are a necessary presupposition to
matters of faith, so that those who do not known them by
demonstration must know them first of all by faith.

Reply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (Poster. i), "science and
opinion about the same object can certainly be in different men," as
we have stated above about science and faith; yet it is possible for
one and the same man to have science and faith about the same thing
relatively, i.e. in relation to the object, but not in the same
respect. For it is possible for the same person, about one and the
same object, to know one thing and to think another: and, in like
manner, one may know by demonstration the unity of the Godhead, and,
by faith, the Trinity. On the other hand, in one and the same man,
about the same object, and in the same respect, science is
incompatible with either opinion or faith, yet for different reasons.
Because science is incompatible with opinion about the same object
simply, for the reason that science demands that its object should be
deemed impossible to be otherwise, whereas it is essential to
opinion, that its object should be deemed possible to be otherwise.
Yet that which is the object of faith, on account of the certainty of
faith, is also deemed impossible to be otherwise; and the reason why
science and faith cannot be about the same object and in the same
respect is because the object of science is something seen whereas
the object of faith is the unseen, as stated above.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 6]

Whether Those Things That Are of Faith Should Be Divided into Certain
Articles?

Objection 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith should
not be divided into certain articles. For all things contained in
Holy Writ are matters of faith. But these, by reason of their
multitude, cannot be reduced to a certain number. Therefore it seems
superfluous to distinguish certain articles of faith.

Obj. 2: Further, material differences can be multiplied indefinitely,
and therefore art should take no notice of them. Now the formal
aspect of the object of faith is one and indivisible, as stated above
(A. 1), viz. the First Truth, so that matters of faith cannot be
distinguished in respect of their formal object. Therefore no notice
should be taken of a material division of matters of faith into
articles.

Obj. 3: Further, it has been said by some [*Cf. William of Auxerre,
Summa Aurea] that "an article is an indivisible truth concerning God,
exacting [arctans] our belief." Now belief is a voluntary act, since,
as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.), "no man believes against
his will." Therefore it seems that matters of faith should not be
divided into articles.

_On the contrary,_ Isidore says: "An article is a glimpse of Divine
truth, tending thereto." Now we can only get a glimpse of Divine truth
by way of analysis, since things which in God are one, are manifold in
our intellect. Therefore matters of faith should be divided into
articles.

_I answer that,_ the word "article" is apparently derived from the
Greek; for the Greek _arthron_ [*Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea]
which the Latin renders "articulus," signifies a fitting together of
distinct parts: wherefore the small parts of the body which fit
together are called the articulations of the limbs. Likewise, in the
Greek grammar, articles are parts of speech which are affixed to
words to show their gender, number or case. Again in rhetoric,
articles are parts that fit together in a sentence, for Tully says
(Rhet. iv) that an article is composed of words each pronounced
singly and separately, thus: "Your passion, your voice, your look,
have struck terror into your foes."

Hence matters of Christian faith are said to contain distinct
articles, in so far as they are divided into parts, and fit together.
Now the object of faith is something unseen in connection with God, as
stated above (A. 4). Consequently any matter that, for a special
reason, is unseen, is a special article; whereas when several matters
are known or not known, under the same aspect, we are not to
distinguish various articles. Thus one encounters one difficulty in
seeing that God suffered, and another in seeing that He rose again
from the dead, wherefore the article of the Resurrection is distinct
from the article of the Passion. But that He suffered, died and was
buried, present the same difficulty, so that if one be accepted, it is
not difficult to accept the others; wherefore all these belong to one
article.

Reply Obj. 1: Some things are proposed to our belief are in
themselves of faith, while others are of faith, not in themselves but
only in relation to others: even as in sciences certain propositions
are put forward on their own account, while others are put forward in
order to manifest others. Now, since the chief object of faith
consists in those things which we hope to see, according to Heb.
11:2: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for," it follows
that those things are in themselves of faith, which order us directly
to eternal life. Such are the Trinity of Persons in Almighty God
[*The Leonine Edition reads: The Three Persons, the omnipotence of
God, etc.], the mystery of Christ's Incarnation, and the like: and
these are distinct articles of faith. On the other hand certain
things in Holy Writ are proposed to our belief, not chiefly on their
own account, but for the manifestation of those mentioned above: for
instance, that Abraham had two sons, that a dead man rose again at
the touch of Eliseus' bones, and the like, which are related in Holy
Writ for the purpose of manifesting the Divine mystery or the
Incarnation of Christ: and such things should not form distinct
articles.

Reply Obj. 2: The formal aspect of the object of faith can be taken
in two ways: first, on the part of the thing believed, and thus there
is one formal aspect of all matters of faith, viz. the First Truth:
and from this point of view there is no distinction of articles.
Secondly, the formal aspect of matters of faith, can be considered
from our point of view; and thus the formal aspect of a matter of
faith is that it is something unseen; and from this point of view
there are various distinct articles of faith, as we saw above.

Reply Obj. 3: This definition of an article is taken from an
etymology of the word as derived from the Latin, rather than in
accordance with its real meaning, as derived from the Greek: hence it
does not carry much weight. Yet even then it could be said that
although faith is exacted of no man by a necessity of coercion, since
belief is a voluntary act, yet it is exacted of him by a necessity of
end, since "he that cometh to God must believe that He is," and
"without faith it is impossible to please God," as the Apostle
declares (Heb. 11:6).
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 7]

Whether the Articles of Faith Have Increased in Course of Time?

Objection 1: It would seem that the articles of faith have not
increased in course of time. Because, as the Apostle says (Heb.
11:1), "faith is the substance of things to be hoped for." Now the
same things are to be hoped for at all times. Therefore, at all
times, the same things are to be believed.

Obj. 2: Further, development has taken place, in sciences devised
by man, on account of the lack of knowledge in those who discovered
them, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. ii). Now the doctrine of
faith was not devised by man, but was delivered to us by God, as
stated in Eph. 2:8: "It is the gift of God." Since then there can be
no lack of knowledge in God, it seems that knowledge of matters of
faith was perfect from the beginning and did not increase as time
went on.

Obj. 3: Further, the operation of grace proceeds in orderly fashion
no less than the operation of nature. Now nature always makes a
beginning with perfect things, as Boethius states (De Consol. iii).
Therefore it seems that the operation of grace also began with
perfect things, so that those who were the first to deliver the
faith, knew it most perfectly.

Obj. 4: Further, just as the faith of Christ was delivered to us
through the apostles, so too, in the Old Testament, the knowledge of
faith was delivered by the early fathers to those who came later,
according to Deut. 32:7: "Ask thy father, and he will declare to
thee." Now the apostles were most fully instructed about the
mysteries, for "they received them more fully than others, even as
they received them earlier," as a gloss says on Rom. 8:23: "Ourselves
also who have the first fruits of the Spirit." Therefore it seems
that knowledge of matters of faith has not increased as time went on.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xvi in Ezech.) that "the
knowledge of the holy fathers increased as time went on . . . and the
nearer they were to Our Savior's coming, the more fully did they
receive the mysteries of salvation."

_I answer that,_ The articles of faith stand in the same relation to
the doctrine of faith, as self-evident principles to a teaching based
on natural reason. Among these principles there is a certain order,
so that some are contained implicitly in others; thus all principles
are reduced, as to their first principle, to this one: "The same
thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," as the
Philosopher states (Metaph. iv, text. 9). In like manner all the
articles are contained implicitly in certain primary matters of
faith, such as God's existence, and His providence over the salvation
of man, according to Heb. 11: "He that cometh to God, must believe
that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him." For the
existence of God includes all that we believe to exist in God
eternally, and in these our happiness consists; while belief in His
providence includes all those things which God dispenses in time, for
man's salvation, and which are the way to that happiness: and in this
way, again, some of those articles which follow from these are
contained in others: thus faith in the Redemption of mankind includes
belief in the Incarnation of Christ, His Passion and so forth.

Accordingly we must conclude that, as regards the substance of the
articles of faith, they have not received any increase as time went
on: since whatever those who lived later have believed, was
contained, albeit implicitly, in the faith of those Fathers who
preceded them. But there was an increase in the number of articles
believed explicitly, since to those who lived in later times some
were known explicitly which were not known explicitly by those who
lived before them. Hence the Lord said to Moses (Ex. 6:2, 3): "I am
the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob [*Vulg.: 'I am
the Lord that appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob'] . . . and
My name Adonai I did not show them": David also said (Ps. 118:100):
"I have had understanding above ancients": and the Apostle says (Eph.
3:5) that the mystery of Christ, "in other generations was not known,
as it is now revealed to His holy apostles and prophets."

Reply Obj. 1: Among men the same things were always to be hoped for
from Christ. But as they did not acquire this hope save through
Christ, the further they were removed from Christ in point of time,
the further they were from obtaining what they hoped for. Hence the
Apostle says (Heb. 11:13): "All these died according to faith, not
having received the promises, but beholding them afar off." Now the
further off a thing is the less distinctly is it seen; wherefore
those who were nigh to Christ's advent had a more distinct knowledge
of the good things to be hoped for.

Reply Obj. 2: Progress in knowledge occurs in two ways. First, on the
part of the teacher, be he one or many, who makes progress in
knowledge as time goes on: and this is the kind of progress that
takes place in sciences devised by man. Secondly, on the part of the
learner; thus the master, who has perfect knowledge of the art, does
not deliver it all at once to his disciple from the very outset, for
he would not be able to take it all in, but he condescends to the
disciple's capacity and instructs him little by little. It is in this
way that men made progress in the knowledge of faith as time went on.
Hence the Apostle (Gal. 3:24) compares the state of the Old Testament
to childhood.

Reply Obj. 3: Two causes are requisite before actual generation can
take place, an agent, namely, and matter. In the order of the active
cause, the more perfect is naturally first; and in this way nature
makes a beginning with perfect things, since the imperfect is not
brought to perfection, except by something perfect already in
existence. On the other hand, in the order of the material cause, the
imperfect comes first, and in this way nature proceeds from the
imperfect to the perfect. Now in the manifestation of faith, God is
the active cause, having perfect knowledge from all eternity; while
man is likened to matter in receiving the influx of God's action.
Hence, among men, the knowledge of faith had to proceed from
imperfection to perfection; and, although some men have been after
the manner of active causes, through being doctors of faith,
nevertheless the manifestation of the Spirit is given to such men for
the common good, according to 1 Cor. 12:7; so that the knowledge of
faith was imparted to the Fathers who were instructors in the faith,
so far as was necessary at the time for the instruction of the
people, either openly or in figures.

Reply Obj. 4: The ultimate consummation of grace was effected by
Christ, wherefore the time of His coming is called the "time of
fulness [*Vulg.: 'fulness of time']" (Gal. 4:4). Hence those who were
nearest to Christ, whether before, like John the Baptist, or after,
like the apostles, had a fuller knowledge of the mysteries of faith;
for even with regard to man's state we find that the perfection of
manhood comes in youth, and that a man's state is all the more
perfect, whether before or after, the nearer it is to the time of his
youth.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 8]

Whether the Articles of Faith Are Suitably Formulated?

Objection 1: It would seem that the articles of faith are unsuitably
formulated. For those things, which can be known by demonstration, do
not belong to faith as to an object of belief for all, as stated above
(A. 5). Now it can be known by demonstration that there is one God;
hence the Philosopher proves this (Metaph. xii, text. 52) and many
other philosophers demonstrated the same truth. Therefore that "there
is one God" should not be set down as an article of faith.

Obj. 2: Further, just as it is necessary to faith that we should
believe God to be almighty, so is it too that we should believe Him to
be "all-knowing" and "provident for all," about both of which points
some have erred. Therefore, among the articles of faith, mention
should have been made of God's wisdom and providence, even as of His
omnipotence.

Obj. 3: Further, to know the Father is the same things as to know
the Son, according to John 14:9: "He that seeth Me, seeth the Father
also." Therefore there ought to be but one article about the Father
and Son, and, for the same reason, about the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 4: Further, the Person of the Father is no less than the
Person of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Now there are several
articles about the Person of the Holy Ghost, and likewise about the
Person of the Son. Therefore there should be several articles about
the Person of the Father.

Obj. 5: Further, just as certain things are said by appropriation, of
the Person of the Father and of the Person of the Holy Ghost, so too
is something appropriated to the Person of the Son, in respect of His
Godhead. Now, among the articles of faith, a place is given to a work
appropriated to the Father, viz. the creation, and likewise, a work
appropriated to the Holy Ghost, viz. that "He spoke by the prophets."
Therefore the articles of faith should contain some work appropriated
to the Son in respect of His Godhead.

Obj. 6: Further, the sacrament of the Eucharist presents a special
difficulty over and above the other articles. Therefore it should
have been mentioned in a special article: and consequently it seems
that there is not a sufficient number of articles.

On the contrary stands the authority of the Church who formulates the
articles thus.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 4, 6), to faith those things in
themselves belong, the sight of which we shall enjoy in eternal life,
and by which we are brought to eternal life. Now two things are
proposed to us to be seen in eternal life: viz. the secret of the
Godhead, to see which is to possess happiness; and the mystery of
Christ's Incarnation, "by Whom we have access" to the glory of the
sons of God, according to Rom. 5:2. Hence it is written (John 17:3):
"This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the . . . true God,
and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent." Wherefore the first
distinction in matters of faith is that some concern the majesty of
the Godhead, while others pertain to the mystery of Christ's human
nature, which is the "mystery of godliness" (1 Tim. 3:16).

Now with regard to the majesty of the Godhead, three things are
proposed to our belief: first, the unity of the Godhead, to which the
first article refers; secondly, the trinity of the Persons, to which
three articles refer, corresponding to the three Persons; and
thirdly, the works proper to the Godhead, the first of which refers
to the order of nature, in relation to which the article about the
creation is proposed to us; the second refers to the order of grace,
in relation to which all matters concerning the sanctification of man
are included in one article; while the third refers to the order of
glory, and in relation to this another article is proposed to us
concerning the resurrection of the dead and life everlasting. Thus
there are seven articles referring to the Godhead.

In like manner, with regard to Christ's human nature, there are seven
articles, the first of which refers to Christ's incarnation or
conception; the second, to His virginal birth; the third, to His
Passion, death and burial; the fourth, to His descent into hell; the
fifth, to His resurrection; the sixth, to His ascension; the seventh,
to His coming for the judgment, so that in all there are fourteen
articles.

Some, however, distinguish twelve articles, six pertaining to the
Godhead, and six to the humanity. For they include in one article the
three about the three Persons; because we have one knowledge of the
three Persons: while they divide the article referring to the work of
glorification into two, viz. the resurrection of the body, and the
glory of the soul. Likewise they unite the conception and nativity
into one article.

Reply Obj. 1: By faith we hold many truths about God, which the
philosophers were unable to discover by natural reason, for instance
His providence and omnipotence, and that He alone is to be worshiped,
all of which are contained in the one article of the unity of God.

Reply Obj. 2: The very name of the Godhead implies a kind of watching
over things, as stated in the First Part (Q. 13, A. 8). Now in beings
having an intellect, power does not work save by the will and
knowledge. Hence God's omnipotence includes, in a way, universal
knowledge and providence. For He would not be able to do all He wills
in things here below, unless He knew them, and exercised His
providence over them.

Reply Obj. 3: We have but one knowledge of the Father, Son, and Holy
Ghost, as to the unity of the Essence, to which the first article
refers: but, as to the distinction of the Persons, which is by the
relations of origin, knowledge of the Father does indeed, in a way,
include knowledge of the Son, for He would not be Father, had He not
a Son; the bond whereof being the Holy Ghost. From this point of
view, there was a sufficient motive for those who referred one
article to the three Persons. Since, however, with regard to each
Person, certain points have to be observed, about which some happen
to fall into error, looking at it in this way, we may distinguish
three articles about the three Persons. For Arius believed in the
omnipotence and eternity of the Father, but did not believe the Son
to be co-equal and consubstantial with the Father; hence the need for
an article about the Person of the Son in order to settle this point.
In like manner it was necessary to appoint a third article about the
Person of the Holy Ghost, against Macedonius. In the same way
Christ's conception and birth, just as the resurrection and life
everlasting, can from one point of view be united together in one
article, in so far as they are ordained to one end; while, from
another point of view, they can be distinct articles, in as much as
each one separately presents a special difficulty.

Reply Obj. 4: It belongs to the Son and Holy Ghost to be sent to
sanctify the creature; and about this several things have to be
believed. Hence it is that there are more articles about the Persons
of the Son and Holy Ghost than about the Person of the Father, Who is
never sent, as we stated in the First Part (Q. 43, A. 4).

Reply Obj. 5: The sanctification of a creature by grace, and its
consummation by glory, is also effected by the gift of charity, which
is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, and by the gift of wisdom, which
is appropriated to the Son: so that each work belongs by
appropriation, but under different aspects, both to the Son and to
the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 6: Two things may be considered in the sacrament of the
Eucharist. One is the fact that it is a sacrament, and in this
respect it is like the other effects of sanctifying grace. The other
is that Christ's body is miraculously contained therein and thus it
is included under God's omnipotence, like all other miracles which
are ascribed to God's almighty power.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 9]

Whether It Is Suitable for the Articles of Faith to Be Embodied in a
Symbol?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is unsuitable for the articles of
faith to be embodied in a symbol. Because Holy Writ is the rule of
faith, to which no addition or subtraction can lawfully be made,
since it is written (Deut. 4:2): "You shall not add to the word that
I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it." Therefore it
was unlawful to make a symbol as a rule of faith, after the Holy
Writ had once been published.

Obj. 2: Further, according to the Apostle (Eph. 4:5) there is but
"one faith." Now the symbol is a profession of faith. Therefore it
is not fitting that there should be more than one symbol.

Obj. 3: Further, the confession of faith, which is contained in the
symbol, concerns all the faithful. Now the faithful are not all
competent to believe in God, but only those who have living faith.
Therefore it is unfitting for the symbol of faith to be expressed
in the words: "I believe in one God."

Obj. 4: Further, the descent into hell is one of the articles of
faith, as stated above (A. 8). But the descent into hell is not
mentioned in the symbol of the Fathers. Therefore the latter is
expressed inadequately.

Obj. 5: Further, Augustine (Tract. xxix in Joan.) expounding the
passage, "You believe in God, believe also in Me" (John 14:1) says:
"We believe Peter or Paul, but we speak only of believing 'in' God."
Since then the Catholic Church is merely a created being, it seems
unfitting to say: "In the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church."

Obj. 6: Further, a symbol is drawn up that it may be a rule of faith.
Now a rule of faith ought to be proposed to all, and that publicly.
Therefore every symbol, besides the symbol of the Fathers, should be
sung at Mass. Therefore it seems unfitting to publish the articles of
faith in a symbol.

_On the contrary,_ The universal Church cannot err, since she is
governed by the Holy Ghost, Who is the Spirit of truth: for such was
Our Lord's promise to His disciples (John 16:13): "When He, the
Spirit of truth, is come, He will teach you all truth." Now the
symbol is published by the authority of the universal Church.
Therefore it contains nothing defective.

_I answer that,_ As the Apostle says (Heb. 11:6), "he that cometh to
God, must believe that He is." Now a man cannot believe, unless the
truth be proposed to him that he may believe it. Hence the need for
the truth of faith to be collected together, so that it might the more
easily be proposed to all, lest anyone might stray from the truth
through ignorance of the faith. It is from its being a collection of
maxims of faith that the symbol [*The Greek _symballein_] takes its
name.

Reply Obj. 1: The truth of faith is contained in Holy Writ,
diffusely, under various modes of expression, and sometimes
obscurely, so that, in order to gather the truth of faith from Holy
Writ, one needs long study and practice, which are unattainable by
all those who require to know the truth of faith, many of whom have
no time for study, being busy with other affairs. And so it was
necessary to gather together a clear summary from the sayings of
Holy Writ, to be proposed to the belief of all. This indeed was no
addition to Holy Writ, but something taken from it.

Reply Obj. 2: The same doctrine of faith is taught in all the
symbols. Nevertheless, the people need more careful instruction about
the truth of faith, when errors arise, lest the faith of
simple-minded persons be corrupted by heretics. It was this that gave
rise to the necessity of formulating several symbols, which nowise
differ from one another, save that on account of the obstinacy of
heretics, one contains more explicitly what another contains
implicitly.

Reply Obj. 3: The confession of faith is drawn up in a symbol in the
person, as it were, of the whole Church, which is united together by
faith. Now the faith of the Church is living faith; since such is
the faith to be found in all those who are of the Church not only
outwardly but also by merit. Hence the confession of faith is
expressed in a symbol, in a manner that is in keeping with living
faith, so that even if some of the faithful lack living faith, they
should endeavor to acquire it.

Reply Obj. 4: No error about the descent into hell had arisen among
heretics, so that there was no need to be more explicit on that
point. For this reason it is not repeated in the symbol of the
Fathers, but is supposed as already settled in the symbol of the
Apostles. For a subsequent symbol does not cancel a preceding one;
rather does it expound it, as stated above (ad 2).

Reply Obj. 5: If we say: "'In' the holy Catholic Church," this must
be taken as verified in so far as our faith is directed to the Holy
Ghost, Who sanctifies the Church; so that the sense is: "I believe in
the Holy Ghost sanctifying the Church." But it is better and more in
keeping with the common use, to omit the 'in,' and say simply, "the
holy Catholic Church," as Pope Leo [*Rufinus, Comm. in Sym. Apost.]
observes.

Reply Obj. 6: Since the symbol of the Fathers is an explanation of
the symbol of the Apostles, and was drawn up after the faith was
already spread abroad, and when the Church was already at peace, it
is sung publicly in the Mass. On the other hand the symbol of the
Apostles, which was drawn up at the time of persecution, before the
faith was made public, is said secretly at Prime and Compline, as
though it were against the darkness of past and future errors.
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 1, Art. 10]

Whether It Belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff to Draw Up a Symbol of
Faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to the Sovereign
Pontiff to draw up a symbol of faith. For a new edition of the symbol
becomes necessary in order to explain the articles of faith, as
stated above (A. 9). Now, in the Old Testament, the articles of faith
were more and more explained as time went on, by reason of the truth
of faith becoming clearer through greater nearness to Christ, as
stated above (A. 7). Since then this reason ceased with the advent of
the New Law, there is no need for the articles of faith to be more
and more explicit. Therefore it does not seem to belong to the
authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a new edition of the
symbol.

Obj. 2: Further, no man has the power to do what is forbidden under
pain of anathema by the universal Church. Now it was forbidden under
pain of anathema by the universal Church, to make a new edition of
the symbol. For it is stated in the acts of the first* council of
Ephesus (P. ii, Act. 6) that "after the symbol of the Nicene council
had been read through, the holy synod decreed that it was unlawful to
utter, write or draw up any other creed, than that which was defined
by the Fathers assembled at Nicaea together with the Holy Ghost," and
this under pain of anathema. [*St. Thomas wrote 'first' (expunged by
Nicolai) to distinguish it from the other council, A.D. 451, known as
the "Latrocinium" and condemned by the Pope.] The same was repeated
in the acts of the council of Chalcedon (P. ii, Act. 5). Therefore it
seems that the Sovereign Pontiff has no authority to publish a new
edition of the symbol.

Obj. 3: Further, Athanasius was not the Sovereign Pontiff, but
patriarch of Alexandria, and yet he published a symbol which is sung
in the Church. Therefore it does not seem to belong to the Sovereign
Pontiff any more than to other bishops, to publish a new edition of
the symbol.

_On the contrary,_ The symbol was drawn up by a general council. Now
such a council cannot be convoked otherwise than by the authority of
the Sovereign Pontiff, as stated in the Decretals [*Dist. xvii, Can.
4, 5]. Therefore it belongs to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff
to draw up a symbol.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Obj. 1), a new edition of the
symbol becomes necessary in order to set aside the errors that may
arise. Consequently to publish a new edition of the symbol belongs to
that authority which is empowered to decide matters of faith finally,
so that they may be held by all with unshaken faith. Now this belongs
to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, "to whom the more
important and more difficult questions that arise in the Church are
referred," as stated in the Decretals [*Dist. xvii, Can. 5]. Hence
our Lord said to Peter whom he made Sovereign Pontiff (Luke 22:32):
"I have prayed for thee," Peter, "that thy faith fail not, and thou,
being once converted, confirm thy brethren." The reason of this is
that there should be but one faith of the whole Church, according to
1 Cor. 1:10: "That you all speak the same thing, and that there be no
schisms among you": and this could not be secured unless any question
of faith that may arise be decided by him who presides over the whole
Church, so that the whole Church may hold firmly to his decision.
Consequently it belongs to the sole authority of the Sovereign
Pontiff to publish a new edition of the symbol, as do all other
matters which concern the whole Church, such as to convoke a general
council and so forth.

Reply Obj. 1: The truth of faith is sufficiently explicit in the
teaching of Christ and the apostles. But since, according to 2 Pet.
3:16, some men are so evil-minded as to pervert the apostolic
teaching and other doctrines and Scriptures to their own destruction,
it was necessary as time went on to express the faith more explicitly
against the errors which arose.

Reply Obj. 2: This prohibition and sentence of the council was
intended for private individuals, who have no business to decide
matters of faith: for this decision of the general council did not
take away from a subsequent council the power of drawing up a new
edition of the symbol, containing not indeed a new faith, but the
same faith with greater explicitness. For every council has taken
into account that a subsequent council would expound matters more
fully than the preceding council, if this became necessary through
some heresy arising. Consequently this belongs to the Sovereign
Pontiff, by whose authority the council is convoked, and its
decision confirmed.

Reply Obj. 3: Athanasius drew up a declaration of faith, not under
the form of a symbol, but rather by way of an exposition of doctrine,
as appears from his way of speaking. But since it contained briefly
the whole truth of faith, it was accepted by the authority of the
Sovereign Pontiff, so as to be considered as a rule of faith. Since
it contained briefly the whole truth of faith, it was accepted by the
authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, so as to be considered as a rule
of faith.
_______________________

QUESTION 2

OF THE ACT OF FAITH
(In Ten Articles)

We must now consider the act of faith, and (1) the internal act;
(2) the external act.

Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:

(1) What is "to believe," which is the internal act of faith?

(2) In how many ways is it expressed?

(3) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in anything
above natural reason?

(4) Whether it is necessary to believe those things that are
attainable by natural reason?

(5) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe certain things
explicitly?

(6) Whether all are equally bound to explicit faith?

(7) Whether explicit faith in Christ is always necessary for
salvation?

(8) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity
explicitly?

(9) Whether the act of faith is meritorious?

(10) Whether human reason diminishes the merit of faith?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 1]

Whether to Believe Is to Think with Assent?

Objection 1: It would seem that to believe is not to think with
assent. Because the Latin word "cogitatio" [thought] implies a
research, for "cogitare" [to think] seems to be equivalent to
"coagitare," i.e. "to discuss together." Now Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. iv) that faith is "an assent without research." Therefore
thinking has no place in the act of faith.

Obj. 2: Further, faith resides in the reason, as we shall show
further on (Q. 4, A. 2). Now to think is an act of the cogitative
power, which belongs to the sensitive faculty, as stated in the
First Part (Q. 78, A. 4). Therefore thought has nothing to do with
faith.

Obj. 3: Further, to believe is an act of the intellect, since its
object is truth. But assent seems to be an act not of the intellect,
but of the will, even as consent is, as stated above (I-II, Q. 15, A.
1, ad 3). Therefore to believe is not to think with assent.

_On the contrary,_ This is how "to believe" is defined by Augustine
(De Praedest. Sanct. ii).

_I answer that,_ "To think" can be taken in three ways. First, in a
general way for any kind of actual consideration of the intellect, as
Augustine observes (De Trin. xiv, 7): "By understanding I mean now
the faculty whereby we understand when thinking." Secondly, "to
think" is more strictly taken for that consideration of the
intellect, which is accompanied by some kind of inquiry, and which
precedes the intellect's arrival at the stage of perfection that
comes with the certitude of sight. In this sense Augustine says (De
Trin. xv, 16) that "the Son of God is not called the Thought, but the
Word of God. When our thought realizes what we know and takes form
therefrom, it becomes our word. Hence the Word of God must be
understood without any thinking on the part of God, for there is
nothing there that can take form, or be unformed." In this way
thought is, properly speaking, the movement of the mind while yet
deliberating, and not yet perfected by the clear sight of truth.
Since, however, such a movement of the mind may be one of
deliberation either about universal notions, which belongs to the
intellectual faculty, or about particular matters, which belongs to
the sensitive part, hence it is that "to think" is taken secondly for
an act of the deliberating intellect, and thirdly for an act of the
cogitative power.

Accordingly, if "to think" be understood broadly according to the
first sense, then "to think with assent," does not express completely
what is meant by "to believe": since, in this way, a man thinks with
assent even when he considers what he knows by science [*Science is
certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its
demonstration.], or understands. If, on the other hand, "to think" be
understood in the second way, then this expresses completely the
nature of the act of believing. For among the acts belonging to the
intellect, some have a firm assent without any such kind of thinking,
as when a man considers the things that he knows by science, or
understands, for this consideration is already formed. But some acts
of the intellect have unformed thought devoid of a firm assent,
whether they incline to neither side, as in one who "doubts"; or
incline to one side rather than the other, but on account of some
slight motive, as in one who "suspects"; or incline to one side yet
with fear of the other, as in one who "opines." But this act "to
believe," cleaves firmly to one side, in which respect belief has
something in common with science and understanding; yet its knowledge
does not attain the perfection of clear sight, wherein it agrees with
doubt, suspicion and opinion. Hence it is proper to the believer to
think with assent: so that the act of believing is distinguished from
all the other acts of the intellect, which are about the true or the
false.

Reply Obj. 1: Faith has not that research of natural reason which
demonstrates what is believed, but a research into those things
whereby a man is induced to believe, for instance that such things
have been uttered by God and confirmed by miracles.

Reply Obj. 2: "To think" is not taken here for the act of the
cogitative power, but for an act of the intellect, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 3: The intellect of the believer is determined to one
object, not by the reason, but by the will, wherefore assent is taken
here for an act of the intellect as determined to one object by the
will.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 2]

Whether the Act of Faith Is Suitably Distinguished As Believing God,
Believing in a God and Believing in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the act of faith is unsuitably
distinguished as believing God, believing in a God, and believing in
God. For one habit has but one act. Now faith is one habit since it is
one virtue. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are three
acts of faith.

Obj. 2: Further, that which is common to all acts of faith should not
be reckoned as a particular kind of act of faith. Now "to believe
God" is common to all acts of faith, since faith is founded on the
First Truth. Therefore it seems unreasonable to distinguish it from
certain other acts of faith.

Obj. 3: Further, that which can be said of unbelievers, cannot be
called an act of faith. Now unbelievers can be said to believe in a
God. Therefore it should not be reckoned an act of faith.

Obj. 4: Further, movement towards the end belongs to the will, whose
object is the good and the end. Now to believe is an act, not of the
will, but of the intellect. Therefore "to believe in God," which
implies movement towards an end, should not be reckoned as a species
of that act.

_On the contrary_ is the authority of Augustine who makes this
distinction (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxi--Tract. xxix in Joan.).

_I answer that,_ The act of any power or habit depends on the relation
of that power or habit to its object. Now the object of faith can be
considered in three ways. For, since "to believe" is an act of the
intellect, in so far as the will moves it to assent, as stated above
(A. 1, ad 3), the object of faith can be considered either on the part
of the intellect, or on the part of the will that moves the intellect.

If it be considered on the part of the intellect, then two things can
be observed in the object of faith, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1). One
of these is the material object of faith, and in this way an act of
faith is "to believe in a God"; because, as stated above (ibid.)
nothing is proposed to our belief, except in as much as it is
referred to God. The other is the formal aspect of the object, for it
is the medium on account of which we assent to such and such a point
of faith; and thus an act of faith is "to believe God," since, as
stated above (ibid.) the formal object of faith is the First Truth,
to Which man gives his adhesion, so as to assent for Its sake to
whatever he believes.

Thirdly, if the object of faith be considered in so far as the
intellect is moved by the will, an act of faith is "to believe in
God." For the First Truth is referred to the will, through having the
aspect of an end.

Reply Obj. 1: These three do not denote different acts of faith, but
one and the same act having different relations to the object of
faith.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply Obj. 3: Unbelievers cannot be said "to believe in a God" as
we understand it in relation to the act of faith. For they do not
believe that God exists under the conditions that faith determines;
hence they do not truly imply believe in a God, since, as the
Philosopher observes (Metaph. ix, text. 22) "to know simple things
defectively is not to know them at all."

Reply Obj. 4: As stated above (I-II, Q. 9, A. 1) the will moves the
intellect and the other powers of the soul to the end: and in this
respect an act of faith is "to believe in God."
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 3]

Whether It Is Necessary for Salvation to Believe Anything Above the
Natural Reason?

Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary for salvation to believe
anything above the natural reason. For the salvation and perfection of
a thing seem to be sufficiently insured by its natural endowments. Now
matters of faith, surpass man's natural reason, since they are things
unseen as stated above (Q. 1, A. 4). Therefore to believe seems
unnecessary for salvation.

Obj. 2: Further, it is dangerous for man to assent to matters,
wherein he cannot judge whether that which is proposed to him be true
or false, according to Job 12:11: "Doth not the ear discern words?"
Now a man cannot form a judgment of this kind in matters of faith,
since he cannot trace them back to first principles, by which all our
judgments are guided. Therefore it is dangerous to believe in such
matters. Therefore to believe is not necessary for salvation.

Obj. 3: Further, man's salvation rests on God, according to Ps.
36:39: "But the salvation of the just is from the Lord." Now "the
invisible things" of God "are clearly seen, being understood by the
things that are made; His eternal power also and Divinity," according
to Rom. 1:20: and those things which are clearly seen by the
understanding are not an object of belief. Therefore it is not
necessary for man's salvation, that he should believe certain things.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 11:6): "Without faith it is
impossible to please God."

_I answer that,_ Wherever one nature is subordinate to another, we
find that two things concur towards the perfection of the lower
nature, one of which is in respect of that nature's proper movement,
while the other is in respect of the movement of the higher nature.
Thus water by its proper movement moves towards the centre (of the
earth), while according to the movement of the moon, it moves round
the centre by ebb and flow. In like manner the planets have their
proper movements from west to east, while in accordance with the
movement of the first heaven, they have a movement from east to west.
Now the created rational nature alone is immediately subordinate to
God, since other creatures do not attain to the universal, but only
to something particular, while they partake of the Divine goodness
either in _being_ only, as inanimate things, or also in _living,_ and
in _knowing singulars,_ as plants and animals; whereas the rational
nature, in as much as it apprehends the universal notion of good and
being, is immediately related to the universal principle of being.

Consequently the perfection of the rational creature consists not
only in what belongs to it in respect of its nature, but also in that
which it acquires through a supernatural participation of Divine
goodness. Hence it was said above (I-II, Q. 3, A. 8) that man's
ultimate happiness consists in a supernatural vision of God: to which
vision man cannot attain unless he be taught by God, according to
John 6:45: "Every one that hath heard of the Father and hath learned
cometh to Me." Now man acquires a share of this learning, not indeed
all at once, but by little and little, according to the mode of his
nature: and every one who learns thus must needs believe, in order
that he may acquire science in a perfect degree; thus also the
Philosopher remarks (De Soph. Elench. i, 2) that "it behooves a
learner to believe."

Hence in order that a man arrive at the perfect vision of heavenly
happiness, he must first of all believe God, as a disciple believes
the master who is teaching him.

Reply Obj. 1: Since man's nature is dependent on a higher nature,
natural knowledge does not suffice for its perfection, and some
supernatural knowledge is necessary, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as man assents to first principles, by the natural
light of his intellect, so does a virtuous man, by the habit of
virtue, judge aright of things concerning that virtue; and in this
way, by the light of faith which God bestows on him, a man assents to
matters of faith and not to those which are against faith.
Consequently "there is no" danger or "condemnation to them that are
in Christ Jesus," and whom He has enlightened by faith.

Reply Obj. 3: In many respects faith perceives the invisible things
of God in a higher way than natural reason does in proceeding to God
from His creatures. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 3:25): "Many things
are shown to thee above the understandings of man."
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 4]

Whether It Is Necessary to Believe Those Things Which Can Be Proved
by Natural Reason?

Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary to believe those things which
can be proved by natural reason. For nothing is superfluous in God's
works, much less even than in the works of nature. Now it is
superfluous to employ other means, where one already suffices.
Therefore it would be superfluous to receive by faith, things that
can be known by natural reason.

Obj. 2: Further, those things must be believed, which are the object
of faith. Now science and faith are not about the same object, as
stated above (Q. 1, AA. 4, 5). Since therefore all things that can be
known by natural reason are an object of science, it seems that there
is no need to believe what can be proved by natural reason.

Obj. 3: Further, all things knowable scientifically [*Science is
certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its
demonstration] would seem to come under one head: so that if some of
them are proposed to man as objects of faith, in like manner the
others should also be believed. But this is not true. Therefore it is
not necessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural
reason.

_On the contrary,_ It is necessary to believe that God is one and
incorporeal: which things philosophers prove by natural reason.

_I answer that,_ It is necessary for man to accept by faith not only
things which are above reason, but also those which can be known by
reason: and this for three motives. First, in order that man may
arrive more quickly at the knowledge of Divine truth. Because the
science to whose province it belongs to prove the existence of God,
is the last of all to offer itself to human research, since it
presupposes many other sciences: so that it would not by until late
in life that man would arrive at the knowledge of God. The second
reason is, in order that the knowledge of God may be more general.
For many are unable to make progress in the study of science, either
through dullness of mind, or through having a number of occupations,
and temporal needs, or even through laziness in learning, all of whom
would be altogether deprived of the knowledge of God, unless Divine
things were brought to their knowledge under the guise of faith. The
third reason is for the sake of certitude. For human reason is very
deficient in things concerning God. A sign of this is that
philosophers in their researches, by natural investigation, into
human affairs, have fallen into many errors, and have disagreed among
themselves. And consequently, in order that men might have knowledge
of God, free of doubt and uncertainty, it was necessary for Divine
matters to be delivered to them by way of faith, being told to them,
as it were, by God Himself Who cannot lie.

Reply Obj. 1: The researches of natural reason do not suffice mankind
for the knowledge of Divine matters, even of those that can be proved
by reason: and so it is not superfluous if these others be believed.

Reply Obj. 2: Science and faith cannot be in the same subject and
about the same object: but what is an object of science for one, can
be an object of faith for another, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 5).

Reply Obj. 3: Although all things that can be known by science are
of one common scientific aspect, they do not all alike lead man to
beatitude: hence they are not all equally proposed to our belief.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 5]

Whether Man Is Bound to Believe Anything Explicitly?

Objection 1: It would seem that man is not bound to believe anything
explicitly. For no man is bound to do what is not in his power. Now it
is not in man's power to believe a thing explicitly, for it is written
(Rom. 10:14, 15): "How shall they believe Him, of whom they have not
heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall they
preach unless they be sent?" Therefore man is not bound to believe
anything explicitly.

Obj. 2: Further, just as we are directed to God by faith, so are we
by charity. Now man is not bound to keep the precepts of charity, and
it is enough if he be ready to fulfil them: as is evidenced by the
precept of Our Lord (Matt. 5:39): "If one strike thee on one [Vulg.:
'thy right'] cheek, turn to him also the other"; and by others of the
same kind, according to Augustine's exposition (De Serm. Dom. in
Monte xix). Therefore neither is man bound to believe anything
explicitly, and it is enough if he be ready to believe whatever God
proposes to be believed.

Obj. 3: Further, the good of faith consists in obedience, according
to Rom. 1:5: "For obedience to the faith in all nations." Now the
virtue of obedience does not require man to keep certain fixed
precepts, but it is enough that his mind be ready to obey, according
to Ps. 118:60: "I am ready and am not troubled; that I may keep Thy
commandments." Therefore it seems enough for faith, too, that man
should be ready to believe whatever God may propose, without his
believing anything explicitly.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 11:6): "He that cometh to God,
must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him."

_I answer that,_ The precepts of the Law, which man is bound to
fulfil, concern acts of virtue which are the means of attaining
salvation. Now an act of virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q. 60, A. 5)
depends on the relation of the habit to its object. Again two things
may be considered in the object of any virtue; namely, that which is
the proper and direct object of that virtue, and that which is
accidental and consequent to the object properly so called. Thus it
belongs properly and directly to the object of fortitude, to face the
dangers of death, and to charge at the foe with danger to oneself,
for the sake of the common good: yet that, in a just war, a man be
armed, or strike another with his sword, and so forth, is reduced to
the object of fortitude, but indirectly.

Accordingly, just as a virtuous act is required for the fulfilment of
a precept, so is it necessary that the virtuous act should terminate
in its proper and direct object: but, on the other hand, the
fulfilment of the precept does not require that a virtuous act should
terminate in those things which have an accidental or secondary
relation to the proper and direct object of that virtue, except in
certain places and at certain times. We must, therefore, say that the
direct object of faith is that whereby man is made one of the
Blessed, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 8): while the indirect and
secondary object comprises all things delivered by God to us in Holy
Writ, for instance that Abraham had two sons, that David was the son
of Jesse, and so forth.

Therefore, as regards the primary points or articles of faith, man is
bound to believe them, just as he is bound to have faith; but as to
other points of faith, man is not bound to believe them explicitly,
but only implicitly, or to be ready to believe them, in so far as he
is prepared to believe whatever is contained in the Divine
Scriptures. Then alone is he bound to believe such things explicitly,
when it is clear to him that they are contained in the doctrine of
faith.

Reply Obj. 1: If we understand those things alone to be in a man's
power, which we can do without the help of grace, then we are bound
to do many things which we cannot do without the aid of healing
grace, such as to love God and our neighbor, and likewise to believe
the articles of faith. But with the help of grace we can do this, for
this help "to whomsoever it is given from above it is mercifully
given; and from whom it is withheld it is justly withheld, as a
punishment of a previous, or at least of original, sin," as Augustine
states (De Corr. et Grat. v, vi [*Cf. Ep. cxc; De Praed. Sanct.
viii.]).

Reply Obj. 2: Man is bound to love definitely those lovable things
which are properly and directly the objects of charity, namely, God
and our neighbor. The objection refers to those precepts of charity
which belong, as a consequence, to the objects of charity.

Reply Obj. 3: The virtue of obedience is seated, properly speaking,
in the will; hence promptness of the will subject to authority,
suffices for the act of obedience, because it is the proper and
direct object of obedience. But this or that precept is accidental
or consequent to that proper and direct object.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 6]

Whether All Are Equally Bound to Have Explicit Faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that all are equally bound to have
explicit faith. For all are bound to those things which are necessary
for salvation, as is evidenced by the precepts of charity. Now it is
necessary for salvation that certain things should be believed
explicitly. Therefore all are equally bound to have explicit faith.

Obj. 2: Further, no one should be put to test in matters that he is
not bound to believe. But simple persons are sometimes tested in
reference to the slightest articles of faith. Therefore all are
bound to believe everything explicitly.

Obj. 3: Further, if the simple are bound to have, not explicit but
only implicit faith, their faith must needs be implied in the faith
of the learned. But this seems unsafe, since it is possible for the
learned to err. Therefore it seems that the simple should also have
explicit faith; so that all are, therefore, equally bound to have
explicit faith.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 1:14): "The oxen were
ploughing, and the asses feeding beside them," because, as Gregory
expounds this passage (Moral. ii, 17), the simple, who are signified
by the asses, ought, in matters of faith, to stay by the learned, who
are denoted by the oxen.

_I answer that,_ The unfolding of matters of faith is the result of
Divine revelation: for matters of faith surpass natural reason. Now
Divine revelation reaches those of lower degree through those who are
over them, in a certain order; to men, for instance, through the
angels, and to the lower angels through the higher, as Dionysius
explains (Coel. Hier. iv, vii). In like manner therefore the unfolding
of faith must needs reach men of lower degree through those of higher
degree. Consequently, just as the higher angels, who enlighten those
who are below them, have a fuller knowledge of Divine things than the
lower angels, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. xii), so too, men of
higher degree, whose business it is to teach others, are under
obligation to have fuller knowledge of matters of faith, and to
believe them more explicitly.

Reply Obj. 1: The unfolding of the articles of faith is not equally
necessary for the salvation of all, since those of higher degree,
whose duty it is to teach others, are bound to believe explicitly
more things than others are.

Reply Obj. 2: Simple persons should not be put to the test about
subtle questions of faith, unless they be suspected of having been
corrupted by heretics, who are wont to corrupt the faith of simple
people in such questions. If, however, it is found that they are free
from obstinacy in their heterodox sentiments, and that it is due to
their simplicity, it is no fault of theirs.

Reply Obj. 3: The simple have no faith implied in that of the
learned, except in so far as the latter adhere to the Divine
teaching. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:16): "Be ye followers of
me, as I also am of Christ." Hence it is not human knowledge, but the
Divine truth that is the rule of faith: and if any of the learned
stray from this rule, he does not harm the faith of the simple ones,
who think that the learned believe aright; unless the simple hold
obstinately to their individual errors, against the faith of the
universal Church, which cannot err, since Our Lord said (Luke 22:32):
"I have prayed for thee," Peter, "that thy faith fail not."
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 7]

Whether It Is Necessary for the Salvation of All, That They Should
Believe Explicitly in the Mystery of Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary for the salvation
of all that they should believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ.
For man is not bound to believe explicitly what the angels are
ignorant about: since the unfolding of faith is the result of Divine
revelation, which reaches man by means of the angels, as stated above
(A. 6; I, Q. 111, A. 1). Now even the angels were in ignorance of the
mystery of the Incarnation: hence, according to the commentary of
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), it is they who ask (Ps. 23:8): "Who is
this king of glory?" and (Isa. 63:1): "Who is this that cometh from
Edom?" Therefore men were not bound to believe explicitly in the
mystery of Christ's Incarnation.

Obj. 2: Further, it is evident that John the Baptist was one of the
teachers, and most nigh to Christ, Who said of him (Matt. 11:11) that
"there hath not risen among them that are born of women, a greater
than" he. Now John the Baptist does not appear to have known the
mystery of Christ explicitly, since he asked Christ (Matt. 11:3):
"Art Thou He that art to come, or look we for another?" Therefore
even the teachers were not bound to explicit faith in Christ.

Obj. 3: Further, many gentiles obtained salvation through the
ministry of the angels, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. ix). Now it
would seem that the gentiles had neither explicit nor implicit faith
in Christ, since they received no revelation. Therefore it seems that
it was not necessary for the salvation of all to believe explicitly
in the mystery of Christ.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Corr. et Gratia vii; Ep. cxc):
"Our faith is sound if we believe that no man, old or young is
delivered from the contagion of death and the bonds of sin, except
by the one Mediator of God and men, Jesus Christ."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5; Q. 1, A. 8), the object of
faith includes, properly and directly, that thing through which man
obtains beatitude. Now the mystery of Christ's Incarnation and
Passion is the way by which men obtain beatitude; for it is written
(Acts 4:12): "There is no other name under heaven given to men,
whereby we must be saved." Therefore belief of some kind in the
mystery of Christ's Incarnation was necessary at all times and for
all persons, but this belief differed according to differences of
times and persons. The reason of this is that before the state of
sin, man believed, explicitly in Christ's Incarnation, in so far as
it was intended for the consummation of glory, but not as it was
intended to deliver man from sin by the Passion and Resurrection,
since man had no foreknowledge of his future sin. He does, however,
seem to have had foreknowledge of the Incarnation of Christ, from the
fact that he said (Gen. 2:24): "Wherefore a man shall leave father
and mother, and shall cleave to his wife," of which the Apostle says
(Eph. 5:32) that "this is a great sacrament . . . in Christ and the
Church," and it is incredible that the first man was ignorant about
this sacrament.

But after sin, man believed explicitly in Christ, not only as to the
Incarnation, but also as to the Passion and Resurrection, whereby the
human race is delivered from sin and death: for they would not, else,
have foreshadowed Christ's Passion by certain sacrifices both before
and after the Law, the meaning of which sacrifices was known by the
learned explicitly, while the simple folk, under the veil of those
sacrifices, believed them to be ordained by God in reference to
Christ's coming, and thus their knowledge was covered with a veil, so
to speak. And, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 7), the nearer they were to
Christ, the more distinct was their knowledge of Christ's mysteries.

After grace had been revealed, both learned and simple folk are bound
to explicit faith in the mysteries of Christ, chiefly as regards
those which are observed throughout the Church, and publicly
proclaimed, such as the articles which refer to the Incarnation, of
which we have spoken above (Q. 1, A. 8). As to other minute points in
reference to the articles of the Incarnation, men have been bound to
believe them more or less explicitly according to each one's state
and office.

Reply Obj. 1: The mystery of the Kingdom of God was not entirely
hidden from the angels, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. v, 19),
yet certain aspects thereof were better known to them when Christ
revealed them to them.

Reply Obj. 2: It was not through ignorance that John the Baptist
inquired of Christ's advent in the flesh, since he had clearly
professed his belief therein, saying: "I saw, and I gave testimony,
that this is the Son of God" (John 1:34). Hence he did not say: "Art
Thou He that hast come?" but "Art Thou He that art to come?" thus
saying about the future, not about the past. Likewise it is not to be
believed that he was ignorant of Christ's future Passion, for he had
already said (John 1:39): "Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him who
taketh away the sins [Vulg.: 'sin'] of the world," thus foretelling
His future immolation; and since other prophets had foretold it, as
may be seen especially in Isaias 53. We may therefore say with
Gregory (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that he asked this question, being in
ignorance as to whether Christ would descend into hell in His own
Person. But he did not ignore the fact that the power of Christ's
Passion would be extended to those who were detained in Limbo,
according to Zech. 9:11: "Thou also, by the blood of Thy testament
hast sent forth Thy prisoners out of the pit, wherein there is no
water"; nor was he bound to believe explicitly, before its
fulfilment, that Christ was to descend thither Himself.

It may also be replied that, as Ambrose observes in his commentary on
Luke 7:19, he made this inquiry, not from doubt or ignorance but from
devotion: or again, with Chrysostom (Hom. xxxvi in Matth.), that he
inquired, not as though ignorant himself, but because he wished his
disciples to be satisfied on that point, through Christ: hence the
latter framed His answer so as to instruct the disciples, by pointing
to the signs of His works.

Reply Obj. 3: Many of the gentiles received revelations of Christ, as
is clear from their predictions. Thus we read (Job 19:25): "I know
that my Redeemer liveth." The Sibyl too foretold certain things about
Christ, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. xiii, 15). Moreover, we
read in the history of the Romans, that at the time of Constantine
Augustus and his mother Irene a tomb was discovered, wherein lay a
man on whose breast was a golden plate with the inscription: "Christ
shall be born of a virgin, and in Him, I believe. O sun, during the
lifetime of Irene and Constantine, thou shalt see me again" [*Cf.
Baron, Annal., A.D. 780]. If, however, some were saved without
receiving any revelation, they were not saved without faith in a
Mediator, for, though they did not believe in Him explicitly, they
did, nevertheless, have implicit faith through believing in Divine
providence, since they believed that God would deliver mankind in
whatever way was pleasing to Him, and according to the revelation of
the Spirit to those who knew the truth, as stated in Job 35:11: "Who
teacheth us more than the beasts of the earth."
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 8]

Whether It Is Necessary for Salvation to Believe Explicitly in the
Trinity?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not necessary for salvation to
believe explicitly in the Trinity. For the Apostle says (Heb. 11:6):
"He that cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to
them that seek Him." Now one can believe this without believing in the
Trinity. Therefore it was not necessary to believe explicitly in the
Trinity.

Obj. 2: Further our Lord said (John 17:5, 6): "Father, I have
manifested Thy name to men," which words Augustine expounds (Tract.
cvi) as follows: "Not the name by which Thou art called God, but the
name whereby Thou art called My Father," and further on he adds: "In
that He made this world, God is known to all nations; in that He is
not to be worshipped together with false gods, 'God is known in
Judea'; but, in that He is the Father of this Christ, through Whom He
takes away the sin of the world, He now makes known to men this name
of His, which hitherto they knew not." Therefore before the coming of
Christ it was not known that Paternity and Filiation were in the
Godhead: and so the Trinity was not believed explicitly.

Obj. 3: Further, that which we are bound to believe explicitly of God
is the object of heavenly happiness. Now the object of heavenly
happiness is the sovereign good, which can be understood to be in
God, without any distinction of Persons. Therefore it was not
necessary to believe explicitly in the Trinity.

_On the contrary,_ In the Old Testament the Trinity of Persons is
expressed in many ways; thus at the very outset of Genesis it is
written in manifestation of the Trinity: "Let us make man to Our image
and likeness" (Gen. 1:26). Therefore from the very beginning it was
necessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity.

_I answer that,_ It is impossible to believe explicitly in the
mystery of Christ, without faith in the Trinity, since the mystery of
Christ includes that the Son of God took flesh; that He renewed the
world through the grace of the Holy Ghost; and again, that He was
conceived by the Holy Ghost. Wherefore just as, before Christ, the
mystery of Christ was believed explicitly by the learned, but
implicitly and under a veil, so to speak, by the simple, so too was
it with the mystery of the Trinity. And consequently, when once grace
had been revealed, all were bound to explicit faith in the mystery of
the Trinity: and all who are born again in Christ, have this bestowed
on them by the invocation of the Trinity, according to Matt. 28:19:
"Going therefore teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of
the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost."

Reply Obj. 1: Explicit faith in those two things was necessary at all
times and for all people: but it was not sufficient at all times and
for all people.

Reply Obj. 2: Before Christ's coming, faith in the Trinity lay hidden
in the faith of the learned, but through Christ and the apostles it
was shown to the world.

Reply Obj. 3: God's sovereign goodness as we understand it now
through its effects, can be understood without the Trinity of
Persons: but as understood in itself, and as seen by the Blessed, it
cannot be understood without the Trinity of Persons. Moreover the
mission of the Divine Persons brings us to heavenly happiness.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 9]

Whether to Believe Is Meritorious?

Objection 1: It would seem that to believe is not meritorious. For
the principle of all merit is charity, as stated above (I-II, Q. 114,
A. 4). Now faith, like nature, is a preamble to charity. Therefore,
just as an act of nature is not meritorious, since we do not merit by
our natural gifts, so neither is an act of faith.

Obj. 2: Further, belief is a mean between opinion and scientific
knowledge or the consideration of things scientifically known
[*Science is a certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through
its demonstration.]. Now the considerations of science are not
meritorious, nor on the other hand is opinion. Therefore belief is
not meritorious.

Obj. 3: Further, he who assents to a point of faith, either has a
sufficient motive for believing, or he has not. If he has a
sufficient motive for his belief, this does not seem to imply any
merit on his part, since he is no longer free to believe or not to
believe: whereas if he has not a sufficient motive for believing,
this is a mark of levity, according to Ecclus. 19:4: "He that is
hasty to give credit, is light of heart," so that, seemingly, he
gains no merit thereby. Therefore to believe is by no means
meritorious.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 11:33) that the saints "by
faith . . . obtained promises," which would not be the case if they
did not merit by believing. Therefore to believe is meritorious.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 114, AA. 3, 4), our
actions are meritorious in so far as they proceed from the free-will
moved with grace by God. Therefore every human act proceeding from
the free-will, if it be referred to God, can be meritorious. Now the
act of believing is an act of the intellect assenting to the Divine
truth at the command of the will moved by the grace of God, so that
it is subject to the free-will in relation to God; and consequently
the act of faith can be meritorious.

Reply Obj. 1: Nature is compared to charity which is the principle of
merit, as matter to form: whereas faith is compared to charity as the
disposition which precedes the ultimate form. Now it is evident that
the subject or the matter cannot act save by virtue of the form, nor
can a preceding disposition, before the advent of the form: but after
the advent of the form, both the subject and the preceding
disposition act by virtue of the form, which is the chief principle
of action, even as the heat of fire acts by virtue of the substantial
form of fire. Accordingly neither nature nor faith can, without
charity, produce a meritorious act; but, when accompanied by charity,
the act of faith is made meritorious thereby, even as an act of
nature, and a natural act of the free-will.

Reply Obj. 2: Two things may be considered in science: namely the
scientist's assent to a scientific fact and his consideration of that
fact. Now the assent of science is not subject to free-will, because
the scientist is obliged to assent by force of the demonstration,
wherefore scientific assent is not meritorious. But the actual
consideration of what a man knows scientifically is subject to his
free-will, for it is in his power to consider or not to consider.
Hence scientific consideration may be meritorious if it be referred
to the end of charity, i.e. to the honor of God or the good of our
neighbor. On the other hand, in the case of faith, both these things
are subject to the free-will so that in both respects the act of
faith can be meritorious: whereas in the case of opinion, there is no
firm assent, since it is weak and infirm, as the Philosopher observes
(Poster. i, 33), so that it does not seem to proceed from a perfect
act of the will: and for this reason, as regards the assent, it does
not appear to be very meritorious, though it can be as regards the
actual consideration.

Reply Obj. 3: The believer has sufficient motive for believing, for
he is moved by the authority of Divine teaching confirmed by
miracles, and, what is more, by the inward instinct of the Divine
invitation: hence he does not believe lightly. He has not, however,
sufficient reason for scientific knowledge, hence he does not lose
the merit.
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 10]

Whether Reasons in Support of What We Believe Lessen the Merit of
Faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that reasons in support of what we believe
lessen the merit of faith. For Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.)
that "there is no merit in believing what is shown by reason." If,
therefore, human reason provides sufficient proof, the merit of faith
is altogether taken away. Therefore it seems that any kind of human
reasoning in support of matters of faith, diminishes the merit of
believing.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever lessens the measure of virtue, lessens
the amount of merit, since "happiness is the reward of virtue," as
the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 9). Now human reasoning seems to
diminish the measure of the virtue of faith, since it is essential
to faith to be about the unseen, as stated above (Q. 1, AA. 4, 5).
Now the more a thing is supported by reasons the less is it unseen.
Therefore human reasons in support of matters of faith diminish the
merit of faith.

Obj. 3: Further, contrary things have contrary causes. Now an
inducement in opposition to faith increases the merit of faith whether
it consist in persecution inflicted by one who endeavors to force a
man to renounce his faith, or in an argument persuading him to do so.
Therefore reasons in support of faith diminish the merit of faith.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Pet. 3:15): "Being ready always to
satisfy every one that asketh you a reason of that faith [*Vulg.: 'Of
that hope which is in you.' St. Thomas' reading is apparently taken
from Bede.] and hope which is in you." Now the Apostle would not give
this advice, if it would imply a diminution in the merit of faith.
Therefore reason does not diminish the merit of faith.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 9), the act of faith can be
meritorious, in so far as it is subject to the will, not only as to
the use, but also as to the assent. Now human reason in support of
what we believe, may stand in a twofold relation to the will of the
believer. First, as preceding the act of the will; as, for instance,
when a man either has not the will, or not a prompt will, to believe,
unless he be moved by human reasons: and in this way human reason
diminishes the merit of faith. In this sense it has been said above
(I-II, Q. 24, A. 3, ad 1; Q. 77, A. 6, ad 2) that, in moral virtues,
a passion which precedes choice makes the virtuous act less
praiseworthy. For just as a man ought to perform acts of moral
virtue, on account of the judgment of his reason, and not on account
of a passion, so ought he to believe matters of faith, not on account
of human reason, but on account of the Divine authority. Secondly,
human reasons may be consequent to the will of the believer. For when
a man's will is ready to believe, he loves the truth he believes, he
thinks out and takes to heart whatever reasons he can find in support
thereof; and in this way human reason does not exclude the merit of
faith but is a sign of greater merit. Thus again, in moral virtues a
consequent passion is the sign of a more prompt will, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 24, A. 3, ad 1). We have an indication of this in the words
of the Samaritans to the woman, who is a type of human reason: "We
now believe, not for thy saying" (John 4:42).

Reply Obj. 1: Gregory is referring to the case of a man who has no
will to believe what is of faith, unless he be induced by reasons.
But when a man has the will to believe what is of faith on the
authority of God alone, although he may have reasons in demonstration
of some of them, e.g. of the existence of God, the merit of his faith
is not, for that reason, lost or diminished.

Reply Obj. 2: The reasons which are brought forward in support of
the authority of faith, are not demonstrations which can bring
intellectual vision to the human intellect, wherefore they do not
cease to be unseen. But they remove obstacles to faith, by showing
that what faith proposes is not impossible; wherefore such reasons do
not diminish the merit or the measure of faith. On the other hand,
though demonstrative reasons in support of the preambles of faith
[*The Leonine Edition reads: 'in support of matters of faith which
are however, preambles to the articles of faith, diminish,' etc.],
but not of the articles of faith, diminish the measure of faith,
since they make the thing believed to be seen, yet they do not
diminish the measure of charity, which makes the will ready to
believe them, even if they were unseen; and so the measure of merit
is not diminished.

Reply Obj. 3: Whatever is in opposition to faith, whether it consist
in a man's thoughts, or in outward persecution, increases the merit
of faith, in so far as the will is shown to be more prompt and firm
in believing. Hence the martyrs had more merit of faith, through not
renouncing faith on account of persecution; and even the wise have
greater merit of faith, through not renouncing their faith on account
of the reasons brought forward by philosophers or heretics in
opposition to faith. On the other hand things that are favorable to
faith, do not always diminish the promptness of the will to believe,
and therefore they do not always diminish the merit of faith.
_______________________

QUESTION 3

OF THE OUTWARD ACT OF FAITH
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider the outward act, viz. the confession of faith:
under which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether confession is an act of faith?

(2) Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 3, Art. 1]

Whether Confession Is an Act of Faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that confession is not an act of faith.
For the same act does not belong to different virtues. Now confession
belongs to penance of which it is a part. Therefore it is not an act
of faith.

Obj. 2: Further, man is sometimes deterred by fear or some kind of
confusion, from confessing his faith: wherefore the Apostle (Eph.
6:19) asks for prayers that it may be granted him "with confidence,
to make known the mystery of the gospel." Now it belongs to
fortitude, which moderates daring and fear, not to be deterred from
doing good on account of confusion or fear. Therefore it seems that
confession is not an act of faith, but rather of fortitude or
constancy.

Obj. 3: Further, just as the ardor of faith makes one confess one's
faith outwardly, so does it make one do other external good works,
for it is written (Gal. 5:6) that "faith . . . worketh by charity."
But other external works are not reckoned acts of faith. Therefore
neither is confession an act of faith.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss explains the words of 2 Thess. 1:11, "and
the work of faith in power" as referring to "confession which is a
work proper to faith."

_I answer that,_ Outward actions belong properly to the virtue to
whose end they are specifically referred: thus fasting is referred
specifically to the end of abstinence, which is to tame the flesh,
and consequently it is an act of abstinence.

Now confession of those things that are of faith is referred
specifically as to its end, to that which concerns faith, according
to 2 Cor. 4:13: "Having the same spirit of faith . . . we believe,
and therefore we speak also." For the outward utterance is intended
to signify the inward thought. Wherefore, just as the inward thought
of matters of faith is properly an act of faith, so too is the
outward confession of them.

Reply Obj. 1: A threefold confession is commended by the Scriptures.
One is the confession of matters of faith, and this is a proper act
of faith, since it is referred to the end of faith as stated above.
Another is the confession of thanksgiving or praise, and this is an
act of "latria," for its purpose is to give outward honor to God,
which is the end of "latria." The third is the confession of sins,
which is ordained to the blotting out of sins, which is the end of
penance, to which virtue it therefore belongs.

Reply Obj. 2: That which removes an obstacle is not a direct, but an
indirect, cause, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 4). Hence
fortitude which removes an obstacle to the confession of faith, viz.
fear or shame, is not the proper and direct cause of confession, but
an indirect cause so to speak.

Reply Obj. 3: Inward faith, with the aid of charity, causes all
outward acts of virtue, by means of the other virtues, commanding,
but not eliciting them; whereas it produces the act of confession
as its proper act, without the help of any other virtue.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 3, Art. 2]

Whether Confession of Faith Is Necessary for Salvation?

Objection 1: It would seem that confession of faith is not necessary
for salvation. For, seemingly, a thing is sufficient for salvation, if
it is a means of attaining the end of virtue. Now the proper end of
faith is the union of the human mind with Divine truth, and this can
be realized without any outward confession. Therefore confession of
faith is not necessary for salvation.

Obj. 2: Further, by outward confession of faith, a man reveals his
faith to another man. But this is unnecessary save for those who have
to instruct others in the faith. Therefore it seems that the simple
folk are not bound to confess the faith.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever may tend to scandalize and disturb others,
is not necessary for salvation, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:32):
"Be without offense to the Jews and to the gentiles and to the Church
of God." Now confession of faith sometimes causes a disturbance among
unbelievers. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 10:10): "With the heart we
believe unto justice; but with the mouth, confession is made unto
salvation."

_I answer that,_ Things that are necessary for salvation come under
the precepts of the Divine law. Now since confession of faith is
something affirmative, it can only fall under an affirmative precept.
Hence its necessity for salvation depends on how it falls under an
affirmative precept of the Divine law. Now affirmative precepts as
stated above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 5, ad 3; I-II, Q. 88, A. 1, ad 2) do
not bind for always, although they are always binding; but they bind
as to place and time according to other due circumstances, in respect
of which human acts have to be regulated in order to be acts of
virtue.

Thus then it is not necessary for salvation to confess one's faith at
all times and in all places, but in certain places and at certain
times, when, namely, by omitting to do so, we would deprive God of
due honor, or our neighbor of a service that we ought to render him:
for instance, if a man, on being asked about his faith, were to
remain silent, so as to make people believe either that he is without
faith, or that the faith is false, or so as to turn others away from
the faith; for in such cases as these, confession of faith is
necessary for salvation.

Reply Obj. 1: The end of faith, even as of the other virtues, must
be referred to the end of charity, which is the love of God and our
neighbor. Consequently when God's honor and our neighbor's good
demand, man should not be contented with being united by faith to
God's truth, but ought to confess his faith outwardly.

Reply Obj. 2: In cases of necessity where faith is in danger, every
one is bound to proclaim his faith to others, either to give good
example and encouragement to the rest of the faithful, or to check
the attacks of unbelievers: but at other times it is not the duty
of all the faithful to instruct others in the faith.

Reply Obj. 3: There is nothing commendable in making a public
confession of one's faith, if it causes a disturbance among
unbelievers, without any profit either to the faith or to the
faithful. Hence Our Lord said (Matt. 7:6): "Give not that which is
holy to dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine . . . lest
turning upon you, they tear you." Yet, if there is hope of profit to
the faith, or if there be urgency, a man should disregard the
disturbance of unbelievers, and confess his faith in public. Hence it
is written (Matt. 15:12) that when the disciples had said to Our Lord
that "the Pharisee, when they heard this word, were scandalized," He
answered: "Let them alone, they are blind, and leaders of the blind."
_______________________

QUESTION 4

OF THE VIRTUE ITSELF OF FAITH
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider the virtue itself of faith, and, in the first
place, faith itself; secondly, those who have faith; thirdly, the
cause of faith; fourthly, its effects.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) What is faith?

(2) In what power of the soul does it reside?

(3) Whether its form is charity?

(4) Whether living (_formata_) faith and lifeless (_informis_) faith
are one identically?

(5) Whether faith is a virtue?

(6) Whether it is one virtue?

(7) Of its relation to the other virtues;

(8) Of its certitude as compared with the certitude of the
intellectual virtues.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 1]

Whether This Is a Fitting Definition of Faith: "Faith Is the
Substance of Things to Be Hoped For, the Evidence of Things That
Appear Not?"

Objection 1: It would seem that the Apostle gives an unfitting
definition of faith (Heb. 11:1) when he says: "Faith is the substance
of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not."
For no quality is a substance: whereas faith is a quality, since it
is a theological virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 3).
Therefore it is not a substance.

Obj. 2: Further, different virtues have different objects. Now things
to be hoped for are the object of hope. Therefore they should not be
included in a definition of faith, as though they were its object.

Obj. 3: Further, faith is perfected by charity rather than by hope,
since charity is the form of faith, as we shall state further on (A.
3). Therefore the definition of faith should have included the thing
to be loved rather than the thing to be hoped for.

Obj. 4: Further, the same thing should not be placed in different
genera. Now "substance" and "evidence" are different genera, and
neither is subalternate to the other. Therefore it is unfitting to
state that faith is both "substance" and "evidence."

Obj. 5: Further, evidence manifests the truth of the matter for which
it is adduced. Now a thing is said to be apparent when its truth is
already manifest. Therefore it seems to imply a contradiction to
speak of "evidence of things that appear not": and so faith is
unfittingly defined.

_On the contrary,_ The authority of the Apostle suffices.

_I answer that,_ Though some say that the above words of the Apostle are
not a definition of faith, yet if we consider the matter aright, this
definition overlooks none of the points in reference to which faith
can be defined, albeit the words themselves are not arranged in the
form of a definition, just as the philosophers touch on the principles
of the syllogism, without employing the syllogistic form.

In order to make this clear, we must observe that since habits are
known by their acts, and acts by their objects, faith, being a habit,
should be defined by its proper act in relation to its proper object.
Now the act of faith is to believe, as stated above (Q. 2, AA. 2, 3),
which is an act of the intellect determinate to one object of the
will's command. Hence an act of faith is related both to the object
of the will, i.e. to the good and the end, and to the object of the
intellect, i.e. to the true. And since faith, through being a
theological virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 2), has one same
thing for object and end, its object and end must, of necessity, be
in proportion to one another. Now it has been already stated (Q. 1,
AA. 1, 4) that the object of faith is the First Truth, as unseen, and
whatever we hold on account thereof: so that it must needs be under
the aspect of something unseen that the First Truth is the end of the
act of faith, which aspect is that of a thing hoped for, according to
the Apostle (Rom. 8:25): "We hope for that which we see not": because
to see the truth is to possess it. Now one hopes not for what one has
already, but for what one has not, as stated above (I-II, Q. 67, A.
4). Accordingly the relation of the act of faith to its end which is
the object of the will, is indicated by the words: "Faith is the
substance of things to be hoped for." For we are wont to call by the
name of substance, the first beginning of a thing, especially when
the whole subsequent thing is virtually contained in the first
beginning; for instance, we might say that the first self-evident
principles are the substance of science, because, to wit, these
principles are in us the first beginnings of science, the whole of
which is itself contained in them virtually. In this way then faith
is said to be the "substance of things to be hoped for," for the
reason that in us the first beginning of things to be hoped for is
brought about by the assent of faith, which contains virtually all
things to be hoped for. Because we hope to be made happy through
seeing the unveiled truth to which our faith cleaves, as was made
evident when we were speaking of happiness (I-II, Q. 3, A. 8; I-II,
Q. 4, A. 3).

The relationship of the act of faith to the object of the intellect,
considered as the object of faith, is indicated by the words,
"evidence of things that appear not," where "evidence" is taken for
the result of evidence. For evidence induces the intellect to adhere
to a truth, wherefore the firm adhesion of the intellect to the
non-apparent truth of faith is called "evidence" here. Hence another
reading has "conviction," because to wit, the intellect of the
believer is convinced by Divine authority, so as to assent to what it
sees not. Accordingly if anyone would reduce the foregoing words to
the form of a definition, he may say that "faith is a habit of the
mind, whereby eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect
assent to what is non-apparent."

In this way faith is distinguished from all other things pertaining to
the intellect. For when we describe it as "evidence," we distinguish
it from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, which do not make the intellect
adhere to anything firmly; when we go on to say, "of things that
appear not," we distinguish it from science and understanding, the
object of which is something apparent; and when we say that it is "the
substance of things to be hoped for," we distinguish the virtue of
faith from faith commonly so called, which has no reference to the
beatitude we hope for.

Whatever other definitions are given of faith, are explanations of
this one given by the Apostle. For when Augustine says (Tract. xl in
Joan.: QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 39) that "faith is a virtue whereby we
believe what we do not see," and when Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
iv, 11) that "faith is an assent without research," and when others
say that "faith is that certainty of the mind about absent things
which surpasses opinion but falls short of science," these all amount
to the same as the Apostle's words: "Evidence of things that appear
not"; and when Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is the solid
foundation of the believer, establishing him in the truth, and showing
forth the truth in him," comes to the same as "substance of things to
be hoped for."

Reply Obj. 1: "Substance" here does not stand for the supreme genus
condivided with the other genera, but for that likeness to substance
which is found in each genus, inasmuch as the first thing in a genus
contains the others virtually and is said to be the substance thereof.

Reply Obj. 2: Since faith pertains to the intellect as commanded by
the will, it must needs be directed, as to its end, to the objects of
those virtues which perfect the will, among which is hope, as we
shall prove further on (Q. 18, A. 1). For this reason the definition
of faith includes the object of hope.

Reply Obj. 3: Love may be of the seen and of the unseen, of the
present and of the absent. Consequently a thing to be loved is not so
adapted to faith, as a thing to be hoped for, since hope is always of
the absent and the unseen.

Reply Obj. 4: "Substance" and "evidence" as included in the
definition of faith, do not denote various genera of faith, nor
different acts, but different relationships of one act to different
objects, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 5: Evidence taken from the proper principles of a thing,
make[s] it apparent, whereas evidence taken from Divine authority
does not make a thing apparent in itself, and such is the evidence
referred to in the definition of faith.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 2]

Whether Faith Resides in the Intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith does not reside in the
intellect. For Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that "faith
resides in the believer's will." Now the will is a power distinct
from the intellect. Therefore faith does not reside in the intellect.

Obj. 2: Further, the assent of faith to believe anything, proceeds
from the will obeying God. Therefore it seems that faith owes all its
praise to obedience. Now obedience is in the will. Therefore faith is
in the will, and not in the intellect.

Obj. 3: Further, the intellect is either speculative or practical.
Now faith is not in the speculative intellect, since this is not
concerned with things to be sought or avoided, as stated in _De
Anima_ iii, 9, so that it is not a principle of operation, whereas
"faith . . . worketh by charity" (Gal. 5:6). Likewise, neither is
it in the practical intellect, the object of which is some true,
contingent thing, that can be made or done. For the object of faith
is the Eternal Truth, as was shown above (Q. 1, A. 1). Therefore
faith does not reside in the intellect.

_On the contrary,_ Faith is succeeded by the heavenly vision,
according to 1 Cor. 13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark
manner; but then face to face." Now vision is in the intellect.
Therefore faith is likewise.

_I answer that,_ Since faith is a virtue, its act must needs be
perfect. Now, for the perfection of an act proceeding from two active
principles, each of these principles must be perfect: for it is not
possible for a thing to be sawn well, unless the sawyer possess the
art, and the saw be well fitted for sawing. Now, in a power of the
soul, which is related to opposite objects, a disposition to act well
is a habit, as stated above (I-II, Q. 49, A. 4, ad 1, 2, 3).
Wherefore an act that proceeds from two such powers must be perfected
by a habit residing in each of them. Again, it has been stated above
(Q. 2, AA. 1, 2) that to believe is an act of the intellect inasmuch
as the will moves it to assent. And this act proceeds from the will
and the intellect, both of which have a natural aptitude to be
perfected in this way. Consequently, if the act of faith is to be
perfect, there needs to be a habit in the will as well as in the
intellect: even as there needs to be the habit of prudence in the
reason, besides the habit of temperance in the concupiscible faculty,
in order that the act of that faculty be perfect. Now, to believe is
immediately an act of the intellect, because the object of that act
is "the true," which pertains properly to the intellect. Consequently
faith, which is the proper principle of that act, must needs reside
in the intellect.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine takes faith for the act of faith, which is
described as depending on the believer's will, in so far as his
intellect assents to matters of faith at the command of the will.

Reply Obj. 2: Not only does the will need to be ready to obey but
also the intellect needs to be well disposed to follow the command of
the will, even as the concupiscible faculty needs to be well disposed
in order to follow the command of reason; hence there needs to be a
habit of virtue not only in the commanding will but also in the
assenting intellect.

Reply Obj. 3: Faith resides in the speculative intellect, as
evidenced by its object. But since this object, which is the First
Truth, is the end of all our desires and actions, as Augustine proves
(De Trin. i, 8), it follows that faith worketh by charity just as
"the speculative intellect becomes practical by extension" (De Anima
iii, 10).
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 3]

Whether Charity Is the Form of Faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the form of faith.
For each thing derives its species from its form. When therefore two
things are opposite members of a division, one cannot be the form of
the other. Now faith and charity are stated to be opposite members of
a division, as different species of virtue (1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore
charity is not the form of faith.

Obj. 2: Further, a form and the thing of which it is the form are in
one subject, since together they form one simply. Now faith is in the
intellect, while charity is in the will. Therefore charity is not the
form of faith.

Obj. 3: Further, the form of a thing is a principle thereof. Now
obedience, rather than charity, seems to be the principle of
believing, on the part of the will, according to Rom. 1:5: "For
obedience to the faith in all nations." Therefore obedience rather
than charity, is the form of faith.

_On the contrary,_ Each thing works through its form. Now faith works
through charity. Therefore the love of charity is the form of faith.

_I answer that,_ As appears from what has been said above (I-II, Q.
1, A. 3; I-II, Q. 18, A. 6), voluntary acts take their species from
their end which is the will's object. Now that which gives a thing
its species, is after the manner of a form in natural things.
Wherefore the form of any voluntary act is, in a manner, the end to
which that act is directed, both because it takes its species
therefrom, and because the mode of an action should correspond
proportionately to the end. Now it is evident from what has been said
(A. 1), that the act of faith is directed to the object of the will,
i.e. the good, as to its end: and this good which is the end of
faith, viz. the Divine Good, is the proper object of charity.
Therefore charity is called the form of faith in so far as the act
of faith is perfected and formed by charity.

Reply Obj. 1: Charity is called the form of faith because it quickens
the act of faith. Now nothing hinders one act from being quickened by
different habits, so as to be reduced to various species in a certain
order, as stated above (I-II, Q. 18, AA. 6, 7; I-II, Q. 61, A. 2)
when we were treating of human acts in general.

Reply Obj. 2: This objection is true of an intrinsic form. But it is
not thus that charity is the form of faith, but in the sense that it
quickens the act of faith, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 3: Even obedience, and hope likewise, and whatever other
virtue might precede the act of faith, is quickened by charity, as
we shall show further on (Q. 23, A. 8), and consequently charity is
spoken of as the form of faith.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 4]

Whether Lifeless Faith Can Become Living, or Living Faith, Lifeless?

Objection 1: It would seem that lifeless faith does not become
living, or living faith lifeless. For, according to 1 Cor. 13:10,
"when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be
done away." Now lifeless faith is imperfect in comparison with living
faith. Therefore when living faith comes, lifeless faith is done
away, so that they are not one identical habit.

Obj. 2: Further, a dead thing does not become a living thing. Now
lifeless faith is dead, according to James 2:20: "Faith without works
is dead." Therefore lifeless faith cannot become living.

Obj. 3: Further, God's grace, by its advent, has no less effect in a
believer than in an unbeliever. Now by coming to an unbeliever it
causes the habit of faith. Therefore when it comes to a believer, who
hitherto had the habit of lifeless faith, it causes another habit of
faith in him.

Obj. 4: Further, as Boethius says (In Categ. Arist. i), "accidents
cannot be altered." Now faith is an accident. Therefore the same
faith cannot be at one time living, and at another, lifeless.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on the words, "Faith without works is dead"
(James 2:20) adds, "by which it lives once more." Therefore faith
which was lifeless and without form hitherto, becomes formed and
living.

_I answer that,_ There have been various opinions on this question.
For some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, iii, 15] have said that
living and lifeless faith are distinct habits, but that when living
faith comes, lifeless faith is done away, and that, in like manner,
when a man sins mortally after having living faith, a new habit of
lifeless faith is infused into him by God. But it seems unfitting
that grace should deprive man of a gift of God by coming to him, and
that a gift of God should be infused into man, on account of a mortal
sin.

Consequently others [*Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. iii, 64] have
said that living and lifeless faith are indeed distinct habits, but
that, all the same, when living faith comes the habit of lifeless
faith is not taken away, and that it remains together with the habit
of living faith in the same subject. Yet again it seems unreasonable
that the habit of lifeless faith should remain inactive in a person
having living faith.

We must therefore hold differently that living and lifeless faith are
one and the same habit. The reason is that a habit is differentiated
by that which directly pertains to that habit. Now since faith is a
perfection of the intellect, that pertains directly to faith, which
pertains to the intellect. Again, what pertains to the will, does not
pertain directly to faith, so as to be able to differentiate the habit
of faith. But the distinction of living from lifeless faith is in
respect of something pertaining to the will, i.e. charity, and not in
respect of something pertaining to the intellect. Therefore living and
lifeless faith are not distinct habits.

Reply Obj. 1: The saying of the Apostle refers to those imperfect
things from which imperfection is inseparable, for then, when the
perfect comes the imperfect must needs be done away. Thus with the
advent of clear vision, faith is done away, because it is essentially
"of the things that appear not." When, however, imperfection is not
inseparable from the imperfect thing, the same identical thing which
was imperfect becomes perfect. Thus childhood is not essential to man
and consequently the same identical subject who was a child, becomes
a man. Now lifelessness is not essential to faith, but is accidental
thereto as stated above. Therefore lifeless faith itself becomes
living.

Reply Obj. 2: That which makes an animal live is inseparable from an
animal, because it is its substantial form, viz. the soul:
consequently a dead thing cannot become a living thing, and a living
and a dead thing differ specifically. On the other hand that which
gives faith its form, or makes it live, is not essential to faith.
Hence there is no comparison.

Reply Obj. 3: Grace causes faith not only when faith begins anew to
be in a man, but also as long as faith lasts. For it has been said
above (I, Q. 104, A. 1; I-II, Q. 109, A. 9) that God is always
working man's justification, even as the sun is always lighting up
the air. Hence grace is not less effective when it comes to a
believer than when it comes to an unbeliever: since it causes faith
in both, in the former by confirming and perfecting it, in the latter
by creating it anew.

We might also reply that it is accidental, namely on account of the
disposition of the subject, that grace does not cause faith in one
who has it already: just as, on the other hand, a second mortal sin
does not take away grace from one who has already lost it through a
previous mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 4: When living faith becomes lifeless, faith is not
changed, but its subject, the soul, which at one time has faith
without charity, and at another time, with charity.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 5]

Whether Faith Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not a virtue. For virtue
is directed to the good, since "it is virtue that makes its subject
good," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 6). But faith is
directed to the true. Therefore faith is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, infused virtue is more perfect than acquired virtue.
Now faith, on account of its imperfection, is not placed among the
acquired intellectual virtues, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi,
3). Much less, therefore, can it be considered an infused virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, living and lifeless faith are the same species, as
stated above (A. 4). Now lifeless faith is not a virtue, since it is
not connected with the other virtues. Therefore neither is living
faith a virtue.

Obj. 4: Further, the gratuitous graces and the fruits are distinct
from the virtues. But faith is numbered among the gratuitous graces
(1 Cor. 12:9) and likewise among the fruits (Gal. 5:23). Therefore
faith is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Man is justified by the virtues, since "justice
is all virtue," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 1). Now man is
justified by faith according to Rom. 5:1: "Being justified therefore
by faith let us have peace," etc. Therefore faith is a virtue.

_I answer that,_ As shown above, it is by human virtue that human
acts are rendered good; hence, any habit that is always the principle
of a good act, may be called a human virtue. Such a habit is living
faith. For since to believe is an act of the intellect assenting to
the truth at the command of the will, two things are required that
this act may be perfect: one of which is that the intellect should
infallibly tend to its object, which is the true; while the other is
that the will should be infallibly directed to the last end, on
account of which it assents to the true: and both of these are to be
found in the act of living faith. For it belongs to the very essence
of faith that the intellect should ever tend to the true, since
nothing false can be the object of faith, as proved above (Q. 1, A.
3): while the effect of charity, which is the form of faith, is that
the soul ever has its will directed to a good end. Therefore living
faith is a virtue.

On the other hand, lifeless faith is not a virtue, because, though
the act of lifeless faith is duly perfect on the part of the
intellect, it has not its due perfection as regards the will: just as
if temperance be in the concupiscible, without prudence being in the
rational part, temperance is not a virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q.
65, A. 1), because the act of temperance requires both an act of
reason, and an act of the concupiscible faculty, even as the act of
faith requires an act of the will, and an act of the intellect.

Reply Obj. 1: The truth is itself the good of the intellect, since it
is its perfection: and consequently faith has a relation to some good
in so far as it directs the intellect to the true. Furthermore, it
has a relation to the good considered as the object of the will,
inasmuch as it is formed by charity.

Reply Obj. 2: The faith of which the Philosopher speaks is based on
human reasoning in a conclusion which does not follow, of necessity,
from its premisses; and which is subject to be false: hence such like
faith is not a virtue. On the other hand, the faith of which we are
speaking is based on the Divine Truth, which is infallible, and
consequently its object cannot be anything false; so that faith of
this kind can be a virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: Living and lifeless faith do not differ specifically,
as though they belonged to different species. But they differ as
perfect and imperfect within the same species. Hence lifeless faith,
being imperfect, does not satisfy the conditions of a perfect virtue,
for "virtue is a kind of perfection" (Phys. vii, text. 18).

Reply Obj. 4: Some say that faith which is numbered among the
gratuitous graces is lifeless faith. But this is said without reason,
since the gratuitous graces, which are mentioned in that passage, are
not common to all the members of the Church: wherefore the Apostle
says: "There are diversities of graces," and again, "To one is given"
this grace and "to another" that. Now lifeless faith is common to all
members of the Church, because its lifelessness is not part of its
substance, if we consider it as a gratuitous gift. We must,
therefore, say that in that passage, faith denotes a certain
excellency of faith, for instance, "constancy in faith," according
to a gloss, or the "word of faith."

Faith is numbered among the fruits, in so far as it gives a certain
pleasure in its act by reason of its certainty, wherefore the gloss
on the fifth chapter to the Galatians, where the fruits are
enumerated, explains faith as being "certainty about the unseen."
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 6]

Whether Faith Is One Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not one. For just as faith
is a gift of God according to Eph. 2:8, so also wisdom and knowledge
are numbered among God's gifts according to Isa. 11:2. Now wisdom and
knowledge differ in this, that wisdom is about eternal things, and
knowledge about temporal things, as Augustine states (De Trin. xii,
14, 15). Since, then, faith is about eternal things, and also about
some temporal things, it seems that faith is not one virtue, but
divided into several parts.

Obj. 2: Further, confession is an act of faith, as stated above (Q.
3, A. 1). Now confession of faith is not one and the same for all:
since what we confess as past, the fathers of old confessed as yet
to come, as appears from Isa. 7:14: "Behold a virgin shall conceive."
Therefore faith is not one.

Obj. 3: Further, faith is common to all believers in Christ. But one
accident cannot be in many subjects. Therefore all cannot have one
faith.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 4:5): "One Lord, one faith."

_I answer that,_ If we take faith as a habit, we can consider it in
two ways. First on the part of the object, and thus there is one
faith. Because the formal object of faith is the First Truth, by
adhering to which we believe whatever is contained in the faith.
Secondly, on the part of the subject, and thus faith is
differentiated according as it is in various subjects. Now it is
evident that faith, just as any other habit, takes its species from
the formal aspect of its object, but is individualized by its
subject. Hence if we take faith for the habit whereby we believe, it
is one specifically, but differs numerically according to its various
subjects.

If, on the other hand, we take faith for that which is believed,
then, again, there is one faith, since what is believed by all is one
same thing: for though the things believed, which all agree in
believing, be diverse from one another, yet they are all reduced to
one.

Reply Obj. 1: Temporal matters which are proposed to be believed, do
not belong to the object of faith, except in relation to something
eternal, viz. the First Truth, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1). Hence
there is one faith of things both temporal and eternal. It is
different with wisdom and knowledge, which consider temporal and
eternal matters under their respective aspects.

Reply Obj. 2: This difference of past and future arises, not from
any difference in the thing believed, but from the different
relationships of believers to the one thing believed, as also we
have mentioned above (I-II, Q. 103, A. 4; I-II, Q. 107, A. 1, ad 1).

Reply Obj. 3: This objection considers numerical diversity of faith.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 7]

Whether Faith Is the First of the Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not the first of the virtues.
For a gloss on Luke 12:4, "I say to you My friends," says that
fortitude is the foundation of faith. Now the foundation precedes that
which is founded thereon. Therefore faith is not the first of the
virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 36, "Be not emulous," says that hope
"leads on to faith." Now hope is a virtue, as we shall state further
on (Q. 17, A. 1). Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, it was stated above (A. 2) that the intellect of the
believer is moved, out of obedience to God, to assent to matters of
faith. Now obedience also is a virtue. Therefore faith is not the
first virtue.

Obj. 4: Further, not lifeless but living faith is the foundation, as
a gloss remarks on 1 Cor. 3:11 [*Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi.].
Now faith is formed by charity, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore it
is owing to charity that faith is the foundation: so that charity is
the foundation yet more than faith is (for the foundation is the
first part of a building) and consequently it seems to precede faith.

Obj. 5: Further, the order of habits is taken from the order of acts.
Now, in the act of faith, the act of the will which is perfected by
charity, precedes the act of the intellect, which is perfected by
faith, as the cause which precedes its effect. Therefore charity
precedes faith. Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that "faith is the
substance of things to be hoped for." Now the substance of a thing is
that which comes first. Therefore faith is first among the virtues.

_I answer that,_ One thing can precede another in two ways: first, by
its very nature; secondly, by accident. Faith, by its very nature,
precedes all other virtues. For since the end is the principle in
matters of action, as stated above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 3; I-II, Q. 34,
A. 4, ad 1), the theological virtues, the object of which is the last
end, must needs precede all the others. Again, the last end must of
necessity be present to the intellect before it is present to the
will, since the will has no inclination for anything except in so far
as it is apprehended by the intellect. Hence, as the last end is
present in the will by hope and charity, and in the intellect, by
faith, the first of all the virtues must, of necessity, be faith,
because natural knowledge cannot reach God as the object of heavenly
bliss, which is the aspect under which hope and charity tend towards
Him.

On the other hand, some virtues can precede faith accidentally. For
an accidental cause precedes its effect accidentally. Now that which
removes an obstacle is a kind of accidental cause, according to the
Philosopher (Phys. viii, 4): and in this sense certain virtues may be
said to precede faith accidentally, in so far as they remove
obstacles to belief. Thus fortitude removes the inordinate fear that
hinders faith; humility removes pride, whereby a man refuses to
submit himself to the truth of faith. The same may be said of some
other virtues, although there are no real virtues, unless faith be
presupposed, as Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv, 3).

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2: Hope cannot lead to faith absolutely. For one cannot
hope to obtain eternal happiness, unless one believes this possible,
since hope does not tend to the impossible, as stated above (I-II, Q.
40, A. 1). It is, however, possible for one to be led by hope to
persevere in faith, or to hold firmly to faith; and it is in this
sense that hope is said to lead to faith.

Reply Obj. 3: Obedience is twofold: for sometimes it denotes the
inclination of the will to fulfil God's commandments. In this way it
is not a special virtue, but is a general condition of every virtue;
since all acts of virtue come under the precepts of the Divine law,
as stated above (I-II, Q. 100, A. 2); and thus it is requisite for
faith. In another way, obedience denotes an inclination to fulfil the
commandments considered as a duty. In this way it is a special
virtue, and a part of justice: for a man does his duty by his
superior when he obeys him: and thus obedience follows faith, whereby
man knows that God is his superior, Whom he must obey.

Reply Obj. 4: To be a foundation a thing requires not only to come
first, but also to be connected with the other parts of the building:
since the building would not be founded on it unless the other parts
adhered to it. Now the connecting bond of the spiritual edifice is
charity, according to Col. 3:14: "Above all . . . things have charity
which is the bond of perfection." Consequently faith without charity
cannot be the foundation: and yet it does not follow that charity
precedes faith.

Reply Obj. 5: Some act of the will is required before faith, but not
an act of the will quickened by charity. This latter act presupposes
faith, because the will cannot tend to God with perfect love, unless
the intellect possesses right faith about Him.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 8]

Whether Faith Is More Certain Than Science and the Other Intellectual
Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not more certain than
science and the other intellectual virtues. For doubt is opposed to
certitude, wherefore a thing would seem to be the more certain,
through being less doubtful, just as a thing is the whiter, the less
it has of an admixture of black. Now understanding, science and also
wisdom are free of any doubt about their objects; whereas the
believer may sometimes suffer a movement of doubt, and doubt about
matters of faith. Therefore faith is no more certain than the
intellectual virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, sight is more certain than hearing. But "faith is
through hearing" according to Rom. 10:17; whereas understanding,
science and wisdom imply some kind of intellectual sight. Therefore
science and understanding are more certain than faith.

Obj. 3: Further, in matters concerning the intellect, the more
perfect is the more certain. Now understanding is more perfect than
faith, since faith is the way to understanding, according to another
version [*The Septuagint] of Isa. 7:9: "If you will not believe, you
shall not understand [Vulg.: 'continue']": and Augustine says (De
Trin. xiv, 1) that "faith is strengthened by science." Therefore it
seems that science or understanding is more certain than faith.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Thess. 2:15): "When you had
received of us the word of the hearing," i.e. by faith . . . "you
received it not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the word
of God." Now nothing is more certain than the word of God. Therefore
science is not more certain than faith; nor is anything else.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 4, ad 2) two of the
intellectual virtues are about contingent matter, viz. prudence and
art; to which faith is preferable in point of certitude, by reason of
its matter, since it is about eternal things, which never change,
whereas the other three intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science
[*In English the corresponding 'gift' is called knowledge] and
understanding, are about necessary things, as stated above (I-II, Q.
57, A. 5, ad 3). But it must be observed that wisdom, science and
understanding may be taken in two ways: first, as intellectual
virtues, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2, 3); secondly,
for the gifts of the Holy Ghost. If we consider them in the first
way, we must note that certitude can be looked at in two ways. First,
on the part of its cause, and thus a thing which has a more certain
cause, is itself more certain. In this way faith is more certain than
those three virtues, because it is founded on the Divine truth,
whereas the aforesaid three virtues are based on human reason.
Secondly, certitude may be considered on the part of the subject, and
thus the more a man's intellect lays hold of a thing, the more
certain it is. In this way, faith is less certain, because matters of
faith are above the human intellect, whereas the objects of the
aforesaid three virtues are not. Since, however, a thing is judged
simply with regard to its cause, but relatively, with respect to a
disposition on the part of the subject, it follows that faith is more
certain simply, while the others are more certain relatively, i.e.
for us. Likewise if these three be taken as gifts received in this
present life, they are related to faith as to their principle which
they presuppose: so that again, in this way, faith is more certain.

Reply Obj. 1: This doubt is not on the side of the cause of faith,
but on our side, in so far as we do not fully grasp matters of faith
with our intellect.

Reply Obj. 2: Other things being equal sight is more certain than
hearing; but if (the authority of) the person from whom we hear
greatly surpasses that of the seer's sight, hearing is more certain
than sight: thus a man of little science is more certain about what
he hears on the authority of an expert in science, than about what is
apparent to him according to his own reason: and much more is a man
certain about what he hears from God, Who cannot be deceived, than
about what he sees with his own reason, which can be mistaken.

Reply Obj. 3: The gifts of understanding and knowledge are more
perfect than the knowledge of faith in the point of their greater
clearness, but not in regard to more certain adhesion: because the
whole certitude of the gifts of understanding and knowledge, arises
from the certitude of faith, even as the certitude of the knowledge
of conclusions arises from the certitude of premisses. But in so far
as science, wisdom and understanding are intellectual virtues, they
are based upon the natural light of reason, which falls short of the
certitude of God's word, on which faith is founded.
_______________________

QUESTION 5

OF THOSE WHO HAVE FAITH
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider those who have faith: under which head there are
four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there was faith in the angels, or in man, in their
original state?

(2) Whether the demons have faith?

(3) Whether those heretics who err in one article, have faith in
others?

(4) Whether among those who have faith, one has it more than another?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 5, Art. 1]

Whether There Was Faith in the Angels, or in Man, in Their Original
State?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was no faith, either in the
angels, or in man, in their original state. For Hugh of S. Victor
says in his Sentences (De Sacram. i, 10) that "man cannot see God or
things that are in God, because he closes his eyes to contemplation."
Now the angels, in their original state, before they were either
confirmed in grace, or had fallen from it, had their eyes opened to
contemplation, since "they saw things in the Word," according to
Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). Likewise the first man, while in the
state of innocence, seemingly had his eyes open to contemplation; for
Hugh St. Victor says (De Sacram. i, 6) that "in his original state
man knew his Creator, not by the mere outward perception of hearing,
but by inward inspiration, not as now believers seek an absent God by
faith, but by seeing Him clearly present to their contemplation."
Therefore there was no faith in the angels and man in their original
state.

Obj. 2: Further, the knowledge of faith is dark and obscure,
according to 1 Cor. 13:13: "We see now through a glass in a dark
manner." Now in their original state there was not obscurity either
in the angels or in man, because it is a punishment of sin. Therefore
there could be no faith in the angels or in man, in their original
state.

Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 10:17) that "faith . . .
cometh by hearing." Now this could not apply to angels and man in
their original state; for then they could not hear anything from
another. Therefore, in that state, there was no faith either in man
or in the angels.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 11:6): "He that cometh to God,
must believe." Now the original state of angels and man was one of
approach to God. Therefore they had need of faith.

_I answer that,_ Some say that there was no faith in the angels before
they were confirmed in grace or fell from it, and in man before he
sinned, by reason of the manifest contemplation that they had of
Divine things. Since, however, "faith is the evidence of things that
appear not," according to the Apostle (Heb. 11:2), and since "by faith
we believe what we see not," according to Augustine (Tract. xl in
Joan.; QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 39), that manifestation alone excludes
faith, which renders apparent or seen the principal object of faith.
Now the principal object of faith is the First Truth, the sight of
which gives the happiness of heaven and takes the place of faith.
Consequently, as the angels before their confirmation in grace, and
man before sin, did not possess the happiness whereby God is seen in
His Essence, it is evident that the knowledge they possessed was not
such as to exclude faith.

It follows then, that the absence of faith in them could only be
explained by their being altogether ignorant of the object of faith.
And if man and the angels were created in a purely natural state, as
some [*St. Bonaventure, Sent. ii, D, 29] hold, perhaps one might hold
that there was no faith in the angels before their confirmation in
grace, or in man before sin, because the knowledge of faith surpasses
not only a man's but even an angel's natural knowledge about God.

Since, however, we stated in the First Part (Q. 62, A. 3; Q. 95, A.
1) that man and the angels were created with the gift of grace, we
must needs say that there was in them a certain beginning of
hoped-for happiness, by reason of grace received but not yet
consummated, which happiness was begun in their will by hope and
charity, and in the intellect by faith, as stated above (Q. 4, A. 7).
Consequently we must hold that the angels had faith before they were
confirmed, and man, before he sinned. Nevertheless we must observe
that in the object of faith, there is something formal, as it were,
namely the First Truth surpassing all the natural knowledge of a
creature, and something material, namely, the thing to which we
assent while adhering to the First Truth. With regard to the former,
before obtaining the happiness to come, faith is common to all who
have knowledge of God, by adhering to the First Truth: whereas with
regard to the things which are proposed as the material object of
faith, some are believed by one, and known manifestly by another,
even in the present state, as we have shown above (Q. 1, A. 5; Q. 2,
A. 4, ad 2). In this respect, too, it may be said that the angels
before being confirmed, and man, before sin, possessed manifest
knowledge about certain points in the Divine mysteries, which now we
cannot know except by believing them.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the words of Hugh of S. Victor are those of a
master, and have the force of an authority, yet it may be said that
the contemplation which removes the need of faith is heavenly
contemplation, whereby the supernatural truth is seen in its essence.
Now the angels did not possess this contemplation before they were
confirmed, nor did man before he sinned: yet their contemplation was
of a higher order than ours, for by its means they approached nearer
to God, and had manifest knowledge of more of the Divine effects and
mysteries than we can have knowledge of. Hence faith was not in them
so that they sought an absent God as we seek Him: since by the light
of wisdom He was more present to them than He is to us, although He
was not so present to them as He is to the Blessed by the light of
glory.

Reply Obj. 2: There was no darkness of sin or punishment in the
original state of man and the angels, but there was a certain natural
obscurity in the human and angelic intellect, in so far as every
creature is darkness in comparison with the immensity of the Divine
light: and this obscurity suffices for faith.

Reply Obj. 3: In the original state there was no hearing anything
from man speaking outwardly, but there was from God inspiring
inwardly: thus the prophets heard, as expressed by the Ps. 84:9:
"I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 5, Art. 2]

Whether in the Demons There Is Faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that the demons have no faith. For
Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that "faith depends on the
believer's will": and this is a good will, since by it man wishes to
believe in God. Since then no deliberate will of the demons is good,
as stated above (I, Q. 64, A. 2, ad 5), it seems that in the demons
there is no faith.

Obj. 2: Further, faith is a gift of Divine grace, according to Eph.
2:8: "By grace you are saved through faith . . . for it is the gift
of God." Now, according to a gloss on Osee 3:1, "They look to strange
gods, and love the husks of the grapes," the demons lost their gifts
of grace by sinning. Therefore faith did not remain in the demons
after they sinned.

Obj. 3: Further, unbelief would seem to be graver than other sins, as
Augustine observes (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.) on John 15:22, "If I had
not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin: but now they
have no excuse for their sin." Now the sin of unbelief is in some
men. Consequently, if the demons have faith, some men would be guilty
of a sin graver than that of the demons, which seems unreasonable.
Therefore in the demons there is no faith.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 2:19): "The devils . . .
believe and tremble."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 1, A. 4; Q. 2, A. 1), the
believer's intellect assents to that which he believes, not because
he sees it either in itself, or by resolving it to first self-evident
principles, but because his will commands his intellect to assent.
Now, that the will moves the intellect to assent, may be due to two
causes. First, through the will being directed to the good, and in
this way, to believe is a praiseworthy action. Secondly, because the
intellect is convinced that it ought to believe what is said, though
that conviction is not based on objective evidence. Thus if a
prophet, while preaching the word of God, were to foretell something,
and were to give a sign, by raising a dead person to life, the
intellect of a witness would be convinced so as to recognize clearly
that God, Who lieth not, was speaking, although the thing itself
foretold would not be evident in itself, and consequently the essence
of faith would not be removed.

Accordingly we must say that faith is commended in the first sense in
the faithful of Christ: and in this way faith is not in the demons,
but only in the second way, for they see many evident signs, whereby
they recognize that the teaching of the Church is from God, although
they do not see the things themselves that the Church teaches, for
instance that there are three Persons in God, and so forth.

Reply Obj. 1: The demons are, in a way, compelled to believe, by the
evidence of signs, and so their will deserves no praise for their
belief.

Reply Obj. 2: Faith, which is a gift of grace, inclines man to
believe, by giving him a certain affection for the good, even when
that faith is lifeless. Consequently the faith which the demons have,
is not a gift of grace. Rather are they compelled to believe through
their natural intellectual acumen.

Reply Obj. 3: The very fact that the signs of faith are so evident,
that the demons are compelled to believe, is displeasing to them, so
that their malice is by no means diminished by their belief.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 5, Art. 3]

Whether a Man Who Disbelieves One Article of Faith, Can Have Lifeless
Faith in the Other Articles?

Objection 1: It would seem that a heretic who disbelieves one article
of faith, can have lifeless faith in the other articles. For the
natural intellect of a heretic is not more able than that of a
catholic. Now a catholic's intellect needs the aid of the gift of
faith in order to believe any article whatever of faith. Therefore it
seems that heretics cannot believe any articles of faith without the
gift of lifeless faith.

Obj. 2: Further, just as faith contains many articles, so does one
science, viz. geometry, contain many conclusions. Now a man may
possess the science of geometry as to some geometrical conclusions,
and yet be ignorant of other conclusions. Therefore a man can believe
some articles of faith without believing the others.

Obj. 3: Further, just as man obeys God in believing the articles of
faith, so does he also in keeping the commandments of the Law. Now a
man can obey some commandments, and disobey others. Therefore he can
believe some articles, and disbelieve others.

_On the contrary,_ Just as mortal sin is contrary to charity, so is
disbelief in one article of faith contrary to faith. Now charity does
not remain in a man after one mortal sin. Therefore neither does
faith, after a man disbelieves one article.

 _I answer that,_ Neither living nor lifeless faith remains in a
heretic who disbelieves one article of faith.

The reason of this is that the species of every habit depends on the
formal aspect of the object, without which the species of the habit
cannot remain. Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth, as
manifested in Holy Writ and the teaching of the Church, which proceeds
from the First Truth. Consequently whoever does not adhere, as to an
infallible and Divine rule, to the teaching of the Church, which
proceeds from the First Truth manifested in Holy Writ, has not the
habit of faith, but holds that which is of faith otherwise than by
faith. Even so, it is evident that a man whose mind holds a conclusion
without knowing how it is proved, has not scientific knowledge, but
merely an opinion about it. Now it is manifest that he who adheres to
the teaching of the Church, as to an infallible rule, assents to
whatever the Church teaches; otherwise, if, of the things taught by
the Church, he holds what he chooses to hold, and rejects what he
chooses to reject, he no longer adheres to the teaching of the Church
as to an infallible rule, but to his own will. Hence it is evident
that a heretic who obstinately disbelieves one article of faith, is
not prepared to follow the teaching of the Church in all things; but
if he is not obstinate, he is no longer in heresy but only in error.
Therefore it is clear that such a heretic with regard to one article
has no faith in the other articles, but only a kind of opinion in
accordance with his own will.

Reply Obj. 1: A heretic does not hold the other articles of faith,
about which he does not err, in the same way as one of the faithful
does, namely by adhering simply to the Divine Truth, because in order
to do so, a man needs the help of the habit of faith; but he holds
the things that are of faith, by his own will and judgment.

Reply Obj. 2: The various conclusions of a science have their
respective means of demonstration, one of which may be known without
another, so that we may know some conclusions of a science without
knowing the others. On the other hand faith adheres to all the
articles of faith by reason of one mean, viz. on account of the First
Truth proposed to us in Scriptures, according to the teaching of the
Church who has the right understanding of them. Hence whoever
abandons this mean is altogether lacking in faith.

Reply Obj. 3: The various precepts of the Law may be referred either
to their respective proximate motives, and thus one can be kept
without another; or to their primary motive, which is perfect
obedience to God, in which a man fails whenever he breaks one
commandment, according to James 2:10: "Whosoever shall . . . offend
in one point is become guilty of all."
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 5, Art. 4]

Whether Faith Can Be Greater in One Man Than in Another?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith cannot be greater in one man
than in another. For the quantity of a habit is taken from its
object. Now whoever has faith believes everything that is of faith,
since by failing in one point, a man loses his faith altogether, as
stated above (A. 3). Therefore it seems that faith cannot be greater
in one than in another.

Obj. 2: Further, those things which consist in something supreme
cannot be "more" or "less." Now faith consists in something supreme,
because it requires that man should adhere to the First Truth above
all things. Therefore faith cannot be "more" or "less."

Obj. 3: Further, faith is to knowledge by grace, as the understanding
of principles is to natural knowledge, since the articles of faith
are the first principles of knowledge by grace, as was shown above
(Q. 1, A. 7). Now the understanding of principles is possessed in
equal degree by all men. Therefore faith is possessed in equal degree
by all the faithful.

_On the contrary,_ Wherever we find great and little, there we find
more or less. Now in the matter of faith we find great and little,
for Our Lord said to Peter (Matt. 14:31): "O thou of little faith,
why didst thou doubt?" And to the woman he said (Matt. 15: 28): "O
woman, great is thy faith!" Therefore faith can be greater in one
than in another.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 52, AA. 1, 2; I-II, Q. 112,
A. 4), the quantity of a habit may be considered from two points of
view: first, on the part of the object; secondly, on the part of its
participation by the subject.

Now the object of faith may be considered in two ways: first, in
respect of its formal aspect; secondly, in respect of the material
object which is proposed to be believed. Now the formal object of
faith is one and simple, namely the First Truth, as stated above (Q.
1, A. 1). Hence in this respect there is no diversity of faith among
believers, but it is specifically one in all, as stated above (Q. 4,
A. 6). But the things which are proposed as the matter of our belief
are many and can be received more or less explicitly; and in this
respect one man can believe explicitly more things than another, so
that faith can be greater in one man on account of its being more
explicit.

If, on the other hand, we consider faith from the point of view of
its participation by the subject, this happens in two ways, since the
act of faith proceeds both from the intellect and from the will, as
stated above (Q. 2, AA. 1, 2; Q. 4, A. 2). Consequently a man's faith
may be described as being greater, in one way, on the part of his
intellect, on account of its greater certitude and firmness, and, in
another way, on the part of his will, on account of his greater
promptitude, devotion, or confidence.

Reply Obj. 1: A man who obstinately disbelieves a thing that is of
faith, has not the habit of faith, and yet he who does not explicitly
believe all, while he is prepared to believe all, has that habit. In
this respect, one man has greater faith than another, on the part of
the object, in so far as he believes more things, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: It is essential to faith that one should give the first
place to the First Truth. But among those who do this, some submit to
it with greater certitude and devotion than others; and in this way
faith is greater in one than in another.

Reply Obj. 3: The understanding of principles results from man's very
nature, which is equally shared by all: whereas faith results from
the gift of grace, which is not equally in all, as explained above
(I-II, Q. 112, A. 4). Hence the comparison fails.

Nevertheless the truth of principles is more known to one than to
another, according to the greater capacity of intellect.
_______________________

QUESTION 6

OF THE CAUSE OF FAITH
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider the cause of faith, under which head there are
two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether faith is infused into man by God?

(2) Whether lifeless faith is a gift of God?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 6, Art. 1]

Whether Faith Is Infused into Man by God?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not infused into man by God.
For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv) that "science begets faith in us,
and nourishes, defends and strengthens it." Now those things which
science begets in us seem to be acquired rather than infused.
Therefore faith does not seem to be in us by Divine infusion.

Obj. 2: Further, that to which man attains by hearing and seeing,
seems to be acquired by him. Now man attains to belief, both by
seeing miracles, and by hearing the teachings of faith: for it is
written (John 4:53): "The father . . . knew that it was at the same
hour, that Jesus said to him, Thy son liveth; and himself believed,
and his whole house"; and (Rom. 10:17) it is said that "faith is
through hearing." Therefore man attains to faith by acquiring it.

Obj. 3: Further, that which depends on a man's will can be acquired
by him. But "faith depends on the believer's will," according to
Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. v). Therefore faith can be acquired
by man.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eph. 2:8, 9): "By grace you are
saved through faith, and that not of yourselves . . . that no man
may glory . . . for it is the gift of God."

_I answer that,_ Two things are requisite for faith. First, that the
things which are of faith should be proposed to man: this is
necessary in order that man believe anything explicitly. The second
thing requisite for faith is the assent of the believer to the things
which are proposed to him. Accordingly, as regards the first of
these, faith must needs be from God. Because those things which are
of faith surpass human reason, hence they do not come to man's
knowledge, unless God reveal them. To some, indeed, they are revealed
by God immediately, as those things which were revealed to the
apostles and prophets, while to some they are proposed by God in
sending preachers of the faith, according to Rom. 10:15: "How shall
they preach, unless they be sent?"

As regards the second, viz. man's assent to the things which are of
faith, we may observe a twofold cause, one of external inducement,
such as seeing a miracle, or being persuaded by someone to embrace
the faith: neither of which is a sufficient cause, since of those who
see the same miracle, or who hear the same sermon, some believe, and
some do not. Hence we must assert another internal cause, which moves
man inwardly to assent to matters of faith.

The Pelagians held that this cause was nothing else than man's
free-will: and consequently they said that the beginning of faith is
from ourselves, inasmuch as, to wit, it is in our power to be ready
to assent to things which are of faith, but that the consummation of
faith is from God, Who proposes to us the things we have to believe.
But this is false, for, since man, by assenting to matters of faith,
is raised above his nature, this must needs accrue to him from some
supernatural principle moving him inwardly; and this is God.
Therefore faith, as regards the assent which is the chief act of
faith, is from God moving man inwardly by grace.

Reply Obj. 1: Science begets and nourishes faith, by way of
external persuasion afforded by science; but the chief and proper
cause of faith is that which moves man inwardly to assent.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument again refers to the cause that
proposes outwardly the things that are of faith, or persuades man to
believe by words or deeds.

Reply Obj. 3: To believe does indeed depend on the will of the
believer: but man's will needs to be prepared by God with grace, in
order that he may be raised to things which are above his nature, as
stated above (Q. 2, A. 3).
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 6, Art. 2]

Whether Lifeless Faith Is a Gift of God?

Objection 1: It would seem that lifeless faith is not a gift of God.
For it is written (Deut. 32:4) that "the works of God are perfect." Now
lifeless faith is something imperfect. Therefore it is not the work of
God.

Obj. 2: Further, just as an act is said to be deformed through
lacking its due form, so too is faith called lifeless (_informis_)
when it lacks the form due to it. Now the deformed act of sin is not
from God, as stated above (I-II, Q. 79, A. 2, ad 2). Therefore
neither is lifeless faith from God.

Obj. 3: Further, whomsoever God heals, He heals wholly: for it is
written (John 7:23): "If a man receive circumcision on the
sabbath-day, that the law of Moses may not be broken; are you angry
at Me because I have healed the whole man on the sabbath-day?" Now
faith heals man from unbelief. Therefore whoever receives from God
the gift of faith, is at the same time healed from all his sins. But
this is not done except by living faith. Therefore living faith alone
is a gift of God: and consequently lifeless faith is not from God.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on 1 Cor. 13:2 says that "the faith which
lacks charity is a gift of God." Now this is lifeless faith.
Therefore lifeless faith is a gift of God.

_I answer that,_ Lifelessness is a privation. Now it must be noted
that privation is sometimes essential to the species, whereas
sometimes it is not, but supervenes in a thing already possessed of
its proper species: thus privation of the due equilibrium of the
humors is essential to the species of sickness, while darkness is not
essential to a diaphanous body, but supervenes in it. Since,
therefore, when we assign the cause of a thing, we intend to assign
the cause of that thing as existing in its proper species, it follows
that what is not the cause of privation, cannot be assigned as the
cause of the thing to which that privation belongs as being essential
to its species. For we cannot assign as the cause of a sickness,
something which is not the cause of a disturbance in the humors:
though we can assign as cause of a diaphanous body, something which
is not the cause of the darkness, which is not essential to the
diaphanous body.

Now the lifelessness of faith is not essential to the species of
faith, since faith is said to be lifeless through lack of an extrinsic
form, as stated above (Q. 4, A. 4). Consequently the cause of lifeless
faith is that which is the cause of faith strictly so called: and this
is God, as stated above (A. 1). It follows, therefore, that
lifeless faith is a gift of God.

Reply Obj. 1: Lifeless faith, though it is not simply perfect with
the perfection of a virtue, is, nevertheless, perfect with a
perfection that suffices for the essential notion of faith.

Reply Obj. 2: The deformity of an act is essential to the act's
species, considered as a moral act, as stated above (I, Q. 48, A. 1,
ad 2; I-II, Q. 18, A. 5): for an act is said to be deformed through
being deprived of an intrinsic form, viz. the due commensuration of
the act's circumstances. Hence we cannot say that God is the cause of
a deformed act, for He is not the cause of its deformity, though He
is the cause of the act as such.

We may also reply that deformity denotes not only privation of a
due form, but also a contrary disposition, wherefore deformity is
compared to the act, as falsehood is to faith. Hence, just as the
deformed act is not from God, so neither is a false faith; and as
lifeless faith is from God, so too, acts that are good generically,
though not quickened by charity, as is frequently the case in
sinners, are from God.

Reply Obj. 3: He who receives faith from God without charity, is
healed from unbelief, not entirely (because the sin of his previous
unbelief is not removed) but in part, namely, in the point of ceasing
from committing such and such a sin. Thus it happens frequently that
a man desists from one act of sin, through God causing him thus to
desist, without desisting from another act of sin, through the
instigation of his own malice. And in this way sometimes it is
granted by God to a man to believe, and yet he is not granted the
gift of charity: even so the gift of prophecy, or the like, is given
to some without charity.
_______________________

QUESTION 7

OF THE EFFECTS OF FAITH
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider the effects of faith: under which head there
are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether fear is an effect of faith?

(2) Whether the heart is purified by faith?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 7, Art. 1]

Whether Fear Is an Effect of Faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not an effect of faith. For
an effect does not precede its cause. Now fear precedes faith: for it
is written (Ecclus. 2:8): "Ye that fear the Lord, believe in Him."
Therefore fear is not an effect of faith.

Obj. 2: Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries. Now
fear and hope are contraries, as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 2):
and faith begets hope, as a gloss observes on Matt. 1:2. Therefore
fear is not an effect of faith.

Obj. 3: Further, one contrary does not cause another. Now the object
of faith is a good, which is the First Truth, while the object of
fear is an evil, as stated above (I-II, Q. 42, A. 1). Again, acts
take their species from the object, according to what was stated
above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 2). Therefore faith is not a cause of fear.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 2:19): "The devils . . .
believe and tremble."

_I answer that,_ Fear is a movement of the appetitive power, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 41, A. 1). Now the principle of all appetitive
movements is the good or evil apprehended: and consequently the
principle of fear and of every appetitive movement must be an
apprehension. Again, through faith there arises in us an apprehension
of certain penal evils, which are inflicted in accordance with the
Divine judgment. In this way, then, faith is a cause of the fear
whereby one dreads to be punished by God; and this is servile fear.

It is also the cause of filial fear, whereby one dreads to be
separated from God, or whereby one shrinks from equalling oneself to
Him, and holds Him in reverence, inasmuch as faith makes us appreciate
God as an unfathomable and supreme good, separation from which is the
greatest evil, and to which it is wicked to wish to be equalled. Of
the first fear, viz. servile fear, lifeless faith is the cause, while
living faith is the cause of the second, viz. filial fear, because it
makes man adhere to God and to be subject to Him by charity.

Reply Obj. 1: Fear of God cannot altogether precede faith, because if
we knew nothing at all about Him, with regard to rewards and
punishments, concerning which faith teaches us, we should nowise fear
Him. If, however, faith be presupposed in reference to certain
articles of faith, for example the Divine excellence, then
reverential fear follows, the result of which is that man submits his
intellect to God, so as to believe in all the Divine promises. Hence
the text quoted continues: "And your reward shall not be made void."

Reply Obj. 2: The same thing in respect of contraries can be the
cause of contraries, but not under the same aspect. Now faith begets
hope, in so far as it enables us to appreciate the prize which God
awards to the just, while it is the cause of fear, in so far as it
makes us appreciate the punishments which He intends to inflict on
sinners.

Reply Obj. 3: The primary and formal object of faith is the good
which is the First Truth; but the material object of faith includes
also certain evils; for instance, that it is an evil either not to
submit to God, or to be separated from Him, and that sinners will
suffer penal evils from God: in this way faith can be the cause of
fear.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 7, Art. 2]

Whether Faith Has the Effect of Purifying the Heart?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith does not purify the heart. For
purity of the heart pertains chiefly to the affections, whereas faith
is in the intellect. Therefore faith has not the effect of purifying
the heart.

Obj. 2: Further, that which purifies the heart is incompatible with
impurity. But faith is compatible with the impurity of sin, as may be
seen in those who have lifeless faith. Therefore faith does not
purify the heart.

Obj. 3: Further, if faith were to purify the human heart in any way,
it would chiefly purify the intellect of man. Now it does not purify
the intellect from obscurity, since it is a veiled knowledge.
Therefore faith nowise purifies the heart.

_On the contrary,_ Peter said (Acts 15:9): "Purifying their hearts by
faith."

_I answer that,_ A thing is impure through being mixed with baser
things: for silver is not called impure, when mixed with gold, which
betters it, but when mixed with lead or tin. Now it is evident that
the rational creature is more excellent than all transient and
corporeal creatures; so that it becomes impure through subjecting
itself to transient things by loving them. From this impurity the
rational creature is purified by means of a contrary movement,
namely, by tending to that which is above it, viz. God. The first
beginning of this movement is faith: since "he that cometh to God
must believe that He is," according to Heb. 11:6. Hence the first
beginning of the heart's purifying is faith; and if this be perfected
through being quickened by charity, the heart will be perfectly
purified thereby.

Reply Obj. 1: Things that are in the intellect are the principles of
those which are in the appetite, in so far as the apprehended good
moves the appetite.

Reply Obj. 2: Even lifeless faith excludes a certain impurity which
is contrary to it, viz. that of error, and which consists in the
human intellect, adhering inordinately to things below itself,
through wishing to measure Divine things by the rule of sensible
objects. But when it is quickened by charity, then it is incompatible
with any kind of impurity, because "charity covereth all sins" (Prov.
10:12).

Reply Obj. 3: The obscurity of faith does not pertain to the impurity
of sin, but rather to the natural defect of the human intellect,
according to the present state of life.
_______________________

QUESTION 8

OF THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider the gifts of understanding and knowledge, which
respond to the virtue of faith. With regard to the gift of
understanding there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether understanding is a gift of the Holy Ghost?

(2) Whether it can be together with faith in the same person?

(3) Whether the understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, is
only speculative, or practical also?

(4) Whether all who are in a state of grace have the gift of
understanding?

(5) Whether this gift is to be found in those who are without grace?

(6) Of the relationship of the gift of understanding to the other
gifts.

(7) Which of the beatitudes corresponds to this gift?

(8) Which of the fruits?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 1]

Whether Understanding Is a Gift of the Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem that understanding is not a gift of the
Holy Ghost. For the gifts of grace are distinct from the gifts of
nature, since they are given in addition to the latter. Now
understanding is a natural habit of the soul, whereby self-evident
principles are known, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 6. Therefore it should
not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 2: Further, the Divine gifts are shared by creatures according
to their capacity and mode, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now
the mode of human nature is to know the truth, not simply (which is a
sign of understanding), but discursively (which is a sign of reason),
as Dionysius explains (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore the Divine knowledge
which is bestowed on man, should be called a gift of reason rather
than a gift of understanding.

Obj. 3: Further, in the powers of the soul the understanding is
condivided with the will (De Anima iii, 9, 10). Now no gift of the Holy
Ghost is called after the will. Therefore no gift of the Holy Ghost
should receive the name of understanding.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 11:2): "The Spirit of the Lord
shall rest upon him, the Spirit of wisdom of understanding."

_I answer that,_ Understanding implies an intimate knowledge, for
"intelligere" [to understand] is the same as "intus legere" [to read
inwardly]. This is clear to anyone who considers the difference
between intellect and sense, because sensitive knowledge is concerned
with external sensible qualities, whereas intellective knowledge
penetrates into the very essence of a thing, because the object of the
intellect is "what a thing is," as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 6.

Now there are many kinds of things that are hidden within, to find
which human knowledge has to penetrate within so to speak. Thus, under
the accidents lies hidden the nature of the substantial reality, under
words lies hidden their meaning; under likenesses and figures the
truth they denote lies hidden (because the intelligible world is
enclosed within as compared with the sensible world, which is
perceived externally), and effects lie hidden in their causes, and
vice versa. Hence we may speak of understanding with regard to all
these things.

Since, however, human knowledge begins with the outside of things
as it were, it is evident that the stronger the light of the
understanding, the further can it penetrate into the heart of things.
Now the natural light of our understanding is of finite power;
wherefore it can reach to a certain fixed point. Consequently man
needs a supernatural light in order to penetrate further still so
as to know what it cannot know by its natural light: and this
supernatural light which is bestowed on man is called the gift of
understanding.

Reply Obj. 1: The natural light instilled within us, manifests only
certain general principles, which are known naturally. But since man
is ordained to supernatural happiness, as stated above (Q. 2, A. 3;
I-II, Q. 3, A. 8), man needs to reach to certain higher truths, for
which he requires the gift of understanding.

Reply Obj. 2: The discourse of reason always begins from an
understanding and ends at an understanding; because we reason by
proceeding from certain understood principles, and the discourse of
reason is perfected when we come to understand what hitherto we
ignored. Hence the act of reasoning proceeds from something
previously understood. Now a gift of grace does not proceed from the
light of nature, but is added thereto as perfecting it. Wherefore
this addition is not called "reason" but "understanding," since the
additional light is in comparison with what we know supernaturally,
what the natural light is in regard to those things which we know
from the first.

Reply Obj. 3: "Will" denotes simply a movement of the appetite
without indicating any excellence; whereas "understanding" denotes a
certain excellence of a knowledge that penetrates into the heart of
things. Hence the supernatural gift is called after the understanding
rather than after the will.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 2]

Whether the Gift of Understanding Is Compatible with Faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is
incompatible with faith. For Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 15)
that "the thing which is understood is bounded by the comprehension
of him who understands it." But the thing which is believed is not
comprehended, according to the word of the Apostle to the Philippians
3:12: "Not as though I had already comprehended [Douay: 'attained'],
or were already perfect." Therefore it seems that faith and
understanding are incompatible in the same subject.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is understood is seen by the understanding.
But faith is of things that appear not, as stated above (Q. 1, A.
4; Q. 4, A. 1). Therefore faith is incompatible with understanding
in the same subject.

Obj. 3: Further, understanding is more certain than science. But
science and faith are incompatible in the same subject, as stated
above (Q. 1, AA. 4, 5). Much less, therefore, can understanding
and faith be in the same subject.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. i, 15) that "understanding
enlightens the mind concerning the things it has heard." Now one who
has faith can be enlightened in his mind concerning what he has heard;
thus it is written (Luke 24:27, 32) that Our Lord opened the scriptures
to His disciples, that they might understand them. Therefore
understanding is compatible with faith.

_I answer that,_ We need to make a twofold distinction here: one on
the side of faith, the other on the part of understanding.

On the side of faith the distinction to be made is that certain
things, of themselves, come directly under faith, such as the mystery
to three Persons in one God, and the incarnation of God the Son;
whereas other things come under faith, through being subordinate, in
one way or another, to those just mentioned, for instance, all that
is contained in the Divine Scriptures.

On the part of understanding the distinction to be observed is that
there are two ways in which we may be said to understand. In one way,
we understand a thing perfectly, when we arrive at knowing the
essence of the thing we understand, and the very truth considered in
itself of the proposition understood. In this way, so long as the
state of faith lasts, we cannot understand those things which are the
direct object of faith: although certain other things that are
subordinate to faith can be understood even in this way.

In another way we understand a thing imperfectly, when the essence of
a thing or the truth of a proposition is not known as to its quiddity
or mode of being, and yet we know that whatever be the outward
appearances, they do not contradict the truth, in so far as we
understand that we ought not to depart from matters of faith, for the
sake of things that appear externally. In this way, even during the
state of faith, nothing hinders us from understanding even those
things which are the direct object of faith.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first three
argue in reference to perfect understanding, while the last refers to
the understanding of matters subordinate to faith.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 3]

Whether the Gift of Understanding Is Merely Speculative or Also
Practical?

Objection 1: It would seem that understanding, considered as a gift of
the Holy Ghost, is not practical, but only speculative. For, according
to Gregory (Moral. i, 32), "understanding penetrates certain more
exalted things." But the practical intellect is occupied, not with
exalted, but with inferior things, viz. singulars, about which actions
are concerned. Therefore understanding, considered as a gift, is not
practical.

Obj. 2: Further, the gift of understanding is something more
excellent than the intellectual virtue of understanding. But the
intellectual virtue of understanding is concerned with none but
necessary things, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 6). Much
more, therefore, is the gift of understanding concerned with none but
necessary matters. Now the practical intellect is not about necessary
things, but about things which may be otherwise than they are, and
which may result from man's activity. Therefore the gift of
understanding is not practical.

Obj. 3: Further, the gift of understanding enlightens the mind in
matters which surpass natural reason. Now human activities, with
which the practical intellect is concerned, do not surpass natural
reason, which is the directing principle in matters of action, as was
made clear above (I-II, Q. 58, A. 2; I-II, Q. 71, A. 6). Therefore
the gift of understanding is not practical.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 110:10): "A good understanding
to all that do it."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the gift of understanding is
not only about those things which come under faith first and
principally, but also about all things subordinate to faith. Now good
actions have a certain relationship to faith: since "faith worketh
through charity," according to the Apostle (Gal. 5:6). Hence the gift
of understanding extends also to certain actions, not as though these
were its principal object, but in so far as the rule of our actions
is the eternal law, to which the higher reason, which is perfected by
the gift of understanding, adheres by contemplating and consulting
it, as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 7).

Reply Obj. 1: The things with which human actions are concerned are
not surpassingly exalted considered in themselves, but, as referred
to the rule of the eternal law, and to the end of Divine happiness,
they are exalted so that they can be the matter of understanding.

Reply Obj. 2: The excellence of the gift of understanding consists
precisely in its considering eternal or necessary matters, not only
as they are rules of human actions, because a cognitive virtue is
the more excellent, according to the greater extent of its object.

Reply Obj. 3: The rule of human actions is the human reason and the
eternal law, as stated above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 6). Now the eternal law
surpasses human reason: so that the knowledge of human actions, as
ruled by the eternal law, surpasses the natural reason, and requires
the supernatural light of a gift of the Holy Ghost.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 4]

Whether the Gift of Understanding Is in All Who Are in a State of
Grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is not in
all who are in a state of grace. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49)
that "the gift of understanding is given as a remedy against dulness
of mind." Now many who are in a state of grace suffer from dulness of
mind. Therefore the gift of understanding is not in all who are in a
state of grace.

Obj. 2: Further, of all the things that are connected with knowledge,
faith alone seems to be necessary for salvation, since by faith
Christ dwells in our hearts, according to Eph. 3:17. Now the gift of
understanding is not in everyone that has faith; indeed, those who
have faith ought to pray that they may understand, as Augustine says
(De Trin. xv, 27). Therefore the gift of understanding is not
necessary for salvation: and, consequently, is not in all who are in
a state of grace.

Obj. 3: Further, those things which are common to all who are in a
state of grace, are never withdrawn from them. Now the grace of
understanding and of the other gifts sometimes withdraws itself
profitably, for, at times, "when the mind is puffed up with
understanding sublime things, it becomes sluggish and dull in base
and vile things," as Gregory observes (Moral. ii, 49). Therefore the
gift of understanding is not in all who are in a state of grace.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 81:5): "They have not known or
understood, they walk on in darkness." But no one who is in a state
of grace walks in darkness, according to John 8:12: "He that
followeth Me, walketh not in darkness." Therefore no one who is in a
state of grace is without the gift of understanding.

_I answer that,_ In all who are in a state of grace, there must needs
be rectitude of the will, since grace prepares man's will for good,
according to Augustine (Contra Julian. Pelag. iv, 3). Now the will
cannot be rightly directed to good, unless there be already some
knowledge of the truth, since the object of the will is good
understood, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 7. Again, just as the Holy
Ghost directs man's will by the gift of charity, so as to move it
directly to some supernatural good; so also, by the gift of
understanding, He enlightens the human mind, so that it knows some
supernatural truth, to which the right will needs to tend.

Therefore, just as the gift of charity is in all of those who have
sanctifying grace, so also is the gift of understanding.

Reply Obj. 1: Some who have sanctifying grace may suffer dulness of
mind with regard to things that are not necessary for salvation; but
with regard to those that are necessary for salvation, they are
sufficiently instructed by the Holy Ghost, according to 1 John 2:27:
"His unction teacheth you of all things."

Reply Obj. 2: Although not all who have faith understand fully the
things that are proposed to be believed, yet they understand that
they ought to believe them, and that they ought nowise to deviate
from them.

Reply Obj. 3: With regard to things necessary for salvation, the gift
of understanding never withdraws from holy persons: but, in order
that they may have no incentive to pride, it does withdraw sometimes
with regard to other things, so that their mind is unable to
penetrate all things clearly.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 5]

Whether the Gift of Understanding Is Found Also in Those Who Have Not
Sanctifying Grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is found
also in those who have not sanctifying grace. For Augustine, in
expounding the words of Ps. 118:20: "My soul hath coveted to long for
Thy justifications," says: "Understanding flies ahead, and man's will
is weak and slow to follow." But in all who have sanctifying grace,
the will is prompt on account of charity. Therefore the gift of
understanding can be in those who have not sanctifying grace.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Dan. 10:1) that "there is need of
understanding in a" prophetic "vision," so that, seemingly, there is
no prophecy without the gift of understanding. But there can be
prophecy without sanctifying grace, as evidenced by Matt. 7:22, where
those who say: "We have prophesied in Thy name [*Vulg.: 'Have we not
prophesied in Thy name?']," are answered with the words: "I never knew
you." Therefore the gift of understanding can be without sanctifying
grace.

Obj. 3: Further, the gift of understanding responds to the virtue
of faith, according to Isa. 7:9, following another reading [*The
Septuagint]: "If you will not believe you shall not understand."
Now faith can be without sanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of
understanding can be without it.

_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (John 6:45): "Every one that hath
heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me." Now it is by
the intellect, as Gregory observes (Moral. i, 32), that we learn
or understand what we hear. Therefore whoever has the gift of
understanding, cometh to Christ, which is impossible without
sanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of understanding cannot be
without sanctifying grace.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 68, AA. 1, 2) the gifts of
the Holy Ghost perfect the soul, according as it is amenable to the
motion of the Holy Ghost. Accordingly then, the intellectual light of
grace is called the gift of understanding, in so far as man's
understanding is easily moved by the Holy Ghost, the consideration of
which movement depends on a true apprehension of the end. Wherefore
unless the human intellect be moved by the Holy Ghost so far as to
have a right estimate of the end, it has not yet obtained the gift of
understanding, however much the Holy Ghost may have enlightened it in
regard to other truths that are preambles to the faith.

Now to have a right estimate about the last end one must not be in
error about the end, and must adhere to it firmly as to the greatest
good: and no one can do this without sanctifying grace; even as in
moral matters a man has a right estimate about the end through a habit
of virtue. Therefore no one has the gift of understanding without
sanctifying grace.

Reply Obj. 1: By understanding Augustine means any kind of
intellectual light, that, however, does not fulfil all the conditions
of a gift, unless the mind of man be so far perfected as to have a
right estimate about the end.

Reply Obj. 2: The understanding that is requisite for prophecy, is a
kind of enlightenment of the mind with regard to the things revealed
to the prophet: but it is not an enlightenment of the mind with
regard to a right estimate about the last end, which belongs to the
gift of understanding.

Reply Obj. 3: Faith implies merely assent to what is proposed but
understanding implies a certain perception of the truth, which
perception, except in one who has sanctifying grace, cannot regard
the end, as stated above. Hence the comparison fails between
understanding and faith.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 6]

Whether the Gift of Understanding Is Distinct from the Other Gifts?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is not
distinct from the other gifts. For there is no distinction between
things whose opposites are not distinct. Now "wisdom is contrary to
folly, understanding is contrary to dulness, counsel is contrary to
rashness, knowledge is contrary to ignorance," as Gregory states
(Moral. ii, 49). But there would seem to be no difference between
folly, dulness, ignorance and rashness. Therefore neither does
understanding differ from the other gifts.

Obj. 2: Further, the intellectual virtue of understanding differs
from the other intellectual virtues in that it is proper to it to be
about self-evident principles. But the gift of understanding is not
about any self-evident principles, since the natural habit of first
principles suffices in respect of those matters which are naturally
self-evident: while faith is sufficient in respect of such things as
are supernatural, since the articles of faith are like first
principles in supernatural knowledge, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 7).
Therefore the gift of understanding does not differ from the other
intellectual gifts.

Obj. 3: Further, all intellectual knowledge is either speculative or
practical. Now the gift of understanding is related to both, as
stated above (A. 3). Therefore it is not distinct from the other
intellectual gifts, but comprises them all.

_On the contrary,_ When several things are enumerated together they
must be, in some way, distinct from one another, because distinction
is the origin of number. Now the gift of understanding is enumerated
together with the other gifts, as appears from Isa. 11:2. Therefore
the gift of understanding is distinct from the other gifts.

_I answer that,_ The difference between the gift of understanding and
three of the others, viz. piety, fortitude, and fear, is evident,
since the gift of understanding belongs to the cognitive power, while
the three belong to the appetitive power.

But the difference between this gift of understanding and the
remaining three, viz. wisdom, knowledge, and counsel, which also
belong to the cognitive power, is not so evident. To some [*William
of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, iii, 8], it seems that the gift of
understanding differs from the gifts of knowledge and counsel, in
that these two belong to practical knowledge, while the gift of
understanding belongs to speculative knowledge; and that it differs
from the gift of wisdom, which also belongs to speculative knowledge,
in that wisdom is concerned with judgment, while understanding
renders the mind apt to grasp the things that are proposed, and to
penetrate into their very heart. And in this sense we have assigned
the number of the gifts, above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 4).

But if we consider the matter carefully, the gift of understanding is
concerned not only with speculative, but also with practical matters,
as stated above (A. 3), and likewise, the gift of knowledge regards
both matters, as we shall show further on (Q. 9, A. 3), and
consequently, we must take their distinction in some other way. For
all these four gifts are ordained to supernatural knowledge, which,
in us, takes its foundation from faith. Now "faith is through
hearing" (Rom. 10:17). Hence some things must be proposed to be
believed by man, not as seen, but as heard, to which he assents by
faith. But faith, first and principally, is about the First Truth,
secondarily, about certain considerations concerning creatures, and
furthermore extends to the direction of human actions, in so far as
it works through charity, as appears from what has been said above
(Q. 4, A. 2, ad 3).

Accordingly on the part of the things proposed to faith for belief,
two things are requisite on our part: first that they be penetrated
or grasped by the intellect, and this belongs to the gift of
understanding. Secondly, it is necessary that man should judge these
things aright, that he should esteem that he ought to adhere to these
things, and to withdraw from their opposites: and this judgment, with
regard to Divine things belong to the gift of wisdom, but with regard
to created things, belongs to the gift of knowledge, and as to its
application to individual actions, belongs to the gift of counsel.

Reply Obj. 1: The foregoing difference between those four gifts is
clearly in agreement with the distinction of those things which
Gregory assigns as their opposites. For dulness is contrary to
sharpness, since an intellect is said, by comparison, to be sharp,
when it is able to penetrate into the heart of the things that are
proposed to it. Hence it is dulness of mind that renders the mind
unable to pierce into the heart of a thing. A man is said to be a
fool if he judges wrongly about the common end of life, wherefore
folly is properly opposed to wisdom, which makes us judge aright
about the universal cause. Ignorance implies a defect in the mind,
even about any particular things whatever, so that it is contrary to
knowledge, which gives man a right judgment about particular causes,
viz. about creatures. Rashness is clearly opposed to counsel, whereby
man does not proceed to action before deliberating with his reason.

Reply Obj. 2: The gift of understanding is about the first principles
of that knowledge which is conferred by grace; but otherwise than
faith, because it belongs to faith to assent to them, while it
belongs to the gift of understanding to pierce with the mind the
things that are said.

Reply Obj. 3: The gift of understanding is related to both kinds of
knowledge, viz. speculative and practical, not as to the judgment,
but as to apprehension, by grasping what is said.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 7]

Whether the Sixth Beatitude, "Blessed Are the Clean of Heart," etc.,
Responds to the Gift of Understanding?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sixth beatitude, "Blessed are the
clean of heart, for they shall see God," does not respond to the gift
of understanding. Because cleanness of heart seems to belong chiefly
to the appetite. But the gift of understanding belongs, not to the
appetite, but rather to the intellectual power. Therefore the
aforesaid beatitude does not respond to the gift of understanding.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Acts 15:9): "Purifying their
hearts by faith." Now cleanness of heart is acquired by the heart
being purified. Therefore the aforesaid beatitude is related to
the virtue of faith rather than to the gift of understanding.

Obj. 3: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in the
present state of life. But the sight of God does not belong to the
present life, since it is that which gives happiness to the Blessed,
as stated above (I-II, Q. 3, A. 8). Therefore the sixth beatitude
which comprises the sight of God, does not respond to the gift of
understanding.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "The
sixth work of the Holy Ghost which is understanding, is applicable to
the clean of heart, whose eye being purified, they can see what eye
hath not seen."

_I answer that,_ Two things are contained in the sixth beatitude, as
also in the others, one by way of merit, viz. cleanness of heart; the
other by way of reward, viz. the sight of God, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 69, AA. 2, 4), and each of these, in some way, responds
to the gift of understanding.

For cleanness is twofold. One is a preamble and a disposition to
seeing God, and consists in the heart being cleansed of inordinate
affections: and this cleanness of heart is effected by the virtues and
gifts belonging to the appetitive power. The other cleanness of heart
is a kind of complement to the sight of God; such is the cleanness of
the mind that is purged of phantasms and errors, so as to receive the
truths which are proposed to it about God, no longer by way of
corporeal phantasms, nor infected with heretical misrepresentations:
and this cleanness is the result of the gift of understanding.

Again, the sight of God is twofold. One is perfect, whereby God's
Essence is seen: the other is imperfect, whereby, though we see not
what God is, yet we see what He is not; and whereby, the more
perfectly do we know God in this life, the more we understand that He
surpasses all that the mind comprehends. Each of these visions of God
belongs to the gift of understanding; the first, to the gift of
understanding in its state of perfection, as possessed in heaven; the
second, to the gift of understanding in its state of inchoation, as
possessed by wayfarers.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first two
arguments refer to the first kind of cleanness; while the third refers
to the perfect vision of God. Moreover the gifts both perfect us in
this life by way of inchoation, and will be fulfilled, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 69, A. 2).
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 8]

Whether Faith, Among the Fruits, Responds to the Gift of
Understanding?

Objection 1: It would seem that, among the fruits, faith does not
respond to the gift of understanding. For understanding is the fruit
of faith, since it is written (Isa. 7:9) according to another reading
[*The Septuagint]: "If you will not believe you shall not
understand," where our version has: "If you will not believe, you
shall not continue." Therefore fruit is not the fruit of
understanding.

Obj. 2: Further, that which precedes is not the fruit of what
follows. But faith seems to precede understanding, since it is the
foundation of the entire spiritual edifice, as stated above (Q. 4,
AA. 1, 7). Therefore faith is not the fruit of understanding.

Obj. 3: Further, more gifts pertain to the intellect than to the
appetite. Now, among the fruits, only one pertains to the intellect;
namely, faith, while all the others pertain to the appetite.
Therefore faith, seemingly, does not pertain to understanding more
than to wisdom, knowledge or counsel.

_On the contrary,_ The end of a thing is its fruit. Now the gift of
understanding seems to be ordained chiefly to the certitude of faith,
which certitude is reckoned a fruit. For a gloss on Gal. 5:22 says
that the "faith which is a fruit, is certitude about the unseen."
Therefore faith, among the fruits, responds to the gift of
understanding.

_I answer that,_ The fruits of the Spirit, as stated above (I-II, Q.
70, A. 1), when we were discussing them, are so called because they
are something ultimate and delightful, produced in us by the power of
the Holy Ghost. Now the ultimate and delightful has the nature of an
end, which is the proper object of the will: and consequently that
which is ultimate and delightful with regard to the will, must be,
after a fashion, the fruit of all the other things that pertain to
the other powers.

Accordingly, therefore, to this kind of gift of virtue that perfects a
power, we may distinguish a double fruit: one, belonging to the same
power; the other, the last of all as it were, belonging to the will.
In this way we must conclude that the fruit which properly responds to
the gift of understanding is faith, i.e. the certitude of faith; while
the fruit that responds to it last of all is joy, which belongs to the
will.

Reply Obj. 1: Understanding is the fruit of faith, taken as a virtue.
But we are not taking faith in this sense here, but for a kind of
certitude of faith, to which man attains by the gift of understanding.

Reply Obj. 2: Faith cannot altogether precede understanding, for it
would be impossible to assent by believing what is proposed to be
believed, without understanding it in some way. However, the
perfection of understanding follows the virtue of faith: which
perfection of understanding is itself followed by a kind of certainty
of faith.

Reply Obj. 3: The fruit of practical knowledge cannot consist in that
very knowledge, since knowledge of that kind is known not for its own
sake, but for the sake of something else. On the other hand,
speculative knowledge has its fruit in its very self, which fruit is
the certitude about the thing known. Hence the gift of counsel, which
belongs only to practical knowledge, has no corresponding fruit of
its own: while the gifts of wisdom, understanding and knowledge,
which can belongs also to speculative knowledge, have but one
corresponding fruit, which is certainly denoted by the name of faith.
The reason why there are several fruits pertaining to the appetitive
faculty, is because, as already stated, the character of end, which
the word fruit implies, pertains to the appetitive rather than to the
intellective part.
_______________________

QUESTION 9

OF THE GIFT OF KNOWLEDGE
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the gift of knowledge, under which head there are
four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether knowledge is a gift?

(2) Whether it is about Divine things?

(3) Whether it is speculative or practical?

(4) Which beatitude responds to it?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 9, Art. 1]

Whether Knowledge Is a Gift?

Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not a gift. For the
gifts of the Holy Ghost surpass the natural faculty. But knowledge
implies an effect of natural reason: for the Philosopher says
(Poster. i, 2) that a "demonstration is a syllogism which produces
knowledge." Therefore knowledge is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are common to all holy
persons, as stated above (Q. 8, A. 4; I-II, Q. 68, A. 5). Now
Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "many of the faithful lack
knowledge though they have faith." Therefore knowledge is not a gift.

Obj. 3: Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 8). Therefore one gift suffices for
the perfection of one virtue. Now the gift of understanding responds
to the virtue of faith, as stated above (Q. 8, A. 2). Therefore the
gift of knowledge does not respond to that virtue, nor does it appear
to which other virtue it can respond. Since, then, the gifts are
perfections of virtues, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, AA. 1, 2), it
seems that knowledge is not a gift.

_On the contrary,_ Knowledge is reckoned among the seven gifts (Isa.
11:2).

_I answer that,_ Grace is more perfect than nature, and, therefore,
does not fail in those things wherein man can be perfected by nature.
Now, when a man, by his natural reason, assents by his intellect to
some truth, he is perfected in two ways in respect of that truth:
first, because he grasps it; secondly, because he forms a sure
judgment on it.

Accordingly, two things are requisite in order that the human
intellect may perfectly assent to the truth of the faith: one of
these is that he should have a sound grasp of the things that are
proposed to be believed, and this pertains to the gift of
understanding, as stated above (Q. 8, A. 6): while the other is that
he should have a sure and right judgment on them, so as to discern
what is to be believed, from what is not to be believed, and for this
the gift of knowledge is required.

Reply Obj. 1: Certitude of knowledge varies in various natures,
according to the various conditions of each nature. Because man forms
a sure judgment about a truth by the discursive process of his
reason: and so human knowledge is acquired by means of demonstrative
reasoning. On the other hand, in God, there is a sure judgment of
truth, without any discursive process, by simple intuition, as was
stated in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 7); wherefore God's knowledge is
not discursive, or argumentative, but absolute and simple, to which
that knowledge is likened which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, since it
is a participated likeness thereof.

Reply Obj. 2: A twofold knowledge may be had about matters of belief.
One is the knowledge of what one ought to believe by discerning
things to be believed from things not to be believed: in this way
knowledge is a gift and is common to all holy persons. The other is a
knowledge about matters of belief, whereby one knows not only what
one ought to believe, but also how to make the faith known, how to
induce others to believe, and confute those who deny the faith. This
knowledge is numbered among the gratuitous graces, which are not
given to all, but to some. Hence Augustine, after the words quoted,
adds: "It is one thing for a man merely to know what he ought to
believe, and another to know how to dispense what he believes to the
godly, and to defend it against the ungodly."

Reply Obj. 3: The gifts are more perfect than the moral and
intellectual virtues; but they are not more perfect than the
theological virtues; rather are all the gifts ordained to the
perfection of the theological virtues, as to their end. Hence it is
not unreasonable if several gifts are ordained to one theological
virtue.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 9, Art. 2]

Whether the Gift of Knowledge Is About Divine Things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of knowledge is about Divine
things. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "knowledge begets,
nourishes and strengthens faith." Now faith is about Divine things,
because its object is the First Truth, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1).
Therefore the gift of knowledge also is about Divine things.

Obj. 2: Further, the gift of knowledge is more excellent than
acquired knowledge. But there is an acquired knowledge about Divine
things, for instance, the science of metaphysics. Much more therefore
is the gift of knowledge about Divine things.

Obj. 3: Further, according to Rom. 1:20, "the invisible things of God
. . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are
made." If therefore there is knowledge about created things, it seems
that there is also knowledge of Divine things.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1): "The knowledge
of Divine things may be properly called wisdom, and the knowledge of
human affairs may properly receive the name of knowledge."

_I answer that,_ A sure judgment about a thing is formed chiefly from
its cause, and so the order of judgments should be according to the
order of causes. For just as the first cause is the cause of the
second, so ought the judgment about the second cause to be formed
through the first cause: nor is it possible to judge of the first
cause through any other cause; wherefore the judgment which is formed
through the first cause, is the first and most perfect judgment.

Now in those things where we find something most perfect, the common
name of the genus is appropriated for those things which fall short
of the most perfect, and some special name is adapted to the most
perfect thing, as is the case in Logic. For in the genus of
convertible terms, that which signifies "what a thing is," is given
the special name of "definition," but the convertible terms which
fall short of this, retain the common name, and are called "proper"
terms.

Accordingly, since the word knowledge implies certitude of judgment
as stated above (A. 1), if this certitude of the judgment is derived
from the highest cause, the knowledge has a special name, which is
wisdom: for a wise man in any branch of knowledge is one who knows
the highest cause of that kind of knowledge, and is able to judge of
all matters by that cause: and a wise man "absolutely," is one who
knows the cause which is absolutely highest, namely God. Hence the
knowledge of Divine things is called "wisdom," while the knowledge
of human things is called "knowledge," this being the common name
denoting certitude of judgment, and appropriated to the judgment
which is formed through second causes. Accordingly, if we take
knowledge in this way, it is a distinct gift from the gift of wisdom,
so that the gift of knowledge is only about human or created things.

Reply Obj. 1: Although matters of faith are Divine and eternal, yet
faith itself is something temporal in the mind of the believer. Hence
to know what one ought to believe, belongs to the gift of knowledge,
but to know in themselves the very things we believe, by a kind of
union with them, belongs to the gift of wisdom. Therefore the gift of
wisdom corresponds more to charity which unites man's mind to God.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument takes knowledge in the generic
acceptation of the term: it is not thus that knowledge is a special
gift, but according as it is restricted to judgments formed through
created things.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 1, A. 1), every cognitive habit
regards formally the mean through which things are known, and
materially, the things that are known through the mean. And since
that which is formal, is of most account, it follows that those
sciences which draw conclusions about physical matter from
mathematical principles, are reckoned rather among the mathematical
sciences, though, as to their matter they have more in common with
physical sciences: and for this reason it is stated in _Phys._  ii, 2
that they are more akin to physics. Accordingly, since man knows God
through His creatures, this seems to pertain to "knowledge," to which
it belongs formally, rather than to "wisdom," to which it belongs
materially: and, conversely, when we judge of creatures according to
Divine things, this pertains to "wisdom" rather than to "knowledge."
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 9, Art. 3]

Whether the Gift of Knowledge Is Practical Knowledge?

Objection 1: It would seem that the knowledge, which is numbered
among the gifts, is practical knowledge. For Augustine says (De Trin.
xii, 14) that "knowledge is concerned with the actions in which we
make use of external things." But the knowledge which is concerned
about actions is practical. Therefore the gift of knowledge is
practical.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): "Knowledge is nought if
it hath not its use for piety . . . and piety is very useless if it
lacks the discernment of knowledge." Now it follows from this
authority that knowledge directs piety. But this cannot apply to a
speculative science. Therefore the gift of knowledge is not
speculative but practical.

Obj. 3: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are only in the
righteous, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 5). But speculative knowledge
can be also in the unrighteous, according to James 4:17: "To
him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a
sin." Therefore the gift of knowledge is not speculative but
practical.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): "Knowledge on her own
day prepares a feast, because she overcomes the fast of ignorance in
the mind." Now ignorance is not entirely removed, save by both kinds
of knowledge, viz. speculative and practical. Therefore the gift of
knowledge is both speculative and practical.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 9, A. 8), the gift of knowledge,
like the gift of understanding, is ordained to the certitude of
faith. Now faith consists primarily and principally in speculation,
in as much as it is founded on the First Truth. But since the First
Truth is also the last end for the sake of which our works are done,
hence it is that faith extends to works, according to Gal. 5:6:
"Faith . . . worketh by charity."

The consequence is that the gift of knowledge also, primarily and
principally indeed, regards speculation, in so far as man knows what
he ought to hold by faith; yet, secondarily, it extends to works,
since we are directed in our actions by the knowledge of matters of
faith, and of conclusions drawn therefrom.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of the gift of knowledge, in so
far as it extends to works; for action is ascribed to knowledge, yet
not action solely, nor primarily: and in this way it directs piety.

Hence the Reply to the Second Objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 3: As we have already stated (Q. 8, A. 5) about the gift
of understanding, not everyone who understands, has the gift of
understanding, but only he that understands through a habit of grace:
and so we must take note, with regard to the gift of knowledge, that
they alone have the gift of knowledge, who judge aright about matters
of faith and action, through the grace bestowed on them, so as never
to wander from the straight path of justice. This is the knowledge of
holy things, according to Wis. 10:10: "She conducted the just . . .
through the right ways . . . and gave him the knowledge of holy
things."
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 9, Art. 4]

Whether the Third Beatitude, "Blessed Are They That Mourn," etc.
Corresponds to the Gift of Knowledge?

Objection 1: It would seem that the third beatitude, "Blessed are they
that mourn," does not correspond to the gift of knowledge. For, even
as evil is the cause of sorrow and grief, so is good the cause of joy.
Now knowledge brings good to light rather than evil, since the latter
is known through evil: for "the straight line rules both itself and
the crooked line" (De Anima i, 5). Therefore the aforesaid beatitude
does not suitably correspond to the gift of knowledge.

Obj. 2: Further, consideration of truth is an act of knowledge. Now
there is no sorrow in the consideration of truth; rather is there
joy, since it is written (Wis. 8:16): "Her conversation hath no
bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness."
Therefore the aforesaid beatitude does not suitably correspond with
the gift of knowledge.

Obj. 3: Further, the gift of knowledge consists in speculation,
before operation. Now, in so far as it consists in speculation,
sorrow does not correspond to it, since "the speculative intellect is
not concerned about things to be sought or avoided" (De Anima iii,
9). Therefore the aforesaid beatitude is not suitably reckoned to
correspond with the gift of knowledge.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte iv):
"Knowledge befits the mourner, who has discovered that he has been
mastered by the evil which he coveted as though it were good."

_I answer that,_ Right judgment about creatures belongs properly to
knowledge. Now it is through creatures that man's aversion from God
is occasioned, according to Wis. 14:11: "Creatures . . . are turned
to an abomination . . . and a snare to the feet of the unwise," of
those, namely, who do not judge aright about creatures, since they
deem the perfect good to consist in them. Hence they sin by placing
their last end in them, and lose the true good. It is by forming a
right judgment of creatures that man becomes aware of the loss (of
which they may be the occasion), which judgment he exercises through
the gift of knowledge.

Hence the beatitude of sorrow is said to correspond to the gift of
knowledge.

Reply Obj. 1: Created goods do not cause spiritual joy, except in
so far as they are referred to the Divine good, which is the proper
cause of spiritual joy. Hence spiritual peace and the resulting joy
correspond directly to the gift of wisdom: but to the gift of
knowledge there corresponds, in the first place, sorrow for past
errors, and, in consequence, consolation, since, by his right
judgment, man directs creatures to the Divine good. For this reason
sorrow is set forth in this beatitude, as the merit, and the
resulting consolation, as the reward; which is begun in this life,
and is perfected in the life to come.

Reply Obj. 2: Man rejoices in the very consideration of truth; yet he
may sometimes grieve for the thing, the truth of which he considers:
it is thus that sorrow is ascribed to knowledge.

Reply Obj. 3: No beatitude corresponds to knowledge, in so far as it
consists in speculation, because man's beatitude consists, not in
considering creatures, but in contemplating God. But man's beatitude
does consist somewhat in the right use of creatures, and in
well-ordered love of them: and this I say with regard to the
beatitude of a wayfarer. Hence beatitude relating to contemplation is
not ascribed to knowledge, but to understanding and wisdom, which are
about Divine things.
_______________________

QUESTION 10

OF UNBELIEF IN GENERAL
(In Twelve Articles)

In due sequence we must consider the contrary vices: first, unbelief,
which is contrary to faith; secondly, blasphemy, which is opposed to
confession of faith; thirdly, ignorance and dulness of mind, which
are contrary to knowledge and understanding.

As to the first, we must consider (1) unbelief in general;
(2) heresy; (3) apostasy from the faith.

Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) Whether unbelief is a sin?

(2) What is its subject?

(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?

(4) Whether every action of unbelievers is a sin?

(5) Of the species of unbelief;

(6) Of their comparison, one with another;

(7) Whether we ought to dispute about faith with unbelievers?

(8) Whether they ought to be compelled to the faith?

(9) Whether we ought to have communications with them?

(10) Whether unbelievers can have authority over Christians?

(11) Whether the rites of unbelievers should be tolerated?

(12) Whether the children of unbelievers are to be baptized against
their parents' will?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 1]

Whether Unbelief Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not a sin. For every sin
is contrary to nature, as Damascene proves (De Fide Orth. ii, 4). Now
unbelief seems not to be contrary to nature; for Augustine says (De
Praedest. Sanct. v) that "to be capable to having faith, just as to be
capable of having charity, is natural to all men; whereas to have
faith, even as to have charity, belongs to the grace of the faithful."
Therefore not to have faith, which is to be an unbeliever, is not a
sin.

Obj. 2: Further, no one sins that which he cannot avoid, since every
sin is voluntary. Now it is not in a man's power to avoid unbelief,
for he cannot avoid it unless he have faith, because the Apostle says
(Rom. 10:14): "How shall they believe in Him, of Whom they have not
heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher?" Therefore
unbelief does not seem to be a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, as stated above (I-II, Q. 84, A. 4), there are seven
capital sins, to which all sins are reduced. But unbelief does not
seem to be comprised under any of them. Therefore unbelief is not a
sin.

_On the contrary,_ Vice is opposed to virtue. Now faith is a virtue,
and unbelief is opposed to it. Therefore unbelief is a sin.

_I answer that,_ Unbelief may be taken in two ways: first, by way of
pure negation, so that a man be called an unbeliever, merely because
he has not the faith. Secondly, unbelief may be taken by way of
opposition to the faith; in which sense a man refuses to hear the
faith, or despises it, according to Isa. 53:1: "Who hath believed our
report?" It is this that completes the notion of unbelief, and it is
in this sense that unbelief is a sin.

If, however, we take it by way of pure negation, as we find it in
those who have heard nothing about the faith, it bears the character,
not of sin, but of punishment, because such like ignorance of Divine
things is a result of the sin of our first parent. If such like
unbelievers are damned, it is on account of other sins, which cannot
be taken away without faith, but not on account of their sin of
unbelief. Hence Our Lord said (John 15:22) "If I had not come, and
spoken to them, they would not have sin"; which Augustine expounds
(Tract. lxxxix in Joan.) as "referring to the sin whereby they
believed not in Christ."

Reply Obj. 1: To have the faith is not part of human nature, but it
is part of human nature that man's mind should not thwart his inner
instinct, and the outward preaching of the truth. Hence, in this way,
unbelief is contrary to nature.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument takes unbelief as denoting a pure
negation.

Reply Obj. 3: Unbelief, in so far as it is a sin, arises from pride,
through which man is unwilling to subject his intellect to the rules
of faith, and to the sound interpretation of the Fathers. Hence
Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "presumptuous innovations arise
from vainglory."

It might also be replied that just as the theological virtues are not
reduced to the cardinal virtues, but precede them, so too, the vices
opposed to the theological virtues are not reduced to the capital
vices.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 2]

Whether Unbelief Is in the Intellect As Its Subject?

Objection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not in the intellect as
its subject. For every sin is in the will, according to Augustine (De
Duabus Anim. x, xi). Now unbelief is a sin, as stated above (A. 1).
Therefore unbelief resides in the will and not in the intellect.

Obj. 2: Further, unbelief is sinful through contempt of the preaching
of the faith. But contempt pertains to the will. Therefore unbelief
is in the will.

Obj. 3: Further, a gloss [*Augustine, Enchiridion lx.] on 2 Cor.
11:14 "Satan . . . transformeth himself into an angel of light," says
that if "a wicked angel pretend to be a good angel, and be taken for
a good angel, it is not a dangerous or an unhealthy error, if he does
or says what is becoming to a good angel." This seems to be because
of the rectitude of the will of the man who adheres to the angel,
since his intention is to adhere to a good angel. Therefore the sin
of unbelief seems to consist entirely in a perverse will: and,
consequently, it does not reside in the intellect.

_On the contrary,_ Things which are contrary to one another are in
the same subject. Now faith, to which unbelief is opposed, resides in
the intellect. Therefore unbelief also is in the intellect.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 74, AA. 1, 2), sin is said
to be in the power which is the principle of the sinful act. Now a
sinful act may have two principles: one is its first and universal
principle, which commands all acts of sin; and this is the will,
because every sin is voluntary. The other principle of the sinful act
is the proper and proximate principle which elicits the sinful act:
thus the concupiscible is the principle of gluttony and lust,
wherefore these sins are said to be in the concupiscible. Now
dissent, which is the act proper to unbelief, is an act of the
intellect, moved, however, by the will, just as assent is.

Therefore unbelief, like faith, is in the intellect as its proximate
subject. But it is in the will as its first moving principle, in which
way every sin is said to be in the will.

Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 2: The will's contempt causes the intellect's dissent,
which completes the notion of unbelief. Hence the cause of unbelief
is in the will, while unbelief itself is in the intellect.

Reply Obj. 3: He that believes a wicked angel to be a good one, does
not dissent from a matter of faith, because "his bodily senses are
deceived, while his mind does not depart from a true and right
judgment" as the gloss observes [*Augustine, Enchiridion lx]. But,
according to the same authority, to adhere to Satan when he begins to
invite one to his abode, i.e. wickedness and error, is not without
sin.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 3]

Whether Unbelief Is the Greatest of Sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not the greatest of sins.
For Augustine says (De Bapt. contra Donat. iv, 20): "I should hesitate
to decide whether a very wicked Catholic ought to be preferred to a
heretic, in whose life one finds nothing reprehensible beyond the fact
that he is a heretic." But a heretic is an unbeliever. Therefore we
ought not to say absolutely that unbelief is the greatest of sins.

Obj. 2: Further, that which diminishes or excuses a sin is not,
seemingly, the greatest of sins. Now unbelief excuses or diminishes
sin: for the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:12, 13): "I . . . before was a
blasphemer, and a persecutor and contumelious; but I obtained . . .
mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly in unbelief." Therefore
unbelief is not the greatest of sins.

Obj. 3: Further, the greater sin deserves the greater punishment,
according to Deut. 25:2: "According to the measure of the sin shall
the measure also of the stripes be." Now a greater punishment is due
to believers than to unbelievers, according to Heb. 10:29: "How much
more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments, who hath trodden
under foot the Son of God, and hath esteemed the blood of the
testament unclean, by which he was sanctified?" Therefore unbelief is
not the greatest of sins.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine, commenting on John 15:22, "If I had not
come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin," says (Tract.
lxxxix in Joan.): "Under the general name, He refers to a singularly
great sin. For this," viz. infidelity, "is the sin to which all others
may be traced." Therefore unbelief is the greatest of sins.

_I answer that,_ Every sin consists formally in aversion from God, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 6; I-II, Q. 73, A. 3). Hence the more a
sin severs man from God, the graver it is. Now man is more than ever
separated from God by unbelief, because he has not even true
knowledge of God: and by false knowledge of God, man does not
approach Him, but is severed from Him.

Nor is it possible for one who has a false opinion of God, to know
Him in any way at all, because the object of his opinion is not God.
Therefore it is clear that the sin of unbelief is greater than any
sin that occurs in the perversion of morals. This does not apply to
the sins that are opposed to the theological virtues, as we shall
state further on (Q. 20, A. 3; Q. 34, A. 2, ad 2; Q. 39, A. 2, ad 3).

Reply Obj. 1: Nothing hinders a sin that is more grave in its genus
from being less grave in respect of some circumstances. Hence
Augustine hesitated to decide between a bad Catholic, and a heretic
not sinning otherwise, because although the heretic's sin is more
grave generically, it can be lessened by a circumstance, and
conversely the sin of the Catholic can, by some circumstance, be
aggravated.

Reply Obj. 2: Unbelief includes both ignorance, as an accessory
thereto, and resistance to matters of faith, and in the latter
respect it is a most grave sin. In respect, however, of this
ignorance, it has a certain reason for excuse, especially when a
man sins not from malice, as was the case with the Apostle.

Reply Obj. 3: An unbeliever is more severely punished for his sin of
unbelief than another sinner is for any sin whatever, if we consider
the kind of sin. But in the case of another sin, e.g. adultery,
committed by a believer, and by an unbeliever, the believer, other
things being equal, sins more gravely than the unbeliever, both on
account of his knowledge of the truth through faith, and on account
of the sacraments of faith with which he has been satiated, and
which he insults by committing sin.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 4]

Whether Every Act of an Unbeliever Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that each act of an unbeliever is a sin.
Because a gloss on Rom. 14:23, "All that is not of faith is sin,"
says: "The whole life of unbelievers is a sin." Now the life of
unbelievers consists of their actions. Therefore every action of an
unbeliever is a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, faith directs the intention. Now there can be no
good save what comes from a right intention. Therefore, among
unbelievers, no action can be good.

Obj. 3: Further, when that which precedes is corrupted, that which
follows is corrupted also. Now an act of faith precedes the acts of
all the virtues. Therefore, since there is no act of faith in
unbelievers, they can do no good work, but sin in every action of
theirs.

_On the contrary,_ It is said of Cornelius, while yet an unbeliever
(Acts 10:4, 31), that his alms were acceptable to God. Therefore not
every action of an unbeliever is a sin, but some of his actions are
good.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 85, AA. 2, 4) mortal sin
takes away sanctifying grace, but does not wholly corrupt the good of
nature. Since therefore, unbelief is a mortal sin, unbelievers are
without grace indeed, yet some good of nature remains in them.
Consequently it is evident that unbelievers cannot do those good works
which proceed from grace, viz. meritorious works; yet they can, to a
certain extent, do those good works for which the good of nature
suffices.

Hence it does not follow that they sin in everything they do; but
whenever they do anything out of their unbelief, then they sin. For
even as one who has the faith, can commit an actual sin, venial or
even mortal, which he does not refer to the end of faith, so too, an
unbeliever can do a good deed in a matter which he does not refer to
the end of his unbelief.

Reply Obj. 1: The words quoted must be taken to mean either that the
life of unbelievers cannot be sinless, since without faith no sin is
taken away, or that whatever they do out of unbelief, is a sin. Hence
the same authority adds: "Because every one that lives or acts
according to his unbelief, sins grievously."

Reply Obj. 2: Faith directs the intention with regard to the
supernatural last end: but even the light of natural reason can
direct the intention in respect of a connatural good.

Reply Obj. 3: Unbelief does not so wholly destroy natural reason in
unbelievers, but that some knowledge of the truth remains in them,
whereby they are able to do deeds that are generically good. With
regard, however, to Cornelius, it is to be observed that he was not
an unbeliever, else his works would not have been acceptable to God,
whom none can please without faith. Now he had implicit faith, as the
truth of the Gospel was not yet made manifest: hence Peter was sent
to him to give him fuller instruction in the faith.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 5]

Whether There Are Several Species of Unbelief?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several species of
unbelief. For, since faith and unbelief are contrary to one another,
they must be about the same thing. Now the formal object of faith is
the First Truth, whence it derives its unity, although its matter
contains many points of belief. Therefore the object of unbelief also
is the First Truth; while the things which an unbeliever disbelieves
are the matter of his unbelief. Now the specific difference depends
not on material but on formal principles. Therefore there are not
several species of unbelief, according to the various points which
the unbeliever disbelieves.

Obj. 2: Further, it is possible to stray from the truth of faith in
an infinite number of ways. If therefore the various species of
unbelief correspond to the number of various errors, it would seem to
follow that there is an infinite number of species of unbelief, and
consequently, that we ought not to make these species the object of
our consideration.

Obj. 3: Further, the same thing does not belong to different species.
Now a man may be an unbeliever through erring about different points
of truth. Therefore diversity of errors does not make a diversity of
species of unbelief: and so there are not several species of unbelief.

_On the contrary,_ Several species of vice are opposed to each
virtue, because "good happens in one way, but evil in many ways,"
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii,
6). Now faith is a virtue. Therefore several species of vice are
opposed to it.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4; I-II, Q. 64, A.
1), every virtue consists in following some rule of human knowledge
or operation. Now conformity to a rule happens one way in one matter,
whereas a breach of the rule happens in many ways, so that many vices
are opposed to one virtue. The diversity of the vices that are
opposed to each virtue may be considered in two ways, first, with
regard to their different relations to the virtue: and in this way
there are determinate species of vices contrary to a virtue: thus to
a moral virtue one vice is opposed by exceeding the virtue, and
another, by falling short of the virtue. Secondly, the diversity of
vices opposed to one virtue may be considered in respect of the
corruption of the various conditions required for that virtue. In
this way an infinite number of vices are opposed to one virtue, e.g.
temperance or fortitude, according to the infinite number of ways in
which the various circumstances of a virtue may be corrupted, so that
the rectitude of virtue is forsaken. For this reason the Pythagoreans
held evil to be infinite.

Accordingly we must say that if unbelief be considered in comparison
to faith, there are several species of unbelief, determinate in
number. For, since the sin of unbelief consists in resisting the
faith, this may happen in two ways: either the faith is resisted
before it has been accepted, and such is the unbelief of pagans or
heathens; or the Christian faith is resisted after it has been
accepted, and this either in the figure, and such is the unbelief of
the Jews, or in the very manifestation of truth, and such is the
unbelief of heretics. Hence we may, in a general way, reckon these
three as species of unbelief.

If, however, the species of unbelief be distinguished according to
the various errors that occur in matters of faith, there are not
determinate species of unbelief: for errors can be multiplied
indefinitely, as Augustine observes (De Haeresibus).

Reply Obj. 1: The formal aspect of a sin can be considered in two
ways. First, according to the intention of the sinner, in which case
the thing to which the sinner turns is the formal object of his sin,
and determines the various species of that sin. Secondly, it may be
considered as an evil, and in this case the good which is forsaken is
the formal object of the sin; which however does not derive its
species from this point of view, in fact it is a privation. We must
therefore reply that the object of unbelief is the First Truth
considered as that which unbelief forsakes, but its formal aspect,
considered as that to which unbelief turns, is the false opinion that
it follows: and it is from this point of view that unbelief derives
its various species. Hence, even as charity is one, because it
adheres to the Sovereign Good, while there are various species of
vice opposed to charity, which turn away from the Sovereign Good by
turning to various temporal goods, and also in respect of various
inordinate relations to God, so too, faith is one virtue through
adhering to the one First Truth, yet there are many species of
unbelief, because unbelievers follow many false opinions.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the various species of unbelief
according to various points in which errors occur.

Reply Obj. 3: Since faith is one because it believes in many things
in relation to one, so may unbelief, although it errs in many things,
be one in so far as all those things are related to one. Yet nothing
hinders one man from erring in various species of unbelief, even as
one man may be subject to various vices, and to various bodily
diseases.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 6]

Whether the Unbelief of Pagans or Heathens Is Graver Than Other Kinds?

Objection 1: It would seem that the unbelief of heathens or pagans is
graver than other kinds. For just as bodily disease is graver
according as it endangers the health of a more important member of
the body, so does sin appear to be graver, according as it is opposed
to that which holds a more important place in virtue. Now that which
is most important in faith, is belief in the unity of God, from which
the heathens deviate by believing in many gods. Therefore their
unbelief is the gravest of all.

Obj. 2: Further, among heresies, the more detestable are those which
contradict the truth of faith in more numerous and more important
points: thus, the heresy of Arius, who severed the Godhead, was more
detestable than that of Nestorius who severed the humanity of Christ
from the Person of God the Son. Now the heathens deny the faith in
more numerous and more important points than Jews and heretics; since
they do not accept the faith at all. Therefore their unbelief is the
gravest.

Obj. 3: Further, every good diminishes evil. Now there is some good
in the Jews, since they believe in the Old Testament as being from
God, and there is some good in heretics, since they venerate the New
Testament. Therefore they sin less grievously than heathens, who
receive neither Testament.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Pet. 2:21): "It had been better
for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have
known it, to turn back." Now the heathens have not known the way of
justice, whereas heretics and Jews have abandoned it after knowing
it in some way. Therefore theirs is the graver sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5), two things may be considered
in unbelief. One of these is its relation to faith: and from this
point of view, he who resists the faith after accepting it, sins more
grievously against faith, than he who resists it without having
accepted it, even as he who fails to fulfil what he has promised,
sins more grievously than if he had never promised it. In this way
the unbelief of heretics, who confess their belief in the Gospel, and
resist that faith by corrupting it, is a more grievous sin than that
of the Jews, who have never accepted the Gospel faith. Since,
however, they accepted the figure of that faith in the Old Law, which
they corrupt by their false interpretations, their unbelief is a more
grievous sin than that of the heathens, because the latter have not
accepted the Gospel faith in any way at all.

The second thing to be considered in unbelief is the corruption of
matters of faith. In this respect, since heathens err on more points
than Jews, and these in more points than heretics, the unbelief of
heathens is more grievous than the unbelief of the Jews, and that of
the Jews than that of the heretics, except in such cases as that of
the Manichees, who, in matters of faith, err even more than heathens
do.

Of these two gravities the first surpasses the second from the point
of view of guilt; since, as stated above (A. 1) unbelief has the
character of guilt, from its resisting faith rather than from the
mere absence of faith, for the latter as was stated (A. 1) seems
rather to bear the character of punishment. Hence, speaking
absolutely, the unbelief of heretics is the worst.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 7]

Whether One Ought to Dispute with Unbelievers in Public?

Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to dispute with
unbelievers in public. For the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:14): "Contend
not in words, for it is to no profit, but to the subverting of the
hearers." But it is impossible to dispute with unbelievers publicly
without contending in words. Therefore one ought not to dispute
publicly with unbelievers.

Obj. 2: Further, the law of Martianus Augustus confirmed by the
canons [*De Sum. Trin. Cod. lib. i, leg. Nemo] expresses itself thus:
"It is an insult to the judgment of the most religious synod, if
anyone ventures to debate or dispute in public about matters which
have once been judged and disposed of." Now all matters of faith have
been decided by the holy councils. Therefore it is an insult to the
councils, and consequently a grave sin to presume to dispute in public
about matters of faith.

Obj. 3: Further, disputations are conducted by means of arguments.
But an argument is a reason in settlement of a dubious matter:
whereas things that are of faith, being most certain, ought not to be
a matter of doubt. Therefore one ought not to dispute in public about
matters of faith.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Acts 9:22, 29) that "Saul
increased much more in strength, and confounded the Jews," and that
"he spoke . . . to the gentiles and disputed with the Greeks."

_I answer that,_ In disputing about the faith, two things must be
observed: one on the part of the disputant; the other on the part of
his hearers. On the part of the disputant, we must consider his
intention. For if he were to dispute as though he had doubts about
the faith, and did not hold the truth of faith for certain, and as
though he intended to probe it with arguments, without doubt he would
sin, as being doubtful of the faith and an unbeliever. On the other
hand, it is praiseworthy to dispute about the faith in order to
confute errors, or for practice.

On the part of the hearers we must consider whether those who hear
the disputation are instructed and firm in the faith, or simple and
wavering. As to those who are well instructed and firm in the faith,
there can be no danger in disputing about the faith in their
presence. But as to simple-minded people, we must make a distinction;
because either they are provoked and molested by unbelievers, for
instance, Jews or heretics, or pagans who strive to corrupt the faith
in them, or else they are not subject to provocation in this matter,
as in those countries where there are no unbelievers. In the first
case it is necessary to dispute in public about the faith, provided
there be those who are equal and adapted to the task of confuting
errors; since in this way simple people are strengthened in the
faith, and unbelievers are deprived of the opportunity to deceive,
while if those who ought to withstand the perverters of the truth of
faith were silent, this would tend to strengthen error. Hence Gregory
says (Pastor. ii, 4): "Even as a thoughtless speech gives rise to
error, so does an indiscreet silence leave those in error who might
have been instructed." On the other hand, in the second case it is
dangerous to dispute in public about the faith, in the presence of
simple people, whose faith for this very reason is more firm, that
they have never heard anything differing from what they believe.
Hence it is not expedient for them to hear what unbelievers have to
say against the faith.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle does not entirely forbid disputations, but
such as are inordinate, and consist of contentious words rather than
of sound speeches.

Reply Obj. 2: That law forbade those public disputations about the
faith, which arise from doubting the faith, but not those which are
for the safeguarding thereof.

Reply Obj. 3: One ought to dispute about matters of faith, not as
though one doubted about them, but in order to make the truth known,
and to confute errors. For, in order to confirm the faith, it is
necessary sometimes to dispute with unbelievers, sometimes by
defending the faith, according to 1 Pet. 3:15: "Being ready always
to satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason of that hope and faith
which is in you [*Vulg.: 'Of that hope which is in you'; St. Thomas'
reading is apparently taken from Bede]." Sometimes again, it is
necessary, in order to convince those who are in error, according to
Titus 1:9: "That he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to
convince the gainsayers."
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 8]

Whether Unbelievers Ought to Be Compelled to the Faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that unbelievers ought by no means to be
compelled to the faith. For it is written (Matt. 13:28) that the
servants of the householder, in whose field cockle had been sown,
asked him: "Wilt thou that we go and gather it up?" and that he
answered: "No, lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root up the
wheat also together with it": on which passage Chrysostom says (Hom.
xlvi in Matth.): "Our Lord says this so as to forbid the slaying of
men. For it is not right to slay heretics, because if you do you will
necessarily slay many innocent persons." Therefore it seems that for
the same reason unbelievers ought not to be compelled to the faith.

Obj. 2: Further, we read in the Decretals (Dist. xlv can., De
Judaeis): "The holy synod prescribes, with regard to the Jews, that
for the future, none are to be compelled to believe." Therefore, in
like manner, neither should unbelievers be compelled to the faith.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.) that "it is
possible for a man to do other things against his will, but he cannot
believe unless he is willing." Therefore it seems that unbelievers
ought not to be compelled to the faith.

Obj. 4: It is said in God's person (Ezech. 18:32 [*Ezech. 33:11]): "I
desire not the death of the sinner [Vulg.: 'of him that dieth']." Now
we ought to conform our will to the Divine will, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 19, AA. 9, 10). Therefore we should not even wish
unbelievers to be put to death.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 14:23): "Go out into the
highways and hedges; and compel them to come in." Now men enter into
the house of God, i.e. into Holy Church, by faith. Therefore some
ought to be compelled to the faith.

_I answer that,_ Among unbelievers there are some who have never
received the faith, such as the heathens and the Jews: and these are
by no means to be compelled to the faith, in order that they may
believe, because to believe depends on the will: nevertheless they
should be compelled by the faithful, if it be possible to do so, so
that they do not hinder the faith, by their blasphemies, or by their
evil persuasions, or even by their open persecutions. It is for this
reason that Christ's faithful often wage war with unbelievers, not
indeed for the purpose of forcing them to believe, because even if
they were to conquer them, and take them prisoners, they should still
leave them free to believe, if they will, but in order to prevent
them from hindering the faith of Christ.

On the other hand, there are unbelievers who at some time have
accepted the faith, and professed it, such as heretics and all
apostates: such should be submitted even to bodily compulsion, that
they may fulfil what they have promised, and hold what they, at one
time, received.

Reply Obj. 1: Some have understood the authority quoted to forbid,
not the excommunication but the slaying of heretics, as appears from
the words of Chrysostom. Augustine too, says (Ep. ad Vincent. xciii)
of himself: "It was once my opinion that none should be compelled to
union with Christ, that we should deal in words, and fight with
arguments. However this opinion of mine is undone, not by words of
contradiction, but by convincing examples. Because fear of the law
was so profitable, that many say: Thanks be to the Lord Who has
broken our chains asunder." Accordingly the meaning of Our Lord's
words, "Suffer both to grow until the harvest," must be gathered from
those which precede, "lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root
the wheat also together with it." For, Augustine says (Contra Ep.
Parmen. iii, 2) "these words show that when this is not to be feared,
that is to say, when a man's crime is so publicly known, and so
hateful to all, that he has no defenders, or none such as might cause
a schism, the severity of discipline should not slacken."

Reply Obj. 2: Those Jews who have in no way received the faith, ought
not by no means to be compelled to the faith: if, however, they have
received it, they ought to be compelled to keep it, as is stated in
the same chapter.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as taking a vow is a matter of will, and keeping a
vow, a matter of obligation, so acceptance of the faith is a matter
of the will, whereas keeping the faith, when once one has received
it, is a matter of obligation. Wherefore heretics should be compelled
to keep the faith. Thus Augustine says to the Count Boniface (Ep.
clxxxv): "What do these people mean by crying out continually: 'We
may believe or not believe just as we choose. Whom did Christ
compel?' They should remember that Christ at first compelled Paul and
afterwards taught Him."

Reply Obj. 4: As Augustine says in the same letter, "none of us
wishes any heretic to perish. But the house of David did not deserve
to have peace, unless his son Absalom had been killed in the war
which he had raised against his father. Thus if the Catholic Church
gathers together some of the perdition of others, she heals the
sorrow of her maternal heart by the delivery of so many nations."
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 9]

Whether It Is Lawful to Communicate with Unbelievers?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to communicate with
unbelievers. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:27): "If any of them that
believe not, invite you, and you be willing to go, eat of anything
that is set before you." And Chrysostom says (Hom. xxv super Epist. ad
Heb.): "If you wish to go to dine with pagans, we permit it without
any reservation." Now to sit at table with anyone is to communicate
with him. Therefore it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers.

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:12): "What have I to do
to judge them that are without?" Now unbelievers are without. When,
therefore, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with
certain people, it seems that they ought not to be forbidden to
communicate with unbelievers.

Obj. 3: Further, a master cannot employ his servant, unless he
communicate with him, at least by word, since the master moves his
servant by command. Now Christians can have unbelievers, either Jews,
or pagans, or Saracens, for servants. Therefore they can lawfully
communicate with them.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 7:2, 3): "Thou shalt make no
league with them, nor show mercy to them; neither shalt thou make
marriages with them": and a gloss on Lev. 15:19, "The woman who at
the return of the month," etc. says: "It is so necessary to shun
idolatry, that we should not come in touch with idolaters or their
disciples, nor have any dealings with them."

_I answer that,_ Communication with a particular person is forbidden to
the faithful, in two ways: first, as a punishment of the person with
whom they are forbidden to communicate; secondly, for the safety of
those who are forbidden to communicate with others. Both motives can
be gathered from the Apostle's words (1 Cor. 5:6). For after he had
pronounced sentence of excommunication, he adds as his reason: "Know
you not that a little leaven corrupts the whole lump?" and afterwards
he adds the reason on the part of the punishment inflicted by the
sentence of the Church when he says (1 Cor. 5:12): "Do not you judge
them that are within?"

Accordingly, in the first way the Church does not forbid the faithful
to communicate with unbelievers, who have not in any way received the
Christian faith, viz. with pagans and Jews, because she has not the
right to exercise spiritual judgment over them, but only temporal
judgment, in the case when, while dwelling among Christians they are
guilty of some misdemeanor, and are condemned by the faithful to some
temporal punishment. On the other hand, in this way, i.e. as a
punishment, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with those
unbelievers who have forsaken the faith they once received, either by
corrupting the faith, as heretics, or by entirely renouncing the
faith, as apostates, because the Church pronounces sentence of
excommunication on both.

With regard to the second way, it seems that one ought to distinguish
according to the various conditions of persons, circumstances and
time. For some are firm in the faith; and so it is to be hoped that
their communicating with unbelievers will lead to the conversion of
the latter rather than to the aversion of the faithful from the faith.
These are not to be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers who have
not received the faith, such as pagans or Jews, especially if there be
some urgent necessity for so doing. But in the case of simple people
and those who are weak in the faith, whose perversion is to be feared
as a probable result, they should be forbidden to communicate with
unbelievers, and especially to be on very familiar terms with them, or
to communicate with them without necessity.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2: The Church does not exercise judgment against
unbelievers in the point of inflicting spiritual punishment on them:
but she does exercise judgment over some of them in the matter of
temporal punishment. It is under this head that sometimes the Church,
for certain special sins, withdraws the faithful from communication
with certain unbelievers.

Reply Obj. 3: There is more probability that a servant who is ruled
by his master's commands, will be converted to the faith of his
master who is a believer, than if the case were the reverse: and so
the faithful are not forbidden to have unbelieving servants. If,
however, the master were in danger, through communicating with such
a servant, he should send him away, according to Our Lord's command
(Matt. 18:8): "If . . . thy foot scandalize thee, cut it off, and
cast it from thee."

With regard to the argument in the contrary [*The Leonine Edition
gives this solution before the Reply Obj. 2] sense the reply is that
the Lord gave this command in reference to those nations into whose
territory the Jews were about to enter. For the latter were inclined
to idolatry, so that it was to be feared lest, through frequent
dealings with those nations, they should be estranged from the faith:
hence the text goes on (Deut. 7:4): "For she will turn away thy son
from following Me."
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 10]

Whether Unbelievers May Have Authority or Dominion Over the Faithful?

Objection 1: It would seem that unbelievers may have authority or
dominion over the faithful. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:1):
"Whosoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their masters
worthy of all honor": and it is clear that he is speaking of
unbelievers, since he adds (1 Tim. 6:2): "But they that have believing
masters, let them not despise them." Moreover it is written (1 Pet.
2:18): "Servants be subject to your masters with all fear, not only to
the good and gentle, but also to the froward." Now this command would
not be contained in the apostolic teaching unless unbelievers could
have authority over the faithful. Therefore it seems that unbelievers
can have authority over the faithful.

Obj. 2: Further, all the members of a prince's household are his
subjects. Now some of the faithful were members of unbelieving
princes' households, for we read in the Epistle to the Philippians
(4:22): "All the saints salute you, especially they that are of
Caesar's household," referring to Nero, who was an unbeliever.
Therefore unbelievers can have authority over the faithful.

Obj. 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2) a slave
is his master's instrument in matters concerning everyday life, even
as a craftsman's laborer is his instrument in matters concerning the
working of his art. Now, in such matters, a believer can be subject
to an unbeliever, for he may work on an unbeliever's farm. Therefore
unbelievers may have authority over the faithful even as to dominion.

_On the contrary,_ Those who are in authority can pronounce judgment
on those over whom they are placed. But unbelievers cannot pronounce
judgment on the faithful, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:1): "Dare any
of you, having a matter against another, go to be judged before the
unjust," i.e. unbelievers, "and not before the saints?" Therefore it
seems that unbelievers cannot have authority over the faithful.

_I answer that,_ That this question may be considered in two ways.
First, we may speak of dominion or authority of unbelievers over the
faithful as of a thing to be established for the first time. This
ought by no means to be allowed, since it would provoke scandal and
endanger the faith, for subjects are easily influenced by their
superiors to comply with their commands, unless the subjects are of
great virtue: moreover unbelievers hold the faith in contempt, if they
see the faithful fall away. Hence the Apostle forbade the faithful to
go to law before an unbelieving judge. And so the Church altogether
forbids unbelievers to acquire dominion over believers, or to have
authority over them in any capacity whatever.

Secondly, we may speak of dominion or authority, as already in force:
and here we must observe that dominion and authority are institutions
of human law, while the distinction between faithful and unbelievers
arises from the Divine law. Now the Divine law which is the law of
grace, does not do away with human law which is the law of natural
reason. Wherefore the distinction between faithful and unbelievers,
considered in itself, does not do away with dominion and authority of
unbelievers over the faithful.

Nevertheless this right of dominion or authority can be justly done
away with by the sentence or ordination of the Church who has the
authority of God: since unbelievers in virtue of their unbelief
deserve to forfeit their power over the faithful who are converted
into children of God.

This the Church does sometimes, and sometimes not. For among those
unbelievers who are subject, even in temporal matters, to the Church
and her members, the Church made the law that if the slave of a Jew
became a Christian, he should forthwith receive his freedom, without
paying any price, if he should be a "vernaculus," i.e. born in
slavery; and likewise if, when yet an unbeliever, he had been bought
for his service: if, however, he had been bought for sale, then he
should be offered for sale within three months. Nor does the Church
harm them in this, because since those Jews themselves are subject to
the Church, she can dispose of their possessions, even as secular
princes have enacted many laws to be observed by their subjects, in
favor of liberty. On the other hand, the Church has not applied the
above law to those unbelievers who are not subject to her or her
members, in temporal matters, although she has the right to do so:
and this, in order to avoid scandal, for as Our Lord showed (Matt.
17:25, 26) that He could be excused from paying the tribute, because
"the children are free," yet He ordered the tribute to be paid in
order to avoid giving scandal. Thus Paul too, after saying that
servants should honor their masters, adds, "lest the name of the
Lord and His doctrine be blasphemed."

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2: The authority of Caesar preceded the distinction of
faithful from unbelievers. Hence it was not cancelled by the
conversion of some to the faith. Moreover it was a good thing that
there should be a few of the faithful in the emperor's household,
that they might defend the rest of the faithful. Thus the Blessed
Sebastian encouraged those whom he saw faltering under torture, and,
the while, remained hidden under the military cloak in the palace
of Diocletian.

Reply Obj. 3: Slaves are subject to their masters for their whole
lifetime, and are subject to their overseers in everything: whereas
the craftsman's laborer is subject to him for certain special works.
Hence it would be more dangerous for unbelievers to have dominion or
authority over the faithful, than that they should be allowed to
employ them in some craft. Wherefore the Church permits Christians to
work on the land of Jews, because this does not entail their living
together with them. Thus Solomon besought the King of Tyre to send
master workmen to hew the trees, as related in 3 Kings 5:6. Yet, if
there be reason to fear that the faithful will be perverted by such
communications and dealings, they should be absolutely forbidden.
_______________________

ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 11]

Whether the Rites of Unbelievers Ought to Be Tolerated?

Objection 1: It would seem that rites of unbelievers ought not to be
tolerated. For it is evident that unbelievers sin in observing their
rites: and not to prevent a sin, when one can, seems to imply consent
therein, as a gloss observes on Rom. 1:32: "Not only they that do
them, but they also that consent to them that do them." Therefore it
is a sin to tolerate their rites.

Obj. 2: Further, the rites of the Jews are compared to idolatry,
because a gloss on Gal. 5:1, "Be not held again under the yoke of
bondage," says: "The bondage of that law was not lighter than that of
idolatry." But it would not be allowable for anyone to observe the
rites of idolatry, in fact Christian princes at first caused the
temples of idols to be closed, and afterwards, to be destroyed, as
Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xviii, 54). Therefore it follows that
even the rites of Jews ought not to be tolerated.

Obj. 3: Further, unbelief is the greatest of sins, as stated above
(A. 3). Now other sins such as adultery, theft and the like, are not
tolerated, but are punishable by law. Therefore neither ought the
rites of unbelievers to be tolerated.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory [*Regist. xi, Ep. 15: cf. Decret., dist.
xlv, can., Qui sincera] says, speaking of the Jews: "They should be
allowed to observe all their feasts, just as hitherto they and their
fathers have for ages observed them."

_I answer that,_ Human government is derived from the Divine
government, and should imitate it. Now although God is all-powerful
and supremely good, nevertheless He allows certain evils to take
place in the universe, which He might prevent, lest, without them,
greater goods might be forfeited, or greater evils ensue. Accordingly
in human government also, those who are in authority, rightly
tolerate certain evils, lest certain goods be lost, or certain
greater evils be incurred: thus Augustine says (De Ordine ii, 4): "If
you do away with harlots, the world will be convulsed with lust."
Hence, though unbelievers sin in their rites, they may be tolerated,
either on account of some good that ensues therefrom, or because of
some evil avoided. Thus from the fact that the Jews observe their
rites, which, of old, foreshadowed the truth of the faith which we
hold, there follows this good--that our very enemies bear witness to
our faith, and that our faith is represented in a figure, so to
speak. For this reason they are tolerated in the observance of their
rites.

On the other hand, the rites of other unbelievers, which are neither
truthful nor profitable are by no means to be tolerated, except
perchance in order to avoid an evil, e.g. the scandal or disturbance
that might ensue, or some hindrance to the salvation of those who if
they were unmolested might gradually be converted to the faith. For
this reason the Church, at times, has tolerated the rites even of
heretics and pagans, when unbelievers were very numerous.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 10, Art. 12]

Whether the Children of Jews and Other Unbelievers Ought to Be
Baptized Against Their Parents' Will?

Objection 1: It would seem that the children of Jews and of other
unbelievers ought to be baptized against their parents' will. For the
bond of marriage is stronger than the right of parental authority
over children, since the right of parental authority can be made to
cease, when a son is set at liberty; whereas the marriage bond cannot
be severed by man, according to Matt. 19:6: "What . . . God hath
joined together let no man put asunder." And yet the marriage bond is
broken on account of unbelief: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:15):
"If the unbeliever depart, let him depart. For a brother or sister is
not under servitude in such cases": and a canon [*Can. Uxor legitima,
and Idololatria, qu. i] says that "if the unbelieving partner is
unwilling to abide with the other, without insult to their Creator,
then the other partner is not bound to cohabitation." Much more,
therefore, does unbelief abrogate the right of unbelieving parents'
authority over their children: and consequently their children may be
baptized against their parents' will.

Obj. 2: Further, one is more bound to succor a man who is in danger
of everlasting death, than one who is in danger of temporal death.
Now it would be a sin, if one saw a man in danger of temporal death
and failed to go to his aid. Since, then, the children of Jews and
other unbelievers are in danger of everlasting death, should they be
left to their parents who would imbue them with their unbelief, it
seems that they ought to be taken away from them and baptized, and
instructed in the faith.

Obj. 3: Further, the children of a bondsman are themselves bondsmen,
and under the power of his master. Now the Jews are bondsmen of kings
and princes: therefore their children are also. Consequently kings
and princes have the power to do what they will with Jewish children.
Therefore no injustice is committed if they baptize them against
their parents' wishes.

Obj. 4: Further, every man belongs more to God, from Whom he has his
soul, than to his carnal father, from whom he has his body. Therefore
it is not unjust if Jewish children be taken away from their parents,
and consecrated to God in Baptism.

Obj. 5: Further, Baptism avails for salvation more than preaching
does, since Baptism removes forthwith the stain of sin and the debt
of punishment, and opens the gate of heaven. Now if danger ensue
through not preaching, it is imputed to him who omitted to preach,
according to the words of Ezech. 33:6 about the man who "sees the
sword coming and sounds not the trumpet." Much more therefore, if
Jewish children are lost through not being baptized are they
accounted guilty of sin, who could have baptized them and did not.

_On the contrary,_ Injustice should be done to no man. Now it would
be an injustice to Jews if their children were to be baptized against
their will, since they would lose the rights of parental authority
over their children as soon as these were Christians. Therefore these
should not be baptized against their parents' will.

_I answer that,_ The custom of the Church has very great authority
and ought to be jealously observed in all things, since the very
doctrine of catholic doctors derives its authority from the Church.
Hence we ought to abide by the authority of the Church rather than by
that of an Augustine or a Jerome or of any doctor whatever. Now it
was never the custom of the Church to baptize the children of the
Jews against the will of their parents, although at times past there
have been many very powerful catholic princes like Constantine and
Theodosius, with whom most holy bishops have been on most friendly
terms, as Sylvester with Constantine, and Ambrose with Theodosius,
who would certainly not have failed to obtain this favor from them if
it had been at all reasonable. It seems therefore hazardous to repeat
this assertion, that the children of Jews should be baptized against
their parents' wishes, in contradiction to the Church's custom
observed hitherto.

There are two reasons for this custom. One is on account of the danger
to the faith. For children baptized before coming to the use of
reason, afterwards when they come to perfect age, might easily be
persuaded by their parents to renounce what they had unknowingly
embraced; and this would be detrimental to the faith.

The other reason is that it is against natural justice. For a child
is by nature part of its father: thus, at first, it is not distinct
from its parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its
mother's womb; and later on after birth, and before it has the use of
its free-will, it is enfolded in the care of its parents, which is
like a spiritual womb, for so long as man has not the use of reason,
he differs not from an irrational animal; so that even as an ox or a
horse belongs to someone who, according to the civil law, can use
them when he likes, as his own instrument, so, according to the
natural law, a son, before coming to the use of reason, is under his
father's care. Hence it would be contrary to natural justice, if a
child, before coming to the use of reason, were to be taken away from
its parents' custody, or anything done to it against its parents'
wish. As soon, however, as it begins to have the use of its
free-will, it begins to belong to itself, and is able to look after
itself, in matters concerning the Divine or the natural law, and then
it should be induced, not by compulsion but by persuasion, to embrace
the faith: it can then consent to the faith, and be baptized, even
against its parents' wish; but not before it comes to the use of
reason. Hence it is said of the children of the fathers of old that
they were saved in the faith of their parents; whereby we are given
to understand that it is the parents' duty to look after the
salvation of their children, especially before they come to the use
of reason.

Reply Obj. 1: In the marriage bond, both husband and wife have the
use of the free-will, and each can assent to the faith without the
other's consent. But this does not apply to a child before it comes
to the use of reason: yet the comparison holds good after the child
has come to the use of reason, if it is willing to be converted.

Reply Obj. 2: No one should be snatched from natural death against
the order of civil law: for instance, if a man were condemned by the
judge to temporal death, nobody ought to rescue him by violence:
hence no one ought to break the order of the natural law, whereby a
child is in the custody of its father, in order to rescue it from
the danger of everlasting death.

Reply Obj. 3: Jews are bondsmen of princes by civil bondage, which
does not exclude the order of natural or Divine law.

Reply Obj. 4: Man is directed to God by his reason, whereby he can
know Him. Hence a child before coming to the use of reason, in the
natural order of things, is directed to God by its parents' reason,
under whose care it lies by nature: and it is for them to dispose
of the child in all matters relating to God.

Reply Obj. 5: The peril that ensues from the omission of preaching,
threatens only those who are entrusted with the duty of preaching.
Hence it had already been said (Ezech. 3:17): "I have made thee a
watchman to the children [Vulg.: 'house'] of Israel." On the other
hand, to provide the sacraments of salvation for the children of
unbelievers is the duty of their parents. Hence it is they whom the
danger threatens, if through being deprived of the sacraments their
children fail to obtain salvation.
_______________________

QUESTION 11

OF HERESY
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider heresy: under which head there are four points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether heresy is a kind of unbelief?

(2) Of the matter about which it is;

(3) Whether heretics should be tolerated?

(4) Whether converts should be received?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 11, Art. 1]

Whether Heresy Is a Species of Unbelief?

Objection 1: It would seem that heresy is not a species of unbelief.
For unbelief is in the understanding, as stated above (Q. 10, A. 2).
Now heresy would seem not to pertain to the understanding, but rather
to the appetitive power; for Jerome says on Gal. 5:19: [*Cf.
Decretals xxiv, qu. iii, cap. 27] "The works of the flesh are
manifest: Heresy is derived from a Greek word meaning choice, whereby
a man makes choice of that school which he deems best." But choice is
an act of the appetitive power, as stated above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 1).
Therefore heresy is not a species of unbelief.

Obj. 2: Further, vice takes its species chiefly from its end; hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who commits adultery that
he may steal, is a thief rather than an adulterer." Now the end of
heresy is temporal profit, especially lordship and glory, which
belong to the vice of pride or covetousness: for Augustine says (De
Util. Credendi i) that "a heretic is one who either devises or
follows false and new opinions, for the sake of some temporal profit,
especially that he may lord and be honored above others." Therefore
heresy is a species of pride rather than of unbelief.

Obj. 3: Further, since unbelief is in the understanding, it would
seem not to pertain to the flesh. Now heresy belongs to the works of
the flesh, for the Apostle says (Gal. 5:19): "The works of the flesh
are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness," and among the
others, he adds, "dissensions, sects," which are the same as
heresies. Therefore heresy is not a species of unbelief.

_On the contrary,_ Falsehood is contrary to truth. Now a heretic is
one who devises or follows false or new opinions. Therefore heresy is
opposed to the truth, on which faith is founded; and consequently it
is a species of unbelief.

_I answer that,_ The word heresy as stated in the first objection
denotes a choosing. Now choice as stated above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 3) is
about things directed to the end, the end being presupposed. Now, in
matters of faith, the will assents to some truth, as to its proper
good, as was shown above (Q. 4, A. 3): wherefore that which is the
chief truth, has the character of last end, while those which are
secondary truths, have the character of being directed to the end.

Now, whoever believes, assents to someone's words; so that, in every
form of unbelief, the person to whose words assent is given seems to
hold the chief place and to be the end as it were; while the things by
holding which one assents to that person hold a secondary place.
Consequently he that holds the Christian faith aright, assents, by his
will, to Christ, in those things which truly belong to His doctrine.

Accordingly there are two ways in which a man may deviate from the
rectitude of the Christian faith. First, because he is unwilling to
assent to Christ: and such a man has an evil will, so to say, in
respect of the very end. This belongs to the species of unbelief in
pagans and Jews. Secondly, because, though he intends to assent to
Christ, yet he fails in his choice of those things wherein he assents
to Christ, because he chooses not what Christ really taught, but the
suggestions of his own mind.

Therefore heresy is a species of unbelief, belonging to those who
profess the Christian faith, but corrupt its dogmas.

Reply Obj. 1: Choice regards unbelief in the same way as the will
regards faith, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: Vices take their species from their proximate end,
while, from their remote end, they take their genus and cause. Thus
in the case of adultery committed for the sake of theft, there is the
species of adultery taken from its proper end and object; but the
ultimate end shows that the act of adultery is both the result of the
theft, and is included under it, as an effect under its cause, or a
species under its genus, as appears from what we have said about acts
in general (I-II, Q. 18, A. 7). Wherefore, as to the case in point
also, the proximate end of heresy is adherence to one's own false
opinion, and from this it derives its species, while its remote end
reveals its cause, viz. that it arises from pride or covetousness.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as heresy is so called from its being a choosing
[*From the Greek _hairein_, to cut off], so does sect derive its name
from its being a cutting off (_secando_), as Isidore states (Etym.
viii, 3). Wherefore heresy and sect are the same thing, and each
belongs to the works of the flesh, not indeed by reason of the act
itself of unbelief in respect of its proximate object, but by reason
of its cause, which is either the desire of an undue end in which way
it arises from pride or covetousness, as stated in the second
objection, or some illusion of the imagination (which gives rise to
error, as the Philosopher states in _Metaph._ iv; _Ed. Did._ iii, 5),
for this faculty has a certain connection with the flesh, in as much
as its act is independent on a bodily organ.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 11, Art. 2]

Whether Heresy Is Properly About Matters of Faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that heresy is not properly about matters
of faith. For just as there are heresies and sects among Christians,
so were there among the Jews, and Pharisees, as Isidore observes
(Etym. viii, 3, 4, 5). Now their dissensions were not about matters
of faith. Therefore heresy is not about matters of faith, as though
they were its proper matter.

Obj. 2: Further, the matter of faith is the thing believed. Now
heresy is not only about things, but also about works, and about
interpretations of Holy Writ. For Jerome says on Gal. 5:20 that
"whoever expounds the Scriptures in any sense but that of the Holy
Ghost by Whom they were written, may be called a heretic, though he
may not have left the Church": and elsewhere he says that "heresies
spring up from words spoken amiss." [*St. Thomas quotes this saying
elsewhere, in Sent. iv, D, 13, and III, Q. 16, A. 8, but it is
not to be found in St. Jerome's works.] Therefore heresy is not
properly about the matter of faith.

Obj. 3: Further, we find the holy doctors differing even about
matters pertaining to the faith, for example Augustine and Jerome, on
the question about the cessation of the legal observances: and yet
this was without any heresy on their part. Therefore heresy is not
properly about the matter of faith.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says against the Manichees [*Cf. De Civ.
Dei xviii, 51]: "In Christ's Church, those are heretics, who hold
mischievous and erroneous opinions, and when rebuked that they may
think soundly and rightly, offer a stubborn resistance, and, refusing
to mend their pernicious and deadly doctrines, persist in defending
them." Now pernicious and deadly doctrines are none but those which
are contrary to the dogmas of faith, whereby "the just man liveth"
(Rom. 1:17). Therefore heresy is about matters of faith, as about its
proper matter.

_I answer that,_ We are speaking of heresy now as denoting a
corruption of the Christian faith. Now it does not imply a corruption
of the Christian faith, if a man has a false opinion in matters that
are not of faith, for instance, in questions of geometry and so
forth, which cannot belong to the faith by any means; but only when a
person has a false opinion about things belonging to the faith.

Now a thing may be of the faith in two ways, as stated above (I, Q.
32, A. 4; I-II, Q. 1, A. 6, ad 1; I-II, Q. 2, A. 5), in one way,
directly and principally, e.g. the articles of faith; in another way,
indirectly and secondarily, e.g. those matters, the denial of which
leads to the corruption of some article of faith; and there may be
heresy in either way, even as there can be faith.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as the heresies of the Jews and Pharisees were
about opinions relating to Judaism or Pharisaism, so also heresies
among Christians are about matter touching the Christian faith.

Reply Obj. 2: A man is said to expound Holy Writ in another sense
than that required by the Holy Ghost, when he so distorts the meaning
of Holy Writ, that it is contrary to what the Holy Ghost has
revealed. Hence it is written (Ezech. 13:6) about the false prophets:
"They have persisted to confirm what they have said," viz. by false
interpretations of Scripture. Moreover a man professes his faith by
the words that he utters, since confession is an act of faith, as
stated above (Q. 3, A. 1). Wherefore inordinate words about matters
of faith may lead to corruption of the faith; and hence it is that
Pope Leo says in a letter to Proterius, Bishop of Alexandria: "The
enemies of Christ's cross lie in wait for our every deed and word, so
that, if we but give them the slightest pretext, they may accuse us
mendaciously of agreeing with Nestorius."

Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Ep. xliii) and we find it stated
in the Decretals (xxiv, qu. 3, can. Dixit Apostolus): "By no means
should we accuse of heresy those who, however false and perverse
their opinion may be, defend it without obstinate fervor, and seek
the truth with careful anxiety, ready to mend their opinion, when
they have found the truth," because, to wit, they do not make a
choice in contradiction to the doctrine of the Church. Accordingly,
certain doctors seem to have differed either in matters the holding
of which in this or that way is of no consequence, so far as faith is
concerned, or even in matters of faith, which were not as yet defined
by the Church; although if anyone were obstinately to deny them after
they had been defined by the authority of the universal Church, he
would be deemed a heretic. This authority resides chiefly in the
Sovereign Pontiff. For we read [*Decret. xxiv, qu. 1, can. Quoties]:
"Whenever a question of faith is in dispute, I think, that all our
brethren and fellow bishops ought to refer the matter to none other
than Peter, as being the source of their name and honor, against
whose authority neither Jerome nor Augustine nor any of the holy
doctors defended their opinion." Hence Jerome says (Exposit. Symbol
[*Among the supposititious works of St. Jerome]): "This, most blessed
Pope, is the faith that we have been taught in the Catholic Church.
If anything therein has been incorrectly or carelessly expressed, we
beg that it may be set aright by you who hold the faith and see of
Peter. If however this, our profession, be approved by the judgment
of your apostleship, whoever may blame me, will prove that he himself
is ignorant, or malicious, or even not a catholic but a heretic."
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 11, Art. 3]

Whether Heretics Ought to Be Tolerated?

Objection 1: It seems that heretics ought to be tolerated. For the
Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:24, 25): "The servant of the Lord must not
wrangle . . . with modesty admonishing them that resist the truth, if
peradventure God may give them repentance to know the truth, and they
may recover themselves from the snares of the devil." Now if heretics
are not tolerated but put to death, they lose the opportunity of
repentance. Therefore it seems contrary to the Apostle's command.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is necessary in the Church should be
tolerated. Now heresies are necessary in the Church, since the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 11:19): "There must be . . . heresies, that they . . .
who are reproved, may be manifest among you." Therefore it seems that
heretics should be tolerated.

Obj. 3: Further, the Master commanded his servants (Matt. 13:30) to
suffer the cockle "to grow until the harvest," i.e. the end of the
world, as a gloss explains it. Now holy men explain that the cockle
denotes heretics. Therefore heretics should be tolerated.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Titus 3:10, 11): "A man that is a
heretic, after the first and second admonition, avoid: knowing that
he, that is such an one, is subverted."

_I answer that,_ With regard to heretics two points must be observed:
one, on their own side; the other, on the side of the Church. On
their own side there is the sin, whereby they deserve not only to be
separated from the Church by excommunication, but also to be severed
from the world by death. For it is a much graver matter to corrupt
the faith which quickens the soul, than to forge money, which
supports temporal life. Wherefore if forgers of money and other
evil-doers are forthwith condemned to death by the secular authority,
much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted
of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death.

On the part of the Church, however, there is mercy which looks to the
conversion of the wanderer, wherefore she condemns not at once, but
"after the first and second admonition," as the Apostle directs:
after that, if he is yet stubborn, the Church no longer hoping for
his conversion, looks to the salvation of others, by excommunicating
him and separating him from the Church, and furthermore delivers him
to the secular tribunal to be exterminated thereby from the world by
death. For Jerome commenting on Gal. 5:9, "A little leaven," says:
"Cut off the decayed flesh, expel the mangy sheep from the fold, lest
the whole house, the whole paste, the whole body, the whole flock,
burn, perish, rot, die. Arius was but one spark in Alexandria, but as
that spark was not at once put out, the whole earth was laid waste by
its flame."

Reply Obj. 1: This very modesty demands that the heretic should be
admonished a first and second time: and if he be unwilling to
retract, he must be reckoned as already "subverted," as we may gather
from the words of the Apostle quoted above.

Reply Obj. 2: The profit that ensues from heresy is beside the
intention of heretics, for it consists in the constancy of the
faithful being put to the test, and "makes us shake off our
sluggishness, and search the Scriptures more carefully," as Augustine
states (De Gen. cont. Manich. i, 1). What they really intend is the
corruption of the faith, which is to inflict very great harm indeed.
Consequently we should consider what they directly intend, and expel
them, rather than what is beside their intention, and so, tolerate
them.

Reply Obj. 3: According to Decret. (xxiv, qu. iii, can. Notandum),
"to be excommunicated is not to be uprooted." A man is
excommunicated, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:5) that his "spirit may
be saved in the day of Our Lord." Yet if heretics be altogether
uprooted by death, this is not contrary to Our Lord's command, which
is to be understood as referring to the case when the cockle cannot
be plucked up without plucking up the wheat, as we explained above
(Q. 10, A. 8, ad 1), when treating of unbelievers in general.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 11, Art. 4]

Whether the Church Should Receive Those Who Return from Heresy?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Church ought in all cases to
receive those who return from heresy. For it is written (Jer. 3:1) in
the person of the Lord: "Thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers;
nevertheless return to Me saith the Lord." Now the sentence of the
Church is God's sentence, according to Deut. 1:17: "You shall hear the
little as well as the great: neither shall you respect any man's
person, because it is the judgment of God." Therefore even those who
are guilty of the prostitution of unbelief which is spiritual
prostitution, should be received all the same.

Obj. 2: Further, Our Lord commanded Peter (Matt. 18:22) to forgive
his offending brother "not" only "till seven times, but till seventy
times seven times," which Jerome expounds as meaning that "a man
should be forgiven, as often as he has sinned." Therefore he ought to
be received by the Church as often as he has sinned by falling back
into heresy.

Obj. 3: Further, heresy is a kind of unbelief. Now other unbelievers
who wish to be converted are received by the Church. Therefore
heretics also should be received.

_On the contrary,_ The Decretal Ad abolendam (De Haereticis, cap. ix)
says that "those who are found to have relapsed into the error which
they had already abjured, must be left to the secular tribunal."
Therefore they should not be received by the Church.

_I answer that,_ In obedience to Our Lord's institution, the Church
extends her charity to all, not only to friends, but also to foes who
persecute her, according to Matt. 5:44: "Love your enemies; do good
to them that hate you." Now it is part of charity that we should both
wish and work our neighbor's good. Again, good is twofold: one is
spiritual, namely the health of the soul, which good is chiefly the
object of charity, since it is this chiefly that we should wish for
one another. Consequently, from this point of view, heretics who
return after falling no matter how often, are admitted by the Church
to Penance whereby the way of salvation is opened to them.

The other good is that which charity considers secondarily, viz.
temporal good, such as life of the body, worldly possessions, good
repute, ecclesiastical or secular dignity, for we are not bound by
charity to wish others this good, except in relation to the eternal
salvation of them and of others. Hence if the presence of one of
these goods in one individual might be an obstacle to eternal
salvation in many, we are not bound out of charity to wish such a
good to that person, rather should we desire him to be without it,
both because eternal salvation takes precedence of temporal good, and
because the good of the many is to be preferred to the good of one.
Now if heretics were always received on their return, in order to
save their lives and other temporal goods, this might be prejudicial
to the salvation of others, both because they would infect others if
they relapsed again, and because, if they escaped without punishment,
others would feel more assured in lapsing into heresy. For it is
written (Eccles. 8:11): "For because sentence is not speedily
pronounced against the evil, the children of men commit evils without
any fear."

For this reason the Church not only admits to Penance those who
return from heresy for the first time, but also safeguards their
lives, and sometimes by dispensation, restores them to the
ecclesiastical dignities which they may have had before, should their
conversion appear to be sincere: we read of this as having frequently
been done for the good of peace. But when they fall again, after
having been received, this seems to prove them to be inconstant in
faith, wherefore when they return again, they are admitted to
Penance, but are not delivered from the pain of death.

Reply Obj. 1: In God's tribunal, those who return are always
received, because God is a searcher of hearts, and knows those who
return in sincerity. But the Church cannot imitate God in this, for
she presumes that those who relapse after being once received, are
not sincere in their return; hence she does not debar them from the
way of salvation, but neither does she protect them from the sentence
of death.

Reply Obj. 2: Our Lord was speaking to Peter of sins committed
against oneself, for one should always forgive such offenses and
spare our brother when he repents. These words are not to be applied
to sins committed against one's neighbor or against God, for it is
not left to our discretion to forgive such offenses, as Jerome says
on Matt. 18:15, "If thy brother shall offend against thee." Yet even
in this matter the law prescribes limits according as God's honor or
our neighbor's good demands.

Reply Obj. 3: When other unbelievers, who have never received the
faith are converted, they do not as yet show signs of inconstancy
in faith, as relapsed heretics do; hence the comparison fails.
_______________________

QUESTION 12

OF APOSTASY
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider apostasy: about which there are two points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether apostasy pertains to unbelief?

(2) Whether, on account of apostasy from the faith, subjects are
absolved from allegiance to an apostate prince?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 12, Art. 1]

Whether Apostasy Pertains to Unbelief?

Objection 1: It would seem that apostasy does not pertain to
unbelief. For that which is the origin of all sins, does not,
seemingly, pertain to unbelief, since many sins there are without
unbelief. Now apostasy seems to be the origin of every sin, for it
is written (Ecclus. 10:14): "The beginning of the pride of man is
apostasy [Douay: 'to fall off'] from God," and further on, (Ecclus.
10:15): "Pride is the beginning of all sin." Therefore apostasy
does not pertain to unbelief.

Obj. 2: Further, unbelief is an act of the understanding: whereas
apostasy seems rather to consist in some outward deed or utterance,
or even in some inward act of the will, for it is written (Prov.
6:12-14): "A man that is an apostate, an unprofitable man walketh
with a perverse mouth. He winketh with the eyes, presseth with the
foot, speaketh with the finger. With a wicked heart he deviseth evil,
and at all times he soweth discord." Moreover if anyone were to have
himself circumcised, or to worship at the tomb of Mahomet, he would
be deemed an apostate. Therefore apostasy does not pertain to
unbelief.

Obj. 3: Further, heresy, since it pertains to unbelief, is a
determinate species of unbelief. If then, apostasy pertained to
unbelief, it would follow that it is a determinate species of
unbelief, which does not seem to agree with what has been said
(Q. 10, A. 5). Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 6:67): "Many of his disciples
went back," i.e. apostatized, of whom Our Lord had said previously
(John 6:65): "There are some of you that believe not." Therefore
apostasy pertains to unbelief.

_I answer that,_ Apostasy denotes a backsliding from God. This may
happen in various ways according to the different kinds of union
between man and God. For, in the first place, man is united to God by
faith; secondly, by having his will duly submissive in obeying His
commandments; thirdly, by certain special things pertaining to
supererogation such as the religious life, the clerical state, or
Holy Orders. Now if that which follows be removed, that which
precedes, remains, but the converse does not hold. Accordingly a man
may apostatize from God, by withdrawing from the religious life to
which he was bound by profession, or from the Holy Order which he
had received: and this is called "apostasy from religious life" or
"Orders." A man may also apostatize from God, by rebelling in his
mind against the Divine commandments: and though man may apostatize
in both the above ways, he may still remain united to God by faith.

But if he give up the faith, then he seems to turn away from God
altogether: and consequently, apostasy simply and absolutely is that
whereby a man withdraws from the faith, and is called "apostasy of
perfidy." In this way apostasy, simply so called, pertains to
unbelief.

Reply Obj. 1: This objection refers to the second kind of apostasy,
which denotes an act of the will in rebellion against God's
commandments, an act that is to be found in every mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to faith not only that the heart should
believe, but also that external words and deeds should bear witness
to the inward faith, for confession is an act of faith. In this way
too, certain external words or deeds pertain to unbelief, in so far
as they are signs of unbelief, even as a sign of health is said
itself to be healthy. Now although the authority quoted may be
understood as referring to every kind of apostate, yet it applies
most truly to an apostate from the faith. For since faith is the
first foundation of things to be hoped for, and since, without faith
it is "impossible to please God"; when once faith is removed, man
retains nothing that may be useful for the obtaining of eternal
salvation, for which reason it is written (Prov. 6:12): "A man that
is an apostate, an unprofitable man": because faith is the life of
the soul, according to Rom. 1:17: "The just man liveth by faith."
Therefore, just as when the life of the body is taken away, man's
every member and part loses its due disposition, so when the life of
justice, which is by faith, is done away, disorder appears in all
his members. First, in his mouth, whereby chiefly his mind stands
revealed; secondly, in his eyes; thirdly, in the instrument of
movement; fourthly, in his will, which tends to evil. The result is
that "he sows discord," endeavoring to sever others from the faith
even as he severed himself.

Reply Obj. 3: The species of a quality or form are not diversified by
the fact of its being the term _wherefrom_ or _whereto_ of movement:
on the contrary, it is the movement that takes its species from the
terms. Now apostasy regards unbelief as the term _whereto_ of the
movement of withdrawal from the faith; wherefore apostasy does not
imply a special kind of unbelief, but an aggravating circumstance
thereof, according to 2 Pet. 2:21: "It had been better for them not
to know the truth [Vulg.: 'the way of justice'], than after they had
known it, to turn back."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 12, Art. 2]

Whether a Prince Forfeits His Dominion Over His Subjects, on Account
of Apostasy from the Faith, So That They No Longer Owe Him Allegiance?

Objection 1: It would seem that a prince does not so forfeit his
dominion over his subjects, on account of apostasy from the faith,
that they no longer owe him allegiance. For Ambrose [*St. Augustine,
Super Ps. 124:3] says that the Emperor Julian, though an apostate,
nevertheless had under him Christian soldiers, who when he said to
them, "Fall into line for the defense of the republic," were bound to
obey. Therefore subjects are not absolved from their allegiance to
their prince on account of his apostasy.

Obj. 2: Further, an apostate from the faith is an unbeliever. Now we
find that certain holy men served unbelieving masters; thus Joseph
served Pharaoh, Daniel served Nabuchodonosor, and Mardochai served
Assuerus. Therefore apostasy from the faith does not release subjects
from allegiance to their sovereign.

Obj. 3: Further, just as by apostasy from the faith, a man turns away
from God, so does every sin. Consequently if, on account of apostasy
from the faith, princes were to lose their right to command those of
their subjects who are believers, they would equally lose it on
account of other sins: which is evidently not the case. Therefore we
ought not to refuse allegiance to a sovereign on account of his
apostatizing from the faith.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory VII says (Council, Roman V): "Holding to
the institutions of our holy predecessors, we, by our apostolic
authority, absolve from their oath those who through loyalty or
through the sacred bond of an oath owe allegiance to excommunicated
persons: and we absolutely forbid them to continue their allegiance
to such persons, until these shall have made amends." Now apostates
from the faith, like heretics, are excommunicated, according to the
Decretal [*Extra, De Haereticis, cap. Ad abolendam]. Therefore
princes should not be obeyed when they have apostatized from the
faith.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 10, A. 10), unbelief, in itself,
is not inconsistent with dominion, since dominion is a device of the
law of nations which is a human law: whereas the distinction between
believers and unbelievers is of Divine right, which does not annul
human right. Nevertheless a man who sins by unbelief may be sentenced
to the loss of his right of dominion, as also, sometimes, on account
of other sins.

Now it is not within the competency of the Church to punish unbelief
in those who have never received the faith, according to the saying
of the Apostle (1 Cor. 5:12): "What have I to do to judge them that
are without?" She can, however, pass sentence of punishment on the
unbelief of those who have received the faith: and it is fitting that
they should be punished by being deprived of the allegiance of their
subjects: for this same allegiance might conduce to great corruption
of the faith, since, as was stated above (A. 1, Obj. 2), "a man that
is an apostate . . . with a wicked heart deviseth evil, and . . .
soweth discord," in order to sever others from the faith.
Consequently, as soon as sentence of excommunication is passed on a
man on account of apostasy from the faith, his subjects are "ipso
facto" absolved from his authority and from the oath of allegiance
whereby they were bound to him.

Reply Obj. 1: At that time the Church was but recently instituted,
and had not, as yet, the power of curbing earthly princes; and so she
allowed the faithful to obey Julian the apostate, in matters that
were not contrary to the faith, in order to avoid incurring a yet
greater danger.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated in the article, it is not a question of those
unbelievers who have never received the faith.

Reply Obj. 3: Apostasy from the faith severs man from God altogether,
as stated above (A. 1), which is not the case in any other sin.
_______________________

QUESTION 13

OF THE SIN OF BLASPHEMY, IN GENERAL
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the sin of blasphemy, which is opposed to the
confession of faith; and (1) blasphemy in general, (2) that blasphemy
which is called the sin against the Holy Ghost.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith?

(2) Whether blasphemy is always a mortal sin?

(3) Whether blasphemy is the most grievous sin?

(4) Whether blasphemy is in the damned?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 13, Art. 1]

Whether Blasphemy Is Opposed to the Confession of Faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that blasphemy is not opposed to the
confession of faith. Because to blaspheme is to utter an affront or
insult against the Creator. Now this pertains to ill-will against God
rather than to unbelief. Therefore blasphemy is not opposed to the
confession of faith.

Obj. 2: Further, on Eph. 4:31, "Let blasphemy . . . be put away from
you," a gloss says, "that which is committed against God or the
saints." But confession of faith, seemingly, is not about other
things than those pertaining to God, Who is the object of faith.
Therefore blasphemy is not always opposed to the confession of faith.

Obj. 3: Further, according to some, there are three kinds of
blasphemy. The first of these is when something unfitting is affirmed
of God; the second is when something fitting is denied of Him; and
the third, when something proper to God is ascribed to a creature, so
that, seemingly, blasphemy is not only about God, but also about His
creatures. Now the object of faith is God. Therefore blasphemy is not
opposed to confession of faith.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:12, 13): "I . . .
before was a blasphemer and a persecutor," and afterwards, "I did it
ignorantly in" my "unbelief." Hence it seems that blasphemy pertains
to unbelief.

_I answer that,_ The word blasphemy seems to denote the disparagement
of some surpassing goodness, especially that of God. Now God, as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), is the very essence of true goodness.
Hence whatever befits God, pertains to His goodness, and whatever does
not befit Him, is far removed from the perfection of goodness which is
His Essence. Consequently whoever either denies anything befitting
God, or affirms anything unbefitting Him, disparages the Divine
goodness.

Now this may happen in two ways. In the first way it may happen
merely in respect of the opinion in the intellect; in the second way
this opinion is united to a certain detestation in the affections,
even as, on the other hand, faith in God is perfected by love of Him.
Accordingly this disparagement of the Divine goodness is either in
the intellect alone, or in the affections also. If it is in thought
only, it is blasphemy of the heart, whereas if it betrays itself
outwardly in speech it is blasphemy of the tongue. It is in this
sense that blasphemy is opposed to confession of faith.

Reply Obj. 1: He that speaks against God, with the intention of
reviling Him, disparages the Divine goodness, not only in respect of
the falsehood in his intellect, but also by reason of the wickedness
of his will, whereby he detests and strives to hinder the honor due
to God, and this is perfect blasphemy.

Reply Obj. 2: Even as God is praised in His saints, in so far as
praise is given to the works which God does in His saints, so does
blasphemy against the saints, redound, as a consequence, against God.

Reply Obj. 3: Properly speaking, the sin of blasphemy is not in this
way divided into three species: since to affirm unfitting things, or
to deny fitting things of God, differ merely as affirmation and
negation. For this diversity does not cause distinct species of
habits, since the falsehood of affirmations and negations is made
known by the same knowledge, and it is the same ignorance which errs
in either way, since negatives are proved by affirmatives, according
to Poster. i, 25. Again to ascribe to creatures things that are
proper to God, seems to amount to the same as affirming something
unfitting of Him, since whatever is proper to God is God Himself: and
to ascribe to a creature, that which is proper to God, is to assert
that God is the same as a creature.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 13, Art. 2]

Whether Blasphemy Is Always a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that blasphemy is not always a mortal sin.
Because a gloss on the words, "Now lay you also all away," etc. (Col.
3:8) says: "After prohibiting greater crimes he forbids lesser sins":
and yet among the latter he includes blasphemy. Therefore blasphemy
is comprised among the lesser, i.e. venial, sins.

Obj. 2: Further, every mortal sin is opposed to one of the precepts
of the decalogue. But, seemingly, blasphemy is not contrary to any of
them. Therefore blasphemy is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, sins committed without deliberation, are not mortal:
hence first movements are not mortal sins, because they precede the
deliberation of the reason, as was shown above (I-II, Q. 74, AA. 3,
10). Now blasphemy sometimes occurs without deliberation of the
reason. Therefore it is not always a mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lev. 24:16): "He that blasphemeth
the name of the Lord, dying let him die." Now the death punishment
is not inflicted except for a mortal sin. Therefore blasphemy is a
mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 5), a mortal sin
is one whereby a man is severed from the first principle of spiritual
life, which principle is the charity of God. Therefore whatever
things are contrary to charity, are mortal sins in respect of their
genus. Now blasphemy, as to its genus, is opposed to Divine charity,
because, as stated above (A. 1), it disparages the Divine goodness,
which is the object of charity. Consequently blasphemy is a mortal
sin, by reason of its genus.

Reply Obj. 1: This gloss is not to be understood as meaning that all
the sins which follow, are mortal, but that whereas all those
mentioned previously are more grievous sins, some of those mentioned
afterwards are less grievous; and yet among the latter some more
grievous sins are included.

Reply Obj. 2: Since, as stated above (A. 1), blasphemy is contrary
to the confession of faith, its prohibition is comprised under the
prohibition of unbelief, expressed by the words: "I am the Lord thy
God," etc. (Ex. 20:1). Or else, it is forbidden by the words: "Thou
shalt not take the name of . . . God in vain" (Ex. 20:7). Because he
who asserts something false about God, takes His name in vain even
more than he who uses the name of God in confirmation of a falsehood.

Reply Obj. 3: There are two ways in which blasphemy may occur
unawares and without deliberation. In the first way, by a man failing
to advert to the blasphemous nature of his words, and this may happen
through his being moved suddenly by passion so as to break out into
words suggested by his imagination, without heeding to the meaning of
those words: this is a venial sin, and is not a blasphemy properly so
called. In the second way, by adverting to the meaning of his words,
and to their blasphemous nature: in which case he is not excused from
mortal sin, even as neither is he who, in a sudden movement of anger,
kills one who is sitting beside him.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 13, Art. 3]

Whether the Sin of Blasphemy Is the Greatest Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of blasphemy is not the
greatest sin. For, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), a thing
is said to be evil because it does harm. Now the sin of murder, since
it destroys a man's life, does more harm than the sin of blasphemy,
which can do no harm to God. Therefore the sin of murder is more
grievous than that of blasphemy.

Obj. 2: Further, a perjurer calls upon God to witness to a falsehood,
and thus seems to assert that God is false. But not every blasphemer
goes so far as to say that God is false. Therefore perjury is a more
grievous sin than blasphemy.

Obj. 3: Further, on Ps. 74:6, "Lift not up your horn on high," a
gloss says: "To excuse oneself for sin is the greatest sin of all."
Therefore blasphemy is not the greatest sin.

_On the contrary,_ On Isa. 18:2, "To a terrible people," etc. a gloss
says: "In comparison with blasphemy, every sin is slight."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), blasphemy is opposed to the
confession of faith, so that it contains the gravity of unbelief:
while the sin is aggravated if the will's detestation is added
thereto, and yet more, if it breaks out into words, even as love
and confession add to the praise of faith.

Therefore, since, as stated above (Q. 10, A. 3), unbelief is the
greatest of sins in respect of its genus, it follows that blasphemy
also is a very great sin, through belonging to the same genus as
unbelief and being an aggravated form of that sin.

Reply Obj. 1: If we compare murder and blasphemy as regards the
objects of those sins, it is clear that blasphemy, which is a sin
committed directly against God, is more grave than murder, which is a
sin against one's neighbor. On the other hand, if we compare them in
respect of the harm wrought by them, murder is the graver sin, for
murder does more harm to one's neighbor, than blasphemy does to God.
Since, however, the gravity of a sin depends on the intention of the
evil will, rather than on the effect of the deed, as was shown above
(I-II, Q. 73, A. 8), it follows that, as the blasphemer intends to do
harm to God's honor, absolutely speaking, he sins more grievously
that the murderer. Nevertheless murder takes precedence, as to
punishment, among sins committed against our neighbor.

Reply Obj. 2: A gloss on the words, "Let . . . blasphemy be put away
from you" (Eph. 4:31) says: "Blasphemy is worse than perjury." The
reason is that the perjurer does not say or think something false
about God, as the blasphemer does: but he calls God to witness to a
falsehood, not that he deems God a false witness, but in the hope, as
it were, that God will not testify to the matter by some evident sign.

Reply Obj. 3: To excuse oneself for sin is a circumstance that
aggravates every sin, even blasphemy itself: and it is called the
most grievous sin, for as much as it makes every sin more grievous.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 13, Art. 4]

Whether the Damned Blaspheme?

Objection 1: It would seem that the damned do not blaspheme. Because
some wicked men are deterred from blaspheming now, on account of the
fear of future punishment. But the damned are undergoing these
punishments, so that they abhor them yet more. Therefore, much more
are they restrained from blaspheming.

Obj. 2: Further, since blasphemy is a most grievous sin, it is most
demeritorious. Now in the life to come there is no state of meriting
or demeriting. Therefore there will be no place for blasphemy.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Eccles. 11:3) that "the tree . . . in
what place soever it shall fall, there shall it be": whence it
clearly follows that, after this life, man acquires neither merit nor
sin, which he did not already possess in this life. Now many will be
damned who were not blasphemous in this life. Neither, therefore,
will they blaspheme in the life to come.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Apoc. 16:9): "The men were scorched
with great heat, and they blasphemed the name of God, Who hath power
over these plagues," and a gloss on these words says that "those who
are in hell, though aware that they are deservedly punished, will
nevertheless complain that God is so powerful as to torture them
thus." Now this would be blasphemy in their present state: and
consequently it will also be in their future state.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 3), detestation of the Divine
goodness is a necessary condition of blasphemy. Now those who are in
hell retain their wicked will which is turned away from God's
justice, since they love the things for which they are punished,
would wish to use them if they could, and hate the punishments
inflicted on them for those same sins. They regret indeed the sins
which they have committed, not because they hate them, but because
they are punished for them. Accordingly this detestation of the
Divine justice is, in them, the interior blasphemy of the heart: and
it is credible that after the resurrection they will blaspheme God
with the tongue, even as the saints will praise Him with their voices.

Reply Obj. 1: In the present life men are deterred from blasphemy
through fear of punishment which they think they can escape: whereas,
in hell, the damned have no hope of escape, so that, in despair, they
are borne towards whatever their wicked will suggests to them.

Reply Obj. 2: Merit and demerit belong to the state of a wayfarer,
wherefore good is meritorious in them, while evil is demeritorious.
In the blessed, on the other hand, good is not meritorious, but is
part of their blissful reward, and, in like manner, in the damned,
evil is not demeritorious, but is part of the punishment of damnation.

Reply Obj. 3: Whoever dies in mortal sin, bears with him a will that
detests the Divine justice with regard to a certain thing, and in
this respect there can be blasphemy in him.
_______________________

QUESTION 14

OF BLASPHEMY AGAINST THE HOLY GHOST
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider in particular blasphemy against the Holy Ghost:
under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether blasphemy or the sin against the Holy Ghost is the same
as the sin committed through certain malice?

(2) Of the species of this sin;

(3) Whether it can be forgiven?

(4) Whether it is possible to begin by sinning against the Holy Ghost
before committing other sins?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 14, Art. 1]

Whether the Sin Against the Holy Ghost Is the Same As the Sin
Committed Through Certain Malice?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sin against the Holy Ghost is not
the same as the sin committed through certain malice. Because the sin
against the Holy Ghost is the sin of blasphemy, according to Matt.
12:32. But not every sin committed through certain malice is a sin of
blasphemy: since many other kinds of sin may be committed through
certain malice. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the
same as the sin committed through certain malice.

Obj. 2: Further, the sin committed through certain malice is
condivided with sin committed through ignorance, and sin committed
through weakness: whereas the sin against the Holy Ghost is
condivided with the sin against the Son of Man (Matt. 12:32).
Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin
committed through certain malice, since things whose opposites
differ, are themselves different.

Obj. 3: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost is itself a generic
sin, having its own determinate species: whereas sin committed
through certain malice is not a special kind of sin, but a condition
or general circumstance of sin, which can affect any kind of sin at
all. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the
sin committed through certain malice.

_On the contrary,_ The Master says (Sent. ii, D, 43) that "to sin
against the Holy Ghost is to take pleasure in the malice of sin for
its own sake." Now this is to sin through certain malice. Therefore
it seems that the sin committed through certain malice is the same
as the sin against the Holy Ghost.

_I answer that,_ Three meanings have been given to the sin against
the Holy Ghost. For the earlier doctors, viz. Athanasius (Super
Matth. xii, 32), Hilary (Can. xii in Matth.), Ambrose (Super Luc.
xii, 10), Jerome (Super Matth. xii), and Chrysostom (Hom. xli in
Matth.), say that the sin against the Holy Ghost is literally to
utter a blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, whether by Holy Spirit we
understand the essential name applicable to the whole Trinity, each
Person of which is a Spirit and is holy, or the personal name of one
of the Persons of the Trinity, in which sense blasphemy against the
Holy Ghost is distinct from the blasphemy against the Son of Man
(Matt. 12:32), for Christ did certain things in respect of His human
nature, by eating, drinking, and such like actions, while He did
others in respect of His Godhead, by casting out devils, raising the
dead, and the like: which things He did both by the power of His own
Godhead and by the operation of the Holy Ghost, of Whom He was full,
according to his human nature. Now the Jews began by speaking
blasphemy against the Son of Man, when they said (Matt. 11:19) that
He was "a glutton . . . a wine drinker," and a "friend of publicans":
but afterwards they blasphemed against the Holy Ghost, when they
ascribed to the prince of devils those works which Christ did by the
power of His own Divine Nature and by the operation of the Holy Ghost.

Augustine, however (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi), says that blasphemy
or the sin against the Holy Ghost, is final impenitence when, namely,
a man perseveres in mortal sin until death, and that it is not
confined to utterance by word of mouth, but extends to words in
thought and deed, not to one word only, but to many. Now this word,
in this sense, is said to be uttered against the Holy Ghost, because
it is contrary to the remission of sins, which is the work of the
Holy Ghost, Who is the charity both of the Father and of the Son. Nor
did Our Lord say this to the Jews, as though they had sinned against
the Holy Ghost, since they were not yet guilty of final impenitence,
but He warned them, lest by similar utterances they should come to
sin against the Holy Ghost: and it is in this sense that we are to
understand Mark 3:29, 30, where after Our Lord had said: "But he that
shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost," etc. the Evangelist adds,
"because they said: He hath an unclean spirit."

But others understand it differently, and say that the sin of
blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, is a sin committed against that
good which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost: because goodness is
appropriated to the Holy Ghost, just a power is appropriated to the
Father, and wisdom to the Son. Hence they say that when a man sins
through weakness, it is a sin "against the Father"; that when he sins
through ignorance, it is a sin "against the Son"; and that when he
sins through certain malice, i.e. through the very choosing of evil,
as explained above (I-II, Q. 78, AA. 1, 3), it is a sin "against the
Holy Ghost."

Now this may happen in two ways. First by reason of the very
inclination of a vicious habit which we call malice, and, in this
way, to sin through malice is not the same as to sin against the Holy
Ghost. In another way it happens that by reason of contempt, that
which might have prevented the choosing of evil, is rejected or
removed; thus hope is removed by despair, and fear by presumption,
and so on, as we shall explain further on (QQ. 20, 21). Now all these
things which prevent the choosing of sin are effects of the Holy
Ghost in us; so that, in this sense, to sin through malice is to sin
against the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as the confession of faith consists in a
protestation not only of words but also of deeds, so blasphemy
against the Holy Ghost can be uttered in word, thought and deed.

Reply Obj. 2: According to the third interpretation, blasphemy
against the Holy Ghost is condivided with blasphemy against the Son
of Man, forasmuch as He is also the Son of God, i.e. the "power of
God and the wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 1:24). Wherefore, in this sense,
the sin against the Son of Man will be that which is committed
through ignorance, or through weakness.

Reply Obj. 3: Sin committed through certain malice, in so far as it
results from the inclination of a habit, is not a special sin, but a
general condition of sin: whereas, in so far as it results from a
special contempt of an effect of the Holy Ghost in us, it has the
character of a special sin. According to this interpretation the sin
against the Holy Ghost is a special kind of sin, as also according to
the first interpretation: whereas according to the second, it is not
a species of sin, because final impenitence may be a circumstance of
any kind of sin.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 14, Art. 2]

Whether It Is Fitting to Distinguish Six Kinds of Sin Against the
Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish six kinds of sin
against the Holy Ghost, viz. despair, presumption, impenitence,
obstinacy, resisting the known truth, envy of our brother's spiritual
good, which are assigned by the Master (Sent. ii, D, 43). For to deny
God's justice or mercy belongs to unbelief. Now, by despair, a man
rejects God's mercy, and by presumption, His justice. Therefore each
of these is a kind of unbelief rather than of the sin against the
Holy Ghost.

Obj. 2: Further, impenitence, seemingly, regards past sins, while
obstinacy regards future sins. Now past and future time do not
diversify the species of virtues or vices, since it is the same faith
whereby we believe that Christ was born, and those of old believed
that He would be born. Therefore obstinacy and impenitence should not
be reckoned as two species of sin against the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 3: Further, "grace and truth came by Jesus Christ" (John 1:17).
Therefore it seem that resistance of the known truth, and envy of a
brother's spiritual good, belong to blasphemy against the Son rather
than against the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 4: Further, Bernard says (De Dispens. et Praecept. xi) that "to
refuse to obey is to resist the Holy Ghost." Moreover a gloss on Lev.
10:16, says that "a feigned repentance is a blasphemy against the
Holy Ghost." Again, schism is, seemingly, directly opposed to the
Holy Ghost by Whom the Church is united together. Therefore it seems
that the species of sins against the Holy Ghost are insufficiently
enumerated.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Fulgentius] (De Fide ad Petrum iii)
says that "those who despair of pardon for their sins, or who without
merits presume on God's mercy, sin against the Holy Ghost," and
(Enchiridion lxxxiii) that "he who dies in a state of obstinacy is
guilty of the sin against the Holy Ghost," and (De Verb. Dom., Serm.
lxxi) that "impenitence is a sin against the Holy Ghost," and (De
Serm. Dom. in Monte xxii), that "to resist fraternal goodness with
the brands of envy is to sin against the Holy Ghost," and in his book
De unico Baptismo (De Bap. contra Donat. vi, 35) he says that "a man
who spurns the truth, is either envious of his brethren to whom the
truth is revealed, or ungrateful to God, by Whose inspiration the
Church is taught," and therefore, seemingly, sins against the Holy
Ghost.

_I answer that,_ The above species are fittingly assigned to the sin
against the Holy Ghost taken in the third sense, because they are
distinguished in respect of the removal or contempt of those things
whereby a man can be prevented from sinning through choice. These
things are either on the part of God's judgment, or on the part of
His gifts, or on the part of sin. For, by consideration of the Divine
judgment, wherein justice is accompanied with mercy, man is hindered
from sinning through choice, both by hope, arising from the
consideration of the mercy that pardons sins and rewards good deeds,
which hope is removed by "despair"; and by fear, arising from the
consideration of the Divine justice that punishes sins, which fear is
removed by "presumption," when, namely, a man presumes that he can
obtain glory without merits, or pardon without repentance.

God's gifts whereby we are withdrawn from sin, are two: one is the
acknowledgment of the truth, against which there is the "resistance of
the known truth," when, namely, a man resists the truth which he has
acknowledged, in order to sin more freely: while the other is the
assistance of inward grace, against which there is "envy of a
brother's spiritual good," when, namely, a man is envious not only of
his brother's person, but also of the increase of Divine grace in the
world.

On the part of sin, there are two things which may withdraw man
therefrom: one is the inordinateness and shamefulness of the act, the
consideration of which is wont to arouse man to repentance for the
sin he has committed, and against this there is "impenitence," not as
denoting permanence in sin until death, in which sense it was taken
above (for thus it would not be a special sin, but a circumstance of
sin), but as denoting the purpose of not repenting. The other thing
is the smallness or brevity of the good which is sought in sin,
according to Rom. 6:21: "What fruit had you therefore then in those
things, of which you are now ashamed?" The consideration of this is
wont to prevent man's will from being hardened in sin, and this is
removed by "obstinacy," whereby man hardens his purpose by clinging
to sin. Of these two it is written (Jer. 8:6): "There is none that
doth penance for his sin, saying: What have I done?" as regards the
first; and, "They are all turned to their own course, as a horse
rushing to the battle," as regards the second.

Reply Obj. 1: The sins of despair and presumption consist, not in
disbelieving in God's justice and mercy, but in contemning them.

Reply Obj. 2: Obstinacy and impenitence differ not only in respect of
past and future time, but also in respect of certain formal aspects
by reason of the diverse consideration of those things which may be
considered in sin, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 3: Grace and truth were the work of Christ through the
gifts of the Holy Ghost which He gave to men.

Reply Obj. 4: To refuse to obey belongs to obstinacy, while a feigned
repentance belongs to impenitence, and schism to the envy of a
brother's spiritual good, whereby the members of the Church are
united together.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 14, Art. 3]

Whether the Sin Against the Holy Ghost Can Be Forgiven?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sin against the Holy Ghost can be
forgiven. For Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi): "We should
despair of no man, so long as Our Lord's patience brings him back to
repentance." But if any sin cannot be forgiven, it would be possible
to despair of some sinners. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost
can be forgiven.

Obj. 2: Further, no sin is forgiven, except through the soul being
healed by God. But "no disease is incurable to an all-powerful
physician," as a gloss says on Ps. 102:3, "Who healeth all thy
diseases." Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven.

Obj. 3: Further, the free-will is indifferent to either good or evil.
Now, so long as man is a wayfarer, he can fall away from any virtue,
since even an angel fell from heaven, wherefore it is written (Job
4:18, 19): "In His angels He found wickedness: how much more shall
they that dwell in houses of clay?" Therefore, in like manner, a man
can return from any sin to the state of justice. Therefore the sin
against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 12:32): "He that shall speak
against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this
world, nor in the world to come": and Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in
Monte i, 22) that "so great is the downfall of this sin that it cannot
submit to the humiliation of asking for pardon."

_I answer that,_ According to the various interpretations of the sin
against the Holy Ghost, there are various ways in which it may be said
that it cannot be forgiven. For if by the sin against the Holy Ghost
we understand final impenitence, it is said to be unpardonable, since
in no way is it pardoned: because the mortal sin wherein a man
perseveres until death will not be forgiven in the life to come, since
it was not remitted by repentance in this life.

According to the other two interpretations, it is said to be
unpardonable, not as though it is nowise forgiven, but because,
considered in itself, it deserves not to be pardoned: and this in two
ways. First, as regards the punishment, since he that sins through
ignorance or weakness, deserves less punishment, whereas he that sins
through certain malice, can offer no excuse in alleviation of his
punishment. Likewise those who blasphemed against the Son of Man
before His Godhead was revealed, could have some excuse, on account
of the weakness of the flesh which they perceived in Him, and hence,
they deserved less punishment; whereas those who blasphemed against
His very Godhead, by ascribing to the devil the works of the Holy
Ghost, had no excuse in diminution of their punishment. Wherefore,
according to Chrysostom's commentary (Hom. xlii in Matth.), the Jews
are said not to be forgiven this sin, neither in this world nor in
the world to come, because they were punished for it, both in the
present life, through the Romans, and in the life to come, in the
pains of hell. Thus also Athanasius adduces the example of their
forefathers who, first of all, wrangled with Moses on account of the
shortage of water and bread; and this the Lord bore with patience,
because they were to be excused on account of the weakness of the
flesh: but afterwards they sinned more grievously when, by ascribing
to an idol the favors bestowed by God Who had brought them out of
Egypt, they blasphemed, so to speak, against the Holy Ghost, saying
(Ex. 32:4): "These are thy gods, O Israel, that have brought thee out
of the land of Egypt." Therefore the Lord both inflicted temporal
punishment on them, since "there were slain on that day about three
and twenty thousand men" (Ex. 32:28), and threatened them with
punishment in the life to come, saying, (Ex. 32:34): "I, in the day
of revenge, will visit this sin . . . of theirs."

Secondly, this may be understood to refer to the guilt: thus a disease
is said to be incurable in respect of the nature of the disease, which
removes whatever might be a means of cure, as when it takes away the
power of nature, or causes loathing for food and medicine, although
God is able to cure such a disease. So too, the sin against the Holy
Ghost is said to be unpardonable, by reason of its nature, in so far
as it removes those things which are a means towards the pardon of
sins. This does not, however, close the way of forgiveness and healing
to an all-powerful and merciful God, Who, sometimes, by a miracle, so
to speak, restores spiritual health to such men.

Reply Obj. 1: We should despair of no man in this life, considering
God's omnipotence and mercy. But if we consider the circumstances of
sin, some are called (Eph. 2:2) "children of despair" [*_Filios
diffidentiae,_ which the Douay version renders "children of
unbelief."].

Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the question on the part of
God's omnipotence, not on that of the circumstances of sin.

Reply Obj. 3: In this life the free-will does indeed ever remain
subject to change: yet sometimes it rejects that whereby, so far as
it is concerned, it can be turned to good. Hence considered in itself
this sin is unpardonable, although God can pardon it.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 14, Art. 4]

Whether a Man Can Sin First of All Against the Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot sin first of all against
the Holy Ghost, without having previously committed other sins. For
the natural order requires that one should be moved to perfection from
imperfection. This is evident as regards good things, according to
Prov. 4:18: "The path of the just, as a shining light, goeth forwards
and increases even to perfect day." Now, in evil things, the perfect
is the greatest evil, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. v, text. 21).
Since then the sin against the Holy Ghost is the most grievous sin, it
seems that man comes to commit this sin through committing lesser
sins.

Obj. 2: Further, to sin against the Holy Ghost is to sin through
certain malice, or through choice. Now man cannot do this until he has
sinned many times; for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6, 9) that
"although a man is able to do unjust deeds, yet he cannot all at once
do them as an unjust man does," viz. from choice. Therefore it seems
that the sin against the Holy Ghost cannot be committed except after
other sins.

Obj. 3: Further, repentance and impenitence are about the same
object. But there is no repentance, except about past sins. Therefore
the same applies to impenitence which is a species of the sin against
the Holy Ghost. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost presupposes
other sins.

_On the contrary,_ "It is easy in the eyes of God on a sudden to
make a poor man rich" (Ecclus. 11:23). Therefore, conversely, it is
possible for a man, according to the malice of the devil who tempts
him, to be led to commit the most grievous of sins which is that
against the Holy Ghost.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), in one way, to sin against
the Holy Ghost is to sin through certain malice. Now one may sin
through certain malice in two ways, as stated in the same place:
first, through the inclination of a habit; but this is not, properly
speaking, to sin against the Holy Ghost, nor does a man come to
commit this sin all at once, in as much as sinful acts must precede
so as to cause the habit that induces to sin. Secondly, one may sin
through certain malice, by contemptuously rejecting the things
whereby a man is withdrawn from sin. This is, properly speaking, to
sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated above (A. 1); and this also,
for the most part, presupposes other sins, for it is written (Prov.
18:3) that "the wicked man, when he is come into the depth of sins,
contemneth."

Nevertheless it is possible for a man, in his first sinful act, to
sin against the Holy Ghost by contempt, both on account of his
free-will, and on account of the many previous dispositions, or
again, through being vehemently moved to evil, while but feebly
attached to good. Hence never or scarcely ever does it happen that
the perfect sin all at once against the Holy Ghost: wherefore Origen
says (Peri Archon. i, 3): "I do not think that anyone who stands on
the highest step of perfection, can fail or fall suddenly; this can
only happen by degrees and bit by bit."

The same applies, if the sin against the Holy Ghost be taken literally
for blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. For such blasphemy as Our Lord
speaks of, always proceeds from contemptuous malice.

If, however, with Augustine (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) we understand
the sin against the Holy Ghost to denote final impenitence, it does
not regard the question in point, because this sin against the Holy
Ghost requires persistence in sin until the end of life.

Reply Obj. 1: Movement both in good and in evil is made, for the most
part, from imperfect to perfect, according as man progresses in good
or evil: and yet in both cases, one man can begin from a greater
(good or evil) than another man does. Consequently, that from which a
man begins can be perfect in good or evil according to its genus,
although it may be imperfect as regards the series of good or evil
actions whereby a man progresses in good or evil.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the sin which is committed
through certain malice, when it proceeds from the inclination of a
habit.

Reply Obj. 3: If by impenitence we understand with Augustine (De
Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) persistence in sin until the end, it is clear
that it presupposes sin, just as repentance does. If, however, we
take it for habitual impenitence, in which sense it is a sin against
the Holy Ghost, it is evident that it can precede sin: for it is
possible for a man who has never sinned to have the purpose either
of repenting or of not repenting, if he should happen to sin.
_______________________

QUESTION 15

OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING
(In Three Articles)

We must now consider the vices opposed to knowledge and
understanding. Since, however, we have treated of ignorance which
is opposed to knowledge, when we were discussing the causes of sins
(I-II, Q. 76), we must now inquire about blindness of mind and
dulness of sense, which are opposed to the gift of understanding;
and under this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether blindness of mind is a sin?

(2) Whether dulness of sense is a sin distinct from blindness of
mind?

(3) Whether these vices arise from sins of the flesh?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 15, Art. 1]

Whether Blindness of Mind Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that blindness of mind is not a sin.
Because, seemingly, that which excuses from sin is not itself a sin.
Now blindness of mind excuses from sin; for it is written (John
9:41): "If you were blind, you should not have sin." Therefore
blindness of mind is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, punishment differs from guilt. But blindness of mind
is a punishment as appears from Isa. 6:10, "Blind the heart of this
people," for, since it is an evil, it could not be from God, were it
not a punishment. Therefore blindness of mind is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine (De
Vera Relig. xiv). Now blindness of mind is not voluntary, since, as
Augustine says (Confess. x), "all love to know the resplendent
truth," and as we read in Eccles. 11:7, "the light is sweet and it is
delightful for the eyes to see the sun." Therefore blindness of mind
is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons blindness of
mind among the vices arising from lust.

_I answer that,_ Just as bodily blindness is the privation of the
principle of bodily sight, so blindness of mind is the privation of
the principle of mental or intellectual sight. Now this has a
threefold principle. One is the light of natural reason, which light,
since it pertains to the species of the rational soul, is never
forfeit from the soul, and yet, at times, it is prevented from
exercising its proper act, through being hindered by the lower powers
which the human intellect needs in order to understand, for instance
in the case of imbeciles and madmen, as stated in the First Part (Q.
84, AA. 7, 8).

Another principle of intellectual sight is a certain habitual light
superadded to the natural light of reason, which light is sometimes
forfeit from the soul. This privation is blindness, and is a
punishment, in so far as the privation of the light of grace is a
punishment. Hence it is written concerning some (Wis. 2:21): "Their
own malice blinded them."

A third principle of intellectual sight is an intelligible principle,
through which a man understands other things; to which principle a
man may attend or not attend. That he does not attend thereto happens
in two ways. Sometimes it is due to the fact that a man's will is
deliberately turned away from the consideration of that principle,
according to Ps. 35:4, "He would not understand, that he might do
well": whereas sometimes it is due to the mind being more busy about
things which it loves more, so as to be hindered thereby from
considering this principle, according to Ps. 57:9, "Fire," i.e. of
concupiscence, "hath fallen on them and they shall not see the sun."
In either of these ways blindness of mind is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1: The blindness that excuses from sin is that which
arises from the natural defect of one who cannot see.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the second kind of blindness
which is a punishment.

Reply Obj. 3: To understand the truth is, in itself, beloved by all;
and yet, accidentally it may be hateful to someone, in so far as a
man is hindered thereby from having what he loves yet more.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 15, Art. 2]

Whether Dulness of Sense Is a Sin Distinct from Blindness of Mind?

Objection 1: It seems that dulness of sense is not a distinct sin
from blindness of mind. Because one thing has one contrary. Now
dulness is opposed to the gift of understanding, according to Gregory
(Moral. ii, 49); and so is blindness of mind, since understanding
denotes a principle of sight. Therefore dulness of sense is the same
as blindness of mind.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) in speaking of dulness
describes it as "dulness of sense in respect of understanding." Now
dulness of sense in respect of understanding seems to be the same as
a defect in understanding, which pertains to blindness of mind.
Therefore dulness of sense is the same as blindness of mind.

Obj. 3: Further, if they differ at all, it seems to be chiefly in the
fact that blindness of mind is voluntary, as stated above (A. 1),
while dulness of sense is a natural defect. But a natural defect is
not a sin: so that, accordingly, dulness of sense would not be a sin,
which is contrary to what Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45), where he
reckons it among the sins arising from gluttony.

_On the contrary,_ Different causes produce different effects. Now
Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that dulness of sense arises from
gluttony, and that blindness of mind arises from lust. Now these
others are different vices. Therefore those are different vices also.

_I answer that,_ Dull is opposed to sharp: and a thing is said to be
sharp because it can pierce; so that a thing is called dull through
being obtuse and unable to pierce. Now a bodily sense, by a kind of
metaphor, is said to pierce the medium, in so far as it perceives its
object from a distance or is able by penetration as it were to
perceive the smallest details or the inmost parts of a thing. Hence
in corporeal things the senses are said to be acute when they can
perceive a sensible object from afar, by sight, hearing, or scent,
while on the other hand they are said to be dull, through being
unable to perceive, except sensible objects that are near at hand, or
of great power.

Now, by way of similitude to bodily sense, we speak of sense in
connection with the intellect; and this latter sense is in respect of
certain primals and extremes, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, even as the
senses are cognizant of sensible objects as of certain principles of
knowledge. Now this sense which is connected with understanding, does
not perceive its object through a medium of corporeal distance, but
through certain other media, as, for instance, when it perceives a
thing's essence through a property thereof, and the cause through its
effect. Consequently a man is said to have an acute sense in
connection with his understanding, if, as soon as he apprehends a
property or effect of a thing, he understands the nature or the thing
itself, and if he can succeed in perceiving its slightest details:
whereas a man is said to have a dull sense in connection with his
understanding, if he cannot arrive at knowing the truth about a
thing, without many explanations; in which case, moreover, he is
unable to obtain a perfect perception of everything pertaining to the
nature of that thing.

Accordingly dulness of sense in connection with understanding denotes
a certain weakness of the mind as to the consideration of spiritual
goods; while blindness of mind implies the complete privation of the
knowledge of such things. Both are opposed to the gift of
understanding, whereby a man knows spiritual goods by apprehending
them, and has a subtle penetration of their inmost nature. This
dulness has the character of sin, just as blindness of mind has, that
is, in so far as it is voluntary, as evidenced in one who, owing to
his affection for carnal things, dislikes or neglects the careful
consideration of spiritual things.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 15, Art. 3]

Whether Blindness of Mind and Dulness of Sense Arise from Sins of the
Flesh?

Objection 1: It would seem that blindness of mind and dulness of
sense do not arise from sins of the flesh. For Augustine (Retract. i,
4) retracts what he had said in his Soliloquies i, 1, "God Who didst
wish none but the clean to know the truth," and says that one might
reply that "many, even those who are unclean, know many truths." Now
men become unclean chiefly by sins of the flesh. Therefore blindness
of mind and dulness of sense are not caused by sins of the flesh.

Obj. 2: Further, blindness of mind and dulness of sense are defects
in connection with the intellective part of the soul: whereas carnal
sins pertain to the corruption of the flesh. But the flesh does not
act on the soul, but rather the reverse. Therefore the sins of the
flesh do not cause blindness of mind and dulness of sense.

Obj. 3: Further, all things are more passive to what is near them
than to what is remote. Now spiritual vices are nearer the mind than
carnal vices are. Therefore blindness of mind and dulness of sense
are caused by spiritual rather than by carnal vices.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that dulness of
sense arises from gluttony and blindness of mind from lust.

_I answer that,_ The perfect intellectual operation in man consists in
an abstraction from sensible phantasms, wherefore the more a man's
intellect is freed from those phantasms, the more thoroughly will it
be able to consider things intelligible, and to set in order all
things sensible. Thus Anaxagoras stated that the intellect requires to
be "detached" in order to command, and that the agent must have power
over matter, in order to be able to move it. Now it is evident that
pleasure fixes a man's attention on that which he takes pleasure in:
wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4, 5) that we all do best
that which we take pleasure in doing, while as to other things, we do
them either not at all, or in a faint-hearted fashion.

Now carnal vices, namely gluttony and lust, are concerned with
pleasures of touch in matters of food and sex; and these are the most
impetuous of all pleasures of the body. For this reason these vices
cause man's attention to be very firmly fixed on corporeal things, so
that in consequence man's operation in regard to intelligible things
is weakened, more, however, by lust than by gluttony, forasmuch as
sexual pleasures are more vehement than those of the table. Wherefore
lust gives rise to blindness of mind, which excludes almost entirely
the knowledge of spiritual things, while dulness of sense arises from
gluttony, which makes a man weak in regard to the same intelligible
things. On the other hand, the contrary virtues, viz. abstinence and
chastity, dispose man very much to the perfection of intellectual
operation. Hence it is written (Dan. 1:17) that "to these children" on
account of their abstinence and continency, "God gave knowledge and
understanding in every book, and wisdom."

Reply Obj. 1: Although some who are the slaves of carnal vices are at
times capable of subtle considerations about intelligible things, on
account of the perfection of their natural genius, or of some habit
superadded thereto, nevertheless, on account of the pleasures of the
body, it must needs happen that their attention is frequently
withdrawn from this subtle contemplation: wherefore the unclean can
know some truths, but their uncleanness is a clog on their knowledge.

Reply Obj. 2: The flesh acts on the intellective faculties, not by
altering them, but by impeding their operation in the aforesaid
manner.

Reply Obj. 3: It is owing to the fact that the carnal vices are
further removed from the mind, that they distract the mind's
attention to more remote things, so that they hinder the mind's
contemplation all the more.
_______________________

QUESTION 16

OF THE PRECEPTS OF FAITH, KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider the precepts pertaining to the aforesaid, and
under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) The precepts concerning faith;

(2) The precepts concerning the gifts of knowledge and understanding.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 16, Art. 1]

Whether in the Old Law There Should Have Been Given Precepts of Faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that, in the Old Law, there should have
been given precepts of faith. Because a precept is about something due
and necessary. Now it is most necessary for man that he should
believe, according to Heb. 11:6, "Without faith it is impossible to
please God." Therefore there was very great need for precepts of faith
to be given.

Obj. 2: Further, the New Testament is contained in the Old, as the
reality in the figure, as stated above (I-II, Q. 107, A. 3). Now the
New Testament contains explicit precepts of faith, for instance John
14:1: "You believe in God; believe also in Me." Therefore it seems
that some precepts of faith ought to have been given in the Old Law
also.

Obj. 3: Further, to prescribe the act of a virtue comes to the same
as to forbid the opposite vices. Now the Old Law contained many
precepts forbidding unbelief: thus (Ex. 20:3): "Thou shalt not have
strange gods before Me," and (Deut. 13:1-3) they were forbidden to
hear the words of the prophet or dreamer who might wish to turn them
away from their faith in God. Therefore precepts of faith should have
been given in the Old Law also.

Obj. 4: Further, confession is an act of faith, as stated above
(Q. 3, A. 1). Now the Old Law contained precepts about the confession
and the promulgation of faith: for they were commanded (Ex. 12:27)
that, when their children should ask them, they should tell them the
meaning of the paschal observance, and (Deut. 13:9) they were
commanded to slay anyone who disseminated doctrine contrary to faith.
Therefore the Old Law should have contained precepts of faith.

Obj. 5: Further, all the books of the Old Testament are contained in
the Old Law; wherefore Our Lord said (John 15:25) that it was written
in the Law: "They have hated Me without cause," although this is
found written in Ps. 34 and 68. Now it is written (Ecclus. 2:8): "Ye
that fear the Lord, believe Him." Therefore the Old Law should have
contained precepts of faith.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle (Rom. 3:27) calls the Old Law the "law
of works" which he contrasts with the "law of faith." Therefore the
Old Law ought not to have contained precepts of faith.

_I answer that,_ A master does not impose laws on others than his
subjects; wherefore the precepts of a law presuppose that everyone
who receives the law is subject to the giver of the law. Now the
primary subjection of man to God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6:
"He that cometh to God, must believe that He is." Hence faith is
presupposed to the precepts of the Law: for which reason (Ex. 20:2)
that which is of faith, is set down before the legal precepts, in the
words, "I am the Lord thy God, Who brought thee out of the land of
Egypt," and, likewise (Deut. 6:4), the words, "Hear, O Israel, the
Lord thy [Vulg.: 'our'] God is one," precede the recording of the
precepts.

Since, however, faith contains many things subordinate to the faith
whereby we believe that God is, which is the first and chief of all
articles of faith, as stated above (Q. 1, AA. 1, 7), it follows that,
if we presuppose faith in God, whereby man's mind is subjected to
Him, it is possible for precepts to be given about other articles of
faith. Thus Augustine expounding the words: "This is My commandment"
(John 15:12) says (Tract. lxxxiii in Joan.) that we have received
many precepts of faith. In the Old Law, however, the secret things of
faith were not to be set before the people, wherefore, presupposing
their faith in one God, no other precepts of faith were given in the
Old Law.

Reply Obj. 1: Faith is necessary as being the principle of spiritual
life, wherefore it is presupposed before the receiving of the Law.

Reply Obj. 2: Even then Our Lord both presupposed something of faith,
namely belief in one God, when He said: "You believe in God," and
commanded something, namely, belief in the Incarnation whereby one
Person is God and man. This explanation of faith belongs to the faith
of the New Testament, wherefore He added: "Believe also in Me."

Reply Obj. 3: The prohibitive precepts regard sins, which corrupt
virtue. Now virtue is corrupted by any particular defect, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 4, ad 3; I-II, Q. 19, A. 6, ad 1, A. 7, ad 3).
Therefore faith in one God being presupposed, prohibitive precepts
had to be given in the Old Law, so that men might be warned off those
particular defects whereby their faith might be corrupted.

Reply Obj. 4: Confession of faith and the teaching thereof also
presuppose man's submission to God by faith: so that the Old Law
could contain precepts relating to the confession and teaching of
faith, rather than to faith itself.

Reply Obj. 5: In this passage again that faith is presupposed whereby
we believe that God is; hence it begins, "Ye that fear the Lord,"
which is not possible without faith. The words which follow--"believe
Him"--must be referred to certain special articles of faith, chiefly
to those things which God promises to them that obey Him, wherefore
the passage concludes--"and your reward shall not be made void."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 16, Art. 2]

Whether the Precepts Referring to Knowledge and Understanding Were
Fittingly Set Down in the Old Law?

Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts referring to knowledge
and understanding were unfittingly set down in the Old Law. For
knowledge and understanding pertain to cognition. Now cognition
precedes and directs action. Therefore the precepts referring to
knowledge and understanding should precede the precepts of the Law
referring to action. Since, then, the first precepts of the Law are
those of the decalogue, it seems that precepts of knowledge and
understanding should have been given a place among the precepts of
the decalogue.

Obj. 2: Further, learning precedes teaching, for a man must learn
from another before he teaches another. Now the Old Law contains
precepts about teaching--both affirmative precepts as, for example,
(Deut. 4:9), "Thou shalt teach them to thy sons"--and prohibitive
precepts, as, for instance, (Deut. 4:2), "You shall not add to the
word that I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it."
Therefore it seems that man ought to have been given also some
precepts directing him to learn.

Obj. 3: Further, knowledge and understanding seem more necessary to a
priest than to a king, wherefore it is written (Malachi 2:7): "The
lips of the priest shall keep knowledge, and they shall seek the law
at his mouth," and (Osee 4:6): "Because thou hast rejected knowledge,
I will reject thee, that thou shalt not do the office of priesthood
to Me." Now the king is commanded to learn knowledge of the Law
(Deut. 17:18, 19). Much more therefore should the Law have commanded
the priests to learn the Law.

Obj. 4: Further, it is not possible while asleep to meditate on
things pertaining to knowledge and understanding: moreover it is
hindered by extraneous occupations. Therefore it is unfittingly
commanded (Deut. 6:7): "Thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy
house, and walking on thy journey, sleeping and rising." Therefore
the precepts relating to knowledge and understanding are unfittingly
set down in the Law.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 4:6): "That, hearing all
these precepts, they may say, Behold a wise and understanding people."

_I answer that,_ Three things may be considered in relation to
knowledge and understanding: first, the reception thereof; secondly,
the use; and thirdly, their preservation. Now the reception of
knowledge or understanding, is by means of teaching and learning, and
both are prescribed in the Law. For it is written (Deut. 6:6): "These
words which I command thee . . . shall be in thy heart." This refers
to learning, since it is the duty of a disciple to apply his mind to
what is said, while the words that follow--"and thou shalt tell them
to thy children"--refer to teaching.

The use of knowledge and understanding is the meditation on those
things which one knows or understands. In reference to this, the text
goes on: "thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house," etc.

Their preservation is effected by the memory, and, as regards this,
the text continues--"and thou shalt bind them as a sign on thy hand,
and they shall be and shall move between thy eyes. And thou shalt
write them in the entry, and on the doors of thy house." Thus the
continual remembrance of God's commandments is signified, since it
is impossible for us to forget those things which are continually
attracting the notice of our senses, whether by touch, as those
things we hold in our hands, or by sight, as those things which are
ever before our eyes, or to which we are continually returning, for
instance, to the house door. Moreover it is clearly stated (Deut.
4:9): "Forget not the words that thy eyes have seen and let them
not go out of thy heart all the days of thy life."

We read of these things also being commanded more notably in the New
Testament, both in the teaching of the Gospel and in that of the
apostles.

Reply Obj. 1: According to Deut. 4:6, "this is your wisdom and
understanding in the sight of the nations." By this we are given to
understand that the wisdom and understanding of those who believe in
God consist in the precepts of the Law. Wherefore the precepts of the
Law had to be given first, and afterwards men had to be led to know
and understand them, and so it was not fitting that the aforesaid
precepts should be placed among the precepts of the decalogue which
take the first place.

Reply Obj. 2: There are also in the Law precepts relating to
learning, as stated above. Nevertheless teaching was commanded more
expressly than learning, because it concerned the learned, who were
not under any other authority, but were immediately under the law,
and to them the precepts of the Law were given. On the other hand
learning concerned the people of lower degree, and these the
precepts of the Law have to reach through the learned.

Reply Obj. 3: Knowledge of the Law is so closely bound up with the
priestly office that being charged with the office implies being
charged to know the Law: hence there was no need for special precepts
to be given about the training of the priests. On the other hand, the
doctrine of God's law is not so bound up with the kingly office,
because a king is placed over his people in temporal matters: hence
it is especially commanded that the king should be instructed by the
priests about things pertaining to the law of God.

Reply Obj. 4: That precept of the Law does not mean that man should
meditate on God's law by sleeping, but during sleep, i.e. that he
should meditate on the law of God when he is preparing to sleep,
because this leads to his having better phantasms while asleep, in so
far as our movements pass from the state of vigil to the state of
sleep, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. i, 13). In like manner we
are commanded to meditate on the Law in every action of ours, not
that we are bound to be always actually thinking about the Law, but
that we should regulate all our actions according to it.
_______________________

QUESTION 17

OF HOPE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF
(In Eight Articles)

After treating of faith, we must consider hope and (1) hope itself;
(2) the gift of fear; (3) the contrary vices; (4) the corresponding
precepts. The first of these points gives rise to a twofold
consideration: (1) hope, considered in itself; (2) its subject.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether hope is a virtue?

(2) Whether its object is eternal happiness?

(3) Whether, by the virtue of hope, one man may hope for another's
happiness?

(4) Whether a man may lawfully hope in man?

(5) Whether hope is a theological virtue?

(6) Of its distinction from the other theological virtues?

(7) Of its relation to faith;

(8) Of its relation to charity.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 1]

Whether Hope Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a virtue. For "no man
makes ill use of a virtue," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii,
18). But one may make ill use of hope, since the passion of hope,
like the other passions, is subject to a mean and extremes. Therefore
hope is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, no virtue results from merits, since "God works
virtue in us without us," as Augustine states (De Grat. et Lib. Arb.
xvii). But hope is caused by grace and merits, according to the
Master (Sent. iii, D, 26). Therefore hope is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing"
(Phys. vii, text. 17, 18). But hope is the disposition of an
imperfect thing, of one, namely, that lacks what it hopes to have.
Therefore hope is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. i, 33) that the three
daughters of Job signify these three virtues, faith, hope and
charity. Therefore hope is a virtue.

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) "the
virtue of a thing is that which makes its subject good, and its work
good likewise." Consequently wherever we find a good human act, it
must correspond to some human virtue. Now in all things measured and
ruled, the good is that which attains its proper rule: thus we say
that a coat is good if it neither exceeds nor falls short of its
proper measurement. But, as we stated above (Q. 8, A. 3, ad 3) human
acts have a twofold measure; one is proximate and homogeneous, viz.
the reason, while the other is remote and excelling, viz. God:
wherefore every human act is good, which attains reason or God
Himself. Now the act of hope, whereof we speak now, attains God. For,
as we have already stated (I-II, Q. 40, A. 1), when we were treating
of the passion of hope, the object of hope is a future good,
difficult but possible to obtain. Now a thing is possible to us in
two ways: first, by ourselves; secondly, by means of others, as
stated in _Ethic._ iii. Wherefore, in so far as we hope for anything
as being possible to us by means of the Divine assistance, our hope
attains God Himself, on Whose help it leans. It is therefore evident
that hope is a virtue, since it causes a human act to be good and to
attain its due rule.

Reply Obj. 1: In the passions, the mean of virtue depends on right
reason being attained, wherein also consists the essence of virtue.
Wherefore in hope too, the good of virtue depends on a man's
attaining, by hoping, the due rule, viz. God. Consequently man cannot
make ill use of hope which attains God, as neither can he make ill
use of moral virtue which attains the reason, because to attain thus
is to make good use of virtue. Nevertheless, the hope of which we
speak now, is not a passion but a habit of the mind, as we shall show
further on (A. 5; Q. 18, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 2: Hope is said to arise from merits, as regards the thing
hoped for, in so far as we hope to obtain happiness by means of grace
and merits; or as regards the act of living hope. The habit itself of
hope, whereby we hope to obtain happiness, does not flow from our
merits, but from grace alone.

Reply Obj. 3: He who hopes is indeed imperfect in relation to that
which he hopes to obtain, but has not as yet; yet he is perfect, in
so far as he already attains his proper rule, viz. God, on Whose help
he leans.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 2]

Whether Eternal Happiness Is the Proper Object of Hope?

Objection 1: It would seem that eternal happiness is not the proper
object of hope. For a man does not hope for that which surpasses
every movement of the soul, since hope itself is a movement of the
soul. Now eternal happiness surpasses every movement of the human
soul, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:9) that it hath not "entered
into the heart of man." Therefore happiness is not the proper object
of hope.

Obj. 2: Further, prayer is an expression of hope, for it is written
(Ps. 36:5): "Commit thy way to the Lord, and trust in Him, and He
will do it." Now it is lawful for man to pray God not only for
eternal happiness, but also for the goods, both temporal and
spiritual, of the present life, and, as evidenced by the Lord's
Prayer, to be delivered from evils which will no longer be in eternal
happiness. Therefore eternal happiness is not the proper object of
hope.

Obj. 3: Further, the object of hope is something difficult. Now many
things besides eternal happiness are difficult to man. Therefore
eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 6:19) that we have hope
"which entereth in," i.e. maketh us to enter . . . "within the veil,"
i.e. into the happiness of heaven, according to the interpretation of
a gloss on these words. Therefore the object of hope is eternal
happiness.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the hope of which we speak
now, attains God by leaning on His help in order to obtain the hoped
for good. Now an effect must be proportionate to its cause. Wherefore
the good which we ought to hope for from God properly and chiefly is
the infinite good, which is proportionate to the power of our divine
helper, since it belongs to an infinite power to lead anyone to an
infinite good. Such a good is eternal life, which consists in the
enjoyment of God Himself. For we should hope from Him for nothing
less than Himself, since His goodness, whereby He imparts good things
to His creature, is no less than His Essence. Therefore the proper
and principal object of hope is eternal happiness.

Reply Obj. 1: Eternal happiness does not enter into the heart of man
perfectly, i.e. so that it be possible for a wayfarer to know its
nature and quality; yet, under the general notion of the perfect
good, it is possible for it to be apprehended by a man, and it is in
this way that the movement of hope towards it arises. Hence the
Apostle says pointedly (Heb. 6:19) that hope "enters in, even within
the veil," because that which we hope for is as yet veiled, so to
speak.

Reply Obj. 2: We ought not to pray God for any other goods, except in
reference to eternal happiness. Hence hope regards eternal happiness
chiefly, and other things, for which we pray God, it regards
secondarily and as referred to eternal happiness: just as faith
regards God principally, and, secondarily, those things which are
referred to God, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 3: To him that longs for something great, all lesser
things seem small; wherefore to him that hopes for eternal happiness,
nothing else appears arduous, as compared with that hope; although,
as compared with the capability of the man who hopes, other things
besides may be arduous to him, so that he may have hope for such
things in reference to its principal object.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 3]

Whether One Man May Hope for Another's Eternal Happiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that one may hope for another's eternal
happiness. For the Apostle says (Phil. 1:6): "Being confident of this
very thing, that He Who hath begun a good work in you, will perfect
it unto the day of Jesus Christ." Now the perfection of that day will
be eternal happiness. Therefore one man may hope for another's
eternal happiness.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever we ask of God, we hope to obtain from Him.
But we ask God to bring others to eternal happiness, according to
James 5:16: "Pray for one another that you may be saved." Therefore
we can hope for another's eternal happiness.

Obj. 3: Further, hope and despair are about the same object. Now it
is possible to despair of another's eternal happiness, else Augustine
would have no reason for saying (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) that we
should not despair of anyone so long as he lives. Therefore one can
also hope for another's eternal salvation.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "hope is
only of such things as belong to him who is supposed to hope for
them."

_I answer that,_ We can hope for something in two ways: first,
absolutely, and thus the object of hope is always something arduous
and pertaining to the person who hopes. Secondly, we can hope for
something, through something else being presupposed, and in this way
its object can be something pertaining to someone else. In order to
explain this we must observe that love and hope differ in this, that
love denotes union between lover and beloved, while hope denotes a
movement or a stretching forth of the appetite towards an arduous
good. Now union is of things that are distinct, wherefore love can
directly regard the other whom a man unites to himself by love,
looking upon him as his other self: whereas movement is always
towards its own term which is proportionate to the subject moved.
Therefore hope regards directly one's own good, and not that which
pertains to another. Yet if we presuppose the union of love with
another, a man can hope for and desire something for another man, as
for himself; and, accordingly, he can hope for another's eternal
life, inasmuch as he is united to him by love, and just as it is the
same virtue of charity whereby a man loves God, himself, and his
neighbor, so too it is the same virtue of hope, whereby a man hopes
for himself and for another.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 4]

Whether a Man Can Lawfully Hope in Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that one may lawfully hope in man. For the
object of hope is eternal happiness. Now we are helped to obtain
eternal happiness by the patronage of the saints, for Gregory says
(Dial. i, 8) that "predestination is furthered by the saints'
prayers." Therefore one may hope in man.

Obj. 2: Further, if a man may not hope in another man, it ought not
to be reckoned a sin in a man, that one should not be able to hope in
him. Yet this is reckoned a vice in some, as appears from Jer. 9:4:
"Let every man take heed of his neighbor, and let him not trust in
any brother of his." Therefore it is lawful to trust in a man.

Obj. 3: Further, prayer is the expression of hope, as stated above
(A. 2, Obj. 2). But it is lawful to pray to a man for something.
Therefore it is lawful to trust in him.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 17:5): "Cursed be the man that
trusteth in man."

_I answer that,_ Hope, as stated above (A. 1; I-II, Q. 40, A. 7),
regards two things, viz. the good which it intends to obtain, and the
help by which that good is obtained. Now the good which a man hopes
to obtain, has the aspect of a final cause, while the help by which
one hopes to obtain that good, has the character of an efficient
cause. Now in each of these kinds of cause we find a principal and a
secondary cause. For the principal end is the last end, while the
secondary end is that which is referred to an end. In like manner the
principal efficient cause is the first agent, while the secondary
efficient cause is the secondary and instrumental agent. Now hope
regards eternal happiness as its last end, and the Divine assistance
as the first cause leading to happiness.

Accordingly, just as it is not lawful to hope for any good save
happiness, as one's last end, but only as something referred to final
happiness, so too, it is unlawful to hope in any man, or any
creature, as though it were the first cause of movement towards
happiness. It is, however, lawful to hope in a man or a creature as
being the secondary and instrumental agent through whom one is helped
to obtain any goods that are ordained to happiness. It is in this way
that we turn to the saints, and that we ask men also for certain
things; and for this reason some are blamed in that they cannot be
trusted to give help.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 5]

Whether Hope Is a Theological Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a theological virtue. For
a theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now hope has
for its object not only God but also other goods which we hope to
obtain from God. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, a theological virtue is not a mean between two
vices, as stated above (I-II, Q. 64, A. 4). But hope is a mean
between presumption and despair. Therefore hope is not a theological
virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, expectation belongs to longanimity which is a
species of fortitude. Since, then, hope is a kind of expectation, it
seems that hope is not a theological, but a moral virtue.

Obj. 4: Further, the object of hope is something arduous. But it
belongs to magnanimity, which is a moral virtue, to tend to the
arduous. Therefore hope is a moral, and not a theological virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Hope is enumerated (1 Cor. 13) together with faith
and charity, which are theological virtues.

_I answer that,_ Since specific differences, by their very nature,
divide a genus, in order to decide under what division we must place
hope, we must observe whence it derives its character of virtue.

Now it has been stated above (A. 1) that hope has the character of
virtue from the fact that it attains the supreme rule of human
actions: and this it attains both as its first efficient cause, in as
much as it leans on its assistance, and as its last final cause, in
as much as it expects happiness in the enjoyment thereof. Hence it is
evident that God is the principal object of hope, considered as a
virtue. Since, then, the very idea of a theological virtue is one
that has God for its object, as stated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 1), it
is evident that hope is a theological virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: Whatever else hope expects to obtain, it hopes for it
in reference to God as the last end, or as the first efficient cause,
as stated above (A. 4).

Reply Obj. 2: In things measured and ruled the mean consists in the
measure or rule being attained; if we go beyond the rule, there is
excess, if we fall short of the rule, there is deficiency. But in the
rule or measure itself there is no such thing as a mean or extremes.
Now a moral virtue is concerned with things ruled by reason, and
these things are its proper object; wherefore it is proper to it to
follow the mean as regards its proper object. On the other hand, a
theological virtue is concerned with the First Rule not ruled by
another rule, and that Rule is its proper object. Wherefore it is not
proper for a theological virtue, with regard to its proper object, to
follow the mean, although this may happen to it accidentally with
regard to something that is referred to its principal object. Thus
faith can have no mean or extremes in the point of trusting to the
First Truth, in which it is impossible to trust too much; whereas on
the part of the things believed, it may have a mean and extremes; for
instance one truth is a mean between two falsehoods. So too, hope has
no mean or extremes, as regards its principal object, since it is
impossible to trust too much in the Divine assistance; yet it may
have a mean and extremes, as regards those things a man trusts to
obtain, in so far as he either presumes above his capability, or
despairs of things of which he is capable.

Reply Obj. 3: The expectation which is mentioned in the definition of
hope does not imply delay, as does the expectation which belongs to
longanimity. It implies a reference to the Divine assistance, whether
that which we hope for be delayed or not.

Reply Obj. 4: Magnanimity tends to something arduous in the hope of
obtaining something that is within one's power, wherefore its proper
object is the doing of great things. On the other hand hope, as a
theological virtue, regards something arduous, to be obtained by
another's help, as stated above (A. 1).
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 6]

Whether Hope Is Distinct from the Other Theological Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not distinct from the other
theological virtues. For habits are distinguished by their objects,
as stated above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 2). Now the object of hope is the
same as of the other theological virtues. Therefore hope is not
distinct from the other theological virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, in the symbol of faith, whereby we make profession
of faith, we say: "I expect the resurrection of the dead and the life
of the world to come." Now expectation of future happiness belongs to
hope, as stated above (A. 5). Therefore hope is not distinct from
faith.

Obj. 3: Further, by hope man tends to God. But this belongs properly
to charity. Therefore hope is not distinct from charity.

_On the contrary,_ There cannot be number without distinction. Now
hope is numbered with the other theological virtues: for Gregory says
(Moral. i, 16) that the three virtues are faith, hope, and charity.
Therefore hope is distinct from the theological virtues.

_I answer that,_ A virtue is said to be theological from having God
for the object to which it adheres. Now one may adhere to a thing in
two ways: first, for its own sake; secondly, because something else
is attained thereby. Accordingly charity makes us adhere to God for
His own sake, uniting our minds to God by the emotion of love.

On the other hand, hope and faith make man adhere to God as to a
principle wherefrom certain things accrue to us. Now we derive from
God both knowledge of truth and the attainment of perfect goodness.
Accordingly faith makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we
derive the knowledge of truth, since we believe that what God tells
us is true: while hope makes us adhere to God, as the source whence
we derive perfect goodness, i.e. in so far as, by hope, we trust to
the Divine assistance for obtaining happiness.

Reply Obj. 1: God is the object of these virtues under different
aspects, as stated above: and a different aspect of the object
suffices for the distinction of habits, as stated above (I-II, Q. 54,
A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2: Expectation is mentioned in the symbol of faith, not as
though it were the proper act of faith, but because the act of hope
presupposes the act of faith, as we shall state further on (A. 7).
Hence an act of faith is expressed in the act of hope.

Reply Obj. 3: Hope makes us tend to God, as to a good to be obtained
finally, and as to a helper strong to assist: whereas charity,
properly speaking, makes us tend to God, by uniting our affections to
Him, so that we live, not for ourselves, but for God.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 7]

Whether Hope Precedes Faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope precedes faith. Because a gloss
on Ps. 36:3, "Trust in the Lord, and do good," says: "Hope is the
entrance to faith and the beginning of salvation." But salvation is
by faith whereby we are justified. Therefore hope precedes faith.

Obj. 2: Further, that which is included in a definition should
precede the thing defined and be more known. But hope is included in
the definition of faith (Heb. 11:1): "Faith is the substance of
things to be hoped for." Therefore hope precedes faith.

Obj. 3: Further, hope precedes a meritorious act, for the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 9:10): "He that plougheth should plough in hope . . . to
receive fruit." But the act of faith is meritorious. Therefore hope
precedes faith.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 1:2): "Abraham begot Isaac,"
i.e. "Faith begot hope," according to a gloss.

_I answer that,_ Absolutely speaking, faith precedes hope. For the
object of hope is a future good, arduous but possible to obtain. In
order, therefore, that we may hope, it is necessary for the object of
hope to be proposed to us as possible. Now the object of hope is, in
one way, eternal happiness, and in another way, the Divine
assistance, as explained above (A. 2; A. 6, ad 3): and both of these
are proposed to us by faith, whereby we come to know that we are able
to obtain eternal life, and that for this purpose the Divine
assistance is ready for us, according to Heb. 11:6: "He that cometh
to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek
Him." Therefore it is evident that faith precedes hope.

Reply Obj. 1: As the same gloss observes further on, "hope" is called
"the entrance" to faith, i.e. of the thing believed, because by hope
we enter in to see what we believe. Or we may reply that it is called
the "entrance to faith," because thereby man begins to be established
and perfected in faith.

Reply Obj. 2: The thing to be hoped for is included in the definition
of faith, because the proper object of faith, is something not
apparent in itself. Hence it was necessary to express it in a
circumlocution by something resulting from faith.

Reply Obj. 3: Hope does not precede every meritorious act; but it
suffices for it to accompany or follow it.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 8]

Whether Charity Precedes Hope?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity precedes hope. For Ambrose
says on Luke 27:6, "If you had faith like to a grain of mustard
seed," etc.: "Charity flows from faith, and hope from charity." But
faith precedes charity. Therefore charity precedes hope.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "good
emotions and affections proceed from love and holy charity." Now to
hope, considered as an act of hope, is a good emotion of the soul.
Therefore it flows from charity.

Obj. 3: Further, the Master says (Sent. iii, D, 26) that hope
proceeds from merits, which precede not only the thing hoped for, but
also hope itself, which, in the order of nature, is preceded by
charity. Therefore charity precedes hope.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the
commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience,"
i.e. "from hope," according to a gloss. Therefore hope precedes
charity.

_I answer that,_ Order is twofold. One is the order of generation and
of matter, in respect of which the imperfect precedes the perfect:
the other is the order of perfection and form, in respect of which
the perfect naturally precedes the imperfect. In respect of the first
order hope precedes charity: and this is clear from the fact that
hope and all movements of the appetite flow from love, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 27, A. 4; I-II, Q. 28, A. 6, ad 2; I-II, Q. 40, A. 7)
in the treatise on the passions.

Now there is a perfect, and an imperfect love. Perfect love is that
whereby a man is loved in himself, as when someone wishes a person
some good for his own sake; thus a man loves his friend. Imperfect
love is that whereby a man love something, not for its own sake, but
that he may obtain that good for himself; thus a man loves what he
desires. The first love of God pertains to charity, which adheres to
God for His own sake; while hope pertains to the second love, since
he that hopes, intends to obtain possession of something for himself.

Hence in the order of generation, hope precedes charity. For just as
a man is led to love God, through fear of being punished by Him for
his sins, as Augustine states (In primam canon. Joan. Tract. ix), so
too, hope leads to charity, in as much as a man through hoping to be
rewarded by God, is encouraged to love God and obey His commandments.
On the other hand, in the order of perfection charity naturally
precedes hope, wherefore, with the advent of charity, hope is made
more perfect, because we hope chiefly in our friends. It is in this
sense that Ambrose states (Obj. 1) that charity flows from hope: so
that this suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2: Hope and every movement of the appetite proceed from
some kind of love, whereby the expected good is loved. But not every
kind of hope proceeds from charity, but only the movement of living
hope, viz. that whereby man hopes to obtain good from God, as from a
friend.

Reply Obj. 3: The Master is speaking of living hope, which is
naturally preceded by charity and the merits caused by charity.
_______________________

QUESTION 18

OF THE SUBJECT OF HOPE
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the subject of hope, under which head there are
four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the virtue of hope is in the will as its subject?

(2) Whether it is in the blessed?

(3) Whether it is in the damned?

(4) Whether there is certainty in the hope of the wayfarer?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 1]

Whether Hope Is in the Will As Its Subject?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not in the will as its
subject. For the object of hope is an arduous good, as stated above
(Q. 17, A. 1; I-II, Q. 40, A. 1). Now the arduous is the object, not
of the will, but of the irascible. Therefore hope is not in the will
but in the irascible.

Obj. 2: Further, where one suffices it is superfluous to add another.
Now charity suffices for the perfecting of the will, which is the
most perfect of the virtues. Therefore hope is not in the will.

Obj. 3: Further, the one same power cannot exercise two acts at the
same time; thus the intellect cannot understand many things
simultaneously. Now the act of hope can be at the same time as an act
of charity. Since, then, the act of charity evidently belongs to the
will, it follows that the act of hope does not belong to that power:
so that, therefore, hope is not in the will.

_On the contrary,_ The soul is not apprehensive of God save as
regards the mind in which is memory, intellect and will, as Augustine
declares (De Trin. xiv, 3, 6). Now hope is a theological virtue
having God for its object. Since therefore it is neither in the
memory, nor in the intellect, which belong to the cognitive faculty,
it follows that it is in the will as its subject.

_I answer that,_ As shown above (I, Q. 87, A. 2), habits are known by
their acts. Now the act of hope is a movement of the appetitive
faculty, since its object is a good. And, since there is a twofold
appetite in man, namely, the sensitive which is divided into
irascible and concupiscible, and the intellective appetite, called
the will, as stated in the First Part (Q. 82, A. 5), those movements
which occur in the lower appetite, are with passion, while those in
the higher appetite are without passion, as shown above (I, Q. 87, A.
2, ad 1; I-II, Q. 22, A. 3, ad 3). Now the act of the virtue of hope
cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, since the good which is the
principal object of this virtue, is not a sensible but a Divine good.
Therefore hope resides in the higher appetite called the will, and
not in the lower appetite, of which the irascible is a part.

Reply Obj. 1: The object of the irascible is an arduous sensible:
whereas the object of the virtue of hope is an arduous intelligible,
or rather superintelligible.

Reply Obj. 2: Charity perfects the will sufficiently with regard to
one act, which is the act of loving: but another virtue is required
in order to perfect it with regard to its other act, which is that of
hoping.

Reply Obj. 3: The movement of hope and the movement of charity are
mutually related, as was shown above (Q. 17, A. 8). Hence there is no
reason why both movements should not belong at the same time to the
same power: even as the intellect can understand many things at the
same time if they be related to one another, as stated in the First
Part (Q. 85, A. 4).
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 2]

Whether in the Blessed There Is Hope?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the blessed there is hope. For
Christ was a perfect comprehensor from the first moment of His
conception. Now He had hope, since, according to a gloss, the words
of Ps. 30:2, "In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped," are said in His person.
Therefore in the blessed there can be hope.

Obj. 2: Further, even as the obtaining of happiness is an arduous
good, so is its continuation. Now, before they obtain happiness, men
hope to obtain it. Therefore, after they have obtained it, they can
hope to continue in its possession.

Obj. 3: Further, by the virtue of hope, a man can hope for happiness,
not only for himself, but also for others, as stated above (Q. 17, A.
3). But the blessed who are in heaven hope for the happiness of
others, else they would not pray for them. Therefore there can be
hope in them.

Obj. 4: Further, the happiness of the saints implies not only glory
of the soul but also glory of the body. Now the souls of the saints
in heaven, look yet for the glory of their bodies (Apoc. 6:10;
Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore in the blessed there can
be hope.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): "What a man seeth,
why doth he hope for?" Now the blessed enjoy the sight of God.
Therefore hope has no place in them.

_I answer that,_ If what gives a thing its species be removed, the
species is destroyed, and that thing cannot remain the same; just as
when a natural body loses its form, it does not remain the same
specifically. Now hope takes its species from its principal object,
even as the other virtues do, as was shown above (Q. 17, AA. 5, 6;
I-II, Q. 54, A. 2): and its principal object is eternal happiness as
being possible to obtain by the assistance of God, as stated above
(Q. 17, A. 2).

Since then the arduous possible good cannot be an object of hope
except in so far as it is something future, it follows that when
happiness is no longer future, but present, it is incompatible with
the virtue of hope. Consequently hope, like faith, is voided in
heaven, and neither of them can be in the blessed.

Reply Obj. 1: Although Christ was a comprehensor and therefore
blessed as to the enjoyment of God, nevertheless He was, at the same
time, a wayfarer, as regards the passibility of nature, to which He
was still subject. Hence it was possible for Him to hope for the
glory of impassibility and immortality, yet not so as to have the
virtue of hope, the principal object of which is not the glory of the
body but the enjoyment of God.

Reply Obj. 2: The happiness of the saints is called eternal life,
because through enjoying God they become partakers, as it were, of
God's eternity which surpasses all time: so that the continuation of
happiness does not differ in respect of present, past and future.
Hence the blessed do not hope for the continuation of their happiness
(for as regards this there is no future), but are in actual
possession thereof.

Reply Obj. 3: So long as the virtue of hope lasts, it is by the same
hope that one hopes for one's own happiness, and for that of others.
But when hope is voided in the blessed, whereby they hoped for their
own happiness, they hope for the happiness of others indeed, yet not
by the virtue of hope, but rather by the love of charity. Even so, he
that has Divine charity, by that same charity loves his neighbor,
without having the virtue of charity, but by some other love.

Reply Obj. 4: Since hope is a theological virtue having God for its
object, its principal object is the glory of the soul, which consists
in the enjoyment of God, and not the glory of the body. Moreover,
although the glory of the body is something arduous in comparison
with human nature, yet it is not so for one who has the glory of the
soul; both because the glory of the body is a very small thing as
compared with the glory of the soul, and because one who has the
glory of the soul has already the sufficient cause of the glory of
the body.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 3]

Whether Hope Is in the Damned?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is hope in the damned. For the
devil is damned and prince of the damned, according to Matt. 25:41:
"Depart . . . you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared
for the devil and his angels." But the devil has hope, according to
Job 40:28, "Behold his hope shall fail him." Therefore it seems that
the damned have hope.

Obj. 2: Further, just as faith is either living or dead, so is hope.
But lifeless faith can be in the devils and the damned, according to
James 2:19: "The devils . . . believe and tremble." Therefore it
seems that lifeless hope also can be in the damned.

Obj. 3: Further, after death there accrues to man no merit or demerit
that he had not before, according to Eccles. 11:3, "If the tree fall
to the south, or to the north, in what place soever it shall fall,
there shall it be." Now many who are damned, in this life hoped and
never despaired. Therefore they will hope in the future life also.

_On the contrary,_ Hope causes joy, according to Rom. 12:12,
"Rejoicing in hope." Now the damned have no joy, but sorrow and
grief, according to Isa. 65:14, "My servants shall praise for
joyfulness of heart, and you shall cry for sorrow of heart, and shall
howl for grief of spirit." Therefore no hope is in the damned.

_I answer that,_ Just as it is a condition of happiness that the will
should find rest therein, so is it a condition of punishment, that
what is inflicted in punishment, should go against the will. Now that
which is not known can neither be restful nor repugnant to the will:
wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 17) that the angels could
not be perfectly happy in their first state before their
confirmation, or unhappy before their fall, since they had no
foreknowledge of what would happen to them. For perfect and true
happiness requires that one should be certain of being happy for
ever, else the will would not rest.

In like manner, since the everlastingness of damnation is a necessary
condition of the punishment of the damned, it would not be truly
penal unless it went against the will; and this would be impossible
if they were ignorant of the everlastingness of their damnation.
Hence it belongs to the unhappy state of the damned, that they should
know that they cannot by any means escape from damnation and obtain
happiness. Wherefore it is written (Job 15:22): "He believeth not
that he may return from darkness to light." It is, therefore, evident
that they cannot apprehend happiness as a possible good, as neither
can the blessed apprehend it as a future good. Consequently there is
no hope either in the blessed or in the damned. On the other hand,
hope can be in wayfarers, whether of this life or in purgatory,
because in either case they apprehend happiness as a future possible
thing.

Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 20) this is said of the
devil as regards his members, whose hope will fail utterly: or, if it
be understood of the devil himself, it may refer to the hope whereby
he expects to vanquish the saints, in which sense we read just before
(Job 40:18): "He trusteth that the Jordan may run into his mouth":
this is not, however, the hope of which we are speaking.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), "faith is about
things, bad or good, past, present, or future, one's own or
another's; whereas hope is only about good things, future and
concerning oneself." Hence it is possible for lifeless faith to be in
the damned, but not hope, since the Divine goods are not for them
future possible things, but far removed from them.

Reply Obj. 3: Lack of hope in the damned does not change their
demerit, as neither does the voiding of hope in the blessed increase
their merit: but both these things are due to the change in their
respective states.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 4]

Whether There Is Certainty in the Hope of a Wayfarer?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no certainty in the hope of
a wayfarer. For hope resides in the will. But certainty pertains not
to the will but to the intellect. Therefore there is no certainty in
hope.

Obj. 2: Further, hope is based on grace and merits, as stated above
(Q. 17, A. 1). Now it is impossible in this life to know for certain
that we are in a state of grace, as stated above (I-II, Q. 112, A.
5). Therefore there is no certainty in the hope of a wayfarer.

Obj. 3: Further, there can be no certainty about that which may fail.
Now many a hopeful wayfarer fails to obtain happiness. Therefore
wayfarer's hope has no certainty.

_On the contrary,_ "Hope is the certain expectation of future
happiness," as the Master states (Sent. iii, D, 26): and this may be
gathered from 2 Tim. 1:12, "I know Whom I have believed, and I am
certain that He is able to keep that which I have committed to Him."

_I answer that,_ Certainty is found in a thing in two ways,
essentially and by participation. It is found essentially in the
cognitive power; by participation in whatever is moved infallibly to
its end by the cognitive power. In this way we say that nature works
with certainty, since it is moved by the Divine intellect which moves
everything with certainty to its end. In this way too, the moral
virtues are said to work with greater certainty than art, in as much
as, like a second nature, they are moved to their acts by the reason:
and thus too, hope tends to its end with certainty, as though sharing
in the certainty of faith which is in the cognitive faculty.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2: Hope does not trust chiefly in grace already received,
but on God's omnipotence and mercy, whereby even he that has not
grace, can obtain it, so as to come to eternal life. Now whoever has
faith is certain of God's omnipotence and mercy.

Reply Obj. 3: That some who have hope fail to obtain happiness, is
due to a fault of the free will in placing the obstacle of sin, but
not to any deficiency in God's power or mercy, in which hope places
its trust. Hence this does not prejudice the certainty of hope.
_______________________

QUESTION 19

OF THE GIFT OF FEAR
(In Twelve Articles)

We must now consider the gift of fear, about which there are twelve
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether God is to be feared?

(2) Of the division of fear into filial, initial, servile and worldly;

(3) Whether worldly fear is always evil?

(4) Whether servile fear is good?

(5) Whether it is substantially the same as filial fear?

(6) Whether servile fear departs when charity comes?

(7) Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom?

(8) Whether initial fear is substantially the same as filial fear?

(9) Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost?

(10) Whether it grows when charity grows?

(11) Whether it remains in heaven?

(12) Which of the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 1]

Whether God Can Be Feared?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be feared. For the object
of fear is a future evil, as stated above (I-II, Q. 41, AA. 2, 3).
But God is free of all evil, since He is goodness itself. Therefore
God cannot be feared.

Obj. 2: Further, fear is opposed to hope. Now we hope in God.
Therefore we cannot fear Him at the same time.

Obj. 3: Further, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 5), "we fear
those things whence evil comes to us." But evil comes to us, not from
God, but from ourselves, according to Osee 13:9: "Destruction is thy
own, O Israel: thy help is . . . in Me." Therefore God is not to be
feared.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 10:7): "Who shall not fear
Thee, O King of nations?" and (Malachi 1:6): "If I be a master, where
is My fear?"

_I answer that,_ Just as hope has two objects, one of which is the
future good itself, that one expects to obtain, while the other is
someone's help, through whom one expects to obtain what one hopes
for, so, too, fear may have two objects, one of which is the very
evil which a man shrinks from, while the other is that from which the
evil may come. Accordingly, in the first way God, Who is goodness
itself, cannot be an object of fear; but He can be an object of fear
in the second way, in so far as there may come to us some evil either
from Him or in relation to Him.

From Him there comes the evil of punishment, but this is evil not
absolutely but relatively, and, absolutely speaking, is a good.
Because, since a thing is said to be good through being ordered to an
end, while evil implies lack of this order, that which excludes the
order to the last end is altogether evil, and such is the evil of
fault. On the other hand the evil of punishment is indeed an evil, in
so far as it is the privation of some particular good, yet absolutely
speaking, it is a good, in so far as it is ordained to the last end.

In relation to God the evil of fault can come to us, if we be
separated from Him: and in this way God can and ought to be feared.

Reply Obj. 1: This objection considers the object of fear as being
the evil which a man shuns.

Reply Obj. 2: In God, we may consider both His justice, in respect of
which He punishes those who sin, and His mercy, in respect of which
He sets us free: in us the consideration of His justice gives rise to
fear, but the consideration of His mercy gives rise to hope, so that,
accordingly, God is the object of both hope and fear, but under
different aspects.

Reply Obj. 3: The evil of fault is not from God as its author but
from us, in for far as we forsake God: while the evil of punishment
is from God as its author, in so far as it has character of a good,
since it is something just, through being inflicted on us justly;
although originally this is due to the demerit of sin: thus it is
written (Wis. 1:13, 16): "God made not death . . . but the wicked
with works and words have called it to them."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 2]

Whether Fear Is Fittingly Divided into Filial, Initial, Servile and
Worldly Fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear is unfittingly divided into
filial, initial, servile and worldly fear. For Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. ii, 15) that there are six kinds of fear, viz. "laziness,
shamefacedness," etc. of which we have treated above (I-II, Q. 41, A.
4), and which are not mentioned in the division in question.
Therefore this division of fear seems unfitting.

Obj. 2: Further, each of these fears is either good or evil. But
there is a fear, viz. natural fear, which is neither morally good,
since it is in the demons, according to James 2:19, "The devils . . .
believe and tremble," nor evil, since it is in Christ, according to
Mk. 14:33, Jesus "began to fear and be heavy." Therefore the
aforesaid division of fear is insufficient.

Obj. 3: Further, the relation of son to father differs from that of
wife to husband, and this again from that of servant to master. Now
filial fear, which is that of the son in comparison with his father,
is distinct from servile fear, which is that of the servant in
comparison with his master. Therefore chaste fear, which seems to be
that of the wife in comparison with her husband, ought to be
distinguished from all these other fears.

Obj. 4: Further, even as servile fear fears punishment, so do initial
and worldly fear. Therefore no distinction should be made between
them.

Obj. 5: Further, even as concupiscence is about some good, so is fear
about some evil. Now "concupiscence of the eyes," which is the desire
for things of this world, is distinct from "concupiscence of the
flesh," which is the desire for one's own pleasure. Therefore
"worldly fear," whereby one fears to lose external goods, is distinct
from "human fear," whereby one fears harm to one's own person.

On the contrary stands the authority of the Master (Sent. iii, D, 34).

_I answer that,_ We are speaking of fear now, in so far as it makes
us turn, so to speak, to God or away from Him. For, since the object
of fear is an evil, sometimes, on account of the evils he fears, man
withdraws from God, and this is called human fear; while sometimes,
on account of the evils he fears, he turns to God and adheres to Him.
This latter evil is twofold, viz. evil of punishment, and evil of
fault.

Accordingly if a man turn to God and adhere to Him, through fear of
punishment, it will be servile fear; but if it be on account of fear
of committing a fault, it will be filial fear, for it becomes a child
to fear offending its father. If, however, it be on account of both,
it will be initial fear, which is between both these fears. As to
whether it is possible to fear the evil of fault, the question has
been treated above (I-II, Q. 42, A. 3) when we were considering the
passion of fear.

Reply Obj. 1: Damascene divides fear as a passion of the soul:
whereas this division of fear is taken from its relation to God, as
explained above.

Reply Obj. 2: Moral good consists chiefly in turning to God, while
moral evil consists chiefly in turning away from Him: wherefore all
the fears mentioned above imply either moral evil or moral good. Now
natural fear is presupposed to moral good and evil, and so it is not
numbered among these kinds of fear.

Reply Obj. 3: The relation of servant to master is based on the power
which the master exercises over the servant; whereas, on the
contrary, the relation of a son to his father or of a wife to her
husband is based on the son's affection towards his father to whom he
submits himself, or on the wife's affection towards her husband to
whom she binds herself in the union of love. Hence filial and chaste
fear amount to the same, because by the love of charity God becomes
our Father, according to Rom. 8:15, "You have received the spirit of
adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father)"; and by this same
charity He is called our spouse, according to 2 Cor. 11:2, "I have
espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste
virgin to Christ": whereas servile fear has no connection with these,
since it does not include charity in its definition.

Reply Obj. 4: These three fears regard punishment but in different
ways. For worldly or human fear regards a punishment which turns man
away from God, and which God's enemies sometimes inflict or threaten:
whereas servile and initial fear regard a punishment whereby men are
drawn to God, and which is inflicted or threatened by God. Servile
fear regards this punishment chiefly, while initial fear regards it
secondarily.

Reply Obj. 5: It amounts to the same whether man turns away from God
through fear of losing his worldly goods, or through fear of
forfeiting the well-being of his body, since external goods belong to
the body. Hence both these fears are reckoned as one here, although
they fear different evils, even as they correspond to the desire of
different goods. This diversity causes a specific diversity of sins,
all of which alike however lead man away from God.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 3]

Whether Worldly Fear Is Always Evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that worldly fear is not always evil.
Because regard for men seems to be a kind of human fear. Now some are
blamed for having no regard for man, for instance, the unjust judge
of whom we read (Luke 18:2) that he "feared not God, nor regarded
man." Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not always evil.

Obj. 2: Further, worldly fear seems to have reference to the
punishments inflicted by the secular power. Now such like punishments
incite us to good actions, according to Rom. 13:3, "Wilt thou not be
afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have
praise from the same." Therefore worldly fear is not always evil.

Obj. 3: Further, it seems that what is in us naturally, is not evil,
since our natural gifts are from God. Now it is natural to man to
fear detriment to his body, and loss of his worldly goods, whereby
the present life is supported. Therefore it seems that worldly fear
is not always evil.

_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 10:28): "Fear ye not them
that kill the body," thus forbidding worldly fear. Now nothing but
what is evil is forbidden by God. Therefore worldly fear is evil.

_I answer that,_ As shown above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; I-II, Q. 18, A. 1;
I-II, Q. 54, A. 2) moral acts and habits take their name and species
from their objects. Now the proper object of the appetite's movement
is the final good: so that, in consequence, every appetitive movement
is both specified and named from its proper end. For if anyone were
to describe covetousness as love of work because men work on account
of covetousness, this description would be incorrect, since the
covetous man seeks work not as end but as a means: the end that he
seeks is wealth, wherefore covetousness is rightly described as the
desire or the love of wealth, and this is evil. Accordingly worldly
love is, properly speaking, the love whereby a man trusts in the
world as his end, so that worldly love is always evil. Now fear is
born of love, since man fears the loss of what he loves, as Augustine
states (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33). Now worldly fear is that which arises
from worldly love as from an evil root, for which reason worldly fear
is always evil.

Reply Obj. 1: One may have regard for men in two ways. First in so
far as there is in them something divine, for instance, the good of
grace or of virtue, or at least of the natural image of God: and in
this way those are blamed who have no regard for man. Secondly, one
may have regard for men as being in opposition to God, and thus it is
praiseworthy to have no regard for men, according as we read of Elias
or Eliseus (Ecclus. 48:13): "In his days he feared not the prince."

Reply Obj. 2: When the secular power inflicts punishment in order to
withdraw men from sin, it is acting as God's minister, according to
Rom. 13:4, "For he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath
upon him that doth evil." To fear the secular power in this way is
part, not of worldly fear, but of servile or initial fear.

Reply Obj. 3: It is natural for man to shrink from detriment to his
own body and loss of worldly goods, but to forsake justice on that
account is contrary to natural reason. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iii, 1) that there are certain things, viz. sinful deeds,
which no fear should drive us to do, since to do such things is worse
than to suffer any punishment whatever.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 4]

Whether Servile Fear Is Good?

Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear is not good. For if the
use of a thing is evil, the thing itself is evil. Now the use of
servile fear is evil, for according to a gloss on Rom. 8:15, "if a man
do anything through fear, although the deed be good, it is not well
done." Therefore servile fear is not good.

Obj. 2: Further, no good grows from a sinful root. Now servile fear
grows from a sinful root, because when commenting on Job 3:11, "Why
did I not die in the womb?" Gregory says (Moral. iv, 25): "When a man
dreads the punishment which confronts him for his sin and no longer
loves the friendship of God which he has lost, his fear is born of
pride, not of humility." Therefore servile fear is evil.

Obj. 3: Further, just as mercenary love is opposed to the love of
charity, so is servile fear, apparently, opposed to chaste fear. But
mercenary love is always evil. Therefore servile fear is also.

_On the contrary,_ Nothing evil is from the Holy Ghost. But servile fear
is from the Holy Ghost, since a gloss on Rom. 8:15, "You have not
received the spirit of bondage," etc. says: "It is the one same spirit
that bestows two fears, viz. servile and chaste fear." Therefore
servile fear is not evil.

_I answer that,_ It is owing to its servility that servile fear may be
evil. For servitude is opposed to freedom. Since, then, "what is free
is cause of itself" (Metaph. i, 2), a slave is one who does not act as
cause of his own action, but as though moved from without. Now whoever
does a thing through love, does it of himself so to speak, because it
is by his own inclination that he is moved to act: so that it is
contrary to the very notion of servility that one should act from
love. Consequently servile fear as such is contrary to charity: so
that if servility were essential to fear, servile fear would be evil
simply, even as adultery is evil simply, because that which makes it
contrary to charity belongs to its very species.

This servility, however, does not belong to the species of servile
fear, even as neither does lifelessness to the species of lifeless
faith. For the species of a moral habit or act is taken from the
object. Now the object of servile fear is punishment, and it is by
accident that, either the good to which the punishment is contrary,
is loved as the last end, and that consequently the punishment is
feared as the greatest evil, which is the case with one who is devoid
of charity, or that the punishment is directed to God as its end, and
that, consequently, it is not feared as the greatest evil, which is
the case with one who has charity. For the species of a habit is not
destroyed through its object or end being directed to a further end.
Consequently servile fear is substantially good, but is servility is
evil.

Reply Obj. 1: This saying of Augustine is to be applied to a man who
does something through servile fear as such, so that he loves not
justice, and fears nothing but the punishment.

Reply Obj. 2: Servile fear as to its substance is not born of pride,
but its servility is, inasmuch as man is unwilling, by love, to
subject his affections to the yoke of justice.

Reply Obj. 3: Mercenary love is that whereby God is loved for the
sake of worldly goods, and this is, of itself, contrary to charity,
so that mercenary love is always evil. But servile fear, as to its
substance, implies merely fear of punishment, whether or not this be
feared as the principal evil.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 5]

Whether Servile Fear Is Substantially the Same As Filial Fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear is substantially the
same as filial fear. For filial fear is to servile fear the same
apparently as living faith is to lifeless faith, since the one is
accompanied by mortal sin and the other not. Now living faith and
lifeless faith are substantially the same. Therefore servile and
filial fear are substantially the same.

Obj. 2: Further, habits are diversified by their objects. Now the
same thing is the object of servile and of filial fear, since they
both fear God. Therefore servile and filial fear are substantially
the same.

Obj. 3: Further, just as man hopes to enjoy God and to obtain favors
from Him, so does he fear to be separated from God and to be punished
by Him. Now it is the same hope whereby we hope to enjoy God, and to
receive other favors from Him, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 2, ad 2).
Therefore filial fear, whereby we fear separation from God, is the
same as servile fear whereby we fear His punishments.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) says
that there are two fears, one servile, another filial or chaste fear.

_I answer that,_ The proper object of fear is evil. And since acts
and habits are diversified by their objects, as shown above (I-II, Q.
54, A. 2), it follows of necessity that different kinds of fear
correspond to different kinds of evil.

Now the evil of punishment, from which servile fear shrinks, differs
specifically from evil of fault, which filial fear shuns, as shown
above (A. 2). Hence it is evident that servile and filial fear are
not the same substantially but differ specifically.

Reply Obj. 1: Living and lifeless faith differ, not as regards the
object, since each of them believes God and believes in a God, but in
respect of something extrinsic, viz. the presence or absence of
charity, and so they do not differ substantially. On the other hand,
servile and filial fear differ as to their objects: and hence the
comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 2: Servile fear and filial fear do not regard God
in the same light. For servile fear looks upon God as the cause of the
infliction of punishment, whereas filial fear looks upon Him, not as
the active cause of guilt, but rather as the term wherefrom it shrinks
to be separated by guilt. Consequently the identity of object, viz.
God, does not prove a specific identity of fear, since also natural
movements differ specifically according to their different
relationships to some one term, for movement from whiteness is not
specifically the same as movement towards whiteness.

Reply Obj. 3: Hope looks upon God as the principle not only of
the enjoyment of God, but also of any other favor whatever. This
cannot be said of fear; and so there is no comparison.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 6]

Whether Servile Fear Remains with Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear does not remain with
charity. For Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) that
"when charity takes up its abode, it drives away fear which had
prepared a place for it."

Obj. 2: Further, "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts,
by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us" (Rom. 5:5). Now "where the
Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. 3:17). Since then
freedom excludes servitude, it seems that servile fear is driven away
when charity comes.

Obj. 3: Further, servile fear is caused by self-love, in so far as
punishment diminishes one's own good. Now love of God drives away
self-love, for it makes us despise ourselves: thus Augustine
testifies (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that "the love of God unto the
contempt of self builds up the city of God." Therefore it seems that
servile fear is driven out when charity comes.

_On the contrary,_ Servile fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as
stated above (A. 4). Now the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not
forfeited through the advent of charity, whereby the Holy Ghost
dwells in us. Therefore servile fear is not driven out when charity
comes.

_I answer that,_ Servile fear proceeds from self-love, because it is
fear of punishment which is detrimental to one's own good. Hence the
fear of punishment is consistent with charity, in the same way as
self-love is: because it comes to the same that a man love his own
good and that he fear to be deprived of it.

Now self-love may stand in a threefold relationship to charity. In
one way it is contrary to charity, when a man places his end in the
love of his own good. In another way it is included in charity, when
a man loves himself for the sake of God and in God. In a third way,
it is indeed distinct from charity, but is not contrary thereto, as
when a man loves himself from the point of view of his own good, yet
not so as to place his end in this his own good: even as one may have
another special love for one's neighbor, besides the love of charity
which is founded on God, when we love him by reason of usefulness,
consanguinity, or some other human consideration, which, however, is
referable to charity.

Accordingly fear of punishment is, in one way, included in charity,
because separation from God is a punishment, which charity shuns
exceedingly; so that this belongs to chaste fear. In another way, it
is contrary to charity, when a man shrinks from the punishment that
is opposed to his natural good, as being the principal evil in
opposition to the good which he loves as an end; and in this way fear
of punishment is not consistent with charity. In another way fear of
punishment is indeed substantially distinct from chaste fear, when,
to wit, a man fears a penal evil, not because it separates him from
God, but because it is hurtful to his own good, and yet he does not
place his end in this good, so that neither does he dread this evil
as being the principal evil. Such fear of punishment is consistent
with charity; but it is not called servile, except when punishment is
dreaded as a principal evil, as explained above (AA. 2, 4). Hence
fear considered as servile, does not remain with charity, but the
substance of servile fear can remain with charity, even as self-love
can remain with charity.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of fear considered as servile:
and such is the sense of the two other objections.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 6]

Whether Fear Is the Beginning of Wisdom?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not the beginning of wisdom.
For the beginning of a thing is a part thereof. But fear is not a
part of wisdom, since fear is seated in the appetitive faculty, while
wisdom is in the intellect. Therefore it seems that fear is not the
beginning of wisdom.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing is the beginning of itself. "Now fear of the
Lord, that is wisdom," according to Job 28:28. Therefore it seems
that fear of God is not the beginning of wisdom.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing is prior to the beginning. But something is
prior to fear, since faith precedes fear. Therefore it seems that
fear is not the beginning of wisdom.

_On the contrary,_ It is written in the Ps. 110:10: "The fear of the
Lord is the beginning of wisdom."

_I answer that,_ A thing may be called the beginning of wisdom in two
ways: in one way because it is the beginning of wisdom itself as to
its essence; in another way, as to its effect. Thus the beginning of
an art as to its essence consists in the principles from which that
art proceeds, while the beginning of an art as to its effect is that
wherefrom it begins to operate: for instance we might say that the
beginning of the art of building is the foundation because that is
where the builder begins his work.

Now, since wisdom is the knowledge of Divine things, as we shall
state further on (Q. 45, A. 1), it is considered by us in one way,
and in another way by philosophers. For, seeing that our life is
ordained to the enjoyment of God, and is directed thereto according
to a participation of the Divine Nature, conferred on us through
grace, wisdom, as we look at it, is considered not only as being
cognizant of God, as it is with the philosophers, but also as
directing human conduct; since this is directed not only by the human
law, but also by the Divine law, as Augustine shows (De Trin. xii,
14). Accordingly the beginning of wisdom as to its essence consists
in the first principles of wisdom, i.e. the articles of faith, and in
this sense faith is said to be the beginning of wisdom. But as
regards the effect, the beginning of wisdom is the point where wisdom
begins to work, and in this way fear is the beginning of wisdom, yet
servile fear in one way, and filial fear, in another. For servile
fear is like a principle disposing a man to wisdom from without, in
so far as he refrains from sin through fear of punishment, and is
thus fashioned for the effect of wisdom, according to Ecclus. 1:27,
"The fear of the Lord driveth out sin." On the other hand, chaste or
filial fear is the beginning of wisdom, as being the first effect of
wisdom. For since the regulation of human conduct by the Divine law
belongs to wisdom, in order to make a beginning, man must first of
all fear God and submit himself to Him: for the result will be that
in all things he will be ruled by God.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument proves that fear is not the beginning of
wisdom as to the essence of wisdom.

Reply Obj. 2: The fear of God is compared to a man's whole life that
is ruled by God's wisdom, as the root to the tree: hence it is
written (Ecclus. 1:25): "The root of wisdom is to fear the Lord, for
[Vulg.: 'and'] the branches thereof are longlived." Consequently, as
the root is said to be virtually the tree, so the fear of God is said
to be wisdom.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above, faith is the beginning of
wisdom in one way, and fear, in another. Hence it is written (Ecclus.
25:16): "The fear of God is the beginning of love: and the beginning
of faith is to be fast joined to it."
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 7]

Whether Initial Fear Differs Substantially from Filial Fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that initial fear differs substantially
from filial fear. For filial fear is caused by love. Now initial fear
is the beginning of love, according to Ecclus. 25:16, "The fear of
God is the beginning of love." Therefore initial fear is distinct
from filial fear.

Obj. 2: Further, initial fear dreads punishment, which is the object
of servile fear, so that initial and servile fear would seem to be
the same. But servile fear is distinct from filial fear. Therefore
initial fear also is substantially distinct from initial fear.

Obj. 3: Further, a mean differs in the same ratio from both the
extremes. Now initial fear is the mean between servile and filial
fear. Therefore it differs from both filial and servile fear.

_On the contrary,_ Perfect and imperfect do not diversify the
substance of a thing. Now initial and filial fear differ in respect
of perfection and imperfection of charity, as Augustine states (In
prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix). Therefore initial fear does not differ
substantially from filial fear.

_I answer that,_ Initial fear is so called because it is a beginning
(_initium_). Since, however, both servile and filial fear are, in
some way, the beginning of wisdom, each may be called in some way,
initial.

It is not in this sense, however, that we are to understand initial
fear in so far as it is distinct from servile and filial fear, but in
the sense according to which it belongs to the state of beginners, in
whom there is a beginning of filial fear resulting from a beginning
of charity, although they do not possess the perfection of filial
fear, because they have not yet attained to the perfection of
charity. Consequently initial fear stands in the same relation to
filial fear as imperfect to perfect charity. Now perfect and
imperfect charity differ, not as to essence but as to state.
Therefore we must conclude that initial fear, as we understand it
here, does not differ essentially from filial fear.

Reply Obj. 1: The fear which is a beginning of love is servile fear,
which is the herald of charity, just as the bristle introduces the
thread, as Augustine states (Tract. ix in Ep. i Joan.). Or else, if
it be referred to initial fear, this is said to be the beginning of
love, not absolutely, but relatively to the state of perfect charity.

Reply Obj. 2: Initial fear does not dread punishment as its proper
object, but as having something of servile fear connected with it:
for this servile fear, as to its substance, remains indeed, with
charity, its servility being cast aside; whereas its act remains with
imperfect charity in the man who is moved to perform good actions not
only through love of justice, but also through fear of punishment,
though this same act ceases in the man who has perfect charity, which
"casteth out fear," according to 1 John 4:18.

Reply Obj. 3: Initial fear is a mean between servile and filial fear,
not as between two things of the same genus, but as the imperfect is
a mean between a perfect being and a non-being, as stated in
_Metaph._ ii, for it is the same substantially as the perfect being,
while it differs altogether from non-being.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 9]

Whether Fear Is a Gift of the Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
For no gift of the Holy Ghost is opposed to a virtue, which is also
from the Holy Ghost; else the Holy Ghost would be in opposition to
Himself. Now fear is opposed to hope, which is a virtue. Therefore
fear is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 2: Further, it is proper to a theological virtue to have God for
its object. But fear has God for its object, in so far as God is
feared. Therefore fear is not a gift, but a theological virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, fear arises from love. But love is reckoned a
theological virtue. Therefore fear also is a theological virtue,
being connected with the same matter, as it were.

Obj. 4: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "fear is bestowed
as a remedy against pride." But the virtue of humility is opposed to
pride. Therefore again, fear is a kind of virtue.

Obj. 5: Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, since
they are bestowed in support of the virtues as Gregory says (Moral.
ii, 49). Now hope is more perfect than fear, since hope regards good,
while fear regards evil. Since, then, hope is a virtue, it should not
be said that fear is a gift.

_On the contrary,_ The fear of the Lord is numbered among the seven
gifts of the Holy Ghost (Isa. 11:3).

_I answer that,_ Fear is of several kinds, as stated above (A. 2).
Now it is not "human fear," according to Augustine (De Gratia et Lib.
Arb. xviii), "that is a gift of God"--for it was by this fear that
Peter denied Christ--but that fear of which it was said (Matt.
10:28): "Fear Him that can destroy both soul and body into hell."

Again servile fear is not to be reckoned among the seven gifts of the
Holy Ghost, though it is from Him, because according to Augustine (De
Nat. et Grat. lvii) it is compatible with the will to sin: whereas
the gifts of the Holy Ghost are incompatible with the will to sin, as
they are inseparable from charity, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A.
5).

It follows, therefore, that the fear of God, which is numbered among
the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, is filial or chaste fear. For it
was stated above (I-II, Q. 68, AA. 1, 3) that the gifts of the Holy
Ghost are certain habitual perfections of the soul's powers, whereby
these are rendered amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost, just as,
by the moral virtues, the appetitive powers are rendered amenable to
the motion of reason. Now for a thing to be amenable to the motion of
a certain mover, the first condition required is that it be a
non-resistant subject of that mover, because resistance of the
movable subject to the mover hinders the movement. This is what
filial or chaste fear does, since thereby we revere God and avoid
separating ourselves from Him. Hence, according to Augustine (De
Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) filial fear holds the first place, as it
were, among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, in the ascending order, and
the last place, in the descending order.

Reply Obj. 1: Filial fear is not opposed to the virtue of hope: since
thereby we fear, not that we may fail of what we hope to obtain by
God's help, but lest we withdraw ourselves from this help. Wherefore
filial fear and hope cling together, and perfect one another.

Reply Obj. 2: The proper and principal object of fear is the evil
shunned, and in this way, as stated above (A. 1), God cannot be an
object of fear. Yet He is, in this way, the object of hope and the
other theological virtues, since, by the virtue of hope, we trust in
God's help, not only to obtain any other goods, but, chiefly, to
obtain God Himself, as the principal good. The same evidently applies
to the other theological virtues.

Reply Obj. 3: From the fact that love is the origin of fear, it does
not follow that the fear of God is not a distinct habit from charity
which is the love of God, since love is the origin of all the
emotions, and yet we are perfected by different habits in respect of
different emotions. Yet love is more of a virtue than fear is,
because love regards good, to which virtue is principally directed by
reason of its own nature, as was shown above (I-II, Q. 55, AA. 3, 4);
for which reason hope is also reckoned as a virtue; whereas fear
principally regards evil, the avoidance of which it denotes,
wherefore it is something less than a theological virtue.

Reply Obj. 4: According to Ecclus. 10:14, "the beginning of the pride
of man is to fall off from God," that is to refuse submission to God,
and this is opposed to filial fear, which reveres God. Thus fear cuts
off the source of pride for which reason it is bestowed as a remedy
against pride. Yet it does not follow that it is the same as the
virtue of humility, but that it is its origin. For the gifts of the
Holy Ghost are the origin of the intellectual and moral virtues, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 4), while the theological virtues are
the origin of the gifts, as stated above (I-II, Q. 69, A. 4, ad 3).

This suffices for the Reply to the Fifth Objection.
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 10]

Whether Fear Decreases When Charity Increases?

Objection 1: It seems that fear decreases when charity increases. For
Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix): "The more charity
increases, the more fear decreases."

Obj. 2: Further, fear decreases when hope increases. But charity
increases when hope increases, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 8).
Therefore fear decreases when charity increases.

Obj. 3: Further, love implies union, whereas fear implies separation.
Now separation decreases when union increases. Therefore fear
decreases when the love of charity increases.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that "the
fear of God not only begins but also perfects wisdom, whereby we love
God above all things, and our neighbor as ourselves."

_I answer that,_ Fear is twofold, as stated above (AA. 2, 4); one is
filial fear, whereby a son fears to offend his father or to be
separated from him; the other is servile fear, whereby one fears
punishment.

Now filial fear must needs increase when charity increases, even as
an effect increases with the increase of its cause. For the more one
loves a man, the more one fears to offend him and to be separated
from him.

On the other hand servile fear, as regards its servility, is entirely
cast out when charity comes, although the fear of punishment remains
as to its substance, as stated above (A. 6). This fear decreases as
charity increases, chiefly as regards its act, since the more a man
loves God, the less he fears punishment; first, because he thinks
less of his own good, to which punishment is opposed; secondly,
because, the faster he clings, the more confident he is of the
reward, and, consequently the less fearful of punishment.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine speaks there of the fear of punishment.

Reply Obj. 2: It is fear of punishment that decreases when hope
increases; but with the increase of the latter filial fear increases,
because the more certainly a man expects to obtain a good by
another's help, the more he fears to offend him or to be separated
from him.

Reply Obj. 3: Filial fear does not imply separation from God, but
submission to Him, and shuns separation from that submission. Yet, in
a way, it implies separation, in the point of not presuming to equal
oneself to Him, and of submitting to Him, which separation is to be
observed even in charity, in so far as a man loves God more than
himself and more than aught else. Hence the increase of the love of
charity implies not a decrease but an increase in the reverence of
fear.
_______________________

ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 11]

Whether Fear Remains in Heaven?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear does not remain in heaven. For
it is written (Prov. 1:33): "He . . . shall enjoy abundance, without
fear of evils," which is to be understood as referring to those who
already enjoy wisdom in everlasting happiness. Now every fear is
about some evil, since evil is the object of fear, as stated above
(AA. 2, 5; I-II, Q. 42, A. 1). Therefore there will be no fear in
heaven.

Obj. 2: Further, in heaven men will be conformed to God, according to
1 John 3:2, "When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him." But God
fears nothing. Therefore, in heaven, men will have no fear.

Obj. 3: Further, hope is more perfect than fear, since hope regards
good, and fear, evil. Now hope will not be in heaven. Therefore
neither will there be fear in heaven.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 18:10): "The fear of the Lord
is holy, enduring for ever and ever."

_I answer that,_ Servile fear, or fear of punishment, will by no
means be in heaven, since such a fear is excluded by the security
which is essential to everlasting happiness, as stated above (I-II,
Q. 5, A. 4).

But with regard to filial fear, as it increases with the increase of
charity, so is it perfected when charity is made perfect; hence, in
heaven, it will not have quite the same act as it has now.

In order to make this clear, we must observe that the proper object
of fear is a possible evil, just as the proper object of hope is a
possible good: and since the movement of fear is like one of
avoidance, fear implies avoidance of a possible arduous evil, for
little evils inspire no fear. Now as a thing's good consists in its
staying in its own order, so a thing's evil consists in forsaking its
order. Again, the order of a rational creature is that it should be
under God and above other creatures. Hence, just as it is an evil for
a rational creature to submit, by love, to a lower creature, so too
is it an evil for it, if it submit not to God, but presumptuously
revolt against Him or contemn Him. Now this evil is possible to a
rational creature considered as to its nature on account of the
natural flexibility of the free-will; whereas in the blessed, it
becomes impossible, by reason of the perfection of glory. Therefore
the avoidance of this evil that consists in non-subjection to God,
and is possible to nature, but impossible in the state of bliss, will
be in heaven; while in this life there is avoidance of this evil as
of something altogether possible. Hence Gregory, expounding the words
of Job (26:11), "The pillars of heaven tremble, and dread at His
beck," says (Moral. xvii, 29): "The heavenly powers that gaze on Him
without ceasing, tremble while contemplating: but their awe, lest it
should be of a penal nature, is one not of fear but of wonder,"
because, to wit, they wonder at God's supereminence and
incomprehensibility. Augustine also (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) in this
sense, admits fear in heaven, although he leaves the question
doubtful. "If," he says, "this chaste fear that endureth for ever and
ever is to be in the future life, it will not be a fear that is
afraid of an evil which might possibly occur, but a fear that holds
fast to a good which we cannot lose. For when we love the good which
we have acquired, with an unchangeable love, without doubt, if it is
allowable to say so, our fear is sure of avoiding evil. Because
chaste fear denotes a will that cannot consent to sin, and whereby we
avoid sin without trembling lest, in our weakness, we fall, and
possess ourselves in the tranquillity born of charity. Else, if no
kind of fear is possible there, perhaps fear is said to endure for
ever and ever, because that which fear will lead us to, will be
everlasting."

Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted excludes from the blessed, the fear
that denotes solicitude, and anxiety about evil, but not the fear
which is accompanied by security.

Reply Obj. 2: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix) "the same things are
both like and unlike God. They are like by reason of a variable
imitation of the Inimitable"--that is, because, so far as they can,
they imitate God Who cannot be imitated perfectly--"they are unlike
because they are the effects of a Cause of Whom they fall short
infinitely and immeasurably." Hence, if there be no fear in God
(since there is none above Him to whom He may be subject) it does not
follow that there is none in the blessed, whose happiness consists in
perfect subjection to God.

Reply Obj. 3: Hope implies a certain defect, namely the futurity of
happiness, which ceases when happiness is present: whereas fear
implies a natural defect in a creature, in so far as it is infinitely
distant from God, and this defect will remain even in heaven. Hence
fear will not be cast out altogether.
_______________________

TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 12]

Whether Poverty of Spirit Is the Beatitude Corresponding to the Gift
of Fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that poverty of spirit is not the
beatitude corresponding to the gift of fear. For fear is the
beginning of the spiritual life, as explained above (A. 7): whereas
poverty belongs to the perfection of the spiritual life, according to
Matt. 19:21, "If thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and
give to the poor." Therefore poverty of spirit does not correspond to
the gift of fear.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ps. 118:120): "Pierce Thou my flesh
with Thy fear," whence it seems to follow that it belongs to fear to
restrain the flesh. But the curbing of the flesh seems to belong
rather to the beatitude of mourning. Therefore the beatitude of
mourning corresponds to the gift of fear, rather than the beatitude
of poverty.

Obj. 3: Further, the gift of fear corresponds to the virtue of hope,
as stated above (A. 9, ad 1). Now the last beatitude which is,
"Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children
of God," seems above all to correspond to hope, because according to
Rom. 5:2, "we . . . glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of
God." Therefore that beatitude corresponds to the gift of fear,
rather than poverty of spirit.

Obj. 4: Further, it was stated above (I-II, Q. 70, A. 2) that the
fruits correspond to the beatitudes. Now none of the fruits
correspond to the gift of fear. Neither, therefore, does any of the
beatitudes.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "The
fear of the Lord is befitting the humble of whom it is said: Blessed
are the poor in spirit."

_I answer that,_ Poverty of spirit properly corresponds to fear.
Because, since it belongs to filial fear to show reverence and
submission to God, whatever results from this submission belongs to
the gift of fear. Now from the very fact that a man submits to God,
it follows that he ceases to seek greatness either in himself or in
another but seeks it only in God. For that would be inconsistent with
perfect subjection to God, wherefore it is written (Ps. 19:8): "Some
trust in chariots and some in horses; but we will call upon the name
of . . . our God." It follows that if a man fear God perfectly, he
does not, by pride, seek greatness either in himself or in external
goods, viz. honors and riches. In either case, this proceeds from
poverty of spirit, in so far as the latter denotes either the voiding
of a puffed up and proud spirit, according to Augustine's
interpretation (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4), or the renunciation of
worldly goods which is done in spirit, i.e. by one's own will,
through the instigation of the Holy Spirit, according to the
expounding of Ambrose on Luke 6:20 and Jerome on Matt. 5:3.

Reply Obj. 1: Since a beatitude is an act of perfect virtue, all the
beatitudes belong to the perfection of spiritual life. And this
perfection seems to require that whoever would strive to obtain a
perfect share of spiritual goods, needs to begin by despising earthly
goods, wherefore fear holds the first place among the gifts.
Perfection, however, does not consist in the renunciation itself of
temporal goods; since this is the way to perfection: whereas filial
fear, to which the beatitude of poverty corresponds, is consistent
with the perfection of wisdom, as stated above (AA. 7, 10).

Reply Obj. 2: The undue exaltation of man either in himself or in
another is more directly opposed to that submission to God which is
the result of filial fear, than is external pleasure. Yet this is, in
consequence, opposed to fear, since whoever fears God and is subject
to Him, takes no delight in things other than God. Nevertheless,
pleasure is not concerned, as exaltation is, with the arduous
character of a thing which fear regards: and so the beatitude of
poverty corresponds to fear directly, and the beatitude of mourning,
consequently.

Reply Obj. 3: Hope denotes a movement by way of a relation of
tendency to a term, whereas fear implies movement by way of a relation
of withdrawal from a term: wherefore the last beatitude which is the
term of spiritual perfection, fittingly corresponds to hope, by way of
ultimate object; while the first beatitude, which implies withdrawal
from external things which hinder submission to God, fittingly
corresponds to fear.

Reply Obj. 4: As regards the fruits, it seems that those things
correspond to the gift of fear, which pertain to the moderate use of
temporal things or to abstinence therefrom; such are modesty,
continency and chastity.
_______________________

QUESTION 20

OF DESPAIR
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the contrary vices; (1) despair; (2) presumption.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether despair is a sin?

(2) Whether it can be without unbelief?

(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?

(4) Whether it arises from sloth?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 20, Art. 1]

Whether Despair Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that despair is not a sin. For every sin
includes conversion to a mutable good, together with aversion from
the immutable good, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). But
despair includes no conversion to a mutable good. Therefore it is not
a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, that which grows from a good root, seems to be no
sin, because "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (Matt.
7:18). Now despair seems to grow from a good root, viz. fear of God,
or from horror at the greatness of one's own sins. Therefore despair
is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, if despair were a sin, it would be a sin also for
the damned to despair. But this is not imputed to them as their fault
but as part of their damnation. Therefore neither is it imputed to
wayfarers as their fault, so that it is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ That which leads men to sin, seems not only to be
a sin itself, but a source of sins. Now such is despair, for the
Apostle says of certain men (Eph. 4:19): "Who, despairing, have given
themselves up to lasciviousness, unto the working of all uncleanness
and [Vulg.: 'unto'] covetousness." Therefore despair is not only a
sin but also the origin of other sins.

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2)
affirmation and negation in the intellect correspond to search and
avoidance in the appetite; while truth and falsehood in the intellect
correspond to good and evil in the appetite. Consequently every
appetitive movement which is conformed to a true intellect, is good
in itself, while every appetitive movement which is conformed to a
false intellect is evil in itself and sinful. Now the true opinion of
the intellect about God is that from Him comes salvation to mankind,
and pardon to sinners, according to Ezech. 18:23, "I desire not the
death of the sinner, but that he should be converted, and live"
[*Vulg.: 'Is it My will that a sinner should die . . . and not that
he should be converted and live?' Cf. Ezech. 33:11]: while it is a
false opinion that He refuses pardon to the repentant sinner, or that
He does not turn sinners to Himself by sanctifying grace. Therefore,
just as the movement of hope, which is in conformity with the true
opinion, is praiseworthy and virtuous, so the contrary movement of
despair, which is in conformity with the false opinion about God, is
vicious and sinful.

Reply Obj. 1: In every mortal sin there is, in some way, aversion
from the immutable good, and conversion to a mutable good, but not
always in the same way. Because, since the theological virtues have
God for their object, the sins which are contrary to them, such as
hatred of God, despair and unbelief, consist principally in aversion
from the immutable good; but, consequently, they imply conversion to
a mutable good, in so far as the soul that is a deserter from God,
must necessarily turn to other things. Other sins, however, consist
principally in conversion to a mutable good, and, consequently, in
aversion from the immutable good: because the fornicator intends, not
to depart from God, but to enjoy carnal pleasure, the result of which
is that he departs from God.

Reply Obj. 2: A thing may grow from a virtuous root in two ways:
first, directly and on the part of the virtue itself; even as an act
proceeds from a habit: and in this way no sin can grow from a
virtuous root, for in this sense Augustine declared (De Lib. Arb. ii,
18, 19) that "no man makes evil use of virtue." Secondly, a thing
proceeds from a virtue indirectly, or is occasioned by a virtue, and
in this way nothing hinders a sin proceeding from a virtue: thus
sometimes men pride themselves of their virtues, according to
Augustine (Ep. ccxi): "Pride lies in wait for good works that they
may die." In this way fear of God or horror of one's own sins may
lead to despair, in so far as man makes evil use of those good
things, by allowing them to be an occasion of despair.

Reply Obj. 3: The damned are outside the pale of hope on account of
the impossibility of returning to happiness: hence it is not imputed
to them that they hope not, but it is a part of their damnation. Even
so, it would be no sin for a wayfarer to despair of obtaining that
which he had no natural capacity for obtaining, or which was not due
to be obtained by him; for instance, if a physician were to despair
of healing some sick man, or if anyone were to despair of ever
becoming rich.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 20, Art. 2]

Whether There Can Be Despair Without Unbelief?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no despair without
unbelief. For the certainty of hope is derived from faith; and so
long as the cause remains the effect is not done away. Therefore a
man cannot lose the certainty of hope, by despairing, unless his
faith be removed.

Obj. 2: Further, to prefer one's own guilt to God's mercy and
goodness, is to deny the infinity of God's goodness and mercy, and so
savors of unbelief. But whoever despairs, prefers his own guilt to
the Divine mercy and goodness, according to Gen. 4:13: "My iniquity
is greater than that I may deserve pardon." Therefore whoever
despairs, is an unbeliever.

Obj. 3: Further, whoever falls into a condemned heresy, is an
unbeliever. But he that despairs seems to fall into a condemned
heresy, viz. that of the Novatians, who say that there is no pardon
for sins after Baptism. Therefore it seems that whoever despairs, is
an unbeliever.

_On the contrary,_ If we remove that which follows, that which
precedes remains. But hope follows faith, as stated above (Q. 17, A.
7). Therefore when hope is removed, faith can remain; so that, not
everyone who despairs, is an unbeliever.

_I answer that,_ Unbelief pertains to the intellect, but despair, to
the appetite: and the intellect is about universals, while the
appetite is moved in connection with particulars, since the
appetitive movement is from the soul towards things, which, in
themselves, are particular. Now it may happen that a man, while
having a right opinion in the universal, is not rightly disposed as
to his appetitive movement, his estimate being corrupted in a
particular matter, because, in order to pass from the universal
opinion to the appetite for a particular thing, it is necessary to
have a particular estimate (De Anima iii, 2), just as it is
impossible to infer a particular conclusion from an universal
proposition, except through the holding of a particular proposition.
Hence it is that a man, while having right faith, in the universal,
fails in an appetitive movement, in regard to some particular, his
particular estimate being corrupted by a habit or a passion, just as
the fornicator, by choosing fornication as a good for himself at this
particular moment, has a corrupt estimate in a particular matter,
although he retains the true universal estimate according to faith,
viz. that fornication is a mortal sin. In the same way, a man while
retaining in the universal, the true estimate of faith, viz. that
there is in the Church the power of forgiving sins, may suffer a
movement of despair, to wit, that for him, being in such a state,
there is no hope of pardon, his estimate being corrupted in a
particular matter. In this way there can be despair, just as there
can be other mortal sins, without belief.

Reply Obj. 1: The effect is done away, not only when the first cause
is removed, but also when the secondary cause is removed. Hence the
movement of hope can be done away, not only by the removal of the
universal estimate of faith, which is, so to say, the first cause of
the certainty of hope, but also by the removal of the particular
estimate, which is the secondary cause, as it were.

Reply Obj. 2: If anyone were to judge, in universal, that God's mercy
is not infinite, he would be an unbeliever. But he who despairs
judges not thus, but that, for him in that state, on account of some
particular disposition, there is no hope of the Divine mercy.

The same answer applies to the Third Objection, since the Novatians
denied, in universal, that there is remission of sins in the Church.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 20, Art. 3]

Whether Despair Is the Greatest of Sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that despair is not the greatest of sins.
For there can be despair without unbelief, as stated above (A. 2).
But unbelief is the greatest of sins because it overthrows the
foundation of the spiritual edifice. Therefore despair is not the
greatest of sins.

Obj. 2: Further, a greater evil is opposed to a greater good, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 10). But charity is greater than
hope, according to 1 Cor. 13:13. Therefore hatred of God is a greater
sin than despair.

Obj. 3: Further, in the sin of despair there is nothing but
inordinate aversion from God: whereas in other sins there is not only
inordinate aversion from God, but also an inordinate conversion.
Therefore the sin of despair is not more but less grave than other
sins.

_On the contrary,_ An incurable sin seems to be most grievous,
according to Jer. 30:12: "Thy bruise is incurable, thy wound is very
grievous." Now the sin of despair is incurable, according to Jer.
15:18: "My wound is desperate so as to refuse to be healed." [*Vulg.:
"Why is my wound," etc.] Therefore despair is a most grievous sin.

_I answer that,_ Those sins which are contrary to the theological
virtues are in themselves more grievous than others: because, since
the theological virtues have God for their object, the sins which are
opposed to them imply aversion from God directly and principally. Now
every mortal sin takes its principal malice and gravity from the fact
of its turning away from God, for if it were possible to turn to a
mutable good, even inordinately, without turning away from God, it
would not be a mortal sin. Consequently a sin which, first and of its
very nature, includes aversion from God, is most grievous among
mortal sins.

Now unbelief, despair and hatred of God are opposed to the
theological virtues: and among them, if we compare hatred of God and
unbelief to despair, we shall find that, in themselves, that is, in
respect of their proper species, they are more grievous. For unbelief
is due to a man not believing God's own truth; while the hatred of
God arises from man's will being opposed to God's goodness itself;
whereas despair consists in a man ceasing to hope for a share of
God's goodness. Hence it is clear that unbelief and hatred of God are
against God as He is in Himself, while despair is against Him,
according as His good is partaken of by us. Wherefore strictly
speaking it is a more grievous sin to disbelieve God's truth, or to
hate God, than not to hope to receive glory from Him.

If, however, despair be compared to the other two sins from our point
of view, then despair is more dangerous, since hope withdraws us from
evils and induces us to seek for good things, so that when hope is
given up, men rush headlong into sin, and are drawn away from good
works. Wherefore a gloss on Prov. 24:10, "If thou lose hope being
weary in the day of distress, thy strength shall be diminished,"
says: "Nothing is more hateful than despair, for the man that has it
loses his constancy both in the every day toils of this life, and,
what is worse, in the battle of faith." And Isidore says (De Sum.
Bono ii, 14): "To commit a crime is to kill the soul, but to despair
is to fall into hell."

[And from this the response to the objections is evident.]
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 20, Art. 4]

Whether Despair Arises from Sloth?

Objection 1: It would seem that despair does not arise from sloth.
Because different causes do not give rise to one same effect. Now
despair of the future life arises from lust, according to Gregory
(Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore it does not arise from sloth.

Obj. 2: Further, just as despair is contrary to hope, so is sloth
contrary to spiritual joy. But spiritual joy arises from hope,
according to Rom. 12:12, "rejoicing in hope." Therefore sloth arises
from despair, and not vice versa.

Obj. 3: Further, contrary effects have contrary causes. Now hope, the
contrary of which is despair, seems to proceed from the consideration
of Divine favors, especially the Incarnation, for Augustine says (De
Trin. xiii, 10): "Nothing was so necessary to raise our hope, than
that we should be shown how much God loves us. Now what greater proof
could we have of this than that God's Son should deign to unite
Himself to our nature?" Therefore despair arises rather from the
neglect of the above consideration than from sloth.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons despair among
the effects of sloth.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 17, A. 1; I-II, Q. 40, A. 1),
the object of hope is a good, difficult but possible to obtain by
oneself or by another. Consequently the hope of obtaining happiness
may be lacking in a person in two ways: first, through his not
deeming it an arduous good; secondly, through his deeming it
impossible to obtain either by himself, or by another. Now, the fact
that spiritual goods taste good to us no more, or seem to be goods of
no great account, is chiefly due to our affections being infected
with the love of bodily pleasures, among which, sexual pleasures hold
the first place: for the love of those pleasures leads man to have a
distaste for spiritual things, and not to hope for them as arduous
goods. In this way despair is caused by lust.

On the other hand, the fact that a man deems an arduous good
impossible to obtain, either by himself or by another, is due to his
being over downcast, because when this state of mind dominates his
affections, it seems to him that he will never be able to rise to any
good. And since sloth is a sadness that casts down the spirit, in
this way despair is born of sloth.

Now this is the proper object of hope--that the thing is possible,
because the good and the arduous regard other passions also. Hence
despair is born of sloth in a more special way: though it may arise
from lust, for the reason given above.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11), just as
hope gives rise to joy, so, when a man is joyful he has greater hope:
and, accordingly, those who are sorrowful fall the more easily into
despair, according to 2 Cor. 2:7: "Lest . . . such an one be
swallowed up by overmuch sorrow." Yet, since the object of hope is
good, to which the appetite tends naturally, and which it shuns, not
naturally but only on account of some supervening obstacle, it
follows that, more directly, hope gives birth to joy, while on the
contrary despair is born of sorrow.

Reply Obj. 3: This very neglect to consider the Divine favors arises
from sloth. For when a man is influenced by a certain passion he
considers chiefly the things which pertain to that passion: so that a
man who is full of sorrow does not easily think of great and joyful
things, but only of sad things, unless by a great effort he turn his
thoughts away from sadness.
_______________________

QUESTION 21

OF PRESUMPTION
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider presumption, under which head there are four
points of inquiry:

(1) What is the object in which presumption trusts?

(2) Whether presumption is a sin?

(3) To what is it opposed?

(4) From what vice does it arise?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 21, Art. 1]

Whether Presumption Trusts in God or in Our Own Power?

Objection 1: It would seem that presumption, which is a sin against
the Holy Ghost, trusts, not in God, but in our own power. For the
lesser the power, the more grievously does he sin who trusts in it
too much. But man's power is less than God's. Therefore it is a more
grievous sin to presume on human power than to presume on the power
of God. Now the sin against the Holy Ghost is most grievous.
Therefore presumption, which is reckoned a species of sin against the
Holy Ghost, trusts to human rather than to Divine power.

Obj. 2: Further, other sins arise from the sin against the Holy
Ghost, for this sin is called malice which is a source from which
sins arise. Now other sins seem to arise from the presumption whereby
man presumes on himself rather than from the presumption whereby he
presumes on God, since self-love is the origin of sin, according to
Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore it seems that presumption
which is a sin against the Holy Ghost, relies chiefly on human power.

Obj. 3: Further, sin arises from the inordinate conversion to a
mutable good. Now presumption is a sin. Therefore it arises from
turning to human power, which is a mutable good, rather than from
turning to the power of God, which is an immutable good.

_On the contrary,_ Just as, through despair, a man despises the
Divine mercy, on which hope relies, so, through presumption, he
despises the Divine justice, which punishes the sinner. Now justice
is in God even as mercy is. Therefore, just as despair consists in
aversion from God, so presumption consists in inordinate conversion
to Him.

_I answer that,_ Presumption seems to imply immoderate hope. Now the
object of hope is an arduous possible good: and a thing is possible
to a man in two ways: first by his own power; secondly, by the power
of God alone. With regard to either hope there may be presumption
owing to lack of moderation. As to the hope whereby a man relies on
his own power, there is presumption if he tends to a good as though
it were possible to him, whereas it surpasses his powers, according
to Judith 6:15: "Thou humblest them that presume of themselves." This
presumption is contrary to the virtue of magnanimity which holds to
the mean in this kind of hope.

But as to the hope whereby a man relies on the power of God, there
may be presumption through immoderation, in the fact that a man tends
to some good as though it were possible by the power and mercy of
God, whereas it is not possible, for instance, if a man hope to
obtain pardon without repenting, or glory without merits. This
presumption is, properly, the sin against the Holy Ghost, because, to
wit, by presuming thus a man removes or despises the assistance of
the Holy Spirit, whereby he is withdrawn from sin.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 20, A. 3; I-II, Q. 73, A. 3) a sin
which is against God is, in its genus, graver than other sins. Hence
presumption whereby a man relies on God inordinately, is a more
grievous sin than the presumption of trusting in one's own power,
since to rely on the Divine power for obtaining what is unbecoming to
God, is to depreciate the Divine power, and it is evident that it is
a graver sin to detract from the Divine power than to exaggerate
one's own.

Reply Obj. 2: The presumption whereby a man presumes inordinately on
God, includes self-love, whereby he loves his own good inordinately.
For when we desire a thing very much, we think we can easily procure
it through others, even though we cannot.

Reply Obj. 3: Presumption on God's mercy implies both
conversion to a mutable good, in so far as it arises from an
inordinate desire of one's own good, and aversion from the immutable
good, in as much as it ascribes to the Divine power that which is
unbecoming to it, for thus man turns away from God's power.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 21, Art. 2]

Whether Presumption Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that presumption is not a sin. For no sin
is a reason why man should be heard by God. Yet, through presumption
some are heard by God, for it is written (Judith 9:17): "Hear me a
poor wretch making supplication to Thee, and presuming of Thy mercy."
Therefore presumption on God's mercy is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, presumption denotes excessive hope. But there cannot
be excess of that hope which is in God, since His power and mercy are
infinite. Therefore it seems that presumption is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, that which is a sin does not excuse from sin: for
the Master says (Sent. ii, D, 22) that "Adam sinned less, because he
sinned in the hope of pardon," which seems to indicate presumption.
Therefore presumption is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned a species of sin against the Holy
Ghost.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 20, A. 1) with regard to
despair, every appetitive movement that is conformed to a false
intellect, is evil in itself and sinful. Now presumption is an
appetitive movement, since it denotes an inordinate hope. Moreover it
is conformed to a false intellect, just as despair is: for just as it
is false that God does not pardon the repentant, or that He does not
turn sinners to repentance, so is it false that He grants forgiveness
to those who persevere in their sins, and that He gives glory to
those who cease from good works: and it is to this estimate that the
movement of presumption is conformed.

Consequently presumption is a sin, but less grave than despair,
since, on account of His infinite goodness, it is more proper to God
to have mercy and to spare, than to punish: for the former becomes
God in Himself, the latter becomes Him by reason of our sins.

Reply Obj. 1: Presumption sometimes stands for hope, because even the
right hope which we have in God seems to be presumption, if it be
measured according to man's estate: yet it is not, if we look at the
immensity of the goodness of God.

Reply Obj. 2: Presumption does not denote excessive hope, as though
man hoped too much in God; but through man hoping to obtain from God
something unbecoming to Him; which is the same as to hope too little
in Him, since it implies a depreciation of His power; as stated above
(A. 1, ad 1).

Reply Obj. 3: To sin with the intention of persevering in sin and
through the hope of being pardoned, is presumptuous, and this does
not diminish, but increases sin. To sin, however, with the hope of
obtaining pardon some time, and with the intention of refraining from
sin and of repenting of it, is not presumptuous, but diminishes sin,
because this seems to indicate a will less hardened in sin.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 21, Art. 3]

Whether Presumption Is More Opposed to Fear Than to Hope?

Objection 1: It would seem that presumption is more opposed to fear
than to hope. Because inordinate fear is opposed to right fear. Now
presumption seems to pertain to inordinate fear, for it is written
(Wis. 17:10): "A troubled conscience always presumes [Douay:
'forecasteth'] grievous things," and (Wis. 17:11) that "fear is a
help to presumption [*Vulg.: 'Fear is nothing else but a yielding up
of the succours from thought.']." Therefore presumption is opposed to
fear rather than to hope.

Obj. 2: Further, contraries are most distant from one another. Now
presumption is more distant from fear than from hope, because
presumption implies movement to something, just as hope does, whereas
fear denotes movement from a thing. Therefore presumption is contrary
to fear rather than to hope.

Obj. 3: Further, presumption excludes fear altogether, whereas it
does not exclude hope altogether, but only the rectitude of hope.
Since therefore contraries destroy one another, it seems that
presumption is contrary to fear rather than to hope.

_On the contrary,_ When two vices are opposed to one another they are
contrary to the same virtue, as timidity and audacity are opposed to
fortitude. Now the sin of presumption is contrary to the sin of
despair, which is directly opposed to hope. Therefore it seems that
presumption also is more directly opposed to hope.

_I answer that,_ As Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "every
virtue not only has a contrary vice manifestly distinct from it, as
temerity is opposed to prudence, but also a sort of kindred vice,
alike, not in truth but only in its deceitful appearance, as cunning
is opposed to prudence." This agrees with the Philosopher who says
(Ethic. ii, 8) that a virtue seems to have more in common with one of
the contrary vices than with the other, as temperance with
insensibility, and fortitude with audacity.

Accordingly presumption appears to be manifestly opposed to fear,
especially servile fear, which looks at the punishment arising from
God's justice, the remission of which presumption hopes for; yet by a
kind of false likeness it is more opposed to hope, since it denotes
an inordinate hope in God. And since things are more directly opposed
when they belong to the same genus, than when they belong to
different genera, it follows that presumption is more directly
opposed to hope than to fear. For they both regard and rely on the
same object, hope inordinately, presumption inordinately.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as hope is misused in speaking of evils, and
properly applied in speaking of good, so is presumption: it is in
this way that inordinate fear is called presumption.

Reply Obj. 2: Contraries are things that are most distant from one
another within the same genus. Now presumption and hope denote a
movement of the same genus, which can be either ordinate or
inordinate. Hence presumption is more directly opposed to hope than
to fear, since it is opposed to hope in respect of its specific
difference, as an inordinate thing to an ordinate one, whereas it is
opposed to fear, in respect of its generic difference, which is the
movement of hope.

Reply Obj. 3: Presumption is opposed to fear by a generic
contrariety, and to the virtue of hope by a specific contrariety.
Hence presumption excludes fear altogether even generically, whereas
it does not exclude hope except by reason of its difference, by
excluding its ordinateness.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 21, Art. 4]

Whether Presumption Arises from Vainglory?

Objection 1: It would seem that presumption does not arise from
vainglory. For presumption seems to rely most of all on the Divine
mercy. Now mercy (_misericordia_) regards unhappiness (_miseriam_)
which is contrary to glory. Therefore presumption does not arise from
vainglory.

Obj. 2: Further, presumption is opposed to despair. Now despair
arises from sorrow, as stated above (Q. 20, A. 4, ad 2). Since
therefore opposites have opposite causes, presumption would seem to
arise from pleasure, and consequently from sins of the flesh, which
give the most absorbing pleasure.

Obj. 3: Further, the vice of presumption consists in tending to some
impossible good, as though it were possible. Now it is owing to
ignorance that one deems an impossible thing to be possible.
Therefore presumption arises from ignorance rather than from
vainglory.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "presumption
of novelties is a daughter of vainglory."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), presumption is twofold; one
whereby a man relies on his own power, when he attempts something
beyond his power, as though it were possible to him. Such like
presumption clearly arises from vainglory; for it is owing to a great
desire for glory, that a man attempts things beyond his power, and
especially novelties which call for greater admiration. Hence Gregory
states explicitly that presumption of novelties is a daughter of
vainglory.

The other presumption is an inordinate trust in the Divine mercy or
power, consisting in the hope of obtaining glory without merits, or
pardon without repentance. Such like presumption seems to arise
directly from pride, as though man thought so much of himself as to
esteem that God would not punish him or exclude him from glory,
however much he might be a sinner.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

QUESTION 22

OF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO HOPE AND FEAR
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider the precepts relating to hope and fear: under
which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) The precepts relating to hope;

(2) The precepts relating to fear.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 22, Art. 1]

Whether There Should Be a Precept of Hope?

Objection 1: It would seem that no precept should be given relating
to the virtue of hope. For when an effect is sufficiently procured by
one cause, there is no need to induce it by another. Now man is
sufficiently induced by his natural inclination to hope for good.
Therefore there is no need of a precept of the Law to induce him to
do this.

Obj. 2: Further, since precepts are given about acts of virtue, the
chief precepts are about the acts of the chief virtues. Now the chief
of all the virtues are the three theological virtues, viz. hope,
faith and charity. Consequently, as the chief precepts of the Law are
those of the decalogue, to which all others may be reduced, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 100, A. 3), it seems that if any precept of hope were
given, it should be found among the precepts of the decalogue. But it
is not to be found there. Therefore it seems that the Law should
contain no precept of hope.

Obj. 3: Further, to prescribe an act of virtue is equivalent to a
prohibition of the act of the opposite vice. Now no precept is to be
found forbidding despair which is contrary to hope. Therefore it
seems that the Law should contain no precept of hope.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says on John 15:12, "This is My
commandment, that you love one another" (Tract. lxxxiii in Joan.):
"How many things are commanded us about faith! How many relating to
hope!" Therefore it is fitting that some precepts should be given
about hope.

_I answer that,_ Among the precepts contained in Holy Writ, some
belong to the substance of the Law, others are preambles to the Law.
The preambles to the Law are those without which no law is possible:
such are the precepts relating to the act of faith and the act of
hope, because the act of faith inclines man's mind so that he
believes the Author of the Law to be One to Whom he owes submission,
while, by the hope of a reward, he is induced to observe the
precepts. The precepts that belong to the substance of the Law are
those which relate to right conduct and are imposed on man already
subject and ready to obey: wherefore when the Law was given these
precepts were set forth from the very outset under the form of a
command.

Yet the precepts of hope and faith were not to be given under the
form of a command, since, unless man already believed and hoped, it
would be useless to give him the Law: but, just as the precept of
faith had to be given under the form of an announcement or reminder,
as stated above (Q. 16, A. 1), so too, the precept of hope, in the
first promulgation of the Law, had to be given under the form of a
promise. For he who promises rewards to them that obey him, by that
very fact, urges them to hope: hence all the promises contained in
the Law are incitements to hope.

Since, however, when once the Law has been given, it is for a wise
man to induce men not only to observe the precepts, but also, and
much more, to safeguard the foundation of the Law, therefore, after
the first promulgation of the Law, Holy Writ holds out to man many
inducements to hope, even by way of warning or command, and not
merely by way of promise, as in the Law; for instance, in the Ps.
61:9: "Hope [Douay: 'Trust'] in Him all ye congregation of the
people," and in many other passages of the Scriptures.

Reply Obj. 1: Nature inclines us to hope for the good which is
proportionate to human nature; but for man to hope for a supernatural
good he had to be induced by the authority of the Divine law, partly
by promises, partly by admonitions and commands. Nevertheless there
was need for precepts of the Divine law to be given even for those
things to which natural reason inclines us, such as the acts of the
moral virtues, for sake of insuring a greater stability, especially
since the natural reason of man was clouded by the lusts of sin.

Reply Obj. 2: The precepts of the law of the decalogue belong to the
first promulgation of the Law: hence there was no need for a precept
of hope among the precepts of the decalogue, and it was enough to
induce men to hope by the inclusion of certain promises, as in the
case of the first and fourth commandments.

Reply Obj. 3: In those observances to which man is bound as under a
duty, it is enough that he receive an affirmative precept as to what
he has to do, wherein is implied the prohibition of what he must
avoid doing: thus he is given a precept concerning the honor due to
parents, but not a prohibition against dishonoring them, except by
the law inflicting punishment on those who dishonor their parents.
And since in order to be saved it is man's duty to hope in God, he
had to be induced to do so by one of the above ways, affirmatively,
so to speak, wherein is implied the prohibition of the opposite.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 22, Art. 2]

Whether There Should Have Been Given a Precept of Fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that, in the Law, there should not have
been given a precept of fear. For the fear of God is about things
which are a preamble to the Law, since it is the "beginning of
wisdom." Now things which are a preamble to the Law do not come under
a precept of the Law. Therefore no precept of fear should be given in
the Law.

Obj. 2: Further, given the cause, the effect is also given. Now love
is the cause of fear, since "every fear proceeds from some kind of
love," as Augustine states (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33). Therefore given the
precept of love, it would have been superfluous to command fear.

Obj. 3: Further, presumption, in a way, is opposed to fear. But the
Law contains no prohibition against presumption. Therefore it seems
that neither should any precept of fear have been given.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 10:12): "And now, Israel,
what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the
Lord thy God?" But He requires of us that which He commands us to do.
Therefore it is a matter of precept that man should fear God.

_I answer that,_ Fear is twofold, servile and filial. Now just as man
is induced, by the hope of rewards, to observe precepts of law, so
too is he induced thereto by the fear of punishment, which fear is
servile.

And just as according to what has been said (A. 1), in the
promulgation of the Law there was no need for a precept of the act of
hope, and men were to be induced thereto by promises, so neither was
there need for a precept, under form of command, of fear which
regards punishment, and men were to be induced thereto by the threat
of punishment: and this was realized both in the precepts of the
decalogue, and afterwards, in due sequence, in the secondary precepts
of the Law.

Yet, just as wise men and the prophets who, consequently, strove to
strengthen man in the observance of the Law, delivered their teaching
about hope under the form of admonition or command, so too did they
in the matter of fear.

On the other hand filial fear which shows reverence to God, is a sort
of genus in respect of the love of God, and a kind of principle of
all observances connected with reverence for God. Hence precepts of
filial fear are given in the Law, even as precepts of love, because
each is a preamble to the external acts prescribed by the Law and to
which the precepts of the decalogue refer. Hence in the passage
quoted in the argument _On the contrary,_ man is required "to have
fear, to walk in God's ways," by worshipping Him, and "to love Him."

Reply Obj. 1: Filial fear is a preamble to the Law, not as though it
were extrinsic thereto, but as being the beginning of the Law, just
as love is. Hence precepts are given of both, since they are like
general principles of the whole Law.

Reply Obj. 2: From love proceeds filial fear as also other good works
that are done from charity. Hence, just as after the precept of
charity, precepts are given of the other acts of virtue, so at the
same time precepts are given of fear and of the love of charity, just
as, in demonstrative sciences, it is not enough to lay down the first
principles, unless the conclusions also are given which follow from
them proximately or remotely.

Reply Obj. 3: Inducement to fear suffices to exclude presumption,
even as inducement to hope suffices to exclude despair, as stated
above (A. 1, ad 3).
_______________________

QUESTION 23

OF CHARITY, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF
(In Eight Articles)

In proper sequence, we must consider charity; and (1) charity itself;
(2) the corresponding gift of wisdom. The first consideration will be
fivefold: (1) Charity itself; (2) The object of charity; (3) Its
acts; (4) The opposite vices; (5) The precepts relating thereto.

The first of these considerations will be twofold: (1) Charity,
considered as regards itself; (2) Charity, considered in its relation
to its subject. Under the first head there are eight points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether charity is friendship?

(2) Whether it is something created in the soul?

(3) Whether it is a virtue?

(4) Whether it is a special virtue?

(5) Whether it is one virtue?

(6) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues?

(7) Whether any true virtue is possible without it?

(8) Whether it is the form of the virtues?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 1]

Whether Charity Is Friendship?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not friendship. For
nothing is so appropriate to friendship as to dwell with one's
friend, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). Now charity is
of man towards God and the angels, "whose dwelling [Douay:
'conversation'] is not with men" (Dan. 2:11). Therefore charity is
not friendship.

Obj. 2: Further, there is no friendship without return of love
(Ethic. viii, 2). But charity extends even to one's enemies,
according to Matt. 5:44: "Love your enemies." Therefore charity is
not friendship.

Obj. 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) there
are three kinds of friendship, directed respectively towards the
delightful, the useful, or the virtuous. Now charity is not the
friendship for the useful or delightful; for Jerome says in his
letter to Paulinus which is to be found at the beginning of the
Bible: "True friendship cemented by Christ, is where men are drawn
together, not by household interests, not by mere bodily presence,
not by crafty and cajoling flattery, but by the fear of God, and the
study of the Divine Scriptures." No more is it friendship for the
virtuous, since by charity we love even sinners, whereas friendship
based on the virtuous is only for virtuous men (Ethic. viii).
Therefore charity is not friendship.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 15:15): "I will not now call
you servants . . . but My friends." Now this was said to them by
reason of nothing else than charity. Therefore charity is friendship.

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 2, 3) not
every love has the character of friendship, but that love which is
together with benevolence, when, to wit, we love someone so as to
wish good to him. If, however, we do not wish good to what we love,
but wish its good for ourselves, (thus we are said to love wine, or a
horse, or the like), it is love not of friendship, but of a kind of
concupiscence. For it would be absurd to speak of having friendship
for wine or for a horse.

Yet neither does well-wishing suffice for friendship, for a certain
mutual love is requisite, since friendship is between friend and
friend: and this well-wishing is founded on some kind of
communication.

Accordingly, since there is a communication between man and God,
inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to us, some kind of
friendship must needs be based on this same communication, of which
it is written (1 Cor. 1:9): "God is faithful: by Whom you are called
unto the fellowship of His Son." The love which is based on this
communication, is charity: wherefore it is evident that charity is
the friendship of man for God.

Reply Obj. 1: Man's life is twofold. There is his outward life in
respect of his sensitive and corporeal nature: and with regard to
this life there is no communication or fellowship between us and God
or the angels. The other is man's spiritual life in respect of his
mind, and with regard to this life there is fellowship between us and
both God and the angels, imperfectly indeed in this present state of
life, wherefore it is written (Phil. 3:20): "Our conversation is in
heaven." But this "conversation" will be perfected in heaven, when
"His servants shall serve Him, and they shall see His face" (Apoc.
22:3, 4). Therefore charity is imperfect here, but will be perfected
in heaven.

Reply Obj. 2: Friendship extends to a person in two ways: first in
respect of himself, and in this way friendship never extends but to
one's friends: secondly, it extends to someone in respect of another,
as, when a man has friendship for a certain person, for his sake he
loves all belonging to him, be they children, servants, or connected
with him in any way. Indeed so much do we love our friends, that for
their sake we love all who belong to them, even if they hurt or hate
us; so that, in this way, the friendship of charity extends even to
our enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation to God, to Whom
the friendship of charity is chiefly directed.

Reply Obj. 3: The friendship that is based on the virtuous is
directed to none but a virtuous man as the principal person, but for
his sake we love those who belong to him, even though they be not
virtuous: in this way charity, which above all is friendship based on
the virtuous, extends to sinners, whom, out of charity, we love for
God's sake.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 2]

Whether Charity Is Something Created in the Soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not something created in
the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7): "He that loveth his
neighbor, consequently, loveth love itself." Now God is love.
Therefore it follows that he loves God in the first place. Again he
says (De Trin. xv, 17): "It was said: God is Charity, even as it was
said: God is a Spirit." Therefore charity is not something created in
the soul, but is God Himself.

Obj. 2: Further, God is the life of the soul spiritually just as the
soul is the life of the body, according to Deut. 30:20: "He is thy
life." Now the soul by itself quickens the body. Therefore God
quickens the soul by Himself. But He quickens it by charity,
according to 1 John 3:14: "We know that we have passed from death to
life, because we love the brethren." Therefore God is charity itself.

Obj. 3: Further, no created thing is of infinite power; on the
contrary every creature is vanity. But charity is not vanity, indeed
it is opposed to vanity; and it is of infinite power, since it brings
the human soul to the infinite good. Therefore charity is not
something created in the soul.

On the charity, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): "By
charity I mean the movement of the soul towards the enjoyment of God
for His own sake." But a movement of the soul is something created in
the soul. Therefore charity is something created in the soul.

_I answer that,_ The Master looks thoroughly into this question in Q.
17 of the First Book, and concludes that charity is not something
created in the soul, but is the Holy Ghost Himself dwelling in the
mind. Nor does he mean to say that this movement of love whereby we
love God is the Holy Ghost Himself, but that this movement is from
the Holy Ghost without any intermediary habit, whereas other virtuous
acts are from the Holy Ghost by means of the habits of other virtues,
for instance the habit of faith or hope or of some other virtue: and
this he said on account of the excellence of charity.

But if we consider the matter aright, this would be, on the contrary,
detrimental to charity. For when the Holy Ghost moves the human mind
the movement of charity does not proceed from this motion in such a
way that the human mind be merely moved, without being the principle
of this movement, as when a body is moved by some extrinsic motive
power. For this is contrary to the nature of a voluntary act, whose
principle needs to be in itself, as stated above (I-II, Q. 6, A. 1):
so that it would follow that to love is not a voluntary act, which
involves a contradiction, since love, of its very nature, implies an
act of the will.

Likewise, neither can it be said that the Holy Ghost moves the will
in such a way to the act of loving, as though the will were an
instrument, for an instrument, though it be a principle of action,
nevertheless has not the power to act or not to act, for then again
the act would cease to be voluntary and meritorious, whereas it has
been stated above (I-II, Q. 114, A. 4) that the love of charity is
the root of merit: and, given that the will is moved by the Holy
Ghost to the act of love, it is necessary that the will also should
be the efficient cause of that act.

Now no act is perfectly produced by an active power, unless it be
connatural to that power by reason of some form which is the
principle of that action. Wherefore God, Who moves all things to
their due ends, bestowed on each thing the form whereby it is
inclined to the end appointed to it by Him; and in this way He
"ordereth all things sweetly" (Wis. 8:1). But it is evident that the
act of charity surpasses the nature of the power of the will, so
that, therefore, unless some form be superadded to the natural power,
inclining it to the act of love, this same act would be less perfect
than the natural acts and the acts of the other powers; nor would it
be easy and pleasurable to perform. And this is evidently untrue,
since no virtue has such a strong inclination to its act as charity
has, nor does any virtue perform its act with so great pleasure.
Therefore it is most necessary that, for us to perform the act of
charity, there should be in us some habitual form superadded to the
natural power, inclining that power to the act of charity, and
causing it to act with ease and pleasure.

Reply Obj. 1: The Divine Essence Itself is charity, even as It is
wisdom and goodness. Wherefore just as we are said to be good with
the goodness which is God, and wise with the wisdom which is God
(since the goodness whereby we are formally good is a participation
of Divine goodness, and the wisdom whereby we are formally wise, is a
share of Divine wisdom), so too, the charity whereby formally we love
our neighbor is a participation of Divine charity. For this manner of
speaking is common among the Platonists, with whose doctrines
Augustine was imbued; and the lack of adverting to this has been to
some an occasion of error.

Reply Obj. 2: God is effectively the life both of the soul by
charity, and of the body by the soul: but formally charity is the
life of the soul, even as the soul is the life of the body.
Consequently we may conclude from this that just as the soul is
immediately united to the body, so is charity to the soul.

Reply Obj. 3: Charity works formally. Now the efficacy of a form
depends on the power of the agent, who instills the form, wherefore
it is evident that charity is not vanity. But because it produces an
infinite effect, since, by justifying the soul, it unites it to God,
this proves the infinity of the Divine power, which is the author of
charity.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 3]

Whether Charity Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not a virtue. For charity
is a kind of friendship. Now philosophers do not reckon friendship a
virtue, as may be gathered from _Ethic._ viii, 1; nor is it numbered
among the virtues whether moral or intellectual. Neither, therefore,
is charity a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, "virtue is the ultimate limit of power" (De Coelo et
Mundo i, 11). But charity is not something ultimate, this applies
rather to joy and peace. Therefore it seems that charity is not a
virtue, and that this should be said rather of joy and peace.

Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is an accidental habit. But charity is
not an accidental habit, since it is a more excellent thing than the
soul itself: whereas no accident is more excellent than its subject.
Therefore charity is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi): "Charity is
a virtue which, when our affections are perfectly ordered, unites us
to God, for by it we love Him."

_I answer that,_ Human acts are good according as they are regulated
by their due rule and measure. Wherefore human virtue which is the
principle of all man's good acts consists in following the rule of
human acts, which is twofold, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 1), viz.
human reason and God.

Consequently just as moral virtue is defined as being "in accord with
right reason," as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6, so too, the nature of
virtue consists in attaining God, as also stated above with regard to
faith, (Q. 4, A. 5) and hope (Q. 17, A. 1). Wherefore, it follows
that charity is a virtue, for, since charity attains God, it unites
us to God, as evidenced by the authority of Augustine quoted above.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher (Ethic. viii) does not deny that
friendship is a virtue, but affirms that it is "either a virtue or
with a virtue." For we might say that it is a moral virtue about
works done in respect of another person, but under a different aspect
from justice. For justice is about works done in respect of another
person, under the aspect of the legal due, whereas friendship
considers the aspect of a friendly and moral duty, or rather that of
a gratuitous favor, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 13).
Nevertheless it may be admitted that it is not a virtue distinct of
itself from the other virtues. For its praiseworthiness and
virtuousness are derived merely from its object, in so far, to wit,
as it is based on the moral goodness of the virtues. This is evident
from the fact that not every friendship is praiseworthy and virtuous,
as in the case of friendship based on pleasure or utility. Wherefore
friendship for the virtuous is something consequent to virtue rather
than a virtue. Moreover there is no comparison with charity since it
is not founded principally on the virtue of a man, but on the
goodness of God.

Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to the same virtue to love a man and to
rejoice about him, since joy results from love, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 25, A. 2) in the treatise on the passions: wherefore love
is reckoned a virtue, rather than joy, which is an effect of love.
And when virtue is described as being something ultimate, we mean
that it is last, not in the order of effect, but in the order of
excess, just as one hundred pounds exceed sixty.

Reply Obj. 3: Every accident is inferior to substance if we consider
its being, since substance has being in itself, while an accident has
its being in another: but considered as to its species, an accident
which results from the principles of its subject is inferior to its
subject, even as an effect is inferior to its cause; whereas an
accident that results from a participation of some higher nature is
superior to its subject, in so far as it is a likeness of that higher
nature, even as light is superior to the diaphanous body. In this way
charity is superior to the soul, in as much as it is a participation
of the Holy Ghost.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 4]

Whether Charity Is a Special Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not a special virtue. For
Jerome says: "Let me briefly define all virtue as the charity whereby
we love God" [*The reference should be to Augustine, Ep. clxvii]: and
Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) [*De Civ. Dei xv, 22] that
"virtue is the order of love." Now no special virtue is included in
the definition of virtue in general. Therefore charity is not a
special virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, that which extends to all works of virtue, cannot be
a special virtue. But charity extends to all works of virtue,
according to 1 Cor. 13:4: "Charity is patient, is kind," etc.; indeed
it extends to all human actions, according to 1 Cor. 16:14: "Let all
your things be done in charity." Therefore charity is not a special
virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, the precepts of the Law refer to acts of virtue. Now
Augustine says (De Perfect. Human. Justit. v) that, "Thou shalt love"
is "a general commandment," and "Thou shalt not covet," "a general
prohibition." Therefore charity is a general virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Nothing general is enumerated together with what
is special. But charity is enumerated together with special virtues,
viz. hope and faith, according to 1 Cor. 13:13: "And now there remain
faith, hope, charity, these three." Therefore charity is a special
virtue.

_I answer that,_ Acts and habits are specified by their objects, as
shown above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 2; I-II, Q. 54, A. 2). Now the proper
object of love is the good, as stated above (I-II, Q. 27, A. 1), so
that wherever there is a special aspect of good, there is a special
kind of love. But the Divine good, inasmuch as it is the object of
happiness, has a special aspect of good, wherefore the love of
charity, which is the love of that good, is a special kind of love.
Therefore charity is a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: Charity is included in the definition of every virtue,
not as being essentially every virtue, but because every virtue
depends on it in a way, as we shall state further on (AA. 7, 8). In
this way prudence is included in the definition of the moral virtues,
as explained in _Ethic._ ii, vi, from the fact that they depend on
prudence.

Reply Obj. 2: The virtue or art which is concerned about the last
end, commands the virtues or arts which are concerned about other
ends which are secondary, thus the military art commands the art of
horse-riding (Ethic. i). Accordingly since charity has for its object
the last end of human life, viz. everlasting happiness, it follows
that it extends to the acts of a man's whole life, by commanding
them, not by eliciting immediately all acts of virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: The precept of love is said to be a general command,
because all other precepts are reduced thereto as to their end,
according to 1 Tim. 1:5: "The end of the commandment is charity."
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 5]

Whether Charity Is One Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not one virtue. For habits
are distinct according to their objects. Now there are two objects of
charity--God and our neighbor--which are infinitely distant from one
another. Therefore charity is not one virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, different aspects of the object diversify a habit,
even though that object be one in reality, as shown above (Q. 17, A.
6; I-II, Q. 54, A. 2, ad 1). Now there are many aspects under which
God is an object of love, because we are debtors to His love by
reason of each one of His favors. Therefore charity is not one virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, charity comprises friendship for our neighbor. But
the Philosopher reckons several species of friendship (Ethic. viii,
3, 11, 12). Therefore charity is not one virtue, but is divided into
a number of various species.

_On the contrary,_ Just as God is the object of faith, so is He the
object of charity. Now faith is one virtue by reason of the unity of
the Divine truth, according to Eph. 4:5: "One faith." Therefore
charity also is one virtue by reason of the unity of the Divine
goodness.

_I answer that,_ Charity, as stated above (A. 1) is a kind of
friendship of man for God. Now the different species of friendship
are differentiated, first of all, in respect of a diversity of end,
and in this way there are three species of friendship, namely
friendship for the useful, for the delightful, and for the virtuous;
secondly, in respect of the different kinds of communion on which
friendships are based; thus there is one species of friendship
between kinsmen, and another between fellow citizens or fellow
travellers, the former being based on natural communion, the latter
on civil communion or on the comradeship of the road, as the
Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 12).

Now charity cannot be differentiated in either of these ways: for its
end is one, namely, the goodness of God; and the fellowship of
everlasting happiness, on which this friendship is based, is also
one. Hence it follows that charity is simply one virtue, and not
divided into several species.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument would hold, if God and our neighbor were
equally objects of charity. But this is not true: for God is the
principal object of charity, while our neighbor is loved out of
charity for God's sake.

Reply Obj. 2: God is loved by charity for His own sake: wherefore
charity regards principally but one aspect of lovableness, namely
God's goodness, which is His substance, according to Ps. 105:1: "Give
glory to the Lord for He is good." Other reasons that inspire us with
love for Him, or which make it our duty to love Him, are secondary
and result from the first.

Reply Obj. 3: Human friendship of which the Philosopher treats has
various ends and various forms of fellowship. This does not apply to
charity, as stated above: wherefore the comparison fails.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 6]

Whether Charity Is the Most Excellent of the Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the most excellent of
the virtues. Because the higher power has the higher virtue even as
it has a higher operation. Now the intellect is higher than the will,
since it directs the will. Therefore, faith, which is in the
intellect, is more excellent than charity which is in the will.

Obj. 2: Further, the thing by which another works seems the less
excellent of the two, even as a servant, by whom his master works, is
beneath his master. Now "faith . . . worketh by charity," according
to Gal. 5:6. Therefore faith is more excellent than charity.

Obj. 3: Further, that which is by way of addition to another seems to
be the more perfect of the two. Now hope seems to be something
additional to charity: for the object of charity is good, whereas the
object of hope is an arduous good. Therefore hope is more excellent
than charity.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Cor. 13:13): "The greater of
these is charity."

_I answer that,_ Since good, in human acts, depends on their being
regulated by the due rule, it must needs be that human virtue, which
is a principle of good acts, consists in attaining the rule of human
acts. Now the rule of human acts is twofold, as stated above (A. 3),
namely, human reason and God: yet God is the first rule, whereby,
even human reason must be regulated. Consequently the theological
virtues, which consist in attaining this first rule, since their
object is God, are more excellent than the moral, or the intellectual
virtues, which consist in attaining human reason: and it follows that
among the theological virtues themselves, the first place belongs to
that which attains God most.

Now that which is of itself always ranks before that which is by
another. But faith and hope attain God indeed in so far as we derive
from Him the knowledge of truth or the acquisition of good, whereas
charity attains God Himself that it may rest in Him, but not that
something may accrue to us from Him. Hence charity is more excellent
than faith or hope, and, consequently, than all the other virtues,
just as prudence, which by itself attains reason, is more excellent
than the other moral virtues, which attain reason in so far as it
appoints the mean in human operations or passions.

Reply Obj. 1: The operation of the intellect is completed by the
thing understood being in the intellectual subject, so that the
excellence of the intellectual operation is assessed according to the
measure of the intellect. On the other hand, the operation of the
will and of every appetitive power is completed in the tendency of
the appetite towards a thing as its term, wherefore the excellence of
the appetitive operation is gauged according to the thing which is
the object of the operation. Now those things which are beneath the
soul are more excellent in the soul than they are in themselves,
because a thing is contained according to the mode of the container
(De Causis xii). On the other hand, things that are above the soul,
are more excellent in themselves than they are in the soul.
Consequently it is better to know than to love the things that are
beneath us; for which reason the Philosopher gave the preference to
the intellectual virtues over the moral virtues (Ethic. x, 7, 8):
whereas the love of the things that are above us, especially of God,
ranks before the knowledge of such things. Therefore charity is more
excellent than faith.

Reply Obj. 2: Faith works by love, not instrumentally, as a master by
his servant, but as by its proper form: hence the argument does not
prove.

Reply Obj. 3: The same good is the object of charity and of hope: but
charity implies union with that good, whereas hope implies distance
therefrom. Hence charity does not regard that good as being arduous,
as hope does, since what is already united has not the character of
arduous: and this shows that charity is more perfect than hope.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 7]

Whether Any True Virtue Is Possible Without Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be true virtue without
charity. For it is proper to virtue to produce a good act. Now those
who have not charity, do some good actions, as when they clothe the
naked, or feed the hungry and so forth. Therefore true virtue is
possible without charity.

Obj. 2: Further, charity is not possible without faith, since it
comes of "an unfeigned faith," as the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5). Now,
in unbelievers, there can be true chastity, if they curb their
concupiscences, and true justice, if they judge rightly. Therefore
true virtue is possible without charity.

Obj. 3: Further, science and art are virtues, according to _Ethic._
vi. But they are to be found in sinners who lack charity. Therefore
true virtue can be without charity.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:3): "If I should
distribute all my goods to the poor, and if I should deliver my body
to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." And yet
true virtue is very profitable, according to Wis. 8:7: "She teacheth
temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such
things as men can have nothing more profitable in life." Therefore no
true virtue is possible without charity.

_I answer that,_ Virtue is ordered to the good, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 55, A. 4). Now the good is chiefly an end, for things
directed to the end are not said to be good except in relation to the
end. Accordingly, just as the end is twofold, the last end, and the
proximate end, so also, is good twofold, one, the ultimate and
universal good, the other proximate and particular. The ultimate and
principal good of man is the enjoyment of God, according to Ps.
72:28: "It is good for me to adhere to God," and to this good man is
ordered by charity. Man's secondary and, as it were, particular good
may be twofold: one is truly good, because, considered in itself, it
can be directed to the principal good, which is the last end; while
the other is good apparently and not truly, because it leads us away
from the final good. Accordingly it is evident that simply true
virtue is that which is directed to man's principal good; thus also
the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that "virtue is the
disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best": and in this
way no true virtue is possible without charity.

If, however, we take virtue as being ordered to some particular end,
then we speak of virtue being where there is no charity, in so far as
it is directed to some particular good. But if this particular good
is not a true, but an apparent good, it is not a true virtue that is
ordered to such a good, but a counterfeit virtue. Even so, as
Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "the prudence of the miser,
whereby he devises various roads to gain, is no true virtue; nor the
miser's justice, whereby he scorns the property of another through
fear of severe punishment; nor the miser's temperance, whereby he
curbs his desire for expensive pleasures; nor the miser's fortitude,
whereby as Horace, says, 'he braves the sea, he crosses mountains, he
goes through fire, in order to avoid poverty'" (Epis. lib, 1; Ep. i,
45). If, on the other hand, this particular good be a true good, for
instance the welfare of the state, or the like, it will indeed be a
true virtue, imperfect, however, unless it be referred to the final
and perfect good. Accordingly no strictly true virtue is possible
without charity.

Reply Obj. 1: The act of one lacking charity may be of two kinds; one
is in accordance with his lack of charity, as when he does something
that is referred to that whereby he lacks charity. Such an act is
always evil: thus Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3) that the
actions which an unbeliever performs as an unbeliever, are always
sinful, even when he clothes the naked, or does any like thing, and
directs it to his unbelief as end.

There is, however, another act of one lacking charity, not in
accordance with his lack of charity, but in accordance with his
possession of some other gift of God, whether faith, or hope, or even
his natural good, which is not completely taken away by sin, as
stated above (Q. 10, A. 4; I-II, Q. 85, A. 2). In this way it is
possible for an act, without charity, to be generically good, but not
perfectly good, because it lacks its due order to the last end.

Reply Obj. 2: Since the end is in practical matters, what the
principle is in speculative matters, just as there can be no strictly
true science, if a right estimate of the first indemonstrable
principle be lacking, so, there can be no strictly true justice, or
chastity, without that due ordering to the end, which is effected by
charity, however rightly a man may be affected about other matters.

Reply Obj. 3: Science and art of their very nature imply a relation
to some particular good, and not to the ultimate good of human life,
as do the moral virtues, which make man good simply, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 56, A. 3). Hence the comparison fails.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 8]

Whether Charity Is the Form of the Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the true form of the
virtues. Because the form of a thing is either exemplar or essential.
Now charity is not the exemplar form of the other virtues, since it
would follow that the other virtues are of the same species as
charity: nor is it the essential form of the other virtues, since
then it would not be distinct from them. Therefore it is in no way
the form of the virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, charity is compared to the other virtues as their
root and foundation, according to Eph. 3:17: "Rooted and founded in
charity." Now a root or foundation is not the form, but rather the
matter of a thing, since it is the first part in the making.
Therefore charity is not the form of the virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, formal, final, and efficient causes do not coincide
with one another (Phys. ii, 7). Now charity is called the end and the
mother of the virtues. Therefore it should not be called their form.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose [*Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 23] says that
charity is the form of the virtues.

_I answer that,_ In morals the form of an act is taken chiefly from
the end. The reason of this is that the principal of moral acts is
the will, whose object and form, so to speak, are the end. Now the
form of an act always follows from a form of the agent. Consequently,
in morals, that which gives an act its order to the end, must needs
give the act its form. Now it is evident, in accordance with what has
been said (A. 7), that it is charity which directs the acts of all
other virtues to the last end, and which, consequently, also gives
the form to all other acts of virtue: and it is precisely in this
sense that charity is called the form of the virtues, for these are
called virtues in relation to "informed" acts.

Reply Obj. 1: Charity is called the form of the other virtues not as
being their exemplar or their essential form, but rather by way of
efficient cause, in so far as it sets the form on all, in the
aforesaid manner.

Reply Obj. 2: Charity is compared to the foundation or root in so far
as all other virtues draw their sustenance and nourishment therefrom,
and not in the sense that the foundation and root have the character
of a material cause.

Reply Obj. 3: Charity is said to be the end of other virtues, because
it directs all other virtues to its own end. And since a mother is
one who conceives within herself and by another, charity is called
the mother of the other virtues, because, by commanding them, it
conceives the acts of the other virtues, by the desire of the last
end.
_______________________

QUESTION 24

OF THE SUBJECT OF CHARITY
(In Twelve Articles)

We must now consider charity in relation to its subject, under which
head there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) Whether charity is in the will as its subject?

(2) Whether charity is caused in man by preceding acts or by a Divine
infusion?

(3) Whether it is infused according to the capacity of our natural
gifts?

(4) Whether it increases in the person who has it?

(5) Whether it increases by addition?

(6) Whether it increases by every act?

(7) Whether it increases indefinitely?

(8) Whether the charity of a wayfarer can be perfect?

(9) Of the various degrees of charity;

(10) Whether charity can diminish?

(11) Whether charity can be lost after it has been possessed?

(12) Whether it is lost through one mortal sin?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 1]

Whether the Will Is the Subject of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not the subject of
charity. For charity is a kind of love. Now, according to the
Philosopher (Topic. ii, 3) love is in the concupiscible part.
Therefore charity is also in the concupiscible and not in the will.

Obj. 2: Further, charity is the foremost of the virtues, as stated
above (Q. 23, A. 6). But the reason is the subject of virtue.
Therefore it seems that charity is in the reason and not in the will.

Obj. 3: Further, charity extends to all human acts, according to 1
Cor. 16:14: "Let all your things be done in charity." Now the
principle of human acts is the free-will. Therefore it seems that
charity is chiefly in the free-will as its subject and not in the
will.

_On the contrary,_ The object of charity is the good, which is also
the object of the will. Therefore charity is in the will as its
subject.

_I answer that,_ Since, as stated in the First Part (Q. 80, A. 2),
the appetite is twofold, namely the sensitive, and the intellective
which is called the will, the object of each is the good, but in
different ways: for the object of the sensitive appetite is a good
apprehended by sense, whereas the object of the intellective appetite
or will is good under the universal aspect of good, according as it
can be apprehended by the intellect. Now the object of charity is not
a sensible good, but the Divine good which is known by the intellect
alone. Therefore the subject of charity is not the sensitive, but the
intellective appetite, i.e. the will.

Reply Obj. 1: The concupiscible is a part of the sensitive, not of
the intellective appetite, as proved in the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2):
wherefore the love which is in the concupiscible, is the love of
sensible good: nor can the concupiscible reach to the Divine good
which is an intelligible good; the will alone can. Consequently the
concupiscible cannot be the subject of charity.

Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9), the
will also is in the reason: wherefore charity is not excluded from
the reason through being in the will. Yet charity is regulated, not
by the reason, as human virtues are, but by God's wisdom, and
transcends the rule of human reason, according to Eph. 3:19: "The
charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge." Hence it is not
in the reason, either as its subject, like prudence is, or as its
rule, like justice and temperance are, but only by a certain kinship
of the will to the reason.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated in the First Part (Q. 83, A. 4), the
free-will is not a distinct power from the will. Yet charity is not
in the will considered as free-will, the act of which is to choose.
For choice is of things directed to the end, whereas the will is of
the end itself (Ethic. iii, 2). Hence charity, whose object is the
last end, should be described as residing in the will rather than in
the free-will.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 2]

Whether Charity Is Caused in Us by Infusion?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not caused in us by
infusion. For that which is common to all creatures, is in man
naturally. Now, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), the "Divine
good," which is the object of charity, "is for all an object of
dilection and love." Therefore charity is in us naturally, and not by
infusion.

Obj. 2: Further, the more lovable a thing is the easier it is to love
it. Now God is supremely lovable, since He is supremely good.
Therefore it is easier to love Him than other things. But we need no
infused habit in order to love other things. Neither, therefore, do
we need one in order to love God.

Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the
commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and
an unfeigned faith." Now these three have reference to human acts.
Therefore charity is caused in us from preceding acts, and not from
infusion.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 5:5): "The charity of God
is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 23, A. 1), charity is a
friendship of man for God, founded upon the fellowship of everlasting
happiness. Now this fellowship is in respect, not of natural, but of
gratuitous gifts, for, according to Rom. 6:23, "the grace of God is
life everlasting": wherefore charity itself surpasses our natural
facilities. Now that which surpasses the faculty of nature, cannot be
natural or acquired by the natural powers, since a natural effect
does not transcend its cause.

Therefore charity can be in us neither naturally, nor through
acquisition by the natural powers, but by the infusion of the Holy
Ghost, Who is the love of the Father and the Son, and the
participation of Whom in us is created charity, as stated above (Q.
23, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius is speaking of the love of God, which is
founded on the fellowship of natural goods, wherefore it is in all
naturally. On the other hand, charity is founded on a supernatural
fellowship, so the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as God is supremely knowable in Himself yet not to
us, on account of a defect in our knowledge which depends on sensible
things, so too, God is supremely lovable in Himself, in as much as He
is the object of happiness. But He is not supremely lovable to us in
this way, on account of the inclination of our appetite towards
visible goods. Hence it is evident that for us to love God above all
things in this way, it is necessary that charity be infused into our
hearts.

Reply Obj. 3: When it is said that in us charity proceeds from "a
pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith," this must
be referred to the act of charity which is aroused by these things.
Or again, this is said because the aforesaid acts dispose man to
receive the infusion of charity. The same remark applies to the
saying of Augustine (Tract. ix in prim. canon. Joan.): "Fear leads to
charity," and of a gloss on Matt. 1:2: "Faith begets hope, and hope
charity."
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 3]

Whether Charity Is Infused According to the Capacity of Our Natural
Gifts?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is infused according to the
capacity of our natural gifts. For it is written (Matt. 25:15) that
"He gave to every one according to his own virtue [Douay: 'proper
ability']." Now, in man, none but natural virtue precedes charity,
since there is no virtue without charity, as stated above (Q. 23, A.
7). Therefore God infuses charity into man according to the measure
of his natural virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, among things ordained towards one another, the
second is proportionate to the first: thus we find in natural things
that the form is proportionate to the matter, and in gratuitous
gifts, that glory is proportionate to grace. Now, since charity is a
perfection of nature, it is compared to the capacity of nature as
second to first. Therefore it seems that charity is infused according
to the capacity of nature.

Obj. 3: Further, men and angels partake of happiness according to the
same measure, since happiness is alike in both, according to Matt.
22:30 and Luke 20:36. Now charity and other gratuitous gifts are
bestowed on the angels, according to their natural capacity, as the
Master teaches (Sent. ii, D, 3). Therefore the same apparently
applies to man.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 3:8): "The Spirit breatheth
where He will," and (1 Cor. 12:11): "All these things one and the
same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as He will."
Therefore charity is given, not according to our natural capacity,
but according as the Spirit wills to distribute His gifts.

_I answer that,_ The quantity of a thing depends on the proper cause
of that thing, since the more universal cause produces a greater
effect. Now, since charity surpasses the proportion of human nature,
as stated above (A. 2) it depends, not on any natural virtue, but on
the sole grace of the Holy Ghost Who infuses charity. Wherefore the
quantity of charity depends neither on the condition of nature nor on
the capacity of natural virtue, but only on the will of the Holy
Ghost Who "divides" His gifts "according as He will." Hence the
Apostle says (Eph. 4:7): "To every one of us is given grace according
to the measure of the giving of Christ."

Reply Obj. 1: The virtue in accordance with which God gives His gifts
to each one, is a disposition or previous preparation or effort of
the one who receives grace. But the Holy Ghost forestalls even this
disposition or effort, by moving man's mind either more or less,
according as He will. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:12): "Who
hath made us worthy to be partakers of the lot of the saints in
light."

Reply Obj. 2: The form does not surpass the proportion of the matter.
In like manner grace and glory are referred to the same genus, for
grace is nothing else than a beginning of glory in us. But charity
and nature do not belong to the same genus, so that the comparison
fails.

Reply Obj. 3: The angel's is an intellectual nature, and it is
consistent with his condition that he should be borne wholly
whithersoever he is borne, as stated in the First Part (Q. 61, A. 6).
Hence there was a greater effort in the higher angels, both for good
in those who persevered, and for evil in those who fell, and
consequently those of the higher angels who remained steadfast became
better than the others, and those who fell became worse. But man's is
a rational nature, with which it is consistent to be sometimes in
potentiality and sometimes in act: so that it is not necessarily
borne wholly whithersoever it is borne, and where there are greater
natural gifts there may be less effort, and vice versa. Thus the
comparison fails.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 4]

Whether Charity Can Increase?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity cannot increase. For nothing
increases save what has quantity. Now quantity is twofold, namely
dimensive and virtual. The former does not befit charity which is a
spiritual perfection, while virtual quantity regards the objects in
respect of which charity does not increase, since the slightest
charity loves all that is to be loved out of charity. Therefore
charity does not increase.

Obj. 2: Further, that which consists in something extreme receives no
increase. But charity consists in something extreme, being the
greatest of the virtues, and the supreme love of the greatest good.
Therefore charity cannot increase.

Obj. 3: Further, increase is a kind of movement. Therefore wherever
there is increase there is movement, and if there be increase of
essence there is movement of essence. Now there is no movement of
essence save either by corruption or generation. Therefore charity
cannot increase essentially, unless it happen to be generated anew or
corrupted, which is unreasonable.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Tract. lxxiv in Joan.) [*Cf. Ep.
clxxxv.] that "charity merits increase that by increase it may merit
perfection."

_I answer that,_ The charity of a wayfarer can increase. For we are
called wayfarers by reason of our being on the way to God, Who is the
last end of our happiness. In this way we advance as we get nigh to
God, Who is approached, "not by steps of the body but by the
affections of the soul" [*St. Augustine, Tract. in Joan. xxxii]: and
this approach is the result of charity, since it unites man's mind to
God. Consequently it is essential to the charity of a wayfarer that
it can increase, for if it could not, all further advance along the
way would cease. Hence the Apostle calls charity the way, when he
says (1 Cor. 12:31): "I show unto you yet a more excellent way."

Reply Obj. 1: Charity is not subject to dimensive, but only to
virtual quantity: and the latter depends not only on the number of
objects, namely whether they be in greater number or of greater
excellence, but also on the intensity of the act, namely whether a
thing is loved more, or less; it is in this way that the virtual
quantity of charity increases.

Reply Obj. 2: Charity consists in an extreme with regard to its
object, in so far as its object is the Supreme Good, and from this it
follows that charity is the most excellent of the virtues. Yet not
every charity consists in an extreme, as regards the intensity of the
act.

Reply Obj. 3: Some have said that charity does not increase in its
essence, but only as to its radication in its subject, or according
to its fervor.

But these people did not know what they were talking about. For since
charity is an accident, its being is to be in something. So that an
essential increase of charity means nothing else but that it is yet
more in its subject, which implies a greater radication in its
subject. Furthermore, charity is essentially a virtue ordained to
act, so that an essential increase of charity implies ability to
produce an act of more fervent love. Hence charity increases
essentially, not by beginning anew, or ceasing to be in its subject,
as the objection imagines, but by beginning to be more and more in
its subject.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 5]

Whether Charity Increases by Addition?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity increases by addition. For
just as increase may be in respect of bodily quantity, so may it be
according to virtual quantity. Now increase in bodily quantity
results from addition; for the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5) that
"increase is addition to pre-existing magnitude." Therefore the
increase of charity which is according to virtual quantity is by
addition.

Obj. 2: Further, charity is a kind of spiritual light in the soul,
according to 1 John 2:10: "He that loveth his brother abideth in the
light." Now light increases in the air by addition; thus the light in
a house increases when another candle is lit. Therefore charity also
increases in the soul by addition.

Obj. 3: Further, the increase of charity is God's work, even as the
causing of it, according to 2 Cor. 9:10: "He will increase the growth
of the fruits of your justice." Now when God first infuses charity,
He puts something in the soul that was not there before. Therefore
also, when He increases charity, He puts something there which was
not there before. Therefore charity increases by addition.

_On the contrary,_ Charity is a simple form. Now nothing greater
results from the addition of one simple thing to another, as proved
in _Phys._ iii, text. 59, and _Metaph._ ii, 4. Therefore charity does
not increase by addition.

_I answer that,_ Every addition is of something to something else: so
that in every addition we must at least presuppose that the things
added together are distinct before the addition. Consequently if
charity be added to charity, the added charity must be presupposed as
distinct from charity to which it is added, not necessarily by a
distinction of reality, but at least by a distinction of thought. For
God is able to increase a bodily quantity by adding a magnitude which
did not exist before, but was created at that very moment; which
magnitude, though not pre-existent in reality, is nevertheless
capable of being distinguished from the quantity to which it is
added. Wherefore if charity be added to charity we must presuppose
the distinction, at least logical, of the one charity from the other.

Now distinction among forms is twofold: specific and numeric.
Specific distinction of habits follows diversity of objects, while
numeric distinction follows distinction of subjects. Consequently a
habit may receive increase through extending to objects to which it
did not extend before: thus the science of geometry increases in one
who acquires knowledge of geometrical matters which he ignored
hitherto. But this cannot be said of charity, for even the slightest
charity extends to all that we have to love by charity. Hence the
addition which causes an increase of charity cannot be understood, as
though the added charity were presupposed to be distinct specifically
from that to which it is added.

It follows therefore that if charity be added to charity, we must
presuppose a numerical distinction between them, which follows a
distinction of subjects: thus whiteness receives an increase when one
white thing is added to another, although such an increase does not
make a thing whiter. This, however, does not apply to the case in
point, since the subject of charity is none other than the rational
mind, so that such like an increase of charity could only take place
by one rational mind being added to another; which is impossible.
Moreover, even if it were possible, the result would be a greater
lover, but not a more loving one. It follows, therefore, that charity
can by no means increase by addition of charity to charity, as some
have held to be the case.

Accordingly charity increases only by its subject partaking of
charity more and more subject thereto. For this is the proper mode of
increase in a form that is intensified, since the being of such a
form consists wholly in its adhering to its subject. Consequently,
since the magnitude of a thing follows on its being, to say that a
form is greater is the same as to say that it is more in its subject,
and not that another form is added to it: for this would be the case
if the form, of itself, had any quantity, and not in comparison with
its subject. Therefore charity increases by being intensified in its
subject, and this is for charity to increase in its essence; and not
by charity being added to charity.

Reply Obj. 1: Bodily quantity has something as quantity, and
something else, in so far as it is an accidental form. As quantity,
it is distinguishable in respect of position or number, and in this
way we have the increase of magnitude by addition, as may be seen in
animals. But in so far as it is an accidental form, it is
distinguishable only in respect of its subject, and in this way it
has its proper increase, like other accidental forms, by way of
intensity in its subject, for instance in things subject to
rarefaction, as is proved in _Phys._ iv, 9. In like manner science,
as a habit, has its quantity from its objects, and accordingly it
increases by addition, when a man knows more things; and again, as an
accidental form, it has a certain quantity through being in its
subject, and in this way it increases in a man who knows the same
scientific truths with greater certainty now than before. In the same
way charity has a twofold quantity; but with regard to that which it
has from its object, it does not increase, as stated above: hence it
follows that it increases solely by being intensified.

Reply Obj. 2: The addition of light to light can be understood
through the light being intensified in the air on account of there
being several luminaries giving light: but this distinction does not
apply to the case in point, since there is but one luminary shedding
forth the light of charity.

Reply Obj. 3: The infusion of charity denotes a change to the state
of _having_ charity from the state of _not having it,_ so that
something must needs come which was not there before. On the other
hand, the increase of charity denotes a change to _more having_ from
_less having,_ so that there is need, not for anything to be there
that was not there before, but for something to be more there that
previously was less there. This is what God does when He increases
charity, that is He makes it to have a greater hold on the soul, and
the likeness of the Holy Ghost to be more perfectly participated by
the soul.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE

Whether Charity Increases Through Every Act of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity increases through every act
of charity. For that which can do what is more, can do what is less.
But every act of charity can merit everlasting life; and this is more
than a simple addition of charity, since it includes the perfection
of charity. Much more, therefore, does every act of charity increase
charity.

Obj. 2: Further, just as the habits of acquired virtue are engendered
by acts, so too an increase of charity is caused by an act of
charity. Now each virtuous act conduces to the engendering of virtue.
Therefore also each virtuous act of charity conduces to the increase
of charity.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory [*St. Bernard, Serm. ii in Festo Purif.]
says that "to stand still in the way to God is to go back." Now no
man goes back when he is moved by an act of charity. Therefore
whoever is moved by an act of charity goes forward in the way to God.
Therefore charity increases through every act of charity.

_On the contrary,_ The effect does not surpass the power of its
cause. But an act of charity is sometimes done with tepidity or
slackness. Therefore it does not conduce to a more excellent charity,
rather does it dispose one to a lower degree.

_I answer that,_ The spiritual increase of charity is somewhat like
the increase of a body. Now bodily increase in animals and plants is
not a continuous movement, so that, to wit, if a thing increase so
much in so much time, it need to increase proportionally in each part
of that time, as happens in local movement; but for a certain space
of time nature works by disposing for the increase, without causing
any actual increase, and afterwards brings into effect that to which
it had disposed, by giving the animal or plant an actual increase. In
like manner charity does not actually increase through every act of
charity, but each act of charity disposes to an increase of charity,
in so far as one act of charity makes man more ready to act again
according to charity, and this readiness increasing, man breaks out
into an act of more fervent love, and strives to advance in charity,
and then his charity increases actually.

Reply Obj. 1: Every act of charity merits everlasting life, which,
however, is not to be bestowed then and there, but at its proper
time. In like manner every act of charity merits an increase of
charity; yet this increase does not take place at once, but when we
strive for that increase.

Reply Obj. 2: Even when an acquired virtue is being engendered, each
act does not complete the formation of the virtue, but conduces
towards that effect by disposing to it, while the last act, which is
the most perfect, and acts in virtue of all those that preceded it,
reduces the virtue into act, just as when many drops hollow out a
stone.

Reply Obj. 3: Man advances in the way to God, not merely by actual
increase of charity, but also by being disposed to that increase.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 7]

Whether Charity Increases Indefinitely?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity does not increase
indefinitely. For every movement is towards some end and term, as
stated in _Metaph._ ii, text. 8, 9. But the increase of charity is a
movement. Therefore it tends to an end and term. Therefore charity
does not increase indefinitely.

Obj. 2: Further, no form surpasses the capacity of its subject. But
the capacity of the rational creature who is the subject of charity
is finite. Therefore charity cannot increase indefinitely.

Obj. 3: Further, every finite thing can, by continual increase,
attain to the quantity of another finite thing however much greater,
unless the amount of its increase be ever less and less. Thus the
Philosopher states (Phys. iii, 6) that if we divide a line into an
indefinite number of parts, and take these parts away and add them
indefinitely to another line, we shall never arrive at any definite
quantity resulting from those two lines, viz. the one from which we
subtracted and the one to which we added what was subtracted. But
this does not occur in the case in point: because there is no need
for the second increase of charity to be less than the first, since
rather is it probable that it would be equal or greater. As,
therefore, the charity of the blessed is something finite, if the
charity of the wayfarer can increase indefinitely, it would follow
that the charity of the way can equal the charity of heaven; which is
absurd. Therefore the wayfarer's charity cannot increase indefinitely.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "Not as though I
had already attained, or were already perfect; but I follow after, if
I may, by any means apprehend," on which words a gloss says: "Even if
he has made great progress, let none of the faithful say: 'Enough.'
For whosoever says this, leaves the road before coming to his
destination." Therefore the wayfarer's charity can ever increase more
and more.

_I answer that,_ A term to the increase of a form may be fixed in
three ways: first by reason of the form itself having a fixed
measure, and when this has been reached it is no longer possible to
go any further in that form, but if any further advance is made,
another form is attained. An example of this is paleness, the bounds
of which may, by continual alteration, be passed, either so that
whiteness ensues, or so that blackness results. Secondly, on the part
of the agent, whose power does not extend to a further increase of
the form in its subject. Thirdly, on the part of the subject, which
is not capable of ulterior perfection.

Now, in none of these ways, is a limit imposed to the increase of
man's charity, while he is in the state of the wayfarer. For charity
itself considered as such has no limit to its increase, since it is a
participation of the infinite charity which is the Holy Ghost. In
like manner the cause of the increase of charity, viz. God, is
possessed of infinite power. Furthermore, on the part of its subject,
no limit to this increase can be determined, because whenever charity
increases, there is a corresponding increased ability to receive a
further increase. It is therefore evident that it is not possible to
fix any limits to the increase of charity in this life.

Reply Obj. 1: The increase of charity is directed to an end, which is
not in this, but in a future life.

Reply Obj. 2: The capacity of the rational creature is increased by
charity, because the heart is enlarged thereby, according to 2 Cor.
6:11: "Our heart is enlarged"; so that it still remains capable of
receiving a further increase.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument holds good in those things which have the
same kind of quantity, but not in those which have different kinds:
thus however much a line may increase it does not reach the quantity
of a superficies. Now the quantity of a wayfarer's charity which
follows the knowledge of faith is not of the same kind as the
quantity of the charity of the blessed, which follows open vision.
Hence the argument does not prove.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 8]

Whether Charity Can Be Perfect in This Life?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity cannot be perfect in this
life. For this would have been the case with the apostles before all
others. Yet it was not so, since the Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "Not
as though I had already attained, or were already perfect." Therefore
charity cannot be perfect in this life.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that "whatever
kindles charity quenches cupidity, but where charity is perfect,
cupidity is done away altogether." But this cannot be in this world,
wherein it is impossible to live without sin, according to 1 John
1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Now all
sin arises from some inordinate cupidity. Therefore charity cannot be
perfect in this life.

Obj. 3: Further, what is already perfect cannot be perfected any
more. But in this life charity can always increase, as stated above
(A. 7). Therefore charity cannot be perfect in this life.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. v)
"Charity is perfected by being strengthened; and when it has been
brought to perfection, it exclaims, 'I desire to be dissolved and to
be with Christ.'" Now this is possible in this life, as in the case
of Paul. Therefore charity can be perfect in this life.

_I answer that,_ The perfection of charity may be understood in two
ways: first with regard to the object loved, secondly with regard to
the person who loves. With regard to the object loved, charity is
perfect, if the object be loved as much as it is lovable. Now God is
as lovable as He is good, and His goodness is infinite, wherefore He
is infinitely lovable. But no creature can love Him infinitely since
all created power is finite. Consequently no creature's charity can
be perfect in this way; the charity of God alone can, whereby He
loves Himself.

On the part of the person who loves, charity is perfect, when he
loves as much as he can. This happens in three ways. First, so that a
man's whole heart is always actually borne towards God: this is the
perfection of the charity of heaven, and is not possible in this
life, wherein, by reason of the weakness of human life, it is
impossible to think always actually of God, and to be moved by love
towards Him. Secondly, so that man makes an earnest endeavor to give
his time to God and Divine things, while scorning other things except
in so far as the needs of the present life demand. This is the
perfection of charity that is possible to a wayfarer; but is not
common to all who have charity. Thirdly, so that a man gives his
whole heart to God habitually, viz. by neither thinking nor desiring
anything contrary to the love of God; and this perfection is common
to all who have charity.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle denies that he has the perfection of
heaven, wherefore a gloss on the same passage says that "he was a
perfect wayfarer, but had not yet achieved the perfection to which
the way leads."

Reply Obj. 2: This is said on account of venial sins, which are
contrary, not to the habit, but to the act of charity: hence they are
incompatible, not with the perfection of the way, but with that of
heaven.

Reply Obj. 3: The perfection of the way is not perfection simply,
wherefore it can always increase.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 9]

Whether Charity Is Rightly Distinguished into Three Degrees,
Beginning,  Progress, and Perfection?

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish three degrees of
charity, beginning, progress, and perfection. For there are many
degrees between the beginning of charity and its ultimate perfection.
Therefore it is not right to put only one.

Obj. 2: Further, charity begins to progress as soon as it begins to
be. Therefore we ought not to distinguish between charity as
progressing and as beginning.

Obj. 3: Further, in this world, however perfect a man's charity may
be, it can increase, as stated above (A. 7). Now for charity to
increase is to progress. Therefore perfect charity ought not to be
distinguished from progressing charity: and so the aforesaid degrees
are unsuitably assigned to charity.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. v)
"As soon as charity is born it takes food," which refers to
beginners, "after taking food, it waxes strong," which refers to
those who are progressing, "and when it has become strong it is
perfected," which refers to the perfect. Therefore there are three
degrees of charity.

_I answer that,_ The spiritual increase of charity may be considered
in respect of a certain likeness to the growth of the human body. For
although this latter growth may be divided into many parts, yet it
has certain fixed divisions according to those particular actions or
pursuits to which man is brought by this same growth. Thus we speak
of a man being an infant until he has the use of reason, after which
we distinguish another state of man wherein he begins to speak and to
use his reason, while there is again a third state, that of puberty
when he begins to acquire the power of generation, and so on until he
arrives at perfection.

In like manner the divers degrees of charity are distinguished
according to the different pursuits to which man is brought by the
increase of charity. For at first it is incumbent on man to occupy
himself chiefly with avoiding sin and resisting his concupiscences,
which move him in opposition to charity: this concerns beginners, in
whom charity has to be fed or fostered lest it be destroyed: in the
second place man's chief pursuit is to aim at progress in good, and
this is the pursuit of the proficient, whose chief aim is to
strengthen their charity by adding to it: while man's third pursuit
is to aim chiefly at union with and enjoyment of God: this belongs to
the perfect who "desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ."

In like manner we observe in local motion that at first there is
withdrawal from one term, then approach to the other term, and
thirdly, rest in this term.

Reply Obj. 1: All these distinct degrees which can be discerned in
the increase of charity, are comprised in the aforesaid three, even
as every division of continuous things is included in these
three--the beginning, the middle, and the end, as the Philosopher
states (De Coelo i, 1).

Reply Obj. 2: Although those who are beginners in charity may
progress, yet the chief care that besets them is to resist the sins
which disturb them by their onslaught. Afterwards, however, when they
come to feel this onslaught less, they begin to tend to perfection
with greater security; yet with one hand doing the work, and with the
other holding the sword as related in 2 Esdr. 4:17 about those who
built up Jerusalem.

Reply Obj. 3: Even the perfect make progress in charity: yet this is
not their chief care, but their aim is principally directed towards
union with God. And though both the beginner and the proficient seek
this, yet their solicitude is chiefly about other things, with the
beginner, about avoiding sin, with the proficient, about progressing
in virtue.
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 10]

Whether Charity Can Decrease?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity can decrease. For contraries
by their nature affect the same subject. Now increase and decrease
are contraries. Since then charity increases, as stated above (A. 4),
it seems that it can also decrease.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine, speaking to God, says (Confess. x) "He
loves Thee less, who loves aught besides Thee": and (Qq. lxxxiii, qu.
36) he says that "what kindles charity quenches cupidity." From this
it seems to follow that, on the contrary, what arouses cupidity
quenches charity. But cupidity, whereby a man loves something besides
God, can increase in man. Therefore charity can decrease.

Obj. 3: Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) "God makes
the just man, by justifying him, but in such a way, that if the man
turns away from God, he no longer retains the effect of the Divine
operation." From this we may gather that when God preserves charity
in man, He works in the same way as when He first infuses charity
into him. Now at the first infusion of charity God infuses less
charity into him that prepares himself less. Therefore also in
preserving charity, He preserves less charity in him that prepares
himself less. Therefore charity can decrease.

_On the contrary,_ In Scripture, charity is compared to fire,
according to Cant 8:6: "The lamps thereof," i.e. of charity, "are
fire and flames." Now fire ever mounts upward so long as it lasts.
Therefore as long as charity endures, it can ascend, but cannot
descend, i.e. decrease.

_I answer that,_ The quantity which charity has in comparison with
its proper object, cannot decrease, even as neither can it increase,
as stated above (A. 4, ad 2).

Since, however, it increases in that quantity which it has in
comparison with its subject, here is the place to consider whether it
can decrease in this way. Now, if it decrease, this must needs be
either through an act, or by the mere cessation from act. It is true
that virtues acquired through acts decrease and sometimes cease
altogether through cessation from act, as stated above (I-II, Q. 53,
A. 3). Wherefore the Philosopher says, in reference to friendship
(Ethic. viii, 5) "that want of intercourse," i.e. the neglect to call
upon or speak with one's friends, "has destroyed many a friendship."
Now this is because the safe-keeping of a thing depends on its cause,
and the cause of human virtue is a human act, so that when human acts
cease, the virtue acquired thereby decreases and at last ceases
altogether. Yet this does not occur to charity, because it is not the
result of human acts, but is caused by God alone, as stated above (A.
2). Hence it follows that even when its act ceases, it does not for
this reason decrease, or cease altogether, unless the cessation
involves a sin.

The consequence is that a decrease of charity cannot be caused except
either by God or by some sinful act. Now no defect is caused in us by
God, except by way of punishment, in so far as He withdraws His grace
in punishment of sin. Hence He does not diminish charity except by
way of punishment: and this punishment is due on account of sin.

It follows, therefore, that if charity decrease, the cause of this
decrease must be sin either effectively or by way of merit. But
mortal sin does not diminish charity, in either of these ways, but
destroys it entirely, both effectively, because every mortal sin is
contrary to charity, as we shall state further on (A. 12), and by way
of merit, since when, by sinning mortally, a man acts against
charity, he deserves that God should withdraw charity from him.

In like manner, neither can venial sin diminish charity either
effectively or by way of merit. Not effectively, because it does not
touch charity, since charity is about the last end, whereas venial
sin is a disorder about things directed to the end: and a man's love
for the end is none the less through his committing an inordinate act
as regards the things directed to the end. Thus sick people
sometimes, though they love health much, are irregular in keeping to
their diet: and thus again, in speculative sciences, the false
opinions that are derived from the principles, do not diminish the
certitude of the principles. So too, venial sin does not merit
diminution of charity; for when a man offends in a small matter he
does not deserve to be mulcted in a great matter. For God does not
turn away from man, more than man turns away from Him: wherefore he
that is out of order in respect of things directed to the end, does
not deserve to be mulcted in charity whereby he is ordered to the
last end.

The consequence is that charity can by no means be diminished, if we
speak of direct causality, yet whatever disposes to its corruption
may be said to conduce indirectly to its diminution, and such are
venial sins, or even the cessation from the practice of works of
charity.

Reply Obj. 1: Contraries affect the same subject when that subject
stands in equal relation to both. But charity does not stand in equal
relation to increase and decrease. For it can have a cause of
increase, but not of decrease, as stated above. Hence the argument
does not prove.

Reply Obj. 2: Cupidity is twofold, one whereby man places his end in
creatures, and this kills charity altogether, since it is its poison,
as Augustine states (Confess. x). This makes us love God less (i.e.
less than we ought to love Him by charity), not indeed by diminishing
charity but by destroying it altogether. It is thus that we must
understand the saying: "He loves Thee less, who loves aught beside
Thee," for he adds these words, "which he loveth not for Thee." This
does not apply to venial sin, but only to mortal sin: since that
which we love in venial sin, is loved for God's sake habitually
though not actually. There is another cupidity, that of venial sin,
which is always diminished by charity: and yet this cupidity cannot
diminish charity, for the reason given above.

Reply Obj. 3: A movement of the free-will is requisite in the
infusion of charity, as stated above (I-II, Q. 113, A. 3). Wherefore
that which diminishes the intensity of the free-will conduces
dispositively to a diminution in the charity to be infused. On the
other hand, no movement of the free-will is required for the
safe-keeping of charity, else it would not remain in us while we
sleep. Hence charity does not decrease on account of an obstacle on
the part of the intensity of the free-will's movement.
_______________________

ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 11]

Whether We Can Lose Charity When Once We Have It?

Objection 1: It would seem that we cannot lose charity when once we
have it. For if we lose it, this can only be through sin. Now he who
has charity cannot sin, for it is written (1 John 3:9): "Whosoever is
born of God, committeth not sin; for His seed abideth in him, and he
cannot sin, because he is born of God." But none save the children of
God have charity, for it is this which distinguishes "the children of
God from the children of perdition," as Augustine says (De Trin. xv,
17). Therefore he that has charity cannot lose it.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7) that "if love be
not true, it should not be called love." Now, as he says again in a
letter to Count Julian, "charity which can fail was never true."
[*The quotation is from _De Salutaribus Documentis ad quemdam
comitem,_ vii., among the works of Paul of Friuli, more commonly
known as Paul the Deacon, a monk of Monte Cassino.] Therefore it was
no charity at all. Therefore, when once we have charity, we cannot
lose it.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang.
xxx) that "God's love works great things where it is; if it ceases to
work it is not charity." Now no man loses charity by doing great
things. Therefore if charity be there, it cannot be lost.

Obj. 4: Further, the free-will is not inclined to sin unless by some
motive for sinning. Now charity excludes all motives for sinning,
both self-love and cupidity, and all such things. Therefore charity
cannot be lost.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Apoc. 2:4): "I have somewhat
against thee, because thou hast left thy first charity."

_I answer that,_ The Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, as shown
above (A. 2; QQ. 23, 24). We can, accordingly, consider charity in
three ways: first on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who moves the soul
to love God, and in this respect charity is incompatible with sin
through the power of the Holy Ghost, Who does unfailingly whatever He
wills to do. Hence it is impossible for these two things to be true
at the same time--that the Holy Ghost should will to move a certain
man to an act of charity, and that this man, by sinning, should lose
charity. For the gift of perseverance is reckoned among the blessings
of God whereby "whoever is delivered, is most certainly delivered,"
as Augustine says in his book on the Predestination of the saints (De
Dono Persev. xiv).

Secondly, charity may be considered as such, and thus it is incapable
of anything that is against its nature. Wherefore charity cannot sin
at all, even as neither can heat cool, nor unrighteousness do good,
as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 24).

Thirdly, charity can be considered on the part of its subject, which
is changeable on account of the free-will. Moreover charity may be
compared with this subject, both from the general point of view of
form in comparison with matter, and from the specific point of view
of habit as compared with power. Now it is natural for a form to be
in its subject in such a way that it can be lost, when it does not
entirely fill the potentiality of matter: this is evident in the
forms of things generated and corrupted, because the matter of such
things receives one form in such a way, that it retains the
potentiality to another form, as though its potentiality were not
completely satisfied with the one form. Hence the one form may be
lost by the other being received. On the other hand the form of a
celestial body which entirely fills the potentiality of its matter,
so that the latter does not retain the potentiality to another form,
is in its subject inseparably. Accordingly the charity of the
blessed, because it entirely fills the potentiality of the rational
mind, since every actual movement of that mind is directed to God, is
possessed by its subject inseparably: whereas the charity of the
wayfarer does not so fill the potentiality of its subject, because
the latter is not always actually directed to God: so that when it is
not actually directed to God, something may occur whereby charity is
lost.

It is proper to a habit to incline a power to act, and this belongs
to a habit, in so far as it makes whatever is suitable to it, to seem
good, and whatever is unsuitable, to seem evil. For as the taste
judges of savors according to its disposition, even so does the human
mind judge of things to be done, according to its habitual
disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that "such as
a man is, so does the end appear to him." Accordingly charity is
inseparable from its possessor, where that which pertains to charity
cannot appear otherwise than good, and that is in heaven, where God
is seen in His Essence, which is the very essence of goodness.
Therefore the charity of heaven cannot be lost, whereas the charity
of the way can, because in this state God is not seen in His Essence,
which is the essence of goodness.

Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted speaks from the point of view of the
power of the Holy Ghost, by Whose safeguarding, those whom He wills
to move are rendered immune from sin, as much as He wills.

Reply Obj. 2: The charity which can fail by reason of itself is no
true charity; for this would be the case, were its love given only
for a time, and afterwards were to cease, which would be inconsistent
with true love. If, however, charity be lost through the
changeableness of the subject, and against the purpose of charity
included in its act, this is not contrary to true charity.

Reply Obj. 3: The love of God ever works great things in its purpose,
which is essential to charity; but it does not always work great
things in its act, on account of the condition of its subject.

Reply Obj. 4: Charity by reason of its act excludes every motive for
sinning. But it happens sometimes that charity is not acting
actually, and then it is possible for a motive to intervene for
sinning, and if we consent to this motive, we lose charity.
_______________________

TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 12]

Whether Charity Is Lost Through One Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not lost through one
mortal sin. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): "When a man who has
mounted to the stage of perfection, is satiated, I do not think that
he will become empty or fall away suddenly; but he must needs do so
gradually and by little and little." But man falls away by losing
charity. Therefore charity is not lost through only one mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, Pope Leo in a sermon on the Passion (lx) addresses
Peter thus: "Our Lord saw in thee not a conquered faith, not an
averted love, but constancy shaken. Tears abounded where love never
failed, and the words uttered in trepidation were washed away by the
fount of charity." From this Bernard [*William of St. Thierry, De
Nat. et Dig. Amoris. vi.] drew his assertion that "charity in Peter
was not quenched, but cooled." But Peter sinned mortally in denying
Christ. Therefore charity is not lost through one mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, charity is stronger than an acquired virtue. Now a
habit of acquired virtue is not destroyed by one contrary sinful act.
Much less, therefore, is charity destroyed by one contrary mortal sin.

Obj. 4: Further, charity denotes love of God and our neighbor. Now,
seemingly, one may commit a mortal sin, and yet retain the love of
God and one's neighbor; because an inordinate affection for things
directed to the end, does not remove the love for the end, as stated
above (A. 10). Therefore charity towards God can endure, though there
be a mortal sin through an inordinate affection for some temporal
good.

Obj. 5: Further, the object of a theological virtue is the last end.
Now the other theological virtues, namely faith and hope, are not
done away by one mortal sin, in fact they remain though lifeless.
Therefore charity can remain without a form, even when a mortal sin
has been committed.

_On the contrary,_ By mortal sin man becomes deserving of eternal
death, according to Rom. 6:23: "The wages of sin is death." On the
other hand whoever has charity is deserving of eternal life, for it
is written (John 14:21): "He that loveth Me, shall be loved by My
Father: and I will love Him, and will manifest Myself to him," in
which manifestation everlasting life consists, according to John
17:3: "This is eternal life; that they may know Thee the . . . true
God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent." Now no man can be worthy,
at the same time, of eternal life and of eternal death. Therefore it
is impossible for a man to have charity with a mortal sin. Therefore
charity is destroyed by one mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ That one contrary is removed by the other contrary
supervening. Now every mortal sin is contrary to charity by its very
nature, which consists in man's loving God above all things, and
subjecting himself to Him entirely, by referring all that is his to
God. It is therefore essential to charity that man should so love God
as to wish to submit to Him in all things, and always to follow the
rule of His commandments; since whatever is contrary to His
commandments is manifestly contrary to charity, and therefore by its
very nature is capable of destroying charity.

If indeed charity were an acquired habit dependent on the power of
its subject, it would not necessarily be removed by one mortal sin,
for act is directly contrary, not to habit but to act. Now the
endurance of a habit in its subject does not require the endurance of
its act, so that when a contrary act supervenes the acquired habit is
not at once done away. But charity, being an infused habit, depends
on the action of God Who infuses it, Who stands in relation to the
infusion and safekeeping of charity, as the sun does to the diffusion
of light in the air, as stated above (A. 10, Obj. 3). Consequently,
just as the light would cease at once in the air, were an obstacle
placed to its being lit up by the sun, even so charity ceases at once
to be in the soul through the placing of an obstacle to the
outpouring of charity by God into the soul.

Now it is evident that through every mortal sin which is contrary to
God's commandments, an obstacle is placed to the outpouring of
charity, since from the very fact that a man chooses to prefer sin to
God's friendship, which requires that we should obey His will, it
follows that the habit of charity is lost at once through one mortal
sin. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) that "man is
enlightened by God's presence, but he is darkened at once by God's
absence, because distance from Him is effected not by change of place
but by aversion of the will."

Reply Obj. 1: This saying of Origen may be understood, in one way,
that a man who is in the state of perfection, does not suddenly go so
far as to commit a mortal sin, but is disposed thereto by some
previous negligence, for which reason venial sins are said to be
dispositions to mortal sin, as stated above (I-II, Q. 88, A. 3).
Nevertheless he falls, and loses charity through the one mortal sin
if he commits it.

Since, however, he adds: "If some slight slip should occur, and he
recover himself quickly he does not appear to fall altogether," we
may reply in another way, that when he speaks of a man being emptied
and falling away altogether, he means one who falls so as to sin
through malice; and this does not occur in a perfect man all at once.

Reply Obj. 2: Charity may be lost in two ways; first, directly, by
actual contempt, and, in this way, Peter did not lose charity.
Secondly, indirectly, when a sin is committed against charity,
through some passion of desire or fear; it was by sinning against
charity in this way, that Peter lost charity; yet he soon recovered
it.

The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 4: Not every inordinate affection for things directed to
the end, i.e., for created goods, constitutes a mortal sin, but only
such as is directly contrary to the Divine will; and then the
inordinate affection is contrary to charity, as stated.

Reply Obj. 5: Charity denotes union with God, whereas faith and hope
do not. Now every mortal sin consists in aversion from God, as stated
above (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12). Consequently every mortal sin is
contrary to charity, but not to faith and hope, but only certain
determinate sins, which destroy the habit of faith or of hope, even
as charity is destroyed by every moral sin. Hence it is evident that
charity cannot remain lifeless, since it is itself the ultimate form
regarding God under the aspect of last end as stated above (Q. 23, A.
8).
_______________________

QUESTION 25

OF THE OBJECT OF CHARITY (TWELVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the object of charity; which consideration will
be twofold: (1) The things we ought to love out of charity: (2) The
order in which they ought to be loved. Under the first head there
are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) Whether we should love God alone, out of charity, or should we
love our neighbor also?

(2) Whether charity should be loved out of charity?

(3) Whether irrational creatures ought to be loved out of charity?

(4) Whether one may love oneself out of charity?

(5) Whether one's own body?

(6) Whether sinners should be loved out of charity?

(7) Whether sinners love themselves?

(8) Whether we should love our enemies out of charity?

(9) Whether we are bound to show them tokens of friendship?

(10) Whether we ought to love the angels out of charity?

(11) Whether we ought to love the demons?

(12) How to enumerate the things we are bound to love out of charity.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 1]

Whether the Love of Charity Stops at God, or Extends to Our Neighbor?

Objection 1: It would seem that the love of charity stops at God and
does not extend to our neighbor. For as we owe God love, so do we owe
Him fear, according Deut. 10:12: "And now Israel, what doth the Lord
thy God require of thee, but that thou fear . . . and love Him?" Now
the fear with which we fear man, and which is called human fear, is
distinct from the fear with which we fear God, and which is either
servile or filial, as is evident from what has been stated above (Q.
10, A. 2). Therefore also the love with which we love God, is
distinct from the love with which we love our neighbor.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that "to be
loved is to be honored." Now the honor due to God, which is known as
_latria,_ is distinct from the honor due to a creature, and known as
_dulia._ Therefore again the love wherewith we love God, is distinct
from that with which we love our neighbor.

Obj. 3: Further, hope begets charity, as a gloss states on Matt. 1:2.
Now hope is so due to God that it is reprehensible to hope in man,
according to Jer. 17:5: "Cursed be the man that trusteth in man."
Therefore charity is so due to God, as not to extend to our neighbor.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 John 4:21): "This commandment we
have from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his brother."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 17, A. 6; Q. 19, A. 3; I-II, Q.
54, A. 3) habits are not differentiated except their acts be of
different species. For every act of the one species belongs to the
same habit. Now since the species of an act is derived from its
object, considered under its formal aspect, it follows of necessity
that it is specifically the same act that tends to an aspect of the
object, and that tends to the object under that aspect: thus it is
specifically the same visual act whereby we see the light, and
whereby we see the color under the aspect of light.

Now the aspect under which our neighbor is to be loved, is God, since
what we ought to love in our neighbor is that he may be in God. Hence
it is clear that it is specifically the same act whereby we love God,
and whereby we love our neighbor. Consequently the habit of charity
extends not only to the love of God, but also to the love of our
neighbor.

Reply Obj. 1: We may fear our neighbor, even as we may love him, in
two ways: first, on account of something that is proper to him, as
when a man fears a tyrant on account of his cruelty, or loves him by
reason of his own desire to get something from him. Such like human
fear is distinct from the fear of God, and the same applies to love.
Secondly, we fear a man, or love him on account of what he has of
God; as when we fear the secular power by reason of its exercising
the ministry of God for the punishment of evildoers, and love it for
its justice: such like fear of man is not distinct from fear of God,
as neither is such like love.

Reply Obj. 2: Love regards good in general, whereas honor regards the
honored person's own good, for it is given to a person in recognition
of his own virtue. Hence love is not differentiated specifically on
account of the various degrees of goodness in various persons, so
long as it is referred to one good common to all, whereas honor is
distinguished according to the good belonging to individuals.
Consequently we love all our neighbors with the same love of charity,
in so far as they are referred to one good common to them all, which
is God; whereas we give various honors to various people, according
to each one's own virtue, and likewise to God we give the singular
honor of latria on account of His singular virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: It is wrong to hope in man as though he were the
principal author of salvation, but not, to hope in man as helping us
ministerially under God. In like manner it would be wrong if a man
loved his neighbor as though he were his last end, but not, if he
loved him for God's sake; and this is what charity does.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 2]

Whether We Should Love Charity Out of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity need not be loved out of
charity. For the things to be loved out of charity are contained in
the two precepts of charity (Matt. 22:37-39): and neither of them
includes charity, since charity is neither God nor our neighbor.
Therefore charity need not be loved out of charity.

Obj. 2: Further, charity is founded on the fellowship of happiness,
as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1). But charity cannot participate in
happiness. Therefore charity need not be loved out of charity.

Obj. 3: Further, charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above
(Q. 23, A. 1). But no man can have friendship for charity or for an
accident, since such things cannot return love for love, which is
essential to friendship, as stated in _Ethic._ viii. Therefore
charity need not be loved out of charity.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 8): "He that loves
his neighbor, must, in consequence, love love itself." But we love
our neighbor out of charity. Therefore it follows that charity also
is loved out of charity.

_I answer that,_ Charity is love. Now love, by reason of the nature
of the power whose act it is, is capable of reflecting on itself; for
since the object of the will is the universal good, whatever has the
aspect of good, can be the object of an act of the will: and since to
will is itself a good, man can will himself to will. Even so the
intellect, whose object is the true, understands that it understands,
because this again is something true. Love, however, even by reason
of its own species, is capable of reflecting on itself, because it is
a spontaneous movement of the lover towards the beloved, wherefore
from the moment a man loves, he loves himself to love.

Yet charity is not love simply, but has the nature of friendship, as
stated above (Q. 23, A. 1). Now by friendship a thing is loved in two
ways: first, as the friend for whom we have friendship, and to whom
we wish good things: secondly, as the good which we wish to a friend.
It is in the latter and not in the former way that charity is loved
out of charity, because charity is the good which we desire for all
those whom we love out of charity. The same applies to happiness, and
to the other virtues.

Reply Obj. 1: God and our neighbor are those with whom we are
friends, but love of them includes the loving of charity, since we
love both God and our neighbor, in so far as we love ourselves and
our neighbor to love God, and this is to love charity.

Reply Obj. 2: Charity is itself the fellowship of the spiritual life,
whereby we arrive at happiness: hence it is loved as the good which
we desire for all whom we love out of charity.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers friendship as referred to those
with whom we are friends.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 3]

Whether Irrational Creatures Also Ought to Be Loved Out of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that irrational creatures also ought to be
loved out of charity. For it is chiefly by charity that we are
conformed to God. Now God loves irrational creatures out of charity,
for He loves "all things that are" (Wis. 11:25), and whatever He
loves, He loves by Himself Who is charity. Therefore we also should
love irrational creatures out of charity.

Obj. 2: Further, charity is referred to God principally, and extends
to other things as referable to God. Now just as the rational
creature is referable to God, in as much as it bears the resemblance
of image, so too, are the irrational creatures, in as much as they
bear the resemblance of a trace [*Cf. I, Q. 45, A. 7]. Therefore
charity extends also to irrational creatures.

Obj. 3: Further, just as the object of charity is God. so is the
object of faith. Now faith extends to irrational creatures, since we
believe that heaven and earth were created by God, that the fishes
and birds were brought forth out of the waters, and animals that
walk, and plants, out of the earth. Therefore charity extends also to
irrational creatures.

_On the contrary,_ The love of charity extends to none but God and
our neighbor. But the word neighbor cannot be extended to irrational
creatures, since they have no fellowship with man in the rational
life. Therefore charity does not extend to irrational creatures.

_I answer that,_ According to what has been stated above (Q. 13, A.
1) charity is a kind of friendship. Now the love of friendship is
twofold: first, there is the love for the friend to whom our
friendship is given, secondly, the love for those good things which
we desire for our friend. With regard to the first, no irrational
creature can be loved out of charity; and for three reasons. Two of
these reasons refer in a general way to friendship, which cannot have
an irrational creature for its object: first because friendship is
towards one to whom we wish good things, while, properly speaking, we
cannot wish good things to an irrational creature, because it is not
competent, properly speaking, to possess good, this being proper to
the rational creature which, through its free-will, is the master of
its disposal of the good it possesses. Hence the Philosopher says
(Phys. ii, 6) that we do not speak of good or evil befalling such
like things, except metaphorically. Secondly, because all friendship
is based on some fellowship in life; since "nothing is so proper to
friendship as to live together," as the Philosopher proves (Ethic.
viii, 5). Now irrational creatures can have no fellowship in human
life which is regulated by reason. Hence friendship with irrational
creatures is impossible, except metaphorically speaking. The third
reason is proper to charity, for charity is based on the fellowship
of everlasting happiness, to which the irrational creature cannot
attain. Therefore we cannot have the friendship of charity towards an
irrational creature.

Nevertheless we can love irrational creatures out of charity, if we
regard them as the good things that we desire for others, in so far,
to wit, as we wish for their preservation, to God's honor and man's
use; thus too does God love them out of charity.

Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident.

Reply Obj. 2: The likeness by way of trace does not confer the
capacity for everlasting life, whereas the likeness of image does:
and so the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 3: Faith can extend to all that is in any way true,
whereas the friendship of charity extends only to such things as have
a natural capacity for everlasting life; wherefore the comparison
fails.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 4]

Whether a Man Ought to Love Himself Out of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man is [not] bound to love himself
out of charity. For Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xvii) that
there "can be no charity between less than two." Therefore no man has
charity towards himself.

Obj. 2: Further, friendship, by its very nature, implies mutual love
and equality (Ethic. viii, 2, 7), which cannot be of one man towards
himself. But charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above (Q. 23,
A. 1). Therefore a man cannot have charity towards himself.

Obj. 3: Further, anything relating to charity cannot be blameworthy,
since charity "dealeth not perversely" (1 Cor. 23:4). Now a man
deserves to be blamed for loving himself, since it is written (2 Tim.
3:1, 2): "In the last days shall come dangerous times, men shall be
lovers of themselves." Therefore a man cannot love himself out of
charity.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lev. 19:18): "Thou shalt love thy
friend as thyself." Now we love our friends out of charity. Therefore
we should love ourselves too out of charity.

_I answer that,_ Since charity is a kind of friendship, as stated
above (Q. 23, A. 1), we may consider charity from two standpoints:
first, under the general notion of friendship, and in this way we
must hold that, properly speaking, a man is not a friend to himself,
but something more than a friend, since friendship implies union, for
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "love is a unitive force," whereas
a man is one with himself which is more than being united to another.
Hence, just as unity is the principle of union, so the love with
which a man loves himself is the form and root of friendship. For if
we have friendship with others it is because we do unto them as we do
unto ourselves, hence we read in _Ethic._ ix, 4, 8, that "the origin
of friendly relations with others lies in our relations to
ourselves." Thus too with regard to principles we have something
greater than science, namely understanding.

Secondly, we may speak of charity in respect of its specific nature,
namely as denoting man's friendship with God in the first place, and,
consequently, with the things of God, among which things is man
himself who has charity. Hence, among these other things which he
loves out of charity because they pertain to God, he loves also
himself out of charity.

Reply Obj. 1: Gregory speaks there of charity under the general
notion of friendship: and the Second Objection is to be taken in the
same sense.

Reply Obj. 3: Those who love themselves are to be blamed, in so far
as they love themselves as regards their sensitive nature, which they
humor. This is not to love oneself truly according to one's rational
nature, so as to desire for oneself the good things which pertain to
the perfection of reason: and in this way chiefly it is through
charity that a man loves himself.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 5]

Whether a Man Ought to Love His Body Out of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought not to love his body out
of charity. For we do not love one with whom we are unwilling to
associate. But those who have charity shun the society of the body,
according to Rom. 7:24: "Who shall deliver me from the body of this
death?" and Phil. 1:23: "Having a desire to be dissolved and to be
with Christ." Therefore our bodies are not to be loved out of charity.

Obj. 2: Further, the friendship of charity is based on fellowship in
the enjoyment of God. But the body can have no share in that
enjoyment. Therefore the body is not to be loved out of charity.

Obj. 3: Further, since charity is a kind of friendship it is towards
those who are capable of loving in return. But our body cannot love
us out of charity. Therefore it should not be loved out of charity.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23, 26) that
there are four things that we should love out of charity, and among
them he reckons our own body.

_I answer that,_ Our bodies can be considered in two ways: first, in
respect of their nature, secondly, in respect of the corruption of
sin and its punishment.

Now the nature of our body was created, not by an evil principle, as
the Manicheans pretend, but by God. Hence we can use it for God's
service, according to Rom. 6:13: "Present . . . your members as
instruments of justice unto God." Consequently, out of the love of
charity with which we love God, we ought to love our bodies also, but
we ought not to love the evil effects of sin and the corruption of
punishment; we ought rather, by the desire of charity, to long for
the removal of such things.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle did not shrink from the society of his
body, as regards the nature of the body, in fact in this respect he
was loth to be deprived thereof, according to 2 Cor. 5:4: "We would
not be unclothed, but clothed over." He did, however, wish to escape
from the taint of concupiscence, which remains in the body, and from
the corruption of the body which weighs down the soul, so as to
hinder it from seeing God. Hence he says expressly: "From the body of
this death."

Reply Obj. 2: Although our bodies are unable to enjoy God by knowing
and loving Him, yet by the works which we do through the body, we are
able to attain to the perfect knowledge of God. Hence from the
enjoyment in the soul there overflows a certain happiness into the
body, viz., "the flush of health and incorruption," as Augustine
states (Ep. ad Dioscor. cxviii). Hence, since the body has, in a
fashion, a share of happiness, it can be loved with the love of
charity.

Reply Obj. 3: Mutual love is found in the friendship which is for
another, but not in that which a man has for himself, either in
respect of his soul, or in respect of his body.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 6]

Whether We Ought to Love Sinners Out of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love sinners out of
charity. For it is written (Ps. 118:113): "I have hated the unjust."
But David had perfect charity. Therefore sinners should be hated
rather than loved, out of charity.

Obj. 2: Further, "love is proved by deeds" as Gregory says in a
homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx). But good men do no works of the
unjust: on the contrary, they do such as would appear to be works of
hate, according to Ps. 100:8: "In the morning I put to death all the
wicked of the land": and God commanded (Ex. 22:18): "Wizards thou
shalt not suffer to live." Therefore sinners should not be loved out
of charity.

Obj. 3: Further, it is part of friendship that one should desire and
wish good things for one's friends. Now the saints, out of charity,
desire evil things for the wicked, according to Ps. 9:18: "May the
wicked be turned into hell [*Douay and A. V.: 'The wicked shall be,'
etc. See Reply to this Objection.]." Therefore sinners should not be
loved out of charity.

Obj. 4: Further, it is proper to friends to rejoice in, and will the
same things. Now charity does not make us will what sinners will, nor
to rejoice in what gives them joy, but rather the contrary. Therefore
sinners should not be loved out of charity.

Obj. 5: Further, it is proper to friends to associate together,
according to _Ethic._ viii. But we ought not to associate with
sinners, according to 2 Cor. 6:17: "Go ye out from among them."
Therefore we should not love sinners out of charity.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 30) that
"when it is said: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor,' it is evident that
we ought to look upon every man as our neighbor." Now sinners do not
cease to be men, for sin does not destroy nature. Therefore we ought
to love sinners out of charity.

_I answer that,_ Two things may be considered in the sinner: his
nature and his guilt. According to his nature, which he has from God,
he has a capacity for happiness, on the fellowship of which charity
is based, as stated above (A. 3; Q. 23, AA. 1, 5), wherefore we ought
to love sinners, out of charity, in respect of their nature.

On the other hand their guilt is opposed to God, and is an obstacle
to happiness. Wherefore, in respect of their guilt whereby they are
opposed to God, all sinners are to be hated, even one's father or
mother or kindred, according to Luke 12:26. For it is our duty to
hate, in the sinner, his being a sinner, and to love in him, his
being a man capable of bliss; and this is to love him truly, out of
charity, for God's sake.

Reply Obj. 1: The prophet hated the unjust, as such, and the object
of his hate was their injustice, which was their evil. Such hatred is
perfect, of which he himself says (Ps. 138:22): "I have hated them
with a perfect hatred." Now hatred of a person's evil is equivalent
to love of his good. Hence also this perfect hatred belongs to
charity.

Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ix, 3), when our
friends fall into sin, we ought not to deny them the amenities of
friendship, so long as there is hope of their mending their ways, and
we ought to help them more readily to regain virtue than to recover
money, had they lost it, for as much as virtue is more akin than
money to friendship. When, however, they fall into very great
wickedness, and become incurable, we ought no longer to show them
friendliness. It is for this reason that both Divine and human laws
command such like sinners to be put to death, because there is
greater likelihood of their harming others than of their mending
their ways. Nevertheless the judge puts this into effect, not out of
hatred for the sinners, but out of the love of charity, by reason of
which he prefers the public good to the life of the individual.
Moreover the death inflicted by the judge profits the sinner, if he
be converted, unto the expiation of his crime; and, if he be not
converted, it profits so as to put an end to the sin, because the
sinner is thus deprived of the power to sin any more.

Reply Obj. 3: Such like imprecations which we come across in Holy
Writ, may be understood in three ways: first, by way of prediction,
not by way of wish, so that the sense is: "May the wicked be," that
is, "The wicked shall be, turned into hell." Secondly, by way of
wish, yet so that the desire of the wisher is not referred to the
man's punishment, but to the justice of the punisher, according to
Ps. 57:11: "The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge,"
since, according to Wis. 1:13, not even God "hath pleasure in the
destruction of the wicked [Vulg.: 'living']" when He punishes them,
but He rejoices in His justice, according to Ps. 10:8: "The Lord is
just and hath loved justice." Thirdly, so that this desire is
referred to the removal of the sin, and not to the punishment itself,
to the effect, namely, that the sin be destroyed, but that the man
may live.

Reply Obj. 4: We love sinners out of charity, not so as to will what
they will, or to rejoice in what gives them joy, but so as to make
them will what we will, and rejoice in what rejoices us. Hence it is
written (Jer. 15:19): "They shall be turned to thee, and thou shalt
not to be turned to them."

Reply Obj. 5: The weak should avoid associating with sinners, on
account of the danger in which they stand of being perverted by them.
But it is commendable for the perfect, of whose perversion there is
no fear, to associate with sinners that they may convert them. For
thus did Our Lord eat and drink with sinners as related by Matt.
9:11-13. Yet all should avoid the society of sinners, as regards
fellowship in sin; in this sense it is written (2 Cor. 6:17): "Go out
from among them . . . and touch not the unclean thing," i.e. by
consenting to sin.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 7]

Whether Sinners Love Themselves?

Objection 1: It would seem that sinners love themselves. For that
which is the principle of sin, is most of all in the sinner. Now love
of self is the principle of sin, since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
xiv, 28) that it "builds up the city of Babylon." Therefore sinners
most of all love themselves.

Obj. 2: Further, sin does not destroy nature. Now it is in keeping
with nature that every man should love himself: wherefore even
irrational creatures naturally desire their own good, for instance,
the preservation of their being, and so forth. Therefore sinners love
themselves.

Obj. 3: Further, good is beloved by all, as Dionysius states (Div.
Nom. iv). Now many sinners reckon themselves to be good. Therefore
many sinners love themselves.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 10:6): "He that loveth
iniquity, hateth his own soul."

_I answer that,_ Love of self is common to all, in one way; in
another way it is proper to the good; in a third way, it is proper to
the wicked. For it is common to all for each one to love what he
thinks himself to be. Now a man is said to be a thing, in two ways:
first, in respect of his substance and nature, and, this way all
think themselves to be what they are, that is, composed of a soul and
body. In this way too, all men, both good and wicked, love
themselves, in so far as they love their own preservation.

Secondly, a man is said to be something in respect of some
predominance, as the sovereign of a state is spoken of as being the
state, and so, what the sovereign does, the state is said to do. In
this way, all do not think themselves to be what they are. For the
reasoning mind is the predominant part of man, while the sensitive
and corporeal nature takes the second place, the former of which the
Apostle calls the "inward man," and the latter, the "outward man" (2
Cor. 4:16). Now the good look upon their rational nature or the
inward man as being the chief thing in them, wherefore in this way
they think themselves to be what they are. On the other hand, the
wicked reckon their sensitive and corporeal nature, or the outward
man, to hold the first place. Wherefore, since they know not
themselves aright, they do not love themselves aright, but love what
they think themselves to be. But the good know themselves truly, and
therefore truly love themselves.

The Philosopher proves this from five things that are proper to
friendship. For in the first place, every friend wishes his friend to
be and to live; secondly, he desires good things for him; thirdly, he
does good things to him; fourthly, he takes pleasure in his company;
fifthly, he is of one mind with him, rejoicing and sorrowing in
almost the same things. In this way the good love themselves, as to
the inward man, because they wish the preservation thereof in its
integrity, they desire good things for him, namely spiritual goods,
indeed they do their best to obtain them, and they take pleasure in
entering into their own hearts, because they find there good thoughts
in the present, the memory of past good, and the hope of future good,
all of which are sources of pleasure. Likewise they experience no
clashing of wills, since their whole soul tends to one thing.

On the other hand, the wicked have no wish to be preserved in the
integrity of the inward man, nor do they desire spiritual goods for
him, nor do they work for that end, nor do they take pleasure in
their own company by entering into their own hearts, because whatever
they find there, present, past and future, is evil and horrible; nor
do they agree with themselves, on account of the gnawings of
conscience, according to Ps. 49:21: "I will reprove thee and set
before thy face."

In the same manner it may be shown that the wicked love themselves,
as regards the corruption of the outward man, whereas the good do not
love themselves thus.

Reply Obj. 1: The love of self which is the principle of sin is that
which is proper to the wicked, and reaches "to the contempt of God,"
as stated in the passage quoted, because the wicked so desire
external goods as to despise spiritual goods.

Reply Obj. 2: Although natural love is not altogether forfeited by
wicked men, yet it is perverted in them, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 3: The wicked have some share of self-love, in so far as
they think themselves good. Yet such love of self is not true but
apparent: and even this is not possible in those who are very wicked.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 8]

Whether Charity Requires That We Should Love Our Enemies?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity does not require us to love
our enemies. For Augustine says (Enchiridion lxxiii) that "this great
good," namely, the love of our enemies, is "not so universal in its
application, as the object of our petition when we say: Forgive us
our trespasses." Now no one is forgiven sin without he have charity,
because, according to Prov. 10:12, "charity covereth all sins."
Therefore charity does not require that we should love our enemies.

Obj. 2: Further, charity does not do away with nature. Now
everything, even an irrational being, naturally hates its contrary,
as a lamb hates a wolf, and water fire. Therefore charity does not
make us love our enemies.

Obj. 3: Further, charity "doth nothing perversely" (1 Cor. 13:4). Now
it seems perverse to love one's enemies, as it would be to hate one's
friends: hence Joab upbraided David by saying (2 Kings 19:6): "Thou
lovest them that hate thee, and thou hatest them that love thee."
Therefore charity does not make us love our enemies.

_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 4:44): "Love your enemies."

_I answer that,_ Love of one's enemies may be understood in three
ways. First, as though we were to love our enemies as such: this is
perverse, and contrary to charity, since it implies love of that
which is evil in another.

Secondly love of one's enemies may mean that we love them as to their
nature, but in general: and in this sense charity requires that we
should love our enemies, namely, that in loving God and our neighbor,
we should not exclude our enemies from the love given to our neighbor
in general.

Thirdly, love of one's enemies may be considered as specially
directed to them, namely, that we should have a special movement of
love towards our enemies. Charity does not require this absolutely,
because it does not require that we should have a special movement of
love to every individual man, since this would be impossible.
Nevertheless charity does require this, in respect of our being
prepared in mind, namely, that we should be ready to love our enemies
individually, if the necessity were to occur. That man should
actually do so, and love his enemy for God's sake, without it being
necessary for him to do so, belongs to the perfection of charity. For
since man loves his neighbor, out of charity, for God's sake, the
more he loves God, the more does he put enmities aside and show love
towards his neighbor: thus if we loved a certain man very much, we
would love his children though they were unfriendly towards us. This
is the sense in which Augustine speaks in the passage quoted in the
First Objection, the Reply to which is therefore evident.

Reply Obj. 2: Everything naturally hates its contrary as such. Now
our enemies are contrary to us, as enemies, wherefore this itself
should be hateful to us, for their enmity should displease us. They
are not, however, contrary to us, as men and capable of happiness:
and it is as such that we are bound to love them.

Reply Obj. 3: It is wrong to love one's enemies as such: charity does
not do this, as stated above.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 9]

Whether It Is Necessary for Salvation That We Should Show Our Enemies
the Signs and Effects of Love?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity demands of a man to show his
enemy the signs or effects of love. For it is written (1 John 3:18):
"Let us not love in word nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth."
Now a man loves in deed by showing the one he loves signs and effects
of love. Therefore charity requires that a man show his enemies such
signs and effects of love.

Obj. 2: Further, Our Lord said in the same breath (Matt. 5:44): "Love
your enemies," and, "Do good to them that hate you." Now charity
demands that we love our enemies. Therefore it demands also that we
should "do good to them."

Obj. 3: Further, not only God but also our neighbor is the object of
charity. Now Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx),
that "love of God cannot be idle for wherever it is it does great
things, and if it ceases to work, it is no longer love." Hence
charity towards our neighbor cannot be without producing works. But
charity requires us to love our neighbor without exception, though he
be an enemy. Therefore charity requires us to show the signs and
effects of love towards our enemies.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Matt. 5:44, "Do good to them that hate
you," says: "To do good to one's enemies is the height of perfection"
[*Augustine, Enchiridion lxxiii]. Now charity does not require us to
do that which belongs to its perfection. Therefore charity does not
require us to show the signs and effects of love to our enemies.

_I answer that,_ The effects and signs of charity are the result of
inward love, and are in proportion with it. Now it is absolutely
necessary, for the fulfilment of the precept, that we should inwardly
love our enemies in general, but not individually, except as regards
the mind being prepared to do so, as explained above (A. 8).

We must accordingly apply this to the showing of the effects and
signs of love. For some of the signs and favors of love are shown to
our neighbors in general, as when we pray for all the faithful, or
for a whole people, or when anyone bestows a favor on a whole
community: and the fulfilment of the precept requires that we should
show such like favors or signs of love towards our enemies. For if we
did not so, it would be a proof of vengeful spite, and contrary to
what is written (Lev. 19:18): "Seek not revenge, nor be mindful of
the injury of thy citizens." But there are other favors or signs of
love, which one shows to certain persons in particular: and it is not
necessary for salvation that we show our enemies such like favors and
signs of love, except as regards being ready in our minds, for
instance to come to their assistance in a case of urgency, according
to Prov. 25:21: "If thy enemy be hungry, give him to eat; if he
thirst, give him . . . drink." Outside cases of urgency, to show such
like favors to an enemy belongs to the perfection of charity, whereby
we not only beware, as in duty bound, of being overcome by evil, but
also wish to overcome evil by good [*Rom. 12:21], which belongs to
perfection: for then we not only beware of being drawn into hatred on
account of the hurt done to us, but purpose to induce our enemy to
love us on account of our kindliness.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 10]

Whether We Ought to Love the Angels Out of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that we are not bound to love the angels
out of charity. For, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i), charity
is a twofold love: the love of God and of our neighbor. Now love of
the angels is not contained in the love of God, since they are
created substances; nor is it, seemingly, contained in the love of
our neighbor, since they do not belong with us to a common species.
Therefore we are not bound to love them out of charity.

Obj. 2: Further, dumb animals have more in common with us than the
angels have, since they belong to the same proximate genus as we do.
But we have not charity towards dumb animals, as stated above (A. 3).
Neither, therefore, have we towards the angels.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing is so proper to friends as companionship
with one another (Ethic. viii, 5). But the angels are not our
companions; we cannot even see them. Therefore we are unable to give
them the friendship of charity.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 30): "If the
name of neighbor is given either to those whom we pity, or to those
who pity us, it is evident that the precept binding us to love our
neighbor includes also the holy angels from whom we receive many
merciful favors."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 23, A. 1), the friendship of
charity is founded upon the fellowship of everlasting happiness, in
which men share in common with the angels. For it is written (Matt.
22:30) that "in the resurrection . . . men shall be as the angels of
God in heaven." It is therefore evident that the friendship of
charity extends also to the angels.

Reply Obj. 1: Our neighbor is not only one who is united to us in a
common species, but also one who is united to us by sharing in the
blessings pertaining to everlasting life, and it is on the latter
fellowship that the friendship of charity is founded.

Reply Obj. 2: Dumb animals are united to us in the proximate
genus, by reason of their sensitive nature; whereas we are partakers
of everlasting happiness, by reason not of our sensitive nature but of
our rational mind wherein we associate with the angels.

Reply Obj. 3: The companionship of the angels does not consist
in outward fellowship, which we have in respect of our sensitive
nature; it consists in a fellowship of the mind, imperfect indeed in
this life, but perfect in heaven, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1, ad 1).
_______________________

ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 11]

Whether We Are Bound to Love the Demons Out of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to love the demons out of
charity. For the angels are our neighbors by reason of their
fellowship with us in a rational mind. But the demons also share in
our fellowship thus, since natural gifts, such as life and
understanding, remain in them unimpaired, as Dionysius states (Div.
Nom. iv). Therefore we ought to love the demons out of charity.

Obj. 2: Further, the demons differ from the blessed angels in the
matter of sin, even as sinners from just men. Now the just man loves
the sinner out of charity. Therefore he ought to love the demons also
out of charity.

Obj. 3: Further, we ought, out of charity, to love, as being our
neighbors, those from whom we receive favors, as appears from the
passage of Augustine quoted above (A. 9). Now the demons are useful
to us in many things, for "by tempting us they work crowns for us,"
as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 17). Therefore we ought to love
the demons out of charity.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 28:18): "Your league with
death shall be abolished, and your covenant with hell shall not
stand." Now the perfection of a peace and covenant is through
charity. Therefore we ought not to have charity for the demons who
live in hell and compass death.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), in the sinner, we are bound,
out of charity, to love his nature, but to hate his sin. But the name
of demon is given to designate a nature deformed by sin, wherefore
demons should not be loved out of charity. Without however laying
stress on the word, the question as to whether the spirits called
demons ought to be loved out of charity, must be answered in
accordance with the statement made above (AA. 2, 3), that a thing may
be loved out of charity in two ways. First, a thing may be loved as
the person who is the object of friendship, and thus we cannot have
the friendship of charity towards the demons. For it is an essential
part of friendship that one should be a well-wisher towards one's
friend; and it is impossible for us, out of charity, to desire the
good of everlasting life, to which charity is referred, for those
spirits whom God has condemned eternally, since this would be in
opposition to our charity towards God whereby we approve of His
justice.

Secondly, we love a thing as being that which we desire to be
enduring as another's good. In this way we love irrational creatures
out of charity, in as much as we wish them to endure, to give glory
to God and be useful to man, as stated above (A. 3): and in this way
too we can love the nature of the demons even out of charity, in as
much as we desire those spirits to endure, as to their natural gifts,
unto God's glory.

Reply Obj. 1: The possession of everlasting happiness is not
impossible for the angelic mind as it is for the mind of a demon;
consequently the friendship of charity which is based on the
fellowship of everlasting life, rather than on the fellowship of
nature, is possible towards the angels, but not towards the demons.

Reply Obj. 2: In this life, men who are in sin retain the possibility
of obtaining everlasting happiness: not so those who are lost in
hell, who, in this respect, are in the same case as the demons.

Reply Obj. 3: That the demons are useful to us is due not to
their intention but to the ordering of Divine providence; hence this
leads us to be friends, not with them, but with God, Who turns their
perverse intention to our profit.
_______________________

TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 12]

Whether Four Things Are Rightly Reckoned As to Be Loved Out of
Charity, Viz. God, Our Neighbor, Our Body and Ourselves?

Objection 1: It would seem that these four things are not rightly
reckoned as to be loved out of charity, to wit: God, our neighbor,
our body, and ourselves. For, as Augustine states (Tract. super Joan.
lxxxiii), "he that loveth not God, loveth not himself." Hence love of
oneself is included in the love of God. Therefore love of oneself is
not distinct from the love of God.

Obj. 2: Further, a part ought not to be condivided with the whole.
But our body is part of ourselves. Therefore it ought not to be
condivided with ourselves as a distinct object of love.

Obj. 3: Further, just as a man has a body, so has his neighbor. Since
then the love with which a man loves his neighbor, is distinct from
the love with which a man loves himself, so the love with which a man
loves his neighbor's body, ought to be distinct from the love with
which he loves his own body. Therefore these four things are not
rightly distinguished as objects to be loved out of charity.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23): "There
are four things to be loved; one which is above us," namely God,
"another, which is ourselves, a third which is nigh to us," namely
our neighbor, "and a fourth which is beneath us," namely our own body.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 23, AA. 1, 5), the friendship of
charity is based on the fellowship of happiness. Now, in this
fellowship, one thing is considered as the principle from which
happiness flows, namely God; a second is that which directly partakes
of happiness, namely men and angels; a third is a thing to which
happiness comes by a kind of overflow, namely the human body.

Now the source from which happiness flows is lovable by reason of its
being the cause of happiness: that which is a partaker of happiness,
can be an object of love for two reasons, either through being
identified with ourselves, or through being associated with us in
partaking of happiness, and in this respect, there are two things to
be loved out of charity, in as much as man loves both himself and his
neighbor.

Reply Obj. 1: The different relations between a lover and the various
things loved make a different kind of lovableness. Accordingly, since
the relation between the human lover and God is different from his
relation to himself, these two are reckoned as distinct objects of
love, for the love of the one is the cause of the love of the other,
so that the former love being removed the latter is taken away.

Reply Obj. 2: The subject of charity is the rational mind that can be
capable of obtaining happiness, to which the body does not reach
directly, but only by a kind of overflow. Hence, by his reasonable
mind which holds the first place in him, man, out of charity, loves
himself in one way, and his own body in another.

Reply Obj. 3: Man loves his neighbor, both as to his soul and as to
his body, by reason of a certain fellowship in happiness. Wherefore,
on the part of his neighbor, there is only one reason for loving him;
and our neighbor's body is not reckoned as a special object of love.
_______________________

QUESTION 26

OF THE ORDER OF CHARITY
(In Thirteen Articles)

We must now consider the order of charity, under which head there are
thirteen points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is an order in charity?

(2) Whether man ought to love God more than his neighbor?

(3) Whether more than himself?

(4) Whether he ought to love himself more than his neighbor?

(5) Whether man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body?

(6) Whether he ought to love one neighbor more than another?

(7) Whether he ought to love more, a neighbor who is better, or one
who is more closely united to him?

(8) Whether he ought to love more, one who is akin to him by blood, or
one who is united to him by other ties?

(9) Whether, out of charity, a man ought to love his son more than his
father?

(10) Whether he ought to love his mother more than his father?

(11) Whether he ought to love his wife more than his father or mother?

(12) Whether we ought to love those who are kind to us more than those
whom we are kind to?

(13) Whether the order of charity endures in heaven?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 1]

Whether There Is Order in Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no order in charity. For
charity is a virtue. But no order is assigned to the other virtues.
Neither, therefore, should any order be assigned to charity.

Obj. 2: Further, just as the object of faith is the First Truth, so
is the object of charity the Sovereign Good. Now no order is
appointed for faith, but all things are believed equally. Neither,
therefore, ought there to be any order in charity.

Obj. 3: Further, charity is in the will: whereas ordering belongs,
not to the will, but to the reason. Therefore no order should be
ascribed to charity.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Cant 2:4): "He brought me into the
cellar of wine, he set in order charity in me."

_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 16), the
terms "before" and "after" are used in reference to some principle.
Now order implies that certain things are, in some way, before or
after. Hence wherever there is a principle, there must needs be also
order of some kind. But it has been said above (Q. 23, A. 1; Q. 25,
A. 12) that the love of charity tends to God as to the principle of
happiness, on the fellowship of which the friendship of charity is
based. Consequently there must needs be some order in things loved
out of charity, which order is in reference to the first principle of
that love, which is God.

Reply Obj. 1: Charity tends towards the last end considered as last
end: and this does not apply to any other virtue, as stated above (Q.
23, A. 6). Now the end has the character of principle in matters of
appetite and action, as was shown above (Q. 23, A. 7, ad 2; I-II, A.
1, ad 1). Wherefore charity, above all, implies relation to the First
Principle, and consequently, in charity above all, we find an order
in reference to the First Principle.

Reply Obj. 2: Faith pertains to the cognitive power, whose operation
depends on the thing known being in the knower. On the other hand,
charity is in an appetitive power, whose operation consists in the
soul tending to things themselves. Now order is to be found in things
themselves, and flows from them into our knowledge. Hence order is
more appropriate to charity than to faith.

And yet there is a certain order in faith, in so far as it is chiefly
about God, and secondarily about things referred to God.

Reply Obj. 3: Order belongs to reason as the faculty that orders, and
to the appetitive power as to the faculty which is ordered. It is in
this way that order is stated to be in charity.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 2]

Whether God Ought to Be Loved More Than Our Neighbor?

Objection 1: It would seem that God ought not to be loved more than
our neighbor. For it is written (1 John 4:20): "He that loveth not
his brother whom he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?"
Whence it seems to follow that the more a thing is visible the more
lovable it is, since loving begins with seeing, according to _Ethic._
ix, 5, 12. Now God is less visible than our neighbor. Therefore He is
less lovable, out of charity, than our neighbor.

Obj. 2: Further, likeness causes love, according to Ecclus. 13:19:
"Every beast loveth its like." Now man bears more likeness to his
neighbor than to God. Therefore man loves his neighbor, out of
charity, more than he loves God.

Obj. 3: Further, what charity loves in a neighbor, is God, according
to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22, 27). Now God is not greater in
Himself than He is in our neighbor. Therefore He is not more to be
loved in Himself than in our neighbor. Therefore we ought not to love
God more than our neighbor.

_On the contrary,_ A thing ought to be loved more, if others ought to
be hated on its account. Now we ought to hate our neighbor for God's
sake, if, to wit, he leads us astray from God, according to Luke
14:26: "If any man come to Me and hate not his father, and mother,
and wife, end children, and brethren, and sisters . . . he cannot be
My disciple." Therefore we ought to love God, out of charity, more
than our neighbor.

_I answer that,_ Each kind of friendship regards chiefly the subject
in which we chiefly find the good on the fellowship of which that
friendship is based: thus civil friendship regards chiefly the ruler
of the state, on whom the entire common good of the state depends;
hence to him before all, the citizens owe fidelity and obedience. Now
the friendship of charity is based on the fellowship of happiness,
which consists essentially in God, as the First Principle, whence it
flows to all who are capable of happiness.

Therefore God ought to be loved chiefly and before all out of
charity: for He is loved as the cause of happiness, whereas our
neighbor is loved as receiving together with us a share of happiness
from Him.

Reply Obj. 1: A thing is a cause of love in two ways: first, as being
the reason for loving. In this way good is the cause of love, since
each thing is loved according to its measure of goodness. Secondly, a
thing causes love, as being a way to acquire love. It is in this way
that seeing is the cause of loving, not as though a thing were
lovable according as it is visible, but because by seeing a thing we
are led to love it. Hence it does not follow that what is more
visible is more lovable, but that as an object of love we meet with
it before others: and that is the sense of the Apostle's argument.
For, since our neighbor is more visible to us, he is the first
lovable object we meet with, because "the soul learns, from those
things it knows, to love what it knows not," as Gregory says in a
homily (In Evang. xi). Hence it can be argued that, if any man loves
not his neighbor, neither does he love God, not because his neighbor
is more lovable, but because he is the first thing to demand our
love: and God is more lovable by reason of His greater goodness.

Reply Obj. 2: The likeness we have to God precedes and causes the
likeness we have to our neighbor: because from the very fact that we
share along with our neighbor in something received from God, we
become like to our neighbor. Hence by reason of this likeness we
ought to love God more than we love our neighbor.

Reply Obj. 3: Considered in His substance, God is equally in
all, in whomsoever He may be, for He is not lessened by being in
anything. And yet our neighbor does not possess God's goodness equally
with God, for God has it essentially, and our neighbor by
participation.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 3]

Whether Out of Charity, Man Is Bound to Love God More Than Himself?

Objection 1: It would seem that man is not bound, out of charity, to
love God more than himself. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8)
that "a man's friendly relations with others arise from his friendly
relations with himself." Now the cause is stronger than its effect.
Therefore man's friendship towards himself is greater than his
friendship for anyone else. Therefore he ought to love himself more
than God.

Obj. 2: Further, one loves a thing in so far as it is one's own good.
Now the reason for loving a thing is more loved than the thing itself
which is loved for that reason, even as the principles which are the
reason for knowing a thing are more known. Therefore man loves
himself more than any other good loved by him. Therefore he does not
love God more than himself.

Obj. 3: Further, a man loves God as much as he loves to enjoy God.
But a man loves himself as much as he loves to enjoy God; since this
is the highest good a man can wish for himself. Therefore man is not
bound, out of charity, to love God more than himself.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22): "If thou
oughtest to love thyself, not for thy own sake, but for the sake of
Him in Whom is the rightest end of thy love, let no other man take
offense if him also thou lovest for God's sake." Now "the cause of a
thing being such is yet more so." Therefore man ought to love God
more than himself.

_I answer that,_ The good we receive from God is twofold, the good of
nature, and the good of grace. Now the fellowship of natural goods
bestowed on us by God is the foundation of natural love, in virtue of
which not only man, so long as his nature remains unimpaired, loves
God above all things and more than himself, but also every single
creature, each in its own way, i.e. either by an intellectual, or by
a rational, or by an animal, or at least by a natural love, as stones
do, for instance, and other things bereft of knowledge, because each
part naturally loves the common good of the whole more than its own
particular good. This is evidenced by its operation, since the
principal inclination of each part is towards common action conducive
to the good of the whole. It may also be seen in civic virtues
whereby sometimes the citizens suffer damage even to their own
property and persons for the sake of the common good. Wherefore much
more is this realized with regard to the friendship of charity which
is based on the fellowship of the gifts of grace.

Therefore man ought, out of charity, to love God, Who is the common
good of all, more than himself: since happiness is in God as in the
universal and fountain principle of all who are able to have a share
of that happiness.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of friendly relations
towards another person in whom the good, which is the object of
friendship, resides in some restricted way; and not of friendly
relations with another in whom the aforesaid good resides in totality.

Reply Obj. 2: The part does indeed love the good of the whole, as
becomes a part, not however so as to refer the good of the whole to
itself, but rather itself to the good of the whole.

Reply Obj. 3: That a man wishes to enjoy God pertains to that love of
God which is love of concupiscence. Now we love God with the love of
friendship more than with the love of concupiscence, because the
Divine good is greater in itself, than our share of good in enjoying
Him. Hence, out of charity, man simply loves God more than himself.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 4]

Whether Out of Charity, Man Ought to Love Himself More Than His
Neighbor?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought not, out of charity, to
love himself more than his neighbor. For the principal object of
charity is God, as stated above (A. 2; Q. 25, AA. 1, 12). Now
sometimes our neighbor is more closely united to God than we are
ourselves. Therefore we ought to love such a one more than ourselves.

Obj. 2: Further, the more we love a person, the more we avoid
injuring him. Now a man, out of charity, submits to injury for his
neighbor's sake, according to Prov. 12:26: "He that neglecteth a loss
for the sake of a friend, is just." Therefore a man ought, out of
charity, to love his neighbor more than himself.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 13:5) "charity seeketh not its
own." Now the thing we love most is the one whose good we seek most.
Therefore a man does not, out of charity, love himself more than his
neighbor.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lev. 19:18, Matt. 22:39): "Thou
shalt love thy neighbor (Lev. 19:18: 'friend') as thyself." Whence it
seems to follow that man's love for himself is the model of his love
for another. But the model exceeds the copy. Therefore, out of
charity, a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor.

_I answer that,_ There are two things in man, his spiritual nature
and his corporeal nature. And a man is said to love himself by reason
of his loving himself with regard to his spiritual nature, as stated
above (Q. 25, A. 7): so that accordingly, a man ought, out of
charity, to love himself more than he loves any other person.

This is evident from the very reason for loving: since, as stated
above (Q. 25, AA. 1, 12), God is loved as the principle of good, on
which the love of charity is founded; while man, out of charity,
loves himself by reason of his being a partaker of the aforesaid
good, and loves his neighbor by reason of his fellowship in that
good. Now fellowship is a reason for love according to a certain
union in relation to God. Wherefore just as unity surpasses union,
the fact that man himself has a share of the Divine good, is a more
potent reason for loving than that another should be a partner with
him in that share. Therefore man, out of charity, ought to love
himself more than his neighbor: in sign whereof, a man ought not to
give way to any evil of sin, which counteracts his share of
happiness, not even that he may free his neighbor from sin.

Reply Obj. 1: The love of charity takes its quantity not only from
its object which is God, but also from the lover, who is the man that
has charity, even as the quantity of any action depends in some way
on the subject. Wherefore, though a better neighbor is nearer to God,
yet because he is not as near to the man who has charity, as this man
is to himself, it does not follow that a man is bound to love his
neighbor more than himself.

Reply Obj. 2: A man ought to bear bodily injury for his friend's
sake, and precisely in so doing he loves himself more as regards his
spiritual mind, because it pertains to the perfection of virtue,
which is a good of the mind. In spiritual matters, however, man ought
not to suffer injury by sinning, in order to free his neighbor from
sin, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), the saying,
"'charity seeks not her own,' means that it prefers the common to the
private good." Now the common good is always more lovable to the
individual than his private good, even as the good of the whole is
more lovable to the part, than the latter's own partial good, as
stated above (A. 3).
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 5]

Whether a Man Ought to Love His Neighbor More Than His Own Body?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to love his
neighbor more than his own body. For his neighbor includes his
neighbor's body. If therefore a man ought to love his neighbor more
than his own body, it follows that he ought to love his neighbor's
body more than his own.

Obj. 2: Further, a man ought to love his own soul more than his
neighbor's, as stated above (A. 4). Now a man's own body is nearer to
his soul than his neighbor. Therefore we ought to love our body more
than our neighbor.

Obj. 3: Further, a man imperils that which he loves less for the sake
of what he loves more. Now every man is not bound to imperil his own
body for his neighbor's safety: this belongs to the perfect,
according to John 15:13: "Greater love than this no man hath, that a
man lay down his life for his friends." Therefore a man is not bound,
out of charity, to love his neighbor more than his own body.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that "we
ought to love our neighbor more than our own body."

_I answer that,_ Out of charity we ought to love more that which has
more fully the reason for being loved out of charity, as stated above
(A. 2; Q. 25, A. 12). Now fellowship in the full participation of
happiness which is the reason for loving one's neighbor, is a greater
reason for loving, than the participation of happiness by way of
overflow, which is the reason for loving one's own body. Therefore,
as regards the welfare of the soul we ought to love our neighbor more
than our own body.

Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) a thing
seems to be that which is predominant in it: so that when we say that
we ought to love our neighbor more than our own body, this refers to
his soul, which is his predominant part.

Reply Obj. 2: Our body is nearer to our soul than our
neighbor, as regards the constitution of our own nature: but as
regards the participation of happiness, our neighbor's soul is more
closely associated with our own soul, than even our own body is.

Reply Obj. 3: Every man is immediately concerned with the care
of his own body, but not with his neighbor's welfare, except perhaps
in cases of urgency: wherefore charity does not necessarily require a
man to imperil his own body for his neighbor's welfare, except in a
case where he is under obligation to do so; and if a man of his own
accord offer himself for that purpose, this belongs to the perfection
of charity.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 6]

Whether We Ought to Love One Neighbor More Than Another?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love one neighbor
more than another. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28): "One
ought to love all men equally. Since, however, one cannot do good to
all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by reason of place, time
or any other circumstance, by a kind of chance, are more closely
united to us." Therefore one neighbor ought not to be loved more than
another.

Obj. 2: Further, where there is one and the same reason for loving
several, there should be no inequality of love. Now there is one and
the same reason for loving all one's neighbors, which reason is God,
as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27). Therefore we ought to
love all our neighbors equally.

Obj. 3: Further, to love a man is to wish him good things, as the
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4). Now to all our neighbors we wish an
equal good, viz. everlasting life. Therefore we ought to love all our
neighbors equally.

_On the contrary,_ One's obligation to love a person is proportionate
to the gravity of the sin one commits in acting against that love.
Now it is a more grievous sin to act against the love of certain
neighbors, than against the love of others. Hence the commandment
(Lev. 10:9), "He that curseth his father or mother, dying let him
die," which does not apply to those who cursed others than the above.
Therefore we ought to love some neighbors more than others.

_I answer that,_ There have been two opinions on this question: for
some have said that we ought, out of charity, to love all our
neighbors equally, as regards our affection, but not as regards the
outward effect. They held that the order of love is to be understood
as applying to outward favors, which we ought to confer on those who
are connected with us in preference to those who are unconnected, and
not to the inward affection, which ought to be given equally to all
including our enemies.

But this is unreasonable. For the affection of charity, which is the
inclination of grace, is not less orderly than the natural appetite,
which is the inclination of nature, for both inclinations flow from
Divine wisdom. Now we observe in the physical order that the natural
inclination in each thing is proportionate to the act or movement
that is becoming to the nature of that thing: thus in earth the
inclination of gravity is greater than in water, because it is
becoming to earth to be beneath water. Consequently the inclination
also of grace which is the effect of charity, must needs be
proportionate to those actions which have to be performed outwardly,
so that, to wit, the affection of our charity be more intense towards
those to whom we ought to behave with greater kindness.

We must, therefore, say that, even as regards the affection we ought
to love one neighbor more than another. The reason is that, since the
principle of love is God, and the person who loves, it must needs be
that the affection of love increases in proportion to the nearness to
one or the other of those principles. For as we stated above (A. 1),
wherever we find a principle, order depends on relation to that
principle.

Reply Obj. 1: Love can be unequal in two ways: first on the part of
the good we wish our friend. In this respect we love all men equally
out of charity: because we wish them all one same generic good,
namely everlasting happiness. Secondly love is said to be greater
through its action being more intense: and in this way we ought not
to love all equally.

Or we may reply that we have unequal love for certain persons in two
ways: first, through our loving some and not loving others. As
regards beneficence we are bound to observe this inequality, because
we cannot do good to all: but as regards benevolence, love ought not
to be thus unequal. The other inequality arises from our loving some
more than others: and Augustine does not mean to exclude the latter
inequality, but the former, as is evident from what he says of
beneficence.

Reply Obj. 2: Our neighbors are not all equally related to God; some
are nearer to Him, by reason of their greater goodness, and those we
ought, out of charity, to love more than those who are not so near to
Him.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the quantity of love on the
part of the good which we wish our friends.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 7]

Whether We Ought to Love Those Who Are Better More Than Those Who Are
More Closely United Us?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to love those who are better
more than those who are more closely united to us. For that which is
in no way hateful seems more lovable than that which is hateful for
some reason: just as a thing is all the whiter for having less black
mixed with it. Now those who are connected with us are hateful for
some reason, according to Luke 14:26: "If any man come to Me, and
hate not his father," etc. On the other hand good men are not hateful
for any reason. Therefore it seems that we ought to love those who
are better more than those who are more closely connected with us.

Obj. 2: Further, by charity above all, man is likened to God. But God
loves more the better man. Therefore man also, out of charity, ought
to love the better man more than one who is more closely united to
him.

Obj. 3: Further, in every friendship, that ought to be loved most
which has most to do with the foundation of that friendship: for, by
natural friendship we love most those who are connected with us by
nature, our parents for instance, or our children. Now the friendship
of charity is founded upon the fellowship of happiness, which has
more to do with better men than with those who are more closely
united to us. Therefore, out of charity, we ought to love better men
more than those who are more closely connected with us.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have not
care of his own and especially of those of his house, he hath denied
the faith, and is worse than an infidel." Now the inward affection of
charity ought to correspond to the outward effect. Therefore charity
regards those who are nearer to us before those who are better.

_I answer that,_ Every act should be proportionate both to its object
and to the agent. But from its object it takes its species, while,
from the power of the agent it takes the mode of its intensity: thus
movement has its species from the term to which it tends, while the
intensity of its speed arises from the disposition of the thing moved
and the power of the mover. Accordingly love takes its species from
its object, but its intensity is due to the lover.

Now the object of charity's love is God, and man is the lover.
Therefore the specific diversity of the love which is in accordance
with charity, as regards the love of our neighbor, depends on his
relation to God, so that, out of charity, we should wish a greater
good to one who is nearer to God; for though the good which charity
wishes to all, viz. everlasting happiness, is one in itself, yet it
has various degrees according to various shares of happiness, and it
belongs to charity to wish God's justice to be maintained, in
accordance with which better men have a fuller share of happiness.
And this regards the species of love; for there are different species
of love according to the different goods that we wish for those whom
we love.

On the other hand, the intensity of love is measured with regard to
the man who loves, and accordingly man loves those who are more
closely united to him, with more intense affection as to the good he
wishes for them, than he loves those who are better as to the greater
good he wishes for them.

Again a further difference must be observed here: for some neighbors
are connected with us by their natural origin, a connection which
cannot be severed, since that origin makes them to be what they are.
But the goodness of virtue, wherein some are close to God, can come
and go, increase and decrease, as was shown above (Q. 24, AA. 4, 10,
11). Hence it is possible for one, out of charity, to wish this man
who is more closely united to one, to be better than another, and so
reach a higher degree of happiness.

Moreover there is yet another reason for which, out of charity, we
love more those who are more nearly connected with us, since we love
them in more ways. For, towards those who are not connected with us
we have no other friendship than charity, whereas for those who are
connected with us, we have certain other friendships, according to
the way in which they are connected. Now since the good on which
every other friendship of the virtuous is based, is directed, as to
its end, to the good on which charity is based, it follows that
charity commands each act of another friendship, even as the art
which is about the end commands the art which is about the means.
Consequently this very act of loving someone because he is akin or
connected with us, or because he is a fellow-countryman or for any
like reason that is referable to the end of charity, can be commanded
by charity, so that, out of charity both eliciting and commanding, we
love in more ways those who are more nearly connected with us.

Reply Obj. 1: We are commanded to hate, in our kindred, not their
kinship, but only the fact of their being an obstacle between us and
God. In this respect they are not akin but hostile to us, according
to Micah 7:6: "A men's enemies are they of his own household."

Reply Obj. 2: Charity conforms man to God proportionately, by making
man comport himself towards what is his, as God does towards what is
His. For we may, out of charity, will certain things as becoming to
us which God does not will, because it becomes Him not to will them,
as stated above (I-II, Q. 19, A. 10), when we were treating of the
goodness of the will.

Reply Obj. 3: Charity elicits the act of love not only as regards the
object, but also as regards the lover, as stated above. The result is
that the man who is more nearly united to us is more loved.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 8]

Whether We Ought to Love More Those Who Are Connected with Us by Ties
of Blood?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love more those who
are more closely united to us by ties of blood. For it is written
(Prov. 18:24): "A man amiable in society, shall be more friendly than
a brother." Again, Valerius Maximus says (Fact. et Dict. Memor. iv
7): "The ties of friendship are most strong and in no way yield to
the ties of blood." Moreover it is quite certain and undeniable, that
as to the latter, the lot of birth is fortuitous, whereas we contract
the former by an untrammelled will, and a solid pledge. Therefore we
ought not to love more than others those who are united to us by ties
of blood.

Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 7): "I love not less
you whom I have begotten in the Gospel, than if I had begotten you in
wedlock, for nature is no more eager to love than grace." Surely we
ought to love those whom we expect to be with us for ever more than
those who will be with us only in this world. Therefore we should not
love our kindred more than those who are otherwise connected with us.

Obj. 3: Further, "Love is proved by deeds," as Gregory states (Hom.
in Evang. xxx). Now we are bound to do acts of love to others than
our kindred: thus in the army a man must obey his officer rather than
his father. Therefore we are not bound to love our kindred most of
all.

_On the contrary,_ The commandments of the decalogue contain a
special precept about the honor due to our parents (Ex. 20:12).
Therefore we ought to love more specially those who are united to us
by ties of blood.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 7), we ought out of charity to
love those who are more closely united to us more, both because our
love for them is more intense, and because there are more reasons for
loving them. Now intensity of love arises from the union of lover and
beloved: and therefore we should measure the love of different
persons according to the different kinds of union, so that a man is
more loved in matters touching that particular union in respect of
which he is loved. And, again, in comparing love to love we should
compare one union with another. Accordingly we must say that
friendship among blood relations is based upon their connection by
natural origin, the friendship of fellow-citizens on their civic
fellowship, and the friendship of those who are fighting side by side
on the comradeship of battle. Wherefore in matters pertaining to
nature we should love our kindred most, in matters concerning
relations between citizens, we should prefer our fellow-citizens, and
on the battlefield our fellow-soldiers. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. ix, 2) that "it is our duty to render to each class of people
such respect as is natural and appropriate. This is in fact the
principle upon which we seem to act, for we invite our relations to a
wedding . . . It would seem to be a special duty to afford our
parents the means of living . . . and to honor them."

The same applies to other kinds of friendship.

If however we compare union with union, it is evident that the union
arising from natural origin is prior to, and more stable than, all
others, because it is something affecting the very substance, whereas
other unions supervene and may cease altogether. Therefore the
friendship of kindred is more stable, while other friendships may be
stronger in respect of that which is proper to each of them.

Reply Obj. 1: In as much as the friendship of comrades originates
through their own choice, love of this kind takes precedence of the
love of kindred in matters where we are free to do as we choose, for
instance in matters of action. Yet the friendship of kindred is more
stable, since it is more natural, and preponderates over others in
matters touching nature: consequently we are more beholden to them in
the providing of necessaries.

Reply Obj. 2: Ambrose is speaking of love with regard to favors
respecting the fellowship of grace, namely, moral instruction. For in
this matter, a man ought to provide for his spiritual children whom
he has begotten spiritually, more than for the sons of his body, whom
he is bound to support in bodily sustenance.

Reply Obj. 3: The fact that in the battle a man obeys his officer
rather than his father proves, that he loves his father less, not
simply [but] relatively, i.e. as regards the love which is based on
fellowship in battle.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 9]

Whether a Man Ought, Out of Charity, to Love His Children More Than
His Father?

Objection 1: It seems that a man ought, out of charity, to love his
children more than his father. For we ought to love those more to
whom we are more bound to do good. Now we are more bound to do good
to our children than to our parents, since the Apostle says (2 Cor.
12:14): "Neither ought the children to lay up for the parents, but
the parents for the children." Therefore a man ought to love his
children more than his parents.

Obj. 2: Further, grace perfects nature. But parents naturally love
their children more than these love them, as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. viii, 12). Therefore a man ought to love his children more
than his parents.

Obj. 3: Further, man's affections are conformed to God by charity.
But God loves His children more than they love Him. Therefore we also
ought to love our children more than our parents.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose [*Origen, Hom. ii in Cant.] says: "We
ought to love God first, then our parents, then our children, and
lastly those of our household."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4, ad 1; A. 7), the degrees of
love may be measured from two standpoints. First, from that of the
object. In this respect the better a thing is, and the more like to
God, the more is it to be loved: and in this way a man ought to love
his father more than his children, because, to wit, he loves his
father as his principle, in which respect he is a more exalted good
and more like God.

Secondly, the degrees of love may be measured from the standpoint of
the lover, and in this respect a man loves more that which is more
closely connected with him, in which way a man's children are more
lovable to him than his father, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
viii). First, because parents love their children as being part of
themselves, whereas the father is not part of his son, so that the
love of a father for his children, is more like a man's love for
himself. Secondly, because parents know better that so and so is
their child than vice versa. Thirdly, because children are nearer to
their parents, as being part of them, than their parents are to them
to whom they stand in the relation of a principle. Fourthly, because
parents have loved longer, for the father begins to love his child at
once, whereas the child begins to love his father after a lapse of
time; and the longer love lasts, the stronger it is, according to
Ecclus. 9:14: "Forsake not an old friend, for the new will not be
like to him."

Reply Obj. 1: The debt due to a principle is submission of respect
and honor, whereas that due to the effect is one of influence and
care. Hence the duty of children to their parents consists chiefly in
honor: while that of parents to their children is especially one of
care.

Reply Obj. 2: It is natural for a man as father to love his children
more, if we consider them as closely connected with him: but if we
consider which is the more exalted good, the son naturally loves his
father more.

Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), God loves
us for our good and for His honor. Wherefore since our father is
related to us as principle, even as God is, it belongs properly to
the father to receive honor from his children, and to the children to
be provided by their parents with what is good for them. Nevertheless
in cases of necessity the child is bound out of the favors received
to provide for his parents before all.
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 10]

Whether a Man Ought to Love His Mother More Than His Father?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his mother more
than his father. For, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. i,
20), "the female produces the body in generation." Now man receives
his soul, not from his father, but from God by creation, as stated in
the First Part (Q. 90, A. 2; Q. 118). Therefore a man receives more
from his mother than from his father: and consequently he ought to
love her more than him.

Obj. 2: Further, where greater love is given, greater love is due.
Now a mother loves her child more than the father does: for the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7) that "mothers have greater love for
their children. For the mother labors more in child-bearing, and she
knows more surely than the father who are her children."

Obj. 3: Further, love should be more fond towards those who have
labored for us more, according to Rom. 16:6: "Salute Mary, who hath
labored much among you." Now the mother labors more than the father
in giving birth and education to her child; wherefore it is written
(Ecclus. 7:29): "Forget not the groanings of thy mother." Therefore a
man ought to love his mother more than his father.

_On the contrary,_ Jerome says on Ezech. 44:25 that "man ought to
love God the Father of all, and then his own father," and mentions
the mother afterwards.

_I answer that,_ In making such comparisons as this, we must take the
answer in the strict sense, so that the present question is whether
the father as father, ought to be loved more than the mother as
mother. The reason is that virtue and vice may make such a difference
in such like matters, that friendship may be diminished or destroyed,
as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. viii, 7). Hence Ambrose [*Origen,
Hom. ii in Cant.] says: "Good servants should be preferred to wicked
children."

Strictly speaking, however, the father should be loved more than the
mother. For father and mother are loved as principles of our natural
origin. Now the father is principle in a more excellent way than the
mother, because he is the active principle, while the mother is a
passive and material principle. Consequently, strictly speaking, the
father is to be loved more.

Reply Obj. 1: In the begetting of man, the mother supplies the
formless matter of the body; and the latter receives its form through
the formative power that is in the semen of the father. And though
this power cannot create the rational soul, yet it disposes the
matter of the body to receive that form.

Reply Obj. 2: This applies to another kind of love. For the
friendship between lover and lover differs specifically from the
friendship between child and parent: while the friendship we are
speaking of here, is that which a man owes his father and mother
through being begotten of them.

The Reply to the Third Objection is evident.
_______________________

ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 11]

Whether a Man Ought to Love His Wife More Than His Father and Mother?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his wife more
than his father and mother. For no man leaves a thing for another
unless he love the latter more. Now it is written (Gen. 2:24) that "a
man shell leave father and mother" on account of his wife. Therefore
a man ought to love his wife more than his father and mother.

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:33) that a husband should
"love his wife as himself." Now a man ought to love himself more than
his parents. Therefore he ought to love his wife also more than his
parents.

Obj. 2: Further, love should be greater where there are more reasons
for loving. Now there are more reasons for love in the friendship of
a man towards his wife. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12)
that "in this friendship there are the motives of utility, pleasure,
and also of virtue, if husband and wife are virtuous." Therefore a
man's love for his wife ought to be greater than his love for his
parents.

_On the contrary,_ According to Eph. 5:28, "men ought to love their
wives as their own bodies." Now a man ought to love his body less
than his neighbor, as stated above (A. 5): and among his neighbors he
should love his parents most. Therefore he ought to love his parents
more than his wife.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 9), the degrees of love may be
taken from the good (which is loved), or from the union between those
who love. On the part of the good which is the object loved, a man
should love his parents more than his wife, because he loves them as
his principles and considered as a more exalted good.

But on the part of the union, the wife ought to be loved more,
because she is united with her husband, as one flesh, according to
Matt. 19:6: "Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh."
Consequently a man loves his wife more intensely, but his parents
with greater reverence.

Reply Obj. 1: A man does not in all respects leave his father and
mother for the sake of his wife: for in certain cases a man ought to
succor his parents rather than his wife. He does however leave all
his kinsfolk, and cleaves to his wife as regards the union of carnal
connection and co-habitation.

Reply Obj. 2: The words of the Apostle do not mean that a man ought
to love his wife equally with himself, but that a man's love for
himself is the reason for his love of his wife, since she is one with
him.

Reply Obj. 3: There are also several reasons for a man's love for his
father; and these, in a certain respect, namely, as regards good, are
more weighty than those for which a man loves his wife; although the
latter outweigh the former as regards the closeness of the union.

As to the argument in the contrary sense, it must be observed that in
the words quoted, the particle "as" denotes not equality of love but
the motive of love. For the principal reason why a man loves his wife
is her being united to him in the flesh.
_______________________

TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 12]

Whether a Man Ought to Love More His Benefactor Than One He Has
Benefited?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his benefactor
more than one he has benefited. For Augustine says (De Catech. Rud.
iv): "Nothing will incite another more to love you than that you love
him first: for he must have a hard heart indeed, who not only refuses
to love, but declines to return love already given." Now a man's
benefactor forestalls him in the kindly deeds of charity. Therefore
we ought to love our benefactors above all.

Obj. 2: Further, the more grievously we sin by ceasing to love a man
or by working against him, the more ought we to love him. Now it is a
more grievous sin to cease loving a benefactor or to work against
him, than to cease loving one to whom one has hitherto done kindly
actions. Therefore we ought to love our benefactors more than those
to whom we are kind.

Obj. 3: Further, of all things lovable, God is to be loved most, and
then one's father, as Jerome says [*Comment. in Ezechiel xliv, 25].
Now these are our greatest benefactors. Therefore a benefactor should
be loved above all others.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7), that
"benefactors seem to love recipients of their benefactions, rather
than vice versa."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 9, 11), a thing is loved more
in two ways: first because it has the character of a more excellent
good, secondly by reason of a closer connection. In the first way we
ought to love our benefactor most, because, since he is a principle
of good to the man he has benefited, he has the character of a more
excellent good, as stated above with regard to one's father (A. 9).

In the second way, however, we love those more who have received
benefactions from us, as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. ix, 7) by
four arguments. First because the recipient of benefactions is the
handiwork of the benefactor, so that we are wont to say of a man: "He
was made by so and so." Now it is natural to a man to love his own
work (thus it is to be observed that poets love their own poems): and
the reason is that we love _to be_ and _to live,_ and these are made
manifest in our _action._ Secondly, because we all naturally love
that in which we see our own good. Now it is true that the benefactor
has some good of his in the recipient of his benefaction, and the
recipient some good in the benefactor; but the benefactor sees his
virtuous good in the recipient, while the recipient sees his useful
good in the benefactor. Now it gives more pleasure to see one's
virtuous good than one's useful good, both because it is more
enduring,--for usefulness quickly flits by, and the pleasure of
calling a thing to mind is not like the pleasure of having it
present--and because it is more pleasant to recall virtuous goods
than the profit we have derived from others. Thirdly, because is it
the lover's part to act, since he wills and works the good of the
beloved, while the beloved takes a passive part in receiving good, so
that to love surpasses being loved, for which reason the greater love
is on the part of the benefactor. Fourthly because it is more
difficult to give than to receive favors: and we are most fond of
things which have cost us most trouble, while we almost despise what
comes easy to us.

Reply Obj. 1: It is some thing in the benefactor that incites the
recipient to love him: whereas the benefactor loves the recipient,
not through being incited by him, but through being moved thereto of
his own accord: and what we do of our own accord surpasses what we do
through another.

Reply Obj. 2: The love of the beneficiary for the benefactor is more
of a duty, wherefore the contrary is the greater sin. On the other
hand, the love of the benefactor for the beneficiary is more
spontaneous, wherefore it is quicker to act.

Reply Obj. 3: God also loves us more than we love Him, and parents
love their children more than these love them. Yet it does not follow
that we love all who have received good from us, more than any of our
benefactors. For we prefer such benefactors as God and our parents,
from whom we have received the greatest favors, to those on whom we
have bestowed lesser benefits.
_______________________

THIRTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 13]

Whether the Order of Charity Endures in Heaven?

Objection 1: It would seem that the order of charity does not endure
in heaven. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xlviii): "Perfect
charity consists in loving greater goods more, and lesser goods
less." Now charity will be perfect in heaven. Therefore a man will
love those who are better more than either himself or those who are
connected with him.

Obj. 2: Further, we love more him to whom we wish a greater good. Now
each one in heaven wishes a greater good for those who have more
good, else his will would not be conformed in all things to God's
will: and there to be better is to have more good. Therefore in
heaven each one loves more those who are better, and consequently he
loves others more than himself, and one who is not connected with
him, more than one who is.

Obj. 3: Further, in heaven love will be entirely for God's sake, for
then will be fulfilled the words of 1 Cor. 15:28: "That God may be
all in all." Therefore he who is nearer God will be loved more, so
that a man will love a better man more than himself, and one who is
not connected with him, more than one who is.

_On the contrary,_ Nature is not done away, but perfected, by glory.
Now the order of charity given above (AA. 2, 3, 4) is derived from
nature: since all things naturally love themselves more than others.
Therefore this order of charity will endure in heaven.

_I answer that,_ The order of charity must needs remain in heaven, as
regards the love of God above all things. For this will be realized
simply when man shall enjoy God perfectly. But, as regards the order
between man himself and other men, a distinction would seem to be
necessary, because, as we stated above (AA. 7, 9), the degrees of
love may be distinguished either in respect of the good which a man
desires for another, or according to the intensity of love itself. In
the first way a man will love better men more than himself, and those
who are less good, less than himself: because, by reason of the
perfect conformity of the human to the Divine will, each of the
blessed will desire everyone to have what is due to him according to
Divine justice. Nor will that be a time for advancing by means of
merit to a yet greater reward, as happens now while it is possible
for a man to desire both the virtue and the reward of a better man,
whereas then the will of each one will rest within the limits
determined by God. But in the second way a man will love himself more
than even his better neighbors, because the intensity of the act of
love arises on the part of the person who loves, as stated above (AA.
7, 9). Moreover it is for this that the gift of charity is bestowed
by God on each one, namely, that he may first of all direct his mind
to God, and this pertains to a man's love for himself, and that, in
the second place, he may wish other things to be directed to God, and
even work for that end according to his capacity.

As to the order to be observed among our neighbors, a man will simply
love those who are better, according to the love of charity. Because
the entire life of the blessed consists in directing their minds to
God, wherefore the entire ordering of their love will be ruled with
respect to God, so that each one will love more and reckon to be
nearer to himself those who are nearer to God. For then one man will
no longer succor another, as he needs to in the present life, wherein
each man has to succor those who are closely connected with him
rather than those who are not, no matter what be the nature of their
distress: hence it is that in this life, a man, by the inclination of
charity, loves more those who are more closely united to him, for he
is under a greater obligation to bestow on them the effect of
charity. It will however be possible in heaven for a man to love in
several ways one who is connected with him, since the causes of
virtuous love will not be banished from the mind of the blessed. Yet
all these reasons are incomparably surpassed by that which is taken
from nighness to God.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument should be granted as to those who are
connected together; but as regards man himself, he ought to love
himself so much the more than others, as his charity is more perfect,
since perfect entire reason of his love, for God is man's charity
directs man to God perfectly, and this belongs to love of oneself, as
stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the order of charity in respect
of the degree of good one wills the person one loves.

Reply Obj. 3: God will be to each one the entire reason of his love,
for God is man's entire good. For if we make the impossible
supposition that God were not man's good, He would not be man's
reason for loving. Hence it is that in the order of love man should
love himself more than all else after God.
_______________________

QUESTION 27

OF THE PRINCIPAL ACT OF CHARITY, WHICH IS TO LOVE
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider the act of charity, and (1) the principal act of
charity, which is to love, (2) the other acts or effects which follow
from that act.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Which is the more proper to charity, to love or to be loved?

(2) Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as
goodwill?

(3) Whether God should be loved for His own sake?

(4) Whether God can be loved immediately in this life?

(5) Whether God can be loved wholly?

(6) Whether the love of God is according to measure?

(7) Which is the better, to love one's friend, or one's enemy?

(8) Which is the better, to love God, or one's neighbor?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 1]

Whether to Be Loved Is More Proper to Charity Than to Love?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is more proper to charity to be
loved than to love. For the better charity is to be found in those
who are themselves better. But those who are better should be more
loved. Therefore to be loved is more proper to charity.

Obj. 2: Further, that which is to be found in more subjects seems to
be more in keeping with nature, and, for that reason, better. Now, as
the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), "many would rather be loved
than love, and lovers of flattery always abound." Therefore it is
better to be loved than to love, and consequently it is more in
keeping with charity.

Obj. 3: Further, "the cause of anything being such is yet more so."
Now men love because they are loved, for Augustine says (De Catech.
Rud. iv) that "nothing incites another more to love you than that you
love him first." Therefore charity consists in being loved rather
than in loving.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that
friendship consists in loving rather than in being loved. Now charity
is a kind of friendship. Therefore it consists in loving rather than
in being loved.

_I answer that,_ To love belongs to charity as charity. For, since
charity is a virtue, by its very essence it has an inclination to its
proper act. Now to be loved is not the act of the charity of the
person loved; for this act is to love: and to be loved is competent
to him as coming under the common notion of good, in so far as
another tends towards his good by an act of charity. Hence it is
clear that to love is more proper to charity than to be loved: for
that which befits a thing by reason of itself and its essence is more
competent to it than that which is befitting to it by reason of
something else. This can be exemplified in two ways. First, in the
fact that friends are more commended for loving than for being loved,
indeed, if they be loved and yet love not, they are blamed. Secondly,
because a mother, whose love is the greatest, seeks rather to love
than to be loved: for "some women," as the Philosopher observes
(Ethic. viii, 8) "entrust their children to a nurse; they do love
them indeed, yet seek not to be loved in return, if they happen not
to be loved."

Reply Obj. 1: A better man, through being better, is more lovable;
but through having more perfect charity, loves more. He loves more,
however, in proportion to the person he loves. For a better man does
not love that which is beneath him less than it ought to be loved:
whereas he who is less good fails to love one who is better, as much
as he ought to be loved.

Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), "men wish to
be loved in as much as they wish to be honored." For just as honor is
bestowed on a man in order to bear witness to the good which is in
him, so by being loved a man is shown to have some good, since good
alone is lovable. Accordingly men seek to be loved and to be honored,
for the sake of something else, viz. to make known the good which is
in the person loved. On the other hand, those who have charity seek
to love for the sake of loving, as though this were itself the good
of charity, even as the act of any virtue is that virtue's good.
Hence it is more proper to charity to wish to love than to wish to be
loved.

Reply Obj. 3: Some love on account of being loved, not so that to be
loved is the end of their loving, but because it is a kind of way
leading a man to love.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 2]

Whether to Love Considered As an Act of Charity Is the Same As
Goodwill?

Objection 1: It would seem that to love, considered as an act of
charity, is nothing else than goodwill. For the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 4) that "to love is to wish a person well"; and this is
goodwill. Therefore the act of charity is nothing but goodwill.

Obj. 2: Further, the act belongs to the same subject as the habit.
Now the habit of charity is in the power of the will, as stated above
(Q. 24, A. 1). Therefore the act of charity is also an act of the
will. But it tends to good only, and this is goodwill. Therefore the
act of charity is nothing else than goodwill.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher reckons five things pertaining to
friendship (Ethic. ix, 4), the first of which is that a man should
wish his friend well; the second, that he should wish him to be and
to live; the third, that he should take pleasure in his company; the
fourth, that he should make choice of the same things; the fifth,
that he should grieve and rejoice with him. Now the first two pertain
to goodwill. Therefore goodwill is the first act of charity.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that "goodwill
is neither friendship nor love, but the beginning of friendship." Now
charity is friendship, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1). Therefore
goodwill is not the same as to love considered as an act of charity.

_I answer that,_ Goodwill properly speaking is that act of the will
whereby we wish well to another. Now this act of the will differs
from actual love, considered not only as being in the sensitive
appetite but also as being in the intellective appetite or will. For
the love which is in the sensitive appetite is a passion. Now every
passion seeks its object with a certain eagerness. And the passion of
love is not aroused suddenly, but is born of an earnest consideration
of the object loved; wherefore the Philosopher, showing the
difference between goodwill and the love which is a passion, says
(Ethic. ix, 5) that goodwill does not imply impetuosity or desire,
that is to say, has not an eager inclination, because it is by the
sole judgment of his reason that one man wishes another well. Again
such like love arises from previous acquaintance, whereas goodwill
sometimes arises suddenly, as happens to us if we look on at a
boxing-match, and we wish one of the boxers to win. But the love,
which is in the intellective appetite, also differs from goodwill,
because it denotes a certain union of affections between the lover
and the beloved, in as much as the lover deems the beloved as
somewhat united to him, or belonging to him, and so tends towards
him. On the other hand, goodwill is a simple act of the will, whereby
we wish a person well, even without presupposing the aforesaid union
of the affections with him. Accordingly, to love, considered as an
act of charity, includes goodwill, but such dilection or love adds
union of affections, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5)
that "goodwill is a beginning of friendship."

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher, by thus defining "to love," does not
describe it fully, but mentions only that part of its definition in
which the act of love is chiefly manifested.

Reply Obj. 2: To love is indeed an act of the will tending to the
good, but it adds a certain union with the beloved, which union is
not denoted by goodwill.

Reply Obj. 3: These things mentioned by the Philosopher belong to
friendship because they arise from a man's love for himself, as he
says in the same passage, in so far as a man does all these things in
respect of his friend, even as he does them to himself: and this
belongs to the aforesaid union of the affections.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 3]

Whether Out of Charity God Ought to Be Loved for Himself?

Objection 1: It would seem that God is loved out of charity, not for
Himself but for the sake of something else. For Gregory says in a
homily (In Evang. xi): "The soul learns from the things it knows, to
love those it knows not," where by things unknown he means the
intelligible and the Divine, and by things known he indicates the
objects of the senses. Therefore God is to be loved for the sake of
something else.

Obj. 2: Further, love follows knowledge. But God is known through
something else, according to Rom. 1:20: "The invisible things of God
are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made."
Therefore He is also loved on account of something else and not for
Himself.

Obj. 3: Further, "hope begets charity" as a gloss says on Matt. 1:1,
and "fear leads to charity," according to Augustine in his commentary
on the First Canonical Epistle of John (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract.
ix). Now hope looks forward to obtain something from God, while fear
shuns something which can be inflicted by God. Therefore it seems
that God is to be loved on account of some good we hope for, or some
evil to be feared. Therefore He is not to be loved for Himself.

_On the contrary,_ According to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i), to
enjoy is to cleave to something for its own sake. Now "God is to be
enjoyed" as he says in the same book. Therefore God is to be loved
for Himself.

_I answer that,_ The preposition "for" denotes a relation of
causality. Now there are four kinds of cause, viz., final, formal,
efficient, and material, to which a material disposition also is to
be reduced, though it is not a cause simply but relatively. According
to these four different causes one thing is said to be loved for
another. In respect of the final cause, we love medicine, for
instance, for health; in respect of the formal cause, we love a man
for his virtue, because, to wit, by his virtue he is formally good
and therefore lovable; in respect of the efficient cause, we love
certain men because, for instance, they are the sons of such and such
a father; and in respect of the disposition which is reducible to the
genus of a material cause, we speak of loving something for that
which disposed us to love it, e.g. we love a man for the favors
received from him, although after we have begun to love our friend,
we no longer love him for his favors, but for his virtue.
Accordingly, as regards the first three ways, we love God, not for
anything else, but for Himself. For He is not directed to anything
else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things; nor
does He require to receive any form in order to be good, for His very
substance is His goodness, which is itself the exemplar of all other
good things; nor again does goodness accrue to Him from aught else,
but from Him to all other things. In the fourth way, however, He can
be loved for something else, because we are disposed by certain
things to advance in His love, for instance, by favors bestowed by
Him, by the rewards we hope to receive from Him, or even by the
punishments which we are minded to avoid through Him.

Reply Obj. 1: From the things it knows the soul learns to love what
it knows not, not as though the things it knows were the reason for
its loving things it knows not, through being the formal, final, or
efficient cause of this love, but because this knowledge disposes man
to love the unknown.

Reply Obj. 2: Knowledge of God is indeed acquired through other
things, but after He is known, He is no longer known through them,
but through Himself, according to John 4:42: "We now believe, not for
thy saying: for we ourselves have heard Him, and know that this is
indeed the Saviour of the world."

Reply Obj. 3: Hope and fear lead to charity by way of a certain
disposition, as was shown above (Q. 17, A. 8; Q. 19, AA. 4, 7, 10).
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 4]

Whether God Can Be Loved Immediately in This Life?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be loved immediately in
this life. For the "unknown cannot be loved" as Augustine says (De
Trin. x, 1). Now we do not know God immediately in this life, since
"we see now through a glass, in a dark manner" (1 Cor. 13:12).
Neither, therefore, do we love Him immediately.

Obj. 2: Further, he who cannot do what is less, cannot do what is
more. Now it is more to love God than to know Him, since "he who is
joined" to God by love, is "one spirit with Him" (1 Cor. 6:17). But
man cannot know God immediately. Therefore much less can he love Him
immediately.

Obj. 3: Further, man is severed from God by sin, according to Isa.
59:2: "Your iniquities have divided between you and your God." Now
sin is in the will rather than in the intellect. Therefore man is
less able to love God immediately than to know Him immediately.

_On the contrary,_ Knowledge of God, through being mediate, is said
to be "enigmatic," and "falls away" in heaven, as stated in 1 Cor.
13:12. But charity "does not fall away" as stated in the same passage
(1 Cor. 13:12). Therefore the charity of the way adheres to God
immediately.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 3; Q. 84, A. 7), the
act of a cognitive power is completed by the thing known being in the
knower, whereas the act of an appetitive power consists in the
appetite being inclined towards the thing in itself. Hence it follows
that the movement of the appetitive power is towards things in
respect of their own condition, whereas the act of a cognitive power
follows the mode of the knower.

Now in itself the very order of things is such, that God is knowable
and lovable for Himself, since He is essentially truth and goodness
itself, whereby other things are known and loved: but with regard to
us, since our knowledge is derived through the senses, those things
are knowable first which are nearer to our senses, and the last term
of knowledge is that which is most remote from our senses.

Accordingly, we must assert that to love which is an act of the
appetitive power, even in this state of life, tends to God first, and
flows on from Him to other things, and in this sense charity loves
God immediately, and other things through God. On the other hand,
with regard to knowledge, it is the reverse, since we know God
through other things, either as a cause through its effects, or by
way of pre-eminence or negation as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i; cf.
I, Q. 12, A. 12).

Reply Obj. 1: Although the unknown cannot be loved, it does not
follow that the order of knowledge is the same as the order of love,
since love is the term of knowledge, and consequently, love can begin
at once where knowledge ends, namely in the thing itself which is
known through another thing.

Reply Obj. 2: Since to love God is something greater than to know
Him, especially in this state of life, it follows that love of God
presupposes knowledge of God. And because this knowledge does not
rest in creatures, but, through them, tends to something else, love
begins there, and thence goes on to other things by a circular
movement so to speak; for knowledge begins from creatures, tends to
God, and love begins with God as the last end, and passes on to
creatures.

Reply Obj. 3: Aversion from God, which is brought about by sin, is
removed by charity, but not by knowledge alone: hence charity, by
loving God, unites the soul immediately to Him with a chain of
spiritual union.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 5]

Whether God can be loved wholly? [*Cf. Q. 184, A. 2]

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be loved wholly. For love
follows knowledge. Now God cannot be wholly known by us, since this
would imply comprehension of Him. Therefore He cannot be wholly loved
by us.

Obj. 2: Further, love is a kind of union, as Dionysius shows (Div.
Nom. iv). But the heart of man cannot be wholly united to God,
because "God is greater than our heart" (1 John 3:20). Therefore God
cannot be loved wholly.

Obj. 3: Further, God loves Himself wholly. If therefore He be loved
wholly by another, this one will love Him as much as God loves
Himself. But this is unreasonable. Therefore God cannot be wholly
loved by a creature.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the
Lord thy God with thy whole heart."

_I answer that,_ Since love may be considered as something between
lover and beloved, when we ask whether God can be wholly loved, the
question may be understood in three ways, first so that the
qualification "wholly" be referred to the thing loved, and thus God
is to be loved wholly, since man should love all that pertains to God.

Secondly, it may be understood as though "wholly" qualified the
lover: and thus again God ought to be loved wholly, since man ought
to love God with all his might, and to refer all he has to the love
of God, according to Deut. 6:5: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God
with thy whole heart."

Thirdly, it may be understood by way of comparison of the lover to
the thing loved, so that the mode of the lover equal the mode of the
thing loved. This is impossible: for, since a thing is lovable in
proportion to its goodness, God is infinitely lovable, since His
goodness is infinite. Now no creature can love God infinitely,
because all power of creatures, whether it be natural or infused, is
finite.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, because the first
three objections consider the question in this third sense, while the
last takes it in the second sense.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 6]

Whether in Loving God We Ought to Observe Any Mode?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to observe some mode in
loving God. For the notion of good consists in mode, species and
order, as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni iii, iv). Now the love
of God is the best thing in man, according to Col. 3:14: "Above
all . . . things, have charity." Therefore there ought to be a
mode of the love of God.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. viii): "Prithee,
tell me which is the mode of love. For I fear lest I burn with the
desire and love of my Lord, more or less than I ought." But it would
be useless to seek the mode of the Divine love, unless there were
one. Therefore there is a mode of the love of God.

Obj. 3: Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), "the measure
which nature appoints to a thing, is its mode." Now the measure of
the human will, as also of external action, is the reason. Therefore
just as it is necessary for the reason to appoint a mode to the
exterior effect of charity, according to Rom. 12:1: "Your reasonable
service," so also the interior love of God requires a mode.

_On the contrary,_ Bernard says (De Dilig. Deum 1) that "God is the
cause of our loving God; the measure is to love Him without measure."

_I answer that,_ As appears from the words of Augustine quoted above
(Obj. 3) mode signifies a determination of measure; which
determination is to be found both in the measure and in the thing
measured, but not in the same way. For it is found in the measure
essentially, because a measure is of itself the determining and
modifying rule of other things; whereas in the things measured, it is
found relatively, that is in so far as they attain to the measure.
Hence there can be nothing unmodified in the measure whereas the
thing measured is unmodified if it fails to attain to the measure,
whether by deficiency or by excess.

Now in all matters of appetite and action the measure is the end,
because the proper reason for all that we desire or do should be
taken from the end, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 9).
Therefore the end has a mode by itself, while the means take their
mode from being proportionate to the end. Hence, according to the
Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), "in every art, the desire for the end is
endless and unlimited," whereas there is a limit to the means: thus
the physician does not put limits to health, but makes it as perfect
as he possibly can; but he puts a limit to medicine, for he does not
give as much medicine as he can, but according as health demands so
that if he give too much or too little, the medicine would be
immoderate.

Again, the end of all human actions and affections is the love of
God, whereby principally we attain to our last end, as stated above
(Q. 23, A. 6), wherefore the mode in the love of God, must not be
taken as in a thing measured where we find too much or too little,
but as in the measure itself, where there cannot be excess, and where
the more the rule is attained the better it is, so that the more we
love God the better our love is.

Reply Obj. 1: That which is so by its essence takes precedence of
that which is so through another, wherefore the goodness of the
measure which has the mode essentially, takes precedence of the
goodness of the thing measured, which has its mode through something
else; and so too, charity, which has a mode as a measure has, stands
before the other virtues, which have a mode through being measured.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine adds in the same passage, "the measure of
our love for God is to love Him with our whole heart," that is to
love Him as much as He can be loved, and this belongs to the mode
which is proper to the measure.

Reply Obj. 3: An affection, whose object is subject to
reason's judgment, should be measured by reason. But the object of the
Divine love which is God surpasses the judgment of reason, wherefore
it is not measured by reason but transcends it. Nor is there parity
between the interior act and external acts of charity. For the
interior act of charity has the character of an end, since man's
ultimate good consists in his soul cleaving to God, according to Ps.
72:28: "It is good for me to adhere to my God"; whereas the exterior
acts are as means to the end, and so have to be measured both
according to charity and according to reason.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 7]

Whether It Is More Meritorious to Love an Enemy Than to Love a Friend?

Objection 1: It would seem more meritorious to love an enemy than to
love a friend. For it is written (Matt. 5:46): "If you love them that
love you, what reward shall you have?" Therefore it is not deserving
of reward to love one's friend: whereas, as the same passage proves,
to love one's enemy is deserving of a reward. Therefore it is more
meritorious to love one's enemy than to love one's friend.

Obj. 2: Further, an act is the more meritorious through proceeding
from a greater charity. But it belongs to the perfect children of God
to love their enemies, whereas those also who have imperfect charity
love their friends. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's
enemy than to love one's friend.

Obj. 3: Further, where there is more effort for good, there seems to
be more merit, since "every man shall receive his own reward
according to his own labor" (1 Cor. 3:8). Now a man has to make a
greater effort to love his enemy than to love his friend, because it
is more difficult. Therefore it seems more meritorious to love one's
enemy than to love one's friend.

_On the contrary,_ The better an action is, the more meritorious it
is. Now it is better to love one's friend, since it is better to love
a better man, and the friend who loves you is better than the enemy
who hates you. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's friend
than to love one's enemy.

_I answer that,_ God is the reason for our loving our neighbor out of
charity, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1). When therefore it is asked
which is better or more meritorious, to love one's friend or one's
enemy, these two loves may be compared in two ways, first, on the
part of our neighbor whom we love, secondly, on the part of the
reason for which we love him.

In the first way, love of one's friend surpasses love of one's enemy,
because a friend is both better and more closely united to us, so
that he is a more suitable matter of love and consequently the act of
love that passes over this matter, is better, and therefore its
opposite is worse, for it is worse to hate a friend than an enemy.

In the second way, however, it is better to love one's enemy than
one's friend, and this for two reasons. First, because it is possible
to love one's friend for another reason than God, whereas God is the
only reason for loving one's enemy. Secondly, because if we suppose
that both are loved for God, our love for God is proved to be all the
stronger through carrying a man's affections to things which are
furthest from him, namely, to the love of his enemies, even as the
power of a furnace is proved to be the stronger, according as it
throws its heat to more distant objects. Hence our love for God is
proved to be so much the stronger, as the more difficult are the
things we accomplish for its sake, just as the power of fire is so
much the stronger, as it is able to set fire to a less inflammable
matter.

Yet just as the same fire acts with greater force on what is near
than on what is distant, so too, charity loves with greater fervor
those who are united to us than those who are far removed; and in
this respect the love of friends, considered in itself, is more
ardent and better than the love of one's enemy.

Reply Obj. 1: The words of Our Lord must be taken in their strict
sense: because the love of one's friends is not meritorious in God's
sight when we love them merely because they are our friends: and this
would seem to be the case when we love our friends in such a way that
we love not our enemies. On the other hand the love of our friends is
meritorious, if we love them for God's sake, and not merely because
they are our friends.

The Reply to the other Objections is evident from what has been said
in the article, because the two arguments that follow consider the
reason for loving, while the last considers the question on the part
of those who are loved.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 27, Art. 8]

Whether It Is More Meritorious to Love One's Neighbor Than to Love
God?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is more meritorious to love one's
neighbor than to love God. For the more meritorious thing would seem
to be what the Apostle preferred. Now the Apostle preferred the love
of our neighbor to the love of God, according to Rom. 9:3: "I wished
myself to be an anathema from Christ for my brethren." Therefore it
is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God.

Obj. 2: Further, in a certain sense it seems to be less meritorious
to love one's friend, as stated above (A. 7). Now God is our chief
friend, since "He hath first loved us" (1 John 4:10). Therefore it
seems less meritorious to love God.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever is more difficult seems to be more virtuous
and meritorious since "virtue is about that which is difficult and
good" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is easier to love God than to love one's
neighbor, both because all things love God naturally, and because
there is nothing unlovable in God, and this cannot be said of one's
neighbor. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor
than to love God.

_On the contrary,_ That on account of which a thing is such, is yet
more so. Now the love of one's neighbor is not meritorious, except by
reason of his being loved for God's sake. Therefore the love of God
is more meritorious than the love of our neighbor.

_I answer that,_ This comparison may be taken in two ways. First, by
considering both loves separately: and then, without doubt, the love
of God is the more meritorious, because a reward is due to it for its
own sake, since the ultimate reward is the enjoyment of God, to Whom
the movement of the Divine love tends: hence a reward is promised to
him that loves God (John 14:21): "He that loveth Me, shall be loved
of My Father, and I will . . . manifest Myself to him." Secondly, the
comparison may be understood to be between the love of God alone on
the one side, and the love of one's neighbor for God's sake, on the
other. In this way love of our neighbor includes love of God, while
love of God does not include love of our neighbor. Hence the
comparison will be between perfect love of God, extending also to our
neighbor, and inadequate and imperfect love of God, for "this
commandment we have from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his
brother" (1 John 4:21).

Reply Obj. 1: According to one gloss, the Apostle did not desire
this, viz. to be severed from Christ for his brethren, when he was in
a state of grace, but had formerly desired it when he was in a state
of unbelief, so that we should not imitate him in this respect.

We may also reply, with Chrysostom (De Compunct. i, 8) [*Hom. xvi in
Ep. ad Rom.] that this does not prove the Apostle to have loved his
neighbor more than God, but that he loved God more than himself. For
he wished to be deprived for a time of the Divine fruition which
pertains to love of one self, in order that God might be honored in
his neighbor, which pertains to the love of God.

Reply Obj. 2: A man's love for his friends is sometimes less
meritorious in so far as he loves them for their sake, so as to fall
short of the true reason for the friendship of charity, which is God.
Hence that God be loved for His own sake does not diminish the merit,
but is the entire reason for merit.

Reply Obj. 3: The _good_ has, more than the _difficult,_ to do
with the reason of merit and virtue. Therefore it does not follow that
whatever is more difficult is more meritorious, but only what is more
difficult, and at the same time better.
_______________________

QUESTION 28

OF JOY
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the effects which result from the principal act
of charity which is love, and (1) the interior effects, (2) the
exterior effects. As to the first, three things have to be considered:
(1) Joy, (2) Peace, (3) Mercy.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether joy is an effect of charity?

(2) Whether this kind of joy is compatible with sorrow?

(3) Whether this joy can be full?

(4) Whether it is a virtue?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 28, Art. 1]

Whether Joy Is Effected in Us by Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that joy is not effected in us by charity.
For the absence of what we love causes sorrow rather than joy. But
God, Whom we love by charity, is absent from us, so long as we are in
this state of life, since "while we are in the body, we are absent
from the Lord" (2 Cor. 5:6). Therefore charity causes sorrow in us
rather than joy.

Obj. 2: Further, it is chiefly through charity that we merit
happiness. Now mourning, which pertains to sorrow, is reckoned among
those things whereby we merit happiness, according to Matt. 5:5:
"Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore
sorrow, rather than joy, is an effect of charity.

Obj. 3: Further, charity is a virtue distinct from hope, as shown
above (Q. 17, A. 6). Now joy is the effect of hope, according to Rom.
12:12: "Rejoicing in hope." Therefore it is not the effect of charity.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 5:5): "The charity of God is
poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us."
But joy is caused in us by the Holy Ghost according to Rom. 14:17:
"The kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but justice and peace, and
joy in the Holy Ghost." Therefore charity is a cause of joy.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1, 2, 3), when we
were treating of the passions, joy and sorrow proceed from love, but
in contrary ways. For joy is caused by love, either through the
presence of the thing loved, or because the proper good of the thing
loved exists and endures in it; and the latter is the case chiefly in
the love of benevolence, whereby a man rejoices in the well-being of
his friend, though he be absent. On the other hand sorrow arises from
love, either through the absence of the thing loved, or because the
loved object to which we wish well, is deprived of its good or
afflicted with some evil. Now charity is love of God, Whose good is
unchangeable, since He is His goodness, and from the very fact that
He is loved, He is in those who love Him by His most excellent
effect, according to 1 John 4:16: "He that abideth in charity,
abideth in God, and God in him." Therefore spiritual joy, which is
about God, is caused by charity.

Reply Obj. 1: So long as we are in the body, we are said to be
"absent from the Lord," in comparison with that presence whereby He
is present to some by the vision of "sight"; wherefore the Apostle
goes on to say (2 Cor. 5:6): "For we walk by faith and not by sight."
Nevertheless, even in this life, He is present to those who love Him,
by the indwelling of His grace.

Reply Obj. 2: The mourning that merits happiness, is about those
things that are contrary to happiness. Wherefore it amounts to the
same that charity causes this mourning, and this spiritual joy about
God, since to rejoice in a certain good amounts to the same as to
grieve for things that are contrary to it.

Reply Obj. 3: There can be spiritual joy about God in two ways.
First, when we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself;
secondly, when we rejoice in the Divine good as participated by us.
The former joy is the better, and proceeds from charity chiefly:
while the latter joy proceeds from hope also, whereby we look forward
to enjoy the Divine good, although this enjoyment itself, whether
perfect or imperfect, is obtained according to the measure of one's
charity.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 28, Art. 2]

Whether the Spiritual Joy, Which Results from Charity, Is Compatible
with an Admixture of Sorrow?

Objection 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy that results from
charity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow. For it belongs to
charity to rejoice in our neighbor's good, according to 1 Cor. 13:4,
6: "Charity . . . rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the
truth." But this joy is compatible with an admixture of sorrow,
according to Rom. 12:15: "Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with
them that weep." Therefore the spiritual joy of charity is compatible
with an admixture of sorrow.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Gregory (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv),
"penance consists in deploring past sins, and in not committing again
those we have deplored." But there is no true penance without
charity. Therefore the joy of charity has an admixture of sorrow.

Obj. 3: Further, it is through charity that man desires to be with
Christ according to Phil. 1:23: "Having a desire to be dissolved and
to be with Christ." Now this desire gives rise, in man, to a certain
sadness, according to Ps. 119:5: "Woe is me that my sojourning is
prolonged!" Therefore the joy of charity admits of a seasoning of
sorrow.

_On the contrary,_ The joy of charity is joy about the Divine wisdom.
Now such like joy has no admixture of sorrow, according to Wis. 8:16:
"Her conversation hath no bitterness." Therefore the joy of charity
is incompatible with an admixture of sorrow.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), a twofold joy in God
arises from charity. One, the more excellent, is proper to charity;
and with this joy we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself.
This joy of charity is incompatible with an admixture of sorrow, even
as the good which is its object is incompatible with any admixture of
evil: hence the Apostle says (Phil. 4:4): "Rejoice in the Lord
always."

The other is the joy of charity whereby we rejoice in the Divine good
as participated by us. This participation can be hindered by anything
contrary to it, wherefore, in this respect, the joy of charity is
compatible with an admixture of sorrow, in so far as a man grieves
for that which hinders the participation of the Divine good, either
in us or in our neighbor, whom we love as ourselves.

Reply Obj. 1: Our neighbor does not weep save on account of some
evil. Now every evil implies lack of participation in the sovereign
good: hence charity makes us weep with our neighbor in so far as he
is hindered from participating in the Divine good.

Reply Obj. 2: Our sins divide between us and God, according to Isa.
59:2; wherefore this is the reason why we grieve for our past sins,
or for those of others, in so far as they hinder us from
participating in the Divine good.

Reply Obj. 3: Although in this unhappy abode we participate, after a
fashion, in the Divine good, by knowledge and love, yet the
unhappiness of this life is an obstacle to a perfect participation in
the Divine good: hence this very sorrow, whereby a man grieves for
the delay of glory, is connected with the hindrance to a
participation of the Divine good.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 28, Art. 3]

Whether the Spiritual Joy Which Proceeds from Charity, Can Be Filled?

Objection 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy which proceeds from
charity cannot be filled. For the more we rejoice in God, the more is
our joy in Him filled. But we can never rejoice in Him as much as it
is meet that we should rejoice in God, since His goodness which is
infinite, surpasses the creature's joy which is finite. Therefore joy
in God can never be filled.

Obj. 2: Further, that which is filled cannot be increased. But the
joy, even of the blessed, can be increased, since one's joy is
greater than another's. Therefore joy in God cannot be filled in a
creature.

Obj. 3: Further, comprehension seems to be nothing else than the
fulness of knowledge. Now, just as the cognitive power of a creature
is finite, so is its appetitive power. Since therefore God cannot be
comprehended by any creature, it seems that no creature's joy in God
can be filled.

_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said to His disciples (John 15:11): "That
My joy may be in you, and your joy may be filled."

_I answer that,_ Fulness of joy can be understood in two ways; first,
on the part of the thing rejoiced in, so that one rejoice in it as
much as it is meet that one should rejoice in it, and thus God's joy
alone in Himself is filled, because it is infinite; and this is
condignly due to the infinite goodness of God: but the joy of any
creature must needs be finite. Secondly, fulness of joy may be
understood on the part of the one who rejoices. Now joy is compared
to desire, as rest to movement, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1,
2), when we were treating of the passions: and rest is full when
there is no more movement. Hence joy is full, when there remains
nothing to be desired. But as long as we are in this world, the
movement of desire does not cease in us, because it still remains
possible for us to approach nearer to God by grace, as was shown
above (Q. 24, AA. 4, 7). When once, however, perfect happiness has
been attained, nothing will remain to be desired, because then there
will be full enjoyment of God, wherein man will obtain whatever he
had desired, even with regard to other goods, according to Ps. 102:5:
"Who satisfieth thy desire with good things." Hence desire will be at
rest, not only our desire for God, but all our desires: so that the
joy of the blessed is full to perfection--indeed over-full, since
they will obtain more than they were capable of desiring: for
"neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath
prepared for them that love Him" (1 Cor. 2:9). This is what is meant
by the words of Luke 6:38: "Good measure and pressed down, and shaken
together, and running over shall they give into your bosom." Yet,
since no creature is capable of the joy condignly due to God, it
follows that this perfectly full joy is not taken into man, but, on
the contrary, man enters into it, according to Matt. 25:21: "Enter
into the joy of thy Lord."

Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes the fulness of joy in reference to
the thing in which we rejoice.

Reply Obj. 2: When each one attains to happiness he will reach the
term appointed to him by Divine predestination, and nothing further
will remain to which he may tend, although by reaching that term,
some will approach nearer to God than others. Hence each one's joy
will be full with regard to himself, because his desire will be fully
set at rest; yet one's joy will be greater than another's, on account
of a fuller participation of the Divine happiness.

Reply Obj. 3: Comprehension denotes fulness of knowledge in respect
of the thing known, so that it is known as much as it can be. There
is however a fulness of knowledge in respect of the knower, just as
we have said of joy. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:9): "That you
may be filled with the knowledge of His will, in all wisdom and
spiritual understanding."
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 28, Art. 4]

Whether Joy Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that joy is a virtue. For vice is contrary
to virtue. Now sorrow is set down as a vice, as in the case of sloth
and envy. Therefore joy also should be accounted a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, as love and hope are passions, the object of which
is _good,_ so also is joy. Now love and hope are reckoned to be
virtues. Therefore joy also should be reckoned a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue.
But we are commanded to rejoice in the Lord, according to Phil. 4:4:
"Rejoice in the Lord always." Therefore joy is a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ It is not numbered among the theological virtues,
nor among the moral, nor among the intellectual virtues, as is
evident from what has been said above (I-II, QQ. 57, 60, 62).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 55, AA. 2, 4), virtue is
an operative habit, wherefore by its very nature it has an
inclination to a certain act. Now it may happen that from the same
habit there proceed several ordinate and homogeneous acts, each of
which follows from another. And since the subsequent acts do not
proceed from the virtuous habit except through the preceding act,
hence it is that the virtue is defined and named in reference to that
preceding act, although those other acts also proceed from the
virtue. Now it is evident from what we have said about the passions
(I-II, Q. 25, AA. 2, 4) that love is the first affection of the
appetitive power, and that desire and joy follow from it. Hence the
same virtuous habit inclines us to love and desire the beloved good,
and to rejoice in it. But in as much as love is the first of these
acts, that virtue takes its name, not from joy, nor from desire, but
from love, and is called charity. Hence joy is not a virtue distinct
from charity, but an act, or effect, of charity: for which reason it
is numbered among the Fruits (Gal. 5:22).

Reply Obj. 1: The sorrow which is a vice is caused by inordinate
self-love, and this is not a special vice, but a general source of
the vices, as stated above (I-II, Q. 77, A. 4); so that it was
necessary to account certain particular sorrows as special vices,
because they do not arise from a special, but from a general vice. On
the other hand love of God is accounted a special virtue, namely
charity, to which joy must be referred, as its proper act, as stated
above (here and A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2: Hope proceeds from love even as joy does, but
hope adds, on the part of the object, a special character, viz.
_difficult,_ and _possible to obtain;_ for which reason it is
accounted a special virtue. On the other hand joy does not add to love
any special aspect, that might cause a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: The Law prescribes joy, as being an act of
charity, albeit not its first act.
_______________________

QUESTION 29

OF PEACE (Four Articles)

We must now consider Peace, under which head there are four points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether peace is the same as concord?

(2) Whether all things desire peace?

(3) Whether peace is an effect of charity?

(4) Whether peace is a virtue?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 29, Art. 1]

Whether Peace Is the Same As Concord?

Objection 1: It would seem that peace is the same as concord. For
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): "Peace among men is well
ordered concord." Now we are speaking here of no other peace than
that of men. Therefore peace is the same as concord.

Obj. 2: Further, concord is union of wills. Now the nature of peace
consists in such like union, for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xi) that
peace unites all, and makes them of one mind. Therefore peace is the
same as concord.

Obj. 3: Further, things whose opposites are identical are themselves
identical. Now the one same thing is opposed to concord and peace,
viz. dissension; hence it is written (1 Cor. 16:33): "God is not the
God of dissension but of peace." Therefore peace is the same as
concord.

_On the contrary,_ There can be concord in evil between wicked men.
But "there is no peace to the wicked" (Isa. 48:22). Therefore peace
is not the same as concord.

_I answer that,_ Peace includes concord and adds something thereto.
Hence wherever peace is, there is concord, but there is not peace,
wherever there is concord, if we give peace its proper meaning.

For concord, properly speaking, is between one man and another, in so
far as the wills of various hearts agree together in consenting to
the same thing. Now the heart of one man may happen to tend to
diverse things, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the
diverse appetitive powers: thus the sensitive appetite tends
sometimes to that which is opposed to the rational appetite,
according to Gal. 5:17: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit."
Secondly, in so far as one and the same appetitive power tends to
diverse objects of appetite, which it cannot obtain all at the same
time: so that there must needs be a clashing of the movements of the
appetite. Now the union of such movements is essential to peace,
because man's heart is not at peace, so long as he has not what he
wants, or if, having what he wants, there still remains something for
him to want, and which he cannot have at the same time. On the other
hand this union is not essential to concord: wherefore concord
denotes union of appetites among various persons, while peace
denotes, in addition to this union, the union of the appetites even
in one man.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking there of that peace which is
between one man and another, and he says that this peace is concord,
not indeed any kind of concord, but that which is well ordered,
through one man agreeing with another in respect of something
befitting to both of them. For if one man concord with another, not
of his own accord, but through being forced, as it were, by the fear
of some evil that besets him, such concord is not really peace,
because the order of each concordant is not observed, but is
disturbed by some fear-inspiring cause. For this reason he premises
that "peace is tranquillity of order," which tranquillity consists in
all the appetitive movements in one man being set at rest together.

Reply Obj. 2: If one man consent to the same thing together with
another man, his consent is nevertheless not perfectly united to
himself, unless at the same time all his appetitive movements be in
agreement.

Reply Obj. 3: A twofold dissension is opposed to peace, namely
dissension between a man and himself, and dissension between one man
and another. The latter alone is opposed to concord.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 29, Art. 2]

Whether All Things Desire Peace?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all things desire peace. For,
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. xi), peace "unites consent." But
there cannot be unity of consent in things which are devoid of
knowledge. Therefore such things cannot desire peace.

Obj. 2: Further, the appetite does not tend to opposite things at the
same time. Now many desire war and dissension. Therefore all men do
not desire peace.

Obj. 3: Further, good alone is an object of appetite. But a certain
peace is, seemingly, evil, else Our Lord would not have said (Matt.
10:34): "I came not to send peace." Therefore all things do not
desire peace.

Obj. 4: Further, that which all desire is, seemingly, the sovereign
good which is the last end. But this is not true of peace, since it
is attainable even by a wayfarer; else Our Lord would vainly command
(Mk. 9:49): "Have peace among you." Therefore all things do not
desire peace.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12, 14) that "all
things desire peace": and Dionysius says the same (Div. Nom. xi).

_I answer that,_ From the very fact that a man desires a certain
thing it follows that he desires to obtain what he desires, and, in
consequence, to remove whatever may be an obstacle to his obtaining
it. Now a man may be hindered from obtaining the good he desires, by
a contrary desire either of his own or of some other, and both are
removed by peace, as stated above. Hence it follows of necessity that
whoever desires anything desires peace, in so far as he who desires
anything, desires to attain, with tranquillity and without hindrance,
to that which he desires: and this is what is meant by peace which
Augustine defines (De Civ. Dei xix, 13) "the tranquillity of order."

Reply Obj. 1: Peace denotes union not only of the intellective or
rational appetite, or of the animal appetite, in both of which
consent may be found, but also of the natural appetite. Hence
Dionysius says that "peace is the cause of consent and of
connaturalness," where "consent" denotes the union of appetites
proceeding from knowledge, and "connaturalness," the union of natural
appetites.

Reply Obj. 2: Even those who seek war and dissension, desire nothing
but peace, which they deem themselves not to have. For as we stated
above, there is no peace when a man concords with another man counter
to what he would prefer. Consequently men seek by means of war to
break this concord, because it is a defective peace, in order that
they may obtain peace, where nothing is contrary to their will. Hence
all wars are waged that men may find a more perfect peace than that
which they had heretofore.

Reply Obj. 3: Peace gives calm and unity to the appetite. Now just as
the appetite may tend to what is good simply, or to what is good
apparently, so too, peace may be either true or apparent. There can
be no true peace except where the appetite is directed to what is
truly good, since every evil, though it may appear good in a way, so
as to calm the appetite in some respect, has, nevertheless many
defects, which cause the appetite to remain restless and disturbed.
Hence true peace is only in good men and about good things. The peace
of the wicked is not a true peace but a semblance thereof, wherefore
it is written (Wis. 14:22): "Whereas they lived in a great war of
ignorance, they call so many and so great evils peace."

Reply Obj. 4: Since true peace is only about good things, as the true
good is possessed in two ways, perfectly and imperfectly, so there is
a twofold true peace. One is perfect peace. It consists in the
perfect enjoyment of the sovereign good, and unites all one's desires
by giving them rest in one object. This is the last end of the
rational creature, according to Ps. 147:3: "Who hath placed peace in
thy borders." The other is imperfect peace, which may be had in this
world, for though the chief movement of the soul finds rest in God,
yet there are certain things within and without which disturb the
peace.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 29, Art. 3]

Whether Peace Is the Proper Effect of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that peace is not the proper effect of
charity. For one cannot have charity without sanctifying grace. But
some have peace who have not sanctifying grace, thus heathens
sometimes have peace. Therefore peace is not the effect of charity.

Obj. 2: Further, if a certain thing is caused by charity, its
contrary is not compatible with charity. But dissension, which is
contrary to peace, is compatible with charity, for we find that even
holy doctors, such as Jerome and Augustine, dissented in some of
their opinions. We also read that Paul and Barnabas dissented from
one another (Acts 15). Therefore it seems that peace is not the
effect of charity.

Obj. 3: Further, the same thing is not the proper effect of different
things. Now peace is the effect of justice, according to Isa. 32:17:
"And the work of justice shall be peace." Therefore it is not the
effect of charity.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 118:165): "Much peace have they
that love Thy Law."

_I answer that,_ Peace implies a twofold union, as stated above (A.
1). The first is the result of one's own appetites being directed to
one object; while the other results from one's own appetite being
united with the appetite of another: and each of these unions is
effected by charity--the first, in so far as man loves God with his
whole heart, by referring all things to Him, so that all his desires
tend to one object--the second, in so far as we love our neighbor as
ourselves, the result being that we wish to fulfil our neighbor's
will as though it were ours: hence it is reckoned a sign of
friendship if people "make choice of the same things" (Ethic. ix, 4),
and Tully says (De Amicitia) that friends "like and dislike the same
things" (Sallust, Catilin.)

Reply Obj. 1: Without sin no one falls from a state of
sanctifying grace, for it turns man away from his due end by making
him place his end in something undue: so that his appetite does not
cleave chiefly to the true final good, but to some apparent good.
Hence, without sanctifying grace, peace is not real but merely
apparentapparent.

Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 6) friends need not
agree in opinion, but only upon such goods as conduce to life, and
especially upon such as are important; because dissension in small
matters is scarcely accounted dissension. Hence nothing hinders those
who have charity from holding different opinions. Nor is this an
obstacle to peace, because opinions concern the intellect, which
precedes the appetite that is united by peace. In like manner if
there be concord as to goods of importance, dissension with regard to
some that are of little account is not contrary to charity: for such
a dissension proceeds from a difference of opinion, because one man
thinks that the particular good, which is the object of dissension,
belongs to the good about which they agree, while the other thinks
that it does not. Accordingly such like dissension about very slight
matters and about opinions is inconsistent with a state of perfect
peace, wherein the truth will be known fully, and every desire
fulfilled; but it is not inconsistent with the imperfect peace of the
wayfarer.

Reply Obj. 3: Peace is the "work of justice" indirectly, in so
far as justice removes the obstacles to peace: but it is the work of
charity directly, since charity, according to its very nature, causes
peace. For love is "a unitive force" as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv):
and peace is the union of the appetite's inclinations.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 29, Art. 4]

Whether Peace Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that peace is a virtue. For nothing is a
matter of precept, unless it be an act of virtue. But there are
precepts about keeping peace, for example: "Have peace among you"
(Mk. 9:49). Therefore peace is a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. Now it is
meritorious to keep peace, according to Matt. 5:9: "Blessed are the
peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God." Therefore
peace is a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, vices are opposed to virtues. But dissensions, which
are contrary to peace, are numbered among the vices (Gal. 5:20).
Therefore peace is a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Virtue is not the last end, but the way thereto.
But peace is the last end, in a sense, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
xix, 11). Therefore peace is not a virtue.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 28, A. 4), when a number of acts
all proceeding uniformly from an agent, follow one from the other,
they all arise from the same virtue, nor do they each have a virtue
from which they proceed, as may be seen in corporeal things. For,
though fire by heating, both liquefies and rarefies, there are not
two powers in fire, one of liquefaction, the other of rarefaction:
and fire produces all such actions by its own power of calefaction.

Since then charity causes peace precisely because it is love of God
and of our neighbor, as shown above (A. 3), there is no other virtue
except charity whose proper act is peace, as we have also said in
reference to joy (Q. 28, A. 4).

Reply Obj. 1: We are commanded to keep peace because it is an act of
charity; and for this reason too it is a meritorious act. Hence it is
placed among the beatitudes, which are acts of perfect virtue, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 69, AA. 1, 3). It is also numbered among the
fruits, in so far as it is a final good, having spiritual sweetness.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply Obj. 3: Several vices are opposed to one virtue in respect of
its various acts: so that not only is hatred opposed to charity, in
respect of its act which is love, but also sloth and envy, in respect
of joy, and dissension in respect of peace.
_______________________

QUESTION 30

OF MERCY* [*The one Latin word "misericordia" signifies either pity
or mercy. The distinction between these two is that pity may stand
either for the act or for the virtue, whereas mercy stands only for
the virtue.]
(In Four Articles)

We must now go on to consider Mercy, under which head there are four
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether evil is the cause of mercy on the part of the person
pitied?

(2) To whom does it belong to pity?

(3) Whether mercy is a virtue?

(4) Whether it is the greatest of virtues?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 30, Art. 1]

Whether Evil Is Properly the Motive of Mercy?

Objection 1: It would seem that, properly speaking, evil is not the
motive of mercy. For, as shown above (Q. 19, A. 1; I-II, Q. 79, A. 1,
ad 4; I, Q. 48, A. 6), fault is an evil rather than punishment. Now
fault provokes indignation rather than mercy. Therefore evil does not
excite mercy.

Obj. 2: Further, cruelty and harshness seem to excel other evils. Now
the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "harshness does not call for
pity but drives it away." Therefore evil, as such, is not the motive
of mercy.

Obj. 3: Further, signs of evils are not true evils. But signs of
evils excite one to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 8).
Therefore evil, properly speaking, is not an incentive to mercy.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 2) that mercy is
a kind of sorrow. Now evil is the motive of sorrow. Therefore it is
the motive of mercy.

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5), mercy is
heartfelt sympathy for another's distress, impelling us to succor him
if we can. For mercy takes its name _misericordia_ from denoting a
man's compassionate heart (_miserum cor_) for another's unhappiness.
Now unhappiness is opposed to happiness: and it is essential to
beatitude or happiness that one should obtain what one wishes; for,
according to Augustine (De Trin. xiii, 5), "happy is he who has
whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss." Hence, on the other
hand, it belongs to unhappiness that a man should suffer what he
wishes not.

Now a man wishes a thing in three ways: first, by his natural
appetite; thus all men naturally wish to be and to live: secondly, a
man wishes a thing from deliberate choice: thirdly, a man wishes a
thing, not in itself, but in its cause, thus, if a man wishes to eat
what is bad for him, we say that, in a way, he wishes to be ill.

Accordingly the motive of _mercy,_ being something pertaining to
_misery,_ is, in the first way, anything contrary to the will's
natural appetite, namely corruptive or distressing evils, the
contrary of which man desires naturally, wherefore the Philosopher
says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "pity is sorrow for a visible evil, whether
corruptive or distressing." Secondly, such like evils are yet more
provocative of pity if they are contrary to deliberate choice,
wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that evil excites our
pity "when it is the result of an accident, as when something turns
out ill, whereas we hoped well of it." Thirdly, they cause yet
greater pity, if they are entirely contrary to the will, as when evil
befalls a man who has always striven to do well: wherefore the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "we pity most the distress of one
who suffers undeservedly."

Reply Obj. 1: It is essential to fault that it be voluntary; and in
this respect it deserves punishment rather than mercy. Since,
however, fault may be, in a way, a punishment, through having
something connected with it that is against the sinner's will, it
may, in this respect, call for mercy. It is in this sense that we
pity and commiserate sinners. Thus Gregory says in a homily (Hom. in
Evang. xxxiv) that "true godliness is not disdainful but
compassionate," and again it is written (Matt. 9:36) that Jesus
"seeing the multitudes, had compassion on them: because they were
distressed, and lying like sheep that have no shepherd."

Reply Obj. 2: Since pity is sympathy for another's distress, it is
directed, properly speaking, towards another, and not to oneself,
except figuratively, like justice, according as a man is considered
to have various parts (Ethic. v, 11). Thus it is written (Ecclus.
30:24): "Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God" [*Cf. Q. 106, A. 3,
ad 1].

Accordingly just as, properly speaking, a man does not pity himself,
but suffers in himself, as when we suffer cruel treatment in
ourselves, so too, in the case of those who are so closely united to
us, as to be part of ourselves, such as our children or our parents,
we do not pity their distress, but suffer as for our own sores; in
which sense the Philosopher says that "harshness drives pity away."

Reply Obj. 3: Just as pleasure results from hope and memory of
good things, so does sorrow arise from the prospect or the
recollection of evil things; though not so keenly as when they are
present to the senses. Hence the signs of evil move us to pity, in so
far as they represent as present, the evil that excites our pity.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 30, Art. 2]

Whether the Reason for Taking Pity Is a Defect in the Person Who Pities?

Objection 1: It would seem that the reason for taking pity is not a
defect in the person who takes pity. For it is proper to God to be
merciful, wherefore it is written (Ps. 144:9): "His tender mercies
are over all His works." But there is no defect in God. Therefore a
defect cannot be the reason for taking pity.

Obj. 2: Further, if a defect is the reason for taking pity, those in
whom there is most defect, must needs take most pity. But this is
false: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "those who are in
a desperate state are pitiless." Therefore it seems that the reason
for taking pity is not a defect in the person who pities.

Obj. 3: Further, to be treated with contempt is to be defective. But
the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "those who are disposed to
contumely are pitiless." Therefore the reason for taking pity, is not
a defect in the person who pities.

_On the contrary,_ Pity is a kind of sorrow. But a defect is the
reason of sorrow, wherefore those who are in bad health give way to
sorrow more easily, as we shall say further on (Q. 35, A. 1, ad 2).
Therefore the reason why one takes pity is a defect in oneself.

_I answer that,_ Since pity is grief for another's distress, as
stated above (A. 1), from the very fact that a person takes pity on
anyone, it follows that another's distress grieves him. And since
sorrow or grief is about one's own ills, one grieves or sorrows for
another's distress, in so far as one looks upon another's distress as
one's own.

Now this happens in two ways: first, through union of the affections,
which is the effect of love. For, since he who loves another looks
upon his friend as another self, he counts his friend's hurt as his
own, so that he grieves for his friend's hurt as though he were hurt
himself. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 4) reckons "grieving with
one's friend" as being one of the signs of friendship, and the
Apostle says (Rom. 12:15): "Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with
them that weep."

Secondly, it happens through real union, for instance when another's
evil comes near to us, so as to pass to us from him. Hence the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that men pity such as are akin to
them, and the like, because it makes them realize that the same may
happen to themselves. This also explains why the old and the wise who
consider that they may fall upon evil times, as also feeble and
timorous persons, are more inclined to pity: whereas those who deem
themselves happy, and so far powerful as to think themselves in no
danger of suffering any hurt, are not so inclined to pity.

Accordingly a defect is always the reason for taking pity, either
because one looks upon another's defect as one's own, through being
united to him by love, or on account of the possibility of suffering
in the same way.

Reply Obj. 1: God takes pity on us through love alone, in as much as
He loves us as belonging to Him.

Reply Obj. 2: Those who are already in infinite distress, do not fear
to suffer more, wherefore they are without pity. In like manner this
applies to those also who are in great fear, for they are so intent
on their own passion, that they pay no attention to the suffering of
others.

Reply Obj. 3: Those who are disposed to contumely, whether through
having been contemned, or because they wish to contemn others, are
incited to anger and daring, which are manly passions and arouse the
human spirit to attempt difficult things. Hence they make a man think
that he is going to suffer something in the future, so that while
they are disposed in that way they are pitiless, according to Prov.
27:4: "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth." For the
same reason the proud are without pity, because they despise others,
and think them wicked, so that they account them as suffering
deservedly whatever they suffer. Hence Gregory says (Hom. in Evang.
xxxiv) that "false godliness," i.e. of the proud, "is not
compassionate but disdainful."
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 30, Art. 3]

Whether Mercy Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that mercy is not a virtue. For the chief
part of virtue is choice as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5).
Now choice is "the desire of what has been already counselled"
(Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore whatever hinders counsel cannot be called
a virtue. But mercy hinders counsel, according to the saying of
Sallust (Catilin.): "All those that take counsel about matters of
doubt, should be free from . . . anger . . . and mercy, because the
mind does not easily see aright, when these things stand in the way."
Therefore mercy is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing contrary to virtue is praiseworthy. But
nemesis is contrary to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii,
9), and yet it is a praiseworthy passion (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore
mercy is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, joy and peace are not special virtues, because they
result from charity, as stated above (Q. 28, A. 4; Q. 29, A. 4). Now
mercy, also, results from charity; for it is out of charity that we
weep with them that weep, as we rejoice with them that rejoice.
Therefore mercy is not a special virtue.

Obj. 4: Further, since mercy belongs to the appetitive power, it is
not an intellectual virtue, and, since it has not God for its object,
neither is it a theological virtue. Moreover it is not a moral
virtue, because neither is it about operations, for this belongs to
justice; nor is it about passions, since it is not reduced to one of
the twelve means mentioned by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7).
Therefore mercy is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): "Cicero in
praising Caesar expresses himself much better and in a fashion at
once more humane and more in accordance with religious feeling, when
he says: 'Of all thy virtues none is more marvelous or more graceful
than thy mercy.'" Therefore mercy is a virtue.

_I answer that,_ Mercy signifies grief for another's distress. Now
this grief may denote, in one way, a movement of the sensitive
appetite, in which case mercy is not a virtue but a passion; whereas,
in another way, it may denote a movement of the intellective
appetite, in as much as one person's evil is displeasing to another.
This movement may be ruled in accordance with reason, and in
accordance with this movement regulated by reason, the movement of
the lower appetite may be regulated. Hence Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei ix, 5) that "this movement of the mind" (viz. mercy) "obeys the
reason, when mercy is vouchsafed in such a way that justice is
safeguarded, whether we give to the needy or forgive the repentant."
And since it is essential to human virtue that the movements of the
soul should be regulated by reason, as was shown above (I-II, Q. 59,
AA. 4, 5), it follows that mercy is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: The words of Sallust are to be understood as applying
to the mercy which is a passion unregulated by reason: for thus it
impedes the counselling of reason, by making it wander from justice.

Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher is speaking there of pity and nemesis,
considered, both of them, as passions. They are contrary to one
another on the part of their respective estimation of another's
evils, for which pity grieves, in so far as it esteems someone to
suffer undeservedly, whereas nemesis rejoices, in so far as it
esteems someone to suffer deservedly, and grieves, if things go well
with the undeserving: "both of these are praiseworthy and come from
the same disposition of character" (Rhet. ii, 9). Properly speaking,
however, it is envy which is opposed to pity, as we shall state
further on (Q. 36, A. 3).

Reply Obj. 3: Joy and peace add nothing to the aspect of good which
is the object of charity, wherefore they do not require any other
virtue besides charity. But mercy regards a certain special aspect,
namely the misery of the person pitied.

Reply Obj. 4: Mercy, considered as a virtue, is a moral virtue
having relation to the passions, and it is reduced to the mean called
nemesis, because "they both proceed from the same character" (Rhet.
ii, 9). Now the Philosopher proposes these means not as virtues, but
as passions, because, even as passions, they are praiseworthy. Yet
nothing prevents them from proceeding from some elective habit, in
which case they assume the character of a virtue.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 30, Art. 4]

Whether Mercy Is the Greatest of the Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that mercy is the greatest of the virtues.
For the worship of God seems a most virtuous act. But mercy is
preferred before the worship of God, according to Osee 6:6 and Matt.
12:7: "I have desired mercy and not sacrifice." Therefore mercy is
the greatest virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, on the words of 1 Tim. 4:8: "Godliness is profitable
to all things," a gloss says: "The sum total of a Christian's rule of
life consists in mercy and godliness." Now the Christian rule of life
embraces every virtue. Therefore the sum total of all virtues is
contained in mercy.

Obj. 3: Further, "Virtue is that which makes its subject good,"
according to the Philosopher. Therefore the more a virtue makes a man
like God, the better is that virtue: since man is the better for
being more like God. Now this is chiefly the result of mercy, since
of God is it said (Ps. 144:9) that "His tender mercies are over all
His works," and (Luke 6:36) Our Lord said: "Be ye . . . merciful, as
your Father also is merciful." Therefore mercy is the greatest of
virtues.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle after saying (Col. 3:12): "Put ye
on . . . as the elect of God . . . the bowels of mercy," etc., adds
(Col. 3:14): "Above all things have charity." Therefore mercy is not
the greatest of virtues.

_I answer that,_ A virtue may take precedence of others in two ways:
first, in itself; secondly, in comparison with its subject. In
itself, mercy takes precedence of other virtues, for it belongs to
mercy to be bountiful to others, and, what is more, to succor others
in their wants, which pertains chiefly to one who stands above. Hence
mercy is accounted as being proper to God: and therein His
omnipotence is declared to be chiefly manifested [*Collect, Tenth
Sunday after Pentecost].

On the other hand, with regard to its subject, mercy is not the
greatest virtue, unless that subject be greater than all others,
surpassed by none and excelling all: since for him that has anyone
above him it is better to be united to that which is above than to
supply the defect of that which is beneath. [*"The quality of mercy
is not strained./'Tis mightiest in the mightiest: it becomes/The
throned monarch better than his crown." Merchant of Venice, Act IV,
Scene i.]. Hence, as regards man, who has God above him, charity
which unites him to God, is greater than mercy, whereby he supplies
the defects of his neighbor. But of all the virtues which relate to
our neighbor, mercy is the greatest, even as its act surpasses all
others, since it belongs to one who is higher and better to supply
the defect of another, in so far as the latter is deficient.

Reply Obj. 1: We worship God by external sacrifices and gifts, not
for His own profit, but for that of ourselves and our neighbor. For
He needs not our sacrifices, but wishes them to be offered to Him, in
order to arouse our devotion and to profit our neighbor. Hence mercy,
whereby we supply others' defects is a sacrifice more acceptable to
Him, as conducing more directly to our neighbor's well-being,
according to Heb. 13:16: "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for
by such sacrifices God's favor is obtained."

Reply Obj. 2: The sum total of the Christian religion consists in
mercy, as regards external works: but the inward love of charity,
whereby we are united to God preponderates over both love and mercy
for our neighbor.

Reply Obj. 3: Charity likens us to God by uniting us to Him in the
bond of love: wherefore it surpasses mercy, which likens us to God as
regards similarity of works.
_______________________

QUESTION 31

OF BENEFICENCE
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the outward acts or effects of charity,
(1) Beneficence, (2) Almsdeeds, which are a part of beneficence,
(3) Fraternal correction, which is a kind of alms.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether beneficence is an act of charity?

(2) Whether we ought to be beneficent to all?

(3) Whether we ought to be more beneficent to those who are more
closely united to us?

(4) Whether beneficence is a special virtue?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 31, Art. 1]

Whether Beneficence Is an Act of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that beneficence is not an act of charity.
For charity is chiefly directed to God. Now we cannot benefit God,
according to Job 35:7: "What shalt thou give Him? or what shall He
receive of thy hand?" Therefore beneficence is not an act of charity.

Obj. 2: Further, beneficence consists chiefly in making gifts. But
this belongs to liberality. Therefore beneficence is an act of
liberality and not of charity.

Obj. 3: Further, what a man gives, he gives either as being due, or
as not due. But a benefit conferred as being due belongs to justice
while a benefit conferred as not due, is gratuitous, and in this
respect is an act of mercy. Therefore every benefit conferred is
either an act of justice, or an act of mercy. Therefore it is not an
act of charity.

_On the contrary,_ Charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above
(Q. 23, A. 1). Now the Philosopher reckons among the acts of
friendship (Ethic. ix, 1) "doing good," i.e. being beneficent, "to
one's friends." Therefore it is an act of charity to do good to
others.

_I answer that,_ Beneficence simply means doing good to someone. This
good may be considered in two ways, first under the general aspect of
good, and this belongs to beneficence in general, and is an act of
friendship, and, consequently, of charity: because the act of love
includes goodwill whereby a man wishes his friend well, as stated
above (Q. 23, A. 1; Q. 27, A. 2). Now the will carries into effect if
possible, the things it wills, so that, consequently, the result of
an act of love is that a man is beneficent to his friend. Therefore
beneficence in its general acceptation is an act of friendship or
charity.

But if the good which one man does another, be considered under some
special aspect of good, then beneficence will assume a special
character and will belong to some special virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "love
moves those, whom it unites, to a mutual relationship: it turns the
inferior to the superior to be perfected thereby; it moves the
superior to watch over the inferior:" and in this respect beneficence
is an effect of love. Hence it is not for us to benefit God, but to
honor Him by obeying Him, while it is for Him, out of His love, to
bestow good things on us.

Reply Obj. 2: Two things must be observed in the bestowal of
gifts. One is the thing given outwardly, while the other is the inward
passion that a man has in the delight of riches. It belongs to
liberality to moderate this inward passion so as to avoid excessive
desire and love for riches; for this makes a man more ready to part
with his wealth. Hence, if a man makes some great gift, while yet
desiring to keep it for himself, his is not a liberal giving. On the
other hand, as regards the outward gift, the act of beneficence
belongs in general to friendship or charity. Hence it does not detract
from a man's friendship, if, through love, he give his friend
something he would like to keep for himself; rather does this prove
the perfection of his friendship.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as friendship or charity sees, in the
benefit bestowed, the general aspect of good, so does justice see
therein the aspect of debt, while pity considers the relieving of
distress or defect.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 31, Art. 2]

Whether We Ought to Do Good to All?

Objection 1: It would seem that we are not bound to do good to all.
For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28) that we "are unable to
do good to everyone." Now virtue does not incline one to the
impossible. Therefore it is not necessary to do good to all.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 12:5) "Give to the good, and
receive not a sinner." But many men are sinners. Therefore we need
not do good to all.

Obj. 3: Further, "Charity dealeth not perversely" (1 Cor. 13:4). Now
to do good to some is to deal perversely: for instance if one were to
do good to an enemy of the common weal, or if one were to do good to
an excommunicated person, since, by doing so, he would be holding
communion with him. Therefore, since beneficence is an act of
charity, we ought not to do good to all.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Gal. 6:10): "Whilst we have
time, let us work good to all men."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 1), beneficence is an
effect of love in so far as love moves the superior to watch over the
inferior. Now degrees among men are not unchangeable as among angels,
because men are subject to many failings, so that he who is superior
in one respect, is or may be inferior in another. Therefore, since
the love of charity extends to all, beneficence also should extend to
all, but according as time and place require: because all acts of
virtue must be modified with a view to their due circumstances.

Reply Obj. 1: Absolutely speaking it is impossible to do good to
every single one: yet it is true of each individual that one may be
bound to do good to him in some particular case. Hence charity binds
us, though not actually doing good to someone, to be prepared in mind
to do good to anyone if we have time to spare. There is however a
good that we can do to all, if not to each individual, at least to
all in general, as when we pray for all, for unbelievers as well as
for the faithful.

Reply Obj. 2: In a sinner there are two things, his guilt and his
nature. Accordingly we are bound to succor the sinner as to the
maintenance of his nature, but not so as to abet his sin, for this
would be to do evil rather than good.

Reply Obj. 3: The excommunicated and the enemies of the common weal
are deprived of all beneficence, in so far as this prevents them from
doing evil deeds. Yet if their nature be in urgent need of succor
lest it fail, we are bound to help them: for instance, if they be in
danger of death through hunger or thirst, or suffer some like
distress, unless this be according to the order of justice.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 31, Art. 3]

Whether We Ought to Do Good to Those Rather Who Are More Closely
United to Us?

Objection 1: It would seem that we are not bound to do good to those
rather who are more closely united to us. For it is written (Luke
14:12): "When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy friends,
nor thy brethren, nor thy kinsmen." Now these are the most closely
united to us. Therefore we are not bound to do good to those rather
who are more closely united to us, but preferably to strangers and to
those who are in want: hence the text goes on: "But, when thou makest
a feast, call the poor, the maimed," etc.

Obj. 2: Further, to help another in the battle is an act of very
great goodness. But a soldier on the battlefield is bound to help a
fellow-soldier who is a stranger rather than a kinsman who is a foe.
Therefore in doing acts of kindness we are not bound to give the
preference to those who are most closely united to us.

Obj. 3: Further, we should pay what is due before conferring
gratuitous favors. But it is a man's duty to be good to those who
have been good to him. Therefore we ought to do good to our
benefactors rather than to those who are closely united to us.

Obj. 4: Further, a man ought to love his parents more than his
children, as stated above (Q. 26, A. 9). Yet a man ought to be more
beneficent to his children, since "neither ought the children to lay
up for the parents," according to 2 Cor. 12:14. Therefore we are not
bound to be more beneficent to those who are more closely united to
us.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28): "Since
one cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by
reason of place, time or any other circumstance, by a kind of chance
are more closely united to us."

_I answer that,_ Grace and virtue imitate the order of nature, which
is established by Divine wisdom. Now the order of nature is such that
every natural agent pours forth its activity first and most of all on
the things which are nearest to it: thus fire heats most what is next
to it. In like manner God pours forth the gifts of His goodness first
and most plentifully on the substances which are nearest to Him, as
Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. vii). But the bestowal of benefits is
an act of charity towards others. Therefore we ought to be most
beneficent towards those who are most closely connected with us.

Now one man's connection with another may be measured in reference to
the various matters in which men are engaged together; (thus the
intercourse of kinsmen is in natural matters, that of fellow-citizens
is in civic matters, that of the faithful is in spiritual matters,
and so forth): and various benefits should be conferred in various
ways according to these various connections, because we ought in
preference to bestow on each one such benefits as pertain to the
matter in which, speaking simply, he is most closely connected with
us. And yet this may vary according to the various requirements of
time, place, or matter in hand: because in certain cases one ought,
for instance, to succor a stranger, in extreme necessity, rather than
one's own father, if he is not in such urgent need.

Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord did not absolutely forbid us to invite our
friends and kinsmen to eat with us, but to invite them so that they
may invite us in return, since that would be an act not of charity
but of cupidity. The case may occur, however, that one ought rather
to invite strangers, on account of their greater want. For it must be
understood that, other things being equal, one ought to succor those
rather who are most closely connected with us. And if of two, one be
more closely connected, and the other in greater want, it is not
possible to decide, by any general rule, which of them we ought to
help rather than the other, since there are various degrees of want
as well as of connection: and the matter requires the judgment of a
prudent man.

Reply Obj. 2: The common good of many is more Godlike than the good
of an individual. Wherefore it is a virtuous action for a man to
endanger even his own life, either for the spiritual or for the
temporal common good of his country. Since therefore men engage
together in warlike acts in order to safeguard the common weal, the
soldier who with this in view succors his comrade, succors him not as
a private individual, but with a view to the welfare of his country
as a whole: wherefore it is not a matter for wonder if a stranger be
preferred to one who is a blood relation.

Reply Obj. 3: A thing may be due in two ways. There is one which
should be reckoned, not among the goods of the debtor, but rather as
belonging to the person to whom it is due: for instance, a man may
have another's goods, whether in money or in kind, either because he
has stolen them, or because he has received them on loan or in
deposit or in some other way. In this case a man ought to pay what he
owes, rather than benefit his connections out of it, unless perchance
the case be so urgent that it would be lawful for him to take
another's property in order to relieve the one who is in need. Yet,
again, this would not apply if the creditor were in equal distress:
in which case, however, the claims on either side would have to be
weighed with regard to such other conditions as a prudent man would
take into consideration, because, on account of the different
particular cases, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 2), it is
impossible to lay down a general rule.

The other kind of due is one which is reckoned among the goods of the
debtor and not of the creditor; for instance, a thing may be due, not
because justice requires it, but on account of a certain moral
equity, as in the case of benefits received gratis. Now no benefactor
confers a benefit equal to that which a man receives from his
parents: wherefore in paying back benefits received, we should give
the first place to our parents before all others, unless, on the
other side, there be such weightier motives, as need or some other
circumstance, for instance the common good of the Church or state. In
other cases we must take to account the connection and the benefit
received; and here again no general rule can laid down.

Reply Obj. 4: Parents are like superiors, and so a parent's love
tends to conferring benefits, while the children's love tends to
honor their parents. Nevertheless in a case of extreme urgency it
would be lawful to abandon one's children rather than one's parents,
to abandon whom it is by no means lawful, on account of the
obligation we lie under towards them for the benefits we have
received from them, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 14).
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 31, Art. 4]

Whether Beneficence Is a Special Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that beneficence is a special virtue. For
precepts are directed to virtue, since lawgivers purpose to make men
virtuous (Ethic. i 9, 13; ii, 1). Now beneficence and love are
prescribed as distinct from one another, for it is written (Matt.
4:44): "Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you." Therefore
beneficence is a virtue distinct from charity.

Obj. 2: Further, vices are opposed to virtues. Now there are opposed
to beneficence certain vices whereby a hurt is inflicted on our
neighbor, for instance, rapine, theft and so forth. Therefore
beneficence is a special virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, charity is not divided into several species: whereas
there would seem to be several kinds of beneficence, according to the
various kinds of benefits. Therefore beneficence is a distinct virtue
from charity.

_On the contrary,_ The internal and the external act do not require
different virtues. Now beneficence and goodwill differ only as
external and internal act, since beneficence is the execution of
goodwill. Therefore as goodwill is not a distinct virtue from
charity, so neither is beneficence.

_I answer that,_ Virtues differ according to the different aspects of
their objects. Now the formal aspect of the object of charity and of
beneficence is the same, since both virtues regard the common aspect
of good, as explained above (A. 1). Wherefore beneficence is not a
distinct virtue from charity, but denotes an act of charity.

Reply Obj. 1: Precepts are given, not about habits but about acts of
virtue: wherefore distinction of precept denotes distinction, not of
habits, but of acts.

Reply Obj. 2: Even as all benefits conferred on our neighbor, if we
consider them under the common aspect of good, are to be traced to
love, so all hurts considered under the common aspect of evil, are to
be traced to hatred. But if we consider these same things under
certain special aspects of good or of evil, they are to be traced to
certain special virtues or vices, and in this way also there are
various kinds of benefits.

Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.
_______________________

QUESTION 32

OF ALMSDEEDS
(In Ten Articles)

We must now consider almsdeeds, under which head there are ten points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether almsgiving is an act of charity?

(2) Of the different kinds of alms;

(3) Which alms are of greater account, spiritual or corporal?

(4) Whether corporal alms have a spiritual effect?

(5) Whether the giving of alms is a matter of precept?

(6) Whether corporal alms should be given out of the things we need?

(7) Whether corporal alms should be given out of ill-gotten goods?

(8) Who can give alms?

(9) To whom should we give alms?

(10) How should alms be given?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 1]

Whether Almsgiving Is an Act of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not an act of charity.
For without charity one cannot do acts of charity. Now it is possible
to give alms without having charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:3: "If I
should distribute all my goods to feed the poor . . . and have not
charity, it profiteth me nothing." Therefore almsgiving is not an act
of charity.

Obj. 2: Further, almsdeeds are reckoned among works of satisfaction,
according to Dan. 4:24: "Redeem thou thy sins with alms." Now
satisfaction is an act of justice. Therefore almsgiving is an act of
justice and not of charity.

Obj. 3: Further, the offering of sacrifices to God is an act of
religion. But almsgiving is offering a sacrifice to God, according to
Heb. 13:16: "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such
sacrifices God's favor is obtained." Therefore almsgiving is not an
act of charity, but of religion.

Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that to give for
a good purpose is an act of liberality. Now this is especially true
of almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is not an act of charity.

_On the contrary,_ It is written 2 John 3:17: "He that hath the
substance of this world, and shall see his brother in need, and shall
put up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of God abide in him?"

_I answer that,_ External acts belong to that virtue which regards
the motive for doing those acts. Now the motive for giving alms is to
relieve one who is in need. Wherefore some have defined alms as being
"a deed whereby something is given to the needy, out of compassion
and for God's sake," which motive belongs to mercy, as stated above
(Q. 30, AA. 1, 2). Hence it is clear that almsgiving is, properly
speaking, an act of mercy. This appears in its very name, for in
Greek (_eleemosyne_) it is derived from having mercy (_eleein_) even
as the Latin _miseratio_ is. And since mercy is an effect of charity,
as shown above (Q. 30, A. 2, A. 3, Obj. 3), it follows that
almsgiving is an act of charity through the medium of mercy.

Reply Obj. 1: An act of virtue may be taken in two ways: first
materially, thus an act of justice is to do what is just; and such an
act of virtue can be without the virtue, since many, without having
the habit of justice, do what is just, led by the natural light of
reason, or through fear, or in the hope of gain. Secondly, we speak
of a thing being an act of justice formally, and thus an act of
justice is to do what is just, in the same way as a just man, i.e.
with readiness and delight, and such an act of virtue cannot be
without the virtue.

Accordingly almsgiving can be materially without charity, but to give
alms formally, i.e. for God's sake, with delight and readiness, and
altogether as one ought, is not possible without charity.

Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders the proper elicited act of one virtue
being commanded by another virtue as commanding it and directing it
to this other virtue's end. It is in this way that almsgiving is
reckoned among works of satisfaction in so far as pity for the one in
distress is directed to the satisfaction for his sin; and in so far
as it is directed to placate God, it has the character of a
sacrifice, and thus it is commanded by religion.

Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.

Reply Obj. 4: Almsgiving belongs to liberality, in so far as
liberality removes an obstacle to that act, which might arise from
excessive love of riches, the result of which is that one clings to
them more than one ought.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 2]

Whether the Different Kinds of Almsdeeds Are Suitably Enumerated?

Objection 1: It would seem that the different kinds of almsdeeds are
unsuitably enumerated. For we reckon seven corporal almsdeeds,
namely, to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe
the naked, to harbor the harborless, to visit the sick, to ransom the
captive, to bury the dead; all of which are expressed in the
following verse: "To visit, to quench, to feed, to ransom, clothe,
harbor or bury."

Again we reckon seven spiritual alms, namely, to instruct the
ignorant, to counsel the doubtful, to comfort the sorrowful, to
reprove the sinner, to forgive injuries, to bear with those who
trouble and annoy us, and to pray for all, which are all contained in
the following verse: "To counsel, reprove, console, to pardon,
forbear, and to pray," yet so that counsel includes both advice and
instruction.

And it seems that these various almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated.
For the purpose of almsdeeds is to succor our neighbor. But a dead
man profits nothing by being buried, else Our Lord would not have
spoken truly when He said (Matt. 10:28): "Be not afraid of them who
kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do." [*The
quotation is from Luke 12:4.] This explains why Our Lord, in
enumerating the works of mercy, made no mention of the burial of the
dead (Matt. 25:35, 36). Therefore it seems that these almsdeeds are
unsuitably enumerated.

Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (A. 1), the purpose of giving alms
is to relieve our neighbor's need. Now there are many needs of human
life other than those mentioned above, for instance, a blind man
needs a leader, a lame man needs someone to lean on, a poor man needs
riches. Therefore these almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated.

Obj. 3: Further, almsgiving is a work of mercy. But the reproof of
the wrong-doer savors, apparently, of severity rather than of mercy.
Therefore it ought not to be reckoned among the spiritual almsdeeds.

Obj. 4: Further, almsgiving is intended for the supply of a defect.
But no man is without the defect of ignorance in some matter or
other. Therefore, apparently, each one ought to instruct anyone who
is ignorant of what he knows himself.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Nom. in Evang. ix): "Let him that
hath understanding beware lest he withhold his knowledge; let him
that hath abundance of wealth, watch lest he slacken his merciful
bounty; let him who is a servant to art be most solicitous to share
his skill and profit with his neighbor; let him who has an
opportunity of speaking with the wealthy, fear lest he be condemned
for retaining his talent, if when he has the chance he plead not with
him the cause of the poor." Therefore the aforesaid almsdeeds are
suitably enumerated in respect of those things whereof men have
abundance or insufficiency.

_I answer that,_ The aforesaid distinction of almsdeeds is suitably
taken from the various needs of our neighbor: some of which affect
the soul, and are relieved by spiritual almsdeeds, while others
affect the body, and are relieved by corporal almsdeeds. For corporal
need occurs either during this life or afterwards. If it occurs
during this life, it is either a common need in respect of things
needed by all, or it is a special need occurring through some
accident supervening. In the first case, the need is either internal
or external. Internal need is twofold: one which is relieved by solid
food, viz. hunger, in respect of which we have _to feed the hungry;_
while the other is relieved by liquid food, viz. thirst, and in
respect of this we have _to give drink to the thirsty._ The common
need with regard to external help is twofold; one in respect of
clothing, and as to this we have _to clothe the naked:_ while the
other is in respect of a dwelling place, and as to this we have _to
harbor the harborless._ Again if the need be special, it is either
the result of an internal cause, like sickness, and then we have _to
visit the sick,_ or it results from an external cause, and then we
have _to ransom the captive._ After this life we give _burial to the
dead._

In like manner spiritual needs are relieved by spiritual acts in two
ways, first by asking for help from God, and in this respect we have
_prayer,_ whereby one man prays for others; secondly, by giving human
assistance, and this in three ways. First, in order to relieve a
deficiency on the part of the intellect, and if this deficiency be in
the speculative intellect, the remedy is applied by _instructing,_
and if in the practical intellect, the remedy is applied by
_counselling._ Secondly, there may be a deficiency on the part of the
appetitive power, especially by way of sorrow, which is remedied by
_comforting._ Thirdly, the deficiency may be due to an inordinate
act; and this may be the subject of a threefold consideration. First,
in respect of the sinner, inasmuch as the sin proceeds from his
inordinate will, and thus the remedy takes the form of _reproof._
Secondly, in respect of the person sinned against; and if the sin be
committed against ourselves, we apply the remedy by _pardoning the
injury,_ while, if it be committed against God or our neighbor, it is
not in our power to pardon, as Jerome observes (Super Matth. xviii,
15). Thirdly, in respect of the result of the inordinate act, on
account of which the sinner is an annoyance to those who live with
him, even beside his intention; in which case the remedy is applied
by _bearing with him,_    especially with regard to those who sin out
of weakness, according to Rom. 15:1: "We that are stronger, ought to
bear the infirmities of the weak," and not only as regards their
being infirm and consequently troublesome on account of their unruly
actions, but also by bearing any other burdens of theirs with them,
according to Gal. 6:2: "Bear ye one another's burdens."

Reply Obj. 1: Burial does not profit a dead man as though his body
could be capable of perception after death. In this sense Our Lord
said that those who kill the body "have no more that they can do";
and for this reason He did not mention the burial of the dead with
the other works of mercy, but those only which are more clearly
necessary. Nevertheless it does concern the deceased what is done
with his body: both that he may live in the memory of man whose
respect he forfeits if he remain without burial, and as regards a
man's fondness for his own body while he was yet living, a fondness
which kindly persons should imitate after his death. It is thus that
some are praised for burying the dead, as Tobias, and those who
buried Our Lord; as Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii).

Reply Obj. 2: All other needs are reduced to these, for blindness and
lameness are kinds of sickness, so that to lead the blind, and to
support the lame, come to the same as visiting the sick. In like
manner to assist a man against any distress that is due to an
extrinsic cause comes to the same as the ransom of captives. And the
wealth with which we relieve the poor is sought merely for the
purpose of relieving the aforesaid needs: hence there was no reason
for special mention of this particular need.

Reply Obj. 3: The reproof of the sinner, as to the exercise of the
act of reproving, seems to imply the severity of justice, but, as to
the intention of the reprover, who wishes to free a man from the evil
of sin, it is an act of mercy and lovingkindness, according to Prov.
27:6: "Better are the wounds of a friend, than the deceitful kisses
of an enemy."

Reply Obj. 4: Nescience is not always a defect, but only when it is
about what one ought to know, and it is a part of almsgiving to
supply this defect by instruction. In doing this however we should
observe the due circumstances of persons, place and time, even as in
other virtuous acts.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 3]

Whether Corporal Alms Are of More Account Than Spiritual Alms?

Objection 1: It would seem that corporal alms are of more account
than spiritual alms. For it is more praiseworthy to give an alms to
one who is in greater want, since an almsdeed is to be praised
because it relieves one who is in need. Now the body which is
relieved by corporal alms, is by nature more needy than the spirit
which is relieved by spiritual alms. Therefore corporal alms are of
more account.

Obj. 2: Further, an alms is less praiseworthy and meritorious if the
kindness is compensated, wherefore Our Lord says (Luke 14:12): "When
thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy neighbors who are
rich, lest perhaps they also invite thee again." Now there is always
compensation in spiritual almsdeeds, since he who prays for another,
profits thereby, according to Ps. 34:13: "My prayer shall be turned
into my bosom": and he who teaches another, makes progress in
knowledge, which cannot be said of corporal almsdeeds. Therefore
corporal almsdeeds are of more account than spiritual almsdeeds.

Obj. 3: Further, an alms is to be commended if the needy one is
comforted by it: wherefore it is written (Job 31:20): "If his sides
have not blessed me," and the Apostle says to Philemon (verse 7):
"The bowels of the saints have been refreshed by thee, brother." Now
a corporal alms is sometimes more welcome to a needy man than a
spiritual alms. Therefore bodily almsdeeds are of more account than
spiritual almsdeeds.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 20) on
the words, "Give to him that asketh of thee" (Matt. 5:42): "You
should give so as to injure neither yourself nor another, and when
you refuse what another asks you must not lose sight of the claims of
justice, and send him away empty; at times indeed you will give what
is better than what is asked for, if you reprove him that asks
unjustly." Now reproof is a spiritual alms. Therefore spiritual
almsdeeds are preferable to corporal almsdeeds.

_I answer that,_ There are two ways of comparing these almsdeeds.
First, simply; and in this respect, spiritual almsdeeds hold the
first place, for three reasons. First, because the offering is more
excellent, since it is a spiritual gift, which surpasses a corporal
gift, according to Prov. 4:2: "I will give you a good gift, forsake
not My Law." Secondly, on account of the object succored, because the
spirit is more excellent than the body, wherefore, even as a man in
looking after himself, ought to look to his soul more than to his
body, so ought he in looking after his neighbor, whom he ought to
love as himself. Thirdly, as regards the acts themselves by which our
neighbor is succored, because spiritual acts are more excellent than
corporal acts, which are, in a fashion, servile.

Secondly, we may compare them with regard to some particular case,
when some corporal alms excels some spiritual alms: for instance, a
man in hunger is to be fed rather than instructed, and as the
Philosopher observes (Topic. iii, 2), for a needy man "money is
better than philosophy," although the latter is better simply.

Reply Obj. 1: It is better to give to one who is in greater want,
other things being equal, but if he who is less needy is better, and
is in want of better things, it is better to give to him: and it is
thus in the case in point.

Reply Obj. 2: Compensation does not detract from merit and praise if
it be not intended, even as human glory, if not intended, does not
detract from virtue. Thus Sallust says of Cato (Catilin.), that "the
less he sought fame, the more he became famous": and thus it is with
spiritual almsdeeds.

Nevertheless the intention of gaining spiritual goods does not
detract from merit, as the intention of gaining corporal goods.

Reply Obj. 3: The merit of an almsgiver depends on that in which the
will of the recipient rests reasonably, and not on that in which it
rests when it is inordinate.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 4]

Whether Corporal Almsdeeds Have a Spiritual Effect?

Objection 1: It would seem that corporal almsdeeds have not a
spiritual effect. For no effect exceeds its cause. But spiritual
goods exceed corporal goods. Therefore corporal almsdeeds have no
spiritual effect.

Obj. 2: Further, the sin of simony consists in giving the corporal
for the spiritual, and it is to be utterly avoided. Therefore one
ought not to give alms in order to receive a spiritual effect.

Obj. 3: Further, to multiply the cause is to multiply the effect. If
therefore corporal almsdeeds cause a spiritual effect, the greater
the alms, the greater the spiritual profit, which is contrary to what
we read (Luke 21:3) of the widow who cast two brass mites into the
treasury, and in Our Lord's own words "cast in more than . . . all."
Therefore bodily almsdeeds have no spiritual effect.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 17:18): "The alms of a man
. . . shall preserve the grace of a man as the apple of the eye."

_I answer that,_ Corporal almsdeeds may be considered in three ways.
First, with regard to their substance, and in this way they have
merely a corporal effect, inasmuch as they supply our neighbor's
corporal needs. Secondly, they may be considered with regard to their
cause, in so far as a man gives a corporal alms out of love for God
and his neighbor, and in this respect they bring forth a spiritual
fruit, according to Ecclus. 29:13, 14: "Lose thy money for thy
brother . . . place thy treasure in the commandments of the Most
High, and it shall bring thee more profit than gold."

Thirdly, with regard to the effect, and in this way again, they have
a spiritual fruit, inasmuch as our neighbor, who is succored by a
corporal alms, is moved to pray for his benefactor; wherefore the
above text goes on (Ecclus. 29:15): "Shut up alms in the heart of the
poor, and it shall obtain help for thee from all evil."

Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers corporal almsdeeds as to their
substance.

Reply Obj. 2: He who gives an alms does not intend to buy a spiritual
thing with a corporal thing, for he knows that spiritual things
infinitely surpass corporal things, but he intends to merit a
spiritual fruit through the love of charity.

Reply Obj. 3: The widow who gave less in quantity, gave more in
proportion; and thus we gather that the fervor of her charity, whence
corporal almsdeeds derive their spiritual efficacy, was greater.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 5]

Whether Almsgiving Is a Matter of Precept?

Objection 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not a matter of
precept. For the counsels are distinct from the precepts. Now
almsgiving is a matter of counsel, according to Dan. 4:24: "Let my
counsel be acceptable to the King; [Vulg.: 'to thee, and'] redeem
thou thy sins with alms." Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of
precept.

Obj. 2: Further, it is lawful for everyone to use and to keep what is
his own. Yet by keeping it he will not give alms. Therefore it is
lawful not to give alms: and consequently almsgiving is not a matter
of precept.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever is a matter of precept binds the
transgressor at some time or other under pain of mortal sin, because
positive precepts are binding for some fixed time. Therefore, if
almsgiving were a matter of precept, it would be possible to point to
some fixed time when a man would commit a mortal sin unless he gave
an alms. But it does not appear how this can be so, because it can
always be deemed probable that the person in need can be relieved in
some other way, and that what we would spend in almsgiving might be
needful to ourselves either now or in some future time. Therefore it
seems that almsgiving is not a matter of precept.

Obj. 4: Further, every commandment is reducible to the precepts of
the Decalogue. But these precepts contain no reference to almsgiving.
Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept.

_On the contrary,_ No man is punished eternally for omitting to do
what is not a matter of precept. But some are punished eternally for
omitting to give alms, as is clear from Matt. 25:41-43. Therefore
almsgiving is a matter of precept.

_I answer that,_ As love of our neighbor is a matter of precept,
whatever is a necessary condition to the love of our neighbor is a
matter of precept also. Now the love of our neighbor requires that
not only should we be our neighbor's well-wishers, but also his
well-doers, according to 1 John 3:18: "Let us not love in word, nor
in tongue, but in deed, and in truth." And in order to be a person's
well-wisher and well-doer, we ought to succor his needs: this is done
by almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is a matter of precept.

Since, however, precepts are about acts of virtue, it follows that
all almsgiving must be a matter of precept, in so far as it is
necessary to virtue, namely, in so far as it is demanded by right
reason. Now right reason demands that we should take into
consideration something on the part of the giver, and something on
the part of the recipient. On the part of the giver, it must be noted
that he should give of his surplus, according to Luke 11:41: "That
which remaineth, give alms." This surplus is to be taken in reference
not only to himself, so as to denote what is unnecessary to the
individual, but also in reference to those of whom he has charge (in
which case we have the expression "necessary to the person" [*The
official necessities of a person in position] taking the word
"person" as expressive of dignity). Because each one must first of
all look after himself and then after those over whom he has charge,
and afterwards with what remains relieve the needs of others. Thus
nature first, by its nutritive power, takes what it requires for the
upkeep of one's own body, and afterwards yields the residue for the
formation of another by the power of generation.

On the part of the recipient it is requisite that he should be in
need, else there would be no reason for giving him alms: yet since it
is not possible for one individual to relieve the needs of all, we
are not bound to relieve all who are in need, but only those who
could not be succored if we not did succor them. For in such cases
the words of Ambrose apply, "Feed him that dies of hunger: if thou
hast not fed him, thou hast slain him" [*Cf. Canon _Pasce,_ dist.
lxxxvi, whence the words, as quoted, are taken]. Accordingly we are
bound to give alms of our surplus, as also to give alms to one whose
need is extreme: otherwise almsgiving, like any other greater good,
is a matter of counsel.

Reply Obj. 1: Daniel spoke to a king who was not subject to God's
Law, wherefore such things as were prescribed by the Law which he did
not profess, had to be counselled to him. Or he may have been
speaking in reference to a case in which almsgiving was not a matter
of precept.

Reply Obj. 2: The temporal goods which God grants us, are ours as to
the ownership, but as to the use of them, they belong not to us alone
but also to such others as we are able to succor out of what we have
over and above our needs. Hence Basil says [*Hom. super Luc. xii,
18]: "If you acknowledge them," viz. your temporal goods, "as coming
from God, is He unjust because He apportions them unequally? Why are
you rich while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the
merit of a good stewardship, and he the reward of patience? It is the
hungry man's bread that you withhold, the naked man's cloak that you
have stored away, the shoe of the barefoot that you have left to rot,
the money of the needy that you have buried underground: and so you
injure as many as you might help." Ambrose expresses himself in the
same way.

Reply Obj. 3: There is a time when we sin mortally if we omit to give
alms; on the part of the recipient when we see that his need is
evident and urgent, and that he is not likely to be succored
otherwise--on the part of the giver, when he has superfluous goods,
which he does not need for the time being, as far as he can judge
with probability. Nor need he consider every case that may possibly
occur in the future, for this would be to think about the morrow,
which Our Lord forbade us to do (Matt. 6:34), but he should judge
what is superfluous and what necessary, according as things probably
and generally occur.

Reply Obj. 4: All succor given to our neighbor is reduced to the
precept about honoring our parents. For thus does the Apostle
interpret it (1 Tim. 4:8) where he says: "Dutifulness* [Douay:
'Godliness'] is profitable to all things, having promise of the life
that now is, and of that which is to come," and he says this because
the precept about honoring our parents contains the promise, "that
thou mayest be longlived upon the land" (Ex. 20:12): and dutifulness
comprises all kinds of almsgiving. [*_Pietas,_ whence our English
word "Piety." Cf. also inf. Q. 101, A. 2.]
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 6]

Whether One Ought to Give Alms Out of What One Needs?

Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to give alms out of
what one needs. For the order of charity should be observed not only
as regards the effect of our benefactions but also as regards our
interior affections. Now it is a sin to contravene the order of
charity, because this order is a matter of precept. Since, then, the
order of charity requires that a man should love himself more than
his neighbor, it seems that he would sin if he deprived himself of
what he needed, in order to succor his neighbor.

Obj. 2: Further, whoever gives away what he needs himself, squanders
his own substance, and that is to be a prodigal, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). But no sinful deed should be done.
Therefore we should not give alms out of what we need.

Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have not
care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied
the faith, and is worse than an infidel." Now if a man gives of what
he needs for himself or for his charge, he seems to detract from the
care he should have for himself or his charge. Therefore it seems
that whoever gives alms from what he needs, sins gravely.

_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 19:21): "If thou wilt be
perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor." Now he that
gives all he has to the poor, gives not only what he needs not, but
also what he needs. Therefore a man may give alms out of what he
needs.

_I answer that,_ A thing is necessary in two ways: first, because
without it something is impossible, and it is altogether wrong to
give alms out of what is necessary to us in this sense; for instance,
if a man found himself in the presence of a case of urgency, and had
merely sufficient to support himself and his children, or others
under his charge, he would be throwing away his life and that of
others if he were to give away in alms, what was then necessary to
him. Yet I say this without prejudice to such a case as might happen,
supposing that by depriving himself of necessaries a man might help a
great personage, and a support of the Church or State, since it would
be a praiseworthy act to endanger one's life and the lives of those
who are under our charge for the delivery of such a person, since the
common good is to be preferred to one's own.

Secondly, a thing is said to be necessary, if a man cannot without it
live in keeping with his social station, as regards either himself or
those of whom he has charge. The "necessary" considered thus is not
an invariable quantity, for one might add much more to a man's
property, and yet not go beyond what he needs in this way, or one
might take much from him, and he would still have sufficient for the
decencies of life in keeping with his own position. Accordingly it is
good to give alms of this kind of "necessary"; and it is a matter not
of precept but of counsel. Yet it would be inordinate to deprive
oneself of one's own, in order to give to others to such an extent
that the residue would be insufficient for one to live in keeping
with one's station and the ordinary occurrences of life: for no man
ought to live unbecomingly. There are, however, three exceptions to
the above rule. The first is when a man changes his state of life,
for instance, by entering religion, for then he gives away all his
possessions for Christ's sake, and does the deed of perfection by
transferring himself to another state. Secondly, when that which he
deprives himself of, though it be required for the decencies of life,
can nevertheless easily be recovered, so that he does not suffer
extreme inconvenience. Thirdly, when he is in presence of extreme
indigence in an individual, or great need on the part of the common
weal. For in such cases it would seem praiseworthy to forego the
requirements of one's station, in order to provide for a greater need.

The objections may be easily solved from what has been said.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 7]

Whether One May Give Alms Out of Ill-gotten Goods?

Objection 1: It would seem that one may give alms out of ill-gotten
goods. For it is written (Luke 16:9): "Make unto you friends of the
mammon of iniquity." Now mammon signifies riches. Therefore it is
lawful to make unto oneself spiritual friends by giving alms out of
ill-gotten riches.

Obj. 2: Further, all filthy lucre seems to be ill-gotten. But the
profits from whoredom are filthy lucre; wherefore it was forbidden
(Deut. 23:18) to offer therefrom sacrifices or oblations to God:
"Thou shalt not offer the hire of a strumpet . . . in the house
of . . . thy God." In like manner gains from games of chance are
ill-gotten, for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), "we take
such like gains from our friends to whom we ought rather to give."
And most of all are the profits from simony ill-gotten, since thereby
the Holy Ghost is wronged. Nevertheless out of such gains it is
lawful to give alms. Therefore one may give alms out of ill-gotten
goods.

Obj. 3: Further, greater evils should be avoided more than lesser
evils. Now it is less sinful to keep back another's property than to
commit murder, of which a man is guilty if he fails to succor one who
is in extreme need, as appears from the words of Ambrose who says (Cf.
Canon _Pasce_ dist. lxxxvi, whence the words, as quoted, are taken):
"Feed him that dies of hunger, if thou hast not fed him, thou hast
slain him". Therefore, in certain cases, it is lawful to give alms of
ill-gotten goods.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2): "Give alms
from your just labors. For you will not bribe Christ your judge, not
to hear you with the poor whom you rob . . . Give not alms from
interest and usury: I speak to the faithful to whom we dispense the
Body of Christ."

_I answer that,_ A thing may be ill-gotten in three ways. In the
first place a thing is ill-gotten if it be due to the person from
whom it is gotten, and may not be kept by the person who has obtained
possession of it; as in the case of rapine, theft and usury, and of
such things a man may not give alms since he is bound to restore them.

Secondly, a thing is ill-gotten, when he that has it may not keep it,
and yet he may not return it to the person from whom he received it,
because he received it unjustly, while the latter gave it unjustly.
This happens in simony, wherein both giver and receiver contravene
the justice of the Divine Law, so that restitution is to be made not
to the giver, but by giving alms. The same applies to all similar
cases of illegal giving and receiving.

Thirdly, a thing is ill-gotten, not because the taking was unlawful,
but because it is the outcome of something unlawful, as in the case
of a woman's profits from whoredom. This is filthy lucre properly so
called, because the practice of whoredom is filthy and against the
Law of God, yet the woman does not act unjustly or unlawfully in
taking the money. Consequently it is lawful to keep and to give in
alms what is thus acquired by an unlawful action.

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. 2), "Some have
misunderstood this saying of Our Lord, so as to take another's
property and give thereof to the poor, thinking that they are
fulfilling the commandment by so doing. This interpretation must be
amended. Yet all riches are called riches of iniquity, as stated in
_De Quaest. Ev._ ii, 34, because "riches are not unjust save for
those who are themselves unjust, and put all their trust in them. Or,
according to Ambrose in his commentary on Luke 16:9, "Make unto
yourselves friends," etc., "He calls mammon unjust, because it draws
our affections by the various allurements of wealth." Or, because
"among the many ancestors whose property you inherit, there is one
who took the property of others unjustly, although you know nothing
about it," as Basil says in a homily (Hom. super Luc. A, 5). Or, all
riches are styled riches "of iniquity," i.e., of "inequality,"
because they are not distributed equally among all, one being in
need, and another in affluence.

Reply Obj. 2: We have already explained how alms may be given out of
the profits of whoredom. Yet sacrifices and oblations were not made
therefrom at the altar, both on account of the scandal, and through
reverence for sacred things. It is also lawful to give alms out of
the profits of simony, because they are not due to him who paid,
indeed he deserves to lose them. But as to the profits from games of
chance, there would seem to be something unlawful as being contrary
to the Divine Law, when a man wins from one who cannot alienate his
property, such as minors, lunatics and so forth, or when a man, with
the desire of making money out of another man, entices him to play,
and wins from him by cheating. In these cases he is bound to
restitution, and consequently cannot give away his gains in alms.
Then again there would seem to be something unlawful as being against
the positive civil law, which altogether forbids any such profits.
Since, however, a civil law does not bind all, but only those who are
subject to that law, and moreover may be abrogated through desuetude,
it follows that all such as are bound by these laws are bound to make
restitution of such gains, unless perchance the contrary custom
prevail, or unless a man win from one who enticed him to play, in
which case he is not bound to restitution, because the loser does not
deserve to be paid back: and yet he cannot lawfully keep what he has
won, so long as that positive law is in force, wherefore in this case
he ought to give it away in alms.

Reply Obj. 3: All things are common property in a case of extreme
necessity. Hence one who is in such dire straits may take another's
goods in order to succor himself, if he can find no one who is
willing to give him something. For the same reason a man may retain
what belongs to another, and give alms thereof; or even take
something if there be no other way of succoring the one who is in
need. If however this be possible without danger, he must ask the
owner's consent, and then succor the poor man who is in extreme
necessity.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 8]

Whether One Who Is Under Another's Power Can Give Alms?

Objection 1: It would seem that one who is under another's power can
give alms. For religious are under the power of their prelates to
whom they have vowed obedience. Now if it were unlawful for them to
give alms, they would lose by entering the state of religion, for as
Ambrose [*The quotation is from the works of Ambrosiaster. Cf. Index
to ecclesiastical authorities quoted by St. Thomas] says on 1 Tim.
4:8: "'Dutifulness [Douay: 'godliness'] is profitable to all things':
The sum total of the Christian religion consists in doing one's duty
by all," and the most creditable way of doing this is to give alms.
Therefore those who are in another's power can give alms.

Obj. 2: Further, a wife is under her husband's power (Gen. 3:16). But
a wife can give alms since she is her husband's partner; hence it is
related of the Blessed Lucy that she gave alms without the knowledge
of her betrothed [*_Sponsus._ The matrimonial institutions of the
Romans were so entirely different from ours that _sponsus_ is no
longer accurately rendered either "husband" or "betrothed."]
Therefore a person is not prevented from giving alms, by being under
another's power.

Obj. 3: Further, the subjection of children to their parents is
founded on nature, wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. 6:1): "Children,
obey your parents in the Lord." But, apparently, children may give
alms out of their parents' property. For it is their own, since they
are the heirs; wherefore, since they can employ it for some bodily
use, it seems that much more can they use it in giving alms so as to
profit their souls. Therefore those who are under another's power can
give alms.

Obj. 4: Further, servants are under their master's power, according
to Titus 2:9: "Exhort servants to be obedient to their masters." Now
they may lawfully do anything that will profit their masters: and
this would be especially the case if they gave alms for them.
Therefore those who are under another's power can give alms.

_On the contrary,_ Alms should not be given out of another's
property; and each one should give alms out of the just profit of his
own labor as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2). Now if those who
are subject to anyone were to give alms, this would be out of
another's property. Therefore those who are under another's power
cannot give alms.

_I answer that,_ Anyone who is under another's power must, as such,
be ruled in accordance with the power of his superior: for the
natural order demands that the inferior should be ruled according to
its superior. Therefore in those matters in which the inferior is
subject to his superior, his ministrations must be subject to the
superior's permission.

Accordingly he that is under another's power must not give alms of
anything in respect of which he is subject to that other, except in
so far as he has been commissioned by his superior. But if he has
something in respect of which he is not under the power of his
superior, he is no longer subject to another in its regard, being
independent in respect of that particular thing, and he can give alms
therefrom.

Reply Obj. 1: If a monk be dispensed through being commissioned by
his superior, he can give alms from the property of his monastery, in
accordance with the terms of his commission; but if he has no such
dispensation, since he has nothing of his own, he cannot give alms
without his abbot's permission either express or presumed for some
probable reason: except in a case of extreme necessity, when it would
be lawful for him to commit a theft in order to give an alms. Nor
does it follow that he is worse off than before, because, as stated
in _De Eccles. Dogm._ lxxi, "it is a good thing to give one's
property to the poor little by little, but it is better still to give
all at once in order to follow Christ, and being freed from care, to
be needy with Christ."

Reply Obj. 2: A wife, who has other property besides her dowry which
is for the support of the burdens of marriage, whether that property
be gained by her own industry or by any other lawful means, can give
alms, out of that property, without asking her husband's permission:
yet such alms should be moderate, lest through giving too much she
impoverish her husband. Otherwise she ought not to give alms without
the express or presumed consent of her husband, except in cases of
necessity as stated, in the case of a monk, in the preceding Reply.
For though the wife be her husband's equal in the marriage act, yet
in matters of housekeeping, the head of the woman is the man, as the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:3). As regards Blessed Lucy, she had a
betrothed, not a husband, wherefore she could give alms with her
mother's consent.

Reply Obj. 3: What belongs to the children belongs also to the
father: wherefore the child cannot give alms, except in such small
quantity that one may presume the father to be willing: unless,
perchance, the father authorize his child to dispose of any
particular property. The same applies to servants. Hence the Reply to
the Fourth Objection is clear.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 9]

Whether One Ought to Give Alms to Those Rather Who Are More Closely
United to Us?

Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to give alms to those
rather who are more closely united to us. For it is written (Ecclus.
12:4, 6): "Give to the merciful and uphold not the sinner . . . Do
good to the humble and give not to the ungodly." Now it happens
sometimes that those who are closely united to us are sinful and
ungodly. Therefore we ought not to give alms to them in preference to
others.

Obj. 2: Further, alms should be given that we may receive an eternal
reward in return, according to Matt. 6:18: "And thy Father Who seeth
in secret, will repay thee." Now the eternal reward is gained chiefly
by the alms which are given to the saints, according to Luke 16:9:
"Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity, that when you shall
fail, they may receive you into everlasting dwellings," which passage
Augustine expounds (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 1): "Who shall have
everlasting dwellings unless the saints of God? And who are they that
shall be received by them into their dwellings, if not those who
succor them in their needs?" Therefore alms should be given to the
more holy persons rather than to those who are more closely united to
us.

Obj. 3: Further, man is more closely united to himself. But a man
cannot give himself an alms. Therefore it seems that we are not bound
to give alms to those who are most closely united to us.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): "If any man have
not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath
denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel."

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28), "it
falls to us by lot, as it were, to have to look to the welfare of
those who are more closely united to us." Nevertheless in this matter
we must employ discretion, according to the various degrees of
connection, holiness and utility. For we ought to give alms to one
who is much holier and in greater want, and to one who is more useful
to the common weal, rather than to one who is more closely united to
us, especially if the latter be not very closely united, and has no
special claim on our care then and there, and who is not in very
urgent need.

Reply Obj. 1: We ought not to help a sinner as such, that is by
encouraging him to sin, but as man, that is by supporting his nature.

Reply Obj. 2: Almsdeeds deserve on two counts to receive an eternal
reward. First because they are rooted in charity, and in this respect
an almsdeed is meritorious in so far as it observes the order of
charity, which requires that, other things being equal, we should, in
preference, help those who are more closely connected with us.
Wherefore Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): "It is with commendable
liberality that you forget not your kindred, if you know them to be
in need, for it is better that you should yourself help your own
family, who would be ashamed to beg help from others." Secondly,
almsdeeds deserve to be rewarded eternally, through the merit of the
recipient, who prays for the giver, and it is in this sense that
Augustine is speaking.

Reply Obj. 3: Since almsdeeds are works of mercy, just as a man does
not, properly speaking, pity himself, but only by a kind of
comparison, as stated above (Q. 30, AA. 1, 2), so too, properly
speaking, no man gives himself an alms, unless he act in another's
person; thus when a man is appointed to distribute alms, he can take
something for himself, if he be in want, on the same ground as when
he gives to others.
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 32, Art. 10]

Whether Alms Should Be Given in Abundance?

Objection 1: It would seem that alms should not be given in
abundance. For we ought to give alms to those chiefly who are most
closely connected with us. But we ought not to give to them in such a
way that they are likely to become richer thereby, as Ambrose says
(De Officiis i, 30). Therefore neither should we give abundantly to
others.

Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): "We should not
lavish our wealth on others all at once, we should dole it out by
degrees." But to give abundantly is to give lavishly. Therefore alms
should not be given in abundance.

Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 8:13): "Not that others
should be eased," i.e. should live on you without working themselves,
"and you burthened," i.e. impoverished. But this would be the result
if alms were given in abundance. Therefore we ought not to give alms
abundantly.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Tob. 4:93): "If thou have much,
give abundantly."

_I answer that,_ Alms may be considered abundant in relation either
to the giver, or to the recipient: in relation to the giver, when
that which a man gives is great as compared with his means. To give
thus is praiseworthy, wherefore Our Lord (Luke 21:3, 4) commended the
widow because "of her want, she cast in all the living that she had."
Nevertheless those conditions must be observed which were laid down
when we spoke of giving alms out of one's necessary goods (A. 9).

On the part of the recipient, an alms may be abundant in two ways;
first, by relieving his need sufficiently, and in this sense it is
praiseworthy to give alms: secondly, by relieving his need more than
sufficiently; this is not praiseworthy, and it would be better to
give to several that are in need, wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor.
13:3): "If I should distribute . . . to feed the poor," on which
words a gloss comments: "Thus we are warned to be careful in giving
alms, and to give, not to one only, but to many, that we may profit
many."

Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers abundance of alms as exceeding
the needs of the recipient.

Reply Obj. 2: The passage quoted considers abundance of alms on the
part of the giver; but the sense is that God does not wish a man to
lavish all his wealth at once, except when he changes his state of
life, wherefore he goes on to say: "Except we imitate Eliseus who
slew his oxen and fed the poor with what he had, so that no household
cares might keep him back" (3 Kings 19:21).

Reply Obj. 3: In the passage quoted the words, "not that others
should be eased or refreshed," refer to that abundance of alms which
surpasses the need of the recipient, to whom one should give alms not
that he may have an easy life, but that he may have relief.
Nevertheless we must bring discretion to bear on the matter, on
account of the various conditions of men, some of whom are more
daintily nurtured, and need finer food and clothing. Hence Ambrose
says (De Officiis i, 30): "When you give an alms to a man, you should
take into consideration his age and his weakness; and sometimes the
shame which proclaims his good birth; and again that perhaps he has
fallen from riches to indigence through no fault of his own."

With regard to the words that follow, "and you burdened," they refer
to abundance on the part of the giver. Yet, as a gloss says on the
same passage, "he says this, not because it would be better to give
in abundance, but because he fears for the weak, and he admonishes
them so to give that they lack not for themselves."
_______________________

QUESTION 33

OF FRATERNAL CORRECTION
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider Fraternal Correction, under which head there are
eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity?

(2) Whether it is a matter of precept?

(3) Whether this precept binds all, or only superiors?

(4) Whether this precept binds the subject to correct his superior?

(5) Whether a sinner may correct anyone?

(6) Whether one ought to correct a person who becomes worse through
being corrected?

(7) Whether secret correction should precede denouncement?

(8) Whether witnesses should be called before denouncement?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 1]

Whether Fraternal Correction Is an Act of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction is not an act of
charity. For a gloss on Matt. 18:15, "If thy brother shall offend
against thee," says that "a man should reprove his brother out of
zeal for justice." But justice is a distinct virtue from charity.
Therefore fraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of
justice.

Obj. 2: Further, fraternal correction is given by secret admonition.
Now admonition is a kind of counsel, which is an act of prudence, for
a prudent man is one who is of good counsel (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore
fraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of prudence.

Obj. 3: Further, contrary acts do not belong to the same virtue. Now
it is an act of charity to bear with a sinner, according to Gal. 6:2:
"Bear ye one another's burdens, and so you shall fulfil the law of
Christ," which is the law of charity. Therefore it seems that the
correction of a sinning brother, which is contrary to bearing with
him, is not an act of charity.

_On the contrary,_ To correct the wrongdoer is a spiritual almsdeed.
But almsdeeds are works of charity, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 1).
Therefore fraternal correction is an act of charity.

_I answer that,_ The correction of the wrongdoer is a remedy which
should be employed against a man's sin. Now a man's sin may be
considered in two ways, first as being harmful to the sinner,
secondly as conducing to the harm of others, by hurting or
scandalizing them, or by being detrimental to the common good, the
justice of which is disturbed by that man's sin.

Consequently the correction of a wrongdoer is twofold, one which
applies a remedy to the sin considered as an evil of the sinner
himself. This is fraternal correction properly so called, which is
directed to the amendment of the sinner. Now to do away with anyone's
evil is the same as to procure his good: and to procure a person's
good is an act of charity, whereby we wish and do our friend well.
Consequently fraternal correction also is an act of charity, because
thereby we drive out our brother's evil, viz. sin, the removal of
which pertains to charity rather than the removal of an external
loss, or of a bodily injury, in so much as the contrary good of
virtue is more akin to charity than the good of the body or of
external things. Therefore fraternal correction is an act of charity
rather than the healing of a bodily infirmity, or the relieving of an
external bodily need. There is another correction which applies a
remedy to the sin of the wrongdoer, considered as hurtful to others,
and especially to the common good. This correction is an act of
justice, whose concern it is to safeguard the rectitude of justice
between one man and another.

Reply Obj. 1: This gloss speaks of the second correction which is an
act of justice. Or if it speaks of the first correction, then it
takes justice as denoting a general virtue, as we shall state further
on (Q. 58, A. 5), in which sense again all "sin is iniquity" (1 John
3:4), through being contrary to justice.

Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), prudence
regulates whatever is directed to the end, about which things counsel
and choice are concerned. Nevertheless when, guided by prudence, we
perform some action aright which is directed to the end of some
virtue, such as temperance or fortitude, that action belongs chiefly
to the virtue to whose end it is directed. Since, then, the
admonition which is given in fraternal correction is directed to the
removal of a brother's sin, which removal pertains to charity, it is
evident that this admonition is chiefly an act of charity, which
virtue commands it, so to speak, but secondarily an act of prudence,
which executes and directs the action.

Reply Obj. 3: Fraternal correction is not opposed to forbearance with
the weak, on the contrary it results from it. For a man bears with a
sinner, in so far as he is not disturbed against him, and retains his
goodwill towards him: the result being that he strives to make him do
better.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 2]

Whether Fraternal Correction Is a Matter of Precept?

Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction is not a matter
of precept. For nothing impossible is a matter of precept, according
to the saying of Jerome [*Pelagius, Expos. Symb. ad Damas]: "Accursed
be he who says that God has commanded anything impossible." Now it is
written (Eccles. 7:14): "Consider the works of God, that no man can
correct whom He hath despised." Therefore fraternal correction is not
a matter of precept.

Obj. 2: Further, all the precepts of the Divine Law are reduced to
the precepts of the Decalogue. But fraternal correction does not come
under any precept of the Decalogue. Therefore it is not a matter of
precept.

Obj. 3: Further, the omission of a Divine precept is a mortal sin,
which has no place in a holy man. Yet holy and spiritual men are
found to omit fraternal correction: since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
i, 9): "Not only those of low degree, but also those of high
position, refrain from reproving others, moved by a guilty cupidity,
not by the claims of charity." Therefore fraternal correction is not
a matter of precept.

Obj. 4: Further, whatever is a matter of precept is something due.
If, therefore, fraternal correction is a matter of precept, it is due
to our brethren that we correct them when they sin. Now when a man
owes anyone a material due, such as the payment of a sum of money, he
must not be content that his creditor come to him, but he should seek
him out, that he may pay him his due. Hence we should have to go
seeking for those who need correction, in order that we might correct
them; which appears to be inconvenient, both on account of the great
number of sinners, for whose correction one man could not suffice,
and because religious would have to leave the cloister in order to
reprove men, which would be unbecoming. Therefore fraternal
correction is not a matter of precept.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 4): "You become
worse than the sinner if you fail to correct him." But this would not
be so unless, by this neglect, one omitted to observe some precept.
Therefore fraternal correction is a matter of precept.

_I answer that,_ Fraternal correction is a matter of precept. We must
observe, however, that while the negative precepts of the Law forbid
sinful acts, the positive precepts inculcate acts of virtue. Now
sinful acts are evil in themselves, and cannot become good, no matter
how, or when, or where, they are done, because of their very nature
they are connected with an evil end, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6:
wherefore negative precepts bind always and for all times. On the
other hand, acts of virtue must not be done anyhow, but by observing
the due circumstances, which are requisite in order that an act be
virtuous; namely, that it be done where, when, and how it ought to be
done. And since the disposition of whatever is directed to the end
depends on the formal aspect of the end, the chief of these
circumstances of a virtuous act is this aspect of the end, which in
this case is the good of virtue. If therefore such a circumstance be
omitted from a virtuous act, as entirely takes away the good of
virtue, such an act is contrary to a precept. If, however, the
circumstance omitted from a virtuous act be such as not to destroy
the virtue altogether, though it does not perfectly attain the good
of virtue, it is not against a precept. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic.
ii, 9) says that if we depart but little from the mean, it is not
contrary to the virtue, whereas if we depart much from the mean
virtue is destroyed in its act. Now fraternal correction is directed
to a brother's amendment: so that it is a matter of precept, in so
far as it is necessary for that end, but not so as we have to correct
our erring brother at all places and times.

Reply Obj. 1: In all good deeds man's action is not efficacious
without the Divine assistance: and yet man must do what is in his
power. Hence Augustine says (De Correp. et Gratia xv): "Since we
ignore who is predestined and who is not, charity should so guide our
feelings, that we wish all to be saved." Consequently we ought to do
our brethren the kindness of correcting them, with the hope of God's
help.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 32, A. 5, ad 4), all the precepts
about rendering service to our neighbor are reduced to the precept
about the honor due to parents.

Reply Obj. 3: Fraternal correction may be omitted in three ways.

First, meritoriously, when out of charity one omits to correct
someone. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): "If a man refrains
from chiding and reproving wrongdoers, because he awaits a suitable
time for so doing, or because he fears lest, if he does so, they may
become worse, or hinder, oppress, or turn away from the faith, others
who are weak and need to be instructed in a life of goodness and
virtue, this does not seem to result from covetousness, but to be
counselled by charity."

Secondly, fraternal correction may be omitted in such a way that one
commits a mortal sin, namely, "when" (as he says in the same passage)
"one fears what people may think, or lest one may suffer grievous
pain or death; provided, however, that the mind is so dominated by
such things, that it gives them the preference to fraternal charity."
This would seem to be the case when a man reckons that he might
probably withdraw some wrongdoer from sin, and yet omits to do so,
through fear or covetousness.

Thirdly, such an omission is a venial sin, when through fear or
covetousness, a man is loth to correct his brother's faults, and yet
not to such a degree, that if he saw clearly that he could withdraw
him from sin, he would still forbear from so doing, through fear or
covetousness, because in his own mind he prefers fraternal charity to
these things. It is in this way that holy men sometimes omit to
correct wrongdoers.

Reply Obj. 4: We are bound to pay that which is due to some fixed and
certain person, whether it be a material or a spiritual good, without
waiting for him to come to us, but by taking proper steps to find
him. Wherefore just as he that owes money to a creditor should seek
him, when the time comes, so as to pay him what he owes, so he that
has spiritual charge of some person is bound to seek him out, in
order to reprove him for a sin. On the other hand, we are not bound
to seek someone on whom to bestow such favors as are due, not to any
certain person, but to all our neighbors in general, whether those
favors be material or spiritual goods, but it suffices that we bestow
them when the opportunity occurs; because, as Augustine says (De
Doctr. Christ. i, 28), we must look upon this as a matter of chance.
For this reason he says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 1) that "Our Lord warns
us not to be listless in regard of one another's sins: not indeed by
being on the lookout for something to denounce, but by correcting
what we see": else we should become spies on the lives of others,
which is against the saying of Prov. 24:19: "Lie not in wait, nor
seek after wickedness in the house of the just, nor spoil his rest."
It is evident from this that there is no need for religious to leave
their cloister in order to rebuke evil-doers.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 3]

Whether Fraternal Correction Belongs Only to Prelates?

Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction belongs to
prelates alone. For Jerome [*Origen, Hom. vii in Joan.] says: "Let
priests endeavor to fulfil this saying of the Gospel: 'If thy brother
sin against thee,'" etc. Now prelates having charge of others were
usually designated under the name of priests. Therefore it seems that
fraternal correction belongs to prelates alone.

Obj. 2: Further, fraternal correction is a spiritual alms. Now
corporal almsgiving belongs to those who are placed above others in
temporal matters, i.e. to the rich. Therefore fraternal correction
belongs to those who are placed above others in spiritual matters,
i.e. to prelates.

Obj. 3: Further, when one man reproves another he moves him by his
rebuke to something better. Now in the physical order the inferior is
moved by the superior. Therefore in the order of virtue also, which
follows the order of nature, it belongs to prelates alone to correct
inferiors.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Dist. xxiv, qu. 3, Can. Tam
Sacerdotes): "Both priests and all the rest of the faithful should be
most solicitous for those who perish, so that their reproof may
either correct their sinful ways, or, if they be incorrigible, cut
them off from the Church."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), correction is twofold. One
is an act of charity, which seeks in a special way the recovery of an
erring brother by means of a simple warning: such like correction
belongs to anyone who has charity, be he subject or prelate.

But there is another correction which is an act of justice purposing
the common good, which is procured not only by warning one's brother,
but also, sometimes, by punishing him, that others may, through fear,
desist from sin. Such a correction belongs only to prelates, whose
business it is not only to admonish, but also to correct by means of
punishments.

Reply Obj. 1: Even as regards that fraternal correction which is
common to all, prelates have a grave responsibility, as Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): "for just as a man ought to bestow temporal
favors on those especially of whom he has temporal care, so too ought
he to confer spiritual favors, such as correction, teaching and the
like, on those who are entrusted to his spiritual care." Therefore
Jerome does not mean that the precept of fraternal correction
concerns priests only, but that it concerns them chiefly.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as he who has the means wherewith to give corporal
assistance is rich in this respect, so he whose reason is gifted with
a sane judgment, so as to be able to correct another's wrong-doing,
is, in this respect, to be looked on as a superior.

Reply Obj. 3: Even in the physical order certain things act mutually
on one another, through being in some respect higher than one
another, in so far as each is somewhat in act, and somewhat in
potentiality with regard to another. In like manner one man can
correct another in so far as he has a sane judgment in a matter
wherein the other sins, though he is not his superior simply.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 4]

Whether a Man Is Bound to Correct His Prelate?

Objection 1: It would seem that no man is bound to correct his
prelate. For it is written (Ex. 19:12): "The beast that shall touch
the mount shall be stoned," [*Vulg.: 'Everyone that shall touch the
mount, dying he shall die.'] and (2 Kings 6:7) it is related that the
Lord struck Oza for touching the ark. Now the mount and the ark
signify our prelates. Therefore prelates should not be corrected by
their subjects.

Obj. 2: Further, a gloss on Gal. 2:11, "I withstood him to the face,"
adds: "as an equal." Therefore, since a subject is not equal to his
prelate, he ought not to correct him.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 8) that "one ought not
to presume to reprove the conduct of holy men, unless one thinks
better of oneself." But one ought not to think better of oneself than
of one's prelate. Therefore one ought not to correct one's prelate.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says in his Rule: "Show mercy not only
to yourselves, but also to him who, being in the higher position
among you, is therefore in greater danger." But fraternal correction
is a work of mercy. Therefore even prelates ought to be corrected.

_I answer that,_ A subject is not competent to administer to his
prelate the correction which is an act of justice through the
coercive nature of punishment: but the fraternal correction which is
an act of charity is within the competency of everyone in respect of
any person towards whom he is bound by charity, provided there be
something in that person which requires correction.

Now an act which proceeds from a habit or power extends to whatever
is contained under the object of that power or habit: thus vision
extends to all things comprised in the object of sight. Since,
however, a virtuous act needs to be moderated by due circumstances,
it follows that when a subject corrects his prelate, he ought to do
so in a becoming manner, not with impudence and harshness, but with
gentleness and respect. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:1): "An
ancient man rebuke not, but entreat him as a father." Wherefore
Dionysius finds fault with the monk Demophilus (Ep. viii), for
rebuking a priest with insolence, by striking and turning him out of
the church.

Reply Obj. 1: It would seem that a subject touches his prelate
inordinately when he upbraids him with insolence, as also when he
speaks ill of him: and this is signified by God's condemnation of
those who touched the mount and the ark.

Reply Obj. 2: To withstand anyone in public exceeds the mode of
fraternal correction, and so Paul would not have withstood Peter
then, unless he were in some way his equal as regards the defense of
the faith. But one who is not an equal can reprove privately and
respectfully. Hence the Apostle in writing to the Colossians (4:17)
tells them to admonish their prelate: "Say to Archippus: Fulfil thy
ministry [*Vulg.: 'Take heed to the ministry which thou hast received
in the Lord, that thou fulfil it.' Cf. 2 Tim. 4:5]." It must be
observed, however, that if the faith were endangered, a subject ought
to rebuke his prelate even publicly. Hence Paul, who was Peter's
subject, rebuked him in public, on account of the imminent danger of
scandal concerning faith, and, as the gloss of Augustine says on Gal.
2:11, "Peter gave an example to superiors, that if at any time they
should happen to stray from the straight path, they should not
disdain to be reproved by their subjects."

Reply Obj. 3: To presume oneself to be simply better than one's
prelate, would seem to savor of presumptuous pride; but there is no
presumption in thinking oneself better in some respect, because, in
this life, no man is without some fault. We must also remember that
when a man reproves his prelate charitably, it does not follow that
he thinks himself any better, but merely that he offers his help to
one who, "being in the higher position among you, is therefore in
greater danger," as Augustine observes in his Rule quoted above.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 5]

Whether a Sinner Ought to Reprove a Wrongdoer?

Objection 1: It would seem that a sinner ought to reprove a
wrongdoer. For no man is excused from obeying a precept by having
committed a sin. But fraternal correction is a matter of precept, as
stated above (A. 2). Therefore it seems that a man ought not to
forbear from such like correction for the reason that he has
committed a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, spiritual almsdeeds are of more account than
corporal almsdeeds. Now one who is in sin ought not to abstain from
administering corporal alms. Much less therefore ought he, on account
of a previous sin, to refrain from correcting wrongdoers.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (1 John 1:8): "If we say that we have
no sin, we deceive ourselves." Therefore if, on account of a sin, a
man is hindered from reproving his brother, there will be none to
reprove the wrongdoer. But the latter proposition is unreasonable:
therefore the former is also.

_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, 32): "He that is
subject to vice should not correct the vices of others." Again it is
written (Rom. 2:1): "Wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest
thyself. For thou dost the same things which thou judgest."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3, ad 2), to correct a wrongdoer
belongs to a man, in so far as his reason is gifted with right
judgment. Now sin, as stated above (I-II, Q. 85, AA. 1, 2), does not
destroy the good of nature so as to deprive the sinner's reason of
all right judgment, and in this respect he may be competent to find
fault with others for committing sin. Nevertheless a previous sin
proves somewhat of a hindrance to this correction, for three reasons.
First because this previous sin renders a man unworthy to rebuke
another; and especially is he unworthy to correct another for a
lesser sin, if he himself has committed a greater. Hence Jerome says
on the words, "Why seest thou the mote?" etc. (Matt. 7:3): "He is
speaking of those who, while they are themselves guilty of mortal
sin, have no patience with the lesser sins of their brethren."

Secondly, such like correction becomes unseemly, on account of the
scandal which ensues therefrom, if the corrector's sin be well known,
because it would seem that he corrects, not out of charity, but more
for the sake of ostentation. Hence the words of Matt. 7:4, "How
sayest thou to thy brother?" etc. are expounded by Chrysostom [*Hom.
xvii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]
thus: "That is--'With what object?' Out of charity, think you, that
you may save your neighbor?" No, "because you would look after your
own salvation first. What you want is, not to save others, but to
hide your evil deeds with good teaching, and to seek to be praised by
men for your knowledge."

Thirdly, on account of the rebuker's pride; when, for instance, a man
thinks lightly of his own sins, and, in his own heart, sets himself
above his neighbor, judging the latter's sins with harsh severity, as
though he himself were a just man. Hence Augustine says (De Serm.
Dom. in Monte ii, 19): "To reprove the faults of others is the duty
of good and kindly men: when a wicked man rebukes anyone, his rebuke
is the latter's acquittal." And so, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom.
in Monte ii, 19): "When we have to find fault with anyone, we should
think whether we were never guilty of his sin; and then we must
remember that we are men, and might have been guilty of it; or that
we once had it on our conscience, but have it no longer: and then we
should bethink ourselves that we are all weak, in order that our
reproof may be the outcome, not of hatred, but of pity. But if we
find that we are guilty of the same sin, we must not rebuke him, but
groan with him, and invite him to repent with us." It follows from
this that, if a sinner reprove a wrongdoer with humility, he does not
sin, nor does he bring a further condemnation on himself, although
thereby he proves himself deserving of condemnation, either in his
brother's or in his own conscience, on account of his previous sin.

Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 6]

Whether One Ought to Forbear from Correcting Someone, Through Fear
Lest He Become Worse?

Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to forbear from
correcting someone through fear lest he become worse. For sin is
weakness of the soul, according to Ps. 6:3: "Have mercy on me, O
Lord, for I am weak." Now he that has charge of a sick person, must
not cease to take care of him, even if he be fractious or
contemptuous, because then the danger is greater, as in the case of
madmen. Much more, therefore should one correct a sinner, no matter
how badly he takes it.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Jerome vital truths are not to be
foregone on account of scandal. Now God's commandments are vital
truths. Since, therefore, fraternal correction is a matter of
precept, as stated above (A. 2), it seems that it should not be
foregone for fear of scandalizing the person to be corrected.

Obj. 3: Further, according to the Apostle (Rom. 3:8) we should not do
evil that good may come of it. Therefore, in like manner, good should
not be omitted lest evil befall. Now fraternal correction is a good
thing. Therefore it should not be omitted for fear lest the person
corrected become worse.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 9:8): "Rebuke not a scorner
lest he hate thee," where a gloss remarks: "You must not fear lest
the scorner insult you when you rebuke him: rather should you bear in
mind that by making him hate you, you may make him worse." Therefore
one ought to forego fraternal correction, when we fear lest we may
make a man worse.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3) the correction of the
wrongdoer is twofold. One, which belongs to prelates, and is directed
to the common good, has coercive force. Such correction should not be
omitted lest the person corrected be disturbed, both because if he is
unwilling to amend his ways of his own accord, he should be made to
cease sinning by being punished, and because, if he be incorrigible,
the common good is safeguarded in this way, since the order of
justice is observed, and others are deterred by one being made an
example of. Hence a judge does not desist from pronouncing sentence
of condemnation against a sinner, for fear of disturbing him or his
friends.

The other fraternal correction is directed to the amendment of the
wrongdoer, whom it does not coerce, but merely admonishes.
Consequently when it is deemed probable that the sinner will not take
the warning, and will become worse, such fraternal correction should
be foregone, because the means should be regulated according to the
requirements of the end.

Reply Obj. 1: The doctor uses force towards a madman, who is
unwilling to submit to his treatment; and this may be compared with
the correction administered by prelates, which has coercive power,
but not with simple fraternal correction.

Reply Obj. 2: Fraternal correction is a matter of precept, in so far
as it is an act of virtue, and it will be a virtuous act in so far as
it is proportionate to the end. Consequently whenever it is a
hindrance to the end, for instance when a man becomes worse through
it, it is longer a vital truth, nor is it a matter of precept.

Reply Obj. 3: Whatever is directed to an end, becomes good through
being directed to the end. Hence whenever fraternal correction
hinders the end, namely the amendment of our brother, it is no longer
good, so that when such a correction is omitted, good is not omitted
lest evil should befall.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 7]

Whether the Precept of Fraternal Correction Demands That a Private
Admonition Should Precede Denunciation?

Objection 1: It would seem that the precept of fraternal correction
does not demand that a private admonition should precede
denunciation. For, in works of charity, we should above all follow
the example of God, according to Eph. 5:1, 2: "Be ye followers of
God, as most dear children, and walk in love." Now God sometimes
punishes a man for a sin, without previously warning him in secret.
Therefore it seems that there is no need for a private admonition to
precede denunciation.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Mendacio xv), we learn
from the deeds of holy men how we ought to understand the
commandments of Holy Writ. Now among the deeds of holy men we find
that a hidden sin is publicly denounced, without any previous
admonition in private. Thus we read (Gen. 37:2) that "Joseph accused
his brethren to his father of a most wicked crime": and (Acts 5:4, 9)
that Peter publicly denounced Ananias and Saphira who had secretly
"by fraud kept back the price of the land," without beforehand
admonishing them in private: nor do we read that Our Lord admonished
Judas in secret before denouncing him. Therefore the precept does not
require that secret admonition should precede public denunciation.

Obj. 3: Further, it is a graver matter to accuse than to denounce.
Now one may go to the length of accusing a person publicly, without
previously admonishing him in secret: for it is decided in the
Decretal (Cap. Qualiter, xiv, De Accusationibus) that "nothing else
need precede accusation except inscription." [*The accuser was bound
by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the writ of accusation. The
effect of this endorsement or inscription was that the accuser bound
himself, if he failed to prove the accusation, to suffer the same
punishment as the accused would have to suffer if proved guilty.]
Therefore it seems that the precept does not require that a secret
admonition should precede public denunciation.

Obj. 4: Further, it does not seem probable that the customs observed
by religious in general are contrary to the precepts of Christ. Now
it is customary among religious orders to proclaim this or that one
for a fault, without any previous secret admonition. Therefore it
seems that this admonition is not required by the precept.

Obj. 5: Further, religious are bound to obey their prelates. Now a
prelate sometimes commands either all in general, or someone in
particular, to tell him if they know of anything that requires
correction. Therefore it would seem that they are bound to tell them
this, even before any secret admonition. Therefore the precept does
not require secret admonition before public denunciation.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 4) on the
words, "Rebuke him between thee and him alone" (Matt. 18:15): "Aiming
at his amendment, while avoiding his disgrace: since perhaps from
shame he might begin to defend his sin; and him whom you thought to
make a better man, you make worse." Now we are bound by the precept
of charity to beware lest our brother become worse. Therefore the
order of fraternal correction comes under the precept.

_I answer that,_ With regard to the public denunciation of sins it is
necessary to make a distinction: because sins may be either public or
secret. In the case of public sins, a remedy is required not only for
the sinner, that he may become better, but also for others, who know
of his sin, lest they be scandalized. Wherefore such like sins should
be denounced in public, according to the saying of the Apostle (1
Tim. 5:20): "Them that sin reprove before all, that the rest also may
have fear," which is to be understood as referring to public sins, as
Augustine states (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 7).

On the other hand, in the case of secret sins, the words of Our Lord
seem to apply (Matt. 18:15): "If thy brother shall offend against
thee," etc. For if he offend thee publicly in the presence of others,
he no longer sins against thee alone, but also against others whom he
disturbs. Since, however, a man's neighbor may take offense even at
his secret sins, it seems that we must make yet a further
distinction. For certain secret sins are hurtful to our neighbor
either in his body or in his soul, as, for instance, when a man plots
secretly to betray his country to its enemies, or when a heretic
secretly turns other men away from the faith. And since he that sins
thus in secret, sins not only against you in particular, but also
against others, it is necessary to take steps to denounce him at
once, in order to prevent him doing such harm, unless by chance you
were firmly persuaded that this evil result would be prevented by
admonishing him secretly. On the other hand there are other sins
which injure none but the sinner, and the person sinned against,
either because he alone is hurt by the sinner, or at least because he
alone knows about his sin, and then our one purpose should be to
succor our sinning brother: and just as the physician of the body
restores the sick man to health, if possible, without cutting off a
limb, but, if this be unavoidable, cuts off a limb which is least
indispensable, in order to preserve the life of the whole body, so
too he who desires his brother's amendment should, if possible, so
amend him as regards his conscience, that he keep his good name.

For a good name is useful, first of all to the sinner himself, not
only in temporal matters wherein a man suffers many losses, if he
lose his good name, but also in spiritual matters, because many are
restrained from sinning, through fear of dishonor, so that when a man
finds his honor lost, he puts no curb on his sinning. Hence Jerome
says on Matt. 18:15: "If he sin against thee, thou shouldst rebuke
him in private, lest he persist in his sin if he should once become
shameless or unabashed." Secondly, we ought to safeguard our sinning
brother's good name, both because the dishonor of one leads to the
dishonor of others, according to the saying of Augustine (Ep. ad
pleb. Hipponens. lxxviii): "When a few of those who bear a name for
holiness are reported falsely or proved in truth to have done
anything wrong, people will seek by busily repeating it to make it
believed of all": and also because when one man's sin is made public
others are incited to sin likewise.

Since, however, one's conscience should be preferred to a good name,
Our Lord wished that we should publicly denounce our brother and so
deliver his conscience from sin, even though he should forfeit his
good name. Therefore it is evident that the precept requires a secret
admonition to precede public denunciation.

Reply Obj. 1: Whatever is hidden, is known to God, wherefore hidden
sins are to the judgment of God, just what public sins are to the
judgment of man. Nevertheless God does rebuke sinners sometimes by
secretly admonishing them, so to speak, with an inward inspiration,
either while they wake or while they sleep, according to Job
33:15-17: "By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth
upon men . . . then He openeth the ears of men, and teaching
instructeth them in what they are to learn, that He may withdraw a
man from the things he is doing."

Reply Obj. 2: Our Lord as God knew the sin of Judas as though it were
public, wherefore He could have made it known at once. Yet He did
not, but warned Judas of his sin in words that were obscure. The sin
of Ananias and Saphira was denounced by Peter acting as God's
executor, by Whose revelation he knew of their sin. With regard to
Joseph it is probable that he warned his brethren, though Scripture
does not say so. Or we may say that the sin was public with regard to
his brethren, wherefore it is stated in the plural that he accused
"his brethren."

Reply Obj. 3: When there is danger to a great number of people, those
words of Our Lord do not apply, because then thy brother does not sin
against thee alone.

Reply Obj. 4: Proclamations made in the chapter of religious are
about little faults which do not affect a man's good name, wherefore
they are reminders of forgotten faults rather than accusations or
denunciations. If, however, they should be of such a nature as to
injure our brother's good name, it would be contrary to Our Lord's
precept, to denounce a brother's fault in this manner.

Reply Obj. 5: A prelate is not to be obeyed contrary to a Divine
precept, according to Acts 5:29: "We ought to obey God rather then
men." Therefore when a prelate commands anyone to tell him anything
that he knows to need correction, the command rightly understood
supports the safeguarding of the order of fraternal correction,
whether the command be addressed to all in general, or to some
particular individual. If, on the other hand, a prelate were to issue
a command in express opposition to this order instituted by Our Lord,
both would sin, the one commanding, and the one obeying him, as
disobeying Our Lord's command. Consequently he ought not to be
obeyed, because a prelate is not the judge of secret things, but God
alone is, wherefore he has no power to command anything in respect of
hidden matters, except in so far as they are made known through
certain signs, as by ill-repute or suspicion; in which cases a
prelate can command just as a judge, whether secular or
ecclesiastical, can bind a man under oath to tell the truth.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 33, Art. 8]

Whether Before the Public Denunciation Witnesses Ought to Be Brought
Forward?

Objection 1: It would seem that before the public denunciation
witnesses ought not to be brought forward. For secret sins ought not
to be made known to others, because by so doing "a man would betray
his brother's sins instead of correcting them," as Augustine says (De
Verb. Dom. xvi, 7). Now by bringing forward witnesses one makes known
a brother's sin to others. Therefore in the case of secret sins one
ought not to bring witnesses forward before the public denunciation.

Obj. 2: Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now no man
brings in witnesses to prove his own secret sin. Neither therefore
ought one to bring forward witnesses to prove the secret sin of our
brother.

Obj. 3: Further, witnesses are brought forward to prove something.
But witnesses afford no proof in secret matters. Therefore it is
useless to bring witnesses forward in such cases.

Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says in his Rule that "before bringing it
to the notice of witnesses . . . it should be put before the
superior." Now to bring a matter before a superior or a prelate is to
tell the Church. Therefore witnesses should not be brought forward
before the public denunciation.

_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 18:16): "Take with thee one
or two more, that in the mouth of two," etc.

_I answer that,_ The right way to go from one extreme to another is
to pass through the middle space. Now Our Lord wished the beginning
of fraternal correction to be hidden, when one brother corrects
another between this one and himself alone, while He wished the end
to be public, when such a one would be denounced to the Church.
Consequently it is befitting that a citation of witnesses should be
placed between the two extremes, so that at first the brother's sin
be indicated to a few, who will be of use without being a hindrance,
and thus his sin be amended without dishonoring him before the public.

Reply Obj. 1: Some have understood the order of fraternal correction
to demand that we should first of all rebuke our brother secretly,
and that if he listens, it is well; but if he listen not, and his sin
be altogether hidden, they say that we should go no further in the
matter, whereas if it has already begun to reach the ears of several
by various signs, we ought to prosecute the matter, according to Our
Lord's command. But this is contrary to what Augustine says in his
Rule that "we are bound to reveal" a brother's sin, if it "will cause
a worse corruption in the heart." Wherefore we must say otherwise
that when the secret admonition has been given once or several times,
as long as there is probable hope of his amendment, we must continue
to admonish him in private, but as soon as we are able to judge with
any probability that the secret admonition is of no avail, we must
take further steps, however secret the sin may be, and call
witnesses, unless perhaps it were thought probable that this would
not conduce to our brother's amendment, and that he would become
worse: because on that account one ought to abstain altogether from
correcting him, as stated above (A. 6).

Reply Obj. 2: A man needs no witnesses that he may amend his own sin:
yet they may be necessary that we may amend a brother's sin. Hence
the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 3: There may be three reasons for citing witnesses. First,
to show that the deed in question is a sin, as Jerome says: secondly,
to prove that the deed was done, if repeated, as Augustine says (loc.
cit.): thirdly, "to prove that the man who rebuked his brother, has
done what he could," as Chrysostom says (Hom. in Matth. lx).

Reply Obj. 4: Augustine means that the matter ought to be made known
to the prelate before it is stated to the witnesses, in so far as the
prelate is a private individual who is able to be of more use than
others, but not that it is to be told him as to the Church, i.e. as
holding the position of judge.
_______________________

QUESTION 34

OF HATRED
(In Six Articles)

We must now consider the vices opposed to charity: (1) hatred, which
is opposed to love; (2) sloth and envy, which are opposed to the joy
of charity; (3) discord and schism, which are contrary to peace; (4)
offense and scandal, which are contrary to beneficence and fraternal
correction.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is possible to hate God?

(2) Whether hatred of God is the greatest of sins?

(3) Whether hatred of one's neighbor is always a sin?

(4) Whether it is the greatest of all sins against our neighbor?

(5) Whether it is a capital sin?

(6) From what capital sin does it arise?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 1]

Whether It Is Possible for Anyone to Hate God?

Objection 1: It would seem that no man can hate God. For Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the first good and beautiful is an object
of love and dilection to all." But God is goodness and beauty itself.
Therefore He is hated by none.

Obj. 2: Further, in the Apocryphal books of 3 Esdras 4:36, 39 it is
written that "all things call upon truth . . . and (all men) do well
like of her works." Now God is the very truth according to John 14:6.
Therefore all love God, and none can hate Him.

Obj. 3: Further, hatred is a kind of aversion. But according to
Dionysius (Div. Nom. i) God draws all things to Himself. Therefore
none can hate Him.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 73:23): "The pride of them that
hate Thee ascendeth continually," and (John 15:24): "But now they
have both seen and hated both Me and My Father."

_I answer that,_ As shown above (I-II, Q. 29, A. 1), hatred is a
movement of the appetitive power, which power is not set in motion
save by something apprehended. Now God can be apprehended by man in
two ways; first, in Himself, as when He is seen in His Essence;
secondly, in His effects, when, to wit, "the invisible things" of God
. . . "are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are
made" (Rom. 1:20). Now God in His Essence is goodness itself, which
no man can hate--for it is natural to good to be loved. Hence it is
impossible for one who sees God in His Essence, to hate Him.

Moreover some of His effects are such that they can nowise be
contrary to the human will, since _to be, to live, to understand,_
which are effects of God, are desirable and lovable to all. Wherefore
again God cannot be an object of hatred if we consider Him as the
Author of such like effects. Some of God's effects, however, are
contrary to an inordinate will, such as the infliction of punishment,
and the prohibition of sin by the Divine Law. Such like effects are
repugnant to a will debased by sin, and as regards the consideration
of them, God may be an object of hatred to some, in so far as they
look upon Him as forbidding sin, and inflicting punishment.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument is true of those who see God's Essence,
which is the very essence of goodness.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument is true in so far as God is apprehended
as the cause of such effects as are naturally beloved of all, among
which are the works of Truth who reveals herself to men.

Reply Obj. 3: God draws all things to Himself, in so far as He is the
source of being, since all things, in as much as they are, tend to be
like God, Who is Being itself.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 2]

Whether Hatred of God Is the Greatest of Sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of God is not the greatest of
sins. For the most grievous sin is the sin against the Holy Ghost,
since it cannot be forgiven, according to Matt. 12:32. Now hatred of
God is not reckoned among the various kinds of sin against the Holy
Ghost, as may be seen from what has been said above (Q. 14, A. 2).
Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin.

Obj. 2: Further, sin consists in withdrawing oneself from God. Now an
unbeliever who has not even knowledge of God seems to be further away
from Him than a believer, who though he hate God, nevertheless knows
Him. Therefore it seems that the sin of unbelief is graver than the
sin of hatred against God.

Obj. 3: Further, God is an object of hatred, only by reason of those
of His effects that are contrary to the will: the chief of which is
punishment. But hatred of punishment is not the most grievous sin.
Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin.

_On the contrary,_ The best is opposite to the worst, according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). But hatred of God is contrary to
the love of God, wherein man's best consists. Therefore hatred of God
is man's worst sin.

_I answer that,_ The defect in sin consists in its aversion from God,
as stated above (Q. 10, A. 3): and this aversion would not have the
character of guilt, were it not voluntary. Hence the nature of guilt
consists in a voluntary aversion from God.

Now this voluntary aversion from God is directly implied in the
hatred of God, but in other sins, by participation and indirectly.
For just as the will cleaves directly to what it loves, so does it
directly shun what it hates. Hence when a man hates God, his will is
directly averted from God, whereas in other sins, fornication for
instance, a man turns away from God, not directly, but indirectly, in
so far, namely, as he desires an inordinate pleasure, to which
aversion from God is connected. Now that which is so by itself,
always takes precedence of that which is so by another. Wherefore
hatred of God is more grievous than other sins.

Reply Obj. 1: According to Gregory (Moral. xxv, 11), "it is one thing
not to do good things, and another to hate the giver of good things,
even as it is one thing to sin indeliberately, and another to sin
deliberately." This implies that to hate God, the giver of all good
things, is to sin deliberately, and this is a sin against the Holy
Ghost. Hence it is evident that hatred of God is chiefly a sin
against the Holy Ghost, in so far as the sin against the Holy Ghost
denotes a special kind of sin: and yet it is not reckoned among the
kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, because it is universally found
in every kind of that sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Even unbelief is not sinful unless it be voluntary:
wherefore the more voluntary it is, the more it is sinful. Now it
becomes voluntary by the fact that a man hates the truth that is
proposed to him. Wherefore it is evident that unbelief derives its
sinfulness from hatred of God, Whose truth is the object of faith;
and hence just as a cause is greater than its effect, so hatred of
God is a greater sin than unbelief.

Reply Obj. 3: Not everyone who hates his punishment, hates God the
author of punishments. For many hate the punishments inflicted on
them, and yet they bear them patiently out of reverence for the
Divine justice. Wherefore Augustine says (Confess. x) that God
commands us to bear with penal evils, not to love them. On the other
hand, to break out into hatred of God when He inflicts those
punishments, is to hate God's very justice, and that is a most
grievous sin. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxv, 11): "Even as sometimes
it is more grievous to love sin than to do it, so is it more wicked
to hate justice than not to have done it."
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 3]

Whether hatred of one's neighbor is always a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of one's neighbor is not
always a sin. For no sin is commanded or counselled by God, according
to Prov. 8:8: "All My words are just, there is nothing wicked nor
perverse in them." Now, it is written (Luke 14:26): "If any man come
to Me, and hate not his father and mother . . . he cannot be My
disciple." Therefore hatred of one's neighbor is not always a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing wherein we imitate God can be a sin. But it
is in imitation of God that we hate certain people: for it is written
(Rom. 1:30): "Detractors, hateful to God." Therefore it is possible
to hate certain people without committing a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing that is natural is a sin, for sin is a
"wandering away from what is according to nature," according to
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4, 30; iv, 20). Now it is natural to a
thing to hate whatever is contrary to it, and to aim at its undoing.
Therefore it seems that it is not a sin to hate one's I enemy.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 John 2:9): "He that . . . hateth
his brother, is in darkness." Now spiritual darkness is sin.
Therefore there cannot be hatred of one's neighbor without sin.

_I answer that,_ Hatred is opposed to love, as stated above (I-II, Q.
29, A. 2); so that hatred of a thing is evil according as the love of
that thing is good. Now love is due to our neighbor in respect of
what he holds from God, i.e. in respect of nature and grace, but not
in respect of what he has of himself and from the devil, i.e. in
respect of sin and lack of justice.

Consequently it is lawful to hate the sin in one's brother, and
whatever pertains to the defect of Divine justice, but we cannot hate
our brother's nature and grace without sin. Now it is part of our
love for our brother that we hate the fault and the lack of good in
him, since desire for another's good is equivalent to hatred of his
evil. Consequently the hatred of one's brother, if we consider it
simply, is always sinful.

Reply Obj. 1: By the commandment of God (Ex. 20:12) we must honor our
parents--as united to us in nature and kinship. But we must hate them
in so far as they prove an obstacle to our attaining the perfection
of Divine justice.

Reply Obj. 2: God hates the sin which is in the detractor, not his
nature: so that we can hate detractors without committing a sin.

Reply Obj. 3: Men are not opposed to us in respect of the goods which
they have received from God: wherefore, in this respect, we should
love them. But they are opposed to us, in so far as they show
hostility towards us, and this is sinful in them. In this respect we
should hate them, for we should hate in them the fact that they are
hostile to us.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 4]

Whether Hatred of Our Neighbor Is the Most Grievous Sin Against Our
Neighbor?

Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of our neighbor is the most
grievous sin against our neighbor. For it is written (1 John 3:15):
"Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer." Now murder is the most
grievous of sins against our neighbor. Therefore hatred is also.

Obj. 2: Further, worst is opposed to best. Now the best thing we give
our neighbor is love, since all other things are referable to love.
Therefore hatred is the worst.

_On the contrary,_ A thing is said to be evil, because it hurts, as
Augustine observes (Enchiridion xii). Now there are sins by which a
man hurts his neighbor more than by hatred, e.g. theft, murder and
adultery. Therefore hatred is not the most grievous sin.

Moreover, Chrysostom [*Hom. x in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely
ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] commenting on Matt. 5:19, "He that
shall break one of these least commandments," says: "The commandments
of Moses, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not commit adultery, count
for little in their reward, but they count for much if they be
disobeyed. On the other hand the commandments of Christ such as, Thou
shalt not be angry, Thou shalt not desire, are reckoned great in
their reward, but little in the transgression." Now hatred is an
internal movement like anger and desire. Therefore hatred of one's
brother is a less grievous sin than murder.

_I answer that,_ Sins committed against our neighbor are evil on two
counts; first by reason of the disorder in the person who sins,
secondly by reason of the hurt inflicted on the person sinned
against. On the first count, hatred is a more grievous sin than
external actions that hurt our neighbor, because hatred is a disorder
of man's will, which is the chief part of man, and wherein is the
root of sin, so that if a man's outward actions were to be
inordinate, without any disorder in his will, they would not be
sinful, for instance, if he were to kill a man, through ignorance or
out of zeal for justice: and if there be anything sinful in a man's
outward sins against his neighbor, it is all to be traced to his
inward hatred.

On the other hand, as regards the hurt inflicted on his neighbor, a
man's outward sins are worse than his inward hatred. This suffices for
the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 5]

Whether Hatred Is a Capital Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that hatred is a capital sin. For hatred
is directly opposed to charity. Now charity is the foremost among the
virtues, and the mother of all others. Therefore hatred is the chief
of the capital sins, and the origin of all others.

Obj. 2: Further, sins arise in us on account of the inclinations of
our passions, according to Rom. 7:5: "The passions of sins . . . did
work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death." Now all other
passions of the soul seem to arise from love and hatred, as was shown
above (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1, 2). Therefore hatred should be reckoned
one of the capital sins.

Obj. 3: Further, vice is a moral evil. Now hatred regards evil more
than any other passion does. Therefore it seems that hatred should be
reckoned a capital sin.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi) does not reckon hatred among
the seven capital sins.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 84, AA. 3, 4), a capital
vice is one from which other vices arise most frequently. Now vice is
contrary to man's nature, in as much as he is a rational animal: and
when a thing acts contrary to its nature, that which is natural to it
is corrupted little by little. Consequently it must first of all fail
in that which is less in accordance with its nature, and last of all
in that which is most in accordance with its nature, since what is
first in construction is last in destruction. Now that which, first
and foremost, is most natural to man, is the love of what is good,
and especially love of the Divine good, and of his neighbor's good.
Wherefore hatred, which is opposed to this love, is not the first but
the last thing in the downfall of virtue resulting from vice: and
therefore it is not a capital vice.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated in _Phys._ vii, text. 18, "the virtue of
a thing consists in its being well disposed in accordance with its
nature." Hence what is first and foremost in the virtues must be first
and foremost in the natural order. Hence charity is reckoned the
foremost of the virtues, and for the same reason hatred cannot be
first among the vices, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: Hatred of the evil that is contrary to one's
natural good, is the first of the soul's passions, even as love of
one's natural good is. But hatred of one's connatural good cannot be
first, but is something last, because such like hatred is a proof of
an already corrupted nature, even as love of an extraneous good.

Reply Obj. 3: Evil is twofold. One is a true evil, for the reason
that it is incompatible with one's natural good, and the hatred of
such an evil may have priority over the other passions. There is,
however, another which is not a true, but an apparent evil, which,
namely, is a true and connatural good, and yet is reckoned evil on
account of the corruption of nature: and the hatred of such an evil
must needs come last. This hatred is vicious, but the former is not.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 6]

Whether Hatred Arises from Envy?

Objection 1: It seems that hatred does not arise from envy. For envy
is sorrow for another's good. Now hatred does not arise from sorrow,
for, on the contrary, we grieve for the presence of the evil we hate.
Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.

Obj. 2: Further, hatred is opposed to love. Now love of our neighbor
is referred to our love of God, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1; Q. 26,
A. 2). Therefore hatred of our neighbor is referred to our hatred of
God. But hatred of God does not arise from envy, for we do not envy
those who are very far removed from us, but rather those who seem to
be near us, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). Therefore hatred
does not arise from envy.

Obj. 3: Further, to one effect there is one cause. Now hatred is
caused by anger, for Augustine says in his Rule that "anger grows
into hatred." Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "out of envy
cometh hatred."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5), hatred of his neighbor is a
man's last step in the path of sin, because it is opposed to the love
which he naturally has for his neighbor. Now if a man declines from
that which is natural, it is because he intends to avoid that which
is naturally an object to be shunned. Now every animal naturally
avoids sorrow, just as it desires pleasure, as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. vii, x). Accordingly just as love arises from pleasure, so
does hatred arise from sorrow. For just as we are moved to love
whatever gives us pleasure, in as much as for that very reason it
assumes the aspect of good; so we are moved to hate whatever
displeases us, in so far as for this very reason it assumes the
aspect of evil. Wherefore, since envy is sorrow for our neighbor's
good, it follows that our neighbor's good becomes hateful to us, so
that "out of envy cometh hatred."

Reply Obj. 1: Since the appetitive power, like the apprehensive
power, reflects on its own acts, it follows that there is a kind of
circular movement in the actions of the appetitive power. And so
according to the first forward course of the appetitive movement,
love gives rise to desire, whence follows pleasure when one has
obtained what one desired. And since the very fact of taking pleasure
in the good one loves is a kind of good, it follows that pleasure
causes love. And in the same way sorrow causes hatred.

Reply Obj. 2: Love and hatred are essentially different, for the
object of love is good, which flows from God to creatures, wherefore
love is due to God in the first place, and to our neighbor
afterwards. On the other hand, hatred is of evil, which has no place
in God Himself, but only in His effects, for which reason it has been
stated above (A. 1), that God is not an object of hatred, except in
so far as He is considered in relation to His effects, and
consequently hatred is directed to our neighbor before being directed
to God. Therefore, since envy of our neighbor is the mother of hatred
of our neighbor, it becomes, in consequence, the cause of hatred
towards God.

Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents a thing arising from various causes in
various respects, and accordingly hatred may arise both from anger
and from envy. However it arises more directly from envy, which looks
upon the very good of our neighbor as displeasing and therefore
hateful, whereas hatred arises from anger by way of increase. For at
first, through anger, we desire our neighbor's evil according to a
certain measure, that is in so far as that evil has the aspect of
vengeance: but afterwards, through the continuance of anger, man goes
so far as absolutely to desire his neighbor's evil, which desire is
part of hatred. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is caused by envy
formally as regards the aspect of the object, but dispositively by
anger.
_______________________

QUESTION 35

OF SLOTH
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the vices opposed to the joy of charity. This joy
is either about the Divine good, and then its contrary is sloth, or
about our neighbor's good, and then its contrary is envy. Wherefore we
must consider (1) Sloth and (2) Envy.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether sloth is a sin?

(2) Whether it is a special vice?

(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(4) Whether it is a capital sin?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 35, Art. 1]

Whether Sloth Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a sin. For we are
neither praised nor blamed for our passions, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 5). Now sloth is a passion, since it is a
kind of sorrow, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14), and as
we stated above (I-II, Q. 35, A. 8). Therefore sloth is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, no bodily failing that occurs at fixed times is a
sin. But sloth is like this, for Cassian says (De Instit. Monast. x,
[*De Institutione Caenobiorum]): "The monk is troubled with sloth
chiefly about the sixth hour: it is like an intermittent fever, and
inflicts the soul of the one it lays low with burning fires at
regular and fixed intervals." Therefore sloth is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, that which proceeds from a good root is, seemingly,
no sin. Now sloth proceeds from a good root, for Cassian says (De
Instit. Monast. x) that "sloth arises from the fact that we sigh at
being deprived of spiritual fruit, and think that other monasteries
and those which are a long way off are much better than the one we
dwell in": all of which seems to point to humility. Therefore sloth
is not a sin.

Obj. 4: Further, all sin is to be avoided, according to Ecclus. 21:2:
"Flee from sins as from the face of a serpent." Now Cassian says (De
Instit. Monast. x): "Experience shows that the onslaught of sloth is
not to be evaded by flight but to be conquered by resistance."
Therefore sloth is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ Whatever is forbidden in Holy Writ is a sin. Now
such is sloth (_acedia_): for it is written (Ecclus. 6:26): "Bow down
thy shoulder, and bear her," namely spiritual wisdom, "and be not
grieved (_acedieris_) with her bands." Therefore sloth is a sin.

_I answer that,_ Sloth, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14)
is an oppressive sorrow, which, to wit, so weighs upon man's mind,
that he wants to do nothing; thus acid things are also cold. Hence
sloth implies a certain weariness of work, as appears from a gloss on
Ps. 106:18, "Their soul abhorred all manner of meat," and from the
definition of some who say that sloth is a "sluggishness of the mind
which neglects to begin good."

Now this sorrow is always evil, sometimes in itself, sometimes in its
effect. For sorrow is evil in itself when it is about that which is
apparently evil but good in reality, even as, on the other hand,
pleasure is evil if it is about that which seems to be good but is,
in truth, evil. Since, then, spiritual good is a good in very truth,
sorrow about spiritual good is evil in itself. And yet that sorrow
also which is about a real evil, is evil in its effect, if it so
oppresses man as to draw him away entirely from good deeds. Hence the
Apostle (2 Cor. 2:7) did not wish those who repented to be "swallowed
up with overmuch sorrow."

Accordingly, since sloth, as we understand it here, denotes sorrow
for spiritual good, it is evil on two counts, both in itself and in
point of its effect. Consequently it is a sin, for by sin we mean an
evil movement of the appetite, as appears from what has been said
above (Q. 10, A. 2; I-II, Q. 74, A. 4).

Reply Obj. 1: Passions are not sinful in themselves; but they are
blameworthy in so far as they are applied to something evil, just as
they deserve praise in so far as they are applied to something good.
Wherefore sorrow, in itself, calls neither for praise nor for blame:
whereas moderate sorrow for evil calls for praise, while sorrow for
good, and again immoderate sorrow for evil, call for blame. It is in
this sense that sloth is said to be a sin.

Reply Obj. 2: The passions of the sensitive appetite may
either be venial sins in themselves, or incline the soul to mortal
sin. And since the sensitive appetite has a bodily organ, it follows
that on account of some bodily transmutation a man becomes apt to
commit some particular sin. Hence it may happen that certain sins may
become more insistent, through certain bodily transmutations occurring
at certain fixed times. Now all bodily effects, of themselves, dispose
one to sorrow; and thus it is that those who fast are harassed by
sloth towards mid-day, when they begin to feel the want of food, and
to be parched by the sun's heat.

Reply Obj. 3: It is a sign of humility if a man does not think
too much of himself, through observing his own faults; but if a man
contemns the good things he has received from God, this, far from
being a proof of humility, shows him to be ungrateful: and from such
like contempt results sloth, because we sorrow for things that we
reckon evil and worthless. Accordingly we ought to think much of the
goods of others, in such a way as not to disparage those we have
received ourselves, because if we did they would give us sorrow.

Reply Obj. 4: Sin is ever to be shunned, but the assaults of sin
should be overcome, sometimes by flight, sometimes by resistance;
by flight when a continued thought increases the incentive to sin,
as in lust; for which reason it is written (1 Cor. 6:18): "Fly
fornication"; by resistance, when perseverance in the thought
diminishes the incentive to sin, which incentive arises from some
trivial consideration. This is the case with sloth, because the more
we think about spiritual goods, the more pleasing they become to us,
and forthwith sloth dies away.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 35, Art. 2]

Whether Sloth Is a Special Vice?

Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a special vice. For that
which is common to all vices does not constitute a special kind of
vice. But every vice makes a man sorrowful about the opposite
spiritual good: for the lustful man is sorrowful about the good of
continence, and the glutton about the good of abstinence. Since then
sloth is sorrow for spiritual good, as stated above (A. 1), it seems
that sloth is not a special sin.

Obj. 2: Further, sloth, through being a kind of sorrow, is opposed to
joy. Now joy is not accounted one special virtue. Therefore sloth
should not be reckoned a special vice.

Obj. 3: Further, since spiritual good is a general kind of object,
which virtue seeks, and vice shuns, it does not constitute a special
virtue or vice, unless it be determined by some addition. Now
nothing, seemingly, except toil, can determine it to sloth, if this
be a special vice; because the reason why a man shuns spiritual
goods, is that they are toilsome, wherefore sloth is a kind of
weariness: while dislike of toil, and love of bodily repose seem to
be due to the same cause, viz. idleness. Hence sloth would be nothing
but laziness, which seems untrue, for idleness is opposed to
carefulness, whereas sloth is opposed to joy. Therefore sloth is not
a special vice.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) distinguishes sloth from
the other vices. Therefore it is a special vice.

_I answer that,_ Since sloth is sorrow for spiritual good, if we take
spiritual good in a general way, sloth will not be a special vice,
because, as stated above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 1), every vice shuns the
spiritual good of its opposite virtue. Again it cannot be said that
sloth is a special vice, in so far as it shuns spiritual good, as
toilsome, or troublesome to the body, or as a hindrance to the body's
pleasure, for this again would not sever sloth from carnal vices,
whereby a man seeks bodily comfort and pleasure.

Wherefore we must say that a certain order exists among spiritual
goods, since all the spiritual goods that are in the acts of each
virtue are directed to one spiritual good, which is the Divine good,
about which there is a special virtue, viz. charity. Hence it is
proper to each virtue to rejoice in its own spiritual good, which
consists in its own act, while it belongs specially to charity to
have that spiritual joy whereby one rejoices in the Divine good. In
like manner the sorrow whereby one is displeased at the spiritual
good which is in each act of virtue, belongs, not to any special
vice, but to every vice, but sorrow in the Divine good about which
charity rejoices, belongs to a special vice, which is called sloth.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 35, Art. 3]

Whether Sloth Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a mortal sin. For every
mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Divine Law. But sloth
seems contrary to no precept, as one may see by going through the
precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore sloth is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, in the same genus, a sin of deed is no less grievous
than a sin of thought. Now it is not a mortal sin to refrain in deed
from some spiritual good which leads to God, else it would be a
mortal sin not to observe the counsels. Therefore it is not a mortal
sin to refrain in thought from such like spiritual works. Therefore
sloth is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, no mortal sin is to be found in a perfect man. But
sloth is to be found in a perfect man: for Cassian says (De Instit.
Caenob. x, l) that "sloth is well known to the solitary, and is a
most vexatious and persistent foe to the hermit." Therefore sloth is
not always a mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Cor. 7:20): "The sorrow of the
world worketh death." But such is sloth; for it is not sorrow
"according to God," which is contrasted with sorrow of the world.
Therefore it is a mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 88, AA. 1, 2), mortal sin
is so called because it destroys the spiritual life which is the
effect of charity, whereby God dwells in us. Wherefore any sin which
by its very nature is contrary to charity is a mortal sin by reason
of its genus. And such is sloth, because the proper effect of charity
is joy in God, as stated above (Q. 28, A. 1), while sloth is sorrow
about spiritual good in as much as it is a Divine good. Therefore
sloth is a mortal sin in respect of its genus. But it must be
observed with regard to all sins that are mortal in respect of their
genus, that they are not mortal, save when they attain to their
perfection. Because the consummation of sin is in the consent of
reason: for we are speaking now of human sins consisting in human
acts, the principle of which is the reason. Wherefore if the sin be a
mere beginning of sin in the sensuality alone, without attaining to
the consent of reason, it is a venial sin on account of the
imperfection of the act. Thus in the genus of adultery, the
concupiscence that goes no further than the sensuality is a venial
sin, whereas if it reach to the consent of reason, it is a mortal
sin. So too, the movement of sloth is sometimes in the sensuality
alone, by reason of the opposition of the flesh to the spirit, and
then it is a venial sin; whereas sometimes it reaches to the reason,
which consents in the dislike, horror and detestation of the Divine
good, on account of the flesh utterly prevailing over the spirit. In
this case it is evident that sloth is a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Sloth is opposed to the precept about hallowing the
Sabbath day. For this precept, in so far as it is a moral precept,
implicitly commands the mind to rest in God: and sorrow of the mind
about the Divine good is contrary thereto.

Reply Obj. 2: Sloth is not an aversion of the mind from any spiritual
good, but from the Divine good, to which the mind is obliged to
adhere. Wherefore if a man is sorry because someone forces him to do
acts of virtue that he is not bound to do, this is not a sin of
sloth; but when he is sorry to have to do something for God's sake.

Reply Obj. 3: Imperfect movements of sloth are to be found in holy
men, but they do not reach to the consent of reason.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 35, Art. 4]

Whether Sloth Should Be Accounted a Capital Vice?

Objection 1: It would seem that sloth ought not to be accounted a
capital vice. For a capital vice is one that moves a man to sinful
acts, as stated above (Q. 34, A. 5). Now sloth does not move one to
action, but on the contrary withdraws one from it. Therefore it
should not be accounted a capital sin.

Obj. 2: Further, a capital sin is one to which daughters are
assigned. Now Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns six daughters to
sloth, viz. "malice, spite, faint-heartedness, despair, sluggishness
in regard to the commandments, wandering of the mind after unlawful
things." Now these do not seem in reality to arise from sloth. For
"spite" is, seemingly the same as hatred, which arises from envy, as
stated above (Q. 34, A. 6); "malice" is a genus which contains all
vices, and, in like manner, a "wandering" of the mind after unlawful
things is to be found in every vice; "sluggishness" about the
commandments seems to be the same as sloth, while "faint-heartedness"
and "despair" may arise from any sin. Therefore sloth is not rightly
accounted a capital sin.

Obj. 3: Further, Isidore distinguishes the vice of sloth from the
vice of sorrow, saying (De Summo Bono ii, 37) that in so far as a man
shirks his duty because it is distasteful and burdensome, it is
sorrow, and in so far as he is inclined to undue repose, it is sloth:
and of sorrow he says that it gives rise to "spite,
faint-heartedness, bitterness, despair," whereas he states that from
sloth seven things arise, viz. "idleness, drowsiness, uneasiness of
the mind, restlessness of the body, instability, loquacity,
curiosity." Therefore it seems that either Gregory or Isidore has
wrongly assigned sloth as a capital sin together with its daughters.

_On the contrary,_ The same Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states that
sloth is a capital sin, and has the daughters aforesaid.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 84, AA. 3, 4), a capital
vice is one which easily gives rise to others as being their final
cause. Now just as we do many things on account of pleasure, both in
order to obtain it, and through being moved to do something under the
impulse of pleasure, so again we do many things on account of sorrow,
either that we may avoid it, or through being exasperated into doing
something under pressure thereof. Wherefore, since sloth is a kind of
sorrow, as stated above (A. 2; I-II, Q. 85, A. 8), it is fittingly
reckoned a capital sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Sloth by weighing on the mind, hinders us from doing
things that cause sorrow: nevertheless it induces the mind to do
certain things, either because they are in harmony with sorrow, such
as weeping, or because they are a means of avoiding sorrow.

Reply Obj. 2: Gregory fittingly assigns the daughters of sloth. For
since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5, 6) "no man can
be a long time in company with what is painful and unpleasant," it
follows that something arises from sorrow in two ways: first, that
man shuns whatever causes sorrow; secondly, that he passes to other
things that give him pleasure: thus those who find no joy in
spiritual pleasures, have recourse to pleasures of the body,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 6). Now in the avoidance of
sorrow the order observed is that man at first flies from unpleasant
objects, and secondly he even struggles against such things as cause
sorrow. Now spiritual goods which are the object of the sorrow of
sloth, are both end and means. Avoidance of the end is the result of
"despair," while avoidance of those goods which are the means to the
end, in matters of difficulty which come under the counsels, is the
effect of "faint-heartedness," and in matters of common
righteousness, is the effect of "sluggishness about the
commandments." The struggle against spiritual goods that cause sorrow
is sometimes with men who lead others to spiritual goods, and this is
called "spite"; and sometimes it extends to the spiritual goods
themselves, when a man goes so far as to detest them, and this is
properly called "malice." In so far as a man has recourse to eternal
objects of pleasure, the daughter of sloth is called "wandering after
unlawful things." From this it is clear how to reply to the
objections against each of the daughters: for "malice" does not
denote here that which is generic to all vices, but must be
understood as explained. Nor is "spite" taken as synonymous with
hatred, but for a kind of indignation, as stated above: and the same
applies to the others.

Reply Obj. 3: This distinction between sorrow and sloth is also given
by Cassian (De Instit. Caenob. x, 1). But Gregory more fittingly
(Moral. xxxi, 45) calls sloth a kind of sorrow, because, as stated
above (A. 2), sorrow is not a distinct vice, in so far as a man
shirks a distasteful and burdensome work, or sorrows on account of
any other cause whatever, but only in so far as he is sorry on
account of the Divine good, which sorrow belongs essentially to
sloth; since sloth seeks undue rest in so far as it spurns the Divine
good. Moreover the things which Isidore reckons to arise from sloth
and sorrow, are reduced to those mentioned by Gregory: for
"bitterness" which Isidore states to be the result of sorrow, is an
effect of "spite." "Idleness" and "drowsiness" are reduced to
"sluggishness about the precepts": for some are idle and omit them
altogether, while others are drowsy and fulfil them with negligence.
All the other five which he reckons as effects of sloth, belong to
the "wandering of the mind after unlawful things." This tendency to
wander, if it reside in the mind itself that is desirous of rushing
after various things without rhyme or reason, is called "uneasiness
of the mind," but if it pertains to the imaginative power, it is
called "curiosity"; if it affect the speech it is called "loquacity";
and in so far as it affects a body that changes place, it is called
"restlessness of the body," when, to wit, a man shows the
unsteadiness of his mind, by the inordinate movements of members of
his body; while if it causes the body to move from one place to
another, it is called "instability"; or "instability" may denote
changeableness of purpose.
_______________________

QUESTION 36

OF ENVY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider envy, and under this head there are four points
of inquiry:

(1) What is envy?

(2) Whether it is a sin?

(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(4) Whether it is a capital sin, and which are its daughters?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 36, Art. 1]

Whether Envy Is a Kind of Sorrow?

Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a kind of sorrow. For the
object of envy is a good, for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) of the
envious man that "self-inflicted pain wounds the pining spirit, which
is racked by the prosperity of another." Therefore envy is not a kind
of sorrow.

Obj. 2: Further, likeness is a cause, not of sorrow but rather of
pleasure. But likeness is a cause of envy: for the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 10): "Men are envious of such as are like them in genus,
in knowledge, in stature, in habit, or in reputation." Therefore envy
is not a kind of sorrow.

Obj. 3: Further, sorrow is caused by a defect, wherefore those who
are in great defect are inclined to sorrow, as stated above (I-II, Q.
47, A. 3) when we were treating of the passions. Now those who lack
little, and who love honors, and who are considered wise, are
envious, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 10). Therefore envy
is not a kind of sorrow.

Obj. 4: Further, sorrow is opposed to pleasure. Now opposite effects
have not one and the same cause. Therefore, since the recollection of
goods once possessed is a cause of pleasure, as stated above (I-II,
Q. 32, A. 3) it will not be a cause of sorrow. But it is a cause of
envy; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that "we envy those who
have or have had things that befitted ourselves, or which we
possessed at some time." Therefore sloth is not a kind of sorrow.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) calls envy a
species of sorrow, and says that "envy is sorrow for another's good."

_I answer that,_ The object of a man's sorrow is his own evil. Now it
may happen that another's good is apprehended as one's own evil, and
in this way sorrow can be about another's good. But this happens in
two ways: first, when a man is sorry about another's good, in so far
as it threatens to be an occasion of harm to himself, as when a man
grieves for his enemy's prosperity, for fear lest he may do him some
harm: such like sorrow is not envy, but rather an effect of fear, as
the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9).

Secondly, another's good may be reckoned as being one's own evil, in
so far as it conduces to the lessening of one's own good name or
excellence. It is in this way that envy grieves for another's good:
and consequently men are envious of those goods in which a good name
consists, and about which men like to be honored and esteemed, as the
Philosopher remarks (Rhet. ii, 10).

Reply Obj. 1: Nothing hinders what is good for one from being
reckoned as evil for another: and in this way it is possible for
sorrow to be about good, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: Since envy is about another's good name in so far as it
diminishes the good name a man desires to have, it follows that a man
is envious of those only whom he wishes to rival or surpass in
reputation. But this does not apply to people who are far removed
from one another: for no man, unless he be out of his mind, endeavors
to rival or surpass in reputation those who are far above him. Thus a
commoner does not envy the king, nor does the king envy a commoner
whom he is far above. Wherefore a man envies not those who are far
removed from him, whether in place, time, or station, but those who
are near him, and whom he strives to rival or surpass. For it is
against our will that these should be in better repute than we are,
and that gives rise to sorrow. On the other hand, likeness causes
pleasure in so far as it is in agreement with the will.

Reply Obj. 3: A man does not strive for mastery in matters where he
is very deficient; so that he does not envy one who surpasses him in
such matters, unless he surpass him by little, for then it seems to
him that this is not beyond him, and so he makes an effort;
wherefore, if his effort fails through the other's reputation
surpassing his, he grieves. Hence it is that those who love to be
honored are more envious; and in like manner the faint-hearted are
envious, because all things are great to them, and whatever good may
befall another, they reckon that they themselves have been bested in
something great. Hence it is written (Job 5:2): "Envy slayeth the
little one," and Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) that "we can envy those
only whom we think better in some respect than ourselves."

Reply Obj. 4: Recollection of past goods in so far as we have had
them, causes pleasure; in so far as we have lost them, causes sorrow;
and in so far as others have them, causes envy, because that, above
all, seems to belittle our reputation. Hence the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii) that the old envy the young, and those who have spent much
in order to get something, envy those who have got it by spending
little, because they grieve that they have lost their goods, and that
others have acquired goods.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 36, Art. 2]

Whether Envy Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a sin. For Jerome says to
Laeta about the education of her daughter (Ep. cvii): "Let her have
companions, so that she may learn together with them, envy them, and
be nettled when they are praised." But no one should be advised to
commit a sin. Therefore envy is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, "Envy is sorrow for another's good," as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But this is sometimes
praiseworthy: for it is written (Prov. 29:2): "When the wicked shall
bear rule, the people shall mourn." Therefore envy is not always a
sin.

Obj. 3: Further, envy denotes a kind of zeal. But there is a good
zeal, according to Ps. 68:10: "The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me
up." Therefore envy is not always a sin.

Obj. 4: Further, punishment is condivided with fault. But envy is a
kind of punishment: for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46): "When the foul
sore of envy corrupts the vanquished heart, the very exterior itself
shows how forcibly the mind is urged by madness. For paleness seizes
the complexion, the eyes are weighed down, the spirit is inflamed,
while the limbs are chilled, there is frenzy in the heart, there is
gnashing with the teeth." Therefore envy is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gal. 5:26): "Let us not be made
desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), envy is sorrow for another's
good. Now this sorrow may come about in four ways. First, when a man
grieves for another's good, through fear that it may cause harm
either to himself, or to some other goods. This sorrow is not envy,
as stated above (A. 1), and may be void of sin. Hence Gregory says
(Moral. xxii, 11): "It very often happens that without charity being
lost, both the destruction of an enemy rejoices us, and again his
glory, without any sin of envy, saddens us, since, when he falls, we
believe that some are deservedly set up, and when he prospers, we
dread lest many suffer unjustly."

Secondly, we may grieve over another's good, not because he has it,
but because the good which he has, we have not: and this, properly
speaking, is zeal, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9). And if this
zeal be about virtuous goods, it is praiseworthy, according to 1 Cor.
14:1: "Be zealous for spiritual gifts": while, if it be about
temporal goods, it may be either sinful or sinless. Thirdly, one may
grieve over another's good, because he who happens to have that good
is unworthy of it. Such sorrow as this cannot be occasioned by
virtuous goods, which make a man righteous, but, as the Philosopher
states, is about riches, and those things which can accrue to the
worthy and the unworthy; and he calls this sorrow _nemesis_ [*The
nearest equivalent is "indignation." The use of the word "nemesis" to
signify "revenge" does not represent the original Greek.], saying
that it belongs to good morals. But he says this because he
considered temporal goods in themselves, in so far as they may seem
great to those who look not to eternal goods: whereas, according to
the teaching of faith, temporal goods that accrue to those who are
unworthy, are so disposed according to God's just ordinance, either
for the correction of those men, or for their condemnation, and such
goods are as nothing in comparison with the goods to come, which are
prepared for good men. Wherefore sorrow of this kind is forbidden in
Holy Writ, according to Ps. 36:1: "Be not emulous of evil doers, nor
envy them that work iniquity," and elsewhere (Ps. 72:2, 3): "My steps
had well nigh slipped, for I was envious of the wicked, when I saw
the prosperity of sinners [*Douay: 'because I had a zeal on occasion
of the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners']." Fourthly, we
grieve over a man's good, in so far as his good surpasses ours; this
is envy properly speaking, and is always sinful, as also the
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 10), because to do so is to grieve over
what should make us rejoice, viz. over our neighbor's good.

Reply Obj. 1: Envy there denotes the zeal with which we ought to
strive to progress with those who are better than we are.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers sorrow for another's good in
the first sense given above.

Reply Obj. 3: Envy differs from zeal, as stated above. Hence a
certain zeal may be good, whereas envy is always evil.

Reply Obj. 4: Nothing hinders a sin from being penal accidentally, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 87, A. 2) when we were treating of sins.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 36, Art. 3]

Whether Envy Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a mortal sin. For since
envy is a kind of sorrow, it is a passion of the sensitive appetite.
Now there is no mortal sin in the sensuality, but only in the reason,
as Augustine declares (De Trin. xii, 12) [*Cf. I-II, Q. 74, A. 4].
Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, there cannot be mortal sin in infants. But envy can
be in them, for Augustine says (Confess. i): "I myself have seen and
known even a baby envious, it could not speak, yet it turned pale and
looked bitterly on its foster-brother." Therefore envy is not a
mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to some virtue. But
envy is contrary, not to a virtue but to _nemesis_, which is a
passion, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore envy
is not a mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 5:2): "Envy slayeth the little
one." Now nothing slays spiritually, except mortal sin. Therefore
envy is a mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ Envy is a mortal sin, in respect of its genus. For
the genus of a sin is taken from its object; and envy according to
the aspect of its object is contrary to charity, whence the soul
derives its spiritual life, according to 1 John 3:14: "We know that
we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren." Now
the object both of charity and of envy is our neighbor's good, but by
contrary movements, since charity rejoices in our neighbor's good,
while envy grieves over it, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore it is
evident that envy is a mortal sin in respect of its genus.

Nevertheless, as stated above (Q. 35, A. 4; I-II, Q. 72, A. 5, ad 1),
in every kind of mortal sin we find certain imperfect movements in
the sensuality, which are venial sins: such are the first movement of
concupiscence, in the genus of adultery, and the first movement of
anger, in the genus of murder, and so in the genus of envy we find
sometimes even in perfect men certain first movements, which are
venial sins.

Reply Obj. 1: The movement of envy in so far as it is a passion of
the sensuality, is an imperfect thing in the genus of human acts, the
principle of which is the reason, so that envy of that kind is not a
mortal sin. The same applies to the envy of little children who have
not the use of reason: wherefore the Reply to the Second Objection is
manifest.

Reply Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9), envy is
contrary both to _nemesis_ and to pity, but for different reasons.
For it is directly contrary to pity, their principal objects being
contrary to one another, since the envious man grieves over his
neighbor's good, whereas the pitiful man grieves over his neighbor's
evil, so that the envious have no pity, as he states in the same
passage, nor is the pitiful man envious. On the other hand, envy is
contrary to _nemesis_ on the part of the man whose good grieves the
envious man, for _nemesis_ is sorrow for the good of the undeserving
according to Ps. 72:3: "I was envious of the wicked, when I saw the
prosperity of sinners" [*Douay: "because I had a zeal on occasion of
the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners"], whereas the envious
grieves over the good of those who are deserving of it. Hence it is
clear that the former contrariety is more direct than the latter. Now
pity is a virtue, and an effect proper to charity: so that envy is
contrary to pity and charity.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 36, Art. 4]

Whether Envy Is a Capital Vice?

Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a capital vice. For the
capital vices are distinct from their daughters. Now envy is the
daughter of vainglory; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that
"those who love honor and glory are more envious." Therefore envy is
not a capital vice.

Obj. 2: Further, the capital vices seem to be less grave than the
other vices which arise from them. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi,
45): "The leading vices seem to worm their way into the deceived mind
under some kind of pretext, but those which follow them provoke the
soul to all kinds of outrage, and confuse the mind with their wild
outcry." Now envy is seemingly a most grave sin, for Gregory says
(Moral. v, 46): "Though in every evil thing that is done, the venom
of our old enemy is infused into the heart of man, yet in this
wickedness the serpent stirs his whole bowels and discharges the bane
of spite fitted to enter deep into the mind." Therefore envy is not a
capital sin.

Obj. 3: Further, it seems that its daughters are unfittingly assigned
by Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45), who says that from envy arise "hatred,
tale-bearing, detraction, joy at our neighbor's misfortunes, and
grief for his prosperity." For joy at our neighbor's misfortunes and
grief for his prosperity seem to be the same as envy, as appears from
what has been said above (A. 3). Therefore these should not be
assigned as daughters of envy.

On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) who
states that envy is a capital sin and assigns the aforesaid daughters
thereto.

_I answer that,_ Just as sloth is grief for a Divine spiritual good,
so envy is grief for our neighbor's good. Now it has been stated
above (Q. 35, A. 4) that sloth is a capital vice for the reason that
it incites man to do certain things, with the purpose either of
avoiding sorrow or of satisfying its demands. Wherefore envy is
accounted a capital vice for the same reason.

Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45), "the capital vices
are so closely akin to one another that one springs from the other.
For the first offspring of pride is vainglory, which by corrupting
the mind it occupies begets envy, since while it craves for the power
of an empty name, it repines for fear lest another should acquire
that power." Consequently the notion of a capital vice does not
exclude its originating from another vice, but it demands that it
should have some principal reason for being itself the origin of
several kinds of sin. However it is perhaps because envy manifestly
arises from vainglory, that it is not reckoned a capital sin, either
by Isidore (De Summo Bono) or by Cassian (De Instit. Caenob. v, 1).

Reply Obj. 2: It does not follow from the passage quoted that envy is
the greatest of sins, but that when the devil tempts us to envy, he
is enticing us to that which has its chief place in his heart, for as
quoted further on in the same passage, "by the envy of the devil,
death came into the world" (Wis. 2:24).

There is, however, a kind of envy which is accounted among the most
grievous sins, viz. envy of another's spiritual good, which envy is a
sorrow for the increase of God's grace, and not merely for our
neighbor's good. Hence it is accounted a sin against the Holy Ghost,
because thereby a man envies, as it were, the Holy Ghost Himself, Who
is glorified in His works.

Reply Obj. 3: The number of envy's daughters may be understood for
the reason that in the struggle aroused by envy there is something by
way of beginning, something by way of middle, and something by way of
term. The beginning is that a man strives to lower another's
reputation, and this either secretly, and then we have
_tale-bearing,_ or openly, and then we have _detraction._ The middle
consists in the fact that when a man aims at defaming another, he is
either able to do so, and then we have _joy at another's misfortune,_
or he is unable, and then we have _grief at another's prosperity._
The term is hatred itself, because just as good which delights causes
love, so does sorrow cause hatred, as stated above (Q. 34, A. 6).
Grief at another's prosperity is in one way the very same as envy,
when, to Wit, a man grieves over another's prosperity, in so far as
it gives the latter a good name, but in another way it is a daughter
of envy, in so far as the envious man sees his neighbor prosper
notwithstanding his efforts to prevent it. On the other hand, _joy at
another's misfortune_ is not directly the same as envy, but is a
result thereof, because grief over our neighbor's good which is envy,
gives rise to joy in his evil.
_______________________

QUESTION 37

OF DISCORD, WHICH IS CONTRARY TO PEACE
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider the sins contrary to peace, and first we shall
consider discord which is in the heart, secondly contention, which is
on the lips, thirdly, those things which consist in deeds, viz.
schism, quarrelling, war, and sedition. Under the first head there
are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether discord is a sin?

(2) Whether it is a daughter of vainglory?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 37, Art. 1]

Whether Discord Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that discord is not a sin. For to
disaccord with man is to sever oneself from another's will. But this
does not seem to be a sin, because God's will alone, and not our
neighbor's, is the rule of our own will. Therefore discord is not a
sin.

Obj. 2: Further, whoever induces another to sin, sins also himself.
But it appears not to be a sin to incite others to discord, for it is
written (Acts 23:6) that Paul, knowing that the one part were
Sadducees, and the other Pharisees, cried out in the council: "Men
brethren, I am a Pharisee, the son of Pharisees, concerning the hope
and resurrection of the dead I am called in question. And when he had
so said, there arose a dissension between the Pharisees and the
Sadducees." Therefore discord is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, sin, especially mortal sin, is not to be found in a
holy man. But discord is to be found even among holy men, for it is
written (Acts 15:39): "There arose a dissension" between Paul and
Barnabas, "so that they departed one from another." Therefore discord
is not a sin, and least of all a mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ "Dissensions," that is, discords, are reckoned
among the works of the flesh (Gal. 5:20), of which it is said
afterwards (Gal. 5:21) that "they who do such things shall not obtain
the kingdom of God." Now nothing, save mortal sin, excludes man from
the kingdom of God. Therefore discord is a mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ Discord is opposed to concord. Now, as stated above
(Q. 29, AA. 1, 3) concord results from charity, in as much as charity
directs many hearts together to one thing, which is chiefly the
Divine good, secondarily, the good of our neighbor. Wherefore discord
is a sin, in so far as it is opposed to this concord.

But it must be observed that this concord is destroyed by discord in
two ways: first, directly; secondly, accidentally. Now, human acts
and movements are said to be direct when they are according to one's
intention. Wherefore a man directly disaccords with his neighbor,
when he knowingly and intentionally dissents from the Divine good and
his neighbor's good, to which he ought to consent. This is a mortal
sin in respect of its genus, because it is contrary to charity,
although the first movements of such discord are venial sins by
reason of their being imperfect acts.

The accidental in human acts is that which occurs beside the
intention. Hence when several intend a good pertaining to God's
honor, or our neighbor's profit, while one deems a certain thing
good, and another thinks contrariwise, the discord is in this case
accidentally contrary to the Divine good or that of our neighbor.
Such like discord is neither sinful nor against charity, unless it be
accompanied by an error about things necessary to salvation, or by
undue obstinacy, since it has also been stated above (Q. 29, AA. 1,
3, ad 2) that the concord which is an effect of charity, is union of
wills not of opinions. It follows from this that discord is sometimes
the sin of one party only, for instance, when one wills a good which
the other knowingly resists; while sometimes it implies sin in both
parties, as when each dissents from the other's good, and loves his
own.

Reply Obj. 1: One man's will considered in itself is not the rule of
another man's will; but in so far as our neighbor's will adheres to
God's will, it becomes in consequence, a rule regulated according to
its proper measure. Wherefore it is a sin to disaccord with such a
will, because by that very fact one disaccords with the Divine rule.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as a man's will that adheres to God is a right
rule, to disaccord with which is a sin, so too a man's will that is
opposed to God is a perverse rule, to disaccord with which is good.
Hence to cause a discord, whereby a good concord resulting from
charity is destroyed, is a grave sin: wherefore it is written (Prov.
6:16): "Six things there are, which the Lord hateth, and the seventh
His soul detesteth," which seventh is stated (Prov. 6:19) to be "him
that soweth discord among brethren." On the other hand, to arouse a
discord whereby an evil concord (i.e. concord in an evil will) is
destroyed, is praiseworthy. In this way Paul was to be commended for
sowing discord among those who concorded together in evil, because
Our Lord also said of Himself (Matt. 10:34): "I came not to send
peace, but the sword."

Reply Obj. 3: The discord between Paul and Barnabas was accidental
and not direct: because each intended some good, yet the one thought
one thing good, while the other thought something else, which was
owing to human deficiency: for that controversy was not about things
necessary to salvation. Moreover all this was ordained by Divine
providence, on account of the good which would ensue.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 37, Art. 2]

Whether Discord Is a Daughter of Vainglory?

Objection 1: It would seem that discord is not a daughter of
vainglory. For anger is a vice distinct from vainglory. Now discord
is apparently the daughter of anger, according to Prov. 15:18: "A
passionate man stirreth up strifes." Therefore it is not a daughter
of vainglory.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine expounding the words of John 7:39, "As yet
the Spirit was not given," says (Tract. xxxii) "Malice severs,
charity unites." Now discord is merely a separation of wills.
Therefore discord arises from malice, i.e. envy, rather than from
vainglory.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever gives rise to many evils, would seem to be
a capital vice. Now such is discord, because Jerome in commenting on
Matt. 12:25, "Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made
desolate," says: "Just as concord makes small things thrive, so
discord brings the greatest things to ruin." Therefore discord should
itself be reckoned a capital vice, rather than a daughter of
vainglory.

On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45).

_I answer that,_ Discord denotes a certain disunion of wills, in so
far, to wit, as one man's will holds fast to one thing, while the
other man's will holds fast to something else. Now if a man's will
holds fast to its own ground, this is due to the act that he prefers
what is his own to that which belongs to others, and if he do this
inordinately, it is due to pride and vainglory. Therefore discord,
whereby a man holds to his own way of thinking, and departs from that
of others, is reckoned to be a daughter of vainglory.

Reply Obj. 1: Strife is not the same as discord, for strife consists
in external deeds, wherefore it is becoming that it should arise from
anger, which incites the mind to hurt one's neighbor; whereas discord
consists in a divergence in the movements of wills, which arises from
pride or vainglory, for the reason given above.

Reply Obj. 2: In discord we may consider that which is the term
_wherefrom,_ i.e. another's will from which we recede, and in this
respect it arises from envy; and again we may consider that which is
the term _whither,_ i.e. something of our own to which we cling, and
in this respect it is caused by vainglory. And since in every moment
the term _whither_ is more important than the term _wherefrom_
(because the end is of more account than the beginning), discord is
accounted a daughter of vainglory rather than of envy, though it may
arise from both for different reasons, as stated.

Reply Obj. 3: The reason why concord makes small things thrive, while
discord brings the greatest to ruin, is because "the more united a
force is, the stronger it is, while the more disunited it is the
weaker it becomes" (De Causis xvii). Hence it is evident that this is
part of the proper effect of discord which is a disunion of wills,
and in no way indicates that other vices arise from discord, as
though it were a capital vice.
_______________________

QUESTION 38

OF CONTENTION
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider contention, in respect of which there are two
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether contention is a mortal sin?

(2) Whether it is a daughter of vainglory?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 38, Art. 1]

Whether Contention Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that contention is not a mortal sin. For
there is no mortal sin in spiritual men: and yet contention is to be
found in them, according to Luke 22:24: "And there was also a strife
amongst" the disciples of Jesus, "which of them should . . . be the
greatest." Therefore contention is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, no well disposed man should be pleased that his
neighbor commit a mortal sin. But the Apostle says (Phil. 1:17):
"Some out of contention preach Christ," and afterwards he says (Phil.
1:18): "In this also I rejoice, yea, and will rejoice." Therefore
contention is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, it happens that people contend either in the courts
or in disputations, without any spiteful purpose, and with a good
intention, as, for example, those who contend by disputing with
heretics. Hence a gloss on 1 Kings 14:1, "It came to pass one day,"
etc. says: "Catholics do not raise contentions with heretics, unless
they are first challenged to dispute." Therefore contention is not a
mortal sin.

Obj. 4: Further, Job seems to have contended with God, according to
Job 39:32: "Shall he that contendeth with God be so easily silenced?"
And yet Job was not guilty of mortal sin, since the Lord said of him
(Job 42:7): "You have not spoken the thing that is right before me,
as my servant Job hath." Therefore contention is not always a mortal
sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is against the precept of the Apostle who says
(2 Tim. 2:14): "Contend not in words." Moreover (Gal. 5:20)
contention is included among the works of the flesh, and as stated
there (Gal. 5:21) "they who do such things shall not obtain the
kingdom of God." Now whatever excludes a man from the kingdom of God
and is against a precept, is a mortal sin. Therefore contention is a
mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ To contend is to tend against some one. Wherefore
just as discord denotes a contrariety of wills, so contention
signifies contrariety of speech. For this reason when a man contrasts
various contrary things in a speech, this is called _contentio,_
which Tully calls one of the rhetorical colors (De Rhet. ad Heren.
iv), where he says that "it consists in developing a speech from
contrary things," for instance: "Adulation has a pleasant beginning,
and a most bitter end."

Now contrariety of speech may be looked at in two ways: first with
regard to the intention of the contentious party, secondly, with
regard to the manner of contending. As to the intention, we must
consider whether he contends against the truth, and then he is to be
blamed, or against falsehood, and then he should be praised. As to
the manner, we must consider whether his manner of contending is in
keeping with the persons and the matter in dispute, for then it would
be praiseworthy, hence Tully says (De Rhet. ad Heren. iii) that
"contention is a sharp speech suitable for proof and refutation"--or
whether it exceeds the demands of the persons and matter in dispute,
in which case it is blameworthy.

Accordingly if we take contention as denoting a disclaimer of the
truth and an inordinate manner, it is a mortal sin. Thus Ambrose
[*Cf. Gloss. Ord. in Rom. i, 29] defines contention: "Contention is a
disclaimer of the truth with clamorous confidence." If, however,
contention denote a disavowal of what is false, with the proper
measure of acrimony, it is praiseworthy: whereas, if it denote a
disavowal of falsehood, together with an inordinate manner, it can be
a venial sin, unless the contention be conducted so inordinately, as
to give scandal to others. Hence the Apostle after saying (2 Tim.
2:14): "Contend not in words," adds, "for it is to no profit, but to
the subverting of the hearers."

Reply Obj. 1: The disciples of Christ contended together, not with
the intention of disclaiming the truth, since each one stood up for
what he thought was true. Yet there was inordinateness in their
contention, because they contended about a matter which they ought
not to have contended about, viz. the primacy of honor; for they were
not spiritual men as yet, as a gloss says on the same passage; and
for this reason Our Lord checked them.

Reply Obj. 2: Those who preached Christ "out of contention," were to
be blamed, because, although they did not gainsay the truth of faith,
but preached it, yet they did gainsay the truth, by the fact that
they thought they would "raise affliction" to the Apostle who was
preaching the truth of faith. Hence the Apostle rejoiced not in their
contention, but in the fruit that would result therefrom, namely that
Christ would be made known--since evil is sometimes the occasion of
good results.

Reply Obj. 3: Contention is complete and is a mortal sin when, in
contending before a judge, a man gainsays the truth of justice, or in
a disputation, intends to impugn the true doctrine. In this sense
Catholics do not contend against heretics, but the reverse. But when,
whether in court or in a disputation, it is incomplete, i.e. in
respect of the acrimony of speech, it is not always a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 4: Contention here denotes an ordinary dispute. For Job
had said (13:3): "I will speak to the Almighty, and I desire to
reason with God": yet he intended not to impugn the truth, but to
defend it, and in seeking the truth thus, he had no wish to be
inordinate in mind or in speech.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 38, Art. 2]

Whether Contention Is a Daughter of Vainglory?

Objection 1: It would seem that contention is not a daughter of
vainglory. For contention is akin to zeal, wherefore it is written (1
Cor. 3:3): "Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: 'envying'] and
contention, are you not carnal, and walk according to men?" Now zeal
pertains to envy. Therefore contention arises rather from envy.

Obj. 2: Further, contention is accompanied by raising of the voice.
But the voice is raised on account of anger, as Gregory declares
(Moral. xxxi, 14). Therefore contention too arises from anger.

Obj. 3: Further, among other things knowledge seems to be the matter
of pride and vainglory, according to 1 Cor. 8:1: "Knowledge puffeth
up." Now contention is often due to lack of knowledge, and by
knowledge we do not impugn the truth, we know it. Therefore
contention is not a daughter of vainglory.

On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 14).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 37, A. 2), discord is a daughter
of vainglory, because each of the disaccording parties clings to his
own opinion, rather than acquiesce with the other. Now it is proper
to pride and vainglory to seek one's own glory. And just as people
are discordant when they hold to their own opinion in their hearts,
so are they contentious when each defends his own opinion by words.
Consequently contention is reckoned a daughter of vainglory for the
same reason as discord.

Reply Obj. 1: Contention, like discord, is akin to envy in so far as
a man severs himself from the one with whom he is discordant, or with
whom he contends, but in so far as a contentious man holds to
something, it is akin to pride and vainglory, because, to wit, he
clings to his own opinion, as stated above (Q. 37, A. 2, ad 1).

Reply Obj. 2: The contention of which we are speaking puts on a loud
voice, for the purpose of impugning the truth, so that it is not the
chief part of contention. Hence it does not follow that contention
arises from the same source as the raising of the voice.

Reply Obj. 3: Pride and vainglory are occasioned chiefly by goods
even those that are contrary to them, for instance, when a man is
proud of his humility: for when a thing arises in this way, it does
so not directly but accidentally, in which way nothing hinders one
contrary from arising out of another. Hence there is no reason why
the _per se_ and direct effects of pride or vainglory, should not
result from the contraries of those things which are the occasion of
pride.
_______________________

QUESTION 39

OF SCHISM
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the vices contrary to peace, which belong to
deeds: such are schism, strife, sedition, and war. In the first
place, then, about schism, there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether schism is a special sin?

(2) Whether it is graver than unbelief?

(3) Of the power exercised by schismatics;

(4) Of the punishment inflicted on them.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 39, Art. 1]

Whether Schism Is a Special Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that schism is not a special sin. For
"schism," as Pope Pelagius I says (Epist. ad Victor. et Pancrat.),
"denotes a division." But every sin causes a division, according to
Isa. 59: "Your sins have divided between you and your God." Therefore
schism is not a special sin.

Obj. 2: Further, a man is apparently a schismatic if he disobeys the
Church. But every sin makes a man disobey the commandments of the
Church, because sin, according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) "is
disobedience against the heavenly commandments." Therefore every sin
is a schism.

Obj. 3: Further, heresy also divides a man from the unity of faith.
If, therefore, the word schism denotes a division, it would seem not
to differ, as a special sin, from the sin of unbelief.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Contra Faust. xx, 3; Contra Crescon.
ii, 4) distinguishes between schism and heresy, for he says that a
"schismatic is one who holds the same faith, and practises the same
worship, as others, and takes pleasure in the mere disunion of the
community, whereas a heretic is one who holds another faith from that
of the Catholic Church." Therefore schism is not a generic sin.

_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. viii, 3), schism takes its
name "from being a scission of minds," and scission is opposed to
unity. Wherefore the sin of schism is one that is directly and
essentially opposed to unity. For in the moral, as in the physical
order, the species is not constituted by that which is accidental.
Now, in the moral order, the essential is that which is intended, and
that which results beside the intention, is, as it were, accidental.
Hence the sin of schism is, properly speaking, a special sin, for the
reason that the schismatic intends to sever himself from that unity
which is the effect of charity: because charity unites not only one
person to another with the bond of spiritual love, but also the whole
Church in unity of spirit.

Accordingly schismatics properly so called are those who, wilfully
and intentionally separate themselves from the unity of the Church;
for this is the chief unity, and the particular unity of several
individuals among themselves is subordinate to the unity of the
Church, even as the mutual adaptation of each member of a natural
body is subordinate to the unity of the whole body. Now the unity of
the Church consists in two things; namely, in the mutual connection
or communion of the members of the Church, and again in the
subordination of all the members of the Church to the one head,
according to Col. 2:18, 19: "Puffed up by the sense of his flesh, and
not holding the Head, from which the whole body, by joints and bands,
being supplied with nourishment and compacted, groweth unto the
increase of God." Now this Head is Christ Himself, Whose viceregent
in the Church is the Sovereign Pontiff. Wherefore schismatics are
those who refuse to submit to the Sovereign Pontiff, and to hold
communion with those members of the Church who acknowledge his
supremacy.

Reply Obj. 1: The division between man and God that results from sin
is not intended by the sinner: it happens beside his intention as a
result of his turning inordinately to a mutable good, and so it is
not schism properly so called.

Reply Obj. 2: The essence of schism consists in rebelliously
disobeying the commandments: and I say "rebelliously," since a
schismatic both obstinately scorns the commandments of the Church,
and refuses to submit to her judgment. But every sinner does not do
this, wherefore not every sin is a schism.

Reply Obj. 3: Heresy and schism are distinguished in respect of those
things to which each is opposed essentially and directly. For heresy
is essentially opposed to faith, while schism is essentially opposed
to the unity of ecclesiastical charity. Wherefore just as faith and
charity are different virtues, although whoever lacks faith lacks
charity, so too schism and heresy are different vices, although
whoever is a heretic is also a schismatic, but not conversely. This
is what Jerome says in his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians
[*In Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10]: "I consider the difference between schism
and heresy to be that heresy holds false doctrine while schism severs
a man from the Church." Nevertheless, just as the loss of charity is
the road to the loss of faith, according to 1 Tim. 1:6: "From which
things," i.e. charity and the like, "some going astray, are turned
aside into vain babbling," so too, schism is the road to heresy.
Wherefore Jerome adds (In Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10) that "at the outset it
is possible, in a certain respect, to find a difference between
schism and heresy: yet there is no schism that does not devise some
heresy for itself, that it may appear to have had a reason for
separating from the Church."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 39, Art. 2]

Whether Schism Is a Graver Sin Than Unbelief?

Objection 1: It would seem that schism is a graver sin than unbelief.
For the graver sin meets with a graver punishment, according to Deut.
25:2: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of
the stripes be." Now we find the sin of schism punished more severely
than even the sin of unbelief or idolatry: for we read (Ex. 32:28)
that some were slain by the swords of their fellow men on account of
idolatry: whereas of the sin of schism we read (Num. 16:30): "If the
Lord do a new thing, and the earth opening her mouth swallow them
down, and all things that belong to them, and they go down alive into
hell, you shall know that they have blasphemed the Lord God."
Moreover the ten tribes who were guilty of schism in revolting from
the rule of David were most severely punished (4 Kings 17). Therefore
the sin of schism is graver than the sin of unbelief.

Obj. 2: Further, "The good of the multitude is greater and more
godlike than the good of the individual," as the Philosopher states
(Ethic. i, 2). Now schism is opposed to the good of the multitude,
namely, ecclesiastical unity, whereas unbelief is contrary to the
particular good of one man, namely the faith of an individual.
Therefore it seems that schism is a graver sin than unbelief.

Obj. 3: Further, a greater good is opposed to a greater evil,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). Now schism is opposed
to charity, which is a greater virtue than faith to which unbelief is
opposed, as shown above (Q. 10, A. 2; Q. 23, A. 6). Therefore schism
is a graver sin than unbelief.

_On the contrary,_ That which results from an addition to something
else surpasses that thing either in good or in evil. Now heresy
results from something being added to schism, for it adds corrupt
doctrine, as Jerome declares in the passage quoted above (A. 1, ad
3). Therefore schism is a less grievous sin than unbelief.

_I answer that,_ The gravity of a sin can be considered in two ways:
first, according to the species of that sin, secondly, according to
its circumstances. And since particular circumstances are infinite in
number, so too they can be varied in an infinite number of ways:
wherefore if one were to ask in general which of two sins is the
graver, the question must be understood to refer to the gravity
derived from the sin's genus. Now the genus or species of a sin is
taken from its object, as shown above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 1; I-II, Q.
73, A. 3). Wherefore the sin which is opposed to the greater good is,
in respect of its genus, more grievous, for instance a sin committed
against God is graver than a sin committed against one's neighbor.

Now it is evident that unbelief is a sin committed against God
Himself, according as He is Himself the First Truth, on which faith
is founded; whereas schism is opposed to ecclesiastical unity, which
is a participated good, and a lesser good than God Himself. Wherefore
it is manifest that the sin of unbelief is generically more grievous
than the sin of schism, although it may happen that a particular
schismatic sins more grievously than a particular unbeliever, either
because his contempt is greater, or because his sin is a source of
greater danger, or for some similar reason.

Reply Obj. 1: It had already been declared to that people by the law
which they had received that there was one God, and that no other God
was to be worshipped by them; and the same had been confirmed among
them by many kinds of signs. Consequently there was no need for those
who sinned against this faith by falling into idolatry, to be
punished in an unwonted manner: it was enough that they should be
punished in the usual way. On the other hand, it was not so well
known among them that Moses was always to be their ruler, and so it
behooved those who rebelled against his authority to be punished in a
miraculous and unwonted manner.

We may also reply by saying that the sin of schism was sometimes more
severely punished in that people, because they were inclined to
seditions and schisms. For it is written (1 Esdra 4:15): "This city
since days gone by has rebelled against its kings: and seditions and
wars were raised therein [*Vulg.: 'This city is a rebellious city,
and hurtful to the kings and provinces, and . . . wars were raised
therein of old']." Now sometimes a more severe punishment is
inflicted for an habitual sin (as stated above, I-II, Q. 105, A. 2,
ad 9), because punishments are medicines intended to keep man away
from sin: so that where there is greater proneness to sin, a more
severe punishment ought to be inflicted. As regards the ten tribes,
they were punished not only for the sin of schism, but also for that
of idolatry as stated in the passage quoted.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as the good of the multitude is greater than the
good of a unit in that multitude, so is it less than the extrinsic
good to which that multitude is directed, even as the good of a rank
in the army is less than the good of the commander-in-chief. In like
manner the good of ecclesiastical unity, to which schism is opposed,
is less than the good of Divine truth, to which unbelief is opposed.

Reply Obj. 3: Charity has two objects; one is its principal object
and is the Divine goodness, the other is its secondary object and is
our neighbor's good. Now schism and other sins against our neighbor,
are opposed to charity in respect of its secondary good, which is
less than the object of faith, for this is God Himself; and so these
sins are less grievous than unbelief. On the other hand, hatred of
God, which is opposed to charity in respect of its principal object,
is not less grievous than unbelief. Nevertheless of all sins
committed by man against his neighbor, the sin of schism would seem
to be the greatest, because it is opposed to the spiritual good of
the multitude.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 39, Art. 3]

Whether Schismatics Have Any Power?

Objection 1: It would seem that schismatics have some power. For
Augustine says (Contra Donat. i, 1): "Just as those who come back to
the Church after being baptized, are not baptized again, so those who
return after being ordained, are not ordained again." Now Order is a
kind of power. Therefore schismatics have some power since they
retain their Orders.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Unico Bapt. [*De Bap. contra
Donat. vi, 5]): "One who is separated can confer a sacrament even as
he can have it." But the power of conferring a sacrament is a very
great power. Therefore schismatics who are separated from the Church,
have a spiritual power.

Obj. 3: Further, Pope Urban II [*Council of Piacenza, cap. x; cf.
Can. Ordinationes, ix, qu. 1] says: "We command that persons
consecrated by bishops who were themselves consecrated according to
the Catholic rite, but have separated themselves by schism from the
Roman Church, should be received mercifully and that their Orders
should be acknowledged, when they return to the unity of the Church,
provided they be of commendable life and knowledge." But this would
not be so, unless spiritual power were retained by schismatics.
Therefore schismatics have spiritual power.

_On the contrary,_ Cyprian says in a letter (Ep. lii, quoted vii, qu.
1, can. Novatianus): "He who observes neither unity of spirit nor the
concord of peace, and severs himself from the bonds of the Church,
and from the fellowship of her priests, cannot have episcopal power
or honor."

_I answer that,_ Spiritual power is twofold, the one sacramental, the
other a power of jurisdiction. The sacramental power is one that is
conferred by some kind of consecration. Now all the consecrations of
the Church are immovable so long as the consecrated thing remains: as
appears even in inanimate things, since an altar, once consecrated,
is not consecrated again unless it has been broken up. Consequently
such a power as this remains, as to its essence, in the man who has
received it by consecration, as long as he lives, even if he fall
into schism or heresy: and this is proved from the fact that if he
come back to the Church, he is not consecrated anew. Since, however,
the lower power ought not to exercise its act, except in so far as it
is moved by the higher power, as may be seen also in the physical
order, it follows that such persons lose the use of their power, so
that it is not lawful for them to use it. Yet if they use it, this
power has its effect in sacramental acts, because therein man acts
only as God's instrument, so that sacramental effects are not
precluded on account of any fault whatever in the person who confers
the sacrament.

On the other hand, the power of jurisdiction is that which is
conferred by a mere human appointment. Such a power as this does not
adhere to the recipient immovably: so that it does not remain in
heretics and schismatics; and consequently they neither absolve nor
excommunicate, nor grant indulgence, nor do anything of the kind, and
if they do, it is invalid.

Accordingly when it is said that such like persons have no spiritual
power, it is to be understood as referring either to the second
power, or if it be referred to the first power, not as referring to
the essence of the power, but to its lawful use.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 39, Art. 4]

Whether It Is Right That Schismatics Should Be Punished with
Excommunication?

Objection 1: It would seem that schismatics are not rightly punished
with excommunication. For excommunication deprives a man chiefly of a
share in the sacraments. But Augustine says (Contra Donat. vi, 5)
that "Baptism can be received from a schismatic." Therefore it seems
that excommunication is not a fitting punishment for schismatics.

Obj. 2: Further, it is the duty of Christ's faithful to lead back
those who have gone astray, wherefore it is written against certain
persons (Ezech. 34:4): "That which was driven away you have not
brought again, neither have you sought that which was lost." Now
schismatics are more easily brought back by such as may hold
communion with them. Therefore it seems that they ought not to be
excommunicated.

Obj. 3: Further, a double punishment is not inflicted for one and the
same sin, according to Nahum 1:9: "God will not judge the same twice"
[*Septuagint version]. Now some receive a temporal punishment for the
sin of schism, according to 23, qu. 5 [*Gratianus, Decretum, P. II,
causa XXIII, qu. 5, can. 44, Quali nos (RP I, 943)], where it is
stated: "Both divine and earthly laws have laid down that those who
are severed from the unity of the Church, and disturb her peace, must
be punished by the secular power." Therefore they ought not to be
punished with excommunication.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Num. 16:26): "Depart from the tents
of these wicked men," those, to wit, who had caused the schism, "and
touch nothing of theirs, lest you be involved in their sins."

_I answer that,_ According to Wis. 11:11, "By what things a man
sinneth, by the same also he should be punished" [Vulg.: 'he is
tormented']. Now a schismatic, as shown above (A. 1), commits a
twofold sin: first by separating himself from communion with the
members of the Church, and in this respect the fitting punishment for
schismatics is that they be excommunicated. Secondly, they refuse
submission to the head of the Church, wherefore, since they are
unwilling to be controlled by the Church's spiritual power, it is
just that they should be compelled by the secular power.

Reply Obj. 1: It is not lawful to receive Baptism from a schismatic,
save in a case of necessity, since it is better for a man to quit
this life, marked with the sign of Christ, no matter from whom he may
receive it, whether from a Jew or a pagan, than deprived of that
mark, which is bestowed in Baptism.

Reply Obj. 2: Excommunication does not forbid the intercourse whereby
a person by salutary admonitions leads back to the unity of the
Church those who are separated from her. Indeed this very separation
brings them back somewhat, because through confusion at their
separation, they are sometimes led to do penance.

Reply Obj. 3: The punishments of the present life are medicinal, and
therefore when one punishment does not suffice to compel a man,
another is added: just as physicians employ several bod[il]y
medicines when one has no effect. In like manner the Church, when
excommunication does not sufficiently restrain certain men, employs
the compulsion of the secular arm. If, however, one punishment
suffices, another should not be employed.
_______________________

QUESTION 40

OF WAR
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider war, under which head there are four points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether some kind of war is lawful?

(2) Whether it is lawful for clerics to fight?

(3) Whether it is lawful for belligerents to lay ambushes?

(4) Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 40, Art. 1]

Whether It Is Always Sinful to Wage War?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is always sinful to wage war.
Because punishment is not inflicted except for sin. Now those who
wage war are threatened by Our Lord with punishment, according to
Matt. 26:52: "All that take the sword shall perish with the sword."
Therefore all wars are unlawful.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is contrary to a Divine precept is a sin.
But war is contrary to a Divine precept, for it is written (Matt.
5:39): "But I say to you not to resist evil"; and (Rom. 12:19): "Not
revenging yourselves, my dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath."
Therefore war is always sinful.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing, except sin, is contrary to an act of
virtue. But war is contrary to peace. Therefore war is always a sin.

Obj. 4: Further, the exercise of a lawful thing is itself lawful, as
is evident in scientific exercises. But warlike exercises which take
place in tournaments are forbidden by the Church, since those who are
slain in these trials are deprived of ecclesiastical burial.
Therefore it seems that war is a sin in itself.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says in a sermon on the son of the
centurion [*Ep. ad Marcel. cxxxviii]: "If the Christian Religion
forbade war altogether, those who sought salutary advice in the
Gospel would rather have been counselled to cast aside their arms,
and to give up soldiering altogether. _On the contrary,_ they were
told: 'Do violence to no man . . . and be content with your pay'
[*Luke 3:14]. If he commanded them to be content with their pay, he
did not forbid soldiering."

_I answer that,_ In order for a war to be just, three things are
necessary. First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the
war is to be waged. For it is not the business of a private
individual to declare war, because he can seek for redress of his
rights from the tribunal of his superior. Moreover it is not the
business of a private individual to summon together the people, which
has to be done in wartime. And as the care of the common weal is
committed to those who are in authority, it is their business to
watch over the common weal of the city, kingdom or province subject
to them. And just as it is lawful for them to have recourse to the
sword in defending that common weal against internal disturbances,
when they punish evil-doers, according to the words of the Apostle
(Rom. 13:4): "He beareth not the sword in vain: for he is God's
minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil"; so
too, it is their business to have recourse to the sword of war in
defending the common weal against external enemies. Hence it is said
to those who are in authority (Ps. 81:4): "Rescue the poor: and
deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner"; and for this reason
Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 75): "The natural order conducive
to peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel
war should be in the hands of those who hold the supreme authority."

Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are
attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account of
some fault. Wherefore Augustine says (QQ. in Hept., qu. x, super
Jos.): "A just war is wont to be described as one that avenges
wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing to
make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore
what it has seized unjustly."

Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful
intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the
avoidance of evil. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. [*The words
quoted are to be found not in St. Augustine's works, but Can. Apud.
Caus. xxiii, qu. 1]): "True religion looks upon as peaceful those
wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty,
but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and
of uplifting the good." For it may happen that the war is declared by
the legitimate authority, and for a just cause, and yet be rendered
unlawful through a wicked intention. Hence Augustine says (Contra
Faust. xxii, 74): "The passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst
for vengeance, an unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of
revolt, the lust of power, and such like things, all these are
rightly condemned in war."

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 70): "To take
the sword is to arm oneself in order to take the life of anyone,
without the command or permission of superior or lawful authority."
On the other hand, to have recourse to the sword (as a private
person) by the authority of the sovereign or judge, or (as a public
person) through zeal for justice, and by the authority, so to speak,
of God, is not to "take the sword," but to use it as commissioned by
another, wherefore it does not deserve punishment. And yet even those
who make sinful use of the sword are not always slain with the sword,
yet they always perish with their own sword, because, unless they
repent, they are punished eternally for their sinful use of the sword.

Reply Obj. 2: Such like precepts, as Augustine observes (De Serm.
Dom. in Monte i, 19), should always be borne in readiness of mind, so
that we be ready to obey them, and, if necessary, to refrain from
resistance or self-defense. Nevertheless it is necessary sometimes
for a man to act otherwise for the common good, or for the good of
those with whom he is fighting. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad
Marcellin. cxxxviii): "Those whom we have to punish with a kindly
severity, it is necessary to handle in many ways against their will.
For when we are stripping a man of the lawlessness of sin, it is good
for him to be vanquished, since nothing is more hopeless than the
happiness of sinners, whence arises a guilty impunity, and an evil
will, like an internal enemy."

Reply Obj. 3: Those who wage war justly aim at peace, and so they are
not opposed to peace, except to the evil peace, which Our Lord "came
not to send upon earth" (Matt. 10:34). Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad
Bonif. clxxxix): "We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we
go to war that we may have peace. Be peaceful, therefore, in warring,
so that you may vanquish those whom you war against, and bring them
to the prosperity of peace."

Reply Obj. 4: Manly exercises in warlike feats of arms are not all
forbidden, but those which are inordinate and perilous, and end in
slaying or plundering. In olden times warlike exercises presented no
such danger, and hence they were called "exercises of arms" or
"bloodless wars," as Jerome states in an epistle [*Reference
incorrect: cf. Veget., De Re Milit. i].
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 40, Art. 2]

Whether It Is Lawful for Clerics and Bishops to Fight?

Objection 1: It would seem lawful for clerics and bishops to fight.
For, as stated above (A. 1), wars are lawful and just in so far as
they protect the poor and the entire common weal from suffering at
the hands of the foe. Now this seems to be above all the duty of
prelates, for Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xiv): "The wolf comes upon
the sheep, when any unjust and rapacious man oppresses those who are
faithful and humble. But he who was thought to be the shepherd, and
was not, leaveth the sheep, and flieth, for he fears lest the wolf
hurt him, and dares not stand up against his injustice." Therefore it
is lawful for prelates and clerics to fight.

Obj. 2: Further, Pope Leo IV writes (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Igitur): "As
untoward tidings had frequently come from the Saracen side, some said
that the Saracens would come to the port of Rome secretly and
covertly; for which reason we commanded our people to gather
together, and ordered them to go down to the seashore." Therefore it
is lawful for bishops to fight.

Obj. 3: Further, apparently, it comes to the same whether a man does
a thing himself, or consents to its being done by another, according
to Rom. 1:32: "They who do such things, are worthy of death, and not
only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do
them." Now those, above all, seem to consent to a thing, who induce
others to do it. But it is lawful for bishops and clerics to induce
others to fight: for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Hortatu) that
Charles went to war with the Lombards at the instance and entreaty of
Adrian, bishop of Rome. Therefore they also are allowed to fight.

Obj. 4: Further, whatever is right and meritorious in itself, is
lawful for prelates and clerics. Now it is sometimes right and
meritorious to make war, for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Omni
timore) that if "a man die for the true faith, or to save his
country, or in defense of Christians, God will give him a heavenly
reward." Therefore it is lawful for bishops and clerics to fight.

_On the contrary,_ It was said to Peter as representing bishops and
clerics (Matt. 16:52): "Put up again thy sword into the scabbard
[Vulg.: 'its place'] [*"Scabbard" is the reading in John 18:11]."
Therefore it is not lawful for them to fight.

_I answer that,_ Several things are requisite for the good of a human
society: and a number of things are done better and quicker by a
number of persons than by one, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i,
1), while certain occupations are so inconsistent with one another,
that they cannot be fittingly exercised at the same time; wherefore
those who are deputed to important duties are forbidden to occupy
themselves with things of small importance. Thus according to human
laws, soldiers who are deputed to warlike pursuits are forbidden to
engage in commerce [*Cod. xii, 35, De Re Milit.].

Now warlike pursuits are altogether incompatible with the duties of a
bishop and a cleric, for two reasons. The first reason is a general
one, because, to wit, warlike pursuits are full of unrest, so that
they hinder the mind very much from the contemplation of Divine
things, the praise of God, and prayers for the people, which belong
to the duties of a cleric. Wherefore just as commercial enterprises
are forbidden to clerics, because they unsettle the mind too much, so
too are warlike pursuits, according to 2 Tim. 2:4: "No man being a
soldier to God, entangleth himself with secular business." The second
reason is a special one, because, to wit, all the clerical Orders are
directed to the ministry of the altar, on which the Passion of Christ
is represented sacramentally, according to 1 Cor. 11:26: "As often as
you shall eat this bread, and drink the chalice, you shall show the
death of the Lord, until He come." Wherefore it is unbecoming for
them to slay or shed blood, and it is more fitting that they should
be ready to shed their own blood for Christ, so as to imitate in deed
what they portray in their ministry. For this reason it has been
decreed that those who shed blood, even without sin, become
irregular. Now no man who has a certain duty to perform, can lawfully
do that which renders him unfit for that duty. Wherefore it is
altogether unlawful for clerics to fight, because war is directed to
the shedding of blood.

Reply Obj. 1: Prelates ought to withstand not only the wolf who
brings spiritual death upon the flock, but also the pillager and the
oppressor who work bodily harm; not, however, by having recourse
themselves to material arms, but by means of spiritual weapons,
according to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 10:4): "The weapons of
our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God." Such are
salutary warnings, devout prayers, and, for those who are obstinate,
the sentence of excommunication.

Reply Obj. 2: Prelates and clerics may, by the authority of their
superiors, take part in wars, not indeed by taking up arms
themselves, but by affording spiritual help to those who fight
justly, by exhorting and absolving them, and by other like spiritual
helps. Thus in the Old Testament (Joshua 6:4) the priests were
commanded to sound the sacred trumpets in the battle. It was for this
purpose that bishops or clerics were first allowed to go to the
front: and it is an abuse of this permission, if any of them take up
arms themselves.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 23, A. 4, ad 2) every power, art or
virtue that regards the end, has to dispose that which is directed to
the end. Now, among the faithful, carnal wars should be considered as
having for their end the Divine spiritual good to which clerics are
deputed. Wherefore it is the duty of clerics to dispose and counsel
other men to engage in just wars. For they are forbidden to take up
arms, not as though it were a sin, but because such an occupation is
unbecoming their personality.

Reply Obj. 4: Although it is meritorious to wage a just war,
nevertheless it is rendered unlawful for clerics, by reason of their
being deputed to works more meritorious still. Thus the marriage act
may be meritorious; and yet it becomes reprehensible in those who
have vowed virginity, because they are bound to a yet greater good.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q., 40, Art. 3]

Whether It Is Lawful to Lay Ambushes in War?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful to lay ambushes in
war. For it is written (Deut. 16:20): "Thou shalt follow justly after
that which is just." But ambushes, since they are a kind of
deception, seem to pertain to injustice. Therefore it is unlawful to
lay ambushes even in a just war.

Obj. 2: Further, ambushes and deception seem to be opposed to
faithfulness even as lies are. But since we are bound to keep faith
with all men, it is wrong to lie to anyone, as Augustine states
(Contra Mend. xv). Therefore, as one is bound to keep faith with
one's enemy, as Augustine states (Ep. ad Bonif. clxxxix), it seems
that it is unlawful to lay ambushes for one's enemies.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Matt. 7:12): "Whatsoever you would
that men should do to you, do you also to them": and we ought to
observe this in all our dealings with our neighbor. Now our enemy is
our neighbor. Therefore, since no man wishes ambushes or deceptions
to be prepared for himself, it seems that no one ought to carry on
war by laying ambushes.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. in Hept. qu. x super Jos):
"Provided the war be just, it is no concern of justice whether it be
carried on openly or by ambushes": and he proves this by the
authority of the Lord, Who commanded Joshua to lay ambushes for the
city of Hai (Joshua 8:2).

_I answer that,_ The object of laying ambushes is in order to deceive
the enemy. Now a man may be deceived by another's word or deed in two
ways. First, through being told something false, or through the
breaking of a promise, and this is always unlawful. No one ought to
deceive the enemy in this way, for there are certain "rights of war
and covenants, which ought to be observed even among enemies," as
Ambrose states (De Officiis i).

Secondly, a man may be deceived by what we say or do, because we do
not declare our purpose or meaning to him. Now we are not always
bound to do this, since even in the Sacred Doctrine many things have
to be concealed, especially from unbelievers, lest they deride it,
according to Matt. 7:6: "Give not that which is holy, to dogs."
Wherefore much more ought the plan of campaign to be hidden from the
enemy. For this reason among other things that a soldier has to learn
is the art of concealing his purpose lest it come to the enemy's
knowledge, as stated in the Book on _Strategy_ [*Stratagematum i, 1]
by Frontinus. Such like concealment is what is meant by an ambush
which may be lawfully employed in a just war.

Nor can these ambushes be properly called deceptions, nor are they
contrary to justice or to a well-ordered will. For a man would have
an inordinate will if he were unwilling that others should hide
anything from him.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 40, Art. 4]

Whether It Is Lawful to Fight on Holy Days?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to fight on holy days. For holy
days are instituted that we may give our time to the things of God.
Hence they are included in the keeping of the Sabbath prescribed Ex.
20:8: for "sabbath" is interpreted "rest." But wars are full of
unrest. Therefore by no means is it lawful to fight on holy days.

Obj. 2: Further, certain persons are reproached (Isa. 58:3) because
on fast-days they exacted what was owing to them, were guilty of
strife, and of smiting with the fist. Much more, therefore, is it
unlawful to fight on holy days.

Obj. 3: Further, no ill deed should be done to avoid temporal harm.
But fighting on a holy day seems in itself to be an ill deed.
Therefore no one should fight on a holy day even through the need of
avoiding temporal harm.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Mac. 2:41): The Jews rightly
determined . . . saying: "Whosoever shall come up against us to fight
on the Sabbath-day, we will fight against him."

_I answer that,_ The observance of holy days is no hindrance to those
things which are ordained to man's safety, even that of his body.
Hence Our Lord argued with the Jews, saying (John 7:23): "Are you
angry at Me because I have healed the whole man on the Sabbath-day?"
Hence physicians may lawfully attend to their patients on holy days.
Now there is much more reason for safeguarding the common weal
(whereby many are saved from being slain, and innumerable evils both
temporal and spiritual prevented), than the bodily safety of an
individual. Therefore, for the purpose of safeguarding the common
weal of the faithful, it is lawful to carry on a war on holy days,
provided there be need for doing so: because it would be to tempt
God, if notwithstanding such a need, one were to choose to refrain
from fighting.

However, as soon as the need ceases, it is no longer lawful to fight
on a holy day, for the reasons given: wherefore this suffices for the
Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

QUESTION 41

OF STRIFE
(In Two Articles)
[*Strife here denotes fighting between individuals]

We must now consider strife, under which head there are two points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether strife is a sin?

(2) Whether it is a daughter of anger?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 41, Art. 1]

Whether Strife Is Always a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that strife is not always a sin. For
strife seems a kind of contention: hence Isidore says (Etym. x) that
the word "rixosus [quarrelsome] is derived from the snarling [rictu]
of a dog, because the quarrelsome man is ever ready to contradict; he
delights in brawling, and provokes contention." Now contention is not
always a sin. Neither, therefore, is strife.

Obj. 2: Further, it is related (Gen. 26:21) that the servants of
Isaac "digged" another well, "and for that they quarrelled likewise."
Now it is not credible that the household of Isaac quarrelled
publicly, without being reproved by him, supposing it were a sin.
Therefore strife is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, strife seems to be a war between individuals. But
war is not always sinful. Therefore strife is not always a sin.

_On the contrary,_ Strifes [*The Douay version has 'quarrels'] are
reckoned among the works of the flesh (Gal. 5:20), and "they who do
such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God." Therefore strifes
are not only sinful, but they are even mortal sins.

_I answer that,_ While contention implies a contradiction of words,
strife denotes a certain contradiction of deeds. Wherefore a gloss on
Gal. 5:20 says that "strifes are when persons strike one another
through anger." Hence strife is a kind of private war, because it
takes place between private persons, being declared not by public
authority, but rather by an inordinate will. Therefore strife is
always sinful. In fact it is a mortal sin in the man who attacks
another unjustly, for it is not without mortal sin that one inflicts
harm on another even if the deed be done by the hands. But in him who
defends himself, it may be without sin, or it may sometimes involve a
venial sin, or sometimes a mortal sin; and this depends on his
intention and on his manner of defending himself. For if his sole
intention be to withstand the injury done to him, and he defend
himself with due moderation, it is no sin, and one cannot say
properly that there is strife on his part. But if, on the other hand,
his self-defense be inspired by vengeance and hatred, it is always a
sin. It is a venial sin, if a slight movement of hatred or vengeance
obtrude itself, or if he does not much exceed moderation in defending
himself: but it is a mortal sin if he makes for his assailant with
the fixed intention of killing him, or inflicting grievous harm on
him.

Reply Obj. 1: Strife is not just the same as contention: and there
are three things in the passage quoted from Isidore, which express
the inordinate nature of strife. First, the quarrelsome man is always
ready to fight, and this is conveyed by the words, "ever ready to
contradict," that is to say, whether the other man says or does well
or ill. Secondly, he delights in quarrelling itself, and so the
passage proceeds, "and delights in brawling." Thirdly, "he" provokes
others to quarrel, wherefore it goes on, "and provokes contention."

Reply Obj. 1: The sense of the text is not that the servants of Isaac
quarrelled, but that the inhabitants of that country quarrelled with
them: wherefore these sinned, and not the servants of Isaac, who bore
the calumny [*Cf. Gen. 26:20].

Reply Obj. 3: In order for a war to be just it must be declared by
authority of the governing power, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 1);
whereas strife proceeds from a private feeling of anger or hatred.
For if the servants of a sovereign or judge, in virtue of their
public authority, attack certain men and these defend themselves, it
is not the former who are said to be guilty of strife, but those who
resist the public authority. Hence it is not the assailants in this
case who are guilty of strife and commit sin, but those who defend
themselves inordinately.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 41, Art. 2]

Whether Strife Is a Daughter of Anger?

Objection 1: It would seem that strife is not a daughter of anger.
For it is written (James 4:1): "Whence are wars and contentions? Are
they not . . . from your concupiscences, which war in your members?"
But anger is not in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore strife is a
daughter, not of anger, but of concupiscence.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 28:25): "He that boasteth and
puffeth up himself, stirreth up quarrels." Now strife is apparently
the same as quarrel. Therefore it seems that strife is a daughter of
pride or vainglory which makes a man boast and puff himself up.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 18:6): "The lips of a fool
intermeddle with strife." Now folly differs from anger, for it is
opposed, not to meekness, but to wisdom or prudence. Therefore strife
is not a daughter of anger.

Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Prov. 10:12): "Hatred stirreth up
strifes." But hatred arises from envy, according to Gregory (Moral.
xxxi, 17). Therefore strife is not a daughter of anger, but of envy.

Obj. 5: Further, it is written (Prov. 17:19): "He that studieth
discords, soweth [Vulg.: 'loveth'] quarrels." But discord is a
daughter of vainglory, as stated above (Q. 37, A. 2). Therefore
strife is also.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that "anger gives
rise to strife"; and it is written (Prov. 15:18; 29:22): "A
passionate man stirreth up strifes."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), strife denotes an antagonism
extending to deeds, when one man designs to harm another. Now there
are two ways in which one man may intend to harm another. In one way
it is as though he intended absolutely the other's hurt, which in
this case is the outcome of hatred, for the intention of hatred is
directed to the hurt of one's enemy either openly or secretly. In
another way a man intends to hurt another who knows and withstands
his intention. This is what we mean by strife, and belongs properly
to anger which is the desire of vengeance: for the angry man is not
content to hurt secretly the object of his anger, he even wishes him
to feel the hurt and know that what he suffers is in revenge for what
he has done, as may be seen from what has been said above about the
passion of anger (I-II, Q. 46, A. 6, ad 2). Therefore, properly
speaking, strife arises from anger.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1, 2), all the
irascible passions arise from those of the concupiscible faculty, so
that whatever is the immediate outcome of anger, arises also from
concupiscence as from its first root.

Reply Obj. 2: Boasting and puffing up of self which are the result of
anger or vainglory, are not the direct but the occasional cause of
quarrels or strife, because, when a man resents another being
preferred to him, his anger is aroused, and then his anger results in
quarrel and strife.

Reply Obj. 3: Anger, as stated above (I-II, Q. 48, A. 3) hinders the
judgment of the reason, so that it bears a likeness to folly. Hence
they have a common effect, since it is due to a defect in the reason
that a man designs to hurt another inordinately.

Reply Obj. 4: Although strife sometimes arises from hatred, it is not
the proper effect thereof, because when one man hates another it is
beside his intention to hurt him in a quarrelsome and open manner,
since sometimes he seeks to hurt him secretly. When, however, he sees
himself prevailing, he endeavors to harm him with strife and quarrel.
But to hurt a man in a quarrel is the proper effect of anger, for the
reason given above.

Reply Obj. 5: Strifes give rise to hatred and discord in the hearts
of those who are guilty of strife, and so he that "studies," i.e.,
intends to sow discord among others, causes them to quarrel among
themselves. Even so any sin may command the act of another sin, by
directing it to its own end. This does not, however, prove that
strife is the daughter of vainglory properly and directly.
_______________________

QUESTION 42

OF SEDITION
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider sedition, under which head there are two points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is a special sin?

(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 42, Art. 1]

Whether Sedition Is a Special Sin Distinct from Other Sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that sedition is not a special sin
distinct from other sins. For, according to Isidore (Etym. x), "a
seditious man is one who sows dissent among minds, and begets
discord." Now, by provoking the commission of a sin, a man sins by no
other kind of sin than that which he provoked. Therefore it seems
that sedition is not a special sin distinct from discord.

Obj. 2: Further, sedition denotes a kind of division. Now schism
takes its name from scission, as stated above (Q. 39, A. 1).
Therefore, seemingly, the sin of sedition is not distinct from that
of schism.

Obj. 3: Further, every special sin that is distinct from other sins,
is either a capital vice, or arises from some capital vice. Now
sedition is reckoned neither among the capital vices, nor among those
vices which arise from them, as appears from Moral. xxxi, 45, where
both kinds of vice are enumerated. Therefore sedition is not a
special sin, distinct from other sins.

_On the contrary,_ Seditions are mentioned as distinct from other
sins (2 Cor. 12:20).

_I answer that,_ Sedition is a special sin, having something in
common with war and strife, and differing somewhat from them. It has
something in common with them, in so far as it implies a certain
antagonism, and it differs from them in two points. First, because
war and strife denote actual aggression on either side, whereas
sedition may be said to denote either actual aggression, or the
preparation for such aggression. Hence a gloss on 2 Cor. 12:20 says
that "seditions are tumults tending to fight," when, to wit, a number
of people make preparations with the intention of fighting. Secondly,
they differ in that war is, properly speaking, carried on against
external foes, being as it were between one people and another,
whereas strife is between one individual and another, or between few
people on one side and few on the other side, while sedition, in its
proper sense, is between mutually dissentient parts of one people, as
when one part of the state rises in tumult against another part.
Wherefore, since sedition is opposed to a special kind of good,
namely the unity and peace of a people, it is a special kind of sin.

Reply Obj. 1: A seditious man is one who incites others to sedition,
and since sedition denotes a kind of discord, it follows that a
seditious man is one who creates discord, not of any kind, but
between the parts of a multitude. And the sin of sedition is not only
in him who sows discord, but also in those who dissent from one
another inordinately.

Reply Obj. 2: Sedition differs from schism in two respects. First,
because schism is opposed to the spiritual unity of the multitude,
viz. ecclesiastical unity, whereas sedition is contrary to the
temporal or secular unity of the multitude, for instance of a city or
kingdom. Secondly, schism does not imply any preparation for a
material fight as sedition does, but only for a spiritual dissent.

Reply Obj. 3: Sedition, like schism, is contained under discord,
since each is a kind of discord, not between individuals, but between
the parts of a multitude.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 42, Art. 2]

Whether Sedition Is Always a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that sedition is not always a mortal sin.
For sedition denotes "a tumult tending to fight," according to the
gloss quoted above (A. 1). But fighting is not always a mortal sin,
indeed it is sometimes just and lawful, as stated above (Q. 40, A.
1). Much more, therefore, can sedition be without a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, sedition is a kind of discord, as stated above (A.
1, ad 3). Now discord can be without mortal sin, and sometimes
without any sin at all. Therefore sedition can be also.

Obj. 3: Further, it is praiseworthy to deliver a multitude from a
tyrannical rule. Yet this cannot easily be done without some
dissension in the multitude, if one part of the multitude seeks to
retain the tyrant, while the rest strive to dethrone him. Therefore
there can be sedition without mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle forbids seditions together with other
things that are mortal sins (2 Cor. 12:20).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 2), sedition is contrary
to the unity of the multitude, viz. the people of a city or kingdom.
Now Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21) that "wise men understand the
word people to designate not any crowd of persons, but the assembly
of those who are united together in fellowship recognized by law and
for the common good." Wherefore it is evident that the unity to which
sedition is opposed is the unity of law and common good: whence it
follows manifestly that sedition is opposed to justice and the common
good. Therefore by reason of its genus it is a mortal sin, and its
gravity will be all the greater according as the common good which it
assails surpasses the private good which is assailed by strife.

Accordingly the sin of sedition is first and chiefly in its authors,
who sin most grievously; and secondly it is in those who are led by
them to disturb the common good. Those, however, who defend the
common good, and withstand the seditious party, are not themselves
seditious, even as neither is a man to be called quarrelsome because
he defends himself, as stated above (Q. 41, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1: It is lawful to fight, provided it be for the common
good, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 1). But sedition runs counter to the
common good of the multitude, so that it is always a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Discord from what is not evidently good, may be without
sin, but discord from what is evidently good, cannot be without sin:
and sedition is discord of this kind, for it is contrary to the unity
of the multitude, which is a manifest good.

Reply Obj. 3: A tyrannical government is not just, because it is
directed, not to the common good, but to the private good of the
ruler, as the Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5; _Ethic._ viii, 10).
Consequently there is no sedition in disturbing a government of this
kind, unless indeed the tyrant's rule be disturbed so inordinately,
that his subjects suffer greater harm from the consequent disturbance
than from the tyrant's government. Indeed it is the tyrant rather
that is guilty of sedition, since he encourages discord and sedition
among his subjects, that he may lord over them more securely; for
this is tyranny, being conducive to the private good of the ruler,
and to the injury of the multitude.
_______________________

QUESTION 43

OF SCANDAL
(In Eight Articles)

It remains for us to consider the vices which are opposed to
beneficence, among which some come under the head of injustice,
those, to wit, whereby one harms one's neighbor unjustly. But scandal
seems to be specially opposed to charity. Accordingly we must here
consider scandal, under which head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) What is scandal?

(2) Whether scandal is a sin?

(3) Whether it is a special sin?

(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(5) Whether the perfect can be scandalized?

(6) Whether they can give scandal?

(7) Whether spiritual goods are to be foregone on account of scandal?

(8) Whether temporal things are to be foregone on account of scandal?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 1]

Whether Scandal Is Fittingly Defined As Being Something Less Rightly
Said or Done That Occasions Spiritual Downfall?

Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is unfittingly defined as
"something less rightly said or done that occasions spiritual
downfall." For scandal is a sin as we shall state further on (A. 2).
Now, according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27), a sin is a
"word, deed, or desire contrary to the law of God." Therefore the
definition given above is insufficient, since it omits "thought" or
"desire."

Obj. 2: Further, since among virtuous or right acts one is more
virtuous or more right than another, that one alone which has perfect
rectitude would not seem to be a "less" right one. If, therefore,
scandal is something "less" rightly said or done, it follows that
every virtuous act except the best of all, is a scandal.

Obj. 3: Further, an occasion is an accidental cause. But nothing
accidental should enter a definition, because it does not specify the
thing defined. Therefore it is unfitting, in defining scandal, to say
that it is an "occasion."

Obj. 4: Further, whatever a man does may be the occasion of another's
spiritual downfall, because accidental causes are indeterminate.
Consequently, if scandal is something that occasions another's
spiritual downfall, any deed or word can be a scandal: and this seems
unreasonable.

Obj. 5: Further, a man occasions his neighbor's spiritual downfall
when he offends or weakens him. Now scandal is condivided with
offense and weakness, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14:21): "It is good
not to eat flesh, and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy
brother is offended or scandalized, or weakened." Therefore the
aforesaid definition of scandal is unfitting.

_On the contrary,_ Jerome in expounding Matt. 15:12, "Dost thou know
that the Pharisees, when they heard this word," etc. says: "When we
read 'Whosoever shall scandalize,' the sense is 'Whosoever shall, by
deed or word, occasion another's spiritual downfall.'"

_I answer that,_ As Jerome observes the Greek _skandalon_ may be
rendered offense, downfall, or a stumbling against something. For
when a body, while moving along a path, meets with an obstacle, it
may happen to stumble against it, and be disposed to fall down: such
an obstacle is a _skandalon_.

In like manner, while going along the spiritual way, a man may be
disposed to a spiritual downfall by another's word or deed, in so
far, to wit, as one man by his injunction, inducement or example,
moves another to sin; and this is scandal properly so called.

Now nothing by its very nature disposes a man to spiritual downfall,
except that which has some lack of rectitude, since what is perfectly
right, secures man against a fall, instead of conducing to his
downfall. Scandal is, therefore, fittingly defined as "something less
rightly done or said, that occasions another's spiritual downfall."

Reply Obj. 1: The thought or desire of evil lies hidden in the heart,
wherefore it does not suggest itself to another man as an obstacle
conducing to his spiritual downfall: hence it cannot come under the
head of scandal.

Reply Obj. 2: A thing is said to be less right, not because something
else surpasses it in rectitude, but because it has some lack of
rectitude, either through being evil in itself, such as sin, or
through having an appearance of evil. Thus, for instance, if a man
were to "sit at meat in the idol's temple" (1 Cor. 8:10), though this
is not sinful in itself, provided it be done with no evil intention,
yet, since it has a certain appearance of evil, and a semblance of
worshipping the idol, it might occasion another man's spiritual
downfall. Hence the Apostle says (1 Thess. 5:22): "From all
appearance of evil refrain yourselves." Scandal is therefore
fittingly described as something done "less rightly," so as to
comprise both whatever is sinful in itself, and all that has an
appearance of evil.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (I-II, Q. 75, AA. 2, 3; I-II, Q. 80, A.
1), nothing can be a sufficient cause of a man's spiritual downfall,
which is sin, save his own will. Wherefore another man's words or
deeds can only be an imperfect cause, conducing somewhat to that
downfall. For this reason scandal is said to afford not a cause, but
an occasion, which is an imperfect, and not always an accidental
cause. Nor is there any reason why certain definitions should not
make mention of things that are accidental, since what is accidental
to one, may be proper to something else: thus the accidental cause is
mentioned in the definition of chance (Phys. ii, 5).

Reply Obj. 4: Another's words or deed may be the cause of another's
sin in two ways, directly and accidentally. Directly, when a man
either intends, by his evil word or deed, to lead another man into
sin, or, if he does not so intend, when his deed is of such a nature
as to lead another into sin: for instance, when a man publicly
commits a sin or does something that has an appearance of sin. In
this case he that does such an act does, properly speaking, afford an
occasion of another's spiritual downfall, wherefore his act is called
"active scandal." One man's word or deed is the accidental cause of
another's sin, when he neither intends to lead him into sin, nor does
what is of a nature to lead him into sin, and yet this other one,
through being ill-disposed, is led into sin, for instance, into envy
of another's good, and then he who does this righteous act, does not,
so far as he is concerned, afford an occasion of the other's
downfall, but it is this other one who takes the occasion according
to Rom. 7:8: "Sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me
all manner of concupiscence." Wherefore this is "passive," without
"active scandal," since he that acts rightly does not, for his own
part, afford the occasion of the other's downfall. Sometimes
therefore it happens that there is active scandal in the one together
with passive scandal in the other, as when one commits a sin being
induced thereto by another; sometimes there is active without passive
scandal, for instance when one, by word or deed, provokes another to
sin, and the latter does not consent; and sometimes there is passive
without active scandal, as we have already said.

Reply Obj. 5: "Weakness" denotes proneness to scandal; while
"offense" signifies resentment against the person who commits a sin,
which resentment may be sometimes without spiritual downfall; and
"scandal" is the stumbling that results in downfall.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 2]

Whether Scandal Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is not a sin. For sins do not
occur from necessity, since all sin is voluntary, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 74, AA. 1, 2). Now it is written (Matt. 18:7): "It must
needs be that scandals come." Therefore scandal is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, no sin arises from a sense of dutifulness, because
"a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (Matt. 7:18). But scandal
may come from a sense of dutifulness, for Our Lord said to Peter
(Matt. 16:23): "Thou art a scandal unto Me," in reference to which
words Jerome says that "the Apostle's error was due to his sense of
dutifulness, and such is never inspired by the devil." Therefore
scandal is not always a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, scandal denotes a stumbling. But he that stumbles
does not always fall. Therefore scandal, which is a spiritual fall,
can be without sin.

_On the contrary,_ Scandal is "something less rightly said or done."
Now anything that lacks rectitude is a sin. Therefore scandal is
always with sin.

_I answer that,_ As already said (A. 1, ad 4), scandal is of two
kinds, passive scandal in the person scandalized, and active scandal
in the person who gives scandal, and so occasions a spiritual
downfall. Accordingly passive scandal is always a sin in the person
scandalized; for he is not scandalized except in so far as he
succumbs to a spiritual downfall, and that is a sin.

Yet there can be passive scandal, without sin on the part of the
person whose action has occasioned the scandal, as for instance, when
a person is scandalized at another's good deed. In like manner active
scandal is always a sin in the person who gives scandal, since either
what he does is a sin, or if it only have the appearance of sin, it
should always be left undone out of that love for our neighbor which
binds each one to be solicitous for his neighbor's spiritual welfare;
so that if he persist in doing it he acts against charity.

Yet there can be active scandal without sin on the part of the person
scandalized, as stated above (A. 1, ad 4).

Reply Obj. 1: These words, "It must needs be that scandals come," are
to be understood to convey, not the absolute, but the conditional
necessity of scandal; in which sense it is necessary that whatever
God foresees or foretells must happen, provided it be taken
conjointly with such foreknowledge, as explained in the First Part
(Q. 14, A. 13, ad 3; Q. 23, A. 6, ad 2).

Or we may say that the necessity of scandals occurring is a necessity
of end, because they are useful in order that "they . . . who are
reproved may be made manifest" (1 Cor. 11:19).

Or scandals must needs occur, seeing the condition of man who fails
to shield himself from sin. Thus a physician on seeing a man
partaking of unsuitable food might say that such a man must needs
injure his health, which is to be understood on the condition that he
does not change his diet. In like manner it must needs be that
scandals come, so long as men fail to change their evil mode of
living.

Reply Obj. 2: In that passage scandal denotes any kind of hindrance:
for Peter wished to hinder Our Lord's Passion out of a sense of
dutifulness towards Christ.

Reply Obj. 3: No man stumbles spiritually, without being kept back
somewhat from advancing in God's way, and that is at least a venial
sin.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 3]

Whether Scandal Is a Special Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is not a special sin. For
scandal is "something said or done less rightly." But this applies to
every kind of sin. Therefore every sin is a scandal, and
consequently, scandal is not a special sin.

Obj. 2: Further, every special kind of sin, or every special kind of
injustice, may be found separately from other kinds, as stated in
_Ethic._ v, 3, 5. But scandal is not to be found separately from
other sins. Therefore it is not a special kind of sin.

Obj. 3: Further, every special sin is constituted by something which
specifies the moral act. But the notion of scandal consists in its
being something done in the presence of others: and the fact of a sin
being committed openly, though it is an aggravating circumstance,
does not seem to constitute the species of a sin. Therefore scandal
is not a special sin.

_On the contrary,_ A special virtue has a special sin opposed to it.
But scandal is opposed to a special virtue, viz. charity. For it is
written (Rom. 14:15): "If, because of thy meat, thy brother be
grieved, thou walkest not now according to charity." Therefore
scandal is a special sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), scandal is twofold, active
and passive. Passive scandal cannot be a special sin, because through
another's word or deed a man may fall into any kind of sin: and the
fact that a man takes occasion to sin from another's word or deed,
does not constitute a special kind of sin, because it does not imply
a special deformity in opposition to a special virtue.

On the other hand, active scandal may be understood in two ways,
directly and accidentally. The scandal is accidental when it is
beside the agent's intention, as when a man does not intend, by his
inordinate deed or word, to occasion another's spiritual downfall,
but merely to satisfy his own will. In such a case even active
scandal is not a special sin, because a species is not constituted by
that which is accidental.

Active scandal is direct when a man intends, by his inordinate word
or deed, to draw another into sin, and then it becomes a special kind
of sin on account of the intention of a special kind of end, because
moral actions take their species from their end, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, AA. 4, 6). Hence, just as theft and murder
are special kinds of sin, on account of their denoting the intention
of doing a special injury to one's neighbor: so too, scandal is a
special kind of sin, because thereby a man intends a special harm to
his neighbor, and it is directly opposed to fraternal correction,
whereby a man intends the removal of a special kind of harm.

Reply Obj. 1: Any sin may be the matter of active scandal, but it may
derive the formal aspect of a special sin from the end intended, as
stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: Active scandal can be found separate from other sins,
as when a man scandalizes his neighbor by a deed which is not a sin
in itself, but has an appearance of evil.

Reply Obj. 3: Scandal does not derive the species of a special sin
from the circumstance in question, but from the intention of the end,
as stated above.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 4]

Whether Scandal Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is a mortal sin. For every
sin that is contrary to charity is a mortal sin, as stated above (Q.
24, A. 12; Q. 35, A. 3). But scandal is contrary to charity, as
stated above (AA. 2, 3). Therefore scandal is a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, no sin, save mortal sin, deserves the punishment of
eternal damnation. But scandal deserves the punishment of eternal
damnation, according to Matt. 18:6: "He that shall scandalize one of
these little ones, that believe in Me, it were better for him that a
mill-stone should be hanged about his neck, and that he should be
drowned in the depth of the sea." For, as Jerome says on this
passage, "it is much better to receive a brief punishment for a
fault, than to await everlasting torments." Therefore scandal is a
mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, every sin committed against God is a mortal sin,
because mortal sin alone turns man away from God. Now scandal is a
sin against God, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 8:12): "When you wound
the weak conscience of the brethren [*Vulg.: 'When you sin thus
against the brethren and wound their weak conscience'], you sin
against Christ." Therefore scandal is always a mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ It may be a venial sin to lead a person into
venial sin: and yet this would be to give scandal. Therefore scandal
may be a venial sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), scandal denotes a stumbling
whereby a person is disposed to a spiritual downfall. Consequently
passive scandal may sometimes be a venial sin, when it consists in a
stumbling and nothing more; for instance, when a person is disturbed
by a movement of venial sin occasioned by another's inordinate word
or deed: while sometimes it is a mortal sin, when the stumbling
results in a downfall, for instance, when a person goes so far as to
commit a mortal sin through another's inordinate word or deed.

Active scandal, if it be accidental, may sometimes be a venial sin;
for instance, when, through a slight indiscretion, a person either
commits a venial sin, or does something that is not a sin in itself,
but has some appearance of evil. On the other hand, it is sometimes a
mortal sin, either because a person commits a mortal sin, or because
he has such contempt for his neighbor's spiritual welfare that he
declines, for the sake of procuring it, to forego doing what he
wishes to do. But in the case of active direct scandal, as when a
person intends to lead another into sin, if he intends to lead him
into mortal sin, his own sin will be mortal; and in like manner if he
intends by committing a mortal sin himself, to lead another into
venial sin; whereas if he intends, by committing a venial sin, to
lead another into venial sin, there will be a venial sin of scandal.

And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 5]

Whether Passive Scandal May Happen Even to the Perfect?

Objection 1: It would seem that passive scandal may happen even to
the perfect. For Christ was supremely perfect: and yet He said to
Peter (Matt. 16:23): "Thou art a scandal to Me." Much more therefore
can other perfect men suffer scandal.

Obj. 2: Further, scandal denotes an obstacle which is put in a
person's spiritual way. Now even perfect men can be hindered in their
progress along the spiritual way, according to 1 Thess. 2:18: "We
would have come to you, I Paul indeed, once and again; but Satan hath
hindered us." Therefore even perfect men can suffer scandal.

Obj. 3: Further, even perfect men are liable to venial sins,
according to 1 John 1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive
ourselves." Now passive scandal is not always a mortal sin, but is
sometimes venial, as stated above (A. 4). Therefore passive scandal
may be found in perfect men.

_On the contrary,_ Jerome, in commenting on Matt. 18:6, "He that
shall scandalize one of these little ones," says: "Observe that it is
the little one that is scandalized, for the elders do not take
scandal."

_I answer that,_ Passive scandal implies that the mind of the person
who takes scandal is unsettled in its adherence to good. Now no man
can be unsettled, who adheres firmly to something immovable. The
elders, i.e. the perfect, adhere to God alone, Whose goodness is
unchangeable, for though they adhere to their superiors, they do so
only in so far as these adhere to Christ, according to 1 Cor. 4:16:
"Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ." Wherefore, however
much others may appear to them to conduct themselves ill in word or
deed, they themselves do not stray from their righteousness,
according to Ps. 124:1: "They that trust in the Lord shall be as
Mount Sion: he shall not be moved for ever that dwelleth in
Jerusalem." Therefore scandal is not found in those who adhere to God
perfectly by love, according to Ps. 118:165: "Much peace have they
that love Thy law, and to them there is no stumbling-block
(_scandalum_)."

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 2, ad 2), in this passage, scandal
is used in a broad sense, to denote any kind of hindrance. Hence Our
Lord said to Peter: "Thou art a scandal to Me," because he was
endeavoring to weaken Our Lord's purpose of undergoing His Passion.

Reply Obj. 2: Perfect men may be hindered in the performance of
external actions. But they are not hindered by the words or deeds of
others, from tending to God in the internal acts of the will,
according to Rom. 8:38, 39: "Neither death, nor life . . . shall be
able to separate us from the love of God."

Reply Obj. 3: Perfect men sometimes fall into venial sins through the
weakness of the flesh; but they are not scandalized (taking scandal
in its true sense), by the words or deeds of others, although there
can be an approach to scandal in them, according to Ps. 72:2: "My
feet were almost moved."
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 6]

Whether Active Scandal Can Be Found in the Perfect?

Objection 1: It would seem that active scandal can be found in the
perfect. For passion is the effect of action. Now some are
scandalized passively by the words or deeds of the perfect, according
to Matt. 15:12: "Dost thou know that the Pharisees, when they heard
this word, were scandalized?" Therefore active scandal can be found
in the perfect.

Obj. 2: Further, Peter, after receiving the Holy Ghost, was in the
state of the perfect. Yet afterwards he scandalized the gentiles: for
it is written (Gal. 2:14): "When I saw that they walked not uprightly
unto the truth of the Gospel, I said to Cephas," i.e. Peter, "before
them all: If thou being a Jew, livest after the manner of the
gentiles, and not as the Jews do, how dost thou compel the gentiles
to live as do the Jews?" Therefore active scandal can be in the
perfect.

Obj. 3: Further, active scandal is sometimes a venial sin. But venial
sins may be in perfect men. Therefore active scandal may be in
perfect men.

_On the contrary,_ Active scandal is more opposed to perfection, than
passive scandal. But passive scandal cannot be in the perfect. Much
less, therefore, can active scandal be in them.

_I answer that,_ Active scandal, properly so called, occurs when a
man says or does a thing which in itself is of a nature to occasion
another's spiritual downfall, and that is only when what he says or
does is inordinate. Now it belongs to the perfect to direct all their
actions according to the rule of reason, as stated in 1 Cor. 14:40:
"Let all things be done decently and according to order"; and they
are careful to do this in those matters chiefly wherein not only
would they do wrong, but would also be to others an occasion of
wrongdoing. And if indeed they fail in this moderation in such words
or deeds as come to the knowledge of others, this has its origin in
human weakness wherein they fall short of perfection. Yet they do not
fall short so far as to stray far from the order of reason, but only
a little and in some slight matter: and this is not so grave that
anyone can reasonably take therefrom an occasion for committing sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Passive scandal is always due to some active scandal;
yet this active scandal is not always in another, but in the very
person who is scandalized, because, to wit, he scandalizes himself.

Reply Obj. 2: In the opinion of Augustine (Ep. xxviii, xl, lxxxii)
and of Paul also, Peter sinned and was to be blamed, in withdrawing
from the gentiles in order to avoid the scandal of the Jews, because
he did this somewhat imprudently, so that the gentiles who had been
converted to the faith were scandalized. Nevertheless Peter's action
was not so grave a sin as to give others sufficient ground for
scandal. Hence they were guilty of passive scandal, while there was
no active scandal in Peter.

Reply Obj. 3: The venial sins of the perfect consist chiefly in
sudden movements, which being hidden cannot give scandal. If,
however, they commit any venial sins even in their external words or
deeds, these are so slight as to be insufficient in themselves to
give scandal.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 7]

Whether Spiritual Goods Should Be Foregone on Account of Scandal?

Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual goods ought to be foregone
on account of scandal. For Augustine (Contra Ep. Parmen. iii, 2)
teaches that "punishment for sin should cease, when the peril of
schism is feared." But punishment of sins is a spiritual good, since
it is an act of justice. Therefore a spiritual good is to be foregone
on account of scandal.

Obj. 2: Further, the Sacred Doctrine is a most spiritual thing. Yet
one ought to desist therefrom on account of scandal, according to
Matt. 7:6: "Give not that which is holy to dogs, neither cast ye your
pearls before swine lest . . . turning upon you, they tear you."
Therefore a spiritual good should be foregone on account of scandal.

Obj. 3: Further, since fraternal correction is an act of charity, it
is a spiritual good. Yet sometimes it is omitted out of charity, in
order to avoid giving scandal to others, as Augustine observes (De
Civ. Dei i, 9). Therefore a spiritual good should be foregone on
account of scandal.

Obj. 4: Further, Jerome [*Hugh de S. Cher., In Matth. xviii; in Luc.
xvii, 2] says that in order to avoid scandal we should forego
whatever it is possible to omit without prejudice to the threefold
truth, i.e. "the truth of life, of justice and of doctrine." Now the
observance of the counsels, and the bestowal of alms may often be
omitted without prejudice to the aforesaid threefold truth, else
whoever omitted them would always be guilty of sin, and yet such
things are the greatest of spiritual works. Therefore spiritual works
should be omitted on account of scandal.

Obj. 5: Further, the avoidance of any sin is a spiritual good, since
any sin brings spiritual harm to the sinner. Now it seems that one
ought sometimes to commit a venial sin in order to avoid scandalizing
one's neighbor, for instance, when by sinning venially, one would
prevent someone else from committing a mortal sin: because one is
bound to hinder the damnation of one's neighbor as much as one can
without prejudice to one's own salvation, which is not precluded by a
venial sin. Therefore one ought to forego a spiritual good in order
to avoid scandal.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. Super Ezech. vii): "If people
are scandalized at the truth, it is better to allow the birth of
scandal, than to abandon the truth." Now spiritual goods belong,
above all others, to the truth. Therefore spiritual goods are not to
be foregone on account of scandal.

_I answer that,_ Whereas scandal is twofold, active and passive, the
present question does not apply to active scandal, for since active
scandal is "something said or done less rightly," nothing ought to be
done that implies active scandal. The question does, however, apply
to passive scandal, and accordingly we have to see what ought to be
foregone in order to avoid scandal. Now a distinction must be made in
spiritual goods. For some of them are necessary for salvation, and
cannot be foregone without mortal sin: and it is evident that no man
ought to commit a mortal sin, in order to prevent another from
sinning, because according to the order of charity, a man ought to
love his own spiritual welfare more than another's. Therefore one
ought not to forego that which is necessary for salvation, in order
to avoid giving scandal.

Again a distinction seems necessary among spiritual things which are
not necessary for salvation: because the scandal which arises from
such things sometimes proceeds from malice, for instance when a man
wishes to hinder those spiritual goods by stirring up scandal. This
is the "scandal of the Pharisees," who were scandalized at Our Lord's
teaching: and Our Lord teaches (Matt. 15:14) that we ought to treat
such like scandal with contempt. Sometimes scandal proceeds from
weakness or ignorance, and such is the "scandal of little ones." In
order to avoid this kind of scandal, spiritual goods ought to be
either concealed, or sometimes even deferred (if this can be done
without incurring immediate danger), until the matter being explained
the scandal cease. If, however, the scandal continue after the matter
has been explained, it would seem to be due to malice, and then it
would no longer be right to forego that spiritual good in order to
avoid such like scandal.

Reply Obj. 1: In the infliction of punishment it is not the
punishment itself that is the end in view, but its medicinal
properties in checking sin; wherefore punishment partakes of the
nature of justice, in so far as it checks sin. But if it is evident
that the infliction of punishment will result in more numerous and
more grievous sins being committed, the infliction of punishment will
no longer be a part of justice. It is in this sense that Augustine is
speaking, when, to wit, the excommunication of a few threatens to
bring about the danger of a schism, for in that case it would be
contrary to the truth of justice to pronounce excommunication.

Reply Obj. 2: With regard to a man's doctrine two points must be
considered, namely, the truth which is taught, and the act of
teaching. The first of these is necessary for salvation, to wit, that
he whose duty it is to teach should not teach what is contrary to the
truth, and that he should teach the truth according to the
requirements of times and persons: wherefore on no account ought he
to suppress the truth and teach error in order to avoid any scandal
that might ensue. But the act itself of teaching is one of the
spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 2), and so the same
is to be said of it as of the other works of mercy, of which we shall
speak further on (ad 4).

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 33, A. 1), fraternal correction
aims at the correction of a brother, wherefore it is to be reckoned
among spiritual goods in so far as this end can be obtained, which is
not the case if the brother be scandalized through being corrected.
And so, if the correction be omitted in order to avoid scandal, no
spiritual good is foregone.

Reply Obj. 4: The truth of life, of doctrine, and of justice
comprises not only whatever is necessary for salvation, but also
whatever is a means of obtaining salvation more perfectly, according
to 1 Cor. 12:31: "Be zealous for the better gifts." Wherefore neither
the counsels nor even the works of mercy are to be altogether omitted
in order to avoid scandal; but sometimes they should be concealed or
deferred, on account of the scandal of the little ones, as stated
above. Sometimes, however, the observance of the counsels and the
fulfilment of the works of mercy are necessary for salvation. This
may be seen in the case of those who have vowed to keep the counsels,
and of those whose duty it is to relieve the wants of others, either
in temporal matters (as by feeding the hungry), or in spiritual
matters (as by instructing the ignorant), whether such duties arise
from their being enjoined as in the case of prelates, or from the
need on the part of the person in want; and then the same applies to
these things as to others that are necessary for salvation.

Reply Obj. 5: Some have said that one ought to commit a venial sin in
order to avoid scandal. But this implies a contradiction, since if it
ought to be done, it is no longer evil or sinful, for a sin cannot be
a matter of choice. It may happen however that, on account of some
circumstance, something is not a venial sin, though it would be were
it not for that circumstance: thus an idle word is a venial sin, when
it is uttered uselessly; yet if it be uttered for a reasonable cause,
it is neither idle nor sinful. And though venial sin does not deprive
a man of grace which is his means of salvation, yet, in so far as it
disposes him to mortal sin, it tends to the loss of salvation.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 43, Art. 8]

Whether Temporal Goods Should Be Foregone on Account of Scandal?

Objection 1: It would seem that temporal goods should be foregone on
account of scandal. For we ought to love our neighbor's spiritual
welfare which is hindered by scandal, more than any temporal goods
whatever. But we forego what we love less for the sake of what we
love more. Therefore we should forego temporal goods in order to
avoid scandalizing our neighbor.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Jerome's rule [*Cf. A. 7, Obj. 4],
whatever can be foregone without prejudice to the threefold truth,
should be omitted in order to avoid scandal. Now temporal goods can
be foregone without prejudice to the threefold truth. Therefore they
should be foregone in order to avoid scandal.

Obj. 3: Further, no temporal good is more necessary than food. But we
ought to forego taking food on account of scandal, according to Rom.
14:15: "Destroy not him with thy meat for whom Christ died." Much
more therefore should all other temporal goods be foregone on account
of scandal.

Obj. 4: Further, the most fitting way of safeguarding and recovering
temporal goods is the court of justice. But it is unlawful to have
recourse to justice, especially if scandal ensues: for it is written
(Matt. 5:40): "If a man will contend with thee in judgment, and take
away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him"; and (1 Cor. 6:7):
"Already indeed there is plainly a fault among you, that you have
lawsuits one with another. Why do you not rather take wrong? why do
you not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?" Therefore it seems
that we ought to forego temporal goods on account of scandal.

Obj. 5: Further, we ought, seemingly, to forego least of all those
temporal goods which are connected with spiritual goods: and yet we
ought to forego them on account of scandal. For the Apostle while
sowing spiritual things did not accept a temporal stipend lest he
"should give any hindrance to the Gospel of Christ" as we read 1 Cor.
9:12. For a like reason the Church does not demand tithes in certain
countries, in order to avoid scandal. Much more, therefore, ought we
to forego other temporal goods in order to avoid scandal.

_On the contrary,_ Blessed Thomas of Canterbury demanded the
restitution of Church property, notwithstanding that the king took
scandal from his doing so.

_I answer that,_ A distinction must be made in temporal goods: for
either they are ours, or they are consigned to us to take care of
them for someone else; thus the goods of the Church are consigned to
prelates, and the goods of the community are entrusted to all such
persons as have authority over the common weal. In this latter case
the care of such things (as of things held in deposit) devolves of
necessity on those persons to whom they are entrusted, wherefore,
even as other things that are necessary for salvation, they are not
to be foregone on account of scandal. On the other hand, as regards
those temporalities of which we have the dominion, sometimes, on
account of scandal, we are bound to forego them, and sometimes we are
not so bound, whether we forego them by giving them up, if we have
them in our possession, or by omitting to claim them, if they are in
the possession of others. For if the scandal arise therefrom through
the ignorance or weakness of others (in which case, as stated above,
A. 7, it is scandal of the little ones) we must either forego such
temporalities altogether, or the scandal must be abated by some other
means, namely, by some kind of admonition. Hence Augustine says (De
Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 20): "Thou shouldst give so as to injure
neither thyself nor another, as much as thou canst lend, and if thou
refusest what is asked, thou must yet be just to him, indeed thou
wilt give him something better than he asks, if thou reprove him that
asks unjustly." Sometimes, however, scandal arises from malice. This
is scandal of the Pharisees: and we ought not to forego temporal
goods for the sake of those who stir up scandals of this kind, for
this would both be harmful to the common good, since it would give
wicked men an opportunity of plunder, and would be injurious to the
plunderers themselves, who would remain in sin as long as they were
in possession of another's property. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxi,
13): "Sometimes we ought to suffer those who rob us of our
temporalities, while sometimes we should resist them, as far as
equity allows, in the hope not only that we may safeguard our
property, but also lest those who take what is not theirs may lose
themselves."

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2: If it were permissible for wicked men to rob other
people of their property, this would tend to the detriment of the
truth of life and justice. Therefore we are not always bound to
forego our temporal goods in order to avoid scandal.

Reply Obj. 3: The Apostle had no intention of counselling total
abstinence from food on account of scandal, because our welfare
requires that we should take food: but he intended to counsel
abstinence from a particular kind of food, in order to avoid scandal,
according to 1 Cor. 8:13: "I will never eat flesh, lest I should
scandalize my brother."

Reply Obj. 4: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19)
this precept of Our Lord is to be understood of the preparedness of
the mind, namely, that man should be prepared, if it be expedient, to
suffer being harmed or defrauded, rather than go to law. But
sometimes it is not expedient, as stated above (ad 2). The same
applies to the saying of the Apostle.

Reply Obj. 5: The scandal which the Apostle avoided, arose from an
error of the gentiles who were not used to this payment. Hence it
behooved him to forego it for the time being, so that they might be
taught first of all that such a payment was a duty. For a like reason
the Church refrains from demanding tithes in those countries where it
is not customary to pay them.
_______________________

QUESTION 44

OF THE PRECEPTS OF CHARITY
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider the Precepts of Charity, under which there are
eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether precepts should be given about charity?

(2) Whether there should be one or two?

(3) Whether two suffice?

(4) Whether it is fittingly prescribed that we should love God, "with
thy whole heart"?

(5) Whether it is fittingly added: "With thy whole mind," etc.?

(6) Whether it is possible to fulfil this precept in this life?

(7) Of the precept: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself";

(8) Whether the order of charity is included in the precept?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 1]

Whether Any Precept Should Be Given About Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that no precept should be given about
charity. For charity imposes the mode on all acts of virtue, since it
is the form of the virtues as stated above (Q. 23, A. 8), while the
precepts are about the virtues themselves. Now, according to the
common saying, the mode is not included in the precept. Therefore no
precepts should be given about charity.

Obj. 2: Further, charity, which "is poured forth in our hearts by the
Holy Ghost" (Rom. 5:5), makes us free, since "where the Spirit of the
Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. 3:17). Now the obligation that
arises from a precept is opposed to liberty, since it imposes a
necessity. Therefore no precept should be given about charity.

Obj. 3: Further, charity is the foremost among all the virtues, to
which the precepts are directed, as shown above (I-II, Q. 90, A. 2;
Q. 100, A. 9). If, therefore, any precepts were given about charity,
they should have a place among the chief precepts which are those of
the decalogue. But they have no place there. Therefore no precepts
should be given about charity.

_On the contrary,_ Whatever God requires of us is included in a
precept. Now God requires that man should love Him, according to
Deut. 10:12. Therefore it behooved precepts to be given about the
love of charity, which is the love of God.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 16, A. 1; I-II, Q. 99, A. 1), a
precept implies the notion of something due. Hence a thing is a
matter of precept, in so far as it is something due. Now a thing is
due in two ways, for its own sake, and for the sake of something
else. In every affair, it is the end that is due for its own sake,
because it has the character of a good for its own sake: while that
which is directed to the end is due for the sake of something else:
thus for a physician, it is due for its own sake, that he should
heal, while it is due for the sake of something else that he should
give a medicine in order to heal. Now the end of the spiritual life
is that man be united to God, and this union is effected by charity,
while all things pertaining to the spiritual life are ordained to
this union, as to their end. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5):
"The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good
conscience, and an unfeigned faith." For all the virtues, about whose
acts the precepts are given, are directed either to the freeing of
the heart from the whirl of the passions--such are the virtues that
regulate the passions--or at least to the possession of a good
conscience--such are the virtues that regulate operations--or to the
having of a right faith--such are those which pertain to the worship
of God: and these three things are required of man that he may love
God. For an impure heart is withdrawn from loving God, on account of
the passion that inclines it to earthly things; an evil conscience
gives man a horror for God's justice, through fear of His
punishments; and an untrue faith draws man's affections to an untrue
representation of God, and separates him from the truth of God. Now
in every genus that which is for its own sake takes precedence of
that which is for the sake of another, wherefore the greatest precept
is that of charity, as stated in Matt. 22:39.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (I-II, Q. 100, A. 10) when we were
treating of the commandments, the mode of love does not come under
those precepts which are about the other acts of virtue: for
instance, this precept, "Honor thy father and thy mother," does not
prescribe that this should be done out of charity. The act of love
does, however, fall under special precepts.

Reply Obj. 2: The obligation of a precept is not opposed to liberty,
except in one whose mind is averted from that which is prescribed, as
may be seen in those who keep the precepts through fear alone. But
the precept of love cannot be fulfilled save of one's own will,
wherefore it is not opposed to charity.

Reply Obj. 3: All the precepts of the decalogue are directed to the
love of God and of our neighbor: and therefore the precepts of
charity had not to be enumerated among the precepts of the decalogue,
since they are included in all of them.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 2]

Whether There Should Have Been Given Two Precepts of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that there should not have been given two
precepts of charity. For the precepts of the Law are directed to
virtue, as stated above (A. 1, Obj. 3). Now charity is one virtue, as
shown above (Q. 33, A. 5). Therefore only one precept of charity
should have been given.

Obj. 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22, 27),
charity loves none but God in our neighbor. Now we are sufficiently
directed to love God by the precept, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy
God." Therefore there was no need to add the precept about loving our
neighbor.

Obj. 3: Further, different sins are opposed to different precepts.
But it is not a sin to put aside the love of our neighbor, provided
we put not aside the love of God; indeed, it is written (Luke 15:26):
"If any man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother . . . he
cannot be My disciple." Therefore the precept of the love of God is
not distinct from the precept of the love of our neighbor.

Obj. 4: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 13:8): "He that loveth his
neighbor hath fulfilled the Law." But a law is not fulfilled unless
all its precepts be observed. Therefore all the precepts are included
in the love of our neighbor: and consequently the one precept of the
love of our neighbor suffices. Therefore there should not be two
precepts of charity.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 John 4:21): "This commandment we
have from God, that he who loveth God, love also his brother."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 91, A. 3; Q. 94, A. 2)
when we were treating of the commandments, the precepts are to the
Law what propositions are to speculative sciences, for in these
latter, the conclusions are virtually contained in the first
principles. Hence whoever knows the principles as to their entire
virtual extent has no need to have the conclusions put separately
before him. Since, however, some who know the principles are unable
to consider all that is virtually contained therein, it is necessary,
for their sake, that scientific conclusions should be traced to their
principles. Now in practical matters wherein the precepts of the Law
direct us, the end has the character of principle, as stated above
(Q. 23, A. 7, ad 2; Q. 26, A. 1, ad 1): and the love of God is the
end to which the love of our neighbor is directed. Therefore it
behooved us to receive precepts not only of the love of God but also
of the love of our neighbor, on account of those who are less
intelligent, who do not easily understand that one of these precepts
is included in the other.

Reply Obj. 1: Although charity is one virtue, yet it has two acts,
one of which is directed to the other as to its end. Now precepts are
given about acts of virtue, and so there had to be several precepts
of charity.

Reply Obj. 2: God is loved in our neighbor, as the end is loved in
that which is directed to the end; and yet there was need for an
explicit precept about both, for the reason given above.

Reply Obj. 3: The means derive their goodness from their relation to
the end, and accordingly aversion from the means derives its malice
from the same source and from no other.

Reply Obj. 4: Love of our neighbor includes love of God, as the end
is included in the means, and vice versa: and yet it behooved each
precept to be given explicitly, for the reason given above.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 3]

Whether Two Precepts of Charity Suffice?

Objection 1: It would seem that two precepts of charity do not
suffice. For precepts are given about acts of virtue. Now acts are
distinguished by their objects. Since, then, man is bound to love
four things out of charity, namely, God, himself, his neighbor and
his own body, as shown above (Q. 25, A. 12; Q. 26), it seems that
there ought to be four precepts of charity, so that two are not
sufficient.

Obj. 2: Further, love is not the only act of charity, but also joy,
peace and beneficence. But precepts should be given about the acts of
the virtues. Therefore two precepts of charity do not suffice.

Obj. 3: Further, virtue consists not only in doing good but also in
avoiding evil. Now we are led by the positive precepts to do good,
and by the negative precepts to avoid evil. Therefore there ought to
have been not only positive, but also negative precepts about
charity; and so two precepts of charity are not sufficient.

_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 22:40): "On these two
commandments dependeth the whole Law and the prophets."

_I answer that,_ Charity, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1), is a kind of
friendship. Now friendship is between one person and another,
wherefore Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xvii): "Charity is not possible
between less than two": and it has been explained how one may love
oneself out of charity (Q. 25, A. 4). Now since good is the object of
dilection and love, and since good is either an end or a means, it is
fitting that there should be two precepts of charity, one whereby we
are induced to love God as our end, and another whereby we are led to
love our neighbor for God's sake, as for the sake of our end.

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23), "though
four things are to be loved out of charity, there was no need of a
precept as regards the second and fourth," i.e. love of oneself and
of one's own body. "For however much a man may stray from the truth,
the love of himself and of his own body always remains in him." And
yet the mode of this love had to be prescribed to man, namely, that
he should love himself and his own body in an ordinate manner, and
this is done by his loving God and his neighbor.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 28, A. 4; Q. 29, A. 3), the other
acts of charity result from the act of love as effects from their
cause. Hence the precepts of love virtually include the precepts
about the other acts. And yet we find that, for the sake of the
laggards, special precepts were given about each act--about joy
(Phil. 4:4): "Rejoice in the Lord always"--about peace (Heb. 12:14):
"Follow peace with all men"--about beneficence (Gal. 6:10): "Whilst
we have time, let us work good to all men"--and Holy Writ contains
precepts about each of the parts of beneficence, as may be seen by
anyone who considers the matter carefully.

Reply Obj. 3: To do good is more than to avoid evil, and therefore
the positive precepts virtually include the negative precepts.
Nevertheless we find explicit precepts against the vices contrary to
charity: for, against hatred it is written (Lev. 12:17): "Thou shalt
not hate thy brother in thy heart"; against sloth (Ecclus. 6:26): "Be
not grieved with her bands"; against envy (Gal. 5:26): "Let us not be
made desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one
another"; against discord (1 Cor. 1:10): "That you all speak the same
thing, and that there be no schisms among you"; and against scandal
(Rom. 14:13): "That you put not a stumbling-block or a scandal in
your brother's way."
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 4]

Whether It Is Fittingly Commanded That Man Should Love God with His
Whole Heart?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is unfittingly commanded that man
should love God with his whole heart. For the mode of a virtuous act
is not a matter of precept, as shown above (A. 1, ad 1; I-II, Q. 100,
A. 9). Now the words "with thy whole heart" signify the mode of the
love of God. Therefore it is unfittingly commanded that man should
love God with his whole heart.

Obj. 2: Further, "A thing is whole and perfect when it lacks nothing"
(Phys. iii, 6). If therefore it is a matter of precept that God be
loved with the whole heart, whoever does something not pertaining to
the love of God, acts counter to the precept, and consequently sins
mortally. Now a venial sin does not pertain to the love of God.
Therefore a venial sin is a mortal sin, which is absurd.

Obj. 3: Further, to love God with one's whole heart belongs to
perfection, since according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, text. 64),
"to be whole is to be perfect." But that which belongs to perfection
is not a matter of precept, but a matter of counsel. Therefore we
ought not to be commanded to love God with our whole heart.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the
Lord thy God with thy whole heart."

_I answer that,_ Since precepts are given about acts of virtue, an
act is a matter of precept according as it is an act of virtue. Now
it is requisite for an act of virtue that not only should it fall on
its own matter, but also that it should be endued with its due
circumstances, whereby it is adapted to that matter. But God is to be
loved as the last end, to which all things are to be referred.
Therefore some kind of totality was to be indicated in connection
with the precept of the love of God.

Reply Obj. 1: The commandment that prescribes an act of virtue does
not prescribe the mode which that virtue derives from another and
higher virtue, but it does prescribe the mode which belongs to its
own proper virtue, and this mode is signified in the words "with thy
whole heart."

Reply Obj. 2: To love God with one's whole heart has a twofold
signification. First, actually, so that a man's whole heart be always
actually directed to God: this is the perfection of heaven. Secondly,
in the sense that a man's whole heart be habitually directed to God,
so that it consent to nothing contrary to the love of God, and this
is the perfection of the way. Venial sin is not contrary to this
latter perfection, because it does not destroy the habit of charity,
since it does not tend to a contrary object, but merely hinders the
use of charity.

Reply Obj. 3: That perfection of charity to which the counsels are
directed, is between the two perfections mentioned in the preceding
reply: and it consists in man renouncing, as much as possible,
temporal things, even such as are lawful, because they occupy the
mind and hinder the actual movement of the heart towards God.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 5]

Whether to the Words, "Thou Shalt Love the Lord Thy God with Thy
Whole Heart," It Was Fitting to Add "and with Thy Whole Soul, and
with Thy Whole Strength"?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was unfitting to the words, "Thou
shalt love the Lord thy God, with thy whole heart," to add, "and with
thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength" (Deut. 6:5). For heart
does not mean here a part of the body, since to love God is not a
bodily action: and therefore heart is to be taken here in a spiritual
sense. Now the heart understood spiritually is either the soul itself
or part of the soul. Therefore it is superfluous to mention both
heart and soul.

Obj. 2: Further, a man's strength whether spiritual or corporal
depends on the heart. Therefore after the words, "Thou shalt love the
Lord thy God with thy whole heart," it was unnecessary to add, "with
all thy strength."

Obj. 3: Further, in Matt. 22:37 we read: "With all thy mind," which
words do not occur here. Therefore it seems that this precept is
unfittingly worded in Deut. 6.

On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture.

_I answer that,_ This precept is differently worded in various
places: for, as we said in the first objection, in Deut. 6 three
points are mentioned: "with thy whole heart," and "with thy whole
soul," and "with thy whole strength." In Matt. 22 we find two of
these mentioned, viz. "with thy whole heart" and "with thy whole
soul," while "with thy whole strength" is omitted, but "with thy
whole mind" is added. Yet in Mark 12 we find all four, viz. "with thy
whole heart," and "with thy whole soul," and "with thy whole mind,"
and "with thy whole force" which is the same as "strength." Moreover,
these four are indicated in Luke 10, where in place of "strength" or
"force" we read "with all thy might." [*St. Thomas is explaining the
Latin text which reads "ex tota fortitudine tua" (Deut.), "ex tota
virtue tua" (Mk.), and "ex omnibus viribus tuis" (Luke), although the
Greek in all three cases has _ex holes tes ischyos_, which the Douay
renders "with thy whole strength."]

Accordingly these four have to be explained, since the fact that one
of them is omitted here or there is due to one implying another. We
must therefore observe that love is an act of the will which is here
denoted by the "heart," because just as the bodily heart is the
principle of all the movements of the body, so too the will,
especially as regards the intention of the last end which is the
object of charity, is the principle of all the movements of the soul.
Now there are three principles of action that are moved by the will,
namely, the intellect which is signified by "the mind," the lower
appetitive power, signified by "the soul"; and the exterior executive
power signified by "strength," "force" or "might." Accordingly we are
commanded to direct our whole intention to God, and this is signified
by the words "with thy whole heart"; to submit our intellect to God,
and this is expressed in the words "with thy whole mind"; to regulate
our appetite according to God, in the words "with thy whole soul";
and to obey God in our external actions, and this is to love God with
our whole "strength," "force" or "might."

Chrysostom [*The quotation is from an anonymous author's unfinished
work (Opus imperf. Hom. xlii, in Matth.) which is included in
Chrysostom's works], on the other hand, takes "heart" and "soul" in
the contrary sense; and Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22) refers
"heart" to the thought, "soul" to the manner of life, and "mind" to
the intellect. Again some explain "with thy whole heart" as denoting
the intellect, "with thy whole soul" as signifying the will, "with
thy mind" as pointing to the memory. And again, according to Gregory
of Nyssa (De Hom. Opif. viii), "heart" signifies the vegetative soul,
"soul" the sensitive, and "mind" the intellective soul, because our
nourishment, sensation, and understanding ought all to be referred by
us to God.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 6]

Whether It Is Possible in This Life to Fulfil This Precept of the
Love of God?

Objection 1: It would seem that in this life it is possible to fulfil
this precept of the love of God. For according to Jerome [*Pelagius,
Exposit. Cath. Fid.] "accursed is he who says that Cod has commanded
anything impossible." But God gave this commandment, as is clear from
Deut. 6:5. Therefore it is possible to fulfil this precept in this
life.

Obj. 2: Further, whoever does not fulfil a precept sins mortally,
since according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) sin is nothing else than
"a transgression of the Divine Law, and disobedience of the heavenly
commandments." If therefore this precept cannot be fulfilled by
wayfarers, it follows that in this life no man can be without mortal
sin, and this is against the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 1:8):
"(Who also) will confirm you unto the end without crime," and (1 Tim.
3:10): "Let them minister, having no crime."

Obj. 3: Further, precepts are given in order to direct man in the way
of salvation, according to Ps. 18:9: "The commandment of the Lord is
lightsome, enlightening the eyes." Now it is useless to direct anyone
to what is impossible. Therefore it is not impossible to fulfill this
precept in this life.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii): "In the
fulness of heavenly charity this precept will be fulfilled: Thou
shalt love the Lord thy God," etc. For as long as any carnal
concupiscence remains, that can be restrained by continence, man
cannot love God with all his heart.

_I answer that,_ A precept can be fulfilled in two ways; perfectly,
and imperfectly. A precept is fulfilled perfectly, when the end
intended by the author of the precept is reached; yet it is
fulfilled, imperfectly however, when although the end intended by its
author is not reached, nevertheless the order to that end is not
departed from. Thus if the commander of an army order his soldiers to
fight, his command will be perfectly obeyed by those who fight and
conquer the foe, which is the commander's intention; yet it is
fulfilled, albeit imperfectly, by those who fight without gaining the
victory, provided they do nothing contrary to military discipline.
Now God intends by this precept that man should be entirely united to
Him, and this will be realized in heaven, when God will be "all in
all," according to 1 Cor. 15:28. Hence this precept will be observed
fully and perfectly in heaven; yet it is fulfilled, though
imperfectly, on the way. Nevertheless on the way one man will fulfil
it more perfectly than another, and so much the more, as he
approaches by some kind of likeness to the perfection of heaven.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument proves that the precept can be fulfilled
after a fashion on the way, but not perfectly.

Reply Obj. 2: Even as the soldier who fights legitimately without
conquering is not blamed nor deserves to be punished for this, so too
he that does not fulfil this precept on the way, but does nothing
against the love of God, does not sin mortally.

Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii), "why
should not this perfection be prescribed to man, although no man
attains it in this life? For one cannot run straight unless one knows
whither to run. And how would one know this if no precept pointed it
out."
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 7]

Whether the Precept of Love of Our Neighbor Is Fittingly Expressed?

Objection 1: It would seem that the precept of the love of our
neighbor is unfittingly expressed. For the love of charity extends to
all men, even to our enemies, as may be seen in Matt. 5:44. But the
word "neighbor" denotes a kind of "nighness" which does not seem to
exist towards all men. Therefore it seems that this precept is
unfittingly expressed.

Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) "the
origin of our friendly relations with others lies in our relation to
ourselves," whence it seems to follow that love of self is the origin
of one's love for one's neighbor. Now the principle is greater than
that which results from it. Therefore man ought not to love his
neighbor as himself.

Obj. 3: Further, man loves himself, but not his neighbor, naturally.
Therefore it is unfitting that he should be commanded to love his
neighbor as himself.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 22:39): "The second"
commandment "is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as
thyself."

_I answer that,_ This precept is fittingly expressed, for it
indicates both the reason for loving and the mode of love. The reason
for loving is indicated in the word "neighbor," because the reason
why we ought to love others out of charity is because they are nigh
to us, both as to the natural image of God, and as to the capacity
for glory. Nor does it matter whether we say "neighbor," or "brother"
according to 1 John 4:21, or "friend," according to Lev. 19:18,
because all these words express the same affinity.

The mode of love is indicated in the words "as thyself." This does
not mean that a man must love his neighbor equally as himself, but in
like manner as himself, and this in three ways. First, as regards the
end, namely, that he should love his neighbor for God's sake, even as
he loves himself for God's sake, so that his love for his neighbor is
a _holy_ love. Secondly, as regards the rule of love, namely, that a
man should not give way to his neighbor in evil, but only in good
things, even as he ought to gratify his will in good things alone, so
that his love for his neighbor may be a _righteous_ love. Thirdly, as
regards the reason for loving, namely, that a man should love his
neighbor, not for his own profit, or pleasure, but in the sense of
wishing his neighbor well, even as he wishes himself well, so that
his love for his neighbor may be a _true_ love: since when a man
loves his neighbor for his own profit or pleasure, he does not love
his neighbor truly, but loves himself.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 44, Art. 8]

Whether the Order of Charity Is Included in the Precept?

Objection 1: It would seem that the order of charity is not included
in the precept. For whoever transgresses a precept does a wrong. But
if man loves some one as much as he ought, and loves any other man
more, he wrongs no man. Therefore he does not transgress the precept.
Therefore the order of charity is not included in the precept.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is a matter of precept is sufficiently
delivered to us in Holy Writ. Now the order of charity which was
given above (Q. 26) is nowhere indicated in Holy Writ. Therefore it
is not included in the precept.

Obj. 3: Further, order implies some kind of distinction. But the love
of our neighbor is prescribed without any distinction, in the words,
"Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Therefore the order of
charity is not included in the precept.

_On the contrary,_ Whatever God works in us by His grace, He teaches
us first of all by His Law, according to Jer. 31:33: "I will give My
Law in their heart [*Vulg.: 'in their bowels, and I will write it in
their heart']." Now God causes in us the order of charity, according
to Cant. 2:4: "He set in order charity in me." Therefore the order of
charity comes under the precept of the Law.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4, ad 1), the mode which is
essential to an act of virtue comes under the precept which
prescribes that virtuous act. Now the order of charity is essential
to the virtue, since it is based on the proportion of love to the
thing beloved, as shown above (Q. 25, A. 12; Q. 26, AA. 1, 2). It is
therefore evident that the order of charity must come under the
precept.

Reply Obj. 1: A man gratifies more the person he loves more, so that
if he loved less one whom he ought to love more, he would wish to
gratify more one whom he ought to gratify less, and so he would do an
injustice to the one he ought to love more.

Reply Obj. 2: The order of those four things we have to love out of
charity is expressed in Holy Writ. For when we are commanded to love
God with our "whole heart," we are given to understand that we must
love Him above all things. When we are commanded to love our neighbor
"as ourselves," the love of self is set before love of our neighbor.
In like manner where we are commanded (1 John 3:16) "to lay down our
souls," i.e. the life of our bodies, "for the brethren," we are given
to understand that a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own
body; and again when we are commanded (Gal. 6:10) to "work good . . .
especially to those who are of the household of the faith," and when
a man is blamed (1 Tim. 5:8) if he "have not care of his own, and
especially of those of his house," it means that we ought to love
most those of our neighbors who are more virtuous or more closely
united to us.

Reply Obj. 3: It follows from the very words, "Thou shalt love thy
neighbor" that those who are nearer to us are to be loved more.
_______________________

QUESTION 45

OF THE GIFT OF WISDOM
(In Six Articles)

We must now consider the gift of wisdom which corresponds to charity;
and firstly, wisdom itself, secondly, the opposite vice. Under the
first head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether wisdom should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy
Ghost?

(2) What is its subject?

(3) Whether wisdom is only speculative or also practical?

(4) Whether the wisdom that is a gift is compatible with mortal sin?

(5) Whether it is in all those who have sanctifying grace?

(6) Which beatitude corresponds to it?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 1]

Whether Wisdom Should Be Reckoned Among the Gifts of the Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom ought not to be reckoned among
the gifts of the Holy Ghost. For the gifts are more perfect than the
virtues, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 8). Now virtue is directed
to the good alone, wherefore Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19)
that "no man makes bad use of the virtues." Much more therefore are
the gifts of the Holy Ghost directed to the good alone. But wisdom is
directed to evil also, for it is written (James 3:15) that a certain
wisdom is "earthly, sensual, devilish." Therefore wisdom should not
be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14) "wisdom is
the knowledge of Divine things." Now that knowledge of Divine things
which man can acquire by his natural endowments, belongs to the
wisdom which is an intellectual virtue, while the supernatural
knowledge of Divine things belongs to faith which is a theological
virtue, as explained above (Q. 4, A. 5; I-II, Q. 62, A. 3). Therefore
wisdom should be called a virtue rather than a gift.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Job 28:28): "Behold the fear of the
Lord, that is wisdom, and to depart from evil, that is
understanding." And in this passage according to the rendering of the
Septuagint which Augustine follows (De Trin. xii, 14; xiv, 1) we
read: "Behold piety, that is wisdom." Now both fear and piety are
gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore wisdom should not be reckoned
among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as though it were distinct from
the others.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 11:2): "The Spirit of the Lord
shall rest upon Him; the spirit of wisdom and of understanding."

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Metaph. i: 2), it
belongs to wisdom to consider the highest cause. By means of that
cause we are able to form a most certain judgment about other causes,
and according thereto all things should be set in order. Now the
highest cause may be understood in two ways, either simply or in some
particular genus. Accordingly he that knows the highest cause in any
particular genus, and by its means is able to judge and set in order
all the things that belong to that genus, is said to be wise in that
genus, for instance in medicine or architecture, according to 1 Cor.
3:10: "As a wise architect, I have laid a foundation." On the other
hand, he who knows the cause that is simply the highest, which is
God, is said to be wise simply, because he is able to judge and set
in order all things according to Divine rules.

Now man obtains this judgment through the Holy Ghost, according to 1
Cor. 2:15: "The spiritual man judgeth all things," because as stated
in the same chapter (1 Cor. 2:10), "the Spirit searcheth all things,
yea the deep things of God." Wherefore it is evident that wisdom is a
gift of the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 1: A thing is said to be good in two senses: first in the
sense that it is truly good and simply perfect, secondly, by a kind
of likeness, being perfect in wickedness; thus we speak of a good or
a perfect thief, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. v, text. 21).
And just as with regard to those things which are truly good, we find
a highest cause, namely the sovereign good which is the last end, by
knowing which, man is said to be truly wise, so too in evil things
something is to be found to which all others are to be referred as to
a last end, by knowing which, man is said to be wise unto evil doing,
according to Jer. 4:22: "They are wise to do evils, but to do good
they have no knowledge." Now whoever turns away from his due end,
must needs fix on some undue end, since every agent acts for an end.
Wherefore, if he fixes his end in external earthly things, his
"wisdom" is called "earthly," if in the goods of the body, it is
called "sensual wisdom," if in some excellence, it is called
"devilish wisdom" because it imitates the devil's pride, of which it
is written (Job 41:25): "He is king over all the children of pride."

Reply Obj. 2: The wisdom which is called a gift of the Holy Ghost,
differs from that which is an acquired intellectual virtue, for the
latter is attained by human effort, whereas the latter is "descending
from above" (James 3:15). In like manner it differs from faith, since
faith assents to the Divine truth in itself, whereas it belongs to
the gift of wisdom to judge according to the Divine truth. Hence the
gift of wisdom presupposes faith, because "a man judges well what he
knows" (Ethic. i, 3).

Reply Obj. 3: Just as piety which pertains to the worship of God is a
manifestation of faith, in so far as we make profession of faith by
worshipping God, so too, piety manifests wisdom. For this reason
piety is stated to be wisdom, and so is fear, for the same reason,
because if a man fear and worship God, this shows that he has a right
judgment about Divine things.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 2]

Whether Wisdom Is in the Intellect As Its Subject?

Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not in the intellect as its
subject. For Augustine says (Ep. cxx) that "wisdom is the charity of
God." Now charity is in the will as its subject, and not in the
intellect, as stated above (Q. 24, A. 1). Therefore wisdom is not in
the intellect as its subject.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 6:23): "The wisdom of
doctrine is according to her name," for wisdom (_sapientia_) may be
described as "sweet-tasting science (_sapida scientia_)," and this
would seem to regard the appetite, to which it belongs to taste
spiritual pleasure or sweetness. Therefore wisdom is in the appetite
rather than in the intellect.

Obj. 3: Further, the intellective power is sufficiently perfected by
the gift of understanding. Now it is superfluous to require two
things where one suffices for the purpose. Therefore wisdom is not in
the intellect.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "wisdom is
contrary to folly." But folly is in the intellect. Therefore wisdom
is also.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), wisdom denotes a certain
rectitude of judgment according to the Eternal Law. Now rectitude of
judgment is twofold: first, on account of perfect use of reason,
secondly, on account of a certain connaturality with the matter about
which one has to judge. Thus, about matters of chastity, a man after
inquiring with his reason forms a right judgment, if he has learnt
the science of morals, while he who has the habit of chastity judges
of such matters by a kind of connaturality.

Accordingly it belongs to the wisdom that is an intellectual virtue
to pronounce right judgment about Divine things after reason has made
its inquiry, but it belongs to wisdom as a gift of the Holy Ghost to
judge aright about them on account of connaturality with them: thus
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that "Hierotheus is perfect in Divine
things, for he not only learns, but is patient of, Divine things."

Now this sympathy or connaturality for Divine things is the result of
charity, which unites us to God, according to 1 Cor. 6:17: "He who is
joined to the Lord, is one spirit." Consequently wisdom which is a
gift, has its cause in the will, which cause is charity, but it has
its essence in the intellect, whose act is to judge aright, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 14, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of wisdom as to its cause, whence
also wisdom (_sapientia_) takes its name, in so far as it denotes a
certain sweetness (_saporem_). Hence the Reply to the Second
Objection is evident, that is if this be the true meaning of the text
quoted. For, apparently this is not the case, because such an
exposition of the text would only fit the Latin word for wisdom,
whereas it does not apply to the Greek and perhaps not in other
languages. Hence it would seem that in the text quoted wisdom stands
for the renown of doctrine, for which it is praised by all.

Reply Obj. 3: The intellect exercises a twofold act, perception and
judgment. The gift of understanding regards the former; the gift of
wisdom regards the latter according to the Divine ideas, the gift of
knowledge, according to human ideas.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 3]

Whether Wisdom Is Merely Speculative, or Practical Also?

Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not practical but merely
speculative. For the gift of wisdom is more excellent than the wisdom
which is an intellectual virtue. But wisdom, as an intellectual
virtue, is merely speculative. Much more therefore is wisdom, as a
gift, speculative and not practical.

Obj. 2: Further, the practical intellect is about matters of
operation which are contingent. But wisdom is about Divine things
which are eternal and necessary. Therefore wisdom cannot be practical.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "in contemplation
we seek the Beginning which is God, but in action we labor under a
mighty bundle of wants." Now wisdom regards the vision of Divine
things, in which there is no toiling under a load, since according to
Wis. 8:16, "her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any
tediousness." Therefore wisdom is merely contemplative, and not
practical or active.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Col. 4:5): "Walk with wisdom
towards them that are without." Now this pertains to action.
Therefore wisdom is not merely speculative, but also practical.

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14), the higher
part of the reason is the province of wisdom, while the lower part is
the domain of knowledge. Now the higher reason according to the same
authority (De Trin. xii, 7) "is intent on the consideration and
consultation of the heavenly," i.e. Divine, "types" [*Cf. I, Q. 79,
A. 9; I-II, Q. 74, A. 7]; it considers them, in so far as it
contemplates Divine things in themselves, and it consults them, in so
far as it judges of human acts by Divine things, and directs human
acts according to Divine rules.

Accordingly wisdom as a gift, is not merely speculative but also
practical.

Reply Obj. 1: The higher a virtue is, the greater the number of
things to which it extends, as stated in _De Causis,_ prop. x, xvii.
Wherefore from the very fact that wisdom as a gift is more excellent
than wisdom as an intellectual virtue, since it attains to God more
intimately by a kind of union of the soul with Him, it is able to
direct us not only in contemplation but also in action.

Reply Obj. 2: Divine things are indeed necessary and eternal in
themselves, yet they are the rules of the contingent things which are
the subject-matter of human actions.

Reply Obj. 3: A thing is considered in itself before being compared
with something else. Wherefore to wisdom belongs first of all
contemplation which is the vision of the Beginning, and afterwards
the direction of human acts according to the Divine rules. Nor from
the direction of wisdom does there result any bitterness or toil in
human acts; on the contrary the result of wisdom is to make the
bitter sweet, and labor a rest.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 4]

Whether Wisdom Can Be Without Grace, and with Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom can be without grace and with
mortal sin. For saints glory chiefly in such things as are
incompatible with mortal sin, according to 2 Cor. 1:12: "Our glory is
this, the testimony of our conscience." Now one ought not to glory in
one's wisdom, according to Jer. 9:23: "Let not the wise man glory in
his wisdom." Therefore wisdom can be without grace and with mortal
sin.

Obj. 2: Further, wisdom denotes knowledge of Divine things, as stated
above (A. 1). Now one in mortal sin may have knowledge of the Divine
truth, according to Rom. 1:18: "(Those men that) detain the truth of
God in injustice." Therefore wisdom is compatible with mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking of
charity: "Nothing surpasses this gift of God, it is this alone that
divides the children of the eternal kingdom from the children of
eternal perdition." But wisdom is distinct from charity. Therefore it
does not divide the children of the kingdom from the children of
perdition. Therefore it is compatible with mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 1:4): "Wisdom will not enter
into a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins."

_I answer that,_ The wisdom which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as
stated above (A. 1), enables us to judge aright of Divine things, or
of other things according to Divine rules, by reason of a certain
connaturalness or union with Divine things, which is the effect of
charity, as stated above (A. 2; Q. 23, A. 5). Hence the wisdom of
which we are speaking presupposes charity. Now charity is
incompatible with mortal sin, as shown above (Q. 24, A. 12).
Therefore it follows that the wisdom of which we are speaking cannot
be together with mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 1: These words are to be understood as referring to
worldly wisdom, or to wisdom in Divine things acquired through human
reasons. In such wisdom the saints do not glory, according to Prov.
30:2: "The wisdom of men is not with Me": But they do glory in Divine
wisdom according to 1 Cor. 1:30: "(Who) of God is made unto us
wisdom."

Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers, not the wisdom of which we
speak but that which is acquired by the study and research of reason,
and is compatible with mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 3: Although wisdom is distinct from charity, it
presupposes it, and for that very reason divides the children of
perdition from the children of the kingdom.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 5]

Whether Wisdom Is in All Who Have Grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not in all who have grace.
For it is more to have wisdom than to hear wisdom. Now it is only for
the perfect to hear wisdom, according to 1 Cor. 2:6: "We speak wisdom
among the perfect." Since then not all who have grace are perfect, it
seems that much less all who have grace have wisdom.

Obj. 2: Further, "The wise man sets things in order," as the
Philosopher states (Metaph. i, 2): and it is written (James 3:17)
that the wise man "judges without dissimulation [*Vulg.: 'The wisdom
that is from above . . . is . . . without judging, without
dissimulation']". Now it is not for all that have grace, to judge, or
put others in order, but only for those in authority. Therefore
wisdom is not in all that have grace.

Obj. 3: Further, "Wisdom is a remedy against folly," as Gregory says
(Moral. ii, 49). Now many that have grace are naturally foolish, for
instance madmen who are baptized or those who without being guilty of
mortal sin have become insane. Therefore wisdom is not in all that
have grace.

_On the contrary,_ Whoever is without mortal sin, is beloved of God;
since he has charity, whereby he loves God, and God loves them that
love Him (Prov. 8:17). Now it is written (Wis. 7:28) that "God loveth
none but him that dwelleth with wisdom." Therefore wisdom is in all
those who have charity and are without mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ The wisdom of which we are speaking, as stated above
(A. 4), denotes a certain rectitude of judgment in the contemplation
and consultation of Divine things, and as to both of these men obtain
various degrees of wisdom through union with Divine things. For the
measure of right judgment attained by some, whether in the
contemplation of Divine things or in directing human affairs
according to Divine rules, is no more than suffices for their
salvation. This measure is wanting to none who is without mortal sin
through having sanctifying grace, since if nature does not fail in
necessaries, much less does grace fail: wherefore it is written (1
John 2:27): "(His) unction teacheth you of all things."

Some, however, receive a higher degree of the gift of wisdom, both as
to the contemplation of Divine things (by both knowing more exalted
mysteries and being able to impart this knowledge to others) and as to
the direction of human affairs according to Divine rules (by being
able to direct not only themselves but also others according to those
rules). This degree of wisdom is not common to all that have
sanctifying grace, but belongs rather to the gratuitous graces, which
the Holy Ghost dispenses as He will, according to 1 Cor. 12:8: "To one
indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom," etc.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle speaks there of wisdom, as extending
to the hidden mysteries of Divine things, as indeed he says himself (2
Cor. 1:7): "We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, a wisdom which is
hidden."

Reply Obj. 2: Although it belongs to those alone who are in
authority to direct and judge other men, yet every man is competent to
direct and judge his own actions, as Dionysius declares (Ep. ad
Demophil.).

Reply Obj. 3: Baptized idiots, like little children, have the
habit of wisdom, which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, but they have not
the act, on account of the bodily impediment which hinders the use of
reason in them.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 6]

Whether the Seventh Beatitude Corresponds to the Gift of Wisdom?

Objection 1: It seems that the seventh beatitude does not correspond
to the gift of wisdom. For the seventh beatitude is: "Blessed are the
peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God." Now both
these things belong to charity: since of peace it is written (Ps.
118:165): "Much peace have they that love Thy law," and, as the
Apostle says (Rom. 5:5), "the charity of God is poured forth in our
hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us," and Who is "the Spirit
of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba [Father]" (Rom. 8:15).
Therefore the seventh beatitude ought to be ascribed to charity
rather than to wisdom.

Obj. 2: Further, a thing is declared by its proximate effect rather
than by its remote effect. Now the proximate effect of wisdom seems
to be charity, according to Wis. 7:27: "Through nations she conveyeth
herself into holy souls; she maketh the friends of God and prophets":
whereas peace and the adoption of sons seem to be remote effects,
since they result from charity, as stated above (Q. 29, A. 3).
Therefore the beatitude corresponding to wisdom should be determined
in respect of the love of charity rather than in respect of peace.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (James 3:17): "The wisdom, that is
from above, first indeed is chaste, then peaceable, modest, easy to
be persuaded, consenting to the good, full of mercy and good fruits,
judging without dissimulation [*Vulg.: 'without judging, without
dissimulation']." Therefore the beatitude corresponding to wisdom
should not refer to peace rather than to the other effects of
heavenly wisdom.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) that
"wisdom is becoming to peacemakers, in whom there is no movement of
rebellion, but only obedience to reason."

_I answer that,_ The seventh beatitude is fittingly ascribed to the
gift of wisdom, both as to the merit and as to the reward. The merit
is denoted in the words, "Blessed are the peacemakers." Now a
peacemaker is one who makes peace, either in himself, or in others:
and in both cases this is the result of setting in due order those
things in which peace is established, for "peace is the tranquillity
of order," according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). Now it
belongs to wisdom to set things in order, as the Philosopher declares
(Metaph. i, 2), wherefore peaceableness is fittingly ascribed to
wisdom. The reward is expressed in the words, "they shall be called
the children of God." Now men are called the children of God in so
far as they participate in the likeness of the only-begotten and
natural Son of God, according to Rom. 8:29, "Whom He foreknew . . .
to be made conformable to the image of His Son," Who is Wisdom
Begotten. Hence by participating in the gift of wisdom, man attains
to the sonship of God.

Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to charity to be at peace, but it belongs to
wisdom to make peace by setting things in order. Likewise the Holy
Ghost is called the "Spirit of adoption" in so far as we receive from
Him the likeness of the natural Son, Who is the Begotten Wisdom.

Reply Obj. 2: These words refer to the Uncreated Wisdom, which in the
first place unites itself to us by the gift of charity, and
consequently reveals to us the mysteries the knowledge of which is
infused wisdom. Hence, the infused wisdom which is a gift, is not the
cause but the effect of charity.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (A. 3) it belongs to wisdom, as a gift,
not only to contemplate Divine things, but also to regulate human
acts. Now the first thing to be effected in this direction of human
acts is the removal of evils opposed to wisdom: wherefore fear is
said to be "the beginning of wisdom," because it makes us shun evil,
while the last thing is like an end, whereby all things are reduced
to their right order; and it is this that constitutes peace. Hence
James said with reason that "the wisdom that is from above" (and this
is the gift of the Holy Ghost) "first indeed is chaste," because it
avoids the corruption of sin, and "then peaceable," wherein lies the
ultimate effect of wisdom, for which reason peace is numbered among
the beatitudes. As to the things that follow, they declare in
becoming order the means whereby wisdom leads to peace. For when a
man, by chastity, avoids the corruption of sin, the first thing he
has to do is, as far as he can, to be moderate in all things, and in
this respect wisdom is said to be modest. Secondly, in those matters
in which he is not sufficient by himself, he should be guided by the
advice of others, and as to this we are told further that wisdom is
"easy to be persuaded." These two are conditions required that man
may be at peace with himself. But in order that man may be at peace
with others it is furthermore required, first that he should not be
opposed to their good; this is what is meant by "consenting to the
good." Secondly, that he should bring to his neighbor's deficiencies,
sympathy in his heart, and succor in his actions, and this is denoted
by the words "full of mercy and good fruits." Thirdly, he should
strive in all charity to correct the sins of others, and this is
indicated by the words "judging without dissimulation [*Vulg.: 'The
wisdom that is from above . . . is . . . without judging, without
dissimulation'," lest he should purpose to sate his hatred under
cover of correction.
_______________________

QUESTION 46

OF FOLLY WHICH IS OPPOSED TO WISDOM
(In Three Articles)

We must now consider folly which is opposed to wisdom; and under this
head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether folly is contrary to wisdom?

(2) Whether folly is a sin?

(3) To which capital sin is it reducible?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 46, Art. 1]

Whether Folly Is Contrary to Wisdom?

Objection 1: It would seem that folly is not contrary to wisdom. For
seemingly unwisdom is directly opposed to wisdom. But folly does not
seem to be the same as unwisdom, for the latter is apparently about
Divine things alone, whereas folly is about both Divine and human
things. Therefore folly is not contrary to wisdom.

Obj. 2: Further, one contrary is not the way to arrive at the other.
But folly is the way to arrive at wisdom, for it is written (1 Cor.
3:18): "If any man among you seem to be wise in this world, let him
become a fool, that he may be wise." Therefore folly is not opposed
to wisdom.

Obj. 3: Further, one contrary is not the cause of the other. But
wisdom is the cause of folly; for it is written (Jer. 10:14): "Every
man is become a fool for knowledge," and wisdom is a kind of
knowledge. Moreover, it is written (Isa. 47:10): "Thy wisdom and thy
knowledge, this hath deceived thee." Now it belongs to folly to be
deceived. Therefore folly is not contrary to wisdom.

Obj. 4: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x, under the letter S) that "a
fool is one whom shame does not incite to sorrow, and who is
unconcerned when he is injured." But this pertains to spiritual
wisdom, according to Gregory (Moral. x, 49). Therefore folly is not
opposed to wisdom.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of
wisdom is given as a remedy against folly."

_I answer that,_ _Stultitia (Folly)_ seems to take its name from
_stupor;_ wherefore Isidore says (loc. cit.): "A fool is one who
through dullness (_stuporem_) remains unmoved." And folly differs
from fatuity, according to the same authority (Etym. x), in that
folly implies apathy in the heart and dullness in the senses, while
fatuity denotes entire privation of the spiritual sense. Therefore
folly is fittingly opposed to wisdom.

For "sapiens" (_wise_) as Isidore says (Etym. x) "is so named from
_sapor_ (savor), because just as the taste is quick to distinguish
between savors of meats, so is a wise man in discerning things and
causes." Wherefore it is manifest that _folly_ is opposed to _wisdom_
as its contrary, while _fatuity_ is opposed to it as a pure negation:
since the fatuous man lacks the sense of judgment, while the fool has
the sense, though dulled, whereas the wise man has the sense acute
and penetrating.

Reply Obj. 1: According to Isidore (Etym. x), "unwisdom is contrary
to wisdom because it lacks the savor of discretion and sense"; so
that unwisdom is seemingly the same as folly. Yet a man would appear
to be a fool chiefly through some deficiency in the verdict of that
judgment, which is according to the highest cause, for if a man fails
in judgment about some trivial matter, he is not for that reason
called a fool.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as there is an evil wisdom, as stated above (Q.
45, A. 1, ad 1), called "worldly wisdom," because it takes for the
highest cause and last end some worldly good, so too there is a good
folly opposed to this evil wisdom, whereby man despises worldly
things: and it is of this folly that the Apostle speaks.

Reply Obj. 3: It is the wisdom of the world that deceives and makes
us foolish in God's sight, as is evident from the Apostle's words (1
Cor. 3:19).

Reply Obj. 4: To be unconcerned when one is injured is sometimes due
to the fact that one has no taste for worldly things, but only for
heavenly things. Hence this belongs not to worldly but to Divine
wisdom, as Gregory declares (Moral. x, 49). Sometimes however it is
the result of a man's being simply stupid about everything, as may be
seen in idiots, who do not discern what is injurious to them, and
this belongs to folly simply.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 2]

Whether Folly Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that folly is not a sin. For no sin arises
in us from nature. But some are fools naturally. Therefore folly is
not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, "Every sin is voluntary," according to Augustine (De
Vera Relig. xiv). But folly is not voluntary. Therefore it is not a
sin.

Obj. 3: Further, every sin is contrary to a Divine precept. But folly
is not contrary to any precept. Therefore folly is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 1:32): "The prosperity of
fools shall destroy them." But no man is destroyed save for sin.
Therefore folly is a sin.

_I answer that,_ Folly, as stated above (A. 1), denotes dullness of
sense in judging, and chiefly as regards the highest cause, which is
the last end and the sovereign good. Now a man may in this respect
contract dullness in judgment in two ways. First, from a natural
indisposition, as in the case of idiots, and such like folly is no
sin. Secondly, by plunging his sense into earthly things, whereby his
sense is rendered incapable of perceiving Divine things, according to
1 Cor. 2:14, "The sensual man perceiveth not these things that are of
the Spirit of God," even as sweet things have no savor for a man
whose taste is infected with an evil humor: and such like folly is a
sin.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2: Though no man wishes to be a fool, yet he wishes those
things of which folly is a consequence, viz. to withdraw his sense
from spiritual things and to plunge it into earthly things. The same
thing happens in regard to other sins; for the lustful man desires
pleasure, without which there is no sin, although he does not desire
sin simply, for he would wish to enjoy the pleasure without sin.

Reply Obj. 3: Folly is opposed to the precepts about the
contemplation of truth, of which we have spoken above (Q. 16) when
we were treating of knowledge and understanding.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 46, Art. 3]

Whether Folly Is a Daughter of Lust?

Objection 1: It would seem that folly is not a daughter of lust. For
Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) enumerates the daughters of lust, among
which however he makes no mention of folly. Therefore folly does not
proceed from lust.

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:19): "The wisdom of this
world is foolishness with God." Now, according to Gregory (Moral. x,
29) "the wisdom of this world consists in covering the heart with
crafty devices;" and this savors of duplicity. Therefore folly is a
daughter of duplicity rather than of lust.

Obj. 3: Further, anger especially is the cause of fury and madness in
some persons; and this pertains to folly. Therefore folly arises from
anger rather than from lust.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 7:22): "Immediately he
followeth her," i.e. the harlot . . . "not knowing that he is drawn
like a fool to bonds."

_I answer that,_ As already stated (A. 2), folly, in so far as it is
a sin, is caused by the spiritual sense being dulled, so as to be
incapable of judging spiritual things. Now man's sense is plunged
into earthly things chiefly by lust, which is about the greatest of
pleasures; and these absorb the mind more than any others. Therefore
the folly which is a sin, arises chiefly from lust.

Reply Obj. 1: It is part of folly that a man should have a distaste
for God and His gifts. Hence Gregory mentions two daughters of lust,
pertaining to folly, namely, "hatred of God" and "despair of the life
to come"; thus he divides folly into two parts as it were.

Reply Obj. 2: These words of the Apostle are to be understood, not
causally but essentially, because, to wit, worldly wisdom itself is
folly with God. Hence it does not follow that whatever belongs to
worldly wisdom, is a cause of this folly.

Reply Obj. 3: Anger by reason of its keenness, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 48, AA. 2, 3, 4), produces a great change in the nature
of the body, wherefore it conduces very much to the folly which
results from a bodily impediment. On the other hand the folly which is
caused by a spiritual impediment, viz. by the mind being plunged into
earthly things, arises chiefly from lust, as stated above.
_______________________

TREATISE ON THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (QQ. 47-170)
_______________________

QUESTION 47

OF PRUDENCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF
(In Sixteen Articles)

After treating of the theological virtues, we must in due sequence
consider the cardinal virtues. In the first place we shall consider
prudence in itself; secondly, its parts; thirdly, the corresponding
gift; fourthly, the contrary vices; fifthly, the precepts concerning
prudence.

Under the first head there are sixteen points of inquiry:

(1) Whether prudence is in the will or in the reason?

(2) If in the reason, whether it is only in the practical, or also
in the speculative reason?

(3) Whether it takes cognizance of singulars?

(4) Whether it is virtue?

(5) Whether it is a special virtue?

(6) Whether it appoints the end to the moral virtues?

(7) Whether it fixes the mean in the moral virtues?

(8) Whether its proper act is command?

(9) Whether solicitude or watchfulness belongs to prudence?

(10) Whether prudence extends to the governing of many?

(11) Whether the prudence which regards private good is the same
in species as that which regards the common good?

(12) Whether prudence is in subjects, or only in their rulers?

(13) Whether prudence is in the wicked?

(14) Whether prudence is in all good men?

(15) Whether prudence is in us naturally?

(16) Whether prudence is lost by forgetfulness?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 1]

Whether Prudence Is in the Cognitive or in the Appetitive Faculty?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in the cognitive but
in the appetitive faculty. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv):
"Prudence is love choosing wisely between the things that help and
those that hinder." Now love is not in the cognitive, but in the
appetitive faculty. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive faculty.

Obj. 2: Further, as appears from the foregoing definition it belongs
to prudence "to choose wisely." But choice is an act of the
appetitive faculty, as stated above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 1). Therefore
prudence is not in the cognitive but in the appetitive faculty.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "in art it
is better to err voluntarily than involuntarily, whereas in the case
of prudence, as of the virtues, it is worse." Now the moral virtues,
of which he is treating there, are in the appetitive faculty, whereas
art is in the reason. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive rather
than in the rational faculty.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 61): "Prudence is
the knowledge of what to seek and what to avoid."

_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. x): "A prudent man is one who
sees as it were from afar, for his sight is keen, and he foresees the
event of uncertainties." Now sight belongs not to the appetitive but
to the cognitive faculty. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence
belongs directly to the cognitive, and not to the sensitive faculty,
because by the latter we know nothing but what is within reach and
offers itself to the senses: while to obtain knowledge of the future
from knowledge of the present or past, which pertains to prudence,
belongs properly to the reason, because this is done by a process of
comparison. It follows therefore that prudence, properly speaking, is
in the reason.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 4) the will moves all the
faculties to their acts. Now the first act of the appetitive faculty
is love, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1, 2). Accordingly
prudence is said to be love, not indeed essentially, but in so far as
love moves to the act of prudence. Wherefore Augustine goes on to say
that "prudence is love discerning aright that which helps from that
which hinders us in tending to God." Now love is said to discern
because it moves the reason to discern.

Reply Obj. 2: The prudent man considers things afar off, in so far as
they tend to be a help or a hindrance to that which has to be done at
the present time. Hence it is clear that those things which prudence
considers stand in relation to this other, as in relation to the end.
Now of those things that are directed to the end there is counsel in
the reason, and choice in the appetite, of which two, counsel belongs
more properly to prudence, since the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi,
5, 7, 9) that a prudent man "takes good counsel." But as choice
presupposes counsel, since it is "the desire for what has been
already counselled" (Ethic. iii, 2), it follows that choice can also
be ascribed to prudence indirectly, in so far, to wit, as prudence
directs the choice by means of counsel.

Reply Obj. 3: The worth of prudence consists not in thought merely,
but in its application to action, which is the end of the practical
reason. Wherefore if any defect occur in this, it is most contrary to
prudence, since, the end being of most import in everything, it
follows that a defect which touches the end is the worst of all.
Hence the Philosopher goes on to say (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence is
"something more than a merely rational habit," such as art is, since,
as stated above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 4) it includes application to
action, which application is an act of the will.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 2]

Whether Prudence Belongs to the Practical Reason Alone or Also to
the Speculative Reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence belongs not only to the
practical, but also to the speculative reason. For it is written
(Prov. 10:23): "Wisdom is prudence to a man." Now wisdom consists
chiefly in contemplation. Therefore prudence does also.

Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): "Prudence is
concerned with the quest of truth, and fills us with the desire of
fuller knowledge." Now this belongs to the speculative reason.
Therefore prudence resides also in the speculative reason.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher assigns art and prudence to the same
part of the soul (Ethic. vi, 1). Now art may be not only practical
but also speculative, as in the case of the liberal arts. Therefore
prudence also is both practical and speculative.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence
is right reason applied to action. Now this belongs to none but the
practical reason. Therefore prudence is in the practical reason only.

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) "a
prudent man is one who is capable of taking good counsel." Now
counsel is about things that we have to do in relation to some end:
and the reason that deals with things to be done for an end is the
practical reason. Hence it is evident that prudence resides only in
the practical reason.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 45, AA. 1, 3), wisdom considers the
absolutely highest cause: so that the consideration of the highest
cause in any particular genus belongs to wisdom in that genus. Now in
the genus of human acts the highest cause is the common end of all
human life, and it is this end that prudence intends. For the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that just as he who reasons well for
the realization of a particular end, such as victory, is said to be
prudent, not absolutely, but in a particular genus, namely warfare,
so he that reasons well with regard to right conduct as a whole, is
said to be prudent absolutely. Wherefore it is clear that prudence is
wisdom about human affairs: but not wisdom absolutely, because it is
not about the absolutely highest cause, for it is about human good,
and this is not the best thing of all. And so it is stated
significantly that "prudence is wisdom for man," but not wisdom
absolutely.

Reply Obj. 2: Ambrose, and Tully also (De Invent. ii, 53) take the
word prudence in a broad sense for any human knowledge, whether
speculative or practical. And yet it may also be replied that the act
itself of the speculative reason, in so far as it is voluntary, is a
matter of choice and counsel as to its exercise; and consequently
comes under the direction of prudence. On the other hand, as regards
its specification in relation to its object which is the "necessary
true," it comes under neither counsel nor prudence.

Reply Obj. 3: Every application of right reason in the work of
production belongs to art: but to prudence belongs only the
application of right reason in matters of counsel, which are those
wherein there is no fixed way of obtaining the end, as stated in
_Ethic._ iii, 3. Since then, the speculative reason makes things such
as syllogisms, propositions and the like, wherein the process follows
certain and fixed rules, consequently in respect of such things it is
possible to have the essentials of art, but not of prudence; and so
we find such a thing as a speculative art, but not a speculative
prudence.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 3]

Whether Prudence Takes Cognizance of Singulars?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not take cognizance of
singulars. For prudence is in the reason, as stated above (AA. 1, 2).
But "reason deals with universals," according to _Phys._ i, 5.
Therefore prudence does not take cognizance except of universals.

Obj. 2: Further, singulars are infinite in number. But the reason
cannot comprehend an infinite number of things. Therefore prudence
which is right reason, is not about singulars.

Obj. 3: Further, particulars are known by the senses. But prudence is
not in a sense, for many persons who have keen outward senses are
devoid of prudence. Therefore prudence does not take cognizance of
singulars.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that "prudence
does not deal with universals only, but needs to take cognizance of
singulars also."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), to prudence belongs
not only the consideration of the reason, but also the application to
action, which is the end of the practical reason. But no man can
conveniently apply one thing to another, unless he knows both the
thing to be applied, and the thing to which it has to be applied. Now
actions are in singular matters: and so it is necessary for the
prudent man to know both the universal principles of reason, and the
singulars about which actions are concerned.

Reply Obj. 1: Reason first and chiefly is concerned with universals,
and yet it is able to apply universal rules to particular cases:
hence the conclusions of syllogisms are not only universal, but also
particular, because the intellect by a kind of reflection extends to
matter, as stated in _De Anima_ iii.

Reply Obj. 2: It is because the infinite number of singulars cannot
be comprehended by human reason, that "our counsels are uncertain"
(Wis. 9:14). Nevertheless experience reduces the infinity of
singulars to a certain finite number which occur as a general rule,
and the knowledge of these suffices for human prudence.

Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8), prudence does
not reside in the external senses whereby we know sensible objects,
but in the interior sense, which is perfected by memory and
experience so as to judge promptly of particular cases. This does not
mean however that prudence is in the interior sense as in its
princip[al] subject, for it is chiefly in the reason, yet by a kind
of application it extends to this sense.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 4]

Whether Prudence Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a virtue. For
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 13) that "prudence is the science of
what to desire and what to avoid." Now science is condivided with
virtue, as appears in the _Predicaments_ (vi). Therefore prudence is
not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, there is no virtue of a virtue: but "there is a
virtue of art," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5): wherefore
art is not a virtue. Now there is prudence in art, for it is written
(2 Paralip. ii, 14) concerning Hiram, that he knew "to grave all sort
of graving, and to devise ingeniously (_prudenter_) all that there
may be need of in the work." Therefore prudence is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, no virtue can be immoderate. But prudence is
immoderate, else it would be useless to say (Prov. 23:4): "Set bounds
to thy prudence." Therefore prudence is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory states (Moral. ii, 49) that prudence,
temperance, fortitude and justice are four virtues.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 3; Q. 56, A. 1)
when we were treating of virtues in general, "virtue is that which
makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise." Now good may
be understood in a twofold sense: first, materially, for the thing
that is good, secondly, formally, under the aspect of good. Good,
under the aspect of good, is the object of the appetitive power.
Hence if any habits rectify the consideration of reason, without
regarding the rectitude of the appetite, they have less of the nature
of a virtue since they direct man to good materially, that is to say,
to the thing which is good, but without considering it under the
aspect of good. On the other hand those virtues which regard the
rectitude of the appetite, have more of the nature of virtue, because
they consider the good not only materially, but also formally, in
other words, they consider that which is good under the aspect of
good.

Now it belongs to prudence, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3; A. 3) to
apply right reason to action, and this is not done without a right
appetite. Hence prudence has the nature of virtue not only as the
other intellectual virtues have it, but also as the moral virtues
have it, among which virtues it is enumerated.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine there takes science in the broad sense for
any kind of right reason.

Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art,
because art does not require rectitude of the appetite; wherefore in
order that a man may make right use of his art, he needs to have a
virtue which will rectify his appetite. Prudence however has nothing
to do with the matter of art, because art is both directed to a
particular end, and has fixed means of obtaining that end. And yet,
by a kind of comparison, a man may be said to act prudently in
matters of art. Moreover in certain arts, on account of the
uncertainty of the means for obtaining the end, there is need for
counsel, as for instance in the arts of medicine and navigation, as
stated in _Ethic._ iii, 3.

Reply Obj. 3: This saying of the wise man does not mean that prudence
itself should be moderate, but that moderation must be imposed on
other things according to prudence.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 5]

Whether Prudence Is a Special Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a special virtue. For
no special virtue is included in the definition of virtue in general,
since virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) "an elective habit that
follows a mean appointed by reason in relation to ourselves, even as
a wise man decides." Now right reason is reason in accordance with
prudence, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 13. Therefore prudence is not a
special virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 13) that "the
effect of moral virtue is right action as regards the end, and that
of prudence, right action as regards the means." Now in every virtue
certain things have to be done as means to the end. Therefore
prudence is in every virtue, and consequently is not a special virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, a special virtue has a special object. But prudence
has not a special object, for it is right reason "applied to action"
(Ethic. vi, 5); and all works of virtue are actions. Therefore
prudence is not a special virtue.

_On the contrary,_ It is distinct from and numbered among the other
virtues, for it is written (Wis. 8:7): "She teacheth temperance and
prudence, justice and fortitude."

_I answer that,_ Since acts and habits take their species from their
objects, as shown above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 2; Q. 54, A. 2),
any habit that has a corresponding special object, distinct from
other objects, must needs be a special habit, and if it be a good
habit, it must be a special virtue. Now an object is called special,
not merely according to the consideration of its matter, but rather
according to its formal aspect, as explained above (I-II, Q. 54, A.
2, ad 1). Because one and the same thing is the subject matter of the
acts of different habits, and also of different powers, according to
its different formal aspects. Now a yet greater difference of object
is requisite for a difference of powers than for a difference of
habits, since several habits are found in the same power, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 1). Consequently any difference in the aspect
of an object, that requires a difference of powers, will _a fortiori_
require a difference of habits.

Accordingly we must say that since prudence is in the reason, as
stated above (A. 2), it is differentiated from the other intellectual
virtues by a material difference of objects. _Wisdom,_    _knowledge_
and _understanding_ are about necessary things, whereas _art_ and
_prudence_ are about contingent things, art being concerned with
_things made,_ that is, with things produced in external matter, such
as a house, a knife and so forth; and prudence, being concerned with
_things done,_ that is, with things that have their being in the doer
himself, as stated above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 4). On the other hand
prudence is differentiated from the moral virtues according to a
formal aspect distinctive of powers, i.e. the intellective power,
wherein is prudence, and the appetitive power, wherein is moral
virtue. Hence it is evident that prudence is a special virtue,
distinct from all other virtues.

Reply Obj. 1: This is not a definition of virtue in general, but of
moral virtue, the definition of which fittingly includes an
intellectual virtue, viz., prudence, which has the same matter in
common with moral virtue; because, just as the subject of moral
virtue is something that partakes of reason, so moral virtue has the
aspect of virtue, in so far as it partakes of intellectual virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument proves that prudence helps all the
virtues, and works in all of them; but this does not suffice to prove
that it is not a special virtue; for nothing prevents a certain genus
from containing a species which is operative in every other species
of that same genus, even as the sun has an influence over all bodies.

Reply Obj. 3: Things done are indeed the matter of prudence, in so
far as they are the object of reason, that is, considered as true:
but they are the matter of the moral virtues, in so far as they are
the object of the appetitive power, that is, considered as good.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 6]

Whether Prudence Appoints the End to Moral Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence appoints the end to moral
virtues. Since prudence is in the reason, while moral virtue is in
the appetite, it seems that prudence stands in relation to moral
virtue, as reason to the appetite. Now reason appoints the end to the
appetitive power. Therefore prudence appoints the end to the moral
virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, man surpasses irrational beings by his reason, but
he has other things in common with them. Accordingly the other parts
of man are in relation to his reason, what man is in relation to
irrational creatures. Now man is the end of irrational creatures,
according to _Polit._ i, 3. Therefore all the other parts of man are
directed to reason as to their end. But prudence is "right reason
applied to action," as stated above (A. 2). Therefore all actions are
directed to prudence as their end. Therefore prudence appoints the
end to all moral virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to the virtue, art, or power that is
concerned about the end, to command the virtues or arts that are
concerned about the means. Now prudence disposes of the other moral
virtues, and commands them. Therefore it appoints their end to them.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that "moral
virtue ensures the rectitude of the intention of the end, while
prudence ensures the rectitude of the means." Therefore it does not
belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to
regulate the means.

_I answer that,_ The end of moral virtues is human good. Now the good
of the human soul is to be in accord with reason, as Dionysius
declares (Div. Nom. iv). Wherefore the ends of moral virtue must of
necessity pre-exist in the reason.

Now, just as, in the speculative reason, there are certain things
naturally known, about which is _understanding,_ and certain things
of which we obtain knowledge through them, viz. conclusions, about
which is _science,_ so in the practical reason, certain things
pre-exist, as naturally known principles, and such are the ends of
the moral virtues, since the end is in practical matters what
principles are in speculative matters, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 7,
ad 2; I-II, Q. 13, A. 3); while certain things are in the practical
reason by way of conclusions, and such are the means which we gather
from the ends themselves. About these is prudence, which applies
universal principles to the particular conclusions of practical
matters. Consequently it does not belong to prudence to appoint the
end to moral virtues, but only to regulate the means.

Reply Obj. 1: Natural reason known by the name of _synderesis_
appoints the end to moral virtues, as stated above (I, Q. 79, A. 12):
but prudence does not do this for the reason given above.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply Obj. 3: The end concerns the moral virtues, not as though they
appointed the end, but because they tend to the end which is
appointed by natural reason. In this they are helped by prudence,
which prepares the way for them, by disposing the means. Hence it
follows that prudence is more excellent than the moral virtues, and
moves them: yet _synderesis_ moves prudence, just as the
understanding of principles moves science.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 7]

Whether It Belongs to Prudence to Find the Mean in Moral Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to prudence to
find the mean in moral virtues. For the achievement of the mean is
the end of moral virtues. But prudence does not appoint the end to
moral virtues, as shown above (A. 6). Therefore it does not find the
mean in them.

Obj. 2: Further, that which of itself has being, would seem to have
no cause, but its very being is its cause, since a thing is said to
have being by reason of its cause. Now "to follow the mean" belongs
to moral virtue by reason of itself, as part of its definition, as
shown above (A. 5, Obj. 1). Therefore prudence does not cause the
mean in moral virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, prudence works after the manner of reason. But moral
virtue tends to the mean after the manner of nature, because, as
Tully states (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53), "virtue is a habit like a
second nature in accord with reason." Therefore prudence does not
appoint the mean to moral virtues.

_On the contrary,_ In the foregoing definition of moral virtue
(A. 5, Obj. 1) it is stated that it "follows a mean appointed by
reason . . . even as a wise man decides."

_I answer that,_ The proper end of each moral virtue consists
precisely in conformity with right reason. For temperance intends
that man should not stray from reason for the sake of his
concupiscences; fortitude, that he should not stray from the right
judgment of reason through fear or daring. Moreover this end is
appointed to man according to natural reason, since natural reason
dictates to each one that he should act according to reason.

But it belongs to the ruling of prudence to decide in what manner and
by what means man shall obtain the mean of reason in his deeds. For
though the attainment of the mean is the end of a moral virtue, yet
this mean is found by the right disposition of these things that are
directed to the end.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as a natural agent makes form to be in
matter, yet does not make that which is essential to the form to
belong to it, so too, prudence appoints the mean in passions and
operations, and yet does not make the searching of the mean to belong
to virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: Moral virtue after the manner of nature intends
to attain the mean. Since, however, the mean as such is not found in
all matters after the same manner, it follows that the inclination of
nature which ever works in the same manner, does not suffice for this
purpose, and so the ruling of prudence is required.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 8]

Whether Command Is the Chief Act of Prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that command is not the chief act of
prudence. For command regards the good to be ensued. Now Augustine
(De Trin. xiv, 9) states that it is an act of prudence "to avoid
ambushes." Therefore command is not the chief act of prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "the
prudent man takes good counsel." Now "to take counsel" and "to
command" seem to be different acts, as appears from what has been
said above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 6). Therefore command is not the chief
act of prudence.

Obj. 3: Further, it seems to belong to the will to command and to
rule, since the will has the end for its object, and moves the other
powers of the soul. Now prudence is not in the will, but in the
reason. Therefore command is not an act of prudence.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 10) that
"prudence commands."

_I answer that,_ Prudence is "right reason applied to action," as
stated above (A. 2). Hence that which is the chief act of reason in
regard to action must needs be the chief act of prudence. Now there
are three such acts. The first is _to take counsel,_ which belongs to
discovery, for counsel is an act of inquiry, as stated above (I-II,
Q. 14, A. 1). The second act is _to judge of what one has
discovered,_ and this is an act of the speculative reason. But the
practical reason, which is directed to action, goes further, and its
third act is _to command,_ which act consists in applying to action
the things counselled and judged. And since this act approaches
nearer to the end of the practical reason, it follows that it is the
chief act of the practical reason, and consequently of prudence.

In confirmation of this we find that the perfection of art consists
in judging and not in commanding: wherefore he who sins voluntarily
against his craft is reputed a better craftsman than he who does so
involuntarily, because the former seems to do so from right judgment,
and the latter from a defective judgment. On the other hand it is the
reverse in prudence, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 5, for it is more
imprudent to sin voluntarily, since this is to be lacking in the
chief act of prudence, viz. command, than to sin involuntarily.

Reply Obj. 1: The act of command extends both to the ensuing of good
and to the avoidance of evil. Nevertheless Augustine ascribes "the
avoidance of ambushes" to prudence, not as its chief act, but as an
act of prudence that does not continue in heaven.

Reply Obj. 2: Good counsel is required in order that the good things
discovered may be applied to action: wherefore command belongs to
prudence which takes good counsel.

Reply Obj. 3: Simply to move belongs to the will: but command denotes
motion together with a kind of ordering, wherefore it is an act of
the reason, as stated above (I-II, Q. 17, A. 1).
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 9]

Whether Solicitude Belongs to Prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that solicitude does not belong to
prudence. For solicitude implies disquiet, wherefore Isidore says
(Etym. x) that "a solicitous man is a restless man." Now motion
belongs chiefly to the appetitive power: wherefore solicitude does
also. But prudence is not in the appetitive power, but in the reason,
as stated above (A. 1). Therefore solicitude does not belong to
prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, the certainty of truth seems opposed to solicitude,
wherefore it is related (1 Kings 9:20) that Samuel said to Saul: "As
for the asses which were lost three days ago, be not solicitous,
because they are found." Now the certainty of truth belongs to
prudence, since it is an intellectual virtue. Therefore solicitude is
in opposition to prudence rather than belonging to it.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) the "magnanimous
man is slow and leisurely." Now slowness is contrary to solicitude.
Since then prudence is not opposed to magnanimity, for "good is not
opposed to good," as stated in the _Predicaments_ (viii) it would
seem that solicitude does not belong to prudence.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Pet. 4:7): "Be prudent . . . and
watch in prayers." But watchfulness is the same as solicitude.
Therefore solicitude belongs to prudence.

_I answer that,_ According to Isidore (Etym. x), a man is said to be
solicitous through being shrewd (_solers_) and alert (_citus_), in so
far as a man through a certain shrewdness of mind is on the alert to
do whatever has to be done. Now this belongs to prudence, whose chief
act is a command about what has been already counselled and judged in
matters of action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 9) that
"one should be quick in carrying out the counsel taken, but slow in
taking counsel." Hence it is that solicitude belongs properly to
prudence, and for this reason Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxiv)
that "prudence keeps most careful watch and ward, lest by degrees we
be deceived unawares by evil counsel."

Reply Obj. 1: Movement belongs to the appetitive power as to the
principle of movement, in accordance however, with the direction and
command of reason, wherein solicitude consists.

Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3), "equal
certainty should not be sought in all things, but in each matter
according to its proper mode." And since the matter of prudence is
the contingent singulars about which are human actions, the certainty
of prudence cannot be so great as to be devoid of all solicitude.

Reply Obj. 3: The magnanimous man is said to be "slow and leisurely"
not because he is solicitous about nothing, but because he is not
over-solicitous about many things, and is trustful in matters where
he ought to have trust, and is not over-solicitous about them: for
over-much fear and distrust are the cause of over-solicitude, since
fear makes us take counsel, as stated above (I-II, Q. 44, A. 2) when
we were treating of the passion of fear.
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 10]

Whether Solicitude Belongs to Prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not extend to the
governing of many, but only to the government of oneself. For the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that virtue directed to the common
good is justice. But prudence differs from justice. Therefore
prudence is not directed to the common good.

Obj. 2: Further, he seems to be prudent, who seeks and does good for
himself. Now those who seek the common good often neglect their own.
Therefore they are not prudent.

Obj. 3: Further, prudence is specifically distinct from temperance
and fortitude. But temperance and fortitude seem to be related only
to a man's own good. Therefore the same applies to prudence.

_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 24:45): "Who, thinkest thou,
is a faithful and prudent [Douay: 'wise'] servant whom his lord hath
appointed over his family?"

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) some
have held that prudence does not extend to the common good, but only
to the good of the individual, and this because they thought that man
is not bound to seek other than his own good. But this opinion is
opposed to charity, which "seeketh not her own" (1 Cor. 13:5):
wherefore the Apostle says of himself (1 Cor. 10:33): "Not seeking
that which is profitable to myself, but to many, that they may be
saved." Moreover it is contrary to right reason, which judges the
common good to be better than the good of the individual.

Accordingly, since it belongs to prudence rightly to counsel, judge,
and command concerning the means of obtaining a due end, it is
evident that prudence regards not only the private good of the
individual, but also the common good of the multitude.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of moral virtue. Now
just as every moral virtue that is directed to the common good is
called "legal" justice, so the prudence that is directed to the
common good is called "political" prudence, for the latter stands in
the same relation to legal justice, as prudence simply so called to
moral virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: He that seeks the good of the many, seeks in
consequence his own good, for two reasons. First, because the
individual good is impossible without the common good of the family,
state, or kingdom. Hence Valerius Maximus says [*Fact. et Dict.
Memor. iv, 6] of the ancient Romans that "they would rather be poor
in a rich empire than rich in a poor empire." Secondly, because,
since man is a part of the home and state, he must needs consider
what is good for him by being prudent about the good of the many. For
the good disposition of parts depends on their relation to the whole;
thus Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8) that "any part which does not
harmonize with its whole, is offensive."

Reply Obj. 3: Even temperance and fortitude can be directed to the
common good, hence there are precepts of law concerning them as
stated in _Ethic._ v, 1: more so, however, prudence and justice,
since these belong to the rational faculty which directly regards the
universal, just as the sensitive part regards singulars.
_______________________

ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 11]

Whether Prudence About One's Own Good Is Specifically the Same As
That Which Extends to the Common Good?

Objection 1: It seems that prudence about one's own good is the same
specifically as that which extends to the common good. For the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "political prudence, and
prudence are the same habit, yet their essence is not the same."

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that "virtue is
the same in a good man and in a good ruler." Now political prudence
is chiefly in the ruler, in whom it is architectonic, as it were.
Since then prudence is a virtue of a good man, it seems that prudence
and political prudence are the same habit.

Obj. 3: Further, a habit is not diversified in species or essence by
things which are subordinate to one another. But the particular good,
which belongs to prudence simply so called, is subordinate to the
common good, which belongs to political prudence. Therefore prudence
and political prudence differ neither specifically nor essentially.

_On the contrary,_ "Political prudence," which is directed to the
common good of the state, "domestic economy" which is of such things
as relate to the common good of the household or family, and
"monastic economy" which is concerned with things affecting the good
of one person, are all distinct sciences. Therefore in like manner
there are different kinds of prudence, corresponding to the above
differences of matter.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5; Q. 54, A. 2, ad 1), the
species of habits differ according to the difference of object
considered in its formal aspect. Now the formal aspect of all things
directed to the end, is taken from the end itself, as shown above
(I-II, Prolog.; Q. 102, A. 1), wherefore the species of habits differ
by their relation to different ends. Again the individual good, the
good of the family, and the good of the city and kingdom are
different ends. Wherefore there must needs be different species of
prudence corresponding to these different ends, so that one is
"prudence" simply so called, which is directed to one's own good;
another, "domestic prudence" which is directed to the common good of
the home; and a third, "political prudence," which is directed to the
common good of the state or kingdom.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher means, not that political prudence is
substantially the same habit as any kind of prudence, but that it is
the same as the prudence which is directed to the common good. This
is called "prudence" in respect of the common notion of prudence,
i.e. as being right reason applied to action, while it is called
"political," as being directed to the common good.

Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher declares (Polit. iii, 2), "it
belongs to a good man to be able to rule well and to obey well,"
wherefore the virtue of a good man includes also that of a good
ruler. Yet the virtue of the ruler and of the subject differs
specifically, even as the virtue of a man and of a woman, as stated
by the same authority (Polit. iii, 2).

Reply Obj. 3: Even different ends, one of which is subordinate to the
other, diversify the species of a habit, thus for instance, habits
directed to riding, soldiering, and civic life, differ specifically
although their ends are subordinate to one another. In like manner,
though the good of the individual is subordinate to the good of the
many, that does not prevent this difference from making the habits
differ specifically; but it follows that the habit which is directed
to the last end is above the other habits and commands them.
_______________________

TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 12]

Whether Prudence Is in Subjects, or Only in Their Rulers?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in subjects but only
in their rulers. For the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that
"prudence alone is the virtue proper to a ruler, while other virtues
are common to subjects and rulers, and the prudence of the subject is
not a virtue but a true opinion."

Obj. 2: Further, it is stated in _Polit._ i, 5 that "a slave is not
competent to take counsel." But prudence makes a man take good
counsel (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence is not befitting slaves or
subjects.

Obj. 3: Further, prudence exercises command, as stated above (A. 8).
But command is not in the competency of slaves or subjects but only
of rulers. Therefore prudence is not in subjects but only in rulers.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are
two kinds of political prudence, one of which is "legislative" and
belongs to rulers, while the other "retains the common name
political," and is about "individual actions." Now it belongs also to
subjects to perform these individual actions. Therefore prudence is
not only in rulers but also in subjects.

_I answer that,_ Prudence is in the reason. Now ruling and governing
belong properly to the reason; and therefore it is proper to a man to
reason and be prudent in so far as he has a share in ruling and
governing. But it is evident that the subject as subject, and the
slave as slave, are not competent to rule and govern, but rather to
be ruled and governed. Therefore prudence is not the virtue of a
slave as slave, nor of a subject as subject.

Since, however, every man, for as much as he is rational, has a share
in ruling according to the judgment of reason, he is proportionately
competent to have prudence. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence is
in the ruler "after the manner of a mastercraft" (Ethic. vi, 8), but
in the subjects, "after the manner of a handicraft."

Reply Obj. 1: The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood
strictly, namely, that prudence is not the virtue of a subject as
such.

Reply Obj. 2: A slave is not capable of taking counsel, in so far as
he is a slave (for thus he is the instrument of his master), but he
does take counsel in so far as he is a rational animal.

Reply Obj. 3: By prudence a man commands not only others, but also
himself, in so far as the reason is said to command the lower powers.
_______________________

THIRTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 13]

Whether Prudence Can Be in Sinners?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be prudence in sinners. For
our Lord said (Luke 16:8): "The children of this world are more
prudent [Douay: 'wiser'] in their generation than the children of
light." Now the children of this world are sinners. Therefore there
be prudence in sinners.

Obj. 2: Further, faith is a more excellent virtue than prudence. But
there can be faith in sinners. Therefore there can be prudence also.

Obj. 3: Further, according to _Ethic._ vi, 7, "we say that to be of
good counsel is the work of prudent man especially." Now many sinners
can take good counsel. Therefore sinners can have prudence.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 12) that "it
is impossible for a man be prudent unless he be good." Now no sinner
is a good man. Therefore no sinner is prudent.

_I answer that,_ Prudence is threefold. There is a false prudence,
which takes its name from its likeness to true prudence. For since a
prudent man is one who disposes well of the things that have to be
done for a good end, whoever disposes well of such things as are
fitting for an evil end, has false prudence, in far as that which he
takes for an end, is good, not in truth but in appearance. Thus man
is called "a good robber," and in this way may speak of "a prudent
robber," by way of similarity, because he devises fitting ways of
committing robbery. This is the prudence of which the Apostle says
(Rom. 8:6): "The prudence [Douay: 'wisdom'] of the flesh is death,"
because, to wit, it places its ultimate end in the pleasures of the
flesh.

The second prudence is indeed true prudence, because it devises
fitting ways of obtaining a good end; and yet it is imperfect, from a
twofold source. First, because the good which it takes for an end, is
not the common end of all human life, but of some particular affair;
thus when a man devises fitting ways of conducting business or of
sailing a ship, he is called a prudent businessman, or a prudent
sailor; secondly, because he fails in the chief act of prudence, as
when a man takes counsel aright, and forms a good judgment, even
about things concerning life as a whole, but fails to make an
effective command.

The third prudence is both true and perfect, for it takes counsel,
judges and commands aright in respect of the good end of man's whole
life: and this alone is prudence simply so-called, and cannot be in
sinners, whereas the first prudence is in sinners alone, while
imperfect prudence is common to good and wicked men, especially that
which is imperfect through being directed to a particular end, since
that which is imperfect on account of a failing in the chief act, is
only in the wicked.

Reply Obj. 1: This saying of our Lord is to be understood of the
first prudence, wherefore it is not said that they are prudent
absolutely, but that they are prudent in "their generation."

Reply Obj. 2: The nature of faith consists not in conformity with the
appetite for certain right actions, but in knowledge alone. On the
other hand prudence implies a relation to a right appetite. First
because its principles are the ends in matters of action; and of such
ends one forms a right estimate through the habits of moral virtue,
which rectify the appetite: wherefore without the moral virtues there
is no prudence, as shown above (I-II, Q. 58, A. 5); secondly because
prudence commands right actions, which does not happen unless the
appetite be right. Wherefore though faith on account of its object is
more excellent than prudence, yet prudence, by its very nature, is
more opposed to sin, which arises from a disorder of the appetite.

Reply Obj. 3: Sinners can take good counsel for an evil end, or for
some particular good, but they do not perfectly take good counsel for
the end of their whole life, since they do not carry that counsel
into effect. Hence they lack prudence which is directed to the good
only; and yet in them, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12)
there is "cleverness," [*_deinotike_] i.e. natural diligence which
may be directed to both good and evil; or "cunning," [*_panourgia_]
which is directed only to evil, and which we have stated above, to be
"false prudence" or "prudence of the flesh."
_______________________

FOURTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 14]

Whether Prudence Is in All Who Have Grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in all who have grace.
Prudence requires diligence, that one may foresee aright what has to
be done. But many who have grace have not this diligence. Therefore
not all who have grace have prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, a prudent man is one who takes good counsel, as
stated above (A. 8, Obj. 2; A. 13, Obj. 3). Yet many have grace who do
not take good counsel, and need to be guided by the counsel of others.
Therefore not all who have grace, have prudence.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that "young
people are not obviously prudent." Yet many young people have grace.
Therefore prudence is not to be found in all who have grace.

_On the contrary,_ No man has grace unless he be virtuous. Now no man
can be virtuous without prudence, for Gregory says (Moral. ii, 46)
that "the other virtues cannot be virtues at all unless they effect
prudently what they desire to accomplish." Therefore all who have
grace have prudence.

_I answer that,_ The virtues must needs be connected together, so that
whoever has one has all, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). Now
 whoever has grace has charity, so that he must needs have all the
other virtues, and hence, since prudence is a virtue, as shown above
(A. 4), he must, of necessity, have prudence also.

Reply Obj. 1: Diligence is twofold: one is merely sufficient
with regard to things necessary for salvation; and such diligence is
given to all who have grace, whom "His unction teacheth of all things"
(1 John 2:27). There is also another diligence which is more than
sufficient, whereby a man is able to make provision both for himself
and for others, not only in matters necessary for salvation, but also
in all things relating to human life; and such diligence as this is
not in all who have grace.

Reply Obj. 2: Those who require to be guided by the counsel of
others, are able, if they have grace, to take counsel for themselves
in this point at least, that they require the counsel of others and
can discern good from evil counsel.

Reply Obj. 3: Acquired prudence is caused by the exercise of
acts, wherefore "its acquisition demands experience and time" (Ethic.
ii, 1), hence it cannot be in the young, neither in habit nor in act.
On the other hand gratuitous prudence is caused by divine infusion.
Wherefore, in children who have been baptized but have not come to the
use of reason, there is prudence as to habit but not as to act, even
as in idiots; whereas in those who have come to the use of reason, it
is also as to act, with regard to things necessary for salvation. This
by practice merits increase, until it becomes perfect, even as the
other virtues. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 5:14) that "strong meat is
for the perfect, for them who by custom have their senses exercised to
the discerning of good and evil."
_______________________

FIFTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 15]

Whether Prudence Is in Us by Nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is in us by nature. The
Philosopher says that things connected with prudence "seem to be
natural," namely "synesis, gnome" [*_synesis_ and _gnome_, Cf. I-II,
Q. 57, A. 6] and the like, but not those which are connected with
speculative wisdom. Now things belonging to the same genus have the
same kind of origin. Therefore prudence also is in us from nature.

Obj. 2: Further, the changes of age are according to nature. Now
prudence results from age, according to Job 12:12: "In the ancient is
wisdom, and in length of days prudence." Therefore prudence is
natural.

Obj. 3: Further, prudence is more consistent with human nature than
with that of dumb animals. Now there are instances of a certain
natural prudence in dumb animals, according to the Philosopher (De
Hist. Anim. viii, 1). Therefore prudence is natural.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that
"intellectual virtue is both originated and fostered by teaching; it
therefore demands experience and time." Now prudence is an
intellectual virtue, as stated above (A. 4). Therefore prudence is in
us, not by nature, but by teaching and experience.

_I answer that,_ As shown above (A. 3), prudence includes knowledge
both of universals, and of the singular matters of action to which
prudence applies the universal principles. Accordingly, as regards
the knowledge of universals, the same is to be said of prudence as of
speculative science, because the primary universal principles of
either are known naturally, as shown above (A. 6): except that the
common principles of prudence are more connatural to man; for as the
Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 7) "the life which is according to the
speculative reason is better than that which is according to man":
whereas the secondary universal principles, whether of the
speculative or of the practical reason, are not inherited from
nature, but are acquired by discovery through experience, or through
teaching.

On the other hand, as regards the knowledge of particulars which are
the matter of action, we must make a further distinction, because
this matter of action is either an end or the means to an end. Now
the right ends of human life are fixed; wherefore there can be a
natural inclination in respect of these ends; thus it has been stated
above (I-II, Q. 51, A. 1; Q. 63, A. 1) that some, from a natural
inclination, have certain virtues whereby they are inclined to right
ends; and consequently they also have naturally a right judgment
about such like ends.

But the means to the end, in human concerns, far from being fixed,
are of manifold variety according to the variety of persons and
affairs. Wherefore since the inclination of nature is ever to
something fixed, the knowledge of those means cannot be in man
naturally, although, by reason of his natural disposition, one man
has a greater aptitude than another in discerning them, just as it
happens with regard to the conclusions of speculative sciences. Since
then prudence is not about the ends, but about the means, as stated
above (A. 6; I-II, Q. 57, A. 5), it follows that prudence is not from
nature.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of things relating to
prudence, in so far as they are directed to ends. Wherefore he had
said before (Ethic. vi, 5, 11) that "they are the principles of the
_ou heneka_" [*Literally, 'for the sake of which' (are the means)],
namely, the end; and so he does not mention _euboulia_ among them,
because it takes counsel about the means.

Reply Obj. 2: Prudence is rather in the old, not only because their
natural disposition calms the movement of the sensitive passions, but
also because of their long experience.

Reply Obj. 3: Even in dumb animals there are fixed ways of obtaining
an end, wherefore we observe that all the animals of a same species
act in like manner. But this is impossible in man, on account of his
reason, which takes cognizance of universals, and consequently
extends to an infinity of singulars.
_______________________

SIXTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 16]

Whether Prudence Can Be Lost Through Forgetfulness?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence can be lost through
forgetfulness. For since science is about necessary things, it is
more certain than prudence which is about contingent matters of
action. But science is lost by forgetfulness. Much more therefore is
prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) "the same
things, but by a contrary process, engender and corrupt virtue." Now
the engendering of prudence requires experience which is made up "of
many memories," as he states at the beginning of his _Metaphysics_
(i, 1). Therefore since forgetfulness is contrary to memory, it seems
that prudence can be lost through forgetfulness.

Obj. 3: Further, there is no prudence without knowledge of
universals. But knowledge of universals can be lost through
forgetfulness. Therefore prudence can also.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that
"forgetfulness is possible to art but not to prudence."

_I answer that,_ Forgetfulness regards knowledge only, wherefore one
can forget art and science, so as to lose them altogether, because
they belong to the reason. But prudence consists not in knowledge
alone, but also in an act of the appetite, because as stated above
(A. 8), its principal act is one of command, whereby a man applies
the knowledge he has, to the purpose of appetition and operation.
Hence prudence is not taken away directly by forgetfulness, but
rather is corrupted by the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
vi, 5) that "pleasure and sorrow pervert the estimate of prudence":
wherefore it is written (Dan. 13:56): "Beauty hath deceived thee, and
lust hath subverted thy heart," and (Ex. 23:8): "Neither shalt thou
take bribes which blind even the prudent [Douay: 'wise']."

Nevertheless forgetfulness may hinder prudence, in so far as the
latter's command depends on knowledge which may be forgotten.

Reply Obj. 1: Science is in the reason only: hence the comparison
fails, as stated above [*Cf. I-II, Q. 53, A. 1].

Reply Obj. 2: The experience required by prudence results not from
memory alone, but also from the practice of commanding aright.

Reply Obj. 3: Prudence consists chiefly, not in the knowledge of
universals, but in applying them to action, as stated above (A. 3).
Wherefore forgetting the knowledge of universals does not destroy the
principal part of prudence, but hinders it somewhat, as stated above.
_______________________

QUESTION 48

OF THE PARTS OF PRUDENCE
(In One Article)

We must now consider the parts of prudence, under which head there are
four points of inquiry:

(1) Which are the parts of prudence?

(2) Of its integral parts;

(3) Of its subjective parts;

(4) Of its potential parts.
_______________________

ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 48, Art.]

Whether Three Parts of Prudence Are Fittingly Assigned?

Objection 1: It would seem that the parts of prudence are assigned
unfittingly. Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) assigns three parts of
prudence, namely, "memory," "understanding" and "foresight."
Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i) following the opinion of Plotinus
ascribes to prudence six parts, namely, "reasoning," "understanding,"
"circumspection," "foresight," "docility" and "caution." Aristotle
says (Ethic. vi, 9, 10, 11) that "good counsel," "synesis" and
"gnome" belong to prudence. Again under the head of prudence he
mentions "conjecture," "shrewdness," "sense" and "understanding." And
another Greek philosopher [*Andronicus; Cf. Q. 80, Obj. 4] says that
ten things are connected with prudence, namely, "good counsel,"
"shrewdness," "foresight," "regnative [*Regnativa]," "military,"
"political" and "domestic prudence," "dialectics," "rhetoric" and
"physics." Therefore it seems that one or the other enumeration is
either excessive or deficient.

Obj. 2: Further, prudence is specifically distinct from science. But
politics, economics, logic, rhetoric, physics are sciences. Therefore
they are not parts of prudence.

Obj. 3: Further, the parts do not exceed the whole. Now the
intellective memory or intelligence, reason, sense and docility,
belong not only to prudence but also to all the cognitive habits.
Therefore they should not be set down as parts of prudence.

Obj. 4: Further, just as counselling, judging and commanding are acts
of the practical reason, so also is using, as stated above (I-II, Q.
16, A. 1). Therefore, just as "eubulia" which refers to counsel, is
connected with prudence, and "synesis" and "gnome" which refer to
judgment, so also ought something to have been assigned corresponding
to use.

Obj. 5: Further, solicitude pertains to prudence, as stated above (Q.
47, A. 9). Therefore solicitude also should have been mentioned among
the parts of prudence.

_I answer that,_ Parts are of three kinds, namely, _integral,_ as
wall, roof, and foundations are parts of a house; _subjective,_ as ox
and lion are parts of animal; and _potential,_ as the nutritive and
sensitive powers are parts of the soul. Accordingly, parts can be
assigned to a virtue in three ways. First, in likeness to integral
parts, so that the things which need to concur for the perfect act of
a virtue, are called the parts of that virtue. In this way, out of
all the things mentioned above, eight may be taken as parts of
prudence, namely, the six assigned by Macrobius; with the addition of
a seventh, viz. _memory_ mentioned by Tully; and _eustochia_ or
_shrewdness_ mentioned by Aristotle. For the _sense_ of prudence is
also called _understanding_: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic.
vi, 11): "Of such things one needs to have the sense, and this is
understanding." Of these eight, five belong to prudence as a
cognitive virtue, namely, _memory, reasoning, understanding,
_docility_ and _shrewdness:_ while the three others belong thereto,
as commanding and applying knowledge to action, namely, _foresight,
circumspection_ and _caution._ The reason of their difference is seen
from the fact that three things may be observed in reference to
knowledge. In the first place, knowledge itself, which, if it be of
the past, is called _memory,_ if of the present, whether contingent
or necessary, is called _understanding_ or _intelligence._ Secondly,
the acquiring of knowledge, which is caused either by teaching, to
which pertains _docility,_ or by _discovery,_ and to this belongs to
_eustochia_, i.e. "a happy conjecture," of which _shrewdness_ is a
part, which is a "quick conjecture of the middle term," as stated in
Poster. i, 9. Thirdly, the use of knowledge, in as much as we proceed
from things known to knowledge or judgment of other things, and this
belongs to _reasoning._ And the reason, in order to command aright,
requires to have three conditions. First, to order that which is
befitting the end, and this belongs to _foresight;_ secondly, to
attend to the circumstances of the matter in hand, and this belongs
to _circumspection;_ thirdly, to avoid obstacles, and this belongs to
_caution._

The subjective parts of a virtue are its various species. In this way
the parts of prudence, if we take them properly, are the prudence
whereby a man rules himself, and the prudence whereby a man governs a
multitude, which differ specifically as stated above (Q. 47, A. 11).
Again, the prudence whereby a multitude is governed, is divided into
various species according to the various kinds of multitude. There is
the multitude which is united together for some particular purpose;
thus an army is gathered together to fight, and the prudence that
governs this is called _military._ There is also the multitude that
is united together for the whole of life; such is the multitude of a
home or family, and this is ruled by _domestic prudence_: and such
again is the multitude of a city or kingdom, the ruling principle of
which is _regnative prudence_ in the ruler, and _political prudence,_
simply so called, in the subjects.

If, however, prudence be taken in a wide sense, as including also
speculative knowledge, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 2, ad 2) then its
parts include _dialectics,_ _rhetoric_ and _physics,_ according to
three methods of prudence in the sciences. The first of these is the
attaining of science by demonstration, which belongs to _physics_ (if
physics be understood to comprise all demonstrative sciences). The
second method is to arrive at an opinion through probable premises,
and this belongs to _dialectics._ The third method is to employ
conjectures in order to induce a certain suspicion, or to persuade
somewhat, and this belongs to _rhetoric._ It may be said, however,
that these three belong also to prudence properly so called, since it
argues sometimes from necessary premises, sometimes from
probabilities, and sometimes from conjectures.

The potential parts of a virtue are the virtues connected with it,
which are directed to certain secondary acts or matters, not having,
as it were, the whole power of the principal virtue. In this way the
parts of prudence are _good counsel,_ which concerns counsel,
_synesis,_ which concerns judgment in matters of ordinary occurrence,
and _gnome,_ which concerns judgment in matters of exception to the
law: while _prudence_ is about the chief act, viz. that of commanding.

Reply Obj. 1: The various enumerations differ, either because
different kinds of parts are assigned, or because that which is
mentioned in one enumeration includes several mentioned in another
enumeration. Thus Tully includes "caution" and "circumspection" under
"foresight," and "reasoning," "docility" and "shrewdness" under
"understanding."

Reply Obj. 2: Here domestic and civic prudence are not to be taken as
sciences, but as kinds of prudence. As to the other three, the reply
may be gathered from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 3: All these things are reckoned parts of prudence, not by
taking them altogether, but in so far as they are connected with
things pertaining to prudence.

Reply Obj. 4: Right command and right use always go together, because
the reason's command is followed by obedience on the part of the
lower powers, which pertain to use.

Reply Obj. 5: Solicitude is included under foresight.
_______________________

QUESTION 49

OF EACH QUASI-INTEGRAL PART OF PRUDENCE
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider each quasi-integral part of prudence, and under
this head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Memory;

(2) Understanding or Intelligence;

(3) Docility;

(4) Shrewdness;

(5) Reason;

(6) Foresight;

(7) Circumspection;

(8) Caution.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 1]

Whether Memory Is a Part of Prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that memory is not a part of prudence. For
memory, as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. i), is in the
sensitive part of the soul: whereas prudence is in the rational part
(Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, prudence is acquired and perfected by experience,
whereas memory is in us from nature. Therefore memory is not a part
of prudence.

Obj. 3: Further, memory regards the past, whereas prudence regards
future matters of action, about which counsel is concerned, as stated
in _Ethic._ vi, 2, 7. Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.

_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) places memory
among the parts of prudence.

_I answer that,_ Prudence regards contingent matters of action, as
stated above (Q. 47, A. 5). Now in such like matters a man can be
directed, not by those things that are simply and necessarily true,
but by those which occur in the majority of cases: because principles
must be proportionate to their conclusions, and "like must be
concluded from like" (Ethic. vi [*Anal. Post. i. 32]). But we need
experience to discover what is true in the majority of cases:
wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual
virtue is engendered and fostered by experience and time." Now
experience is the result of many memories as stated in _Metaph._ i,
1, and therefore prudence requires the memory of many things. Hence
memory is fittingly accounted a part of prudence.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 47, AA. 3, 6), prudence applies
universal knowledge to particulars which are objects of sense: hence
many things belonging to the sensitive faculties are requisite for
prudence, and memory is one of them.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as aptitude for prudence is in our nature, while
its perfection comes through practice or grace, so too, as Tully says
in his Rhetoric [*Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii, 16, 24], memory not
only arises from nature, but is also aided by art and diligence.

There are four things whereby a man perfects his memory. First, when
a man wishes to remember a thing, he should take some suitable yet
somewhat unwonted illustration of it, since the unwonted strikes us
more, and so makes a greater and stronger impression on the mind; the
mind; and this explains why we remember better what we saw when we
were children. Now the reason for the necessity of finding these
illustrations or images, is that simple and spiritual impressions
easily slip from the mind, unless they be tied as it were to some
corporeal image, because human knowledge has a greater hold on
sensible objects. For this reason memory is assigned to the sensitive
part of the soul. Secondly, whatever a man wishes to retain in his
memory he must carefully consider and set in order, so that he may
pass easily from one memory to another. Hence the Philosopher says
(De Memor. et Remin. ii): "Sometimes a place brings memories back to
us: the reason being that we pass quickly from the one to the other."
Thirdly, we must be anxious and earnest about the things we wish to
remember, because the more a thing is impressed on the mind, the less
it is liable to slip out of it. Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric
[*Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii.] that "anxiety preserves the figures
of images entire." Fourthly, we should often reflect on the things we
wish to remember. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memoria i) that
"reflection preserves memories," because as he remarks (De Memoria
ii) "custom is a second nature": wherefore when we reflect on a thing
frequently, we quickly call it to mind, through passing from one
thing to another by a kind of natural order.

Reply Obj. 3: It behooves us to argue, as it were, about the future
from the past; wherefore memory of the past is necessary in order to
take good counsel for the future.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 2]

Whether Understanding* Is a Part of Prudence?
[*Otherwise intuition; Aristotle's word is _nous_]

Objection 1: It would seem that understanding is not a part of
prudence. When two things are members of a division, one is not part
of the other. But intellectual virtue is divided into understanding
and prudence, according to _Ethic._ vi, 3. Therefore understanding
should not be reckoned a part of prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, understanding is numbered among the gifts of the
Holy Ghost, and corresponds to faith, as stated above (Q. 8, AA. 1,
8). But prudence is a virtue other than faith, as is clear from what
has been said above (Q. 4, A. 8; I-II, Q. 62, A. 2). Therefore
understanding does not pertain to prudence.

Obj. 3: Further, prudence is about singular matters of action (Ethic.
vi, 7): whereas understanding takes cognizance of universal and
immaterial objects (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore understanding is not
a part of prudence.

_On the contrary,_ Tully [*De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53] accounts
"intelligence" a part of prudence, and Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i,
8] mentions "understanding," which comes to the same.

_I answer that,_ Understanding denotes here, not the intellectual
power, but the right estimate about some final principle, which is
taken as self-evident: thus we are said to understand the first
principles of demonstrations. Now every deduction of reason proceeds
from certain statements which are taken as primary: wherefore every
process of reasoning must needs proceed from some understanding.
Therefore since prudence is right reason applied to action, the whole
process of prudence must needs have its source in understanding.
Hence it is that understanding is reckoned a part of prudence.

Reply Obj. 1: The reasoning of prudence terminates, as in a
conclusion, in the particular matter of action, to which, as stated
above (Q. 47, AA. 3, 6), it applies the knowledge of some universal
principle. Now a singular conclusion is argued from a universal and a
singular proposition. Wherefore the reasoning of prudence must
proceed from a twofold understanding. The one is cognizant of
universals, and this belongs to the understanding which is an
intellectual virtue, whereby we know naturally not only speculative
principles, but also practical universal principles, such as "One
should do evil to no man," as shown above (Q. 47, A. 6). The other
understanding, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 11, is cognizant of an
extreme, i.e. of some primary singular and contingent practical
matter, viz. the minor premiss, which must needs be singular in the
syllogism of prudence, as stated above (Q. 47, AA. 3, 6). Now this
primary singular is some singular end, as stated in the same place.
Wherefore the understanding which is a part of prudence is a right
estimate of some particular end.

Reply Obj. 2: The understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, is
a quick insight into divine things, as shown above (Q. 8, AA. 1, 2).
It is in another sense that it is accounted a part of prudence, as
stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: The right estimate about a particular end is called
both "understanding," in so far as its object is a principle, and
"sense," in so far as its object is a particular. This is what the
Philosopher means when he says (Ethic. v, 11): "Of such things we
need to have the sense, and this is understanding." But this is to be
understood as referring, not to the particular sense whereby we know
proper sensibles, but to the interior sense, whereby we judge of a
particular.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 3]

Whether Docility Should Be Accounted a Part of Prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that docility should not be accounted a
part of prudence. For that which is a necessary condition of every
intellectual virtue, should not be appropriated to one of them. But
docility is requisite for every intellectual virtue. Therefore it
should not be accounted a part of prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, that which pertains to a human virtue is in our
power, since it is for things that are in our power that we are
praised or blamed. Now it is not in our power to be docile, for this
is befitting to some through their natural disposition. Therefore it
is not a part of prudence.

Obj. 3: Further, docility is in the disciple: whereas prudence, since
it makes precepts, seems rather to belong to teachers, who are also
called "preceptors." Therefore docility is not a part of prudence.

_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] following the
opinion of Plotinus places docility among the parts of prudence.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2, ad 1; Q. 47, A. 3) prudence
is concerned with particular matters of action, and since such
matters are of infinite variety, no one man can consider them all
sufficiently; nor can this be done quickly, for it requires length of
time. Hence in matters of prudence man stands in very great need of
being taught by others, especially by old folk who have acquired a
sane understanding of the ends in practical matters. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11): "It is right to pay no less
attention to the undemonstrated assertions and opinions of such
persons as are experienced, older than we are, and prudent, than to
their demonstrations, for their experience gives them an insight into
principles." Thus it is written (Prov. 3:5): "Lean not on thy own
prudence," and (Ecclus. 6:35): "Stand in the multitude of the
ancients" (i.e. the old men), "that are wise, and join thyself from
thy heart to their wisdom." Now it is a mark of docility to be ready
to be taught: and consequently docility is fittingly reckoned a part
of prudence.

Reply Obj. 1: Although docility is useful for every intellectual
virtue, yet it belongs to prudence chiefly, for the reason given
above.

Reply Obj. 2: Man has a natural aptitude for docility even as for
other things connected with prudence. Yet his own efforts count for
much towards the attainment of perfect docility: and he must
carefully, frequently and reverently apply his mind to the teachings
of the learned, neither neglecting them through laziness, nor
despising them through pride.

Reply Obj. 3: By prudence man makes precepts not only for others, but
also for himself, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 12, ad 3). Hence as
stated (Ethic. vi, 11), even in subjects, there is place for
prudence; to which docility pertains. And yet even the learned should
be docile in some respects, since no man is altogether
self-sufficient in matters of prudence, as stated above.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 4]

Whether Shrewdness Is Part of Prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that shrewdness is not a part of prudence.
For shrewdness consists in easily finding the middle term for
demonstrations, as stated in _Poster._ i, 34. Now the reasoning of
prudence is not a demonstration since it deals with contingencies.
Therefore shrewdness does not pertain to prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, good counsel pertains to prudence according to
_Ethic._ vi, 5, 7, 9. Now there is no place in good counsel for
shrewdness [*Ethic. vi, 9; Poster. i, 34] which is a kind of
_eustochia_, i.e. "a happy conjecture": for the latter is
"unreasoning and rapid," whereas counsel needs to be slow, as stated
in _Ethic._ vi, 9. Therefore shrewdness should not be accounted a
part of prudence.

Obj. 3: Further, shrewdness as stated above (Q. 48) is a "happy
conjecture." Now it belongs to rhetoricians to make use of
conjectures. Therefore shrewdness belongs to rhetoric rather than to
prudence.

_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x): "A solicitous man is one
who is shrewd and alert (_solers citus_)." But solicitude belongs to
prudence, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 9). Therefore shrewdness does
also.

_I answer that,_ Prudence consists in a right estimate about matters
of action. Now a right estimate or opinion is acquired in two ways,
both in practical and in speculative matters, first by discovering it
oneself, secondly by learning it from others. Now just as docility
consists in a man being well disposed to acquire a right opinion from
another man, so shrewdness is an apt disposition to acquire a right
estimate by oneself, yet so that shrewdness be taken for _eustochia_,
of which it is a part. For _eustochia_ is a happy conjecture about
any matter, while shrewdness is "an easy and rapid conjecture in
finding the middle term" (Poster. i, 34). Nevertheless the
philosopher [*Andronicus; Cf. Q. 48, Obj. 1] who calls shrewdness a
part of prudence, takes it for _eustochia_, in general, hence he
says: "Shrewdness is a habit whereby congruities are discovered
rapidly."

Reply Obj. 1: Shrewdness is concerned with the discovery of the
middle term not only in demonstrative, but also in practical
syllogisms, as, for instance, when two men are seen to be friends
they are reckoned to be enemies of a third one, as the Philosopher
says (Poster. i, 34). In this way shrewdness belongs to prudence.

Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher adduces the true reason (Ethic. vi, 9)
to prove that _euboulia_, i.e. good counsel, is not _eustochia_,
which is commended for grasping quickly what should be done. Now a
man may take good counsel, though he be long and slow in so doing,
and yet this does not discount the utility of a happy conjecture in
taking good counsel: indeed it is sometimes a necessity, when, for
instance, something has to be done without warning. It is for this
reason that shrewdness is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence.

Reply Obj. 3: Rhetoric also reasons about practical matters,
wherefore nothing hinders the same thing belonging both to rhetoric
and prudence. Nevertheless, conjecture is taken here not only in the
sense in which it is employed by rhetoricians, but also as applicable
to all matters whatsoever wherein man is said to conjecture the truth.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 5]

Whether Reason Should Be Reckoned a Part of Prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that reason should not be reckoned a part
of prudence. For the subject of an accident is not a part thereof.
But prudence is in the reason as its subject (Ethic. vi, 5).
Therefore reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, that which is common to many, should not be reckoned
a part of any one of them; or if it be so reckoned, it should be
reckoned a part of that one to which it chiefly belongs. Now reason
is necessary in all the intellectual virtues, and chiefly in wisdom
and science, which employ a demonstrative reason. Therefore reason
should not be reckoned a part of prudence

Obj. 3: Further, reason as a power does not differ essentially from
the intelligence, as stated above (I, Q. 79, A. 8). If therefore
intelligence be reckoned a part of prudence, it is superfluous to add
reason.

_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i], following the
opinion of Plotinus, numbers reason among the parts of prudence.

_I answer that,_ The work of prudence is to take good counsel, as
stated in _Ethic._ vi, 7. Now counsel is a research proceeding from
certain things to others. But this is the work of reason. Wherefore
it is requisite for prudence that man should be an apt reasoner. And
since the things required for the perfection of prudence are called
requisite or quasi-integral parts of prudence, it follows that reason
should be numbered among these parts.

Reply Obj. 1: Reason denotes here, not the power of reason, but its
good use.

Reply Obj. 2: The certitude of reason comes from the intellect. Yet
the need of reason is from a defect in the intellect, since those
things in which the intellective power is in full vigor, have no need
for reason, for they comprehend the truth by their simple insight, as
do God and the angels. On the other hand particular matters of
action, wherein prudence guides, are very far from the condition of
things intelligible, and so much the farther, as they are less
certain and fixed. Thus matters of art, though they are singular, are
nevertheless more fixed and certain, wherefore in many of them there
is no room for counsel on account of their certitude, as stated in
_Ethic._ iii, 3. Hence, although in certain other intellectual
virtues reason is more certain than in prudence, yet prudence above
all requires that man be an apt reasoner, so that he may rightly
apply universals to particulars, which latter are various and
uncertain.

Reply Obj. 3: Although intelligence and reason are not different
powers, yet they are named after different acts. For intelligence
takes its name from being an intimate penetration of the truth [*Cf.
II-II, Q. 8, A. 1], while reason is so called from being inquisitive
and discursive. Hence each is accounted a part of reason as explained
above (A. 2; Q. 47, A. 2, 3).
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 6]

Whether Foresight* Should Be Accounted a Part of Prudence?
[*"Providentia," which may be translated either "providence" or
"foresight."]

Objection 1: It would seem that foresight should not be accounted a
part of prudence. For nothing is part of itself. Now foresight seems
to be the same as prudence, because according to Isidore (Etym. x),
"a prudent man is one who sees from afar (_porro videns_)": and this
is also the derivation of _providentia_ (foresight), according to
Boethius (De Consol. v). Therefore foresight is not a part of
prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, prudence is only practical, whereas foresight may be
also speculative, because _seeing,_ whence we have the word "to
foresee," has more to do with speculation than operation. Therefore
foresight is not a part of prudence.

Obj. 3: Further, the chief act of prudence is to command, while its
secondary act is to judge and to take counsel. But none of these
seems to be properly implied by foresight. Therefore foresight is not
part of prudence.

On the contrary stands the authority of Tully and Macrobius, who
number foresight among the parts of prudence, as stated above (Q. 48).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 47, A. 1, ad 2, AA. 6, 13),
prudence is properly about the means to an end, and its proper work
is to set them in due order to the end. And although certain things
are necessary for an end, which are subject to divine providence, yet
nothing is subject to human providence except the contingent matters
of actions which can be done by man for an end. Now the past has
become a kind of necessity, since what has been done cannot be
undone. In like manner, the present as such, has a kind of necessity,
since it is necessary that Socrates sit, so long as he sits.

Consequently, future contingents, in so far as they can be directed by
man to the end of human life, are the matter of prudence: and each of
these things is implied in the word foresight, for it implies the
notion of something distant, to which that which occurs in the present
has to be directed. Therefore foresight is part of prudence.

Reply Obj. 1: Whenever many things are requisite for a unity, one of
them must needs be the principal to which all the others are
subordinate. Hence in every whole one part must be formal and
predominant, whence the whole has unity. Accordingly foresight is the
principal of all the parts of prudence, since whatever else is
required for prudence, is necessary precisely that some particular
thing may be rightly directed to its end. Hence it is that the very
name of prudence is taken from foresight (_providentia_) as from its
principal part.

Reply Obj. 2: Speculation is about universal and necessary things,
which, in themselves, are not distant, since they are everywhere and
always, though they are distant from us, in so far as we fail to know
them. Hence foresight does not apply properly to speculative, but
only to practical matters.

Reply Obj. 3: Right order to an end which is included in the notion
of foresight, contains rectitude of counsel, judgment and command,
without which no right order to the end is possible.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 7]

Whether Circumspection Can Be a Part of Prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that circumspection cannot be a part of
prudence. For circumspection seems to signify looking at one's
surroundings. But these are of infinite number, and cannot be
considered by the reason wherein is prudence. Therefore
circumspection should not be reckoned a part of prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, circumstances seem to be the concern of moral
virtues rather than of prudence. But circumspection seems to denote
nothing but attention to circumstances. Therefore circumspection
apparently belongs to the moral virtues rather than to prudence.

Obj. 3: Further, whoever can see things afar off can much more see
things that are near. Now foresight enables a man to look on distant
things. Therefore there is no need to account circumspection a part
of prudence in addition to foresight.

On the contrary stands the authority of Macrobius, quoted above (Q.
48).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), it belongs to prudence
chiefly to direct something aright to an end; and this is not done
aright unless both the end be good, and the means good and suitable.

Since, however, prudence, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 3) is about
singular matters of action, which contain many combinations of
circumstances, it happens that a thing is good in itself and suitable
to the end, and nevertheless becomes evil or unsuitable to the end,
by reason of some combination of circumstances. Thus to show signs of
love to someone seems, considered in itself, to be a fitting way to
arouse love in his heart, yet if pride or suspicion of flattery arise
in his heart, it will no longer be a means suitable to the end. Hence
the need of circumspection in prudence, viz. of comparing the means
with the circumstances.

Reply Obj. 1: Though the number of possible circumstances be
infinite, the number of actual circumstances is not; and the judgment
of reason in matters of action is influenced by things which are few
in number.

Reply Obj. 2: Circumstances are the concern of prudence, because
prudence has to fix them; on the other hand they are the concern of
moral virtues, in so far as moral virtues are perfected by the fixing
of circumstances.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as it belongs to foresight to look on that
which is by its nature suitable to an end, so it belongs to
circumspection to consider whether it be suitable to the end in view
of the circumstances. Now each of these presents a difficulty of its
own, and therefore each is reckoned a distinct part of prudence.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 8]

Whether Caution Should Be Reckoned a Part of Prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that caution should not be reckoned a part
of prudence. For when no evil is possible, no caution is required.
Now no man makes evil use of virtue, as Augustine declares (De Lib.
Arb. ii, 19). Therefore caution does not belong to prudence which
directs the virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, to foresee good and to avoid evil belong to the same
faculty, just as the same art gives health and cures ill-health. Now
it belongs to foresight to foresee good, and consequently, also to
avoid evil. Therefore caution should not be accounted a part of
prudence, distinct from foresight.

Obj. 3: Further, no prudent man strives for the impossible. But no
man can take precautions against all possible evils. Therefore
caution does not belong to prudence.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 5:15): "See how you walk
cautiously [Douay: 'circumspectly']."

_I answer that,_ The things with which prudence is concerned, are
contingent matters of action, wherein, even as false is found with
true, so is evil mingled with good, on account of the great variety
of these matters of action, wherein good is often hindered by evil,
and evil has the appearance of good. Wherefore prudence needs
caution, so that we may have such a grasp of good as to avoid evil.

Reply Obj. 1: Caution is required in moral acts, that we may be on
our guard, not against acts of virtue, but against the hindrance of
acts of virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: It is the same in idea, to ensue good and to avoid the
opposite evil, but the avoidance of outward hindrances is different
in idea. Hence caution differs from foresight, although they both
belong to the one virtue of prudence.

Reply Obj. 3: Of the evils which man has to avoid, some are of
frequent occurrence; the like can be grasped by reason, and against
them caution is directed, either that they may be avoided altogether,
or that they may do less harm. Others there are that occur rarely and
by chance, and these, since they are infinite in number, cannot be
grasped by reason, nor is man able to take precautions against them,
although by exercising prudence he is able to prepare against all the
surprises of chance, so as to suffer less harm thereby.
_______________________

QUESTION 50

OF THE SUBJECTIVE PARTS OF PRUDENCE
(In Four Articles)

We must, in due sequence, consider the subjective parts of prudence.
And since we have already spoken of the prudence with which a man
rules himself (Q. 47, seqq.), it remains for us to discuss the species
of prudence whereby a multitude is governed. Under this head there are
four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a species of prudence is regnative?

(2) Whether political and (3) domestic economy are species of
prudence?

(4) Whether military prudence is?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 50, Art. 1]

Whether a Species of Prudence Is Regnative?

Objection 1: It would seem that regnative should not be reckoned a
species of prudence. For regnative prudence is directed to the
preservation of justice, since according to _Ethic._ v, 6 the prince
is the guardian of justice. Therefore regnative prudence belongs to
justice rather than to prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 5) a
kingdom (_regnum_) is one of six species of government. But no
species of prudence is ascribed to the other five forms of
government, which are "aristocracy," "polity," also called
"timocracy" [*Cf. _Ethic._ viii, 10], "tyranny," "oligarchy" and
"democracy." Therefore neither should a regnative species be ascribed
to a kingdom.

Obj. 3: Further, lawgiving belongs not only to kings, but also to
certain others placed in authority, and even to the people, according
to Isidore (Etym. v). Now the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) reckons a
part of prudence to be "legislative." Therefore it is not becoming to
substitute regnative prudence in its place.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 11) that
"prudence is a virtue which is proper to the prince." Therefore a
special kind of prudence is regnative.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 47, AA. 8, 10), it belongs to
prudence to govern and command, so that wherever in human acts we
find a special kind of governance and command, there must be a
special kind of prudence. Now it is evident that there is a special
and perfect kind of governance in one who has to govern not only
himself but also the perfect community of a city or kingdom; because
a government is the more perfect according as it is more universal,
extends to more matters, and attains a higher end. Hence prudence in
its special and most perfect sense, belongs to a king who is charged
with the government of a city or kingdom: for which reason a species
of prudence is reckoned to be regnative.

Reply Obj. 1: All matters connected with moral virtue belong to
prudence as their guide, wherefore "right reason in accord with
prudence" is included in the definition of moral virtue, as stated
above (Q. 47, A. 5, ad 1; I-II, Q. 58, A. 2, ad 4). For this reason
also the execution of justice in so far as it is directed to the
common good, which is part of the kingly office, needs the guidance
of prudence. Hence these two virtues--prudence and justice--belong
most properly to a king, according to Jer. 23:5: "A king shall reign
and shall be wise, and shall execute justice and judgment in the
earth." Since, however, direction belongs rather to the king, and
execution to his subjects, regnative prudence is reckoned a species
of prudence which is directive, rather than to justice which is
executive.

Reply Obj. 2: A kingdom is the best of all governments, as stated in
_Ethic._ viii, 10: wherefore the species of prudence should be
denominated rather from a kingdom, yet so as to comprehend under
regnative all other rightful forms of government, but not perverse
forms which are opposed to virtue, and which, accordingly, do not
pertain to prudence.

Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher names regnative prudence after the
principal act of a king which is to make laws, and although this
applies to the other forms of government, this is only in so far as
they have a share of kingly government.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 50, Art. 2]

Whether Political Prudence Is Fittingly Accounted a Part of Prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that political prudence is not fittingly
accounted a part of prudence. For regnative is a part of political
prudence, as stated above (A. 1). But a part should not be reckoned a
species with the whole. Therefore political prudence should not be
reckoned a part of prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, the species of habits are distinguished by their
various objects. Now what the ruler has to command is the same as
what the subject has to execute. Therefore political prudence as
regards the subjects, should not be reckoned a species of prudence
distinct from regnative prudence.

Obj. 3: Further, each subject is an individual person. Now each
individual person can direct himself sufficiently by prudence
commonly so called. Therefore there is no need of a special kind of
prudence called political.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "of the
prudence which is concerned with the state one kind is a
master-prudence and is called legislative; another kind bears the
common name political, and deals with individuals."

_I answer that,_ A slave is moved by his master, and a subject by his
ruler, by command, but otherwise than as irrational and inanimate
beings are set in motion by their movers. For irrational and
inanimate beings are moved only by others and do not put themselves
in motion, since they have no free-will whereby to be masters of
their own actions, wherefore the rectitude of their government is not
in their power but in the power of their movers. On the other hand,
men who are slaves or subjects in any sense, are moved by the
commands of others in such a way that they move themselves by their
free-will; wherefore some kind of rectitude of government is required
in them, so that they may direct themselves in obeying their
superiors; and to this belongs that species of prudence which is
called political.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, regnative is the most perfect species
of prudence, wherefore the prudence of subjects, which falls short of
regnative prudence, retains the common name of political prudence,
even as in logic a convertible term which does not denote the essence
of a thing retains the name of "proper."

Reply Obj. 2: A different aspect of the object diversifies the
species of a habit, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 5). Now the same
actions are considered by the king, but under a more general aspect,
as by his subjects who obey: since many obey one king in various
departments. Hence regnative prudence is compared to this political
prudence of which we are speaking, as mastercraft to handicraft.

Reply Obj. 3: Man directs himself by prudence commonly so called, in
relation to his own good, but by political prudence, of which we
speak, he directs himself in relation to the common good.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 50, Art. 3]

Whether a Part of Prudence Should Be Reckoned to Be Domestic?

Objection 1: It would seem that domestic should not be reckoned a
part of prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5)
"prudence is directed to a good life in general": whereas domestic
prudence is directed to a particular end, viz. wealth, according to
_Ethic._ i, 1. Therefore a species of prudence is not domestic.

Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 13) prudence is only in
good people. But domestic prudence may be also in wicked people,
since many sinners are provident in governing their household.
Therefore domestic prudence should not be reckoned a species of
prudence.

Obj. 3: Further, just as in a kingdom there is a ruler and subject,
so also is there in a household. If therefore domestic like political
is a species of prudence, there should be a paternal corresponding to
regnative prudence. Now there is no such prudence. Therefore neither
should domestic prudence be accounted a species of prudence.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 8) that there
are various kinds of prudence in the government of a multitude, "one
of which is domestic, another legislative, and another political."

_I answer that,_ Different aspects of an object, in respect of
universality and particularity, or of totality and partiality,
diversify arts and virtues; and in respect of such diversity one act
of virtue is principal as compared with another. Now it is evident
that a household is a mean between the individual and the city or
kingdom, since just as the individual is part of the household, so is
the household part of the city or kingdom. And therefore, just as
prudence commonly so called which governs the individual, is distinct
from political prudence, so must domestic prudence be distinct from
both.

Reply Obj. 1: Riches are compared to domestic prudence, not as
its last end, but as its instrument, as stated in _Polit. i, 3. On the
other hand, the end of political prudence is "a good life in general"
as regards the conduct of the household. In _Ethic._ i, 1 the
Philosopher speaks of riches as the end of political prudence, by way
of example and in accordance with the opinion of many.

Reply Obj. 2: Some sinners may be provident in certain matters
of detail concerning the disposition of their household, but not in
regard to "a good life in general" as regards the conduct of the
household, for which above all a virtuous life is required.

Reply Obj. 3: The father has in his household an authority
like that of a king, as stated in _Ethic._ viii, 10, but he has not the
full power of a king, wherefore paternal government is not reckoned a
distinct species of prudence, like regnative prudence.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 50, Art. 4]

Whether Military Prudence Should Be Reckoned a Part of Prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that military prudence should not be
reckoned a part of prudence. For prudence is distinct from art,
according to _Ethic._ vi, 3. Now military prudence seems to be the
art of warfare, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8).
Therefore military prudence should not be accounted a species of
prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, just as military business is contained under
political affairs, so too are many other matters, such as those of
tradesmen, craftsmen, and so forth. But there are no species of
prudence corresponding to other affairs in the state. Neither
therefore should any be assigned to military business.

Obj. 3: Further, the soldiers' bravery counts for a great deal in
warfare. Therefore military prudence pertains to fortitude rather
than to prudence.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 24:6): "War is managed by due
ordering, and there shall be safety where there are many counsels."
Now it belongs to prudence to take counsel. Therefore there is great
need in warfare for that species of prudence which is called
"military."

_I answer that,_ Whatever things are done according to art or reason,
should be made to conform to those which are in accordance with
nature, and are established by the Divine Reason. Now nature has a
twofold tendency: first, to govern each thing in itself, secondly, to
withstand outward assailants and corruptives: and for this reason she
has provided animals not only with the concupiscible faculty, whereby
they are moved to that which is conducive to their well-being, but
also with the irascible power, whereby the animal withstands an
assailant. Therefore in those things also which are in accordance
with reason, there should be not only "political" prudence, which
disposes in a suitable manner such things as belong to the common
good, but also a "military" prudence, whereby hostile attacks are
repelled.

Reply Obj. 1: Military prudence may be an art, in so far as it has
certain rules for the right use of certain external things, such as
arms and horses, but in so far as it is directed to the common good,
it belongs rather to prudence.

Reply Obj. 2: Other matters in the state are directed to the profit
of individuals, whereas the business of soldiering is directed to the
service belongs to fortitude, but the direction, protection of the
entire common good.

Reply Obj. 3: The execution of military service belongs to fortitude,
but the direction, especially in so far as it concerns the
commander-in-chief, belongs to prudence.
_______________________

QUESTION 51

OF THE VIRTUES WHICH ARE CONNECTED WITH PRUDENCE
(In Four Articles)

In due sequence, we must consider the virtues that are connected with
prudence, and which are its quasi-potential parts. Under this head
there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether _euboulia_ is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a special virtue, distinct from prudence?

(3) Whether _synesis_ is a special virtue?

(4) Whether _gnome_ is a special virtue?

[*These three Greek words may be rendered as the faculties of
deliberating well (_euboulia_), of judging well according to common
law (_synesis_), and of judging well according to general law
(_gnome_), respectively.]
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 51, Art. 1]

Whether _Euboulia_ Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that _euboulia_ is not a virtue. For,
according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18, 19) "no man makes evil
use of virtue." Now some make evil use of _euboulia_ or good counsel,
either through devising crafty counsels in order to achieve evil
ends, or through committing sin in order that they may achieve good
ends, as those who rob that they may give alms. Therefore _euboulia_
is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, virtue is a perfection, according to _Phys._ vii.
But _euboulia_ is concerned with counsel, which implies doubt and
research, and these are marks of imperfection. Therefore _euboulia_
is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 65). Now _euboulia_ is not connected with the other
virtues, since many sinners take good-counsel, and many godly men are
slow in taking counsel. Therefore _euboulia_ is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9)
_euboulia_ "is a right counselling." Now the perfection of virtue
consists in right reason. Therefore _euboulia_ is a virtue.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 47, A. 4) the nature of a human
virtue consists in making a human act good. Now among the acts of
man, it is proper to him to take counsel, since this denotes a
research of the reason about the actions he has to perform and
whereof human life consists, for the speculative life is above man,
as stated in _Ethic._ x. But _euboulia_ signifies goodness of
counsel, for it is derived from the _eu_, good, and _boule_, counsel,
being "a good counsel" or rather "a disposition to take good
counsel." Hence it is evident that _euboulia_ is a human virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: There is no good counsel either in deliberating for an
evil end, or in discovering evil means for attaining a good end, even
as in speculative matters, there is no good reasoning either in
coming to a false conclusion, or in coming to a true conclusion from
false premisses through employing an unsuitable middle term. Hence
both the aforesaid processes are contrary to _euboulia,_ as the
Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9).

Reply Obj. 2: Although virtue is essentially a perfection, it does
not follow that whatever is the matter of a virtue implies
perfection. For man needs to be perfected by virtues in all his
parts, and this not only as regards the acts of reason, of which
counsel is one, but also as regards the passions of the sensitive
appetite, which are still more imperfect.

It may also be replied that human virtue is a perfection according to
the mode of man, who is unable by simple insight to comprehend with
certainty the truth of things, especially in matters of action which
are contingent.

Reply Obj. 3: In no sinner as such is _euboulia_ to be found: since
all sin is contrary to taking good counsel. For good counsel requires
not only the discovery or devising of fit means for the end, but also
other circumstances. Such are suitable time, so that one be neither
too slow nor too quick in taking counsel, and the mode of taking
counsel, so that one be firm in the counsel taken, and other like due
circumstances, which sinners fail to observe when they sin. On the
other hand, every virtuous man takes good counsel in those things
which are directed to the end of virtue, although perhaps he does not
take good counsel in other particular matters, for instance in
matters of trade, or warfare, or the like.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 51, Art. 2]

Whether _Euboulia_ Is a Special Virtue, Distinct from Prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that _euboulia_ is not a distinct virtue
from prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), the
"prudent man is, seemingly, one who takes good counsel." Now this
belongs to _euboulia_ as stated above. Therefore _euboulia_ is not
distinct from prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, human acts to which human virtues are directed, are
specified chiefly by their end, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q.
18, AA. 4, 6). Now _euboulia_ and prudence are directed to the same
end, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 9, not indeed to some particular end,
but to the common end of all life. Therefore _euboulia_ is not a
distinct virtue from prudence.

Obj. 3: Further, in speculative sciences, research and decision
belong to the same science. Therefore in like manner these belong to
the same virtue in practical matters. Now research belongs to
_euboulia,_ while decision belongs to prudence. There _euboulia_ is
not a distinct virtue from prudence.

_On the contrary,_ Prudence is preceptive, according to _Ethic._ vi,
10. But this does not apply to _euboulia_. Therefore _euboulia_ is a
distinct virtue from prudence.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), virtue is properly directed
to an act which it renders good; and consequently virtues must differ
according to different acts, especially when there is a different
kind of goodness in the acts. For, if various acts contained the same
kind of goodness, they would belong to the same virtue: thus the
goodness of love, desire and joy depends on the same, wherefore all
these belong to the same virtue of charity.

Now acts of the reason that are ordained to action are diverse, nor
have they the same kind of goodness: since it is owing to different
causes that a man acquires good counsel, good judgment, or good
command, inasmuch as these are sometimes separated from one another.
Consequently _euboulia_ which makes man take good counsel must needs
be a distinct virtue from prudence, which makes man command well. And
since counsel is directed to command as to that which is principal,
so _euboulia_ is directed to prudence as to a principal virtue,
without which it would be no virtue at all, even as neither are the
moral virtues without prudence, nor the other virtues without charity.

Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to prudence to take good counsel by
commanding it, to _euboulia_ by eliciting it.

Reply Obj. 2: Different acts are directed in different degrees to the
one end which is "a good life in general" [*Ethic. vi, 5]: for
counsel comes first, judgment follows, and command comes last. The
last named has an immediate relation to the last end: whereas the
other two acts are related thereto remotely. Nevertheless these have
certain proximate ends of their own, the end of counsel being the
discovery of what has to be done, and the end of judgment, certainty.
Hence this proves not that _euboulia_ is not a distinct virtue from
prudence, but that it is subordinate thereto, as a secondary to a
principal virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: Even in speculative matters the rational science of
dialectics, which is directed to research and discovery, is distinct
from demonstrative science, which decides the truth.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 51, Art. 3]

Whether _Synesis_ Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that _synesis_ is not a virtue. Virtues
are not in us by nature, according to _Ethic._ ii, 1. But _synesis_
is natural to some, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 11).
Therefore _synesis_ is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, as stated in the same book (10), _synesis_ is
nothing but "a faculty of judging." But judgment without command can
be even in the wicked. Since then virtue is only in the good, it
seems that _synesis_ is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, there is never a defective command, unless there be
a defective judgment, at least in a particular matter of action; for
it is in this that every wicked man errs. If therefore _synesis_ be
reckoned a virtue directed to good judgment, it seems that there is
no need for any other virtue directed to good command: and
consequently prudence would be superfluous, which is not reasonable.
Therefore _synesis_ is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Judgment is more perfect than counsel. But
_euboulia_, or good counsel, is a virtue. Much more, therefore, is
_synesis_ a virtue, as being good judgment.

_I answer that,_ _synesis_ signifies a right judgment, not indeed
about speculative matters, but about particular practical matters,
about which also is prudence. Hence in Greek some, in respect of
_synesis_ are said to be _synetoi,_ i.e. "persons of sense," or
_eusynetoi,_ i.e. "men of good sense," just as on the other hand,
those who lack this virtue are called _asynetoi,_ i.e. "senseless."

Now, different acts which cannot be ascribed to the same cause, must
correspond to different virtues. And it is evident that goodness of
counsel and goodness of judgment are not reducible to the same cause,
for many can take good counsel, without having good sense so as to
judge well. Even so, in speculative matters some are good at
research, through their reason being quick at arguing from one thing
to another (which seems to be due to a disposition of their power of
imagination, which has a facility in forming phantasms), and yet such
persons sometimes lack good judgment (and this is due to a defect in
the intellect arising chiefly from a defective disposition of the
common sense which fails to judge aright). Hence there is need,
besides _euboulia_, for another virtue, which judges well, and this
is called _synesis._

Reply Obj. 1: Right judgment consists in the cognitive power
apprehending a thing just as it is in reality, and this is due to the
right disposition of the apprehensive power. Thus if a mirror be well
disposed the forms of bodies are reflected in it just as they are,
whereas if it be ill disposed, the images therein appear distorted
and misshapen. Now that the cognitive power be well disposed to
receive things just as they are in reality, is radically due to
nature, but, as to its consummation, is due to practice or to a gift
of grace, and this in two ways. First directly, on the part of the
cognitive power itself, for instance, because it is imbued, not with
distorted, but with true and correct ideas: this belongs to _synesis_
which in this respect is a special virtue. Secondly indirectly,
through the good disposition of the appetitive power, the result
being that one judges well of the objects of appetite: and thus a
good judgment of virtue results from the habits of moral virtue; but
this judgment is about the ends, whereas _synesis_ is rather about
the means.

Reply Obj. 2: In wicked men there may be right judgment of a
universal principle, but their judgment is always corrupt in the
particular matter of action, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 13).

Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes after judging aright we delay to execute or
execute negligently or inordinately. Hence after the virtue which
judges aright there is a further need of a final and principal
virtue, which commands aright, and this is prudence.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 51, Art. 4]

Whether _Gnome_ Is a Special Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that _gnome_ is not a special virtue
distinct from _synesis._ For a man is said, in respect of _synesis,_
to have good judgment. Now no man can be said to have good judgment,
unless he judge aright in all things. Therefore _synesis_ extends to
all matters of judgment, and consequently there is no other virtue of
good judgment called _gnome._

Obj. 2: Further, judgment is midway between counsel and precept. Now
there is only one virtue of good counsel, viz. _euboulia,_ and only
one virtue of good command, viz. prudence. Therefore there is only
one virtue of good judgment, viz. _synesis._

Obj. 3: Further, rare occurrences wherein there is need to depart
from the common law, seem for the most part to happen by chance, and
with such things reason is not concerned, as stated in _Phys._ ii, 5.
Now all the intellectual virtues depend on right reason. Therefore
there is no intellectual virtue about such matters.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher concludes (Ethic. vi, 11) that
_gnome_ is a special virtue.

_I answer that_ cognitive habits differ according to higher and lower
principles: thus in speculative matters wisdom considers higher
principles than science does, and consequently is distinguished from
it; and so must it be also in practical matters. Now it is evident
that what is beside the order of a lower principle or cause, is
sometimes reducible to the order of a higher principle; thus
monstrous births of animals are beside the order of the active
seminal force, and yet they come under the order of a higher
principle, namely, of a heavenly body, or higher still, of Divine
Providence. Hence by considering the active seminal force one could
not pronounce a sure judgment on such monstrosities, and yet this is
possible if we consider Divine Providence.

Now it happens sometimes that something has to be done which is not
covered by the common rules of actions, for instance in the case of
the enemy of one's country, when it would be wrong to give him back
his deposit, or in other similar cases. Hence it is necessary to
judge of such matters according to higher principles than the common
laws, according to which _synesis_ judges: and corresponding to such
higher principles it is necessary to have a higher virtue of
judgment, which is called _gnome,_ and which denotes a certain
discrimination in judgment.

Reply Obj. 1: _Synesis_ judges rightly about all actions that are
covered by the common rules: but certain things have to be judged
beside these common rules, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: Judgment about a thing should be formed from the proper
principles thereof, whereas research is made by employing also common
principles. Wherefore also in speculative matters, dialectics which
aims at research proceeds from common principles; while demonstration
which tends to judgment, proceeds from proper principles. Hence
_euboulia_ to which the research of counsel belongs is one for all,
but not so _synesis_ whose act is judicial. Command considers in all
matters the one aspect of good, wherefore prudence also is only one.

Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to Divine Providence alone to consider all
things that may happen beside the common course. On the other hand,
among men, he who is most discerning can judge a greater number of
such things by his reason: this belongs to _gnome,_ which denotes a
certain discrimination in judgment.
_______________________

QUESTION 52

OF THE GIFT OF COUNSEL
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the gift of counsel which corresponds to
prudence. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether counsel should be reckoned among the seven gifts of the
Holy Ghost?

(2) Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence?

(3) Whether the gift of counsel remains in heaven?

(4) Whether the fifth beatitude, "Blessed are the merciful," etc.
corresponds to the gift of counsel?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 52, Art. 1]

Whether Counsel Should Be Reckoned Among the Gifts of the Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem that counsel should not be reckoned among
the gifts of the Holy Ghost. The gifts of the Holy Ghost are given as
a help to the virtues, according to Gregory (Moral. ii, 49). Now for
the purpose of taking counsel, man is sufficiently perfected by the
virtue of prudence, or even of _euboulia_, as is evident from what
has been said (Q. 47, A. 1, ad 2; Q. 51, AA. 1, 2). Therefore counsel
should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 2: Further, the difference between the seven gifts of the Holy
Ghost and the gratuitous graces seems to be that the latter are not
given to all, but are divided among various people, whereas the gifts
of the Holy Ghost are given to all who have the Holy Ghost. But
counsel seems to be one of those things which are given by the Holy
Ghost specially to certain persons, according to 1 Macc. 2:65:
"Behold . . . your brother Simon is a man of counsel." Therefore
counsel should be numbered among the gratuitous graces rather than
among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Rom. 8:14): "Whosoever are led by the
Spirit of God, they are the sons of God." But counselling is not
consistent with being led by another. Since then the gifts of the
Holy Ghost are most befitting the children of God, who "have received
the spirit of adoption of sons," it would seem that counsel should
not be numbered among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 11:2): "(The Spirit of the
Lord) shall rest upon him . . . the spirit of counsel, and of
fortitude."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 1), the gifts of
the Holy Ghost are dispositions whereby the soul is rendered amenable
to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now God moves everything according
to the mode of the thing moved: thus He moves the corporeal creature
through time and place, and the spiritual creature through time, but
not through place, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20, 22).
Again, it is proper to the rational creature to be moved through the
research of reason to perform any particular action, and this
research is called counsel. Hence the Holy Ghost is said to move the
rational creature by way of counsel, wherefore counsel is reckoned
among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 1: Prudence or _euboulia_, whether acquired or infused,
directs man in the research of counsel according to principles that
the reason can grasp; hence prudence or _euboulia_ makes man take
good counsel either for himself or for another. Since, however, human
reason is unable to grasp the singular and contingent things which
may occur, the result is that "the thoughts of mortal men are
fearful, and our counsels uncertain" (Wis. 9:14). Hence in the
research of counsel, man requires to be directed by God who
comprehends all things: and this is done through the gift of counsel,
whereby man is directed as though counseled by God, just as, in human
affairs, those who are unable to take counsel for themselves, seek
counsel from those who are wiser.

Reply Obj. 2: That a man be of such good counsel as to counsel
others, may be due to a gratuitous grace; but that a man be
counselled by God as to what he ought to do in matters necessary for
salvation is common to all holy persons.

Reply Obj. 3: The children of God are moved by the Holy Ghost
according to their mode, without prejudice to their free-will which
is the "faculty of will and reason" [*Sent. iii, D, 24]. Accordingly
the gift of counsel is befitting the children of God in so far as the
reason is instructed by the Holy Ghost about what we have to do.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 52, Art. 2]

Whether the Gift of Counsel Corresponds to the Virtue of Prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of counsel does not
fittingly correspond to the virtue of prudence. For "the highest
point of that which is underneath touches that which is above," as
Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. vii), even as a man comes into contact
with the angel in respect of his intellect. Now cardinal virtues are
inferior to the gifts, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 8). Since,
then, counsel is the first and lowest act of prudence, while command
is its highest act, and judgment comes between, it seems that the
gift corresponding to prudence is not counsel, but rather a gift of
judgment or command.

Obj. 2: Further, one gift suffices to help one virtue, since the
higher a thing is the more one it is, as proved in _De Causis._ Now
prudence is helped by the gift of knowledge, which is not only
speculative but also practical, as shown above (Q. 9, A. 3).
Therefore the gift of counsel does not correspond to the virtue of
prudence.

Obj. 3: Further, it belongs properly to prudence to direct, as stated
above (Q. 47, A. 8). But it belongs to the gift of counsel that man
should be directed by God, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore the gift
of counsel does not correspond to the virtue of prudence.

_On the contrary,_ The gift of counsel is about what has to be done
for the sake of the end. Now prudence is about the same matter.
Therefore they correspond to one another.

_I answer that,_ A lower principle of movement is helped chiefly, and
is perfected through being moved by a higher principle of movement,
as a body through being moved by a spirit. Now it is evident that the
rectitude of human reason is compared to the Divine Reason, as a
lower motive principle to a higher: for the Eternal Reason is the
supreme rule of all human rectitude. Consequently prudence, which
denotes rectitude of reason, is chiefly perfected and helped through
being ruled and moved by the Holy Ghost, and this belongs to the gift
of counsel, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore the gift of counsel
corresponds to prudence, as helping and perfecting it.

Reply Obj. 1: To judge and command belongs not to the thing moved,
but to the mover. Wherefore, since in the gifts of the Holy Ghost,
the position of the human mind is of one moved rather than of a
mover, as stated above (A. 1; I-II, Q. 68, A. 1), it follows that it
would be unfitting to call the gift corresponding to prudence by the
name of command or judgment rather than of counsel whereby it is
possible to signify that the counselled mind is moved by another
counselling it.

Reply Obj. 2: The gift of knowledge does not directly correspond to
prudence, since it deals with speculative matters: yet by a kind of
extension it helps it. On the other hand the gift of counsel
corresponds to prudence directly, because it is concerned about the
same things.

Reply Obj. 3: The mover that is moved, moves through being moved.
Hence the human mind, from the very fact that it is directed by the
Holy Ghost, is enabled to direct itself and others.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 52, Art. 3]

Whether the Gift of Counsel Remains in Heaven?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of counsel does not remain
in heaven. For counsel is about what has to be done for the sake of
an end. But in heaven nothing will have to be done for the sake of an
end, since there man possesses the last end. Therefore the gift of
counsel is not in heaven.

Obj. 2: Further, counsel implies doubt, for it is absurd to take
counsel in matters that are evident, as the Philosopher observes
(Ethic. iii, 3). Now all doubt will cease in heaven. Therefore there
is no counsel in heaven.

Obj. 3: Further, the saints in heaven are most conformed to God,
according to 1 John 3:2, "When He shall appear, we shall be like to
Him." But counsel is not becoming to God, according to Rom. 11:34,
"Who hath been His counsellor?" Therefore neither to the saints in
heaven is the gift of counsel becoming.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xvii, 12): "When either the
guilt or the righteousness of each nation is brought into the debate
of the heavenly Court, the guardian of that nation is said to have
won in the conflict, or not to have won."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2; I-II, Q. 68, A. 1), the gifts
of the Holy Ghost are connected with the motion of the rational
creature by God. Now we must observe two points concerning the motion
of the human mind by God. First, that the disposition of that which
is moved, differs while it is being moved from its disposition when
it is in the term of movement. Indeed if the mover is the principle
of the movement alone, when the movement ceases, the action of the
mover ceases as regards the thing moved, since it has already reached
the term of movement, even as a house, after it is built, ceases
being built by the builder. On the other hand, when the mover is
cause not only of the movement, but also of the form to which the
movement tends, then the action of the mover does not cease even
after the form has been attained: thus the sun lightens the air even
after it is lightened. In this way, then, God causes in us virtue and
knowledge, not only when we first acquire them, but also as long as
we persevere in them: and it is thus that God causes in the blessed a
knowledge of what is to be done, not as though they were ignorant,
but by continuing that knowledge in them.

Nevertheless there are things which the blessed, whether angels or
men, do not know: such things are not essential to blessedness, but
concern the government of things according to Divine Providence. As
regards these, we must make a further observation, namely, that God
moves the mind of the blessed in one way, and the mind of the
wayfarer, in another. For God moves the mind of the wayfarer in
matters of action, by soothing the pre-existing anxiety of doubt;
whereas there is simple nescience in the mind of the blessed as
regards the things they do not know. From this nescience the angel's
mind is cleansed, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), nor does
there precede in them any research of doubt, for they simply turn to
God; and this is to take counsel of God, for as Augustine says (Gen.
ad lit. v, 19) "the angels take counsel of God about things beneath
them": wherefore the instruction which they receive from God in such
matters is called "counsel."

Accordingly the gift of counsel is in the blessed, in so far as God
preserves in them the knowledge that they have, and enlightens them
in their nescience of what has to be done.

Reply Obj. 1: Even in the blessed there are acts directed to an end,
or resulting, as it were, from their attainment of the end, such as
the acts of praising God, or of helping on others to the end which
they themselves have attained, for example the ministrations of the
angels, and the prayers of the saints. In this respect the gift of
counsel finds a place in them.

Reply Obj. 2: Doubt belongs to counsel according to the present state
of life, but not to that counsel which takes place in heaven. Even so
neither have the theological virtues quite the same acts in heaven as
on the way thither.

Reply Obj. 3: Counsel is in God, not as receiving but as giving it:
and the saints in heaven are conformed to God, as receivers to the
source whence they receive.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 52, Art. 4]

Whether the Fifth Beatitude, Which Is That of Mercy, Corresponds to
the Gift of Counsel?

Objection 1: It would seem that the fifth beatitude, which is that of
mercy, does not correspond to the gift of counsel. For all the
beatitudes are acts of virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q. 69, A. 1).
Now we are directed by counsel in all acts of virtue. Therefore the
fifth beatitude does not correspond more than any other to counsel.

Obj. 2: Further, precepts are given about matters necessary for
salvation, while counsel is given about matters which are not
necessary for salvation. Now mercy is necessary for salvation,
according to James 2:13, "Judgment without mercy to him that hath not
done mercy." On the other hand poverty is not necessary for
salvation, but belongs to the life of perfection, according to Matt.
19:21. Therefore the beatitude of poverty corresponds to the gift of
counsel, rather than to the beatitude of mercy.

Obj. 3: Further, the fruits result from the beatitudes, for they
denote a certain spiritual delight resulting from perfect acts of
virtue. Now none of the fruits correspond to the gift of counsel, as
appears from Gal. 5:22, 23. Therefore neither does the beatitude of
mercy correspond to the gift of counsel.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. iv): "Counsel is
befitting the merciful, because the one remedy is to be delivered
from evils so great, to pardon, and to give."

_I answer that,_ Counsel is properly about things useful for an end.
Hence such things as are of most use for an end, should above all
correspond to the gift of counsel. Now such is mercy, according to 1
Tim. 4:8, "Godliness [*_Pietas,_ whence our English word _pity,_
which is the same as mercy; see note on II-II, Q. 30, A. 1] is
profitable to all things." Therefore the beatitude of mercy specially
corresponds to the gift of counsel, not as eliciting but as directing
mercy.

Reply Obj. 1: Although counsel directs in all the acts of
virtue, it does so in a special way in works of mercy, for the reason
given above.

Reply Obj. 2: Counsel considered as a gift of the Holy Ghost
guides us in all matters that are directed to the end of eternal life
whether they be necessary for salvation or not, and yet not every work
of mercy is necessary for salvation.

Reply Obj. 3: Fruit denotes something ultimate. Now the
ultimate in practical matters consists not in knowledge but in an
action which is the end. Hence nothing pertaining to practical
knowledge is numbered among the fruits, but only such things as
pertain to action, in which practical knowledge is the guide. Among
these we find "goodness" and "benignity" which correspond to mercy.
_______________________

QUESTION 53

OF IMPRUDENCE
(In Six Articles)

We must now consider the vices opposed to prudence. For Augustine
says (Contra Julian. iv, 3): "There are vices opposed to every
virtue, not only vices that are in manifest opposition to virtue, as
temerity is opposed to prudence, but also vices which have a kind of
kinship and not a true but a spurious likeness to virtue; thus in
opposition to prudence we have craftiness."

Accordingly we must consider first of all those vices which are in
evident opposition to prudence, those namely which are due to a
defect either of prudence or of those things which are requisite for
prudence, and secondly those vices which have a false resemblance to
prudence, those namely which are due to abuse of the things required
for prudence. And since solicitude pertains to prudence, the first of
these considerations will be twofold: (1) Of imprudence; (2) Of
negligence which is opposed to solicitude.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Concerning imprudence, whether it is a sin?

(2) Whether it is a special sin?

(3) Of precipitation or temerity;

(4) Of thoughtlessness;

(5) Of inconstancy;

(6) Concerning the origin of these vices.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 1]

Whether Imprudence Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that imprudence is not a sin. For every
sin is voluntary, according to Augustine [*De Vera Relig. xiv];
whereas imprudence is not voluntary, since no man wishes to be
imprudent. Therefore imprudence is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, none but original sin comes to man with his birth.
But imprudence comes to man with his birth, wherefore the young are
imprudent; and yet it is not original sin which is opposed to
original justice. Therefore imprudence is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, every sin is taken away by repentance. But
imprudence is not taken away by repentance. Therefore imprudence is
not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ The spiritual treasure of grace is not taken away
save by sin. But it is taken away by imprudence, according to Prov.
21:20, "There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the dwelling of
the just, and the imprudent [Douay: 'foolish'] man shall spend it."
Therefore imprudence is a sin.

_I answer that,_ Imprudence may be taken in two ways, first, as a
privation, secondly, as a contrary. Properly speaking it is not taken
as a negation, so as merely to signify the absence of prudence, for
this can be without any sin. Taken as a privation, imprudence denotes
lack of that prudence which a man can and ought to have, and in this
sense imprudence is a sin by reason of a man's negligence in striving
to have prudence.

Imprudence is taken as a contrary, in so far as the movement or act
of reason is in opposition to prudence: for instance, whereas the
right reason of prudence acts by taking counsel, the imprudent man
despises counsel, and the same applies to the other conditions which
require consideration in the act of prudence. In this way imprudence
is a sin in respect of prudence considered under its proper aspect,
since it is not possible for a man to act against prudence, except by
infringing the rules on which the right reason of prudence depends.
Wherefore, if this should happen through aversion from the Divine
Law, it will be a mortal sin, as when a man acts precipitately
through contempt and rejection of the Divine teaching: whereas if he
act beside the Law and without contempt, and without detriment to
things necessary for salvation, it will be a venial sin.

Reply Obj. 1: No man desires the deformity of imprudence, but the
rash man wills the act of imprudence, because he wishes to act
precipitately. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "he who
sins willingly against prudence is less to be commended."

Reply Obj. 2: This argument takes imprudence in the negative sense.
It must be observed however that lack of prudence or of any other
virtue is included in the lack of original justice which perfected
the entire soul. Accordingly all such lack of virtue may be ascribed
to original sin.

Reply Obj. 3: Repentance restores infused prudence, and thus the lack
of this prudence ceases; but acquired prudence is not restored as to
the habit, although the contrary act is taken away, wherein properly
speaking the sin of imprudence consists.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 2]

Whether Imprudence Is a Special Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that imprudence is not a special sin. For
whoever sins, acts against right reason, i.e. against prudence. But
imprudence consists in acting against prudence, as stated above (A.
1). Therefore imprudence is not a special sin.

Obj. 2: Further, prudence is more akin to moral action than knowledge
is. But ignorance which is opposed to knowledge, is reckoned one of
the general causes of sin. Much more therefore should imprudence be
reckoned among those causes.

Obj. 3: Further, sin consists in the corruption of the circumstances
of virtue, wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil results
from each single defect." Now many things are requisite for prudence;
for instance, reason, intelligence, docility, and so on, as stated
above (QQ. 48, 49). Therefore there are many species of imprudence,
so that it is not a special sin.

_On the contrary,_ Imprudence is opposed to prudence, as stated above
(A. 1). Now prudence is a special virtue. Therefore imprudence too is
one special vice.

_I answer that,_ A vice or sin may be styled general in two ways;
first, absolutely, because, to wit, it is general in respect of all
sins; secondly, because it is general in respect of certain vices,
which are its species. In the first way, a vice may be said to be
general on two counts: first, essentially, because it is predicated
of all sins: and in this way imprudence is not a general sin, as
neither is prudence a general virtue: since it is concerned with
special acts, namely the very acts of reason: secondly, by
participation; and in this way imprudence is a general sin: for, just
as all the virtues have a share of prudence, in so far as it directs
them, so have all vices and sins a share of imprudence, because no
sin can occur, without some defect in an act of the directing reason,
which defect belongs to imprudence.

If, on the other hand, a sin be called general, not simply but in
some particular genus, that is, as containing several species of sin,
then imprudence is a general sin. For it contains various species in
three ways. First, by opposition to the various subjective parts of
prudence, for just as we distinguish the prudence that guides the
individual, from other kinds that govern communities, as stated above
(Q. 48; Q. 50, A. 7), so also we distinguish various kinds of
imprudence. Secondly, in respect of the quasi-potential parts of
prudence, which are virtues connected with it, and correspond to the
several acts of reason. Thus, by defect of "counsel" to which
_euboulia_ corresponds, "precipitation" or "temerity" is a species of
imprudence; by defect of "judgment," to which _synesis_ (judging well
according to common law) and _gnome_ (judging well according to
general law) refer, there is "thoughtlessness"; while "inconstancy"
and "negligence" correspond to the "command" which is the proper act
of prudence. Thirdly, this may be taken by opposition to those things
which are requisite for prudence, which are the quasi-integral parts
of prudence. Since however all these things are intended for the
direction of the aforesaid three acts of reason, it follows that all
the opposite defects are reducible to the four parts mentioned above.
Thus incautiousness and incircumspection are included in
"thoughtlessness"; lack of docility, memory, or reason is referable
to "precipitation"; improvidence, lack of intelligence and of
shrewdness, belong to "negligence" and "inconstancy."

Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers generality by participation.

Reply Obj. 2: Since knowledge is further removed from morality than
prudence is, according to their respective proper natures, it follows
that ignorance has the nature of mortal sin, not of itself, but on
account either of a preceding negligence, or of the consequent
result, and for this reason it is reckoned one of the general causes
of sin. On the other hand imprudence, by its very nature, denotes a
moral vice; and for this reason it can be called a special sin.

Reply Obj. 3: When various circumstances are corrupted for the
same motive, the species of sin is not multiplied: thus it is the same
species of sin to take what is not one's own, where one ought not, and
when one ought not. If, however, there be various motives, there are
various species: for instance, if one man were to take another's
property from where he ought not, so as to wrong a sacred place, this
would constitute the species called sacrilege, while if another were
to take another's property when he ought not, merely through the lust
of possession, this would be a case of simple avarice. Hence the lack
of those things which are requisite for prudence, does not constitute
a diversity of species, except in so far as they are directed to
different acts of reason, as stated above.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 3]

Whether Precipitation Is a Sin Included in Imprudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that precipitation is not a sin included
in imprudence. Imprudence is opposed to the virtue of prudence;
whereas precipitation is opposed to the gift of counsel, according to
Gregory, who says (Moral. ii, 49) that the gift of "counsel is given
as a remedy to precipitation." Therefore precipitation is not a sin
contained under imprudence.

Obj. 2: Further, precipitation seemingly pertains to rashness. Now
rashness implies presumption, which pertains to pride. Therefore
precipitation is not a vice contained under imprudence.

Obj. 3: Further, precipitation seems to denote inordinate haste. Now
sin happens in counselling not only through being over hasty but also
through being over slow, so that the opportunity for action passes
by, and through corruption of other circumstances, as stated in
_Ethic._ vi, 9. Therefore there is no reason for reckoning
precipitation as a sin contained under imprudence, rather than
slowness, or something else of the kind pertaining to inordinate
counsel.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 4:19): "The way of the wicked
is darksome, they know not where they fall." Now the darksome ways of
ungodliness belong to imprudence. Therefore imprudence leads a man to
fall or to be precipitate.

_I answer that,_ Precipitation is ascribed metaphorically to acts of
the soul, by way of similitude to bodily movement. Now a thing is
said to be precipitated as regards bodily movement, when it is
brought down from above by the impulse either of its own movement or
of another's, and not in orderly fashion by degrees. Now the summit
of the soul is the reason, and the base is reached in the action
performed by the body; while the steps that intervene by which one
ought to descend in orderly fashion are _memory_ of the past,
_intelligence_ of the present, _shrewdness_ in considering the future
outcome, _reasoning_ which compares one thing with another,
_docility_ in accepting the opinions of others. He that takes counsel
descends by these steps in due order, whereas if a man is rushed into
action by the impulse of his will or of a passion, without taking
these steps, it will be a case of precipitation. Since then
inordinate counsel pertains to imprudence, it is evident that the
vice of precipitation is contained under imprudence.

Reply Obj. 1: Rectitude of counsel belongs to the gift of counsel and
to the virtue of prudence; albeit in different ways, as stated above
(Q. 52, A. 2), and consequently precipitation is opposed to both.

Reply Obj. 2: Things are said to be done rashly when they are not
directed by reason: and this may happen in two ways; first through
the impulse of the will or of a passion, secondly through contempt of
the directing rule; and this is what is meant by rashness properly
speaking, wherefore it appears to proceed from that root of pride,
which refuses to submit to another's ruling. But precipitation refers
to both, so that rashness is contained under precipitation, although
precipitation refers rather to the first.

Reply Obj. 3: Many things have to be considered in the research of
reason; hence the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9) that "one
should be slow in taking counsel." Hence precipitation is more
directly opposed to rectitude of counsel than over slowness is, for
the latter bears a certain likeness to right counsel.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 4]

Whether Thoughtlessness Is a Special Sin Included in Imprudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that thoughtlessness is not a special sin
included in imprudence. For the Divine law does not incite us to any
sin, according to Ps. 18:8, "The law of the Lord is unspotted"; and
yet it incites us to be thoughtless, according to Matt. 10:19, "Take
no thought how or what to speak." Therefore thoughtlessness is not a
sin.

Obj. 2: Further, whoever takes counsel must needs give thought to
many things. Now precipitation is due to a defect of counsel and
therefore to a defect of thought. Therefore precipitation is
contained under thoughtlessness: and consequently thoughtlessness is
not a special sin.

Obj. 3: Further, prudence consists in acts of the practical reason,
viz. _counsel,_ _judgment_ about what has been counselled, and
_command_ [*Cf. Q. 47, A. 8]. Now thought precedes all these acts,
since it belongs also to the speculative intellect. Therefore
thoughtlessness is not a special sin contained under imprudence.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 4:25): "Let thy eyes look
straight on, and let thine eye-lids go before thy steps." Now this
pertains to prudence, while the contrary pertains to thoughtlessness.
Therefore thoughtlessness is a special sin contained under imprudence.

_I answer that,_ Thought signifies the act of the intellect in
considering the truth about something. Now just as research belongs
to the reason, so judgment belongs to the intellect. Wherefore in
speculative matters a demonstrative science is said to exercise
judgment, in so far as it judges the truth of the results of research
by tracing those results back to the first indemonstrable principles.
Hence thought pertains chiefly to judgment; and consequently the lack
of right judgment belongs to the vice of thoughtlessness, in so far,
to wit, as one fails to judge rightly through contempt or neglect of
those things on which a right judgment depends. It is therefore
evident that thoughtlessness is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord did not forbid us to take thought, when we
have the opportunity, about what we ought to do or say, but, in the
words quoted, He encourages His disciples, so that when they had no
opportunity of taking thought, either through lack of knowledge or
through a sudden call, they should trust in the guidance of God
alone, because "as we know not what to do, we can only turn our eyes
to God," according to 2 Paral. 20:12: else if man, instead of doing
what he can, were to be content with awaiting God's assistance, he
would seem to tempt God.

Reply Obj. 2: All thought about those things of which counsel takes
cognizance, is directed to the formation of a right judgment,
wherefore this thought is perfected in judgment. Consequently
thoughtlessness is above all opposed to the rectitude of judgment.

Reply Obj. 3: Thoughtlessness is to be taken here in relation to a
determinate matter, namely, that of human action, wherein more things
have to be thought about for the purpose of right judgment, than in
speculative matters, because actions are about singulars.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 5]

Whether Inconstancy Is a Vice Contained Under Imprudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that inconstancy is not a vice contained
under imprudence. For inconstancy consists seemingly in a lack of
perseverance in matters of difficulty. But perseverance in difficult
matters belongs to fortitude. Therefore inconstancy is opposed to
fortitude rather than to prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (James 3:16): "Where jealousy [Douay:
'envy'] and contention are, there are inconstancy and every evil
work." But jealousy pertains to envy. Therefore inconstancy pertains
not to imprudence but to envy.

Obj. 3: Further, a man would seem to be inconstant who fails to
persevere in what he has proposed to do. Now this is a mark of
"incontinency" in pleasurable matters, and of "effeminacy" or
"squeamishness" in unpleasant matters, according to _Ethic._ vii, 1.
Therefore inconstancy does not pertain to imprudence.

_On the contrary,_ It belongs to prudence to prefer the greater good
to the lesser. Therefore to forsake the greater good belongs to
imprudence. Now this is inconstancy. Therefore inconstancy belongs to
imprudence.

_I answer that,_ Inconstancy denotes withdrawal from a definite good
purpose. Now the origin of this withdrawal is in the appetite, for a
man does not withdraw from a previous good purpose, except on account
of something being inordinately pleasing to him: nor is this
withdrawal completed except through a defect of reason, which is
deceived in rejecting what before it had rightly accepted. And since
it can resist the impulse of the passions, if it fail to do this, it
is due to its own weakness in not standing to the good purpose it has
conceived; hence inconstancy, as to its completion, is due to a
defect in the reason. Now just as all rectitude of the practical
reason belongs in some degree to prudence, so all lack of that
rectitude belongs to imprudence. Consequently inconstancy, as to its
completion, belongs to imprudence. And just as precipitation is due
to a defect in the act of counsel, and thoughtlessness to a defect in
the act of judgment, so inconstancy arises from a defect in the act
of command. For a man is stated to be inconstant because his reason
fails in commanding what has been counselled and judged.

Reply Obj. 1: The good of prudence is shared by all the moral
virtues, and accordingly perseverance in good belongs to all moral
virtues, chiefly, however, to fortitude, which suffers a greater
impulse to the contrary.

Reply Obj. 2: Envy and anger, which are the source of contention,
cause inconstancy on the part of the appetite, to which power the
origin of inconstancy is due, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: Continency and perseverance seem to be not in the
appetitive power, but in the reason. For the continent man suffers
evil concupiscences, and the persevering man suffers grievous sorrows
(which points to a defect in the appetitive power); but reason stands
firm, in the continent man, against concupiscence, and in the
persevering man, against sorrow. Hence continency and perseverance
seem to be species of constancy which pertains to reason; and to this
power inconstancy pertains also.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 6]

Whether the Aforesaid Vices Arise from Lust?

Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid vices do not arise from
lust. For inconstancy arises from envy, as stated above (A. 5, ad 2).
But envy is a distinct vice from lust.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (James 1:8): "A double-minded man is
inconstant in all his ways." Now duplicity does not seem to pertain
to lust, but rather to deceitfulness, which is a daughter of
covetousness, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore the
aforesaid vices do not arise from lust.

Obj. 3: Further, the aforesaid vices are connected with some defect
of reason. Now spiritual vices are more akin to the reason than
carnal vices. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise from spiritual
vices rather than from carnal vices.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory declares (Moral. xxxi, 45) that the
aforesaid vices arise from lust.

_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5) "pleasure
above all corrupts the estimate of prudence," and chiefly sexual
pleasure which absorbs the mind, and draws it to sensible delight.
Now the perfection of prudence and of every intellectual virtue
consists in abstraction from sensible objects. Wherefore, since the
aforesaid vices involve a defect of prudence and of the practical
reason, as stated above (AA. 2, 5), it follows that they arise
chiefly from lust.

Reply Obj. 1: Envy and anger cause inconstancy by drawing away the
reason to something else; whereas lust causes inconstancy by
destroying the judgment of reason entirely. Hence the Philosopher
says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "the man who is incontinent through anger
listens to reason, yet not perfectly, whereas he who is incontinent
through lust does not listen to it at all."

Reply Obj. 2: Duplicity also is something resulting from lust, just
as inconstancy is, if by duplicity we understand fluctuation of the
mind from one thing to another. Hence Terence says (Eunuch. act 1,
sc. 1) that "love leads to war, and likewise to peace and truce."

Reply Obj. 3: Carnal vices destroy the judgment of reason so much the
more as they lead us away from reason.
_______________________

QUESTION 54

OF NEGLIGENCE
(In Three Articles)

We must now consider negligence, under which head there are three
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether negligence is a special sin?

(2) To which virtue is it opposed?

(3) Whether negligence is a mortal sin?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 54, Art. 1]

Whether Negligence Is a Special Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that negligence is not a special sin. For
negligence is opposed to diligence. But diligence is required in
every virtue. Therefore negligence is not a special sin.

Obj. 2: Further, that which is common to every sin is not a special
sin. Now negligence is common to every sin, because he who sins
neglects that which withdraws him from sin, and he who perseveres in
sin neglects to be contrite for his sin. Therefore negligence is not
a special sin.

Obj. 3: Further, every special sin has a determinate matter. But
negligence seems to have no determinate matter: since it is neither
about evil or indifferent things (for no man is accused of negligence
if he omit them), nor about good things, for if these be done
negligently, they are no longer good. Therefore it seems that
negligence is not a special vice.

_On the contrary,_ Sins committed through negligence, are
distinguished from those which are committed through contempt.

_I answer that,_ Negligence denotes lack of due solicitude. Now every
lack of a due act is sinful: wherefore it is evident that negligence
is a sin, and that it must needs have the character of a special sin
according as solicitude is the act of a special virtue. For certain
sins are special through being about a special matter, as lust is
about sexual matters, while some vices are special on account of
their having a special kind of act which extends to all kinds of
matter, and such are all vices affecting an act of reason, since
every act of reason extends to any kind of moral matter. Since then
solicitude is a special act of reason, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 9),
it follows that negligence, which denotes lack of solicitude, is a
special sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Diligence seems to be the same as solicitude, because
the more we love (_diligimus_) a thing the more solicitous are we
about it. Hence diligence, no less than solicitude, is required for
every virtue, in so far as due acts of reason are requisite for every
virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: In every sin there must needs be a defect affecting an
act of reason, for instance a defect in counsel or the like. Hence
just as precipitation is a special sin on account of a special act of
reason which is omitted, namely counsel, although it may be found in
any kind of sin; so negligence is a special sin on account of the
lack of a special act of reason, namely solicitude, although it is
found more or less in all sins.

Reply Obj. 3: Properly speaking the matter of negligence is a good
that one ought to do, not that it is a good when it is done
negligently, but because on account of negligence it incurs a lack of
goodness, whether a due act be entirely omitted through lack of
solicitude, or some due circumstance be omitted.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 54, Art. 2]

Whether Negligence Is Opposed to Prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that negligence is not opposed to
prudence. For negligence seems to be the same as idleness or
laziness, which belongs to sloth, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi,
45). Now sloth is not opposed to prudence, but to charity, as stated
above (Q. 35, A. 3). Therefore negligence is not opposed to prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, every sin of omission seems to be due to negligence.
But sins of omission are not opposed to prudence, but to the
executive moral virtues. Therefore negligence is not opposed to
prudence.

Obj. 3: Further, imprudence relates to some act of reason. But
negligence does not imply a defect of counsel, for that is
_precipitation,_ nor a defect of judgment, since that is
_thoughtlessness,_ nor a defect of command, because that is
_inconstancy._ Therefore negligence does not pertain to imprudence.

Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Eccles. 7:19): "He that feareth God,
neglecteth nothing." But every sin is excluded by the opposite
virtue. Therefore negligence is opposed to fear rather than to
prudence.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 20:7): "A babbler and a
fool (_imprudens_) will regard no time." Now this is due to
negligence. Therefore negligence is opposed to prudence.

_I answer that,_ Negligence is directly opposed to solicitude. Now
solicitude pertains to the reason, and rectitude of solicitude to
prudence. Hence, on the other hand, negligence pertains to
imprudence. This appears from its very name, because, as Isidore
observes (Etym. x) "a negligent man is one who fails to choose (_nec
eligens_)": and the right choice of the means belongs to prudence.
Therefore negligence pertains to imprudence.

Reply Obj. 1: Negligence is a defect in the internal act, to
which choice also belongs: whereas idleness and laziness denote
slowness of execution, yet so that idleness denotes slowness in
setting about the execution, while laziness denotes remissness in the
execution itself. Hence it is becoming that laziness should arise from
sloth, which is "an oppressive sorrow," i.e. hindering, the mind from
action [*Cf. Q. 35, A. 1; I-II, Q. 35, A. 8].

Reply Obj. 2: Omission regards the external act, for it
consists in failing to perform an act which is due. Hence it is
opposed to justice, and is an effect of negligence, even as the
execution of a just deed is the effect of right reason.

Reply Obj. 3: Negligence regards the act of command, which
solicitude also regards. Yet the negligent man fails in regard to this
act otherwise than the inconstant man: for the inconstant man fails in
commanding, being hindered as it were, by something, whereas the
negligent man fails through lack of a prompt will.

Reply Obj. 4: The fear of God helps us to avoid all sins, because
according to Prov. 15:27, "by the fear of the Lord everyone declineth
from evil." Hence fear makes us avoid negligence, yet not as though
negligence were directly opposed to fear, but because fear incites
man to acts of reason. Wherefore also it has been stated above (I-II,
Q. 44, A. 2) when we were treating of the passions, that "fear makes
us take counsel."
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 54, Art. 3]

Whether Negligence Can Be a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that negligence cannot be a mortal sin.
For a gloss of Gregory [*Moral. ix. 34] on Job 9:28, "I feared all my
works," etc. says that "too little love of God aggravates the
former," viz. negligence. But wherever there is mortal sin, the love
of God is done away with altogether. Therefore negligence is not a
mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, a gloss on Ecclus. 7:34, "For thy negligences purify
thyself with a few," says: "Though the offering be small it cleanses
the negligences of many sins." Now this would not be, if negligence
were a mortal sin. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, under the law certain sacrifices were prescribed for
mortal sins, as appears from the book of Leviticus. Yet no sacrifice
was prescribed for negligence. Therefore negligence is not a mortal
sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 19:16): "He that neglecteth
his own life [Vulg.: 'way'] shall die."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2, ad 3), negligence arises out
of a certain remissness of the will, the result being a lack of
solicitude on the part of the reason in commanding what it should
command, or as it should command. Accordingly negligence may happen
to be a mortal sin in two ways. First on the part of that which is
omitted through negligence. If this be either an act or a
circumstance necessary for salvation, it will be a mortal sin.
Secondly on the part of the cause: for if the will be so remiss about
Divine things, as to fall away altogether from the charity of God,
such negligence is a mortal sin, and this is the case chiefly when
negligence is due to contempt.

But if negligence consists in the omission of an act or circumstance
that is not necessary for salvation, it is not a mortal but a venial
sin, provided the negligence arise, not from contempt, but from some
lack of fervor, to which venial sin is an occasional obstacle.

Reply Obj. 1: Man may be said to love God less in two ways. First
through lack of the fervor of charity, and this causes the negligence
that is a venial sin: secondly through lack of charity itself, in
which sense we say that a man loves God less when he loves Him with a
merely natural love; and this causes the negligence that is a mortal
sin.

Reply Obj. 2: According to the same authority (gloss), a small
offering made with a humble mind and out of pure love, cleanses man
not only from venial but also from mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 3: When negligence consists in the omission of that which
is necessary for salvation, it is drawn to the other more manifest
genus of sin. Because those sins that consist of inward actions, are
more hidden, wherefore no special sacrifices were prescribed for them
in the Law, since the offering of sacrifices was a kind of public
confession of sin, whereas hidden sins should not be confessed in
public.
_______________________

QUESTION 55

OF VICES OPPOSED TO PRUDENCE BY WAY OF RESEMBLANCE
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider those vices opposed to prudence, which have a
resemblance thereto. Under this head there are eight points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether prudence of the flesh is a sin?

(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(3) Whether craftiness is a special sin?

(4) Of guile;

(5) Of fraud;

(6) Of solicitude about temporal things;

(7) Of solicitude about the future;

(8) Of the origin of these vices.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 1]

Whether Prudence of the Flesh Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence of the flesh is not a sin.
For prudence is more excellent than the other moral virtues, since it
governs them all. But no justice or temperance is sinful. Neither
therefore is any prudence a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, it is not a sin to act prudently for an end which it
is lawful to love. But it is lawful to love the flesh, "for no man
ever hated his own flesh" (Eph. 5:29). Therefore prudence of the
flesh is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, just as man is tempted by the flesh, so too is he
tempted by the world and the devil. But no prudence of the world, or
of the devil is accounted a sin. Therefore neither should any
prudence of the flesh be accounted among sins.

_On the contrary,_ No man is an enemy to God save for wickedness
according to Wis. 14:9, "To God the wicked and his wickedness are
hateful alike." Now it is written (Rom. 8:7): "The prudence [Vulg.:
'wisdom'] of the flesh is an enemy to God." Therefore prudence of the
flesh is a sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 47, A. 13), prudence regards
things which are directed to the end of life as a whole. Hence
prudence of the flesh signifies properly the prudence of a man who
looks upon carnal goods as the last end of his life. Now it is
evident that this is a sin, because it involves a disorder in man
with respect to his last end, which does not consist in the goods of
the body, as stated above (I-II, Q. 2, A. 5). Therefore prudence of
the flesh is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Justice and temperance include in their very nature
that which ranks them among the virtues, viz. equality and the
curbing of concupiscence; hence they are never taken in a bad sense.
On the other hand prudence is so called from foreseeing
(_providendo_), as stated above (Q. 47, A. 1; Q. 49, A. 6), which can
extend to evil things also. Therefore, although prudence is taken
simply in a good sense, yet, if something be added, it may be taken
in a bad sense: and it is thus that prudence of the flesh is said to
be a sin.

Reply Obj. 2: The flesh is on account of the soul, as matter is on
account of the form, and the instrument on account of the principal
agent. Hence the flesh is loved lawfully, if it be directed to the
good of the soul as its end. If, however, a man place his last end in
a good of the flesh, his love will be inordinate and unlawful, and it
is thus that the prudence of the flesh is directed to the love of the
flesh.

Reply Obj. 3: The devil tempts us, not through the good of the
appetible object, but by way of suggestion. Wherefore, since prudence
implies direction to some appetible end, we do not speak of "prudence
of the devil," as of a prudence directed to some evil end, which is
the aspect under which the world and the flesh tempt us, in so far as
worldly or carnal goods are proposed to our appetite. Hence we speak
of "carnal" and again of "worldly" prudence, according to Luke 16:8,
"The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser'] in
their generation," etc. The Apostle includes all in the "prudence of
the flesh," because we covet the external things of the world on
account of the flesh.

We may also reply that since prudence is in a certain sense called
"wisdom," as stated above (Q. 47, A. 2, ad 1), we may distinguish a
threefold prudence corresponding to the three kinds of temptation.
Hence it is written (James 3:15) that there is a wisdom which is
"earthly, sensual and devilish," as explained above (Q. 45, A. 1, ad
1), when we were treating of wisdom.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 2]

Whether Prudence of the Flesh Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence of the flesh is a mortal
sin. For it is a mortal sin to rebel against the Divine law, since
this implies contempt of God. Now "the prudence [Douay: 'wisdom'] of
the flesh . . . is not subject to the law of God" (Rom. 8:7).
Therefore prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, every sin against the Holy Ghost is a mortal sin.
Now prudence of the flesh seems to be a sin against the Holy Ghost,
for "it cannot be subject to the law of God" (Rom. 8:7), and so it
seems to be an unpardonable sin, which is proper to the sin against
the Holy Ghost. Therefore prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, the greatest evil is opposed to the greatest good,
as stated in _Ethic._ viii, 10. Now prudence of the flesh is opposed
to that prudence which is the chief of the moral virtues. Therefore
prudence of the flesh is chief among mortal sins, so that it is
itself a mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ That which diminishes a sin has not of itself the
nature of a mortal sin. Now the thoughtful quest of things pertaining
to the care of the flesh, which seems to pertain to carnal prudence,
diminishes sin [*Cf. Prov. 6:30]. Therefore prudence of the flesh has
not of itself the nature of a mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 47, A. 2, ad 1; A. 13), a man is
said to be prudent in two ways. First, simply, i.e. in relation to
the end of life as a whole. Secondly, relatively, i.e. in relation to
some particular end; thus a man is said to be prudent in business or
something else of the kind. Accordingly if prudence of the flesh be
taken as corresponding to prudence in its absolute signification, so
that a man place the last end of his whole life in the care of the
flesh, it is a mortal sin, because he turns away from God by so
doing, since he cannot have several last ends, as stated above (I-II,
Q. 1, A. 5).

If, on the other hand, prudence of the flesh be taken as
corresponding to particular prudence, it is a venial sin. For it
happens sometimes that a man has an inordinate affection for some
pleasure of the flesh, without turning away from God by a mortal sin;
in which case he does not place the end of his whole life in carnal
pleasure. To apply oneself to obtain this pleasure is a venial sin
and pertains to prudence of the flesh. But if a man actually refers
the care of the flesh to a good end, as when one is careful about
one's food in order to sustain one's body, this is no longer prudence
of the flesh, because then one uses the care of the flesh as a means
to an end.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle is speaking of that carnal prudence whereby
a man places the end of his whole life in the goods of the flesh, and
this is a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Prudence of the flesh does not imply a sin against the
Holy Ghost. For when it is stated that "it cannot be subject to the
law of God," this does not mean that he who has prudence of the
flesh, cannot be converted and submit to the law of God, but that
carnal prudence itself cannot be subject to God's law, even as
neither can injustice be just, nor heat cold, although that which is
hot may become cold.

Reply Obj. 3: Every sin is opposed to prudence, just as prudence is
shared by every virtue. But it does not follow that every sin opposed
to prudence is most grave, but only when it is opposed to prudence in
some very grave matter.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 3]

Whether Craftiness Is a Special Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that craftiness is not a special sin. For
the words of Holy Writ do not induce anyone to sin; and yet they
induce us to be crafty, according to Prov. 1:4, "To give craftiness
[Douay: 'subtlety'] to little ones." Therefore craftiness is not a
sin.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 13:16): "The crafty [Douay:
'prudent'] man doth all things with counsel." Therefore, he does so
either for a good or for an evil end. If for a good end, there is no
sin seemingly, and if for an evil end, it would seem to pertain to
carnal or worldly prudence. Therefore craftiness is not a special sin
distinct from prudence of the flesh.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory expounding the words of Job 12, "The
simplicity of the just man is laughed to scorn," says (Moral. x, 29):
"The wisdom of this world is to hide one's thoughts by artifice, to
conceal one's meaning by words, to represent error as truth, to make
out the truth to be false," and further on he adds: "This prudence is
acquired by the young, it is learnt at a price by children." Now the
above things seem to belong to craftiness. Therefore craftiness is not
distinct from carnal or worldly prudence, and consequently it seems
not to be a special sin.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (2 Cor. 4:2): "We renounce the
hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness, nor
adulterating the word of God." Therefore craftiness is a sin.

_I answer that,_ Prudence is _right reason applied to action,_ just
as science is _right reason applied to knowledge._ In speculative
matters one may sin against rectitude of knowledge in two ways: in
one way when the reason is led to a false conclusion that appears to
be true; in another way when the reason proceeds from false premises,
that appear to be true, either to a true or to a false conclusion.
Even so a sin may be against prudence, through having some
resemblance thereto, in two ways. First, when the purpose of the
reason is directed to an end which is good not in truth but in
appearance, and this pertains to prudence of the flesh; secondly,
when, in order to obtain a certain end, whether good or evil, a man
uses means that are not true but fictitious and counterfeit, and this
belongs to the sin of craftiness. This is consequently a sin opposed
to prudence, and distinct from prudence of the flesh.

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine observes (Contra Julian. iv, 3) just as
prudence is sometimes improperly taken in a bad sense, so is
craftiness sometimes taken in a good sense, and this on account of
their mutual resemblance. Properly speaking, however, craftiness is
taken in a bad sense, as the Philosopher states in _Ethic._ vi, 12.

Reply Obj. 2: Craftiness can take counsel both for a good end and for
an evil end: nor should a good end be pursued by means that are false
and counterfeit but by such as are true. Hence craftiness is a sin if
it be directed to a good end.

Reply Obj. 3: Under "worldly prudence" Gregory included everything
that can pertain to false prudence, so that it comprises craftiness
also.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 4]

Whether Guile Is a Sin Pertaining to Craftiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that guile is not a sin pertaining to
craftiness. For sin, especially mortal, has no place in perfect men.
Yet a certain guile is to be found in them, according to 2 Cor.
12:16, "Being crafty I caught you by guile." Therefore guile is not
always a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, guile seems to pertain chiefly to the tongue,
according to Ps. 5:11, "They dealt deceitfully with their tongues."
Now craftiness like prudence is in the very act of reason. Therefore
guile does not pertain to craftiness.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 12:20): "Guile [Douay:
'Deceit'] is in the heart of them that think evil things." But the
thought of evil things does not always pertain to craftiness.
Therefore guile does not seem to belong to craftiness.

_On the contrary,_ Craftiness aims at lying in wait, according to
Eph. 4:14, "By cunning craftiness by which they lie in wait to
deceive": and guile aims at this also. Therefore guile pertains to
craftiness.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), it belongs to craftiness to
adopt ways that are not true but counterfeit and apparently true, in
order to attain some end either good or evil. Now the adopting of
such ways may be subjected to a twofold consideration; first, as
regards the process of thinking them out, and this belongs properly
to craftiness, even as thinking out right ways to a due end belongs
to prudence. Secondly the adopting of such like ways may be
considered with regard to their actual execution, and in this way it
belongs to guile. Hence guile denotes a certain execution of
craftiness, and accordingly belongs thereto.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as craftiness is taken properly in a bad sense,
and improperly in a good sense, so too is guile which is the
execution of craftiness.

Reply Obj. 2: The execution of craftiness with the purpose of
deceiving, is effected first and foremost by words, which hold the
chief place among those signs whereby a man signifies something to
another man, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), hence
guile is ascribed chiefly to speech. Yet guile may happen also in
deeds, according to Ps. 104:25, "And to deal deceitfully with his
servants." Guile is also in the heart, according to Ecclus. 19:23,
"His interior is full of deceit," but this is to devise deceits,
according to Ps. 37:13: "They studied deceits all the day long."

Reply Obj. 3: Whoever purposes to do some evil deed, must needs
devise certain ways of attaining his purpose, and for the most part
he devises deceitful ways, whereby the more easily to obtain his end.
Nevertheless it happens sometimes that evil is done openly and by
violence without craftiness and guile; but as this is more difficult,
it is of less frequent occurrence.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 5]

Whether Fraud Pertains to Craftiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that fraud does not pertain to craftiness.
For a man does not deserve praise if he allows himself to be
deceived, which is the object of craftiness; and yet a man deserves
praise for allowing himself to be defrauded, according to 1 Cor. 6:1,
"Why do you not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?" Therefore
fraud does not belong to craftiness.

Obj. 2: Further, fraud seems to consist in unlawfully taking or
receiving external things, for it is written (Acts 5:1) that "a
certain man named Ananias with Saphira his wife, sold a piece of
land, and by fraud kept back part of the price of the land." Now it
pertains to injustice or illiberality to take possession of or retain
external things unjustly. Therefore fraud does not belong to
craftiness which is opposed to prudence.

Obj. 3: Further, no man employs craftiness against himself. But the
frauds of some are against themselves, for it is written (Prov. 1:18)
concerning some "that they practice frauds [Douay: 'deceits'] against
their own souls." Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness.

_On the contrary,_ The object of fraud is to deceive, according to
Job 13:9, "Shall he be deceived as a man, with your fraudulent
[Douay: 'deceitful'] dealings?" Now craftiness is directed to the
same object. Therefore fraud pertains to craftiness.

_I answer that,_ Just as _guile_ consists in the execution of
craftiness, so also does _fraud._ But they seem to differ in the fact
that _guile_ belongs in general to the execution of craftiness,
whether this be effected by words, or by deeds, whereas _fraud_
belongs more properly to the execution of craftiness by deeds.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle does not counsel the faithful to be
deceived in their knowledge, but to bear patiently the effect of
being deceived, and to endure wrongs inflicted on them by fraud.

Reply Obj. 2: The execution of craftiness may be carried out
by another vice, just as the execution of prudence by the virtues: and
accordingly nothing hinders fraud from pertaining to covetousness or
illiberality.

Reply Obj. 3: Those who commit frauds, do not design anything against
themselves or their own souls; it is through God's just judgment that
what they plot against others, recoils on themselves, according to
Ps. 7:16, "He is fallen into the hole he made."
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 6]

Whether It Is Lawful to Be Solicitous About Temporal Matters?

Objection 1: It would seem lawful to be solicitous about temporal
matters. Because a superior should be solicitous for his subjects,
according to Rom. 12:8, "He that ruleth, with solicitude." Now
according to the Divine ordering, man is placed over temporal things,
according to Ps. 8:8, "Thou hast subjected all things under his
feet," etc. Therefore man should be solicitous about temporal things.

Obj. 2: Further, everyone is solicitous about the end for which he
works. Now it is lawful for a man to work for the temporal things
whereby he sustains life, wherefore the Apostle says (2 Thess. 3:10):
"If any man will not work, neither let him eat." Therefore it is
lawful to be solicitous about temporal things.

Obj. 3: Further, solicitude about works of mercy is praiseworthy,
according to 2 Tim. 1:17, "When he was come to Rome, he carefully
sought me." Now solicitude about temporal things is sometimes
connected with works of mercy; for instance, when a man is solicitous
to watch over the interests of orphans and poor persons. Therefore
solicitude about temporal things is not unlawful.

_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 6:31): "Be not
solicitous . . . saying, What shall we eat, or what shall we drink,
or wherewith shall we be clothed?" And yet such things are very
necessary.

_I answer that,_ Solicitude denotes an earnest endeavor to obtain
something. Now it is evident that the endeavor is more earnest when
there is fear of failure, so that there is less solicitude when
success is assured. Accordingly solicitude about temporal things may
be unlawful in three ways. First on the part of the object of
solicitude; that is, if we seek temporal things as an end. Hence
Augustine says (De Operibus Monach. xxvi): "When Our Lord said: 'Be
not solicitous, ' etc. . . . He intended to forbid them either to
make such things their end, or for the sake of these things to do
whatever they were commanded to do in preaching the Gospel."
Secondly, solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful, through
too much earnestness in endeavoring to obtain temporal things, the
result being that a man is drawn away from spiritual things which
ought to be the chief object of his search, wherefore it is written
(Matt. 13:22) that "the care of this world . . . chokes up the word."
Thirdly, through over much fear, when, to wit, a man fears to lack
necessary things if he do what he ought to do. Now our Lord gives
three motives for laying aside this fear. First, on account of the
yet greater favors bestowed by God on man, independently of his
solicitude, viz. his body and soul (Matt. 6:26); secondly, on account
of the care with which God watches over animals and plants without
the assistance of man, according to the requirements of their nature;
thirdly, because of Divine providence, through ignorance of which the
gentiles are solicitous in seeking temporal goods before all others.
Consequently He concludes that we should be solicitous most of all
about spiritual goods, hoping that temporal goods also may be granted
us according to our needs, if we do what we ought to do.

Reply Obj. 1: Temporal goods are subjected to man that he may use
them according to his needs, not that he may place his end in them
and be over solicitous about them.

Reply Obj. 2: The solicitude of a man who gains his bread by bodily
labor is not superfluous but proportionate; hence Jerome says on
Matt. 6:31, "Be not solicitous," that "labor is necessary, but
solicitude must be banished," namely superfluous solicitude which
unsettles the mind.

Reply Obj. 3: In the works of mercy solicitude about temporal things
is directed to charity as its end, wherefore it is not unlawful,
unless it be superfluous.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 7]

Whether We Should Be Solicitous About the Future?

Objection 1: It would seem that we should be solicitous about the
future. For it is written (Prov. 6:6-8): "Go to the ant, O sluggard,
and consider her ways and learn wisdom; which, although she hath no
guide, nor master . . . provideth her meat for herself in the summer,
and gathereth her food in the harvest." Now this is to be solicitous
about the future. Therefore solicitude about the future is
praiseworthy.

Obj. 2: Further, solicitude pertains to prudence. But prudence is
chiefly about the future, since its principal part is _foresight of
future things,_ as stated above (Q. 49, A. 6, ad 1). Therefore it is
virtuous to be solicitous about the future.

Obj. 3: Further, whoever puts something by that he may keep it for
the morrow, is solicitous about the future. Now we read (John 12:6)
that Christ had a bag for keeping things in, which Judas carried, and
(Acts 4:34-37) that the Apostles kept the price of the land, which
had been laid at their feet. Therefore it is lawful to be solicitous
about the future.

_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 6:34): "Be not . . .
solicitous for tomorrow"; where "tomorrow" stands for the future, as
Jerome says in his commentary on this passage.

_I answer that,_ No work can be virtuous, unless it be vested with
its due circumstances, and among these is the due time, according to
Eccles. 8:6, "There is a time and opportunity for every business";
which applies not only to external deeds but also to internal
solicitude. For every time has its own fitting proper solicitude;
thus solicitude about the crops belongs to the summer time, and
solicitude about the vintage to the time of autumn. Accordingly if a
man were solicitous about the vintage during the summer, he would be
needlessly forestalling the solicitude belonging to a future time.
Hence Our Lord forbids such like excessive solicitude, saying:
"Be . . . not solicitous for tomorrow," wherefore He adds, "for the
morrow will be solicitous for itself," that is to say, the morrow
will have its own solicitude, which will be burden enough for the
soul. This is what He means by adding: "Sufficient for the day is
the evil thereof," namely, the burden of solicitude.

Reply Obj. 1: The ant is solicitous at a befitting time, and it is
this that is proposed for our example.

Reply Obj. 2: Due foresight of the future belongs to prudence. But it
would be an inordinate foresight or solicitude about the future, if a
man were to seek temporal things, to which the terms "past" and
"future" apply, as ends, or if he were to seek them in excess of the
needs of the present life, or if he were to forestall the time for
solicitude.

Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 17),
"when we see a servant of God taking thought lest he lack these
needful things, we must not judge him to be solicitous for the
morrow, since even Our Lord deigned for our example to have a purse,
and we read in the Acts of the Apostles that they procured the
necessary means of livelihood in view of the future on account of a
threatened famine. Hence Our Lord does not condemn those who
according to human custom, provide themselves with such things, but
those who oppose themselves to God for the sake of these things."
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 8]

Whether These Vices Arise from Covetousness?

Objection 1: It would seem that these vices do not arise from
covetousness. As stated above (Q. 43, A. 6) lust is the chief cause
of lack of rectitude in the reason. Now these vices are opposed to
right reason, i.e. to prudence. Therefore they arise chiefly from
lust; especially since the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that
"Venus is full of guile and her girdle is many colored" and that "he
who is incontinent in desire acts with cunning."

Obj. 2: Further, these vices bear a certain resemblance to prudence,
as stated above (Q. 47, A. 13). Now, since prudence is in the reason,
the more spiritual vices seem to be more akin thereto, such as pride
and vainglory. Therefore the aforesaid vices seem to arise from pride
rather than from covetousness.

Obj. 3: Further, men make use of stratagems not only in laying hold
of other people's goods, but also in plotting murders, the former of
which pertains to covetousness, and the latter to anger. Now the use
of stratagems pertains to craftiness, guile, and fraud. Therefore the
aforesaid vices arise not only from covetousness, but also from anger.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states that fraud is a
daughter of covetousness.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3; Q. 47, A. 13), carnal
prudence and craftiness, as well as guile and fraud, bear a certain
resemblance to prudence in some kind of use of the reason. Now among
all the moral virtues it is justice wherein the use of right reason
appears chiefly, for justice is in the rational appetite. Hence the
undue use of reason appears chiefly in the vices opposed to justice,
the chief of which is covetousness. Therefore the aforesaid vices
arise chiefly from covetousness.

Reply Obj. 1: On account of the vehemence of pleasure and of
concupiscence, lust entirely suppresses the reason from exercising
its act: whereas in the aforesaid vices there is some use of reason,
albeit inordinate. Hence these vices do not arise directly from lust.
When the Philosopher says that "Venus is full of guile," he is
referring to a certain resemblance, in so far as she carries man away
suddenly, just as he is moved in deceitful actions, yet not by means
of craftiness but rather by the vehemence of concupiscence and
pleasure; wherefore he adds that "Venus doth cozen the wits of the
wisest man" [*Cf. Iliad xiv, 214-217].

Reply Obj. 2: To do anything by stratagem seems to be due to
pusillanimity: because a magnanimous man wishes to act openly, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Wherefore, as pride resembles or
apes magnanimity, it follows that the aforesaid vices which make use
of fraud and guile, do not arise directly from pride, but rather from
covetousness, which seeks its own profit and sets little by
excellence.

Reply Obj. 3: Anger's movement is sudden, hence it acts with
precipitation, and without counsel, contrary to the use of the
aforesaid vices, though these use counsel inordinately. That men use
stratagems in plotting murders, arises not from anger but rather from
hatred, because the angry man desires to harm manifestly, as the
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2, 3) [*Cf. _Ethic._ vii, 6].
_______________________

QUESTION 56

OF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO PRUDENCE
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider the precepts relating to prudence, under which
head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) The precepts of prudence;

(2) The precepts relating to the opposite vices.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 56, Art. 1]

Whether the Precepts of the Decalogue Should Have Included a Precept
of Prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue should
have included a precept of prudence. For the chief precepts should
include a precept of the chief virtue. Now the chief precepts are
those of the decalogue. Since then prudence is the chief of the moral
virtues, it seems that the precepts of the decalogue should have
included a precept of prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, the teaching of the Gospel contains the Law
especially with regard to the precepts of the decalogue. Now the
teaching of the Gospel contains a precept of prudence (Matt. 10:16):
"Be ye . . . prudent [Douay: 'wise'] as serpents." Therefore the
precepts of the decalogue should have included a precept of prudence.

Obj. 3: Further, the other lessons of the Old Testament are directed
to the precepts of the decalogue: wherefore it is written (Malach.
4:4): "Remember the law of Moses My servant, which I commanded him in
Horeb." Now the other lessons of the Old Testament include precepts
of prudence; for instance (Prov. 3:5): "Lean not upon thy own
prudence"; and further on (Prov. 4:25): "Let thine eyelids go before
thy steps." Therefore the Law also should have contained a precept of
prudence, especially among the precepts of the decalogue.

The contrary however appears to anyone who goes through the precepts
of the decalogue.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 100, A. 3; A. 5, ad 1)
when we were treating of precepts, the commandments of the decalogue
being given to the whole people, are a matter of common knowledge to
all, as coming under the purview of natural reason. Now foremost
among the things dictated by natural reason are the ends of human
life, which are to the practical order what naturally known
principles are to the speculative order, as shown above (Q. 47, A.
6). Now prudence is not about the end, but about the means, as stated
above (Q. 47, A. 6). Hence it was not fitting that the precepts of
the decalogue should include a precept relating directly to prudence.
And yet all the precepts of the decalogue are related to prudence, in
so far as it directs all virtuous acts.

Reply Obj. 1: Although prudence is simply foremost among all the
moral virtues, yet justice, more than any other virtue, regards its
object under the aspect of something due, which is a necessary
condition for a precept, as stated above (Q. 44, A. 1; I-II, Q. 99,
AA. 1, 5). Hence it behooved the chief precepts of the Law, which are
those of the decalogue, to refer to justice rather than to prudence.

Reply Obj. 2: The teaching of the Gospel is the doctrine of
perfection. Therefore it needed to instruct man perfectly in all
matters relating to right conduct, whether ends or means: wherefore
it behooved the Gospel teaching to contain precepts also of prudence.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as the rest of the teaching of the Old Testament
is directed to the precepts of the decalogue as its end, so it
behooved man to be instructed by the subsequent lessons of the Old
Testament about the act of prudence which is directed to the means.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 56, Art. 2]

Whether the Prohibitive Precepts Relating to the Vices Opposed to
Prudence Are Fittingly Propounded in the Old Law?

Objection 1: It would seem that the prohibitive precepts relating to
the vices opposed to prudence are unfittingly propounded in the Old
Law. For such vices as imprudence and its parts which are directly
opposed to prudence are not less opposed thereto, than those which
bear a certain resemblance to prudence, such as craftiness and vices
connected with it. Now the latter vices are forbidden in the Law: for
it is written (Lev. 19:13): "Thou shalt not calumniate thy neighbor,"
and (Deut. 25:13): "Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag, a
greater and a less." Therefore there should have also been
prohibitive precepts about the vices directly opposed to prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, there is room for fraud in other things than in
buying and selling. Therefore the Law unfittingly forbade fraud
solely in buying and selling.

Obj. 3: Further, there is the same reason for prescribing an act of
virtue as for prohibiting the act of a contrary vice. But acts of
prudence are not prescribed in the Law. Therefore neither should any
contrary vices have been forbidden in the Law.

The contrary, however, appears from the precepts of the Law which are
quoted in the first objection.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), justice, above all, regards
the aspect of something due, which is a necessary condition for a
precept, because justice tends to render that which is due to
another, as we shall state further on (Q. 58, A. 2). Now craftiness,
as to its execution, is committed chiefly in matters of justice, as
stated above (Q. 55, A. 8): and so it was fitting that the Law should
contain precepts forbidding the execution of craftiness, in so far as
this pertains to injustice, as when a man uses guile and fraud in
calumniating another or in stealing his goods.

Reply Obj. 1: Those vices that are manifestly opposed to prudence, do
not pertain to injustice in the same way as the execution of
craftiness, and so they are not forbidden in the Law, as fraud and
guile are, which latter pertain to injustice.

Reply Obj. 2: All guile and fraud committed in matters of injustice,
can be understood to be forbidden in the prohibition of calumny (Lev.
19:13). Yet fraud and guile are wont to be practiced chiefly in
buying and selling, according to Ecclus. 26:28, "A huckster shall not
be justified from the sins of the lips": and it is for this reason
that the Law contained a special precept forbidding fraudulent buying
and selling.

Reply Obj. 3: All the precepts of the Law that relate to acts of
justice pertain to the execution of prudence, even as the precepts
prohibitive of stealing, calumny and fraudulent selling pertain to
the execution of craftiness.
_______________________

QUESTION 57

OF RIGHT
(In Four Articles)

After considering prudence we must in due sequence consider justice,
the consideration of which will be fourfold:

(1) Of justice;

(2) Of its parts;

(3) Of the corresponding gift;

(4) Of the precepts relating to justice.

Four points will have to be considered about justice: (1) Right; (2)
Justice itself; (3) Injustice; (4) Judgment.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether right is the object of justice?

(2) Whether right is fittingly divided into natural and positive
right?

(3) Whether the right of nations is the same as natural right?

(4) Whether right of dominion and paternal right are distinct species?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 57, Art. 1]

Whether Right Is the Object of Justice?

Objection 1: It would seem that right is not the object of justice.
For the jurist Celsus says [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 1] that
"right is the art of goodness and equality." Now art is not the
object of justice, but is by itself an intellectual virtue. Therefore
right is not the object of justice.

Obj. 2: Further, "Law," according to Isidore (Etym. v, 3), "is a kind
of right." Now law is the object not of justice but of prudence,
wherefore the Philosopher [*Ethic. vi, 8] reckons "legislative" as
one of the parts of prudence. Therefore right is not the object of
justice.

Obj. 3: Further, justice, before all, subjects man to God: for
Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "justice is love serving
God alone, and consequently governing aright all things subject to
man." Now right (_jus_) does not pertain to Divine things, but only
to human affairs, for Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that "_fas_ is the
Divine law, and _jus,_ the human law." Therefore right is not the
object of justice.

_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that "_jus_ (right) is
so called because it is just." Now the _just_ is the object of
justice, for the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that "all are
agreed in giving the name of justice to the habit which makes men
capable of doing just actions."

_I answer that,_ It is proper to justice, as compared with the other
virtues, to direct man in his relations with others: because it
denotes a kind of equality, as its very name implies; indeed we are
wont to say that things are adjusted when they are made equal, for
equality is in reference of one thing to some other. On the other
hand the other virtues perfect man in those matters only which befit
him in relation to himself. Accordingly that which is right in the
works of the other virtues, and to which the intention of the virtue
tends as to its proper object, depends on its relation to the agent
only, whereas the right in a work of justice, besides its relation to
the agent, is set up by its relation to others. Because a man's work
is said to be just when it is related to some other by way of some
kind of equality, for instance the payment of the wage due for a
service rendered. And so a thing is said to be just, as having the
rectitude of justice, when it is the term of an act of justice,
without taking into account the way in which it is done by the agent:
whereas in the other virtues nothing is declared to be right unless
it is done in a certain way by the agent. For this reason justice has
its own special proper object over and above the other virtues, and
this object is called the just, which is the same as _right._ Hence
it is evident that right is the object of justice.

Reply Obj. 1: It is usual for words to be distorted from their
original signification so as to mean something else: thus the word
"medicine" was first employed to signify a remedy used for curing a
sick person, and then it was drawn to signify the art by which this
is done. In like manner the word _jus_ (right) was first of all used
to denote the just thing itself, but afterwards it was transferred to
designate the art whereby it is known what is just, and further to
denote the place where justice is administered, thus a man is said to
appear _in jure_ [*In English we speak of a court of law, a barrister
at law, etc.], and yet further, we say even that a man, who has the
office of exercising justice, administers the _jus_ even if his
sentence be unjust.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as there pre-exists in the mind of the craftsman
an expression of the things to be made externally by his craft, which
expression is called the rule of his craft, so too there pre-exists
in the mind an expression of the particular just work which the
reason determines, and which is a kind of rule of prudence. If this
rule be expressed in writing it is called a "law," which according to
Isidore (Etym. v, 1) is "a written decree": and so law is not the
same as right, but an expression of right.

Reply Obj. 3: Since justice implies equality, and since we cannot
offer God an equal return, it follows that we cannot make Him a
perfectly just repayment. For this reason the Divine law is not
properly called _jus_ but _fas,_ because, to wit, God is satisfied if
we accomplish what we can. Nevertheless justice tends to make man
repay God as much as he can, by subjecting his mind to Him entirely.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 57, Art. 2]

Whether Right Is Fittingly Divided into Natural Right and Positive
Right?

Objection 1: It would seem that right is not fittingly divided into
natural right and positive right. For that which is natural is
unchangeable, and is the same for all. Now nothing of the kind is to
be found in human affairs, since all the rules of human right fail in
certain cases, nor do they obtain force everywhere. Therefore there
is no such thing as natural right.

Obj. 2: Further, a thing is called "positive" when it proceeds from
the human will. But a thing is not just, simply because it proceeds
from the human will, else a man's will could not be unjust. Since
then the "just" and the "right" are the same, it seems that there is
no positive right.

Obj. 3: Further, Divine right is not natural right, since it
transcends human nature. In like manner, neither is it positive
right, since it is based not on human, but on Divine authority.
Therefore right is unfittingly divided into natural and positive.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "political
justice is partly natural and partly legal," i.e. established by law.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1) the "right" or the "just" is
a work that is adjusted to another person according to some kind of
equality. Now a thing can be adjusted to a man in two ways: first by
its very nature, as when a man gives so much that he may receive
equal value in return, and this is called "natural right." In another
way a thing is adjusted or commensurated to another person, by
agreement, or by common consent, when, to wit, a man deems himself
satisfied, if he receive so much. This can be done in two ways: first
by private agreement, as that which is confirmed by an agreement
between private individuals; secondly, by public agreement, as when
the whole community agrees that something should be deemed as though
it were adjusted and commensurated to another person, or when this is
decreed by the prince who is placed over the people, and acts in its
stead, and this is called "positive right."

Reply Obj. 1: That which is natural to one whose nature is
unchangeable, must needs be such always and everywhere. But man's
nature is changeable, wherefore that which is natural to man may
sometimes fail. Thus the restitution of a deposit to the depositor is
in accordance with natural equality, and if human nature were always
right, this would always have to be observed; but since it happens
sometimes that man's will is unrighteous there are cases in which a
deposit should not be restored, lest a man of unrighteous will make
evil use of the thing deposited: as when a madman or an enemy of the
common weal demands the return of his weapons.

Reply Obj. 2: The human will can, by common agreement, make a thing
to be just provided it be not, of itself, contrary to natural
justice, and it is in such matters that positive right has its place.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "in the case of the
legal just, it does not matter in the first instance whether it takes
one form or another, it only matters when once it is laid down." If,
however, a thing is, of itself, contrary to natural right, the human
will cannot make it just, for instance by decreeing that it is lawful
to steal or to commit adultery. Hence it is written (Isa. 10:1): "Woe
to them that make wicked laws."

Reply Obj. 3: The Divine right is that which is promulgated by God.
Such things are partly those that are naturally just, yet their
justice is hidden to man, and partly are made just by God's decree.
Hence also Divine right may be divided in respect of these two
things, even as human right is. For the Divine law commands certain
things because they are good, and forbids others, because they are
evil, while others are good because they are prescribed, and others
evil because they are forbidden.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 57, Art. 3]

Whether the Right of Nations Is the Same As the Natural Right?

Objection 1: It would seem that the right of nations is the same as
the natural right. For all men do not agree save in that which is
natural to them. Now all men agree in the right of nations; since the
jurist [*Ulpian: Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i] "the right of
nations is that which is in use among all nations." Therefore the
right of nations is the natural right.

Obj. 2: Further, slavery among men is natural, for some are naturally
slaves according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2). Now "slavery
belongs to the right of nations," as Isidore states (Etym. v, 4).
Therefore the right of nations is a natural right.

Obj. 3: Further, right as stated above (A. 2) is divided into natural
and positive. Now the right of nations is not a positive right, since
all nations never agreed to decree anything by common agreement.
Therefore the right of nations is a natural right.

_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. v, 4) that "right is either
natural, or civil, or right of nations," and consequently the right
of nations is distinct from natural right.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the natural right or just is
that which by its very nature is adjusted to or commensurate with
another person. Now this may happen in two ways; first, according as
it is considered absolutely: thus a male by [his] very nature is
commensurate with the female to beget offspring by her, and a parent
is commensurate with the offspring to nourish it. Secondly a thing is
naturally commensurate with another person, not according as it is
considered absolutely, but according to something resultant from it,
for instance the possession of property. For if a particular piece of
land be considered absolutely, it contains no reason why it should
belong to one man more than to another, but if it be considered in
respect of its adaptability to cultivation, and the unmolested use of
the land, it has a certain commensuration to be the property of one
and not of another man, as the Philosopher shows (Polit. ii, 2).

Now it belongs not only to man but also to other animals to apprehend
a thing absolutely: wherefore the right which we call natural, is
common to us and other animals according to the first kind of
commensuration. But the right of nations falls short of natural right
in this sense, as the jurist [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i] says
because "the latter is common to all animals, while the former is
common to men only." On the other hand to consider a thing by
comparing it with what results from it, is proper to reason,
wherefore this same is natural to man in respect of natural reason
which dictates it. Hence the jurist Gaius says (Digest. i, 1; De
Just. et Jure i, 9): "whatever natural reason decrees among all men,
is observed by all equally, and is called the right of nations." This
suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2: Considered absolutely, the fact that this particular
man should be a slave rather than another man, is based, not on
natural reason, but on some resultant utility, in that it is useful
to this man to be ruled by a wiser man, and to the latter to be
helped by the former, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 2).
Wherefore slavery which belongs to the right of nations is natural in
the second way, but not in the first.

Reply Obj. 3: Since natural reason dictates matters which are
according to the right of nations, as implying a proximate equality,
it follows that they need no special institution, for they are
instituted by natural reason itself, as stated by the authority
quoted above.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 57, Art. 4]

Whether Paternal Right and Right of Dominion Should Be Distinguished
As Special Species?

Objection 1: It would seem that "paternal right" and "right of
dominion" should not be distinguished as special species. For it
belongs to justice to render to each one what is his, as Ambrose
states (De Offic. i, 24). Now right is the object of justice, as
stated above (A. 1). Therefore right belongs to each one equally; and
we ought not to distinguish the rights of fathers and masters as
distinct species.

Obj. 2: Further, the law is an expression of what is just, as stated
above (A. 1, ad 2). Now a law looks to the common good of a city or
kingdom, as stated above (I-II, Q. 90, A. 2), but not to the private
good of an individual or even of one household. Therefore there is no
need for a special right of dominion or paternal right, since the
master and the father pertain to a household, as stated in _Polit._
i, 2.

Obj. 3: Further, there are many other differences of degrees among
men, for instance some are soldiers, some are priests, some are
princes. Therefore some special kind of right should be allotted to
them.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) distinguishes right
of dominion, paternal right and so on as species distinct from civil
right.

_I answer that,_ Right or just depends on commensuration with another
person. Now "another" has a twofold signification. First, it may
denote something that is other simply, as that which is altogether
distinct; as, for example, two men neither of whom is subject to the
other, and both of whom are subjects of the ruler of the state; and
between these according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) there is the
"just" simply. Secondly a thing is said to be other from something
else, not simply, but as belonging in some way to that something
else: and in this way, as regards human affairs, a son belongs to his
father, since he is part of him somewhat, as stated in _Ethic._ viii,
12, and a slave belongs to his master, because he is his instrument,
as stated in _Polit._ i, 2 [*Cf. _Ethic._ viii, 11]. Hence a father
is not compared to his son as to another simply, and so between them
there is not the just simply, but a kind of just, called "paternal."
In like manner neither is there the just simply, between master and
servant, but that which is called "dominative." A wife, though she is
something belonging to the husband, since she stands related to him
as to her own body, as the Apostle declares (Eph. 5:28), is
nevertheless more distinct from her husband, than a son from his
father, or a slave from his master: for she is received into a kind
of social life, that of matrimony, wherefore according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) there is more scope for justice between
husband and wife than between father and son, or master and slave,
because, as husband and wife have an immediate relation to the
community of the household, as stated in _Polit._ i, 2, 5, it follows
that between them there is "domestic justice" rather than "civic."

Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to justice to render to each one his right,
the distinction between individuals being presupposed: for if a man
gives himself his due, this is not strictly called "just." And since
what belongs to the son is his father's, and what belongs to the
slave is his master's, it follows that properly speaking there is not
justice of father to son, or of master to slave.

Reply Obj. 2: A son, as such, belongs to his father, and a slave, as
such, belongs to his master; yet each, considered as a man, is
something having separate existence and distinct from others. Hence
in so far as each of them is a man, there is justice towards them in
a way: and for this reason too there are certain laws regulating the
relations of father to his son, and of a master to his slave; but in
so far as each is something belonging to another, the perfect idea of
"right" or "just" is wanting to them.

Reply Obj. 3: All other differences between one person and another in
a state, have an immediate relation to the community of the state and
to its ruler, wherefore there is just towards them in the perfect
sense of justice. This "just" however is distinguished according to
various offices, hence when we speak of "military," or "magisterial,"
or "priestly" right, it is not as though such rights fell short of
the simply right, as when we speak of "paternal" right, or right of
"dominion," but for the reason that something proper is due to each
class of person in respect of his particular office.
_______________________

QUESTION 58

OF JUSTICE
(In Twelve Articles)

We must now consider justice. Under this head there are twelve points
of inquiry:

(1) What is justice?

(2) Whether justice is always towards another?

(3) Whether it is a virtue?

(4) Whether it is in the will as its subject?

(5) Whether it is a general virtue?

(6) Whether, as a general virtue, it is essentially the same as every
virtue?

(7) Whether there is a particular justice?

(8) Whether particular justice has a matter of its own?

(9) Whether it is about passions, or about operations only?

(10) Whether the mean of justice is the real mean?

(11) Whether the act of justice is to render to everyone his own?

(12) Whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 1]

Whether Justice Is Fittingly Defined As Being the Perpetual and
Constant Will to Render to Each One His Right?

Objection 1: It would seem that lawyers have unfittingly defined
justice as being "the perpetual and constant will to render to each
one his right" [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 10]. For, according
to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1), justice is a habit which makes a
man "capable of doing what is just, and of being just in action and
in intention." Now "will" denotes a power, or also an act. Therefore
justice is unfittingly defined as being a will.

Obj. 2: Further, rectitude of the will is not the will; else if the
will were its own rectitude, it would follow that no will is
unrighteous. Yet, according to Anselm (De Veritate xii), justice is
rectitude. Therefore justice is not the will.

Obj. 3: Further, no will is perpetual save God's. If therefore
justice is a perpetual will, in God alone will there be justice.

Obj. 4: Further, whatever is perpetual is constant, since it is
unchangeable. Therefore it is needless in defining justice, to say
that it is both "perpetual" and "constant."

Obj. 5: Further, it belongs to the sovereign to give each one his
right. Therefore, if justice gives each one his right, it follows
that it is in none but the sovereign: which is absurd.

Obj. 6: Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "justice
is love serving God alone." Therefore it does not render to each one
his right.

_I answer that,_ The aforesaid definition of justice is fitting if
understood aright. For since every virtue is a habit that is the
principle of a good act, a virtue must needs be defined by means of
the good act bearing on the matter proper to that virtue. Now the
proper matter of justice consists of those things that belong to our
intercourse with other men, as shall be shown further on (A. 2).
Hence the act of justice in relation to its proper matter and object
is indicated in the words, "Rendering to each one his right," since,
as Isidore says (Etym. x), "a man is said to be just because he
respects the rights (_jus_) of others."

Now in order that an act bearing upon any matter whatever be
virtuous, it requires to be voluntary, stable, and firm, because the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that in order for an act to be
virtuous it needs first of all to be done "knowingly," secondly to be
done "by choice," and "for a due end," thirdly to be done
"immovably." Now the first of these is included in the second, since
"what is done through ignorance is involuntary" (Ethic. iii, 1).
Hence the definition of justice mentions first the "will," in order
to show that the act of justice must be voluntary; and mention is
made afterwards of its "constancy" and "perpetuity" in order to
indicate the firmness of the act.

Accordingly, this is a complete definition of justice; save that the
act is mentioned instead of the habit, which takes its species from
that act, because habit implies relation to act. And if anyone would
reduce it to the proper form of a definition, he might say that
"justice is a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a
constant and perpetual will": and this is about the same definition
as that given by the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5) who says that "justice
is a habit whereby a man is said to be capable of doing just actions
in accordance with his choice."

Reply Obj. 1: Will here denotes the act, not the power: and it is
customary among writers to define habits by their acts: thus
Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. xl) that "faith is to believe what
one sees not."

Reply Obj. 2: Justice is the same as rectitude, not essentially but
causally; for it is a habit which rectifies the deed and the will.

Reply Obj. 3: The will may be called perpetual in two ways. First on
the part of the will's act which endures for ever, and thus God's
will alone is perpetual. Secondly on the part of the subject,
because, to wit, a man wills to do a certain thing always, and this
is a necessary condition of justice. For it does not satisfy the
conditions of justice that one wish to observe justice in some
particular matter for the time being, because one could scarcely find
a man willing to act unjustly in every case; and it is requisite that
one should have the will to observe justice at all times and in all
cases.

Reply Obj. 4: Since "perpetual" does not imply perpetuity of the act
of the will, it is not superfluous to add "constant": for while the
"perpetual will" denotes the purpose of observing justice always,
"constant" signifies a firm perseverance in this purpose.

Reply Obj. 5: A judge renders to each one what belongs to him, by way
of command and direction, because a judge is the "personification of
justice," and "the sovereign is its guardian" (Ethic. v, 4). On the
other hand, the subjects render to each one what belongs to him, by
way of execution.

Reply Obj. 6: Just as love of God includes love of our neighbor, as
stated above (Q. 25, A. 1), so too the service of God includes
rendering to each one his due.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 2]

Whether Justice Is Always Towards Another?

Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not always towards
another. For the Apostle says (Rom. 3:22) that "the justice of God is
by faith of Jesus Christ." Now faith does not concern the dealings of
one man with another. Neither therefore does justice.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv), "it
belongs to justice that man should direct to the service of God his
authority over the things that are subject to him." Now the sensitive
appetite is subject to man, according to Gen. 4:7, where it is
written: "The lust thereof," viz. of sin, "shall be under thee, and
thou shalt have dominion over it." Therefore it belongs to justice to
have dominion over one's own appetite: so that justice is towards
oneself.

Obj. 3: Further, the justice of God is eternal. But nothing else is
co-eternal with God. Therefore justice is not essentially towards
another.

Obj. 4: Further, man's dealings with himself need to be rectified no
less than his dealings with another. Now man's dealings are rectified
by justice, according to Prov. 11:5, "The justice of the upright
shall make his way prosperous." Therefore justice is about our
dealings not only with others, but also with ourselves.

_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Officiis i, 7) that "the object of
justice is to keep men together in society and mutual intercourse."
Now this implies relationship of one man to another. Therefore
justice is concerned only about our dealings with others.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 57, A. 1) since justice by its
name implies equality, it denotes essentially relation to another,
for a thing is equal, not to itself, but to another. And forasmuch as
it belongs to justice to rectify human acts, as stated above (Q. 57,
A. 1; I-II, Q. 113, A. 1) this otherness which justice demands must
needs be between beings capable of action. Now actions belong to
supposits [*Cf. I, Q. 29, A. 2] and wholes and, properly speaking,
not to parts and forms or powers, for we do not say properly that the
hand strikes, but a man with his hand, nor that heat makes a thing
hot, but fire by heat, although such expressions may be employed
metaphorically. Hence, justice properly speaking demands a
distinction of supposits, and consequently is only in one man towards
another. Nevertheless in one and the same man we may speak
metaphorically of his various principles of action such as the
reason, the irascible, and the concupiscible, as though they were so
many agents: so that metaphorically in one and the same man there is
said to be justice in so far as the reason commands the irascible and
concupiscible, and these obey reason; and in general in so far as to
each part of man is ascribed what is becoming to it. Hence the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 11) calls this "metaphorical justice."

Reply Obj. 1: The justice which faith works in us, is that whereby
the ungodly is justified: it consists in the due coordination of the
parts of the soul, as stated above (I-II, Q. 113, A. 1) where we were
treating of the justification of the ungodly. Now this belongs to
metaphorical justice, which may be found even in a man who lives all
by himself.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply Obj. 3: God's justice is from eternity in respect of the
eternal will and purpose (and it is chiefly in this that justice
consists); although it is not eternal as regards its effect, since
nothing is co-eternal with God.

Reply Obj. 4: Man's dealings with himself are sufficiently rectified
by the rectification of the passions by the other moral virtues. But
his dealings with others need a special rectification, not only in
relation to the agent, but also in relation to the person to whom
they are directed. Hence about such dealings there is a special
virtue, and this is justice.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 3]

Whether Justice Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not a virtue. For it is
written (Luke 17:10): "When you shall have done all these things that
are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done
that which we ought to do." Now it is not unprofitable to do a
virtuous deed: for Ambrose says (De Officiis ii, 6): "We look to a
profit that is estimated not by pecuniary gain but by the acquisition
of godliness." Therefore to do what one ought to do, is not a
virtuous deed. And yet it is an act of justice. Therefore justice is
not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, that which is done of necessity, is not meritorious.
But to render to a man what belongs to him, as justice requires, is
of necessity. Therefore it is not meritorious. Yet it is by virtuous
actions that we gain merit. Therefore justice is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, every moral virtue is about matters of action. Now
those things which are wrought externally are not things concerning
behavior but concerning handicraft, according to the Philosopher
(Metaph. ix) [*Didot ed., viii, 8]. Therefore since it belongs to
justice to produce externally a deed that is just in itself, it seems
that justice is not a moral virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "the entire
structure of good works is built on four virtues," viz. temperance,
prudence, fortitude and justice.

_I answer that,_ A human virtue is one "which renders a human act and
man himself good" [*Ethic. ii, 6], and this can be applied to justice.
For a man's act is made good through attaining the rule of reason,
which is the rule whereby human acts are regulated. Hence, since
justice regulates human operations, it is evident that it renders
man's operations good, and, as Tully declares (De Officiis i, 7),
good men are so called chiefly from their justice, wherefore, as he
says again (De Officiis i, 7) "the luster of virtue appears above all
in justice."

Reply Obj. 1: When a man does what he ought, he brings no gain to the
person to whom he does what he ought, but only abstains from doing
him a harm. He does however profit himself, in so far as he does what
he ought, spontaneously and readily, and this is to act virtuously.
Hence it is written (Wis. 8:7) that Divine wisdom "teacheth
temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such
things as men (i.e. virtuous men) can have nothing more profitable in
life."

Reply Obj. 2: Necessity is twofold. One arises from _constraint,_ and
this removes merit, since it runs counter to the will. The other
arises from the obligation of a _command,_ or from the necessity of
obtaining an end, when, to wit, a man is unable to achieve the end of
virtue without doing some particular thing. The latter necessity does
not remove merit, when a man does voluntarily that which is necessary
in this way. It does however exclude the credit of supererogation,
according to 1 Cor. 9:16, "If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to
me, for a necessity lieth upon me."

Reply Obj. 3: Justice is concerned about external things, not by
making them, which pertains to art, but by using them in our dealings
with other men.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 4]

Whether Justice Is in the Will As Its Subject?

Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not in the will as its
subject. For justice is sometimes called truth. But truth is not in
the will, but in the intellect. Therefore justice is not in the will
as its subject.

Obj. 2: Further, justice is about our dealings with others. Now it
belongs to the reason to direct one thing in relation to another.
Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject but in the reason.

Obj. 3: Further, justice is not an intellectual virtue, since it is
not directed to knowledge; wherefore it follows that it is a moral
virtue. Now the subject of moral virtue is the faculty which is
"rational by participation," viz. the irascible and the
concupiscible, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 13). Therefore
justice is not in the will as its subject, but in the irascible and
concupiscible.

_On the contrary,_ Anselm says (De Verit. xii) that "justice is
rectitude of the will observed for its own sake."

_I answer that,_ The subject of a virtue is the power whose act that
virtue aims at rectifying. Now justice does not aim at directing an
act of the cognitive power, for we are not said to be just through
knowing something aright. Hence the subject of justice is not the
intellect or reason which is a cognitive power. But since we are said
to be just through doing something aright, and because the proximate
principle of action is the appetitive power, justice must needs be in
some appetitive power as its subject.

Now the appetite is twofold; namely, the will which is in the reason
and the sensitive appetite which follows on sensitive apprehension,
and is divided into the irascible and the concupiscible, as stated in
the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2). Again the act of rendering his due to
each man cannot proceed from the sensitive appetite, because
sensitive apprehension does not go so far as to be able to consider
the relation of one thing to another; but this is proper to the
reason. Therefore justice cannot be in the irascible or concupiscible
as its subject, but only in the will: hence the Philosopher (Ethic.
v, 1) defines justice by an act of the will, as may be seen above (A.
1).

Reply Obj. 1: Since the will is the rational appetite, when the
rectitude of the reason which is called truth is imprinted on the
will on account of its nighness to the reason, this imprint retains
the name of truth; and hence it is that justice sometimes goes by the
name of truth.

Reply Obj. 2: The will is borne towards its object consequently on
the apprehension of reason: wherefore, since the reason directs one
thing in relation to another, the will can will one thing in relation
to another, and this belongs to justice.

Reply Obj. 3: Not only the irascible and concupiscible parts are
_rational by participation,_ but the entire _appetitive_ faculty, as
stated in _Ethic._ i, 13, because all appetite is subject to reason.
Now the will is contained in the appetitive faculty, wherefore it can
be the subject of moral virtue.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 5]

Whether Justice Is a General Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not a general virtue. For
justice is specified with the other virtues, according to Wis. 8:7,
"She teacheth temperance and prudence, and justice, and fortitude."
Now the "general" is not specified or reckoned together with the
species contained under the same "general." Therefore justice is not
a general virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, as justice is accounted a cardinal virtue, so are
temperance and fortitude. Now neither temperance nor fortitude is
reckoned to be a general virtue. Therefore neither should justice in
any way be reckoned a general virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, justice is always towards others, as stated above
(A. 2). But a sin committed against one's neighbor cannot be a
general sin, because it is condivided with sin committed against
oneself. Therefore neither is justice a general virtue.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "justice
is every virtue."

_I answer that,_ Justice, as stated above (A. 2) directs man in his
relations with other men. Now this may happen in two ways: first as
regards his relation with individuals, secondly as regards his
relations with others in general, in so far as a man who serves a
community, serves all those who are included in that community.
Accordingly justice in its proper acceptation can be directed to
another in both these senses. Now it is evident that all who are
included in a community, stand in relation to that community as parts
to a whole; while a part, as such, belongs to a whole, so that
whatever is the good of a part can be directed to the good of the
whole. It follows therefore that the good of any virtue, whether such
virtue direct man in relation to himself, or in relation to certain
other individual persons, is referable to the common good, to which
justice directs: so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice,
in so far as it directs man to the common good. It is in this sense
that justice is called a general virtue. And since it belongs to the
law to direct to the common good, as stated above (I-II, Q. 90, A.
2), it follows that the justice which is in this way styled general,
is called "legal justice," because thereby man is in harmony with the
law which directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.

Reply Obj. 1: Justice is specified or enumerated with the other
virtues, not as a general but as a special virtue, as we shall state
further on (AA. 7, 12).

Reply Obj. 2: Temperance and fortitude are in the sensitive appetite,
viz. in the concupiscible and irascible. Now these powers are
appetitive of certain particular goods, even as the senses are
cognitive of particulars. On the other hand justice is in the
intellective appetite as its subject, which can have the universal
good as its object, knowledge whereof belongs to the intellect. Hence
justice can be a general virtue rather than temperance or fortitude.

Reply Obj. 3: Things referable to oneself are referable to
another, especially in regard to the common good. Wherefore legal
justice, in so far as it directs to the common good, may be called a
general virtue: and in like manner injustice may be called a general
sin; hence it is written (1 John 3:4) that all "sin is iniquity."
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 6]

Whether Justice, As a General Virtue, Is Essentially the Same As All
Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that justice, as a general virtue, is
essentially the same as all virtue. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
v, 1) that "virtue and legal justice are the same as all virtue, but
differ in their mode of being." Now things that differ merely in
their mode of being or logically do not differ essentially. Therefore
justice is essentially the same as every virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, every virtue that is not essentially the same as all
virtue is a part of virtue. Now the aforesaid justice, according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. v. 1) "is not a part but the whole of
virtue." Therefore the aforesaid justice is essentially the same as
all virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, the essence of a virtue does not change through that
virtue directing its act to some higher end even as the habit of
temperance remains essentially the same even though its act be
directed to a Divine good. Now it belongs to legal justice that the
acts of all the virtues are directed to a higher end, namely the
common good of the multitude, which transcends the good of one single
individual. Therefore it seems that legal justice is essentially all
virtue.

Obj. 4: Further, every good of a part can be directed to the good of
the whole, so that if it be not thus directed it would seem without
use or purpose. But that which is in accordance with virtue cannot be
so. Therefore it seems that there can be no act of any virtue, that
does not belong to general justice, which directs to the common good;
and so it seems that general justice is essentially the same as all
virtue.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "many are
able to be virtuous in matters affecting themselves, but are unable
to be virtuous in matters relating to others," and (Polit. iii, 2)
that "the virtue of the good man is not strictly the same as the
virtue of the good citizen." Now the virtue of a good citizen is
general justice, whereby a man is directed to the common good.
Therefore general justice is not the same as virtue in general, and
it is possible to have one without the other.

_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be "general" in two ways. First,
by _predication:_ thus "animal" is general in relation to man and
horse and the like: and in this sense that which is general must
needs be essentially the same as the things in relation to which it
is general, for the reason that the genus belongs to the essence of
the species, and forms part of its definition. Secondly a thing is
said to be general _virtually;_ thus a universal cause is general in
relation to all its effects, the sun, for instance, in relation to
all bodies that are illumined, or transmuted by its power; and in
this sense there is no need for that which is "general" to be
essentially the same as those things in relation to which it is
general, since cause and effect are not essentially the same. Now it
is in the latter sense that, according to what has been said (A. 5),
legal justice is said to be a general virtue, in as much, to wit, as
it directs the acts of the other virtues to its own end, and this is
to move all the other virtues by its command; for just as charity may
be called a general virtue in so far as it directs the acts of all
the virtues to the Divine good, so too is legal justice, in so far as
it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.
Accordingly, just as charity which regards the Divine good as its
proper object, is a special virtue in respect of its essence, so too
legal justice is a special virtue in respect of its essence, in so
far as it regards the common good as its proper object. And thus it
is in the sovereign principally and by way of a mastercraft, while it
is secondarily and administratively in his subjects.

However the name of legal justice can be given to every virtue, in so
far as every virtue is directed to the common good by the aforesaid
legal justice, which though special essentially is nevertheless
virtually general. Speaking in this way, legal justice is essentially
the same as all virtue, but differs therefrom logically: and it is in
this sense that the Philosopher speaks.

Wherefore the Replies to the First and Second Objections are manifest.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument again takes legal justice for the
virtue commanded by legal justice.

Reply Obj. 4: Every virtue strictly speaking directs its act
to that virtue's proper end: that it should happen to be directed to a
further end either always or sometimes, does not belong to that virtue
considered strictly, for it needs some higher virtue to direct it to
that end. Consequently there must be one supreme virtue essentially
distinct from every other virtue, which directs all the virtues to the
common good; and this virtue is legal justice.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 7]

Whether There Is a Particular Besides a General Justice?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a particular besides a
general justice. For there is nothing superfluous in the virtues, as
neither is there in nature. Now general justice directs man
sufficiently in all his relations with other men. Therefore there is
no need for a particular justice.

Obj. 2: Further, the species of a virtue does not vary according to
"one" and "many." But legal justice directs one man to another in
matters relating to the multitude, as shown above (AA. 5, 6).
Therefore there is not another species of justice directing one man
to another in matters relating to the individual.

Obj. 3: Further, between the individual and the general public stands
the household community. Consequently, if in addition to general
justice there is a particular justice corresponding to the
individual, for the same reason there should be a domestic justice
directing man to the common good of a household: and yet this is not
the case. Therefore neither should there be a particular besides a
legal justice.

_On the contrary,_ Chrysostom in his commentary on Matt. 5:6,
"Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," says (Hom.
xv in Matth.): "By justice He signifies either the general virtue, or
the particular virtue which is opposed to covetousness."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), legal justice is not
essentially the same as every virtue, and besides legal justice which
directs man immediately to the common good, there is a need for other
virtues to direct him immediately in matters relating to particular
goods: and these virtues may be relative to himself or to another
individual person. Accordingly, just as in addition to legal justice
there is a need for particular virtues to direct man in relation to
himself, such as temperance and fortitude, so too besides legal
justice there is need for particular justice to direct man in his
relations to other individuals.

Reply Obj. 1: Legal justice does indeed direct man sufficiently in
his relations towards others. As regards the common good it does so
immediately, but as to the good of the individual, it does so
mediately. Wherefore there is need for particular justice to direct a
man immediately to the good of another individual.

Reply Obj. 2: The common good of the realm and the particular good of
the individual differ not only in respect of the _many_ and the
_few,_ but also under a formal aspect. For the aspect of the _common_
good differs from the aspect of the _individual_ good, even as the
aspect of _whole_ differs from that of _part._ Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1) that "they are wrong who maintain that
the State and the home and the like differ only as many and few and
not specifically."

Reply Obj. 3: The household community, according to the Philosopher
(Polit. i, 2), differs in respect of a threefold fellowship; namely
"of husband and wife, father and son, master and slave," in each of
which one person is, as it were, part of the other. Wherefore between
such persons there is not justice simply, but a species of justice,
viz. _domestic_ justice, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 6.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 8]

Whether Particular Justice Has a Special Matter?

Objection 1: It would seem that particular justice has no special
matter. Because a gloss on Gen. 2:14, "The fourth river is
Euphrates," says: "Euphrates signifies 'fruitful'; nor is it stated
through what country it flows, because justice pertains to all the
parts of the soul." Now this would not be the case, if justice had a
special matter, since every special matter belongs to a special
power. Therefore particular justice has no special matter.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 61) that "the soul
has four virtues whereby, in this life, it lives spiritually, viz.
temperance, prudence, fortitude and justice;" and he says that "the
fourth is justice, which pervades all the virtues." Therefore
particular justice, which is one of the four cardinal virtues, has no
special matter.

Obj. 3: Further, justice directs man sufficiently in matters relating
to others. Now a man can be directed to others in all matters
relating to this life. Therefore the matter of justice is general and
not special.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher reckons (Ethic. v, 2) particular
justice to be specially about those things which belong to social
life.

_I answer that,_ Whatever can be rectified by reason is the matter of
moral virtue, for this is defined in reference to right reason,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now the reason can
rectify not only the internal passions of the soul, but also external
actions, and also those external things of which man can make use.
And yet it is in respect of external actions and external things by
means of which men can communicate with one another, that the
relation of one man to another is to be considered; whereas it is in
respect of internal passions that we consider man's rectitude in
himself. Consequently, since justice is directed to others, it is not
about the entire matter of moral virtue, but only about external
actions and things, under a certain special aspect of the object, in
so far as one man is related to another through them.

Reply Obj. 1: It is true that justice belongs essentially to one part
of the soul, where it resides as in its subject; and this is the will
which moves by its command all the other parts of the soul; and
accordingly justice belongs to all the parts of the soul, not
directly but by a kind of diffusion.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3, 4), the cardinal
virtues may be taken in two ways: first as special virtues, each
having a determinate matter; secondly, as certain general modes of
virtue. In this latter sense Augustine speaks in the passage quoted:
for he says that "prudence is knowledge of what we should seek and
avoid, temperance is the curb on the lust for fleeting pleasures,
fortitude is strength of mind in bearing with passing trials, justice
is the love of God and our neighbor which pervades the other virtues,
that is to say, is the common principle of the entire order between
one man and another."

Reply Obj. 3: A man's internal passions which are a part of moral
matter, are not in themselves directed to another man, which belongs
to the specific nature of justice; yet their effects, i.e. external
actions, are capable of being directed to another man. Consequently
it does not follow that the matter of justice is general.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 9]

Whether Justice Is About the Passions?

Objection 1: It would seem that justice is about the passions. For
the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue is about
pleasure and pain." Now pleasure or delight, and pain are passions,
as stated above [*I-II, Q. 23, A. 4; Q. 31, A. 1; Q. 35, A. 1] when
we were treating of the passions. Therefore justice, being a moral
virtue, is about the passions.

Obj. 2: Further, justice is the means of rectifying a man's
operations in relation to another man. Now such like operations
cannot be rectified unless the passions be rectified, because it is
owing to disorder of the passions that there is disorder in the
aforesaid operations: thus sexual lust leads to adultery, and
overmuch love of money leads to theft. Therefore justice must needs
be about the passions.

Obj. 3: Further, even as particular justice is towards another person
so is legal justice. Now legal justice is about the passions, else it
would not extend to all the virtues, some of which are evidently
about the passions. Therefore justice is about the passions.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is
about operations.

_I answer that,_ The true answer to this question may be gathered
from a twofold source. First from the subject of justice, i.e. from
the will, whose movements or acts are not passions, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 22, A. 3; Q. 59, A. 4), for it is only the sensitive
appetite whose movements are called passions. Hence justice is not
about the passions, as are temperance and fortitude, which are in the
irascible and concupiscible parts. Secondly, on he part of the
matter, because justice is about man's relations with another, and we
are not directed immediately to another by the internal passions.
Therefore justice is not about the passions.

Reply Obj. 1: Not every moral virtue is about pleasure and pain as
its proper matter, since fortitude is about fear and daring: but
every moral virtue is directed to pleasure and pain, as to ends to be
acquired, for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11), "pleasure
and pain are the principal end in respect of which we say that this
is an evil, and that a good": and in this way too they belong to
justice, since "a man is not just unless he rejoice in just actions"
(Ethic. i, 8).

Reply Obj. 2: External operations are as it were between external
things, which are their matter, and internal passions, which are
their origin. Now it happens sometimes that there is a defect in one
of these, without there being a defect in the other. Thus a man may
steal another's property, not through the desire to have the thing,
but through the will to hurt the man; or vice versa, a man may covet
another's property without wishing to steal it. Accordingly the
directing of operations in so far as they tend towards external
things, belongs to justice, but in so far as they arise from the
passions, it belongs to the other moral virtues which are about the
passions. Hence justice hinders theft of another's property, in so
far as stealing is contrary to the equality that should be maintained
in external things, while liberality hinders it as resulting from an
immoderate desire for wealth. Since, however, external operations
take their species, not from the internal passions but from external
things as being their objects, it follows that, external operations
are essentially the matter of justice rather than of the other moral
virtues.

Reply Obj. 3: The common good is the end of each individual
member of a community, just as the good of the whole is the end of
each part. On the other hand the good of one individual is not the end
of another individual: wherefore legal justice which is directed to
the common good, is more capable of extending to the internal passions
whereby man is disposed in some way or other in himself, than
particular justice which is directed to the good of another
individual: although legal justice extends chiefly to other virtues in
the point of their external operations, in so far, to wit, as "the law
commands us to perform the actions of a courageous person . . . the
actions of a temperate person . . . and the actions of a gentle
person" (Ethic. v, 5).
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 10]

Whether the Mean of Justice Is the Real Mean?

Objection 1: It would seem that the mean of justice is not the real
mean. For the generic nature remains entire in each species. Now
moral virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) to be "an elective habit which
observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason." Therefore justice
observes the rational and not the real mean.

Obj. 2: Further, in things that are good simply, there is neither
excess nor defect, and consequently neither is there a mean; as is
clearly the case with the virtues, according to _Ethic._ ii, 6. Now
justice is about things that are good simply, as stated in _Ethic._
v. Therefore justice does not observe the real mean.

Obj. 3: Further, the reason why the other virtues are said to observe
the rational and not the real mean, is because in their case the mean
varies according to different persons, since what is too much for one
is too little for another (Ethic. ii, 6). Now this is also the case
in justice: for one who strikes a prince does not receive the same
punishment as one who strikes a private individual. Therefore justice
also observes, not the real, but the rational mean.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6; v, 4) that the
mean of justice is to be taken according to "arithmetical"
proportion, so that it is the real mean.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 9; I-II, Q. 59, A. 4), the other
moral virtues are chiefly concerned with the passions, the regulation
of which is gauged entirely by a comparison with the very man who is
the subject of those passions, in so far as his anger and desire are
vested with their various due circumstances. Hence the mean in such
like virtues is measured not by the proportion of one thing to
another, but merely by comparison with the virtuous man himself, so
that with them the mean is only that which is fixed by reason in our
regard.

On the other hand, the matter of justice is external operation, in so
far as an operation or the thing used in that operation is duly
proportionate to another person, wherefore the mean of justice
consists in a certain proportion of equality between the external
thing and the external person. Now equality is the real mean between
greater and less, as stated in _Metaph._ x [*Didot ed., ix, 5; Cf.
_Ethic._ v, 4]: wherefore justice observes the real mean.

Reply Obj. 1: This real mean is also the rational mean, wherefore
justice satisfies the conditions of a moral virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: We may speak of a thing being good simply in two ways.
First a thing may be good in every way: thus the virtues are good;
and there is neither mean nor extremes in things that are good simply
in this sense. Secondly a thing is said to be good simply through
being good absolutely i.e. in its nature, although it may become evil
through being abused. Such are riches and honors; and in the like it
is possible to find excess, deficiency and mean, as regards men who
can use them well or ill: and it is in this sense that justice is
about things that are good simply.

Reply Obj. 3: The injury inflicted bears a different proportion to a
prince from that which it bears to a private person: wherefore each
injury requires to be equalized by vengeance in a different way: and
this implies a real and not merely a rational diversity.
_______________________

ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 11]

Whether the Act of Justice Is to Render to Each One His Own?

Objection 1: It would seem that the act of justice is not to render
to each one his own. For Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9) ascribes to
justice the act of succoring the needy. Now in succoring the needy we
give them what is not theirs but ours. Therefore the act of justice
does not consist in rendering to each one his own.

Obj. 2: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 7) that "beneficence which
we may call kindness or liberality, belongs to justice." Now it
pertains to liberality to give to another of one's own, not of what
is his. Therefore the act of justice does not consist in rendering to
each one his own.

Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to justice not only to distribute things
duly, but also to repress injurious actions, such as murder, adultery
and so forth. But the rendering to each one of what is his seems to
belong solely to the distribution of things. Therefore the act of
justice is not sufficiently described by saying that it consists in
rendering to each one his own.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): "It is justice
that renders to each one what is his, and claims not another's
property; it disregards its own profit in order to preserve the
common equity."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 8, 10), the matter of justice
is an external operation in so far as either it or the thing we use
by it is made proportionate to some other person to whom we are
related by justice. Now each man's own is that which is due to him
according to equality of proportion. Therefore the proper act of
justice is nothing else than to render to each one his own.

Reply Obj. 1: Since justice is a cardinal virtue, other secondary
virtues, such as mercy, liberality and the like are connected with
it, as we shall state further on (Q. 80, A. 1). Wherefore to succor
the needy, which belongs to mercy or pity, and to be liberally
beneficent, which pertains to liberality, are by a kind of reduction
ascribed to justice as to their principal virtue.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 4), in matters of
justice, the name of "profit" is extended to whatever is excessive,
and whatever is deficient is called "loss." The reason for this is
that justice is first of all and more commonly exercised in voluntary
interchanges of things, such as buying and selling, wherein those
expressions are properly employed; and yet they are transferred to
all other matters of justice. The same applies to the rendering to
each one of what is his own.
_______________________

TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 58, Art. 12]

Whether Justice Stands Foremost Among All Moral Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that justice does not stand foremost among
all the moral virtues. Because it belongs to justice to render to
each one what is his, whereas it belongs to liberality to give of
one's own, and this is more virtuous. Therefore liberality is a
greater virtue than justice.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing is adorned by a less excellent thing than
itself. Now magnanimity is the ornament both of justice and of all
the virtues, according to _Ethic._ iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is
more excellent than justice.

Obj. 3: Further, virtue is about that which is "difficult" and
"good," as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3. But fortitude is about more
difficult things than justice is, since it is about dangers of death,
according to _Ethic._ iii, 6. Therefore fortitude is more excellent
than justice.

_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Offic. i, 7): "Justice is the most
resplendent of the virtues, and gives its name to a good man."

_I answer that,_ If we speak of legal justice, it is evident that it
stands foremost among all the moral virtues, for as much as the
common good transcends the individual good of one person. In this
sense the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that "the most excellent
of the virtues would seem to be justice, and more glorious than
either the evening or the morning star." But, even if we speak of
particular justice, it excels the other moral virtues for two
reasons. The first reason may be taken from the subject, because
justice is in the more excellent part of the soul, viz. the rational
appetite or will, whereas the other moral virtues are in the
sensitive appetite, whereunto appertain the passions which are the
matter of the other moral virtues. The second reason is taken from
the object, because the other virtues are commendable in respect of
the sole good of the virtuous person himself, whereas justice is
praiseworthy in respect of the virtuous person being well disposed
towards another, so that justice is somewhat the good of another
person, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 1. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet.
i, 9): "The greatest virtues must needs be those which are most
profitable to other persons, because virtue is a faculty of doing
good to others. For this reason the greatest honors are accorded the
brave and the just, since bravery is useful to others in warfare, and
justice is useful to others both in warfare and in time of peace."

Reply Obj. 1: Although the liberal man gives of his own, yet he does
so in so far as he takes into consideration the good of his own
virtue, while the just man gives to another what is his, through
consideration of the common good. Moreover justice is observed
towards all, whereas liberality cannot extend to all. Again
liberality which gives of a man's own is based on justice, whereby
one renders to each man what is his.

Reply Obj. 2: When magnanimity is added to justice it increases the
latter's goodness; and yet without justice it would not even be a
virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: Although fortitude is about the most difficult things,
it is not about the best, for it is only useful in warfare, whereas
justice is useful both in war and in peace, as stated above.
_______________________

QUESTION 59

OF INJUSTICE
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider injustice, under which head there are four points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether injustice is a special vice?

(2) Whether it is proper to the unjust man to do unjust deeds?

(3) Whether one can suffer injustice willingly?

(4) Whether injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 59, Art. 1]

Whether Injustice Is a Special Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that injustice is not a special vice. For
it is written (1 John 3:4): "All sin is iniquity [*Vulg.: 'Whosoever
committeth sin, committeth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity']." Now
iniquity would seem to be the same as injustice, because justice is a
kind of equality, so that injustice is apparently the same as
inequality or iniquity. Therefore injustice is not a special sin.

Obj. 2: Further, no special sin is contrary to all the virtues. But
injustice is contrary to all the virtues: for as regards adultery it
is opposed to chastity, as regards murder it is opposed to meekness,
and in like manner as regards the other sins. Therefore injustice is
not a special sin.

Obj. 3: Further, injustice is opposed to justice which is in the
will. But every sin is in the will, as Augustine declares (De Duabus
Anim. x). Therefore injustice is not a special sin.

_On the contrary,_ Injustice is contrary to justice. But justice is a
special virtue. Therefore injustice is a special vice.

_I answer that,_ Injustice is twofold. First there is illegal
injustice which is opposed to legal justice: and this is essentially
a special vice, in so far as it regards a special object, namely the
common good which it contemns; and yet it is a general vice, as
regards the intention, since contempt of the common good may lead to
all kinds of sin. Thus too all vices, as being repugnant to the
common good, have the character of injustice, as though they arose
from injustice, in accord with what has been said above about justice
(Q. 58, AA. 5, 6). Secondly we speak of injustice in reference to an
inequality between one person and another, when one man wishes to
have more goods, riches for example, or honors, and less evils, such
as toil and losses, and thus injustice has a special matter and is a
particular vice opposed to particular justice.

Reply Obj. 1: Even as legal justice is referred to human
common good, so Divine justice is referred to the Divine good, to
which all sin is repugnant, and in this sense all sin is said to be
iniquity.

Reply Obj. 2: Even particular justice is indirectly opposed to
all the virtues; in so far, to wit, as even external acts pertain both
to justice and to the other moral virtues, although in different ways
as stated above (Q. 58, A. 9, ad 2).

Reply Obj. 3: The will, like the reason, extends to all moral
matters, i.e. passions and those external operations that relate to
another person. On the other hand justice perfects the will solely in
the point of its extending to operations that relate to another: and
the same applies to injustice.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 59, Art. 2]

Whether a Man Is Called Unjust Through Doing an Unjust Thing?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man is called unjust through doing
an unjust thing. For habits are specified by their objects, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 2). Now the proper object of justice is the
just, and the proper object of injustice is the unjust. Therefore a
man should be called just through doing a just thing, and unjust
through doing an unjust thing.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9) that they
hold a false opinion who maintain that it is in a man's power to do
suddenly an unjust thing, and that a just man is no less capable of
doing what is unjust than an unjust man. But this opinion would not
be false unless it were proper to the unjust man to do what is
unjust. Therefore a man is to be deemed unjust from the fact that he
does an unjust thing.

Obj. 3: Further, every virtue bears the same relation to its proper
act, and the same applies to the contrary vices. But whoever does
what is intemperate, is said to be intemperate. Therefore whoever
does an unjust thing, is said to be unjust.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6) that "a man may
do an unjust thing without being unjust."

_I answer that,_ Even as the object of justice is something equal in
external things, so too the object of injustice is something unequal,
through more or less being assigned to some person than is due to
him. To this object the habit of injustice is compared by means of
its proper act which is called an injustice. Accordingly it may
happen in two ways that a man who does an unjust thing, is not
unjust: first, on account of a lack of correspondence between the
operation and its proper object. For the operation takes its species
and name from its direct and not from its indirect object: and in
things directed to an end the direct is that which is intended, and
the indirect is what is beside the intention. Hence if a man do that
which is unjust, without intending to do an unjust thing, for
instance if he do it through ignorance, being unaware that it is
unjust, properly speaking he does an unjust thing, not directly, but
only indirectly, and, as it were, doing materially that which is
unjust: hence such an operation is not called an injustice. Secondly,
this may happen on account of a lack of proportion between the
operation and the habit. For an injustice may sometimes arise from a
passion, for instance, anger or desire, and sometimes from choice,
for instance when the injustice itself is the direct object of one's
complacency. In the latter case properly speaking it arises from a
habit, because whenever a man has a habit, whatever befits that habit
is, of itself, pleasant to him. Accordingly, to do what is unjust
intentionally and by choice is proper to the unjust man, in which
sense the unjust man is one who has the habit of injustice: but a man
may do what is unjust, unintentionally or through passion, without
having the habit of injustice.

Reply Obj. 1: A habit is specified by its object in its direct and
formal acceptation, not in its material and indirect acceptation.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not easy for any man to do an unjust thing from
choice, as though it were pleasing for its own sake and not for the
sake of something else: this is proper to one who has the habit, as
the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9).

Reply Obj. 3: The object of temperance is not something established
externally, as is the object of justice: the object of temperance,
i.e. the temperate thing, depends entirely on proportion to the man
himself. Consequently what is accidental and unintentional cannot be
said to be temperate either materially or formally. In like manner
neither can it be called intemperate: and in this respect there is
dissimilarity between justice and the other moral virtues; but as
regards the proportion between operation and habit, there is
similarity in all respects.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 59, Art. 3]

Whether We Can Suffer Injustice Willingly?

Objection 1: It would seem that one can suffer injustice willingly.
For injustice is inequality, as stated above (A. 2). Now a man by
injuring himself, departs from equality, even as by injuring another.
Therefore a man can do an injustice to himself, even as to another.
But whoever does himself an injustice, does so involuntarily.
Therefore a man can voluntarily suffer injustice especially if it be
inflicted by himself.

Obj. 2: Further, no man is punished by the civil law, except for
having committed some injustice. Now suicides were formerly punished
according to the law of the state by being deprived of an honorable
burial, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore a man
can do himself an injustice, and consequently it may happen that a
man suffers injustice voluntarily.

Obj. 3: Further, no man does an injustice save to one who suffers
that injustice. But it may happen that a man does an injustice to one
who wishes it, for instance if he sell him a thing for more than it
is worth. Therefore a man may happen to suffer an injustice
voluntarily.

_On the contrary,_ To suffer an injustice and to do an injustice are
contraries. Now no man does an injustice against his will. Therefore
on the other hand no man suffers an injustice except against his will.

_I answer that,_ Action by its very nature proceeds from an agent,
whereas passion as such is from another: wherefore the same thing in
the same respect cannot be both agent and patient, as stated in
_Phys._ iii, 1; viii, 5. Now the proper principle of action in man is
the will, wherefore man does properly and essentially what he does
voluntarily, and on the other hand a man suffers properly what he
suffers against his will, since in so far as he is willing, he is a
principle in himself, and so, considered thus, he is active rather
than passive. Accordingly we must conclude that properly and strictly
speaking no man can do an injustice except voluntarily, nor suffer an
injustice save involuntarily; but that accidentally and materially so
to speak, it is possible for that which is unjust in itself either to
be done involuntarily (as when a man does anything unintentionally),
or to be suffered voluntarily (as when a man voluntarily gives to
another more than he owes him).

Reply Obj. 1: When one man gives voluntarily to another that which he
does not owe him, he causes neither injustice nor inequality. For a
man's ownership depends on his will, so there is no disproportion if
he forfeit something of his own free-will, either by his own or by
another's action.

Reply Obj. 2: An individual person may be considered in two ways.
First, with regard to himself; and thus, if he inflict an injury on
himself, it may come under the head of some other kind of sin,
intemperance for instance or imprudence, but not injustice; because
injustice no less than justice, is always referred to another person.
Secondly, this or that man may be considered as belonging to the
State as part thereof, or as belonging to God, as His creature and
image; and thus a man who kills himself, does an injury not indeed to
himself, but to the State and to God. Wherefore he is punished in
accordance with both Divine and human law, even as the Apostle
declares in respect of the fornicator (1 Cor. 3:17): "If any man
violate the temple of God, him shall God destroy."

Reply Obj. 3: Suffering is the effect of external action. Now
in the point of doing and suffering injustice, the material element is
that which is done externally, considered in itself, as stated above
(A. 2), and the formal and essential element is on the part of
the will of agent and patient, as stated above (A. 2).
Accordingly we must reply that injustice suffered by one man and
injustice done by another man always accompany one another, in the
material sense. But if we speak in the formal sense a man can do an
injustice with the intention of doing an injustice, and yet the other
man does not suffer an injustice, because he suffers voluntarily; and
on the other hand a man can suffer an injustice if he suffer an
injustice against his will, while the man who does the injury
unknowingly, does an injustice, not formally but only materially.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 59, Art. 4]

Whether Whoever Does an Injustice Sins Mortally?

Objection 1: It would seem that not everyone who does an injustice
sins mortally. For venial sin is opposed to mortal sin. Now it is
sometimes a venial sin to do an injury: for the Philosopher says
(Ethic. v, 8) in reference to those who act unjustly: "Whatever they
do not merely in ignorance but through ignorance is a venial matter."
Therefore not everyone that does an injustice sins mortally.

Obj. 2: Further, he who does an injustice in a small matter, departs
but slightly from the mean. Now this seems to be insignificant and
should be accounted among the least of evils, as the Philosopher
declares (Ethic. ii, 9). Therefore not everyone that does an
injustice sins mortally.

Obj. 3: Further, charity is the "mother of all the virtues" [*Peter
Lombard, Sent. iii, D. 23], and it is through being contrary thereto
that a sin is called mortal. But not all the sins contrary to the
other virtues are mortal. Therefore neither is it always a mortal sin
to do an injustice.

_On the contrary,_ Whatever is contrary to the law of God is a mortal
sin. Now whoever does an injustice does that which is contrary to the
law of God, since it amounts either to theft, or to adultery, or to
murder, or to something of the kind, as will be shown further on (Q.
64, seqq.). Therefore whoever does an injustice sins mortally.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 12, A. 5), when we were
treating of the distinction of sins, a mortal sin is one that is
contrary to charity which gives life to the soul. Now every injury
inflicted on another person is of itself contrary to charity, which
moves us to will the good of another. And so since injustice always
consists in an injury inflicted on another person, it is evident that
to do an injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus.

Reply Obj. 1: This saying of the Philosopher is to be
understood as referring to ignorance of fact, which he calls
"ignorance of particular circumstances" [*Ethic. iii, 1], and which
deserves pardon, and not to ignorance of the law which does not
excuse: and he who does an injustice through ignorance, does no
injustice except accidentally, as stated above (A. 2)

Reply Obj. 2: He who does an injustice in small matters falls
short of the perfection of an unjust deed, in so far as what he does
may be deemed not altogether contrary to the will of the person who
suffers therefrom: for instance, if a man take an apple or some such
thing from another man, in which case it is probable that the latter
is not hurt or displeased.

Reply Obj. 3: The sins which are contrary to the other virtues
are not always hurtful to another person, but imply a disorder
affecting human passions; hence there is no comparison.
_______________________

QUESTION 60

OF JUDGMENT
(In Six Articles)

In due sequence we must consider judgment, under which head there are
six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether judgment is an act of justice?

(2) Whether it is lawful to judge?

(3) Whether judgment should be based on suspicions?

(4) Whether doubts should be interpreted favorably?

(5) Whether judgment should always be given according to the written
law?

(6) Whether judgment is perverted by being usurped?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 1]

Whether Judgment Is an Act of Justice?

Objection 1: It would seem that judgment is not an act of justice.
The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 3) that "everyone judges well of what
he knows," so that judgment would seem to belong to the cognitive
faculty. Now the cognitive faculty is perfected by prudence.
Therefore judgment belongs to prudence rather than to justice, which
is in the will, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 4).

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:15): "The spiritual man
judgeth all things." Now man is made spiritual chiefly by the virtue
of charity, which "is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost
Who is given to us" (Rom. 5:5). Therefore judgment belongs to charity
rather than to justice.

Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to every virtue to judge aright of its
proper matter, because "the virtuous man is the rule and measure in
everything," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 4). Therefore
judgment does not belong to justice any more than to the other moral
virtues.

Obj. 4: Further, judgment would seem to belong only to judges. But
the act of justice is to be found in every just man. Since then
judges are not the only just men, it seems that judgment is not the
proper act of justice.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 93:15): "Until justice be
turned into judgment."

_I answer that,_ Judgment properly denotes the act of a judge as
such. Now a judge (_judex_) is so called because he asserts the right
(_jus dicens_) and right is the object of justice, as stated above
(Q. 57, A. 1). Consequently the original meaning of the word
"judgment" is a statement or decision of the just or right. Now to
decide rightly about virtuous deeds proceeds, properly speaking, from
the virtuous habit; thus a chaste person decides rightly about
matters relating to chastity. Therefore judgment, which denotes a
right decision about what is just, belongs properly to justice. For
this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4) that "men have
recourse to a judge as to one who is the personification of justice."

Reply Obj. 1: The word "judgment," from its original meaning of a
right decision about what is just, has been extended to signify a
right decision in any matter whether speculative or practical. Now a
right judgment in any matter requires two things. The first is the
virtue itself that pronounces judgment: and in this way, judgment is
an act of reason, because it belongs to the reason to pronounce or
define. The other is the disposition of the one who judges, on which
depends his aptness for judging aright. In this way, in matters of
justice, judgment proceeds from justice, even as in matters of
fortitude, it proceeds from fortitude. Accordingly judgment is an act
of justice in so far as justice inclines one to judge aright, and of
prudence in so far as prudence pronounces judgment: wherefore
_synesis_ which belongs to prudence is said to "judge rightly," as
stated above (Q. 51, A. 3).

Reply Obj. 2: The spiritual man, by reason of the habit of charity,
has an inclination to judge aright of all things according to the
Divine rules; and it is in conformity with these that he pronounces
judgment through the gift of wisdom: even as the just man pronounces
judgment through the virtue of prudence conformably with the ruling
of the law.

Reply Obj. 3: The other virtues regulate man in himself, whereas
justice regulates man in his dealings with others, as shown above (Q.
58, A. 2). Now man is master in things concerning himself, but not in
matters relating to others. Consequently where the other virtues are
in question, there is no need for judgment other than that of a
virtuous man, taking judgment in its broader sense, as explained
above (ad 1). But in matters of justice, there is further need for
the judgment of a superior, who is "able to reprove both, and to put
his hand between both" [*Job 9:33]. Hence judgment belongs more
specifically to justice than to any other virtue.

Reply Obj. 4: Justice is in the sovereign as a master-virtue [*Cf. Q.
58, A. 6], commanding and prescribing what is just; while it is in
the subjects as an executive and administrative virtue. Hence
judgment, which denotes a decision of what is just, belongs to
justice, considered as existing chiefly in one who has authority.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 2]

Whether It Is Lawful to Judge?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to judge. For nothing is punished
except what is unlawful. Now those who judge are threatened with
punishment, which those who judge not will escape, according to Matt.
7:1, "Judge not, and ye shall not be judged." Therefore it is
unlawful to judge.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Rom. 14:4): "Who art thou that
judgest another man's servant[?] To his own lord he standeth or
falleth." Now God is the Lord of all. Therefore to no man is it
lawful to judge.

Obj. 3: Further, no man is sinless, according to 1 John 1:8, "If we
say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Now it is unlawful
for a sinner to judge, according to Rom. 2:1, "Thou art inexcusable,
O man, whosoever thou art, that judgest; for wherein thou judgest
another, thou condemnest thyself, for thou dost the same things which
thou judgest." Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 16:18): "Thou shalt appoint
judges and magistrates in all thy gates . . . that they may judge the
people with just judgment."

_I answer that,_ Judgment is lawful in so far as it is an act of
justice. Now it follows from what has been stated above (A. 1, ad 1,
3) that three conditions are requisite for a judgment to be an act of
justice: first, that it proceed from the inclination of justice;
secondly, that it come from one who is in authority; thirdly, that it
be pronounced according to the right ruling of prudence. If any one
of these be lacking, the judgment will be faulty and unlawful. First,
when it is contrary to the rectitude of justice, and then it is
called "perverted" or "unjust": secondly, when a man judges about
matters wherein he has no authority, and this is called judgment "by
usurpation": thirdly, when the reason lacks certainty, as when a man,
without any solid motive, forms a judgment on some doubtful or hidden
matter, and then it is called judgment by "suspicion" or "rash"
judgment.

Reply Obj. 1: In these words our Lord forbids rash judgment which is
about the inward intention, or other uncertain things, as Augustine
states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18). Or else He forbids judgment
about Divine things, which we ought not to judge, but simply believe,
since they are above us, as Hilary declares in his commentary on
Matt. 5. Or again according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in
the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], He
forbids the judgment which proceeds not from benevolence but from
bitterness of heart.

Reply Obj. 2: A judge is appointed as God's servant; wherefore it is
written (Deut. 1:16): "Judge that which is just," and further on
(Deut. 1:17), "because it is the judgment of God."

Reply Obj. 3: Those who stand guilty of grievous sins should not
judge those who are guilty of the same or lesser sins, as Chrysostom
[*Hom. xxiv] says on the words of Matt. 7:1, "Judge not." Above all
does this hold when such sins are public, because there would be an
occasion of scandal arising in the hearts of others. If however they
are not public but hidden, and there be an urgent necessity for the
judge to pronounce judgment, because it is his duty, he can reprove
or judge with humility and fear. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom.
in Monte ii, 19): "If we find that we are guilty of the same sin as
another man, we should groan together with him, and invite him to
strive against it together with us." And yet it is not through acting
thus that a man condemns himself so as to deserve to be condemned
once again, but when, in condemning another, he shows himself to be
equally deserving of condemnation on account of another or a like sin.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 3]

Whether It Is Unlawful to Form a Judgment from Suspicions?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to form a judgment
from suspicions. For suspicion is seemingly an uncertain opinion
about an evil, wherefore the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 3) that
suspicion is about both the true and the false. Now it is impossible
to have any but an uncertain opinion about contingent singulars.
Since then human judgment is about human acts, which are about
singular and contingent matters, it seems that no judgment would be
lawful, if it were not lawful to judge from suspicions.

Obj. 2: Further, a man does his neighbor an injury by judging him
unlawfully. But an evil suspicion consists in nothing more than a
man's opinion, and consequently does not seem to pertain to the
injury of another man. Therefore judgment based on suspicion is not
unlawful.

Obj. 3: Further, if it is unlawful, it must needs be reducible to an
injustice, since judgment is an act of justice, as stated above (A.
1). Now an injustice is always a mortal sin according to its genus,
as stated above (Q. 59, A. 4). Therefore a judgment based on
suspicion would always be a mortal sin, if it were unlawful. But this
is false, because "we cannot avoid suspicions," according to a gloss
of Augustine (Tract. xc in Joan.) on 1 Cor. 4:5, "Judge not before
the time." Therefore a judgment based on suspicion would seem not to
be unlawful.

_On the contrary,_ Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in the Opus
Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] in comment on
the words of Matt. 7:1, "Judge not," etc., says: "By this commandment
our Lord does not forbid Christians to reprove others from kindly
motives, but that Christian should despise Christian by boasting his
own righteousness, by hating and condemning others for the most part
on mere suspicion."

_I answer that,_ As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), suspicion
denotes evil thinking based on slight indications, and this is due to
three causes. First, from a man being evil in himself, and from this
very fact, as though conscious of his own wickedness, he is prone to
think evil of others, according to Eccles. 10:3, "The fool when he
walketh in the way, whereas he himself is a fool, esteemeth all men
fools." Secondly, this is due to a man being ill-disposed towards
another: for when a man hates or despises another, or is angry with
or envious of him, he is led by slight indications to think evil of
him, because everyone easily believes what he desires. Thirdly, this
is due to long experience: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
13) that "old people are very suspicious, for they have often
experienced the faults of others." The first two causes of suspicion
evidently connote perversity of the affections, while the third
diminishes the nature of suspicion, in as much as experience leads to
certainty which is contrary to the nature of suspicion. Consequently
suspicion denotes a certain amount of vice, and the further it goes,
the more vicious it is.

Now there are three degrees of suspicion. The first degree is when a
man begins to doubt of another's goodness from slight indications.
This is a venial and a light sin; for "it belongs to human temptation
without which no man can go through this life," according to a gloss
on 1 Cor. 4:5, "Judge not before the time." The second degree is when
a man, from slight indications, esteems another man's wickedness as
certain. This is a mortal sin, if it be about a grave matter, since
it cannot be without contempt of one's neighbor. Hence the same gloss
goes on to say: "If then we cannot avoid suspicions, because we are
human, we must nevertheless restrain our judgment, and refrain from
forming a definite and fixed opinion." The third degree is when a
judge goes so far as to condemn a man on suspicion: this pertains
directly to injustice, and consequently is a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Some kind of certainty is found in human acts, not
indeed the certainty of a demonstration, but such as is befitting the
matter in point, for instance when a thing is proved by suitable
witnesses.

Reply Obj. 2: From the very fact that a man thinks evil of another
without sufficient cause, he despises him unduly, and therefore does
him an injury.

Reply Obj. 3: Since justice and injustice are about external
operations, as stated above (Q. 58, AA. 8, 10, 11; Q. 59, A. 1, ad
3), the judgment of suspicion pertains directly to injustice when it
is betrayed by external action, and then it is a mortal sin, as
stated above. The internal judgment pertains to justice, in so far as
it is related to the external judgment, even as the internal to the
external act, for instance as desire is related to fornication, or
anger to murder.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 4]

Whether Doubts Should Be Interpreted for the Best?

Objection 1: It would seem that doubts should not be interpreted for
the best. Because we should judge from what happens for the most
part. But it happens for the most part that evil is done, since "the
number of fools is infinite" (Eccles. 1:15), "for the imagination and
thought of man's heart are prone to evil from his youth" (Gen. 8:21).
Therefore doubts should be interpreted for the worst rather than for
the best.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that "he
leads a godly and just life who is sound in his estimate of things,
and turns neither to this side nor to that." Now he who interprets a
doubtful point for the best, turns to one side. Therefore this should
not be done.

Obj. 3: Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now with
regard to himself, a man should interpret doubtful matters for the
worst, according to Job 9:28, "I feared all my works." Therefore it
seems that doubtful matters affecting one's neighbor should be
interpreted for the worst.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Rom. 14:3, "He that eateth not, let him
not judge him that eateth," says: "Doubts should be interpreted in
the best sense."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3, ad 2), from the very fact
that a man thinks ill of another without sufficient cause, he injures
and despises him. Now no man ought to despise or in any way injure
another man without urgent cause: and, consequently, unless we have
evident indications of a person's wickedness, we ought to deem him
good, by interpreting for the best whatever is doubtful about him.

Reply Obj. 1: He who interprets doubtful matters for the best, may
happen to be deceived more often than not; yet it is better to err
frequently through thinking well of a wicked man, than to err less
frequently through having an evil opinion of a good man, because in
the latter case an injury is inflicted, but not in the former.

Reply Obj. 2: It is one thing to judge of things and another to judge
of men. For when we judge of things, there is no question of the good
or evil of the thing about which we are judging, since it will take
no harm no matter what kind of judgment we form about it; but there
is question of the good of the person who judges, if he judge truly,
and of his evil if he judge falsely because "the true is the good of
the intellect, and the false is its evil," as stated in _Ethic._ vi,
2, wherefore everyone should strive to make his judgment accord with
things as they are. On the other hand when we judge of men, the good
and evil in our judgment is considered chiefly on the part of the
person about whom judgment is being formed; for he is deemed worthy
of honor from the very fact that he is judged to be good, and
deserving of contempt if he is judged to be evil. For this reason we
ought, in this kind of judgment, to aim at judging a man good, unless
there is evident proof of the contrary. And though we may judge
falsely, our judgment in thinking well of another pertains to our
good feeling and not to the evil of the intellect, even as neither
does it pertain to the intellect's perfection to know the truth of
contingent singulars in themselves.

Reply Obj. 3: One may interpret something for the worst or for the
best in two ways. First, by a kind of supposition; and thus, when we
have to apply a remedy to some evil, whether our own or another's, in
order for the remedy to be applied with greater certainty of a cure,
it is expedient to take the worst for granted, since if a remedy be
efficacious against a worse evil, much more is it efficacious against
a lesser evil. Secondly we may interpret something for the best or
for the worst, by deciding or determining, and in this case when
judging of things we should try to interpret each thing according as
it is, and when judging of persons, to interpret things for the best
as stated above.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 5]

Whether We Should Always Judge According to the Written Law?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not always to judge
according to the written law. For we ought always to avoid judging
unjustly. But written laws sometimes contain injustice, according to
Isa. 10:1, "Woe to them that make wicked laws, and when they write,
write injustice." Therefore we ought not always to judge according to
the written law.

Obj. 2: Further, judgment has to be formed about individual
happenings. But no written law can cover each and every individual
happening, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 10). Therefore it
seems that we are not always bound to judge according to the written
law.

Obj. 3: Further, a law is written in order that the lawgiver's
intention may be made clear. But it happens sometimes that even if
the lawgiver himself were present he would judge otherwise. Therefore
we ought not always to judge according to the written law.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): "In these
earthly laws, though men judge about them when they are making them,
when once they are established and passed, the judges may judge no
longer of them, but according to them."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), judgment is nothing else but
a decision or determination of what is just. Now a thing becomes just
in two ways: first by the very nature of the case, and this is called
"natural right," secondly by some agreement between men, and this is
called "positive right," as stated above (Q. 57, A. 2). Now laws are
written for the purpose of manifesting both these rights, but in
different ways. For the written law does indeed contain natural
right, but it does not establish it, for the latter derives its
force, not from the law but from nature: whereas the written law both
contains positive right, and establishes it by giving it force of
authority.

Hence it is necessary to judge according to the written law, else
judgment would fall short either of the natural or of the positive
right.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as the written law does not give force to the
natural right, so neither can it diminish or annul its force, because
neither can man's will change nature. Hence if the written law
contains anything contrary to the natural right, it is unjust and has
no binding force. For positive right has no place except where "it
matters not," according to the natural right, "whether a thing be
done in one way or in another"; as stated above (Q. 57, A. 2, ad 2).
Wherefore such documents are to be called, not laws, but rather
corruptions of law, as stated above (I-II, Q. 95, A. 2): and
consequently judgment should not be delivered according to them.

Reply Obj. 2: Even as unjust laws by their very nature are, either
always or for the most part, contrary to the natural right, so too
laws that are rightly established, fail in some cases, when if they
were observed they would be contrary to the natural right. Wherefore
in such cases judgment should be delivered, not according to the
letter of the law, but according to equity which the lawgiver has in
view. Hence the jurist says [*Digest. i, 3; De leg. senatusque
consult. 25]: "By no reason of law, or favor of equity, is it
allowable for us to interpret harshly, and render burdensome, those
useful measures which have been enacted for the welfare of man." In
such cases even the lawgiver himself would decide otherwise; and if
he had foreseen the case, he might have provided for it by law.

This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 6]

Whether Judgment Is Rendered Perverse by Being Usurped?

Objection 1: It would seem that judgment is not rendered perverse by
being usurped. For justice is rectitude in matters of action. Now
truth is not impaired, no matter who tells it, but it may suffer from
the person who ought to accept it. Therefore again justice loses
nothing, no matter who declares what is just, and this is what is
meant by judgment.

Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to judgment to punish sins. Now it is
related to the praise of some that they punished sins without having
authority over those whom they punished; such as Moses in slaying the
Egyptian (Ex. 2:12), and Phinees the son of Eleazar in slaying Zambri
the son of Salu (Num. 25:7-14), and "it was reputed to him unto
justice" (Ps. 105:31). Therefore usurpation of judgment pertains not
to injustice.

Obj. 3: Further, spiritual power is distinct from temporal. Now
prelates having spiritual power sometimes interfere in matters
concerning the secular power. Therefore usurped judgment is not
unlawful.

Obj. 4: Further, even as the judge requires authority in order to
judge aright, so also does he need justice and knowledge, as shown
above (A. 1, ad 1, 3; A. 2). But a judgment is not described as
unjust, if he who judges lacks the habit of justice or the knowledge
of the law. Neither therefore is it always unjust to judge by
usurpation, i.e. without authority.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 14:4): "Who art thou that
judgest another man's servant?"

_I answer that,_ Since judgment should be pronounced according to the
written law, as stated above (A. 5), he that pronounces judgment,
interprets, in a way, the letter of the law, by applying it to some
particular case. Now since it belongs to the same authority to
interpret and to make a law, just as a law cannot be made save by
public authority, so neither can a judgment be pronounced except by
public authority, which extends over those who are subject to the
community. Wherefore even as it would be unjust for one man to force
another to observe a law that was not approved by public authority,
so too it is unjust, if a man compels another to submit to a judgment
that is pronounced by other than the public authority.

Reply Obj. 1: When the truth is declared there is no obligation to
accept it, and each one is free to receive it or not, as he wishes.
On the other hand judgment implies an obligation, wherefore it is
unjust for anyone to be judged by one who has no public authority.

Reply Obj. 2: Moses seems to have slain the Egyptian by authority
received as it were, by divine inspiration; this seems to follow from
Acts 7:24, 25, where it is said that "striking the Egyptian . . . he
thought that his brethren understood that God by his hand would save
Israel [Vulg.: 'them']." Or it may be replied that Moses slew the
Egyptian in order to defend the man who was unjustly attacked,
without himself exceeding the limits of a blameless defence.
Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 36) that "whoever does not ward
off a blow from a fellow man when he can, is as much in fault as the
striker"; and he quotes the example of Moses. Again we may reply with
Augustine (QQ. Exod. qu. 2) [*Cf. Contra Faust. xxii, 70] that just
as "the soil gives proof of its fertility by producing useless herbs
before the useful seeds have grown, so this deed of Moses was sinful
although it gave a sign of great fertility," in so far, to wit, as it
was a sign of the power whereby he was to deliver his people.

With regard to Phinees the reply is that he did this out of zeal for
God by Divine inspiration; or because though not as yet high-priest,
he was nevertheless the high-priest's son, and this judgment was his
concern as of the other judges, to whom this was commanded [*Ex.
22:20; Lev. 20; Deut. 13, 17].

Reply Obj. 3: The secular power is subject to the spiritual, even as
the body is subject to the soul. Consequently the judgment is not
usurped if the spiritual authority interferes in those temporal
matters that are subject to the spiritual authority or which have
been committed to the spiritual by the temporal authority.

Reply Obj. 4: The habits of knowledge and justice are perfections of
the individual, and consequently their absence does not make a
judgment to be usurped, as in the absence of public authority which
gives a judgment its coercive force.
_______________________

QUESTION 61

OF THE PARTS OF JUSTICE
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the parts of justice; (1) the subjective parts,
which are the species of justice, i.e. distributive and commutative
justice; (2) the quasi-integral parts; (3) the quasi-potential parts,
i.e. the virtues connected with justice. The first consideration will
be twofold: (1) The parts of justice; (2) their opposite vices. And
since restitution would seem to be an act of commutative justice, we
must consider (1) the distinction between commutative and
distributive justice; (2) restitution.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there are two species of justice, viz. distributive and
commutative?

(2) Whether in either case the mean is take in the same way?

(3) Whether their matter is uniform or manifold?

(4) Whether in any of these species the just is the same as
counter-passion?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 61, Art. 1]

Whether Two Species of Justice Are Suitably Assigned, Viz.
Commutative and Distributive?

Objection 1: It would seem that the two species of justice are
unsuitably assigned, viz. distributive and commutative. That which is
hurtful to the many cannot be a species of justice, since justice is
directed to the common good. Now it is hurtful to the common good of
the many, if the goods of the community are distributed among many,
both because the goods of the community would be exhausted, and
because the morals of men would be corrupted. For Tully says (De
Offic. ii, 15): "He who receives becomes worse, and the more ready to
expect that he will receive again." Therefore distribution does not
belong to any species of justice.

Obj. 2: Further, the act of justice is to render to each one what is
his own, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 2). But when things are
distributed, a man does not receive what was his, but becomes
possessed of something which belonged to the community. Therefore
this does not pertain to justice.

Obj. 3: Further, justice is not only in the sovereign, but also in
the subject, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 6). But it belongs
exclusively to the sovereign to distribute. Therefore distribution
does not always belong to justice.

Obj. 4: Further, "Distributive justice regards common goods" (Ethic.
v, 4). Now matters regarding the community pertain to legal justice.
Therefore distributive justice is a part, not of particular, but of
legal justice.

Obj. 5: Further, unity or multitude do not change the species of a
virtue. Now commutative justice consists in rendering something to
one person, while distributive justice consists in giving something
to many. Therefore they are not different species of justice.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher assigns two parts to justice and
says (Ethic. v, 2) that "one directs distributions, the other,
commutations."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 58, AA. 7, 8), particular
justice is directed to the private individual, who is compared to the
community as a part to the whole. Now a twofold order may be
considered in relation to a part. In the first place there is the
order of one part to another, to which corresponds the order of one
private individual to another. This order is directed by commutative
justice, which is concerned about the mutual dealings between two
persons. In the second place there is the order of the whole towards
the parts, to which corresponds the order of that which belongs to
the community in relation to each single person. This order is
directed by distributive justice, which distributes common goods
proportionately. Hence there are two species of justice, distributive
and commutative.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as a private individual is praised for moderation
in his bounty, and blamed for excess therein, so too ought moderation
to be observed in the distribution of common goods, wherein
distributive justice directs.

Reply Obj. 2: Even as part and whole are somewhat the same, so too
that which pertains to the whole, pertains somewhat to the part also:
so that when the goods of the community are distributed among a
number of individuals each one receives that which, in a way, is his
own.

Reply Obj. 3: The act of distributing the goods of the community,
belongs to none but those who exercise authority over those goods;
and yet distributive justice is also in the subjects to whom those
goods are distributed in so far as they are contented by a just
distribution. Moreover distribution of common goods is sometimes made
not to the state but to the members of a family, and such
distribution can be made by authority of a private individual.

Reply Obj. 4: Movement takes its species from the term
_whereunto._ Hence it belongs to legal justice to direct to the common
good those matters which concern private individuals: whereas on the
contrary it belongs to particular justice to direct the common good to
particular individuals by way of distribution.

Reply Obj. 5: Distributive and commutative justice differ not
only in respect of unity and multitude, but also in respect of
different kinds of due: because common property is due to an
individual in one way, and his personal property in another way.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 61, Art. 2]

Whether the Mean Is to Be Observed in the Same Way in Distributive As
in Commutative Justice?

Objection 1: It would seem that the mean in distributive justice is
to be observed in the same way as in commutative justice. For each of
these is a kind of particular justice, as stated above (A. 1). Now
the mean is taken in the same way in all the parts of temperance or
fortitude. Therefore the mean should also be observed in the same way
in both distributive and commutative justice.

Obj. 2: Further, the form of a moral virtue consists in observing the
mean which is determined in accordance with reason. Since, then, one
virtue has one form, it seems that the mean for both should be the
same.

Obj. 3: Further, in order to observe the mean in distributive justice
we have to consider the various deserts of persons. Now a person's
deserts are considered also in commutative justice, for instance, in
punishments; thus a man who strikes a prince is punished more than
one who strikes a private individual. Therefore the mean is observed
in the same way in both kinds of justice.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3, 4) that the
mean in distributive justice is observed according to "geometrical
proportion," whereas in commutative justice it follows "arithmetical
proportion."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), in distributive justice
something is given to a private individual, in so far as what belongs
to the whole is due to the part, and in a quantity that is
proportionate to the importance of the position of that part in
respect of the whole. Consequently in distributive justice a person
receives all the more of the common goods, according as he holds a
more prominent position in the community. This prominence in an
aristocratic community is gauged according to virtue, in an oligarchy
according to wealth, in a democracy according to liberty, and in
various ways according to various forms of community. Hence in
distributive justice the mean is observed, not according to equality
between thing and thing, but according to proportion between things
and persons: in such a way that even as one person surpasses another,
so that which is given to one person surpasses that which is allotted
to another. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3, 4) that the mean
in the latter case follows "geometrical proportion," wherein equality
depends not on quantity but on proportion. For example we say that 6
is to 4 as 3 is to 2, because in either case the proportion equals
1½; since the greater number is the sum of the lesser plus its half:
whereas the equality of excess is not one of quantity, because 6
exceeds 4 by 2, while 3 exceeds 2 by 1.

On the other hand in commutations something is paid to an individual
on account of something of his that has been received, as may be seen
chiefly in selling and buying, where the notion of commutation is
found primarily. Hence it is necessary to equalize thing with thing,
so that the one person should pay back to the other just so much as
he has become richer out of that which belonged to the other. The
result of this will be equality according to the "arithmetical mean"
which is gauged according to equal excess in quantity. Thus 5 is the
mean between 6 and 4, since it exceeds the latter and is exceeded by
the former, by 1. Accordingly if, at the start, both persons have 5,
and one of them receives 1 out of the other's belongings, the one
that is the receiver, will have 6, and the other will be left with 4:
and so there will be justice if both be brought back to the mean, 1
being taken from him that has 6, and given to him that has 4, for
then both will have 5 which is the mean.

Reply Obj. 1: In the other moral virtues the rational, not the real
mean, is to be followed: but justice follows the real mean; wherefore
the mean, in justice, depends on the diversity of things.

Reply Obj. 2: Equality is the general form of justice, wherein
distributive and commutative justice agree: but in one we find
equality of geometrical proportion, whereas in the other we find
equality of arithmetical proportion.

Reply Obj. 3: In actions and passions a person's station affects the
quantity of a thing: for it is a greater injury to strike a prince
than a private person. Hence in distributive justice a person's
station is considered in itself, whereas in commutative justice it is
considered in so far as it causes a diversity of things.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 61, Art. 3]

Whether There Is a Different Matter for Both Kinds of Justice?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a different matter for
both kinds of justice. Diversity of matter causes diversity of
virtue, as in the case of fortitude and temperance. Therefore, if
distributive and commutative justice have different matters, it would
seem that they are not comprised under the same virtue, viz. justice.

Obj. 2: Further, the distribution that has to do with distributive
justice is one of "wealth or of honors, or of whatever can be
distributed among the members of the community" (Ethic. v, 2), which
very things are the subject matter of commutations between one person
and another, and this belongs to commutative justice. Therefore the
matters of distributive and commutative justice are not distinct.

Obj. 3: Further, if the matter of distributive justice differs from
that of commutative justice, for the reason that they differ
specifically, where there is no specific difference, there ought to
be no diversity of matter. Now the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2) reckons
commutative justice as one species, and yet this has many kinds of
matter. Therefore the matter of these species of justice is,
seemingly, not of many kinds.

_On the contrary,_ It is stated in _Ethic._ v, 2 that "one kind of
justice directs distributions, and another commutations."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 51, AA. 8, 10), justice is about
certain external operations, namely distribution and commutation.
These consist in the use of certain externals, whether things,
persons or even works: of things, as when one man takes from or
restores to another that which is his; of persons, as when a man does
an injury to the very person of another, for instance by striking or
insulting him, or even by showing respect for him; and of works, as
when a man justly exacts a work of another, or does a work for him.
Accordingly, if we take for the matter of each kind of justice the
things themselves of which the operations are the use, the matter of
distributive and commutative justice is the same, since things can be
distributed out of the common property to individuals, and be the
subject of commutation between one person and another; and again
there is a certain distribution and payment of laborious works.

If, however, we take for the matter of both kinds of justice the
principal actions themselves, whereby we make use of persons, things,
and works, there is then a difference of matter between them. For
distributive justice directs distributions, while commutative justice
directs commutations that can take place between two persons. Of
these some are involuntary, some voluntary. They are involuntary when
anyone uses another man's chattel, person, or work against his will,
and this may be done secretly by fraud, or openly by violence. In
either case the offence may be committed against the other man's
chattel or person, or against a person connected with him. If the
offence is against his chattel and this be taken secretly, it is
called "theft," if openly, it is called "robbery." If it be against
another man's person, it may affect either the very substance of his
person, or his dignity. If it be against the substance of his person,
a man is injured secretly if he is treacherously slain, struck or
poisoned, and openly, if he is publicly slain, imprisoned, struck or
maimed. If it be against his personal dignity, a man is injured
secretly by false witness, detractions and so forth, whereby he is
deprived of his good name, and openly, by being accused in a court of
law, or by public insult. If it be against a personal connection, a
man is injured in the person of his wife, secretly (for the most
part) by adultery, in the person of his slave, if the latter be
induced to leave his master: which things can also be done openly.
The same applies to other personal connections, and whatever injury
may be committed against the principal, may be committed against them
also. Adultery, however, and inducing a slave to leave his master are
properly injuries against the person; yet the latter, since a slave
is his master's chattel, is referred to theft. Voluntary commutations
are when a man voluntarily transfers his chattel to another person.
And if he transfer it simply so that the recipient incurs no debt, as
in the case of gifts, it is an act, not of justice but of liberality.
A voluntary transfer belongs to justice in so far as it includes the
notion of debt, and this may occur in many ways. First when one man
simply transfers his thing to another in exchange for another thing,
as happens in selling and buying. Secondly when a man transfers his
thing to another, that the latter may have the use of it with the
obligation of returning it to its owner. If he grant the use of a
thing gratuitously, it is called "usufruct" in things that bear
fruit; and simply "borrowing" on "loan" in things that bear no fruit,
such as money, pottery, etc.; but if not even the use is granted
gratis, it is called "letting" or "hiring." Thirdly, a man transfers
his thing with the intention of recovering it, not for the purpose of
its use, but that it may be kept safe, as in a "deposit," or under
some obligation, as when a man pledges his property, or when one man
stands security for another. In all these actions, whether voluntary
or involuntary, the mean is taken in the same way according to the
equality of repayment. Hence all these actions belong to the one same
species of justice, namely commutative justice. And this suffices for
the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 61, Art. 4]

Whether the Just Is Absolutely the Same As Retaliation?

Objection 1: It would seem that the just is absolutely the same as
retaliation. For the judgment of God is absolutely just. Now the
judgment of God is such that a man has to suffer in proportion with
his deeds, according to Matt. 7:2: "With what measure you judge, you
shall be judged: and with what measure you mete, it shall be measured
to you again." Therefore the just is absolutely the same as
retaliation.

Obj. 2: Further, in either kind of justice something is given to
someone according to a kind of equality. In distributive justice this
equality regards personal dignity, which would seem to depend chiefly
on what a person has done for the good of the community; while in
commutative justice it regards the thing in which a person has
suffered loss. Now in respect of either equality there is retaliation
in respect of the deed committed. Therefore it would seem that the
just is absolutely the same as retaliation.

Obj. 3: Further, the chief argument against retaliation is based on
the difference between the voluntary and the involuntary; for he who
does an injury involuntarily is less severely punished. Now voluntary
and involuntary taken in relation to ourselves, do not diversify the
mean of justice since this is the real mean and does not depend on
us. Therefore it would seem that the just is absolutely the same as
retaliation.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher proves (Ethic. v, 5) that the just
is not always the same as retaliation.

_I answer that,_ Retaliation (_contrapassum_) denotes equal passion
repaid for previous action; and the expression applies most properly
to injurious passions and actions, whereby a man harms the person of
his neighbor; for instance if a man strike, that he be struck back.
This kind of just is laid down in the Law (Ex. 21:23, 24): "He shall
render life for life, eye for eye," etc. And since also to take away
what belongs to another is to do an unjust thing, it follows that
secondly retaliation consists in this also, that whosoever causes
loss to another, should suffer loss in his belongings. This just loss
is also found in the Law (Ex. 22:1): "If any man steal an ox or a
sheep, and kill or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for one ox and
four sheep for one sheep." Thirdly retaliation is transferred to
voluntary commutations, where action and passion are on both sides,
although voluntariness detracts from the nature of passion, as stated
above (Q. 59, A. 3).

In all these cases, however, repayment must be made on a basis of
equality according to the requirements of commutative justice, namely
that the meed of passion be equal to the action. Now there would not
always be equality if passion were in the same species as the action.
Because, in the first place, when a person injures the person of one
who is greater, the action surpasses any passion of the same species
that he might undergo, wherefore he that strikes a prince, is not
only struck back, but is much more severely punished. In like manner
when a man despoils another of his property against the latter's
will, the action surpasses the passion if he be merely deprived of
that thing, because the man who caused another's loss, himself would
lose nothing, and so he is punished by making restitution several
times over, because not only did he injure a private individual, but
also the common weal, the security of whose protection he has
infringed. Nor again would there be equality of passion in voluntary
commutations, were one always to exchange one's chattel for another
man's, because it might happen that the other man's chattel is much
greater than our own: so that it becomes necessary to equalize
passion and action in commutations according to a certain
proportionate commensuration, for which purpose money was invented.
Hence retaliation is in accordance with commutative justice: but
there is no place for it in distributive justice, because in
distributive justice we do not consider the equality between thing
and thing or between passion and action (whence the expression
_contrapassum_), but according to proportion between things and
persons, as stated above (A. 2).

Reply Obj. 1: This form of the Divine judgment is in accordance with
the conditions of commutative justice, in so far as rewards are
apportioned to merits, and punishments to sins.

Reply Obj. 2: When a man who has served the community is paid for his
services, this is to be referred to commutative, not distributive,
justice. Because distributive justice considers the equality, not
between the thing received and the thing done, but between the thing
received by one person and the thing received by another according to
the respective conditions of those persons.

Reply Obj. 3: When the injurious action is voluntary, the injury is
aggravated and consequently is considered as a greater thing. Hence
it requires a greater punishment in repayment, by reason of a
difference, not on our part, but on the part of the thing.
_______________________

QUESTION 62

OF RESTITUTION
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider restitution, under which head there are eight
points of inquiry:

(1) Of what is it an act?

(2) Whether it is always of necessity for salvation to restore what
one has taken away?

(3) Whether it is necessary to restore more than has been taken away?

(4) Whether it is necessary to restore what one has not taken away?

(5) Whether it is necessary to make restitution to the person from
whom something has been taken?

(6) Whether the person who has taken something away is bound to
restore it?

(7) Whether any other person is bound to restitution?

(8) Whether one is bound to restore at once?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 1]

Whether Restitution Is an Act of Commutative Justice?

Objection 1: It would seem that restitution is not an act of
commutative justice. For justice regards the notion of what is due.
Now one may restore, even as one may give, that which is not due.
Therefore restitution is not the act of any part of justice.

Obj. 2: Further, that which has passed away and is no more cannot be
restored. Now justice and injustice are about certain actions and
passions, which are unenduring and transitory. Therefore restitution
would not seem to be the act of a part of justice.

Obj. 3: Further, restitution is repayment of something taken away.
Now something may be taken away from a man not only in commutation,
but also in distribution, as when, in distributing, one gives a man
less than his due. Therefore restitution is not more an act of
commutative than of distributive justice.

_On the contrary,_ Restitution is opposed to taking away. Now it is
an act of commutative injustice to take away what belongs to another.
Therefore to restore it is an act of that justice which directs
commutations.

_I answer that,_ To restore is seemingly the same as to reinstate a
person in the possession or dominion of his thing, so that in
restitution we consider the equality of justice attending the payment
of one thing for another, and this belongs to commutative justice.
Hence restitution is an act of commutative justice, occasioned by one
person having what belongs to another, either with his consent, for
instance on loan or deposit, or against his will, as in robbery or
theft.

Reply Obj. 1: That which is not due to another is not his properly
speaking, although it may have been his at some time: wherefore it is
a mere gift rather than a restitution, when anyone renders to another
what is not due to him. It is however somewhat like a restitution,
since the thing itself is materially the same; yet it is not the same
in respect of the formal aspect of justice, which considers that
thing as belonging to this particular man: and so it is not
restitution properly so called.

Reply Obj. 2: In so far as the word restitution denotes something
done over again, it implies identity of object. Hence it would seem
originally to have applied chiefly to external things, which can pass
from one person to another, since they remain the same both
substantially and in respect of the right of dominion. But, even as
the term "commutation" has passed from such like things to those
actions and passions which confer reverence or injury, harm or profit
on another person, so too the term "restitution" is applied, to
things which though they be transitory in reality, yet remain in
their effect; whether this touch his body, as when the body is hurt
by being struck, or his reputation, as when a man remains defamed or
dishonored by injurious words.

Reply Obj. 3: Compensation is made by the distributor to the man to
whom less was given than his due, by comparison of thing with thing,
when the latter receives so much the more according as he received
less than his due: and consequently it pertains to commutative
justice.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 2]

Whether Restitution of What Has Been Taken Away Is Necessary for
Salvation?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary to restore what
has been taken away. For that which is impossible is not necessary
for salvation. But sometimes it is impossible to restore what has
been taken, as when a man has taken limb or life. Therefore it does
not seem necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from
another.

Obj. 2: Further, the commission of a sin is not necessary for
salvation, for then a man would be in a dilemma. But sometimes it is
impossible, without sin, to restore what has been taken, as when one
has taken away another's good name by telling the truth. Therefore it
is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from
another.

Obj. 3: Further, what is done cannot be undone. Now sometimes a man
loses his personal honor by being unjustly insulted. Therefore that
which has been taken from him cannot be restored to him: so that it
is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken.

Obj. 4: Further, to prevent a person from obtaining a good thing is
seemingly the same as to take it away from him, since "to lack little
is almost the same as to lack nothing at all," as the Philosopher
says (Phys. ii, 5). Now when anyone prevents a man from obtaining a
benefice or the like, seemingly he is not bound to restore the
benefice, since this would be sometimes impossible. Therefore it is
not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Ep. ad Maced. cxliii): "Unless a
man restore what he has purloined, his sin is not forgiven."

_I answer that,_ Restitution as stated above (A. 1) is an act of
commutative justice, and this demands a certain equality. Wherefore
restitution denotes the return of the thing unjustly taken; since it
is by giving it back that equality is reestablished. If, however, it
be taken away justly, there will be equality, and so there will be no
need for restitution, for justice consists in equality. Since
therefore the safeguarding of justice is necessary for salvation, it
follows that it is necessary for salvation to restore what has been
taken unjustly.

Reply Obj. 1: When it is impossible to repay the equivalent, it
suffices to repay what one can, as in the case of honor due to God
and our parents, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14).
Wherefore when that which has been taken cannot be restored in
equivalent, compensation should be made as far as possible: for
instance if one man has deprived another of a limb, he must make
compensation either in money or in honor, the condition of either
party being duly considered according to the judgment of a good man.

Reply Obj. 2: There are three ways in which one may take away
another's good name. First, by saying what is true, and this justly,
as when a man reveals another's sin, while observing the right order
of so doing, and then he is not bound to restitution. Secondly, by
saying what is untrue and unjustly, and then he is bound to restore
that man's good name, by confessing that he told an untruth. Thirdly,
by saying what is true, but unjustly, as when a man reveals another's
sin contrarily to the right order of so doing, and then he is bound
to restore his good name as far as he can, and yet without telling an
untruth; for instance by saying that he spoke ill, or that he defamed
him unjustly; or if he be unable to restore his good name, he must
compensate him otherwise, the same as in other cases, as stated above
(ad 1).

Reply Obj. 3: The action of the man who has defamed another cannot be
undone, but it is possible, by showing him deference, to undo its
effect, viz. the lowering of the other man's personal dignity in the
opinion of other men.

Reply Obj. 4: There are several ways of preventing a man from
obtaining a benefice. First, justly: for instance, if having in view
the honor of God or the good of the Church, one procures its being
conferred on a more worthy subject, and then there is no obligation
whatever to make restitution or compensation. Secondly, unjustly, if
the intention is to injure the person whom one hinders, through
hatred, revenge or the like. In this case, if before the benefice has
been definitely assigned to anyone, one prevents its being conferred
on a worthy subject by counseling that it be not conferred on him, one
is bound to make some compensation, after taking account of the
circumstances of persons and things according to the judgment of a
prudent person: but one is not bound in equivalent, because that man
had not obtained the benefice and might have been prevented in many
ways from obtaining it. If, on the other hand, the benefice had
already been assigned to a certain person, and someone, for some undue
cause procures its revocation, it is the same as though he had
deprived a man of what he already possessed, and consequently he would
be bound to compensation in equivalent, in proportion, however, to his
means.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 3]

Whether It Suffices to Restore the Exact Amount Taken?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not sufficient to restore the
exact amount taken. For it is written (Ex. 22:1): "If a man shall
steal an ox or a sheep and kill or sell it, he shall restore five
oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep." Now everyone is bound
to keep the commandments of the Divine law. Therefore a thief is
bound to restore four- or fivefold.

Obj. 2: Further, "What things soever were written, were written for
our learning" (Rom. 15:4). Now Zachaeus said (Luke 19:8) to our Lord:
"If I have wronged any man of any thing, I restore him fourfold."
Therefore a man is bound to restore several times over the amount he
has taken unjustly.

Obj. 3: Further, no one can be unjustly deprived of what he is not
bound to give. Now a judge justly deprives a thief of more than the
amount of his theft, under the head of damages. Therefore a man is
bound to pay it, and consequently it is not sufficient to restore the
exact amount.

_On the contrary,_ Restitution re-establishes equality where an
unjust taking has caused inequality. Now equality is restored by
repaying the exact amount taken. Therefore there is no obligation to
restore more than the exact amount taken.

_I answer that,_ When a man takes another's thing unjustly, two
things must be considered. One is the inequality on the part of the
thing, which inequality is sometimes void of injustice, as is the
case in loans. The other is the sin of injustice, which is consistent
with equality on the part of the thing, as when a person intends to
use violence but fails.

As regards the first, the remedy is applied by making restitution,
since thereby equality is re-established; and for this it is enough
that a man restore just so much as he has belonging to another. But
as regards the sin, the remedy is applied by punishment, the
infliction of which belongs to the judge: and so, until a man is
condemned by the judge, he is not bound to restore more than he took,
but when once he is condemned, he is bound to pay the penalty.

Hence it is clear how to answer the First Objection: because this law
fixes the punishment to be inflicted by the judge. Nor is this
commandment to be kept now, because since the coming of Christ no man
is bound to keep the judicial precepts, as stated above (I-II, Q.
104, A. 3). Nevertheless the same might be determined by human law,
and then the same answer would apply.

Reply Obj. 2: Zachaeus said this being willing to do more than he was
bound to do; hence he had said already: "Behold . . . the half of my
goods I give to the poor."

Reply Obj. 3: By condemning the man justly, the judge can exact more
by way of damages; and yet this was not due before the sentence.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 4]

Whether a Man Is Bound to Restore What He Has Not Taken?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man is bound to restore what he has
not taken. For he that has inflicted a loss on a man is bound to
remove that loss. Now it happens sometimes that the loss sustained is
greater than the thing taken: for instance, if you dig up a man's
seeds, you inflict on the sower a loss equal to the coming harvest,
and thus you would seem to be bound to make restitution accordingly.
Therefore a man is bound to restore what he has not taken.

Obj. 2: Further, he who retains his creditor's money beyond the
stated time, would seem to occasion his loss of all his possible
profits from that money, and yet he does not really take them.
Therefore it seems that a man is bound to restore what he did not
take.

Obj. 3: Further, human justice is derived from Divine justice. Now a
man is bound to restore to God more than he has received from Him,
according to Matt. 25:26, "Thou knewest that I reap where I sow not,
and gather where I have not strewed." Therefore it is just that one
should restore to a man also, something that one has not taken.

_On the contrary,_ Restitution belongs to justice, because it
re-establishes equality. But if one were to restore what one did not
take, there would not be equality. Therefore it is not just to make
such a restitution.

_I answer that,_ Whoever brings a loss upon another person,
seemingly, takes from him the amount of the loss, since, according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) loss is so called from a man having
_less_* than his due. [*The derivation is more apparent in English
than in Latin, where _damnum_ stands for _loss,_ and _minus_ for
_less._ Aristotle merely says that to have more than your own is
called "gain," and to have less than you started with is called
"loss."] Therefore a man is bound to make restitution according to
the loss he has brought upon another.

Now a man suffers a loss in two ways. First, by being deprived of
what he actually has; and a loss of this kind is always to be made
good by repayment in equivalent: for instance if a man damnifies
another by destroying his house he is bound to pay him the value of
the house. Secondly, a man may damnify another by preventing him from
obtaining what he was on the way to obtain. A loss of this kind need
not be made good in equivalent; because to have a thing virtually is
less than to have it actually, and to be on the way to obtain a thing
is to have it merely virtually or potentially, and so were he to be
indemnified by receiving the thing actually, he would be paid, not
the exact value taken from him, but more, and this is not necessary
for salvation, as stated above. However he is bound to make some
compensation, according to the condition of persons and things.

From this we see how to answer the First and Second Objections:
because the sower of the seed in the field, has the harvest, not
actually but only virtually. In like manner he that has money has the
profit not yet actually but only virtually: and both may be hindered
in many ways.

Reply Obj. 3: God requires nothing from us but what He Himself has
sown in us. Hence this saying is to be understood as expressing
either the shameful thought of the lazy servant, who deemed that he
had received nothing from the other, or the fact that God expects
from us the fruit of His gifts, which fruit is from Him and from us,
although the gifts themselves are from God without us.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 5]

Whether Restitution Must Always Be Made to the Person from Whom a
Thing Has Been Taken?

Objection 1: It would seem that restitution need not always be made
to the person from whom a thing has been taken. For it is not lawful
to injure anyone. Now it would sometimes be injurious to the man
himself, or to others, were one to restore to him what has been taken
from him; if, for instance, one were to return a madman his sword.
Therefore restitution need not always be made to the person from whom
a thing has been taken.

Obj. 2: Further, if a man has given a thing unlawfully, he does not
deserve to recover it. Now sometimes a man gives unlawfully that
which another accepts unlawfully, as in the case of the giver and
receiver who are guilty of simony. Therefore it is not always
necessary to make restitution to the person from whom one has taken
something.

Obj. 3: Further, no man is bound to do what is impossible. Now it is
sometimes impossible to make restitution to the person from whom a
thing has been taken, either because he is dead, or because he is too
far away, or because he is unknown to us. Therefore restitution need
not always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken.

Obj. 4: Further, we owe more compensation to one from whom we have
received a greater favor. Now we have received greater favors from
others (our parents for instance) than from a lender or depositor.
Therefore sometimes we ought to succor some other person rather than
make restitution to one from whom we have taken something.

Obj. 5: Further, it is useless to restore a thing which reverts to
the restorer by being restored. Now if a prelate has unjustly taken
something from the Church and makes restitution to the Church, it
reverts into his hands, since he is the guardian of the Church's
property. Therefore he ought not to restore to the Church from whom
he has taken: and so restitution should not always be made to the
person from whom something has been taken away.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 13:7): "Render . . . to all
men their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom
custom."

_I answer that,_ Restitution re-establishes the equality of
commutative justice, which equality consists in the equalizing of
thing to thing, as stated above (A. 2; Q. 58, A. 10). Now this
equalizing of things is impossible, unless he that has less than his
due receive what is lacking to him: and for this to be done,
restitution must be made to the person from whom a thing has been
taken.

Reply Obj. 1: When the thing to be restored appears to be grievously
injurious to the person to whom it is to be restored, or to some
other, it should not be restored to him there and then, because
restitution is directed to the good of the person to whom it is made,
since all possessions come under the head of the useful. Yet he who
retains another's property must not appropriate it, but must either
reserve it, that he may restore it at a fitting time, or hand it over
to another to keep it more securely.

Reply Obj. 2: A person may give a thing unlawfully in two ways. First
through the giving itself being illicit and against the law, as is
the case when a man gives a thing simoniacally. Such a man deserves
to lose what he gave, wherefore restitution should not be made to
him: and, since the receiver acted against the law in receiving, he
must not retain the price, but must use it for some pious object.
Secondly a man gives unlawfully, through giving for an unlawful
purpose, albeit the giving itself is not unlawful, as when a woman
receives payment for fornication: wherefore she may keep what she has
received. If, however, she has extorted overmuch by fraud or deceit,
she would be bound to restitution.

Reply Obj. 3: If the person to whom restitution is due is unknown
altogether, restitution must be made as far as possible, for instance
by giving an alms for his spiritual welfare (whether he be dead or
living): but not without previously making a careful inquiry about
his person. If the person to whom restitution is due be dead,
restitution should be made to his heir, who is looked upon as one
with him. If he be very far away, what is due to him should be sent
to him, especially if it be of great value and can easily be sent:
else it should be deposited in a safe place to be kept for him, and
the owner should be advised of the fact.

Reply Obj. 4: A man is bound, out of his own property, to succor his
parents, or those from whom he has received greater benefits; but he
ought not to compensate a benefactor out of what belongs to others;
and he would be doing this if he were to compensate one with what is
due to another. Exception must be made in cases of extreme need, for
then he could and should even take what belongs to another in order
to succor a parent.

Reply Obj. 5: There are three ways in which a prelate can rob the
Church of her property. First by laying hands on Church property
which is committed, not to him but to another; for instance, if a
bishop appropriates the property of the chapter. In such a case it is
clear that he is bound to restitution, by handing it over to those
who are its lawful owners. Secondly by transferring to another person
(for instance a relative or a friend) Church property committed to
himself: in which case he must make restitution to the Church, and
have it under his own care, so as to hand it over to his successor.
Thirdly, a prelate may lay hands on Church property, merely in
intention, when, to wit, he begins to have a mind to hold it as his
own and not in the name of the Church: in which case he must make
restitution by renouncing his intention.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 6]

Whether He That Has Taken a Thing Is Always Bound to Restitution?

Objection 1: It would seem that he who has taken a thing is not
always bound to restore it. Restitution re-establishes the equality
of justice, by taking away from him that has more and giving to him
that has less. Now it happens sometimes that he who has taken that
which belongs to another, no longer has it, through its having passed
into another's hands. Therefore it should be restored, not by the
person that took it, but by the one that has it.

Obj. 2: Further, no man is bound to reveal his own crime. But by
making restitution a man would sometimes reveal his crime, as in the
case of theft. Therefore he that has taken a thing is not always
bound to restitution.

Obj. 3: Further, the same thing should not be restored several times.
Now sometimes several persons take a thing at the same time, and one
of them restores it in its entirety. Therefore he that takes a thing
is not always bound to restitution.

_On the contrary,_ He that has sinned is bound to satisfaction. Now
restitution belongs to satisfaction. Therefore he that has taken a
thing is bound to restore it.

_I answer that,_ With regard to a man who has taken another's
property, two points must be considered: the thing taken, and the
taking. By reason of the thing taken, he is bound to restore it as
long as he has it in his possession, since the thing that he has in
addition to what is his, should be taken away from him, and given to
him who lacks it according to the form of commutative justice. On the
other hand, the taking of the thing that is another's property, may
be threefold. For sometimes it is injurious, i.e. against the will of
the owner, as in theft and robbery: in which case the thief is bound
to restitution not only by reason of the thing, but also by reason of
the injurious action, even though the thing is no longer in his
possession. For just as a man who strikes another, though he gain
nothing thereby, is bound to compensate the injured person, so too he
that is guilty of theft or robbery, is bound to make compensation for
the loss incurred, although he be no better off; and in addition he
must be punished for the injustice committed. Secondly, a man takes
another's property for his own profit but without committing an
injury, i.e. with the consent of the owner, as in the case of a loan:
and then, the taker is bound to restitution, not only by reason of
the thing, but also by reason of the taking, even if he has lost the
thing: for he is bound to compensate the person who has done him a
favor, and he would not be doing so if the latter were to lose
thereby. Thirdly, a man takes another's property without injury to
the latter or profit to himself, as in the case of a deposit;
wherefore he that takes a thing thus, incurs no obligation on account
of the taking, in fact by taking he grants a favor; but he is bound
to restitution on account of the thing taken. Consequently if this
thing be taken from him without any fault on his part, he is not
bound to restitution, although he would be, if he were to lose the
thing through a grievous fault on his part.

Reply Obj. 1: The chief end of restitution is, not that he who has
more than his due may cease to have it, but that he who has less than
his due may be compensated. Wherefore there is no place for
restitution in those things which one man may receive from another
without loss to the latter, as when a person takes a light from
another's candle. Consequently although he that has taken something
from another, may have ceased to have what he took, through having
transferred it to another, yet since that other is deprived of what
is his, both are bound to restitution, he that took the thing, on
account of the injurious taking, and he that has it, on account of
the thing.

Reply Obj. 2: Although a man is not bound to reveal his crime to
other men, yet is he bound to reveal it to God in confession; and so
he may make restitution of another's property through the priest to
whom he confesses.

Reply Obj. 3: Since restitution is chiefly directed to the
compensation for the loss incurred by the person from whom a thing
has been taken unjustly, it stands to reason that when he has
received sufficient compensation from one, the others are not bound
to any further restitution in his regard: rather ought they to refund
the person who has made restitution, who, nevertheless, may excuse
them from so doing.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 7]

Whether Restitution Is Binding on Those Who Have Not Taken?

Objection 1: It would seem that restitution is not binding on those
who have not taken. For restitution is a punishment of the taker. Now
none should be punished except the one who sinned. Therefore none are
bound to restitution save the one who has taken.

Obj. 2: Further, justice does not bind one to increase another's
property. Now if restitution were binding not only on the man who
takes a thing but also on all those who cooperate with him in any way
whatever, the person from whom the thing was taken would be the
gainer, both because he would receive restitution many times over,
and because sometimes a person cooperates towards a thing being taken
away from someone, without its being taken away in effect. Therefore
the others are not bound to restitution.

Obj. 3: Further, no man is bound to expose himself to danger, in
order to safeguard another's property. Now sometimes a man would
expose himself to the danger of death, were he to betray a thief, or
withstand him. Therefore one is not bound to restitution, through not
betraying or withstanding a thief.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 1:32): "They who do such
things are worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but also
they that consent to them that do them." Therefore in like manner
they that consent are bound to restitution.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), a person is bound to
restitution not only on account of someone else's property which he
has taken, but also on account of the injurious taking. Hence whoever
is cause of an unjust taking is bound to restitution. This happens in
two ways, directly and indirectly. Directly, when a man induces
another to take, and this in three ways. First, on the part of the
taking, by moving a man to take, either by express command, counsel,
or consent, or by praising a man for his courage in thieving.
Secondly, on the part of the taker, by giving him shelter or any
other kind of assistance. Thirdly, on the part of the thing taken, by
taking part in the theft or robbery, as a fellow evil-doer.
Indirectly, when a man does not prevent another from evil-doing
(provided he be able and bound to prevent him), either by omitting
the command or counsel which would hinder him from thieving or
robbing, or by omitting to do what would have hindered him, or by
sheltering him after the deed. All these are expressed as follows:

"By command, by counsel, by consent, by flattery, by receiving, by
participation, by silence, by not preventing, by not denouncing."

It must be observed, however, that in five of these cases the
cooperator is always bound to restitution. First, in the case of
command: because he that commands is the chief mover, wherefore he is
bound to restitution principally. Secondly, in the case of consent;
namely of one without whose consent the robbery cannot take place.
Thirdly, in the case of receiving; when, to wit, a man is a receiver
of thieves, and gives them assistance. Fourthly, in the case of
participation; when a man takes part in the theft and in the booty.
Fifthly, he who does not prevent the theft, whereas he is bound to do
so; for instance, persons in authority who are bound to safeguard
justice on earth, are bound to restitution, if by their neglect
thieves prosper, because their salary is given to them in payment of
their preserving justice here below.

In the other cases mentioned above, a man is not always bound to
restitution: because counsel and flattery are not always the
efficacious cause of robbery. Hence the counsellor or flatterer is
bound to restitution, only when it may be judged with probability
that the unjust taking resulted from such causes.

Reply Obj. 1: Not only is he bound to restitution who commits the
sin, but also he who is in any way cause of the sin, whether by
counselling, or by commanding, or in any other way whatever.

Reply Obj. 2: He is bound chiefly to restitution, who is the
principal in the deed; first of all, the _commander;_ secondly, the
_executor,_ and in due sequence, the others: yet so that, if one of
them make restitution, another is not bound to make restitution to
the same person. Yet those who are principals in the deed, and who
took possession of the thing, are bound to compensate those who have
already made restitution. When a man commands an unjust taking that
does not follow, no restitution has to be made, since its end is
chiefly to restore the property of the person who has been unjustly
injured.

Reply Obj. 3: He that fails to denounce a thief or does not withstand
or reprehend him is not always bound to restitution, but only when he
is obliged, in virtue of his office, to do so: as in the case of
earthly princes who do not incur any great danger thereby; for they
are invested with public authority, in order that they may maintain
justice.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 8]

Whether a Man Is Bound to Immediate Restitution, or May He Put It Off?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to immediate
restitution, and can lawfully delay to restore. For affirmative
precepts do not bind for always. Now the necessity of making
restitution is binding through an affirmative precept. Therefore a
man is not bound to immediate restitution.

Obj. 2: Further, no man is bound to do what is impossible. But it is
sometimes impossible to make restitution at once. Therefore no man is
bound to immediate restitution.

Obj. 3: Further, restitution is an act of virtue, viz. of justice.
Now time is one of the circumstances requisite for virtuous acts.
Since then the other circumstances are not determinate for acts of
virtue, but are determinable according to the dictate of prudence, it
seems that neither in restitution is there any fixed time, so that a
man be bound to restore at once.

_On the contrary,_ All matters of restitution seem to come under one
head. Now a man who hires the services of a wage-earner, must not
delay compensation, as appears from Lev. 19:13, "The wages of him
that hath been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until the
morning." Therefore neither is it lawful, in other cases of
restitution, to delay, and restitution should be made at once.

_I answer that,_ Even as it is a sin against justice to take
another's property, so also is it to withhold it, since, to withhold
the property of another against the owner's will, is to deprive him
of the use of what belongs to him, and to do him an injury. Now it is
clear that it is wrong to remain in sin even for a short time; and
one is bound to renounce one's sin at once, according to Ecclus.
21:2, "Flee from sin as from the face of a serpent." Consequently one
is bound to immediate restitution, if possible, or to ask for a
respite from the person who is empowered to grant the use of the
thing.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the precept about the making of restitution is
affirmative in form, it implies a negative precept forbidding us to
withhold another's property.

Reply Obj. 2: When one is unable to restore at once, this very
inability excuses one from immediate restitution: even as a person is
altogether excused from making restitution if he is altogether unable
to make it. He is, however, bound either himself or through another
to ask the person to whom he owes compensation to grant him a
remission or a respite.

Reply Obj. 3: Whenever the omission of a circumstance is contrary to
virtue that circumstance must be looked upon as determinate, and we
are bound to observe it: and since delay of restitution involves a
sin of unjust detention which is opposed to just detention, it stands
to reason that the time is determinate in the point of restitution
being immediate.
_______________________

QUESTION 63

OF RESPECT OF PERSONS
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid parts of
justice. First we shall consider respect of persons which is opposed
to distributive justice; secondly we shall consider the vices opposed
to commutative justice.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether respect of persons is a sin?

(2) Whether it takes place in the dispensation of spiritualities?

(3) Whether it takes place in showing honor?

(4) Whether it takes place in judicial sentences?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 63, Art. 1]

Whether Respect of Persons Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that respect of persons is not a sin. For
the word "person" includes a reference to personal dignity [*Cf. I,
Q. 29, A. 3, ad 2]. Now it belongs to distributive justice to
consider personal dignity. Therefore respect of persons is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, in human affairs persons are of more importance than
things, since things are for the benefit of persons and not
conversely. But respect of things is not a sin. Much less, therefore,
is respect of persons.

Obj. 3: Further, no injustice or sin can be in God. Yet God seems to
respect persons, since of two men circumstanced alike He sometimes
upraises one by grace, and leaves the other in sin, according to
Matt. 24:40: "Two shall be in a bed [Vulg.: 'field'] [*'Bed' is the
reading of Luke 17:34], one shall be taken, and one shall be left."
Therefore respect of persons is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ Nothing but sin is forbidden in the Divine law.
Now respect of persons is forbidden, Deut. 1:17: "Neither shall you
respect any man's person." Therefore respect of persons is a sin.

_I answer that,_ Respect of persons is opposed to distributive
justice. For the equality of distributive justice consists in
allotting various things to various persons in proportion to their
personal dignity. Accordingly, if one considers that personal
property by reason of which the thing allotted to a particular person
is due to him, this is respect not of the person but of the cause.
Hence a gloss on Eph. 6:9, "There is no respect of persons with God
[Vulg.: 'Him']," says that "a just judge regards causes, not
persons." For instance if you promote a man to a professorship on
account of his having sufficient knowledge, you consider the due
cause, not the person; but if, in conferring something on someone,
you consider in him not the fact that what you give him is
proportionate or due to him, but the fact that he is this particular
man (e.g. Peter or Martin), then there is respect of the person,
since you give him something not for some cause that renders him
worthy of it, but simply because he is this person. And any
circumstance that does not amount to a reason why this man be worthy
of this gift, is to be referred to his person: for instance if a man
promote someone to a prelacy or a professorship, because he is rich
or because he is a relative of his, it is respect of persons. It may
happen, however, that a circumstance of person makes a man worthy as
regards one thing, but not as regards another: thus consanguinity
makes a man worthy to be appointed heir to an estate, but not to be
chosen for a position of ecclesiastical authority: wherefore
consideration of the same circumstance of person will amount to
respect of persons in one matter and not in another. It follows,
accordingly, that respect of persons is opposed to distributive
justice in that it fails to observe due proportion. Now nothing but
sin is opposed to virtue: and therefore respect of persons is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1: In distributive justice we consider those circumstances
of a person which result in dignity or right, whereas in respect of
persons we consider circumstances that do not so result.

Reply Obj. 2: Persons are rendered proportionate to and worthy of
things which are distributed among them, by reason of certain things
pertaining to circumstances of person, wherefore such conditions
ought to be considered as the proper cause. But when we consider the
persons themselves, that which is not a cause is considered as though
it were; and so it is clear that although persons are more worthy,
absolutely speaking, yet they are not more worthy in this regard.

Reply Obj. 3: There is a twofold giving. One belongs to justice, and
occurs when we give a man his due: in such like givings respect of
persons takes place. The other giving belongs to liberality, when one
gives gratis that which is not a man's due: such is the bestowal of
the gifts of grace, whereby sinners are chosen by God. In such a
giving there is no place for respect of persons, because anyone may,
without injustice, give of his own as much as he will, and to whom he
will, according to Matt. 20:14, 15, "Is it not lawful for me to do
what I will? . . . Take what is thine, and go thy way."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 63, Art. 2]

Whether Respect of Persons Takes Place in the Dispensation of
Spiritual Goods?

Objection 1: It would seem that respect of persons does not take
place in the dispensation of spiritual goods. For it would seem to
savor of respect of persons if a man confers ecclesiastical dignity
or benefice on account of consanguinity, since consanguinity is not a
cause whereby a man is rendered worthy of an ecclesiastical benefice.
Yet this apparently is not a sin, for ecclesiastical prelates are
wont to do so. Therefore the sin of respect of persons does not take
place in the conferring of spiritual goods.

Obj. 2: Further, to give preference to a rich man rather than to a
poor man seems to pertain to respect of persons, according to James
2:2, 3. Nevertheless dispensations to marry within forbidden degrees
are more readily granted to the rich and powerful than to others.
Therefore the sin of respect of persons seems not to take place in
the dispensation of spiritual goods.

Obj. 3: Further, according to jurists [*Cap. Cum dilectus.] it
suffices to choose a good man, and it is not requisite that one
choose the better man. But it would seem to savor of respect of
persons to choose one who is less good for a higher position.
Therefore respect of persons is not a sin in spiritual matters.

Obj. 4: Further, according to the law of the Church (Cap. Cum
dilectus.) the person to be chosen should be "a member of the flock."
Now this would seem to imply respect of persons, since sometimes more
competent persons would be found elsewhere. Therefore respect of
persons is not a sin in spiritual matters.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 2:1): "Have not the faith of
our Lord Jesus Christ . . . with respect of persons." On these words
a gloss of Augustine says: "Who is there that would tolerate the
promotion of a rich man to a position of honor in the Church, to the
exclusion of a poor man more learned and holier?" [*Augustine, Ep. ad
Hieron. clxvii.]

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), respect of persons is a sin,
in so far as it is contrary to justice. Now the graver the matter in
which justice is transgressed, the more grievous the sin: so that,
spiritual things being of greater import than temporal, respect of
persons is a more grievous sin in dispensing spiritualities than in
dispensing temporalities. And since it is respect of persons when
something is allotted to a person out of proportion to his deserts,
it must be observed that a person's worthiness may be considered in
two ways. First, simply and absolutely: and in this way the man who
abounds the more in the spiritual gifts of grace is the more worthy.
Secondly, in relation to the common good; for it happens at times
that the less holy and less learned man may conduce more to the
common good, on account of worldly authority or activity, or
something of the kind. And since the dispensation of spiritualities
is directed chiefly to the common good, according to 1 Cor. 12:7,
"The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit,"
it follows that in the dispensation of spiritualities the simply less
good are sometimes preferred to the better, without respect of
persons, just as God sometimes bestows gratuitous graces on the less
worthy.

Reply Obj. 1: We must make a distinction with regard to a prelate's
kinsfolk: for sometimes they are less worthy, both absolutely
speaking, and in relation to the common good: and then if they are
preferred to the more worthy, there is a sin of respect of persons in
the dispensation of spiritual goods, whereof the ecclesiastical
superior is not the owner, with power to give them away as he will,
but the dispenser, according to 1 Cor. 4:1, "Let a man so account of
us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries
of God." Sometimes however the prelate's kinsfolk are as worthy as
others, and then without respect of persons he can lawfully give
preference to his kindred since there is at least this advantage,
that he can trust the more in their being of one mind with him in
conducting the business of the Church. Yet he would have to forego so
doing for fear of scandal, if anyone might take an example from him
and give the goods of the Church to their kindred without regard to
their deserts.

Reply Obj. 2: Dispensations for contracting marriage came into use
for the purpose of strengthening treaties of peace: and this is more
necessary for the common good in relation to persons of standing, so
that there is no respect of persons in granting dispensations more
readily to such persons.

Reply Obj. 3: In order that an election be not rebutted in a court of
law, it suffices to elect a good man, nor is it necessary to elect
the better man, because otherwise every election might have a flaw.
But as regards the conscience of an elector, it is necessary to elect
one who is better, either absolutely speaking, or in relation to the
common good. For if it is possible to have one who is more competent
for a post, and yet another be preferred, it is necessary to have
some cause for this. If this cause have anything to do with the
matter in point, he who is elected will, in this respect, be more
competent; and if that which is taken for cause have nothing to do
with the matter, it will clearly be respect of persons.

Reply Obj. 4: The man who is taken from among the members of a
particular Church, is generally speaking more useful as regards the
common good, since he loves more the Church wherein he was brought
up. For this reason it was commanded (Deut. 17:15): "Thou mayest not
make a man of another nation king, who is not thy brother."
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 63, Art. 3]

Whether Respect of Persons Takes Place in Showing Honor and Respect?

Objection 1: It would seem that respect of persons does not take
place in showing honor and respect. For honor is apparently nothing
else than "reverence shown to a person in recognition of his virtue,"
as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 5). Now prelates and princes
should be honored although they be wicked, even as our parents, of
whom it is written (Ex. 20:12): "Honor thy father and thy mother."
Again masters, though they be wicked, should be honored by their
servants, according to 1 Tim. 6:1: "Whoever are servants under the
yoke, let them count their masters worthy of all honor." Therefore it
seems that it is not a sin to respect persons in showing honor.

Obj. 2: Further, it is commanded (Lev. 19:32): "Rise up before the
hoary head, and, honor the person of the aged man." But this seems to
savor of respect of persons, since sometimes old men are not
virtuous; according to Dan. 13:5: "Iniquity came out from the
ancients of the people [*Vulg.: 'Iniquity came out of Babylon from
the ancient judges, that seemed to govern the people.']." Therefore
it is not a sin to respect persons in showing honor.

Obj. 3: Further, on the words of James 2:1, "Have not the faith . . .
with respect of persons," a gloss of Augustine [*Ep. ad Hieron.
clxvii.] says: "If the saying of James, 'If there shall come into
your assembly a man having a golden ring,' etc., refer to our daily
meetings, who sins not here, if however he sin at all?" Yet it is
respect of persons to honor the rich for their riches, for Gregory
says in a homily (xxviii in Evang.): "Our pride is blunted, since in
men we honor, not the nature wherein they are made to God's image,
but wealth," so that, wealth not being a due cause of honor, this
will savor of respect of persons. Therefore it is not a sin to
respect persons in showing honor.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on James 2:1, says: "Whoever honors the
rich for their riches, sins," and in like manner, if a man be honored
for other causes that do not render him worthy of honor. Now this
savors of respect of persons. Therefore it is a sin to respect
persons in showing honor.

_I answer that,_ To honor a person is to recognize him as having
virtue, wherefore virtue alone is the due cause of a person being
honored. Now it is to be observed that a person may be honored not
only for his own virtue, but also for another's: thus princes and
prelates, although they be wicked, are honored as standing in God's
place, and as representing the community over which they are placed,
according to Prov. 26:8, "As he that casteth a stone into the heap of
Mercury, so is he that giveth honor to a fool." For, since the
gentiles ascribed the keeping of accounts to Mercury, "the heap of
Mercury" signifies the casting up of an account, when a merchant
sometimes substitutes a pebble [*_Lapillus_ or _calculus_ whence the
English word 'calculate'] for one hundred marks. So too, is a fool
honored if he stand in God's place or represent the whole community:
and in the same way parents and masters should be honored, on account
of their having a share of the dignity of God Who is the Father and
Lord of all. The aged should be honored, because old age is a sign of
virtue, though this sign fail at times: wherefore, according to Wis.
4:8, 9, "venerable old age is not that of long time, nor counted by
the number of years; but the understanding of a man is gray hairs,
and a spotless life is old age." The rich ought to be honored by
reason of their occupying a higher position in the community: but if
they be honored merely for their wealth, it will be the sin of
respect of persons.

Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 63, Art. 4]

Whether the Sin of Respect of Persons Takes Place in Judicial
Sentences?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of respect of persons does
not take place in judicial sentences. For respect of persons is
opposed to distributive justice, as stated above (A. 1): whereas
judicial sentences seem to pertain chiefly to commutative justice.
Therefore respect of persons does not take place in judicial
sentences.

Obj. 2: Further, penalties are inflicted according to a sentence. Now
it is not a sin to respect persons in pronouncing penalties, since a
heavier punishment is inflicted on one who injures the person of a
prince than on one who injures the person of others. Therefore
respect of persons does not take place in judicial sentences.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 4:10): "In judging be
merciful to the fatherless." But this seems to imply respect of the
person of the needy. Therefore in judicial sentences respect of
persons is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 18:5): "It is not good to
accept the person in judgment [*Vulg.: 'It is not good to accept the
person of the wicked, to decline from the truth of judgment.']."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 60, A. 1), judgment is an act of
justice, in as much as the judge restores to the equality of justice,
those things which may cause an opposite inequality. Now respect of
persons involves a certain inequality, in so far as something is
allotted to a person out of that proportion to him in which the
equality of justice consists. Wherefore it is evident that judgment
is rendered corrupt by respect of persons.

Reply Obj. 1: A judgment may be looked at in two ways. First, in view
of the thing judged, and in this way judgment is common to
commutative and distributive justice: because it may be decided by
judgment how some common good is to be distributed among many, and
how one person is to restore to another what he has taken from him.
Secondly, it may be considered in view of the form of judgment, in as
much as, even in commutative justice, the judge takes from one and
gives to another, and this belongs to distributive justice. In this
way respect of persons may take place in any judgment.

Reply Obj. 2: When a person is more severely punished on account of a
crime committed against a greater person, there is no respect of
persons, because the very difference of persons causes, in that case,
a diversity of things, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 10, ad 3; Q. 61, A.
2, ad 3).

Reply Obj. 3: In pronouncing judgment one ought to succor the needy
as far as possible, yet without prejudice to justice: else the saying
of Ex. 23:3 would apply: "Neither shalt thou favor a poor man in
judgment."
_______________________

QUESTION 64

OF MURDER
(In Eight Articles)

In due sequence we must consider the vices opposed to commutative
justice. We must consider (1) those sins that are committed in
relation to involuntary commutations; (2) those that are committed
with regard to voluntary commutations. Sins are committed in relation
to involuntary commutations by doing an injury to one's neighbor
against his will: and this can be done in two ways, namely by deed or
by word. By deed when one's neighbor is injured either in his own
person, or in a person connected with him, or in his possessions.

We must therefore consider these points in due order, and in the
first place we shall consider murder whereby a man inflicts the
greatest injury on his neighbor. Under this head there are eight
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is a sin to kill dumb animals or even plants?

(2) Whether it is lawful to kill a sinner?

(3) Whether this is lawful to a private individual, or to a public
person only?

(4) Whether this is lawful to a cleric?

(5) Whether it is lawful to kill oneself?

(6) Whether it is lawful to kill a just man?

(7) Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?

(8) Whether accidental homicide is a mortal sin?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 1]

Whether It Is Unlawful to Kill Any Living Thing?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to kill any living thing. For the
Apostle says (Rom. 13:2): "They that resist the ordinance of God
purchase to themselves damnation [*Vulg.: 'He that resisteth the
power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist, purchase
themselves damnation.']." Now Divine providence has ordained that all
living things should be preserved, according to Ps. 146:8, 9, "Who
maketh grass to grow on the mountains . . . Who giveth to beasts
their food." Therefore it seems unlawful to take the life of any
living thing.

Obj. 2: Further, murder is a sin because it deprives a man of life.
Now life is common to all animals and plants. Hence for the same
reason it is apparently a sin to slay dumb animals and plants.

Obj. 3: Further, in the Divine law a special punishment is not
appointed save for a sin. Now a special punishment had to be
inflicted, according to the Divine law, on one who killed another
man's ox or sheep (Ex. 22:1). Therefore the slaying of dumb animals
is a sin.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): "When we hear
it said, 'Thou shalt not kill,' we do not take it as referring to
trees, for they have no sense, nor to irrational animals, because
they have no fellowship with us. Hence it follows that the words,
'Thou shalt not kill' refer to the killing of a man."

_I answer that,_ There is no sin in using a thing for the purpose for
which it is. Now the order of things is such that the imperfect are
for the perfect, even as in the process of generation nature proceeds
from imperfection to perfection. Hence it is that just as in the
generation of a man there is first a living thing, then an animal,
and lastly a man, so too things, like the plants, which merely have
life, are all alike for animals, and all animals are for man.
Wherefore it is not unlawful if man use plants for the good of
animals, and animals for the good of man, as the Philosopher states
(Polit. i, 3).

Now the most necessary use would seem to consist in the fact that
animals use plants, and men use animals, for food, and this cannot be
done unless these be deprived of life: wherefore it is lawful both to
take life from plants for the use of animals, and from animals for
the use of men. In fact this is in keeping with the commandment of
God Himself: for it is written (Gen. 1:29, 30): "Behold I have given
you every herb . . . and all trees . . . to be your meat, and to all
beasts of the earth": and again (Gen. 9:3): "Everything that moveth
and liveth shall be meat to you."

Reply Obj. 1: According to the Divine ordinance the life of animals
and plants is preserved not for themselves but for man. Hence, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20), "by a most just ordinance of the
Creator, both their life and their death are subject to our use."

Reply Obj. 2: Dumb animals and plants are devoid of the life of
reason whereby to set themselves in motion; they are moved, as it
were by another, by a kind of natural impulse, a sign of which is
that they are naturally enslaved and accommodated to the uses of
others.

Reply Obj. 3: He that kills another's ox, sins, not through killing
the ox, but through injuring another man in his property. Wherefore
this is not a species of the sin of murder but of the sin of theft or
robbery.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 2]

Whether It Is Lawful to Kill Sinners?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to kill men who have sinned. For
our Lord in the parable (Matt. 13) forbade the uprooting of the
cockle which denotes wicked men according to a gloss. Now whatever is
forbidden by God is a sin. Therefore it is a sin to kill a sinner.

Obj. 2: Further, human justice is conformed to Divine justice. Now
according to Divine justice sinners are kept back for repentance,
according to Ezech. 33:11, "I desire not the death of the wicked, but
that the wicked turn from his way and live." Therefore it seems
altogether unjust to kill sinners.

Obj. 3: Further, it is not lawful, for any good end whatever, to do
that which is evil in itself, according to Augustine (Contra Mendac.
vii) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now to kill a man is evil in
itself, since we are bound to have charity towards all men, and "we
wish our friends to live and to exist," according to _Ethic._ ix, 4.
Therefore it is nowise lawful to kill a man who has sinned.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 22:18): "Wizards thou shalt not
suffer to live"; and (Ps. 100:8): "In the morning I put to death all
the wicked of the land."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), it is lawful to kill dumb
animals, in so far as they are naturally directed to man's use, as
the imperfect is directed to the perfect. Now every part is directed
to the whole, as imperfect to perfect, wherefore every part is
naturally for the sake of the whole. For this reason we observe that
if the health of the whole body demands the excision of a member,
through its being decayed or infectious to the other members, it will
be both praiseworthy and advantageous to have it cut away. Now every
individual person is compared to the whole community, as part to
whole. Therefore if a man be dangerous and infectious to the
community, on account of some sin, it is praiseworthy and
advantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the common good,
since "a little leaven corrupteth the whole lump" (1 Cor. 5:6).

Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord commanded them to forbear from uprooting the
cockle in order to spare the wheat, i.e. the good. This occurs when
the wicked cannot be slain without the good being killed with them,
either because the wicked lie hidden among the good, or because they
have many followers, so that they cannot be killed without danger to
the good, as Augustine says (Contra Parmen. iii, 2). Wherefore our
Lord teaches that we should rather allow the wicked to live, and that
vengeance is to be delayed until the last judgment, rather than that
the good be put to death together with the wicked. When, however, the
good incur no danger, but rather are protected and saved by the
slaying of the wicked, then the latter may be lawfully put to death.

Reply Obj. 2: According to the order of His wisdom, God sometimes
slays sinners forthwith in order to deliver the good, whereas
sometimes He allows them time to repent, according as He knows what
is expedient for His elect. This also does human justice imitate
according to its powers; for it puts to death those who are dangerous
to others, while it allows time for repentance to those who sin
without grievously harming others.

Reply Obj. 3: By sinning man departs from the order of reason, and
consequently falls away from the dignity of his manhood, in so far as
he is naturally free, and exists for himself, and he falls into the
slavish state of the beasts, by being disposed of according as he is
useful to others. This is expressed in Ps. 48:21: "Man, when he was
in honor, did not understand; he hath been compared to senseless
beasts, and made like to them," and Prov. 11:29: "The fool shall
serve the wise." Hence, although it be evil in itself to kill a man
so long as he preserve his dignity, yet it may be good to kill a man
who has sinned, even as it is to kill a beast. For a bad man is worse
than a beast, and is more harmful, as the Philosopher states (Polit.
i, 1 and _Ethic._ vii, 6).
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 3]

Whether It Is Lawful for a Private Individual to Kill a Man Who Has
Sinned?

Objection 1: It would seem lawful for a private individual to kill a
man who has sinned. For nothing unlawful is commanded in the Divine
law. Yet, on account of the sin of the molten calf, Moses commanded
(Ex. 32:27): "Let every man kill his brother, and friend, and
neighbor." Therefore it is lawful for private individuals to kill a
sinner.

Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3), man, on account of
sin, is compared to the beasts. Now it is lawful for any private
individual to kill a wild beast, especially if it be harmful.
Therefore for the same reason, it is lawful for any private
individual to kill a man who has sinned.

Obj. 3: Further, a man, though a private individual, deserves praise
for doing what is useful for the common good. Now the slaying of
evildoers is useful for the common good, as stated above (A. 2).
Therefore it is deserving of praise if even private individuals kill
evil-doers.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) [*Can. Quicumque
percutit, caus. xxiii, qu. 8]: "A man who, without exercising public
authority, kills an evil-doer, shall be judged guilty of murder, and
all the more, since he has dared to usurp a power which God has not
given him."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), it is lawful to kill an
evildoer in so far as it is directed to the welfare of the whole
community, so that it belongs to him alone who has charge of the
community's welfare. Thus it belongs to a physician to cut off a
decayed limb, when he has been entrusted with the care of the health
of the whole body. Now the care of the common good is entrusted to
persons of rank having public authority: wherefore they alone, and
not private individuals, can lawfully put evildoers to death.

Reply Obj. 1: The person by whose authority a thing is done really
does the thing as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. iii). Hence
according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei i, 21), "He slays not who owes
his service to one who commands him, even as a sword is merely the
instrument to him that wields it." Wherefore those who, at the Lord's
command, slew their neighbors and friends, would seem not to have
done this themselves, but rather He by whose authority they acted
thus: just as a soldier slays the foe by the authority of his
sovereign, and the executioner slays the robber by the authority of
the judge.

Reply Obj. 2: A beast is by nature distinct from man, wherefore in
the case of a wild beast there is no need for an authority to kill
it; whereas, in the case of domestic animals, such authority is
required, not for their sake, but on account of the owner's loss. On
the other hand a man who has sinned is not by nature distinct from
good men; hence a public authority is requisite in order to condemn
him to death for the common good.

Reply Obj. 3: It is lawful for any private individual to do anything
for the common good, provided it harm nobody: but if it be harmful to
some other, it cannot be done, except by virtue of the judgment of
the person to whom it pertains to decide what is to be taken from the
parts for the welfare of the whole.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 4]

Whether It Is Lawful for Clerics to Kill Evil-doers?

Objection 1: It would seem lawful for clerics to kill evil-doers. For
clerics especially should fulfil the precept of the Apostle (1 Cor.
4:16): "Be ye followers of me as I also am of Christ," whereby we are
called upon to imitate God and His saints. Now the very God whom we
worship puts evildoers to death, according to Ps. 135:10, "Who smote
Egypt with their firstborn." Again Moses made the Levites slay
twenty-three thousand men on account of the worship of the calf (Ex.
32), the priest Phinees slew the Israelite who went in to the woman
of Madian (Num. 25), Samuel killed Agag king of Amalec (1 Kings 15),
Elias slew the priests of Baal (3 Kings 18), Mathathias killed the
man who went up to the altar to sacrifice (1 Mac. 2); and, in the New
Testament, Peter killed Ananias and Saphira (Acts 5). Therefore it
seems that even clerics may kill evil-doers.

Obj. 2: Further, spiritual power is greater than the secular and is
more united to God. Now the secular power as "God's minister"
lawfully puts evil-doers to death, according to Rom. 13:4. Much more
therefore may clerics, who are God's ministers and have spiritual
power, put evil-doers to death.

Obj. 3: Further, whosoever lawfully accepts an office, may lawfully
exercise the functions of that office. Now it belongs to the princely
office to slay evildoers, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore those
clerics who are earthly princes may lawfully slay malefactors.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Tim. 3:2, 3): "It behooveth . . .
a bishop to be without crime [*Vulg.: 'blameless.' 'Without crime' is
the reading in Tit. 1:7] . . . not given to wine, no striker."

_I answer that,_ It is unlawful for clerics to kill, for two reasons.
First, because they are chosen for the ministry of the altar, whereon
is represented the Passion of Christ slain "Who, when He was struck
did not strike [Vulg.: 'When He suffered, He threatened not']" (1
Pet. 2:23). Therefore it becomes not clerics to strike or kill: for
ministers should imitate their master, according to Ecclus. 10:2, "As
the judge of the people is himself, so also are his ministers." The
other reason is because clerics are entrusted with the ministry of
the New Law, wherein no punishment of death or of bodily maiming is
appointed: wherefore they should abstain from such things in order
that they may be fitting ministers of the New Testament.

Reply Obj. 1: God works in all things without exception whatever is
right, yet in each one according to its mode. Wherefore everyone
should imitate God in that which is specially becoming to him. Hence,
though God slays evildoers even corporally, it does not follow that
all should imitate Him in this. As regards Peter, he did not put
Ananias and Saphira to death by his own authority or with his own
hand, but published their death sentence pronounced by God. The
Priests or Levites of the Old Testament were the ministers of the Old
Law, which appointed corporal penalties, so that it was fitting for
them to slay with their own hands.

Reply Obj. 2: The ministry of clerics is concerned with better things
than corporal slayings, namely with things pertaining to spiritual
welfare, and so it is not fitting for them to meddle with minor
matters.

Reply Obj. 3: Ecclesiastical prelates accept the office of earthly
princes, not that they may inflict capital punishment themselves, but
that this may be carried into effect by others in virtue of their
authority.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 5]

Whether It Is Lawful to Kill Oneself?

Objection 1: It would seem lawful for a man to kill himself. For
murder is a sin in so far as it is contrary to justice. But no man
can do an injustice to himself, as is proved in _Ethic._ v, 11.
Therefore no man sins by killing himself.

Obj. 2: Further, it is lawful, for one who exercises public
authority, to kill evil-doers. Now he who exercises public authority
is sometimes an evil-doer. Therefore he may lawfully kill himself.

Obj. 3: Further, it is lawful for a man to suffer spontaneously a
lesser danger that he may avoid a greater: thus it is lawful for a
man to cut off a decayed limb even from himself, that he may save his
whole body. Now sometimes a man, by killing himself, avoids a greater
evil, for example an unhappy life, or the shame of sin. Therefore a
man may kill himself.

Obj. 4: Further, Samson killed himself, as related in Judges 16, and
yet he is numbered among the saints (Heb. 11). Therefore it is lawful
for a man to kill himself.

Obj. 5: Further, it is related (2 Mac. 14:42) that a certain Razias
killed himself, "choosing to die nobly rather than to fall into the
hands of the wicked, and to suffer abuses unbecoming his noble
birth." Now nothing that is done nobly and bravely is unlawful.
Therefore suicide is not unlawful.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): "Hence it
follows that the words 'Thou shalt not kill' refer to the killing of
a man--not another man; therefore, not even thyself. For he who kills
himself, kills nothing else than a man."

_I answer that,_ It is altogether unlawful to kill oneself, for three
reasons. First, because everything naturally loves itself, the result
being that everything naturally keeps itself in being, and resists
corruptions so far as it can. Wherefore suicide is contrary to the
inclination of nature, and to charity whereby every man should love
himself. Hence suicide is always a mortal sin, as being contrary to
the natural law and to charity. Secondly, because every part, as
such, belongs to the whole. Now every man is part of the community,
and so, as such, he belongs to the community. Hence by killing
himself he injures the community, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic.
v, 11). Thirdly, because life is God's gift to man, and is subject to
His power, Who kills and makes to live. Hence whoever takes his own
life, sins against God, even as he who kills another's slave, sins
against that slave's master, and as he who usurps to himself judgment
of a matter not entrusted to him. For it belongs to God alone to
pronounce sentence of death and life, according to Deut. 32:39, "I
will kill and I will make to live."

Reply Obj. 1: Murder is a sin, not only because it is contrary to
justice, but also because it is opposed to charity which a man should
have towards himself: in this respect suicide is a sin in relation to
oneself. In relation to the community and to God, it is sinful, by
reason also of its opposition to justice.

Reply Obj. 2: One who exercises public authority may lawfully put to
death an evil-doer, since he can pass judgment on him. But no man is
judge of himself. Wherefore it is not lawful for one who exercises
public authority to put himself to death for any sin whatever:
although he may lawfully commit himself to the judgment of others.

Reply Obj. 3: Man is made master of himself through his free-will:
wherefore he can lawfully dispose of himself as to those matters
which pertain to this life which is ruled by man's free-will. But the
passage from this life to another and happier one is subject not to
man's free-will but to the power of God. Hence it is not lawful for
man to take his own life that he may pass to a happier life, nor that
he may escape any unhappiness whatsoever of the present life, because
the ultimate and most fearsome evil of this life is death, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 6). Therefore to bring death upon
oneself in order to escape the other afflictions of this life, is to
adopt a greater evil in order to avoid a lesser. In like manner it is
unlawful to take one's own life on account of one's having committed
a sin, both because by so doing one does oneself a very great injury,
by depriving oneself of the time needful for repentance, and because
it is not lawful to slay an evildoer except by the sentence of the
public authority. Again it is unlawful for a woman to kill herself
lest she be violated, because she ought not to commit on herself the
very great sin of suicide, to avoid the lesser sin of another. For
she commits no sin in being violated by force, provided she does not
consent, since "without consent of the mind there is no stain on the
body," as the Blessed Lucy declared. Now it is evident that
fornication and adultery are less grievous sins than taking a man's,
especially one's own, life: since the latter is most grievous,
because one injures oneself, to whom one owes the greatest love.
Moreover it is most dangerous since no time is left wherein to
expiate it by repentance. Again it is not lawful for anyone to take
his own life for fear he should consent to sin, because "evil must
not be done that good may come" (Rom. 3:8) or that evil may be
avoided especially if the evil be of small account and an uncertain
event, for it is uncertain whether one will at some future time
consent to a sin, since God is able to deliver man from sin under any
temptation whatever.

Reply Obj. 4: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 21), "not even Samson
is to be excused that he crushed himself together with his enemies
under the ruins of the house, except the Holy Ghost, Who had wrought
many wonders through him, had secretly commanded him to do this." He
assigns the same reason in the case of certain holy women, who at the
time of persecution took their own lives, and who are commemorated by
the Church.

Reply Obj. 5: It belongs to fortitude that a man does not shrink from
being slain by another, for the sake of the good of virtue, and that
he may avoid sin. But that a man take his own life in order to avoid
penal evils has indeed an appearance of fortitude (for which reason
some, among whom was Razias, have killed themselves thinking to act
from fortitude), yet it is not true fortitude, but rather a weakness
of soul unable to bear penal evils, as the Philosopher (Ethic. iii,
7) and Augustine (De Civ. Dei 22, 23) declare.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 6]

Whether It Is Lawful to Kill the Innocent?

Objection 1: It would seem that in some cases it is lawful to kill
the innocent. The fear of God is never manifested by sin, since on
the contrary "the fear of the Lord driveth out sin" (Ecclus. 1:27).
Now Abraham was commended in that he feared the Lord, since he was
willing to slay his innocent son. Therefore one may, without sin,
kill an innocent person.

Obj. 2: Further, among those sins that are committed against one's
neighbor, the more grievous seem to be those whereby a more grievous
injury is inflicted on the person sinned against. Now to be killed is
a greater injury to a sinful than to an innocent person, because the
latter, by death, passes forthwith from the unhappiness of this life
to the glory of heaven. Since then it is lawful in certain cases to
kill a sinful man, much more is it lawful to slay an innocent or a
righteous person.

Obj. 3: Further, what is done in keeping with the order of justice is
not a sin. But sometimes a man is forced, according to the order of
justice, to slay an innocent person: for instance, when a judge, who
is bound to judge according to the evidence, condemns to death a man
whom he knows to be innocent but who is convicted by false witnesses;
and again the executioner, who in obedience to the judge puts to
death the man who has been unjustly sentenced.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 23:7): "The innocent and just
person thou shalt not put to death."

_I answer that,_ An individual man may be considered in two ways:
first, in himself; secondly, in relation to something else. If we
consider a man in himself, it is unlawful to kill any man, since in
every man though he be sinful, we ought to love the nature which God
has made, and which is destroyed by slaying him. Nevertheless, as
stated above (A. 2) the slaying of a sinner becomes lawful in
relation to the common good, which is corrupted by sin. On the other
hand the life of righteous men preserves and forwards the common
good, since they are the chief part of the community. Therefore it is
in no way lawful to slay the innocent.

Reply Obj. 1: God is Lord of death and life, for by His decree both
the sinful and the righteous die. Hence he who at God's command kills
an innocent man does not sin, as neither does God Whose behest he
executes: indeed his obedience to God's commands is a proof that he
fears Him.

Reply Obj. 2: In weighing the gravity of a sin we must consider the
essential rather than the accidental. Wherefore he who kills a just
man, sins more grievously than he who slays a sinful man: first,
because he injures one whom he should love more, and so acts more in
opposition to charity: secondly, because he inflicts an injury on a
man who is less deserving of one, and so acts more in opposition to
justice: thirdly, because he deprives the community of a greater
good: fourthly, because he despises God more, according to Luke
10:16, "He that despiseth you despiseth Me." On the other hand it is
accidental to the slaying that the just man whose life is taken be
received by God into glory.

Reply Obj. 3: If the judge knows that a man who has been convicted by
false witnesses, is innocent he must, like Daniel, examine the
witnesses with great care, so as to find a motive for acquitting the
innocent: but if he cannot do this he should remit him for judgment
by a higher tribunal. If even this is impossible, he does not sin if
he pronounce sentence in accordance with the evidence, for it is not
he that puts the innocent man to death, but they who stated him to be
guilty. He that carries out the sentence of the judge who has
condemned an innocent man, if the sentence contains an inexcusable
error, he should not obey, else there would be an excuse for the
executions of the martyrs: if however it contain no manifest
injustice, he does not sin by carrying out the sentence, because he
has no right to discuss the judgment of his superior; nor is it he
who slays the innocent man, but the judge whose minister he is.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 7]

Whether It Is Lawful to Kill a Man in Self-defense?

Objection 1: It would seem that nobody may lawfully kill a man in
self-defense. For Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): "I do not
agree with the opinion that one may kill a man lest one be killed by
him; unless one be a soldier, exercise a public office, so that one
does it not for oneself but for others, having the power to do so,
provided it be in keeping with one's person." Now he who kills a man
in self-defense, kills him lest he be killed by him. Therefore this
would seem to be unlawful.

Obj. 2: Further, he says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): "How are they free from
sin in sight of Divine providence, who are guilty of taking a man's
life for the sake of these contemptible things?" Now among
contemptible things he reckons "those which men may forfeit
unwillingly," as appears from the context (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): and
the chief of these is the life of the body. Therefore it is unlawful
for any man to take another's life for the sake of the life of his
own body.

Obj. 3: Further, Pope Nicolas [*Nicolas I, Dist. 1, can. De his
clericis] says in the Decretals: "Concerning the clerics about whom
you have consulted Us, those, namely, who have killed a pagan in
self-defense, as to whether, after making amends by repenting, they
may return to their former state, or rise to a higher degree; know
that in no case is it lawful for them to kill any man under any
circumstances whatever." Now clerics and laymen are alike bound to
observe the moral precepts. Therefore neither is it lawful for laymen
to kill anyone in self-defense.

Obj. 4: Further, murder is a more grievous sin than fornication or
adultery. Now nobody may lawfully commit simple fornication or
adultery or any other mortal sin in order to save his own life; since
the spiritual life is to be preferred to the life of the body.
Therefore no man may lawfully take another's life in self-defense in
order to save his own life.

Obj. 5: Further, if the tree be evil, so is the fruit, according to
Matt. 7:17. Now self-defense itself seems to be unlawful, according
to Rom. 12:19: "Not defending [Douay: 'revenging'] yourselves, my
dearly beloved." Therefore its result, which is the slaying of a man,
is also unlawful.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 22:2): "If a thief be found
breaking into a house or undermining it, and be wounded so as to die;
he that slew him shall not be guilty of blood." Now it is much more
lawful to defend one's life than one's house. Therefore neither is a
man guilty of murder if he kill another in defense of his own life.

_I answer that,_ Nothing hinders one act from having two effects,
only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the
intention. Now moral acts take their species according to what is
intended, and not according to what is beside the intention, since
this is accidental as explained above (Q. 43, A. 3; I-II, Q. 12, A.
1). Accordingly the act of self-defense may have two effects, one is
the saving of one's life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor.
Therefore this act, since one's intention is to save one's own life,
is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to everything to keep
itself in _being,_ as far as possible. And yet, though proceeding
from a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful, if it be out
of proportion to the end. Wherefore if a man, in self-defense, uses
more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful: whereas if he
repel force with moderation his defense will be lawful, because
according to the jurists [*Cap. Significasti, De Homicid. volunt. vel
casual.], "it is lawful to repel force by force, provided one does
not exceed the limits of a blameless defense." Nor is it necessary
for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate self-defense in
order to avoid killing the other man, since one is bound to take more
care of one's own life than of another's. But as it is unlawful to
take a man's life, except for the public authority acting for the
common good, as stated above (A. 3), it is not lawful for a man to
intend killing a man in self-defense, except for such as have public
authority, who while intending to kill a man in self-defense, refer
this to the public good, as in the case of a soldier fighting against
the foe, and in the minister of the judge struggling with robbers,
although even these sin if they be moved by private animosity.

Reply Obj. 1: The words quoted from Augustine refer to the case when
one man intends to kill another to save himself from death. The
passage quoted in the Second Objection is to be understood in the
same sense. Hence he says pointedly, "for the sake of these things,"
whereby he indicates the intention. This suffices for the Reply to
the Second Objection.

Reply Obj. 3: Irregularity results from the act though sinless of
taking a man's life, as appears in the case of a judge who justly
condemns a man to death. For this reason a cleric, though he kill a
man in self-defense, is irregular, albeit he intends not to kill him,
but to defend himself.

Reply Obj. 4: The act of fornication or adultery is not necessarily
directed to the preservation of one's own life, as is the act whence
sometimes results the taking of a man's life.

Reply Obj. 5: The defense forbidden in this passage is that which
comes from revengeful spite. Hence a gloss says: "Not defending
yourselves--that is, not striking your enemy back."
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 8]

Whether One Is Guilty of Murder Through Killing Someone by Chance?

Objection 1: It would seem that one is guilty of murder through
killing someone by chance. For we read (Gen. 4:23, 24) that Lamech
slew a man in mistake for a wild beast [*The text of the Bible does
not say so, but this was the Jewish traditional commentary on Gen.
4:23], and that he was accounted guilty of murder. Therefore one
incurs the guilt of murder through killing a man by chance.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ex. 21:22): "If . . . one strike a
woman with child, and she miscarry indeed . . . if her death ensue
thereupon, he shall render life for life." Yet this may happen
without any intention of causing her death. Therefore one is guilty
of murder through killing someone by chance.

Obj. 3: Further, the Decretals [*Dist. 1] contain several canons
prescribing penalties for unintentional homicide. Now penalty is not
due save for guilt. Therefore he who kills a man by chance, incurs
the guilt of murder.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): "When we
do a thing for a good and lawful purpose, if thereby we
unintentionally cause harm to anyone, it should by no means be
imputed to us." Now it sometimes happens by chance that a person is
killed as a result of something done for a good purpose. Therefore
the person who did it is not accounted guilty.

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 6) "chance
is a cause that acts beside one's intention." Hence chance
happenings, strictly speaking, are neither intended nor voluntary.
And since every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine (De Vera
Relig. xiv) it follows that chance happenings, as such, are not sins.

Nevertheless it happens that what is not actually and directly
voluntary and intended, is voluntary and intended accidentally,
according as that which removes an obstacle is called an accidental
cause. Wherefore he who does not remove something whence homicide
results whereas he ought to remove it, is in a sense guilty of
voluntary homicide. This happens in two ways: first when a man causes
another's death through occupying himself with unlawful things which
he ought to avoid: secondly, when he does not take sufficient care.
Hence, according to jurists, if a man pursue a lawful occupation and
take due care, the result being that a person loses his life, he is
not guilty of that person's death: whereas if he be occupied with
something unlawful, or even with something lawful, but without due
care, he does not escape being guilty of murder, if his action
results in someone's death.

Reply Obj. 1: Lamech did not take sufficient care to avoid taking a
man's life: and so he was not excused from being guilty of homicide.

Reply Obj. 2: He that strikes a woman with child does something
unlawful: wherefore if there results the death either of the woman or
of the animated fetus, he will not be excused from homicide,
especially seeing that death is the natural result of such a blow.

Reply Obj. 3: According to the canons a penalty is inflicted on those
who cause death unintentionally, through doing something unlawful, or
failing to take sufficient care.
_______________________

QUESTION 65

OF OTHER INJURIES COMMITTED ON THE PERSON
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider other sinful injuries committed on the person.
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) The mutilation of members;

(2) Blows;

(3) Imprisonment;

(4) Whether the sins that consist in inflicting such like injuries
are aggravated through being perpetrated on persons connected with
others?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 65, Art. 1]

Whether in Some Cases It May Be Lawful to Maim Anyone?

Objection 1: It would seem that in no case can it be lawful to maim
anyone. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20) that "sin consists
in departing from what is according to nature, towards that which is
contrary to nature." Now according to nature it is appointed by God
that a man's body should be entire in its members, and it is contrary
to nature that it should be deprived of a member. Therefore it seems
that it is always a sin to maim a person.

Obj. 2: Further, as the whole soul is to the whole body, so are the
parts of the soul to the parts of the body (De Anima ii, 1). But it
is unlawful to deprive a man of his soul by killing him, except by
public authority. Therefore neither is it lawful to maim anyone,
except perhaps by public authority.

Obj. 3: Further, the welfare of the soul is to be preferred to the
welfare of the body. Now it is not lawful for a man to maim himself
for the sake of the soul's welfare: since the council of Nicea [*P.
I, sect. 4, can. i] punished those who castrated themselves that they
might preserve chastity. Therefore it is not lawful for any other
reason to maim a person.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 21:24): "Eye for eye, tooth for
tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot."

_I answer that,_ Since a member is part of the whole human body, it
is for the sake of the whole, as the imperfect for the perfect. Hence
a member of the human body is to be disposed of according as it is
expedient for the body. Now a member of the human body is of itself
useful to the good of the whole body, yet, accidentally it may happen
to be hurtful, as when a decayed member is a source of corruption to
the whole body. Accordingly so long as a member is healthy and
retains its natural disposition, it cannot be cut off without injury
to the whole body. But as the whole of man is directed as to his end
to the whole of the community of which he is a part, as stated above
(Q. 61, A. 1; Q. 64, AA. 2, 5), it may happen that although the
removal of a member may be detrimental to the whole body, it may
nevertheless be directed to the good of the community, in so far as
it is applied to a person as a punishment for the purpose of
restraining sin. Hence just as by public authority a person is
lawfully deprived of life altogether on account of certain more
heinous sins, so is he deprived of a member on account of certain
lesser sins. But this is not lawful for a private individual, even
with the consent of the owner of the member, because this would
involve an injury to the community, to whom the man and all his parts
belong. If, however, the member be decayed and therefore a source of
corruption to the whole body, then it is lawful with the consent of
the owner of the member, to cut away the member for the welfare of
the whole body, since each one is entrusted with the care of his own
welfare. The same applies if it be done with the consent of the
person whose business it is to care for the welfare of the person who
has a decayed member: otherwise it is altogether unlawful to maim
anyone.

Reply Obj. 1: Nothing prevents that which is contrary to a particular
nature from being in harmony with universal nature: thus death and
corruption, in the physical order, are contrary to the particular
nature of the thing corrupted, although they are in keeping with
universal nature. In like manner to maim anyone, though contrary to
the particular nature of the body of the person maimed, is
nevertheless in keeping with natural reason in relation to the common
good.

Reply Obj. 2: The life of the entire man is not directed to something
belonging to man; on the contrary whatever belongs to man is directed
to his life. Hence in no case does it pertain to a person to take
anyone's life, except to the public authority to whom is entrusted
the procuring of the common good. But the removal of a member can be
directed to the good of one man, and consequently in certain cases
can pertain to him.

Reply Obj. 3: A member should not be removed for the sake of the
bodily health of the whole, unless otherwise nothing can be done to
further the good of the whole. Now it is always possible to further
one's spiritual welfare otherwise than by cutting off a member,
because sin is always subject to the will: and consequently in no
case is it allowable to maim oneself, even to avoid any sin whatever.
Hence Chrysostom, in his exposition on Matt. 19:12 (Hom. lxii in
Matth.), "There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the
kingdom of heaven," says: "Not by maiming themselves, but by
destroying evil thoughts, for a man is accursed who maims himself,
since they are murderers who do such things." And further on he says:
"Nor is lust tamed thereby, on the contrary it becomes more
importunate, for the seed springs in us from other sources, and
chiefly from an incontinent purpose and a careless mind: and
temptation is curbed not so much by cutting off a member as by
curbing one's thoughts."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 65, Art. 2]

Whether It Is Lawful for Parents to Strike Their Children, or
Masters Their Slaves?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for parents to strike their
children, or masters their slaves. For the Apostle says (Eph. 6:4):
"You, fathers, provoke not your children to anger"; and further on
(Eph. 9:6): "And you, masters, do the same thing to your slaves
[Vulg.: 'to them'] forbearing threatenings." Now some are provoked to
anger by blows, and become more troublesome when threatened.
Therefore neither should parents strike their children, nor masters
their slaves.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9) that "a father's
words are admonitory and not coercive." Now blows are a kind of
coercion. Therefore it is unlawful for parents to strike their
children.

Obj. 3: Further, everyone is allowed to impart correction, for this
belongs to the spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 2).
If, therefore, it is lawful for parents to strike their children for
the sake of correction, for the same reason it will be lawful for any
person to strike anyone, which is clearly false. Therefore the same
conclusion follows.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 13:24): "He that spareth the
rod hateth his son," and further on (Prov. 23:13): "Withhold not
correction from a child, for if thou strike him with the rod, he
shall not die. Thou shalt beat him with the rod, and deliver his soul
from hell." Again it is written (Ecclus. 33:28): "Torture and fetters
are for a malicious slave."

_I answer that,_ Harm is done a body by striking it, yet not so as
when it is maimed: since maiming destroys the body's integrity, while
a blow merely affects the sense with pain, wherefore it causes much
less harm than cutting off a member. Now it is unlawful to do a
person a harm, except by way of punishment in the cause of justice.
Again, no man justly punishes another, except one who is subject to
his jurisdiction. Therefore it is not lawful for a man to strike
another, unless he have some power over the one whom he strikes. And
since the child is subject to the power of the parent, and the slave
to the power of his master, a parent can lawfully strike his child,
and a master his slave that instruction may be enforced by correction.

Reply Obj. 1: Since anger is a desire for vengeance, it is aroused
chiefly when a man deems himself unjustly injured, as the Philosopher
states (Rhet. ii). Hence when parents are forbidden to provoke their
children to anger, they are not prohibited from striking their
children for the purpose of correction, but from inflicting blows on
them without moderation. The command that masters should forbear from
threatening their slaves may be understood in two ways. First that
they should be slow to threaten, and this pertains to the moderation
of correction; secondly, that they should not always carry out their
threats, that is that they should sometimes by a merciful forgiveness
temper the judgment whereby they threatened punishment.

Reply Obj. 2: The greater power should exercise the greater coercion.
Now just as a city is a perfect community, so the governor of a city
has perfect coercive power: wherefore he can inflict irreparable
punishments such as death and mutilation. On the other hand the
father and the master who preside over the family household, which is
an imperfect community, have imperfect coercive power, which is
exercised by inflicting lesser punishments, for instance by blows,
which do not inflict irreparable harm.

Reply Obj. 3: It is lawful for anyone to impart correction to a
willing subject. But to impart it to an unwilling subject belongs to
those only who have charge over him. To this pertains chastisement by
blows.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 65, Art. 3]

Whether It Is Lawful to Imprison a Man?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to imprison a man. An act which
deals with undue matter is evil in its genus, as stated above (I-II,
Q. 18, A. 2). Now man, having a free-will, is undue matter for
imprisonment which is inconsistent with free-will. Therefore it is
unlawful to imprison a man.

Obj. 2: Further, human justice should be ruled by Divine justice. Now
according to Ecclus. 15:14, "God left man in the hand of his own
counsel." Therefore it seems that a man ought not to be coerced by
chains or prisons.

Obj. 3: Further, no man should be forcibly prevented except from
doing an evil deed; and any man can lawfully prevent another from
doing this. If, therefore, it were lawful to imprison a man, in order
to restrain him from evil deeds, it would be lawful for anyone to put
a man in prison; and this is clearly false. Therefore the same
conclusion follows.

_On the contrary,_ We read in Lev. 24 that a man was imprisoned for
the sin of blasphemy.

_I answer that,_ In the goods of the body three things may be
considered in due order. First, the substantial integrity of the
body, and this is injured by death or maiming. Secondly, pleasure or
rest of the senses, and to this striking or anything causing a sense
of pain is opposed. Thirdly, the movement or use of the members, and
this is hindered by binding or imprisoning or any kind of detention.

Therefore it is unlawful to imprison or in any way detain a man,
unless it be done according to the order of justice, either in
punishment, or as a measure of precaution against some evil.

Reply Obj. 1: A man who abuses the power entrusted to him deserves to
lose it, and therefore when a man by sinning abuses the free use of
his members, he becomes a fitting matter for imprisonment.

Reply Obj. 2: According to the order of His wisdom God
sometimes restrains a sinner from accomplishing a sin, according to
Job 5:12: "Who bringeth to nought the designs of the malignant, so
that their hand cannot accomplish what they had begun, while sometimes
He allows them to do what they will." In like manner, according to
human justice, men are imprisoned, not for every sin but for certain
ones.

Reply Obj. 3: It is lawful for anyone to restrain a man for a
time from doing some unlawful deed there and then: as when a man
prevents another from throwing himself over a precipice, or from
striking another. But to him alone who has the right of disposing in
general of the actions and of the life of another does it belong
primarily to imprison or fetter, because by so doing he hinders him
from doing not only evil but also good deeds.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 65, Art. 4]

Whether the Sin Is Aggravated by the Fact That the Aforesaid Injuries
Are Perpetrated on Those Who Are Connected with Others?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sin is not aggravated by the fact
that the aforesaid injuries are perpetrated on those who are
connected with others. Such like injuries take their sinful character
from inflicting an injury on another against his will. Now the evil
inflicted on a man's own person is more against his will than that
which is inflicted on a person connected with him. Therefore an
injury inflicted on a person connected with another is less grievous.

Obj. 2: Further, Holy Writ reproves those especially who do injuries
to orphans and widows: hence it is written (Ecclus. 35:17): "He will
not despise the prayers of the fatherless, nor the widow when she
poureth out her complaint." Now the widow and the orphan are not
connected with other persons. Therefore the sin is not aggravated
through an injury being inflicted on one who is connected with others.

Obj. 3: Further, the person who is connected has a will of his own
just as the principal person has, so that something may be voluntary
for him and yet against the will of the principal person, as in the
case of adultery which pleases the woman but not the husband. Now
these injuries are sinful in so far as they consist in an involuntary
commutation. Therefore such like injuries are of a less sinful nature.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 28:32) as though indicating
an aggravating circumstance: "Thy sons and thy daughters shall be
given to another people, thy eyes looking on [*Vulg.: 'May thy sons
and thy daughters be given,' etc.]."

_I answer that,_ Other things being equal, an injury is a more
grievous sin according as it affects more persons; and hence it is
that it is a more grievous sin to strike or injure a person in
authority than a private individual, because it conduces to the
injury of the whole community, as stated above (I-II, Q. 73, A. 9).
Now when an injury is inflicted on one who is connected in any way
with another, that injury affects two persons, so that, other things
being equal, the sin is aggravated by this very fact. It may happen,
however, that in view of certain circumstances, a sin committed
against one who is not connected with any other person, is more
grievous, on account of either the dignity of the person, or the
greatness of the injury.

Reply Obj. 1: An injury inflicted on a person connected with others
is less harmful to the persons with whom he is connected, than if it
were perpetrated immediately on them, and from this point of view it
is a less grievous sin. But all that belongs to the injury of the
person with whom he is connected, is added to the sin of which a man
is guilty through injuring the other one in himself.

Reply Obj. 2: Injuries done to widows and orphans are more insisted
upon both through being more opposed to mercy, and because the same
injury done to such persons is more grievous to them since they have
no one to turn to for relief.

Reply Obj. 3: The fact that the wife voluntarily consents to the
adultery, lessens the sin and injury, so far as the woman is
concerned, for it would be more grievous, if the adulterer oppressed
her by violence. But this does not remove the injury as affecting her
husband, since "the wife hath not power of her own body; but the
husband" (1 Cor. 7:4). The same applies to similar cases. Of
adultery, however, as it is opposed not only to justice but also to
chastity, we shall speak in the treatise on Temperance (Q. 154, A. 8).
_______________________

QUESTION 66

OF THEFT AND ROBBERY
(In Nine Articles)

We must now consider the sins opposed to justice, whereby a man
injures his neighbor in his belongings; namely theft and robbery.

Under this head there are nine points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is natural to man to possess external things?

(2) Whether it is lawful for a man to possess something as his own?

(3) Whether theft is the secret taking of another's property?

(4) Whether robbery is a species of sin distinct from theft?

(5) Whether every theft is a sin?

(6) Whether theft is a mortal sin?

(7) Whether it is lawful to thieve in a case of necessity?

(8) Whether every robbery is a mortal sin?

(9) Whether robbery is a more grievous sin than theft?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 1]

Whether It Is Natural for Man to Possess External Things?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not natural for man to possess
external things. For no man should ascribe to himself that which is
God's. Now the dominion over all creatures is proper to God,
according to Ps. 23:1, "The earth is the Lord's," etc. Therefore it
is not natural for man to possess external things.

Obj. 2: Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man (Luke
12:18), "I will gather all things that are grown to me, and my
goods," says [*Hom. in Luc. xii, 18]: "Tell me: which are thine?
where did you take them from and bring them into being?" Now whatever
man possesses naturally, he can fittingly call his own. Therefore man
does not naturally possess external things.

Obj. 3: Further, according to Ambrose (De Trin. i [*De Fide, ad
Gratianum, i, 1]) "dominion denotes power." But man has no power over
external things, since he can work no change in their nature.
Therefore the possession of external things is not natural to man.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 8:8): "Thou hast subjected all
things under his feet."

_I answer that,_ External things can be considered in two ways.
First, as regards their nature, and this is not subject to the power
of man, but only to the power of God Whose mere will all things obey.
Secondly, as regards their use, and in this way, man has a natural
dominion over external things, because, by his reason and will, he is
able to use them for his own profit, as they were made on his
account: for the imperfect is always for the sake of the perfect, as
stated above (Q. 64, A. 1). It is by this argument that the
Philosopher proves (Polit. i, 3) that the possession of external
things is natural to man. Moreover, this natural dominion of man over
other creatures, which is competent to man in respect of his reason
wherein God's image resides, is shown forth in man's creation (Gen.
1:26) by the words: "Let us make man to our image and likeness: and
let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea," etc.

Reply Obj. 1: God has sovereign dominion over all things: and
He, according to His providence, directed certain things to the
sustenance of man's body. For this reason man has a natural dominion
over things, as regards the power to make use of them.

Reply Obj. 2: The rich man is reproved for deeming external
things to belong to him principally, as though he had not received
them from another, namely from God.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the dominion over
external things as regards their nature. Such a dominion belongs to
God alone, as stated above.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 2]

Whether It Is Lawful for a Man to Possess a Thing As His Own?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for a man to possess a thing as
his own. For whatever is contrary to the natural law is unlawful. Now
according to the natural law all things are common property: and the
possession of property is contrary to this community of goods.
Therefore it is unlawful for any man to appropriate any external
thing to himself.

Obj. 2: Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man quoted
above (A. 1, Obj. 2), says: "The rich who deem as their own property
the common goods they have seized upon, are like to those who by
going beforehand to the play prevent others from coming, and
appropriate to themselves what is intended for common use." Now it
would be unlawful to prevent others from obtaining possession of
common goods. Therefore it is unlawful to appropriate to oneself what
belongs to the community.

Obj. 3: Further, Ambrose says [*Serm. lxiv, de temp.], and his words
are quoted in the Decretals [*Dist. xlvii., Can. Sicut hi.]: "Let no
man call his own that which is common property": and by "common" he
means external things, as is clear from the context. Therefore it
seems unlawful for a man to appropriate an external thing to himself.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Haeres., haer. 40): "The
'Apostolici' are those who with extreme arrogance have given
themselves that name, because they do not admit into their communion
persons who are married or possess anything of their own, such as
both monks and clerics who in considerable number are to be found in
the Catholic Church." Now the reason why these people are heretics
was because severing themselves from the Church, they think that
those who enjoy the use of the above things, which they themselves
lack, have no hope of salvation. Therefore it is erroneous to
maintain that it is unlawful for a man to possess property.

_I answer that,_ Two things are competent to man in respect of
exterior things. One is the power to procure and dispense them, and
in this regard it is lawful for man to possess property. Moreover
this is necessary to human life for three reasons. First because
every man is more careful to procure what is for himself alone than
that which is common to many or to all: since each one would shirk
the labor and leave to another that which concerns the community, as
happens where there is a great number of servants. Secondly, because
human affairs are conducted in more orderly fashion if each man is
charged with taking care of some particular thing himself, whereas
there would be confusion if everyone had to look after any one thing
indeterminately. Thirdly, because a more peaceful state is ensured to
man if each one is contented with his own. Hence it is to be observed
that quarrels arise more frequently where there is no division of the
things possessed.

The second thing that is competent to man with regard to external
things is their use. In this respect man ought to possess external
things, not as his own, but as common, so that, to wit, he is ready
to communicate them to others in their need. Hence the Apostle says
(1 Tim. 6:17, 18): "Charge the rich of this world . . . to give
easily, to communicate to others," etc.

Reply Obj. 1: Community of goods is ascribed to the natural law, not
that the natural law dictates that all things should be possessed in
common and that nothing should be possessed as one's own: but because
the division of possessions is not according to the natural law, but
rather arose from human agreement which belongs to positive law, as
stated above (Q. 57, AA. 2, 3). Hence the ownership of possessions is
not contrary to the natural law, but an addition thereto devised by
human reason.

Reply Obj. 2: A man would not act unlawfully if by going beforehand
to the play he prepared the way for others: but he acts unlawfully if
by so doing he hinders others from going. In like manner a rich man
does not act unlawfully if he anticipates someone in taking
possession of something which at first was common property, and gives
others a share: but he sins if he excludes others indiscriminately
from using it. Hence Basil says (Hom. in Luc. xii, 18): "Why are you
rich while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the merit
of a good stewardship, and he the reward of patience?"

Reply Obj. 3: When Ambrose says: "Let no man call his own that which
is common," he is speaking of ownership as regards use, wherefore he
adds: "He who spends too much is a robber."
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 3]

Whether the Essence of Theft Consists in Taking Another's Thing
Secretly?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to theft to take
another's thing secretly. For that which diminishes a sin, does not,
apparently, belong to the essence of a sin. Now to sin secretly tends
to diminish a sin, just as, on the contrary, it is written as
indicating an aggravating circumstance of the sin of some (Isa. 3:9):
"They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not
hid it." Therefore it is not essential to theft that it should
consist in taking another's thing secretly.

Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says [*Serm. lxiv, de temp., A. 2, Obj. 3,
Can. Sicut hi.]: and his words are embodied in the Decretals [*Dist.
xlvii]: "It is no less a crime to take from him that has, than to
refuse to succor the needy when you can and are well off." Therefore
just as theft consists in taking another's thing, so does it consist
in keeping it back.

Obj. 3: Further, a man may take by stealth from another, even that
which is his own, for instance a thing that he has deposited with
another, or that has been taken away from him unjustly. Therefore it
is not essential to theft that it should consist in taking another's
thing secretly.

_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x): "_Fur_ (thief) is derived
from _furvus_ and so from _fuscus_ (dark), because he takes advantage
of the night."

_I answer that,_ Three things combine together to constitute theft.
The first belongs to theft as being contrary to justice, which gives
to each one that which is his, so that it belongs to theft to take
possession of what is another's. The second thing belongs to theft as
distinct from those sins which are committed against the person, such
as murder and adultery, and in this respect it belongs to theft to be
about a thing possessed: for if a man takes what is another's not as
a possession but as a part (for instance, if he amputates a limb), or
as a person connected with him (for instance, if he carry off his
daughter or his wife), it is not strictly speaking a case of theft.
The third difference is that which completes the nature of theft, and
consists in a thing being taken secretly: and in this respect it
belongs properly to theft that it consists in "taking another's thing
secretly."

Reply Obj. 1: Secrecy is sometimes a cause of sin, as when a man
employs secrecy in order to commit a sin, for instance in fraud and
guile. In this way it does not diminish sin, but constitutes a
species of sin: and thus it is in theft. In another way secrecy is
merely a circumstance of sin, and thus it diminishes sin, both
because it is a sign of shame, and because it removes scandal.

Reply Obj. 2: To keep back what is due to another, inflicts the same
kind of injury as taking a thing unjustly: wherefore an unjust
detention is included in an unjust taking.

Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents that which belongs to one person
simply, from belonging to another in some respect: thus a deposit
belongs simply to the depositor, but with regard to its custody it is
the depositary's, and the thing stolen is the thief's, not simply,
but as regards its custody.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 4]

Whether Theft and Robbery Are Sins of Different Species?

Objection 1: It would seem that theft and robbery are not sins of
different species. For theft and robbery differ as "secret" and
"manifest": because theft is taking something secretly, while robbery
is to take something violently and openly. Now in the other kinds of
sins, the secret and the manifest do not differ specifically.
Therefore theft and robbery are not different species of sin.

Obj. 2: Further, moral actions take their species from the end, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 6). Now theft and robbery
are directed to the same end, viz. the possession of another's
property. Therefore they do not differ specifically.

Obj. 3: Further, just as a thing is taken by force for the sake of
possession, so is a woman taken by force for pleasure: wherefore
Isidore says (Etym. x) that "he who commits a rape is called a
corrupter, and the victim of the rape is said to be corrupted." Now
it is a case of rape whether the woman be carried off publicly or
secretly. Therefore the thing appropriated is said to be taken by
force, whether it be done secretly or publicly. Therefore theft and
robbery do not differ.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2) distinguishes theft
from robbery, and states that theft is done in secret, but that
robbery is done openly.

_I answer that,_ Theft and robbery are vices contrary to justice, in
as much as one man does another an injustice. Now "no man suffers an
injustice willingly," as stated in _Ethic._ v, 9. Wherefore theft and
robbery derive their sinful nature, through the taking being
involuntary on the part of the person from whom something is taken.
Now the involuntary is twofold, namely, through violence and through
ignorance, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 1. Therefore the sinful aspect
of robbery differs from that of theft: and consequently they differ
specifically.

Reply Obj. 1: In the other kinds of sin the sinful nature is not
derived from something involuntary, as in the sins opposed to
justice: and so where there is a different kind of involuntary, there
is a different species of sin.

Reply Obj. 2: The remote end of robbery and theft is the same. But
this is not enough for identity of species, because there is a
difference of proximate ends, since the robber wishes to take a thing
by his own power, but the thief, by cunning.

Reply Obj. 3: The robbery of a woman cannot be secret on the part of
the woman who is taken: wherefore even if it be secret as regards the
others from whom she is taken, the nature of robbery remains on the
part of the woman to whom violence is done.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 5]

Whether Theft Is Always a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that theft is not always a sin. For no sin
is commanded by God, since it is written (Ecclus. 15:21): "He hath
commanded no man to do wickedly." Yet we find that God commanded
theft, for it is written (Ex. 12:35, 36): "And the children of Israel
did as the Lord had commanded Moses [Vulg.: 'as Moses had
commanded']. . . and they stripped the Egyptians." Therefore theft is
not always a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, if a man finds a thing that is not his and takes it,
he seems to commit a theft, for he takes another's property. Yet this
seems lawful according to natural equity, as the jurists hold. [*See
loc. cit. in Reply.] Therefore it seems that theft is not always a
sin.

Obj. 3: Further, he that takes what is his own does not seem to sin,
because he does not act against justice, since he does not destroy
its equality. Yet a man commits a theft even if he secretly take his
own property that is detained by or in the safe-keeping of another.
Therefore it seems that theft is not always a sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 20:15): "Thou shalt not steal."

_I answer that,_ If anyone consider what is meant by theft, he will
find that it is sinful on two counts. First, because of its
opposition to justice, which gives to each one what is his, so that
for this reason theft is contrary to justice, through being a taking
of what belongs to another. Secondly, because of the guile or fraud
committed by the thief, by laying hands on another's property
secretly and cunningly. Wherefore it is evident that every theft is a
sin.

Reply Obj. 1: It is no theft for a man to take another's property
either secretly or openly by order of a judge who has commanded him
to do so, because it becomes his due by the very fact that it is
adjudicated to him by the sentence of the court. Hence still less was
it a theft for the Israelites to take away the spoils of the
Egyptians at the command of the Lord, Who ordered this to be done on
account of the ill-treatment accorded to them by the Egyptians
without any cause: wherefore it is written significantly (Wis.
10:19): "The just took the spoils of the wicked."

Reply Obj. 2: With regard to treasure-trove a distinction must be
made. For some there are that were never in anyone's possession, for
instance precious stones and jewels, found on the seashore, and such
the finder is allowed to keep [*Dig. I, viii, De divis. rerum: Inst.
II, i, De rerum divis.]. The same applies to treasure hidden
underground long since and belonging to no man, except that according
to civil law the finder is bound to give half to the owner of the
land, if the treasure trove be in the land of another person [*Inst.
II, i, 39: Cod. X, xv, De Thesauris]. Hence in the parable of the
Gospel (Matt. 13:44) it is said of the finder of the treasure hidden
in a field that he bought the field, as though he purposed thus to
acquire the right of possessing the whole treasure. On the other Land
the treasure-trove may be nearly in someone's possession: and then if
anyone take it with the intention, not of keeping it but of returning
it to the owner who does not look upon such things as unappropriated,
he is not guilty of theft. In like manner if the thing found appears
to be unappropriated, and if the finder believes it to be so,
although he keep it, he does not commit a theft [*Inst. II, i, 47].
In any other case the sin of theft is committed [*Dig. XLI, i, De
acquirend. rerum dominio, 9: Inst. II, i, 48]: wherefore Augustine
says in a homily (Serm. clxxviii; De Verb. Apost.): "If thou hast
found a thing and not returned it, thou hast stolen it" (Dig. xiv, 5,
can. Si quid invenisti).

Reply Obj. 3: He who by stealth takes his own property which is
deposited with another man burdens the depositary, who is bound
either to restitution, or to prove himself innocent. Hence he is
clearly guilty of sin, and is bound to ease the depositary of his
burden. On the other hand he who, by stealth, takes his own property,
if this be unjustly detained by another, he sins indeed; yet not
because he burdens the retainer, and so he is not bound to
restitution or compensation: but he sins against general justice by
disregarding the order of justice and usurping judgment concerning
his own property. Hence he must make satisfaction to God and endeavor
to allay whatever scandal he may have given his neighbor by acting
this way.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 6]

Whether Theft Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that theft is not a mortal sin. For it is
written (Prov. 6:30): "The fault is not so great when a man hath
stolen." But every mortal sin is a great fault. Therefore theft is
not a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, mortal sin deserves to be punished with death. But
in the Law theft is punished not by death but by indemnity, according
to Ex. 22:1, "If any man steal an ox or a sheep . . . he shall
restore have oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep."
Therefore theft is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, theft can be committed in small even as in great
things. But it seems unreasonable for a man to be punished with
eternal death for the theft of a small thing such as a needle or a
quill. Therefore theft is not a mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ No man is condemned by the Divine judgment save
for a mortal sin. Yet a man is condemned for theft, according to
Zech. 5:3, "This is the curse that goeth forth over the face of the
earth; for every thief shall be judged as is there written."
Therefore theft is a mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 59, A. 4; I-II, Q. 72, A. 5), a
mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity as the spiritual life
of the soul. Now charity consists principally in the love of God, and
secondarily in the love of our neighbor, which is shown in our
wishing and doing him well. But theft is a means of doing harm to our
neighbor in his belongings; and if men were to rob one another
habitually, human society would be undone. Therefore theft, as being
opposed to charity, is a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 1: The statement that theft is not a great fault is in
view of two cases. First, when a person is led to thieve through
necessity. This necessity diminishes or entirely removes sin, as we
shall show further on (A. 7). Hence the text continues: "For he
stealeth to fill his hungry soul." Secondly, theft is stated not to
be a great fault in comparison with the guilt of adultery, which is
punished with death. Hence the text goes on to say of the thief that
"if he be taken, he shall restore sevenfold . . . but he that is an
adulterer . . . shall destroy his own soul."

Reply Obj. 2: The punishments of this life are medicinal rather than
retributive. For retribution is reserved to the Divine judgment which
is pronounced against sinners "according to truth" (Rom. 2:2).
Wherefore, according to the judgment of the present life the death
punishment is inflicted, not for every mortal sin, but only for such
as inflict an irreparable harm, or again for such as contain some
horrible deformity. Hence according to the present judgment the pain
of death is not inflicted for theft which does not inflict an
irreparable harm, except when it is aggravated by some grave
circumstance, as in the case of sacrilege which is the theft of a
sacred thing, of peculation, which is theft of common property, as
Augustine states (Tract. 1, Super Joan.), and of kidnaping which is
stealing a man, for which the pain of death is inflicted (Ex. 21:16).

Reply Obj. 3: Reason accounts as nothing that which is little: so
that a man does not consider himself injured in very little matters:
and the person who takes such things can presume that this is not
against the will of the owner. And if a person take such like very
little things, he may be proportionately excused from mortal sin. Yet
if his intention is to rob and injure his neighbor, there may be a
mortal sin even in these very little things, even as there may be
through consent in a mere thought.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 7]

Whether It Is Lawful to Steal Through Stress of Need?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to steal through stress of need.
For penance is not imposed except on one who has sinned. Now it is
stated (Extra, De furtis, Cap. Si quis): "If anyone, through stress
of hunger or nakedness, steal food, clothing or beast, he shall do
penance for three weeks." Therefore it is not lawful to steal through
stress of need.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "there are
some actions whose very name implies wickedness," and among these he
reckons theft. Now that which is wicked in itself may not be done for
a good end. Therefore a man cannot lawfully steal in order to remedy
a need.

Obj. 3: Further, a man should love his neighbor as himself. Now,
according to Augustine (Contra Mendac. vii), it is unlawful to steal
in order to succor one's neighbor by giving him an alms. Therefore
neither is it lawful to steal in order to remedy one's own needs.

_On the contrary,_ In cases of need all things are common property,
so that there would seem to be no sin in taking another's property,
for need has made it common.

_I answer that,_ Things which are of human right cannot derogate from
natural right or Divine right. Now according to the natural order
established by Divine Providence, inferior things are ordained for
the purpose of succoring man's needs by their means. Wherefore the
division and appropriation of things which are based on human law, do
not preclude the fact that man's needs have to be remedied by means
of these very things. Hence whatever certain people have in
superabundance is due, by natural law, to the purpose of succoring
the poor. For this reason Ambrose [*Loc. cit., A. 2, Obj. 3] says,
and his words are embodied in the Decretals (Dist. xlvii, can. Sicut
ii): "It is the hungry man's bread that you withhold, the naked man's
cloak that you store away, the money that you bury in the earth is
the price of the poor man's ransom and freedom."

Since, however, there are many who are in need, while it is
impossible for all to be succored by means of the same thing, each
one is entrusted with the stewardship of his own things, so that out
of them he may come to the aid of those who are in need.
Nevertheless, if the need be so manifest and urgent, that it is
evident that the present need must be remedied by whatever means be
at hand (for instance when a person is in some imminent danger, and
there is no other possible remedy), then it is lawful for a man to
succor his own need by means of another's property, by taking it
either openly or secretly: nor is this properly speaking theft or
robbery.

Reply Obj. 1: This decretal considers cases where there is no urgent
need.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not theft, properly speaking, to take secretly
and use another's property in a case of extreme need: because that
which he takes for the support of his life becomes his own property
by reason of that need.

Reply Obj. 3: In a case of a like need a man may also take secretly
another's property in order to succor his neighbor in need.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 8]

Whether Robbery May Be Committed Without Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that robbery may be committed without sin.
For spoils are taken by violence, and this seems to belong to the
essence of robbery, according to what has been said (A. 4). Now it is
lawful to take spoils from the enemy; for Ambrose says (De Patriarch.
4 [*De Abraham i, 3]): "When the conqueror has taken possession of
the spoils, military discipline demands that all should be reserved
for the sovereign," in order, to wit, that he may distribute them.
Therefore in certain cases robbery is lawful.

Obj. 2: Further, it is lawful to take from a man what is not his. Now
the things which unbelievers have are not theirs, for Augustine says
(Ep. ad Vincent. Donat. xciii.): "You falsely call things your own,
for you do not possess them justly, and according to the laws of
earthly kings you are commanded to forfeit them." Therefore it seems
that one may lawfully rob unbelievers.

Obj. 3: Further, earthly princes violently extort many things from
their subjects: and this seems to savor of robbery. Now it would seem
a grievous matter to say that they sin in acting thus, for in that
case nearly every prince would be damned. Therefore in some cases
robbery is lawful.

_On the contrary,_ Whatever is taken lawfully may be offered to God
in sacrifice and oblation. Now this cannot be done with the proceeds
of robbery, according to Isa. 61:8, "I am the Lord that love
judgment, and hate robbery in a holocaust." Therefore it is not
lawful to take anything by robbery.

_I answer that,_ Robbery implies a certain violence and coercion
employed in taking unjustly from a man that which is his. Now in
human society no man can exercise coercion except through public
authority: and, consequently, if a private individual not having
public authority takes another's property by violence, he acts
unlawfully and commits a robbery, as burglars do. As regards princes,
the public power is entrusted to them that they may be the guardians
of justice: hence it is unlawful for them to use violence or
coercion, save within the bounds of justice--either by fighting
against the enemy, or against the citizens, by punishing evil-doers:
and whatever is taken by violence of this kind is not the spoils of
robbery, since it is not contrary to justice. On the other hand to
take other people's property violently and against justice, in the
exercise of public authority, is to act unlawfully and to be guilty
of robbery; and whoever does so is bound to restitution.

Reply Obj. 1: A distinction must be made in the matter of spoils. For
if they who take spoils from the enemy, are waging a just war, such
things as they seize in the war become their own property. This is no
robbery, so that they are not bound to restitution. Nevertheless even
they who are engaged in a just war may sin in taking spoils through
cupidity arising from an evil intention, if, to wit, they fight
chiefly not for justice but for spoil. For Augustine says (De Verb.
Dom. xix; Serm. lxxxii) that "it is a sin to fight for booty." If,
however, those who take the spoil, are waging an unjust war, they are
guilty of robbery, and are bound to restitution.

Reply Obj. 2: Unbelievers possess their goods unjustly in so far as
they are ordered by the laws of earthly princes to forfeit those
goods. Hence these may be taken violently from them, not by private
but by public authority.

Reply Obj. 3: It is no robbery if princes exact from their subjects
that which is due to them for the safe-guarding of the common good,
even if they use violence in so doing: but if they extort something
unduly by means of violence, it is robbery even as burglary is. Hence
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 4): "If justice be disregarded, what
is a king but a mighty robber? since what is a robber but a little
king?" And it is written (Ezech. 22:27): "Her princes in the midst of
her, are like wolves ravening the prey." Wherefore they are bound to
restitution, just as robbers are, and by so much do they sin more
grievously than robbers, as their actions are fraught with greater
and more universal danger to public justice whose wardens they are.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 66, Art. 9]

Whether Theft Is a More Grievous Sin Than Robbery?

Objection 1: It would seem that theft is a more grievous sin than
robbery. For theft adds fraud and guile to the taking of another's
property: and these things are not found in robbery. Now fraud and
guile are sinful in themselves, as stated above (Q. 55, AA. 4, 5).
Therefore theft is a more grievous sin than robbery.

Obj. 2: Further, shame is fear about a wicked deed, as stated in
_Ethic._ iv, 9. Now men are more ashamed of theft than of robbery.
Therefore theft is more wicked than robbery.

Obj. 3: Further, the more persons a sin injures the more grievous it
would seem to be. Now the great and the lowly may be injured by
theft: whereas only the weak can be injured by robbery, since it is
possible to use violence towards them. Therefore the sin of theft
seems to be more grievous than the sin of robbery.

_On the contrary,_ According to the laws robbery is more severely
punished than theft.

_I answer that,_ Robbery and theft are sinful, as stated above (AA.
4, 6), on account of the involuntariness on the part of the person
from whom something is taken: yet so that in theft the
involuntariness is due to ignorance, whereas in robbery it is due to
violence. Now a thing is more involuntary through violence than
through ignorance, because violence is more directly opposed to the
will than ignorance. Therefore robbery is a more grievous sin than
theft. There is also another reason, since robbery not only inflicts
a loss on a person in his things, but also conduces to the ignominy
and injury of his person, and this is of graver import than fraud or
guile which belong to theft. Hence the Reply to the First Objection
is evident.

Reply Obj. 2: Men who adhere to sensible things think more of
external strength which is evidenced in robbery, than of internal
virtue which is forfeit through sin: wherefore they are less ashamed
of robbery than of theft.

Reply Obj. 3: Although more persons may be injured by theft than by
robbery, yet more grievous injuries may be inflicted by robbery than
by theft: for which reason also robbery is more odious.
_______________________

QUESTION 67

OF THE INJUSTICE OF A JUDGE, IN JUDGING
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider those vices opposed to commutative justice,
that consist in words injurious to our neighbors. We shall consider
(1) those which are connected with judicial proceedings, and
(2) injurious words uttered extra-judicially.

Under the first head five points occur for our consideration: (1) The
injustice of a judge in judging; (2) The injustice of the prosecutor
in accusing; (3) The injustice of the defendant in defending himself;
(4) The injustice of the witnesses in giving evidence; (5) The
injustice of the advocate in defending.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a man can justly judge one who is not his subject?

(2) Whether it is lawful for a judge, on account of the evidence, to
deliver judgment in opposition to the truth which is known to him?

(3) Whether a judge can justly sentence a man who is not accused?

(4) Whether he can justly remit the punishment?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 67, Art. 1]

Whether a Man Can Justly Judge One Who Is Not Subject to His
Jurisdiction?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man can justly judge one who is not
subject to his jurisdiction. For it is stated (Dan. 13) that Daniel
sentenced the ancients who were convicted of bearing false witness.
But these ancients were not subject to Daniel; indeed they were
judges of the people. Therefore a man may lawfully judge one that is
not subject to his jurisdiction.

Obj. 2: Further, Christ was no man's subject, indeed He was "King of
kings and Lord of lords" (Apoc. 19:16). Yet He submitted to the
judgment of a man. Therefore it seems that a man may lawfully judge
one that is not subject to his jurisdiction.

Obj. 3: Further, according to the law [*Cap. Licet ratione, de Foro
Comp.] a man is tried in this or that court according to his kind of
offense. Now sometimes the defendant is not the subject of the man
whose business it is to judge in that particular place, for instance
when the defendant belongs to another diocese or is exempt. Therefore
it seems that a man may judge one that is not his subject.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory [*Regist. xi, epist. 64] in commenting on
Deut. 23:25, "If thou go into thy friend's corn," etc. says: "Thou
mayest not put the sickle of judgment to the corn that is entrusted
to another."

_I answer that,_ A judge's sentence is like a particular law
regarding some particular fact. Wherefore just as a general law
should have coercive power, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 9),
so too the sentence of a judge should have coercive power, whereby
either party is compelled to comply with the judge's sentence; else
the judgment would be of no effect. Now coercive power is not
exercised in human affairs, save by those who hold public authority:
and those who have this authority are accounted the superiors of
those over whom they preside whether by ordinary or by delegated
authority. Hence it is evident that no man can judge others than his
subjects and this in virtue either of delegated or of ordinary
authority.

Reply Obj. 1: In judging those ancients Daniel exercised an
authority delegated to him by Divine instinct. This is indicated where
it is said (Dan. 13:45) that "the Lord raised up the . . . spirit of a
young boy."

Reply Obj. 2: In human affairs a man may submit of his own accord to
the judgment of others although these be not his superiors, an
example of which is when parties agree to a settlement by
arbitrators. Wherefore it is necessary that the arbitrator should be
upheld by a penalty, since the arbitrators through not exercising
authority in the case, have not of themselves full power of coercion.
Accordingly in this way did Christ of his own accord submit to human
judgment: and thus too did Pope Leo [*Leo IV] submit to the judgment
of the emperor [*Can. Nos si incompetenter, caus. ii, qu. 7].

Reply Obj. 3: The bishop of the defendant's diocese becomes
the latter's superior as regards the fault committed, even though he
be exempt: unless perchance the defendant offend in a matter exempt
from the bishop's authority, for instance in administering the
property of an exempt monastery. But if an exempt person commits a
theft, or a murder or the like, he may be justly condemned by the
ordinary.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 67, Art. 2]

Whether It Is Lawful for a Judge to Pronounce Judgment Against the
Truth That He Knows, on Account of Evidence to the Contrary?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for a judge to pronounce judgment
against the truth that he knows, on account of evidence to the
contrary. For it is written (Deut. 17:9): "Thou shalt come to the
priests of the Levitical race, and to the judge that shall be at that
time; and thou shalt ask of them, and they shall show thee the truth
of the judgment." Now sometimes certain things are alleged against
the truth, as when something is proved by means of false witnesses.
Therefore it is unlawful for a judge to pronounce judgment according
to what is alleged and proved in opposition to the truth which he
knows.

Obj. 2: Further, in pronouncing judgment a man should conform to the
Divine judgment, since "it is the judgment of God" (Deut. 1:17). Now
"the judgment of God is according to the truth" (Rom. 2:2), and it
was foretold of Christ (Isa. 11:3, 4): "He shall not judge according
to the sight of the eyes, nor reprove according to the hearing of the
ears. But He shall judge the poor with justice, and shall reprove
with equity for the meek of the earth." Therefore the judge ought not
to pronounce judgment according to the evidence before him if it be
contrary to what he knows himself.

Obj. 3: Further, the reason why evidence is required in a court of
law, is that the judge may have a faithful record of the truth of the
matter, wherefore in matters of common knowledge there is no need of
judicial procedure, according to 1 Tim. 5:24, "Some men's sins are
manifest, going before to judgment." Consequently, if the judge by
his personal knowledge is aware of the truth, he should pay no heed
to the evidence, but should pronounce sentence according to the truth
which he knows.

Obj. 4: Further, the word "conscience" denotes application of
knowledge to a matter of action as stated in the First Part (Q. 79,
A. 13). Now it is a sin to act contrary to one's knowledge. Therefore
a judge sins if he pronounces sentence according to the evidence but
against his conscience of the truth.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Ambrose, Super Ps. 118, serm. 20] says
in his commentary on the Psalter: "A good judge does nothing
according to his private opinion but pronounces sentence according to
the law and the right." Now this is to pronounce judgment according
to what is alleged and proved in court. Therefore a judge ought to
pronounce judgment in accordance with these things, and not according
to his private opinion.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1; Q. 60, AA. 2, 6) it is the
duty of a judge to pronounce judgment in as much as he exercises
public authority, wherefore his judgment should be based on
information acquired by him, not from his knowledge as a private
individual, but from what he knows as a public person. Now the latter
knowledge comes to him both in general and in particular--in general
through the public laws, whether Divine or human, and he should admit
no evidence that conflicts therewith--in some particular matter,
through documents and witnesses, and other legal means of
information, which in pronouncing his sentence, he ought to follow
rather than the information he has acquired as a private individual.
And yet this same information may be of use to him, so that he can
more rigorously sift the evidence brought forward, and discover its
weak points. If, however, he is unable to reject that evidence
juridically, he must, as stated above, follow it in pronouncing
sentence.

Reply Obj. 1: The reason why, in the passage quoted, it is stated
that the judges should first of all be asked their reasons, is to
make it clear that the judges ought to judge the truth in accordance
with the evidence.

Reply Obj. 2: To judge belongs to God in virtue of His own power:
wherefore His judgment is based on the truth which He Himself knows,
and not on knowledge imparted by others: the same is to be said of
Christ, Who is true God and true man: whereas other judges do not
judge in virtue of their own power, so that there is no comparison.

Reply Obj. 3: The Apostle refers to the case where something is well
known not to the judge alone, but both to him and to others, so that
the guilty party can by no means deny his guilt (as in the case of
notorious criminals), and is convicted at once from the evidence of
the fact. If, on the other hand, it be well known to the judge, but
not to others, or to others, but not to the judge, then it is
necessary for the judge to sift the evidence.

Reply Obj. 4: In matters touching his own person, a man must form his
conscience from his own knowledge, but in matters concerning the
public authority, he must form his conscience in accordance with the
knowledge attainable in the public judicial procedure.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 67, Art. 3]

Whether a Judge May Condemn a Man Who Is Not Accused?

Objection 1: It would seem that a judge may pass sentence on a man
who is not accused. For human justice is derived from Divine justice.
Now God judges the sinner even though there be no accuser. Therefore
it seems that a man may pass sentence of condemnation on a man even
though there be no accuser.

Obj. 2: Further, an accuser is required in judicial procedure in
order that he may relate the crime to the judge. Now sometimes the
crime may come to the judge's knowledge otherwise than by accusation;
for instance, by denunciation, or by evil report, or through the
judge himself being an eye-witness. Therefore a judge may condemn a
man without there being an accuser.

Obj. 3: Further, the deeds of holy persons are related in Holy Writ,
as models of human conduct. Now Daniel was at the same time the
accuser and the judge of the wicked ancients (Dan. 13). Therefore it
is not contrary to justice for a man to condemn anyone as judge while
being at the same time his accuser.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose in his commentary on 1 Cor. 5:2,
expounding the Apostle's sentence on the fornicator, says that "a
judge should not condemn without an accuser, since our Lord did not
banish Judas, who was a thief, yet was not accused."

_I answer that,_ A judge is an interpreter of justice. Wherefore, as
the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have recourse to a judge as
to one who is the personification of justice." Now, as stated above
(Q. 58, A. 2), justice is not between a man and himself but between
one man and another. Hence a judge must needs judge between two
parties, which is the case when one is the prosecutor, and the other
the defendant. Therefore in criminal cases the judge cannot sentence
a man unless the latter has an accuser, according to Acts 25:16: "It
is not the custom of the Romans to condemn any man, before that he
who is accused have his accusers present, and have liberty to make
his answer, to clear himself of the crimes" of which he is accused.

Reply Obj. 1: God, in judging man, takes the sinner's conscience as
his accuser, according to Rom. 2:15, "Their thoughts between
themselves accusing, or also defending one another"; or again, He
takes the evidence of the fact as regards the deed itself, according
to Gen. 4:10, "The voice of thy brother's blood crieth to Me from the
earth."

Reply Obj. 2: Public disgrace takes the place of an accuser. Hence a
gloss on Gen. 4:10, "The voice of thy brother's blood," etc. says:
"There is no need of an accuser when the crime committed is
notorious." In a case of denunciation, as stated above (Q. 33, A. 7),
the amendment, not the punishment, of the sinner is intended:
wherefore when a man is denounced for a sin, nothing is done against
him, but for him, so that no accuser is required. The punishment that
is inflicted is on account of his rebellion against the Church, and
since this rebellion is manifest, it stands instead of an accuser.
The fact that the judge himself was an eye-witness, does not
authorize him to proceed to pass sentence, except according to the
order of judicial procedure.

Reply Obj. 3: God, in judging man, proceeds from His own knowledge of
the truth, whereas man does not, as stated above (A. 2). Hence a man
cannot be accuser, witness and judge at the same time, as God is.
Daniel was at once accuser and judge, because he was the executor of
the sentence of God, by whose instinct he was moved, as stated above
(A. 1, ad 1).
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 67, Art. 4]

Whether the Judge Can Lawfully Remit the Punishment?

Objection 1: It would seem that the judge can lawfully remit the
punishment. For it is written (James 2:13): "Judgment without mercy"
shall be done "to him that hath not done mercy." Now no man is
punished for not doing what he cannot do lawfully. Therefore any
judge can lawfully do mercy by remitting the punishment.

Obj. 2: Further, human judgment should imitate the Divine judgment.
Now God remits the punishment to sinners, because He desires not the
death of the sinner, according to Ezech. 18:23. Therefore a human
judge also may lawfully remit the punishment to one who repents.

Obj. 3: Further, it is lawful for anyone to do what is profitable to
some one and harmful to none. Now the remission of his punishment
profits the guilty man and harms nobody. Therefore the judge can
lawfully loose a guilty man from his punishment.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 13:8, 9) concerning anyone
who would persuade a man to serve strange gods: "Neither let thy eye
spare him to pity and conceal him, but thou shalt presently put him
to death": and of the murderer it is written (Deut. 19:12, 13): "He
shall die. Thou shalt not pity him."

_I answer that,_ As may be gathered from what has been said (AA. 2,
3), with regard to the question in point, two things may be observed
in connection with a judge. One is that he has to judge between
accuser and defendant, while the other is that he pronounces the
judicial sentence, in virtue of his power, not as a private
individual but as a public person. Accordingly on two counts a judge
is hindered from loosing a guilty person from his punishment. First
on the part of the accuser, whose right it sometimes is that the
guilty party should be punished--for instance on account of some
injury committed against the accuser--because it is not in the power
of a judge to remit such punishment, since every judge is bound to
give each man his right. Secondly, he finds a hindrance on the part
of the commonwealth, whose power he exercises, and to whose good it
belongs that evil-doers should be punished.

Nevertheless in this respect there is a difference between judges of
lower degree and the supreme judge, i.e. the sovereign, to whom the
entire public authority is entrusted. For the inferior judge has no
power to exempt a guilty man from punishment against the laws imposed
on him by his superior. Wherefore Augustine in commenting on John
19:11, "Thou shouldst not have any power against Me," says (Tract.
cxvi in Joan.): "The power which God gave Pilate was such that he was
under the power of Caesar, so that he was by no means free to acquit
the person accused." On the other hand the sovereign who has full
authority in the commonwealth, can lawfully remit the punishment to a
guilty person, provided the injured party consent to the remission,
and that this do not seem detrimental to the public good.

Reply Obj. 1: There is a place for the judge's mercy in matters that
are left to the judge's discretion, because in like matters a good
man is slow to punish as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10). But
in matters that are determined in accordance with Divine or human
laws, it is not left to him to show mercy.

Reply Obj. 2: God has supreme power of judging, and it concerns Him
whatever is done sinfully against anyone. Therefore He is free to
remit the punishment, especially since punishment is due to sin
chiefly because it is done against Him. He does not, however, remit
the punishment, except in so far as it becomes His goodness, which is
the source of all laws.

Reply Obj. 3: If the judge were to remit punishment inordinately, he
would inflict an injury on the community, for whose good it behooves
ill-deeds to be punished, in order that men may avoid sin. Hence the
text, after appointing the punishment of the seducer, adds (Deut.
13:11): "That all Israel hearing may fear, and may do no more
anything like this." He would also inflict harm on the injured
person; who is compensated by having his honor restored in the
punishment of the man who has injured him.
_______________________

QUESTION 68

OF MATTERS CONCERNING UNJUST ACCUSATION
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider matters pertaining to unjust accusation. Under
this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a man is bound to accuse?

(2) Whether the accusation should be made in writing?

(3) How is an accusation vitiated?

(4) How should those be punished who have accused a man wrongfully?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 68, Art. 1]

Whether a Man Is Bound to Accuse?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to accuse. For no
man is excused on account of sin from fulfilling a Divine precept,
since he would thus profit by his sin. Yet on account of sin some are
disqualified from accusing, such as those who are excommunicate or of
evil fame, or who are accused of grievous crimes and are not yet
proved to be innocent [*1 Tim. 1:5]. Therefore a man is not bound by
a Divine precept to accuse.

Obj. 2: Further, every duty depends on charity which is "the end of
the precept" [*Can. Definimus, caus. iv, qu. 1; caus. vi, qu. 1]:
wherefore it is written (Rom. 13:8): "Owe no man anything, but to
love one another." Now that which belongs to charity is a duty that
man owes to all both of high and of low degree, both superiors and
inferiors. Since therefore subjects should not accuse their
superiors, nor persons of lower degree, those of a higher degree, as
shown in several chapters (Decret. II, qu. vii), it seems that it is
no man's duty to accuse.

Obj. 3: Further, no man is bound to act against the fidelity which he
owes his friend; because he ought not to do to another what he would
not have others do to him. Now to accuse anyone is sometimes contrary
to the fidelity that one owes a friend; for it is written (Prov.
11:13): "He that walketh deceitfully, revealeth secrets; but he that
is faithful, concealeth the thing committed to him by his friend."
Therefore a man is not bound to accuse.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lev. 5:1): "If any one sin, and
hear the voice of one swearing, and is a witness either because he
himself hath seen, or is privy to it: if he do not utter it, he shall
bear his iniquity."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 33, AA. 6, 7; Q. 67, A. 3, ad
2), the difference between denunciation and accusation is that in
denunciation we aim at a brother's amendment, whereas in accusation
we intend the punishment of his crime. Now the punishments of this
life are sought, not for their own sake, because this is not the
final time of retribution, but in their character of medicine,
conducing either to the amendment of the sinner, or to the good of
the commonwealth whose calm is ensured by the punishment of
evil-doers. The former of these is intended in denunciation, as
stated, whereas the second regards properly accusation. Hence in the
case of a crime that conduces to the injury of the commonwealth, a
man is bound to accusation, provided he can offer sufficient proof,
since it is the accuser's duty to prove: as, for example, when
anyone's sin conduces to the bodily or spiritual corruption of the
community. If, however, the sin be not such as to affect the
community, or if he cannot offer sufficient proof, a man is not bound
to attempt to accuse, since no man is bound to do what he cannot duly
accomplish.

Reply Obj. 1: Nothing prevents a man being debarred by sin from doing
what men are under an obligation to do: for instance from meriting
eternal life, and from receiving the sacraments of the Church. Nor
does a man profit by this: indeed it is a most grievous fault to fail
to do what one is bound to do, since virtuous acts are perfections of
man.

Reply Obj. 2: Subjects are debarred from accusing their superiors,
"if it is not the affection of charity but their own wickedness that
leads them to defame and disparage the conduct of their superiors"
[*Append. Grat. ad can. Sunt nonnulli, caus. ii, qu. 7]--or again if
the subject who wishes to accuse his superior is himself guilty of
crime [*Decret. II, qu. vii, can. Praesumunt.]. Otherwise, provided
they be in other respects qualified to accuse, it is lawful for
subjects to accuse their superiors out of charity.

Reply Obj. 3: It is contrary to fidelity to make known secrets
to the injury of a person; but not if they be revealed for the good of
the community, which should always be preferred to a private good.
Hence it is unlawful to receive any secret in detriment to the common
good: and yet a thing is scarcely a secret when there are sufficient
witnesses to prove it.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 68, Art. 2]

Whether It Is Necessary for the Accusation to Be Made in Writing?

Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary for the accusation to be made
in writing. For writing was devised as an aid to the human memory of
the past. But an accusation is made in the present. Therefore the
accusation needs not to be made in writing.

Obj. 2: Further, it is laid down (Decret. II, qu. viii, can. Per
scripta) that "no man may accuse or be accused in his absence." Now
writing seems to be useful in the fact that it is a means of
notifying something to one who is absent, as Augustine declares (De
Trin. x, 1). Therefore the accusation need not be in writing: and all
the more that the canon declares that "no accusation in writing
should be accepted."

Obj. 3: Further, a man's crime is made known by denunciation, even as
by accusation. Now writing is unnecessary in denunciation. Therefore
it is seemingly unnecessary in accusation.

_On the contrary,_ It is laid down (Decret. II, qu. viii, can.
Accusatorum) that "the role of accuser must never be sanctioned
without the accusation be in writing."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 67, A. 3), when the process in a
criminal case goes by way of accusation, the accuser is in the
position of a party, so that the judge stands between the accuser and
the accused for the purpose of the trial of justice, wherein it
behooves one to proceed on certainties, as far as possible. Since
however verbal utterances are apt to escape one's memory, the judge
would be unable to know for certain what had been said and with what
qualifications, when he comes to pronounce sentence, unless it were
drawn up in writing. Hence it has with reason been established that
the accusation, as well as other parts of the judicial procedure,
should be put into writing.

Reply Obj. 1: Words are so many and so various that it is difficult
to remember each one. A proof of this is the fact that if a number of
people who have heard the same words be asked what was said, they
will not agree in repeating them, even after a short time. And since
a slight difference of words changes the sense, even though the
judge's sentence may have to be pronounced soon afterwards, the
certainty of judgment requires that the accusation be drawn up in
writing.

Reply Obj. 2: Writing is needed not only on account of the absence of
the person who has something to notify, or of the person to whom
something is notified, but also on account of the delay of time as
stated above (ad 1). Hence when the canon says, "Let no accusation be
accepted in writing" it refers to the sending of an accusation by one
who is absent: but it does not exclude the necessity of writing when
the accuser is present.

Reply Obj. 3: The denouncer does not bind himself to give proofs:
wherefore he is not punished if he is unable to prove. For this
reason writing is unnecessary in a denunciation: and it suffices that
the denunciation be made verbally to the Church, who will proceed, in
virtue of her office, to the correction of the brother.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 68, Art. 3]

Whether an Accusation Is Rendered Unjust by Calumny, Collusion or
Evasion?

Objection 1: It would seem that an accusation is not rendered unjust
by calumny, collusion or evasion. For according to Decret. II, qu.
iii [*Append. Grat. ad can. Si quem poenituerit.], "calumny consists
in falsely charging a person with a crime." Now sometimes one man
falsely accuses another of a crime through ignorance of fact which
excuses him. Therefore it seems that an accusation is not always
rendered unjust through being slanderous.

Obj. 2: Further, it is stated by the same authority that "collusion
consists in hiding the truth about a crime." But seemingly this is
not unlawful, because one is not bound to disclose every crime, as
stated above (A. 1; Q. 33, A. 7). Therefore it seems that an
accusation is not rendered unjust by collusion.

Obj. 3: Further, it is stated by the same authority that "evasion
consists in withdrawing altogether from an accusation." But this can
be done without injustice: for it is stated there also: "If a man
repent of having made a wicked accusation and inscription* in a
matter which he cannot prove, and come to an understanding with the
innocent party whom he has accused, let them acquit one another."
[*The accuser was bound by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the
writ of accusation. The effect of this endorsement or inscription was
that the accuser bound himself, if he failed to prove the accusation,
to suffer the same punishment as the accused would have to suffer if
proved guilty.] Therefore evasion does not render an accusation
unjust.

_On the contrary,_ It is stated by the same authority: "The rashness
of accusers shows itself in three ways. For they are guilty either of
calumny, or of collusion, or of evasion."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), accusation is ordered for
the common good which it aims at procuring by means of knowledge of
the crime. Now no man ought to injure a person unjustly, in order to
promote the common good. Wherefore a man may sin in two ways when
making an accusation: first through acting unjustly against the
accused, by charging him falsely with the commission of a crime, i.e.
by calumniating him; secondly, on the part of the commonwealth, whose
good is intended chiefly in an accusation, when anyone with wicked
intent hinders a sin being punished. This again happens in two ways:
first by having recourse to fraud in making the accusation. This
belongs to collusion (_prevaricatio_) for "he that is guilty of
collusion is like one who rides astraddle (_varicator_), because he
helps the other party, and betrays his own side" [*Append. Grat. ad
can. Si quem poenituerit.]. Secondly by withdrawing altogether from
the accusation. This is evasion (_tergiversatio_) for by desisting
from what he had begun he seems to turn his back (_tergum vertere_).

Reply Obj. 1: A man ought not to proceed to accuse except of what he
is quite certain about, wherein ignorance of fact has no place. Yet
he who falsely charges another with a crime is not a calumniator
unless he gives utterance to false accusations out of malice. For it
happens sometimes that a man through levity of mind proceeds to
accuse someone, because he believes too readily what he hears, and
this pertains to rashness; while, on the other hand sometimes a man
is led to make an accusation on account of an error for which he is
not to blame. All these things must be weighed according to the
judge's prudence, lest he should declare a man to have been guilty of
calumny, who through levity of mind or an error for which he is not
to be blamed has uttered a false accusation.

Reply Obj. 2: Not everyone who hides the truth about a crime is
guilty of collusion, but only he who deceitfully hides the matter
about which he makes the accusation, by collusion with the defendant,
dissembling his proofs, and admitting false excuses.

Reply Obj. 3: Evasion consists in withdrawing altogether from the
accusation, by renouncing the intention of accusing, not anyhow, but
inordinately. There are two ways, however, in which a man may rightly
desist from accusing without committing a sin--in one way, in the
very process of accusation, if it come to his knowledge that the
matter of his accusation is false, and then by mutual consent the
accuser and the defendant acquit one another--in another way, if the
accusation be quashed by the sovereign to whom belongs the care of
the common good, which it is intended to procure by the accusation.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 68, Art. 4]

Whether an Accuser Who Fails to Prove His Indictment Is Bound to the
Punishment of Retaliation?

Objection 1: It would seem that the accuser who fails to prove his
indictment is not bound to the punishment of retaliation. For
sometimes a man is led by a just error to make an accusation, in
which case the judge acquit the accuser, as stated in Decret. II, qu.
iii. [*Append. Grat., ad can. Si quem poenituerit.] Therefore the
accuser who fails to prove his indictment is not bound to the
punishment of retaliation.

Obj. 2: Further, if the punishment of retaliation ought to be
inflicted on one who has accused unjustly, this will be on account of
the injury he has done to someone--but not on account of any injury
done to the person of the accused, for in that case the sovereign
could not remit this punishment, nor on account of an injury to the
commonwealth, because then the accused could not acquit him.
Therefore the punishment of retaliation is not due to one who has
failed to prove his accusation.

Obj. 3: Further, the one same sin does not deserve a twofold
punishment, according to Nahum 1:9 [*Septuagint version]: "God shall
not judge the same thing a second time." But he who fails to prove
his accusation, incurs the punishment due to defamation [*Can.
Infames, caus. vi, qu. 1], which punishment even the Pope seemingly
cannot remit, according to a statement of Pope Gelasius [*Callist. I,
Epist. ad omn. Gall. episc.]: "Although we are able to save souls by
Penance, we are unable to remove the defamation." Therefore he is not
bound to suffer the punishment of retaliation.

_On the contrary,_ Pope Hadrian I says (Cap. lii): "He that fails to
prove his accusation, must himself suffer the punishment which his
accusation inferred."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), in a case, where the
procedure is by way of accusation, the accuser holds the position of
a party aiming at the punishment of the accused. Now the duty of the
judge is to establish the equality of justice between them: and the
equality of justice requires that a man should himself suffer
whatever harm he has intended to be inflicted on another, according
to Ex. 21:24, "Eye for eye, tooth for tooth." Consequently it is just
that he who by accusing a man has put him in danger of being punished
severely, should himself suffer a like punishment.

Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5) justice does not
always require counterpassion, because it matters considerably
whether a man injures another voluntarily or not. Voluntary injury
deserves punishment, involuntary deserves forgiveness. Hence when the
judge becomes aware that a man has made a false accusation, not with
a mind to do harm, but involuntarily through ignorance or a just
error, he does not impose the punishment of retaliation.

Reply Obj. 2: He who accuses wrongfully sins both against the person
of the accused and against the commonwealth; wherefore he is punished
on both counts. This is the meaning of what is written (Deut.
19:18-20): "And when after most diligent inquisition, they shall find
that the false witness hath told a lie against his brother: they
shall render to him as he meant to do to his brother," and this
refers to the injury done to the person: and afterwards, referring to
the injury done to the commonwealth, the text continues: "And thou
shalt take away the evil out of the midst of thee, that others
hearing may fear, and may not dare to do such things." Specially,
however, does he injure the person of the accused, if he accuse him
falsely. Wherefore the accused, if innocent, may condone the injury
done to himself, particularly if the accusation were made not
calumniously but out of levity of mind. But if the accuser desist
from accusing an innocent man, through collusion with the latter's
adversary, he inflicts an injury on the commonwealth: and this cannot
be condoned by the accused, although it can be remitted by the
sovereign, who has charge of the commonwealth.

Reply Obj. 3: The accuser deserves the punishment of retaliation in
compensation for the harm he attempts to inflict on his neighbor: but
the punishment of disgrace is due to him for his wickedness in
accusing another man calumniously. Sometimes the sovereign remits the
punishment, and not the disgrace, and sometimes he removes the
disgrace also: wherefore the Pope also can remove this disgrace. When
Pope Gelasius says: "We cannot remove the disgrace," he may mean
either the disgrace attaching to the deed (_infamia facti_), or that
sometimes it is not expedient to remove it, or again he may be
referring to the disgrace inflicted by the civil judge, as Gratian
states (Callist. I, Epist. ad omn. Gall. episc.).
_______________________

QUESTION 69

OF SINS COMMITTED AGAINST JUSTICE ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider those sins which are committed against justice
on the part of the defendant. Under this head there are four points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is a mortal sin to deny the truth which would lead to
one's condemnation?

(2) Whether it is lawful to defend oneself with calumnies?

(3) Whether it is lawful to escape condemnation by appealing?

(4) Whether it is lawful for one who has been condemned to defend
himself by violence if he be able to do so?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 69, Art. 1]

Whether One Can, Without a Mortal Sin, Deny the Truth Which Would
Lead to One's Condemnation?

Objection 1: It would seem one can, without a mortal sin, deny the
truth which would lead to one's condemnation. For Chrysostom says
(Hom. xxxi super Ep. ad Heb.): "I do not say that you should lay bare
your guilt publicly, nor accuse yourself before others." Now if the
accused were to confess the truth in court, he would lay bare his
guilt and be his own accuser. Therefore he is not bound to tell the
truth: and so he does not sin mortally if he tell a lie in court.

Obj. 2: Further, just as it is an officious lie when one tells a lie
in order to rescue another man from death, so is it an officious lie
when one tells a lie in order to free oneself from death, since one
is more bound towards oneself than towards another. Now an officious
lie is considered not a mortal but a venial sin. Therefore if the
accused denies the truth in court, in order to escape death, he does
not sin mortally.

Obj. 3: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as stated
above (Q. 24, A. 12). But that the accused lie by denying himself to
be guilty of the crime laid to his charge is not contrary to charity,
neither as regards the love we owe God, nor as to the love due to our
neighbor. Therefore such a lie is not a mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ Whatever is opposed to the glory of God is a
mortal sin, because we are bound by precept to "do all to the glory
of God" (1 Cor. 10:31). Now it is to the glory of God that the
accused confess that which is alleged against him, as appears from
the words of Josue to Achan, "My son, give glory to the Lord God of
Israel, and confess and tell me what thou hast done, hide it not"
(Joshua 7:19). Therefore it is a mortal sin to lie in order to cover
one's guilt.

_I answer that,_ Whoever acts against the due order of justice, sins
mortally, as stated above (Q. 59, A. 4). Now it belongs to the order
of justice that a man should obey his superior in those matters to
which the rights of his authority extend. Again, the judge, as stated
above (Q. 67, A. 1), is the superior in relation to the person whom
he judges. Therefore the accused is in duty bound to tell the judge
the truth which the latter exacts from him according to the form of
law. Hence if he refuse to tell the truth which he is under
obligation to tell, or if he mendaciously deny it, he sins mortally.
If, on the other hand, the judge asks of him that which he cannot ask
in accordance with the order of justice, the accused is not bound to
satisfy him, and he may lawfully escape by appealing or otherwise:
but it is not lawful for him to lie.

Reply Obj. 1: When a man is examined by the judge according to the
order of justice, he does not lay bare his own guilt, but his guilt
is unmasked by another, since the obligation of answering is imposed
on him by one whom he is bound to obey.

Reply Obj. 2: To lie, with injury to another person, in order to
rescue a man from death is not a purely officious lie, for it has an
admixture of the pernicious lie: and when a man lies in court in
order to exculpate himself, he does an injury to one whom he is bound
to obey, since he refuses him his due, namely an avowal of the truth.

Reply Obj. 3: He who lies in court by denying his guilt, acts both
against the love of God to whom judgment belongs, and against the
love of his neighbor, and this not only as regards the judge, to whom
he refuses his due, but also as regards his accuser, who is punished
if he fail to prove his accusation. Hence it is written (Ps. 140:4):
"Incline not my heart to evil words, to make excuses in sins": on
which words a gloss says: "Shameless men are wont by lying to deny
their guilt when they have been found out." And Gregory in expounding
Job 31:33, "If as a man I have hid my sin," says (Moral. xxii, 15):
"It is a common vice of mankind to sin in secret, by lying to hide
the sin that has been committed, and when convicted to aggravate the
sin by defending oneself."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 69, Art. 2]

Whether It Is Lawful for the Accused to Defend Himself with
Calumnies?

Objection 1: It would seem lawful for the accused to defend himself
with calumnies. Because, according to civil law (Cod. II, iv, De
transact. 18), when a man is on trial for his life it is lawful for
him to bribe his adversary. Now this is done chiefly by defending
oneself with calumnies. Therefore the accused who is on trial for his
life does not sin if he defend himself with calumnies.

Obj. 2: Further, an accuser who is guilty of collusion with the
accused, is punishable by law (Decret. II, qu. iii, can. Si quem
poenit.). Yet no punishment is imposed on the accused for collusion
with the accuser. Therefore it would seem lawful for the accused to
defend himself with calumnies.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 14:16): "A wise man feareth and
declineth from evil, the fool leapeth over and is confident." Now
what is done wisely is no sin. Therefore no matter how a man declines
from evil, he does not sin.

_On the contrary,_ In criminal cases an oath has to be taken against
calumnious allegations (Extra, De juramento calumniae, cap.
Inhaerentes): and this would not be the case if it were lawful to
defend oneself with calumnies. Therefore it is not lawful for the
accused to defend himself with calumnies.

_I answer that,_ It is one thing to withhold the truth, and another
to utter a falsehood. The former is lawful sometimes, for a man is
not bound to divulge all truth, but only such as the judge can and
must require of him according to the order of justice; as, for
instance, when the accused is already disgraced through the
commission of some crime, or certain indications of his guilt have
already been discovered, or again when his guilt is already more or
less proven. On the other hand it is never lawful to make a false
declaration.

As regards what he may do lawfully, a man can employ either lawful
means, and such as are adapted to the end in view, which belongs to
prudence; or he can use unlawful means, unsuitable to the proposed
end, and this belongs to craftiness, which is exercised by fraud and
guile, as shown above (Q. 55, AA. 3, seqq.). His conduct in the
former case is praiseworthy, in the latter sinful. Accordingly it is
lawful for the accused to defend himself by withholding the truth
that he is not bound to avow, by suitable means, for instance by not
answering such questions as he is not bound to answer. This is not to
defend himself with calumnies, but to escape prudently. But it is
unlawful for him, either to utter a falsehood, or to withhold a truth
that he is bound to avow, or to employ guile or fraud, because fraud
and guile have the force of a lie, and so to use them would be to
defend oneself with calumnies.

Reply Obj. 1: Human laws leave many things unpunished, which
according to the Divine judgment are sins, as, for example, simple
fornication; because human law does not exact perfect virtue from
man, for such virtue belongs to few and cannot be found in so great a
number of people as human law has to direct. That a man is sometimes
unwilling to commit a sin in order to escape from the death of the
body, the danger of which threatens the accused who is on trial for
his life, is an act of perfect virtue, since "death is the most
fearful of all temporal things" (Ethic. iii, 6). Wherefore if the
accused, who is on trial for his life, bribes his adversary, he sins
indeed by inducing him to do what is unlawful, yet the civil law does
not punish this sin, and in this sense it is said to be lawful.

Reply Obj. 2: If the accuser is guilty of collusion with the accused
and the latter is guilty, he incurs punishment, and so it is evident
that he sins. Wherefore, since it is a sin to induce a man to sin, or
to take part in a sin in any way--for the Apostle says (Rom. 1:32),
that "they . . . are worthy of death . . . that consent" to those who
sin--it is evident that the accused also sins if he is guilty of
collusion with his adversary. Nevertheless according to human laws no
punishment is inflicted on him, for the reason given above.

Reply Obj. 3: The wise man hides himself not by slandering others but
by exercising prudence.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 69, Art. 3]

Whether It Is Lawful for the Accused to Escape Judgment by Appealing?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for the accused to escape
judgment by appealing. The Apostle says (Rom. 13:1): "Let every soul
be subject to the higher powers." Now the accused by appealing
refuses to be subject to a higher power, viz. the judge. Therefore he
commits a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, ordinary authority is more binding than that which
we choose for ourselves. Now according to the Decretals (II, qu. vi,
cap. A judicibus) it is unlawful to appeal from the judges chosen by
common consent. Much less therefore is it lawful to appeal from
ordinary judges.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever is lawful once is always lawful. But it is
not lawful to appeal after the tenth day [*Can. Anteriorum, caus. ii,
qu. 6], nor a third time on the same point [*Can. Si autem, caus. ii,
qu. 6]. Therefore it would seem that an appeal is unlawful in itself.

_On the contrary,_ Paul appealed to Caesar (Acts 25).

_I answer that,_ There are two motives for which a man appeals. First
through confidence in the justice of his cause, seeing that he is
unjustly oppressed by the judge, and then it is lawful for him to
appeal, because this is a prudent means of escape. Hence it is laid
down (Decret. II, qu. vi, can. Omnis oppressus): "All those who are
oppressed are free, if they so wish, to appeal to the judgment of the
priests, and no man may stand in their way." Secondly, a man appeals
in order to cause a delay, lest a just sentence be pronounced against
him. This is to defend oneself calumniously, and is unlawful as
stated above (A. 2). For he inflicts an injury both on the judge,
whom he hinders in the exercise of his office, and on his adversary,
whose justice he disturbs as far as he is able. Hence it is laid down
(II, qu. vi, can. Omnino puniendus): "Without doubt a man should be
punished if his appeal be declared unjust."

Reply Obj. 1: A man should submit to the lower authority in so far as
the latter observes the order of the higher authority. If the lower
authority departs from the order of the higher, we ought not to
submit to it, for instance "if the proconsul order one thing and the
emperor another," according to a gloss on Rom. 13:2. Now when a judge
oppresses anyone unjustly, in this respect he departs from the order
of the higher authority, whereby he is obliged to judge justly. Hence
it is lawful for a man who is oppressed unjustly, to have recourse to
the authority of the higher power, by appealing either before or
after sentence has been pronounced. And since it is to be presumed
that there is no rectitude where true faith is lacking, it is
unlawful for a Catholic to appeal to an unbelieving judge, according
to Decret. II, qu. vi, can. _Catholicus:_ "The Catholic who appeals
to the decision of a judge of another faith shall be excommunicated,
whether his case be just or unjust." Hence the Apostle also rebuked
those who went to law before unbelievers (1 Cor. 6:6).

Reply Obj. 2: It is due to a man's own fault or neglect that, of his
own accord, he submits to the judgment of one in whose justice he has
no confidence. Moreover it would seem to point to levity of mind for
a man not to abide by what he has once approved of. Hence it is with
reason that the law refuses us the faculty of appealing from the
decision of judges of our own choice, who have no power save by
virtue of the consent of the litigants. On the other hand the
authority of an ordinary judge depends, not on the consent of those
who are subject to his judgment, but on the authority of the king or
prince who appointed him. Hence, as a remedy against his unjust
oppression, the law allows one to have recourse to appeal, so that
even if the judge be at the same time ordinary and chosen by the
litigants, it is lawful to appeal from his decision, since seemingly
his ordinary authority occasioned his being chosen as arbitrator. Nor
is it to be imputed as a fault to the man who consented to his being
arbitrator, without adverting to the fact that he was appointed
ordinary judge by the prince.

Reply Obj. 3: The equity of the law so guards the interests of
the one party that the other is not oppressed. Thus it allows ten days
for appeal to be made, this being considered sufficient time for
deliberating on the expediency of an appeal. If on the other hand
there were no fixed time limit for appealing, the certainty of
judgment would ever be in suspense, so that the other party would
suffer an injury. The reason why it is not allowed to appeal a third
time on the same point, is that it is not probable that the judges
would fail to judge justly so many times.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 69, Art. 4]

Whether a Man Who Is Condemned to Death May Lawfully Defend Himself
If He Can?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man who is condemned to death may
lawfully defend himself if he can. For it is always lawful to do that
to which nature inclines us, as being of natural right, so to speak.
Now, to resist corruption is an inclination of nature not only in men
and animals but also in things devoid of sense. Therefore if he can
do so, the accused, after condemnation, may lawfully resist being put
to death.

Obj. 2: Further, just as a man, by resistance, escapes the death to
which he has been condemned, so does he by flight. Now it is lawful
seemingly to escape death by flight, according to Ecclus. 9:18, "Keep
thee far from the man that hath power to kill [and not to quicken]"
[*The words in the brackets are not in the Vulgate]. Therefore it is
also lawful for the accused to resist.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 24:11): "Deliver them that are
led to death: and those that are drawn to death forbear not to
deliver." Now a man is under greater obligation to himself than to
another. Therefore it is lawful for a condemned man to defend himself
from being put to death.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 13:2): "He that resisteth
the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist,
purchase to themselves damnation." Now a condemned man, by defending
himself, resists the power in the point of its being ordained by God
"for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of the good"
[*1 Pet. 2:14]. Therefore he sins in defending himself.

_I answer that,_ A man may be condemned to death in two ways. First
justly, and then it is not lawful for the condemned to defend
himself, because it is lawful for the judge to combat his resistance
by force, so that on his part the fight is unjust, and consequently
without any doubt he sins.

Secondly a man is condemned unjustly: and such a sentence is like the
violence of robbers, according to Ezech. 22:21, "Her princes in the
midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey to shed blood."
Wherefore even as it is lawful to resist robbers, so is it lawful, in
a like case, to resist wicked princes; except perhaps in order to
avoid scandal, whence some grave disturbance might be feared to arise.

Reply Obj. 1: Reason was given to man that he might ensue those
things to which his nature inclines, not in all cases, but in
accordance with the order of reason. Hence not all self-defense is
lawful, but only such as is accomplished with due moderation.

Reply Obj. 2: When a man is condemned to death, he has not to kill
himself, but to suffer death: wherefore he is not bound to do
anything from which death would result, such as to stay in the place
whence he would be led to execution. But he may not resist those who
lead him to death, in order that he may not suffer what is just for
him to suffer. Even so, if a man were condemned to die of hunger, he
does not sin if he partakes of food brought to him secretly, because
to refrain from taking it would be to kill himself.

Reply Obj. 3: This saying of the wise man does not direct that one
should deliver a man from death in opposition to the order of
justice: wherefore neither should a man deliver himself from death by
resisting against justice.
_______________________

QUESTION 70

OF INJUSTICE WITH REGARD TO THE PERSON OF THE WITNESS
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider injustice with regard to the person of the
witness. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a man is bound to give evidence?

(2) Whether the evidence of two or three witnesses suffices?

(3) Whether a man's evidence may be rejected without any fault on his
part?

(4) Whether it is a mortal sin to bear false witness?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 70, Art. 1]

Whether a Man Is Bound to Give Evidence?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to give evidence.
Augustine says (QQ. Gen. 1:26) [*Cf. Contra Faust. xxii, 33, 34],
that when Abraham said of his wife (Gen. 20:2), "She is my sister,"
he wished the truth to be concealed and not a lie be told. Now, by
hiding the truth a man abstains from giving evidence. Therefore a man
is not bound to give evidence.

Obj. 2: Further, no man is bound to act deceitfully. Now it is
written (Prov. 11:13): "He that walketh deceitfully revealeth
secrets, but he that is faithful concealeth the thing committed to
him by his friend." Therefore a man is not always bound to give
evidence, especially on matters committed to him as a secret by a
friend.

Obj. 3: Further, clerics and priests, more than others, are bound to
those things that are necessary for salvation. Yet clerics and
priests are forbidden to give evidence when a man is on trial for his
life. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation to give evidence.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Can. Quisquis, caus. xi, qu. 3, cap.
Falsidicus; cf. Isidore, Sentent. iii, 55] says: "Both he who
conceals the truth and he who tells a lie are guilty, the former
because he is unwilling to do good, the latter because he desires to
hurt."

_I answer that,_ We must make a distinction in the matter of giving
evidence: because sometimes a certain man's evidence is necessary,
and sometimes not. If the necessary evidence is that of a man subject
to a superior whom, in matters pertaining to justice, he is bound to
obey, without doubt he is bound to give evidence on those points
which are required of him in accordance with the order of justice,
for instance on manifest things or when ill-report has preceded. If
however he is required to give evidence on other points, for instance
secret matters, and those of which no ill-report has preceded, he is
not bound to give evidence. On the other hand, if his evidence be
required by authority of a superior whom he is bound to obey, we must
make a distinction: because if his evidence is required in order to
deliver a man from an unjust death or any other penalty, or from
false defamation, or some loss, in such cases he is bound to give
evidence. Even if his evidence is not demanded, he is bound to do
what he can to declare the truth to someone who may profit thereby.
For it is written (Ps. 81:4): "Rescue the poor, and deliver the needy
from the hand of the sinner"; and (Prov. 24:11): "Deliver them that
are led to death"; and (Rom. 1:32): "They are worthy of death, not
only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do
them," on which words a gloss says: "To be silent when one can
disprove is to consent." In matters pertaining to a man's
condemnation, one is not bound to give evidence, except when one is
constrained by a superior in accordance with the order of justice;
since if the truth of such a matter be concealed, no particular
injury is inflicted on anyone. Or, if some danger threatens the
accuser, it matters not since he risked the danger of his own accord:
whereas it is different with the accused, who incurs the danger
against his will.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of concealment of the truth in a
case when a man is not compelled by his superior's authority to
declare the truth, and when such concealment is not specially
injurious to any person.

Reply Obj. 2: A man should by no means give evidence on
matters secretly committed to him in confession, because he knows such
things, not as man but as God's minister: and the sacrament is more
binding than any human precept. But as regards matters committed to
man in some other way under secrecy, we must make a distinction.
Sometimes they are of such a nature that one is bound to make them
known as soon as they come to our knowledge, for instance if they
conduce to the spiritual or corporal corruption of the community, or
to some grave personal injury, in short any like matter that a man is
bound to make known either by giving evidence or by denouncing it.
Against such a duty a man cannot be obliged to act on the plea that
the matter is committed to him under secrecy, for he would break the
faith he owes to another. On the other hand sometimes they are such as
one is not bound to make known, so that one may be under obligation
not to do so on account of their being committed to one under secrecy.
In such a case one is by no means bound to make them known, even if
the superior should command; because to keep faith is of natural
right, and a man cannot be commanded to do what is contrary to natural
right.

Reply Obj. 3: It is unbecoming for ministers of the altar to
slay a man or to cooperate in his slaying, as stated above
(Q. 64, A. 4); hence according to the order of justice they
cannot be compelled to give evidence when a man is on trial for his
life.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 70, Art. 2]

Whether the Evidence of Two or Three Persons Suffices?

Objection 1: It would seem that the evidence of two or three persons
is not sufficient. For judgment requires certitude. Now certitude of
the truth is not obtained by the assertions of two or three
witnesses, for we read that Naboth was unjustly condemned on the
evidence of two witnesses (3 Kings 21). Therefore the evidence of two
or three witnesses does not suffice.

Obj. 2: Further, in order for evidence to be credible it must agree.
But frequently the evidence of two or three disagrees in some point.
Therefore it is of no use for proving the truth in court.

Obj. 3: Further, it is laid down (Decret. II, qu. iv, can. Praesul.):
"A bishop shall not be condemned save on the evidence of seventy-two
witnesses; nor a cardinal priest of the Roman Church, unless there be
sixty-four witnesses. Nor a cardinal deacon of the Roman Church,
unless there be twenty-seven witnesses; nor a subdeacon, an acolyte,
an exorcist, a reader or a doorkeeper without seven witnesses." Now
the sin of one who is of higher dignity is more grievous, and
consequently should be treated more severely. Therefore neither is
the evidence of two or three witnesses sufficient for the
condemnation of other persons.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 17:6): "By the mouth of two
or three witnesses shall he die that is to be slain," and further on
(Deut. 19:15): "In the mouth of two or three witnesses every word
shall stand."

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3), "we must
not expect to find certitude equally in every matter." For in human
acts, on which judgments are passed and evidence required, it is
impossible to have demonstrative certitude, because they are about
things contingent and variable. Hence the certitude of probability
suffices, such as may reach the truth in the greater number of cases,
although it fail in the minority. Now it is probable that the
assertion of several witnesses contains the truth rather than the
assertion of one: and since the accused is the only one who denies,
while several witness affirm the same as the prosecutor, it is
reasonably established both by Divine and by human law, that the
assertion of several witnesses should be upheld. Now all multitude is
comprised of three elements, the beginning, the middle and the end.
Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (De Coelo i, 1), "we reckon
'all' and 'whole' to consist of three parts." Now we have a triple
voucher when two agree with the prosecutor: hence two witnesses are
required; or for the sake of greater certitude three, which is the
perfect number. Wherefore it is written (Eccles. 4:12): "A threefold
cord is not easily broken": and Augustine, commenting on John 8:17,
"The testimony of two men is true," says (Tract. xxxvi) that "there
is here a mystery by which we are given to understand that Trinity
wherein is perpetual stability of truth."

Reply Obj. 1: No matter how great a number of witnesses may be
determined, the evidence might sometimes be unjust, since is written
(Ex. 23:2): "Thou shalt not follow the multitude to do evil." And yet
the fact that in so many it is not possible to have certitude without
fear of error, is no reason why we should reject the certitude which
can probably be had through two or three witnesses, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: If the witnesses disagree in certain principal
circumstances which change the substance of the fact, for instance in
time, place, or persons, which are chiefly in question, their
evidence is of no weight, because if they disagree in such things,
each one would seem to be giving distinct evidence and to be speaking
of different facts. For instance, one say that a certain thing
happened at such and such a time or place, while another says it
happened at another time or place, they seem not to be speaking of
the same event. The evidence is not weakened if one witness says that
he does not remember, while the other attests to a determinate time
or place. And if on such points as these the witness for prosecution
and defense disagree altogether, and if they be equal in number on
either side, and of equal standing, the accused should have the
benefit of the doubt, because the judge ought to be more inclined to
acquit than to condemn, except perhaps in favorable suits, such as a
pleading for liberty and the like. If, however, the witnesses for the
same side disagree, the judge ought to use his own discretion in
discerning which side to favor, by considering either the number of
witnesses, or their standing, or the favorableness of the suit, or
the nature of the business and of the evidence.

Much more ought the evidence of one witness to be rejected if he
contradict himself when questioned about what he has seen and about
what he knows; not, however, if he contradict himself when questioned
about matters of opinion and report, since he may be moved to answer
differently according to the different things he has seen and heard.

On the other hand if there be discrepancy of evidence in
circumstances not touching the substance of the fact, for instance,
whether the weather were cloudy or fine, whether the house were
painted or not, or such like matters, such discrepancy does not
weaken the evidence, because men are not wont to take much notice of
such things, wherefore they easily forget them. Indeed, a discrepancy
of this kind renders the evidence more credible, as Chrysostom states
(Hom. i in Matth.), because if the witnesses agreed in every point,
even in the minutest of details, they would seem to have conspired
together to say the same thing: but this must be left to the prudent
discernment of the judge.

Reply Obj. 3: This passage refers specially to the bishops, priests,
deacons and clerics of the Roman Church, on account of its dignity:
and this for three reasons. First because in that Church those men
ought to be promoted whose sanctity makes their evidence of more
weight than that of many witnesses. Secondly, because those who have
to judge other men, often have many opponents on account of their
justice, wherefore those who give evidence against them should not be
believed indiscriminately, unless they be very numerous. Thirdly,
because the condemnation of any one of them would detract in public
opinion from the dignity and authority of that Church, a result which
would be more fraught with danger than if one were to tolerate a
sinner in that same Church, unless he were very notorious and
manifest, so that a grave scandal would arise if he were tolerated.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 70, Art. 3]

Whether a Man's Evidence Can Be Rejected Without Any Fault of His?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man's evidence ought not to be
rejected except on account of some fault. For it is inflicted as a
penalty on some that their evidence is inadmissible, as in the case
of those who are branded with infamy. Now a penalty must not be
inflicted save for a fault. Therefore it would seem that no man's
evidence ought to be rejected save on account of a fault.

Obj. 2: Further, "Good is to be presumed of every one, unless the
contrary appear" [*Cap. Dudum, de Praesumpt.]. Now it pertains to a
man's goodness that he should give true evidence. Since therefore
there can be no proof of the contrary, unless there be some fault of
his, it would seem that no man's evidence should be rejected save for
some fault.

Obj. 3: Further, no man is rendered unfit for things necessary for
salvation except by some sin. But it is necessary for salvation to
give true evidence, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore no man should
be excluded from giving evidence save for some fault.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Regist. xiii, 44): "As to the bishop
who is said to have been accused by his servants, you are to know
that they should by no means have been heard": which words are
embodied in the Decretals (II, qu. 1, can. Imprimis).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the authority of evidence is
not infallible but probable; and consequently the evidence for one
side is weakened by whatever strengthens the probability of the
other. Now the reliability of a person's evidence is weakened,
sometimes indeed on account of some fault of his, as in the case of
unbelievers and persons of evil repute, as well as those who are
guilty of a public crime and who are not allowed even to accuse;
sometimes, without any fault on his part, and this owing either to a
defect in the reason, as in the case of children, imbeciles and
women, or to personal feeling, as in the case of enemies, or persons
united by family or household ties, or again owing to some external
condition, as in the case of poor people, slaves, and those who are
under authority, concerning whom it is to be presumed that they might
easily be induced to give evidence against the truth.

Thus it is manifest that a person's evidence may be rejected either
with or without some fault of his.

Reply Obj. 1: If a person is disqualified from giving evidence this
is done as a precaution against false evidence rather than as a
punishment. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply Obj. 2: Good is to be presumed of everyone unless the contrary
appear, provided this does not threaten injury to another: because,
in that case, one ought to be careful not to believe everyone
readily, according to 1 John 4:1: "Believe not every spirit."

Reply Obj. 3: To give evidence is necessary for salvation, provided
the witness be competent, and the order of justice observed. Hence
nothing hinders certain persons being excused from giving evidence,
if they be considered unfit according to law.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 70, Art. 4]

Whether It Is Always a Mortal Sin to Give False Evidence?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not always a mortal sin to give
false evidence. For a person may happen to give false evidence,
through ignorance of fact. Now such ignorance excuses from mortal
sin. Therefore the giving of false evidence is not always a mortal
sin.

Obj. 2: Further, a lie that benefits someone and hurts no man is
officious, and this is not a mortal sin. Now sometimes a lie of this
kind occurs in false evidence, as when a person gives false evidence
in order to save a man from death, or from an unjust sentence which
threatens him through other false witnesses or a perverse judge.
Therefore in such cases it is not a mortal sin to give false evidence.

Obj. 3: Further, a witness is required to take an oath in order that
he may fear to commit a mortal sin of perjury. But this would not be
necessary, if it were already a mortal sin to give false evidence.
Therefore the giving of false evidence is not always mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 19:5): "A false witness shall
not be unpunished."

_I answer that,_ False evidence has a threefold deformity. The first
is owing to perjury, since witnesses are admitted only on oath and on
this count it is always a mortal sin. Secondly, owing to the
violation of justice, and on this account it is a mortal sin
generically, even as any kind of injustice. Hence the prohibition of
false evidence by the precept of the decalogue is expressed in this
form when it is said (Ex. 20:16), "Thou shalt not bear false witness
against thy neighbor." For one does nothing against a man by
preventing him from doing someone an injury, but only by taking away
his justice. Thirdly, owing to the falsehood itself, by reason of
which every lie is a sin: on this account, the giving of false
evidence is not always a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 1: In giving evidence a man ought not to affirm as
certain, as though he knew it, that about which he is not certain;
and he should confess his doubt in doubtful terms, and that which he
is certain about, in terms of certainty. Owing however to the frailty
of the human memory, a man sometimes thinks he is certain about
something that is not true; and then if after thinking over the
matter with due care he deems himself certain about that false thing,
he does not sin mortally if he asserts it, because the evidence which
he gives is not directly and intentionally, but accidentally contrary
to what he intends.

Reply Obj. 2: An unjust judgment is not a judgment, wherefore the
false evidence given in an unjust judgment, in order to prevent
injustice is not a mortal sin by virtue of the judgment, but only by
reason of the oath violated.

Reply Obj. 3: Men abhor chiefly those sins that are against God, as
being most grievous; and among them is perjury: whereas they do not
abhor so much sins against their neighbor. Consequently, for the
greater certitude of evidence, the witness is required to take a oath.
_______________________

QUESTION 71

OF INJUSTICE IN JUDGMENT ON THE PART OF COUNSEL
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the injustice which takes place in judgment on
the part of counsel, and under this head there are four points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor?

(2) Whether certain persons should be prohibited from exercising the
office of advocate?

(3) Whether an advocate sins by defending an unjust cause?

(4) Whether he sins if he accept a fee for defending a suit?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 71, Art. 1]

Whether an Advocate Is Bound to Defend the Suits of the Poor?

Objection 1: It would seem that an advocate is bound to defend the
suits of the poor. For it is written (Ex. 23:5): "If thou see the ass
of him that hateth thee lie underneath his burden, thou shalt not
pass by, but shall lift him up with him." Now no less a danger
threatens the poor man whose suit is being unjustly prejudiced, than
if his ass were to lie underneath its burden. Therefore an advocate
is bound to defend the suits of the poor.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says in a homily (ix in Evang.): "Let him
that hath understanding beware lest he withhold his knowledge; let
him that hath abundance of wealth watch lest he slacken his merciful
bounty; let him who is a servant to art share his skill with his
neighbor; let him who has an opportunity of speaking with the wealthy
plead the cause of the poor: for the slightest gift you have received
will be reputed a talent." Now every man is bound, not to hide but
faithfully to dispense the talent committed to him; as evidenced by
the punishment inflicted on the servant who hid his talent (Matt.
25:30). Therefore an advocate is bound to plead for the poor.

Obj. 3: Further, the precept about performing works of mercy, being
affirmative, is binding according to time and place, and this is
chiefly in cases of need. Now it seems to be a case of need when the
suit of a poor man is being prejudiced. Therefore it seems that in
such a case an advocate is bound to defend the poor man's suit.

_On the contrary,_ He that lacks food is no less in need than he that
lacks an advocate. Yet he that is able to give food is not always
bound to feed the needy. Therefore neither is an advocate always
bound to defend the suits of the poor.

_I answer that,_ Since defense of the poor man's suit belongs to the
works of mercy, the answer to this inquiry is the same as the one
given above with regard to the other works of mercy (Q. 32, AA. 5,
9). Now no man is sufficient to bestow a work of mercy on all those
who need it. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28),
"since one cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly
who by reason of place, time, or any other circumstance, by a kind of
chance are more closely united to us." He says "by reason of place,"
because one is not bound to search throughout the world for the needy
that one may succor them; and it suffices to do works of mercy to
those one meets with. Hence it is written (Ex. 23:4): "If thou meet
thy enemy's ass going astray, bring it back to him." He says also "by
reason of time," because one is not bound to provide for the future
needs of others, and it suffices to succor present needs. Hence it is
written (1 John 3:17): "He that . . . shall see his brother in need,
and shall put up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of God
abide in him?" Lastly he says, "or any other circumstance," because
one ought to show kindness to those especially who are by any tie
whatever united to us, according to 1 Tim. 5:8, "If any man have not
care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied
the faith and is worse than an infidel."

It may happen however that these circumstances concur, and then we
have to consider whether this particular man stands in such a need
that it is not easy to see how he can be succored otherwise, and then
one is bound to bestow the work of mercy on him. If, however, it is
easy to see how he can be otherwise succored, either by himself, or
by some other person still more closely united to him, or in a better
position to help him, one is not bound so strictly to help the one in
need that it would be a sin not to do so: although it would be
praiseworthy to do so where one is not bound to. Therefore an
advocate is not always bound to defend the suits of the poor, but
only when the aforesaid circumstances concur, else he would have to
put aside all other business, and occupy himself entirely in
defending the suits of poor people. The same applies to a physician
with regard to attendance on the sick.

Reply Obj. 1: So long as the ass lies under the burden, there is no
means of help in this case, unless those who are passing along come
to the man's aid, and therefore they are bound to help. But they
would not be so bound if help were possible from another quarter.

Reply Obj. 2: A man is bound to make good use of the talent bestowed
on him, according to the opportunities afforded by time, place, and
other circumstances, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: Not every need is such that it is one's duty to remedy
it, but only such as we have stated above.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 71, Art. 2]

Whether It Is Fitting That the Law Should Debar Certain Persons from
the Office of Advocate?

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting for the law to debar certain
persons from the office of advocate. For no man should be debarred
from doing works of mercy. Now it belongs to the works of mercy to
defend a man's suit, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore no man should
be debarred from this office.

Obj. 2: Further, contrary causes have not, seemingly, the same
effect. Now to be busy with Divine things and to be busy about sin
are contrary to one another. Therefore it is unfitting that some
should be debarred from the office of advocate, on account of
religion, as monks and clerics, while others are debarred on account
of sin, as persons of ill-repute and heretics.

Obj. 3: Further, a man should love his neighbor as himself. Now it is
a duty of love for an advocate to plead a person's cause. Therefore
it is unfitting that certain persons should be debarred from pleading
the cause of others, while they are allowed to advocate their own
cause.

_On the contrary,_ According to Decret. III, qu. vii, can. _Infames,_
many persons are debarred from the office of advocate.

_I answer that,_ In two ways a person is debarred from performing a
certain act: first because it is impossible to him, secondly because
it is unbecoming to him: but, whereas the man to whom a certain act
is impossible, is absolutely debarred from performing it, he to whom
an act is unbecoming is not debarred altogether, since necessity may
do away with its unbecomingness. Accordingly some are debarred from
the office of advocate because it is impossible to them through lack
of sense--either interior, as in the case of madmen and minors--or
exterior, as in the case of the deaf and dumb. For an advocate needs
to have both interior skill so that he may be able to prove the
justice of the cause he defends, and also speech and hearing, that he
may speak and hear what is said to him. Consequently those who are
defective in these points, are altogether debarred from being
advocates either in their own or in another's cause. The becomingness
of exercising this office is removed in two ways. First, through a
man being engaged in higher things. Wherefore it is unfitting that
monks or priests should be advocates in any cause whatever, or that
clerics should plead in a secular court, because such persons are
engaged in Divine things. Secondly, on account of some personal
defect, either of body (for instance a blind man whose attendance in
a court of justice would be unbecoming) or of soul, for it ill
becomes one who has disdained to be just himself, to plead for the
justice of another. Wherefore it is unbecoming that persons of ill
repute, unbelievers, and those who have been convicted of grievous
crimes should be advocates. Nevertheless this unbecomingness is
outweighed by necessity: and for this reason such persons can plead
either their own cause or that of persons closely connected with
them. Moreover, clerics can be advocates in the cause of their own
church, and monks in the cause of their own monastery, if the abbot
direct them to do so.

Reply Obj. 1: Certain persons are sometimes debarred by
unbecomingness, and others by inability from performing works of
mercy: for not all the works of mercy are becoming to all persons:
thus it ill becomes a fool to give counsel, or the ignorant to teach.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as virtue is destroyed by "too much" and "too
little," so does a person become incompetent by "more" and "less."
For this reason some, like religious and clerics, are debarred from
pleading in causes, because they are above such an office; and others
because they are less than competent to exercise it, such as persons
of ill-repute and unbelievers.

Reply Obj. 3: The necessity of pleading the causes of others is not
so pressing as the necessity of pleading one's own cause, because
others are able to help themselves otherwise: hence the comparison
fails.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 71, Art. 3]

Whether an Advocate Sins by Defending an Unjust Cause?

Objection 1: It would seem that an advocate does not sin by defending
an unjust cause. For just as a physician proves his skill by healing
a desperate disease, so does an advocate prove his skill, if he can
defend an unjust cause. Now a physician is praised if he heals a
desperate malady. Therefore an advocate also commits no sin, but
ought to be praised, if he defends an unjust cause.

Obj. 2: Further, it is always lawful to desist from committing a sin.
Yet an advocate is punished if he throws up his brief (Decret. II,
qu. iii, can. Si quem poenit.). Therefore an advocate does not sin by
defending an unjust cause, when once he has undertaken its defense.

Obj. 3: Further, it would seem to be a greater sin for an advocate to
use unjust means in defense of a just cause (e.g. by producing false
witnesses, or alleging false laws), than to defend an unjust cause,
since the former is a sin against the form, the latter against the
matter of justice. Yet it is seemingly lawful for an advocate to make
use of such underhand means, even as it is lawful for a soldier to
lay ambushes in a battle. Therefore it would seem that an advocate
does not sin by defending an unjust cause.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (2 Paralip. 19:2): "Thou helpest the
ungodly . . . and therefore thou didst deserve . . . the wrath of the
Lord." Now an advocate by defending an unjust cause, helps the
ungodly. Therefore he sins and deserves the wrath of the Lord.

_I answer that,_ It is unlawful to cooperate in an evil deed, by
counseling, helping, or in any way consenting, because to counsel or
assist an action is, in a way, to do it, and the Apostle says (Rom.
1:32) that "they . . . are worthy of death, not only they that do" a
sin, "but they also that consent to them that do" it. Hence it was
stated above (Q. 62, A. 7), that all such are bound to restitution.
Now it is evident that an advocate provides both assistance and
counsel to the party for whom he pleads. Wherefore, if knowingly he
defends an unjust cause, without doubt he sins grievously, and is
bound to restitution of the loss unjustly incurred by the other party
by reason of the assistance he has provided. If, however, he defends
an unjust cause unknowingly, thinking it just, he is to be excused
according to the measure in which ignorance is excusable.

Reply Obj. 1: The physician injures no man by undertaking to heal a
desperate malady, whereas the advocate who accepts service in an
unjust cause, unjustly injures the party against whom he pleads
unjustly. Hence the comparison fails. For though he may seem to
deserve praise for showing skill in his art, nevertheless he sins by
reason of injustice in his will, since he abuses his art for an evil
end.

Reply Obj. 2: If an advocate believes from the outset that the cause
is just, and discovers afterwards while the case is proceeding that
it is unjust, he ought not to throw up his brief in such a way as to
help the other side, or so as to reveal the secrets of his client to
the other party. But he can and must give up the case, or induce his
client to give way, or make some compromise without prejudice to the
opposing party.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 40, A. 3), it is lawful for a
soldier, or a general to lay ambushes in a just war, by prudently
concealing what he has a mind to do, but not by means of fraudulent
falsehoods, since we should keep faith even with a foe, as Tully says
(De offic. iii, 29). Hence it is lawful for an advocate, in defending
his case, prudently to conceal whatever might hinder its happy issue,
but it is unlawful for him to employ any kind of falsehood.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 71, Art. 4]

Whether It Is Lawful for an Advocate to Take a Fee for Pleading?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for an advocate to take a fee for
pleading. Works of mercy should not be done with a view to human
remuneration, according to Luke 14:12, "When thou makest a dinner or
a supper, call not thy friends . . . nor thy neighbors who are rich:
lest perhaps they also invite thee again, and a recompense be made to
thee." Now it is a work of mercy to plead another's cause, as stated
above (A. 1). Therefore it is not lawful for an advocate to take
payment in money for pleading.

Obj. 2: Further, spiritual things are not to be bartered with
temporal things. But pleading a person's cause seems to be a
spiritual good since it consists in using one's knowledge of law.
Therefore it is not lawful for an advocate to take a fee for pleading.

Obj. 3: Further, just as the person of the advocate concurs towards
the pronouncement of the verdict, so do the persons of the judge and
of the witness. Now, according to Augustine (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.),
"the judge should not sell a just sentence, nor the witness true
evidence." Therefore neither can an advocate sell a just pleading.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.) that "an
advocate may lawfully sell his pleading, and a lawyer his advice."

_I answer that,_ A man may justly receive payment for granting what
he is not bound to grant. Now it is evident that an advocate is not
always bound to consent to plead, or to give advice in other people's
causes. Wherefore, if he sell his pleading or advice, he does not act
against justice. The same applies to the physician who attends on a
sick person to heal him, and to all like persons; provided, however,
they take a moderate fee, with due consideration for persons, for the
matter in hand, for the labor entailed, and for the custom of the
country. If, however, they wickedly extort an immoderate fee, they
sin against justice. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.)
that "it is customary to demand from them restitution of what they
have extorted by a wicked excess, but not what has been given to them
in accordance with a commendable custom."

Reply Obj. 1: Man is not bound to do gratuitously whatever he
can do from motives of mercy: else no man could lawfully sell
anything, since anything may be given from motives of mercy. But when
a man does give a thing out of mercy, he should seek, not a human, but
a Divine reward. In like manner an advocate, when he mercifully pleads
the cause of a poor man, should have in view not a human but a Divine
meed; and yet he is not always bound to give his services
gratuitously.

Reply Obj. 2: Though knowledge of law is something spiritual, the use
of that knowledge is accomplished by the work of the body: hence it
is lawful to take money in payment of that use, else no craftsman
would be allowed to make profit by his art.

Reply Obj. 3: The judge and witnesses are common to either
party, since the judge is bound to pronounce a just verdict, and the
witness to give true evidence. Now justice and truth do not incline to
one side rather than to the other: and consequently judges receive out
of the public funds a fixed pay for their labor; and witnesses receive
their expenses (not as payment for giving evidence, but as a fee for
their labor) either from both parties or from the party by whom they
are adduced, because no man "serveth as a soldier at any time at his
own charge [*Vulg.: 'Who serveth as a soldier,']" (1 Cor. 9:7). On the
other hand an advocate defends one party only, and so he may lawfully
accept fee from the party he assists.
_______________________

QUESTION 72

OF REVILING
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider injuries inflicted by words uttered
extrajudicially. We shall consider (1) reviling, (2) backbiting,
(3) tale bearing, (4) derision, (5) cursing.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) What is reviling?

(2) Whether every reviling is a mortal sin?

(3) Whether one ought to check revilers?

(4) Of the origin of reviling.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 72, Art. 1]

Whether Reviling Consists in Words?

Objection 1: It would seem that reviling does not consist in words.
Reviling implies some injury inflicted on one's neighbor, since it is
a kind of injustice. But words seem to inflict no injury on one's
neighbor, either in his person, or in his belongings. Therefore
reviling does not consist in words.

Obj. 2: Further, reviling seems to imply dishonor. But a man can be
dishonored or slighted by deeds more than by words. Therefore it
seems that reviling consists, not in words but in deeds.

Obj. 3: Further, a dishonor inflicted by words is called a railing or
a taunt. But reviling seems to differ from railing or taunt.
Therefore reviling does not consist in words.

_On the contrary,_ Nothing, save words, is perceived by the hearing.
Now reviling is perceived by the hearing according to Jer. 20:10, "I
heard reviling [Douay: 'contumelies'] on every side." Therefore
reviling consists in words.

_I answer that,_ Reviling denotes the dishonoring of a person, and
this happens in two ways: for since honor results from excellence,
one person dishonors another, first, by depriving him of the
excellence for which he is honored. This is done by sins of deed,
whereof we have spoken above (Q. 64, seqq.). Secondly, when a man
publishes something against another's honor, thus bringing it to the
knowledge of the latter and of other men. This reviling properly so
called, and is done by some kind of signs. Now, according to
Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), "compared with words all other
signs are very few, for words have obtained the chief place among men
for the purpose of expressing whatever the mind conceives." Hence
reviling, properly speaking, consists in words: wherefore, Isidore
says (Etym. x) that a reviler (_contumeliosus_) "is hasty and bursts
out (_tumet_) in injurious words." Since, however, things are also
signified by deeds, which on this account have the same significance
as words, it follows that reviling in a wider sense extends also to
deeds. Wherefore a gloss on Rom. 1:30, "contumelious, proud," says:
"The contumelious are those who by word or deed revile and shame
others."

Reply Obj. 1: Our words, if we consider them in their essence, i.e.
as audible sounds, injure no man, except perhaps by jarring of the
ear, as when a person speaks too loud. But, considered as signs
conveying something to the knowledge of others, they may do many
kinds of harm. Such is the harm done to a man to the detriment of his
honor, or of the respect due to him from others. Hence the reviling
is greater if one man reproach another in the presence of many: and
yet there may still be reviling if he reproach him by himself, in so
far as the speaker acts unjustly against the respect due to the
hearer.

Reply Obj. 2: One man slights another by deeds in so far as such
deeds cause or signify that which is against that other man's honor.
In the former case it is not a matter of reviling but of some other
kind of injustice, of which we have spoken above (QQ. 64, 65, 66):
where as in the latter case there is reviling, in so far as deeds
have the significant force of words.

Reply Obj. 3: Railing and taunts consist in words, even as reviling,
because by all of them a man's faults are exposed to the detriment of
his honor. Such faults are of three kinds. First, there is the fault
of guilt, which is exposed by _reviling_ words. Secondly, there is
the fault of both guilt and punishment, which is exposed by _taunts_
(_convicium_), because _vice_ is commonly spoken of in connection
with not only the soul but also the body. Hence if one man says
spitefully to another that he is blind, he taunts but does not revile
him: whereas if one man calls another a thief, he not only taunts but
also reviles him. Thirdly, a man reproaches another for his
inferiority or indigence, so as to lessen the honor due to him for
any kind of excellence. This is done by _upbraiding_ words, and
properly speaking, occurs when one spitefully reminds a man that one
has succored him when he was in need. Hence it is written (Ecclus.
20:15): "He will give a few things and upbraid much." Nevertheless
these terms are sometimes employed one for the other.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 72, Art. 2]

Whether Reviling or Railing Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that reviling or railing is not a mortal
sin. For no mortal sin is an act of virtue. Now railing is the act of
a virtue, viz. of wittiness (_eutrapelia_) [*Cf. I-II, Q. 60, A. 5]
to which it pertains to rail well, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iv, 8). Therefore railing or reviling is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, mortal sin is not to be found in perfect men; and
yet these sometimes give utterance to railing or reviling. Thus the
Apostle says (Gal. 3:1): "O senseless Galatians!," and our Lord said
(Luke 24:25): "O foolish and slow of heart to believe!" Therefore
railing or reviling is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, although that which is a venial sin by reason of its
genus may become mortal, that which is mortal by reason of its genus
cannot become venial, as stated above (I-II, Q. 88, AA. 4, 6). Hence
if by reason of its genus it were a mortal sin to give utterance to
railing or reviling, it would follow that it is always a mortal sin.
But this is apparently untrue, as may be seen in the case of one who
utters a reviling word indeliberately or through slight anger.
Therefore reviling or railing is not a mortal sin, by reason of its
genus.

_On the contrary,_ Nothing but mortal sin deserves the eternal
punishment of hell. Now railing or reviling deserves the punishment
of hell, according to Matt. 5:22, "Whosoever shall say to his brother
. . . Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire." Therefore railing
or reviling is a mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), words are injurious to other
persons, not as sounds, but as signs, and this signification depends
on the speaker's inward intention. Hence, in sins of word, it seems
that we ought to consider with what intention the words are uttered.
Since then railing or reviling essentially denotes a dishonoring, if
the intention of the utterer is to dishonor the other man, this is
properly and essentially to give utterance to railing or reviling:
and this is a mortal sin no less than theft or robbery, since a man
loves his honor no less than his possessions. If, on the other hand,
a man says to another a railing or reviling word, yet with the
intention, not of dishonoring him, but rather perhaps of correcting
him or with some like purpose, he utters a railing or reviling not
formally and essentially, but accidentally and materially, in so far
to wit as he says that which might be a railing or reviling. Hence
this may be sometimes a venial sin, and sometimes without any sin at
all. Nevertheless there is need of discretion in such matters, and
one should use such words with moderation, because the railing might
be so grave that being uttered inconsiderately it might dishonor the
person against whom it is uttered. In such a case a man might commit
a mortal sin, even though he did not intend to dishonor the other
man: just as were a man incautiously to injure grievously another by
striking him in fun, he would not be without blame.

Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to wittiness to utter some slight mockery,
not with intent to dishonor or pain the person who is the object of
the mockery, but rather with intent to please and amuse: and this may
be without sin, if the due circumstances be observed. On the other
hand if a man does not shrink from inflicting pain on the object of
his witty mockery, so long as he makes others laugh, this is sinful,
as stated in the passage quoted.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as it is lawful to strike a person, or damnify him
in his belongings for the purpose of correction, so too, for the
purpose of correction, may one say a mocking word to a person whom
one has to correct. It is thus that our Lord called the disciples
"foolish," and the Apostle called the Galatians "senseless." Yet, as
Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19), "seldom and only when
it is very necessary should we have recourse to invectives, and then
so as to urge God's service, not our own."

Reply Obj. 3: Since the sin of railing or reviling depends on the
intention of the utterer, it may happen to be a venial sin, if it be
a slight railing that does not inflict much dishonor on a man, and be
uttered through lightness of heart or some slight anger, without the
fixed purpose of dishonoring him, for instance when one intends by
such a word to give but little pain.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 72, Art. 3]

Whether One Ought to Suffer Oneself to Be Reviled?

Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to suffer oneself to be
reviled. For he that suffers himself to be reviled, encourages the
reviler. But one ought not to do this. Therefore one ought not to
suffer oneself to be reviled, but rather reply to the reviler.

Obj. 2: Further, one ought to love oneself more than another. Now one
ought not to suffer another to be reviled, wherefore it is written
(Prov. 26:10): "He that putteth a fool to silence appeaseth anger."
Therefore neither should one suffer oneself to be reviled.

Obj. 3: Further, a man is not allowed to revenge himself, for it is
said: "Vengeance belongeth to Me, I will repay" [*Heb. 10:30]. Now by
submitting to be reviled a man revenges himself, according to
Chrysostom (Hom. xxii, in Ep. ad Rom.): "If thou wilt be revenged, be
silent; thou hast dealt him a fatal blow." Therefore one ought not by
silence to submit to reviling words, but rather answer back.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 37:13): "They that sought evils
to me spoke vain things," and afterwards (Ps. 37:14) he says: "But I
as a deaf man, heard not; and as a dumb man not opening his mouth."

_I answer that,_ Just as we need patience in things done against us,
so do we need it in those said against us. Now the precepts of
patience in those things done against us refer to the preparedness of
the mind, according to Augustine's (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19)
exposition on our Lord's precept, "If one strike thee on thy right
cheek, turn to him also the other" [*The words as quoted by St.
Thomas are a blending of Matt. 5:39 and Luke 6:29]: that is to say, a
man ought to be prepared to do so if necessary. But he is not always
bound to do this actually: since not even did our Lord do so, for
when He received a blow, He said: "Why strikest thou Me?" (John
18:23). Consequently the same applies to the reviling words that are
said against us. For we are bound to hold our minds prepared to
submit to be reviled, if it should be expedient. Nevertheless it
sometimes behooves us to withstand against being reviled, and this
chiefly for two reasons. First, for the good of the reviler; namely,
that his daring may be checked, and that he may not repeat the
attempt, according to Prov. 26:5, "Answer a fool according to his
folly, lest he imagine himself to be wise." Secondly, for the good of
many who would be prevented from progressing in virtue on account of
our being reviled. Hence Gregory says (Hom. ix, Super Ezech.): "Those
who are so placed that their life should be an example to others,
ought, if possible, to silence their detractors, lest their preaching
be not heard by those who could have heard it, and they continue
their evil conduct through contempt of a good life."

Reply Obj. 1: The daring of the railing reviler should be checked
with moderation, i.e. as a duty of charity, and not through lust for
one's own honor. Hence it is written (Prov. 26:4): "Answer not a fool
according to his folly, lest thou be like him."

Reply Obj. 2: When one man prevents another from being reviled there
is not the danger of lust for one's own honor as there is when a man
defends himself from being reviled: indeed rather would it seem to
proceed from a sense of charity.

Reply Obj. 3: It would be an act of revenge to keep silence with the
intention of provoking the reviler to anger, but it would be
praiseworthy to be silent, in order to give place to anger. Hence it
is written (Ecclus. 8:4): "Strive not with a man that is full of
tongue, and heap not wood upon his fire."
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 72, Art. 4]

Whether Reviling Arises from Anger?

Objection 1: It would seem that reviling does not arise from anger.
For it is written (Prov. 11:2): "Where pride is, there shall also be
reviling [Douay: 'reproach']." But anger is a vice distinct from
pride. Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 20:3): "All fools are meddling
with revilings [Douay: 'reproaches']." Now folly is a vice opposed to
wisdom, as stated above (Q. 46, A. 1); whereas anger is opposed to
meekness. Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.

Obj. 3: Further, no sin is diminished by its cause. But the sin of
reviling is diminished if one gives vent to it through anger: for it
is a more grievous sin to revile out of hatred than out of anger.
Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "anger gives
rise to revilings."

_I answer that,_ While one sin may arise from various causes, it is
nevertheless said to have its source chiefly in that one from which
it is wont to arise most frequently, through being closely connected
with its end. Now reviling is closely connected with anger's end,
which is revenge: since the easiest way for the angry man to take
revenge on another is to revile him. Therefore reviling arises
chiefly from anger.

Reply Obj. 1: Reviling is not directed to the end of pride which is
excellency. Hence reviling does not arise directly from pride.
Nevertheless pride disposes a man to revile, in so far as those who
think themselves to excel, are more prone to despise others and
inflict injuries on them, because they are more easily angered,
through deeming it an affront to themselves whenever anything is done
against their will.

Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 6)
"anger listens imperfectly to reason": wherefore an angry man suffers
a defect of reason, and in this he is like the foolish man. Hence
reviling arises from folly on account of the latter's kinship with
anger.

Reply Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) "an
angry man seeks an open offense, but he who hates does not worry about
this." Hence reviling which denotes a manifest injury belongs to anger
rather than to hatred.
_______________________

QUESTION 73

OF BACKBITING [*Or detraction]
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider backbiting, under which head there are four
points of inquiry:

(1) What is backbiting?

(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(3) Of its comparison with other sins;

(4) Whether it is a sin to listen to backbiting?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 73, Art. 1]

Whether Backbiting Is Suitably Defined As the Blackening of Another's
Character by Secret Words?

Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is not as defined by some
[*Albert the Great, Sum. Theol. II, cxvii.], "the blackening of
another's good name by words uttered in secret." For "secretly" and
"openly" are circumstances that do not constitute the species of a
sin, because it is accidental to a sin that it be known by many or by
few. Now that which does not constitute the species of a sin, does
not belong to its essence, and should not be included in its
definition. Therefore it does not belong to the essence of backbiting
that it should be done by secret words.

Obj. 2: Further, the notion of a good name implies something known to
the public. If, therefore, a person's good name is blackened by
backbiting, this cannot be done by secret words, but by words uttered
openly.

Obj. 3: Further, to detract is to subtract, or to diminish something
already existing. But sometimes a man's good name is blackened, even
without subtracting from the truth: for instance, when one reveals
the crimes which a man has in truth committed. Therefore not every
blackening of a good name is backbiting.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 10:11): "If a serpent bite
in silence, he is nothing better that backbiteth."

_I answer that,_ Just as one man injures another by deed in two
ways--openly, as by robbery or by doing him any kind of violence--and
secretly, as by theft, or by a crafty blow, so again one man injures
another by words in two ways--in one way, openly, and this is done by
reviling him, as stated above (Q. 72, A. 1)--and in another way
secretly, and this is done by backbiting. Now from the fact that one
man openly utters words against another man, he would appear to think
little of him, so that for this reason he dishonors him, so that
reviling is detrimental to the honor of the person reviled. On the
other hand, he that speaks against another secretly, seems to respect
rather than slight him, so that he injures directly, not his honor
but his good name, in so far as by uttering such words secretly, he,
for his own part, causes his hearers to have a bad opinion of the
person against whom he speaks. For the backbiter apparently intends
and aims at being believed. It is therefore evident that backbiting
differs from reviling in two points: first, in the way in which the
words are uttered, the reviler speaking openly against someone, and
the backbiter secretly; secondly, as to the end in view, i.e. as
regards the injury inflicted, the reviler injuring a man's honor, the
backbiter injuring his good name.

Reply Obj. 1: In involuntary commutations, to which are reduced all
injuries inflicted on our neighbor, whether by word or by deed, the
kind of sin is differentiated by the circumstances "secretly" and
"openly," because involuntariness itself is diversified by violence
and by ignorance, as stated above (Q. 65, A. 4; I-II, Q. 6, AA. 5, 8).

Reply Obj. 2: The words of a backbiter are said to be secret, not
altogether, but in relation to the person of whom they are said,
because they are uttered in his absence and without his knowledge. On
the other hand, the reviler speaks against a man to his face.
Wherefore if a man speaks ill of another in the presence of several,
it is a case of backbiting if he be absent, but of reviling if he
alone be present: although if a man speak ill of an absent person to
one man alone, he destroys his good name not altogether but partly.

Reply Obj. 3: A man is said to backbite (_detrahere_) another, not
because he detracts from the truth, but because he lessens his good
name. This is done sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly.
Directly, in four ways: first, by saying that which is false about
him; secondly, by stating his sin to be greater than it is; thirdly,
by revealing something unknown about him; fourthly, by ascribing his
good deeds to a bad intention. Indirectly, this is done either by
gainsaying his good, or by maliciously concealing it, or by
diminishing it.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 73, Art. 2]

Whether Backbiting Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is not a mortal sin. For
no act of virtue is a mortal sin. Now, to reveal an unknown sin,
which pertains to backbiting, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3), is an act
of the virtue of charity, whereby a man denounces his brother's sin
in order that he may amend: or else it is an act of justice, whereby
a man accuses his brother. Therefore backbiting is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, a gloss on Prov. 24:21, "Have nothing to do with
detractors," says: "The whole human race is in peril from this vice."
But no mortal sin is to be found in the whole of mankind, since many
refrain from mortal sin: whereas they are venial sins that are found
in all. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine in a homily _on the Fire of Purgatory_
[*Serm. civ in the appendix to St. Augustine's work] reckons it a
slight sin "to speak ill without hesitation or forethought." But this
pertains to backbiting. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 1:30): "Backbiters, hateful to
God," which epithet, according to a gloss, is inserted, "lest it be
deemed a slight sin because it consists in words."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 72, A. 2), sins of word should
be judged chiefly from the intention of the speaker. Now backbiting
by its very nature aims at blackening a man's good name. Wherefore,
properly speaking, to backbite is to speak ill of an absent person in
order to blacken his good name. Now it is a very grave matter to
blacken a man's good name, because of all temporal things a man's
good name seems the most precious, since for lack of it he is
hindered from doing many things well. For this reason it is written
(Ecclus. 41:15): "Take care of a good name, for this shall continue
with thee, more than a thousand treasures precious and great."
Therefore backbiting, properly speaking, is a mortal sin.
Nevertheless it happens sometimes that a man utters words, whereby
someone's good name is tarnished, and yet he does not intend this,
but something else. This is not backbiting strictly and formally
speaking, but only materially and accidentally as it were. And if
such defamatory words be uttered for the sake of some necessary good,
and with attention to the due circumstances, it is not a sin and
cannot be called backbiting. But if they be uttered out of lightness
of heart or for some unnecessary motive, it is not a mortal sin,
unless perchance the spoken word be of such a grave nature, as to
cause a notable injury to a man's good name, especially in matters
pertaining to his moral character, because from the very nature of
the words this would be a mortal sin. And one is bound to restore a
man his good name, no less than any other thing one has taken from
him, in the manner stated above (Q. 62, A. 2) when we were treating
of restitution.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, it is not backbiting to reveal a man's
hidden sin in order that he may mend, whether one denounce it, or
accuse him for the good of public justice.

Reply Obj. 2: This gloss does not assert that backbiting is to
be found throughout the whole of mankind, but "almost," both because
"the number of fools is infinite," [*Eccles. 1:15] and few are they
that walk in the way of salvation, [*Cf. Matt. 7:14] and because there
are few or none at all who do not at times speak from lightness of
heart, so as to injure someone's good name at least slightly, for it
is written (James 3:2): "If any man offend not in word, the same is a
perfect man."

Reply Obj. 3: Augustine is referring to the case when a man
utters a slight evil about someone, not intending to injure him, but
through lightness of heart or a slip of the tongue.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 73, Art. 3]

Whether Backbiting Is the Gravest of All Sins Committed Against One's
Neighbor?

Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is the gravest of all sins
committed against one's neighbor. Because a gloss on Ps. 108:4,
"Instead of making me a return of love they detracted me," a gloss
says: "Those who detract Christ in His members and slay the souls of
future believers are more guilty than those who killed the flesh that
was soon to rise again." From this it seems to follow that backbiting
is by so much a graver sin than murder, as it is a graver matter to
kill the soul than to kill the body. Now murder is the gravest of the
other sins that are committed against one's neighbor. Therefore
backbiting is absolutely the gravest of all.

Obj. 2: Further, backbiting is apparently a graver sin than reviling,
because a man can withstand reviling, but not a secret backbiting.
Now backbiting is seemingly a graver sin than adultery, because
adultery unites two persons in one flesh, whereas reviling severs
utterly those who were united. Therefore backbiting is more grievous
than adultery: and yet of all other sins a man commits against his
neighbor, adultery is most grave.

Obj. 3: Further, reviling arises from anger, while backbiting arises
from envy, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). But envy is a
graver sin than anger. Therefore backbiting is a graver sin than
reviling; and so the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 4: Further, the gravity of a sin is measured by the gravity of
the defect that it causes. Now backbiting causes a most grievous
defect, viz. blindness of mind. For Gregory says (Regist. xi, Ep. 2):
"What else do backbiters but blow on the dust and stir up the dirt
into their eyes, so that the more they breathe of detraction, the
less they see of the truth?" Therefore backbiting is the most
grievous sin committed against one's neighbor.

_On the contrary,_ It is more grievous to sin by deed than by word.
But backbiting is a sin of word, while adultery, murder, and theft
are sins of deed. Therefore backbiting is not graver than the other
sins committed against one's neighbor.

_I answer that,_ The essential gravity of sins committed against
one's neighbor must be weighed by the injury they inflict on him,
since it is thence that they derive their sinful nature. Now the
greater the good taken away, the greater the injury. And while man's
good is threefold, namely the good of his soul, the good of his body,
and the good of external things; the good of the soul, which is the
greatest of all, cannot be taken from him by another save as an
occasional cause, for instance by an evil persuasion, which does not
induce necessity. On the other hand the two latter goods, viz. of the
body and of external things, can be taken away by violence. Since,
however, the goods of the body excel the goods of external things,
those sins which injure a man's body are more grievous than those
which injure his external things. Consequently, among other sins
committed against one's neighbor, murder is the most grievous, since
it deprives man of the life which he already possesses: after this
comes adultery, which is contrary to the right order of human
generation, whereby man enters upon life. In the last place come
external goods, among which a man's good name takes precedence of
wealth because it is more akin to spiritual goods, wherefore it is
written (Prov. 22:1): "A good name is better than great riches."
Therefore backbiting according to its genus is a more grievous sin
than theft, but is less grievous than murder or adultery.
Nevertheless the order may differ by reason of aggravating or
extenuating circumstances.

The accidental gravity of a sin is to be considered in relation to
the sinner, who sins more grievously, if he sins deliberately than if
he sins through weakness or carelessness. In this respect sins of
word have a certain levity, in so far as they are apt to occur
through a slip of the tongue, and without much forethought.

Reply Obj. 1: Those who detract Christ by hindering the faith of His
members, disparage His Godhead, which is the foundation of our faith.
Wherefore this is not simple backbiting but blasphemy.

Reply Obj. 2: Reviling is a more grievous sin than backbiting, in as
much as it implies greater contempt of one's neighbor: even as
robbery is a graver sin than theft, as stated above (Q. 66, A. 9).
Yet reviling is not a more grievous sin than adultery. For the
gravity of adultery is measured, not from its being a union of
bodies, but from being a disorder in human generation. Moreover the
reviler is not the sufficient cause of unfriendliness in another man,
but is only the occasional cause of division among those who were
united, in so far, to wit, as by declaring the evils of another, he
for his own part severs that man from the friendship of other men,
though they are not forced by his words to do so. Accordingly a
backbiter is a murderer _occasionally,_ since by his words he gives
another man an occasion for hating or despising his neighbor. For
this reason it is stated in the Epistle of Clement [*Ad Jacob. Ep. i]
that "backbiters are murderers," i.e. occasionally; because "he that
hateth his brother is a murderer" (1 John 3:15).

Reply Obj. 3: Anger seeks openly to be avenged, as the Philosopher
states (Rhet. ii, 2): wherefore backbiting which takes place in
secret, is not the daughter of anger, as reviling is, but rather of
envy, which strives by any means to lessen one's neighbor's glory.
Nor does it follow from this that backbiting is more grievous than
reviling: since a lesser vice can give rise to a greater sin, just as
anger gives birth to murder and blasphemy. For the origin of a sin
depends on its inclination to an end, i.e. on the thing to which the
sin turns, whereas the gravity of a sin depends on what it turns away
from.

Reply Obj. 4: Since "a man rejoiceth in the sentence of his mouth"
(Prov. 15:23), it follows that a backbiter more and more loves and
believes what he says, and consequently more and more hates his
neighbor, and thus his knowledge of the truth becomes less and less.
This effect however may also result from other sins pertaining to
hate of one's neighbor.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 73, Art. 4]

Whether It Is a Grave Sin for the Listener to Suffer the Backbiter?

Objection 1: It would seem that the listener who suffers a backbiter
does not sin grievously. For a man is not under greater obligations
to others than to himself. But it is praiseworthy for a man to suffer
his own backbiters: for Gregory says (Hom. ix, super Ezech): "Just as
we ought not to incite the tongue of backbiters, lest they perish, so
ought we to suffer them with equanimity when they have been incited
by their own wickedness, in order that our merit may be the greater."
Therefore a man does not sin if he does not withstand those who
backbite others.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 4:30): "In no wise speak
against the truth." Now sometimes a person tells the truth while
backbiting, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). Therefore it seems that one
is not always bound to withstand a backbiter.

Obj. 3: Further, no man should hinder what is profitable to others.
Now backbiting is often profitable to those who are backbitten: for
Pope Pius [*St. Pius I] says [*Append. Grat. ad can. Oves, caus. vi,
qu. 1]: "Not unfrequently backbiting is directed against good
persons, with the result that those who have been unduly exalted
through the flattery of their kindred, or the favor of others, are
humbled by backbiting." Therefore one ought not to withstand
backbiters.

_On the contrary,_ Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii): "Take care not to
have an itching tongue, nor tingling ears, that is, neither detract
others nor listen to backbiters."

_I answer that,_ According to the Apostle (Rom. 1:32), they "are
worthy of death . . . not only they that" commit sins, "but they also
that consent to them that do them." Now this happens in two ways.
First, directly, when, to wit, one man induces another to sin, or
when the sin is pleasing to him: secondly, indirectly, that is, if he
does not withstand him when he might do so, and this happens
sometimes, not because the sin is pleasing to him, but on account of
some human fear.

Accordingly we must say that if a man listens to backbiting without
resisting it, he seems to consent to the backbiter, so that he
becomes a participator in his sin. And if he induces him to backbite,
or at least if the detraction be pleasing to him on account of his
hatred of the person detracted, he sins no less than the detractor,
and sometimes more. Wherefore Bernard says (De Consid. ii, 13): "It
is difficult to say which is the more to be condemned[:] the
backbiter or he that listens to backbiting." If however the sin is
not pleasing to him, and he fails to withstand the backbiter, through
fear, negligence, or even shame, he sins indeed, but much less than
the backbiter, and, as a rule venially. Sometimes too this may be a
mortal sin, either because it is his official duty to correct the
backbiter, or by reason of some consequent danger; or on account of
the radical reason for which human fear may sometimes be a mortal
sin, as stated above (Q. 19, A. 3).

Reply Obj. 1: No man hears himself backbitten, because when a man is
spoken evil of in his hearing, it is not backbiting, properly
speaking, but reviling, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2). Yet it is
possible for the detractions uttered against a person to come to his
knowledge through others telling him, and then it is left to his
discretion whether he will suffer their detriment to his good name,
unless this endanger the good of others, as stated above (Q. 72, A.
3). Wherefore his patience may deserve commendation for as much as he
suffers patiently being detracted himself. But it is not left to his
discretion to permit an injury to be done to another's good name,
hence he is accounted guilty if he fails to resist when he can, for
the same reason whereby a man is bound to raise another man's ass
lying "underneath his burden," as commanded in Deut. 21:4 [*Ex. 23:5].

Reply Obj. 2: One ought not always to withstand a backbiter by
endeavoring to convince him of falsehood, especially if one knows
that he is speaking the truth: rather ought one to reprove him with
words, for that he sins in backbiting his brother, or at least by our
pained demeanor show him that we are displeased with his backbiting,
because according to Prov. 25:23, "the north wind driveth away rain,
as doth a sad countenance a backbiting tongue."

Reply Obj. 3: The profit one derives from being backbitten is due,
not to the intention of the backbiter, but to the ordinance of God
Who produces good out of every evil. Hence we should none the less
withstand backbiters, just as those who rob or oppress others, even
though the oppressed and the robbed may gain merit by patience.
_______________________

QUESTION 74

OF TALE-BEARING
[*_Susurratio,_ i.e. whispering]
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider tale-bearing: under which head there are two
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether tale-bearing is a sin distinct from backbiting?

(2) Which of the two is the more grievous?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 74, Art. 1]

Whether Tale-bearing Is a Sin Distinct from Backbiting?

Objection 1: It would seem that tale-bearing is not a distinct sin
from backbiting. Isidore says (Etym. x): "The _susurro_ (tale-bearer)
takes his name from the sound of his speech, for he speaks
disparagingly not to the face but into the ear." But to speak of
another disparagingly belongs to backbiting. Therefore tale-bearing
is not a distinct sin from backbiting.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Lev. 19:16): "Thou shalt not be an
informer [Douay: 'a detractor'] nor a tale-bearer [Douay:
'whisperer'] among the people." But an informer is apparently the
same as a backbiter. Therefore neither does tale-bearing differ from
backbiting.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 28:15): "The tale-bearer
[Douay: 'whisperer'] and the double-tongued is accursed." But a
double-tongued man is apparently the same as a backbiter, because a
backbiter speaks with a double tongue, with one in your absence, with
another in your presence. Therefore a tale-bearer is the same as a
backbiter.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Rom. 1:29, 30, "Tale-bearers,
backbiters [Douay: 'whisperers, detractors']" says: "Tale-bearers sow
discord among friends; backbiters deny or disparage others' good
points."

_I answer that,_ The tale-bearer and the backbiter agree in matter,
and also in form or mode of speaking, since they both speak evil
secretly of their neighbor: and for this reason these terms are
sometimes used one for the other. Hence a gloss on Ecclus. 5:16, "Be
not called a tale-bearer [Douay: 'whisperer']" says: "i.e. a
backbiter." They differ however in end, because the backbiter intends
to blacken his neighbor's good name, wherefore he brings forward
those evils especially about his neighbor which are likely to defame
him, or at least to depreciate his good name: whereas a tale-bearer
intends to sever friendship, as appears from the gloss quoted above
and from the saying of Prov. 26:20, "Where the tale-bearer is taken
away, contentions shall cease." Hence it is that a tale-bearer speaks
such ill about his neighbors as may stir his hearer's mind against
them, according to Ecclus. 28:11, "A sinful man will trouble his
friends, and bring in debate in the midst of them that are at peace."

Reply Obj. 1: A tale-bearer is called a backbiter in so far as he
speaks ill of another; yet he differs from a backbiter since he
intends not to speak ill as such, but to say anything that may stir
one man against another, though it be good simply, and yet has a
semblance of evil through being unpleasant to the hearer.

Reply Obj. 2: An informer differs from a tale-bearer and a backbiter,
for an informer is one who charges others publicly with crimes,
either by accusing or by railing them, which does not apply to a
backbiter or tale-bearer.

Reply Obj. 3: A double-tongued person is properly speaking a
tale-bearer. For since friendship is between two, the tale-bearer
strives to sever friendship on both sides. Hence he employs a double
tongue towards two persons, by speaking ill of one to the other:
wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 28:15): "The tale-bearer [Douay:
'whisperer'] and the double-tongued is accursed," and then it is
added, "for he hath troubled many that were peace."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 74, Art. 2]

Whether Backbiting Is a Graver Sin Than Tale-bearing?

Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is a graver sin than
tale-bearing. For sins of word consist in speaking evil. Now a
backbiter speaks of his neighbor things that are evil simply, for
such things lead to the loss or depreciation of his good name:
whereas a tale-bearer is only intent on saying what is apparently
evil, because to wit they are unpleasant to the hearer. Therefore
backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing.

Obj. 2: Further, he that deprives a man of his good name, deprives
him not merely of one friend, but of many, because everyone is minded
to scorn the friendship of a person with a bad name. Hence it is
reproached against a certain individual [*King Josaphat] (2 Paralip.
19:2): "Thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord."
But tale-bearing deprives one of only one friend. Therefore
backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (James 4:11): "He that backbiteth
[Douay: 'detracteth'] his brother . . . detracteth the law," and
consequently God the giver of the law. Wherefore the sin of
backbiting seems to be a sin against God, which is most grievous, as
stated above (Q. 20, A. 3; I-II, Q. 73, A. 3). On the other hand the
sin of tale-bearing is against one's neighbor. Therefore the sin of
backbiting is graver than the sin of tale-bearing.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 5:17): "An evil mark of
disgrace is upon the double-tongued; but to the tale-bearer [Douay:
'whisperer'] hatred, and enmity, and reproach."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 73, A. 3; I-II, Q. 73, A. 8),
sins against one's neighbor are the more grievous, according as they
inflict a greater injury on him: and an injury is so much the
greater, according to the greatness of the good which it takes away.
Now of all one's external goods a friend takes the first place, since
"no man can live without friends," as the Philosopher declares
(Ethic. viii, 1). Hence it is written (Ecclus. 6:15): "Nothing can be
compared to a faithful friend." Again, a man's good name whereof
backbiting deprives him, is most necessary to him that he may be
fitted for friendship. Therefore tale-bearing is a greater sin than
backbiting or even reviling, because a friend is better than honor,
and to be loved is better than to be honored, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. viii).

Reply Obj. 1: The species and gravity of a sin depend on the end
rather than on the material object, wherefore, by reason of its end,
tale-bearing is worse than backbiting, although sometimes the
backbiter says worse things.

Reply Obj. 2: A good name is a disposition for friendship, and a bad
name is a disposition for enmity. But a disposition falls short of
the thing for which it disposes. Hence to do anything that leads to a
disposition for enmity is a less grievous sin than to do what
conduces directly to enmity.

Reply Obj. 3: He that backbites his brother, seems to detract the
law, in so far as he despises the precept of love for one's neighbor:
while he that strives to sever friendship seems to act more directly
against this precept. Hence the latter sin is more specially against
God, because "God is charity" (1 John 4:16), and for this reason it
is written (Prov. 6:16): "Six things there are, which the Lord
hateth, and the seventh His soul detesteth," and the seventh is "he
(Prov. 6:19) that soweth discord among brethren."
_______________________

QUESTION 75

OF DERISION
[*Or mockery]
(In Two Articles)

We must now speak of derision, under which head there are two points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether derision is a special sin distinct from the other sins
whereby one's neighbor is injured by words?

(2) Whether derision is a mortal sin?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 75, Art. 1]

Whether Derision Is a Special Sin Distinct from Those Already
Mentioned?

Objection 1: It would seem that derision is not a special sin
distinct from those mentioned above. For laughing to scorn is
apparently the same as derision. But laughing to scorn pertains to
reviling. Therefore derision would seem not to differ from reviling.

Obj. 2: Further, no man is derided except for something reprehensible
which puts him to shame. Now such are sins; and if they be imputed to
a person publicly, it is a case of reviling, if privately, it amounts
to backbiting or tale-bearing. Therefore derision is not distinct
from the foregoing vices.

Obj. 3: Further, sins of this kind are distinguished by the injury
they inflict on one's neighbor. Now the injury inflicted on a man by
derision affects either his honor, or his good name, or is
detrimental to his friendship. Therefore derision is not a sin
distinct from the foregoing.

_On the contrary,_ Derision is done in jest, wherefore it is
described as "making fun." Now all the foregoing are done seriously
and not in jest. Therefore derision differs from all of them.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 72, A. 2), sins of word should
be weighed chiefly by the intention of the speaker, wherefore these
sins are differentiated according to the various intentions of those
who speak against another. Now just as the railer intends to injure
the honor of the person he rails, the backbiter to depreciate a good
name, and the tale-bearer to destroy friendship, so too the derider
intends to shame the person he derides. And since this end is
distinct from the others, it follows that the sin of derision is
distinct from the foregoing sins.

Reply Obj. 1: Laughing to scorn and derision agree as to the end but
differ in mode, because derision is done with the "mouth," i.e. by
words and laughter, while laughing to scorn is done by wrinkling the
nose, as a gloss says on Ps. 2:4, "He that dwelleth in heaven shall
laugh at them": and such a distinction does not differentiate the
species. Yet they both differ from reviling, as being shamed differs
from being dishonored: for to be ashamed is "to fear dishonor," as
Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 15).

Reply Obj. 2: For doing a virtuous deed a man deserves both respect
and a good name in the eyes of others, and in his own eyes the glory
of a good conscience, according to 2 Cor. 1:12, "Our glory is this,
the testimony of our conscience." Hence, on the other hand, for doing
a reprehensible, i.e. a vicious action, a man forfeits his honor and
good name in the eyes of others--and for this purpose the reviler and
the backbiter speak of another person--while in his own eyes, he
loses the glory of his conscience through being confused and ashamed
at reprehensible deeds being imputed to him--and for this purpose the
derider speaks ill of him. It is accordingly evident that derision
agrees with the foregoing vices as to the matter but differs as to
the end.

Reply Obj. 3: A secure and calm conscience is a great good, according
to Prov. 15:15, "A secure mind is like a continual feast." Wherefore
he that disturbs another's conscience by confounding him inflicts a
special injury on him: hence derision is a special kind of sin.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 75, Art. 2]

Whether Derision Can Be a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that derision cannot be a mortal sin.
Every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But derision does not seem
contrary to charity, for sometimes it takes place in jest among
friends, wherefore it is known as "making fun." Therefore derision
cannot be a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, the greatest derision would appear to be that which
is done as an injury to God. But derision is not always a mortal sin
when it tends to the injury of God: else it would be a mortal sin to
relapse into a venial sin of which one has repented. For Isidore says
(De Sum. Bon. ii, 16) that "he who continues to do what he has
repented of, is a derider and not a penitent." It would likewise
follow that all hypocrisy is a mortal sin, because, according to
Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 15) "the ostrich signifies the hypocrite, who
derides the horse, i.e. the just man, and his rider, i.e. God."
Therefore derision is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, reviling and backbiting seem to be graver sins than
derision, because it is more to do a thing seriously than in jest.
But not all backbiting or reviling is a mortal sin. Much less
therefore is derision a mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 3:34): "He derideth [Vulg.:
'shall scorn'] the scorners." But God's derision is eternal
punishment for mortal sin, as appears from the words of Ps. 2:4, "He
that dwelleth in heaven shall laugh at them." Therefore derision is a
mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ The object of derision is always some evil or
defect. Now when an evil is great, it is taken, not in jest, but
seriously: consequently if it is taken in jest or turned to ridicule
(whence the terms 'derision' and 'jesting'), this is because it is
considered to be slight. Now an evil may be considered to be slight
in two ways: first, in itself, secondly, in relation to the person.
When anyone makes game or fun of another's evil or defect, because it
is a slight evil in itself, this is a venial sin by reason of its
genus. On the other hand this defect may be considered as a slight
evil in relation to the person, just as we are wont to think little
of the defects of children and imbeciles: and then to make game or
fun of a person, is to scorn him altogether, and to think him so
despicable that his misfortune troubles us not one whit, but is held
as an object of derision. In this way derision is a mortal sin, and
more grievous than reviling, which is also done openly: because the
reviler would seem to take another's evil seriously; whereas the
derider does so in fun, and so would seem the more to despise and
dishonor the other man. Wherefore, in this sense, derision is a
grievous sin, and all the more grievous according as a greater
respect is due to the person derided.

Consequently it is an exceedingly grievous sin to deride God and the
things of God, according to Isa. 37:23, "Whom hast thou reproached,
and whom hast thou blasphemed, and against whom hast thou exalted thy
voice?" and he replies: "Against the Holy One of Israel." In the
second place comes derision of one's parents, wherefore it is written
(Prov. 30:17): "The eye that mocketh at his father, and that
despiseth the labor of his mother in bearing him, let the ravens of
the brooks pick it out, and the young eagles eat it." Further, the
derision of good persons is grievous, because honor is the reward of
virtue, and against this it is written (Job 12:4): "The simplicity of
the just man is laughed to scorn." Such like derision does very much
harm: because it turns men away from good deeds, according to Gregory
(Moral. xx, 14), "Who when they perceive any good points appearing in
the acts of others, directly pluck them up with the hand of a
mischievous reviling."

Reply Obj. 1: Jesting implies nothing contrary to charity in relation
to the person with whom one jests, but it may imply something against
charity in relation to the person who is the object of the jest, on
account of contempt, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: Neither he that relapses into a sin of which he has
repented, nor a hypocrite, derides God explicitly, but implicitly, in
so far as either's behavior is like a derider's. Nor is it true that
to commit a venial sin is to relapse or dissimulate altogether, but
only dispositively and imperfectly.

Reply Obj. 3: Derision considered in itself is less grievous than
backbiting or reviling, because it does not imply contempt, but jest.
Sometimes however it includes greater contempt than reviling does, as
stated above, and then it is a grave sin.
_______________________

QUESTION 76

OF CURSING
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider cursing. Under this head there are four points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether one may lawfully curse another?

(2) Whether one may lawfully curse an irrational creature?

(3) Whether cursing is a mortal sin?

(4) Of its comparison with other sins.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 76, Art. 1]

Whether It Is Lawful to Curse Anyone?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to curse anyone. For it is
unlawful to disregard the command of the Apostle in whom Christ
spoke, according to 2 Cor. 13:3. Now he commanded (Rom. 12:14),
"Bless and curse not." Therefore it is not lawful to curse anyone.

Obj. 2: Further, all are bound to bless God, according to Dan. 3:82,
"O ye sons of men, bless the Lord." Now the same mouth cannot both
bless God and curse man, as proved in the third chapter of James.
Therefore no man may lawfully curse another man.

Obj. 3: Further, he that curses another would seem to wish him some
evil either of fault or of punishment, since a curse appears to be a
kind of imprecation. But it is not lawful to wish ill to anyone,
indeed we are bound to pray that all may be delivered from evil.
Therefore it is unlawful for any man to curse.

Obj. 4: Further, the devil exceeds all in malice on account of his
obstinacy. But it is not lawful to curse the devil, as neither is it
lawful to curse oneself; for it is written (Ecclus. 21:30): "While
the ungodly curseth the devil, he curseth his own soul." Much less
therefore is it lawful to curse a man.

Obj. 5: Further, a gloss on Num. 23:8, "How shall I curse whom God
hath not cursed?" says: "There cannot be a just cause for cursing a
sinner if one be ignorant of his sentiments." Now one man cannot know
another man's sentiments, nor whether he is cursed by God. Therefore
no man may lawfully curse another.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 27:26): "Cursed be he that
abideth not in the words of this law." Moreover Eliseus cursed the
little boys who mocked him (4 Kings 2:24).

_I answer that,_ To curse (_maledicere_) is the same as to speak ill
(_malum dicere_). Now "speaking" has a threefold relation to the
thing spoken. First, by way of assertion, as when a thing is
expressed in the indicative mood: in this way _maledicere_ signifies
simply to tell someone of another's evil, and this pertains to
backbiting, wherefore tellers of evil (_maledici_) are sometimes
called backbiters. Secondly, speaking is related to the thing spoken,
by way of cause, and this belongs to God first and foremost, since He
made all things by His word, according to Ps. 32:9, "He spoke and
they were made"; while secondarily it belongs to man, who, by his
word, commands others and thus moves them to do something: it is for
this purpose that we employ verbs in the imperative mood. Thirdly,
"speaking" is related to the thing spoken by expressing the
sentiments of one who desires that which is expressed in words; and
for this purpose we employ the verb in the optative mood.

Accordingly we may omit the first kind of evil speaking which is by
way of simple assertion of evil, and consider the other two kinds.
And here we must observe that to do something and to will it are
consequent on one another in the matter of goodness and wickedness,
as shown above (I-II, Q. 20, A. 3). Hence in these two ways of evil
speaking, by way of command and by way of desire, there is the same
aspect of lawfulness and unlawfulness, for if a man commands or
desires another's evil, as evil, being intent on the evil itself,
then evil speaking will be unlawful in both ways, and this is what is
meant by cursing. On the other hand if a man commands or desires
another's evil under the aspect of good, it is lawful; and it may be
called cursing, not strictly speaking, but accidentally, because the
chief intention of the speaker is directed not to evil but to good.

Now evil may be spoken, by commanding or desiring it, under the
aspect of a twofold good. Sometimes under the aspect of just, and
thus a judge lawfully curses a man whom he condemns to a just
penalty: thus too the Church curses by pronouncing anathema. In the
same way the prophets in the Scriptures sometimes call down evils on
sinners, as though conforming their will to Divine justice, although
such like imprecation may be taken by way of foretelling. Sometimes
evil is spoken under the aspect of useful, as when one wishes a
sinner to suffer sickness or hindrance of some kind, either that he
may himself reform, or at least that he may cease from harming others.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle forbids cursing strictly so called with an
evil intent: and the same answer applies to the Second Objection.

Reply Obj. 3: To wish another man evil under the aspect of good, is
not opposed to the sentiment whereby one wishes him good simply, in
fact rather is it in conformity therewith.

Reply Obj. 4: In the devil both nature and guilt must be considered.
His nature indeed is good and is from God nor is it lawful to curse
it. On the other hand his guilt is deserving of being cursed,
according to Job 3:8, "Let them curse it who curse the day." Yet when
a sinner curses the devil on account of his guilt, for the same
reason he judges himself worthy of being cursed; and in this sense he
is said to curse his own soul.

Reply Obj. 5: Although the sinner's sentiments cannot be perceived in
themselves, they can be perceived through some manifest sin, which
has to be punished. Likewise although it is not possible to know whom
God curses in respect of final reprobation, it is possible to know
who is accursed of God in respect of being guilty of present sin.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 76, Art. 2]

Whether It Is Lawful to Curse an Irrational Creature?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful to curse an irrational
creature. Cursing would seem to be lawful chiefly in its relation to
punishment. Now irrational creatures are not competent subjects
either of guilt or of punishment. Therefore it is unlawful to curse
them.

Obj. 2: Further, in an irrational creature there is nothing but the
nature which God made. But it is unlawful to curse this even in the
devil, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse
an irrational creature.

Obj. 3: Further, irrational creatures are either stable, as bodies,
or transient, as the seasons. Now, according to Gregory (Moral. iv,
2), "it is useless to curse what does not exist, and wicked to curse
what exists." Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse an irrational
creature.

_On the contrary,_ our Lord cursed the fig tree, as related in Matt.
21:19; and Job cursed his day, according to Job 3:1.

_I answer that,_ Benediction and malediction, properly speaking,
regard things to which good or evil may happen, viz. rational
creatures: while good and evil are said to happen to irrational
creatures in relation to the rational creature for whose sake they
are. Now they are related to the rational creature in several ways.
First by way of ministration, in so far as irrational creatures
minister to the needs of man. In this sense the Lord said to man
(Gen. 3:17): "Cursed is the earth in thy work," so that its
barrenness would be a punishment to man. Thus also David cursed the
mountains of Gelboe, according to Gregory's expounding (Moral. iv,
3). Again the irrational creature is related to the rational creature
by way of signification: and thus our Lord cursed the fig tree in
signification of Judea. Thirdly, the irrational creature is related
to rational creatures as something containing them, namely by way of
time or place: and thus Job cursed the day of his birth, on account
of the original sin which he contracted in birth, and on account of
the consequent penalties. In this sense also we may understand David
to have cursed the mountains of Gelboe, as we read in 2 Kings 1:21,
namely on account of the people slaughtered there.

But to curse irrational beings, considered as creatures of God, is a
sin of blasphemy; while to curse them considered in themselves is
idle and vain and consequently unlawful.

From this the Replies to the objections may easily be gathered.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 76, Art. 3]

Whether Cursing Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that cursing is not a mortal sin. For
Augustine in a homily _on the Fire of Purgatory_ [*Serm. civ in the
appendix of St. Augustine's works] reckons cursing among slight sins.
But such sins are venial. Therefore cursing is not a mortal but a
venial Sin.

Obj. 2: Further, that which proceeds from a slight movement of the
mind does not seem to be generically a mortal sin. But cursing
sometimes arises from a slight movement. Therefore cursing is not a
mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, evil deeds are worse than evil words. But evil deeds
are not always mortal sins. Much less therefore is cursing a mortal
sin.

_On the contrary,_ Nothing save mortal sin excludes one from the
kingdom of God. But cursing excludes from the kingdom of God,
according to 1 Cor. 6:10, "Nor cursers [Douay: 'railers'], nor
extortioners shall possess the kingdom of God." Therefore cursing is
a mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ The evil words of which we are speaking now are
those whereby evil is uttered against someone by way of command or
desire. Now to wish evil to another man, or to conduce to that evil
by commanding it, is, of its very nature, contrary to charity whereby
we love our neighbor by desiring his good. Consequently it is a
mortal sin, according to its genus, and so much the graver, as the
person whom we curse has a greater claim on our love and respect.
Hence it is written (Lev. 20:9): "He that curseth his father, or
mother, dying let him die."

It may happen however that the word uttered in cursing is a venial
sin either through the slightness of the evil invoked on another in
cursing him, or on account of the sentiments of the person who utters
the curse; because he may say such words through some slight
movement, or in jest, or without deliberation, and sins of word
should be weighed chiefly with regard to the speaker's intention, as
stated above (Q. 72, A. 2).

From this the Replies to the Objections may be easily gathered.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 76, Art. 4]

Whether Cursing Is a Graver Sin Than Backbiting?

Objection 1: It would seem that cursing is a graver sin than
backbiting. Cursing would seem to be a kind of blasphemy, as implied
in the canonical epistle of Jude (verse 9) where it is said that
"when Michael the archangel, disputing with the devil, contended
about the body of Moses, he durst not bring against him the judgment
of blasphemy [Douay: 'railing speech']," where blasphemy stands for
cursing, according to a gloss. Now blasphemy is a graver sin than
backbiting. Therefore cursing is a graver sin than backbiting.

Obj. 2: Further, murder is more grievous than backbiting, as stated
above (Q. 73, A. 3). But cursing is on a par with the sin of murder;
for Chrysostom says (Hom. xix, super Matth.): "When thou sayest:
'Curse him down with his house, away with everything,' you are no
better than a murderer." Therefore cursing is graver than backbiting.

Obj. 3: Further, to cause a thing is more than to signify it. But the
curser causes evil by commanding it, whereas the backbiter merely
signifies an evil already existing. Therefore the curser sins more
grievously than the backbiter.

_On the contrary,_ It is impossible to do well in backbiting, whereas
cursing may be either a good or an evil deed, as appears from what
has been said (A. 1). Therefore backbiting is graver than cursing.

_I answer that,_ As stated in the First Part (Q. 48, A. 5), evil is
twofold, evil of fault, and evil of punishment; and of the two, evil
of fault is the worse (I, Q. 48, A. 6). Hence to speak evil of fault
is worse than to speak evil of punishment, provided the mode of
speaking be the same. Accordingly it belongs to the reviler, the
tale-bearer, the backbiter and the derider to speak evil of fault,
whereas it belongs to the evil-speaker, as we understand it here, to
speak evil of punishment, and not evil of fault except under the
aspect of punishment. But the mode of speaking is not the same, for
in the case of the four vices mentioned above, evil of fault is
spoken by way of assertion, whereas in the case of cursing evil of
punishment is spoken, either by causing it in the form of a command,
or by wishing it. Now the utterance itself of a person's fault is a
sin, in as much as it inflicts an injury on one's neighbor, and it is
more grievous to inflict an injury, than to wish to inflict it, other
things being equal.

Hence backbiting considered in its generic aspect is a graver sin
than the cursing which expresses a mere desire; while the cursing
which is expressed by way of command, since it has the aspect of a
cause, will be more or less grievous than backbiting, according as it
inflicts an injury more or less grave than the blackening of a man's
good name. Moreover this must be taken as applying to these vices
considered in their essential aspects: for other accidental points
might be taken into consideration, which would aggravate or extenuate
the aforesaid vices.

Reply Obj. 1: To curse a creature, as such, reflects on God, and thus
accidentally it has the character of blasphemy; not so if one curse a
creature on account of its fault: and the same applies to backbiting.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (A. 3), cursing, in one way, includes
the desire for evil, where if the curser desire the evil of another's
violent death, he does not differ, in desire, from a murderer, but he
differs from him in so far as the external act adds something to the
act of the will.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers cursing by way of command.
_______________________

QUESTION 77

OF CHEATING, WHICH IS COMMITTED IN BUYING AND SELLING
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider those sins which relate to voluntary
commutations. First, we shall consider cheating, which is committed
in buying and selling: secondly, we shall consider usury, which
occurs in loans. In connection with the other voluntary commutations
no special kind of sin is to be found distinct from rapine and theft.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Of unjust sales as regards the price; namely, whether it is
lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth?

(2) Of unjust sales on the part of the thing sold;

(3) Whether the seller is bound to reveal a fault in the thing sold?

(4) Whether it is lawful in trading to sell a thing at a higher price
than was paid for it?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 77, Art. 1]

Whether It Is Lawful to Sell a Thing for More Than Its Worth?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to sell a thing for more
than its worth. In the commutations of human life, civil laws
determine that which is just. Now according to these laws it is just
for buyer and seller to deceive one another (Cod. IV, xliv, De
Rescind. Vend. 8, 15): and this occurs by the seller selling a thing
for more than its worth, and the buyer buying a thing for less than
its worth. Therefore it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its
worth.

Obj. 2: Further, that which is common to all would seem to be natural
and not sinful. Now Augustine relates that the saying of a certain
jester was accepted by all, "You wish to buy for a song and to sell
at a premium," which agrees with the saying of Prov. 20:14, "It is
naught, it is naught, saith every buyer: and when he is gone away,
then he will boast." Therefore it is lawful to sell a thing for more
than its worth.

Obj. 3: Further, it does not seem unlawful if that which honesty
demands be done by mutual agreement. Now, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13), in the friendship which is based on
utility, the amount of the recompense for a favor received should
depend on the utility accruing to the receiver: and this utility
sometimes is worth more than the thing given, for instance if the
receiver be in great need of that thing, whether for the purpose of
avoiding a danger, or of deriving some particular benefit. Therefore,
in contracts of buying and selling, it is lawful to give a thing in
return for more than its worth.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 7:12): "All things . . .
whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them."
But no man wishes to buy a thing for more than its worth. Therefore
no man should sell a thing to another man for more than its worth.

_I answer that,_ It is altogether sinful to have recourse to deceit
in order to sell a thing for more than its just price, because this
is to deceive one's neighbor so as to injure him. Hence Tully says
(De Offic. iii, 15): "Contracts should be entirely free from
double-dealing: the seller must not impose upon the bidder, nor the
buyer upon one that bids against him."

But, apart from fraud, we may speak of buying and selling in two
ways. First, as considered in themselves, and from this point of
view, buying and selling seem to be established for the common
advantage of both parties, one of whom requires that which belongs to
the other, and vice versa, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3).
Now whatever is established for the common advantage, should not be
more of a burden to one party than to another, and consequently all
contracts between them should observe equality of thing and thing.
Again, the quality of a thing that comes into human use is measured
by the price given for it, for which purpose money was invented, as
stated in _Ethic._ v, 5. Therefore if either the price exceed the
quantity of the thing's worth, or, conversely, the thing exceed the
price, there is no longer the equality of justice: and consequently,
to sell a thing for more than its worth, or to buy it for less than
its worth, is in itself unjust and unlawful.

Secondly we may speak of buying and selling, considered as
accidentally tending to the advantage of one party, and to the
disadvantage of the other: for instance, when a man has great need of
a certain thing, while another man will suffer if he be without it.
In such a case the just price will depend not only on the thing sold,
but on the loss which the sale brings on the seller. And thus it will
be lawful to sell a thing for more than it is worth in itself, though
the price paid be not more than it is worth to the owner. Yet if the
one man derive a great advantage by becoming possessed of the other
man's property, and the seller be not at a loss through being without
that thing, the latter ought not to raise the price, because the
advantage accruing to the buyer, is not due to the seller, but to a
circumstance affecting the buyer. Now no man should sell what is not
his, though he may charge for the loss he suffers.

On the other hand if a man find that he derives great advantage from
something he has bought, he may, of his own accord, pay the seller
something over and above: and this pertains to his honesty.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 2) human law is given
to the people among whom there are many lacking virtue, and it is not
given to the virtuous alone. Hence human law was unable to forbid all
that is contrary to virtue; and it suffices for it to prohibit
whatever is destructive of human intercourse, while it treats other
matters as though they were lawful, not by approving of them, but by
not punishing them. Accordingly, if without employing deceit the
seller disposes of his goods for more than their worth, or the buyer
obtain them for less than their worth, the law looks upon this as
licit, and provides no punishment for so doing, unless the excess be
too great, because then even human law demands restitution to be
made, for instance if a man be deceived in regard to more than half
the amount of the just price of a thing [*Cod. IV, xliv, De Rescind.
Vend. 2, 8].

On the other hand the Divine law leaves nothing unpunished that is
contrary to virtue. Hence, according to the Divine law, it is
reckoned unlawful if the equality of justice be not observed in
buying and selling: and he who has received more than he ought must
make compensation to him that has suffered loss, if the loss be
considerable. I add this condition, because the just price of things
is not fixed with mathematical precision, but depends on a kind of
estimate, so that a slight addition or subtraction would not seem to
destroy the equality of justice.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says "this jester, either by looking into
himself or by his experience of others, thought that all men are
inclined to wish to buy for a song and sell at a premium. But since
in reality this is wicked, it is in every man's power to acquire that
justice whereby he may resist and overcome this inclination." And
then he gives the example of a man who gave the just price for a book
to a man who through ignorance asked a low price for it. Hence it is
evident that this common desire is not from nature but from vice,
wherefore it is common to many who walk along the broad road of sin.

Reply Obj. 3: In commutative justice we consider chiefly real
equality. On the other hand, in friendship based on utility we
consider equality of usefulness, so that the recompense should depend
on the usefulness accruing, whereas in buying it should be equal to
the thing bought.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 77, Art. 2]

Whether a Sale Is Rendered Unlawful Through a Fault in the Thing Sold?

Objection 1: It would seem that a sale is not rendered unjust and
unlawful through a fault in the thing sold. For less account should
be taken of the other parts of a thing than of what belongs to its
substance. Yet the sale of a thing does not seem to be rendered
unlawful through a fault in its substance: for instance, if a man
sell instead of the real metal, silver or gold produced by some
chemical process, which is adapted to all the human uses for which
silver and gold are necessary, for instance in the making of vessels
and the like. Much less therefore will it be an unlawful sale if the
thing be defective in other ways.

Obj. 2: Further, any fault in the thing, affecting the quantity,
would seem chiefly to be opposed to justice which consists in
equality. Now quantity is known by being measured: and the measures
of things that come into human use are not fixed, but in some places
are greater, in others less, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 7).
Therefore just as it is impossible to avoid defects on the part of
the thing sold, it seems that a sale is not rendered unlawful through
the thing sold being defective.

Obj. 3: Further, the thing sold is rendered defective by lacking a
fitting quality. But in order to know the quality of a thing, much
knowledge is required that is lacking in most buyers. Therefore a
sale is not rendered unlawful by a fault (in the thing sold).

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. iii, 11): "It is
manifestly a rule of justice that a good man should not depart from
the truth, nor inflict an unjust injury on anyone, nor have any
connection with fraud."

_I answer that,_ A threefold fault may be found pertaining to the
thing which is sold. One, in respect of the thing's substance: and if
the seller be aware of a fault in the thing he is selling, he is
guilty of a fraudulent sale, so that the sale is rendered unlawful.
Hence we find it written against certain people (Isa. 1:22), "Thy
silver is turned into dross, thy wine is mingled with water": because
that which is mixed is defective in its substance.

Another defect is in respect of quantity which is known by being
measured: wherefore if anyone knowingly make use of a faulty measure
in selling, he is guilty of fraud, and the sale is illicit. Hence it
is written (Deut. 25:13, 14): "Thou shalt not have divers weights in
thy bag, a greater and a less: neither shall there be in thy house a
greater bushel and a less," and further on (Deut. 25:16): "For the
Lord . . . abhorreth him that doth these things, and He hateth all
injustice."

A third defect is on the part of the quality, for instance, if a man
sell an unhealthy animal as being a healthy one: and if anyone do
this knowingly he is guilty of a fraudulent sale, and the sale, in
consequence, is illicit.

In all these cases not only is the man guilty of a fraudulent sale,
but he is also bound to restitution. But if any of the foregoing
defects be in the thing sold, and he knows nothing about this, the
seller does not sin, because he does that which is unjust materially,
nor is his deed unjust, as shown above (Q. 59, A. 2). Nevertheless he
is bound to compensate the buyer, when the defect comes to his
knowledge. Moreover what has been said of the seller applies equally
to the buyer. For sometimes it happens that the seller thinks his
goods to be specifically of lower value, as when a man sells gold
instead of copper, and then if the buyer be aware of this, he buys it
unjustly and is bound to restitution: and the same applies to a
defect in quantity as to a defect in quality.

Reply Obj. 1: Gold and silver are costly not only on account of the
usefulness of the vessels and other like things made from them, but
also on account of the excellence and purity of their substance.
Hence if the gold or silver produced by alchemists has not the true
specific nature of gold and silver, the sale thereof is fraudulent
and unjust, especially as real gold and silver can produce certain
results by their natural action, which the counterfeit gold and
silver of alchemists cannot produce. Thus the true metal has the
property of making people joyful, and is helpful medicinally against
certain maladies. Moreover real gold can be employed more frequently,
and lasts longer in its condition of purity than counterfeit gold. If
however real gold were to be produced by alchemy, it would not be
unlawful to sell it for the genuine article, for nothing prevents art
from employing certain natural causes for the production of natural
and true effects, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) of things
produced by the art of the demons.

Reply Obj. 2: The measures of salable commodities must needs be
different in different places, on account of the difference of
supply: because where there is greater abundance, the measures are
wont to be larger. However in each place those who govern the state
must determine the just measures of things salable, with due
consideration for the conditions of place and time. Hence it is not
lawful to disregard such measures as are established by public
authority or custom.

Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 16) the price of
things salable does not depend on their degree of nature, since at
times a horse fetches a higher price than a slave; but it depends on
their usefulness to man. Hence it is not necessary for the seller or
buyer to be cognizant of the hidden qualities of the thing sold, but
only of such as render the thing adapted to man's use, for instance,
that the horse be strong, run well and so forth. Such qualities the
seller and buyer can easily discover.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 77, Art. 3]

Whether the Seller Is Bound to State the Defects of the Thing Sold?

Objection 1: It would seem that the seller is not bound to state the
defects of the thing sold. Since the seller does not bind the buyer
to buy, he would seem to leave it to him to judge of the goods
offered for sale. Now judgment about a thing and knowledge of that
thing belong to the same person. Therefore it does not seem imputable
to the seller if the buyer be deceived in his judgment, and be
hurried into buying a thing without carefully inquiring into its
condition.

Obj. 2: Further, it seems foolish for anyone to do what prevents him
carrying out his work. But if a man states the defects of the goods
he has for sale, he prevents their sale: wherefore Tully (De Offic.
iii, 13) pictures a man as saying: "Could anything be more absurd
than for a public crier, instructed by the owner, to cry: 'I offer
this unhealthy horse for sale?'" Therefore the seller is not bound to
state the defects of the thing sold.

Obj. 3: Further, man needs more to know the road of virtue than to
know the faults of things offered for sale. Now one is not bound to
offer advice to all or to tell them the truth about matters
pertaining to virtue, though one should not tell anyone what is
false. Much less therefore is a seller bound to tell the faults of
what he offers for sale, as though he were counseling the buyer.

Obj. 4: Further, if one were bound to tell the faults of what one
offers for sale, this would only be in order to lower the price. Now
sometimes the price would be lowered for some other reason, without
any defect in the thing sold: for instance, if the seller carry wheat
to a place where wheat fetches a high price, knowing that many will
come after him carrying wheat; because if the buyers knew this they
would give a lower price. But apparently the seller need not give the
buyer this information. Therefore, in like manner, neither need he
tell him the faults of the goods he is selling.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. iii, 10): "In all
contracts the defects of the salable commodity must be stated; and
unless the seller make them known, although the buyer has already
acquired a right to them, the contract is voided on account of the
fraudulent action."

_I answer that,_ It is always unlawful to give anyone an occasion of
danger or loss, although a man need not always give another the help
or counsel which would be for his advantage in any way; but only in
certain fixed cases, for instance when someone is subject to him, or
when he is the only one who can assist him. Now the seller who offers
goods for sale, gives the buyer an occasion of loss or danger, by the
very fact that he offers him defective goods, if such defect may
occasion loss or danger to the buyer--loss, if, by reason of this
defect, the goods are of less value, and he takes nothing off the
price on that account--danger, if this defect either hinder the use
of the goods or render it hurtful, for instance, if a man sells a
lame for a fleet horse, a tottering house for a safe one, rotten or
poisonous food for wholesome. Wherefore if such like defects be
hidden, and the seller does not make them known, the sale will be
illicit and fraudulent, and the seller will be bound to compensation
for the loss incurred.

On the other hand, if the defect be manifest, for instance if a horse
have but one eye, or if the goods though useless to the buyer, be
useful to someone else, provided the seller take as much as he ought
from the price, he is not bound to state the defect of the goods,
since perhaps on account of that defect the buyer might want him to
allow a greater rebate than he need. Wherefore the seller may look to
his own indemnity, by withholding the defect of the goods.

Reply Obj. 1: Judgment cannot be pronounced save on what is manifest:
for "a man judges of what he knows" (Ethic. i, 3). Hence if the
defects of the goods offered for sale be hidden, judgment of them is
not sufficiently left with the buyer unless such defects be made
known to him. The case would be different if the defects were
manifest.

Reply Obj. 2: There is no need to publish beforehand by the public
crier the defects of the goods one is offering for sale, because if
he were to begin by announcing its defects, the bidders would be
frightened to buy, through ignorance of other qualities that might
render the thing good and serviceable. Such defect ought to be stated
to each individual that offers to buy: and then he will be able to
compare the various points one with the other, the good with the bad:
for nothing prevents that which is defective in one respect being
useful in many others.

Reply Obj. 3: Although a man is not bound strictly speaking to tell
everyone the truth about matters pertaining to virtue, yet he is so
bound in a case when, unless he tells the truth, his conduct would
endanger another man in detriment to virtue: and so it is in this
case.

Reply Obj. 4: The defect in a thing makes it of less value now than
it seems to be: but in the case cited, the goods are expected to be
of less value at a future time, on account of the arrival of other
merchants, which was not foreseen by the buyers. Wherefore the
seller, since he sells his goods at the price actually offered him,
does not seem to act contrary to justice through not stating what is
going to happen. If however he were to do so, or if he lowered his
price, it would be exceedingly virtuous on his part: although he does
not seem to be bound to do this as a debt of justice.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 77, Art. 4]

Whether, in Trading, It Is Lawful to Sell a Thing at a Higher Price
Than What Was Paid for It?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful, in trading, to sell
a thing for a higher price than we paid for it. For Chrysostom [*Hom.
xxxviii in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John
Chrysostom] says on Matt. 21:12: "He that buys a thing in order that
he may sell it, entire and unchanged, at a profit, is the trader who
is cast out of God's temple." Cassiodorus speaks in the same sense in
his commentary on Ps. 70:15, "Because I have not known learning, or
trading" according to another version [*The Septuagint]: "What is
trade," says he, "but buying at a cheap price with the purpose of
retailing at a higher price?" and he adds: "Such were the tradesmen
whom Our Lord cast out of the temple." Now no man is cast out of the
temple except for a sin. Therefore such like trading is sinful.

Obj. 2: Further, it is contrary to justice to sell goods at a higher
price than their worth, or to buy them for less than their value, as
shown above (A. 1). Now if you sell a thing for a higher price than
you paid for it, you must either have bought it for less than its
value, or sell it for more than its value. Therefore this cannot be
done without sin.

Obj. 3: Further, Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii): "Shun, as you would
the plague, a cleric who from being poor has become wealthy, or who,
from being a nobody has become a celebrity." Now trading would net
seem to be forbidden to clerics except on account of its sinfulness.
Therefore it is a sin in trading, to buy at a low price and to sell
at a higher price.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine commenting on Ps. 70:15, "Because I have
not known learning," [*Cf. Obj. 1] says: "The greedy tradesman
blasphemes over his losses; he lies and perjures himself over the
price of his wares. But these are vices of the man, not of the craft,
which can be exercised without these vices." Therefore trading is not
in itself unlawful.

_I answer that,_ A tradesman is one whose business consists in the
exchange of things. According to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3),
exchange of things is twofold; one, natural as it were, and
necessary, whereby one commodity is exchanged for another, or money
taken in exchange for a commodity, in order to satisfy the needs of
life. Such like trading, properly speaking, does not belong to
tradesmen, but rather to housekeepers or civil servants who have to
provide the household or the state with the necessaries of life. The
other kind of exchange is either that of money for money, or of any
commodity for money, not on account of the necessities of life, but
for profit, and this kind of exchange, properly speaking, regards
tradesmen, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3). The former
kind of exchange is commendable because it supplies a natural need:
but the latter is justly deserving of blame, because, considered in
itself, it satisfies the greed for gain, which knows no limit and
tends to infinity. Hence trading, considered in itself, has a certain
debasement attaching thereto, in so far as, by its very nature, it
does not imply a virtuous or necessary end. Nevertheless gain which
is the end of trading, though not implying, by its nature, anything
virtuous or necessary, does not, in itself, connote anything sinful
or contrary to virtue: wherefore nothing prevents gain from being
directed to some necessary or even virtuous end, and thus trading
becomes lawful. Thus, for instance, a man may intend the moderate
gain which he seeks to acquire by trading for the upkeep of his
household, or for the assistance of the needy: or again, a man may
take to trade for some public advantage, for instance, lest his
country lack the necessaries of life, and seek gain, not as an end,
but as payment for his labor.

Reply Obj. 1: The saying of Chrysostom refers to the trading which
seeks gain as a last end. This is especially the case where a man
sells something at a higher price without its undergoing any change.
For if he sells at a higher price something that has changed for the
better, he would seem to receive the reward of his labor.
Nevertheless the gain itself may be lawfully intended, not as a last
end, but for the sake of some other end which is necessary or
virtuous, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: Not everyone that sells at a higher price than he
bought is a tradesman, but only he who buys that he may sell at a
profit. If, on the contrary, he buys not for sale but for possession,
and afterwards, for some reason wishes to sell, it is not a trade
transaction even if he sell at a profit. For he may lawfully do this,
either because he has bettered the thing, or because the value of the
thing has changed with the change of place or time, or on account of
the danger he incurs in transferring the thing from one place to
another, or again in having it carried by another. In this sense
neither buying nor selling is unjust.

Reply Obj. 3: Clerics should abstain not only from things that are
evil in themselves, but even from those that have an appearance of
evil. This happens in trading, both because it is directed to worldly
gain, which clerics should despise, and because trading is open to so
many vices, since "a merchant is hardly free from sins of the lips"
[*'A merchant is hardly free from negligence, and a huckster shall
not be justified from the sins of the lips'] (Ecclus. 26:28). There
is also another reason, because trading engages the mind too much
with worldly cares, and consequently withdraws it from spiritual
cares; wherefore the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:4): "No man being a
soldier to God entangleth himself with secular businesses."
Nevertheless it is lawful for clerics to engage in the first
mentioned kind of exchange, which is directed to supply the
necessaries of life, either by buying or by selling.
_______________________

QUESTION 78

OF THE SIN OF USURY
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the sin of usury, which is committed in loans:
and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is a sin to take money as a price for money lent,
which is to receive usury?

(2) Whether it is lawful to lend money for any other kind of
consideration, by way of payment for the loan?

(3) Whether a man is bound to restore just gains derived from money
taken in usury?

(4) Whether it is lawful to borrow money under a condition of usury?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 78, Art. 1]

Whether It Is a Sin to Take Usury for Money Lent?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not a sin to take usury for
money lent. For no man sins through following the example of Christ.
But Our Lord said of Himself (Luke 19:23): "At My coming I might have
exacted it," i.e. the money lent, "with usury." Therefore it is not a
sin to take usury for lending money.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Ps. 18:8, "The law of the Lord is
unspotted," because, to wit, it forbids sin. Now usury of a kind is
allowed in the Divine law, according to Deut. 23:19, 20: "Thou shalt
not fenerate to thy brother money, nor corn, nor any other thing, but
to the stranger": nay more, it is even promised as a reward for the
observance of the Law, according to Deut. 28:12: "Thou shalt
fenerate* to many nations, and shalt not borrow of any one."
[*_Faeneraberis_--'Thou shalt lend upon usury.' The Douay version has
simply 'lend.' The objection lays stress on the word _faeneraberis:_
hence the necessity of rendering it by 'fenerate.'] Therefore it is
not a sin to take usury.

Obj. 3: Further, in human affairs justice is determined by civil
laws. Now civil law allows usury to be taken. Therefore it seems to
be lawful.

Obj. 4: Further, the counsels are not binding under sin. But, among
other counsels we find (Luke 6:35): "Lend, hoping for nothing
thereby." Therefore it is not a sin to take usury.

Obj. 5: Further, it does not seem to be in itself sinful to accept a
price for doing what one is not bound to do. But one who has money is
not bound in every case to lend it to his neighbor. Therefore it is
lawful for him sometimes to accept a price for lending it.

Obj. 6: Further, silver made into coins does not differ specifically
from silver made into a vessel. But it is lawful to accept a price
for the loan of a silver vessel. Therefore it is also lawful to
accept a price for the loan of a silver coin. Therefore usury is not
in itself a sin.

Obj. 7: Further, anyone may lawfully accept a thing which its owner
freely gives him. Now he who accepts the loan, freely gives the
usury. Therefore he who lends may lawfully take the usury.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 22:25): "If thou lend money to
any of thy people that is poor, that dwelleth with thee, thou shalt
not be hard upon them as an extortioner, nor oppress them with
usuries."

_I answer that,_ To take usury for money lent is unjust in itself,
because this is to sell what does not exist, and this evidently leads
to inequality which is contrary to justice. In order to make this
evident, we must observe that there are certain things the use of
which consists in their consumption: thus we consume wine when we use
it for drink and we consume wheat when we use it for food. Wherefore
in such like things the use of the thing must not be reckoned apart
from the thing itself, and whoever is granted the use of the thing,
is granted the thing itself and for this reason, to lend things of
this kind is to transfer the ownership. Accordingly if a man wanted
to sell wine separately from the use of the wine, he would be selling
the same thing twice, or he would be selling what does not exist,
wherefore he would evidently commit a sin of injustice. In like
manner he commits an injustice who lends wine or wheat, and asks for
double payment, viz. one, the return of the thing in equal measure,
the other, the price of the use, which is called usury.

On the other hand, there are things the use of which does not consist
in their consumption: thus to use a house is to dwell in it, not to
destroy it. Wherefore in such things both may be granted: for
instance, one man may hand over to another the ownership of his house
while reserving to himself the use of it for a time, or vice versa,
he may grant the use of the house, while retaining the ownership. For
this reason a man may lawfully make a charge for the use of his
house, and, besides this, revendicate the house from the person to
whom he has granted its use, as happens in renting and letting a
house.

Now money, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5; Polit. i, 3)
was invented chiefly for the purpose of exchange: and consequently
the proper and principal use of money is its consumption or
alienation whereby it is sunk in exchange. Hence it is by its very
nature unlawful to take payment for the use of money lent, which
payment is known as usury: and just as a man is bound to restore
other ill-gotten goods, so is he bound to restore the money which he
has taken in usury.

Reply Obj. 1: In this passage usury must be taken figuratively for
the increase of spiritual goods which God exacts from us, for He
wishes us ever to advance in the goods which we receive from Him: and
this is for our own profit not for His.

Reply Obj. 2: The Jews were forbidden to take usury from their
brethren, i.e. from other Jews. By this we are given to understand
that to take usury from any man is evil simply, because we ought to
treat every man as our neighbor and brother, especially in the state
of the Gospel, whereto all are called. Hence it is said without any
distinction in Ps. 14:5: "He that hath not put out his money to
usury," and (Ezech. 18:8): "Who hath not taken usury [*Vulg.: 'If a
man . . . hath not lent upon money, nor taken any increase . . . he
is just.']." They were permitted, however, to take usury from
foreigners, not as though it were lawful, but in order to avoid a
greater evil, lest, to wit, through avarice to which they were prone
according to Isa. 56:11, they should take usury from the Jews who
were worshippers of God.

Where we find it promised to them as a reward, "Thou shalt fenerate
to many nations," etc., fenerating is to be taken in a broad sense
for lending, as in Ecclus. 29:10, where we read: "Many have refused
to fenerate, not out of wickedness," i.e. they would not lend.
Accordingly the Jews are promised in reward an abundance of wealth,
so that they would be able to lend to others.

Reply Obj. 3: Human laws leave certain things unpunished, on account
of the condition of those who are imperfect, and who would be
deprived of many advantages, if all sins were strictly forbidden and
punishments appointed for them. Wherefore human law has permitted
usury, not that it looks upon usury as harmonizing with justice, but
lest the advantage of many should be hindered. Hence it is that in
civil law [*Inst. II, iv, de Usufructu] it is stated that "those
things according to natural reason and civil law which are consumed
by being used, do not admit of usufruct," and that "the senate did
not (nor could it) appoint a usufruct to such things, but established
a quasi-usufruct," namely by permitting usury. Moreover the
Philosopher, led by natural reason, says (Polit. i, 3) that "to make
money by usury is exceedingly unnatural."

Reply Obj. 4: A man is not always bound to lend, and for this reason
it is placed among the counsels. Yet it is a matter of precept not to
seek profit by lending: although it may be called a matter of counsel
in comparison with the maxims of the Pharisees, who deemed some kinds
of usury to be lawful, just as love of one's enemies is a matter of
counsel. Or again, He speaks here not of the hope of usurious gain,
but of the hope which is put in man. For we ought not to lend or do
any good deed through hope in man, but only through hope in God.

Reply Obj. 5: He that is not bound to lend, may accept repayment for
what he has done, but he must not exact more. Now he is repaid
according to equality of justice if he is repaid as much as he lent.
Wherefore if he exacts more for the usufruct of a thing which has no
other use but the consumption of its substance, he exacts a price of
something non-existent: and so his exaction is unjust.

Reply Obj. 6: The principal use of a silver vessel is not its
consumption, and so one may lawfully sell its use while retaining
one's ownership of it. On the other hand the principal use of silver
money is sinking it in exchange, so that it is not lawful to sell its
use and at the same time expect the restitution of the amount lent.
It must be observed, however, that the secondary use of silver
vessels may be an exchange, and such use may not be lawfully sold. In
like manner there may be some secondary use of silver money; for
instance, a man might lend coins for show, or to be used as security.

Reply Obj. 7: He who gives usury does not give it voluntarily simply,
but under a certain necessity, in so far as he needs to borrow money
which the owner is unwilling to lend without usury.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 78, Art. 2]

Whether It Is Lawful to Ask for Any Other Kind of Consideration for
Money Lent?

Objection 1: It would seem that one may ask for some other kind of
consideration for money lent. For everyone may lawfully seek to
indemnify himself. Now sometimes a man suffers loss through lending
money. Therefore he may lawfully ask for or even exact something else
besides the money lent.

Obj. 2: Further, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 5, one is in duty bound by
a point of honor, to repay anyone who has done us a favor. Now to
lend money to one who is in straits is to do him a favor for which he
should be grateful. Therefore the recipient of a loan, is bound by a
natural debt to repay something. Now it does not seem unlawful to
bind oneself to an obligation of the natural law. Therefore it is not
unlawful, in lending money to anyone, to demand some sort of
compensation as condition of the loan.

Obj. 3: Further, just as there is real remuneration, so is there
verbal remuneration, and remuneration by service, as a gloss says on
Isa. 33:15, "Blessed is he that shaketh his hands from all bribes
[*Vulg.: 'Which of you shall dwell with everlasting burnings? . . .
He that shaketh his hands from all bribes.']." Now it is lawful to
accept service or praise from one to whom one has lent money.
Therefore in like manner it is lawful to accept any other kind of
remuneration.

Obj. 4: Further, seemingly the relation of gift to gift is the same
as of loan to loan. But it is lawful to accept money for money given.
Therefore it is lawful to accept repayment by loan in return for a
loan granted.

Obj. 5: Further, the lender, by transferring his ownership of a sum
of money removes the money further from himself than he who entrusts
it to a merchant or craftsman. Now it is lawful to receive interest
for money entrusted to a merchant or craftsman. Therefore it is also
lawful to receive interest for money lent.

Obj. 6: Further, a man may accept a pledge for money lent, the use of
which pledge he might sell for a price: as when a man mortgages his
land or the house wherein he dwells. Therefore it is lawful to
receive interest for money lent.

Obj. 7: Further, it sometimes happens that a man raises the price of
his goods under guise of loan, or buys another's goods at a low
figure; or raises his price through delay in being paid, and lowers
his price that he may be paid the sooner. Now in all these cases
there seems to be payment for a loan of money: nor does it appear to
be manifestly illicit. Therefore it seems to be lawful to expect or
exact some consideration for money lent.

_On the contrary,_ Among other conditions requisite in a just man it
is stated (Ezech. 18:17) that he "hath not taken usury and increase."

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1), a thing
is reckoned as money "if its value can be measured by money."
Consequently, just as it is a sin against justice, to take money, by
tacit or express agreement, in return for lending money or anything
else that is consumed by being used, so also is it a like sin, by
tacit or express agreement to receive anything whose price can be
measured by money. Yet there would be no sin in receiving something
of the kind, not as exacting it, nor yet as though it were due on
account of some agreement tacit or expressed, but as a gratuity:
since, even before lending the money, one could accept a gratuity,
nor is one in a worse condition through lending.

On the other hand it is lawful to exact compensation for a loan, in
respect of such things as are not appreciated by a measure of money,
for instance, benevolence, and love for the lender, and so forth.

Reply Obj. 1: A lender may without sin enter an agreement with the
borrower for compensation for the loss he incurs of something he
ought to have, for this is not to sell the use of money but to avoid
a loss. It may also happen that the borrower avoids a greater loss
than the lender incurs, wherefore the borrower may repay the lender
with what he has gained. But the lender cannot enter an agreement for
compensation, through the fact that he makes no profit out of his
money: because he must not sell that which he has not yet and may be
prevented in many ways from having.

Reply Obj. 2: Repayment for a favor may be made in two ways. In one
way, as a debt of justice; and to such a debt a man may be bound by a
fixed contract; and its amount is measured according to the favor
received. Wherefore the borrower of money or any such thing the use
of which is its consumption is not bound to repay more than he
received in loan: and consequently it is against justice if he be
obliged to pay back more. In another way a man's obligation to
repayment for favor received is based on a debt of friendship, and
the nature of this debt depends more on the feeling with which the
favor was conferred than on the greatness of the favor itself. This
debt does not carry with it a civil obligation, involving a kind of
necessity that would exclude the spontaneous nature of such a
repayment.

Reply Obj. 3: If a man were, in return for money lent, as though
there had been an agreement tacit or expressed, to expect or exact
repayment in the shape of some remuneration of service or words, it
would be the same as if he expected or exacted some real
remuneration, because both can be priced at a money value, as may be
seen in the case of those who offer for hire the labor which they
exercise by work or by tongue. If on the other hand the remuneration
by service or words be given not as an obligation, but as a favor,
which is not to be appreciated at a money value, it is lawful to
take, exact, and expect it.

Reply Obj. 4: Money cannot be sold for a greater sum than the amount
lent, which has to be paid back: nor should the loan be made with a
demand or expectation of aught else but of a feeling of benevolence
which cannot be priced at a pecuniary value, and which can be the
basis of a spontaneous loan. Now the obligation to lend in return at
some future time is repugnant to such a feeling, because again an
obligation of this kind has its pecuniary value. Consequently it is
lawful for the lender to borrow something else at the same time, but
it is unlawful for him to bind the borrower to grant him a loan at
some future time.

Reply Obj. 5: He who lends money transfers the ownership of the money
to the borrower. Hence the borrower holds the money at his own risk
and is bound to pay it all back: wherefore the lender must not exact
more. On the other hand he that entrusts his money to a merchant or
craftsman so as to form a kind of society, does not transfer the
ownership of his money to them, for it remains his, so that at his
risk the merchant speculates with it, or the craftsman uses it for
his craft, and consequently he may lawfully demand as something
belonging to him, part of the profits derived from his money.

Reply Obj. 6: If a man in return for money lent to him pledges
something that can be valued at a price, the lender must allow for
the use of that thing towards the repayment of the loan. Else if he
wishes the gratuitous use of that thing in addition to repayment, it
is the same as if he took money for lending, and that is usury,
unless perhaps it were such a thing as friends are wont to lend to
one another gratis, as in the case of the loan of a book.

Reply Obj. 7: If a man wish to sell his goods at a higher price than
that which is just, so that he may wait for the buyer to pay, it is
manifestly a case of usury: because this waiting for the payment of
the price has the character of a loan, so that whatever he demands
beyond the just price in consideration of this delay, is like a price
for a loan, which pertains to usury. In like manner if a buyer wishes
to buy goods at a lower price than what is just, for the reason that
he pays for the goods before they can be delivered, it is a sin of
usury; because again this anticipated payment of money has the
character of a loan, the price of which is the rebate on the just
price of the goods sold. On the other hand if a man wishes to allow a
rebate on the just price in order that he may have his money sooner,
he is not guilty of the sin of usury.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 78, Art. 3]

Whether a Man Is Bound to Restore Whatever Profits He Has Made Out of
Money Gotten by Usury?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man is bound to restore whatever
profits he has made out of money gotten by usury. For the Apostle
says (Rom. 11:16): "If the root be holy, so are the branches."
Therefore likewise if the root be rotten so are the branches. But the
root was infected with usury. Therefore whatever profit is made
therefrom is infected with usury. Therefore he is bound to restore it.

Obj. 2: Further, it is laid down (Extra, De Usuris, in the Decretal:
'Cum tu sicut asseris'): "Property accruing from usury must be sold,
and the price repaid to the persons from whom the usury was
extorted." Therefore, likewise, whatever else is acquired from
usurious money must be restored.

Obj. 3: Further, that which a man buys with the proceeds of usury is
due to him by reason of the money he paid for it. Therefore he has no
more right to the thing purchased than to the money he paid. But he
was bound to restore the money gained through usury. Therefore he is
also bound to restore what he acquired with it.

_On the contrary,_ A man may lawfully hold what he has lawfully
acquired. Now that which is acquired by the proceeds of usury is
sometimes lawfully acquired. Therefore it may be lawfully retained.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), there are certain things
whose use is their consumption, and which do not admit of usufruct,
according to law (ibid., ad 3). Wherefore if such like things be
extorted by means of usury, for instance money, wheat, wine and so
forth, the lender is not bound to restore more than he received
(since what is acquired by such things is the fruit not of the thing
but of human industry), unless indeed the other party by losing some
of his own goods be injured through the lender retaining them: for
then he is bound to make good the loss.

On the other hand, there are certain things whose use is not their
consumption: such things admit of usufruct, for instance house or
land property and so forth. Wherefore if a man has by usury extorted
from another his house or land, he is bound to restore not only the
house or land but also the fruits accruing to him therefrom, since
they are the fruits of things owned by another man and consequently
are due to him.

Reply Obj. 1: The root has not only the character of matter, as money
made by usury has; but has also somewhat the character of an active
cause, in so far as it administers nourishment. Hence the comparison
fails.

Reply Obj. 2: Further, Property acquired from usury does not belong
to the person who paid usury, but to the person who bought it. Yet he
that paid usury has a certain claim on that property just as he has
on the other goods of the usurer. Hence it is not prescribed that
such property should be assigned to the persons who paid usury, since
the property is perhaps worth more than what they paid in usury, but
it is commanded that the property be sold, and the price be restored,
of course according to the amount taken in usury.

Reply Obj. 3: The proceeds of money taken in usury are due to the
person who acquired them not by reason of the usurious money as
instrumental cause, but on account of his own industry as principal
cause. Wherefore he has more right to the goods acquired with
usurious money than to the usurious money itself.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 78, Art. 4]

Whether It Is Lawful to Borrow Money Under a Condition of Usury?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to borrow money
under a condition of usury. For the Apostle says (Rom. 1:32) that
they "are worthy of death . . . not only they that do" these sins,
"but they also that consent to them that do them." Now he that
borrows money under a condition of usury consents in the sin of the
usurer, and gives him an occasion of sin. Therefore he sins also.

Obj. 2: Further, for no temporal advantage ought one to give another
an occasion of committing a sin: for this pertains to active scandal,
which is always sinful, as stated above (Q. 43, A. 2). Now he that
seeks to borrow from a usurer gives him an occasion of sin. Therefore
he is not to be excused on account of any temporal advantage.

Obj. 3: Further, it seems no less necessary sometimes to deposit
one's money with a usurer than to borrow from him. Now it seems
altogether unlawful to deposit one's money with a usurer, even as it
would be unlawful to deposit one's sword with a madman, a maiden with
a libertine, or food with a glutton. Neither therefore is it lawful
to borrow from a usurer.

_On the contrary,_ He that suffers injury does not sin, according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 11), wherefore justice is not a mean
between two vices, as stated in the same book (ch. 5). Now a usurer
sins by doing an injury to the person who borrows from him under a
condition of usury. Therefore he that accepts a loan under a
condition of usury does not sin.

_I answer that,_ It is by no means lawful to induce a man to sin, yet
it is lawful to make use of another's sin for a good end, since even
God uses all sin for some good, since He draws some good from every
evil as stated in the Enchiridion (xi). Hence when Publicola asked
whether it were lawful to make use of an oath taken by a man swearing
by false gods (which is a manifest sin, for he gives Divine honor to
them) Augustine (Ep. xlvii) answered that he who uses, not for a bad
but for a good purpose, the oath of a man that swears by false gods,
is a party, not to his sin of swearing by demons, but to his good
compact whereby he kept his word. If however he were to induce him to
swear by false gods, he would sin.

Accordingly we must also answer to the question in point that it is
by no means lawful to induce a man to lend under a condition of
usury: yet it is lawful to borrow for usury from a man who is ready
to do so and is a usurer by profession; provided the borrower have a
good end in view, such as the relief of his own or another's need.
Thus too it is lawful for a man who has fallen among thieves to point
out his property to them (which they sin in taking) in order to save
his life, after the example of the ten men who said to Ismahel (Jer.
41:8): "Kill us not: for we have stores in the field."

Reply Obj. 1: He who borrows for usury does not consent to the
usurer's sin but makes use of it. Nor is it the usurer's acceptance
of usury that pleases him, but his lending, which is good.

Reply Obj. 2: He who borrows for usury gives the usurer an occasion,
not for taking usury, but for lending; it is the usurer who finds an
occasion of sin in the malice of his heart. Hence there is passive
scandal on his part, while there is no active scandal on the part of
the person who seeks to borrow. Nor is this passive scandal a reason
why the other person should desist from borrowing if he is in need,
since this passive scandal arises not from weakness or ignorance but
from malice.

Reply Obj. 3: If one were to entrust one's money to a usurer lacking
other means of practising usury; or with the intention of making a
greater profit from his money by reason of the usury, one would be
giving a sinner matter for sin, so that one would be a participator
in his guilt. If, on the other hand, the usurer to whom one entrusts
one's money has other means of practising usury, there is no sin in
entrusting it to him that it may be in safer keeping, since this is
to use a sinner for a good purpose.
_______________________

QUESTION 79

OF THE QUASI-INTEGRAL PARTS OF JUSTICE
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the quasi-integral parts of justice, which are
_to do good,_ and _to decline from evil,_ and the opposite vices.
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether these two are parts of justice?

(2) Whether transgression is a special sin?

(3) Whether omission is a special sin?

(4) Of the comparison between omission and transgression.
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 79, Art. 1]

Whether to Decline from Evil and to Do Good Are Parts of Justice?

Objection 1: It would seem that to decline from evil and to do good
are not parts of justice. For it belongs to every virtue to perform a
good deed and to avoid an evil one. But parts do not exceed the
whole. Therefore to decline from evil and to do good should not be
reckoned parts of justice, which is a special kind of virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 33:15, "Turn away from evil and do
good," says: "The former," i.e. to turn away from evil, "avoids sin,
the latter," i.e. to do good, "deserves the life and the palm." But
any part of a virtue deserves the life and the palm. Therefore to
decline from evil is not a part of justice.

Obj. 3: Further, things that are so related that one implies the
other, are not mutually distinct as parts of a whole. Now declining
from evil is implied in doing good: since no one does evil and good
at the same time. Therefore declining from evil and doing good are
not parts of justice.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Correp. et Grat. i) declares that
"declining from evil and doing good" belong to the justice of the law.

_I answer that,_ If we speak of good and evil in general, it belongs
to every virtue to do good and to avoid evil: and in this sense they
cannot be reckoned parts of justice, except justice be taken in the
sense of "all virtue" [*Cf. Q. 58, A. 5]. And yet even if justice be
taken in this sense it regards a certain special aspect of good;
namely, the good as due in respect of Divine or human law.

On the other hand justice considered as a special virtue regards good
as due to one's neighbor. And in this sense it belongs to special
justice to do good considered as due to one's neighbor, and to avoid
the opposite evil, that, namely, which is hurtful to one's neighbor;
while it belongs to general justice to do good in relation to the
community or in relation to God, and to avoid the opposite evil.

Now these two are said to be quasi-integral parts of general or of
special justice, because each is required for the perfect act of
justice. For it belongs to justice to establish equality in our
relations with others, as shown above (Q. 58, A. 2): and it pertains
to the same cause to establish and to preserve that which it has
established. Now a person establishes the equality of justice by
doing good, i.e. by rendering to another his due: and he preserves
the already established equality of justice by declining from evil,
that is by inflicting no injury on his neighbor.

Reply Obj. 1: Good and evil are here considered under a special
aspect, by which they are appropriated to justice. The reason why
these two are reckoned parts of justice under a special aspect of
good and evil, while they are not reckoned parts of any other moral
virtue, is that the other moral virtues are concerned with the
passions wherein to do good is to observe the mean, which is the same
as to avoid the extremes as evils: so that doing good and avoiding
evil come to the same, with regard to the other virtues. On the other
hand justice is concerned with operations and external things,
wherein to establish equality is one thing, and not to disturb the
equality established is another.

Reply Obj. 2: To decline from evil, considered as a part of justice,
does not denote a pure negation, viz. "not to do evil"; for this does
not deserve the palm, but only avoids the punishment. But it implies
a movement of the will in repudiating evil, as the very term
"decline" shows. This is meritorious; especially when a person
resists against an instigation to do evil.

Reply Obj. 3: Doing good is the completive act of justice, and the
principal part, so to speak, thereof. Declining from evil is a more
imperfect act, and a secondary part of that virtue. Hence it is a
material part, so to speak, thereof, and a necessary condition of the
formal and completive part.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 79, Art. 2]

Whether Transgression Is a Special Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that transgression is not a special sin.
For no species is included in the definition of its genus. Now
transgression is included in the definition of sin; because Ambrose
says (De Parad. viii) that sin is "a transgression of the Divine
law." Therefore transgression is not a species of sin.

Obj. 2: Further, no species is more comprehensive than its genus. But
transgression is more comprehensive than sin, because sin is a "word,
deed or desire against the law of God," according to Augustine
(Contra Faust. xxii, 27), while transgression is also against nature,
or custom. Therefore transgression is not a species of sin.

Obj. 3: Further, no species contains all the parts into which its
genus is divided. Now the sin of transgression extends to all the
capital vices, as well as to sins of thought, word and deed.
Therefore transgression is not a special sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is opposed to a special virtue, namely justice.

_I answer that,_ The term transgression is derived from bodily
movement and applied to moral actions. Now a person is said to
transgress in bodily movement, when he steps (_graditur_) beyond
(_trans_) a fixed boundary--and it is a negative precept that fixes
the boundary that man must not exceed in his moral actions. Wherefore
to transgress, properly speaking, is to act against a negative
precept.

Now materially considered this may be common to all the species of
sin, because man transgresses a Divine precept by any species of
mortal sin. But if we consider it formally, namely under its special
aspect of an act against a negative precept, it is a special sin in
two ways. First, in so far as it is opposed to those kinds of sin
that are opposed to the other virtues: for just as it belongs
properly to legal justice to consider a precept as binding, so it
belongs properly to a transgression to consider a precept as an
object of contempt. Secondly, in so far as it is distinct from
omission which is opposed to an affirmative precept.

Reply Obj. 1: Even as legal justice is "all virtue" (Q. 58, A. 5) as
regards its subject and matter, so legal injustice is materially "all
sin." It is in this way that Ambrose defined sin, considering it from
the point of view of legal injustice.

Reply Obj. 2: The natural inclination concerns the precepts of the
natural law. Again, a laudable custom has the force of a precept;
since as Augustine says in an epistle _on the Fast of the Sabbath_
(Ep. xxxvi), "a custom of God's people should be looked upon as law."
Hence both sin and transgression may be against a laudable custom and
against a natural inclination.

Reply Obj. 3: All these species of sin may include transgression, if
we consider them not under their proper aspects, but under a special
aspect, as stated above. The sin of omission, however, is altogether
distinct from the sin of transgression.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 79, Art. 3]

Whether Omission Is a Special Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that omission is not a special sin. For
every sin is either original or actual. Now omission is not original
sin, for it is not contracted through origin; nor is it actual sin,
for it may be altogether without act, as stated above (I-II, Q. 71,
A. 5) when we were treating of sins in general. Therefore omission is
not a special sin.

Obj. 2: Further, every sin is voluntary. Now omission sometimes is
not voluntary but necessary, as when a woman is violated after taking
a vow of virginity, or when one lose that which one is under an
obligation to restore, or when a priest is bound to say Mass, and is
prevented from doing so. Therefore omission is not always a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, it is possible to fix the time when any special sin
begins. But this is not possible in the case of omission, since one
is not altered by not doing a thing, no matter when the omission
occurs, and yet the omission is not always sinful. Therefore omission
is not a special sin.

Obj. 4: Further, every special sin is opposed to a special virtue.
But it is not possible to assign any special virtue to which omission
is opposed, both because the good of any virtue can be omitted, and
because justice to which it would seem more particularly opposed,
always requires an act, even in declining from evil, as stated above
(A. 1, ad 2), while omission may be altogether without act. Therefore
omission is not a special sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 4:17): "To him . . . who
knoweth to do good and doth it not, to him it is sin."

_I answer that,_ omission signifies the non-fulfilment of a good, not
indeed of any good, but of a good that is due. Now good under the
aspect of due belongs properly to justice; to legal justice, if the
thing due depends on Divine or human law; to special justice, if the
due is something in relation to one's neighbor. Wherefore, in the
same way as justice is a special virtue, as stated above (Q. 58, AA.
6, 7), omission is a special sin distinct from the sins which are
opposed to the other virtues; and just as doing good, which is the
opposite of omitting it, is a special part of justice, distinct from
avoiding evil, to which transgression is opposed, so too is omission
distinct from transgression.

Reply Obj. 2: Omission is not original but actual sin, not as though
it had some act essential to it, but for as much as the negation of
an act is reduced to the genus of act, and in this sense non-action
is a kind of action, as stated above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 6, ad 1).

Reply Obj. 2: Omission, as stated above, is only of such good as is
due and to which one is bound. Now no man is bound to the impossible:
wherefore no man sins by omission, if he does not do what he cannot.
Accordingly she who is violated after vowing virginity, is guilty of
an omission, not through not having virginity, but through not
repenting of her past sin, or through not doing what she can to
fulfil her vow by observing continence. Again a priest is not bound
to say Mass, except he have a suitable opportunity, and if this be
lacking, there is no omission. And in like manner, a person is bound
to restitution, supposing he has the wherewithal; if he has not and
cannot have it, he is not guilty of an omission, provided he does
what he can. The same applies to other similar cases.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as the sin of transgression is opposed to negative
precepts which regard the avoidance of evil, so the sin of omission
is opposed to affirmative precepts, which regard the doing of good.
Now affirmative precepts bind not for always, but for a fixed time,
and at that time the sin of omission begins. But it may happen that
then one is unable to do what one ought, and if this inability is
without any fault on his part, he does not omit his duty, as stated
above (ad 2; I-II, Q. 71, A. 5). On the other hand if this inability
is due to some previous fault of his (for instance, if a man gets
drunk at night, and cannot get up for matins, as he ought to), some
say that the sin of omission begins when he engages in an action that
is illicit and incompatible with the act to which he is bound. But
this does not seem to be true, for supposing one were to rouse him by
violence and that he went to matins, he would not omit to go, so
that, evidently, the previous drunkenness was not an omission, but
the cause of an omission. Consequently, we must say that the omission
begins to be imputed to him as a sin, when the time comes for the
action; and yet this is on account of a preceding cause by reason of
which the subsequent omission becomes voluntary.

Reply Obj. 4: Omission is directly opposed to justice, as stated
above; because it is a non-fulfilment of a good of virtue, but only
under the aspect of due, which pertains to justice. Now more is
required for an act to be virtuous and meritorious than for it to be
sinful and demeritorious, because "good results from an entire cause,
whereas evil arises from each single defect" [*Dionysius, De Div.
Nom. iv]. Wherefore the merit of justice requires an act, whereas an
omission does not.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 79, Art. 4]

Whether a Sin of Omission Is More Grievous Than a Sin of
Transgression?

Objection 1: It would seem that a sin of omission is more grievous
than a sin of transgression. For _delictum_ would seem to signify the
same as _derelictum_ [*Augustine, QQ. in Levit., qu. xx], and
therefore is seemingly the same as an omission. But _delictum_
denotes a more grievous offence than transgression, because it
deserves more expiation as appears from Lev. 5. Therefore the sin of
omission is more grievous than the sin of transgression.

Obj. 2: Further, the greater evil is opposed to the greater good, as
the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 10). Now to do good is a more
excellent part of justice, than to decline from evil, to which
transgression is opposed, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). Therefore
omission is a graver sin than transgression.

Obj. 3: Further, sins of transgression may be either venial or
mortal. But sins of omission seem to be always mortal, since they are
opposed to an affirmative precept. Therefore omission would seem to
be a graver sin than transgression.

Obj. 4: Further, the pain of loss which consists in being deprived of
seeing God and is inflicted for the sin of omission, is a greater
punishment than the pain of sense, which is inflicted for the sin of
transgression, as Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiii super Matth.). Now
punishment is proportionate to fault. Therefore the sin of omission
is graver than the sin of transgression.

_On the contrary,_ It is easier to refrain from evil deeds than to
accomplish good deeds. Therefore it is a graver sin not to refrain
from an evil deed, i.e. _to transgress,_ than not to accomplish a
good deed, which is _to omit._

_I answer that,_ The gravity of a sin depends on its remoteness from
virtue. Now contrariety is the greatest remoteness, according to
_Metaph._ x [*Didot. ed. ix, 4]. Wherefore a thing is further removed
from its contrary than from its simple negation; thus black is
further removed from white than not-white is, since every black is
not-white, but not conversely. Now it is evident that transgression
is contrary to an act of virtue, while omission denotes the negation
thereof: for instance it is a sin of omission, if one fail to give
one's parents due reverence, while it is a sin of transgression to
revile them or injure them in any way. Hence it is evident that,
simply and absolutely speaking, transgression is a graver sin than
omission, although a particular omission may be graver than a
particular transgression.

Reply Obj. 1: _Delictum_ in its widest sense denotes any kind of
omission; but sometimes it is taken strictly for the omission of
something concerning God, or for a man's intentional and as it were
contemptuous dereliction of duty: and then it has a certain gravity,
for which reason it demands a greater expiation.

Reply Obj. 2: The opposite of _doing good_ is both _not doing good,_
which is an omission, and _doing evil,_ which is a transgression: but
the first is opposed by contradiction, the second by contrariety,
which implies greater remoteness: wherefore transgression is the more
grievous sin.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as omission is opposed to affirmative precepts, so
is transgression opposed to negative precepts: wherefore both,
strictly speaking, have the character of mortal sin. Transgression
and omission, however, may be taken broadly for any infringement of
an affirmative or negative precept, disposing to the opposite of such
precept: and so taking both in a broad sense they may be venial sins.

Reply Obj. 4: To the sin of transgression there correspond both the
pain of loss on account of the aversion from God, and the pain of
sense, on account of the inordinate conversion to a mutable good. In
like manner omission deserves not only the pain of loss, but also the
pain of sense, according to Matt. 7:19, "Every tree that bringeth not
forth good fruit shall be cut down, and shall be cast into the fire";
and this on account of the root from which it grows, although it does
not necessarily imply conversion to any mutable good.
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QUESTION 80

OF THE POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE
(In One Article)

We must now consider the potential parts of justice, namely the
virtues annexed thereto; under which head there are two points of
consideration:

(1) What virtues are annexed to justice?

(2) The individual virtues annexed to justice.
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ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 80, Art.]

Whether the Virtues Annexed to Justice Are Suitably Enumerated?

Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues annexed to justice are
unsuitably enumerated. Tully [*De Invent. ii, 53] reckons six, viz.
"religion, piety, gratitude, revenge, observance, truth." Now revenge
is seemingly a species of commutative justice whereby revenge is
taken for injuries inflicted, as stated above (Q. 61, A. 4).
Therefore it should not be reckoned among the virtues annexed to
justice.

Obj. 2: Further, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons seven,
viz. "innocence, friendship, concord, piety, religion, affection,
humanity," several of which are omitted by Tully. Therefore the
virtues annexed to justice would seem to be insufficiently enumerated.

Obj. 3: Further, others reckon five parts of justice, viz.
"obedience" in respect of one's superiors, "discipline" with regard
to inferiors, "equity" as regards equals, "fidelity" and
"truthfulness" towards all; and of these "truthfulness" alone is
mentioned by Tully. Therefore he would seem to have enumerated
insufficiently the virtues annexed to justice.

Obj. 4: Further, the peripatetic Andronicus [*De Affectibus] reckons
nine parts annexed to justice viz. "liberality, kindliness, revenge,
commonsense, [*_eugnomosyne_] piety, gratitude, holiness, just
exchange" and "just lawgiving"; and of all these it is evident that
Tully mentions none but "revenge." Therefore he would appear to have
made an incomplete enumeration.

Obj. 5: Further, Aristotle (Ethic. v, 10) mentions _epieikeia_ as
being annexed to justice: and yet seemingly it is not included in any
of the foregoing enumerations. Therefore the virtues annexed to
justice are insufficiently enumerated.

_I answer that,_ Two points must be observed about the virtues
annexed to a principal virtue. The first is that these virtues have
something in common with the principal virtue; and the second is that
in some respect they fall short of the perfection of that virtue.
Accordingly since justice is of one man to another as stated above
(Q. 58, A. 2), all the virtues that are directed to another person
may by reason of this common aspect be annexed to justice. Now the
essential character of justice consists in rendering to another his
due according to equality, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 11). Wherefore
in two ways may a virtue directed to another person fall short of the
perfection of justice: first, by falling short of the aspect of
equality; secondly, by falling short of the aspect of due. For
certain virtues there are which render another his due, but are
unable to render the equal due. In the first place, whatever man
renders to God is due, yet it cannot be equal, as though man rendered
to God as much as he owes Him, according to Ps. 115:12, "What shall I
render to the Lord for all the things that He hath rendered to me?"
In this respect _religion_ is annexed to justice since, according to
Tully (De invent. ii, 53), it consists in offering service and
ceremonial rites or worship to "some superior nature that men call
divine." Secondly, it is not possible to make to one's parents an
equal return of what one owes to them, as the Philosopher declares
(Ethic. viii, 14); and thus _piety_ is annexed to justice, for
thereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), a man "renders service
and constant deference to his kindred and the well-wishers of his
country." Thirdly, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), man
is unable to offer an equal meed for virtue, and thus _observance_ is
annexed to justice, consisting according to Tully (De invent. ii, 53)
in the "deference and honor rendered to those who excel in worth."

A falling short of the just due may be considered in respect of a
twofold due, moral or legal: wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. viii,
13) assigns a corresponding twofold just. The legal due is that which
one is bound to render by reason of a legal obligation; and this due
is chiefly the concern of justice, which is the principal virtue. On
the other hand, the moral due is that to which one is bound in
respect of the rectitude of virtue: and since a due implies
necessity, this kind of due has two degrees. For one due is so
necessary that without it moral rectitude cannot be ensured: and this
has more of the character of due. Moreover this due may be considered
from the point of view of the debtor, and in this way it pertains to
this kind of due that a man represent himself to others just as he
is, both in word and deed. Wherefore to justice is annexed _truth,_
whereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), present, past and future
things are told without perversion. It may also be considered from
the point of view of the person to whom it is due, by comparing the
reward he receives with what he has done--sometimes in good things;
and then annexed to justice we have _gratitude_ which "consists in
recollecting the friendship and kindliness shown by others, and in
desiring to pay them back," as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53)--and
sometimes in evil things, and then to justice is annexed _revenge,_
whereby, as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53), "we resist force,
injury or anything obscure* by taking vengeance or by self-defense."
[*St. Thomas read _obscurum,_ and explains it as meaning
_derogatory,_ infra Q. 108, A. 2. Cicero, however, wrote _obfuturum,_
i.e. _hurtful._]

There is another due that is necessary in the sense that it conduces
to greater rectitude, although without it rectitude may be ensured.
This due is the concern of _liberality,_ _affability_ or
_friendship,_ or the like, all of which Tully omits in the aforesaid
enumeration because there is little of the nature of anything due in
them.

Reply Obj. 1: The revenge taken by authority of a public power, in
accordance with a judge's sentence, belongs to commutative justice:
whereas the revenge which a man takes on his own initiative, though
not against the law, or which a man seeks to obtain from a judge,
belongs to the virtue annexed to justice.

Reply Obj. 2: Macrobius appears to have considered the two integral
parts of justice, namely, _declining from evil,_ to which _innocence_
belongs, and _doing good,_ to which the six others belong. Of these,
two would seem to regard relations between equals, namely,
_friendship_ in the external conduct and _concord_ internally; two
regard our relations toward superiors, namely, _piety_ to parents,
and _religion_ to God; while two regard our relations towards
inferiors, namely, _condescension,_ in so far as their good pleases
us, and _humanity,_ whereby we help them in their needs. For Isidore
says (Etym. x) that a man is said to be "humane, through having a
feeling of love and pity towards men: this gives its name to humanity
whereby we uphold one another." In this sense _friendship_ is
understood as directing our external conduct towards others, from
which point of view the Philosopher treats of it in _Ethic._ iv, 6.
_Friendship_ may also be taken as regarding properly the affections,
and as the Philosopher describes it in _Ethic._ viii and ix. In this
sense three things pertain to friendship, namely, _benevolence_ which
is here called _affection_; _concord,_ and _beneficence_ which is
here called _humanity._ These three, however, are omitted by Tully,
because, as stated above, they have little of the nature of a due.

Reply Obj. 3: _Obedience_ is included in observance, which Tully
mentions, because both reverential honor and obedience are due to
persons who excel. "Faithfulness whereby a man's acts agree with his
words" [*Cicero, De Repub. iv, De Offic. i, 7], is contained in
_truthfulness_ as to the observance of one's promises: yet
_truthfulness_ covers a wider ground, as we shall state further on
(Q. 109, AA. 1, 3). _Discipline_ is not due as a necessary duty,
because one is under no obligation to an inferior as such, although a
superior may be under an obligation to watch over his inferiors,
according to Matt. 24:45, "A faithful and wise servant, whom his lord
hath appointed over his family": and for this reason it is omitted by
Tully. It may, however, be included in humanity mentioned by
Macrobius; and equity under _epieikeia_ or under _friendship._

Reply Obj. 4: This enumeration contains some belonging to true
justice. To particular justice belongs _justice of exchange,_ which
he describes as "the habit of observing equality in commutations." To
legal justice, as regards things to be observed by all, he ascribes
_legislative justice,_ which he describes as "the science of
political commutations relating to the community." As regards things
which have to be done in particular cases beside the general laws, he
mentions _common sense_ or _good judgment,_* which is our guide in
such like matters, as stated above (Q. 51, A. 4) in the treatise on
prudence: wherefore he says that it is a "voluntary justification,"
because by his own free will man observes what is just according to
his judgment and not according to the written law. [*St. Thomas
indicates the Greek derivation: _eugnomosyne_ quasi 'bona _gnome_.']
These two are ascribed to prudence as their director, and to justice
as their executor. _Eusebeia_ (piety) means _good worship_ and
consequently is the same as religion, wherefore he says that it is
the science of "the service of God" (he speaks after the manner of
Socrates who said that 'all the virtues are sciences') [*Aristotle,
_Ethic._ vi, 13]: and _holiness_ comes to the same, as we shall state
further on (Q. 81, A. 8). _Eucharistia_ (gratitude) means "good
thanksgiving," and is mentioned by Macrobius: wherefore Isidore says
(Etym. x) that "a kind man is one who is ready of his own accord to
do good, and is of gentle speech": and Andronicus too says that
"kindliness is a habit of voluntary beneficence." _Liberality_ would
seem to pertain to _humanity._

Reply Obj. 5: _Epieikeia_ is annexed, not to particular but to legal
justice, and apparently is the same as that which goes by the name of
_eugnomosyne_ (common sense).
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QUESTION 81

OF RELIGION
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider each of the foregoing virtues, in so far as
our present scope demands. We shall consider (1) religion, (2) piety,
(3) observance, (4) gratitude, (5) revenge, (6) truth, (7) friendship,
(8) liberality, (9) _epieikeia_. Of the other virtues that have been
mentioned we have spoken partly in the treatise on charity, viz. of
concord and the like, and partly in this treatise on justice, for
instance, of right commutations and of innocence. Of legislative
justice we spoke in the treatise on prudence.

Religion offers a threefold consideration: (1) Religion considered in
itself; (2) its acts; (3) the opposite vices.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether religion regards only our relation to God?

(2) Whether religion is a virtue?

(3) Whether religion is one virtue?

(4) Whether religion is a special virtue?

(5) Whether religion is a theological virtue?

(6) Whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues?

(7) Whether religion has any external actions?

(8) Whether religion is the same as holiness?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 1]

Whether Religion Directs Man to God Alone?

Objection 1: It would seem that religion does not direct man to God
alone. It is written (James 1:27): "Religion clean and undefiled
before God and the Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows
in their tribulation, and to keep oneself unspotted from this world."
Now "to visit the fatherless and widows" indicates an order between
oneself and one's neighbor, and "to keep oneself unspotted from this
world" belongs to the order of a man within himself. Therefore
religion does not imply order to God alone.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 1) that "since in
speaking Latin not only unlettered but even most cultured persons ere
wont to speak of religion as being exhibited, to our human kindred
and relations as also to those who are linked with us by any kind of
tie, that term does not escape ambiguity when it is a question of
Divine worship, so that we be able to say without hesitation that
religion is nothing else but the worship of God." Therefore religion
signifies a relation not only to God but also to our kindred.

Obj. 3: Further, seemingly _latria_ pertains to religion. Now
"_latria_ signifies servitude," as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x,
1). And we are bound to serve not only God, but also our neighbor,
according to Gal. 5:13, "By charity of the spirit serve one another."
Therefore religion includes a relation to one's neighbor also.

Obj. 4: Further, worship belongs to religion. Now man is said to
worship not only God, but also his neighbor, according to the saying
of Cato [*Dionysius Cato, Breves Sententiae], "Worship thy parents."
Therefore religion directs us also to our neighbor, and not only to
God.

Obj. 5: Further, all those who are in the state of grace are subject
to God. Yet not all who are in a state of grace are called religious,
but only those who bind themselves by certain vows and observances,
and to obedience to certain men. Therefore religion seemingly does
not denote a relation of subjection of man to God.

_On the contrary,_ Tully says (Rhet. ii, 53) that "religion consists
in offering service and ceremonial rites to a superior nature that
men call divine."

_I answer that,_ as Isidore says (Etym. x), "according to Cicero, a
man is said to be religious from _religio,_ because he often ponders
over, and, as it were, reads again (_relegit_), the things which
pertain to the worship of God," so that religion would seem to take
its name from reading over those things which belong to Divine
worship because we ought frequently to ponder over such things in our
hearts, according to Prov. 3:6, "In all thy ways think on Him."
According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3) it may also take its name
from the fact that "we ought to seek God again, whom we had lost by
our neglect" [*St. Augustine plays on the words _reeligere,_ i.e. to
choose over again, and _negligere,_ to neglect or despise.]. Or
again, religion may be derived from _religare_ (to bind together),
wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55): "May religion bind us
to the one Almighty God." However, whether religion take its name
from frequent reading, or from a repeated choice of what has been
lost through negligence, or from being a bond, it denotes properly a
relation to God. For it is He to Whom we ought to be bound as to our
unfailing principle; to Whom also our choice should be resolutely
directed as to our last end; and Whom we lose when we neglect Him by
sin, and should recover by believing in Him and confessing our faith.

Reply Obj. 1: Religion has two kinds of acts. Some are its proper and
immediate acts, which it elicits, and by which man is directed to God
alone, for instance, sacrifice, adoration and the like. But it has
other acts, which it produces through the medium of the virtues which
it commands, directing them to the honor of God, because the virtue
which is concerned with the end, commands the virtues which are
concerned with the means. Accordingly "to visit the fatherless and
widows in their tribulation" is an act of religion as commanding, and
an act of mercy as eliciting; and "to keep oneself unspotted from
this world" is an act of religion as commanding, but of temperance or
of some similar virtue as eliciting.

Reply Obj. 2: Religion is referred to those things one exhibits to
one's human kindred, if we take the term religion in a broad sense,
but not if we take it in its proper sense. Hence, shortly before the
passage quoted, Augustine says: "In a stricter sense religion seems
to denote, not any kind of worship, but the worship of God."

Reply Obj. 3: Since servant implies relation to a lord, wherever
there is a special kind of lordship there must needs be a special
kind of service. Now it is evident that lordship belongs to God in a
special and singular way, because He made all things, and has supreme
dominion over all. Consequently a special kind of service is due to
Him, which is known as _latria_ in Greek; and therefore it belongs to
religion.

Reply Obj. 4: We are said to worship those whom we honor, and to
cultivate [*In the Latin the same word _colere_ stands for "worship"
and "cultivate"] a man's memory or presence: we even speak of
cultivating things that are beneath us, thus a farmer (_agricola_) is
one who cultivates the land, and an inhabitant (_incola_) is one who
cultivates the place where he dwells. Since, however, special honor
is due to God as the first principle of all things, to Him also is
due a special kind of worship, which in Greek is _Eusebeia_ or
_Theosebeia_, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1).

Reply Obj. 5: Although the name "religious" may be given to all in
general who worship God, yet in a special way religious are those who
consecrate their whole life to the Divine worship, by withdrawing
from human affairs. Thus also the term "contemplative" is applied,
not to those who contemplate, but to those who give up their whole
lives to contemplation. Such men subject themselves to man, not for
man's sake but for God's sake, according to the word of the Apostle
(Gal. 4:14), "You . . . received me as an angel of God, even as
Christ Jesus."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 2]

Whether Religion Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not a virtue. Seemingly
it belongs to religion to pay reverence to God. But reverence is an
act of fear which is a gift, as stated above (Q. 19, A. 9). Therefore
religion is not a virtue but a gift.

Obj. 2: Further, every virtue is a free exercise of the will,
wherefore it is described as an "elective" or voluntary "habit"
[*Ethic. ii, 6]. Now, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3) _latria_ belongs
to religion, and _latria_ denotes a kind of servitude. Therefore
religion is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, according to _Ethic._ ii, 1, aptitude for virtue is
in us by nature, wherefore things pertaining to virtue belong to the
dictate of natural reason. Now, it belongs to religion "to offer
ceremonial worship to the Godhead" [*Cf. A. 1], and ceremonial
matters, as stated above (I-II, Q. 99, A. 3, ad 2; Q. 101), do not
belong to the dictate of natural reason. Therefore religion is not a
virtue.

_On the contrary,_ It is enumerated with the other virtues, as
appears from what has been said above (Q. 80).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 58, A. 3; I-II, Q. 55, AA. 3, 4)
"a virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his act good
likewise," wherefore we must needs say that every good act belongs to
a virtue. Now it is evident that to render anyone his due has the
aspect of good, since by rendering a person his due, one becomes
suitably proportioned to him, through being ordered to him in a
becoming manner. But order comes under the aspect of good, just as
mode and species, according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii). Since
then it belongs to religion to pay due honor to someone, namely, to
God, it is evident that religion is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: To pay reverence to God is an act of the gift of
fear. Now it belongs to religion to do certain things through
reverence for God. Hence it follows, not that religion is the same as
the gift of fear, but that it is referred thereto as to something more
excellent; for the gifts are more excellent than the moral virtues, as
stated above (Q. 9, A. 1, ad 3; I-II, Q. 68, A. 8).

Reply Obj. 2: Even a slave can voluntarily do his duty by his
master, and so "he makes a virtue of necessity" [*Jerome, Ep. liv, ad
Furiam.], by doing his duty voluntarily. In like manner, to render due
service to God may be an act of virtue, in so far as man does so
voluntarily.

Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to the dictate of natural reason that
man should do something through reverence for God. But that he should
do this or that determinate thing does not belong to the dictate of
natural reason, but is established by Divine or human law.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 3]

Whether Religion Is One Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not one virtue. Religion
directs us to God, as stated above (A. 1). Now in God there are three
Persons; and also many attributes, which differ at least logically
from one another. Now a logical difference in the object suffices for
a difference of virtue, as stated above (Q. 50, A. 2, ad 2).
Therefore religion is not one virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, of one virtue there is seemingly one act, since
habits are distinguished by their acts. Now there are many acts of
religion, for instance to worship, to serve, to vow, to pray, to
sacrifice and many such like. Therefore religion is not one virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, adoration belongs to religion. Now adoration is paid
to images under one aspect, and under another aspect to God Himself.
Since, then, a difference of aspect distinguishes virtues, it would
seem that religion is not one virtue.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eph. 4:5): "One God [Vulg.:
'Lord'], one faith." Now true religion professes faith in one God.
Therefore religion is one virtue.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 2, ad 1), habits
are differentiated according to a different aspect of the object. Now
it belongs to religion to show reverence to one God under one aspect,
namely, as the first principle of the creation and government of
things. Wherefore He Himself says (Malach. 1:6): "If . . . I be a
father, where is My honor?" For it belongs to a father to beget and
to govern. Therefore it is evident that religion is one virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: The three Divine Persons are the one principle of the
creation and government of things, wherefore they are served by one
religion. The different aspects of the attributes concur under the
aspect of first principle, because God produces all things, and
governs them by the wisdom, will and power of His goodness. Wherefore
religion is one virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: By the one same act man both serves and worships God,
for worship regards the excellence of God, to Whom reverence is due:
while service regards the subjection of man who, by his condition, is
under an obligation of showing reverence to God. To these two belong
all acts ascribed to religion, because, by them all, man bears
witness to the Divine excellence and to his own subjection to God,
either by offering something to God, or by assuming something Divine.

Reply Obj. 3: The worship of religion is paid to images, not as
considered in themselves, nor as things, but as images leading us to
God incarnate. Now movement to an image as image does not stop at the
image, but goes on to the thing it represents. Hence neither _latria_
nor the virtue of religion is differentiated by the fact that
religious worship is paid to the images of Christ.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 4]

Whether Religion Is a Special Virtue, Distinct from the Others?

Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not a special virtue
distinct from the others. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 6): "Any
action whereby we are united to God in holy fellowship, is a true
sacrifice." But sacrifice belongs to religion. Therefore every
virtuous deed belongs to religion; and consequently religion is not a
special virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): "Do all to the
glory of God." Now it belongs to religion to do anything in reverence
of God, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2; A. 2). Therefore religion is not
a special virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, the charity whereby we love God is not distinct from
the charity whereby we love our neighbor. But according to _Ethic._
 viii, 8 "to be honored is almost to be loved." Therefore the
religion whereby we honor God is not a special virtue distinct from
observance, or _dulia,_ or piety whereby we honor our neighbor.
Therefore religion is not a special virtue.

_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned a part of justice, distinct from
the other parts.

_I answer that,_ Since virtue is directed to the good, wherever there
is a special aspect of good, there must be a special virtue. Now the
good to which religion is directed, is to give due honor to God.
Again, honor is due to someone under the aspect of excellence: and to
God a singular excellence is competent, since He infinitely surpasses
all things and exceeds them in every way. Wherefore to Him is special
honor due: even as in human affairs we see that different honor is
due to different personal excellences, one kind of honor to a father,
another to the king, and so on. Hence it is evident that religion is
a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: Every virtuous deed is said to be a sacrifice, in so
far as it is done out of reverence of God. Hence this does not prove
that religion is a general virtue, but that it commands all other
virtues, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1).

Reply Obj. 2: Every deed, in so far as it is done in God's honor,
belongs to religion, not as eliciting but as commanding: those belong
to religion as eliciting which pertain to the reverence of God by
reason of their specific character.

Reply Obj. 3: The object of love is the good, but the object of honor
and reverence is something excellent. Now God's goodness is
communicated to the creature, but the excellence of His goodness is
not. Hence the charity whereby God is loved is not distinct from the
charity whereby our neighbor is loved; whereas the religion whereby
God is honored, is distinct from the virtues whereby we honor our
neighbor.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 5]

Whether Religion Is a Theological Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that religion is a theological virtue.
Augustine says (Enchiridion iii) that "God is worshiped by faith,
hope and charity," which are theological virtues. Now it belongs to
religion to pay worship to God. Therefore religion is a theological
virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, a theological virtue is one that has God for its
object. Now religion has God for its object, since it directs us to
God alone, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore religion is a
theological virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or intellectual,
or moral, as is clear from what has been said (I-II, QQ. 57, 58, 62).
Now it is evident that religion is not an intellectual virtue,
because its perfection does not depend on the consideration of truth:
nor is it a moral virtue, which consists properly in observing the
mean between too much and too little, for one cannot worship God too
much, according to Ecclus. 43:33, "Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as
much as you can; for He is above all praise." Therefore it remains
that it is a theological virtue.

_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned a part of justice which is a moral
virtue.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4) religion pays due worship to
God. Hence two things are to be considered in religion: first that
which it offers to God, viz. worship, and this is by way of matter
and object in religion; secondly, that to which something is offered,
viz. God, to Whom worship is paid. And yet the acts whereby God is
worshiped do not reach out to God himself, as when we believe God we
reach out to Him by believing; for which reason it was stated (Q. 1,
AA. 1, 2, 4) that God is the object of faith, not only because we
believe in a God, but because we believe God.

Now due worship is paid to God, in so far as certain acts whereby God
is worshiped, such as the offering of sacrifices and so forth, are
done out of reverence for God. Hence it is evident that God is
related to religion not as matter or object, but as end: and
consequently religion is not a theological virtue whose object is the
last end, but a moral virtue which is properly about things referred
to the end.

Reply Obj. 1: The power or virtue whose action deals with an end,
moves by its command the power or virtue whose action deals with
matters directed to that end. Now the theological virtues, faith,
hope and charity have an act in reference to God as their proper
object: wherefore, by their command, they cause the act of religion,
which performs certain deeds directed to God: and so Augustine says
that God is worshiped by faith, hope and charity.

Reply Obj. 2: Religion directs man to God not as its object but as
its end.

Reply Obj. 3: Religion is neither a theological nor an intellectual,
but a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and observes a
mean, not in the passions, but in actions directed to God, by
establishing a kind of equality in them. And when I say "equality," I
do not mean absolute equality, because it is not possible to pay God
as much as we owe Him, but equality in consideration of man's ability
and God's acceptance.

And it is possible to have too much in matters pertaining to the
Divine worship, not as regards the circumstance of quantity, but as
regards other circumstances, as when Divine worship is paid to whom
it is not due, or when it is not due, or unduly in respect of some
other circumstance.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 6]

Whether Religion Should Be Preferred to the Other Moral Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that religion should not be preferred to
the other moral virtues. The perfection of a moral virtue consists in
its observing the mean, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6. But religion
fails to observe the mean of justice, since it does not render an
absolute equal to God. Therefore religion is not more excellent than
the other moral virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, what is offered by one man to another is the more
praiseworthy, according as the person it is offered to is in greater
need: wherefore it is written (Isa. 57:7): "Deal thy bread to the
hungry." But God needs nothing that we can offer Him, according to
Ps. 15:2, "I have said: Thou art my God, for Thou hast no need of my
goods." Therefore religion would seem less praiseworthy than the
other virtues whereby man's needs are relieved.

Obj. 3: Further, the greater the obligation to do a thing, the less
praise does it deserve, according to 1 Cor. 9:16, "If I preach the
Gospel, it is no glory to me: a necessity lieth upon me." Now the
more a thing is due, the greater the obligation of paying it. Since,
then, what is paid to God by man is in the highest degree due to Him,
it would seem that religion is less praiseworthy than the other human
virtues.

_On the contrary,_ The precepts pertaining to religion are given
precedence (Ex. 20) as being of greatest importance. Now the order of
precepts is proportionate to the order of virtues, since the precepts
of the Law prescribe acts of virtue. Therefore religion is the chief
of the moral virtues.

_I answer that,_ Whatever is directed to an end takes its goodness
from being ordered to that end; so that the nearer it is to the end
the better it is. Now moral virtues, as stated above (A. 5; Q. 4, A.
7), are about matters that are ordered to God as their end. And
religion approaches nearer to God than the other moral virtues, in so
far as its actions are directly and immediately ordered to the honor
of God. Hence religion excels among the moral virtues.

Reply Obj. 1: Virtue is praised because of the will, not because of
the ability: and therefore if a man fall short of equality which is
the mean of justice, through lack of ability, his virtue deserves no
less praise, provided there be no failing on the part of his will.

Reply Obj. 2: In offering a thing to a man on account of its
usefulness to him, the more needy the man the more praiseworthy the
offering, because it is more useful: whereas we offer a thing to God
not on account of its usefulness to Him, but for the sake of His
glory, and on account of its usefulness to us.

Reply Obj. 3: Where there is an obligation to do a thing it loses the
luster of supererogation, but not the merit of virtue, provided it be
done voluntarily. Hence the argument proves nothing.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 7]

Whether Religion Has an External Act?

Objection 1: It would seem that religion has not an external act. It
is written (John 4:24): "God is a spirit, and they that adore Him,
must adore Him in spirit and in truth." Now external acts pertain,
not to the spirit but to the body. Therefore religion, to which
adoration belongs, has acts that are not external but internal.

Obj. 2: Further, the end of religion is to pay God reverence and
honor. Now it would savor of irreverence towards a superior, if one
were to offer him that which properly belongs to his inferior. Since
then whatever man offers by bodily actions, seems to be directed
properly to the relief of human needs, or to the reverence of
inferior creatures, it would seem unbecoming to employ them in
showing reverence to God.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) commends Seneca for
finding fault with those who offered to idols those things that are
wont to be offered to men, because, to wit, that which befits mortals
is unbecoming to immortals. But such things are much less becoming to
the true God, Who is "exalted above all gods" [*Ps. 94:3]. Therefore
it would seem wrong to worship God with bodily actions. Therefore
religion has no bodily actions.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 83:3): "My heart and my flesh
have rejoiced in the living God." Now just as internal actions belong
to the heart, so do external actions belong to the members of the
flesh. Therefore it seems that God ought to be worshiped not only by
internal but also by external actions.

_I answer that,_ We pay God honor and reverence, not for His sake
(because He is of Himself full of glory to which no creature can add
anything), but for our own sake, because by the very fact that we
revere and honor God, our mind is subjected to Him; wherein its
perfection consists, since a thing is perfected by being subjected to
its superior, for instance the body is perfected by being quickened
by the soul, and the air by being enlightened by the sun. Now the
human mind, in order to be united to God, needs to be guided by the
sensible world, since "invisible things . . . are clearly seen, being
understood by the things that are made," as the Apostle says (Rom.
1:20). Wherefore in the Divine worship it is necessary to make use of
corporeal things, that man's mind may be aroused thereby, as by
signs, to the spiritual acts by means of which he is united to God.
Therefore the internal acts of religion take precedence of the others
and belong to religion essentially, while its external acts are
secondary, and subordinate to the internal acts.

Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord is speaking of that which is most important
and directly intended in the worship of God.

Reply Obj. 2: These external things are offered to God, not as though
He stood in need of them, according to Ps. 49:13, "Shall I eat the
flesh of bullocks? or shall I drink the blood of goats?" but as signs
of the internal and spiritual works, which are of themselves
acceptable to God. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5): "The
visible sacrifice is the sacrament or sacred sign of the invisible
sacrifice."

Reply Obj. 3: Idolaters are ridiculed for offering to idols things
pertaining to men, not as signs arousing them to certain spiritual
things, but as though they were of themselves acceptable to the
idols; and still more because they were foolish and wicked.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 8]

Whether Religion Is the Same As Sanctity?

Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not the same as sanctity.
Religion is a special virtue, as stated above (A. 4): whereas
sanctity is a general virtue, because it makes us faithful, and
fulfil our just obligations to God, according to Andronicus [*De
Affectibus]. Therefore sanctity is not the same as religion.

Obj. 2: Further, sanctity seems to denote a kind of purity. For
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii) that "sanctity is free from all
uncleanness, and is perfect and altogether unspotted purity." Now
purity would seem above all to pertain to temperance which repels
bodily uncleanness. Since then religion belongs to justice, it would
seem that sanctity is not the same as religion.

Obj. 3: Further, things that are opposite members of a division are
not identified with one another. But in an enumeration given above
(Q. 80, ad 4) of the parts of justice, sanctity is reckoned as
distinct from religion. Therefore sanctity is not the same as
religion.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 1:74, 75): "That . . . we may
serve Him . . . in holiness and justice." Now, "to serve God" belongs
to religion, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3; A. 3, ad 2). Therefore
religion is the same as sanctity.

_I answer that,_ The word "sanctity" seems to have two
significations. In one way it denotes purity; and this signification
fits in with the Greek, for _hagios_ means "unsoiled." In another way
it denotes firmness, wherefore in olden times the term "sancta" was
applied to such things as were upheld by law and were not to be
violated. Hence a thing is said to be sacred (_sancitum_) when it is
ratified by law. Again, in Latin, this word _sanctus_ may be
connected with purity, if it be resolved into _sanguine tinctus,_
"since, in olden times, those who wished to be purified were
sprinkled with the victim's blood," according to Isidore (Etym. x).
In either case the signification requires sanctity to be ascribed to
those things that are applied to the Divine worship; so that not only
men, but also the temple, vessels and such like things are said to be
sanctified through being applied to the worship of God. For purity is
necessary in order that the mind be applied to God, since the human
mind is soiled by contact with inferior things, even as all things
depreciate by admixture with baser things, for instance, silver by
being mixed with lead. Now in order for the mind to be united to the
Supreme Being it must be withdrawn from inferior things: and hence it
is that without purity the mind cannot be applied to God. Wherefore
it is written (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with all men, and holiness,
without which no man shall see God." Again, firmness is required for
the mind to be applied to God, for it is applied to Him as its last
end and first beginning, and such things must needs be most
immovable. Hence the Apostle said (Rom. 8:38, 39): "I am sure that
neither death, nor life . . . shall separate me [*Vulg.: 'shall be
able to separate us'] from the love of God."

Accordingly, it is by sanctity that the human mind applies itself and
its acts to God: so that it differs from religion not essentially but
only logically. For it takes the name of religion according as it
gives God due service in matters pertaining specially to the Divine
worship, such as sacrifices, oblations, and so forth; while it is
called sanctity, according as man refers to God not only these but
also the works of the other virtues, or according as man by means of
certain good works disposes himself to the worship of God.

Reply Obj. 1: Sanctity is a special virtue according to its essence;
and in this respect it is in a way identified with religion. But it
has a certain generality, in so far as by its command it directs the
acts of all the virtues to the Divine good, even as legal justice is
said to be a general virtue, in so far as it directs the acts of all
the virtues to the common good.

Reply Obj. 2: Temperance practices purity, yet not so as to have the
character of sanctity unless it be referred to God. Hence of
virginity itself Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that "it is honored
not for what it is, but for being consecrated to God."

Reply Obj. 3: Sanctity differs from religion as explained above, not
really but logically.
_______________________

QUESTION 82

OF DEVOTION
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the acts of religion. First, we shall consider
the interior acts, which, as stated above, are its principal acts;
secondly, we shall consider its exterior acts, which are secondary.
The interior acts of religion are seemingly devotion and prayer.
Accordingly we shall treat first of devotion, and afterwards of
prayer.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether devotion is a special act?

(2) Whether it is an act of religion?

(3) Of the cause of devotion?

(4) Of its effect?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 82, Art. 1]

Whether Devotion Is a Special Act?

Objection 1: It would seem that devotion is not a special act. That
which qualifies other acts is seemingly not a special act. Now
devotion seems to qualify other acts, for it is written (2 Paralip.
29:31): "All the multitude offered victims, and praises, and
holocausts with a devout mind." Therefore devotion is not a special
act.

Obj. 2: Further, no special kind of act is common to various genera
of acts. But devotion is common to various genera of acts, namely,
corporal and spiritual acts: for a person is said to meditate
devoutly and to genuflect devoutly. Therefore devotion is not a
special act.

Obj. 3: Further, every special act belongs either to an appetitive or
to a cognitive virtue or power. But devotion belongs to neither, as
may be seen by going through the various species of acts of either
faculty, as enumerated above (I, QQ. 78, seqq.; I-II, Q. 23, A. 4).
Therefore devotion is not a special act.

_On the contrary,_ Merits are acquired by acts as stated above (I-II,
Q. 21, AA. 34). But devotion has a special reason for merit.
Therefore devotion is a special act.

_I answer that,_ Devotion is derived from "devote" [*The Latin
_devovere_ means "to vow"]; wherefore those persons are said to be
"devout" who, in a way, devote themselves to God, so as to subject
themselves wholly to Him. Hence in olden times among the heathens a
devotee was one who vowed to his idols to suffer death for the safety
of his army, as Livy relates of the two Decii (Decad. I, viii, 9; x,
28). Hence devotion is apparently nothing else but the will to give
oneself readily to things concerning the service of God. Wherefore it
is written (Ex. 35:20, 21) that "the multitude of the children of
Israel . . . offered first-fruits to the Lord with a most ready and
devout mind." Now it is evident that the will to do readily what
concerns the service of God is a special kind of act. Therefore
devotion is a special act of the will.

Reply Obj. 1: The mover prescribes the mode of the movement of the
thing moved. Now the will moves the other powers of the soul to their
acts, and the will, in so far as it regards the end, moves both
itself and whatever is directed to the end, as stated above (I-II, Q.
9, A. 3). Wherefore, since devotion is an act of the will whereby a
man offers himself for the service of God Who is the last end, it
follows that devotion prescribes the mode to human acts, whether they
be acts of the will itself about things directed to the end, or acts
of the other powers that are moved by the will.

Reply Obj. 2: Devotion is to be found in various genera of acts, not
as a species of those genera, but as the motion of the mover is found
virtually in the movements of the things moved.

Reply Obj. 3: Devotion is an act of the appetitive part of the soul,
and is a movement of the will, as stated above.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 82, Art. 2]

Whether Devotion Is an Act of Religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that devotion is not an act of religion.
Devotion, as stated above (A. 1), consists in giving oneself up to
God. But this is done chiefly by charity, since according to
Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) "the Divine love produces ecstasy, for it
takes the lover away from himself and gives him to the beloved."
Therefore devotion is an act of charity rather than of religion.

Obj. 2: Further, charity precedes religion; and devotion seems to
precede charity; since, in the Scriptures, charity is represented by
fire, while devotion is signified by fatness which is the material of
fire [*Cant. 8:6; Ps. 52:6]. Therefore devotion is not an act of
religion.

Obj. 3: Further, by religion man is directed to God alone, as stated
above (Q. 81, A. 1). But devotion is directed also to men; for we
speak of people being devout to certain holy men, and subjects are
said to be devoted to their masters; thus Pope Leo says [*Serm. viii,
De Pass. Dom.] that the Jews "out of devotion to the Roman laws,"
said: "We have no king but Caesar." Therefore devotion is not an act
of religion.

_On the contrary,_ Devotion is derived from _devovere,_ as stated
(A. 1). But a vow is an act of religion. Therefore devotion is also
an act of religion.

_I answer that,_ It belongs to the same virtue, to will to do
something, and to have the will ready to do it, because both acts
have the same object. For this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. v,
1): "It is justice whereby men both will end do just actions." Now it
is evident that to do what pertains to the worship or service of God,
belongs properly to religion, as stated above (Q. 81). Wherefore it
belongs to that virtue to have the will ready to do such things, and
this is to be devout. Hence it is evident that devotion is an act of
religion.

Reply Obj. 1: It belongs immediately to charity that man should give
himself to God, adhering to Him by a union of the spirit; but it
belongs immediately to religion, and, through the medium of religion,
to charity which is the principle of religion, that man should give
himself to God for certain works of Divine worship.

Reply Obj. 2: Bodily fatness is produced by the natural heat in the
process of digestion, and at the same time the natural heat thrives,
as it were, on this fatness. In like manner charity both causes
devotion (inasmuch as love makes one ready to serve one's friend) and
feeds on devotion. Even so all friendship is safeguarded and
increased by the practice and consideration of friendly deeds.

Reply Obj. 3: Devotion to God's holy ones, dead or living, does not
terminate in them, but passes on to God, in so far as we honor God in
His servants. But the devotion of subjects to their temporal masters
is of another kind, just as service of a temporal master differs from
the service of God.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 82, Art. 3]

Whether Contemplation or Meditation Is the Cause of Devotion?

Objection 1: It would seem that contemplation or meditation is not
the cause of devotion. No cause hinders its effect. But subtle
considerations about abstract matters are often a hindrance to
devotion. Therefore contemplation or meditation is not the cause of
devotion.

Obj. 2: Further, if contemplation were the proper and essential cause
of devotion, the higher objects of contemplation would arouse greater
devotion. But the contrary is the case: since frequently we are urged
to greater devotion by considering Christ's Passion and other
mysteries of His humanity than by considering the greatness of His
Godhead. Therefore contemplation is not the proper cause of devotion.

Obj. 3: Further, if contemplation were the proper cause of devotion,
it would follow that those who are most apt for contemplation, are
also most apt for devotion. Yet the contrary is to be noticed, for
devotion is frequently found in men of simplicity and members of the
female sex, who are defective in contemplation. Therefore
contemplation is not the proper cause of devotion.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 38:4): "In my meditation a fire
shall flame out." But spiritual fire causes devotion. Therefore
meditation is the cause of devotion.

_I answer that,_ The extrinsic and chief cause of devotion is God, of
Whom Ambrose, commenting on Luke 9:55, says that "God calls whom He
deigns to call, and whom He wills He makes religious: the profane
Samaritans, had He so willed, He would have made devout." But the
intrinsic cause on our part must needs be meditation or
contemplation. For it was stated above (A. 1) that devotion is an act
of the will to the effect that man surrenders himself readily to the
service of God. Now every act of the will proceeds from some
consideration, since the object of the will is a good understood.
Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 12; xv, 23) that "the will
arises from the intelligence." Consequently meditation must needs be
the cause of devotion, in so far as through meditation man conceives
the thought of surrendering himself to God's service. Indeed a
twofold consideration leads him thereto. The one is the consideration
of God's goodness and loving kindness, according to Ps. 72:28, "It is
good for me to adhere to my God, to put my hope in the Lord God": and
this consideration wakens love [*_Dilectio,_ the interior act of
charity; cf. Q. 27] which is the proximate cause of devotion. The
other consideration is that of man's own shortcomings, on account of
which he needs to lean on God, according to Ps. 120:1, 2, "I have
lifted up my eyes to the mountains, from whence help shall come to
me: my help is from the Lord, Who made heaven and earth"; and this
consideration shuts out presumption whereby man is hindered from
submitting to God, because he leans on His strength.

Reply Obj. 1: The consideration of such things as are of a nature to
awaken our love [*Ibid.] of God, causes devotion; whereas the
consideration of foreign matters that distract the mind from such
things is a hindrance to devotion.

Reply Obj. 2: Matters concerning the Godhead are, in themselves, the
strongest incentive to love [*Ibid.] and consequently to devotion,
because God is supremely lovable. Yet such is the weakness of the
human mind that it needs a guiding hand, not only to the knowledge,
but also to the love of Divine things by means of certain sensible
objects known to us. Chief among these is the humanity of Christ,
according to the words of the Preface [*Preface for Christmastide],
"that through knowing God visibly, we may be caught up to the love of
things invisible." Wherefore matters relating to Christ's humanity
are the chief incentive to devotion, leading us thither as a guiding
hand, although devotion itself has for its object matters concerning
the Godhead.

Reply Obj. 3: Science and anything else conducive to greatness, is to
man an occasion of self-confidence, so that he does not wholly
surrender himself to God. The result is that such like things
sometimes occasion a hindrance to devotion; while in simple souls and
women devotion abounds by repressing pride. If, however, a man
perfectly submits to God his science or any other perfection, by this
very fact his devotion is increased.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 82, Art. 4]

Whether Joy Is an Effect of Devotion?

Objection 1: It would seem that joy is not an effect of devotion. As
stated above (A. 3, ad 2), Christ's Passion is the chief incentive to
devotion. But the consideration thereof causes an affliction of the
soul, according to Lam. 3:19, "Remember my poverty . . . the wormwood
and the gall," which refers to the Passion, and afterwards (Lam.
3:20) it is said: "I will be mindful and remember, and my soul shall
languish within me." Therefore delight or joy is not the effect of
devotion.

Obj. 2: Further, devotion consists chiefly in an interior sacrifice
of the spirit. But it is written (Ps. 50:19): "A sacrifice to God is
an afflicted spirit." Therefore affliction is the effect of devotion
rather than gladness or joy.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory of Nyssa says (De Homine xii) [*Orat.
funebr. de Placilla Imp.] that "just as laughter proceeds from joy,
so tears and groans are signs of sorrow." But devotion makes some
people shed tears. Therefore gladness or joy is not the effect of
devotion.

_On the contrary,_ We say in the Collect [*Thursday after fourth
Sunday of Lent]: "That we who are punished by fasting may be
comforted by a holy devotion."

_I answer that,_ The direct and principal effect of devotion is the
spiritual joy of the mind, though sorrow is its secondary and
indirect effect. For it has been stated (A. 3) that devotion is
caused by a twofold consideration: chiefly by the consideration of
God's goodness, because this consideration belongs to the term, as it
were, of the movement of the will in surrendering itself to God, and
the direct result of this consideration is joy, according to Ps.
76:4, "I remembered God, and was delighted"; but accidentally this
consideration causes a certain sorrow in those who do not yet enjoy
God fully, according to Ps. 41:3, "My soul hath thirsted after the
strong living God," and afterwards it is said (Ps. 41:4): "My tears
have been my bread," etc. Secondarily devotion is caused as stated
(A. 3), by the consideration of one's own failings; for this
consideration regards the term from which man withdraws by the
movement of his devout will, in that he trusts not in himself, but
subjects himself to God. This consideration has an opposite tendency
to the first: for it is of a nature to cause sorrow directly (when
one thinks over one's own failings), and joy accidentally, namely,
through hope of the Divine assistance. It is accordingly evident that
the first and direct effect of devotion is joy, while the secondary
and accidental effect is that "sorrow which is according to God" [*2
Cor. 7:10].

Reply Obj. 1: In the consideration of Christ's Passion there is
something that causes sorrow, namely, the human defect, the removal
of which made it necessary for Christ to suffer [*Luke 24:25]; and
there is something that causes joy, namely, God's loving-kindness to
us in giving us such a deliverance.

Reply Obj. 2: The spirit which on the one hand is afflicted on
account of the defects of the present life, on the other hand is
rejoiced, by the consideration of God's goodness, and by the hope of
the Divine help.

Reply Obj. 3: Tears are caused not only through sorrow, but also
through a certain tenderness of the affections, especially when one
considers something that gives joy mixed with pain. Thus men are wont
to shed tears through a sentiment of piety, when they recover their
children or dear friends, whom they thought to have lost. In this way
tears arise from devotion.
_______________________

QUESTION 83

OF PRAYER (In Seventeen Articles)

We must now consider prayer, under which head there are seventeen
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether prayer is an act of the appetitive or of the cognitive
power?

(2) Whether it is fitting to pray to God?

(3) Whether prayer is an act of religion?

(4) Whether we ought to pray to God alone?

(5) Whether we ought to ask for something definite when we pray?

(6) Whether we ought to ask for temporal things when we pray?

(7) Whether we ought to pray for others?

(8) Whether we ought to pray for our enemies?

(9) Of the seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer;

(10) Whether prayer is proper to the rational creature?

(11) Whether the saints in heaven pray for us?

(12) Whether prayer should be vocal?

(13) Whether attention is requisite in prayer?

(14) Whether prayer should last a long time?

(15) Whether prayer is meritorious? [*Art. 16]

(16) Whether sinners impetrate anything from God by praying? [*Art.
15]

(17) of the different kinds of prayer.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 1]

Whether Prayer Is an Act of the Appetitive Power?

Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is an act of the appetitive
power. It belongs to prayer to be heard. Now it is the desire that is
heard by God, according to Ps. 9:38, "The Lord hath heard the desire
of the poor." Therefore prayer is desire. But desire is an act of the
appetitive power: and therefore prayer is also.

Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii): "It is useful to
begin everything with prayer, because thereby we surrender ourselves
to God and unite ourselves to Him." Now union with God is effected by
love which belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore prayer belongs
to the appetitive power.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, 6) that there
are two operations of the intellective part. Of these the first is
"the understanding of indivisibles," by which operation we apprehend
what a thing is: while the second is "synthesis" and "analysis,"
whereby we apprehend that a thing is or is not. To these a third may
be added, namely, "reasoning," whereby we proceed from the known to
the unknown. Now prayer is not reducible to any of these operations.
Therefore it is an operation, not of the intellective, but of the
appetitive power.

_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x) that "to pray is to speak."
Now speech belongs to the intellect. Therefore prayer is an act, not
of the appetitive, but of the intellective power.

_I answer that,_ According to Cassiodorus [*Comment. in Ps. 38:13]
"prayer (_oratio_) is spoken reason (_oris ratio_)." Now the
speculative and practical reason differ in this, that the speculative
merely apprehends its object, whereas the practical reason not only
apprehends but causes. Now one thing is the cause of another in two
ways: first perfectly, when it necessitates its effect, and this
happens when the effect is wholly subject to the power of the cause;
secondly imperfectly, by merely disposing to the effect, for the
reason that the effect is not wholly subject to the power of the
cause. Accordingly in this way the reason is cause of certain things
in two ways: first, by imposing necessity; and in this way it belongs
to reason, to command not only the lower powers and the members of
the body, but also human subjects, which indeed is done by
commanding; secondly, by leading up to the effect, and, in a way,
disposing to it, and in this sense the reason asks for something to
be done by things not subject to it, whether they be its equals or
its superiors. Now both of these, namely, to command and to ask or
beseech, imply a certain ordering, seeing that man proposes something
to be effected by something else, wherefore they pertain to the
reason to which it belongs to set in order. For this reason the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that the "reason exhorts us to do
what is best."

Now in the present instance we are speaking of prayer [*This last
paragraph refers to the Latin word _oratio_ (prayer) which originally
signified a speech, being derived in the first instance from _os,_
_oris_ (the mouth).] as signifying a beseeching or petition, in which
sense Augustine [*Rabanus, De Univ. vi, 14]: says (De Verb. Dom.)
that "prayer is a petition," and Damascene states (De Fide Orth. iii,
24) that "to pray is to ask becoming things of God." Accordingly it
is evident that prayer, as we speak of it now, is an act of reason.

Reply Obj. 1: The Lord is said to hear the desire of the poor, either
because desire is the cause of their petition, since a petition is
like the interpreter of a desire, or in order to show how speedily
they are heard, since no sooner do the poor desire something than God
hears them before they put up a prayer, according to the saying of
Isa. 65:24, "And it shall come to pass, that before they call, I will
hear."

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 4; I-II, Q. 9, A. 1, ad
3), the will moves the reason to its end: wherefore nothing hinders
the act of reason, under the motion of the will, from tending to an
end such as charity which is union with God. Now prayer tends to God
through being moved by the will of charity, as it were, and this in
two ways. First, on the part of the object of our petition, because
when we pray we ought principally to ask to be united to God,
according to Ps. 26:4, "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will
I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days
of my life." Secondly, on the part of the petitioner, who ought to
approach the person whom he petitions, either locally, as when he
petitions a man, or mentally, as when he petitions God. Hence
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "when we call upon God in our
prayers, we unveil our mind in His presence": and in the same sense
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that "prayer is the raising up
of the mind to God."

Reply Obj. 3: These three acts belong to the speculative reason, but
to the practical reason it belongs in addition to cause something by
way of command or of petition, as stated above.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 2]

Whether It Is Becoming to Pray?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is unbecoming to pray. Prayer
seems to be necessary in order that we may make our needs known to
the person to whom we pray. But according to Matt. 6:32, "Your Father
knoweth that you have need of all these things." Therefore it is not
becoming to pray to God.

Obj. 2: Further, by prayer we bend the mind of the person to whom we
pray, so that he may do what is asked of him. But God's mind is
unchangeable and inflexible, according to 1 Kings 15:29, "But the
Triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to
repentance." Therefore it is not fitting that we should pray to God.

Obj. 3: Further, it is more liberal to give to one that asks not,
than to one who asks because, according to Seneca (De Benefic. ii,
1), "nothing is bought more dearly than what is bought with prayers."
But God is supremely liberal. Therefore it would seem unbecoming to
pray to God.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 18:1): "We ought always to
pray, and not to faint."

_I answer that,_ Among the ancients there was a threefold error
concerning prayer. Some held that human affairs are not ruled by
Divine providence; whence it would follow that it is useless to pray
and to worship God at all: of these it is written (Malach. 3:14):
"You have said: He laboreth in vain that serveth God." Another
opinion held that all things, even in human affairs, happen of
necessity, whether by reason of the unchangeableness of Divine
providence, or through the compelling influence of the stars, or on
account of the connection of causes: and this opinion also excluded
the utility of prayer. There was a third opinion of those who held
that human affairs are indeed ruled by Divine providence, and that
they do not happen of necessity; yet they deemed the disposition of
Divine providence to be changeable, and that it is changed by prayers
and other things pertaining to the worship of God. All these opinions
were disproved in the First Part (Q. 19, AA. 7, 8; Q. 22, AA. 2, 4;
Q. 115, A. 6; Q. 116). Wherefore it behooves us so to account for the
utility of prayer as neither to impose necessity on human affairs
subject to Divine providence, nor to imply changeableness on the part
of the Divine disposition.

In order to throw light on this question we must consider that Divine
providence disposes not only what effects shall take place, but also
from what causes and in what order these effects shall proceed. Now
among other causes human acts are the causes of certain effects.
Wherefore it must be that men do certain actions, not that thereby
they may change the Divine disposition, but that by those actions
they may achieve certain effects according to the order of the Divine
disposition: and the same is to be said of natural causes. And so is
it with regard to prayer. For we pray not that we may change the
Divine disposition, but that we may impetrate that which God has
disposed to be fulfilled by our prayers, in other words "that by
asking, men may deserve to receive what Almighty God from eternity
has disposed to give," as Gregory says (Dial. i, 8).

Reply Obj. 1: We need to pray to God, not in order to make known to
Him our needs or desires but that we ourselves may be reminded of the
necessity of having recourse to God's help in these matters.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above, our motive in praying is, not that we
may change the Divine disposition, but that, by our prayers, we may
obtain what God has appointed.

Reply Obj. 3: God bestows many things on us out of His liberality,
even without our asking for them: but that He wishes to bestow
certain things on us at our asking, is for the sake of our good,
namely, that we may acquire confidence in having recourse to God, and
that we may recognize in Him the Author of our goods. Hence
Chrysostom says [*Implicitly (Hom. ii, de Orat.; Hom. xxx in Genes.;
Cf. Caten. Aur. on Luke 18)]: "Think what happiness is granted thee,
what honor bestowed on thee, when thou conversest with God in prayer,
when thou talkest with Christ, when thou askest what thou wilt,
whatever thou desirest."
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 3]

Whether Prayer Is an Act of Religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is not an act of religion.
Since religion is a part of justice, it resides in the will as in its
subject. But prayer belongs to the intellective part, as stated above
(A. 1). Therefore prayer seems to be an act, not of religion, but of
the gift of understanding whereby the mind ascends to God.

Obj. 2: Further, the act of _latria_ falls under a necessity of
precept. But prayer does not seem to come under a necessity of
precept, but to come from the mere will, since it is nothing else
than a petition for what we will. Therefore prayer seemingly is not
an act of religion.

Obj. 3: Further, it seems to belong to religion that one "offers
worship and ceremonial rites to the Godhead" [*Cicero, Rhet. ii, 53].
But prayer seems not to offer anything to God, but to ask to obtain
something from Him. Therefore prayer is not an act of religion.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 140:2): "Let my prayer be
directed as incense in Thy sight": and a gloss on the passage says
that "it was to signify this that under the Old Law incense was said
to be offered for a sweet smell to the Lord." Now this belongs to
religion. Therefore prayer is an act of religion.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 81, AA. 2, 4), it belongs
properly to religion to show honor to God, wherefore all those things
through which reverence is shown to God, belong to religion. Now man
shows reverence to God by means of prayer, in so far as he subjects
himself to Him, and by praying confesses that he needs Him as the
Author of his goods. Hence it is evident that prayer is properly an
act of religion.

Reply Obj. 1: The will moves the other powers of the soul to its end,
as stated above (Q. 82, A. 1, ad 1), and therefore religion, which is
in the will, directs the acts of the other powers to the reverence of
God. Now among the other powers of the soul the intellect is the
highest, and the nearest to the will; and consequently after devotion
which belongs to the will, prayer which belongs to the intellective
part is the chief of the acts of religion, since by it religion
directs man's intellect to God.

Reply Obj. 2: It is a matter of precept not only that we should ask
for what we desire, but also that we should desire aright. But to
desire comes under a precept of charity, whereas to ask comes under a
precept of religion, which precept is expressed in Matt. 7:7, where
it is said: "Ask and ye shall receive" [*Vulg.: 'Ask and it shall be
given you.'].

Reply Obj. 3: By praying man surrenders his mind to God, since he
subjects it to Him with reverence and, so to speak, presents it to
Him, as appears from the words of Dionysius quoted above (A. 1, Obj.
2). Wherefore just as the human mind excels exterior things, whether
bodily members, or those external things that are employed for God's
service, so too, prayer surpasses other acts of religion.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 4]

Whether We Ought to Pray to God Alone?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to pray to God alone. Prayer
is an act of religion, as stated above (A. 3). But God alone is to be
worshiped by religion. Therefore we should pray to God alone.

Obj. 2: Further, it is useless to pray to one who is ignorant of the
prayer. But it belongs to God alone to know one's prayer, both
because frequently prayer is uttered by an interior act which God
alone knows, rather than by words, according to the saying of the
Apostle (1 Cor. 14:15), "I will pray with the spirit, I will pray
also with the understanding": and again because, as Augustine says
(De Cura pro mortuis xiii) the "dead, even the saints, know not what
the living, even their own children, are doing." Therefore we ought
to pray to God alone.

Obj. 3: Further, if we pray to any of the saints, this is only
because they are united to God. Now some yet living in this world, or
even some who are in Purgatory, are closely united to God by grace,
and yet we do not pray to them. Therefore neither should we pray to
the saints who are in Paradise.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 5:1), "Call . . . if there be
any that will answer thee, and turn to some of the saints."

_I answer that,_ Prayer is offered to a person in two ways: first, as
to be fulfilled by him, secondly, as to be obtained through him. In
the first way we offer prayer to God alone, since all our prayers
ought to be directed to the acquisition of grace and glory, which God
alone gives, according to Ps. 83:12, "The Lord will give grace and
glory." But in the second way we pray to the saints, whether angels
or men, not that God may through them know our petitions, but that
our prayers may be effective through their prayers and merits. Hence
it is written (Apoc. 8:4) that "the smoke of the incense," namely
"the prayers of the saints ascended up before God." This is also
clear from the very style employed by the Church in praying: since we
beseech the Blessed Trinity "to have mercy on us," while we ask any
of the saints "to pray for us."

Reply Obj. 1: To Him alone do we offer religious worship when
praying, from Whom we seek to obtain what we pray for, because by so
doing we confess that He is the Author of our goods: but not to those
whom we call upon as our advocates in God's presence.

Reply Obj. 2: The dead, if we consider their natural condition, do
not know what takes place in this world, especially the interior
movements of the heart. Nevertheless, according to Gregory (Moral.
xii, 21), whatever it is fitting the blessed should know about what
happens to us, even as regards the interior movements of the heart,
is made known to them in the Word: and it is most becoming to their
exalted position that they should know the petitions we make to them
by word or thought; and consequently the petitions which we raise to
them are known to them through Divine manifestation.

Reply Obj. 3: Those who are in this world or in Purgatory, do not yet
enjoy the vision of the Word, so as to be able to know what we think
or say. Wherefore we do not seek their assistance by praying to them,
but ask it of the living by speaking to them.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 5]

Whether We Ought to Ask for Something Definite When We Pray?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to ask for anything
definite when we pray to God. According to Damascene (De Fide Orth.
iii, 24), "to pray is to ask becoming things of God"; wherefore it is
useless to pray for what is inexpedient, according to James 4:3, "You
ask, and receive not: because you ask amiss." Now according to Rom.
8:26, "we know not what we should pray for as we ought." Therefore we
ought not to ask for anything definite when we pray.

Obj. 2: Further, those who ask another person for something definite
strive to incline his will to do what they wish themselves. But we
ought not to endeavor to make God will what we will; on the contrary,
we ought to strive to will what He wills, according to a gloss on Ps.
32:1, "Rejoice in the Lord, O ye just." Therefore we ought not to ask
God for anything definite when we pray.

Obj. 3: Further, evil things are not to be sought from God; and as to
good things, God Himself invites us to take them. Now it is useless
to ask a person to give you what he invites you to take. Therefore we
ought not to ask God for anything definite in our prayers.

_On the contrary,_ our Lord (Matt. 6 and Luke 11) taught His
disciples to ask definitely for those things which are contained in
the petitions of the Lord's Prayer.

_I answer that,_ According to Valerius Maximus [*Fact. et Dict.
Memor. vii, 2], "Socrates deemed that we should ask the immortal gods
for nothing else but that they should grant us good things, because
they at any rate know what is good for each one whereas when we pray
we frequently ask for what it had been better for us not to obtain."
This opinion is true to a certain extent, as to those things which
may have an evil result, and which man may use ill or well, such as
"riches, by which," as stated by the same authority (Fact. et Dict.
Memor. vii, 2), "many have come to an evil end; honors, which have
ruined many; power, of which we frequently witness the unhappy
results; splendid marriages, which sometimes bring about the total
wreck of a family." Nevertheless there are certain goods which man
cannot ill use, because they cannot have an evil result. Such are
those which are the object of beatitude and whereby we merit it: and
these the saints seek absolutely when they pray, as in Ps. 79:4,
"Show us Thy face, and we shall be saved," and again in Ps. 118:35,
"Lead me into the path of Thy commandments."

Reply Obj. 1: Although man cannot by himself know what he ought to
pray for, "the Spirit," as stated in the same passage, "helpeth our
infirmity," since by inspiring us with holy desires, He makes us ask
for what is right. Hence our Lord said (John 4:24) that true adorers
"must adore . . . in spirit and in truth."

Reply Obj. 2: When in our prayers we ask for things concerning our
salvation, we conform our will to God's, of Whom it is written (1
Tim. 2:4) that "He will have all men to be saved."

Reply Obj. 3: God so invites us to take good things, that we may
approach to them not by the steps of the body, but by pious desires
and devout prayers.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 6]

Whether Man Ought to Ask God for Temporal Things When He Prays?

Objection 1: It would seem that man ought not to ask God for temporal
things when he prays. We seek what we ask for in prayer. But we
should not seek for temporal things, for it is written (Matt. 6:33):
"Seek ye . . . first the kingdom of God, and His justice: and all
these things shall be added unto you," that is to say, temporal
things, which, says He, we are not to seek, but they will be added to
what we seek. Therefore temporal things are not to be asked of God in
prayer.

Obj. 2: Further, no one asks save for that which he is solicitous
about. Now we ought not to have solicitude for temporal things,
according to the saying of Matt. 6:25, "Be not solicitous for your
life, what you shall eat." Therefore we ought not to ask for temporal
things when we pray.

Obj. 3: Further, by prayer our mind should be raised up to God. But
by asking for temporal things, it descends to things beneath it,
against the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:18), "While we look not
at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen.
For the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are
not seen are eternal." Therefore man ought not to ask God for
temporal things when he prays.

Obj. 4: Further, man ought not to ask of God other than good and
useful things. But sometimes temporal things, when we have them, are
harmful, not only in a spiritual sense, but also in a material sense.
Therefore we should not ask God for them in our prayers.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 30:8): "Give me only the
necessaries of life."

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (ad Probam, de orando Deum, Ep.
cxxx, 12): "It is lawful to pray for what it is lawful to desire."
Now it is lawful to desire temporal things, not indeed principally,
by placing our end therein, but as helps whereby we are assisted in
tending towards beatitude, in so far, to wit, as they are the means
of supporting the life of the body, and are of service to us as
instruments in performing acts of virtue, as also the Philosopher
states (Ethic. i, 8). Augustine too says the same to Proba (ad
Probam, de orando Deum, Ep. cxxx, 6, 7) when he states that "it is
not unbecoming for anyone to desire enough for a livelihood, and no
more; for this sufficiency is desired, not for its own sake, but for
the welfare of the body, or that we should desire to be clothed in a
way befitting one's station, so as not to be out of keeping with
those among whom we have to live. Accordingly we ought to pray that
we may keep these things if we have them, and if we have them not,
that we may gain possession of them."

Reply Obj. 1: We should seek temporal things not in the first but in
the second place. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii,
16): "When He says that this" (i.e. the kingdom of God) "is to be
sought first, He implies that the other" (i.e. temporal goods) "is to
be sought afterwards, not in time but in importance, this as being
our good, the other as our need."

Reply Obj. 2: Not all solicitude about temporal things is forbidden,
but that which is superfluous and inordinate, as stated above (Q. 55,
A. 6).

Reply Obj. 3: When our mind is intent on temporal things in order
that it may rest in them, it remains immersed therein; but when it is
intent on them in relation to the acquisition of beatitude, it is not
lowered by them, but raises them to a higher level.

Reply Obj. 4: From the very fact that we ask for temporal things not
as the principal object of our petition, but as subordinate to
something else, we ask God for them in the sense that they may be
granted to us in so far as they are expedient for salvation.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 7]

Whether We Ought to Pray for Others?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to pray for others. In
praying we ought to conform to the pattern given by our Lord. Now in
the Lord's Prayer we make petitions for ourselves, not for others;
thus we say: "Give us this day our daily bread," etc. Therefore we
should not pray for others.

Obj. 2: Further, prayer is offered that it may be heard. Now one of
the conditions required for prayer that it may be heard is that one
pray for oneself, wherefore Augustine in commenting on John 16:23,
"If you ask the Father anything in My name He will give it you," says
(Tract. cii): "Everyone is heard when he prays for himself, not when
he prays for all; wherefore He does not say simply 'He will give it,'
but 'He will give it you.'" Therefore it would seem that we ought not
to pray for others, but only for ourselves.

Obj. 3: Further, we are forbidden to pray for others, if they are
wicked, according to Jer. 7:16, "Therefore do not then pray for this
people . . . and do not withstand Me, for I will not hear thee." On
the other hand we are not bound to pray for the good, since they are
heard when they pray for themselves. Therefore it would seem that we
ought not to pray for others.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 5:16): "Pray one for another,
that you may be saved."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), when we pray we ought to ask
for what we ought to desire. Now we ought to desire good things not
only for ourselves, but also for others: for this is essential to the
love which we owe to our neighbor, as stated above (Q. 25, AA. 1, 12;
Q. 27, A. 2; Q. 31, A. 1). Therefore charity requires us to pray for
others. Hence Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Matth.) [*Opus
Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]: "Necessity
binds us to pray for ourselves, fraternal charity urges us to pray
for others: and the prayer that fraternal charity proffers is sweeter
to God than that which is the outcome of necessity."

Reply Obj. 1: As Cyprian says (De orat. Dom.), "We say 'Our Father'
and not 'My Father,' 'Give us' and not 'Give me,' because the Master
of unity did not wish us to pray privately, that is for ourselves
alone, for He wished each one to pray for all, even as He Himself
bore all in one."

Reply Obj. 2: It is a condition of prayer that one pray for oneself:
not as though it were necessary in order that prayer be meritorious,
but as being necessary in order that prayer may not fail in its
effect of impetration. For it sometimes happens that we pray for
another with piety and perseverance, and ask for things relating to
his salvation, and yet it is not granted on account of some obstacle
on the part of the person we are praying for, according to Jer. 15:1,
"If Moses and Samuel shall stand before Me, My soul is not towards
this people." And yet the prayer will be meritorious for the person
who prays thus out of charity, according to Ps. 34:13, "My prayer
shall be turned into my bosom, i.e. though it profit them not, I am
not deprived of my reward," as the gloss expounds it.

Reply Obj. 3: We ought to pray even for sinners, that they may be
converted, and for the just that they may persevere and advance in
holiness. Yet those who pray are heard not for all sinners but for
some: since they are heard for the predestined, but not for those who
are foreknown to death; even as the correction whereby we correct the
brethren, has an effect in the predestined but not in the reprobate,
according to Eccles. 7:14, "No man can correct whom God hath
despised." Hence it is written (1 John 5:16): "He that knoweth his
brother to sin a sin which is not to death, let him ask, and life
shall be given to him, who sinneth not to death." Now just as the
benefit of correction must not be refused to any man so long as he
lives here below, because we cannot distinguish the predestined from
the reprobate, as Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xv), so too no
man should be denied the help of prayer.

We ought also to pray for the just for three reasons: First, because
the prayers of a multitude are more easily heard, wherefore a gloss
on Rom. 15:30, "Help me in your prayers," says: "The Apostle rightly
tells the lesser brethren to pray for him, for many lesser ones, if
they be united together in one mind, become great, and it is
impossible for the prayers of a multitude not to obtain" that which
is possible to be obtained by prayer. Secondly, that many may thank
God for the graces conferred on the just, which graces conduce to the
profit of many, according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 1:11). Thirdly, that
the more perfect may not wax proud, seeing that they find that they
need the prayers of the less perfect.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 8]

Whether We Ought to Pray for Our Enemies?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to pray for our enemies.
According to Rom. 15:4, "what things soever were written, were
written for our learning." Now Holy Writ contains many imprecations
against enemies; thus it is written (Ps. 6:11): "Let all my enemies
be ashamed and be . . . troubled, let them be ashamed and be troubled
very speedily [*Vulg.: 'Let them be turned back and be ashamed.']."
Therefore we too should pray against rather than for our enemies.

Obj. 2: Further, to be revenged on one's enemies is harmful to them.
But holy men seek vengeance of their enemies according to Apoc. 6:10,
"How long . . . dost Thou not . . . revenge our blood on them that
dwell on earth?" Wherefore they rejoice in being revenged on their
enemies, according to Ps. 57:11, "The just shall rejoice when he
shall see the revenge." Therefore we should not pray for our enemies,
but against them.

Obj. 3: Further, man's deed should not be contrary to his prayer. Now
sometimes men lawfully attack their enemies, else all wars would be
unlawful, which is opposed to what we have said above (Q. 40, A. 1).
Therefore we should not pray for our enemies.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 5:44): "Pray for them that
persecute and calumniate you."

_I answer that,_ To pray for another is an act of charity, as stated
above (A. 7). Wherefore we are bound to pray for our enemies in the
same manner as we are bound to love them. Now it was explained above
in the treatise on charity (Q. 25, AA. 8, 9), how we are bound to
love our enemies, namely, that we must love in them their nature, not
their sin, and that to love our enemies in general is a matter of
precept, while to love them in the individual is not a matter of
precept, except in the preparedness of the mind, so that a man must
be prepared to love his enemy even in the individual and to help him
in a case of necessity, or if his enemy should beg his forgiveness.
But to love one's enemies absolutely in the individual, and to assist
them, is an act of perfection.

In like manner it is a matter of obligation that we should not
exclude our enemies from the general prayers which we offer up for
others: but it is a matter of perfection, and not of obligation, to
pray for them individually, except in certain special cases.

Reply Obj. 1: The imprecations contained in Holy Writ may be
understood in four ways. First, according to the custom of the
prophets "to foretell the future under the veil of an imprecation,"
as Augustine states [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 21]. Secondly, in the
sense that certain temporal evils are sometimes inflicted by God on
the wicked for their correction. Thirdly, because they are understood
to be pronounced, not against the men themselves, but against the
kingdom of sin, with the purpose, to wit, of destroying sin by the
correction of men. Fourthly, by way of conformity of our will to the
Divine justice with regard to the damnation of those who are
obstinate in sin.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine states in the same book (De Serm. Dom. in
Monte i, 22), "the martyrs' vengeance is the overthrow of the kingdom
of sin, because they suffered so much while it reigned": or as he
says again (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. lxviii), "their prayer for
vengeance is expressed not in words but in their minds, even as the
blood of Abel cried from the earth." They rejoice in vengeance not
for its own sake, but for the sake of Divine justice.

Reply Obj. 3: It is lawful to attack one's enemies, that they may be
restrained from sin: and this is for their own good and for the good
of others. Consequently it is even lawful in praying to ask that
temporal evils be inflicted on our enemies in order that they may
mend their ways. Thus prayer and deed will not be contrary to one
another.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 9]

Whether the Seven Petitions of the Lord's Prayer Are Fittingly
Assigned?

Objection 1: It would seem that the seven petitions of the Lord's
Prayer are not fittingly assigned. It is useless to ask for that to
be hallowed which is always holy. But the name of God is always holy,
according to Luke 1:49, "Holy is His name." Again, His kingdom is
everlasting, according to Ps. 144:13, "Thy kingdom is a kingdom of
all ages." Again, God's will is always fulfilled, according to Isa
46:10, "All My will shall be done." Therefore it is useless to ask
for "the name of God to be hallowed," for "His kingdom to come," and
for "His will to be done."

Obj. 2: Further, one must withdraw from evil before attaining good.
Therefore it seems unfitting for the petitions relating to the
attainment of good to be set forth before those relating to the
removal of evil.

Obj. 3: Further, one asks for a thing that it may be given to one.
Now the chief gift of God is the Holy Ghost, and those gifts that we
receive through Him. Therefore the petitions seem to be unfittingly
assigned, since they do not correspond to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 4: Further, according to Luke, only five petitions are mentioned
in the Lord's Prayer, as appears from the eleventh chapter. Therefore
it was superfluous for Matthew to mention seven.

Obj. 5: Further, it seems useless to seek to win the benevolence of
one who forestalls us by his benevolence. Now God forestalls us by
His benevolence, since "He first hath loved us" ( 1 John 4:19).
Therefore it is useless to preface the petitions with the words our
"Father Who art in heaven," which seem to indicate a desire to win
God's benevolence.

_On the contrary,_ The authority of Christ, who composed this prayer,
suffices.

_I answer that,_ The Lord's Prayer is most perfect, because, as
Augustine says (ad Probam Ep. cxxx, 12), "if we pray rightly and
fittingly, we can say nothing else but what is contained in this
prayer of our Lord." For since prayer interprets our desires, as it
were, before God, then alone is it right to ask for something in our
prayers when it is right that we should desire it. Now in the Lord's
Prayer not only do we ask for all that we may rightly desire, but
also in the order wherein we ought to desire them, so that this
prayer not only teaches us to ask, but also directs all our
affections. Thus it is evident that the first thing to be the object
of our desire is the end, and afterwards whatever is directed to the
end. Now our end is God towards Whom our affections tend in two ways:
first, by our willing the glory of God, secondly, by willing to enjoy
His glory. The first belongs to the love whereby we love God in
Himself, while the second belongs to the love whereby we love
ourselves in God. Wherefore the first petition is expressed thus:
"Hallowed be Thy name," and the second thus: "Thy kingdom come," by
which we ask to come to the glory of His kingdom.

To this same end a thing directs us in two ways: in one way, by its
very nature, in another way, accidentally. Of its very nature the
good which is useful for an end directs us to that end. Now a thing
is useful in two ways to that end which is beatitude: in one way,
directly and principally, according to the merit whereby we merit
beatitude by obeying God, and in this respect we ask: "Thy will be
done on earth as it is in heaven"; in another way instrumentally, and
as it were helping us to merit, and in this respect we say: "Give us
this day our daily bread," whether we understand this of the
sacramental Bread, the daily use of which is profitable to man, and
in which all the other sacraments are contained, or of the bread of
the body, so that it denotes all sufficiency of food, as Augustine
says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 11), since the Eucharist is the chief
sacrament, and bread is the chief food: thus in the Gospel of Matthew
we read, "supersubstantial," i.e. "principal," as Jerome expounds it.

We are directed to beatitude accidentally by the removal of
obstacles. Now there are three obstacles to our attainment of
beatitude. First, there is sin, which directly excludes a man from
the kingdom, according to 1 Cor. 6:9, 10, "Neither fornicators, nor
idolaters, etc., shall possess the kingdom of God"; and to this refer
the words, "Forgive us our trespasses." Secondly, there is temptation
which hinders us from keeping God's will, and to this we refer when
we say: "And lead us not into temptation," whereby we do not ask not
to be tempted, but not to be conquered by temptation, which is to be
led into temptation. Thirdly, there is the present penal state which
is a kind of obstacle to a sufficiency of life, and to this we refer
in the words, "Deliver us from evil."

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 5), when
we say, "Hallowed be Thy name, we do not mean that God's name is not
holy, but we ask that men may treat it as a holy thing," and this
pertains to the diffusion of God's glory among men. When we say, "Thy
kingdom come, we do not imply that God is not reigning now," but "we
excite in ourselves the desire for that kingdom, that it may come to
us, and that we may reign therein," as Augustine says (ad Probam, Ep.
cxxx, 11). The words, "Thy will be done" rightly signify, "'May Thy
commandments be obeyed' on earth as in heaven, i.e. by men as well as
by angels" (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 6). Hence these three
petitions will be perfectly fulfilled in the life to come; while the
other four, according to Augustine (Enchiridion cxv), belong to the
needs of the present life.

Reply Obj. 2: Since prayer is the interpreter of desire, the order of
the petitions corresponds with the order, not of execution, but of
desire or intention, where the end precedes the things that are
directed to the end, and attainment of good precedes removal of evil.

Reply Obj. 3: Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 11) adapts the
seven petitions to the gifts and beatitudes. He says: "If it is fear
of God whereby blessed are the poor in spirit, let us ask that God's
name be hallowed among men with a chaste fear. If it is piety whereby
blessed are the meek, let us ask that His kingdom may come, so that
we become meek and no longer resist Him. If it is knowledge whereby
blessed are they that mourn, let us pray that His will be done, for
thus we shall mourn no more. If it is fortitude whereby blessed ere
they that hunger, let us pray that our daily bread be given to us. If
it is counsel whereby blessed are the merciful, let us forgive the
trespasses of others that our own may be forgiven. If it is
understanding whereby blessed are the pure in heart, let us pray lest
we have a double heart by seeking after worldly things which ere the
occasion of our temptations. If it is wisdom whereby blessed are the
peacemakers for they shall be called the children of God, let us pray
to be delivered from evil: for if we be delivered we shall by that
very fact become the free children of God."

Reply Obj. 4: According to Augustine (Enchiridion cxvi), "Luke
included not seven but five petitions in the Lord's Prayer, for by
omitting it, he shows that the third petition is a kind of repetition
of the two that precede, and thus helps us to understand it";
because, to wit, the will of God tends chiefly to this--that we come
to the knowledge of His holiness and to reign together with Him.
Again the last petition mentioned by Matthew, "Deliver us from evil,"
is omitted by Luke, so that each one may know himself to be delivered
from evil if he be not led into temptation.

Reply Obj. 5: Prayer is offered up to God, not that we may bend Him,
but that we may excite in ourselves the confidence to ask: which
confidence is excited in us chiefly by the consideration of His
charity in our regard, whereby he wills our good--wherefore we say:
"Our Father"; and of His excellence, whereby He is able to fulfil
it--wherefore we say: "Who art in heaven."
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 10]

Whether Prayer Is Proper to the Rational Creature?

Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is not proper to the rational
creature. Asking and receiving apparently belong to the same subject.
But receiving is becoming also to uncreated Persons, viz. the Son and
Holy Ghost. Therefore it is competent to them to pray: for the Son
said (John 14:16): "I will ask My [Vulg.: 'the'] Father," and the
Apostle says of the Holy Ghost (Rom. 8:26): "The Spirit . . . asketh
for us."

Obj. 2: Angels are above rational creatures, since they are
intellectual substances. Now prayer is becoming to the angels,
wherefore we read in the Ps. 96:7: "Adore Him, all you His angels."
Therefore prayer is not proper to the rational creature.

Obj. 3: Further, the same subject is fitted to pray as is fitted to
call upon God, since this consists chiefly in prayer. But dumb
animals are fitted to call upon God, according to Ps. 146:9, "Who
giveth to beasts their food and to the young ravens that call upon
Him." Therefore prayer is not proper to the rational creatures.

_On the contrary,_ Prayer is an act of reason, as stated above (A.
1). But the rational creature is so called from his reason. Therefore
prayer is proper to the rational creature.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1) prayer is an act of reason,
and consists in beseeching a superior; just as command is an act of
reason, whereby an inferior is directed to something. Accordingly
prayer is properly competent to one to whom it is competent to have
reason, and a superior whom he may beseech. Now nothing is above the
Divine Persons; and dumb animals are devoid of reason. Therefore
prayer is unbecoming both the Divine Persons and dumb animals, and it
is proper to the rational creature.

Reply Obj. 1: Receiving belongs to the Divine Persons in respect of
their nature, whereas prayer belongs to one who receives through
grace. The Son is said to ask or pray in respect of His assumed, i.e.
His human, nature and not in respect of His Godhead: and the Holy
Ghost is said to ask, because He makes us ask.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated in the First Part (Q. 79, A. 8), intellect
and reason are not distinct powers in us: but they differ as the
perfect from the imperfect. Hence intellectual creatures which are
the angels are distinct from rational creatures, and sometimes are
included under them. In this sense prayer is said to be proper to the
rational creature.

Reply Obj. 3: The young ravens are said to call upon God, on account
of the natural desire whereby all things, each in its own way, desire
to attain the Divine goodness. Thus too dumb animals are said to obey
God, on account of the natural instinct whereby they are moved by God.
_______________________

ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 11]

Whether the Saints in Heaven Pray for Us?

Objection 1: It would seem that the saints in heaven do not pray for
us. A man's action is more meritorious for himself than for others.
But the saints in heaven do not merit for themselves, neither do they
pray for themselves, since they are already established in the term.
Neither therefore do they pray for us.

Obj. 2: Further, the saints conform their will to God perfectly, so
that they will only what God wills. Now what God wills is always
fulfilled. Therefore it would be useless for the saints to pray for
us.

Obj. 3: Further, just as the saints in heaven are above, so are those
in Purgatory, for they can no longer sin. Now those in Purgatory do
not pray for us, on the contrary we pray for them. Therefore neither
do the saints in heaven pray for us.

Obj. 4: Further, if the saints in heaven pray for us, the prayers of
the higher saints would be more efficacious; and so we ought not to
implore the help of the lower saints' prayers but only of those of
the higher saints.

Obj. 5: Further, the soul of Peter is not Peter. If therefore the
souls of the saints pray for us, so long as they are separated from
their bodies, we ought not to call upon Saint Peter, but on his soul,
to pray for us: yet the Church does the contrary. The saints
therefore do not pray for us, at least before the resurrection.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Macc. 15:14): "This is . . . he
that prayeth much for the people, and for all the holy city, Jeremias
the prophet of God."

_I answer that,_ As Jerome says (Cont. Vigilant. 6), the error of
Vigilantius consisted in saying that "while we live, we can pray one
for another; but that after we are dead, none of our prayers for
others can be heard, seeing that not even the martyrs' prayers are
granted when they pray for their blood to be avenged." But this is
absolutely false, because, since prayers offered for others proceed
from charity, as stated above (AA. 7, 8), the greater the charity of
the saints in heaven, the more they pray for wayfarers, since the
latter can be helped by prayers: and the more closely they are united
to God, the more are their prayers efficacious: for the Divine order
is such that lower beings receive an overflow of the excellence of
the higher, even as the air receives the brightness of the sun.
Wherefore it is said of Christ (Heb. 7:25): "Going to God by His own
power . . . to make intercession for us" [*Vulg.: 'He is able to save
for ever them that come to God by Him, always living to make
intercession for us.']. Hence Jerome says (Cont. Vigilant. 6): "If
the apostles and martyrs while yet in the body and having to be
solicitous for themselves, can pray for others, how much more now
that they have the crown of victory and triumph."

Reply Obj. 1: The saints in heaven, since they are blessed, have no
lack of bliss, save that of the body's glory, and for this they pray.
But they pray for us who lack the ultimate perfection of bliss: and
their prayers are efficacious in impetrating through their previous
merits and through God's acceptance.

Reply Obj. 2: The saints impetrate what ever God wishes to take place
through their prayers: and they pray for that which they deem will be
granted through their prayers according to God's will.

Reply Obj. 3: Those who are in Purgatory though they are above us on
account of their impeccability, yet they are below us as to the pains
which they suffer: and in this respect they are not in a condition to
pray, but rather in a condition that requires us to pray for them.

Reply Obj. 4: It is God's will that inferior beings should be helped
by all those that are above them, wherefore we ought to pray not only
to the higher but also to the lower saints; else we should have to
implore the mercy of God alone. Nevertheless it happens sometime that
prayers addressed to a saint of lower degree are more efficacious,
either because he is implored with greater devotion, or because God
wishes to make known his sanctity.

Reply Obj. 5: It is because the saints while living merited to pray
for us, that we invoke them under the names by which they were known
in this life, and by which they are better known to us: and also in
order to indicate our belief in the resurrection, according to the
saying of Ex. 3:6, "I am the God of Abraham," etc.
_______________________

TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 12]

Whether Prayer Should Be Vocal?

Objection 1: It would seem that prayer ought not to be vocal. As
stated above (A. 4), prayer is addressed chiefly to God. Now God
knows the language of the heart. Therefore it is useless to employ
vocal prayer.

Obj. 2: Further, prayer should lift man's mind to God, as stated
above (A. 1, ad 2). But words, like other sensible objects, prevent
man from ascending to God by contemplation. Therefore we should not
use words in our prayers.

Obj. 3: Further, prayer should be offered to God in secret, according
to Matt. 6:6, "But thou, when thou shalt pray, enter into thy
chamber, and having shut the door, pray to thy Father in secret." But
prayer loses its secrecy by being expressed vocally. Therefore prayer
should not be vocal.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 141:2): "I cried to the Lord
with my voice, with my voice I made supplication to the Lord."

_I answer that,_ Prayer is twofold, common and individual. Common
prayer is that which is offered to God by the ministers of the Church
representing the body of the faithful: wherefore such like prayer
should come to the knowledge of the whole people for whom it is
offered: and this would not be possible unless it were vocal prayer.
Therefore it is reasonably ordained that the ministers of the Church
should say these prayers even in a loud voice, so that they may come
to the knowledge of all.

On the other hand individual prayer is that which is offered by any
single person, whether he pray for himself or for others; and it is
not essential to such a prayer as this that it be vocal. And yet the
voice is employed in such like prayers for three reasons. First, in
order to excite interior devotion, whereby the mind of the person
praying is raised to God, because by means of external signs, whether
of words or of deeds, the human mind is moved as regards
apprehension, and consequently also as regards the affections. Hence
Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx, 9) that "by means of words and
other signs we arouse ourselves more effectively to an increase of
holy desires." Hence then alone should we use words and such like
signs when they help to excite the mind internally. But if they
distract or in any way impede the mind we should abstain from them;
and this happens chiefly to those whose mind is sufficiently prepared
for devotion without having recourse to those signs. Wherefore the
Psalmist (Ps. 26:8) said: "My heart hath said to Thee: 'My face hath
sought Thee,'" and we read of Anna (1 Kings 1:13) that "she spoke in
her heart." Secondly, the voice is used in praying as though to pay a
debt, so that man may serve God with all that he has from God, that
is to say, not only with his mind, but also with his body: and this
applies to prayer considered especially as satisfactory. Hence it is
written (Osee 14:3): "Take away all iniquity, and receive the good:
and we will render the calves of our lips." Thirdly, we have recourse
to vocal prayer, through a certain overflow from the soul into the
body, through excess of feeling, according to Ps. 15:9, "My heart
hath been glad, and my tongue hath rejoiced."

Reply Obj. 1: Vocal prayer is employed, not in order to tell God
something He does not know, but in order to lift up the mind of the
person praying or of other persons to God.

Reply Obj. 2: Words about other matters distract the mind and hinder
the devotion of those who pray: but words signifying some object of
devotion lift up the mind, especially one that is less devout.

Reply Obj. 3: As Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in the Opus Imperfectum
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], "Our Lord forbids one to
pray in presence of others in order that one may be seen by others.
Hence when you pray, do nothing strange to draw men's attention,
either by shouting so as to be heard by others, or by openly striking
the heart, or extending the hands, so as to be seen by many. And yet,
according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 3), "it is not
wrong to be seen by men, but to do this or that in order to be seen
by men."
_______________________

THIRTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 13]

Whether Attention Is a Necessary Condition of Prayer?

Objection 1: It would seem that attention is a necessary condition of
prayer. It is written (John 4:24): "God is a spirit, and they that
adore Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth." But prayer is not
in spirit unless it be attentive. Therefore attention is a necessary
condition of prayer.

Obj. 2: Further, prayer is "the ascent of the mind to God"
[*Damascene, De Fide Orth. iii, 24]. But the mind does not ascend to
God if the prayer is inattentive. Therefore attention is a necessary
condition of prayer.

Obj. 3: Further, it is a necessary condition of prayer that it should
be altogether sinless. Now if a man allows his mind to wander while
praying he is not free of sin, for he seems to make light of God;
even as if he were to speak to another man without attending to what
he was saying. Hence Basil says [*De Constit. Monach. i] that the
"Divine assistance is to be implored, not lightly, nor with a mind
wandering hither and thither: because he that prays thus not only
will not obtain what he asks, nay rather will he provoke God to
anger." Therefore it would seem a necessary condition of prayer that
it should be attentive.

_On the contrary,_ Even holy men sometimes suffer from a wandering of
the mind when they pray, according to Ps. 39:13, "My heart hath
forsaken me."

_I answer that,_ This question applies chiefly to vocal prayer.
Accordingly we must observe that a thing is necessary in two ways.
First, a thing is necessary because thereby the end is better
obtained: and thus attention is absolutely necessary for prayer.
Secondly, a thing is said to be necessary when without it something
cannot obtain its effect. Now the effect of prayer is threefold. The
first is an effect which is common to all acts quickened by charity,
and this is merit. In order to realize this effect, it is not
necessary that prayer should be attentive throughout; because the
force of the original intention with which one sets about praying
renders the whole prayer meritorious, as is the case with other
meritorious acts. The second effect of prayer is proper thereto, and
consists in impetration: and again the original intention, to which
God looks chiefly, suffices to obtain this effect. But if the
original intention is lacking, prayer lacks both merit and
impetration: because, as Gregory [*Hugh St. Victor, Expos. in Reg. S.
Aug. iii] says, "God hears not the prayer of those who pay no
attention to their prayer." The third effect of prayer is that which
it produces at once; this is the spiritual refreshment of the mind,
and for this effect attention is a necessary condition: wherefore it
is written (1 Cor. 14:14): "If I pray in a tongue . . . my
understanding is without fruit."

It must be observed, however, that there are three kinds of attention
that can be brought to vocal prayer: one which attends to the words,
lest we say them wrong, another which attends to the sense of the
words, and a third, which attends to the end of prayer, namely, God,
and to the thing we are praying for. That last kind of attention is
most necessary, and even idiots are capable of it. Moreover this
attention, whereby the mind is fixed on God, is sometimes so strong
that the mind forgets all other things, as Hugh of St. Victor states
[*De Modo Orandi ii].

Reply Obj. 1: To pray in spirit and in truth is to set about praying
through the instigation of the Spirit, even though afterwards the
mind wander through weakness.

Reply Obj. 2: The human mind is unable to remain aloft for long on
account of the weakness of nature, because human weakness weighs down
the soul to the level of inferior things: and hence it is that when,
while praying, the mind ascends to God by contemplation, of a sudden
it wanders off through weakness.

Reply Obj. 3: Purposely to allow one's mind to wander in prayer is
sinful and hinders the prayer from having fruit. It is against this
that Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "When you pray God with
psalms and hymns, let your mind attend to that which your lips
pronounce." But to wander in mind unintentionally does not deprive
prayer of its fruit. Hence Basil says (De Constit. Monach. i): "If
you are so truly weakened by sin that you are unable to pray
attentively, strive as much as you can to curb yourself, and God will
pardon you, seeing that you are unable to stand in His presence in a
becoming manner, not through negligence but through frailty."
_______________________

FOURTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 14]

Whether Prayer Should Last a Long Time?

Objection 1: It would seem that prayer should not be continual. It is
written (Matt. 6:7): "When you are praying, speak not much." Now one
who prays a long time needs to speak much, especially if his be vocal
prayer. Therefore prayer should not last a long time.

Obj. 2: Further, prayer expresses the desire. Now a desire is all the
holier according as it is centered on one thing, according to Ps.
26:4, "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after."
Therefore the shorter prayer is, the more is it acceptable to God.

Obj. 3: Further, it seems to be wrong to transgress the limits fixed
by God, especially in matters concerning Divine worship, according to
Ex. 19:21: "Charge the people, lest they should have a mind to pass
the limits to see the Lord, and a very great multitude of them should
perish." But God has fixed for us the limits of prayer by instituting
the Lord's Prayer (Matt. 6). Therefore it is not right to prolong our
prayer beyond its limits.

Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ It would seem that we ought to pray
continually. For our Lord said (Luke 18:1): "We ought always to pray,
and not to faint": and it is written (1 Thess. 5:17): "Pray without
ceasing."

_I answer that,_ We may speak about prayer in two ways: first, by
considering it in itself; secondly, by considering it in its cause.
The cause of prayer is the desire of charity, from which prayer ought
to arise: and this desire ought to be in us continually, either
actually or virtually, for the virtue of this desire remains in
whatever we do out of charity; and we ought to "do all things to the
glory of God" (1 Cor. 10:31). From this point of view prayer ought to
be continual: wherefore Augustine says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 9):
"Faith, hope and charity are by themselves a prayer of continual
longing." But prayer, considered in itself, cannot be continual,
because we have to be busy about other works, and, as Augustine says
(ad Probam. Ep. cxxx, 9), "we pray to God with our lips at certain
intervals and seasons, in order to admonish ourselves by means of
such like signs, to take note of the amount of our progress in that
desire, and to arouse ourselves more eagerly to an increase thereof."
Now the quantity of a thing should be commensurate with its end, for
instance the quantity of the dose should be commensurate with health.
And so it is becoming that prayer should last long enough to arouse
the fervor of the interior desire: and when it exceeds this measure,
so that it cannot be continued any longer without causing weariness,
it should be discontinued. Wherefore Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep.
cxxx): "It is said that the brethren in Egypt make frequent but very
short prayers, rapid ejaculations, as it were, lest that vigilant and
erect attention which is so necessary in prayer slacken and languish,
through the strain being prolonged. By so doing they make it
sufficiently clear not only that this attention must not be forced if
we are unable to keep it up, but also that if we are able to
continue, it should not be broken off too soon." And just as we must
judge of this in private prayers by considering the attention of the
person praying, so too, in public prayers we must judge of it by
considering the devotion of the people.

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx), "to pray with
many words is not the same as to pray long; to speak long is one
thing, to be devout long is another. For it is written that our Lord
passed the whole night in prayer, and that He 'prayed the longer' in
order to set us an example." Further on he says: "When praying say
little, yet pray much so long as your attention is fervent. For to
say much in prayer is to discuss your need in too many words: whereas
to pray much is to knock at the door of Him we pray, by the
continuous and devout clamor of the heart. Indeed this business is
frequently done with groans rather than with words, with tears rather
than with speech."

Reply Obj. 2: Length of prayer consists, not in praying for many
things, but in the affections persisting in the desire of one thing.

Reply Obj. 3: Our Lord instituted this prayer, not that we might use
no other words when we pray, but that in our prayers we might have
none but these things in view, no matter how we express them or think
of them.

Reply Obj. 4: One may pray continually, either through having a
continual desire, as stated above; or through praying at certain
fixed times, though interruptedly; or by reason of the effect,
whether in the person who prays--because he remains more devout even
after praying, or in some other person--as when by his kindness a man
incites another to pray for him, even after he himself has ceased
praying.
_______________________

FIFTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 15]

Whether Prayer Is Meritorious?

Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is not meritorious. All merit
proceeds from grace. But prayer precedes grace, since even grace is
obtained by means of prayer according to Luke 11:13, "(How much more)
will your Father from heaven give the good Spirit to them that ask
Him!" Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act.

Obj. 2: Further, if prayer merits anything, this would seem to be
chiefly that which is besought in prayer. Yet it does not always
merit this, because even the saints' prayers are frequently not
heard; thus Paul was not heard when he besought the sting of the
flesh to be removed from him. Therefore prayer is not a meritorious
act.

Obj. 3: Further, prayer is based chiefly on faith, according to James
1:6, "But let him ask in faith, nothing wavering." Now faith is not
sufficient for merit, as instanced in those who have lifeless faith.
Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on the words of Ps. 34:13, "My prayer
shall be turned into my bosom," explains them as meaning, "if my
prayer does not profit them, yet shall not I be deprived of my
reward." Now reward is not due save to merit. Therefore prayer is
meritorious.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 13) prayer, besides causing
spiritual consolation at the time of praying, has a twofold efficacy
in respect of a future effect, namely, efficacy in meriting and
efficacy in impetrating. Now prayer, like any other virtuous act, is
efficacious in meriting, because it proceeds from charity as its
root, the proper object of which is the eternal good that we merit to
enjoy. Yet prayer proceeds from charity through the medium of
religion, of which prayer is an act, as stated above (A. 3), and with
the concurrence of other virtues requisite for the goodness of
prayer, viz. humility and faith. For the offering of prayer itself to
God belongs to religion, while the desire for the thing that we pray
to be accomplished belongs to charity. Faith is necessary in
reference to God to Whom we pray; that is, we need to believe that we
can obtain from Him what we seek. Humility is necessary on the part
of the person praying, because he recognizes his neediness. Devotion
too is necessary: but this belongs to religion, for it is its first
act and a necessary condition of all its secondary acts, as stated
above (Q. 82, AA. 1, 2).

As to its efficacy in impetrating, prayer derives this from the grace
of God to Whom we pray, and Who instigates us to pray. Wherefore
Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. cv, 1): "He would not urge us to
ask, unless He were willing to give"; and Chrysostom [*Cf. Catena
Aurea of St. Thomas on Luke 18. The words as quoted are not to be
found in the words of Chrysostom] says: "He never refuses to grant
our prayers, since in His loving-kindness He urged us not to faint in
praying."

Reply Obj. 1: Neither prayer nor any other virtuous act is
meritorious without sanctifying grace. And yet even that prayer which
impetrates sanctifying grace proceeds from some grace, as from a
gratuitous gift, since the very act of praying is "a gift of God," as
Augustine states (De Persever. xxiii).

Reply Obj. 2: Sometimes the merit of prayer regards chiefly something
distinct from the object of one's petition. For the chief object of
merit is beatitude, whereas the direct object of the petition of
prayer extends sometimes to certain other things, as stated above
(AA. 6, 7). Accordingly if this other thing that we ask for ourselves
be not useful for our beatitude, we do not merit it; and sometimes by
asking for and desiring such things we lose merit for instance if we
ask of God the accomplishment of some sin, which would be an impious
prayer. And sometimes it is not necessary for salvation, nor yet
manifestly contrary thereto; and then although he who prays may merit
eternal life by praying, yet he does not merit to obtain what he asks
for. Hence Augustine says (Liber. Sentent. Prosperi sent. ccxii): "He
who faithfully prays God for the necessaries of this life, is both
mercifully heard, and mercifully not heard. For the physician knows
better than the sick man what is good for the disease." For this
reason, too, Paul was not heard when he prayed for the removal of the
sting in his flesh, because this was not expedient. If, however, we
pray for something that is useful for our beatitude, through being
conducive to salvation, we merit it not only by praying, but also by
doing other good deeds: therefore without any doubt we receive what
we ask for, yet when we ought to receive it: "since certain things
are not denied us, but are deferred that they may be granted at a
suitable time," according to Augustine (Tract. cii in Joan.): and
again this may be hindered if we persevere not in asking for it.
Wherefore Basil says (De Constit. Monast. i): "The reason why
sometimes thou hast asked and not received, is because thou hast
asked amiss, either inconsistently, or lightly, or because thou hast
asked for what was not good for thee, or because thou hast ceased
asking." Since, however, a man cannot condignly merit eternal life
for another, as stated above (I-II, Q. 114, A. 6), it follows that
sometimes one cannot condignly merit for another things that pertain
to eternal life. For this reason we are not always heard when we pray
for others, as stated above (A. 7, ad 2, 3). Hence it is that four
conditions are laid down; namely, to ask--"for ourselves--things
necessary for salvation--piously--perseveringly"; when all these four
concur, we always obtain what we ask for.

Reply Obj. 3: Prayer depends chiefly on faith, not for its efficacy
in meriting, because thus it depends chiefly on charity, but for its
efficacy in impetrating, because it is through faith that man comes
to know of God's omnipotence and mercy, which are the source whence
prayer impetrates what it asks for.
_______________________

SIXTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 16]

Whether Sinners Impetrate Anything from God by Their Prayers?

Objection 1: It would seem that sinners impetrate nothing from God by
their prayers. It is written (John 9:31): "We know that God doth not
hear sinners"; and this agrees with the saying of Prov. 28:9, "He
that turneth away his ears from hearing the law, his prayer shall be
an abomination." Now an abominable prayer impetrates nothing from
God. Therefore sinners impetrate nothing from God.

Obj. 2: Further, the just impetrate from God what they merit, as
stated above (A. 15, ad 2). But sinners cannot merit anything since
they lack grace and charity which is the "power of godliness,"
according to a gloss on 2 Tim. 3:5, "Having an appearance indeed of
godliness, but denying the power thereof." and so their prayer is
impious, and yet piety is required in order that prayer may be
impetrative, as stated above (A. 15, ad 2). Therefore sinners
impetrate nothing by their prayers.

Obj. 3: Further, Chrysostom [*Hom. xiv in the Opus Imperfectum
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "The Father is
unwilling to hear the prayer which the Son has not inspired." Now in
the prayer inspired by Christ we say: "Forgive us our trespasses as
we forgive them that trespass against us": and sinners do not fulfil
this. Therefore either they lie in saying this, and so are unworthy
to be heard, or, if they do not say it, they are not heard, because
they do not observe the form of prayer instituted by Christ.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Tract. xliv, super Joan.): "If God
were not to hear sinners, the publican would have vainly said: Lord,
be merciful to me a sinner"; and Chrysostom [*Hom. xviii of the same
Opus Imperfectum] says: "Everyone that asketh shall receive, that is
to say whether he be righteous or sinful."

_I answer that,_ In the sinner, two things are to be considered: his
nature which God loves, and the sin which He hates. Accordingly when
a sinner prays for something as sinner, i.e. in accordance with a
sinful desire, God hears him not through mercy but sometimes through
vengeance when He allows the sinner to fall yet deeper into sin. For
"God refuses in mercy what He grants in anger," as Augustine declares
(Tract. lxxiii in Joan.). On the other hand God hears the sinner's
prayer if it proceed from a good natural desire, not out of justice,
because the sinner does not merit to be heard, but out of pure mercy
[*Cf. A. 15, ad 1], provided however he fulfil the four conditions
given above, namely, that he beseech for himself things necessary for
salvation, piously and perseveringly.

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine states (Tract. xliv super Joan.), these
words were spoken by the blind man before being anointed, i.e.
perfectly enlightened, and consequently lack authority. And yet there
is truth in the saying if it refers to a sinner as such, in which
sense also the sinner's prayer is said to be an abomination.

Reply Obj. 2: There can be no godliness in the sinner's prayer as
though his prayer were quickened by a habit of virtue: and yet his
prayer may be godly in so far as he asks for something pertaining to
godliness. Even so a man who has not the habit of justice is able to
will something just, as stated above (Q. 59, A. 2). And though his
prayer is not meritorious, it can be impetrative, because merit
depends on justice, whereas impetration rests on grace.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (A. 7, ad 1) the Lord's Prayer is
pronounced in the common person of the whole Church: and so if anyone
say the Lord's Prayer while unwilling to forgive his neighbor's
trespasses, he lies not, although his words do not apply to him
personally: for they are true as referred to the person of the
Church, from which he is excluded by merit, and consequently he is
deprived of the fruit of his prayer. Sometimes, however, a sinner is
prepared to forgive those who have trespassed against him, wherefore
his prayers are heard, according to Ecclus. 28:2, "Forgive thy
neighbor if he hath hurt thee, and then shall thy sins be forgiven to
thee when thou prayest."
_______________________

SEVENTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 17]

Whether the Parts of Prayer Are Fittingly Described As Supplications,
Prayers, Intercessions, and Thanksgivings?

Objection 1: It would seem that the parts of prayer are unfittingly
described as supplications, prayers, intercessions, and
thanksgivings. Supplication would seem to be a kind of adjuration.
Yet, according to Origen (Super Matth. Tract. xxxv), "a man who
wishes to live according to the gospel need not adjure another, for
if it be unlawful to swear, it is also unlawful to adjure." Therefore
supplication is unfittingly reckoned a part of prayer.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 24), "to
pray is to ask becoming things of God." Therefore it is unfitting to
distinguish "prayers" from "intercessions."

Obj. 3: Further, thanksgivings regard the past, while the others
regard the future. But the past precedes the future. Therefore
thanksgivings are unfittingly placed after the others.

_On the contrary,_ suffices the authority of the Apostle (1 Tim. 2:1).

_I answer that,_ Three conditions are requisite for prayer. First,
that the person who prays should approach God Whom he prays: this is
signified in the word "prayer," because prayer is "the raising up of
one's mind to God." The second is that there should be a petition,
and this is signified in the word "intercession." In this case
sometimes one asks for something definite, and then some say it is
"intercession" properly so called, or we may ask for some thing
indefinitely, for instance to be helped by God, or we may simply
indicate a fact, as in John 11:3, "Behold, he whom Thou lovest is
sick," and then they call it "insinuation." The third condition is
the reason for impetrating what we ask for: and this either on the
part of God, or on the part of the person who asks. The reason of
impetration on the part of God is His sanctity, on account of which
we ask to be heard, according to Dan. 9:17, 18, "For Thy own sake,
incline, O God, Thy ear"; and to this pertains "supplication"
(_obsecratio_) which means a pleading through sacred things, as when
we say, "Through Thy nativity, deliver us, O Lord." The reason for
impetration on the part of the person who asks is "thanksgiving";
since "through giving thanks for benefits received we merit to
receive yet greater benefits," as we say in the collect [*Ember
Friday in September and Postcommunion of the common of a Confessor
Bishop]. Hence a gloss on 1 Tim. 2:1 says that "in the Mass, the
consecration is preceded by supplication," in which certain sacred
things are called to mind; that "prayers are in the consecration
itself," in which especially the mind should be raised up to God; and
that "intercessions are in the petitions that follow, and
thanksgivings at the end."

We may notice these four things in several of the Church's collects.
Thus in the collect of Trinity Sunday the words, "Almighty eternal
God" belong to the offering up of prayer to God; the words, "Who hast
given to Thy servants," etc. belong to thanksgiving; the words,
"grant, we beseech Thee," belong to intercession; and the words at
the end, "Through Our Lord," etc. belong to supplication.

In the _Conferences of the Fathers_ (ix, cap. 11, seqq.) we read:
"Supplication is bewailing one's sins; prayer is vowing something to
God; intercession is praying for others; thanksgiving is offered by
the mind to God in ineffable ecstasy." The first explanation,
however, is the better.

Reply Obj. 1: "Supplication" is an adjuration not for the purpose of
compelling, for this is forbidden, but in order to implore mercy.

Reply Obj. 2: "Prayer" in the general sense includes all the things
mentioned here; but when distinguished from the others it denotes
properly the ascent to God.

Reply Obj. 3: Among things that are diverse the past precedes the
future; but the one and same thing is future before it is past. Hence
thanksgiving for other benefits precedes intercession: but one and
the same benefit is first sought, and finally, when it has been
received, we give thanks for it. Intercession is preceded by prayer
whereby we approach Him of Whom we ask: and prayer is preceded by
supplication, whereby through the consideration of God's goodness we
dare approach Him.
_______________________

QUESTION 84

OF ADORATION (In Three Articles)

In due sequence we must consider the external acts of latria, and in
the first place, adoration whereby one uses one's body to reverence
God; secondly, those acts whereby some external thing is offered to
God; thirdly, those acts whereby something belonging to God is
assumed.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether adoration is an act of latria?

(2) Whether adoration denotes an internal or an external act?

(3) Whether adoration requires a definite place?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 84, Art. 1]

Whether Adoration Is an Act of Latria or Religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that adoration is not an act of latria or
religion. The worship of religion is due to God alone. But adoration
is not due to God alone: since we read (Gen. 18:2) that Abraham
adored the angels; and (3 Kings 1:23) that the prophet Nathan, when
he was come in to king David, "worshiped him bowing down to the
ground." Therefore adoration is not an act of religion.

Obj. 2: Further, the worship of religion is due to God as the object
of beatitude, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3): whereas
adoration is due to Him by reason of His majesty, since a gloss on
Ps. 28:2, "Adore ye the Lord in His holy court," says: "We pass from
these courts into the court where we adore His majesty." Therefore
adoration is not an act of latria.

Obj. 3: Further, the worship of one same religion is due to the three
Persons. But we do not adore the three Persons with one adoration,
for we genuflect at each separate invocation of Them [*At the
adoration of the Cross, on Good Friday]. Therefore adoration is nol
an act of latria.

_On the contrary,_ are the words quoted Matt. 4:10: "The Lord thy God
shalt thou adore and Him only shalt thou serve."

_I answer that,_ Adoration is directed to the reverence of the person
adored. Now it is evident from what we have said (Q. 81, AA. 2, 4)
that it is proper to religion to show reverence to God. Hence the
adoration whereby we adore God is an act of religion.

Reply Obj. 1: Reverence is due to God on account of His excellence,
which is communicated to certain creatures not in equal measure, but
according to a measure of proportion; and so the reverence which we
pay to God, and which belongs to latria, differs from the reverence
which we pay to certain excellent creatures; this belongs to dulia,
and we shall speak of it further on (Q. 103). And since external
actions are signs of internal reverence, certain external tokens
significative of reverence are offered to creatures of excellence,
and among these tokens the chief is adoration: yet there is one thing
which is offered to God alone, and that is sacrifice. Hence Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei x, 4): "Many tokens of Divine worship are employed
in doing honor to men, either through excessive humility, or through
pernicious flattery; yet so that those to whom these honors are given
are recognized as being men to whom we owe esteem and reverence and
even adoration if they be far above us. But who ever thought it his
duty to sacrifice to any other than one whom he either knew or deemed
or pretended to be a God?" Accordingly it was with the reverence due
to an excellent creature that Nathan adored David; while it was the
reverence due to God with which Mardochai refused to adore Aman
fearing "lest he should transfer the honor of his God to a man"
(Esther 13:14).

Again with the reverence due to an excellent creature Abraham adored
the angels, as did also Josue (Jos. 5:15): though we may understand
them to have adored, with the adoration of latria, God Who appeared
and spoke to them in the guise of an angel. It was with the reverence
due to God that John was forbidden to adore the angel (Apoc. 22:9),
both to indicate the dignity which he had acquired through Christ,
whereby man is made equal to an angel: wherefore the same text goes
on: "I am thy fellow-servant and of thy brethren"; as also to exclude
any occasion of idolatry, wherefore the text continues: "Adore God."

Reply Obj. 2: Every Divine excellency is included in His majesty: to
which it pertains that we should be made happy in Him as in the
sovereign good.

Reply Obj. 3: Since there is one excellence of the three
Divine Persons, one honor and reverence is due to them and
consequently one adoration. It is to represent this that where it is
related (Gen. 18:2) that three men appeared to Abraham, we are told
that he addressed one, saying: "Lord, if I have found favor in thy
sight," etc. The triple genuflection represents the Trinity of
Persons, not a difference of adoration.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 84, Art. 2]

Whether Adoration Denotes an Action of the Body?

Objection 1: It would seem that adoration does not denote an act of
the body. It is written (John 4:23): "The true adorers shall adore
the Father in spirit and in truth." Now what is done in spirit has
nothing to do with an act of the body. Therefore adoration does not
denote an act of the body.

Obj. 2: Further, the word adoration is taken from _oratio_ (prayer).
But prayer consists chiefly in an interior act, according to 1 Cor.
14:15, "I will pray with the spirit, I will pray also with the
understanding." Therefore adoration denotes chiefly a spiritual act.

Obj. 3: Further, acts of the body pertain to sensible knowledge:
whereas we approach God not by bodily but by spiritual sense.
Therefore adoration does not denote an act of the body.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Ex. 20:5, "Thou shalt not adore them,
nor serve them," says: "Thou shalt neither worship them in mind, nor
adore them outwardly."

_I answer that,_ As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 12), since we
are composed of a twofold nature, intellectual and sensible, we offer
God a twofold adoration; namely, a spiritual adoration, consisting in
the internal devotion of the mind; and a bodily adoration, which
consists in an exterior humbling of the body. And since in all acts
of latria that which is without is referred to that which is within
as being of greater import, it follows that exterior adoration is
offered on account of interior adoration, in other words we exhibit
signs of humility in our bodies in order to incite our affections to
submit to God, since it is connatural to us to proceed from the
sensible to the intelligible.

Reply Obj. 1: Even bodily adoration is done in spirit, in so far as
it proceeds from and is directed to spiritual devotion.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as prayer is primarily in the mind, and
secondarily expressed in words, as stated above (Q. 83, A. 12), so
too adoration consists chiefly in an interior reverence of God, but
secondarily in certain bodily signs of humility; thus when we
genuflect we signify our weakness in comparison with God, and when we
prostrate ourselves we profess that we are nothing of ourselves.

Reply Obj. 3: Though we cannot reach God with the senses, our mind is
urged by sensible signs to approach God.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 84, Art. 3]

Whether Adoration Requires a Definite Place?

Objection 1: It would seem that adoration does not require a definite
place. It is written (John 4:21): "The hour cometh, when you shall
neither on this mountain, nor in Jerusalem, adore the Father"; and
the same reason seems to apply to other places. Therefore a definite
place is not necessary for adoration.

Obj. 2: Further, exterior adoration is directed to interior
adoration. But interior adoration is shown to God as existing
everywhere. Therefore exterior adoration does not require a definite
place.

Obj. 3: Further, the same God is adored in the New as in the Old
Testament. Now in the Old Testament they adored towards the west,
because the door of the Tabernacle looked to the east (Ex. 26:18
seqq.). Therefore for the same reason we ought now to adore towards
the west, if any definite place be requisite for adoration.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 56:7): "My house shall be
called the house of prayer," which words are also quoted (John 2:16).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the chief part of adoration
is the internal devotion of the mind, while the secondary part is
something external pertaining to bodily signs. Now the mind
internally apprehends God as not comprised in a place; while bodily
signs must of necessity be in some definite place and position. Hence
a definite place is required for adoration, not chiefly, as though it
were essential thereto, but by reason of a certain fittingness, like
other bodily signs.

Reply Obj. 1: By these words our Lord foretold the cessation of
adoration, both according to the rite of the Jews who adored in
Jerusalem, and according to the rite of the Samaritans who adored on
Mount Garizim. For both these rites ceased with the advent of the
spiritual truth of the Gospel, according to which "a sacrifice is
offered to God in every place," as stated in Malach. 1:11.

Reply Obj. 2: A definite place is chosen for adoration, not on
account of God Who is adored, as though He were enclosed in a place,
but on account of the adorers; and this for three reasons. First,
because the place is consecrated, so that those who pray there
conceive a greater devotion and are more likely to be heard, as may
be seen in the prayer of Solomon (3 Kings 8). Secondly, on account of
the sacred mysteries and other signs of holiness contained therein.
Thirdly, on account of the concourse of many adorers, by reason of
which their prayer is more likely to be heard, according to Matt.
18:20, "Where there are two or three gathered together in My name,
there am I in the midst of them."

Reply Obj. 3: There is a certain fittingness in adoring towards the
east. First, because the Divine majesty is indicated in the movement
of the heavens which is from the east. Secondly, because Paradise was
situated in the east according to the Septuagint version of Gen. 2:8,
and so we signify our desire to return to Paradise. Thirdly, on
account of Christ Who is "the light of the world" [*John 8:12; 9:5],
and is called "the Orient" (Zech. 6:12); "Who mounteth above the
heaven of heavens to the east" (Ps. 67:34), and is expected to come
from the east, according to Matt. 24:27, "As lightning cometh out of
the east, and appeareth even into the west; so shall also the coming
of the Son of Man be."
_______________________

QUESTION 85

OF SACRIFICE
(In Four Articles)

In due sequence we must consider those acts whereby external things
are offered to God. These give rise to a twofold consideration:
(1) Of things given to God by the faithful; (2) Of vows, whereby
something is promised to Him.

Under the first head we shall consider sacrifices, oblations,
first-fruits, and tithes. About sacrifices there are four points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether offering a sacrifice to God is of the law of nature?

(2) Whether sacrifice should be offered to God alone?

(3) Whether the offering of a sacrifice is a special act of virtue?

(4) Whether all are bound to offer sacrifice?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 85, Art. 1]

Whether Offering a Sacrifice to God Is of the Law of Nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that offering a sacrifice to God is not of
the natural law. Things that are of the natural law are common among
all men. Yet this is not the case with sacrifices: for we read of
some, e.g. Melchisedech (Gen. 14:18), offering bread and wine in
sacrifice, and of certain animals being offered by some, and others
by others. Therefore the offering of sacrifices is not of the natural
law.

Obj. 2: Further, things that are of the natural law were observed by
all just men. Yet we do not read that Isaac offered sacrifice; nor
that Adam did so, of whom nevertheless it is written (Wis. 10:2) that
wisdom "brought him out of his sin." Therefore the offering of
sacrifice is not of the natural law.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5, 19) that
sacrifices are offered in signification of something. Now words which
are chief among signs, as he again says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3),
"signify, not by nature but by convention," according to the
Philosopher (Peri Herm. i, 2). Therefore sacrifices are not of the
natural law.

_On the contrary,_ At all times and among all nations there has
always been the offering of sacrifices. Now that which is observed by
all is seemingly natural. Therefore the offering of sacrifices is of
the natural law.

_I answer that,_ Natural reason tells man that he is subject to a
higher being, on account of the defects which he perceives in
himself, and in which he needs help and direction from someone above
him: and whatever this superior being may be, it is known to all
under the name of God. Now just as in natural things the lower are
naturally subject to the higher, so too it is a dictate of natural
reason in accordance with man's natural inclination that he should
tender submission and honor, according to his mode, to that which is
above man. Now the mode befitting to man is that he should employ
sensible signs in order to signify anything, because he derives his
knowledge from sensibles. Hence it is a dictate of natural reason
that man should use certain sensibles, by offering them to God in
sign of the subjection and honor due to Him, like those who make
certain offerings to their lord in recognition of his authority. Now
this is what we mean by a sacrifice, and consequently the offering of
sacrifice is of the natural law.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (I-II, Q. 95, A. 2), certain things
belong generically to the natural law, while their determination
belongs to the positive law; thus the natural law requires that
evildoers should be punished; but that this or that punishment should
be inflicted on them is a matter determined by God or by man. In like
manner the offering of sacrifice belongs generically to the natural
law, and consequently all are agreed on this point, but the
determination of sacrifices is established by God or by man, and this
is the reason for their difference.

Reply Obj. 2: Adam, Isaac and other just men offered sacrifice to God
in a manner befitting the times in which they lived, according to
Gregory, who says (Moral. iv, 3) that in olden times original sin was
remitted through the offering of sacrifices. Nor does Scripture
mention all the sacrifices of the just, but only those that have
something special connected with them. Perhaps the reason why we read
of no sacrifice being offered by Adam may be that, as the origin of
sin is ascribed to him, the origin of sanctification ought not to be
represented as typified in him. Isaac was a type of Christ, being
himself offered in sacrifice; and so there was no need that he should
be represented as offering a sacrifice.

Reply Obj. 3: It is natural to man to express his ideas by signs, but
the determination of those signs depends on man's pleasure.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 85, Art. 2]

Whether Sacrifice Should Be Offered to God Alone?

Objection 1: It would seem that sacrifice should not be offered to
the most high God alone. Since sacrifice ought to be offered to God,
it would seem that it ought to be offered to all such as are
partakers of the Godhead. Now holy men are made "partakers of the
Divine nature,"    according to 2 Pet. 1:4; wherefore of them is it
written (Ps. 81:6): "I have said, You are gods": and angels too are
called "sons of God,"    according to Job 1:6. Thus sacrifice should
be offered to all these.

Obj. 2: Further, the greater a person is the greater the honor due to
him from man. Now the angels and saints are far greater than any
earthly princes: and yet the subjects of the latter pay them much
greater honor, by prostrating before them, and offering them gifts,
than is implied by offering an animal or any other thing in
sacrifice. Much more therefore may one offer sacrifice to the angels
and saints.

Obj. 3: Further, temples and altars are raised for the offering of
sacrifices. Yet temples and altars are raised to angels and saints.
Therefore sacrifices also may be offered to them.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 22:20): "He that sacrificeth to
gods shall be put to death, save only to the Lord."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a sacrifice is offered in
order that something may be represented. Now the sacrifice that is
offered outwardly represents the inward spiritual sacrifice, whereby
the soul offers itself to God according to Ps. 50:19, "A sacrifice to
God is an afflicted spirit," since, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 7; Q.
84, A. 2), the outward acts of religion are directed to the inward
acts. Again the soul offers itself in sacrifice to God as its
beginning by creation, and its end by beatification: and according to
the true faith God alone is the creator of our souls, as stated in
the First Part (QQ. 90, A. 3; 118, A. 2), while in Him alone the
beatitude of our soul consists, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 8; Q.
2, A. 8; Q. 3, AA. 1, 7, 8). Wherefore just as to God alone ought we
to offer spiritual sacrifice, so too ought we to offer outward
sacrifices to Him alone: even so "in our prayers and praises we
proffer significant words to Him to Whom in our hearts we offer the
things which we designate thereby," as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei
x, 19). Moreover we find that in every country the people are wont to
show the sovereign ruler some special sign of honor, and that if this
be shown to anyone else, it is a crime of high-treason. Therefore, in
the Divine law, the death punishment is assigned to those who offer
Divine honor to another than God.

Reply Obj. 1: The name of the Godhead is communicated to certain
ones, not equally with God, but by participation; hence neither is
equal honor due to them.

Reply Obj. 2: The offering of a sacrifice is measured not by the
value of the animal killed, but by its signification, for it is done
in honor of the sovereign Ruler of the whole universe. Wherefore, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 19), "the demons rejoice, not in the
stench of corpses, but in receiving divine honors."

Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei viii, 19), "we do not
raise temples and priesthoods to the martyrs, because not they but
their God is our God. Wherefore the priest says not: I offer
sacrifice to thee, Peter or Paul. But we give thanks to God for their
triumphs, and urge ourselves to imitate them."
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 85, Art. 3]

Whether the Offering of Sacrifice Is a Special Act of Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that the offering of sacrifice is not a
special act of virtue. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 6): "A true
sacrifice is any work done that we may cleave to God in holy
fellowship." But not every good work is a special act of some
definite virtue. Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not a special
act of a definite virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, the mortification of the body by fasting belongs to
abstinence, by continence belongs to chastity, by martyrdom belongs
to fortitude. Now all these things seem to be comprised in the
offering of sacrifice, according to Rom. 12:1, "Present your bodies a
living sacrifice." Again the Apostle says (Heb. 13:16): "Do not
forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God's favor
is obtained." Now it belongs to charity, mercy and liberality to do
good and to impart. Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not a
special act of a definite virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, a sacrifice is apparently anything offered to God.
Now many things are offered to God, such as devotion, prayer, tithes,
first-fruits, oblations, and holocausts. Therefore sacrifice does not
appear to be a special act of a definite virtue.

_On the contrary,_ The law contains special precepts about
sacrifices, as appears from the beginning of Leviticus.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 18, AA. 6, 7), where an
act of one virtue is directed to the end of another virtue it
partakes somewhat of its species; thus when a man thieves in order to
commit fornication, his theft assumes, in a sense, the deformity of
fornication, so that even though it were not a sin otherwise, it
would be a sin from the very fact that it was directed to
fornication. Accordingly, sacrifice is a special act deserving of
praise in that it is done out of reverence for God; and for this
reason it belongs to a definite virtue, viz. religion. But it happens
that the acts of the other virtues are directed to the reverence of
God, as when a man gives alms of his own things for God's sake, or
when a man subjects his own body to some affliction out of reverence
for God; and in this way the acts also of other virtues may be called
sacrifices. On the other hand there are acts that are not deserving
of praise save through being done out of reverence for God: such acts
are properly called sacrifices, and belong to the virtue of religion.

Reply Obj. 1: The very fact that we wish to cling to God in a
spiritual fellowship pertains to reverence for God: and consequently
the act of any virtue assumes the character of a sacrifice through
being done in order that we may cling to God in holy fellowship.

Reply Obj. 2: Man's good is threefold. There is first his soul's good
which is offered to God in a certain inward sacrifice by devotion,
prayer and other like interior acts: and this is the principal
sacrifice. The second is his body's good, which is, so to speak,
offered to God in martyrdom, and abstinence or continency. The third
is the good which consists of external things: and of these we offer
a sacrifice to God, directly when we offer our possession to God
immediately, and indirectly when we share them with our neighbor for
God's sake.

Reply Obj. 3: A "sacrifice," properly speaking, requires that
something be done to the thing which is offered to God, for instance
animals were slain and burnt, the bread is broken, eaten, blessed.
The very word signifies this, since "sacrifice" is so called because
a man does something sacred (_facit sacrum_). On the other hand an
"oblation" is properly the offering of something to God even if
nothing be done thereto, thus we speak of offering money or bread at
the altar, and yet nothing is done to them. Hence every sacrifice is
an oblation, but not conversely. "First-fruits" are oblations,
because they were offered to God, according to Deut. 26, but they are
not a sacrifice, because nothing sacred was done to them. "Tithes,"
however, are neither a sacrifice nor an oblation, properly speaking,
because they are not offered immediately to God, but to the ministers
of Divine worship.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 85, Art. 4]

Whether All Are Bound to Offer Sacrifices?

Objection 1: It would seem that all are not bound to offer
sacrifices. The Apostle says (Rom. 3:19): "What things soever the Law
speaketh, it speaketh to them that are in the Law." Now the law of
sacrifices was not given to all, but only to the Hebrew people.
Therefore all are not bound to offer sacrifices.

Obj. 2: Further, sacrifices are offered to God in order to signify
something. But not everyone is capable of understanding these
significations. Therefore not all are bound to offer sacrifices.

Obj. 3: Further, priests [*_Sacerdotes:_ Those who give or administer
sacred things (_sacra dantes_): cf. 1 Cor. 4:1] are so called because
they offer sacrifice to God. But all are not priests. Therefore not
all are bound to offer sacrifices.

_On the contrary,_ The offering of sacrifices of is of the natural
law, as stated above (A. 1). Now all are bound to do that which is of
the natural law. Therefore all are bound to offer sacrifice to God.

_I answer that,_ Sacrifice is twofold, as stated above (A. 2). The
first and principal is the inward sacrifice, which all are bound to
offer, since all are obliged to offer to God a devout mind. The other
is the outward sacrifice, and this again is twofold. There is a
sacrifice which is deserving of praise merely through being offered
to God in protestation of our subjection to God: and the obligation
of offering this sacrifice was not the same for those under the New
or the Old Law, as for those who were not under the Law. For those
who are under the Law are bound to offer certain definite sacrifices
according to the precepts of the Law, whereas those who were not
under the Law were bound to perform certain outward actions in God's
honor, as became those among whom they dwelt, but not definitely to
this or that action. The other outward sacrifice is when the outward
actions of the other virtues are performed out of reverence for God;
some of which are a matter of precept; and to these all are bound,
while others are works of supererogation, and to these all are not
bound.

Reply Obj. 1: All were not bound to offer those particular
sacrifices which were prescribed in the Law: but they were bound to
some sacrifices inward or outward, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: Though all do not know explicitly the power of
the sacrifices, they know it implicitly, even as they have implicit
faith, as stated above (Q. 2, AA. 6, 7).

Reply Obj. 3: The priests offer those sacrifices which are
specially directed to the Divine worship, not only for themselves but
also for others. But there are other sacrifices, which anyone can
offer to God for himself as explained above (AA. 2, 3).
_______________________

QUESTION 86

OF OBLATIONS AND FIRST-FRUITS
(In Four Articles)

We must next consider oblations and first-fruits. Under this head
there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether any oblations are necessary as a matter of precept?

(2) To whom are oblations due?

(3) of what things they should be made?

(4) In particular, as to first-fruits, whether men are bound to offer
them?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 86, Art. 1]

Whether Men Are Under a Necessity of Precept to Make Oblations?

Objection 1: It would seem that men are not bound by precept to make
oblations. Men are not bound, at the time of the Gospel, to observe
the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law, as stated above (I-II, Q.
103, AA. 3, 4). Now the offering of oblations is one of the
ceremonial precepts of the Old Law, since it is written (Ex. 23:14):
"Three times every year you shall celebrate feasts with Me," and
further on (Ex. 23:15): "Thou shalt not appear empty before Me."
Therefore men are not now under a necessity of precept to make
oblations.

Obj. 2: Further, before they are made, oblations depend on man's
will, as appears from our Lord's saying (Matt. 5:23), "If . . . thou
offer thy gift at the altar," as though this were left to the choice
of the offerer: and when once oblations have been made, there is no
way of offering them again. Therefore in no way is a man under a
necessity of precept to make oblations.

Obj. 3: Further, if anyone is bound to give a certain thing to the
Church, and fails to give it, he can be compelled to do so by being
deprived of the Church's sacraments. But it would seem unlawful to
refuse the sacraments of the Church to those who refuse to make
oblations according to a decree of the sixth council [*Can. Trullan,
xxiii, quoted I, qu. i, can. Nullus]: "Let none who dispense Holy
Communion exact anything of the recipient, and if they exact anything
let them be deposed." Therefore it is not necessary that men should
make oblations.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says [*Gregory VII; Concil. Roman. v, can.
xii]: "Let every Christian take care that he offer something to God
at the celebration of Mass."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 85, A. 3, ad 3), the term
"oblation" is common to all things offered for the Divine worship, so
that if a thing be offered to be destroyed in worship of God, as
though it were being made into something holy, it is both an oblation
and a sacrifice. Wherefore it is written (Ex. 29:18): "Thou shalt
offer the whole ram for a burnt-offering upon the altar; it is an
oblation to the Lord, a most sweet savor of the victim of the Lord";
and (Lev. 2:1): "When anyone shall offer an oblation of sacrifice to
the Lord, his offering shall be of fine flour." If, on the other
hand, it be offered with a view to its remaining entire and being
deputed to the worship of God or to the use of His ministers, it will
be an oblation and not a sacrifice. Accordingly it is essential to
oblations of this kind that they be offered voluntarily, according to
Ex. 25:2, of "every man that offereth of his own accord you shall
take them." Nevertheless it may happen in four ways that one is bound
to make oblations. First, on account of a previous agreement: as when
a person is granted a portion of Church land, that he may make
certain oblations at fixed times, although this has the character of
rent. Secondly, by reason of a previous assignment or promise; as
when a man offers a gift among the living, or by will bequeaths to
the Church something whether movable or immovable to be delivered at
some future time. Thirdly, on account of the need of the Church, for
instance if her ministers were without means of support. Fourthly, on
account of custom; for the faithful are bound at certain solemn
feasts to make certain customary oblations. In the last two cases,
however, the oblation remains voluntary, as regards, to wit, the
quantity or kind of the thing offered.

Reply Obj. 1: Under the New Law men are not bound to make oblations
on account of legal solemnities, as stated in Exodus, but on account
of certain other reasons, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: Some are bound to make oblations, both before making
them, as in the first, third, and fourth cases, and after they have
made them by assignment or promise: for they are bound to offer in
reality that which has been already offered to the Church by way of
assignment.

Reply Obj. 3: Those who do not make the oblations they are
bound to make may be punished by being deprived of the sacraments, not
by the priest himself to whom the oblations should be made, lest he
seem to exact, something for bestowing the sacraments, but by someone
superior to him.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 86, Art. 2]

Whether Oblations Are Due to Priests Alone?

Objection 1: It would seem that oblations are not due to priests
alone. For chief among oblations would seem to be those that are
deputed to the sacrifices of victims. Now whatever is given to the
poor is called a "victim" in Scripture according to Heb. 13:16, "Do
not forget to do good and to impart, for by such victims [Douay:
'sacrifices'] God's favor is obtained." Much more therefore are
oblations due to the poor.

Obj. 2: Further, in many parishes monks have a share in the
oblations. Now "the case of clerics is distinct from the case of
monks," as Jerome states [*Ep. xiv, ad Heliod.]. Therefore oblations
art not due to priests alone.

Obj. 3: Further, lay people with the consent of the Church buy
oblations such as loaves and so forth, and they do so for no other
reason than that they may make use thereof themselves. Therefore
oblations may have reference to the laity.

_On the contrary,_ A canon of Pope Damasus [*Damasus I] quoted X, qu.
i [*Can. Hanc consuetudinem], says: "None but the priests whom day by
day we see serving the Lord may eat and drink of the oblations which
are offered within the precincts of the Holy Church: because in the
Old Testament the Lord forbade the children of Israel to eat the
sacred loaves, with the exception of Aaron and his sons" (Lev. 24:8,
9).

_I answer that,_ The priest is appointed mediator and stands, so to
speak, _between_ the people and God, as we read of Moses (Deut. 5:5),
wherefore it belongs to him to set forth the Divine teachings and
sacraments before the people; and besides to offer to the Lord things
appertaining to the people, their prayers, for instance, their
sacrifices and oblations. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. 5:1): "Every
high priest taken from among men is ordained for men in the things
that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for
sins." Hence the oblations which the people offer to God concern the
priests, not only as regards their turning them to their own use, but
also as regards the faithful dispensation thereof, by spending them
partly on things appertaining to the Divine worship, partly on things
touching their own livelihood (since they that serve the altar
partake with the altar, according to 1 Cor. 9:13), and partly for the
good of the poor, who, as far as possible, should be supported from
the possessions of the Church: for our Lord had a purse for the use
of the poor, as Jerome observes on Matt. 17:26, "That we may not
scandalize them."

Reply Obj. 1: Whatever is given to the poor is not a sacrifice
properly speaking; yet it is called a sacrifice in so far as it is
given to them for God's sake. In like manner, and for the same
reason, it can be called an oblation, though not properly speaking,
since it is not given immediately to God. Oblations properly so
called fall to the use of the poor, not by the dispensation of the
offerers, but by the dispensation of the priests.

Reply Obj. 2: Monks or other religious may receive oblations under
three counts. First, as poor, either by the dispensation of the
priests, or by ordination of the Church; secondly, through being
ministers of the altar, and then they can accept oblations that are
freely offered; thirdly, if the parishes belong to them, and they can
accept oblations, having a right to them as rectors of the Church.

Reply Obj. 3: Oblations when once they are consecrated, such
as sacred vessels and vestments, cannot be granted to the use of the
laity: and this is the meaning of the words of Pope Damasus. But those
which are unconsecrated may be allowed to the use of layfolk by
permission of the priests, whether by way of gift or by way of sale.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 86, Art. 3]

Whether a Man May Make Oblations of Whatever He Lawfully Possesses?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man may not make oblations of
whatever he lawfully possesses. According to human law [*Dig. xii, v,
de Condict. ob. turp. vel iniust. caus. 4] "the whore's is a shameful
trade in what she does but not in what she takes," and consequently
what she takes she possesses lawfully. Yet it is not lawful for her
to make an oblation with her gains, according to Deut. 23:18, "Thou
shalt not offer the hire of a strumpet . . . in the house of the Lord
thy God." Therefore it is not lawful to make an oblation of whatever
one possesses lawfully.

Obj. 2: Further, in the same passage it is forbidden to offer "the
price of a dog" in the house of God. But it is evident that a man
possesses lawfully the price of a dog he has lawfully sold. Therefore
it is not lawful to make an oblation of whatever we possess lawfully.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Malachi 1:8): "If you offer the lame
and the sick, is it not evil?" Yet an animal though lame or sick is a
lawful possession. Therefore it would seem that not of every lawful
possession may one make an oblation.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 3:9): "Honor the Lord with
thy substance." Now whatever a man possesses lawfully belongs to his
substance. Therefore he may make oblations of whatever he possesses
lawfully.

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. cxiii),
"shouldst thou plunder one weaker than thyself and give some of the
spoil to the judge, if he should pronounce in thy favor, such is the
force of justice that even thou wouldst not be pleased with him: and
if this should not please thee, neither does it please thy God."
Hence it is written (Ecclus. 34:21): "The offering of him that
sacrificeth of a thing wrongfully gotten is stained." Therefore it is
evident that an oblation must not be made of things unjustly acquired
or possessed. In the Old Law, however, wherein the figure was
predominant, certain things were reckoned unclean on account of their
signification, and it was forbidden to offer them. But in the New Law
all God's creatures are looked upon as clean, as stated in Titus
1:15: and consequently anything that is lawfully possessed,
considered in itself, may be offered in oblation. But it may happen
accidentally that one may not make an oblation of what one possesses
lawfully; for instance if it be detrimental to another person, as in
the case of a son who offers to God the means of supporting his
father (which our Lord condemns, Matt. 15:5), or if it give rise to
scandal or contempt, or the like.

Reply Obj. 1: In the Old Law it was forbidden to make an offering of
the hire of a strumpet on account of its uncleanness, and in the New
Law, on account of scandal, lest the Church seem to favor sin if she
accept oblations from the profits of sin.

Reply Obj. 2: According to the Law, a dog was deemed an unclean
animal. Yet other unclean animals were redeemed and their price could
be offered, according to Lev. 27:27, "If it be an unclean animal, he
that offereth it shall redeem it." But a dog was neither offered nor
redeemed, both because idolaters used dogs in sacrifices to their
idols, and because they signify robbery, the proceeds of which cannot
be offered in oblation. However, this prohibition ceased under the
New Law.

Reply Obj. 3: The oblation of a blind or lame animal was declared
unlawful for three reasons. First, on account of the purpose for
which it was offered, wherefore it is written (Malach. 1:8): "If you
offer the blind in sacrifice, is it not evil?" and it behooved
sacrifices to be without blemish. Secondly, on account of contempt,
wherefore the same text goes on (Malach. 1:12): "You have profaned"
My name, "in that you say: The table of the Lord is defiled and that
which is laid thereupon is contemptible." Thirdly, on account of a
previous vow, whereby a man has bound himself to offer without
blemish whatever he has vowed: hence the same text says further on
(Malach. 1:14): "Cursed is the deceitful man that hath in his flock a
male, and making a vow offereth in sacrifice that which is feeble to
the Lord." The same reasons avail still in the New Law, but when they
do not apply the unlawfulness ceases.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 86, Art. 4]

Whether Men Are Bound to Pay First-fruits?

Objection 1: It would seem that men are not bound to pay
first-fruits. After giving the law of the first-born the text
continues (Ex. 13:9): "It shall be as a sign in thy hand," so that,
apparently, it is a ceremonial precept. But ceremonial precepts are
not to be observed in the New Law. Neither therefore ought
first-fruits to be paid.

Obj. 2: Further, first-fruits were offered to the Lord for a special
favor conferred on that people, wherefore it is written (Deut. 26:2,
3): "Thou shalt take the first of all thy fruits . . . and thou shalt
go to the priest that shall be in those days, and say to him: I
profess this day before the Lord thy God, that I am come into the
land, for which He swore to our fathers, that He would give it us."
Therefore other nations are not bound to pay first-fruits.

Obj. 3: That which one is bound to do should be something definite.
But neither in the New Law nor in the Old do we find mention of a
definite amount of first-fruits. Therefore one is not bound of
necessity to pay them.

_On the contrary,_ It is laid down (16, qu. vii, can. Decimas): "We
confirm the right of priests to tithes and first-fruits, and
everybody must pay them."

_I answer that,_ First-fruits are a kind of oblation, because they
are offered to God with a certain profession (Deut. 26); where the
same passage continues: "The priest taking the basket containing the
first-fruits from the hand of him that bringeth the first-fruits,
shall set it before the altar of the Lord thy God," and further on
(Deut. 26:10) he is commanded to say: "Therefore now I offer the
first-fruits of the land, which the Lord hath given me." Now the
first-fruits were offered for a special reason, namely, in
recognition of the divine favor, as though man acknowledged that he
had received the fruits of the earth from God, and that he ought to
offer something to God in return, according to 1 Paral 29:14, "We
have given Thee what we received of Thy hand." And since what we
offer God ought to be something special, hence it is that man was
commanded to offer God his first-fruits, as being a special part of
the fruits of the earth: and since a priest is "ordained for the
people in the things that appertain to God" (Heb. 5:1), the
first-fruits offered by the people were granted to the priest's use.
Wherefore it is written (Num. 18:8): "The Lord said to Aaron: Behold
I have given thee the charge of My first-fruits." Now it is a point
of natural law that man should make an offering in God's honor out of
the things he has received from God, but that the offering should be
made to any particular person, or out of his first-fruits, or in such
or such a quantity, was indeed determined in the Old Law by divine
command; but in the New Law it is fixed by the declaration of the
Church, in virtue of which men are bound to pay first-fruits
according to the custom of their country and the needs of the
Church's ministers.

Reply Obj. 1: The ceremonial observances were properly speaking signs
of the future, and consequently they ceased when the foreshadowed
truth was actually present. But the offering of first-fruits was for
a sign of a past favor, whence arises the duty of acknowledgment in
accordance with the dictate of natural reason. Hence taken in a
general sense this obligation remains.

Reply Obj. 2: First-fruits were offered in the Old Law, not only on
account of the favor of the promised land given by God, but also on
account of the favor of the fruits of the earth, which were given by
God. Hence it is written (Deut. 26:10): "I offer the first-fruits of
the land which the Lord hath given me," which second motive is common
among all people. We may also reply that just as God granted the land
of promise to the Jews by a special favor, so by a general favor He
bestowed the lordship of the earth on the whole of mankind, according
to Ps. 113:24, "The earth He has given to the children of men."

Reply Obj. 3: As Jerome says [*Comment. in Ezech. 45:13, 14; cf. Cap.
Decimam, de Decim. Primit. et Oblat.]: "According to the tradition of
the ancients the custom arose for those who had most to give the
priests a fortieth part, and those who had least, one sixtieth, in
lieu of first-fruits." Hence it would seem that first-fruits should
vary between these limits according to the custom of one's country.
And it was reasonable that the amount of first-fruits should not be
fixed by law, since, as stated above, first-fruits are offered by way
of oblation, a condition of which is that it should be voluntary.
_______________________

QUESTION 87

OF TITHES
(In Four Articles)

Next we must consider tithes, under which head there are four points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether men are bound by precept to pay tithes?

(2) Of what things ought tithes to be paid?

(3) To whom ought they to be paid?

(4) Who ought to pay tithes?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 87, Art. 1]

Whether Men Are Bound to Pay Tithes Under a Necessity of Precept?

Objection 1: It would seem that men are not bound by precept to pay
tithes. The commandment to pay tithes is contained in the Old Law
(Lev. 27:30), "All tithes of the land, whether of corn or of the
fruits of trees, are the Lord's," and further on (Lev. 27:32): "Of
all the tithes of oxen and sheep and goats, that pass under the
shepherd's rod, every tenth that cometh shall be sanctified to the
Lord." This cannot be reckoned among the moral precepts, because
natural reason does not dictate that one ought to give a tenth part,
rather than a ninth or eleventh. Therefore it is either a judicial or
a ceremonial precept. Now, as stated above (I-II, Q. 103, A. 3; Q.
104, A. 3), during the time of grace men are hound neither to the
ceremonial nor to the judicial precepts of the Old Law. Therefore men
are not bound now to pay tithes.

Obj. 2: Further, during the time of grace men are bound only to those
things which were commanded by Christ through the Apostles, according
to Matt. 28:20, "Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I
have commanded you"; and Paul says (Acts 20:27): "I have not spared
to declare unto you all the counsel of God." Now neither in the
teaching of Christ nor in that of the apostles is there any mention
of the paying of tithes: for the saying of our Lord about tithes
(Matt. 23:23), "These things you ought to have done" seems to refer
to the past time of legal observance: thus Hilary says (Super Matth.
can. xxiv): "The tithing of herbs, which was useful in foreshadowing
the future, was not to be omitted." Therefore during the time of
grace men are not bound to pay tithes.

Obj. 3: Further, during the time of grace, men are not more bound to
the legal observances than before the Law. But before the Law tithes
were given, by reason not of a precept but of a vow. For we read
(Gen. 28:20, 22) that Jacob "made a vow" saying: "If God shall be
with me, and shall keep me in the way by which I walk . . . of all
the things that Thou shalt give to me, I will offer tithes to Thee."
Neither, therefore, during the time of grace are men bound to pay
tithes.

Obj. 4: Further, in the Old Law men were bound to pay three kinds of
tithe. For it is written (Num. 18:23, 24): "The sons of Levi . . .
shall . . . be content with the oblation of tithes, which I have
separated for their uses and necessities." Again, there were other
tithes of which we read (Deut. 14:22, 23): "Every year thou shalt set
aside the tithes of all thy fruits, that the earth bringeth forth
year by year; and thou shalt eat before the Lord thy God in the place
which He shall choose." And there were yet other tithes, of which it
is written (Deut. 14:28): "The third year thou shalt separate another
tithe of all things that grow to thee at that time, and shalt lay it
up within thy gates. And the Levite that hath no other part nor
possession with thee, and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the
widow, that are within thy gates, shall . . . eat and be filled." Now
during the time of grace men are not bound to pay the second and
third tithes. Neither therefore are they bound to pay the first.

Obj. 5: Further, a debt that is due without any time being fixed for
its payment, must be paid at once under pain of sin. Accordingly if
during the time of grace men are bound, under necessity of precept,
to pay tithes in those countries where tithes are not paid, they
would all be in a state of mortal sin, and so would also be the
ministers of the Church for dissembling. But this seems unreasonable.
Therefore during the time of grace men are not bound under necessity
of precept to pay tithes.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Append. Serm. cclxxcii], whose words
are quoted 16, qu. i [*Can. Decimae], says: "It is a duty to pay
tithes, and whoever refuses to pay them takes what belongs to
another."

_I answer that,_ In the Old Law tithes were paid for the sustenance
of the ministers of God. Hence it is written (Malach. 3:10): "Bring
all the tithes into My [Vulg.: 'the'] store-house that there may be
meat in My house." Hence the precept about the paying of tithes was
partly moral and instilled in the natural reason; and partly
judicial, deriving its force from its divine institution. Because
natural reason dictates that the people should administer the
necessaries of life to those who minister the divine worship for the
welfare of the whole people even as it is the people's duty to
provide a livelihood for their rulers and soldiers and so forth.
Hence the Apostle proves this from human custom, saying (1 Cor. 9:7):
"Who serveth as a soldier at any time at his own charge? Who planteth
a vineyard and eateth not of the fruit thereof?" But the fixing of
the proportion to be offered to the ministers of divine worship does
not belong to the natural law, but was determined by divine
institution, in accordance with the condition of that people to whom
the law was being given. For they were divided into twelve tribes,
and the twelfth tribe, namely that of Levi, was engaged exclusively
in the divine ministry and had no possessions whence to derive a
livelihood: and so it was becomingly ordained that the remaining
eleven tribes should give one-tenth part of their revenues to the
Levites [*Num. 18:21] that the latter might live respectably; and
also because some, through negligence, would disregard this precept.
Hence, so far as the tenth part was fixed, the precept was judicial,
since all institutions established among this people for the special
purpose of preserving equality among men, in accordance with this
people's condition, are called "judicial precepts." Nevertheless by
way of consequence these institutions foreshadowed something in the
future, even as everything else connected with them, according to 1
Cor. 12, "All these things happened to them in figure." In this
respect they had something in common with the _ceremonial precepts,_
which were instituted chiefly that they might be signs of the future.
Hence the precept about paying tithes foreshadowed something in the
future. For ten is, in a way, the perfect number (being the first
numerical limit, since the figures do not go beyond ten but begin
over again from one), and therefore he that gave a tenth, which is
the sign of perfection, reserving the nine other parts for himself,
acknowledged by a sign that imperfection was his part, and that the
perfection which was to come through Christ was to be hoped for from
God. Yet this proves it to be, not a ceremonial but a judicial
precept, as stated above.

There is this difference between the ceremonial and judicial precepts
of the Law, as we stated above (I-II, Q. 104, A. 3), that it is
unlawful to observe the ceremonial precepts at the time of the New
Law, whereas there is no sin in keeping the judicial precepts during
the time of grace although they are not binding. Indeed they are
bound to be observed by some, if they be ordained by the authority of
those who have power to make laws. Thus it was a judicial precept of
the Old Law that he who stole a sheep should restore four sheep (Ex.
22:1), and if any king were to order this to be done his subjects
would be bound to obey. In like manner during the time of the New Law
the authority of the Church has established the payment of tithe;
thus showing a certain kindliness, lest the people of the New Law
should give less to the ministers of the New Testament than did the
people of the Old Law to the ministers of the Old Testament; for the
people of the New Law are under greater obligations, according to
Matt. 5:20, "Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes
and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven," and,
moreover, the ministers of the New Testament are of greater dignity
than the ministers of the Old Testament, as the Apostle shows (2 Cor.
3:7, 8).

Accordingly it is evident that man's obligation to pay tithes arises
partly from natural law, partly from the institution of the Church;
who, nevertheless, in consideration of the requirements of time and
persons might ordain the payment of some other proportion.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2: The precept about paying tithes, in so far as it was a
moral precept, was given in the Gospel by our Lord when He said
(Matt. 10:10) [*The words as quoted are from Luke 10:7: Matthew has
'meat' instead of 'hire']: "The workman is worthy of his hire," and
the Apostle says the same (1 Cor. 9:4 seqq.). But the fixing of the
particular proportion is left to the ordinance of the Church.

Reply Obj. 3: Before the time of the Old Law the ministry of the
divine worship was not entrusted to any particular person; although
it is stated that the first-born were priests, and that they received
a double portion. For this very reason no particular portion was
directed to be given to the ministers of the divine worship: but when
they met with one, each man of his own accord gave him what he deemed
right. Thus Abraham by a kind of prophetic instinct gave tithes to
Melchisedech, the priest of the Most High God, according to Gen.
14:20, and again Jacob made a vow to give tithes [*Gen. 28:20],
although he appears to have vowed to do so, not by paying them to
ministers, but for the purpose of the divine worship, for instance
for the fulfilling of sacrifices, hence he said significantly: "I
will offer tithes to Thee."

Reply Obj. 4: The second kind of tithe, which was reserved for the
offering of sacrifices, has no place in the New Law, since the legal
victims had ceased. But the third kind of tithe which they had to eat
with the poor, is increased in the New Law, for our Lord commanded us
to give to the poor not merely the tenth part, but all our surplus,
according to Luke 11:41: "That which remaineth, give alms." Moreover
the tithes that are given to the ministers of the Church should be
dispensed by them for the use of the poor.

Reply Obj. 5: The ministers of the Church ought to be more
solicitous for the increase of spiritual goods in the people, than for
the amassing of temporal goods: and hence the Apostle was unwilling to
make use of the right given him by the Lord of receiving his
livelihood from those to whom he preached the Gospel, lest he should
occasion a hindrance to the Gospel of Christ [*1 Cor. 9:12]. Nor did
they sin who did not contribute to his upkeep, else the Apostle would
not have omitted to reprove them. In like manner the ministers of the
Church rightly refrain from demanding the Church's tithes, when they
could not demand them without scandal, on account of their having
fallen into desuetude, or for some other reason. Nevertheless those
who do not give tithes in places where the Church does not demand them
are not in a state of damnation, unless they be obstinate, and
unwilling to pay even if tithes were demanded of them.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 87, Art. 2]

Whether Men Are Bound to Pay Tithes of All Things?

Objection 1: It would seem that men are not bound to give tithes of
all things. The paying of tithes seems to be an institution of the
Old Law. Now the Old Law contains no precept about personal tithes,
viz. those that are payable on property acquired by one's own act,
for instance by commerce or soldiering. Therefore no man is bound to
pay tithes on such things.

Obj. 2: Further, it is not right to make oblations of that which is
ill-gotten, as stated above (Q. 86, A. 3). Now oblations, being
offered to God immediately, seem to be more closely connected with
the divine worship than tithes which are offered to the ministers.
Therefore neither should tithes be paid on ill-gotten goods.

Obj. 3: Further, in the last chapter of Leviticus (30, 32) the
precept of paying tithes refers only to "corn, fruits of trees" and
animals "that pass under the shepherd's rod." But man derives a
revenue from other smaller things, such as the herbs that grow in his
garden and so forth. Therefore neither on these things is a man bound
to pay tithes.

Obj. 4: Further, man cannot pay except what is in his power. Now a
man does not always remain in possession of all his profit from land
and stock, since sometimes he loses them by theft or robbery;
sometimes they are transferred to another person by sale; sometimes
they are due to some other person, thus taxes are due to princes, and
wages due to workmen. Therefore one ought not to pay tithes on such
like things.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 28:22): "Of all things that
Thou shalt give to me, I will offer tithes to Thee."

_I answer that,_ In judging about a thing we should look to its
principle. Now the principle of the payment of tithes is the debt
whereby carnal things are due to those who sow spiritual things,
according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:11), "If we have
sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great matter if we reap your
carnal things?" [thus implying that on the contrary "it is no great
matter if we reap your carnal things"] [*The phrase in the brackets
is omitted in the Leonine edition]. For this debt is the principle on
which is based the commandment of the Church about the payment of
tithes. Now whatever man possesses comes under the designation of
carnal things. Therefore tithes must be paid on whatever one
possesses.

Reply Obj. 1: In accordance with the condition of that people there
was a special reason why the Old Law did not include a precept about
personal tithes; because, to wit, all the other tribes had certain
possessions wherewith they were able to provide a sufficient
livelihood for the Levites who had no possessions, but were not
forbidden to make a profit out of other lawful occupations as the
other Jews did. On the other hand the people of the New Law are
spread abroad throughout the world, and many of them have no
possessions, but live by trade, and these would contribute nothing to
the support of God's ministers if they did not pay tithes on their
trade profits. Moreover the ministers of the New Law are more
strictly forbidden to occupy themselves in money-making trades,
according to 2 Tim. 2:4, "No man being a soldier to God, entangleth
himself with secular business." Wherefore in the New Law men are
bound to pay personal tithes, according to the custom of their
country and the needs of the ministers: hence Augustine, whose words
are quoted 16, qu. 1, cap. Decimae, says [*Append. Serm. cclxxvii]:
"Tithes must be paid on the profits of soldiering, trade or craft."

Reply Obj. 2: Things are ill-gotten in two ways. First, because the
getting itself was unjust: such, for instance, are things gotten by
robbery, theft or usury: and these a man is bound to restore, and not
to pay tithes on them. If, however, a field be bought with the
profits of usury, the usurer is bound to pay tithes on the produce,
because the latter is not gotten usuriously but given by God. On the
other hand certain things are said to be ill-gotten, because they are
gotten of a shameful cause, for instance of whoredom or
stage-playing, and the like. Such things a man is not bound to
restore, and consequently he is bound to pay tithes on them in the
same way as other personal tithes. Nevertheless the Church must not
accept the tithe so long as those persons remain in sin, lest she
appear to have a share in their sins: but when they have done
penance, tithes may be accepted from them on these things.

Reply Obj. 3: Things directed to an end must be judged according to
their fittingness to the end. Now the payment of tithes is due not
for its own sake, but for the sake of the ministers, to whose dignity
it is unbecoming that they should demand minute things with careful
exactitude, for this is reckoned sinful according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iv, 2). Hence the Old Law did not order the payment of tithes
on such like minute things, but left it to the judgment of those who
are willing to pay, because minute things are counted as nothing.
Wherefore the Pharisees who claimed for themselves the perfect
justice of the Law, paid tithes even on these minute things: nor are
they reproved by our Lord on that account, but only because they
despised greater, i.e. spiritual, precepts; and rather did He show
them to be deserving of praise in this particular, when He said
(Matt. 23:23): "These things you ought to have done," i.e. during the
time of the Law, according to Chrysostom's [*Hom. xliv in the Opus
Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] commentary. This
also seems to denote fittingness rather than obligation. Therefore
now too men are not bound to pay tithes on such minute things, except
perhaps by reason of the custom of one's country.

Reply Obj. 4: A man is not bound to pay tithes on what he has lost by
theft or robbery, before he recovers his property: unless he has
incurred the loss through his own fault or neglect, because the
Church ought not to be the loser on that account. If he sell wheat
that has not been tithed, the Church can command the tithes due to
her, both from the buyer who has a thing due to the Church, and from
the seller, because so far as he is concerned he has defrauded the
Church: yet if one pays, the other is not bound. Tithes are due on
the fruits of the earth, in so far as these fruits are the gift of
God. Wherefore tithes do not come under a tax, nor are they subject
to workmen's wages. Hence it is not right to deduct one's taxes and
the wages paid to workmen, before paying tithes: but tithes must be
paid before anything else on one's entire produce.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 87, Art. 4]

Whether Tithes Should Be Paid to the Clergy?

Objection 1: It would seem that tithes should not be paid to the
clergy. Tithes were paid to the Levites in the Old Testament, because
they had no portion in the people's possessions, according to Num.
18:23, 24. But in the New Testament the clergy have possessions not
only ecclesiastical, but sometimes also patrimonial: moreover they
receive first-fruits, and oblations for the living and the dead.
Therefore it is unnecessary to pay tithes to them.

Obj. 2: Further, it sometimes happens that a man dwells in one
parish, and farms in another; or a shepherd may take his flock within
the bounds of one parish during one part of the year, and within the
bounds of another parish during the other part of the year; or he may
have his sheepfold in one parish, and graze the sheep in another. Now
in all these and similar cases it seems impossible to decide to which
clergy the tithes ought to be paid. Therefore it would seem that no
fixed tithe ought to be paid to the clergy.

Obj. 3: Further, it is the general custom in certain countries for
the soldiers to hold the tithes from the Church in fee; and certain
religious receive tithes. Therefore seemingly tithes are not due only
to those of the clergy who have care of souls.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Num. 18:21): "I have given to the
sons of Levi all the tithes of Israel for a possession, for the
ministry wherewith they serve Me in the Tabernacle." Now the clergy
are the successors of the sons of Levi in the New Testament.
Therefore tithes are due to the clergy alone.

_I answer that,_ Two things have to be considered with regard to
tithes: namely, the right to receive tithes, and the things given in
the name of tithes. The right to receive tithes is a spiritual thing,
for it arises from the debt in virtue of which the ministers of the
altar have a right to the expenses of their ministry, and temporal
things are due to those who sow spiritual things. This debt concerns
none but the clergy who have care of souls, and so they alone are
competent to have this right.

On the other hand the things given in the name of tithes are
material, wherefore they may come to be used by anyone, and thus it
is that they fall into the hands of the laity.

Reply Obj. 1: In the Old Law, as stated above (A. 1, ad 4), special
tithes were earmarked for the assistance of the poor. But in the New
Law the tithes are given to the clergy, not only for their own
support, but also that the clergy may use them in assisting the poor.
Hence they are not unnecessary; indeed Church property, oblations and
first-fruits as well as tithes are all necessary for this same
purpose.

Reply Obj. 2: Personal tithes are due to the church in whose parish a
man dwells, while predial tithes seem more reasonably to belong to
the church within whose bounds the land is situated. The law,
however, prescribes that in this matter a custom that has obtained
for a long time must be observed [*Cap. Cum sint, and Cap. Ad
apostolicae, de Decimis, etc.]. The shepherd who grazes his flock at
different seasons in two parishes, should pay tithe proportionately
to both churches. And since the fruit of the flock is derived from
the pasture, the tithe of the flock is due to the church in whose
lands the flock grazes, rather than to the church on whose land the
fold is situated.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as the Church can hand over to a layman the things
she receives under the title of tithe, so too can she allow him to
receive tithes that are yet to be paid, the right of receiving being
reserved to the ministers of the Church. The motive may be either the
need of the Church, as when tithes are due to certain soldiers
through being granted to them in fee by the Church, or it may be the
succoring of the poor; thus certain tithes have been granted by way
of alms to certain lay religious, or to those that have no care of
souls. Some religious, however, are competent to receive tithes,
because they have care of souls.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 87, Art. 4]

Whether the Clergy Also Are Bound to Pay Tithes?

Objection 1: It would seem that clerics also are bound to pay tithes.
By common law [*Cap. Cum homines, de Decimis, etc.] the parish church
should receive the tithes on the lands which are in its territory.
Now it happens sometimes that the clergy have certain lands of their
own on the territory of some parish church, or that one church has
ecclesiastical property on the territory of another. Therefore it
would seem that the clergy are bound to pay predial tithes.

Obj. 2: Further, some religious are clerics; and yet they are bound
to pay tithes to churches on account of the lands which they
cultivate even with their own hands [*Cap. Ex parte, and Cap.
Nuper.]. Therefore it would seem that the clergy are not immune from
the payment of tithes.

Obj. 3: Further, in the eighteenth chapter of Numbers (26, 28), it is
prescribed not only that the Levites should receive tithes from the
people, but also that they should themselves pay tithes to the
high-priest. Therefore the clergy are bound to pay tithes to the
Sovereign Pontiff, no less than the laity are bound to pay tithes to
the clergy.

Obj. 4: Further, tithes should serve not only for the support of the
clergy, but also for the assistance of the poor. Therefore, if the
clergy are exempt from paying tithes, so too are the poor. Yet the
latter is not true. Therefore the former is false.

_On the contrary,_ A decretal of Pope Paschal [*Paschal II] says: "It
is a new form of exaction when the clergy demand tithes from the
clergy" [*Cap. Novum genus, de Decimis, etc.].

_I answer that,_ The cause of giving cannot be the cause of
receiving, as neither can the cause of action be the cause of
passion; yet it happens that one and the same person is giver and
receiver, even as agent and patient, on account of different causes
and from different points of view. Now tithes are due to the clergy
as being ministers of the altar and sowers of spiritual things among
the people. Wherefore those members of the clergy as such, i.e. as
having ecclesiastical property, are not bound to pay tithes; whereas
from some other cause through holding property in their own right,
either by inheriting it from their kindred, or by purchase, or in any
other similar manner, they are bound to the payment of tithes.

Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear, because the clergy
like anyone else are bound to pay tithes on their own lands to the
parish church, even though they be the clergy of that same church,
because to possess a thing as one's private property is not the same
as possessing it in common. But church lands are not tithable, even
though they be within the boundaries of another parish.

Reply Obj. 2: Religious who are clerics, if they have care of souls,
and dispense spiritual things to the people, are not bound to pay
tithes, but they may receive them. Another reason applies to other
religious, who though clerics do not dispense spiritual things to the
people; for according to the ordinary law they are bound to pay
tithes, but they are somewhat exempt by reason of various concessions
granted by the Apostolic See [*Cap. Ex multiplici, Ex parte, and Ad
audientiam, de Decimis, etc.].

Reply Obj. 3: In the Old Law first-fruits were due to the priests,
and tithes to the Levites; and since the Levites were below the
priests, the Lord commanded that the former should pay the
high-priest "the tenth part of the tenth" [*Num. 18:26] instead of
first-fruits: wherefore for the same reason the clergy are bound now
to pay tithes to the Sovereign Pontiff, if he demanded them. For
natural reason dictates that he who has charge of the common estate
of a multitude should be provided with all goods, so that he may be
able to carry out whatever is necessary for the common welfare.

Reply Obj. 4: Tithes should be employed for the assistance of the
poor, through the dispensation of the clergy. Hence the poor have no
reason for accepting tithes, but they are bound to pay them.
_______________________

QUESTION 88

OF VOWS
(In Twelve Articles)

We must now consider vows, whereby something is promised to God.
Under this head there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) What is a vow?

(2) What is the matter of a vow?

(3) Of the obligation of vows;

(4) Of the use of taking vows;

(5) Of what virtue is it an act?

(6) Whether it is more meritorious to do a thing from a vow, than
without a vow?

(7) Of the solemnizing of a vow;

(8) Whether those who are under another's power can take vows?

(9) Whether children may be bound by vow to enter religion?

(10) Whether a vow is subject to dispensation or commutation?

(11) Whether a dispensation can be granted in a solemn vow of
continence?

(12) Whether the authority of a superior is required in a
dispensation from a vow?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 1]

Whether a Vow Consists in a Mere Purpose of the Will?

Objection 1: It would seem that a vow consists in nothing but a
purpose of the will. According to some [*William of Auxerre, Sum.
Aur. III, xxviii, qu. 1; Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38], "a vow is
a conception of a good purpose after a firm deliberation of the mind,
whereby a man binds himself before God to do or not to do a certain
thing." But the conception of a good purpose and so forth, may
consist in a mere movement of the will. Therefore a vow consists in a
mere purpose of the will.

Obj. 2: Further, the very word vow seems to be derived from
_voluntas_ (will), for one is said to do a thing _proprio voto_ (by
one's own vow) when one does it voluntarily. Now to _purpose_ is an
act of the will, while to _promise_ is an act of the reason.
Therefore a vow consists in a mere act of the will.

Obj. 3: Further, our Lord said (Luke 9:62): "No man putting his hand
to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God." Now
from the very fact that a man has a purpose of doing good, he puts
his hand to the plough. Consequently, if he look back by desisting
from his good purpose, he is not fit for the kingdom of God.
Therefore by a mere good purpose a man is bound before God, even
without making a promise; and consequently it would seem that a vow
consists in a mere purpose of the will.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 5:3): "If thou hast vowed
anything to God, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish
promise displeaseth Him." Therefore to vow is to promise, and a vow
is a promise.

_I answer that,_ A vow denotes a binding to do or omit some
particular thing. Now one man binds himself to another by means of a
promise, which is an act of the reason to which faculty it belongs to
direct. For just as a man by commanding or praying, directs, in a
fashion, what others are to do for him, so by promising he directs
what he himself is to do for another. Now a promise between man and
man can only be expressed in words or any other outward signs;
whereas a promise can be made to God by the mere inward thought,
since according to 1 Kings 16:7, "Man seeth those things that appear,
but the Lord beholdeth the heart." Yet we express words outwardly
sometimes, either to arouse ourselves, as was stated above with
regard to prayer (Q. 83, A. 12), or to call others to witness, so
that one may refrain from breaking the vow, not only through fear of
God, but also through respect of men. Now a promise is the outcome
from a purpose of doing something: and a purpose presupposes
deliberation, since it is the act of a deliberate will. Accordingly
three things are essential to a vow: the first is deliberation; the
second is a purpose of the will; and the third is a promise, wherein
is completed the nature of a vow. Sometimes, however, two other
things are added as a sort of confirmation of the vow, namely,
pronouncement by word of mouth, according to Ps. 65:13, "I will pay
Thee my vows which my lips have uttered"; and the witnessing of
others. Hence the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 38) that a vow is "the
witnessing of a spontaneous promise and ought to be made to God and
about things relating to God": although the "witnessing" may strictly
refer to the inward protestation.

Reply Obj. 1: The conceiving of a good purpose is not confirmed by
the deliberation of the mind, unless the deliberation lead to a
promise.

Reply Obj. 2: Man's will moves the reason to promise something
relating to things subject to his will, and a vow takes its name from
the will forasmuch as it proceeds from the will as first mover.

Reply Obj. 3: He that puts his hand to the plough does something
already; while he that merely purposes to do something does nothing
so far. When, however, he promises, he already sets about doing,
although he does not yet fulfil his promise: even so, he that puts
his hand to the plough does not plough yet, nevertheless he stretches
out his hand for the purpose of ploughing.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 2]

Whether a Vow Should Always Be About a Better Good?

Objection 1: It would seem that a vow need not be always about a
better good. A greater good is one that pertains to supererogation.
But vows are not only about matters of supererogation, but also about
matters of salvation: thus in Baptism men vow to renounce the devil
and his pomps, and to keep the faith, as a gloss observes on Ps.
75:12, "Vow ye, and pay to the Lord your God"; and Jacob vowed (Gen.
28:21) that the Lord should be his God. Now this above all is
necessary for salvation. Therefore vows are not only about a better
good.

Obj. 2: Further, Jephte is included among the saints (Heb. 11:32).
Yet he killed his innocent daughter on account of his vow (Judges
11). Since, then, the slaying of an innocent person is not a better
good, but is in itself unlawful, it seems that a vow may be made not
only about a better good, but also about something unlawful.

Obj. 3: Further, things that tend to be harmful to the person, or
that are quite useless, do not come under the head of a better good.
Yet sometimes vows are made about immoderate vigils or fasts which
tend to injure the person: and sometimes vows are about indifferent
matters and such as are useful to no purpose. Therefore a vow is not
always about a better good.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 23:22): "If thou wilt not
promise thou shalt be without sin."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a vow is a promise made to
God. Now a promise is about something that one does voluntarily for
someone else: since it would be not a promise but a threat to say
that one would do something against someone. In like manner it would
be futile to promise anyone something unacceptable to him. Wherefore,
as every sin is against God, and since no work is acceptable to God
unless it be virtuous, it follows that nothing unlawful or
indifferent, but only some act of virtue, should be the matter of a
vow. But as a vow denotes a voluntary promise, while necessity
excludes voluntariness, whatever is absolutely necessary, whether to
be or not to be, can nowise be the matter of a vow. For it would be
foolish to vow that one would die or that one would not fly.

On the other hand, if a thing be necessary, not absolutely but on the
supposition of an end--for instance if salvation be unattainable
without it--it may be the matter of a vow in so far as it is done
voluntarily, but not in so far as there is a necessity for doing it.
But that which is not necessary, neither absolutely, nor on the
supposition of an end, is altogether voluntary, and therefore is most
properly the matter of a vow. And this is said to be a greater good
in comparison with that which is universally necessary for salvation.
Therefore, properly speaking, a vow is said to be about a better good.

Reply Obj. 1: Renouncing the devil's pomps and keeping the faith of
Christ are the matter of baptismal vows, in so far as these things
are done voluntarily, although they are necessary for salvation. The
same answer applies to Jacob's vow: although it may also be explained
that Jacob vowed that he would have the Lord for his God, by giving
Him a special form of worship to which he was not bound, for instance
by offering tithes and so forth as mentioned further on in the same
passage.

Reply Obj. 2: Certain things are good, whatever be their result; such
are acts of virtue, and these can be, absolutely speaking, the matter
of a vow: some are evil, whatever their result may be; as those
things which are sins in themselves, and these can nowise be the
matter of a vow: while some, considered in themselves, are good, and
as such may be the matter of a vow, yet they may have an evil result,
in which case the vow must not be kept. It was thus with the vow of
Jephte, who as related in Judges 11:30, 31, "made a vow to the Lord,
saying: If Thou wilt deliver the children of Ammon into my hands,
whosoever shall first come forth out of the doors of my house, and
shall meet me when I return in peace . . . the same will I offer a
holocaust to the Lord." For this could have an evil result if, as
indeed happened, he were to be met by some animal which it would be
unlawful to sacrifice, such as an ass or a human being. Hence Jerome
says [*Implicitly 1 Contra Jovin.: Comment. in Micheam vi, viii:
Comment. in Jerem. vii. The quotation is from Peter Comestor, Hist.
Scholast.]: "In vowing he was foolish, through lack of discretion,
and in keeping his vow he was wicked." Yet it is premised (Judges
11:29) that "the Spirit of the Lord came upon him," because his faith
and devotion, which moved him to make that vow, were from the Holy
Ghost; and for this reason he is reckoned among the saints, as also
by reason of the victory which he obtained, and because it is
probable that he repented of his sinful deed, which nevertheless
foreshadowed something good.

Reply Obj. 3: The mortification of one's own body, for instance by
vigils and fasting, is not acceptable to God except in so far as it
is an act of virtue; and this depends on its being done with due
discretion, namely, that concupiscence be curbed without
overburdening nature. On this condition such things may be the matter
of a vow. Hence the Apostle after saying (Rom. 12:1), "Present your
bodies a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing to God," adds, "your
reasonable service." Since, however, man is easily mistaken in
judging of matters concerning himself, such vows as these are more
fittingly kept or disregarded according to the judgment of a
superior, yet so that, should a man find that without doubt he is
seriously burdened by keeping such a vow, and should he be unable to
appeal to his superior, he ought not to keep it. As to vows about
vain and useless things they should be ridiculed rather than kept.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 3]

Whether All Vows Are Binding?

Objection 1: It would seem that vows are not all binding. For man
needs things that are done by another, more than God does, since He
has no need for our goods (Ps. 15:2). Now according to the
prescription of human laws [*Dig. L. xii, de pollicitat., i] a simple
promise made to a man is not binding; and this seems to be prescribed
on account of the changeableness of the human will. Much less binding
therefore is a simple promise made to God, which we call a vow.

Obj. 2: Further, no one is bound to do what is impossible. Now
sometimes that which a man has vowed becomes impossible to him,
either because it depends on another's decision, as when, for
instance, a man vows to enter a monastery, the monks of which refuse
to receive him: or on account of some defect arising, for instance
when a woman vows virginity, and afterwards is deflowered; or when a
man vows to give a sum of money, and afterwards loses it. Therefore a
vow is not always binding.

Obj. 3: Further, if a man is bound to pay something, he must do so at
once. But a man is not bound to pay his vow at once, especially if it
be taken under a condition to be fulfilled in the future. Therefore a
vow is not always binding.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 5:3, 4): "Whatsoever thou
hast vowed, pay it; and it is much better not to vow, than after a
vow not to perform the things promised."

_I answer that,_ For one to be accounted faithful one must keep one's
promises. Wherefore, according to Augustine [*Ep. xxxii, 2: De
Mendac. xx] faith takes its name "from a man's deed agreeing with his
word" [*_Fides . . . fiunt dicta._ Cicero gives the same etymology
(De Offic. i, 7)]. Now man ought to be faithful to God above all,
both on account of God's sovereignty, and on account of the favors he
has received from God. Hence man is obliged before all to fulfill the
vows he has made to God, since this is part of the fidelity he owes
to God. On the other hand, the breaking of a vow is a kind of
infidelity. Wherefore Solomon gives the reason why vows should be
paid to God, because "an unfaithful . . . promise displeaseth Him"
[*Eccles. 5:3].

Reply Obj. 1: Honesty demands that a man should keep any promise he
makes to another man, and this obligation is based on the natural
law. But for a man to be under a civil obligation through a promise
he has made, other conditions are requisite. And although God needs
not our goods, we are under a very great obligation to Him: so that
a vow made to Him is most binding.

Reply Obj. 2: If that which a man has vowed becomes impossible
to him through any cause whatsoever, he must do what he can, so that
he have at least a will ready to do what he can. Hence if a man has
vowed to enter a monastery, he must endeavor to the best of his power
to be received there. And if his intention was chiefly to bind himself
to enter the religious life, so that, in consequence, he chose this
particular form of religious life, or this place, as being most
agreeable to him, he is bound, should he be unable to be received
there, to enter the religious life elsewhere. But if his principal
intention is to bind himself to this particular kind of religious
life, or to this particular place, because the one or the other
pleases him in some special way, he is not bound to enter another
religious house, if they are unwilling to receive him into this
particular one. On the other hand, if he be rendered incapable of
fulfilling his vow through his own fault, he is bound over and above
to do penance for his past fault: thus if a woman has vowed virginity
and is afterwards violated, she is bound not only to observe what is
in her power, namely, perpetual continency, but also to repent of what
she has lost by sinning.

Reply Obj. 3: The obligation of a vow is caused by our own
will and intention, wherefore it is written (Deut. 23:23): "That which
is once gone out of thy lips, thou shalt observe, and shalt do as thou
hast promised to the Lord thy God, and hast spoken with thy own will
and with thy own mouth." Wherefore if in taking a vow, it is one's
intention and will to bind oneself to fulfil it at once, one is bound
to fulfil it immediately. But if one intend to fulfil it at a certain
time, or under a certain condition, one is not bound to immediate
fulfilment. And yet one ought not to delay longer than one intended to
bind oneself, for it is written (Deut. 23:21): "When thou hast made a
vow to the Lord thy God thou shalt not delay to pay it: because the
Lord thy God will require it; and if thou delay, it shall be imputed
to thee for a sin."
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 4]

Whether It Is Expedient to Take Vows?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not expedient to take vows. It
is not expedient to anyone to deprive himself of the good that God
has given him. Now one of the greatest goods that God has given man
is liberty whereof he seems to be deprived by the necessity
implicated in a vow. Therefore it would seem inexpedient for man to
take vows.

Obj. 2: Further, no one should expose himself to danger. But whoever
takes a vow exposes himself to danger, since that which, before
taking a vow, he could omit without danger, becomes a source of
danger to him if he should not fulfil it after taking the vow. Hence
Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): "Since thou hast
vowed, thou hast bound thyself, thou canst not do otherwise. If thou
dost not what thou hast vowed thou wilt not be as thou wouldst have
been hadst thou not vowed. For then thou wouldst have been less
great, not less good: whereas now if thou breakest faith with God
(which God forbid) thou art the more unhappy, as thou wouldst have
been happier, hadst thou kept thy vow." Therefore it is not expedient
to take vows.

Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:16): "Be ye followers of
me, as I also am of Christ." But we do not read that either Christ or
the Apostles took any vows. Therefore it would seem inexpedient to
take vows.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 75:12): "Vow ye and pay to the
Lord your God."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2), a vow is a promise made
to God. Now one makes a promise to a man under one aspect, and to God
under another. Because we promise something to a man for his own
profit; since it profits him that we should be of service to him, and
that we should at first assure him of the future fulfilment of that
service: whereas we make promises to God not for His but for our own
profit. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): "He
is a kind and not a needy exactor, for he does not grow rich on our
payments, but makes those who pay Him grow rich in Him." And just as
what we give God is useful not to Him but to us, since "what is given
Him is added to the giver," as Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment.
et Paulin.), so also a promise whereby we vow something to God, does
not conduce to His profit, nor does He need to be assured by us, but
it conduces to our profit, in so far as by vowing we fix our wills
immovably on that which it is expedient to do. Hence it is expedient
to take vows.

Reply Obj. 1: Even as one's liberty is not lessened by one being
unable to sin, so, too, the necessity resulting from a will firmly
fixed to good does not lessen the liberty, as instanced in God and
the blessed. Such is the necessity implied by a vow, bearing a
certain resemblance to the confirmation of the blessed. Hence,
Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.) that "happy is
the necessity that compels us to do the better things."

Reply Obj. 2: When danger arises from the deed itself, this deed is
not expedient, for instance that one cross a river by a tottering
bridge: but if the danger arise through man's failure in the deed,
the latter does not cease to be expedient: thus it is expedient to
mount on horseback, though there be the danger of a fall from the
horse: else it would behoove one to desist from all good things, that
may become dangerous accidentally. Wherefore it is written (Eccles.
11:4): "He that observeth the wind shall not sow, and he that
considereth the clouds shall never reap." Now a man incurs danger,
not from the vow itself, but from his fault, when he changes his mind
by breaking his vow. Hence, Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et
Paulin.): "Repent not of thy vow: thou shouldst rather rejoice that
thou canst no longer do what thou mightest lawfully have done to thy
detriment."

Reply Obj. 3: It was incompetent for Christ, by His very nature, to
take a vow, both because He was God, and because, as man, His will
was firmly fixed on the good, since He was a _comprehensor._ By a
kind of similitude, however, He is represented as saying (Ps. 21:26):
"I will pay my vows in the sight of them that fear Him," when He is
speaking of His body, which is the Church.

The apostles are understood to have vowed things pertaining to the
state of perfection when "they left all things and followed Christ."
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 5]

Whether a Vow Is an Act of Latria or Religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that a vow is not an act of latria or
religion. Every act of virtue is matter for a vow. Now it would seem
to pertain to the same virtue to promise a thing and to do it.
Therefore a vow pertains to any virtue and not to religion especially.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Tully (De Invent. ii, 53) it belongs to
religion to offer God worship and ceremonial rites. But he who takes
a vow does not yet offer something to God, but only promises it.
Therefore, a vow is not an act of religion.

Obj. 3: Further, religious worship should be offered to none but God.
But a vow is made not only to God, but also to the saints and to
one's superiors, to whom religious vow obedience when they make their
profession. Therefore, a vow is not an act of religion.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 19:21): "(The Egyptians) shall
worship Him with sacrifices and offerings and they shall make vows to
the Lord, and perform them." Now, the worship of God is properly the
act of religion or latria. Therefore, a vow is an act of latria or
religion.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 81, A. 1, ad 1), every act of
virtue belongs to religion or latria by way of command, in so far as
it is directed to the reverence of God which is the proper end of
latria. Now the direction of other actions to their end belongs to
the commanding virtue, not to those which are commanded. Therefore
the direction of the acts of any virtue to the service of God is the
proper act of latria.

Now, it is evident from what has been said above (AA. 1, 2) that a
vow is a promise made to God, and that a promise is nothing else than
a directing of the thing promised to the person to whom the promise
is made. Hence a vow is a directing of the thing vowed to the worship
or service of God. And thus it is clear that to take a vow is
properly an act of latria or religion.

Reply Obj. 1: The matter of a vow is sometimes the act of another
virtue, as, for instance, keeping the fast or observing continency;
while sometimes it is an act of religion, as offering a sacrifice or
praying. But promising either of them to God belongs to religion, for
the reason given above. Hence it is evident that some vows belong to
religion by reason only of the promise made to God, which is the
essence of a vow, while others belong thereto by reason also of the
thing promised, which is the matter of the vow.

Reply Obj. 2: He who promises something gives it already in as far as
he binds himself to give it: even as a thing is said to be made when
its cause is made, because the effect is contained virtually in its
cause. This is why we thank not only a giver, but also one who
promises to give.

Reply Obj. 3: A vow is made to God alone, whereas a promise may be
made to a man also: and this very promise of good, which is made to a
man, may be the matter of a vow, and in so far as it is a virtuous
act. This is how we are to understand vows whereby we vow something
to the saints or to one's superiors: so that the promise made to the
saints or to one's superiors is the matter of the vow, in so far as
one vows to God to fulfil what one has promised to the saints or
one's superiors.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 6]

Whether It Is More Praiseworthy and Meritorious to Do Something in
Fulfilment of a Vow, Than Without a Vow?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is more praiseworthy and
meritorious to do a thing without a vow than in fulfilment of a vow.
Prosper says (De Vita Contempl. ii): "We should abstain or fast
without putting ourselves under the necessity of fasting, lest that
which we are free to do be done without devotion and unwillingly."
Now he who vows to fast puts himself under the necessity of fasting.
Therefore it would be better for him to fast without taking the vow.

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 9:7): "Everyone as he hath
determined in his heart, not with sadness, or of necessity: for God
loveth a cheerful giver." Now some fulfil sorrowfully what they have
vowed: and this seems to be due to the necessity arising from the
vow, for necessity is a cause of sorrow according to _Metaph._ v
[*Ed. Did. iv, 5]. Therefore, it is better to do something without a
vow, than in fulfilment of a vow.

Obj. 3: Further, a vow is necessary for the purpose of fixing the
will on that which is vowed, as stated above (A. 4). But the will
cannot be more fixed on a thing than when it actually does that
thing. Therefore it is no better to do a thing in fulfilment of a vow
than without a vow.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on the words of Ps. 75:12, "Vow ye and
pay,"    says: "Vows are counseled to the will." But a counsel is
about none but a better good. Therefore it is better to do a deed in
fulfilment of a vow than without a vow: since he that does it without
a vow fulfils only one counsel, viz. the counsel to do it, whereas he
that does it with a vow, fulfils two counsels, viz. the counsel to
vow and the counsel to do it.

_I answer that,_ For three reasons it is better and more meritorious
to do one and the same deed with a vow than without. First, because
to vow, as stated above (A. 5) is an act of religion which is the
chief of the moral virtues. Now the more excellent the virtue the
better and more meritorious the deed. Wherefore the act of an
inferior virtue is the better and more meritorious for being
commanded by a superior virtue, whose act it becomes through being
commanded by it, just as the act of faith or hope is better if it be
commanded by charity. Hence the works of the other moral virtues (for
instance, fasting, which is an act of abstinence; and being
continent, which is an act of chastity) are better and more
meritorious, if they be done in fulfilment of a vow, since thus they
belong to the divine worship, being like sacrifices to God. Wherefore
Augustine says (De Virg. viii) that "not even is virginity honorable
as such, but only when it is consecrated to God, and cherished by
godly continence."

Secondly, because he that vows something and does it, subjects
himself to God more than he that only does it; for he subjects
himself to God not only as to the act, but also as to the power,
since in future he cannot do something else. Even so he gives more
who gives the tree with its fruit, than he that gives the fruit only,
as Anselm [*Eadmer] observes (De Simil. viii). For this reason, we
thank even those who promise, as stated above (A. 5, ad 2).

Thirdly, because a vow fixes the will on the good immovably and to do
anything of a will that is fixed on the good belongs to the
perfection of virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 4),
just as to sin with an obstinate mind aggravates the sin, and is
called a sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated above (Q. 14, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted should be understood as referring to
necessity of coercion which causes an act to be involuntary and
excludes devotion. Hence he says pointedly: "Lest that which we are
free to do be done without devotion and unwillingly." On the other
hand the necessity resulting from a vow is caused by the immobility
of the will, wherefore it strengthens the will and increases
devotion. Hence the argument does not conclude.

Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher, necessity of coercion, in
so far as it is opposed to the will, causes sorrow. But the necessity
resulting from a vow, in those who are well disposed, in so far as it
strengthens the will, causes not sorrow but joy. Hence Augustine says
(Ep. ad Arment. et Paulin. cxxcii): "Repent not of thy vow: thou
shouldst rather rejoice that thou canst no longer do what thou
mightest lawfully have done to thy detriment." If, however, the very
deed, considered in itself, were to become disagreeable and
involuntary after one has taken the vow, the will to fulfil it
remaining withal, it is still more meritorious than if it were done
without the vow, since the fulfilment of a vow is an act of religion
which is a greater virtue than abstinence, of which fasting is an act.

Reply Obj. 3: He who does something without having vowed it has an
immovable will as regards the individual deed which he does and at
the time when he does it; but his will does not remain altogether
fixed for the time to come, as does the will of one who makes a vow:
for the latter has bound his will to do something, both before he did
that particular deed, and perchance to do it many times.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 7]

Whether a Vow Is Solemnized by the Reception of Holy Orders, and by
the Profession of a Certain Rule?

Objection 1: It would seem that a vow is not solemnized by the
reception of holy orders and by the profession of a certain rule. As
stated above (A. 1), a vow is a promise made to God. Now external
actions pertaining to solemnity seem to be directed, not to God, but
to men. Therefore they are related to vows accidentally: and
consequently a solemnization of this kind is not a proper
circumstance of a vow.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever belongs to the condition of a thing, would
seem to be applicable to all in which that thing is found. Now many
things may be the subject of a vow, which have no connection either
with holy orders, or to any particular rule: as when a man vows a
pilgrimage, or something of the kind. Therefore the solemnization
that takes place in the reception of holy orders or in the profession
of a certain rule does not belong to the condition of a vow.

Obj. 3: Further, a solemn vow seems to be the same as a public vow.
Now many other vows may be made in public besides that which is
pronounced in receiving holy orders or in professing a certain rule;
which latter, moreover, may be made in private. Therefore not only
these vows are solemn.

_On the contrary,_ These vows alone are an impediment to the contract
of marriage, and annul marriage if it be contracted, which is the
effect of a solemn vow, as we shall state further on in the Third
Part of this work [*Suppl., Q. 53, A. 2].

_I answer that,_ The manner in which a thing is solemnized depends on
its nature (_conditio_): thus when a man takes up arms he solemnizes
the fact in one way, namely, with a certain display of horses and
arms and a concourse of soldiers, while a marriage is solemnized in
another way, namely, the array of the bridegroom and bride and the
gathering of their kindred. Now a vow is a promise made to God:
wherefore, the solemnization of a vow consists in something spiritual
pertaining to God; i.e. in some spiritual blessing or consecration
which, in accordance with the institution of the apostles, is given
when a man makes profession of observing a certain rule, in the
second degree after the reception of holy orders, as Dionysius states
(Eccl. Hier. vi). The reason of this is that solemnization is not
wont to be employed, save when a man gives himself up entirely to
some particular thing. For the nuptial solemnization takes place only
when the marriage is celebrated, and when the bride and bridegroom
mutually deliver the power over their bodies to one another. In like
manner a vow is solemnized when a man devotes himself to the divine
ministry by receiving holy orders, or embraces the state of
perfection by renouncing the world and his own will by the profession
of a certain rule.

Reply Obj. 1: This kind of solemnization regards not only men but
also God in so far as it is accompanied by a spiritual consecration
or blessing, of which God is the author, though man is the minister,
according to Num. 6:27, "They shall invoke My name upon the children
of Israel, and I will bless them." Hence a solemn vow is more binding
with God than a simple vow, and he who breaks a solemn vow sins more
grievously. When it is said that a simple vow is no less binding than
a solemn vow, this refers to the fact that the transgressor of either
commits a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not customary to solemnize particular acts, but
the embracing of a new state, as we have said above. Hence when a man
vows particular deeds, such as a pilgrimage, or some special fast,
such a vow is not competent to be solemnized, but only such as the
vow whereby a man entirely devotes himself to the divine ministry or
service: and yet many particular works are included under this vow as
under a universal.

Reply Obj. 3: Through being pronounced in public vows may have a
certain human solemnity, but not a spiritual and divine solemnity, as
the aforesaid vows have, even when they are pronounced before a few
persons. Hence the publicity of a vow differs from its solemnization.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 8]

Whether Those Who Are Subject to Another's Power Are Hindered from
Taking Vows?

Objection 1: It would seem that those who are subject to another's
power are not hindered from taking vows. The lesser bond is surpassed
by the greater. Now the obligation of one man subject to another is a
lesser bond than a vow whereby one is under an obligation to God.
Therefore those who are subject to another's power are not hindered
from taking vows.

Obj. 2: Further, children are under their parents' power. Yet
children may make religious profession even without the consent of
their parents. Therefore one is not hindered from taking vows,
through being subject to another's power.

Obj. 3: Further, to do is more than to promise. But religious who are
under the power of their superiors can do certain things such as to
say some psalms, or abstain from certain things. Much more therefore
seemingly can they promise such things to God by means of vows.

Obj. 4: Further, whoever does what he cannot do lawfully sins. But
subjects do not sin by taking vows, since nowhere do we find this
forbidden. Therefore it would seem that they can lawfully take vows.

_On the contrary,_ It is commanded (Num. 30:4-6) that "if a woman vow
any thing . . . being in her father's house, and yet but a girl in
age," she is not bound by the vow, unless her father consent: and the
same is said there (Num. 30:7-9) of the woman that has a husband.
Therefore in like manner other persons that are subject to another's
power cannot bind themselves by vow.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a vow is a promise made to
God. Now no man can firmly bind himself by a promise to do what is in
another's power, but only to that which is entirely in his own power.
Now whoever is subject to another, as to the matter wherein he is
subject to him, it does not lie in his power to do as he will, but it
depends on the will of the other. And therefore without the consent
of his superior he cannot bind himself firmly by a vow in those
matters wherein he is subject to another.

Reply Obj. 1: Nothing but what is virtuous can be the subject of a
promise made to God, as stated above (A. 2). Now it is contrary to
virtue for a man to offer to God that which belongs to another, as
stated above (Q. 86, A. 3). Hence the conditions necessary for a vow
are not altogether ensured, when a man who is under another's power
vows that which is in that other's power, except under the condition
that he whose power it concerns does not gainsay it.

Reply Obj. 2: As soon as a man comes of age, if he be a freeman he is
in his own power in all matters concerning his person, for instance
with regard to binding himself by vow to enter religion, or with
regard to contracting marriage. But he is not in his own power as
regards the arrangements of the household, so that in these matters
he cannot vow anything that shall be valid without the consent of his
father.

A slave, through being in his master's power, even as regards his
personal deeds, cannot bind himself by vow to enter religion, since
this would withdraw him from his master's service.

Reply Obj. 3: A religious is subject to his superior as to his
actions connected with his profession of his rule. Wherefore even
though one may be able to do something now and then, when one is not
being occupied with other things by one's superior, yet since there
is no time when his superior cannot occupy him with something, no vow
of a religious stands without the consent of his superior, as neither
does the vow of a girl while in (her father's) house without his
consent; nor of a wife, without the consent of her husband.

Reply Obj. 4: Although the vow of one who is subject to another's
power does not stand without the consent of the one to whom he is
subject, he does not sin by vowing; because his vow is understood to
contain the requisite condition, providing, namely, that his superior
approve or do not gainsay it.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 9]

Whether Children Can Bind Themselves by Vow to Enter Religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that children cannot bind themselves by
vow to enter religion. Since a vow requires deliberation of the mind,
it is fitting that those alone should vow who have the use of reason.
But this is lacking in children just as in imbeciles and madmen.
Therefore just as imbeciles and madmen cannot bind themselves to
anything by vow, so neither, seemingly, can children bind themselves
by vow to enter religion.

Obj. 2: Further, that which can be validly done by one cannot be
annulled by another. Now a vow to enter religion made by a boy or
girl before the age of puberty can be revoked by the parents or
guardian (20, qu. ii, cap. Puella). Therefore it seems that a boy or
girl cannot validly make a vow before the age of fourteen.

Obj. 3: Further, according to the rule of Blessed Benedict [*Ch. 58]
and a statute of Innocent IV, a year's probation is granted to those
who enter religion, so that probation may precede the obligation of
the vow. Therefore it seems unlawful, before the year of probation,
for children to be bound by vow to enter religion.

_On the contrary,_ That which is not done aright is invalid without
being annulled by anyone. But the vow pronounced by a maiden, even
before attaining the age of puberty, is valid, unless it be annulled
by her parents within a year (20, qu. ii, cap. Puella). Therefore
even before attaining to puberty children can lawfully and validly be
bound by a vow to enter religion.

_I answer that,_ As may be gathered from what has been said above (A.
7), vows are of two kinds, simple and solemn. And since, as stated in
the same article, the solemnization of a vow consists in a spiritual
blessing and consecration bestowed through the ministry of the
Church, it follows that it comes under the Church's dispensation. Now
a simple vow takes its efficacy from the deliberation of the mind,
whereby one intends to put oneself under an obligation. That such an
obligation be of no force may happen in two ways. First, through
defect of reason, as in madmen and imbeciles, who cannot bind
themselves by vow so long as they remain in a state of madness or
imbecility. Secondly, through the maker of a vow being subject to
another's power, as stated above (A. 8). Now these two circumstances
concur in children before the age of puberty, because in most
instances they are lacking in reason, and besides are naturally under
the care of their parents, or guardians in place of their parents:
wherefore in both events their vows are without force. It happens,
however, through a natural disposition which is not subject to human
laws, that the use of reason is accelerated in some, albeit few, who
on this account are said to be capable of guile: and yet they are
not, for this reason, exempt in any way from the care of their
parents; for this care is subject to human law, which takes into
account that which is of most frequent occurrence.

Accordingly we must say that boys or girls who have not reached the
years of puberty and have not attained the use of reason can nowise
bind themselves to anything by vow. If, however, they attain the use
of reason, before reaching the years of puberty, they can for their
own part, bind themselves by vow; but their vows can be annulled by
their parents, under whose care they are still subject.

Yet no matter how much they be capable of guile before the years of
puberty, they cannot be bound by a solemn religious vow, on account
of the Church's decree [*Sext. Decret. cap. Is qui, de Reg. et
transeunt. ad Relig.] which considers the majority of cases. But
after the years of puberty have been reached, they can bind
themselves by religious vows, simple or solemn, without the consent
of their parents.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument avails in the case of children who have
not yet reached the use of reason: for their vows then are invalid,
as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: The vows of persons subject to another's power contain
an implied condition, namely, that they be not annulled by the
superior. This condition renders them licit and valid if it be
fulfilled, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument avails in the case of solemn vows which
are taken in profession.
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 10]

Whether Vows Admit of Dispensation?

Objection 1: It would seem that vows are not subject to dispensation.
It is less to have a vow commuted than to be dispensed from keeping
it. But a vow cannot be commuted, according to Lev. 27:9, 10, "A
beast that may be sacrificed to the Lord, if anyone shall vow, shall
be holy, and cannot be changed, neither a better for a worse, nor a
worse for a better." Much less, therefore, do vows admit of
dispensation.

Obj. 2: Further, no man can grant a dispensation in matters
concerning the natural law and in the Divine precepts, especially
those of the First Table, since these aim directly at the love of
God, which is the last end of the precepts. Now the fulfilment of a
vow is a matter of the natural law, and is commanded by the Divine
law, as shown above (A. 3), and belongs to the precepts of the First
Table since it is an act of religion. Therefore vows do not admit of
dispensation.

Obj. 3: Further, the obligation of a vow is based on the fidelity
which a man owes to God, as stated above (A. 3). But no man can
dispense in such a matter as this. Neither, therefore, can any one
grant a dispensation from a vow.

_On the contrary,_ That which proceeds from the common will of many
has apparently greater stability than that which proceeds from the
individual will of some one person. Now the law which derives its
force from the common will admits of dispensation by a man. Therefore
it seems that vows also admit of dispensation by a man.

_I answer that,_ The dispensation from a vow is to be taken in the
same sense as a dispensation given in the observance of a law
because, as stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 6; Q. 97, A. 4), a law is
made with an eye to that which is good in the majority of instances.
But since in certain cases this is not good, there is need for
someone to decide that in that particular case the law is not to be
observed. This is properly speaking to dispense in the law: for a
dispensation would seem to denote a commensurate distribution or
application of some common thing to those that are contained under
it, in the same way as a person is said to dispense food to a
household.

In like manner a person who takes a vow makes a law for himself as it
were, and binds himself to do something which in itself and in the
majority of cases is a good. But it may happen that in some
particular case this is simply evil, or useless, or a hindrance to a
greater good: and this is essentially contrary to that which is the
matter of a vow, as is clear from what has been said above (A. 2).
Therefore it is necessary, in such a case, to decide that the vow is
not to be observed. And if it be decided absolutely that a particular
vow is not to be observed, this is called a "dispensation" from that
vow; but if some other obligation be imposed in lieu of that which
was to have been observed, the vow is said to be "commuted." Hence it
is less to commute a vow than to dispense from a vow: both, however,
are in the power of the Church.

Reply Obj. 1: An animal that could be lawfully sacrificed was deemed
holy from the very moment that it was the subject of a vow, being, as
it were, dedicated to the worship of God: and for this reason it
could not be changed: even so neither may one now exchange for
something better, or worse, that which one has vowed, if it be
already consecrated, e.g. a chalice or a house. On the other hand, an
animal that could not be sacrificed, through not being the lawful
matter of a sacrifice, could and had to be bought back, as the law
requires. Even so, vows can be commuted now, if no consecration has
intervened.

Reply Obj. 2: Even as man is bound by natural law and Divine precept
to fulfil his vow, so, too, is he bound under the same heads to obey
the law or commands of his superiors. And yet when he is dispensed
from keeping a human law, this does not involve disobedience to that
human law, for this would be contrary to the natural law and the
Divine command; but it amounts to this--that what was law is not law
in this particular case. Even so, when a superior grants a
dispensation, that which was contained under a vow is by his
authority no longer so contained, in so far as he decides that in
this case such and such a thing is not fitting matter for a vow.
Consequently when an ecclesiastical superior dispenses someone from a
vow, he does not dispense him from keeping a precept of the natural
or of the Divine law, but he pronounces a decision on a matter to
which a man had bound himself of his own accord, and of which he was
unable to consider every circumstance.

Reply Obj. 3: The fidelity we owe to God does not require that we
fulfil that which it would be wrong or useless to vow, or which would
be an obstacle to the greater good whereunto the dispensation from
that vow would conduce. Hence the dispensation from a vow is not
contrary to the fidelity due to God.
_______________________

ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 11]

Whether It Is Possible to Be Dispensed from a Solemn Vow of
Continency?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is possible to be dispensed from a
solemn vow of continency. As stated above, one reason for granting a
dispensation from a vow is if it be an obstacle to a greater good.
But a vow of continency, even though it be solemn, may be an obstacle
to a greater good, since the common good is more God-like than the
good of an individual. Now one man's continency may be an obstacle to
the good of the whole community, for instance, in the case where, if
certain persons who have vowed continency were to marry, the peace of
their country might be procured. Therefore it seems that it is
possible to be dispensed even from a solemn vow of continency.

Obj. 2: Further, religion is a more excellent virtue than chastity.
Now if a man vows an act of religion, e.g. to offer sacrifice to God
he can be dispensed from that vow. Much more, therefore, can he be
dispensed from the vow of continency which is about an act of
chastity.

Obj. 3: Further, just as the observance of a vow of abstinence may be
a source of danger to the person, so too may be the observance of a
vow of continency. Now one who takes a vow of abstinence can be
dispensed from that vow if it prove a source of danger to his body.
Therefore for the same reason one may be dispensed from a vow of
continency.

Obj. 4: Further, just as the vow of continency is part of the
religious profession, whereby the vow is solemnized, so also are the
vows of poverty and obedience. But it is possible to be dispensed
from the vows of poverty and obedience, as in the case of those who
are appointed bishops after making profession. Therefore it seems
that it is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of continency.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 26:20): "No price is worthy
of a continent soul."

Further, (Extra, De Statu Monach.) at the end of the Decretal, _Cum
ad Monasterium,_ it is stated that the "renouncing of property, like
the keeping of chastity, is so bound up with the monastic rule, that
not even the Sovereign Pontiff can disperse from its observance."

_I answer that,_ Three things may be considered in a solemn vow of
continency: first, the matter of the vow, namely, continency;
secondly, the perpetuity of the vow, namely, when a person binds
himself by vow to the perpetual observance of chastity: thirdly, the
solemnity of the vow. Accordingly, some [*William of Auxerre, Sum.
Aur. III. vii. 1, qu. 5] say that the solemn vow cannot be a matter
of dispensation, on account of the continency itself for which no
worthy price can be found, as is stated by the authority quoted
above. The reason for this is assigned by some to the fact that by
continency man overcomes a foe within himself, or to the fact that by
continency man is perfectly conformed to Christ in respect of purity
of both body and soul. But this reason does not seem to be cogent
since the goods of the soul, such as contemplation and prayer, far
surpass the goods of the body and still more conform us to God, and
yet one may be dispensed from a vow of prayer or contemplation.
Therefore, continency itself absolutely considered seems no reason
why the solemn vow thereof cannot be a matter of dispensation;
especially seeing that the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:34) exhorts us to be
continent on account of contemplation, when he says that the
unmarried woman . . . "thinketh on the things of God [Vulg.: 'the
Lord']," and since the end is of more account than the means.

Consequently others [*Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38] find the
reason for this in the perpetuity and universality of this vow. For
they assert that the vow of continency cannot be canceled, save by
something altogether contrary thereto, which is never lawful in any
vow. But this is evidently false, because just as the practice of
carnal intercourse is contrary to continency, so is eating flesh or
drinking wine contrary to abstinence from such things, and yet these
latter vows may be a matter for dispensation.

For this reason others [*Innocent IV, on the above decretal] maintain
that one may be dispensed even from a solemn vow of continency, for
the sake of some common good or common need, as in the case of the
example given above (Obj. 1), of a country being restored to peace
through a certain marriage to be contracted. Yet since the Decretal
quoted says explicitly that "not even the Sovereign Pontiff can
dispense a monk from keeping chastity," it follows seemingly, that we
must maintain that, as stated above (A. 10, ad 1; cf. Lev. 27:9, 10,
28), whatsoever has once been sanctified to the Lord cannot be put to
any other use. For no ecclesiastical prelate can make that which is
sanctified to lose its consecration, not even though it be something
inanimate, for instance a consecrated chalice to be not consecrated,
so long as it remains entire. Much less, therefore, can a prelate
make a man that is consecrated to God cease to be consecrated, so
long as he lives. Now the solemnity of a vow consists in a kind of
consecration or blessing of the person who takes the vow, as stated
above (A. 7). Hence no prelate of the Church can make a man, who has
pronounced a solemn vow, to be quit of that to which he was
consecrated, e.g. one who is a priest, to be a priest no more,
although a prelate may, for some particular reason, inhibit him from
exercising his order. In like manner the Pope cannot make a man who
has made his religious profession cease to be a religious, although
certain jurists have ignorantly held the contrary.

We must therefore consider whether continency is essentially bound up
with the purpose for which the vow is solemnized. Because if not, the
solemnity of the consecration can remain without the obligation of
continency, but not if continency is essentially bound up with that
for which the vow is solemnized. Now the obligation of observing
continency is connected with Holy Orders, not essentially but by the
institution of the Church; wherefore it seems that the Church can
grant a dispensation from the vow of continency solemnized by the
reception of Holy Orders. On the other hand the obligation of
observing continency is an essential condition of the religious
state, whereby a man renounces the world and binds himself wholly to
God's service, for this is incompatible with matrimony, in which
state a man is under the obligation of taking to himself a wife, of
begetting children, of looking after his household, and of procuring
whatever is necessary for these purposes. Wherefore the Apostle says
(1 Cor. 7:33) that "he that is with a wife, is solicitous for the
things of the world, how he may please his wife; and he is divided."
Hence the "monk" takes his name from "unity" [*The Greek _monos_] in
contrast with this division. For this reason the Church cannot
dispense from a vow solemnized by the religious profession; and the
reason assigned by the Decretal is because "chastity is bound up with
the monastic rule."

Reply Obj. 1: Perils occasioned by human affairs should be obviated
by human means, not by turning divine things to a human use. Now a
professed religious is dead to the world and lives to God, and so he
must not be called back to the human life on the pretext of any human
contingency.

Reply Obj. 2: A vow of temporal continency can be a matter of
dispensation, as also a vow of temporal prayer or of temporal
abstinence. But the fact that no dispensation can be granted from a
vow of continency solemnized by profession is due, not to its being
an act of chastity, but because through the religious profession it
is already an act of religion.

Reply Obj. 3: Food is directly ordered to the upkeep of the person,
therefore abstinence from food may be a direct source of danger to
the person: and so on this count a vow of abstinence is a matter of
dispensation. On the other hand sexual intercourse is directly
ordered to the upkeep not of the person but of the species, wherefore
to abstain from such intercourse by continency does not endanger the
person. And if indeed accidentally it prove a source of danger to the
person, this danger may be obviated by some other means, for instance
by abstinence, or other corporal remedies.

Reply Obj. 4: A religious who is made a bishop is no more absolved
from his vow of poverty than from his vow of continency, since he
must have nothing of his own and must hold himself as being the
dispenser of the common goods of the Church. In like manner neither
is he dispensed from his vow of obedience; it is an accident that he
is not bound to obey if he have no superior; just as the abbot of a
monastery, who nevertheless is not dispensed from his vow of
obedience.

The passage of Ecclesiasticus, which is put forward in the contrary
sense, should be taken as meaning that neither fruitfulness of the of
the flesh nor any bodily good is to be compared with continency,
which is reckoned one of the goods of the soul, as Augustine declares
(De Sanct. Virg. viii). Wherefore it is said pointedly "of a
continent soul," not "of a continent body."
_______________________

TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 12]

Whether the Authority of a Prelate Is Required for the Commutation or
the Dispensation of a Vow?

Objection 1: It would seem that the authority of a prelate is not
required for the commutation or dispensation of a vow. A person may
enter religion without the authority of a superior prelate. Now by
entering religion one is absolved from the vows he made in the world,
even from the vow of making a pilgrimage to the Holy Land [*Cap.
Scripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt.]. Therefore the commutation or
dispensation of a vow is possible without the authority of a superior
prelate.

Obj. 2: Further, to dispense anyone from a vow seems to consist in
deciding in what circumstances he need not keep that vow. But if the
prelate is at fault in his decision, the person who took the vow does
not seem to be absolved from his vow, since no prelate can grant a
dispensation contrary to the divine precept about keeping one's vows,
as stated above (A. 10, ad 2; A. 11). Likewise, when anyone rightly
determines of his own authority that in his case a vow is not to be
kept, he would seem not to be bound; since a vow need not be kept if
it have an evil result (A. 2, ad 2). Therefore the Authority of a
prelate is not required that one may be dispensed from a vow.

Obj. 3: Further, if it belongs to a prelate's power to grant
dispensations from vows, on the same count it is competent to all
prelates, but it does not belong to all to dispense from every vow.
Therefore it does not belong to the power of a prelate to dispense
from vows.

_On the contrary,_ A vow binds one to do something, even as a law
does. Now the superior's authority is requisite for a dispensation
from a precept of the law, as stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 6; Q. 97,
A. 4). Therefore it is likewise required in a dispensation from a vow.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2), a vow is a promise made
to God about something acceptable to Him. Now if you promise
something to anyone it depends on his decision whether he accept what
you promise. Again in the Church a prelate stands in God's place.
Therefore a commutation or dispensation of vows requires the
authority of a prelate who in God's stead declares what is acceptable
to God, according to 2 Cor. 2:10: "For [I] . . . have pardoned . . .
for your sakes . . . in the person of Christ." And he says
significantly "for your sakes," since whenever we ask a prelate for a
dispensation we should do so to honor Christ in Whose person he
dispenses, or to promote the interests of the Church which is His
Body.

Reply Obj. 1: All other vows are about some particular works, whereas
by the religious life a man consecrates his whole life to God's
service. Now the particular is included in the universal, wherefore a
Decretal [*Cap. Scripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt.] says that "a
man is not deemed a vow-breaker if he exchange a temporal service for
the perpetual service of religion." And yet a man who enters religion
is not bound to fulfil the vows, whether of fasting or of praying or
the like, which he made when in the world, because by entering
religion he dies to his former life, and it is unsuitable to the
religious life that each one should have his own observances, and
because the burden of religion is onerous enough without requiring
the addition of other burdens.

Reply Obj. 2: Some have held that prelates can dispense from vows at
their will, for the reason that every vow supposes as a condition
that the superior prelate be willing; thus it was stated above (A. 8)
that the vow of a subject, e.g. of a slave or a son, supposes this
condition, if "the father or master consent," or "does not dissent."
And thus a subject might break his vow without any remorse of
conscience, whenever his superior tells him to.

But this opinion is based on a false supposition: because a spiritual
prelate being, not a master, but a dispenser, his power is given
"unto edification, not for destruction" (2 Cor. 10:8), and
consequently, just as he cannot command that which is in itself
displeasing to God, namely, sin, so neither can he forbid what is in
itself pleasing to God, namely, works of virtue. Therefore absolutely
speaking man can vow them. But it does belong to a prelate to decide
what is the more virtuous and the more acceptable to God.
Consequently in matters presenting no difficulty, the prelate's
dispensation would not excuse one from sin: for instance, if a
prelate were to dispense a person from a vow to enter the religious
life, without any apparent cause to prevent him from fulfilling his
vow. But if some cause were to appear, giving rise, at least, to
doubt, he could hold to the prelate's decision whether of commutation
or of dispensation. He could not, however, follow his own judgment in
the matter, because he does not stand in the place of God; except
perhaps in the case when the thing he has vowed is clearly unlawful,
and he is unable to have recourse to the prelate.

Reply Obj. 3: Since the Sovereign Pontiff holds the place of Christ
throughout the whole Church, he exercises absolute power of
dispensing from all vows that admit of dispensation. To other and
inferior prelates is the power committed of dispensing from those
vows that are commonly made and frequently require dispensation, in
order that men may easily have recourse to someone; such are the vows
of pilgrimage (Cap. de Peregin., de Voto et Voti redempt.), fasting
and the like, and of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, are reserved to the
Sovereign Pontiff [*Cap. Ex multa].
_______________________

QUESTION 89

OF OATHS (TEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider those external acts of religion, whereby
something Divine is taken by man: and this is either a sacrament or
the Name of God. The place for treating of the taking of a sacrament
will be in the Third Part of this work: of the taking of God's Name
we shall treat now. The Name of God is taken by man in three ways.
First, by way oath in order to confirm one's own assertion: secondly,
by way of adjuration as an inducement to others: thirdly, by way of
invocation for the purpose of prayer or praise. Accordingly we must
first treat of oaths: and under this head there are ten points of
inquiry:

(1) What is an oath?

(2) Whether it is lawful?

(3) What are the accompanying conditions of an oath?

(4) Of what virtue is it an act?

(5) Whether oaths are desirable, and to be employed frequently as
something useful and good?

(6) Whether it is lawful to swear by a creature?

(7) Whether an oath is binding?

(8) Which is more binding, an oath or a vow?

(9) Whether an oath is subject to dispensation?

(10) Who may lawfully swear, and when?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 1]

Whether to Swear Is to Call God to Witness?

Objection 1: It would seem that to swear is not to call God to
witness. Whoever invokes the authority of Holy Writ calls God to
witness, since it is His word that Holy Writ contains. Therefore, if
to swear is to call God to witness, whoever invoked the authority of
Holy Writ would swear. But this is false. Therefore the antecedent is
false also.

Obj. 2: Further, one does not pay anything to a person by calling him
to witness. But he who swears by God pays something to Him for it is
written (Matt. 5:33): "Thou shall pay [Douay: 'perform'] thy oaths to
the Lord"; and Augustine says [*Serm. clxxx] that to swear (_jurare_)
is "to pay the right (_jus reddere_) of truth to God." Therefore to
swear is not to call God to witness.

Obj. 3: Further, the duties of a judge differ from the duties of a
witness, as shown above (QQ. 67, 70). Now sometimes a man, by
swearing, implores the Divine judgment, according to Ps. 7:5, "If I
have rendered to them that repaid me evils, let me deservedly fall
empty before my enemies." Therefore to swear is not to call God to
witness.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says in a sermon on perjury (Serm.
clxxx): "When a man says: 'By God,' what else does he mean but that
God is his witness?"

_I answer that,_ As the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16), oaths are taken for
the purpose of confirmation. Now speculative propositions receive
confirmation from reason, which proceeds from principles known
naturally and infallibly true. But particular contingent facts
regarding man cannot be confirmed by a necessary reason, wherefore
propositions regarding such things are wont to be confirmed by
witnesses. Now a human witness does not suffice to confirm such
matters for two reasons. First, on account of man's lack of truth,
for many give way to lying, according to Ps. 16:10, "Their mouth hath
spoken lies [Vulg.: 'proudly']." Secondly, on account of [his] lack
of knowledge, since he can know neither the future, nor secret
thoughts, nor distant things: and yet men speak about such things,
and our everyday life requires that we should have some certitude
about them. Hence the need to have recourse to a Divine witness, for
neither can God lie, nor is anything hidden from Him. Now to call God
to witness is named _jurare_ (to swear) because it is established as
though it were a principle of law (_jure_) that what a man asserts
under the invocation of God as His witness should be accepted as
true. Now sometimes God is called to witness when we assert present
or past events, and this is termed a "declaratory oath"; while
sometimes God is called to witness in confirmation of something
future, and this is termed a "promissory oath." But oaths are not
employed in order to substantiate necessary matters, and such as come
under the investigation of reason; for it would seem absurd in a
scientific discussion to wish to prove one's point by an oath.

Reply Obj. 1: It is one thing to employ a Divine witness already
given, as when one adduces the authority of Holy Scripture; and
another to implore God to bear witness, as in an oath.

Reply Obj. 2: A man is said to pay his oaths to God because he
performs what he swears to do, or because, from the very fact that he
calls upon God to witness, he recognizes Him as possessing universal
knowledge and unerring truth.

Reply Obj. 3: A person is called to give witness, in order that he
may make known the truth about what is alleged. Now there are two
ways in which God makes known whether the alleged facts are true or
not. In one way He reveals the truth simply, either by inward
inspiration, or by unveiling the facts, namely, by making public what
was hitherto secret: in another way by punishing the lying witness,
and then He is at once judge and witness, since by punishing the liar
He makes known his lie. Hence oaths are of two kinds: one is a simple
contestation of God, as when a man says "God is my witness," or, "I
speak before God," or, "By God," which has the same meaning, as
Augustine states [*See argument On the contrary]; the other is by
cursing, and consists in a man binding himself or something of his to
punishment if what is alleged be not true.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 2]

Whether It Is Lawful to Swear?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to swear. Nothing
forbidden in the Divine Law is lawful. Now swearing is forbidden
(Matt. 5:34), "But I say to you not to swear at all"; and (James
5:12), "Above all things, my brethren, swear not." Therefore swearing
is unlawful.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever comes from an evil seems to be unlawful,
because according to Matt. 7:18, "neither can an evil tree bring
forth good fruit." Now swearing comes from an evil, for it is written
(Matt. 5:37): "But let your speech be: Yea, yea: No, no. And that
which is over and above these is of evil." Therefore swearing is
apparently unlawful.

Obj. 3: Further, to seek a sign of Divine Providence is to tempt God,
and this is altogether unlawful, according to Deut. 6:16, "Thou shalt
not tempt the Lord thy God." Now he that swears seems to seek a sign
of Divine Providence, since he asks God to bear witness, and this
must be by some evident effect. Therefore it seems that swearing is
altogether unlawful.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 6:13): "Thou shalt fear the
Lord thy God . . . and shalt swear by His name."

_I answer that,_ Nothing prevents a thing being good in itself, and
yet becoming a source of evil to one who makes use thereof
unbecomingly: thus to receive the Eucharist is good, and yet he that
receives it "unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself" (1
Cor. 11:29). Accordingly in answer to the question in point it must
be stated that an oath is in itself lawful and commendable. This is
proved from its origin and from its end. From its origin, because
swearing owes its introduction to the faith whereby man believes that
God possesses unerring truth and universal knowledge and foresight of
all things: and from its end, since oaths are employed in order to
justify men, and to put an end to controversy (Heb. 6:16).

Yet an oath becomes a source of evil to him that makes evil use of
it, that is who employs it without necessity and due caution. For if
a man calls God as witness, for some trifling reason, it would
seemingly prove him to have but little reverence for God, since he
would not treat even a good man in this manner. Moreover, he is in
danger of committing perjury, because man easily offends in words,
according to James 3:2, "If any man offend not in word, the same is a
perfect man." Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 23:9): "Let not thy
mouth be accustomed to swearing, for in it there are many falls."

Reply Obj. 1: Jerome, commenting on Matt. 5:34, says: "Observe that
our Saviour forbade us to swear, not by God, but by heaven and earth.
For it is known that the Jews have this most evil custom of swearing
by the elements." Yet this answer does not suffice, because James
adds, "nor by any other oath." Wherefore we must reply that, as
Augustine states (De Mendacio xv), "when the Apostle employs an oath
in his epistles, he shows how we are to understand the saying, 'I say
to you, not to swear at all'; lest, to wit, swearing lead us to swear
easily and from swearing easily, we contract the habit, and, from
swearing habitually, we fall into perjury. Hence we find that he
swore only when writing, because thought brings caution and avoids
hasty words."

Reply Obj. 2: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i. 17):
"If you have to swear, note that the necessity arises from the
infirmity of those whom you convince, which infirmity is indeed an
evil. Accordingly He did not say: 'That which is over and above is
evil,' but 'is of evil.' For you do no evil; since you make good use
of swearing, by persuading another to a useful purpose: yet it 'comes
of the evil' of the person by whose infirmity you are forced to
swear."

Reply Obj. 3: He who swears tempts not God, because it is not without
usefulness and necessity that he implores the Divine assistance.
Moreover, he does not expose himself to danger, if God be unwilling
to bear witness there and then: for He certainly will bear witness at
some future time, when He "will bring to light the hidden things of
darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of hearts" (1 Cor.
4:5). And this witness will be lacking to none who swears, neither
for nor against him.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 3]

Whether Three Accompanying Conditions of an Oath Are Suitably
Assigned, Namely, Justice, Judgment, and Truth?

Objection 1: It would seem that justice, judgment and truth are
unsuitably assigned as the conditions accompanying an oath. Things
should not be enumerated as diverse, if one of them includes the
other. Now of these three, one includes another, since truth is a
part of justice, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53): and
judgment is an act of justice, as stated above (Q. 60, A. 1).
Therefore the three accompanying conditions of an oath are unsuitably
assigned.

Obj. 2: Further, many other things are required for an oath, namely,
devotion, and faith whereby we believe that God knows all things and
cannot lie. Therefore the accompanying conditions of an oath are
insufficiently enumerated.

Obj. 3: Further, these three are requisite in man's every deed: since
he ought to do nothing contrary to justice and truth, or without
judgment, according to 1 Tim. 5:21, "Do nothing without prejudice,"
i.e. without previous judgment [*Vulg.: 'Observe these things without
prejudice, doing nothing by declining to either side.']. Therefore
these three should not be associated with an oath any more than with
other human actions.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 4:2): "Thou shalt swear: As
the Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice": which
words Jerome expounds, saying: "Observe that an oath must be
accompanied by these conditions, truth, judgment and justice."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), an oath is not good except
for one who makes good use of it. Now two conditions are required for
the good use of an oath. First, that one swear, not for frivolous,
but for urgent reasons, and with discretion; and this requires
judgment or discretion on the part of the person who swears.
Secondly, as regards the point to be confirmed by oath, that it be
neither false, nor unlawful, and this requires both truth, so that
one employ an oath in order to confirm what is true, and justice, so
that one confirm what is lawful. A rash oath lacks judgment, a false
oath lacks truth, and a wicked or unlawful oath lacks justice.

Reply Obj. 1: Judgment does not signify here the execution of
justice, but the judgment of discretion, as stated above. Nor is
truth here to be taken for the part of justice, but for a condition
of speech.

Reply Obj. 2: Devotion, faith and like conditions requisite for the
right manner of swearing are implied by judgment: for the other two
regard the things sworn to as stated above. We might also reply that
justice regards the reason for swearing.

Reply Obj. 3: There is great danger in swearing, both on account of
the greatness of God Who is called upon to bear witness, and on
account of the frailty of the human tongue, the words of which are
confirmed by oath. Hence these conditions are more requisite for an
oath than for other human actions.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 4]

Whether an Oath Is an Act of Religion, or Latria?

Objection 1: It would seem that an oath is not an act of religion, or
latria. Acts of religion are about holy and divine things. But oaths
are employed in connection with human disputes, as the Apostle
declares (Heb. 6:16). Therefore swearing is not an act of religion or
latria.

Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to religion to give worship to God, as
Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). But he who swears offers
nothing to God, but calls God to be his witness. Therefore swearing
is not an act of religion or latria.

Obj. 3: Further, the end of religion or latria is to show reverence
to God. But the end of an oath is not this, but rather the
confirmation of some assertion. Therefore swearing is not an act of
religion.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 6:13): "Thou shalt fear the
Lord thy God, and shalt serve Him only, and thou shalt swear by His
name." Now he speaks there of the servitude of religion. Therefore
swearing is an act of religion.

_I answer that,_ As appears from what has been said above (A. 1), he
that swears calls God to witness in confirmation of what he says. Now
nothing is confirmed save by what is more certain and more powerful.
Therefore in the very fact that a man swears by God, he acknowledges
God to be more powerful, by reason of His unfailing truth and His
universal knowledge; and thus in a way he shows reverence to God. For
this reason the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16) that "men swear by one
greater than themselves," and Jerome commenting on Matt. 5:34, says
that "he who swears either reveres or loves the person by whom he
swears." The Philosopher, too, states (Metaph. i, 3) that "to swear
is to give very great honor." Now to show reverence to God belongs to
religion or latria. Wherefore it is evident that an oath is an act of
religion or latria.

Reply Obj. 1: Two things may be observed in an oath. The witness
adduced, and this is Divine: and the thing witnessed to, or that
which makes it necessary to call the witness, and this is human.
Accordingly an oath belongs to religion by reason of the former, and
not of the latter.

Reply Obj. 2: In the very fact that a man takes God as witness by way
of an oath, he acknowledges Him to be greater: and this pertains to
the reverence and honor of God, so that he offers something to God,
namely, reverence and honor.

Reply Obj. 3: Whatsoever we do, we should do it in honor of God:
wherefore there is no hindrance, if by intending to assure a man, we
show reverence to God. For we ought so to perform our actions in
God's honor that they may conduce to our neighbor's good, since God
also works for His own glory and for our good.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 5]

Whether Oaths Are Desirable and to Be Used Frequently As Something
Useful and Good?

Objection 1: It would seem that oaths are desirable and to be used
frequently as something useful and good. Just as a vow is an act of
religion, so is an oath. Now it is commendable and more meritorious
to do a thing by vow, because a vow is an act of religion, as stated
above (Q. 88, A. 5). Therefore for the same reason, to do or say a
thing with an oath is more commendable, and consequently oaths are
desirable as being good essentially.

Obj. 2: Further, Jerome, commenting on Matt. 5:34, says that "he who
swears either reveres or loves the person by whom he swears." Now
reverence and love of God are desirable as something good
essentially. Therefore swearing is also.

Obj. 3: Further, swearing is directed to the purpose of confirming or
assuring. But it is a good thing for a man to confirm his assertion.
Therefore an oath is desirable as a good thing.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 23:12): "A man that
sweareth much shall be filled with iniquity": and Augustine says (De
Mendacio xv) that "the Lord forbade swearing, in order that for your
own part you might not be fond of it, and take pleasure in seeking
occasions of swearing, as though it were a good thing."

_I answer that,_ Whatever is required merely as a remedy for an
infirmity or a defect, is not reckoned among those things that are
desirable for their own sake, but among those that are necessary:
this is clear in the case of medicine which is required as a remedy
for sickness. Now an oath is required as a remedy to a defect,
namely, some man's lack of belief in another man. Wherefore an oath
is not to be reckoned among those things that are desirable for their
own sake, but among those that are necessary for this life; and such
things are used unduly whenever they are used outside the bounds of
necessity. For this reason Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i,
17): "He who understands that swearing is not to be held as a good
thing," i.e. desirable for its own sake, "restrains himself as far as
he can from uttering oaths, unless there be urgent need."

Reply Obj. 1: There is no parity between a vow and an oath: because
by a vow we direct something to the honor of God, so that for this
very reason a vow is an act of religion. On the other hand, in an
oath reverence for the name of God is taken in confirmation of a
promise. Hence what is confirmed by oath does not, for this reason,
become an act of religion, since moral acts take their species from
the end.

Reply Obj. 2: He who swears does indeed make use of his reverence or
love for the person by whom he swears: he does not, however, direct
his oath to the reverence or love of that person, but to something
else that is necessary for the present life.

Reply Obj. 3: Even as a medicine is useful for healing, and yet, the
stronger it is, the greater harm it does if it be taken unduly, so
too an oath is useful indeed as a means of confirmation, yet the
greater the reverence it demands the more dangerous it is, unless it
be employed aright; for, as it is written (Ecclus. 23:13), "if he
make it void," i.e. if he deceive his brother, "his sin shall be upon
him: and if he dissemble it," by swearing falsely, and with
dissimulation, "he offendeth double," (because, to wit, "pretended
equity is a twofold iniquity," as Augustine [*Enarr. in Ps. lxiii, 7]
declares): "and if he swear in vain," i.e. without due cause and
necessity, "he shall not be justified."
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 6]

Whether It Is Lawful to Swear by Creatures?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to swear by
creatures. It is written (Matt. 5:34-36): "I say to you not to swear
at all, neither by heaven . . . nor by the earth . . . nor by
Jerusalem . . . nor by thy head": and Jerome, expounding these words,
says: "Observe that the Saviour does not forbid swearing by God, but
by heaven and earth," etc.

Obj. 2: Further, punishment is not due save for a fault. Now a
punishment is appointed for one who swears by creatures: for it is
written (22, qu. i, can. Clericum): "If a cleric swears by creatures
he must be very severely rebuked: and if he shall persist in this
vicious habit we wish that he be excommunicated." Therefore it is
unlawful to swear by creatures.

Obj. 3: Further, an oath is an act of religion, as stated above (A.
4). But religious worship is not due to any creature, according to
Rom. 1:23, 25. Therefore it is not lawful to swear by a creature.

_On the contrary,_ Joseph swore "by the health of Pharaoh" (Gen.
42:16). Moreover it is customary to swear by the Gospel, by relics,
and by the saints.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), there are two kinds of
oath. One is uttered as a simple contestation or calling God as
witness: and this kind of oath, like faith, is based on God's truth.
Now faith is essentially and chiefly about God Who is the very truth,
and secondarily about creatures in which God's truth is reflected, as
stated above (Q. 1, A. 1). In like manner an oath is chiefly referred
to God Whose testimony is invoked; and secondarily an appeal by oath
is made to certain creatures considered, not in themselves, but as
reflecting the Divine truth. Thus we swear by the Gospel, i.e. by God
Whose truth is made known in the Gospel; and by the saints who
believed this truth and kept it.

The other way of swearing is by cursing and in this kind of oath a
creature is adduced that the judgment of God may be wrought therein.
Thus a man is wont to swear by his head, or by his son, or by some
other thing that he loves, even as the Apostle swore (2 Cor. 1:23),
saying: "I call God to witness upon my soul."

As to Joseph's oath by the health of Pharaoh this may be understood
in both ways: either by way of a curse, as though he pledged Pharao's
health to God; or by way of contestation, as though he appealed to
the truth of God's justice which the princes of the earth are
appointed to execute.

Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord forbade us to swear by creatures so as to give
them the reverence due to God. Hence Jerome adds that "the Jews,
through swearing by the angels and the like, worshipped creatures
with a Divine honor."

In the same sense a cleric is punished, according to the canons (22,
qu. i, can. Clericum, Obj. 2), for swearing by a creature, for this
savors of the blasphemy of unbelief. Hence in the next chapter, it is
said: "If any one swears by God's hair or head, or otherwise utter
blasphemy against God, and he be in ecclesiastical orders, let him be
degraded."

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply Obj. 3: Religious worship is shown to one whose testimony is
invoked by oath: hence the prohibition (Ex. 23:13): "By the name of
strange gods you shall not swear." But religious worship is not given
to creatures employed in an oath in the ways mentioned above.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 7]

Whether an Oath Has a Binding Force?

Objection 1: It would seem that an oath has no binding force. An oath
is employed in order to confirm the truth of an assertion. But when a
person makes an assertion about the future his assertion is true,
though it may not be verified. Thus Paul lied not (2 Cor. 1:15,
seqq.) though he went not to Corinth, as he had said he would (1 Cor.
16:5). Therefore it seems that an oath is not binding.

Obj. 2: Further, virtue is not contrary to virtue (Categ. viii, 22).
Now an oath is an act of virtue, as stated above (A. 4). But it would
sometimes be contrary to virtue, or an obstacle thereto, if one were
to fulfil what one has sworn to do: for instance, if one were to
swear to commit a sin, or to desist from some virtuous action.
Therefore an oath is not always binding.

Obj. 3: Further, sometimes a man is compelled against his will to
promise something under oath. Now, "such a person is loosed by the
Roman Pontiffs from the bond of his oath" (Extra, De Jurejur., cap.
Verum in ea quaest., etc.). Therefore an oath is not always binding.

Obj. 4: Further, no person can be under two opposite obligations. Yet
sometimes the person who swears and the person to whom he swears have
opposite intentions. Therefore an oath cannot always be binding.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 5:33): "Thou shalt perform
thy oaths to the Lord."

_I answer that,_ An obligation implies something to be done or
omitted; so that apparently it regards neither the declaratory oath
(which is about something present or past), nor such oaths as are
about something to be effected by some other cause (as, for example,
if one were to swear that it would rain tomorrow), but only such as
are about things to be done by the person who swears.

Now just as a declaratory oath, which is about the future or the
present, should contain the truth, so too ought the oath which is
about something to be done by us in the future. Yet there is a
difference: since, in the oath that is about the past or present,
this obligation affects, not the thing that already has been or is,
but the action of the swearer, in the point of his swearing to what
is or was already true; whereas, on the contrary, in the oath that is
made about something to be done by us, the obligation falls on the
thing guaranteed by oath. For a man is bound to make true what he has
sworn, else his oath lacks truth.

Now if this thing be such as not to be in his power, his oath is
lacking in judgment of discretion: unless perchance what was possible
when he swore become impossible to him through some mishap, as when a
man swore to pay a sum of money, which is subsequently taken from him
by force or theft. For then he would seem to be excused from
fulfilling his oath, although he is bound to do what he can, as, in
fact, we have already stated with regard to the obligation of a vow
(Q. 88, A. 3, ad 2). If, on the other hand, it be something that he
can do, but ought not to, either because it is essentially evil, or
because it is a hindrance to a good, then his oath is lacking in
justice: wherefore an oath must not be kept when it involves a sin or
a hindrance to good. For in either case "its result is evil" [*Cf.
Bede, Homil. xix, in Decoll. S. Joan. Bapt.]

Accordingly we must conclude that whoever swears to do something is
bound to do what he can for the fulfilment of truth; provided always
that the other two accompanying conditions be present, namely,
judgment and justice.

Reply Obj. 1: It is not the same with a simple assertion, and with an
oath wherein God is called to witness: because it suffices for the
truth of an assertion, that a person say what he proposes to do,
since it is already true in its cause, namely, the purpose of the
doer. But an oath should not be employed, save in a matter about
which one is firmly certain: and, consequently, if a man employ an
oath, he is bound, as far as he can, to make true what he has sworn,
through reverence of the Divine witness invoked, unless it leads to
an evil result, as stated.

Reply Obj. 2: An oath may lead to an evil result in two ways. First,
because from the very outset it has an evil result, either through
being evil of its very nature (as, if a man were to swear to commit
adultery), or through being a hindrance to a greater good, as if a
man were to swear not to enter religion, or not to become a cleric,
or that he would not accept a prelacy, supposing it would be
expedient for him to accept, or in similar cases. For oaths of this
kind are unlawful from the outset: yet with a difference: because if
a man swear to commit a sin, he sinned in swearing, and sins in
keeping his oath: whereas if a man swear not to perform a greater
good, which he is not bound to do withal, he sins indeed in swearing
(through placing an obstacle to the Holy Ghost, Who is the inspirer
of good purposes), yet he does not sin in keeping his oath, though he
does much better if he does not keep it.

Secondly, an oath leads to an evil result through some new and
unforeseen emergency. An instance is the oath of Herod, who swore to
the damsel, who danced before him, that he would give her what she
would ask of him. For this oath could be lawful from the outset,
supposing it to have the requisite conditions, namely, that the
damsel asked what it was right to grant, but the fulfilment of the
oath was unlawful. Hence Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 50): "Sometimes
it is wrong to fulfil a promise, and to keep an oath; as Herod, who
granted the slaying of John, rather than refuse what he had promised."

Reply Obj. 3: There is a twofold obligation in the oath which
a man takes under compulsion: one, whereby he is beholden to the
person to whom he promises something; and this obligation is cancelled
by the compulsion, because he that used force deserves that the
promise made to him should not be kept. The other is an obligation
whereby a man is beholden to God, in virtue of which he is bound to
fulfil what he has promised in His name. This obligation is not
removed in the tribunal of conscience, because that man ought rather
to suffer temporal loss, than violate his oath. He can, however, seek
in a court of justice to recover what he has paid, or denounce the
matter to his superior even if he has sworn to the contrary, because
such an oath would lead to evil results since it would be contrary to
public justice. The Roman Pontiffs, in absolving men from oaths of
this kind, did not pronounce such oaths to be unbinding, but relaxed
the obligation for some just cause.

Reply Obj. 4: When the intention of the swearer is not the
same as the intention of the person to whom he swears, if this be due
to the swearer's guile, he must keep his oath in accordance with the
sound understanding of the person to whom the oath is made. Hence
Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 31): "However artful a man may be in
wording his oath, God Who witnesses his conscience accepts his oath as
understood by the person to whom it is made." And that this refers to
the deceitful oath is clear from what follows: "He is doubly guilty
who both takes God's name in vain, and tricks his neighbor by guile."
If, however, the swearer uses no guile, he is bound in accordance with
his own intention. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 7): "The human
ear takes such like words in their natural outward sense, but the
Divine judgment interprets them according to our inward intention."
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 8]

Whether an Oath Is More Binding Than a Vow?

Objection 1: It would seem that an oath is more binding than a vow. A
vow is a simple promise: whereas an oath includes, besides a promise,
an appeal to God as witness. Therefore an oath is more binding than a
vow.

Obj. 2: Further, the weaker is wont to be confirmed by the stronger.
Now a vow is sometimes confirmed by an oath. Therefore an oath is
stronger than a vow.

Obj. 3: Further, the obligation of a vow arises from the deliberation
of the mind, a stated above (Q. 88, A. 1); while the obligation of an
oath results from the truth of God Whose testimony is invoked. Since
therefore God's truth is something greater than human deliberation,
it seems that the obligation of an oath is greater than that of a vow.

_On the contrary,_ A vow binds one to God while an oath sometimes
binds one to man. Now one is more bound to God than to man. Therefore
a vow is more binding than an oath.

_I answer that,_ The obligation both of vow and of an oath arises
from something Divine; but in different ways. For the obligation of a
vow arises from the fidelity we owe God, which binds us to fulfil our
promises to Him. On the other hand, the obligation of an oath arises
from the reverence we owe Him which binds us to make true what we
promise in His name. Now every act of infidelity includes an
irreverence, but not conversely, because the infidelity of a subject
to his lord would seem to be the greatest irreverence. Hence a vow by
its very nature is more binding than an oath.

Reply Obj. 1: A vow is not any kind of promise, but a promise made to
God; and to be unfaithful to God is most grievous.

Reply Obj. 2: An oath is added to a vow not because it is more
stable, but because greater stability results from "two immutable
things" [*Heb. 6:18].

Reply Obj. 3: Deliberation of the mind gives a vow its stability, on
the part of the person who takes the vow: but it has a greater cause
of stability on the part of God, to Whom the vow is offered.
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NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 9]

Whether Anyone Can Dispense from an Oath?

Objection 1: It would seem that no one can dispense from an oath.
Just as truth is required for a declaratory oath, which is about the
past or the present, so too is it required for a promissory oath,
which is about the future. Now no one can dispense a man from
swearing to the truth about present or past things. Therefore neither
can anyone dispense a man from making truth that which he has
promised by oath to do in the future.

Obj. 2: Further, a promissory oath is used for the benefit of the
person to whom the promise is made. But, apparently, he cannot
release the other from his oath, since it would be contrary to the
reverence of God. Much less therefore can a dispensation from this
oath be granted by anyone.

Obj. 3: Further, any bishop can grant a dispensation from a vow,
except certain vows reserved to the Pope alone, as stated above (Q.
88, A. 12, ad 3). Therefore in like manner, if an oath admits of
dispensation, any bishop can dispense from an oath. And yet seemingly
this is to be against the law [*Caus. XV, qu. 6, can. Auctoritatem,
seqq.: Cap. Si vero, de Jurejurando]. Therefore it would seem that an
oath does not admit of dispensation.

_On the contrary,_ A vow is more binding than an oath, as stated
above (A. 8). But a vow admits of dispensation and therefore an oath
does also.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 88, A. 10), the necessity of a
dispensation both from the law and from a vow arises from the fact
that something which is useful and morally good in itself and
considered in general, may be morally evil and hurtful in respect of
some particular emergency: and such a case comes under neither law
nor vow. Now anything morally evil or hurtful is incompatible with
the matter of an oath: for if it be morally evil it is opposed to
justice, and if it be hurtful it is contrary to judgment. Therefore
an oath likewise admits of dispensation.

Reply Obj. 1: A dispensation from an oath does not imply a permission
to do anything against the oath: for this is impossible, since the
keeping of an oath comes under a Divine precept, which does not admit
of dispensation: but it implies that what hitherto came under an oath
no longer comes under it, as not being due matter for an oath, just
as we have said with regard to vows (Q. 88, A. 10, ad 2). Now the
matter of a declaratory oath, which is about something past or
present, has already acquired a certain necessity, and has become
unchangeable, wherefore the dispensation will regard not the matter
but the act itself of the oath: so that such a dispensation would be
directly contrary to the Divine precept. On the other hand, the
matter of a promissory oath is something future, which admits of
change, so that, to wit, in certain emergencies, it may be unlawful
or hurtful, and consequently undue matter for an oath. Therefore a
promissory oath admits of dispensation, since such dispensation
regards the matter of an oath, and is not contrary to the Divine
precept about the keeping of oaths.

Reply Obj. 2: One man may promise something under oath to another in
two ways. First, when he promises something for his benefit: for
instance, if he promise to serve him, or to give him money: and from
such a promise he can be released by the person to whom he made it:
for he is understood to have already kept his promise to him when he
acts towards him according to his will. Secondly, one man promises
another something pertaining to God's honor or to the benefit of
others: for instance, if a man promise another under oath that he
will enter religion, or perform some act of kindness. In this case
the person to whom the promise is made cannot release him that made
the promise, because it was made principally not to him but to God:
unless perchance it included some condition, for instance, "provided
he give his consent" or some such like condition.

Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes that which is made the matter of a promissory
oath is manifestly opposed to justice, either because it is a sin, as
when a man swears to commit a murder, or because it is an obstacle to
a greater good, as when a man swears not to enter religion: and such
an oath requires no dispensation. But in the former case a man is
bound not to keep such an oath, while in the latter it is lawful for
him to keep or not to keep the oath, as stated above (A. 7, ad 2).
Sometimes what is promised on oath is doubtfully right or wrong,
useful or harmful, either in itself or under the circumstance. In
this case any bishop can dispense. Sometimes, however, that which is
promised under oath is manifestly lawful and beneficial. An oath of
this kind seemingly admits not of dispensation but of commutation,
when there occurs something better to be done for the common good, in
which case the matter would seem to belong chiefly to the power of
the Pope, who has charge over the whole Church; and even of absolute
relaxation, for this too belongs in general to the Pope in all
matters regarding the administration of things ecclesiastical. Thus
it is competent to any man to cancel an oath made by one of his
subjects in matters that come under his authority: for instance, a
father may annul his daughter's oath, and a husband his wife's (Num.
30:6, seqq.), as stated above with regard to vows (Q. 88, AA. 8, 9).
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TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 89, Art. 10]

Whether an Oath Is Voided by a Condition of Person or Time?

Objection 1: It would seem that an oath is not voided by a condition
of person or time. An oath, according to the Apostle (Heb. 6:16), is
employed for the purpose of confirmation. Now it is competent to
anyone to confirm his assertion, and at any time. Therefore it would
seem that an oath is not voided by a condition of person or time.

Obj. 2: Further, to swear by God is more than to swear by the
Gospels: wherefore Chrysostom [*Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "If there is a reason
for swearing, it seems a small thing to swear by God, but a great
thing to swear by the Gospels. To those who think thus, it must be
said: Nonsense! the Scriptures were made for God's sake, not God for
the sake of the Scriptures." Now men of all conditions and at all
times are wont to swear by God. Much more, therefore, is it lawful to
swear by the Gospels.

Obj. 3: Further, the same effect does not proceed from contrary
causes, since contrary causes produce contrary effects. Now some are
debarred from swearing on account of some personal defect; children,
for instance, before the age of fourteen, and persons who have
already committed perjury. Therefore it would seem that a person
ought not to be debarred from swearing either on account of his
dignity, as clerics, or on account of the solemnity of the time.

Obj. 4: Further, in this world no living man is equal in dignity to
an angel: for it is written (Matt. 11:11) that "he that is the lesser
in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he," namely than John the
Baptist, while yet living. Now an angel is competent to swear, for it
is written (Apoc. 10:6) that the angel "swore by Him that liveth for
ever and ever." Therefore no man ought to be excused from swearing,
on account of his dignity.

_On the contrary,_ It is stated (II, qu. v, can. Si quis presbyter):
"Let a priest be examined 'by his sacred consecration,' instead of
being put on his oath": and (22, qu. v, can. Nullus): "Let no one in
ecclesiastical orders dare to swear on the Holy Gospels to a layman."

_I answer that,_ Two things are to be considered in an oath. One is
on the part of God, whose testimony is invoked, and in this respect
we should hold an oath in the greatest reverence. For this reason
children before the age of puberty are debarred from taking oaths
[*Caus. XXII, qu. 5, can. Parvuli], and are not called upon to swear,
because they have not yet attained the perfect use of reason, so as
to be able to take a oath with due reverence. Perjurers also are
debarred from taking an oath, because it is presumed from their
antecedents that they will not treat an oath with the reverence due
to it. For this same reason, in order that oaths might be treated
with due reverence the law says (22, qu. v, can. Honestum): "It is
becoming that he who ventures to swear on holy things should do so
fasting, with all propriety and fear of God."

The other thing to be considered is on the part of the man, whose
assertion is confirmed by oath. For a man's assertion needs no
confirmation save because there is a doubt about it. Now it derogates
from a person's dignity that one should doubt about the truth of what
he says, wherefore "it becomes not persons of great dignity to
swear." For this reason the law says (II, qu. v, can. Si quis
presbyter) that "priests should not swear for trifling reasons."
Nevertheless it is lawful for them to swear if there be need for it,
or if great good may result therefrom. Especially is this the case in
spiritual affairs, when moreover it is becoming that they should take
oath on days of solemnity, since they ought then to devote themselves
to spiritual matters. Nor should they on such occasions take oaths
temporal matters, except perhaps in cases grave necessity.

Reply Obj. 1: Some are unable to confirm their own assertions on
account of their own defect: and some there are whose words should be
so certain that they need no confirmation.

Reply Obj. 2: The greater the thing sworn by, the holier and the more
binding is the oath, considered in itself, as Augustine states (Ad
Public., Ep. xlvii): and accordingly it is a graver matter to swear
by God than the Gospels. Yet the contrary may be the case on account
of the manner of swearing for instance, an oath by the Gospels might
be taken with deliberation and solemnity, and an oath by God
frivolously and without deliberation.

Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents the same thing from arising out of
contrary causes, by way of superabundance and defect. It is in this
way that some are debarred from swearing, through being of so great
authority that it is unbecoming for them to swear; while others are
of such little authority that their oaths have no standing.

Reply Obj. 4: The angel's oath is adduced not on account of any
defect in the angel, as though one ought not to credit his mere word,
but in order to show that the statement made issues from God's
infallible disposition. Thus too God is sometimes spoken of by
Scripture as swearing, in order to express the immutability of His
word, as the Apostle declares (Heb. 6:17).
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QUESTION 90

OF THE TAKING OF GOD'S NAME BY WAY OF ADJURATION
(In Three Articles)

We must now consider the taking of God's name by way of adjuration:
under which head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is lawful to adjure a man?

(2) Whether it is lawful to adjure the demons?

(3) Whether it is lawful to adjure irrational creatures?
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 90, Art. 1]

Whether It Is Lawful to Adjure a Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to adjure a man.
Origen says (Tract. xxxv super Matth.): "I deem that a man who wishes
to live according to the Gospel should not adjure another man. For
if, according to the Gospel mandate of Christ, it be unlawful to
swear, it is evident that neither is it lawful to adjure: and
consequently it is manifest that the high-priest unlawfully adjured
Jesus by the living God."

Obj. 2: Further, whoever adjures a man, compels him after a fashion.
But it is unlawful to compel a man against his will. Therefore
seemingly it is also unlawful to adjure a man.

Obj. 3: Further, to adjure is to induce a person to swear. Now it
belongs to man's superior to induce him to swear, for the superior
imposes an oath on his subject. Therefore subjects cannot adjure
their superiors.

_On the contrary,_ Even when we pray God we implore Him by certain
holy things: and the Apostle too besought the faithful "by the mercy
of God" (Rom. 12:1): and this seems to be a kind of adjuration.
Therefore it is lawful to adjure.

_I answer that,_ A man who utters a promissory oath, swearing by his
reverence for the Divine name, which he invokes in confirmation of
his promise, binds himself to do what he has undertaken, and so
orders himself unchangeably to do a certain thing. Now just as a man
can order himself to do a certain thing, so too can he order others,
by beseeching his superiors, or by commanding his inferiors, as
stated above (Q. 83, A. 1). Accordingly when either of these
orderings is confirmed by something Divine it is an adjuration. Yet
there is this difference between them, that man is master of his own
actions but not of those of others; wherefore he can put himself
under an obligation by invoking the Divine name, whereas he cannot
put others under such an obligation unless they be his subjects, whom
he can compel on the strength of the oath they have taken.

Therefore, if a man by invoking the name of God, or any holy thing,
intends by this adjuration to put one who is not his subject under an
obligation to do a certain thing, in the same way as he would bind
himself by oath, such an adjuration is unlawful, because he usurps
over another a power which he has not. But superiors may bind their
inferiors by this kind of adjuration, if there be need for it.

If, however, he merely intend, through reverence of the Divine name
or of some holy thing, to obtain something from the other man without
putting him under any obligation, such an adjuration may be lawfully
employed in respect of anyone.

Reply Obj. 1: Origen is speaking of an adjuration whereby a man
intends to put another under an obligation, in the same way as he
would bind himself by oath: for thus did the high-priest presume to
adjure our Lord Jesus Christ [*Matt. 26:63].

Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the adjuration which imposes an
obligation.

Reply Obj. 3: To adjure is not to induce a man to swear, but to
employ terms resembling an oath in order to provoke another to do a
certain thing.

Moreover, we adjure God in one way and man in another; because when we
adjure a man we intend to alter his will by appealing to his reverence
for a holy thing: and we cannot have such an intention in respect of
God Whose will is immutable. If we obtain something from God through
His eternal will, it is due, not to our merits, but to His goodness.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 90, Art. 2]

Whether It Is Lawful to Adjure the Demons?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to adjure the demons. Origen says
(Tract. xxxv, super Matth.): "To adjure the demons is not accordance
with the power given by our Saviour: for this is a Jewish practice."
Now rather than imitate the rites of the Jews, we should use the
power given by Christ. Therefore it is not lawful to adjure the
demons.

Obj. 2: Further, many make use of necromantic incantations when
invoking the demons by something Divine: and this is an adjuration.
Therefore, if it be lawful to adjure the demons, it is lawful to make
use of necromantic incantations, which is evidently false. Therefore
the antecedent is false also.

Obj. 3: Further, whoever adjures a person, by that very fact
associates himself with him. Now it is not lawful to have fellowship
with the demons, according to 1 Cor. 10:20, "I would not that you
should be made partakers with devils." Therefore it is not lawful to
adjure the demons.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Mk. 16:17): "In My name they shall
cast out devils." Now to induce anyone to do a certain thing for the
sake of God's name is to adjure. Therefore it is lawful to adjure the
demons.

_I answer that,_ As stated in the preceding article, there are two
ways of adjuring: one by way of prayer or inducement through
reverence of some holy thing: the other by way of compulsion. In the
first way it is not lawful to adjure the demons because such a way
seems to savor of benevolence or friendship, which it is unlawful to
bear towards the demons. As to the second kind of adjuration, which
is by compulsion, we may lawfully use it for some purposes, and not
for others. For during the course of this life the demons are our
adversaries: and their actions are not subject to our disposal but to
that of God and the holy angels, because, as Augustine says (De Trin.
iii, 4), "the rebel spirit is ruled by the just spirit." Accordingly
we may repulse the demons, as being our enemies, by adjuring them
through the power of God's name, lest they do us harm of soul or
body, in accord with the Divine power given by Christ, as recorded by
Luke 10:19: "Behold, I have given you power to tread upon serpents
and scorpions, and upon all the power of the enemy: and nothing shall
hurt you."

It is not, however, lawful to adjure them for the purpose of learning
something from them, or of obtaining something through them, for this
would amount to holding fellowship with them: except perhaps when
certain holy men, by special instinct or Divine revelation, make use
of the demons' actions in order to obtain certain results: thus we
read of the Blessed James [*the Greater; cf. Apocrypha, N.T., Hist.
Certam. Apost. vi, 19] that he caused Hermogenes to be brought to
him, by the instrumentality of the demons.

Reply Obj. 1: Origen is speaking of adjuration made, not
authoritatively by way of compulsion, but rather by way of a friendly
appeal.

Reply Obj. 2: Necromancers adjure and invoke the demons in order to
obtain or learn something from them: and this is unlawful, as stated
above. Wherefore Chrysostom, commenting on our Lord's words to the
unclean spirit (Mk. 1:25), "Speak no more, and go out of the man,"
says: "A salutary teaching is given us here, lest we believe the
demons, however much they speak the truth."

Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the adjuration whereby the
demon's help is besought in doing or learning something: for this
savors of fellowship with them. On the other hand, to repulse the
demons by adjuring them, is to sever oneself from their fellowship.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 90, Art. 3]

Whether It Is Lawful to Adjure an Irrational Creature?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to adjure an irrational creature.
An adjuration consists of spoken words. But it is useless to speak to
one that understands not, such as an irrational creature. Therefore
it is vain and unlawful to adjure an irrational creature.

Obj. 2: Further, seemingly wherever adjuration is admissible,
swearing is also admissible. But swearing is not consistent with an
irrational creature. Therefore it would seem unlawful to employ
adjuration towards one.

Obj. 3: Further, there are two ways of adjuring, as explained above
(AA. 1, 2). One is by way of appeal; and this cannot be employed
towards irrational creatures, since they are not masters of their own
actions. The other kind of adjuration is by way of compulsion: and,
seemingly, neither is it lawful to use this towards them, because we
have not the power to command irrational creatures, but only He of
Whom it was said (Matt. 8:27): "For the winds and the sea obey Him."
Therefore in no way, apparently, is it lawful to adjure irrational
creatures.

_On the contrary,_ Simon and Jude are related to have adjured dragons
and to have commanded them to withdraw into the desert. [*From the
apocryphal Historiae Certam. Apost. vi. 19.]

_I answer that,_ Irrational creatures are directed to their own
actions by some other agent. Now the action of what is directed and
moved is also the action of the director and mover: thus the movement
of the arrow is an operation of the archer. Wherefore the operation
of the irrational creature is ascribed not only to it, but also and
chiefly to God, Who disposes the movements of all things. It is also
ascribed to the devil, who, by God's permission, makes use of
irrational creatures in order to inflict harm on man.

Accordingly the adjuration of an irrational creature may be of two
kinds. First, so that the adjuration is referred to the irrational
creature in itself: and in this way it would be vain to adjure an
irrational creature. Secondly, so that it be referred to the director
and mover of the irrational creature, and in this sense a creature of
this kind may be adjured in two ways. First, by way of appeal made to
God, and this relates to those who work miracles by calling on God:
secondly, by way of compulsion, which relates to the devil, who uses
the irrational creature for our harm. This is the kind of adjuration
used in the exorcisms of the Church, whereby the power of the demons
is expelled from an irrational creature. But it is not lawful to
adjure the demons by beseeching them to help us.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

QUESTION 91

OF TAKING THE DIVINE NAME FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVOKING IT BY MEANS OF
PRAISE
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider the taking of the Divine name for the purpose of
invoking it by prayer or praise. Of prayer we have already spoken
(Q. 83). Wherefore we must speak now of praise. Under this head there
are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether God should be praised with the lips?

(2) Whether God should be praised with song?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 91, Art. 1]

Whether God Should Be Praised with the Lips?

Objection 1: It would seem that God should not be praised with the
lips. The Philosopher says (Ethic. 1, 12): "The best of men ere
accorded not praise, but something greater." But God transcends the
very best of all things. Therefore God ought to be given, not praise,
but something greater than praise: wherefore He is said (Ecclus.
43:33) to be "above all praise."

Obj. 2: Further, divine praise is part of divine worship, for it is
an act of religion. Now God is worshiped with the mind rather than
with the lips: wherefore our Lord quoted against certain ones the
words of Isa. 29:13, "This people . . . honors [Vulg.: 'glorifies']
Me with their lips, but their heart is far from Me." Therefore the
praise of God lies in the heart rather than on the lips.

Obj. 3: Further, men are praised with the lips that they may be
encouraged to do better: since just as being praised makes the wicked
proud, so does it incite the good to better things. Wherefore it is
written (Prov. 27:21): "As silver is tried in the fining-pot . . . so
a man is tried by the mouth of him that praiseth." But God is not
incited to better things by man's words, both because He is
unchangeable, and because He is supremely good, and it is not
possible for Him to grow better. Therefore God should not be praised
with the lips.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 62:6): "My mouth shall praise
Thee with joyful lips."

_I answer that,_ We use words, in speaking to God, for one reason,
and in speaking to man, for another reason. For when speaking to man
we use words in order to tell him our thoughts which are unknown to
him. Wherefore we praise a man with our lips, in order that he or
others may learn that we have a good opinion of him: so that in
consequence we may incite him to yet better things; and that we may
induce others, who hear him praised, to think well of him, to
reverence him, and to imitate him. On the other hand we employ words,
in speaking to God, not indeed to make known our thoughts to Him Who
is the searcher of hearts, but that we may bring ourselves and our
hearers to reverence Him.

Consequently we need to praise God with our lips, not indeed for His
sake, but for our own sake; since by praising Him our devotion is
aroused towards Him, according to Ps. 49:23: "The sacrifice of praise
shall glorify Me, and there is the way by which I will show him the
salvation of God." And forasmuch as man, by praising God, ascends in
his affections to God, by so much is he withdrawn from things opposed
to God, according to Isa. 48:9, "For My praise I will bridle thee
lest thou shouldst perish." The praise of the lips is also profitable
to others by inciting their affections towards God, wherefore it is
written (Ps. 33:2): "His praise shall always be in my mouth," and
farther on: "Let the meek hear and rejoice. O magnify the Lord with
me."

Reply Obj. 1: We may speak of God in two ways. First, with regard to
His essence; and thus, since He is incomprehensible and ineffable, He
is above all praise. In this respect we owe Him reverence and the
honor of latria; wherefore Ps. 64:2 is rendered by Jerome in his
Psalter [*Translated from the Hebrew]: "Praise to Thee is speechless,
O God," as regards the first, and as to the second, "A vow shall be
paid to Thee." Secondly, we may speak of God as to His effects which
are ordained for our good. In this respect we owe Him praise;
wherefore it is written (Isa. 63:7): "I will remember the tender
mercies of the Lord, the praise of the Lord for all the things that
the Lord hath bestowed upon us." Again, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1):
"Thou wilt find that all the sacred hymns," i.e. divine praises "of
the sacred writers, are directed respectively to the Blessed
Processions of the Thearchy," i.e. of the Godhead, "showing forth and
praising the names of God."

Reply Obj. 2: It profits one nothing to praise with the lips if one
praise not with the heart. For the heart speaks God's praises when it
fervently recalls "the glorious things of His works" [*Cf. Ecclus.
17:7, 8]. Yet the outward praise of the lips avails to arouse the
inward fervor of those who praise, and to incite others to praise
God, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: We praise God, not for His benefit, but for ours as
stated.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 91, Art. 2]

Whether God Should Be Praised with Song?

Objection 1: It would seem that God should not be praised with song.
For the Apostle says (Col. 3:16): "Teaching and admonishing one
another in psalms, hymns and spiritual canticles." Now we should
employ nothing in the divine worship, save what is delivered to us on
the authority of Scripture. Therefore it would seem that, in praising
God, we should employ, not corporal but spiritual canticles.

Obj. 2: Further, Jerome in his commentary on Eph. 5:19, "Singing and
making melody in your hearts to the Lord," says: "Listen, young men
whose duty it is to recite the office in church: God is to be sung
not with the voice but with the heart. Nor should you, like
play-actors, ease your throat and jaws with medicaments, and make the
church resound with theatrical measures and airs." Therefore God
should not be praised with song.

Obj. 3: Further, the praise of God is competent to little and great,
according to Apoc. 14, "Give praise to our God, all ye His servants;
and you that fear Him, little and great." But the great, who are in
the church, ought not to sing: for Gregory says (Regist. iv, ep. 44):
"I hereby ordain that in this See the ministers of the sacred altar
must not sing" (Cf. Decret., dist. xcii., cap. In sancta Romana
Ecclesia). Therefore singing is unsuitable to the divine praises.

Obj. 4: Further, in the Old Law God was praised with musical
instruments and human song, according to Ps. 32:2, 3: "Give praise to
the Lord on the harp, sing to Him with the psaltery, the instrument
of ten strings. Sing to Him a new canticle." But the Church does not
make use of musical instruments such as harps and psalteries, in the
divine praises, for fear of seeming to imitate the Jews. Therefore in
like manner neither should song be used in the divine praises.

Obj. 5: Further, the praise of the heart is more important than the
praise of the lips. But the praise of the heart is hindered by
singing, both because the attention of the singers is distracted from
the consideration of what they are singing, so long as they give all
their attention to the chant, and because others are less able to
understand the things that are sung than if they were recited without
chant. Therefore chants should not be employed in the divine praises.

_On the contrary,_ Blessed Ambrose established singing in the Church
of Milan, as Augustine relates (Confess. ix).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the praise of the voice is
necessary in order to arouse man's devotion towards God. Wherefore
whatever is useful in conducing to this result is becomingly adopted
in the divine praises. Now it is evident that the human soul is moved
in various ways according to various melodies of sound, as the
Philosopher state (Polit. viii, 5), and also Boethius (De Musica,
prologue). Hence the use of music in the divine praises is a salutary
institution, that the souls of the faint-hearted may be the more
incited to devotion. Wherefore Augustine say (Confess. x, 33): "I am
inclined to approve of the usage of singing in the church, that so by
the delight of the ears the faint-hearted may rise to the feeling of
devotion": and he says of himself (Confess. ix, 6): "I wept in Thy
hymns and canticles, touched to the quick by the voices of Thy
sweet-attuned Church."

Reply Obj. 1: The name of spiritual canticle may be given not only to
those that are sung inwardly in spirit, but also to those that are
sung outwardly with the lips, inasmuch as such like canticles arouse
spiritual devotion.

Reply Obj. 2: Jerome does not absolutely condemn singing, but
reproves those who sing theatrically in church not in order to arouse
devotion, but in order to show off, or to provoke pleasure. Hence
Augustine says (Confess. x, 33): "When it befalls me to be more moved
by the voice than by the words sung, I confess to have sinned
penally, and then had rather not hear the singer."

Reply Obj. 3: To arouse men to devotion by teaching and preaching is
a more excellent way than by singing. Wherefore deacons and prelates,
whom it becomes to incite men's minds towards God by means of
preaching and teaching, ought not to be instant in singing, lest
thereby they be withdrawn from greater things. Hence Gregory says
(Regist. iv, ep. 44): "It is a most discreditable custom for those
who have been raised to the diaconate to serve as choristers, for it
behooves them to give their whole time to the duty of preaching and
to taking charge of the alms."

Reply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (Polit. viii, 6), "Teaching
should not be accompanied with a flute or any artificial instrument
such as the harp or anything else of this kind: but only with such
things as make good hearers." For such like musical instruments move
the soul to pleasure rather than create a good disposition within it.
In the Old Testament instruments of this description were employed,
both because the people were more coarse and carnal--so that they
needed to be aroused by such instruments as also by earthly
promises--and because these material instruments were figures of
something else.

Reply Obj. 5: The soul is distracted from that which is sung by a
chant that is employed for the purpose of giving pleasure. But if the
singer chant for the sake of devotion, he pays more attention to what
he says, both because he lingers more thereon, and because, as
Augustine remarks (Confess. x, 33), "each affection of our spirit,
according to its variety, has its own appropriate measure in the
voice, and singing, by some hidden correspondence wherewith it is
stirred." The same applies to the hearers, for even if some of them
understand not what is sung, yet they understand why it is sung,
namely, for God's glory: and this is enough to arouse their devotion.
_______________________

QUESTION 92

OF SUPERSTITION (TWO ARTICLES)

In due sequence we must consider the vices that are opposed to
religion. First we shall consider those which agree with religion in
giving worship to God; secondly, we shall treat of those vices which
are manifestly contrary to religion, through showing contempt of those
things that pertain to the worship of God. The former come under the
head of superstition, the latter under that of irreligion. Accordingly
we must consider in the first place, superstition and its parts, and
afterwards irreligion and its parts.

Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether superstition is a vice opposed to religion?

(2) Whether it has several parts or species?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 92, Art. 1]

Whether Superstition Is a Vice Contrary to Religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that superstition is not a vice contrary
to religion. One contrary is not included in the definition of the
other. But religion is included in the definition of superstition:
for the latter is defined as being "immoderate observance of
religion," according to a gloss on Col. 2:23, "Which things have
indeed a show of wisdom in superstition." Therefore superstition is
not a vice contrary to religion.

Obj. 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x): "Cicero [*De Natura Deorum
ii, 28] states that the superstitious were so called because they
spent the day in praying and offering sacrifices that their children
might survive (_superstites_) them." But this may be done even in
accordance with true religious worship. Therefore superstition is not
a vice opposed to religion.

Obj. 3: Further, superstition seems to denote an excess. But religion
admits of no excess, since, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 5, ad 3),
there is no possibility of rendering to God, by religion, the equal
of what we owe Him. Therefore superstition is not a vice contrary to
religion.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Decem Chord. Serm. ix): "Thou
strikest the first chord in the worship of one God, and the beast of
superstition hath fallen." Now the worship of one God belongs to
religion. Therefore superstition is contrary to religion.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 81, A. 5), religion is a moral
virtue. Now every moral virtue observes a mean, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 64, A. 1). Therefore a twofold vice is opposed to a moral
virtue; one by way of excess, the other by way of deficiency. Again,
the mean of virtue may be exceeded, not only with regard to the
circumstance called "how much," but also with regard to other
circumstances: so that, in certain virtues such as magnanimity and
magnificence; vice exceeds the mean of virtue, not through tending to
something greater than the virtue, but possibly to something less,
and yet it goes beyond the mean of virtue, through doing something to
whom it ought not, or when it ought not, and in like manner as
regards other circumstances, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. iv, 1,
2, 3).

Accordingly superstition is a vice contrary to religion by excess,
not that it offers more to the divine worship than true religion, but
because it offers divine worship either to whom it ought not, or in a
manner it ought not.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as we speak metaphorically of good among evil
things--thus we speak of a good thief--so too sometimes the names of
the virtues are employed by transposition in an evil sense. Thus
prudence is sometimes used instead of cunning, according to Luke
16:8, "The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser']
in their generation than the children of light." It is in this way
that superstition is described as religion.

Reply Obj. 2: The etymology of a word differs from its meaning. For
its etymology depends on what it is taken from for the purpose of
signification: whereas its meaning depends on the thing to which it
is applied for the purpose of signifying it. Now these things differ
sometimes: for "lapis" (a stone) takes its name from hurting the foot
(_laedere pedem_), but this is not its meaning, else iron, since it
hurts the foot, would be a stone. In like manner it does not follow
that "superstition" means that from which the word is derived.

Reply Obj. 3: Religion does not admit of excess, in respect of
absolute quantity, but it does admit of excess in respect of
proportionate quantity, in so far, to wit, as something may be done
in divine worship that ought not to be done.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 92, Art. 2]

Whether There Are Various Species of Superstition?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not various species of
superstition. According to the Philosopher (Topic. i, 13), "if one
contrary includes many kinds, so does the other." Now religion, to
which superstition is contrary, does not include various species; but
all its acts belong to the one species. Therefore neither has
superstition various species.

Obj. 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But religion, to
which superstition is opposed, relates to those things whereby we are
directed to God, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 1). Therefore
superstition, which is opposed to religion, is not specified
according to divinations of human occurrences, or by the observances
of certain human actions.

Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Col. 2:23, "Which things have . . . a
show of wisdom in superstition," adds: "that is to say in a
hypocritical religion." Therefore hypocrisy should be reckoned a
species of superstition.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine assigns the various species of
superstition (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20).

_I answer that,_ As stated above, sins against religion consist in
going beyond the mean of virtue in respect of certain circumstances
(A. 1). For as we have stated (I-II, Q. 72, A. 9), not every
diversity of corrupt circumstances differentiates the species of a
sin, but only that which is referred to diverse objects, for diverse
ends: since it is in this respect that moral acts are diversified
specifically, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, AA. 2, 6).

Accordingly the species of superstition are differentiated, first on
the part of the mode, secondly on the part of the object. For the
divine worship may be given either to whom it ought to be given,
namely, to the true God, but _in an undue mode,_ and this is the
first species of superstition; or to whom it ought not to be given,
namely, to any creature whatsoever, and this is another genus of
superstition, divided into many species in respect of the various
ends of divine worship. For the end of divine worship is in the first
place to give reverence to God, and in this respect the first species
of this genus is _idolatry,_ which unduly gives divine honor to a
creature. The second end of religion is that man may be taught by God
Whom he worships; and to this must be referred _divinatory_
superstition, which consults the demons through compacts made with
them, whether tacit or explicit. Thirdly, the end of divine worship
is a certain direction of human acts according to the precepts of God
the object of that worship: and to this must be referred the
superstition of certain _observances._

Augustine alludes to these three (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20), where he
says that "anything invented by man for making and worshipping idols
is superstitious," and this refers to the first species. Then he goes
on to say, "or any agreement or covenant made with the demons for the
purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens," which refers to
the second species; and a little further on he adds: "To this kind
belong all sorts of amulets and such like," and this refers to the
third species.

Reply Obj. 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "good results from a
cause that is one and entire, whereas evil arises from each single
defect." Wherefore several vices are opposed to one virtue, as stated
above (A. 1; Q. 10, A. 5). The saying of the Philosopher is true of
opposites wherein there is the same reason of multiplicity.

Reply Obj. 2: Divinations and certain observances come under the head
of superstition, in so far as they depend on certain actions of the
demons: and thus they pertain to compacts made with them.

Reply Obj. 3: Hypocritical religion is taken here for
"religion as applied to human observances," as the gloss goes on to
explain. Wherefore this hypocritical religion is nothing else than
worship given to God in an undue mode: as, for instance, if a man
were, in the time of grace, to wish to worship God according to the
rite of the Old Law. It is of religion taken in this sense that the
gloss speaks literally.
_______________________

QUESTION 93

OF SUPERSTITION CONSISTING IN UNDUE WORSHIP OF THE TRUE GOD
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider the species of superstition. We shall treat (1)
Of the superstition which consists in giving undue worship to the true
God; (2) Of the superstition of idolatry; (3) of divinatory
superstition; (4) of the superstition of observances.

Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the
true God?

(2) Whether there can be anything superfluous therein?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 93, Art. 1]

Whether There Can Be Anything Pernicious in the Worship of the True
God?

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be anything pernicious
in the worship of the true God. It is written (Joel 2:32): "Everyone
that shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved." Now
whoever worships God calls upon His name. Therefore all worship of
God is conducive to salvation, and consequently none is pernicious.

Obj. 2: Further, it is the same God that is worshiped by the just in
any age of the world. Now before the giving of the Law the just
worshiped God in whatever manner they pleased, without committing
mortal sin: wherefore Jacob bound himself by his own vow to a special
kind of worship, as related in Genesis 28. Therefore now also no
worship of God is pernicious.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing pernicious is tolerated in the Church. Yet
the Church tolerates various rites of divine worship: wherefore
Gregory, replying to Augustine, bishop of the English (Regist. xi,
ep. 64), who stated that there existed in the churches various
customs in the celebration of Mass, wrote: "I wish you to choose
carefully whatever you find likely to be most pleasing to God,
whether in the Roman territory, or in the land of the Gauls, or in
any part of the Church." Therefore no way of worshiping God is
pernicious.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Jerome (Ep. lxxv, ad Aug.) See Opp.
August. Ep. lxxxii] in a letter to Jerome (and the words are quoted
in a gloss on Gal. 2:14) says that "after the Gospel truth had been
preached the legal observances became deadly," and yet these
observances belonged to the worship of God. Therefore there can be
something deadly in the divine worship.

_I answer that,_ As Augustine states (Cont. Mendac. xiv), "a most
pernicious lie is that which is uttered in matters pertaining to
Christian religion." Now it is a lie if one signify outwardly that
which is contrary to the truth. But just as a thing is signified by
word, so it is by deed: and it is in this signification by deed that
the outward worship of religion consists, as shown above (Q. 81, A.
7). Consequently, if anything false is signified by outward worship,
this worship will be pernicious.

Now this happens in two ways. In the first place, it happens on the
part of the thing signified, through the worship signifying something
discordant therefrom: and in this way, at the time of the New Law,
the mysteries of Christ being already accomplished, it is pernicious
to make use of the ceremonies of the Old Law whereby the mysteries of
Christ were foreshadowed as things to come: just as it would be
pernicious for anyone to declare that Christ has yet to suffer. In
the second place, falsehood in outward worship occurs on the part of
the worshiper, and especially in common worship which is offered by
ministers impersonating the whole Church. For even as he would be
guilty of falsehood who would, in the name of another person, proffer
things that are not committed to him, so too does a man incur the
guilt of falsehood who, on the part of the Church, gives worship to
God contrary to the manner established by the Church or divine
authority, and according to ecclesiastical custom. Hence Ambrose
[*Comment. in 1 ad1 Cor. 11:27, quoted in the gloss of Peter Lombard]
says: "He is unworthy who celebrates the mystery otherwise than
Christ delivered it." For this reason, too, a gloss on Col. 2:23 says
that superstition is "the use of human observances under the name of
religion."

Reply Obj. 1: Since God is truth, to invoke God is to worship Him in
spirit and truth, according to John 4:23. Hence a worship that
contains falsehood, is inconsistent with a salutary calling upon God.

Reply Obj. 2: Before the time of the Law the just were instructed by
an inward instinct as to the way of worshiping God, and others
followed them. But afterwards men were instructed by outward precepts
about this matter, and it is wicked to disobey them.

Reply Obj. 3: The various customs of the Church in the divine worship
are in no way contrary to the truth: wherefore we must observe them,
and to disregard them is unlawful.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 93, Art. 2]

Whether There Can Be Any Excess in the Worship of God?

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be excess in the worship
of God. It is written (Ecclus. 43:32): "Glorify the Lord as much as
ever you can, for He will yet far exceed." Now the divine worship is
directed to the glorification of God. Therefore there can be no
excess in it.

Obj. 2: Further, outward worship is a profession of inward worship,
"whereby God is worshiped with faith, hope, and charity," as
Augustine says (Enchiridion iii). Now there can be no excess in
faith, hope, and charity. Neither, therefore, can there be in the
worship of God.

Obj. 3: Further, to worship God consists in offering to Him what we
have received from Him. But we have received all our goods from God.
Therefore if we do all that we possibly can for God's honor, there
will be no excess in the divine worship.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 18) "that
the good and true Christian rejects also superstitious fancies from
Holy Writ." But Holy Writ teaches us to worship God. Therefore there
can be superstition by reason of excess even in the worship of God.

_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be in excess in two ways. First,
with regard to absolute quantity, and in this way there cannot be
excess in the worship of God, because whatever man does is less than
he owes God. Secondly, a thing is in excess with regard to quantity
of proportion, through not being proportionate to its end. Now the
end of divine worship is that man may give glory to God, and submit
to Him in mind and body. Consequently, whatever a man may do
conducing to God's glory, and subjecting his mind to God, and his
body, too, by a moderate curbing of the concupiscences, is not
excessive in the divine worship, provided it be in accordance with
the commandments of God and of the Church, and in keeping with the
customs of those among whom he lives.

On the other hand if that which is done be, in itself, not conducive
to God's glory, nor raise man's mind to God, nor curb inordinate
concupiscence, or again if it be not in accordance with the
commandments of God and of the Church, or if it be contrary to the
general custom--which, according to Augustine [*Ad Casulan. Ep.
xxxvi], "has the force of law"--all this must be reckoned excessive
and superstitious, because consisting, as it does, of mere externals,
it has no connection with the internal worship of God. Hence
Augustine (De Vera Relig. iii) quotes the words of Luke 17:21, "The
kingdom of God is within you," against the "superstitious," those, to
wit, who pay more attention to externals.

Reply Obj. 1: The glorification of God implies that what is done is
done for God's glory: and this excludes the excess denoted by
superstition.

Reply Obj. 2: Faith, hope and charity subject the mind to God, so
that there can be nothing excessive in them. It is different with
external acts, which sometimes have no connection with these virtues.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers excess by way of absolute
quantity.
_______________________

QUESTION 94

OF IDOLATRY
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider idolatry: under which head there are four points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether idolatry is a species of superstition?

(2) Whether it is a sin?

(3) Whether it is the gravest sin?

(4) Of the cause of this sin.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 94, Art. 1]

Whether Idolatry Is Rightly Reckoned a Species of Superstition?

Objection 1: It would seem that idolatry is not rightly reckoned a
species of superstition. Just as heretics are unbelievers, so are
idolaters. But heresy is a species of unbelief, as stated above (Q.
11, A. 1). Therefore idolatry is also a species of unbelief and not
of superstition.

Obj. 2: Further, latria pertains to the virtue of religion to which
superstition is opposed. But latria, apparently, is univocally
applied to idolatry and to that which belongs to the true religion.
For just as we speak univocally of the desire of false happiness, and
of the desire of true happiness, so too, seemingly, we speak
univocally of the worship of false gods, which is called idolatry,
and of the worship of the true God, which is the latria of true
religion. Therefore idolatry is not a species of superstition.

Obj. 3: Further, that which is nothing cannot be the species of any
genus. But idolatry, apparently, is nothing: for the Apostle says (1
Cor. 8:4): "We know that an idol is nothing in the world," and
further on (1 Cor. 10:19): "What then? Do I say that what is offered
in sacrifice to idols is anything? Or that the idol is anything?"
implying an answer in the negative. Now offering things to idols
belongs properly to idolatry. Therefore since idolatry is like to
nothing, it cannot be a species of superstition.

Obj. 4: Further, it belongs to superstition to give divine honor to
whom that honor is not due. Now divine honor is undue to idols, just
as it is undue to other creatures, wherefore certain people are
reproached (Rom. 1:25) for that they "worshipped and served the
creature rather than the Creator." Therefore this species of
superstition is unfittingly called idolatry, and should rather be
named "worship of creatures."

_On the contrary,_ It is related (Acts 17:16) that when Paul awaited
Silas and Timothy at Athens, "his spirit was stirred within him
seeing the whole city given to idolatry," and further on (Acts 17:22)
he says: "Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things you are too
superstitious." Therefore idolatry belongs to superstition.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 92, A. 2), it belongs to
superstition to exceed the due mode of divine worship, and this is
done chiefly when divine worship is given to whom it should not be
given. Now it should be given to the most high uncreated God alone,
as stated above (Q. 81, A. 1) when we were treating of religion.
Therefore it is superstition to give worship to any creature
whatsoever.

Now just as this divine worship was given to sensible creatures by
means of sensible signs, such as sacrifices, games, and the like, so
too was it given to a creature represented by some sensible form or
shape, which is called an "idol." Yet divine worship was given to
idols in various ways. For some, by means of a nefarious art,
constructed images which produced certain effects by the power of the
demons: wherefore they deemed that the images themselves contained
something God-like, and consequently that divine worship was due to
them. This was the opinion of Hermes Trismegistus [*De Natura Deorum,
ad Asclep.], as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei viii, 23): while others
gave divine worship not to the images, but to the creatures
represented thereby. The Apostle alludes to both of these (Rom. 1:23,
25). For, as regards the former, he says: "They changed the glory of
the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible
man, and of birds, and of four-footed beasts, and of creeping
things," and of the latter he says: "Who worshipped and served the
creature rather than the Creator."

These latter were of three ways of thinking. For some deemed certain
men to have been gods, whom they worshipped in the images of those
men: for instance, Jupiter, Mercury, and so forth. Others again
deemed the whole world to be one god, not by reason of its material
substance, but by reason of its soul, which they believed to be God,
for they held God to be nothing else than a soul governing the world
by movement and reason: even as a man is said to be wise in respect
not of his body but of his soul. Hence they thought that divine
worship ought to be given to the whole world and to all its parts,
heaven, air, water, and to all such things: and to these they
referred the names of their gods, as Varro asserted, and Augustine
relates (De Civ. Dei vii, 5). Lastly, others, namely, the Platonists,
said that there is one supreme god, the cause of all things. After
him they placed certain spiritual substances created by the supreme
god. These they called "gods," on account of their having a share of
the godhead; but we call them "angels." After these they placed the
souls of the heavenly bodies, and beneath these the demons which they
stated to be certain animal denizens of the air, and beneath these
again they placed human souls, which they believed to be taken up
into the fellowship of the gods or of the demons by reason of the
merit of their virtue. To all these they gave divine worship, as
Augustine relates (De Civ . . Dei xviii, 14).

The last two opinions were held to belong to "natural theology" which
the philosophers gathered from their study of the world and taught in
the schools: while the other, relating to the worship of men, was
said to belong to "mythical theology" which was wont to be
represented on the stage according to the fancies of poets. The
remaining opinion relating to images was held to belong to "civil
theology," which was celebrated by the pontiffs in the temples [*De
Civ. Dei vi, 5].

Now all these come under the head of the superstition of idolatry.
Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20): "Anything
invented by man for making and worshipping idols, or for giving
Divine worship to a creature or any part of a creature, is
superstitious."

Reply Obj. 1: Just as religion is not faith, but a confession of
faith by outward signs, so superstition is a confession of unbelief
by external worship. Such a confession is signified by the term
idolatry, but not by the term heresy, which only means a false
opinion. Therefore heresy is a species of unbelief, but idolatry is a
species of superstition.

Reply Obj. 2: The term latria may be taken in two senses. In one
sense it may denote a human act pertaining to the worship of God: and
then its signification remains the same, to whomsoever it be shown,
because, in this sense, the thing to which it is shown is not
included in its definition. Taken thus latria is applied univocally,
whether to true religion or to idolatry, just as the payment of a tax
is univocally the same, whether it is paid to the true or to a false
king. In another sense latria denotes the same as religion, and then,
since it is a virtue, it is essential thereto that divine worship be
given to whom it ought to be given; and in this way latria is applied
equivocally to the latria of true religion, and to idolatry: just as
prudence is applied equivocally to the prudence that is a virtue, and
to that which is carnal.

Reply Obj. 3: The saying of the Apostle that "an idol is nothing in
the world" means that those images which were called idols, were not
animated, or possessed of a divine power, as Hermes maintained, as
though they were composed of spirit and body. In the same sense we
must understand the saying that "what is offered in sacrifice to
idols is not anything," because by being thus sacrificed the
sacrificial flesh acquired neither sanctification, as the Gentiles
thought, nor uncleanness, as the Jews held.

Reply Obj. 4: It was owing to the general custom among the Gentiles
of worshipping any kind of creature under the form of images that the
term "idolatry" was used to signify any worship of a creature, even
without the use of images.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 94, Art. 2]

Whether Idolatry Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that idolatry is not a sin. Nothing is a
sin that the true faith employs in worshipping God. Now the true
faith employs images for the divine worship: since both in the
Tabernacle were there images of the cherubim, as related in Ex. 25,
and in the Church are images set up which the faithful worship.
Therefore idolatry, whereby idols are worshipped, is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, reverence should be paid to every superior. But the
angels and the souls of the blessed are our superiors. Therefore it
will be no sin to pay them reverence by worship, of sacrifices or the
like.

Obj. 3: Further, the most high God should be honored with an inward
worship, according to John 4:24, "God . . . they must adore . . . in
spirit and in truth": and Augustine says (Enchiridion iii), that "God
is worshipped by faith, hope and charity." Now a man may happen to
worship idols outwardly, and yet not wander from the true faith
inwardly. Therefore it seems that we may worship idols outwardly
without prejudice to the divine worship.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 20:5): "Thou shalt not adore
them," i.e. outwardly, "nor serve them," i.e. inwardly, as a gloss
explains it: and it is a question of graven things and images.
Therefore it is a sin to worship idols whether outwardly or inwardly.

_I answer that,_ There has been a twofold error in this matter. For
some [*The School of Plato] have thought that to offer sacrifices and
other things pertaining to latria, not only to God but also to the
others aforesaid, is due and good in itself, since they held that
divine honor should be paid to every superior nature, as being nearer
to God. But this is unreasonable. For though we ought to revere all
superiors, yet the same reverence is not due to them all: and
something special is due to the most high God Who excels all in a
singular manner: and this is the worship of latria.

Nor can it be said, as some have maintained, that "these visible
sacrifices are fitting with regard to other gods, and that to the
most high God, as being better than those others, better sacrifices,
namely, the service of a pure mind, should be offered" [*Augustine,
as quoted below]. The reason is that, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
x, 19), "external sacrifices are signs of internal, just as audible
words are signs of things. Wherefore, just as by prayer and praise we
utter significant words to Him, and offer to Him in our hearts the
things they signify, so too in our sacrifices we ought to realize
that we should offer a visible sacrifice to no other than to Him
Whose invisible sacrifice we ourselves should be in our hearts."

Others held that the outward worship of latria should be given to
idols, not as though it were something good or fitting in itself, but
as being in harmony with the general custom. Thus Augustine (De Civ.
Dei vi, 10) quotes Seneca as saying: "We shall adore," says he, "in
such a way as to remember that our worship is in accordance with
custom rather than with the reality": and (De Vera Relig. v)
Augustine says that "we must not seek religion from the philosophers,
who accepted the same things for sacred, as did the people; and gave
utterance in the schools to various and contrary opinions about the
nature of their gods, and the sovereign good." This error was
embraced also by certain heretics [*The Helcesaitae], who affirmed
that it is not wrong for one who is seized in time of persecution to
worship idols outwardly so long as he keeps the faith in his heart.

But this is evidently false. For since outward worship is a sign of
the inward worship, just as it is a wicked lie to affirm the contrary
of what one holds inwardly of the true faith so too is it a wicked
falsehood to pay outward worship to anything counter to the
sentiments of one's heart. Wherefore Augustine condemns Seneca (De
Civ. Dei vi, 10) in that "his worship of idols was so much the more
infamous forasmuch as the things he did dishonestly were so done by
him that the people believed him to act honestly."

Reply Obj. 1: Neither in the Tabernacle or Temple of the Old Law, nor
again now in the Church are images set up that the worship of latria
may be paid to them, but for the purpose of signification, in order
that belief in the excellence of angels and saints may be impressed
and confirmed in the mind of man. It is different with the image of
Christ, to which latria is due on account of His Divinity, as we
shall state in the Third Part (Q. 25, A. 3).

The Replies to the Second and Third Objections are evident from what
has been said above.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 94, Art. 3]

Whether Idolatry Is the Gravest of Sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that idolatry is not the gravest of sins.
The worst is opposed to the best (Ethic. viii, 10). But interior
worship, which consists of faith, hope and charity, is better than
external worship. Therefore unbelief, despair and hatred of God,
which are opposed to internal worship, are graver sins than idolatry,
which is opposed to external worship.

Obj. 2: Further, the more a sin is against God the more grievous it
is. Now, seemingly, a man acts more directly against God by
blaspheming, or denying the faith, than by giving God's worship to
another, which pertains to idolatry. Therefore blasphemy and denial
of the faith are more grievous sins than idolatry.

Obj. 3: Further, it seems that lesser evils are punished with greater
evils. But the sin of idolatry was punished with the sin against
nature, as stated in Rom. 1:26. Therefore the sin against nature is a
graver sin than idolatry.

Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xx, 5): "Neither do we
say that you," viz. the Manichees, "are pagans, or a sect of pagans,
but that you bear a certain likeness to them since you worship many
gods: and yet you are much worse than they are, for they worship
things that exist, but should not be worshiped as gods, whereas you
worship things that exist not at all." Therefore the vice of
heretical depravity is more grievous than idolatry.

Obj. 5: Further, a gloss of Jerome on Gal. 4:9, "How turn you again
to the weak and needy elements?" says: "The observance of the Law, to
which they were then addicted, was a sin almost equal to the worship
of idols, to which they had been given before their conversion."
Therefore idolatry is not the most grievous sin.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on the saying of Lev. 15:25, about the
uncleanness of a woman suffering from an issue of blood, says: "Every
sin is an uncleanness of the soul, but especially idolatry."

_I answer that,_ The gravity of a sin may be considered in two ways.
First, on the part of the sin itself, and thus idolatry is the most
grievous sin. For just as the most heinous crime in an earthly
commonwealth would seem to be for a man to give royal honor to
another than the true king, since, so far as he is concerned, he
disturbs the whole order of the commonwealth, so, in sins that are
committed against God, which indeed are the greater sins, the
greatest of all seems to be for a man to give God's honor to a
creature, since, so far as he is concerned, he sets up another God in
the world, and lessens the divine sovereignty. Secondly, the gravity
of a sin may be considered on the part of the sinner. Thus the sin of
one that sins knowingly is said to be graver than the sin of one that
sins through ignorance: and in this way nothing hinders heretics, if
they knowingly corrupt the faith which they have received, from
sinning more grievously than idolaters who sin through ignorance.
Furthermore other sins may be more grievous on account of greater
contempt on the part of the sinner.

Reply Obj. 1: Idolatry presupposes internal unbelief, and to this it
adds undue worship. But in a case of external idolatry without
internal unbelief, there is an additional sin of falsehood, as stated
above (A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2: Idolatry includes a grievous blasphemy, inasmuch as it
deprives God of the singleness of His dominion and denies the faith
by deeds.

Reply Obj. 3: Since it is essential to punishment that it be against
the will, a sin whereby another sin is punished needs to be more
manifest, in order that it may make the man more hateful to himself
and to others; but it need not be a more grievous sin: and in this
way the sin against nature is less grievous than the sin of idolatry.
But since it is more manifest, it is assigned as a fitting punishment
of the sin of idolatry, in order that, as by idolatry man abuses the
order of the divine honor, so by the sin against nature he may suffer
confusion from the abuse of his own nature.

Reply Obj. 4: Even as to the genus of the sin, the Manichean heresy
is more grievous than the sin of other idolaters, because it is more
derogatory to the divine honor, since they set up two gods in
opposition to one another, and hold many vain and fabulous fancies
about God. It is different with other heretics, who confess their
belief in one God and worship Him alone.

Reply Obj. 5: The observance of the Law during the time of grace is
not quite equal to idolatry as to the genus of the sin, but almost
equal, because both are species of pestiferous superstition.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 94, Art. 4]

Whether the Cause of Idolatry Was on the Part of Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the cause of idolatry was not on the
part of man. In man there is nothing but either nature, virtue, or
guilt. But the cause of idolatry could not be on the part of man's
nature, since rather does man's natural reason dictate that there is
one God, and that divine worship should not be paid to the dead or to
inanimate beings. Likewise, neither could idolatry have its cause in
man on the part of virtue, since "a good tree cannot bring forth evil
fruit," according to Matt. 7:18: nor again could it be on the part of
guilt, because, according to Wis. 14:27, "the worship of abominable
idols is the cause and the beginning and end of all evil." Therefore
idolatry has no cause on the part of man.

Obj. 2: Further, those things which have a cause in man are found
among men at all times. Now idolatry was not always, but is stated
[*Peter Comestor, Hist. Genes. xxxvii, xl] to have been originated
either by Nimrod, who is related to have forced men to worship fire,
or by Ninus, who caused the statue of his father Bel to be worshiped.
Among the Greeks, as related by Isidore (Etym. viii, 11), Prometheus
was the first to set up statues of men: and the Jews say that Ismael
was the first to make idols of clay. Moreover, idolatry ceased to a
great extent in the sixth age. Therefore idolatry had no cause on the
part of man.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6): "It was not
possible to learn, for the first time, except from their" (i.e. the
demons') "teaching, what each of them desired or disliked, and by
what name to invite or compel him: so as to give birth to the magic
arts and their professors": and the same observation seems to apply
to idolatry. Therefore idolatry had no cause on the part of man.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 14:14): "By the vanity of men
they," i.e. idols, "came into the world."

_I answer that,_ Idolatry had a twofold cause. One was a dispositive
cause; this was on the part of man, and in three ways. First, on
account of his inordinate affections, forasmuch as he gave other men
divine honor, through either loving or revering them too much. This
cause is assigned (Wis. 14:15): "A father being afflicted with bitter
grief, made to himself the image of his son, who was quickly taken
away: and him who then had died as a man he began to worship as a
god." The same passage goes on to say (Wis. 14:21) that "men serving
either their affection, or their kings, gave the incommunicable name
[Vulg.: 'names']," i.e. of the Godhead, "to stones and wood."
Secondly, because man takes a natural pleasure in representations, as
the Philosopher observes (Poet. iv), wherefore as soon as the
uncultured man saw human images skillfully fashioned by the diligence
of the craftsman, he gave them divine worship; hence it is written
(Wis. 13:11-17): "If an artist, a carpenter, hath cut down a tree,
proper for his use, in the wood . . . and by the skill of his art
fashioneth it, and maketh it like the image of a man . . . and then
maketh prayer to it, inquiring concerning his substance, and his
children, or his marriage." Thirdly, on account of their ignorance of
the true God, inasmuch as through failing to consider His excellence
men gave divine worship to certain creatures, on account of their
beauty or power, wherefore it is written (Wis. 13:1, 2): "All
men . . . neither by attending to the works have acknowledged who was
the workman, but have imagined either the fire, or the wind, or the
swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun
and the moon, to be the gods that rule the world."

The other cause of idolatry was completive, and this was on the part
of the demons, who offered themselves to be worshipped by men, by
giving answers in the idols, and doing things which to men seemed
marvelous. Hence it is written (Ps. 95:5): "All the gods of the
Gentiles are devils."

Reply Obj. 1: The dispositive cause of idolatry was, on the part of
man, a defect of nature, either through ignorance in his intellect,
or disorder in his affections, as stated above; and this pertains to
guilt. Again, idolatry is stated to be the cause, beginning and end
of all sin, because there is no kind of sin that idolatry does not
produce at some time, either through leading expressly to that sin by
causing it, or through being an occasion thereof, either as a
beginning or as an end, in so far as certain sins were employed in
the worship of idols; such as homicides, mutilations, and so forth.
Nevertheless certain sins may precede idolatry and dispose man
thereto.

Reply Obj. 2: There was no idolatry in the first age, owing to the
recent remembrance of the creation of the world, so that man still
retained in his mind the knowledge of one God. In the sixth age
idolatry was banished by the doctrine and power of Christ, who
triumphed over the devil.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the consummative cause of
idolatry.
_______________________

QUESTION 95

OF SUPERSTITION IN DIVINATIONS
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider superstition in divinations, under which head
there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether divination is a sin?

(2) Whether it is a species of superstition?

(3) Of the species of divination;

(4) Of divination by means of demons;

(5) Of divination by the stars;

(6) Of divination by dreams;

(7) Of divination by auguries and like observances;

(8) Of divination by lots.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 1]

Whether Divination Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that divination is not a sin. Divination
is derived from something _divine:_ and things that are divine
pertain to holiness rather than to sin. Therefore it seems that
divination is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 1): "Who dares to
say that learning is an evil?" and again: "I could nowise admit that
intelligence can be an evil." But some arts are divinatory, as the
Philosopher states (De Memor. i): and divination itself would seem to
pertain to a certain intelligence of the truth. Therefore it seems
that divination is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, there is no natural inclination to evil; because
nature inclines only to its like. But men by natural inclination seek
to foreknow future events; and this belongs to divination. Therefore
divination is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 18:10, 11): "Neither let
there be found among you . . . any one that consulteth pythonic
spirits, or fortune tellers": and it is stated in the Decretals (26,
qu. v, can. Qui divinationes): "Those who seek for divinations shall
be liable to a penance of five years' duration, according to the
fixed grades of penance."

_I answer that,_ Divination denotes a foretelling of the future. The
future may be foreknown in two ways: first in its causes, secondly in
itself. Now the causes of the future are threefold: for some produce
their effects, of necessity and always; and such like future effects
can be foreknown and foretold with certainty, from considering their
causes, even as astrologers foretell a coming eclipse. Other causes
produce their effects, not of necessity and always, but for the most
part, yet they rarely fail: and from such like causes their future
effects can be foreknown, not indeed with certainty, but by a kind of
conjecture, even as astrologers by considering the stars can foreknow
and foretell things concerning rains and droughts, and physicians,
concerning health and death. Again, other causes, considered in
themselves, are indifferent; and this is chiefly the case in the
rational powers, which stand in relation to opposites, according to
the Philosopher [*Metaph. viii, 2, 5, 8]. Such like effects, as also
those which ensue from natural causes by chance and in the minority
of instances, cannot be foreknown from a consideration of their
causes, because these causes have no determinate inclination to
produce these effects. Consequently such like effects cannot be
foreknown unless they be considered in themselves. Now man cannot
consider these effects in themselves except when they are present, as
when he sees Socrates running or walking: the consideration of such
things in themselves before they occur is proper to God, Who alone in
His eternity sees the future as though it were present, as stated in
the First Part (Q. 14, A. 13; Q. 57, A. 3; Q. 86, A. 4). Hence it is
written (Isa. 41:23): "Show the things that are to come hereafter,
and we shall know that ye are gods." Therefore if anyone presume to
foreknow or foretell such like future things by any means whatever,
except by divine revelation, he manifestly usurps what belongs to
God. It is for this reason that certain men are called divines:
wherefore Isidore says (Etym. viii, 9): "They are called divines, as
though they were full of God. For they pretend to be filled with the
Godhead, and by a deceitful fraud they forecast the future to men."

Accordingly it is not called divination, if a man foretells things
that happen of necessity, or in the majority of instances, for the
like can be foreknown by human reason: nor again if anyone knows
other contingent future things, through divine revelation: for then
he does not divine, i.e. cause something divine, but rather receives
something divine. Then only is a man said to divine, when he usurps
to himself, in an undue manner, the foretelling of future events: and
this is manifestly a sin. Consequently divination is always a sin;
and for this reason Jerome says in his commentary on Mic. 3:9, seqq.
that "divination is always taken in an evil sense."

Reply Obj. 1: Divination takes its name not from a rightly ordered
share of something divine, but from an undue usurpation thereof, as
stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: There are certain arts for the foreknowledge of future
events that occur of necessity or frequently, and these do not
pertain to divination. But there are no true arts or sciences for the
knowledge of other future events, but only vain inventions of the
devil's deceit, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 8).

Reply Obj. 3: Man has a natural inclination to know the future by
human means, but not by the undue means of divination.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 2]

Whether Divination Is a Species of Superstition?

Objection 1: It would seem that divination is not a species of
superstition. The same thing cannot be a species of diverse genera.
Now divination is apparently a species of curiosity, according to
Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxviii) [*Cf. De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23,
24; De Divin. Daem. 3]. Therefore it is not, seemingly, a species of
superstition.

Obj. 2: Further, just as religion is due worship, so is superstition
undue worship. But divination does not seem to pertain to undue
worship. Therefore it does not pertain to superstition.

Obj. 3: Further, superstition is opposed to religion. But in true
religion nothing is to be found corresponding as a contrary to
divination. Therefore divination is not a species of superstition.

_On the contrary,_ Origen says in his Peri Archon [*The quotation is
from his sixteenth homily on the Book of Numbers]: "There is an
operation of the demons in the administering of foreknowledge,
comprised, seemingly, under the head of certain arts exercised by
those who have enslaved themselves to the demons, by means of lots,
omens, or the observance of shadows. I doubt not that all these
things are done by the operation of the demons." Now, according to
Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20, 23), "whatever results from
fellowship between demons and men is superstitious." Therefore
divination is a species of superstition.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1; QQ. 92, 94), superstition
denotes undue divine worship. Now a thing pertains to the worship of
God in two ways: in one way, it is something offered to God; as a
sacrifice, an oblation, or something of the kind: in another way, it
is something divine that is assumed, as stated above with regard to
an oath (Q. 89, A. 4, ad 2). Wherefore superstition includes not only
idolatrous sacrifices offered to demons, but also recourse to the
help of the demons for the purpose of doing or knowing something. But
all divination results from the demons' operation, either because the
demons are expressly invoked that the future may be made known, or
because the demons thrust themselves into futile searchings of the
future, in order to entangle men's minds with vain conceits. Of this
kind of vanity it is written (Ps. 39:5): "Who hath not regard to
vanities and lying follies." Now it is vain to seek knowledge of the
future, when one tries to get it from a source whence it cannot be
foreknown. Therefore it is manifest that divination is a species of
superstition.

Reply Obj. 1: Divination is a kind of curiosity with regard to the
end in view, which is foreknowledge of the future; but it is a kind
of superstition as regards the mode of operation.

Reply Obj. 2: This kind of divination pertains to the worship of the
demons, inasmuch as one enters into a compact, tacit or express with
the demons.

Reply Obj. 3: In the New Law man's mind is restrained from solicitude
about temporal things: wherefore the New Law contains no institution
for the foreknowledge of future events in temporal matters. On the
other hand in the Old Law, which contained earthly promises, there
were consultations about the future in connection with religious
matters. Hence where it is written (Isa. 8:19): "And when they shall
say to you: Seek of pythons and of diviners, who mutter in their
enchantments," it is added by way of answer: "Should not the people
seek of their God, a vision for the living and the dead? [*Vulg.:
'seek of their God, for the living of the dead?']"

In the New Testament, however, there were some possessed of the spirit
of prophecy, who foretold many things about future events.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 3]

Whether We Ought to Distinguish Several Species of Divination?

Objection 1: It would seem that we should not distinguish several
species of divination. Where the formality of sin is the same, there
are not seemingly several species of sin. Now there is one formality
of sin in all divinations, since they consist in entering into
compact with the demons in order to know the future. Therefore there
are not several species of divination.

Obj. 2: Further, a human act takes its species from its end, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 6). But all divination is
directed to one end, namely, the foretelling of the future. Therefore
all divinations are of one species.

Obj. 3: Further, signs do not vary the species of a sin, for whether
one detracts by word, writing or gestures, it is the same species of
sin. Now divinations seem to differ merely according to the various
signs whence the foreknowledge of the future is derived. Therefore
there are not several species of divination.

_On the contrary,_ Isidore enumerates various species of divination
(Etym. viii, 9).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), all divinations seek to
acquire foreknowledge of future events, by means of some counsel and
help of a demon, who is either expressly called upon to give his
help, or else thrusts himself in secretly, in order to foretell
certain future things unknown to men, but known to him in such
manners as have been explained in the First Part (Q. 57, A. 3). When
demons are expressly invoked, they are wont to foretell the future in
many ways. Sometimes they offer themselves to human sight and hearing
by mock apparitions in order to foretell the future: and this species
is called "prestigiation" because man's eyes are blindfolded
(_praestringuntur_). Sometimes they make use of dreams, and this is
called "divination by dreams": sometimes they employ apparitions or
utterances of the dead, and this species is called "necromancy," for
as Isidore observes (Etym. viii) in Greek, "_nekron_ means dead, and
_manteia_ divination, because after certain incantations and the
sprinkling of blood, the dead seem to come to life, to divine and to
answer questions." Sometimes they foretell the future through living
men, as in the case of those who are possessed: this is divination by
"pythons," of whom Isidore says that "pythons are so called from
Pythius Apollo, who was said to be the inventor of divination."
Sometimes they foretell the future by means of shapes or signs which
appear in inanimate beings. If these signs appear in some earthly
body such as wood, iron or polished stone, it is called "geomancy,"
if in water "hydromancy," if in the air "aeromancy," if in fire
"pyromancy," if in the entrails of animals sacrificed on the altars
of demons, "aruspicy."

The divination which is practiced without express invocation of the
demons is of two kinds. The first is when, with a view to obtain
knowledge of the future, we take observations in the disposition of
certain things. If one endeavor to know the future by observing the
position and movements of the stars, this belongs to "astrologers,"
who are also called "genethliacs," because they take note of the days
on which people are born. If one observe the movements and cries of
birds or of any animals, or the sneezing of men, or the sudden
movements of limbs, this belongs in general to "augury," which is so
called from the chattering of birds (_avium garritu_), just as
"auspice" is derived from watching birds (_avium inspectione_). These
are chiefly wont to be observed in birds, the former by the ear, the
latter by the eye. If, however, these observations have for their
object men's words uttered unintentionally, which someone twist so as
to apply to the future that he wishes to foreknow, then it is called
an "omen": and as Valerius Maximus [*De Dict. Fact. Memor. i, 5]
remarks, "the observing of omens has a touch of religion mingled with
it, for it is believed to be founded not on a chance movement, but on
divine providence. It was thus that when the Romans were deliberating
whether they would change their position, a centurion happened to
exclaim at the time: 'Standard-bearer, fix the banner, we had best
stand here': and on hearing these words they took them as an omen,
and abandoned their intention of advancing further." If, however, the
observation regards the dispositions, that occur to the eye, of
figures in certain bodies, there will be another species of
divination: for the divination that is taken from observing the lines
of the hand is called "chiromancy," i.e. divination of the hand
(because _cheir_ is the Greek for hand): while the divination which
is taken from signs appearing in the shoulder-blades of an animal is
called "spatulamancy."

To this second species of divination, which is without express
invocation of the demons, belongs that which is practiced by
observing certain things done seriously by men in the research of the
occult, whether by drawing lots, which is called "geomancy"; or by
observing the shapes resulting from molten lead poured into water; or
by observing which of several sheets of paper, with or without
writing upon them, a person may happen to draw; or by holding out
several unequal sticks and noting who takes the greater or the
lesser, or by throwing dice, and observing who throws the highest
score; or by observing what catches the eye when one opens a book,
all of which are named "sortilege."

Accordingly it is clear that there are three kinds of divination. The
first is when the demons are invoked openly, this comes under the
head of "necromancy"; the second is merely an observation of the
disposition or movement of some other being, and this belongs to
"augury"; while the third consists in doing something in order to
discover the occult; and this belongs to "sortilege." Under each of
these many others are contained, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 1: In all the aforesaid there is the same general, but not
the same special, character of sin: for it is much more grievous to
invoke the demons than to do things that deserve the demons'
interference.

Reply Obj. 2: Knowledge of the future or of the occult is the
ultimate end whence divination takes its general formality. But the
various species are distinguished by their proper objects or matters,
according as the knowledge of the occult is sought in various things.

Reply Obj. 3: The things observed by diviners are considered by them,
not as signs expressing what they already know, as happens in
detraction, but as principles of knowledge. Now it is evident that
diversity of principles diversifies the species, even in
demonstrative sciences.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 4]

Whether Divination Practiced by Invoking the Demons Is Unlawful?

Objection 1: It would seem that divination practiced by invoking the
demons is not unlawful. Christ did nothing unlawful, according to 1
Pet. 2:22, "Who did no sin." Yet our Lord asked the demon: "What is
thy name?" and the latter replied: "My name is Legion, for we are
many" (Mk. 5:9). Therefore it seems lawful to question the demons
about the occult.

Obj. 2: Further, the souls of the saints do not encourage those who
ask unlawfully. Yet Samuel appeared to Saul when the latter inquired
of the woman that had a divining spirit, concerning the issue of the
coming war (1 Kings 28:8, sqq.). Therefore the divination that
consists in questioning demons is not unlawful.

Obj. 3: Further, it seems lawful to seek the truth from one who
knows, if it be useful to know it. But it is sometimes useful to know
what is hidden from us, and can be known through the demons, as in
the discovery of thefts. Therefore divination by questioning demons
is not unlawful.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 18:10, 11): "Neither let there
there be found among you . . . anyone that consulteth soothsayers . . .
nor . . . that consulteth pythonic spirits."

_I answer that,_ All divination by invoking demons is unlawful for
two reasons. The first is gathered from the principle of divination,
which is a compact made expressly with a demon by the very fact of
invoking him. This is altogether unlawful; wherefore it is written
against certain persons (Isa. 28:15): "You have said: We have entered
into a league with death, and we have made a covenant with hell." And
still more grievous would it be if sacrifice were offered or
reverence paid to the demon invoked. The second reason is gathered
from the result. For the demon who intends man's perdition endeavors,
by his answers, even though he sometimes tells the truth, to accustom
men to believe him, and so to lead him on to something prejudicial to
the salvation of mankind. Hence Athanasius, commenting on the words
of Luke 4:35, "He rebuked him, saying: Hold thy peace," says:
"Although the demon confessed the truth, Christ put a stop to his
speech, lest together with the truth he should publish his wickedness
and accustom us to care little for such things, however much he may
seem to speak the truth. For it is wicked, while we have the divine
Scriptures, to seek knowledge from the demons."

Reply Obj. 1: According to Bede's commentary on Luke 8:30, "Our Lord
inquired, not through ignorance, but in order that the disease, which
he tolerated, being made public, the power of the Healer might shine
forth more graciously." Now it is one thing to question a demon who
comes to us of his own accord (and it is lawful to do so at times for
the good of others, especially when he can be compelled, by the power
of God, to tell the truth) and another to invoke a demon in order to
gain from him knowledge of things hidden from us.

Reply Obj. 2: According to Augustine (Ad Simplic. ii, 3), "there is
nothing absurd in believing that the spirit of the just man, being
about to smite the king with the divine sentence, was permitted to
appear to him, not by the sway of magic art or power, but by some
occult dispensation of which neither the witch nor Saul was aware. Or
else the spirit of Samuel was not in reality aroused from his rest,
but some phantom or mock apparition formed by the machinations of the
devil, and styled by Scripture under the name of Samuel, just as the
images of things are wont to be called by the names of those things."

Reply Obj. 3: No temporal utility can compare with the harm to
spiritual health that results from the research of the unknown by
invoking the demon.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 5]

Whether Divination by the Stars Is Unlawful?

Objection 1: It would seem that divination by the stars is not
unlawful. It is lawful to foretell effects by observing their causes:
thus a physician foretells death from the disposition of the disease.
Now the heavenly bodies are the cause of what takes place in the
world, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore divination by
the stars is not unlawful.

Obj. 2: Further, human science originates from experiments, according
to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 1). Now it has been discovered through
many experiments that the observation of the stars is a means whereby
some future events may be known beforehand. Therefore it would seem
not unlawful to make use of this kind of divination.

Obj. 3: Further, divination is declared to be unlawful in so far as
it is based on a compact made with the demons. But divination by the
stars contains nothing of the kind, but merely an observation of
God's creatures. Therefore it would seem that this species of
divination is not unlawful.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. iv, 3): "Those
astrologers whom they call mathematicians, I consulted without
scruple; because they seemed to use no sacrifice, nor to pray to any
spirit for their divinations which art, however, Christian and true
piety rejects and condemns."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2), the operation of the
demon thrusts itself into those divinations which are based on false
and vain opinions, in order that man's mind may become entangled in
vanity and falsehood. Now one makes use of a vain and false opinion
if, by observing the stars, one desires to foreknow the future that
cannot be forecast by their means. Wherefore we must consider what
things can be foreknown by observing the stars: and it is evident
that those things which happen of necessity can be foreknown by this
means: even so astrologers forecast a future eclipse.

However, with regard to the foreknowledge of future events acquired
by observing the stars there have been various opinions. For some
have stated that the stars signify rather than cause the things
foretold by means of their observation. But this is an unreasonable
statement: since every corporeal sign is either the effect of that
for which it stands (thus smoke signifies fire whereby it is caused),
or it proceeds from the same cause, so that by signifying the cause,
in consequence it signifies the effect (thus a rainbow is sometimes a
sign of fair weather, in so far as its cause is the cause of fair
weather). Now it cannot be said that the dispositions and movements
of the heavenly bodies are the effect of future events; nor again can
they be ascribed to some common higher cause of a corporeal nature,
although they are referable to a common higher cause, which is divine
providence. On the contrary the appointment of the movements and
positions of the heavenly bodies by divine providence is on a
different principle from the appointment of the occurrence of future
contingencies, because the former are appointed on a principle of
necessity, so that they always occur in the same way, whereas the
latter are appointed on a principle of contingency, so that the
manner of their occurrence is variable. Consequently it is impossible
to acquire foreknowledge of the future from an observation of the
stars, except in so far as effects can be foreknown from their causes.

Now two kinds of effects escape the causality of heavenly bodies. In
the first place all effects that occur accidentally, whether in human
affairs or in the natural order, since, as it is proved in _Metaph._
vi [*Ed. Did. v, 3], an accidental being has no cause, least of all a
natural cause, such as is the power of a heavenly body, because what
occurs accidentally, neither is a _being_ properly speaking, nor is
_one_--for instance, that an earthquake occur when a stone falls, or
that a treasure be discovered when a man digs a grave--for these and
like occurrences are not one thing, but are simply several things.
Whereas the operation of nature has always some one thing for its
term, just as it proceeds from some one principle, which is the form
of a natural thing.

In the second place, acts of the free-will, which is the faculty of
will and reason, escape the causality of heavenly bodies. For the
intellect or reason is not a body, nor the act of a bodily organ, and
consequently neither is the will, since it is in the reason, as the
Philosopher shows (De Anima iii, 4, 9). Now no body can make an
impression on an incorporeal body. Wherefore it is impossible for
heavenly bodies to make a direct impression on the intellect and
will: for this would be to deny the difference between intellect and
sense, with which position Aristotle reproaches (De Anima iii, 3)
those who held that "such is the will of man, as is the day which the
father of men and of gods," i.e. the sun or the heavens, "brings on"
[*Odyssey xviii, 135].

Hence the heavenly bodies cannot be the direct cause of the
free-will's operations. Nevertheless they can be a dispositive cause
of an inclination to those operations, in so far as they make an
impression on the human body, and consequently on the sensitive
powers which are acts of bodily organs having an inclination for
human acts. Since, however, the sensitive powers obey reason, as the
Philosopher shows (De Anima iii, 11; _Ethic._ i, 13), this does not
impose any necessity on the free-will, and man is able, by his
reason, to act counter to the inclination of the heavenly bodies.

Accordingly if anyone take observation of the stars in order to
foreknow casual or fortuitous future events, or to know with
certitude future human actions, his conduct is based on a false and
vain opinion; and so the operation of the demon introduces itself
therein, wherefore it will be a superstitious and unlawful
divination. On the other hand if one were to apply the observation of
the stars in order to foreknow those future things that are caused by
heavenly bodies, for instance, drought or rain and so forth, it will
be neither an unlawful nor a superstitious divination.

Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident.

Reply Obj. 2: That astrologers not unfrequently forecast the truth by
observing the stars may be explained in two ways. First, because a
great number of men follow their bodily passions, so that their
actions are for the most part disposed in accordance with the
inclination of the heavenly bodies: while there are few, namely, the
wise alone, who moderate these inclinations by their reason. The
result is that astrologers in many cases foretell the truth,
especially in public occurrences which depend on the multitude.
Secondly, because of the interference of the demons. Hence Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 17): "When astrologers tell the truth, it must
be allowed that this is due to an instinct that, unknown to man, lies
hidden in his mind. And since this happens through the action of
unclean and lying spirits who desire to deceive man for they are
permitted to know certain things about temporal affairs." Wherefore
he concludes: "Thus a good Christian should beware of astrologers,
and of all impious diviners, especially of those who tell the truth,
lest his soul become the dupe of the demons and by making a compact of of
partnership with them enmesh itself in their fellowship."

This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 6]

Whether Divination by Dreams Is Unlawful?

Objection 1: It would seem that divination by dreams is not unlawful.
It is not unlawful to make use of divine instruction. Now men are
instructed by God in dreams, for it is written (Job 33:15, 16): "By a
dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, and
they are sleeping in their beds, then He," God to wit, "openeth the
ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to
learn." Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of divination by
dreams.

Obj. 2: Further, those who interpret dreams, properly speaking, make
use of divination by dreams. Now we read of holy men interpreting
dreams: thus Joseph interpreted the dreams of Pharaoh's butler and of
his chief baker (Gen. 40), and Daniel interpreted the dream of the
king of Babylon (Dan. 2, 4). Therefore divination by dreams is not
unlawful.

Obj. 3: Further, it is unreasonable to deny the common experiences of
men. Now it is the experience of all that dreams are significative of
the future. Therefore it is useless to deny the efficacy of dreams
for the purpose of divination, and it is lawful to listen to them.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 18:10): "Neither let there be
found among you any one that . . . observeth dreams."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 2, 6), divination is
superstitious and unlawful when it is based on a false opinion.
Wherefore we must consider what is true in the matter of foreknowing
the future from dreams. Now dreams are sometimes the cause of future
occurrences; for instance, when a person's mind becomes anxious
through what it has seen in a dream and is thereby led to do
something or avoid something: while sometimes dreams are signs of
future happenings, in so far as they are referable to some common
cause of both dreams and future occurrences, and in this way the
future is frequently known from dreams. We must, then, consider what
is the cause of dreams, and whether it can be the cause of future
occurrences, or be cognizant of them.

Accordingly it is to be observed that the cause of dreams is
sometimes in us and sometimes outside us. The inward cause of dreams
is twofold: one regards the soul, in so far as those things which
have occupied a man's thoughts and affections while awake recur to
his imagination while asleep. A such like cause of dreams is not a
cause of future occurrences, so that dreams of this kind are related
accidentally to future occurrences, and if at any time they concur it
will be by chance. But sometimes the inward cause of dreams regards
the body: because the inward disposition of the body leads to the
formation of a movement in the imagination consistent with that
disposition; thus a man in whom there is abundance of cold humors
dreams that he is in the water or snow: and for this reason
physicians say that we should take note of dreams in order to
discover internal dispositions.

In like manner the outward cause of dreams is twofold, corporal and
spiritual. It is corporal in so far as the sleeper's imagination is
affected either by the surrounding air, or through an impression of a
heavenly body, so that certain images appear to the sleeper, in
keeping with the disposition of the heavenly bodies. The spiritual
cause is sometimes referable to God, Who reveals certain things to
men in their dreams by the ministry of the angels, according Num.
12:6, "If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to
him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream." Sometimes,
however, it is due to the action of the demons that certain images
appear to persons in their sleep, and by this means they, at times,
reveal certain future things to those who have entered into an
unlawful compact with them.

Accordingly we must say that there is no unlawful divination in
making use of dreams for the foreknowledge of the future, so long as
those dreams are due to divine revelation, or to some natural cause
inward or outward, and so far as the efficacy of that cause extends.
But it will be an unlawful and superstitious divination if it be
caused by a revelation of the demons, with whom a compact has been
made, whether explicit, through their being invoked for the purpose,
or implicit, through the divination extending beyond its possible
limits.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 7]

Whether Divination by Auguries, Omens, and by Like Observations of
External Things Is Unlawful?

Objection 1: It would seem that divination by auguries, omens, and by
like observations of external things is not unlawful. If it were
unlawful holy men would not make use thereof. Now we read of Joseph
that he paid attention to auguries, for it is related (Gen. 44:5)
that Joseph's steward said: "The cup which you have stolen is that in
which my lord drinketh and in which he is wont to divine
(_augurari_)": and he himself afterwards said to his brethren (Gen.
44:15): "Know you not that there is no one like me in the science of
divining?" Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of this kind of
divination.

Obj. 2: Further, birds naturally know certain things regarding future
occurrences of the seasons, according to Jer. 8:7, "The kite in the
air hath known her time; the turtle, the swallow, and the stork have
observed the time of their coming." Now natural knowledge is
infallible and comes from God. Therefore it seems not unlawful to
make use of the birds' knowledge in order to know the future, and
this is divination by augury.

Obj. 3: Further, Gedeon is numbered among the saints (Heb. 11:32).
Yet Gedeon made use of an omen, when he listened to the relation and
interpreting of a dream (Judges 7:15): and Eliezer, Abraham's
servant, acted in like manner (Gen. 24). Therefore it seems that this
kind of divination is not unlawful.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 18:10): "Neither let there be
found among you anyone . . . that observeth omens."

_I answer that,_ The movements or cries of birds, and whatever
dispositions one may consider in such things, are manifestly not the
cause of future events: wherefore the future cannot be known
therefrom as from its cause. It follows therefore that if anything
future can be known from them, it will be because the causes from
which they proceed are also the causes of future occurrences or are
cognizant of them. Now the cause of dumb animals' actions is a
certain instinct whereby they are inclined by a natural movement, for
they are not masters of their actions. This instinct may proceed from
a twofold cause. In the first place it may be due to a bodily cause.
For since dumb animals have naught but a sensitive soul, every power
of which is the act of a bodily organ, their soul is subject to the
disposition of surrounding bodies, and primarily to that of the
heavenly bodies. Hence nothing prevents some of their actions from
being signs of the future, in so far as they are conformed to the
dispositions of the heavenly bodies and of the surrounding air, to
which certain future events are due. Yet in this matter we must
observe two things: first, that such observations must not be applied
to the foreknowledge of future things other than those which can be
foreknown from the movements of heavenly bodies, as stated above (AA.
5, 6): secondly, that they be not applied to other matters than those
which in some way may have reference to these animals (since they
acquire through the heavenly bodies a certain natural knowledge and
instinct about things necessary for their life--such as changes
resulting from rain and wind and so forth).

In the second place, this instinct is produced by a spiritual cause,
namely, either by God, as may be seen in the dove that descended upon
Christ, the raven that fed Elias, and the whale that swallowed and
vomited Jonas, or by demons, who make use of these actions of dumb
animals in order to entangle our minds with vain opinions. This seems
to be true of all such like things; except omens, because human words
which are taken for an omen are not subject to the disposition of the
stars, yet are they ordered according to divine providence and
sometimes according to the action of the demons.

Accordingly we must say that all such like divinations are
superstitious and unlawful, if they be extended beyond the limits set
according to the order of nature or of divine providence.

Reply Obj. 1: According to Augustine [*QQ. in Genes., qu. cxlv], when
Joseph said that there was no one like him in the science of
divining, he spoke in joke and not seriously, referring perhaps to
the common opinion about him: in this sense also spoke his steward.

Reply Obj. 2: The passage quoted refers to the knowledge that birds
have about things concerning them; and in order to know these things
it is not unlawful to observe their cries and movements: thus from
the frequent cawing of crows one might say that it will rain soon.

Reply Obj. 3: Gedeon listened to the recital and interpretation of a
dream, seeing therein an omen, ordered by divine providence for his
instruction. In like manner Eliezer listened to the damsel's words,
having previously prayed to God.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 95, Art. 8]

Whether Divination by Drawing Lots Is Unlawful?

Objection 1: It would seem that divination by drawing lots is not
unlawful, because a gloss of Augustine on Ps. 30:16, "My lots are in
Thy hands," says: "It is not wrong to cast lots, for it is a means of
ascertaining the divine will when a man is in doubt."

Obj. 2: There is, seemingly, nothing unlawful in the observances
which the Scriptures relate as being practiced by holy men. Now both
in the Old and in the New Testament we find holy men practicing the
casting of lots. For it is related (Jos. 7:14, sqq.) that Josue, at
the Lord's command, pronounced sentence by lot on Achan who had
stolen of the anathema. Again Saul, by drawing lots, found that his
son Jonathan had eaten honey (1 Kings 14:58, sqq.): Jonas, when
fleeing from the face of the Lord, was discovered and thrown into the
sea (Jonah 1:7, sqq.): Zacharias was chosen by lot to offer incense
(Luke 1:9): and the apostles by drawing lots elected Matthias to the
apostleship (Acts 1:26). Therefore it would seem that divination by
lots is not unlawful.

Obj. 3: Further, fighting with the fists, or "monomachy," i.e. single
combat as it is called, and trial by fire and water, which are called
"popular" trials, seem to come under the head of sortilege, because
something unknown is sought by their means. Yet these practices seem
to be lawful, because David is related to have engaged in single
combat with the Philistine (1 Kings 17:32, sqq.). Therefore it would
seem that divination by lot is not unlawful.

_On the contrary,_ It is written in the Decretals (XXVI, qu. v, can.
Sortes): "We decree that the casting of lots, by which means you make
up your mind in all your undertakings, and which the Fathers have
condemned, is nothing but divination and witchcraft. For which reason
we wish them to be condemned altogether, and henceforth not to be
mentioned among Christians, and we forbid the practice thereof under
pain of anathema."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), sortilege consists, properly
speaking, in doing something, that by observing the result one may
come to the knowledge of something unknown. If by casting lots one
seeks to know what is to be given to whom, whether it be a
possession, an honor, a dignity, a punishment, or some action or
other, it is called "sortilege of allotment"; if one seeks to know
what ought to be done, it is called "sortilege of consultation"; if
one seeks to know what is going to happen, it is called "sortilege of
divination." Now the actions of man that are required for sortilege
and their results are not subject to the dispositions of the stars.
Wherefore if anyone practicing sortilege is so minded as though the
human acts requisite for sortilege depended for their result on the
dispositions of the stars, his opinion is vain and false, and
consequently is not free from the interference of the demons, so that
a divination of this kind is superstitious and unlawful.

Apart from this cause, however, the result of sortilegious acts must
needs be ascribed to chance, or to some directing spiritual cause. If
we ascribe it to chance, and this can only take place in "sortilege
of allotment," it does not seem to imply any vice other than vanity,
as in the case of persons who, being unable to agree upon the
division of something or other, are willing to draw lots for its
division, thus leaving to chance what portion each is to receive.

If, on the other hand, the decision by lot be left to a spiritual
cause, it is sometimes ascribed to demons. Thus we read (Ezech.
21:21) that "the king of Babylon stood in the highway, at the head of
two ways, seeking divination, shuffling arrows; he inquired of the
idols, and consulted entrails": sortilege of this kind is unlawful,
and forbidden by the canons.

Sometimes, however, the decision is left to God, according to Prov.
16:33, "Lots are cast into the lap, but they are disposed of by the
Lord": sortilege of this kind is not wrong in itself, as Augustine
declares [*Enarr. ii in Ps. xxx, serm. 2; cf. Obj.[1]].

Yet this may happen to be sinful in four ways. First, if one have
recourse to lots without any necessity: for this would seem to amount
to tempting God. Hence Ambrose, commenting on the words of Luke 1:8,
says: "He that is chosen by lot is not bound by the judgment of men."
Secondly, if even in a case of necessity one were to have recourse to
lots without reverence. Hence, on the Acts of the Apostles, Bede says
(Super Act. Apost. i): "But if anyone, compelled by necessity, thinks
that he ought, after the apostles' example, to consult God by casting
lots, let him take note that the apostles themselves did not do so,
except after calling together the assembly of the brethren and
pouring forth prayer to God." Thirdly, if the Divine oracles be
misapplied to earthly business. Hence Augustine says (ad inquisit.
Januar. ii; Ep. lv): "Those who tell fortunes from the Gospel pages,
though it is to be hoped that they do so rather than have recourse to
consulting the demons, yet does this custom also displease me, that
anyone should wish to apply the Divine oracles to worldly matters and
to the vain things of this life." Fourthly, if anyone resort to the
drawing of lots in ecclesiastical elections, which should be carried
out by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore, as Bede says
(Super Act. Apost. i): "Before Pentecost the ordination of Matthias
was decided by lot," because as yet the fulness of the Holy Ghost was
not yet poured forth into the Church: "whereas the same deacons were
ordained not by lot but by the choice of the disciples." It is
different with earthly honors, which are directed to the disposal of
earthly things: in elections of this kind men frequently have
recourse to lots, even as in the distribution of earthly possessions.

If, however, there be urgent necessity it is lawful to seek the
divine judgment by casting lots, provided due reverence be observed.
Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Honor. ccxxviii), "If, at a time of
persecution, the ministers of God do not agree as to which of them is
to remain at his post lest all should flee, and which of them is to
flee, lest all die and the Church be forsaken, should there be no
other means of coming to an agreement, so far as I can see, they must
be chosen by lot." Again he says (De Doctr. Christ. xxviii): "If thou
aboundest in that which it behooves thee to give to him who hath not,
and which cannot be given to two; should two come to you, neither of
whom surpasses the other either in need or in some claim on thee,
thou couldst not act more justly than in choosing by lot to whom thou
shalt give that which thou canst not give to both."

This suffices for the Reply to the First and Second Objections.

Reply Obj. 3: The trial by hot iron or boiling water is directed to
the investigation of someone's hidden sin, by means of something done
by a man, and in this it agrees with the drawing of lots. But in so
far as a miraculous result is expected from God, it surpasses the
common generality of sortilege. Hence this kind of trial is rendered
unlawful, both because it is directed to the judgment of the occult,
which is reserved to the divine judgment, and because such like
trials are not sanctioned by divine authority. Hence we read in a
decree of Pope Stephen V [*II, qu. v., can. Consuluist i]: "The
sacred canons do not approve of extorting a confession from anyone by
means of the trial by hot iron or boiling water, and no one must
presume, by a superstitious innovation, to practice what is not
sanctioned by the teaching of the holy fathers. For it is allowable
that public crimes should be judged by our authority, after the
culprit has made spontaneous confession, or when witnesses have been
approved, with due regard to the fear of God; but hidden and unknown
crimes must be left to Him Who alone knows the hearts of the children
of men." The same would seem to apply to the law concerning duels,
save that it approaches nearer to the common kind of sortilege, since
no miraculous effect is expected thereupon, unless the combatants be
very unequal in strength or skill.
_______________________

QUESTION 96

OF SUPERSTITION IN OBSERVANCES
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider superstition in observances, under which head
there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Of observances for acquiring knowledge, which are prescribed by
the magic art;

(2) Of observances for causing alterations in certain bodies;

(3) Of observances practiced in fortune-telling;

(4) Of wearing sacred words at the neck.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 96, Art. 1]

Whether It Be Unlawful to Practice the Observances of the Magic Art?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to practice the
observances of the magic art. A thing is said to be unlawful in two
ways. First, by reason of the genus of the deed, as murder and theft:
secondly, through being directed to an evil end, as when a person
gives an alms for the sake of vainglory. Now the observances of the
magic art are not evil as to the genus of the deed, for they consist
in certain fasts and prayers to God; moreover, they are directed to a
good end, namely, the acquisition of science. Therefore it is not
unlawful to practice these observances.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Dan. 1:17) that "to the children" who
abstained, "God gave knowledge, and understanding in every book, and
wisdom." Now the observances of the magic art consist in certain
fasts and abstinences. Therefore it seems that this art achieves its
results through God: and consequently it is not unlawful to practice
it.

Obj. 3: Further, seemingly, as stated above (A. 1), the reason why it
is wrong to inquire of the demons concerning the future is because
they have no knowledge of it, this knowledge being proper to God. Yet
the demons know scientific truths: because sciences are about things
necessary and invariable, and such things are subject to human
knowledge, and much more to the knowledge of demons, who are of
keener intellect, as Augustine says [*Gen. ad lit. ii, 17; De Divin.
Daemon. 3, 4]. Therefore it seems to be no sin to practice the magic
art, even though it achieve its result through the demons.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 18:10, 11): "Neither let
there be found among you . . . anyone . . . that seeketh the truth
from the dead": which search relies on the demons' help. Now through
the observances of the magic art, knowledge of the truth is sought
"by means of certain signs agreed upon by compact with the demons"
[*Augustine, De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20; see above Q. 92, A. 2].
Therefore it is unlawful to practice the notary art.

_I answer that,_ The magic art is both unlawful and futile. It is
unlawful, because the means it employs for acquiring knowledge have
not in themselves the power to cause science, consisting as they do
in gazing certain shapes, and muttering certain strange words, and so
forth. Wherefore this art does not make use of these things as
causes, but as signs; not however as signs instituted by God, as are
the sacramental signs. It follows, therefore, that they are empty
signs, and consequently a kind of "agreement or covenant made with
the demons for the purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens"
[*Ibid.]. Wherefore the magic art is to be absolutely repudiated and
avoided by Christians, even as other arts of vain and noxious
superstition, as Augustine declares (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23). This
art is also useless for the acquisition of science. For since it is
not intended by means of this art to acquire science in a manner
connatural to man, namely, by discovery and instruction, the
consequence is that this effect is expected either from God or from
the demons. Now it is certain that some have received wisdom and
science infused into them by God, as related of Solomon (3 Kings 3
and 2 Paralip. 1). Moreover, our Lord said to His disciples (Luke
21:15): "I will give you a mouth and wisdom, which all your
adversaries shall not be able to resist and gainsay." However, this
gift is not granted to all, or in connection with any particular
observance, but according to the will of the Holy Ghost, as stated in
1 Cor. 12:8, "To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of
wisdom, to another the word of knowledge, according to the same
Spirit," and afterwards it is said (1 Cor. 12:11): "All these things
one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to everyone according as He
will." On the other hand it does not belong to the demons to
enlighten the intellect, as stated in the First Part (Q. 109, A. 3).
Now the acquisition of knowledge and wisdom is effected by the
enlightening of the intellect, wherefore never did anyone acquire
knowledge by means of the demons. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
x, 9): "Porphyry confesses that the intellectual soul is in no way
cleansed by theurgic inventions," i.e. the operations "of the demons,
so as to be fitted to see its God, and discern what is true," such as
are all scientific conclusions. The demons may, however, be able by
speaking to men to express in words certain teachings of the
sciences, but this is not what is sought by means of magic.

Reply Obj. 1: It is a good thing to acquire knowledge, but it
is not good to acquire it by undue means, and it is to this end that
the magic art tends.

Reply Obj. 2: The abstinence of these children was not in
accordance with a vain observance of the notary art, but according to
the authority of the divine law, for they refused to be defiled by the
meat of Gentiles. Hence as a reward for their obedience they received
knowledge from God, according to Ps. 118:100, "I have had
understanding above the ancients, because I have sought Thy
commandments."

Reply Obj. 3: To seek knowledge of the future from the demons
is a sin not only because they are ignorant of the future, but also on
account of the fellowship entered into with them, which also applies
to the case in point.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 96, Art. 2]

Whether Observances Directed to the Alteration of Bodies, As for the
Purpose of Acquiring Health or the Like, Are Unlawful?

Objection 1: It would seem that observances directed to the
alteration of bodies, as for the purpose of acquiring health, or the
like, are lawful. It is lawful to make use of the natural forces of
bodies in order to produce their proper effects. Now in the physical
order things have certain occult forces, the reason of which man is
unable to assign; for instance that the magnet attracts iron, and
many like instances, all of which Augustine enumerates (De Civ. Dei
xxi, 5, 7). Therefore it would seem lawful to employ such like forces
for the alteration of bodies.

Obj. 2: Further, artificial bodies are subject to the heavenly
bodies, just as natural bodies are. Now natural bodies acquire
certain occult forces resulting from their species through the
influence of the heavenly bodies. Therefore artificial bodies, e.g.
images, also acquire from the heavenly bodies a certain occult force
for the production of certain effects. Therefore it is not unlawful
to make use of them and of such like things.

Obj. 3: Further, the demons too are able to alter bodies in many
ways, as Augustine states (De Trin. iii, 8, 9). But their power is
from God. Therefore it is lawful to make use of their power for the
purpose of producing these alterations.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20) that "to
superstition belong the experiments of magic arts, amulets and
nostrums condemned by the medical faculty, consisting either of
incantations or of certain cyphers which they call characters, or of
any kind of thing worn or fastened on."

_I answer that,_ In things done for the purpose of producing some
bodily effect we must consider whether they seem able to produce that
effect naturally: for if so it will not be unlawful to do so, since
it is lawful to employ natural causes in order to produce their
proper effects. But, if they seem unable to produce those effects
naturally, it follows that they are employed for the purpose of
producing those effects, not as causes but only as signs, so that
they come under the head of "compact by tokens entered into with the
demons" [*Augustine, De Doctr. Christ.; see above Q. 92, A. 2].
Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6): "The demons are
allured by means of creatures, which were made, not by them, but by
God. They are enticed by various objects differing according to the
various things in which they delight, not as animals by meat, but as
spirits by signs, such as are to each one's liking, by means of
various kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals, songs and rites."

Reply Obj. 1: There is nothing superstitious or unlawful in employing
natural things simply for the purpose of causing certain effects such
as they are thought to have the natural power of producing. But if in
addition there be employed certain characters, words, or any other
vain observances which clearly have no efficacy by nature, it will be
superstitious and unlawful.

Reply Obj. 2: The natural forces of natural bodies result from their
substantial forms which they acquire through the influence of
heavenly bodies; wherefore through this same influence they acquire
certain active forces. On the other hand the forms of artificial
bodies result from the conception of the craftsman; and since they
are nothing else but composition, order and shape, as stated in
_Phys._ i, 5, they cannot have a natural active force. Consequently,
no force accrues to them from the influence of heavenly bodies, in so
far as they are artificial, but only in respect of their natural
matter. Hence it is false, what Porphyry held, according to Augustine
(De Civ. Dei x, 11), that "by herbs, stones, animals, certain
particular sounds, words, shapes and devices, or again by certain
movements of the stars observed in the course of the heavens it is
possible for men to fashion on earth forces capable of carrying into
effect the various dispositions of the stars," as though the results
of the magic arts were to be ascribed to the power of the heavenly
bodies. In fact as Augustine adds (De Civ. Dei x, 11), "all these
things are to be ascribed to the demons, who delude the souls that
are subject to them."

Wherefore those images called astronomical also derive their efficacy
from the actions of the demons: a sign of this is that it is
requisite to inscribe certain characters on them which do not conduce
to any effect naturally, since shape is not a principle of natural
action. Yet astronomical images differ from necromantic images in
this, that the latter include certain explicit invocations and
trickery, wherefore they come under the head of explicit agreements
made with the demons: whereas in the other images there are tacit
agreements by means of tokens in certain shapes or characters.

Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to the domain of the divine majesty, to Whom
the demons are subject, that God should employ them to whatever
purpose He will. But man has not been entrusted with power over the
demons, to employ them to whatsoever purpose he will; on the
contrary, it is appointed that he should wage war against the demons.
Hence in no way is it lawful for man to make use of the demons' help
by compacts either tacit or express.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 96, Art. 3]

Whether Observances Directed to the Purpose of Fortune-telling Are
Unlawful?

Objection 1: It would seem that observances directed to the purpose
of fortune-telling are not unlawful. Sickness is one of the
misfortunes that occur to man. Now sickness in man is preceded by
certain symptoms, which the physician observes. Therefore it seems
not unlawful to observe such like signs.

Obj. 2: Further, it is unreasonable to deny that which nearly
everybody experiences. Now nearly everyone experiences that certain
times, or places, hearing of certain words meetings of men or
animals, uncanny or ungainly actions, are presages of good or evil to
come. Therefore it seems not unlawful to observe these things.

Obj. 3: Further, human actions and occurrences are disposed by divine
providence in a certain order: and this order seems to require that
precedent events should be signs of subsequent occurrences:
wherefore, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 10:6), the things that
happened to the fathers of old are signs of those that take place in
our time. Now it is not unlawful to observe the order that proceeds
from divine providence. Therefore it is seemingly not unlawful to
observe these presages.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20) that "a
thousand vain observances are comprised under the head of compacts
entered into with the demons: for instance, the twitching of a limb;
a stone, a dog, or a boy coming between friends walking together;
kicking the door-post when anyone passes in front of one's house; to
go back to bed if you happen to sneeze while putting on your shoes;
to return home if you trip when going forth; when the rats have
gnawed a hole in your clothes, to fear superstitiously a future evil
rather than to regret the actual damage."

_I answer that,_ Men attend to all these observances, not as causes
but as signs of future events, good or evil. Nor do they observe them
as signs given by God, since these signs are brought forward, not on
divine authority, but rather by human vanity with the cooperation of
the malice of the demons, who strive to entangle men's minds with
such like trifles. Accordingly it is evident that all these
observances are superstitious and unlawful: they are apparently
remains of idolatry, which authorized the observance of auguries, of
lucky and unlucky days which is allied to divination by the stars, in
respect of which one day is differentiated from another: except that
these observances are devoid of reason and art, wherefore they are
yet more vain and superstitious.

Reply Obj. 1: The causes of sickness are seated in us, and they
produce certain signs of sickness to come, which physicians lawfully
observe. Wherefore it is not unlawful to consider a presage of future
events as proceeding from its cause; as when a slave fears a flogging
when he sees his master's anger. Possibly the same might be said if
one were to fear for child lest it take harm from the evil eye, of
which we have spoken in the First Part (Q. 117, A. 3, ad 2). But this
does not apply to this kind of observances.

Reply Obj. 2: That men have at first experienced a certain degree of
truth in these observances is due to chance. But afterwards when a
man begins to entangle his mind with observances of this kind, many
things occur in connection with them through the trickery of the
demons, "so that men, through being entangled in these observances,
become yet more curious, and more and more embroiled in the manifold
snares of a pernicious error," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ.
ii, 23).

Reply Obj. 3: Among the Jewish people of whom Christ was to be born,
not only words but also deeds were prophetic, as Augustine states
(Contra Faust. iv, 2; xxii, 24). Wherefore it is lawful to apply
those deeds to our instruction, as signs given by God. Not all
things, however, that occur through divine providence are ordered so
as to be signs of the future. Hence the argument does not prove.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 96, Art. 4]

Whether It Is Unlawful to Wear Divine Words at the Neck?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to wear divine
words at the neck. Divine words are no less efficacious when written
than when uttered. But it is lawful to utter sacred words for the
purpose of producing certain effects; (for instance, in order to heal
the sick), such as the "Our Father" or the "Hail Mary," or in any way
whatever to call on the Lord's name, according to Mk. 16:17, 18, "In
My name they shall cast out devils, they shall speak with new
tongues, they shall take up serpents." Therefore it seems to be
lawful to wear sacred words at one's neck, as a remedy for sickness
or for any kind of distress.

Obj. 2: Further, sacred words are no less efficacious on the human
body than on the bodies of serpents and other animals. Now certain
incantations are efficacious in checking serpents, or in healing
certain other animals: wherefore it is written (Ps. 57:5): "Their
madness is according to the likeness of a serpent, like the deaf asp
that stoppeth her ears, which will not hear the voice of the
charmers, nor of the wizard that charmeth wisely." Therefore it is
lawful to wear sacred words as a remedy for men.

Obj. 3: Further, God's word is no less holy than the relics of the
saints; wherefore Augustine says (Lib. L. Hom. xxvi) that "God's word
is of no less account than the Body of Christ." Now it is lawful for
one to wear the relics of the saints at one's neck, or to carry them
about one in any way for the purpose of self-protection. Therefore it
is equally lawful to have recourse to the words of Holy Writ, whether
uttered or written, for one's protection.

Obj. 4: On the other hand, Chrysostom says (Hom. xliii in Matth.)
[*Cf. the Opus Imperfectum in Matthaeum, among St. Chrysostom's
works, and falsely ascribed to him]: "Some wear round their necks a
passage in writing from the Gospel. Yet is not the Gospel read in
church and heard by all every day? How then, if it does a man no good
to have the Gospels in his ears, will he find salvation by wearing
them round his neck? Moreover, where is the power of the Gospel? In
the shapes of the letters or in the understanding of the sense? If in
the shapes, you do well to wear them round your neck; if in the
understanding, you will then do better to bear them in your heart
than to wear them round your neck."

_I answer that,_ In every incantation or wearing of written words,
two points seem to demand caution. The first is the thing said or
written, because if it is connected with invocation of the demons it
is clearly superstitious and unlawful. In like manner it seems that
one should beware lest it contain strange words, for fear that they
conceal something unlawful. Hence Chrysostom says [*Cf. the Opus
Imperfectum in Matthaeum, among St. Chrysostom's works, falsely
ascribed to him] that "many now after the example of the Pharisees
who enlarged their fringes, invent and write Hebrew names of angels,
and fasten them to their persons. Such things seem fearsome to those
who do not understand them." Again, one should take care lest it
contain anything false, because in that case also the effect could
not be ascribed to God, Who does not bear witness to a falsehood.

In the second place, one should beware lest besides the sacred words
it contain something vain, for instance certain written characters,
except the sign of the Cross; or if hope be placed in the manner of
writing or fastening, or in any like vanity, having no connection
with reverence for God, because this would be pronounced
superstitious: otherwise, however, it is lawful. Hence it is written
in the Decretals (XXVI, qu. v, cap. Non liceat Christianis): "In
blending together medicinal herbs, it is not lawful to make use of
observances or incantations, other than the divine symbol, or the
Lord's Prayer, so as to give honor to none but God the Creator of
all."

Reply Obj. 1: It is indeed lawful to pronounce divine words, or to
invoke the divine name, if one do so with a mind to honor God alone,
from Whom the result is expected: but it is unlawful if it be done in
connection with any vain observance.

Reply Obj. 2: Even in the case of incantations of serpents or any
animals whatever, if the mind attend exclusively to the sacred words
and to the divine power, it will not be unlawful. Such like
incantations, however, often include unlawful observances, and rely
on the demons for their result, especially in the case of serpents,
because the serpent was the first instrument employed by the devil in
order to deceive man. Hence a gloss on the passage quoted says: "Note
that Scripture does not commend everything whence it draws its
comparisons, as in the case of the unjust judge who scarcely heard
the widow's request."

Reply Obj. 3: The same applies to the wearing of relics, for if they
be worn out of confidence in God, and in the saints whose relics they
are, it will not be unlawful. But if account were taken in this
matter of some vain circumstance (for instance that the casket be
three-cornered, or the like, having no bearing on the reverence due
to God and the saints), it would be superstitious and unlawful.

Reply Obj. 4: Chrysostom is speaking of the case in which more
attention is paid the written characters than to the understanding of
the words.
_______________________

QUESTION 97

OF THE TEMPTATION OF GOD
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the vices that are opposed to religion, through
lack of religion, and which are manifestly contrary thereto, so that
they come under the head of irreligion. Such are the vices which
pertain to contempt or irreverence for God and holy things.
Accordingly we shall consider: (1) Vices pertaining directly to
irreverence for God; (2) Vices pertaining to irreverence for holy
things. With regard to the first we shall consider the temptation
whereby God is tempted, and perjury, whereby God's name is taken with
irreverence. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) In what the temptation of God consists;

(2) Whether it is a sin?

(3) To what virtue it is opposed;

(4) Of its comparison with other vices.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 97, Art. 1]

Whether the Temptation of God Consists in Certain Deeds, Wherein the
Expected Result Is Ascribed to the Power of God Alone?

Objection 1: It would seem that the temptation of God does not
consist in certain deeds wherein the result is expected from the
power of God alone. Just as God is tempted by man so is man tempted
by God, man, and demons. But when man is tempted the result is not
always expected from his power. Therefore neither is God tempted when
the result is expected from His power alone.

Obj. 2: Further, all those who work miracles by invoking the divine
name look for an effect due to God's power alone. Therefore, if the
temptation of God consisted in such like deeds, all who work miracles
would tempt God.

Obj. 3: Further, it seems to belong to man's perfection that he
should put aside human aids and put his hope in God alone. Hence
Ambrose, commenting on Luke 9:3, "Take nothing for your journey,"
etc. says: "The Gospel precept points out what is required of him
that announces the kingdom of God, namely, that he should not depend
on worldly assistance, and that, taking assurance from his faith, he
should hold himself to be the more able to provide for himself, the
less he seeks these things." And the Blessed Agatha said: "I have
never treated my body with bodily medicine, I have my Lord Jesus
Christ, Who restores all things by His mere word." [*Office of St.
Agatha, eighth Responsory (Dominican Breviary).] But the temptation
of God does not consist in anything pertaining to perfection.
Therefore the temptation of God does not consist in such like deeds,
wherein the help of God alone is expected.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 36): "Christ
who gave proof of God's power by teaching and reproving openly, yet
not allowing the rage of His enemies to prevail against Him,
nevertheless by fleeing and hiding, instructed human weakness, lest
it should dare to tempt God when it has to strive to escape from that
which it needs to avoid." From this it would seem that the temptation
of God consists in omitting to do what one can in order to escape
from danger, and relying on the assistance of God alone.

_I answer that,_ Properly speaking, to tempt is to test the person
tempted. Now we put a person to the test by words or by deeds. By
words, that we may find out whether he knows what we ask, or whether
he can and will grant it: by deeds, when, by what we do, we probe
another's prudence, will or power. Either of these may happen in two
ways. First, openly, as when one declares oneself a tempter: thus
Samson (Judges 14:12) proposed a riddle to the Philistines in order
to tempt them. In the second place it may be done with cunning and by
stealth, as the Pharisees tempted Christ, as we read in Matt. 22:15,
sqq. Again this is sometimes done explicitly, as when anyone intends,
by word or deed, to put some person to the test; and sometimes
implicitly, when, to wit, though he does not intend to test a person,
yet that which he does or says can seemingly have no other purpose
than putting him to a test.

Accordingly, man tempts God sometimes by words, sometimes by deeds.
Now we speak with God in words when we pray. Hence a man tempts God
explicitly in his prayers when he asks something of God with the
intention of probing God's knowledge, power or will. He tempts God
explicitly by deeds when he intends, by whatever he does, to
experiment on God's power, good will or wisdom. But He will tempt God
implicitly, if, though he does not intend to make an experiment on
God, yet he asks for or does something which has no other use than to
prove God's power, goodness or knowledge. Thus when a man wishes his
horse to gallop in order to escape from the enemy, this is not giving
the horse a trial: but if he make the horse gallop with out any
useful purpose, it seems to be nothing else than a trial of the
horse's speed; and the same applies to all other things. Accordingly
when a man in his prayers or deeds entrusts himself to the divine
assistance for some urgent or useful motive, this is not to tempt
God: for it is written (2 Paralip 20:12): "As we know not what to do,
we can only turn our eyes to Thee." But if this be done without any
useful or urgent motive, this is to tempt God implicitly. Wherefore a
gloss on Deut. 6:16, "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God," says:
"A man tempts God, if having the means at hand, without reason he
chooses a dangerous course, trying whether he can be delivered by
God."

Reply Obj. 1: Man also is sometimes tempted by means of deeds, to
test his ability or knowledge or will to uphold or oppose those same
deeds.

Reply Obj. 2: When saints work miracles by their prayers, they are
moved by a motive of necessity or usefulness to ask for that which is
an effect of the divine power.

Reply Obj. 3: The preachers of God's kingdom dispense with temporal
aids, so as to be freer to give their time to the word of God:
wherefore if they depend on God alone, it does not follow that they
tempt God. But if they were to neglect human assistance without any
useful or urgent motive, they would be tempting God. Hence Augustine
(Contra Faust. xxii, 36) says that "Paul fled, not through ceasing to
believe in God, but lest he should tempt God, were he not to flee
when he had the means of flight." The Blessed Agatha had experience
of God's kindness towards her, so that either she did not suffer such
sickness as required bodily medicine, or else she felt herself
suddenly cured by God.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 97, Art. 2]

Whether It Is a Sin to Tempt God?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not a sin to tempt God. For God
has not commanded sin. Yet He has commanded men to try, which is the
same as to tempt, Him: for it is written (Malach. 3:10): "Bring all
the tithes into the storehouse, that there may be meat in My house;
and try Me in this, saith the Lord, if I open not unto you the
flood-gates of heaven." Therefore it seems not to be a sin to tempt
God.

Obj. 2: Further, a man is tempted not only in order to test his
knowledge and his power, but also to try his goodness or his will.
Now it is lawful to test the divine goodness or will, for it is
written (Ps. 33:9): "O taste and see that the Lord is sweet," and
(Rom. 12:2): "That you may prove what is the good, and the
acceptable, and the perfect will of God." Therefore it is not a sin
to tempt God.

Obj. 3: Further, Scripture never blames a man for ceasing from sin,
but rather for committing a sin. Now Achaz is blamed because when the
Lord said: "Ask thee a sign of the Lord thy God," he replied: "I will
not ask, and I will not tempt the Lord," and then it was said to him:
"Is it a small thing for you to be grievous to men, that you are
grievous to my God also?" (Isa. 7:11-13). And we read of Abraham
(Gen. 15:8) that he said to the Lord: "Whereby may I know that I
shall possess it?" namely, the land which God had promised him. Again
Gedeon asked God for a sign of the victory promised to him (Judges
6:36, sqq.). Yet they were not blamed for so doing. Therefore it is
not a sin to tempt God.

_On the contrary,_ It is forbidden in God's Law, for it is written
(Deut. 6:10): "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), to tempt a person is to put
him to a test. Now one never tests that of which one is certain.
Wherefore all temptation proceeds from some ignorance or doubt,
either in the tempter (as when one tests a thing in order to know its
qualities), or in others (as when one tests a thing in order to prove
it to others), and in this latter way God is said to tempt us. Now it
is a sin to be ignorant of or to doubt that which pertains to God's
perfection. Wherefore it is evident that it is a sin to tempt God in
order that the tempter himself may know God's power.

On the other hand, if one were to test that which pertains to the
divine perfection, not in order to know it oneself, but to prove it
to others: this is not tempting God, provided there be just motive of
urgency, or a pious motive of usefulness, and other requisite
conditions. For thus did the apostles ask the Lord that signs might
be wrought in the name of Jesus Christ, as related in Acts 4:30, in
order, to wit, that Christ's power might be made manifest to
unbelievers.

Reply Obj. 1: The paying of tithes was prescribed in the Law, as
stated above (Q. 87, A. 1). Hence there was a motive of urgency to
pay it, through the obligation of the Law, and also a motive of
usefulness, as stated in the text quoted--"that there may be meat in
God's house": wherefore they did not tempt God by paying tithes. The
words that follow, "and try Me," are not to be understood causally,
as though they had to pay tithes in order to try if "God would open
the flood-gates of heaven," but consecutively, because, to wit, if
they paid tithes, they would prove by experience the favors which
God would shower upon them.

Reply Obj. 2: There is a twofold knowledge of God's goodness or will.
One is speculative and as to this it is not lawful to doubt or to
prove whether God's will be good, or whether God is sweet. The other
knowledge of God's will or goodness is effective or experimental and
thereby a man experiences in himself the taste of God's sweetness,
and complacency in God's will, as Dionysius says of Hierotheos (Div.
Nom. ii) that "he learnt divine things through experience of them."
It is in this way that we are told to prove God's will, and to taste
His sweetness.

Reply Obj. 3: God wished to give a sign to Achaz, not for him alone,
but for the instruction of the whole people. Hence he was reproved
because, by refusing to ask a sign, he was an obstacle to the common
welfare. Nor would he have tempted God by asking, both because he
would have asked through God commanding him to do so, and because it
was a matter relating to the common good. Abraham asked for a sign
through the divine instinct, and so he did not sin. Gedeon seems to
have asked a sign through weakness of faith, wherefore he is not to
be excused from sin, as a gloss observes: just as Zachary sinned in
saying to the angel (Luke 1:18): "Whereby shall I know this?" so that
he was punished for his unbelief.

It must be observed, however, that there are two ways of asking God
for a sign: first in order to test God's power or the truth of His
word, and this of its very nature pertains to the temptation of God.
Secondly, in order to be instructed as to what is God's pleasure in
some particular matter; and this nowise comes under the head of
temptation of God.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 97, Art. 3]

Whether Temptation of God Is Opposed to the Virtue of Religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that the temptation of God is not opposed
to the virtue of religion. The temptation of God is sinful, because a
man doubts God, as stated above (A. 2). Now doubt about God comes
under the head of unbelief, which is opposed to faith. Therefore
temptation of God is opposed to faith rather than to religion.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 18:23): "Before prayer
prepare thy soul, and be not as a man that tempteth God. Such a man,"
that is, who tempts God, says the interlinear gloss, "prays for what
God taught him to pray for, yet does not what God has commanded him
to do." Now this pertains to imprudence which is opposed to hope.
Therefore it seems that temptation of God is a sin opposed to hope.

Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Ps. 77:18, "And they tempted God in their
hearts," says that "to tempt God is to pray to Him deceitfully, with
simplicity in our words and wickedness in our hearts." Now deceit is
opposed to the virtue of truth. Therefore temptation of God is
opposed, not to religion, but to truth.

_On the contrary,_ According to the gloss quoted above "to tempt God
is to pray to Him inordinately." Now to pray to God becomingly is an
act of religion as stated above (Q. 83, A. 15). Therefore to tempt
God is a sin opposed to religion.

_I answer that,_ As clearly shown above (Q. 81, A. 5), the end of
religion is to pay reverence to God. Wherefore whatever pertains
directly to irreverence for God is opposed to religion. Now it is
evident that to tempt a person pertains to irreverence for him: since
no one presumes to tempt one of whose excellence he is sure. Hence it
is manifest that to tempt God is a sin opposed to religion.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 81, A. 7), it belongs to religion
to declare one's faith by certain signs indicative of reverence
towards God. Consequently it belongs to irreligion that, through
doubtful faith, a man does things indicative of irreverence towards
God. To tempt God is one of these; wherefore it is a species of
irreligion.

Reply Obj. 2: He that prepares not his soul before prayer by
forgiving those against whom he has anything, or in some other way
disposing himself to devotion, does not do what he can to be heard by
God, wherefore he tempts God implicitly as it were. And though this
implicit temptation would seem to arise from presumption or
indiscretion, yet the very fact that a man behaves presumptuously and
without due care in matters relating to God implies irreverence
towards Him. For it is written (1 Pet. 5:6): "Be you humbled . . .
under the mighty hand of God," and (2 Tim. 2:15): "Carefully study to
present thyself approved unto God." Therefore also this kind of
temptation is a species of irreligion.

Reply Obj. 3: A man is said to pray deceitfully, not in relation to
God, Who knows the secrets of the heart, but in relation to man.
Wherefore deceit is accidental to the temptation of God, and
consequently it does not follow that to tempt God is directly opposed
to the truth.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 97, Art. 4]

Whether the Temptation of God Is a Graver Sin Than Superstition?

Objection 1: It would seem that the temptation of God is a graver sin
than superstition. The greater sin receives the greater punishment.
Now the sin of tempting God was more severely punished in the Jews
than was the sin of idolatry; and yet the latter is the chief form of
superstition: since for the sin of idolatry three thousand men of
their number were slain, as related in Ex. 32:28 [*Septuagint
version. The Vulgate has "twenty-three thousand."], whereas for the
sin of temptation they all without exception perished in the desert,
and entered not into the land of promise, according to Ps. 94:9,
"Your fathers tempted Me," and further on, "so I swore in My wrath
that they should not enter into My rest." Therefore to tempt God is a
graver sin than superstition.

Obj. 2: Further, the more a sin is opposed to virtue the graver it
would seem to be. Now irreligion, of which the temptation of God is a
species, is more opposed to the virtue of religion, than superstition
which bears some likeness to religion. Therefore to tempt God is a
graver sin than superstition.

Obj. 3: Further, it seems to be a greater sin to behave
disrespectfully to one's parents, than to pay others the respect we
owe to our parents. Now God should be honored by us as the Father of
all (Malach. 1:6). Therefore, temptation of God whereby we behave
irreverently to God, seems to be a greater sin than idolatry, whereby
we give to a creature the honor we owe to God.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Deut. 17:2, "When there shall be found
among you," etc. says: "The Law detests error and idolatry above all:
for it is a very great sin to give to a creature the honor that
belongs to the Creator."

_I answer that,_ Among sins opposed to religion, the more grievous is
that which is the more opposed to the reverence due to God. Now it is
less opposed to this reverence that one should doubt the divine
excellence than that one should hold the contrary for certain. For
just as a man is more of an unbeliever if he be confirmed in his
error, than if he doubt the truth of faith, so, too, a man acts more
against the reverence due to God, if by his deeds he professes an
error contrary to the divine excellence, than if he expresses a
doubt. Now the superstitious man professes an error, as shown above
(Q. 94, A. 1, ad 1), whereas he who tempts God by words or deeds
expresses a doubt of the divine excellence, as stated above (A. 2).
Therefore the sin of superstition is graver than the sin of tempting
God.

Reply Obj. 1: The sin of idolatry was not punished in the above
manner, as though it were a sufficient punishment; because a more
severe punishment was reserved in the future for that sin, for it is
written (Ex. 32:34): "And I, in the day of revenge, will visit this
sin also of theirs."

Reply Obj. 2: Superstition bears a likeness to religion, as regards
the material act which it pays just as religion does. But, as regards
the end, it is more contrary to religion than the temptation of God,
since it implies greater irreverence for God, as stated.

Reply Obj. 3: It belongs essentially to the divine excellence that it
is singular and incommunicable. Consequently to give divine reverence
to another is the same as to do a thing opposed to the divine
excellence. There is no comparison with the honor due to our parents,
which can without sin be given to others.
_______________________

QUESTION 98

OF PERJURY
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider perjury: under which head there are four points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether falsehood is necessary for perjury?

(2) Whether perjury is always a sin?

(3) Whether it is always a mortal sin?

(4) Whether it is a sin to enjoin an oath on a perjurer?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 98, Art. 1]

Whether It Is Necessary for Perjury That the Statement Confirmed on
Oath Be False?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary for perjury that
the statement confirmed on oath be false. As stated above (Q. 89, A.
3), an oath should be accompanied by judgment and justice no less
than by truth. Since therefore perjury is incurred through lack of
truth, it is incurred likewise through lack of judgment, as when one
swears indiscreetly, and through lack of justice, as when one swears
to something unjust.

Obj. 2: Further, that which confirms is more weighty than the thing
confirmed thereby: thus in a syllogism the premises are more weighty
than the conclusion. Now in an oath a man's statement is confirmed by
calling on the name of God. Therefore perjury seems to consist in
swearing by false gods rather than in a lack of truth in the human
statement which is confirmed on oath.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm.
clxxx): "Men swear falsely both in deceiving others and when they are
deceived themselves"; and he gives three examples. The first is:
"Supposing a man to swear, thinking that what he swears to is true,
whereas it is false"; the second is: "Take the instance of another
who knows the statement to be false, and swears to it as though it
were true"; and the third is: "Take another, who thinks his statement
false, and swears to its being true, while perhaps it is true," of
whom he says afterwards that he is a perjurer. Therefore one may be a
perjurer while swearing to the truth. Therefore falsehood is not
necessary for perjury.

_On the contrary,_ Perjury is defined "a falsehood confirmed by oath"
[*Hugh of St. Victor, Sum. Sent. iv, 5].

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 92, A. 2), moral acts take their
species from their end. Now the end of an oath is the confirmation of
a human assertion. To this confirmation falsehood is opposed: since
an assertion is confirmed by being firmly shown to be true; and this
cannot happen to that which is false. Hence falsehood directly annuls
the end of an oath: and for this reason, that perversity in swearing,
which is called perjury, takes its species chiefly from falsehood.
Consequently falsehood is essential to perjury.

Reply Obj. 1: As Jerome says on Jer. 4:2, "whichever of these three
be lacking, there is perjury," but in different order. For first and
chiefly perjury consists in a lack of truth, for the reason stated in
the Article. Secondly, there is perjury when justice is lacking, for
in whatever way a man swears to that which is unlawful, for this very
reason he is guilty of falsehood, since he is under an obligation to
do the contrary. Thirdly, there is perjury when judgment is lacking,
since by the very fact that a man swears indiscreetly, he incurs the
danger of lapsing into falsehood.

Reply Obj. 2: In syllogisms the premises are of greater weight, since
they are in the position of active principle, as stated in _Phys._
ii, 3: whereas in moral matters the end is of greater importance than
the active principle. Hence though it is a perverse oath when a man
swears to the truth by false gods, yet perjury takes its name from
that kind of perversity in an oath, that deprives the oath of its
end, by swearing what is false.

Reply Obj. 3: Moral acts proceed from the will, whose object is the
apprehended good. Wherefore if the false be apprehended as true, it
will be materially false, but formally true, as related to the will.
If something false be apprehended as false, it will be false both
materially and formally. If that which is true be apprehended as
false, it will be materially true, and formally false. Hence in each
of these cases the conditions required for perjury are to be found in
some way, on account of some measure of falsehood. Since, however,
that which is formal in anything is of greater importance than that
which is material, he that swears to a falsehood thinking it true is
not so much of a perjurer as he that swears to the truth thinking it
false. For Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. clxxx): "It
depends how the assertion proceeds from the mind, for the tongue is
not guilty except the mind be guilty."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 98, Art. 2]

Whether All Perjury Is Sinful?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all perjury is sinful. Whoever
does not fulfil what he has confirmed on oath is seemingly a
perjurer. Yet sometimes a man swears he will do something unlawful
(adultery, for instance, or murder): and if he does it, he commits a
sin. If therefore he would commit a sin even if he did it not, it
would follow that he is perplexed.

Obj. 2: Further, no man sins by doing what is best. Yet sometimes by
committing a perjury one does what is best: as when a man swears not
to enter religion, or not to do some kind of virtuous deed. Therefore
not all perjury is sinful.

Obj. 3: Further, he that swears to do another's will would seem to be
guilty of perjury unless he do it. Yet it may happen sometimes that
he sins not, if he do not the man's will: for instance, if the latter
order him to do something too hard and unbearable. Therefore
seemingly not all perjury is sinful.

Obj. 4: Further, a promissory oath extends to future, just as a
declaratory oath extends to past and present things. Now the
obligation of an oath may be removed by some future occurrence: thus
a state may swear to fulfil some obligation, and afterwards other
citizens come on the scene who did not take the oath; or a canon may
swear to keep the statutes of a certain church, and afterwards new
statutes are made. Therefore seemingly he that breaks an oath does
not sin.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm.
cxxx), in speaking of perjury: "See how you should detest this
horrible beast and exterminate it from all human business."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 89, A. 1), to swear is to call
God as witness. Now it is an irreverence to God to call Him to
witness to a falsehood, because by so doing one implies either that
God ignores the truth or that He is willing to bear witness to a
falsehood. Therefore perjury is manifestly a sin opposed to religion,
to which it belongs to show reverence to God.

Reply Obj. 1: He that swears to do what is unlawful is thereby guilty
of perjury through lack of justice: though, if he fails to keep his
oath, he is not guilty of perjury in this respect, since that which
he swore to do was not a fit matter of an oath.

Reply Obj. 2: A person who swears not to enter religion, or not to
give an alms, or the like, is guilty of perjury through lack of
judgment. Hence when he does that which is best it is not an act of
perjury, but contrary thereto: for the contrary of that which he is
doing could not be a matter of an oath.

Reply Obj. 3: When one man swears or promises to do another's will,
there is to be understood this requisite condition--that the thing
commanded be lawful and virtuous, and not unbearable or immoderate.

Reply Obj. 4: An oath is a personal act, and so when a man becomes a
citizen of a state, he is not bound, as by oath, to fulfil whatever
the state has sworn to do. Yet he is bound by a kind of fidelity, the
nature of which obligation is that he should take his share of the
state's burdens if he takes a share of its goods.

The canon who swears to keep the statutes that have force in some
particular "college" is not bound by his oath to keep any that may be
made in the future, unless he intends to bind himself to keep all,
past and future. Nevertheless he is bound to keep them by virtue of
the statutes themselves, since they are possessed of coercive force,
as stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 4).
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 98, Art. 3]

Whether All Perjury Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all perjury is a mortal sin. It
is laid down (Extra, De Jurejur., cap. Verum): "Referring to the
question whether an oath is binding on those who have taken one in
order to safeguard their life and possessions, we have no other mind
than that which our predecessors the Roman Pontiffs are known to have
had, and who absolved such persons from the obligations of their
oath. Henceforth, that discretion may be observed, and in order to
avoid occasions of perjury, let them not be told expressly not to
keep their oath: but if they should not keep it, they are not for
this reason to be punished as for a mortal sin." Therefore not all
perjury is a mortal sin.

Obj. 2. Further, as Chrysostom [*Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum on
St. Matthew, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says, "it is a
greater thing to swear by God than by the Gospels." Now it is not
always a mortal sin to swear by God to something false; for instance,
if we were to employ such an oath in fun or by a slip of the tongue
in the course of an ordinary conversation. Therefore neither is it
always a mortal sin to break an oath that has been taken solemnly on
the Gospels.

Obj. 3: Further, according to the Law a man incurs infamy through
committing perjury (VI, qu. i, cap. Infames). Now it would seem that
infamy is not incurred through any kind of perjury, as it is
prescribed in the case of a declaratory oath violated by perjury
[*Cap. Cum dilectus, de Ord. Cognit.]. Therefore, seemingly, not all
perjury is a mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ Every sin that is contrary to a divine precept is
a mortal sin. Now perjury is contrary to a divine precept, for it is
written (Lev. 19:12): "Thou shalt not swear falsely by My name."
Therefore it is a mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ According to the teaching of the Philosopher
(Poster. i, 2), "that which causes a thing to be such is yet more
so." Now we know that an action which is, by reason of its very
nature, a venial sin, or even a good action, is a mortal sin if it be
done out of contempt of God. Wherefore any action that of its nature,
implies contempt of God is a mortal sin. Now perjury, of its very
nature implies contempt of God, since, as stated above (A. 2), the
reason why it is sinful is because it is an act of irreverence
towards God. Therefore it is manifest that perjury, of its very
nature, is a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 89, A. 7, ad 3), coercion does not
deprive a promissory oath of its binding force, as regards that which
can be done lawfully. Wherefore he who fails to fulfil an oath which
he took under coercion is guilty of perjury and sins mortally.
Nevertheless the Sovereign Pontiff can, by his authority, absolve a
man from an obligation even of an oath, especially if the latter
should have been coerced into taking the oath through such fear as
may overcome a high-principled man.

When, however, it is said that these persons are not to be punished
as for a mortal sin, this does not mean that they are not guilty of
mortal sin, but that a lesser punishment is to be inflicted on them.

Reply Obj. 2: He that swears falsely in fun is nonetheless irreverent
to God, indeed, in a way, he is more so, and consequently is not
excused from mortal sin. He that swears falsely by a slip of tongue,
if he adverts to the fact that he is swearing, and that he is
swearing to something false, is not excused from mortal sin, as
neither is he excused from contempt of God. If, however, he does not
advert to this, he would seem to have no intention of swearing, and
consequently is excused from the sin of perjury.

It is, however, a more grievous sin to swear solemnly by the Gospels,
than to swear by God in ordinary conversation, both on account of
scandal and on account of the greater deliberation. But if we
consider them equally in comparison with one another, it is more
grievous to commit perjury in swearing by God than in swearing by the
Gospels.

Reply Obj. 3: Not every sin makes a man infamous in the eye of the
law. Wherefore, if a man who has sworn falsely in a declaratory oath
be not infamous in the eye of the law, but only when he has been so
declared by sentence in a court of law, it does not follow that he
has not sinned mortally. The reason why the law attaches infamy
rather to one who breaks a promissory oath taken solemnly is that he
still has it in his power after he has sworn to substantiate his
oath, which is not the case in a declaratory oath.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 98, Art. 4]

Whether He Sins Who Demands an Oath of a Perjurer?

Objection 1: It would seem that he who demands an oath of a perjurer
commits a sin. Either he knows that he swears truly, or he knows that
he swears falsely. If he knows him to swear truly, it is useless for
him to demand an oath: and if he believes him to swear falsely, for
his own part he leads him into sin. Therefore nowise seemingly should
one enjoin an oath on another person.

Obj. 2: Further, to receive an oath from a person is less than to
impose an oath on him. Now it would seem unlawful to receive an oath
from a person, especially if he swear falsely, because he would then
seem to consent in his sin. Much less therefore would it seem lawful
to impose an oath on one who swears falsely.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Lev. 5:1): "If anyone sin, and hear
the voice of one swearing falsely [*'Falsely' is not in the Vulgate],
and is a witness either because he himself hath seen, or is privy to
it: if he do not utter it, he shall bear his iniquity." Hence it
would seem that when a man knows another to be swearing falsely, he
is bound to denounce him. Therefore it is not lawful to demand an
oath of such a man.

Obj. 4: On the other hand, Just as it is a sin to swear falsely so is
it to swear by false gods. Yet it is lawful to take advantage of an
oath of one who has sworn by false gods, as Augustine says (ad
Public. Ep. xlvii). Therefore it is lawful to demand an oath from one
who swears falsely.

_I answer that,_ As regards a person who demands an oath from
another, a distinction would seem to be necessary. For either he
demands the oath on his own account and of his own accord, or he
demands it on account of the exigencies of a duty imposed on him. If
a man demands an oath on his own account as a private individual, we
must make a distinction, as does Augustine (de Perjuriis. serm.
clxxx): "For if he knows not that the man will swear falsely, and
says to him accordingly: 'Swear to me' in order that he may be
credited, there is no sin: yet it is a human temptation" (because, to
wit, it proceeds from his weakness in doubting whether the man will
speak the truth). "This is the evil whereof Our Lord says (Matt.
5:37): That which is over and above these, is of evil. But if he
knows the man to have done so," i.e. the contrary of what he swears
to, "and yet forces him to swear, he is a murderer: for the other
destroys himself by his perjury, but it is he who urged the hand of
the slayer."

If, on the other hand, a man demands an oath as a public person, in
accordance with the requirements of the law, on the requisition of a
third person: he does not seem to be at fault, if he demands an oath
of a person, whether he knows that he will swear falsely or truly,
because seemingly it is not he that exacts the oath but the person at
whose instance he demands it.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument avails in the case of one who demands an
oath on his own account. Yet he does not always know that the other
will swear truly or falsely, for at times he has doubts about the
fact, and believes he will swear truly. In such a case he exacts an
oath in order that he may be more certain.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (ad Public. serm. xlvii), "though we
are forbidden to swear, I do not remember ever to have read in the
Holy Scriptures that we must not accept oaths from others." Hence he
that accepts an oath does not sin, except perchance when of his own
accord he forces another to swear, knowing that he will swear falsely.

Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (QQ. Super Lev, qu. i), Moses in the
passage quoted did not state to whom one man had to denounce
another's perjury: wherefore it must be understood that the matter
had to be denounced "to those who would do the perjurer good rather
than harm." Again, neither did he state in what order the
denunciation was to be made: wherefore seemingly the Gospel order
should be followed, if the sin of perjury should be hidden,
especially when it does not tend to another person's injury: because
if it did, the Gospel order would not apply to the case, as stated
above (Q. 33, A. 7; Q. 68, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 4: It is lawful to make use of an evil for the sake of
good, as God does, but it is not lawful to lead anyone to do evil.
Consequently it is lawful to accept the oath of one who is ready to
swear by false gods, but it is not lawful to induce him to swear by
false gods. Yet it seems to be different in the case of one who
swears falsely by the true God, because an oath of this kind lacks
the good of faith, which a man makes use of in the oath of one who
swears truly by false gods, as Augustine says (ad Public. Ep. xlvii).
Hence when a man swears falsely by the true God his oath seems to
lack any good that one may use lawfully.
_______________________

QUESTION 99

OF SACRILEGE
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the vices which pertain to irreligion,
whereby sacred things are treated with irreverence. We shall
consider (1) Sacrilege; (2) Simony.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) What is sacrilege?

(2) Whether it is a special sin?

(3) Of the species of sacrilege;

(4) Of the punishment of sacrilege.
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 99, Art. 1]

Whether Sacrilege Is the Violation of a Sacred Thing?

Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege is not the violation of a
sacred thing. It is stated (XVII, qu. iv [*Append. Gratian, on can.
Si quis suadente]): "They are guilty of sacrilege who disagree about
the sovereign's decision, and doubt whether the person chosen by the
sovereign be worthy of honor." Now this seems to have no connection
with anything sacred. Therefore sacrilege does not denote the
violation of something sacred.

Obj. 2: Further, it is stated further on [*Append. Gratian, on can.
Constituit.] that if any man shall allow the Jews to hold public
offices, "he must be excommunicated as being guilty of sacrilege."
Yet public offices have nothing to do with anything sacred. Therefore
it seems that sacrilege does not denote the violation of a sacred
thing.

Obj. 3: Further, God's power is greater than man's. Now sacred things
receive their sacred character from God. Therefore they cannot be
violated by man: and so a sacrilege would not seem to be the
violation of a sacred thing.

_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x) that "a man is said to be
sacrilegious because he selects," i.e. steals, "sacred things."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 81, A. 5; I-II, Q. 101, A. 4), a
thing is called "sacred" through being deputed to the divine worship.
Now just as a thing acquires an aspect of good through being deputed
to a good end, so does a thing assume a divine character through
being deputed to the divine worship, and thus a certain reverence is
due to it, which reverence is referred to God. Therefore whatever
pertains to irreverence for sacred things is an injury to God, and
comes under the head of sacrilege.

Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2) the common
good of the nation is a divine thing, wherefore in olden times the
rulers of a commonwealth were called divines, as being the ministers
of divine providence, according to Wis. 6:5, "Being ministers of His
kingdom, you have not judged rightly." Hence by an extension of the
term, whatever savors of irreverence for the sovereign, such as
disputing his judgment, and questioning whether one ought to follow
it, is called sacrilege by a kind of likeness.

Reply Obj. 2: Christians are sanctified by faith and the sacraments
of Christ, according to 1 Cor. 6:11, "But you are washed, but you are
sanctified." Wherefore it is written (1 Pet. 2:9): "You are a chosen
generation, a kingly priesthood, a holy nation, a purchased people."
Therefore any injury inflicted on the Christian people, for instance
that unbelievers should be put in authority over it, is an
irreverence for a sacred thing, and is reasonably called a sacrilege.

Reply Obj. 3: Violation here means any kind of irreverence or
dishonor. Now as "honor is in the person who honors and not in the
one who is honored" (Ethic. i, 5), so again irreverence is in the
person who behaves irreverently even though he do no harm to the
object of his irreverence. Hence, so far he is concerned, he violates
the sacred thing, though the latter be not violated in itself.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 99, Art. 2]

Whether Sacrilege Is a Special Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege is not a special sin. It is
stated (XVII, qu. iv) "They are guilty of sacrilege who through
ignorance sin against the sanctity of the law, violate and defile it
by their negligence." But this is done in every sin, because sin is
"a word, deed or desire contrary to the law of God," according to
Augustine (Contra Faust. xxi, 27). Therefore sacrilege is a general
sin.

Obj. 2: Further, no special sin is comprised under different kinds of
sin. Now sacrilege is comprised under different kinds of sin, for
instance under murder, if one kill a priest under lust, as the
violation of a consecrate virgin, or of any woman in a sacred place
under theft, if one steal a sacred thing. Therefore sacrilege is not
a special sin.

Obj. 3: Further, every special sin is to found apart from other sins
as the Philosopher states, in speaking of special justice (Ethic. v,
11). But, seemingly, sacrilege is not to be found apart from other
sins; for it is sometimes united to theft, sometimes to murder, as
stated in the preceding objection. Therefore it is not a special sin.

_On the contrary,_ That which is opposed to a special virtue is a
special sin. But sacrilege is opposed to a special virtue, namely
religion, to which it belongs to reverence God and divine things.
Therefore sacrilege is a special sin.

_I answer that,_ Wherever we find a special aspect of deformity,
there must needs be a special sin; because the species of a thing is
derived chiefly from its formal aspect, and not from its matter or
subject. Now in sacrilege we find a special aspect of deformity,
namely, the violation of a sacred thing by treating it irreverently.
Hence it is a special sin.

Moreover, it is opposed to religion. For according to Damascene (De
Fide Orth. iv, 3), "When the purple has been made into a royal robe,
we pay it honor and homage, and if anyone dishonor it he is condemned
to death," as acting against the king: and in the same way if a man
violate a sacred thing, by so doing his behavior is contrary to the
reverence due to God and consequently he is guilty of irreligion.

Reply Obj. 1: Those are said to sin against the sanctity of the
divine law who assail God's law, as heretics and blasphemers do.
These are guilty of unbelief, through not believing in God; and of
sacrilege, through perverting the words of the divine law.

Reply Obj. 2: Nothing prevents one specific kind of sin being found
in various generic kinds of sin, inasmuch as various sins are
directed to the end of one sin, just as happens in the case of
virtues commanded by one virtue. In this way, by whatever kind of sin
a man acts counter to reverence due to sacred things, he commits a
sacrilege formally; although his act contains various kinds of sin
materially.

Reply Obj. 3: Sacrilege is sometimes found apart from other sins,
through its act having no other deformity than the violation of a
sacred thing: for instance, if a judge were to take a person from a
sacred place, for he might lawfully have taken him from elsewhere.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 99, Art. 3]

Whether the Species of Sacrilege Are Distinguished According to the
Sacred Things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the species of sacrilege are not
distinguished according to the sacred things. Material diversity does
not differentiate species, if the formal aspect remains the same. Now
there would seem to be the same formal aspect of sin in all
violations of sacred things, and that the only difference is one of
matter. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not distinguished
thereby.

Obj. 2: Further, it does not seem possible that things belonging to
the same species should at the same time differ specifically. Now
murder, theft, and unlawful intercourse, are different species of
sin. Therefore they cannot belong to the one same species of
sacrilege: and consequently it seems that the species of sacrilege
are distinguished in accordance with the species of other sins, and
not according to the various sacred things.

Obj. 3: Further, among sacred things sacred persons are reckoned. If,
therefore, one species of sacrilege arises from the violation of a
sacred person, it would follow that every sin committed by a sacred
person is a sacrilege, since every sin violates the person of the
sinner. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not reckoned according
to the sacred things.

_On the contrary,_ Acts and habits are distinguished by their
objects. Now the sacred thing is the object of sacrilege, as stated
above (A. 1). Therefore the species of sacrilege are distinguished
according to the sacred things.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the sin of sacrilege
consists in the irreverent treatment of a sacred thing. Now reverence
is due to a sacred thing by reason of its holiness: and consequently
the species of sacrilege must needs be distinguished according to the
different aspects of sanctity in the sacred things which are treated
irreverently: for the greater the holiness ascribed to the sacred
thing that is sinned against, the more grievous the sacrilege.

Now holiness is ascribed, not only to sacred persons, namely, those
who are consecrated to the divine worship, but also to sacred places
and to certain other sacred things. And the holiness of a place is
directed to the holiness of man, who worships God in a holy place.
For it is written (2 Macc. 5:19): "God did not choose the people for
the place's sake, but the place for the people's sake." Hence
sacrilege committed against a sacred person is a graver sin than that
which is committed against a sacred place. Yet in either species
there are various degrees of sacrilege, according to differences of
sacred persons and places.

In like manner the third species of sacrilege, which is committed
against other sacred things, has various degrees, according to the
differences of sacred things. Among these the highest place belongs
to the sacraments whereby man is sanctified: chief of which is the
sacrament of the Eucharist, for it contains Christ Himself. Wherefore
the sacrilege that is committed against this sacrament is the gravest
of all. The second place, after the sacraments, belongs to the
vessels consecrated for the administration of the sacraments; also
sacred images, and the relics of the saints, wherein the very persons
of the saints, so to speak, are reverenced and honored. After these
come things connected with the apparel of the Church and its
ministers; and those things, whether movable or immovable, that are
deputed to the upkeep of the ministers. And whoever sins against any
one of the aforesaid incurs the crime of sacrilege.

Reply Obj. 1: There is not the same aspect of holiness in all the
aforesaid: wherefore the diversity of sacred things is not only a
material, but also a formal difference.

Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders two things from belonging to one
species in one respect, and to different species in another respect.
Thus Socrates and Plato belong to the one species, "animal," but
differ in the species "colored thing," if one be white and the other
black. In like manner it is possible for two sins to differ
specifically as to their material acts, and to belong to the same
species as regards the one formal aspect of sacrilege: for instance,
the violation of a nun by blows or by copulation.

Reply Obj. 3: Every sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege
materially and accidentally as it were. Hence Jerome [*The quotation
is from St. Bernard, De Consideration. ii, 13] says that "a trifle on
a priest's lips is a sacrilege or a blasphemy." But formally and
properly speaking a sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege
only when it is committed against his holiness, for instance if a
virgin consecrated to God be guilty of fornication: and the same is
to be said of other instances.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 99, Art. 4]

Whether the Punishment of Sacrilege Should Be Pecuniary?

Objection 1: It would seem that the punishment of sacrilege should
not be pecuniary. A pecuniary punishment is not wont to be inflicted
for a criminal fault. But sacrilege is a criminal fault, wherefore it
is punished by capital sentence according to civil law [*Dig. xlviii,
13; Cod. i, 3, de Episc. et Cleric.]. Therefore sacrilege should not
be awarded a pecuniary punishment.

Obj. 2: Further, the same sin should not receive a double punishment,
according to Nahum 1:9, "There shall not rise a double affliction."
But sacrilege is punished with excommunication; major
excommunication, for violating a sacred person, and for burning or
destroying a church, and minor excommunication for other sacrileges.
Therefore sacrilege should not be awarded a pecuniary punishment.

Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Thess. 2:5): "Neither have we
taken an occasion of covetousness." But it seems to involve an
occasion of covetousness that a pecuniary punishment should be
exacted for the violation of a sacred thing. Therefore this does not
seem to be a fitting punishment of sacrilege.

_On the contrary,_ It is written [*XVII, qu. iv, can. Si quis
contumax]: "If anyone contumaciously or arrogantly take away by force
an escaped slave from the confines of a church he shall pay nine
hundred soldi": and again further on (XVII, qu. iv, can. Quisquis
inventus, can. 21): "Whoever is found guilty of sacrilege shall pay
thirty pounds of tried purest silver."

_I answer that,_ In the award of punishments two points must be
considered. First equality, in order that the punishment may be just,
and that "by what things a man sinneth by the same . . . he may be
tormented" (Wis. 11:17). In this respect the fitting punishment of
one guilty of sacrilege, since he has done an injury to a sacred
thing, is excommunication [*Append. Gratian. on can. Si quis
contumax, quoted above] whereby sacred things are withheld from him.
The second point to be considered is utility. For punishments are
inflicted as medicines, that men being deterred thereby may desist
from sin. Now it would seem that the sacrilegious man, who reverences
not sacred things, is not sufficiently deterred from sinning by
sacred things being withheld from him, since he has no care for them.
Wherefore according to human laws he is sentenced to capital
punishment, and according to the statutes of the Church, which does
not inflict the death of the body, a pecuniary punishment is
inflicted, in order that men may be deterred from sacrilege, at least
by temporal punishments.

Reply Obj. 1: The Church inflicts not the death of the body, but
excommunication in its stead.

Reply Obj. 2: When one punishment is not sufficient to deter a man
from sin, a double punishment must be inflicted. Wherefore it was
necessary to inflict some kind of temporal punishment in addition to
the punishment of excommunication, in order to coerce those who
despise spiritual things.

Reply Obj. 3: If money were exacted without a reasonable cause, this
would seem to involve an occasion of covetousness. But when it is
exacted for the purpose of man's correction, it has a manifest
utility, and consequently involves no occasion of avarice.
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QUESTION 100

ON SIMONY
(In Six Articles)

We must now consider simony, under which head there are six points of
inquiry:

(1) What is simony?

(2) Whether it is lawful to accept money for the sacraments?

(3) Whether it is lawful to accept money for spiritual actions?

(4) Whether it is lawful to sell things connected with spirituals?

(5) Whether real remuneration alone makes a man guilty of simony, or
also oral remuneration or remuneration by service?

(6) Of the punishment of simony.
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 100, Art. 1]

Whether Simony Is an Intentional Will to Buy or Sell Something
Spiritual or Connected with a Spiritual Thing?

Objection 1: It would seem that simony is not "an express will to buy
or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing."
Simony is heresy, since it is written (I, qu. i [*Can. Eos qui per
pecunias]): "The impious heresy of Macedonius and of those who with
him impugned the Holy Ghost, is more endurable than that of those who
are guilty of simony: since the former in their ravings maintained
that the Holy Spirit of Father and Son is a creature and the slave of
God, whereas the latter make the same Holy Spirit to be their own
slave. For every master sells what he has just as he wills, whether
it be his slave or any other of his possessions." But unbelief, like
faith, is an act not of the will but of the intellect, as shown above
(Q. 10, A. 2). Therefore simony should not be defined as an act of
the will.

Obj. 2: Further, to sin intentionally is to sin through malice, and
this is to sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore, if simony is an
intentional will to sin, it would seem that it is always a sin
against the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing is more spiritual than the kingdom of
heaven. But it is lawful to buy the kingdom of heaven: for Gregory
says in a homily (v, in Ev.): "The kingdom of heaven is worth as much
as you possess." Therefore simony does not consist in a will to buy
something spiritual.

Obj. 4: Further, simony takes its name from Simon the magician, of
whom we read (Acts 8:18, 19) that "he offered the apostles money"
that he might buy a spiritual power, in order, to wit, "that on
whomsoever he imposed his hand they might receive the Holy Ghost."
But we do not read that he wished to sell anything. Therefore simony
is not the will to sell a spiritual thing.

Obj. 5: Further, there are many other voluntary commutations besides
buying and selling, such as exchange and transaction [*A kind of
legal compromise--Oxford Dictionary]. Therefore it would seem that
simony is defined insufficiently.

Obj. 6: Further, anything connected with spiritual things is itself
spiritual. Therefore it is superfluous to add "or connected with
spiritual things."

Obj. 7: Further, according to some, the Pope cannot commit simony:
yet he can buy or sell something spiritual. Therefore simony is not
the will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a
spiritual thing.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory VII says (Regist. [*Caus. I, qu. i, can.
Presbyter, qu. iii, can. Altare]): "None of the faithful is ignorant
that buying or selling altars, tithes, or the Holy Ghost is the
heresy of simony."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 2) an act is evil
generically when it bears on undue matter. Now a spiritual thing is
undue matter for buying and selling for three reasons. First, because
a spiritual thing cannot be appraised at any earthly price, even as
it is said concerning wisdom (Prov. 3:15), "she is more precious than
all riches, and all things that are desired, are not to be compared
with her": and for this reason Peter, in condemning the wickedness of
Simon in its very source, said (Acts 8:20): "Keep thy money to
thyself to perish with thee, because thou hast thought that the gift
of God may be purchased with money."

Secondly, because a thing cannot be due matter for sale if the vendor
is not the owner thereof, as appears from the authority quoted (Obj.
1). Now ecclesiastical superiors are not owners, but dispensers of
spiritual things, according to 1 Cor. 4:1, "Let a man so account of
us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the ministers
of God."

Thirdly, because sale is opposed to the source of spiritual things,
since they flow from the gratuitous will of God. Wherefore Our Lord
said (Matt. 10:8): "Freely have you received, freely give."

Therefore by buying or selling a spiritual thing, a man treats God
and divine things with irreverence, and consequently commits a sin of
irreligion.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as religion consists in a kind of protestation of
faith, without, sometimes, faith being in one's heart, so too the
vices opposed to religion include a certain protestation of unbelief
without, sometimes, unbelief being in the mind. Accordingly simony is
said to be a "heresy," as regards the outward protestation, since by
selling a gift of the Holy Ghost a man declares, in a way, that he is
the owner of a spiritual gift; and this is heretical. It must,
however, be observed that Simon Magus, besides wishing the apostles
to sell him a grace of the Holy Ghost for money, said that the world
was not created by God, but by some heavenly power, as Isidore states
(Etym. viii, 5): and so for this reason simoniacs are reckoned with
other heretics, as appears from Augustine's book on heretics.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 58, A. 4), justice, with all its
parts, and consequently all the opposite vices, is in the will as its
subject. Hence simony is fittingly defined from its relation to the
will. This act is furthermore described as "express," in order to
signify that it proceeds from choice, which takes the principal part
in virtue and vice. Nor does everyone sin against the Holy Ghost that
sins from choice, but only he who chooses sin through contempt of
those things whereby man is wont to be withdrawn from sin, as stated
above (Q. 14, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 3: The kingdom of heaven is said to be bought when a man
gives what he has for God's sake. But this is to employ the term
"buying" in a wide sense, and as synonymous with merit: nor does it
reach to the perfect signification of buying, both because neither
"the sufferings of this time," nor any gift or deed of ours, "are
worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed
in us" (Rom. 8:18), and because merit consists chiefly, not in an
outward gift, action or passion, but in an inward affection.

Reply Obj. 4: Simon the magician wished to buy a spiritual power in
order that afterwards he might sell it. For it is written (I, qu. iii
[*Can. Salvator]), that "Simon the magician wished to buy the gift of
the Holy Ghost, in order that he might make money by selling the
signs to be wrought by him." Hence those who sell spiritual things
are likened in intention to Simon the magician: while those who wish
to buy them are likened to him in act. Those who sell them imitate,
in act, Giezi the disciple of Eliseus, of whom we read (4 Kings
5:20-24) that he received money from the leper who was healed:
wherefore the sellers of spiritual things may be called not only
"simoniacs" but also "giezites."

Reply Obj. 5: The terms "buying" and "selling" cover all kinds of
non-gratuitous contracts. Wherefore it is impossible for the exchange
or agency of prebends or ecclesiastical benefices to be made by
authority of the parties concerned without danger of committing
simony, as laid down by law [*Cap. Quaesitum, de rerum Permutat.;
cap. Super, de Transact.]. Nevertheless the superior, in virtue of
his office, can cause these exchanges to be made for useful or
necessary reasons.

Reply Obj. 6: Even as the soul lives by itself, while the body lives
through being united to the soul; so, too, certain things are
spiritual by themselves, such as the sacraments and the like, while
others are called spiritual, through adhering to those others. Hence
(I, qu. iii, cap. Siquis objecerit) it is stated that "spiritual
things do not progress without corporal things, even as the soul has
no bodily life without the body."

Reply Obj. 7: The Pope can be guilty of the vice of simony, like any
other man, since the higher a man's position the more grievous is his
sin. For although the possessions of the Church belong to him as
dispenser in chief, they are not his as master and owner. Therefore,
were he to accept money from the income of any church in exchange for
a spiritual thing, he would not escape being guilty of the vice of
simony. In like manner he might commit simony by accepting from a
layman moneys not belonging to the goods of the Church.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 100, Art. 2]

Whether It Is Always Unlawful to Give Money for the Sacraments?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not always unlawful to give
money for the sacraments. Baptism is the door of the sacraments, as
we shall state in the Third Part (Q. 68, A. 6; Q. 73, A. 3). But
seemingly it is lawful in certain cases to give money for Baptism,
for instance if a priest were unwilling to baptize a dying child
without being paid. Therefore it is not always unlawful to buy or
sell the sacraments.

Obj. 2: Further, the greatest of the sacraments is the Eucharist,
which is consecrated in the Mass. But some priests receive a prebend
or money for singing masses. Much more therefore is it lawful to buy
or sell the other sacraments.

Obj. 3: Further, the sacrament of Penance is a necessary sacrament
consisting chiefly in the absolution. But some persons demand money
when absolving from excommunication. Therefore it is not always
unlawful to buy or sell a sacrament.

Obj. 4: Further, custom makes that which otherwise were sinful to be
not sinful; thus Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 47) that "it was
no crime to have several wives, so long as it was the custom." Now it
is the custom in some places to give something in the consecration of
bishops, blessings of abbots, ordinations of the clergy, in exchange
for the chrism, holy oil, and so forth. Therefore it would seem that
it is not unlawful.

Obj. 5: Further, it happens sometimes that someone maliciously
hinders a person from obtaining a bishopric or some like dignity. But
it is lawful for a man to make good his grievance. Therefore it is
lawful, seemingly, in such a case to give money for a bishopric or a
like ecclesiastical dignity.

Obj. 6: Further, marriage is a sacrament. But sometimes money is
given for marriage. Therefore it is lawful to sell a sacrament.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (I, qu. i [*Can. Qui per pecunias]):
"Whosoever shall consecrate anyone for money, let him be cut off from
the priesthood."

_I answer that,_ The sacraments of the New Law are of all things most
spiritual, inasmuch as they are the cause of spiritual grace, on
which no price can be set, and which is essentially incompatible with
a non-gratuitous giving. Now the sacraments are dispensed through the
ministers of the Church, whom the people are bound to support,
according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:13), "Know you not,
that they who work in the holy place, eat the things that are of the
holy place; and they that serve the altar, partake with the altar?"

Accordingly we must answer that to receive money for the spiritual
grace of the sacraments, is the sin of simony, which cannot be
excused by any custom whatever, since "custom does not prevail over
natural or divine law" [*Cap. Cum tanto, de Consuetud.; cf. I-II, Q.
97, A. 3]. Now by money we are to understand anything that has a
pecuniary value, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 1). On the
other hand, to receive anything for the support of those who
administer the sacraments, in accordance with the statutes of the
Church and approved customs, is not simony, nor is it a sin. For it
is received not as a price of goods, but as a payment for their need.
Hence a gloss of Augustine on 1 Tim. 5:17, "Let the priests that rule
well," says: "They should look to the people for a supply to their
need, but to the Lord for the reward of their ministry."

Reply Obj. 1: In a case of necessity anyone may baptize. And since
nowise ought one to sin, if the priest be unwilling to baptize
without being paid, one must act as though there were no priest
available for the baptism. Hence the person who is in charge of the
child can, in such a case, lawfully baptize it, or cause it to be
baptized by anyone else. He could, however, lawfully buy the water
from the priest, because it is merely a bodily element. But if it
were an adult in danger of death that wished to be baptized, and the
priest were unwilling to baptize him without being paid, he ought, if
possible, to be baptized by someone else. And if he is unable to have
recourse to another, he must by no means pay a price for Baptism, and
should rather die without being baptized, because for him the baptism
of desire would supply the lack of the sacrament.

Reply Obj. 2: The priest receives money, not as the price for
consecrating the Eucharist, or for singing the Mass (for this would
be simoniacal), but as payment for his livelihood, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: The money exacted of the person absolved is not the
price of his absolution (for this would be simoniacal), but a
punishment of a past crime for which he was excommunicated.

Reply Obj. 4: As stated above, "custom does not prevail over natural
or divine law" whereby simony is forbidden. Wherefore the custom, if
such there be, of demanding anything as the price of a spiritual
thing, with the intention of buying or selling it, is manifestly
simoniacal, especially when the demand is made of a person unwilling
to pay. But if the demand be made in payment of a stipend recognized
by custom it is not simoniacal, provided there be no intention of
buying or selling, but only of doing what is customary, and
especially if the demand be acceded to voluntarily. In all these
cases, however, one must beware of anything having an appearance of
simony or avarice, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Thess.
5:22), "From all appearance of evil restrain yourselves."

Reply Obj. 5: It would be simoniacal to buy off the opposition of
one's rivals, before acquiring the right to a bishopric or any
dignity or prebend, by election, appointment or presentation, since
this would be to use money as a means of obtaining a spiritual thing.
But it is lawful to use money as a means of removing unjust
opposition, after one has already acquired that right.

Reply Obj. 6: Some [*Innocent IV on Cap. Cum in Ecclesia, de Simonia]
say that it is lawful to give money for Matrimony because no grace is
conferred thereby. But this is not altogether true, as we shall state
in the Third Part of the work [* Supp., Q. 42, A. 3]. Wherefore we
must reply that Matrimony is not only a sacrament of the Church, but
also an office of nature. Consequently it is lawful to give money for
Matrimony considered as an office of nature, but unlawful if it be
considered as a sacrament of the Church. Hence, according to the law
[*Cap. Cum in Ecclesia, de Simonia], it is forbidden to demand
anything for the Nuptial Blessing.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 100, Art. 3]

Whether It Is Lawful to Give and Receive Money for Spiritual Actions?

Objection 1: It seems that it is lawful to give and receive money for
spiritual actions. The use of prophecy is a spiritual action. But
something used to be given of old for the use of prophecy, as appears
from 1 Kings 9:7, 8, and 3 Kings 14:3. Therefore it would seem that
it is lawful to give and receive money for a spiritual action.

Obj. 2: Further, prayer, preaching, divine praise, are most spiritual
actions. Now money is given to holy persons in order to obtain the
assistance of their prayers, according to Luke 16:9, "Make unto you
friends of the mammon of iniquity." To preachers also, who sow
spiritual things, temporal things are due according to the Apostle (1
Cor. 9:14). Moreover, something is given to those who celebrate the
divine praises in the ecclesiastical office, and make processions:
and sometimes an annual income is assigned to them. Therefore it is
lawful to receive something for spiritual actions.

Obj. 3: Further, science is no less spiritual than power. Now it is
lawful to receive money for the use of science: thus a lawyer may
sell his just advocacy, a physician his advice for health, and a
master the exercise of his teaching. Therefore in like manner it
would seem lawful for a prelate to receive something for the use of
his spiritual power, for instance, for correction, dispensation, and
so forth.

Obj. 4: Further, religion is the state of spiritual perfection. Now
in certain monasteries something is demanded from those who are
received there. Therefore it is lawful to demand something for
spiritual things.

_On the contrary,_ It is stated (I, qu. i [*Can. Quidquid
invisibilis]): "It is absolutely forbidden to make a charge for what
is acquired by the consolation of invisible grace, whether by
demanding a price or by seeking any kind of return whatever." Now all
these spiritual things are acquired through an invisible grace.
Therefore it is not lawful to charge a price or return for them.

_I answer that,_ Just as the sacraments are called spiritual, because
they confer a spiritual grace, so, too, certain other things are
called spiritual, because they flow from spiritual grace and dispose
thereto. And yet these things are obtainable through the ministry of
men, according to 1 Cor. 9:7, "Who serveth as a soldier at any time
at his own charges? Who feedeth the flock, and eateth not of the milk
of the flock?" Hence it is simoniacal to sell or buy that which is
spiritual in such like actions; but to receive or give something for
the support of those who minister spiritual things in accordance with
the statutes of the Church and approved customs is lawful, yet in
such wise that there be no intention of buying or selling, and that
no pressure be brought to bear on those who are unwilling to give, by
withholding spiritual things that ought to be administered, for then
there would be an appearance of simony. But after the spiritual
things have been freely bestowed, then the statutory and customary
offerings and other dues may be exacted from those who are unwilling
but able to pay, if the superior authorize this to be done.

Reply Obj. 1: As Jerome says in his commentary on Mic. 3:9, certain
gifts were freely offered to the good prophets, for their livelihood,
but not as a price for the exercise of their gift of prophecy. Wicked
prophets, however, abused this exercise by demanding payment for it.

Reply Obj. 2: Those who give alms to the poor in order to obtain from
them the assistance of their prayers do not give with the intent of
buying their prayers; but by their gratuitous beneficence inspire the
poor with the mind to pray for them freely and out of charity.
Temporal things are due to the preacher as means for his support, not
as a price of the words he preaches. Hence a gloss on 1 Tim. 5:11,
"Let the priests that rule well," says: "Their need allows them to
receive the wherewithal to live, charity demands that this should be
given to them: yet the Gospel is not for sale, nor is a livelihood
the object of preaching: for if they sell it for this purpose, they
sell a great thing for a contemptible price." In like manner temporal
things are given to those who praise God by celebrating the divine
office whether for the living or for the dead, not as a price but as
a means of livelihood; and the same purpose is fulfilled when alms
are received for making processions in funerals. Yet it is simoniacal
to do such things by contract, or with the intention of buying or
selling. Hence it would be an unlawful ordinance if it were decreed
in any church that no procession would take place at a funeral unless
a certain sum of money were paid, because such an ordinance would
preclude the free granting of pious offices to any person. The
ordinance would be more in keeping with the law, if it were decreed
that this honor would be accorded to all who gave a certain alms,
because this would not preclude its being granted to others.
Moreover, the former ordinance has the appearance of an exaction,
whereas the latter bears a likeness to a gratuitous remuneration.

Reply Obj. 3: A person to whom a spiritual power is entrusted is
bound by virtue of his office to exercise the power entrusted to him
in dispensing spiritual things. Moreover, he receives a statutory
payment from the funds of the Church as a means of livelihood.
Therefore, if he were to accept anything for the exercise of his
spiritual power, this would imply, not a hiring of his labor (which
he is bound to give, as a duty arising out of the office he has
accepted), but a sale of the very use of a spiritual grace. For this
reason it is unlawful for him to receive anything for any dispensing
whatever, or for allowing someone else to take his duty, or for
correcting his subjects, or for omitting to correct them. On the
other hand it is lawful for him to receive "procurations," when he
visits his subjects, not as a price for correcting them, but as a
means of livelihood. He that is possessed of science, without having
taken upon himself the obligation of using it for the benefit of
others can lawfully receive a price for his learning or advice, since
this is not a sale of truth or science, but a hiring of labor. If, on
the other hand, he be so bound by virtue of his office, this would
amount to a sale of the truth, and consequently he would sin
grievously. For instance, those who in certain churches are appointed
to instruct the clerics of that church and other poor persons, and
are in receipt of an ecclesiastical benefice for so doing, are not
allowed to receive anything in return, either for teaching, or for
celebrating or omitting any feasts.

Reply Obj. 4: It is unlawful to exact or receive anything as price
for entering a monastery: but, in the case of small monasteries, that
are unable to support so many persons, it is lawful, while entrance
to the monastery is free, to accept something for the support of
those who are about to be received into the monastery, if its
revenues are insufficient. In like manner it is lawful to be easier
in admitting to a monastery a person who has proved his regard for
that monastery by the generosity of his alms: just as, on the other
hand, it is lawful to incite a person's regard for a monastery by
means of temporal benefits, in order that he may thereby be induced
to enter the monastery; although it is unlawful to agree to give or
receive something for entrance into a monastery (I, qu. ii, cap. Quam
pio).
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 100, Art. 4]

Whether It Is Lawful to Receive Money for Things Annexed to Spiritual
Things?

Objection 1: It would seem lawful to receive money for things annexed
to spiritual things. Seemingly all temporal things are annexed to
spiritual things, since temporal things ought to be sought for the
sake of spiritual things. If, therefore, it is unlawful to sell what
is annexed to spiritual things, it will be unlawful to sell anything
temporal, and this is clearly false.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing would seem to be more annexed to spiritual
things than consecrated vessels. Yet it is lawful to sell a chalice
for the ransom of prisoners, according to Ambrose (De Offic. ii, 28).
Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual things.

Obj. 3: Further, things annexed to spiritual things include right of
burial, right of patronage, and, according to ancient writers, right
of the first-born (because before the Lord the first-born exercised
the priestly office), and the right to receive tithes. Now Abraham
bought from Ephron a double cave for a burying-place (Gen. 23:8,
sqq.), and Jacob bought from Esau the right of the first-born (Gen.
25:31, sqq.). Again the right of patronage is transferred with the
property sold, and is granted "in fee." Tithes are granted to certain
soldiers, and can be redeemed. Prelates also at times retain for
themselves the revenues of prebends of which they have the
presentation, although a prebend is something annexed to a spiritual
thing. Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual
things.

_On the contrary,_ Pope Paschal [*Paschal II] says (cf. I, qu. iii,
cap. Si quis objecerit): "Whoever sells one of two such things, that
the one is unproductive without the other, leaves neither unsold.
Wherefore let no person sell a church, or a prebend, or anything
ecclesiastical."

_I answer that,_ A thing may be annexed to spiritual things in two
ways. First, as being dependent on spiritual things. Thus to have
ecclesiastical benefices is said to be annexed to spiritual things,
because it is not competent save to those who hold a clerical office.
Hence such things can by no means exist apart from spiritual things.
Consequently it is altogether unlawful to sell such things, because
the sale thereof implies the sale of things spiritual. Other things
are annexed to spiritual things through being directed thereto, for
instance the right of patronage, which is directed to the
presentation of clerics to ecclesiastical benefices; and sacred
vessels, which are directed to the use of the sacraments. Wherefore
such things as these do not presuppose spiritual things, but precede
them in the order of time. Hence in a way they can be sold, but not
as annexed to spiritual things.

Reply Obj. 1: All things temporal are annexed to spiritual things, as
to their end, wherefore it is lawful to sell temporal things, but
their relation to spiritual things cannot be the matter of a lawful
sale.

Reply Obj. 2: Sacred vessels also are annexed to spiritual things as
to their end, wherefore their consecration cannot be sold. Yet their
material can be sold for the needs of the Church or of the poor
provided they first be broken, after prayer has been said over them,
since when once broken, they are considered to be no longer sacred
vessels but mere metal: so that if like vessels were to be made out
of the same material they would have to be consecrated again.

Reply Obj. 3: We have no authority for supposing that the double cave
which Abraham bought for a burial place was consecrated for that
purpose: wherefore Abraham could lawfully buy that site to be used
for burial, in order to turn it into a sepulchre: even so it would be
lawful now to buy an ordinary field as a site for a cemetery or even
a church. Nevertheless because even among the Gentiles burial places
are looked upon as religious, if Ephron intended to accept the price
as payment for a burial place, he sinned in selling, though Abraham
did not sin in buying, because he intended merely to buy an ordinary
plot of ground. Even now, it is lawful in a case of necessity to sell
or buy land on which there has previously been a church, as we have
also said with regard to sacred vessels (Reply Obj. 2). Or again,
Abraham is to be excused because he thus freed himself of a
grievance. For although Ephron offered him the burial place for
nothing, Abraham deemed that he could not accept it gratis without
prejudice to himself.

The right of the first-born was due to Jacob by reason of God's
choice, according to Malach. 1:2, 3, "I have loved Jacob, but have
hated Esau." Wherefore Esau sinned by selling his birthright, yet
Jacob sinned not in buying, because he is understood to have freed
himself of his grievance.

The right of patronage cannot be the matter of a direct sale, nor can
it be granted "in fee," but is transferred with the property sold or
granted.

The spiritual right of receiving tithes is not granted to layfolk,
but merely the temporal commodities which are granted in the name of
tithe, as stated above (Q. 87, A. 3).

With regard to the granting of benefices it must, however, be
observed, that it is not unlawful for a bishop, before presenting a
person to a benefice, to decide, for some reason, to retain part of
the revenues of the benefice in question, and to spend it on some
pious object. But, on the other hand, if he were to require part of
the revenues of that benefice to be given to him by the beneficiary,
it would be the same as though he demanded payment from him, and he
would not escape the guilt of simony.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 100, Art. 5]

Whether It Is Lawful to Grant Spiritual Things in Return for an
Equivalent of Service, or for an Oral Remuneration?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to grant spiritual
things in return for an equivalent of service, or an oral
remuneration. Gregory says (Regist. iii, ep. 18): "It is right that
those who serve the interests of the Church should be rewarded." Now
an equivalent of service denotes serving the interests of the Church.
Therefore it seems lawful to confer ecclesiastical benefices for
services received.

Obj. 2: Further, to confer an ecclesiastical benefice for service
received seems to indicate a carnal intention, no less than to do so
on account of kinship. Yet the latter seemingly is not simoniacal
since it implies no buying or selling. Therefore neither is the
former simoniacal.

Obj. 3: Further, that which is done only at another's request would
seem to be done gratis: so that apparently it does not involve
simony, which consists in buying or selling. Now oral remuneration
denotes the conferring of an ecclesiastical benefice at some person's
request. Therefore this is not simoniacal.

Obj. 4: Further, hypocrites perform spiritual deeds in order that
they may receive human praise, which seems to imply oral
remuneration: and yet hypocrites are not said to be guilty of simony.
Therefore oral remuneration does not entail simony.

_On the contrary,_ Pope Urban [*Urban II, Ep. xvii ad Lucium] says:
"Whoever grants or acquires ecclesiastical things, not for the
purpose for which they were instituted but for his own profit, in
consideration of an oral remuneration or of an equivalent in service
rendered or money received, is guilty of simony."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the term "money" denotes
"anything that can have a pecuniary value." Now it is evident that a
man's service is directed to some kind of usefulness, which has a
pecuniary value, wherefore servants are hired for a money wage.
Therefore to grant a spiritual thing for a service rendered or to be
rendered is the same as to grant it for the money, received or
promised, at which that service could be valued. Likewise, to grant a
person's request for the bestowal of a temporary favor is directed to
some kind of usefulness which has a pecuniary value. Wherefore just
as a man contracts the guilt of simony by accepting money or any
external thing which comes under the head of "real remuneration," so
too does he contract it, by receiving "oral remuneration" or an
"equivalent in service rendered."

Reply Obj. 1: If a cleric renders a prelate a lawful service,
directed to spiritual things (e.g. to the good of the Church, or
benefit of her ministers), he becomes worthy of an ecclesiastical
benefice by reason of the devotion that led him to render the
service, as he would by reason of any other good deed. Hence this is
not a case of remuneration for service rendered, such as Gregory has
in mind. But if the service be unlawful, or directed to carnal things
(e.g. a service rendered to the prelate for the profit of his
kindred, or the increase of his patrimony, or the like), it will be a
case of remuneration for service rendered, and this will be simony.

Reply Obj. 2: The bestowal of a spiritual thing gratis on a person by
reason of kinship or of any carnal affection is unlawful and carnal,
but not simoniacal: since nothing is received in return, wherefore it
does not imply a contract of buying and selling, on which simony is
based. But to present a person to an ecclesiastical benefice with the
understanding or intention that he provide for one's kindred from the
revenue is manifest simony.

Reply Obj. 3: Oral remuneration denotes either praise that
pertains to human favor, which has its price, or a request whereby
man's favor is obtained or the contrary avoided. Hence if one intend
this chiefly one commits simony. Now to grant a request made for an
unworthy person implies, seemingly, that this is one's chief intention
wherefore the deed itself is simoniacal. But if the request be made
for a worthy person, the deed itself is not simoniacal, because it is
based on a worthy cause, on account of which a spiritual thing is
granted to the person for whom the request is made. Nevertheless there
may be simony in the intention, if one look, not to the worthiness of
the person, but to human favor. If, however, a person asks for
himself, that he may obtain the cure of souls, his very presumption
renders him unworthy, and so his request is made for an unworthy
person. But, if one be in need, one may lawfully seek for oneself an
ecclesiastical benefice without the cure of souls.

Reply Obj. 4: A hypocrite does not give a spiritual thing for
the sake of praise, he only makes a show of it, and under false
pretenses stealthily purloins rather than buys human praise: so that
seemingly the hypocrite is not guilty of simony.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 100, Art. 6]

Whether Those Who Are Guilty of Simony Are Fittingly Punished by
Being Deprived of What They Have Acquired by Simony?

Objection 1: It would seem that those who are guilty of simony are
not fittingly punished by being deprived of what they have acquired
by simony. Simony is committed by acquiring spiritual things in
return for a remuneration. Now certain spiritual things cannot be
lost when once acquired, such as all characters that are imprinted by
a consecration. Therefore it is not a fitting punishment for a person
to be deprived of what he has acquired simoniacally.

Obj. 2: Further, it sometimes happens that one who has obtained the
episcopate by simony commands a subject of his to receive orders from
him: and apparently the subject should obey, so long as the Church
tolerates him. Yet no one ought to receive from him that has not the
power to give. Therefore a bishop does not lose his episcopal power,
if he has acquired it by simony.

Obj. 3: Further, no one should be punished for what was done without
his knowledge and consent, since punishment is due for sin which is
voluntary, as was shown above (I-II, Q. 74, AA. 1, 2; Q. 77, A. 7).
Now it happens sometimes that a person acquires something spiritual,
which others have procured for him without his knowledge and consent.
Therefore he should not be punished by being deprived of what has
been bestowed on him.

Obj. 4: Further, no one should profit by his own sin. Yet, if a
person who has acquired an ecclesiastical benefice by simony, were to
restore what he has received, this would sometimes turn to the profit
of those who had a share in his simony; for instance, when a prelate
and his entire chapter have consented to the simony. Therefore that
which has been acquired by simony ought not always to be restored.

Obj. 5: Further, sometimes a person obtains admission to a monastery
by simony, and there takes the solemn vow of profession. But no one
should be freed from the obligation of a vow on account of a fault he
has committed. Therefore he should not be expelled from the monastic
state which he has acquired by simony.

Obj. 6: Further, in this world external punishment is not inflicted
for the internal movements of the heart, whereof God alone is the
judge. Now simony is committed in the mere intention or will,
wherefore it is defined in reference to the will, as stated above (A.
1, ad 2). Therefore a person should not always be deprived of what he
has acquired by simony.

Obj. 7: Further, to be promoted to greater dignity is much less than
to retain that which one has already received. Now sometimes those
who are guilty of simony are, by dispensation, promoted to greater
dignity. Therefore they should not always be deprived of what they
have received.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (I, qu. i, cap. Si quis Episcopus):
"He that has been ordained shall profit nothing from his ordination
or promotion that he has acquired by the bargain, but shall forfeit
the dignity or cure that he has acquired with his money."

_I answer that,_ No one can lawfully retain that which he has
acquired against the owner's will. For instance, if a steward were to
give some of his lord's property to a person, against his lord's will
and orders, the recipient could not lawfully retain what he received.
Now Our Lord, Whose stewards and ministers are the prelates of
churches, ordered spiritual things to be given gratis, according to
Matt. 10:8, "Freely have you received, freely give." Wherefore
whosoever acquires spiritual things in return for a remuneration
cannot lawfully retain them. Moreover, those who are guilty of
simony, by either selling or buying spiritual things, as well as
those who act as go-between, are sentenced to other punishments,
namely, infamy and deposition, if they be clerics, and
excommunication if they be laymen, as stated qu. i, cap. Si quis
Episcopus [*Qu. iii, can. Si quis praebendas].

Reply Obj. 1: He that has received a sacred Order simoniacally,
receives the character of the Order on account of the efficacy of the
sacrament: but he does not receive the grace nor the exercise of the
Order, because he has received the character by stealth as it were,
and against the will of the Supreme Lord. Wherefore he is suspended,
by virtue of the law, both as regards himself, namely, that he should
not busy himself about exercising his Order, and as regards others,
namely, that no one may communicate with him in the exercise of his
Order, whether his sin be public or secret. Nor may he reclaim the
money which he basely gave, although the other party unjustly retains
it.

Again, a man who is guilty of simony, through having conferred Orders
simoniacally, or through having simoniacally granted or received a
benefice, or through having been a go-between in a simoniacal
transaction, if he has done so publicly, is suspended by virtue of
the law, as regards both himself and others; but if he has acted in
secret he is suspended by virtue of the law, as regards himself
alone, and not as regards others.

Reply Obj. 2: One ought not to receive Orders from a bishop one knows
to have been promoted simoniacally, either on account of his command
or for fear of his excommunication: and such as receive Orders from
him do not receive the exercise of their Orders, even though they are
ignorant of his being guilty of simony; and they need to receive a
dispensation. Some, however, maintain that one ought to receive
Orders in obedience to his command unless one can prove him to be
guilty of simony, but that one ought not to exercise the Order
without a dispensation. But this is an unreasonable statement,
because no one should obey a man to the extent of communicating with
him in an unlawful action. Now he that is, by virtue of the law,
suspended as regards both himself and others, confers Orders
unlawfully: wherefore no one should communicate with him, by
receiving Orders from him for any cause whatever. If, however, one be
not certain on the point, one ought not to give credence to another's
sin, and so one ought with a good conscience to receive Orders from
him. And if the bishop has been guilty of simony otherwise than by a
simoniacal promotion, and the fact be a secret, one can receive
Orders from him because he is not suspended as regards others, but
only as regards himself, as stated above (ad 1).

Reply Obj. 3: To be deprived of what one has received is not only the
punishment of a sin, but is also sometimes the effect of acquiring
unjustly, as when one buys a thing of a person who cannot sell it.
Wherefore if a man, knowingly and spontaneously, receives Orders or
an ecclesiastical benefice simoniacally, not only is he deprived of
what he has received, by forfeiting the exercise of his order, and
resigning the benefice and the fruits acquired therefrom, but also in
addition to this he is punished by being marked with infamy.
Moreover, he is bound to restore not only the fruit actually
acquired, but also such as could have been acquired by a careful
possessor (which, however, is to be understood of the net fruits,
allowance being made for expenses incurred on account of the fruits),
excepting those fruits that have been expended for the good of the
Church.

On the other hand, if a man's promotion be procured simoniacally by
others, without his knowledge and consent, he forfeits the exercise
of his Order, and is bound to resign the benefice obtained together
with fruits still extant; but he is not bound to restore the fruits
which he has consumed, since he possessed them in good faith.
Exception must be made in the case when his promotion has been
deceitfully procured by an enemy of his; or when he expressly opposes
the transaction, for then he is not bound to resign, unless
subsequently he agree to the transaction, by paying what was promised.

Reply Obj. 4: Money, property, or fruits simoniacally received, must
be restored to the Church that has incurred loss by their transfer,
notwithstanding the fact that the prelate or a member of the chapter
of that church was at fault, since others ought not to be the losers
by his sin: in suchwise, however, that, as far as possible, the
guilty parties be not the gainers. But if the prelate and the entire
chapter be at fault, restitution must be made, with the consent of
superior authority, either to the poor or to some other church.

Reply Obj. 5: If there are any persons who have been simoniacally
admitted into a monastery, they must quit: and if the simony was
committed with their knowledge since the holding of the General
Council [*Fourth Lateran Council, A.D. 1215, held by Innocent III],
they must be expelled from their monastery without hope of return,
and do perpetual penance under a stricter rule, or in some house of
the same order, if a stricter one be not found. If, however, this
took place before the Council, they must be placed in other houses of
the same order. If this cannot be done, they must be received into
monasteries of the same order, by way of compensation, lest they
wander about the world, but they must not be admitted to their former
rank, and must be assigned a lower place.

On the other hand, if they were received simoniacally, without their
knowledge, whether before or after the Council, then after quitting
they may be received again, their rank being changed as stated.

Reply Obj. 6: In God's sight the mere will makes a man guilty of
simony; but as regards the external ecclesiastical punishment he is
not punished as a simoniac, by being obliged to resign, but is bound
to repent of his evil intention.

Reply Obj. 7: The Pope alone can grant a dispensation to one who has
knowingly received a benefice (simoniacally). In other cases the
bishop also can dispense, provided the beneficiary first of all
renounce what he has received simoniacally, so that he will receive
either the lesser dispensation allowing him to communicate with the
laity, or a greater dispensation, allowing him after doing penance to
retain his order in some other Church; or again a greater
dispensation, allowing him to remain in the same Church, but in minor
orders; or a full dispensation allowing him to exercise even the
major orders in the same Church, but not to accept a prelacy.
_______________________

QUESTION 101

OF PIETY
(In Four Articles)

After religion we must consider piety, the consideration of which
will render the opposite vices manifest. Accordingly four points of
inquiry arise with regard to piety:

(1) To whom does piety extend?

(2) What does piety make one offer a person?

(3) Whether piety is a special virtue?

(4) Whether the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of
religion?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 101, Art. 1]

Whether Piety Extends to Particular Human Individuals?

Objection 1: It seems that piety does not extend to particular human
individuals. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x) that piety denotes,
properly speaking, the worship of God, which the Greeks designate by
the term _eusebeia_. But the worship of God does not denote relation
to man, but only to God. Therefore piety does not extend definitely
to certain human individuals.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i): "Piety, on her day,
provides a banquet, because she fills the inmost recesses of the
heart with works of mercy." Now the works of mercy are to be done to
all, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i). Therefore piety
does not extend definitely to certain special persons.

Obj. 3: Further, in human affairs there are many other mutual
relations besides those of kindred and citizenship, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 11, 12), and on each of them is
founded a kind of friendship, which would seem to be the virtue of
piety, according to a gloss on 2 Tim. 3:5, "Having an appearance
indeed of piety [Douay: 'godliness']." Therefore piety extends not
only to one's kindred and fellow-citizens.

_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by
piety that we do our duty towards our kindred and well-wishers of our
country and render them faithful service."

_I answer that,_ Man becomes a debtor to other men in various ways,
according to their various excellence and the various benefits
received from them. On both counts God holds first place, for He is
supremely excellent, and is for us the first principle of being and
government. In the second place, the principles of our being and
government are our parents and our country, that have given us birth
and nourishment. Consequently man is debtor chiefly to his parents
and his country, after God. Wherefore just as it belongs to religion
to give worship to God, so does it belong to piety, in the second
place, to give worship to one's parents and one's country.

The worship due to our parents includes the worship given to all our
kindred, since our kinsfolk are those who descend from the same
parents, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12). The worship
given to our country includes homage to all our fellow-citizens and
to all the friends of our country. Therefore piety extends chiefly to
these.

Reply Obj. 1: The greater includes the lesser: wherefore the worship
due to God includes the worship due to our parents as a particular.
Hence it is written (Malach. 1:6): "If I be a father, where is My
honor?" Consequently the term piety extends also to the divine
worship.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), "the term piety is
often used in connection with works of mercy, in the language of the
common people; the reason for which I consider to be the fact that
God Himself has declared that these works are more pleasing to Him
than sacrifices. This custom has led to the application of the word
'pious' to God Himself."

Reply Obj. 3: The relations of a man with his kindred and
fellow-citizens are more referable to the principles of his being
than other relations: wherefore the term piety is more applicable to
them.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 101, Art. 2]

Whether Piety Provides Support for Our Parents?

Objection 1: It seems that piety does not provide support for our
parents. For, seemingly, the precept of the decalogue, "Honor thy
father and mother," belongs to piety. But this prescribes only the
giving of honor. Therefore it does not belong to piety to provide
support for one's parents.

Obj. 2: Further, a man is bound to lay up for those whom he is bound
to support. Now according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 12:14), "neither
ought the children to lay up for the parents." Therefore piety does
not oblige them to support their parents.

Obj. 3: Further, piety extends not only to one's parents, but also to
other kinsmen and to one's fellow-citizens, as stated above (A. 1).
But one is not bound to support all one's kindred and
fellow-citizens. Therefore neither is one bound to support one's
parents.

_On the contrary,_ our Lord (Matt. 15:3-6) reproved the Pharisees for
hindering children from supporting their parents.

_I answer that,_ We owe something to our parents in two ways: that is
to say, both essentially, and accidentally. We owe them essentially
that which is due to a father as such: and since he is his son's
superior through being the principle of his being, the latter owes
him reverence and service. Accidentally, that is due to a father,
which it befits him to receive in respect of something accidental to
him, for instance, if he be ill, it is fitting that his children
should visit him and see to his cure; if he be poor, it is fitting
that they should support him; and so on in like instance, all of
which come under the head of service due. Hence Tully says (De
Invent. Rhet. ii) that "piety gives both duty and homage": "duty"
referring to service, and "homage" to reverence or honor, because, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), "we are said to give homage to those
whose memory or presence we honor."

Reply Obj. 1: According to our Lord's interpretation (Matt. 15:3-6)
the honor due to our parents includes whatever support we owe them;
and the reason for this is that support is given to one's father
because it is due to him as to one greater.

Reply Obj. 2: Since a father stands in the relation of principle, and
his son in the relation of that which is from a principle, it is
essentially fitting for a father to support his son: and consequently
he is bound to support him not only for a time, but for all his life,
and this is to lay by. On the other hand, for the son to bestow
something on his father is accidental, arising from some momentary
necessity, wherein he is bound to support him, but not to lay by as
for a long time beforehand, because naturally parents are not the
successors of their children, but children of their parents.

Reply Obj. 3: As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), "we offer homage
and duty to all our kindred and to the well-wishers of our country";
not, however, equally to all, but chiefly to our parents, and to
others according to our means and their personal claims.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 101, Art. 3]

Whether Piety Is a Special Virtue Distinct from Other Virtues?

Objection 1: It seems that piety is not a special virtue distinct
from other virtues. For the giving of service and homage to anyone
proceeds from love. But it belongs to piety. Therefore piety is not a
distinct virtue from charity.

Obj. 2: Further, it is proper to religion to give worship to God. But
piety also gives worship to God, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei
x). Therefore piety is not distinct from religion.

Obj. 3: Further, piety, whereby we give our country worship and duty,
seems to be the same as legal justice, which looks to the common
good. But legal justice is a general virtue, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1, 2). Therefore piety is not a special virtue.

_On the contrary,_ It is accounted by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) as
a part of justice.

_I answer that,_ A special virtue is one that regards an object under
a special aspect. Since, then, the nature of justice consists in
rendering another person his due, wherever there is a special aspect
of something due to a person, there is a special virtue. Now a thing
is indebted in a special way to that which is its connatural
principle of being and government. And piety regards this principle,
inasmuch as it pays duty and homage to our parents and country, and
to those who are related thereto. Therefore piety is a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as religion is a protestation of faith, hope and
charity, whereby man is primarily directed to God, so again piety is
a protestation of the charity we bear towards our parents and country.

Reply Obj. 2: God is the principle of our being and government in a
far more excellent manner than one's father or country. Hence
religion, which gives worship to God, is a distinct virtue from
piety, which pays homage to our parents and country. But things
relating to creatures are transferred to God as the summit of
excellence and causality, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): wherefore,
by way of excellence, piety designates the worship of God, even as
God, by way of excellence, is called "Our Father."

Reply Obj. 3: Piety extends to our country in so far as the latter is
for us a principle of being: but legal justice regards the good of
our country, considered as the common good: wherefore legal justice
has more of the character of a general virtue than piety has.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 101, Art. 4]

Whether the Duties of Piety Towards One's Parents Should Be Omitted
for the Sake of Religion?

Objection 1: It seems that the duties of piety towards one's parents
should be omitted for the sake of religion. For Our Lord said (Luke
14:26): "If any man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother,
and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea and his own
life also, he cannot be My disciple." Hence it is said in praise of
James and John (Matt. 4:22) that they left "their nets and father,
and followed" Christ. Again it is said in praise of the Levites
(Deut. 33:9): "Who hath said to his father, and to his mother: I do
not know you; and to his brethren: I know you not; and their own
children they have not known. These have kept Thy word." Now a man
who knows not his parents and other kinsmen, or who even hates them,
must needs omit the duties of piety. Therefore the duties of piety
should be omitted for the sake of religion.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Luke 9:59, 60) that in answer to him
who said: "Suffer me first to go and bury my father," Our Lord
replied: "Let the dead bury their dead: but go thou, and preach the
kingdom of God." Now the latter pertains to religion, while it is a
duty of piety to bury one's father. Therefore a duty of piety should
be omitted for the sake of religion.

Obj. 3: Further, God is called "Our Father" by excellence. Now just
as we worship our parents by paying them the duties of piety so do we
worship God by religion. Therefore the duties of piety should be
omitted for the sake of the worship of religion.

Obj. 4: Further, religious are bound by a vow which they may not
break to fulfil the observances of religion. Now in accordance with
those observances they are hindered from supporting their parents,
both on the score of poverty, since they have nothing of their own,
and on the score of obedience, since they may not leave the cloister
without the permission of their superior. Therefore the duties of
piety towards one's parents should be omitted for the sake of
religion.

_On the contrary,_ Our Lord reproved the Pharisees (Matt. 15:3-6) who
taught that for the sake of religion one ought to refrain from paying
one's parents the honor we owe them.

_I answer that,_ Religion and piety are two virtues. Now no virtue is
opposed to another virtue, since according to the Philosopher, in his
book on the Categories (Cap. De oppos.), "good is not opposed to
good." Therefore it is impossible that religion and piety mutually
hinder one another, so that the act of one be excluded by the act of
the other. Now, as stated above (I-II, Q. 7, A. 2; Q. 18, A. 3), the
act of every virtue is limited by the circumstances due thereto, and
if it overstep them it will be an act no longer of virtue but of
vice. Hence it belongs to piety to pay duty and homage to one's
parents according to the due mode. But it is not the due mode that
man should tend to worship his father rather than God, but, as
Ambrose says on Luke 12:52, "the piety of divine religion takes
precedence of the claims of kindred."

Accordingly, if the worship of one's parents take one away from the
worship of God it would no longer be an act of piety to pay worship
to one's parents to the prejudice of God. Hence Jerome says (Ep. ad
Heliod.): "Though thou trample upon thy father, though thou spurn thy
mother, turn not aside, but with dry eyes hasten to the standard of
the cross; it is the highest degree of piety to be cruel in this
matter." Therefore in such a case the duties of piety towards one's
parents should be omitted for the sake of the worship religion gives
to God. If, however, by paying the services due to our parents, we
are not withdrawn from the service of God, then will it be an act of
piety, and there will be no need to set piety aside for the sake of
religion.

Reply Obj. 1: Gregory expounding this saying of our Lord says (Hom.
xxxvii in Ev.) that "when we find our parents to be a hindrance in
our way to God, we must ignore them by hating and fleeing from them."
For if our parents incite us to sin, and withdraw us from the service
of God, we must, as regards this point, abandon and hate them. It is
in this sense that the Levites are said to have not known their
kindred, because they obeyed the Lord's command, and spared not the
idolaters (Ex. 32). James and John are praised for leaving their
parents and following our Lord, not that their father incited them to
evil, but because they deemed it possible for him to find another
means of livelihood, if they followed Christ.

Reply Obj. 2: Our Lord forbade the disciple to bury his father
because, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matth.), "Our Lord
by so doing saved him from many evils, such as the sorrows and
worries and other things that one anticipates under these
circumstances. For after the burial the will had to be read, the
estate had to be divided, and so forth: but chiefly, because there
were others who could see to the funeral." Or, according to Cyril's
commentary on Luke 9, "this disciple's request was, not that he might
bury a dead father, but that he might support a yet living father in
the latter's old age, until at length he should bury him. This is
what Our Lord did not grant, because there were others, bound by the
duties of kindred, to take care of him."

Reply Obj. 3: Whatever we give our parents out of piety is referred
by us to God; just as other works of mercy which we perform with
regard to any of our neighbors are offered to God, according to Matt.
25:40: "As long as you did it to one of . . . My least . . . you did
it to Me." Accordingly, if our carnal parents stand in need of our
assistance, so that they have no other means of support, provided
they incite us to nothing against God, we must not abandon them for
the sake of religion. But if we cannot devote ourselves to their
service without sin, or if they can be supported without our
assistance, it is lawful to forego their service, so as to give more
time to religion.

Reply Obj. 4: We must speak differently of one who is yet in the
world, and of one who has made his profession in religion. For he
that is in the world, if he has parents unable to find support
without him, he must not leave them and enter religion, because he
would be breaking the commandment prescribing the honoring of
parents. Some say, however, that even then he might abandon them, and
leave them in God's care. But this, considered aright, would be to
tempt God: since, while having human means at hand, he would be
exposing his parents to danger, in the hope of God's assistance. On
the other hand, if the parents can find means of livelihood without
him, it is lawful for him to abandon them and enter religion, because
children are not bound to support their parents except in cases of
necessity, as stated above. He that has already made his profession
in religion is deemed to be already dead to the world: wherefore he
ought not, under pretext of supporting his parents, to leave the
cloister where he is buried with Christ, and busy himself once more
with worldly affairs. Nevertheless he is bound, saving his obedience
to his superiors, and his religious state withal, to make points
efforts for his parents' support.
_______________________

QUESTION 102

OF OBSERVANCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF, AND OF ITS PARTS
(In Three Articles)

We must now consider observance and its parts, the considerations of
which will manifest the contrary vices.

Under the head of observance there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other
virtues?

(2) What does observance offer?

(3) Of its comparison with piety.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 102, Art. 1]

Whether Observance Is a Special Virtue, Distinct from Other Virtues?

Objection 1: It seems that observance is not a special virtue,
distinct from other virtues. For virtues are distinguished by their
objects. But the object of observance is not distinct from the object
of piety: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by
observance that we pay worship and honor to those who excel in some
kind of dignity." But worship and honor are paid also by piety to our
parents, who excel in dignity. Therefore observance is not a distinct
virtue from piety.

Obj. 2: Further, just as honor and worship are due to those that are
in a position of dignity, so also are they due to those who excel in
science and virtue. But there is no special virtue whereby we pay
honor and worship to those who excel in science and virtue. Therefore
observance, whereby we pay worship and honor to those who excel in
dignity, is not a special virtue distinct from other virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, we have many duties towards those who are in a
position of dignity, the fulfilment of which is required by law,
according to Rom. 13:7, "Render . . . to all men their dues: tribute
to whom tribute is due," etc. Now the fulfilment of the requirements
of the law belongs to legal justice, or even to special justice.
Therefore observance is not by itself a special virtue distinct from
other virtues.

_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons observance
along with the other parts of justice, which are special virtues.

_I answer that,_ As explained above (Q. 101, AA. 1, 3; Q. 80),
according to the various excellences of those persons to whom
something is due, there must needs be a corresponding distinction of
virtues in a descending order. Now just as a carnal father partakes
of the character of principle in a particular way, which character is
found in God in a universal way, so too a person who, in some way,
exercises providence in one respect, partakes of the character of
father in a particular way, since a father is the principle of
generation, of education, of learning and of whatever pertains to the
perfection of human life: while a person who is in a position of
dignity is as a principle of government with regard to certain
things: for instance, the governor of a state in civil matters, the
commander of an army in matters of warfare, a professor in matters of
learning, and so forth. Hence it is that all such persons are
designated as "fathers," on account of their being charged with like
cares: thus the servants of Naaman said to him (4 Kings 5:13):
"Father, if the prophet had bid thee do some great thing," etc.

Therefore, just as, in a manner, beneath religion, whereby worship is
given to God, we find piety, whereby we worship our parents; so under
piety we find observance, whereby worship and honor are paid to
persons in positions of dignity.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 101, A. 3, ad 2), religion goes by
the name of piety by way of supereminence, although piety properly so
called is distinct from religion; and in the same way piety can be
called observance by way of excellence, although observance properly
speaking is distinct from piety.

Reply Obj. 2: By the very fact of being in a position of dignity a
man not only excels as regards his position, but also has a certain
power of governing subjects, wherefore it is fitting that he should
be considered as a principle inasmuch as he is the governor of
others. On the other hand, the fact that a man has perfection of
science and virtue does not give him the character of a principle in
relation to others, but merely a certain excellence in himself.
Wherefore a special virtue is appointed for the payment of worship
and honor to persons in positions of dignity. Yet, forasmuch as
science, virtue and all like things render a man fit for positions of
dignity, the respect which is paid to anyone on account of any
excellence whatever belongs to the same virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to special justice, properly speaking, to
pay the equivalent to those to whom we owe anything. Now this cannot
be done to the virtuous, and to those who make good use of their
position of dignity, as neither can it be done to God, nor to our
parents. Consequently these matters belong to an annexed virtue, and
not to special justice, which is a principal virtue.

Legal justice extends to the acts of all the virtues, as stated above
(Q. 58, A. 6).
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 102, Art. 2]

Whether It Belongs to Observance to Pay Worship and Honor to Those
Who Are in Positions of Dignity?

Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to observance to pay
worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity. For according
to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x), we are said to worship those persons
whom we hold in honor, so that worship and honor would seem to be the
same. Therefore it is unfitting to define observance as paying
worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity.

Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to justice that we pay what we owe:
wherefore this belongs to observance also, since it is a part of
justice. Now we do not owe worship and honor to all persons in
positions of dignity, but only to those who are placed over us.
Therefore observance is unfittingly defined as giving worship and
honor to all.

Obj. 3: Further, not only do we owe honor to persons of dignity who
are placed over us; we owe them also fear and a certain payment of
remuneration, according to Rom. 13:7, "Render . . . to all men their
dues; tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to
whom fear; honor to whom honor." Moreover, we owe them reverence and
subjection, according to Heb. 13:17, "Obey your prelates, and be
subject to them." Therefore observance is not fittingly defined as
paying worship and honor.

_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by
observance that we pay worship and honor to those who excel in some
kind of dignity."

_I answer that,_ It belongs to persons in positions of dignity to
govern subjects. Now to govern is to move certain ones to their due
end: thus a sailor governs his ship by steering it to port. But every
mover has a certain excellence and power over that which is moved.
Wherefore, a person in a position of dignity is an object of twofold
consideration: first, in so far as he obtains excellence of position,
together with a certain power over subjects: secondly, as regards the
exercise of his government. In respect of his excellence there is due
to him honor, which is the recognition of some kind of excellence;
and in respect of the exercise of his government, there is due to him
worship, consisting in rendering him service, by obeying his
commands, and by repaying him, according to one's faculty, for the
benefits we received from him.

Reply Obj. 1: Worship includes not only honor, but also whatever
other suitable actions are connected with the relations between man
and man.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 80), debt is twofold. One is legal
debt, to pay which man is compelled by law; and thus man owes honor
and worship to those persons in positions of dignity who are placed
over him. The other is moral debt, which is due by reason of a
certain honesty: it is in this way that we owe worship and honor to
persons in positions of dignity even though we be not their subjects.

Reply Obj. 3: Honor is due to the excellence of persons in positions
of dignity, on account of their higher rank: while fear is due to
them on account of their power to use compulsion: and to the exercise
of their government there is due both obedience, whereby subjects are
moved at the command of their superiors, and tributes, which are a
repayment of their labor.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 102, Art. 3]

Whether Observance Is a Greater Virtue Than Piety?

Objection 1: It seems that observance is a greater virtue than piety.
For the prince to whom worship is paid by observance is compared to a
father who is worshiped by piety, as a universal to a particular
governor; because the household which a father governs is part of the
state which is governed by the prince. Now a universal power is
greater, and inferiors are more subject thereto. Therefore observance
is a greater virtue than piety.

Obj. 2: Further, persons in positions of dignity take care of the
common good. Now our kindred pertain to the private good, which we
ought to set aside for the common good: wherefore it is praiseworthy
to expose oneself to the danger of death for the sake of the common
good. Therefore observance, whereby worship is paid to persons in
positions of dignity, is a greater virtue than piety, which pays
worship to one's kindred.

Obj. 3: Further honor and reverence are due to the virtuous in the
first place after God. Now honor and reverence are paid to the
virtuous by the virtue of observance, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3).
Therefore observance takes the first place after religion.

_On the contrary,_ The precepts of the Law prescribe acts of virtue.
Now, immediately after the precepts of religion, which belong to the
first table, follows the precept of honoring our parents which refers
to piety. Therefore piety follows immediately after religion in the
order of excellence.

_I answer that,_ Something may be paid to persons in positions of
dignity in two ways. First, in relation to the common good, as when
one serves them in the administration of the affairs of the state.
This no longer belongs to observance, but to piety, which pays
worship not only to one's father but also to one's fatherland.
Secondly, that which is paid to persons in positions of dignity
refers specially to their personal usefulness or renown, and this
belongs properly to observance, as distinct from piety. Therefore in
comparing observance with piety we must needs take into consideration
the different relations in which other persons stand to ourselves,
which relations both virtues regard. Now it is evident that the
persons of our parents and of our kindred are more substantially akin
to us than persons in positions of dignity, since birth and
education, which originate in the father, belong more to one's
substance than external government, the principle of which is seated
in those who are in positions of dignity. For this reason piety takes
precedence of observance, inasmuch as it pays worship to persons more
akin to us, and to whom we are more strictly bound.

Reply Obj. 1: The prince is compared to the father as a universal to
a particular power, as regards external government, but not as
regards the father being a principle of generation: for in this way
the father should be compared with the divine power from which all
things derive their being.

Reply Obj. 2: In so far as persons in positions of dignity are
related to the common good, their worship does not pertain to
observance, but to piety, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: The rendering of honor or worship should be
proportionate to the person to whom it is paid not only as considered
in himself, but also as compared to those who pay them. Wherefore,
though virtuous persons, considered in themselves, are more worthy of
honor than the persons of one's parents, yet children are under a
greater obligation, on account of the benefits they have received
from their parents and their natural kinship with them, to pay
worship and honor to their parents than to virtuous persons who are
not of their kindred.
_______________________

QUESTION 103

OF DULIA
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the parts of observance. We shall consider
(1) dulia, whereby we pay honor and other things pertaining thereto
to those who are in a higher position; (2) obedience, whereby we obey
their commands.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether honor is a spiritual or a corporal thing?

(2) Whether honor is due to those only who are in a higher position?

(3) Whether dulia, which pays honor and worship to those who are
above us, is a special virtue, distinct from latria?

(4) Whether it contains several species?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 103, Art. 1]

Whether Honor Denotes Something Corporal?

Objection 1: It seems that honor does not denote something corporal.
For honor is showing reverence in acknowledgment of virtue, as may be
gathered from the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5). Now showing reverence is
something spiritual, since to revere is an act of fear, as stated
above (Q. 81, A. 2, ad 1). Therefore honor is something spiritual.

Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), "honor
is the reward of virtue." Now, since virtue consists chiefly of
spiritual things, its reward is not something corporal, for the
reward is more excellent than the merit. Therefore honor does not
consist of corporal things.

Obj. 3: Further, honor is distinct from praise, as also from glory.
Now praise and glory consist of external things. Therefore honor
consists of things internal and spiritual.

_On the contrary,_ Jerome in his exposition of 1 Tim. 5:3, "Honor
widows that are widows indeed," and (1 Tim. 5:17), "let the priests
that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honor" etc. says (Ep. ad
Ageruch.): "Honor here stands either for almsgiving or for
remuneration." Now both of these pertain to [corporal] things.
Therefore honor consists of corporal things.

_I answer that,_ Honor denotes a witnessing to a person's excellence.
Therefore men who wish to be honored seek a witnessing to their
excellence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5; viii, 8). Now
witness is borne either before God or before man. Before God, Who is
the searcher of hearts, the witness of one's conscience suffices.
wherefore honor, so far as God is concerned, may consist of the mere
internal movement of the heart, for instance when a man acknowledges
either God's excellence or another man's excellence before God. But,
as regards men, one cannot bear witness, save by means of signs,
either by words, as when one proclaims another's excellence by word
of mouth, or by deeds, for instance by bowing, saluting, and so
forth, or by external things, as by offering gifts, erecting statues,
and the like. Accordingly honor consists of signs, external and
corporal.

Reply Obj. 1: Reverence is not the same as honor: but on the one hand
it is the primary motive for showing honor, in so far as one man
honors another out of the reverence he has for him; and on the other
hand, it is the end of honor, in so far as a person is honored in
order that he may be held in reverence by others.

Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), honor is
not a sufficient reward of virtue: yet nothing in human and corporal
things can be greater than honor, since these corporal things
themselves are employed as signs in acknowledgment of excelling
virtue. It is, however, due to the good and the beautiful, that they
may be made known, according to Matt. 5:15, "Neither do men light a
candle, and put it under a bushel, but upon a candlestick, that it
may shine to all that are in the house." In this sense honor is said
to be the reward of virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: Praise is distinguished from honor in two ways.
First, because praise consists only of verbal signs, whereas honor
consists of any external signs, so that praise is included in honor.
Secondly, because by paying honor to a person we bear witness to a
person's excelling goodness absolutely, whereas by praising him we
bear witness to his goodness in reference to an end: thus we praise
one that works well for an end. On the other hand, honor is given even
to the best, which is not referred to an end, but has already arrived
at the end, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5).

Glory is the effect of honor and praise, since the result of our
bearing witness to a person's goodness is that his goodness becomes
clear to the knowledge of many. The word "glory" signifies this, for
"glory" is the same as _kleria_, wherefore a gloss of Augustine on
Rom. 16:27 observes that glory is "clear knowledge together with
praise."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 103, Art. 2]

Whether Honor Is Properly Due to Those Who Are Above Us?

Objection 1: It seems that honor is not properly due to those who are
above us. For an angel is above any human wayfarer, according to
Matt. 11:11, "He that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater
than John the Baptist." Yet an angel forbade John when the latter
wished to honor him (Apoc. 22:10). Therefore honor is not due to
those who are above us.

Obj. 2: Further, honor is due to a person in acknowledgment of his
virtue, as stated above (A. 1; Q. 63, A. 3). But sometimes those who
are above us are not virtuous. Therefore honor is not due to them, as
neither is it due to the demons, who nevertheless are above us in the
order of nature.

Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 12:10): "With honor
preventing one another," and we read (1 Pet. 2:17): "Honor all men."
But this would not be so if honor were due to those alone who are
above us. Therefore honor is not due properly to those who are above
us.

Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Tob. 1:16) that Tobias "had ten
talents of silver of that which he had been honored by the king": and
we read (Esther 6:11) that Assuerus honored Mardochaeus, and ordered
it to be proclaimed in his presence: "This honor is he worthy of whom
the king hath a mind to honor." Therefore honor is paid to those also
who are beneath us, and it seems, in consequence, that honor is not
due properly to those who are above us.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 12) that "honor is
due to the best."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), honor is nothing but an
acknowledgment of a person's excelling goodness. Now a person's
excellence may be considered, not only in relation to those who honor
him, in the point of his being more excellent than they, but also in
itself, or in relation to other persons, and in this way honor is
always due to a person, on account of some excellence or superiority.

For the person honored has no need to be more excellent than those
who honor him; it may suffice for him to be more excellent than some
others, or again he may be more excellent than those who honor him in
some respect and not simply.

Reply Obj. 1: The angel forbade John to pay him, not any kind of
honor, but the honor of adoration and latria, which is due to God. Or
again, he forbade him to pay the honor of dulia, in order to indicate
the dignity of John himself, for which Christ equaled him to the
angels "according to the hope of glory of the children of God":
wherefore he refused to be honored by him as though he were superior
to him.

Reply Obj. 2: A wicked superior is honored for the excellence, not of
his virtue but of his dignity, as being God's minister, and because
the honor paid to him is paid to the whole community over which he
presides. As for the demons, they are wicked beyond recall, and
should be looked upon as enemies, rather than treated with honor.

Reply Obj. 3: In every man is to be found something that makes it
possible to deem him better than ourselves, according to Phil. 2:3,
"In humility, let each esteem others better than themselves," and
thus, too, we should all be on the alert to do honor to one another.

Reply Obj. 4: Private individuals are sometimes honored by kings, not
that they are above them in the order of dignity but on account of
some excellence of their virtue: and in this way Tobias and
Mardochaeus were honored by kings.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 103, Art. 3]

Whether Dulia Is a Special Virtue Distinct from Latria?

Objection 1. It seems that dulia is not a special virtue distinct
from latria. For a gloss on Ps. 7:1, "O Lord my God, in Thee have I
put my trust," says: "Lord of all by His power, to Whom dulia is due;
God by creation, to Whom we owe latria." Now the virtue directed to
God as Lord is not distinct from that which is directed to Him as
God. Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria.

Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 8), "to
be loved is like being honored." Now the charity with which we love
God is the same as that whereby we love our neighbor. Therefore dulia
whereby we honor our neighbor is not a distinct virtue from latria
with which we honor God.

Obj. 3: Further, the movement whereby one is moved towards an image
is the same as the movement whereby one is moved towards the thing
represented by the image. Now by dulia we honor a man as being made
to the image of God. For it is written of the wicked (Wis. 2:22, 23)
that "they esteemed not the honor of holy souls, for God created man
incorruptible, and to the image of His own likeness He made him."
Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria whereby God is
honored.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), that "the homage
due to man, of which the Apostle spoke when he commanded servants to
obey their masters and which in Greek is called dulia, is distinct
from latria which denotes the homage that consists in the worship of
God."

_I answer that,_ According to what has been stated above (Q. 101, A.
3), where there are different aspects of that which is due, there
must needs be different virtues to render those dues. Now servitude
is due to God and to man under different aspects: even as lordship is
competent to God and to man under different aspects. For God has
absolute and paramount lordship over the creature wholly and singly,
which is entirely subject to His power: whereas man partakes of a
certain likeness to the divine lordship, forasmuch as he exercises a
particular power over some man or creature. Wherefore dulia, which
pays due service to a human lord, is a distinct virtue from latria,
which pays due service to the lordship of God. It is, moreover, a
species of observance, because by observance we honor all those who
excel in dignity, while dulia properly speaking is the reverence of
servants for their master, dulia being the Greek for servitude.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as religion is called piety by way of excellence,
inasmuch as God is our Father by way of excellence, so again latria
is called dulia by way of excellence, inasmuch as God is our Lord by
way of excellence. Now the creature does not partake of the power to
create by reason of which latria is due to God: and so this gloss
drew a distinction, by ascribing latria to God in respect of
creation, which is not communicated to a creature, but dulia in
respect of lordship, which is communicated to a creature.

Reply Obj. 2: The reason why we love our neighbor is God, since that
which we love in our neighbor through charity is God alone. Wherefore
the charity with which we love God is the same as that with which we
love our neighbor. Yet there are other friendships distinct from
charity, in respect of the other reasons for which a man is loved. In
like manner, since there is one reason for serving God and another
for serving man, and for honoring the one or the other, latria and
dulia are not the same virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: Movement towards an image as such is referred to the
thing represented by the image: yet not every movement towards an
image is referred to the image as such, and consequently sometimes
the movement to the image differs specifically from the movement to
the thing. Accordingly we must reply that the honor or subjection of
dulia regards some dignity of a man absolutely. For though, in
respect of that dignity, man is made to the image or likeness of God,
yet in showing reverence to a person, one does not always refer this
to God actually.

Or we may reply that the movement towards an image is, after a
fashion, towards the thing, yet the movement towards the thing need
not be towards its image. Wherefore reverence paid to a person as the
image of God redounds somewhat to God: and yet this differs from the
reverence that is paid to God Himself, for this in no way refers to
His image.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 103, Art. 4]

Whether Dulia Has Various Species?

Objection 1: It seems that dulia has various species. For by dulia we
show honor to our neighbor. Now different neighbors are honored under
different aspects, for instance king, father and master, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 2). Since this difference of aspect in
the object differentiates the species of virtue, it seems that dulia
is divided into specifically different virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, the mean differs specifically from the extremes, as
pale differs from white and black. Now hyperdulia is apparently a
mean between latria and dulia: for it is shown towards creatures
having a special affinity to God, for instance to the Blessed Virgin
as being the mother of God. Therefore it seems that there are
different species of dulia, one being simply dulia, the other
hyperdulia.

Obj. 3: Further, just as in the rational creature we find the image
of God, for which reason it is honored, so too in the irrational
creature we find the trace of God. Now the aspect of likeness denoted
by an image differs from the aspect conveyed by a trace. Therefore we
must distinguish a corresponding difference of dulia: and all the
more since honor is shown to certain irrational creatures, as, for
instance, to the wood of the Holy Cross.

_On the contrary,_ Dulia is condivided with latria. But latria is not
divided into different species. Neither therefore is dulia.

_I answer that,_ Dulia may be taken in two ways. In one way it may be
taken in a wide sense as denoting reverence paid to anyone on account
of any kind of excellence, and thus it comprises piety and
observance, and any similar virtue whereby reverence is shown towards
a man. Taken in this sense it will have parts differing specifically
from one another. In another way it may be taken in a strict sense as
denoting the reverence of a servant for his lord, for dulia signifies
servitude, as stated above (A. 3). Taken in this sense it is not
divided into different species, but is one of the species of
observance, mentioned by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii), for the reason
that a servant reveres his lord under one aspect, a soldier his
commanding officer under another, the disciple his master under
another, and so on in similar cases.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes dulia in a wide sense.

Reply Obj. 2: Hyperdulia is the highest species of dulia taken in a
wide sense, since the greatest reverence is that which is due to a
man by reason of his having an affinity to God.

Reply Obj. 3: Man owes neither subjection nor honor to an irrational
creature considered in itself, indeed all such creatures are
naturally subject to man. As to the Cross of Christ, the honor we pay
to it is the same as that which we pay to Christ, just as the king's
robe receives the same honor as the king himself, according to
Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv).
_______________________

QUESTION 104

OF OBEDIENCE
(In Six Articles)

We must now consider obedience, under which head there are six points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether one man is bound to obey another?

(2) Whether obedience is a special virtue?

(3) Of its comparison with other virtues;

(4) Whether God must be obeyed in all things?

(5) Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things?

(6) Whether the faithful are bound to obey the secular power?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 104, Art. 1]

Whether One Man Is Bound to Obey Another?

Objection 1: It seems that one man is not bound to obey another. For
nothing should be done contrary to the divine ordinance. Now God has
so ordered that man is ruled by his own counsel, according to Ecclus.
15:14, "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of
his own counsel." Therefore one man is not bound to obey another.

Obj. 2: Further, if one man were bound to obey another, he would have
to look upon the will of the person commanding him, as being his rule
of conduct. Now God's will alone, which is always right, is a rule of
human conduct. Therefore man is bound to obey none but God.

Obj. 3: Further, the more gratuitous the service the more is it
acceptable. Now what a man does out of duty is not gratuitous.
Therefore if a man were bound in duty to obey others in doing good
deeds, for this very reason his good deeds would be rendered less
acceptable through being done out of obedience. Therefore one man is
not bound to obey another.

_On the contrary,_ It is prescribed (Heb. 13:17): "Obey your prelates
and be subject to them."

_I answer that,_ Just as the actions of natural things proceed from
natural powers, so do human actions proceed from the human will. In
natural things it behooved the higher to move the lower to their
actions by the excellence of the natural power bestowed on them by
God: and so in human affairs also the higher must move the lower by
their will in virtue of a divinely established authority. Now to move
by reason and will is to command. Wherefore just as in virtue of the
divinely established natural order the lower natural things need to
be subject to the movement of the higher, so too in human affairs, in
virtue of the order of natural and divine law, inferiors are bound to
obey their superiors.

Reply Obj. 1: God left man in the hand of his own counsel, not as
though it were lawful to him to do whatever he will, but because,
unlike irrational creatures, he is not compelled by natural necessity
to do what he ought to do, but is left the free choice proceeding
from his own counsel. And just as he has to proceed on his own
counsel in doing other things, so too has he in the point of obeying
his superiors. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxv), "When we humbly give
way to another's voice, we overcome ourselves in our own hearts."

Reply Obj. 2: The will of God is the first rule whereby all rational
wills are regulated: and to this rule one will approaches more than
another, according to a divinely appointed order. Hence the will of
the one man who issues a command may be as a second rule to the will
of this other man who obeys him.

Reply Obj. 3: A thing may be deemed gratuitous in two ways. In one
way on the part of the deed itself, because, to wit, one is not bound
to do it; in another way, on the part of the doer, because he does it
of his own free will. Now a deed is rendered virtuous, praiseworthy
and meritorious, chiefly according as it proceeds from the will.
Wherefore although obedience be a duty, if one obey with a prompt
will, one's merit is not for that reason diminished, especially
before God, Who sees not only the outward deed, but also the inward
will.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q, 104, Art. 2]

Whether Obedience Is a Special Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that obedience is not a special virtue. For
disobedience is contrary to obedience. But disobedience is a general
sin, because Ambrose says (De Parad. viii) that "sin is to disobey
the divine law." Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, every special virtue is either theological or moral.
But obedience is not a theological virtue, since it is not comprised
under faith, hope or charity. Nor is it a moral virtue, since it does
not hold the mean between excess and deficiency, for the more
obedient one is the more is one praised. Therefore obedience is not a
special virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is the
more meritorious and praiseworthy, the less it holds its own." But
every special virtue is the more to be praised the more it holds its
own, since virtue requires a man to exercise his will and choice, as
stated in _Ethic._ ii, 4. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.

Obj. 4: Further, virtues differ in species according to their
objects. Now the object of obedience would seem to be the command of
a superior, of which, apparently, there are as many kinds as there
are degrees of superiority. Therefore obedience is a general virtue,
comprising many special virtues.

_On the contrary,_ obedience is reckoned by some to be a part of
justice, as stated above (Q. 80).

_I answer that,_ A special virtue is assigned to all good deeds that
have a special reason of praise: for it belongs properly to virtue to
render a deed good. Now obedience to a superior is due in accordance
with the divinely established order of things, as shown above (A. 1),
and therefore it is a good, since good consists in mode, species and
order, as Augustine states (De Natura Boni iii) [*Cf. First Part, Q.
5, A. 5]. Again, this act has a special aspect of praiseworthiness by
reason of its object. For while subjects have many obligations
towards their superiors, this one, that they are bound to obey their
commands, stands out as special among the rest. Wherefore obedience
is a special virtue, and its specific object is a command tacit or
express, because the superior's will, however it become known, is a
tacit precept, and a man's obedience seems to be all the more prompt,
forasmuch as by obeying he forestalls the express command as soon as
he understands his superior's will.

Reply Obj. 1: Nothing prevents the one same material object from
admitting two special aspects to which two special virtues
correspond: thus a soldier, by defending his king's fortress, fulfils
both an act of fortitude, by facing the danger of death for a good
end, and an act of justice, by rendering due service to his lord.
Accordingly the aspect of precept, which obedience considers, occurs
in acts of all virtues, but not in all acts of virtue, since not all
acts of virtue are a matter of precept, as stated above (I-II, Q. 96,
A. 3). Moreover, certain things are sometimes a matter of precept,
and pertain to no other virtue, such things for instance as are not
evil except because they are forbidden. Wherefore, if obedience be
taken in its proper sense, as considering formally and intentionally
the aspect of precept, it will be a special virtue, and disobedience
a special sin: because in this way it is requisite for obedience that
one perform an act of justice or of some other virtue with the
intention of fulfilling a precept; and for disobedience that one
treat the precept with actual contempt. On the other hand, if
obedience be taken in a wide sense for the performance of any action
that may be a matter of precept, and disobedience for the omission of
that action through any intention whatever, then obedience will be a
general virtue, and disobedience a general sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Obedience is not a theological virtue, for its direct
object is not God, but the precept of any superior, whether expressed
or inferred, namely, a simple word of the superior, indicating his
will, and which the obedient subject obeys promptly, according to
Titus 3:1, "Admonish them to be subject to princes, and to obey at a
word," etc.

It is, however, a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and it
observes the mean between excess and deficiency. Excess thereof is
measured in respect, not of quantity, but of other circumstances, in
so far as a man obeys either whom he ought not, or in matters wherein
he ought not to obey, as we have stated above regarding religion (Q.
92, A. 2). We may also reply that as in justice, excess is in the
person who retains another's property, and deficiency in the person
who does not receive his due, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v,
4), so too obedience observes the mean between excess on the part of
him who fails to pay due obedience to his superior, since he exceeds
in fulfilling his own will, and deficiency on the part of the
superior, who does not receive obedience. Wherefore in this way
obedience will be a mean between two forms of wickedness, as was
stated above concerning justice (Q. 58, A. 10).

Reply Obj. 3: Obedience, like every virtue, requires the will to be
prompt towards its proper object, but not towards that which is
repugnant to it. Now the proper object of obedience is a precept, and
this proceeds from another's will. Wherefore obedience makes a man's
will prompt in fulfilling the will of another, the maker, namely, of
the precept. If that which is prescribed to him is willed by him for
its own sake apart from its being prescribed, as happens in agreeable
matters, he tends towards it at once by his own will and seems to
comply, not on account of the precept, but on account of his own
will. But if that which is prescribed is nowise willed for its own
sake, but, considered in itself, repugnant to his own will, as
happens in disagreeable matters, then it is quite evident that it is
not fulfilled except on account of the precept. Hence Gregory says
(Moral. xxxv) that "obedience perishes or diminishes when it holds
its own in agreeable matters," because, to wit, one's own will seems
to tend principally, not to the accomplishment of the precept, but to
the fulfilment of one's own desire; but that "it increases in
disagreeable or difficult matters," because there one's own will
tends to nothing beside the precept. Yet this must be understood as
regards outward appearances: for, on the other hand, according to the
judgment of God, Who searches the heart, it may happen that even in
agreeable matters obedience, while holding its own, is nonetheless
praiseworthy, provided the will of him that obeys tend no less
devotedly [*Cf. Q. 82, A. 2] to the fulfilment of the precept.

Reply Obj. 4: Reverence regards directly the person that excels:
wherefore it admits a various species according to the various
aspects of excellence. Obedience, on the other hand, regards the
precept of the person that excels, and therefore admits of only one
aspect. And since obedience is due to a person's precept on account
of reverence to him, it follows that obedience to a man is of one
species, though the causes from which it proceeds differ specifically.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 104, Art. 3]

Whether Obedience Is the Greatest of the Virtues?

Objection 1: It seems that obedience is the greatest of the virtues.
For it is written (1 Kings 15:22): "Obedience is better than
sacrifices." Now the offering of sacrifices belongs to religion,
which is the greatest of all moral virtues, as shown above (Q. 81, A.
6). Therefore obedience is the greatest of all virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is the
only virtue that ingrafts virtues in the soul and protects them when
ingrafted." Now the cause is greater than the effect. Therefore
obedience is greater than all the virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "evil should never
be done out of obedience: yet sometimes for the sake of obedience we
should lay aside the good we are doing." Now one does not lay aside a
thing except for something better. Therefore obedience, for whose
sake the good of other virtues is set aside, is better than other
virtues.

_On the contrary,_ obedience deserves praise because it proceeds from
charity: for Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience should be
practiced, not out of servile fear, but from a sense of charity, not
through fear of punishment, but through love of justice." Therefore
charity is a greater virtue than obedience.

_I answer that,_ Just as sin consists in man contemning God and
adhering to mutable things, so the merit of a virtuous act consists
in man contemning created goods and adhering to God as his end. Now
the end is greater than that which is directed to the end. Therefore
if a man contemns created goods in order that he may adhere to God,
his virtue derives greater praise from his adhering to God than from
his contemning earthly things. And so those, namely the theological,
virtues whereby he adheres to God in Himself, are greater than the
moral virtues, whereby he holds in contempt some earthly thing in
order to adhere to God.

Among the moral virtues, the greater the thing which a man contemns
that he may adhere to God, the greater the virtue. Now there are
three kinds of human goods that man may contemn for God's sake. The
lowest of these are external goods, the goods of the body take the
middle place, and the highest are the goods of the soul; and among
these the chief, in a way, is the will, in so far as, by his will,
man makes use of all other goods. Therefore, properly speaking, the
virtue of obedience, whereby we contemn our own will for God's sake,
is more praiseworthy than the other moral virtues, which contemn
other goods for the sake of God.

Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is rightly preferred
to sacrifices, because by sacrifices another's body is slain whereas
by obedience we slay our own will." Wherefore even any other acts of
virtue are meritorious before God through being performed out of
obedience to God's will. For were one to suffer even martyrdom, or to
give all one's goods to the poor, unless one directed these things to
the fulfilment of the divine will, which pertains directly to
obedience, they could not be meritorious: as neither would they be if
they were done without charity, which cannot exist apart from
obedience. For it is written (1 John 2:4, 5): "He who saith that he
knoweth God, and keepeth not His commandments, is a liar . . . but he
that keepeth His word, in him in very deed the charity of God is
perfected": and this because friends have the same likes and dislikes.

Reply Obj. 1: Obedience proceeds from reverence, which pays worship
and honor to a superior, and in this respect it is contained under
different virtues, although considered in itself, as regarding the
aspect of precept, it is one special virtue. Accordingly, in so far
as it proceeds from reverence for a superior, it is contained, in a
way, under observance; while in so far as it proceeds from reverence
for one's parents, it is contained under piety; and in so far as it
proceeds from reverence for God, it comes under religion, and
pertains to devotion, which is the principal act of religion.
Wherefore from this point of view it is more praiseworthy to obey God
than to offer sacrifice, as well as because, "in a sacrifice we slay
another's body, whereas by obedience we slay our own will," as
Gregory says (Moral. xxxv). As to the special case in which Samuel
spoke, it would have been better for Saul to obey God than to offer
in sacrifice the fat animals of the Amalekites against the
commandment of God.

Reply Obj. 2: All acts of virtue, in so far as they come under a
precept, belong to obedience. Wherefore according as acts of virtue
act causally or dispositively towards their generation and
preservation, obedience is said to ingraft and protect all virtues.
And yet it does not follow that obedience takes precedence of all
virtues absolutely, for two reasons. First, because though an act of
virtue come under a precept, one may nevertheless perform that act of
virtue without considering the aspect of precept. Consequently, if
there be any virtue, whose object is naturally prior to the precept,
that virtue is said to be naturally prior to obedience. Such a virtue
is faith, whereby we come to know the sublime nature of divine
authority, by reason of which the power to command is competent to
God. Secondly, because infusion of grace and virtues may precede,
even in point of time, all virtuous acts: and in this way obedience
is not prior to all virtues, neither in point of time nor by nature.

Reply Obj. 3: There are two kinds of good. There is that to
which we are bound of necessity, for instance to love God, and so
forth: and by no means may such a good be set aside on account of
obedience. But there is another good to which man is not bound of
necessity, and this good we ought sometimes to set aside for the sake
of obedience to which we are bound of necessity, since we ought not to
do good by falling into sin. Yet as Gregory remarks (Moral. xxxv), "he
who forbids his subjects any single good, must needs allow them many
others, lest the souls of those who obey perish utterly from
starvation, through being deprived of every good." Thus the loss of
one good may be compensated by obedience and other goods.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 104, Art. 4]

Whether God Ought to Be Obeyed in All Things?

Objection 1: It seems that God need not be obeyed in all things. For
it is written (Matt. 9:30, 31) that our Lord after healing the two
blind men commanded them, saying: "See that no man know this. But
they going out spread His fame abroad in all that country." Yet they
are not blamed for so doing. Therefore it seems that we are not bound
to obey God in all things.

Obj. 2: Further, no one is bound to do anything contrary to virtue.
Now we find that God commanded certain things contrary to virtue:
thus He commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gen. 22); and the
Jews to steal the property of the Egyptians (Ex. 11), which things
are contrary to justice; and Osee to take to himself a woman who was
an adulteress (Osee 3), and this is contrary to chastity. Therefore
God is not to be obeyed in all things.

Obj. 3: Further, whoever obeys God conforms his will to the divine
will even as to the thing willed. But we are not bound in all things
to conform our will to the divine will as to the thing willed, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 19, A. 10). Therefore man is not bound to obey
God in all things.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 24:7): "All things that the
Lord hath spoken we will do, and we will be obedient."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), he who obeys is moved by the
command of the person he obeys, just as natural things are moved by
their motive causes. Now just a God is the first mover of all things
that are moved naturally, so too is He the first mover of all wills,
as shown above (I-II, Q. 9, A. 6). Therefore just as all natural
things are subject to the divine motion by a natural necessity so too
all wills, by a kind of necessity of justice, are bound to obey the
divine command.

Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord in telling the blind men to conceal the
miracle had no intention of binding them with the force of a divine
precept, but, as Gregory says (Moral. xix), "gave an example to His
servants who follow Him that they might wish to hide their virtue and
yet that it should be proclaimed against their will, in order that
others might profit by their example."

Reply Obj. 2: Even as God does nothing contrary to nature (since "the
nature of a thing is what God does therein," according to a gloss on
Rom. 11), and yet does certain things contrary to the wonted course
of nature; so to God can command nothing contrary to virtue since
virtue and rectitude of human will consist chiefly in conformity with
God's will and obedience to His command, although it be contrary to
the wonted mode of virtue. Accordingly, then, the command given to
Abraham to slay his innocent son was not contrary to justice, since
God is the author of life and death. Nor again was it contrary to
justice that He commanded the Jews to take things belonging to the
Egyptians, because all things are His, and He gives them to whom He
will. Nor was it contrary to chastity that Osee was commanded to take
an adulteress, because God Himself is the ordainer of human
generation, and the right manner of intercourse with woman is that
which He appoints. Hence it is evident that the persons aforesaid did
not sin, either by obeying God or by willing to obey Him.

Reply Obj. 3: Though man is not always bound to will what God wills,
yet he is always bound to will what God wills him to will. This comes
to man's knowledge chiefly through God's command, wherefore man is
bound to obey God's commands in all things.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 104, Art. 5]

Whether Subjects Are Bound to Obey Their Superiors in All Things?

Objection 1: It seems that subjects are bound to obey their superiors
in all things. For the Apostle says (Col. 3:20): "Children, obey your
parents in all things," and farther on (Col. 3:22): "Servants, obey
in all things your masters according to the flesh." Therefore in like
manner other subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things.

Obj. 2: Further, superiors stand between God and their subjects,
according to Deut. 5:5, "I was the mediator and stood between the
Lord and you at that time, to show you His words." Now there is no
going from extreme to extreme, except through that which stands
between. Therefore the commands of a superior must be esteemed the
commands of God, wherefore the Apostle says (Gal. 4:14): "You . . .
received me as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus" and (1 Thess.
2:13): "When you had received of us the word of the hearing of God,
you received it, not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the
word of God." Therefore as man is bound to obey God in all things, so
is he bound to obey his superiors.

Obj. 3: Further, just as religious in making their profession take
vows of chastity and poverty, so do they also vow obedience. Now a
religious is bound to observe chastity and poverty in all things.
Therefore he is also bound to obey in all things.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Acts 5:29): "We ought to obey God
rather than men." Now sometimes the things commanded by a superior
are against God. Therefore superiors are not to be obeyed in all
things.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 4), he who obeys is moved at
the bidding of the person who commands him, by a certain necessity of
justice, even as a natural thing is moved through the power of its
mover by a natural necessity. That a natural thing be not moved by
its mover, may happen in two ways. First, on account of a hindrance
arising from the stronger power of some other mover; thus wood is not
burnt by fire if a stronger force of water intervene. Secondly,
through lack of order in the movable with regard to its mover, since,
though it is subject to the latter's action in one respect, yet it is
not subject thereto in every respect. Thus, a humor is sometimes
subject to the action of heat, as regards being heated, but not as
regards being dried up or consumed. In like manner there are two
reasons, for which a subject may not be bound to obey his superior in
all things. First on account of the command of a higher power. For as
a gloss says on Rom. 13:2, "They that resist [Vulg.: 'He that
resisteth'] the power, resist the ordinance of God" (cf. St.
Augustine, De Verb. Dom. viii). "If a commissioner issue an order,
are you to comply, if it is contrary to the bidding of the proconsul?
Again if the proconsul command one thing, and the emperor another,
will you hesitate to disregard the former and serve the latter?
Therefore if the emperor commands one thing and God another, you must
disregard the former and obey God." Secondly, a subject is not bound
to obey his superior if the latter command him to do something
wherein he is not subject to him. For Seneca says (De Beneficiis
iii): "It is wrong to suppose that slavery falls upon the whole man:
for the better part of him is excepted." His body is subjected and
assigned to his master but his soul is his own. Consequently in
matters touching the internal movement of the will man is not bound
to obey his fellow-man, but God alone.

Nevertheless man is bound to obey his fellow-man in things that have
to be done externally by means of the body: and yet, since by nature
all men are equal, he is not bound to obey another man in matters
touching the nature of the body, for instance in those relating to
the support of his body or the begetting of his children. Wherefore
servants are not bound to obey their masters, nor children their
parents, in the question of contracting marriage or of remaining in
the state of virginity or the like. But in matters concerning the
disposal of actions and human affairs, a subject is bound to obey his
superior within the sphere of his authority; for instance a soldier
must obey his general in matters relating to war, a servant his
master in matters touching the execution of the duties of his
service, a son his father in matters relating to the conduct of his
life and the care of the household; and so forth.

Reply Obj. 1: When the Apostle says "in all things," he refers to
matters within the sphere of a father's or master's authority.

Reply Obj. 2: Man is subject to God simply as regards all things,
both internal and external, wherefore he is bound to obey Him in all
things. On the other hand, inferiors are not subject to their
superiors in all things, but only in certain things and in a
particular way, in respect of which the superior stands between God
and his subjects, whereas in respect of other matters the subject is
immediately under God, by Whom he is taught either by the natural or
by the written law.

Reply Obj. 3: Religious profess obedience as to the regular mode of
life, in respect of which they are subject to their superiors:
wherefore they are bound to obey in those matters only which may
belong to the regular mode of life, and this obedience suffices for
salvation. If they be willing to obey even in other matters, this
will belong to the superabundance of perfection; provided, however,
such things be not contrary to God or to the rule they profess, for
obedience in this case would be unlawful.

Accordingly we may distinguish a threefold obedience; one, sufficient
for salvation, and consisting in obeying when one is bound to obey:
secondly, perfect obedience, which obeys in all things lawful:
thirdly, indiscreet obedience, which obeys even in matters unlawful.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 104, Art. 6]

Whether Christians Are Bound to Obey the Secular Powers?

Objection 1: It seems that Christians are not bound to obey the
secular power. For a gloss on Matt. 17:25, "Then the children are
free," says: "If in every kingdom the children of the king who holds
sway over that kingdom are free, then the children of that King,
under Whose sway are all kingdoms, should be free in every kingdom."
Now Christians, by their faith in Christ, are made children of God,
according to John 1:12: "He gave them power to be made the sons of
God, to them that believe in His name." Therefore they are not bound
to obey the secular power.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Rom. 7:4): "You . . . are become dead
to the law by the body of Christ," and the law mentioned here is the
divine law of the Old Testament. Now human law whereby men are
subject to the secular power is of less account than the divine law
of the Old Testament. Much more, therefore, since they have become
members of Christ's body, are men freed from the law of subjection,
whereby they were under the power of secular princes.

Obj. 3: Further, men are not bound to obey robbers, who oppress them
with violence. Now, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv): "Without
justice, what else is a kingdom but a huge robbery?" Since therefore
the authority of secular princes is frequently exercised with
injustice, or owes its origin to some unjust usurpation, it seems
that Christians ought not to obey secular princes.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Titus 3:1): "Admonish them to be
subject to princes and powers," and (1 Pet. 2:13, 14): "Be ye subject
. . . to every human creature for God's sake: whether it be to the
king as excelling, or to governors as sent by him."

_I answer that,_ Faith in Christ is the origin and cause of justice,
according to Rom. 3:22, "The justice of God by faith of Jesus
Christ:" wherefore faith in Christ does not void the order of
justice, but strengthens it. Now the order of justice requires that
subjects obey their superiors, else the stability of human affairs
would cease. Hence faith in Christ does not excuse the faithful from
the obligation of obeying secular princes.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 5), subjection whereby one man is
bound to another regards the body; not the soul, which retains its
liberty. Now, in this state of life we are freed by the grace of
Christ from defects of the soul, but not from defects of the body, as
the Apostle declares by saying of himself (Rom. 7:23) that in his
mind he served the law of God, but in his flesh the law of sin.
Wherefore those that are made children of God by grace are free from
the spiritual bondage of sin, but not from the bodily bondage,
whereby they are held bound to earthly masters, as a gloss observes
on 1 Tim. 6:1, "Whosoever are servants under the yoke," etc.

Reply Obj. 2: The Old Law was a figure of the New Testament, and
therefore it had to cease on the advent of truth. And the comparison
with human law does not stand because thereby one man is subject to
another. Yet man is bound by divine law to obey his fellow-man.

Reply Obj. 3: Man is bound to obey secular princes in so far as this
is required by order of justice. Wherefore if the prince's authority
is not just but usurped, or if he commands what is unjust, his
subjects are not bound to obey him, except perhaps accidentally, in
order to avoid scandal or danger.
_______________________

QUESTION 105

OF DISOBEDIENCE
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider disobedience, under which head there are two
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(2) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 105, Art. 2]

Whether Disobedience Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that disobedience is not a mortal sin. For
every sin is a disobedience, as appears from Ambrose's definition
given above (Q. 104, A. 2, Obj. 1). Therefore if disobedience were a
mortal sin, every sin would be mortal.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that disobedience is born
of vainglory. But vainglory is not a mortal sin. Neither therefore is
disobedience.

Obj. 3: Further, a person is said to be disobedient when he does not
fulfil a superior's command. But superiors often issue so many
commands that it is seldom, if ever, possible to fulfil them.
Therefore if disobedience were a mortal sin, it would follow that man
cannot avoid mortal sin, which is absurd. Wherefore disobedience is
not a mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ The sin of disobedience to parents is reckoned
(Rom. 1:30; 2 Tim. 3:2) among other mortal sins.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 24, A. 12; I-II, Q. 72, A. 5;
I-II, Q. 88, A. 1), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity
which is the cause of spiritual life. Now by charity we love God and
our neighbor. The charity of God requires that we obey His
commandments, as stated above (Q. 24, A. 12). Therefore to be
disobedient to the commandments of God is a mortal sin, because it is
contrary to the love of God.

Again, the commandments of God contain the precept of obedience to
superiors. Wherefore also disobedience to the commands of a superior
is a mortal sin, as being contrary to the love of God, according to
Rom. 13:2, "He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of
God." It is also contrary to the love of our neighbor, as it
withdraws from the superior who is our neighbor the obedience that is
his due.

Reply Obj. 1: The definition given by Ambrose refers to mortal sin,
which has the character of perfect sin. Venial sin is not
disobedience, because it is not contrary to a precept, but beside it.
Nor again is every mortal sin disobedience, properly and essentially,
but only when one contemns a precept, since moral acts take their
species from the end. And when a thing is done contrary to a precept,
not in contempt of the precept, but with some other purpose, it is
not a sin of disobedience except materially, and belongs formally to
another species of sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Vainglory desires display of excellence. And since it
seems to point to a certain excellence that one be not subject to
another's command, it follows that disobedience arises from
vainglory. But there is nothing to hinder mortal sin from arising out
of venial sin, since venial sin is a disposition to mortal.

Reply Obj. 3: No one is bound to do the impossible: wherefore if a
superior makes a heap of precepts and lays them upon his subjects, so
that they are unable to fulfil them, they are excused from sin.
Wherefore superiors should refrain from making a multitude of
precepts.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 105, Art. 2]

Whether Disobedience Is the Most Grievous of Sins?

Objection 1: It seems that disobedience is the most grievous of sins.
For it is written (1 Kings 15:23): "It is like the sin of witchcraft
to rebel, and like the crime of idolatry to refuse to obey." But
idolatry is the most grievous of sins, as stated above (Q. 94, A. 3).
Therefore disobedience is the most grievous of sins.

Obj. 2: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost is one that removes
the obstacles of sin, as stated above (Q. 14, A. 2). Now disobedience
makes a man contemn a precept which, more than anything, prevents a
man from sinning. Therefore disobedience is a sin against the Holy
Ghost, and consequently is the most grievous of sins.

Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 5:19) that "by the
disobedience of one man, many were made sinners." Now the cause is
seemingly greater than its effect. Therefore disobedience seems to be
a more grievous sin than the others that are caused thereby.

_On the contrary,_ Contempt of the commander is a more grievous sin
than contempt of his command. Now some sins are against the very
person of the commander, such as blasphemy and murder. Therefore
disobedience is not the most grievous of sins.

_I answer that,_ Not every disobedience is equally a sin: for one
disobedience may be greater than another, in two ways. First, on the
part of the superior commanding, since, although a man should take
every care to obey each superior, yet it is a greater duty to obey a
higher than a lower authority, in sign of which the command of a
lower authority is set aside if it be contrary to the command of a
higher authority. Consequently the higher the person who commands,
the more grievous is it to disobey him: so that it is more grievous
to disobey God than man. Secondly, on the part of the things
commanded. For the person commanding does not equally desire the
fulfilment of all his commands: since every such person desires above
all the end, and that which is nearest to the end. Wherefore
disobedience is the more grievous, according as the unfulfilled
commandment is more in the intention of the person commanding. As to
the commandments of God, it is evident that the greater the good
commanded, the more grievous the disobedience of that commandment,
because since God's will is essentially directed to the good, the
greater the good the more does God wish it to be fulfilled.
Consequently he that disobeys the commandment of the love of God sins
more grievously than one who disobeys the commandment of the love of
our neighbor. On the other hand, man's will is not always directed to
the greater good: hence, when we are bound by a mere precept of man,
a sin is more grievous, not through setting aside a greater good, but
through setting aside that which is more in the intention of the
person commanding.

Accordingly the various degrees of disobedience must correspond with
the various degrees of precepts: because the disobedience in which
there is contempt of God's precept, from the very nature of
disobedience is more grievous than a sin committed against a man,
apart from the latter being a disobedience to God. And I say this
because whoever sins against his neighbor acts also against God's
commandment. And if the divine precept be contemned in a yet graver
matter, the sin is still more grievous. The disobedience that
contains contempt of a man's precept is less grievous than the sin
which contemns the man who made the precept, because reverence for
the person commanding should give rise to reverence for his command.
In like manner a sin that directly involves contempt of God, such as
blasphemy, or the like, is more grievous (even if we mentally
separate the disobedience from the sin) than would be a sin involving
contempt of God's commandment alone.

Reply Obj. 1: This comparison of Samuel is one, not of equality but
of likeness, because disobedience redounds to the contempt of God
just as idolatry does, though the latter does so more.

Reply Obj. 2: Not every disobedience is sin against the Holy Ghost,
but only that which obstinacy is added: for it is not the contempt of
any obstacle to sin that constitutes sin against the Holy Ghost, else
the contempt of any good would be a sin against the Holy Ghost, since
any good may hinder a man from committing sin. The sin against the
Holy Ghost consists in the contempt of those goods which lead
directly to repentance and the remission of sins.

Reply Obj. 3: The first sin of our first parent, from which sin was
transmitted to all men, was not disobedience considered as a special
sin, but pride, from which then man proceeded to disobey. Hence the
Apostle in these words seems to take disobedience in its relation to
every sin.
_______________________

QUESTION 106

OF THANKFULNESS OR GRATITUDE
(In Six Articles)

We must now consider thankfulness or gratitude, and ingratitude.
Concerning thankfulness there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether thankfulness is a special virtue distinct from other
virtues?

(2) Who owes more thanks to God, the innocent or the penitent?

(3) Whether man is always bound to give thanks for human favors?

(4) Whether thanksgiving should be deferred?

(5) Whether thanksgiving should be measured according to the favor
received or the disposition of the giver?

(6) Whether one ought to pay back more than one has received?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 1]

Whether Thankfulness Is a Special Virtue, Distinct from Other
Virtues?

Objection 1: It seems that thankfulness is not a special virtue,
distinct from other virtues. For we have received the greatest
benefits from God, and from our parents. Now the honor which we pay
to God in return belongs to the virtue of religion, and the honor
with which we repay our parents belongs to the virtue of piety.
Therefore thankfulness or gratitude is not distinct from the other
virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, proportionate repayment belongs to commutative
justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4). Now the purpose
of giving thanks is repayment (Ethic. 5, 4). Therefore thanksgiving,
which belongs to gratitude, is an act of justice. Therefore gratitude
is not a special virtue, distinct from other virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, acknowledgment of favor received is requisite for
the preservation of friendship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
viii, 13; ix, 1). Now friendship is associated with all the virtues,
since they are the reason for which man is loved. Therefore
thankfulness or gratitude, to which it belongs to repay favors
received, is not a special virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Tully reckons thankfulness a special part of
justice (De Invent. Rhet. ii).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 60, A. 3), the nature of
the debt to be paid must needs vary according to various causes
giving rise to the debt, yet so that the greater always includes the
lesser. Now the cause of debt is found primarily and chiefly in God,
in that He is the first principle of all our goods: secondarily it is
found in our father, because he is the proximate principle of our
begetting and upbringing: thirdly it is found in the person that
excels in dignity, from whom general favors proceed; fourthly it is
found in a benefactor, from whom we have received particular and
private favors, on account of which we are under particular
obligation to him.

Accordingly, since what we owe God, or our father, or a person
excelling in dignity, is not the same as what we owe a benefactor
from whom we have received some particular favor, it follows that
after religion, whereby we pay God due worship, and piety, whereby we
worship our parents, and observance, whereby we worship persons
excelling in dignity, there is thankfulness or gratitude, whereby we
give thanks to our benefactors. And it is distinct from the foregoing
virtues, just as each of these is distinct from the one that
precedes, as falling short thereof.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as religion is superexcelling piety, so is it
excelling thankfulness or gratitude: wherefore giving thanks to God
was reckoned above (Q. 83, A. 17) among things pertaining to religion.

Reply Obj. 2: Proportionate repayment belongs to commutative justice,
when it answers to the legal due; for instance when it is contracted
that so much be paid for so much. But the repayment that belongs to
the virtue of thankfulness or gratitude answers to the moral debt,
and is paid spontaneously. Hence thanksgiving is less thankful when
compelled, as Seneca observes (De Beneficiis iii).

Reply Obj. 3: Since true friendship is based on virtue, whatever
there is contrary to virtue in a friend is an obstacle to friendship,
and whatever in him is virtuous is an incentive to friendship. In
this way friendship is preserved by repayment of favors, although
repayment of favors belongs specially to the virtue of gratitude.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 2]

Whether the Innocent Is More Bound to Give Thanks to God Than the
Penitent?

Objection 1: It seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks
to God than the penitent. For the greater the gift one has received
from God, the more one is bound to give Him thanks. Now the gift of
innocence is greater than that of justice restored. Therefore it
seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the
penitent.

Obj. 2: Further, a man owes love to his benefactor just as he owes
him gratitude. Now Augustine says (Confess. ii): "What man, weighing
his own infirmity, would dare to ascribe his purity and innocence to
his own strength; that so he should love Thee the less, as if he had
less needed Thy mercy, whereby Thou remittest sins to those that turn
to Thee?" And farther on he says: "And for this let him love Thee as
much, yea and more, since by Whom he sees me to have been recovered
from such deep torpor of sin, by Him he sees himself to have been
from the like torpor of sin preserved." Therefore the innocent is
also more bound to give thanks than the penitent.

Obj. 3: Further, the more a gratuitous favor is continuous, the
greater the thanksgiving due for it. Now the favor of divine grace is
more continuous in the innocent than in the penitent. For Augustine
says (Confess. iii): "To Thy grace I ascribe it, and to Thy mercy,
that Thou hast melted away my sins as it were ice. To Thy grace I
ascribe also whatsoever I have not done of evil; for what might I not
have done? . . . Yea, all I confess to have been forgiven me, both
what evils I committed by my own wilfulness, and what by Thy guidance
committed not." Therefore the innocent is more bound to give thanks
than the penitent.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 7:43): "To whom more is
forgiven, he loveth more [*Vulg.: 'To whom less is forgiven, he
loveth less' Luke 7:47]." Therefore for the same reason he is bound
to greater thanksgiving.

_I answer that,_ Thanksgiving (_gratiarum actio_) in the recipient
corresponds to the favor (_gratia_) of the giver: so that when there
is greater favor on the part of the giver, greater thanks are due on
the part of the recipient. Now a favor is something bestowed
_gratis:_ wherefore on the part of the giver the favor may be greater
on two counts. First, owing to the quantity of the thing given: and
in this way the innocent owes greater thanksgiving, because he
receives a greater gift from God, also, absolutely speaking, a more
continuous gift, other things being equal. Secondly, a favor may be
said to be greater, because it is given more gratuitously; and in
this sense the penitent is more bound to give thanks than the
innocent, because what he receives from God is more gratuitously
given: since, whereas he was deserving of punishment, he has received
grace. Wherefore, although the gift bestowed on the innocent is,
considered absolutely, greater, yet the gift bestowed on the penitent
is greater in relation to him: even as a small gift bestowed on a
poor man is greater to him than a great gift is to a rich man. And
since actions are about singulars, in matters of action, we have to
take note of what is such here and now, rather than of what is such
absolutely, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii) in treating of
the voluntary and the involuntary.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 3]

Whether a Man Is Bound to Give Thanks to Every Benefactor?

Objection 1: It seems that a man is not bound to give thanks to every
benefactor. For a man may benefit himself just as he may harm
himself, according to Ecclus. 14:5, "He that is evil to himself, to
whom will he be good?" But a man cannot thank himself, since
thanksgiving seems to pass from one person to another. Therefore
thanksgiving is not due to every benefactor.

Obj. 2: Further, gratitude is a repayment of an act of grace. But
some favors are granted without grace, and are rudely, slowly and
grudgingly given. Therefore gratitude is not always due to a
benefactor.

Obj. 3: Further, no thanks are due to one who works for his own
profit. But sometimes people bestow favors for their own profit.
Therefore thanks are not due to them.

Obj. 4: Further, no thanks are due to a slave, for all that he is
belongs to his master. Yet sometimes a slave does a good turn to his
master. Therefore gratitude is not due to every benefactor.

Obj. 5: Further, no one is bound to do what he cannot do equitably
and advantageously. Now it happens at times that the benefactor is
very well off, and it would be of no advantage to him to be repaid
for a favor he has bestowed. Again it happens sometimes that the
benefactor from being virtuous has become wicked, so that it would
not seem equitable to repay him. Also the recipient of a favor may be
a poor man, and is quite unable to repay. Therefore seemingly a man
is not always bound to repayment for favors received.

Obj. 6: Further, no one is bound to do for another what is
inexpedient and hurtful to him. Now sometimes it happens that
repayment of a favor would be hurtful or useless to the person
repaid. Therefore favors are not always to be repaid by gratitude.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Thess. 5:18): "In all things give
thanks."

_I answer that,_ Every effect turns naturally to its cause; wherefore
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that "God turns all things to Himself
because He is the cause of all": for the effect must needs always be
directed to the end of the agent. Now it is evident that a
benefactor, as such, is cause of the beneficiary. Hence the natural
order requires that he who has received a favor should, by repaying
the favor, turn to his benefactor according to the mode of each. And,
as stated above with regard to a father (Q. 31, A. 3; Q. 101, A. 2),
a man owes his benefactor, as such, honor and reverence, since the
latter stands to him in the relation of principle; but accidentally
he owes him assistance or support, if he need it.

Reply Obj. 1: In the words of Seneca (1 Benef. v), "just as a man is
liberal who gives not to himself but to others, and gracious who
forgives not himself but others, and merciful who is moved, not by
his own misfortunes but by another's, so too, no man confers a favor
on himself, he is but following the bent of his nature, which moves
him to resist what hurts him, and to seek what is profitable."
Wherefore in things that one does for oneself, there is no place for
gratitude or ingratitude, since a man cannot deny himself a thing
except by keeping it. Nevertheless things which are properly spoken
of in relation to others are spoken of metaphorically in relation to
oneself, as the Philosopher states regarding justice (Ethic. v, 11),
in so far, to wit, as the various parts of man are considered as
though they were various persons.

Reply Obj. 2: It is the mark of a happy disposition to see good
rather than evil. Wherefore if someone has conferred a favor, not as
he ought to have conferred it, the recipient should not for that
reason withhold his thanks. Yet he owes less thanks, than if the
favor had been conferred duly, since in fact the favor is less, for,
as Seneca remarks (De Benef. ii.) "promptness enhances, delay
discounts a favor."

Reply Obj. 3: As Seneca observes (De Benef. vi), "it matters much
whether a person does a kindness to us for his own sake, or for ours,
or for both his and ours. He that considers himself only, and
benefits because cannot otherwise benefit himself, seems to me like a
man who seeks fodder for his cattle." And farther on: "If he has done
it for me in common with himself, having both of us in his mind, I am
ungrateful and not merely unjust, unless I rejoice that what was
profitable to him is profitable to me also. It is the height of
malevolence to refuse to recognize a kindness, unless the giver has
been the loser thereby."

Reply Obj. 4: As Seneca observes (De Benef. iii), "when a slave does
what is wont to be demanded of a slave, it is part of his service:
when he does more than a slave is bound to do, it is a favor: for as
soon as he does anything from a motive of friendship, if indeed that
be his motive, it is no longer called service." Wherefore gratitude
is due even to a slave, when he does more than his duty.

Reply Obj. 5: A poor man is certainly not ungrateful if he does what
he can. For since kindness depends on the heart rather than on the
deed, so too gratitude depends chiefly the heart. Hence Seneca says
(De Benef. ii): "Who receives a favor gratefully, has already begun
to pay it back: and that we are grateful for favors received should
be shown by the outpourings of the heart, not only in his hearing but
everywhere." From this it is evident that however well off a man may
be, it is possible to thank him for his kindness by showing him
reverence and honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii,
14): "He that abounds should be repaid with honor, he that is in want
should be repaid with money": and Seneca writes (De Benef. vi):
"There are many ways of repaying those who are well off, whatever we
happen to owe them; such as good advice, frequent fellowship, affable
and pleasant conversation without flattery." Therefore there is no
need for a man to desire neediness or distress in his benefactor
before repaying his kindness, because, as Seneca says (De Benef. vi),
"it were inhuman to desire this in one from whom you have received no
favor; how much more so to desire it in one whose kindness has made
you his debtor!"

If, however, the benefactor has lapsed from virtue, nevertheless he
should be repaid according to his state, that he may return to virtue
if possible. But if he be so wicked as to be incurable, then his heart
has changed, and consequently no repayment is due for his kindness, as
heretofore. And yet, as far as it possible without sin, the kindness
he has shown should be held in memory, as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
ix, 3).

Reply Obj. 6: As stated in the preceding reply, repayment of a favor
depends chiefly on the affection of the heart: wherefore repayment
should be made in such a way as to prove most beneficial. If,
however, through the benefactor's carelessness it prove detrimental
to him, this is not imputed to the person who repays him, as Seneca
observes (De Benef. vii): "It is my duty to repay, and not to keep
back and safeguard my repayment."
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 4]

Whether a Man Is Bound to Repay a Favor at Once?

Objection 1: It seems that a man is bound to repay a favor at once.
For we are bound to restore at once what we owe, unless the term be
fixed. Now there is no term prescribed for the repayment of favors,
and yet this repayment is a duty, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore a
man is bound to repay a favor at once.

Obj. 2: Further, a good action would seem to be all the more
praiseworthy according as it is done with greater earnestness. Now
earnestness seems to make a man do his duty without any delay.
Therefore it is apparently more praiseworthy to repay a favor at once.

Obj. 3: Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii) that "it is proper to a
benefactor to act freely and quickly." Now repayment ought to equal
the favor received. Therefore it should be done at once.

_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Benef. iv): "He that hastens to
repay, is animated with a sense, not of gratitude but of
indebtedness."

_I answer that,_ Just as in conferring a favor two things are to be
considered, namely, the affection of the heart and the gift, so also
must these things be considered in repaying the favor. As regards the
affection of the heart, repayment should be made at once, wherefore
Seneca says (De Benef. ii): "Do you wish to repay a favor? Receive it
graciously." As regards the gift, one ought to wait until such a time
as will be convenient to the benefactor. In fact, if instead of
choosing a convenient time, one wished to repay at once, favor for
favor, it would not seem to be a virtuous, but a constrained
repayment. For, as Seneca observes (De Benef. iv), "he that wishes to
repay too soon, is an unwilling debtor, and an unwilling debtor is
ungrateful."

Reply Obj. 1: A legal debt must be paid at once, else the equality of
justice would not be preserved, if one kept another's property
without his consent. But a moral debt depends on the equity of the
debtor: and therefore it should be repaid in due time according as
the rectitude of virtue demands.

Reply Obj. 2: Earnestness of the will is not virtuous unless it be
regulated by reason; wherefore it is not praiseworthy to forestall
the proper time through earnestness.

Reply Obj. 3: Favors also should be conferred at a convenient time
and one should no longer delay when the convenient time comes; and
the same is to be observed in repaying favors.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 5]

Whether in Giving Thanks We Should Look at the Benefactor's
Disposition or at the Deed?

Objection 1: It seems that in repaying favors we should not look at
the benefactor's disposition but at the deed. For repayment is due to
beneficence, and beneficence consists in deeds, as the word itself
denotes. Therefore in repaying favors we should look at the deed.

Obj. 2: Further, thanksgiving, whereby we repay favors, is a part of
justice. But justice considers equality between giving and taking.
Therefore also in repaying favors we should consider the deed rather
than the disposition of the benefactor.

Obj. 3: Further, no one can consider what he does not know. Now God
alone knows the interior disposition. Therefore it is impossible to
repay a favor according to the benefactor's disposition.

_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Benef. i): "We are sometimes under
a greater obligation to one who has given little with a large heart,
and has bestowed a small favor, yet willingly."

_I answer that,_ The repayment of a favor may belong to three
virtues, namely, justice, gratitude and friendship. It belongs to
justice when the repayment has the character of a legal debt, as in a
loan and the like: and in such cases repayment must be made according
to the quantity received.

On the other hand, repayment of a favor belongs, though in different
ways, to friendship and likewise to the virtue of gratitude when it
has the character of a moral debt. For in the repayment of friendship
we have to consider the cause of friendship; so that in the
friendship that is based on the useful, repayment should be made
according to the usefulness accruing from the favor conferred, and in
the friendship based on virtue repayment should be made with regard
for the choice or disposition of the giver, since this is the chief
requisite of virtue, as stated in _Ethic._ viii, 13. And likewise,
since gratitude regards the favor inasmuch as it is bestowed gratis,
and this regards the disposition of the giver, it follows again that
repayment of a favor depends more on the disposition of the giver
than on the effect.

Reply Obj. 1: Every moral act depends on the will. Hence a kindly
action, in so far as it is praiseworthy and is deserving of
gratitude, consists materially in the thing done, but formally and
chiefly in the will. Hence Seneca says (De Benef. i): "A kindly
action consists not in deed or gift, but in the disposition of the
giver or doer."

Reply Obj. 2: Gratitude is a part of justice, not indeed as a species
is part of a genus, but by a kind of reduction to the genus of
justice, as stated above (Q. 80). Hence it does not follow that we
shall find the same kind of debt in both virtues.

Reply Obj. 3: God alone sees man's disposition in itself: but in so
far as it is shown by certain signs, man also can know it. It is thus
that a benefactor's disposition is known by the way in which he does
the kindly action, for instance through his doing it joyfully and
readily.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 6]

Whether the Repayment of Gratitude Should Surpass the Favor Received?

Objection 1: It seems that there is no need for the repayment of
gratitude to surpass the favor received. For it is not possible to
make even equal repayment to some, for instance, one's parents, as
the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). Now virtue does not attempt
the impossible. Therefore gratitude for a favor does not tend to
something yet greater.

Obj. 2: Further, if one person repays another more than he has
received by his favor, by that very fact he gives him something his
turn, as it were. But the latter owes him repayment for the favor
which in his turn the former has conferred on him. Therefore he that
first conferred a favor will be bound to a yet greater repayment, and
so on indefinitely. Now virtue does not strive at the indefinite,
since "the indefinite removes the nature of good" (Metaph. ii, text.
8). Therefore repayment of gratitude should not surpass the favor
received.

Obj. 3: Further, justice consists in equality. But "more" is excess
of equality. Since therefore excess is sinful in every virtue, it
seems that to repay more than the favor received is sinful and
opposed to justice.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5): "We should
repay those who are gracious to us, by being gracious to them
return," and this is done by repaying more than we have received.
Therefore gratitude should incline to do something greater.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5), gratitude regards the favor
received according the intention of the benefactor; who seems be
deserving of praise, chiefly for having conferred the favor gratis
without being bound to do so. Wherefore the beneficiary is under a
moral obligation to bestow something gratis in return. Now he does
not seem to bestow something gratis, unless he exceeds the quantity
of the favor received: because so long as he repays less or an
equivalent, he would seem to do nothing gratis, but only to return
what he has received. Therefore gratitude always inclines, as far as
possible, to pay back something more.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 3, ad 5; A. 5), in repaying favors
we must consider the disposition rather than the deed. Accordingly,
if we consider the effect of beneficence, which a son receives from
his parents namely, to be and to live, the son cannot make an equal
repayment, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). But if we
consider the will of the giver and of the repayer, then it is
possible for the son to pay back something greater to his father, as
Seneca declares (De Benef. iii). If, however, he were unable to do
so, the will to pay back would be sufficient for gratitude.

Reply Obj. 2: The debt of gratitude flows from charity, which the
more it is paid the more it is due, according to Rom. 13:8, "Owe no
man anything, but to love one another." Wherefore it is not
unreasonable if the obligation of gratitude has no limit.

Reply Obj. 3: As in injustice, which is a cardinal virtue, we
consider equality of things, so in gratitude we consider equality of
wills. For while on the one hand the benefactor of his own free-will
gave something he was not bound to give, so on the other hand the
beneficiary repays something over and above what he has received.
_______________________

QUESTION 107

OF INGRATITUDE
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider ingratitude, under which head there are four
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether ingratitude is always a sin?

(2) Whether ingratitude is a special sin?

(3) Whether every act of ingratitude is a mortal sin?

(4) Whether favors should be withdrawn from the ungrateful?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 107, Art. 1]

Whether Ingratitude Is Always a Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is not always a sin. For
Seneca says (De Benef. iii) that "he who does not repay a favor is
ungrateful." But sometimes it is impossible to repay a favor without
sinning, for instance if one man has helped another to commit a sin.
Therefore, since it is not a sin to refrain from sinning, it seems
that ingratitude is not always a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, every sin is in the power of the person who commits
it: because, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract. i),
"no man sins in what he cannot avoid." Now sometimes it is not in the
power of the sinner to avoid ingratitude, for instance when he has
not the means of repaying. Again forgetfulness is not in our power,
and yet Seneca declares (De Benef. iii) that "to forget a kindness is
the height of ingratitude." Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, there would seem to be no repayment in being
unwilling to owe anything, according to the Apostle (Rom. 13:8), "Owe
no man anything." Yet "an unwilling debtor is ungrateful," as Seneca
declares (De Benef. iv). Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin.

_On the contrary,_ Ingratitude is reckoned among other sins (2 Tim.
3:2), where it is written: "Disobedient to parents, ungrateful,
wicked." etc.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 106, A. 4, ad 1, A. 6) a debt of
gratitude is a moral debt required by virtue. Now a thing is a sin
from the fact of its being contrary to virtue. Wherefore it is
evident that every ingratitude is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Gratitude regards a favor received: and he that helps
another to commit a sin does him not a favor but an injury: and so no
thanks are due to him, except perhaps on account of his good will,
supposing him to have been deceived, and to have thought to help him
in doing good, whereas he helped him to sin. In such a case the
repayment due to him is not that he should be helped to commit a sin,
because this would be repaying not good but evil, and this is
contrary to gratitude.

Reply Obj. 2: No man is excused from ingratitude through inability to
repay, for the very reason that the mere will suffices for the
repayment of the debt of gratitude, as stated above (Q. 106, A. 6, ad
1).

Forgetfulness of a favor received amounts to ingratitude, not indeed
the forgetfulness that arises from a natural defect, that is not
subject to the will, but that which arises from negligence. For, as
Seneca observes (De Benef. iii), "when forgetfulness of favors lays
hold of a man, he has apparently given little thought to their
repayment."

Reply Obj. 3: The debt of gratitude flows from the debt of love, and
from the latter no man should wish to be free. Hence that anyone
should owe this debt unwillingly seems to arise from lack of love for
his benefactor.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 107, Art. 2]

Whether Ingratitude Is a Special Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is not a special sin. For
whoever sins acts against God his sovereign benefactor. But this
pertains to ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.

Obj. 2: Further, no special sin is contained under different kinds of
sin. But one can be ungrateful by committing different kinds of sin,
for instance by calumny, theft, or something similar committed
against a benefactor. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.

Obj. 3: Further, Seneca writes (De Benef. iii): "It is ungrateful to
take no notice of a kindness, it is ungrateful not to repay one, but
it is the height of ingratitude to forget it." Now these do not seem
to belong to the same species of sin. Therefore ingratitude is not a
special sin.

_On the contrary,_ Ingratitude is opposed to gratitude or
thankfulness, which is a special virtue. Therefore it is a special
sin.

_I answer that,_ Every vice is denominated from a deficiency of
virtue, because deficiency is more opposed to virtue: thus
illiberality is more opposed to liberality than prodigality is. Now a
vice may be opposed to the virtue of gratitude by way of excess, for
instance if one were to show gratitude for things for which gratitude
is not due, or sooner than it is due, as stated above (Q. 106, A. 4).
But still more opposed to gratitude is the vice denoting deficiency
of gratitude, because the virtue of gratitude, as stated above (Q.
106, A. 6), inclines to return something more. Wherefore ingratitude
is properly denominated from being a deficiency of gratitude. Now
every deficiency or privation takes its species from the opposite
habit: for blindness and deafness differ according to the difference
of sight and hearing. Therefore just as gratitude or thankfulness is
one special virtue, so also is ingratitude one special sin.

It has, however, various degrees corresponding in their order to the
things required for gratitude. The first of these is to recognize the
favor received, the second to express one's appreciation and thanks,
and the third to repay the favor at a suitable place and time
according to one's means. And since what is last in the order of
generation is first in the order of destruction, it follows that the
first degree of ingratitude is when a man fails to repay a favor, the
second when he declines to notice or indicate that he has received a
favor, while the third and supreme degree is when a man fails to
recognize the reception of a favor, whether by forgetting it or in
any other way. Moreover, since opposite affirmation includes
negation, it follows that it belongs to the first degree of
ingratitude to return evil for good, to the second to find fault with
a favor received, and to the third to esteem kindness as though it
were unkindness.

Reply Obj. 1: In every sin there is material ingratitude to God,
inasmuch as a man does something that may pertain to ingratitude. But
formal ingratitude is when a favor is actually contemned, and this is
a special sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders the formal aspect of some special sin
from being found materially in several kinds of sin, and in this way
the aspect of ingratitude is to be found in many kinds of sin.

Reply Obj. 3: These three are not different species but different
degrees of one special sin.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 107, Art. 3]

Whether Ingratitude Is Always a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is always a mortal sin. For
one ought to be grateful to God above all. But one is not ungrateful
to God by committing a venial sin: else every man would be guilty of
ingratitude. Therefore no ingratitude is a venial sin.

Obj. 2: Further, a sin is mortal through being contrary to charity,
as stated above (Q. 24, A. 12). But ingratitude is contrary to
charity, since the debt of gratitude proceeds from that virtue, as
stated above (Q. 106, A. 1, ad 3; A. 6, ad 2). Therefore ingratitude
is always a mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii): "Between the giver and
the receiver of a favor there is this law, that the former should
forthwith forget having given, and the latter should never forget
having received." Now, seemingly, the reason why the giver should
forget is that he may be unaware of the sin of the recipient, should
the latter prove ungrateful; and there would be no necessity for that
if ingratitude were a slight sin. Therefore ingratitude is always a
mortal sin.

Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ No one should be put in the way of
committing a mortal sin. Yet, according to Seneca (De Benef. ii),
"sometimes it is necessary to deceive the person who receives
assistance, in order that he may receive without knowing from whom he
has received." But this would seem to put the recipient in the way of
ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not always a mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ As appears from what we have said above (A. 2), a
man may be ungrateful in two ways: first, by mere omission, for
instance by failing to recognize the favor received, or to express
his appreciation of it or to pay something in return, and this is not
always a mortal sin, because, as stated above (Q. 106, A. 6), the
debt of gratitude requires a man to make a liberal return, which,
however, he is not bound to do; wherefore if he fail to do so, he
does not sin mortally. It is nevertheless a venial sin, because it
arises either from some kind of negligence or from some
disinclination to virtue in him. And yet ingratitude of this kind may
happen to be a mortal sin, by reason either of inward contempt, or of
the kind of thing withheld, this being needful to the benefactor,
either simply, or in some case of necessity.

Secondly, a man may be ungrateful, because he not only omits to pay
the debt of gratitude, but does the contrary. This again is sometimes
a mortal and sometimes a venial sin, according to the kind of thing
that is done.

It must be observed, however, that when ingratitude arises from a
mortal sin, it has the perfect character of ingratitude, and when it
arises from venial sin, it has the imperfect character.

Reply Obj. 1: By committing a venial sin one is not ungrateful to God
to the extent of incurring the guilt of perfect ingratitude: but
there is something of ingratitude in a venial sin, in so far as it
removes a virtuous act of obedience to God.

Reply Obj. 2: When ingratitude is a venial sin it is not contrary to,
but beside charity: since it does not destroy the habit of charity,
but excludes some act thereof.

Reply Obj. 3: Seneca also says (De Benef. vii): "When we say that a
man after conferring a favor should forget about it, it is a mistake
to suppose that we mean him to shake off the recollection of a thing
so very praiseworthy. When we say: He must not remember it, we mean
that he must not publish it abroad and boast about it."

Reply Obj. 4: He that is unaware of a favor conferred on him is not
ungrateful, if he fails to repay it, provided he be prepared to do so
if he knew. It is nevertheless commendable at times that the object
of a favor should remain in ignorance of it, both in order to avoid
vainglory, as when Blessed Nicolas threw gold into a house secretly,
wishing to avoid popularity: and because the kindness is all the
greater through the benefactor wishing not to shame the person on
whom he is conferring the favor.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 107, Art. 4]

Whether Favors Should Be Withheld from the Ungrateful?

Objection 1: It seems that favors should withheld from the
ungrateful. For it is written (Wis. 16:29): "The hope of the
unthankful shall melt away as the winter's ice." But this hope would
not melt away unless favors were withheld from him. Therefore favors
should be withheld from the ungrateful.

Obj. 2: Further, no one should afford another an occasion of
committing sin. But the ungrateful in receiving a favor is given an
occasion of ingratitude. Therefore favors should not be bestowed on
the ungrateful.

Obj. 3: Further, "By what things a man sinneth, by the same also he
is tormented" (Wis. 11:17). Now he that is ungrateful when he
receives a favor sins against the favor. Therefore he should be
deprived of the favor.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 6:35) that "the Highest . . .
is kind to the unthankful, and to the evil." Now we should prove
ourselves His children by imitating Him (Luke 6:36). Therefore we
should not withhold favors from the ungrateful.

_I answer that,_ There are two points to be considered with regard to
an ungrateful person. The first is what he deserves to suffer and
thus it is certain that he deserves to be deprived of our favor. The
second is, what ought his benefactor to do? For in the first place he
should not easily judge him to be ungrateful, since, as Seneca
remarks (De Benef. iii), "a man is often grateful although he repays
not," because perhaps he has not the means or the opportunity of
repaying. Secondly, he should be inclined to turn his ungratefulness
into gratitude, and if he does not achieve this by being kind to him
once, he may by being so a second time. If, however, the more he
repeats his favors, the more ungrateful and evil the other becomes,
he should cease from bestowing his favors upon him.

Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted speaks of what the ungrateful man
deserves to suffer.

Reply Obj. 2: He that bestows a favor on an ungrateful person affords
him an occasion not of sin but of gratitude and love. And if the
recipient takes therefrom an occasion of ingratitude, this is not to
be imputed to the bestower.

Reply Obj. 3: He that bestows a favor must not at once act the part
of a punisher of ingratitude, but rather that of a kindly physician,
by healing the ingratitude with repeated favors.
_______________________

QUESTION 108

OF VENGEANCE
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider vengeance, under which head there are four
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether vengeance is lawful?

(2) Whether it is a special virtue?

(3) Of the manner of taking vengeance;

(4) On whom should vengeance be taken?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 108, Art. 1]

Whether Vengeance Is Lawful?

Objection 1: It seems that vengeance is not lawful. For whoever
usurps what is God's sins. But vengeance belongs to God, for it is
written (Deut. 32:35, Rom. 12:19): "Revenge to Me, and I will repay."
Therefore all vengeance is unlawful.

Obj. 2: Further, he that takes vengeance on a man does not bear with
him. But we ought to bear with the wicked, for a gloss on Cant. 2:2,
"As the lily among the thorns," says: "He is not a good man that
cannot bear with a wicked one." Therefore we should not take
vengeance on the wicked.

Obj. 3: Further, vengeance is taken by inflicting punishment, which
is the cause of servile fear. But the New Law is not a law of fear,
but of love, as Augustine states (Contra Adamant. xvii). Therefore at
least in the New Testament all vengeance is unlawful.

Obj. 4: Further, a man is said to avenge himself when he takes
revenge for wrongs inflicted on himself. But, seemingly, it is
unlawful even for a judge to punish those who have wronged him: for
Chrysostom [*Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth., falsely ascribed
to St. Chrysostom] says: "Let us learn after Christ's example to bear
our own wrongs with magnanimity, yet not to suffer God's wrongs, not
even by listening to them." Therefore vengeance seems to be unlawful.

Obj. 5: Further, the sin of a multitude is more harmful than the sin
of only one: for it is written (Ecclus. 26:5-7): "Of three things my
heart hath been afraid . . . the accusation of a city, and the
gathering together of the people, and a false calumny." But vengeance
should not be taken on the sin of a multitude, for a gloss on Matt.
13:29, 30, "Lest perhaps . . . you root up the wheat . . . suffer
both to grow," says that "a multitude should not be excommunicated,
nor should the sovereign." Neither therefore is any other vengeance
lawful.

_On the contrary,_ We should look to God for nothing save what is
good and lawful. But we are to look to God for vengeance on His
enemies: for it is written (Luke 18:7): "Will not God revenge His
elect who cry to Him day and night?" as if to say: "He will indeed."
Therefore vengeance is not essentially evil and unlawful.

_I answer that,_ Vengeance consists in the infliction of a penal evil
on one who has sinned. Accordingly, in the matter of vengeance, we
must consider the mind of the avenger. For if his intention is
directed chiefly to the evil of the person on whom he takes vengeance
and rests there, then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: because
to take pleasure in another's evil belongs to hatred, which is
contrary to the charity whereby we are bound to love all men. Nor is
it an excuse that he intends the evil of one who has unjustly
inflicted evil on him, as neither is a man excused for hating one
that hates him: for a man may not sin against another just because
the latter has already sinned against him, since this is to be
overcome by evil, which was forbidden by the Apostle, who says (Rom.
12:21): "Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good."

If, however, the avenger's intention be directed chiefly to some
good, to be obtained by means of the punishment of the person who has
sinned (for instance that the sinner may amend, or at least that he
may be restrained and others be not disturbed, that justice may be
upheld, and God honored), then vengeance may be lawful, provided
other due circumstances be observed.

Reply Obj. 1: He who takes vengeance on the wicked in keeping with
his rank and position does not usurp what belongs to God but makes
use of the power granted him by God. For it is written (Rom. 13:4) of
the earthly prince that "he is God's minister, an avenger to execute
wrath upon him that doeth evil." If, however, a man takes vengeance
outside the order of divine appointment, he usurps what is God's and
therefore sins.

Reply Obj. 2: The good bear with the wicked by enduring patiently,
and in due manner, the wrongs they themselves receive from them: but
they do not bear with them as to endure the wrongs they inflict on
God and their neighbor. For Chrysostom [*Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v
in Matth., falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom] says: "It is
praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to overlook
God's wrongs is most wicked."

Reply Obj. 3: The law of the Gospel is the law of love, and therefore
those who do good out of love, and who alone properly belong to the
Gospel, ought not to be terrorized by means of punishment, but only
those who are not moved by love to do good, and who, though they
belong to the Church outwardly, do not belong to it in merit.

Reply Obj. 4: Sometimes a wrong done to a person reflects on God and
the Church: and then it is the duty of that person to avenge the
wrong. For example, Elias made fire descend on those who were come to
seize him (4 Kings 1); likewise Eliseus cursed the boys that mocked
him (4 Kings 2); and Pope Sylverius excommunicated those who sent him
into exile (XXIII, Q. iv, Cap. Guilisarius). But in so far as the
wrong inflicted on a man affects his person, he should bear it
patiently if this be expedient. For these precepts of patience are to
be understood as referring to preparedness of the mind, as Augustine
states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i).

Reply Obj. 5: When the whole multitude sins, vengeance must be taken
on them, either in respect of the whole multitude--thus the Egyptians
were drowned in the Red Sea while they were pursuing the children of
Israel (Ex. 14), and the people of Sodom were entirely destroyed
(Gen. 19)--or as regards part of the multitude, as may be seen in the
punishment of those who worshipped the calf.

Sometimes, however, if there is hope of many making amends, the
severity of vengeance should be brought to bear on a few of the
principals, whose punishment fills the rest with fear; thus the Lord
(Num. 25) commanded the princes of the people to be hanged for the
sin of the multitude.

On the other hand, if it is not the whole but only a part of the
multitude that has sinned, then if the guilty can be separated from
the innocent, vengeance should be wrought on them: provided, however,
that this can be done without scandal to others; else the multitude
should be spared and severity foregone. The same applies to the
sovereign, whom the multitude follow. For his sin should be borne
with, if it cannot be punished without scandal to the multitude:
unless indeed his sin were such, that it would do more harm to the
multitude, either spiritually or temporally, than would the scandal
that was feared to arise from his punishment.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 108, Art. 2]

Whether Vengeance Is a Special Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that vengeance is not a special and distinct
virtue. For just as the good are rewarded for their good deeds, so
are the wicked punished for their evil deeds. Now the rewarding of
the good does not belong to a special virtue, but is an act of
commutative justice. Therefore in the same way vengeance should not
be accounted a special virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, there is no need to appoint a special virtue for an
act to which a man is sufficiently disposed by the other virtues. Now
man is sufficiently disposed by the virtues of fortitude or zeal to
avenge evil. Therefore vengeance should not be reckoned a special
virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, there is a special vice opposed to every special
virtue. But seemingly no special vice is opposed to vengeance.
Therefore it is not a special virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of
justice.

_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1), aptitude
to virtue is in us by nature, but the complement of virtue is in us
through habituation or some other cause. Hence it is evident that
virtues perfect us so that we follow in due manner our natural
inclinations, which belong to the natural right. Wherefore to every
definite natural inclination there corresponds a special virtue. Now
there is a special inclination of nature to remove harm, for which
reason animals have the irascible power distinct from the
concupiscible. Man resists harm by defending himself against wrongs,
lest they be inflicted on him, or he avenges those which have already
been inflicted on him, with the intention, not of harming, but of
removing the harm done. And this belongs to vengeance, for Tully says
(De Invent. Rhet. ii) that by "vengeance we resist force, or wrong,
and in general whatever is obscure" [*_Obscurum._ Cicero wrote
_obfuturum_ but the sense is the same as St. Thomas gives in the
parenthesis] "(i.e. derogatory), either by self-defense or by
avenging it." Therefore vengeance is a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as repayment of a legal debt belongs to
commutative justice, and as repayment of a moral debt, arising from
the bestowal of a particular favor, belongs to the virtue of
gratitude, so too the punishment of sins, so far as it is the concern
of public justice, is an act of commutative justice; while so far as
it is concerned in defending the rights of the individual by whom a
wrong is resisted, it belongs to the virtue of revenge.

Reply Obj. 2: Fortitude disposes to vengeance by removing an obstacle
thereto, namely, fear of an imminent danger. Zeal, as denoting the
fervor of love, signifies the primary root of vengeance, in so far as
a man avenges the wrong done to God and his neighbor, because charity
makes him regard them as his own. Now every act of virtue proceeds
from charity as its root, since, according to Gregory (Hom. xxvii in
Ev.), "there are no green leaves on the bough of good works, unless
charity be the root."

Reply Obj. 3: Two vices are opposed to vengeance: one by way of
excess, namely, the sin of cruelty or brutality, which exceeds the
measure in punishing: while the other is a vice by way of deficiency
and consists in being remiss in punishing, wherefore it is written
(Prov. 13:24): "He that spareth the rod hateth his son." But the
virtue of vengeance consists in observing the due measure of
vengeance with regard to all the circumstances.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 108, Art. 3]

Whether Vengeance Should Be Wrought by Means of Punishments Customary
Among Men?

Objection 1: It seems that vengeance should not be wrought by means
of punishments customary among men. For to put a man to death is to
uproot him. But our Lord forbade (Matt. 13:29) the uprooting of the
cockle, whereby the children of the wicked one are signified.
Therefore sinners should not be put to death.

Obj. 2: Further, all who sin mortally seem to be deserving of the
same punishment. Therefore if some who sin mortally are punished with
death, it seems that all such persons should be punished with death:
and this is evidently false.

Obj. 3: Further, to punish a man publicly for his sin seems to
publish his sin: and this would seem to have a harmful effect on the
multitude, since the example of sin is taken by them as an occasion
for sin. Therefore it seems that the punishment of death should not
be inflicted for a sin.

_On the contrary,_ These punishments are fixed by the divine law as
appears from what we have said above (I-II, Q. 105, A. 2).

_I answer that,_ Vengeance is lawful and virtuous so far as it tends
to the prevention of evil. Now some who are not influenced by motive
of virtue are prevented from committing sin, through fear of losing
those things which they love more than those they obtain by sinning,
else fear would be no restraint to sin. Consequently vengeance for
sin should be taken by depriving a man of what he loves most. Now the
things which man loves most are life, bodily safety, his own freedom,
and external goods such as riches, his country and his good name.
Wherefore, according to Augustine's reckoning (De Civ. Dei xxi),
"Tully writes that the laws recognize eight kinds of punishment":
namely, "death," whereby man is deprived of life; "stripes,"
"retaliation," or the loss of eye for eye, whereby man forfeits his
bodily safety; "slavery," and "imprisonment," whereby he is deprived
of freedom; "exile" whereby he is banished from his country; "fines,"
whereby he is mulcted in his riches; "ignominy," whereby he loses
his good name.

Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord forbids the uprooting of the cockle, when
there is fear lest the wheat be uprooted together with it. But
sometimes the wicked can be uprooted by death, not only without
danger, but even with great profit, to the good. Wherefore in such a
case the punishment of death may be inflicted on sinners.

Reply Obj. 2: All who sin mortally are deserving of eternal death, as
regards future retribution, which is in accordance with the truth of
the divine judgment. But the punishments of this life are more of a
medicinal character; wherefore the punishment of death is inflicted
on those sins alone which conduce to the grave undoing of others.

Reply Obj. 3: The very fact that the punishment, whether of death or
of any kind that is fearsome to man, is made known at the same time
as the sin, makes man's will avers to sin: because the fear of
punishment is greater than the enticement of the example of sin.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 108, Art. 4]

Whether Vengeance Should Be Taken on Those Who Have Sinned
Involuntarily?

Objection 1: It seems that vengeance should be taken on those who
have sinned involuntarily. For the will of one man does not follow
from the will of another. Yet one man is punished for another,
according to Ex. 20:5, "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the
iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth
generation." Thus for the sin of Cham, his son Chanaan was cursed
(Gen. 9:25) and for the sin of Giezi, his descendants were struck
with leprosy (4 Kings 5). Again the blood of Christ lays the
descendants of the Jews under the ban of punishment, for they said
(Matt. 27:25): "His blood be upon us and upon our children." Moreover
we read (Josue 7) that the people of Israel were delivered into the
hands of their enemies for the sin of Achan, and that the same people
were overthrown by the Philistines on account of the sin of the sons
of Heli (1 Kings 4). Therefore a person is to be punished without
having deserved it voluntarily.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing is voluntary except what is in a man's
power. But sometimes a man is punished for what is not in his power;
thus a man is removed from the administration of the Church on
account of being infected with leprosy; and a Church ceases to be an
episcopal see on account of the depravity or evil of the people.
Therefore vengeance is taken not only for voluntary sins.

Obj. 3: Further, ignorance makes an act involuntary. Now vengeance is
sometimes taken on the ignorant. Thus the children of the people of
Sodom, though they were in invincible ignorance, perished with their
parents (Gen. 19). Again, for the sin of Dathan and Abiron their
children were swallowed up together with them (Num 16). Moreover,
dumb animals, which are devoid of reason, were commanded to be slain
on account of the sin of the Amalekites (1 Kings 15). Therefore
vengeance is sometimes taken on those who have deserved it
involuntarily.

Obj. 4: Further, compulsion is most opposed to voluntariness. But a
man does not escape the debt of punishment through being compelled by
fear to commit a sin. Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those
who have deserved it involuntarily.

Obj. 5: Further Ambrose says on Luke 5 that "the ship in which Judas
was, was in distress"; wherefore "Peter, who was calm in the security
of his own merits, was in distress about those of others." But Peter
did not will the sin of Judas. Therefore a person is sometimes
punished without having voluntarily deserved it.

_On the contrary,_ Punishment is due to sin. But every sin is
voluntary according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract. i).
Therefore vengeance should be taken only on those who have deserved
it voluntarily.

_I answer that,_ Punishment may be considered in two ways. First,
under the aspect of punishment, and in this way punishment is not due
save for sin, because by means of punishment the equality of justice
is restored, in so far as he who by sinning has exceeded in following
his own will suffers something that is contrary to this will.
Wherefore, since every sin is voluntary, not excluding original sin,
as stated above (I-II, Q. 81, A. 1), it follows that no one is
punished in this way, except for something done voluntarily.
Secondly, punishment may be considered as a medicine, not only
healing the past sin, but also preserving from future sin, or
conducing to some good, and in this way a person is sometimes
punished without any fault of his own, yet not without cause.

It must, however, be observed that a medicine never removes a greater
good in order to promote a lesser; thus the medicine of the body
never blinds the eye, in order to repair the heel: yet sometimes it
is harmful in lesser things that it may be helpful in things of
greater consequence. And since spiritual goods are of the greatest
consequence, while temporal goods are least important, sometimes a
person is punished in his temporal goods without any fault of his
own. Such are many of the punishments inflicted by God in this
present life for our humiliation or probation. But no one is punished
in spiritual goods without any fault on his part, neither in this nor
in the future life, because in the latter punishment is not
medicinal, but a result of spiritual condemnation.

Reply Obj. 1: A man is never condemned to a spiritual punishment for
another man's sin, because spiritual punishment affects the soul, in
respect of which each man is master of himself. But sometimes a man
is condemned to punishment in temporal matters for the sin of
another, and this for three reasons. First, because one man may be
the temporal goods of another, and so he may be punished in
punishment of the latter: thus children, as to the body, are a
belonging of their father, and slaves are a possession of their
master. Secondly, when one person's sin is transmitted to another,
either by _imitation,_ as children copy the sins of their parents,
and slaves the sins of their masters, so as to sin with greater
daring; or by way of _merit,_ as the sinful subjects merit a sinful
superior, according to Job 34:30, "Who maketh a man that is a
hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people?" Hence the people of
Israel were punished for David's sin in numbering the people (2 Kings
24). This may also happen through some kind of _consent_ or
_connivance:_ thus sometimes even the good are punished in temporal
matters together with the wicked, for not having condemned their
sins, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9). Thirdly, in order to mark
the unity of human fellowship, whereby one man is bound to be
solicitous for another, lest he sin; and in order to inculcate horror
of sin, seeing that the punishment of one affects all, as though all
were one body, as Augustine says in speaking of the sin of Achan (QQ.
sup. Josue viii). The saying of the Lord, "Visiting the iniquity of
the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation,"
seems to belong to mercy rather than to severity, since He does not
take vengeance forthwith, but waits for some future time, in order
that the descendants at least may mend their ways; yet should the
wickedness of the descendants increase, it becomes almost necessary
to take vengeance on them.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine states (QQ. sup. Josue viii), human
judgment should conform to the divine judgment, when this is
manifest, and God condemns men spiritually for their own sins. But
human judgment cannot be conformed to God's hidden judgments, whereby
He punishes certain persons in temporal matters without any fault of
theirs, since man is unable to grasp the reasons of these judgments
so as to know what is expedient for each individual. Wherefore
according to human judgment a man should never be condemned without
fault of his own to an inflictive punishment, such as death,
mutilation or flogging. But a man may be condemned, even according to
human judgment, to a punishment of forfeiture, even without any fault
on his part, but not without cause: and this in three ways.

First, through a person becoming, without any fault of his,
disqualified for having or acquiring a certain good: thus for being
infected with leprosy a man is removed from the administration of the
Church: and for bigamy, or through pronouncing a death sentence a man
is hindered from receiving sacred orders.

Secondly, because the particular good that he forfeits is not his own
but common property: thus that an episcopal see be attached to a
certain church belongs to the good of the whole city, and not only to
the good of the clerics.

Thirdly, because the good of one person may depend on the good of
another: thus in the crime of high treason a son loses his
inheritance through the sin of his parent.

Reply Obj. 3: By the judgment of God children are punished in
temporal matters together with their parents, both because they are a
possession of their parents, so that their parents are punished also
in their person, and because this is for their good lest, should they
be spared, they might imitate the sins of their parents, and thus
deserve to be punished still more severely. Vengeance is wrought on
dumb animals and any other irrational creatures, because in this way
their owners are punished; and also in horror of sin.

Reply Obj. 4: An act done through compulsion of fear is not
involuntary simply, but has an admixture of voluntariness, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 6, AA. 5, 6).

Reply Obj. 5: The other apostles were distressed about the sin of
Judas, in the same way as the multitude is punished for the sin of
one, in commendation of unity, as state above (Reply Obj. 1, 2).
_______________________

QUESTION 109

OF TRUTH
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider truth and the vices opposed thereto. Concerning
truth there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether truth is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a special virtue?

(3) Whether it is a part of justice?

(4) Whether it inclines to that which is less?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 109, Art. 1]

Whether Truth Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a virtue. For the first of
virtues is faith, whose object is truth. Since then the object
precedes the habit and the act, it seems that truth is not a virtue,
but something prior to virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), it
belongs to truth that a man should state things concerning himself to
be neither more nor less than they are. But this is not always
praiseworthy--neither in good things, since according to Prov. 27:2,
"Let another praise thee, and not thy own mouth"--nor even in evil
things, because it is written in condemnation of certain people (Isa.
3:9): "They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have
not hid it." Therefore truth is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or intellectual,
or moral. Now truth is not a theological virtue, because its object
is not God but temporal things. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii)
that by "truth we faithfully represent things as they are, were, or
will be." Likewise it is not one of the intellectual virtues, but
their end. Nor again is it a moral virtue, since it is not a mean
between excess and deficiency, for the more one tells the truth, the
better it is. Therefore truth is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher both in the Second and in the
Fourth Book of Ethics places truth among the other virtues.

_I answer that,_ Truth can be taken in two ways. First, for that by
reason of which a thing is said to be true, and thus truth is not a
virtue, but the object or end of a virtue: because, taken in this
way, truth is not a habit, which is the genus containing virtue, but
a certain equality between the understanding or sign and the thing
understood or signified, or again between a thing and its rule, as
stated in the First Part (Q. 16, A. 1; Q. 21, A. 2). Secondly, truth
may stand for that by which a person says what is true, in which
sense one is said to be truthful. This truth or truthfulness must
needs be a virtue, because to say what is true is a good act: and
virtue is "that which makes its possessor good, and renders his
action good."

Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes truth in the first sense.

Reply Obj. 2: To state that which concerns oneself, in so far as it
is a statement of what is true, is good generically. Yet this does
not suffice for it to be an act of virtue, since it is requisite for
that purpose that it should also be clothed with the due
circumstances, and if these be not observed, the act will be sinful.
Accordingly it is sinful to praise oneself without due cause even for
that which is true: and it is also sinful to publish one's sin, by
praising oneself on that account, or in any way proclaiming it
uselessly.

Reply Obj. 3: A person who says what is true, utters certain
signs which are in conformity with things; and such signs are either
words, or external actions, or any external thing. Now such kinds of
things are the subject-matter of the moral virtues alone, for the
latter are concerned with the use of the external members, in so far
as this use is put into effect at the command of the will. Wherefore
truth is neither a theological, nor an intellectual, but a moral
virtue. And it is a mean between excess and deficiency in two ways.
First, on the part of the object, secondly, on the part of the act. On
the part of the object, because the true essentially denotes a kind of
equality, and equal is a mean between more and less. Hence for the
very reason that a man says what is true about himself, he observes
the mean between one that says more than the truth about himself, and
one that says less than the truth. On the part of the act, to observe
the mean is to tell the truth, when one ought, and as one ought.
Excess consists in making known one's own affairs out of season, and
deficiency in hiding them when one ought to make them known.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 109, Art. 2]

Whether Truth Is a Special Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a special virtue. For the
true and the good are convertible. Now goodness is not a special
virtue, in fact every virtue is goodness, because "it makes its
possessor good." Therefore truth is not a special virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, to make known what belongs to oneself is an act of
truth as we understand it here. But this belongs to every virtue,
since every virtuous habit is made known by its own act. Therefore
truth is not a special virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, the truth of life is the truth whereby one lives
aright, and of which it is written (Isa. 38:3): "I beseech Thee . . .
remember how I have walked before Thee in truth, and with a perfect
heart." Now one lives aright by any virtue, as follows from the
definition of virtue given above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4). Therefore truth
is not a special virtue.

Obj. 4: Further, truth seems to be the same as simplicity, since
hypocrisy is opposed to both. But simplicity is not a special virtue,
since it rectifies the intention, and that is required in every
virtue. Therefore neither is truth a special virtue.

_On the contrary,_ It is numbered together with other virtues (Ethic.
ii, 7).

_I answer that,_ The nature of human virtue consists in making a
man's deed good. Consequently whenever we find a special aspect of
goodness in human acts, it is necessary that man be disposed thereto
by a special virtue. And since according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni
iii) good consists in order, it follows that a special aspect of good
will be found where there is a special order. Now there is a special
order whereby our externals, whether words or deeds, are duly ordered
in relation to some thing, as sign to thing signified: and thereto
man is perfected by the virtue of truth. Wherefore it is evident that
truth is a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: The true and the good are convertible as to subject,
since every true thing is good, and every good thing is true. But
considered logically, they exceed one another, even as the intellect
and will exceed one another. For the intellect understands the will
and many things besides, and the will desires things pertaining to
the intellect, and many others. Wherefore the _true_ considered in
its proper aspect as a perfection of the intellect is a particular
good, since it is something appetible: and in like manner the _good_
considered in its proper aspect as the end of the appetite is
something true, since it is something intelligible. Therefore since
virtue includes the aspect of goodness, it is possible for truth to
be a special virtue, just as the _true_ is a special good; yet it is
not possible for goodness to be a special virtue, since rather,
considered logically, it is the genus of virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: The habits of virtue and vice take their species from
what is directly intended, and not from that which is accidental and
beside the intention. Now that a man states that which concerns
himself, belongs to the virtue of truth, as something directly
intended: although it may belong to other virtues consequently and
beside his principal intention. For the brave man intends to act
bravely: and that he shows his fortitude by acting bravely is a
consequence beside his principal intention.

Reply Obj. 3: The truth of life is the truth whereby a thing is true,
not whereby a person says what is true. Life like anything else is
said to be true, from the fact that it attains its rule and measure,
namely, the divine law; since rectitude of life depends on conformity
to that law. This truth or rectitude is common to every virtue.

Reply Obj. 4: Simplicity is so called from its opposition to
duplicity, whereby, to wit, a man shows one thing outwardly while
having another in his heart: so that simplicity pertains to this
virtue. And it rectifies the intention, not indeed directly (since
this belongs to every virtue), but by excluding duplicity, whereby a
man pretends one thing and intends another.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 109, Art. 3]

Whether Truth Is a Part of Justice?

Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a part of justice. For it
seems proper to justice to give another man his due. But, by telling
the truth, one does not seem to give another man his due, as is the
case in all the foregoing parts of justice. Therefore truth is not a
part of justice.

Obj. 2: Further, truth pertains to the intellect: whereas justice is
in the will, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 4). Therefore truth is not a
part of justice.

Obj. 3: Further, according to Jerome truth is threefold, namely,
"truth of life," "truth of justice," and "truth of doctrine." But
none of these is a part of justice. For truth of life comprises all
virtues, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3): truth of justice is the same
as justice, so that it is not one of its parts; and truth of doctrine
belongs rather to the intellectual virtues. Therefore truth is nowise
a part of justice.

_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons truth among
the parts of justice.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 80), a virtue is annexed to
justice, as secondary to a principal virtue, through having something
in common with justice, while falling short from the perfect virtue
thereof. Now the virtue of truth has two things in common with
justice. In the first place it is directed to another, since the
manifestation, which we have stated to be an act of truth, is
directed to another, inasmuch as one person manifests to another the
things that concern himself. In the second place, justice sets up a
certain equality between things, and this the virtue of truth does
also, for it equals signs to the things which concern man himself.
Nevertheless it falls short of the proper aspect of justice, as to
the notion of debt: for this virtue does not regard legal debt, which
justice considers, but rather the moral debt, in so far as, out of
equity, one man owes another a manifestation of the truth. Therefore
truth is a part of justice, being annexed thereto as a secondary
virtue to its principal.

Reply Obj. 1: Since man is a social animal, one man naturally owes
another whatever is necessary for the preservation of human society.
Now it would be impossible for men to live together, unless they
believed one another, as declaring the truth one to another. Hence
the virtue of truth does, in a manner, regard something as being due.

Reply Obj. 2: Truth, as known, belongs to the intellect. But man, by
his own will, whereby he uses both habits and members, utters
external signs in order to manifest the truth, and in this way the
manifestation of the truth is an act of the will.

Reply Obj. 3: The truth of which we are speaking now differs from the
truth of life, as stated in the preceding A. 2, ad 3.

We speak of the truth of justice in two ways. In one way we refer to
the fact that justice itself is a certain rectitude regulated
according to the rule of the divine law; and in this way the truth of
justice differs from the truth of life, because by the truth of life
a man lives aright in himself, whereas by the truth of justice a man
observes the rectitude of the law in those judgments which refer to
another man: and in this sense the truth of justice has nothing to do
with the truth of which we speak now, as neither has the truth of
life. In another way the truth of justice may be understood as
referring to the fact that, out of justice, a man manifests the
truth, as for instance when a man confesses the truth, or gives true
evidence in a court of justice. This truth is a particular act of
justice, and does not pertain directly to this truth of which we are
now speaking, because, to wit, in this manifestation of the truth a
man's chief intention is to give another man his due. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) in describing this virtue: "We are
not speaking of one who is truthful in his agreements, nor does this
apply to matters in which justice or injustice is questioned."

The truth of doctrine consists in a certain manifestation of truths
relating to science wherefore neither does this truth directly pertain
to this virtue, but only that truth whereby a man, both in life and in
speech, shows himself to be such as he is, and the things that concern
him, not other, and neither greater nor less, than they are.
Nevertheless since truths of science, as known by us, are something
concerning us, and pertain to this virtue, in this sense the truth of
doctrine may pertain to this virtue, as well as any other kind of
truth whereby a man manifests, by word or deed, what he knows.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 109, Art. 4]

Whether the Virtue of Truth Inclines Rather to That Which Is Less?

Objection 1: It seems that the virtue of truth does not incline to
that which is less. For as one incurs falsehood by saying more, so
does one by saying less: thus it is no more false that four are five,
than that four are three. But "every falsehood is in itself evil, and
to be avoided," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore
the virtue of truth does not incline to that which is less rather
than to that which is greater.

Obj. 2: Further, that a virtue inclines to the one extreme rather
than to the other, is owing to the fact that the virtue's mean is
nearer to the one extreme than to the other: thus fortitude is nearer
to daring than to timidity. But the mean of truth is not nearer to
one extreme than to the other; because truth, since it is a kind of
equality, holds to the exact mean. Therefore truth does not more
incline to that which is less.

Obj. 3: Further, to forsake the truth for that which is less seems to
amount to a denial of the truth, since this is to subtract therefrom;
and to forsake the truth for that which is greater seems to amount to
an addition thereto. Now to deny the truth is more repugnant to truth
than to add something to it, because truth is incompatible with the
denial of truth, whereas it is compatible with addition. Therefore it
seems that truth should incline to that which is greater rather than
to that which is less.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "by this
virtue a man declines rather from the truth towards that which is
less."

_I answer that,_ There are two ways of declining from the truth to
that which is less. First, by affirming, as when a man does not show
the whole good that is in him, for instance science, holiness and so
forth. This is done without prejudice to truth, since the lesser is
contained in the greater: and in this way this virtue inclines to
what is less. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), "this
seems to be more prudent because exaggerations give annoyance." For
those who represent themselves as being greater than they are, are a
source of annoyance to others, since they seem to wish to surpass
others: whereas those who make less account of themselves are a
source of pleasure, since they seem to defer to others by their
moderation. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:6): "Though I should
have a mind to glory, I shall not be foolish: for I will say the
truth. But I forbear, lest any man should think of me above that
which he seeth in me or anything he heareth from me."

Secondly, one may incline to what is less by denying, so as to say
that what is in us is not. In this way it does not belong to this
virtue to incline to what is less, because this would imply
falsehood. And yet this would be less repugnant to the truth, not
indeed as regards the proper aspect of truth, but as regards the
aspect of prudence, which should be safeguarded in all the virtues.
For since it is fraught with greater danger and is more annoying to
others, it is more repugnant to prudence to think or boast that one
has what one has not, than to think or say that one has not what one
has.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

QUESTION 110

OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TRUTH, AND FIRST OF LYING
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the vices opposed to truth, and (1) lying:
(2) dissimulation or hypocrisy: (3) boasting and the opposite vice.
Concerning lying there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether lying, as containing falsehood, is always opposed to
truth?

(2) Of the species of lying;

(3) Whether lying is always a sin?

(4) Whether it is always a mortal sin?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 110, Art. 1]

Whether Lying Is Always Opposed to Truth?

Objection 1: It seems that lying is not always opposed to truth. For
opposites are incompatible with one another. But lying is compatible
with truth, since he that speaks the truth, thinking it to be false,
lies, according to Augustine (Lib. De Mendac. iii). Therefore lying
is not opposed to truth.

Obj. 2: Further, the virtue of truth applies not only to words but
also to deeds, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) by
this virtue one tells the truth both in one's speech and in one's
life. But lying applies only to words, for Augustine says (Contra
Mend. xii) that "a lie is a false signification by words."
Accordingly, it seems that lying is not directly opposed to the
virtue of truth.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mendac. iii) that the
"liar's sin is the desire to deceive." But this is not opposed to
truth, but rather to benevolence or justice. Therefore lying is not
opposed to truth.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Mend. x): "Let no one doubt
that it is a lie to tell a falsehood in order to deceive. Wherefore a
false statement uttered with intent to deceive is a manifest lie."
But this is opposed to truth. Therefore lying is opposed to truth.

_I answer that,_ A moral act takes its species from two things, its
object, and its end: for the end is the object of the will, which is
the first mover in moral acts. And the power moved by the will has
its own object, which is the proximate object of the voluntary act,
and stands in relation to the will's act towards the end, as material
to formal, as stated above (I-II, Q. 18, AA. 6, 7).

Now it has been said above (Q. 109, A. 1, ad 3) that the virtue of
truth--and consequently the opposite vices--regards a manifestation
made by certain signs: and this manifestation or statement is an act
of reason comparing sign with the thing signified; because every
representation consists in comparison, which is the proper act of the
reason. Wherefore though dumb animals manifest something, yet they do
not intend to manifest anything: but they do something by natural
instinct, and a manifestation is the result. But when this
manifestation or statement is a moral act, it must needs be
voluntary, and dependent on the intention of the will. Now the proper
object of a manifestation or statement is the true or the false. And
the intention of a bad will may bear on two things: one of which is
that a falsehood may be told; while the other is the proper effect of
a false statement, namely, that someone may be deceived.

Accordingly if these three things concur, namely, falsehood of what
is said, the will to tell a falsehood, and finally the intention to
deceive, then there is falsehood--materially, since what is said is
false, formally, on account of the will to tell an untruth, and
effectively, on account of the will to impart a falsehood.

However, the essential notion of a lie is taken from formal
falsehood, from the fact namely, that a person intends to say what is
false; wherefore also the word _mendacium_ (lie) is derived from its
being in opposition to the _mind._ Consequently if one says what is
false, thinking it to be true, it is false materially, but not
formally, because the falseness is beside the intention of the
speaker so that it is not a perfect lie, since what is beside the
speaker's intention is accidental for which reason it cannot be a
specific difference. If, on the other hand, one utters falsehood
formally, through having the will to deceive, even if what one says
be true, yet inasmuch as this is a voluntary and moral act, it
contains falseness essentially and truth accidentally, and attains
the specific nature of a lie.

That a person intends to cause another to have a false opinion, by
deceiving him, does not belong to the species of lying, but to
perfection thereof, even as in the physical order, a thing acquires
its species if it has its form, even though the form's effect be
lacking; for instance a heavy body which is held up aloft by force,
lest it come down in accordance with the exigency of its form.
Therefore it is evident that lying is directly an formally opposed to
the virtue of truth.

Reply Obj. 1: We judge of a thing according to what is in it formally
and essentially rather than according to what is in it materially and
accidentally. Hence it is more in opposition to truth, considered as
a moral virtue, to tell the truth with the intention of telling a
falsehood than to tell a falsehood with the intention of telling the
truth.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii), words hold
the chief place among other signs. And so when it is said that "a lie
is a false signification by words," the term "words" denotes every
kind of sign. Wherefore if a person intended to signify something
false by means of signs, he would not be excused from lying.

Reply Obj. 3: The desire to deceive belongs to the perfection of
lying, but not to its species, as neither does any effect belong to
the species of its cause.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 110, Art. 2]

Whether Lies Are Sufficiently Divided into Officious, Jocose, and
Mischievous Lies?

Objection 1: It seems that lies are not sufficiently divided into
"officious," "jocose" and "mischievous" lies. For a division should
be made according to that which pertains to a thing by reason of its
nature, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. vii, text. 43; De Part.
Animal i, 3). But seemingly the intention of the effect resulting
from a moral act is something beside and accidental to the species of
that act, so that an indefinite number of effects can result from one
act. Now this division is made according to the intention of the
effect: for a "jocose" lie is told in order to make fun, an
"officious" lie for some useful purpose, and a "mischievous" lie in
order to injure someone. Therefore lies are unfittingly divided in
this way.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (Contra Mendac. xiv) gives eight kinds of
lies. The first is "in religious doctrine"; the second is "a lie that
profits no one and injures someone"; the third "profits one party so
as to injure another"; the fourth is "told out of mere lust of lying
and deceiving"; the fifth is "told out of the desire to please"; the
sixth "injures no one, and profits someone in saving his money"; the
seventh "injures no one and profits someone in saving him from
death"; the eighth "injures no one, and profits someone in saving him
from defilement of the body." Therefore it seems that the first
division of lies is insufficient.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) divides lying into
"boasting," which exceeds the truth in speech, and "irony," which
falls short of the truth by saying something less: and these two are
not contained under any one of the kinds mentioned above. Therefore
it seems that the aforesaid division of lies is inadequate.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Ps. 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy all that
speak a lie," says "that there are three kinds of lies; for some are
told for the wellbeing and convenience of someone; and there is
another kind of lie that is told in fun; but the third kind of lie is
told out of malice." The first of these is called an officious lie,
the second a jocose lie, the third a mischievous lie. Therefore lies
are divided into these three kinds.

_I answer that,_ Lies may be divided in three ways. First, with
respect to their nature as lies: and this is the proper and essential
division of lying. In this way, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
iv, 7), lies are of two kinds, namely, the lie which goes beyond the
truth, and this belongs to "boasting," and the lie which stops short
of the truth, and this belongs to "irony." This division is an
essential division of lying itself, because lying as such is opposed
to truth, as stated in the preceding Article: and truth is a kind of
equality, to which more and less are in essential opposition.

Secondly, lies may be divided with respect to their nature as sins,
and with regard to those things that aggravate or diminish the sin of
lying, on the part of the end intended. Now the sin of lying is
aggravated, if by lying a person intends to injure another, and this
is called a "mischievous" lie, while the sin of lying is diminished
if it be directed to some good--either of pleasure and then it is a
"jocose" lie, or of usefulness, and then we have the "officious" lie,
whereby it is intended to help another person, or to save him from
being injured. In this way lies are divided into the three kinds
aforesaid.

Thirdly, lies are divided in a more general way, with respect to
their relation to some end, whether or not this increase or diminish
their gravity: and in this way the division comprises eight kinds, as
stated in the Second Objection. Here the first three kinds are
contained under "mischievous" lies, which are either against God, and
then we have the lie "in religious doctrine," or against man, and
this either with the sole intention of injuring him, and then it is
the second kind of lie, which "profits no one, and injures someone";
or with the intention of injuring one and at the same time profiting
another, and this is the third kind of lie, "which profits one, and
injures another." Of these the first is the most grievous, because
sins against God are always more grievous, as stated above (I-II, Q.
73, A. 3): and the second is more grievous than the third, since the
latter's gravity is diminished by the intention of profiting another.

After these three, which aggravate the sin of lying, we have a
fourth, which has its own measure of gravity without addition or
diminution; and this is the lie which is told "out of mere lust of
lying and deceiving." This proceeds from a habit, wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "the liar, when he lies from
habit, delights in lying."

The four kinds that follow lessen the gravity of the sin of lying.
For the fifth kind is the jocose lie, which is told "with a desire to
please": and the remaining three are comprised under the officious
lie, wherein something useful to another person is intended. This
usefulness regards either external things, and then we have the sixth
kind of lie, which "profits someone in saving his money"; or his
body, and this is the seventh kind, which "saves a man from death";
or the morality of his virtue, and this is the eighth kind, which
"saves him from unlawful defilement of his body."

Now it is evident that the greater the good intended, the more is the
sin of lying diminished in gravity. Wherefore a careful consideration
of the matter will show that these various kinds of lies are
enumerated in their order of gravity: since the useful good is better
than the pleasurable good, and life of the body than money, and
virtue than the life of the body.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 110, Art. 3]

Whether Every Lie Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that not every lie is a sin. For it is evident
that the evangelists did not sin in the writing of the Gospel. Yet
they seem to have told something false: since their accounts of the
words of Christ and of others often differ from one another:
wherefore seemingly one of them must have given an untrue account.
Therefore not every lie is a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, no one is rewarded by God for sin. But the midwives
of Egypt were rewarded by God for a lie, for it is stated that "God
built them houses" (Ex. 1:21). Therefore a lie is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, the deeds of holy men are related in Sacred Writ
that they may be a model of human life. But we read of certain very
holy men that they lied. Thus (Gen. 12 and 20) we are told that
Abraham said of his wife that she was his sister. Jacob also lied
when he said that he was Esau, and yet he received a blessing (Gen.
27:27-29). Again, Judith is commended (Judith 15:10, 11) although she
lied to Holofernes. Therefore not every lie is a sin.

Obj. 4: Further, one ought to choose the lesser evil in order to
avoid the greater: even so a physician cuts off a limb, lest the
whole body perish. Yet less harm is done by raising a false opinion
in a person's mind, than by someone slaying or being slain. Therefore
a man may lawfully lie, to save another from committing murder, or
another from being killed.

Obj. 5: Further, it is a lie not to fulfill what one has promised.
Yet one is not bound to keep all one's promises: for Isidore says
(Synonym. ii): "Break your faith when you have promised ill."
Therefore not every lie is a sin.

Obj. 6: Further, apparently a lie is a sin because thereby we deceive
our neighbor: wherefore Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xxi): "Whoever
thinks that there is any kind of lie that is not a sin deceives
himself shamefully, since he deems himself an honest man when he
deceives others." Yet not every lie is a cause of deception, since no
one is deceived by a jocose lie; seeing that lies of this kind are
told, not with the intention of being believed, but merely for the
sake of giving pleasure. Hence again we find hyperbolical expressions
in Holy Writ. Therefore not every lie is a sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 7:14): "Be not willing to
make any manner of lie."

_I answer that,_ An action that is naturally evil in respect of its
genus can by no means be good and lawful, since in order for an
action to be good it must be right in every respect: because good
results from a complete cause, while evil results from any single
defect, as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now a lie is evil in
respect of its genus, since it is an action bearing on undue matter.
For as words are naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is
unnatural and undue for anyone to signify by words something that is
not in his mind. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that
"lying is in itself evil and to be shunned, while truthfulness is
good and worthy of praise." Therefore every lie is a sin, as also
Augustine declares (Contra Mend. i).

Reply Obj. 1: It is unlawful to hold that any false assertion is
contained either in the Gospel or in any canonical Scripture, or that
the writers thereof have told untruths, because faith would be
deprived of its certitude which is based on the authority of Holy
Writ. That the words of certain people are variously reported in the
Gospel and other sacred writings does not constitute a lie. Hence
Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. ii): "He that has the wit to
understand that in order to know the truth it is necessary to get at
the sense, will conclude that he must not be the least troubled, no
matter by what words that sense is expressed." Hence it is evident,
as he adds (De Consens. Evang. ii), that "we must not judge that
someone is lying, if several persons fail to describe in the same way
and in the same words a thing which they remember to have seen or
heard."

Reply Obj. 2: The midwives were rewarded, not for their lie, but for
their fear of God, and for their good-will, which latter led them to
tell a lie. Hence it is expressly stated (Ex. 2:21): "And because the
midwives feared God, He built them houses." But the subsequent lie
was not meritorious.

Reply Obj. 3: In Holy Writ, as Augustine observes (Lib. De Mend. v),
the deeds of certain persons are related as examples of perfect
virtue: and we must not believe that such persons were liars. If,
however, any of their statements appear to be untruthful, we must
understand such statements to have been figurative and prophetic.
Hence Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. v): "We must believe that
whatever is related of those who, in prophetical times, are mentioned
as being worthy of credit, was done and said by them prophetically."
As to Abraham "when he said that Sara was his sister, he wished to
hide the truth, not to tell a lie, for she is called his sister since
she was the daughter of his father," Augustine says (QQ. Super. Gen.
xxvi; Contra Mend. x; Contra Faust. xxii). Wherefore Abraham himself
said (Gen. 20:12): "She is truly my sister, the daughter of my
father, and not the daughter of my mother," being related to him on
his father's side. Jacob's assertion that he was Esau, Isaac's
first-born, was spoken in a mystical sense, because, to wit, the
latter's birthright was due to him by right: and he made use of this
mode of speech being moved by the spirit of prophecy, in order to
signify a mystery, namely, that the younger people, i.e. the
Gentiles, should supplant the first-born, i.e. the Jews.

Some, however, are commended in the Scriptures, not on account of
perfect virtue, but for a certain virtuous disposition, seeing that
it was owing to some praiseworthy sentiment that they were moved to
do certain undue things. It is thus that Judith is praised, not for
lying to Holofernes, but for her desire to save the people, to which
end she exposed herself to danger. And yet one might also say that
her words contain truth in some mystical sense.

Reply Obj. 4: A lie is sinful not only because it injures one's
neighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness, as stated above
in this Article. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything
inordinate in order to ward off injury or defects from another: as
neither is it lawful to steal in order to give an alms, except
perhaps in a case of necessity when all things are common. Therefore
it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any
danger whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth
prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says (Contra Mend. x).

Reply Obj. 5: A man does not lie, so long as he has a mind to do what
he promises, because he does not speak contrary to what he has in
mind: but if he does not keep his promise, he seems to act without
faith in changing his mind. He may, however, be excused for two
reasons. First, if he has promised something evidently unlawful,
because he sinned in promise, and did well to change his mind.
Secondly, if circumstances have changed with regard to persons and
the business in hand. For, as Seneca states (De Benef. iv), for a man
to be bound to keep a promise, it is necessary for everything to
remain unchanged: otherwise neither did he lie in promising--since he
promised what he had in his mind, due circumstances being taken for
granted--nor was he faithless in not keeping his promise, because
circumstances are no longer the same. Hence the Apostle, though he
did not go to Corinth, whither he had promised to go (2 Cor. 1), did
not lie, because obstacles had arisen which prevented him.

Reply Obj. 6: An action may be considered in two ways. First, in
itself, secondly, with regard to the agent. Accordingly a jocose lie,
from the very genus of the action, is of a nature to deceive;
although in the intention of the speaker it is not told to deceive,
nor does it deceive by the way it is told. Nor is there any
similarity in the hyperbolical or any kind of figurative expressions,
with which we meet in Holy Writ: because, as Augustine says (Lib. De
Mend. v), "it is not a lie to do or say a thing figuratively: because
every statement must be referred to the thing stated: and when a
thing is done or said figuratively, it states what those to whom it
is tendered understand it to signify."
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 110, Art. 4]

Whether Every Lie Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that every lie is a mortal sin. For it is
written (Ps. 6:7): "Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie," and
(Wis. 1:11): "The mouth that belieth killeth the soul." Now mortal
sin alone causes destruction and death of the soul. Therefore every
lie is a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is against a precept of the decalogue is a
mortal sin. Now lying is against this precept of the decalogue: "Thou
shalt not bear false witness." Therefore every lie is a mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 36): "Every
liar breaks his faith in lying, since forsooth he wishes the person
to whom he lies to have faith in him, and yet he does not keep faith
with him, when he lies to him: and whoever breaks his faith is guilty
of iniquity." Now no one is said to break his faith or "to be guilty
of iniquity," for a venial sin. Therefore no lie is a venial sin.

Obj. 4: Further, the eternal reward is not lost save for a mortal
sin. Now, for a lie the eternal reward was lost, being exchanged for
a temporal meed. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that "we learn from
the reward of the midwives what the sin of lying deserves: since the
reward which they deserved for their kindness, and which they might
have received in eternal life, dwindled into a temporal meed on
account of the lie of which they were guilty." Therefore even an
officious lie, such as was that of the midwives, which seemingly is
the least of lies, is a mortal sin.

Obj. 5: Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xvii) that "it is a
precept of perfection, not only not to lie at all, but not even to
wish to lie." Now it is a mortal sin to act against a precept.
Therefore every lie of the perfect is a mortal sin: and consequently
so also is a lie told by anyone else, otherwise the perfect would be
worse off than others.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says on Ps. 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy,"
etc.: "There are two kinds of lie, that are not grievously sinful yet
are not devoid of sin, when we lie either in joking, or for the sake
of our neighbor's good." But every mortal sin is grievous. Therefore
jocose and officious lies are not mortal sins.

_I answer that,_ A mortal sin is, properly speaking, one that is
contrary to charity whereby the soul lives in union with God, as
stated above (Q. 24, A. 12; Q. 35, A. 3). Now a lie may be contrary
to charity in three ways: first, in itself; secondly, in respect of
the evil intended; thirdly, accidentally.

A lie may be in itself contrary to charity by reason of its false
signification. For if this be about divine things, it is contrary to
the charity of God, whose truth one hides or corrupts by such a lie;
so that a lie of this kind is opposed not only to the virtue of
charity, but also to the virtues of faith and religion: wherefore it
is a most grievous and a mortal sin. If, however, the false
signification be about something the knowledge of which affects a
man's good, for instance if it pertain to the perfection of science
or to moral conduct, a lie of this description inflicts an injury on
one's neighbor, since it causes him to have a false opinion,
wherefore it is contrary to charity, as regards the love of our
neighbor, and consequently is a mortal sin. On the other hand, if the
false opinion engendered by the lie be about some matter the
knowledge of which is of no consequence, then the lie in question
does no harm to one's neighbor; for instance, if a person be deceived
as to some contingent particulars that do not concern him. Wherefore
a lie of this kind, considered in itself, is not a mortal sin.

As regards the end in view, a lie may be contrary to charity, through
being told with the purpose of injuring God, and this is always a
mortal sin, for it is opposed to religion; or in order to injure
one's neighbor, in his person, his possessions or his good name, and
this also is a mortal sin, since it is a mortal sin to injure one's
neighbor, and one sins mortally if one has merely the intention of
committing a mortal sin. But if the end intended be not contrary to
charity, neither will the lie, considered under this aspect, be a
mortal sin, as in the case of a jocose lie, where some little
pleasure is intended, or in an officious lie, where the good also of
one's neighbor is intended. Accidentally a lie may be contrary to
charity by reason of scandal or any other injury resulting therefrom:
and thus again it will be a mortal sin, for instance if a man were
not deterred through scandal from lying publicly.

Reply Obj. 1: The passages quoted refer to the mischievous lie, as a
gloss explains the words of Ps. 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy all that
speak a lie."

Reply Obj. 2: Since all the precepts of the decalogue are directed to
the love of God and our neighbor, as stated above (Q. 44, A. 1, ad 3;
I-II, Q. 100, A. 5, ad 1), a lie is contrary to a precept of the
decalogue, in so far as it is contrary to the love of God and our
neighbor. Hence it is expressly forbidden to bear false witness
against our neighbor.

Reply Obj. 3: Even a venial sin can be called "iniquity" in a broad
sense, in so far as it is beside the equity of justice; wherefore it
is written (1 John 3:4): "Every sin is iniquity [*Vulg.: 'And sin is
iniquity.']." It is in this sense that Augustine is speaking.

Reply Obj. 4: The lie of the midwives may be considered in two ways.
First as regards their feeling of kindliness towards the Jews, and
their reverence and fear of God, for which their virtuous disposition
is commended. For this an eternal reward is due. Wherefore Jerome (in
his exposition of Isa. 65:21, 'And they shall build houses') explains
that God "built them spiritual houses." Secondly, it may be
considered with regard to the external act of lying. For thereby they
could merit, not indeed eternal reward, but perhaps some temporal
meed, the deserving of which was not inconsistent with the deformity
of their lie, though this was inconsistent with their meriting an
eternal reward. It is in this sense that we must understand the words
of Gregory, and not that they merited by that lie to lose the eternal
reward as though they had already merited it by their preceding
kindliness, as the objection understands the words to mean.

Reply Obj. 5: Some say that for the perfect every lie is a mortal
sin. But this assertion is unreasonable. For no circumstance causes a
sin to be infinitely more grievous unless it transfers it to another
species. Now a circumstance of person does not transfer a sin to
another species, except perhaps by reason of something annexed to
that person, for instance if it be against his vow: and this cannot
apply to an officious or jocose lie. Wherefore an officious or a
jocose lie is not a mortal sin in perfect men, except perhaps
accidentally on account of scandal. We may take in this sense the
saying of Augustine that "it is a precept of perfection not only not
to lie at all, but not even to wish to lie": although Augustine says
this not positively but dubiously, for he begins by saying: "Unless
perhaps it is a precept," etc. Nor does it matter that they are
placed in a position to safeguard the truth: because they are bound
to safeguard the truth by virtue of their office in judging or
teaching, and if they lie in these matters their lie will be a mortal
sin: but it does not follow that they sin mortally when they lie in
other matters.
_______________________

QUESTION 111

OF DISSIMULATION AND HYPOCRISY
(In Four Articles)

In due sequence we must consider dissimulation and hypocrisy. Under
this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether all dissimulation is a sin?

(2) Whether hypocrisy is dissimulation?

(3) Whether it is opposed to truth?

(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 111, Art. 1]

Whether All Dissimulation Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that not all dissimulation is a sin. For it is
written (Luke 24:28) that our Lord "pretended [Douay: 'made as
though'] he would go farther"; and Ambrose in his book on the
Patriarchs (De Abraham i) says of Abraham that he "spoke craftily to
his servants, when he said" (Gen. 22:5): "I and the boy will go with
speed as far as yonder, and after we have worshipped, will return to
you." Now to pretend and to speak craftily savor of dissimulation:
and yet it is not to be said that there was sin in Christ or Abraham.
Therefore not all dissimulation is a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, no sin is profitable. But according to Jerome, in
his commentary on Gal. 2:11, "When Peter [Vulg.: 'Cephas'] was come
to Antioch:--The example of Jehu, king of Israel, who slew the priest
of Baal, pretending that he desired to worship idols, should teach us
that dissimulation is useful and sometimes to be employed"; and David
"changed his countenance before" Achis, king of Geth (1 Kings 21:13).
Therefore not all dissimulation is a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, good is contrary to evil. Therefore if it is evil to
simulate good, it is good to simulate evil.

Obj. 4: Further, it is written in condemnation of certain people
(Isa. 3:9): "They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they
have not hid it." Now it pertains to dissimulation to hide one's sin.
Therefore it is reprehensible sometimes not to simulate. But it is
never reprehensible to avoid sin. Therefore dissimulation is not a
sin.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Isa. 16:14, "In three years," etc.,
says: "Of the two evils it is less to sin openly than to simulate
holiness." But to sin openly is always a sin. Therefore dissimulation
is always a sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 109, A. 3; Q. 110, A. 1), it
belongs to the virtue of truth to show oneself outwardly by outward
signs to be such as one is. Now outward signs are not only words, but
also deeds. Accordingly just as it is contrary to truth to signify by
words something different from that which is in one's mind, so also
is it contrary to truth to employ signs of deeds or things to signify
the contrary of what is in oneself, and this is what is properly
denoted by dissimulation. Consequently dissimulation is properly a
lie told by the signs of outward deeds. Now it matters not whether
one lie in word or in any other way, as stated above (Q. 110, A. 1,
Obj. 2). Wherefore, since every lie is a sin, as stated above (Q.
110, A. 3), it follows that also all dissimulation is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii), "To pretend is
not always a lie: but only when the pretense has no signification,
then it is a lie. When, however, our pretense refers to some
signification, there is no lie, but a representation of the truth."
And he cites figures of speech as an example, where a thing is
"pretended," for we do not mean it to be taken literally but as a
figure of something else that we wish to say. In this way our Lord
"pretended He would go farther," because He acted as if wishing to go
farther; in order to signify something figuratively either because He
was far from their faith, according to Gregory (Hom. xxiii in Ev.);
or, as Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii), because, "as He was about
to go farther away from them by ascending into heaven, He was, so to
speak, held back on earth by their hospitality."

Abraham also spoke figuratively. Wherefore Ambrose (De Abraham i)
says that Abraham "foretold what he knew not": for he intended to
return alone after sacrificing his son: but by his mouth the Lord
expressed what He was about to do. It is evident therefore that
neither dissembled.

Reply Obj. 2: Jerome employs the term "simulation" in a broad sense
for any kind of pretense. David's change of countenance was a
figurative pretense, as a gloss observes in commenting on the title
of Ps. 33, "I will bless the Lord at all times." There is no need to
excuse Jehu's dissimulation from sin or lie, because he was a wicked
man, since he departed not from the idolatry of Jeroboam (4 Kings
10:29, 31). And yet he is praised withal and received an earthly
reward from God, not for his dissimulation, but for his zeal in
destroying the worship of Baal.

Reply Obj. 3: Some say that no one may pretend to be wicked, because
no one pretends to be wicked by doing good deeds, and if he do evil
deeds, he is evil. But this argument proves nothing. Because a man
might pretend to be evil, by doing what is not evil in itself but has
some appearance of evil: and nevertheless this dissimulation is evil,
both because it is a lie, and because it gives scandal; and although
he is wicked on this account, yet his wickedness is not the
wickedness he simulates. And because dissimulation is evil in itself,
its sinfulness is not derived from the thing simulated, whether this
be good or evil.

Reply Obj. 4: Just as a man lies when he signifies by word that which
he is not, yet lies not when he refrains from saying what he is, for
this is sometimes lawful; so also does a man dissemble, when by
outward signs of deeds or things he signifies that which he is not,
yet he dissembles not if he omits to signify what he is. Hence one
may hide one's sin without being guilty of dissimulation. It is thus
that we must understand the saying of Jerome on the words of Isa.
3:9, that the "second remedy after shipwreck is to hide one's sin,"
lest, to wit, others be scandalized thereby.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 111, Art. 2]

Whether Hypocrisy Is the Same As Dissimulation?

Objection 1: It seems that hypocrisy is not the same as
dissimulation. For dissimulation consists in lying by deeds. But
there may be hypocrisy in showing outwardly what one does inwardly,
according to Matt. 6:2, "When thou dost an alms-deed sound not a
trumpet before thee, as the hypocrites do." Therefore hypocrisy is
not the same as dissimulation.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7): "Some there are who
wear the habit of holiness, yet are unable to attain the merit of
perfection. We must by no means deem these to have joined the ranks
of the hypocrites, since it is one thing to sin from weakness, and
another to sin from malice." Now those who wear the habit of
holiness, without attaining the merit of perfection, are dissemblers,
since the outward habit signifies works of perfection. Therefore
dissimulation is not the same as hypocrisy.

Obj. 3: Further, hypocrisy consists in the mere intention. For our
Lord says of hypocrites (Matt. 23:5) that "all their works they do
for to be seen of men": and Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7) that "they
never consider what it is that they do, but how by their every action
they may please men." But dissimulation consists, not in the mere
intention, but in the outward action: wherefore a gloss on Job 36:13,
"Dissemblers and crafty men prove the wrath of God," says that "the
dissembler simulates one thing and does another: he pretends
chastity, and delights in lewdness, he makes a show of poverty and
fills his purse." Therefore hypocrisy is not the same as
dissimulation.

_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x): "'Hypocrite' is a Greek
word corresponding to the Latin 'simulator,' for whereas he is evil
within," he "shows himself outwardly as being good; _hypo_ denoting
falsehood, and _krisis_, judgment."

_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. x), "the word hypocrite is
derived from the appearance of those who come on to the stage with a
disguised face, by changing the color of their complexion, so as to
imitate the complexion of the person they simulate, at one time under
the guise of a man, at another under the guise of a woman, so as to
deceive the people in their acting." Hence Augustine says (De Serm.
Dom. ii) that "just as hypocrites by simulating other persons act the
parts of those they are not (since he that acts the part of Agamemnon
is not that man himself but pretends to be), so too in the Church and
in every department of human life, whoever wishes to seem what he is
not is a hypocrite: for he pretends to be just without being so in
reality."

We must conclude, therefore, that hypocrisy is dissimulation, not,
however, any form of dissimulation, but only when one person
simulates another, as when a sinner simulates the person of a just
man.

Reply Obj. 1: The outward deed is a natural sign of the intention.
Accordingly when a man does good works pertaining by their genus to
the service of God, and seeks by their means to please, not God but
man, he simulates a right intention which he has not. Wherefore
Gregory says (Moral.) that "hypocrites make God's interests
subservient to worldly purposes, since by making a show of saintly
conduct they seek, not to turn men to God, but to draw to themselves
the applause of their approval:" and so they make a lying pretense of
having a good intention, which they have not, although they do not
pretend to do a good deed without doing it.

Reply Obj. 2: The habit of holiness, for instance the religious or
the clerical habit, signifies a state whereby one is bound to perform
works of perfection. And so when a man puts on the habit of holiness,
with the intention of entering the state of perfection, if he fail
through weakness, he is not a dissembler or a hypocrite, because he
is not bound to disclose his sin by laying aside the habit of
holiness. If, however, he were to put on the habit of holiness in
order to make a show of righteousness, he would be a hypocrite and a
dissembler.

Reply Obj. 3: In dissimulation, as in a lie, there are two things:
one by way of sign, the other by way of thing signified. Accordingly
the evil intention in hypocrisy is considered as a thing signified,
which does not tally with the sign: and the outward words, or deeds,
or any sensible objects are considered in every dissimulation and lie
as a sign.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 111, Art. 3]

Whether Hypocrisy Is Contrary to the Virtue of Truth?

Objection 1: It seems that hypocrisy is not contrary to the virtue of
truth. For in dissimulation or hypocrisy there is a sign and a thing
signified. Now with regard to neither of these does it seem to be
opposed to any special virtue: for a hypocrite simulates any virtue,
and by means of any virtuous deeds, such as fasting, prayer and alms
deeds, as stated in Matt. 6:1-18. Therefore hypocrisy is not
specially opposed to the virtue of truth.

Obj. 2: Further, all dissimulation seems to proceed from guile,
wherefore it is opposed to simplicity. Now guile is opposed to
prudence as above stated (Q. 55, A. 4). Therefore, hypocrisy which is
dissimulation is not opposed to truth, but rather to prudence or
simplicity.

Obj. 3: Further, the species of moral acts is taken from their end.
Now the end of hypocrisy is the acquisition of gain or vainglory:
wherefore a gloss on Job 27:8, "What is the hope of the hypocrite, if
through covetousness he take by violence," says: "A hypocrite or, as
the Latin has it, a dissimulator, is a covetous thief: for through
desire of being honored for holiness, though guilty of wickedness, he
steals praise for a life which is not his." [*The quotation is from
St. Gregory's _Moralia,_ Bk XVIII.] Therefore since covetousness or
vainglory is not directly opposed to truth, it seems that neither is
hypocrisy or dissimulation.

_On the contrary,_ All dissimulation is a lie, as stated above (A.
1). Now a lie is directly opposed to truth. Therefore dissimulation
or hypocrisy is also.

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Metaph. text. 13, 24,
x), "contrariety is opposition as regards form," i.e. the specific
form. Accordingly we must reply that dissimulation or hypocrisy may
be opposed to a virtue in two ways, in one way directly, in another
way indirectly. Its direct opposition or contrariety is to be
considered with regard to the very species of the act, and this
species depends on that act's proper object. Wherefore since
hypocrisy is a kind of dissimulation, whereby a man simulates a
character which is not his, as stated in the preceding article, it
follows that it is directly opposed to truth whereby a man shows
himself in life and speech to be what he is, as stated in _Ethic._
iv, 7.

The indirect opposition or contrariety of hypocrisy may be considered
in relation to any accident, for instance a remote end, or an
instrument of action, or anything else of that kind.

Reply Obj. 1: The hypocrite in simulating a virtue regards it as his
end, not in respect of its existence, as though he wished to have it,
but in respect of appearance, since he wishes to seem to have it.
Hence his hypocrisy is not opposed to that virtue, but to truth,
inasmuch as he wishes to deceive men with regard to that virtue. And
he performs acts of that virtue, not as intending them for their own
sake, but instrumentally, as signs of that virtue, wherefore his
hypocrisy has not, on that account, a direct opposition to that
virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 55, AA. 3, 4, 5), the vice directly
opposed to prudence is cunning, to which it belongs to discover ways
of achieving a purpose, that are apparent and not real: while it
accomplishes that purpose, by guile in words, and by fraud in deeds:
and it stands in relation to prudence, as guile and fraud to
simplicity. Now guile and fraud are directed chiefly to deception,
and sometimes secondarily to injury. Wherefore it belongs directly to
simplicity to guard oneself from deception, and in this way the
virtue of simplicity is the same as the virtue of truth as stated
above (Q. 109, A. 2, ad 4). There is, however, a mere logical
difference between them, because by truth we mean the concordance
between sign and thing signified, while simplicity indicates that one
does not tend to different things, by intending one thing inwardly,
and pretending another outwardly.

Reply Obj. 3: Gain or glory is the remote end of the dissembler as
also of the liar. Hence it does not take its species from this end,
but from the proximate end, which is to show oneself other than one
is. Wherefore it sometimes happens to a man to pretend great things
of himself, for no further purpose than the mere lust of hypocrisy,
as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), and as also we have said
above with regard to lying (Q. 110, A. 2).
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 111, Art. 4]

Whether Hypocrisy Is Always a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that hypocrisy is always a mortal sin. For
Jerome says on Isa. 16:14: "Of the two evils it is less to sin openly
than to simulate holiness": and a gloss on Job 1:21 [*St. Augustine,
on Ps. 63:7], "As it hath pleased the Lord," etc., says that
"pretended justice is no justice, but a twofold sin": and again a
gloss on Lam. 4:6, "The iniquity . . . of my people is made greater
than the sin of Sodom," says: "He deplores the sins of the soul that
falls into hypocrisy, which is a greater iniquity than the sin of
Sodom." Now the sins of Sodom are mortal sin. Therefore hypocrisy is
always a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 8) that hypocrites sin
out of malice. But this is most grievous, for it pertains to the sin
against the Holy Ghost. Therefore a hypocrite always sins mortally.

Obj. 3: Further, no one deserves the anger of God and exclusion from
seeing God, save on account of mortal sin. Now the anger of God is
deserved through hypocrisy according to Job 36:13, "Dissemblers and
crafty men prove the wrath of God": and the hypocrite is excluded
from seeing God, according to Job 13:16, "No hypocrite shall come
before His presence." Therefore hypocrisy is always a mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ Hypocrisy is lying by deed since it is a kind of
dissimulation. But it is not always a mortal sin to lie by deed.
Neither therefore is all hypocrisy a mortal sin.

Further, the intention of a hypocrite is to appear to be good. But
this is not contrary to charity. Therefore hypocrisy is not of itself
a mortal sin.

Further, hypocrisy is born of vainglory, as Gregory says (Moral.
xxxi, 17). But vainglory is not always a mortal sin. Neither
therefore is hypocrisy.

_I answer that,_ There are two things in hypocrisy, lack of holiness,
and simulation thereof. Accordingly if by a hypocrite we mean a
person whose intention is directed to both the above, one, namely,
who cares not to be holy but only to appear so, in which sense Sacred
Scripture is wont to use the term, it is evident that hypocrisy is a
mortal sin: for no one is entirely deprived of holiness save through
mortal sin. But if by a hypocrite we mean one who intends to simulate
holiness, which he lacks through mortal sin, then, although he is in
mortal sin, whereby he is deprived of holiness, yet, in his case, the
dissimulation itself is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes a
venial sin. This will depend on the end in view; for if this be
contrary to the love of God or of his neighbor, it will be a mortal
sin: for instance if he were to simulate holiness in order to
disseminate false doctrine, or that he may obtain ecclesiastical
preferment, though unworthy, or that he may obtain any temporal good
in which he fixes his end. If, however, the end intended be not
contrary to charity, it will be a venial sin, as for instance when a
man takes pleasure in the pretense itself: of such a man it is said
in _Ethic._ iv, 7 that "he would seem to be vain rather than evil";
for the same applies to simulation as to a lie.

It happens also sometimes that a man simulates the perfection of
holiness which is not necessary for spiritual welfare. Simulation of
this kind is neither a mortal sin always, nor is it always associated
with mortal sin.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

QUESTION 112

OF BOASTING
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider boasting and irony, which are parts of lying
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7). Under the first head,
namely, boasting, there are two points of inquiry:

(1) To which virtue is it opposed?

(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 112, Art. 1]

Whether Boasting Is Opposed to the Virtue of Truth?

Objection 1: It seems that boasting is not opposed to the virtue of
truth. For lying is opposed to truth. But it is possible to boast
even without lying, as when a man makes a show of his own excellence.
Thus it is written (Esther 1:3, 4) that Assuerus "made a great feast
. . . that he might show the riches of the glory" and "of his
kingdom, and the greatness and boasting of his power." Therefore
boasting is not opposed to the virtue of truth.

Obj. 2: Further, boasting is reckoned by Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 4) to
be one of the four species of pride, "when," to wit, "a man boasts of
having what he has not." Hence it is written (Jer. 48:29, 30): "We
have heard the pride of Moab, he is exceeding proud: his haughtiness,
and his arrogancy, and his pride, and the loftiness of his heart. I
know, saith the Lord, his boasting, and that the strength thereof is
not according to it." Moreover, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7) that
boasting arises from vainglory. Now pride and vainglory are opposed
to the virtue of humility. Therefore boasting is opposed, not to
truth, but to humility.

Obj. 3: Further, boasting seems to be occasioned by riches; wherefore
it is written (Wis. 5:8): "What hath pride profited us? or what
advantage hath the boasting of riches brought us?" Now excess of
riches seems to belong to the sin of covetousness, which is opposed
to justice or liberality. Therefore boasting is not opposed to truth.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 7), that
boasting is opposed to truth.

_I answer that,_ _Jactantia_ (boasting) seems properly to denote the
uplifting of self by words: since if a man wishes to throw
(_jactare_) a thing far away, he lifts it up high. And to uplift
oneself, properly speaking, is to talk of oneself above oneself [*Or
'tall-talking' as we should say in English]. This happens in two
ways. For sometimes a man speaks of himself, not above what he is in
himself, but above that which he is esteemed by men to be: and this
the Apostle declines to do when he says (2 Cor. 12:6): "I forbear
lest any man should think of me above that which he seeth in me, or
anything he heareth of me." In another way a man uplifts himself in
words, by speaking of himself above that which he is in reality. And
since we should judge of things as they are in themselves, rather
than as others deem them to be, it follows that boasting denotes more
properly the uplifting of self above what one is in oneself, than the
uplifting of self above what others think of one: although in either
case it may be called boasting. Hence boasting properly so called is
opposed to truth by way of excess.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes boasting as exceeding men's opinion.

Reply Obj. 2: The sin of boasting may be considered in two ways.
First, with regard to the species of the act, and thus it is opposed
to truth; as stated (in the body of the article and Q. 110, A. 2).
Secondly, with regard to its cause, from which more frequently though
not always it arises: and thus it proceeds from pride as its inwardly
moving and impelling cause. For when a man is uplifted inwardly by
arrogance, it often results that outwardly he boasts of great things
about himself; though sometimes a man takes to boasting, not from
arrogance, but from some kind of vanity, and delights therein,
because he is a boaster by habit. Hence arrogance, which is an
uplifting of self above oneself, is a kind of pride; yet it is not
the same as boasting, but is very often its cause. For this reason
Gregory reckons boasting among the species of pride. Moreover, the
boaster frequently aims at obtaining glory through his boasting, and
so, according to Gregory, it arises from vainglory considered as its
end.

Reply Obj. 3: Wealth also causes boasting, in two ways. First, as an
occasional cause, inasmuch as a man prides himself on his riches.
Hence (Prov. 8:18) "riches" are significantly described as "proud"
[Douay: 'glorious']. Secondly, as being the end of boasting, since
according to _Ethic._ iv, 7, some boast, not only for the sake of
glory, but also for the sake of gain. Such people invent stories
about themselves, so as to make profit thereby; for instance, they
pretend to be skilled in medicine, wisdom, or divination.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 112, Art. 2]

Whether Boasting Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that boasting is a mortal sin. For it is
written (Prov. 28:25): "He that boasteth, and puffeth himself,
stirreth up quarrels." Now it is a mortal sin to stir up quarrels,
since God hates those that sow discord, according to Prov. 6:19.
Therefore boasting is a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is forbidden in God's law is a mortal sin.
Now a gloss on Ecclus. 6:2, "Extol not thyself in the thoughts of thy
soul," says: "This is a prohibition of boasting and pride." Therefore
boasting is a mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, boasting is a kind of lie. But it is neither an
officious nor a jocose lie. This is evident from the end of lying;
for according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), "the boaster
pretends to something greater than he is, sometimes for no further
purpose, sometimes for the sake of glory or honor, sometimes for the
sake of money." Thus it is evident that it is neither an officious
nor a jocose lie, and consequently it must be a mischievous lie.
Therefore seemingly it is always a mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ Boasting arises from vainglory, according to
Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17). Now vainglory is not always a mortal sin,
but is sometimes a venial sin which only the very perfect avoid. For
Gregory says (Moral. viii, 30) that "it belongs to the very perfect,
by outward deeds so to seek the glory of their author, that they are
not inwardly uplifted by the praise awarded them." Therefore boasting
is not always a mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 110, A. 4), a mortal sin is one
that is contrary to charity. Accordingly boasting may be considered
in two ways. First, in itself, as a lie, and thus it is sometimes a
mortal, and sometimes a venial sin. It will be a mortal sin when a
man boasts of that which is contrary to God's glory--thus it is said
in the person of the king of Tyre (Ezech. 28:2): "Thy heart is lifted
up, and thou hast said: I am God"--or contrary to the love of our
neighbor, as when a man while boasting of himself breaks out into
invectives against others, as told of the Pharisee who said (Luke
18:11): "I am not as the rest of men, extortioners, unjust,
adulterers, as also is this publican." Sometimes it is a venial sin,
when, to wit, a man boasts of things that are against neither God nor
his neighbor. Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its
cause, namely, pride, or the desire of gain or of vainglory: and then
if it proceeds from pride or from such vainglory as is a mortal sin,
then the boasting will also be a mortal sin: otherwise it will be a
venial sin. Sometimes, however, a man breaks out into boasting
through desire of gain, and for this very reason he would seem to be
aiming at the deception and injury of his neighbor: wherefore
boasting of this kind is more likely to be a mortal sin. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "a man who boasts for the sake
of gain, is viler than one who boasts for the sake of glory or
honor." Yet it is not always a mortal sin because the gain may be
such as not to injure another man.

Reply Obj. 1: To boast in order to stir quarrels is a mortal sin. But
it happens sometimes that boasts are the cause of quarrels, not
intentionally but accidentally: and consequently boasting will not be
a mortal sin on that account.

Reply Obj. 2: This gloss speaks of boasting as arising from pride
that is a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 3: Boasting does not always involve a mischievous lie, but
only where it is contrary to the love of God or our neighbor, either
in itself or in its cause. That a man boast, through mere pleasure in
boasting, is an inane thing to do, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic.
iv, 7): wherefore it amounts to a jocose lie. Unless perchance he
were to prefer this to the love of God, so as to contemn God's
commandments for the sake of boasting: for then it would be against
the charity of God, in Whom alone ought our mind to rest as in its
last end.

To boast for the sake of glory or gain seems to involve an officious
lie: provided it be done without injury to others, for then it would
at once become a mischievous lie.
_______________________

QUESTION 113

IRONY*
(In Two Articles)
[*Irony here must be given the signification of the Greek _eironia_,
whence it is derived: dissimulation of one's own good points.]

We must now consider irony, under which head there are two points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether irony is a sin?

(2) Of its comparison with boasting.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 113, Art. 1]

Whether Irony Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that irony, which consists in belittling
oneself, is not a sin. For no sin arises from one's being
strengthened by God: and yet this leads one to belittle oneself,
according to Prov. 30:1, 2: "The vision which the man spoke, with
whom is God, and who being strengthened by God, abiding with him,
said, I am the most foolish of men." Also it is written (Amos 7:14):
"Amos answered . . . I am not a prophet." Therefore irony, whereby a
man belittles himself in words, is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says in a letter to Augustine, bishop of the
English (Regist. xii): "It is the mark of a well-disposed mind to
acknowledge one's fault when one is not guilty." But all sin is
inconsistent with a well-disposed mind. Therefore irony is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, it is not a sin to shun pride. But "some belittle
themselves in words, so as to avoid pride," according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore irony is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Verb. Apost., Serm. xxix): "If
thou liest on account of humility, if thou wert not a sinner before
lying, thou hast become one by lying."

_I answer that,_ To speak so as to belittle oneself may occur in two
ways. First so as to safeguard truth, as when a man conceals the
greater things in himself, but discovers and asserts lesser things of
himself the presence of which in himself he perceives. To belittle
oneself in this way does not belong to irony, nor is it a sin in
respect of its genus, except through corruption of one of its
circumstances. Secondly, a person belittles himself by forsaking the
truth, for instance by ascribing to himself something mean the
existence of which in himself he does not perceive, or by denying
something great of himself, which nevertheless he perceives himself
to possess: this pertains to irony, and is always a sin.

Reply Obj. 1: There is a twofold wisdom and a twofold folly. For
there is a wisdom according to God, which has human or worldly folly
annexed to it, according to 1 Cor. 3:18, "If any man among you seem
to be wise in this world, let him become a fool that he may be wise."
But there is another wisdom that is worldly, which as the same text
goes on to say, "is foolishness with God." Accordingly, he that is
strengthened by God acknowledges himself to be most foolish in the
estimation of men, because, to wit, he despises human things, which
human wisdom seeks. Hence the text quoted continues, "and the wisdom
of men is not with me," and farther on, "and I have known the science
of the saints" [*Vulg.: 'and I have not known the science of the
saints'].

It may also be replied that "the wisdom of men" is that which is
acquired by human reason, while the "wisdom of the saints" is that
which is received by divine inspiration.

Amos denied that he was a prophet by birth, since, to wit, he was not
of the race of prophets: hence the text goes on, "nor am I the son of
a prophet."

Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to a well-disposed mind that a man tend to
perfect righteousness, and consequently deem himself guilty, not only
if he fall short of common righteousness, which is truly a sin, but
also if he fall short of perfect righteousness, which sometimes is
not a sin. But he does not call sinful that which he does not
acknowledge to be sinful: which would be a lie of irony.

Reply Obj. 3: A man should not commit one sin in order to avoid
another: and so he ought not to lie in any way at all in order to
avoid pride. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xliii in Joan.): "Shun not
arrogance so as to forsake truth": and Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 3)
that "it is a reckless humility that entangles itself with lies."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 113, Art. 2]

Whether Irony Is a Less Grievous Sin Than Boasting?

Objection 1: It seems that irony is not a less grievous sin than
boasting. For each of them is a sin through forsaking truth, which is
a kind of equality. But one does not forsake truth by exceeding it
any more than by diminishing it. Therefore irony is not a less
grievous sin than boasting.

Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), irony
sometimes is boasting. But boasting is not irony. Therefore irony is
not a less grievous sin than boasting.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 26:25): "When he shall speak
low, trust him not: because there are seven mischiefs in his heart."
Now it belongs to irony to speak low. Therefore it contains a
manifold wickedness.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7): "Those who
speak with irony and belittle themselves are more gracious,
seemingly, in their manners."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 110, AA. 2, 4), one lie is more
grievous than another, sometimes on account of the matter which it is
about--thus a lie about a matter of religious doctrine is most
grievous--and sometimes on account of the motive for sinning; thus a
mischievous lie is more grievous than an officious or jocose lie. Now
irony and boasting lie about the same matter, either by words, or by
any other outward signs, namely, about matters affecting the person:
so that in this respect they are equal.

But for the most part boasting proceeds from a viler motive, namely,
the desire of gain or honor: whereas irony arises from a man's
averseness, albeit inordinate, to be disagreeable to others by
uplifting himself: and in this respect the Philosopher says (Ethic.
iv, 7) that "boasting is a more grievous sin than irony."

Sometimes, however, it happens that a man belittles himself for some
other motive, for instance that he may deceive cunningly: and then
irony is more grievous.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument applies to irony and boasting, according
as a lie is considered to be grievous in itself or on account of its
matter: for it has been said that in this way they are equal.

Reply Obj. 2: Excellence is twofold: one is in temporal, the other in
spiritual things. Now it happens at times that a person, by outward
words or signs, pretends to be lacking in external things, for
instance by wearing shabby clothes, or by doing something of the
kind, and that he intends by so doing to make a show of some
spiritual excellence. Thus our Lord said of certain men (Matt. 6:16)
that "they disfigure their faces that they may appear unto men to
fast." Wherefore such persons are guilty of both vices, irony and
boasting, although in different respects, and for this reason they
sin more grievously. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that
it is "the practice of boasters both to make overmuch of themselves,
and to make very little of themselves": and for the same reason it is
related of Augustine that he was unwilling to possess clothes that
were either too costly or too shabby, because by both do men seek
glory.

Reply Obj. 3: According to the words of Ecclus. 19:23, "There is one
that humbleth himself wickedly, and his interior is full of deceit,"
and it is in this sense that Solomon speaks of the man who, through
deceitful humility, "speaks low" wickedly.
_______________________

QUESTION 114

OF THE FRIENDLINESS WHICH IS CALLED AFFABILITY
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider the friendliness which is called affability, and
the opposite vices which are flattery and quarreling. Concerning
friendliness or affability, there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is a special virtue?

(2) Whether it is a part of justice?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 114, Art. 1]

Whether Friendliness Is a Special Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that friendliness is not a special virtue. For
the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 3) that "the perfect friendship is
that which is on account of virtue." Now any virtue is the cause of
friendship: "since the good is lovable to all," as Dionysius states
(Div. Nom. iv). Therefore friendliness is not a special virtue, but a
consequence of every virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) of this kind of
friend that he "takes everything in a right manner both from those he
loves and from those who are not his friends." Now it seems to
pertain to simulation that a person should show signs of friendship
to those whom he loves not, and this is incompatible with virtue.
Therefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, virtue "observes the mean according as a wise man
decides" (Ethic. ii, 6). Now it is written (Eccles. 7:5): "The heart
of the wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools where
there is mirth": wherefore "it belongs to a virtuous man to be most
wary of pleasure" (Ethic. ii, 9). Now this kind of friendship,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), "is essentially desirous
of sharing pleasures, but fears to give pain." Therefore this kind of
friendliness is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue.
Now it is written (Ecclus. 4:7): "Make thyself affable to the
congregation of the poor." Therefore affability, which is what we
mean by friendship, is a special virtue.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 109, A. 2; I-II, Q. 55, A. 3),
since virtue is directed to good, wherever there is a special kind of
good, there must needs be a special kind of virtue. Now good consists
in order, as stated above (Q. 109, A. 2). And it behooves man to be
maintained in a becoming order towards other men as regards their
mutual relations with one another, in point of both deeds and words,
so that they behave towards one another in a becoming manner. Hence
the need of a special virtue that maintains the becomingness of this
order: and this virtue is called friendliness.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher speaks of a twofold friendship in his
_Ethics._ One consists chiefly in the affection whereby one man loves
another and may result from any virtue. We have stated above, in
treating of charity (Q. 23, A. 1, A. 3, ad 1; QQ. 25, 26), what
things belong to this kind of friendship. But he mentions another
friendliness, which consists merely in outward words or deeds; this
has not the perfect nature of friendship, but bears a certain
likeness thereto, in so far as a man behaves in a becoming manner
towards those with whom he is in contact.

Reply Obj. 2: Every man is naturally every man's friend by a certain
general love; even so it is written (Ecclus. 13:19) that "every beast
loveth its like." This love is signified by signs of friendship,
which we show outwardly by words or deeds, even to those who are
strangers or unknown to us. Hence there is no dissimulation in this:
because we do not show them signs of perfect friendship, for we do
not treat strangers with the same intimacy as those who are united to
us by special friendship.

Reply Obj. 3: When it is said that "the heart of the wise is where
there is mourning" it is not that he may bring sorrow to his
neighbor, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14:15): "If, because of thy
meat, thy brother be grieved, thou walkest not now according to
charity": but that he may bring consolation to the sorrowful,
according to Ecclus. 7:38, "Be not wanting in comforting them that
weep, and walk with them that mourn." Again, "the heart of fools is
where there is mirth," not that they may gladden others, but that
they may enjoy others' gladness. Accordingly, it belongs to the wise
man to share his pleasures with those among whom he dwells, not
lustful pleasures, which virtue shuns, but honest pleasures,
according to Ps. 132:1, "Behold how good and how pleasant it is for
brethren to dwell together in unity."

Nevertheless, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6), for the sake of
some good that will result, or in order to avoid some evil, the
virtuous man will sometimes not shrink from bringing sorrow to those
among whom he lives. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:8): "Although I
made you sorrowful by my epistle, I do not repent," and further on (2
Cor. 7:9), "I am glad; not because you were made sorrowful, but
because you were made sorrowful unto repentance." For this reason we
should not show a cheerful face to those who are given to sin, in
order that we may please them, lest we seem to consent to their sin,
and in a way encourage them to sin further. Hence it is written
(Ecclus. 7:26): "Hast thou daughters? Have a care of their body, and
show not thy countenance gay towards them."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 114, Art. 2]

Whether This Kind of Friendship Is a Part of Justice?

Objection 1: It seems that this kind of friendship is not a part of
justice. For justice consists in giving another man his due. But this
virtue does not consist in doing that, but in behaving agreeably
towards those among whom we live. Therefore this virtue is not a part
of justice.

Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this
virtue is concerned about the joys and sorrows of those who dwell in
fellowship. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate the greatest
pleasures, as stated above (I-II, Q. 60, A. 5; Q. 61, A. 3).
Therefore this virtue is a part of temperance rather than of justice.

Obj. 3: Further, to give equal things to those who are unequal is
contrary to justice, as stated above (Q. 59, AA. 1, 2). Now,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this virtue "treats in
like manner known and unknown, companions and strangers." Therefore
this virtue rather than being a part of justice is opposed thereto.

_On the contrary,_ Macrobius (De Somno Scip. i) accounts friendship a
part of justice.

_I answer that,_ This virtue is a part of justice, being annexed to
it as to a principal virtue. Because in common with justice it is
directed to another person, even as justice is: yet it falls short of
the notion of justice, because it lacks the full aspect of debt,
whereby one man is bound to another, either by legal debt, which the
law binds him to pay, or by some debt arising out of a favor
received. For it regards merely a certain debt of equity, namely,
that we behave pleasantly to those among whom we dwell, unless at
times, for some reason, it be necessary to displease them for some
good purpose.

Reply Obj. 1: As we have said above (Q. 109, A. 3, ad 1), because man
is a social animal he owes his fellow-man, in equity, the
manifestation of truth without which human society could not last.
Now as man could not live in society without truth, so likewise, not
without joy, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii), no one
could abide a day with the sad nor with the joyless. Therefore, a
certain natural equity obliges a man to live agreeably with his
fellow-men; unless some reason should oblige him to sadden them for
their good.

Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to temperance to curb pleasures of the
senses. But this virtue regards the pleasures of fellowship, which
have their origin in the reason, in so far as one man behaves
becomingly towards another. Such pleasures need not to be curbed as
though they were noisome.

Reply Obj. 3: This saying of the Philosopher does not mean that one
ought to converse and behave in the same way with acquaintances and
strangers, since, as he says (Ethic. iv, 6), "it is not fitting to
please and displease intimate friends and strangers in the same way."
This likeness consists in this, that we ought to behave towards all
in a fitting manner.
_______________________

QUESTION 115

OF FLATTERY
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid virtue:
(1) Flattery, and (2) Quarreling. Concerning flattery there are two
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether flattery is a sin?

(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 115, Art. 1]

Whether Flattery Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that flattery is not a sin. For flattery
consists in words of praise offered to another in order to please
him. But it is not a sin to praise a person, according to Prov.
31:28, "Her children rose up and called her blessed: her husband, and
he praised her." Moreover, there is no evil in wishing to please
others, according to 1 Cor. 10:33, "I . . . in all things please all
men." Therefore flattery is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, evil is contrary to good, and blame to praise. But
it is not a sin to blame evil. Neither, then, is it a sin to praise
good, which seems to belong to flattery. Therefore flattery is not a
sin.

Obj. 3: Further, detraction is contrary to flattery. Wherefore
Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 5) that detraction is a remedy against
flattery. "It must be observed," says he, "that by the wonderful
moderation of our Ruler, we are often allowed to be rent by
detractions but are uplifted by immoderate praise, so that whom the
voice of the flatterer upraises, the tongue of the detractor may
humble." But detraction is an evil, as stated above (Q. 73, AA. 2,
3). Therefore flattery is a good.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Ezech. 13:18, "Woe to them that sew
cushions under every elbow," says, "that is to say, sweet flattery."
Therefore flattery is a sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 114, A. 1, ad 3), although the
friendship of which we have been speaking, or affability, intends
chiefly the pleasure of those among whom one lives, yet it does not
fear to displease when it is a question of obtaining a certain good,
or of avoiding a certain evil. Accordingly, if a man were to wish
always to speak pleasantly to others, he would exceed the mode of
pleasing, and would therefore sin by excess. If he do this with the
mere intention of pleasing he is said to be "complaisant," according
to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6): whereas if he do it with the
intention of making some gain out of it, he is called a "flatterer"
or "adulator." As a rule, however, the term "flattery" is wont to be
applied to all who wish to exceed the mode of virtue in pleasing
others by words or deeds in their ordinary behavior towards their
fellows.

Reply Obj. 1: One may praise a person both well and ill, according as
one observes or omits the due circumstances. For if while observing
other due circumstances one were to wish to please a person by
praising him, in order thereby to console him, or that he may strive
to make progress in good, this will belong to the aforesaid virtue of
friendship. But it would belong to flattery, if one wished to praise
a person for things in which he ought not to be praised; since
perhaps they are evil, according to Ps. 9:24, "The sinner is praised
in the desires of his soul"; or they may be uncertain, according to
Ecclus. 27:8, "Praise not a man before he speaketh," and again
(Ecclus. 11:2), "Praise not a man for his beauty"; or because there
may be fear lest human praise should incite him to vainglory,
wherefore it is written, (Ecclus. 11:30), "Praise not any man before
death." Again, in like manner it is right to wish to please a man in
order to foster charity, so that he may make spiritual progress
therein. But it would be sinful to wish to please men for the sake of
vainglory or gain, or to please them in something evil, according to
Ps. 52:6, "God hath scattered the bones of them that please men," and
according to the words of the Apostle (Gal. 1:10), "If I yet pleased
men, I should not be the servant of Christ."

Reply Obj. 2: Even to blame evil is sinful, if due circumstances be
not observed; and so too is it to praise good.

Reply Obj. 3: Nothing hinders two vices being contrary to one
another. Wherefore even as detraction is evil, so is flattery, which
is contrary thereto as regards what is said, but not directly as
regards the end. Because flattery seeks to please the person
flattered, whereas the detractor seeks not the displeasure of the
person defamed, since at times he defames him in secret, but seeks
rather his defamation.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 115, Art. 2]

Whether Flattery Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that flattery is a mortal sin. For, according
to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), "a thing is evil because it is
harmful." But flattery is most harmful, according to Ps. 9:24, "For
the sinner is praised in the desires of his soul, and the unjust man
is blessed. The sinner hath provoked the Lord." Wherefore Jerome says
(Ep. ad Celant): "Nothing so easily corrupts the human mind as
flattery": and a gloss on Ps. 69:4, "Let them be presently turned
away blushing for shame that say to me: 'Tis well, 'Tis well," says:
"The tongue of the flatterer harms more than the sword of the
persecutor." Therefore flattery is a most grievous sin.

Obj. 2: Further, whoever does harm by words, harms himself no less
than others: wherefore it is written (Ps. 36:15): "Let their sword
enter into their own hearts." Now he that flatters another induces
him to sin mortally: hence a gloss on Ps. 140:5, "Let not the oil of
the sinner fatten my head," says: "The false praise of the flatterer
softens the mind by depriving it of the rigidity of truth and renders
it susceptive of vice." Much more, therefore, does the flatterer sin
in himself.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written in the Decretals (D. XLVI, Cap. 3):
"The cleric who shall be found to spend his time in flattery and
treachery shall be degraded from his office." Now such a punishment
as this is not inflicted save for mortal sin. Therefore flattery is a
mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine in a sermon on Purgatory (xli, de
Sanctis) reckons among slight sins, "if one desire to flatter any
person of higher standing, whether of one's own choice, or out of
necessity."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 112, A. 2), a mortal sin is one
that is contrary to charity. Now flattery is sometimes contrary to
charity and sometimes not. It is contrary to charity in three ways.
First, by reason of the very matter, as when one man praises
another's sin: for this is contrary to the love of God, against Whose
justice he speaks, and contrary to the love of his neighbor, whom he
encourages to sin. Wherefore this is a mortal sin, according to Isa.
5:20. "Woe to you that call evil good." Secondly, by reason of the
intention, as when one man flatters another, so that by deceiving him
he may injure him in body or in soul; this is also a mortal sin, and
of this it is written (Prov. 27:6): "Better are the wounds of a
friend than the deceitful kisses of an enemy." Thirdly, by way of
occasion, as when the praise of a flatterer, even without his
intending it, becomes to another an occasion of sin. In this case it
is necessary to consider, whether the occasion were given or taken,
and how grievous the consequent downfall, as may be understood from
what has been said above concerning scandal (Q. 43, AA. 3, 4). If,
however, one man flatters another from the mere craving to please
others, or again in order to avoid some evil, or to acquire something
in a case of necessity, this is not contrary to charity. Consequently
it is not a mortal but a venial sin.

Reply Obj. 1: The passages quoted speak of the flatterer who praises
another's sin. Flattery of this kind is said to harm more than the
sword of the persecutor, since it does harm to goods that are of
greater consequence, namely, spiritual goods. Yet it does not harm so
efficaciously, since the sword of the persecutor slays effectively,
being a sufficient cause of death; whereas no one by flattering can
be a sufficient cause of another's sinning, as was shown above (Q.
43, A. 1, ad 3; I-II, Q. 73, A. 8, ad 3; I-II, Q. 80, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 2: This argument applies to one that flatters with the
intention of doing harm: for such a man harms himself more than
others, since he harms himself, as the sufficient cause of sinning,
whereas he is only the occasional cause of the harm he does to others.

Reply Obj. 3: The passage quoted refers to the man who flatters
another treacherously, in order to deceive him.
_______________________

QUESTION 116

OF QUARRELING
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider quarreling; concerning which there are two
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is opposed to the virtue of friendship?

(2) Of its comparison with flattery?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 116, Art. 1]

Whether Quarreling Is Opposed to the Virtue of Friendship or
Affability?

Objection 1: It seems that quarreling is not opposed to the virtue of
friendship or affability. For quarreling seems to pertain to discord,
just as contention does. But discord is opposed to charity, as stated
above (Q. 37, A. 1). Therefore quarreling is also.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 26:21): "An angry man stirreth
up strife." Now anger is opposed to meekness. Therefore strife or
quarreling is also.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (James 4:1): "From whence are wars and
quarrels [Douay: 'contentions'] among you? Are they not hence, from
your concupiscences which war in your members?" Now it would seem
contrary to temperance to follow one's concupiscences. Therefore it
seems that quarreling is opposed not to friendship but to temperance.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher opposes quarreling to friendship
(Ethic. iv, 6).

_I answer that,_ Quarreling consists properly in words, when, namely,
one person contradicts another's words. Now two things may be
observed in this contradiction. For sometimes contradiction arises on
account of the person who speaks, the contradictor refusing to
consent with him from lack of that love which unites minds together,
and this seems to pertain to discord, which is contrary to charity.
Whereas at times contradiction arises by reason of the speaker being
a person to whom someone does not fear to be disagreeable: whence
arises quarreling, which is opposed to the aforesaid friendship or
affability, to which it belongs to behave agreeably towards those
among whom we dwell. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that
"those who are opposed to everything with the intent of being
disagreeable, and care for nobody, are said to be peevish and
quarrelsome."

Reply Obj. 1: Contention pertains rather to the contradiction of
discord, while quarreling belongs to the contradiction which has the
intention of displeasing.

Reply Obj. 2: The direct opposition of virtues to vices depends, not
on their causes, since one vice may arise from many causes, but on
the species of their acts. And although quarreling arises at times
from anger, it may arise from many other causes, hence it does not
follow that it is directly opposed to meekness.

Reply Obj. 3: James speaks there of concupiscence considered as a
general evil whence all vices arise. Thus, a gloss on Rom. 7:7 says:
"The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all
evil."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 116, Art. 2]

Whether Quarreling Is a More Grievous Sin Than Flattery?

Objection 1: It seems that quarreling is a less grievous sin than the
contrary vice, viz. adulation or flattery. For the more harm a sin
does the more grievous it seems to be. Now flattery does more harm
than quarreling, for it is written (Isa. 3:12): "O My people, they
that call thee blessed, the same deceive thee, and destroy the way of
thy steps." Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin than quarreling.

Obj. 2: Further, there appears to be a certain amount of deceit in
flattery, since the flatterer says one thing, and thinks another:
whereas the quarrelsome man is without deceit, for he contradicts
openly. Now he that sins deceitfully is a viler man, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 6). Therefore flattery is a more grievous
sin than quarreling.

Obj. 3: Further, shame is fear of what is vile, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9). But a man is more ashamed to be a
flatterer than a quarreler. Therefore quarreling is a less grievous
sin than flattery.

_On the contrary,_ The more a sin is inconsistent with the spiritual
state, the more it appears to be grievous. Now quarreling seems to be
more inconsistent with the spiritual state: for it is written (1 Tim.
3:2, 3) that it "behooveth a bishop to be . . . not quarrelsome"; and
(2 Tim. 3:24): "The servant of the Lord must not wrangle." Therefore
quarreling seems to be a more grievous sin than flattery.

_I answer that,_ We can speak of each of these sins in two ways. In
one way we may consider the species of either sin, and thus the more
a vice is at variance with the opposite virtue the more grievous it
is. Now the virtue of friendship has a greater tendency to please
than to displease: and so the quarrelsome man, who exceeds in giving
displeasure sins more grievously than the adulator or flatterer, who
exceeds in giving pleasure. In another way we may consider them as
regards certain external motives, and thus flattery is sometimes more
grievous, for instance when one intends by deception to acquire undue
honor or gain: while sometimes quarreling is more grievous; for
instance, when one intends either to deny the truth, or to hold up
the speaker to contempt.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as the flatterer may do harm by deceiving
secretly, so the quarreler may do harm sometimes by assailing openly.
Now, other things being equal, it is more grievous to harm a person
openly, by violence as it were, than secretly. Wherefore robbery is a
more grievous sin than theft, as stated above (Q. 66, A. 9).

Reply Obj. 2: In human acts, the more grievous is not always the more
vile. For the comeliness of a man has its source in his reason:
wherefore the sins of the flesh, whereby the flesh enslaves the
reason, are viler, although spiritual sins are more grievous, since
they proceed from greater contempt. In like manner, sins that are
committed through deceit are viler, in so far as they seem to arise
from a certain weakness, and from a certain falseness of the reason,
although sins that are committed openly proceed sometimes from a
greater contempt. Hence flattery, through being accompanied by
deceit, seems to be a viler sin; while quarreling, through proceeding
from greater contempt, is apparently more grievous.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated in the objection, shame regards the vileness
of a sin; wherefore a man is not always more ashamed of a more
grievous sin, but of a viler sin. Hence it is that a man is more
ashamed of flattery than of quarreling, although quarreling is more
grievous.
_______________________

QUESTION 117

OF LIBERALITY
(In Six Articles)

We must now consider liberality and the opposite vices, namely,
covetousness and prodigality.

Concerning liberality there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether liberality is a virtue?

(2) What is its matter?

(3) Of its act;

(4) Whether it pertains thereto to give rather than to take?

(5) Whether liberality is a part of justice?

(6) Of its comparison with other virtues.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 1]

Whether Liberality Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that liberality is not a virtue. For no virtue
is contrary to a natural inclination. Now it is a natural inclination
for one to provide for oneself more than for others: and yet it
pertains to the liberal man to do the contrary, since, according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1), "it is the mark of a liberal man not
to look to himself, so that he leaves for himself the lesser things."
Therefore liberality is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, man sustains life by means of riches, and wealth
contributes to happiness instrumentally, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 8.
Since, then, every virtue is directed to happiness, it seems that the
liberal man is not virtuous, for the Philosopher says of him (Ethic.
iv, 1) that "he is inclined neither to receive nor to keep money, but
to give it away."

Obj. 3: Further, the virtues are connected with one another. But
liberality does not seem to be connected with the other virtues:
since many are virtuous who cannot be liberal, for they have nothing
to give; and many give or spend liberally who are not virtuous
otherwise. Therefore liberality is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "the Gospel
contains many instances in which a just liberality is inculcated."
Now in the Gospel nothing is taught that does not pertain to virtue.
Therefore liberality is a virtue.

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19), "it belongs
to virtue to use well the things that we can use ill." Now we may use
both well and ill, not only the things that are within us, such as
the powers and the passions of the soul, but also those that are
without, such as the things of this world that are granted us for our
livelihood. Wherefore since it belongs to liberality to use these
things well, it follows that liberality is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: According to Ambrose (Serm. lxiv de Temp.) and Basil
(Hom. in Luc. xii, 18) excess of riches is granted by God to some, in
order that they may obtain the merit of a good stewardship. But it
suffices for one man to have few things. Wherefore the liberal man
commendably spends more on others than on himself. Nevertheless we
are bound to be more provident for ourselves in spiritual goods, in
which each one is able to look after himself in the first place. And
yet it does not belong to the liberal man even in temporal things to
attend so much to others as to lose sight of himself and those
belonging to him. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "It is a
commendable liberality not to neglect your relatives if you know them
to be in want."

Reply Obj. 2: It does not belong to a liberal man so to give away his
riches that nothing is left for his own support, nor the wherewithal
to perform those acts of virtue whereby happiness is acquired. Hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "the liberal man does not
neglect his own, wishing thus to be of help to certain people"; and
Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "Our Lord does not wish a man to pour
out his riches all at once, but to dispense them: unless he do as
Eliseus did, who slew his oxen and fed the poor, that he might not be
bound by any household cares." For this belongs to the state of
perfection, of which we shall speak farther on (Q. 184; Q. 186, A. 3).

It must be observed, however, that the very act of giving away one's
possessions liberally, in so far as it is an act of virtue, is
directed to happiness.

Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), "those who
spend much on intemperance are not liberal but prodigal"; and
likewise whoever spends what he has for the sake of other sins. Hence
Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "If you assist to rob others of their
possessions, your honesty is not to be commended, nor is your
liberality genuine if you give for the sake of boasting rather than
of pity." Wherefore those who lack other virtues, though they spend
much on certain evil works, are not liberal.

Again, nothing hinders certain people from spending much on good
uses, without having the habit of liberality: even as men perform
works of other virtues, before having the habit of virtue, though not
in the same way as virtuous people, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A.
1). In like manner nothing prevents a virtuous man from being
liberal, although he be poor. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
1): "Liberality is proportionate to a man's substance," i.e. his
means, "for it consists, not in the quantity given, but in the habit
of the giver": and Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "it is the heart
that makes a gift rich or poor, and gives things their value."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 2]

Whether Liberality Is About Money?

Objection 1: It seems that liberality is not about money. For every
moral virtue is about operations and passions. Now it is proper to
justice to be about operations, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 1.
Therefore, since liberality is a moral virtue, it seems that it is
about passions and not about money.

Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to a liberal man to make use of any kind
of wealth. Now natural riches are more real than artificial riches,
according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 5, 6). Therefore liberality
is not chiefly about money.

Obj. 3: Further, different virtues have different matter, since
habits are distinguished by their objects. But external things are
the matter of distributive and commutative justice. Therefore they
are not the matter of liberality.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that
"liberality seems to be a mean in the matter of money."

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) it
belongs to the liberal man to part with things. Hence liberality is
also called open-handedness (_largitas_), because that which is open
does not withhold things but parts with them. The term "liberality"
seems also to allude to this, since when a man quits hold of a thing
he frees it (_liberat_), so to speak, from his keeping and ownership,
and shows his mind to be free of attachment thereto. Now those things
which are the subject of a man's free-handedness towards others are
the goods he possesses, which are denoted by the term "money."
Therefore the proper matter of liberality is money.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), liberality depends not on
the quantity given, but on the heart of the giver. Now the heart of
the giver is disposed according to the passions of love and desire,
and consequently those of pleasure and sorrow, towards the things
given. Hence the interior passions are the immediate matter of
liberality, while exterior money is the object of those same passions.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says in his book _De Disciplina Christi_
(Tract. de divers, i), everything whatsoever man has on earth, and
whatsoever he owns, goes by the name of _pecunia_ (money), because
in olden times men's possessions consisted entirely of _pecora_
(flocks). And the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): "We give the name
of money to anything that can be valued in currency."

Reply Obj. 3: Justice establishes equality in external things, but
has nothing to do, properly speaking, with the regulation of internal
passions: wherefore money is in one way the matter of liberality, and
in another way of justice.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 3]

Whether Using Money Is the Act of Liberality?

Objection 1: It seems that using money is not the act of liberality.
For different virtues have different acts. But using money is
becoming to other virtues, such as justice and magnificence.
Therefore it is not the proper act of liberality.

Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to a liberal man, not only to give but
also to receive and keep. But receiving and keeping do not seem to be
connected with the use of money. Therefore using money seems to be
unsuitably assigned as the proper act of liberality.

Obj. 3: Further, the use of money consists not only in giving it but
also in spending it. But the spending of money refers to the spender,
and consequently is not an act of liberality: for Seneca says (De
Benef. v): "A man is not liberal by giving to himself." Therefore not
every use of money belongs to liberality.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): "In whatever
matter a man is virtuous, he will make the best use of that matter:
Therefore he that has the virtue with regard to money will make the
best use of riches." Now such is the liberal man. Therefore the good
use of money is the act of liberality.

_I answer that,_ The species of an act is taken from its object, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 2). Now the object or matter of
liberality is money and whatever has a money value, as stated in the
foregoing Article (ad 2). And since every virtue is consistent with
its object, it follows that, since liberality is a virtue, its act is
consistent with money. Now money comes under the head of useful
goods, since all external goods are directed to man's use. Hence the
proper act of liberality is making use of money or riches.

Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to liberality to make good use of
riches as such, because riches are the proper matter of liberality. On
the other hand it belongs to justice to make use of riches under
another aspect, namely, that of debt, in so far as an external thing
is due to another. And it belongs to magnificence to make use of
riches under a special aspect, in so far, to wit, as they are employed
for the fulfilment of some great deed. Hence magnificence stands in
relation to liberality as something in addition thereto, as we shall
explain farther on (Q. 134).

Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to a virtuous man not only to make
good use of his matter or instrument, but also to provide
opportunities for that good use. Thus it belongs to a soldier's
fortitude not only to wield his sword against the foe, but also to
sharpen his sword and keep it in its sheath. Thus, too, it belongs to
liberality not only to use money, but also to keep it in preparation
and safety in order to make fitting use of it.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated (A. 2, ad 1), the internal passions
whereby man is affected towards money are the proximate matter of
liberality. Hence it belongs to liberality before all that a man
should not be prevented from making any due use of money through an
inordinate affection for it. Now there is a twofold use of money: one
consists in applying it to one's own use, and would seem to come under
the designation of costs or expenditure; while the other consists in
devoting it to the use of others, and comes under the head of gifts.
Hence it belongs to liberality that one be not hindered by an
immoderate love of money, either from spending it becomingly, or from
making suitable gifts. Therefore liberality is concerned with giving
and spending, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). The saying
of Seneca refers to liberality as regards giving: for a man is not
said to be liberal for the reason that he gives something to himself.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 4]

Whether It Belongs to a Liberal Man Chiefly to Give?

Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to a liberal man
chiefly to give. For liberality, like all other moral virtues, is
regulated by prudence. Now it seems to belong very much to prudence
that a man should keep his riches. Wherefore the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 1) that "those who have not earned money, but have
received the money earned by others, spend it more liberally, because
they have not experienced the want of it." Therefore it seems that
giving does not chiefly belong to the liberal man.

Obj. 2: Further, no man is sorry for what he intends chiefly to do,
nor does he cease from doing it. But a liberal man is sometimes sorry
for what he has given, nor does he give to all, as stated in _Ethic._
iv, 1. Therefore it does not belong chiefly to a liberal man to give.

Obj. 3: Further, in order to accomplish what he intends chiefly, a
man employs all the ways he can. Now a liberal man is not a beggar,
as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 1); and yet by begging he
might provide himself with the means of giving to others. Therefore
it seems that he does not chiefly aim at giving.

Obj. 4: Further, man is bound to look after himself rather than
others. But by spending he looks after himself, whereas by giving he
looks after others. Therefore it belongs to a liberal man to spend
rather than to give.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "it
belongs to a liberal man to surpass in giving."

_I answer that,_ It is proper to a liberal man to use money. Now the
use of money consists in parting with it. For the acquisition of
money is like generation rather than use: while the keeping of money,
in so far as it is directed to facilitate the use of money, is like a
habit. Now in parting with a thing--for instance, when we throw
something--the farther we put it away the greater the force
(_virtus_) employed. Hence parting with money by giving it to others
proceeds from a greater virtue than when we spend it on ourselves.
But it is proper to a virtue as such to tend to what is more perfect,
since "virtue is a kind of perfection" (Phys. vii, text. 17, 18).
Therefore a liberal man is praised chiefly for giving.

Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to prudence to keep money, lest it be stolen
or spent uselessly. But to spend it usefully is not less but more
prudent than to keep it usefully: since more things have to be
considered in money's use, which is likened to movement, than in its
keeping, which is likened to rest. As to those who, having received
money that others have earned, spend it more liberally, through not
having experienced the want of it, if their inexperience is the sole
cause of their liberal expenditure they have not the virtue of
liberality. Sometimes, however, this inexperience merely removes the
impediment to liberality, so that it makes them all the more ready to
act liberally, because, not unfrequently, the fear of want that
results from the experience of want hinders those who have acquired
money from using it up by acting with liberality; as does likewise
the love they have for it as being their own effect, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1).

Reply Obj. 2: As stated in this and the preceding Article, it belongs
to liberality to make fitting use of money, and consequently to give
it in a fitting manner, since this is a use of money. Again, every
virtue is grieved by whatever is contrary to its act, and avoids
whatever hinders that act. Now two things are opposed to suitable
giving; namely, not giving what ought suitably to be given, and
giving something unsuitably. Wherefore the liberal man is grieved at
both: but especially at the former, since it is more opposed to his
proper act. For this reason, too, he does not give to all: since his
act would be hindered were he to give to everyone: for he would not
have the means of giving to those to whom it were fitting for him to
give.

Reply Obj. 3: Giving and receiving are related to one another as
action and passion. Now the same thing is not the principle of both
action and passion. Hence, since liberality is a principle of giving,
it does not belong to the liberal man to be ready to receive, and
still less to beg. Hence the verse:

In this world he that wishes to be pleasing to many Should give
often, take seldom, ask never.

But he makes provision in order to give certain things according as
liberality requires; such are the fruits of his own possessions, for
he is careful about realizing them that he may make a liberal use
thereof.

Reply Obj. 4: To spend on oneself is an inclination of nature; hence
to spend money on others belongs properly to a virtue.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 5]

Whether Liberality Is a Part of Justice?

Objection 1: It seems that liberality is not a part of justice. For
justice regards that which is due. Now the more a thing is due the
less liberally is it given. Therefore liberality is not a part of
justice, but is incompatible with it.

Obj. 2: Further, justice is about operation as stated above (Q. 58,
A. 9; I-II, Q. 60, AA. 2, 3): whereas liberality is chiefly about the
love and desire of money, which are passions. Therefore liberality
seems to belong to temperance rather than to justice.

Obj. 3: Further, it belongs chiefly to liberality to give becomingly,
as stated (A. 4). But giving becomingly belongs to beneficence and
mercy, which pertain to charity, as state above (QQ. 30, 31).
Therefore liberality is a part of charity rather than of justice.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "Justice has to do
with the fellowship of mankind. For the notion of fellowship is
divided into two parts, justice and beneficence, also called
liberality or kind-heartedness." Therefore liberality pertains to
justice.

_I answer that,_ Liberality is not a species of justice, since
justice pays another what is his whereas liberality gives another
what is one's own. There are, however, two points in which it agrees
with justice: first, that it is directed chiefly to another, as
justice is; secondly, that it is concerned with external things, and
so is justice, albeit under a different aspect, a stated in this
Article and above (A. 2, ad 3). Hence it is that liberality is
reckoned by some to be a part of justice, being annexed thereto as to
a principal virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: Although liberality does not consider the legal due
that justice considers, it considers a certain moral due. This due is
based on a certain fittingness and not on an obligation: so that it
answers to the idea of due in the lowest degree.

Reply Obj. 2: Temperance is about concupiscence in pleasures of the
body. But the concupiscence and delight in money is not referable to
the body but rather to the soul. Hence liberality does not properly
pertain to temperance.

Reply Obj. 3: The giving of beneficence and mercy proceeds from the
fact that a man has a certain affection towards the person to whom he
gives: wherefore this giving belongs to charity or friendship. But
the giving of liberality arises from a person being affected in a
certain way towards money, in that he desires it not nor loves it: so
that when it is fitting he gives it not only to his friends but also
to those whom he knows not. Hence it belong not to charity, but to
justice, which is about external things.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 117, Art. 6]

Whether Liberality Is the Greatest of the Virtues?

Objection 1: It seems that liberality is the greatest of the virtues.
For every virtue of man is a likeness to the divine goodness. Now man
is likened chiefly by liberality to God, "Who giveth to all men
abundantly, and upbraideth not" (James 1:5). Therefore liberality is
the greatest of the virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. vi, 8), "in things
that are great, but not in bulk, to be greatest is to be best." Now
the nature of goodness seems to pertain mostly to liberality, since
"the good is self-communicative," according to Dionysius (Div. Nom.
iv). Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "justice reclines to
severity, liberality to goodness." Therefore liberality is the
greatest of virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, men are honored and loved on account of virtue. Now
Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that "bounty above all makes a man
famous": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "among the
virtuous the liberal are the most beloved." Therefore liberality is
the greatest of virtues.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "justice seems to
be more excellent than liberality, although liberality is more
pleasing." The Philosopher also says (Rhet. i, 9) that "brave and
just men are honored chiefly and, after them, those who are liberal."

_I answer that,_ Every virtue tends towards a good; wherefore the
greater virtue is that which tends towards the greater good. Now
liberality tends towards a good in two ways: in one way, primarily
and of its own nature; in another way, consequently. Primarily and of
its very nature it tends to set in order one's own affection towards
the possession and use of money. In this way temperance, which
moderates desires and pleasures relating to one's own body, takes
precedence of liberality: and so do fortitude and justice, which, in
a manner, are directed to the common good, one in time of peace, the
other in time of war: while all these are preceded by those virtues
which are directed to the Divine good. For the Divine good surpasses
all manner of human good; and among human goods the public good
surpasses the good of the individual; and of the last named the good
of the body surpasses those goods that consist of external things.
Again, liberality is ordained to a good consequently, and in this way
it is directed to all the aforesaid goods. For by reason of his not
being a lover of money, it follows that a man readily makes use of
it, whether for himself, or for the good of others, or for God's
glory. Thus it derives a certain excellence from being useful in many
ways. Since, however, we should judge of things according to that
which is competent to them primarily and in respect of their nature,
rather than according to that which pertains to them. Consequently,
it remains to be said that liberality is not the greatest of virtues.

Reply Obj. 1: God's giving proceeds from His love for those to whom
He gives, not from His affection towards the things He gives,
wherefore it seems to pertain to charity, the greatest of virtues,
rather than to liberality.

Reply Obj. 2: Every virtue shares the nature of goodness by giving
forth its own act: and the acts of certain other virtues are better
than money which liberality gives forth.

Reply Obj. 3: The friendship whereby a liberal man is beloved is not
that which is based on virtue, as though he were better than others,
but that which is based on utility, because he is more useful in
external goods, which as a rule men desire above all others. For the
same reason he becomes famous.
_______________________

QUESTION 118

OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO LIBERALITY, AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, OF
COVETOUSNESS
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider the vices opposed to liberality: and
(1) covetousness; (2) prodigality.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether covetousness is a sin?

(2) Whether it is a special sin?

(3) To which virtue it is opposed;

(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(5) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?

(6) Whether it is a sin of the flesh or a spiritual sin?

(7) Whether it is a capital vice?

(8) Of its daughters.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 1]

Whether Covetousness Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a sin. For
covetousness (_avaritia_) denotes a certain greed for gold (_aeris
aviditas_),* because, to wit, it consists in a desire for money,
under which all external goods may be comprised. [*The Latin for
covetousness _avaritia_ is derived from _aveo_ to desire; but the
Greek _philargyria_ signifies literally "love of money": and it is to
this that St. Thomas is alluding (cf. A. 2, Obj. 2)]. Now it is not a
sin to desire external goods: since man desires them naturally, both
because they are naturally subject to man, and because by their means
man's life is sustained (for which reason they are spoken of as his
substance). Therefore covetousness is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, every sin is against either God, or one's neighbor,
or oneself, as stated above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 4). But covetousness is
not, properly speaking, a sin against God: since it is opposed
neither to religion nor to the theological virtues, by which man is
directed to God. Nor again is it a sin against oneself, for this
pertains properly to gluttony and lust, of which the Apostle says (1
Cor. 6:18): "He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own
body." In like manner neither is it apparently a sin against one's
neighbor, since a man harms no one by keeping what is his own.
Therefore covetousness is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, things that occur naturally are not sins. Now
covetousness comes naturally to old age and every kind of defect,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore covetousness
is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 13:5): "Let your manners be
without covetousness, contented with such things as you have."

_I answer that,_ In whatever things good consists in a due measure,
evil must of necessity ensue through excess or deficiency of that
measure. Now in all things that are for an end, the good consists in
a certain measure: since whatever is directed to an end must needs be
commensurate with the end, as, for instance, medicine is commensurate
with health, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 6). External
goods come under the head of things useful for an end, as stated
above (Q. 117, A. 3; I-II, Q. 2, A. 1). Hence it must needs be that
man's good in their respect consists in a certain measure, in other
words, that man seeks, according to a certain measure, to have
external riches, in so far as they are necessary for him to live in
keeping with his condition of life. Wherefore it will be a sin for
him to exceed this measure, by wishing to acquire or keep them
immoderately. This is what is meant by covetousness, which is defined
as "immoderate love of possessing." It is therefore evident that
covetousness is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1: It is natural to man to desire external things as means
to an end: wherefore this desire is devoid of sin, in so far as it is
held in check by the rule taken from the nature of the end. But
covetousness exceeds this rule, and therefore is a sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Covetousness may signify immoderation about external
things in two ways. First, so as to regard immediately the
acquisition and keeping of such things, when, to wit, a man acquires
or keeps them more than is due. In this way it is a sin directly
against one's neighbor, since one man cannot over-abound in external
riches, without another man lacking them, for temporal goods cannot
be possessed by many at the same time. Secondly, it may signify
immoderation in the internal affection which a man has for riches
when, for instance, a man loves them, desires them, or delights in
them, immoderately. In this way by covetousness a man sins against
himself, because it causes disorder in his affections, though not in
his body as do the sins of the flesh.

As a consequence, however, it is a sin against God, just as all
mortal sins, inasmuch as man contemns things eternal for the sake of
temporal things.

Reply Obj. 3: Natural inclinations should be regulated according to
reason, which is the governing power in human nature. Hence though
old people seek more greedily the aid of external things, just as
everyone that is in need seeks to have his need supplied, they are
not excused from sin if they exceed this due measure of reason with
regard to riches.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 2]

Whether Covetousness Is a Special Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a special sin. For
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii): "Covetousness, which in Greek is
called _philargyria_, applies not only to silver or money, but also
to anything that is desired immoderately." Now in every sin there is
immoderate desire of something, because sin consists in turning away
from the immutable good, and adhering to mutable goods, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 71, A. 6, Obj. 3). Therefore covetousness is a
general sin.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x), "the covetous
(_avarus_) man" is so called because he is "greedy for brass (_avidus
aeris_)," i.e. money: wherefore in Greek covetousness is called
_philargyria_, i.e. "love of silver." Now silver, which stands for
money, signifies all external goods the value of which can be
measured by money, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 2, ad 2). Therefore
covetousness is a desire for any external thing: and consequently
seems to be a general sin.

Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Rom. 7:7, "For I had not known
concupiscence," says: "The law is good, since by forbidding
concupiscence, it forbids all evil." Now the law seems to forbid
especially the concupiscence of covetousness: hence it is written
(Ex. 20:17): "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods." Therefore
the concupiscence of covetousness is all evil, and so covetousness is
a general sin.

_On the contrary,_ Covetousness is numbered together with other
special sins (Rom. 1:29), where it is written: "Being filled with all
iniquity, malice, fornication, covetousness" [Douay: 'avarice'], etc.

_I answer that,_ Sins take their species from their objects, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 1). Now the object of a sin is the good
towards which an inordinate appetite tends. Hence where there is a
special aspect of good inordinately desired, there is a special kind
of sin. Now the useful good differs in aspect from the delightful
good. And riches, as such, come under the head of useful good, since
they are desired under the aspect of being useful to man.
Consequently covetousness is a special sin, forasmuch as it is an
immoderate love of having possessions, which are comprised under the
name of money, whence covetousness (_avaritia_) is denominated.

Since, however, the verb "to have," which seems to have been
originally employed in connection with possessions whereof we are
absolute masters, is applied to many other things (thus a man is said
to have health, a wife, clothes, and so forth, as stated in _De
Praedicamentis_), consequently the term "covetousness" has been
amplified to denote all immoderate desire for having anything
whatever. Thus Gregory says in a homily (xvi in Ev.) that
"covetousness is a desire not only for money, but also for knowledge
and high places, when prominence is immoderately sought after." In
this way covetousness is not a special sin: and in this sense
Augustine speaks of covetousness in the passage quoted in the First
Objection. Wherefore this suffices for the Reply to the First
Objection.

Reply Obj. 2: All those external things that are subject to the uses
of human life are comprised under the term "money," inasmuch as they
have the aspect of useful good. But there are certain external goods
that can be obtained by money, such as pleasures, honors, and so
forth, which are desirable under another aspect. Wherefore the desire
for such things is not properly called covetousness, in so far as it
is a special vice.

Reply Obj. 3: This gloss speaks of the inordinate concupiscence for
anything whatever. For it is easy to understand that if it is
forbidden to covet another's possessions it is also forbidden to
covet those things that can be obtained by means of those possessions.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 3]

Whether Covetousness Is Opposed to Liberality?

Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not opposed to liberality.
For Chrysostom, commenting on Matt. 5:6, "Blessed are they that
hunger and thirst after justice," says, (Hom. xv in Matth.) that
there are two kinds of justice, one general, and the other special,
to which covetousness is opposed: and the Philosopher says the same
(Ethic. v, 2). Therefore covetousness is not opposed to liberality.

Obj. 2: Further, the sin of covetousness consists in a man's
exceeding the measure in the things he possesses. But this measure is
appointed by justice. Therefore covetousness is directly opposed to
justice and not to liberality.

Obj. 3: Further, liberality is a virtue that observes the mean
between two contrary vices, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 7;
iv, 1). But covetousness has no contrary and opposite sin, according
to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1, 2). Therefore covetousness is not
opposed to liberality.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 5:9): "A covetous man shall
not be satisfied with money, and he that loveth riches shall have no
fruits from them." Now not to be satisfied with money and to love it
inordinately are opposed to liberality, which observes the mean in
the desire of riches. Therefore covetousness is opposed to liberality.

_I answer that,_ Covetousness denotes immoderation with regard to
riches in two ways. First, immediately in respect of the acquisition
and keeping of riches. In this way a man obtains money beyond his
due, by stealing or retaining another's property. This is opposed to
justice, and in this sense covetousness is mentioned (Ezech. 22:27):
"Her princes in the midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey to
shed blood . . . and to run after gains through covetousness."
Secondly, it denotes immoderation in the interior affections for
riches; for instance, when a man loves or desires riches too much, or
takes too much pleasure in them, even if he be unwilling to steal. In
this way covetousness is opposed to liberality, which moderates these
affections, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 2, ad 3; A. 3, ad 3; A. 6).
In this sense covetousness is spoken of (2 Cor. 9:5): "That they
would . . . prepare this blessing before promised, to be ready, so as
a blessing, not as covetousness," where a gloss observes: "Lest they
should regret what they had given, and give but little."

Reply Obj. 1: Chrysostom and the Philosopher are speaking of
covetousness in the first sense: covetousness in the second sense is
called illiberality [*_aneleutheria_] by the Philosopher.

Reply Obj. 2: It belongs properly to justice to appoint the measure
in the acquisition and keeping of riches from the point of view of
legal due, so that a man should neither take nor retain another's
property. But liberality appoints the measure of reason, principally
in the interior affections, and consequently in the exterior taking
and keeping of money, and in the spending of the same, in so far as
these proceed from the interior affection, looking at the matter from
the point of view not of the legal but of the moral debt, which
latter depends on the rule of reason.

Reply Obj. 3: Covetousness as opposed to justice has no opposite
vice: since it consists in having more than one ought according to
justice, the contrary of which is to have less than one ought, and
this is not a sin but a punishment. But covetousness as opposed to
liberality has the vice of prodigality opposed to it.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 4]

Whether Covetousness Is Always a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is always a mortal sin. For
no one is worthy of death save for a mortal sin. But men are worthy
of death on account of covetousness. For the Apostle after saying
(Rom. 1:29): "Being filled with all iniquity . . . fornication,
covetousness [Douay: 'avarice']," etc. adds (Rom. 1:32): "They who do
such things are worthy of death." Therefore covetousness is a mortal
sin.

Obj. 2: Further, the least degree of covetousness is to hold to one's
own inordinately. But this seemingly is a mortal sin: for Basil says
(Serm. super. Luc. xii, 18): "It is the hungry man's bread that thou
keepest back, the naked man's cloak that thou hoardest, the needy
man's money that thou possessest, hence thou despoilest as many as
thou mightest succor."

Now it is a mortal sin to do an injustice to another, since it is
contrary to the love of our neighbor. Much more therefore is all
covetousness a mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, no one is struck with spiritual blindness save
through a mortal sin, for this deprives a man of the light of grace.
But, according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xv in the Opus Imperfectum,
falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom], "Lust for money brings darkness
on the soul." Therefore covetousness, which is lust for money, is a
mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on 1 Cor. 3:12, "If any man build upon
this foundation," says (cf. St. Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi) that
"he builds wood, hay, stubble, who thinks in the things of the world,
how he may please the world," which pertains to the sin of
covetousness. Now he that builds wood, hay, stubble, sins not
mortally but venially, for it is said of him that "he shall be saved,
yet so as by fire." Therefore covetousness is some times a venial sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3) covetousness is twofold. In
one way it is opposed to justice, and thus it is a mortal sin in
respect of its genus. For in this sense covetousness consists in the
unjust taking or retaining of another's property, and this belongs to
theft or robbery, which are mortal sins, as stated above (Q. 66, AA.
6, 8). Yet venial sin may occur in this kind of covetousness by
reason of imperfection of the act, as stated above (Q. 66, A. 6, ad
3), when we were treating of theft.

In another way covetousness may be taken as opposed to liberality: in
which sense it denotes inordinate love of riches. Accordingly if the
love of riches becomes so great as to be preferred to charity, in
such wise that a man, through love of riches, fear not to act counter
to the love of God and his neighbor, covetousness will then be a
mortal sin. If, on the other hand, the inordinate nature of his love
stops short of this, so that although he love riches too much, yet he
does not prefer the love of them to the love of God, and is unwilling
for the sake of riches to do anything in opposition to God or his
neighbor, then covetousness is a venial sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Covetousness is numbered together with mortal sins, by
reason of the aspect under which it is a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Basil is speaking of a case wherein a man is bound by a
legal debt to give of his goods to the poor, either through fear of
their want or on account of his having too much.

Reply Obj. 3: Lust for riches, properly speaking, brings darkness on
the soul, when it puts out the light of charity, by preferring the
love of riches to the love of God.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 5]

Whether Covetousness Is the Greatest of Sins?

Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is the greatest of sins. For
it is written (Ecclus. 10:9): "Nothing is more wicked than a covetous
man," and the text continues: "There is not a more wicked thing than
to love money: for such a one setteth even his own soul to sale."
Tully also says (De Offic. i, under the heading, 'True magnanimity is
based chiefly on two things'): "Nothing is so narrow or little minded
as to love money." But this pertains to covetousness. Therefore
covetousness is the most grievous of sins.

Obj. 2: Further, the more a sin is opposed to charity, the more
grievous it is. Now covetousness is most opposed to charity: for
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 36) that "greed is the bane of charity."
Therefore covetousness is the greatest of sins.

Obj. 3: Further, the gravity of a sin is indicated by its being
incurable: wherefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is said to be
most grievous, because it is irremissible. But covetousness is an
incurable sin: hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "old
age and helplessness of any kind make men illiberal." Therefore
covetousness is the most grievous of sins.

Obj. 4: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:5) that covetousness is "a
serving of idols." Now idolatry is reckoned among the most grievous
sins. Therefore covetousness is also.

_On the contrary,_ Adultery is a more grievous sin than theft,
according to Prov. 6:30. But theft pertains to covetousness.
Therefore covetousness is not the most grievous of sins.

_I answer that,_ Every sin, from the very fact that it is an evil,
consists in the corruption or privation of some good: while, in so
far as it is voluntary, it consists in the desire of some good.
Consequently the order of sins may be considered in two ways. First,
on the part of the good that is despised or corrupted by sin, and
then the greater the good the graver the sin. From this point of view
a sin that is against God is most grievous; after this comes a sin
that is committed against a man's person, and after this comes a sin
against external things, which are deputed to man's use, and this
seems to belong to covetousness. Secondly, the degrees of sin may be
considered on the part of the good to which the human appetite is
inordinately subjected; and then the lesser the good, the more
deformed is the sin: for it is more shameful to be subject to a lower
than to a higher good. Now the good of external things is the lowest
of human goods: since it is less than the good of the body, and this
is less than the good of the soul, which is less than the Divine
good. From this point of view the sin of covetousness, whereby the
human appetite is subjected even to external things, has in a way a
greater deformity. Since, however, corruption or privation of good is
the formal element in sin, while conversion to a mutable good is the
material element, the gravity of the sin is to be judged from the
point of view of the good corrupted, rather than from that of the
good to which the appetite is subjected. Hence we must assert that
covetousness is not simply the most grievous of sins.

Reply Obj. 1: These authorities speak of covetousness on the part of
the good to which the appetite is subjected. Hence (Ecclus. 10:10) it
is given as a reason that the covetous man "setteth his own soul to
sale"; because, to wit, he exposes his soul--that is, his life--to
danger for the sake of money. Hence the text continues: "Because
while he liveth he hath cast away"--that is, despised--"his bowels,"
in order to make money. Tully also adds that it is the mark of a
"narrow mind," namely, that one be willing to be subject to money.

Reply Obj. 2: Augustine is taking greed generally, in reference to
any temporal good, not in its special acceptation for covetousness:
because greed for any temporal good is the bane of charity, inasmuch
as a man turns away from the Divine good through cleaving to a
temporal good.

Reply Obj. 3: The sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable in one way,
covetousness in another. For the sin against the Holy Ghost is
incurable by reason of contempt: for instance, because a man contemns
God's mercy, or His justice, or some one of those things whereby
man's sins are healed: wherefore incurability of this kind points to
the greater gravity of the sin. on the other hand, covetousness is
incurable on the part of a human defect; a thing which human nature
ever seeks to remedy, since the more deficient one is the more one
seeks relief from external things, and consequently the more one
gives way to covetousness. Hence incurability of this kind is an
indication not of the sin being more grievous, but of its being
somewhat more dangerous.

Reply Obj. 4: Covetousness is compared to idolatry on account of a
certain likeness that it bears to it: because the covetous man, like
the idolater, subjects himself to an external creature, though not in
the same way. For the idolater subjects himself to an external
creature by paying it Divine honor, whereas the covetous man subjects
himself to an external creature by desiring it immoderately for use,
not for worship. Hence it does not follow that covetousness is as
grievous a sin as idolatry.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 6]

Whether Covetousness Is a Spiritual Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a spiritual sin. For
spiritual sins seem to regard spiritual goods. But the matter of
covetousness is bodily goods, namely, external riches. Therefore
covetousness is not a spiritual sin.

Obj. 2: Further, spiritual sin is condivided with sin of the flesh.
Now covetousness is seemingly a sin of the flesh, for it results from
the corruption of the flesh, as instanced in old people who, through
corruption of carnal nature, fall into covetousness. Therefore
covetousness is not a spiritual sin.

Obj. 3: Further, a sin of the flesh is one by which man's body is
disordered, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 6:18), "He
that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body." Now
covetousness disturbs man even in his body; wherefore Chrysostom
(Hom. xxix in Matth.) compares the covetous man to the man who was
possessed by the devil (Mk. 5) and was troubled in body. Therefore
covetousness seems not to be a spiritual sin.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers covetousness among
spiritual vices.

_I answer that,_ Sins are seated chiefly in the affections: and all
the affections or passions of the soul have their term in pleasure
and sorrow, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 5). Now some
pleasures are carnal and some spiritual. Carnal pleasures are those
which are consummated in the carnal senses--for instance, the
pleasures of the table and sexual pleasures: while spiritual
pleasures are those which are consummated in the mere apprehension of
the soul. Accordingly, sins of the flesh are those which are
consummated in carnal pleasures, while spiritual sins are consummated
in pleasures of the spirit without pleasure of the flesh. Such is
covetousness: for the covetous man takes pleasure in the
consideration of himself as a possessor of riches. Therefore
covetousness is a spiritual sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Covetousness with regard to a bodily object seeks the
pleasure, not of the body but only of the soul, forasmuch as a man
takes pleasure in the fact that he possesses riches: wherefore it is
not a sin of the flesh. Nevertheless by reason of its object it is a
mean between purely spiritual sins, which seek spiritual pleasure in
respect of spiritual objects (thus pride is about excellence), and
purely carnal sins, which seek a purely bodily pleasure in respect of
a bodily object.

Reply Obj. 2: Movement takes its species from the term _whereto_ and
not from the term _wherefrom._ Hence a vice of the flesh is so called
from its tending to a pleasure of the flesh, and not from its
originating in some defect of the flesh.

Reply Obj. 3: Chrysostom compares a covetous man to the man who was
possessed by the devil, not that the former is troubled in the flesh
in the same way as the latter, but by way of contrast, since while
the possessed man, of whom we read in Mk. 5, stripped himself, the
covetous man loads himself with an excess of riches.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 7]

Whether Covetousness Is a Capital Vice?

Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a capital vice. For
covetousness is opposed to liberality as the mean, and to prodigality
as extreme. But neither is liberality a principal virtue, nor
prodigality a capital vice. Therefore covetousness also should not be
reckoned a capital vice.

Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (I-II, Q. 84, AA. 3, 4), those vices
are called capital which have principal ends, to which the ends of
other vices are directed. But this does not apply to covetousness:
since riches have the aspect, not of an end, but rather of something
directed to an end, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 5. Therefore
covetousness is not a capital vice.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xv), that "covetousness arises
sometimes from pride, sometimes from fear. For there are those who,
when they think that they lack the needful for their expenses, allow
the mind to give way to covetousness. And there are others who,
wishing to be thought more of, are incited to greed for other
people's property." Therefore covetousness arises from other vices
instead of being a capital vice in respect of other vices.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi) reckons covetousness among
the capital vices.

_I answer that,_ As stated in the Second Objection, a capital vice is
one which under the aspect of end gives rise to other vices: because
when an end is very desirable, the result is that through desire
thereof man sets about doing many things either good or evil. Now the
most desirable end is happiness or felicity, which is the last end of
human life, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, AA. 4, 7, 8): wherefore the
more a thing is furnished with the conditions of happiness, the more
desirable it is. Also one of the conditions of happiness is that it
be self-sufficing, else it would not set man's appetite at rest, as
the last end does. Now riches give great promise of self-sufficiency,
as Boethius says (De Consol. iii): the reason of which, according to
the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5), is that we "use money in token of
taking possession of something," and again it is written (Eccles.
10:19): "All things obey money." Therefore covetousness, which is
desire for money, is a capital vice.

Reply Obj. 1: Virtue is perfected in accordance with reason, but vice
is perfected in accordance with the inclination of the sensitive
appetite. Now reason and sensitive appetite do not belong chiefly to
the same genus, and consequently it does not follow that principal
vice is opposed to principal virtue. Wherefore, although liberality
is not a principal virtue, since it does not regard the principal
good of the reason, yet covetousness is a principal vice, because it
regards money, which occupies a principal place among sensible goods,
for the reason given in the Article.

On the other hand, prodigality is not directed to an end that is
desirable principally, indeed it seems rather to result from a lack
of reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "a prodigal
man is a fool rather than a knave."

Reply Obj. 2: It is true that money is directed to something else as
its end: yet in so far as it is useful for obtaining all sensible
things, it contains, in a way, all things virtually. Hence it has a
certain likeness to happiness, as stated in the Article.

Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents a capital vice from arising
sometimes out of other vices, as stated above (Q. 36, A. 4, ad 1;
I-II, Q. 84, A. 4), provided that itself be frequently the source
of others.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 118, Art. 8]

Whether Treachery, Fraud, Falsehood, Perjury, Restlessness, Violence,
and Insensibility to Mercy Are Daughters of Covetousness?

Objection 1: It seems that the daughters of covetousness are not as
commonly stated, namely, "treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury,
restlessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy." For covetousness
is opposed to liberality, as stated above (A. 3). Now treachery,
fraud, and falsehood are opposed to prudence, perjury to religion,
restlessness to hope, or to charity which rests in the beloved
object, violence to justice, insensibility to mercy. Therefore these
vices have no connection with covetousness.

Obj. 2: Further, treachery, fraud and falsehood seem to pertain to
the same thing, namely, the deceiving of one's neighbor. Therefore
they should not be reckoned as different daughters of covetousness.

Obj. 3: Further, Isidore (Comment. in Deut.) enumerates nine
daughters of covetousness; which are "lying, fraud, theft, perjury,
greed of filthy lucre, false witnessing, violence, inhumanity,
rapacity." Therefore the former reckoning of daughters is
insufficient.

Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) mentions many kinds
of vices as belonging to covetousness which he calls illiberality,
for he speaks of those who are "sparing, tight-fisted, skinflints
[*_kyminopristes_], misers [*_kimbikes_], who do illiberal deeds,"
and of those who "batten on whoredom, usurers, gamblers, despoilers
of the dead, and robbers." Therefore it seems that the aforesaid
enumeration is insufficient.

Obj. 5: Further, tyrants use much violence against their subjects.
But the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "tyrants who destroy
cities and despoil sacred places are not to be called illiberal,"
i.e. covetous. Therefore violence should not be reckoned a daughter
of covetousness.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi) assigns to covetousness the
daughters mentioned above.

_I answer that,_ The daughters of covetousness are the vices which
arise therefrom, especially in respect of the desire of an end. Now
since covetousness is excessive love of possessing riches, it exceeds
in two things. For in the first place it exceeds in retaining, and in
this respect covetousness gives rise to _insensibility to mercy,_
because, to wit, a man's heart is not softened by mercy to assist the
needy with his riches [*See Q. 30, A. 1]. In the second place it
belongs to covetousness to exceed in receiving, and in this respect
covetousness may be considered in two ways. First as in the thought
(_affectu_). In this way it gives rise to _restlessness,_ by
hindering man with excessive anxiety and care, for "a covetous man
shall not be satisfied with money" (Eccles. 5:9). Secondly, it may be
considered in the execution (_effectu_). In this way the covetous
man, in acquiring other people's goods, sometimes employs force,
which pertains to _violence,_ sometimes deceit, and then if he has
recourse to words, it is _falsehood,_ if it be mere words, _perjury_
if he confirm his statement by oath; if he has recourse to deeds, and
the deceit affects things, we have _fraud_; if persons, then we have
_treachery,_ as in the case of Judas, who betrayed Christ through
covetousness.

Reply Obj. 1: There is no need for the daughters of a capital sin to
belong to that same kind of vice: because a sin of one kind allows of
sins even of a different kind being directed to its end; seeing that
it is one thing for a sin to have daughters, and another for it to
have species.

Reply Obj. 2: These three are distinguished as stated in the Article.

Reply Obj. 3: These nine are reducible to the seven aforesaid. For
lying and false witnessing are comprised under falsehood, since false
witnessing is a special kind of lie, just as theft is a special kind
of fraud, wherefore it is comprised under fraud; and greed of filthy
lucre belongs to restlessness; rapacity is comprised under violence,
since it is a species thereof; and inhumanity is the same as
insensibility to mercy.

Reply Obj. 4: The vices mentioned by Aristotle are species rather
than daughters of illiberality or covetousness. For a man may be said
to be illiberal or covetous through a defect in giving. If he gives
but little he is said to be "sparing"; if nothing, he is
"tightfisted": if he gives with great reluctance, he is said to be
_kyminopristes_ ("skinflint"), a cumin-seller, as it were, because he
makes a great fuss about things of little value. Sometimes a man is
said to be illiberal or covetous, through an excess in receiving, and
this in two ways. In one way, through making money by disgraceful
means, whether in performing shameful and servile works by means of
illiberal practices, or by acquiring more through sinful deeds, such
as whoredom or the like, or by making a profit where one ought to
have given gratis, as in the case of usury, or by laboring much to
make little profit. In another way, in making money by unjust means,
whether by using violence on the living, as robbers do, or by
despoiling the dead, or by preying on one's friends, as gamblers do.

Reply Obj. 5: Just as liberality is about moderate sums of money, so
is illiberality. Wherefore tyrants who take great things by violence,
are said to be, not illiberal, but unjust.
_______________________

QUESTION 119

OF PRODIGALITY
(In Three Articles)

We must now consider prodigality, under which head there are three
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness?

(2) Whether prodigality is a sin?

(3) Whether it is a graver sin that covetousness?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 119, Art. 1]

Whether Prodigality Is Opposite to Covetousness?

Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is not opposite to
covetousness. For opposites cannot be together in the same subject.
But some are at the same time prodigal and covetous. Therefore
prodigality is not opposite to covetousness.

Obj. 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But
covetousness, as opposed to liberality, relates to certain passions
whereby man is affected towards money: whereas prodigality does not
seem to relate to any passions of the soul, since it is not affected
towards money, or to anything else of the kind. Therefore prodigality
is not opposite to covetousness.

Obj. 3: Further, sin takes its species chiefly from its end, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 3). Now prodigality seems always to be
directed to some unlawful end, for the sake of which the prodigal
squanders his goods. Especially is it directed to pleasures,
wherefore it is stated (Luke 15:13) of the prodigal son that he
"wasted his substance living riotously." Therefore it seems that
prodigality is opposed to temperance and insensibility rather than to
covetousness and liberality.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 1) that
prodigality is opposed to liberality, and illiberality, to which we
give here the name of covetousness.

_I answer that,_ In morals vices are opposed to one another and to
virtue in respect of excess and deficiency. Now covetousness and
prodigality differ variously in respect of excess and deficiency.
Thus, as regards affection for riches, the covetous man exceeds by
loving them more than he ought, while the prodigal is deficient, by
being less careful of them than he ought: and as regards external
action, prodigality implies excess in giving, but deficiency in
retaining and acquiring, while covetousness, on the contrary, denotes
deficiency in giving, but excess in acquiring and retaining. Hence it
is evident that prodigality is opposed to covetousness.

Reply Obj. 1: Nothing prevents opposites from being in the same
subject in different respects. For a thing is denominated more from
what is in it principally. Now just as in liberality, which observes
the mean, the principal thing is giving, to which receiving and
retaining are subordinate, so, too, covetousness and prodigality
regard principally giving. Wherefore he who exceeds in giving is said
to be "prodigal," while he who is deficient in giving is said to be
"covetous." Now it happens sometimes that a man is deficient in
giving, without exceeding in receiving, as the Philosopher observes
(Ethic. iv, 1). And in like manner it happens sometimes that a man
exceeds in giving, and therefore is prodigal, and yet at the same
time exceeds in receiving. This may be due either to some kind of
necessity, since while exceeding in giving he is lacking in goods of
his own, so that he is driven to acquire unduly, and this pertains to
covetousness; or it may be due to inordinateness of the mind, for he
gives not for a good purpose, but, as though despising virtue, cares
not whence or how he receives. Wherefore he is prodigal and covetous
in different respects.

Reply Obj. 2: Prodigality regards passions in respect of money, not
as exceeding, but as deficient in them.

Reply Obj. 3: The prodigal does not always exceed in giving for the
sake of pleasures which are the matter of temperance, but sometimes
through being so disposed as not to care about riches, and sometimes
on account of something else. More frequently, however, he inclines
to intemperance, both because through spending too much on other
things he becomes fearless of spending on objects of pleasure, to
which the concupiscence of the flesh is more prone; and because
through taking no pleasure in virtuous goods, he seeks for himself
pleasures of the body. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1)
"that many a prodigal ends in becoming intemperate."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 119, Art. 2]

Whether Prodigality Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is not a sin. For the Apostle
says (1 Tim. 6:10): "Covetousness [Douay: 'desire of money'] is the
root of all evils." But it is not the root of prodigality, since this
is opposed to it. Therefore prodigality is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:17, 18): "Charge the rich
of this world . . . to give easily, to communicate to others." Now
this is especially what prodigal persons do. Therefore prodigality is
not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to prodigality to exceed in giving and
to be deficient in solicitude about riches. But this is most becoming
to the perfect, who fulfil the words of Our Lord (Matt. 6:34), "Be
not . . . solicitous for tomorrow," and (Matt. 19:21), "Sell all
[Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor." Therefore
prodigality is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ The prodigal son is held to blame for his
prodigality.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the opposition between
prodigality and covetousness is one of excess and deficiency; either
of which destroys the mean of virtue. Now a thing is vicious and
sinful through corrupting the good of virtue. Hence it follows that
prodigality is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Some expound this saying of the Apostle as referring,
not to actual covetousness, but to a kind of habitual covetousness,
which is the concupiscence of the _fomes_ [*Cf. I-II, Q. 81, A. 3, ad
2], whence all sins arise. Others say that he is speaking of a
general covetousness with regard to any kind of good: and in this
sense also it is evident that prodigality arises from covetousness;
since the prodigal seeks to acquire some temporal good inordinately,
namely, to give pleasure to others, or at least to satisfy his own
will in giving. But to one that reviews the passage correctly, it is
evident that the Apostle is speaking literally of the desire of
riches, for he had said previously (1 Tim. 6:9): "They that will
become rich," etc. In this sense covetousness is said to be "the root
of all evils," not that all evils always arise from covetousness, but
because there is no evil that does not at some time arise from
covetousness. Wherefore prodigality sometimes is born of
covetousness, as when a man is prodigal in going to great expense in
order to curry favor with certain persons from whom he may receive
riches.

Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle bids the rich to be ready to give and
communicate their riches, according as they ought. The prodigal does
not do this: since, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. iv, 1), "his
giving is neither good, nor for a good end, nor according as it ought
to be. For sometimes they give much to those who ought to be poor,
namely, to buffoons and flatterers, whereas to the good they give
nothing."

Reply Obj. 3: The excess in prodigality consists chiefly, not in the
total amount given, but in the amount over and above what ought to be
given. Hence sometimes the liberal man gives more than the prodigal
man, if it be necessary. Accordingly we must reply that those who
give all their possessions with the intention of following Christ,
and banish from their minds all solicitude for temporal things, are
not prodigal but perfectly liberal.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 119, Art. 3]

Whether Prodigality Is a More Grievous Sin Than Covetousness?

Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is a more grievous sin than
covetousness. For by covetousness a man injures his neighbor by not
communicating his goods to him, whereas by prodigality a man injures
himself, because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "the
wasting of riches, which are the means whereby a man lives, is an
undoing of his very being." Now he that injures himself sins more
grievously, according to Ecclus. 14:5, "He that is evil to himself,
to whom will he be good?" Therefore prodigality is a more grievous
sin than covetousness.

Obj. 2: Further, a disorder that is accompanied by a laudable
circumstance is less sinful. Now the disorder of covetousness is
sometimes accompanied by a laudable circumstance, as in the case of
those who are unwilling to spend their own, lest they be driven to
accept from others: whereas the disorder of prodigality is
accompanied by a circumstance that calls for blame, inasmuch as we
ascribe prodigality to those who are intemperate, as the Philosopher
observes (Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin
than covetousness.

Obj. 3: Further, prudence is chief among the moral virtues, as stated
above (Q. 56, A. 1, ad 1; I-II, Q. 61, A. 2, ad 1). Now prodigality
is more opposed to prudence than covetousness is: for it is written
(Prov. 21:20): "There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the
dwelling of the just; and the foolish man shall spend it": and the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that "it is the mark of a fool to
give too much and receive nothing." Therefore prodigality is a more
grievous sin than covetousness.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that "the
prodigal seems to be much better than the illiberal man."

_I answer that,_ Prodigality considered in itself is a less grievous
sin than covetousness, and this for three reasons. First, because
covetousness differs more from the opposite virtue: since giving,
wherein the prodigal exceeds, belongs to liberality more than
receiving or retaining, wherein the covetous man exceeds. Secondly,
because the prodigal man is of use to the many to whom he gives,
while the covetous man is of use to no one, not even to himself, as
stated in _Ethic._ iv, 6. Thirdly, because prodigality is easily
cured. For not only is the prodigal on the way to old age, which is
opposed to prodigality, but he is easily reduced to a state of want,
since much useless spending impoverishes him and makes him unable to
exceed in giving. Moreover, prodigality is easily turned into virtue
on account of its likeness thereto. On the other hand, the covetous
man is not easily cured, for the reason given above (Q. 118, A. 5, ad
3).

Reply Obj. 1: The difference between the prodigal and the covetous
man is not that the former sins against himself and the latter
against another. For the prodigal sins against himself by spending
that which is his, and his means of support, and against others by
spending the wherewithal to help others. This applies chiefly to the
clergy, who are the dispensers of the Church's goods, that belong to
the poor whom they defraud by their prodigal expenditure. In like
manner the covetous man sins against others, by being deficient in
giving; and he sins against himself, through deficiency in spending:
wherefore it is written (Eccles. 6:2): "A man to whom God hath given
riches . . . yet doth not give him the power to eat thereof."
Nevertheless the prodigal man exceeds in this, that he injures both
himself and others yet so as to profit some; whereas the covetous man
profits neither others nor himself, since he does not even use his
own goods for his own profit.

Reply Obj. 2: In speaking of vices in general, we judge of them
according to their respective natures: thus, with regard to
prodigality we note that it consumes riches to excess, and with
regard to covetousness that it retains them to excess. That one spend
too much for the sake of intemperance points already to several
additional sins, wherefore the prodigal of this kind is worse, as
stated in _Ethic._ iv, 1. That an illiberal or covetous man refrain
from taking what belongs to others, although this appears in itself
to call for praise, yet on account of the motive for which he does so
it calls for blame, since he is unwilling to accept from others lest
he be forced to give to others.

Reply Obj. 3: All vices are opposed to prudence, even as all virtues
are directed by prudence: wherefore if a vice be opposed to prudence
alone, for this very reason it is deemed less grievous.
_______________________

QUESTION 120

OF "EPIKEIA" OR EQUITY
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider "epikeia," under which head there are two points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether "epikeia" is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a part of justice?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 120, Art. 1]

Whether "Epikeia" [*_Epieikeia_] Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that _epikeia_ is not a virtue. For no virtue
does away with another virtue. Yet _epikeia_ does away with another
virtue, since it sets aside that which is just according to law, and
seemingly is opposed to severity. Therefore _epikeia_ is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): "With regard
to these earthly laws, although men pass judgment on them when they
make them, yet, when once they are made and established, the judge
must pronounce judgment not on them but according to them." But
seemingly _epikeia_ pronounces judgment on the law, when it deems
that the law should not be observed in some particular case.
Therefore _epikeia_ is a vice rather than a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, apparently it belongs to _epikeia_ to consider the
intention of the lawgiver, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10).
But it belongs to the sovereign alone to interpret the intention of
the lawgiver, wherefore the Emperor says in the _Codex of Laws and
Constitutions,_ under _Law_ i: "It is fitting and lawful that We
alone should interpret between equity and law." Therefore the act of
_epikeia_ is unlawful: and consequently _epikeia_ is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) states it to be a
virtue.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 6), when we were
treating of laws, since human actions, with which laws are concerned,
are composed of contingent singulars and are innumerable in their
diversity, it was not possible to lay down rules of law that would
apply to every single case. Legislators in framing laws attend to
what commonly happens: although if the law be applied to certain
cases it will frustrate the equality of justice and be injurious to
the common good, which the law has in view. Thus the law requires
deposits to be restored, because in the majority of cases this is
just. Yet it happens sometimes to be injurious--for instance, if a
madman were to put his sword in deposit, and demand its delivery
while in a state of madness, or if a man were to seek the return of
his deposit in order to fight against his country. In these and like
cases it is bad to follow the law, and it is good to set aside the
letter of the law and to follow the dictates of justice and the
common good. This is the object of _epikeia_ which we call equity.
Therefore it is evident that _epikeia_ is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: _Epikeia_ does not set aside that which is just in
itself but that which is just as by law established. Nor is it
opposed to severity, which follows the letter of the law when it
ought to be followed. To follow the letter of the law when it ought
not to be followed is sinful. Hence it is written in the _Codex of
Laws and Constitutions_ under _Law_ v: "Without doubt he transgresses
the law who by adhering to the letter of the law strives to defeat
the intention of the lawgiver."

Reply Obj. 2: It would be passing judgment on a law to say that it
was not well made; but to say that the letter of the law is not to be
observed in some particular case is passing judgment not on the law,
but on some particular contingency.

Reply Obj. 3: Interpretation is admissible in doubtful cases where it
is not allowed to set aside the letter of the law without the
interpretation of the sovereign. But when the case is manifest there
is need, not of interpretation, but of execution.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 120, Art. 2]

Whether _Epikeia_ Is a Part of Justice?

Objection 1: It seems that _epikeia_ is not a part of justice. For,
as stated above (Q. 58, A. 7), justice is twofold, particular and
legal. Now _epikeia_ is not a part of particular justice, since it
extends to all virtues, even as legal justice does. In like manner,
neither is it a part of legal justice, since its operation is beside
that which is established by law. Therefore it seems that _epikeia_
is not a part of justice.

Obj. 2: Further, a more principal virtue is not assigned as the part
of a less principal virtue: for it is to the cardinal virtue, as
being principal, that secondary virtues are assigned as parts. Now
_epikeia_ seems to be a more principal virtue than justice, as
implied by its name: for it is derived from _epi_, i.e. "above," and
_dikaion_, i.e. "just." Therefore _epikeia_ is not a part of justice.

Obj. 3: Further, it seems that _epikeia_ is the same as modesty. For
where the Apostle says (Phil. 4:5), "Let your modesty be known to all
men," the Greek has _epieikeia_ [*_to epieikes_]. Now, according to
Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii), modesty is a part of temperance.
Therefore _epikeia_ is not a part of justice.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 10) that "_epikeia_
is a kind of justice."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 48), a virtue has three kinds of
parts, subjective, integral, and potential. A subjective part is one
of which the whole is predicated essentially, and it is less than the
whole. This may happen in two ways. For sometimes one thing is
predicated of many in one common ratio, as animal of horse and ox:
and sometimes one thing is predicated of many according to priority
and posteriority, as _being_ of substance and accident.

Accordingly, _epikeia_ is a part of justice taken in a general sense,
for it is a kind of justice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v,
10). Wherefore it is evident that _epikeia_ is a subjective part of
justice; and justice is predicated of it with priority to being
predicated of legal justice, since legal justice is subject to the
direction of _epikeia._ Hence _epikeia_ is by way of being a higher
rule of human actions.

Reply Obj. 1: _Epikeia_ corresponds properly to legal justice, and in
one way is contained under it, and in another way exceeds it. For if
legal justice denotes that which complies with the law, whether as
regards the letter of the law, or as regards the intention of the
lawgiver, which is of more account, then _epikeia_ is the more
important part of legal justice. But if legal justice denote merely
that which complies with the law with regard to the letter, then
_epikeia_ is a part not of legal justice but of justice in its
general acceptation, and is condivided with legal justice, as
exceeding it.

Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10), "_epikeia_ is
better than a certain," namely, legal, "justice," which observes the
letter of the law: yet since it is itself a kind of justice, it is
not better than all justice.

Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to _epikeia_ to moderate something, namely,
the observance of the letter of the law. But modesty, which is
reckoned a part of temperance, moderates man's outward life--for
instance, in his deportment, dress or the like. Possibly also the
term _epieikeia_ is applied in Greek by a similitude to all kinds of
moderation.
_______________________

QUESTION 121

OF PIETY
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider the gift that corresponds to justice; namely,
piety. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is a gift of the Holy Ghost?

(2) Which of the beatitudes and fruits corresponds to it?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 121, Art. 1]

Whether Piety Is a Gift?

Objection 1: It seems that piety is not a gift. For the gifts differ
from the virtues, as stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 1). But piety is a
virtue, as stated above (Q. 101, A. 3). Therefore piety is not a gift.

Obj. 2: Further, the gifts are more excellent than the virtues, above
all the moral virtues, as above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 8). Now among the
parts of justice religion is greater than piety. Therefore if any
part of justice is to be accounted a gift, it seems that religion
should be a gift rather than piety.

Obj. 3: Further, the gifts and their acts remain in heaven, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 6). But the act of piety cannot remain in
heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that "piety fills the inmost
recesses of the heart with works of mercy": and so there will be no
piety in heaven since there will be no unhappiness [*Cf. Q. 30, A.
1]. Therefore piety is not a gift.

_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned among the gifts in the eleventh
chapter of Isaias (verse 2) [Douay: "godliness"] [*_Pietas,_ whence
our English word "pity," which is the same as mercy.]

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 1; Q. 69, AA. 1,
3), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habitual dispositions of the
soul, rendering it amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the
Holy Ghost moves us to this effect among others, of having a filial
affection towards God, according to Rom. 8:15, "You have received the
spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father)." And since
it belongs properly to piety to pay duty and worship to one's father,
it follows that piety, whereby, at the Holy Ghost's instigation, we
pay worship and duty to God as our Father, is a gift of the Holy
Ghost.

Reply Obj. 1: The piety that pays duty and worship to a father in the
flesh is a virtue: but the piety that is a gift pays this to God as
Father.

Reply Obj. 2: To pay worship to God as Creator, as religion does, is
more excellent than to pay worship to one's father in the flesh, as
the piety that is a virtue does. But to pay worship to God as Father
is yet more excellent than to pay worship to God as Creator and Lord.
Wherefore religion is greater than the virtue of piety: while the
gift of piety is greater than religion.

Reply Obj. 3: As by the virtue of piety man pays duty and worship not
only to his father in the flesh, but also to all his kindred on
account of their being related to his father, so by the gift of piety
he pays worship and duty not only to God, but also to all men on
account of their relationship to God. Hence it belongs to piety to
honor the saints, and not to contradict the Scriptures whether one
understands them or not, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii).
Consequently it also assists those who are in a state of unhappiness.
And although this act has no place in heaven, especially after the
Day of Judgment, yet piety will exercise its principal act, which is
to revere God with filial affection: for it is then above all that
this act will be fulfilled, according to Wis. 5:5, "Behold how they
are numbered among the children of God." The saints will also
mutually honor one another. Now, however, before the Judgment Day,
the saints have pity on those also who are living in this unhappy
state.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 121, Art. 2]

Whether the Second Beatitude, "Blessed Are the Meek," Corresponds to
the Gift of Piety?

Objection 1: It seems that the second beatitude, "Blessed are the
meek," does not correspond to the gift of piety. For piety is the
gift corresponding to justice, to which rather belongs the fourth
beatitude, "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice,"
or the fifth beatitude, "Blessed are the merciful," since as stated
above (A. 1, Obj. 3), the works of mercy belong to piety. Therefore
the second beatitude does not pertain to the gift of piety.

Obj. 2: Further, the gift of piety is directed by the gift of
knowledge, which is united to it in the enumeration of the gifts
(Isa. 11). Now direction and execution extend to the same matter.
Since, then, the third beatitude, "Blessed are they that mourn,"
corresponds to the gift of knowledge, it seems that the second
beatitude corresponds to piety.

Obj. 3: Further, the fruits correspond to the beatitudes and gifts,
as stated above (I-II, Q. 70, A. 2). Now among the fruits, goodness
and benignity seem to agree with piety rather than mildness, which
pertains to meekness. Therefore the second beatitude does not
correspond to the gift of piety.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): "Piety
is becoming to the meek."

_I answer that,_ In adapting the beatitudes to the gifts a twofold
congruity may be observed. One is according to the order in which
they are given, and Augustine seems to have followed this: wherefore
he assigns the first beatitude to the lowest gift, namely, fear, and
the second beatitude, "Blessed are the meek," to piety, and so on.
Another congruity may be observed in keeping with the special nature
of each gift and beatitude. In this way one must adapt the beatitudes
to the gifts according to their objects and acts: and thus the fourth
and fifth beatitudes would correspond to piety, rather than the
second. Yet the second beatitude has a certain congruity with piety,
inasmuch as meekness removes the obstacles to acts of piety.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2: Taking the beatitudes and gifts according to their
proper natures, the same beatitude must needs correspond to knowledge
and piety: but taking them according to their order, different
beatitudes correspond to them, although a certain congruity may be
observed, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: In the fruits goodness and benignity may be directly
ascribed to piety; and mildness indirectly in so far as it removes
obstacles to acts of piety, as stated above.
_______________________

QUESTION 122

OF THE PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE
(In Six Articles)

We must now consider the precepts of justice, under which head there
are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice?

(2) Of the first precept of the decalogue;

(3) Of the second;

(4) Of the third;

(5) Of the fourth;

(6) Of the other six.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 1]

Whether the Precepts of the Decalogue Are Precepts of Justice?

Objection 1: It seems that the precepts of the decalogue are not
precepts of justice. For the intention of a lawgiver is "to make the
citizens virtuous in respect of every virtue," as stated in _Ethic._
ii, 1. Wherefore, according to _Ethic._ v, 1, "the law prescribes
about all acts of all virtues." Now the precepts of the decalogue are
the first principles of the whole Divine Law. Therefore the precepts
of the decalogue do not pertain to justice alone.

Obj. 2: Further, it would seem that to justice belong especially the
judicial precepts, which are condivided with the moral precepts, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 99, A. 4). But the precepts of the decalogue
are moral precepts, as stated above (I-II, Q. 100, A. 3). Therefore
the precepts of the decalogue are not precepts of justice.

Obj. 3: Further, the Law contains chiefly precepts about acts of
justice regarding the common good, for instance about public officers
and the like. But there is no mention of these in the precepts of the
decalogue. Therefore it seems that the precepts of the decalogue do
not properly belong to justice.

Obj. 4: Further, the precepts of the decalogue are divided into two
tables, corresponding to the love of God and the love of our
neighbor, both of which regard the virtue of charity. Therefore the
precepts of the decalogue belong to charity rather than to justice.

_On the contrary,_ Seemingly justice is the sole virtue whereby we
are directed to another. Now we are directed to another by all the
precepts of the decalogue, as is evident if one consider each of
them. Therefore all the precepts of the decalogue pertain to justice.

_I answer that,_ The precepts of the decalogue are the first
principles of the Law: and the natural reason assents to them at
once, as to principles that are most evident. Now it is altogether
evident that the notion of duty, which is essential to a precept,
appears in justice, which is of one towards another. Because in those
matters that relate to himself it would seem at a glance that man is
master of himself, and that he may do as he likes: whereas in matters
that refer to another it appears manifestly that a man is under
obligation to render to another that which is his due. Hence the
precepts of the decalogue must needs pertain to justice. Wherefore
the first three precepts are about acts of religion, which is the
chief part of justice; the fourth precept is about acts of piety,
which is the second part of justice; and the six remaining are about
justice commonly so called, which is observed among equals.

Reply Obj. 1: The intention of the law is to make all men virtuous,
but in a certain order, namely, by first of all giving them precepts
about those things where the notion of duty is most manifest, as
stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: The judicial precepts are determinations of the moral
precepts, in so far as these are directed to one's neighbor, just as
the ceremonial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts in
so far as these are directed to God. Hence neither precepts are
contained in the decalogue: and yet they are determinations of the
precepts of the decalogue, and therefore pertain to justice.

Reply Obj. 3: Things that concern the common good must needs be
administered in different ways according to the difference of men.
Hence they were to be given a place not among the precepts of the
decalogue, but among the judicial precepts.

Reply Obj. 4: The precepts of the decalogue pertain to charity as
their end, according to 1 Tim. 1:5, "The end of the commandment is
charity": but they belong to justice, inasmuch as they refer
immediately to acts of justice.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 2]

Whether the First Precept of the Decalogue Is Fittingly Expressed?

Objection 1: It seems that the first precept of the decalogue is
unfittingly expressed. For man is more bound to God than to his
father in the flesh, according to Heb. 12:9, "How much more shall we
[Vulg.: 'shall we not much more'] obey the Father of spirits and
live?" Now the precept of piety, whereby man honors his father, is
expressed affirmatively in these words: "Honor thy father and thy
mother." Much more, therefore, should the first precept of religion,
whereby all honor God, be expressed affirmatively, especially as
affirmation is naturally prior to negation.

Obj. 2: Further, the first precept of the decalogue pertains to
religion, as stated above (A. 1). Now religion, since it is one
virtue, has one act. Yet in the first precept three acts are
forbidden: since we read first: "Thou shalt not have strange gods
before Me"; secondly, "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven
thing"; and thirdly, "Thou shalt not adore them nor serve them."
Therefore the first precept is unfittingly expressed.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De decem chord. ix) that "the first
precept forbids the sin of superstition." But there are many wicked
superstitions besides idolatry, as stated above (Q. 92, A. 2).
Therefore it was insufficient to forbid idolatry alone.

_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Scripture.

_I answer that,_ It pertains to law to make men good, wherefore it
behooved the precepts of the Law to be set in order according to the
order of generation, the order, to wit, of man's becoming good. Now
two things must be observed in the order of generation. The first is
that the first part is the first thing to be established; thus in the
generation of an animal the first thing to be formed is the heart,
and in building a home the first thing to be set up is the
foundation: and in the goodness of the soul the first part is
goodness of the will, the result of which is that a man makes good
use of every other goodness. Now the goodness of the will depends on
its object, which is its end. Wherefore since man was to be directed
to virtue by means of the Law, the first thing necessary was, as it
were, to lay the foundation of religion, whereby man is duly directed
to God, Who is the last end of man's will.

The second thing to be observed in the order of generation is that in
the first place contraries and obstacles have to be removed. Thus the
farmer first purifies the soil, and afterwards sows his seed,
according to Jer. 4:3, "Break up anew your fallow ground, and sow not
upon thorns." Hence it behooved man, first of all to be instructed in
religion, so as to remove the obstacles to true religion. Now the
chief obstacle to religion is for man to adhere to a false god,
according to Matt. 6:24, "You cannot serve God and mammon." Therefore
in the first precept of the Law the worship of false gods is excluded.

Reply Obj. 1: In point of fact there is one affirmative precept about
religion, namely: "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath Day."
Still the negative precepts had to be given first, so that by their
means the obstacles to religion might be removed. For though
affirmation naturally precedes negation, yet in the process of
generation, negation, whereby obstacles are removed, comes first, as
stated in the Article. Especially is this true in matters concerning
God, where negation is preferable to affirmation, on account of our
insufficiency, as Dionysius observes (Coel. Hier. ii).

Reply Obj. 2: People worshiped strange gods in two ways. For some
served certain creatures as gods without having recourse to images.
Hence Varro says that for a long time the ancient Romans worshiped
gods without using images: and this worship is first forbidden by the
words, "Thou shalt not have strange gods." Among others the worship
of false gods was observed by using certain images: and so the very
making of images was fittingly forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt
not make to thyself any graven thing," as also the worship of those
same images, by the words, "Thou shalt not adore them," etc.

Reply Obj. 3: All other kinds of superstition proceed from some
compact, tacit or explicit, with the demons; hence all are understood
to be forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not have strange gods."
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 3]

Whether the Second Precept of the Decalogue Is Fittingly Expressed?

Objection 1: It seems that the second precept of the decalogue is
unfittingly expressed. For this precept, "Thou shalt not take the
name of thy God in vain" is thus explained by a gloss on Ex. 20:7:
"Thou shalt not deem the Son of God to be a creature," so that it
forbids an error against faith. Again, a gloss on the words of Deut.
5:11, "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain," adds,
i.e. "by giving the name of God to wood or stone," as though they
forbade a false confession of faith, which, like error, is an act of
unbelief. Now unbelief precedes superstition, as faith precedes
religion. Therefore this precept should have preceded the first,
whereby superstition is forbidden.

Obj. 2: Further, the name of God is taken for many purposes--for
instance, those of praise, of working miracles, and generally
speaking in conjunction with all we say or do, according to Col.
3:17, "All whatsoever you do in word or in work . . . do ye in the
name of the Lord." Therefore the precept forbidding the taking of
God's name in vain seems to be more universal than the precept
forbidding superstition, and thus should have preceded it.

Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Ex. 20:7 expounds the precept, "Thou
shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain," namely, by
swearing to nothing. Hence this precept would seem to forbid useless
swearing, that is to say, swearing without judgment. But false
swearing, which is without truth, and unjust swearing, which is
without justice, are much more grievous. Therefore this precept
should rather have forbidden them.

Obj. 4: Further, blasphemy or any word or deed that is an insult to
God is much more grievous than perjury. Therefore blasphemy and other
like sins should rather have been forbidden by this precept.

Obj. 5: Further, God's names are many. Therefore it should not have
been said indefinitely: "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy
God in vain."

_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Scripture.

_I answer that,_ In one who is being instructed in virtue it is
necessary to remove obstacles to true religion before establishing
him in true religion. Now a thing is opposed to true religion in two
ways. First, by excess, when, to wit, that which belongs to religion
is given to others than to whom it is due, and this pertains to
superstition. Secondly, by lack, as it were, of reverence, when, to
wit, God is contemned, and this pertains to the vice of irreligion,
as stated above (Q. 97, in the preamble, and in the Article that
follows). Now superstition hinders religion by preventing man from
acknowledging God so as to worship Him: and when a man's mind is
engrossed in some undue worship, he cannot at the same time give due
worship to God, according to Isa. 28:20, "The bed is straitened, so
that one must fall out," i.e. either the true God or a false god must
fall out from man's heart, "and a short covering cannot cover both."
On the other hand, irreligion hinders religion by preventing man from
honoring God after he has acknowledged Him. Now one must first of all
acknowledge God with a view to worship, before honoring Him we have
acknowledged.

For this reason the precept forbidding superstition is placed before
the second precept, which forbids perjury that pertains to irreligion.

Reply Obj. 1: These expositions are mystical. The literal
explanation is that which is given Deut. 5:11: "Thou shalt not take
the name of . . . thy God in vain," namely, "by swearing on that
which is not [*Vulg.: 'for he shall not be unpunished that taketh His
name upon a vain thing']."

Reply Obj. 2: This precept does not forbid all taking of the name of
God, but properly the taking of God's name in confirmation of a man's
word by way of an oath, because men are wont to take God's name more
frequently in this way. Nevertheless we may understand that in
consequence all inordinate taking of the Divine name is forbidden by
this precept: and it is in this sense that we are to take the
explanation quoted in the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 3: To swear to nothing means to swear to that which is
not. This pertains to false swearing, which is chiefly called
perjury, as stated above (Q. 98, A. 1, ad 3). For when a man swears
to that which is false, his swearing is vain in itself, since it is
not supported by the truth. On the other hand, when a man swears
without judgment, through levity, if he swear to the truth, there is
no vanity on the part of the oath itself, but only on the part of the
swearer.

Reply Obj. 4: Just as when we instruct a man in some science, we
begin by putting before him certain general maxims, even so the Law,
which forms man to virtue by instructing him in the precepts of the
decalogue, which are the first of all precepts, gave expression, by
prohibition or by command, to those things which are of most common
occurrence in the course of human life. Hence the precepts of the
decalogue include the prohibition of perjury, which is of more
frequent occurrence than blasphemy, since man does not fall so often
into the latter sin.

Reply Obj. 5: Reverence is due to the Divine names on the part of the
thing signified, which is one, and not on the part of the signifying
words, which are many. Hence it is expressed in the singular: "Thou
shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain": since it matters
not in which of God's names perjury is committed.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 4]

Whether the Third Precept of the Decalogue, Concerning the Hallowing
of the Sabbath, Is Fittingly Expressed?

Objection 1: It seems that the third precept of the decalogue,
concerning the hallowing of the Sabbath, is unfittingly expressed.
For this, understood spiritually, is a general precept: since Bede in
commenting on Luke 13:14, "The ruler of the synagogue being angry
that He had healed on the Sabbath," says (Comment. iv): "The Law
forbids, not to heal man on the Sabbath, but to do servile works,"
i.e. "to burden oneself with sin." Taken literally it is a ceremonial
precept, for it is written (Ex. 31:13): "See that you keep My
Sabbath: because it is a sign between Me and you in your
generations." Now the precepts of the decalogue are both spiritual
and moral. Therefore it is unfittingly placed among the precepts of
the decalogue.

Obj. 2: Further, the ceremonial precepts of the Law contain "sacred
things, sacrifices, sacraments and observances," as stated above
(I-II, Q. 101, A. 4). Now sacred things comprised not only sacred
days, but also sacred places and sacred vessels, and so on. Moreover,
there were many sacred days other than the Sabbath. Therefore it was
unfitting to omit all other ceremonial observances and to mention
only that of the Sabbath.

Obj. 3: Further, whoever breaks a precept of the decalogue, sins. But
in the Old Law some who broke the observances of the Sabbath did not
sin--for instance, those who circumcised their sons on the eighth
day, and the priests who worked in the temple on the Sabbath. Also
Elias (3 Kings 19), who journeyed for forty days unto the mount of
God, Horeb, must have traveled on a Sabbath: the priests also who
carried the ark of the Lord for seven days, as related in Josue 7,
must be understood to have carried it on a Sabbath. Again it is
written (Luke 13:15): "Doth not every one of you on the Sabbath day
loose his ox or his ass . . . and lead them to water?" Therefore it
is unfittingly placed among the precepts of the decalogue.

Obj. 4: Further, the precepts of the decalogue have to be observed
also under the New Law. Yet in the New Law this precept is not
observed, neither in the point of the Sabbath day, nor as to the
Lord's day, on which men cook their food, travel, fish, and do many
like things. Therefore the precept of the observance of the Sabbath
is unfittingly expressed.

_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Scripture.

_I answer that,_ The obstacles to true religion being removed by the
first and second precepts of the decalogue, as stated above (AA. 2,
3), it remained for the third precept to be given whereby man is
established in true religion. Now it belongs to religion to give
worship to God: and just as the Divine scriptures teach the interior
worship under the guise of certain corporal similitudes, so is
external worship given to God under the guise of sensible signs. And
since for the most part man is induced to pay interior worship,
consisting in prayer and devotion, by the interior prompting of the
Holy Ghost, a precept of the Law as necessary respecting the exterior
worship that consists in sensible signs. Now the precepts of the
decalogue are, so to speak, first and common principles of the Law,
and consequently the third precept of the decalogue describes the
exterior worship of God as the sign of a universal boon that concerns
all. This universal boon was the work of the Creation of the world,
from which work God is stated to have rested on the seventh day: and
sign of this we are commanded to keep holy seventh day--that is, to
set it aside as a day to be given to God. Hence after the precept
about the hallowing of the Sabbath the reason for it is given: "For
in six days the Lord made heaven and earth . . . and rested on the
seventh day."

Reply Obj. 1: The precept about hallowing the Sabbath, understood
literally, is partly moral and partly ceremonial. It is a moral
precept in the point of commanding man to aside a certain time to be
given to Divine things. For there is in man a natural inclination to
set aside a certain time for each necessary thing, such as
refreshment of the body, sleep, and so forth. Hence according to the
dictate of reason, man sets aside a certain time for spiritual
refreshment, by which man's mind is refreshed in God. And thus to
have a certain time set aside for occupying oneself with Divine
things is the matter of a moral precept. But, in so far as this
precept specializes the time as a sign representing the Creation of
the world, it is a ceremonial precept. Again, it is a ceremonial
precept in its allegorical signification, as representative of
Christ's rest in the tomb on the seventh day: also in its moral
signification, as representing cessation from all sinful acts, and
the mind's rest in God, in which sense, too, it is a general precept.
Again, it is a ceremonial precept in its analogical signification, as
foreshadowing the enjoyment of God in heaven. Hence the precept about
hallowing the Sabbath is placed among the precepts of the decalogue,
as a moral, but not as a ceremonial precept.

Reply Obj. 2: The other ceremonies of the Law are signs of certain
particular Divine works: but the observance of the Sabbath is
representative of a general boon, namely, the production of all
creatures. Hence it was fitting that it should be placed among the
general precepts of the decalogue, rather than any other ceremonial
precept of the Law.

Reply Obj. 3: Two things are to be observed in the hallowing of the
Sabbath. One of these is the end: and this is that man occupy himself
with Divine things, and is signified in the words: "Remember that
thou keep holy the Sabbath day." For in the Law those things are said
to be holy which are applied to the Divine worship. The other thing
is cessation from work, and is signified in the words (Ex. 20:11),
"On the seventh day . . . thou shalt do no work." The kind of work
meant appears from Lev. 23:3, "You shall do no servile work on that
day [*Vulg.: 'You shall do no work on that day']." Now servile work
is so called from servitude: and servitude is threefold. One, whereby
man is the servant of sin, according to John 8:34, "Whosoever
committeth sin is the servant of sin," and in this sense all sinful
acts are servile. Another servitude is whereby one man serves
another. Now one man serves another not with his mind but with his
body, as stated above (Q. 104, AA. 5, 6, ad 1). Wherefore in this
respect those works are called servile whereby one man serves
another. The third is the servitude of God; and in this way the work
of worship, which pertains to the service of God, may be called a
servile work. In this sense servile work is not forbidden on the
Sabbath day, because that would be contrary to the end of the Sabbath
observance: since man abstains from other works on the Sabbath day in
order that he may occupy himself with works connected with God's
service. For this reason, according to John 7:23, "a man [*Vulg.: 'If
a man,' etc.] receives circumcision on the Sabbath day, that the law
of Moses may not be broken": and for this reason too we read (Matt.
12:5), that "on the Sabbath days the priests in the temple break the
Sabbath," i.e. do corporal works on the Sabbath, "and are without
blame." Accordingly, the priests in carrying the ark on the Sabbath
did not break the precept of the Sabbath observance. In like manner
it is not contrary to the observance of the Sabbath to exercise any
spiritual act, such as teaching by word or writing. Wherefore a gloss
on Num 28 says that "smiths and like craftsmen rest on the Sabbath
day, but the reader or teacher of the Divine law does not cease from
his work. Yet he profanes not the Sabbath, even as the priests in the
temple break the Sabbath, and are without blame." On the other hand,
those works that are called servile in the first or second way are
contrary to the observance of the Sabbath, in so far as they hinder
man from applying himself to Divine things. And since man is hindered
from applying himself to Divine things rather by sinful than by
lawful albeit corporal works, it follows that to sin on a feast day
is more against this precept than to do some other but lawful bodily
work. Hence Augustine says (De decem chord. iii): "It would be better
if the Jew did some useful work on his farm than spent his time
seditiously in the theatre: and their womenfolk would do better to be
making linen on the Sabbath than to be dancing lewdly all day in
their feasts of the new moon." It is not, however, against this
precept to sin venially on the Sabbath, because venial sin does not
destroy holiness.

Again, corporal works, not pertaining to the spiritual worship of
God, are said to be servile in so far as they belong properly to
servants; while they are not said to be servile, in so far as they
are common to those who serve and those who are free. Moreover,
everyone, be he servant or free, is bound to provide necessaries both
for himself and for his neighbor, chiefly in respect of things
pertaining to the well-being of the body, according to Prov. 24:11,
"Deliver them that are led to death": secondarily as regards avoiding
damage to one's property, according to Deut. 22:1, "Thou shalt not
pass by if thou seest thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray, but
thou shalt bring them back to thy brother." Hence a corporal work
pertaining to the preservation of one's own bodily well-being does
not profane the Sabbath: for it is not against the observance of the
Sabbath to eat and do such things as preserve the health of the body.
For this reason the Machabees did not profane the Sabbath when they
fought in self-defense on the Sabbath day (1 Macc. 2), nor Elias when
he fled from the face of Jezabel on the Sabbath. For this same reason
our Lord (Matt. 12:3) excused His disciples for plucking the ears of
corn on account of the need which they suffered. In like manner a
bodily work that is directed to the bodily well-being of another is
not contrary to the observance of the Sabbath: wherefore it is
written (John 7:23): "Are you angry at Me because I have healed the
whole man on the Sabbath day?" And again, a bodily work that is done
to avoid an imminent damage to some external thing does not profane
the Sabbath, wherefore our Lord says (Matt. 12:11): "What man shall
there be among you, that hath one sheep, and if the same fall into a
pit on the Sabbath day, will he not take hold on it and lift it up?"

Reply Obj. 4: In the New Law the observance of the Lord's day took
the place of the observance of the Sabbath, not by virtue of the
precept but by the institution of the Church and the custom of
Christian people. For this observance is not figurative, as was the
observance of the Sabbath in the Old Law. Hence the prohibition to
work on the Lord's day is not so strict as on the Sabbath: and
certain works are permitted on the Lord's day which were forbidden on
the Sabbath, such as the cooking of food and so forth. And again in
the New Law, dispensation is more easily granted than in the Old, in
the matter of certain forbidden works, on account of their necessity,
because the figure pertains to the protestation of truth, which it is
unlawful to omit even in small things; while works, considered in
themselves, are changeable in point of place and time.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 5]

Whether the Fourth Precept, About Honoring One's Parents, Is
Fittingly Expressed?

Objection 1: It seems that the fourth precept, about honoring one's
parents, is unfittingly expressed. For this is the precept pertaining
to piety. Now, just as piety is a part of justice, so are observance,
gratitude, and others of which we have spoken (QQ. 101, 102, seq.).
Therefore it seems that there should not have been given a special
precept of piety, as none is given regarding the others.

Obj. 2: Further, piety pays worship not only to one's parents, but
also to one's country, and also to other blood kindred, and to the
well-wishers of our country, as stated above (Q. 101, AA. 1, 2).
Therefore it was unfitting for this precept to mention only the
honoring of one's father and mother.

Obj. 3: Further, we owe our parents not merely honor but also
support. Therefore the mere honoring of one's parents is unfittingly
prescribed.

Obj. 4: Further, sometimes those who honor their parents die young,
and on the contrary those who honor them not live a long time.
Therefore it was unfitting to supplement this precept with the
promise, "That thou mayest be long-lived upon earth."

_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Scripture.

_I answer that,_ The precepts of the decalogue are directed to the
love of God and of our neighbor. Now to our parents, of all our
neighbors, we are under the greatest obligation. Hence, immediately
after the precepts directing us to God, a place is given to the
precept directing us to our parents, who are the particular principle
of our being, just as God is the universal principle: so that this
precept has a certain affinity to the precepts of the First Table.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 101, A. 2), piety directs us to pay
the debt due to our parents, a debt which is common to all. Hence,
since the precepts of the decalogue are general precepts, they ought
to contain some reference to piety rather than to the other parts of
justice, which regard some special debt.

Reply Obj. 2: The debt to one's parents precedes the debt to one's
kindred and country since it is because we are born of our parents
that our kindred and country belong to us. Hence, since the precepts
of the decalogue are the first precepts of the Law, they direct man
to his parents rather than to his country and other kindred.
Nevertheless this precept of honoring our parents is understood to
command whatever concerns the payment of debt to any person, as
secondary matter included in the principal matter.

Reply Obj. 3: Reverential honor is due to one's parents as such,
whereas support and so forth are due to them accidentally, for
instance, because they are in want, in slavery, or the like, as
stated above (Q. 101, A. 2). And since that which belongs to a thing
by nature precedes that which is accidental, it follows that among
the first precepts of the Law, which are the precepts of the
decalogue, there is a special precept of honoring our parents: and
this honor, as a kind of principle, is understood to comprise support
and whatever else is due to our parents.

Reply Obj. 4: A long life is promised to those who honor their
parents not only as to the life to come, but also as to the present
life, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Tim. 4:8): "Piety
[Douay: 'godliness'] is profitable to all things, having promise of
the life that now is and of that which is to come." And with reason.
Because the man who is grateful for a favor deserves, with a certain
congruity, that the favor should be continued to him, and he who is
ungrateful for a favor deserves to lose it. Now we owe the favor of
bodily life to our parents after God: wherefore he that honors his
parents deserves the prolongation of his life, because he is grateful
for that favor: while he that honors not his parents deserves to be
deprived of life because he is ungrateful for the favor. However,
present goods or evils are not the subject of merit or demerit except
in so far as they are directed to a future reward, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 114, A. 12). Wherefore sometimes in accordance with the
hidden design of the Divine judgments, which regard chiefly the
future reward, some, who are dutiful to their parents, are sooner
deprived of life, while others, who are undutiful to their parents,
live longer.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 6]

Whether the Other Six Precepts of the Decalogue Are Fittingly
Expressed?

Objection 1: It seems that the other six precepts of the decalogue
are unfittingly expressed. For it is not sufficient for salvation
that one refrain from injuring one's neighbor; but it is required
that one pay one's debts, according to Rom. 13:7, "Render . . . to
all men their dues." Now the last six precepts merely forbid one to
injure one's neighbor. Therefore these precepts are unfittingly
expressed.

Obj. 2: Further, these precepts forbid murder, adultery, stealing and
bearing false witness. But many other injuries can be inflicted on
one's neighbor, as appears from those which have been specified above
(QQ. 72, seq.). Therefore it seems that the aforesaid precepts are
unfittingly expressed.

Obj. 3: Further, concupiscence may be taken in two ways. First as
denoting an act of the will, as in Wis. 6:21, "The desire
(_concupiscentia_) of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom":
secondly, as denoting an act of the sensuality, as in James 4:1,
"From whence are wars and contentions among you? Are they not . . .
from your concupiscences which war in your members?" Now the
concupiscence of the sensuality is not forbidden by a precept of the
decalogue, otherwise first movements would be mortal sins, as they
would be against a precept of the decalogue. Nor is the concupiscence
of the will forbidden, since it is included in every sin. Therefore
it is unfitting for the precepts of the decalogue to include some
that forbid concupiscence.

Obj. 4: Further, murder is a more grievous sin than adultery or
theft. But there is no precept forbidding the desire of murder.
Therefore neither was it fitting to have precepts forbidding the
desire of theft and of adultery.

_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Scripture.

_I answer that,_ Just as by the parts of justice a man pays that
which is due to certain definite persons, to whom he is bound for
some special reason, so too by justice properly so called he pays
that which is due to all in general. Hence, after the three precepts
pertaining to religion, whereby man pays what is due God, and after
the fourth precept pertaining to piety, whereby he pays what is due
to his parents--which duty includes the paying of all that is due for
any special reason--it was necessary in due sequence to give certain
precepts pertaining to justice properly so called, which pays to all
indifferently what is due to them.

Reply Obj. 1: Man is bound towards all persons in general to inflict
injury on no one: hence the negative precepts, which forbid the doing
of those injuries that can be inflicted on one's neighbor, had to be
given a place, as general precepts, among the precepts of the
decalogue. On the other hand, the duties we owe to our neighbor are
paid in different ways to different people: hence it did not behoove
to include affirmative precepts about those duties among the precepts
of the decalogue.

Reply Obj. 2: All other injuries that are inflicted on our neighbor
are reducible to those that are forbidden by these precepts, as
taking precedence of others in point of generality and importance.
For all injuries that are inflicted on the person of our neighbor are
understood to be forbidden under the head of murder as being the
principal of all. Those that are inflicted on a person connected with
one's neighbor, especially by way of lust, are understood to be
forbidden together with adultery: those that come under the head of
damage done to property are understood to be forbidden together with
theft: and those that are comprised under speech, such as
detractions, insults, and so forth, are understood to be forbidden
together with the bearing of false witness, which is more directly
opposed to justice.

Reply Obj. 3: The precepts forbidding concupiscence do not include
the prohibition of first movements of concupiscence, that do not go
farther than the bounds of sensuality. The direct object of their
prohibition is the consent of the will, which is directed to deed or
pleasure.

Reply Obj. 4: Murder in itself is an object not of concupiscence but
of horror, since it has not in itself the aspect of good. On the
other hand, adultery has the aspect of a certain kind of good, i.e.
of something pleasurable, and theft has an aspect of good, i.e. of
something useful: and good of its very nature has the aspect of
something concupiscible. Hence the concupiscence of theft and
adultery had to be forbidden by special precepts, but not the
concupiscence of murder.
_______________________

TREATISE ON FORTITUDE AND TEMPERANCE (QQ. 123-170)
_______________________

QUESTION 123

OF FORTITUDE
(In Twelve Articles)

After considering justice we must in due sequence consider fortitude.
We must (1) consider the virtue itself of fortitude; (2) its parts;
(3) the gift corresponding thereto; (4) the precepts that pertain to
it.

Concerning fortitude three things have to be considered:
(1) Fortitude itself; (2) its principal act, viz. martyrdom;
(3) the vices opposed to fortitude.

Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) Whether fortitude is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a special virtue?

(3) Whether fortitude is only about fear and daring?

(4) Whether it is only about fear of death?

(5) Whether it is only in warlike matters?

(6) Whether endurance is its chief act?

(7) Whether its action is directed to its own good?

(8) Whether it takes pleasure in its own action?

(9) Whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences?

(10) Whether it makes use of anger in its action?

(11) Whether it is a cardinal virtue?

(12) Of its comparison with the other cardinal virtues.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 1]

Whether Fortitude Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a virtue. For the Apostle
says (2 Cor. 12:9): "Virtue is perfected in infirmity." But fortitude
is contrary to infirmity. Therefore fortitude is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, if it is a virtue, it is either theological,
intellectual, or moral. Now fortitude is not contained among the
theological virtues, nor among the intellectual virtues, as may be
gathered from what we have said above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 2; Q. 62, A.
3). Neither, apparently, is it contained among the moral virtues,
since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 7, 8): "Some seem to
be brave through ignorance; or through experience, as soldiers," both
of which cases seem to pertain to act rather than to moral virtue,
"and some are called brave on account of certain passions"; for
instance, on account of fear of threats, or of dishonor, or again on
account of sorrow, anger, or hope. But moral virtue does not act from
passion but from choice, as stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4).
Therefore fortitude is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, human virtue resides chiefly in the soul, since it
is a "good quality of the mind," as stated above (Ethic. iii, 7, 8).
But fortitude, seemingly, resides in the body, or at least results
from the temperament of the body. Therefore it seems that fortitude
is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv, xxi, xxii) numbers
fortitude among the virtues.

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) "virtue
is that which makes its possessor good, and renders his work good."
Hence human virtue, of which we are speaking now, is that which makes
a man good, and renders his work good. Now man's good is to be in
accordance with reason, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22).
Wherefore it belongs to human virtue to make man good, to make his
work accord with reason. This happens in three ways: first, by
rectifying reason itself, and this is done by the intellectual
virtues; secondly, by establishing the rectitude of reason in human
affairs, and this belongs to justice; thirdly, by removing the
obstacles to the establishment of this rectitude in human affairs.
Now the human will is hindered in two ways from following the
rectitude of reason. First, through being drawn by some object of
pleasure to something other than what the rectitude of reason
requires; and this obstacle is removed by the virtue of temperance.
Secondly, through the will being disinclined to follow that which is
in accordance with reason, on account of some difficulty that
presents itself. In order to remove this obstacle fortitude of the
mind is requisite, whereby to resist the aforesaid difficulty even as
a man, by fortitude of body, overcomes and removes bodily obstacles.

Hence it is evident that fortitude is a virtue, in so far as it
conforms man to reason.

Reply Obj. 1: The virtue of the soul is perfected, not in the
infirmity of the soul, but in the infirmity of the body, of which the
Apostle was speaking. Now it belongs to fortitude of the mind to bear
bravely with infirmities of the flesh, and this belongs to the virtue
of patience or fortitude, as also to acknowledge one's own infirmity,
and this belongs to the perfection that is called humility.

Reply Obj. 2: Sometimes a person performs the exterior act of a
virtue without having the virtue, and from some other cause than
virtue. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8) mentions five ways in
which people are said to be brave by way of resemblance, through
performing acts of fortitude without having the virtue. This may be
done in three ways. First, because they tend to that which is
difficult as though it were not difficult: and this again happens in
three ways, for sometimes this is owing to ignorance, through not
perceiving the greatness of the danger; sometimes it is owing to the
fact that one is hopeful of overcoming dangers--when, for instance,
one has often experienced escape from danger; and sometimes this is
owing to a certain science and art, as in the case of soldiers who,
through skill and practice in the use of arms, think little of the
dangers of battle, as they reckon themselves capable of defending
themselves against them; thus Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i), "No man
fears to do what he is confident of having learned to do well."
Secondly, a man performs an act of fortitude without having the
virtue, through the impulse of a passion, whether of sorrow that he
wishes to cast off, or again of anger. Thirdly, through choice, not
indeed of a due end, but of some temporal advantage to be obtained,
such as honor, pleasure, or gain, or of some disadvantage to be
avoided, such as blame, pain, or loss.

Reply Obj. 3: The fortitude of the soul which is reckoned a virtue,
as explained in the Reply to the First Objection, is so called from
its likeness to fortitude of the body. Nor is it inconsistent with
the notion of virtue, that a man should have a natural inclination to
virtue by reason of his natural temperament, as stated above (I-II,
Q. 63, A. 1).
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 2]

Whether Fortitude Is a Special Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a special virtue. For it
is written (Wis. 7:7): "She teacheth temperance, and prudence, and
justice, and fortitude," where the text has "virtue" for "fortitude."
Since then the term "virtue" is common to all virtues, it seems that
fortitude is a general virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "Fortitude is not
lacking in courage, for alone she defends the honor of the virtues
and guards their behests. She it is that wages an inexorable war on
all vice, undeterred by toil, brave in face of dangers, steeled
against pleasures, unyielding to lusts, avoiding covetousness as a
deformity that weakens virtue"; and he says the same further on in
connection with other vices. Now this cannot apply to any special
virtue. Therefore fortitude is not a special virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, fortitude would seem to derive its name from
firmness. But it belongs to every virtue to stand firm, as stated in
_Ethic._ ii. Therefore fortitude is a general virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxii) numbers it among the other
virtues.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3, 4), the term
"fortitude" can be taken in two ways. First, as simply denoting a
certain firmness of mind, and in this sense it is a general virtue,
or rather a condition of every virtue, since as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. ii), it is requisite for every virtue to act firmly
and immovably. Secondly, fortitude may be taken to denote firmness
only in bearing and withstanding those things wherein it is most
difficult to be firm, namely in certain grave dangers. Therefore
Tully says (Rhet. ii), that "fortitude is deliberate facing of
dangers and bearing of toils." In this sense fortitude is reckoned a
special virtue, because it has a special matter.

Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (De Coelo i, 116) the word
virtue refers to the extreme limit of a power. Now a natural power
is, in one sense, the power of resisting corruptions, and in another
sense is a principle of action, as stated in _Metaph._ v, 17. And
since this latter meaning is the more common, the term "virtue," as
denoting the extreme limit of such a power, is a common term, for
virtue taken in a general sense is nothing else than a habit whereby
one acts well. But as denoting the extreme limit of power in the
first sense, which sense is more specific, it is applied to a special
virtue, namely fortitude, to which it belongs to stand firm against
all kinds of assaults.

Reply Obj. 2: Ambrose takes fortitude in a broad sense, as denoting
firmness of mind in face of assaults of all kinds. Nevertheless even
as a special virtue with a determinate matter, it helps to resist the
assaults of all vices. For he that can stand firm in things that are
most difficult to bear, is prepared, in consequence, to resist those
which are less difficult.

Reply Obj. 3: This objection takes fortitude in the first sense.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 3]

Whether Fortitude Is About Fear and Daring?

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not about fear and daring.
For Gregory says (Moral. vii): "The fortitude of the just man is to
overcome the flesh, to withstand self-indulgence, to quench the lusts
of the present life." Therefore fortitude seems to be about pleasures
rather than about fear and daring.

Obj. 2: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), that it belongs to
fortitude to face dangers and to bear toil. But this seemingly has
nothing to do with the passions of fear and daring, but rather with a
man's toilsome deeds and external dangers. Therefore fortitude is not
about fear and daring.

Obj. 3: Further, not only daring, but also hope, is opposed to fear,
as stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 1, ad 2) in the treatise on
passions. Therefore fortitude should not be about daring any more
than about hope.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 9) that
fortitude is about fear and daring.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), it belongs to the virtue of
fortitude to remove any obstacle that withdraws the will from
following the reason. Now to be withdrawn from something difficult
belongs to the notion of fear, which denotes withdrawal from an evil
that entails difficulty, as stated above (I-II, Q. 42, AA. 3, 5) in
the treatise on passions. Hence fortitude is chiefly about fear of
difficult things, which can withdraw the will from following the
reason. And it behooves one not only firmly to bear the assault of
these difficulties by restraining fear, but also moderately to
withstand them, when, to wit, it is necessary to dispel them
altogether in order to free oneself therefrom for the future, which
seems to come under the notion of daring. Therefore fortitude is
about fear and daring, as curbing fear and moderating daring.

Reply Obj. 1: Gregory is speaking then of the fortitude of the just
man, as to its common relation to all virtues. Hence he first of all
mentions matters pertaining to temperance, as in the words quoted,
and then adds that which pertains properly to fortitude as a special
virtue, by saying: "To love the trials of this life for the sake of
an eternal reward."

Reply Obj. 2: Dangers and toils do not withdraw the will from the
course of reason, except in so far as they are an object of fear.
Hence fortitude needs to be immediately about fear and daring, but
mediately about dangers and toils, these being the objects of those
passions.

Reply Obj. 3: Hope is opposed to fear on the part of the object, for
hope is of good, fear of evil: whereas daring is about the same
object, and is opposed to fear by way of approach and withdrawal, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 1). And since fortitude properly
regards those temporal evils that withdraw one from virtue, as
appears from Tully's definition quoted in the Second Objection, it
follows that fortitude properly is about fear and daring and not
about hope, except in so far as it is connected with daring, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 2).
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 4]

Whether Fortitude Is Only About Dangers of Death?

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not only about dangers of
death. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "fortitude is
love bearing all things readily for the sake of the object beloved":
and (Music. vi) he says that fortitude is "the love which dreads no
hardship, not even death." Therefore fortitude is not only about
danger of death, but also about other afflictions.

Obj. 2: Further, all the passions of the soul need to be reduced to a
mean by some virtue. Now there is no other virtue reducing fears to a
mean. Therefore fortitude is not only about fear of death, but also
about other fears.

Obj. 3: Further, no virtue is about extremes. But fear of death is
about an extreme, since it is the greatest of fears, as stated in
_Ethic._ iii. Therefore the virtue of fortitude is not about fear of
death.

_On the contrary,_ Andronicus says that "fortitude is a virtue of the
irascible faculty that is not easily deterred by the fear of death."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), it belongs to the virtue of
fortitude to guard the will against being withdrawn from the good of
reason through fear of bodily evil. Now it behooves one to hold
firmly the good of reason against every evil whatsoever, since no
bodily good is equivalent to the good of the reason. Hence fortitude
of soul must be that which binds the will firmly to the good of
reason in face of the greatest evils: because he that stands firm
against great things, will in consequence stand firm against less
things, but not conversely. Moreover it belongs to the notion of
virtue that it should regard something extreme: and the most fearful
of all bodily evils is death, since it does away all bodily goods.
Wherefore Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxii) that "the soul is
shaken by its fellow body, with fear of toil and pain, lest the body
be stricken and harassed with fear of death lest it be done away and
destroyed." Therefore the virtue of fortitude is about the fear of
dangers of death.

Reply Obj. 1: Fortitude behaves well in bearing all manner of
adversity: yet a man is not reckoned brave simply through bearing any
kind of adversity, but only through bearing well even the greatest
evils; while through bearing others he is said to be brave in a
restricted sense.

Reply Obj. 2: Since fear is born of love, any virtue that moderates
the love of certain goods must in consequence moderate the fear of
contrary evils: thus liberality, which moderates the love of money,
as a consequence, moderates the fear of losing it, and the same is
the case with temperance and other virtues. But to love one's own
life is natural: and hence the necessity of a special virtue
modifying the fear of death.

Reply Obj. 3: In virtues the extreme consists in exceeding right
reason: wherefore to undergo the greatest dangers in accordance with
reason is not contrary to virtue.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 5]

Whether Fortitude Is Properly About Dangers of Death in Battle?

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not properly about dangers of
death in battle. For martyrs above all are commended for their
fortitude. But martyrs are not commended in connection with battle.
Therefore fortitude is not properly about dangers of death in battle.

Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "fortitude is
applicable both to warlike and to civil matters": and Tully (De
Offic. i), under the heading, "That it pertains to fortitude to excel
in battle rather than in civil life," says: "Although not a few think
that the business of war is of greater importance than the affairs of
civil life, this opinion must be qualified: and if we wish to judge
the matter truly, there are many things in civil life that are more
important and more glorious than those connected with war." Now
greater fortitude is about greater things. Therefore fortitude is not
properly concerned with death in battle.

Obj. 3: Further, war is directed to the preservation of a country's
temporal peace: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix) that "wars are
waged in order to insure peace." Now it does not seem that one ought
to expose oneself to the danger of death for the temporal peace of
one's country, since this same peace is the occasion of much license
in morals. Therefore it seems that the virtue of fortitude is not
about the danger of death in battle.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) that fortitude
is chiefly about death in battle.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), fortitude strengthens a
man's mind against the greatest danger, which is that of death. Now
fortitude is a virtue; and it is essential to virtue ever to tend to
good; wherefore it is in order to pursue some good that man does not
fly from the danger of death. But the dangers of death arising out of
sickness, storms at sea, attacks from robbers, and the like, do not
seem to come on a man through his pursuing some good. On the other
hand, the dangers of death which occur in battle come to man directly
on account of some good, because, to wit, he is defending the common
good by a just fight. Now a just fight is of two kinds. First, there
is the general combat, for instance, of those who fight in battle;
secondly, there is the private combat, as when a judge or even
private individual does not refrain from giving a just judgment
through fear of the impending sword, or any other danger though it
threaten death. Hence it belongs to fortitude to strengthen the mind
against dangers of death, not only such as arise in a general battle,
but also such as occur in singular combat, which may be called by the
general name of battle. Accordingly it must be granted that fortitude
is properly about dangers of death occurring in battle.

Moreover, a brave man behaves well in face of danger of any other
kind of death; especially since man may be in danger of any kind of
death on account of virtue: thus may a man not fail to attend on a
sick friend through fear of deadly infection, or not refuse to
undertake a journey with some godly object in view through fear of
shipwreck or robbers.

Reply Obj. 1: Martyrs face the fight that is waged against their own
person, and this for the sake of the sovereign good which is God;
wherefore their fortitude is praised above all. Nor is it outside the
genus of fortitude that regards warlike actions, for which reason
they are said to have been valiant in battle. [*Office of Martyrs,
ex. Heb. xi. 34.]

Reply Obj. 2: Personal and civil business is differentiated from the
business of war that regards general wars. However, personal and
civil affairs admit of dangers of death arising out of certain
conflicts which are private wars, and so with regard to these also
there may be fortitude properly so called.

Reply Obj. 3: The peace of the state is good in itself, nor does it
become evil because certain persons make evil use of it. For there
are many others who make good use of it; and many evils prevented by
it, such as murders and sacrileges, are much greater than those which
are occasioned by it, and which belong chiefly to the sins of the
flesh.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 6]

Whether Endurance Is the Chief Act of Fortitude?

Objection 1: It seems that endurance is not the chief act of
fortitude. For virtue "is about the difficult and the good" (Ethic.
ii, 3). Now it is more difficult to attack than to endure. Therefore
endurance is not the chief act of fortitude.

Obj. 2: Further, to be able to act on another seems to argue greater
power than not to be changed by another. Now to attack is to act on
another, and to endure is to persevere unchangeably. Since then
fortitude denotes perfection of power, it seems that it belongs to
fortitude to attack rather than to endure.

Obj. 3: Further, one contrary is more distant from the other than its
mere negation. Now to endure is merely not to fear, whereas to attack
denotes a movement contrary to that of fear, since it implies
pursuit. Since then fortitude above all withdraws the mind from fear,
it seems that it regards attack rather than endurance.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that "certain
persons are" said to be brave chiefly because they endure affliction.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), and according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 9), "fortitude is more concerned to allay
fear, than to moderate daring." For it is more difficult to allay
fear than to moderate daring, since the danger which is the object of
daring and fear, tends by its very nature to check daring, but to
increase fear. Now to attack belongs to fortitude in so far as the
latter moderates daring, whereas to endure follows the repression of
fear. Therefore the principal act of fortitude is endurance, that is
to stand immovable in the midst of dangers rather than to attack them.

Reply Obj. 1: Endurance is more difficult than aggression, for three
reasons. First, because endurance seemingly implies that one is being
attacked by a stronger person, whereas aggression denotes that one is
attacking as though one were the stronger party; and it is more
difficult to contend with a stronger than with a weaker. Secondly,
because he that endures already feels the presence of danger, whereas
the aggressor looks upon danger as something to come; and it is more
difficult to be unmoved by the present than by the future. Thirdly,
because endurance implies length of time, whereas aggression is
consistent with sudden movements; and it is more difficult to remain
unmoved for a long time, than to be moved suddenly to something
arduous. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "some hurry
to meet danger, yet fly when the danger is present; this is not the
behavior of a brave man."

Reply Obj. 2: Endurance denotes indeed a passion of the body, but an
action of the soul cleaving most resolutely (_fortissime_) to good,
the result being that it does not yield to the threatening passion of
the body. Now virtue concerns the soul rather than the body.

Reply Obj. 3: He that endures fears not, though he is confronted with
the cause of fear, whereas this cause is not present to the aggressor.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 7]

Whether the Brave Man Acts for the Sake of the Good of His Habit?

Objection 1: It seems that the brave man does not act for the sake of
the good of his habit. For in matters of action the end, though first
in intention, is last in execution. Now the act of fortitude, in the
order of execution, follows the habit of fortitude. Therefore it is
impossible for the brave man to act for the sake of the good of his
habit.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): "We love virtues for
the sake of happiness, and yet some make bold to counsel us to be
virtuous," namely by saying that we should desire virtue for its own
sake, "without loving happiness. If they succeed in their endeavor,
we shall surely cease to love virtue itself, since we shall no longer
love that for the sake of which alone we love virtue." But fortitude
is a virtue. Therefore the act of fortitude is directed not to
fortitude but to happiness.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "fortitude
is love ready to bear all things for God's sake." Now God is not the
habit of fortitude, but something better, since the end must needs be
better than what is directed to the end. Therefore the brave man does
not act for the sake of the good of his habit.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that "to the
brave man fortitude itself is a good": and such is his end.

_I answer that,_ An end is twofold: proximate and ultimate. Now the
proximate end of every agent is to introduce a likeness of that
agent's form into something else: thus the end of fire in heating is
to introduce the likeness of its heat into some passive matter, and
the end of the builder is to introduce into matter the likeness of
his art. Whatever good ensues from this, if it be intended, may be
called the remote end of the agent. Now just as in things made,
external matter is fashioned by art, so in things done, human deeds
are fashioned by prudence. Accordingly we must conclude that the
brave man intends as his proximate end to reproduce in action a
likeness of his habit, for he intends to act in accordance with his
habit: but his remote end is happiness or God.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the First
Objection proceeds as though the very essence of a habit were its
end, instead of the likeness of the habit in act, as stated. The
other two objections consider the ultimate end.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 8]

Whether the Brave Man Delights in His Act?

Objection 1: It seems that the brave man delights in his act. For
"delight is the unhindered action of a connatural habit" (Ethic. x,
4, 6, 8). Now the brave deed proceeds from a habit which acts after
the manner of nature. Therefore the brave man takes pleasure in his
act.

Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose, commenting on Gal. 5:22, "But the fruit of
the Spirit is charity, joy, peace," says that deeds of virtue are
called "fruits because they refresh man's mind with a holy and pure
delight." Now the brave man performs acts of virtue. Therefore he
takes pleasure in his act.

Obj. 3: Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. Now the
brave man has a stronger love for the good of virtue than for his own
body, which he exposes to the danger of death. Therefore the delight
in the good of virtue banishes the pain of the body; and consequently
the brave man does all things with pleasure.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that "the
brave man seems to have no delight in his act."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 31, AA. 3, 4, 5) where we
were treating of the passions, pleasure is twofold; one is bodily,
resulting from bodily contact, the other is spiritual, resulting from
an apprehension of the soul. It is the latter which properly results
from deeds of virtue, since in them we consider the good of reason.
Now the principal act of fortitude is to endure, not only certain
things that are unpleasant as apprehended by the soul--for instance,
the loss of bodily life, which the virtuous man loves not only as a
natural good, but also as being necessary for acts of virtue, and
things connected with them--but also to endure things unpleasant in
respect of bodily contact, such as wounds and blows. Hence the brave
man, on one side, has something that affords him delight, namely as
regards spiritual pleasure, in the act itself of virtue and the end
thereof: while, on the other hand, he has cause for both spiritual
sorrow, in the thought of losing his life, and for bodily pain. Hence
we read (2 Macc. 6:30) that Eleazar said: "I suffer grievous pains in
body: but in soul am well content to suffer these things because I
fear Thee."

Now the sensible pain of the body makes one insensible to the
spiritual delight of virtue, without the copious assistance of God's
grace, which has more strength to raise the soul to the Divine things
in which it delights, than bodily pains have to afflict it. Thus the
Blessed Tiburtius, while walking barefoot on the burning coal, said
that he felt as though he were walking on roses.

Yet the virtue of fortitude prevents the reason from being entirely
overcome by bodily pain. And the delight of virtue overcomes
spiritual sorrow, inasmuch as a man prefers the good of virtue to the
life of the body and to whatever appertains thereto. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3; iii, 9) that "it is not necessary for
a brave man to delight so as to perceive his delight, but it suffices
for him not to be sad."

Reply Obj. 1: The vehemence of the action or passion of one power
hinders the action of another power: wherefore the pain in his senses
hinders the mind of the brave man from feeling delight in its proper
operation.

Reply Obj. 2: Deeds of virtue are delightful chiefly on account of
their end; yet they can be painful by their nature, and this is
principally the case with fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iii, 9) that "to perform deeds with pleasure does not happen
in all virtues, except in so far as one attains the end."

Reply Obj. 3: In the brave man spiritual sorrow is overcome by the
delight of virtue. Yet since bodily pain is more sensible, and the
sensitive apprehension is more in evidence to man, it follows that
spiritual pleasure in the end of virtue fades away, so to speak, in
the presence of great bodily pain.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 9]

Whether Fortitude Deals Chiefly with Sudden Occurrences?

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude does not deal chiefly with
sudden occurrences. For it would seem that things occur suddenly when
they are unforeseen. But Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that
"fortitude is the deliberate facing of danger, and bearing of toil."
Therefore fortitude does not deal chiefly with sudden happenings.

Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "The brave man is not
unmindful of what may be likely to happen; he takes measures
beforehand, and looks out as from the conning-tower of his mind, so
as to encounter the future by his forethought, lest he should say
afterwards: This befell me because I did not think it could possibly
happen." But it is not possible to be prepared for the future in the
case of sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation of fortitude is
not concerned with sudden happenings.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that the "brave
man is of good hope." But hope looks forward to the future, which is
inconsistent with sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation of
fortitude is not concerned with sudden happenings.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that
"fortitude is chiefly about sudden dangers of death."

_I answer that,_ Two things must be considered in the operation of
fortitude. One is in regard to its choice: and thus fortitude is not
about sudden occurrences: because the brave man chooses to think
beforehand of the dangers that may arise, in order to be able to
withstand them, or to bear them more easily: since according to
Gregory (Hom. xxv in Evang.), "the blow that is foreseen strikes with
less force, and we are able more easily to bear earthly wrongs, if we
are forearmed with the shield of foreknowledge." The other thing to
be considered in the operation of fortitude regards the display of
the virtuous habit: and in this way fortitude is chiefly about sudden
occurrences, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8) the
habit of fortitude is displayed chiefly in sudden dangers: since a
habit works by way of nature. Wherefore if a person without
forethought does that which pertains to virtue, when necessity urges
on account of some sudden danger, this is a very strong proof that
habitual fortitude is firmly seated in his mind.

Yet is it possible for a person even without the habit of fortitude,
to prepare his mind against danger by long forethought: in the same
way as a brave man prepares himself when necessary. This suffices for
the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 10]

Whether the Brave Man Makes Use of Anger in His Action?

Objection 1: It seems that the brave man does not use anger in his
action. For no one should employ as an instrument of his action that
which he cannot use at will. Now man cannot use anger at will, so as
to take it up and lay it aside when he will. For, as the Philosopher
says (De Memoria ii), when a bodily passion is in movement, it does
not rest at once just as one wishes. Therefore a brave man should not
employ anger for his action.

Obj. 2: Further, if a man is competent to do a thing by himself, he
should not seek the assistance of something weaker and more
imperfect. Now the reason is competent to achieve by itself deeds of
fortitude, wherein anger is impotent: wherefore Seneca says (De Ira
i): "Reason by itself suffices not only to make us prepared for
action but also to accomplish it. In fact is there greater folly than
for reason to seek help from anger? the steadfast from the unstaid,
the trusty from the untrustworthy, the healthy from the sick?"
Therefore a brave man should not make use of anger.

Obj. 3: Further, just as people are more earnest in doing deeds of
fortitude on account of anger, so are they on account of sorrow or
desire; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that wild
beasts are incited to face danger through sorrow or pain, and
adulterous persons dare many things for the sake of desire. Now
fortitude employs neither sorrow nor desire for its action. Therefore
in like manner it should not employ anger.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "anger
helps the brave."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 24, A. 2), concerning
anger and the other passions there was a difference of opinion
between the Peripatetics and the Stoics. For the Stoics excluded
anger and all other passions of the soul from the mind of a wise or
good man: whereas the Peripatetics, of whom Aristotle was the chief,
ascribed to virtuous men both anger and the other passions of the
soul albeit modified by reason. And possibly they differed not in
reality but in their way of speaking. For the Peripatetics, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 24, A. 2), gave the name of passions to all the
movements of the sensitive appetite, however they may comport
themselves. And since the sensitive appetite is moved by the command
of reason, so that it may cooperate by rendering action more prompt,
they held that virtuous persons should employ both anger and the
other passions of the soul, modified according to the dictate of
reason. On the other hand, the Stoics gave the name of passions to
certain immoderate emotions of the sensitive appetite, wherefore they
called them sicknesses or diseases, and for this reason severed them
altogether from virtue.

Accordingly the brave man employs moderate anger for his action, but
not immoderate anger.

Reply Obj. 1: Anger that is moderated in accordance with reason is
subject to the command of reason: so that man uses it at his will,
which would not be the case were it immoderate.

Reply Obj. 2: Reason employs anger for its action, not as seeking its
assistance, but because it uses the sensitive appetite as an
instrument, just as it uses the members of the body. Nor is it
unbecoming for the instrument to be more imperfect than the principal
agent, even as the hammer is more imperfect than the smith. Moreover,
Seneca was a follower of the Stoics, and the above words were aimed
by him directly at Aristotle.

Reply Obj. 3: Whereas fortitude, as stated above (A. 6), has two
acts, namely endurance and aggression, it employs anger, not for the
act of endurance, because the reason by itself performs this act, but
for the act of aggression, for which it employs anger rather than the
other passions, since it belongs to anger to strike at the cause of
sorrow, so that it directly cooperates with fortitude in attacking.
On the other hand, sorrow by its very nature gives way to the thing
that hurts; though accidentally it helps in aggression, either as
being the cause of anger, as stated above (I-II, Q. 47, A. 3), or as
making a person expose himself to danger in order to escape from
sorrow. In like manner desire, by its very nature, tends to a
pleasurable good, to which it is directly contrary to withstand
danger: yet accidentally sometimes it helps one to attack, in so far
as one prefers to risk dangers rather than lack pleasure. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "Of all the cases in which
fortitude arises from a passion, the most natural is when a man is
brave through anger, making his choice and acting for a purpose,"
i.e. for a due end; "this is true fortitude."
_______________________

ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 11]

Whether Fortitude Is a Cardinal Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a cardinal virtue. For,
as stated above (A. 10), anger is closely allied with fortitude. Now
anger is not accounted a principal passion; nor is daring which
belongs to fortitude. Therefore neither should fortitude be reckoned
a cardinal virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, the object of virtue is good. But the direct object
of fortitude is not good, but evil, for it is endurance of evil and
toil, as Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii). Therefore fortitude is not
a cardinal virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, the cardinal virtues are about those things upon
which human life is chiefly occupied, just as a door turns upon a
hinge (_cardine_). But fortitude is about dangers of death which are
of rare occurrence in human life. Therefore fortitude should not be
reckoned a cardinal or principal virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxii), Ambrose in his commentary
on Luke 6:20, and Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv), number fortitude
among the four cardinal or principal virtues.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3, 4), those
virtues are said to be cardinal or principal which have a foremost
claim to that which belongs to the virtues in common. And among other
conditions of virtue in general one is that it is stated to "act
steadfastly," according to _Ethic._ ii, 4. Now fortitude above all
lays claim to praise for steadfastness. Because he that stands firm
is so much the more praised, as he is more strongly impelled to fall
or recede. Now man is impelled to recede from that which is in
accordance with reason, both by the pleasing good and the displeasing
evil. But bodily pain impels him more strongly than pleasure. For
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 36): "There is none that does not shun
pain more than he desires pleasure. For we perceive that even the
most untamed beasts are deterred from the greatest pleasures by the
fear of pain." And among the pains of the mind and dangers those are
mostly feared which lead to death, and it is against them that the
brave man stands firm. Therefore fortitude is a cardinal virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: Daring and anger do not cooperate with fortitude in its
act of endurance, wherein its steadfastness is chiefly commended: for
it is by that act that the brave man curbs fear, which is a principal
passion, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 4).

Reply Obj. 2: Virtue is directed to the good of reason which it
behooves to safeguard against the onslaught of evils. And fortitude
is directed to evils of the body, as contraries which it withstands,
and to the good of reason, as the end, which it intends to safeguard.

Reply Obj. 3: Though dangers of death are of rare occurrence, yet the
occasions of those dangers occur frequently, since on account of
justice which he pursues, and also on account of other good deeds,
man encounters mortal adversaries.
_______________________

TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 12]

Whether Fortitude Excels Among All Other Virtues?

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude excels among all other virtues.
For Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "Fortitude is higher, so to speak,
than the rest."

Obj. 2: Further, virtue is about that which is difficult and good.
But fortitude is about most difficult things. Therefore it is the
greatest of the virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, the person of a man is more excellent than his
possessions. But fortitude is about a man's person, for it is this
that a man exposes to the danger of death for the good of virtue:
whereas justice and the other moral virtues are about other and
external things. Therefore fortitude is the chief of the moral
virtues.

Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Offic. i): "Justice is the
most resplendent of the virtues and gives its name to a good man."

Obj. 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 19): "Those virtues
must needs be greatest which are most profitable to others." Now
liberality seems to be more useful than fortitude. Therefore it is a
greater virtue.

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Trin. vi), "In things that are
great, but not in bulk, to be great is to be good": wherefore the
better a virtue the greater it is. Now reason's good is man's good,
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) prudence, since it is a
perfection of reason, has the good essentially: while justice effects
this good, since it belongs to justice to establish the order of
reason in all human affairs: whereas the other virtues safeguard this
good, inasmuch as they moderate the passions, lest they lead man away
from reason's good. As to the order of the latter, fortitude holds
the first place, because fear of dangers of death has the greatest
power to make man recede from the good of reason: and after fortitude
comes temperance, since also pleasures of touch excel all others in
hindering the good of reason. Now to be a thing essentially ranks
before effecting it, and the latter ranks before safeguarding it by
removing obstacles thereto. Wherefore among the cardinal virtues,
prudence ranks first, justice second, fortitude third, temperance
fourth, and after these the other virtues.

Reply Obj. 1: Ambrose places fortitude before the other virtues, in
respect of a certain general utility, inasmuch as it is useful both
in warfare, and in matters relating to civil or home life. Hence he
begins by saying (De Offic. i): "Now we come to treat of fortitude,
which being higher so to speak than the others, is applicable both to
warlike and to civil matters."

Reply Obj. 2: Virtue essentially regards the good rather than the
difficult. Hence the greatness of a virtue is measured according to
its goodness rather than its difficulty.

Reply Obj. 3: A man does not expose his person to dangers of death
except in order to safeguard justice: wherefore the praise awarded to
fortitude depends somewhat on justice. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic.
i) that "fortitude without justice is an occasion of injustice; since
the stronger a man is the more ready is he to oppress the weaker."

The Fourth argument is granted.

Reply Obj. 5: Liberality is useful in conferring certain particular
favors: whereas a certain general utility attaches to fortitude,
since it safeguards the whole order of justice. Hence the Philosopher
says (Rhet. i, 9) that "just and brave men are most beloved, because
they are most useful in war and peace."
_______________________

QUESTION 124

OF MARTYRDOM
(In Five Articles)

We must now consider martyrdom, under which head there are five
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether martyrdom is an act of virtue?

(2) Of what virtue is it the act?

(3) Concerning the perfection of this act;

(4) The pain of martyrdom;

(5) Its cause.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 124, Art. 1]

Whether Martyrdom Is an Act of Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of virtue. For all
acts of virtue are voluntary. But martyrdom is sometimes not
voluntary, as in the case of the Innocents who were slain for
Christ's sake, and of whom Hilary says (Super Matth. i) that "they
attained the ripe age of eternity through the glory of martyrdom."
Therefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing unlawful is an act of virtue. Now it is
unlawful to kill oneself, as stated above (Q. 64, A. 5), and yet
martyrdom is achieved by so doing: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i)
that "during persecution certain holy women, in order to escape from
those who threatened their chastity, threw themselves into a river,
and so ended their lives, and their martyrdom is honored in the
Catholic Church with most solemn veneration." Therefore martyrdom is
not an act of virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, it is praiseworthy to offer oneself to do an act of
virtue. But it is not praiseworthy to court martyrdom, rather would
it seem to be presumptuous and rash. Therefore martyrdom is not an
act of virtue.

_On the contrary,_ The reward of beatitude is not due save to acts of
virtue. Now it is due to martyrdom, since it is written (Matt. 5:10):
"Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice' sake, for
theirs is the kingdom of heaven." Therefore martyrdom is an act of
virtue.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, AA. 1, 3), it belongs to
virtue to safeguard man in the good of reason. Now the good of reason
consists in the truth as its proper object, and in justice as its
proper effect, as shown above (Q. 109, AA. 1, 2; Q. 123, A. 12). And
martyrdom consists essentially in standing firmly to truth and
justice against the assaults of persecution. Hence it is evident that
martyrdom is an act of virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: Some have said that in the case of the Innocents the
use of their free will was miraculously accelerated, so that they
suffered martyrdom even voluntarily. Since, however, Scripture
contains no proof of this, it is better to say that these babes in
being slain obtained by God's grace the glory of martyrdom which
others acquire by their own will. For the shedding of one's blood for
Christ's sake takes the place of Baptism. Wherefore just as in the
case of baptized children the merit of Christ is conducive to the
acquisition of glory through the baptismal grace, so in those who
were slain for Christ's sake the merit of Christ's martyrdom is
conducive to the acquisition of the martyr's palm. Hence Augustine
says in a sermon on the Epiphany (De Diversis lxvi), as though he
were addressing them: "A man that does not believe that children are
benefited by the baptism of Christ will doubt of your being crowned
in suffering for Christ. You were not old enough to believe in
Christ's future sufferings, but you had a body wherein you could
endure suffering of Christ Who was to suffer."

Reply Obj. 2: Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) that "possibly the
Church was induced by certain credible witnesses of Divine authority
thus to honor the memory of those holy women [*Cf. Q. 64, A. 1, ad
2]."

Reply Obj. 3: The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now
it has been stated (I-II, Q. 108, A. 1, ad 4) that some of the
precepts of the Divine Law are to be understood in reference to the
preparation of the mind, in the sense that man ought to be prepared
to do such and such a thing, whenever expedient. In the same way
certain things belong to an act of virtue as regards the preparation
of the mind, so that in such and such a case a man should act
according to reason. And this observation would seem very much to the
point in the case of martyrdom, which consists in the right endurance
of sufferings unjustly inflicted. Nor ought a man to give another an
occasion of acting unjustly: yet if anyone act unjustly, one ought to
endure it in moderation.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 124, Art. 2]

Whether Martyrdom Is an Act of Fortitude?

Objection 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of fortitude. For
the Greek _martyr_ signifies a witness. Now witness is borne to the
faith of Christ. according to Acts 1:8, "You shall be witnesses unto
Me," etc. and Maximus says in a sermon: "The mother of martyrs is the
Catholic faith which those glorious warriors have sealed with their
blood." Therefore martyrdom is an act of faith rather than of
fortitude.

Obj. 2: Further, a praiseworthy act belongs chiefly to the virtue
which inclines thereto, is manifested thereby, and without which the
act avails nothing. Now charity is the chief incentive to martyrdom:
Thus Maximus says in a sermon: "The charity of Christ is victorious
in His martyrs." Again the greatest proof of charity lies in the act
of martyrdom, according to John 15:13, "Greater love than this no man
hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends." Moreover without
charity martyrdom avails nothing, according to 1 Cor. 13:3, "If I
should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it
profiteth me nothing." Therefore martyrdom is an act of charity
rather than of fortitude.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says in a sermon on St. Cyprian: "It is
easy to honor a martyr by singing his praises, but it is a great
thing to imitate his faith and patience." Now that which calls
chiefly for praise in a virtuous act, is the virtue of which it is
the act. Therefore martyrdom is an act of patience rather than of
fortitude.

_On the contrary,_ Cyprian says (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf. ii): "Blessed
martyrs, with what praise shall I extol you? Most valiant warriors,
how shall I find words to proclaim the strength of your courage?" Now
a person is praised on account of the virtue whose act he performs.
Therefore martyrdom is an act of fortitude.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 1, seqq.), it belongs to
fortitude to strengthen man in the good of virtue, especially against
dangers, and chiefly against dangers of death, and most of all
against those that occur in battle. Now it is evident that in
martyrdom man is firmly strengthened in the good of virtue, since he
cleaves to faith and justice notwithstanding the threatening danger
of death, the imminence of which is moreover due to a kind of
particular contest with his persecutors. Hence Cyprian says in a
sermon (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf. ii): "The crowd of onlookers wondered
to see an unearthly battle, and Christ's servants fighting erect,
undaunted in speech, with souls unmoved, and strength divine."
Wherefore it is evident that martyrdom is an act of fortitude; for
which reason the Church reads in the office of Martyrs: They "became
valiant in battle" [*Heb. 11:34].

Reply Obj. 1: Two things must be considered in the act of fortitude.
One is the good wherein the brave man is strengthened, and this is
the end of fortitude; the other is the firmness itself, whereby a man
does not yield to the contraries that hinder him from achieving that
good, and in this consists the essence of fortitude. Now just as
civic fortitude strengthens a man's mind in human justice, for the
safeguarding of which he braves the danger of death, so gratuitous
fortitude strengthens man's soul in the good of Divine justice, which
is "through faith in Christ Jesus," according to Rom. 3:22. Thus
martyrdom is related to faith as the end in which one is
strengthened, but to fortitude as the eliciting habit.

Reply Obj. 2: Charity inclines one to the act of martyrdom, as its
first and chief motive cause, being the virtue commanding it, whereas
fortitude inclines thereto as being its proper motive cause, being
the virtue that elicits it. Hence martyrdom is an act of charity as
commanding, and of fortitude as eliciting. For this reason also it
manifests both virtues. It is due to charity that it is meritorious,
like any other act of virtue: and for this reason it avails not
without charity.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 123, A. 6), the chief act of
fortitude is endurance: to this and not to its secondary act, which
is aggression, martyrdom belongs. And since patience serves fortitude
on the part of its chief act, viz. endurance, hence it is that
martyrs are also praised for their patience.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 124, Art. 3]

Whether Martyrdom Is an Act of the Greatest Perfection?

Objection 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of the greatest
perfection. For seemingly that which is a matter of counsel and not
of precept pertains to perfection, because, to wit, it is not
necessary for salvation. But it would seem that martyrdom is
necessary for salvation, since the Apostle says (Rom. 10:10), "With
the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is
made unto salvation," and it is written (1 John 3:16), that "we ought
to lay down our lives for the brethren." Therefore martyrdom does not
pertain to perfection.

Obj. 2: Further, it seems to point to greater perfection that a man
give his soul to God, which is done by obedience, than that he give
God his body, which is done by martyrdom: wherefore Gregory says
(Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is preferable to all sacrifices."
Therefore martyrdom is not an act of the greatest perfection.

Obj. 3: Further, it would seem better to do good to others than to
maintain oneself in good, since the "good of the nation is better
than the good of the individual," according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. i, 2). Now he that suffers martyrdom profits himself alone,
whereas he that teaches does good to many. Therefore the act of
teaching and guiding subjects is more perfect than the act of
martyrdom.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Sanct. Virgin. xlvi) prefers
martyrdom to virginity which pertains to perfection. Therefore
martyrdom seems to belong to perfection in the highest degree.

_I answer that,_ We may speak of an act of virtue in two ways. First,
with regard to the species of that act, as compared to the virtue
proximately eliciting it. In this way martyrdom, which consists in
the due endurance of death, cannot be the most perfect of virtuous
acts, because endurance of death is not praiseworthy in itself, but
only in so far as it is directed to some good consisting in an act of
virtue, such as faith or the love of God, so that this act of virtue
being the end is better.

A virtuous act may be considered in another way, in comparison with
its first motive cause, which is the love of charity, and it is in
this respect that an act comes to belong to the perfection of life,
since, as the Apostle says (Col. 3:14), that "charity . . . is the
bond of perfection." Now, of all virtuous acts martyrdom is the
greatest proof of the perfection of charity: since a man's love for a
thing is proved to be so much the greater, according as that which he
despises for its sake is more dear to him, or that which he chooses
to suffer for its sake is more odious. But it is evident that of all
the goods of the present life man loves life itself most, and on the
other hand he hates death more than anything, especially when it is
accompanied by the pains of bodily torment, "from fear of which even
dumb animals refrain from the greatest pleasures," as Augustine
observes (QQ. 83, qu. 36). And from this point of view it is clear
that martyrdom is the most perfect of human acts in respect of its
genus, as being the sign of the greatest charity, according to John
15:13: "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his
life for his friends."

Reply Obj. 1: There is no act of perfection, which is a matter of
counsel, but what in certain cases is a matter of precept, as being
necessary for salvation. Thus Augustine declares (De Adult. Conjug.
xiii) that a man is under the obligation of observing continency,
through the absence or sickness of his wife. Hence it is not contrary
to the perfection of martyrdom if in certain cases it be necessary
for salvation, since there are cases when it is not necessary for
salvation to suffer martyrdom; thus we read of many holy martyrs who
through zeal for the faith or brotherly love gave themselves up to
martyrdom of their own accord. As to these precepts, they are to be
understood as referring to the preparation of the mind.

Reply Obj. 2: Martyrdom embraces the highest possible degree of
obedience, namely obedience unto death; thus we read of Christ (Phil.
2:8) that He became "obedient unto death." Hence it is evident that
martyrdom is of itself more perfect than obedience considered
absolutely.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers martyrdom according to the
proper species of its act, whence it derives no excellence over all
other virtuous acts; thus neither is fortitude more excellent than
all virtues.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 124, Art. 4]

Whether Death Is Essential to Martyrdom?

Objection 1: It seems that death is not essential to martyrdom. For
Jerome says in a sermon on the Assumption (Epist. ad Paul. et
Eustoch.): "I should say rightly that the Mother of God was both
virgin and martyr, although she ended her days in peace": and Gregory
says (Hom. iii in Evang.): "Although persecution has ceased to offer
the opportunity, yet the peace we enjoy is not without its martyrdom,
since even if we no longer yield the life of the body to the sword,
yet do we slay fleshly desires in the soul with the sword of the
spirit." Therefore there can be martyrdom without suffering death.

Obj. 2: Further, we read of certain women as commended for despising
life for the sake of safeguarding the integrity of the flesh:
wherefore seemingly the integrity of chastity is preferable to the
life of the body. Now sometimes the integrity of the flesh has been
forfeited or has been threatened in confession of the Christian
faith, as in the case of Agnes and Lucy. Therefore it seems that the
name of martyr should be accorded to a woman who forfeits the
integrity of the flesh for the sake of Christ's faith, rather than if
she were to forfeit even the life of the body: wherefore also Lucy
said: "If thou causest me to be violated against my will, my chastity
will gain me a twofold crown."

Obj. 3: Further, martyrdom is an act of fortitude. But it belongs to
fortitude to brave not only death but also other hardships, as
Augustine declares (Music. vi). Now there are many other hardships
besides death, which one may suffer for Christ's faith, namely
imprisonment, exile, being stripped of one's goods, as mentioned in
Heb. 10:34, for which reason we celebrate the martyrdom of Pope Saint
Marcellus, notwithstanding that he died in prison. Therefore it is
not essential to martyrdom that one suffer the pain of death.

Obj. 4: Further, martyrdom is a meritorious act, as stated above (A.
2, ad 1; A. 3). Now it cannot be a meritorious act after death.
Therefore it is before death; and consequently death is not essential
to martyrdom.

_On the contrary,_ Maximus says in a sermon on the martyrs that "in
dying for the faith he conquers who would have been vanquished in
living without faith."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), a martyr is so called as
being a witness to the Christian faith, which teaches us to despise
things visible for the sake of things invisible, as stated in Heb.
11. Accordingly it belongs to martyrdom that a man bear witness to
the faith in showing by deed that he despises all things present, in
order to obtain invisible goods to come. Now so long as a man retains
the life of the body he does not show by deed that he despises all
things relating to the body. For men are wont to despise both their
kindred and all they possess, and even to suffer bodily pain, rather
than lose life. Hence Satan testified against Job (Job 2:4): "Skin
for skin, and all that a man hath he will give for his soul" [Douay:
'life'] i.e. for the life of his body. Therefore the perfect notion
of martyrdom requires that a man suffer death for Christ's sake.

Reply Obj. 1: The authorities quoted, and the like that one may meet
with, speak of martyrdom by way of similitude.

Reply Obj. 2: When a woman forfeits the integrity of the flesh, or is
condemned to forfeit it under pretext of the Christian faith, it is
not evident to men whether she suffers this for love of the Christian
faith, or rather through contempt of chastity. Wherefore in the sight
of men her testimony is not held to be sufficient, and consequently
this is not martyrdom properly speaking. In the sight of God,
however, Who searcheth the heart, this may be deemed worthy of a
reward, as Lucy said.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 123, AA. 4, 5), fortitude regards
danger of death chiefly, and other dangers consequently; wherefore a
person is not called a martyr merely for suffering imprisonment, or
exile, or forfeiture of his wealth, except in so far as these result
in death.

Reply Obj. 4: The merit of martyrdom is not after death, but in the
voluntary endurance of death, namely in the fact that a person
willingly suffers being put to death. It happens sometimes, however,
that a man lives for some time after being mortally wounded for
Christ's sake, or after suffering for the faith of Christ any other
kind of hardship inflicted by persecution and continued until death
ensues. The act of martyrdom is meritorious while a man is in this
state, and at the very time that he is suffering these hardships.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 124, Art. 5]

Whether Faith Alone Is the Cause of Martyrdom?

Objection 1: It seems that faith alone is the cause of martyrdom. For
it is written (1 Pet. 4:15, 16): "Let none of you suffer as a
murderer, or a thief, or a railer, or a coveter of other men's
things. But if as a Christian, let him not be ashamed, but let him
glorify God in this name." Now a man is said to be a Christian
because he holds the faith of Christ. Therefore only faith in Christ
gives the glory of martyrdom to those who suffer.

Obj. 2: Further, a martyr is a kind of witness. But witness is borne
to the truth alone. Now one is not called a martyr for bearing
witness to any truth, but only for witnessing to the Divine truth,
otherwise a man would be a martyr if he were to die for confessing a
truth of geometry or some other speculative science, which seems
ridiculous. Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom.

Obj. 3: Further, those virtuous deeds would seem to be of most
account which are directed to the common good, since "the good of the
nation is better than the good of the individual," according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). If, then, some other good were the cause
of martyrdom, it would seem that before all those would be martyrs
who die for the defense of their country. Yet this is not consistent
with Church observance, for we do not celebrate the martyrdom of
those who die in a just war. Therefore faith alone is the cause of
martyrdom.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 5:10): "Blessed are they that
suffer persecution for justice' sake," which pertains to martyrdom,
according to a gloss, as well as Jerome's commentary on this passage.
Now not only faith but also the other virtues pertain to justice.
Therefore other virtues can be the cause of martyrdom.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), martyrs are so called as
being witnesses, because by suffering in body unto death they bear
witness to the truth; not indeed to any truth, but to the truth which
is in accordance with godliness, and was made known to us by Christ:
wherefore Christ's martyrs are His witnesses. Now this truth is the
truth of faith. Wherefore the cause of all martyrdom is the truth of
faith.

But the truth of faith includes not only inward belief, but also
outward profession, which is expressed not only by words, whereby one
confesses the faith, but also by deeds, whereby a person shows that
he has faith, according to James 2:18, "I will show thee, by works,
my faith." Hence it is written of certain people (Titus 1:16): "They
profess that they know God but in their works they deny Him." Thus
all virtuous deeds, inasmuch as they are referred to God, are
professions of the faith whereby we come to know that God requires
these works of us, and rewards us for them: and in this way they can
be the cause of martyrdom. For this reason the Church celebrates the
martyrdom of Blessed John the Baptist, who suffered death, not for
refusing to deny the faith, but for reproving adultery.

Reply Obj. 1: A Christian is one who is Christ's. Now a person is
said to be Christ's, not only through having faith in Christ, but
also because he is actuated to virtuous deeds by the Spirit of
Christ, according to Rom. 8:9, "If any man have not the Spirit of
Christ, he is none of His"; and again because in imitation of Christ
he is dead to sins, according to Gal. 5:24, "They that are Christ's
have crucified their flesh with the vices and concupiscences." Hence
to suffer as a Christian is not only to suffer in confession of the
faith, which is done by words, but also to suffer for doing any good
work, or for avoiding any sin, for Christ's sake, because this all
comes under the head of witnessing to the faith.

Reply Obj. 2: The truth of other sciences has no connection with the
worship of the Godhead: hence it is not called truth according to
godliness, and consequently the confession thereof cannot be said to
be the direct cause of martyrdom. Yet, since every lie is a sin, as
stated above (Q. 110, AA. 3, 4), avoidance of a lie, to whatever
truth it may be contrary, may be the cause of martyrdom inasmuch as a
lie is a sin against the Divine Law.

Reply Obj. 3: The good of one's country is paramount among human
goods: yet the Divine good, which is the proper cause of martyrdom,
is of more account than human good. Nevertheless, since human good
may become Divine, for instance when it is referred to God, it
follows that any human good in so far as it is referred to God, may
be the cause of martyrdom.
_______________________

QUESTION 125

OF FEAR*
(In Four Articles)
[* St. Thomas calls this vice indifferently 'fear' or 'timidity.' The
translation requires one to adhere to these terms on account of the
connection with the passion of fear. Otherwise 'cowardice' would be a
better rendering.]

We must now consider the vices opposed to fortitude: (1) Fear; (2)
Fearlessness; (3) Daring.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether fear is a sin?

(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?

(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(4) Whether it excuses from sin, or diminishes it?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 125, Art. 1]

Whether Fear Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that fear is not a sin. For fear is a passion,
as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 4; Q. 42). Now we are neither
praised nor blamed for passions, as stated in _Ethic._ ii. Since then
every sin is blameworthy, it seems that fear is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing that is commanded in the Divine Law is a
sin: since the "law of the Lord is unspotted" (Ps. 18:8). Yet fear is
commanded in God's law, for it is written (Eph. 6:5): "Servants, be
obedient to them that are your lords according to the flesh, with
fear and trembling." Therefore fear is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing that is naturally in man is a sin, for sin
is contrary to nature according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii). Now
fear is natural to man: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,
7) that "a man would be insane or insensible to pain, if nothing, not
even earthquakes nor deluges, inspired him with fear." Therefore fear
is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ our Lord said (Matt. 10:28): "Fear ye not them
that kill the body," and it is written (Ezech. 2:6): "Fear not,
neither be thou afraid of their words."

_I answer that,_ A human act is said to be a sin on account of its
being inordinate, because the good of a human act consists in order,
as stated above (Q. 109, A. 2; Q. 114, A. 1). Now this due order
requires that the appetite be subject to the ruling of reason. And
reason dictates that certain things should be shunned and some sought
after. Among things to be shunned, it dictates that some are to be
shunned more than others; and among things to be sought after, that
some are to be sought after more than others. Moreover, the more a
good is to be sought after, the more is the opposite evil to be
shunned. The result is that reason dictates that certain goods are to
be sought after more than certain evils are to be avoided.
Accordingly when the appetite shuns what the reason dictates that we
should endure rather than forfeit others that we should rather seek
for, fear is inordinate and sinful. On the other hand, when the
appetite fears so as to shun what reason requires to be shunned, the
appetite is neither inordinate nor sinful.

Reply Obj. 1: Fear in its generic acceptation denotes avoidance in
general. Hence in this way it does not include the notion of good or
evil: and the same applies to every other passion. Wherefore the
Philosopher says that passions call for neither praise nor blame,
because, to wit, we neither praise nor blame those who are angry or
afraid, but only those who behave thus in an ordinate or inordinate
manner.

Reply Obj. 2: The fear which the Apostle inculcates is in accordance
with reason, namely that servants should fear lest they be lacking in
the service they owe their masters.

Reply Obj. 3: Reason dictates that we should shun the evils that we
cannot withstand, and the endurance of which profits us nothing.
Hence there is no sin in fearing them.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 125, Art. 2]

Whether the Sin of Fear Is Contrary to Fortitude?

Objection 1: It seems that the sin of fear is not contrary to
fortitude: because fortitude is about dangers of death, as stated
above (Q. 123, AA. 4, 5). But the sin of fear is not always connected
with dangers of death, for a gloss on Ps. 127:1, "Blessed are all
they that fear the Lord," says that "it is human fear whereby we
dread to suffer carnal dangers, or to lose worldly goods." Again a
gloss on Matt. 27:44, "He prayed the third time, saying the selfsame
word," says that "evil fear is threefold, fear of death, fear of
pain, and fear of contempt." Therefore the sin of fear is not
contrary to fortitude.

Obj. 2: Further, the chief reason why a man is commended for
fortitude is that he exposes himself to the danger of death. Now
sometimes a man exposes himself to death through fear of slavery or
shame. Thus Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei i) that Cato, in order not
to be Caesar's slave, gave himself up to death. Therefore the sin of
fear bears a certain likeness to fortitude instead of being opposed
thereto.

Obj. 3: Further, all despair arises from fear. But despair is opposed
not to fortitude but to hope, as stated above (Q. 20, A. 1; I-II, Q.
40, A. 4). Neither therefore is the sin of fear opposed to fortitude.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 7) states that
timidity is opposed to fortitude.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 19, A. 3; I-II, Q. 43, A. 1),
all fear arises from love; since no one fears save what is contrary
to something he loves. Now love is not confined to any particular
kind of virtue or vice: but ordinate love is included in every
virtue, since every virtuous man loves the good proper to his virtue;
while inordinate love is included in every sin, because inordinate
love gives use to inordinate desire. Hence in like manner inordinate
fear is included in every sin; thus the covetous man fears the loss
of money, the intemperate man the loss of pleasure, and so on. But
the greatest fear of all is that which has the danger of death for
its object, as we find proved in _Ethic._ iii, 6. Wherefore the
inordinateness of this fear is opposed to fortitude which regards
dangers of death. For this reason timidity is said to be
antonomastically* opposed to fortitude. [*Antonomasia is the figure
of speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term;
e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle: and so timidity, which is
inordinate fear of any evil, is employed to denote inordinate fear of
the danger of death.]

Reply Obj. 1: The passages quoted refer to inordinate fear in its
generic acceptation, which can be opposed to various virtues.

Reply Obj. 2: Human acts are estimated chiefly with reference to the
end, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 6): and it belongs
to a brave man to expose himself to danger of death for the sake of a
good. But a man who exposes himself to danger of death in order to
escape from slavery or hardships is overcome by fear, which is
contrary to fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7),
that "to die in order to escape poverty, lust, or something
disagreeable is an act not of fortitude but of cowardice: for to shun
hardships is a mark of effeminacy."

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 2), fear is the
beginning of despair even as hope is the beginning of daring.
Wherefore, just as fortitude which employs daring in moderation
presupposes hope, so on the other hand despair proceeds from some
kind of fear. It does not follow, however, that any kind of despair
results from any kind of fear, but that only from fear of the same
kind. Now the despair that is opposed to hope is referred to another
kind, namely to Divine things; whereas the fear that is opposed to
fortitude regards dangers of death. Hence the argument does not prove.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 125, Art. 3]

Whether Fear Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that fear is not a mortal sin. For, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 1), fear is in the irascible faculty which is
a part of the sensuality. Now there is none but venial sin in the
sensuality, as stated above (I-II, Q. 74, A. 4). Therefore fear is
not a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, every mortal sin turns the heart wholly from God.
But fear does not this, for a gloss on Judges 7:3, "Whosoever is
fearful," etc., says that "a man is fearful when he trembles at the
very thought of conflict; yet he is not so wholly terrified at heart,
but that he can rally and take courage." Therefore fear is not a
mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, mortal sin is a lapse not only from perfection but
also from a precept. But fear does not make one lapse from a precept,
but only from perfection; for a gloss on Deut. 20:8, "What man is
there that is fearful and fainthearted?" says: "We learn from this
that no man can take up the profession of contemplation or spiritual
warfare, if he still fears to be despoiled of earthly riches."
Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ For mortal sin alone is the pain of hell due: and
yet this is due to the fearful, according to Apoc. 21:8, "But the
fearful and unbelieving and the abominable," etc., "shall have their
portion in the pool burning with fire and brimstone which is the
second death." Therefore fear is a mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), fear is a sin through being
inordinate, that is to say, through shunning what ought not to be
shunned according to reason. Now sometimes this inordinateness of
fear is confined to the sensitive appetites, without the accession of
the rational appetite's consent: and then it cannot be a mortal, but
only a venial sin. But sometimes this inordinateness of fear reaches
to the rational appetite which is called the will, which deliberately
shuns something against the dictate of reason: and this
inordinateness of fear is sometimes a mortal, sometimes a venial sin.
For if a man through fear of the danger of death or of any other
temporal evil is so disposed as to do what is forbidden, or to omit
what is commanded by the Divine law, such fear is a mortal sin:
otherwise it is a venial sin.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers fear as confined to the
sensuality.

Reply Obj. 2: This gloss also can be understood as referring to the
fear that is confined within the sensuality. Or better still we may
reply that a man is terrified with his whole heart when fear banishes
his courage beyond remedy. Now even when fear is a mortal sin, it may
happen nevertheless that one is not so wilfully terrified that one
cannot be persuaded to put fear aside: thus sometimes a man sins
mortally by consenting to concupiscence, and is turned aside from
accomplishing what he purposed doing.

Reply Obj. 3: This gloss speaks of the fear that turns man aside from
a good that is necessary, not for the fulfilment of a precept, but
for the perfection of a counsel. Such like fear is not a mortal sin,
but is sometimes venial: and sometimes it is not a sin, for instance
when one has a reasonable cause for fear.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 125, Art. 4]

Whether Fear Excuses from Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that fear does not excuse from sin. For fear is
a sin, as stated above (A. 1). But sin does not excuse from sin,
rather does it aggravate it. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin.

Obj. 2: Further, if any fear excuses from sin, most of all would this
be true of the fear of death, to which, as the saying is, a
courageous man is subject. Yet this fear, seemingly, is no excuse,
because, since death comes, of necessity, to all, it does not seem to
be an object of fear. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin.

Obj. 3: Further, all fear is of evil, either temporal or spiritual.
Now fear of spiritual evil cannot excuse sin, because instead of
inducing one to sin, it withdraws one from sin: and fear of temporal
evil does not excuse from sin, because according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iii, 6), "one should not fear poverty, nor sickness, nor
anything that is not a result of one's own wickedness." Therefore it
seems that in no sense does fear excuse from sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is stated in the Decretals (I, Q. 1, Cap.
Constat.): "A man who has been forcibly and unwillingly ordained by
heretics, has an ostensible excuse."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), fear is sinful in so far as
it runs counter to the order of reason. Now reason judges certain
evils to be shunned rather than others. Wherefore it is no sin not to
shun what is less to be shunned in order to avoid what reason judges
to be more avoided: thus death of the body is more to be avoided than
the loss of temporal goods. Hence a man would be excused from sin if
through fear of death he were to promise or give something to a
robber, and yet he would be guilty of sin were he to give to sinners,
rather than to the good to whom he should give in preference. On the
other hand, if through fear a man were to avoid evils which according
to reason are less to be avoided, and so incur evils which according
to reason are more to be avoided, he could not be wholly excused from
sin, because such like fear would be inordinate. Now the evils of the
soul are more to be feared than the evils of the body, and evils of
the body more than evils of external things. Wherefore if one were to
incur evils of the soul, namely sins, in order to avoid evils of the
body, such as blows or death, or evils of external things, such as
loss of money; or if one were to endure evils of the body in order to
avoid loss of money, one would not be wholly excused from sin. Yet
one's sin would be extenuated somewhat, for what is done through fear
is less voluntary, because when fear lays hold of a man he is under a
certain necessity of doing a certain thing. Hence the Philosopher
(Ethic. iii, 1) says that these things that are done through fear are
not simply voluntary, but a mixture of voluntary and involuntary.

Reply Obj. 1: Fear excuses, not in the point of its sinfulness, but
in the point of its involuntariness.

Reply Obj. 2: Although death comes, of necessity, to all, yet the
shortening of temporal life is an evil and consequently an object of
fear.

Reply Obj. 3: According to the opinion of Stoics, who held temporal
goods not to be man's goods, it follows in consequence that temporal
evils are not man's evils, and that therefore they are nowise to be
feared. But according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii) these temporal
things are goods of the least account, and this was also the opinion
of the Peripatetics. Hence their contraries are indeed to be feared;
but not so much that one ought for their sake to renounce that which
is good according to virtue.
_______________________

QUESTION 126

OF FEARLESSNESS
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider the vice of fearlessness: under which head there
are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is a sin to be fearless?

(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 126, Art. 1]

Whether Fearlessness Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that fearlessness is not a sin. For that which
is reckoned to the praise of a just man is not a sin. Now it is
written in praise of the just man (Prov. 28:1): "The just, bold as a
lion, shall be without dread." Therefore it is not a sin to be
without fear.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing is so fearful as death, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6). Yet one ought not to fear even death,
according to Matt. 10:28, "Fear ye not them that kill the body,"
etc., nor anything that can be inflicted by man, according to Isa.
51:12, "Who art thou, that thou shouldst be afraid of a mortal man?"
Therefore it is not a sin to be fearless.

Obj. 3: Further, fear is born of love, as stated above (Q. 125, A.
2). Now it belongs to the perfection of virtue to love nothing
earthly, since according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv), "the love of
God to the abasement of self makes us citizens of the heavenly city."
Therefore it is seemingly not a sin to fear nothing earthly.

_On the contrary,_ It is said of the unjust judge (Luke 18:2) that
"he feared not God nor regarded man."

_I answer that,_ Since fear is born of love, we must seemingly judge
alike of love and fear. Now it is here a question of that fear
whereby one dreads temporal evils, and which results from the love of
temporal goods. And every man has it instilled in him by nature to
love his own life and whatever is directed thereto; and to do so in
due measure, that is, to love these things not as placing his end
therein, but as things to be used for the sake of his last end. Hence
it is contrary to the natural inclination, and therefore a sin, to
fall short of loving them in due measure. Nevertheless, one never
lapses entirely from this love: since what is natural cannot be
wholly lost: for which reason the Apostle says (Eph. 5:29): "No man
ever hated his own flesh." Wherefore even those that slay themselves
do so from love of their own flesh, which they desire to free from
present stress. Hence it may happen that a man fears death and other
temporal evils less than he ought, for the reason that he loves them*
less than he ought. [*Viz. the contrary goods. One would expect 'se'
instead of 'ea.' We should then read: For the reason that he loves
himself less than he ought.] But that he fear none of these things
cannot result from an entire lack of love, but only from the fact
that he thinks it impossible for him to be afflicted by the evils
contrary to the goods he loves. This is sometimes the result of pride
of soul presuming on self and despising others, according to the
saying of Job 41:24, 25: "He [Vulg.: 'who'] was made to fear no one,
he beholdeth every high thing": and sometimes it happens through a
defect in the reason; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that
the "Celts, through lack of intelligence, fear nothing." [*"A man
would deserve to be called insane and senseless if there were nothing
that he feared, not even an earthquake nor a storm at sea, as is said
to be the case with the Celts."] It is therefore evident that
fearlessness is a vice, whether it result from lack of love, pride of
soul, or dullness of understanding: yet the latter is excused from
sin if it be invincible.

Reply Obj. 1: The just man is praised for being without fear that
withdraws him from good; not that he is altogether fearless, for it
is written (Ecclus. 1:28): "He that is without fear cannot be
justified."

Reply Obj. 2: Death and whatever else can be inflicted by mortal man
are not to be feared so that they make us forsake justice: but they
are to be feared as hindering man in acts of virtue, either as
regards himself, or as regards the progress he may cause in others.
Hence it is written (Prov. 14:16): "A wise man feareth and declineth
from evil."

Reply Obj. 3: Temporal goods are to be despised as hindering us from
loving and serving God, and on the same score they are not to be
feared; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 34:16): "He that feareth the
Lord shall tremble at nothing." But temporal goods are not to be
despised, in so far as they are helping us instrumentally to attain
those things that pertain to Divine fear and love.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 126, Art. 2]

Whether Fearlessness Is Opposed to Fortitude?

Objection 1: It seems that fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude.
For we judge of habits by their acts. Now no act of fortitude is
hindered by a man being fearless: since if fear be removed, one is
both brave to endure, and daring to attack. Therefore fearlessness is
not opposed to fortitude.

Obj. 2: Further, fearlessness is a vice, either through lack of due
love, or on account of pride, or by reason of folly. Now lack of due
love is opposed to charity, pride is contrary to humility, and folly
to prudence or wisdom. Therefore the vice of fearlessness is not
opposed to fortitude.

Obj. 3: Further, vices are opposed to virtue and extremes to the
mean. But one mean has only one extreme on the one side. Since then
fortitude has fear opposed to it on the one side and daring on the
other, it seems that fearlessness is not opposed thereto.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. iii) reckons fearlessness
to be opposed to fortitude.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 3), fortitude is
concerned about fear and daring. Now every moral virtue observes the
rational mean in the matter about which it is concerned. Hence it
belongs to fortitude that man should moderate his fear according to
reason, namely that he should fear what he ought, and when he ought,
and so forth. Now this mode of reason may be corrupted either by
excess or by deficiency. Wherefore just as timidity is opposed to
fortitude by excess of fear, in so far as a man fears what he ought
not, and as he ought not, so too fearlessness is opposed thereto by
deficiency of fear, in so far as a man fears not what he ought to
fear.

Reply Obj. 1: The act of fortitude is to endure death without fear,
and to be aggressive, not anyhow, but according to reason: this the
fearless man does not do.

Reply Obj. 2: Fearlessness by its specific nature corrupts the mean
of fortitude, wherefore it is opposed to fortitude directly. But in
respect of its causes nothing hinders it from being opposed to other
virtues.

Reply Obj. 3: The vice of daring is opposed to fortitude by excess of
daring, and fearlessness by deficiency of fear. Fortitude imposes the
mean on each passion. Hence there is nothing unreasonable in its
having different extremes in different respects.
_______________________

QUESTION 127

OF DARING*
[*Excessive daring or foolhardiness]
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider daring; and under this head there are two points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether daring is a sin?

(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 127, Art. 1]

Whether Daring Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that daring is not a sin. For it is written
(Job 39:21) concerning the horse, by which according to Gregory
(Moral. xxxi) the godly preacher is denoted, that "he goeth forth
boldly to meet armed men [*Vulg.: 'he pranceth boldly, he goeth forth
to meet armed men']." But no vice redounds to a man's praise.
Therefore it is not a sin to be daring.

Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9), "one
should take counsel in thought, and do quickly what has been
counseled." But daring helps this quickness in doing. Therefore
daring is not sinful but praiseworthy.

Obj. 3: Further, daring is a passion caused by hope, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 45, A. 2) when we were treating of the passions. But hope
is accounted not a sin but a virtue. Neither therefore should daring
be accounted a sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 8:18): "Go not on the way
with a bold man, lest he burden thee with his evils." Now no man's
fellowship is to be avoided save on account of sin. Therefore daring
is a sin.

_I answer that,_ Daring, as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 1; Q. 55),
is a passion. Now a passion is sometimes moderated according to
reason, and sometimes it lacks moderation, either by excess or by
deficiency, and on this account the passion is sinful. Again, the
names of the passions are sometimes employed in the sense of excess,
thus we speak of anger meaning not any but excessive anger, in which
case it is sinful, and in the same way daring as implying excess is
accounted a sin.

Reply Obj. 1: The daring spoken of there is that which is moderated
by reason, for in that sense it belongs to the virtue of fortitude.

Reply Obj. 2: It is praiseworthy to act quickly after taking counsel,
which is an act of reason. But to wish to act quickly before taking
counsel is not praiseworthy but sinful; for this would be to act
rashly, which is a vice contrary to prudence, as stated above (Q. 58,
A. 3). Wherefore daring which leads one to act quickly is so far
praiseworthy as it is directed by reason.

Reply Obj. 3: Some vices are unnamed, and so also are some virtues,
as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 4, 5, 6). Hence the
names of certain passions have to be applied to certain vices and
virtues: and in order to designate vices we employ especially the
names of those passions the object of which is an evil, as in the
case of hatred, fear, anger and daring. But hope and love have a good
for this object, and so we use them rather to designate virtues.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 127, Art. 2]

Whether Daring Is Opposed to Fortitude?

Objection 1: It seems that daring is not opposed to fortitude. For
excess of daring seems to result from presumption of mind. But
presumption pertains to pride which is opposed to humility. Therefore
daring is opposed to humility rather than to fortitude.

Obj. 2: Further, daring does not seem to call for blame, except in so
far as it results in harm either to the daring person who puts
himself in danger inordinately, or to others whom he attacks with
daring, or exposes to danger. But this seemingly pertains to
injustice. Therefore daring, as designating a sin, is opposed, not to
fortitude but to justice.

Obj. 3: Further, fortitude is concerned about fear and daring, as
stated above (Q. 123, A. 3). Now since timidity is opposed to
fortitude in respect of an excess of fear, there is another vice
opposed to timidity in respect of a lack of fear. If then, daring is
opposed to fortitude, in the point of excessive daring, there will
likewise be a vice opposed to it in the point of deficient daring.
But there is no such vice. Therefore neither should daring be
accounted a vice in opposition to fortitude.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher in both the Second and Third Books
of Ethics accounts daring to be opposed to fortitude.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 126, A. 2), it belongs to a
moral virtue to observe the rational mean in the matter about which
it is concerned. Wherefore every vice that denotes lack of moderation
in the matter of a moral virtue is opposed to that virtue, as
immoderate to moderate. Now daring, in so far as it denotes a vice,
implies excess of passion, and this excess goes by the name of
daring. Wherefore it is evident that it is opposed to the virtue of
fortitude which is concerned about fear and daring, as stated above
(Q. 122, A. 3).

Reply Obj. 1: Opposition between vice and virtue does not depend
chiefly on the cause of the vice but on the vice's very species.
Wherefore it is not necessary that daring be opposed to the same
virtue as presumption which is its cause.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as the direct opposition of a vice does not depend
on its cause, so neither does it depend on its effect. Now the harm
done by daring is its effect. Wherefore neither does the opposition
of daring depend on this.

Reply Obj. 3: The movement of daring consists in a man taking the
offensive against that which is in opposition to him: and nature
inclines him to do this except in so far as such inclination is
hindered by the fear of receiving harm from that source. Hence the
vice which exceeds in daring has no contrary deficiency, save only
timidity. Yet daring does not always accompany so great a lack of
timidity, for as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7), "the daring
are precipitate and eager to meet danger, yet fail when the danger is
present," namely through fear.
_______________________

QUESTION 128

OF THE PARTS OF FORTITUDE

We must now consider the parts of fortitude; first we shall consider
what are the parts of fortitude; and secondly we shall treat of each
part.
_______________________

ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 128, Art.]

Whether the Parts of Fortitude Are Suitably Assigned?

Objection 1: It seems that the parts of fortitude are unsuitably
assigned. For Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) assigns four parts to
fortitude, namely _magnificence, confidence, patience,_ and
_perseverance._ Now magnificence seems to pertain to liberality;
since both are concerned about money, and "a magnificent man must
needs be liberal," as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 2). But
liberality is a part of justice, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 5).
Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.

Obj. 2: Further, confidence is apparently the same as hope. But hope
does not seem to pertain to fortitude, but is rather a virtue by
itself. Therefore confidence should not be reckoned a part of
fortitude.

Obj. 3: Further, fortitude makes a man behave aright in face of
danger. But magnificence and confidence do not essentially imply any
relation to danger. Therefore they are not suitably reckoned as parts
of fortitude.

Obj. 4: Further, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) patience
denotes endurance of hardships, and he ascribes the same to
fortitude. Therefore patience is the same as fortitude and not a part
thereof.

Obj. 5: Further, that which is a requisite to every virtue should not
be reckoned a part of a special virtue. But perseverance is required
in every virtue: for it is written (Matt. 24:13): "He that shall
persevere to the end he shall be saved." Therefore perseverance
should not be accounted a part of fortitude.

Obj. 6: Further, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) reckons seven parts of
fortitude, namely "magnanimity, confidence, security, magnificence,
constancy, forbearance, stability." Andronicus also reckons seven
virtues annexed to fortitude, and these are, "courage, strength of
will, magnanimity, manliness, perseverance, magnificence." Therefore
it seems that Tully's reckoning of the parts of fortitude is
incomplete.

Obj. 7: Further, Aristotle (Ethic. iii) reckons five parts of
fortitude. The first is _civic_ fortitude, which produces brave deeds
through fear of dishonor or punishment; the second is _military_
fortitude, which produces brave deeds as a result of warlike art or
experience; the third is the fortitude which produces brave deeds
resulting from passion, especially anger; the fourth is the fortitude
which makes a man act bravely through being accustomed to overcome;
the fifth is the fortitude which makes a man act bravely through
being unaccustomed to danger. Now these kinds of fortitude are not
comprised under any of the above enumerations. Therefore these
enumerations of the parts of fortitude are unfitting.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 48), a virtue can have three
kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. But fortitude,
taken as a special virtue, cannot have subjective parts, since it is
not divided into several specifically distinct virtues, for it is
about a very special matter.

However, there are quasi-integral and potential parts assigned to it:
integral parts, with regard to those things the concurrence of which
is requisite for an act of fortitude; and potential parts, because
what fortitude practices in face of the greatest hardships, namely
dangers of death, certain other virtues practice in the matter of
certain minor hardships and these virtues are annexed to fortitude as
secondary virtues to the principal virtue. As stated above (Q. 123,
AA. 3, 6), the act of fortitude is twofold, aggression and endurance.
Now two things are required for the act of aggression. The first
regards preparation of the mind, and consists in one's having a mind
ready for aggression. In this respect Tully mentions _confidence,_ of
which he says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "with this the mind is much
assured and firmly hopeful in great and honorable undertakings." The
second regards the accomplishment of the deed, and consists in not
failing to accomplish what one has confidently begun. In this respect
Tully mentions _magnificence,_ which he describes as being "the
discussion and administration," i.e. accomplishment "of great and
lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind,"
so as to combine execution with greatness of purpose. Accordingly if
these two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, namely to
dangers of death, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof, because
without them there can be no fortitude; whereas if they be referred
to other matters involving less hardship, they will be virtues
specifically distinct from fortitude, but annexed thereto as
secondary virtues to principal: thus _magnificence_ is referred by
the Philosopher (Ethic. iv) to great expenses, and _magnanimity,_
which seems to be the same as confidence, to great honors. Again, two
things are requisite for the other act of fortitude, viz. endurance.
The first is that the mind be not broken by sorrow, and fall away
from its greatness, by reason of the stress of threatening evil. In
this respect he mentions _patience,_ which he describes as "the
voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for
the sake of virtue or profit." The other is that by the prolonged
suffering of hardships man be not wearied so as to lose courage,
according to Heb. 12:3, "That you be not wearied, fainting in your
minds." In this respect he mentions _perseverance,_ which accordingly
he describes as "the fixed and continued persistence in a well
considered purpose." If these two be confined to the proper matter of
fortitude, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof; but if they be
referred to any kind of hardship they will be virtues distinct from
fortitude, yet annexed thereto as secondary to principal.

Reply Obj. 1: Magnificence in the matter of liberality adds a certain
greatness: this is connected with the notion of difficulty which is
the object of the irascible faculty, that is perfected chiefly by
fortitude: and to this virtue, in this respect, it belongs.

Reply Obj. 2: Hope whereby one confides in God is accounted a
theological virtue, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 5; I-II, Q. 62, A. 3).
But by confidence which here is accounted a part of fortitude, man
hopes in himself, yet under God withal.

Reply Obj. 3: To venture on anything great seems to involve danger,
since to fail in such things is very disastrous. Wherefore although
magnificence and confidence are referred to the accomplishment of or
venturing on any other great things, they have a certain connection
with fortitude by reason of the imminent danger.

Reply Obj. 4: Patience endures not only dangers of death, with which
fortitude is concerned, without excessive sorrow, but also any other
hardships or dangers. In this respect it is accounted a virtue
annexed to fortitude: but as referred to dangers of death, it is an
integral part thereof.

Reply Obj. 5: Perseverance as denoting persistence in a good deed
unto the end, may be a circumstance of every virtue, but it is
reckoned a part of fortitude in the sense stated in the body of the
Article.

Reply Obj. 6: Macrobius reckons the four aforesaid mentioned by
Tully, namely _confidence, magnificence, forbearance,_ which he puts
in the place of patience, and _firmness,_ which he substitutes for
perseverance. And he adds three, two of which, namely _magnanimity_
and _security,_ are comprised by Tully under the head of confidence.
But Macrobius is more specific in his enumeration. Because confidence
denotes a man's hope for great things: and hope for anything
presupposes an appetite stretching forth to great things by desire,
and this belongs to magnanimity. For it has been stated above (I-II,
Q. 40, A. 2) that hope presupposes love and desire of the thing hoped
for.

A still better reply is that confidence pertains to the certitude of
hope; while magnanimity refers to the magnitude of the thing hoped
for. Now hope has no firmness unless its contrary be removed, for
sometimes one, for one's own part, would hope for something, but hope
is avoided on account of the obstacle of fear, since fear is somewhat
contrary to hope, as stated above, (I-II, Q. 40, A. 4, ad 1). Hence
Macrobius adds security, which banishes fear. He adds a third, namely
constancy, which may be comprised under magnificence. For in
performing deeds of magnificence one needs to have a constant mind.
For this reason Tully says that magnificence consists not only in
accomplishing great things, but also in discussing them generously in
the mind. Constancy may also pertain to perseverance, so that one may
be called persevering through not desisting on account of delays, and
constant through not desisting on account of any other obstacles.

Those that are mentioned by Andronicus seem to amount to the same as
the above. For with Tully and Macrobius he mentions _perseverance_
and _magnificence,_ and with Macrobius, _magnanimity. Strength of
will_ is the same as patience or forbearance, for he says that
"strength of will is a habit that makes one ready to attempt what
ought to be attempted, and to endure what reason says should be
endured"--i.e. good courage seems to be the same as assurance, for he
defines it as "strength of soul in the accomplishment of its
purpose." Manliness is apparently the same as confidence, for he says
that "manliness is a habit of self-sufficiency in matters of virtue."
Besides magnificence he mentions _andragathia_, i.e. manly goodness
which we may render "strenuousness." For magnificence consists not
only in being constant in the accomplishment of great deeds, which
belongs to constancy, but also in bringing a certain manly prudence
and solicitude to that accomplishment, and this belongs to
_andragathia_, strenuousness: wherefore he says that _andragathia_ is
the virtue of a man, whereby he thinks out profitable works.

Accordingly it is evident that all these parts may be reduced to the
four principal parts mentioned by Tully.

Reply Obj. 7: The five mentioned by Aristotle fall short of the true
notion of virtue, for though they concur in the act of fortitude,
they differ as to motive, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 1, ad 2);
wherefore they are not reckoned parts but modes of fortitude.
_______________________

QUESTION 129

OF MAGNANIMITY*
[*Not in the ordinary restricted sense but as explained by the author]
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider each of the parts of fortitude, including,
however, the other parts under those mentioned by Tully, with the
exception of confidence, for which we shall substitute magnanimity,
of which Aristotle treats. Accordingly we shall consider
(1) Magnanimity; (2) Magnificence; (3) Patience; (4) Perseverance.
As regards the first we shall treat (1) of magnanimity; (2) of its
contrary vices. Under the first head there are eight points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether magnanimity is about honors?

(2) Whether magnanimity is only about great honors?

(3) Whether it is a virtue?

(4) Whether it is a special virtue?

(5) Whether it is a part of fortitude?

(6) Of its relation to confidence;

(7) Of its relation to assurance;

(8) Of its relation to goods of fortune.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 1]

Whether Magnanimity Is About Honors?

Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not about honors. For
magnanimity is in the irascible faculty, as its very name shows,
since "magnanimity" signifies greatness of mind, and "mind" denotes
the irascible part, as appears from _De Anima_ iii, 42, where the
Philosopher says that "in the sensitive appetite are desire and
mind," i.e. the concupiscible and irascible parts. But honor is a
concupiscible good since it is the reward of virtue. Therefore it
seems that magnanimity is not about honors.

Obj. 2: Further, since magnanimity is a moral virtue, it must needs
be about either passions or operations. Now it is not about
operations, for then it would be a part of justice: whence it follows
that it is about passions. But honor is not a passion. Therefore
magnanimity is not about honors.

Obj. 3: Further, the nature of magnanimity seems to regard pursuit
rather than avoidance, for a man is said to be magnanimous because he
tends to great things. But the virtuous are praised not for desiring
honors, but for shunning them. Therefore magnanimity is not about
honors.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that
"magnanimity is about honor and dishonor."

_I answer that,_ Magnanimity by its very name denotes stretching
forth of the mind to great things. Now virtue bears a relationship to
two things, first to the matter about which is the field of its
activity, secondly to its proper act, which consists in the right use
of such matter. And since a virtuous habit is denominated chiefly
from its act, a man is said to be magnanimous chiefly because he is
minded to do some great act. Now an act may be called great in two
ways: in one way proportionately, in another absolutely. An act may
be called great proportionately, even if it consist in the use of
some small or ordinary thing, if, for instance, one make a very good
use of it: but an act is simply and absolutely great when it consists
in the best use of the greatest thing.

The things which come into man's use are external things, and among
these honor is the greatest simply, both because it is the most akin
to virtue, since it is an attestation to a person's virtue, as stated
above (Q. 103, AA. 1, 2); and because it is offered to God and to the
best; and again because, in order to obtain honor even as to avoid
shame, men set aside all other things. Now a man is said to be
magnanimous in respect of things that are great absolutely and
simply, just as a man is said to be brave in respect of things that
are difficult simply. It follows therefore that magnanimity is about
honors.

Reply Obj. 1: Good and evil absolutely considered regard the
concupiscible faculty, but in so far as the aspect of difficult is
added, they belong to the irascible. Thus it is that magnanimity
regards honor, inasmuch, to wit, as honor has the aspect of something
great or difficult.

Reply Obj. 2: Although honor is neither a passion nor an operation,
yet it is the object of a passion, namely hope, which tends to a
difficult good. Wherefore magnanimity is immediately about the
passions of hope, and mediately about honor as the object of hope:
even so, we have stated (Q. 123, AA. 4, 5) with regard to fortitude
that it is about dangers of death in so far as they are the object of
fear and daring.

Reply Obj. 3: Those are worthy of praise who despise riches in such a
way as to do nothing unbecoming in order to obtain them, nor have too
great a desire for them. If, however, one were to despise honors so
as not to care to do what is worthy of honor, this would be deserving
of blame. Accordingly magnanimity is about honors in the sense that a
man strives to do what is deserving of honor, yet not so as to think
much of the honor accorded by man.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 2]

Whether Magnanimity Is Essentially About Great Honors?

Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not essentially about great
honors. For the proper matter of magnanimity is honor, as stated
above (A. 1). But great and little are accidental to honor. Therefore
it is not essential to magnanimity to be about great honors.

Obj. 2: Further, just as magnanimity is about honor, so is meekness
about anger. But it is not essential to meekness to be about either
great or little anger. Therefore neither is it essential to
magnanimity to be about great honor.

Obj. 3: Further, small honor is less aloof from great honor than is
dishonor. But magnanimity is well ordered in relation to dishonor,
and consequently in relation to small honors also. Therefore it is
not only about great honors.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that
magnanimity is about great honors.

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Phys. vii, 17, 18),
virtue is a perfection, and by this we are to understand the
perfection of a power, and that it regards the extreme limit of that
power, as stated in _De Coelo_ i, 116. Now the perfection of a power
is not perceived in every operation of that power, but in such
operations as are great or difficult: for every power, however
imperfect, can extend to ordinary and trifling operations. Hence it
is essential to a virtue to be about the difficult and the good, as
stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3.

Now the difficult and the good (which amount to the same) in an act
of virtue may be considered from two points of view. First, from the
point of view of reason, in so far as it is difficult to find and
establish the rational means in some particular matter: and this
difficulty is found only in the act of intellectual virtues, and also
of justice. The other difficulty is on the part of the matter, which
may involve a certain opposition to the moderation of reason, which
moderation has to be applied thereto: and this difficulty regards
chiefly the other moral virtues, which are about the passions,
because the passions resist reason as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv,
4).

Now as regards the passions it is to be observed that the greatness
of this power of resistance to reason arises chiefly in some cases
from the passions themselves, and in others from the things that are
the objects of the passions. The passions themselves have no great
power of resistance, unless they be violent, because the sensitive
appetite, which is the seat of the passions, is naturally subject to
reason. Hence the resisting virtues that are about these passions
regard only that which is great in such passions: thus fortitude is
about very great fear and daring; temperance about the concupiscence
of the greatest pleasures, and likewise meekness about the greatest
anger. On the other hand, some passions have great power of
resistance to reason arising from the external things themselves that
are the objects of those passions: such are the love or desire of
money or of honor. And for these it is necessary to have a virtue not
only regarding that which is greatest in those passions, but also
about that which is ordinary or little: because things external,
though they be little, are very desirable, as being necessary for
human life. Hence with regard to the desire of money there are two
virtues, one about ordinary or little sums of money, namely
liberality, and another about large sums of money, namely
"magnificence."

In like manner there are two virtues about honors, one about ordinary
honors. This virtue has no name, but is denominated by its extremes,
which are _philotimia_, i.e. love of honor, and _aphilotimia_, i.e.
without love of honor: for sometimes a man is commended for loving
honor, and sometimes for not caring about it, in so far, to wit, as
both these things may be done in moderation. But with regard to great
honors there is _magnanimity._ Wherefore we must conclude that the
proper matter of magnanimity is great honor, and that a magnanimous
man tends to such things as are deserving of honor.

Reply Obj. 1: Great and little are accidental to honor considered in
itself: but they make a great difference in their relation to reason,
the mode of which has to be observed in the use of honor, for it is
much more difficult to observe it in great than in little honors.

Reply Obj. 2: In anger and other matters only that which is greatest
presents any notable difficulty, and about this alone is there any
need of a virtue. It is different with riches and honors which are
things existing outside the soul.

Reply Obj. 3: He that makes good use of great things is much more
able to make good use of little things. Accordingly the magnanimous
man looks upon great honors as a thing of which he is worthy, or even
little honors as something he deserves, because, to wit, man cannot
sufficiently honor virtue which deserves to be honored by God. Hence
he is not uplifted by great honors, because he does not deem them
above him; rather does he despise them, and much more such as are
ordinary or little. In like manner he is not cast down by dishonor,
but despises it, since he recognizes that he does not deserve it.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 3]

Whether Magnanimity Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a virtue. For every
moral virtue observes the mean. But magnanimity observes not the mean
but the greater extreme: because the "magnanimous man deems himself
worthy of the greatest things" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity
is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, he that has one virtue has them all, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). But one may have a virtue without having
magnanimity: since the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that
"whosoever is worthy of little things and deems himself worthy of
them, is temperate, but he is not magnanimous." Therefore magnanimity
is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, "Virtue is a good quality of the mind," as stated
above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4). But magnanimity implies certain
dispositions of the body: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) of
"a magnanimous man that his gait is slow, his voice deep, and his
utterance calm." Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

Obj. 4: Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But
magnanimity is opposed to humility, since "the magnanimous deems
himself worthy of great things, and despises others," according to
_Ethic._ iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

Obj. 5: Further, the properties of every virtue are praiseworthy. But
magnanimity has certain properties that call for blame. For, in the
first place, the magnanimous is unmindful of favors; secondly, he is
remiss and slow of action; thirdly, he employs irony [*Cf. Q. 113]
towards many; fourthly, he is unable to associate with others;
fifthly, because he holds to the barren things rather than to those
that are fruitful. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ It is written in praise of certain men (2 Macc.
15:18): "Nicanor hearing of the valor of Judas' companions, and the
greatness of courage (_animi magnitudinem_) with which they fought
for their country, was afraid to try the matter by the sword." Now,
only deeds of virtue are worthy of praise. Therefore magnanimity
which consists in greatness of courage is a virtue.

_I answer that,_ The essence of human virtue consists in safeguarding
the good of reason in human affairs, for this is man's proper good.
Now among external human things honors take precedence of all others,
as stated above (A. 1; I-II, Q. 11, A. 2, Obj. 3). Therefore
magnanimity, which observes the mode of reason in great honors, is a
virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher again says (Ethic. iv, 3), "the
magnanimous in point of quantity goes to extremes," in so far as he
tends to what is greatest, "but in the matter of becomingness, he
follows the mean," because he tends to the greatest things according
to reason, for "he deems himself worthy in accordance with his worth"
(Ethic. iv, 3), since his aims do not surpass his deserts.

Reply Obj. 2: The mutual connection of the virtues does not apply to
their acts, as though every one were competent to practice the acts
of all the virtues. Wherefore the act of magnanimity is not becoming
to every virtuous man, but only to great men. On the other hand, as
regards the principles of virtue, namely prudence and grace, all
virtues are connected together, since their habits reside together in
the soul, either in act or by way of a proximate disposition thereto.
Thus it is possible for one to whom the act of magnanimity is not
competent, to have the habit of magnanimity, whereby he is disposed
to practice that act if it were competent to him according to his
state.

Reply Obj. 3: The movements of the body are differentiated according
to the different apprehensions and emotions of the soul. And so it
happens that to magnanimity there accrue certain fixed accidents by
way of bodily movements. For quickness of movement results from a man
being intent on many things which he is in a hurry to accomplish,
whereas the magnanimous is intent only on great things; these are few
and require great attention, wherefore they call for slow movement.
Likewise shrill and rapid speaking is chiefly competent to those who
are quick to quarrel about anything, and this becomes not the
magnanimous who are busy only about great things. And just as these
dispositions of bodily movements are competent to the magnanimous man
according to the mode of his emotions, so too in those who are
naturally disposed to magnanimity these conditions are found
naturally.

Reply Obj. 4: There is in man something great which he possesses
through the gift of God; and something defective which accrues to him
through the weakness of nature. Accordingly magnanimity makes a man
deem himself worthy of great things in consideration of the gifts he
holds from God: thus if his soul is endowed with great virtue,
magnanimity makes him tend to perfect works of virtue; and the same
is to be said of the use of any other good, such as science or
external fortune. On the other hand, humility makes a man think
little of himself in consideration of his own deficiency, and
magnanimity makes him despise others in so far as they fall away from
God's gifts: since he does not think so much of others as to do
anything wrong for their sake. Yet humility makes us honor others and
esteem them better than ourselves, in so far as we see some of God's
gifts in them. Hence it is written of the just man (Ps. 14:4): "In
his sight a vile person is contemned [*Douay: 'The malignant is
brought to nothing, but he glorifieth,' etc.]," which indicates the
contempt of magnanimity, "but he honoreth them that fear the Lord,"
which points to the reverential bearing of humility. It is therefore
evident that magnanimity and humility are not contrary to one
another, although they seem to tend in contrary directions, because
they proceed according to different considerations.

Reply Obj. 5: These properties in so far as they belong to a
magnanimous man call not for blame, but for very great praise. For in
the first place, when it is said that the magnanimous is not mindful
of those from whom he has received favors, this points to the fact
that he takes no pleasure in accepting favors from others unless he
repay them with yet greater favor; this belongs to the perfection of
gratitude, in the act of which he wishes to excel, even as in the
acts of other virtues. Again, in the second place, it is said that he
is remiss and slow of action, not that he is lacking in doing what
becomes him, but because he does not busy himself with all kinds of
works, but only with great works, such as are becoming to him. He is
also said, in the third place, to employ irony, not as opposed to
truth, and so as either to say of himself vile things that are not
true, or deny of himself great things that are true, but because he
does not disclose all his greatness, especially to the large number
of those who are beneath him, since, as also the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 3), "it belongs to a magnanimous man to be great towards
persons of dignity and affluence, and unassuming towards the middle
class." In the fourth place, it is said that he cannot associate with
others: this means that he is not at home with others than his
friends: because he altogether shuns flattery and hypocrisy, which
belong to littleness of mind. But he associates with all, both great
and little, according as he ought, as stated above (ad 1). It is also
said, fifthly, that he prefers to have barren things, not indeed any,
but good, i.e. virtuous; for in all things he prefers the virtuous to
the useful, as being greater: since the useful is sought in order to
supply a defect which is inconsistent with magnanimity.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 4]

Whether Magnanimity Is a Special Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a special virtue. For
no special virtue is operative in every virtue. But the Philosopher
states (Ethic. iv, 3) that "whatever is great in each virtue belongs
to the magnanimous." Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, the acts of different virtues are not ascribed to
any special virtue. But the acts of different virtues are ascribed to
the magnanimous man. For it is stated in _Ethic._ iv, 3 that "it
belongs to the magnanimous not to avoid reproof" (which is an act of
prudence), "nor to act unjustly" (which is an act of justice), "that
he is ready to do favors" (which is an act of charity), "that he
gives his services readily" (which is an act of liberality), that "he
is truthful" (which is an act of truthfulness), and that "he is not
given to complaining" (which is an act of patience). Therefore
magnanimity is not a special virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is a special ornament of the soul,
according to the saying of Isa. 61:10, "He hath clothed me with the
garments of salvation," and afterwards he adds, "and as a bride
adorned with her jewels." But magnanimity is the ornament of all the
virtues, as stated in _Ethic._ iv. Therefore magnanimity is a general
virtue.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) distinguishes it
from the other virtues.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 2), it belongs to a
special virtue to establish the mode of reason in a determinate
matter. Now magnanimity establishes the mode of reason in a
determinate matter, namely honors, as stated above (AA. 1, 2): and
honor, considered in itself, is a special good, and accordingly
magnanimity considered in itself is a special virtue.

Since, however, honor is the reward of every virtue, as stated above
(Q. 103, A. 1, ad 2), it follows that by reason of its matter it
regards all the virtues.

Reply Obj. 1: Magnanimity is not about any kind of honor, but great
honor. Now, as honor is due to virtue, so great honor is due to a
great deed of virtue. Hence it is that the magnanimous is intent on
doing great deeds in every virtue, in so far, to wit, as he tends to
what is worthy of great honors.

Reply Obj. 2: Since the magnanimous tends to great things, it follows
that he tends chiefly to things that involve a certain excellence,
and shuns those that imply defect. Now it savors of excellence that a
man is beneficent, generous and grateful. Wherefore he shows himself
ready to perform actions of this kind, but not as acts of the other
virtues. On the other hand, it is a proof of defect, that a man
thinks so much of certain external goods or evils, that for their
sake he abandons and gives up justice or any virtue whatever. Again,
all concealment of the truth indicates a defect, since it seems to be
the outcome of fear. Also that a man be given to complaining denotes
a defect, because by so doing the mind seems to give way to external
evils. Wherefore these and like things the magnanimous man avoids
under a special aspect, inasmuch as they are contrary to his
excellence or greatness.

Reply Obj. 3: Every virtue derives from its species a certain luster
or adornment which is proper to each virtue: but further adornment
results from the very greatness of a virtuous deed, through
magnanimity which makes all virtues greater as stated in _Ethic._
iv, 3.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 5]

Whether Magnanimity Is a Part of Fortitude?

Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a part of fortitude.
For a thing is not a part of itself. But magnanimity appears to be
the same as fortitude. For Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.): "If
magnanimity, which is also called fortitude, be in thy soul, thou
shalt live in great assurance": and Tully says (De Offic. i): "If a
man is brave we expect him to be magnanimous, truth-loving, and far
removed from deception." Therefore magnanimity is not a part of
fortitude.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a
magnanimous man is not _philokindynos_, that is, a lover of danger.
But it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger. Therefore
magnanimity has nothing in common with fortitude so as to be called a
part thereof.

Obj. 3: Further, magnanimity regards the great in things to be hoped
for, whereas fortitude regards the great in things to be feared or
dared. But good is of more import than evil. Therefore magnanimity is
a more important virtue than fortitude. Therefore it is not a part
thereof.

_On the contrary,_ Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon
magnanimity as a part of fortitude.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, A. 3), a principal
virtue is one to which it belongs to establish a general mode of
virtue in a principal matter. Now one of the general modes of virtue
is firmness of mind, because "a firm standing is necessary in every
virtue," according to _Ethic._ ii. And this is chiefly commended in
those virtues that tend to something difficult, in which it is most
difficult to preserve firmness. Wherefore the more difficult it is to
stand firm in some matter of difficulty, the more principal is the
virtue which makes the mind firm in that matter.

Now it is more difficult to stand firm in dangers of death, wherein
fortitude confirms the mind, than in hoping for or obtaining the
greatest goods, wherein the mind is confirmed by magnanimity, for, as
man loves his life above all things, so does he fly from dangers of
death more than any others. Accordingly it is clear that magnanimity
agrees with fortitude in confirming the mind about some difficult
matter; but it falls short thereof, in that it confirms the mind
about a matter wherein it is easier to stand firm. Hence magnanimity
is reckoned a part of fortitude, because it is annexed thereto as
secondary to principal.

Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1, 3), "to lack evil
is looked upon as a good," wherefore not to be overcome by a grievous
evil, such as the danger of death, is looked upon as though it were
the obtaining of a great good, the former belonging to fortitude, and
the latter to magnanimity: in this sense fortitude and magnanimity
may be considered as identical. Since, however, there is a difference
as regards the difficulty on the part of either of the aforesaid, it
follows that properly speaking magnanimity, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), is a distinct virtue from fortitude.

Reply Obj. 2: A man is said to love danger when he exposes himself to
all kinds of dangers, which seems to be the mark of one who thinks
"many" the same as "great." This is contrary to the nature of a
magnanimous man, for no one seemingly exposes himself to danger for
the sake of a thing that he does not deem great. But for things that
are truly great, a magnanimous man is most ready to expose himself to
danger, since he does something great in the act of fortitude, even
as in the acts of the other virtues. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. ii, 7) that the magnanimous man is not _mikrokindynos_, i.e.
endangering himself for small things, but _megalokindynos_, i.e.
endangering himself for great things. And Seneca says (De Quat.
Virtut.): "Thou wilt be magnanimous if thou neither seekest dangers
like a rash man, nor fearest them like a coward. For nothing makes
the soul a coward save the consciousness of a wicked life."

Reply Obj. 3: Evil as such is to be avoided: and that one has to
withstand it is accidental; in so far, to wit, as one has to suffer
an evil in order to safeguard a good. But good as such is to be
desired, and that one avoids it is only accidental, in so far, to
wit, as it is deemed to surpass the ability of the one who desires
it. Now that which is so essentially is always of more account than
that which is so accidentally. Wherefore the difficult in evil things
is always more opposed to firmness of mind than the difficult in good
things. Hence the virtue of fortitude takes precedence of the virtue
of magnanimity. For though good is simply of more import than evil,
evil is of more import in this particular respect.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 6]

Whether Confidence Belongs to Magnanimity?

Objection 1: It seems that confidence does not belong to magnanimity.
For a man may have assurance not only in himself, but also in
another, according to 2 Cor. 3:4, 5, "Such confidence we have,
through Christ towards God, not that we are sufficient to think
anything of ourselves, as of ourselves." But this seems inconsistent
with the idea of magnanimity. Therefore confidence does not belong to
magnanimity.

Obj. 2: Further, confidence seems to be opposed to fear, according to
Isa. 12:2, "I will deal confidently and will not fear." But to be
without fear seems more akin to fortitude. Therefore confidence also
belongs to fortitude rather than to magnanimity.

Obj. 3: Further, reward is not due except to virtue. But a reward is
due to confidence, according to Heb. 3:6, where it is said that we
are the house of Christ, "if we hold fast the confidence and glory of
hope unto the end." Therefore confidence is a virtue distinct from
magnanimity: and this is confirmed by the fact that Macrobius
enumerates it with magnanimity (In Somn. Scip. i).

_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii) seems to substitute
confidence for magnanimity, as stated above in the preceding Question
(ad 6) and in the prologue to this.

_I answer that,_ Confidence takes its name from "fides" (faith): and
it belongs to faith to believe something and in somebody. But
confidence belongs to hope, according to Job 11:18, "Thou shalt have
confidence, hope being set before thee." Wherefore confidence
apparently denotes chiefly that a man derives hope through believing
the word of one who promises to help him. Since, however, faith
signifies also a strong opinion, and since one may come to have a
strong opinion about something, not only on account of another's
statement, but also on account of something we observe in another, it
follows that confidence may denote the hope of having something,
which hope we conceive through observing something either in
oneself--for instance, through observing that he is healthy, a man is
confident that he will live long. Or in another, for instance,
through observing that another is friendly to him and powerful, a man
is confident that he will receive help from him.

Now it has been stated above (A. 1, ad 2) that magnanimity is chiefly
about the hope of something difficult. Wherefore, since confidence
denotes a certain strength of hope arising from some observation
which gives one a strong opinion that one will obtain a certain good,
it follows that confidence belongs to magnanimity.

Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), it belongs to
the "magnanimous to need nothing," for need is a mark of the
deficient. But this is to be understood according to the mode of a
man, hence he adds "or scarcely anything." For it surpasses man to
need nothing at all. For every man needs, first, the Divine
assistance, secondly, even human assistance, since man is naturally a
social animal, for he is [not] sufficient by himself to provide for
his own life. Accordingly, in so far as he needs others, it belongs
to a magnanimous man to have confidence in others, for it is also a
point of excellence in a man that he should have at hand those who
are able to be of service to him. And in so far as his own ability
goes, it belongs to a magnanimous man to be confident in himself.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 2; Q. 40, A. 4),
when we were treating of the passions, hope is directly opposed to
despair, because the latter is about the same object, namely good.
But as regards contrariety of objects it is opposed to fear, because
the latter's object is evil. Now confidence denotes a certain
strength of hope, wherefore it is opposed to fear even as hope is.
Since, however, fortitude properly strengthens a man in respect of
evil, and magnanimity in respect of the obtaining of good, it
follows that confidence belongs more properly to magnanimity than
to fortitude. Yet because hope causes daring, which belongs to
fortitude, it follows in consequence that confidence pertains to
fortitude.

Reply Obj. 3: Confidence, as stated above, denotes a certain mode of
hope: for confidence is hope strengthened by a strong opinion. Now
the mode applied to an affection may call for commendation of the
act, so that it become meritorious, yet it is not this that draws it
to a species of virtue, but its matter. Hence, properly speaking,
confidence cannot denote a virtue, though it may denote the
conditions of a virtue. For this reason it is reckoned among the
parts of fortitude, not as an annexed virtue, except as identified
with magnanimity by Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii), but as an integral
part, as stated in the preceding Question.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 7]

Whether Security Belongs to Magnanimity?

Objection 1: It seems that security does not belong to magnanimity.
For security, as stated above (Q. 128, ad 6), denotes freedom from
the disturbance of fear. But fortitude does this most effectively.
Wherefore security is seemingly the same as fortitude. But fortitude
does not belong to magnanimity; rather the reverse is the case.
Neither therefore does security belong to magnanimity.

Obj. 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man "is said to be
secure because he is without care." But this seems to be contrary to
virtue, which has a care for honorable things, according to 2 Tim.
2:15, "Carefully study to present thyself approved unto God."
Therefore security does not belong to magnanimity, which does great
things in all the virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, virtue is not its own reward. But security is
accounted the reward of virtue, according to Job 11:14, 18, "If thou
wilt put away from thee the iniquity that is in thy hand . . . being
buried thou shalt sleep secure." Therefore security does not belong
to magnanimity or to any other virtue, as a part thereof.

_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading:
"Magnanimity consists of two things," that "it belongs to magnanimity
to give way neither to a troubled mind, nor to man, nor to fortune."
But a man's security consists in this. Therefore security belongs to
magnanimity.

_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear makes a
man take counsel," because, to wit he takes care to avoid what he
fears. Now security takes its name from the removal of this care, of
which fear is the cause: wherefore security denotes perfect freedom
of the mind from fear, just as confidence denotes strength of hope.
Now, as hope directly belongs to magnanimity, so fear directly
regards fortitude. Wherefore as confidence belongs immediately to
magnanimity, so security belongs immediately to fortitude.

It must be observed, however, that as hope is the cause of daring, so
is fear the cause of despair, as stated above when we were treating
of the passion (I-II, Q. 45, A. 2). Wherefore as confidence belongs
indirectly to fortitude, in so far as it makes use of daring, so
security belongs indirectly to magnanimity, in so far as it banishes
despair.

Reply Obj. 1: Fortitude is chiefly commended, not because it banishes
fear, which belongs to security, but because it denotes a firmness of
mind in the matter of the passion. Wherefore security is not the same
as fortitude, but is a condition thereof.

Reply Obj. 2: Not all security is worthy of praise but only when one
puts care aside, as one ought, and in things when one should not
fear: in this way it is a condition of fortitude and of magnanimity.

Reply Obj. 3: There is in the virtues a certain likeness to, and
participation of, future happiness, as stated above (I-II, Q. 5, AA.
3, 7). Hence nothing hinders a certain security from being a
condition of a virtue, although perfect security belongs to virtue's
reward.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 8]

Whether Goods of Fortune Conduce to Magnanimity?

Objection 1: It seems that goods of fortune do not conduce to
magnanimity. For according to Seneca (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi):
"virtue suffices for itself." Now magnanimity takes every virtue
great, as stated above (A. 4, ad 3). Therefore goods of fortune do
not conduce to magnanimity.

Obj. 2: Further, no virtuous man despises what is helpful to him. But
the magnanimous man despises whatever pertains to goods of fortune:
for Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading: "Magnanimity consists
of two things," that "a great soul is commended for despising
external things." Therefore a magnanimous man is not helped by goods
of fortune.

Obj. 3: Further, Tully adds (De Offic. i) that "it belongs to a great
soul so to bear what seems troublesome, as nowise to depart from his
natural estate, or from the dignity of a wise man." And Aristotle
says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "a magnanimous man does not grieve at
misfortune." Now troubles and misfortunes are opposed to goods of
fortune, for every one grieves at the loss of what is helpful to him.
Therefore external goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "good
fortune seems to conduce to magnanimity."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), magnanimity regards two
things: honor as its matter, and the accomplishment of something
great as its end. Now goods of fortune conduce to both these things.
For since honor is conferred on the virtuous, not only by the wise,
but also by the multitude who hold these goods of fortune in the
highest esteem, the result is that they show greater honor to those
who possess goods of fortune. Likewise goods of fortune are useful
organs or instruments of virtuous deeds: since we can easily
accomplish things by means of riches, power and friends. Hence it is
evident that goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity.

Reply Obj. 1: Virtue is said to be sufficient for itself, because it
can be without even these external goods; yet it needs them in order
to act more expeditiously.

Reply Obj. 2: The magnanimous man despises external goods, inasmuch
as he does not think them so great as to be bound to do anything
unbecoming for their sake. Yet he does not despise them, but that he
esteems them useful for the accomplishment of virtuous deeds.

Reply Obj. 3: If a man does not think much of a thing, he is neither
very joyful at obtaining it, nor very grieved at losing it.
Wherefore, since the magnanimous man does not think much of external
goods, that is goods of fortune, he is neither much uplifted by them
if he has them, nor much cast down by their loss.
_______________________

QUESTION 130

OF PRESUMPTION
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider the vices opposed to magnanimity; and in the
first place, those that are opposed thereto by excess. These are
three, namely, presumption, ambition, and vainglory. Secondly, we
shall consider pusillanimity which is opposed to it by way of
deficiency. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether presumption is a sin?

(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 130, Art. 1]

Whether Presumption Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that presumption is not a sin. For the Apostle
says: "Forgetting the things that are behind, I stretch forth [Vulg.:
'and stretching forth'] myself to those that are before." But it
seems to savor of presumption that one should tend to what is above
oneself. Therefore presumption is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 7) "we should not
listen to those who would persuade us to relish human things because
we are men, or mortal things because we are mortal, but we should
relish those that make us immortal": and (Metaph. i) "that man should
pursue divine things as far as possible." Now divine and immortal
things are seemingly far above man. Since then presumption consists
essentially in tending to what is above oneself, it seems that
presumption is something praiseworthy, rather than a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:5): "Not that we are
sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves." If then
presumption, by which one strives at that for which one is not
sufficient, be a sin, it seems that man cannot lawfully even think of
anything good: which is absurd. Therefore presumption is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 37:3): "O wicked
presumption, whence camest thou?" and a gloss answers: "From a
creature's evil will." Now all that comes of the root of an evil will
is a sin. Therefore presumption is a sin.

_I answer that,_ Since whatever is according to nature, is ordered by
the Divine Reason, which human reason ought to imitate, whatever is
done in accordance with human reason in opposition to the order
established in general throughout natural things is vicious and
sinful. Now it is established throughout all natural things, that
every action is commensurate with the power of the agent, nor does
any natural agent strive to do what exceeds its ability. Hence it is
vicious and sinful, as being contrary to the natural order, that any
one should assume to do what is above his power: and this is what is
meant by presumption, as its very name shows. Wherefore it is evident
that presumption is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1: [A thing may be] above the active power of a natural
thing, and yet not above the passive power of that same thing: thus
the air is possessed of a passive power by reason of which it can be
so changed as to obtain the action and movement of fire, which
surpass the active power of air. Thus too it would be sinful and
presumptuous for a man while in a state of imperfect virtue to
attempt the immediate accomplishment of what belongs to perfect
virtue. But it is not presumptuous or sinful for a man to endeavor to
advance towards perfect virtue. In this way the Apostle stretched
himself forth to the things that were before him, namely continually
advancing forward.

Reply Obj. 2: Divine and immortal things surpass man according to the
order of nature. Yet man is possessed of a natural power, namely the
intellect, whereby he can be united to immortal and Divine things. In
this respect the Philosopher says that "man ought to pursue immortal
and divine things," not that he should do what it becomes God to do,
but that he should be united to Him in intellect and will.

Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), "what we can
do by the help of others we can do by ourselves in a sense." Hence
since we can think and do good by the help of God, this is not
altogether above our ability. Hence it is not presumptuous for a man
to attempt the accomplishment of a virtuous deed: but it would be
presumptuous if one were to make the attempt without confidence in
God's assistance.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 130, Art. 2]

Whether Presumption Is Opposed to Magnanimity by Excess?

Objection 1: It seems that presumption is not opposed to magnanimity
by excess. For presumption is accounted a species of the sin against
the Holy Ghost, as stated above (Q. 14, A. 2; Q. 21, A. 1). But the
sin against the Holy Ghost is not opposed to magnanimity, but to
charity. Neither therefore is presumption opposed to magnanimity.

Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to magnanimity that one should deem
oneself worthy of great things. But a man is said to be presumptuous
even if he deem himself worthy of small things, if they surpass his
ability. Therefore presumption is not directly opposed to magnanimity.

Obj. 3: Further, the magnanimous man looks upon external goods as
little things. Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), "on
account of external fortune the presumptuous disdain and wrong
others, because they deem external goods as something great."
Therefore presumption is opposed to magnanimity, not by excess, but
only by deficiency.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 3) that
the "vain man," i.e. a vaporer or a wind-bag, which with us denotes a
presumptuous man, "is opposed to the magnanimous man by excess."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 129, A. 3, ad 1), magnanimity
observes the means, not as regards the quantity of that to which it
tends, but in proportion to our own ability: for it does not tend to
anything greater than is becoming to us.

Now the presumptuous man, as regards that to which he tends, does not
exceed the magnanimous, but sometimes falls far short of him: but he
does exceed in proportion to his own ability, whereas the magnanimous
man does not exceed his. It is in this way that presumption is
opposed to magnanimity by excess.

Reply Obj. 1: It is not every presumption that is accounted a sin
against the Holy Ghost, but that by which one contemns the Divine
justice through inordinate confidence in the Divine mercy. The latter
kind of presumption, by reason of its matter, inasmuch, to wit, as it
implies contempt of something Divine, is opposed to charity, or
rather to the gift of fear, whereby we revere God. Nevertheless, in
so far as this contempt exceeds the proportion to one's own ability,
it can be opposed to magnanimity.

Reply Obj. 2: Presumption, like magnanimity, seems to tend to
something great. For we are not, as a rule, wont to call a man
presumptuous for going beyond his powers in something small. If,
however, such a man be called presumptuous, this kind of presumption
is not opposed to magnanimity, but to that virtue which is about
ordinary honor, as stated above (Q. 129, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 3: No one attempts what is above his ability, except in so
far as he deems his ability greater than it is. In this one may err
in two ways. First only as regards quantity, as when a man thinks he
has greater virtue, or knowledge, or the like, than he has. Secondly,
as regards the kind of thing, as when he thinks himself great, and
worthy of great things, by reason of something that does not make him
so, for instance by reason of riches or goods of fortune. For, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), "those who have these things without
virtue, neither justly deem themselves worthy of great things, nor
are rightly called magnanimous."

Again, the thing to which a man sometimes tends in excess of his
ability, is sometimes in very truth something great, simply as in the
case of Peter, whose intent was to suffer for Christ, which has
exceeded his power; while sometimes it is something great, not
simply, but only in the opinion of fools, such as wearing costly
clothes, despising and wronging others. This savors of an excess of
magnanimity, not in any truth, but in people's opinion. Hence Seneca
says (De Quat. Virtut.) that "when magnanimity exceeds its measure,
it makes a man high-handed, proud, haughty restless, and bent on
excelling in all things, whether in words or in deeds, without any
considerations of virtue." Thus it is evident that the presumptuous
man sometimes falls short of the magnanimous in reality, although in
appearance he surpasses him.
_______________________

QUESTION 131

OF AMBITION
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider ambition: and under this head there are two
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is a sin?

(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 131, Art. 1]

Whether Ambition Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that ambition is not a sin. For ambition
denotes the desire of honor. Now honor is in itself a good thing, and
the greatest of external goods: wherefore those who care not for
honor are reproved. Therefore ambition is not a sin; rather is it
something deserving of praise, in so far as a good is laudably
desired.

Obj. 2: Further, anyone may, without sin, desire what is due to him
as a reward. Now honor is the reward of virtue, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. i, 12; iv, 3; viii, 14). Therefore ambition of honor
is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, that which heartens a man to do good and disheartens
him from doing evil, is not a sin. Now honor heartens men to do good
and to avoid evil; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that
"with the bravest men, cowards are held in dishonor, and the brave in
honor": and Tully says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that "honor fosters the
arts." Therefore ambition is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Cor. 13:5) that "charity is not
ambitious, seeketh not her own." Now nothing is contrary to charity,
except sin. Therefore ambition is a sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 103, AA. 1, 2), honor denotes
reverence shown to a person in witness of his excellence. Now two
things have to be considered with regard to man's honor. The first is
that a man has not from himself the thing in which he excels, for
this is, as it were, something Divine in him, wherefore on this count
honor is due principally, not to him but to God. The second point
that calls for observation is that the thing in which man excels is
given to him by God, that he may profit others thereby: wherefore a
man ought so far to be pleased that others bear witness to his
excellence, as this enables him to profit others.

Now the desire of honor may be inordinate in three ways. First, when
a man desires recognition of an excellence which he has not: this is
to desire more than his share of honor. Secondly, when a man desires
honor for himself without referring it to God. Thirdly, when a man's
appetite rests in honor itself, without referring it to the profit of
others. Since then ambition denotes inordinate desire of honor, it is
evident that it is always a sin.

Reply Obj. 1: The desire for good should be regulated according to
reason, and if it exceed this rule it will be sinful. In this way it
is sinful to desire honor in disaccord with the order of reason. Now
those are reproved who care not for honor in accordance with reason's
dictate that they should avoid what is contrary to honor.

Reply Obj. 2: Honor is not the reward of virtue, as regards the
virtuous man, in this sense that he should seek for it as his reward:
since the reward he seeks is happiness, which is the end of virtue.
But it is said to be the reward of virtue as regards others, who have
nothing greater than honor whereby to reward the virtuous; which
honor derives greatness from the very fact that it bears witness to
virtue. Hence it is evident that it is not an adequate reward, as
stated in _Ethic._ iv, 3.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as some are heartened to do good and disheartened
from doing evil, by the desire of honor, if this be desired in due
measure; so, if it be desired inordinately, it may become to man an
occasion of doing many evil things, as when a man cares not by what
means he obtains honor. Wherefore Sallust says (Catilin.) that "the
good as well as the wicked covet honors for themselves, but the one,"
i.e. the good, "go about it in the right way," whereas "the other,"
i.e. the wicked, "through lack of the good arts, make use of deceit
and falsehood." Yet they who, merely for the sake of honor, either do
good or avoid evil, are not virtuous, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iii, 8), where he says that they who do brave things for the
sake of honor are not truly brave.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 131, Art. 2]

Whether Ambition Is Opposed to Magnanimity by Excess?

Objection 1: It seems that ambition is not opposed to magnanimity by
excess. For one mean has only one extreme opposed to it on the one
side. Now presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess as stated
above (Q. 130, A. 2). Therefore ambition is not opposed to it by
excess.

Obj. 2: Further, magnanimity is about honors; whereas ambition seems
to regard positions of dignity: for it is written (2 Macc. 4:7) that
"Jason ambitiously sought the high priesthood." Therefore ambition is
not opposed to magnanimity.

Obj. 3: Further, ambition seems to regard outward show: for it is
written (Acts 25:27) that "Agrippa and Berenice . . . with great
pomp (_ambitione_) . . . had entered into the hall of audience"
[*'Praetorium.' The Vulgate has 'auditorium,' but the meaning is
the same], and (2 Para. 16:14) that when Asa died they "burned spices
and . . . ointments over his body" with very great pomp (_ambitione_).
But magnanimity is not about outward show. Therefore ambition is not
opposed to magnanimity.

_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Offic. i) that "the more a man
exceeds in magnanimity, the more he desires himself alone to dominate
others." But this pertains to ambition. Therefore ambition denotes an
excess of magnanimity.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), ambition signifies
inordinate love of honor. Now magnanimity is about honors and makes
use of them in a becoming manner. Wherefore it is evident that
ambition is opposed to magnanimity as the inordinate to that which is
well ordered.

Reply Obj. 1: Magnanimity regards two things. It regards one as its
end, in so far as it is some great deed that the magnanimous man
attempts in proportion to his ability. In this way presumption is
opposed to magnanimity by excess: because the presumptuous man
attempts great deeds beyond his ability. The other thing that
magnanimity regards is its matter, viz. honor, of which it makes
right use: and in this way ambition is opposed to magnanimity by
excess. Nor is it impossible for one mean to be exceeded in various
respects.

Reply Obj. 2: Honor is due to those who are in a position of dignity,
on account of a certain excellence of their estate: and accordingly
inordinate desire for positions of dignity pertains to ambition. For
if a man were to have an inordinate desire for a position of dignity,
not for the sake of honor, but for the sake of a right use of a
dignity exceeding his ability, he would not be ambitious but
presumptuous.

Reply Obj. 3: The very solemnity of outward worship is a kind of
honor, wherefore in such cases honor is wont to be shown. This is
signified by the words of James 2:2, 3: "If there shall come into
your assembly a man having a golden ring, in fine apparel . . . and
you . . . shall say to him: Sit thou here well," etc. Wherefore
ambition does not regard outward worship, except in so far as this
is a kind of honor.
_______________________

QUESTION 132

OF VAINGLORY
(In Five Articles)

We must now consider vainglory: under which head there are five
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether desire of glory is a sin?

(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity?

(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(4) Whether it is a capital vice?

(5) Of its daughters.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 132, Art. 1]

Whether the Desire of Glory Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that the desire of glory is not a sin. For no
one sins in being likened to God: in fact we are commanded (Eph.
5:1): "Be ye . . . followers of God, as most dear children." Now by
seeking glory man seems to imitate God, Who seeks glory from men:
wherefore it is written (Isa. 43:6, 7): "Bring My sons from afar, and
My daughters from the ends of the earth. And every one that calleth
on My name, I have created him for My glory." Therefore the desire
for glory is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, that which incites a man to do good is apparently
not a sin. Now the desire of glory incites men to do good. For Tully
says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that "glory inflames every man to strive
his utmost": and in Holy Writ glory is promised for good works,
according to Rom. 2:7: "To them, indeed, who according to patience in
good work . . . glory and honor" [*Vulg.: 'Who will render to every
man according to his works, to them indeed who . . . seek glory and
honor and incorruption, eternal life.']. Therefore the desire for
glory is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that glory is
"consistent good report about a person, together with praise": and
this comes to the same as what Augustine says (Contra Maximin. iii),
viz. that glory is, "as it were, clear knowledge with praise." Now it
is no sin to desire praiseworthy renown: indeed, it seems itself to
call for praise, according to Ecclus. 41:15, "Take care of a good
name," and Rom. 12:17, "Providing good things not only in the sight
of God, but also in the sight of all men." Therefore the desire of
vainglory is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v): "He is better
advised who acknowledges that even the love of praise is sinful."

_I answer that,_ Glory signifies a certain clarity, wherefore
Augustine says (Tract. lxxxii, c, cxiv in Joan.) that to be
"glorified is the same as to be clarified." Now clarity and
comeliness imply a certain display: wherefore the word glory properly
denotes the display of something as regards its seeming comely in the
sight of men, whether it be a bodily or a spiritual good. Since,
however, that which is clear simply can be seen by many, and by those
who are far away, it follows that the word glory properly denotes
that somebody's good is known and approved by many, according to the
saying of Sallust (Catilin.) [*The quotation is from Livy: Hist.,
Lib. XXII C, 39]: "I must not boast while I am addressing one man."

But if we take the word glory in a broader sense, it not only
consists in the knowledge of many, but also in the knowledge of few,
or of one, or of oneself alone, as when one considers one's own good
as being worthy of praise. Now it is not a sin to know and approve
one's own good: for it is written (1 Cor. 2:12): "Now we have
received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God
that we may know the things that are given us from God." Likewise it
is not a sin to be willing to approve one's own good works: for it is
written (Matt. 5:16): "Let your light shine before men." Hence the
desire for glory does not, of itself, denote a sin: but the desire
for empty or vain glory denotes a sin: for it is sinful to desire
anything vain, according to Ps. 4:3, "Why do you love vanity, and
seek after lying?"

Now glory may be called vain in three ways. First, on the part of the
thing for which one seeks glory: as when a man seeks glory for that
which is unworthy of glory, for instance when he seeks it for
something frail and perishable: secondly, on the part of him from
whom he seeks glory, for instance a man whose judgment is uncertain:
thirdly, on the part of the man himself who seeks glory, for that he
does not refer the desire of his own glory to a due end, such as
God's honor, or the spiritual welfare of his neighbor.

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says on John 13:13, "You call Me Master
and Lord; and you say well" (Tract. lviii in Joan.):
"Self-complacency is fraught with danger of one who has to beware of
pride. But He Who is above all, however much He may praise Himself,
does not uplift Himself. For knowledge of God is our need, not His:
nor does any man know Him unless he be taught of Him Who knows." It
is therefore evident that God seeks glory, not for His own sake, but
for ours. In like manner a man may rightly seek his own glory for the
good of others, according to Matt. 5:16, "That they may see your good
works, and glorify your Father Who is in heaven."

Reply Obj. 2: That which we receive from God is not vain but true
glory: it is this glory that is promised as a reward for good works,
and of which it is written (2 Cor. 10:17, 18): "He that glorieth let
him glory in the Lord, for not he who commendeth himself is approved,
but he whom God commendeth." It is true that some are heartened to do
works of virtue, through desire for human glory, as also through the
desire for other earthly goods. Yet he is not truly virtuous who does
virtuous deeds for the sake of human glory, as Augustine proves (De
Civ. Dei v).

Reply Obj. 3: It is requisite for man's perfection that he should
know himself; but not that he should be known by others, wherefore it
is not to be desired in itself. It may, however, be desired as being
useful for something, either in order that God may be glorified by
men, or that men may become better by reason of the good they know to
be in another man, or in order that man, knowing by the testimony of
others' praise the good which is in him, may himself strive to
persevere therein and to become better. In this sense it is
praiseworthy that a man should "take care of his good name," and that
he should "provide good things in the sight of God and men": but not
that he should take an empty pleasure in human praise.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 132, Art. 2]

Whether Vainglory Is Opposed to Magnanimity?

Objection 1: It seems that vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.
For, as stated above (A. 1), vainglory consists in glorying in things
that are not, which pertains to falsehood; or in earthly and
perishable things, which pertains to covetousness; or in the
testimony of men, whose judgment is uncertain, which pertains to
imprudence. Now these vices are not contrary to magnanimity.
Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.

Obj. 2: Further, vainglory is not, like pusillanimity, opposed to
magnanimity by way of deficiency, for this seems inconsistent with
vainglory. Nor is it opposed to it by way of excess, for in this way
presumption and ambition are opposed to magnanimity, as stated above
(Q. 130, A. 2; Q. 131, A. 2): and these differ from vainglory.
Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.

Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Phil. 2:3, "Let nothing be done through
contention, neither by vainglory," says: "Some among them were given
to dissension and restlessness, contending with one another for the
sake of vainglory." But contention [*Cf. Q. 38] is not opposed to
magnanimity. Neither therefore is vainglory.

_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading,
"Magnanimity consists in two things": "We should beware of the desire
for glory, since it enslaves the mind, which a magnanimous man should
ever strive to keep untrammeled." Therefore it is opposed to
magnanimity.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 103, A. 1, ad 3), glory is an
effect of honor and praise: because from the fact that a man is
praised, or shown any kind of reverence, he acquires charity in the
knowledge of others. And since magnanimity is about honor, as stated
above (Q. 129, AA. 1, 2), it follows that it also is about glory:
seeing that as a man uses honor moderately, so too does he use glory
in moderation. Wherefore inordinate desire of glory is directly
opposed to magnanimity.

Reply Obj. 1: To think so much of little things as to glory in them
is itself opposed to magnanimity. Wherefore it is said of the
magnanimous man (Ethic. iv) that honor is of little account to him.
In like manner he thinks little of other things that are sought for
honor's sake, such as power and wealth. Likewise it is inconsistent
with magnanimity to glory in things that are not; wherefore it is
said of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv) that he cares more for truth
than for opinion. Again it is incompatible with magnanimity for a man
to glory in the testimony of human praise, as though he deemed this
something great; wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic.
iv), that he cares not to be praised. And so, when a man looks upon
little things as though they were great, nothing hinders this from
being contrary to magnanimity, as well as to other virtues.

Reply Obj. 2: He that is desirous of vainglory does in truth fall
short of being magnanimous, because he glories in what the
magnanimous man thinks little of, as stated in the preceding Reply.
But if we consider his estimate, he is opposed to the magnanimous man
by way of excess, because the glory which he seeks is something great
in his estimation, and he tends thereto in excess of his deserts.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 127, A. 2, ad 2), the opposition of
vices does not depend on their effects. Nevertheless contention, if
done intentionally, is opposed to magnanimity: since no one contends
save for what he deems great. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic.
iv, 3) that the magnanimous man is not contentious, because nothing
is great in his estimation.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 132, Art. 3]

Whether Vainglory Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that vainglory is a mortal sin. For nothing
precludes the eternal reward except a mortal sin. Now vainglory
precludes the eternal reward: for it is written (Matt. 6:1): "Take
heed, that you do not give justice before men, to be seen by them:
otherwise you shall not have a reward of your Father Who is in
heaven." Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, whoever appropriates to himself that which is proper
to God, sins mortally. Now by desiring vainglory, a man appropriates
to himself that which is proper to God. For it is written (Isa.
42:8): "I will not give My glory to another," and (1 Tim. 1:17): "To
. . . the only God be honor and glory." Therefore vainglory is a
mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, apparently a sin is mortal if it be most dangerous
and harmful. Now vainglory is a sin of this kind, because a gloss of
Augustine on 1 Thess. 2:4, "God, Who proveth our hearts," says:
"Unless a man war against the love of human glory he does not
perceive its baneful power, for though it be easy for anyone not to
desire praise as long as one does not get it, it is difficult not to
take pleasure in it, when it is given." Chrysostom also says (Hom.
xix in Matth.) that "vainglory enters secretly, and robs us
insensibly of all our inward possessions." Therefore vainglory is a
mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in the Opus
Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that "while
other vices find their abode in the servants of the devil, vainglory
finds a place even in the servants of Christ." Yet in the latter
there is no mortal sin. Therefore vainglory is not a mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 24, A. 12; Q. 110, A. 4; Q. 112,
A. 2), a sin is mortal through being contrary to charity. Now the sin
of vainglory, considered in itself, does not seem to be contrary to
charity as regards the love of one's neighbor: yet as regards the
love of God it may be contrary to charity in two ways. In one way, by
reason of the matter about which one glories: for instance when one
glories in something false that is opposed to the reverence we owe
God, according to Ezech. 28:2, "Thy heart is lifted up, and Thou hast
said: I am God," and 1 Cor. 4:7, "What hast thou that thou hast not
received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou
hadst not received it?" Or again when a man prefers to God the
temporal good in which he glories: for this is forbidden (Jer. 9:23,
24): "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, and let not the
strong man glory in his strength, and let not the rich man glory in
his riches. But let him that glorieth glory in this, that he
understandeth and knoweth Me." Or again when a man prefers the
testimony of man to God's; thus it is written in reproval of certain
people (John 12:43): "For they loved the glory of men more than the
glory of God."

In another way vainglory may be contrary to charity, on the part of
the one who glories, in that he refers his intention to glory as his
last end: so that he directs even virtuous deeds thereto, and, in
order to obtain it, forbears not from doing even that which is
against God. In this way it is a mortal sin. Wherefore Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei v, 14) that "this vice," namely the love of human
praise, "is so hostile to a godly faith, if the heart desires glory
more than it fears or loves God, that our Lord said (John 5:44): How
can you believe, who receive glory one from another, and the glory
which is from God alone, you do not seek?"

If, however, the love of human glory, though it be vain, be not
inconsistent with charity, neither as regards the matter gloried in,
nor as to the intention of him that seeks glory, it is not a mortal
but a venial sin.

Reply Obj. 1: No man, by sinning, merits eternal life: wherefore a
virtuous deed loses its power to merit eternal life, if it be done
for the sake of vainglory, even though that vainglory be not a mortal
sin. On the other hand when a man loses the eternal reward simply
through vainglory, and not merely in respect of one act, vainglory is
a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Not every man that is desirous of vainglory, desires
the excellence which belongs to God alone. For the glory due to God
alone differs from the glory due to a virtuous or rich man.

Reply Obj. 3: Vainglory is stated to be a dangerous sin, not only on
account of its gravity, but also because it is a disposition to grave
sins, in so far as it renders man presumptuous and too
self-confident: and so it gradually disposes a man to lose his inward
goods.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 132, Art. 4]

Whether Vainglory Is a Capital Vice?

Objection 1: It seems that vainglory is not a capital vice. For a
vice that always arises from another vice is seemingly not capital.
But vainglory always arises from pride. Therefore vainglory is not a
capital vice.

Obj. 2: Further, honor would seem to take precedence of glory, for
this is its effect. Now ambition which is inordinate desire of honor
is not a capital vice. Neither therefore is the desire of vainglory.

Obj. 3: Further, a capital vice has a certain prominence. But
vainglory seems to have no prominence, neither as a sin, because it
is not always a mortal sin, nor considered as an appetible good,
since human glory is apparently a frail thing, and is something
outside man himself. Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers vainglory among the
seven capital vices.

_I answer that,_ The capital vices are enumerated in two ways. For
some reckon pride as one of their number: and these do not place
vainglory among the capital vices. Gregory, however (Moral. xxxi),
reckons pride to be the queen of all the vices, and vainglory, which
is the immediate offspring of pride, he reckons to be a capital vice:
and not without reason. For pride, as we shall state farther on (Q.
152, AA. 1, 2), denotes inordinate desire of excellence. But whatever
good one may desire, one desires a certain perfection and excellence
therefrom: wherefore the end of every vice is directed to the end of
pride, so that this vice seems to exercise a kind of causality over
the other vices, and ought not to be reckoned among the special
sources of vice, known as the capital vices. Now among the goods that
are the means whereby man acquires honor, glory seems to be the most
conducive to that effect, inasmuch as it denotes the manifestation of
a man's goodness: since good is naturally loved and honored by all.
Wherefore, just as by the glory which is in God's sight man acquires
honor in Divine things, so too by the glory which is in the sight of
man he acquires excellence in human things. Hence on account of its
close connection with excellence, which men desire above all, it
follows that it is most desirable. And since many vices arise from
the inordinate desire thereof, it follows that vainglory is a capital
vice.

Reply Obj. 1: It is not impossible for a capital vice to arise from
pride, since as stated above (in the body of the Article and I-II, Q.
84, A. 2) pride is the queen and mother of all the vices.

Reply Obj. 2: Praise and honor, as stated above (A. 2), stand in
relation to glory as the causes from which it proceeds, so that glory
is compared to them as their end. For the reason why a man loves to
be honored and praised is that he thinks thereby to acquire a certain
renown in the knowledge of others.

Reply Obj. 3: Vainglory stands prominent under the aspect of
desirability, for the reason given above, and this suffices for it to
be reckoned a capital vice. Nor is it always necessary for a capital
vice to be a mortal sin; for mortal sin can arise from venial sin,
inasmuch as venial sin can dispose man thereto.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 132, Art. 5]

Whether the Daughters of Vainglory Are Suitably Reckoned to Be
Disobedience, Boastfulness, Hypocrisy, Contention, Obstinacy,
Discord, and Love of Novelties?

Objection 1: It seems that the daughters of vainglory are unsuitably
reckoned to be "disobedience, boastfulness, hypocrisy, contention,
obstinacy, discord, and eccentricity [*_Praesumptio novitatum,_
literally 'presumption of novelties']." For according to Gregory
(Moral. xxiii) boastfulness is numbered among the species of pride.
Now pride does not arise from vainglory, rather is it the other way
about, as Gregory says (Moral. xxxi). Therefore boastfulness should
not be reckoned among the daughters of vainglory.

Obj. 2: Further, contention and discord seem to be the outcome
chiefly of anger. But anger is a capital vice condivided with
vainglory. Therefore it seems that they are not the daughters of
vainglory.

Obj. 3: Further, Chrysostom says (Hom. xix in Matth.) that vainglory
is always evil, but especially in philanthropy, i.e. mercy. And yet
this is nothing new, for it is an established custom among men.
Therefore eccentricity should not be specially reckoned as a daughter
of vainglory.

_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi), who
there assigns the above daughters to vainglory.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 34, A. 5; Q. 35, A. 4; I-II, Q.
84, AA. 3, 4), the vices which by their very nature are such as to be
directed to the end of a certain capital vice, are called its
daughters. Now the end of vainglory is the manifestation of one's own
excellence, as stated above (AA. 1, 4): and to this end a man may
tend in two ways. In one way directly, either by words, and this is
boasting, or by deeds, and then if they be true and call for
astonishment, it is love of novelties which men are wont to wonder at
most; but if they be false, it is hypocrisy. In another way a man
strives to make known his excellence by showing that he is not
inferior to another, and this in four ways. First, as regards the
intellect, and thus we have _obstinacy,_ by which a man is too much
attached to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe one that is
better. Secondly, as regards the will, and then we have _discord,_
whereby a man is unwilling to give up his own will, and agree with
others. Thirdly, as regards _speech,_ and then we have _contention,_
whereby a man quarrels noisily with another. Fourthly as regards
deeds, and this is _disobedience,_ whereby a man refuses to carry out
the command of his superiors.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 112, A. 1, ad 2), boasting is
reckoned a kind of pride, as regards its interior cause, which is
arrogance: but outward boasting, according to _Ethic._ iv, is
directed sometimes to gain, but more often to glory and honor, and
thus it is the result of vainglory.

Reply Obj. 2: Anger is not the cause of discord and contention,
except in conjunction with vainglory, in that a man thinks it a
glorious thing for him not to yield to the will and words of others.

Reply Obj. 3: Vainglory is reproved in connection with almsdeeds on
account of the lack of charity apparent in one who prefers vainglory
to the good of his neighbor, seeing that he does the latter for the
sake of the former. But a man is not reproved for presuming to give
alms as though this were something novel.
_______________________

QUESTION 133

OF PUSILLANIMITY
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider pusillanimity. Under this head there are two
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether pusillanimity is a sin?

(2) To what virtue is it opposed?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 133, Art. 1]

Whether Pusillanimity Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that pusillanimity is not a sin. For every sin
makes a man evil, just as every virtue makes a man good. But a
fainthearted man is not evil, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3).
Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "a
fainthearted man is especially one who is worthy of great goods, yet
does not deem himself worthy of them." Now no one is worthy of great
goods except the virtuous, since as the Philosopher again says
(Ethic. iv, 3), "none but the virtuous are truly worthy of honor."
Therefore the fainthearted are virtuous: and consequently
pusillanimity is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, "Pride is the beginning of all sin" (Ecclus. 10:15).
But pusillanimity does not proceed from pride, since the proud man
sets himself above what he is, while the fainthearted man withdraws
from the things he is worthy of. Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.

Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "he who
deems himself less worthy than he is, is said to be fainthearted."
Now sometimes holy men deem themselves less worthy than they are; for
instance, Moses and Jeremias, who were worthy of the office God chose
them for, which they both humbly declined (Ex. 3:11; Jer. 1:6).
Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ Nothing in human conduct is to be avoided save
sin. Now pusillanimity is to be avoided: for it is written (Col.
3:21): "Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest they
be discouraged." Therefore pusillanimity is a sin.

_I answer that,_ Whatever is contrary to a natural inclination is a
sin, because it is contrary to a law of nature. Now everything has a
natural inclination to accomplish an action that is commensurate with
its power: as is evident in all natural things, whether animate or
inanimate. Now just as presumption makes a man exceed what is
proportionate to his power, by striving to do more than he can, so
pusillanimity makes a man fall short of what is proportionate to his
power, by refusing to tend to that which is commensurate thereto.
Wherefore as presumption is a sin, so is pusillanimity. Hence it is
that the servant who buried in the earth the money he had received
from his master, and did not trade with it through fainthearted fear,
was punished by his master (Matt. 25; Luke 19).

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher calls those evil who injure their
neighbor: and accordingly the fainthearted is said not to be evil,
because he injures no one, save accidentally, by omitting to do what
might be profitable to others. For Gregory says (Pastoral. i) that if
"they who demur to do good to their neighbor in preaching be judged
strictly, without doubt their guilt is proportionate to the good they
might have done had they been less retiring."

Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders a person who has a virtuous habit from
sinning venially and without losing the habit, or mortally and with
loss of the habit of gratuitous virtue. Hence it is possible for a
man, by reason of the virtue which he has, to be worthy of doing
certain great things that are worthy of great honor, and yet through
not trying to make use of his virtue, he sins sometimes venially,
sometimes mortally.

Again it may be replied that the fainthearted is worthy of great
things in proportion to his ability for virtue, ability which he
derives either from a good natural disposition, or from science, or
from external fortune, and if he fails to use those things for
virtue, he becomes guilty of pusillanimity.

Reply Obj. 3: Even pusillanimity may in some way be the result of
pride: when, to wit, a man clings too much to his own opinion,
whereby he thinks himself incompetent for those things for which he
is competent. Hence it is written (Prov. 26:16): "The sluggard is
wiser in his own conceit than seven men that speak sentences." For
nothing hinders him from depreciating himself in some things, and
having a high opinion of himself in others. Wherefore Gregory says
(Pastoral. i) of Moses that "perchance he would have been proud, had
he undertaken the leadership of a numerous people without misgiving:
and again he would have been proud, had he refused to obey the
command of his Creator."

Reply Obj. 4: Moses and Jeremias were worthy of the office to which
they were appointed by God, but their worthiness was of Divine grace:
yet they, considering the insufficiency of their own weakness,
demurred; though not obstinately lest they should fall into pride.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 133, Art. 2]

Whether Pusillanimity Is Opposed to Magnanimity?

Objection 1: It seems that pusillanimity is not opposed to
magnanimity. For the Philosopher says (Ethic., 3) that "the
fainthearted man knows not himself: for he would desire the good
things, of which he is worthy, if he knew himself." Now ignorance of
self seems opposed to prudence. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to
prudence.

Obj. 2: Further our Lord calls the servant wicked and slothful who
through pusillanimity refused to make use of the money. Moreover the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the fainthearted seem to be
slothful. Now sloth is opposed to solicitude, which is an act of
prudence, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 9). Therefore pusillanimity is
not opposed to magnanimity.

Obj. 3: Further, pusillanimity seems to proceed from inordinate fear:
hence it is written (Isa. 35:4): "Say to the fainthearted: Take
courage and fear not." It also seems to proceed from inordinate
anger, according to Col. 3:21, "Fathers, provoke not your children to
indignation, lest they be discouraged." Now inordinate fear is
opposed to fortitude, and inordinate anger to meekness. Therefore
pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity.

Obj. 4: Further, the vice that is in opposition to a particular
virtue is the more grievous according as it is more unlike that
virtue. Now pusillanimity is more unlike magnanimity than presumption
is. Therefore if pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity, it follows
that it is a more grievous sin than presumption: yet this is contrary
to the saying of Ecclus. 37:3, "O wicked presumption, whence camest
thou?" Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity.

_On the contrary,_ Pusillanimity and magnanimity differ as greatness
and littleness of soul, as their very names denote. Now great and
little are opposites. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to
magnanimity.

_I answer that,_ Pusillanimity may be considered in three ways.
First, in itself; and thus it is evident that by its very nature it
is opposed to magnanimity, from which it differs as great and little
differ in connection with the same subject. For just as the
magnanimous man tends to great things out of greatness of soul, so
the pusillanimous man shrinks from great things out of littleness of
soul. Secondly, it may be considered in reference to its cause, which
on the part of the intellect is ignorance of one's own qualification,
and on the part of the appetite is the fear of failure in what one
falsely deems to exceed one's ability. Thirdly, it may be considered
in reference to its effect, which is to shrink from the great things
of which one is worthy. But, as stated above (Q. 132, A. 2, ad 3),
opposition between vice and virtue depends rather on their respective
species than on their cause or effect. Hence pusillanimity is
directly opposed to magnanimity.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers pusillanimity as proceeding
from a cause in the intellect. Yet it cannot be said properly that it
is opposed to prudence, even in respect of its cause: because
ignorance of this kind does not proceed from indiscretion but from
laziness in considering one's own ability, according to _Ethic._ iv,
3, or in accomplishing what is within one's power.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers pusillanimity from the point of
view of its effect.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the point of view of cause. Nor
is the fear that causes pusillanimity always a fear of the dangers of
death: wherefore it does not follow from this standpoint that
pusillanimity is opposed to fortitude. As regards anger, if we
consider it under the aspect of its proper movement, whereby a man is
roused to take vengeance, it does not cause pusillanimity, which
disheartens the soul; on the contrary, it takes it away. If, however,
we consider the causes of anger, which are injuries inflicted whereby
the soul of the man who suffers them is disheartened, it conduces to
pusillanimity.

Reply Obj. 4: According to its proper species pusillanimity is a
graver sin than presumption, since thereby a man withdraws from good
things, which is a very great evil according to _Ethic._ iv.
Presumption, however, is stated to be "wicked" on account of pride
whence it proceeds.
_______________________

QUESTION 134

OF MAGNIFICENCE
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider magnificence and the vices opposed to it. With
regard to magnificence there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether magnificence is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a special virtue?

(3) What is its matter?

(4) Whether it is a part of fortitude?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 134, Art. 1]

Whether Magnificence Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a virtue. For whoever
has one virtue has all the virtues, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A.
1). But one may have the other virtues without having magnificence:
because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "not every liberal
man is magnificent." Therefore magnificence is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, moral virtue observes the mean, according to
_Ethic._ ii, 6. But magnificence does not seemingly observe the mean,
for it exceeds liberality in greatness. Now "great" and "little" are
opposed to one another as extremes, the mean of which is "equal," as
stated in _Metaph._ x. Hence magnificence observes not the mean, but
the extreme. Therefore it is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, no virtue is opposed to a natural inclination, but
on the contrary perfects it, as stated above (Q. 108, A. 2; Q. 117,
A. 1, Obj. 1). Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 2) the
"magnificent man is not lavish towards himself": and this is opposed
to the natural inclination one has to look after oneself. Therefore
magnificence is not a virtue.

Obj. 4: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 4) "act is
right reason about things to be made." Now magnificence is about
things to be made, as its very name denotes [*Magnificence = _magna
facere_--i.e. to make great things]. Therefore it is an act rather
than a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Human virtue is a participation of Divine power.
But magnificence (_virtutis_) belongs to Divine power, according to
Ps. 47:35: "His magnificence and His power is in the clouds."
Therefore magnificence is a virtue.

_I answer that,_ According to _De Coelo_ i, 16, "we speak of virtue
in relation to the extreme limit of a thing's power," not as regards
the limit of deficiency, but as regards the limit of excess, the very
nature of which denotes something great. Wherefore to do something
great, whence magnificence takes its name, belongs properly to the
very notion of virtue. Hence magnificence denotes a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: Not every liberal man is magnificent as regards his
actions, because he lacks the wherewithal to perform magnificent
deeds. Nevertheless every liberal man has the habit of magnificence,
either actually or in respect of a proximate disposition thereto, as
explained above (Q. 129, A. 3, ad 2), as also (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1)
when we were treating of the connection of virtues.

Reply Obj. 2: It is true that magnificence observes the extreme, if
we consider the quantity of the thing done: yet it observes the mean,
if we consider the rule of reason, which it neither falls short of
nor exceeds, as we have also said of magnanimity (Q. 129, A. 3, ad 1).

Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to magnificence to do something great. But
that which regards a man's person is little in comparison with that
which regards Divine things, or even the affairs of the community at
large. Wherefore the magnificent man does not intend principally to
be lavish towards himself, not that he does not seek his own good,
but because to do so is not something great. Yet if anything
regarding himself admits of greatness, the magnificent man
accomplishes it magnificently: for instance, things that are done
once, such as a wedding, or the like; or things that are of a lasting
nature; thus it belongs to a magnificent man to provide himself with
a suitable dwelling, as stated in _Ethic._ iv.

Reply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) "there must
needs be a virtue of act," i.e. a moral virtue, whereby the appetite
is inclined to make good use of the rule of act: and this is what
magnificence does. Hence it is not an act but a virtue.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 134, Art. 2]

Whether Magnificence Is a Special Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a special virtue. For
magnificence would seem to consist in doing something great. But it
may belong to any virtue to do something great, if the virtue be
great: as in the case of one who has a great virtue of temperance,
for he does a great work of temperance. Therefore, magnificence is
not a special virtue, but denotes a perfect degree of any virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, seemingly that which tends to a thing is the same as
that which does it. But it belongs to magnanimity to tend to
something great, as stated above (Q. 129, AA. 1, 2). Therefore it
belongs to magnanimity likewise to do something great. Therefore
magnificence is not a special virtue distinct from magnanimity.

Obj. 3: Further, magnificence seems to belong to holiness, for it is
written (Ex. 15:11): "Magnificent [Douay: 'glorious'] in holiness,"
and (Ps. 95:6): "Holiness and magnificence [Douay: 'Majesty'] in His
sanctuary." Now holiness is the same as religion, as stated above (Q.
81, A. 8). Therefore magnificence is apparently the same as religion.
Therefore it is not a special virtue, distinct from the others.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher reckons it with other special
virtues (Ethic. ii, 7; iv 2).

_I answer that,_ It belongs to magnificence to do (_facere_)
something great, as its name implies [* magnificence = _magna
facere_--i.e. to make great things]. Now _facere_ may be taken in two
ways, in a strict sense, and in a broad sense. Strictly _facere_
means to work something in external matter, for instance to make a
house, or something of the kind; in a broad sense _facere_ is
employed to denote any action, whether it passes into external
matter, as to burn or cut, or remain in the agent, as to understand
or will.

Accordingly if magnificence be taken to denote the doing of something
great, the doing (_factio_) being understood in the strict sense, it
is then a special virtue. For the work done is produced by act: in
the use of which it is possible to consider a special aspect of
goodness, namely that the work produced (_factum_) by the act is
something great, namely in quantity, value, or dignity, and this is
what magnificence does. In this way magnificence is a special virtue.

If, on the other hand, magnificence take its name from doing
something great, the doing (_facere_) being understood in a broad
sense, it is not a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to every perfect virtue to do something
great in the genus of that virtue, if "doing" (_facere_) be taken in
the broad sense, but not if it be taken strictly, for this is proper
to magnificence.

Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to magnanimity not only to tend to something
great, but also to do great works in all the virtues, either by
making (_faciendo_), or by any kind of action, as stated in _Ethic._
iv, 3: yet so that magnanimity, in this respect, regards the sole
aspect of great, while the other virtues which, if they be perfect,
do something great, direct their principal intention, not to
something great, but to that which is proper to each virtue: and the
greatness of the thing done is sometimes consequent upon the
greatness of the virtue.

On the other hand, it belongs to magnificence not only to do
something great, "doing" (_facere_) being taken in the strict sense,
but also to tend with the mind to the doing of great things. Hence
Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "magnificence is the discussing
and administering of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain
broad and noble purpose of mind," "discussion" referring to the
inward intention, and "administration" to the outward accomplishment.
Wherefore just as magnanimity intends something great in every
matter, it follows that magnificence does the same in every work that
can be produced in external matter (_factibili_).

Reply Obj. 3: The intention of magnificence is the production
of a great work. Now works done by men are directed to an end: and no
end of human works is so great as the honor of God: wherefore
magnificence does a great work especially in reference to the Divine
honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the most
commendable expenditure is that which is directed to Divine
sacrifices": and this is the chief object of magnificence. For this
reason magnificence is connected with holiness, since its chief effect
is directed to religion or holiness.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 134, Art. 3]

Whether the Matter of Magnificence Is Great Expenditure?

Objection 1: It seems that the matter of magnificence is not great
expenditure. For there are not two virtues about the same matter. But
liberality is about expenditure, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 2).
Therefore magnificence is not about expenditure.

Obj. 2: Further, "every magnificent man is liberal" (Ethic. iv, 2).
But liberality is about gifts rather than about expenditure.
Therefore magnificence also is not chiefly about expenditure, but
about gifts.

Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to magnificence to produce an external
work. But not even great expenditure is always the means of producing
an external work, for instance when one spends much in sending
presents. Therefore expenditure is not the proper matter of
magnificence.

Obj. 4: Further, only the rich are capable of great expenditure. But
the poor are able to possess all the virtues, since "the virtues do
not necessarily require external fortune, but are sufficient for
themselves," as Seneca says (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi). Therefore
magnificence is not about great expenditure.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that
"magnificence does not extend, like liberality, to all transactions
in money, but only to expensive ones, wherein it exceeds liberality
in scale." Therefore it is only about great expenditure.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), it belongs to magnificence
to intend doing some great work. Now for the doing of a great work,
proportionate expenditure is necessary, for great works cannot be
produced without great expenditure. Hence it belongs to magnificence
to spend much in order that some great work may be accomplished in
becoming manner. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that
"a magnificent man will produce a more magnificent work with equal,"
i.e. proportionate, "expenditure." Now expenditure is the outlay of a
sum of money; and a man may be hindered from making that outlay if he
love money too much. Hence the matter of magnificence may be said to
be both this expenditure itself, which the magnificent man uses to
produce a great work, and also the very money which he employs in
going to great expense, and as well as the love of money, which love
the magnificent man moderates, lest he be hindered from spending much.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 129, A. 2), those virtues that are
about external things experience a certain difficulty arising from
the genus itself of the thing about which the virtue is concerned,
and another difficulty besides arising from the greatness of that
same thing. Hence the need for two virtues, concerned about money and
its use; namely, liberality, which regards the use of money in
general, and magnificence, which regards that which is great in the
use of money.

Reply Obj. 2: The use of money regards the liberal man in one way and
the magnificent man in another. For it regards the liberal man,
inasmuch as it proceeds from an ordinate affection in respect of
money; wherefore all due use of money (such as gifts and
expenditure), the obstacles to which are removed by a moderate love
of money, belongs to liberality. But the use of money regards the
magnificent man in relation to some great work which has to be
produced, and this use is impossible without expenditure or outlay.

Reply Obj. 3: The magnificent man also makes gifts of presents, as
stated in _Ethic._ iv, 2, but not under the aspect of gift, but
rather under the aspect of expenditure directed to the production of
some work, for instance in order to honor someone, or in order to do
something which will reflect honor on the whole state: as when he
brings to effect what the whole state is striving for.

Reply Obj. 4: The chief act of virtue is the inward choice, and a
virtue may have this without outward fortune: so that even a poor man
may be magnificent. But goods of fortune are requisite as instruments
to the external acts of virtue: and in this way a poor man cannot
accomplish the outward act of magnificence in things that are great
simply. Perhaps, however, he may be able to do so in things that are
great by comparison to some particular work; which, though little in
itself, can nevertheless be done magnificently in proportion to its
genus: for little and great are relative terms, as the Philosopher
says (De Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.).
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 134, Art. 4]

Whether Magnificence Is a Part of Fortitude?

Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a part of fortitude.
For magnificence agrees in matter with liberality, as stated above
(A. 3). But liberality is a part, not of fortitude, but of justice.
Therefore magnificence is not a part of fortitude.

Obj. 2: Further, fortitude is about fear and darings. But
magnificence seems to have nothing to do with fear, but only with
expenditure, which is a kind of action. Therefore magnificence seems
to pertain to justice, which is about actions, rather than to
fortitude.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "the
magnificent man is like the man of science." Now science has more in
common with prudence than with fortitude. Therefore magnificence
should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.

_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) and Macrobius (De
Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnificence to be a part of
fortitude.

_I answer that,_ Magnificence, in so far as it is a special virtue,
cannot be reckoned a subjective part of fortitude, since it does not
agree with this virtue in the point of matter: but it is reckoned a
part thereof, as being annexed to it as secondary to principal virtue.

In order for a virtue to be annexed to a principal virtue, two things
are necessary, as stated above (Q. 80). The one is that the secondary
virtue agree with the principal, and the other is that in some
respect it be exceeded thereby. Now magnificence agrees with
fortitude in the point that as fortitude tends to something arduous
and difficult, so also does magnificence: wherefore seemingly it is
seated, like fortitude, in the irascible. Yet magnificence falls
short of fortitude, in that the arduous thing to which fortitude
tends derives its difficulty from a danger that threatens the person,
whereas the arduous thing to which magnificence tends, derives its
difficulty from the dispossession of one's property, which is of much
less account than danger to one's person. Wherefore magnificence is
accounted a part of fortitude.

Reply Obj. 1: Justice regards operations in themselves, as viewed
under the aspect of something due: but liberality and magnificence
regard sumptuary operations as related to the passions of the soul,
albeit in different ways. For liberality regards expenditure in
reference to the love and desire of money, which are passions of the
concupiscible faculty, and do not hinder the liberal man from giving
and spending: so that this virtue is in the concupiscible. On the
other hand, magnificence regards expenditure in reference to hope, by
attaining to the difficulty, not simply, as magnanimity does, but in
a determinate matter, namely expenditure: wherefore magnificence,
like magnanimity, is apparently in the irascible part.

Reply Obj. 2: Although magnificence does not agree with fortitude in
matter, it agrees with it as the condition of its matter: since it
tends to something difficult in the matter of expenditure, even as
fortitude tends to something difficult in the matter of fear.

Reply Obj. 3: Magnificence directs the use of art to something great,
as stated above and in the preceding Article. Now art is in the
reason. Wherefore it belongs to the magnificent man to use his reason
by observing proportion of expenditure to the work he has in hand.
This is especially necessary on account of the greatness of both
those things, since if he did not take careful thought, he would
incur the risk of a great loss.
_______________________

QUESTION 135

OF MEANNESS*
(In Two Articles)
[*"Parvificentia," or doing mean things, just as "magnificentia" is
doing great things.]

We must now consider the vices opposed to magnificence: under which
head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether meanness is a vice?

(2) Of the vice opposed to it.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 135, Art. 1]

Whether Meanness Is a Vice?

Objection 1: It seems that meanness is not a vice. For just as vice
moderates great things, so does it moderate little things: wherefore
both the liberal and the magnificent do little things. But
magnificence is a virtue. Therefore likewise meanness is a virtue
rather than a vice.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "careful
reckoning is mean." But careful reckoning is apparently praiseworthy,
since man's good is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius
states (Div. Nom. iv, 4). Therefore meanness is not a vice.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that "a mean man
is loth to spend money." But this belongs to covetousness or
illiberality. Therefore meanness is not a distinct vice from the
others.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii) accounts meanness a
special vice opposed to magnificence.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 6),
moral acts take their species from their end, wherefore in many cases
they are denominated from that end. Accordingly a man is said to be
mean (_parvificus_) because he intends to do something little
(_parvum_). Now according to the Philosopher (De Praedic. Cap. Ad
aliquid.) great and little are relative terms: and when we say that a
mean man intends to do something little, this must be understood in
relation to the kind of work he does. This may be little or great in
two ways: in one way as regards the work itself to be done, in
another as regards the expense. Accordingly the magnificent man
intends principally the greatness of his work, and secondarily he
intends the greatness of the expense, which he does not shirk, so
that he may produce a great work. Wherefore the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 4) that "the magnificent man with equal expenditure will
produce a more magnificent result." On the other hand, the mean man
intends principally to spend little, wherefore the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 2) that "he seeks how he may spend least." As a result of
this he intends to produce a little work, that is, he does not shrink
from producing a little work, so long as he spends little. Wherefore
the Philosopher says that "the mean man after going to great expense
forfeits the good" of the magnificent work, "for the trifle" that he
is unwilling to spend. Therefore it is evident that the mean man
fails to observe the proportion that reason demands between
expenditure and work. Now the essence of vice is that it consists in
failing to do what is in accordance with reason. Hence it is manifest
that meanness is a vice.

Reply Obj. 1: Virtue moderates little things, according to the rule
of reason: from which rule the mean man declines, as stated in the
Article. For he is called mean, not for moderating little things, but
for declining from the rule of reason in moderating great or little
things: hence meanness is a vice.

Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear makes us
take counsel": wherefore a mean man is careful in his reckonings,
because he has an inordinate fear of spending his goods, even in
things of the least account. Hence this is not praiseworthy, but
sinful and reprehensible, because then a man does not regulate his
affections according to reason, but, on the contrary, makes use of
his reason in pursuance of his inordinate affections.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as the magnificent man has this in common with the
liberal man, that he spends his money readily and with pleasure, so
too the mean man in common with the illiberal or covetous man is loth
and slow to spend. Yet they differ in this, that illiberality regards
ordinary expenditure, while meanness regards great expenditure, which
is a more difficult accomplishment: wherefore meanness is less sinful
than illiberality. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that
"although meanness and its contrary vice are sinful, they do not
bring shame on a man, since neither do they harm one's neighbor, nor
are they very disgraceful."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 135, Art. 2]

Whether There Is a Vice Opposed to Meanness?

Objection 1: It seems that there is no vice opposed to meanness. For
great is opposed to little. Now, magnificence is not a vice, but a
virtue. Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.

Obj. 2: Further, since meanness is a vice by deficiency, as stated
above (A. 1), it seems that if any vice is opposed to meanness, it
would merely consist in excessive spending. But those who spend much,
where they ought to spend little, spend little where they ought to
spend much, according to _Ethic._ iv, 2, and thus they have something
of meanness. Therefore there is not a vice opposed to meanness.

Obj. 3: Further, moral acts take their species from their end, as
stated above (A. 1). Now those who spend excessively, do so in order
to make a show of their wealth, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 2. But this
belongs to vainglory, which is opposed to magnanimity, as stated
above (Q. 131, A. 2). Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.

_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of the Philosopher who
(Ethic. ii, 8; iv, 2) places magnificence as a mean between two
opposite vices.

_I answer that,_ Great is opposed to little. Also little and great
are relative terms, as stated above (A. 1). Now just as expenditure
may be little in comparison with the work, so may it be great in
comparison with the work in that it exceeds the proportion which
reason requires to exist between expenditure and work. Hence it is
manifest that the vice of meanness, whereby a man intends to spend
less than his work is worth, and thus fails to observe due proportion
between his expenditure and his work, has a vice opposed to it,
whereby a man exceeds this same proportion, by spending more than is
proportionate to his work. This vice is called in Greek _banausia_,
so called from the Greek _baunos_, because, like the fire in the
furnace, it consumes everything. It is also called _apyrokalia_, i.e.
lacking good fire, since like fire it consumes all, but not for a
good purpose. Hence in Latin it may be called _consumptio_ (waste).

Reply Obj. 1: Magnificence is so called from the great work done, but
not from the expenditure being in excess of the work: for this
belongs to the vice which is opposed to meanness.

Reply Obj. 2: To the one same vice there is opposed the virtue which
observes the mean, and a contrary vice. Accordingly, then, the vice
of waste is opposed to meanness in that it exceeds in expenditure the
value of the work, by spending much where it behooved to spend
little. But it is opposed to magnificence on the part of the great
work, which the magnificent man intends principally, in so far as
when it behooves to spend much, it spends little or nothing.

Reply Obj. 3: Wastefulness is opposed to meanness by the very species
of its act, since it exceeds the rule of reason, whereas meanness
falls short of it. Yet nothing hinders this from being directed to
the end of another vice, such as vainglory or any other.
_______________________

QUESTION 136

OF PATIENCE
(In Five Articles)

We must now consider patience. Under this head there are five points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether patience is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues?

(3) Whether it can be had without grace?

(4) Whether it is a part of fortitude?

(5) Whether it is the same as longanimity?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 136, Art. 1]

Whether Patience Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that patience is not a virtue. For the virtues
are most perfect in heaven, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv). Yet
patience is not there, since no evils have to be borne there,
according to Isa. 49:10 and Apoc. 7:16, "They shall not hunger nor
thirst, neither shall the heat nor the sun strike them." Therefore
patience is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, no virtue can be found in the wicked, since virtue
it is "that makes its possessor good." Yet patience is sometimes
found in wicked men; for instance, in the covetous, who bear many
evils patiently that they may amass money, according to Eccles. 5:16,
"All the days of his life he eateth in darkness, and in many cares,
and in misery and in sorrow." Therefore patience is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, the fruits differ from the virtues, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 70, A. 1, ad 3). But patience is reckoned among the fruits
(Gal. 5:22). Therefore patience is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Patientia i): "The virtue of
the soul that is called patience, is so great a gift of God, that we
even preach the patience of Him who bestows it upon us."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 1), the moral virtues
are directed to the good, inasmuch as they safeguard the good of
reason against the impulse of the passions. Now among the passions
sorrow is strong to hinder the good of reason, according to 2 Cor.
7:10, "The sorrow of the world worketh death," and Ecclus. 30:25,
"Sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it." Hence the
necessity for a virtue to safeguard the good of reason against
sorrow, lest reason give way to sorrow: and this patience does.
Wherefore Augustine says (De Patientia ii): "A man's patience it is
whereby he bears evil with an equal mind," i.e. without being
disturbed by sorrow, "lest he abandon with an unequal mind the goods
whereby he may advance to better things." It is therefore evident
that patience is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: The moral virtues do not remain in heaven as regards
the same act that they have on the way, in relation, namely, to the
goods of the present life, which will not remain in heaven: but they
will remain in their relation to the end, which will be in heaven.
Thus justice will not be in heaven in relation to buying and selling
and other matters pertaining to the present life, but it will remain
in the point of being subject to God. In like manner the act of
patience, in heaven, will not consist in bearing things, but in
enjoying the goods to which we had aspired by suffering. Hence
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv) that "patience itself will not be in
heaven, since there is no need for it except where evils have to be
borne: yet that which we shall obtain by patience will be eternal."

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Patientia ii; v) "properly
speaking those are patient who would rather bear evils without
inflicting them, than inflict them without bearing them. As for those
who bear evils that they may inflict evil, their patience is neither
marvelous nor praiseworthy, for it is no patience at all: we may
marvel at their hardness of heart, but we must refuse to call them
patient."

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (I-II, Q. 11, A. 1), the very notion of
fruit denotes pleasure. And works of virtue afford pleasure in
themselves, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 8. Now the names of the virtues
are wont to be applied to their acts. Wherefore patience as a habit
is a virtue, but as to the pleasure which its act affords, it is
reckoned a fruit, especially in this, that patience safeguards the
mind from being overcome by sorrow.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 136, Art. 2]

Whether Patience Is the Greatest of the Virtues?

Objection 1: It seems that patience is the greatest of the virtues.
For in every genus that which is perfect is the greatest. Now
"patience hath a perfect work" (James 1:4). Therefore patience is the
greatest of the virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, all the virtues are directed to the good of the
soul. Now this seems to belong chiefly to patience; for it is written
(Luke 21:19): "In your patience you shall possess your souls."
Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, seemingly that which is the safeguard and cause of
other things is greater than they are. But according to Gregory (Hom.
xxxv in Evang.) "patience is the root and safeguard of all the
virtues." Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.

_On the contrary,_ It is not reckoned among the four virtues which
Gregory (Moral. xxii) and Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv) call
principal.

_I answer that,_ Virtues by their very nature are directed to good.
For it is virtue that "makes its possessor good, and renders the
latter's work good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Hence it follows that a virtue's
superiority and preponderance over other virtues is the greater
according as it inclines man to good more effectively and directly.
Now those virtues which are effective of good, incline a man more
directly to good than those which are a check on the things which
lead man away from good: and just as among those that are effective
of good, the greater is that which establishes man in a greater good
(thus faith, hope, and charity are greater than prudence and
justice); so too among those that are a check on things that withdraw
man from good, the greater virtue is the one which is a check on a
greater obstacle to good. But dangers of death, about which is
fortitude, and pleasures of touch, with which temperance is
concerned, withdraw man from good more than any kind of hardship,
which is the object of patience. Therefore patience is not the
greatest of the virtues, but falls short, not only of the theological
virtues, and of prudence and justice which directly establish man in
good, but also of fortitude and temperance which withdraw him from
greater obstacles to good.

Reply Obj. 1: Patience is said to have a perfect work in bearing
hardships: for these give rise first to sorrow, which is moderated by
patience; secondly, to anger, which is moderated by meekness;
thirdly, to hatred, which charity removes; fourthly, to unjust
injury, which justice forbids. Now that which removes the principle
is the most perfect.

Yet it does not follow, if patience be more perfect in this respect,
that it is more perfect simply.

Reply Obj. 2: Possession denotes undisturbed ownership; wherefore man
is said to possess his soul by patience, in so far as it removes by
the root the passions that are evoked by hardships and disturb the
soul.

Reply Obj. 3: Patience is said to be the root and safeguard of all
the virtues, not as though it caused and preserved them directly, but
merely because it removes their obstacles.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 136, Art. 3]

Whether It Is Possible to Have Patience Without Grace?

Objection 1: It seems that it is possible to have patience without
grace. For the more his reason inclines to a thing, the more is it
possible for the rational creature to accomplish it. Now it is more
reasonable to suffer evil for the sake of good than for the sake of
evil. Yet some suffer evil for evil's sake, by their own virtue and
without the help of grace; for Augustine says (De Patientia iii) that
"men endure many toils and sorrows for the sake of the things they
love sinfully." Much more, therefore, is it possible for man, without
the help of grace, to bear evil for the sake of good, and this is to
be truly patient.

Obj. 2: Further, some who are not in a state of grace have more
abhorrence for sinful evils than for bodily evils: hence some
heathens are related to have endured many hardships rather than
betray their country or commit some other misdeed. Now this is to be
truly patient. Therefore it seems that it is possible to have
patience without the help of grace.

Obj. 3: Further, it is quite evident that some go through much
trouble and pain in order to regain health of the body. Now the
health of the soul is not less desirable than bodily health.
Therefore in like manner one may, without the help of grace, endure
many evils for the health of the soul, and this is to be truly
patient.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 61:6): "From Him," i.e. from
God, "is my patience."

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Patientia iv), "the strength
of desire helps a man to bear toil and pain: and no one willingly
undertakes to bear what is painful, save for the sake of that which
gives pleasure." The reason of this is because sorrow and pain are of
themselves displeasing to the soul, wherefore it would never choose
to suffer them for their own sake, but only for the sake of an end.
Hence it follows that the good for the sake of which one is willing
to endure evils, is more desired and loved than the good the
privation of which causes the sorrow that we bear patiently. Now the
fact that a man prefers the good of grace to all natural goods, the
loss of which may cause sorrow, is to be referred to charity, which
loves God above all things. Hence it is evident that patience, as a
virtue, is caused by charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:4, "Charity is
patient."

But it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity save through
grace, according to Rom. 5:5, "The charity of God is poured forth in
our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us." Therefore it is
clearly impossible to have patience without the help of grace.

Reply Obj. 1: The inclination of reason would prevail in human nature
in the state of integrity. But in corrupt nature the inclination of
concupiscence prevails, because it is dominant in man. Hence man is
more prone to bear evils for the sake of goods in which the
concupiscence delights here and now, than to endure evils for the
sake of goods to come, which are desired in accordance with reason:
and yet it is this that pertains to true patience.

Reply Obj. 2: The good of a social virtue [*Cf. I-II, Q. 61, A. 5] is
commensurate with human nature; and consequently the human will can
tend thereto without the help of sanctifying grace, yet not without
the help of God's grace [*Cf. I-II, Q. 109, A. 2]. On the other hand,
the good of grace is supernatural, wherefore man cannot tend thereto
by a natural virtue. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 3: Even the endurance of those evils which a man
bears for the sake of his body's health, proceeds from the love a man
naturally has for his own flesh. Hence there is no comparison between
this endurance and patience which proceeds from a supernatural love.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 136, Art. 4]

Whether Patience Is a Part of Fortitude?

Objection 1: It seems that patience is not a part of fortitude. For a
thing is not part of itself. Now patience is apparently the same as
fortitude: because, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 6), the proper act of
fortitude is to endure; and this belongs also to patience. For it is
stated in the Liber Sententiarum Prosperi [*The quotation is from St.
Gregory, Hom. xxxv in Evang.] that "patience consists in enduring
evils inflicted by others." Therefore patience is not a part of
fortitude.

Obj. 2: Further, fortitude is about fear and daring, as stated above
(Q. 123, A. 3), and thus it is in the irascible. But patience seems
to be about sorrow, and consequently would seem to be in the
concupiscible. Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude but of
temperance.

Obj. 3: Further, the whole cannot be without its part. Therefore if
patience is a part of fortitude, there can be no fortitude without
patience. Yet sometimes a brave man does not endure evils patiently,
but even attacks the person who inflicts the evil. Therefore patience
is not a part of fortitude.

_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of
fortitude.

_I answer that,_ Patience is a quasi-potential part of fortitude,
because it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal virtue. For
it belongs to patience "to suffer with an equal mind the evils
inflicted by others," as Gregory says in a homily (xxxv in Evang.).
Now of those evils that are inflicted by others, foremost and most
difficult to endure are those that are connected with the danger of
death, and about these evils fortitude is concerned. Hence it is
clear that in this matter fortitude has the principal place, and that
it lays claim to that which is principal in this matter. Wherefore
patience is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue,
for which reason Prosper calls patience brave (Sent. 811).

Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to fortitude to endure, not anything indeed,
but that which is most difficult to endure, namely dangers of death:
whereas it may pertain to patience to endure any kind of evil.

Reply Obj. 2: The act of fortitude consists not only in holding fast
to good against the fear of future dangers, but also in not failing
through sorrow or pain occasioned by things present; and it is in the
latter respect that patience is akin to fortitude. Yet fortitude is
chiefly about fear, which of itself evokes flight which fortitude
avoids; while patience is chiefly about sorrow, for a man is said to
be patient, not because he does not fly, but because he behaves in a
praiseworthy manner by suffering (_patiendo_) things which hurt him
here and now, in such a way as not to be inordinately saddened by
them. Hence fortitude is properly in the irascible, while patience is
in the concupiscible faculty.

Nor does this hinder patience from being a part of fortitude, because
the annexing of virtue to virtue does not regard the subject, but the
matter or the form. Nevertheless patience is not to be reckoned a
part of temperance, although both are in the concupiscible, because
temperance is only about those sorrows that are opposed to pleasures
of touch, such as arise through abstinence from pleasures of food and
sex: whereas patience is chiefly about sorrows inflicted by other
persons. Moreover it belongs to temperance to control these sorrows
besides their contrary pleasures: whereas it belongs to patience that
a man forsake not the good of virtue on account of such like sorrows,
however great they be.

Reply Obj. 3: It may be granted that patience in a certain respect is
an integral part of justice, if we consider the fact that a man may
patiently endure evils pertaining to dangers of death; and it is from
this point of view that the objection argues. Nor is it inconsistent
with patience that a man should, when necessary, rise up against the
man who inflicts evils on him; for Chrysostom [*Homily v. in the Opus
Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says on Matt.
4:10, "Begone Satan," that "it is praiseworthy to be patient under
our own wrongs, but to endure God's wrongs patiently is most wicked":
and Augustine says in a letter to Marcellinus (Ep. cxxxviii) that
"the precepts of patience are not opposed to the good of the
commonwealth, since in order to ensure that good we fight against our
enemies." But in so far as patience regards all kinds of evils, it is
annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 136, Art. 5]

Whether Patience Is the Same As Longanimity?* [*Longsuffering. It is
necessary to preserve the Latin word, on account of the comparison
with magnanimity.]

Objection 1: It seems that patience is the same as longanimity. For
Augustine says (De Patientia i) that "we speak of patience in God,
not as though any evil made Him suffer, but because He awaits the
wicked, that they may be converted." Wherefore it is written (Ecclus.
5:4): "The Most High is a patient rewarder." Therefore it seems that
patience is the same as longanimity.

Obj. 2: Further, the same thing is not contrary to two things. But
impatience is contrary to longanimity, whereby one awaits a delay:
for one is said to be impatient of delay, as of other evils.
Therefore it seems that patience is the same as longanimity.

Obj. 3: Further, just as time is a circumstance of wrongs endured, so
is place. But no virtue is distinct from patience on the score of
place. Therefore in like manner longanimity which takes count of
time, in so far as a person waits for a long time, is not distinct
from patience.

Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ a gloss [*Origen, Comment. in Ep. ad Rom.
ii] on Rom. 2:4, "Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and
patience, and longsuffering?" says: "It seems that longanimity
differs from patience, because those who offend from weakness rather
than of set purpose are said to be borne with longanimity: while
those who take a deliberate delight in their crimes are said to be
borne patiently."

_I answer that,_ Just as by magnanimity a man has a mind to tend to
great things, so by longanimity a man has a mind to tend to something
a long way off. Wherefore as magnanimity regards hope, which tends to
good, rather than daring, fear, or sorrow, which have evil as their
object, so also does longanimity. Hence longanimity has more in
common with magnanimity than with patience.

Nevertheless it may have something in common with patience, for two
reasons. First, because patience, like fortitude, endures certain
evils for the sake of good, and if this good is awaited shortly,
endurance is easier: whereas if it be delayed a long time, it is more
difficult. Secondly, because the very delay of the good we hope for,
is of a nature to cause sorrow, according to Prov. 13:12, "Hope that
is deferred afflicteth the soul." Hence there may be patience in
bearing this trial, as in enduring any other sorrows. Accordingly
longanimity and constancy are both comprised under patience, in so
far as both the delay of the hoped for good (which regards
longanimity) and the toil which man endures in persistently
accomplishing a good work (which regards constancy) may be considered
under the one aspect of grievous evil.

For this reason Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) in defining patience,
says that "patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance of
arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit." By
saying "arduous" he refers to constancy in good; when he says
"difficult" he refers to the grievousness of evil, which is the
proper object of patience; and by adding "continued" or "long
lasting," he refers to longanimity, in so far as it has something in
common with patience.

This suffices for the Replies to the First and Second Objections.

Reply Obj. 3: That which is a long way off as to place, though
distant from us, is not simply distant from things in nature, as that
which is a long way off in point of time: hence the comparison fails.
Moreover, what is remote as to place offers no difficulty save in the
point of time, since what is placed a long way from us is a long time
coming to us.

We grant the fourth argument. We must observe, however, that the
reason for the difference assigned by this gloss is that it is hard
to bear with those who sin through weakness, merely because they
persist a long time in evil, wherefore it is said that they are borne
with longanimity: whereas the very fact of sinning through pride
seems to be unendurable; for which reason those who sin through pride
are stated to be borne with patience.
_______________________

QUESTION 137

OF PERSEVERANCE
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider perseverance and the vices opposed to it. Under
the head of perseverance there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether perseverance is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a part of fortitude?

(3) Of its relation to constancy;

(4) Whether it needs the help of grace?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 137, Art. 1]

Whether Perseverance Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that perseverance is not a virtue. For,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), continency is greater
than perseverance. But continency is not a virtue, as stated in
_Ethic._ iv, 9. Therefore perseverance is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, "by virtue man lives aright," according to Augustine
(De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Now according to the same authority (De
Persever. i), no one can be said to have perseverance while living,
unless he persevere until death. Therefore perseverance is not a
virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, it is requisite of every virtue that one should
persist unchangeably in the work of that virtue, as stated in
_Ethic._ ii, 4. But this is what we understand by perseverance: for
Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "perseverance is the fixed and
continued persistence in a well-considered purpose." Therefore
perseverance is not a special virtue, but a condition of every virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Andronicus [*Chrysippus: in De Affect.] says that
"perseverance is a habit regarding things to which we ought to stand,
and those to which we ought not to stand, as well as those that are
indifferent." Now a habit that directs us to do something well, or to
omit something, is a virtue. Therefore perseverance is a virtue.

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3), "virtue
is about the difficult and the good"; and so where there is a special
kind of difficulty or goodness, there is a special virtue. Now a
virtuous deed may involve goodness or difficulty on two counts.
First, from the act's very species, which is considered in respect of
the proper object of that act: secondly, from the length of time,
since to persist long in something difficult involves a special
difficulty. Hence to persist long in something good until it is
accomplished belongs to a special virtue.

Accordingly just as temperance and fortitude are special virtues, for
the reason that the one moderates pleasures of touch (which is of
itself a difficult thing), while the other moderates fear and daring
in connection with dangers of death (which also is something
difficult in itself), so perseverance is a special virtue, since it
consists in enduring delays in the above or other virtuous deeds, so
far as necessity requires.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is taking perseverance there, as it is
found in one who bears those things which are most difficult to
endure long. Now it is difficult to endure, not good, but evil. And
evils that involve danger of death, for the most part are not endured
for a long time, because often they soon pass away: wherefore it is
not on this account that perseverance has its chief title to praise.
Among other evils foremost are those which are opposed to pleasures
of touch, because evils of this kind affect the necessaries of life:
such are the lack of food and the like, which at times call for long
endurance. Now it is not difficult to endure these things for a long
time for one who grieves not much at them, nor delights much in the
contrary goods; as in the case of the temperate man, in whom these
passions are not violent. But they are most difficult to bear for one
who is strongly affected by such things, through lacking the perfect
virtue that moderates these passions. Wherefore if perseverance be
taken in this sense it is not a perfect virtue, but something
imperfect in the genus of virtue. On the other hand, if we take
perseverance as denoting long persistence in any kind of difficult
good, it is consistent in one who has even perfect virtue: for even
if it is less difficult for him to persist, yet he persists in the
more perfect good. Wherefore such like perseverance may be a virtue,
because virtue derives perfection from the aspect of good rather than
from the aspect of difficulty.

Reply Obj. 2: Sometimes a virtue and its act go by the same name:
thus Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. lxxix): "Faith is to believe
without seeing." Yet it is possible to have a habit of virtue without
performing the act: thus a poor man has the habit of magnificence
without exercising the act. Sometimes, however, a person who has the
habit, begins to perform the act, yet does not accomplish it, for
instance a builder begins to build a house, but does not complete it.
Accordingly we must reply that the term "perseverance" is sometimes
used to denote the habit whereby one chooses to persevere, sometimes
for the act of persevering: and sometimes one who has the habit of
perseverance chooses to persevere and begins to carry out his choice
by persisting for a time, yet completes not the act, through not
persisting to the end. Now the end is twofold: one is the end of the
work, the other is the end of human life. Properly speaking it
belongs to perseverance to persevere to the end of the virtuous work,
for instance that a soldier persevere to the end of the fight, and
the magnificent man until his work be accomplished. There are,
however, some virtues whose acts must endure throughout the whole of
life, such as faith, hope, and charity, since they regard the last
end of the entire life of man. Wherefore as regards these which are
the principal virtues, the act of perseverance is not accomplished
until the end of life. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of
perseverance as denoting the consummate act of perseverance.

Reply Obj. 3: Unchangeable persistence may belong to a virtue in two
ways. First, on account of the intended end that is proper to that
virtue; and thus to persist in good for a long time until the end,
belongs to a special virtue called perseverance, which intends this
as its special end. Secondly, by reason of the relation of the habit
to its subject: and thus unchangeable persistence is consequent upon
every virtue, inasmuch as virtue is a "quality difficult to change."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 137, Art. 2]

Whether Perseverance Is a Part of Fortitude?

Objection 1: It seems that perseverance is not a part of fortitude.
For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 7), "perseverance is
about pains of touch." But these belong to temperance. Therefore
perseverance is a part of temperance rather than of fortitude.

Obj. 2: Further, every part of a moral virtue is about certain
passions which that virtue moderates. Now perseverance does not imply
moderation of the passions: since the more violent the passions, the
more praiseworthy is it to persevere in accordance with reason.
Therefore it seems that perseverance is a part not of a moral virtue,
but rather of prudence which perfects the reason.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Persev. i) that no one can lose
perseverance; whereas one can lose the other virtues. Therefore
perseverance is greater than all the other virtues. Now a principal
virtue is greater than its part. Therefore perseverance is not a part
of a virtue, but is itself a principal virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons perseverance
as a part of fortitude.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 2; I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3,
4), a principal virtue is one to which is principally ascribed
something that lays claim to the praise of virtue, inasmuch as it
practices it in connection with its own matter, wherein it is most
difficult of accomplishment. In accordance with this it has been
stated (Q. 123, A. 2) that fortitude is a principal virtue, because
it observes firmness in matters wherein it is most difficult to stand
firm, namely in dangers of death. Wherefore it follows of necessity
that every virtue which has a title to praise for the firm endurance
of something difficult must be annexed to fortitude as secondary to
principal virtue. Now the endurance of difficulty arising from delay
in accomplishing a good work gives perseverance its claim to praise:
nor is this so difficult as to endure dangers of death. Therefore
perseverance is annexed to fortitude, as secondary to principal
virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: The annexing of secondary to principal virtues depends
not only on the matter [*Cf. Q. 136, A. 4, ad 2], but also on the
mode, because in everything form is of more account than matter.
Wherefore although, as to matter, perseverance seems to have more in
common with temperance than with fortitude, yet, in mode, it has more
in common with fortitude, in the point of standing firm against the
difficulty arising from length of time.

Reply Obj. 2: The perseverance of which the Philosopher speaks
(Ethic. vii, 4, 7) does not moderate any passions, but consists
merely in a certain firmness of reason and will. But perseverance,
considered as a virtue, moderates certain passions, namely fear of
weariness or failure on account of the delay. Hence this virtue, like
fortitude, is in the irascible.

Reply Obj. 3: Augustine speaks there of perseverance, as denoting,
not a virtuous habit, but a virtuous act sustained to the end,
according to Matt. 24:13, "He that shall persevere to the end, he
shall be saved." Hence it is incompatible with such like perseverance
for it to be lost, since it would no longer endure to the end.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 137. Art. 3]

Whether Constancy Pertains to Perseverance?

Objection 1: It seems that constancy does not pertain to
perseverance. For constancy pertains to patience, as stated above (Q.
137, A. 5): and patience differs from perseverance. Therefore
constancy does not pertain to perseverance.

Obj. 2: Further, "virtue is about the difficult and the good." Now it
does not seem difficult to be constant in little works, but only in
great deeds, which pertain to magnificence. Therefore constancy
pertains to magnificence rather than to perseverance.

Obj. 3: Further, if constancy pertained to perseverance, it would
seem nowise to differ from it, since both denote a kind of
unchangeableness. Yet they differ: for Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i)
condivides constancy with firmness by which he indicates
perseverance, as stated above (Q. 128, A. 6). Therefore constancy
does not pertain to perseverance.

_On the contrary,_ One is said to be constant because one stands to a
thing. Now it belongs to perseverance to stand to certain things, as
appears from the definition given by Andronicus. Therefore constancy
belongs to perseverance.

_I answer that,_ Perseverance and constancy agree as to end, since it
belongs to both to persist firmly in some good: but they differ as to
those things which make it difficult to persist in good. Because the
virtue of perseverance properly makes man persist firmly in good,
against the difficulty that arises from the very continuance of the
act: whereas constancy makes him persist firmly in good against
difficulties arising from any other external hindrances. Hence
perseverance takes precedence of constancy as a part of fortitude,
because the difficulty arising from continuance of action is more
intrinsic to the act of virtue than that which arises from external
obstacles.

Reply Obj. 1: External obstacles to persistence in good are
especially those which cause sorrow. Now patience is about sorrow, as
stated above (Q. 136, A. 1). Hence constancy agrees with perseverance
as to end: while it agrees with patience as to those things which
occasion difficulty. Now the end is of most account: wherefore
constancy pertains to perseverance rather than to patience.

Reply Obj. 2: It is more difficult to persist in great deeds: yet in
little or ordinary deeds, it is difficult to persist for any length
of time, if not on account of the greatness of the deed which
magnificence considers, yet from its very continuance which
perseverance regards. Hence constancy may pertain to both.

Reply Obj. 3: Constancy pertains to perseverance in so far as it has
something in common with it: but it is not the same thing in the
point of their difference, as stated in the Article.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 137, Art. 4]

Whether Perseverance Needs the Help of Grace?
[*Cf. I-II, Q. 109, A. 10]

Objection 1: It seems that perseverance does not need the help of
grace. For perseverance is a virtue, as stated above (A. 1). Now
according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) virtue acts after the manner
of nature. Therefore the sole inclination of virtue suffices for
perseverance. Therefore this does not need the help of grace.

Obj. 2: Further, the gift of Christ's grace is greater than the harm
brought upon us by Adam, as appears from Rom. 5:15, seqq. Now "before
sin man was so framed that he could persevere by means of what he had
received," as Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi). Much more
therefore can man, after being repaired by the grace of Christ,
persevere without the help of a further grace.

Obj. 3: Further, sinful deeds are sometimes more difficult than deeds
of virtue: hence it is said in the person of the wicked (Wis. 5:7):
"We . . . have walked through hard ways." Now some persevere in
sinful deeds without the help of another. Therefore man can also
persevere in deeds of virtue without the help of grace.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Persev. i): "We hold that
perseverance is a gift of God, whereby we persevere unto the end, in
Christ."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 2; A. 2, ad 3),
perseverance has a twofold signification. First, it denotes the habit
of perseverance, considered as a virtue. In this way it needs the
gift of habitual grace, even as the other infused virtues. Secondly,
it may be taken to denote the act of perseverance enduring until
death: and in this sense it needs not only habitual grace, but also
the gratuitous help of God sustaining man in good until the end of
life, as stated above (I-II, Q. 109, A. 10), when we were treating of
grace. Because, since the free-will is changeable by its very nature,
which changeableness is not taken away from it by the habitual grace
bestowed in the present life, it is not in the power of the
free-will, albeit repaired by grace, to abide unchangeably in good,
though it is in its power to choose this: for it is often in our
power to choose yet not to accomplish.

Reply Obj. 1: The virtue of perseverance, so far as it is concerned,
inclines one to persevere: yet since it is a habit, and a habit is a
thing one uses at will, it does not follow that a person who has the
habit of virtue uses it unchangeably until death.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi), "it was
given to the first man, not to persevere, but to be able to persevere
of his free-will: because then no corruption was in human nature to
make perseverance difficult. Now, however, by the grace of Christ,
the predestined receive not only the possibility of persevering, but
perseverance itself. Wherefore the first man whom no man threatened,
of his own free-will rebelling against a threatening God, forfeited
so great a happiness and so great a facility of avoiding sin: whereas
these, although the world rage against their constancy, have
persevered in faith."

Reply Obj. 3: Man is able by himself to fall into sin, but he cannot
by himself arise from sin without the help of grace. Hence by falling
into sin, so far as he is concerned man makes himself to be
persevering in sin, unless he be delivered by God's grace. On the
other hand, by doing good he does not make himself to be persevering
in good, because he is able, by himself, to sin: wherefore he needs
the help of grace for that end.
_______________________

QUESTION 138

OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO PERSEVERANCE
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider the vices opposed to perseverance; under which
head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Of effeminacy;

(2) Of pertinacity.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 138, Art. 1]

Whether Effeminacy* Is Opposed to Perseverance?
[* _Mollities,_ literally "softness"]

Objection 1: It seems that effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance.
For a gloss on 1 Cor. 6:9, 10, "Nor adulterers, nor the effeminate,
nor liers with mankind," expounds the text thus: "Effeminate--i.e.
obscene, given to unnatural vice." But this is opposed to chastity.
Therefore effeminacy is not a vice opposed to perseverance.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "delicacy
is a kind of effeminacy." But to be delicate seems akin to
intemperance. Therefore effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance but
to temperance.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "the man
who is fond of amusement is effeminate." Now immoderate fondness of
amusement is opposed to _eutrapelia_, which is the virtue about
pleasures of play, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 8. Therefore effeminacy
is not opposed to perseverance.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "the
persevering man is opposed to the effeminate."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 137, AA. 1, 2), perseverance is
deserving of praise because thereby a man does not forsake a good on
account of long endurance of difficulties and toils: and it is
directly opposed to this, seemingly, for a man to be ready to forsake
a good on account of difficulties which he cannot endure. This is
what we understand by effeminacy, because a thing is said to be
"soft" if it readily yields to the touch. Now a thing is not declared
to be soft through yielding to a heavy blow, for walls yield to the
battering-ram. Wherefore a man is not said to be effeminate if he
yields to heavy blows. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7)
that "it is no wonder, if a person is overcome by strong and
overwhelming pleasures or sorrows; but he is to be pardoned if he
struggles against them." Now it is evident that fear of danger is
more impelling than the desire of pleasure: wherefore Tully says (De
Offic. i) under the heading "True magnanimity consists of two
things": "It is inconsistent for one who is not cast down by fear, to
be defeated by lust, or who has proved himself unbeaten by toil, to
yield to pleasure." Moreover, pleasure itself is a stronger motive of
attraction than sorrow, for the lack of pleasure is a motive of
withdrawal, since lack of pleasure is a pure privation. Wherefore,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), properly speaking an
effeminate man is one who withdraws from good on account of sorrow
caused by lack of pleasure, yielding as it were to a weak motion.

Reply Obj. 1: This effeminacy is caused in two ways. In one way, by
custom: for where a man is accustomed to enjoy pleasures, it is more
difficult for him to endure the lack of them. In another way, by
natural disposition, because, to wit, his mind is less persevering
through the frailty of his temperament. This is how women are
compared to men, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): wherefore
those who are passively sodomitical are said to be effeminate, being
womanish themselves, as it were.

Reply Obj. 2: Toil is opposed to bodily pleasure: wherefore it
is only toilsome things that are a hindrance to pleasures. Now the
delicate are those who cannot endure toils, nor anything that
diminishes pleasure. Hence it is written (Deut. 28:56): "The tender and
delicate woman, that could not go upon the ground, nor set down her
foot for . . . softness [Douay: 'niceness']." Thus delicacy is a kind
of effeminacy. But properly speaking effeminacy regards lack of
pleasures, while delicacy regards the cause that hinders pleasure, for
instance toil or the like.

Reply Obj. 3: In play two things may be considered. In the
first place there is the pleasure, and thus inordinate fondness of
play is opposed to _eutrapelia_. Secondly, we may consider the
relaxation or rest which is opposed to toil. Accordingly just as it
belongs to effeminacy to be unable to endure toilsome things, so too
it belongs thereto to desire play or any other relaxation
inordinately.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 138, Art. 2]

Whether Pertinacity Is Opposed to Perseverance?

Objection 1: It seems that pertinacity is not opposed to
perseverance. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that pertinacity arises
from vainglory. But vainglory is not opposed to perseverance but to
magnanimity, as stated above (Q. 132, A. 2). Therefore pertinacity is
not opposed to perseverance.

Obj. 2: Further, if it is opposed to perseverance, this is so either
by excess or by deficiency. Now it is not opposed by excess: because
the pertinacious also yield to certain pleasure and sorrow, since
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9) "they rejoice when they
prevail, and grieve when their opinions are rejected." And if it be
opposed by deficiency, it will be the same as effeminacy, which is
clearly false. Therefore pertinacity is nowise opposed to
perseverance.

Obj. 3: Further, just as the persevering man persists in good against
sorrow, so too do the continent and the temperate against pleasures,
the brave against fear, and the meek against anger. But pertinacity
is over-persistence in something. Therefore pertinacity is not
opposed to perseverance more than to other virtues.

_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that pertinacity
is to perseverance as superstition is to religion. But superstition
is opposed to religion, as stated above (Q. 92, A. 1). Therefore
pertinacity is opposed to perseverance.

_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. x) "a person is said to be
pertinacious who holds on impudently, as being utterly tenacious."
"Pervicacious" has the same meaning, for it signifies that a man
"perseveres in his purpose until he is victorious: for the ancients
called 'vicia' what we call victory." These the Philosopher (Ethic.
vii, 9) calls _ischyrognomones_, that is "head-strong," or
_idiognomones_, that is "self-opinionated," because they abide by
their opinions more than they should; whereas the effeminate man does
so less than he ought, and the persevering man, as he ought. Hence it
is clear that perseverance is commended for observing the mean, while
pertinacity is reproved for exceeding the mean, and effeminacy for
falling short of it.

Reply Obj. 1: The reason why a man is too persistent in his own
opinion, is that he wishes by this means to make a show of his own
excellence: wherefore this is the result of vainglory as its cause.
Now it has been stated above (Q. 127, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 133, A. 2), that
opposition of vices to virtues depends, not on their cause, but on
their species.

Reply Obj. 2: The pertinacious man exceeds by persisting inordinately
in something against many difficulties: yet he takes a certain
pleasure in the end, just as the brave and the persevering man.
Since, however, this pleasure is sinful, seeing that he desires it
too much, and shuns the contrary pain, he is like the incontinent or
effeminate man.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the other virtues persist against the
onslaught of the passions, they are not commended for persisting in
the same way as perseverance is. As to continence, its claim to
praise seems to lie rather in overcoming pleasures. Hence pertinacity
is directly opposed to perseverance.
_______________________

QUESTION 139

OF THE GIFT OF FORTITUDE
(In Two Articles)

We must next consider the gift corresponding to fortitude, and this
is the gift of fortitude. Under this head there are two points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether fortitude is a gift?

(2) Which among the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 139, Art. 1]

Whether Fortitude Is a Gift?

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a gift. For the virtues
differ from the gifts: and fortitude is a virtue. Therefore it should
not be reckoned a gift.

Obj. 2: Further, the acts of the gifts remain in heaven, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 6). But the act of fortitude does not remain
in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that "fortitude encourages the
fainthearted against hardships, which will be altogether absent from
heaven." Therefore fortitude is not a gift.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that "it is a
sign of fortitude to cut oneself adrift from all the deadly pleasures
of the passing show." Now noisome pleasures and delights are the
concern of temperance rather than of fortitude. Therefore it seems
that fortitude is not the gift corresponding to the virtue of
fortitude.

_On the contrary,_ Fortitude is reckoned among the other gifts of the
Holy Ghost (Isa. 11:2).

_I answer that,_ Fortitude denotes a certain firmness of mind, as
stated above (Q. 123, A. 2; I-II, Q. 61, A. 3): and this firmness of
mind is required both in doing good and in enduring evil, especially
with regard to goods or evils that are difficult. Now man, according
to his proper and connatural mode, is able to have this firmness in
both these respects, so as not to forsake the good on account of
difficulties, whether in accomplishing an arduous work, or in
enduring grievous evil. In this sense fortitude denotes a special or
general virtue, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 2).

Yet furthermore man's mind is moved by the Holy Ghost, in order that
he may attain the end of each work begun, and avoid whatever perils
may threaten. This surpasses human nature: for sometimes it is not in
a man's power to attain the end of his work, or to avoid evils or
dangers, since these may happen to overwhelm him in death. But the
Holy Ghost works this in man, by bringing him to everlasting life,
which is the end of all good deeds, and the release from all perils.
A certain confidence of this is infused into the mind by the Holy
Ghost Who expels any fear of the contrary. It is in this sense that
fortitude is reckoned a gift of the Holy Ghost. For it has been
stated above (I-II, Q. 68, AA. 1, 2) that the gifts regard the motion
of the mind by the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 1: Fortitude, as a virtue, perfects the mind in the
endurance of all perils whatever; but it does not go so far as to
give confidence of overcoming all dangers: this belongs to the
fortitude that is a gift of the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 2: The gifts have not the same acts in heaven as on the
way: for they exercise acts in connection with the enjoyment of the
end. Hence the act of fortitude there is to enjoy full security from
toil and evil.

Reply Obj. 3: The gift of fortitude regards the virtue of fortitude
not only because it consists in enduring dangers, but also inasmuch
as it consists in accomplishing any difficult work. Wherefore the
gift of fortitude is directed by the gift of counsel, which seems to
be concerned chiefly with the greater goods.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 139, Art. 2]

Whether the Fourth Beatitude: "Blessed Are They That Hunger and
Thirst After Justice," Corresponds to the Gift of Fortitude?

Objection 1: It seems that the fourth beatitude, "Blessed are they
that hunger and thirst after justice," does not correspond to the
gift of fortitude. For the gift of piety and not the gift of
fortitude corresponds to the virtue of justice. Now hungering and
thirsting after justice pertain to the act of justice. Therefore this
beatitude corresponds to the gift of piety rather than to the gift of
fortitude.

Obj. 2: Further, hunger and thirst after justice imply a desire for
good. Now this belongs properly to charity, to which the gift of
wisdom, and not the gift of fortitude, corresponds, as stated above
(Q. 45). Therefore this beatitude corresponds, not to the gift of
fortitude, but to the gift of wisdom.

Obj. 3: Further, the fruits are consequent upon the beatitudes, since
delight is essential to beatitude, according to _Ethic._ i, 8. Now
the fruits, apparently, include none pertaining to fortitude.
Therefore neither does any beatitude correspond to it.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i):
"Fortitude becomes the hungry and thirsty: since those who desire to
enjoy true goods, and wish to avoid loving earthly and material
things, must toil."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 121, A. 2), Augustine makes the
beatitudes correspond to the gifts according to the order in which
they are set forth, observing at the same time a certain fittingness
between them. Wherefore he ascribes the fourth beatitude, concerning
the hunger and thirst for justice, to the fourth gift, namely
fortitude.

Yet there is a certain congruity between them, because, as stated (A.
1), fortitude is about difficult things. Now it is very difficult,
not merely to do virtuous deeds, which receive the common designation
of works of justice, but furthermore to do them with an unsatiable
desire, which may be signified by hunger and thirst for justice.

Reply Obj. 1: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), we may
understand here not only particular, but also universal justice,
which is related to all virtuous deeds according to _Ethic._ v, 1,
wherein whatever is hard is the object of that fortitude which is a
gift.

Reply Obj. 2: Charity is the root of all the virtues and gifts, as
stated above (Q. 23, A. 8, ad 3; I-II, Q. 68, A. 4, ad 3). Hence
whatever pertains to fortitude may also be referred to charity.

Reply Obj. 3: There are two of the fruits which correspond
sufficiently to the gift of fortitude: namely, patience, which
regards the enduring of evils: and longanimity, which may regard
the long delay and accomplishment of goods.
_______________________

QUESTION 140

OF THE PRECEPTS OF FORTITUDE
(In Two Articles)

We must next consider the precepts of fortitude:

(1) The precepts of fortitude itself;

(2) The precepts of its parts.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 140, Art. 1]

Whether the Precepts of Fortitude Are Suitably Given in the Divine
Law?

Objection 1: It seems that the precepts of fortitude are not suitably
given in the Divine Law. For the New Law is more perfect than the Old
Law. Yet the Old Law contains precepts of fortitude (Deut. 20).
Therefore precepts of fortitude should have been given in the New Law
also.

Obj. 2: Further, affirmative precepts are of greater import than
negative precepts, since the affirmative include the negative, but
not vice versa. Therefore it is unsuitable for the Divine Law to
contain none but negative precepts in prohibition of fear.

Obj. 3: Further, fortitude is one of the principal virtues, as stated
above (Q. 123, A. 2; I-II, Q. 61, A. 2). Now the precepts are
directed to the virtues as to their end: wherefore they should be
proportionate to them. Therefore the precepts of fortitude should
have been placed among the precepts of the decalogue, which are the
chief precepts of the Law.

_On the contrary,_ stands Holy Writ which contains these precepts.

_I answer that,_ Precepts of law are directed to the end intended by
the lawgiver. Wherefore precepts of law must needs be framed in
various ways according to the various ends intended by lawgivers, so
that even in human affairs there are laws of democracies, others of
kingdoms, and others again of tyrannical governments. Now the end of
the Divine Law is that man may adhere to God: wherefore the Divine
Law contains precepts both of fortitude and of the other virtues,
with a view to directing the mind to God. For this reason it is
written (Deut. 20:3, 4): "Fear ye them not: because the Lord your God
is in the midst of you, and will fight for you against your enemies."

As to human laws, they are directed to certain earthly goods, and
among them we find precepts of fortitude according to the
requirements of those goods.

Reply Obj. 1: The Old Testament contained temporal promises, while
the promises of the New Testament are spiritual and eternal,
according to Augustine (Contra Faust. iv). Hence in the Old Law there
was need for the people to be taught how to fight, even in a bodily
contest, in order to obtain an earthly possession. But in the New
Testament men were to be taught how to come to the possession of
eternal life by fighting spiritually, according to Matt. 11:12, "The
kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent bear it away."
Hence Peter commands (1 Pet. 5:8, 9): "Your adversary the devil, as a
roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour: whom resist
ye, strong in faith," as also James 4:7: "Resist the devil, and he
will fly from you." Since, however, men while tending to spiritual
goods may be withdrawn from them by corporal dangers, precepts of
fortitude had to be given even in the New Law, that they might
bravely endure temporal evils, according to Matt. 10:28, "Fear ye not
them that kill the body."

Reply Obj. 2: The law gives general directions in its precepts. But
the things that have to be done in cases of danger are not, like the
things to be avoided, reducible to some common thing. Hence the
precepts of fortitude are negative rather than affirmative.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 122, A. 1), the precepts of the
decalogue are placed in the Law, as first principles, which need to
be known to all from the outset. Wherefore the precepts of the
decalogue had to be chiefly about those acts of justice in which the
notion of duty is manifest, and not about acts of fortitude, because
it is not so evident that it is a duty for a person not to fear
dangers of death.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 140, Art. 2]

Whether the Precepts of the Parts of Fortitude Are Suitably Given in
the Divine Law?

Objection 1: It seems that the precept of the parts of fortitude are
unsuitably given in the Divine Law. For just as patience and
perseverance are parts of fortitude, so also are magnificence,
magnanimity, and confidence, as stated above (Q. 128). Now we find
precepts of patience in the Divine Law, as also of perseverance.
Therefore there should also have been precepts of magnificence and
magnanimity.

Obj. 2: Further, patience is a very necessary virtue, since it is the
guardian of the other virtues, as Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxv).
Now the other virtues are commanded absolutely. Therefore patience
should not have been commanded merely, as Augustine says (De Serm.
Dom. in Monte i), as to the preparedness of the mind.

Obj. 3: Further, patience and perseverance are parts of fortitude, as
stated above (Q. 128; Q. 136, A. 4; Q. 137, A. 2). Now the precepts
of fortitude are not affirmative but only negative, as stated above
(A. 1, ad 2). Therefore the precepts of patience and perseverance
should have been negative and not affirmative.

The contrary, however, follows from the way in which they are given
by Holy Writ.

_I answer that,_ The Divine Law instructs man perfectly about such
things as are necessary for right living. Now in order to live aright
man needs not only the principal virtues, but also the secondary and
annexed virtues. Wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts not only
about the acts of the principal virtues, but also about the acts of
the secondary and annexed virtues.

Reply Obj. 1: Magnificence and magnanimity do not belong to the genus
of fortitude, except by reason of a certain excellence of greatness
which they regard in their respective matters. Now things pertaining
to excellence come under the counsels of perfection rather than under
precepts of obligation. Wherefore, there was need of counsels, rather
than of precepts about magnificence and magnanimity. On the other
hand, the hardships and toils of the present life pertain to patience
and perseverance, not by reason of any greatness observable in them,
but on account of the very nature of those virtues. Hence the need of
precepts of patience and perseverance.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 3, A. 2), although affirmative
precepts are always binding, they are not binding for always, but
according to place and time. Wherefore just as the affirmative
precepts about the other virtues are to be understood as to the
preparedness of the mind, in the sense that man be prepared to fulfil
them when necessary, so too are the precepts of patience to be
understood in the same way.

Reply Obj. 3: Fortitude, as distinct from patience and perseverance,
is about the greatest dangers wherein one must proceed with caution;
nor is it necessary to determine what is to be done in particular. On
the other hand, patience and perseverance are about minor hardships
and toils, wherefore there is less danger in determining, especially
in general, what is to be done in such cases.
_______________________

QUESTION 141

OF TEMPERANCE
(In Eight Articles)

In the next place we must consider temperance: (1) Temperance itself;
(2) its parts; (3) its precepts. With regard to temperance we must
consider (1) temperance itself; (2) the contrary vices.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether temperance is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a special virtue?

(3) Whether it is only about desires and pleasures?

(4) Whether it is only about pleasures of touch?

(5) Whether it is about pleasures of taste, as such, or only as a
kind of touch?

(6) What is the rule of temperance?

(7) Whether it is a cardinal, or principal, virtue?

(8) Whether it is the greatest of virtues?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 1]

Whether Temperance Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that temperance is not a virtue. For no virtue
goes against the inclination of nature, since "there is in us a
natural aptitude for virtue," as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 1. Now
temperance withdraws us from pleasures to which nature inclines,
according to _Ethic._ ii, 3, 8. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). But some people have temperance without
having the other virtues: for we find many who are temperate, and yet
covetous or timid. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, to every virtue there is a corresponding gift, as
appears from what we have said above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 4). But
seemingly no gift corresponds to temperance, since all the gifts have
been already ascribed to the other virtues (QQ. 8, 9, 19, 45, 52, 71,
139). Therefore temperance is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Music. vi, 15): "Temperance is the
name of a virtue."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 3), it is essential
to virtue to incline man to good. Now the good of man is to be in
accordance with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence
human virtue is that which inclines man to something in accordance
with reason. Now temperance evidently inclines man to this, since its
very name implies moderation or temperateness, which reason causes.
Therefore temperance is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: Nature inclines everything to whatever is becoming to
it. Wherefore man naturally desires pleasures that are becoming to
him. Since, however, man as such is a rational being, it follows that
those pleasures are becoming to man which are in accordance with
reason. From such pleasures temperance does not withdraw him, but
from those which are contrary to reason. Wherefore it is clear that
temperance is not contrary to the inclination of human nature, but is
in accord with it. It is, however, contrary to the inclination of the
animal nature that is not subject to reason.

Reply Obj. 2: The temperance which fulfils the conditions of perfect
virtue is not without prudence, while this is lacking to all who are
in sin. Hence those who lack other virtues, through being subject to
the opposite vices, have not the temperance which is a virtue, though
they do acts of temperance from a certain natural disposition, in so
far as certain imperfect virtues are either natural to man, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 63, A. 1), or acquired by habituation, which virtues,
through lack of prudence, are not perfected by reason, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 3: Temperance also has a corresponding gift, namely, fear,
whereby man is withheld from the pleasures of the flesh, according to
Ps. 118:120: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear." The gift of fear
has for its principal object God, Whom it avoids offending, and in
this respect it corresponds to the virtue of hope, as stated above
(Q. 19, A. 9, ad 1). But it may have for its secondary object
whatever a man shuns in order to avoid offending God. Now man stands
in the greatest need of the fear of God in order to shun those things
which are most seductive, and these are the matter of temperance:
wherefore the gift of fear corresponds to temperance also.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 2]

Whether Temperance Is a Special Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a special virtue.
For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "it belongs to
temperance to preserve one's integrity and freedom from corruption
for God's sake." But this is common to every virtue. Therefore
temperance is not a special virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 42) that "what we observe
and seek most in temperance is tranquillity of soul." But this is
common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) that "we cannot
separate the beautiful from the virtuous," and that "whatever is just
is beautiful." Now the beautiful is considered as proper to
temperance, according to the same authority (Tully, De Offic. i, 27).
Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 10) reckons it
a special virtue.

_I answer that,_ It is customary in human speech to employ a common
term in a restricted sense in order to designate the principal things
to which that common term is applicable: thus the word "city" is used
antonomastically* to designate Rome. [*Antonomasia is the figure of
speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term;
e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle]. Accordingly the word
"temperance" has a twofold acceptation. First, in accordance with its
common signification: and thus temperance is not a special but a
general virtue, because the word "temperance" signifies a certain
temperateness or moderation, which reason appoints to human
operations and passions: and this is common to every moral virtue.
Yet there is a logical difference between temperance and fortitude,
even if we take them both as general virtues: since temperance
withdraws man from things which seduce the appetite from obeying
reason, while fortitude incites him to endure or withstand those
things on account of which he forsakes the good of reason.

On the other hand, if we take temperance antonomastically, as
withholding the appetite from those things which are most seductive
to man, it is a special virtue, for thus it has, like fortitude, a
special matter.

Reply Obj. 1: Man's appetite is corrupted chiefly by those things
which seduce him into forsaking the rule of reason and Divine law.
Wherefore integrity, which Augustine ascribes to temperance, can,
like the latter, be taken in two ways: first, in a general sense, and
secondly in a sense of excellence.

Reply Obj. 2: The things about which temperance is concerned have a
most disturbing effect on the soul, for the reason that they are
natural to man, as we shall state further on (AA. 4, 5). Hence
tranquillity of soul is ascribed to temperance by way of excellence,
although it is a common property of all the virtues.

Reply Obj. 3: Although beauty is becoming to every virtue, it is
ascribed to temperance, by way of excellence, for two reasons. First,
in respect of the generic notion of temperance, which consists in a
certain moderate and fitting proportion, and this is what we
understand by beauty, as attested by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv).
Secondly, because the things from which temperance withholds us, hold
the lowest place in man, and are becoming to him by reason of his
animal nature, as we shall state further on (AA. 4, 5; Q. 142, A. 4),
wherefore it is natural that such things should defile him. In
consequence beauty is a foremost attribute of temperance which above
all hinders man from being defiled. In like manner honesty [*Honesty
must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral
goodness, from the point of view of decorum] is a special attribute
of temperance: for Isidore says (Etym. x): "An honest man is one who
has no defilement, for honesty means an honorable state." This is
most applicable to temperance, which withstands the vices that bring
most dishonor on man, as we shall state further on (Q. 142, A. 4).
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 3]

Whether Temperance Is Only About Desires and Pleasures?

Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires
and pleasures. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that
"temperance is reason's firm and moderate mastery of lust and other
wanton emotions of the mind." Now all the passions of the soul are
called emotions of the mind. Therefore it seems that temperance is
not only about desires and pleasures.

Obj. 2: Further, "Virtue is about the difficult and the good"
[*Ethic. ii, 3]. Now it seems more difficult to temper fear,
especially with regard to dangers of death, than to moderate desires
and pleasures, which are despised on account of deadly pains and
dangers, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 36). Therefore it seems
that the virtue of temperance is not chiefly about desires and
pleasures.

Obj. 3: Further, according to Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) "the grace of
moderation belongs to temperance": and Tully says (De Offic. ii, 27)
that "it is the concern of temperance to calm all disturbances of the
mind and to enforce moderation." Now moderation is needed, not only
in desires and pleasures, but also in external acts and whatever
pertains to the exterior. Therefore temperance is not only about
desires and pleasures.

_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym.) [*The words quoted do not
occur in the work referred to; Cf. his De Summo Bono xxxvii, xlii,
and De Different. ii, 39]: that "it is temperance whereby lust and
desire are kept under control."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 12; Q. 136, A. 1), it
belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against the
passions that rebel against reason. Now the movement of the soul's
passions is twofold, as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 2), when we
were treating of the passions: the one, whereby the sensitive
appetite pursues sensible and bodily goods, the other whereby it
flies from sensible and bodily evils.

The first of these movements of the sensitive appetite rebels against
reason chiefly by lack of moderation. Because sensible and bodily
goods, considered in their species, are not in opposition to reason,
but are subject to it as instruments which reason employs in order to
attain its proper end: and that they are opposed to reason is owing
to the fact that the sensitive appetite fails to tend towards them in
accord with the mode of reason. Hence it belongs properly to moral
virtue to moderate those passions which denote a pursuit of the good.

On the other hand, the movement of the sensitive appetite in flying
from sensible evil is mostly in opposition to reason, not through
being immoderate, but chiefly in respect of its flight: because, when
a man flies from sensible and bodily evils, which sometimes accompany
the good of reason, the result is that he flies from the good of
reason. Hence it belongs to moral virtue to make man while flying
from evil to remain firm in the good of reason.

Accordingly, just as the virtue of fortitude, which by its very
nature bestows firmness, is chiefly concerned with the passion, viz.
fear, which regards flight from bodily evils, and consequently with
daring, which attacks the objects of fear in the hope of attaining
some good, so, too, temperance, which denotes a kind of moderation,
is chiefly concerned with those passions that tend towards sensible
goods, viz. desire and pleasure, and consequently with the sorrows
that arise from the absence of those pleasures. For just as daring
presupposes objects of fear, so too such like sorrow arises from the
absence of the aforesaid pleasures.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (I-II, Q. 23, AA. 1, 2; I-II, Q. 25, A.
1), when we were treating of the passions, those passions which
pertain to avoidance of evil, presuppose the passions pertaining to
the pursuit of good; and the passions of the irascible presuppose the
passions of the concupiscible. Hence, while temperance directly
moderates the passions of the concupiscible which tend towards good,
as a consequence, it moderates all the other passions, inasmuch as
moderation of the passions that precede results in moderation of the
passions that follow: since he that is not immoderate in desire is
moderate in hope, and grieves moderately for the absence of the
things he desires.

Reply Obj. 2: Desire denotes an impulse of the appetite towards the
object of pleasure and this impulse needs control, which belongs to
temperance. On the other hand fear denotes a withdrawal of the mind
from certain evils, against which man needs firmness of mind, which
fortitude bestows. Hence temperance is properly about desires, and
fortitude about fears.

Reply Obj. 3: External acts proceed from the internal passions of the
soul: wherefore their moderation depends on the moderation of the
internal passions.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 4]

Whether Temperance Is Only About Desires and Pleasures of Touch?

Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires
and pleasures of touch. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xix) that
"the function of temperance is to control and quell the desires which
draw us to the things which withdraw us from the laws of God and from
the fruit of His goodness"; and a little further on he adds that "it
is the duty of temperance to spurn all bodily allurements and popular
praise." Now we are withdrawn from God's laws not only by the desire
for pleasures of touch, but also by the desire for pleasures of the
other senses, for these, too, belong to the bodily allurements, and
again by the desire for riches or for worldly glory: wherefore it is
written (1 Tim. 6:10). "Desire [*_Cupiditas,_ which the Douay version
following the Greek _philargyria_ renders 'desire of money'] is the
root of all evils." Therefore temperance is not only about desires of
pleasures of touch.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "one who is
worthy of small things and deems himself worthy of them is temperate,
but he is not magnificent." Now honors, whether small or great, of
which he is speaking there, are an object of pleasure, not of touch,
but in the soul's apprehension. Therefore temperance is not only
about desires for pleasures of touch.

Obj. 3: Further, things that are of the same genus would seem to
pertain to the matter of a particular virtue under one same aspect.
Now all pleasures of sense are apparently of the same genus.
Therefore they all equally belong to the matter of temperance.

Obj. 4: Further, spiritual pleasures are greater than the pleasures
of the body, as stated above (I-II, Q. 31, A. 5) in the treatise on
the passions. Now sometimes men forsake God's laws and the state of
virtue through desire for spiritual pleasures, for instance, through
curiosity in matters of knowledge: wherefore the devil promised man
knowledge, saying (Gen. 3:5): "Ye shall be as Gods, knowing good and
evil." Therefore temperance is not only about pleasures of touch.

Obj. 5: Further, if pleasures of touch were the proper matter of
temperance, it would follow that temperance is about all pleasures of
touch. But it is not about all, for instance, about those which occur
in games. Therefore pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of
temperance.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that
"temperance is properly about desires of pleasures of touch."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), temperance is about desires
and pleasures in the same way as fortitude is about fear and daring.
Now fortitude is about fear and daring with respect to the greatest
evils whereby nature itself is dissolved; and such are dangers of
death. Wherefore in like manner temperance must needs be about
desires for the greatest pleasures. And since pleasure results from a
natural operation, it is so much the greater according as it results
from a more natural operation. Now to animals the most natural
operations are those which preserve the nature of the individual by
means of meat and drink, and the nature of the species by the union
of the sexes. Hence temperance is properly about pleasures of meat
and drink and sexual pleasures. Now these pleasures result from the
sense of touch. Wherefore it follows that temperance is about
pleasures of touch.

Reply Obj. 1: In the passage quoted Augustine apparently takes
temperance, not as a special virtue having a determinate matter, but
as concerned with the moderation of reason, in any matter whatever:
and this is a general condition of every virtue. However, we may also
reply that if a man can control the greatest pleasures, much more can
he control lesser ones. Wherefore it belongs chiefly and properly to
temperance to moderate desires and pleasures of touch, and
secondarily other pleasures.

Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher takes temperance as denoting moderation
in external things, when, to wit, a man tends to that which is
proportionate to him, but not as denoting moderation in the soul's
emotions, which pertains to the virtue of temperance.

Reply Obj. 3: The pleasures of the other senses play a different part
in man and in other animals. For in other animals pleasures do not
result from the other senses save in relation to sensibles of touch:
thus the lion is pleased to see the stag, or to hear its voice, in
relation to his food. On the other hand man derives pleasure from the
other senses, not only for this reason, but also on account of the
becomingness of the sensible object. Wherefore temperance is about
the pleasures of the other senses, in relation to pleasures of touch,
not principally but consequently: while in so far as the sensible
objects of the other senses are pleasant on account of their
becomingness, as when a man is pleased at a well-harmonized sound,
this pleasure has nothing to do with the preservation of nature.
Hence these passions are not of such importance that temperance can
be referred to them antonomastically.

Reply Obj. 4: Although spiritual pleasures are by their nature
greater than bodily pleasures, they are not so perceptible to the
senses, and consequently they do not so strongly affect the sensitive
appetite, against whose impulse the good of reason is safeguarded by
moral virtue. We may also reply that spiritual pleasures, strictly
speaking, are in accordance with reason, wherefore they need no
control, save accidentally, in so far as one spiritual pleasure is a
hindrance to another greater and more binding.

Reply Obj. 5: Not all pleasures of touch regard the preservation of
nature, and consequently it does not follow that temperance is about
all pleasures of touch.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 5]

Whether Temperance Is About the Pleasures Proper to the Taste?

Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is about pleasures proper
to the taste. For pleasures of the taste result from food and drink,
which are more necessary to man's life than sexual pleasures, which
regard the touch. But according to what has been said (A. 4),
temperance is about pleasures in things that are necessary to human
life. Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste
rather than about those proper to the touch.

Obj. 2: Further, temperance is about the passions rather than about
things themselves. Now, according to _De Anima_ ii, 3, "the touch is
the sense of food," as regards the very substance of the food,
whereas "savor" which is the proper object of the taste, is "the
pleasing quality of the food." Therefore temperance is about the
taste rather than about the touch.

Obj. 3: Further, according to _Ethic._ vii, 4, 7: "temperance and
intemperance are about the same things, and so are continence and
incontinence, perseverance, and effeminacy," to which delicacy
pertains. Now delicacy seems to regard the delight taken in savors
which are the object of the taste. Therefore temperance is about
pleasures proper to the taste.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that
"seemingly temperance and intemperance have little if anything to do
with the taste."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), temperance is about the
greatest pleasures, which chiefly regard the preservation of human
life either in the species or in the individual. In these matters
certain things are to be considered as principal and others as
secondary. The principal thing is the use itself of the necessary
means, of the woman who is necessary for the preservation of the
species, or of food and drink which are necessary for the
preservation of the individual: while the very use of these
necessary things has a certain essential pleasure annexed thereto.

In regard to either use we consider as secondary whatever makes the
use more pleasurable, such as beauty and adornment in woman, and a
pleasing savor and likewise odor in food. Hence temperance is chiefly
about the pleasure of touch, that results essentially from the use of
these necessary things, which use is in all cases attained by the
touch. Secondarily, however, temperance and intemperance are about
pleasures of the taste, smell, or sight, inasmuch as the sensible
objects of these senses conduce to the pleasurable use of the
necessary things that have relation to the touch. But since the taste
is more akin to the touch than the other senses are, it follows that
temperance is more about the taste than about the other senses.

Reply Obj. 1: The use of food and the pleasure that essentially
results therefrom pertain to the touch. Hence the Philosopher says
(De Anima ii, 3) that "touch is the sense of food, for food is hot or
cold, wet or dry." To the taste belongs the discernment of savors,
which make the food pleasant to eat, in so far as they are signs of
its being suitable for nourishment.

Reply Obj. 2: The pleasure resulting from savor is additional, so to
speak, whereas the pleasure of touch results essentially from the use
of food and drink.

Reply Obj. 3: Delicacy regards principally the substance of the food,
but secondarily it regards its delicious savor and the way in which
it is served.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 6]

Whether the Rule of Temperance Depends on the Need of the Present
Life?

Objection 1: It would seem that the rule of temperance does not
depend on the needs of the present life. For higher things are not
regulated according to lower. Now, as temperance is a virtue of the
soul, it is above the needs of the body. Therefore the rule of
temperance does not depend on the needs of the body.

Obj. 2: Further, whoever exceeds a rule sins. Therefore if the needs
of the body were the rule of temperance, it would be a sin against
temperance to indulge in any other pleasure than those required by
nature, which is content with very little. But this would seem
unreasonable.

Obj. 3: Further, no one sins in observing a rule. Therefore if the
need of the body were the rule of temperance, there would be no sin
in using any pleasure for the needs of the body, for instance, for
the sake of health. But this is apparently false. Therefore the need
of the body is not the rule of temperance.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi): "In both
Testaments the temperate man finds confirmation of the rule
forbidding him to love the things of this life, or to deem any of
them desirable for its own sake, and commanding him to avail himself
of those things with the moderation of a user not the attachment of a
lover, in so far as they are requisite for the needs of this life and
of his station."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1; Q. 109, A. 2; Q. 123, A. 12),
the good of moral virtue consists chiefly in the order of reason:
because "man's good is to be in accord with reason," as Dionysius
asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now the principal order of reason is that by
which it directs certain things towards their end, and the good of
reason consists chiefly in this order; since good has the aspect of
end, and the end is the rule of whatever is directed to the end. Now
all the pleasurable objects that are at man's disposal, are directed
to some necessity of this life as to their end. Wherefore temperance
takes the need of this life, as the rule of the pleasurable objects
of which it makes use, and uses them only for as much as the need of
this life requires.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, the need of this life is regarded
as a rule in so far as it is an end. Now it must be observed that
sometimes the end of the worker differs from the end of the work,
thus it is clear that the end of building is a house, whereas
sometimes the end of the builder is profit. Accordingly the end and
rule of temperance itself is happiness; while the end and rule of the
thing it makes use of is the need of human life, to which whatever is
useful for life is subordinate.

Reply Obj. 2: The need of human life may be taken in two ways. First,
it may be taken in the sense in which we apply the term "necessary"
to that without which a thing cannot be at all; thus food is
necessary to an animal. Secondly, it may be taken for something
without which a thing cannot be becomingly. Now temperance regards
not only the former of these needs, but also the latter. Wherefore
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11) that "the temperate man desires
pleasant things for the sake of health, or for the sake of a sound
condition of body." Other things that are not necessary for this
purpose may be divided into two classes. For some are a hindrance to
health and a sound condition of body; and these temperance makes not
use of whatever, for this would be a sin against temperance. But
others are not a hindrance to those things, and these temperance uses
moderately, according to the demands of place and time, and in
keeping with those among whom one dwells. Hence the Philosopher
(Ethic. iii, 11) says that the "temperate man also desires other
pleasant things," those namely that are not necessary for health or a
sound condition of body, "so long as they are not prejudicial to
these things."

Reply Obj. 3: As stated (ad 2), temperance regards need according
to the requirements of life, and this depends not only on the
requirements of the body, but also on the requirements of external
things, such as riches and station, and more still on the
requirements of good conduct. Hence the Philosopher adds (Ethic. iii,
11) that "the temperate man makes use of pleasant things provided
that not only they be not prejudicial to health and a sound bodily
condition, but also that they be not inconsistent with good," i.e.
good conduct, nor "beyond his substance," i.e. his means. And
Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi) that the "temperate man
considers the need" not only "of this life" but also "of his station."
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 7]

Whether Temperance Is a Cardinal Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a cardinal virtue.
For the good of moral virtue depends on reason. But temperance is
about those things that are furthest removed from reason, namely
about pleasures common to us and the lower animals, as stated in
_Ethic._ iii, 10. Therefore temperance, seemingly, is not a principal
virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, the greater the impetus the more difficult is it to
control. Now anger, which is controlled by meekness, seems to be more
impetuous than desire, which is controlled by temperance. For it is
written (Prov. 27:4): "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh
forth; and who can bear the violence (_impetum_) of one provoked?"
Therefore meekness is a principal virtue rather than temperance.

Obj. 3: Further, hope as a movement of the soul takes precedence of
desire and concupiscence, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 4). But
humility controls the presumption of immoderate hope. Therefore,
seemingly, humility is a principal virtue rather than temperance
which controls concupiscence.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory reckons temperance among the principal
virtues (Moral. ii, 49).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 11; Q. 61, A. 3), a
principal or cardinal virtue is so called because it has a foremost
claim to praise on account of one of those things that are requisite
for the notion of virtue in general. Now moderation, which is
requisite in every virtue, deserves praise principally in pleasures
of touch, with which temperance is concerned, both because these
pleasures are most natural to us, so that it is more difficult to
abstain from them, and to control the desire for them, and because
their objects are more necessary to the present life, as stated above
(A. 4). For this reason temperance is reckoned a principal or
cardinal virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: The longer the range of its operation, the greater is
the agent's power (_virtus_) shown to be: wherefore the very fact
that the reason is able to moderate desires and pleasures that are
furthest removed from it, proves the greatness of reason's power.
This is how temperance comes to be a principal virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: The impetuousness of anger is caused by an accident,
for instance, a painful hurt; wherefore it soon passes, although its
impetus be great. On the other hand, the impetuousness of the desire
for pleasures of touch proceeds from a natural cause, wherefore it is
more lasting and more general, and consequently its control regards a
more principal virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: The object of hope is higher than the object of desire,
wherefore hope is accounted the principal passion in the irascible.
But the objects of desires and pleasures of touch move the appetite
with greater force, since they are more natural. Therefore
temperance, which appoints the mean in such things, is a principal
virtue.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 141, Art. 8]

Whether Temperance Is the Greatest of the Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is the greatest of the
virtues. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "what we observe and
seek most in temperance is the safeguarding of what is honorable, and
the regard for what is beautiful." Now virtue deserves praise for
being honorable and beautiful. Therefore temperance is the greatest
of the virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, the more difficult the deed the greater the virtue.
Now it is more difficult to control desires and pleasures of touch
than to regulate external actions, the former pertaining to
temperance and the latter to justice. Therefore temperance is a
greater virtue than justice.

Obj. 3: Further, seemingly the more general a thing is, the more
necessary and the better it is. Now fortitude is about dangers of
death which occur less frequently than pleasures of touch, for these
occur every day; so that temperance is in more general use than
fortitude. Therefore temperance is a more excellent virtue than
fortitude.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) that the
"greatest virtues are those which are most profitable to others, for
which reason we give the greatest honor to the brave and the just."

_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 2) "the good
of the many is more of the godlike than the good of the individual,"
wherefore the more a virtue regards the good of the many, the better
it is. Now justice and fortitude regard the good of the many more
than temperance does, since justice regards the relations between one
man and another, while fortitude regards dangers of battle which are
endured for the common weal: whereas temperance moderates only the
desires and pleasures which affect man himself. Hence it is evident
that justice and fortitude are more excellent virtues than
temperance: while prudence and the theological virtues are more
excellent still.

Reply Obj. 1: Honor and beauty are especially ascribed to temperance,
not on account of the excellence of the good proper to temperance,
but on account of the disgrace of the contrary evil from which it
withdraws us, by moderating the pleasures common to us and the lower
animals.

Reply Obj. 2: Since virtue is about the difficult and the good, the
excellence of a virtue is considered more under the aspect of good,
wherein justice excels, than under the aspect of difficult, wherein
temperance excels.

Reply Obj. 3: That which is general because it regards the many
conduces more to the excellence of goodness than that which is
general because it occurs frequently: fortitude excels in the former
way, temperance in the latter. Hence fortitude is greater simply,
although in some respects temperance may be described as greater not
only than fortitude but also than justice.
_______________________

QUESTION 142

OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TEMPERANCE
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the vices opposed to temperance. Under this head
there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether insensibility is a sin?

(2) Whether intemperance is a childish sin?

(3) Of the comparison between intemperance and timidity;

(4) Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of vices?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 142, Art. 1]

Whether Insensibility Is a Vice?

Objection 1: It would seem that insensibility is not a vice. For
those are called insensible who are deficient with regard to
pleasures of touch. Now seemingly it is praiseworthy and virtuous to
be altogether deficient in such matters: for it is written (Dan.
10:2, 3): "In those days Daniel mourned the days of three weeks, I
ate no desirable bread, and neither flesh nor wine entered my mouth,
neither was I anointed with ointment." Therefore insensibility is not
a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, "man's good is to be in accord with reason,"
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Now abstinence from all
pleasures of touch is most conducive to man's progress in the good of
reason: for it is written (Dan. 1:17) that "to the children" who took
pulse for their food (Dan. 1:12), "God gave knowledge, and
understanding in every book and wisdom." Therefore insensibility,
which rejects these pleasures altogether, is not sinful.

Obj. 3: Further, that which is a very effective means of avoiding sin
would seem not to be sinful. Now the most effective remedy in
avoiding sin is to shun pleasures, and this pertains to
insensibility. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 9) that "if we
deny ourselves pleasures we are less liable to sin." Therefore there
is nothing vicious in insensibility.

_On the contrary,_ Nothing save vice is opposed to virtue. Now
insensibility is opposed to the virtue of temperance according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 11). Therefore insensibility is a
vice.

_I answer that,_ Whatever is contrary to the natural order is
vicious. Now nature has introduced pleasure into the operations that
are necessary for man's life. Wherefore the natural order requires
that man should make use of these pleasures, in so far as they are
necessary for man's well-being, as regards the preservation either of
the individual or of the species. Accordingly, if anyone were to
reject pleasure to the extent of omitting things that are necessary
for nature's preservation, he would sin, as acting counter to the
order of nature. And this pertains to the vice of insensibility.

It must, however, be observed that it is sometimes praiseworthy, and
even necessary for the sake of an end, to abstain from such pleasures
as result from these operations. Thus, for the sake of the body's
health, certain persons refrain from pleasures of meat, drink, and
sex; as also for the fulfilment of certain engagements: thus athletes
and soldiers have to deny themselves many pleasures, in order to
fulfil their respective duties. In like manner penitents, in order to
recover health of soul, have recourse to abstinence from pleasures,
as a kind of diet, and those who are desirous of giving themselves up
to contemplation and Divine things need much to refrain from carnal
things. Nor do any of these things pertain to the vice of
insensibility, because they are in accord with right reason.

Reply Obj. 1: Daniel abstained thus from pleasures, not through any
horror of pleasure as though it were evil in itself, but for some
praiseworthy end, in order, namely, to adapt himself to the heights
of contemplation by abstaining from pleasures of the body. Hence the
text goes on to tell of the revelation that he received immediately
afterwards.

Reply Obj. 2: Since man cannot use his reason without his sensitive
powers, which need a bodily organ, as stated in the First Part (Q.
84, AA. 7, 8), man needs to sustain his body in order that he may use
his reason. Now the body is sustained by means of operations that
afford pleasure: wherefore the good of reason cannot be in a man if
he abstain from all pleasures. Yet this need for using pleasures of
the body will be greater or less, according as man needs more or less
the powers of his body in accomplishing the act of reason. Wherefore
it is commendable for those who undertake the duty of giving
themselves to contemplation, and of imparting to others a spiritual
good, by a kind of spiritual procreation, as it were, to abstain from
many pleasures, but not for those who are in duty bound to bodily
occupations and carnal procreation.

Reply Obj. 3: In order to avoid sin, pleasure must be shunned, not
altogether, but so that it is not sought more than necessity requires.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 142, Art. 2]

Whether Intemperance Is a Childish Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that intemperance is not a childish sin.
For Jerome in commenting on Matt. 18:3, "Unless you be converted, and
become as little children," says that "a child persists not in anger,
is unmindful of injuries, takes no pleasure in seeing a beautiful
woman," all of which is contrary to intemperance. Therefore
intemperance is not a childish sin.

Obj. 2: Further, children have none but natural desires. Now "in
respect of natural desires few sin by intemperance," according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11). Therefore intemperance is not a
childish sin.

Obj. 3: Further, children should be fostered and nourished: whereas
concupiscence and pleasure, about which intemperance is concerned,
are always to be thwarted and uprooted, according to Col. 3:5,
"Mortify . . . your members upon the earth, which are . . .
concupiscence" [*Vulg.: 'your members which are upon the earth,
fornication . . concupiscence'], etc. Therefore intemperance is not a
childish sin.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "we
apply the term intemperance* to childish faults." [*_Akolasia_ which
Aristotle refers to _kolazo_ to punish, so that its original sense
would be 'impunity' or 'unrestraint.']

_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be childish for two reasons.
First, because it is becoming to children, and the Philosopher does
not mean that the sin of intemperance is childish in this sense.
Secondly. by way of likeness, and it is in this sense that sins of
intemperance are said to be childish. For the sin of intemperance is
one of unchecked concupiscence, which is likened to a child in three
ways. First, as regards that which they both desire, for like a child
concupiscence desires something disgraceful. This is because in human
affairs a thing is beautiful according as it harmonizes with reason.
Wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) under the heading "Comeliness
is twofold," that "the beautiful is that which is in keeping with
man's excellence in so far as his nature differs from other animals."
Now a child does not attend to the order of reason; and in like
manner "concupiscence does not listen to reason," according to
_Ethic._ vii, 6. Secondly, they are alike as to the result. For a
child, if left to his own will, becomes more self-willed: hence it is
written (Ecclus. 30:8): "A horse not broken becometh stubborn, and a
child left to himself will become headstrong." So, too,
concupiscence, if indulged, gathers strength: wherefore Augustine
says (Confess. viii, 5): "Lust served became a custom, and custom not
resisted became necessity." Thirdly, as to the remedy which is
applied to both. For a child is corrected by being restrained; hence
it is written (Prov. 23:13, 14): "Withhold not correction from a
child . . . Thou shalt beat him with a rod, and deliver his soul from
Hell." In like manner by resisting concupiscence we moderate it
according to the demands of virtue. Augustine indicates this when he
says (Music. vi, 11) that if the mind be lifted up to spiritual
things, and remain fixed "thereon, the impulse of custom," i.e.
carnal concupiscence, "is broken, and being suppressed is gradually
weakened: for it was stronger when we followed it, and though not
wholly destroyed, it is certainly less strong when we curb it." Hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "as a child ought to live
according to the direction of his tutor, so ought the concupiscible
to accord with reason."

Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes the term "childish" as denoting
what is observed in children. It is not in this sense that the sin of
intemperance is said to be childish, but by way of likeness, as
stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: A desire may be said to be natural in two ways. First,
with regard to its genus, and thus temperance and intemperance are
about natural desires, since they are about desires of food and sex,
which are directed to the preservation of nature. Secondly, a desire
may be called natural with regard to the species of the thing that
nature requires for its own preservation; and in this way it does not
happen often that one sins in the matter of natural desires, for
nature requires only that which supplies its need, and there is no
sin in desiring this, save only where it is desired in excess as to
quantity. This is the only way in which sin can occur with regard to
natural desires, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11).

There are other things in respect of which sins frequently occur, and
these are certain incentives to desire devised by human curiosity
[*Cf. Q. 167], such as the nice (_curiosa_) preparation of food, or
the adornment of women. And though children do not affect these
things much, yet intemperance is called a childish sin for the reason
given above.

Reply Obj. 3: That which regards nature should be nourished and
fostered in children, but that which pertains to the lack of reason
in them should not be fostered, but corrected, as stated above.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 142, Art. 3]

Whether Cowardice* Is a Greater Vice Than Intemperance?
[*Cf. Q. 125]

Objection 1: It would seem that cowardice is a greater vice than
intemperance. For a vice deserves reproach through being opposed to
the good of virtue. Now cowardice is opposed to fortitude, which is a
more excellent virtue than temperance, as stated above (A. 2; Q. 141,
A. 8). Therefore cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance.

Obj. 2: Further, the greater the difficulty to be surmounted, the
less is a man to be reproached for failure, wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is no wonder, in fact it is pardonable,
if a man is mastered by strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains."
Now seemingly it is more difficult to control pleasures than other
passions; hence it is stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3, that "it is more
difficult to contend against pleasure than against anger, which would
seem to be stronger than fear." Therefore intemperance, which is
overcome by pleasure, is a less grievous sin than cowardice, which is
overcome by fear.

Obj. 3: Further, it is essential to sin that it be voluntary. Now
cowardice is more voluntary than intemperance, since no man desires
to be intemperate, whereas some desire to avoid dangers of death,
which pertains to cowardice. Therefore cowardice is a more grievous
sin than intemperance.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that
"intemperance seems more akin to voluntary action than cowardice."
Therefore it is more sinful.

_I answer that,_ one may be compared with another in two ways. First,
with regard to the matter or object; secondly, on the part of the man
who sins: and in both ways intemperance is a more grievous sin than
cowardice.

First, as regards the matter. For cowardice shuns dangers of death,
to avoid which the principal motive is the necessity of preserving
life. On the other hand, intemperance is about pleasures, the desire
of which is not so necessary for the preservation of life, because,
as stated above (A. 2, ad 2), intemperance is more about certain
annexed pleasures or desires than about natural desires or pleasures.
Now the more necessary the motive of sin the less grievous the sin.
Wherefore intemperance is a more grievous vice than cowardice, on the
part of the object or motive matter.

In like manner again, on the part of the man who sins, and this for
three reasons. First, because the more sound-minded a man is, the
more grievous his sin, wherefore sins are not imputed to those who
are demented. Now grave fear and sorrow, especially in dangers of
death, stun the human mind, but not so pleasure which is the motive
of intemperance. Secondly, because the more voluntary a sin the
graver it is. Now intemperance has more of the voluntary in it than
cowardice has, and this for two reasons. The first is because actions
done through fear have their origin in the compulsion of an external
agent, so that they are not simply voluntary but mixed, as stated in
_Ethic._ iii, 1, whereas actions done for the sake of pleasure are
simply voluntary. The second reason is because the actions of an
intemperate man are more voluntary individually and less voluntary
generically. For no one would wish to be intemperate, yet man is
enticed by individual pleasures which make of him an intemperate man.
Hence the most effective remedy against intemperance is not to dwell
on the consideration of singulars. It is the other way about in
matters relating to cowardice: because the particular action that
imposes itself on a man is less voluntary, for instance to cast aside
his shield, and the like, whereas the general purpose is more
voluntary, for instance to save himself by flight. Now that which is
more voluntary in the particular circumstances in which the act takes
place, is simply more voluntary. Wherefore intemperance, being simply
more voluntary than cowardice, is a greater vice. Thirdly, because it
is easier to find a remedy for intemperance than for cowardice, since
pleasures of food and sex, which are the matter of intemperance, are
of everyday occurrence, and it is possible for man without danger by
frequent practice in their regard to become temperate; whereas
dangers of death are of rare occurrence, and it is more dangerous for
man to encounter them frequently in order to cease being a coward.

Reply Obj. 1: The excellence of fortitude in comparison with
temperance may be considered from two standpoints. First, with regard
to the end, which has the aspect of good: because fortitude is
directed to the common good more than temperance is. And from this
point of view cowardice has a certain precedence over intemperance,
since by cowardice some people forsake the defense of the common
good. Secondly, with regard to the difficulty, because it is more
difficult to endure dangers of death than to refrain from any
pleasures whatever: and from this point of view there is no need for
cowardice to take precedence of intemperance. For just as it is a
greater strength that does not succumb to a stronger force, so on the
other hand to be overcome by a stronger force is proof of a lesser
vice, and to succumb to a weaker force, is the proof of a greater
vice.

Reply Obj. 2: Love of self-preservation, for the sake of which one
shuns perils of death, is much more connatural than any pleasures
whatever of food and sex which are directed to the preservation of
life. Hence it is more difficult to overcome the fear of dangers of
death, than the desire of pleasure in matters of food and sex:
although the latter is more difficult to resist than anger, sorrow,
and fear, occasioned by certain other evils.

Reply Obj. 3: The voluntary, in cowardice, depends rather on a
general than on a particular consideration: wherefore in such cases
we have the voluntary not simply but in a restricted sense.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 142, Art. 4]

Whether Intemperance Is the Most Disgraceful of Sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that intemperance is not the most
disgraceful of sins. As honor is due to virtue so is disgrace due to
sin. Now some sins are more grievous than intemperance: for instance
murder, blasphemy, and the like. Therefore intemperance is not the
most disgraceful of sins.

Obj. 2: Further, those sins which are the more common are seemingly
less disgraceful, since men are less ashamed of them. Now sins of
intemperance are most common, because they are about things connected
with the common use of human life, and in which many happen to sin.
Therefore sins of intemperance do not seem to be most disgraceful.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) temperance and
intemperance are about human desires and pleasures. Now certain
desires and pleasures are more shameful than human desires and
pleasures; such are brutal pleasures and those caused by disease as
the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 5). Therefore intemperance is not
the most disgraceful of sins.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that
"intemperance is justly more deserving of reproach than other vices."

_I answer that,_ Disgrace is seemingly opposed to honor and glory.
Now honor is due to excellence, as stated above (Q. 103, A. 1), and
glory denotes clarity (Q. 103, A. 1, ad 3). Accordingly intemperance
is most disgraceful for two reasons. First, because it is most
repugnant to human excellence, since it is about pleasures common to
us and the lower animals, as stated above (Q. 141, AA. 2, 3).
Wherefore it is written (Ps. 48:21): "Man, when he was in honor, did
not understand: he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made
like to them." Secondly, because it is most repugnant to man's
clarity or beauty; inasmuch as the pleasures which are the matter of
intemperance dim the light of reason from which all the clarity and
beauty of virtue arises: wherefore these pleasures are described as
being most slavish.

Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says [*Moral. xxxiii. 12] "the sins of the
flesh," which are comprised under the head of intemperance, although
less culpable, are more disgraceful. The reason is that culpability
is measured by inordinateness in respect of the end, while disgrace
regards shamefulness, which depends chiefly on the unbecomingness of
the sin in respect of the sinner.

Reply Obj. 2: The commonness of a sin diminishes the shamefulness and
disgrace of a sin in the opinion of men, but not as regards the
nature of the vices themselves.

Reply Obj. 3: When we say that intemperance is most disgraceful, we
mean in comparison with human vices, those, namely, that are
connected with human passions which to a certain extent are in
conformity with human nature. But those vices which exceed the mode
of human nature are still more disgraceful. Nevertheless such vices
are apparently reducible to the genus of intemperance, by way of
excess: for instance, if a man delight in eating human flesh, or in
committing the unnatural vice.
_______________________

QUESTION 143

OF THE PARTS OF TEMPERANCE, IN GENERAL

We must now consider the parts of temperance: we shall consider these
same parts (1) in general; (2) each of them in particular.
_______________________

ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 143, Art.]

Whether the Parts of Temperance Are Rightly Assigned?

Objection 1: It would seem that Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54)
unbecomingly assigns the parts of temperance, when he asserts them to
be "continence, mildness, and modesty." For continence is reckoned to
be distinct from virtue (Ethic. vii, 1): whereas temperance is
comprised under virtue. Therefore continence is not a part of
temperance.

Obj. 2: Further, mildness seemingly softens hatred or anger. But
temperance is not about these things, but about pleasures of touch,
as stated above (Q. 141, A. 4). Therefore mildness is not a part of
temperance.

Obj. 3: Further, modesty concerns external action, wherefore the
Apostle says (Phil. 4:5): "Let your modesty be known to all men." Now
external actions are the matter of justice, as stated above (Q. 58,
A. 8). Therefore modesty is a part of justice rather than of
temperance.

Obj. 4: Further, Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons many more
parts of temperance: for he says that "temperance results in modesty,
shamefacedness, abstinence, chastity, honesty, moderation, lowliness,
sobriety, purity." Andronicus also says [*De Affectibus] that "the
companions of temperance are gravity, continence, humility,
simplicity, refinement, method, contentment." [*_Per-se-sufficientiam_
which could be rendered "self-sufficiency," but for the fact that
this is taken in a bad sense. See Q. 169, A. 1.] Therefore it seems
that Tully insufficiently reckoned the parts of temperance.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (QQ. 48, 128), a cardinal virtue may
have three kinds of parts, namely integral, subjective, and
potential. The integral parts of a virtue are the conditions the
concurrence of which are necessary for virtue: and in this respect
there are two integral parts of temperance, _shamefacedness,_ whereby
one recoils from the disgrace that is contrary to temperance, and
_honesty,_ whereby one loves the beauty of temperance. For, as stated
above (Q. 141, A. 2, ad 3), temperance more than any other virtue
lays claim to a certain comeliness, and the vices of intemperance
excel others in disgrace.

The subjective parts of a virtue are its species: and the species of
a virtue have to be differentiated according to the difference of
matter or object. Now temperance is about pleasures of touch, which
are of two kinds. For some are directed to nourishment: and in these
as regards meat, there is _abstinence,_ and as regards drink properly
there is _sobriety._ Other pleasures are directed to the power of
procreation, and in these as regards the principal pleasure of the
act itself of procreation, there is _chastity,_ and as to the
pleasures incidental to the act, resulting, for instance, from
kissing, touching, or fondling, we have _purity._

The potential parts of a principal virtue are called secondary
virtues: for while the principal virtue observes the mode in some
principal matter, these observe the mode in some other matter wherein
moderation is not so difficult. Now it belongs to temperance to
moderate pleasures of touch, which are most difficult to moderate.
Wherefore any virtue that is effective of moderation in some matter
or other, and restrains the appetite in its impulse towards
something, may be reckoned a part of temperance, as a virtue annexed
thereto.

This happens in three ways: first, in the inward movements of the
soul; secondly, in the outward movements and actions of the body;
thirdly, in outward things. Now besides the movement of
concupiscence, which temperance moderates and restrains, we find in
the soul three movements towards a particular object. In the first
place there is the movement of the will when stirred by the impulse
of passion: and this movement is restrained by _continence,_ the
effect of which is that, although a man suffer immoderate
concupiscences, his will does not succumb to them. Another inward
movement towards something is the movement of hope, and of the
resultant daring, and this is moderated or restrained by _humility._
The third movement is that of anger, which tends towards revenge, and
this is restrained by _meekness_ or _mildness._

With regard to bodily movements and actions, moderation and restraint
is the effect of _modesty,_ which, according to Andronicus, has three
parts. The first of these enables one to discern what to do and what
not to do, and to observe the right order, and to persevere in what
we do: this he assigns to _method._ The second is that a man observe
decorum in what he does, and this he ascribes to _refinement._ The
third has to do with the conversation or any other intercourse
between a man and his friends, and this is called _gravity._

With regard to external things, a twofold moderation has to be
observed. First, we must not desire too many, and to this Macrobius
assigns _lowliness,_ and Andronicus _contentment_; secondly, we must
not be too nice in our requirements, and to this Macrobius ascribes
_moderation,_ Andronicus _simplicity._

Reply Obj. 1: It is true that continence differs from virtue, just as
imperfect differs from perfect, as we shall state further on (Q. 165,
A. 1); and in this sense it is condivided with virtue. Yet it has
something in common with temperance both as to matter, since it is
about pleasures of touch, and as to mode, since it is a kind of
restraint. Hence it is suitably assigned as a part of temperance.

Reply Obj. 2: Mildness or meekness is reckoned a part of temperance
not because of a likeness of matter, but because they agree as to the
mode of restraint and moderation as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: In the matter of external action justice considers what
is due to another. Modesty does not consider this, but only a certain
moderation. Hence it is reckoned a part not of justice but of
temperance.

Reply Obj. 4: Under modesty Tully includes whatever pertains to the
moderation of bodily movements and external things, as well as the
moderation of hope which we reckoned as pertaining to humility.
_______________________

QUESTION 144

OF SHAMEFACEDNESS
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the parts of temperance in particular: and in
the first place the integral parts, which are shamefacedness and
honesty. With regard to shamefacedness there are four points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether shamefacedness is a virtue?

(2) What is its object?

(3) Who are the cause of a man being ashamed?

(4) What kind of people are ashamed?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 144, Art. 1]

Whether Shamefacedness Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that shamefacedness is a virtue. For it is
proper to a virtue "to observe the mean as fixed by reason": this is
clear from the definition of virtue given in _Ethic._ ii, 6. Now
shamefacedness observes the mean in this way, as the Philosopher
observes (Ethic. ii, 7). Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is praiseworthy is either a virtue or
something connected with virtue. Now shamefacedness is praiseworthy.
But it is not part of a virtue. For it is not a part of prudence,
since it is not in the reason but in the appetite; nor is it a part
of justice. Since shamefacedness implies a certain passion, whereas
justice is not about the passions; nor again is it a part of
fortitude, because it belongs to fortitude to be persistent and
aggressive, while it belongs to shamefacedness to recoil from
something; nor lastly is it a part of temperance, since the latter is
about desires, whereas shamefacedness is a kind of fear according as
the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 9) and Damascene (De Fide Orth.
ii, 15). Hence it follows that shamefacedness is a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, the honest and the virtuous are convertible
according to Tully (De Offic. i, 27). Now shamefacedness is a part of
honesty: for Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "shamefacedness is
the companion and familiar of the restful mind, averse to wantonness,
a stranger to any kind of excess, the friend of sobriety and the
support of what is honest, a seeker after the beautiful." Therefore
shamefacedness is a virtue.

Obj. 4: Further, every vice is opposed to a virtue. Now certain vices
are opposed to shamefacedness, namely shamelessness and inordinate
prudery. Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.

Obj. 5: Further, "like acts beget like habits," according to _Ethic._
ii, 1. Now shamefacedness implies a praiseworthy act; wherefore from
many such acts a habit results. But a habit of praiseworthy deeds is
a virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 12). Therefore
shamefacedness is a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 9) that
shamefacedness is not a virtue.

_I answer that,_ Virtue is taken in two ways, in a strict sense and
in a broad sense. Taken strictly virtue is a perfection, as stated in
_Phys._    vii, 17, 18. Wherefore anything that is inconsistent with
perfection, though it be good, falls short of the notion of virtue.
Now shamefacedness is inconsistent with perfection, because it is the
fear of something base, namely of that which is disgraceful. Hence
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that "shamefacedness is fear of
a base action." Now just as hope is about a possible and difficult
good, so is fear about a possible and arduous evil, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 40, A. 1; Q. 41, A. 2; Q. 42, A. 3), when we were treating
of the passions. But one who is perfect as to a virtuous habit, does
not apprehend that which would be disgraceful and base to do, as
being possible and arduous, that is to say difficult for him to
avoid; nor does he actually do anything base, so as to be in fear of
disgrace. Therefore shamefacedness, properly speaking, is not a
virtue, since it falls short of the perfection of virtue.

Taken, however, in a broad sense virtue denotes whatever is good and
praiseworthy in human acts or passions; and in this way
shamefacedness is sometimes called a virtue, since it is a
praiseworthy passion.

Reply Obj. 1: Observing the mean is not sufficient for the notion of
virtue, although it is one of the conditions included in virtue's
definition: but it is requisite, in addition to this, that it be "an
elective habit," that is to say, operating from choice. Now
shamefacedness denotes, not a habit but a passion, nor does its
movement result from choice, but from an impulse of passion. Hence it
falls short of the notion of virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above, shamefacedness is fear of baseness and
disgrace. Now it has been stated (Q. 142, A. 4) that the vice of
intemperance is most base and disgraceful. Wherefore shamefacedness
pertains more to temperance than to any other virtue, by reason of
its motive cause, which is a base action though not according to the
species of the passion, namely fear. Nevertheless in so far as the
vices opposed to other virtues are base and disgraceful,
shamefacedness may also pertain to other virtues.

Reply Obj. 3: Shamefacedness fosters honesty, by removing that which
is contrary thereto, but not so as to attain to the perfection of
honesty.

Reply Obj. 4: Every defect causes a vice, but not every good is
sufficient for the notion of virtue. Consequently it does not follow
that whatever is directly opposed to vice is a virtue, although every
vice is opposed to a virtue, as regards its origin. Hence
shamelessness, in so far as it results from excessive love of
disgraceful things, is opposed to temperance.

Reply Obj. 5: Being frequently ashamed causes the habit of an
acquired virtue whereby one avoids disgraceful things which are the
object of shamefacedness, without continuing to be ashamed in their
regard: although as a consequence of this acquired virtue, a man
would be more ashamed, if confronted with the matter of
shamefacedness.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 144, Art. 2]

Whether Shamefacedness Is About a Disgraceful Action?

Objection 1: It would seem that shamefacedness is not about a
disgraceful action. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that
"shamefacedness is fear of disgrace." Now sometimes those who do
nothing wrong suffer ignominy, according to Ps. 67:8, "For thy sake I
have borne reproach, shame hath covered my face." Therefore
shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing apparently is disgraceful but what is
sinful. Yet man is ashamed of things that are not sins, for instance
when he performs a menial occupation. Therefore it seems that
shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.

Obj. 3: Further, virtuous deeds are not disgraceful but most
beautiful according to _Ethic._ i, 8. Yet sometimes people are
ashamed to do virtuous deeds, according to Luke 9:26, "He that shall
be ashamed of Me and My words, of him the Son of man shall be
ashamed," etc. Therefore shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful
action.

Obj. 4: Further, if shamefacedness were properly about a disgraceful
action, it would follow that the more disgraceful the action the more
ashamed would one be. Yet sometimes a man is more ashamed of lesser
sins, while he glories in those which are most grievous, according to
Ps. 51:3, "Why dost thou glory in malice?" Therefore shamefacedness
is not properly about a disgraceful action.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) and Gregory of
Nyssa [*Nemesius, (De Nat. Hom. xx)] say that "shamefacedness is fear
of doing a disgraceful deed or of a disgraceful deed done."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 41, A. 2; Q. 42, A. 3),
when we were treating of the passions, fear is properly about an
arduous evil, one, namely, that is difficult to avoid. Now disgrace
is twofold. There is the disgrace inherent to vice, which consists in
the deformity of a voluntary act: and this, properly speaking, has
not the character of an arduous evil. For that which depends on the
will alone does not appear to be arduous and above man's ability:
wherefore it is not apprehended as fearful, and for this reason the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that such evils are not a matter of
fear.

The other kind of disgrace is penal so to speak, and it consists in
the reproach that attaches to a person, just as the clarity of glory
consists in a person being honored. And since this reproach has the
character of an arduous evil, just as honor has the character of an
arduous good, shamefacedness, which is fear of disgrace, regards
first and foremost reproach or ignominy. And since reproach is
properly due to vice, as honor is due to virtue, it follows that
shamefacedness regards also the disgrace inherent to vice. Hence the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "a man is less ashamed of those
defects which are not the result of any fault of his own."

Now shamefacedness regards fault in two ways. In one way a man
refrains from vicious acts through fear of reproach: in another way a
man while doing a disgraceful deed avoids the public eye through fear
of reproach. In the former case, according to Gregory of Nyssa
(Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx), we speak of a person "blushing," in the
latter we say that he is "ashamed." Hence he says that "the man who
is ashamed acts in secret, but he who blushes fears to be disgraced."

Reply Obj. 1: Shamefacedness properly regards disgrace as due to sin
which is a voluntary defect. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6)
that "a man is more ashamed of those things of which he is the
cause." Now the virtuous man despises the disgrace to which he is
subject on account of virtue, because he does not deserve it; as the
Philosopher says of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3). Thus we find it
said of the apostles (Acts 5:41) that "they (the apostles) went from
the presence of the council, rejoicing that they were accounted
worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus." It is owing to
imperfection of virtue that a man is sometimes ashamed of the
reproaches which he suffers on account of virtue, since the more
virtuous a man is, the more he despises external things, whether good
or evil. Wherefore it is written (Isa. 51:7): "Fear ye not the
reproach of men."

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 63, A. 3), though honor is not
really due save to virtue alone, yet it regards a certain excellence:
and the same applies to reproach, for though it is properly due to
sin alone, yet, at least in man's opinion, it regards any kind of
defect. Hence a man is ashamed of poverty, disrepute, servitude, and
the like.

Reply Obj. 3: Shamefacedness does not regard virtuous deeds as such.
Yet it happens accidentally that a man is ashamed of them either
because he looks upon them as vicious according to human opinion, or
because he is afraid of being marked as presumptuous or hypocritical
for doing virtuous deeds.

Reply Obj. 4: Sometimes more grievous sins are less shameful, either
because they are less disgraceful, as spiritual sins in comparison
with sins of the flesh, or because they connote a certain abundance
of some temporal good; thus a man is more ashamed of cowardice than
of daring, of theft than of robbery, on account of a semblance of
power. The same applies to other sins.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 144, Art. 3]

Whether Man Is More Shamefaced of Those Who Are More Closely
Connected with Him?

Objection 1: It would seem that man is not more shamefaced of those
who are more closely connected with him. For it is stated in _Rhet._
ii, 6 that "men are more shamefaced of those from whom they desire
approbation." Now men desire this especially from people of the
better sort who are sometimes not connected with them. Therefore man
is not more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with
him.

Obj. 2: Further, seemingly those are more closely connected who
perform like deeds. Now man is not made ashamed of his sin by those
whom he knows to be guilty of the same sin, because according to
_Rhet._ ii, 6, "a man does not forbid his neighbor what he does
himself." Therefore he is not more shamefaced of those who are most
closely connected with him.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men take
more shame from those who retail their information to many, such as
jokers and fable-tellers." But those who are more closely connected
with a man do not retail his vices. Therefore one should not take
shame chiefly from them.

Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men are
most liable to be made ashamed by those among whom they have done
nothing amiss; by those of whom they ask something for the first
time; by those whose friends they wish to become." Now these are less
closely connected with us. Therefore man is not made most ashamed by
those who are more closely united to him.

_On the contrary,_ It is stated in Rhet. ii, 6 that "man is made most
ashamed by those who are to be continually with him."

_I answer that,_ Since reproach is opposed to honor, just as honor
denotes attestation to someone's excellence, especially the
excellence which is according to virtue, so too reproach, the fear of
which is shamefacedness, denotes attestation to a person's defect,
especially that which results from sin. Hence the more weighty a
person's attestation is considered to be, the more does he make
another person ashamed. Now a person's attestation may be considered
as being more weighty, either because he is certain of the truth or
because of its effect. Certitude of the truth attaches to a person's
attestations for two reasons. First on account of the rectitude of
his judgement, as in the case of wise and virtuous men, by whom man
is more desirous of being honored and by whom he is brought to a
greater sense of shame. Hence children and the lower animals inspire
no one with shame, by reason of their lack of judgment. Secondly, on
account of his knowledge of the matter attested, because "everyone
judges well of what is known to him" [*Ethic. i, 3]. In this way we
are more liable to be made ashamed by persons connected with us,
since they are better acquainted with our deeds: whereas strangers
and persons entirely unknown to us, who are ignorant of what we do,
inspire us with no shame at all.

An attestation receives weight from its effect by reason of some
advantage or harm resulting therefrom; wherefore men are more
desirous of being honored by those who can be of use to them, and are
more liable to be made ashamed by those who are able to do them some
harm. And for this reason again, in a certain respect, persons
connected with us make us more ashamed, since we are to be
continually in their society, as though this entailed a continual
harm to us: whereas the harm that comes from strangers and passersby
ceases almost at once.

Reply Obj. 1: People of the better sort make us ashamed for the same
reason as those who are more closely connected with us; because just
as the attestation of the better men carries more weight since they
have a more universal knowledge of things, and in their judgments
hold fast to the truth: so, too, the attestation of those among whom
we live is more cogent since they know more about our concerns in
detail.

Reply Obj. 2: We fear not the attestation of those who are connected
with us in the likeness of sin, because we do not think that they
look upon our defect as disgraceful.

Reply Obj. 3: Tale-bearers make us ashamed on account of the harm
they do by making many think ill of us.

Reply Obj. 4: Even those among whom we have done no wrong, make us
more ashamed, on account of the harm that would follow, because, to
wit, we should forfeit the good opinion they had of us: and again
because when contraries are put in juxtaposition their opposition
seems greater, so that when a man notices something disgraceful in
one whom he esteemed good, he apprehends it as being the more
disgraceful. The reason why we are made more ashamed by those of whom
we ask something for the first time, or whose friends we wish to be,
is that we fear to suffer some injury, by being disappointed in our
request, or by failing to become their friends.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 144, Art. 4]

Whether Even Virtuous Men Can Be Ashamed?

Objection 1: It would seem that even virtuous men can be ashamed. For
contraries have contrary effects. Now those who excel in wickedness
are not ashamed, according to Jer. 3:3, "Thou hadst a harlot's
forehead, thou wouldst not blush." Therefore those who are virtuous
are more inclined to be ashamed.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that "men are
ashamed not only of vice, but also of the signs of evil": and this
happens also in the virtuous. Therefore virtuous men can be ashamed.

Obj. 3: Further, shamefacedness is "fear of disgrace" [*Ethic. iv,
9]. Now virtuous people may happen to be ignominious, for instance if
they are slandered, or if they suffer reproach undeservedly.
Therefore a virtuous man can be ashamed.

Obj. 4: Further, shamefacedness is a part of temperance, as stated
above (Q. 143). Now a part is not separated from its whole. Since
then temperance is in a virtuous man, it means that shamefacedness is
also.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that a
"virtuous man is not shamefaced."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2) shamefacedness is fear of
some disgrace. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil is not
feared: first, because it is not reckoned an evil; secondly because
one reckons it impossible with regard to oneself, or as not difficult
to avoid.

Accordingly shame may be lacking in a person in two ways. First,
because the things that should make him ashamed are not deemed by him
to be disgraceful; and in this way those who are steeped in sin are
without shame, for instead of disapproving of their sins, they boast
of them. Secondly, because they apprehend disgrace as impossible to
themselves, or as easy to avoid. In this way the old and the virtuous
are not shamefaced. Yet they are so disposed, that if there were
anything disgraceful in them they would be ashamed of it. Wherefore
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that "shame is in the virtuous
hypothetically."

Reply Obj. 1: Lack of shame occurs in the best and in the worst men
through different causes, as stated in the Article. In the average
men it is found, in so far as they have a certain love of good, and
yet are not altogether free from evil.

Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to the virtuous man to avoid not only vice,
but also whatever has the semblance of vice, according to 1 Thess.
5:22, "From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves." The
Philosopher, too, says (Ethic. iv, 9) that the virtuous man should
avoid "not only what is really evil, but also those things that are
regarded as evil."

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (A. 1, ad 1) the virtuous man despises
ignominy and reproach, as being things he does not deserve, wherefore
he is not much ashamed of them. Nevertheless, to a certain extent,
shame, like the other passions, may forestall reason.

Reply Obj. 4: Shamefacedness is a part of temperance, not as though
it entered into its essence, but as a disposition to it: wherefore
Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "shamefacedness lays the first
foundation of temperance," by inspiring man with the horror of
whatever is disgraceful.
_______________________

QUESTION 145

OF HONESTY*
(In Four Articles)
[*Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with
moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum.]

We must now consider honesty, under which head there are four points
of inquiry:

(1) The relation between the honest and the virtuous;

(2) Its relation with the beautiful [*As honesty here denotes moral
goodness, so beauty stands for moral beauty];

(3) Its relation with the useful and the pleasant;

(4) Whether honesty is a part of temperance?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 145, Art. 1]

Whether Honesty Is the Same As Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that honesty is not the same as virtue.
For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) that "the honest is what is
desired for its own sake." Now virtue is desired, not for its own
sake, but for the sake of happiness, for the Philosopher says (Ethic.
i, 9) that "happiness is the reward and the end of virtue." Therefore
honesty is not the same as virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x) "honesty means an
honorable state." Now honor is due to many things besides virtue,
since "it is praise that is the proper due of virtue" (Ethic. i, 12).
Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, the "principal part of virtue is the interior
choice," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 13). But honesty seems
to pertain rather to exterior conduct, according to 1 Cor. 14:40,
"Let all things be done decently (_honeste_) and according to order"
among you. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.

Obj. 4: Further, honesty apparently consists in external wealth.
According to Ecclus. 11:14, "good things and evil, life and death
[poverty and riches] are from God" [*The words in brackets are
omitted in the Leonine edition. For riches the Vulgate has
_honestas_]. But virtue does not consist in external wealth.
Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Offic. i, 5; Rhet. ii, 53) divides
honesty into the four principal virtues, into which virtue is also
divided. Therefore honesty is the same as virtue.

_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. x) "honesty means an
honorable state," wherefore a thing may be said to be honest through
being worthy of honor. Now honor, as stated above (Q. 144, A. 2, ad
2), is due to excellence: and the excellence of a man is gauged
chiefly according to his virtue, as stated in _Phys._ vii, 17.
Therefore, properly speaking, honesty refers to the same thing as
virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7), of those
things that are desired for their own sake, some are desired for
their own sake alone, and never for the sake of something else, such
as happiness which is the last end; while some are desired, not only
for their own sake, inasmuch as they have an aspect of goodness in
themselves, even if no further good accrued to us through them, but
also for the sake of something else, inasmuch as they are conducive
to some more perfect good. It is thus that the virtues are desirable
for their own sake: wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52)
that "some things allure us by their own force, and attract us by
their own worth, such as virtue, truth, knowledge." And this suffices
to give a thing the character of honest.

Reply Obj. 2: Some of the things which are honored besides virtue are
more excellent than virtue, namely God and happiness, and such like
things are not so well known to us by experience as virtue which we
practice day by day. Hence virtue has a greater claim to the name of
honesty. Other things which are beneath virtue are honored, in so far
as they are a help to the practice of virtue, such as rank, power,
and riches [*Ethic. i, 8]. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3)
that these things "are honored by some people, but in truth it is
only the good man who is worthy of honor." Now a man is good in
respect of virtue. Wherefore praise is due to virtue in so far as the
latter is desirable for the sake of something else, while honor is
due to virtue for its own sake: and it is thus that virtue has the
character of honesty.

Reply Obj. 3: As we have stated honest denotes that to which honor is
due. Now honor is an attestation to someone's excellence, as stated
above (Q. 103, AA. 1, 2). But one attests only to what one knows; and
the internal choice is not made known save by external actions.
Wherefore external conduct has the character of honesty, in so far as
it reflects internal rectitude. For this reason honesty consists
radically in the internal choice, but its expression lies in the
external conduct.

Reply Obj. 4: It is because the excellence of wealth is commonly
regarded as making a man deserving of honor, that sometimes the name
of honesty is given to external prosperity.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 145, Art. 2]

Whether the Honest Is the Same As the Beautiful?

Objection 1: It would seem that the honest is not the same as the
beautiful. For the aspect of honest is derived from the appetite,
since the honest is "what is desirable for its own sake" [*Cicero, De
Invent. Rhet. ii, 53]. But the beautiful regards rather the faculty
of vision to which it is pleasing. Therefore the beautiful is not the
same as the honest.

Obj. 2: Further, beauty requires a certain clarity, which is
characteristic of glory: whereas the honest regards honor. Since then
honor and glory differ, as stated above (Q. 103, A. 1, ad 3), it
seems also that the honest and the beautiful differ.

Obj. 3: Further, honesty is the same as virtue, as stated above (A.
1). But a certain beauty is contrary to virtue, wherefore it is
written (Ezech. 16:15): "Trusting in thy beauty thou playest the
harlot because of thy renown." Therefore the honest is not the same
as the beautiful.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:23, 24): "Those that
are our uncomely (_inhonesta_) parts, have more abundant comeliness
(_honestatem_), but our comely (_honesta_) parts have no need." Now
by uncomely parts he means the baser members, and by comely parts the
beautiful members. Therefore the honest and the beautiful are
apparently the same.

_I answer that,_ As may be gathered from the words of Dionysius (Div.
Nom. iv), beauty or comeliness results from the concurrence of
clarity and due proportion. For he states that God is said to be
beautiful, as being "the cause of the harmony and clarity of the
universe." Hence the beauty of the body consists in a man having his
bodily limbs well proportioned, together with a certain clarity of
color. In like manner spiritual beauty consists in a man's conduct or
actions being well proportioned in respect of the spiritual clarity
of reason. Now this is what is meant by honesty, which we have stated
(A. 1) to be the same as virtue; and it is virtue that moderates
according to reason all that is connected with man. Wherefore
"honesty is the same as spiritual beauty." Hence Augustine says (QQ.
83, qu. 30): "By honesty I mean intelligible beauty, which we
properly designate as spiritual," and further on he adds that "many
things are beautiful to the eye, which it would be hardly proper to
call honest."

Reply Obj. 1: The object that moves the appetite is an apprehended
good. Now if a thing is perceived to be beautiful as soon as it is
apprehended, it is taken to be something becoming and good. Hence
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the beautiful and the good are
beloved by all." Wherefore the honest, inasmuch as it implies
spiritual beauty, is an object of desire, and for this reason Tully
says (De Offic. i, 5): "Thou perceivest the form and the features, so
to speak, of honesty; and were it to be seen with the eye, would, as
Plato declares, arouse a wondrous love of wisdom."

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 103, A. 1, ad 3), glory is the
effect of honor: because through being honored or praised, a person
acquires clarity in the eyes of others. Wherefore, just as the same
thing makes a man honorable and glorious, so is the same thing honest
and beautiful.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument applies to the beauty of the body:
although it might be replied that to be proud of one's honesty is to
play the harlot because of one's spiritual beauty, according to
Ezech. 28:17, "Thy heart was lifted up with thy beauty, thou hast
lost thy wisdom in thy beauty."
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 145, Art. 3]

Whether the Honest Differs from the Useful and the Pleasant?

Objection 1: It would seem that the honest does not differ from the
useful and the pleasant. For the honest is "what is desirable for its
own sake" [*Cicero, De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53]. Now pleasure is desired
for its own sake, for "it seems ridiculous to ask a man why he wishes
to be pleased," as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore
the honest does not differ from the pleasant.

Obj. 2: Further, riches are comprised under the head of useful good:
for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52): "There is a thing that
attracts the desire not by any force of its own, nor by its very
nature, but on account of its fruitfulness and utility": and "that is
money." Now riches come under the head of honesty, for it is written
(Ecclus. 11:14): "Poverty and riches (_honestas_) are from God," and
(Ecclus. 13:2): "He shall take a burden upon him that hath fellowship
with one more honorable," i.e. richer, "than himself." Therefore the
honest differs not from the useful.

Obj. 3: Further, Tully proves (De Offic. ii, 3) that nothing can be
useful unless it be honest: and Ambrose makes the same statement (De
Offic. ii, 6). Therefore the useful differs not from the honest.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Q. 83, qu. 30): "The honest is
that which is desirable for its own sake: the useful implies
reference to something else."

_I answer that,_ The honest concurs in the same subject with the
useful and the pleasant, but it differs from them in aspect. For, as
stated above (A. 2), a thing is said to be honest, in so far as it
has a certain beauty through being regulated by reason. Now whatever
is regulated in accordance with reason is naturally becoming to man.
Again, it is natural for a thing to take pleasure in that which is
becoming to it. Wherefore an honest thing is naturally pleasing to
man: and the Philosopher proves this with regard to acts of virtue
(Ethic. i, 8). Yet not all that is pleasing is honest, since a thing
may be becoming according to the senses, but not according to reason.
A pleasing thing of this kind is beside man's reason which perfects
his nature. Even virtue itself, which is essentially honest, is
referred to something else as its end namely happiness. Accordingly
the honest the useful, and the pleasant concur in the one subject.

Nevertheless they differ in aspect. For a thing is said to be honest
as having a certain excellence deserving of honor on account of its
spiritual beauty: while it is said to be pleasing, as bringing rest
to desire, and useful, as referred to something else. The pleasant,
however, extends to more things than the useful and the honest: since
whatever is useful and honest is pleasing in some respect, whereas
the converse does not hold (Ethic. ii, 3).

Reply Obj. 1: A thing is said to be honest, if it is desired for its
own sake by the rational appetite, which tends to that which is in
accordance with reason: while a thing is said to be pleasant if it is
desired for its own sake by the sensitive appetite.

Reply Obj. 2: Riches are denominated honesty according of the opinion
of the many who honor wealth: or because they are intended to be the
instruments of virtuous deeds, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2).

Reply Obj. 3: Tully and Ambrose mean to say that nothing incompatible
with honesty can be simply and truly useful, since it follows that it
is contrary to man's last end, which is a good in accordance with
reason; although it may perhaps be useful in some respect, with
regard to a particular end. But they do not mean to say that every
useful thing as such may be classed among those that are honest.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 145, Art. 4]

Whether Honesty Should Be Reckoned a Part of Temperance?

Objection 1: It would seem that honesty should not be reckoned a part
of temperance. For it is not possible for a thing to be part and
whole in respect of one same thing. Now "temperance is a part of
honesty,"    according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). Therefore
honesty is not a part of temperance.

Obj. 2: Further, it is stated (3 Esdra 3:21) that "wine . . . makes
all thoughts honest." But the use of wine, especially in excess, in
which sense the passage quoted should seemingly be taken, pertains to
intemperance rather than to temperance. Therefore honesty is not a
part of temperance.

Obj. 3: Further, the honest is that which is deserving of honor. Now
"it is the just and the brave who receive most honor," according to
the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 9). Therefore honesty pertains, not to
temperance, but rather to justice and fortitude: wherefore Eleazar
said as related in 2 Macc. 6:28: "I suffer an honorable (_honesta_)
death, for the most venerable and most holy laws."

_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i] reckons honesty a
part of temperance, and Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) ascribes honesty as
pertaining especially to temperance.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), honesty is a kind of
spiritual beauty. Now the disgraceful is opposed to the beautiful:
and opposites are most manifest of one another. Wherefore seemingly
honesty belongs especially to temperance, since the latter repels
that which is most disgraceful and unbecoming to man, namely animal
lusts. Hence by its very name temperance is most significative of the
good of reason to which it belongs to moderate and temper evil
desires. Accordingly honesty, as being ascribed for a special reason
to temperance, is reckoned as a part thereof, not as a subjective
part, nor as an annexed virtue, but as an integral part or condition
attaching thereto.

Reply Obj. 1: Temperance is accounted a subjective part of honesty
taken in a wide sense: it is not thus that the latter is reckoned a
part of temperance.

Reply Obj. 2: When a man is intoxicated, "the wine makes his thoughts
honest" according to his own reckoning because he deems himself great
and deserving of honor [*Cf. Q. 148, A. 6].

Reply Obj. 3: Greater honor is due to justice and fortitude than to
temperance, because they excel in the point of a greater good: yet
greater honor is due to temperance, because the vices which it holds
in check are the most deserving of reproach, as stated above. Thus
honesty is more to be ascribed to temperance according to the rule
given by the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:23) when he says that "our uncomely
parts have more abundant comeliness," which, namely, destroys
whatever is uncomely.
_______________________

QUESTION 146

OF ABSTINENCE
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider the subjective parts of temperance: first, those
which are about pleasures of food; secondly, those which are about
pleasures of sex. The first consideration will include abstinence,
which is about meat and drink, and sobriety, which is specifically
about drink.

With regard to abstinence three points have to be considered:
(1) Abstinence itself; (2) its act which is fasting; (3) its opposite
vice which is gluttony. Under the first head there are two points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether abstinence is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 146, Art. 1]

Whether Abstinence Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that abstinence is not a virtue. For the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:20): "The kingdom of God is not in speech but
in power (_virtute_)." Now the kingdom of God does not consist in
abstinence, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14:17): "The kingdom of God is
not meat and drink," where a gloss [*Cf. St. Augustine, QQ. Evang.
ii, qu. 11] observes that "justice consists neither in abstaining nor
in eating." Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Confess. x, 11) addressing himself
to God: "This hast Thou taught me, that I should set myself to take
food as physic." Now it belongs not to virtue, but to the medical art
to regulate medicine. Therefore, in like manner, to regulate one's
food, which belongs to abstinence, is an act not of virtue but of art.

Obj. 3: Further, every virtue "observes the mean," as stated in
_Ethic._ ii, 6, 7. But abstinence seemingly inclines not to the mean
but to deficiency, since it denotes retrenchment. Therefore
abstinence is not a virtue.

Obj. 4: Further, no virtue excludes another virtue. But abstinence
excludes patience: for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that
"impatience not unfrequently dislodges the abstainer's mind from its
peaceful seclusion." Likewise he says (Pastor. iii, 19) that
"sometimes the sin of pride pierces the thoughts of the abstainer,"
so that abstinence excludes humility. Therefore abstinence is not a
virtue.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Pet. 1:5, 6): "Join with your
faith virtue, and with virtue knowledge, and with knowledge
abstinence"; where abstinence is numbered among other virtues.
Therefore abstinence is a virtue.

_I answer that,_ Abstinence by its very name denotes retrenchment of
food. Hence the term abstinence may be taken in two ways. First, as
denoting retrenchment of food absolutely, and in this way it
signifies neither a virtue nor a virtuous act, but something
indifferent. Secondly, it may be taken as regulated by reason, and
then it signifies either a virtuous habit or a virtuous act. This is
the meaning of Peter's words quoted above, where he says that we
ought "to join abstinence with knowledge," namely that in abstaining
from food a man should act with due regard for those among whom he
lives, for his own person, and for the requirements of health.

Reply Obj. 1: The use of and abstinence from food, considered in
themselves, do not pertain to the kingdom of God, since the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 8:8): "Meat doth not commend us to God. For neither, if
we eat not [*Vulg.: 'Neither if we eat . . . nor if we eat not'],
shall we have the less, nor if we eat, shall we have the more," i.e.
spiritually. Nevertheless they both belong to the kingdom of God, in
so far as they are done reasonably through faith and love of God.

Reply Obj. 2: The regulation of food, in the point of quantity and
quality, belongs to the art of medicine as regards the health of the
body: but in the point of internal affections with regard to the good
of reason, it belongs to abstinence. Hence Augustine says (QQ. Evang.
ii, qu. 11): "It makes no difference whatever to virtue what or how
much food a man takes, so long as he does it with due regard for the
people among whom he lives, for his own person, and for the
requirements of his health: but it matters how readily and
uncomplainingly he does without food when bound by duty or necessity
to abstain."

Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to temperance to bridle the pleasures which
are too alluring to the soul, just as it belongs to fortitude to
strengthen the soul against fears that deter it from the good of
reason. Wherefore, just as fortitude is commended on account of a
certain excess, from which all the parts of fortitude take their
name, so temperance is commended for a kind of deficiency, from which
all its parts are denominated. Hence abstinence, since it is a part
of temperance, is named from deficiency, and yet it observes the
mean, in so far as it is in accord with right reason.

Reply Obj. 4: Those vices result from abstinence in so far as it is
not in accord with right reason. For right reason makes one abstain
as one ought, i.e. with gladness of heart, and for the due end, i.e.
for God's glory and not one's own.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 146, Art. 1]

Whether Abstinence Is a Special Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that abstinence is not a special virtue.
For every virtue is praiseworthy by itself. But abstinence is not
praiseworthy by itself; for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that "the
virtue of abstinence is praised only on account of the other
virtues." Therefore abstinence is not a special virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Pet. xlii)
that "the saints abstain from meat and drink, not that any creature
of God is evil, but merely in order to chastise the body." Now this
belongs to chastity, as its very name denotes. Therefore abstinence
is not a special virtue distinct from chastity.

Obj. 3: Further, as man should be content with moderate meat, so
should he be satisfied with moderate clothes, according to 1 Tim.
6:8, "Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these we should
be [Vulg.: 'are'] content." Now there is no special virtue in being
content with moderate clothes. Neither, therefore, is there in
abstinence which moderates food.

_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] reckons
abstinence as a special part of temperance.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 136, A. 1; Q. 141, A. 3) moral
virtue maintains the good of reason against the onslaught of the
passions: hence whenever we find a special motive why a passion
departs from the good of reason, there is need of a special virtue.
Now pleasures of the table are of a nature to withdraw man from the
good of reason, both because they are so great, and because food is
necessary to man who needs it for the maintenance of life, which he
desires above all other things. Therefore abstinence is a special
virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: Virtues are of necessity connected together, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). Wherefore one virtue receives help and
commendation from another, as justice from fortitude. Accordingly in
this way the virtue of abstinence receives commendation on account of
the other virtues.

Reply Obj. 2: The body is chastised by means of abstinence, not only
against the allurements of lust, but also against those of gluttony:
since by abstaining a man gains strength for overcoming the
onslaughts of gluttony, which increase in force the more he yields to
them. Yet abstinence is not prevented from being a special virtue
through being a help to chastity, since one virtue helps another.

Reply Obj. 3: The use of clothing was devised by art, whereas the use
of food is from nature. Hence it is more necessary to have a special
virtue for the moderation of food than for the moderation of clothing.
_______________________

QUESTION 147

OF FASTING
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider fasting: under which head there are eight points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether fasting is an act of virtue?

(2) Of what virtue is it the act?

(3) Whether it is a matter of precept?

(4) Whether anyone is excused from fulfilling this precept?

(5) The time of fasting;

(6) Whether it is requisite for fasting to eat but once?

(7) The hour of eating for those who fast;

(8) The meats from which it is necessary to abstain.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 1]

Whether Fasting Is an Act of Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that fasting is not an act of virtue. For
every act of virtue is acceptable to God. But fasting is not always
acceptable to God, according to Isa. 58:3, "Why have we fasted and
Thou hast not regarded?" Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, no act of virtue forsakes the mean of virtue. Now
fasting forsakes the mean of virtue, which in the virtue of
abstinence takes account of the necessity of supplying the needs of
nature, whereas by fasting something is retrenched therefrom: else
those who do not fast would not have the virtue of abstinence.
Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, that which is competent to all, both good and evil,
is not an act of virtue. Now such is fasting, since every one is
fasting before eating. Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.

_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned together with other virtuous acts
(2 Cor. 6:5, 6) where the Apostle says: "In fasting, in knowledge, in
chastity, etc. [Vulg.: 'in chastity, in knowledge']."

_I answer that,_ An act is virtuous through being directed by reason
to some virtuous (_honestum_) [*Cf. Q. 145, A. 1] good. Now this is
consistent with fasting, because fasting is practiced for a threefold
purpose. First, in order to bridle the lusts of the flesh, wherefore
the Apostle says (2 Cor. 6:5, 6): "In fasting, in chastity," since
fasting is the guardian of chastity. For, according to Jerome
[*Contra Jov. ii.] "Venus is cold when Ceres and Bacchus are not
there," that is to say, lust is cooled by abstinence in meat and
drink. Secondly, we have recourse to fasting in order that the mind
may arise more freely to the contemplation of heavenly things: hence
it is related (Dan. 10) of Daniel that he received a revelation from
God after fasting for three weeks. Thirdly, in order to satisfy for
sins: wherefore it is written (Joel 2:12): "Be converted to Me with
all your heart, in fasting and in weeping and in mourning." The same
is declared by Augustine in a sermon (De orat. et Jejun. [*Serm.
lxxii] (ccxxx, de Tempore)): "Fasting cleanses the soul, raises the
mind, subjects one's flesh to the spirit, renders the heart contrite
and humble, scatters the clouds of concupiscence, quenches the fire
of lust, kindles the true light of chastity."

Reply Obj. 1: An act that is virtuous generically may be rendered
vicious by its connection with certain circumstances. Hence the text
goes on to say: "Behold in the day of your fast your own will is
founded," and a little further on (Isa. 58:4): "You fast for debates
and strife and strike with the fist wickedly." These words are
expounded by Gregory (Pastor. iii, 19) as follows: "The will
indicates joy and the fist anger. In vain then is the flesh
restrained if the mind allowed to drift to inordinate movements be
wrecked by vice." And Augustine says (in the same sermon) that
"fasting loves not many words, deems wealth superfluous, scorns
pride, commends humility, helps man to perceive what is frail and
paltry."

Reply Obj. 2: The mean of virtue is measured not according to
quantity but according to right reason, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6.
Now reason judges it expedient, on account of some special motive,
for a man to take less food than would be becoming to him under
ordinary circumstances, for instance in order to avoid sickness, or
in order to perform certain bodily works with greater ease: and much
more does reason direct this to the avoidance of spiritual evils and
the pursuit of spiritual goods. Yet reason does not retrench so much
from one's food as to refuse nature its necessary support: thus
Jerome says:* "It matters not whether thou art a long or a short time
in destroying thyself, since to afflict the body immoderately,
whether by excessive lack of nourishment, or by eating or sleeping
too little, is to offer a sacrifice of stolen goods." [*The quotation
is from the Corpus of Canon Law (Cap. Non mediocriter, De
Consecrationibus, dist. 5). Gratian there ascribes the quotation to
St. Jerome, but it is not to be found in the saint's works.] In like
manner right reason does not retrench so much from a man's food as to
render him incapable of fulfilling his duty. Hence Jerome says (in
the same reference) "Rational man forfeits his dignity, if he sets
fasting before chastity, or night-watchings before the well-being of
his senses."

Reply Obj. 3: The fasting of nature, in respect of which a man is
said to be fasting until he partakes of food, consists in a pure
negation, wherefore it cannot be reckoned a virtuous act. Such is
only the fasting of one who abstains in some measure from food for a
reasonable purpose. Hence the former is called natural fasting
(_jejunium jejunii_) [*Literally the 'fast of fasting']: while the
latter is called the faster's fast, because he fasts for a purpose.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 2]

Whether Fasting Is an Act of Abstinence?

Objection 1: It would seem that fasting is not an act of abstinence.
For Jerome [*The quotation is from the Ordinary Gloss, where the
reference is lacking] commenting on Matt. 17:20, "This kind of devil"
says: "To fast is to abstain not only from food but also from all
manner of lusts." Now this belongs to every virtue. Therefore fasting
is not exclusively an act of abstinence.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says in a Lenten Homily (xvi in Evang.) that
"the Lenten fast is a tithe of the whole year." Now paying tithes is
an act of religion, as stated above (Q. 87, A. 1). Therefore fasting
is an act of religion and not of abstinence.

Obj. 3: Further, abstinence is a part of temperance, as stated above
(QQ. 143, 146, A. 1, ad 3). Now temperance is condivided with
fortitude, to which it belongs to endure hardships, and this seems
very applicable to fasting. Therefore fasting is not an act of
abstinence.

_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that "fasting is
frugality of fare and abstinence from food."

_I answer that,_ Habit and act have the same matter. Wherefore every
virtuous act about some particular matter belongs to the virtue that
appoints the mean in that matter. Now fasting is concerned with food,
wherein the mean is appointed by abstinence. Wherefore it is evident
that fasting is an act of abstinence.

Reply Obj. 1: Properly speaking fasting consists in abstaining from
food, but speaking metaphorically it denotes abstinence from anything
harmful, and such especially is sin.

We may also reply that even properly speaking fasting is abstinence
from all manner of lust, since, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1), an act
ceases to be virtuous by the conjunction of any vice.

Reply Obj. 2: Nothing prevents the act of one virtue belonging to
another virtue, in so far as it is directed to the end of that
virtue, as explained above (Q. 32, A. 1, ad 2; Q. 85, A. 3).
Accordingly there is no reason why fasting should not be an act of
religion, or of chastity, or of any other virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to fortitude as a special virtue, to endure,
not any kind of hardship, but only those connected with the danger of
death. To endure hardships resulting from privation of pleasure of
touch, belongs to temperance and its parts: and such are the
hardships of fasting.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 3]

Whether Fasting Is a Matter of Precept?

Objection 1: It would seem that fasting is not a matter of precept.
For precepts are not given about works of supererogation which are a
matter of counsel. Now fasting is a work of supererogation: else it
would have to be equally observed at all places and times. Therefore
fasting is not a matter of precept.

Obj. 2: Further, whoever infringes a precept commits a mortal sin.
Therefore if fasting were a matter of precept, all who do not fast
would sin mortally, and a widespreading snare would be laid for men.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 17) that "the Wisdom
of God having taken human nature, and called us to a state of
freedom, instituted a few most salutary sacraments whereby the
community of the Christian people, that is, of the free multitude,
should be bound together in subjection to one God." Now the liberty
of the Christian people seems to be hindered by a great number of
observances no less than by a great number of sacraments. For
Augustine says (Ad inquis. Januar., Ep. lv) that "whereas God in His
mercy wished our religion to be distinguished by its freedom and the
evidence and small number of its solemn sacraments, some people
render it oppressive with slavish burdens." Therefore it seems that
the Church should not have made fasting a matter of precept.

_On the contrary,_ Jerome (Ad Lucin., Ep. lxxi) speaking of fasting
says: "Let each province keep to its own practice, and look upon the
commands of the elders as though they were laws of the apostles."
Therefore fasting is a matter of precept.

_I answer that,_ Just as it belongs to the secular authority to make
legal precepts which apply the natural law to matters of common weal
in temporal affairs, so it belongs to ecclesiastical superiors to
prescribe by statute those things that concern the common weal of the
faithful in spiritual goods.

Now it has been stated above (A. 1) that fasting is useful as atoning
for and preventing sin, and as raising the mind to spiritual things.
And everyone is bound by the natural dictate of reason to practice
fasting as far as it is necessary for these purposes. Wherefore
fasting in general is a matter of precept of the natural law, while
the fixing of the time and manner of fasting as becoming and
profitable to the Christian people, is a matter of precept of
positive law established by ecclesiastical authority: the latter is
the Church fast, the former is the fast prescribed by nature.

Reply Obj. 1: Fasting considered in itself denotes something not
eligible but penal: yet it becomes eligible in so far as it is useful
to some end. Wherefore considered absolutely it is not binding under
precept, but it is binding under precept to each one that stands in
need of such a remedy. And since men, for the most part, need this
remedy, both because "in many things we all offend" (James 3:2), and
because "the flesh lusteth against the spirit" (Gal. 5:17), it was
fitting that the Church should appoint certain fasts to be kept by
all in common. In doing this the Church does not make a precept of a
matter of supererogation, but particularizes in detail that which is
of general obligation.

Reply Obj. 2: Those commandments which are given under the form of a
general precept, do not bind all persons in the same way, but subject
to the requirements of the end intended by the lawgiver. It will be a
mortal sin to disobey a commandment through contempt of the
lawgiver's authority, or to disobey it in such a way as to frustrate
the end intended by him: but it is not a mortal sin if one fails to
keep a commandment, when there is a reasonable motive, and especially
if the lawgiver would not insist on its observance if he were
present. Hence it is that not all, who do not keep the fasts of the
Church, sin mortally.

Reply Obj. 3: Augustine is speaking there of those things "that are
neither contained in the authorities of Holy Scripture, nor found
among the ordinances of bishops in council, nor sanctioned by the
custom of the universal Church." On the other hand, the fasts that
are of obligation are appointed by the councils of bishops and are
sanctioned by the custom of the universal Church. Nor are they
opposed to the freedom of the faithful, rather are they of use in
hindering the slavery of sin, which is opposed to spiritual freedom,
of which it is written (Gal. 5:13): "You, brethren, have been called
unto liberty; only make not liberty an occasion to the flesh."
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 4]

Whether All Are Bound to Keep the Fasts of the Church?

Objection 1: It would seem that all are bound to keep the fasts of
the Church. For the commandments of the Church are binding even as
the commandments of God, according to Luke 10:16, "He that heareth
you heareth Me." Now all are bound to keep the commandments of God.
Therefore in like manner all are bound to keep the fasts appointed by
the Church.

Obj. 2: Further, children especially are seemingly not exempt from
fasting, on account of their age: for it is written (Joel 2:15):
"Sanctify a fast," and further on (Joel 2:16): "Gather together the
little ones, and them that suck the breasts." Much more therefore are
all others bound to keep the fasts.

Obj. 3: Further, spiritual things should be preferred to temporal,
and necessary things to those that are not necessary. Now bodily
works are directed to temporal gain; and pilgrimages, though directed
to spiritual things, are not a matter of necessity. Therefore, since
fasting is directed to a spiritual gain, and is made a necessary
thing by the commandment of the Church, it seems that the fasts of
the Church ought not to be omitted on account of a pilgrimage, or
bodily works.

Obj. 4: Further, it is better to do a thing willingly than through
necessity, as stated in 2 Cor. 9:7. Now the poor are wont to fast
through necessity, owing to lack of food. Much more therefore ought
they to fast willingly.

_On the contrary,_ It seems that no righteous man is bound to fast.
For the commandments of the Church are not binding in opposition to
Christ's teaching. But our Lord said (Luke 5:34) that "the children
of the bridegroom cannot fast whilst the bridegroom is with them
[*Vulg.: 'Can you make the children of the bridegroom fast, whilst
the bridegroom is with them?']." Now He is with all the righteous by
dwelling in them in a special manner [*Cf. I, Q. 8, A. 3], wherefore
our Lord said (Matt. 28:20): "Behold I am with you . . . even to the
consummation of the world." Therefore the righteous are not bound by
the commandment of the Church to fast.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 90, A. 2; Q. 98, AA. 2,
6), general precepts are framed according to the requirements of the
many. Wherefore in making such precepts the lawgiver considers what
happens generally and for the most part, and he does not intend the
precept to be binding on a person in whom for some special reason
there is something incompatible with observance of the precept. Yet
discretion must be brought to bear on the point. For if the reason be
evident, it is lawful for a man to use his own judgment in omitting
to fulfil the precept, especially if custom be in his favor, or if it
be difficult for him to have recourse to superior authority. On the
other hand, if the reason be doubtful, one should have recourse to
the superior who has power to grant a dispensation in such cases. And
this must be done in the fasts appointed by the Church, to which all
are bound in general, unless there be some special obstacle to this
observance.

Reply Obj. 1: The commandments of God are precepts of the natural
law, which are, of themselves, necessary for salvation. But the
commandments of the Church are about matters which are necessary for
salvation, not of themselves, but only through the ordinance of the
Church. Hence there may be certain obstacles on account of which
certain persons are not bound to keep the fasts in question.

Reply Obj. 2: In children there is a most evident reason for not
fasting, both on account of their natural weakness, owing to which
they need to take food frequently, and not much at a time, and
because they need much nourishment owing to the demands of growth,
which results from the residuum of nourishment. Wherefore as long as
the stage of growth lasts, which as a rule lasts until they have
completed the third period of seven years, they are not bound to keep
the Church fasts: and yet it is fitting that even during that time
they should exercise themselves in fasting, more or less, in
accordance with their age. Nevertheless when some great calamity
threatens, even children are commanded to fast, in sign of more
severe penance, according to Jonah 3:7, "Let neither men nor
beasts . . . taste anything . . . nor drink water."

Reply Obj. 3: Apparently a distinction should be made with regard to
pilgrims and working people. For if the pilgrimage or laborious work
can be conveniently deferred or lessened without detriment to the
bodily health and such external conditions as are necessary for the
upkeep of bodily or spiritual life, there is no reason for omitting
the fasts of the Church. But if one be under the necessity of
starting on the pilgrimage at once, and of making long stages, or of
doing much work, either for one's bodily livelihood, or for some need
of the spiritual life, and it be impossible at the same time to keep
the fasts of the Church, one is not bound to fast: because in
ordering fasts the Church would not seem to have intended to prevent
other pious and more necessary undertakings. Nevertheless, in such
cases one ought seemingly, to seek the superior's dispensation;
except perhaps when the above course is recognized by custom, since
when superiors are silent they would seem to consent.

Reply Obj. 4: Those poor who can provide themselves with sufficient
for one meal are not excused, on account of poverty, from keeping the
fasts of the Church. On the other hand, those would seem to be exempt
who beg their food piecemeal, since they are unable at any one time
to have a sufficiency of food.

Reply Obj. 5: This saying of our Lord may be expounded in three ways.
First, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxx in Matth.), who says that
"the disciples, who are called children of the bridegroom, were as
yet of a weakly disposition, wherefore they are compared to an old
garment." Hence while Christ was with them in body they were to be
fostered with kindness rather than drilled with the harshness of
fasting. According to this interpretation, it is fitting that
dispensations should be granted to the imperfect and to beginners,
rather than to the elders and the perfect, according to a gloss on
Ps. 130:2, "As a child that is weaned is towards his mother."
Secondly, we may say with Jerome [*Bede, Comment. in Luc. v] that our
Lord is speaking here of the fasts of the observances of the Old Law.
Wherefore our Lord means to say that the apostles were not to be held
back by the old observances, since they were to be filled with the
newness of grace. Thirdly, according to Augustine (De Consensu Evang.
ii, 27), who states that fasting is of two kinds. One pertains to
those who are humbled by disquietude, and this is not befitting
perfect men, for they are called "children of the bridegroom"; hence
when we read in Luke: "The children of the bridegroom cannot fast
[*Hom. xiii, in Matth.]," we read in Matt. 9:15: "The children of the
bridegroom cannot mourn [*Vulg.: 'Can the children of the bridegroom
mourn?']." The other pertains to the mind that rejoices in adhering
to spiritual things: and this fasting is befitting the perfect.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 5]

Whether the Times for the Church Fast Are Fittingly Ascribed?

Objection 1: It would seem that the times for the Church fast are
unfittingly appointed. For we read (Matt. 4) that Christ began to
fast immediately after being baptized. Now we ought to imitate
Christ, according to 1 Cor. 4:16, "Be ye followers of me, as I also
am of Christ." Therefore we ought to fast immediately after the
Epiphany when Christ's baptism is celebrated.

Obj. 2: Further, it is unlawful in the New Law to observe the
ceremonies of the Old Law. Now it belongs to the solemnities of the
Old Law to fast in certain particular months: for it is written
(Zech. 8:19): "The fast of the fourth month and the fast of the
fifth, and the fast of the seventh, and the fast of the tenth shall
be to the house of Judah, joy and gladness and great solemnities."
Therefore the fast of certain months, which are called Ember days,
are unfittingly kept in the Church.

Obj. 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Consensu Evang. ii, 27),
just as there is a fast "of sorrow," so is there a fast "of joy." Now
it is most becoming that the faithful should rejoice spiritually in
Christ's Resurrection. Therefore during the five weeks which the
Church solemnizes on account of Christ's Resurrection, and on Sundays
which commemorate the Resurrection, fasts ought to be appointed.

_On the contrary,_ stands the general custom of the Church.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 3), fasting is directed to
two things, the deletion of sin, and the raising of the mind to
heavenly things. Wherefore fasting ought to be appointed specially
for those times, when it behooves man to be cleansed from sin, and
the minds of the faithful to be raised to God by devotion: and these
things are particularly requisite before the feast of Easter, when
sins are loosed by baptism, which is solemnly conferred on
Easter-eve, on which day our Lord's burial is commemorated, because
"we are buried together with Christ by baptism unto death" (Rom.
6:4). Moreover at the Easter festival the mind of man ought to be
devoutly raised to the glory of eternity, which Christ restored by
rising from the dead, and so the Church ordered a fast to be observed
immediately before the Paschal feast; and for the same reason, on the
eve of the chief festivals, because it is then that one ought to make
ready to keep the coming feast devoutly. Again it is the custom in
the Church for Holy Orders to be conferred every quarter of the year
(in sign whereof our Lord fed four thousand men with seven loaves,
which signify the New Testament year as Jerome says [*Comment. in
Marc. viii]): and then both the ordainer, and the candidates for
ordination, and even the whole people, for whose good they are
ordained, need to fast in order to make themselves ready for the
ordination. Hence it is related (Luke 6:12) that before choosing His
disciples our Lord "went out into a mountain to pray": and Ambrose
[*Exposit. in Luc.] commenting on these words says: "What shouldst
thou do, when thou desirest to undertake some pious work, since
Christ prayed before sending His apostles?"

With regard to the forty day's fast, according to Gregory (Hom. xvi
in Evang.) there are three reasons for the number. First, "because
the power of the Decalogue is accomplished in the four books of the
Holy Gospels: since forty is the product of ten multiplied by four."
Or "because we are composed of four elements in this mortal body
through whose lusts we transgress the Lord's commandments which are
delivered to us in the Decalogue. Wherefore it is fitting we should
punish that same body forty times. Or, because, just as under the Law
it was commanded that tithes should be paid of things, so we strive
to pay God a tithe of days, for since a year is composed of three
hundred and sixty-six days, by punishing ourselves for thirty-six
days" (namely, the fasting days during the six weeks of Lent) "we pay
God a tithe of our year." According to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ.
ii, 16) a fourth reason may be added. For the Creator is the
_Trinity,_ Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: while the number _three_
refers to the invisible creature, since we are commanded to love God,
with our whole heart, with our whole soul, and with our whole mind:
and the number _four_ refers to the visible creature, by reason of
heat, cold, wet and dry. Thus the number _ten_ [*Ten is the sum of
three, three, and four] signifies all things, and if this be
multiplied by four which refers to the body whereby we make use of
things, we have the number forty.

Each fast of the Ember days is composed of three days, on account of
the number of months in each season: or on account of the number of
Holy orders which are conferred at these times.

Reply Obj. 1: Christ needed not baptism for His own sake, but in
order to commend baptism to us. Wherefore it was competent for Him to
fast, not before, but after His baptism, in order to invite us to
fast before our baptism.

Reply Obj. 2: The Church keeps the Ember fasts, neither at the very
same time as the Jews, nor for the same reasons. For they fasted in
July, which is the fourth month from April (which they count as the
first), because it was then that Moses coming down from Mount Sinai
broke the tables of the Law (Ex. 32), and that, according to Jer.
39:2, "the walls of the city were first broken through." In the fifth
month, which we call August, they fasted because they were commanded
not to go up on to the mountain, when the people had rebelled on
account of the spies (Num. 14): also in this month the temple of
Jerusalem was burnt down by Nabuchodonosor (Jer. 52) and afterwards
by Titus. In the seventh month which we call October, Godolias was
slain, and the remnants of the people were dispersed (Jer. 51). In
the tenth month, which we call January, the people who were with
Ezechiel in captivity heard of the destruction of the temple (Ezech.
4).

Reply Obj. 3: The "fasting of joy" proceeds from the instigation of
the Holy Ghost Who is the Spirit of liberty, wherefore this fasting
should not be a matter of precept. Accordingly the fasts appointed by
the commandment of the Church are rather "fasts of sorrow" which are
inconsistent with days of joy. For this reason fasting is not ordered
by the Church during the whole of the Paschal season, nor on Sundays:
and if anyone were to fast at these times in contradiction to the
custom of Christian people, which as Augustine declares (Ep. xxxvi)
"is to be considered as law," or even through some erroneous opinion
(thus the Manichees fast, because they deem such fasting to be of
obligation)--he would not be free from sin. Nevertheless fasting
considered in itself is commendable at all times; thus Jerome wrote
(Ad Lucin., Ep. lxxi): "Would that we might fast always."
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 6]

Whether It Is Requisite for Fasting That One Eat but Once?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not requisite for fasting that
one eat but once. For, as stated above (A. 2), fasting is an act of
the virtue of abstinence, which observes due quantity of food not
less than the number of meals. Now the quantity of food is not
limited for those who fast. Therefore neither should the number of
meals be limited.

Obj. 2: Further, Just as man is nourished by meat, so is he by drink:
wherefore drink breaks the fast, and for this reason we cannot
receive the Eucharist after drinking. Now we are not forbidden to
drink at various hours of the day. Therefore those who fast should
not be forbidden to eat several times.

Obj. 3: Further, digestives are a kind of food: and yet many take
them on fasting days after eating. Therefore it is not essential to
fasting to take only one meal.

_On the contrary,_ stands the common custom of the Christian people.

_I answer that,_ Fasting is instituted by the Church in order to
bridle concupiscence, yet so as to safeguard nature. Now only one
meal is seemingly sufficient for this purpose, since thereby man is
able to satisfy nature; and yet he withdraws something from
concupiscence by minimizing the number of meals. Therefore it is
appointed by the Church, in her moderation, that those who fast
should take one meal in the day.

Reply Obj. 1: It was not possible to fix the same quantity of food
for all, on account of the various bodily temperaments, the result
being that one person needs more, and another less food: whereas, for
the most part, all are able to satisfy nature by only one meal.

Reply Obj. 2: Fasting is of two kinds [*Cf. A. 1, ad 3]. One is the
natural fast, which is requisite for receiving the Eucharist. This is
broken by any kind of drink, even of water, after which it is not
lawful to receive the Eucharist. The fast of the Church is another
kind and is called the "fasting of the faster," and this is not
broken save by such things as the Church intended to forbid in
instituting the fast. Now the Church does not intend to command
abstinence from drink, for this is taken more for bodily refreshment,
and digestion of the food consumed, although it nourishes somewhat.
It is, however, possible to sin and lose the merit of fasting, by
partaking of too much drink: as also by eating immoderately at one
meal.

Reply Obj. 3: Although digestives nourish somewhat they are not taken
chiefly for nourishment, but for digestion. Hence one does not break
one's fast by taking them or any other medicines, unless one were to
take digestives, with a fraudulent intention, in great quantity and
by way of food.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 7]

Whether the Ninth Hour Is Suitably Fixed for the Faster's Meal?

Objection 1: It would seem that the ninth hour is not suitably fixed
for the faster's meal. For the state of the New Law is more perfect
than the state of the Old Law. Now in the Old Testament they fasted
until evening, for it is written (Lev. 23:32): "It is a sabbath . . .
you shall afflict your souls," and then the text continues: "From
evening until evening you shall celebrate your sabbaths." Much more
therefore under the New Testament should the fast be ordered until
the evening.

Obj. 2: Further, the fast ordered by the Church is binding on all.
But all are not able to know exactly the ninth hour. Therefore it
seems that the fixing of the ninth hour should not form part of the
commandment to fast.

Obj. 3: Further, fasting is an act of the virtue of abstinence, as
stated above (A. 2). Now the mean of moral virtue does not apply in
the same way to all, since what is much for one is little for
another, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6. Therefore the ninth hour should
not be fixed for those who fast.

_On the contrary,_ The Council of Chalons [*The quotation is from the
Capitularies (Cap. 39) of Theodulf, bishop of Orleans (760-821) and
is said to be found in the Corpus Juris, Cap. Solent, dist. 1, De
Consecratione] says: "During Lent those are by no means to be
credited with fasting who eat before the celebration of the office of
Vespers," which in the Lenten season is said after the ninth hour.
Therefore we ought to fast until the ninth hour.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 3, 5), fasting is directed
to the deletion and prevention of sin. Hence it ought to add
something to the common custom, yet so as not to be a heavy burden to
nature. Now the right and common custom is for men to eat about the
sixth hour: both because digestion is seemingly finished (the natural
heat being withdrawn inwardly at night-time on account of the
surrounding cold of the night), and the humor spread about through
the limbs (to which result the heat of the day conduces until the sun
has reached its zenith), and again because it is then chiefly that
the nature of the human body needs assistance against the external
heat that is in the air, lest the humors be parched within. Hence, in
order that those who fast may feel some pain in satisfaction for
their sins, the ninth hour is suitably fixed for their meal.

Moreover, this hour agrees with the mystery of Christ's Passion,
which was brought to a close at the ninth hour, when "bowing His
head, He gave up the ghost" (John 19:30): because those who fast by
punishing their flesh, are conformed to the Passion of Christ,
according to Gal. 5:24, "They that are Christ's, have crucified their
flesh with the vices and concupiscences."

Reply Obj. 1: The state of the Old Testament is compared to the
night, while the state of the New Testament is compared to the day,
according to Rom. 13:12, "The night is passed and the day is at
hand." Therefore in the Old Testament they fasted until night, but
not in the New Testament.

Reply Obj. 2: Fasting requires a fixed hour based, not on a strict
calculation, but on a rough estimate: for it suffices that it be
about the ninth hour, and this is easy for anyone to ascertain.

Reply Obj. 3: A little more or a little less cannot do much harm. Now
it is not a long space of time from the sixth hour at which men for
the most part are wont to eat, until the ninth hour, which is fixed
for those who fast. Wherefore the fixing of such a time cannot do
much harm to anyone, whatever his circumstances may be. If however
this were to prove a heavy burden to a man on account of sickness,
age, or some similar reason, he should be dispensed from fasting, or
be allowed to forestall the hour by a little.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 147, Art. 8]

Whether It Is Fitting That Those Who Fast Should Be Bidden to Abstain
from Flesh Meat, Eggs, and Milk Foods?

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that those who fast should be
bidden to abstain from flesh meat, eggs, and milk foods. For it has
been stated above (A. 6) that fasting was instituted as a curb on the
concupiscence of the flesh. Now concupiscence is kindled by drinking
wine more than by eating flesh; according to Prov. 20:1, "Wine is a
luxurious thing," and Eph. 5:18, "Be not drunk with wine, wherein is
luxury." Since then those who fast are not forbidden to drink wine,
it seems that they should not be forbidden to eat flesh meat.

Obj. 2: Further, some fish are as delectable to eat as the flesh of
certain animals. Now "concupiscence is desire of the delectable," as
stated above (I-II, Q. 30, A. 1). Therefore since fasting which was
instituted in order to bridle concupiscence does not exclude the
eating of fish, neither should it exclude the eating of flesh meat.

Obj. 3: Further, on certain fasting days people make use of eggs and
cheese. Therefore one can likewise make use of them during the Lenten
fast.

_On the contrary,_ stands the common custom of the faithful.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), fasting was instituted by
the Church in order to bridle the concupiscences of the flesh, which
regard pleasures of touch in connection with food and sex. Wherefore
the Church forbade those who fast to partake of those foods which
both afford most pleasure to the palate, and besides are a very great
incentive to lust. Such are the flesh of animals that take their rest
on the earth, and of those that breathe the air and their products,
such as milk from those that walk on the earth, and eggs from birds.
For, since such like animals are more like man in body, they afford
greater pleasure as food, and greater nourishment to the human body,
so that from their consumption there results a greater surplus
available for seminal matter, which when abundant becomes a great
incentive to lust. Hence the Church has bidden those who fast to
abstain especially from these foods.

Reply Obj. 1: Three things concur in the act of procreation, namely,
heat, spirit [*Cf. P. I., Q. 118, A. 1, ad 3], and humor. Wine and
other things that heat the body conduce especially to heat: flatulent
foods seemingly cooperate in the production of the vital spirit: but
it is chiefly the use of flesh meat which is most productive of
nourishment, that conduces to the production of humor. Now the
alteration occasioned by heat, and the increase in vital spirits are
of short duration, whereas the substance of the humor remains a long
time. Hence those who fast are forbidden the use of flesh meat rather
than of wine or vegetables which are flatulent foods.

Reply Obj. 2: In the institution of fasting, the Church takes account
of the more common occurrences. Now, generally speaking, eating flesh
meat affords more pleasure than eating fish, although this is not
always the case. Hence the Church forbade those who fast to eat flesh
meat, rather than to eat fish.

Reply Obj. 3: Eggs and milk foods are forbidden to those who fast,
for as much as they originate from animals that provide us with
flesh: wherefore the prohibition of flesh meat takes precedence of
the prohibition of eggs and milk foods. Again the Lenten fast is the
most solemn of all, both because it is kept in imitation of Christ,
and because it disposes us to celebrate devoutly the mysteries of our
redemption. For this reason the eating of flesh meat is forbidden in
every fast, while the Lenten fast lays a general prohibition even on
eggs and milk foods. As to the use of the latter things in other
fasts the custom varies among different people, and each person is
bound to conform to that custom which is in vogue with those among
whom he is dwelling. Hence Jerome says [*Augustine, De Lib. Arb. iii,
18; cf. De Nat. et Grat. lxvii]: "Let each province keep to its own
practice, and look upon the commands of the elders as though they
were the laws of the apostles."
_______________________

QUESTION 148

OF GLUTTONY
(In Six Articles)

We must now consider gluttony. Under this head there are six points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether gluttony is a sin?

(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?

(4) Its species;

(5) Whether it is a capital sin?

(6) Its daughters.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 148, Art. 1]

Whether Gluttony Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a sin. For our Lord
said (Matt. 15:11): "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a
man." Now gluttony regards food which goes into a man. Therefore,
since every sin defiles a man, it seems that gluttony is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, "No man sins in what he cannot avoid" [*Ep. lxxi, ad
Lucin.]. Now gluttony is immoderation in food; and man cannot avoid
this, for Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18): "Since in eating pleasure
and necessity go together, we fail to discern between the call of
necessity and the seduction of pleasure," and Augustine says
(Confess. x, 31): "Who is it, Lord, that does not eat a little more
than necessary?" Therefore gluttony is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, in every kind of sin the first movement is a sin.
But the first movement in taking food is not a sin, else hunger and
thirst would be sinful. Therefore gluttony is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18) that "unless we
first tame the enemy dwelling within us, namely our gluttonous
appetite, we have not even stood up to engage in the spiritual
combat." But man's inward enemy is sin. Therefore gluttony is a sin.

_I answer that,_ Gluttony denotes, not any desire of eating and
drinking, but an inordinate desire. Now desire is said to be
inordinate through leaving the order of reason, wherein the good of
moral virtue consists: and a thing is said to be a sin through being
contrary to virtue. Wherefore it is evident that gluttony is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1: That which goes into man by way of food, by reason of
its substance and nature, does not defile a man spiritually. But the
Jews, against whom our Lord is speaking, and the Manichees deemed
certain foods to make a man unclean, not on account of their
signification, but by reason of their nature [*Cf. I-II, Q. 102, A.
6, ad 1]. It is the inordinate desire of food that defiles a man
spiritually.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above, the vice of gluttony does not regard
the substance of food, but in the desire thereof not being regulated
by reason. Wherefore if a man exceed in quantity of food, not from
desire of food, but through deeming it necessary to him, this
pertains, not to gluttony, but to some kind of inexperience. It is a
case of gluttony only when a man knowingly exceeds the measure in
eating, from a desire for the pleasures of the palate.

Reply Obj. 3: The appetite is twofold. There is the natural appetite,
which belongs to the powers of the vegetal soul. In these powers
virtue and vice are impossible, since they cannot be subject to
reason; wherefore the appetitive power is differentiated from the
powers of secretion, digestion, and excretion, and to it hunger and
thirst are to be referred. Besides this there is another, the
sensitive appetite, and it is in the concupiscence of this appetite
that the vice of gluttony consists. Hence the first movement of
gluttony denotes inordinateness in the sensitive appetite, and this
is not without sin.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 148, Art. 2]

Whether Gluttony Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a mortal sin. For
every mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Decalogue: and this,
apparently, does not apply to gluttony. Therefore gluttony is not a
mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as stated
above (Q. 132, A. 3). But gluttony is not opposed to charity, neither
as regards the love of God, nor as regards the love of one's
neighbor. Therefore gluttony is never a mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory [*Cf.
Append. to St. Augustine's works: Serm. civ (xli, de sanctis)]:
"Whenever a man takes more meat and drink than is necessary, he
should know that this is one of the lesser sins." But this pertains
to gluttony. Therefore gluttony is accounted among the lesser, that
is to say venial, sins.

Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18): "As long as
the vice of gluttony has a hold on a man, all that he has done
valiantly is forfeited by him: and as long as the belly is
unrestrained, all virtue comes to naught." But virtue is not done
away save by mortal sin. Therefore gluttony is a mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the vice of gluttony
properly consists in inordinate concupiscence. Now the order of
reason in regulating the concupiscence may be considered from two
points of view. First, with regard to things directed to the end,
inasmuch as they may be incommensurate and consequently
improportionate to the end; secondly, with regard to the end itself,
inasmuch as concupiscence turns man away from his due end.
Accordingly, if the inordinate concupiscence in gluttony be found to
turn man away from the last end, gluttony will be a mortal sin. This
is the case when he adheres to the pleasure of gluttony as his end,
for the sake of which he contemns God, being ready to disobey God's
commandments, in order to obtain those pleasures. On the other hand,
if the inordinate concupiscence in the vice of gluttony be found to
affect only such things as are directed to the end, for instance when
a man has too great a desire for the pleasures of the palate, yet
would not for their sake do anything contrary to God's law, it is a
venial sin.

Reply Obj. 1: The vice of gluttony becomes a mortal sin by turning
man away from his last end: and accordingly, by a kind of reduction,
it is opposed to the precept of hallowing the sabbath, which commands
us to rest in our last end. For mortal sins are not all directly
opposed to the precepts of the Decalogue, but only those which
contain injustice: because the precepts of the Decalogue pertain
specially to justice and its parts, as stated above (Q. 122, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 2: In so far as it turns man away from his last end,
gluttony is opposed to the love of God, who is to be loved, as our
last end, above all things: and only in this respect is gluttony a
mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 3: This saying of Augustine refers to gluttony as denoting
inordinate concupiscence merely in regard of things directed to the
end.

Reply Obj. 4: Gluttony is said to bring virtue to naught, not so much
on its own account, as on account of the vices which arise from it.
For Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19): "When the belly is distended by
gluttony, the virtues of the soul are destroyed by lust."
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 148, Art. 3]

Whether Gluttony Is the Greatest of Sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is the greatest of sins. For
the grievousness of a sin is measured by the grievousness of the
punishment. Now the sin of gluttony is most grievously punished, for
Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in Matth.]: "Gluttony turned Adam out of
Paradise, gluttony it was that drew down the deluge at the time of
Noah." According to Ezech. 16:49, "This was the iniquity of Sodom,
thy sister . . . fulness of bread," etc. Therefore the sin of
gluttony is the greatest of all.

Obj. 2: Further, in every genus the cause is the most powerful. Now
gluttony is apparently the cause of other sins, for a gloss on Ps.
135:10, "Who smote Egypt with their first-born," says: "Lust,
concupiscence, pride are the first-born of gluttony." Therefore
gluttony is the greatest of sins.

Obj. 3: Further, man should love himself in the first place after
God, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 4). Now man, by the vice of gluttony,
inflicts an injury on himself: for it is written (Ecclus. 37:34): "By
surfeiting many have perished." Therefore gluttony is the greatest of
sins, at least excepting those that are against God.

_On the contrary,_ The sins of the flesh, among which gluttony is
reckoned, are less culpable according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii).

_I answer that,_ The gravity of a sin may be measured in three ways.
First and foremost it depends on the matter in which the sin is
committed: and in this way sins committed in connection with Divine
things are the greatest. From this point of view gluttony is not the
greatest sin, for it is about matters connected with the nourishment
of the body. Secondly, the gravity of a sin depends on the person who
sins, and from this point of view the sin of gluttony is diminished
rather than aggravated, both on account of the necessity of taking
food, and on account of the difficulty of proper discretion and
moderation in such matters. Thirdly, from the point of view of the
result that follows, and in this way gluttony has a certain gravity,
inasmuch as certain sins are occasioned thereby.

Reply Obj. 1: These punishments are to be referred to the vices that
resulted from gluttony, or to the root from which gluttony sprang,
rather than to gluttony itself. For the first man was expelled from
Paradise on account of pride, from which he went on to an act of
gluttony: while the deluge and the punishment of the people of Sodom
were inflicted for sins occasioned by gluttony.

Reply Obj. 2: This objection argues from the standpoint of the sins
that result from gluttony. Nor is a cause necessarily more powerful,
unless it be a direct cause: and gluttony is not the direct cause but
the accidental cause, as it were, and the occasion of other vices.

Reply Obj. 3: The glutton intends, not the harm to his body, but the
pleasure of eating: and if injury results to his body, this is
accidental. Hence this does not directly affect the gravity of
gluttony, the guilt of which is nevertheless aggravated, if a man
incur some bodily injury through taking too much food.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 148, Art. 4]

Whether the Species of Gluttony Are Fittingly Distinguished?

Objection 1: It seems that the species of gluttony are unfittingly
distinguished by Gregory who says (Moral. xxx, 18): "The vice of
gluttony tempts us in five ways. Sometimes it forestalls the hour of
need; sometimes it seeks costly meats; sometimes it requires the food
to be daintily cooked; sometimes it exceeds the measure of
refreshment by taking too much; sometimes we sin by the very heat of
an immoderate appetite"--which are contained in the following verse:
"Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily."

For the above are distinguished according to diversity of
circumstance. Now circumstances, being the accidents of an act, do
not differentiate its species. Therefore the species of gluttony are
not distinguished according to the aforesaid.

Obj. 2: Further, as time is a circumstance, so is place. If then
gluttony admits of one species in respect of time, it seems that
there should likewise be others in respect of place and other
circumstances.

Obj. 3: Further, just as temperance observes due circumstances, so do
the other moral virtues. Now the species of the vices opposed to the
other moral virtues are not distinguished according to various
circumstances. Neither, therefore, are the species of gluttony
distinguished thus.

_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Gregory quoted above.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), gluttony denotes inordinate
concupiscence in eating. Now two things are to be considered in
eating, namely the food we eat, and the eating thereof. Accordingly,
the inordinate concupiscence may be considered in two ways. First,
with regard to the food consumed: and thus, as regards the substance
or species of food a man seeks "sumptuous"--i.e. costly food; as
regards its quality, he seeks food prepared too nicely--i.e.
"daintily"; and as regards quantity, he exceeds by eating "too much."

Secondly, the inordinate concupiscence is considered as to the
consumption of food: either because one forestalls the proper time
for eating, which is to eat "hastily," or one fails to observe the
due manner of eating, by eating "greedily."

Isidore [*De Summo Bon. ii, 42] comprises the first and second under
one heading, when he says that the glutton exceeds in "what" he eats,
or in "how much," "how" or "when he eats."

Reply Obj. 1: The corruption of various circumstances causes the
various species of gluttony, on account of the various motives, by
reason of which the species of moral things are differentiated. For
in him that seeks sumptuous food, concupiscence is aroused by the
very species of the food; in him that forestalls the time
concupiscence is disordered through impatience of delay, and so forth.

Reply Obj. 2: Place and other circumstances include no special motive
connected with eating, that can cause a different species of gluttony.

Reply Obj. 3: In all other vices, whenever different circumstances
correspond to different motives, the difference of circumstances
argues a specific difference of vice: but this does not apply to all
circumstances, as stated above (I-II, Q. 72, A. 9).
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 148, Art. 5]

Whether Gluttony Is a Capital Vice?

Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a capital vice. For
capital vices denote those whence, under the aspect of final cause,
other vices originate. Now food, which is the matter of gluttony, has
not the aspect of end, since it is sought, not for its own sake, but
for the body's nourishment. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice.

Obj. 2: Further, a capital vice would seem to have a certain
pre-eminence in sinfulness. But this does not apply to gluttony,
which, in respect of its genus, is apparently the least of sins,
seeing that it is most akin to what is [according to nature].
Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice.

Obj. 3: Further, sin results from a man forsaking the [good] of
virtue on account of something useful to the present life, or
pleasing to the senses. Now as regards goods having the aspect of
utility, there is but one capital vice, namely covetousness.
Therefore, seemingly, there would be but one capital vice in respect
of pleasures: and this is lust, which is a greater vice than
gluttony, and is about greater pleasures. Therefore gluttony is not a
capital vice.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons gluttony among
the capital vices.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 84, A. 3), a capital vice
denotes one from which, considered as final cause, i.e. as having a
most desirable end, other vices originate: wherefore through desiring
that end men are incited to sin in many ways. Now an end is rendered
most desirable through having one of the conditions of happiness
which is desirable by its very nature: and pleasure is essential to
happiness, according to _Ethic._ i, 8; x, 3, 7, 8. Therefore the vice
of gluttony, being about pleasures of touch which stand foremost
among other pleasures, is fittingly reckoned among the capital vices.

Reply Obj. 1: It is true that food itself is directed to something as
its end: but since that end, namely the sustaining of life, is most
desirable and whereas life cannot be sustained without food, it
follows that food too is most desirable: indeed, nearly all the toil
of man's life is directed thereto, according to Eccles. 6:7, "All the
labor of man is for his mouth." Yet gluttony seems to be about
pleasures of food rather than about food itself; wherefore, as
Augustine says (De Vera Relig. liii), "with such food as is good for
the worthless body, men desire to be fed," wherein namely the
pleasure consists, "rather than to be filled: since the whole end of
that desire is this--not to thirst and not to hunger."

Reply Obj. 2: In sin the end is ascertained with respect to the
conversion, while the gravity of sin is determined with regard to the
aversion. Wherefore it does not follow that the capital sin which has
the most desirable end surpasses the others in gravity.

Reply Obj. 3: That which gives pleasure is desirable in itself: and
consequently corresponding to its diversity there are two capital
vices, namely gluttony and lust. On the other hand, that which is
useful is desirable, not in itself, but as directed to something
else: wherefore seemingly in all useful things there is one aspect of
desirability. Hence there is but one capital vice, in respect of such
things.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 148, Art. 6]

Whether [Five] Daughters Are Fittingly Assigned to Gluttony?

Objection 1: It would seem that [five] daughters are unfittingly
assigned to gluttony, to wit, "unseemly joy, scurrility, uncleanness,
loquaciousness, and dullness of mind as regards the understanding."
For unseemly joy results from every sin, according to Prov. 2:14,
"Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked
things." Likewise dullness of mind is associated with every sin,
according to Prov. 14:22, "They err that work evil." Therefore they
are unfittingly reckoned to be daughters of gluttony.

Obj. 2: Further, the uncleanness which is particularly the result of
gluttony would seem to be connected with vomiting, according to Isa.
28:8, "All tables were full of vomit and filth." But this seems to be
not a sin but a punishment; or even a useful thing that is a matter
of counsel, according to Ecclus. 31:25, "If thou hast been forced to
eat much, arise, go out, and vomit; and it shall refresh thee."
Therefore it should not be reckoned among the daughters of gluttony.

Obj. 3: Further, Isidore (QQ. in Deut. xvi) reckons scurrility as a
daughter of lust. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the
daughters of gluttony.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters
to gluttony.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2, 3), gluttony consists
properly in an immoderate pleasure in eating and drinking. Wherefore
those vices are reckoned among the daughters of gluttony, which are
the results of eating and drinking immoderately. These may be
accounted for either on the part of the soul or on the part of the
body. On the part of the soul these results are of four kinds. First,
as regards the reason, whose keenness is dulled by immoderate meat
and drink, and in this respect we reckon as a daughter of gluttony,
"dullness of sense in the understanding," on account of the fumes of
food disturbing the brain. Even so, on the other hand, abstinence
conduces to the penetrating power of wisdom, according to Eccles.
2:3, "I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I
might turn my mind in wisdom." Secondly, as regards the appetite,
which is disordered in many ways by immoderation in eating and
drinking, as though reason were fast asleep at the helm, and in this
respect "unseemly joy" is reckoned, because all the other inordinate
passions are directed to joy or sorrow, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 5.
To this we must refer the saying of 3 Esdr. 3:20, that "wine . . .
gives every one a confident and joyful mind." Thirdly, as regards
inordinate words, and thus we have "loquaciousness," because as
Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19), "unless gluttons were carried away by
immoderate speech, that rich man who is stated to have feasted
sumptuously every day would not have been so tortured in his tongue."
Fourthly, as regards inordinate action, and in this way we have
"scurrility," i.e. a kind of levity resulting from lack of reason,
which is unable not only to bridle the speech, but also to restrain
outward behavior. Hence a gloss on Eph. 5:4, "Or foolish talking or
scurrility," says that "fools call this geniality--i.e. jocularity,
because it is wont to raise a laugh." Both of these, however, may be
referred to the words which may happen to be sinful, either by reason
of excess which belongs to "loquaciousness," or by reason of
unbecomingness, which belongs to "scurrility."

On the part of the body, mention is made of "uncleanness," which may
refer either to the inordinate emission of any kind of superfluities,
or especially to the emission of the semen. Hence a gloss on Eph.
5:3, "But fornication and all uncleanness," says: "That is, any kind
of incontinence that has reference to lust."

Reply Obj. 1: Joy in the act or end of sin results from every sin,
especially the sin that proceeds from habit, but the random riotous
joy which is described as "unseemly" arises chiefly from immoderate
partaking of meat or drink. In like manner, we reply that dullness of
sense as regards matters of choice is common to all sin, whereas
dullness of sense in speculative matters arises chiefly from
gluttony, for the reason given above.

Reply Obj. 2: Although it does one good to vomit after eating too
much, yet it is sinful to expose oneself to its necessity by
immoderate meat or drink. However, it is no sin to procure vomiting
as a remedy for sickness if the physician prescribes it.

Reply Obj. 3: Scurrility proceeds from the act of gluttony, and not
from the lustful act, but from the lustful will: wherefore it may be
referred to either vice.
_______________________

QUESTION 149

OF SOBRIETY
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider sobriety and the contrary vice, namely
drunkenness. As regards sobriety there are four points of inquiry:

(1) What is the matter of sobriety?

(2) Whether it is a special virtue?

(3) Whether the use of wine is lawful?

(4) To whom especially is sobriety becoming?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 149, Art. 1]

Whether Drink Is the Matter of Sobriety?

Objection 1: It would seem that drink is not the matter proper to
sobriety. For it is written (Rom. 12:3): "Not to be more wise than it
behooveth to be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety." Therefore
sobriety is also about wisdom, and not only about drink.

Obj. 2: Further, concerning the wisdom of God, it is written (Wis.
8:7) that "she teacheth sobriety [Douay: 'temperance'], and prudence,
and justice, and fortitude," where sobriety stands for temperance.
Now temperance is not only about drink, but also about meat and
sexual matters. Therefore sobriety is not only about drink.

Obj. 3: Further, sobriety would seem to take its name from "measure"
[*_Bria,_ a measure, a cup; Cf. Facciolati and Forcellini's
_Lexicon_]. Now we ought to be guided by the measure in all things
appertaining to us: for it is written (Titus 2:12): "We should live
soberly and justly and godly," where a gloss remarks: "Soberly, in
ourselves"; and (1 Tim. 2:9): "Women . . . in decent apparel,
adorning themselves with modesty and sobriety." Consequently it would
seem that sobriety regards not only the interior man, but also things
appertaining to external apparel. Therefore drink is not the matter
proper to sobriety.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 31:32): "Wine taken with
sobriety is equal life to men; if thou drink it moderately, thou
shalt be sober."

_I answer that,_ When a virtue is denominated from some condition
common to the virtues, the matter specially belonging to it is that
in which it is most difficult and most commendable to satisfy that
condition of virtue: thus fortitude is about dangers of death, and
temperance about pleasures of touch. Now sobriety takes its name from
"measure," for a man is said to be sober because he observes the
_bria,_ i.e. the measure. Wherefore sobriety lays a special claim to
that matter wherein the observance of the measure is most deserving
of praise. Such matter is the drinking of intoxicants, because the
measured use thereof is most profitable, while immoderate excess
therein is most harmful, since it hinders the use of reason even more
than excessive eating. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 31:37, 38):
"Sober drinking is health to soul and body; wine drunken with excess
raiseth quarrels, and wrath and many ruins." For this reason sobriety
is especially concerned with drink, not any kind of drink, but that
which by reason of its volatility is liable to disturb the brain,
such as wine and all intoxicants. Nevertheless, sobriety may be
employed in a general sense so as to apply to any matter, as stated
above (Q. 123, A. 2; Q. 141, A. 2) with regard to fortitude and
temperance.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as the material wine intoxicates a man as to his
body, so too, speaking figuratively, the consideration of wisdom is
said to be an inebriating draught, because it allures the mind by its
delight, according to Ps. 22:5, "My chalice which inebriateth me, how
goodly is it!" Hence sobriety is applied by a kind of metaphor in
speaking of the contemplation of wisdom.

Reply Obj. 2: All the things that belong properly to temperance are
necessary to the present life, and their excess is harmful. Wherefore
it behooves one to apply a measure in all such things. This is the
business of sobriety: and for this reason sobriety is used to
designate temperance. Yet slight excess is more harmful in drink than
in other things, wherefore sobriety is especially concerned with
drink.

Reply Obj. 3: Although a measure is needful in all things, sobriety
is not properly employed in connection with all things, but only in
those wherein there is most need for a measure.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 149, Art. 2]

Whether Sobriety Is by Itself a Special Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that sobriety is not by itself a special
virtue. For abstinence is concerned with both meat and drink. Now
there is no special virtue about meat. Therefore neither is sobriety,
which is about drink, a special virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, abstinence and gluttony are about pleasures of touch
as sensitive to food. Now meat and drink combine together to make
food, since an animal needs a combination of wet and dry nourishment.
Therefore sobriety, which is about drink, is not a. special virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, just as in things pertaining to nourishment, drink
is distinguished from meat, so are there various kinds of meats and
of drinks. Therefore if sobriety is by itself a special virtue,
seemingly there will be a special virtue corresponding to each
different kind of meat or drink, which is unreasonable. Therefore it
would seem that sobriety is not a special virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somno Scip. i, 8] reckons sobriety
to be a special part of temperance.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 146, A. 2), it belongs to moral
virtue to safeguard the good of reason against those things which may
hinder it. Hence wherever we find a special hindrance to reason,
there must needs be a special virtue to remove it. Now intoxicating
drink is a special kind of hindrance to the use of reason, inasmuch
as it disturbs the brain by its fumes. Wherefore in order to remove
this hindrance to reason a special virtue, which is sobriety, is
requisite.

Reply Obj. 1: Meat and drink are alike capable of hindering the good
of reason, by embroiling the reason with immoderate pleasure: and in
this respect abstinence is about both meat and drink alike. But
intoxicating drink is a special kind of hindrance, as stated above,
wherefore it requires a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: The virtue of abstinence is about meat and drink,
considered, not as food but as a hindrance to reason. Hence it does
not follow that special kinds of virtue correspond to different kinds
of food.

Reply Obj. 3: In all intoxicating drinks there is one kind of
hindrance to the use of reason: so that the difference of drinks
bears an accidental relation to virtue. Hence this difference does
not call for a difference of virtue. The same applies to the
difference of meats.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 149, Art. 3]

Whether the Use of Wine Is Altogether Unlawful?

Objection 1: It would seem that the use of wine is altogether
unlawful. For without wisdom, a man cannot be in the state of
salvation: since it is written (Wis. 7:28): "God loveth none but him
that dwelleth with wisdom," and further on (Wis. 9:19): "By wisdom
they were healed, whosoever have pleased Thee, O Lord, from the
beginning." Now the use of wine is a hindrance to wisdom, for it is
written (Eccles. 2:3): "I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh
from wine, that I might turn my mind to wisdom." Therefore
wine-drinking is altogether unlawful.

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 14:21): "It is good not to
eat flesh, and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother is
offended or scandalized, or made weak." Now it is sinful to forsake
the good of virtue, as likewise to scandalize one's brethren.
Therefore it is unlawful to make use of wine.

Obj. 3: Further, Jerome says [*Contra Jovin. i] that "after the
deluge wine and flesh were sanctioned: but Christ came in the last of
the ages and brought back the end into line with the beginning."
Therefore it seems unlawful to use wine under the Christian law.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:23): "Do not still
drink water, but use a little wine for thy stomach's sake, and thy
frequent infirmities"; and it is written (Ecclus. 31:36): "Wine
drunken with moderation is the joy of the soul and the heart."

_I answer that,_ No meat or drink, considered in itself, is unlawful,
according to Matt. 15:11, "Not that which goeth into the mouth
defileth a man." Wherefore it is not unlawful to drink wine as such.
Yet it may become unlawful accidentally. This is sometimes owing to a
circumstance on the part of the drinker, either because he is easily
the worse for taking wine, or because he is bound by a vow not to
drink wine: sometimes it results from the mode of drinking, because
to wit he exceeds the measure in drinking: and sometimes it is on
account of others who would be scandalized thereby.

Reply Obj. 1: A man may have wisdom in two ways. First, in a general
way, according as it is sufficient for salvation: and in this way it
is required, in order to have wisdom, not that a man abstain
altogether from wine, but that he abstain from its immoderate use.
Secondly, a man may have wisdom in some degree of perfection: and in
this way, in order to receive wisdom perfectly, it is requisite for
certain persons that they abstain altogether from wine, and this
depends on circumstances of certain persons and places.

Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle does not declare simply that it is good to
abstain from wine, but that it is good in the case where this would
give scandal to certain people.

Reply Obj. 3: Christ withdraws us from some things as being
altogether unlawful, and from others as being obstacles to
perfection. It is in the latter way that he withdraws some from the
use of wine, that they may aim at perfection, even as from riches and
the like.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 149, Art. 4]

Whether Sobriety Is More Requisite in Persons of Greater Standing?

Objection 1: It would seem that sobriety is more requisite in persons
of greater standing. For old age gives a man a certain standing;
wherefore honor and reverence are due to the old, according to Lev.
19:32, "Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of the
aged man." Now the Apostle declares that old men especially should be
exhorted to sobriety, according to Titus 2:2, "That the aged man be
sober." Therefore sobriety is most requisite in persons of standing.

Obj. 2: Further, a bishop has the highest degree in the Church: and
the Apostle commands him to be sober, according to 1 Tim. 3:2, "It
behooveth . . . a bishop to be blameless, the husband of one wife,
sober, prudent," etc. Therefore sobriety is chiefly required in
persons of high standing.

Obj. 3: Further, sobriety denotes abstinence from wine. Now wine is
forbidden to kings, who hold the highest place in human affairs:
while it is allowed to those who are in a state of affliction,
according to Prov. 31:4, "Give not wine to kings," and further on
(Prov. 31:6), "Give strong drink to them that are sad, and wine to
them that are grieved in mind." Therefore sobriety is more requisite
in persons of standing.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:11): "The women in like
manner, chaste . . . sober," etc., and (Titus 2:6) "Young men in like
manner exhort that they be sober."

_I answer that,_ Virtue includes relationship to two things, to the
contrary vices which it removes, and to the end to which it leads.
Accordingly a particular virtue is more requisite in certain persons
for two reasons. First, because they are more prone to the
concupiscences which need to be restrained by virtue, and to the
vices which are removed by virtue. In this respect, sobriety is most
requisite in the young and in women, because concupiscence of
pleasure thrives in the young on account of the heat of youth, while
in women there is not sufficient strength of mind to resist
concupiscence. Hence, according to Valerius Maximus [*Dict. Fact.
Memor. ii, 1] among the ancient Romans women drank no wine. Secondly,
sobriety is more requisite in certain persons, as being more
necessary for the operations proper to them. Now immoderate use of
wine is a notable obstacle to the use of reason: wherefore sobriety
is specially prescribed to the old, in whom reason should be vigorous
in instructing others: to bishops and all ministers of the Church,
who should fulfil their spiritual duties with a devout mind; and to
kings, who should rule their subjects with wisdom.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

QUESTION 150

OF DRUNKENNESS
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider drunkenness. Under this head there are four
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether drunkenness is a sin?

(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(3) Whether it is the most grievous sin?

(4) Whether it excuses from sin?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 150, Art. 1]

Whether Drunkenness Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness is not a sin. For every
sin has a corresponding contrary sin, thus timidity is opposed to
daring, and presumption to pusillanimity. But no sin is opposed to
drunkenness. Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, every sin is voluntary [*Augustine, De Vera Relig.
xiv]. But no man wishes to be drunk, since no man wishes to be
deprived of the use of reason. Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, whoever causes another to sin, sins himself.
Therefore, if drunkenness were a sin, it would follow that it is a
sin to ask a man to drink that which makes him drunk, which would
seem very hard.

Obj. 4: Further, every sin calls for correction. But correction is
not applied to drunkards: for Gregory [*Cf. Canon Denique, dist. 4
where Gratian refers to a letter of St. Gregory to St. Augustine of
Canterbury] says that "we must forbear with their ways, lest they
become worse if they be compelled to give up the habit." Therefore
drunkenness is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 13:13): "Not in rioting and
drunkenness."

_I answer that,_ Drunkenness may be understood in two ways. First, it
may signify the defect itself of a man resulting from his drinking
much wine, the consequence being that he loses the use of reason. In
this sense drunkenness denotes not a sin, but a penal defect
resulting from a fault. Secondly, drunkenness may denote the act by
which a man incurs this defect. This act may cause drunkenness in two
ways. In one way, through the wine being too strong, without the
drinker being cognizant of this: and in this way too, drunkenness may
occur without sin, especially if it is not through his negligence,
and thus we believe that Noah was made drunk as related in Gen. 9. In
another way drunkenness may result from inordinate concupiscence and
use of wine: in this way it is accounted a sin, and is comprised
under gluttony as a species under its genus. For gluttony is divided
into "surfeiting [Douay: 'rioting'] and drunkenness," which are
forbidden by the Apostle (Rom. 13:13).

Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11), insensibility
which is opposed to temperance "is not very common," so that like its
species which are opposed to the species of intemperance it has no
name. Hence the vice opposed to drunkenness is unnamed; and yet if a
man were knowingly to abstain from wine to the extent of molesting
nature grievously, he would not be free from sin.

Reply Obj. 2: This objection regards the resulting defect which is
involuntary: whereas immoderate use of wine is voluntary, and it is
in this that the sin consists.

Reply Obj. 3: Even as he that is drunk is excused if he knows not the
strength of the wine, so too is he that invites another to drink
excused from sin, if he be unaware that the drinker is the kind of
person to be made drunk by the drink offered. But if ignorance be
lacking neither is excused from sin.

Reply Obj. 4: Sometimes the correction of a sinner is to be
foregone, as stated above (Q. 33, A. 6). Hence Augustine says in
a letter (Ad Aurel. Episc. Ep. xxii), "Meseems, such things are cured
not by bitterness, severity, harshness, but by teaching rather than
commanding, by advice rather than threats. Such is the course to be
followed with the majority of sinners: few are they whose sins should
be treated with severity."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 150, Art. 2]

Whether Drunkenness Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness is not a mortal sin. For
Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory [*Serm. civ in the Appendix
to St. Augustine's works] that "drunkenness if indulged in
assiduously, is a mortal sin." Now assiduity denotes a circumstance
which does not change the species of a sin; so that it cannot
aggravate a sin infinitely, and make a mortal sin of a venial sin, as
shown above (I-II, Q. 88, A. 5). Therefore if drunkenness is not a
mortal sin for some other reason, neither is it for this.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says [*Serm. civ in the Appendix to St.
Augustine's works]: "Whenever a man takes more meat and drink than is
necessary, he should know that this is one of the lesser sins." Now
the lesser sins are called venial. Therefore drunkenness, which is
caused by immoderate drink, is a venial sin.

Obj. 3: Further, no mortal sin should be committed on the score of
medicine. Now some drink too much at the advice of the physician,
that they may be purged by vomiting; and from this excessive drink
drunkenness ensues. Therefore drunkenness is not a mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ We read in the Canons of the apostles (Can. xli,
xlii): "A bishop, priest or deacon who is given to drunkenness or
gambling, or incites others thereto, must either cease or be deposed;
a subdeacon, reader or precentor who does these things must either
give them up or be excommunicated; the same applies to the laity."
Now such punishments are not inflicted save for mortal sins.
Therefore drunkenness is a mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ The sin of drunkenness, as stated in the foregoing
Article, consists in the immoderate use and concupiscence of wine.
Now this may happen to a man in three ways. First, so that he knows
not the drink to be immoderate and intoxicating: and then drunkenness
may be without sin, as stated above (A. 1). Secondly, so that he
perceives the drink to be immoderate, but without knowing it to be
intoxicating, and then drunkenness may involve a venial sin. Thirdly,
it may happen that a man is well aware that the drink is immoderate
and intoxicating, and yet he would rather be drunk than abstain from
drink. Such a man is a drunkard properly speaking, because morals
take their species not from things that occur accidentally and beside
the intention, but from that which is directly intended. In this way
drunkenness is a mortal sin, because then a man willingly and
knowingly deprives himself of the use of reason, whereby he performs
virtuous deeds and avoids sin, and thus he sins mortally by running
the risk of falling into sin. For Ambrose says (De Patriarch. [*De
Abraham i.]): "We learn that we should shun drunkenness, which
prevents us from avoiding grievous sins. For the things we avoid when
sober, we unknowingly commit through drunkenness." Therefore
drunkenness, properly speaking, is a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Assiduity makes drunkenness a mortal sin, not on
account of the mere repetition of the act, but because it is
impossible for a man to become drunk assiduously, without exposing
himself to drunkenness knowingly and willingly, since he has many
times experienced the strength of wine and his own liability to
drunkenness.

Reply Obj. 2: To take more meat or drink than is necessary belongs to
the vice of gluttony, which is not always a mortal sin: but knowingly
to take too much drink to the point of being drunk, is a mortal sin.
Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 31): "Drunkenness is far from me:
Thou wilt have mercy, that it come not near me. But full feeding
sometimes hath crept upon Thy servant."

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 141, A. 6), meat and drink should
be moderate in accordance with the demands of the body's health.
Wherefore, just as it happens sometimes that the meat and drink which
are moderate for a healthy man are immoderate for a sick man, so too
it may happen conversely, that what is excessive for a healthy man is
moderate for one that is ailing. In this way when a man eats or
drinks much at the physician's advice in order to provoke vomiting,
he is not to be deemed to have taken excessive meat or drink. There
is, however, no need for intoxicating drink in order to procure
vomiting, since this is caused by drinking lukewarm water: wherefore
this is no sufficient cause for excusing a man from drunkenness.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 150, Art. 3]

Whether drunkenness is the gravest of sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness is the gravest of sins.
For Chrysostom says (Hom. lviii in Matth.) that "nothing gains the
devil's favor so much as drunkenness and lust, the mother of all the
vices." And it is written in the Decretals (Dist. xxxv, can. Ante
omnia): "Drunkenness, more than anything else, is to be avoided by
the clergy, for it foments and fosters all the vices."

Obj. 2: Further, from the very fact that a thing excludes the good of
reason, it is a sin. Now this is especially the effect of
drunkenness. Therefore drunkenness is the greatest of sins.

Obj. 3: Further, the gravity of a sin is shown by the gravity of its
punishment. Now seemingly drunkenness is punished most severely; for
Ambrose says [*De Elia et de Jejunio v] that "there would be no
slavery, were there no drunkards." Therefore drunkenness is the
greatest of sins.

_On the contrary,_ According to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 12),
spiritual vices are greater than carnal vices. Now drunkenness is one
of the carnal vices. Therefore it is not the greatest of sins.

_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be evil because it removes a
good. Wherefore the greater the good removed by an evil, the graver
the evil. Now it is evident that a Divine good is greater than a
human good. Wherefore the sins that are directly against God are
graver than the sin of drunkenness, which is directly opposed to the
good of human reason.

Reply Obj. 1: Man is most prone to sins of intemperance, because such
like concupiscences and pleasures are connatural to us, and for this
reason these sins are said to find greatest favor with the devil, not
for being graver than other sins, but because they occur more
frequently among men.

Reply Obj. 2: The good of reason is hindered in two ways: in one way
by that which is contrary to reason, in another by that which takes
away the use of reason. Now that which is contrary to reason has more
the character of an evil, than that which takes away the use of
reason for a time, since the use of reason, which is taken away by
drunkenness, may be either good or evil, whereas the goods of virtue,
which are taken away by things that are contrary to reason, are
always good.

Reply Obj. 3: Drunkenness was the occasional cause of slavery, in so
far as Cham brought the curse of slavery on to his descendants, for
having laughed at his father when the latter was made drunk. But
slavery was not the direct punishment of drunkenness.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 150, Art. 4]

Whether Drunkenness Excuses from Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness does not excuse from sin.
For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that "the drunkard deserves
double punishment." Therefore drunkenness aggravates a sin instead of
excusing from it.

Obj. 2: Further, one sin does not excuse another, but increases it.
Now drunkenness is a sin. Therefore it is not an excuse for sin.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that just as
man's reason is tied by drunkenness, so is it by concupiscence. But
concupiscence is not an excuse for sin: neither therefore is
drunkenness.

_On the contrary,_ According to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 43),
Lot was to be excused from incest on account of drunkenness.

_I answer that,_ Two things are to be observed in drunkenness, as
stated above (A. 1), namely the resulting defect and the preceding
act. On the part of the resulting defect whereby the use of reason is
fettered, drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, in so far as it
causes an act to be involuntary through ignorance. But on the part of
the preceding act, a distinction would seem necessary; because, if
the drunkenness that results from that act be without sin, the
subsequent sin is entirely excused from fault, as perhaps in the case
of Lot. If, however, the preceding act was sinful, the person is not
altogether excused from the subsequent sin, because the latter is
rendered voluntary through the voluntariness of the preceding act,
inasmuch as it was through doing something unlawful that he fell into
the subsequent sin. Nevertheless, the resulting sin is diminished,
even as the character of voluntariness is diminished. Wherefore
Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 44) that "Lot's guilt is to be
measured, not by the incest, but by his drunkenness."

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher does not say that the drunkard deserves
more severe punishment, but that he deserves double punishment for
his twofold sin. Or we may reply that he is speaking in view of the
law of a certain Pittacus, who, as stated in Polit. ii, 9, ordered
"those guilty of assault while drunk to be more severely punished
than if they had been sober, because they do wrong in more ways than
one." In this, as Aristotle observes (Polit. ii, 9), "he seems to
have considered the advantage," namely of the prevention of wrong,
"rather than the leniency which one should have for drunkards,"
seeing that they are not in possession of their faculties.

Reply Obj. 2: Drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, not in the point
of its being itself a sin, but in the point of the defect that
results from it, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: Concupiscence does not altogether fetter the reason, as
drunkenness does, unless perchance it be so vehement as to make a man
insane. Yet the passion of concupiscence diminishes sin, because it
is less grievous to sin through weakness than through malice.
_______________________

QUESTION 151

OF CHASTITY
(In Four Articles)

We must next consider chastity: (1) The virtue itself of chastity:
(2) virginity, which is a part of chastity: (3) lust, which is the
contrary vice. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether chastity is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a general virtue?

(3) Whether it is a virtue distinct from abstinence?

(4) Of its relation to purity.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 151, Art. 1]

Whether Chastity Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that chastity is not a virtue. For here we
are treating of virtues of the soul. But chastity, seemingly, belongs
to the body: for a person is said to be chaste because he behaves in
a certain way as regards the use of certain parts of the body.
Therefore chastity is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, virtue is "a voluntary habit," as stated in _Ethic._
ii, 6. But chastity, apparently, is not voluntary, since it can be
taken away by force from a woman to whom violence is done. Therefore
it seems that chastity is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, there is no virtue in unbelievers. Yet some
unbelievers are chaste. Therefore chastity is not a virtue.

Obj. 4: Further, the fruits are distinct from the virtues. But
chastity is reckoned among the fruits (Gal. 5:23). Therefore chastity
is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Decem Chord. [*Serm. ix de
Tempore]): "Whereas thou shouldst excel thy wife in virtue, since
chastity is a virtue, thou yieldest to the first onslaught of lust,
while thou wishest thy wife to be victorious."

_I answer that,_ Chastity takes its name from the fact that reason
"chastises" concupiscence, which, like a child, needs curbing, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12). Now the essence of human virtue
consists in being something moderated by reason, as shown above
(I-II, Q. 64, A. 1). Therefore it is evident that chastity is a
virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: Chastity does indeed reside in the soul as its subject,
though its matter is in the body. For it belongs to chastity that a
man make moderate use of bodily members in accordance with the
judgment of his reason and the choice of his will.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), "so long as her
mind holds to its purpose, whereby she has merited to be holy even in
body, not even the violence of another's lust can deprive her body of
its holiness, which is safeguarded by her persevering continency." He
also says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "in the mind there is a virtue
which is the companion of fortitude, whereby it is resolved to suffer
any evil whatsoever rather than consent to evil."

Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "it is
impossible to have any true virtue unless one be truly just; nor is
it possible to be just unless one live by faith." Whence he argues
that in unbelievers there is neither true chastity, nor any other
virtue, because, to wit, they are not referred to the due end, and as
he adds (Contra Julian. iv, 3) "virtues are distinguished from vices
not by their functions," i.e. their acts, "but by their ends."

Reply Obj. 4: Chastity is a virtue in so far as it works in
accordance with reason, but in so far as it delights in its act, it
is reckoned among the fruits.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 151, Art. 2]

Whether Chastity Is a General Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that chastity is a general virtue. For
Augustine says (De Mendacio xx) that "chastity of the mind is the
well-ordered movement of the mind that does not prefer the lesser to
the greater things." But this belongs to every virtue. Therefore
chastity is a general virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, "Chastity" takes its name from "chastisement" [*Cf.
A. 1]. Now every movement of the appetitive part should be chastised
by reason. Since, then, every moral virtue curbs some movement of the
appetite, it seems that every moral virtue is chastity.

Obj. 3: Further, chastity is opposed to fornication. But fornication
seems to belong to every kind of sin: for it is written (Ps. 72:27):
"Thou shalt destroy [Vulg.: 'hast destroyed'] all them that go
awhoring from [Douay: 'are disloyal to'] Thee." Therefore chastity is
a general virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] reckons it to be
a part of temperance.

_I answer that,_ The word "chastity" is employed in two ways. First,
properly; and thus it is a special virtue having a special matter,
namely the concupiscences relating to venereal pleasures. Secondly,
the word "chastity" is employed metaphorically: for just as a
mingling of bodies conduces to venereal pleasure which is the proper
matter of chastity and of lust its contrary vice, so too the
spiritual union of the mind with certain things conduces to a
pleasure which is the matter of a spiritual chastity metaphorically
speaking, as well as of a spiritual fornication likewise
metaphorically so called. For if the human mind delight in the
spiritual union with that to which it behooves it to be united,
namely God, and refrains from delighting in union with other things
against the requirements of the order established by God, this may be
called a spiritual chastity, according to 2 Cor. 11:2, "I have
espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste
virgin to Christ." If, on the other hand, the mind be united to any
other things whatsoever, against the prescription of the Divine
order, it will be called spiritual fornication, according to Jer.
3:1, "But thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers." Taking
chastity in this sense, it is a general virtue, because every virtue
withdraws the human mind from delighting in a union with unlawful
things. Nevertheless, the essence of this chastity consists
principally in charity and the other theological virtues, whereby the
human mind is united to God.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes chastity in the metaphorical sense.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (A. 1; Q. 142, A. 2), the concupiscence
of that which gives pleasure is especially likened to a child,
because the desire of pleasure is connatural to us, especially of
pleasures of touch which are directed to the maintenance of nature.
Hence it is that if the concupiscence of such pleasures be fostered
by consenting to it, it will wax very strong, as in the case of a
child left to his own will. Wherefore the concupiscence of these
pleasures stands in very great need of being chastised: and
consequently chastity is applied antonomastically to such like
concupiscences, even as fortitude is about those matters wherein we
stand in the greatest need of strength of mind.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers spiritual fornication
metaphorically so called, which is opposed to spiritual chastity,
as stated.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 151, Art. 3]

Whether Chastity Is a Distinct Virtue from Abstinence?

Objection 1: It would seem that chastity is not a distinct virtue
from abstinence. Because where the matter is generically the same,
one virtue suffices. Now it would seem that things pertaining to the
same sense are of one genus. Therefore, since pleasures of the palate
which are the matter of abstinence, and venereal pleasures which are
the matter of chastity, pertain to the touch, it seems that chastity
is not a distinct virtue from abstinence.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 12) likens all vices of
intemperance to childish sins, which need chastising. Now "chastity"
takes its name from "chastisement" of the contrary vices. Since then
certain vices are bridled by abstinence, it seems that abstinence is
chastity.

Obj. 3: Further, the pleasures of the other senses are the concern of
temperance in so far as they refer to pleasures of touch; which are
the matter of temperance. Now pleasures of the palate, which are the
matter of abstinence, are directed to venereal pleasures, which are
the matter of chastity: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. cxlvii ad Amand.
Cf. Gratian, Dist. xliv.], commenting on Titus 1:7, "Not given to
wine, no striker," etc.: "The belly and the organs of generation are
neighbors, that the neighborhood of the organs may indicate their
complicity in vice." Therefore abstinence and chastity are not
distinct virtues.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle (2 Cor. 6:5, 6) reckons "chastity"
together with "fastings" which pertain to abstinence.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 141, A. 4), temperance is
properly about the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch: so that
where there are different kinds of pleasure, there are different
virtues comprised under temperance. Now pleasures are proportionate
to the actions whose perfections they are, as stated in _Ethic._ ix,
4, 5: and it is evident that actions connected with the use of food
whereby the nature of the individual is maintained differ generically
from actions connected with the use of matters venereal, whereby the
nature of the species is preserved. Therefore chastity, which is
about venereal pleasures, is a distinct virtue from abstinence, which
is about pleasures of the palate.

Reply Obj. 1: Temperance is chiefly about pleasures of touch, not as
regards the sense's judgment concerning the objects of touch, which
judgment is of uniform character concerning all such objects, but as
regards the use itself of those objects, as stated in _Ethic._ iii,
10. Now the uses of meats, drinks, and venereal matters differ in
character. Wherefore there must needs be different virtues, though
they regard the one sense.

Reply Obj. 2: Venereal pleasures are more impetuous, and are more
oppressive on the reason than the pleasures of the palate: and
therefore they are in greater need of chastisement and restraint,
since if one consent to them this increases the force of
concupiscence and weakens the strength of the mind. Hence Augustine
says (Soliloq. i, 10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the
manly mind from its heights as the fondling of women, and those
bodily contacts which belong to the married state."

Reply Obj. 3: The pleasures of the other senses do not pertain to the
maintenance of man's nature, except in so far as they are directed to
pleasures of touch. Wherefore in the matter of such pleasures there
is no other virtue comprised under temperance. But the pleasures of
the palate, though directed somewhat to venereal pleasures, are
essentially directed to the preservation of man's life: wherefore by
their very nature they have a special virtue, although this virtue
which is called abstinence directs its act to chastity as its end.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 151, Art. 4]

Whether Purity Belongs Especially to Chastity?

Objection 1: It would seem that purity does not belong especially to
chastity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "purity is a
virtue of the soul." Therefore it is not something belonging to
chastity, but is of itself a virtue distinct from chastity.

Obj. 2: Further, _pudicitia_ (purity) is derived from _pudor,_ which
is equivalent to shame. Now shame, according to Damascene [*De Fide
Orth. ii, 15], is about a disgraceful act, and this is common to all
sinful acts. Therefore purity belongs no more to chastity than to the
other virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "every
kind of intemperance is most deserving of reproach." Now it would
seem to belong to purity to avoid all that is deserving of reproach.
Therefore purity belongs to all the parts of temperance, and not
especially to chastity.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Perseverantia xx): "We must
give praise to purity, that he who has ears to hear, may put to none
but a lawful use the organs intended for procreation." Now the use of
these organs is the proper matter of chastity. Therefore purity
belongs properly to chastity.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Obj. 2), _pudicitia_ (purity) takes
its name from _pudor,_ which signifies shame. Hence purity must needs
be properly about the things of which man is most ashamed. Now men
are most ashamed of venereal acts, as Augustine remarks (De Civ. Dei
xiv, 18), so much so that even the conjugal act, which is adorned by
the honesty [*Cf. Q. 145] of marriage, is not devoid of shame: and
this because the movement of the organs of generation is not subject
to the command of reason, as are the movements of the other external
members. Now man is ashamed not only of this sexual union but also of
all the signs thereof, as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 6).
Consequently purity regards venereal matters properly, and especially
the signs thereof, such as impure looks, kisses, and touches. And
since the latter are more wont to be observed, purity regards rather
these external signs, while chastity regards rather sexual union.
Therefore purity is directed to chastity, not as a virtue distinct
therefrom, but as expressing a circumstance of chastity. Nevertheless
the one is sometimes used to designate the other.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is here speaking of purity as designating
chastity.

Reply Obj. 2: Although every vice has a certain disgrace, the vices
of intemperance are especially disgraceful, as stated above (Q. 142,
A. 4).

Reply Obj. 3: Among the vices of intemperance, venereal sins are most
deserving of reproach, both on account of the insubordination of the
genital organs, and because by these sins especially, the reason is
absorbed.
_______________________

QUESTION 152

OF VIRGINITY
(In Five Articles)

We must now consider virginity: and under this head there are five
points of inquiry:

(1) In what does virginity consist?

(2) Whether it is lawful?

(3) Whether it is a virtue?

(4) Of its excellence in comparison with marriage;

(5) Of its excellence in comparison with the other virtues.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 152, Art. 1]

Whether Virginity Consists in Integrity of the Flesh?

Objection 1: It would seem that virginity does not consist in
integrity of the flesh. For Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup.) [*The
quotation is from De Sancta Virgin. xiii] that "virginity is the
continual meditation on incorruption in a corruptible flesh." But
meditation does not concern the flesh. Therefore virginity is not
situated in the flesh.

Obj. 2: Further, virginity denotes a kind of purity. Now Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "purity dwells in the soul." Therefore
virginity is not incorruption of the flesh.

Obj. 3: Further, the integrity of the flesh would seem to consist in
the seal of virginal purity. Yet sometimes the seal is broken without
loss of virginity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "those
organs may be injured through being wounded by mischance. Physicians,
too, sometimes do for the sake of health that which makes one shudder
to see: and a midwife has been known to destroy by touch the proof of
virginity that she sought." And he adds: "Nobody, I think, would be
so foolish as to deem this maiden to have forfeited even bodily
sanctity, though she lost the integrity of that organ." Therefore
virginity does not consist in incorruption of the flesh.

Obj. 4: Further, corruption of the flesh consists chiefly in
resolution of the semen: and this may take place without copulation,
whether one be asleep or awake. Yet seemingly virginity is not lost
without copulation: for Augustine says (De Virgin. xiii) that
"virginal integrity and holy continency that refrains from all sexual
intercourse is the portion of angels." Therefore virginity does not
consist in incorruption of the flesh.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that "virginity
is continence whereby integrity of the flesh is vowed, consecrated
and observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and flesh."

_I answer that,_ Virginity takes its name apparently from _viror_
(freshness), and just as a thing is described as fresh and retaining
its freshness, so long as it is not parched by excessive heat, so
too, virginity denotes that the person possessed thereof is unseared
by the heat of concupiscence which is experienced in achieving the
greatest bodily pleasure which is that of sexual intercourse. Hence,
Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 5) that "virginal chastity is integrity
free of pollution."

Now venereal pleasures offer three points for consideration. The
first is on the part of the body, viz. the violation of the seal of
virginity. The second is the link between that which concerns the
soul and that which concerns the body, and this is the resolution of
the semen, causing sensible pleasure. The third is entirely on the
part of the soul, namely the purpose of attaining this pleasure. Of
these three the first is accidental to the moral act, which as such
must be considered in reference to the soul. The second stands in the
relation of matter to the moral act, since the sensible passions are
the matters of moral acts. But the third stands in the position of
form and complement, because the essence of morality is perfected in
that which concerns the reason. Since then virginity consists in
freedom from the aforesaid corruption, it follows that the integrity
of the bodily organ is accidental to virginity; while freedom from
pleasure in resolution of the semen is related thereto materially;
and the purpose of perpetually abstaining from this pleasure is the
formal and completive element in virginity.

Reply Obj. 1: This definition of Augustine's expresses directly that
which is formal in virginity. For "meditation" denotes reason's
purpose; and the addition "perpetual" does not imply that a virgin
must always retain this meditation actually, but that she should bear
in mind the purpose of always persevering therein. The material
element is expressed indirectly by the words "on incorruption in a
corruptible body." This is added to show the difficulty of virginity:
for if the flesh were incorruptible, it would not be difficult to
maintain a perpetual meditation on incorruption.

Reply Obj. 2: It is true that purity, as to its essence, is in the
soul; but as to its matter, it is in the body: and it is the same
with virginity. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that
"although virginity resides in the flesh," and for this reason is a
bodily quality, "yet it is a spiritual thing, which a holy continency
fosters and preserves."

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above, the integrity of a bodily organ is
accidental to virginity, in so far as a person, through purposely
abstaining from venereal pleasure, retains the integrity of a bodily
organ. Hence if the organ lose its integrity by chance in some other
way, this is no more prejudicial to virginity than being deprived of
a hand or foot.

Reply Obj. 4: Pleasure resulting from resolution of semen may arise
in two ways. If this be the result of the mind's purpose, it destroys
virginity, whether copulation takes place or not. Augustine, however,
mentions copulation, because such like resolution is the ordinary and
natural result thereof. In another way this may happen beside the
purpose of the mind, either during sleep, or through violence and
without the mind's consent, although the flesh derives pleasure from
it, or again through weakness of nature, as in the case of those who
are subject to a flow of semen. In such cases virginity is not
forfeit, because such like pollution is not the result of impurity
which excludes virginity.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 152, Art. 2]

Whether Virginity Is Unlawful?

Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is unlawful. For whatever
is contrary to a precept of the natural law is unlawful. Now just as
the words of Gen. 2:16, "Of every tree" that is in "paradise, thou
shalt eat," indicate a precept of the natural law, in reference to
the preservation of the individual, so also the words of Gen. 1:28,
"Increase and multiply, and fill the earth," express a precept of the
natural law, in reference to the preservation of the species.
Therefore just as it would be a sin to abstain from all food, as this
would be to act counter to the good of the individual, so too it is a
sin to abstain altogether from the act of procreation, for this is to
act against the good of the species.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever declines from the mean of virtue is
apparently sinful. Now virginity declines from the mean of virtue,
since it abstains from all venereal pleasures: for the Philosopher
says (Ethic. ii, 2), that "he who revels in every pleasure, and
abstains from not even one, is intemperate: but he who refrains from
all is loutish and insensible." Therefore virginity is something
sinful.

Obj. 3: Further, punishment is not due save for a vice. Now in olden
times those were punished who led a celibate life, as Valerius
Maximus asserts [*Dict. Fact. Mem. ii, 9]. Hence according to
Augustine (De Vera Relig. iii) Plato "is said to have sacrificed to
nature, in order that he might atone for his perpetual continency as
though it were a sin." Therefore virginity is a sin.

_On the contrary,_ No sin is a matter of direct counsel. But
virginity is a matter of direct counsel: for it is written (1 Cor.
7:25): "Concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I
give counsel." Therefore virginity is not an unlawful thing.

_I answer that,_ In human acts, those are sinful which are against
right reason. Now right reason requires that things directed to an
end should be used in a measure proportionate to that end. Again,
man's good is threefold as stated in _Ethic._ i, 8; one consisting in
external things, for instance riches; another, consisting in bodily
goods; the third, consisting in the goods of the soul among which the
goods of the contemplative life take precedence of the goods of the
active life, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. x, 7), and as our Lord
declared (Luke 10:42), "Mary hath chosen the better part." Of these
goods those that are external are directed to those which belong to
the body, and those which belong to the body are directed to those
which belong to the soul; and furthermore those which belong to the
active life are directed to those which belong to the life of
contemplation. Accordingly, right reason dictates that one use
external goods in a measure proportionate to the body, and in like
manner as regards the rest. Wherefore if a man refrain from
possessing certain things (which otherwise it were good for him to
possess), for the sake of his body's good, or of the contemplation of
truth, this is not sinful, but in accord with right reason. In like
manner if a man abstain from bodily pleasures, in order more freely
to give himself to the contemplation of truth, this is in accordance
with the rectitude of reason. Now holy virginity refrains from all
venereal pleasure in order more freely to have leisure for Divine
contemplation: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:34): "The unmarried
woman and the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord: that she may
be holy in both body and in spirit. But she that is married thinketh
on the things of the world, how she may please her husband."
Therefore it follows that virginity instead of being sinful is worthy
of praise.

Reply Obj. 1: A precept implies a duty, as stated above (Q. 122, A.
1). Now there are two kinds of duty. There is the duty that has to be
fulfilled by one person; and a duty of this kind cannot be set aside
without sin. The other duty has to be fulfilled by the multitude, and
the fulfilment of this kind of duty is not binding on each one of the
multitude. For the multitude has many obligations which cannot be
discharged by the individual; but are fulfilled by one person doing
this, and another doing that. Accordingly the precept of natural law
which binds man to eat must needs be fulfilled by each individual,
otherwise the individual cannot be sustained. On the other hand, the
precept of procreation regards the whole multitude of men, which
needs not only to multiply in body, but also to advance spiritually.
Wherefore sufficient provision is made for the human multitude, if
some betake themselves to carnal procreation, while others abstaining
from this betake themselves to the contemplation of Divine things,
for the beauty and welfare of the whole human race. Thus too in an
army, some take sentry duty, others are standard-bearers, and others
fight with the sword: yet all these things are necessary for the
multitude, although they cannot be done by one person.

Reply Obj. 2: The person who, beside the dictate of right reason,
abstains from all pleasures through aversion, as it were, for
pleasure as such, is insensible as a country lout. But a virgin does
not refrain from every pleasure, but only from that which is
venereal: and abstains therefrom according to right reason, as stated
above. Now the mean of virtue is fixed with reference, not to
quantity but to right reason, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6: wherefore
it is said of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3) that "in point of
quantity he goes to the extreme, but in point of becomingness he
follows the mean."

Reply Obj. 3: Laws are framed according to what occurs more
frequently. Now it seldom happened in olden times that anyone
refrained from all venereal pleasure through love of the
contemplation of truth: as Plato alone is related to have done. Hence
it was not through thinking this a sin, that he offered sacrifice,
but "because he yielded to the false opinion of his fellow
countrymen," as Augustine remarks (De Vera Relig. iii).
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 152, Art. 3]

Whether Virginity Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is not a virtue. For "no
virtue is in us by nature," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1).
Now virginity is in us by nature, since all are virgins when born.
Therefore virginity is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, whoever has one virtue has all virtues, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). Yet some have other virtues without having
virginity: else, since none can go to the heavenly kingdom without
virtue, no one could go there without virginity, which would involve
the condemnation of marriage. Therefore virginity is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is recovered by penance. But virginity
is not recovered by penance: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. xxii ad
Eustoch.]: "Other things God can do, but He cannot restore the virgin
after her downfall." Therefore seemingly virginity is not a virtue.

Obj. 4: Further, no virtue is lost without sin. Yet virginity is lost
without sin, namely by marriage. Therefore virginity is not a virtue.

Obj. 5: Further, virginity is condivided with widowhood and conjugal
purity. But neither of these is a virtue. Therefore virginity is not
a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 3): "Love of virginity
moves us to say something about virginity, lest by passing it over we
should seem to cast a slight on what is a virtue of high degree."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the formal and completive
element in virginity is the purpose of abstaining from venereal
pleasure, which purpose is rendered praiseworthy by its end, in so
far, to wit, as this is done in order to have leisure for Divine
things: while the material element in virginity is integrity of the
flesh free of all experience of venereal pleasure. Now it is manifest
that where a good action has a special matter through having a
special excellence, there is a special kind of virtue: for example,
magnificence which is about great expenditure is for this reason a
special virtue distinct from liberality, which is about all uses of
money in general. Now to keep oneself free from the experience of
venereal pleasure has an excellence of its own deserving of greater
praise than keeping oneself free from inordinate venereal pleasure.
Wherefore virginity is a special virtue being related to chastity as
magnificence to liberality.

Reply Obj. 1: Men have from their birth that which is material in
virginity, namely integrity of the flesh and freedom from venereal
experience. But they have not that which is formal in virginity,
namely the purpose of safeguarding this integrity for God's sake,
which purpose gives virginity its character of virtue. Hence
Augustine says (De Virgin. xi): "Nor do we praise virgins for being
virgins, but, because their virginity is consecrated to God by holy
continency."

Reply Obj. 2: Virtues are connected together by reason of that which
is formal in them, namely charity, or by reason of prudence, as
stated above (Q. 129, A. 3, ad 2), but not by reason of that which is
material in them. For nothing hinders a virtuous man from providing
the matter of one virtue, and not the matter of another virtue: thus
a poor man has the matter of temperance, but not that of
magnificence. It is in this way that one who has the other virtues
lacks the matter of virginity, namely the aforesaid integrity of the
flesh: nevertheless he can have that which is formal in virginity,
his mind being so prepared that he has the purpose of safeguarding
this same integrity of the flesh, should it be fitting for him to do
so: even as a poor man may be so prepared in mind as to have the
purpose of being magnificent in his expenditure, were he in a
position to do so: or again as a prosperous man is so prepared in
mind as to purpose bearing misfortune with equanimity: without which
preparedness of the mind no man can be virtuous.

Reply Obj. 3: Virtue can be recovered by penance as regards that
which is formal in virtue, but not as to that which is material
therein. For if a magnificent man has squandered all his wealth he
does not recover his riches by repenting of his sin. In like manner a
person who has lost virginity by sin, recovers by repenting, not the
matter of virginity but the purpose of virginity.

As regards the matter of virginity there is that which can be
miraculously restored by God, namely the integrity of the organ,
which we hold to be accidental to virginity: while there is something
else which cannot be restored even by miracle, to wit, that one who
has experienced venereal lust should cease to have had that
experience. For God cannot make that which is done not to have been
done, as stated in the First Part (Q. 25, A. 4).

Reply Obj. 4: Virginity as a virtue denotes the purpose, confirmed by
vow, of observing perpetual integrity. For Augustine says (De Virgin.
viii) that "by virginity, integrity of the flesh is vowed,
consecrated and observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and
flesh." Hence virginity, as a virtue, is never lost without sin.

Reply Obj. 5: Conjugal chastity is deserving of praise merely because
it abstains from unlawful pleasures: hence no excellence attaches to
it above that of chastity in general. Widowhood, however, adds
something to chastity in general; but it does not attain to that
which is perfect in this matter, namely to entire freedom from
venereal pleasure; virginity alone achieves this. Wherefore virginity
alone is accounted a virtue above chastity, even as magnificence is
reckoned above liberality.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 152, Art. 4]

Whether Virginity Is More Excellent Than Marriage?

Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is not more excellent than
marriage. For Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi): "Continence was
equally meritorious in John who remained unmarried and Abraham who
begot children." Now a greater virtue has greater merit. Therefore
virginity is not a greater virtue than conjugal chastity.

Obj. 2: Further, the praise accorded a virtuous man depends on his
virtue. If, then, virginity were preferable to conjugal continence,
it would seem to follow that every virgin is to be praised more than
any married woman. But this is untrue. Therefore virginity is not
preferable to marriage.

Obj. 3: Further, the common good takes precedence of the private
good, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). Now marriage is
directed to the common good: for Augustine says (De Bono Conjug.
xvi): "What food is to a man's wellbeing, such is sexual intercourse
to the welfare of the human race." On the other hand, virginity is
ordered to the individual good, namely in order to avoid what the
Apostle calls the "tribulation of the flesh," to which married people
are subject (1 Cor. 7:28). Therefore virginity is not greater than
conjugal continence.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Virgin. xix): "Both solid
reason and the authority of Holy Writ show that neither is marriage
sinful, nor is it to be equaled to the good of virginal continence or
even to that of widowhood."

_I answer that,_ According to Jerome (Contra Jovin. i) the error of
Jovinian consisted in holding virginity not to be preferable to
marriage. This error is refuted above all by the example of Christ
Who both chose a virgin for His mother, and remained Himself a
virgin, and by the teaching of the Apostle who (1 Cor. 7) counsels
virginity as the greater good. It is also refuted by reason, both
because a Divine good takes precedence of a human good, and because
the good of the soul is preferable to the good of the body, and again
because the good of the contemplative life is better than that of the
active life. Now virginity is directed to the good of the soul in
respect of the contemplative life, which consists in thinking "on the
things of God" [Vulg.: 'the Lord'], whereas marriage is directed to
the good of the body, namely the bodily increase of the human race,
and belongs to the active life, since the man and woman who embrace
the married life have to think "on the things of the world," as the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:34). Without doubt therefore virginity is
preferable to conjugal continence.

Reply Obj. 1: Merit is measured not only by the kind of action, but
still more by the mind of the agent. Now Abraham had a mind so
disposed, that he was prepared to observe virginity, if it were in
keeping with the times for him to do so. Wherefore in him conjugal
continence was equally meritorious with the virginal continence of
John, as regards the essential reward, but not as regards the
accidental reward. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that
both "the celibacy of John and the marriage of Abraham fought
Christ's battle in keeping with the difference of the times: but John
was continent even in deed, whereas Abraham was continent only in
habit."

Reply Obj. 2: Though virginity is better than conjugal continence, a
married person may be better than a virgin for two reasons. First, on
the part of chastity itself; if to wit, the married person is more
prepared in mind to observe virginity, if it should be expedient,
than the one who is actually a virgin. Hence Augustine (De Bono
Conjug. xxii) charges the virgin to say: "I am no better than
Abraham, although the chastity of celibacy is better than the
chastity of marriage." Further on he gives the reason for this: "For
what I do now, he would have done better, if it were fitting for him
to do it then; and what they did I would even do now if it behooved
me now to do it." Secondly, because perhaps the person who is not a
virgin has some more excellent virtue. Wherefore Augustine says (De
Virgin. xliv): "Whence does a virgin know the things that belong to
the Lord, however solicitous she be about them, if perchance on
account of some mental fault she be not yet ripe for martyrdom,
whereas this woman to whom she delighted in preferring herself is
already able to drink the chalice of the Lord?"

Reply Obj. 3: The common good takes precedence of the private good,
if it be of the same genus: but it may be that the private good is
better generically. It is thus that the virginity that is consecrated
to God is preferable to carnal fruitfulness. Hence Augustine says (De
Virgin. ix): "It must be confessed that the fruitfulness of the
flesh, even of those women who in these times seek naught else from
marriage but children in order to make them servants of Christ,
cannot compensate for lost virginity."
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 152, Art. 5]

Whether Virginity Is the Greatest of Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is the greatest of virtues.
For Cyprian says (De Virgin. [*De Habitu Virg.]): "We address
ourselves now to the virgins. Sublime is their glory, but no less
exalted is their vocation. They are a flower of the Church's sowing,
the pride and ornament of spiritual grace, the most honored portion
of Christ's flock."

Obj. 2: Further, a greater reward is due to the greater virtue. Now
the greatest reward is due to virginity, namely the hundredfold
fruit, according to a gloss on Matt. 13:23. Therefore virginity is
the greatest of the virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, the more a virtue conforms us to Christ, the greater
it is. Now virginity above all conforms us to Christ; for it is
declared in the Apocalypse (14:4) that virgins "follow the Lamb
whithersoever He goeth," and (Apoc. 14:3) that they sing "a new
canticle," which "no" other "man" could say. Therefore virginity is
the greatest of the virtues.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Virgin. xlvi): "No one,
methinks, would dare prefer virginity to martyrdom," and (De Virgin.
xlv): "The authority of the Church informs the faithful in no
uncertain manner, so that they know in what place the martyrs and the
holy virgins who have departed this life are commemorated in the
Sacrament of the Altar." By this we are given to understand that
martyrdom, and also the monastic state, are preferable to virginity.

_I answer that,_ A thing may excel all others in two ways. First, in
some particular genus: and thus virginity is most excellent, namely
in the genus of chastity, since it surpasses the chastity both of
widowhood and of marriage. And because comeliness is ascribed to
chastity antonomastically, it follows that surpassing beauty is
ascribed to chastity. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 7): "Can
anyone esteem any beauty greater than a virgin's, since she is
beloved of her King, approved by her Judge, dedicated to her Lord,
consecrated to her God?" Secondly, a thing may be most excellent
simply, and in this way virginity is not the most excellent of the
virtues. Because the end always excels that which is directed to the
end; and the more effectively a thing is directed to the end, the
better it is. Now the end which renders virginity praiseworthy is
that one may have leisure for Divine things, as stated above (A. 4).
Wherefore the theological virtues as well as the virtue of religion,
the acts of which consist in being occupied about Divine things, are
preferable to virginity. Moreover, martyrs work more mightily in
order to cleave to God--since for this end they hold their own life
in contempt; and those who dwell in monasteries--since for this end
they give up their own will and all that they may possess--than
virgins who renounce venereal pleasure for that same purpose.
Therefore virginity is not simply the greatest of virtues.

Reply Obj. 1: Virgins are "the more honored portion of Christ's
flock," and "their glory more sublime" in comparison with widows and
married women.

Reply Obj. 2: The hundredfold fruit is ascribed to virginity,
according to Jerome [*Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.], on account of its
superiority to widowhood, to which the sixtyfold fruit is ascribed,
and to marriage, to which is ascribed the thirtyfold fruit. But
according to Augustine (De QQ. Evang. i, 9), "the hundredfold fruit
is given to martyrs, the sixtyfold to virgins, and the thirtyfold to
married persons." Wherefore it does not follow that virginity is
simply the greatest of virtues, but only in comparison with other
degrees of chastity.

Reply Obj. 3: Virgins "follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth,"
because they imitate Christ, by integrity not only of the mind but
also of the flesh, as Augustine says (De Virgin. xxvii). Wherefore
they follow the Lamb in more ways, but this does not imply that they
follow more closely, because other virtues make us cleave to God more
closely by imitation of the mind. The "new hymn" which virgins alone
sing, is their joy at having preserved integrity of the flesh.
_______________________

QUESTION 153

OF LUST
(In Five Articles)

We must next consider the vice of lust which is opposed to chastity:
(1) Lust in general; (2) its species. Under the first head there are
five points of inquiry:

(1) What is the matter of lust?

(2) Whether all copulation is unlawful?

(3) Whether lust is a mortal sin?

(4) Whether lust is a capital vice?

(5) Concerning its daughters.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 153, Art. 1]

Whether the Matter of Lust Is Only Venereal Desires and Pleasures?

Objection 1: It would seem that the matter of lust is not only
venereal desires and pleasures. For Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6)
that "lust affects to be called surfeit and abundance." But surfeit
regards meat and drink, while abundance refers to riches. Therefore
lust is not properly about venereal desires and pleasures.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 20:1): "Wine is a lustful
[Douay: 'luxurious'] thing." Now wine is connected with pleasure of
meat and drink. Therefore these would seem to be the matter of lust.

Obj. 3: Further, lust is defined "as the desire of wanton pleasure"
[*Alexander of Hales, Summ. Theol. ii, cxvli]. But wanton pleasure
regards not only venereal matters but also many others. Therefore
lust is not only about venereal desires and pleasures.

_On the contrary,_ To the lustful it is said (De Vera Relig. iii
[*Written by St. Augustine]): "He that soweth in the flesh, of the
flesh shall reap corruption." Now the sowing of the flesh refers to
venereal pleasures. Therefore these belong to lust.

_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. x), "a lustful man is one who
is debauched with pleasures." Now venereal pleasures above all
debauch a man's mind. Therefore lust is especially concerned with
such like pleasures.

Reply Obj. 1: Even as temperance chiefly and properly applies to
pleasures of touch, yet consequently and by a kind of likeness is
referred to other matters, so too, lust applies chiefly to venereal
pleasures, which more than anything else work the greatest havoc in a
man's mind, yet secondarily it applies to any other matters
pertaining to excess. Hence a gloss on Gal. 5:19 says "lust is any
kind of surfeit."

Reply Obj. 2: Wine is said to be a lustful thing, either in the sense
in which surfeit in any matter is ascribed to lust, or because the
use of too much wine affords an incentive to venereal pleasure.

Reply Obj. 3: Although wanton pleasure applies to other matters, the
name of lust has a special application to venereal pleasures, to
which also wantonness is specially applicable, as Augustine remarks
(De Civ. xiv, 15, 16).
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 153, Art. 2]

Whether No Venereal Act Can Be Without Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that no venereal act can be without sin.
For nothing but sin would seem to hinder virtue. Now every venereal
act is a great hindrance to virtue. For Augustine says (Soliloq. i,
10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its
height as the fondling of a woman, and those bodily contacts."
Therefore, seemingly, no venereal act is without sin.

Obj. 2: Further, any excess that makes one forsake the good of reason
is sinful, because virtue is corrupted by "excess" and "deficiency"
as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 2. Now in every venereal act there is
excess of pleasure, since it so absorbs the mind, that "it is
incompatible with the act of understanding," as the Philosopher
observes (Ethic. vii, 11); and as Jerome [*Origen, Hom. vi in Num.;
Cf. Jerome, Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.] states, rendered the hearts of
the prophets, for the moment, insensible to the spirit of prophecy.
Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.

Obj. 3: Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. Now
original sin is transmitted to children by concupiscence, without
which no venereal act is possible, as Augustine declares (De Nup. et
Concup. i, 24). Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxv): "This is a
sufficient answer to heretics, if only they will understand that no
sin is committed in that which is against neither nature, nor morals,
nor a commandment": and he refers to the act of sexual intercourse
between the patriarchs of old and their several wives. Therefore not
every venereal act is a sin.

_I answer that,_ A sin, in human acts, is that which is against the
order of reason. Now the order of reason consists in its ordering
everything to its end in a fitting manner. Wherefore it is no sin if
one, by the dictate of reason, makes use of certain things in a
fitting manner and order for the end to which they are adapted,
provided this end be something truly good. Now just as the
preservation of the bodily nature of one individual is a true good,
so, too, is the preservation of the nature of the human species a
very great good. And just as the use of food is directed to the
preservation of life in the individual, so is the use of venereal
acts directed to the preservation of the whole human race. Hence
Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): "What food is to a man's well
being, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the whole human
race." Wherefore just as the use of food can be without sin, if it be
taken in due manner and order, as required for the welfare of the
body, so also the use of venereal acts can be without sin, provided
they be performed in due manner and order, in keeping with the end of
human procreation.

Reply Obj. 1: A thing may be a hindrance to virtue in two ways.
First, as regards the ordinary degree of virtue, and as to this
nothing but sin is an obstacle to virtue. Secondly, as regards the
perfect degree of virtue, and as to this virtue may be hindered by
that which is not a sin, but a lesser good. In this way sexual
intercourse casts down the mind not from virtue, but from the height,
i.e. the perfection of virtue. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug.
viii): "Just as that was good which Martha did when busy about
serving holy men, yet better still that which Mary did in hearing the
word of God: so, too, we praise the good of Susanna's conjugal
chastity, yet we prefer the good of the widow Anna, and much more
that of the Virgin Mary."

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 152, A. 2, ad 2; I-II, Q. 64, A.
2), the mean of virtue depends not on quantity but on conformity with
right reason: and consequently the exceeding pleasure attaching to a
venereal act directed according to reason, is not opposed to the mean
of virtue. Moreover, virtue is not concerned with the amount of
pleasure experienced by the external sense, as this depends on the
disposition of the body; what matters is how much the interior
appetite is affected by that pleasure. Nor does it follow that the
act in question is contrary to virtue, from the fact that the free
act of reason in considering spiritual things is incompatible with
the aforesaid pleasure. For it is not contrary to virtue, if the act
of reason be sometimes interrupted for something that is done in
accordance with reason, else it would be against virtue for a person
to set himself to sleep. That venereal concupiscence and pleasure are
not subject to the command and moderation of reason, is due to the
punishment of the first sin, inasmuch as the reason, for rebelling
against God, deserved that its body should rebel against it, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13).

Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13), "the child,
shackled with original sin, is born of fleshly concupiscence (which
is not imputed as sin to the regenerate) as of a daughter of sin."
Hence it does not follow that the act in question is a sin, but that
it contains something penal resulting from the first sin.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 153, Art. 3]

Whether the Lust That Is About Venereal Acts Can Be a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that lust about venereal acts cannot be a
sin. For the venereal act consists in the emission of semen which is
the surplus from food, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Anim.
i, 18). But there is no sin attaching to the emission of other
superfluities. Therefore neither can there be any sin in venereal
acts.

Obj. 2: Further, everyone can lawfully make what use he pleases of
what is his. But in the venereal act a man uses only what is his own,
except perhaps in adultery or rape. Therefore there can be no sin in
venereal acts, and consequently lust is no sin.

Obj. 3: Further, every sin has an opposite vice. But, seemingly, no
vice is opposed to lust. Therefore lust is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ The cause is more powerful than its effect. Now
wine is forbidden on account of lust, according to the saying of the
Apostle (Eph. 5:18), "Be not drunk with wine wherein is lust [Douay:
'luxury']." Therefore lust is forbidden.

Further, it is numbered among the works of the flesh: Gal. 5:19
[Douay: 'luxury'].

_I answer that,_ The more necessary a thing is, the more it behooves
one to observe the order of reason in its regard; wherefore the more
sinful it becomes if the order of reason be forsaken. Now the use of
venereal acts, as stated in the foregoing Article, is most necessary
for the common good, namely the preservation of the human race.
Wherefore there is the greatest necessity for observing the order of
reason in this matter: so that if anything be done in this connection
against the dictate of reason's ordering, it will be a sin. Now lust
consists essentially in exceeding the order and mode of reason in the
matter of venereal acts. Wherefore without any doubt lust is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says in the same book (De Gener.
Anim. i, 18), "the semen is a surplus that is needed." For it is said
to be superfluous, because it is the residue from the action of the
nutritive power, yet it is needed for the work of the generative
power. But the other superfluities of the human body are such as not
to be needed, so that it matters not how they are emitted, provided
one observe the decencies of social life. It is different with the
emission of semen, which should be accomplished in a manner befitting
the end for which it is needed.

Reply Obj. 2: As the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:20) in speaking against
lust, "You are bought with a great price: glorify and bear God in
your body." Wherefore by inordinately using the body through lust a
man wrongs God Who is the Supreme Lord of our body. Hence Augustine
says (De Decem. Chord. 10 [*Serm. ix (xcvi de Temp.)]): "God Who thus
governs His servants for their good, not for His, made this order and
commandment, lest unlawful pleasures should destroy His temple which
thou hast begun to be."

Reply Obj. 3: The opposite of lust is not found in many, since men
are more inclined to pleasure. Yet the contrary vice is comprised
under insensibility, and occurs in one who has such a dislike for
sexual intercourse as not to pay the marriage debt.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 153, Art. 4]

Whether Lust Is a Capital Vice?

Objection 1: It seems that lust is not a capital vice. For lust is
apparently the same as "uncleanness," according to a gloss on Eph.
5:3 (Cf. 2 Cor. 12:21). But uncleanness is a daughter of gluttony,
according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore lust is not a
capital vice.

Obj. 2: Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that "as pride
of mind leads to the depravity of lust, so does humility of mind
safeguard the chastity of the flesh." Now it is seemingly contrary to
the nature of a capital vice to arise from another vice. Therefore
lust is not a capital vice.

Obj. 3: Further, lust is caused by despair, according to Eph. 4:19,
"Who despairing, have given themselves up to lasciviousness." But
despair is not a capital vice; indeed, it is accounted a daughter of
sloth, as stated above (Q. 35, A. 4, ad 2). Much less, therefore, is
lust a capital vice.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places lust among the
capital vices.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 148, A. 5; I-II, Q. 84, AA. 3,
4), a capital vice is one that has a very desirable end, so that
through desire for that end, a man proceeds to commit many sins, all
of which are said to arise from that vice as from a principal vice.
Now the end of lust is venereal pleasure, which is very great.
Wherefore this pleasure is very desirable as regards the sensitive
appetite, both on account of the intensity of the pleasure, and
because such like concupiscence is connatural to man. Therefore it is
evident that lust is a capital vice.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 148, A. 6), according to some, the
uncleanness which is reckoned a daughter of gluttony is a certain
uncleanness of the body, and thus the objection is not to the point.
If, however, it denote the uncleanness of lust, we must reply that it
is caused by gluttony materially--in so far as gluttony provides the
bodily matter of lust--and not under the aspect of final cause, in
which respect chiefly the capital vices are said to be the cause of
others.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 132, A. 4, ad 1), when we were
treating of vainglory, pride is accounted the common mother of all
sins, so that even the capital vices originate therefrom.

Reply Obj. 3: Certain persons refrain from lustful pleasures chiefly
through hope of the glory to come, which hope is removed by despair,
so that the latter is a cause of lust, as removing an obstacle
thereto, not as its direct cause; whereas this is seemingly necessary
for a capital vice.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 153, Art. 5]

Whether the Daughters of Lust Are Fittingly Described?

Objection 1: It would seem that the daughters of lust are unfittingly
reckoned to be "blindness of mind, thoughtlessness, inconstancy,
rashness, self-love, hatred of God, love of this world and abhorrence
or despair of a future world." For mental blindness, thoughtlessness
and rashness pertain to imprudence, which is to be found in every
sin, even as prudence is in every virtue. Therefore they should not
be reckoned especially as daughters of lust.

Obj. 2: Further, constancy is reckoned a part of fortitude, as stated
above (Q. 128, ad 6; Q. 137, A. 3). But lust is contrary, not to
fortitude but to temperance. Therefore inconstancy is not a daughter
of lust.

Obj. 3: Further, "Self-love extending to the contempt of God" is the
origin of every sin, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28).
Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of lust.

Obj. 4: Further, Isidore [*QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi] mentions four,
namely, "obscene," "scurrilous," "wanton" and "foolish talking."
There the aforesaid enumeration would seem to be superfluous.

_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45).

_I answer that,_ When the lower powers are strongly moved towards
their objects, the result is that the higher powers are hindered and
disordered in their acts. Now the effect of the vice of lust is that
the lower appetite, namely the concupiscible, is most vehemently
intent on its object, to wit, the object of pleasure, on account of
the vehemence of the pleasure. Consequently the higher powers, namely
the reason and the will, are most grievously disordered by lust.

Now the reason has four acts in matters of action. First there is
simple understanding, which apprehends some end as good, and this act
is hindered by lust, according to Dan. 13:56, "Beauty hath deceived
thee, and lust hath perverted thy heart." In this respect we have
"blindness of mind." The second act is counsel about what is to be
done for the sake of the end: and this is also hindered by the
concupiscence of lust. Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1),
speaking of lecherous love: "This thing admits of neither counsel nor
moderation, thou canst not control it by counseling." In this respect
there is "rashness," which denotes absence of counsel, as stated
above (Q. 53, A. 3). The third act is judgment about the things to be
done, and this again is hindered by lust. For it is said of the
lustful old men (Dan. 13:9): "They perverted their own mind . . .
that they might not . . . remember just judgments." In this respect
there is "thoughtlessness." The fourth act is the reason's command
about the thing to be done, and this also is impeded by lust, in so
far as through being carried away by concupiscence, a man is hindered
from doing what his reason ordered to be done. [To this "inconstancy"
must be referred.] [*The sentence in brackets is omitted in the
Leonine edition.] Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1) of a man
who declared that he would leave his mistress: "One little false tear
will undo those words."

On the part of the will there results a twofold inordinate act. One
is the desire for the end, to which we refer "self-love," which
regards the pleasure which a man desires inordinately, while on the
other hand there is "hatred of God," by reason of His forbidding the
desired pleasure. The other act is the desire for the things directed
to the end. With regard to this there is "love of this world," whose
pleasures a man desires to enjoy, while on the other hand there is
"despair of a future world," because through being held back by
carnal pleasures he cares not to obtain spiritual pleasures, since
they are distasteful to him.

Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5),
intemperance is the chief corruptive of prudence: wherefore the vices
opposed to prudence arise chiefly from lust, which is the principal
species of intemperance.

Reply Obj. 2: The constancy which is a part of fortitude regards
hardships and objects of fear; but constancy in refraining from
pleasures pertains to continence which is a part of temperance, as
stated above (Q. 143). Hence the inconstancy which is opposed thereto
is to be reckoned a daughter of lust. Nevertheless even the first
named inconstancy arises from lust, inasmuch as the latter enfeebles
a man's heart and renders it effeminate, according to Osee 4:11,
"Fornication and wine and drunkenness take away the heart [Douay:
'understanding']." Vegetius, too, says (De Re Milit. iii) that "the
less a man knows of the pleasures of life, the less he fears death."
Nor is there any need, as we have repeatedly stated, for the
daughters of a capital vice to agree with it in matter (cf. Q. 35, A.
4, ad 2; Q. 118, A. 8, ad 1; Q. 148, A. 6).

Reply Obj. 3: Self-love in respect of any goods that a man desires
for himself is the common origin of all sins; but in the special
point of desiring carnal pleasures for oneself, it is reckoned a
daughter of lust.

Reply Obj. 4: The sins mentioned by Isidore are inordinate external
acts, pertaining in the main to speech; wherein there is a fourfold
inordinateness. First, on account of the matter, and to this we refer
"obscene words": for since "out of the abundance of the heart the
mouth speaketh" (Matt. 12:34), the lustful man, whose heart is full
of lewd concupiscences, readily breaks out into lewd words. Secondly,
on account of the cause: for, since lust causes thoughtlessness and
rashness, the result is that it makes a man speak without weighing or
giving a thought to his words, which are described as "scurrilous."
Thirdly, on account of the end: for since the lustful man seeks
pleasure, he directs his speech thereto, and so gives utterance to
"wanton words." Fourthly, on account of the sentiments expressed by
his words, for through causing blindness of mind, lust perverts a
man's sentiments, and so he gives way "to foolish talking," for
instance, by expressing a preference for the pleasures he desires to
anything else.
_______________________

QUESTION 154

OF THE PARTS OF LUST
(In Twelve Articles)

We must now consider the parts of lust, under which head there are
twelve points of inquiry:

(1) Into what parts is lust divided?

(2) Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin?

(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?

(4) Whether there is mortal sin in touches, kisses and such like
seduction?

(5) Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin?

(6) Of seduction;

(7) Of rape;

(8) Of adultery;

(9) Of incest;

(10) Of sacrilege;

(11) Of the sin against nature;

(12) Of the order of gravity in the aforesaid sins.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 1]

Whether Six Species Are Fittingly Assigned to Lust?

Objection 1: It would seem that six species are unfittingly assigned
to lust, namely, "simple fornication, adultery, incest, seduction,
rape, and the unnatural vice." For diversity of matter does not
diversify the species. Now the aforesaid division is made with regard
to diversity of matter, according as the woman with whom a man has
intercourse is married or a virgin, or of some other condition.
Therefore it seems that the species of lust are diversified in this
way.

Obj. 2: Further, seemingly the species of one vice are not
differentiated by things that belong to another vice. Now adultery
does not differ from simple fornication, save in the point of a man
having intercourse with one who is another's, so that he commits an
injustice. Therefore it seems that adultery should not be reckoned a
species of lust.

Obj. 3: Further, just as a man may happen to have intercourse with a
woman who is bound to another man by marriage, so may it happen that
a man has intercourse with a woman who is bound to God by vow.
Therefore sacrilege should be reckoned a species of lust, even as
adultery is.

Obj. 4: Further, a married man sins not only if he be with another
woman, but also if he use his own wife inordinately. But the latter
sin is comprised under lust. Therefore it should be reckoned among
the species thereof.

Obj. 5: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:21): "Lest again, when I
come, God humble me among you, and I mourn many of them that sinned
before, and have not done penance for the uncleanness and fornication
and lasciviousness that they have committed." Therefore it seems that
also uncleanness and lasciviousness should be reckoned species of
lust, as well as fornication.

Obj. 6: Further, the thing divided is not to be reckoned among
its parts. But lust is reckoned together with the aforesaid: for it is
written (Gal. 5:19): "The works of the flesh are manifest, which are
fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, lust [Douay: 'luxury']."
Therefore it seems that fornication is unfittingly reckoned a species
of lust.

_On the contrary,_ The aforesaid division is given in the Decretals
36, qu. i [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa].

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 153, A. 3), the sin of lust
consists in seeking venereal pleasure not in accordance with right
reason. This may happen in two ways. First, in respect of the matter
wherein this pleasure is sought; secondly, when, whereas there is due
matter, other due circumstances are not observed. And since a
circumstance, as such, does not specify a moral act, whose species is
derived from its object which is also its matter, it follows that the
species of lust must be assigned with respect to its matter or object.

Now this same matter may be discordant with right reason in two ways.
First, because it is inconsistent with the end of the venereal act.
In this way, as hindering the begetting of children, there is the
_vice against nature,_ which attaches to every venereal act from
which generation cannot follow; and, as hindering the due upbringing
and advancement of the child when born, there is _simple
fornication,_ which is the union of an unmarried man with an
unmarried woman. Secondly, the matter wherein the venereal act is
consummated may be discordant with right reason in relation to other
persons; and this in two ways. First, with regard to the woman, with
whom a man has connection, by reason of due honor not being paid to
her; and thus there is _incest,_ which consists in the misuse of a
woman who is related by consanguinity or affinity. Secondly, with
regard to the person under whose authority the woman is placed: and
if she be under the authority of a husband, it is _adultery,_ if
under the authority of her father, it is _seduction,_ in the absence
of violence, and _rape_ if violence be employed.

These species are differentiated on the part of the woman rather than
of the man, because in the venereal act the woman is passive and is
by way of matter, whereas the man is by way of agent; and it has been
stated above (Obj. 1) that the aforesaid species are assigned with
regard to a difference of matter.

Reply Obj. 1: The aforesaid diversity of matter is connected with a
formal difference of object, which difference results from different
modes of opposition to right reason, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (I-II, Q. 18, A. 7), nothing hinders
the deformities of different vices concurring in the one act, and in
this way adultery is comprised under lust and injustice. Nor is this
deformity of injustice altogether accidental to lust: since the lust
that obeys concupiscence so far as to lead to injustice, is thereby
shown to be more grievous.

Reply Obj. 3: Since a woman, by vowing continence, contracts a
spiritual marriage with God, the sacrilege that is committed in the
violation of such a woman is a spiritual adultery. In like manner,
the other kinds of sacrilege pertaining to lustful matter are reduced
to other species of lust.

Reply Obj. 4: The sin of a husband with his wife is not connected
with undue matter, but with other circumstances, which do not
constitute the species of a moral act, as stated above (I-II, Q. 18,
A. 2).

Reply Obj. 5: As a gloss says on this passage, "uncleanness" stands
for lust against nature, while "lasciviousness" is a man's abuse of
boys, wherefore it would appear to pertain to seduction. We may also
reply that "lasciviousness" relates to certain acts circumstantial to
the venereal act, for instance kisses, touches, and so forth.

Reply Obj. 6: According to a gloss on this passage "lust" there
signifies any kind of excess.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 2]

Whether Simple Fornication Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that simple fornication is not a mortal
sin. For things that come under the same head would seem to be on a
par with one another. Now fornication comes under the same head as
things that are not mortal sins: for it is written (Acts 15:29):
"That you abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood,
and from things strangled, and from fornication." But there is not
mortal sin in these observances, according to 1 Tim. 4:4, "Nothing is
rejected that is received with thanksgiving." Therefore fornication
is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, no mortal sin is the matter of a Divine precept. But
the Lord commanded (Osee 1:2): "Go take thee a wife of fornications,
and have of her children of fornications." Therefore fornication is
not a mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, no mortal sin is mentioned in Holy Writ without
disapprobation. Yet simple fornication is mentioned without
disapprobation by Holy Writ in connection with the patriarchs. Thus
we read (Gen. 16:4) that Abraham went in to his handmaid Agar; and
further on (Gen. 30:5, 9) that Jacob went in to Bala and Zelpha the
handmaids of his wives; and again (Gen. 38:18) that Juda was with
Thamar whom he thought to be a harlot. Therefore simple fornication
is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 4: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But simple
fornication is not contrary to charity, neither as regards the love
of God, since it is not a sin directly against God, nor as regards
the love of our neighbor, since thereby no one is injured. Therefore
simple fornication is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 5: Further, every mortal sin leads to eternal perdition. But
simple fornication has not this result: because a gloss of Ambrose
[*The quotation is from the Gloss of Peter Lombard, who refers it to
St. Ambrose: whereas it is from Hilary the deacon] on 1 Tim. 4:8,
"Godliness is profitable to all things," says: "The whole of
Christian teaching is summed up in mercy and godliness: if a man
conforms to this, even though he gives way to the inconstancy of the
flesh, doubtless he will be punished, but he will not perish."
Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 6: Further, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi) that "what food
is to the well-being of the body, such is sexual intercourse to the
welfare of the human race." But inordinate use of food is not always
a mortal sin. Therefore neither is all inordinate sexual intercourse;
and this would seem to apply especially to simple fornication, which
is the least grievous of the aforesaid species.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Tob. 4:13): "Take heed to keep
thyself . . . from all fornication, and beside thy wife never endure
to know a crime." Now crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore
fornication and all intercourse with other than one's wife is a
mortal sin.

Further, nothing but mortal sin debars a man from God's kingdom. But
fornication debars him, as shown by the words of the Apostle (Gal.
5:21), who after mentioning fornication and certain other vices,
adds: "They who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God."
Therefore simple fornication is a mortal sin.

Further, it is written in the Decretals (XXII, qu. i, can.
Praedicandum): "They should know that the same penance is to be
enjoined for perjury as for adultery, fornication, and wilful murder
and other criminal offenses." Therefore simple fornication is a
criminal or mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ Without any doubt we must hold simple fornication to
be a mortal sin, notwithstanding that a gloss [*St. Augustine, QQ. in
Deut., qu. 37] on Deut. 23:17, says: "This is a prohibition against
going with whores, whose vileness is venial." For instead of "venial"
it should be "venal," since such is the wanton's trade. In order to
make this evident, we must take note that every sin committed
directly against human life is a mortal sin. Now simple fornication
implies an inordinateness that tends to injure the life of the
offspring to be born of this union. For we find in all animals where
the upbringing of the offspring needs care of both male and female,
that these come together not indeterminately, but the male with a
certain female, whether one or several; such is the case with all
birds: while, on the other hand, among those animals, where the
female alone suffices for the offspring's upbringing, the union is
indeterminate, as in the case of dogs and like animals. Now it is
evident that the upbringing of a human child requires not only the
mother's care for his nourishment, but much more the care of his
father as guide and guardian, and under whom he progresses in goods
both internal and external. Hence human nature rebels against an
indeterminate union of the sexes and demands that a man should be
united to a determinate woman and should abide with her a long time
or even for a whole lifetime. Hence it is that in the human race the
male has a natural solicitude for the certainty of offspring, because
on him devolves the upbringing of the child: and this certainly would
cease if the union of sexes were indeterminate.

This union with a certain definite woman is called matrimony; which
for the above reason is said to belong to the natural law. Since,
however, the union of the sexes is directed to the common good of the
whole human race, and common goods depend on the law for their
determination, as stated above (I-II, Q. 90, A. 2), it follows that
this union of man and woman, which is called matrimony, is determined
by some law. What this determination is for us will be stated in the
Third Part of this work (Suppl., Q. 50, seqq.), where we shall treat
of the sacrament of matrimony. Wherefore, since fornication is an
indeterminate union of the sexes, as something incompatible with
matrimony, it is opposed to the good of the child's upbringing, and
consequently it is a mortal sin.

Nor does it matter if a man having knowledge of a woman by
fornication, make sufficient provision for the upbringing of the
child: because a matter that comes under the determination of the law
is judged according to what happens in general, and not according to
what may happen in a particular case.

Reply Obj. 1: Fornication is reckoned in conjunction with these
things, not as being on a par with them in sinfulness, but because
the matters mentioned there were equally liable to cause dispute
between Jews and Gentiles, and thus prevent them from agreeing
unanimously. For among the Gentiles, fornication was not deemed
unlawful, on account of the corruption of natural reason: whereas
the Jews, taught by the Divine law, considered it to be unlawful.
The other things mentioned were loathsome to the Jews through custom
introduced by the law into their daily life. Hence the Apostles
forbade these things to the Gentiles, not as though they were
unlawful in themselves, but because they were loathsome to the Jews,
as stated above (I-II, Q. 103, A. 4, ad 3).

Reply Obj. 2: Fornication is said to be a sin, because it is contrary
to right reason. Now man's reason is right, in so far as it is ruled
by the Divine Will, the first and supreme rule. Wherefore that which
a man does by God's will and in obedience to His command, is not
contrary to right reason, though it may seem contrary to the general
order of reason: even so, that which is done miraculously by the
Divine power is not contrary to nature, though it be contrary to the
usual course of nature. Therefore just as Abraham did not sin in
being willing to slay his innocent son, because he obeyed God,
although considered in itself it was contrary to right human reason
in general, so, too, Osee sinned not in committing fornication by
God's command. Nor should such a copulation be strictly called
fornication, though it be so called in reference to the general
course of things. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): "When God
commands a thing to be done against the customs or agreement of any
people, though it were never done by them heretofore, it is to be
done"; and afterwards he adds: "For as among the powers of human
society, the greater authority is obeyed in preference to the lesser,
so must God in preference to all."

Reply Obj. 3: Abraham and Jacob went in to their handmaidens with no
purpose of fornication, as we shall show further on when we treat of
matrimony (Suppl., Q. 65, A. 5, ad 2). As to Juda there is no need to
excuse him, for he also caused Joseph to be sold.

Reply Obj. 4: Simple fornication is contrary to the love of our
neighbor, because it is opposed to the good of the child to be born,
as we have shown, since it is an act of generation accomplished in a
manner disadvantageous to the future child.

Reply Obj. 5: A person, who, while given to works of piety, yields to
the inconstancy of the flesh, is freed from eternal loss, in so far
as these works dispose him to receive the grace to repent, and
because by such works he makes satisfaction for his past inconstancy;
but not so as to be freed by pious works, if he persist in carnal
inconstancy impenitent until death.

Reply Obj. 6: One copulation may result in the begetting of a man,
wherefore inordinate copulation, which hinders the good of the future
child, is a mortal sin as to the very genus of the act, and not only
as to the inordinateness of concupiscence. On the other hand, one
meal does not hinder the good of a man's whole life, wherefore the
act of gluttony is not a mortal sin by reason of its genus. It would,
however, be a mortal sin, if a man were knowingly to partake of a
food which would alter the whole condition of his life, as was the
case with Adam.

Nor is it true that fornication is the least of the sins comprised
under lust, for the marriage act that is done out of sensuous
pleasure is a lesser sin.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 3]

Whether Fornication Is the Most Grievous of Sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that fornication is the most grievous of
sins. For seemingly a sin is the more grievous according as it
proceeds from a greater sensuous pleasure. Now the greatest sensuous
pleasure is in fornication, for a gloss on 1 Cor. 7:9 says that the
"flame of sensuous pleasure is most fierce in lust." Therefore it
seems that fornication is the gravest of sins.

Obj. 2: Further, a sin is the more grievous that is committed against
a person more closely united to the sinner: thus he sins more
grievously who strikes his father than one who strikes a stranger.
Now according to 1 Cor. 6:18, "He that committeth fornication sinneth
against his own body," which is most intimately connected with a man.
Therefore it seems that fornication is the most grievous of sins.

Obj. 3: Further, the greater a good is, the graver would seem to be
the sin committed against it. Now the sin of fornication is seemingly
opposed to the good of the whole human race, as appears from what was
said in the foregoing Article. It is also against Christ, according
to 1 Cor. 6:15, "Shall I . . . take the members of Christ, and make
them the members of a harlot?" Therefore fornication is the most
grievous of sins.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 12) that the sins of
the flesh are less grievous than spiritual sins.

_I answer that,_ The gravity of a sin may be measured in two ways,
first with regard to the sin in itself, secondly with regard to some
accident. The gravity of a sin is measured with regard to the sin
itself, by reason of its species, which is determined according to
the good to which that sin is opposed. Now fornication is contrary to
the good of the child to be born. Wherefore it is a graver sin, as to
its species, than those sins which are contrary to external goods,
such as theft and the like; while it is less grievous than those
which are directly against God, and sins that are injurious to the
life of one already born, such as murder.

Reply Obj. 1: The sensual pleasure that aggravates a sin is that
which is in the inclination of the will. But the sensual pleasure
that is in the sensitive appetite, lessens sin, because a sin is the
less grievous according as it is committed under the impulse of a
greater passion. It is in this way that the greatest sensual pleasure
is in fornication. Hence Augustine says (De Agone Christiano [*Serm.
ccxciii; ccl de Temp.; see Appendix to St. Augustine's works]) that of
all a Christian's conflicts, the most difficult combats are those of
chastity; wherein the fight is a daily one, but victory rare: and
Isidore declares (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that "mankind is subjected to
the devil by carnal lust more than by anything else," because, to
wit, the vehemence of this passion is more difficult to overcome.

Reply Obj. 2: The fornicator is said to sin against his own body, not
merely because the pleasure of fornication is consummated in the
flesh, which is also the case in gluttony, but also because he acts
against the good of his own body by an undue resolution and
defilement thereof, and an undue association with another. Nor does
it follow from this that fornication is the most grievous sin,
because in man reason is of greater value than the body, wherefore if
there be a sin more opposed to reason, it will be more grievous.

Reply Obj. 3: The sin of fornication is contrary to the good of the
human race, in so far as it is prejudicial to the individual
begetting of the one man that may be born. Now one who is already an
actual member of the human species attains to the perfection of the
species more than one who is a man potentially, and from this point
of view murder is a more grievous sin than fornication and every kind
of lust, through being more opposed to the good of the human species.
Again, a Divine good is greater than the good of the human race: and
therefore those sins also that are against God are more grievous.
Moreover, fornication is a sin against God, not directly as though
the fornicator intended to offend God, but consequently, in the same
way as all mortal sins. And just as the members of our body are
Christ's members, so too, our spirit is one with Christ, according to
1 Cor. 6:17, "He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit." Wherefore
also spiritual sins are more against Christ than fornication is.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 4]

Whether There Can Be Mortal Sin in Touches and Kisses?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no mortal sin in touches and
kisses. For the Apostle says (Eph. 5:3): "Fornication and all
uncleanness, or covetousness, let it not so much as be named among
you, as becometh saints," then he adds: "Or obscenity" (which a gloss
refers to "kissing and fondling"), "or foolish talking" (as "soft
speeches"), "or scurrility" (which "fools call geniality--i.e.
jocularity"), and afterwards he continues (Eph. 5:5): "For know ye
this and understand that no fornicator, or unclean, or covetous
person (which is the serving of idols), hath inheritance in the
kingdom of Christ and of God," thus making no further mention of
obscenity, as neither of foolish talking or scurrility. Therefore
these are not mortal sins.

Obj. 2: Further, fornication is stated to be a mortal sin as being
prejudicial to the good of the future child's begetting and
upbringing. But these are not affected by kisses and touches or
blandishments. Therefore there is no mortal sin in these.

Obj. 3: Further, things that are mortal sins in themselves can never
be good actions. Yet kisses, touches, and the like can be done
sometimes without sin. Therefore they are not mortal sins in
themselves.

_On the contrary,_ A lustful look is less than a touch, a caress or a
kiss. But according to Matt. 5:28, "Whosoever shall look on a woman
to lust after her hath already committed adultery with her in his
heart." Much more therefore are lustful kisses and other like things
mortal sins.

Further, Cyprian says (Ad Pompon, de Virgin., Ep. lxii), "By their
very intercourse, their blandishments, their converse, their
embraces, those who are associated in a sleep that knows neither
honor nor shame, acknowledge their disgrace and crime." Therefore by
doing these things a man is guilty of a crime, that is, of mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be a mortal sin in two ways.
First, by reason of its species, and in this way a kiss, caress, or
touch does not, of its very nature, imply a mortal sin, for it is
possible to do such things without lustful pleasure, either as being
the custom of one's country, or on account of some obligation or
reasonable cause. Secondly, a thing is said to be a mortal sin by
reason of its cause: thus he who gives an alms, in order to lead
someone into heresy, sins mortally on account of his corrupt
intention. Now it has been stated above (I-II, Q. 74, A. 8), that it
is a mortal sin not only to consent to the act, but also to the
delectation of a mortal sin. Wherefore since fornication is a mortal
sin, and much more so the other kinds of lust, it follows that in
such like sins not only consent to the act but also consent to the
pleasure is a mortal sin. Consequently, when these kisses and
caresses are done for this delectation, it follows that they are
mortal sins, and only in this way are they said to be lustful.
Therefore in so far as they are lustful, they are mortal sins.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle makes no further mention of these three
because they are not sinful except as directed to those that he had
mentioned before.

Reply Obj. 2: Although kisses and touches do not by their very nature
hinder the good of the human offspring, they proceed from lust, which
is the source of this hindrance: and on this account they are
mortally sinful.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument proves that such things are not mortal
sins in their species.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 5]

Whether Nocturnal Pollution Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that nocturnal pollution is a sin. For the
same things are the matter of merit and demerit. Now a man may merit
while he sleeps, as was the case with Solomon, who while asleep
obtained the gift of wisdom from the Lord (3 Kings 3:2, Par. 1).
Therefore a man may demerit while asleep; and thus nocturnal
pollution would seem to be a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, whoever has the use of reason can sin. Now a man has
the use of reason while asleep, since in our sleep we frequently
discuss matters, choose this rather than that, consenting to one
thing, or dissenting to another. Therefore one may sin while asleep,
so that nocturnal pollution is not prevented by sleep from being a
sin, seeing that it is a sin according to its genus.

Obj. 3: Further, it is useless to reprove and instruct one who cannot
act according to or against reason. Now man, while asleep, is
instructed and reproved by God, according to Job 33:15, 16, "By a
dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep is wont to lay hold of
men [*Vulg.: 'When deep sleep falleth upon men.' St. Thomas is
apparently quoting from memory, as the passage is given correctly
above, Q. 95, A. 6, Obj. 1.] . . . Then He openeth the ears of men,
and teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn." Therefore a
man, while asleep, can act according to or against his reason, and
this is to do good or sinful actions, and thus it seems that
nocturnal pollution is a sin.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15): "When the
same image that comes into the mind of a speaker presents itself to
the mind of the sleeper, so that the latter is unable to distinguish
the imaginary from the real union of bodies, the flesh is at once
moved, with the result that usually follows such motions; and yet
there is as little sin in this as there is in speaking and therefore
thinking about such things while one is awake."

_I answer that,_ Nocturnal pollution may be considered in two ways.
First, in itself; and thus it has not the character of a sin. For
every sin depends on the judgment of reason, since even the first
movement of the sensuality has nothing sinful in it, except in so far
as it can be suppressed by reason; wherefore in the absence of
reason's judgment, there is no sin in it. Now during sleep reason has
not a free judgment. For there is no one who while sleeping does not
regard some of the images formed by his imagination as though they
were real, as stated above in the First Part (Q. 84, A. 8, ad 2).
Wherefore what a man does while he sleeps and is deprived of reason's
judgment, is not imputed to him as a sin, as neither are the actions
of a maniac or an imbecile.

Secondly, nocturnal pollution may be considered with reference to its
cause. This may be threefold. One is a bodily cause. For when there
is excess of seminal humor in the body, or when the humor is
disintegrated either through overheating of the body or some other
disturbance, the sleeper dreams things that are connected with the
discharge of this excessive or disintegrated humor: the same thing
happens when nature is cumbered with other superfluities, so that
phantasms relating to the discharge of those superfluities are formed
in the imagination. Accordingly if this excess of humor be due to a
sinful cause (for instance excessive eating or drinking), nocturnal
pollution has the character of sin from its cause: whereas if the
excess or disintegration of these superfluities be not due to a
sinful cause, nocturnal pollution is not sinful, neither in itself
nor in its cause.

A second cause of nocturnal pollution is on the part of the soul and
the inner man: for instance when it happens to the sleeper on account
of some previous thought. For the thought which preceded while he was
awake, is sometimes purely speculative, for instance when one thinks
about the sins of the flesh for the purpose of discussion; while
sometimes it is accompanied by a certain emotion either of
concupiscence or of abhorrence. Now nocturnal pollution is more apt
to arise from thinking about carnal sins with concupiscence for such
pleasures, because this leaves its trace and inclination in the soul,
so that the sleeper is more easily led in his imagination to consent
to acts productive of pollution. In this sense the Philosopher says
(Ethic. i, 13) that "in so far as certain movements in some degree
pass" from the waking state to the state of sleep, "the dreams of
good men are better than those of any other people": and Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15) that "even during sleep, the soul may
have conspicuous merit on account of its good disposition." Thus it
is evident that nocturnal pollution may be sinful on the part of its
cause. On the other hand, it may happen that nocturnal pollution
ensues after thoughts about carnal acts, though they were
speculative, or accompanied by abhorrence, and then it is not sinful,
neither in itself nor in its cause.

The third cause is spiritual and external; for instance when by the
work of a devil the sleeper's phantasms are disturbed so as to induce
the aforesaid result. Sometimes this is associated with a previous
sin, namely the neglect to guard against the wiles of the devil.
Hence the words of the hymn at even: "Our enemy repress, that so our
bodies no uncleanness know" [*Translation W. K. Blount].

On the other hand, this may occur without any fault on man's part,
and through the wickedness of the devil alone. Thus we read in the
_Collationes Patrum_ (Coll. xxii, 6) of a man who was ever wont to
suffer from nocturnal pollution on festivals, and that the devil
brought this about in order to prevent him from receiving Holy
Communion. Hence it is manifest that nocturnal pollution is never a
sin, but is sometimes the result of a previous sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Solomon did not merit to receive wisdom from God while
he was asleep. He received it in token of his previous desire. It is
for this reason that his petition is stated to have been pleasing to
God (3 Kings 3:10), as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15).

Reply Obj. 2: The use of reason is more or less hindered in sleep,
according as the inner sensitive powers are more or less overcome by
sleep, on account of the violence or attenuation of the evaporations.
Nevertheless it is always hindered somewhat, so as to be unable to
elicit a judgment altogether free, as stated in the First Part (Q.
84, A. 8, ad 2). Therefore what it does then is not imputed to it as
a sin.

Reply Obj. 3: Reason's apprehension is not hindered during sleep to
the same extent as its judgment, for this is accomplished by reason
turning to sensible objects, which are the first principles of human
thought. Hence nothing hinders man's reason during sleep from
apprehending anew something arising out of the traces left by his
previous thoughts and phantasms presented to him, or again through
Divine revelation, or the interference of a good or bad angel.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 6]

Whether Seduction Should Be Reckoned a Species of Lust?

Objection 1: It would seem that seduction should not be reckoned a
species of lust. For seduction denotes the unlawful violation of a
virgin, according to the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1) [*Append. Grat. ad
can. Lex illa]. But this may occur between an unmarried man and an
unmarried woman, which pertains to fornication. Therefore seduction
should not be reckoned a species of lust, distinct from fornication.

Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Patriarch. [*De Abraham i, 4]):
"Let no man be deluded by human laws: all seduction is adultery." Now
a species is not contained under another that is differentiated in
opposition to it. Therefore since adultery is a species of lust, it
seems that seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust.

Obj. 3: Further, to do a person an injury would seem to pertain to
injustice rather than to lust. Now the seducer does an injury to
another, namely the violated maiden's father, who "can take the
injury as personal to himself" [*Gratian, ad can. Lex illa], and sue
the seducer for damages. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a
species of lust.

_On the contrary,_ Seduction consists properly in the venereal act
whereby a virgin is violated. Therefore, since lust is properly about
venereal actions, it would seem that seduction is a species of lust.

_I answer that,_ When the matter of a vice has a special deformity,
we must reckon it to be a determinate species of that vice. Now lust
is a sin concerned with venereal matter, as stated above (Q. 153, A.
1). And a special deformity attaches to the violation of a virgin who
is under her father's care: both on the part of the maid, who through
being violated without any previous compact of marriage is both
hindered from contracting a lawful marriage and is put on the road to
a wanton life from which she was withheld lest she should lose the
seal of virginity: and on the part of the father, who is her
guardian, according to Ecclus. 42:11, "Keep a sure watch over a
shameless daughter, lest at any time she make thee become a
laughing-stock to thy enemies." Therefore it is evident that
seduction which denotes the unlawful violation of a virgin, while
still under the guardianship of her parents, is a determinate species
of lust.

Reply Obj. 1: Although a virgin is free from the bond of marriage,
she is not free from her father's power. Moreover, the seal of
virginity is a special obstacle to the intercourse of fornication, in
that it should be removed by marriage only. Hence seduction is not
simple fornication, since the latter is intercourse with harlots,
women, namely, who are no longer virgins, as a gloss observes on 2
Cor. 12: "And have not done penance for the uncleanness and
fornication," etc.

Reply Obj. 2: Ambrose here takes seduction in another sense, as
applicable in a general way to any sin of lust. Wherefore seduction,
in the words quoted, signifies the intercourse between a married man
and any woman other than his wife. This is clear from his adding:
"Nor is it lawful for the husband to do what the wife may not." In
this sense, too, we are to understand the words of Num. 5:13: "If
[Vulg.: 'But'] the adultery is secret, and cannot be provided by
witnesses, because she was not found in adultery (_stupro_)."

Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents a sin from having a greater deformity
through being united to another sin. Now the sin of lust obtains a
greater deformity from the sin of injustice, because the
concupiscence would seem to be more inordinate, seeing that it
refrains not from the pleasurable object so that it may avoid an
injustice. In fact a twofold injustice attaches to it. One is on the
part of the virgin, who, though not violated by force, is
nevertheless seduced, and thus the seducer is bound to compensation.
Hence it is written (Ex. 22:16, 17): "If a man seduce a virgin not
yet espoused, and lie with her, he shall endow her and have her to
wife. If the maid's father will not give her to him, he shall give
money according to the dowry, which virgins are wont to receive." The
other injury is done to the maid's father: wherefore the seducer is
bound by the Law to a penalty in his regard. For it is written (Deut.
22:28, 29): "If a man find a damsel that is a virgin, who is not
espoused, and taking her, lie with her, and the matter come to
judgment: he that lay with her shall give to the father of the maid
fifty sicles of silver, and shall have her to wife, and because he
hath humbled her, he may not put her away all the days of his life":
and this, lest he should prove to have married her in mockery, as
Augustine observes. [*QQ. in Deut., qu. xxxiv.]
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 7]

Whether Rape Is a Species of Lust, Distinct from Seduction?

Objection 1: It would seem that rape is not a species of lust,
distinct from seduction. For Isidore says (Etym. v, 26) that
"seduction (_stuprum_), or rape, properly speaking, is unlawful
intercourse, and takes its name from its causing corruption:
wherefore he that is guilty of rape is a seducer." Therefore it seems
that rape should not be reckoned a species of lust distinct from
seduction.

Obj. 2: Further, rape, apparently, implies violence. For it is stated
in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]) that
"rape is committed when a maid is taken away by force from her
father's house that after being violated she may be taken to wife."
But the employment of force is accidental to lust, for this
essentially regards the pleasure of intercourse. Therefore it seems
that rape should not be reckoned a determinate species of lust.

Obj. 3: Further, the sin of lust is curbed by marriage: for it is
written (1 Cor. 7:2): "For fear of fornication, let every man have
his own wife." Now rape is an obstacle to subsequent marriage, for it
was enacted in the council of Meaux: "We decree that those who are
guilty of rape, or of abducting or seducing women, should not have
those women in marriage, although they should have subsequently
married them with the consent of their parents." Therefore rape is
not a determinate species of lust distinct from seduction.

Obj. 4: Further, a man may have knowledge of his newly married wife
without committing a sin of lust. Yet he may commit rape if he take
her away by force from her parents' house, and have carnal knowledge
of her. Therefore rape should not be reckoned a determinate species
of lust.

_On the contrary,_ Rape is unlawful sexual intercourse, as Isidore
states (Etym. v, 26). But this pertains to the sin of lust. Therefore
rape is a species of lust.

_I answer that,_ Rape, in the sense in which we speak of it now, is a
species of lust: and sometimes it coincides with seduction; sometimes
there is rape without seduction, and sometimes seduction without rape.

They coincide when a man employs force in order unlawfully to violate
a virgin. This force is employed sometimes both towards the virgin
and towards her father; and sometimes towards the father and not to
the virgin, for instance if she allows herself to be taken away by
force from her father's house. Again, the force employed in rape
differs in another way, because sometimes a maid is taken away by
force from her parents' house, and is forcibly violated: while
sometimes, though taken away by force, she is not forcibly violated,
but of her own consent, whether by act of fornication or by the act
of marriage: for the conditions of rape remain no matter how force is
employed. There is rape without seduction if a man abduct a widow or
one who is not a virgin. Hence Pope Symmachus says [*Ep. v ad
Caesarium; Cf. can. Raptores xxxvi, qu. 2], "We abhor abductors
whether of widows or of virgins on account of the heinousness of
their crime."

There is seduction without rape when a man, without employing force,
violates a virgin unlawfully.

Reply Obj. 1: Since rape frequently coincides with seduction, the one
is sometimes used to signify the other.

Reply Obj. 2: The employment of force would seem to arise from the
greatness of concupiscence, the result being that a man does not fear
to endanger himself by offering violence.

Reply Obj. 3: The rape of a maiden who is promised in marriage is to
be judged differently from that of one who is not so promised. For
one who is promised in marriage must be restored to her betrothed,
who has a right to her in virtue of their betrothal: whereas one that
is not promised to another must first of all be restored to her
father's care, and then the abductor may lawfully marry her with her
parents' consent. Otherwise the marriage is unlawful, since whosoever
steals a thing he is bound to restore it. Nevertheless rape does not
dissolve a marriage already contracted, although it is an impediment
to its being contracted. As to the decree of the council in question,
it was made in abhorrence of this crime, and has been abrogated.
Wherefore Jerome [*The quotation is from Can. Tria. xxxvi, qu. 2]
declares the contrary: "Three kinds of lawful marriage," says he,
"are mentioned in Holy Writ. The first is that of a chaste maiden
given away lawfully in her maidenhood to a man. The second is when a
man finds a maiden in the city, and by force has carnal knowledge of
her. If the father be willing, the man shall endow her according to
the father's estimate, and shall pay the price of her purity [*Cf.
Deut. 22:23-29]. The third is, when the maiden is taken away from
such a man, and is given to another at the father's will."

We may also take this decree to refer to those who are promised to
others in marriage, especially if the betrothal be expressed by words
in the present tense.

Reply Obj. 4: The man who is just married has, in virtue of the
betrothal, a certain right in her: wherefore, although he sins by
using violence, he is not guilty of the crime of rape. Hence Pope
Gelasius says [*Can. Lex illa, xxvii, qu. 2; xxxvi, qu. 1]: "This law
of bygone rulers stated that rape was committed when a maiden, with
regard to whose marriage nothing had so far been decided, was taken
away by force."
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 8]

Whether Adultery Is Determinate Species of Lust, Distinct from the
Other Species?

Objection 1: It would seem that adultery is not a determinate species
of lust, distinct from the other species. For adultery takes its name
from a man having intercourse "with a woman who is not his own [ad
alteram]," according to a gloss [*St. Augustine: Serm. li, 13 de
Divers. lxiii] on Ex. 20:14. Now a woman who is not one's own may be
of various conditions, namely either a virgin, or under her father's
care, or a harlot, or of any other description. Therefore it seems
that adultery is not a species of lust distinct from the others.

Obj. 2: Further, Jerome says [*Contra Jovin. i]: "It matters not for
what reason a man behaves as one demented. Hence Sixtus the
Pythagorean says in his Maxims: He that is insatiable of his wife is
an adulterer," and in like manner one who is over enamored of any
woman. Now every kind of lust includes a too ardent love. Therefore
adultery is in every kind of lust: and consequently it should not be
reckoned a species of lust.

Obj. 3: Further, where there is the same kind of deformity, there
would seem to be the same species of sin. Now, apparently, there is
the same kind of deformity in seduction and adultery: since in either
case a woman is violated who is under another person's authority.
Therefore adultery is not a determinate species of lust, distinct
from the others.

_On the contrary,_ Pope Leo [*St. Augustine, De Bono Conjug. iv; Cf.
Append. Grat. ad can. Ille autem. xxxii, qu. 5] says that "adultery
is sexual intercourse with another man or woman in contravention of
the marriage compact, whether through the impulse of one's own lust,
or with the consent of the other party." Now this implies a special
deformity of lust. Therefore adultery is a determinate species of
lust.

_I answer that,_ Adultery, as its name implies, "is access to
another's marriage-bed (_ad alienum torum_)" [*Cf. Append. Gratian,
ad can. Ille autem. xxxii, qu. 1]. By so doing a man is guilty of a
twofold offense against chastity and the good of human procreation.
First, by accession to a woman who is not joined to him in marriage,
which is contrary to the good of the upbringing of his own children.
Secondly, by accession to a woman who is united to another in
marriage, and thus he hinders the good of another's children. The
same applies to the married woman who is corrupted by adultery.
Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 23:32, 33): "Every woman . . . that
leaveth her husband . . . shall be guilty of sin. For first she hath
been unfaithful to the law of the Most High" (since there it is
commanded: "Thou shalt not commit adultery"); "and secondly, she hath
offended against her husband," by making it uncertain that the
children are his: "thirdly, she hath fornicated in adultery, and hath
gotten children of another man," which is contrary to the good of her
offspring. The first of these, however, is common to all mortal sins,
while the two others belong especially to the deformity of adultery.
Hence it is manifest that adultery is a determinate species of lust,
through having a special deformity in venereal acts.

Reply Obj. 1: If a married man has intercourse with another woman,
his sin may be denominated either with regard to him, and thus it is
always adultery, since his action is contrary to the fidelity of
marriage, or with regard to the woman with whom he has intercourse;
and thus sometimes it is adultery, as when a married man has
intercourse with another's wife; and sometimes it has the character
of seduction, or of some other sin, according to various conditions
affecting the woman with whom he has intercourse: and it has been
stated above (A. 1) that the species of lust correspond to the
various conditions of women.

Reply Obj. 2: Matrimony is specially ordained for the good of human
offspring, as stated above (A. 2). But adultery is specially opposed
to matrimony, in the point of breaking the marriage faith which is
due between husband and wife. And since the man who is too ardent a
lover of his wife acts counter to the good of marriage if he use her
indecently, although he be not unfaithful, he may in a sense be
called an adulterer; and even more so than he that is too ardent a
lover of another woman.

Reply Obj. 3: The wife is under her husband's authority, as united to
him in marriage: whereas the maid is under her father's authority, as
one who is to be married by that authority. Hence the sin of adultery
is contrary to the good of marriage in one way, and the sin of
seduction in another; wherefore they are reckoned to differ
specifically. Of other matters concerning adultery we shall speak in
the Third Part [* Cf. Suppl., Q. 59, A. 3; QQ. 60, 62], when we treat
of matrimony.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 9]

Whether Incest Is a Determinate Species of Lust?

Objection 1: It would seem that incest is not a determinate species
of lust. For incest [* _Incestus_ is equivalent to _in-castus_ =
"unchaste"] takes its name from being a privation of chastity. But
all kinds of lust are opposed to chastity. Therefore it seems that
incest is not a species of lust, but is lust itself in general.

Obj. 2: Further, it is stated in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Cf.
Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]) that "incest is intercourse between
a man and a woman related by consanguinity or affinity." Now affinity
differs from consanguinity. Therefore it is not one but several
species of lust.

Obj. 3: Further, that which does not, of itself, imply a deformity,
does not constitute a determinate species of vice. But intercourse
between those who are related by consanguinity or affinity does not,
of itself, contain any deformity, else it would never have been
lawful. Therefore incest is not a determinate species of lust.

_On the contrary,_ The species of lust are distinguished according to
the various conditions of women with whom a man has unlawful
intercourse. Now incest implies a special condition on the part of
the woman, because it is unlawful intercourse with a woman related by
consanguinity or affinity as stated (Obj. 2). Therefore incest is a
determinate species of lust.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 6) wherever we find
something incompatible with the right use of venereal actions, there
must needs be a determinate species of lust. Now sexual intercourse
with women related by consanguinity or affinity is unbecoming to
venereal union on three counts. First, because man naturally owes a
certain respect to his parents and therefore to his other blood
relations, who are descended in near degree from the same parents: so
much so indeed that among the ancients, as Valerius Maximus relates
[*Dict. Fact. Memor. ii, 1], it was not deemed right for a son to
bathe with his father, lest they should see one another naked. Now
from what has been said (Q. 142, A. 4; Q. 151, A. 4), it is evident
that in venereal acts there is a certain shamefulness inconsistent
with respect, wherefore men are ashamed of them. Wherefore it is
unseemly that such persons should be united in venereal intercourse.
This reason seems to be indicated (Lev. 18:7) where we read: "She is
thy mother, thou shalt not uncover her nakedness," and the same is
expressed further on with regard to others.

The second reason is because blood relations must needs live in close
touch with one another. Wherefore if they were not debarred from
venereal union, opportunities of venereal intercourse would be very
frequent and thus men's minds would be enervated by lust. Hence in
the Old Law [*Lev. 18] the prohibition was apparently directed
specially to those persons who must needs live together.

The third reason is, because this would hinder a man from having many
friends: since through a man taking a stranger to wife, all his
wife's relations are united to him by a special kind of friendship,
as though they were of the same blood as himself. Wherefore Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16): "The demands of charity are most perfectly
satisfied by men uniting together in the bonds that the various ties
of friendship require, so that they may live together in a useful and
becoming amity; nor should one man have many relationships in one,
but each should have one."

Aristotle adds another reason (2 Polit. ii): for since it is natural
that a man should have a liking for a woman of his kindred, if to
this be added the love that has its origin in venereal intercourse,
his love would be too ardent and would become a very great incentive
to lust: and this is contrary to chastity. Hence it is evident that
incest is a determinate species of lust.

Reply Obj. 1: Unlawful intercourse between persons related to one
another would be most prejudicial to chastity, both on account of the
opportunities it affords, and because of the excessive ardor of love,
as stated in the Article. Wherefore the unlawful intercourse between
such persons is called "incest" antonomastically.

Reply Obj. 2: Persons are related by affinity through one who is
related by consanguinity: and therefore since the one depends on the
other, consanguinity and affinity entail the same kind of
unbecomingness.

Reply Obj. 3: There is something essentially unbecoming and contrary
to natural reason in sexual intercourse between persons related by
blood, for instance between parents and children who are directly and
immediately related to one another, since children naturally owe
their parents honor. Hence the Philosopher instances a horse (De
Animal. ix, 47) which covered its own mother by mistake and threw
itself over a precipice as though horrified at what it had done,
because some animals even have a natural respect for those that have
begotten them. There is not the same essential unbecomingness
attaching to other persons who are related to one another not
directly but through their parents: and, as to this, becomingness or
unbecomingness varies according to custom, and human or Divine law:
because, as stated above (A. 2), sexual intercourse, being directed
to the common good, is subject to law. Wherefore, as Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei xv, 16), whereas the union of brothers and sisters goes
back to olden times, it became all the more worthy of condemnation
when religion forbade it.
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 1]

Whether Sacrilege Can Be a Species of Lust?

Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege cannot be a species of
lust. For the same species is not contained under different genera
that are not subalternated to one another. Now sacrilege is a species
of irreligion, as stated above (Q. 99, A. 2). Therefore sacrilege
cannot be reckoned a species of lust.

Obj. 2: Further, the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Append. Grat. ad can.
Lex illa]), do not place sacrilege among other sins which are
reckoned species of lust. Therefore it would seem not to be a species
of lust.

Obj. 3: Further, something derogatory to a sacred thing may be done
by the other kinds of vice, as well as by lust. But sacrilege is not
reckoned a species of gluttony, or of any other similar vice.
Therefore neither should it be reckoned a species of lust.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16) that "if it is
wicked, through covetousness, to go beyond one's earthly bounds, how
much more wicked is it through venereal lust to transgress the bounds
of morals!" Now to go beyond one's earthly bounds in sacred matters
is a sin of sacrilege. Therefore it is likewise a sin of sacrilege to
overthrow the bounds of morals through venereal desire in sacred
matters. But venereal desire pertains to lust. Therefore sacrilege is
a species of lust.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 18, AA. 6, 7), the act of
a virtue or vice, that is directed to the end of another virtue or
vice, assumes the latter's species: thus, theft committed for the
sake of adultery, passes into the species of adultery. Now it is
evident that as Augustine states (De Virgin. 8), the observance of
chastity, by being directed to the worship of God, becomes an act of
religion, as in the case of those who vow and keep chastity.
Wherefore it is manifest that lust also, by violating something
pertaining to the worship of God, belongs to the species of
sacrilege: and in this way sacrilege may be accounted a species of
lust.

Reply Obj. 1: Lust, by being directed to another vice as its end,
becomes a species of that vice: and so a species of lust may be also
a species of irreligion, as of a higher genus.

Reply Obj. 2: The enumeration referred to, includes those sins which
are species of lust by their very nature: whereas sacrilege is a
species of lust in so far as it is directed to another vice as its
end, and may coincide with the various species of lust. For unlawful
intercourse between persons mutually united by spiritual
relationship, is a sacrilege after the manner of incest. Intercourse
with a virgin consecrated to God, inasmuch as she is the spouse of
Christ, is sacrilege resembling adultery. If the maiden be under her
father's authority, it will be spiritual seduction; and if force be
employed it will be spiritual rape, which kind of rape even the civil
law punishes more severely than others. Thus the Emperor Justinian
says [*Cod. i, iii de Episc. et Cler. 5]: "If any man dare, I will
not say to rape, but even to tempt a consecrated virgin with a view
to marriage, he shall be liable to capital punishment."

Reply Obj. 3: Sacrilege is committed on a consecrated thing. Now a
consecrated thing is either a consecrated person, who is desired for
sexual intercourse, and thus it is a kind of lust, or it is desired
for possession, and thus it is a kind of injustice. Sacrilege may
also come under the head of anger, for instance, if through anger an
injury be done to a consecrated person. Again, one may commit a
sacrilege by partaking gluttonously of sacred food. Nevertheless,
sacrilege is ascribed more specially to lust which is opposed to
chastity for the observance of which certain persons are specially
consecrated.
_______________________

ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 11]

Whether the Unnatural Vice Is a Species of Lust?

Objection 1: It would seem that the unnatural vice is not a species
of lust. For no mention of the vice against nature is made in the
enumeration given above (A. 1, Obj. 1). Therefore it is not a species
of lust.

Obj. 2: Further, lust is contrary to virtue; and so it is comprised
under vice. But the unnatural vice is comprised not under vice, but
under bestiality, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5).
Therefore the unnatural vice is not a species of lust.

Obj. 3: Further, lust regards acts directed to human generation, as
stated above (Q. 153, A. 2): Whereas the unnatural vice concerns acts
from which generation cannot follow. Therefore the unnatural vice is
not a species of lust.

_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned together with the other species of
lust (2 Cor. 12:21) where we read: "And have not done penance for the
uncleanness, and fornication, and lasciviousness," where a gloss
says: "Lasciviousness, i.e., unnatural lust."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 6, 9) wherever there occurs a
special kind of deformity whereby the venereal act is rendered
unbecoming, there is a determinate species of lust. This may occur in
two ways: First, through being contrary to right reason, and this is
common to all lustful vices; secondly, because, in addition, it is
contrary to the natural order of the venereal act as becoming to the
human race: and this is called "the unnatural vice." This may happen
in several ways. First, by procuring pollution, without any
copulation, for the sake of venereal pleasure: this pertains to the
sin of "uncleanness" which some call "effeminacy." Secondly, by
copulation with a thing of undue species, and this is called
"bestiality." Thirdly, by copulation with an undue sex, male with
male, or female with female, as the Apostle states (Rom. 1:27): and
this is called the "vice of sodomy." Fourthly, by not observing the
natural manner of copulation, either as to undue means, or as to
other monstrous and bestial manners of copulation.

Reply Obj. 1: There we enumerated the species of lust that are not
contrary to human nature: wherefore the unnatural vice was omitted.

Reply Obj. 2: Bestiality differs from vice, for the latter is opposed
to human virtue by a certain excess in the same matter as the virtue,
and therefore is reducible to the same genus.

Reply Obj. 3: The lustful man intends not human generation but
venereal pleasures. It is possible to have this without those acts
from which human generation follows: and it is that which is sought
in the unnatural vice.
_______________________

TWELFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 154, Art. 12]

Whether the Unnatural Vice Is the Greatest Sin Among the Species of
Lust?

Objection 1: It would seem that the unnatural vice is not the
greatest sin among the species of lust. For the more a sin is
contrary to charity the graver it is. Now adultery, seduction and
rape which are injurious to our neighbor are seemingly more contrary
to the love of our neighbor, than unnatural sins, by which no other
person is injured. Therefore the unnatural sin is not the greatest
among the species of lust.

Obj. 2: Further, sins committed against God would seem to be the most
grievous. Now sacrilege is committed directly against God, since it
is injurious to the Divine worship. Therefore sacrilege is a graver
sin than the unnatural vice.

Obj. 3: Further, seemingly, a sin is all the more grievous according
as we owe a greater love to the person against whom that sin is
committed. Now the order of charity requires that a man love more
those persons who are united to him--and such are those whom he
defiles by incest--than persons who are not connected with him, and
whom in certain cases he defiles by the unnatural vice. Therefore
incest is a graver sin than the unnatural vice.

Obj. 4: Further, if the unnatural vice is most grievous, the more it
is against nature the graver it would seem to be. Now the sin of
uncleanness or effeminacy would seem to be most contrary to nature,
since it would seem especially in accord with nature that agent and
patient should be distinct from one another. Hence it would follow
that uncleanness is the gravest of unnatural vices. But this is not
true. Therefore unnatural vices are not the most grievous among sins
of lust.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De adult. conjug. [*The quotation
is from Cap. Adulterii xxxii, qu. 7. Cf. Augustine, De Bono
Conjugali, viii.]) that "of all these," namely the sins belonging to
lust, "that which is against nature is the worst."

_I answer that,_ In every genus, worst of all is the corruption of
the principle on which the rest depend. Now the principles of reason
are those things that are according to nature, because reason
presupposes things as determined by nature, before disposing of other
things according as it is fitting. This may be observed both in
speculative and in practical matters. Wherefore just as in
speculative matters the most grievous and shameful error is that
which is about things the knowledge of which is naturally bestowed on
man, so in matters of action it is most grave and shameful to act
against things as determined by nature. Therefore, since by the
unnatural vices man transgresses that which has been determined by
nature with regard to the use of venereal actions, it follows that in
this matter this sin is gravest of all. After it comes incest, which,
as stated above (A. 9), is contrary to the natural respect which we
owe persons related to us.

With regard to the other species of lust they imply a transgression
merely of that which is determined by right reason, on the
presupposition, however, of natural principles. Now it is more
against reason to make use of the venereal act not only with
prejudice to the future offspring, but also so as to injure another
person besides. Wherefore simple fornication, which is committed
without injustice to another person, is the least grave among the
species of lust. Then, it is a greater injustice to have intercourse
with a woman who is subject to another's authority as regards the act
of generation, than as regards merely her guardianship. Wherefore
adultery is more grievous than seduction. And both of these are
aggravated by the use of violence. Hence rape of a virgin is graver
than seduction, and rape of a wife than adultery. And all these are
aggravated by coming under the head of sacrilege, as stated above (A.
10, ad 2).

Reply Obj. 1: Just as the ordering of right reason proceeds from man,
so the order of nature is from God Himself: wherefore in sins
contrary to nature, whereby the very order of nature is violated, an
injury is done to God, the Author of nature. Hence Augustine says
(Confess. iii, 8): "Those foul offenses that are against nature
should be everywhere and at all times detested and punished, such as
were those of the people of Sodom, which should all nations commit,
they should all stand guilty of the same crime, by the law of God
which hath not so made men that they should so abuse one another. For
even that very intercourse which should be between God and us is
violated, when that same nature, of which He is the Author, is
polluted by the perversity of lust."

Reply Obj. 2: Vices against nature are also against God, as stated
above (ad 1), and are so much more grievous than the depravity of
sacrilege, as the order impressed on human nature is prior to and
more firm than any subsequently established order.

Reply Obj. 3: The nature of the species is more intimately united to
each individual, than any other individual is. Wherefore sins against
the specific nature are more grievous.

Reply Obj. 4: Gravity of a sin depends more on the abuse of a thing
than on the omission of the right use. Wherefore among sins against
nature, the lowest place belongs to the sin of uncleanness, which
consists in the mere omission of copulation with another. While the
most grievous is the sin of bestiality, because use of the due
species is not observed. Hence a gloss on Gen. 37:2, "He accused his
brethren of a most wicked crime," says that "they copulated with
cattle." After this comes the sin of sodomy, because use of the right
sex is not observed. Lastly comes the sin of not observing the right
manner of copulation, which is more grievous if the abuse regards the
"vas" than if it affects the manner of copulation in respect of other
circumstances.
_______________________

QUESTION 155

OF CONTINENCE
(In Four Articles)

We must next consider the potential parts of temperance:
(1) continence; (2) clemency; (3) modesty. Under the first head we
must consider continence and incontinence. With regard to continence
there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether continence is a virtue?

(2) What is its matter?

(3) What is its subject?

(4) Of its comparison with temperance.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 155, Art. 1]

Whether Continence Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that continence is not a virtue. For
species and genus are not co-ordinate members of the same division.
But continence is co-ordinated with virtue, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1, 9). Therefore continence is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, no one sins by using a virtue, since, according to
Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18, 19), "a virtue is a thing that no one
makes ill use of." Yet one may sin by containing oneself: for
instance, if one desire to do a good, and contain oneself from doing
it. Therefore continence is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, no virtue withdraws man from that which is lawful,
but only from unlawful things: for a gloss on Gal. 5:23, "Faith,
modesty," etc., says that by continence a man refrains even from
things that are lawful. Therefore continence is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Every praiseworthy habit would seem to be a
virtue. Now such is continence, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus]
that "continence is a habit unconquered by pleasure." Therefore
continence is a virtue.

_I answer that,_ The word "continence" is taken by various people in
two ways. For some understand continence to denote abstention from
all venereal pleasure: thus the Apostle joins continence to chastity
(Gal. 5:23). In this sense perfect continence is virginity in the
first place, and widowhood in the second. Wherefore the same applies
to continence understood thus, as to virginity which we have stated
above (Q. 152, A. 3) to be a virtue. Others, however, understand
continence as signifying that whereby a man resists evil desires,
which in him are vehement. In this sense the Philosopher takes
continence (Ethic. vii, 7), and thus also it is used in the
Conferences of the Fathers (Collat. xii, 10, 11). In this way
continence has something of the nature of a virtue, in so far, to
wit, as the reason stands firm in opposition to the passions, lest it
be led astray by them: yet it does not attain to the perfect nature
of a moral virtue, by which even the sensitive appetite is subject to
reason so that vehement passions contrary to reason do not arise in
the sensitive appetite. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9)
that "continence is not a virtue but a mixture," inasmuch as it has
something of virtue, and somewhat falls short of virtue.

If, however, we take virtue in a broad sense, for any principle of
commendable actions, we may say that continence is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher includes continence in the same
division with virtue in so far as the former falls short of virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: Properly speaking, man is that which is according to
reason. Wherefore from the very fact that a man holds (_tenet se_) to
that which is in accord with reason, he is said to contain himself.
Now whatever pertains to perversion of reason is not according to
reason. Hence he alone is truly said to be continent who stands to
that which is in accord with right reason, and not to that which is
in accord with perverse reason. Now evil desires are opposed to right
reason, even as good desires are opposed to perverse reason.
Wherefore he is properly and truly continent who holds to right
reason, by abstaining from evil desires, and not he who holds to
perverse reason, by abstaining from good desires: indeed, the latter
should rather be said to be obstinate in evil.

Reply Obj. 3: The gloss quoted takes continence in the first sense,
as denoting a perfect virtue, which refrains not merely from unlawful
goods, but also from certain lawful things that are lesser goods, in
order to give its whole attention to the more perfect goods.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 155, Art. 2]

Whether Desires for Pleasures of Touch Are the Matter of Continence?

Objection 1: It would seem that desires for pleasures of touch are
not the matter of continence. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 46):
"General decorum by its consistent form and the perfection of what is
virtuous is restrained* in its every action." [*"Continentem"
according to St. Thomas' reading; St. Ambrose wrote "concinentem =
harmonious"].

Obj. 2: Further, continence takes its name from a man standing for
the good of right reason, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2). Now other
passions lead men astray from right reason with greater vehemence
than the desire for pleasures of touch: for instance, the fear of
mortal dangers, which stupefies a man, and anger which makes him
behave like a madman, as Seneca remarks [*De Ira i, 1]. Therefore
continence does not properly regard the desires for pleasures of
touch.

Obj. 3: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54): "It is
continence that restrains cupidity with the guiding hand of counsel."
Now cupidity is generally used to denote the desire for riches rather
than the desire for pleasures of touch, according to 1 Tim. 6:10,
"Cupidity [Douay: 'The desire of money'] (_philargyria_), is the root
of all evils." Therefore continence is not properly about the desires
for pleasures of touch.

Obj. 4: Further, there are pleasures of touch not only in venereal
matters but also in eating. But continence is wont to be applied only
to the use of venereal matters. Therefore the desire for pleasures of
touch is not its proper matter.

Obj. 5: Further, among pleasures of touch some are not human but
bestial, both as regards food--for instance, the pleasure of eating
human flesh; and as regards venereal matters--for instance the abuse
of animals or boys. But continence is not about such like things, as
stated in _Ethic._ vii, 5. Therefore desires for pleasures of touch
are not the proper matter of continence.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that
"continence and incontinence are about the same things as temperance
and intemperance." Now temperance and intemperance are about the
desires for pleasures of touch, as stated above (Q. 141, A. 4).
Therefore continence and incontinence are also about that same matter.

_I answer that,_ Continence denotes, by its very name, a certain
curbing, in so far as a man contains himself from following his
passions. Hence continence is properly said in reference to those
passions which urge a man towards the pursuit of something, wherein
it is praiseworthy that reason should withhold man from pursuing:
whereas it is not properly about those passions, such as fear and the
like, which denote some kind of withdrawal: since in these it is
praiseworthy to remain firm in pursuing what reason dictates, as
stated above (Q. 123, AA. 3, 4). Now it is to be observed that
natural inclinations are the principles of all supervening
inclinations, as stated above (I, Q. 60, A. 2). Wherefore the more
they follow the inclination of nature, the more strongly do the
passions urge to the pursuance of an object. Now nature inclines
chiefly to those things that are necessary to it, whether for the
maintenance of the individual, such as food, or for the maintenance
of the species, such as venereal acts, the pleasures of which pertain
to the touch. Therefore continence and incontinence refer properly to
desires for pleasures of touch.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as temperance may be used in a general sense in
connection with any matter; but is properly applied to that matter
wherein it is best for man to be curbed: so, too, continence properly
speaking regards that matter wherein it is best and most difficult to
contain oneself, namely desires for pleasures of touch, and yet in a
general sense and relatively may be applied to any other matter: and
in this sense Ambrose speaks of continence.

Reply Obj. 2: Properly speaking we do not speak of continence in
relation to fear, but rather of firmness of mind which fortitude
implies. As to anger, it is true that it begets an impulse to the
pursuit of something, but this impulse follows an apprehension of the
soul--in so far as a man apprehends that someone has injured
him--rather than an inclination of nature. Wherefore a man may be
said to be continent of anger, relatively but not simply.

Reply Obj. 3: External goods, such as honors, riches and the like, as
the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4), seem to be objects of choice in
themselves indeed, but not as being necessary for the maintenance of
nature. Wherefore in reference to such things we speak of a person as
being continent or incontinent, not simply, but relatively, by adding
that they are continent or incontinent in regard to wealth, or honor
and so forth. Hence Tully either understood continence in a general
sense, as including relative continence, or understood cupidity in a
restricted sense as denoting desire for pleasures of touch.

Reply Obj. 4: Venereal pleasures are more vehement than pleasures of
the palate: wherefore we are wont to speak of continence and
incontinence in reference to venereal matters rather than in
reference to food; although according to the Philosopher they are
applicable to both.

Reply Obj. 5: Continence is a good of the human reason: wherefore it
regards those passions which can be connatural to man. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that "if a man were to lay hold of a
child with desire of eating him or of satisfying an unnatural passion
whether he follow up his desire or not, he is said to be continent
[*See A. 4], not absolutely, but relatively."
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 155, Art. 3]

Whether the Subject of Continence Is the Concupiscible Power?

Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of continence is the
concupiscible power. For the subject of a virtue should be
proportionate to the virtue's matter. Now the matter of continence,
as stated (A. 2), is desires for the pleasures of touch, which
pertain to the concupiscible power. Therefore continence is in the
concupiscible power.

Obj. 2: Further, "Opposites are referred to one same thing" [*Categ.
viii]. But incontinence is in the concupiscible, whose passions
overcome reason, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus] that
"incontinence is the evil inclination of the concupiscible, by
following which it chooses wicked pleasures in disobedience to
reason." Therefore continence is likewise in the concupiscible.

Obj. 3: Further, the subject of a human virtue is either the reason,
or the appetitive power, which is divided into the will, the
concupiscible and the irascible. Now continence is not in the reason,
for then it would be an intellectual virtue; nor is it in the will,
since continence is about the passions which are not in the will; nor
again is it in the irascible, because it is not properly about the
passions of the irascible, as stated above (A. 2, ad 2). Therefore it
follows that it is in the concupiscible.

_On the contrary,_ Every virtue residing in a certain power removes
the evil act of that power. But continence does not remove the evil
act of the concupiscible: since "the continent man has evil desires,"
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9). Therefore continence is
not in the concupiscible power.

_I answer that,_ Every virtue while residing in a subject, makes that
subject have a different disposition from that which it has while
subjected to the opposite vice. Now the concupiscible has the same
disposition in one who is continent and in one who is incontinent,
since in both of them it breaks out into vehement evil desires.
Wherefore it is manifest that continence is not in the concupiscible
as its subject. Again the reason has the same disposition in both,
since both the continent and the incontinent have right reason, and
each of them, while undisturbed by passion, purposes not to follow
his unlawful desires. Now the primary difference between them is to
be found in their choice: since the continent man, though subject to
vehement desires, chooses not to follow them, because of his reason;
whereas the incontinent man chooses to follow them, although his
reason forbids. Hence continence must needs reside in that power of
the soul, whose act it is to choose; and that is the will, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1: Continence has for its matter the desires for pleasures
of touch, not as moderating them (this belongs to temperance which is
in the concupiscible), but its business with them is to resist them.
For this reason it must be in another power, since resistance is of
one thing against another.

Reply Obj. 2: The will stands between reason and the concupiscible,
and may be moved by either. In the continent man it is moved by the
reason, in the incontinent man it is moved by the concupiscible.
Hence continence may be ascribed to the reason as to its first mover,
and incontinence to the concupiscible power: though both belong
immediately to the will as their proper subject.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the passions are not in the will as their
subject, yet it is in the power of the will to resist them: thus it
is that the will of the continent man resists desires.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 155, Art. 4]

Whether Continence Is Better Than Temperance?

Objection 1: It would seem that continence is better than temperance.
For it is written (Ecclus. 26:20): "No price is worthy of a continent
soul." Therefore no virtue can be equalled to continence.

Obj. 2: Further, the greater the reward a virtue merits, the greater
the virtue. Now continence apparently merits the greater reward; for
it is written (2 Tim. 2:5): "He . . . is not crowned, except he
strive lawfully," and the continent man, since he is subject to
vehement evil desires, strives more than the temperate man, in whom
these things are not vehement. Therefore continence is a greater
virtue than temperance.

Obj. 3: Further, the will is a more excellent power than the
concupiscible. But continence is in the will, whereas temperance is
in the concupiscible, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore continence is
a greater virtue than temperance.

_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) and Andronicus
[*De Affectibus] reckon continence to be annexed to temperance, as to
a principal virtue.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), continence has a twofold
signification. In one way it denotes cessation from all venereal
pleasures; and if continence be taken in this sense, it is greater
than temperance considered absolutely, as may be gathered from what
we said above (Q. 152, A. 5) concerning the preeminence of virginity
over chastity considered absolutely. In another way continence may be
taken as denoting the resistance of the reason to evil desires when
they are vehement in a man: and in this sense temperance is far
greater than continence, because the good of a virtue derives its
praise from that which is in accord with reason. Now the good of
reason flourishes more in the temperate man than in the continent
man, because in the former even the sensitive appetite is obedient to
reason, being tamed by reason so to speak, whereas in the continent
man the sensitive appetite strongly resists reason by its evil
desires. Hence continence is compared to temperance, as the imperfect
to the perfect.

Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted may be understood in two ways. First
in reference to the sense in which continence denotes abstinence from
all things venereal: and thus it means that "no price is worthy of a
continent soul," in the genus of chastity; since not even the
fruitfulness of the flesh which is the purpose of marriage is
equalled to the continence of virginity or of widowhood, as stated
above (Q. 152, AA. 4, 5). Secondly it may be understood in reference
to the general sense in which continence denotes any abstinence from
things unlawful: and thus it means that "no price is worthy of a
continent soul," because its value is not measured with gold or
silver, which are appreciable according to weight.

Reply Obj. 2: The strength or weakness of concupiscence may proceed
from two causes. For sometimes it is owing to a bodily cause: because
some people by their natural temperament are more prone to
concupiscence than others; and again opportunities for pleasure which
inflame the concupiscence are nearer to hand for some people than for
others. Such like weakness of concupiscence diminishes merit, whereas
strength of concupiscence increases it. On the other hand, weakness
or strength of concupiscence arises from a praiseworthy spiritual
cause, for instance the vehemence of charity, or the strength of
reason, as in the case of a temperate man. In this way weakness of
concupiscence, by reason of its cause, increases merit, whereas
strength of concupiscence diminishes it.

Reply Obj. 3: The will is more akin to the reason than the
concupiscible power is. Wherefore the good of reason--on account of
which virtue is praised by the very fact that it reaches not only to
the will but also to the concupiscible power, as happens in the
temperate man--is shown to be greater than if it reach only to the
will, as in the case of one who is continent.
_______________________

QUESTION 156

OF INCONTINENCE
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider incontinence: and under this head there are four
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body?

(2) Whether incontinence is a sin?

(3) The comparison between incontinence and intemperance;

(4) Which is the worse, incontinence in anger, or incontinence in
desire?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 156, Art. 1]

Whether Incontinence Pertains to the Soul or to the Body?

Objection 1: It would seem that incontinence pertains not to the soul
but to the body. For sexual diversity comes not from the soul but
from the body. Now sexual diversity causes diversity of incontinence:
for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that women are not described
either as continent or as incontinent. Therefore incontinence
pertains not to the soul but to the body.

Obj. 2: Further, that which pertains to the soul does not result from
the temperament of the body. But incontinence results from the bodily
temperament: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is
especially people of a quick or choleric and atrabilious temper whose
incontinence is one of unbridled desire." Therefore incontinence
regards the body.

Obj. 3: Further, victory concerns the victor rather than the
vanquished. Now a man is said to be incontinent, because "the flesh
lusteth against the spirit," and overcomes it. Therefore incontinence
pertains to the flesh rather than to the soul.

_On the contrary,_ Man differs from beast chiefly as regards the
soul. Now they differ in respect of continence and incontinence, for
we ascribe neither continence nor incontinence to the beasts, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore incontinence is chiefly
on the part of the soul.

_I answer that,_ Things are ascribed to their direct causes rather
than to those which merely occasion them. Now that which is on the
part of the body is merely an occasional cause of incontinence; since
it is owing to a bodily disposition that vehement passions can arise
in the sensitive appetite which is a power of the organic body. Yet
these passions, however vehement they be, are not the sufficient
cause of incontinence, but are merely the occasion thereof, since, so
long as the use of reason remains, man is always able to resist his
passions. If, however, the passions gain such strength as to take
away the use of reason altogether--as in the case of those who become
insane through the vehemence of their passions--the essential
conditions of continence or incontinence cease, because such people
do not retain the judgment of reason, which the continent man follows
and the incontinent forsakes. From this it follows that the direct
cause of incontinence is on the part of the soul, which fails to
resist a passion by the reason. This happens in two ways, according
to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7): first, when the soul yields to
the passions, before the reason has given its counsel; and this is
called "unbridled incontinence" or "impetuosity": secondly, when a
man does not stand to what has been counselled, through holding
weakly to reason's judgment; wherefore this kind of incontinence is
called "weakness." Hence it is manifest that incontinence pertains
chiefly to the soul.

Reply Obj. 1: The human soul is the form of the body, and has certain
powers which make use of bodily organs. The operations of these
organs conduce somewhat to those operations of the soul which are
accomplished without bodily instruments, namely to the acts of the
intellect and of the will, in so far as the intellect receives from
the senses, and the will is urged by passions of the sensitive
appetite. Accordingly, since woman, as regards the body, has a weak
temperament, the result is that for the most part, whatever she holds
to, she holds to it weakly; although in rare cases the opposite
occurs, according to Prov. 31:10, "Who shall find a valiant woman?"
And since small and weak things "are accounted as though they were
not" [*Aristotle, _Phys._ ii, 5] the Philosopher speaks of women as
though they had not the firm judgment of reason, although the
contrary happens in some women. Hence he states that "we do not
describe women as being continent, because they are vacillating"
through being unstable of reason, and "are easily led" so that they
follow their passions readily.

Reply Obj. 2: It is owing to the impulse of passion that a man at
once follows his passion before his reason counsels him. Now the
impulse of passion may arise either from its quickness, as in bilious
persons [*Cf. I-II, Q. 46, A. 5], or from its vehemence, as in the
melancholic, who on account of their earthy temperament are most
vehemently aroused. Even so, on the other hand, a man fails to stand
to that which is counselled, because he holds to it in weakly fashion
by reason of the softness of his temperament, as we have stated with
regard to woman (ad 1). This is also the case with phlegmatic
temperaments, for the same reason as in women. And these results are
due to the fact that the bodily temperament is an occasional but not
a sufficient cause of incontinence, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: In the incontinent man concupiscence of the flesh
overcomes the spirit, not necessarily, but through a certain
negligence of the spirit in not resisting strongly.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 156, Art. 2]

Whether Incontinence Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that incontinence is not a sin. For as
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "No man sins in what he cannot
avoid." Now no man can by himself avoid incontinence, according to
Wis. 8:21, "I know [Vulg.: 'knew'] that I could not . . . be
continent, except God gave it." Therefore incontinence is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, apparently every sin originates in the reason. But
the judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man. Therefore
incontinence is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, no one sins in loving God vehemently. Now a man
becomes incontinent through the vehemence of divine love: for
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "Paul, through incontinence of
divine love, exclaimed: I live, now not I" (Gal. 2:20). Therefore
incontinence is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is numbered together with other sins (2 Tim.
3:3) where it is written: "Slanderers, incontinent, unmerciful," etc.
Therefore incontinence is a sin.

_I answer that,_ Incontinence about a matter may be considered in two
ways. First it may be considered properly and simply: and thus
incontinence is about concupiscences of pleasures of touch, even as
intemperance is, as we have said in reference to continence (Q. 155,
A. 2). In this way incontinence is a sin for two reasons: first,
because the incontinent man goes astray from that which is in accord
with reason; secondly, because he plunges into shameful pleasures.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that "incontinence is
censurable not only because it is wrong"--that is, by straying from
reason--"but also because it is wicked"--that is, by following evil
desires. Secondly, incontinence about a matter is considered,
properly--inasmuch as it is a straying from reason--but not simply;
for instance when a man does not observe the mode of reason in his
desire for honor, riches, and so forth, which seem to be good in
themselves. About such things there is incontinence, not simply but
relatively, even as we have said above in reference to continence (Q.
155, A. 2, ad 3). In this way incontinence is a sin, not from the
fact that one gives way to wicked desires, but because one fails to
observe the mode of reason even in the desire for things that are of
themselves desirable.

Thirdly, incontinence is said to be about a matter, not properly, but
metaphorically, for instance about the desires for things of which
one cannot make an evil use, such as the desire for virtue. A man may
be said to be incontinent in these matters metaphorically, because
just as the incontinent man is entirely led by his evil desire, even
so is a man entirely led by his good desire which is in accord with
reason. Such like incontinence is no sin, but pertains to the
perfection of virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: Man can avoid sin and do good, yet not without God's
help, according to John 15:5: "Without Me you can do nothing."
Wherefore the fact that man needs God's help in order to be
continent, does not show incontinence to be no sin, for, as stated in
_Ethic._ iii, 3, "what we can do by means of a friend we do, in a
way, ourselves."

Reply Obj. 2: The judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent
man, not necessarily, for then he would commit no sin, but through a
certain negligence on account of his not standing firm in resisting
the passion by holding to the judgment formed by his reason.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument takes incontinence metaphorically and not
properly.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 156, Art. 3]

Whether the Incontinent Man Sins More Gravely Than the Intemperate?

Objection 1: It would seem that the incontinent man sins more gravely
than the intemperate. For, seemingly, the more a man acts against his
conscience, the more gravely he sins, according to Luke 12:47, "That
servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did not . . . shall
be beaten with many stripes." Now the incontinent man would seem to
act against his conscience more than the intemperate because,
according to _Ethic._ vii, 3, the incontinent man, though knowing how
wicked are the things he desires, nevertheless acts through passion,
whereas the intemperate man judges what he desires to be good.
Therefore the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.

Obj. 2: Further, apparently, the graver a sin is, the more incurable
it is: wherefore the sins against the Holy Ghost, being most grave,
are declared to be unpardonable. Now the sin of incontinence would
appear to be more incurable than the sin of intemperance. For a
person's sin is cured by admonishment and correction, which seemingly
are no good to the incontinent man, since he knows he is doing wrong,
and does wrong notwithstanding: whereas it seems to the intemperate
man that he is doing well, so that it were good for him to be
admonished. Therefore it would appear that the incontinent man sins
more gravely than the intemperate.

Obj. 3: Further, the more eagerly man sins, the more grievous his
sin. Now the incontinent sins more eagerly than the intemperate,
since the incontinent man has vehement passions and desires, which
the intemperate man does not always have. Therefore the incontinent
man sins more gravely than the intemperate.

_On the contrary,_ Impenitence aggravates every sin: wherefore
Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. serm. xi, 12, 13) that "impenitence is
a sin against the Holy Ghost." Now according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. vii, 8) "the intemperate man is not inclined to be penitent,
for he holds on to his choice: but every incontinent man is inclined
to repentance." Therefore the intemperate man sins more gravely than
the incontinent.

_I answer that,_ According to Augustine [*De Duab. Anim. x, xi] sin
is chiefly an act of the will, because "by the will we sin and live
aright" [*Retract. i, 9]. Consequently where there is a greater
inclination of the will to sin, there is a graver sin. Now in the
intemperate man, the will is inclined to sin in virtue of its own
choice, which proceeds from a habit acquired through custom: whereas
in the incontinent man, the will is inclined to sin through a
passion. And since passion soon passes, whereas a habit is "a
disposition difficult to remove," the result is that the incontinent
man repents at once, as soon as the passion has passed; but not so
the intemperate man; in fact he rejoices in having sinned, because
the sinful act has become connatural to him by reason of his habit.
Wherefore in reference to such persons it is written (Prov. 2:14)
that "they are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most
wicked things." Hence it follows that "the intemperate man is much
worse than the incontinent," as also the Philosopher declares (Ethic.
vii, 7).

Reply Obj. 1: Ignorance in the intellect sometimes precedes the
inclination of the appetite and causes it, and then the greater the
ignorance, the more does it diminish or entirely excuse the sin, in
so far as it renders it involuntary. On the other hand, ignorance in
the reason sometimes follows the inclination of the appetite, and
then such like ignorance, the greater it is, the graver the sin,
because the inclination of the appetite is shown thereby to be
greater. Now in both the incontinent and the intemperate man,
ignorance arises from the appetite being inclined to something,
either by passion, as in the incontinent, or by habit, as in the
intemperate. Nevertheless greater ignorance results thus in the
intemperate than in the incontinent. In one respect as regards
duration, since in the incontinent man this ignorance lasts only
while the passion endures, just as an attack of intermittent fever
lasts as long as the humor is disturbed: whereas the ignorance of the
intemperate man endures without ceasing, on account of the endurance
of the habit, wherefore it is likened to phthisis or any chronic
disease, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 8). In another respect
the ignorance of the intemperate man is greater as regards the thing
ignored. For the ignorance of the incontinent man regards some
particular detail of choice (in so far as he deems that he must
choose this particular thing now): whereas the intemperate man's
ignorance is about the end itself, inasmuch as he judges this thing
good, in order that he may follow his desires without being curbed.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7, 8) that "the incontinent
man is better than the intemperate, because he retains the best
principle [*_To beltiston, e arche_, 'the best thing, i.e. the
principle']," to wit, the right estimate of the end.

Reply Obj. 2: Mere knowledge does not suffice to cure the incontinent
man, for he needs the inward assistance of grace which quenches
concupiscence, besides the application of the external remedy of
admonishment and correction, which induce him to begin to resist his
desires, so that concupiscence is weakened, as stated above (Q. 142,
A. 2). By these same means the intemperate man can be cured. But his
curing is more difficult, for two reasons. The first is on the part
of reason, which is corrupt as regards the estimate of the last end,
which holds the same position as the principle in demonstrations. Now
it is more difficult to bring back to the truth one who errs as to
the principle; and it is the same in practical matters with one who
errs in regard to the end. The other reason is on the part of the
inclination of the appetite: for in the intemperate man this proceeds
from a habit, which is difficult to remove, whereas the inclination
of the incontinent man proceeds from a passion, which is more easily
suppressed.

Reply Obj. 3: The eagerness of the will, which increases a sin, is
greater in the intemperate man than in the incontinent, as explained
above. But the eagerness of concupiscence in the sensitive appetite
is sometimes greater in the incontinent man, because he does not sin
except through vehement concupiscence, whereas the intemperate man
sins even through slight concupiscence and sometimes forestalls it.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that we blame more the
intemperate man, "because he pursues pleasure without desiring it or
with calm," i.e. slight desire. "For what would he have done if he
had desired it with passion?"
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 156, Art. 4]

Whether the Incontinent in Anger Is Worse Than the Incontinent in Desire?

Objection 1: It would seem that the incontinent in anger is worse
than the incontinent in desire. For the more difficult it is to
resist the passion, the less grievous, apparently is incontinence:
wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): "It is not wonderful,
indeed it is pardonable if a person is overcome by strong and
overwhelming pleasures or pains." Now, "as Heraclitus says, it is
more difficult to resist desire than anger" [*Ethic. ii. 3].
Therefore incontinence of desire is less grievous than incontinence
of anger.

Obj. 2: Further, one is altogether excused from sin if the passion be
so vehement as to deprive one of the judgment of reason, as in the
case of one who becomes demented through passion. Now he that is
incontinent in anger retains more of the judgment of reason, than one
who is incontinent in desire: since "anger listens to reason
somewhat, but desire does not" as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii,
6). Therefore the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent
in desire.

Obj. 3: Further, the more dangerous a sin the more grievous it is.
Now incontinence of anger would seem to be more dangerous, since it
leads a man to a greater sin, namely murder, for this is a more
grievous sin than adultery, to which incontinence of desire leads.
Therefore incontinence of anger is graver than incontinence of desire.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that
"incontinence of anger is less disgraceful than incontinence of
desire."

_I answer that,_ The sin of incontinence may be considered in two
ways. First, on the part of the passion which occasions the downfall
of reason. In this way incontinence of desire is worse than
incontinence of anger, because the movement of desire is more
inordinate than the movement of anger. There are four reasons for
this, and the Philosopher indicates them, _Ethic._ vii, 6: First,
because the movement of anger partakes somewhat of reason, since the
angry man tends to avenge the injury done to him, and reason dictates
this in a certain degree. Yet he does not tend thereto perfectly,
because he does not intend the due mode of vengeance. On the other
hand, the movement of desire is altogether in accord with sense and
nowise in accord with reason. Secondly, because the movement of anger
results more from the bodily temperament owing to the quickness of
the movement of the bile which tends to anger. Hence one who by
bodily temperament is disposed to anger is more readily angry than
one who is disposed to concupiscence is liable to be concupiscent:
wherefore also it happens more often that the children of those who
are disposed to anger are themselves disposed to anger, than that the
children of those who are disposed to concupiscence are also disposed
to concupiscence. Now that which results from the natural disposition
of the body is deemed more deserving of pardon. Thirdly, because
anger seeks to work openly, whereas concupiscence is fain to disguise
itself and creeps in by stealth. Fourthly, because he who is subject
to concupiscence works with pleasure, whereas the angry man works as
though forced by a certain previous displeasure.

Secondly, the sin of incontinence may be considered with regard to
the evil into which one falls through forsaking reason; and thus
incontinence of anger is, for the most part, more grievous, because
it leads to things that are harmful to one's neighbor.

Reply Obj. 1: It is more difficult to resist pleasure perseveringly
than anger, because concupiscence is enduring. But for the moment it
is more difficult to resist anger, on account of its impetuousness.

Reply Obj. 2: Concupiscence is stated to be without reason, not as
though it destroyed altogether the judgment of reason, but because
nowise does it follow the judgment of reason: and for this reason it
is more disgraceful.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers incontinence with regard to its
result.
_______________________

QUESTION 157

OF CLEMENCY AND MEEKNESS
(In Four Articles)

We must next consider clemency and meekness, and the contrary vices.
Concerning the virtues themselves there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether clemency and meekness are altogether identical?

(2) Whether each of them is a virtue?

(3) Whether each is a part of temperance?

(4) Of their comparison with the other virtues.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 157, Art. 1]

Whether Clemency and Meekness Are Absolutely the Same?

Objection 1: It would seem that clemency and meekness are absolutely
the same. For meekness moderates anger, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. iv, 5). Now anger is "desire of vengeance" [*Aristotle, Rhet.
ii, 2]. Since, then, clemency "is leniency of a superior in
inflicting punishment on an inferior," as Seneca states (De Clementia
ii, 3), and vengeance is taken by means of punishment, it would seem
that clemency and meekness are the same.

Obj. 2: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that "clemency
is a virtue whereby the mind is restrained by kindness when
unreasonably provoked to hatred of a person," so that apparently
clemency moderates hatred. Now, according to Augustine [*Ep. ccxi],
hatred is caused by anger; and this is the matter of meekness and
clemency. Therefore seemingly clemency and meekness are absolutely
the same.

Obj. 3: Further, the same vice is not opposed to different virtues.
But the same vice, namely cruelty, is opposed to meekness and
clemency. Therefore it seems that meekness and clemency are
absolutely the same.

_On the contrary,_ According to the aforesaid definition of Seneca
(Obj. 1) "clemency is leniency of a superior towards an inferior":
whereas meekness is not merely of superior to inferior, but of each
to everyone. Therefore meekness and clemency are not absolutely the
same.

_I answer that,_ As stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3, a moral virtue is
"about passions and actions." Now internal passions are principles of
external actions, and are likewise obstacles thereto. Wherefore
virtues that moderate passions, to a certain extent, concur towards
the same effect as virtues that moderate actions, although they
differ specifically. Thus it belongs properly to justice to restrain
man from theft, whereunto he is inclined by immoderate love or desire
of money, which is restrained by liberality; so that liberality
concurs with justice towards the effect, which is abstention from
theft. This applies to the case in point; because through the passion
of anger a man is provoked to inflict a too severe punishment, while
it belongs directly to clemency to mitigate punishment, and this
might be prevented by excessive anger.

Consequently meekness, in so far as it restrains the onslaught of
anger, concurs with clemency towards the same effect; yet they differ
from one another, inasmuch as clemency moderates external punishment,
while meekness properly mitigates the passion of anger.

Reply Obj. 1: Meekness regards properly the desire itself of
vengeance; whereas clemency regards the punishment itself which is
applied externally for the purpose of vengeance.

Reply Obj. 2: Man's affections incline to the moderation of things
that are unpleasant to him in themselves. Now it results from one man
loving another that he takes no pleasure in the latter's punishment
in itself, but only as directed to something else, for instance
justice, or the correction of the person punished. Hence love makes
one quick to mitigate punishment--and this pertains to
clemency--while hatred is an obstacle to such mitigation. For this
reason Tully says that "the mind provoked to hatred" that is to
punish too severely, "is restrained by clemency," from inflicting too
severe a punishment, so that clemency directly moderates not hatred
but punishment.

Reply Obj. 3: The vice of anger, which denotes excess in the
passion of anger, is properly opposed to meekness, which is directly
concerned with the passion of anger; while cruelty denotes excess in
punishing. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "those are
called cruel who have reason for punishing, but lack moderation in
punishing." Those who delight in a man's punishment for its own sake
may be called savage or brutal, as though lacking the human feeling
that leads one man to love another.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 157, Art. 2]

Whether Both Clemency and Meekness Are Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that neither clemency nor meekness is a
virtue. For no virtue is opposed to another virtue. Yet both of these
are apparently opposed to severity, which is a virtue. Therefore
neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, "Virtue is destroyed by excess and defect" [*Ethic.
ii, 2]. But both clemency and meekness consist in a certain decrease;
for clemency decreases punishment, and meekness decreases anger.
Therefore neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, meekness or mildness is included (Matt. 5:4) among
the beatitudes, and (Gal. 5:23) among the fruits. Now the virtues
differ from the beatitudes and fruits. Therefore they are not
comprised under virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 5): "Every good man
is conspicuous for his clemency and meekness." Now it is virtue
properly that belongs to a good man, since "virtue it is that makes
its possessor good, and renders his works good also" (Ethic. ii, 6).
Therefore clemency and meekness are virtues.

_I answer that,_ The nature of moral virtue consists in the
subjection of appetite to reason, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic.
i, 13). Now this is verified both in clemency and in meekness. For
clemency, in mitigating punishment, "is guided by reason," according
to Seneca (De Clementia ii, 5), and meekness, likewise, moderates
anger according to right reason, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 5.
Wherefore it is manifest that both clemency and meekness are virtues.

Reply Obj. 1: Meekness is not directly opposed to severity; for
meekness is about anger. On the other hand, severity regards the
external infliction of punishment, so that accordingly it would seem
rather to be opposed to clemency, which also regards external
punishing, as stated above (A. 1). Yet they are not really opposed to
one another, since they are both according to right reason. For
severity is inflexible in the infliction of punishment when right
reason requires it; while clemency mitigates punishment also
according to right reason, when and where this is requisite.
Wherefore they are not opposed to one another as they are not about
the same thing.

Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5), "the habit
that observes the mean in anger is unnamed; so that the virtue is
denominated from the diminution of anger, and is designated by the
name of meekness." For the virtue is more akin to diminution than to
excess, because it is more natural to man to desire vengeance for
injuries done to him, than to be lacking in that desire, since
"scarcely anyone belittles an injury done to himself," as Sallust
observes [*Cf. Q. 120]. As to clemency, it mitigates punishment, not
in respect of that which is according to right reason, but as regards
that which is according to common law, which is the object of legal
justice: yet on account of some particular consideration, it
mitigates the punishment, deciding, as it were, that a man is not to
be punished any further. Hence Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 1):
"Clemency grants this, in the first place, that those whom she sets
free are declared immune from all further punishment; and remission
of punishment due amounts to a pardon." Wherefore it is clear that
clemency is related to severity as equity [the Greek _epieikeia_
[*Cf. Q. 120]] to legal justice, whereof severity is a part, as
regards the infliction of punishment in accordance with the law. Yet
clemency differs from equity, as we shall state further on (A. 3, ad
1).

Reply Obj. 3: The beatitudes are acts of virtue: while the fruits are
delights in virtuous acts. Wherefore nothing hinders meekness being
reckoned both virtue, and beatitude and fruit.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 157, Art. 3]

Whether the Aforesaid Virtues Are Parts of Temperance?

Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid virtues are not parts
of temperance. For clemency mitigates punishment, as stated above (A.
2). But the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) ascribes this to equity, which
pertains to justice, as stated above (Q. 120, A. 2). Therefore
seemingly clemency is not a part of temperance.

Obj. 2: Further, temperance is concerned with concupiscences; whereas
meekness and clemency regard, not concupiscences, but anger and
vengeance. Therefore they should not be reckoned parts of temperance.

Obj. 3: Further, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4): "A man may be said
to be of unsound mind when he takes pleasure in cruelty." Now this is
opposed to clemency and meekness. Since then an unsound mind is
opposed to prudence, it seems that clemency and meekness are parts of
prudence rather than of temperance.

_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that "clemency is
temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge."
Tully also (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons clemency a part of
temperance.

_I answer that,_ Parts are assigned to the principal virtues, in so
far as they imitate them in some secondary matter as to the mode
whence the virtue derives its praise and likewise its name. Thus the
mode and name of justice consist in a certain _equality,_ those of
fortitude in a certain _strength of mind,_ those of temperance in a
certain _restraint,_ inasmuch as it restrains the most vehement
concupiscences of the pleasures of touch. Now clemency and meekness
likewise consist in a certain restraint, since clemency mitigates
punishment, while meekness represses anger, as stated above (AA. 1,
2). Therefore both clemency and meekness are annexed to temperance as
principal virtue, and accordingly are reckoned to be parts thereof.

Reply Obj. 1: Two points must be considered in the mitigation of
punishment. One is that punishment should be mitigated in accordance
with the lawgiver's intention, although not according to the letter
of the law; and in this respect it pertains to equity. The other
point is a certain moderation of a man's inward disposition, so that
he does not exercise his power of inflicting punishment. This belongs
properly to clemency, wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that
"it is temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking
revenge." This moderation of soul comes from a certain sweetness of
disposition, whereby a man recoils from anything that may be painful
to another. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that "clemency
is a certain smoothness of the soul"; for, on the other hand, there
would seem to be a certain roughness of soul in one who fears not to
pain others.

Reply Obj. 2: The annexation of secondary to principal virtues
depends on the mode of virtue, which is, so to speak, a kind of form
of the virtue, rather than on the matter. Now meekness and clemency
agree with temperance in mode, as stated above, though they agree not
in matter.

Reply Obj. 3: _Unsoundness_ is corruption of _soundness._ Now just as
soundness of body is corrupted by the body lapsing from the condition
due to the human species, so unsoundness of mind is due to the mind
lapsing from the disposition due to the human species. This occurs
both in respect of the reason, as when a man loses the use of reason,
and in respect of the appetitive power, as when a man loses that
humane feeling whereby "every man is naturally friendly towards all
other men" (Ethic. viii, 1). The unsoundness of mind that excludes
the use of reason is opposed to prudence. But that a man who takes
pleasure in the punishment of others is said to be of unsound mind,
is because he seems on this account to be devoid of the humane
feeling which gives rise to clemency.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 157, Art. 4]

Whether Clemency and Meekness Are the Greatest Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that clemency and meekness are the
greatest virtues. For virtue is deserving of praise chiefly because
it directs man to happiness that consists in the knowledge of God.
Now meekness above all directs man to the knowledge of God: for it is
written (James 1:21): "With meekness receive the ingrafted word," and
(Ecclus. 5:13): "Be meek to hear the word" of God. Again, Dionysius
says (Ep. viii ad Demophil.) that "Moses was deemed worthy of the
Divine apparition on account of his great meekness." Therefore
meekness is the greatest of virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, seemingly a virtue is all the greater according as
it is more acceptable to God and men. Now meekness would appear to be
most acceptable to God. For it is written (Ecclus. 1:34, 35): "That
which is agreeable" to God is "faith and meekness"; wherefore Christ
expressly invites us to be meek like unto Himself (Matt. 11:29),
where He says: "Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart";
and Hilary declares [*Comment. in Matth. iv, 3] that "Christ dwells
in us by our meekness of soul." Again, it is most acceptable to men;
wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 3:19): "My son, do thy works in
meekness, and thou shalt be beloved above the glory of men": for
which reason it is also declared (Prov. 20:28) that the King's
"throne is strengthened by clemency." Therefore meekness and clemency
are the greatest of virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 2) that
"the meek are they who yield to reproaches, and resist not evil, but
overcome evil by good." Now this seems to pertain to mercy or piety
which would seem to be the greatest of virtues: because a gloss of
Ambrose [*Hilary the deacon] on 1 Tim. 4:8, "Piety [Douay:
'Godliness'] is profitable to all things," observes that "piety is
the sum total of the Christian religion." Therefore meekness and
clemency are the greatest virtues.

_On the contrary,_ They are not reckoned as principal virtues, but
are annexed to another, as to a principal, virtue.

_I answer that,_ Nothing prevents certain virtues from being
greatest, not indeed simply, nor in every respect, but in a
particular genus. It is impossible for clemency or meekness to be
absolutely the greatest virtues, since they owe their praise to the
fact that they withdraw a man from evil, by mitigating anger or
punishment. Now it is more perfect to obtain good than to lack evil.
Wherefore those virtues like faith, hope, charity, and likewise
prudence and justice, which direct one to good simply, are absolutely
greater virtues than clemency and meekness.

Yet nothing prevents clemency and meekness from having a certain
restricted excellence among the virtues which resist evil
inclinations. For anger, which is mitigated by meekness, is, on
account of its impetuousness, a very great obstacle to man's free
judgment of truth: wherefore meekness above all makes a man
self-possessed. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 10:31): "My son, keep
thy soul in meekness." Yet the concupiscences of the pleasures of
touch are more shameful, and harass more incessantly, for which
reason temperance is more rightly reckoned as a principal virtue. as
stated above (Q. 141, A. 7, ad 2). As to clemency, inasmuch as it
mitigates punishment, it would seem to approach nearest to charity,
the greatest of the virtues, since thereby we do good towards our
neighbor, and hinder his evil.

Reply Obj. 1: Meekness disposes man to the knowledge of God, by
removing an obstacle; and this in two ways. First, because it makes
man self-possessed by mitigating his anger, as stated above;
secondly, because it pertains to meekness that a man does not
contradict the words of truth, which many do through being disturbed
by anger. Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7): "To be
meek is not to contradict Holy Writ, whether we understand it, if it
condemn our evil ways, or understand it not, as though we might know
better and have a clearer insight of the truth."

Reply Obj. 2: Meekness and clemency make us acceptable to God and
men, in so far as they concur with charity, the greatest of the
virtues, towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our
neighbor's evils.

Reply Obj. 3: Mercy and piety agree indeed with meekness and clemency
by concurring towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our
neighbor's evils. Nevertheless they differ as to motive. For piety
relieves a neighbor's evil through reverence for a superior, for
instance God or one's parents: mercy relieves a neighbor's evil,
because this evil is displeasing to one, in so far as one looks upon
it as affecting oneself, as stated above (Q. 30, A. 2): and this
results from friendship which makes friends rejoice and grieve for
the same things: meekness does this, by removing anger that urges to
vengeance, and clemency does this through leniency of soul, in so far
as it judges equitable that a person be no further punished.
_______________________

QUESTION 158

OF ANGER
(In Eight Articles)

We must next consider the contrary vices: (1) Anger that is opposed
to meekness; (2) Cruelty that is opposed to clemency. Concerning
anger there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is lawful to be angry?

(2) Whether anger is a sin?

(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(4) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?

(5) Of its species;

(6) Whether anger is a capital vice?

(7) Of its daughters;

(8) Whether it has a contrary vice?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 1]

Whether It Is Lawful to Be Angry?

Objection 1: It would seem that it cannot be lawful to be angry. For
Jerome in his exposition on Matt. 5:22, "Whosoever is angry with his
brother," etc. says: "Some codices add 'without cause.' However, in
the genuine codices the sentence is unqualified, and anger is
forbidden altogether." Therefore it is nowise lawful to be angry.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) "The soul's
evil is to be without reason." Now anger is always without reason:
for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger does not listen
perfectly to reason"; and Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "when
anger sunders the tranquil surface of the soul, it mangles and rends
it by its riot"; and Cassian says (De Inst. Caenob. viii, 6): "From
whatever cause it arises, the angry passion boils over and blinds the
eye of the mind." Therefore it is always evil to be angry.

Obj. 3: Further, anger is "desire for vengeance" [*Aristotle, Rhet.
ii, 2] according to a gloss on Lev. 19:17, "Thou shalt not hate thy
brother in thy heart." Now it would seem unlawful to desire
vengeance, since this should be left to God, according to Deut.
32:35, "Revenge is Mine." Therefore it would seem that to be angry is
always an evil.

Obj. 4: Further, all that makes us depart from likeness to God is
evil. Now anger always makes us depart from likeness to God, since
God judges with tranquillity according to Wis. 12:18. Therefore to be
angry is always an evil.

_On the contrary,_ Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in the Opus Imperfectum,
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "He that is angry
without cause, shall be in danger; but he that is angry with cause,
shall not be in danger: for without anger, teaching will be useless,
judgments unstable, crimes unchecked." Therefore to be angry is not
always an evil.

_I answer that,_ Properly speaking anger is a passion of the
sensitive appetite, and gives its name to the irascible power, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 46, A. 1) when we were treating of the
passions. Now with regard to the passions of the soul, it is to be
observed that evil may be found in them in two ways. First by reason
of the passion's very species, which is derived from the passion's
object. Thus envy, in respect of its species, denotes an evil, since
it is displeasure at another's good, and such displeasure is in
itself contrary to reason: wherefore, as the Philosopher remarks
(Ethic. ii, 6), "the very mention of envy denotes something evil."
Now this does not apply to anger, which is the desire for revenge,
since revenge may be desired both well and ill. Secondly, evil is
found in a passion in respect of the passion's quantity, that is in
respect of its excess or deficiency; and thus evil may be found in
anger, when, to wit, one is angry, more or less than right reason
demands. But if one is angry in accordance with right reason, one's
anger is deserving of praise.

Reply Obj. 1: The Stoics designated anger and all the other passions
as emotions opposed to the order of reason; and accordingly they
deemed anger and all other passions to be evil, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 24, A. 2) when we were treating of the passions. It is in
this sense that Jerome considers anger; for he speaks of the anger
whereby one is angry with one's neighbor, with the intent of doing
him a wrong.--But, according to the Peripatetics, to whose opinion
Augustine inclines (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), anger and the other passions
of the soul are movements of the sensitive appetite, whether they be
moderated or not, according to reason: and in this sense anger is not
always evil.

Reply Obj. 2: Anger may stand in a twofold relation to reason. First,
antecedently; in this way it withdraws reason from its rectitude, and
has therefore the character of evil. Secondly, consequently, inasmuch
as the movement of the sensitive appetite is directed against vice
and in accordance with reason, this anger is good, and is called
"zealous anger." Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 45): "We must
beware lest, when we use anger as an instrument of virtue, it
overrule the mind, and go before it as its mistress, instead of
following in reason's train, ever ready, as its handmaid, to obey."
This latter anger, although it hinder somewhat the judgment of reason
in the execution of the act, does not destroy the rectitude of
reason. Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "zealous anger
troubles the eye of reason, whereas sinful anger blinds it." Nor is
it incompatible with virtue that the deliberation of reason be
interrupted in the execution of what reason has deliberated: since
art also would be hindered in its act, if it were to deliberate about
what has to be done, while having to act.

Reply Obj. 3: It is unlawful to desire vengeance considered as evil
to the man who is to be punished, but it is praiseworthy to desire
vengeance as a corrective of vice and for the good of justice; and to
this the sensitive appetite can tend, in so far as it is moved
thereto by the reason: and when revenge is taken in accordance with
the order of judgment, it is God's work, since he who has power to
punish "is God's minister," as stated in Rom. 13:4.

Reply Obj. 4: We can and ought to be like to God in the desire for
good; but we cannot be altogether likened to Him in the mode of our
desire, since in God there is no sensitive appetite, as in us, the
movement of which has to obey reason. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral.
v, 45) that "anger is more firmly erect in withstanding vice, when it
bows to the command of reason."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 2]

Whether Anger Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not a sin. For we demerit by
sinning. But "we do not demerit by the passions, even as neither do
we incur blame thereby," as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 5. Consequently no
passion is a sin. Now anger is a passion as stated above (I-II, Q.
46, A. 1) in the treatise on the passions. Therefore anger is not a
sin.

Obj. 2: Further, in every sin there is conversion to some mutable
good. But in anger there is conversion not to a mutable good, but to
a person's evil. Therefore anger is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, "No man sins in what he cannot avoid," as Augustine
asserts [*De Lib. Arb. iii, 18]. But man cannot avoid anger, for a
gloss on Ps. 4:5, "Be ye angry and sin not," says: "The movement of
anger is not in our power." Again, the Philosopher asserts (Ethic.
vii, 6) that "the angry man acts with displeasure." Now displeasure
is contrary to the will. Therefore anger is not a sin.

Obj. 4: Further, sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene
[*De Fide Orth. ii, 4, 30]. But it is not contrary to man's nature to
be angry, and it is the natural act of a power, namely the irascible;
wherefore Jerome says in a letter [*Ep. xii ad Anton. Monach.] that
"to be angry is the property of man." Therefore it is not a sin to be
angry.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 4:31): "Let all indignation
and anger [*Vulg.: 'Anger and indignation'] . . . be put away from
you."

_I answer that,_ Anger, as stated above (A. 1), is properly the name
of a passion. A passion of the sensitive appetite is good in so far
as it is regulated by reason, whereas it is evil if it set the order
of reason aside. Now the order of reason, in regard to anger, may be
considered in relation to two things. First, in relation to the
appetible object to which anger tends, and that is revenge. Wherefore
if one desire revenge to be taken in accordance with the order of
reason, the desire of anger is praiseworthy, and is called "zealous
anger" [*Cf. Greg., Moral. v, 45]. On the other hand, if one desire
the taking of vengeance in any way whatever contrary to the order of
reason, for instance if he desire the punishment of one who has not
deserved it, or beyond his deserts, or again contrary to the order
prescribed by law, or not for the due end, namely the maintaining of
justice and the correction of defaults, then the desire of anger will
be sinful, and this is called sinful anger.

Secondly, the order of reason in regard to anger may be considered in
relation to the mode of being angry, namely that the movement of
anger should not be immoderately fierce, neither internally nor
externally; and if this condition be disregarded, anger will not lack
sin, even though just vengeance be desired.

Reply Obj. 1: Since passion may be either regulated or not regulated
by reason, it follows that a passion considered absolutely does not
include the notion of merit or demerit, of praise or blame. But as
regulated by reason, it may be something meritorious and deserving of
praise; while on the other hand, as not regulated by reason, it may
be demeritorious and blameworthy. Wherefore the Philosopher says
(Ethic. ii, 5) that "it is he who is angry in a certain way, that is
praised or blamed."

Reply Obj. 2: The angry man desires the evil of another, not for its
own sake but for the sake of revenge, towards which his appetite
turns as to a mutable good.

Reply Obj. 3: Man is master of his actions through the judgment of
his reason, wherefore as to the movements that forestall that
judgment, it is not in man's power to prevent them as a whole, i.e.
so that none of them arise, although his reason is able to check each
one, if it arise. Accordingly it is stated that the movement of anger
is not in man's power, to the extent namely that no such movement
arise. Yet since this movement is somewhat in his power, it is not
entirely sinless if it be inordinate. The statement of the
Philosopher that "the angry man acts with displeasure," means that he
is displeased, not with his being angry, but with the injury which he
deems done to himself: and through this displeasure he is moved to
seek vengeance.

Reply Obj. 4: The irascible power in man is naturally subject to his
reason, wherefore its act is natural to man, in so far as it is in
accord with reason, and in so far as it is against reason, it is
contrary to man's nature.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 3]

Whether All Anger Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that all anger is a mortal sin. For it is
written (Job 5:2): "Anger killeth the foolish man [*Vulg.: 'Anger
indeed killeth the foolish']," and he speaks of the spiritual killing,
whence mortal sin takes its name. Therefore all anger is a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing save mortal sin is deserving of eternal
condemnation. Now anger deserves eternal condemnation; for our Lord
said (Matt. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his brother shall be in
danger of the judgment": and a gloss on this passage says that "the
three things mentioned there, namely judgment, council, and
hell-fire, signify in a pointed manner different abodes in the state
of eternal damnation corresponding to various sins." Therefore anger
is a mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, whatsoever is contrary to charity is a mortal sin.
Now anger is of itself contrary to charity, as Jerome declares in his
commentary on Matt. 5:22, "Whosoever is angry with his brother," etc.
where he says that this is contrary to the love of your neighbor.
Therefore anger is a mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Ps. 4:5, "Be ye angry and sin not,"
says: "Anger is venial if it does not proceed to action."

_I answer that,_ The movement of anger may be inordinate and sinful
in two ways, as stated above (A. 2). First, on the part of the
appetible object, as when one desires unjust revenge; and thus anger
is a mortal sin in the point of its genus, because it is contrary to
charity and justice. Nevertheless such like anger may happen to be a
venial sin by reason of the imperfection of the act. This
imperfection is considered either in relation to the subject desirous
of vengeance, as when the movement of anger forestalls the judgment
of his reason; or in relation to the desired object, as when one
desires to be avenged in a trifling matter, which should be deemed of
no account, so that even if one proceeded to action, it would not be
a mortal sin, for instance by pulling a child slightly by the hair,
or by some other like action. Secondly, the movement of anger may be
inordinate in the mode of being angry, for instance, if one be too
fiercely angry inwardly, or if one exceed in the outward signs of
anger. In this way anger is not a mortal sin in the point of its
genus; yet it may happen to be a mortal sin, for instance if through
the fierceness of his anger a man fall away from the love of God and
his neighbor.

Reply Obj. 1: It does not follow from the passage quoted that all
anger is a mortal sin, but that the foolish are killed spiritually by
anger, because, through not checking the movement of anger by their
reason, they fall into mortal sins, for instance by blaspheming God
or by doing injury to their neighbor.

Reply Obj. 2: Our Lord said this of anger, by way of addition to the
words of the Law: "Whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the
judgment" (Matt. 5:21). Consequently our Lord is speaking here of the
movement of anger wherein a man desires the killing or any grave
injury of his neighbor: and should the consent of reason be given to
this desire, without doubt it will be a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 3: In the case where anger is contrary to charity, it is a
mortal sin, but it is not always so, as appears from what we have
said.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 4]

Whether Anger Is the Most Grievous Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that anger is the most grievous sin. For
Chrysostom says [*Hom. xlviii in Joan.] that "nothing is more
repulsive than the look of an angry man, and nothing uglier than a
ruthless* face, and most of all than a cruel soul." [*_Severo_. The
correct text is _Si vero._ The translation would then run thus . . .
"and nothing uglier." And if his "face is ugly, how much uglier is
his soul!"]. Therefore anger is the most grievous sin.

Obj. 2: Further, the more hurtful a sin is, the worse it would seem
to be; since, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), "a thing is
said to be evil because it hurts." Now anger is most hurtful, because
it deprives man of his reason, whereby he is master of himself; for
Chrysostom says (Hom. xlviii in Joan.) that "anger differs in no way
from madness; it is a demon while it lasts, indeed more troublesome
than one harassed by a demon." Therefore anger is the most grievous
sin.

Obj. 3: Further, inward movements are judged according to their
outward effects. Now the effect of anger is murder, which is a most
grievous sin. Therefore anger is a most grievous sin.

_On the contrary,_ Anger is compared to hatred as the mote to the
beam; for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "Lest anger grow
into hatred and a mote become a beam." Therefore anger is not the
most grievous sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2), the inordinateness of
anger is considered in a twofold respect, namely with regard to an
undue object, and with regard to an undue mode of being angry. As to
the appetible object which it desires, anger would seem to be the
least of sins, for anger desires the evil of punishment for some
person, under the aspect of a good that is vengeance. Hence on the
part of the evil which it desires the sin of anger agrees with those
sins which desire the evil of our neighbor, such as envy and hatred;
but while hatred desires absolutely another's evil as such, and the
envious man desires another's evil through desire of his own glory,
the angry man desires another's evil under the aspect of just
revenge. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is more grievous than
envy, and envy than anger: since it is worse to desire evil as an
evil, than as a good; and to desire evil as an external good such as
honor or glory, than under the aspect of the rectitude of justice. On
the part of the good, under the aspect of which the angry man desires
an evil, anger concurs with the sin of concupiscence that tends to a
good. In this respect again, absolutely speaking, the sin of anger is
apparently less grievous than that of concupiscence, according as the
good of justice, which the angry man desires, is better than the
pleasurable or useful good which is desired by the subject of
concupiscence. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that
"the incontinent in desire is more disgraceful than the incontinent
in anger."

On the other hand, as to the inordinateness which regards the mode of
being angry, anger would seem to have a certain pre-eminence on
account of the strength and quickness of its movement, according to
Prov. 27:4, "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth:
and who can bear the violence of one provoked?" Hence Gregory says
(Moral. v, 45): "The heart goaded by the pricks of anger is
convulsed, the body trembles, the tongue entangles itself, the face
is inflamed, the eyes are enraged and fail utterly to recognize those
whom we know: the tongue makes sounds indeed, but there is no sense
in its utterance."

Reply Obj. 1: Chrysostom is alluding to the repulsiveness of the
outward gestures which result from the impetuousness of anger.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the inordinate movement of
anger, that results from its impetuousness, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: Murder results from hatred and envy no less than from
anger: yet anger is less grievous, inasmuch as it considers the
aspect of justice, as stated above.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 5]

Whether the Philosopher Suitably Assigns the Species of Anger?

Objection 1: It would seem that the species of anger are unsuitably
assigned by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) where he says that some
angry persons are "choleric," some "sullen," and some "ill-tempered"
or "stern." According to him, a person is said to be "sullen" whose
anger "is appeased with difficulty and endures a long time." But this
apparently pertains to the circumstance of time. Therefore it seems
that anger can be differentiated specifically in respect also of the
other circumstances.

Obj. 2: Further, he says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "ill-tempered" or
"stern" persons "are those whose anger is not appeased without
revenge, or punishment." Now this also pertains to the
unquenchableness of anger. Therefore seemingly the ill-tempered is
the same as bitterness.

Obj. 3: Further, our Lord mentions three degrees of anger, when He
says (Matt. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in
danger of the judgment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca,
shall be in danger of the council, and whosoever shall say" to his
brother, "Thou fool." But these degrees are not referable to the
aforesaid species. Therefore it seems that the above division of
anger is not fitting.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi]
says "there are three species of irascibility," namely, "the anger
which is called wrath [*_Fellea,_ i.e. like gall. But in I-II, Q.
46, A. 8, St. Thomas quoting the same authority has _Cholos_ which we
render 'wrath']," and "ill-will" which is a disease of the mind, and
"rancour." Now these three seem to coincide with the three aforesaid.
For "wrath" he describes as "having beginning and movement," and the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) ascribes this to "choleric" persons:
"ill-will" he describes as "an anger that endures and grows old," and
this the Philosopher ascribes to "sullenness"; while he describes
"rancour" as "reckoning the time for vengeance," which tallies with
the Philosopher's description of the "ill-tempered." The same
division is given by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16). Therefore the
aforesaid division assigned by the Philosopher is not unfitting.

_I answer that,_ The aforesaid distinction may be referred either to
the passion, or to the sin itself of anger. We have already stated
when treating of the passions (I-II, Q. 46, A. 8) how it is to be
applied to the passion of anger. And it would seem that this is
chiefly what Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene had in view. Here,
however, we have to take the distinction of these species in its
application to the sin of anger, and as set down by the Philosopher.

For the inordinateness of anger may be considered in relation to two
things. First, in relation to the origin of anger, and this regards
"choleric" persons, who are angry too quickly and for any slight
cause. Secondly, in relation to the duration of anger, for that anger
endures too long; and this may happen in two ways. In one way,
because the cause of anger, to wit, the inflicted injury, remains too
long in a man's memory, the result being that it gives rise to a
lasting displeasure, wherefore he is "grievous" and "sullen" to
himself. In another way, it happens on the part of vengeance, which a
man seeks with a stubborn desire: this applies to "ill-tempered" or
"stern" people, who do not put aside their anger until they have
inflicted punishment.

Reply Obj. 1: It is not time, but a man's propensity to anger, or his
pertinacity in anger, that is the chief point of consideration in the
aforesaid species.

Reply Obj. 2: Both "sullen" and "ill-tempered" people have a
long-lasting anger, but for different reasons. For a "sullen" person
has an abiding anger on account of an abiding displeasure, which he
holds locked in his breast; and as he does not break forth into the
outward signs of anger, others cannot reason him out of it, nor does
he of his own accord lay aside his anger, except his displeasure wear
away with time and thus his anger cease. On the other hand, the anger
of "ill-tempered" persons is long-lasting on account of their intense
desire for revenge, so that it does not wear out with time, and can
be quelled only by revenge.

Reply Obj. 3: The degrees of anger mentioned by our Lord do not refer
to the different species of anger, but correspond to the course of
the human act [*Cf. I-II, Q. 46, A. 8, Obj. 3]. For the first degree
is an inward conception, and in reference to this He says: "Whosoever
is angry with his brother." The second degree is when the anger is
manifested by outward signs, even before it breaks out into effect;
and in reference to this He says: "Whosoever shall say to his
brother, Raca!" which is an angry exclamation. The third degree is
when the sin conceived inwardly breaks out into effect. Now the
effect of anger is another's hurt under the aspect of revenge; and
the least of hurts is that which is done by a mere word; wherefore in
reference to this He says: "Whosoever shall say to his brother Thou
fool!" Consequently it is clear that the second adds to the first,
and the third to both the others; so that, if the first is a mortal
sin, in the case referred to by our Lord, as stated above (A. 3, ad
2), much more so are the others. Wherefore some kind of condemnation
is assigned as corresponding to each one of them. In the first case
"judgment" is assigned, and this is the least severe, for as
Augustine says [*Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 9], "where judgment is to be
delivered, there is an opportunity for defense": in the second case
"council" is assigned, "whereby the judges deliberate together on the
punishment to be inflicted": to the third case is assigned
"hell-fire," i.e. "decisive condemnation."
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 6]

Whether Anger Should Be Reckoned Among the Capital Vices?

Objection 1: It would seem that anger should not be reckoned among
the capital sins. For anger is born of sorrow which is a capital vice
known by the name of sloth. Therefore anger should not be reckoned a
capital vice.

Obj. 2: Further, hatred is a graver sin than anger. Therefore it
should be reckoned a capital vice rather than anger.

Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Prov. 29:22, "An angry [Douay:
'passionate'] man provoketh quarrels," says: "Anger is the door to
all vices: if it be closed, peace is ensured within to all the
virtues; if it be opened, the soul is armed for every crime." Now no
capital vice is the origin of all sins, but only of certain definite
ones. Therefore anger should not be reckoned among the capital vices.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places anger among the
capital vices.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 84, A. 3, 4), a capital
vice is defined as one from which many vices arise. Now there are two
reasons for which many vices can arise from anger. The first is on
the part of its object which has much of the aspect of desirability,
in so far as revenge is desired under the aspect of just or honest*,
which is attractive by its excellence, as stated above (A. 4).
[*Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with
moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum; Cf. Q. 145, A. 1.]
The second is on the part of its impetuosity, whereby it precipitates
the mind into all kinds of inordinate action. Therefore it is evident
that anger is a capital vice.

Reply Obj. 1: The sorrow whence anger arises is not, for the most
part, the vice of sloth, but the passion of sorrow, which results
from an injury inflicted.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 118, A. 7; Q. 148, A. 5; Q. 153, A.
4; I-II, Q. 84, A. 4), it belongs to the notion of a capital vice to
have a most desirable end, so that many sins are committed through
the desire thereof. Now anger, which desires evil under the aspect of
good, has a more desirable end than hatred has, since the latter
desires evil under the aspect of evil: wherefore anger is more a
capital vice than hatred is.

Reply Obj. 3: Anger is stated to be the door to the vices
accidentally, that is by removing obstacles, to wit by hindering the
judgment of reason, whereby man is withdrawn from evil. It is,
however, directly the cause of certain special sins, which are called
its daughters.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 7]

Whether Six Daughters Are Fittingly Assigned to Anger?

Objection 1: It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly
assigned to anger, namely "quarreling, swelling of the mind,
contumely, clamor, indignation and blasphemy." For blasphemy is
reckoned by Isidore [*QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi] to be a daughter of
pride. Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of anger.

Obj. 2: Further, hatred is born of anger, as Augustine says in his
rule (Ep. ccxi). Therefore it should be placed among the daughters of
anger.

Obj. 3: Further, "a swollen mind" would seem to be the same as pride.
Now pride is not the daughter of a vice, but "the mother of all
vices," as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore swelling of
the mind should not be reckoned among the daughters of anger.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters
to anger.

_I answer that,_ Anger may be considered in three ways. First, as
consisting in thought, and thus two vices arise from anger. One is on
the part of the person with whom a man is angry, and whom he deems
unworthy (_indignum_) of acting thus towards him, and this is called
"indignation." The other vice is on the part of the man himself, in
so far as he devises various means of vengeance, and with such like
thoughts fills his mind, according to Job 15:2, "Will a wise
man . . . fill his stomach with burning heat?" And thus we have
"swelling of the mind."

Secondly, anger may be considered, as expressed in words: and thus a
twofold disorder arises from anger. One is when a man manifests his
anger in his manner of speech, as stated above (A. 5, ad 3) of the
man who says to his brother, "Raca": and this refers to "clamor,"
which denotes disorderly and confused speech. The other disorder is
when a man breaks out into injurious words, and if these be against
God, it is "blasphemy," if against one's neighbor, it is "contumely."

Thirdly, anger may be considered as proceeding to deeds; and thus
anger gives rise to "quarrels," by which we are to understand all
manner of injuries inflicted on one's neighbor through anger.

Reply Obj. 1: The blasphemy into which a man breaks out deliberately
proceeds from pride, whereby a man lifts himself up against God:
since, according to Ecclus. 10:14, "the beginning of the pride of man
is to fall off from God," i.e. to fall away from reverence for Him is
the first part of pride [*Cf. Q. 162, A. 7, ad 2]; and this gives
rise to blasphemy. But the blasphemy into which a man breaks out
through a disturbance of the mind, proceeds from anger.

Reply Obj. 2: Although hatred sometimes arises from anger, it has a
previous cause, from which it arises more directly, namely
displeasure, even as, on the other hand, love is born of pleasure.
Now through displeasure, a man is moved sometimes to anger, sometimes
to hatred. Wherefore it was fitting to reckon that hatred arises from
sloth rather than from anger.

Reply Obj. 3: Swelling of the mind is not taken here as identical
with pride, but for a certain effort or daring attempt to take
vengeance; and daring is a vice opposed to fortitude.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 158, Art. 8]

Whether There Is a Vice Opposed to Anger Resulting from Lack of Anger?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a vice opposed to anger,
resulting from lack of anger. For no vice makes us like to God. Now
by being entirely without anger, a man becomes like to God, Who
judges "with tranquillity" (Wis. 12:18). Therefore seemingly it is
not a vice to be altogether without anger.

Obj. 2: Further, it is not a vice to lack what is altogether useless.
But the movement of anger is useful for no purpose, as Seneca proves
in the book he wrote on anger (De Ira i, 9, seqq.). Therefore it
seems that lack of anger is not a vice.

Obj. 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "man's evil
is to be without reason." Now the judgment of reason remains
unimpaired, if all movement of anger be done away. Therefore no lack
of anger amounts to a vice.

_On the contrary,_ Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in Matth. in the Opus
Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "He who
is not angry, whereas he has cause to be, sins. For unreasonable
patience is the hotbed of many vices, it fosters negligence, and
incites not only the wicked but even the good to do wrong."

_I answer that,_ Anger may be understood in two ways. In one way, as
a simple movement of the will, whereby one inflicts punishment, not
through passion, but in virtue of a judgment of the reason: and thus
without doubt lack of anger is a sin. This is the sense in which
anger is taken in the saying of Chrysostom, for he says (Hom. xi in
Matth., in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John
Chrysostom): "Anger, when it has a cause, is not anger but judgment.
For anger, properly speaking, denotes a movement of passion": and
when a man is angry with reason, his anger is no longer from passion:
wherefore he is said to judge, not to be angry. In another way anger
is taken for a movement of the sensitive appetite, which is with
passion resulting from a bodily transmutation. This movement is a
necessary sequel, in man, to the movement of his will, since the
lower appetite necessarily follows the movement of the higher
appetite, unless there be an obstacle. Hence the movement of anger in
the sensitive appetite cannot be lacking altogether, unless the
movement of the will be altogether lacking or weak. Consequently lack
of the passion of anger is also a vice, even as the lack of movement
in the will directed to punishment by the judgment of reason.

Reply Obj. 1: He that is entirely without anger when he ought to be
angry, imitates God as to lack of passion, but not as to God's
punishing by judgment.

Reply Obj. 2: The passion of anger, like all other movements of the
sensitive appetite, is useful, as being conducive to the more prompt
execution [*Cf. I-II, Q. 24, A. 3] of reason's dictate: else, the
sensitive appetite in man would be to no purpose, whereas "nature
does nothing without purpose" [*Aristotle, De Coelo i, 4].

Reply Obj. 3: When a man acts inordinately, the judgment of his
reason is cause not only of the simple movement of the will but also
of the passion in the sensitive appetite, as stated above. Wherefore
just as the removal of the effect is a sign that the cause is
removed, so the lack of anger is a sign that the judgment of reason
is lacking.
_______________________

QUESTION 159

OF CRUELTY
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider cruelty, under which head there are two points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency?

(2) Of its comparison with savagery or brutality.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 159, Art. 1]

Whether Cruelty Is Opposed to Clemency?

Objection 1: It would seem that cruelty is not opposed to clemency.
For Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "those are said to be cruel
who exceed in punishing," which is contrary to justice. Now clemency
is reckoned a part, not of justice but of temperance. Therefore
apparently cruelty is not opposed to clemency.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Jer. 6:23): "They are cruel, and will
have no mercy"; so that cruelty would seem opposed to mercy. Now
mercy is not the same as clemency, as stated above (Q. 157, A. 4, ad
3). Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency.

Obj. 3: Further, clemency is concerned with the infliction of
punishment, as stated above (Q. 157, A. 1): whereas cruelty applies
to the withdrawal of beneficence, according to Prov. 11:17, "But he
that is cruel casteth off even his own kindred." Therefore cruelty is
not opposed to clemency.

_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "the
opposite of clemency is cruelty, which is nothing else but hardness
of heart in exacting punishment."

_I answer that,_ Cruelty apparently takes its name from _cruditas_
(rawness). Now just as things when cooked and prepared are wont to
have an agreeable and sweet savor, so when raw they have a
disagreeable and bitter taste. Now it has been stated above (Q. 157,
A. 3, ad 1; A. 4, ad 3) that clemency denotes a certain smoothness or
sweetness of soul, whereby one is inclined to mitigate punishment.
Hence cruelty is directly opposed to clemency.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as it belongs to equity to mitigate punishment
according to reason, while the sweetness of soul which inclines one
to this belongs to clemency: so too, excess in punishing, as regards
the external action, belongs to injustice; but as regards the
hardness of heart, which makes one ready to increase punishment,
belongs to cruelty.

Reply Obj. 2: Mercy and clemency concur in this, that both
shun and recoil from another's unhappiness, but in different ways. For
it belongs to mercy [*Cf. Q. 30, A. 1] to relieve another's
unhappiness by a beneficent action, while it belongs to clemency to
mitigate another's unhappiness by the cessation of punishment. And
since cruelty denotes excess in exacting punishment, it is more
directly opposed to clemency than to mercy; yet on account of the
mutual likeness of these virtues, cruelty is sometimes taken for
mercilessness.

Reply Obj. 3: Cruelty is there taken for mercilessness, which
is lack of beneficence. We may also reply that withdrawal of
beneficence is in itself a punishment.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 159, Art. 2]

Whether Cruelty Differs from Savagery or Brutality?

Objection 1: It would seem that cruelty differs not from savagery or
brutality. For seemingly one vice is opposed in one way to one
virtue. Now both savagery and cruelty are opposed to clemency by way
of excess. Therefore it would seem that savagery and cruelty are the
same.

Obj. 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that "severity is as it were
savagery with verity, because it holds to justice without attending
to piety": so that savagery would seem to exclude that mitigation of
punishment in delivering judgment which is demanded by piety. Now
this has been stated to belong to cruelty (A. 1, ad 1). Therefore
cruelty is the same as savagery.

Obj. 3: Further, just as there is a vice opposed to a virtue by way
of excess, so is there a vice opposed to it by way of deficiency,
which latter is opposed both to the virtue which is the mean, and to
the vice which is in excess. Now the same vice pertaining to
deficiency is opposed to both cruelty and savagery, namely remission
or laxity. For Gregory says (Moral. xx, 5): "Let there be love, but
not that which enervates, let there be severity, but without fury,
let there be zeal without unseemly savagery, let there be piety
without undue clemency." Therefore savagery is the same as cruelty.

_On the contrary,_ Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that "a man who
is angry without being hurt, or with one who has not offended him, is
not said to be cruel, but to be brutal or savage."

_I answer that,_ "Savagery" and "brutality" take their names from a
likeness to wild beasts which are also described as savage. For
animals of this kind attack man that they may feed on his body, and
not for some motive of justice the consideration of which belongs to
reason alone. Wherefore, properly speaking, brutality or savagery
applies to those who in inflicting punishment have not in view a
default of the person punished, but merely the pleasure they derive
from a man's torture. Consequently it is evident that it is comprised
under bestiality: for such like pleasure is not human but bestial,
and resulting as it does either from evil custom, or from a corrupt
nature, as do other bestial emotions. On the other hand, cruelty not
only regards the default of the person punished, but exceeds in the
mode of punishing: wherefore cruelty differs from savagery or
brutality, as human wickedness differs from bestiality, as stated in
_Ethic._ vii, 5.

Reply Obj. 1: Clemency is a human virtue; wherefore directly opposed
to it is cruelty which is a form of human wickedness. But savagery or
brutality is comprised under bestiality, wherefore it is directly
opposed not to clemency, but to a more excellent virtue, which the
Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5) calls "heroic" or "god-like," which
according to us, would seem to pertain to the gifts of the Holy
Ghost. Consequently we may say that savagery is directly opposed to
the gift of piety.

Reply Obj. 2: A severe man is not said to be simply savage, because
this implies a vice; but he is said to be "savage as regards the
truth," on account of some likeness to savagery which is not inclined
to mitigate punishment.

Reply Obj. 3: Remission of punishment is not a vice, except it
disregard the order of justice, which requires a man to be punished
on account of his offense, and which cruelty exceeds. On the other
hand, cruelty disregards this order altogether. Wherefore remission
of punishment is opposed to cruelty, but not to savagery.
_______________________

QUESTION 160

OF MODESTY
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider modesty: and (1) Modesty in general; (2) Each of
its species. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether modesty is a part of temperance?

(2) What is the matter of modesty?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 160, Art. 1]

Whether Modesty Is a Part of Temperance?

Objection 1: It would seem that modesty is not a part of temperance.
For modesty is denominated from mode. Now mode is requisite in every
virtue: since virtue is directed to good; and "good," according to
Augustine (De Nat. Boni 3), "consists in mode, species, and order."
Therefore modesty is a general virtue, and consequently should not be
reckoned a part of temperance.

Obj. 2: Further, temperance would seem to be deserving of praise
chiefly on account of its moderation. Now this gives modesty its
name. Therefore modesty is the same as temperance, and not one of its
parts.

Obj. 3: Further, modesty would seem to regard the correction of our
neighbor, according to 2 Tim. 2:24, 25, "The servant of the Lord must
not wrangle, but be mild towards all men . . . with modesty
admonishing them that resist the truth." Now admonishing wrong-doers
is an act of justice or of charity, as stated above (Q. 33, A. 1).
Therefore seemingly modesty is a part of justice rather than of
temperance.

_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons modesty as
a part of temperance.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 141, A. 4; Q. 157, A. 3),
temperance brings moderation into those things wherein it is most
difficult to be moderate, namely the concupiscences of pleasures of
touch. Now whenever there is a special virtue about some matter of
very great moment, there must needs be another virtue about matters
of lesser import: because the life of man requires to be regulated by
the virtues with regard to everything: thus it was stated above (Q.
134, A. 3, ad 1), that while magnificence is about great expenditure,
there is need in addition for liberality, which is concerned with
ordinary expenditure. Hence there is need for a virtue to moderate
other lesser matters where moderation is not so difficult. This
virtue is called modesty, and is annexed to temperance as its
principal.

Reply Obj. 1: When a name is common to many it is sometimes
appropriated to those of the lowest rank; thus the common name of
angel is appropriated to the lowest order of angels. In the same way,
mode which is observed by all virtues in common, is specially
appropriated to the virtue which prescribes the mode in the slightest
things.

Reply Obj. 2: Some things need tempering on account of their
strength, thus we temper strong wine. But moderation is necessary in
all things: wherefore temperance is more concerned with strong
passions, and modesty about weaker passions.

Reply Obj. 3: Modesty is to be taken there for the general moderation
which is necessary in all virtues.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 160, Art. 2]

Whether Modesty Is Only About Outward Actions?

Objection 1: It would seem that modesty is only about outward
actions. For the inward movements of the passions cannot be known to
other persons. Yet the Apostle enjoins (Phil. 4:5): "Let your modesty
be known to all men." Therefore modesty is only about outward actions.

Obj. 2: Further, the virtues that are about the passions are
distinguished from justice which is about operations. Now modesty is
seemingly one virtue. Therefore, if it be about outward works, it
will not be concerned with inward passions.

Obj. 3: Further, no one same virtue is both about things pertaining
to the appetite--which is proper to the moral virtues--and about
things pertaining to knowledge--which is proper to the intellectual
virtues--and again about things pertaining to the irascible and
concupiscible faculties. Therefore, if modesty be one virtue, it
cannot be about all these things.

_On the contrary,_ In all these things it is necessary to observe the
"mode" whence modesty takes its name. Therefore modesty is about all
of them.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), modesty differs from
temperance, in that temperance moderates those matters where
restraint is most difficult, while modesty moderates those that
present less difficulty. Authorities seem to have had various
opinions about modesty. For wherever they found a special kind of
good or a special difficulty of moderation, they withdrew it from the
province of modesty, which they confined to lesser matters. Now it is
clear to all that the restraint of pleasures of touch presents a
special difficulty: wherefore all distinguished temperance from
modesty.

In addition to this, moreover, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54)
considered that there was a special kind of good in the moderation of
punishment; wherefore he severed clemency also from modesty, and held
modesty to be about the remaining ordinary matters that require
moderation. These seemingly are of four kinds. One is the movement of
the mind towards some excellence, and this is moderated by
_humility._ The second is the desire of things pertaining to
knowledge, and this is moderated by _studiousness_ which is opposed
to curiosity. The third regards bodily movements and actions, which
require to be done becomingly and honestly [*Cf. Q. 145, A. 1],
whether we act seriously or in play. The fourth regards outward show,
for instance in dress and the like.

To some of these matters, however, other authorities appointed
certain special virtues: thus Andronicus [*De Affectibus] mentions
"meekness, simplicity, humility," and other kindred virtues, of which
we have spoken above (Q. 143); while Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7)
assigned _eutrapelia_ to pleasures in games, as stated above (I-II,
Q. 60, A. 5). All these are comprised under modesty as understood by
Tully; and in this way modesty regards not only outward but also
inward actions.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle speaks of modesty as regarding externals.
Nevertheless the moderation of the inner man may be shown by certain
outward signs.

Reply Obj. 2: Various virtues assigned by various authorities are
comprised under modesty. Wherefore nothing prevents modesty from
regarding matters which require different virtues. Yet there is not
so great a difference between the various parts of modesty, as there
is between justice, which is about operations, and temperance, which
is about passions, because in actions and passions that present no
great difficulty on the part of the matter, but only on the part of
moderation, there is but one virtue, one namely for each kind of
moderation.

Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection also is clear.
_______________________

QUESTION 161

OF HUMILITY
(In Six Articles)

We must consider next the species of modesty: (1) Humility, and pride
which is opposed to it; (2) Studiousness, and its opposite,
Curiosity; (3) Modesty as affecting words or deeds; (4) Modesty as
affecting outward attire.

Concerning humility there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether humility is a virtue?

(2) Whether it resides in the appetite, or in the judgment of reason?

(3) Whether by humility one ought to subject oneself to all men?

(4) Whether it is a part of modesty or temperance?

(5) Of its comparison with the other virtues;

(6) Of the degrees of humility.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 1]

Whether Humility Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that humility is not a virtue. For virtue
conveys the notion of a good. But humility conveys the notion of a
penal evil, according to Ps. 104:18, "They humbled his feet in
fetters." Therefore humility is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, virtue and vice are mutually opposed. Now humility
seemingly denotes a vice, for it is written (Ecclus. 19:23): "There
is one that humbleth himself wickedly." Therefore humility is not a
virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But humility
is apparently opposed to the virtue of magnanimity, which aims at
great things, whereas humility shuns them. Therefore it would seem
that humility is not a virtue.

Obj. 4: Further, virtue is "the disposition of that which is perfect"
(Phys. vii, text. 17). But humility seemingly belongs to the
imperfect: wherefore it becomes not God to be humble, since He can be
subject to none. Therefore it seems that humility is not a virtue.

Obj. 5: Further, every moral virtue is about actions and passions,
according to _Ethic._ ii, 3. But humility is not reckoned by the
Philosopher among the virtues that are about passions, nor is it
comprised under justice which is about actions. Therefore it would
seem not to be a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Origen commenting on Luke 1:48, "He hath regarded
the humility of His handmaid," says (Hom. viii in Luc.): "One of the
virtues, humility, is particularly commended in Holy Writ; for our
Saviour said: 'Learn of Me, because I am meek, and humble of heart.'"

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 2) when we were
treating of the passions, the difficult good has something attractive
to the appetite, namely the aspect of good, and likewise something
repulsive to the appetite, namely the difficulty of obtaining it. In
respect of the former there arises the movement of hope, and in
respect of the latter, the movement of despair. Now it has been
stated above (I-II, Q. 61, A. 2) that for those appetitive movements
which are a kind of impulse towards an object, there is need of a
moderating and restraining moral virtue, while for those which are a
kind of recoil, there is need, on the part of the appetite, of a
moral virtue to strengthen it and urge it on. Wherefore a twofold
virtue is necessary with regard to the difficult good: one, to temper
and restrain the mind, lest it tend to high things immoderately; and
this belongs to the virtue of humility: and another to strengthen the
mind against despair, and urge it on to the pursuit of great things
according to right reason; and this is magnanimity. Therefore it is
evident that humility is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: As Isidore observes (Etym. x), "a humble man is so
called because he is, as it were, _humo acclinis"_ [*Literally, "bent
to the ground"], i.e. inclined to the lowest place. This may happen
in two ways. First, through an extrinsic principle, for instance when
one is cast down by another, and thus humility is a punishment.
Secondly, through an intrinsic principle: and this may be done
sometimes well, for instance when a man, considering his own
failings, assumes the lowest place according to his mode: thus
Abraham said to the Lord (Gen. 18:27), "I will speak to my Lord,
whereas I am dust and ashes." In this way humility is a virtue.
Sometimes, however, this may be ill-done, for instance when man, "not
understanding his honor, compares himself to senseless beasts, and
becomes like to them" (Ps. 48:13).

Reply Obj. 2: As stated (ad 1), humility, in so far as it is a
virtue, conveys the notion of a praiseworthy self-abasement to the
lowest place. Now this is sometimes done merely as to outward signs
and pretense: wherefore this is "false humility," of which Augustine
says in a letter (Ep. cxlix) that it is "grievous pride," since to
wit, it would seem to aim at excellence of glory. Sometimes, however,
this is done by an inward movement of the soul, and in this way,
properly speaking, humility is reckoned a virtue, because virtue does
not consist in externals, but chiefly in the inward choice of the
mind, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5).

Reply Obj. 3: Humility restrains the appetite from aiming at great
things against right reason: while magnanimity urges the mind to
great things in accord with right reason. Hence it is clear that
magnanimity is not opposed to humility: indeed they concur in this,
that each is according to right reason.

Reply Obj. 4: A thing is said to be perfect in two ways. First
absolutely; such a thing contains no defect, neither in its nature
nor in respect of anything else, and thus God alone is perfect. To
Him humility is fitting, not as regards His Divine nature, but only
as regards His assumed nature. Secondly, a thing may be said to be
perfect in a restricted sense, for instance in respect of its nature
or state or time. Thus a virtuous man is perfect: although in
comparison with God his perfection is found wanting, according to the
word of Isa. 40:17, "All nations are before Him as if they had no
being at all." In this way humility may be competent to every man.

Reply Obj. 5: The Philosopher intended to treat of virtues as
directed to civic life, wherein the subjection of one man to another
is defined according to the ordinance of the law, and consequently is
a matter of legal justice. But humility, considered as a special
virtue, regards chiefly the subjection of man to God, for Whose sake
he humbles himself by subjecting himself to others.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 2]

Whether Humility Has to Do with the Appetite?

Objection 1: It would seem that humility concerns, not the appetite
but the judgment of reason. Because humility is opposed to pride. Now
pride concerns things pertaining to knowledge: for Gregory says
(Moral. xxxiv, 22) that "pride, when it extends outwardly to the
body, is first of all shown in the eyes": wherefore it is written
(Ps. 130:1), "Lord, my heart is not exalted, nor are my eyes lofty."
Now eyes are the chief aids to knowledge. Therefore it would seem
that humility is chiefly concerned with knowledge, whereby one thinks
little of oneself.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that "almost the
whole of Christian teaching is humility." Consequently nothing
contained in Christian teaching is incompatible with humility. Now
Christian teaching admonishes us to seek the better things, according
to 1 Cor. 12:31, "Be zealous for the better gifts." Therefore it
belongs to humility to restrain not the desire of difficult things
but the estimate thereof.

Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to the same virtue both to restrain
excessive movement, and to strengthen the soul against excessive
withdrawal: thus fortitude both curbs daring and fortifies the soul
against fear. Now it is magnanimity that strengthens the soul against
the difficulties that occur in the pursuit of great things. Therefore
if humility were to curb the desire of great things, it would follow
that humility is not a distinct virtue from magnanimity, which is
evidently false. Therefore humility is concerned, not with the desire
but with the estimate of great things.

Obj. 4: Further, Andronicus [*De Affectibus] assigns humility to
outward show; for he says that humility is "the habit of avoiding
excessive expenditure and parade." Therefore it is not concerned with
the movement of the appetite.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Poenit. [*Serm. cccli]) that
"the humble man is one who chooses to be an abject in the house of
the Lord, rather than to dwell in the tents of sinners." But choice
concerns the appetite. Therefore humility has to do with the appetite
rather than with the estimative power.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), it belongs properly to
humility, that a man restrain himself from being borne towards that
which is above him. For this purpose he must know his disproportion
to that which surpasses his capacity. Hence knowledge of one's own
deficiency belongs to humility, as a rule guiding the appetite.
Nevertheless humility is essentially in the appetite itself; and
consequently it must be said that humility, properly speaking,
moderates the movement of the appetite.

Reply Obj. 1: Lofty eyes are a sign of pride, inasmuch as it excludes
respect and fear: for fearing and respectful persons are especially
wont to lower the eyes, as though not daring to compare themselves
with others. But it does not follow from this that humility is
essentially concerned with knowledge.

Reply Obj. 2: It is contrary to humility to aim at greater things
through confiding in one's own powers: but to aim at greater things
through confidence in God's help, is not contrary to humility;
especially since the more one subjects oneself to God, the more is
one exalted in God's sight. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi):
"It is one thing to raise oneself to God, and another to raise
oneself up against God. He that abases himself before Him, him He
raiseth up; he that raises himself up against Him, him He casteth
down."

Reply Obj. 3: In fortitude there is the same reason for restraining
daring and for strengthening the soul against fear: since the reason
in both cases is that man should set the good of reason before
dangers of death. But the reason for restraining presumptuous hope
which pertains to humility is not the same as the reason for
strengthening the soul against despair. Because the reason for
strengthening the soul against despair is the acquisition of one's
proper good lest man, by despair, render himself unworthy of a good
which was competent to him; while the chief reason for suppressing
presumptuous hope is based on divine reverence, which shows that man
ought not to ascribe to himself more than is competent to him
according to the position in which God has placed him. Wherefore
humility would seem to denote in the first place man's subjection to
God; and for this reason Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4)
ascribes humility, which he understands by poverty of spirit, to the
gift of fear whereby man reveres God. Hence it follows that the
relation of fortitude to daring differs from that of humility to
hope. Because fortitude uses daring more than it suppresses it: so
that excess of daring is more like fortitude than lack of daring is.
On the other hand, humility suppresses hope or confidence in self
more than it uses it; wherefore excessive self-confidence is more
opposed to humility than lack of confidence is.

Reply Obj. 4: Excess in outward expenditure and parade is wont to be
done with a view of boasting, which is suppressed by humility.
Accordingly humility has to do, in a secondary way, with externals,
as signs of the inward movement of the appetite.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 3]

Whether One Ought, by Humility, to Subject Oneself to All Men?

Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not, by humility, to
subject oneself to all men. For, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3),
humility consists chiefly in man's subjection to God. Now one ought
not to offer to a man that which is due to God, as is the case with
all acts of religious worship. Therefore, by humility, one ought not
to subject oneself to man.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Nat. et Gratia xxxiv): "Humility
should take the part of truth, not of falsehood." Now some men are of
the highest rank, who cannot, without falsehood, subject themselves
to their inferiors. Therefore one ought not, by humility, to subject
oneself to all men.

Obj. 3: Further no one ought to do that which conduces to the
detriment of another's spiritual welfare. But if a man subject
himself to another by humility, this is detrimental to the person to
whom he subjects himself; for the latter might wax proud, or despise
the other. Hence Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "Lest through
excessive humility the superior lose his authority." Therefore a man
ought not, by humility, to subject himself to all.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Phil. 2:3): "In humility, let each
esteem others better than themselves."

_I answer that,_ We may consider two things in man, namely that which
is God's, and that which is man's. Whatever pertains to defect is
man's: but whatever pertains to man's welfare and perfection is
God's, according to the saying of Osee 13:9, "Destruction is thy own,
O Israel; thy help is only in Me." Now humility, as stated above (A.
1, ad 5; A. 2, ad 3), properly regards the reverence whereby man is
subject to God. Wherefore every man, in respect of that which is his
own, ought to subject himself to every neighbor, in respect of that
which the latter has of God's: but humility does not require a man to
subject what he has of God's to that which may seem to be God's in
another. For those who have a share of God's gifts know that they
have them, according to 1 Cor. 2:12: "That we may know the things
that are given us from God." Wherefore without prejudice to humility
they may set the gifts they have received from God above those that
others appear to have received from Him; thus the Apostle says (Eph.
3:5): "(The mystery of Christ) was not known to the sons of men as it
is now revealed to His holy apostles." In like manner, humility does
not require a man to subject that which he has of his own to that
which his neighbor has of man's: otherwise each one would have to
esteem himself a greater sinner than anyone else: whereas the Apostle
says without prejudice to humility (Gal. 2:15): "We by nature are
Jews, and not of the Gentiles, sinners." Nevertheless a man may
esteem his neighbor to have some good which he lacks himself, or
himself to have some evil which another has not: by reason of which,
he may subject himself to him with humility.

Reply Obj. 1: We must not only revere God in Himself, but also that
which is His in each one, although not with the same measure of
reverence as we revere God. Wherefore we should subject ourselves
with humility to all our neighbors for God's sake, according to 1
Pet. 2:13, "Be ye subject . . . to every human creature for God's
sake"; but to God alone do we owe the worship of latria.

Reply Obj. 2: If we set what our neighbor has of God's above that
which we have of our own, we cannot incur falsehood. Wherefore a
gloss [*St. Augustine, QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 71] on Phil. 2:3, "Esteem
others better than themselves," says: "We must not esteem by
pretending to esteem; but we should in truth think it possible for
another person to have something that is hidden to us and whereby he
is better than we are, although our own good whereby we are
apparently better than he, be not hidden."

Reply Obj. 3: Humility, like other virtues, resides chiefly inwardly
in the soul. Consequently a man, by an inward act of the soul, may
subject himself to another, without giving the other man an occasion
of detriment to his spiritual welfare. This is what Augustine means
in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "With fear, the superior should prostrate
himself at your feet in the sight of God." On the other hand, due
moderation must be observed in the outward acts of humility even as
of other virtues, lest they conduce to the detriment of others. If,
however, a man does as he ought, and others take therefrom an
occasion of sin, this is not imputed to the man who acts with
humility; since he does not give scandal, although others take it.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 4]

Whether Humility Is a Part of Modesty or Temperance?

Objection 1: It would seem that humility is not a part of modesty or
temperance. For humility regards chiefly the reverence whereby one is
subject to God, as stated above (A. 3). Now it belongs to a
theological virtue to have God for its object. Therefore humility
should be reckoned a theological virtue rather than a part of
temperance or modesty.

Obj. 2: Further, temperance is in the concupiscible, whereas humility
would seem to be in the irascible, just as pride which is opposed to
it, and whose object is something difficult. Therefore apparently
humility is not a part of temperance or modesty.

Obj. 3: Further, humility and magnanimity are about the same object,
as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). But magnanimity is reckoned a part, not
of temperance but of fortitude, as stated above (Q. 129, A. 5).
Therefore it would seem that humility is not a part of temperance or
modesty.

_On the contrary,_ Origen says (Hom. viii super Luc.): "If thou wilt
hear the name of this virtue, and what it was called by the
philosophers, know that humility which God regards is the same as
what they called _metriotes_, i.e. measure or moderation." Now this
evidently pertains to modesty or temperance. Therefore humility is a
part of modesty or temperance.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 137, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 157, A. 3,
ad 2), in assigning parts to a virtue we consider chiefly the
likeness that results from the mode of the virtue. Now the mode of
temperance, whence it chiefly derives its praise, is the restraint or
suppression of the impetuosity of a passion. Hence whatever virtues
restrain or suppress, and the actions which moderate the impetuosity
of the emotions, are reckoned parts of temperance. Now just as
meekness suppresses the movement of anger, so does humility suppress
the movement of hope, which is the movement of a spirit aiming at
great things. Wherefore, like meekness, humility is accounted a part
of temperance. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says
that a man who aims at small things in proportion to his mode is not
magnanimous but "temperate," and such a man we may call humble.
Moreover, for the reason given above (Q. 160, A. 2), among the
various parts of temperance, the one under which humility is
comprised is modesty as understood by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii,
54), inasmuch as humility is nothing else than a moderation of
spirit: wherefore it is written (1 Pet. 3:4): "In the
incorruptibility of a quiet and meek spirit."

Reply Obj. 1: The theological virtues, whose object is our last end,
which is the first principle in matters of appetite, are the causes
of all the other virtues. Hence the fact that humility is caused by
reverence for God does not prevent it from being a part of modesty or
temperance.

Reply Obj. 2: Parts are assigned to a principal virtue by reason of a
sameness, not of subject or matter, but of formal mode, as stated
above (Q. 137, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 157, A. 3, ad 2). Consequently,
although humility is in the irascible as its subject, it is assigned
as a part of modesty or temperance by reason of its mode.

Reply Obj. 3: Although humility and magnanimity agree as to matter,
they differ as to mode, by reason of which magnanimity is reckoned a
part of fortitude, and humility a part of temperance.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 5]

Whether Humility Is the Greatest of the Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that humility is the greatest of the
virtues. For Chrysostom, expounding the story of the Pharisee and the
publican (Luke 18), says [*Eclog. hom. vii de Humil. Animi.] that "if
humility is such a fleet runner even when hampered by sin that it
overtakes the justice that is the companion of pride, whither will it
not reach if you couple it with justice? It will stand among the
angels by the judgment seat of God." Hence it is clear that humility
is set above justice. Now justice is either the most exalted of all
the virtues, or includes all virtues, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. v, 1). Therefore humility is the greatest of the virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. [*S. 10, C.
1]): "Are you thinking of raising the great fabric of spirituality?
Attend first of all to the foundation of humility." Now this would
seem to imply that humility is the foundation of all virtue.
Therefore apparently it is greater than the other virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, the greater virtue deserves the greater reward. Now
the greatest reward is due to humility, since "he that humbleth
himself shall be exalted" (Luke 14:11). Therefore humility is the
greatest of virtues.

Obj. 4: Further, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. 16),
"Christ's whole life on earth was a lesson in moral conduct through
the human nature which He assumed." Now He especially proposed His
humility for our example, saying (Matt. 11:29): "Learn of Me, because
I am meek and humble of heart." Moreover, Gregory says (Pastor. iii,
1) that the "lesson proposed to us in the mystery of our redemption
is the humility of God." Therefore humility would seem to be the
greatest of virtues.

_On the contrary,_ Charity is set above all the virtues, according to
Col. 3:14, "Above all . . . things have charity." Therefore humility
is not the greatest of virtues.

_I answer that,_ The good of human virtue pertains to the order of
reason: which order is considered chiefly in reference to the end:
wherefore the theological virtues are the greatest because they have
the last end for their object. Secondarily, however, it is considered
in reference to the ordering of the means to the end. This ordinance,
as to its essence, is in the reason itself from which it issues, but
by participation it is in the appetite ordered by the reason; and
this ordinance is the effect of justice, especially of legal justice.
Now humility makes a man a good subject to ordinance of all kinds and
in all matters; while every other virtue has this effect in some
special matter. Therefore after the theological virtues, after the
intellectual virtues which regard the reason itself, and after
justice, especially legal justice, humility stands before all others.

Reply Obj. 1: Humility is not set before justice, but before that
justice which is coupled with pride, and is no longer a virtue; even
so, on the other hand, sin is pardoned through humility: for it is
said of the publican (Luke 18:14) that through the merit of his
humility "he went down into his house justified." Hence Chrysostom
says [*De incompr. Nat. Dei, Hom. v]: "Bring me a pair of two-horse
chariots: in the one harness pride with justice, in the other sin
with humility: and you will see that sin outrunning justice wins not
by its own strength, but by that of humility: while you will see the
other pair beaten, not by the weakness of justice, but by the weight
and size of pride."

Reply Obj. 2: Just as the orderly assembly of virtues is, by reason
of a certain likeness, compared to a building, so again that which is
the first step in the acquisition of virtue is likened to the
foundation, which is first laid before the rest of the building. Now
the virtues are in truth infused by God. Wherefore the first step in
the acquisition of virtue may be understood in two ways. First by way
of removing obstacles: and thus humility holds the first place,
inasmuch as it expels pride, which "God resisteth," and makes man
submissive and ever open to receive the influx of Divine grace. Hence
it is written (James 4:6): "God resisteth the proud, and giveth grace
to the humble." In this sense humility is said to be the foundation
of the spiritual edifice. Secondly, a thing is first among virtues
directly, because it is the first step towards God. Now the first
step towards God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6, "He that cometh
to God must believe." In this sense faith is the foundation in a more
excellent way than humility.

Reply Obj. 3: To him that despises earthly things, heavenly things
are promised: thus heavenly treasures are promised to those who
despise earthly riches, according to Matt. 6:19, 20, "Lay not up to
yourselves treasures on earth . . . but lay up to yourselves
treasures in heaven." Likewise heavenly consolations are promised to
those who despise worldly joys, according to Matt. 4:5, "Blessed are
they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." In the same way
spiritual uplifting is promised to humility, not that humility alone
merits it, but because it is proper to it to despise earthly
uplifting. Wherefore Augustine says (De Poenit. [*Serm. cccli]):
"Think not that he who humbles himself remains for ever abased, for
it is written: 'He shall be exalted.' And do not imagine that his
exaltation in men's eyes is effected by bodily uplifting."

Reply Obj. 4: The reason why Christ chiefly proposed humility to us,
was because it especially removes the obstacle to man's spiritual
welfare consisting in man's aiming at heavenly and spiritual things,
in which he is hindered by striving to become great in earthly
things. Hence our Lord, in order to remove an obstacle to our
spiritual welfare, showed by giving an example of humility, that
outward exaltation is to be despised. Thus humility is, as it were,
a disposition to man's untrammeled access to spiritual and divine
goods. Accordingly as perfection is greater than disposition, so
charity, and other virtues whereby man approaches God directly, are
greater than humility.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 161, Art. 6]

Whether Twelve Degrees of Humility Are Fittingly Distinguished in the
Rule of the Blessed Benedict?

Objection 1: It would seem that the twelve degrees of humility that
are set down in the Rule of the Blessed Benedict [*St. Thomas gives
these degrees in the reverse order to that followed by St. Benedict]
are unfittingly distinguished. The first is to be "humble not only in
heart, but also to show it in one's very person, one's eyes fixed on
the ground"; the second is "to speak few and sensible words, and not
to be loud of voice"; the third is "not to be easily moved, and
disposed to laughter"; the fourth is "to maintain silence until one
is asked"; the fifth is "to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by
the common rule of the monastery"; the sixth is "to believe and
acknowledge oneself viler than all"; the seventh is "to think oneself
worthless and unprofitable for all purposes"; the eighth is "to
confess one's sin"; the ninth is "to embrace patience by obeying
under difficult and contrary circumstances"; the tenth is "to subject
oneself to a superior"; the eleventh is "not to delight in fulfilling
one's own desires"; the twelfth is "to fear God and to be always
mindful of everything that God has commanded." For among these there
are some things pertaining to the other virtues, such as obedience
and patience. Again there are some that seem to involve a false
opinion--and this is inconsistent with any virtue--namely to declare
oneself more despicable than all men, and to confess and believe
oneself to be in all ways worthless and unprofitable. Therefore these
are unfittingly placed among the degrees of humility.

Obj. 2: Further, humility proceeds from within to externals, as do
other virtues. Therefore in the aforesaid degrees, those which
concern outward actions are unfittingly placed before those which
pertain to inward actions.

Obj. 3: Further, Anselm (De Simil. ci, seqq.) gives seven degrees of
humility, the first of which is "to acknowledge oneself
contemptible"; the second, "to grieve for this"; the third, "to
confess it"; the fourth, "to convince others of this, that is to wish
them to believe it"; the fifth, "to bear patiently that this be said
of us"; the sixth, "to suffer oneself to be treated with contempt";
the seventh, "to love being thus treated." Therefore the aforesaid
degrees would seem to be too numerous.

Obj. 4: Further, a gloss on Matt. 3:15 says: "Perfect humility has
three degrees. The first is to subject ourselves to those who are
above us, and not to set ourselves above our equals: this is
sufficient. The second is to submit to our equals, and not to set
ourselves before our inferiors; this is called abundant humility. The
third degree is to subject ourselves to inferiors, and in this is
perfect righteousness." Therefore the aforesaid degrees would seem to
be too numerous.

Obj. 5: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi): "The measure of
humility is apportioned to each one according to his rank. It is
imperiled by pride, for the greater a man is the more liable is he to
be entrapped." Now the measure of a man's greatness cannot be fixed
according to a definite number of degrees. Therefore it would seem
that it is not possible to assign the aforesaid degrees to humility.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2) humility has essentially to
do with the appetite, in so far as a man restrains the impetuosity of
his soul, from tending inordinately to great things: yet its rule is
in the cognitive faculty, in that we should not deem ourselves to be
above what we are. Also, the principle and origin of both these
things is the reverence we bear to God. Now the inward disposition of
humility leads to certain outward signs in words, deeds, and
gestures, which manifest that which is hidden within, as happens also
with the other virtues. For "a man is known by his look, and a wise
man, when thou meetest him, by his countenance" (Ecclus. 19:26).
Wherefore the aforesaid degrees of humility include something
regarding the root of humility, namely the twelfth degree, "that a
man fear God and bear all His commandments in mind."

Again, they include certain things with regard to the appetite, lest
one aim inordinately at one's own excellence. This is done in three
ways. First, by not following one's own will, and this pertains to
the eleventh degree; secondly, by regulating it according to one's
superior judgment, and this applies to the tenth degree; thirdly, by
not being deterred from this on account of the difficulties and
hardships that come in our way, and this belongs to the ninth degree.

Certain things also are included referring to the estimate a man
forms in acknowledging his own deficiency, and this in three ways.
First by acknowledging and avowing his own shortcomings; this belongs
to the eighth degree: secondly, by deeming oneself incapable of great
things, and this pertains to the seventh degree: thirdly, that in
this respect one should put others before oneself, and this belongs
to the sixth degree.

Again, some things are included that refer to outward signs. One of
these regards deeds, namely that in one's work one should not depart
from the ordinary way; this applies to the fifth degree. Two others
have reference to words, namely that one should not be in a hurry to
speak, which pertains to the fourth degree, and that one be not
immoderate in speech, which refers to the second. The others have to
do with outward gestures, for instance in restraining haughty looks,
which regards the first, and in outwardly checking laughter and other
signs of senseless mirth, and this belongs to the third degree.

Reply Obj. 1: It is possible, without falsehood, to deem and avow
oneself the most despicable of men, as regards the hidden faults
which we acknowledge in ourselves, and the hidden gifts of God which
others have. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. lii): "Bethink you
that some persons are in some hidden way better than you, although
outwardly you are better than they." Again, without falsehood one may
avow and believe oneself in all ways unprofitable and useless in
respect of one's own capability, so as to refer all one's sufficiency
to God, according to 2 Cor. 3:5, "Not that we are sufficient to think
anything of ourselves as of ourselves: but our sufficiency is from
God." And there is nothing unbecoming in ascribing to humility those
things that pertain to other virtues, since, just as one vice arises
from another, so, by a natural sequence, the act of one virtue
proceeds from the act of another.

Reply Obj. 2: Man arrives at humility in two ways. First and chiefly
by a gift of grace, and in this way the inner man precedes the
outward man. The other way is by human effort, whereby he first of
all restrains the outward man, and afterwards succeeds in plucking
out the inward root. It is according to this order that the degrees
of humility are here enumerated.

Reply Obj. 3: All the degrees mentioned by Anselm are reducible to
knowledge, avowal, and desire of one's own abasement. For the first
degree belongs to the knowledge of one's own deficiency; but since it
would be wrong for one to love one's own failings, this is excluded
by the second degree. The third and fourth degrees regard the avowal
of one's own deficiency; namely that not merely one simply assert
one's failing, but that one convince another of it. The other three
degrees have to do with the appetite, which seeks, not outward
excellence, but outward abasement, or bears it with equanimity,
whether it consist of words or deeds. For as Gregory says (Regist.
ii, 10, Ep. 36), "there is nothing great in being humble towards
those who treat us with regard, for even worldly people do this: but
we should especially be humble towards those who make us suffer," and
this belongs to the fifth and sixth degrees: or the appetite may even
go so far as lovingly to embrace external abasement, and this
pertains to the seventh degree; so that all these degrees are
comprised under the sixth and seventh mentioned above.

Reply Obj. 4: These degrees refer, not to the thing itself, namely
the nature of humility, but to the degrees among men, who are either
of higher or lower or of equal degree.

Reply Obj. 5: This argument also considers the degrees of humility
not according to the nature of the thing, in respect of which the
aforesaid degrees are assigned, but according to the various
conditions of men.
_______________________

QUESTION 162

OF PRIDE
(In Eight Articles)

We must next consider pride, and (1) pride in general; (2) the first
man's sin, which we hold to have been pride. Under the first head
there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether pride is a sin?

(2) Whether it is a special vice?

(3) Wherein does it reside as in its subject?

(4) Of its species;

(5) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(6) Whether it is the most grievous of all sins?

(7) Of its relation to other sins;

(8) Whether it should be reckoned a capital vice?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 1]

Whether Pride Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not a sin. For no sin is the
object of God's promise. For God's promises refer to what He will do;
and He is not the author of sin. Now pride is numbered among the
Divine promises: for it is written (Isa. 60:15): "I will make thee to
be an everlasting pride [Douay: 'glory'], a joy unto generation and
generation." Therefore pride is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, it is not a sin to wish to be like unto God: for
every creature has a natural desire for this; and especially does
this become the rational creature which is made to God's image and
likeness. Now it is said in Prosper's Lib. Sent. 294, that "pride is
love of one's own excellence, whereby one is likened to God who is
supremely excellent." Hence Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): "Pride
imitates exaltedness; whereas Thou alone art God exalted over all."
Therefore pride is not a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, a sin is opposed not only to a virtue but also to a
contrary vice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But no vice
is found to be opposed to pride. Therefore pride is not a sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Tob. 4:14): "Never suffer pride to
reign in thy mind or in thy words."

_I answer that,_ Pride (_superbia_) is so called because a man
thereby aims higher (_supra_) than he is; wherefore Isidore says
(Etym. x): "A man is said to be proud, because he wishes to appear
above (super) what he really is"; for he who wishes to overstep
beyond what he is, is proud. Now right reason requires that every
man's will should tend to that which is proportionate to him.
Therefore it is evident that pride denotes something opposed to right
reason, and this shows it to have the character of sin, because
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 4), "the soul's evil is to be
opposed to reason." Therefore it is evident that pride is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Pride (_superbia_) may be understood in two ways.
First, as overpassing (_supergreditur_) the rule of reason, and in
this sense we say that it is a sin. Secondly, it may simply
denominate "super-abundance"; in which sense any super-abundant thing
may be called pride: and it is thus that God promises pride as
significant of super-abundant good. Hence a gloss of Jerome on the
same passage (Isa. 61:6) says that "there is a good and an evil
pride"; or "a sinful pride which God resists, and a pride that
denotes the glory which He bestows."

It may also be replied that pride there signifies abundance of those
things in which men may take pride.

Reply Obj. 2: Reason has the direction of those things for which man
has a natural appetite; so that if the appetite wander from the rule
of reason, whether by excess or by default, it will be sinful, as is
the case with the appetite for food which man desires naturally. Now
pride is the appetite for excellence in excess of right reason.
Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13) that pride is the
"desire for inordinate exaltation": and hence it is that, as he
asserts (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13; xix, 12), "pride imitates God
inordinately: for it hath equality of fellowship under Him, and
wishes to usurp His dominion over our fellow-creatures."

Reply Obj. 3: Pride is directly opposed to the virtue of humility,
which, in a way, is concerned about the same matter as magnanimity,
as stated above (Q. 161, A. 1, ad 3). Hence the vice opposed to pride
by default is akin to the vice of pusillanimity, which is opposed by
default to magnanimity. For just as it belongs to magnanimity to urge
the mind to great things against despair, so it belongs to humility
to withdraw the mind from the inordinate desire of great things
against presumption. Now pusillanimity, if we take it for a
deficiency in pursuing great things, is properly opposed to
magnanimity by default; but if we take it for the mind's attachment
to things beneath what is becoming to a man, it is opposed to
humility by default; since each proceeds from a smallness of mind. In
the same way, on the other hand, pride may be opposed by excess, both
to magnanimity and humility, from different points of view: to
humility, inasmuch as it scorns subjection, to magnanimity, inasmuch
as it tends to great things inordinately. Since, however, pride
implies a certain elation, it is more directly opposed to humility,
even as pusillanimity, which denotes littleness of soul in tending
towards great things, is more directly opposed to magnanimity.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 2]

Whether Pride Is a Special Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not a special sin. For
Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that "you will find no sin
that is not labelled pride"; and Prosper says (De Vita Contempl. iii,
2) that "without pride no sin is, or was, or ever will be possible."
Therefore pride is a general sin.

Obj. 2: Further, a gloss on Job 33:17, "That He may withdraw man from
wickedness [*Vulg.: 'From the things that he is doing, and may
deliver him from pride']," says that "a man prides himself when he
transgresses His commandments by sin." Now according to Ambrose [*De
Parad. viii], "every sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and a
disobedience of the heavenly commandments." Therefore every sin is
pride.

Obj. 3: Further, every special sin is opposed to a special virtue.
But pride is opposed to all the virtues, for Gregory says (Moral.
xxxiv, 23): "Pride is by no means content with the destruction of one
virtue; it raises itself up against all the powers of the soul, and
like an all-pervading and poisonous disease corrupts the whole body";
and Isidore says (Etym. [*De Summo Bono ii, 38]) that it is "the
downfall of all virtues." Therefore pride is not a special sin.

Obj. 4: Further, every special sin has a special matter. Now pride
has a general matter, for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that "one
man is proud of his gold, another of his eloquence: one is elated by
mean and earthly things, another by sublime and heavenly virtues."
Therefore pride is not a special but a general sin.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix): "If he
look into the question carefully, he will find that, according to
God's law, pride is a very different sin from other vices." Now the
genus is not different from its species. Therefore pride is not a
general but a special sin.

_I answer that,_ The sin of pride may be considered in two ways.
First with regard to its proper species, which it has under the
aspect of its proper object. In this way pride is a special sin,
because it has a special object: for it is inordinate desire of one's
own excellence, as stated (A. 1, ad 2). Secondly, it may be
considered as having a certain influence towards other sins. In this
way it has somewhat of a generic character, inasmuch as all sins may
arise from pride, in two ways. First directly, through other sins
being directed to the end of pride which is one's own excellence, to
which may be directed anything that is inordinately desired.
Secondly, indirectly and accidentally as it were, that is by removing
an obstacle, since pride makes a man despise the Divine law which
hinders him from sinning, according to Jer. 2:20, "Thou hast broken
My yoke, thou hast burst My bands, and thou saidst: I will not serve."

It must, however, be observed that this generic character of pride
admits of the possibility of all vices arising from pride sometimes,
but it does not imply that all vices originate from pride always. For
though one may break the commandments of the Law by any kind of sin,
through contempt which pertains to pride, yet one does not always
break the Divine commandments through contempt, but sometimes through
ignorance, and sometimes through weakness: and for this reason
Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that "many things are done
amiss which are not done through pride."

Reply Obj. 1: These words are introduced by Augustine into his book
_De Nat. et Grat.,_ not as being his own, but as those of someone
with whom he is arguing. Hence he subsequently disproves the
assertion, and shows that not all sins are committed through pride.
We might, however, reply that these authorities must be understood as
referring to the outward effect of pride, namely the breaking of the
commandments, which applies to every sin, and not to the inward act
of pride, namely contempt of the commandment. For sin is committed,
not always through contempt, but sometimes through ignorance,
sometimes through weakness, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: A man may sometimes commit a sin effectively, but not
affectively; thus he who, in ignorance, slays his father, is a
parricide effectively, but not affectively, since he did not intend
it. Accordingly he who breaks God's commandment is said to pride
himself against God, effectively always, but not always affectively.

Reply Obj. 3: A sin may destroy a virtue in two ways. In one way by
direct contrariety to a virtue, and thus pride does not corrupt every
virtue, but only humility; even as every special sin destroys the
special virtue opposed to it, by acting counter thereto. In another
way a sin destroys a virtue, by making ill use of that virtue: and
thus pride destroys every virtue, in so far as it finds an occasion
of pride in every virtue, just as in everything else pertaining to
excellence. Hence it does not follow that it is a general sin.

Reply Obj. 4: Pride regards a special aspect in its object, which
aspect may be found in various matters: for it is inordinate love of
one's excellence, and excellence may be found in various things.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 3]

Whether the Subject of Pride Is the Irascible Faculty?

Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of pride is not the
irascible faculty. For Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 17): "A swollen
mind is an obstacle to truth, for the swelling shuts out the light."
Now the knowledge of truth pertains, not to the irascible but to the
rational faculty. Therefore pride is not in the irascible.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 8) that "the proud
observe other people's conduct not so as to set themselves beneath
them with humility, but so as to set themselves above them with
pride": wherefore it would seem that pride originates in undue
observation. Now observation pertains not to the irascible but to the
rational faculty.

Obj. 3: Further, pride seeks pre-eminence not only in sensible
things, but also in spiritual and intelligible things: while it
consists essentially in the contempt of God, according to Ecclus.
10:14, "The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God."
Now the irascible, since it is a part of the sensitive appetite,
cannot extend to God and things intelligible. Therefore pride cannot
be in the irascible.

Obj. 4: Further, as stated in Prosper's _Liber Sententiarum,_ sent.
294, "Pride is love of one's own excellence." But love is not in the
irascible, but in the concupiscible. Therefore pride is not in the
irascible.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. ii, 49) opposes pride to the gift
of fear. Now fear belongs to the irascible. Therefore pride is in the
irascible.

_I answer that,_ The subject of any virtue or vice is to be
ascertained from its proper object: for the object of a habit or act
cannot be other than the object of the power, which is the subject of
both. Now the proper object of pride is something difficult, for
pride is the desire of one's own excellence, as stated above (AA. 1,
2). Wherefore pride must needs pertain in some way to the irascible
faculty. Now the irascible may be taken in two ways. First in a
strict sense, and thus it is a part of the sensitive appetite, even
as anger, strictly speaking, is a passion of the sensitive appetite.
Secondly, the irascible may be taken in a broader sense, so as to
belong also to the intellective appetite, to which also anger is
sometimes ascribed. It is thus that we attribute anger to God and the
angels, not as a passion, but as denoting the sentence of justice
pronouncing judgment. Nevertheless the irascible understood in this
broad sense is not distinct from the concupiscible power, as stated
above in the First Part (Q. 59, A. 4; I-II, Q. 82, A. 5, ad 1 and 2).

Consequently if the difficult thing which is the object of pride,
were merely some sensible object, whereto the sensitive appetite
might tend, pride would have to be in the irascible which is part of
the sensitive appetite. But since the difficult thing which pride has
in view is common both to sensible and to spiritual things, we must
needs say that the subject of pride is the irascible not only
strictly so called, as a part of the sensitive appetite, but also in
its wider acceptation, as applicable to the intellective appetite.
Wherefore pride is ascribed also to the demons.

Reply Obj. 1: Knowledge of truth is twofold. One is purely
speculative, and pride hinders this indirectly by removing its cause.
For the proud man subjects not his intellect to God, that he may
receive the knowledge of truth from Him, according to Matt. 11:25,
"Thou hast hid these things from the wise and the prudent," i.e. from
the proud, who are wise and prudent in their own eyes, "and hast
revealed them to little ones," i.e. to the humble.

Nor does he deign to learn anything from man, whereas it is written
(Ecclus. 6:34): "If thou wilt incline thy ear, thou shalt receive
instruction." The other knowledge of truth is affective, and this is
directly hindered by pride, because the proud, through delighting in
their own excellence, disdain the excellence of truth; thus Gregory
says (Moral. xxiii, 17) that "the proud, although certain hidden
truths be conveyed to their understanding, cannot realize their
sweetness: and if they know of them they cannot relish them." Hence
it is written (Prov. 11:2): "Where humility is there also is wisdom."

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 161, AA. 2, 6), humility observes
the rule of right reason whereby a man has true self-esteem. Now
pride does not observe this rule of right reason, for he esteems
himself greater than he is: and this is the outcome of an inordinate
desire for his own excellence, since a man is ready to believe what
he desires very much, the result being that his appetite is borne
towards things higher than what become him. Consequently whatsoever
things lead a man to inordinate self-esteem lead him to pride: and
one of those is the observing of other people's failings, just as, on
the other hand, in the words of Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 17), "holy
men, by a like observation of other people's virtues, set others
above themselves." Accordingly the conclusion is not that pride is in
the rational faculty, but that one of its causes is in the reason.

Reply Obj. 3: Pride is in the irascible, not only as a part of the
sensitive appetite, but also as having a more general signification,
as stated above.

Reply Obj. 4: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9), "love
precedes all other emotions of the soul, and is their cause,"
wherefore it may be employed to denote any of the other emotions. It
is in this sense that pride is said to be "love of one's own
excellence," inasmuch as love makes a man presume inordinately on his
superiority over others, and this belongs properly to pride.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 4]

Whether the Four Species of Pride Are Fittingly Assigned by Gregory?

Objection 1: It seems that the four species of pride are unfittingly
assigned by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxiii, 6): "There are four
marks by which every kind of pride of the arrogant betrays itself;
either when they think that their good is from themselves, or if they
believe it to be from above, yet they think that it is due to their
own merits; or when they boast of having what they have not, or
despise others and wish to appear the exclusive possessors of what
they have." For pride is a vice distinct from unbelief, just as
humility is a distinct virtue from faith. Now it pertains to
unbelief, if a man deem that he has not received his good from God,
or that he has the good of grace through his own merits. Therefore
this should not be reckoned a species of pride.

Obj. 2: Further, the same thing should not be reckoned a species of
different genera. Now boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as
stated above (Q. 110, A. 2; Q. 112). Therefore it should not be
accounted a species of pride.

Obj. 3: Further, some other things apparently pertain to pride, which
are not mentioned here. For Jerome [*Reference unknown] says that
"nothing is so indicative of pride as to show oneself ungrateful":
and Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 14) that "it belongs to pride to
excuse oneself of a sin one has committed." Again, presumption
whereby one aims at having what is above one, would seem to have much
to do with pride. Therefore the aforesaid division does not
sufficiently account for the different species of pride.

Obj. 4: Further, we find other divisions of pride. For Anselm
[*Eadmer, De Similit. xxii, seqq.] divides the uplifting of pride,
saying that there is "pride of will, pride of speech, end pride of
deed." Bernard [*De Grad. Humil. et Superb. x, seqq.] also reckons
twelve degrees of pride, namely "curiosity, frivolity of mind,
senseless mirth, boasting, singularity, arrogance, presumption,
defense of one's sins, deceitful confession, rebelliousness, license,
sinful habit." Now these apparently are not comprised under the
species mentioned by Gregory. Therefore the latter would seem to be
assigned unfittingly.

_On the contrary,_ The authority of Gregory suffices.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2, 3), pride denotes
immoderate desire of one's own excellence, a desire, to wit, that is
not in accord with right reason. Now it must be observed that all
excellence results from a good possessed. Such a good may be
considered in three ways. First, in itself. For it is evident that
the greater the good that one has, the greater the excellence that
one derives from it. Hence when a man ascribes to himself a good
greater than what he has, it follows that his appetite tends to his
own excellence in a measure exceeding his competency: and thus we
have the third species of pride, namely "boasting of having what one
has not."

Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its cause, in so far as
to have a thing of oneself is more excellent than to have it of
another. Hence when a man esteems the good he has received of another
as though he had it of himself, the result is that his appetite is
borne towards his own excellence immoderately. Now one is cause of
one's own good in two ways, efficiently and meritoriously: and thus
we have the first two species of pride, namely "when a man thinks he
has from himself that which he has from God," or "when he believes
that which he has received from above to be due to his own merits."

Thirdly, it may be considered with regard to the manner of having it,
in so far as a man obtains greater excellence through possessing some
good more excellently than other men; the result again being that his
appetite is borne inordinately towards his own excellence: and thus
we have the fourth species of pride, which is "when a man despises
others and wishes to be singularly conspicuous."

Reply Obj. 1: A true judgment may be destroyed in two ways. First,
universally: and thus in matters of faith, a true judgment is
destroyed by unbelief. Secondly, in some particular matter of choice,
and unbelief does not do this. Thus a man who commits fornication,
judges that for the time being it is good for him to commit
fornication; yet he is not an unbeliever, as he would be, were he to
say that universally fornication is good. It is thus in the question
in point: for it pertains to unbelief to assert universally that
there is a good which is not from God, or that grace is given to men
for their merits, whereas, properly speaking, it belongs to pride and
not to unbelief, through inordinate desire of one's own excellence,
to boast of one's goods as though one had them of oneself, or of
one's own merits.

Reply Obj. 2: Boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as regards the
outward act whereby a man falsely ascribes to himself what he has
not: but as regards the inward arrogance of the heart it is reckoned
by Gregory to be a species of pride.

Reply Obj. 3: The ungrateful man ascribes to himself what he has from
another: wherefore the first two species of pride pertain to
ingratitude. To excuse oneself of a sin one has committed, belongs to
the third species, since by so doing a man ascribes to himself the
good of innocence which he has not. To aim presumptuously at what is
above one, would seem to belong chiefly to the fourth species, which
consists in wishing to be preferred to others.

Reply Obj. 4: The three mentioned by Anselm correspond to the
progress of any particular sin: for it begins by being conceived in
thought, then is uttered in word, and thirdly is accomplished in deed.

The twelve degrees mentioned by Bernard are reckoned by way of
opposition to the twelve degrees of humility, of which we have spoken
above (Q. 161, A. 6). For the first degree of humility is to "be
humble in heart, and to show it in one's very person, one's eyes
fixed on the ground": and to this is opposed "curiosity," which
consists in looking around in all directions curiously and
inordinately. The second degree of humility is "to speak few and
sensible words, and not to be loud of voice": to this is opposed
"frivolity of mind," by which a man is proud of speech. The third
degree of humility is "not to be easily moved and disposed to
laughter," to which is opposed "senseless mirth." The fourth degree
of humility is "to maintain silence until one is asked," to which is
opposed "boasting". The fifth degree of humility is "to do nothing
but to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery," to
which is opposed "singularity," whereby a man wishes to seem more
holy than others. The sixth degree of humility is "to believe and
acknowledge oneself viler than all," to which is opposed "arrogance,"
whereby a man sets himself above others. The seventh degree of
humility is "to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for all
purposes," to which is opposed "presumption," whereby a man thinks
himself capable of things that are above him. The eighth degree of
humility is "to confess one's sins," to which is opposed "defense of
one's sins." The ninth degree is "to embrace patience by obeying
under difficult and contrary circumstances," to which is opposed
"deceitful confession," whereby a man being unwilling to be punished
for his sins confesses them deceitfully. The tenth degree of humility
is "obedience," to which is opposed "rebelliousness." The eleventh
degree of humility is "not to delight in fulfilling one's own
desires"; to this is opposed "license," whereby a man delights in
doing freely whatever he will. The last degree of humility is "fear
of God": to this is opposed "the habit of sinning," which implies
contempt of God.

In these twelve degrees not only are the species of pride indicated,
but also certain things that precede and follow them, as we have
stated above with regard to humility (Q. 161, A. 6).
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 5]

Whether Pride Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not a mortal sin. For a
gloss on Ps. 7:4, "O Lord my God, if I have done this thing," says:
"Namely, the universal sin which is pride." Therefore if pride were a
mortal sin, so would every sin be.

Obj. 2: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But pride
is apparently not contrary to charity, neither as to the love of God,
nor as to the love of one's neighbor, because the excellence which,
by pride, one desires inordinately, is not always opposed to God's
honor, or our neighbor's good. Therefore pride is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, every mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But pride is
not opposed to virtue; on the contrary, it arises therefrom, for as
Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23), "sometimes a man is elated by
sublime and heavenly virtues." Therefore pride is not a mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that "pride is a
most evident sign of the reprobate, and contrariwise, humility of the
elect." But men do not become reprobate on account of venial sins.
Therefore pride is not a venial but a mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ Pride is opposed to humility. Now humility properly
regards the subjection of man to God, as stated above (Q. 161, A. 1,
ad 5). Hence pride properly regards lack of this subjection, in so
far as a man raises himself above that which is appointed to him
according to the Divine rule or measure, against the saying of the
Apostle (2 Cor. 10:13), "But we will not glory beyond our measure;
but according to the measure of the rule which God hath measured to
us." Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 10:14): "The beginning of the
pride of man is to fall off from God" because, to wit, the root of
pride is found to consist in man not being, in some way, subject to
God and His rule. Now it is evident that not to be subject to God is
of its very nature a mortal sin, for this consists in turning away
from God: and consequently pride is, of its genus, a mortal sin.
Nevertheless just as in other sins which are mortal by their genus
(for instance fornication and adultery) there are certain motions
that are venial by reason of their imperfection (through forestalling
the judgment of reason, and being without its consent), so too in the
matter of pride it happens that certain motions of pride are venial
sins, when reason does not consent to them.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 2) pride is a general sin, not by
its essence but by a kind of influence, in so far as all sins may
have their origin in pride. Hence it does not follow that all sins
are mortal, but only such as arise from perfect pride, which we have
stated to be a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Pride is always contrary to the love of God, inasmuch
as the proud man does not subject himself to the Divine rule as he
ought. Sometimes it is also contrary to the love of our neighbor;
when, namely, a man sets himself inordinately above his neighbor: and
this again is a transgression of the Divine rule, which has
established order among men, so that one ought to be subject to
another.

Reply Obj. 3: Pride arises from virtue, not as from its direct
cause, but as from an accidental cause, in so far as a man makes a
virtue an occasion for pride. And nothing prevents one contrary from
being the accidental cause of another, as stated in _Phys._ viii, 1.
Hence some are even proud of their humility.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 6]

Whether Pride Is the Most Grievous of Sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not the most grievous of
sins. For the more difficult a sin is to avoid, the less grievous it
would seem to be. Now pride is most difficult to avoid; for Augustine
says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), "Other sins find their vent in the
accomplishment of evil deeds, whereas pride lies in wait for good
deeds to destroy them." Therefore pride is not the most grievous of
sins.

Obj. 2: Further, "The greater evil is opposed to the greater good,"
as the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. viii, 10). Now humility to which
pride is opposed is not the greatest of virtues, as stated above (Q.
61, A. 5). Therefore the vices that are opposed to greater virtues,
such as unbelief, despair, hatred of God, murder, and so forth, are
more grievous sins than pride.

Obj. 3: Further, the greater evil is not punished by a lesser evil.
But pride is sometimes punished by other sins according to Rom. 1:28,
where it is stated that on account of their pride of heart, men of
science were delivered "to a reprobate sense, to do those things
which are not convenient." Therefore pride is not the most grievous
of sins.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Ps. 118:51, "The proud did
iniquitously,"    says: "The greatest sin in man is pride."

_I answer that,_ Two things are to be observed in sin, conversion to
a mutable good, and this is the material part of sin; and aversion
from the immutable good, and this gives sin its formal aspect and
complement. Now on the part of the conversion, there is no reason for
pride being the greatest of sins, because uplifting which pride
covets inordinately, is not essentially most incompatible with the
good of virtue. But on the part of the aversion, pride has extreme
gravity, because in other sins man turns away from God, either
through ignorance or through weakness, or through desire for any
other good whatever; whereas pride denotes aversion from God simply
through being unwilling to be subject to God and His rule. Hence
Boethius [*Cf. Cassian, de Caenob. Inst. xii, 7] says that "while all
vices flee from God, pride alone withstands God"; for which reason it
is specially stated (James 4:6) that "God resisteth the proud."
Wherefore aversion from God and His commandments, which is a
consequence as it were in other sins, belongs to pride by its very
nature, for its act is the contempt of God. And since that which
belongs to a thing by its nature is always of greater weight than
that which belongs to it through something else, it follows that
pride is the most grievous of sins by its genus, because it exceeds
in aversion which is the formal complement of sin.

Reply Obj. 1: A sin is difficult to avoid in two ways. First, on
account of the violence of its onslaught; thus anger is violent in
its onslaught on account of its impetuosity; and "still more
difficult is it to resist concupiscence, on account of its
connaturality," as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3, 9. A difficulty of this
kind in avoiding sin diminishes the gravity of the sin; because a man
sins the more grievously, according as he yields to a less impetuous
temptation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 12, 15).

Secondly, it is difficult to avoid a sin, on account of its being
hidden. In this way it is difficult to avoid pride, since it takes
occasion even from good deeds, as stated (A. 5, ad 3). Hence
Augustine says pointedly that it "lies in wait for good deeds"; and
it is written (Ps. 141:4): "In the way wherein I walked, the proud
[*Cf. Ps. 139:6, 'The proud have hidden a net for me.'] [Vulg.:
'they'] have hidden a snare for me." Hence no very great gravity
attaches to the movement of pride while creeping in secretly, and
before it is discovered by the judgment of reason: but once
discovered by reason, it is easily avoided, both by considering one's
own infirmity, according to Ecclus. 10:9, "Why is earth and ashes
proud?" and by considering God's greatness, according to Job 15:13,
"Why doth thy spirit swell against God?" as well as by considering
the imperfection of the goods on which man prides himself, according
to Isa. 40:6, "All flesh is grass, and all the glory thereof as the
flower of the field"; and farther on (Isa. 64:6), "all our justices"
are become "like the rag of a menstruous woman."

Reply Obj. 2: Opposition between a vice and a virtue is inferred from
the object, which is considered on the part of conversion. In this
way pride has no claim to be the greatest of sins, as neither has
humility to be the greatest of virtues. But it is the greatest on the
part of aversion, since it brings greatness upon other sins. For
unbelief, by the very fact of its arising out of proud contempt, is
rendered more grievous than if it be the outcome of ignorance or
weakness. The same applies to despair and the like.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as in syllogisms that lead to an impossible
conclusion one is sometimes convinced by being faced with a more
evident absurdity, so too, in order to overcome their pride, God
punishes certain men by allowing them to fall into sins of the flesh,
which though they be less grievous are more evidently shameful. Hence
Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 38) that "pride is the worst of all
vices; whether because it is appropriate to those who are of highest
and foremost rank, or because it originates from just and virtuous
deeds, so that its guilt is less perceptible. On the other hand,
carnal lust is apparent to all, because from the outset it is of a
shameful nature: and yet, under God's dispensation, it is less
grievous than pride. For he who is in the clutches of pride and feels
it not, falls into the lusts of the flesh, that being thus humbled he
may rise from his abasement."

From this indeed the gravity of pride is made manifest. For just as a
wise physician, in order to cure a worse disease, allows the patient
to contract one that is less dangerous, so the sin of pride is shown
to be more grievous by the very fact that, as a remedy, God allows
men to fall into other sins.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 7]

Whether Pride Is the First Sin of All?

Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not the first sin of all.
For the first is maintained in all that follows. Now pride does not
accompany all sins, nor is it the origin of all: for Augustine says
(De Nat. et Grat. xx) that many things are done "amiss which are not
done with pride." Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 10:14) that the "beginning of
. . . pride is to fall off from God." Therefore falling away from God
precedes pride.

Obj. 3: Further, the order of sins would seem to be according to the
order of virtues. Now, not humility but faith is the first of all
virtues. Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.

Obj. 4: Further, it is written (2 Tim. 3:13): "Evil men and seducers
shall grow worse and worse"; so that apparently man's beginning of
wickedness is not the greatest of sins. But pride is the greatest of
sins as stated in the foregoing Article. Therefore pride is not the
first sin.

Obj. 5: Further, resemblance and pretense come after the reality. Now
the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that "pride apes fortitude and
daring." Therefore the vice of daring precedes the vice of pride.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the
beginning of all sin."

_I answer that,_ The first thing in every genus is that which is
essential. Now it has been stated above (A. 6) that aversion from
God, which is the formal complement of sin, belongs to pride
essentially, and to other sins, consequently. Hence it is that pride
fulfils the conditions of a first thing, and is "the beginning of all
sins," as stated above (I-II, Q. 84, A. 2), when we were treating of
the causes of sin on the part of the aversion which is the chief part
of sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Pride is said to be "the beginning of all sin," not as
though every sin originated from pride, but because any kind of sin
is naturally liable to arise from pride.

Reply Obj. 2: To fall off from God is said to be the beginning of
pride, not as though it were a distinct sin from pride, but as being
the first part of pride. For it has been said above (A. 5) that pride
regards chiefly subjection to God which it scorns, and in consequence
it scorns to be subject to a creature for God's sake.

Reply Obj. 3: There is no need for the order of virtues to be the
same as that of vices. For vice is corruptive of virtue. Now that
which is first to be generated is the last to be corrupted. Wherefore
as faith is the first of virtues, so unbelief is the last of sins, to
which sometimes man is led by other sins. Hence a gloss on Ps. 136:7,
"Rase it, rase it, even to the foundation thereof," says that "by
heaping vice upon vice a man will lapse into unbelief," and the
Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:19) that "some rejecting a good conscience
have made shipwreck concerning the faith."

Reply Obj. 4: Pride is said to be the most grievous of sins because
that which gives sin its gravity is essential to pride. Hence pride
is the cause of gravity in other sins. Accordingly previous to pride
there may be certain less grievous sins that are committed through
ignorance or weakness. But among the grievous sins the first is
pride, as the cause whereby other sins are rendered more grievous.
And as that which is the first in causing sins is the last in the
withdrawal from sin, a gloss on Ps. 18:13, "I shall be cleansed from
the greatest sin," says: "Namely from the sin of pride, which is the
last in those who return to God, and the first in those who withdraw
from God."

Reply Obj. 5: The Philosopher associates pride with feigned
fortitude, not that it consists precisely in this, but because man
thinks he is more likely to be uplifted before men, if he seem to be
daring or brave.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 162, Art. 8]

Whether Pride Should Be Reckoned a Capital Vice?

Objection 1: It would seem that pride should be reckoned a capital
vice, since Isidore [*Comment. in Deut. xvi] and Cassian [*De Inst.
Caenob. v, 1: Collat. v, 2] number pride among the capital vices.

Obj. 2: Further, pride is apparently the same as vainglory, since
both covet excellence. Now vainglory is reckoned a capital vice.
Therefore pride also should be reckoned a capital vice.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that "pride
begets envy, nor is it ever without this companion." Now envy is
reckoned a capital vice, as stated above (Q. 36, A. 4). Much more
therefore is pride a capital vice.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) does not include pride
among the capital vices.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 2, 5, ad 1) pride may be
considered in two ways; first in itself, as being a special sin;
secondly, as having a general influence towards all sins. Now the
capital vices are said to be certain special sins from which many
kinds of sin arise. Wherefore some, considering pride in the light of
a special sin, numbered it together with the other capital vices. But
Gregory, taking into consideration its general influence towards all
vices, as explained above (A. 2, Obj. 3), did not place it among the
capital vices, but held it to be the "queen and mother of all the
vices." Hence he says (Moral. xxxi, 45): "Pride, the queen of vices,
when it has vanquished and captured the heart, forthwith delivers it
into the hands of its lieutenants the seven principal vices, that
they may despoil it and produce vices of all kinds."

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2: Pride is not the same as vainglory, but is the cause
thereof: for pride covets excellence inordinately: while vainglory
covets the outward show of excellence.

Reply Obj. 3: The fact that envy, which is a capital vice, arises
from pride, does not prove that pride is a capital vice, but that it
is still more principal than the capital vices themselves.
_______________________

QUESTION 163

OF THE FIRST MAN'S SIN
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the first man's sin which was pride: and (1) his
sin; (2) its punishment; (3) the temptation whereby he was led to sin.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether pride was the first man's first sin?

(2) What the first man coveted by sinning?

(3) Whether his sin was more grievous than all other sins?

(4) Which sinned more grievously, the man or the woman?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 163, Art. 1]

Whether Pride Was the First Man's First Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that pride was not the first man's first
sin. For the Apostle says (Rom. 5:19) that "by the disobedience of
one man many were made sinners." Now the first man's first sin is the
one by which all men were made sinners in the point of original sin.
Therefore disobedience, and not pride, was the first man's first sin.

Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says, commenting on Luke 4:3, "And the devil
said to Him," that the devil in tempting Christ observed the same
order as in overcoming the first man. Now Christ was first tempted to
gluttony, as appears from Matt. 4:3, where it was said to Him: "If
thou be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread."
Therefore the first man's first sin was not pride but gluttony.

Obj. 3: Further, man sinned at the devil's suggestion. Now the devil
in tempting man promised him knowledge (Gen. 3:5). Therefore
inordinateness in man was through the desire of knowledge, which
pertains to curiosity. Therefore curiosity, and not pride, was the
first sin.

Obj. 4: Further, a gloss [*St. Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xi] on 1 Tim.
2:14, "The woman being seduced was in the transgression," says: "The
Apostle rightly calls this seduction, for they were persuaded to
accept a falsehood as being true; namely that God had forbidden them
to touch that tree, because He knew that if they touched it, they
would be like gods, as though He who made them men, begrudged them
the godhead . . ." Now it pertains to unbelief to believe such a
thing. Therefore man's first sin was unbelief and not pride.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the
beginning of all sin." Now man's first sin is the beginning of all
sin, according to Rom. 5:12, "By one man sin entered into this
world." Therefore man's first sin was pride.

_I answer that,_ Many movements may concur towards one sin, and the
character of sin attaches to that one in which inordinateness is
first found. And it is evident that inordinateness is in the inward
movement of the soul before being in the outward act of the body;
since, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), the sanctity of the
body is not forfeited so long as the sanctity of the soul remains.
Also, among the inward movements, the appetite is moved towards the
end before being moved towards that which is desired for the sake of
the end; and consequently man's first sin was where it was possible
for his appetite to be directed to an inordinate end. Now man was so
appointed in the state of innocence, that there was no rebellion of
the flesh against the spirit. Wherefore it was not possible for the
first inordinateness in the human appetite to result from his
coveting a sensible good, to which the concupiscence of the flesh
tends against the order of reason. It remains therefore that the
first inordinateness of the human appetite resulted from his coveting
inordinately some spiritual good. Now he would not have coveted it
inordinately, by desiring it according to his measure as established
by the Divine rule. Hence it follows that man's first sin consisted
in his coveting some spiritual good above his measure: and this
pertains to pride. Therefore it is evident that man's first sin was
pride.

Reply Obj. 1: Man's disobedience to the Divine command was not willed
by man for his own sake, for this could not happen unless one
presuppose inordinateness in his will. It remains therefore that he
willed it for the sake of something else. Now the first thing he
coveted inordinately was his own excellence; and consequently his
disobedience was the result of his pride. This agrees with the
statement of Augustine, who says (Ad Oros [*Dial. QQ. lxv, qu. 4])
that "man puffed up with pride obeyed the serpent's prompting, and
scorned God's commands."

Reply Obj. 2: Gluttony also had a place in the sin of our first
parents. For it is written (Gen. 3:6): "The woman saw that the tree
was good to eat, and fair to the eyes, and delightful to behold, and
she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat." Yet the very goodness
and beauty of the fruit was not their first motive for sinning, but
the persuasive words of the serpent, who said (Gen. 3:5): "Your eyes
shall be opened and you shall be as Gods": and it was by coveting
this that the woman fell into pride. Hence the sin of gluttony
resulted from the sin of pride.

Reply Obj. 3: The desire for knowledge resulted in our first parents
from their inordinate desire for excellence. Hence the serpent began
by saying: "You shall be as Gods," and added: "Knowing good and evil."

Reply Obj. 4: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30), "the
woman had not believed the serpent's statement that they were
debarred by God from a good and useful thing, were her mind not
already filled with the love of her own power, and a certain proud
self-presumption." This does not mean that pride preceded the
promptings of the serpent, but that as soon as the serpent had spoken
his words of persuasion, her mind was puffed up, the result being
that she believed the demon to have spoken truly.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 163, Art. 2]

Whether the First Man's Pride Consisted in His Coveting God's Likeness?

Objection 1: It would seem that the first man's pride did not consist
in his coveting the Divine likeness. For no one sins by coveting that
which is competent to him according to his nature. Now God's likeness
is competent to man according to his nature: for it is written (Gen.
1:26): "Let us make man to our image and likeness." Therefore he did
not sin by coveting God's likeness.

Obj. 2: Further, it would seem that man coveted God's likeness in
order that he might obtain knowledge of good and evil: for this was
the serpent's suggestion: "You shall be as Gods knowing good and
evil." Now the desire of knowledge is natural to man, according to
the saying of the Philosopher at the beginning of his Metaphysics i,
1: "All men naturally desire knowledge." Therefore he did not sin by
coveting God's likeness.

Obj. 3: Further, no wise man chooses the impossible. Now the first
man was endowed with wisdom, according to Ecclus. 17:5, "He filled
them with the knowledge of understanding." Since then every sin
consists in a deliberate act of the appetite, namely choice, it would
seem that the first man did not sin by coveting something impossible.
But it is impossible for man to be like God, according to the saying
of Ex. 15:11, "Who is like to Thee among the strong, O Lord?"
Therefore the first man did not sin by coveting God's likeness.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine commenting on Ps. 68:5 [*Enarr. in Ps.
68], "Then did I restore [Douay: 'pay'] that which I took not away,"
says: "Adam and Eve wished to rob the Godhead and they lost
happiness."

_I answer that,_ likeness is twofold. One is a likeness of absolute
equality [*Cf. I, Q. 93, A. 1]: and such a likeness to God our first
parents did not covet, since such a likeness to God is not
conceivable to the mind, especially of a wise man.

The other is a likeness of imitation, such as is possible for a
creature in reference to God, in so far as the creature participates
somewhat of God's likeness according to its measure. For Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. ix): "The same things are like and unlike to God;
like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He can be imitated;
unlike, according as an effect falls short of its cause." Now every
good existing in a creature is a participated likeness of the first
good.

Wherefore from the very fact that man coveted a spiritual good above
his measure, as stated in the foregoing Article, it follows that he
coveted God's likeness inordinately.

It must, however, be observed that the proper object of the appetite
is a thing not possessed. Now spiritual good, in so far as the
rational creature participates in the Divine likeness, may be
considered in reference to three things. First, as to natural being:
and this likeness was imprinted from the very outset of their
creation, both on man--of whom it is written (Gen. 1:26) that God
made man "to His image and likeness"--and on the angel, of whom it is
written (Ezech. 28:12): "Thou wast the seal of resemblance."
Secondly, as to knowledge: and this likeness was bestowed on the
angel at his creation, wherefore immediately after the words just
quoted, "Thou wast the seal of resemblance," we read: "Full of
wisdom." But the first man, at his creation, had not yet received
this likeness actually but only in potentiality. Thirdly, as to the
power of operation: and neither angel nor man received this likeness
actually at the very outset of his creation, because to each there
remained something to be done whereby to obtain happiness.

Accordingly, while both (namely the devil and the first man) coveted
God's likeness inordinately, neither of them sinned by coveting a
likeness of nature. But the first man sinned chiefly by coveting
God's likeness as regards "knowledge of good and evil," according to
the serpent's instigation, namely that by his own natural power he
might decide what was good, and what was evil for him to do; or again
that he should of himself foreknow what good and what evil would
befall him. Secondarily he sinned by coveting God's likeness as
regards his own power of operation, namely that by his own natural
power he might act so as to obtain happiness. Hence Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that "the woman's mind was filled with love of
her own power." On the other hand, the devil sinned by coveting God's
likeness, as regards power. Wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig.
13) that "he wished to enjoy his own power rather than God's."
Nevertheless both coveted somewhat to be equal to God, in so far as
each wished to rely on himself in contempt of the order of the Divine
rule.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the likeness of nature: and man
did not sin by coveting this, as stated.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not a sin to covet God's likeness as to
knowledge, absolutely; but to covet this likeness inordinately, that
is, above one's measure, this is a sin. Hence Augustine commenting on
Ps. 70:18, "O God, who is like Thee?" says: "He who desires to be of
himself, even as God is of no one, wishes wickedly to be like God.
Thus did the devil, who was unwilling to be subject to Him, and man
who refused to be, as a servant, bound by His command."

Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the likeness of equality.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 163, Art. 7]

Whether the Sin of Our First Parents Was More Grievous Than Other Sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of our first parents was more
grievous than other sins. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15):
"Great was the wickedness in sinning, when it was so easy to avoid
sin." Now it was very easy for our first parents to avoid sin,
because they had nothing within them urging them to sin. Therefore
the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins.

Obj. 2: Further, punishment is proportionate to guilt. Now the sin of
our first parents was most severely punished, since by it "death
entered into this world," as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:12). Therefore
that sin was more grievous than other sins.

Obj. 3: Further, the first in every genus is seemingly the greatest
(Metaph. ii, 4 [*Ed. Diel. i, 1]). Now the sin of our first parents
was the first among sins of men. Therefore it was the greatest.

_On the contrary,_ Origen says [*Peri Archon i, 3]: "I think that a
man who stands on the highest step of perfection cannot fail or fall
suddenly: this can happen only by degrees and little by little." Now
our first parents were established on the highest and perfect grade.
Therefore their first sin was not the greatest of all sins.

_I answer that,_ There is a twofold gravity to be observed in sin.
one results from the very species of the sin: thus we say that
adultery is a graver sin than simple fornication. The other gravity
of sin results from some circumstance of place, person, or time. The
former gravity is more essential to sin and is of greater moment:
hence a sin is said to be grave in respect of this gravity rather
than of the other. Accordingly we must say that the first man's sin
was not graver than all other sins of men, as regards the species of
the sin. For though pride, of its genus, has a certain pre-eminence
over other sins, yet the pride whereby one denies or blasphemes God
is greater than the pride whereby one covets God's likeness
inordinately, such as the pride of our first parents, as stated (A.
2).

But if we consider the circumstances of the persons who sinned, that
sin was most grave on account of the perfection of their state. We
must accordingly conclude that this sin was most grievous relatively
but not simply.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the gravity of sin as resulting
from the person of the sinner.

Reply Obj. 2: The severity of the punishment awarded to that first
sin corresponds to the magnitude of the sin, not as regards its
species but as regards its being the first sin: because it destroyed
the innocence of our original state, and by robbing it of innocence
brought disorder upon the whole human nature.

Reply Obj. 3: Where things are directly subordinate, the first must
needs be the greatest. Such is not the order among sins, for one
follows from another accidentally. And thus it does not follow that
the first sin is the greatest.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 163, Art. 4]

Whether Adam's Sin Was More Grievous Than Eve's?

Objection 1: It would seem that Adam's sin was more grievous than
Eve's. For it is written (1 Tim. 2:14): "Adam was not seduced, but
the woman being seduced was in the transgression": and so it would
seem that the woman sinned through ignorance, but the man through
assured knowledge. Now the latter is the graver sin, according to
Luke 12:47, 48, "That servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and
did not according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes: but
he that knew not, and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten
with few stripes." Therefore Adam's sin was more grievous than Eve's.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Decem Chordis 3 [*Serm. ix; xcvi
de Temp.]): "If the man is the head, he should live better, and give
an example of good deeds to his wife, that she may imitate him." Now
he who ought to do better, sins more grievously, if he commit a sin.
Therefore Adam sinned more grievously than Eve.

Obj. 3: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost would seem to be the
most grievous. Now Adam, apparently, sinned against the Holy Ghost,
because while sinning he relied on God's mercy [*Cf. Q. 21, A. 2,
Obj. 3. St. Thomas is evidently alluding to the words of Peter
Lombard quoted there], and this pertains to the sin of presumption.
Therefore it seems that Adam sinned more grievously than Eve.

_On the contrary,_ Punishment corresponds to guilt. Now the woman was
more grievously punished than the man, as appears from Gen. 3.
Therefore she sinned more grievously than the man.

_I answer that,_ As stated (A. 3), the gravity of a sin depends on
the species rather than on a circumstance of that sin. Accordingly we
must assert that, if we consider the condition attaching to these
persons, the man's sin is the more grievous, because he was more
perfect than the woman.

As regards the genus itself of the sin, the sin of each is considered
to be equal, for each sinned by pride. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. xi, 35): "Eve in excusing herself betrays disparity of sex,
though parity of pride."

But as regards the species of pride, the woman sinned more
grievously, for three reasons. First, because she was more puffed up
than the man. For the woman believed in the serpent's persuasive
words, namely that God had forbidden them to eat of the tree, lest
they should become like to Him; so that in wishing to attain to God's
likeness by eating of the forbidden fruit, her pride rose to the
height of desiring to obtain something against God's will. On the
other hand, the man did not believe this to be true; wherefore he did
not wish to attain to God's likeness against God's will: but his
pride consisted in wishing to attain thereto by his own power.
Secondly, the woman not only herself sinned, but suggested sin to the
man; wherefore she sinned against both God and her neighbor. Thirdly,
the man's sin was diminished by the fact that, as Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. xi, 42), "he consented to the sin out of a certain
friendly good-will, on account of which a man sometimes will offend
God rather than make an enemy of his friend. That he ought not to
have done so is shown by the just issue of the Divine sentence."

It is therefore evident that the woman's sin was more grievous than
the man's.

Reply Obj. 1: The woman was deceived because she was first of all
puffed up with pride. Wherefore her ignorance did not excuse, but
aggravated her sin, in so far as it was the cause of her being puffed
up with still greater pride.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers the circumstance of personal
condition, on account of which the man's sin was more grievous than
the woman's.

Reply Obj. 3: The man's reliance on God's mercy did not reach to
contempt of God's justice, wherein consists the sin against the Holy
Ghost, but as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi [*De Civ. Dei xiv,
11]), it was due to the fact that, "having had no experience of God's
severity, he thought the sin to be venial," i.e. easily forgiven
[*Cf. I-II, Q. 89, A. 3, ad 1].
_______________________

QUESTION 164

OF THE PUNISHMENTS OF THE FIRST MAN'S SIN
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider the punishments of the first sin; and under this
head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Death, which is the common
punishment; (2) the other particular punishments mentioned in Genesis.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 164, Art. 1]

Whether Death Is the Punishment of Our First Parents' Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that death is not the punishment of our
first parents' sin. For that which is natural to man cannot be called
a punishment of sin, because sin does not perfect nature but vitiates
it. Now death is natural to man: and this is evident both from the
fact that his body is composed of contraries, and because "mortal" is
included in the definition of man. Therefore death is not a
punishment of our first parents' sin.

Obj. 2: Further, death and other bodily defects are similarly found
in man as well as in other animals, according to Eccles. 3:19, "The
death of man and of beasts is one, and the condition of them both
equal." But in dumb animals death is not a punishment of sin.
Therefore neither is it so in men.

Obj. 3: Further, the sin of our first parents was the sin of
particular individuals: whereas death affects the entire human
nature. Therefore it would seem that it is not a punishment of our
first parents' sin.

Obj. 4: Further, all are equally descended from our first parents.
Therefore if death were the punishment of our first parents' sin, it
would follow that all men would suffer death in equal measure. But
this is clearly untrue, since some die sooner, and some more
painfully, than others. Therefore death is not the punishment of the
first sin.

Obj. 5: Further, the evil of punishment is from God, as stated above
(I, Q. 48, A. 6; Q. 49, A. 2). But death, apparently, is not from
God: for it is written (Wis. 1:13): "God made not death." Therefore
death is not the punishment of the first sin.

Obj. 6: Further, seemingly, punishments are not meritorious, since
merit is comprised under good, and punishment under evil. Now death
is sometimes meritorious, as in the case of a martyr's death.
Therefore it would seem that death is not a punishment.

Obj. 7: Further, punishment would seem to be painful. But death
apparently cannot be painful, since man does not feel it when he is
dead, and he cannot feel it when he is not dying. Therefore death is
not a punishment of sin.

Obj. 8: Further, if death were a punishment of sin, it would have
followed sin immediately. But this is not true, for our first parents
lived a long time after their sin (Gen. 5:5). Therefore, seemingly,
death is not a punishment of sin.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): "By one man sin
entered into this world, and by sin death."

_I answer that,_ If any one, on account of his fault, be deprived of
a favor bestowed on him the privation of that favor is a punishment
of that fault. Now as we stated in the First Part (Q. 95, A. 1; Q.
97, A. 1), God bestowed this favor on man, in his primitive state,
that as long as his mind was subject to God, the lower powers of his
soul would be subject to his rational mind, and his body to his soul.
But inasmuch as through sin man's mind withdrew from subjection to
God, the result was that neither were his lower powers wholly subject
to his reason, whence there followed so great a rebellion of the
carnal appetite against the reason: nor was the body wholly subject
to the soul; whence arose death and other bodily defects. For life
and soundness of body depend on the body being subject to the soul,
as the perfectible is subject to its perfection. Consequently, on the
other hand, death, sickness, and all defects of the body are due to
the lack of the body's subjection to the soul.

It is therefore evident that as the rebellion of the carnal appetite
against the spirit is a punishment of our first parents' sin, so also
are death and all defects of the body.

Reply Obj. 1: A thing is said to be natural if it proceeds from the
principles of nature. Now the essential principles of nature are form
and matter. The form of man is his rational soul, which is, of
itself, immortal: wherefore death is not natural to man on the part
of his form. The matter of man is a body such as is composed of
contraries, of which corruptibility is a necessary consequence, and
in this respect death is natural to man. Now this condition attached
to the nature of the human body results from a natural necessity,
since it was necessary for the human body to be the organ of touch,
and consequently a mean between objects of touch: and this was
impossible, were it not composed of contraries, as the Philosopher
states (De Anima ii, 11). On the other hand, this condition is not
attached to the adaptability of matter to form because, if it were
possible, since the form is incorruptible, its matter should rather
be incorruptible. In the same way a saw needs to be of iron, this
being suitable to its form and action, so that its hardness may make
it fit for cutting. But that it be liable to rust is a necessary
result of such a matter and is not according to the agent's choice;
for, if the craftsman were able, of the iron he would make a saw that
would not rust. Now God Who is the author of man is all-powerful,
wherefore when He first made man, He conferred on him the favor of
being exempt from the necessity resulting from such a matter: which
favor, however, was withdrawn through the sin of our first parents.
Accordingly death is both natural on account of a condition attaching
to matter, and penal on account of the loss of the Divine favor
preserving man from death [*Cf. I-II, Q. 85, A. 6].

Reply Obj. 2: This likeness of man to other animals regards a
condition attaching to matter, namely the body being composed of
contraries. But it does not regard the form, for man's soul is
immortal, whereas the souls of dumb animals are mortal.

Reply Obj. 3: Our first parents were made by God not only as
particular individuals, but also as principles of the whole human
nature to be transmitted by them to their posterity, together with
the Divine favor preserving them from death. Hence through their sin
the entire human nature, being deprived of that favor in their
posterity, incurred death.

Reply Obj. 4: A twofold defect arises from sin. One is by way of a
punishment appointed by a judge: and such a defect should be equal in
those to whom the sin pertains equally. The other defect is that
which results accidentally from this punishment; for instance, that
one who has been deprived of his sight for a sin he has committed,
should fall down in the road. Such a defect is not proportionate to
the sin, nor does a human judge take it into account, since he cannot
foresee chance happenings. Accordingly, the punishment appointed for
the first sin and proportionately corresponding thereto, was the
withdrawal of the Divine favor whereby the rectitude and integrity of
human nature was maintained. But the defects resulting from this
withdrawal are death and other penalties of the present life.
Wherefore these punishments need not be equal in those to whom the
first sin equally appertains. Nevertheless, since God foreknows all
future events, Divine providence has so disposed that these penalties
are apportioned in different ways to various people. This is not on
account of any merits or demerits previous to this life, as Origen
held [*Peri Archon ii, 9]: for this is contrary to the words of Rom.
9:11, "When they . . . had not done any good or evil"; and also
contrary to statements made in the First Part (Q. 90, A. 4; Q. 118,
A. 3), namely that the soul is not created before the body: but
either in punishment of their parents' sins, inasmuch as the child is
something belonging to the father, wherefore parents are often
punished in their children; or again it is for a remedy intended for
the spiritual welfare of the person who suffers these penalties, to
wit that he may thus be turned away from his sins, or lest he take
pride in his virtues, and that he may be crowned for his patience.

Reply Obj. 5: Death may be considered in two ways. First, as an evil
of human nature, and thus it is not of God, but is a defect befalling
man through his fault. Secondly, as having an aspect of good, namely
as being a just punishment, and thus it is from God. Wherefore
Augustine says (Retract. i, 21) that God is not the author of death,
except in so far as it is a punishment.

Reply Obj. 6: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 5), "just as the
wicked abuse not only evil but also good things, so do the righteous
make good use not only of good but also of evil things. Hence it is
that both evil men make evil use of the law, though the law is good,
while good men die well, although death is an evil." Wherefore
inasmuch as holy men make good use of death, their death is to them
meritorious.

Reply Obj. 7: Death may be considered in two ways. First, as the
privation of life, and thus death cannot be felt, since it is the
privation of sense and life. In this way it involves not pain of
sense but pain of loss. Secondly, it may be considered as denoting
the corruption which ends in the aforesaid privation. Now we may
speak of corruption even as of generation in two ways: in one way as
being the term of alteration, and thus in the first instant in which
life departs, death is said to be present. In this way also death has
no pain of sense. In another way corruption may be taken as including
the previous alteration: thus a person is said to die, when he is in
motion towards death; just as a thing is said to be engendered, while
in motion towards the state of having been engendered: and thus death
may be painful.

Reply Obj. 8: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. [*De Pecc. Mer. et
Rem. i, 16. Cf. Gen. ad lit. ii. 32]), "although our first parents
lived thereafter many years, they began to die on the day when they
heard the death-decree, condemning them to decline to old age."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 164, Art. 2]

Whether the Particular Punishments of Our First Parents Are Suitably
Appointed in Scripture?

Objection 1: It would seem that the particular punishments of our
first parents are unsuitably appointed in Scripture. For that which
would have occurred even without sin should not be described as a
punishment for sin. Now seemingly there would have been "pain in
child-bearing," even had there been no sin: for the disposition of
the female sex is such that offspring cannot be born without pain to
the bearer. Likewise the "subjection of woman to man" results from
the perfection of the male, and the imperfection of the female sex.
Again it belongs to the nature of the earth "to bring forth thorns
and thistles," and this would have occurred even had there been no
sin. Therefore these are unsuitable punishments of the first sin.

Obj. 2: Further, that which pertains to a person's dignity does not,
seemingly, pertain to his punishment. But the "multiplying of
conceptions" pertains to a woman's dignity. Therefore it should not
be described as the woman's punishment.

Obj. 3: Further, the punishment of our first parents' sin is
transmitted to all, as we have stated with regard to death (A. 1).
But all "women's conceptions" are not "multiplied," nor does "every
man eat bread in the sweat of his face." Therefore these are not
suitable punishments of the first sin.

Obj. 4: Further, the place of paradise was made for man. Now nothing
in the order of things should be without purpose. Therefore it would
seem that the exclusion of man from paradise was not a suitable
punishment of man.

Obj. 5: Further, this place of the earthly paradise is said to be
naturally inaccessible. Therefore it was useless to put other
obstacles in the way lest man should return thither, to wit the
cherubim, and the "flaming sword turning every way."

Obj. 6: Further, immediately after his sin man was subject to the
necessity of dying, so that he could not be restored to immortality
by the beneficial tree of life. Therefore it was useless to forbid
him to eat of the tree of life, as instanced by the words of Gen.
3:22: "See, lest perhaps he . . . take . . . of the tree of
life . . . and live for ever."

Obj. 7: Further, to mock the unhappy seems inconsistent with mercy
and clemency, which are most of all ascribed to God in Scripture,
according to Ps. 144:9, "His tender mercies are over all His works."
Therefore God is unbecomingly described as mocking our first parents,
already reduced through sin to unhappy straits, in the words of Gen.
3:22, "Behold Adam is become as one of Us, knowing good and evil."

Obj. 8: Further, clothes are necessary to man, like food, according
to 1 Tim. 6:8, "Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these
we are content." Therefore just as food was appointed to our first
parents before their sin, so also should clothing have been ascribed
to them. Therefore after their sin it was unsuitable to say that God
made for them garments of skin.

Objection 9: Further, the punishment inflicted for a sin should
outweigh in evil the gain realized through the sin: else the
punishment would not deter one from sinning. Now through sin our
first parents gained in this, that their eyes were opened, according
to Gen. 3:7. But this outweighs in good all the penal evils which are
stated to have resulted from sin. Therefore the punishments resulting
from our first parents' sin are unsuitably described.

_On the contrary,_ These punishments were appointed by God, Who does
all things, "in number, weight, and measure [*Vulg.: 'Thou hast
ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight.']" (Wis.
11:21).

_I answer that,_ As stated in the foregoing Article, on account of
their sin, our first parents were deprived of the Divine favor,
whereby the integrity of human nature was maintained in them, and by
the withdrawal of this favor human nature incurred penal defects.
Hence they were punished in two ways. In the first place by being
deprived of that which was befitting the state of integrity, namely
the place of the earthly paradise: and this is indicated (Gen. 3:23)
where it is stated that "God sent him out of the paradise of
pleasure." And since he was unable, of himself, to return to that
state of original innocence, it was fitting that obstacles should be
placed against his recovering those things that were befitting his
original state, namely food (lest he should take of the tree of life)
and place; for "God placed before . . . paradise . . . Cherubim, and
a flaming sword." Secondly, they were punished by having appointed to
them things befitting a nature bereft of the aforesaid favor: and
this as regards both the body and the soul. With regard to the body,
to which pertains the distinction of sex, one punishment was
appointed to the woman and another to the man. To the woman
punishment was appointed in respect of two things on account of which
she is united to the man; and these are the begetting of children,
and community of works pertaining to family life. As regards the
begetting of children, she was punished in two ways: first in the
weariness to which she is subject while carrying the child after
conception, and this is indicated in the words (Gen. 3:16), "I will
multiply thy sorrows, and thy conceptions"; secondly, in the pain
which she suffers in giving birth, and this is indicated by the words
(Gen. 3:16), "In sorrow shalt thou bring forth." As regards family
life she was punished by being subjected to her husband's authority,
and this is conveyed in the words (Gen. 3:16), "Thou shalt be under
thy husband's power."

Now, just as it belongs to the woman to be subject to her husband in
matters relating to the family life, so it belongs to the husband to
provide the necessaries of that life. In this respect he was punished
in three ways. First, by the barrenness of the earth, in the words
(Gen. 3:17), "Cursed is the earth in thy work." Secondly, by the
cares of his toil, without which he does not win the fruits of the
earth; hence the words (Gen. 3:17), "With labor and toil shalt thou
eat thereof all the days of thy life." Thirdly, by the obstacles
encountered by the tillers of the soil, wherefore it is written (Gen.
3:18), "Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee."

Likewise a triple punishment is ascribed to them on the part of the
soul. First, by reason of the confusion they experienced at the
rebellion of the flesh against the spirit; hence it is written (Gen.
3:7): "The eyes of them both were opened; and . . . they perceived
themselves to be naked." Secondly, by the reproach for their sin,
indicated by the words (Gen. 3:22), "Behold Adam is become as one of
Us." Thirdly, by the reminder of their coming death, when it was said
to him (Gen. 3:19): "Dust thou art and into dust thou shalt return."
To this also pertains that God made them garments of skin, as a sign
of their mortality.

Reply Obj. 1: In the state of innocence child-bearing would have been
painless: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "Just as, in
giving birth, the mother would then be relieved not by groans of
pain, but by the instigations of maturity, so in bearing and
conceiving the union of both sexes would be one not of lustful desire
but of deliberate action" [*Cf. I, Q. 98, A. 2].

The subjection of the woman to her husband is to be understood as
inflicted in punishment of the woman, not as to his headship (since
even before sin the man was the "head" and governor "of the woman"),
but as to her having now to obey her husband's will even against her
own.

If man had not sinned, the earth would have brought forth thorns and
thistles to be the food of animals, but not to punish man, because
their growth would bring no labor or punishment for the tiller of the
soil, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 18). Alcuin [*Interrog. et
Resp. in Gen. lxxix], however, holds that, before sin, the earth
brought forth no thorns and thistles, whatever: but the former
opinion is the better.

Reply Obj. 2: The multiplying of her conceptions was appointed as a
punishment to the woman, not on account of the begetting of children,
for this would have been the same even before sin, but on account of
the numerous sufferings to which the woman is subject, through
carrying her offspring after conception. Hence it is expressly
stated: "I will multiply thy sorrows, and thy conceptions."

Reply Obj. 3: These punishments affect all somewhat. For any woman
who conceives must needs suffer sorrows and bring forth her child
with pain: except the Blessed Virgin, who "conceived without
corruption, and bore without pain" [*St. Bernard, Serm. in Dom. inf.
oct. Assum. B. V. M.], because her conceiving was not according to
the law of nature, transmitted from our first parents. And if a woman
neither conceives nor bears, she suffers from the defect of
barrenness, which outweighs the aforesaid punishments. Likewise
whoever tills the soil must needs eat his bread in the sweat of his
brow: while those who do not themselves work on the land, are busied
with other labors, for "man is born to labor" (Job 5:7): and thus
they eat the bread for which others have labored in the sweat of
their brow.

Reply Obj. 4: Although the place of the earthly paradise avails not
man for his use, it avails him for a lesson; because he knows himself
deprived of that place on account of sin, and because by the things
that have a bodily existence in that paradise, he is instructed in
things pertaining to the heavenly paradise, the way to which is
prepared for man by Christ.

Reply Obj. 5: Apart from the mysteries of the spiritual
interpretation, this place would seem to be inaccessible, chiefly on
account of the extreme heat in the middle zone by reason of the
nighness of the sun. This is denoted by the "flaming sword," which is
described as "turning every way," as being appropriate to the
circular movement that causes this heat. And since the movements of
corporal creatures are set in order through the ministry of the
angels, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4), it was fitting
that, besides the sword turning every way, there should be cherubim
"to keep the way of the tree of life." Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. xi, 40): "It is to be believed that even in the visible paradise
this was done by heavenly powers indeed, so that there was a fiery
guard set there by the ministry of angels."

Reply Obj. 6: After sin, if man had [eaten] of the tree of life, he
would not thereby have recovered immortality, but by means of that
beneficial food he might have prolonged his life. Hence in the words
"And live for ever," "for ever" signifies "for a long time." For it
was not expedient for man to remain longer in the unhappiness of this
life.

Reply Obj. 7: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 39), "these
words of God are not so much a mockery of our first parents as a
deterrent to others, for whose benefit these things are written, lest
they be proud likewise, because Adam not only failed to become that
which he coveted to be, but did not keep that to which he was made."

Reply Obj. 8: Clothing is necessary to man in his present state of
unhappiness for two reasons. First, to supply a deficiency in respect
of external harm caused by, for instance, extreme heat or cold.
Secondly, to hide his ignominy and to cover the shame of those
members wherein the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit is most
manifest. Now these two motives do not apply to the primitive state.
because then man's body could not be hurt by any outward thing, as
stated in the First Part (Q. 97, A. 2), nor was there in man's body
anything shameful that would bring confusion on him. Hence it is
written (Gen. 2:23): "And they were both naked, to wit Adam and his
wife, and were not ashamed." The same cannot be said of food, which
is necessary to entertain the natural heat, and to sustain the body.

Reply Obj. 9: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 31), "We must not
imagine that our first parents were created with their eyes closed,
especially since it is stated that the woman saw that the tree was
fair, and good to eat. Accordingly the eyes of both were opened so
that they saw and thought on things which had not occurred to their
minds before, this was a mutual concupiscence such as they had not
hitherto."
_______________________

QUESTION 165

OF OUR FIRST PARENTS' TEMPTATION
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider our first parents' temptation, concerning which
there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it was fitting for man to be tempted by the devil?

(2) Of the manner and order of that temptation.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 165, Art. 1]

Whether It Was Fitting for Man to Be Tempted by the Devil?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for man to be
tempted by the devil. For the same final punishment is appointed to
the angels' sin and to man's, according to Matt. 25:41, "Go [Vulg.:
'Depart from Me'] you cursed into everlasting fire, which was
prepared for the devil and his angels." Now the angels' first sin did
not follow a temptation from without. Therefore neither should man's
first sin have resulted from an outward temptation.

Obj. 2: Further, God, Who foreknows the future, knew that through the
demon's temptation man would fall into sin, and thus He knew full
well that it was not expedient for man to be tempted. Therefore it
would seem unfitting for God to allow him to be tempted.

Obj. 3: Further, it seems to savor of punishment that anyone should
have an assailant, just as on the other hand the cessation of an
assault is akin to a reward. Now punishment should not precede fault.
Therefore it was unfitting for man to be tempted before he sinned.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 34:11): "He that hath not
been tempted [Douay: 'tried'], what manner of things doth he know?"

_I answer that,_ God's wisdom "orders all things sweetly" (Wis. 8:1),
inasmuch as His providence appoints to each one that which is
befitting it according to its nature. For as Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv), "it belongs to providence not to destroy, but to maintain,
nature." Now it is a condition attaching to human nature that one
creature can be helped or impeded by another. Wherefore it was
fitting that God should both allow man in the state of innocence to
be tempted by evil angels, and should cause him to be helped by good
angels. And by a special favor of grace, it was granted him that no
creature outside himself could harm him against his own will, whereby
he was able even to resist the temptation of the demon.

Reply Obj. 1: Above the human nature there is another that
admits of the possibility of the evil of fault: but there is not above
the angelic nature. Now only one that is already become evil through
sin can tempt by leading another into evil. Hence it was fitting that
by an evil angel man should be tempted to sin, even as according to
the order of nature he is moved forward to perfection by means of a
good angel. An angel could be perfected in good by something above
him, namely by God, but he could not thus be led into sin, because
according to James 1:13, "God is not a tempter of evils."

Reply Obj. 2: Just as God knew that man, through being
tempted, would fall into sin, so too He knew that man was able, by his
free will, to resist the tempter. Now the condition attaching to man's
nature required that he should be left to his own will, according to
Ecclus. 15:14, "God left" man "in the hand of his own counsel." Hence
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 4): "It seems to me that man would
have had no prospect of any special praise, if he were able to lead a
good life simply because there was none to persuade him to lead an
evil life; since both by nature he had the power, and in his power he
had the will, not to consent to the persuader."

Reply Obj. 3: An assault is penal if it be difficult to resist
it: but, in the state of innocence, man was able, without any
difficulty, to resist temptation. Consequently the tempter's assault
was not a punishment to man.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 165, Art. 2]

Whether the Manner and Order of the First Temptation Was Fitting?

Objection 1: It would seem that the manner and order of the first
temptation was not fitting. For just as in the order of nature the
angel was above man, so was the man above the woman. Now sin came
upon man through an angel: therefore in like manner it should have
come upon the woman through the man; in other words the woman should
have been tempted by the man, and not the other way about.

Obj. 2: Further, the temptation of our first parents was by
suggestion. Now the devil is able to make suggestions to man without
making use of an outward sensible creature. Since then our first
parents were endowed with a spiritual mind, and adhered less to
sensible than to intelligible things, it would have been more fitting
for man to be tempted with a merely spiritual, instead of an outward,
temptation.

Obj. 3: Further, one cannot fittingly suggest an evil except through
some apparent good. But many other animals have a greater appearance
of good than the serpent has. Therefore man was unfittingly tempted
by the devil through a serpent.

Obj. 4: Further, the serpent is an irrational animal. Now wisdom,
speech, and punishment are not befitting an irrational animal.
Therefore the serpent is unfittingly described (Gen. 3:1) as "more
subtle than any of the beasts of the earth," or as "the most prudent
of all beasts" according to another version [*The Septuagint]: and
likewise is unfittingly stated to have spoken to the woman, and to
have been punished by God.

_On the contrary,_ That which is first in any genus should be
proportionate to all that follow it in that genus. Now in every kind
of sin we find the same order as in the first temptation. For,
according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12), it begins with the
concupiscence of sin in the sensuality, signified by the serpent;
extends to the lower reason, by pleasure, signified by the woman; and
reaches to the higher reason by consent in the sin, signified by the
man. Therefore the order of the first temptation was fitting.

_I answer that,_ Man is composed of a twofold nature, intellective
and sensitive. Hence the devil, in tempting man, made use of a
twofold incentive to sin: one on the part of the intellect, by
promising the Divine likeness through the acquisition of knowledge
which man naturally desires to have; the other on the part of sense.
This he did by having recourse to those sensible things, which are
most akin to man, partly by tempting the man through the woman who
was akin to him in the same species; partly by tempting the woman
through the serpent, who was akin to them in the same genus; partly
by suggesting to them to eat of the forbidden fruit, which was akin
to them in the proximate genus.

Reply Obj. 1: In the act of tempting the devil was by way of
principal agent; whereas the woman was employed as an instrument of
temptation in bringing about the downfall of the man, both because
the woman was weaker than the man, and consequently more liable to be
deceived, and because, on account of her union with man, the devil
was able to deceive the man especially through her. Now there is no
parity between principal agent and instrument, because the principal
agent must exceed in power, which is not requisite in the
instrumental agent.

Reply Obj. 2: A suggestion whereby the devil suggests something to
man spiritually, shows the devil to have more power against man than
outward suggestion has, since by an inward suggestion, at least,
man's imagination is changed by the devil [*Cf. First Part, Q. 91, A.
3]; whereas by an outward suggestion, a change is wrought merely on
an outward creature. Now the devil had a minimum of power against man
before sin, wherefore he was unable to tempt him by inward
suggestion, but only by outward suggestion.

Reply Obj. 3: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 3), "we are
not to suppose that the devil chose the serpent as his means of
temptation; but as he was possessed of the lust of deceit, he could
only do so by the animal he was allowed to use for that purpose."

Reply Obj. 4: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 29), "the
serpent is described as most prudent or subtle, on account of the
cunning of the devil, who wrought his wiles in it: thus, we speak of
a prudent or cunning tongue, because it is the instrument of a
prudent or cunning man in advising something prudently or cunningly.
Nor indeed (Gen. ad lit. xi, 28) did the serpent understand the
sounds which were conveyed through it to the woman; nor again are we
to believe that its soul was changed into a rational nature, since
not even men, who are rational by nature, know what they say when a
demon speaks in them. Accordingly (Gen. ad lit. xi, 29) the serpent
spoke to man, even as the ass on which Balaam sat spoke to him,
except that the former was the work of a devil, whereas the latter
was the work of an angel. Hence (Gen. ad lit. xi, 36) the serpent was
not asked why it had done this, because it had not done this in its
own nature, but the devil in it, who was already condemned to
everlasting fire on account of his sin: and the words addressed to
the serpent were directed to him who wrought through the serpent."

Moreover, as again Augustine says (Super Gen. contra Manich. ii, 17,
18), "his, that is, the devil's, punishment mentioned here is that
for which we must be on our guard against him, not that which is
reserved till the last judgment. For when it was said to him: 'Thou
art cursed among all cattle and beasts of the earth,' the cattle are
set above him, not in power, but in the preservation of their nature,
since the cattle lost no heavenly bliss, seeing that they never had
it, but they continue to live in the nature which they received." It
is also said to him: "'Upon thy breast and belly shalt thou creep,'"
according to another version [*The Septuagint] "Here the breast
signifies pride, because it is there that the impulse of the soul
dominates, while the belly denotes carnal desire, because this part
of the body is softest to the touch: and on these he creeps to those
whom he wishes to deceive." The words, "'Earth shalt thou eat all the
days of thy life' may be understood in two ways. Either 'Those shall
belong to thee, whom thou shalt deceive by earthly lust,' namely
sinners who are signified under the name of earth, or a third kind of
temptation, namely curiosity, is signified by these words: for to eat
earth is to look into things deep and dark." The putting of enmities
between him and the woman "means that we cannot be tempted by the
devil, except through that part of the soul which bears or reflects
the likeness of a woman. The seed of the devil is the temptation to
evil, the seed of the woman is the fruit of good works, whereby the
temptation to evil is resisted. Wherefore the serpent lies in wait
for the woman's heel, that if at any time she fall away towards what
is unlawful, pleasure may seize hold of her: and she watches his head
that she may shut him out at the very outset of the evil temptation."
_______________________

QUESTION 166

OF STUDIOUSNESS
(In Two Articles)

We must next consider studiousness and its opposite, curiosity.
Concerning studiousness there are two points of inquiry:

(1) What is the matter of studiousness?

(2) Whether it is a part of temperance?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 166, Art. 1]

Whether the Proper Matter of Studiousness Is Knowledge?

Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not the proper matter of
studiousness. For a person is said to be studious because he applies
study to certain things. Now a man ought to apply study to every
matter, in order to do aright what has to be done. Therefore
seemingly knowledge is not the special matter of studiousness.

Obj. 2: Further, studiousness is opposed to curiosity. Now curiosity,
which is derived from _cura_ (care), may also refer to elegance of
apparel and other such things, which regard the body; wherefore the
Apostle says (Rom. 13:14): "Make not provision (_curam_) for the
flesh in its concupiscences."

Obj. 3: Further it is written (Jer. 6:13): "From the least of them
even to the greatest, all study [Douay: 'are given to']
covetousness." Now covetousness is not properly about knowledge, but
rather about the possession of wealth, as stated above (Q. 118, A.
2). Therefore studiousness, which is derived from "study," is not
properly about knowledge.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 27:11): "Study wisdom, my
son, and make my heart joyful, that thou mayest give an answer to him
that reproacheth." Now study, which is commended as a virtue, is the
same as that to which the Law urges. Therefore studiousness is
properly about _knowledge._

_I answer that,_ Properly speaking, study denotes keen application of
the mind to something. Now the mind is not applied to a thing except
by knowing that thing. Wherefore the mind's application to knowledge
precedes its application to those things to which man is directed by
his knowledge. Hence study regards knowledge in the first place, and
as a result it regards any other things the working of which requires
to be directed by knowledge. Now the virtues lay claim to that matter
about which they are first and foremost; thus fortitude is concerned
about dangers of death, and temperance about pleasures of touch.
Therefore studiousness is properly ascribed to knowledge.

Reply Obj. 1: Nothing can be done aright as regards other matters,
except in so far as is previously directed by the knowing reason.
Hence studiousness, to whatever matter it be applied, has a prior
regard for knowledge.

Reply Obj. 2: Man's mind is drawn, on account of his affections,
towards the things for which he has an affection, according to Matt.
6:21, "Where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also." And since man
has special affection for those things which foster the flesh, it
follows that man's thoughts are concerned about things that foster
his flesh, so that man seeks to know how he may best sustain his
body. Accordingly curiosity is accounted to be about things
pertaining to the body by reason of things pertaining to knowledge.

Reply Obj. 3: Covetousness craves the acquisition of gain, and for
this it is very necessary to be skilled in earthly things.
Accordingly studiousness is ascribed to things pertaining to
covetousness.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 166, Art. 2]

Whether Studiousness Is a Part of Temperance?

Objection 1: It would seem that studiousness is not a part of
temperance. For a man is said to be studious by reason of his
studiousness. Now all virtuous persons without exception are called
studious according to the Philosopher, who frequently employs the
term "studious" (_spoudaios_) in this sense (Ethic. ix, 4, 8, 9).
[*In the same sense Aristotle says in _Ethic._ iii, 2, that "every
vicious person is ignorant of what he ought to do."] Therefore
studiousness is a general virtue, and not a part of temperance.

Obj. 2: Further, studiousness, as stated (A. 1), pertains to
knowledge. But knowledge has no connection with the moral virtues
which are in the appetitive part of the soul, and pertains rather to
the intellectual virtues which are in the cognitive part: wherefore
solicitude is an act of prudence as stated above (Q. 47, A. 9).
Therefore studiousness is not a part of temperance.

Obj. 3: Further, a virtue that is ascribed as part of a principal
virtue resembles the latter as to mode. Now studiousness does not
resemble temperance as to mode, because temperance takes its name
from being a kind of restraint, wherefore it is more opposed to the
vice that is in excess: whereas studiousness is denominated from
being the application of the mind to something, so that it would seem
to be opposed to the vice that is in default, namely, neglect of
study, rather than to the vice which is in excess, namely curiosity.
wherefore, on account of its resemblance to the latter, Isidore says
(Etym. x) that "a studious man is one who is curious to study."
Therefore studiousness is not a part of temperance.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. 21): "We are
forbidden to be curious: and this is a great gift that temperance
bestows." Now curiosity is prevented by moderate studiousness.
Therefore studiousness is a part of temperance.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 141, AA. 3, 4, 5), it belongs to
temperance to moderate the movement of the appetite, lest it tend
excessively to that which is desired naturally. Now just as in
respect of his corporeal nature man naturally desires the pleasures
of food and sex, so, in respect of his soul, he naturally desires to
know something; thus the Philosopher observes at the beginning of his
_Metaphysics_ (i, 1): "All men have a natural desire for knowledge."

The moderation of this desire pertains to the virtue of studiousness;
wherefore it follows that studiousness is a potential part of
temperance, as a subordinate virtue annexed to a principal virtue.
Moreover, it is comprised under modesty for the reason given above
(Q. 160, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 1: Prudence is the complement of all the moral virtues, as
stated in _Ethic._ vi, 13. Consequently, in so far as the knowledge
of prudence pertains to all the virtues, the term "studiousness,"
which properly regards knowledge, is applied to all the virtues.

Reply Obj. 2: The act of a cognitive power is commanded by the
appetitive power, which moves all the powers, as stated above (I-II,
Q. 9, A. 1). Wherefore knowledge regards a twofold good. One is
connected with the act of knowledge itself; and this good pertains to
the intellectual virtues, and consists in man having a true estimate
about each thing. The other good pertains to the act of the
appetitive power, and consists in man's appetite being directed
aright in applying the cognitive power in this or that way to this or
that thing. And this belongs to the virtue of seriousness. Wherefore
it is reckoned among the moral virtues.

Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 93) in order to be
virtuous we must avoid those things to which we are most naturally
inclined. Hence it is that, since nature inclines us chiefly to fear
dangers of death, and to seek pleasures of the flesh, fortitude is
chiefly commended for a certain steadfast perseverance against such
dangers, and temperance for a certain restraint from pleasures of the
flesh. But as regards knowledge, man has contrary inclinations. For
on the part of the soul, he is inclined to desire knowledge of
things; and so it behooves him to exercise a praiseworthy restraint
on this desire, lest he seek knowledge immoderately: whereas on the
part of his bodily nature, man is inclined to avoid the trouble of
seeking knowledge. Accordingly, as regards the first inclination
studiousness is a kind of restraint, and it is in this sense that it
is reckoned a part of temperance. But as to the second inclination,
this virtue derives its praise from a certain keenness of interest in
seeking knowledge of things; and from this it takes its name. The
former is more essential to this virtue than the latter: since the
desire to know directly regards knowledge, to which studiousness is
directed, whereas the trouble of learning is an obstacle to
knowledge, wherefore it is regarded by this virtue indirectly, as by
that which removes an obstacle.
_______________________

QUESTION 167

OF CURIOSITY
(In Two Articles)

We must next consider curiosity, under which head there are two
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the vice of curiosity can regard intellective knowledge?

(2) Whether it is about sensitive knowledge?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 167, Art. 1]

Whether Curiosity Can Be About Intellective Knowledge?

Objection 1: It would seem that curiosity cannot be about
intellective knowledge. Because, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
ii, 6), there can be no mean and extremes in things which are
essentially good. Now intellective knowledge is essentially good:
because man's perfection would seem to consist in his intellect being
reduced from potentiality to act, and this is done by the knowledge
of truth. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the good of the
human soul is to be in accordance with reason," whose perfection
consists in knowing the truth. Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot
be about intellective knowledge.

Obj. 2: Further, that which makes man like to God, and which he
receives from God, cannot be an evil. Now all abundance of knowledge
is from God, according to Ecclus. 1:1, "All wisdom is from the Lord
God," and Wis. 7:17, "He hath given me the true knowledge of things
that are, to know the disposition of the whole world, and the virtues
of the elements," etc. Again, by knowing the truth man is likened to
God, since "all things are naked and open to His eyes" (Heb. 4:13),
and "the Lord is a God of all knowledge" (1 Kings 2:3). Therefore
however abundant knowledge of truth may be, it is not evil but good.
Now the desire of good is not sinful. Therefore the vice of curiosity
cannot be about the intellective knowledge of truth.

Obj. 3: Further, if the vice of curiosity can be about any kind of
intellective knowledge, it would be chiefly about the philosophical
sciences. But, seemingly, there is no sin in being intent on them:
for Jerome says (Super Daniel 1:8): "Those who refused to partake of
the king's meat and wine, lest they should be defiled, if they had
considered the wisdom and teaching of the Babylonians to be sinful,
would never have consented to learn that which was unlawful": and
Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 40) that "if the philosophers
made any true statements, we must claim them for our own use, as from
unjust possessors." Therefore curiosity about intellective knowledge
cannot be sinful.

_On the contrary,_ Jerome [*Comment. in Ep. ad Ephes. iv, 17] says:
"Is it not evident that a man who day and night wrestles with the
dialectic art, the student of natural science whose gaze pierces the
heavens, walks in vanity of understanding and darkness of mind?" Now
vanity of understanding and darkness of mind are sinful. Therefore
curiosity about intellective sciences may be sinful.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 166, A. 2, ad 2) studiousness is
directly, not about knowledge itself, but about the desire and study
in the pursuit of knowledge. Now we must judge differently of the
knowledge itself of truth, and of the desire and study in the pursuit
of the knowledge of truth. For the knowledge of truth, strictly
speaking, is good, but it may be evil accidentally, by reason of some
result, either because one takes pride in knowing the truth,
according to 1 Cor. 8:1, "Knowledge puffeth up," or because one uses
the knowledge of truth in order to sin.

On the other hand, the desire or study in pursuing the knowledge of
truth may be right or wrong. First, when one tends by his study to
the knowledge of truth as having evil accidentally annexed to it, for
instance those who study to know the truth that they may take pride
in their knowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. 21): "Some
there are who forsaking virtue, and ignorant of what God is, and of
the majesty of that nature which ever remains the same, imagine they
are doing something great, if with surpassing curiosity and keenness
they explore the whole mass of this body which we call the world. So
great a pride is thus begotten, that one would think they dwelt in
the very heavens about which they argue." In like manner, those who
study to learn something in order to sin are engaged in a sinful
study, according to the saying of Jer. 9:5, "They have taught their
tongue to speak lies, they have labored to commit iniquity."

Secondly, there may be sin by reason of the appetite or study
directed to the learning of truth being itself inordinate; and this
in four ways. First, when a man is withdrawn by a less profitable
study from a study that is an obligation incumbent on him; hence
Jerome says [*Epist. xxi ad Damas]: "We see priests forsaking the
gospels and the prophets, reading stage-plays, and singing the love
songs of pastoral idylls." Secondly, when a man studies to learn of
one, by whom it is unlawful to be taught, as in the case of those who
seek to know the future through the demons. This is superstitious
curiosity, of which Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 4): "Maybe, the
philosophers were debarred from the faith by their sinful curiosity
in seeking knowledge from the demons."

Thirdly, when a man desires to know the truth about creatures,
without referring his knowledge to its due end, namely, the knowledge
of God. Hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29) that "in studying
creatures, we must not be moved by empty and perishable curiosity;
but we should ever mount towards immortal and abiding things."

Fourthly, when a man studies to know the truth above the capacity of
his own intelligence, since by so doing men easily fall into error:
wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 3:22): "Seek not the things that are
too high for thee, and search not into things above thy ability . . .
and in many of His works be not curious," and further on (Ecclus.
3:26), "For . . . the suspicion of them hath deceived many, and hath
detained their minds in vanity."

Reply Obj. 1: Man's good consists in the knowledge of truth; yet
man's sovereign good consists, not in the knowledge of any truth, but
in the perfect knowledge of the sovereign truth, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. x, 7, 8). Hence there may be sin in the knowledge of
certain truths, in so far as the desire of such knowledge is not
directed in due manner to the knowledge of the sovereign truth,
wherein supreme happiness consists.

Reply Obj. 2: Although this argument shows that the knowledge of
truth is good in itself, this does not prevent a man from misusing
the knowledge of truth for an evil purpose, or from desiring the
knowledge of truth inordinately, since even the desire for good
should be regulated in due manner.

Reply Obj. 3: The study of philosophy is in itself lawful and
commendable, on account of the truth which the philosophers acquired
through God revealing it to them, as stated in Rom. 1:19. Since,
however, certain philosophers misuse the truth in order to assail the
faith, the Apostle says (Col. 2:8): "Beware lest any man cheat you by
philosophy and vain deceit, according to the tradition of men . . .
and not according to Christ": and Dionysius says (Ep. vii ad
Polycarp.) of certain philosophers that "they make an unholy use of
divine things against that which is divine, and by divine wisdom
strive to destroy the worship of God."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 167, Art. 2]

Whether the Vice of Curiosity Is About Sensitive Knowledge?

Objection 1: It would seem that the vice of curiosity is not about
sensitive knowledge. For just as some things are known by the sense
of sight, so too are some things known by the senses of touch and
taste. Now the vice concerned about objects of touch and taste is not
curiosity but lust or gluttony. Therefore seemingly neither is the
vice of curiosity about things known by the sight.

Obj. 2: Further, curiosity would seem to refer to watching games;
wherefore Augustine says (Confess. vi, 8) that when "a fall occurred
in the fight, a mighty cry of the whole people struck him strongly,
and overcome by curiosity Alypius opened his eyes." But it does not
seem to be sinful to watch games, because it gives pleasure on
account of the representation, wherein man takes a natural delight,
as the Philosopher states (Poet. vi). Therefore the vice of curiosity
is not about the knowledge of sensible objects.

Obj. 3: Further, it would seem to pertain to curiosity to inquire
into our neighbor's actions, as Bede observes [*Comment. in 1 John
2:16]. Now, seemingly, it is not a sin to inquire into the actions of
others, because according to Ecclus. 17:12, God "gave to every one of
them commandment concerning his neighbor." Therefore the vice of
curiosity does not regard the knowledge of such like particular
sensible objects.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 38) that
"concupiscence of the eyes makes men curious." Now according to Bede
(Comment. in 1 John 2:16) "concupiscence of the eyes refers not only
to the learning of magic arts, but also to sight-seeing, and to the
discovery and dispraise of our neighbor's faults," and all these are
particular objects of sense. Therefore since concupiscence of the
eves is a sin, even as concupiscence of the flesh and pride of life,
which are members of the same division (1 John 2:16), it seems that
the vice of curiosity is about the knowledge of sensible things.

_I answer that,_ The knowledge of sensible things is directed to two
things. For in the first place, both in man and in other animals, it
is directed to the upkeep of the body, because by knowledge of this
kind, man and other animals avoid what is harmful to them, and seek
those things that are necessary for the body's sustenance. In the
second place, it is directed in a manner special to man, to
intellective knowledge, whether speculative or practical. Accordingly
to employ study for the purpose of knowing sensible things may be
sinful in two ways. First, when the sensitive knowledge is not
directed to something useful, but turns man away from some useful
consideration. Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 35), "I go no more
to see a dog coursing a hare in the circus; but in the open country,
if I happen to be passing, that coursing haply will distract me from
some weighty thought, and draw me after it . . . and unless Thou,
having made me see my weakness, didst speedily admonish me, I become
foolishly dull." Secondly, when the knowledge of sensible things is
directed to something harmful, as looking on a woman is directed to
lust: even so the busy inquiry into other people's actions is
directed to detraction. On the other hand, if one be ordinately
intent on the knowledge of sensible things by reason of the necessity
of sustaining nature, or for the sake of the study of intelligible
truth, this studiousness about the knowledge of sensible things is
virtuous.

Reply Obj. 1: Lust and gluttony are about pleasures arising from the
use of objects of touch, whereas curiosity is about pleasures arising
from the knowledge acquired through all the senses. According to
Augustine (Confess. x, 35) "it is called concupiscence of the eyes"
because "the sight is the sense chiefly used for obtaining knowledge,
so that all sensible things are said to be seen," and as he says
further on: "By this it may more evidently be discerned wherein
pleasure and wherein curiosity is the object of the senses; for
pleasure seeketh objects beautiful, melodious, fragrant, savory,
soft; but curiosity, for trial's sake, seeketh even the contraries of
these, not for the sake of suffering annoyance, but out of the lust
of experiment and knowledge."

Reply Obj. 2: Sight-seeing becomes sinful, when it renders a man
prone to the vices of lust and cruelty on account of things he sees
represented. Hence Chrysostom says [*Hom. vi in Matth.] that such
sights make men adulterers and shameless.

Reply Obj. 3: One may watch other people's actions or inquire into
them, with a good intent, either for one's own good--that is in order
to be encouraged to better deeds by the deeds of our neighbor--or for
our neighbor's good--that is in order to correct him, if he do
anything wrong, according to the rule of charity and the duty of
one's position. This is praiseworthy, according to Heb. 10:24,
"Consider one another to provoke unto charity and to good works." But
to observe our neighbor's faults with the intention of looking down
upon them, or of detracting them, or even with no further purpose
than that of disturbing them, is sinful: hence it is written (Prov.
24:15), "Lie not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in the house of
the just, nor spoil his rest."
_______________________

QUESTION 168

OF MODESTY AS CONSISTING IN THE OUTWARD MOVEMENTS OF THE BODY
(In Four Articles)

We must next consider modesty as consisting in the outward movements
of the body, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in the outward movements of
the body that are done seriously?

(2) Whether there can be a virtue about playful actions?

(3) Of the sin consisting in excess of play;

(4) Of the sin consisting in lack of play.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 168, Art. 1]

Whether Any Virtue Regards the Outward Movements of the Body?

Objection 1: It would seem that no virtue regards the outward
movements of the body. For every virtue pertains to the spiritual
beauty of the soul, according to Ps. 44:14, "All the glory of the
king's daughter is within," and a gloss adds, "namely, in the
conscience." Now the movements of the body are not within, but
without. Therefore there can be no virtue about them.

Obj. 2: Further, "Virtues are not in us by nature," as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1). But outward bodily movements are
in man by nature, since it is by nature that some are quick, and some
slow of movement, and the same applies to other differences of
outward movements. Therefore there is no virtue about movements of
this kind.

Obj. 3: Further, every moral virtue is either about actions directed
to another person, as justice, or about passions, as temperance and
fortitude. Now outward bodily movements are not directed to another
person, nor are they passions. Therefore no virtue is connected with
them.

Obj. 4: Further, study should be applied to all works of virtue, as
stated above (Q. 166, A. 1, Obj. 1; A. 2, ad 1). Now it is censurable
to apply study to the ordering of one's outward movements: for
Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "A becoming gait is one that reflects
the carriage of authority, has the tread of gravity, and the
foot-print of tranquillity: yet so that there be neither study nor
affectation, but natural and artless movement." Therefore seemingly
there is no virtue about the style of outward movements.

_On the contrary,_ The beauty of honesty [*Cf. Q. 145, A. 1] pertains
to virtue. Now the style of outward movements pertains to the beauty
of honesty. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "The sound of the
voice and the gesture of the body are distasteful to me, whether they
be unduly soft and nerveless, or coarse and boorish. Let nature be
our model; her reflection is gracefulness of conduct and beauty of
honesty." Therefore there is a virtue about the style of outward
movement.

_I answer that,_ Moral virtue consists in the things pertaining to
man being directed by his reason. Now it is manifest that the outward
movements of man are dirigible by reason, since the outward members
are set in motion at the command of reason. Hence it is evident that
there is a moral virtue concerned with the direction of these
movements.

Now the direction of these movements may be considered from a twofold
standpoint. First, in respect of fittingness to the person; secondly,
in respect of fittingness to externals, whether persons, business, or
place. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "Beauty of conduct
consists in becoming behavior towards others, according to their sex
and person," and this regards the first. As to the second, he adds:
"This is the best way to order our behavior, this is the polish
becoming to every action."

Hence Andronicus [*De Affectibus] ascribes two things to these
outward movements: namely "taste" (_ornatus_) which regards what is
becoming to the person, wherefore he says that it is the knowledge of
what is becoming in movement and behavior; and "methodicalness"
(_bona ordinatio_) which regards what is becoming to the business in
hand, and to one's surroundings, wherefore he calls it "the practical
knowledge of separation," i.e. of the distinction of "acts."

Reply Obj. 1: Outward movements are signs of the inward disposition,
according to Ecclus. 19:27, "The attire of the body, and the laughter
of the teeth, and the gait of the man, show what he is"; and Ambrose
says (De Offic. i, 18) that "the habit of mind is seen in the gesture
of the body," and that "the body's movement is an index of the soul."

Reply Obj. 2: Although it is from natural disposition that a man is
inclined to this or that style of outward movement, nevertheless what
is lacking to nature can be supplied by the efforts of reason. Hence
Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "Let nature guide the movement: and
if nature fail in any respect, surely effort will supply the defect."

Reply Obj. 3: As stated (ad 1) outward movements are indications of
the inward disposition, and this regards chiefly the passions of the
soul. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18) that "from these
things," i.e. the outward movements, "the man that lies hidden in our
hearts is esteemed to be either frivolous, or boastful, or impure, or
on the other hand sedate, steady, pure, and free from blemish." It is
moreover from our outward movements that other men form their
judgment about us, according to Ecclus. 19:26, "A man is known by his
look, and a wise man, when thou meetest him, is known by his
countenance." Hence moderation of outward movements is directed
somewhat to other persons, according to the saying of Augustine in
his Rule (Ep. ccxi), "In all your movements, let nothing be done to
offend the eye of another, but only that which is becoming to the
holiness of your state." Wherefore the moderation of outward
movements may be reduced to two virtues, which the Philosopher
mentions in _Ethic._ iv, 6, 7. For, in so far as by outward movements
we are directed to other persons, the moderation of our outward
movements belongs to "friendliness or affability" [*Cf. Q. 114, A.
1]. This regards pleasure or pain which may arise from words or deeds
in reference to others with whom a man comes in contact. And, in so
far as outward movements are signs of our inward disposition, their
moderation belongs to the virtue of truthfulness [*Cf. Q. 9], whereby
a man, by word and deed, shows himself to be such as he is inwardly.

Reply Obj. 4: It is censurable to study the style of one's outward
movements, by having recourse to pretense in them, so that they do
not agree with one's inward disposition. Nevertheless it behooves one
to study them, so that if they be in any way inordinate, this may be
corrected. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): "Let them be without
artifice, but not without correction."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 168, Art. 2]

Whether There Can Be a Virtue About Games?

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be a virtue about games.
For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 23): "Our Lord said: 'Woe to you who
laugh, for you shall weep.' Wherefore I consider that all, and not
only excessive, games should be avoided." Now that which can be done
virtuously is not to be avoided altogether. Therefore there cannot be
a virtue about games.

Obj. 2: Further, "Virtue is that which God forms in us, without us,"
as stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4). Now Chrysostom says [*Hom. vi in
Matth.]: "It is not God, but the devil, that is the author of fun.
Listen to what happened to those who played: 'The people sat down to
eat and drink, and they rose up to play.'" Therefore there can be no
virtue about games.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 6) that "playful
actions are not directed to something else." But it is a requisite of
virtue that the agent in choosing should "direct his action to
something else," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4). Therefore
there can be no virtue about games.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Music. ii, 15): "I pray thee,
spare thyself at times: for it becomes a wise man sometimes to relax
the high pressure of his attention to work." Now this relaxation of
the mind from work consists in playful words or deeds. Therefore it
becomes a wise and virtuous man to have recourse to such things at
times. Moreover the Philosopher [*Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8] assigns to
games the virtue of _eutrapelia_, which we may call "pleasantness."

_I answer that,_ Just as man needs bodily rest for the body's
refreshment, because he cannot always be at work, since his power is
finite and equal to a certain fixed amount of labor, so too is it
with his soul, whose power is also finite and equal to a fixed amount
of work. Consequently when he goes beyond his measure in a certain
work, he is oppressed and becomes weary, and all the more since when
the soul works, the body is at work likewise, in so far as the
intellective soul employs forces that operate through bodily organs.
Now sensible goods are connatural to man, and therefore, when the
soul arises above sensibles, through being intent on the operations
of reason, there results in consequence a certain weariness of soul,
whether the operations with which it is occupied be those of the
practical or of the speculative reason. Yet this weariness is greater
if the soul be occupied with the work of contemplation, since thereby
it is raised higher above sensible things; although perhaps certain
outward works of the practical reason entail a greater bodily labor.
In either case, however, one man is more soul-wearied than another,
according as he is more intensely occupied with works of reason. Now
just as weariness of the body is dispelled by resting the body, so
weariness of the soul must needs be remedied by resting the soul: and
the soul's rest is pleasure, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 2;
I-II, Q. 31, A. 1, ad 2). Consequently, the remedy for weariness of
soul must needs consist in the application of some pleasure, by
slackening the tension of the reason's study. Thus in the
_Conferences of the Fathers_ (xxiv, 21), it is related of Blessed
John the Evangelist, that when some people were scandalized on
finding him playing together with his disciples, he is said to have
told one of them who carried a bow to shoot an arrow. And when the
latter had done this several times, he asked him whether he could do
it indefinitely, and the man answered that if he continued doing it,
the bow would break. Whence the Blessed John drew the inference that
in like manner man's mind would break if its tension were never
relaxed.

Now such like words or deeds wherein nothing further is sought than
the soul's delight, are called playful or humorous. Hence it is
necessary at times to make use of them, in order to give rest, as it
were, to the soul. This is in agreement with the statement of the
Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 8) that "in the intercourse of this life
there is a kind of rest that is associated with games": and
consequently it is sometimes necessary to make use of such things.

Nevertheless it would seem that in this matter there are three points
which require especial caution. The first and chief is that the
pleasure in question should not be sought in indecent or injurious
deeds or words. Wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i, 29) that "one kind
of joke is discourteous, insolent, scandalous, obscene." Another
thing to be observed is that one lose not the balance of one's mind
altogether. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 20): "We should beware
lest, when we seek relaxation of mind, we destroy all that harmony
which is the concord of good works": and Tully says (De Offic. i,
29), that, "just as we do not allow children to enjoy absolute
freedom in their games, but only that which is consistent with good
behavior, so our very fun should reflect something of an upright
mind." Thirdly, we must be careful, as in all other human actions, to
conform ourselves to persons, time, and place, and take due account
of other circumstances, so that our fun "befit the hour and the man,"
as Tully says (De Offic. i, 29).

Now these things are directed according to the rule of reason: and a
habit that operates according to reason is virtue. Therefore there
can be a virtue about games. The Philosopher gives it the name of
wittiness (_eutrapelia_), and a man is said to be pleasant through
having a happy turn* of mind, whereby he gives his words and deeds a
cheerful turn: and inasmuch as this virtue restrains a man from
immoderate fun, it is comprised under modesty. [*_Eutrapelia_ is
derived from _trepein_ = "to turn"].

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, fun should fit with business and
persons; wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. i, 17) that "when the
audience is weary, it will be useful for the speaker to try something
novel or amusing, provided that joking be not incompatible with the
gravity of the subject." Now the sacred doctrine is concerned with
things of the greatest moment, according to Prov. 8:6, "Hear, for I
will speak of great things." Wherefore Ambrose does not altogether
exclude fun from human speech, but from the sacred doctrine; hence he
begins by saying: "Although jokes are at times fitting and pleasant,
nevertheless they are incompatible with the ecclesiastical rule;
since how can we have recourse to things which are not to be found in
Holy Writ?"

Reply Obj. 2: This saying of Chrysostom refers to the inordinate use
of fun, especially by those who make the pleasure of games their end;
of whom it is written (Wis. 15:12): "They have accounted our life a
pastime." Against these Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): "We are so
begotten by nature that we appear to be made not for play and fun,
but rather for hardships, and for occupations of greater gravity and
moment."

Reply Obj. 3: Playful actions themselves considered in their species
are not directed to an end: but the pleasure derived from such
actions is directed to the recreation and rest of the soul, and
accordingly if this be done with moderation, it is lawful to make use
of fun. Hence Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): "It is indeed lawful to
make use of play and fun, but in the same way as we have recourse to
sleep and other kinds of rest, then only when we have done our duty
by grave and serious matters."
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 168, Art. 3]

Whether There Can Be Sin in the Excess of Play?

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be sin in the excess of
play. For that which is an excuse for sin is not held to be sinful.
Now play is sometimes an excuse for sin, for many things would be
grave sins if they were done seriously, whereas if they be done in
fun, are either no sin or but slightly sinful. Therefore it seems
that there is no sin in excessive play.

Obj. 2: Further, all other vices are reducible to the seven capital
vices, as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 17). But excess of play does
not seem reducible to any of the capital vices. Therefore it would
seem not to be a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, comedians especially would seem to exceed in play,
since they direct their whole life to playing. Therefore if excess of
play were a sin, all actors would be in a state of sin; moreover all
those who employ them, as well as those who make them any payment,
would sin as accomplices of their sin. But this would seem untrue;
for it is related in the Lives of the Fathers (ii. 16; viii. 63) that
is was revealed to the Blessed Paphnutius that a certain jester would
be with him in the life to come.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Prov. 14:13, "Laughter shall be mingled
with sorrow and mourning taketh hold of the end of joy," remarks: "A
mourning that will last for ever." Now there is inordinate laughter
and inordinate joy in excessive play. Therefore there is mortal sin
therein, since mortal sin alone is deserving of everlasting mourning.

_I answer that,_ In all things dirigible according to reason, the
excessive is that which goes beyond, and the deficient is that which
falls short of the rule of reason. Now it has been stated (A. 2) that
playful or jesting words or deeds are dirigible according to reason.
Wherefore excessive play is that which goes beyond the rule of
reason: and this happens in two ways. First, on account of the very
species of the acts employed for the purpose of fun, and this kind of
jesting, according to Tully (De Offic. i, 29), is stated to be
"discourteous, insolent, scandalous, and obscene," when to wit a man,
for the purpose of jesting, employs indecent words or deeds, or such
as are injurious to his neighbor, these being of themselves mortal
sins. And thus it is evident that excessive play is a mortal sin.

Secondly, there may be excess in play, through lack of due
circumstances: for instance when people make use of fun at undue
times or places, or out of keeping with the matter in hand, or
persons. This may be sometimes a mortal sin on account of the strong
attachment to play, when a man prefers the pleasure he derives
therefrom to the love of God, so as to be willing to disobey a
commandment of God or of the Church rather than forego, such like
amusements. Sometimes, however, it is a venial sin, for instance
where a man is not so attached to amusement as to be willing for its
sake to do anything in disobedience to God.

Reply Obj. 1: Certain things are sinful on account of the intention
alone, because they are done in order to injure someone. Such an
intention is excluded by their being done in fun, the intention of
which is to please, not to injure: in these cases fun excuses from
sin, or diminishes it. Other things, however, are sins according to
their species, such as murder, fornication, and the like: and fun is
no excuse for these; in fact they make fun scandalous and obscene.

Reply Obj. 2: Excessive play pertains to senseless mirth, which
Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) calls a daughter of gluttony. Wherefore it
is written (Ex. 32:6): "The people sat down to eat and drink, and
they rose up to play."

Reply Obj. 3: As stated (A. 2), play is necessary for the intercourse
of human life. Now whatever is useful to human intercourse may have a
lawful employment ascribed to it. Wherefore the occupation of
play-actors, the object of which is to cheer the heart of man, is not
unlawful in itself; nor are they in a state of sin provided that
their playing be moderated, namely that they use no unlawful words or
deeds in order to amuse, and that they do not introduce play into
undue matters and seasons. And although in human affairs, they have
no other occupation in reference to other men, nevertheless in
reference to themselves, and to God, they perform other actions both
serious and virtuous, such as prayer and the moderation of their own
passions and operations, while sometimes they give alms to the poor.
Wherefore those who maintain them in moderation do not sin but act
justly, by rewarding them for their services. On the other hand, if a
man spends too much on such persons, or maintains those comedians who
practice unlawful mirth, he sins as encouraging them in their sin.
Hence Augustine says (Tract. c. in Joan.) that "to give one's
property to comedians is a great sin, not a virtue"; unless by chance
some play-actor were in extreme need, in which case one would have to
assist him, for Ambrose says (De Offic. [*Quoted in Canon Pasce,
dist. 86]): "Feed him that dies of hunger; for whenever thou canst
save a man by feeding him, if thou hast not fed him, thou hast slain
him."
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 168, Art. 4]

Whether There Is a Sin in Lack of Mirth?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no sin in lack of mirth. For
no sin is prescribed to a penitent. But Augustine speaking of a
penitent says (De Vera et Falsa Poenit. 15) [*Spurious]: "Let him
refrain from games and the sights of the world, if he wishes to
obtain the grace of a full pardon." Therefore there is no sin in lack
of mirth.

Obj. 2: Further, no sin is included in the praise given to holy men.
But some persons are praised for having refrained from mirth; for it
is written (Jer. 15:17): "I sat not in the assembly of jesters," and
(Tobias 3:17): "Never have I joined myself with them that play;
neither have I made myself partaker with them that walk in
lightness." Therefore there can be no sin in the lack of mirth.

Obj. 3: Further, Andronicus counts austerity to be one of the
virtues, and he describes it as a habit whereby a man neither gives
nor receives the pleasures of conversation. Now this pertains to the
lack of mirth. Therefore the lack of mirth is virtuous rather than
sinful.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8) reckons the
lack of mirth to be a vice.

_I answer that,_ In human affairs whatever is against reason is a
sin. Now it is against reason for a man to be burdensome to others,
by offering no pleasure to others, and by hindering their enjoyment.
Wherefore Seneca [*Martin of Braga, Formula Vitae Honestae: cap. De
Continentia] says (De Quat. Virt., cap. De Continentia): "Let your
conduct be guided by wisdom so that no one will think you rude, or
despise you as a cad." Now a man who is without mirth, not only is
lacking in playful speech, but is also burdensome to others, since he
is deaf to the moderate mirth of others. Consequently they are
vicious, and are said to be boorish or rude, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. iv, 8).

Since, however, mirth is useful for the sake of the rest and
pleasures it affords; and since, in human life, pleasure and rest are
not in quest for their own sake, but for the sake of operation, as
stated in _Ethic._ x, 6, it follows that "lack of mirth is less
sinful than excess thereof." Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix,
10): "We should make few friends for the sake of pleasure, since but
little sweetness suffices to season life, just as little salt
suffices for our meat."

Reply Obj. 1: Mirth is forbidden the penitent because he is called
upon to mourn for his sins. Nor does this imply a vice in default,
because this very diminishment of mirth in them is in accordance with
reason.

Reply Obj. 2: Jeremias speaks there in accordance with the times, the
state of which required that man should mourn; wherefore he adds: "I
sat alone, because Thou hast filled me with threats." The words of
Tobias 3 refer to excessive mirth; and this is evident from his
adding: "Neither have I made myself partaker with them that walk in
lightness."

Reply Obj. 3: Austerity, as a virtue, does not exclude all pleasures,
but only such as are excessive and inordinate; wherefore it would
seem to pertain to affability, which the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6)
calls "friendliness," or _eutrapelia_, otherwise wittiness.
Nevertheless he names and defines it thus in respect of its agreement
with temperance, to which it belongs to restrain pleasure.
_______________________

QUESTION 169

OF MODESTY IN THE OUTWARD APPAREL
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider modesty as connected with the outward apparel,
and under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in connection with outward
apparel?

(2) Whether women sin mortally by excessive adornment?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 169, Art. 1]

Whether There Can Be Virtue and Vice in Connection with Outward
Apparel?

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be virtue and vice in
connection with outward apparel. For outward adornment does not
belong to us by nature, wherefore it varies according to different
times and places. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12)
that "among the ancient Romans it was scandalous for one to wear a
cloak with sleeves and reaching to the ankles, whereas now it is
scandalous for anyone hailing from a reputable place to be without
them." Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1) there is in us
a natural aptitude for the virtues. Therefore there is no virtue or
vice about such things.

Obj. 2: Further, if there were virtue and vice in connection with
outward attire, excess in this matter would be sinful. Now excess in
outward attire is not apparently sinful, since even the ministers of
the altar use most precious vestments in the sacred ministry.
Likewise it would seem not to be sinful to be lacking in this, for it
is said in praise of certain people (Heb. 11:37): "They wandered
about in sheepskins and in goatskins." Therefore it seems that there
cannot be virtue and vice in this matter.

Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or moral, or
intellectual. Now an intellectual virtue is not conversant with
matter of this kind, since it is a perfection regarding the knowledge
of truth. Nor is there a theological virtue connected therewith,
since that has God for its object; nor are any of the moral virtues
enumerated by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), connected with it.
Therefore it seems that there cannot be virtue and vice in connection
with this kind of attire.

_On the contrary,_ Honesty [*Cf. Q. 145] pertains to virtue. Now a
certain honesty is observed in the outward apparel; for Ambrose says
(De Offic. i, 19): "The body should be bedecked naturally and without
affectation, with simplicity, with negligence rather than nicety, not
with costly and dazzling apparel, but with ordinary clothes, so that
nothing be lacking to honesty and necessity, yet nothing be added to
increase its beauty." Therefore there can be virtue and vice in the
outward attire.

_I answer that,_ It is not in the outward things themselves which man
uses, that there is vice, but on the part of man who uses them
immoderately. This lack of moderation occurs in two ways. First, in
comparison with the customs of those among whom one lives; wherefore
Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): "Those offenses which are contrary
to the customs of men, are to be avoided according to the customs
generally prevailing, so that a thing agreed upon and confirmed by
custom or law of any city or nation may not be violated at the
lawless pleasure of any, whether citizen or foreigner. For any part,
which harmonizeth not with its whole, is offensive." Secondly, the
lack of moderation in the use of these things may arise from the
inordinate attachment of the user, the result being that a man
sometimes takes too much pleasure in using them, either in accordance
with the custom of those among whom he dwells or contrary to such
custom. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12): "We must
avoid excessive pleasure in the use of things, for it leads not only
wickedly to abuse the customs of those among whom we dwell, but
frequently to exceed their bounds, so that, whereas it lay hidden,
while under the restraint of established morality, it displays its
deformity in a most lawless outbreak."

In point of excess, this inordinate attachment occurs in three ways.
First when a man seeks glory from excessive attention to dress; in so
far as dress and such like things are a kind of ornament. Hence
Gregory says (Hom. xl in Ev.): "There are some who think that
attention to finery and costly dress is no sin. Surely, if this were
no fault, the word of God would not say so expressly that the rich
man who was tortured in hell had been clothed in purple and fine
linen. No one, forsooth, seeks costly apparel" (such, namely, as
exceeds his estate) "save for vainglory." Secondly, when a man seeks
sensuous pleasure from excessive attention to dress, in so far as
dress is directed to the body's comfort. Thirdly, when a man is too
solicitous [*Cf. Q. 55, A. 6] in his attention to outward apparel.

Accordingly Andronicus [*De Affectibus] reckons three virtues in
connection with outward attire; namely "humility," which excludes the
seeking of glory, wherefore he says that humility is "the habit of
avoiding excessive expenditure and parade"; "contentment" [*Cf. Q.
143, Obj. 4], which excludes the seeking of sensuous pleasure,
wherefore he says that "contentedness is the habit that makes a man
satisfied with what is suitable, and enables him to determine what is
becoming in his manner of life" (according to the saying of the
Apostle, 1 Tim. 6:8): "Having food and wherewith to be covered, with
these let us be content;"--and "simplicity," which excludes excessive
solicitude about such things, wherefore he says that "simplicity is a
habit that makes a man contented with what he has."

In the point of deficiency there may be inordinate attachment in two
ways. First, through a man's neglect to give the requisite study or
trouble to the use of outward apparel. Wherefore the Philosopher says
(Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is a mark of effeminacy to let one's cloak
trail on the ground to avoid the trouble of lifting it up." Secondly,
by seeking glory from the very lack of attention to outward attire.
Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12) that "not only
the glare and pomp of outward things, but even dirt and the weeds of
mourning may be a subject of ostentation, all the more dangerous as
being a decoy under the guise of God's service"; and the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "both excess and inordinate defect are a
subject of ostentation."

Reply Obj. 1: Although outward attire does not come from nature, it
belongs to natural reason to moderate it; so that we are naturally
inclined to be the recipients of the virtue that moderates outward
raiment.

Reply Obj. 2: Those who are placed in a position of dignity, or again
the ministers of the altar, are attired in more costly apparel than
others, not for the sake of their own glory, but to indicate the
excellence of their office or of the Divine worship: wherefore this
is not sinful in them. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii,
12): "Whoever uses outward things in such a way as to exceed the
bounds observed by the good people among whom he dwells, either
signifies something by so doing, or is guilty of sin, inasmuch as he
uses these things for sensual pleasure or ostentation."

Likewise there may be sin on the part of deficiency: although it is
not always a sin to wear coarser clothes than other people. For, if
this be done through ostentation or pride, in order to set oneself
above others, it is a sin of superstition; whereas, if this be done
to tame the flesh, or to humble the spirit, it belongs to the virtue
of temperance. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12):
"Whoever uses transitory things with greater restraint than is
customary with those among whom he dwells, is either temperate or
superstitious." Especially, however, is the use of coarse raiment
befitting to those who by word and example urge others to repentance,
as did the prophets of whom the Apostle is speaking in the passage
quoted. Wherefore a gloss on Matt. 3:4, says: "He who preaches
penance, wears the garb of penance."

Reply Obj. 3: This outward apparel is an indication of man's estate;
wherefore excess, deficiency, and mean therein, are referable to the
virtue of truthfulness, which the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) assigns
to deeds and words, which are indications of something connected with
man's estate.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 169, Art. 2]

Whether the Adornment of Women Is Devoid of Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that the adornment of women is not devoid
of mortal sin. For whatever is contrary to a precept of the Divine
law is a mortal sin. Now the adornment of women is contrary to a
precept of the Divine law; for it is written (1 Pet. 3:3): "Whose,"
namely women's, "adorning, let it not be the outward plaiting of the
hair, or the wearing of gold, or the putting on of apparel."
Wherefore a gloss of Cyprian says: "Those who are clothed in silk and
purple cannot sincerely put on Christ: those who are bedecked with
gold and pearls and trinkets have forfeited the adornments of mind
and body." Now this is not done without a mortal sin. Therefore the
adornment of women cannot be devoid of mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, Cyprian says (De Habit. Virg.): "I hold that not
only virgins and widows, but also wives and all women without
exception, should be admonished that nowise should they deface God's
work and fabric, the clay that He has fashioned, with the aid of
yellow pigments, black powders or rouge, or by applying any dye that
alters the natural features." And afterwards he adds: "They lay hands
on God, when they strive to reform what He has formed. This is an
assault on the Divine handiwork, a distortion of the truth. Thou
shalt not be able to see God, having no longer the eyes that God
made, but those the devil has unmade; with him shalt thou burn on
whose account thou art bedecked." But this is not due except to
mortal sin. Therefore the adornment of women is not devoid of mortal
sin.

Obj. 3: Further, just as it is unbecoming for a woman to wear man's
clothes, so is it unbecoming for her to adorn herself inordinately.
Now the former is a sin, for it is written (Deut. 22:5): "A woman
shall not be clothed with man's apparel, neither shall a man use
woman's apparel." Therefore it seems that also the excessive
adornment of women is a mortal sin.

Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ If this were true it would seem that the
makers of these means of adornment sin mortally.

_I answer that,_ As regards the adornment of women, we must bear in
mind the general statements made above (A. 1) concerning outward
apparel, and also something special, namely that a woman's apparel
may incite men to lust, according to Prov. 7:10, "Behold a woman
meeteth him in harlot's attire, prepared to deceive souls."

Nevertheless a woman may use means to please her husband, lest
through despising her he fall into adultery. Hence it is written (1
Cor. 7:34) that the woman "that is married thinketh on the things of
the world, how she may please her husband." Wherefore if a married
woman adorn herself in order to please her husband she can do this
without sin.

But those women who have no husband nor wish to have one, or who are
in a state of life inconsistent with marriage, cannot without sin
desire to give lustful pleasure to those men who see them, because
this is to incite them to sin. And if indeed they adorn themselves
with this intention of provoking others to lust, they sin mortally;
whereas if they do so from frivolity, or from vanity for the sake of
ostentation, it is not always mortal, but sometimes venial. And the
same applies to men in this respect. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ccxlv
ad Possid.): "I do not wish you to be hasty in forbidding the wearing
of gold or costly attire except in the case of those who being
neither married nor wishful to marry, should think how they may
please God: whereas the others think on the things of the world,
either husbands how they may please their wives, or wives how they
may please their husbands, except that it is unbecoming for women
though married to uncover their hair, since the Apostle commands them
to cover the head." Yet in this case some might be excused from sin,
when they do this not through vanity but on account of some contrary
custom: although such a custom is not to be commended.

Reply Obj. 1: As a gloss says on this passage, "The wives of those
who were in distress despised their husbands, and decked themselves
that they might please other men": and the Apostle forbids this.
Cyprian is speaking in the same sense; yet he does not forbid married
women to adorn themselves in order to please their husbands, lest the
latter be afforded an occasion of sin with other women. Hence the
Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:9): "Women . . . in ornate [Douay: 'decent']
apparel, adorning themselves with modesty and sobriety, not with
plaited hair, or gold, or pearls, or costly attire": whence we are
given to understand that women are not forbidden to adorn themselves
soberly and moderately but to do so excessively, shamelessly, and
immodestly.

Reply Obj. 2: Cyprian is speaking of women painting themselves: this
is a kind of falsification, which cannot be devoid of sin. Wherefore
Augustine says (Ep. ccxlv ad Possid.): "To dye oneself with paints in
order to have a rosier or a paler complexion is a lying counterfeit.
I doubt whether even their husbands are willing to be deceived by it,
by whom alone" (i.e. the husbands) "are they to be permitted, but not
ordered, to adorn themselves." However, such painting does not always
involve a mortal sin, but only when it is done for the sake of
sensuous pleasure or in contempt of God, and it is to like cases that
Cyprian refers.

It must, however, be observed that it is one thing to counterfeit a
beauty one has not, and another to hide a disfigurement arising from
some cause such as sickness or the like. For this is lawful, since
according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:23), "such as we think to be the
less honorable members of the body, about these we put more abundant
honor."

Reply Obj. 3: As stated in the foregoing Article, outward apparel
should be consistent with the estate of the person, according to the
general custom. Hence it is in itself sinful for a woman to wear
man's clothes, or vice versa; especially since this may be a cause of
sensuous pleasure; and it is expressly forbidden in the Law (Deut.
22) because the Gentiles used to practice this change of attire for
the purpose of idolatrous superstition. Nevertheless this may be done
sometimes without sin on account of some necessity, either in order
to hide oneself from enemies, or through lack of other clothes, or
for some similar motive.

Reply Obj. 4: In the case of an art directed to the production of
goods which men cannot use without sin, it follows that the workmen
sin in making such things, as directly affording others an occasion
of sin; for instance, if a man were to make idols or anything
pertaining to idolatrous worship. But in the case of an art the
products of which may be employed by man either for a good or for an
evil use, such as swords, arrows, and the like, the practice of such
an art is not sinful. These alone should be called arts; wherefore
Chrysostom says [*Hom. xlix super Matth.]: "The name of art should be
applied to those only which contribute towards and produce
necessaries and mainstays of life." In the case of an art that
produces things which for the most part some people put to an evil
use, although such arts are not unlawful in themselves, nevertheless,
according to the teaching of Plato, they should be extirpated from
the State by the governing authority. Accordingly, since women may
lawfully adorn themselves, whether to maintain the fitness of their
estate, or even by adding something thereto, in order to please their
husbands, it follows that those who make such means of adornment do
not sin in the practice of their art, except perhaps by inventing
means that are superfluous and fantastic. Hence Chrysostom says
(Super Matth.) that "even the shoemakers' and clothiers' arts stand
in need of restraint, for they have lent their art to lust, by
abusing its needs, and debasing art by art."
_______________________

QUESTION 170

OF THE PRECEPTS OF TEMPERANCE
(In Two Articles)

We must next consider the precepts of temperance:

(1) The precepts of temperance itself;

(2) The precepts of its parts.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 170, Art. 1]

Whether the Precepts of Temperance Are Suitably Given in the Divine
Law?

Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of temperance are
unsuitably given in the Divine law. Because fortitude is a greater
virtue than temperance, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 12; Q. 141, A. 8;
I-II, Q. 66, A. 4). Now there is no precept of fortitude among the
precepts of the decalogue, which are the most important among the
precepts of the Law. Therefore it was unfitting to include among the
precepts of the decalogue the prohibition of adultery, which is
contrary to temperance, as stated above (Q. 154, AA. 1, 8).

Obj. 2: Further, temperance is not only about venereal matters, but
also about pleasures of meat and drink. Now the precepts of the
decalogue include no prohibition of a vice pertaining to pleasures of
meat and drink, or to any other species of lust. Neither, therefore,
should they include a precept prohibiting adultery, which pertains to
venereal pleasure.

Obj. 3: Further, in the lawgiver's intention inducement to virtue
precedes the prohibition of vice, since vices are forbidden in order
that obstacles to virtue may be removed. Now the precepts of the
decalogue are the most important in the Divine law. Therefore the
precepts of the decalogue should have included an affirmative precept
directly prescribing the virtue of temperance, rather than a negative
precept forbidding adultery which is directly opposed thereto.

_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Scripture in the decalogue
(Ex. 20:14, 17).

_I answer that,_ As the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5), "the end of the
commandment is charity," which is enjoined upon us in the two
precepts concerning the love of God and of our neighbor. Wherefore
the decalogue contains those precepts which tend more directly to the
love of God and of our neighbor. Now among the vices opposed to
temperance, adultery would seem most of all opposed to the love of
our neighbor, since thereby a man lays hold of another's property for
his own use, by abusing his neighbor's wife. Wherefore the precepts
of the decalogue include a special prohibition of adultery, not only
as committed in deed, but also as desired in thought.

Reply Obj. 1: Among the species of vices opposed to fortitude there
is not one that is so directly opposed to the love of our neighbor as
adultery, which is a species of lust that is opposed to temperance.
And yet the vice of daring, which is opposed to fortitude, is wont to
be sometimes the cause of murder, which is forbidden by one of the
precepts of the decalogue: for it is written (Ecclus. 8:18): "Go not
on the way with a bold man lest he burden thee with his evils."

Reply Obj. 2: Gluttony is not directly opposed to the love of our
neighbor, as adultery is. Nor indeed is any other species of lust,
for a father is not so wronged by the seduction of the virgin over
whom he has no connubial right, as is the husband by the adultery of
his wife, for he, not the wife herself, has power over her body [*1
Cor. 7:4].

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 122, AA. 1, 4) the precepts of the
decalogue are universal principles of the Divine law; hence they need
to be common precepts. Now it was not possible to give any common
affirmative precepts of temperance, because the practice of
temperance varies according to different times, as Augustine remarks
(De Bono Conjug. xv, 7), and according to different human laws and
customs.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 170, Art. 2]

Whether the Precepts of the Virtues Annexed to Temperance Are
Suitably Given in the Divine Law?

Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the virtues annexed
to temperance are unsuitably given in the Divine law. For the
precepts of the Decalogue, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3), are certain
universal principles of the whole Divine law. Now "pride is the
beginning of all sin," according to Ecclus. 10:15. Therefore among
the precepts of the Decalogue there should have been one forbidding
pride.

Obj. 2: Further, a place before all should have been given in the
decalogue to those precepts by which men are especially induced to
fulfil the Law, because these would seem to be the most important.
Now since humility subjects man to God, it would seem most of all to
dispose man to the fulfilment of the Divine law; wherefore obedience
is accounted one of the degrees of humility, as stated above (Q. 161,
A. 6); and the same apparently applies to meekness, the effect of
which is that a man does not contradict the Divine Scriptures, as
Augustine observes (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7). Therefore it seems that
the Decalogue should have contained precepts of humility and meekness.

Obj. 3: Further, it was stated in the foregoing Article that adultery
is forbidden in the decalogue, because it is contrary to the love of
our neighbor. But inordinateness of outward movements, which is
contrary to modesty, is opposed to neighborly love: wherefore
Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxii): "In all your movements let
nothing be done to offend the eye of any person whatever." Therefore
it seems that this kind of inordinateness should also have been
forbidden by a precept of the Decalogue.

_On the contrary,_ suffices the authority of Scripture.

_I answer that,_ The virtues annexed to temperance may be considered
in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, in their effects.
Considered in themselves they have no direct connection with the love
of God or of our neighbor; rather do they regard a certain moderation
of things pertaining to man himself. But considered in their effects,
they may regard the love of God or of our neighbor: and in this
respect the decalogue contains precepts that relate to the
prohibition of the effects of the vices opposed to the parts of
temperance. Thus the effect of anger, which is opposed to meekness,
is sometimes that a man goes on to commit murder (and this is
forbidden in the Decalogue), and sometimes that he refuses due honor
to his parents, which may also be the result of pride, which leads
many to transgress the precepts of the first table.

Reply Obj. 1: Pride is the beginning of sin, but it lies hidden in
the heart; and its inordinateness is not perceived by all in common.
Hence there was no place for its prohibition among the precepts of
the Decalogue, which are like first self-evident principles.

Reply Obj. 2: Those precepts which are essentially an inducement to
the observance of the Law presuppose the Law to be already given,
wherefore they cannot be first precepts of the Law so as to have a
place in the Decalogue.

Reply Obj. 3: Inordinate outward movement is not injurious to one's
neighbor, if we consider the species of the act, as are murder,
adultery, and theft, which are forbidden in the decalogue; but only
as being signs of an inward inordinateness, as stated above (Q. 168,
A. 1, ad 1, 3).
_______________________

TREATISE ON GRATUITOUS GRACES (QQ. 171-182)
_______________________

QUESTION 171

OF PROPHECY
(In Six Articles)

After treating individually of all the virtues and vices that pertain
to men of all conditions and estates, we must now consider those
things which pertain especially to certain men. Now there is a triple
difference between men as regards things connected with the soul's
habits and acts. First, in reference to the various gratuitous
graces, according to 1 Cor. 12:4, 7: "There are diversities of graces
. . . and to one . . . by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to
another the word of knowledge," etc. Another difference arises from
the diversities of life, namely the active and the contemplative
life, which correspond to diverse purposes of operation, wherefore it
is stated (1 Cor. 12:4, 7) that "there are diversities of
operations." For the purpose of operation in Martha, who "was busy
about much serving," which pertains to the active life, differed from
the purpose of operation in Mary, "who sitting . . . at the Lord's
feet, heard His word" (Luke 10:39, 40), which pertains to the
contemplative life. A third difference corresponds to the various
duties and states of life, as expressed in Eph. 4:11, "And He gave
some apostles; and some prophets; and other some evangelists; and
other some pastors and doctors": and this pertains to diversity of
ministries, of which it is written (1 Cor. 12:5): "There are
diversities of ministries."

With regard to gratuitous graces, which are the first object to be
considered, it must be observed that some of them pertain to
knowledge, some to speech, and some to operation. Now all things
pertaining to knowledge may be comprised under _prophecy,_ since
prophetic revelation extends not only to future events relating to
man, but also to things relating to God, both as to those which are
to be believed by all and are matters of _faith,_ and as to yet
higher mysteries, which concern the perfect and belong to _wisdom._
Again, prophetic revelation is about things pertaining to spiritual
substances, by whom we are urged to good or evil; this pertains to
the _discernment of spirits._ Moreover it extends to the direction of
human acts, and this pertains to _knowledge,_ as we shall explain
further on (Q. 177). Accordingly we must first of all consider
prophecy, and rapture which is a degree of prophecy.

Prophecy admits of four heads of consideration: (1) its essence;
(2) its cause; (3) the mode of prophetic knowledge; (4) the division
of prophecy.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether prophecy pertains to knowledge?

(2) Whether it is a habit?

(3) Whether it is only about future contingencies?

(4) Whether a prophet knows all possible matters of prophecy?

(5) Whether a prophet distinguishes that which he perceives by the
gift of God, from that which he perceives by his own spirit?

(6) Whether anything false can be the matter of prophecy?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 171, Art. 1]

Whether Prophecy Pertains to Knowledge?

Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy does not pertain to
knowledge. For it is written (Ecclus. 48:14) that after death the
body of Eliseus prophesied, and further on (Ecclus. 49:18) it is said
of Joseph that "his bones were visited, and after death they
prophesied." Now no knowledge remains in the body or in the bones
after death. Therefore prophecy does not pertain to knowledge.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 14:3): "He that prophesieth,
speaketh to men unto edification." Now speech is not knowledge
itself, but its effect. Therefore it would seem that prophecy does
not pertain to knowledge.

Obj. 3: Further, every cognitive perfection excludes folly and
madness. Yet both of these are consistent with prophecy; for it is
written (Osee 9:7): "Know ye, O Israel, that the prophet was foolish
and mad [*Vulg.: 'the spiritual man was mad']." Therefore prophecy is
not a cognitive perfection.

Obj. 4: Further, just as revelation regards the intellect, so
inspiration regards, apparently, the affections, since it denotes a
kind of motion. Now prophecy is described as "inspiration" or
"revelation," according to Cassiodorus [*Prolog. super Psalt. i].
Therefore it would seem that prophecy does not pertain to the
intellect more than to the affections.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Kings 9:9): "For he that is now
called a prophet, in time past was called a seer." Now sight pertains
to knowledge. Therefore prophecy pertains to knowledge.

_I answer that,_ Prophecy first and chiefly consists in knowledge,
because, to wit, prophets know things that are far (_procul_) removed
from man's knowledge. Wherefore they may be said to take their name
from _phanos_, "apparition," because things appear to them from afar.
Wherefore, as Isidore states (Etym. vii, 8), "in the Old Testament,
they were called Seers, because they saw what others saw not, and
surveyed things hidden in mystery." Hence among heathen nations they
were known as _vates,_ "on account of their power of mind (_vi
mentis_),"    [*The Latin _vates_ is from the Greek _phates_, and may
be rendered "soothsayer"] (ibid. viii, 7).

Since, however, it is written (1 Cor. 12:7): "The manifestation of
the Spirit is given to every man unto profit," and further on (1 Cor.
14:12): "Seek to abound unto the edification of the Church," it
follows that prophecy consists secondarily in speech, in so far as
the prophets declare for the instruction of others, the things they
know through being taught of God, according to the saying of Isa.
21:10, "That which I have heard of the Lord of hosts, the God of
Israel, I have declared unto you." Accordingly, as Isidore says
(Etym. viii, 7), "prophets" may be described as _praefatores_
(foretellers), "because they tell from afar (_porro fantur_)," that
is, speak from a distance, "and foretell the truth about things to
come."

Now those things above human ken which are revealed by God cannot be
confirmed by human reason, which they surpass as regards the
operation of the Divine power, according to Mk. 16:20, "They . . .
preached everywhere, the Lord working withal and confirming the word
with signs that followed." Hence, thirdly, prophecy is concerned with
the working of miracles, as a kind of confirmation of the prophetic
utterances. Wherefore it is written (Deut. 34:10, 11): "There arose
no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face
to face, in all the signs and wonders."

Reply Obj. 1: These passages speak of prophecy in reference to the
third point just mentioned, which regards the proof of prophecy.

Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle is speaking there of the prophetic
utterances.

Reply Obj. 3: Those prophets who are described as foolish and mad are
not true but false prophets, of whom it is said (Jer. 3:16): "Hearken
not to the words of the prophets that prophesy to you, and deceive
you; they speak a vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth
of the Lord," and (Ezech. 13:3): "Woe to the foolish prophets, that
follow their own spirit, and see nothing."

Reply Obj. 4: It is requisite to prophecy that the intention of the
mind be raised to the perception of Divine things: wherefore it is
written (Ezech. 2:1): "Son of man, stand upon thy feet, and I will
speak to thee." This raising of the intention is brought about by the
motion of the Holy Ghost, wherefore the text goes on to say: "And the
Spirit entered into me . . . and He set me upon my feet." After the
mind's intention has been raised to heavenly things, it perceives the
things of God; hence the text continues: "And I heard Him speaking to
me." Accordingly inspiration is requisite for prophecy, as regards
the raising of the mind, according to Job 32:8, "The inspiration of
the Almighty giveth understanding": while revelation is necessary, as
regards the very perception of Divine things, whereby prophecy is
completed; by its means the veil of darkness and ignorance is
removed, according to Job 12:22, "He discovereth great things out of
darkness."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 171, Art. 2]

Whether Prophecy Is a Habit?

Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy is a habit. For according to
_Ethic._ ii, 5, "there are three things in the soul, power, passion,
and habit." Now prophecy is not a power, for then it would be in all
men, since the powers of the soul are common to them. Again it is not
a passion, since the passions belong to the appetitive faculty, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 22, A. 2); whereas prophecy pertains
principally to knowledge, as stated in the foregoing Article.
Therefore prophecy is a habit.

Obj. 2: Further, every perfection of the soul, which is not always in
act, is a habit. Now prophecy is a perfection of the soul; and it is
not always in act, else a prophet could not be described as asleep.
Therefore seemingly prophecy is a habit.

Obj. 3: Further, prophecy is reckoned among the gratuitous graces.
Now grace is something in the soul, after the manner of a habit, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 110, A. 2). Therefore prophecy is a habit.

_On the contrary,_ A habit is something "whereby we act when we
will," as the Commentator [*Averroes or Ibn Roshd, 1120-1198] says
(De Anima iii). But a man cannot make use of prophecy when he will,
as appears in the case of Eliseus (4 Kings 3:15), "who on Josaphat
inquiring of him concerning the future, and the spirit of prophecy
failing him, caused a minstrel to be brought to him, that the spirit
of prophecy might come down upon him through the praise of psalmody,
and fill his mind with things to come," as Gregory observes (Hom. i
super Ezech.). Therefore prophecy is not a habit.

_I answer that,_ As the Apostle says (Eph. 5:13), "all that is made
manifest is light," because, to wit, just as the manifestation of the
material sight takes place through material light, so too the
manifestation of intellectual sight takes place through intellectual
light. Accordingly manifestation must be proportionate to the light
by means of which it takes place, even as an effect is proportionate
to its cause. Since then prophecy pertains to a knowledge that
surpasses natural reason, as stated above (A. 1), it follows that
prophecy requires an intellectual light surpassing the light of
natural reason. Hence the saying of Micah 7:8: "When I sit in
darkness, the Lord is my light." Now light may be in a subject in two
ways: first, by way of an abiding form, as material light is in the
sun, and in fire; secondly, by way of a passion, or passing
impression, as light is in the air. Now the prophetic light is not in
the prophet's intellect by way of an abiding form, else a prophet
would always be able to prophesy, which is clearly false. For Gregory
says (Hom. i super Ezech.): "Sometimes the spirit of prophecy is
lacking to the prophet, nor is it always within the call of his mind,
yet so that in its absence he knows that its presence is due to a
gift." Hence Eliseus said of the Sunamite woman (4 Kings 4:27): "Her
soul is in anguish, and the Lord hath hid it from me, and hath not
told me." The reason for this is that the intellectual light that is
in a subject by way of an abiding and complete form, perfects the
intellect chiefly to the effect of knowing the principle of the
things manifested by that light; thus by the light of the active
intellect the intellect knows chiefly the first principles of all
things known naturally. Now the principle of things pertaining to
supernatural knowledge, which are manifested by prophecy, is God
Himself, Whom the prophets do not see in His essence, although He is
seen by the blessed in heaven, in whom this light is by way of an
abiding and complete form, according to Ps. 35:10, "In Thy light we
shall see light."

It follows therefore that the prophetic light is in the prophet's
soul by way of a passion or transitory impression. This is indicated
Ex. 33:22: "When my glory shall pass, I will set thee in a hole of
the rock," etc., and 3 Kings 19:11: "Go forth and stand upon the
mount before the Lord; and behold the Lord passeth," etc. Hence it is
that even as the air is ever in need of a fresh enlightening, so too
the prophet's mind is always in need of a fresh revelation; thus a
disciple who has not yet acquired the principles of an art needs to
have every detail explained to him. Wherefore it is written (Isa.
1:4): "In the morning He wakeneth my ear, so that I may hear Him as a
master." This is also indicated by the very manner in which
prophecies are uttered: thus it is stated that "the Lord spake to
such and such a prophet," or that "the word of the Lord," or "the
hand of the Lord was made upon him."

But a habit is an abiding form. Wherefore it is evident that,
properly speaking, prophecy is not a habit.

Reply Obj. 1: This division of the Philosopher's does not comprise
absolutely all that is in the soul, but only such as can be
principles of moral actions, which are done sometimes from passion,
sometimes from habit, sometimes from mere power, as in the case of
those who perform an action from the judgment of their reason before
having the habit of that action.

However, prophecy may be reduced to a passion, provided we understand
passion to denote any kind of receiving, in which sense the
Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "to understand is, in a way,
to be passive." For just as, in natural knowledge, the possible
intellect is passive to the light of the active intellect, so too in
prophetic knowledge the human intellect is passive to the
enlightening of the Divine light.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as in corporeal things, when a passion ceases,
there remains a certain aptitude to a repetition of the passion--thus
wood once ignited is more easily ignited again, so too in the
prophet's intellect, after the actual enlightenment has ceased, there
remains an aptitude to be enlightened anew--thus when the mind has
once been aroused to devotion, it is more easily recalled to its
former devotion. Hence Augustine says (De orando Deum. Ep. cxxx, 9)
that our prayers need to be frequent, "lest devotion be extinguished
as soon as it is kindled."

We might, however, reply that a person is called a prophet, even
while his prophetic enlightenment ceases to be actual, on account of
his being deputed by God, according to Jer. 1:5, "And I made thee a
prophet unto the nations."

Reply Obj. 3: Every gift of grace raises man to something above human
nature, and this may happen in two ways. First, as to the substance
of the act--for instance, the working of miracles, and the knowledge
of the uncertain and hidden things of Divine wisdom--and for such
acts man is not granted a habitual gift of grace. Secondly, a thing
is above human nature as to the mode but not the substance of the
act--for instance to love God and to know Him in the mirror of His
creatures--and for this a habitual gift of grace is bestowed.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 171, Art. 3]

Whether Prophecy Is Only About Future Contingencies?

Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy is only about future
contingencies. For Cassiodorus says [*Prol. super Psalt. i] that
"prophecy is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue
of things with unchangeable truth." Now issues pertain to future
contingencies. Therefore the prophetic revelation is about future
contingencies alone.

Obj. 2: Further, according to 1 Cor. 12, the grace of prophecy is
differentiated from wisdom and faith, which are about Divine things;
and from the discernment of spirits, which is about created spirits;
and from knowledge, which is about human things. Now habits and acts
are differentiated by their objects, as stated above (I-II, Q. 54, A.
2). Therefore it seems that the object of prophecy is not connected
with any of the above. Therefore it follows that it is about future
contingencies alone.

Obj. 3: Further, difference of object causes difference of species,
as stated above (I-II, Q. 54, A. 2). Therefore, if one prophecy is
about future contingencies, and another about other things, it would
seem to follow that these are different species of prophecy.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.) that some
prophecies are "about the future, for instance (Isa. 7:14), 'Behold a
virgin shall conceive, and bear a son'"; some are "about the past, as
(Gen. 1:1), 'In the beginning God created heaven and earth'"; some
are "about the present," as (1 Cor. 14:24, 25), "If all prophesy, and
there come in one that believeth not . . . the secrets of his heart
are made manifest." Therefore prophecy is not about future
contingencies alone.

_I answer that,_ A manifestation made by means of a certain light can
extend to all those things that are subject to that light: thus the
body's sight extends to all colors, and the soul's natural knowledge
extends to whatever is subject to the light of the active intellect.
Now prophetic knowledge comes through a Divine light, whereby it is
possible to know all things both Divine and human, both spiritual and
corporeal; and consequently the prophetic revelation extends to them
all. Thus by the ministry of spirits a prophetic revelation
concerning the perfections of God and the angels was made to Isa.
6:1, where it is written, "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high
and elevated." Moreover his prophecy contains matters referring to
natural bodies, according to the words of Isa. 40:12, "Who hath
measured the waters in the hollow of His hand," etc. It also contains
matters relating to human conduct, according to Isa. 58:1, "Deal thy
bread to the hungry," etc.; and besides this it contains things
pertaining to future events, according to Isa. 47:9, "Two things
shall come upon thee suddenly in one day, barrenness and widowhood."

Since, however, prophecy is about things remote from our knowledge,
it must be observed that the more remote things are from our
knowledge the more pertinent they are to prophecy. Of such things
there are three degrees. One degree comprises things remote from the
knowledge, either sensitive or intellective, of some particular man,
but not from the knowledge of all men; thus a particular man knows by
sense things present to him locally, which another man does not know
by human sense, since they are removed from him. Thus Eliseus knew
prophetically what his disciple Giezi had done in his absence (4
Kings 5:26), and in like manner the secret thoughts of one man are
manifested prophetically to another, according to 1 Cor. 14:25; and
again in this way what one man knows by demonstration may be revealed
to another prophetically.

The second degree comprises those things which surpass the knowledge
of all men without exception, not that they are in themselves
unknowable, but on account of a defect in human knowledge; such as
the mystery of the Trinity, which was revealed by the Seraphim
saying: "Holy, Holy, Holy," etc. (Isa. 6:3).

The last degree comprises things remote from the knowledge of all
men, through being in themselves unknowable; such are future
contingencies, the truth of which is indeterminate. And since that
which is predicated universally and by its very nature, takes
precedence of that which is predicated in a limited and relative
sense, it follows that revelation of future events belongs most
properly to prophecy, and from this prophecy apparently takes its
name. Hence Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): "And since a prophet
is so called because he foretells the future, his name loses its
significance when he speaks of the past or present."

Reply Obj. 1: Prophecy is there defined according to its proper
signification; and it is in this sense that it is differentiated from
the other gratuitous graces.

Reply Obj. 2: This is evident from what has just been said. We might
also reply that all those things that are the matter of prophecy have
the common aspect of being unknowable to man except by Divine
revelation; whereas those that are the matter of _wisdom, knowledge,_
and the _interpretation of speeches,_ can be known by man through
natural reason, but are manifested in a higher way through the
enlightening of the Divine light. As to _faith,_ although it is about
things invisible to man, it is not concerned with the knowledge of
the things believed, but with a man's certitude of assent to things
known by others.

Reply Obj. 3: The formal element in prophetic knowledge is the Divine
light, which being one, gives unity of species to prophecy, although
the things prophetically manifested by the Divine light are diverse.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 171, Art. 4]

Whether by the Divine Revelation a Prophet Knows All That Can Be
Known Prophetically?

Objection 1: It would seem that by the Divine revelation a prophet
knows all that can be known prophetically. For it is written (Amos
3:7): "The Lord God doth nothing without revealing His secret to His
servants the prophets." Now whatever is revealed prophetically is
something done by God. Therefore there is not one of them but what is
revealed to the prophet.

Obj. 2: Further, "God's works are perfect" (Deut. 32:4). Now prophecy
is a "Divine revelation," as stated above (A. 3). Therefore it is
perfect; and this would not be so unless all possible matters of
prophecy were revealed prophetically, since "the perfect is that
which lacks nothing" (Phys. iii, 6). Therefore all possible matters
of prophecy are revealed to the prophet.

Obj. 3: Further, the Divine light which causes prophecy is more
powerful than the right of natural reason which is the cause of human
science. Now a man who has acquired a science knows whatever pertains
to that science; thus a grammarian knows all matters of grammar.
Therefore it would seem that a prophet knows all matters of prophecy.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.) that "sometimes
the spirit of prophecy indicates the present to the prophet's mind
and nowise the future; and sometimes it points not to the present but
to the future." Therefore the prophet does not know all matters of
prophecy.

_I answer that,_ Things which differ from one another need not exist
simultaneously, save by reason of some one thing in which they are
connected and on which they depend: thus it has been stated above
(I-II, Q. 65, AA. 1, 2) that all the virtues must needs exist
simultaneously on account of prudence and charity. Now all the things
that are known through some principle are connected in that principle
and depend thereon. Hence he who knows a principle perfectly, as
regards all to which its virtue extends, knows at the same time all
that can be known through that principle; whereas if the common
principle is unknown, or known only in a general way, it does not
follow that one knows all those things at the same time, but each of
them has to be manifested by itself, so that consequently some of
them may be known, and some not.

Now the principle of those things that are prophetically manifested
by the Divine light is the first truth, which the prophets do not see
in itself. Wherefore there is no need for their knowing all possible
matters of prophecy; but each one knows some of them according to the
special revelation of this or that matter.

Reply Obj. 1: The Lord reveals to the prophets all things that are
necessary for the instruction of the faithful; yet not all to every
one, but some to one, and some to another.

Reply Obj. 2: Prophecy is by way of being something imperfect in the
genus of Divine revelation: hence it is written (1 Cor. 13:8) that
"prophecies shall be made void," and that "we prophesy in part," i.e.
imperfectly. The Divine revelation will be brought to its perfection
in heaven; wherefore the same text continues (1 Cor. 113:10): "When
that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done
away." Consequently it does not follow that nothing is lacking to
prophetic revelation, but that it lacks none of those things to which
prophecy is directed.

Reply Obj. 3: He who has a science knows the principles of that
science, whence whatever is pertinent to that science depends;
wherefore to have the habit of a science perfectly, is to know
whatever is pertinent to that science. But God Who is the principle
of prophetic knowledge is not known in Himself through prophecy;
wherefore the comparison fails.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 171, Art. 5]

Whether the Prophet Always Distinguishes What He Says by His Own
Spirit from What He Says by the Prophetic Spirit?

Objection 1: It would seem that the prophet always distinguishes what
he says by his own spirit from what he says by the prophetic spirit.
For Augustine states (Confess. vi, 13) that his mother said "she
could, through a certain feeling, which in words she could not
express, discern betwixt Divine revelations, and the dreams of her
own soul." Now prophecy is a Divine revelation, as stated above (A.
3). Therefore the prophet always distinguishes what he says by the
spirit of prophecy, from what he says by his own spirit.

Obj. 2: Further, God commands nothing impossible, as Jerome
[*Pelagius. Ep. xvi, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome]
says. Now the prophets were commanded (Jer. 23:28): "The prophet that
hath a dream, let him tell a dream; and he that hath My word, let him
speak My word with truth." Therefore the prophet can distinguish what
he has through the spirit of prophecy from what he sees otherwise.

Obj. 3: Further, the certitude resulting from a Divine light is
greater than that which results from the light of natural reason. Now
he that has science, by the light of natural reason knows for certain
that he has it. Therefore he that has prophecy by a Divine light is
much more certain that he has it.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): "It must be
observed that sometimes the holy prophets, when consulted, utter
certain things by their own spirit, through being much accustomed to
prophesying, and think they are speaking by the prophetic spirit."

_I answer that,_ The prophet's mind is instructed by God in two ways:
in one way by an express revelation, in another way by a most
mysterious instinct to "which the human mind is subjected without
knowing it," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 17). Accordingly the
prophet has the greatest certitude about those things which he knows
by an express revelation, and he has it for certain that they are
revealed to him by God; wherefore it is written (Jer. 26:15): "In
truth the Lord sent me to you, to speak all these words in your
hearing." Else, were he not certain about this, the faith which
relies on the utterances of the prophet would not be certain. A sign
of the prophet's certitude may be gathered from the fact that Abraham
being admonished in a prophetic vision, prepared to sacrifice his
only-begotten son, which he nowise would have done had he not been
most certain of the Divine revelation.

On the other hand, his position with regard to the things he knows by
instinct is sometimes such that he is unable to distinguish fully
whether his thoughts are conceived of Divine instinct or of his own
spirit. And those things which we know by Divine instinct are not all
manifested with prophetic certitude, for this instinct is something
imperfect in the genus of prophecy. It is thus that we are to
understand the saying of Gregory. Lest, however, this should lead to
error, "they are very soon set aright by the Holy Ghost [*For
instance, cf. 2 Kings 7:3 seqq.], and from Him they hear the truth,
so that they reproach themselves for having said what was untrue," as
Gregory adds (Hom. i super Ezech.).

The arguments set down in the first place consider the revelation
that is made by the prophetic spirit; wherefore the answer to all the
objections is clear.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 171, Art. 6]

Whether Things Known or Declared Prophetically Can Be False?

Objection 1: It would seem that things known or declared
prophetically can be false. For prophecy is about future
contingencies, as stated above (A. 3). Now future contingencies may
possibly not happen; else they would happen of necessity. Therefore
the matter of prophecy can be false.

Obj. 2: Further, Isaias prophesied to Ezechias saying (Isa. 38:1):
"Take order with thy house, for thou shalt surely die, and shalt not
live," and yet fifteen years were added to his life (4 Kings 20:6).
Again the Lord said (Jer. 18:7, 8): "I will suddenly speak against a
nation and against a kingdom, to root out and to pull down and to
destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall repent
of their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to
do them." This is instanced in the example of the Ninevites,
according to John 3:10: "The Lord [Vulg.: 'God'] had mercy with
regard to the evil which He had said that He would do to them, and He
did it not." Therefore the matter of prophecy can be false.

Obj. 3: Further, in a conditional proposition, whenever the
antecedent is absolutely necessary, the consequent is absolutely
necessary, because the consequent of a conditional proposition stands
in the same relation to the antecedent, as the conclusion to the
premises in a syllogism, and a syllogism whose premises are necessary
always leads to a necessary conclusion, as we find proved in I
Poster. 6. But if the matter of a prophecy cannot be false, the
following conditional proposition must needs be true: "If a thing has
been prophesied, it will be." Now the antecedent of this conditional
proposition is absolutely necessary, since it is about the past.
Therefore the consequent is also necessary absolutely; yet this is
unfitting, for then prophecy would not be about contingencies.
Therefore it is untrue that the matter of prophecy cannot be false.

_On the contrary,_ Cassiodorus says [*Prol. in Psalt. i] that
"prophecy is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue
of things with invariable truth." Now the truth of prophecy would not
be invariable, if its matter could be false. Therefore nothing false
can come under prophecy.

_I answer that,_ As may be gathered from what has been said (AA. 1,
3, 5), prophecy is a kind of knowledge impressed under the form of
teaching on the prophet's intellect, by Divine revelation. Now the
truth of knowledge is the same in disciple and teacher since the
knowledge of the disciple is a likeness of the knowledge of the
teacher, even as in natural things the form of the thing generated is
a likeness of the form of the generator. Jerome speaks in this sense
when he says [*Comment. in Daniel ii, 10] that "prophecy is the seal
of the Divine foreknowledge." Consequently the same truth must needs
be in prophetic knowledge and utterances, as in the Divine knowledge,
under which nothing false can possibly come, as stated in the First
Part (Q. 16, A. 8). Therefore nothing false can come under prophecy.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 13) the
certitude of the Divine foreknowledge does not exclude the
contingency of future singular events, because that knowledge regards
the future as present and already determinate to one thing. Wherefore
prophecy also, which is an "impressed likeness" or "seal of the
Divine foreknowledge," does not by its unchangeable truth exclude the
contingency of future things.

Reply Obj. 2: The Divine foreknowledge regards future things in two
ways. First, as they are in themselves, in so far, to wit, as it sees
them in their presentiality: secondly, as in their causes, inasmuch
as it sees the order of causes in relation to their effects. And
though future contingencies, considered as in themselves, are
determinate to one thing, yet, considered as in their causes, they
are not so determined but that they can happen otherwise. Again,
though this twofold knowledge is always united in the Divine
intellect, it is not always united in the prophetic revelation,
because an imprint made by an active cause is not always on a par
with the virtue of that cause. Hence sometimes the prophetic
revelation is an imprinted likeness of the Divine foreknowledge, in
so far as the latter regards future contingencies in themselves: and
such things happen in the same way as foretold, for example this
saying of Isa. 7:14: "Behold a virgin shall conceive." Sometimes,
however, the prophetic revelation is an imprinted likeness of the
Divine foreknowledge as knowing the order of causes to effects; and
then at times the event is otherwise than foretold. Yet the prophecy
does not cover a falsehood, for the meaning of the prophecy is that
inferior causes, whether they be natural causes or human acts, are so
disposed as to lead to such a result. In this way we are to
understand the saying of Isa. 38:1: "Thou shalt die, and not live";
in other words, "The disposition of thy body has a tendency to
death": and the saying of Jonah 3:4, "Yet forty days, and Nineveh
shall be destroyed," that is to say, "Its merits demand that it
should be destroyed." God is said "to repent," metaphorically,
inasmuch as He bears Himself after the manner of one who repents, by
"changing His sentence, although He changes not His counsel" [*Cf. I,
Q. 19, A. 7, ad 2].

Reply Obj. 3: Since the same truth of prophecy is the same as
the truth of Divine foreknowledge, as stated above, the conditional
proposition: "If this was prophesied, it will be," is true in the same
way as the proposition: "If this was foreknown, it will be": for in
both cases it is impossible for the antecedent not to be. Hence the
consequent is necessary, considered, not as something future in our
regard, but as being present to the Divine foreknowledge, as stated in
the First Part (Q. 14, A. 13, ad 2).
_______________________

QUESTION 172

OF THE CAUSE OF PROPHECY
(In Six Articles)

We must now consider the cause of prophecy. Under this head there are
six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether prophecy is natural?

(2) Whether it is from God by means of the angels?

(3) Whether a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy?

(4) Whether a good life is requisite?

(5) Whether any prophecy is from the demons?

(6) Whether prophets of the demons ever tell what is true?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 172, Art. 1]

Whether Prophecy Can Be Natural?

Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy can be natural. For Gregory
says (Dial. iv, 26) that "sometimes the mere strength of the soul is
sufficiently cunning to foresee certain things": and Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. xii, 13) that the human soul, according as it is
withdrawn from the sense of the body, is able to foresee the future
[*Cf. I, Q. 86, A. 4, ad 2]. Now this pertains to prophecy. Therefore
the soul can acquire prophecy naturally.

Obj. 2: Further, the human soul's knowledge is more alert while one
wakes than while one sleeps. Now some, during sleep, naturally
foresee the future, as the Philosopher asserts (De Somn. et Vigil.
[*De Divinat. per Somn. ii, which is annexed to the work quoted]).
Much more therefore can a man naturally foreknow the future.

Obj. 3: Further, man, by his nature, is more perfect than dumb
animals. Yet some dumb animals have foreknowledge of future things
that concern them. Thus ants foreknow the coming rains, which is
evident from their gathering grain into their nest before the rain
commences; and in like manner fish foreknow a coming storm, as may be
gathered from their movements in avoiding places exposed to storm.
Much more therefore can men foreknow the future that concerns
themselves, and of such things is prophecy. Therefore prophecy comes
from nature.

Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Prov. 29:18): "When prophecy shall
fail, the people shall be scattered abroad"; wherefore it is evident
that prophecy is necessary for the stability of the human race. Now
"nature does not fail in necessaries" [*Aristotle, _De Anima_ iii,
9]. Therefore it seems that prophecy is from nature.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Pet. 1:21): "For prophecy came
not by the will of man at any time, but the holy men of God spoke,
inspired by the Holy Ghost." Therefore prophecy comes not from
nature, but through the gift of the Holy Ghost.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 171, A. 6, ad 2) prophetic
foreknowledge may regard future things in two ways: in one way, as
they are in themselves; in another way, as they are in their causes.
Now, to foreknow future things, as they are in themselves, is proper
to the Divine intellect, to Whose eternity all things are present, as
stated in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 13). Wherefore such like
foreknowledge of the future cannot come from nature, but from Divine
revelation alone. On the other hand, future things can be foreknown
in their causes with a natural knowledge even by man: thus a
physician foreknows future health or death in certain causes, through
previous experimental knowledge of the order of those causes to such
effects. Such like knowledge of the future may be understood to be in
a man by nature in two ways. In one way that the soul, from that
which it holds, is able to foreknow the future, and thus Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13): "Some have deemed the human soul to
contain a certain power of divination." This seems to be in accord
with the opinion of Plato [*Phaed. xxvii; Civit. vi], who held that
our souls have knowledge of all things by participating in the ideas;
but that this knowledge is obscured in them by union with the body;
yet in some more, in others less, according to a difference in bodily
purity. According to this it might be said that men, whose souls are
not much obscured through union with the body, are able to foreknow
such like future things by their own knowledge. Against this opinion
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13): "How is it that the soul
cannot always have this power of divination, since it always wishes
to have it?"

Since, however, it seems truer, according to the opinion of
Aristotle, that the soul acquires knowledge from sensibles, as stated
in the First Part (Q. 84, A. 6), it is better to have recourse to
another explanation, and to hold that men have no such foreknowledge
of the future, but that they can acquire it by means of experience,
wherein they are helped by their natural disposition, which depends
on the perfection of a man's imaginative power, and the clarity of
his understanding.

Nevertheless this latter foreknowledge of the future differs in two
ways from the former, which comes through Divine revelation. First,
because the former can be about any events whatever, and this
infallibly; whereas the latter foreknowledge, which can be had
naturally, is about certain effects, to which human experience may
extend. Secondly, because the former prophecy is "according to the
unchangeable truth" [*Q. 171, A. 3, Obj. 1], while the latter is not,
and can cover a falsehood. Now the former foreknowledge, and not the
latter, properly belongs to prophecy, because, as stated above (Q.
171, A. 3), prophetic knowledge is of things which naturally surpass
human knowledge. Consequently we must say that prophecy strictly so
called cannot be from nature, but only from Divine revelation.

Reply Obj. 1: When the soul is withdrawn from corporeal things, it
becomes more adapted to receive the influence of spiritual substances
[*Cf. I, Q. 88, A. 4, ad 2], and also is more inclined to receive the
subtle motions which take place in the human imagination through the
impression of natural causes, whereas it is hindered from receiving
them while occupied with sensible things. Hence Gregory says (Dial.
iv, 26) that "the soul, at the approach of death, foresees certain
future things, by reason of the subtlety of its nature," inasmuch as
it is receptive even of slight impressions. Or again, it knows future
things by a revelation of the angels; but not by its own power,
because according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13), "if this were
so, it would be able to foreknow the future whenever it willed,"
which is clearly false.

Obj. 2: Knowledge of the future by means of dreams, comes either from
the revelation of spiritual substances, or from a corporeal cause, as
stated above (Q. 95, A. 6), when we were treating of divination. Now
both these causes are more applicable to a person while asleep than
while awake, because, while awake, the soul is occupied with external
sensibles, so that it is less receptive of the subtle impressions
either of spiritual substances, or even of natural causes; although
as regards the perfection of judgment, the reason is more alert in
waking than in sleeping.

Reply Obj. 3: Even dumb animals have no foreknowledge of future
events, except as these are foreknown in their causes, whereby their
imagination is moved more than man's, because man's imagination,
especially in waking, is more disposed according to reason than
according to the impression of natural causes. Yet reason effects
much more amply in man, that which the impression of natural causes
effects in dumb animals; and Divine grace by inspiring the prophecy
assists man still more.

Reply Obj. 4: The prophetic light extends even to the direction of
human acts; and in this way prophecy is requisite for the government
of a people, especially in relation to Divine worship; since for this
nature is not sufficient, and grace is necessary.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 172, Art. 2]

Whether Prophetic Revelation Comes Through the Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that prophetic revelation does not come
through the angels. For it is written (Wis. 7:27) that Divine wisdom
"conveyeth herself into holy souls," and "maketh the friends of God,
and the prophets." Now wisdom makes the friends of God immediately.
Therefore it also makes the prophets immediately, and not through the
medium of the angels.

Obj. 2: Further, prophecy is reckoned among the gratuitous graces.
But the gratuitous graces are from the Holy Ghost, according to 1
Cor. 12:4, "There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit."
Therefore the prophetic revelation is not made by means of an angel.

Obj. 3: Further, Cassiodorus [*Prol. in Psalt. i] says that prophecy
is a "Divine revelation": whereas if it were conveyed by the angels,
it would be called an angelic revelation. Therefore prophecy is not
bestowed by means of the angels.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "Our glorious
fathers received Divine visions by means of the heavenly powers"; and
he is speaking there of prophetic visions. Therefore prophetic
revelation is conveyed by means of the angels.

_I answer that,_ As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1), "Things that are of
God are well ordered [*Vulg.: 'Those that are, are ordained of
God.']." Now the Divine ordering, according to Dionysius [*Coel.
Hier. iv; Eccl. Hier. v], is such that the lowest things are directed
by middle things. Now the angels hold a middle position between God
and men, in that they have a greater share in the perfection of the
Divine goodness than men have. Wherefore the Divine enlightenments
and revelations are conveyed from God to men by the angels. Now
prophetic knowledge is bestowed by Divine enlightenment and
revelation. Therefore it is evident that it is conveyed by the angels.

Reply Obj. 1: Charity which makes man a friend of God, is a
perfection of the will, in which God alone can form an impression;
whereas prophecy is a perfection of the intellect, in which an angel
also can form an impression, as stated in the First Part (Q. 111, A.
1), wherefore the comparison fails between the two.

Reply Obj. 2: The gratuitous graces are ascribed to the Holy Ghost as
their first principle: yet He works grace of this kind in men by
means of the angels.

Reply Obj. 3: The work of the instrument is ascribed to the principal
agent by whose power the instrument acts. And since a minister is
like an instrument, prophetic revelation, which is conveyed by the
ministry of the angels, is said to be Divine.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 172, Art. 3]

Whether a Natural Disposition Is Requisite for Prophecy?

Objection 1: It would seem that a natural disposition is requisite
for prophecy. For prophecy is received by the prophet according to
the disposition of the recipient, since a gloss of Jerome on Amos
1:2, "The Lord will roar from Sion," says: "Anyone who wishes to make
a comparison naturally turns to those things of which he has
experience, and among which his life is spent. For example, sailors
compare their enemies to the winds, and their losses to a shipwreck.
In like manner Amos, who was a shepherd, likens the fear of God to
that which is inspired by the lion's roar." Now that which is
received by a thing according to the mode of the recipient requires a
natural disposition. Therefore prophecy requires a natural
disposition.

Obj. 2: Further, the considerations of prophecy are more lofty than
those of acquired science. Now natural indisposition hinders the
considerations of acquired science, since many are prevented by
natural indisposition from succeeding to grasp the speculations of
science. Much more therefore is a natural disposition requisite for
the contemplation of prophecy.

Obj. 3: Further, natural indisposition is a much greater obstacle
than an accidental impediment. Now the considerations of prophecy are
hindered by an accidental occurrence. For Jerome says in his
commentary on Matthew [*The quotation is from Origen, Hom. vi in
Num.] that "at the time of the marriage act, the presence of the Holy
Ghost will not be vouchsafed, even though it be a prophet that
fulfils the duty of procreation." Much more therefore does a natural
indisposition hinder prophecy; and thus it would seem that a good
natural disposition is requisite for prophecy.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (xxx in
Ev.): "He," namely the Holy Ghost, "fills the boy harpist and makes
him a Psalmist; He fills the herdsman plucking wild figs, and makes
him a prophet." Therefore prophecy requires no previous disposition,
but depends on the will alone of the Holy Ghost, of Whom it is
written (1 Cor. 12:2): "All these things, one and the same Spirit
worketh, dividing to every one according as He will."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), prophecy in its true and
exact sense comes from Divine inspiration; while that which comes
from a natural cause is not called prophecy except in a relative
sense. Now we must observe that as God Who is the universal efficient
cause requires neither previous matter nor previous disposition of
matter in His corporeal effects, for He is able at the same instant
to bring into being matter and disposition and form, so neither does
He require a previous disposition in His spiritual effects, but is
able to produce both the spiritual effect and at the same time the
fitting disposition as requisite according to the order of nature.
More than this, He is able at the same time, by creation, to produce
the subject, so as to dispose a soul for prophecy and give it the
prophetic grace, at the very instant of its creation.

Reply Obj. 1: It matters not to prophecy by what comparisons the
thing prophesied is expressed; and so the Divine operation makes no
change in a prophet in this respect. Yet if there be anything in him
incompatible with prophecy, it is removed by the Divine power.

Reply Obj. 2: The considerations of science proceed from a natural
cause, and nature cannot work without a previous disposition in
matter. This cannot be said of God Who is the cause of prophecy.

Reply Obj. 3: A natural indisposition, if not removed, might be an
obstacle to prophetic revelation, for instance if a man were
altogether deprived of the natural senses. In the same way a man
might be hindered from the act of prophesying by some very strong
passion, whether of anger, or of concupiscence as in coition, or by
any other passion. But such a natural indisposition as this is
removed by the Divine power, which is the cause of prophecy.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 172, Art. 4]

Whether a Good Life Is Requisite for Prophecy?

Objection 1: It would seem that a good life is requisite for
prophecy. For it is written (Wis. 7:27) that the wisdom of God
"through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls," and "maketh the
friends of God, and prophets." Now there can be no holiness without a
good life and sanctifying grace. Therefore prophecy cannot be without
a good life and sanctifying grace.

Obj. 2: Further, secrets are not revealed save to a friend, according
to John 15:15, "But I have called you friends, because all things
whatsoever I have heard of My Father, I have made known to you." Now
God reveals His secrets to the prophets (Amos 3:7). Therefore it
would seem that the prophets are the friends of God; which is
impossible without charity. Therefore seemingly prophecy cannot be
without charity; and charity is impossible without sanctifying grace.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Matt. 7:15): "Beware of false
prophets, who come to you in the clothing of sheep, but inwardly they
are ravening wolves." Now all who are without grace are likened
inwardly to a ravening wolf, and consequently all such are false
prophets. Therefore no man is a true prophet except he be good by
grace.

Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*Cf. De
Divinat. per Somn. i, which is annexed to the work quoted]) that "if
interpretation of dreams is from God, it is unfitting for it to be
bestowed on any but the best." Now it is evident that the gift of
prophecy is from God. Therefore the gift of prophecy is vouchsafed
only to the best men.

_On the contrary,_ To those who had said, "Lord, have we not
prophesied in Thy name?" this reply is made: "I never knew you"
(Matt. 7:22, 23). Now "the Lord knoweth who are His" (2 Tim. 2:19).
Therefore prophecy can be in those who are not God's by grace.

_I answer that,_ A good life may be considered from two points of
view. First, with regard to its inward root, which is sanctifying
grace. Secondly, with regard to the inward passions of the soul and
the outward actions. Now sanctifying grace is given chiefly in order
that man's soul may be united to God by charity. Wherefore Augustine
says (De Trin. xv, 18): "A man is not transferred from the left side
to the right, unless he receive the Holy Ghost, by Whom he is made a
lover of God and of his neighbor." Hence whatever can be without
charity can be without sanctifying grace, and consequently without
goodness of life. Now prophecy can be without charity; and this is
clear on two counts. First, on account of their respective acts: for
prophecy pertains to the intellect, whose act precedes the act of the
will, which power is perfected by charity. For this reason the
Apostle (1 Cor. 13) reckons prophecy with other things pertinent to
the intellect, that can be had without charity. Secondly, on account
of their respective ends. For prophecy like other gratuitous graces
is given for the good of the Church, according to 1 Cor. 12:7, "The
manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit"; and
is not directly intended to unite man's affections to God, which is
the purpose of charity. Therefore prophecy can be without a good
life, as regards the first root of this goodness.

If, however, we consider a good life, with regard to the passions of
the soul, and external actions, from this point of view an evil life
is an obstacle to prophecy. For prophecy requires the mind to be
raised very high in order to contemplate spiritual things, and this
is hindered by strong passions, and the inordinate pursuit of
external things. Hence we read of the sons of the prophets (4 Kings
4:38) that they "dwelt together with [Vulg.: 'before']" Eliseus,
leading a solitary life, as it were, lest worldly employment should
be a hindrance to the gift of prophecy.

Reply Obj. 1: Sometimes the gift of prophecy is given to a man both
for the good of others, and in order to enlighten his own mind; and
such are those whom Divine wisdom, "conveying itself" by sanctifying
grace to their minds, "maketh the friends of God, and prophets."
Others, however, receive the gift of prophecy merely for the good of
others. Hence Jerome commenting on Matt. 7:22, says: "Sometimes
prophesying, the working of miracles, and the casting out of demons
are accorded not to the merit of those who do these things, but
either to the invoking the name of Christ, or to the condemnation of
those who invoke, and for the good of those who see and hear."

Reply Obj. 2: Gregory [*Hom. xxvii in Ev.] expounding this passage
[*John 15:15] says: "Since we love the lofty things of heaven as soon
as we hear them, we know them as soon as we love them, for to love is
to know. Accordingly He had made all things known to them, because
having renounced earthly desires they were kindled by the torches of
perfect love." In this way the Divine secrets are not always revealed
to prophets.

Reply Obj. 3: Not all wicked men are ravening wolves, but only those
whose purpose is to injure others. For Chrysostom says [*Opus Imperf.
in Matth., Hom. xix, among the works of St. John Chrysostom, and
falsely ascribed to him] that "Catholic teachers, though they be
sinners, are called slaves of the flesh, but never ravening wolves,
because they do not purpose the destruction of Christians." And since
prophecy is directed to the good of others, it is manifest that such
are false prophets, because they are not sent for this purpose by God.

Reply Obj. 4: God's gifts are not always bestowed on those who are
simply the best, but sometimes are vouchsafed to those who are best
as regards the receiving of this or that gift. Accordingly God grants
the gift of prophecy to those whom He judges best to give it to.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 172, Art. 5]

Whether Any Prophecy Comes from the Demons?

Objection 1: It would seem that no prophecy comes from the demons.
For prophecy is "a Divine revelation," according to Cassiodorus
[*Prol. in Psalt. i]. But that which is done by a demon is not
Divine. Therefore no prophecy can be from a demon.

Obj. 2: Further, some kind of enlightenment is requisite for
prophetic knowledge, as stated above (Q. 171, AA. 2, 3). Now the
demons do not enlighten the human intellect, as stated above in the
First Part (Q. 119, A. 3). Therefore no prophecy can come from the
demons.

Obj. 3: Further, a sign is worthless if it betokens contraries. Now
prophecy is a sign in confirmation of faith; wherefore a gloss on
Rom. 12:6, "Either prophecy to be used according to the rule of
faith," says: "Observe that in reckoning the graces, he begins with
prophecy, which is the first proof of the reasonableness of our
faith; since believers, after receiving the Spirit, prophesied."
Therefore prophecy cannot be bestowed by the demons.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (3 Kings 18:19): "Gather unto me all
Israel unto mount Carmel, and the prophets of Baal four hundred and
fifty, and the prophets of the grove four hundred, who eat at
Jezebel's table." Now these were worshippers of demons. Therefore it
would seem that there is also a prophecy from the demons.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 171, A. 1), prophecy denotes
knowledge far removed from human knowledge. Now it is evident that an
intellect of a higher order can know some things that are far removed
from the knowledge of an inferior intellect. Again, above the human
intellect there is not only the Divine intellect, but also the
intellects of good and bad angels according to the order of nature.
Hence the demons, even by their natural knowledge, know certain
things remote from men's knowledge, which they can reveal to men:
although those things which God alone knows are remote simply and
most of all.

Accordingly prophecy, properly and simply, is conveyed by Divine
revelations alone; yet the revelation which is made by the demons may
be called prophecy in a restricted sense. Wherefore those men to whom
something is revealed by the demons are styled in the Scriptures as
prophets, not simply, but with an addition, for instance as "false
prophets," or "prophets of idols." Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
xii, 19): "When the evil spirit lays hold of a man for such purposes
as these," namely visions, "he makes him either devilish, or
possessed, or a false prophet."

Reply Obj. 1: Cassiodorus is here defining prophecy in its proper and
simple acceptation.

Reply Obj. 2: The demons reveal what they know to men, not by
enlightening the intellect, but by an imaginary vision, or even by
audible speech; and in this way this prophecy differs from true
prophecy.

Reply Obj. 3: The prophecy of the demons can be distinguished from
Divine prophecy by certain, and even outward, signs. Hence Chrysostom
says [*Opus Imperf. in Matth., Hom. xix, falsely ascribed to St. John
Chrysostom] that "some prophesy by the spirit of the devil, such as
diviners, but they may be discerned by the fact that the devil
sometimes utters what is false, the Holy Ghost never." Wherefore it
is written (Deut. 18:21, 22): "If in silent thought thou answer: How
shall I know the word that the Lord hath spoken? Thou shalt have this
sign: Whatsoever that same prophet foretelleth in the name of the
Lord, and it come not to pass, that thing the Lord hath not spoken."
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 172, Art. 6]

Whether the Prophets of the Demons Ever Foretell the Truth?

Objection 1: It would seem that the prophets of the demons never
foretell the truth. For Ambrose [*Hilary the Deacon (Ambrosiaster) on
1 Cor. 12:3] says that "Every truth, by whomsoever spoken, is from
the Holy Ghost." Now the prophets of the demons do not speak from the
Holy Ghost, because "there is no concord between Christ and Belial
[*'What concord hath Christ with Belial?']" (2 Cor. 6:15). Therefore
it would seem that they never foretell the truth.

Obj. 2: Further, just as true prophets are inspired by the Spirit of
truth, so the prophets of the demons are inspired by the spirit of
untruth, according to 3 Kings 22:22, "I will go forth, and be a lying
spirit in the mouth of all his prophets." Now the prophets inspired
by the Holy Ghost never speak false, as stated above (Q. 111, A. 6).
Therefore the prophets of the demons never speak truth.

Obj. 3: Further, it is said of the devil (John 8:44) that "when he
speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own, for the devil is a liar, and
the father thereof," i.e. of lying. Now by inspiring his prophets,
the devil speaks only of his own, for he is not appointed God's
minister to declare the truth, since "light hath no fellowship with
darkness [*Vulg.: 'What fellowship hath light with darkness?']" (2
Cor. 6:14). Therefore the prophets of the demons never foretell the
truth.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Num. 22:14, says that "Balaam was a
diviner, for he sometimes foreknew the future by help of the demons
and the magic art." Now he foretold many true things, for instance
that which is to be found in Num. 24:17: "A star shall rise out of
Jacob, and a scepter shall spring up from Israel." Therefore even the
prophets of the demons foretell the truth.

_I answer that,_ As the good is in relation to things, so is the true
in relation to knowledge. Now in things it is impossible to find one
that is wholly devoid of good. Wherefore it is also impossible for
any knowledge to be wholly false, without some mixture of truth.
Hence Bede says [*Comment. in Luc. xvii, 12; Cf. Augustine, QQ.
Evang. ii, 40] that "no teaching is so false that it never mingles
truth with falsehood." Hence the teaching of the demons, with which
they instruct their prophets, contains some truths whereby it is
rendered acceptable. For the intellect is led astray to falsehood by
the semblance of truth, even as the will is seduced to evil by the
semblance of goodness. Wherefore Chrysostom says [*Opus Imperf. in
Matth., Hom. xix, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]: "The
devil is allowed sometimes to speak true things, in order that his
unwonted truthfulness may gain credit for his lie."

Reply Obj. 1: The prophets of the demons do not always speak from the
demons' revelation, but sometimes by Divine inspiration. This was
evidently the case with Balaam, of whom we read that the Lord spoke
to him (Num. 22:12), though he was a prophet of the demons, because
God makes use even of the wicked for the profit of the good. Hence He
foretells certain truths even by the demons' prophets, both that the
truth may be rendered more credible, since even its foes bear witness
to it, and also in order that men, by believing such men, may be more
easily led on to truth. Wherefore also the Sibyls foretold many true
things about Christ.

Yet even when the demons' prophets are instructed by the demons, they
foretell the truth, sometimes by virtue of their own nature, the
author of which is the Holy Ghost, and sometimes by revelation of the
good spirits, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 19): so that
even then this truth which the demons proclaim is from the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 2: A true prophet is always inspired by the Spirit of
truth, in Whom there is no falsehood, wherefore He never says what is
not true; whereas a false prophet is not always instructed by the
spirit of untruth, but sometimes even by the Spirit of truth. Even
the very spirit of untruth sometimes declares true things, sometimes
false, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: Those things are called the demons' own, which they
have of themselves, namely lies and sins; while they have, not of
themselves but of God, those things which belong to them by nature:
and it is by virtue of their own nature that they sometimes foretell
the truth, as stated above (ad 1). Moreover God makes use of them to
make known the truth which is to be accomplished through them, by
revealing Divine mysteries to them through the angels, as already
stated (Gen. ad lit. xii, 19; I, Q. 109, A. 4, ad 1).
_______________________

QUESTION 173

OF THE MANNER IN WHICH PROPHETIC KNOWLEDGE IS CONVEYED
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the manner in which prophetic knowledge is
conveyed, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the prophets see God's very essence?

(2) Whether the prophetic revelation is effected by the infusion of
certain species, or by the infusion of Divine light alone?

(3) Whether prophetic revelation is always accompanied by abstraction
from the sense?

(4) Whether prophecy is always accompanied by knowledge of the things
prophesied?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 173, Art. 1]

Whether the Prophets See the Very Essence of God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the prophets see the very essence of
God, for a gloss on Isa. 38:1, "Take order with thy house, for thou
shalt die and not live," says: "Prophets can read in the book of
God's foreknowledge in which all things are written." Now God's
foreknowledge is His very essence. Therefore prophets see God's very
essence.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 7) that "in that
eternal truth from which all temporal things are made, we see with
the mind's eye the type both of our being and of our actions." Now,
of all men, prophets have the highest knowledge of Divine things.
Therefore they, especially, see the Divine essence.

Obj. 3: Further, future contingencies are foreknown by the prophets
"with unchangeable truth." Now future contingencies exist thus in God
alone. Therefore the prophets see God Himself.

_On the contrary,_ The vision of the Divine essence is not made void
in heaven; whereas "prophecy is made void" (1 Cor. 13:8). Therefore
prophecy is not conveyed by a vision of the Divine essence.

_I answer that,_ Prophecy denotes Divine knowledge as existing afar
off. Wherefore it is said of the prophets (Heb. 11:13) that "they
were beholding . . . afar off." But those who are in heaven and in
the state of bliss see, not as from afar off, but rather, as it were,
from near at hand, according to Ps. 139:14, "The upright shall dwell
with Thy countenance." Hence it is evident that prophetic knowledge
differs from the perfect knowledge, which we shall have in heaven, so
that it is distinguished therefrom as the imperfect from the perfect,
and when the latter comes the former is made void, as appears from
the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 13:10).

Some, however, wishing to discriminate between prophetic knowledge
and the knowledge of the blessed, have maintained that the prophets
see the very essence of God (which they call the "mirror of
eternity") [*Cf. De Veritate, xii, 6; Sent. II, D, XI, part 2, art.
2, ad 4], not, however, in the way in which it is the object of the
blessed, but as containing the types [*Cf. I, Q. 15] of future
events. But this is altogether impossible. For God is the object of
bliss in His very essence, according to the saying of Augustine
(Confess. v, 4): "Happy whoso knoweth Thee, though he know not
these," i.e. creatures. Now it is not possible to see the types of
creatures in the very essence of God without seeing It, both because
the Divine essence is Itself the type of all things that are
made--the ideal type adding nothing to the Divine essence save only a
relationship to the creature--and because knowledge of a thing in
itself--and such is the knowledge of God as the object of heavenly
bliss--precedes knowledge of that thing in its relation to something
else--and such is the knowledge of God as containing the types of
things. Consequently it is impossible for prophets to see God as
containing the types of creatures, and yet not as the object of
bliss. Therefore we must conclude that the prophetic vision is not
the vision of the very essence of God, and that the prophets do not
see in the Divine essence Itself the things they do see, but that
they see them in certain images, according as they are enlightened by
the Divine light.

Wherefore Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv), in speaking of prophetic
visions, says that "the wise theologian calls that vision divine
which is effected by images of things lacking a bodily form through
the seer being rapt in divine things." And these images illumined by
the Divine light have more of the nature of a mirror than the Divine
essence: since in a mirror images are formed from other things, and
this cannot be said of God. Yet the prophet's mind thus enlightened
may be called a mirror, in so far as a likeness of the truth of the
Divine foreknowledge is formed therein, for which reason it is called
the "mirror of eternity," as representing God's foreknowledge, for
God in His eternity sees all things as present before Him, as stated
above (Q. 172, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1: The prophets are said to read the book of God's
foreknowledge, inasmuch as the truth is reflected from God's
foreknowledge on the prophet's mind.

Reply Obj. 2: Man is said to see in the First Truth the type of his
existence, in so far as the image of the First Truth shines forth on
man's mind, so that he is able to know himself.

Reply Obj. 3: From the very fact that future contingencies are in God
according to unalterable truth, it follows that God can impress a
like knowledge on the prophet's mind without the prophet seeing God
in His essence.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 173, Art. 2]

Whether, in Prophetic Revelation, New Species of Things Are Impressed
on the Prophet's Mind, or Merely a New Light?

Objection 1: It would seem that in prophetic revelation no new
species of things are impressed on the prophet's mind, but only a new
light. For a gloss of Jerome on Amos 1:2 says that "prophets draw
comparisons from things with which they are conversant." But if
prophetic vision were effected by means of species newly impressed,
the prophet's previous experience of things would be inoperative.
Therefore no new species are impressed on the prophet's soul, but
only the prophetic light.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9), "it is
not imaginative but intellective vision that makes the prophet";
wherefore it is declared (Dan. 10:1) that "there is need of
understanding in a vision." Now intellective vision, as stated in the
same book (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6) is not effected by means of images,
but by the very truth of things. Therefore it would seem that
prophetic revelation is not effected by impressing species on the
soul.

Obj. 3: Further, by the gift of prophecy the Holy Ghost endows man
with something that surpasses the faculty of nature. Now man can by
his natural faculties form all kinds of species of things. Therefore
it would seem that in prophetic revelation no new species of things
are impressed, but merely an intellectual light.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Osee 12:10): "I have multiplied"
their "visions, and I have used similitudes, by the ministry of the
prophets." Now multiplicity of visions results, not from a diversity
of intellectual light, which is common to every prophetic vision, but
from a diversity of species, whence similitudes also result.
Therefore it seems that in prophetic revelation new species of things
are impressed, and not merely an intellectual light.

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9), "prophetic
knowledge pertains most of all to the intellect." Now two things have
to be considered in connection with the knowledge possessed by the
human mind, namely the acceptance or representation of things, and
the judgment of the things represented. Now things are represented to
the human mind under the form of species: and according to the order
of nature, they must be represented first to the senses, secondly to
the imagination, thirdly to the passive intellect, and these are
changed by the species derived from the phantasms, which change
results from the enlightening action of the active intellect. Now in
the imagination there are the forms of sensible things not only as
received from the senses, but also transformed in various ways,
either on account of some bodily transformation (as in the case of
people who are asleep or out of their senses), or through the
coordination of the phantasms, at the command of reason, for the
purpose of understanding something. For just as the various
arrangements of the letters of the alphabet convey various ideas to
the understanding, so the various coordinations of the phantasms
produce various intelligible species of the intellect.

As to the judgment formed by the human mind, it depends on the power
of the intellectual light.

Now the gift of prophecy confers on the human mind something which
surpasses the natural faculty in both these respects, namely as to
the judgment which depends on the inflow of intellectual light, and
as to the acceptance or representation of things, which is effected
by means of certain species. Human teaching may be likened to
prophetic revelation in the second of these respects, but not in the
first. For a man represents certain things to his disciple by signs
of speech, but he cannot enlighten him inwardly as God does.

But it is the first of these two that holds the chief place in
prophecy, since judgment is the complement of knowledge. Wherefore if
certain things are divinely represented to any man by means of
imaginary likenesses, as happened to Pharaoh (Gen. 41:1-7) and to
Nabuchodonosor (Dan. 4:1-2), or even by bodily likenesses, as
happened to Balthasar (Dan. 5:5), such a man is not to be considered
a prophet, unless his mind be enlightened for the purpose of
judgment; and such an apparition is something imperfect in the genus
of prophecy. Wherefore some [*Rabbi Moyses, Doct. Perplex. II, xxxvi]
have called this "prophetic ecstasy," and such is divination by
dreams. And yet a man will be a prophet, if his intellect be
enlightened merely for the purpose of judging of things seen in
imagination by others, as in the case of Joseph who interpreted
Pharaoh's dream. But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9),
"especially is he a prophet who excels in both respects, so," to wit,
"as to see in spirit likenesses significant of things corporeal, and
understand them by the quickness of his intellect."

Now sensible forms are divinely presented to the prophet's mind,
sometimes externally by means of the senses--thus Daniel saw the
writing on the wall (Dan. 5:25)--sometimes by means of imaginary
forms, either of exclusively Divine origin and not received through
the senses (for instance, if images of colors were imprinted on the
imagination of one blind from birth), or divinely coordinated from
those derived from the senses--thus Jeremiah saw the "boiling caldron
. . . from the face of the north" (Jer. 1:13)--or by the direct
impression of intelligible species on the mind, as in the case of
those who receive infused scientific knowledge or wisdom, such as
Solomon or the apostles.

But intellectual light is divinely imprinted on the human
mind--sometimes for the purpose of judging of things seen by others,
as in the case of Joseph, quoted above, and of the apostles whose
understanding our Lord opened "that they might understand the
scriptures" (Luke 24:45); and to this pertains the "interpretation of
speeches"--sometimes for the purpose of judging according to Divine
truth, of the things which a man apprehends in the ordinary course of
nature--sometimes for the purpose of discerning truthfully and
efficaciously what is to be done, according to Isa. 63:14, "The
Spirit of the Lord was their leader."

Hence it is evident that prophetic revelation is conveyed sometimes
by the mere infusion of light, sometimes by imprinting species anew,
or by a new coordination of species.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, sometimes in prophetic revelation
imaginary species previously derived from the senses are divinely
coordinated so as to accord with the truth to be revealed, and then
previous experience is operative in the production of the images, but
not when they are impressed on the mind wholly from without.

Reply Obj. 2: Intellectual vision is not effected by means of bodily
and individual images, but by an intelligible image. Hence Augustine
says (De Trin. ix, 11) that "the soul possesses a certain likeness of
the species known to it." Sometimes this intelligible image is, in
prophetic revelation, imprinted immediately by God, sometimes it
results from pictures in the imagination, by the aid of the prophetic
light, since a deeper truth is gathered from these pictures in the
imagination by means of the enlightenment of the higher light.

Reply Obj. 3: It is true that man is able by his natural powers to
form all kinds of pictures in the imagination, by simply considering
these pictures, but not so that they be directed to the
representation of intelligible truths that surpass his intellect,
since for this purpose he needs the assistance of a supernatural
light.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 173, Art. 3]

Whether the Prophetic Vision Is Always Accompanied by Abstraction
from the Senses?

Objection 1: It would seem that the prophetic vision is always
accompanied by abstraction from the senses. For it is written (Num.
12:6): "If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to
him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream." Now a gloss says
at the beginning of the Psalter, "a vision that takes place by dreams
and apparitions consists of things which seem to be said or done."
But when things seem to be said or done, which are neither said nor
done, there is abstraction from the senses. Therefore prophecy is
always accompanied by abstraction from the senses.

Obj. 2: Further, when one power is very intent on its own operation,
other powers are drawn away from theirs; thus men who are very intent
on hearing something fail to see what takes place before them. Now in
the prophetic vision the intellect is very much uplifted, and intent
on its act. Therefore it seems that the prophetic vision is always
accompanied by abstraction from the senses.

Obj. 3: Further, the same thing cannot, at the same time, tend in
opposite directions. Now in the prophetic vision the mind tends to
the acceptance of things from above, and consequently it cannot at
the same time tend to sensible objects. Therefore it would seem
necessary for prophetic revelation to be always accompanied by
abstraction from the senses.

Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Cor. 14:32): "The spirits
of the prophets are subject to the prophets." Now this were
impossible if the prophet were not in possession of his faculties,
but abstracted from his senses. Therefore it would seem that
prophetic vision is not accompanied by abstraction from the senses.

_I answer that,_ As stated in the foregoing Article, the prophetic
revelation takes place in four ways: namely, by the infusion of an
intelligible light, by the infusion of intelligible species, by
impression or coordination of pictures in the imagination, and by the
outward presentation of sensible images. Now it is evident that there
is no abstraction from the senses, when something is presented to the
prophet's mind by means of sensible species--whether these be
divinely formed for this special purpose, as the bush shown to Moses
(Ex. 3:2), and the writing shown to Daniel (Dan. 5:)--or whether they
be produced by other causes; yet so that they are ordained by Divine
providence to be prophetically significant of something, as, for
instance, the Church was signified by the ark of Noah.

Again, abstraction from the external senses is not rendered necessary
when the prophet's mind is enlightened by an intellectual light, or
impressed with intelligible species, since in us the perfect judgment
of the intellect is effected by its turning to sensible objects,
which are the first principles of our knowledge, as stated in the
First Part (Q. 84, A. 6).

When, however, prophetic revelation is conveyed by images in the
imagination, abstraction from the senses is necessary lest the things
thus seen in imagination be taken for objects of external sensation.
Yet this abstraction from the senses is sometimes complete, so that a
man perceives nothing with his senses; and sometimes it is
incomplete, so that he perceives something with his senses, yet does
not fully discern the things he perceives outwardly from those he
sees in imagination. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 12):
"Those images of bodies which are formed in the soul are seen just as
bodily things themselves are seen by the body, so that we see with
our eyes one who is present, and at the same time we see with the
soul one who is absent, as though we saw him with our eyes."

Yet this abstraction from the senses takes place in the prophets
without subverting the order of nature, as is the case with those who
are possessed or out of their senses; but is due to some well-ordered
cause. This cause may be natural--for instance, sleep--or
spiritual--for instance, the intenseness of the prophets'
contemplation; thus we read of Peter (Acts 10:9) that while he was
praying in the supper-room [*Vulg.: 'the house-top' or
'upper-chamber'] "he fell into an ecstasy"--or he may be carried away
by the Divine power, according to the saying of Ezechiel 1:3: "The
hand of the Lord was upon him."

Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted refers to prophets in whom imaginary
pictures were formed or coordinated, either while asleep, which is
denoted by the word "dream," or while awake, which is signified by
the word "vision."

Reply Obj. 2: When the mind is intent, in its act, upon distant
things which are far removed from the senses, the intensity of its
application leads to abstraction from the senses; but when it is
intent, in its act, upon the coordination of or judgment concerning
objects of sense, there is no need for abstraction from the senses.

Reply Obj. 3: The movement of the prophetic mind results not from its
own power, but from a power acting on it from above. Hence there is
no abstraction from the senses when the prophet's mind is led to
judge or coordinate matters relating to objects of sense, but only
when the mind is raised to the contemplation of certain more lofty
things.

Reply Obj. 4: The spirit of the prophets is said to be subject to the
prophets as regards the prophetic utterances to which the Apostle
refers in the words quoted; because, to wit, the prophets in
declaring what they have seen speak their own mind, and are not
thrown off their mental balance, like persons who are possessed, as
Priscilla and Montanus maintained. But as regards the prophetic
revelation itself, it would be more correct to say that the prophets
are subject to the spirit of prophecy, i.e. to the prophetic gift.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 173, Art. 4]

Whether Prophets Always Know the Things Which They Prophesy?

Objection 1: It would seem that the prophets always know the things
which they prophesy. For, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9),
"those to whom signs were shown in spirit by means of the likenesses
of bodily things, had not the gift of prophecy, unless the mind was
brought into action, so that those signs were also understood by
them." Now what is understood cannot be unknown. Therefore the
prophet is not ignorant of what he prophesies.

Obj. 2: Further, the light of prophecy surpasses the light of natural
reason. Now one who possesses a science by his natural light, is not
ignorant of his scientific acquirements. Therefore he who utters
things by the prophetic light cannot ignore them.

Obj. 3: Further, prophecy is directed for man's enlightenment;
wherefore it is written (2 Pet. 1:19): "We have the more firm
prophetical word, whereunto you do well to attend, as to a light that
shineth in a dark place." Now nothing can enlighten others unless it
be lightsome in itself. Therefore it would seem that the prophet is
first enlightened so as to know what he declares to others.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 11:51): "And this he"
(Caiphas) "spoke, not of himself, but being the High Priest of that
year, he prophesied that Jesus should die for the nation," etc. Now
Caiphas knew this not. Therefore not every prophet knows what he
prophesies.

_I answer that,_ In prophetic revelation the prophet's mind is moved
by the Holy Ghost, as an instrument that is deficient in regard to
the principal agent. Now the prophet's mind is moved not only to
apprehend something, but also to speak or to do something; sometimes
indeed to all these three together, sometimes to two, sometimes to
one only, and in each case there may be a defect in the prophet's
knowledge. For when the prophet's mind is moved to think or apprehend
a thing, sometimes he is led merely to apprehend that thing, and
sometimes he is further led to know that it is divinely revealed to
him.

Again, sometimes the prophet's mind is moved to speak something, so
that he understands what the Holy Ghost means by the words he utters;
like David who said (2 Kings 23:2): "The Spirit of the Lord hath
spoken by me"; while, on the other hand, sometimes the person whose
mind is moved to utter certain words knows not what the Holy Ghost
means by them, as was the case with Caiphas (John 11:51).

Again, when the Holy Ghost moves a man's mind to do something,
sometimes the latter understands the meaning of it, like Jeremias who
hid his loin-cloth in the Euphrates (Jer. 13:1-11); while sometimes
he does not understand it--thus the soldiers, who divided Christ's
garments, understood not the meaning of what they did.

Accordingly, when a man knows that he is being moved by the Holy
Ghost to think something, or signify something by word or deed, this
belongs properly to prophecy; whereas when he is moved, without his
knowing it, this is not perfect prophecy, but a prophetic instinct.
Nevertheless it must be observed that since the prophet's mind is a
defective instrument, as stated above, even true prophets know not
all that the Holy Ghost means by the things they see, or speak, or
even do.

And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections, since the
arguments given at the beginning refer to true prophets whose minds
are perfectly enlightened from above.
_______________________

QUESTION 174

OF THE DIVISION OF PROPHECY (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the division of prophecy, and under this head
there are six points of inquiry:

(1) The division of prophecy into its species;

(2) Whether the more excellent prophecy is that which is without
imaginative vision?

(3) The various degrees of prophecy;

(4) Whether Moses was the greatest of the prophets?

(5) Whether a comprehensor can be a prophet?

(6) Whether prophecy advanced in perfection as time went on?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 174, Art. 1]

Whether Prophecy Is Fittingly Divided into the Prophecy of Divine
Predestination, of Foreknowledge, and of Denunciation?

Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy is unfittingly divided
according to a gloss on Matt. 1:23, "Behold a virgin shall be with
child," where it is stated that "one kind of prophecy proceeds from
the Divine predestination, and must in all respects be accomplished
so that its fulfillment is independent of our will, for instance the
one in question. Another prophecy proceeds from God's foreknowledge:
and into this our will enters. And another prophecy is called
denunciation, which is significative of God's disapproval." For that
which results from every prophecy should not be reckoned a part of
prophecy. Now all prophecy is according to the Divine foreknowledge,
since the prophets "read in the book of foreknowledge," as a gloss
says on Isa. 38:1. Therefore it would seem that prophecy according to
foreknowledge should not be reckoned a species of prophecy.

Obj. 2: Further, just as something is foretold in denunciation, so is
something foretold in promise, and both of these are subject to
alteration. For it is written (Jer. 18:7, 8): "I will suddenly speak
against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull
down, and to destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken
shall repent of their evil, I also will repent"--and this pertains to
the prophecy of denunciation, and afterwards the text continues in
reference to the prophecy of promise (Jer. 18:9, 10): "I will
suddenly speak of a nation and of a kingdom, to build up and plant
it. If it shall do evil in My sight . . . I will repent of the good
that I have spoken to do unto it." Therefore as there is reckoned to
be a prophecy of denunciation, so should there be a prophecy of
promise.

Obj. 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. vii, 8): "There are seven kinds
of prophecy. The first is an ecstasy, which is the transport of the
mind: thus Peter saw a vessel descending from heaven with all manner
of beasts therein. The second kind is a vision, as we read in Isaias,
who says (Isa. 6:1): 'I saw the Lord sitting,' etc. The third kind is
a dream: thus Jacob in a dream, saw a ladder. The fourth kind is from
the midst of a cloud: thus God spake to Moses. The fifth kind is a
voice from heaven, as that which called to Abraham saying (Gen.
22:11): 'Lay not thy hand upon the boy.' The sixth kind is taking up
a parable, as in the example of Balaam (Num. 23:7; 24:15). The
seventh kind is the fullness of the Holy Ghost, as in the case of
nearly all the prophets." Further, he mentions three kinds of vision;
"one by the eyes of the body, another by the soul's imagination, a
third by the eyes of the mind." Now these are not included in the
aforesaid division. Therefore it is insufficient.

_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Jerome to whom the gloss
above quoted is ascribed.

_I answer that,_ The species of moral habits and acts are
distinguished according to their objects. Now the object of prophecy
is something known by God and surpassing the faculty of man.
Wherefore, according to the difference of such things, prophecy is
divided into various species, as assigned above. Now it has been
stated above (Q. 71, A. 6, ad 2) that the future is contained in the
Divine knowledge in two ways. First, as in its cause: and thus we
have the prophecy of _denunciation,_ which is not always fulfilled.
but it foretells the relation of cause to effect, which is sometimes
hindered by some other occurrence supervening. Secondly, God
foreknows certain things in themselves--either as to be accomplished
by Himself, and of such things is the prophecy of _predestination,_
since, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 30), "God
predestines things which are not in our power"--or as to be
accomplished through man's free-will, and of such is the prophecy of
_foreknowledge._ This may regard either good or evil, which does not
apply to the prophecy of predestination, since the latter regards
good alone. And since predestination is comprised under
foreknowledge, the gloss in the beginning of the Psalter assigns only
two species to prophecy, namely of _foreknowledge,_ and of
_denunciation._

Reply Obj. 1: Foreknowledge, properly speaking, denotes precognition
of future events in themselves, and in this sense it is reckoned a
species of prophecy. But in so far as it is used in connection with
future events, whether as in themselves, or as in their causes, it is
common to every species of prophecy.

Reply Obj. 2: The prophecy of promise is included in the prophecy of
denunciation, because the aspect of truth is the same in both. But it
is denominated in preference from denunciation, because God is more
inclined to remit punishment than to withdraw promised blessings.

Reply Obj. 3: Isidore divides prophecy according to the manner of
prophesying. Now we may distinguish the manner of prophesying--either
according to man's cognitive powers, which are sense, imagination,
and intellect, and then we have the three kinds of vision mentioned
both by him and by Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6, 7)--or according
to the different ways in which the prophetic current is received.
Thus as regards the enlightening of the intellect there is the
"fullness of the Holy Ghost" which he mentions in the seventh place.
As to the imprinting of pictures on the imagination he mentions
three, namely "dreams," to which he gives the third place; "vision,"
which occurs to the prophet while awake and regards any kind of
ordinary object, and this he puts in the second place; and "ecstasy,"
which results from the mind being uplifted to certain lofty things,
and to this he assigns the first place. As regards sensible signs he
reckons three kinds of prophecy, because a sensible sign is--either a
corporeal thing offered externally to the sight, such as "a cloud,"
which he mentions in the fourth place--or a "voice" sounding from
without and conveyed to man's hearing--this he puts in the fifth
place--or a voice proceeding from a man, conveying something under a
similitude, and this pertains to the "parable" to which he assigns
the sixth place.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 174, Art. 2]

Whether the Prophecy Which Is Accompanied by Intellective and
Imaginative Vision Is More Excellent Than That Which Is Accompanied
by Intellective Vision Alone?

Objection 1: It would seem that the prophecy which has intellective
and imaginative vision is more excellent than that which is
accompanied by intellective vision alone. For Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. xii, 9): "He is less a prophet, who sees in spirit nothing but
the signs representative of things, by means of the images of things
corporeal: he is more a prophet, who is merely endowed with the
understanding of these signs; but most of all is he a prophet, who
excels in both ways," and this refers to the prophet who has
intellective together with imaginative vision. Therefore this kind of
prophecy is more excellent.

Obj. 2: Further, the greater a thing's power is, the greater the
distance to which it extends. Now the prophetic light pertains
chiefly to the mind, as stated above (Q. 173, A. 2). Therefore
apparently the prophecy that extends to the imagination is greater
than that which is confined to the intellect.

Obj. 3: Further, Jerome (Prol. in Lib. Reg.) distinguishes the
"prophets" from the "sacred writers." Now all those whom he calls
prophets (such as Isaias, Jeremias, and the like) had intellective
together with imaginative vision: but not those whom he calls sacred
writers, as writing by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost (such as
Job, David, Solomon, and the like). Therefore it would seem more
proper to call prophets those who had intellective together with
imaginative vision, than those who had intellective vision alone.

Obj. 4: Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that "it is
impossible for the Divine ray to shine on us, except as screened
round about by the many-colored sacred veils." Now the prophetic
revelation is conveyed by the infusion of the divine ray. Therefore
it seems that it cannot be without the veils of phantasms.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss says at the beginning of the Psalter that
"the most excellent manner of prophecy is when a man prophesies by
the mere inspiration of the Holy Ghost, apart from any outward
assistance of deed, word, vision, or dream."

_I answer that,_ The excellence of the means is measured chiefly by
the end. Now the end of prophecy is the manifestation of a truth that
surpasses the faculty of man. Wherefore the more effective this
manifestation is, the more excellent the prophecy. But it is evident
that the manifestation of divine truth by means of the bare
contemplation of the truth itself, is more effective than that which
is conveyed under the similitude of corporeal things, for it
approaches nearer to the heavenly vision whereby the truth is seen in
God's essence. Hence it follows that the prophecy whereby a
supernatural truth is seen by intellectual vision, is more excellent
than that in which a supernatural truth is manifested by means of the
similitudes of corporeal things in the vision of the imagination.

Moreover the prophet's mind is shown thereby to be more lofty: even
as in human teaching the hearer, who is able to grasp the bare
intelligible truth the master propounds, is shown to have a better
understanding than one who needs to be taken by the hand and helped
by means of examples taken from objects of sense. Hence it is said in
commendation of David's prophecy (2 Kings 23:3): "The strong one of
Israel spoke to me," and further on (2 Kings 23:4): "As the light of
the morning, when the sun riseth, shineth in the morning without
clouds."

Reply Obj. 1: When a particular supernatural truth has to be revealed
by means of corporeal images, he that has both, namely the
intellectual light and the imaginary vision, is more a prophet than
he that has only one, because his prophecy is more perfect; and it is
in this sense that Augustine speaks as quoted above. Nevertheless the
prophecy in which the bare intelligible truth is revealed is greater
than all.

Reply Obj. 2: The same judgment does not apply to things that are
sought for their own sake, as to things sought for the sake of
something else. For in things sought for their own sake, the agent's
power is the more effective according as it extends to more numerous
and more remote objects; even so a physician is thought more of, if
he is able to heal more people, and those who are further removed
from health. On the other hand, in things sought only for the sake of
something else, that agent would seem to have greater power, who is
able to achieve his purpose with fewer means and those nearest to
hand: thus more praise is awarded the physician who is able to heal a
sick person by means of fewer and more gentle remedies. Now, in the
prophetic knowledge, imaginary vision is required, not for its own
sake, but on account of the manifestation of the intelligible truth.
Wherefore prophecy is all the more excellent according as it needs it
less.

Reply Obj. 3: The fact that a particular predicate is applicable to
one thing and less properly to another, does not prevent this latter
from being simply better than the former: thus the knowledge of the
blessed is more excellent than the knowledge of the wayfarer,
although faith is more properly predicated of the latter knowledge,
because faith implies an imperfection of knowledge. In like manner
prophecy implies a certain obscurity, and remoteness from the
intelligible truth; wherefore the name of prophet is more properly
applied to those who see by imaginary vision. And yet the more
excellent prophecy is that which is conveyed by intellectual vision,
provided the same truth be revealed in either case. If, however, the
intellectual light be divinely infused in a person, not that he may
know some supernatural things, but that he may be able to judge, with
the certitude of divine truth, of things that can be known by human
reason, such intellectual prophecy is beneath that which is conveyed
by an imaginary vision leading to a supernatural truth. It was this
kind of prophecy that all those had who are included in the ranks of
the prophets, who moreover were called prophets for the special
reason that they exercised the prophetic calling officially. Hence
they spoke as God's representatives, saying to the people: "Thus
saith the Lord": but not so the authors of the _sacred writings,_
several of whom treated more frequently of things that can be known
by human reason, not in God's name, but in their own, yet with the
assistance of the Divine light withal.

Reply Obj. 4: In the present life the enlightenment by the divine ray
is not altogether without any veil of phantasms, because according to
his present state of life it is unnatural to man not to understand
without a phantasm. Sometimes, however, it is sufficient to have
phantasms abstracted in the usual way from the senses without any
imaginary vision divinely vouchsafed, and thus prophetic vision is
said to be without imaginary vision.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 174, Art. 3]

Whether the Degrees of Prophecy Can Be Distinguished According to the
Imaginary Vision?

Objection 1: It would seem that the degrees of prophecy cannot be
distinguished according to the imaginary vision. For the degrees of a
thing bear relation to something that is on its own account, not on
account of something else. Now, in prophecy, intellectual vision is
sought on its own account, and imaginary vision on account of
something else, as stated above (A. 2, ad 2). Therefore it would seem
that the degrees of prophecy are distinguished not according to
imaginary, but only according to intellectual, vision.

Obj. 2: Further, seemingly for one prophet there is one degree of
prophecy. Now one prophet receives revelation through various
imaginary visions. Therefore a difference of imaginary visions does
not entail a difference of prophecy.

Obj. 3: Further, according to a gloss [*Cassiodorus, super Prolog.
Hieron. in Psalt.], prophecy consists of words, deeds, dreams, and
visions. Therefore the degrees of prophecy should not be
distinguished according to imaginary vision, to which vision and
dreams pertain, rather than according to words and deeds.

_On the contrary,_ The medium differentiates the degrees of
knowledge: thus science based on direct [*_Propter quid_] proofs is
more excellent than science based on indirect [*_Quia_] premises or
than opinion, because it comes through a more excellent medium. Now
imaginary vision is a kind of medium in prophetic knowledge.
Therefore the degrees of prophecy should be distinguished according
to imaginary vision.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 173, A. 2), the prophecy
wherein, by the intelligible light, a supernatural truth is revealed
through an imaginary vision, holds the mean between the prophecy
wherein a supernatural truth is revealed without imaginary vision,
and that wherein through the intelligible light and without an
imaginary vision, man is directed to know or do things pertaining to
human conduct. Now knowledge is more proper to prophecy than is
action; wherefore the lowest degree of prophecy is when a man, by an
inward instinct, is moved to perform some outward action. Thus it is
related of Samson (Judges 15:14) that "the Spirit of the Lord came
strongly upon him, and as the flax [*_Lina._ St. Thomas apparently
read _ligna_ ('wood')] is wont to be consumed at the approach of
fire, so the bands with which he was bound were broken and loosed."
The second degree of prophecy is when a man is enlightened by an
inward light so as to know certain things, which, however, do not go
beyond the bounds of natural knowledge: thus it is related of Solomon
(3 Kings 4:32, 33) that "he spoke . . . parables . . . and he treated
about trees from the cedar that is in Libanus unto the hyssop that
cometh out of the wall, and he discoursed of beasts and of fowls, and
of creeping things and of fishes": and all of this came from divine
inspiration, for it was stated previously (3 Kings 4:29): "God gave
to Solomon wisdom and understanding exceeding much."

Nevertheless these two degrees are beneath prophecy properly so
called, because they do not attain to supernatural truth. The
prophecy wherein supernatural truth is manifested through imaginary
vision is differentiated first according to the difference between
dreams which occur during sleep, and vision which occurs while one is
awake. The latter belongs to a higher degree of prophecy, since the
prophetic light that draws the soul away to supernatural things while
it is awake and occupied with sensible things would seem to be
stronger than that which finds a man's soul asleep and withdrawn from
objects of sense. Secondly the degrees of this prophecy are
differentiated according to the expressiveness of the imaginary signs
whereby the intelligible truth is conveyed. And since words are the
most expressive signs of intelligible truth, it would seem to be a
higher degree of prophecy when the prophet, whether awake or asleep,
hears words expressive of an intelligible truth, than when he sees
things significative of truth, for instance "the seven full ears of
corn" signified "seven years of plenty" (Gen. 41:22, 26). In such
like signs prophecy would seem to be the more excellent, according as
the signs are more expressive, for instance when Jeremias saw the
burning of the city under the figure of a boiling cauldron (Jer.
1:13). Thirdly, it is evidently a still higher degree of prophecy
when a prophet not only sees signs of words or deeds, but also,
either awake or asleep, sees someone speaking or showing something to
him, since this proves the prophet's mind to have approached nearer
to the cause of the revelation. Fourthly, the height of a degree of
prophecy may be measured according to the appearance of the person
seen: for it is a higher degree of prophecy, if he who speaks or
shows something to the waking or sleeping prophet be seen by him
under the form of an angel, than if he be seen by him under the form
of man: and higher still is it, if he be seen by the prophet whether
asleep or awake, under the appearance of God, according to Isa. 6:1,
"I saw the Lord sitting."

But above all these degrees there is a third kind of prophecy, wherein
an intelligible and supernatural truth is shown without any imaginary
vision. However, this goes beyond the bounds of prophecy properly so
called, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3); and consequently the degrees of
prophecy are properly distinguished according to imaginary vision.

Reply Obj. 1: We are unable to know how to distinguish the
intellectual light, except by means of imaginary or sensible signs.
Hence the difference in the intellectual light is gathered from the
difference in the things presented to the imagination.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 171, A. 2), prophecy is by way, not
of an abiding habit, but of a transitory passion; wherefore there is
nothing inconsistent if one and the same prophet, at different times,
receive various degrees of prophetic revelation.

Reply Obj. 3: The words and deeds mentioned there do not pertain to
the prophetic revelation, but to the announcement, which is made
according to the disposition of those to whom that which is revealed
to the prophet is announced; and this is done sometimes by words,
sometimes by deeds. Now this announcement, and the working of
miracles, are something consequent upon prophecy, as stated above (Q.
171, A. 1).
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 174, Art. 4]

Whether Moses Was the Greatest of the Prophets?

Objection 1: It would seem that Moses was not the greatest of the
prophets. For a gloss at the beginning of the Psalter says that
"David is called the prophet by way of excellence." Therefore Moses
was not the greatest of all.

Obj. 2: Further, greater miracles were wrought by Josue, who made the
sun and moon to stand still (Josh. 10:12-14), and by Isaias, who made
the sun to turn back (Isa. 38:8), than by Moses, who divided the Red
Sea (Ex. 14:21). In like manner greater miracles were wrought by
Elias, of whom it is written (Ecclus. 48:4, 5): "Who can glory like
to thee? Who raisedst up a dead man from below." Therefore Moses was
not the greatest of the prophets.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Matt. 11:11) that "there hath not
risen, among them that are born of women, a greater than John the
Baptist." Therefore Moses was not greater than all the prophets.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 34:10): "There arose no more
a prophet in Israel like unto Moses."

_I answer that,_ Although in some respect one or other of the
prophets was greater than Moses, yet Moses was simply the greatest
of all. For, as stated above (A. 3; Q. 171, A. 1), in prophecy we
may consider not only the knowledge, whether by intellectual or by
imaginary vision, but also the announcement and the confirmation by
miracles. Accordingly Moses was greater than the other prophets.
First, as regards the intellectual vision, since he saw God's very
essence, even as Paul in his rapture did, according to Augustine
(Gen. ad lit. xii, 27). Hence it is written (Num. 12:8) that he saw
God "plainly and not by riddles." Secondly, as regards the imaginary
vision, which he had at his call, as it were, for not only did he
hear words, but also saw one speaking to him under the form of God,
and this not only while asleep, but even when he was awake. Hence it
is written (Ex. 33:11) that "the Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as
a man is wont to speak to his friend." Thirdly, as regards the
working of miracles which he wrought on a whole nation of
unbelievers. Wherefore it is written (Deut. 34:10, 11): "There arose
no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face
to face: in all the signs and wonders, which He sent by him, to do in
the land of Egypt to Pharaoh, and to all his servants, and to his
whole land."

Reply Obj. 1: The prophecy of David approaches near to the vision of
Moses, as regards the intellectual vision, because both received a
revelation of intelligible and supernatural truth, without any
imaginary vision. Yet the vision of Moses was more excellent as
regards the knowledge of the Godhead; while David more fully knew and
expressed the mysteries of Christ's incarnation.

Reply Obj. 2: These signs of the prophets mentioned were greater as
to the substance of the thing done; yet the miracles of Moses were
greater as regards the way in which they were done, since they were
wrought on a whole people.

Reply Obj. 3: John belongs to the New Testament, whose ministers take
precedence even of Moses, since they are spectators of a fuller
revelation, as stated in 2 Cor. 3.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 174, Art. 6]

Whether There Is a Degree of Prophecy in the Blessed?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is a degree of prophecy in the
blessed. For, as stated above (A. 4), Moses saw the Divine essence,
and yet he is called a prophet. Therefore in like manner the blessed
can be called prophets.

Obj. 2: Further, prophecy is a "divine revelation." Now divine
revelations are made even to the blessed angels. Therefore even
blessed angels can be prophets.

Obj. 3: Further, Christ was a comprehensor from the moment of His
conception; and yet He calls Himself a prophet (Matt. 13:57), when He
says: "A prophet is not without honor, save in his own country."
Therefore even comprehensors and the blessed can be called prophets.

Obj. 4: Further, it is written of Samuel (Ecclus. 46:23): "He lifted
up his voice from the earth in prophecy to blot out the wickedness of
the nation." Therefore other saints can likewise be called prophets
after they have died.

_On the contrary,_ The prophetic word is compared (2 Pet. 1:19) to a
"light that shineth in a dark place." Now there is no darkness in the
blessed. Therefore they cannot be called prophets.

_I answer that,_ Prophecy denotes vision of some supernatural truth
as being far remote from us. This happens in two ways. First, on the
part of the knowledge itself, because, to wit, the supernatural truth
is not known in itself, but in some of its effects; and this truth
will be more remote if it be known by means of images of corporeal
things, than if it be known in its intelligible effects; and such
most of all is the prophetic vision, which is conveyed by images and
likenesses of corporeal things. Secondly, vision is remote on the
part of the seer, because, to wit, he has not yet attained completely
to his ultimate perfection, according to 2 Cor. 5:6, "While we are in
the body, we are absent from the Lord."

Now in neither of these ways are the blessed remote; wherefore they
cannot be called prophets.

Reply Obj. 1: This vision of Moses was interrupted after the manner
of a passion, and was not permanent like the beatific vision,
wherefore he was as yet a seer from afar. For this reason his vision
did not entirely lose the character of prophecy.

Reply Obj. 2: The divine revelation is made to the angels, not as
being far distant, but as already wholly united to God; wherefore
their revelation has not the character of prophecy.

Reply Obj. 3: Christ was at the same time comprehensor and wayfarer
[*Cf. III, QQ. 9, seqq.]. Consequently the notion of prophecy is not
applicable to Him as a comprehensor, but only as a wayfarer.

Reply Obj. 4: Samuel had not yet attained to the state of
blessedness. Wherefore although by God's will the soul itself of
Samuel foretold to Saul the issue of the war as revealed to him by
God, this pertains to the nature of prophecy. It is not the same with
the saints who are now in heaven. Nor does it make any difference
that this is stated to have been brought about by the demons' art,
because although the demons are unable to evoke the soul of a saint,
or to force it to do any particular thing, this can be done by the
power of God, so that when the demon is consulted, God Himself
declares the truth by His messenger: even as He gave a true answer by
Elias to the King's messengers who were sent to consult the god of
Accaron (4 Kings 1).

It might also be replied [*The Book of Ecclesiasticus was not as yet
declared by the Church to be Canonical Scripture; Cf. I, Q. 89, A. 8,
ad 2] that it was not the soul of Samuel, but a demon impersonating
him; and that the wise man calls him Samuel, and describes his
prediction as prophetic, in accordance with the thoughts of Saul and
the bystanders who were of this opinion.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 174, Art. 6]

Whether the Degrees of Prophecy Change As Time Goes On?

Objection 1: It would seem that the degrees of prophecy change as
time goes on. For prophecy is directed to the knowledge of Divine
things, as stated above (A. 2). Now according to Gregory (Hom. in
Ezech.), "knowledge of God went on increasing as time went on."
Therefore degrees of prophecy should be distinguished according to
the process of time.

Obj. 2: Further, prophetic revelation is conveyed by God speaking to
man; while the prophets declared both in words and in writing the
things revealed to them. Now it is written (1 Kings 3:1) that before
the time of Samuel "the word of the Lord was precious," i.e. rare;
and yet afterwards it was delivered to many. In like manner the books
of the prophets do not appear to have been written before the time of
Isaias, to whom it was said (Isa. 8:1): "Take thee a great book and
write in it with a man's pen," after which many prophets wrote their
prophecies. Therefore it would seem that in course of time the degree
of prophecy made progress.

Obj. 3: Further, our Lord said (Matt. 11:13): "The prophets and the
law prophesied until John"; and afterwards the gift of prophecy was
in Christ's disciples in a much more excellent manner than in the
prophets of old, according to Eph. 3:5, "In other generations" the
mystery of Christ "was not known to the sons of men, as it is now
revealed to His holy apostles and prophets in the Spirit." Therefore
it would seem that in course of time the degree of prophecy advanced.

_On the contrary,_ As stated above (A. 4), Moses was the greatest of
the prophets, and yet he preceded the other prophets. Therefore
prophecy did not advance in degree as time went on.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), prophecy is directed to the
knowledge of Divine truth, by the contemplation of which we are not
only instructed in faith, but also guided in our actions, according
to Ps. 42:3, "Send forth Thy light and Thy truth: they have conducted
me." Now our faith consists chiefly in two things: first, in the true
knowledge of God, according to Heb. 11:6, "He that cometh to God must
believe that He is"; secondly, in the mystery of Christ's
incarnation, according to John 14:1, "You believe in God, believe
also in Me." Accordingly, if we speak of prophecy as directed to the
Godhead as its end, it progressed according to three divisions of
time, namely before the law, under the law, and under grace. For
before the law, Abraham and the other patriarchs were prophetically
taught things pertinent to faith in the Godhead. Hence they are
called prophets, according to Ps. 104:15, "Do no evil to My
prophets," which words are said especially on behalf of Abraham and
Isaac. Under the Law prophetic revelation of things pertinent to
faith in the Godhead was made in a yet more excellent way than
hitherto, because then not only certain special persons or families
but the whole people had to be instructed in these matters. Hence the
Lord said to Moses (Ex. 6:2, 3): "I am the Lord that appeared to
Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, by the name of God almighty, and My
name Adonai I did not show to them"; because previously the
patriarchs had been taught to believe in a general way in God, one
and Almighty, while Moses was more fully instructed in the simplicity
of the Divine essence, when it was said to him (Ex. 3:14): "I am Who
am"; and this name is signified by Jews in the word "Adonai" on
account of their veneration for that unspeakable name. Afterwards in
the time of grace the mystery of the Trinity was revealed by the Son
of God Himself, according to Matt. 28:19: "Going . . . teach ye all
nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son,
and of the Holy Ghost."

In each state, however, the most excellent revelation was that which
was given first. Now the first revelation, before the Law, was given
to Abraham, for it was at that time that men began to stray from
faith in one God by turning aside to idolatry, whereas hitherto no
such revelation was necessary while all persevered in the worship of
one God. A less excellent revelation was made to Isaac, being founded
on that which was made to Abraham. Wherefore it was said to him (Gen.
26:24): "I am the God of Abraham thy father," and in like manner to
Jacob (Gen. 28:13): "I am the God of Abraham thy father, and the God
of Isaac." Again in the state of the Law the first revelation which
was given to Moses was more excellent, and on this revelation all the
other revelations to the prophets were founded. And so, too, in the
time of grace the entire faith of the Church is founded on the
revelation vouchsafed to the apostles, concerning the faith in one
God and three Persons, according to Matt. 16:18, "On this rock," i.e.
of thy confession, "I will build My Church."

As to the faith in Christ's incarnation, it is evident that the
nearer men were to Christ, whether before or after Him, the more
fully, for the most part, were they instructed on this point, and
after Him more fully than before, as the Apostle declares (Eph. 3:5).

As regards the guidance of human acts, the prophetic revelation
varied not according to the course of time, but according as
circumstances required, because as it is written (Prov. 29:18), "When
prophecy shall fail, the people shall be scattered abroad." Wherefore
at all times men were divinely instructed about what they were to do,
according as it was expedient for the spiritual welfare of the elect.

Reply Obj. 1: The saying of Gregory is to be referred to the time
before Christ's incarnation, as regards the knowledge of this mystery.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 27), "just as in
the early days of the Assyrian kingdom promises were made most
explicitly to Abraham, so at the outset of the western Babylon,"
which is Rome, "and under its sway Christ was to come, in Whom were
to be fulfilled the promises made through the prophetic oracles
testifying in word and writing to that great event to come," the
promises, namely, which were made to Abraham. "For while prophets
were scarcely ever lacking to the people of Israel from the time that
they began to have kings, it was exclusively for their benefit, not
for that of the nations. But when those prophetic writings were being
set up with greater publicity, which at some future time were to
benefit the nations, it was fitting to begin when this city," Rome to
wit, "was being built, which was to govern the nations."

The reason why it behooved that nation to have a number of prophets
especially at the time of the kings, was that then it was not
over-ridden by other nations, but had its own king; wherefore it
behooved the people, as enjoying liberty, to have prophets to teach
them what to do.

Reply Obj. 3: The prophets who foretold the coming of Christ could
not continue further than John, who with his finger pointed to Christ
actually present. Nevertheless as Jerome says on this passage, "This
does not mean that there were no more prophets after John. For we
read in the Acts of the apostles that Agabus and the four maidens,
daughters of Philip, prophesied." John, too, wrote a prophetic book
about the end of the Church; and at all times there have not been
lacking persons having the spirit of prophecy, not indeed for the
declaration of any new doctrine of faith, but for the direction of
human acts. Thus Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 26) that "the emperor
Theodosius sent to John who dwelt in the Egyptian desert, and whom he
knew by his ever-increasing fame to be endowed with the prophetic
spirit: and from him he received a message assuring him of victory."
_______________________

QUESTION 175

OF RAPTURE
(In Six Articles)

We must now consider rapture. Under this head there are six points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether the soul of man is carried away to things divine?

(2) Whether rapture pertains to the cognitive or to the appetitive
power?

(3) Whether Paul when in rapture saw the essence of God?

(4) Whether he was withdrawn from his senses?

(5) Whether, when in that state, his soul was wholly separated from
his body?

(6) What did he know, and what did he not know about this matter?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 175, Art. 1]

Whether the Soul of Man Is Carried Away to Things Divine?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of man is not carried away
to things divine. For some define rapture as "an uplifting by the
power of a higher nature, from that which is according to nature to
that which is above nature" [*Reference unknown; Cf. De Veritate
xiii, 1]. Now it is in accordance with man's nature that he be
uplifted to things divine; for Augustine says at the beginning of his
Confessions: "Thou madest us, Lord, for Thyself, and our heart is
restless, till it rest in Thee." Therefore man's soul is not carried
away to things divine.

Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii) that "God's justice
is seen in this that He treats all things according to their mode and
dignity." But it is not in accordance with man's mode and worth that
he be raised above what he is according to nature. Therefore it would
seem that man's soul is not carried away to things divine.

Obj. 3: Further, rapture denotes violence of some kind. But God rules
us not by violence or force, as Damascene says [*De Fide Orth. ii,
30]. Therefore man's soul is not carried away to things divine.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:2): "I know a man in
Christ . . . rapt even to the third heaven." On which words a gloss
says: "Rapt, that is to say, uplifted contrary to nature."

_I answer that,_ Rapture denotes violence of a kind as stated above
(Obj. 3); and "the violent is that which has its principle without,
and in which he that suffers violence concurs not at all" (Ethic.
iii, 1). Now everything concurs in that to which it tends in
accordance with its proper inclination, whether voluntary or natural.
Wherefore he who is carried away by some external agent, must be
carried to something different from that to which his inclination
tends. This difference arises in two ways: in one way from the end of
the inclination--for instance a stone, which is naturally inclined to
be borne downwards, may be thrown upwards; in another way from the
manner of tending--for instance a stone may be thrown downwards with
greater velocity than consistent with its natural movement.

Accordingly man's soul also is said to be carried away, in a twofold
manner, to that which is contrary to its nature: in one way, as
regards the term of transport--as when it is carried away to
punishment, according to Ps. 49:22, "Lest He snatch you away, and
there be none to deliver you"; in another way, as regards the manner
connatural to man, which is that he should understand the truth
through sensible things. Hence when he is withdrawn from the
apprehension of sensibles, he is said to be carried away, even though
he be uplifted to things whereunto he is directed naturally: provided
this be not done intentionally, as when a man betakes himself to
sleep which is in accordance with nature, wherefore sleep cannot be
called rapture, properly speaking.

This withdrawal, whatever its term may be, may arise from a threefold
cause. First, from a bodily cause, as happens to those who suffer
abstraction from the senses through weakness: secondly, by the power
of the demons, as in those who are possessed: thirdly, by the power
of God. In this last sense we are now speaking of rapture, whereby a
man is uplifted by the spirit of God to things supernatural, and
withdrawn from his senses, according to Ezech. 8:3, "The spirit
lifted me up between the earth and the heaven, and brought me in the
vision of God into Jerusalem."

It must be observed, however, that sometimes a person is said to be
carried away, not only through being withdrawn from his senses, but
also through being withdrawn from the things to which he was
attending, as when a person's mind wanders contrary to his purpose.
But this is to use the expression in a less proper signification.

Reply Obj. 1: It is natural to man to tend to divine things through
the apprehension of things sensible, according to Rom. 1:20, "The
invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by
the things that are made." But the mode, whereby a man is uplifted to
divine things and withdrawn from his senses, is not natural to man.

Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to man's mode and dignity that he be
uplifted to divine things, from the very fact that he is made to
God's image. And since a divine good infinitely surpasses the faculty
of man in order to attain that good, he needs the divine assistance
which is bestowed on him in every gift of grace. Hence it is not
contrary to nature, but above the faculty of nature that man's mind
be thus uplifted in rapture by God.

Reply Obj. 3: The saying of Damascene refers to those things which a
man does by himself. But as to those things which are beyond the
scope of the free-will, man needs to be uplifted by a stronger
operation, which in a certain respect may be called force if we
consider the mode of operation, but not if we consider its term to
which man is directed both by nature and by his intention.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 175, Art. 2]

Whether Rapture Pertains to the Cognitive Rather Than to the
Appetitive Power?

Objection 1: It would seem that rapture pertains to the appetitive
rather than to the cognitive power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
iv): "The Divine love causes ecstasy." Now love pertains to the
appetitive power. Therefore so does ecstasy or rapture.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 3) that "he who fed the
swine debased himself by a dissipated mind and an unclean life;
whereas Peter, when the angel delivered him and carried him into
ecstasy, was not beside himself, but above himself." Now the prodigal
son sank into the depths by his appetite. Therefore in those also who
are carried up into the heights it is the appetite that is affected.

Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Ps. 30:1, "In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped,
let me never be confounded," says in explaining the title [*Unto the
end, a psalm for David, in an ecstasy]: "_Ekstasis_ in Greek
signifies in Latin _excessus mentis,_ an aberration of the mind. This
happens in two ways, either through dread of earthly things or
through the mind being rapt in heavenly things and forgetful of this
lower world." Now dread of earthly things pertains to the appetite.
Therefore rapture of the mind in heavenly things, being placed in
opposition to this dread, also pertains to the appetite.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Ps. 115:2, "I said in my excess: Every
man is a liar," says: "We speak of ecstasy, not when the mind wanders
through fear, but when it is carried aloft on the wings of
revelation." Now revelation pertains to the intellective power.
Therefore ecstasy or rapture does also.

_I answer that,_ We can speak of rapture in two ways. First, with
regard to the term of rapture, and thus, properly speaking, rapture
cannot pertain to the appetitive, but only to the cognitive power.
For it was stated (A. 1) that rapture is outside the inclination of
the person who is rapt; whereas the movement of the appetitive power
is an inclination to an appetible good. Wherefore, properly speaking,
in desiring something, a man is not rapt, but is moved by himself.

Secondly, rapture may be considered with regard to its cause, and
thus it may have a cause on the part of the appetitive power. For
from the very fact that the appetite is strongly affected towards
something, it may happen, owing to the violence of his affection,
that a man is carried away from everything else. Moreover, it has an
effect on the appetitive power, when for instance a man delights in
the things to which he is rapt. Hence the Apostle said that he was
rapt, not only "to the third heaven"--which pertains to the
contemplation of the intellect--but also into "paradise," which
pertains to the appetite.

Reply Obj. 1: Rapture adds something to ecstasy. For ecstasy means
simply a going out of oneself by being placed outside one's proper
order [*Cf. I-II, Q. 28, A. 3]; while rapture denotes a certain
violence in addition. Accordingly ecstasy may pertain to the
appetitive power, as when a man's appetite tends to something outside
him, and in this sense Dionysius says that "the Divine love causes
ecstasy," inasmuch as it makes man's appetite tend to the object
loved. Hence he says afterwards that "even God Himself, the cause of
all things, through the overflow of His loving goodness, goes outside
Himself in His providence for all beings." But even if this were said
expressly of rapture, it would merely signify that love is the cause
of rapture.

Reply Obj. 2: There is a twofold appetite in man; to wit, the
intellective appetite which is called the will, and the sensitive
appetite known as the sensuality. Now it is proper to man that his
lower appetite be subject to the higher appetite, and that the higher
move the lower. Hence man may become outside himself as regards the
appetite, in two ways. In one way, when a man's intellective appetite
tends wholly to divine things, and takes no account of those things
whereto the sensitive appetite inclines him; thus Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv) that "Paul being in ecstasy through the vehemence of
Divine love" exclaimed: "I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me."

In another way, when a man tends wholly to things pertaining to the
lower appetite, and takes no account of his higher appetite. It is
thus that "he who fed the swine debased himself"; and this latter
kind of going out of oneself, or being beside oneself, is more akin
than the former to the nature of rapture because the higher appetite
is more proper to man. Hence when through the violence of his lower
appetite a man is withdrawn from the movement of his higher appetite,
it is more a case of being withdrawn from that which is proper to
him. Yet, because there is no violence therein, since the will is
able to resist the passion, it falls short of the true nature of
rapture, unless perchance the passion be so strong that it takes away
entirely the use of reason, as happens to those who are mad with
anger or love.

It must be observed, however, that both these excesses affecting the
appetite may cause an excess in the cognitive power, either because
the mind is carried away to certain intelligible objects, through
being drawn away from objects of sense, or because it is caught up
into some imaginary vision or fanciful apparition.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as love is a movement of the appetite with regard
to good, so fear is a movement of the appetite with regard to evil.
Wherefore either of them may equally cause an aberration of mind; and
all the more since fear arises from love, as Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xiv, 7, 9).
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 175, Art. 3]

Whether Paul, When in Rapture, Saw the Essence of God?

Objection 1: It would seem that Paul, when in rapture, did not see
the essence of God. For just as we read of Paul that he was rapt to
the third heaven, so we read of Peter (Acts 10:10) that "there came
upon him an ecstasy of mind." Now Peter, in his ecstasy, saw not
God's essence but an imaginary vision. Therefore it would seem that
neither did Paul see the essence of God.

Obj. 2: Further, the vision of God is beatific. But Paul, in his
rapture, was not beatified; else he would never have returned to the
unhappiness of this life, but his body would have been glorified by
the overflow from his soul, as will happen to the saints after the
resurrection, and this clearly was not the case. Therefore Paul when
in rapture saw not the essence of God.

Obj. 3: Further, according to 1 Cor. 13:10-12, faith and hope are
incompatible with the vision of the Divine essence. But Paul when in
this state had faith and hope. Therefore he saw not the essence of
God.

Obj. 4: Further, as Augustine states (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6, 7),
"pictures of bodies are seen in the imaginary vision." Now Paul is
stated (2 Cor. 12:2, 4) to have seen certain pictures in his rapture,
for instance of the "third heaven" and of "paradise." Therefore he
would seem to have been rapt to an imaginary vision rather than to
the vision of the Divine essence.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Ep. CXLVII, 13; ad Paulin., de videndo
Deum) concludes that "possibly God's very substance was seen by some
while yet in this life: for instance by Moses, and by Paul who in
rapture heard unspeakable words, which it is not granted unto man to
utter."

_I answer that,_ Some have said that Paul, when in rapture, saw "not
the very essence of God, but a certain reflection of His clarity."
But Augustine clearly comes to an opposite decision, not only in his
book (De videndo Deum), but also in Gen. ad lit. xii, 28 (quoted in a
gloss on 2 Cor. 12:2). Indeed the words themselves of the Apostle
indicate this. For he says that "he heard secret words, which it is
not granted unto man to utter": and such would seem to be words
pertaining to the vision of the blessed, which transcends the state
of the wayfarer, according to Isa. 64:4, "Eye hath not seen, O God,
besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that love
[Vulg.: 'wait for'] Thee" [*1 Cor. 2:9]. Therefore it is more
becoming to hold that he saw God in His essence.

Reply Obj. 1: Man's mind is rapt by God to the contemplation of
divine truth in three ways. First, so that he contemplates it through
certain imaginary pictures, and such was the ecstasy that came upon
Peter. Secondly, so that he contemplates the divine truth through its
intelligible effects; such was the ecstasy of David, who said (Ps.
115:11): "I said in my excess: Every man is a liar." Thirdly, so that
he contemplates it in its essence. Such was the rapture of Paul, as
also of Moses [*Cf. Q. 174, A. 4]; and not without reason, since as
Moses was the first Teacher of the Jews, so was Paul the first
"Teacher of the gentiles" [*Cf. I, Q. 68, A. 4].

Reply Obj. 2: The Divine essence cannot be seen by a created
intellect save through the light of glory, of which it is written
(Ps. 35:10): "In Thy light we shall see light." But this light can be
shared in two ways. First by way of an abiding form, and thus it
beatifies the saints in heaven. Secondly, by way of a transitory
passion, as stated above (Q. 171, A. 2) of the light of prophecy; and
in this way that light was in Paul when he was in rapture. Hence this
vision did not beatify him simply, so as to overflow into his body,
but only in a restricted sense. Consequently this rapture pertains
somewhat to prophecy.

Reply Obj. 3: Since, in his rapture, Paul was beatified not as to the
habit, but only as to the act of the blessed, it follows that he had
not the act of faith at the same time, although he had the habit.

Reply Obj. 4: In one way by the third heaven we may understand
something corporeal, and thus the third heaven denotes the empyrean
[*1 Tim. 2:7; Cf. I, Q. 12, A. 11, ad 2], which is described as the
"third," in relation to the aerial and starry heavens, or better
still, in relation to the aqueous and crystalline heavens. Moreover
Paul is stated to be rapt to the "third heaven," not as though his
rapture consisted in the vision of something corporeal, but because
this place is appointed for the contemplation of the blessed. Hence
the gloss on 2 Cor. 12 says that the "third heaven is a spiritual
heaven, where the angels and the holy souls enjoy the contemplation
of God: and when Paul says that he was rapt to this heaven he means
that God showed him the life wherein He is to be seen forevermore."

In another way the third heaven may signify a supra-mundane vision.
Such a vision may be called the third heaven in three ways. First,
according to the order of the cognitive powers. In this way the first
heaven would indicate a supramundane bodily vision, conveyed through
the senses; thus was seen the hand of one writing on the wall (Dan.
5:5); the second heaven would be an imaginary vision such as Isaias
saw, and John in the Apocalypse; and the third heaven would denote an
intellectual vision according to Augustine's explanation (Gen. ad
lit. xii, 26, 28, 34). Secondly, the third heaven may be taken
according to the order of things knowable, the first heaven being
"the knowledge of heavenly bodies, the second the knowledge of
heavenly spirits, the third the knowledge of God Himself." Thirdly,
the third heaven may denote the contemplation of God according to the
degrees of knowledge whereby God is seen. The first of these degrees
belongs to the angels of the lowest hierarchy [*Cf. I, Q. 108, A. 1],
the second to the angels of the middle hierarchy, the third to the
angels of the highest hierarchy, according to the gloss on 2 Cor. 12.

And since the vision of God cannot be without delight, he says that he
was not only "rapt to the third heaven" by reason of his
contemplation, but also into "Paradise" by reason of the consequent
delight.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 175, Art. 4]

Whether Paul, When in Rapture, Was Withdrawn from His Senses?

Objection 1: It would seem that Paul, when in rapture, was not
withdrawn from his senses. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 28):
"Why should we not believe that when so great an apostle, the teacher
of the gentiles, was rapt to this most sublime vision, God was
willing to vouchsafe him a glimpse of that eternal life which is to
take the place of the present life?" Now in that future life after
the resurrection the saints will see the Divine essence without being
withdrawn from the senses of the body. Therefore neither did such a
withdrawal take place in Paul.

Obj. 2: Further, Christ was truly a wayfarer, and also enjoyed an
uninterrupted vision of the Divine essence, without, however, being
withdrawn from His senses. Therefore there was no need for Paul to be
withdrawn from his senses in order for him to see the essence of God.

Obj. 3: Further, after seeing God in His essence, Paul remembered
what he had seen in that vision; hence he said (2 Cor. 12:4): "He
heard secret words, which it is not granted to man to utter." Now the
memory belongs to the sensitive faculty according to the Philosopher
(De Mem. et Remin. i). Therefore it seems that Paul, while seeing the
essence of God, was not withdrawn from his senses.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27): "Unless a
man in some way depart this life, whether by going altogether out of
his body or by turning away and withdrawing from his carnal senses,
so that he truly knows not as the Apostle said, whether he be in the
body or out of the body, he is not rapt and caught up into that
vision.*" [*The text of St. Augustine reads: "when he is rapt," etc.]

_I answer that,_ The Divine essence cannot be seen by man through any
cognitive power other than the intellect. Now the human intellect
does not turn to intelligible objects except by means of the
phantasms [*Cf. I, Q. 84, A. 7] which it takes from the senses
through the intelligible species; and it is in considering these
phantasms that the intellect judges of and coordinates sensible
objects. Hence in any operation that requires abstraction of the
intellect from phantasms, there must be also withdrawal of the
intellect from the senses. Now in the state of the wayfarer it is
necessary for man's intellect, if it see God's essence, to be
withdrawn from phantasms. For God's essence cannot be seen by means
of a phantasm, nor indeed by any created intelligible species [*Cf.
I, Q. 12, A. 2], since God's essence infinitely transcends not only
all bodies, which are represented by phantasms, but also all
intelligible creatures. Now when man's intellect is uplifted to the
sublime vision of God's essence, it is necessary that his mind's
whole attention should be summoned to that purpose in such a way that
he understand naught else by phantasms, and be absorbed entirely in
God. Therefore it is impossible for man while a wayfarer to see God
in His essence without being withdrawn from his senses.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 3, Obj. 2), after the resurrection,
in the blessed who see God in His essence, there will be an overflow
from the intellect to the lower powers and even to the body. Hence it
is in keeping with the rule itself of the divine vision that the soul
will turn towards phantasms and sensible objects. But there is no
such overflow in those who are raptured, as stated (A. 3, Obj. 2, ad
2), and consequently the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 2: The intellect of Christ's soul was glorified by the
habit of the light of glory, whereby He saw the Divine essence much
more fully than an angel or a man. He was, however, a wayfarer on
account of the passibility of His body, in respect of which He was
"made a little lower than the angels" (Heb. 2:9), by dispensation,
and not on account of any defect on the part of His intellect. Hence
there is no comparison between Him and other wayfarers.

Reply Obj. 3: Paul, after seeing God in His essence, remembered what
he had known in that vision, by means of certain intelligible species
that remained in his intellect by way of habit; even as in the
absence of the sensible object, certain impressions remain in the
soul which it recollects when it turns to the phantasms. And so this
was the knowledge that he was unable wholly to think over or express
in words.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 175, Art. 5]

Whether, While in This State, Paul's Soul Was Wholly Separated from
His Body?

Objection 1: It would seem that, while in this state, Paul's soul was
wholly separated from his body. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6, 7):
"While we are in the body we are absent from the Lord. For we walk by
faith, and not by sight" [*_Per speciem,_ i.e. by an intelligible
species]. Now, while in that state, Paul was not absent from the
Lord, for he saw Him by a species, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore
he was not in the body.

Obj. 2: Further, a power of the soul cannot be uplifted above the
soul's essence wherein it is rooted. Now in this rapture the
intellect, which is a power of the soul, was withdrawn from its
bodily surroundings through being uplifted to divine contemplation.
Much more therefore was the essence of the soul separated from the
body.

Obj. 3: Further, the forces of the vegetative soul are more material
than those of the sensitive soul. Now in order for him to be rapt to
the vision of God, it was necessary for him to be withdrawn from the
forces of the sensitive soul, as stated above (A. 4). Much more,
therefore, was it necessary for him to be withdrawn from the forces
of the vegetative soul. Now when these forces cease to operate, the
soul is no longer in any way united to the body. Therefore it would
seem that in Paul's rapture it was necessary for the soul to be
wholly separated from the body.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Ep. CXLVII, 13, ad Paulin.; de
videndo Deum): "It is not incredible that this sublime revelation"
(namely, that they should see God in His essence) "was vouchsafed
certain saints, without their departing this life so completely as to
leave nothing but a corpse for burial." Therefore it was not
necessary for Paul's soul, when in rapture, to be wholly separated
from his body.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, Obj. 1), in the rapture of
which we are speaking now, man is uplifted by God's power, "from that
which is according to nature to that which is above nature."
Wherefore two things have to be considered: first, what pertains to
man according to nature; secondly, what has to be done by God in man
above his nature. Now, since the soul is united to the body as its
natural form, it belongs to the soul to have a natural disposition to
understand by turning to phantasms; and this is not withdrawn by the
divine power from the soul in rapture, since its state undergoes no
change, as stated above (A. 3, ad 2, 3). Yet, this state remaining,
actual conversion to phantasms and sensible objects is withdrawn from
the soul, lest it be hindered from being uplifted to that which
transcends all phantasms, as stated above (A. 4). Therefore it was
not necessary that his soul in rapture should be so separated from
the body as to cease to be united thereto as its form; and yet it was
necessary for his intellect to be withdrawn from phantasms and the
perception of sensible objects.

Reply Obj. 1: In this rapture Paul was absent from the Lord as
regards his state, since he was still in the state of a wayfarer, but
not as regards the act by which he saw God by a species, as stated
above (A. 3, ad 2, 3).

Reply Obj. 2: A faculty of the soul is not uplifted by the natural
power above the mode becoming the essence of the soul; but it can be
uplifted by the divine power to something higher, even as a body by
the violence of a stronger power is lifted up above the place
befitting it according to its specific nature.

Reply Obj. 3: The forces of the vegetative soul do not operate
through the soul being intent thereon, as do the sensitive forces,
but by way of nature. Hence in the case of rapture there is no need
for withdrawal from them, as from the sensitive powers, whose
operations would lessen the intentness of the soul on intellective
knowledge.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 175, Art. 6]

Did Paul Know Whether His Soul Were Separated from His Body?

Objection 1: It would seem that Paul was not ignorant whether his
soul were separated from his body. For he says (2 Cor. 12:2): "I know
a man in Christ rapt even to the third heaven." Now man denotes
something composed of soul and body; and rapture differs from death.
Seemingly therefore he knew that his soul was not separated from his
body by death, which is the more probable seeing that this is the
common opinion of the Doctors.

Obj. 2: Further, it appears from the same words of the Apostle that
he knew whither he was rapt, since it was "to the third heaven." Now
this shows that he knew whether he was in the body or not, for if he
knew the third heaven to be something corporeal, he must have known
that his soul was not separated from his body, since a corporeal
thing cannot be an object of sight save through the body. Therefore
it would seem that he was not ignorant whether his soul were
separated from his body.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 28) that "when in
rapture, he saw God with the same vision as the saints see Him in
heaven." Now from the very fact that the saints see God, they know
whether their soul is separated from their body. Therefore Paul too
knew this.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Cor. 12:3): "Whether in the body,
or out of the body, I know not, God knoweth."

_I answer that,_ The true answer to this question must be gathered
from the Apostle's very words, whereby he says he knew something,
namely that he was "rapt even to the third heaven," and that
something he knew not, namely "whether" he were "in the body or out
of the body." This may be understood in two ways. First, the words
"whether in the body or out of the body" may refer not to the very
being of the man who was rapt (as though he knew not whether his soul
were in his body or not), but to the mode of rapture, so that he
ignored whether his body besides his soul, or, on the other hand, his
soul alone, were rapt to the third heaven. Thus Ezechiel is stated
(Ezech. 8:3) to have been "brought in the vision of God into
Jerusalem." This was the explanation of a certain Jew according to
Jerome (Prolog. super Daniel.), where he says that "lastly our
Apostle" (thus said the Jew) "durst not assert that he was rapt in
his body, but said: 'Whether in the body or out of the body, I know
not.'"

Augustine, however, disapproves of this explanation (Gen. ad lit.
xii, 3 seqq.) for this reason that the Apostle states that he knew he
was rapt even to the third heaven. Wherefore he knew it to be really
the third heaven to which he was rapt, and not an imaginary likeness
of the third heaven: otherwise if he gave the name of third heaven to
an imaginary third heaven, in the same way he might state that he was
rapt in the body, meaning, by body, an image of his body, such as
appears in one's dreams. Now if he knew it to be really the third
heaven, it follows that either he knew it to be something spiritual
and incorporeal, and then his body could not be rapt thither; or he
knew it to be something corporeal, and then his soul could not be
rapt thither without his body, unless it were separated from his
body. Consequently we must explain the matter otherwise, by saying
that the Apostle knew himself to be rapt both in soul and body, but
that he ignored how his soul stood in relation to his body, to wit,
whether it were accompanied by his body or not.

Here we find a diversity of opinions. For some say that the Apostle
knew his soul to be united to his body as its form, but ignored
whether it were abstracted from its senses, or again whether it were
abstracted from the operations of the vegetative soul. But he could
not but know that it was abstracted from the senses, seeing that he
knew himself to be rapt; and as to his being abstracted from the
operation of the vegetative soul, this was not of such importance as
to require him to be so careful in mentioning it. It follows, then,
that the Apostle ignored whether his soul were united to his body as
its form, or separated from it by death. Some, however, granting this
say that the Apostle did not consider the matter while he was in
rapture, because he was wholly intent upon God, but that afterwards
he questioned the point, when taking cognizance of what he had seen.
But this also is contrary to the Apostle's words, for he there
distinguishes between the past and what happened subsequently, since
he states that at the present time he knows that he was rapt
"fourteen years ago," and that at the present time he knows not
"whether he was in the body or out of the body."

Consequently we must assert that both before and after he ignored
whether his soul were separated from his body. Wherefore Augustine
(Gen. ad lit. xii, 5), after discussing the question at length,
concludes: "Perhaps then we must infer that he ignored whether, when
he was rapt to the third heaven, his soul was in his body (in the
same way as the soul is in the body, when we speak of a living body
either of a waking or of a sleeping man, or of one that is withdrawn
from his bodily senses during ecstasy), or whether his soul went out
of his body altogether, so that his body lay dead."

Reply Obj. 1: Sometimes by the figure of synecdoche a part of man,
especially the soul which is the principal part, denotes a man. Or
again we might take this to mean that he whom he states to have been
rapt was a man not at the time of his rapture, but fourteen years
afterwards: for he says "I know a man," not "I know a rapt man."
Again nothing hinders death brought about by God being called
rapture; and thus Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 3): "If the
Apostle doubted the matter, who of us will dare to be certain about
it?" Wherefore those who have something to say on this subject speak
with more conjecture than certainty.

Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle knew that either the heaven in question was
something incorporeal, or that he saw something incorporeal in that
heaven; yet this could be done by his intellect, even without his
soul being separated from his body.

Reply Obj. 3: Paul's vision, while he was in rapture, was like the
vision of the blessed in one respect, namely as to the thing seen;
and, unlike, in another respect, namely as to the mode of seeing,
because he saw not so perfectly as do the saints in heaven. Hence
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 36): "Although, when the Apostle
was rapt from his carnal senses to the third heaven, he lacked that
full and perfect knowledge of things which is in the angels, in that
he knew not whether he was in the body, or out of the body, this will
surely not be lacking after reunion with the body in the resurrection
of the dead, when this corruptible will put on incorruption."
_______________________

QUESTION 176

OF THE GRACE OF TONGUES
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider those gratuitous graces that pertain to speech,
and (1) the grace of tongues; (2) the grace of the word of wisdom and
knowledge. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether by the grace of tongues a man acquires the knowledge of
all languages?

(2) Of the comparison between this gift and the grace of prophecy.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 176, Art. 1]

Whether Those Who Received the Gift of Tongues Spoke in Every
Language?

Objection 1: It seems that those who received the gift of tongues did
not speak in every language. For that which is granted to certain
persons by the divine power is the best of its kind: thus our Lord
turned the water into good wine, as stated in John 2:10. Now those
who had the gift of tongues spoke better in their own language; since
a gloss on Heb. 1, says that "it is not surprising that the epistle
to the Hebrews is more graceful in style than the other epistles,
since it is natural for a man to have more command over his own than
over a strange language. For the Apostle wrote the other epistles in
a foreign, namely the Greek, idiom; whereas he wrote this in the
Hebrew tongue." Therefore the apostles did not receive the knowledge
of all languages by a gratuitous grace.

Obj. 2: Further, nature does not employ many means where one is
sufficient; and much less does God Whose work is more orderly than
nature's. Now God could make His disciples to be understood by all,
while speaking one tongue: hence a gloss on Acts 2:6, "Every man
heard them speak in his own tongue," says that "they spoke in every
tongue, or speaking in their own, namely the Hebrew language, were
understood by all, as though they spoke the language proper to each."
Therefore it would seem that they had not the knowledge to speak in
all languages.

Obj. 3: Further, all graces flow from Christ to His body, which is
the Church, according to John 1:16, "Of His fullness we all have
received." Now we do not read that Christ spoke more than one
language, nor does each one of the faithful now speak save in one
tongue. Therefore it would seem that Christ's disciples did not
receive the grace to the extent of speaking in all languages.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Acts 2:4) that "they were all
filled with the Holy Ghost, and they began to speak with divers
tongues, according as the Holy Ghost gave them to speak"; on which
passage a gloss of Gregory [*Hom. xxx in Ev.] says that "the Holy
Ghost appeared over the disciples under the form of fiery tongues,
and gave them the knowledge of all tongues."

_I answer that,_ Christ's first disciples were chosen by Him in order
that they might disperse throughout the whole world, and preach His
faith everywhere, according to Matt. 28:19, "Going . . . teach ye all
nations." Now it was not fitting that they who were being sent to
teach others should need to be taught by others, either as to how
they should speak to other people, or as to how they were to
understand those who spoke to them; and all the more seeing that
those who were being sent were of one nation, that of Judea,
according to Isa. 27:6, "When they shall rush out from Jacob [*Vulg.:
'When they shall rush in unto Jacob,' etc.] . . . they shall fill
the face of the world with seed." Moreover those who were being sent
were poor and powerless; nor at the outset could they have easily
found someone to interpret their words faithfully to others, or to
explain what others said to them, especially as they were sent to
unbelievers. Consequently it was necessary, in this respect, that God
should provide them with the gift of tongues; in order that, as the
diversity of tongues was brought upon the nations when they fell away
to idolatry, according to Gen. 11, so when the nations were to be
recalled to the worship of one God a remedy to this diversity might
be applied by the gift of tongues.

Reply Obj. 1: As it is written (1 Cor. 12:7), "the manifestation of
the Spirit is given to every man unto profit"; and consequently both
Paul and the other apostles were divinely instructed in the languages
of all nations sufficiently for the requirements of the teaching of
the faith. But as regards the grace and elegance of style which human
art adds to a language, the Apostle was instructed in his own, but
not in a foreign tongue. Even so they were sufficiently instructed in
wisdom and scientific knowledge, as required for teaching the faith,
but not as to all things known by acquired science, for instance the
conclusions of arithmetic and geometry.

Reply Obj. 2: Although either was possible, namely that, while
speaking in one tongue they should be understood by all, or that they
should speak in all tongues, it was more fitting that they should
speak in all tongues, because this pertained to the perfection of
their knowledge, whereby they were able not only to speak, but also
to understand what was said by others. Whereas if their one language
were intelligible to all, this would either have been due to the
knowledge of those who understood their speech, or it would have
amounted to an illusion, since a man's words would have had a
different sound in another's ears, from that with which they were
uttered. Hence a gloss says on Acts 2:6 that "it was a greater
miracle that they should speak all kinds of tongues"; and Paul says
(1 Cor. 14:18): "I thank my God I speak with all your tongues."

Reply Obj. 3: Christ in His own person purposed preaching to only one
nation, namely the Jews. Consequently, although without any doubt He
possessed most perfectly the knowledge of all languages, there was no
need for Him to speak in every tongue. And therefore, as Augustine
says (Tract. xxxii in Joan.), "whereas even now the Holy Ghost is
received, yet no one speaks in the tongues of all nations, because
the Church herself already speaks the languages of all nations: since
whoever is not in the Church, receives not the Holy Ghost."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 176, Art. 2]

Whether the Gift of Tongues Is More Excellent Than the Grace of Prophecy?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent
than the grace of prophecy. For, seemingly, better things are proper
to better persons, according to the Philosopher (Topic. iii, 1). Now
the gift of tongues is proper to the New Testament, hence we sing in
the sequence of Pentecost [*The sequence: _Sancti Spiritus adsit
nobis gratia_ ascribed to King Robert of France, the reputed author
of the _Veni Sancte Spiritus._ Cf. Migne, Patr. Lat. tom. CXLI]: "On
this day Thou gavest Christ's apostles an unwonted gift, a marvel to
all time": whereas prophecy is more pertinent to the Old Testament,
according to Heb. 1:1, "God Who at sundry times and in divers manners
spoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets." Therefore it
would seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the gift
of prophecy.

Obj. 2: Further, that whereby we are directed to God is seemingly
more excellent than that whereby we are directed to men. Now, by the
gift of tongues, man is directed to God, whereas by prophecy he is
directed to man; for it is written (1 Cor. 14:2, 3): "He that
speaketh in a tongue, speaketh not unto men, but unto God . . . but
he that prophesieth, speaketh unto men unto edification." Therefore
it would seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the
gift of prophecy.

Obj. 3: Further, the gift of tongues abides like a habit in the
person who has it, and "he can use it when he will"; wherefore it is
written (1 Cor. 14:18): "I thank my God I speak with all your
tongues." But it is not so with the gift of prophecy, as stated above
(Q. 171, A. 2). Therefore the gift of tongues would seem to be more
excellent than the gift of prophecy.

Obj. 4: Further, the "interpretation of speeches" would seem to be
contained under prophecy, because the Scriptures are expounded by the
same Spirit from Whom they originated. Now the interpretation of
speeches is placed after "divers kinds of tongues" (1 Cor. 12:10).
Therefore it seems that the gift of tongues is more excellent than
the gift of prophecy, particularly as regards a part of the latter.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:5): "Greater is he
that prophesieth than he that speaketh with tongues."

_I answer that,_ The gift of prophecy surpasses the gift of tongues,
in three ways. First, because the gift of tongues regards the
utterance of certain words, which signify an intelligible truth, and
this again is signified by the phantasms which appear in an imaginary
vision; wherefore Augustine compares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 8) the gift
of tongues to an imaginary vision. On the other hand, it has been
stated above (Q. 173, A. 2) that the gift of prophecy consists in the
mind itself being enlightened so as to know an intelligible truth.
Wherefore, as the prophetic enlightenment is more excellent than the
imaginary vision, as stated above (Q. 174, A. 2), so also is prophecy
more excellent than the gift of tongues considered in itself.
Secondly, because the gift of prophecy regards the knowledge of
things, which is more excellent than the knowledge of words, to which
the gift of tongues pertains.

Thirdly, because the gift of prophecy is more profitable. The Apostle
proves this in three ways (1 Cor. 14); first, because prophecy is
more profitable to the edification of the Church, for which purpose
he that speaketh in tongues profiteth nothing, unless interpretation
follow (1 Cor. 14:4, 5). Secondly, as regards the speaker himself,
for if he be enabled to speak in divers tongues without understanding
them, which pertains to the gift of prophecy, his own mind would not
be edified (1 Cor. 14:7-14). Thirdly, as to unbelievers for whose
especial benefit the gift of tongues seems to have been given; since
perchance they might think those who speak in tongues to be mad (1
Cor. 14:23), for instance the Jews deemed the apostles drunk when the
latter spoke in various tongues (Acts 2:13): whereas by prophecies
the unbeliever is convinced, because the secrets of his heart are
made manifest (Acts 2:25).

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 174, A. 3, ad 1), it belongs to the
excellence of prophecy that a man is not only enlightened by an
intelligible light, but also that he should perceive an imaginary
vision: and so again it belongs to the perfection of the Holy Ghost's
operation, not only to fill the mind with the prophetic light, and
the imagination with the imaginary vision, as happened in the Old
Testament, but also to endow the tongue with external erudition, in
the utterance of various signs of speech. All this is done in the New
Testament, according to 1 Cor. 14:26, "Every one of you hath a psalm,
hath a doctrine, hath a tongue, hath a revelation," i.e. a prophetic
revelation.

Reply Obj. 2: By the gift of prophecy man is directed to God in his
mind, which is more excellent than being directed to Him in his
tongue. "He that speaketh in a tongue" is said to speak "not unto
men," i.e. to men's understanding or profit, but unto God's
understanding and praise. On the other hand, by prophecy a man is
directed both to God and to man; wherefore it is the more perfect
gift.

Reply Obj. 3: Prophetic revelation extends to the knowledge of all
things supernatural; wherefore from its very perfection it results
that in this imperfect state of life it cannot be had perfectly by
way of habit, but only imperfectly by way of passion. On the other
hand, the gift of tongues is confined to a certain particular
knowledge, namely of human words; wherefore it is not inconsistent
with the imperfection of this life, that it should be had perfectly
and by way of habit.

Reply Obj. 4: The interpretation of speeches is reducible to the gift
of prophecy, inasmuch as the mind is enlightened so as to understand
and explain any obscurities of speech arising either from a
difficulty in the things signified, or from the words uttered being
unknown, or from the figures of speech employed, according to Dan.
5:16, "I have heard of thee, that thou canst interpret obscure
things, and resolve difficult things." Hence the interpretation of
speeches is more excellent than the gift of tongues, as appears from
the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 14:5), "Greater is he that
prophesieth than he that speaketh with tongues; unless perhaps he
interpret." Yet the interpretation of speeches is placed after the
gift of tongues, because the interpretation of speeches extends even
to the interpretation of divers kinds of tongues.
_______________________

QUESTION 177

OF THE GRATUITOUS GRACE CONSISTING IN WORDS
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider the gratuitous grace that attaches to words; of
which the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8): "To one . . . by the Spirit is
given the word of wisdom, and to another the word of knowledge." Under
this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether any gratuitous grace attaches to words?

(2) To whom is the grace becoming?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 177, Art. 1]

Whether Any Gratuitous Grace Attaches to Words?

Objection 1: It would seem that a gratuitous grace does not attach to
words. For grace is given for that which surpasses the faculty of
nature. But natural reason has devised the art of rhetoric whereby a
man is able to speak so as to teach, please, and persuade, as
Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iv, 12). Now this belongs to the
grace of words. Therefore it would seem that the grace of words is
not a gratuitous grace.

Obj. 2: Further, all grace pertains to the kingdom of God. But the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:20): "The kingdom of God is not in speech, but
in power." Therefore there is no gratuitous grace connected with
words.

Obj. 3: Further, no grace is given through merit, since "if by grace,
it is not now of works" (Rom. 11:6). But the word is sometimes given
to a man on his merits. For Gregory says (Moral. xi, 15) in
explanation of Ps. 118:43, "Take not Thou the word of truth utterly
out of my mouth" that "the word of truth is that which Almighty God
gives to them that do it, and takes away from them that do it not."
Therefore it would seem that the gift of the word is not a gratuitous
grace.

Obj. 4: Further, it behooves man to declare in words things
pertaining to the virtue of faith, no less than those pertaining to
the gift of wisdom or of knowledge. Therefore if the word of wisdom
and the word of knowledge are reckoned gratuitous graces, the word of
faith should likewise be placed among the gratuitous graces.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 6:5): "A gracious tongue in
a good man shall abound [Vulg.: 'aboundeth']." Now man's goodness is
by grace. Therefore graciousness in words is also by grace.

_I answer that,_ The gratuitous graces are given for the profit of
others, as stated above (I-II, Q. 111, AA. 1, 4). Now the knowledge a
man receives from God cannot be turned to another's profit, except by
means of speech. And since the Holy Ghost does not fail in anything
that pertains to the profit of the Church, He provides also the
members of the Church with speech; to the effect that a man not only
speaks so as to be understood by different people, which pertains to
the gift of tongues, but also speaks with effect, and this pertains
to the grace _of the word._

This happens in three ways. First, in order to instruct the
intellect, and this is the case when a man speaks so as _to teach._
Secondly, in order to move the affections, so that a man willingly
hearkens to the word of God. This is the case when a man speaks so as
_to please_ his hearers, not indeed with a view to his own favor, but
in order to draw them to listen to God's word. Thirdly, in order that
men may love that which is signified by the word, and desire to
fulfill it, and this is the case when a man so speaks as _to sway_
his hearers. In order to effect this the Holy Ghost makes use of the
human tongue as of an instrument; but He it is Who perfects the work
within. Hence Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (Hom. xxx in
Ev.): "Unless the Holy Ghost fill the hearts of the hearers, in vain
does the voice of the teacher resound in the ears of the body."

Reply Obj. 1: Even as by a miracle God sometimes works in a more
excellent way those things which nature also can work, so too the
Holy Ghost effects more excellently by the grace of words that which
art can effect in a less efficient manner.

Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle is speaking there of the word that relies
on human eloquence without the power of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore he
says just before (1 Cor. 4:19): "I . . . will know, not the speech of
them that are puffed up, but the power": and of himself he had
already said (1 Cor. 2:4): "My speech and my preaching was not in the
persuasive words of human wisdom, but in the showing of the spirit
and power."

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above, the grace of the word is given to a
man for the profit of others. Hence it is withdrawn sometimes through
the fault of the hearer, and sometimes through the fault of the
speaker. The good works of either of them do not merit this grace
directly, but only remove the obstacles thereto. For sanctifying
grace also is withdrawn on account of a person's fault, and yet he
does not merit it by his good works, which, however, remove the
obstacles to grace.

Reply Obj. 4: As stated above, the grace of the word is directed to
the profit of others. Now if a man communicates his faith to others
this is by the word of knowledge or of wisdom. Hence Augustine says
(De Trin. xiv, 1) that "to know how faith may profit the godly and be
defended against the ungodly, is apparently what the Apostle means by
knowledge." Hence it was not necessary for him to mention the word of
faith, but it was sufficient for him to mention the word of knowledge
and of wisdom.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 177, Art. 2]

Whether the Grace of the Word of Wisdom and Knowledge Is Becoming to
Women?

Objection 1: It would seem that the grace of the word of wisdom and
knowledge is becoming even to women. For teaching is pertinent to
this grace, as stated in the foregoing Article. Now it is becoming to
a woman to teach; for it is written (Prov. 4:3, 4): "I was an only
son in the sight of my mother, and she taught me [*Vulg.: 'I was my
father's son, tender, and as an only son in the sight of my mother.
And he taught me.']." Therefore this grace is becoming to women.

Obj. 2: Further, the grace of prophecy is greater than the grace of
the word, even as the contemplation of truth is greater than its
utterance. But prophecy is granted to women, as we read of Deborah
(Judges 4:4), and of Holda the prophetess, the wife of Sellum (4
Kings 22:14), and of the four daughters of Philip (Acts 21:9).
Moreover the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:5): "Every woman praying or
prophesying," etc. Much more therefore would it seem that the grace
of the word is becoming to a woman.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (1 Pet. 4:10): "As every man hath
received grace ministering the same one to another." Now some women
receive the grace of wisdom and knowledge, which they cannot minister
to others except by the grace of the word. Therefore the grace of the
word is becoming to women.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:34): "Let women keep
silence in the churches," and (1 Tim. 2:12): "I suffer not a woman to
teach." Now this pertains especially to the grace of the word.
Therefore the grace of the word is not becoming to women.

_I answer that,_ Speech may be employed in two ways: in one way
privately, to one or a few, in familiar conversation, and in this
respect the grace of the word may be becoming to women; in another
way, publicly, addressing oneself to the whole church, and this is
not permitted to women. First and chiefly, on account of the
condition attaching to the female sex, whereby woman should be
subject to man, as appears from Gen. 3:16. Now teaching and
persuading publicly in the church belong not to subjects but to the
prelates (although men who are subjects may do these things if they
be so commissioned, because their subjection is not a result of their
natural sex, as it is with women, but of some thing supervening by
accident). Secondly, lest men's minds be enticed to lust, for it is
written (Ecclus. 9:11): "Her conversation burneth as fire." Thirdly,
because as a rule women are not perfected in wisdom, so as to be fit
to be intrusted with public teaching.

Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted speaks of private teaching whereby a
father instructs his son.

Reply Obj. 2: The grace of prophecy consists in God enlightening the
mind, on the part of which there is no difference of sex among men,
according to Col. 3:10, 11, "Putting on the new" man, "him who is
renewed unto knowledge, according to the image of Him that created
him, where there is neither male nor female [*Vulg.: 'Neither Gentile
nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian nor Scythian,
bond nor free.' Cf. I, Q. 93, A. 6, ad 2 footnote]." Now the grace of
the word pertains to the instruction of men among whom the difference
of sex is found. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 3: The recipients of a divinely conferred grace administer
it in different ways according to their various conditions. Hence
women, if they have the grace of wisdom or of knowledge, can
administer it by teaching privately but not publicly.
_______________________

QUESTION 178

OF THE GRACE OF MIRACLES
(In Two Articles)

We must next consider the grace of miracles, under which head there
are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is a gratuitous grace of working miracles?

(2) To whom is it becoming?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 178, Art. 1]

Whether There Is a Gratuitous Grace of Working Miracles?

Objection 1: It would seem that no gratuitous grace is directed to
the working of miracles. For every grace puts something in the one to
whom it is given (Cf. I-II, Q. 90, A. 1). Now the working of miracles
puts nothing in the soul of the man who receives it since miracles
are wrought at the touch even of a dead body. Thus we read (4 Kings
13:21) that "some . . . cast the body into the sepulchre of Eliseus.
And when it had touched the bones of Eliseus, the man came to life,
and stood upon his feet." Therefore the working of miracles does not
belong to a gratuitous grace.

Obj. 2: Further, the gratuitous graces are from the Holy Ghost,
according to 1 Cor. 12:4, "There are diversities of graces, but the
same Spirit." Now the working of miracles is effected even by the
unclean spirit, according to Matt. 24:24, "There shall arise false
Christs and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders."
Therefore it would seem that the working of miracles does not belong
to a gratuitous grace.

Obj. 3: Further, miracles are divided into "signs," "wonders" or
"portents," and "virtues." [*Cf. 2 Thess. 2:9, where the Douay
version renders _virtus_ by "power." The use of the word "virtue" in
the sense of a miracle is now obsolete, and the generic term
"miracle" is elsewhere used in its stead: Cf. 1 Cor. 12:10, 28; Heb.
2:4; Acts 2:22]. Therefore it is unreasonable to reckon the "working
of miracles" a gratuitous grace, any more than the "working of signs"
and "wonders."

Obj. 4: Further, the miraculous restoring to health is done by the
power of God. Therefore the grace of healing should not be
distinguished from the working of miracles.

Obj. 5: Further, the working of miracles results from faith--either
of the worker, according to 1 Cor. 13:2, "If I should have all faith,
so that I could remove mountains," or of other persons for whose sake
miracles are wrought, according to Matt. 13:58, "And He wrought not
many miracles there, because of their unbelief." Therefore, if faith
be reckoned a gratuitous grace, it is superfluous to reckon in
addition the working of signs as another gratuitous grace.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle (1 Cor. 12:9, 10) says that among
other gratuitous graces, "to another" is given "the grace of healing
. . . to another, the working of miracles."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 177, A. 1), the Holy Ghost
provides sufficiently for the Church in matters profitable unto
salvation, to which purpose the gratuitous graces are directed. Now
just as the knowledge which a man receives from God needs to be
brought to the knowledge of others through the gift of tongues and
the grace of the word, so too the word uttered needs to be confirmed
in order that it be rendered credible. This is done by the working of
miracles, according to Mk. 16:20, "And confirming the word with signs
that followed": and reasonably so. For it is natural to man to arrive
at the intelligible truth through its sensible effects. Wherefore
just as man led by his natural reason is able to arrive at some
knowledge of God through His natural effects, so is he brought to a
certain degree of supernatural knowledge of the objects of faith by
certain supernatural effects which are called miracles. Therefore the
working of miracles belongs to a gratuitous grace.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as prophecy extends to whatever can be known
supernaturally, so the working of miracles extends to all things that
can be done supernaturally; the cause whereof is the divine
omnipotence which cannot be communicated to any creature. Hence it is
impossible for the principle of working miracles to be a quality
abiding as a habit in the soul. On the other hand, just as the
prophet's mind is moved by divine inspiration to know something
supernaturally, so too is it possible for the mind of the miracle
worker to be moved to do something resulting in the miraculous effect
which God causes by His power. Sometimes this takes place after
prayer, as when Peter raised to life the dead Tabitha (Acts 9:40):
sometimes without any previous prayer being expressed, as when Peter
by upbraiding the lying Ananias and Saphira delivered them to death
(Acts 5:4, 9). Hence Gregory says (Dial. ii, 30) that "the saints
work miracles, sometimes by authority, sometimes by prayer." In
either case, however, God is the principal worker, for He uses
instrumentally either man's inward movement, or his speech, or some
outward action, or again the bodily contact of even a dead body. Thus
when Josue had said as though authoritatively (Josh. 10:12): "Move
not, O sun, toward Gabaon," it is said afterwards (Josh. 10:14):
"There was not before or after so long a day, the Lord obeying the
voice of a man."

Reply Obj. 2: Our Lord is speaking there of the miracles to be
wrought at the time of Antichrist, of which the Apostle says (2
Thess. 2:9) that the coming of Antichrist will be "according to the
working of Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders." To
quote the words of Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 19), "it is a matter of
debate whether they are called signs and lying wonders, because he
will deceive the senses of mortals by imaginary visions, in that he
will seem to do what he does not, or because, though they be real
wonders, they will seduce into falsehood them that believe." They are
said to be real, because the things themselves will be real, just as
Pharaoh's magicians made real frogs and real serpents; but they will
not be real miracles, because they will be done by the power of
natural causes, as stated in the First Part (Q. 114, A. 4); whereas
the working of miracles which is ascribed to a gratuitous grace, is
done by God's power for man's profit.

Reply Obj. 3: Two things may be considered in miracles. One is that
which is done: this is something surpassing the faculty of nature,
and in this respect miracles are called "virtues." The other thing is
the purpose for which miracles are wrought, namely the manifestation
of something supernatural, and in this respect they are commonly
called "signs": but on account of some excellence they receive the
name of "wonder" or "prodigy," as showing something from afar
(_procul_).

Reply Obj. 4: The "grace of healing" is mentioned separately, because
by its means a benefit, namely bodily health, is conferred on man in
addition to the common benefit bestowed in all miracles, namely the
bringing of men to the knowledge of God.

Reply Obj. 5: The working of miracles is ascribed to faith for two
reasons. First, because it is directed to the confirmation of faith,
secondly, because it proceeds from God's omnipotence on which faith
relies. Nevertheless, just as besides the grace of faith, the grace
of the word is necessary that people may be instructed in the faith,
so too is the grace of miracles necessary that people may be
confirmed in their faith.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 178, Art. 2]

Whether the Wicked Can Work Miracles?

Objection 1: It would seem that the wicked cannot work miracles. For
miracles are wrought through prayer, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1).
Now the prayer of a sinner is not granted, according to John 9:31,
"We know that God doth not hear sinners," and Prov. 28:9, "He that
turneth away his ear from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an
abomination." Therefore it would seem that the wicked cannot work
miracles.

Obj. 2: Further, miracles are ascribed to faith, according to Matt.
17:19, "If you have faith as a grain of mustard seed you shall say to
this mountain: Remove from hence hither, and it shall remove." Now
"faith without works is dead," according to James 2:20, so that,
seemingly, it is devoid of its proper operation. Therefore it would
seem that the wicked, since they do not good works, cannot work
miracles.

Obj. 3: Further, miracles are divine attestations, according to Heb.
2:4, "God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders and divers
miracles": wherefore in the Church the canonization of certain
persons is based on the attestation of miracles. Now God cannot bear
witness to a falsehood. Therefore it would seem that wicked men
cannot work miracles.

Obj. 4: Further, the good are more closely united to God than the
wicked. But the good do not all work miracles. Much less therefore do
the wicked.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:2): "If I should have
all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I
am nothing." Now whosoever has not charity is wicked, because "this
gift alone of the Holy Ghost distinguishes the children of the
kingdom from the children of perdition," as Augustine says (De Trin.
xv, 18). Therefore it would seem that even the wicked can work
miracles.

_I answer that,_ Some miracles are not true but imaginary deeds,
because they delude man by the appearance of that which is not; while
others are true deeds, yet they have not the character of a true
miracle, because they are done by the power of some natural cause.
Both of these can be done by the demons, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2).

True miracles cannot be wrought save by the power of God, because God
works them for man's benefit, and this in two ways: in one way for
the confirmation of truth declared, in another way in proof of a
person's holiness, which God desires to propose as an example of
virtue. In the first way miracles can be wrought by any one who
preaches the true faith and calls upon Christ's name, as even the
wicked do sometimes. In this way even the wicked can work miracles.
Hence Jerome commenting on Matt. 7:22, "Have not we prophesied in Thy
name?" says: "Sometimes prophesying, the working of miracles, and the
casting out of demons are accorded not to the merit of those who do
these things, but to the invoking of Christ's name, that men may
honor God, by invoking Whom such great miracles are wrought."

In the second way miracles are not wrought except by the saints,
since it is in proof of their holiness that miracles are wrought
during their lifetime or after death, either by themselves or by
others. For we read (Acts 19:11, 12) that "God wrought by the hand of
Paul . . . miracles" and "even there were brought from his body to
the sick, handkerchiefs . . . and the diseases departed from them."
In this way indeed there is nothing to prevent a sinner from working
miracles by invoking a saint; but the miracle is ascribed not to him,
but to the one in proof of whose holiness such things are done.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 83, A. 16) when we were treating of
prayer, the prayer of impetration relies not on merit but on God's
mercy, which extends even to the wicked, wherefore the prayers even
of sinners are sometimes granted by God. Hence Augustine says (Tract.
xliv in Joan.) that "the blind man spoke these words before he was
anointed," that is, before he was perfectly enlightened; "since God
does hear sinners." When it is said that the prayer of one who hears
not the law is an abomination, this must be understood so far as the
sinner's merit is concerned; yet it is sometimes granted, either for
the spiritual welfare of the one who prays--as the publican was heard
(Luke 18:14)--or for the good of others and for God's glory.

Reply Obj. 2: Faith without works is said to be dead, as regards the
believer, who lives not, by faith, with the life of grace. But
nothing hinders a living thing from working through a dead
instrument, as a man through a stick. It is thus that God works while
employing instrumentally the faith of a sinner.

Reply Obj. 3: Miracles are always true witnesses to the purpose for
which they are wrought. Hence wicked men who teach a false doctrine
never work true miracles in confirmation of their teaching, although
sometimes they may do so in praise of Christ's name which they
invoke, and by the power of the sacraments which they administer. If
they teach a true doctrine, sometimes they work true miracles as
confirming their teaching, but not as an attestation of holiness.
Hence Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 79): "Magicians work miracles
in one way, good Christians in another, wicked Christians in another.
Magicians by private compact with the demons, good Christians by
their manifest righteousness, evil Christians by the outward signs of
righteousness."

Reply Obj. 4: As Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 79), "the reason
why these are not granted to all holy men is lest by a most baneful
error the weak be deceived into thinking such deeds to imply greater
gifts than the deeds of righteousness whereby eternal life is
obtained."
_______________________

QUESTION 179

OF THE DIVISION OF LIFE INTO ACTIVE AND CONTEMPLATIVE
(In Two Articles)

We must next consider active and contemplative life. This
consideration will be fourfold: (1) Of the division of life into
active and contemplative; (2) Of the contemplative life; (3) Of the
active life; (4) Of the comparison between the active and the
contemplative life.

Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative?

(2) Whether this is an adequate division?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 179, Art. 1]

Whether Life Is Fittingly Divided into Active and Contemplative?

Objection 1: It would seem that life is not fittingly divided into
active and contemplative. For the soul is the principle of life by
its essence: since the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "in
living things to live is to be." Now the soul is the principle of
action and contemplation by its powers. Therefore it would seem that
life is not fittingly divided into active and contemplative.

Obj. 2: Further, the division of that which comes afterwards is
unfittingly applied to that which comes first. Now active and
contemplative, or "speculative" and "practical," are differences of
the intellect (De Anima iii, 10); while "to live" comes before "to
understand," since "to live" comes first to living things through the
vegetative soul, as the Philosopher states (De Anima ii, 4).
Therefore life is unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.

Obj. 3: Further, the word "life" implies movement, according to
Dionysius (Div. Nom. vi): whereas contemplation consists rather in
rest, according to Wis. 8:16: "When I enter into my house, I shall
repose myself with her." Therefore it would seem that life is
unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xiv super Ezech.): "There is a
twofold life wherein Almighty God instructs us by His holy word, the
active life and the contemplative."

_I answer that,_ Properly speaking, those things are said to live
whose movement or operation is from within themselves. Now that which
is proper to a thing and to which it is most inclined is that which
is most becoming to it from itself; wherefore every living thing
gives proof of its life by that operation which is most proper to it,
and to which it is most inclined. Thus the life of plants is said to
consist in nourishment and generation; the life of animals in
sensation and movement; and the life of men in their understanding
and acting according to reason. Wherefore also in men the life of
every man would seem to be that wherein he delights most, and on
which he is most intent; thus especially does he wish "to associate
with his friends" (Ethic. ix, 12).

Accordingly since certain men are especially intent on the
contemplation of truth, while others are especially intent on
external actions, it follows that man's life is fittingly divided
into active and contemplative.

Reply Obj. 1: Each thing's proper form that makes it actually _to be_
is properly that thing's principle of operation. Hence _to live_ is,
in living things, _to be,_ because living things through having
_being_ from their form, act in such and such a way.

Reply Obj. 2: Life in general is not divided into active and
contemplative, but the life of man, who derives his species from
having an intellect, wherefore the same division applies to intellect
and human life.

Reply Obj. 3: It is true that contemplation enjoys rest from external
movements. Nevertheless to contemplate is itself a movement of the
intellect, in so far as every operation is described as a movement;
in which sense the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that sensation
and understanding are movements of a kind, in so far as movement is
defined "the act of a perfect thing." In this way Dionysius (Div.
Nom. iv) ascribes three movements to the soul in contemplation,
namely, "straight," "circular," and "oblique" [*Cf. Q. 180, A. 6].
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 179, Art. 2]

Whether Life Is Adequately Divided into Active and Contemplative?

Objection 1: It would seem that life is not adequately divided into
active and contemplative. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5) that
there are three most prominent kinds of life, the life of "pleasure,"
the "civil" which would seem to be the same as the active, and the
"contemplative" life. Therefore the division of life into active and
contemplative would seem to be inadequate.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1, 2, 3, 19) mentions
three kinds of life, namely the life of "leisure" which pertains to
the contemplative, the "busy" life which pertains to the active, and
a third "composed of both." Therefore it would seem that life is
inadequately divided into active and contemplative.

Obj. 3: Further, man's life is diversified according to the divers
actions in which men are occupied. Now there are more than two
occupations of human actions. Therefore it would seem that life
should be divided into more kinds than the active and the
contemplative.

_On the contrary,_ These two lives are signified by the two wives of
Jacob; the active by Lia, and the contemplative by Rachel: and by the
two hostesses of our Lord; the contemplative life by Mary, and the
active life by Martha, as Gregory declares (Moral. vi, 37 [*Hom. xiv
in Ezech.]). Now this signification would not be fitting if there were
more than two lives. Therefore life is adequately divided into active
and contemplative.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 2), this division applies
to the human life as derived from the intellect. Now the intellect is
divided into active and contemplative, since the end of intellective
knowledge is either the knowledge itself of truth, which pertains to
the contemplative intellect, or some external action, which pertains
to the practical or active intellect. Therefore life too is
adequately divided into active and contemplative.

Reply Obj. 1: The life of pleasure places its end in pleasures
of the body, which are common to us and dumb animals; wherefore as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. _Ethic._ i, 5), it is the life "of a beast."
Hence it is not included in this division of the life of a man into
active and contemplative.

Reply Obj. 2: A mean is a combination of extremes, wherefore
it is virtually contained in them, as tepid in hot and cold, and pale
in white and black. In like manner active and contemplative comprise
that which is composed of both. Nevertheless as in every mixture one
of the simples predominates, so too in the mean state of life
sometimes the contemplative, sometimes the active element, abounds.

Reply Obj. 3: All the occupations of human actions, if
directed to the requirements of the present life in accord with right
reason, belong to the active life which provides for the necessities
of the present life by means of well-ordered activity. If, on the
other hand, they minister to any concupiscence whatever, they belong
to the life of pleasure, which is not comprised under the active life.
Those human occupations that are directed to the consideration of
truth belong to the contemplative life.
_______________________

QUESTION 180

OF THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider the contemplative life, under which head there
are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the contemplative life pertains to the intellect only, or
also to the affections?

(2) Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life?

(3) Whether the contemplative life consists in one action or in
several?

(4) Whether the consideration of any truth whatever pertains to the
contemplative life?

(5) Whether the contemplative life of man in this state can arise to
the vision of God?

(6) Of the movements of contemplation assigned by Dionysius (Div.
Nom. iv);

(7) Of the pleasure of contemplation;

(8) Of the duration of contemplation.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 1]

Whether the Contemplative Life Has Nothing to Do with the Affections,
and Pertains Wholly to the Intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to
do with the affections and pertains wholly to the intellect. For the
Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, text. 3 [*Ed Did. ia, 1]) that "the end
of contemplation is truth." Now truth pertains wholly to the
intellect. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life wholly
regards the intellect.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37; Hom. xix in Ezech.)
that "Rachel, which is interpreted 'vision of the principle' [*Or
rather, 'One seeing the principle,' if derived from _rah_ and _irzn_;
Cf. Jerome, De Nom. Hebr.], signifies the contemplative life." Now the
vision of a principle belongs properly to the intellect. Therefore
the contemplative life belongs properly to the intellect.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that it belongs to
the contemplative life, "to rest from external action." Now the
affective or appetitive power inclines to external actions. Therefore
it would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to do with the
appetitive power.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the
contemplative life is to cling with our whole mind to the love of God
and our neighbor, and to desire nothing beside our Creator." Now
desire and love pertain to the affective or appetitive power, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 25, A. 2; Q. 26, A. 2). Therefore the
contemplative life has also something to do with the affective or
appetitive power.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 179, A. 1) theirs is said to be
the contemplative who are chiefly intent on the contemplation of
truth. Now intention is an act of the will, as stated above (I-II, Q.
12, A. 1), because intention is of the end which is the object of the
will. Consequently the contemplative life, as regards the essence of
the action, pertains to the intellect, but as regards the motive
cause of the exercise of that action it belongs to the will, which
moves all the other powers, even the intellect, to their actions, as
stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 4; I-II, Q. 9, A. 1).

Now the appetitive power moves one to observe things either with the
senses or with the intellect, sometimes for love of the thing seen
because, as it is written (Matt. 6:21), "where thy treasure is, there
is thy heart also," sometimes for love of the very knowledge that one
acquires by observation. Wherefore Gregory makes the contemplative
life to consist in the "love of God," inasmuch as through loving God
we are aflame to gaze on His beauty. And since everyone delights when
he obtains what he loves, it follows that the contemplative life
terminates in delight, which is seated in the affective power, the
result being that love also becomes more intense.

Reply Obj. 1: From the very fact that truth is the end of
contemplation, it has the aspect of an appetible good, both lovable
and delightful, and in this respect it pertains to the appetitive
power.

Reply Obj. 2: We are urged to the vision of the first
principle, namely God, by the love thereof; wherefore Gregory says
(Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the contemplative life tramples on all
cares and longs to see the face of its Creator."

Reply Obj. 3: The appetitive power moves not only the bodily
members to perform external actions, but also the intellect to
practice the act of contemplation, as stated above.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 2]

Whether the Moral Virtues Pertain to the Contemplative Life?

Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the
contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the
contemplative life is to cling to the love of God and our neighbor
with the whole mind." Now all the moral virtues, since their acts are
prescribed by the precepts of the Law, are reducible to the love of
God and of our neighbor, for "love . . . is the fulfilling of the
Law" (Rom. 13:10). Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues
belong to the contemplative life.

Obj. 2: Further, the contemplative life is chiefly directed to the
contemplation of God; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the
mind tramples on all cares and longs to gaze on the face of its
Creator." Now no one can accomplish this without cleanness of heart,
which is a result of moral virtue [*Cf. Q. 8, A. 7]. For it is
written (Matt. 5:8): "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall
see God": and (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with all men, and holiness,
without which no man shall see God." Therefore it would seem that the
moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the
contemplative life gives beauty to the soul," wherefore it is
signified by Rachel, of whom it is said (Gen. 29:17) that she was "of
a beautiful countenance." Now the beauty of the soul consists in the
moral virtues, especially temperance, as Ambrose says (De Offic. i,
43, 45, 46). Therefore it seems that the moral virtues pertain to the
contemplative life.

_On the contrary,_ The moral virtues are directed to external
actions. Now Gregory says (Moral. vi [*Hom. xiv in Ezech.; Cf. A. 1,
Obj. 3]) that it belongs to the contemplative life "to rest from
external action." Therefore the moral virtues do not pertain to the
contemplative life.

_I answer that,_ A thing may belong to the contemplative life in two
ways, essentially or dispositively. The moral virtues do not belong
to the contemplative life essentially, because the end of the
contemplative life is the consideration of truth: and as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4), "knowledge," which pertains to the
consideration of truth, "has little influence on the moral virtues":
wherefore he declares (Ethic. x, 8) that the moral virtues pertain to
active but not to contemplative happiness.

On the other hand, the moral virtues belong to the contemplative life
dispositively. For the act of contemplation, wherein the
contemplative life essentially consists, is hindered both by the
impetuosity of the passions which withdraw the soul's intention from
intelligible to sensible things, and by outward disturbances. Now the
moral virtues curb the impetuosity of the passions, and quell the
disturbance of outward occupations. Hence moral virtues belong
dispositively to the contemplative life.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 1), the contemplative life has its
motive cause on the part of the affections, and in this respect the
love of God and our neighbor is requisite to the contemplative life.
Now motive causes do not enter into the essence of a thing, but
dispose and perfect it. Wherefore it does not follow that the moral
virtues belong essentially to the contemplative life.

Reply Obj. 2: Holiness or cleanness of heart is caused by the virtues
that are concerned with the passions which hinder the purity of the
reason; and peace is caused by justice which is about operations,
according to Isa. 32:17, "The work of justice shall be peace": since
he who refrains from wronging others lessens the occasions of
quarrels and disturbances. Hence the moral virtues dispose one to the
contemplative life by causing peace and cleanness of heart.

Reply Obj. 3: Beauty, as stated above (Q. 145, A. 2), consists in a
certain clarity and due proportion. Now each of these is found
radically in the reason; because both the light that makes beauty
seen, and the establishing of due proportion among things belong to
reason. Hence since the contemplative life consists in an act of the
reason, there is beauty in it by its very nature and essence;
wherefore it is written (Wis. 8:2) of the contemplation of wisdom: "I
became a lover of her beauty."

On the other hand, beauty is in the moral virtues by participation,
in so far as they participate in the order of reason; and especially
is it in temperance, which restrains the concupiscences which
especially darken the light of reason. Hence it is that the virtue of
chastity most of all makes man apt for contemplation, since venereal
pleasures most of all weigh the mind down to sensible objects, as
Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10).
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 3]

Whether There Are Various Actions Pertaining to the Contemplative
Life?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are various actions pertaining
to the contemplative life. For Richard of St. Victor [*De Grat.
Contempl. i, 3, 4] distinguishes between "contemplation,"
"meditation,"    and "cogitation." Yet all these apparently pertain
to contemplation. Therefore it would seem that there are various
actions pertaining to the contemplative life.

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:18): "But we . . .
beholding (_speculantes_) the glory of the Lord with open face, are
transformed into the same clarity [*Vulg.: 'into the same image from
glory to glory.']." Now this belongs to the contemplative life.
Therefore in addition to the three aforesaid, vision (_speculatio_)
belongs to the contemplative life.

Obj. 3: Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that "the first and
greatest contemplation is admiration of the Majesty." Now according
to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) admiration is a kind of fear.
Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for the
contemplative life.

Obj. 4: Further, "Prayer," "reading," and "meditation" [*Hugh of St.
Victor, Alleg. in N.T. iii, 4] are said to belong to the
contemplative life. Again, "hearing" belongs to the contemplative
life: since it is stated that Mary (by whom the contemplative life is
signified) "sitting . . . at the Lord's feet, heard His word" (Luke
10:39). Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for
the contemplative life.

_On the contrary,_ Life signifies here the operation on which a man
is chiefly intent. Wherefore if there are several operations of the
contemplative life, there will be, not one, but several contemplative
lives.

_I answer that,_ We are now speaking of the contemplative life as
applicable to man. Now according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) between
man and angel there is this difference, that an angel perceives the
truth by simple apprehension, whereas man arrives at the perception
of a simple truth by a process from several premises. Accordingly,
then, the contemplative life has one act wherein it is finally
completed, namely the contemplation of truth, and from this act it
derives its unity. Yet it has many acts whereby it arrives at this
final act. Some of these pertain to the reception of principles, from
which it proceeds to the contemplation of truth; others are concerned
with deducing from the principles, the truth, the knowledge of which
is sought; and the last and crowning act is the contemplation itself
of the truth.

Reply Obj. 1: According to Richard of St. Victor "cogitation" would
seem to regard the consideration of the many things from which a
person intends to gather one simple truth. Hence cogitation may
comprise not only the perceptions of the senses in taking cognizance
of certain effects, but also the imaginations. And again the reason's
discussion of the various signs or of anything that conduces to the
truth in view: although, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7),
cogitation may signify any actual operation of the intellect.
"Meditation" would seem to be the process of reason from certain
principles that lead to the contemplation of some truth: and
"consideration" has the same meaning, according to Bernard (De
Consid. ii, 2), although, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii,
1), every operation of the intellect may be called "consideration."
But "contemplation" regards the simple act of gazing on the truth;
wherefore Richard says again (De Grat. Contempl. i, 4) that
"contemplation is the soul's clear and free dwelling upon the object
of its gaze; meditation is the survey of the mind while occupied in
searching for the truth: and cogitation is the mind's glance which is
prone to wander."

Reply Obj. 2: According to a gloss [*Cf. De Trin. xv, 8] of Augustine
on this passage, "beholding" (_speculatio_) denotes "seeing in a
mirror (_speculo_), not from a watch-tower (_specula_)." Now to see a
thing in a mirror is to see a cause in its effect wherein its
likeness is reflected. Hence "beholding" would seem to be reducible
to meditation.

Reply Obj. 3: Admiration is a kind of fear resulting from the
apprehension of a thing that surpasses our faculties: hence it
results from the contemplation of the sublime truth. For it was
stated above (A. 1) that contemplation terminates in the affections.

Reply Obj. 4: Man reaches the knowledge of truth in two ways. First,
by means of things received from another. In this way, as regards the
things he receives from God, he needs _prayer,_ according to Wis.
7:7, "I called upon" God, "and the spirit of wisdom came upon me":
while as regards the things he receives from man, he needs _hearing,_
in so far as he receives from the spoken word, and _reading,_ in so
far as he receives from the tradition of Holy Writ. Secondly, he
needs to apply himself by his personal study, and thus he requires
_meditation._
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 4]

Whether the Contemplative Life Consists in the Mere Contemplation of
God, or Also in the Consideration of Any Truth Whatever?

Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life consists not
only in the contemplation of God, but also in the consideration of
any truth. For it is written (Ps. 138:14): "Wonderful are Thy works,
and my soul knoweth right well." Now the knowledge of God's works is
effected by any contemplation of the truth. Therefore it would seem
that it pertains to the contemplative life to contemplate not only
the divine truth, but also any other.

Obj. 2: Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that "contemplation
consists in admiration first of God's majesty, secondly of His
judgments, thirdly of His benefits, fourthly of His promises." Now of
these four the first alone regards the divine truth, and the other
three pertain to His effects. Therefore the contemplative life
consists not only in the contemplation of the divine truth, but also
in the consideration of truth regarding the divine effects.

Obj. 3: Further, Richard of St. Victor [*De Grat. Contempl. i, 6]
distinguishes six species of contemplation. The first belongs to "the
imagination alone," and consists in thinking of corporeal things. The
second is in "the imagination guided by reason," and consists in
considering the order and disposition of sensible objects. The third
is in "the reason based on the imagination"; when, to wit, from the
consideration of the visible we rise to the invisible. The fourth is
in "the reason and conducted by the reason," when the mind is intent
on things invisible of which the imagination has no cognizance. The
fifth is "above the reason," but not contrary to reason, when by
divine revelation we become cognizant of things that cannot be
comprehended by the human reason. The sixth is "above reason and
contrary to reason"; when, to wit, by the divine enlightening we know
things that seem contrary to human reason, such as the doctrine of
the mystery of the Trinity. Now only the last of these would seem to
pertain to the divine truth. Therefore the contemplation of truth
regards not only the divine truth, but also that which is considered
in creatures.

Obj. 4: Further, in the contemplative life the contemplation of truth
is sought as being the perfection of man. Now any truth is a
perfection of the human intellect. Therefore the contemplative life
consists in the contemplation of any truth.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "in
contemplation we seek the principle which is God."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), a thing may belong to the
contemplative life in two ways: principally, and secondarily, or
dispositively. That which belongs principally to the contemplative
life is the contemplation of the divine truth, because this
contemplation is the end of the whole human life. Hence Augustine
says (De Trin. i, 8) that "the contemplation of God is promised us as
being the goal of all our actions and the everlasting perfection of
our joys." This contemplation will be perfect in the life to come,
when we shall see God face to face, wherefore it will make us
perfectly happy: whereas now the contemplation of the divine truth is
competent to us imperfectly, namely "through a glass" and "in a dark
manner" (1 Cor. 13:12). Hence it bestows on us a certain inchoate
beatitude, which begins now and will be continued in the life to
come; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 7) places man's ultimate
happiness in the contemplation of the supreme intelligible good.

Since, however, God's effects show us the way to the contemplation
of God Himself, according to Rom. 1:20, "The invisible things of
God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are
made," it follows that the contemplation of the divine effects also
belongs to the contemplative life, inasmuch as man is guided thereby
to the knowledge of God. Hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxix)
that "in the study of creatures we must not exercise an empty and
futile curiosity, but should make them the stepping-stone to things
unperishable and everlasting."

Accordingly it is clear from what has been said (AA. 1, 2, 3) that
four things pertain, in a certain order, to the contemplative life;
first, the moral virtues; secondly, other acts exclusive of
contemplation; thirdly, contemplation of the divine effects;
fourthly, the complement of all which is the contemplation of the
divine truth itself.

Reply Obj. 1: David sought the knowledge of God's works, so that he
might be led by them to God; wherefore he says elsewhere (Ps. 142:5,
6): "I meditated on all Thy works: I meditated upon the works of Thy
hands: I stretched forth my hands to Thee."

Reply Obj. 2: By considering the divine judgments man is guided to
the consideration of the divine justice; and by considering the
divine benefits and promises, man is led to the knowledge of God's
mercy or goodness, as by effects already manifested or yet to be
vouchsafed.

Reply Obj. 3: These six denote the steps whereby we ascend by means
of creatures to the contemplation of God. For the first step consists
in the mere consideration of sensible objects; the second step
consists in going forward from sensible to intelligible objects; the
third step is to judge of sensible objects according to intelligible
things; the fourth is the absolute consideration of the intelligible
objects to which one has attained by means of sensibles; the fifth is
the contemplation of those intelligible objects that are unattainable
by means of sensibles, but which the reason is able to grasp; the
sixth step is the consideration of such intelligible things as the
reason can neither discover nor grasp, which pertain to the sublime
contemplation of divine truth, wherein contemplation is ultimately
perfected.

Reply Obj. 4: The ultimate perfection of the human intellect is the
divine truth: and other truths perfect the intellect in relation to
the divine truth.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 5]

Whether in the Present State of Life the Contemplative Life Can Reach
to the Vision of the Divine Essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the present state of life the
contemplative life can reach to the vision of the Divine essence.
For, as stated in Gen. 32:30, Jacob said: "I have seen God face to
face, and my soul has been saved." Now the vision of God's face is
the vision of the Divine essence. Therefore it would seem that in the
present life one may come, by means of contemplation, to see God in
His essence.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "contemplative men
withdraw within themselves in order to explore spiritual things, nor
do they ever carry with them the shadows of things corporeal, or if
these follow them they prudently drive them away: but being desirous
of seeing the incomprehensible light, they suppress all the images of
their limited comprehension, and through longing to reach what is
above them, they overcome that which they are." Now man is not
hindered from seeing the Divine essence, which is the
incomprehensible light, save by the necessity of turning to corporeal
phantasms. Therefore it would seem that the contemplation of the
present life can extend to the vision of the incomprehensible light
in its essence.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 35): "All creatures are
small to the soul that sees its Creator: wherefore when the man of
God," the blessed Benedict, to wit, "saw a fiery globe in the tower
and angels returning to heaven, without doubt he could only see such
things by the light of God." Now the blessed Benedict was still in
this life. Therefore the contemplation of the present life can extend
to the vision of the essence of God.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "As long as we
live in this mortal flesh, no one reaches such a height of
contemplation as to fix the eyes of his mind on the ray itself of
incomprehensible light."

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27), "no one
seeing God lives this mortal life wherein the bodily senses have
their play: and unless in some way he depart this life, whether by
going altogether out of his body, or by withdrawing from his carnal
senses, he is not caught up into that vision." This has been
carefully discussed above (Q. 175, AA. 4, 5), where we spoke of
rapture, and in the First Part (Q. 12, A. 2), where we treated of the
vision of God.

Accordingly we must state that one may be in this life in two ways.
First, with regard to act, that is to say by actually making use of
the bodily senses, and thus contemplation in the present life can
nowise attain to the vision of God's essence. Secondly, one may be in
this life potentially and not with regard to act, that is to say,
when the soul is united to the mortal body as its form, yet so as to
make use neither of the bodily senses, nor even of the imagination,
as happens in rapture; and in this way the contemplation of the
present life can attain to the vision of the Divine essence.
Consequently the highest degree of contemplation in the present life
is that which Paul had in rapture, whereby he was in a middle state
between the present life and the life to come.

Reply Obj. 1: As Dionysius says (Ep. i ad Caium. Monach.), "if anyone
seeing God, understood what he saw, he saw not God Himself, but
something belonging to God." And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.):
"By no means is God seen now in His glory; but the soul sees
something of lower degree, and is thereby refreshed so that
afterwards it may attain to the glory of vision." Accordingly the
words of Jacob, "I saw God face to face" do not imply that he saw
God's essence, but that he saw some shape [*Cf. I, Q. 12, A. 11, ad
1], imaginary of course, wherein God spoke to him. Or, "since we know
a man by his face, by the face of God he signified his knowledge of
Him," according to a gloss of Gregory on the same passage.

Reply Obj. 2: In the present state of life human contemplation is
impossible without phantasms, because it is connatural to man to see
the intelligible species in the phantasms, as the Philosopher states
(De Anima iii, 7). Yet intellectual knowledge does not consist in the
phantasms themselves, but in our contemplating in them the purity of
the intelligible truth: and this not only in natural knowledge, but
also in that which we obtain by revelation. For Dionysius says (Coel.
Hier. i) that "the Divine glory shows us the angelic hierarchies
under certain symbolic figures, and by its power we are brought back
to the single ray of light," i.e. to the simple knowledge of the
intelligible truth. It is in this sense that we must understand the
statement of Gregory that "contemplatives do not carry along with
them the shadows of things corporeal," since their contemplation is
not fixed on them, but on the consideration of the intelligible truth.

Reply Obj. 3: By these words Gregory does not imply that the blessed
Benedict, in that vision, saw God in His essence, but he wishes to
show that because "all creatures are small to him that sees God," it
follows that all things can easily be seen through the enlightenment
of the Divine light. Wherefore he adds: "For however little he may
see of the Creator's light, all created things become petty to him."
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 6]

Whether the Operation of Contemplation Is Fittingly Divided into a
Threefold Movement, Circular, Straight and Oblique?

Objection 1: It would seem that the operation of contemplation is
unfittingly divided into a threefold movement, "circular,"
"straight," and "oblique" (Div. Nom. iv). For contemplation pertains
exclusively to rest, according to Wis. 8:16, "When I go into my
house, I shall repose myself with her." Now movement is opposed to
rest. Therefore the operations of the contemplative life should not
be described as movements.

Obj. 2: Further, the action of the contemplative life pertains to the
intellect, whereby man is like the angels. Now Dionysius describes
these movements as being different in the angels from what they are
in the soul. For he says (Div. Nom. iv) that the "circular" movement
in the angel is "according to his enlightenment by the beautiful and
the good." On the other hand, he assigns the circular movement of the
soul to several things: the first of which is the "withdrawal of the
soul into itself from externals"; the second is "a certain
concentration of its powers, whereby it is rendered free of error and
of outward occupation"; and the third is "union with those things
that are above it." Again, he describes differently their respective
straight movements. For he says that the straight movement of the
angel is that by which he proceeds to the care of those things that
are beneath him. On the other hand, he describes the straight
movement of the soul as being twofold: first, "its progress towards
things that are near it"; secondly, "its uplifting from external
things to simple contemplation." Further, he assigns a different
oblique movement to each. For he assigns the oblique movement of the
angels to the fact that "while providing for those who have less they
remain unchanged in relation to God": whereas he assigns the oblique
movement of the soul to the fact that "the soul is enlightened in
Divine knowledge by reasoning and discoursing." Therefore it would
seem that the operations of contemplation are unfittingly assigned
according to the ways mentioned above.

Obj. 3: Further, Richard of St. Victor (De Contempl. i, 5) mentions
many other different movements in likeness to the birds of the air.
"For some of these rise at one time to a great height, at another
swoop down to earth, and they do so repeatedly; others fly now to the
right, now to the left again and again; others go forwards or lag
behind many times; others fly in a circle now more now less extended;
and others remain suspended almost immovably in one place." Therefore
it would seem that there are only three movements of contemplation.

_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 119, A. 1, ad 3), the operation
of the intellect, wherein contemplation essentially consists, is
called a movement, in so far as movement is the act of a perfect
thing, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 1). Since,
however, it is through sensible objects that we come to the knowledge
of intelligible things, and since sensible operations do not take
place without movement, the result is that even intelligible
operations are described as movements, and are differentiated in
likeness to various movements. Now of bodily movements, local
movements are the most perfect and come first, as proved in _Phys._
viii, 7; wherefore the foremost among intelligible operations are
described by being likened to them. These movements are of three
kinds; for there is the "circular" movement, by which a thing moves
uniformly round one point as center, another is the "straight"
movement, by which a thing goes from one point to another; the third
is "oblique," being composed as it were of both the others.
Consequently, in intelligible operations, that which is simply
uniform is compared to circular movement; the intelligible operation
by which one proceeds from one point to another is compared to the
straight movement; while the intelligible operation which unites
something of uniformity with progress to various points is compared
to the oblique movement.

Reply Obj. 1: External bodily movements are opposed to the quiet of
contemplation, which consists in rest from outward occupations: but
the movements of intellectual operations belong to the quiet of
contemplation.

Reply Obj. 2: Man is like the angels in intellect generically, but
the intellective power is much higher in the angel than in man.
Consequently these movements must be ascribed to souls and angels in
different ways, according as they are differently related to
uniformity. For the angelic intellect has uniform knowledge in two
respects. First, because it does not acquire intelligible truth from
the variety of composite objects; secondly, because it understands
the truth of intelligible objects not discursively, but by simple
intuition. On the other hand, the intellect of the soul acquires
intelligible truth from sensible objects, and understands it by a
certain discoursing of the reason.

Wherefore Dionysius assigns the "circular" movement of the angels to
the fact that their intuition of God is uniform and unceasing, having
neither beginning nor end: even as a circular movement having neither
beginning nor end is uniformly around the one same center. But on the
part of the soul, ere it arrive at this uniformity, its twofold lack
of uniformity needs to be removed. First, that which arises from the
variety of external things: this is removed by the soul withdrawing
from externals, and so the first thing he mentions regarding the
circular movement of the soul is "the soul's withdrawal into itself
from external objects." Secondly, another lack of uniformity requires
to be removed from the soul, and this is owing to the discoursing of
reason. This is done by directing all the soul's operations to the
simple contemplation of the intelligible truth, and this is indicated
by his saying in the second place that "the soul's intellectual
powers must be uniformly concentrated," in other words that
discoursing must be laid aside and the soul's gaze fixed on the
contemplation of the one simple truth. In this operation of the soul
there is no error, even as there is clearly no error in the
understanding of first principles which we know by simple intuition.
Afterwards these two things being done, he mentions thirdly the
uniformity which is like that of the angels, for then all things
being laid aside, the soul continues in the contemplation of God
alone. This he expresses by saying: "Then being thus made uniform
unitedly," i.e. conformably, "by the union of its powers, it is
conducted to the good and the beautiful." The "straight" movement of
the angel cannot apply to his proceeding from one thing to another by
considering them, but only to the order of his providence, namely to
the fact that the higher angel enlightens the lower angels through
the angels that are intermediate. He indicates this when he says:
"The angel's movement takes a straight line when he proceeds to the
care of things subject to him, taking in his course whatever things
are direct," i.e. in keeping with the dispositions of the direct
order. Whereas he ascribes the "straight" movement in the soul to the
soul's proceeding from exterior sensibles to the knowledge of
intelligible objects. The "oblique" movement in the angels he
describes as being composed of the straight and circular movements,
inasmuch as their care for those beneath them is in accordance with
their contemplation of God: while the "oblique" movement in the soul
he also declares to be partly straight and partly circular, in so far
as in reasoning it makes use of the light received from God.

Reply Obj. 3: These varieties of movement that are taken from the
distinction between above and below, right and left, forwards and
backwards, and from varying circles, are all comprised under either
straight [or] oblique movement, because they all denote discursions
of reason. For if the reason pass from the genus to the species, or
from the part to the whole, it will be, as he explains, from above to
below: if from one opposite to another, it will be from right to
left; if from the cause to the effect, it will be backwards and
forwards; if it be about accidents that surround a thing near at hand
or far remote, the movement will be circular. The discoursing of
reason from sensible to intelligible objects, if it be according to
the order of natural reason, belongs to the straight movement; but if
it be according to the Divine enlightenment, it will belong to the
oblique movement as explained above (ad 2). That alone which he
describes as immobility belongs to the circular movement.

Wherefore it is evident that Dionysius describes the movement of
contemplation with much greater fulness and depth.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 7]

Whether There Is Delight in Contemplation?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no delight in contemplation.
For delight belongs to the appetitive power; whereas contemplation
resides chiefly in the intellect. Therefore it would seem that there
is no delight in contemplation.

Obj. 2: Further, all strife and struggle is a hindrance to delight.
Now there is strife and struggle in contemplation. For Gregory says
(Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "when the soul strives to contemplate God,
it is in a state of struggle; at one time it almost overcomes,
because by understanding and feeling it tastes something of the
incomprehensible light, and at another time it almost succumbs,
because even while tasting, it fails." Therefore there is no delight
in contemplation.

Obj. 3: Further, delight is the result of a perfect operation, as
stated in _Ethic._ x, 4. Now the contemplation of wayfarers is
imperfect, according to 1 Cor. 13:12, "We see now through a glass in
a dark manner." Therefore seemingly there is no delight in the
contemplative life.

Obj. 4: Further, a lesion of the body is an obstacle to delight. Now
contemplation causes a lesion of the body; wherefore it is stated
(Gen. 32) that after Jacob had said (Gen. 32:30), "'I have seen God
face to face' . . . he halted on his foot (Gen. 32:31) . . . because
he touched the sinew of his thigh and it shrank" (Gen. 32:32).
Therefore seemingly there is no delight in contemplation.

_On the contrary,_ It is written of the contemplation of wisdom (Wis.
8:16): "Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any
tediousness, but joy and gladness": and Gregory says (Hom. xiv in
Ezech.) that "the contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly
lovable."

_I answer that,_ There may be delight in any particular contemplation
in two ways. First by reason of the operation itself [*Cf. I-II, Q.
3, A. 5], because each individual delights in the operation which
befits him according to his own nature or habit. Now contemplation of
the truth befits a man according to his nature as a rational animal:
the result being that "all men naturally desire to know," so that
consequently they delight in the knowledge of truth. And more
delightful still does this become to one who has the habit of wisdom
and knowledge, the result of which is that he contemplates without
difficulty. Secondly, contemplation may be delightful on the part of
its object, in so far as one contemplates that which one loves; even
as bodily vision gives pleasure, not only because to see is
pleasurable in itself, but because one sees a person whom one loves.
Since, then, the contemplative life consists chiefly in the
contemplation of God, of which charity is the motive, as stated above
(AA. 1, 2, ad 1), it follows that there is delight in the
contemplative life, not only by reason of the contemplation itself,
but also by reason of the Divine love.

In both respects the delight thereof surpasses all human delight,
both because spiritual delight is greater than carnal pleasure, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 31, A. 5), when we were treating of the
passions, and because the love whereby God is loved out of charity
surpasses all love. Hence it is written (Ps. 33:9): "O taste and see
that the Lord is sweet."

Reply Obj. 1: Although the contemplative life consists chiefly in an
act of the intellect, it has its beginning in the appetite, since it
is through charity that one is urged to the contemplation of God. And
since the end corresponds to the beginning, it follows that the term
also and the end of the contemplative life has its being in the
appetite, since one delights in seeing the object loved, and the very
delight in the object seen arouses a yet greater love. Wherefore
Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "when we see one whom we love,
we are so aflame as to love him more." And this is the ultimate
perfection of the contemplative life, namely that the Divine truth be
not only seen but also loved.

Reply Obj. 2: Strife or struggle arising from the opposition of an
external thing, hinders delight in that thing. For a man delights not
in a thing against which he strives: but in that for which he
strives; when he has obtained it, other things being equal, he
delights yet more: wherefore Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3) that
"the more peril there was in the battle, the greater the joy in the
triumph." But there is no strife or struggle in contemplation on the
part of the truth which we contemplate, though there is on the part
of our defective understanding and our corruptible body which drags
us down to lower things, according to Wis. 9:15, "The corruptible
body is a load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth
down the mind that museth upon many things." Hence it is that when
man attains to the contemplation of truth, he loves it yet more,
while he hates the more his own deficiency and the weight of his
corruptible body, so as to say with the Apostle (Rom. 7:24): "Unhappy
man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"
Wherefore Gregory say (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "When God is once known
by desire and understanding, He withers all carnal pleasure in us."

Reply Obj. 3: The contemplation of God in this life is imperfect in
comparison with the contemplation in heaven; and in like manner the
delight of the wayfarer's contemplation is imperfect as compared with
the delight of contemplation in heaven, of which it is written (Ps.
35:9): "Thou shalt make them drink of the torrent of Thy pleasure."
Yet, though the contemplation of Divine things which is to be had by
wayfarers is imperfect, it is more delightful than all other
contemplation however perfect, on account of the excellence of that
which is contemplated. Hence the Philosopher says (De Part. Animal.
i, 5): "We may happen to have our own little theories about those
sublime beings and godlike substances, and though we grasp them but
feebly, nevertheless so elevating is the knowledge that they give us
more delight than any of those things that are round about us": and
Gregory says in the same sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The
contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly lovable; for it carries
the soul away above itself, it opens heaven and discovers the
spiritual world to the eyes of the mind."

Reply Obj. 4: After contemplation Jacob halted with one foot,
"because we need to grow weak in the love of the world ere we wax
strong in the love of God," as Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.).
"Thus when we have known the sweetness of God, we have one foot sound
while the other halts; since every one who halts on one foot leans
only on that foot which is sound."
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 180, Art. 8]

Whether the Contemplative Life Is Continuous?

Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life is not
continuous. For the contemplative life consists essentially in things
pertaining to the intellect. Now all the intellectual perfections of
this life will be made void, according to 1 Cor. 13:8, "Whether
prophecies shall be made void, or tongues shall cease, or knowledge
shall be destroyed." Therefore the contemplative life is made void.

Obj. 2: Further, a man tastes the sweetness of contemplation by
snatches and for a short time only: wherefore Augustine says
(Confess. x, 40), "Thou admittest me to a most unwonted affection in
my inmost soul, to a strange sweetness . . . yet through my grievous
weight I sink down again." Again, Gregory commenting on the words of
Job 4:15, "When a spirit passed before me," says (Moral. v, 33): "The
mind does not remain long at rest in the sweetness of inward
contemplation, for it is recalled to itself and beaten back by the
very immensity of the light." Therefore the contemplative life is not
continuous.

Obj. 3: Further, that which is not connatural to man cannot be
continuous. Now the contemplative life, according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. x, 7), "is better than the life which is according to man."
Therefore seemingly the contemplative life is not continuous.

_On the contrary,_ our Lord said (Luke 10:42): "Mary hath chosen the
best part, which shall not be taken away from her," since as Gregory
says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.), "the contemplative life begins here so
that it may be perfected in our heavenly home."

_I answer that,_ A thing may be described as continuous in two ways:
first, in regard to its nature; secondly, in regard to us. It is
evident that in regard to itself contemplative life is continuous for
two reasons: first, because it is about incorruptible and
unchangeable things; secondly, because it has no contrary, for there
is nothing contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, as stated in
_Topic._ i, 13. But even in our regard contemplative life is
continuous--both because it is competent to us in respect of the
incorruptible part of the soul, namely the intellect, wherefore it
can endure after this life--and because in the works of the
contemplative life we work not with our bodies, so that we are the
more able to persevere in the works thereof, as the Philosopher
observes (Ethic. x, 7).

Reply Obj. 1: The manner of contemplation is not the same here as in
heaven: yet the contemplative life is said to remain by reason of
charity, wherein it has both its beginning and its end. Gregory
speaks in this sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The contemplative life
begins here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home, because the
fire of love which begins to burn here is aflame with a yet greater
love when we see Him Whom we love."

Reply Obj. 2: No action can last long at its highest pitch. Now the
highest point of contemplation is to reach the uniformity of Divine
contemplation, according to Dionysius [*Cf. Coel. Hier. iii], and as
we have stated above (A. 6, ad 2). Hence although contemplation
cannot last long in this respect, it can be of long duration as
regards the other contemplative acts.

Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher declares the contemplative life to be
above man, because it befits us "so far as there is in us something
divine" (Ethic. x, 7), namely the intellect, which is incorruptible
and impassible in itself, wherefore its act can endure longer.
_______________________

QUESTION 181

OF THE ACTIVE LIFE
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the active life, under which head there are four
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether all the works of the moral virtues pertain to the active
life?

(2) Whether prudence pertains to the active life?

(3) Whether teaching pertains to the active life?

(4) Of the duration of the active life.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 181, Art. 1]

Whether All the Actions of the Moral Virtues Pertain to the Active
Life?

Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of the moral virtues do not
all pertain to the active life. For seemingly the active life regards
only our relations with other persons: hence Gregory says (Hom. xiv
in Ezech.) that "the active life is to give bread to the hungry," and
after mentioning many things that regard our relations with other
people he adds finally, "and to give to each and every one whatever
he needs." Now we are directed in our relations to others, not by all
the acts of moral virtues, but only by those of justice and its
parts, as stated above (Q. 58, AA. 2, 8; I-II, Q. 60, AA. 2, 3).
Therefore the acts of the moral virtues do not all pertain to the
active life.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that Lia who was
blear-eyed but fruitful signifies the active life: which "being
occupied with work, sees less, and yet since it urges one's neighbor
both by word and example to its imitation it begets a numerous
offspring of good deeds." Now this would seem to belong to charity,
whereby we love our neighbor, rather than to the moral virtues.
Therefore seemingly the acts of moral virtue do not pertain to the
active life.

Obj. 3: Further, as stated above (Q. 180, A. 2), the moral virtues
dispose one to the contemplative life. Now disposition and perfection
belong to the same thing. Therefore it would seem that the moral
virtues do not pertain to the active life.

_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, 15): "In the
active life all vices must first of all be extirpated by the practice
of good works, in order that in the contemplative life the mind's eye
being purified one may advance to the contemplation of the Divine
light." Now all vices are not extirpated save by acts of the moral
virtues. Therefore the acts of the moral virtues pertain to the
active life.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 179, A. 1) the active and the
contemplative life differ according to the different occupations of
men intent on different ends: one of which occupations is the
consideration of the truth; and this is the end of the contemplative
life, while the other is external work to which the active life is
directed.

Now it is evident that the moral virtues are directed chiefly, not
to the contemplation of truth but to operation. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that "for virtue knowledge is of
little or no avail." Hence it is clear that the moral virtues belong
essentially to the active life; for which reason the Philosopher
(Ethic. x, 8) subordinates the moral virtues to active happiness.

Reply Obj. 1: The chief of the moral virtues is justice by which one
man is directed in his relations towards another, as the Philosopher
proves (Ethic. v, 1). Hence the active life is described with
reference to our relations with other people, because it consists in
these things, not exclusively, but principally.

Reply Obj. 2: It is possible, by the acts of all the moral virtues,
for one to direct one's neighbor to good by example: and this is what
Gregory here ascribes to the active life.

Reply Obj. 3: Even as the virtue that is directed to the end of
another virtue passes, as it were, into the species of the latter
virtue, so again when a man makes use of things pertaining to the
active life, merely as dispositions to contemplation, such things are
comprised under the contemplative life. On the other hand, when we
practice the works of the moral virtues, as being good in themselves,
and not as dispositions to the contemplative life, the moral virtues
belong to the active life.

It may also be replied, however, that the active life is a
disposition to the contemplative life.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 181, Art. 2]

Whether Prudence Pertains to the Active Life?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not pertain to the
active life. For just as the contemplative life belongs to the
cognitive power, so the active life belongs to the appetitive power.
Now prudence belongs not to the appetitive but to the cognitive
power. Therefore prudence does not belong to the active life.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that the "active
life being occupied with work, sees less," wherefore it is signified
by Lia who was blear-eyed. But prudence requires clear eyes, so that
one may judge aright of what has to be done. Therefore it seems that
prudence does not pertain to the active life.

Obj. 3: Further, prudence stands between the moral and the
intellectual virtues. Now just as the moral virtues belong to the
active life, as stated above (A. 1), so do the intellectual virtues
pertain to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that
prudence pertains neither to the active nor to the contemplative
life, but to an intermediate kind of life, of which Augustine makes
mention (De Civ. Dei xix, 2, 3, 19).

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that prudence
pertains to active happiness, to which the moral virtues belong.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 3; I-II, Q. 18, A. 6), if
one thing be directed to another as its end, it is drawn, especially
in moral matters, to the species of the thing to which it is
directed: for instance "he who commits adultery that he may steal, is
a thief rather than an adulterer," according to the Philosopher
(Ethic. v, 2). Now it is evident that the knowledge of prudence is
directed to the works of the moral virtues as its end, since it is
"right reason applied to action" (Ethic. vi, 5); so that the ends of
the moral virtues are the principles of prudence, as the Philosopher
says in the same book. Accordingly, as it was stated above (A. 1, ad
3) that the moral virtues in one who directs them to the quiet of
contemplation belong to the contemplative life, so the knowledge of
prudence, which is of itself directed to the works of the moral
virtues, belongs directly to the active life, provided we take
prudence in its proper sense as the Philosopher speaks of it.

If, however, we take it in a more general sense, as comprising any
kind of human knowledge, then prudence, as regards a certain part
thereof, belongs to the contemplative life. In this sense Tully (De
Offic. i, 5) says that "the man who is able most clearly and quickly
to grasp the truth and to unfold his reasons, is wont to be
considered most prudent and wise."

Reply Obj. 1: Moral works take their species from their end, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 18, AA. 4, 6), wherefore the knowledge
pertaining to the contemplative life is that which has its end in the
very knowledge of truth; whereas the knowledge of prudence, through
having its end in an act of the appetitive power, belongs to the
active life.

Reply Obj. 2: External occupation makes a man see less in
intelligible things, which are separated from sensible objects with
which the works of the active life are concerned. Nevertheless the
external occupation of the active life enables a man to see more
clearly in judging of what is to be done, which belongs to prudence,
both on account of experience, and on account of the mind's
attention, since "brains avail when the mind is attentive" as Sallust
observes [*Bell. Catilin., LI].

Reply Obj. 3: Prudence is said to be intermediate between the
intellectual and the moral virtues because it resides in the same
subject as the intellectual virtues, and has absolutely the same
matter as the moral virtues. But this third kind of life is
intermediate between the active and the contemplative life as regards
the things about which it is occupied, because it is occupied
sometimes with the contemplation of the truth, sometimes with eternal
things.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 811, Art. 3]

Whether Teaching Is a Work of the Active or of the Contemplative Life?

Objection 1: It would seem that teaching is a work not of the active
but of the contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.)
that "the perfect who have been able to contemplate heavenly goods,
at least through a glass, proclaim them to their brethren, whose
minds they inflame with love for their hidden beauty." But this
pertains to teaching. Therefore teaching is a work of the
contemplative life.

Obj. 2: Further, act and habit would seem to be referable to the same
kind of life. Now teaching is an act of wisdom: for the Philosopher
says (Metaph. i, 1) that "to be able to teach is an indication of
knowledge." Therefore since wisdom or knowledge pertain to the
contemplative life, it would seem that teaching also belongs to the
contemplative life.

Obj. 3: Further, prayer, no less than contemplation, is an act of the
contemplative life. Now prayer, even when one prays for another,
belongs to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that it
belongs also to the contemplative life to acquaint another, by
teaching him, of the truth we have meditated.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The active
life is to give bread to the hungry, to teach the ignorant the words
of wisdom."

_I answer that,_ The act of teaching has a twofold object. For
teaching is conveyed by speech, and speech is the audible sign of the
interior concept. Accordingly one object of teaching is the matter or
object of the interior concept; and as to this object teaching
belongs sometimes to the active, sometimes to the contemplative life.
It belongs to the active life, when a man conceives a truth inwardly,
so as to be directed thereby in his outward action; but it belongs to
the contemplative life when a man conceives an intelligible truth, in
the consideration and love whereof he delights. Hence Augustine says
(De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ, 1): "Let them choose for themselves the
better part," namely the contemplative life, "let them be busy with
the word, long for the sweetness of teaching, occupy themselves with
salutary knowledge," thus stating clearly that teaching belongs to
the contemplative life.

The other object of teaching is on the part of the speech heard, and
thus the object of teaching is the hearer. As to this object all
doctrine belongs to the active life to which external actions pertain.

Reply Obj. 1: The authority quoted speaks expressly of doctrine as to
its matter, in so far as it is concerned with the consideration and
love of truth.

Reply Obj. 2: Habit and act have a common object. Hence this argument
clearly considers the matter of the interior concept. For it pertains
to the man having wisdom and knowledge to be able to teach, in so far
as he is able to express his interior concept in words, so as to
bring another man to understand the truth.

Reply Obj. 3: He who prays for another does nothing towards the man
for whom he prays, but only towards God Who is the intelligible
truth; whereas he who teaches another does something in his regard by
external action. Hence the comparison fails.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 181, Art. 4]

Whether the Active Life Remains After This Life?

Objection 1: It would seem that the active life remains after this
life. For the acts of the moral virtues belong to the active life, as
stated above (A. 1). But the moral virtues endure after this life
according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9). Therefore the active life
remains after this life.

Obj. 2: Further, teaching others belongs to the active life, as
stated above (A. 3). But in the life to come when "we shall be like
the angels," teaching will be possible: even as apparently it is in
the angels of whom one "enlightens, cleanses, and perfects" [*Coel.
Hier. iii, viii] another, which refers to the "receiving of
knowledge," according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii). Therefore it
would seem that the active life remains after this life.

Obj. 3: Further, the more lasting a thing is in itself, the more is
it able to endure after this life. But the active life is seemingly
more lasting in itself: for Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that "we
can remain fixed in the active life, whereas we are nowise able to
maintain an attentive mind in the contemplative life." Therefore the
active life is much more able than the contemplative to endure after
this life.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The active
life ends with this world, but the contemplative life begins here, to
be perfected in our heavenly home."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the active life has its end
in external actions: and if these be referred to the quiet of
contemplation, for that very reason they belong to the contemplative
life. But in the future life of the blessed the occupation of
external actions will cease, and if there be any external actions at
all, these will be referred to contemplation as their end. For, as
Augustine says at the end of _De Civitate Dei_ xxii, 30, "there we
shall rest and we shall see, we shall see and love, we shall love and
praise." And he had said before (De Civ. Dei xxii, 30) that "there
God will be seen without end, loved without wearying, praised without
tiring: such will be the occupation of all, the common love, the
universal activity."

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 136, A. 1, ad 1), the moral virtues
will remain not as to those actions which are about the means, but as
to the actions which are about the end. Such acts are those that
conduce to the quiet of contemplation, which in the words quoted
above Augustine denotes by "rest," and this rest excludes not only
outward disturbances but also the inward disturbance of the passions.

Reply Obj. 2: The contemplative life, as stated above (Q. 180, A. 4),
consists chiefly in the contemplation of God, and as to this, one
angel does not teach another, since according to Matt. 18:10, "the
little ones' angels," who belong to the lower order, "always see the
face of the Father"; and so, in the life to come, no man will teach
another of God, but "we shall" all "see Him as He is" (1 John 3:2).
This is in keeping with the saying of Jeremiah 31:34: "They shall
teach no more every man his neighbor . . . saying: Know the Lord: for
all shall know me, from the least of them even to the greatest."

But as regards things pertaining to the "dispensation of the
mysteries of God," one angel teaches another by cleansing,
enlightening, and perfecting him: and thus they have something of
the active life so long as the world lasts, from the fact that they
are occupied in administering to the creatures below them. This is
signified by the fact that Jacob saw angels "ascending" the
ladder--which refers to contemplation--and "descending"--which refers
to action. Nevertheless, as Gregory remarks (Moral. ii, 3), "they do
not wander abroad from the Divine vision, so as to be deprived of the
joys of inward contemplation." Hence in them the active life does not
differ from the contemplative life as it does in us for whom the
works of the active life are a hindrance to contemplation.

Nor is the likeness to the angels promised to us as regards the
administering to lower creatures, for this is competent to us not by
reason of our natural order, as it is to the angels, but by reason of
our seeing God.

Reply Obj. 3: That the durability of the active life in the
present state surpasses the durability of the contemplative life
arises not from any property of either life considered in itself, but
from our own deficiency, since we are withheld from the heights of
contemplation by the weight of the body. Hence Gregory adds (Moral.
ii, 3) that "the mind through its very weakness being repelled from
that immense height recoils on itself."
_______________________

QUESTION 182

OF THE ACTIVE LIFE IN COMPARISON WITH THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE
(In Four Articles)

We must now consider the active life in comparison with the
contemplative life, under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Which of them is of greater import or excellence?

(2) Which of them has the greater merit?

(3) Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the active life?

(4) Of their order.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 182, Art. 1]

Whether the Active Life Is More Excellent Than the Contemplative?

Objection 1: It would seem that the active life is more excellent
than the contemplative. For "that which belongs to better men would
seem to be worthier and better," as the Philosopher says (Top. iii,
1). Now the active life belongs to persons of higher rank, namely
prelates, who are placed in a position of honor and power; wherefore
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "in our actions we must not
love honor or power in this life." Therefore it would seem that the
active life is more excellent than the contemplative.

Obj. 2: Further, in all habits and acts, direction belongs to the
more important; thus the military art, being the more important,
directs the art of the bridle-maker [*Ethic. i, 1]. Now it belongs to
the active life to direct and command the contemplative, as appears
from the words addressed to Moses (Ex. 19:21), "Go down and charge
the people, lest they should have a mind to pass the" fixed "limits
to see the Lord." Therefore the active life is more excellent than
the contemplative.

Obj. 3: Further, no man should be taken away from a greater thing in
order to be occupied with lesser things: for the Apostle says (1 Cor.
12:31): "Be zealous for the better gifts." Now some are taken away
from the state of the contemplative life to the occupations of the
active life, as in the case of those who are transferred to the state
of prelacy. Therefore it would seem that the active life is more
excellent than the contemplative.

_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Luke 10:42): "Mary hath chosen the
best part, which shall not be taken away from her." Now Mary figures
the contemplative life. Therefore the contemplative life is more
excellent than the active.

_I answer that,_ Nothing prevents certain things being more excellent
in themselves, whereas they are surpassed by another in some respect.
Accordingly we must reply that the contemplative life is simply more
excellent than the active: and the Philosopher proves this by eight
reasons (Ethic. x, 7, 8). The first is, because the contemplative
life becomes man according to that which is best in him, namely the
intellect, and according to its proper objects, namely things
intelligible; whereas the active life is occupied with externals.
Hence Rachael, by whom the contemplative life is signified, is
interpreted "the vision of the principle," [*Or rather, 'One seeing
the principle,' if derived from _rah_ and _irzn_; Cf. Jerome, De Nom.
Hebr.] whereas as Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) the active life is
signified by Lia who was blear-eyed. The second reason is because the
contemplative life can be more continuous, although not as regards
the highest degree of contemplation, as stated above (Q. 180, A. 8,
ad 2; Q. 181, A. 4, ad 3), wherefore Mary, by whom the contemplative
life is signified, is described as "sitting" all the time "at the
Lord's feet." Thirdly, because the contemplative life is more
delightful than the active; wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom.
Serm. ciii) that "Martha was troubled, but Mary feasted." Fourthly,
because in the contemplative life man is more self-sufficient, since
he needs fewer things for that purpose; wherefore it was said (Luke
10:41): "Martha, Martha, thou art careful and art troubled about many
things." Fifthly, because the contemplative life is loved more for
its own sake, while the active life is directed to something else.
Hence it is written (Ps. 36:4): "One thing I have asked of the Lord,
this will I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all
the days of my life, that I may see the delight of the Lord."
Sixthly, because the contemplative life consists in leisure and rest,
according to Ps. 45:11, "Be still and see that I am God." Seventhly,
because the contemplative life is according to Divine things, whereas
active life is according to human things; wherefore Augustine says
(De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ): "'In the beginning was the Word': to Him
was Mary hearkening: 'The Word was made flesh': Him was Martha
serving." Eighthly, because the contemplative life is according to
that which is most proper to man, namely his intellect; whereas in
the works of the active life the lower powers also, which are common
to us and brutes, have their part; wherefore (Ps. 35:7) after the
words, "Men and beasts Thou wilt preserve, O Lord," that which is
special to man is added (Ps. 35:10): "In Thy light we shall see
light."

Our Lord adds a ninth reason (Luke 10:42) when He says: "Mary hath
chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her," which
words Augustine (De Verb. Dom. Serm. ciii) expounds thus: "Not--Thou
hast chosen badly but--She has chosen better. Why better?
Listen--because it shall not be taken away from her. But the burden
of necessity shall at length be taken from thee: whereas the
sweetness of truth is eternal."

Yet in a restricted sense and in a particular case one should prefer
the active life on account of the needs of the present life. Thus too
the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2): "It is better to be wise than
to be rich, yet for one who is in need, it is better to be rich . . ."

Reply Obj. 1: Not only the active life concerns prelates, they should
also excel in the contemplative life; hence Gregory says (Pastor. ii,
1): "A prelate should be foremost in action, more uplifted than
others in contemplation."

Reply Obj. 2: The contemplative life consists in a certain liberty of
mind. For Gregory says (Hom. iii in Ezech.) that "the contemplative
life obtains a certain freedom of mind, for it thinks not of temporal
but of eternal things." And Boethius says (De Consol. v, 2): "The
soul of man must needs be more free while it continues to gaze on the
Divine mind, and less so when it stoops to bodily things." Wherefore
it is evident that the active life does not directly command the
contemplative life, but prescribes certain works of the active life
as dispositions to the contemplative life; which it accordingly
serves rather than commands. Gregory refers to this when he says
(Hom. iii in Ezech.) that "the active life is bondage, whereas the
contemplative life is freedom."

Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes a man is called away from the contemplative
life to the works of the active life, on account of some necessity of
the present life, yet not so as to be compelled to forsake
contemplation altogether. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19):
"The love of truth seeks a holy leisure, the demands of charity
undertake an honest toil," the work namely of the active life. "If no
one imposes this burden upon us we must devote ourselves to the
research and contemplation of truth, but if it be imposed on us, we
must bear it because charity demands it of us. Yet even then we must
not altogether forsake the delights of truth, lest we deprive
ourselves of its sweetness, and this burden overwhelm us." Hence it
is clear that when a person is called from the contemplative life to
the active life, this is done by way not of subtraction but of
addition.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 182, Art. 2]

Whether the Active Life Is of Greater Merit Than the Contemplative?

Objection 1: It would seem that the active life is of greater merit
than the contemplative. For merit implies relation to meed; and meed
is due to labor, according to 1 Cor. 3:8, "Every man shall receive
his own reward according to his own labor." Now labor is ascribed to
the active life, and rest to the contemplative life; for Gregory says
(Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "Whosoever is converted to God must first of
all sweat from labor, i.e. he must take Lia, that afterwards he may
rest in the embraces of Rachel so as to see the principle." Therefore
the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative.

Obj. 2: Further, the contemplative life is a beginning of the
happiness to come; wherefore Augustine commenting on John 21:22, "So
I will have him to remain till I come," says (Tract. cxxiv in Joan.):
"This may be expressed more clearly: Let perfect works follow Me
conformed to the example of My passion, and let contemplation begun
here remain until I come, that it may be perfected when I shall
come." And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "contemplation
begins here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home." Now the
life to come will be a state not of meriting but of receiving the
reward of our merits. Therefore the contemplative life would seem to
have less of the character of merit than the active, but more of the
character of reward.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xii in Ezech.) that "no sacrifice
is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls." Now by the zeal for
souls a man turns to the occupations of the active life. Therefore it
would seem that the contemplative life is not of greater merit than
the active.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Great are the
merits of the active life, but greater still those of the
contemplative."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 114, A. 4), the root of
merit is charity; and, while, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1), charity
consists in the love of God and our neighbor, the love of God is by
itself more meritorious than the love of our neighbor, as stated
above (Q. 27, A. 8). Wherefore that which pertains more directly to
the love of God is generically more meritorious than that which
pertains directly to the love of our neighbor for God's sake. Now the
contemplative life pertains directly and immediately to the love of
God; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "the love of" the
Divine "truth seeks a holy leisure," namely of the contemplative
life, for it is that truth above all which the contemplative life
seeks, as stated above (Q. 181, A. 4, ad 2). On the other hand, the
active life is more directly concerned with the love of our neighbor,
because it is "busy about much serving" (Luke 10:40). Wherefore the
contemplative life is generically of greater merit than the active
life. This is moreover asserted by Gregory (Hom. iii in Ezech.): "The
contemplative life surpasses in merit the active life, because the
latter labors under the stress of present work," by reason of the
necessity of assisting our neighbor, "while the former with heartfelt
relish has a foretaste of the coming rest," i.e. the contemplation of
God.

Nevertheless it may happen that one man merits more by the works of
the active life than another by the works of the contemplative life.
For instance through excess of Divine love a man may now and then
suffer separation from the sweetness of Divine contemplation for the
time being, that God's will may be done and for His glory's sake.
Thus the Apostle says (Rom. 9:3): "I wished myself to be an anathema
from Christ, for my brethren"; which words Chrysostom expounds as
follows (De Compunct. i, 7 [*Ad Demetr. de Compunct. Cordis.]): "His
mind was so steeped in the love of Christ that, although he desired
above all to be with Christ, he despised even this, because thus he
pleased Christ."

Reply Obj. 1: External labor conduces to the increase of the
accidental reward; but the increase of merit with regard to the
essential reward consists chiefly in charity, whereof external labor
borne for Christ's sake is a sign. Yet a much more expressive sign
thereof is shown when a man, renouncing whatsoever pertains to this
life, delights to occupy himself entirely with Divine contemplation.

Reply Obj. 2: In the state of future happiness man has arrived at
perfection, wherefore there is no room for advancement by merit; and
if there were, the merit would be more efficacious by reason of the
greater charity. But in the present life contemplation is not without
some imperfection, and can always become more perfect; wherefore it
does not remove the idea of merit, but causes a yet greater merit on
account of the practice of greater Divine charity.

Reply Obj. 3: A sacrifice is rendered to God spiritually when
something is offered to Him; and of all man's goods, God specially
accepts that of the human soul when it is offered to Him in
sacrifice. Now a man ought to offer to God, in the first place, his
soul, according to Ecclus. 30:24, "Have pity on thy own soul,
pleasing God"; in the second place, the souls of others, according to
Apoc. 22:17, "He that heareth, let him say: Come." And the more
closely a man unites his own or another's soul to God, the more
acceptable is his sacrifice to God; wherefore it is more acceptable
to God that one apply one's own soul and the souls of others to
contemplation than to action. Consequently the statement that "no
sacrifice is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls," does not
mean that the merit of the active life is preferable to the merit of
the contemplative life, but that it is more meritorious to offer to
God one's own soul and the souls of others, than any other external
gifts.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 182, Art. 3]

Whether the Contemplative Life Is Hindered by the Active Life?

Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life is hindered by
the active life. For the contemplative life requires a certain
stillness of mind, according to Ps. 45:11, "Be still, and see that I
am God"; whereas the active life involves restlessness, according to
Luke 10:41, "Martha, Martha, thou art careful and troubled about many
things." Therefore the active life hinders the contemplative.

Obj. 2: Further, clearness of vision is a requisite for the
contemplative life. Now active life is a hindrance to clear vision;
for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that it "is blear-eyed and
fruitful, because the active life, being occupied with work, sees
less." Therefore the active life hinders the contemplative.

Obj. 3: Further, one contrary hinders the other. Now the active and
the contemplative life are apparently contrary to one another, since
the active life is busy about many things, while the contemplative
life attends to the contemplation of one; wherefore they differ in
opposition to one another. Therefore it would seem that the
contemplative life is hindered by the active.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Those who wish to
hold the fortress of contemplation, must first of all train in the
camp of action."

_I answer that,_ The active life may be considered from two points of
view. First, as regards the attention to and practice of external
works: and thus it is evident that the active life hinders the
contemplative, in so far as it is impossible for one to be busy with
external action, and at the same time give oneself to Divine
contemplation. Secondly, active life may be considered as quieting
and directing the internal passions of the soul; and from this point
of view the active life is a help to the contemplative, since the
latter is hindered by the inordinateness of the internal passions.
Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Those who wish to hold the
fortress of contemplation must first of all train in the camp of
action. Thus after careful study they will learn whether they no
longer wrong their neighbor, whether they bear with equanimity the
wrongs their neighbors do to them, whether their soul is neither
overcome with joy in the presence of temporal goods, nor cast down
with too great a sorrow when those goods are withdrawn. In this way
they will know when they withdraw within themselves, in order to
explore spiritual things, whether they no longer carry with them the
shadows of the things corporeal, or, if these follow them, whether
they prudently drive them away." Hence the work of the active life
conduces to the contemplative, by quelling the interior passions
which give rise to the phantasms whereby contemplation is hindered.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections; for these arguments
consider the occupation itself of external actions, and not the effect
which is the quelling of the passions.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 182, Art. 4]

Whether the Active Life Precedes the Contemplative?

Objection 1: It would seem that the active life does not precede the
contemplative. For the contemplative life pertains directly to the
love of God; while the active life pertains to the love of our
neighbor. Now the love of God precedes the love of our neighbor,
since we love our neighbor for God's sake. Seemingly therefore the
contemplative life also precedes the active life.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "It should be
observed that while a well-ordered life proceeds from action to
contemplation, sometimes it is useful for the soul to turn from the
contemplative to the active life." Therefore the active is not simply
prior to the contemplative.

Obj. 3: Further, it would seem that there is not necessarily any
order between things that are suitable to different subjects. Now the
active and the contemplative life are suitable to different subjects;
for Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Often those who were able to
contemplate God so long as they were undisturbed have fallen when
pressed with occupation; and frequently they who might live
advantageously occupied with the service of their fellow-creatures
are killed by the sword of their inaction."

_I answer that,_ A thing is said to precede in two ways. First, with
regard to its nature; and in this way the contemplative life precedes
the active, inasmuch as it applies itself to things which precede and
are better than others, wherefore it moves and directs the active
life. For the higher reason which is assigned to contemplation is
compared to the lower reason which is assigned to action, and the
husband is compared to his wife, who should be ruled by her husband,
as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3, 7, 12).

Secondly, a thing precedes with regard to us, because it comes first
in the order of generation. In this way the active precedes the
contemplative life, because it disposes one to it, as stated above
(A. 1; Q. 181, A. 1, ad 3); and, in the order of generation,
disposition precedes form, although the latter precedes simply and
according to its nature.

Reply Obj. 1: The contemplative life is directed to the love of God,
not of any degree, but to that which is perfect; whereas the active
life is necessary for any degree of the love of our neighbor. Hence
Gregory says (Hom. iii in Ezech.): "Without the contemplative life it
is possible to enter the heavenly kingdom, provided one omit not the
good actions we are able to do; but we cannot enter therein without
the active life, if we neglect to do the good we can do."

From this it is also evident that the active precedes the
contemplative life, as that which is common to all precedes, in the
order of generation, that which is proper to the perfect.

Reply Obj. 2: Progress from the active to the contemplative life is
according to the order of generation; whereas the return from the
contemplative life to the active is according to the order of
direction, in so far as the active life is directed by the
contemplative. Even thus habit is acquired by acts, and by the
acquired habit one acts yet more perfectly, as stated in _Ethic._ ii,
7.

Reply Obj. 3: He that is prone to yield to his passions on account
of his impulse to action is simply more apt for the active life by
reason of his restless spirit. Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37)
that "there be some so restless that when they are free from labor
they labor all the more, because the more leisure they have for
thought, the worse interior turmoil they have to bear." Others, on
the contrary, have the mind naturally pure and restful, so that they
are apt for contemplation, and if they were to apply themselves
wholly to action, this would be detrimental to them. Wherefore
Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "some are so slothful of mind that
if they chance to have any hard work to do they give way at the very
outset." Yet, as he adds further on, "often . . . love stimulates
slothful souls to work, and fear restrains souls that are disturbed
in contemplation." Consequently those who are more adapted to the
active life can prepare themselves for the contemplative by the
practice of the active life; while none the less, those who are more
adapted to the contemplative life can take upon themselves the works
of the active life, so as to become yet more apt for contemplation.
_______________________

TREATISE ON THE STATES OF LIFE (QQ. 183-189)
_______________________

OF MAN'S VARIOUS DUTIES AND STATES IN GENERAL
(In Four Articles)

We must next consider man's various states and duties. We shall
consider (1) man's duties and states in general; (2) the state of the
perfect in particular.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) What constitutes a state among men?

(2) Whether among men there should be various states and duties?

(3) Of the diversity of duties;

(4) Of the diversity of states.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 183, Art. 1]

Whether the Notion of a State Denotes a Condition of Freedom or
Servitude?

Objection 1: It would seem that the notion of a state does not denote
a condition of freedom or servitude. For "state" takes its name from
"standing." Now a person is said to stand on account of his being
upright; and Gregory says (Moral. vii, 17): "To fall by speaking
harmful words is to forfeit entirely the state of righteousness." But
a man acquires spiritual uprightness by submitting his will to God;
wherefore a gloss on Ps. 32:1, "Praise becometh the upright," says:
"The upright are those who direct their heart according to God's
will." Therefore it would seem that obedience to the Divine
commandments suffices alone for the notion of a state.

Obj. 2: Further, the word "state" seems to denote immobility
according to 1 Cor. 15:48, "Be ye steadfast (_stabiles_) and
immovable"; wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xxi in Ezech.): "The stone
is foursquare, and is stable on all sides, if no disturbance will
make it fall." Now it is virtue that enables us "to act with
immobility," according to _Ethic._ ii, 4. Therefore it would seem
that a state is acquired by every virtuous action.

Obj. 3: Further, the word "state" seems to indicate height of a kind;
because to stand is to be raised upwards. Now one man is made higher
than another by various duties; and in like manner men are raised
upwards in various ways by various grades and orders. Therefore the
mere difference of grades, orders, or duties suffices for a
difference of states.

_On the contrary,_ It is thus laid down in the Decretals (II, qu. vi,
can. Si Quando): "Whenever anyone intervene in a cause where life or
state is at stake he must do so, not by a proxy, but in his own
person"; and "state" here has reference to freedom or servitude.
Therefore it would seem that nothing differentiates a man's state,
except that which refers to freedom or servitude.

_I answer that,_ "State," properly speaking, denotes a kind of
position, whereby a thing is disposed with a certain immobility in a
manner according with its nature. For it is natural to man that his
head should be directed upwards, his feet set firmly on the ground,
and his other intermediate members disposed in becoming order; and
this is not the case if he lie down, sit, or recline, but only when
he stands upright: nor again is he said to stand, if he move, but
only when he is still. Hence it is again that even in human acts, a
matter is said to have stability (_statum_) in reference to its own
disposition in the point of a certain immobility or restfulness.
Consequently matters which easily change and are extrinsic to them do
not constitute a state among men, for instance that a man be rich or
poor, of high or low rank, and so forth. Wherefore in the civil law
[*Dig. I, IX, De Senatoribus] (Lib. Cassius ff. De Senatoribus) it is
said that if a man be removed from the senate, he is deprived of his
dignity rather than of his state. But that alone seemingly pertains
to a man's state, which regards an obligation binding his person, in
so far, to wit, as a man is his own master or subject to another, not
indeed from any slight or unstable cause, but from one that is firmly
established; and this is something pertaining to the nature of
freedom or servitude. Therefore state properly regards freedom or
servitude whether in spiritual or in civil matters.

Reply Obj. 1: Uprightness as such does not pertain to the notion of
state, except in so far as it is connatural to man with the addition
of a certain restfulness. Hence other animals are said to stand
without its being required that they should be upright; nor again are
men said to stand, however upright their position be, unless they be
still.

Reply Obj. 2: Immobility does not suffice for the notion of state;
since even one who sits or lies down is still, and yet he is not said
to stand.

Reply Obj. 3: Duty implies relation to act; while grades denote an
order of superiority and inferiority. But state requires immobility
in that which regards a condition of the person himself.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 183, Art. 2]

Whether There Should Be Different Duties or States in the Church?

Objection 1: It would seem that there should not be different duties
or states in the Church. For distinction is opposed to unity. Now the
faithful of Christ are called to unity according to John 17:21, 22:
"That they . . . may be one in Us . . . as We also are one."
Therefore there should not be a distinction of duties and states in
the Church.

Obj. 2: Further, nature does not employ many means where one
suffices. But the working of grace is much more orderly than the
working of nature. Therefore it were more fitting for things
pertaining to the operations of grace to be administered by the same
persons, so that there would not be a distinction of duties and
states in the Church.

Obj. 3: Further, the good of the Church seemingly consists chiefly in
peace, according to Ps. 147:3, "Who hath placed peace in thy
borders," and 2 Cor. 13:11, "Have peace, and the God of peace . . .
shall be with you." Now distinction is a hindrance to peace, for
peace would seem to result from likeness, according to Ecclus. 13:19,
"Every beast loveth its like," while the Philosopher says (Polit.
vii, 5) that "a little difference causes dissension in a state."
Therefore it would seem that there ought not to be a distinction of
states and duties in the Church.

_On the contrary,_ It is written in praise of the Church (Ps. 44:10)
that she is "surrounded with variety": and a gloss on these words
says that "the Queen," namely the Church, "is bedecked with the
teaching of the apostles, the confession of martyrs, the purity of
virgins, the sorrowings of penitents."

_I answer that,_ The difference of states and duties in the Church
regards three things. In the first place it regards the perfection of
the Church. For even as in the order of natural things, perfection,
which in God is simple and uniform, is not to be found in the created
universe except in a multiform and manifold manner, so too, the
fulness of grace, which is centered in Christ as head, flows forth to
His members in various ways, for the perfecting of the body of the
Church. This is the meaning of the Apostle's words (Eph. 4:11, 12):
"He gave some apostles, and some prophets, and other some
evangelists, and other some pastors and doctors for the perfecting of
the saints." Secondly, it regards the need of those actions which are
necessary in the Church. For a diversity of actions requires a
diversity of men appointed to them, in order that all things may be
accomplished without delay or confusion; and this is indicated by the
Apostle (Rom. 12:4, 5), "As in one body we have many members, but all
the members have not the same office, so we being many are one body
in Christ." Thirdly, this belongs to the dignity and beauty of the
Church, which consist in a certain order; wherefore it is written (3
Kings 10:4, 5) that "when the queen of Saba saw all the wisdom of
Solomon . . . and the apartments of his servants, and the order of
his ministers . . . she had no longer any spirit in her." Hence the
Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:20) that "in a great house there are not only
vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and of earth."

Reply Obj. 1: The distinction of states and duties is not an obstacle
to the unity of the Church, for this results from the unity of faith,
charity, and mutual service, according to the saying of the Apostle
(Eph. 4:16): "From whom the whole body being compacted," namely by
faith, "and fitly joined together," namely by charity, "by what every
joint supplieth," namely by one man serving another.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as nature does not employ many means where one
suffices, so neither does it confine itself to one where many are
required, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:17), "If
the whole body were the eye, where would be the hearing?" Hence there
was need in the Church, which is Christ's body, for the members to be
differentiated by various duties, states, and grades.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as in the natural body the various members are
held together in unity by the power of the quickening spirit, and are
dissociated from one another as soon as that spirit departs, so too
in the Church's body the peace of the various members is preserved by
the power of the Holy Spirit, Who quickens the body of the Church, as
stated in John 6:64. Hence the Apostle says (Eph. 4:3): "Careful to
keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace." Now a man departs
from this unity of spirit when he seeks his own; just as in an
earthly kingdom peace ceases when the citizens seek each man his own.
Besides, the peace both of mind and of an earthly commonwealth is the
better preserved by a distinction of duties and states, since thereby
the greater number have a share in public actions. Wherefore the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:24, 25) that "God hath tempered (_the body_)
together that there might be no schism in the body, but the members
might be mutually careful one for another."
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 183, Art. 3]

Whether Duties Differ According to Their Actions?

Objection 1: It would seem that duties do not differ according to
their actions. For there are infinite varieties of human acts both in
spirituals and in temporals. Now there can be no certain distinction
among things that are infinite in number. Therefore human duties
cannot be differentiated according to a difference of acts.

Obj. 2: Further, the active and the contemplative life differ
according to their acts, as stated above (Q. 179, A. 1). But the
distinction of duties seems to be other than the distinction of
lives. Therefore duties do not differ according to their acts.

Obj. 3: Further, even ecclesiastical orders, states, and grades
seemingly differ according to their acts. If, then, duties differ
according to their acts it would seem that duties, grades, and states
differ in the same way. Yet this is not true, since they are divided
into their respective parts in different ways. Therefore duties do
not differ according to their acts.

_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that "_officium_
(duty) takes its name from _efficere_ (to effect), as though it were
instead of _efficium,_ by the change of one letter for the sake of
the sound." But effecting pertains to action. Therefore duties differ
according to their acts.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), difference among the members
of the Church is directed to three things: perfection, action, and
beauty; and according to these three we may distinguish a threefold
distinction among the faithful. One, with regard to perfection, and
thus we have the difference of states, in reference to which some
persons are more perfect than others. Another distinction regards
action and this is the distinction of duties: for persons are said to
have various duties when they are appointed to various actions. A
third distinction regards the order of ecclesiastical beauty: and
thus we distinguish various grades according as in the same state or
duty one person is above another. Hence according to a variant text
[*The Septuagint] it is written (Ps. 47:4): "In her grades shall God
be known."

Reply Obj. 1: The material diversity of human acts is infinite. It is
not thus that duties differ, but by their formal diversity which
results from diverse species of acts, and in this way human acts are
not infinite.

Reply Obj. 2: Life is predicated of a thing absolutely: wherefore
diversity of lives results from a diversity of acts which are
becoming to man considered in himself. But efficiency, whence we have
the word "office" (as stated above), denotes action tending to
something else according to _Metaph._ ix, text. 16 [*Ed. Did. viii,
8]. Hence offices differ properly in respect of acts that are
referred to other persons; thus a teacher is said to have an office,
and so is a judge, and so forth. Wherefore Isidore says (Etym. vi,
19) that "to have an office is to be officious," i.e. harmful "to no
one, but to be useful to all."

Reply Obj. 3: Differences of state, offices and grades are taken from
different things, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). Yet these three
things may concur in the same subject: thus when a person is
appointed to a higher action, he attains thereby both office and
grade, and sometimes, besides this, a state of perfection, on account
of the sublimity of the act, as in the case of a bishop. The
ecclesiastical orders are particularly distinct according to divine
offices. For Isidore says (Etym. vi): "There are various kinds of
offices; but the foremost is that which relates to sacred and Divine
things."
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 183, Art. 4]

Whether the Difference of States Applies to Those Who Are Beginning,
Progressing, or Perfect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the difference of states does not
apply to those who are beginning, progressing, or perfect. For
"diverse genera have diverse species and differences" [*Aristotle,
Categ. ii]. Now this difference of beginning, progress, and
perfection is applied to the degrees of charity, as stated above (Q.
24, A. 9), where we were treating of charity. Therefore it would seem
that the differences of states should not be assigned in this manner.

Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (A. 1), state regards a condition of
servitude or freedom, which apparently has no connection with the
aforesaid difference of beginning, progress, and perfection.
Therefore it is unfitting to divide state in this way.

Obj. 3: Further, the distinction of beginning, progress, and
perfection seems to refer to _more_ and _less,_ and this seemingly
implies the notion of grades. But the distinction of grades differs
from that of states, as we have said above (AA. 2, 3). Therefore
state is unfittingly divided according to beginning, progress, and
perfection.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 11): "There are three
states of the converted, the beginning, the middle, and the
perfection"; and (Hom. xv in Ezech.): "Other is the beginning of
virtue, other its progress, and other still its perfection."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1) state regards freedom or
servitude. Now in spiritual things there is a twofold servitude and a
twofold freedom: for there is the servitude of sin and the servitude
of justice; and there is likewise a twofold freedom, from sin, and
from justice, as appears from the words of the Apostle (Rom. 6:20,
22), "When you were the servants of sin, you were free men to justice
. . . but now being made free from sin," you are . . . "become
servants to God."

Now the servitude of sin or justice consists in being inclined to
evil by a habit of sin, or inclined to good by a habit of justice:
and in like manner freedom from sin is not to be overcome by the
inclination to sin, and freedom from justice is not to be held back
from evil for the love of justice. Nevertheless, since man, by his
natural reason, is inclined to justice, while sin is contrary to
natural reason, it follows that freedom from sin is true freedom
which is united to the servitude of justice, since they both incline
man to that which is becoming to him. In like manner true servitude
is the servitude of sin, which is connected with freedom from
justice, because man is thereby hindered from attaining that which is
proper to him. That a man become the servant of justice or sin
results from his efforts, as the Apostle declares (Rom. 6:16): "To
whom you yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants you are whom
you obey, whether it be of sin unto death, or of obedience unto
justice." Now in every human effort we can distinguish a beginning, a
middle, and a term; and consequently the state of spiritual servitude
and freedom is differentiated according to these things, namely, the
beginning--to which pertains the state of beginners--the middle, to
which pertains the state of the proficient--and the term, to which
belongs the state of the perfect.

Reply Obj. 1: Freedom from sin results from charity which "is poured
forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us" (Rom.
5:5). Hence it is written (2 Cor. 3:17): "Where the Spirit of the
Lord is, there is liberty." Wherefore the same division applies to
charity as to the state of those who enjoy spiritual freedom.

Reply Obj. 2: Men are said to be beginners, proficient, and perfect
(so far as these terms indicate different states), not in relation to
any occupation whatever, but in relation to such occupations as
pertain to spiritual freedom or servitude, as stated above (A. 1).

Reply Obj. 3: As already observed (A. 3, ad 3), nothing hinders grade
and state from concurring in the same subject. For even in earthly
affairs those who are free, not only belong to a different state from
those who are in service, but are also of a different grade.
_______________________

QUESTION 184

OF THE STATE OF PERFECTION IN GENERAL
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider those things that pertain to the state of
perfection whereto the other states are directed. For the
consideration of offices in relation to other acts belongs to the
legislator; and in relation to the sacred ministry it comes under the
consideration of orders of which we shall treat in the Third Part
[*Suppl., Q. 34].

Concerning the state of the perfect, a three-fold consideration
presents itself: (1) The state of perfection in general; (2) Things
relating to the perfection of bishops; (3) Things relating to the
perfection of religious.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether perfection bears any relation to charity?

(2) Whether one can be perfect in this life?

(3) Whether the perfection of this life consists chiefly in observing
the counsels or the commandments?

(4) Whether whoever is perfect is in the state of perfection?

(5) Whether especially prelates and religious are in the state of
perfection?

(6) Whether all prelates are in the state of perfection?

(7) Which is the more perfect, the episcopal or the religious state?

(8) The comparison between religious and parish priests and
archdeacons.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 1]

Whether the Perfection of the Christian Life Consists Chiefly in
Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that the perfection of the Christian life
does not consist chiefly in charity. For the Apostle says (1 Cor.
14:20): "In malice be children, but in sense be perfect." But charity
regards not the senses but the affections. Therefore it would seem
that the perfection of the Christian life does not chiefly consist in
charity.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Eph. 6:13): "Take unto you the armor
of God, that you may be able to resist in the evil day, and to stand
in all things perfect"; and the text continues (Eph. 6:14, 16),
speaking of the armor of God: "Stand therefore having your loins girt
about with truth, and having on the breast-plate of justice . . . in
all things taking the shield of faith." Therefore the perfection of
the Christian life consists not only in charity, but also in other
virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, virtues like other habits, are specified by their
acts. Now it is written (James 1:4) that "patience hath a perfect
work." Therefore seemingly the state of perfection consists more
specially in patience.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Col. 3:14): "Above all things have
charity, which is the bond of perfection," because it binds, as it
were, all the other virtues together in perfect unity.

_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be perfect in so far as it
attains its proper end, which is the ultimate perfection thereof. Now
it is charity that unites us to God, Who is the last end of the human
mind, since "he that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in
him" (1 John 4:16). Therefore the perfection of the Christian life
consists radically in charity.

Reply Obj. 1: The perfection of the human senses would seem to
consist chiefly in their concurring together in the unity of truth,
according to 1 Cor. 1:10, "That you be perfect in the same mind
(_sensu_), and in the same judgment." Now this is effected by charity
which operates consent in us men. Wherefore even the perfection of
the senses consists radically in the perfection of charity.

Reply Obj. 2: A man may be said to be perfect in two ways. First,
simply: and this perfection regards that which belongs to a thing's
nature, for instance an animal may be said to be perfect when it
lacks nothing in the disposition of its members and in such things as
are necessary for an animal's life. Secondly, a thing is said to be
perfect relatively: and this perfection regards something connected
with the thing externally, such as whiteness or blackness or
something of the kind. Now the Christian life consists chiefly in
charity whereby the soul is united to God; wherefore it is written (1
John 3:14): "He that loveth not abideth in death." Hence the
perfection of the Christian life consists simply in charity, but in
the other virtues relatively. And since that which is simply, is
paramount and greatest in comparison with other things, it follows
that the perfection of charity is paramount in relation to the
perfection that regards the other virtues.

Reply Obj. 3: Patience is stated to have a perfect work in relation
to charity, in so far as it is an effect of the abundance of charity
that a man bears hardships patiently, according to Rom. 8:35,
"Who . . . shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall
tribulation? Or distress?" etc.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 2]

Whether Any One Can Be Perfect in This Life?

Objection 1: It would seem that none can be perfect in this life. For
the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:10): "When that which is perfect is come,
that which is in part shall be done away." Now in this life that
which is in part is not done away; for in this life faith and hope,
which are in part, remain. Therefore none can be perfect in this life.

Obj. 2: Further, "The perfect is that which lacks nothing" (Phys.
iii, 6). Now there is no one in this life who lacks nothing; for it
is written (James 3:2): "In many things we all offend"; and (Ps.
138:16): "Thy eyes did see my imperfect being." Therefore none is
perfect in this life.

Obj. 3: Further, the perfection of the Christian life, as stated (A.
1), relates to charity, which comprises the love of God and of our
neighbor. Now, neither as to the love of God can one have perfect
charity in this life, since according to Gregory (Hom. xiv in Ezech.)
"the furnace of love which begins to burn here, will burn more
fiercely when we see Him Whom we love"; nor as to the love of our
neighbor, since in this life we cannot love all our neighbors
actually, even though we love them habitually; and habitual love is
imperfect. Therefore it seems that no one can be perfect in this life.

_On the contrary,_ The Divine law does not prescribe the impossible.
Yet it prescribes perfection according to Matt. 5:48, "Be you . . .
perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect." Therefore
seemingly one can be perfect in this life.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the perfection of the
Christian life consists in charity. Now perfection implies a certain
universality because according to _Phys._ iii, 6, "the perfect is
that which lacks nothing." Hence we may consider a threefold
perfection. One is absolute, and answers to a totality not only on
the part of the lover, but also on the part of the object loved, so
that God be loved as much as He is lovable. Such perfection as this
is not possible to any creature, but is competent to God alone, in
Whom good is wholly and essentially.

Another perfection answers to an absolute totality on the part of the
lover, so that the affective faculty always actually tends to God as
much as it possibly can; and such perfection as this is not possible
so long as we are on the way, but we shall have it in heaven.

The third perfection answers to a totality neither on the part of the
object served, nor on the part of the lover as regards his always
actually tending to God, but on the part of the lover as regards the
removal of obstacles to the movement of love towards God, in which
sense Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII, qu. 36) that "carnal desire is the
bane of charity; to have no carnal desires is the perfection of
charity." Such perfection as this can be had in this life, and in two
ways. First, by the removal from man's affections of all that is
contrary to charity, such as mortal sin; and there can be no charity
apart from this perfection, wherefore it is necessary for salvation.
Secondly, by the removal from man's affections not only of whatever
is contrary to charity, but also of whatever hinders the mind's
affections from tending wholly to God. Charity is possible apart from
this perfection, for instance in those who are beginners and in those
who are proficient.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle is speaking there of heavenly perfection
which is not possible to those who are on the way.

Reply Obj. 2: Those who are perfect in this life are said to "offend
in many things" with regard to venial sins, which result from the
weakness of the present life: and in this respect they have an
"imperfect being" in comparison with the perfection of heaven.

Reply Obj. 3: As the conditions of the present life do not allow of a
man always tending actually to God, so neither does it allow of his
tending actually to each individual neighbor; but it suffices for him
to tend to all in common and collectively, and to each individual
habitually and according to the preparedness of his mind. Now in the
love of our neighbor, as in the love of God we may observe a twofold
perfection: one without which charity is impossible, and consisting
in one's having in one's affections nothing that is contrary to the
love of one's neighbor; and another without which it is possible to
have charity. The latter perfection may be considered in three ways.
First, as to the extent of love, through a man loving not only his
friends and acquaintances but also strangers and even his enemies,
for as Augustine says (Enchiridion lxxiii) this is a mark of the
perfect children of God. Secondly, as to the intensity of love, which
is shown by the things which man despises for his neighbor's sake,
through his despising not only external goods for the sake of his
neighbor, but also bodily hardships and even death, according to John
15:13, "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his
life for his friends." Thirdly, as to the effect of love, so that a
man will surrender not only temporal but also spiritual goods and
even himself, for his neighbor's sake, according to the words of the
Apostle (2 Cor. 12:15), "But I most gladly will spend and be spent
myself for your souls."
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 3]

Whether, in This Life, Perfection Consists in the Observance of the
Commandments or of the Counsels?

Objection 1: It would seem that, in this life, perfection consists in
the observance not of the commandments but of the counsels. For our
Lord said (Matt. 19:21): "If thou wilt be perfect, go sell all
[Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor . . . and come,
follow Me." Now this is a counsel. Therefore perfection regards the
counsels and not the precepts.

Obj. 2: Further, all are bound to the observance of the commandments,
since this is necessary for salvation. Therefore, if the perfection
of the Christian life consists in observing the commandments, it
follows that perfection is necessary for salvation, and that all are
bound thereto; and this is evidently false.

Obj. 3: Further, the perfection of the Christian life is gauged
according to charity, as stated above (A. 1). Now the perfection of
charity, seemingly, does not consist in the observance of the
commandments, since the perfection of charity is preceded both by its
increase and by its beginning, as Augustine says (Super Canonic.
Joan. Tract. ix). But the beginning of charity cannot precede the
observance of the commandments, since according to John 14:23, "If
any one love Me, he will keep My word." Therefore the perfection of
life regards not the commandments but the counsels.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the
Lord thy God with thy whole heart," and (Lev. 19:18): "Thou shalt
love thy neighbor [Vulg.: 'friend'] as thyself"; and these are the
commandments of which our Lord said (Matt. 22:40): "On these two
commandments dependeth the whole law and the prophets." Now the
perfection of charity, in respect of which the Christian life is said
to be perfect, consists in our loving God with our whole heart, and
our neighbor as ourselves. Therefore it would seem that perfection
consists in the observance of the precepts.

_I answer that,_ Perfection is said to consist in a thing in two
ways: in one way, primarily and essentially; in another, secondarily
and accidentally. Primarily and essentially the perfection of the
Christian life consists in charity, principally as to the love of
God, secondarily as to the love of our neighbor, both of which are
the matter of the chief commandments of the Divine law, as stated
above. Now the love of God and of our neighbor is not commanded
according to a measure, so that what is in excess of the measure be a
matter of counsel. This is evident from the very form of the
commandment, pointing, as it does, to perfection--for instance in the
words, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart": since
"the whole" is the same as "the perfect," according to the
Philosopher (Phys. iii, 6), and in the words, "Thou shalt love thy
neighbor as thyself," since every one loves himself most. The reason
of this is that "the end of the commandment is charity," according to
the Apostle (1 Tim. 1:5); and the end is not subject to a measure,
but only such things as are directed to the end, as the Philosopher
observes (Polit. i, 3); thus a physician does not measure the amount
of his healing, but how much medicine or diet he shall employ for the
purpose of healing. Consequently it is evident that perfection
consists essentially in the observance of the commandments; wherefore
Augustine says (De Perf. Justit. viii): "Why then should not this
perfection be prescribed to man, although no man has it in this life?"

Secondarily and instrumentally, however, perfection consists in the
observance of the counsels, all of which, like the commandments, are
directed to charity; yet not in the same way. For the commandments,
other than the precepts of charity, are directed to the removal of
things contrary to charity, with which, namely, charity is
incompatible, whereas the counsels are directed to the removal of
things that hinder the act of charity, and yet are not contrary to
charity, such as marriage, the occupation of worldly business, and so
forth. Hence Augustine says (Enchiridion cxxi): "Whatever things God
commands, for instance, 'Thou shalt not commit adultery,' and
whatever are not commanded, yet suggested by a special counsel, for
instance, 'It is good for a man not to touch a woman,' are then done
aright when they are referred to the love of God, and of our neighbor
for God's sake, both in this world and in the world to come." Hence
it is that in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. i, cap. vii) the
abbot Moses says: "Fastings, watchings, meditating on the Scriptures,
penury and loss of all one's wealth, these are not perfection but
means to perfection, since not in them does the school of perfection
find its end, but through them it achieves its end," and he had
already said that "we endeavor to ascend by these steps to the
perfection of charity."

Reply Obj. 1: In this saying of our Lord something is indicated as
being the way to perfection by the words, "Go, sell all thou hast,
and give to the poor"; and something else is added wherein perfection
consists, when He said, "And follow Me." Hence Jerome in his
commentary on Matt. 19:27, says that "since it is not enough merely
to leave, Peter added that which is perfect: 'And have followed
Thee'"; and Ambrose, commenting on Luke 5:27, "Follow Me," says: "He
commands him to follow, not with steps of the body, but with devotion
of the soul, which is the effect of charity." Wherefore it is evident
from the very way of speaking that the counsels are means of
attaining to perfection, since it is thus expressed: "If thou wilt be
perfect, go, sell," etc., as though He said: "By so doing thou shalt
accomplish this end."

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Perf. Justit. viii) "the
perfection of charity is prescribed to man in this life, because one
runs not right unless one knows whither to run. And how shall we know
this if no commandment declares it to us?" And since that which is a
matter of precept can be fulfilled variously, one does not break a
commandment through not fulfilling it in the best way, but it is
enough to fulfil it in any way whatever. Now the perfection of Divine
love is a matter of precept for all without exception, so that even
the perfection of heaven is not excepted from this precept, as
Augustine says (De Perf. Justit. viii [*Cf. De Spir. et Lit. XXXVI]),
and one escapes transgressing the precept, in whatever measure one
attains to the perfection of Divine love. The lowest degree of Divine
love is to love nothing more than God, or contrary to God, or equally
with God, and whoever fails from this degree of perfection nowise
fulfils the precept. There is another degree of the Divine love,
which cannot be fulfilled so long as we are on the way, as stated
above (A. 2), and it is evident that to fail from this is not to be a
transgressor of the precept; and in like manner one does not
transgress the precept, if one does not attain to the intermediate
degrees of perfection, provided one attain to the lowest.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as man has a certain perfection of his nature as
soon as he is born, which perfection belongs to the very essence of
his species, while there is another perfection which he acquires by
growth, so again there is a perfection of charity which belongs to
the very essence of charity, namely that man love God above all
things, and love nothing contrary to God, while there is another
perfection of charity even in this life, whereto a man attains by a
kind of spiritual growth, for instance when a man refrains even from
lawful things, in order more freely to give himself to the service of
God.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 4]

Whether Whoever Is Perfect Is in the State of Perfection?

Objection 1: It would seem that whoever is perfect is in the state of
perfection. For, as stated above (A. 3, ad 3), just as bodily
perfection is reached by bodily growth, so spiritual perfection is
acquired by spiritual growth. Now after bodily growth one is said to
have reached the state of perfect age. Therefore seemingly also after
spiritual growth, when one has already reached spiritual perfection,
one is in the state of perfection.

Obj. 2: Further, according to _Phys._ v, 2, movement "from one
contrary to another" has the same aspect as "movement from less to
more." Now when a man is changed from sin to grace, he is said to
change his state, in so far as the state of sin differs from the
state of grace. Therefore it would seem that in the same manner, when
one progresses from a lesser to a greater grace, so as to reach the
perfect degree, one is in the state of perfection.

Obj. 3: Further, a man acquires a state by being freed from
servitude. But one is freed from the servitude of sin by charity,
because "charity covereth all sins" (Prov. 10:12). Now one is said to
be perfect on account of charity, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore,
seemingly, whoever has perfection, for this very reason has the state
of perfection.

_On the contrary,_ Some are in the state of perfection, who are
wholly lacking in charity and grace, for instance wicked bishops or
religious. Therefore it would seem that on the other hand some have
the perfection of life, who nevertheless have not the state of
perfection.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 183, A. 1), state properly
regards a condition of freedom or servitude. Now spiritual freedom or
servitude may be considered in man in two ways: first, with respect
to his internal actions; secondly, with respect to his external
actions. And since according to 1 Kings 16:7, "man seeth those things
that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart," it follows that with
regard to man's internal disposition we consider his spiritual state
in relation to the Divine judgment, while with regard to his external
actions we consider man's spiritual state in relation to the Church.
It is in this latter sense that we are now speaking of states, namely
in so far as the Church derives a certain beauty from the variety of
states [*Cf. Q. 183, A. 2].

Now it must be observed, that so far as men are concerned, in order
that any one attain to a state of freedom or servitude there is
required first of all an obligation or a release. For the mere fact
of serving someone does not make a man a slave, since even the free
serve, according to Gal. 5:13, "By charity of the spirit serve one
another": nor again does the mere fact of ceasing to serve make a man
free, as in the case of a runaway slave; but properly speaking a man
is a slave if he be bound to serve, and a man is free if he be
released from service. Secondly, it is required that the aforesaid
obligation be imposed with a certain solemnity; even as a certain
solemnity is observed in other matters which among men obtain a
settlement in perpetuity.

Accordingly, properly speaking, one is said to be in the state of
perfection, not through having the act of perfect love, but through
binding himself in perpetuity and with a certain solemnity to those
things that pertain to perfection. Moreover it happens that some
persons bind themselves to that which they do not keep, and some
fulfil that to which they have not bound themselves, as in the case
of the two sons (Matt. 21:28, 30), one of whom when his father said:
"Work in my vineyard," answered: "I will not," and "afterwards . . .
he went," while the other "answering said: I go . . . and he went
not." Wherefore nothing hinders some from being perfect without being
in the state of perfection, and some in the state of perfection
without being perfect.

Reply Obj. 1: By bodily growth a man progresses in things pertaining
to nature, wherefore he attains to the state of nature; especially
since "what is according to nature is," in a way, "unchangeable"
[*Ethic. v, 7], inasmuch as nature is determinate to one thing. In
like manner by inward spiritual growth a man reaches the state of
perfection in relation to the Divine judgment. But as regards the
distinctions of ecclesiastical states, a man does not reach the state
of perfection except by growth in respect of external actions.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument also regards the interior state. Yet when
a man passes from sin to grace, he passes from servitude to freedom;
and this does not result from a mere progress in grace, except when a
man binds himself to things pertaining to grace.

Reply Obj. 3: Again this argument considers the interior state.
Nevertheless, although charity causes the change of condition from
spiritual servitude to spiritual freedom, an increase of charity has
not the same effect.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 5]

Whether Religious and Prelates Are in the State of Perfection?

Objection 1: It would seem that prelates and religious are not in the
state of perfection. For the state of perfection differs from the
state of the beginners and the proficient. Now no class of men is
specially assigned to the state of the proficient or of the
beginners. Therefore it would seem that neither should any class of
men be assigned to the state of perfection.

Obj. 2: Further, the outward state should answer to the inward, else
one is guilty of lying, "which consists not only in false words, but
also in deceitful deeds," according to Ambrose in one of his sermons
(xxx de Tempore). Now there are many prelates and religious who have
not the inward perfection of charity. Therefore, if all religious and
prelates are in the state of perfection, it would follow that all of
them that are not perfect are in mortal sin, as deceivers and liars.

Obj. 3: Further, as stated above (A. 1), perfection is measured
according to charity. Now the most perfect charity would seem to be
in the martyrs, according to John 15:13, "Greater love than this no
man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends": and a gloss
on Heb. 12:4, "For you have not yet resisted unto blood," says: "In
this life no love is more perfect than that to which the holy martyrs
attained, who strove against sin even unto blood." Therefore it would
seem that the state of perfection should be ascribed to the martyrs
rather than to religious and bishops.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) ascribes perfection to
bishops as being perfecters, and (Eccl. Hier. vi) to religious (whom
he calls monks or _therapeutai_, i.e. servants of God) as being
perfected.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), there is required for the
state of perfection a perpetual obligation to things pertaining to
perfection, together with a certain solemnity. Now both these
conditions are competent to religious and bishops. For religious bind
themselves by vow to refrain from worldly affairs, which they might
lawfully use, in order more freely to give themselves to God, wherein
consists the perfection of the present life. Hence Dionysius says
(Eccl. Hier. vi), speaking of religious: "Some call them
_therapeutai_," i.e. servants, "on account of their rendering pure
service and homage to God; others call them _monachoi_" [*i.e.
solitaries; whence the English word 'monk'], "on account of the
indivisible and single-minded life which by their being wrapped in,"
i.e. contemplating, "indivisible things, unites them in a Godlike
union and a perfection beloved of God" [*Cf. Q. 180, A. 6]. Moreover,
the obligation in both cases is undertaken with a certain solemnity
of profession and consecration; wherefore Dionysius adds (Eccl. Hier.
vi): "Hence the holy legislation in bestowing perfect grace on them
accords them a hallowing invocation."

In like manner bishops bind themselves to things pertaining to
perfection when they take up the pastoral duty, to which it belongs
that a shepherd "lay down his life for his sheep," according to John
10:15. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:12): "Thou . . . hast
confessed a good confession before many witnesses," that is to say,
"when he was ordained," as a gloss says on this passage. Again, a
certain solemnity of consecration is employed together with the
aforesaid profession, according to 2 Tim. 1:6: "Stir up the grace of
God which is in thee by the imposition of my hands," which the gloss
ascribes to the grace of the episcopate. And Dionysius says (Eccl.
Hier. v) that "when the high priest," i.e. the bishop, "is ordained,
he receives on his head the most holy imposition of the sacred
oracles, whereby it is signified that he is a participator in the
whole and entire hierarchical power, and that not only is he the
enlightener in all things pertaining to his holy discourses and
actions, but that he also confers this on others."

Reply Obj. 1: Beginning and increase are sought not for their own
sake, but for the sake of perfection; hence it is only to the state
of perfection that some are admitted under certain obligations and
with solemnity.

Reply Obj. 2: Those who enter the state of perfection do not profess
to be perfect, but to tend to perfection. Hence the Apostle says
(Phil. 3:12): "Not as though I had already attained, or were already
perfect; but I follow after, if I may by any means apprehend": and
afterwards (Phil. 3:15): "Let us therefore as many as are perfect, be
thus minded." Hence a man who takes up the state of perfection is not
guilty of lying or deceit through not being perfect, but through
withdrawing his mind from the intention of reaching perfection.

Reply Obj. 3: Martyrdom is the most perfect act of charity. But an
act of perfection does not suffice to make the state of perfection,
as stated above (A. 4).
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 6]

Whether All Ecclesiastical Prelates Are in the State of Perfection?

Objection 1: It would seem that all ecclesiastical prelates are
in a state of perfection. For Jerome commenting on Titus 1:5,
"Ordain . . . in every city," etc. says: "Formerly priest was the
same as bishop," and afterwards he adds: "Just as priests know that
by the custom of the Church they are subject to the one who is placed
over them, so too, bishops should recognize that, by custom rather
than by the very ordinance of our Lord, they are above the priests,
and are together the rightful governors of the Church." Now bishops
are in the state of perfection. Therefore those priests also are who
have the cure of souls.

Obj. 2: Further, just as bishops together with their consecration
receive the cure of souls, so also do parish priests and archdeacons,
of whom a gloss on Acts 6:3, "Brethren, look ye out . . . seven men
of good reputation," says: "The apostles decided here to appoint
throughout the Church seven deacons, who were to be of a higher
degree, and as it were the supports of that which is nearest to the
altar." Therefore it would seem that these also are in the state of
perfection.

Obj. 3: Further, just as bishops are bound to "lay down their life
for their sheep," so too are parish priests and archdeacons. But this
belongs to the perfection of charity, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3).
Therefore it would seem that parish priests and archdeacons also are
in the state of perfection.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v): "The order of
pontiffs is consummative and perfecting, that of the priests is
illuminative and light-giving, that of the ministers is cleansing and
discretive." Hence it is evident that perfection is ascribed to
bishops only.

_I answer that,_ In priests and deacons having cure of souls two
things may be considered, namely their order and their cure. Their
order is directed to some act in the Divine offices. Wherefore it has
been stated above (Q. 183, A. 3, ad 3) that the distinction of orders
is comprised under the distinction of offices. Hence by receiving a
certain order a man receives the power of exercising certain sacred
acts, but he is not bound on this account to things pertaining to
perfection, except in so far as in the Western Church the receiving
of a sacred order includes the taking of a vow of continence, which
is one of the things pertaining to perfection, as we shall state
further on (Q. 186, A. 4). Therefore it is clear that from the fact
that a man receives a sacred order a man is not placed simply in the
state of perfection, although inward perfection is required in order
that one exercise such acts worthily.

In like manner, neither are they placed in the state of perfection on
the part of the cure which they take upon themselves. For they are
not bound by this very fact under the obligation of a perpetual vow
to retain the cure of souls; but they can surrender it--either by
entering religion, even without their bishop's permission (cf.
Decret. xix, qu. 2, can. Duae sunt)--or again an archdeacon may with
his bishop's permission resign his arch-deaconry or parish, and
accept a simple prebend without cure, which would be nowise lawful,
if he were in the state of perfection; for "no man putting his hand
to the plough and looking back is fit for the kingdom of God" (Luke
9:62). On the other hand bishops, since they are in the state of
perfection, cannot abandon the episcopal cure, save by the authority
of the Sovereign Pontiff (to whom alone it belongs also to dispense
from perpetual vows), and this for certain causes, as we shall state
further on (Q. 185, A. 4). Wherefore it is manifest that not all
prelates are in the state of perfection, but only bishops.

Reply Obj. 1: We may speak of priest and bishop in two ways. First,
with regard to the name: and thus formerly bishops and priests were
not distinct. For bishops are so called "because they watch over
others," as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei xix, 19); while the
priests according to the Greek are "elders." [*Referring to the Greek
_episkopos_ and _presbyteros_ from which the English 'bishop' and
'priest' are derived.] Hence the Apostle employs the term "priests"
in reference to both, when he says (1 Tim. 5:17): "Let the priests
that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honor"; and again he uses
the term "bishops" in the same way, wherefore addressing the priests
of the Church of Ephesus he says (Acts 20:28): "Take heed to
yourselves" and "to the whole flock, wherein the Holy Ghost hath
placed you bishops, to rule the church of God."

But as regards the thing signified by these terms, there was always a
difference between them, even at the time of the apostles. This is
clear on the authority of Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v), and of a gloss
on Luke 10:1, "After these things the Lord appointed," etc. which
says: "Just as the apostles were made bishops, so the seventy-two
disciples were made priests of the second order." Subsequently,
however, in order to avoid schism, it became necessary to distinguish
even the terms, by calling the higher ones bishops and the lower ones
priests. But to assert that priests nowise differ from bishops is
reckoned by Augustine among heretical doctrines (De Heres. liii),
where he says that the Arians maintained that "no distinction existed
between a priest and a bishop."

Reply Obj. 2: Bishops have the chief cure of the sheep of their
diocese, while parish priests and archdeacons exercise an inferior
ministry under the bishops. Hence a gloss on 1 Cor. 12:28, "to one,
helps, to another, governments [*Vulg.: 'God hath set some in the
church . . . helps, governments,' etc.]," says: "Helps, namely
assistants to those who are in authority," as Titus was to the
Apostle, or as archdeacons to the bishop; "governments, namely
persons of lesser authority, such as priests who have to instruct the
people": and Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v) that "just as we see the
whole hierarchy culminating in Jesus, so each office culminates in
its respective godlike hierarch or bishop." Also it is said (XVI, qu.
i, can. Cunctis): "Priests and deacons must all take care not to do
anything without their bishop's permission." Wherefore it is evident
that they stand in relation to their bishop as wardens or mayors to
the king; and for this reason, just as in earthly governments the
king alone receives a solemn blessing, while others are appointed by
simple commission, so too in the Church the episcopal cure is
conferred with the solemnity of consecration, while the archdeacon or
parish priest receives his cure by simple appointment; although they
are consecrated by receiving orders before having a cure.

Reply Obj. 3: As parish priests and archdeacons have not the chief
cure, but a certain ministry as committed to them by the bishop, so
the pastoral office does not belong to them in chief, nor are they
bound to lay down their life for the sheep, except in so far as they
have a share in their cure. Hence we should say that they have an
office pertaining to perfection rather than that they attain the
state of perfection.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 7]

Whether the Religious State Is More Perfect Than That of Prelates?

Objection 1: It would seem that the religious state is more perfect
than that of prelates. For our Lord said (Matt. 19:21): "If thou wilt
be perfect, go" and "sell" all [Vulg.: 'what'] "thou hast, and give
to the poor"; and religious do this. But bishops are not bound to do
so; for it is said (XII, qu. i, can. Episcopi de rebus): "Bishops, if
they wish, may bequeath to their heirs their personal or acquired
property, and whatever belongs to them personally." Therefore
religious are in a more perfect state than bishops.

Obj. 2: Further, perfection consists more especially in the love of
God than in the love of our neighbor. Now the religious state is
directly ordered to the love of God, wherefore it takes its name from
"service and homage to God," as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi);
[*Quoted above A. 5] whereas the bishop's state would seem to be
ordered to the love of our neighbor, of whose cure he is the
"warden," and from this he takes his name, as Augustine observes (De
Civ. Dei. xix, 19). Therefore it would seem that the religious state
is more perfect than that of bishops.

Obj. 3: Further, the religious state is directed to the contemplative
life, which is more excellent than the active life to which the
episcopal state is directed. For Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7) that
"Isaias wishing to be of profit to his neighbor by means of the
active life desired the office of preaching, whereas Jeremias, who
was fain to hold fast to the love of his Creator, exclaimed against
being sent to preach." Therefore it would seem that the religious
state is more perfect than the episcopal state.

_On the contrary,_ It is not lawful for anyone to pass from a more
excellent to a less excellent state; for this would be to look back
[*Cf. Luke 9:62]. Yet a man may pass from the religious to the
episcopal state, for it is said (XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that
"the holy ordination makes a monk to be a bishop." Therefore the
episcopal state is more perfect than the religious.

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16), "the agent
is ever more excellent than the patient." Now in the genus of
perfection according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v, vi), bishops are in
the position of "perfecters," whereas religious are in the position
of being "perfected"; the former of which pertains to action, and the
latter to passion. Whence it is evident that the state of perfection
is more excellent in bishops than in religious.

Reply Obj. 1: Renunciation of one's possessions may be considered in
two ways. First, as being actual: and thus it is not essential, but a
means, to perfection, as stated above (A. 3). Hence nothing hinders
the state of perfection from being without renunciation of one's
possessions, and the same applies to other outward practices.
Secondly, it may be considered in relation to one's preparedness, in
the sense of being prepared to renounce or give away all: and this
belongs directly to perfection. Hence Augustine says (De QQ. Evang.
ii, qu. 11): "Our Lord shows that the children of wisdom understand
righteousness to consist neither in eating nor in abstaining, but in
bearing want patiently." Wherefore the Apostle says (Phil. 4:12): "I
know . . . both to abound and to suffer need." Now bishops especially
are bound to despise all things for the honor of God and the
spiritual welfare of their flock, when it is necessary for them to do
so, either by giving to the poor of their flock, or by suffering
"with joy the being stripped of" their "own goods" [*Heb. 10:34].

Reply Obj. 2: That bishops are busy about things pertaining to the
love of their neighbor, arises out of the abundance of their love of
God. Hence our Lord asked Peter first of all whether he loved Him,
and afterwards committed the care of His flock to him. And Gregory
says (Pastor. i, 5): "If the pastoral care is a proof of love, he who
refuses to feed God's flock, though having the means to do so, is
convicted of not loving the supreme Pastor." And it is a sign of
greater love if a man devotes himself to others for his friend's
sake, than if he be willing only to serve his friend.

Reply Obj. 3: As Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 1), "a prelate
should be foremost in action, and more uplifted than others in
contemplation," because it is incumbent on him to contemplate, not
only for his own sake, but also for the purpose of instructing others.
Hence Gregory applies (Hom. v in Ezech.) the words of Ps. 144:7, "They
shall publish the memory . . . of Thy sweetness," to perfect men
returning after their contemplation.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 184, Art. 8]

Whether Parish Priests and Archdeacons Are More Perfect Than
Religious?

Objection 1: It would seem that also parish priests and archdeacons
are more perfect than religious. For Chrysostom says in his Dialogue
(De Sacerdot. vi): "Take for example a monk, such as Elias, if I may
exaggerate somewhat, he is not to be compared with one who, cast
among the people and compelled to carry the sins of many, remains
firm and strong." A little further on he says: "If I were given the
choice, where would I prefer to please, in the priestly office, or in
the monastic solitude, without hesitation I should choose the
former." Again in the same book (ch. 5) he says: "If you compare the
toils of this project, namely of the monastic life, with a
well-employed priesthood, you will find them as far distant from one
another as a common citizen is from a king." Therefore it would seem
that priests who have the cure of souls are more perfect than
religious.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (ad Valerium, Ep. xxi): "Let thy
religious prudence observe that in this life, and especially at these
times, there is nothing so difficult, so onerous, so perilous as the
office of bishop, priest, or deacon; while in God's sight there is no
greater blessing, if one engage in the fight as ordered by our
Commander-in-chief." Therefore religious are not more perfect than
priests or deacons.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Ep. lx, ad Aurel.): "It would be
most regrettable, were we to exalt monks to such a disastrous degree
of pride, and deem the clergy deserving of such a grievous insult,"
as to assert that "'a bad monk is a good clerk,' since sometimes even
a good monk makes a bad clerk." And a little before this he says that
"God's servants," i.e. monks, "must not be allowed to think that they
may easily be chosen for something better," namely the clerical
state, "if they should become worse thereby," namely by leaving the
monastic state. Therefore it would seem that those who are in the
clerical state are more perfect than religious.

Obj. 4: Further, it is not lawful to pass from a more perfect to a
less perfect state. Yet it is lawful to pass from the monastic state
to a priestly office with a cure attached, as appears (XVI, qu. i,
can. Si quis monachus) from a decree of Pope Gelasius, who says: "If
there be a monk, who by the merit of his exemplary life is worthy of
the priesthood, and the abbot under whose authority he fights for
Christ his King, ask that he be made a priest, the bishop shall take
him and ordain him in such place as he shall choose fitting." And
Jerome says (Ad Rustic. Monach., Ep. cxxv): "In the monastery so live
as to deserve to be a clerk." Therefore parish priests and
archdeacons are more perfect than religious.

Obj. 5: Further, bishops are in a more perfect state than religious,
as shown above (A. 7). But parish priests and archdeacons, through
having cure of souls, are more like bishops than religious are.
Therefore they are more perfect.

Obj. 6: Further, virtue "is concerned with the difficult and the
good" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is more difficult to lead a good life in
the office of parish priest or archdeacon than in the religious
state. Therefore parish priests and archdeacons have more perfect
virtue than religious.

_On the contrary,_ It is stated (XIX, qu. ii, cap. Duce): "If a man
while governing the people in his church under the bishop and leading
a secular life is inspired by the Holy Ghost to desire to work out
his salvation in a monastery or under some canonical rule, since he
is led by a private law, there is no reason why he should be
constrained by a public law." Now a man is not led by the law of the
Holy Ghost, which is here called a "private law," except to something
more perfect. Therefore it would seem that religious are more perfect
than archdeacons or parish priests.

_I answer that,_ When we compare things in the point of
super-eminence, we look not at that in which they agree, but at that
wherein they differ. Now in parish priests and archdeacons three
things may be considered, their state, their order, and their office.
It belongs to their state that they are seculars, to their order that
they are priests or deacons, to their office that they have the cure
of souls committed to them.

Accordingly, if we compare these with one who is a religious by
state, a deacon or priest by order, having the cure of souls by
office, as many monks and canons regular have, this one will excel in
the first point, and in the other points he will be equal. But if the
latter differ from the former in state and office, but agree in
order, such as religious priests and deacons not having the cure of
souls, it is evident that the latter will be more excellent than the
former in state, less excellent in office, and equal in order.

We must therefore consider which is the greater, preeminence of state
or of office; and here, seemingly, we should take note of two things,
goodness and difficulty. Accordingly, if we make the comparison with
a view to goodness, the religious state surpasses the office of
parish priest or archdeacon, because a religious pledges his whole
life to the quest of perfection, whereas the parish priest or
archdeacon does not pledge his whole life to the cure of souls, as a
bishop does, nor is it competent to him, as it is to a bishop, to
exercise the cure of souls in chief, but only in certain particulars
regarding the cure of souls committed to his charge, as stated above
(A. 6, ad 2). Wherefore the comparison of their religious state with
their office is like the comparisons of the universal with the
particular, and of a holocaust with a sacrifice which is less than a
holocaust according to Gregory (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Hence it is said
(XIX, qu. i, can. Clerici qui monachorum.): "Clerics who wish to take
the monastic vows through being desirous of a better life must be
allowed by their bishops the free entrance into the monastery."

This comparison, however, must be considered as regarding the genus
of the deed; for as regards the charity of the doer it happens
sometimes that a deed which is of less account in its genus is of
greater merit if it be done out of greater charity.

On the other hand, if we consider the difficulty of leading a good
life in religion, and in the office of one having the cure of souls,
in this way it is more difficult to lead a good life together with
the exercise of the cure of souls, on account of outward dangers:
although the religious life is more difficult as regards the genus of
the deed, by reason of the strictness of religious observance. If,
however, the religious is also without orders, as in the case of
religious lay brethren, then it is evident that the pre-eminence of
order excels in the point of dignity, since by holy orders a man is
appointed to the most august ministry of serving Christ Himself in
the sacrament of the altar. For this requires a greater inward
holiness than that which is requisite for the religious state, since
as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi) the monastic order must follow the
priestly orders, and ascend to Divine things in imitation of them.
Hence, other things being equal, a cleric who is in holy orders, sins
more grievously if he do something contrary to holiness than a
religious who is not in holy orders: although a religious who is not
in orders is bound to regular observance to which persons in holy
orders are not bound.

Reply Obj. 1: We might answer briefly these quotations from
Chrysostom by saying that he speaks not of a priest of lesser order
who has the cure of souls, but of a bishop, who is called a
high-priest; and this agrees with the purpose of that book wherein he
consoles himself and Basil in that they were chosen to be bishops. We
may, however, pass this over and reply that he speaks in view of the
difficulty. For he had already said: "When the pilot is surrounded by
the stormy sea and is able to bring the ship safely out of the
tempest, then he deserves to be acknowledged by all as a perfect
pilot"; and afterwards he concludes, as quoted, with regard to the
monk, "who is not to be compared with one who, cast among the people
. . . remains firm"; and he gives the reason why, because "both in
the calm and in the storm he piloted himself to safety." This proves
nothing more than that the state of one who has the cure of souls is
fraught with more danger than the monastic state; and to keep oneself
innocent in face of a greater peril is proof of greater virtue. on
the other hand, it also indicates greatness of virtue if a man avoid
dangers by entering religion; hence he does not say that "he would
prefer the priestly office to the monastic solitude," but that "he
would rather please" in the former than in the latter, since this is
a proof of greater virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: This passage quoted from Augustine also clearly refers
to the question of difficulty which proves the greatness of virtue in
those who lead a good life, as stated above (ad 1).

Reply Obj. 3: Augustine there compares monks with clerics as regards
the pre-eminence of order, not as regards the distinction between
religious and secular life.

Reply Obj. 4: Those who are taken from the religious state to receive
the cure of souls, being already in sacred orders, attain to
something they had not hitherto, namely the office of the cure, yet
they do not put aside what they had already. For it is said in the
Decretals (XVI, qu. i, can. De Monachis): "With regard to those monks
who after long residence in a monastery attain to the order of
clerics, we bid them not to lay aside their former purpose."

On the other hand, parish priests and archdeacons, when they enter
religion, resign their cure, in order to enter the state of
perfection. This very fact shows the excellence of the religious
life. When religious who are not in orders are admitted to the
clerical state and to the sacred orders, they are clearly promoted to
something better, as stated: this is indicated by the very way in
which Jerome expresses himself: "So live in the monastery as to
deserve to be a clerk."

Reply Obj. 5: Parish priests and archdeacons are more like bishops
than religious are, in a certain respect, namely as regards the cure
of souls which they have subordinately; but as regards the obligation
in perpetuity, religious are more like a bishop, as appears from what
we have said above (AA. 5, 6).

Reply Obj. 6: The difficulty that arises from the arduousness of the
deed adds to the perfection of virtue; but the difficulty that
results from outward obstacles sometimes lessens the perfection of
virtue--for instance, when a man loves not virtue so much as to wish
to avoid the obstacles to virtue, according to the saying of the
Apostle (1 Cor. 9:25), "Everyone that striveth for the mastery
refraineth himself from all things": and sometimes it is a sign of
perfect virtue--for instance, when a man forsakes not virtue,
although he is hindered in the practice of virtue unawares or by some
unavoidable cause. In the religious state there is greater difficulty
arising from the arduousness of deeds; whereas for those who in any
way at all live in the world, there is greater difficulty resulting
from obstacles to virtue, which obstacles the religious has had the
foresight to avoid.
_______________________

QUESTION 185

OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE EPISCOPAL STATE
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider things pertaining to the episcopal state. Under
this head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is lawful to desire the office of a bishop?

(2) Whether it is lawful to refuse the office of bishop definitively?

(3) Whether the better man should be chosen for the episcopal office?

(4) Whether a bishop may pass over to the religious state?

(5) Whether he may lawfully abandon his subjects in a bodily manner?

(6) Whether he can have anything of his own?

(7) Whether he sins mortally by not distributing ecclesiastical goods
to the poor?

(8) Whether religious who are appointed to the episcopal office are
bound to religious observances?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 1]

Whether It Is Lawful to Desire the Office of a Bishop?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to desire the office of
a bishop. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:1): "He that desires [Vulg.:
'If a man desire'] the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work."
Now it is lawful and praiseworthy to desire a good work. Therefore it
is even praiseworthy to desire the office of a bishop.

Obj. 2: Further, the episcopal state is more perfect than the
religious, as we have said above (Q. 184, A. 7). But it is
praiseworthy to desire to enter the religious state. Therefore it is
also praiseworthy to desire promotion to the episcopal state.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 11:26): "He that hideth up corn
shall be cursed among the people; but a blessing upon the head of
them that sell." Now a man who is apt, both in manner of life and by
knowledge, for the episcopal office, would seem to hide up the
spiritual corn, if he shun the episcopal state, whereas by accepting
the episcopal office he enters the state of a dispenser of spiritual
corn. Therefore it would seem praiseworthy to desire the office of a
bishop, and blameworthy to refuse it.

Obj. 4: Further, the deeds of the saints related in Holy Writ are set
before us as an example, according to Rom. 15:4, "What things soever
were written, were written for our learning." Now we read (Isa. 6:8)
that Isaias offered himself for the office of preacher, which belongs
chiefly to bishops. Therefore it would seem praiseworthy to desire
the office of a bishop.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "The higher
place, without which the people cannot be ruled, though it be filled
becomingly, is unbecomingly desired."

_I answer that,_ Three things may be considered in the episcopal
office. One is principal and final, namely the bishop's work, whereby
the good of our neighbor is intended, according to John 21:17, "Feed
My sheep." Another thing is the height of degree, for a bishop is
placed above others, according to Matt. 24:45, "A faithful and a wise
servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family." The third is
something resulting from these, namely reverence, honor, and a
sufficiency of temporalities, according to 1 Tim. 5:17, "Let the
priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honor."
Accordingly, to desire the episcopal office on account of these
incidental goods is manifestly unlawful, and pertains to covetousness
or ambition. Wherefore our Lord said against the Pharisees (Matt.
23:6, 7): "They love the first places at feasts, and the first chairs
in the synagogues, and salutations in the market-place, and to be
called by men, Rabbi." As regards the second, namely the height of
degree, it is presumptuous to desire the episcopal office. Hence our
Lord reproved His disciples for seeking precedence, by saying to them
(Matt. 20:25): "You know that the princes of the gentiles lord it
over them." Here Chrysostom says (Hom. lxv in Matth.) that in these
words "He points out that it is heathenish to seek precedence; and
thus by comparing them to the gentiles He converted their impetuous
soul."

On the other hand, to desire to do good to one's neighbor is in
itself praiseworthy, and virtuous. Nevertheless, since considered as
an episcopal act it has the height of degree attached to it, it would
seem that, unless there be manifest and urgent reason for it, it
would be presumptuous for any man to desire to be set over others in
order to do them good. Thus Gregory says (Pastor. i, 8) that "it was
praiseworthy to seek the office of a bishop when it was certain to
bring one into graver dangers." Wherefore it was not easy to find a
person to accept this burden, especially seeing that it is through
the zeal of charity that one divinely instigated to do so, according
to Gregory, who says (Pastor. i, 7) that "Isaias being desirous of
profiting his neighbor, commendably desired the office of preacher."

Nevertheless, anyone may, without presumption, desire to do such like
works if he should happen to be in that office, or to be worthy of
doing them; so that the object of his desire is the good work and not
the precedence in dignity. Hence Chrysostom* says: "It is indeed good
to desire a good work, but to desire the primacy of honor is vanity.
For primacy seeks one that shuns it, and abhors one that desires it."
[*The quotation is from the Opus Imperfectum in Matth. (Hom. xxxv),
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom.]

Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says (Pastor. i, 8), "when the Apostle said
this he who was set over the people was the first to be dragged to
the torments of martyrdom," so that there was nothing to be desired
in the episcopal office, save the good work. Wherefore Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that when the Apostle said, "'Whoever desireth
the office of bishop, desireth a good work,' he wished to explain
what the episcopacy is: for it denotes work and not honor: since
_skopos_ signifies 'watching.' Wherefore if we like we may render
_episkopein_ by the Latin _superintendere_ (to watch over): thus a
man may know himself to be no bishop if he loves to precede rather
than to profit others." For, as he observed shortly before, "in our
actions we should seek, not honor nor power in this life, since all
things beneath the sun are vanity, but the work itself which that
honor or power enables us to do." Nevertheless, as Gregory says
(Pastor. i, 8), "while praising the desire" (namely of the good work)
"he forthwith turns this object of praise into one of fear, when he
adds: It behooveth . . . a bishop to be blameless," as though to say:
"I praise what you seek, but learn first what it is you seek."

Reply Obj. 2: There is no parity between the religious and the
episcopal state, for two reasons. First, because perfection of life
is a prerequisite of the episcopal state, as appears from our Lord
asking Peter if he loved Him more than the others, before committing
the pastoral office to him, whereas perfection is not a prerequisite
of the religious state, since the latter is the way to perfection.
Hence our Lord did not say (Matt. 19:21): "If thou art perfect, go,
sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast," but "If thou wilt be perfect."
The reason for this difference is because, according to Dionysius
(Eccl. Hier. vi), perfection pertains actively to the bishop, as the
"perfecter," but to the monk passively as one who is "perfected": and
one needs to be perfect in order to bring others to perfection, but
not in order to be brought to perfection. Now it is presumptuous to
think oneself perfect, but it is not presumptuous to tend to
perfection. Secondly, because he who enters the religious state
subjects himself to others for the sake of a spiritual profit, and
anyone may lawfully do this. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
xix, 19): "No man is debarred from striving for the knowledge of
truth, since this pertains to a praiseworthy ease." On the other
hand, he who enters the episcopal state is raised up in order to
watch over others, and no man should seek to be raised thus,
according to Heb. 5:4, "Neither doth any man take the honor to
himself, but he that is called by God": and Chrysostom says: "To
desire supremacy in the Church is neither just nor useful. For what
wise man seeks of his own accord to submit to such servitude and
peril, as to have to render an account of the whole Church? None save
him who fears not God's judgment, and makes a secular abuse of his
ecclesiastical authority, by turning it to secular uses."

Reply Obj. 3: The dispensing of spiritual corn is not to be carried
on in an arbitrary fashion, but chiefly according to the appointment
and disposition of God, and in the second place according to the
appointment of the higher prelates, in whose person it is said (1
Cor. 4:1): "Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ,
and the dispensers of the mysteries of God." Wherefore a man is not
deemed to hide spiritual corn if he avoids governing or correcting
others, and is not competent to do so, neither in virtue of his
office nor of his superior's command; thus alone is he deemed to hide
it, when he neglects to dispense it while under obligation to do so
in virtue of his office, or obstinately refuses to accept the office
when it is imposed on him. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix,
19): "The love of truth seeks a holy leisure, the demands of charity
undertake an honest labor. If no one imposes this burden upon us, we
must devote ourselves to the research and contemplation of truth, but
if it be imposed on us, we must bear it because charity demands it of
us."

Reply Obj. 4: As Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7), "Isaias, who wishing to
be sent, knew himself to be already cleansed by the live coal taken
from the altar, shows us that no one should dare uncleansed to
approach the sacred ministry. Since, then, it is very difficult for
anyone to be able to know that he is cleansed, it is safer to decline
the office of preacher."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 2]

Whether It Is Lawful for a Man to Refuse Absolutely an Appointment to
the Episcopate?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to refuse absolutely an
appointment to the episcopate. For as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7),
"Isaias wishing to be of profit to his neighbor by means of the
active life, desired the office of preaching, whereas Jeremias who
was fain to hold fast to the love of his Creator by contemplation
exclaimed against being sent to preach." Now no man sins by being
unwilling to forgo better things in order to adhere to things that
are not so good. Since then the love of God surpasses the love of our
neighbor, and the contemplative life is preferable to the active, as
shown above (Q. 25, A. 1; Q. 26, A. 2; Q. 182, A. 1) it would seem
that a man sins not if he refuse absolutely the episcopal office.

Obj. 2: Further, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7), "it is very
difficult for anyone to be able to know that he is cleansed: nor
should anyone uncleansed approach the sacred ministry." Therefore if
a man perceives that he is not cleansed, however urgently the
episcopal office be enjoined him, he ought not to accept it.

Obj. 3: Further, Jerome (Prologue, super Marc.) says that "it is
related of the Blessed Mark* that after receiving the faith he cut
off his thumb that he might be excluded from the priesthood." [*This
prologue was falsely ascribed to St. Jerome, and the passage quoted
refers, not to St. Mark the Evangelist, but to a hermit of that name.
(Cf. Baronius, Anno Christi, 45, num. XLIV)] Likewise some take a vow
never to accept a bishopric. Now to place an obstacle to a thing
amounts to the same as refusing it altogether. Therefore it would
seem that one may, without sin, refuse the episcopal office
absolutely.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Ep. xlviii ad Eudox.): "If Mother
Church requires your service, neither accept with greedy conceit, nor
refuse with fawning indolence"; and afterwards he adds: "Nor prefer
your ease to the needs of the Church: for if no good men were willing
to assist her in her labor, you would seek in vain how we could be
born of her."

_I answer that,_ Two things have to be considered in the acceptance
of the episcopal office: first, what a man may fittingly desire
according to his own will; secondly, what it behooves a man to do
according to the will of another. As regards his own will it becomes
a man to look chiefly to his own spiritual welfare, whereas that he
look to the spiritual welfare of others becomes a man according to
the appointment of another having authority, as stated above (A. 1,
ad 3). Hence just as it is a mark of an inordinate will that a man of
his own choice incline to be appointed to the government of others,
so too it indicates an inordinate will if a man definitively refuse
the aforesaid office of government in direct opposition to the
appointment of his superior: and this for two reasons.

First, because this is contrary to the love of our neighbor, for
whose good a man should offer himself according as place and time
demand: hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "the demands
of charity undertake an honest labor." Secondly, because this is
contrary to humility, whereby a man submits to his superior's
commands: hence Gregory says (Pastor. i, 6): "In God's sight humility
is genuine when it does not obstinately refuse to submit to what is
usefully prescribed."

Reply Obj. 1: Although simply and absolutely speaking the
contemplative life is more excellent than the active, and the love of
God better than the love of our neighbor, yet, on the other hand, the
good of the many should be preferred to the good of the individual.
Wherefore Augustine says in the passage quoted above: "Nor prefer
your own ease to the needs of the Church," and all the more since it
belongs to the love of God that a man undertake the pastoral care of
Christ's sheep. Hence Augustine, commenting on John 21:17, "Feed My
sheep," says (Tract. cxxiii in Joan.): "Be it the task of love to
feed the Lord's flock, even as it was the mark of fear to deny the
Shepherd."

Moreover prelates are not transferred to the active life, so as to
forsake the contemplative; wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix,
19) that "if the burden of the pastoral office be imposed, we must
not abandon the delights of truth," which are derived from
contemplation.

Reply Obj. 2: No one is bound to obey his superior by doing what is
unlawful, as appears from what was said above concerning obedience
(Q. 104, A. 5). Accordingly it may happen that he who is appointed to
the office of prelate perceive something in himself on account of
which it is unlawful for him to accept a prelacy. But this obstacle
may sometimes be removed by the very person who is appointed to the
pastoral cure--for instance, if he have a purpose to sin, he may
abandon it--and for this reason he is not excused from being bound to
obey definitely the superior who has appointed him. Sometimes,
however, he is unable himself to remove the impediment that makes the
pastoral office unlawful to him, yet the prelate who appoints him can
do so--for instance, if he be irregular or excommunicate. In such a
case he ought to make known his defect to the prelate who has
appointed him; and if the latter be willing to remove the impediment,
he is bound humbly to obey. Hence when Moses had said (Ex. 4:10): "I
beseech thee, Lord, I am not eloquent from yesterday, and the day
before," the Lord answered (Ex. 4:12): "I will be in thy mouth, and I
will teach thee what thou shalt speak." At other times the impediment
cannot be removed, neither by the person appointing nor by the one
appointed--for instance, if an archbishop be unable to dispense from
an irregularity; wherefore a subject, if irregular, would not be
bound to obey him by accepting the episcopate or even sacred orders.

Reply Obj. 3: It is not in itself necessary for salvation to accept
the episcopal office, but it becomes necessary by reason of the
superior's command. Now one may lawfully place an obstacle to things
thus necessary for salvation, before the command is given; else it
would not be lawful to marry a second time, lest one should thus
incur an impediment to the episcopate or holy orders. But this would
not be lawful in things necessary for salvation. Hence the Blessed
Mark did not act against a precept by cutting off his finger,
although it is credible that he did this by the instigation of the
Holy Ghost, without which it would be unlawful for anyone to lay
hands on himself. If a man take a vow not to accept the bishop's
office, and by this intend to bind himself not even to accept it in
obedience to his superior prelate, his vow is unlawful; but if he
intend to bind himself, so far as it lies with him, not to seek the
episcopal office, nor to accept it except under urgent necessity, his
vow is lawful, because he vows to do what it becomes a man to do.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 3]

Whether He That Is Appointed to the Episcopate Ought to Be Better
Than Others?

Objection 1: It would seem that one who is appointed to the
episcopate ought to be better than others. For our Lord, when about
to commit the pastoral office to Peter, asked him if he loved Him
more than the others. Now a man is the better through loving God the
more. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to be appointed to
the episcopal office except he be better than others.

Obj. 2: Further, Pope Symmachus says (can. Vilissimus I, qu. 1): "A
man is of very little worth who though excelling in dignity, excels
not in knowledge and holiness." Now he who excels in knowledge and
holiness is better. Therefore a man ought not to be appointed to the
episcopate unless he be better than others.

Obj. 3: Further, in every genus the lesser are governed by the
greater, as corporeal things are governed by things spiritual, and
the lower bodies by the higher, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 3).
Now a bishop is appointed to govern others. Therefore he should be
better than others.

_On the contrary,_ The Decretal [*Can. Cum dilectus, de Electione]
says that "it suffices to choose a good man, nor is it necessary to
choose the better man."

_I answer that,_ In designating a man for the episcopal office,
something has to be considered on the part of the person designate,
and something on the part of the designator. For on the part of the
designator, whether by election or by appointment, it is required
that he choose such a one as will dispense the divine mysteries
faithfully. These should be dispensed for the good of the Church,
according to 1 Cor. 14:12, "Seek to abound unto the edifying of the
Church"; and the divine mysteries are not committed to men for their
own meed, which they should await in the life to come. Consequently
he who has to choose or appoint one for a bishop is not bound to take
one who is best simply, i.e. according to charity, but one who is
best for governing the Church, one namely who is able to instruct,
defend, and govern the Church peacefully. Hence Jerome, commenting on
Titus 1:5, says against certain persons that "some seek to erect as
pillars of the Church, not those whom they know to be more useful to
the Church, but those whom they love more, or those by whose
obsequiousness they have been cajoled or undone, or for whom some
person in authority has spoken, and, not to say worse than this, have
succeeded by means of gifts in being made clerics."

Now this pertains to the respect of persons, which in such matters is
a grave sin. Wherefore a gloss of Augustine [*Ep. clxvii ad Hieron.]
on James 2:1, "Brethren, have not . . . with respect of persons,"
says: "If this distinction of sitting and standing be referred to
ecclesiastical honors, we must not deem it a slight sin to 'have the
faith of the Lord of glory with respect of persons.' For who would
suffer a rich man to be chosen for the Church's seat of honor, in
despite of a poor man who is better instructed and holier?"

On the part of the person appointed, it is not required that he
esteem himself better than others, for this would be proud and
presumptuous; but it suffices that he perceive nothing in himself
which would make it unlawful for him to take up the office of
prelate. Hence although Peter was asked by our Lord if he loved Him
more than the others, he did not, in his reply, set himself before
the others, but answered simply that he loved Christ.

Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord knew that, by His own bestowal, Peter was in
other respects fitted to govern the Church: wherefore He questioned
him about his greater love, to show that when we find a man otherwise
fitted for the government of the Church, we must look chiefly to his
pre-eminence in the love of God.

Reply Obj. 2: This statement refers to the pursuits of the man who is
placed in authority. For he should aim at showing himself to be more
excellent than others in both knowledge and holiness. Wherefore
Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 1) "the occupations of a prelate ought to
excel those of the people, as much as the shepherd's life excels that
of his flock." But he is not to be blamed and looked upon as
worthless if he excelled not before being raised to the prelacy.

Reply Obj. 3: According to 1 Cor. 12:4 seqq., "there are diversities
of graces . . . and . . . of ministries . . . and . . . of
operations." Hence nothing hinders one from being more fitted for the
office of governing, who does not excel in the grace of holiness. It
is otherwise in the government of the natural order, where that which
is higher in the natural order is for that very reason more fitted to
dispose of those that are lower.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 4]

Whether a Bishop May Lawfully Forsake the Episcopal Cure, in Order to
Enter Religion?

Objection 1: It seems that a bishop cannot lawfully forsake his
episcopal cure in order to enter religion. For no one can lawfully
pass from a more perfect to a less perfect state; since this is "to
look back," which is condemned by the words of our Lord (Luke 9:62),
"No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for
the kingdom of God." Now the episcopal state is more perfect than the
religious, as shown above (Q. 184, A. 7). Therefore just as it is
unlawful to return to the world from the religious state, so is it
unlawful to pass from the episcopal to the religious state.

Obj. 2: Further, the order of grace is more congruous than the order
of nature. Now according to nature a thing is not moved in contrary
directions; thus if a stone be naturally moved downwards, it cannot
naturally return upwards from below. But according to the order of
grace it is lawful to pass from the religious to the episcopal state.
Therefore it is not lawful to pass contrariwise from the episcopal to
the religious state.

Obj. 3: Further, in the works of grace nothing should be inoperative.
Now when once a man is consecrated bishop he retains in perpetuity
the spiritual power of giving orders and doing like things that
pertain to the episcopal office: and this power would seemingly
remain inoperative in one who gives up the episcopal cure. Therefore
it would seem that a bishop may not forsake the episcopal cure and
enter religion.

_On the contrary,_ No man is compelled to do what is in itself
unlawful. Now those who seek to resign their episcopal cure are
compelled to resign (Extra, de Renunt. cap. Quidam). Therefore
apparently it is not unlawful to give up the episcopal cure.

_I answer that,_ The perfection of the episcopal state consists in
this that for love of God a man binds himself to work for the
salvation of his neighbor, wherefore he is bound to retain the
pastoral cure so long as he is able to procure the spiritual welfare
of the subjects entrusted to his care: a matter which he must not
neglect--neither for the sake of the quiet of divine contemplation,
since the Apostle, on account of the needs of his subjects, suffered
patiently to be delayed even from the contemplation of the life to
come, according to Phil. 1:22-25, "What I shall choose I know not,
but I am straitened between two, having a desire to be dissolved, and
to be with Christ, a thing by far better. But to abide still in the
flesh is needful for you. And having this confidence, I know that I
shall abide"; nor for the sake of avoiding any hardships or of
acquiring any gain whatsoever, because as it is written (John 10:11),
"the good shepherd giveth his life for his sheep."

At times, however, it happens in several ways that a bishop is
hindered from procuring the spiritual welfare of his subjects.
Sometimes on account of his own defect, either of conscience (for
instance if he be guilty of murder or simony), or of body (for
example if he be old or infirm), or of irregularity arising, for
instance, from bigamy. Sometimes he is hindered through some defect
in his subjects, whom he is unable to profit. Hence Gregory says
(Dial. ii, 3): "The wicked must be borne patiently, when there are
some good who can be succored, but when there is no profit at all for
the good, it is sometimes useless to labor for the wicked. Wherefore
the perfect when they find that they labor in vain are often minded
to go elsewhere in order to labor with fruit." Sometimes again this
hindrance arises on the part of others, as when scandal results from
a certain person being in authority: for the Apostle says (1 Cor.
8:13): "If meat scandalize my brother, I will never eat flesh":
provided, however, the scandal is not caused by the wickedness of
persons desirous of subverting the faith or the righteousness of the
Church; because the pastoral cure is not to be laid aside on account
of scandal of this kind, according to Matt. 15:14, "Let them alone,"
those namely who were scandalized at the truth of Christ's teaching,
"they are blind, and leaders of the blind."

Nevertheless just as a man takes upon himself the charge of authority
at the appointment of a higher superior, so too it behooves him to be
subject to the latter's authority in laying aside the accepted charge
for the reasons given above. Hence Innocent III says (Extra, de
Renunt., cap. Nisi cum pridem): "Though thou hast wings wherewith
thou art anxious to fly away into solitude, they are so tied by the
bonds of authority, that thou art not free to fly without our
permission." For the Pope alone can dispense from the perpetual vow,
by which a man binds himself to the care of his subjects, when he
took upon himself the episcopal office.

Reply Obj. 1: The perfection of religious and that of bishops are
regarded from different standpoints. For it belongs to the perfection
of a religious to occupy oneself in working out one's own salvation,
whereas it belongs to the perfection of a bishop to occupy oneself in
working for the salvation of others. Hence so long as a man can be
useful to the salvation of his neighbor, he would be going back, if
he wished to pass to the religious state, to busy himself only with
his own salvation, since he has bound himself to work not only for
his own but also for others' salvation. Wherefore Innocent III says
in the Decretal quoted above that "it is more easily allowable for a
monk to ascend to the episcopacy, than for a bishop to descend to the
monastic life. If, however, he be unable to procure the salvation of
others it is meet he should seek his own."

Reply Obj. 2: On account of no obstacle should a man forego the work
of his own salvation, which pertains to the religious state. But
there may be an obstacle to the procuring of another's salvation;
wherefore a monk may be raised to the episcopal state wherein he is
able also to work out his own salvation. And a bishop, if he be
hindered from procuring the salvation of others, may enter the
religious life, and may return to his bishopric should the obstacle
cease, for instance by the correction of his subjects, cessation of
the scandal, healing of his infirmity, removal of his ignorance by
sufficient instruction. Again, if he owed his promotion to simony of
which he was in ignorance, and resigning his episcopate entered the
religious life, he can be reappointed to another bishopric [*Cap.
Post translat., de Renunt.]. On the other hand, if a man be deposed
from the episcopal office for some sin, and confined in a monastery
that he may do penance, he cannot be reappointed to a bishopric.
Hence it is stated (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): "The holy synod
orders that any man who has been degraded from the episcopal dignity
to the monastic life and a place of repentance, should by no means
rise again to the episcopate."

Reply Obj. 3: Even in natural things power remains inactive on
account of a supervening obstacle, for instance the act of sight
ceases through an affliction of the eye. So neither is it
unreasonable if, through the occurrence of some obstacle from
without, the episcopal power remain without the exercise of its act.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 5]

Whether It Is Lawful for a Bishop on Account of Bodily Persecution to
Abandon the Flock Committed to His Care?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful for a bishop, on
account of some temporal persecution, to withdraw his bodily presence
from the flock committed to his care. For our Lord said (John 10:12)
that he is a hireling and no true shepherd, who "seeth the wolf
coming, and leaveth the sheep and flieth": and Gregory says (Hom. xiv
in Ev.) that "the wolf comes upon the sheep when any man by his
injustice and robbery oppresses the faithful and the humble."
Therefore if, on account of the persecution of a tyrant, a bishop
withdraws his bodily presence from the flock entrusted to his care,
it would seem that he is a hireling and not a shepherd.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 6:1): "My son, if thou be
surety for thy friend, thou hast engaged fast thy hand to a
stranger," and afterwards (Prov. 6:3): "Run about, make haste, stir
up thy friend." Gregory expounds these words and says (Pastor. iii,
4): "To be surety for a friend, is to vouch for his good conduct by
engaging oneself to a stranger. And whoever is put forward as an
example to the lives of others, is warned not only to watch but even
to rouse his friend." Now he cannot do this if he withdraw his bodily
presence from his flock. Therefore it would seem that a bishop should
not on account of persecution withdraw his bodily presence from his
flock.

Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to the perfection of the bishop's state
that he devote himself to the care of his neighbor. Now it is
unlawful for one who has professed the state of perfection to forsake
altogether the things that pertain to perfection. Therefore it would
seem unlawful for a bishop to withdraw his bodily presence from the
execution of his office, except perhaps for the purpose of devoting
himself to works of perfection in a monastery.

_On the contrary,_ our Lord commanded the apostles, whose successors
bishops are (Matt. 10:23): "When they shall persecute you in this
city, flee into another."

_I answer that,_ In any obligation the chief thing to be considered
is the end of the obligation. Now bishops bind themselves to fulfil
the pastoral office for the sake of the salvation of their subjects.
Consequently when the salvation of his subjects demands the personal
presence of the pastor, the pastor should not withdraw his personal
presence from his flock, neither for the sake of some temporal
advantage, nor even on account of some impending danger to his
person, since the good shepherd is bound to lay down his life for his
sheep.

On the other hand, if the salvation of his subjects can be
sufficiently provided for by another person in the absence of the
pastor, it is lawful for the pastor to withdraw his bodily presence
from his flock, either for the sake of some advantage to the Church,
or on account of some danger to his person. Hence Augustine says (Ep.
ccxxviii ad Honorat.): "Christ's servants may flee from one city to
another, when one of them is specially sought out by persecutors: in
order that the Church be not abandoned by others who are not so
sought for. When, however, the same danger threatens all, those who
stand in need of others must not be abandoned by those whom they
need." For "if it is dangerous for the helmsman to leave the ship
when the sea is calm, how much more so when it is stormy," as Pope
Nicholas I says (cf. VII, qu. i, can. Sciscitaris).

Reply Obj. 1: To flee as a hireling is to prefer temporal advantage
or one's bodily welfare to the spiritual welfare of one's neighbor.
Hence Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ev.): "A man cannot endanger himself
for the sake of his sheep, if he uses his authority over them not
through love of them but for the sake of earthly gain: wherefore he
fears to stand in the way of danger lest he lose what he loves." But
he who, in order to avoid danger, leaves the flock without
endangering the flock, does not flee as a hireling.

Reply Obj. 2: If he who is surety for another be unable to fulfil his
engagement, it suffices that he fulfil it through another. Hence if a
superior is hindered from attending personally to the care of his
subjects, he fulfils his obligation if he do so through another.

Reply Obj. 3: When a man is appointed to a bishopric, he
embraces the state of perfection as regards one kind of perfection;
and if he be hindered from the practice thereof, he is not bound to
another kind of perfection, so as to be obliged to enter the religious
state. Yet he is under the obligation of retaining the intention of
devoting himself to his neighbor's salvation, should an opportunity
offer, and necessity require it of him.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 6]

Whether It Is Lawful for a Bishop to Have Property of His Own?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful for a bishop to have
property of his own. For our Lord said (Matt. 19:21): "If thou wilt
be perfect, go sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the
poor . . . and come, follow Me"; whence it would seem to follow that
voluntary poverty is requisite for perfection. Now bishops are in the
state of perfection. Therefore it would seem unlawful for them to
possess anything as their own.

Obj. 2: Further, bishops take the place of the apostles in the
Church, according to a gloss on Luke 10:1. Now our Lord commanded the
apostles to possess nothing of their own, according to Matt. 10:9,
"Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses";
wherefore Peter said for himself and the other apostles (Matt.
19:27): "Behold we have left all things and have followed Thee."
Therefore it would seem that bishops are bound to keep this command,
and to possess nothing of their own.

Obj. 3: Further, Jerome says (Ep. lii ad Nepotian.): "The Greek
_kleros_ denotes the Latin _sors._ Hence clerics are so called either
because they are of the Lord's estate, or because the Lord Himself is
the estate, i.e. portion of clerics. Now he that possesses the Lord,
can have nothing besides God; and if he have gold and silver,
possessions, and chattels of all kinds, with such a portion the Lord
does not vouchsafe to be his portion also." Therefore it would seem
that not only bishops but even clerics should have nothing of their
own.

_On the contrary,_ It is stated (XII, qu. i, can. Episcopi de rebus):
"Bishops, if they wish, may bequeath to their heirs their personal or
acquired property, and whatever belongs to them personally."

_I answer that,_ No one is bound to works of supererogation, unless
he binds himself specially thereto by vow. Hence Augustine says (Ep.
cxxvii ad Paulin. et Arment.): "Since you have taken the vow, you
have already bound yourself, you can no longer do otherwise. Before
you were bound by the vow, you were free to submit." Now it is
evident that to live without possessing anything is a work of
supererogation, for it is a matter not of precept but of counsel.
Wherefore our Lord after saying to the young man: "If thou wilt enter
into life, keep the commandments," said afterwards by way of
addition: "If thou wilt be perfect go sell" all "that thou hast, and
give to the poor" (Matt. 19:17, 21). Bishops, however, do not bind
themselves at their ordination to live without possessions of their
own; nor indeed does the pastoral office, to which they bind
themselves, make it necessary for them to live without anything of
their own. Therefore bishops are not bound to live without
possessions of their own.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 184, A. 3, ad 1) the perfection of
the Christian life does not essentially consist in voluntary poverty,
but voluntary poverty conduces instrumentally to the perfection of
life. Hence it does not follow that where there is greater poverty
there is greater perfection; indeed the highest perfection is
compatible with great wealth, since Abraham, to whom it was said
(Gen. 17:1): "Walk before Me and be perfect," is stated to have been
rich (Gen. 13:2).

Reply Obj. 2: This saying of our Lord can be understood in three
ways. First, mystically, that we should possess neither gold nor
silver means that the preacher should not rely chiefly on temporal
wisdom and eloquence; thus Jerome expounds the passage.

Secondly, according to Augustine's explanation (De Consens. Ev. ii,
30), we are to understand that our Lord said this not in command but
in permission. For he permitted them to go preaching without gold or
silver or other means, since they were to receive the means of
livelihood from those to whom they preached; wherefore He added: "For
the workman is worthy of his meat." And yet if anyone were to use his
own means in preaching the Gospel, this would be a work of
supererogation, as Paul says in reference to himself (1 Cor. 9:12,
15).

Thirdly, according to the exposition of Chrysostom [*Hom. ii in Rom.
xvi, 3, we are to understand that our Lord laid these commands on His
disciples in reference to the mission on which they were sent to
preach to the Jews, so that they might be encouraged to trust in His
power, seeing that He provided for their wants without their having
means of their own. But it does not follow from this that they, or
their successors, were obliged to preach the Gospel without having
means of their own: since we read of Paul (2 Cor. 11:8) that he
"received wages" of other churches for preaching to the Corinthians,
wherefore it is clear that he possessed something sent to him by
others. And it seems foolish to say that so many holy bishops as
Athanasius, Ambrose, and Augustine would have disobeyed these
commandments if they believed themselves bound to observe them.

Reply Obj. 3: Every part is less than the whole. Accordingly a man
has other portions together with God, if he becomes less intent on
things pertaining to God by occupying himself with things of the
world. Now neither bishops nor clerics ought thus to possess means of
their own, that while busy with their own they neglect those that
concern the worship of God.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 7]

Whether Bishops Sin Mortally If They Distribute Not to the Poor the
Ecclesiastical Goods Which Accrue to Them?

Objection 1: It would seem that bishops sin mortally if they
distribute not to the poor the ecclesiastical goods which they
acquire. For Ambrose [*Basil, Serm. lxiv, de Temp., among the
supposititious works of St. Jerome] expounding Luke 12:16, "The land
of a certain . . . man brought forth plenty of fruits," says: "Let no
man claim as his own that which he has taken and obtained by violence
from the common property in excess of his requirements"; and
afterwards he adds: "It is not less criminal to take from him who
has, than, when you are able and have plenty to refuse him who has
not." Now it is a mortal sin to take another's property by violence.
Therefore bishops sin mortally if they give not to the poor that
which they have in excess.

Obj. 2: Further, a gloss of Jerome on Isa. 3:14, "The spoil of the
poor is in your house," says that "ecclesiastical goods belong to the
poor." Now whoever keeps for himself or gives to others that which
belongs to another, sins mortally and is bound to restitution.
Therefore if bishops keep for themselves, or give to their relations
or friends, their surplus of ecclesiastical goods, it would seem that
they are bound to restitution.

Obj. 3: Further, much more may one take what is necessary for oneself
from the goods of the Church, than accumulate a surplus therefrom.
Yet Jerome says in a letter to Pope Damasus [*Cf. Can. Clericos,
cause. i, qu. 2; Can. Quoniam; cause. xvi, qu. 1; Regul. Monach. iv,
among the supposititious works of St. Jerome]: "It is right that
those clerics who receive no goods from their parents and relations
should be supported from the funds of the Church. But those who have
sufficient income from their parents and their own possessions, if
they take what belongs to the poor, they commit and incur the guilt
of sacrilege." Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:16): "If any of
the faithful have widows, let him minister to them, and let not the
Church be charged, that there may be sufficient for them that are
widows indeed." Much more therefore do bishops sin mortally if they
give not to the poor the surplus of their ecclesiastical goods.

_On the contrary,_ Many bishops do not give their surplus to the
poor, but would seem commendably to lay it out so as to increase the
revenue of the Church.

_I answer that,_ The same is not to be said of their own goods which
bishops may possess, and of ecclesiastical goods. For they have real
dominion over their own goods; wherefore from the very nature of the
case they are not bound to give these things to others, and may
either keep them for themselves or bestow them on others at will.
Nevertheless they may sin in this disposal by inordinate affection,
which leads them either to accumulate more than they should, or not
to assist others, in accordance with the demands of charity; yet they
are not bound to restitution, because such things are entrusted to
their ownership.

On the other hand, they hold ecclesiastical goods as dispensers or
trustees. For Augustine says (Ep. clxxxv ad Bonif.): "If we possess
privately what is enough for us, other things belong not to us but to
the poor, and we have the dispensing of them; but we can claim
ownership of them only by wicked theft." Now dispensing requires good
faith, according to 1 Cor. 4:2, "Here now it is required among the
dispensers that a man be found faithful." Moreover ecclesiastical
goods are to be applied not only to the good of the poor, but also to
the divine worship and the needs of its ministers. Hence it is said
(XII, qu. ii, can. de reditibus): "Of the Church's revenues or the
offerings of the faithful only one part is to be assigned to the
bishop, two parts are to be used by the priest, under pain of
suspension, for the ecclesiastical fabric, and for the benefit of the
poor; the remaining part is to be divided among the clergy according
to their respective merits." Accordingly if the goods which are
assigned to the use of the bishop are distinct from those which are
appointed for the use of the poor, or the ministers, or for the
ecclesiastical worship, and if the bishop keeps back for himself part
of that which should be given to the poor, or to the ministers for
their use, or expended on the divine worship, without doubt he is an
unfaithful dispenser, sins mortally, and is bound to restitution.

But as regards those goods which are deputed to his private use, the
same apparently applies as to his own property, namely that he sins
through immoderate attachment thereto or use thereof, if he exceeds
moderation in what he keeps for himself, and fails to assist others
according to the demands of charity.

On the other hand, if no distinction is made in the aforesaid goods,
their distribution is entrusted to his good faith; and if he fail or
exceed in a slight degree, this may happen without prejudice to his
good faith, because in such matters a man cannot possibly decide
precisely what ought to be done. On the other hand, if the excess be
very great he cannot be ignorant of the fact; consequently he would
seem to be lacking in good faith, and is guilty of mortal sin. For it
is written (Matt. 24:48-51) that "if that evil servant shall say in
his heart: My lord is long a-coming," which shows contempt of God's
judgment, "and shall begin to strike his fellow-servants," which is a
sign of pride, "and shall eat and drink with drunkards," which
proceeds from lust, "the lord of that servant shall come in a day
that he hopeth not . . . and shall separate him," namely from the
fellowship of good men, "and appoint his portion with hypocrites,"
namely in hell.

Reply Obj. 1: This saying of Ambrose refers to the administration not
only of ecclesiastical things but also of any goods whatever from
which a man is bound, as a duty of charity, to provide for those who
are in need. But it is not possible to state definitely when this
need is such as to impose an obligation under pain of mortal sin, as
is the case in other points of detail that have to be considered in
human acts: for the decision in such matters is left to human
prudence.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above the goods of the Church have to be
employed not only for the use of the poor, but also for other
purposes. Hence if a bishop or cleric wish to deprive himself of that
which is assigned to his own use, and give it to his relations or
others, he sins not so long as he observes moderation, so, to wit,
that they cease to be in want without becoming the richer thereby.
Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 30): "It is a commendable liberality
if you overlook not your kindred when you know them to be in want;
yet not so as to wish to make them rich with what you can give to the
poor."

Reply Obj. 3: The goods of churches should not all be given to the
poor, except in a case of necessity: for then, as Ambrose says (De
Offic. ii, 28), even the vessels consecrated to the divine worship
are to be sold for the ransom of prisoners, and other needs of the
poor. In such a case of necessity a cleric would sin if he chose to
maintain himself on the goods of the Church, always supposing him to
have a patrimony of his own on which to support himself.

Reply Obj. 4: The goods of the churches should be employed for the
good of the poor. Consequently a man is to be commended if, there
being no present necessity for helping the poor, he spends the
surplus from the Church revenue, in buying property, or lays it by
for some future use connected with the Church or the needs of the
poor. But if there be a pressing need for helping the poor, to lay by
for the future is a superfluous and inordinate saving, and is
forbidden by our Lord Who said (Matt. 6:34): "Be . . . not solicitous
for the morrow."
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 185, Art. 8]

Whether Religious Who Are Raised to the Episcopate Are Bound to
Religious Observances?

Objection 1: It would seem that religious who are raised to the
episcopate are not bound to religious observances. For it is said
(XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that a "canonical election loosens a
monk from the yoke imposed by the rule of the monastic profession,
and the holy ordination makes of a monk a bishop." Now the regular
observances pertain to the yoke of the rule. Therefore religious who
are appointed bishops are not bound to religious observances.

Obj. 2: Further, he who ascends from a lower to a higher degree is
seemingly not bound to those things which pertain to the lower
degree: thus it was stated above (Q. 88, A. 12, ad 1) that a
religious is not bound to keep the vows he made in the world. But a
religious who is appointed to the episcopate ascends to something
greater, as stated above (Q. 84, A. 7). Therefore it would seem that
a bishop is not bound to those things whereto he was bound in the
state of religion.

Obj. 3: Further, religious would seem to be bound above all to
obedience, and to live without property of their own. But religious
who are appointed bishops, are not bound to obey the superiors of
their order, since they are above them; nor apparently are they bound
to poverty, since according to the decree quoted above (Obj. 1) "when
the holy ordination has made of a monk a bishop he enjoys the right,
as the lawful heir, of claiming his paternal inheritance." Moreover
they are sometimes allowed to make a will. Much less therefore are
they bound to other regular observances.

_On the contrary,_ It is said in the Decretals (XVI, qu. i, can. De
Monachis): "With regard to those who after long residence in a
monastery attain to the order of clerics, we bid them not to lay
aside their former purpose."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 2) the religious state
pertains to perfection, as a way of tending to perfection, while the
episcopal state pertains to perfection, as a professorship of
perfection. Hence the religious state is compared to the episcopal
state, as the school to the professorial chair, and as disposition to
perfection. Now the disposition is not voided at the advent of
perfection, except as regards what perchance is incompatible with
perfection, whereas as to that wherein it is in accord with
perfection, it is confirmed the more. Thus when the scholar has
become a professor it no longer becomes him to be a listener, but it
becomes him to read and meditate even more than before. Accordingly
we must assert that if there be among religious observances any that
instead of being an obstacle to the episcopal office, are a safeguard
of perfection, such as continence, poverty, and so forth, a
religious, even after he has been made a bishop, remains bound to
observe these, and consequently to wear the habit of his order, which
is a sign of this obligation.

On the other hand, a man is not bound to keep such religious
observances as may be incompatible with the episcopal office, for
instance solitude, silence, and certain severe abstinences or
watchings and such as would render him bodily unable to exercise the
episcopal office. For the rest he may dispense himself from them,
according to the needs of his person or office, and the manner of
life of those among whom he dwells, in the same way as religious
superiors dispense themselves in such matters.

Reply Obj. 1: He who from being a monk becomes a bishop is loosened
from the yoke of the monastic profession, not in everything, but in
those that are incompatible with the episcopal office, as stated
above.

Reply Obj. 2: The vows of those who are living in the world are
compared to the vows of religion as the particular to the universal,
as stated above (Q. 88, A. 12, ad 1). But the vows of religion are
compared to the episcopal dignity as disposition to perfection. Now
the particular is superfluous when one has the universal, whereas the
disposition is still necessary when perfection has been attained.

Reply Obj. 3: It is accidental that religious who are bishops are not
bound to obey the superiors of their order, because, to wit, they
have ceased to be their subjects; even as those same religious
superiors. Nevertheless the obligation of the vow remains virtually,
so that if any person be lawfully set above them, they would be bound
to obey them, inasmuch as they are bound to obey both the statutes of
their rule in the way mentioned above, and their superiors if they
have any.

As to property they can nowise have it. For they claim their paternal
inheritance not as their own, but as due to the Church. Hence it is
added (XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that after he has been ordained
bishop at the altar to which he is consecrated and appointed
according to the holy canons, he must restore whatever he may acquire.

Nor can he make any testament at all, because he is entrusted with
the sole administration of things ecclesiastical, and this ends with
his death, after which a testament comes into force according to the
Apostle (Heb. 9:17). If, however, by the Pope's permission he make a
will, he is not to be understood to bequeath property of his own, but
we are to understand that by apostolic authority the power of his
administration has been prolonged so as to remain in force after his
death.
_______________________

QUESTION 186

OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH THE RELIGIOUS STATE PROPERLY CONSISTS
(In Ten Articles)

We must now consider things pertaining to the religious state: which
consideration will be fourfold. In the first place we shall consider
those things in which the religious state consists chiefly; secondly,
those things which are lawfully befitting to religious; thirdly, the
different kinds of religious orders; fourthly, the entrance into the
religious state.

Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the religious state is perfect?

(2) Whether religious are bound to all the counsels?

(3) Whether voluntary poverty is required for the religious state?

(4) Whether continency is necessary?

(5) Whether obedience is necessary?

(6) Whether it is necessary that these should be the matter of a vow?

(7) Of the sufficiency of these vows;

(8) Of their comparison one with another;

(9) Whether a religious sins mortally whenever he transgresses a
statute of his rule?

(10) Whether, other things being equal, a religious sins more
grievously by the same kind of sin than a secular person?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 1]

Whether Religion Implies a State of Perfection?

Objection 1: It would seem that religion does not imply a state of
perfection. For that which is necessary for salvation does not
seemingly pertain to perfection. But religion is necessary for
salvation, whether because "thereby we are bound (_religamur_) to the
one almighty God," as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55), or because
it takes its name from "our returning (_religimus_) to God Whom we
had lost by neglecting Him" [*Cf. Q. 81, A. 1], according to
Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3). Therefore it would seem that religion
does not denote the state of perfection.

Obj. 2: Further, religion according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii,
53) is that "which offers worship and ceremony to the Divine nature."
Now the offering of worship and ceremony to God would seem to pertain
to the ministry of holy orders rather than to the diversity of
states, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 2; Q. 183, A. 3). Therefore it
would seem that religion does not denote the state of perfection.

Obj. 3: Further, the state of perfection is distinct from the state
of beginners and that of the proficient. But in religion also some
are beginners, and some are proficient. Therefore religion does not
denote the state of perfection.

Obj. 4: Further, religion would seem a place of repentance; for it is
said in the Decrees (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): "The holy synod
orders that any man who has been degraded from the episcopal dignity
to the monastic life and a place of repentance, should by no means
rise again to the episcopate." Now a place of repentance is opposed
to the state of perfection; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. vi) places
penitents in the lowest place, namely among those who are to be
cleansed. Therefore it would seem that religion is not the state of
perfection.

_On the contrary,_ In the Conferences of the Fathers (Collat. i, 7)
abbot Moses speaking of religious says: "We must recognize that we
have to undertake the hunger of fasting, watchings, bodily toil,
privation, reading, and other acts of virtue, in order by these
degrees to mount to the perfection of charity." Now things pertaining
to human acts are specified and denominated from the intention of the
end. Therefore religious belong to the state of perfection.

Moreover Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi) that those who are called
servants of God, by reason of their rendering pure service and
subjection to God, are united to the perfection beloved of Him.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 141, A. 2) that which is
applicable to many things in common is ascribed antonomastically to
that to which it is applicable by way of excellence. Thus the name of
"fortitude" is claimed by the virtue which preserves the firmness of
the mind in regard to most difficult things, and the name of
"temperance," by that virtue which tempers the greatest pleasures.
Now religion as stated above (Q. 81, A. 2; A. 3, ad 2) is a virtue
whereby a man offers something to the service and worship of God.
Wherefore those are called religious antonomastically, who give
themselves up entirely to the divine service, as offering a holocaust
to God. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.): "Some there are who
keep nothing for themselves, but sacrifice to almighty God their
tongue, their senses, their life, and the property they possess." Now
the perfection of man consists in adhering wholly to God, as stated
above (Q. 184, A. 2), and in this sense religion denotes the state of
perfection.

Reply Obj. 1: To offer something to the worship of God is necessary
for salvation, but to offer oneself wholly, and one's possessions to
the worship of God belongs to perfection.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 81, A. 1, ad 1; A. 4, ad 1, 2; Q.
85, A. 3) when we were treating of the virtue of religion, religion
has reference not only to the offering of sacrifices and other like
things that are proper to religion, but also to the acts of all the
virtues which in so far as these are referred to God's service and
honor become acts of religion. Accordingly if a man devotes his whole
life to the divine service, his whole life belongs to religion, and
thus by reason of the religious life that they lead, those who are in
the state of perfection are called religious.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 184, AA. 4, 6) religion denotes the
state of perfection by reason of the end intended. Hence it does not
follow that whoever is in the state of perfection is already perfect,
but that he tends to perfection. Hence Origen commenting on Matt.
19:21, "If thou wilt be perfect," etc., says (Tract. viii in Matth.)
that "he who has exchanged riches for poverty in order to become
perfect does not become perfect at the very moment of giving his
goods to the poor; but from that day the contemplation of God will
begin to lead him to all the virtues." Thus all are not perfect in
religion, but some are beginners, some proficient.

Reply Obj. 4: The religious state was instituted chiefly that we
might obtain perfection by means of certain exercises, whereby the
obstacles to perfect charity are removed. By the removal of the
obstacles of perfect charity, much more are the occasions of sin cut
off, for sin destroys charity altogether. Wherefore since it belongs
to penance to cut out the causes of sin, it follows that the
religious state is a most fitting place for penance. Hence (XXXIII,
qu. ii, cap. Admonere) a man who had killed his wife is counseled to
enter a monastery which is described as "better and lighter," rather
than to do public penance while remaining in the world.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 2]

Whether Every Religious Is Bound to Keep All the Counsels?

Objection 1: It would seem that every religious is bound to keep all
the counsels. For whoever professes a certain state of life is bound
to observe whatever belongs to that state. Now each religious
professes the state of perfection. Therefore every religious is bound
to keep all the counsels that pertain to the state of perfection.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.) that "he who
renounces this world, and does all the good he can, is like one who
has gone out of Egypt and offers sacrifice in the wilderness." Now it
belongs specially to religious to renounce the world. Therefore it
belongs to them also to do all the good they can. and so it would
seem that each of them is bound to fulfil all the counsels.

Obj. 3: Further, if it is not requisite for the state of perfection
to fulfil all the counsels, it would seem enough to fulfil some of
them. But this is false, since some who lead a secular life fulfil
some of the counsels, for instance those who observe continence.
Therefore it would seem that every religious who is in the state of
perfection is bound to fulfil whatever pertains to perfection: and
such are the counsels.

_On the contrary,_ one is not bound, unless one bind oneself, to do
works of supererogation. But every religious does not bind himself to
keep all the counsels, but to certain definite ones, some to some,
others to others. Therefore all are not bound to keep all of them.

_I answer that,_ A thing pertains to perfection in three ways. First,
essentially, and thus, as stated above (Q. 184, A. 3) the perfect
observance of the precepts of charity belongs to perfection.
Secondly, a thing belongs to perfection consequently: such are those
things that result from the perfection of charity, for instance to
bless them that curse you (Luke 6:27), and to keep counsels of a like
kind, which though they be binding as regards the preparedness of the
mind, so that one has to fulfil them when necessity requires; yet are
sometimes fulfilled, without there being any necessity, through
superabundance of charity. Thirdly, a thing belongs to perfection
instrumentally and dispositively, as poverty, continence, abstinence,
and the like.

Now it has been stated (A. 1) that the perfection of charity is the
end of the religious state. And the religious state is a school or
exercise for the attainment of perfection, which men strive to reach
by various practices, just as a physician may use various remedies in
order to heal. But it is evident that for him who works for an end it
is not necessary that he should already have attained the end, but it
is requisite that he should by some means tend thereto. Hence he who
enters the religious state is not bound to have perfect charity, but
he is bound to tend to this, and use his endeavors to have perfect
charity.

For the same reason he is not bound to fulfil those things that
result from the perfection of charity, although he is bound to intend
to fulfil them: against which intention he acts if he contemns them,
wherefore he sins not by omitting them but by contempt of them.

In like manner he is not bound to observe all the practices whereby
perfection may be attained, but only those which are definitely
prescribed to him by the rule which he has professed.

Reply Obj. 1: He who enters religion does not make profession to be
perfect, but he professes to endeavor to attain perfection; even as
he who enters the schools does not profess to have knowledge, but to
study in order to acquire knowledge. Wherefore as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei viii, 2), Pythagoras was unwilling to profess to be a wise
man, but acknowledged himself, "a lover of wisdom." Hence a religious
does not violate his profession if he be not perfect, but only if he
despises to tend to perfection.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as, though all are bound to love God with their
whole heart, yet there is a certain wholeness of perfection which
cannot be omitted without sin, and another wholeness which can be
omitted without sin (Q. 184, A. 2, ad 3), provided there be no
contempt, as stated above (ad 1), so too, all, both religious and
seculars, are bound, in a certain measure, to do whatever good they
can, for to all without exception it is said (Eccles. 9:10):
"Whatsoever thy hand is able to do, do it earnestly." Yet there is a
way of fulfilling this precept, so as to avoid sin, namely if one do
what one can as required by the conditions of one's state of life:
provided there be no contempt of doing better things, which contempt
sets the mind against spiritual progress.

Reply Obj. 3: There are some counsels such that if they be omitted,
man's whole life would be taken up with secular business; for
instance if he have property of his own, or enter the married state,
or do something of the kind that regards the essential vows of
religion themselves; wherefore religious are bound to keep all such
like counsels. Other counsels there are, however, about certain
particular better actions, which can be omitted without one's life
being taken up with secular actions; wherefore there is no need for
religious to be bound to fulfil all of them.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 3]

Whether Poverty Is Required for Religious Perfection?

Objection 1: It would seem that poverty is not required for religious
perfection. For that which it is unlawful to do does not apparently
belong to the state of perfection. But it would seem to be unlawful
for a man to give up all he possesses; since the Apostle (2 Cor.
8:12) lays down the way in which the faithful are to give alms
saying: "If the will be forward, it is accepted according to that
which a man hath," i.e. "you should keep back what you need," and
afterwards he adds (2 Cor. 8:13): "For I mean not that others should
be eased, and you burthened," i.e. "with poverty," according to a
gloss. Moreover a gloss on 1 Tim. 6:8, "Having food, and wherewith to
be covered," says: "Though we brought nothing, and will carry nothing
away, we must not give up these temporal things altogether."
Therefore it seems that voluntary poverty is not requisite for
religious perfection.

Obj. 2: Further, whosoever exposes himself to danger sins. But he who
renounces all he has and embraces voluntary poverty exposes himself
to danger--not only spiritual, according to Prov. 30:9, "Lest perhaps
. . . being compelled by poverty, I should steal and forswear the
name of my God," and Ecclus. 27:1, "Through poverty many have
sinned"--but also corporal, for it is written (Eccles. 7:13): "As
wisdom is a defense, so money is a defense," and the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iv, 1) that "the waste of property appears to be a sort of
ruining of one's self, since thereby man lives." Therefore it would
seem that voluntary poverty is not requisite for the perfection of
religious life.

Obj. 3: Further, "Virtue observes the mean," as stated in _Ethic._
ii, 6. But he who renounces all by voluntary poverty seems to go to
the extreme rather than to observe the mean. Therefore he does not
act virtuously: and so this does not pertain to the perfection of
life.

Obj. 4: Further, the ultimate perfection of man consists in
happiness. Now riches conduce to happiness; for it is written
(Ecclus. 31:8): "Blessed is the rich man that is found without
blemish," and the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) that "riches
contribute instrumentally to happiness." Therefore voluntary poverty
is not requisite for religious perfection.

Obj. 5: Further, the episcopal state is more perfect than the
religious state. But bishops may have property, as stated above (Q.
185, A. 6). Therefore religious may also.

Obj. 6: Further, almsgiving is a work most acceptable to God, and as
Chrysostom says (Hom. ix in Ep. ad Hebr.) "is a most effective remedy
in repentance." Now poverty excludes almsgiving. Therefore it would
seem that poverty does not pertain to religious perfection.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. viii, 26): "There are some of
the righteous who bracing themselves up to lay hold of the very
height of perfection, while they aim at higher objects within,
abandon all things without." Now, as stated above, (AA. 1, 2), it
belongs properly to religious to brace themselves up in order to lay
hold of the very height of perfection. Therefore it belongs to them
to abandon all outward things by voluntary poverty.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the religious state is an
exercise and a school for attaining to the perfection of charity. For
this it is necessary that a man wholly withdraw his affections from
worldly things; since Augustine says (Confess. x, 29), speaking to
God: "Too little doth he love Thee, who loves anything with Thee,
which he loveth not for Thee." Wherefore he says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu.
36) that "greater charity means less cupidity, perfect charity means
no cupidity." Now the possession of worldly things draws a man's mind
to the love of them: hence Augustine says (Ep. xxxi ad Paulin. et
Theras.) that "we are more firmly attached to earthly things when we
have them than when we desire them: since why did that young man go
away sad, save because he had great wealth? For it is one thing not
to wish to lay hold of what one has not, and another to renounce what
one already has; the former are rejected as foreign to us, the latter
are cut off as a limb." And Chrysostom says (Hom. lxiii in Matth.)
that "the possession of wealth kindles a greater flame and the desire
for it becomes stronger."

Hence it is that in the attainment of the perfection of charity the
first foundation is voluntary poverty, whereby a man lives without
property of his own, according to the saying of our Lord (Matt.
19:21), "If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou
hast, and give to the poor . . . and come, follow Me."

Reply Obj. 1: As the gloss adds, "when the Apostle said this (namely
'not that you should be burthened,' i.e. with poverty)," he did not
mean that "it were better not to give: but he feared for the weak,
whom he admonished so to give as not to suffer privation." Hence in
like manner the other gloss means not that it is unlawful to renounce
all one's temporal goods, but that this is not required of necessity.
Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 30): "Our Lord does not wish,"
namely does not command us "to pour out our wealth all at once, but
to dispense it; or perhaps to do as did Eliseus who slew his oxen,
and fed the poor with that which was his own so that no household
care might hold him back."

Reply Obj. 2: He who renounces all his possessions for Christ's sake
exposes himself to no danger, neither spiritual nor corporal. For
spiritual danger ensues from poverty when the latter is not
voluntary; because those who are unwillingly poor, through the desire
of money-getting, fall into many sins, according to 1 Tim. 6:9, "They
that will become rich, fall into temptation and into the snare of the
devil." This attachment is put away by those who embrace voluntary
poverty, but it gathers strength in those who have wealth, as stated
above. Again bodily danger does not threaten those who, intent on
following Christ, renounce all their possessions and entrust
themselves to divine providence. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom.
in Monte ii, 17): "Those who seek first the kingdom of God and His
justice are not weighed down by anxiety lest they lack what is
necessary."

Reply Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), the mean
of virtue is taken according to right reason, not according to the
quantity of a thing. Consequently whatever may be done in accordance
with right reason is not rendered sinful by the greatness of the
quantity, but all the more virtuous. It would, however, be against
right reason to throw away all one's possessions through
intemperance, or without any useful purpose; whereas it is in
accordance with right reason to renounce wealth in order to devote
oneself to the contemplation of wisdom. Even certain philosophers are
said to have done this; for Jerome says (Ep. xlviii ad Paulin.): "The
famous Theban, Crates, once a very wealthy man, when he was going to
Athens to study philosophy, cast away a large amount of gold; for he
considered that he could not possess both gold and virtue at the same
time." Much more therefore is it according to right reason for a man
to renounce all he has, in order perfectly to follow Christ.
Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rust. Monach.): "Poor thyself,
follow Christ poor."

Reply Obj. 4: Happiness or felicity is twofold. One is perfect, to
which we look forward in the life to come; the other is imperfect, in
respect of which some are said to be happy in this life. The
happiness of this life is twofold, one is according to the active
life, the other according to the contemplative life, as the
Philosopher asserts (Ethic. x, 7, 8). Now wealth conduces
instrumentally to the happiness of the active life which consists in
external actions, because as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) "we
do many things by friends, by riches, by political influence, as it
were by instruments." On the other hand, it does not conduce to the
happiness of the contemplative life, rather is it an obstacle
thereto, inasmuch as the anxiety it involves disturbs the quiet of
the soul, which is most necessary to one who contemplates. Hence it
is that the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. x, 8) that "for actions many
things are needed, but the contemplative man needs no such things,"
namely external goods, "for his operation; in fact they are obstacles
to his contemplation."

Man is directed to future happiness by charity; and since voluntary
poverty is an efficient exercise for the attaining of perfect
charity, it follows that it is of great avail in acquiring the
happiness of heaven. Wherefore our Lord said (Matt. 19:21): "Go, sell
all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt
have treasure in heaven." Now riches once they are possessed are in
themselves of a nature to hinder the perfection of charity,
especially by enticing and distracting the mind. Hence it is written
(Matt. 13:22) that "the care of this world and the deceitfulness of
riches choketh up the word" of God, for as Gregory says (Hom. xv in
Ev.) by "preventing the good desire from entering into the heart,
they destroy life at its very outset." Consequently it is difficult
to safeguard charity amidst riches: wherefore our Lord said (Matt.
19:23) that "a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of
heaven," which we must understand as referring to one who actually
has wealth, since He says that this is impossible for him who places
his affection in riches, according to the explanation of Chrysostom
(Hom. lxiii in Matth.), for He adds (Matt. 19:24): "It is easier for
a camel to pass through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to
enter into the kingdom of heaven." Hence it is not said simply that
the "rich man" is blessed, but "the rich man that is found without
blemish, and that hath not gone after gold," and this because he has
done a difficult thing, wherefore the text continues (Matt. 19:9):
"Who is he? and we will praise him; for he hath done wonderful things
in his life," namely by not loving riches though placed in the midst
of them.

Reply Obj. 5: The episcopal state is not directed to the attainment
of perfection, but rather to the effect that, in virtue of the
perfection which he already has, a man may govern others, by
administering not only spiritual but also temporal things. This
belongs to the active life, wherein many things occur that may be
done by means of wealth as an instrument, as stated (ad 4). Wherefore
it is not required of bishops, who make profession of governing
Christ's flock, that they have nothing of their own, whereas it is
required of religious who make profession of learning to obtain
perfection.

Reply Obj. 6: The renouncement of one's own wealth is compared to
almsgiving as the universal to the particular, and as the holocaust
to the sacrifice. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.) that those
who assist "the needy with the things they possess, by their good
deeds offer sacrifice, since they offer up something to God and keep
back something for themselves; whereas those who keep nothing for
themselves offer a holocaust which is greater than a sacrifice."
Wherefore Jerome also says (Contra Vigilant.): "When you declare that
those do better who retain the use of their possessions, and dole out
the fruits of their possessions to the poor, it is not I but the Lord
Who answers you; If thou wilt be perfect," etc., and afterwards he
goes on to say: "This man whom you praise belongs to the second and
third degree, and we too commend him: provided we acknowledge the
first as to be preferred to the second and third." For this reason in
order to exclude the error of Vigilantius it is said (De Eccl. Dogm.
xxxviii): "It is a good thing to give away one's goods by dispensing
them to the poor: it is better to give them away once for all with
the intention of following the Lord, and, free of solicitude, to be
poor with Christ."
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 4]

Whether Perpetual Continence Is Required for Religious Perfection?

Objection 1: It would seem that perpetual continence is not required
for religious perfection. For all perfection of the Christian life
began with Christ's apostles. Now the apostles do not appear to have
observed continence, as evidenced by Peter, of whose mother-in-law we
read Matt. 8:14. Therefore it would seem that perpetual continence is
not requisite for religious perfection.

Obj. 2: Further, the first example of perfection is shown to us in
the person of Abraham, to whom the Lord said (Gen. 17:1): "Walk
before Me, and be perfect." Now the copy should not surpass the
example. Therefore perpetual continence is not requisite for
religious perfection.

Obj. 3: Further, that which is required for religious perfection is
to be found in every religious order. Now there are some religious
who lead a married life. Therefore religious perfection does not
require perpetual continence.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:1): "Let us cleanse
ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit,
perfecting sanctification in the fear of God." Now cleanness of flesh
and spirit is safeguarded by continence, for it is said (1 Cor.
7:34): "The unmarried woman and the virgin thinketh on the things of
the Lord that she may be holy both in spirit and in body [Vulg.:
'both in body and in spirit']." Therefore religious perfection
requires continence.

_I answer that,_ The religious state requires the removal of whatever
hinders man from devoting himself entirely to God's service. Now the
use of sexual union hinders the mind from giving itself wholly to the
service of God, and this for two reasons. First, on account of its
vehement delectation, which by frequent repetition increases
concupiscence, as also the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii, 12): and
hence it is that the use of venery withdraws the mind from that
perfect intentness on tending to God. Augustine expresses this when
he says (Solil. i, 10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the
manly mind from its height as the fondling of women, and those bodily
contacts which belong to the married state." Secondly, because it
involves man in solicitude for the control of his wife, his children,
and his temporalities which serve for their upkeep. Hence the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 7:32, 33): "He that is without a wife is solicitous for
the things that belong to the Lord, how he may please God: but he
that is with a wife is solicitous for the things of the world, how he
may please his wife."

Therefore perpetual continence, as well as voluntary poverty, is
requisite for religious perfection. Wherefore just as Vigilantius was
condemned for equaling riches to poverty, so was Jovinian condemned
for equaling marriage to virginity.

Reply Obj. 1: The perfection not only of poverty but also of
continence was introduced by Christ Who said (Matt. 19:12): "There
are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs, for the kingdom of
heaven," and then added: "He that can take, let him take it." And
lest anyone should be deprived of the hope of attaining perfection,
he admitted to the state of perfection those even who were married.
Now the husbands could not without committing an injustice forsake
their wives, whereas men could without injustice renounce riches.
Wherefore Peter whom He found married, He severed not from his wife,
while "He withheld from marriage John who wished to marry" [*Prolog.
in Joan. among the supposititious works of St. Jerome].

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxii), "the chastity
of celibacy is better than the chastity of marriage, one of which
Abraham had in use, both of them in habit. For he lived chastely, and
he might have been chaste without marrying, but it was not requisite
then." Nevertheless if the patriarchs of old had perfection of mind
together with wealth and marriage, which is a mark of the greatness
of their virtue, this is no reason why any weaker person should
presume to have such great virtue that he can attain to perfection
though rich and married; as neither does a man unarmed presume to
attack his enemy, because Samson slew many foes with the jaw-bone of
an ass. For those fathers, had it been seasonable to observe
continence and poverty, would have been most careful to observe them.

Reply Obj. 3: Such ways of living as admit of the use of marriage are
not the religious life simply and absolutely speaking, but in a
restricted sense, in so far as they have a certain share in those
things that belong to the religious state.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 5]

Whether Obedience Belongs to Religious Perfection?

Objection 1: It would seem that obedience does not belong to
religious perfection. For those things seemingly belong to religious
perfection, which are works of supererogation and are not binding
upon all. But all are bound to obey their superiors, according to the
saying of the Apostle (Heb. 13:17), "Obey your prelates, and be
subject to them." Therefore it would seem that obedience does not
belong to religious perfection.

Obj. 2: Further, obedience would seem to belong properly to those who
have to be guided by the sense of others, and such persons are
lacking in discernment. Now the Apostle says (Heb. 5:14) that "strong
meat is for the perfect, for them who by custom have their senses
exercised to the discerning of good and evil." Therefore it would
seem that obedience does not belong to the state of the perfect.

Obj. 3: Further, if obedience were requisite for religious
perfection, it would follow that it is befitting to all religious.
But it is not becoming to all; since some religious lead a solitary
life, and have no superior whom they obey. Again religious superiors
apparently are not bound to obedience. Therefore obedience would seem
not to pertain to religious perfection.

Obj. 4: Further, if the vow of obedience were requisite for religion,
it would follow that religious are bound to obey their superiors in
all things, just as they are bound to abstain from all venery by
their vow of continence. But they are not bound to obey them in all
things, as stated above (Q. 104, A. 5), when we were treating of the
virtue of obedience. Therefore the vow of obedience is not requisite
for religion.

Obj. 5: Further, those services are most acceptable to God which are
done freely and not of necessity, according to 2 Cor. 9:7, "Not with
sadness or of necessity." Now that which is done out of obedience is
done of necessity of precept. Therefore those good works are more
deserving of praise which are done of one's own accord. Therefore the
vow of obedience is unbecoming to religion whereby men seek to attain
to that which is better.

_On the contrary,_ Religious perfection consists chiefly in the
imitation of Christ, according to Matt. 19:21, "If thou wilt be
perfect, go sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor,
and follow Me." Now in Christ obedience is commended above all
according to Phil. 2:8, "He became [Vulg.: 'becoming'] obedient unto
death." Therefore seemingly obedience belongs to religious perfection.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 2, 3) the religious state is a
school and exercise for tending to perfection. Now those who are
being instructed or exercised in order to attain a certain end must
needs follow the direction of someone under whose control they are
instructed or exercised so as to attain that end as disciples under a
master. Hence religious need to be placed under the instruction and
command of someone as regards things pertaining to the religious
life; wherefore it is said (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): "The
monastic life denotes subjection and discipleship." Now one man is
subjected to another's command and instruction by obedience: and
consequently obedience is requisite for religious perfection.

Reply Obj. 1: To obey one's superiors in matters that are essential
to virtue is not a work of supererogation, but is common to all:
whereas to obey in matters pertaining to the practice of perfection
belongs properly to religious. This latter obedience is compared to
the former as the universal to the particular. For those who live in
the world, keep something for themselves, and offer something to God;
and in the latter respect they are under obedience to their
superiors: whereas those who live in religion give themselves wholly
and their possessions to God, as stated above (AA. 1, 3). Hence their
obedience is universal.

Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1, 2), by
performing actions we contract certain habits, and when we have
acquired the habit we are best able to perform the actions.
Accordingly those who have not attained to perfection, acquire
perfection by obeying, while those who have already acquired
perfection are most ready to obey, not as though they need to be
directed to the acquisition of perfection, but as maintaining
themselves by this means in that which belongs to perfection.

Reply Obj. 3: The subjection of religious is chiefly in reference to
bishops, who are compared to them as perfecters to perfected, as
Dionysius states (Eccl. Hier. vi), where he also says that the
"monastic order is subjected to the perfecting virtues of the
bishops, and is taught by their godlike enlightenment." Hence neither
hermits nor religious superiors are exempt from obedience to bishops;
and if they be wholly or partly exempt from obedience to the bishop
of the diocese, they are nevertheless bound to obey the Sovereign
Pontiff, not only in matters affecting all in common, but also in
those which pertain specially to religious discipline.

Reply Obj. 4: The vow of obedience taken by religious, extends to the
disposition of a man's whole life, and in this way it has a certain
universality, although it does not extend to all individual acts. For
some of these do not belong to religion, through not being of those
things that concern the love of God and of our neighbor, such as
rubbing one's beard, lifting a stick from the ground and so forth,
which do not come under a vow nor under obedience; and some are
contrary to religion. Nor is there any comparison with continence
whereby acts are excluded which are altogether contrary to religion.

Reply Obj. 5: The necessity of coercion makes an act involuntary and
consequently deprives it of the character of praise or merit; whereas
the necessity which is consequent upon obedience is a necessity not
of coercion but of a free will, inasmuch as a man is willing to obey,
although perhaps he would not be willing to do the thing commanded
considered in itself. Wherefore since by the vow of obedience a man
lays himself under the necessity of doing for God's sake certain
things that are not pleasing in themselves, for this very reason that
which he does is the more acceptable to God, though it be of less
account, because man can give nothing greater to God, than by
subjecting his will to another man's for God's sake. Hence in the
Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xviii, 7) it is stated that "the
Sarabaitae are the worst class of monks, because through providing
for their own needs without being subject to superiors, they are free
to do as they will; and yet day and night they are more busily
occupied in work than those who live in monasteries."
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 6]

Whether It Is Requisite for Religious Perfection That Poverty,
Continence, and Obedience Should Come Under a Vow?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not requisite for religious
perfection that the three aforesaid, namely poverty, continence, and
obedience, should come under a vow. For the school of perfection is
founded on the principles laid down by our Lord. Now our Lord in
formulating perfection (Matt. 19:21) said: "If thou wilt be perfect,
go, sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor,"
without any mention of a vow. Therefore it would seem that a vow is
not necessary for the school of religion.

Obj. 2: Further, a vow is a promise made to God, wherefore (Eccles.
5:3) the wise man after saying: "If thou hast vowed anything to God,
defer not to pay it," adds at once, "for an unfaithful and foolish
promise displeaseth Him." But when a thing is being actually given
there is no need for a promise. Therefore it suffices for religious
perfection that one keep poverty, continence, and obedience without.
vowing them.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Ad Pollent., de Adult. Conjug. i,
14): "The services we render are more pleasing when we might lawfully
not render them, yet do so out of love." Now it is lawful not to
render a service which we have not vowed, whereas it is unlawful if
we have vowed to render it. Therefore seemingly it is more pleasing
to God to keep poverty, continence, and obedience without a vow.
Therefore a vow is not requisite for religious perfection.

_On the contrary,_ In the Old Law the Nazareans were consecrated by
vow according to Num. 6:2, "When a man or woman shall make a vow to
be sanctified and will consecrate themselves to the Lord," etc. Now
these were a figure of those "who attain the summit of perfection,"
as a gloss [*Cf. Moral. ii] of Gregory states. Therefore a vow is
requisite for religious perfection.

_I answer that,_ It belongs to religious to be in the state of
perfection, as shown above (Q. 174, A. 5). Now the state of
perfection requires an obligation to whatever belongs to perfection:
and this obligation consists in binding oneself to God by means of a
vow. But it is evident from what has been said (AA. 3, 4, 5) that
poverty, continence, and obedience belong to the perfection of the
Christian life. Consequently the religious state requires that one be
bound to these three by vow. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.):
"When a man vows to God all his possessions, all his life, all his
knowledge, it is a holocaust"; and afterwards he says that this
refers to those who renounce the present world.

Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord declared that it belongs to the perfection of
life that a man follow Him, not anyhow, but in such a way as not to
turn back. Wherefore He says again (Luke 9:62): "No man putting his
hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God."
And though some of His disciples went back, yet when our Lord asked
(John 6:68, 69), "Will you also go away?" Peter answered for the
others: "Lord, to whom shall we go?" Hence Augustine says (De
Consensu Ev. ii, 17) that "as Matthew and Mark relate, Peter and
Andrew followed Him after drawing their boats on to the beach, not as
though they purposed to return, but as following Him at His command."
Now this unwavering following of Christ is made fast by a vow:
wherefore a vow is requisite for religious perfection.

Reply Obj. 2: As Gregory says (Moral. ii) religious perfection
requires that a man give "his whole life" to God. But a man cannot
actually give God his whole life, because that life taken as a whole
is not simultaneous but successive. Hence a man cannot give his whole
life to God otherwise than by the obligation of a vow.

Reply Obj. 3: Among other services that we can lawfully give, is our
liberty, which is dearer to man than aught else. Consequently when a
man of his own accord deprives himself by vow of the liberty of
abstaining from things pertaining to God's service, this is most
acceptable to God. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii ad Paulin. et
Arment.): "Repent not of thy vow; rejoice rather that thou canst no
longer do lawfully, what thou mightest have done lawfully but to thy
own cost. Happy the obligation that compels to better things."
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 7]

Whether It Is Right to Say That Religious Perfection Consists in
These Three Vows?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not right to say that religious
perfection consists in these three vows. For the perfection of life
consists of inward rather than of outward acts, according to Rom.
14:17, "The Kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but justice and
peace and joy in the Holy Ghost." Now the religious vow binds a man
to things belonging to perfection. Therefore vows of inward actions,
such as contemplation, love of God and our neighbor, and so forth,
should pertain to the religious state, rather than the vows of
poverty, continence, and obedience which refer to outward actions.

Obj. 2: Further, the three aforesaid come under the religious vow, in
so far as they belong to the practice of tending to perfection. But
there are many other things that religious practice, such as
abstinence, watchings, and the like. Therefore it would seem that
these three vows are incorrectly described as pertaining to the state
of perfection.

Obj. 3: Further, by the vow of obedience a man is bound to do
according to his superior's command whatever pertains to the practice
of perfection. Therefore the vow of obedience suffices without the
two other vows.

Obj. 4: Further, external goods comprise not only riches but also
honors. Therefore, if religious, by the vow of poverty, renounce
earthly riches, there should be another vow whereby they may despise
worldly honors.

_On the contrary,_ It is stated (Extra, de Statu Monach., cap. Cum ad
monasterium) that "the keeping of chastity and the renouncing of
property are affixed to the monastic rule."

_I answer that,_ The religious state may be considered in three ways.
First, as being a practice of tending to the perfection of charity:
secondly, as quieting the human mind from outward solicitude,
according to 1 Cor. 7:32: "I would have you to be without
solicitude": thirdly, as a holocaust whereby a man offers himself and
his possessions wholly to God; and in corresponding manner the
religious state is constituted by these three vows.

First, as regards the practice of perfection a man is required to
remove from himself whatever may hinder his affections from tending
wholly to God, for it is in this that the perfection of charity
consists. Such hindrances are of three kinds. First, the attachment
to external goods, which is removed by the vow of poverty; secondly,
the concupiscence of sensible pleasures, chief among which are
venereal pleasures, and these are removed by the vow of continence;
thirdly, the inordinateness of the human will, and this is removed by
the vow of obedience. In like manner the disquiet of worldly
solicitude is aroused in man in reference especially to three things.
First, as regards the dispensing of external things, and this
solicitude is removed from man by the vow of poverty; secondly, as
regards the control of wife and children, which is cut away by the
vow of continence; thirdly, as regards the disposal of one's own
actions, which is eliminated by the vow of obedience, whereby a man
commits himself to the disposal of another.

Again, "a holocaust is the offering to God of all that one has,"
according to Gregory (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Now man has a threefold
good, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 8). First, the good of
external things, which he wholly offers to God by the vow of
voluntary poverty: secondly, the good of his own body, and this good
he offers to God especially by the vow of continence, whereby he
renounces the greatest bodily pleasures. The third is the good of the
soul, which man wholly offers to God by the vow of obedience, whereby
he offers God his own will by which he makes use of all the powers
and habits of the soul. Therefore the religious state is fittingly
constituted by the three vows.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 1), the end whereunto the religious
vow is directed is the perfection of charity, since all the interior
acts of virtue belong to charity as to their mother, according to 1
Cor. 13:4, "Charity is patient, is kind," etc. Hence the interior
acts of virtue, for instance humility, patience, and so forth, do not
come under the religious vow, but this is directed to them as its end.

Reply Obj. 2: All other religious observances are directed to the
three aforesaid principal vows; for if any of them are ordained for
the purpose of procuring a livelihood, such as labor, questing, and
so on, they are to be referred to poverty; for the safeguarding of
which religious seek a livelihood by these means. Other observances
whereby the body is chastised, such as watching, fasting, and the
like, are directly ordained for the observance of the vow of
continence. And such religious observances as regard human actions
whereby a man is directed to the end of religion, namely the love of
God and his neighbor (such as reading, prayer, visiting the sick, and
the like), are comprised under the vow of obedience that applies to
the will, which directs its actions to the end according to the
ordering of another person. The distinction of habit belongs to all
three vows, as a sign of being bound by them: wherefore the religious
habit is given or blessed at the time of profession.

Reply Obj. 3: By obedience a man offers to God his will, to which
though all human affairs are subject, yet some are subject to it
alone in a special manner, namely human actions, since passions
belong also to the sensitive appetite. Wherefore in order to restrain
the passions of carnal pleasures and of external objects of appetite,
which hinder the perfection of life, there was need for the vows of
continence and poverty; but for the ordering of one's own actions
accordingly as the state of perfection requires, there was need for
the vow of obedience.

Reply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), strictly and
truly speaking honor is not due save to virtue. Since, however,
external goods serve instrumentally for certain acts of virtue, the
consequence is that a certain honor is given to their excellence
especially by the common people who acknowledge none but outward
excellence. Therefore since religious tend to the perfection of
virtue it becomes them not to renounce the honor which God and all
holy men accord to virtue, according to Ps. 138:17, "But to me Thy
friends, O God, are made exceedingly honorable." On the other hand,
they renounce the honor that is given to outward excellence, by the
very fact that they withdraw from a worldly life: hence no special
vow is needed for this.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 8]

Whether the Vow of Obedience Is the Chief of the Three Religious Vows?

Objection 1: It would seem that the vow of obedience is not the chief
of the three religious vows. For the perfection of the religious life
was inaugurated by Christ. Now Christ gave a special counsel of
poverty; whereas He is not stated to have given a special counsel of
obedience. Therefore the vow of poverty is greater than the vow of
obedience.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 26:20) that "no price is
worthy of a continent soul." Now the vow of that which is more worthy
is itself more excellent. Therefore the vow of continence is more
excellent than the vow of obedience.

Obj. 3: Further, the greater a vow the more indispensable it would
seem to be. Now the vows of poverty and continence "are so
inseparable from the monastic rule, that not even the Sovereign
Pontiff can allow them to be broken," according to a Decretal (De
Statu Monach., cap. Cum ad monasterium): yet he can dispense a
religious from obeying his superior. Therefore it would seem that the
vow of obedience is less than the vow of poverty and continence.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxv, 14): "Obedience is
rightly placed before victims, since by victims another's flesh, but
by obedience one's own will, is sacrificed." Now the religious vows
are holocausts, as stated above (AA. 1, 3, ad 6). Therefore the vow
of obedience is the chief of all religious vows.

_I answer that,_ The vow of obedience is the chief of the three
religious vows, and this for three reasons.

First, because by the vow of obedience man offers God something
greater, namely his own will; for this is of more account than his
own body, which he offers God by continence, and than external
things, which he offers God by the vow of poverty. Wherefore that
which is done out of obedience is more acceptable to God than that
which is done of one's own will, according to the saying of Jerome
(Ep. cxxv ad Rustic Monach.): "My words are intended to teach you not
to rely on your own judgment": and a little further on he says: "You
may not do what you will; you must eat what you are bidden to eat,
you may possess as much as you receive, clothe yourself with what is
given to you." Hence fasting is not acceptable to God if it is done
of one's own will, according to Isa. 58:3, "Behold in the day of your
fast your own will is found."

Secondly, because the vow of obedience includes the other vows, but
not vice versa: for a religious, though bound by vow to observe
continence and poverty, yet these also come under obedience, as well
as many other things besides the keeping of continence and poverty.

Thirdly, because the vow of obedience extends properly to those acts
that are closely connected with the end of religion; and the more
closely a thing is connected with the end, the better it is.

It follows from this that the vow of obedience is more essential to
the religious life. For if a man without taking a vow of obedience
were to observe, even by vow, voluntary poverty and continence, he
would not therefore belong to the religious state, which is to be
preferred to virginity observed even by vow; for Augustine says (De
Virgin. xlvi): "No one, methinks, would prefer virginity to the
monastic life." [*St. Augustine wrote not _monasterio_ but
_martyrio_--to "martyrdom"; and St. Thomas quotes the passage
correctly above, Q. 124, A. 3, and Q. 152, A. 5].

Reply Obj. 1: The counsel of obedience was included in the very
following of Christ, since to obey is to follow another's will.
Consequently it is more pertinent to perfection than the vow of
poverty, because as Jerome, commenting on Matt. 19:27, "Behold we
have left all things," observes, "Peter added that which is perfect
when he said: And have followed Thee."

Reply Obj. 2: The words quoted mean that continence is to be
preferred, not to all other acts of virtue, but to conjugal chastity,
or to external riches of gold and silver which are measured by weight
[*_Pondere,_ referring to the Latin _ponderatio_ in the Vulgate,
which the Douay version renders "price."]. Or again continence is
taken in a general sense for abstinence from all evil, as stated
above (Q. 155, A. 4, ad 1).

Reply Obj. 3: The Pope cannot dispense a religious from his vow of
obedience so as to release him from obedience to every superior in
matters relating to the perfection of life, for he cannot exempt him
from obedience to himself. He can, however, exempt him from
subjection to a lower superior, but this is not to dispense him from
his vow of obedience.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 9]

Whether a Religious Sins Mortally Whenever He Transgresses the Things
Contained in His Rule?

Objection 1: It would seem that a religious sins mortally whenever he
transgresses the things contained in his rule. For to break a vow is
a sin worthy of condemnation, as appears from 1 Tim. 5:11, 12, where
the Apostle says that widows who "will marry have [Vulg.: 'having']
damnation, because they have made void their first faith." But
religious are bound to a rule by the vows of their profession.
Therefore they sin mortally by transgressing the things contained in
their rule.

Obj. 2: Further, the rule is enjoined upon a religious in the same
way as a law. Now he who transgresses a precept of law sins mortally.
Therefore it would seem that a monk sins mortally if he transgresses
the things contained in his rule.

Obj. 3: Further, contempt involves a mortal sin. Now whoever
repeatedly does what he ought not to do seems to sin from contempt.
Therefore it would seem that a religious sins mortally by frequently
transgressing the things contained in his rule.

_On the contrary,_ The religious state is safer than the secular
state; wherefore Gregory at the beginning of his Morals [*Epist.
Missoria, ad Leand. Episc. i] compares the secular life to the stormy
sea, and the religious life to the calm port. But if every
transgression of the things contained in his rule were to involve a
religious in mortal sin, the religious life would be fraught with
danger of account of its multitude of observances. Therefore not
every transgression of the things contained in the rule is a mortal
sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 1, 2), a thing is
contained in the rule in two ways. First, as the end of the rule, for
instance things that pertain to the acts of the virtues; and the
transgression of these, as regards those which come under a common
precept, involves a mortal sin; but as regards those which are not
included in the common obligation of a precept, the transgression
thereof does not involve a mortal sin, except by reason of contempt,
because, as stated above (A. 2), a religious is not bound to be
perfect, but to tend to perfection, to which the contempt of
perfection is opposed.

Secondly, a thing is contained in the rule through pertaining to the
outward practice, such as all external observances, to some of which
a religious is bound by the vow of his profession. Now the vow of
profession regards chiefly the three things aforesaid, namely
poverty, continence, and obedience, while all others are directed to
these. Consequently the transgression of these three involves a
mortal sin, while the transgression of the others does not involve a
mortal sin, except either by reason of contempt of the rule (since
this is directly contrary to the profession whereby a man vows to
live according to the rule), or by reason of a precept, whether given
orally by a superior, or expressed in the rule, since this would be
to act contrary to the vow of obedience.

Reply Obj. 1: He who professes a rule does not vow to observe all the
things contained in the rule, but he vows the regular life which
consists essentially in the three aforesaid things. Hence in certain
religious orders precaution is taken to profess, not the rule, but to
live according to the rule, i.e. to tend to form one's conduct in
accordance with the rule as a kind of model; and this is set aside by
contempt. Yet greater precaution is observed in some religious orders
by professing obedience according to the rule, so that only that
which is contrary to a precept of the rule is contrary to the
profession, while the transgression or omission of other things binds
only under pain of venial sin, because, as stated above (A. 7, ad 2),
such things are dispositions to the chief vows. And venial sin is a
disposition to mortal, as stated above (I-II, Q. 88, A. 3), inasmuch
as it hinders those things whereby a man is disposed to keep the
chief precepts of Christ's law, namely the precepts of charity.

There is also a religious order, that of the Friars Preachers, where
such like transgressions or omissions do not, by their very nature,
involve sin, either mortal or venial; but they bind one to suffer the
punishment affixed thereto, because it is in this way that they are
bound to observe such things. Nevertheless they may sin venially or
mortally through neglect, concupiscence, or contempt.

Reply Obj. 2: Not all the contents of the law are set forth by way of
precept; for some are expressed under the form of ordinance or
statute binding under pain of a fixed punishment. Accordingly, just
as in the civil law the transgression of a legal statute does not
always render a man deserving of bodily death, so neither in the law
of the Church does every ordinance or statute bind under mortal sin;
and the same applies to the statutes of the rule.

Reply Obj. 3: An action or transgression proceeds from contempt when
a man's will refuses to submit to the ordinance of the law or rule,
and from this he proceeds to act against the law or rule. On the
other hand, he does not sin from contempt, but from some other cause,
when he is led to do something against the ordinance of the law or
rule through some particular cause such as concupiscence or anger,
even though he often repeat the same kind of sin through the same or
some other cause. Thus Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that
"not all sins are committed through proud contempt." Nevertheless the
frequent repetition of a sin leads dispositively to contempt,
according to the words of Prov. 18:3, "The wicked man, when he is
come into the depth of sins, contemneth."
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 186, Art. 10]

Whether a Religious Sins More Grievously Than a Secular by the Same
Kind of Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that a religious does not sin more
grievously than a secular by the same kind of sin. For it is written
(2 Paralip. 30:18, 19): "The Lord Who is good will show mercy to all
them who with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their
fathers, and will not impute it to them that they are not
sanctified." Now religious apparently follow the Lord the God of
their fathers with their whole heart rather than seculars, who partly
give themselves and their possessions to God and reserve part for
themselves, as Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Therefore it would
seem that it is less imputed to them if they fall short somewhat of
their sanctification.

Obj. 2: Further, God is less angered at a man's sins if he does some
good deeds, according to 2 Paralip. 19:2, 3, "Thou helpest the
ungodly, and thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the
Lord, and therefore thou didst deserve indeed the wrath of the Lord:
but good works are found in thee." Now religious do more good works
than seculars. Therefore if they commit any sins, God is less angry
with them.

Obj. 3: Further, this present life is not carried through without
sin, according to James 3:2, "In many things we all offend."
Therefore if the sins of religious were more grievous than those of
seculars it would follow that religious are worse off than seculars:
and consequently it would not be a wholesome counsel to enter
religion.

_On the contrary,_ The greater the evil the more it would seem to be
deplored. But seemingly the sins of those who are in the state of
holiness and perfection are the most deplorable, for it is written
(Jer. 23:9): "My heart is broken within me," and afterwards (Jer.
23:11): "For the prophet and the priest are defiled; and in My house
I have found their wickedness." Therefore religious and others who
are in the state of perfection, other things being equal, sin more
grievously.

_I answer that,_ A sin committed by a religious may be in three ways
more grievous than a like sin committed by a secular. First, if it be
against his religious vow; for instance if he be guilty of
fornication or theft, because by fornication he acts against the vow
of continence, and by theft against the vow of poverty; and not
merely against a precept of the divine law. Secondly, if he sin out
of contempt, because thereby he would seem to be the more ungrateful
for the divine favors which have raised him to the state of
perfection. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. 10:29) that the believer
"deserveth worse punishments" who through contempt tramples under
foot the Son of God. Hence the Lord complains (Jer. 11:15): "What is
the meaning that My beloved hath wrought much wickedness in My
house?" Thirdly, the sin of a religious may be greater on account of
scandal, because many take note of his manner of life: wherefore it
is written (Jer. 23:14): "I have seen the likeness of adulterers, and
the way of lying in the Prophets of Jerusalem; and they strengthened
the hands of the wicked, that no man should return from his evil
doings."

On the other hand, if a religious, not out of contempt, but out of
weakness or ignorance, commit a sin that is not against the vow of
his profession, without giving scandal (for instance if he commit it
in secret) he sins less grievously in the same kind of sin than a
secular, because his sin if slight is absorbed as it were by his many
good works, and if it be mortal, he more easily recovers from it.
First, because he has a right intention towards God, and though it be
intercepted for the moment, it is easily restored to its former
object. Hence Origen commenting on Ps. 36:24, "When he shall fall he
shall not be bruised," says (Hom. iv in Ps. 36): "The wicked man, if
he sin, repents not, and fails to make amends for his sin. But the
just man knows how to make amends and recover himself; even as he who
had said: 'I know not the man,' shortly afterwards when the Lord had
looked on him, knew to shed most bitter tears, and he who from the
roof had seen a woman and desired her knew to say: 'I have sinned and
done evil before Thee.'" Secondly, he is assisted by his
fellow-religious to rise again, according to Eccles. 4:10, "If one
fall he shall be supported by the other: woe to him that is alone,
for when he falleth he hath none to lift him up."

Reply Obj. 1: The words quoted refer to things done through weakness
or ignorance, but not to those that are done out of contempt.

Reply Obj. 2: Josaphat also, to whom these words were addressed,
sinned not out of contempt, but out of a certain weakness of human
affection.

Reply Obj. 3: The just sin not easily out of contempt; but sometimes
they fall into a sin through ignorance or weakness from which they
easily arise. If, however, they go so far as to sin out of contempt,
they become most wicked and incorrigible, according to the word of
Jer. 2:20: "Thou hast broken My yoke, thou hast burst My bands, and
thou hast said: 'I will not serve.' For on every high hill and under
every green tree thou didst prostitute thyself." Hence Augustine says
(Ep. lxxviii ad Pleb. Hippon.): "From the time I began to serve God,
even as I scarcely found better men than those who made progress in
monasteries, so have I not found worse than those who in the
monastery have fallen."
_______________________

QUESTION 187

OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE COMPETENT TO RELIGIOUS
(In Six Articles)

We must now consider the things that are competent to religious; and
under this head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is lawful for them to teach, preach, and do like
things?

(2) Whether it is lawful for them to meddle in secular business?

(3) Whether they are bound to manual labor?

(4) Whether it is lawful for them to live on alms?

(5) Whether it is lawful for them to quest?

(6) Whether it is lawful for them to wear coarser clothes than other
persons?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 187, Art. 1]

Whether It Is Lawful for Religious to Teach, Preach, and the Like?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to teach, preach,
and the like. For it is said (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam) in an
ordinance of a synod of Constantinople [*Pseudosynod held by Photius
in the year 879]: "The monastic life is one of subjection and
discipleship, not of teaching, authority, or pastoral care." And
Jerome says (ad Ripar. et Desider. [*Contra Vigilant. xvi]): "A
monk's duty is not to teach but to lament." Again Pope Leo [*Leo I,
Ep. cxx ad Theodoret., 6, cf. XVI, qu. i, can. Adjicimus]: says "Let
none dare to preach save the priests of the Lord, be he monk or
layman, and no matter what knowledge he may boast of having." Now it
is not lawful to exceed the bounds of one's office or transgress the
ordinance of the Church. Therefore seemingly it is unlawful for
religious to teach, preach, and the like.

Obj. 2: Further, in an ordinance of the Council of Nicea (cf. XVI,
qu. i, can. Placuit) it is laid down as follows: "It is our absolute
and peremptory command addressed to all that monks shall not hear
confessions except of one another, as is right, that they shall not
bury the dead except those dwelling with them in the monastery, or if
by chance a brother happen to die while on a visit." But just as the
above belong to the duty of clerics, so also do preaching and
teaching. Therefore since "the business of a monk differs from that
of a cleric," as Jerome says (Ep. xiv ad Heliod.), it would seem
unlawful for religious to preach, teach, and the like.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Regist. v, Ep. 1): "No man can fulfil
ecclesiastical duties, and keep consistently to the monastic rule":
and this is quoted XVI, qu. i, can. Nemo potest. Now monks are bound
to keep consistently to the monastic rule. Therefore it would seem
that they cannot fulfil ecclesiastical duties, whereof teaching and
preaching are a part. Therefore seemingly it is unlawful for them to
preach, teach, and do similar things.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory is quoted (XVI, qu. i, can. Ex
auctoritate) as saying: "By authority of this decree framed in virtue
of our apostolic power and the duty of our office, be it lawful to
monk priests who are configured to the apostles, to preach, baptize,
give communion, pray for sinners, impose penance, and absolve from
sin."

_I answer that,_ A thing is declared to be unlawful to a person in
two ways. First, because there is something in him contrary to that
which is declared unlawful to him: thus to no man is it lawful to
sin, because each man has in himself reason and an obligation to
God's law, to which things sin is contrary. And in this way it is
said to be unlawful for a person to preach, teach, or do like things,
because there is in him something incompatible with these things,
either by reason of a precept--thus those who are irregular by
ordinance of the Church may not be raised to the sacred orders--or by
reason of sin, according to Ps. 49:16, "But to the sinner God hath
said: Why dost thou declare My justice?"

In this way it is not unlawful for religious to preach, teach, and do
like things, both because they are bound neither by vow nor by
precept of their rule to abstain from these things, and because they
are not rendered less apt for these things by any sin committed, but
on the contrary they are the more apt through having taken upon
themselves the practice of holiness. For it is foolish to say that a
man is rendered less fit for spiritual duties through advancing
himself in holiness; and consequently it is foolish to declare that
the religious state is an obstacle to the fulfilment of such like
duties. This error is rejected by Pope Boniface [*Boniface IV] for
the reasons given above. His words which are quoted (XVI, qu. i, can.
Sunt. nonnulli) are these: "There are some who without any dogmatic
proof, and with extreme daring, inspired with a zeal rather of
bitterness than of love, assert that monks though they be dead to the
world and live to God, are unworthy of the power of the priestly
office, and that they cannot confer penance, nor christen, nor
absolve in virtue of the power divinely bestowed on them in the
priestly office. But they are altogether wrong." He proves this first
because it is not contrary to the rule; thus he continues: "For
neither did the Blessed Benedict the saintly teacher of monks forbid
this in any way," nor is it forbidden in other rules. Secondly, he
refutes the above error from the usefulness of the monks, when he
adds at the end of the same chapter: "The more perfect a man is, the
more effective is he in these, namely in spiritual works."

Secondly, a thing is said to be unlawful for a man, not on account of
there being in him something contrary thereto, but because he lacks
that which enables him to do it: thus it is unlawful for a deacon to
say mass, because he is not in priestly orders; and it is unlawful
for a priest to deliver judgment because he lacks the episcopal
authority. Here, however, a distinction must be made. Because those
things which are a matter of an order, cannot be deputed to one who
has not the order, whereas matters of jurisdiction can be deputed to
those who have not ordinary jurisdiction: thus the delivery of a
judgment is deputed by the bishop to a simple priest. In this sense
it is said to be unlawful for monks and other religious to preach,
teach, and so forth, because the religious state does not give them
the power to do these things. They can, however, do them if they
receive orders, or ordinary jurisdiction, or if matters of
jurisdiction be delegated to them.

Reply Obj. 1: It results from the words quoted that the fact of their
being monks does not give monks the power to do these things, yet it
does not involve in them anything contrary to the performance of
these acts.

Reply Obj. 2: Again, this ordinance of the Council of Nicea forbids
monks to claim the power of exercising those acts on the ground of
their being monks, but it does not forbid those acts being delegated
to them.

Reply Obj. 3: These two things are incompatible, namely, the ordinary
cure of ecclesiastical duties, and the observance of the monastic
rule in a monastery. But this does not prevent monks and other
religious from being sometimes occupied with ecclesiastical duties
through being deputed thereto by superiors having ordinary cure;
especially members of religious orders that are especially instituted
for that purpose, as we shall say further on (Q. 188, A. 4).
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 187, Art. 2]

Whether It Is Lawful for Religious to Occupy Themselves with Secular
Business?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to occupy
themselves with secular business. For in the decree quoted above (A.
1) of Pope Boniface it is said that the "Blessed Benedict bade them
to be altogether free from secular business; and this is most
explicitly prescribed by the apostolic doctrine and the teaching of
all the Fathers, not only to religious, but also to all the canonical
clergy,"    according to 2 Tim. 2:4, "No man being a soldier to God,
entangleth himself with secular business." Now it is the duty of all
religious to be soldiers of God. Therefore it is unlawful for them to
occupy themselves with secular business.

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Thess. 4:11): "That you use your
endeavor to be quiet, and that you do your own business," which a
gloss explains thus--"by refraining from other people's affairs, so
as to be the better able to attend to the amendment of your own
life." Now religious devote themselves in a special way to the
amendment of their life. Therefore they should not occupy themselves
with secular business.

Obj. 3: Further, Jerome, commenting on Matt. 11:8, "Behold they that
are clothed in soft garments are in the houses of kings," says:
"Hence we gather that an austere life and severe preaching should
avoid the palaces of kings and the mansions of the voluptuous." But
the needs of secular business induce men to frequent the palaces of
kings. Therefore it is unlawful for religious to occupy themselves
with secular business.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 16:1): "I commend to you
Phoebe our Sister," and further on (Rom. 16:2), "that you assist her
in whatsoever business she shall have need of you."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 186, AA. 1, 7, ad 1), the
religious state is directed to the attainment of the perfection of
charity, consisting principally in the love of God and secondarily in
the love of our neighbor. Consequently that which religious intend
chiefly and for its own sake is to give themselves to God. Yet if
their neighbor be in need, they should attend to his affairs out of
charity, according to Gal. 6:2, "Bear ye one another's burthens: and
so you shall fulfil the law of Christ," since through serving their
neighbor for God's sake, they are obedient to the divine love. Hence
it is written (James 1:27): "Religion clean and undefiled before God
and the Father, is this: to visit the fatherless and widows in their
tribulation," which means, according to a gloss, to assist the
helpless in their time of need.

We must conclude therefore that it is unlawful for either monks or
clerics to carry on secular business from motives of avarice; but
from motives of charity, and with their superior's permission, they
may occupy themselves with due moderation in the administration and
direction of secular business. Wherefore it is said in the Decretals
(Dist. xxxviii, can. Decrevit): "The holy synod decrees that
henceforth no cleric shall buy property or occupy himself with
secular business, save with a view to the care of the fatherless,
orphans, or widows, or when the bishop of the city commands him to
take charge of the business connected with the Church." And the same
applies to religious as to clerics, because they are both debarred
from secular business on the same grounds, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 1: Monks are forbidden to occupy themselves with secular
business from motives of avarice, but not from motives of charity.

Reply Obj. 2: To occupy oneself with secular business on account of
another's need is not officiousness but charity.

Reply Obj. 3: To haunt the palaces of kings from motives of pleasure,
glory, or avarice is not becoming to religious, but there is nothing
unseemly in their visiting them from motives of piety. Hence it is
written (4 Kings 4:13): "Hast thou any business, and wilt thou that I
speak to the king or to the general of the army?" Likewise it becomes
religious to go to the palaces of kings to rebuke and guide them,
even as John the Baptist rebuked Herod, as related in Matt. 14:4.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 187, Art. 3]

Whether Religious Are Bound to Manual Labor?

Objection 1: It would seem that religious are bound to manual labor.
For religious are not exempt from the observance of precepts. Now
manual labor is a matter of precept according to 1 Thess. 4:11, "Work
with your own hands as we commanded you"; wherefore Augustine says
(De oper. Monach. xxx): "But who can allow these insolent men,"
namely religious that do no work, of whom he is speaking there, "who
disregard the most salutary admonishment of the Apostle, not merely
to be borne with as being weaker than others, but even to preach as
though they were holier than others." Therefore it would seem that
religious are bound to manual labor.

Obj. 2: Further, a gloss [*St. Augustine, (De oper. Monach. xxi)] on
2 Thess. 3:10, "If any man will not work, neither let him eat," says:
"Some say that this command of the Apostle refers to spiritual works,
and not to the bodily labor of the farmer or craftsman"; and further
on: "But it is useless for them to try to hide from themselves and
from others the fact that they are unwilling not only to fulfil, but
even to understand the useful admonishments of charity"; and again:
"He wishes God's servants to make a living by working with their
bodies." Now religious especially are called servants of God, because
they give themselves entirely to the service of God, as Dionysius
asserts (Eccl. Hier. vi). Therefore it would seem that they are bound
to manual labor.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xvii): "I would
fain know how they would occupy themselves, who are unwilling to work
with their body. We occupy our time, say they, with prayers, psalms,
reading, and the word of God." Yet these things are no excuse, and he
proves this, as regards each in particular. For in the first place,
as to prayer, he says: "One prayer of the obedient man is sooner
granted than ten thousand prayers of the contemptuous": meaning that
those are contemptuous and unworthy to be heard who work not with
their hands. Secondly, as to the divine praises he adds: "Even while
working with their hands they can easily sing hymns to God." Thirdly,
with regard to reading, he goes on to say: "Those who say they are
occupied in reading, do they not find there what the Apostle
commanded? What sort of perverseness is this, to wish to read but not
to obey what one reads?" Fourthly, he adds in reference to preaching
[*Cap. xviii]: "If one has to speak, and is so busy that he cannot
spare time for manual work, can all in the monastery do this? And
since all cannot do this, why should all make this a pretext for
being exempt? And even if all were able, they should do so by turns,
not only so that the others may be occupied in other works, but also
because it suffices that one speak while many listen." Therefore it
would seem that religious should not desist from manual labor on
account of such like spiritual works to which they devote themselves.

Obj. 4: Further, a gloss on Luke 12:33, "Sell what you possess,"
says: "Not only give your clothes to the poor, but sell what you
possess, that having once for all renounced all your possessions for
the Lord's sake, you may henceforth work with the labor of your
hands, so as to have wherewith to live or to give alms." Now it
belongs properly to religious to renounce all they have. Therefore it
would seem likewise to belong to them to live and give alms through
the labor of their hands.

Obj. 5: Further, religious especially would seem to be bound to
imitate the life of the apostles, since they profess the state of
perfection. Now the apostles worked with their own hands, according
to 1 Cor. 4:12: "We labor, working with our own hands." Therefore it
would seem that religious are bound to manual labor.

_On the contrary,_ Those precepts that are commonly enjoined upon all
are equally binding on religious and seculars. But the precept of
manual labor is enjoined upon all in common, as appears from 2 Thess.
3:6, "Withdraw yourselves from every brother walking disorderly,"
etc. (for by brother he signifies every Christian, according to 1
Cor. 7:12, "If any brother have a wife that believeth not"). Now it
is written in the same passage (2 Thess. 3:10): "If any man will not
work, neither let him eat." Therefore religious are not bound to
manual labor any more than seculars are.

_I answer that,_ Manual labor is directed to four things. First and
principally to obtain food; wherefore it was said to the first man
(Gen. 3:19): "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread," and it
is written (Ps. 127:2): "For thou shalt eat the labors of thy hands."
Secondly, it is directed to the removal of idleness whence arise many
evils; hence it is written (Ecclus. 33:28, 29): "Send" thy slave "to
work, that he be not idle, for idleness hath taught much evil."
Thirdly, it is directed to the curbing of concupiscence, inasmuch as
it is a means of afflicting the body; hence it is written (2 Cor.
6:5, 6): "In labors, in watchings, in fastings, in chastity."
Fourthly, it is directed to almsgiving, wherefore it is written (Eph.
4:28): "He that stole, let him now steal no more; but rather let him
labor, working with his hands the thing which is good, that he may
have something to give to him that suffereth need." Accordingly, in
so far as manual labor is directed to obtaining food, it comes under
a necessity of precept in so far as it is necessary for that end:
since that which is directed to an end derives its necessity from
that end, being, in effect, so far necessary as the end cannot be
obtained without it. Consequently he who has no other means of
livelihood is bound to work with his hands, whatever his condition
may be. This is signified by the words of the Apostle: "If any man
will not work, neither let him eat," as though to say: "The necessity
of manual labor is the necessity of meat." So that if one could live
without eating, one would not be bound to work with one's hands. The
same applies to those who have no other lawful means of livelihood:
since a man is understood to be unable to do what he cannot do
lawfully. Wherefore we find that the Apostle prescribed manual labor
merely as a remedy for the sin of those who gained their livelihood
by unlawful means. For the Apostle ordered manual labor first of all
in order to avoid theft, as appears from Eph. 4:28, "He that stole,
let him now steal no more; but rather let him labor, working with his
hands." Secondly, to avoid the coveting of others' property,
wherefore it is written (1 Thess. 4:11): "Work with your own hands,
as we commanded you, and that you walk honestly towards them that are
without." Thirdly, to avoid the discreditable pursuits whereby some
seek a livelihood. Hence he says (2 Thess. 3:10-12): "When we were
with you, this we declared to you: that if any man will not work,
neither let him eat. For we have heard that there are some among you
who walk disorderly, working not at all, but curiously meddling"
(namely, as a gloss explains it, "who make a living by meddling in
unlawful things). Now we charge them that are such, and beseech them
. . . that working with silence, they would eat their own bread."
Hence Jerome states (Super epist. ad Galat. [*Preface to Bk. ii of
Commentary]) that the Apostle said this "not so much in his capacity
of teacher as on account of the faults of the people."

It must, however, be observed that under manual labor are comprised
all those human occupations whereby man can lawfully gain a
livelihood, whether by using his hands, his feet, or his tongue. For
watchmen, couriers, and such like who live by their labor, are
understood to live by their handiwork: because, since the hand is
"the organ of organs" [*De Anima iii, 8], handiwork denotes all kinds
of work, whereby a man may lawfully gain a livelihood.

In so far as manual labor is directed to the removal of idleness, or
the affliction of the body, it does not come under a necessity of
precept if we consider it in itself, since there are many other means
besides manual labor of afflicting the body or of removing idleness:
for the flesh is afflicted by fastings and watchings, and idleness is
removed by meditation on the Holy Scriptures and by the divine
praises. Hence a gloss on Ps. 118:82, "My eyes have failed for Thy
word," says: "He is not idle who meditates only on God's word; nor is
he who works abroad any better than he who devotes himself to the
study of knowing the truth." Consequently for these reasons religious
are not bound to manual labor, as neither are seculars, except when
they are so bound by the statutes of their order. Thus Jerome says
(Ep. cxxv ad Rustic Monach.): "The Egyptian monasteries are wont to
admit none unless they work or labor, not so much for the necessities
of life, as for the welfare of the soul, lest it be led astray by
wicked thoughts." But in so far as manual labor is directed to
almsgiving, it does not come under the necessity of precept, save
perchance in some particular case, when a man is under an obligation
to give alms, and has no other means of having the wherewithal to
assist the poor: for in such a case religious would be bound as well
as seculars to do manual labor.

Reply Obj. 1: This command of the Apostle is of natural law:
wherefore a gloss on 2 Thess. 3:6, "That you withdraw yourselves from
every brother walking disorderly," says, "otherwise than the natural
order requires," and he is speaking of those who abstained from
manual labor. Hence nature has provided man with hands instead of
arms and clothes, with which she has provided other animals, in order
that with his hands he may obtain these and all other necessaries.
Hence it is clear that this precept, even as all the precepts of the
natural law, is binding on both religious and seculars alike. Yet not
everyone sins that works not with his hands, because those precepts
of the natural law which regard the good of the many are not binding
on each individual, but it suffices that one person apply himself to
this business and another to that; for instance, that some be
craftsmen, others husbandmen, others judges, and others teachers, and
so forth, according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:17), "If
the whole body were the eye, where would be the hearing? If the whole
were the hearing, where would be the smelling?"

Reply Obj. 2: This gloss is taken from Augustine's _De operibus
Monachorum,_ cap. 21, where he speaks against certain monks who
declared it to be unlawful for the servants of God to work with their
hands, on account of our Lord's saying (Matt. 6:25): "Be not
solicitous for your life, what you shall eat." Nevertheless his words
do not imply that religious are bound to work with their hands, if
they have other means of livelihood. This is clear from his adding:
"He wishes the servants of God to make a living by working with their
bodies." Now this does not apply to religious any more than to
seculars, which is evident for two reasons. First, on account of the
way in which the Apostle expresses himself, by saying: "That you
withdraw yourselves from every brother walking disorderly." For he
calls all Christians brothers, since at that time religious orders
were not as yet founded. Secondly, because religious have no other
obligations than what seculars have, except as required by the rule
they profess: wherefore if their rule contain nothing about manual
labor, religious are not otherwise bound to manual labor than
seculars are.

Reply Obj. 3: A man may devote himself in two ways to all the
spiritual works mentioned by Augustine in the passage quoted: in one
way with a view to the common good, in another with a view to his
private advantage. Accordingly those who devote themselves publicly
to the aforesaid spiritual works are thereby exempt from manual labor
for two reasons: first, because it behooves them to be occupied
exclusively with such like works; secondly, because those who devote
themselves to such works have a claim to be supported by those for
whose advantage they work.

On the other hand, those who devote themselves to such works not
publicly but privately as it were, ought not on that account to be
exempt from manual labor, nor have they a claim to be supported by
the offerings of the faithful, and it is of these that Augustine is
speaking. For when he says: "They can sing hymns to God even while
working with their hands; like the craftsmen who give tongue to fable
telling without withdrawing their hands from their work," it is clear
that he cannot refer to those who sing the canonical hours in the
church, but to those who tell psalms or hymns as private prayers.
Likewise what he says of reading and prayer is to be referred to the
private prayer and reading which even lay people do at times, and not
to those who perform public prayers in the church, or give public
lectures in the schools. Hence he does not say: "Those who say they
are occupied in teaching and instructing," but: "Those who say they
are occupied in reading." Again he speaks of that preaching which is
addressed, not publicly to the people, but to one or a few in
particular by way of private admonishment. Hence he says expressly:
"If one has to speak." For according to a gloss on 1 Cor. 2:4,
"Speech is addressed privately, preaching to many."

Reply Obj. 4: Those who despise all for God's sake are bound to work
with their hands, when they have no other means of livelihood, or of
almsgiving (should the case occur where almsgiving were a matter of
precept), but not otherwise, as stated in the Article. It is in this
sense that the gloss quoted is to be understood.

Reply Obj. 5: That the apostles worked with their hands was sometimes
a matter of necessity, sometimes a work of supererogation. It was of
necessity when they failed to receive a livelihood from others. Hence
a gloss on 1 Cor. 4:12, "We labor, working with our own hands," adds,
"because no man giveth to us." It was supererogation, as appears from
1 Cor. 9:12, where the Apostle says that he did not use the power he
had of living by the Gospel. The Apostle had recourse to this
supererogation for three motives. First, in order to deprive the
false apostles of the pretext for preaching, for they preached merely
for a temporal advantage; hence he says (2 Cor. 11:12): "But what I
do, that I will do that I may cut off the occasion from them," etc.
Secondly, in order to avoid burdening those to whom he preached;
hence he says (2 Cor. 12:13): "What is there that you have had less
than the other churches, but that I myself was not burthensome to
you?" Thirdly, in order to give an example of work to the idle; hence
he says (2 Thess. 3:8, 9): "We worked night and day . . . that we
might give ourselves a pattern unto you, to imitate us." However, the
Apostle did not do this in places like Athens where he had facilities
for preaching daily, as Augustine observes (De oper. Monach. xviii).
Yet religious are not for this reason bound to imitate the Apostle in
this matter, since they are not bound to all works of supererogation:
wherefore neither did the other apostles work with their hands.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 187, Art. 4]

Whether It Is Lawful for Religious to Live on Alms?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to live on alms.
For the Apostle (1 Tim. 5:16) forbids those widows who have other
means of livelihood to live on the alms of the Church, so that the
Church may have "sufficient for them that are widows indeed." And
Jerome says to Pope Damasus [*Cf. Cf. Can. Clericos, cause. i, qu. 2;
Can. Quoniam, cause xvi, qu. 1; Regul. Monach. iv among the
supposititious works of St. Jerome] that "those who have sufficient
income from their parents and their own possessions, if they take
what belongs to the poor they commit and incur the guilt of
sacrilege, and by the abuse of such things they eat and drink
judgment to themselves." Now religious if they be able-bodied can
support themselves by the work of their hands. Therefore it would
seem that they sin if they consume the alms belonging to the poor.

Obj. 2: Further, to live at the expense of the faithful is the
stipend appointed to those who preach the Gospel in payment of their
labor or work, according to Matt. 10:10: "The workman is worthy of
his meat." Now it belongs not to religious to preach the Gospel, but
chiefly to prelates who are pastors and teachers. Therefore religious
cannot lawfully live on the alms of the faithful.

Obj. 3: Further, religious are in the state of perfection. But it is
more perfect to give than to receive alms; for it is written (Acts
20:35): "It is a more blessed thing to give, rather than to receive."
Therefore they should not live on alms, but rather should they give
alms of their handiwork.

Obj. 4: Further, it belongs to religious to avoid obstacles to virtue
and occasions of sin. Now the receiving of alms offers an occasion of
sin, and hinders an act of virtue; hence a gloss on 2 Thess. 3:9,
"That we might give ourselves a pattern unto you," says: "He who
through idleness eats often at another's table, must needs flatter
the one who feeds him." It is also written (Ex. 23:8): "Neither shalt
thou take bribes which . . . blind the wise, and pervert the words of
the just," and (Prov. 22:7): "The borrower is servant to him that
lendeth." This is contrary to religion, wherefore a gloss on 2 Thess.
3:9, "That we might give ourselves a pattern," etc., says, "our
religion calls men to liberty." Therefore it would seem that
religious should not live on alms.

Obj. 5: Further, religious especially are bound to imitate the
perfection of the apostles; wherefore the Apostle says (Phil. 3:15):
"Let us . . . as many as are perfect, be thus minded." But the
Apostle was unwilling to live at the expense of the faithful, either
in order to cut off the occasion from the false apostles as he
himself says (2 Cor. 11:12), or to avoid giving scandal to the weak,
as appears from 1 Cor. 9:12. It would seem therefore that religious
ought for the same reasons to refrain from living on alms. Hence
Augustine says (De oper. Monach. 28): "Cut off the occasion of
disgraceful marketing whereby you lower yourselves in the esteem of
others, and give scandal to the weak: and show men that you seek not
an easy livelihood in idleness, but the kingdom of God by the narrow
and strait way."

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Dial. ii, 1): The Blessed Benedict
after leaving his home and parents dwelt for three years in a cave,
and while there lived on the food brought to him by a monk from Rome.
Nevertheless, although he was able-bodied, we do not read that he
sought to live by the labor of his hands. Therefore religious may
lawfully live on alms.

_I answer that,_ A man may lawfully live on what is his or due to
him. Now that which is given out of liberality becomes the property
of the person to whom it is given. Wherefore religious and clerics
whose monasteries or churches have received from the munificence of
princes or of any of the faithful any endowment whatsoever for their
support, can lawfully live on such endowment without working with
their hands, and yet without doubt they live on alms. Wherefore in
like manner if religious receive movable goods from the faithful they
can lawfully live on them. For it is absurd to say that a person may
accept an alms of some great property but not bread or some small sum
of money. Nevertheless since these gifts would seem to be bestowed on
religious in order that they may have more leisure for religious
works, in which the donors of temporal goods wish to have a share,
the use of such gifts would become unlawful for them if they
abstained from religious works, because in that case, so far as they
are concerned, they would be thwarting the intention of those who
bestowed those gifts.

A thing is due to a person in two ways. First, on account of
necessity, which makes all things common, as Ambrose [*Basil, Serm.
de Temp. lxiv, among the supposititious works of St. Ambrose]
asserts. Consequently if religious be in need they can lawfully live
on alms. Such necessity may occur in three ways. First, through
weakness of body, the result being that they are unable to make a
living by working with their hands. Secondly, because that which they
gain by their handiwork is insufficient for their livelihood:
wherefore Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xvii) that "the good works
of the faithful should not leave God's servants who work with their
hands without a supply of necessaries, that when the hour comes for
them to nourish their souls, so as to make it impossible for them to
do these corporal works, they be not oppressed by want." Thirdly,
because of the former mode of life of those who were unwont to work
with their hands: wherefore Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxi)
that "if they had in the world the wherewithal easily to support this
life without working, and gave it to the needy when they were
converted to God, we must credit their weakness and bear with it."
For those who have thus been delicately brought up are wont to be
unable to bear the toil of bodily labor.

In another way a thing becomes due to a person through his affording
others something whether temporal or spiritual, according to 1 Cor.
9:11, "If we have sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great
matter if we reap your carnal things?" And in this sense religious
may live on alms as being due to them in four ways. First, if they
preach by the authority of the prelates. Secondly, if they be
ministers of the altar, according to 1 Cor. 9:13, 14, "They that
serve the altar partake with the altar. So also the lord ordained
that they who preach the Gospel should live by the Gospel." Hence
Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxi): "If they be gospelers, I
allow, they have" (a claim to live at the charge of the faithful):
"if they be ministers of the altar and dispensers of the sacraments,
they need not insist on it, but it is theirs by perfect right." The
reason for this is because the sacrament of the altar wherever it be
offered is common to all the faithful. Thirdly, if they devote
themselves to the study of Holy Writ to the common profit of the
whole Church. Wherefore Jerome says (Contra Vigil. xiii): "It is
still the custom in Judea, not only among us but also among the
Hebrews, for those who meditate on the law of the Lord day and night,
and have no other share on earth but God alone, to be supported by
the subscriptions of the synagogues and of the whole world."
Fourthly, if they have endowed the monastery with the goods they
possessed, they may live on the alms given to the monastery. Hence
Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxv) that "those who renouncing or
distributing their means, whether ample or of any amount whatever,
have desired with pious and salutary humility to be numbered among
the poor of Christ, have a claim on the community and on brotherly
love to receive a livelihood in return. They are to be commended
indeed if they work with their hands, but if they be unwilling, who
will dare to force them? Nor does it matter, as he goes on to say, to
which monasteries, or in what place any one of them has bestowed his
goods on his needy brethren; for all Christians belong to one
commonwealth."

On the other hand, in the default of any necessity, or of their
affording any profit to others, it is unlawful for religious to wish
to live in idleness on the alms given to the poor. Hence Augustine
says (De oper. Monach. xxii): "Sometimes those who enter the
profession of God's service come from a servile condition of life,
from tilling the soil or working at some trade or lowly occupation.
In their case it is not so clear whether they came with the purpose
of serving God, or of evading a life of want and toil with a view to
being fed and clothed in idleness, and furthermore to being honored
by those by whom they were wont to be despised and downtrodden. Such
persons surely cannot excuse themselves from work on the score of
bodily weakness, for their former mode of life is evidence against
them." And he adds further on (De oper. Monach. xxv): "If they be
unwilling to work, neither let them eat. For if the rich humble
themselves to piety, it is not that the poor may be exalted to pride;
since it is altogether unseemly that in a life wherein senators
become laborers, laborers should become idle, and that where the
lords of the manor have come after renouncing their ease, the serfs
should live in comfort."

Reply Obj. 1: These authorities must be understood as referring to
cases of necessity, that is to say, when there is no other means of
succoring the poor: for then they would be bound not only to refrain
from accepting alms, but also to give what they have for the support
of the needy.

Reply Obj. 2: Prelates are competent to preach in virtue of their
office, but religious may be competent to do so in virtue of
delegation; and thus when they work in the field of the Lord, they
may make their living thereby, according to 2 Tim. 2:6, "The
husbandman that laboreth must first partake of the fruits," which a
gloss explains thus, "that is to say, the preacher, who in the field
of the Church tills the hearts of his hearers with the plough of
God's word." Those also who minister to the preachers may live on
alms. Hence a gloss on Rom. 15:27, "If the Gentiles have been made
partakers of their spiritual things, they ought also in carnal things
to minister to them," says, "namely, to the Jews who sent preachers
from Jerusalem." There are moreover other reasons for which a person
has a claim to live at the charge of the faithful, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: Other things being equal, it is more perfect to give
than to receive. Nevertheless to give or to give up all one's
possessions for Christ's sake, and to receive a little for one's
livelihood is better than to give to the poor part by part, as stated
above (Q. 186, A. 3, ad 6).

Reply Obj. 4: To receive gifts so as to increase one's wealth, or to
accept a livelihood from another without having a claim to it, and
without profit to others or being in need oneself, affords an
occasion of sin. But this does not apply to religious, as stated
above.

Reply Obj. 5: Whenever there is evident necessity for religious
living on alms without doing any manual work, as well as an evident
profit to be derived by others, it is not the weak who are
scandalized, but those who are full of malice like the Pharisees,
whose scandal our Lord teaches us to despise (Matt. 15:12-14). If,
however, these motives of necessity and profit be lacking, the weak
might possibly be scandalized thereby; and this should be avoided.
Yet the same scandal might be occasioned through those who live in
idleness on the common revenues.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 187, Art. 5]

Whether It Is Lawful for Religious to Beg?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to beg. For
Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxviii): "The most cunning foe has
scattered on all sides a great number of hypocrites wearing the
monastic habit, who go wandering about the country," and afterwards
he adds: "They all ask, they all demand to be supported in their
profitable penury, or to be paid for a pretended holiness." Therefore
it would seem that the life of mendicant religious is to be condemned.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (1 Thess. 4:11): "That you . . . work
with your own hands as we commanded you, and that you walk honestly
towards them that are without: and that you want nothing of any
man's": and a gloss on this passage says: "You must work and not be
idle, because work is both honorable and a light to the unbeliever:
and you must not covet that which belongs to another and much less
beg or take anything." Again a gloss [*St. Augustine, (De oper.
Monach. iii)] on 2 Thess. 3:10, "If any man will not work," etc.
says: "He wishes the servants of God to work with the body, so as to
gain a livelihood, and not be compelled by want to ask for
necessaries." Now this is to beg. Therefore it would seem unlawful to
beg while omitting to work with one's hands.

Obj. 3: Further, that which is forbidden by law and contrary to
justice, is unbecoming to religious. Now begging is forbidden in the
divine law; for it is written (Deut. 15:4): "There shall be no poor
nor beggar among you," and (Ps. 36:25): "I have not seen the just
forsaken, nor his seed seeking bread." Moreover an able-bodied
mendicant is punished by civil law, according to the law (XI, xxvi,
de Valid. Mendicant.). Therefore it is unfitting for religious to beg.

Obj. 4: Further, "Shame is about that which is disgraceful," as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15). Now Ambrose says (De Offic. i,
30) that "to be ashamed to beg is a sign of good birth." Therefore it
is disgraceful to beg: and consequently this is unbecoming to
religious.

Obj. 5: Further, according to our Lord's command it is especially
becoming to preachers of the Gospel to live on alms, as stated above
(A. 4). Yet it is not becoming that they should beg, since a gloss on
2 Tim. 2:6, "The husbandman, that laboreth," etc. says: "The Apostle
wishes the gospeler to understand that to accept necessaries from
those among whom he labors is not mendicancy but a right." Therefore
it would seem unbecoming for religious to beg.

_On the contrary,_ It becomes religious to live in imitation of
Christ. Now Christ was a mendicant, according to Ps. 39:18, "But I am
a beggar and poor"; where a gloss says: "Christ said this of Himself
as bearing the 'form of a servant,'" and further on: "A beggar is one
who entreats another, and a poor man is one who has not enough for
himself." Again it is written (Ps. 69:6): "I am needy and poor";
where a gloss says: "'Needy,' that is a suppliant; 'and poor,' that
is, not having enough for myself, because I have no worldly wealth."
And Jerome says in a letter [*Reference unknown]: "Beware lest
whereas thy Lord," i.e. Christ, "begged, thou amass other people's
wealth." Therefore it becomes religious to beg.

_I answer that,_ Two things may be considered in reference to
mendicancy. The first is on the part of the act itself of begging,
which has a certain abasement attaching to it; since of all men those
would seem most abased who are not only poor, but are so needy that
they have to receive their meat from others. In this way some deserve
praise for begging out of humility, just as they abase themselves in
other ways, as being the most efficacious remedy against pride which
they desire to quench either in themselves or in others by their
example. For just as a disease that arises from excessive heat is
most efficaciously healed by things that excel in cold, so proneness
to pride is most efficaciously healed by those things which savor
most of abasement. Hence it is said in the Decretals (II, cap. Si
quis semel, de Paenitentia): "To condescend to the humblest duties,
and to devote oneself to the lowliest service is an exercise of
humility; for thus one is able to heal the disease of pride and human
glory." Hence Jerome praises Fabiola (Ep. lxxvii ad ocean.) for that
she desired "to receive alms, having poured forth all her wealth for
Christ's sake." The Blessed Alexis acted in like manner, for, having
renounced all his possessions for Christ's sake he rejoiced in
receiving alms even from his own servants. It is also related of the
Blessed Arsenius in the Lives of the Fathers (v, 6) that he gave
thanks because he was forced by necessity to ask for alms. Hence it
is enjoined to some people as a penance for grievous sins to go on a
pilgrimage begging. Since, however, humility like the other virtues
should not be without discretion, it behooves one to be discreet in
becoming a mendicant for the purpose of humiliation, lest a man
thereby incur the mark of covetousness or of anything else
unbecoming. Secondly, mendicancy may be considered on the part of
that which one gets by begging: and thus a man may be led to beg by a
twofold motive. First, by the desire to have wealth or meat without
working for it, and such like mendicancy is unlawful; secondly, by a
motive of necessity or usefulness. The motive is one of necessity if
a man has no other means of livelihood save begging; and it is a
motive of usefulness if he wishes to accomplish something useful, and
is unable to do so without the alms of the faithful. Thus alms are
besought for the building of a bridge, or church, or for any other
work whatever that is conducive to the common good: thus scholars may
seek alms that they may devote themselves to the study of wisdom. In
this way mendicancy is lawful to religious no less than to seculars.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking there explicitly of those who beg
from motives of covetousness.

Reply Obj. 2: The first gloss speaks of begging from motives of
covetousness, as appears from the words of the Apostle; while the
second gloss speaks of those who without effecting any useful
purpose, beg their livelihood in order to live in idleness. On the
other hand, he lives not idly who in any way lives usefully.

Reply Obj. 3: This precept of the divine law does not forbid anyone
to beg, but it forbids the rich to be so stingy that some are
compelled by necessity to beg. The civil law imposes a penalty on
able-bodied mendicants who beg from motives neither of utility nor of
necessity.

Reply Obj. 4: Disgrace is twofold; one arises from lack of honesty
[*Cf. Q. 145, A. 1], the other from an external defect, thus it is
disgraceful for a man to be sick or poor. Such like uncomeliness of
mendicancy does not pertain to sin, but it may pertain to humility,
as stated above.

Reply Obj. 5: Preachers have the right to be fed by those to whom
they preach: yet if they wish to seek this by begging so as to
receive it as a free gift and not as a right this will be a mark of
greater humility.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 187, Art. 6]

Whether It Is Lawful for Religious to Wear Coarser Clothes Than
Others?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to wear coarser
clothes than others. For according to the Apostle (1 Thess. 5:22) we
ought to "refrain from all appearance of evil." Now coarseness of
clothes has an appearance of evil; for our Lord said (Matt. 7:15):
"Beware of false prophets who come to you in the clothing of sheep":
and a gloss on Apoc. 6:8, "Behold a pale horse," says: "The devil
finding that he cannot succeed, neither by outward afflictions nor by
manifest heresies, sends in advance false brethren, who under the
guise of religion assume the characteristics of the black and red
horses by corrupting the faith." Therefore it would seem that
religious should not wear coarse clothes.

Obj. 2: Further, Jerome says (Ep. lii ad Nepotian.): "Avoid somber,"
i.e. black, "equally with glittering apparel. Fine and coarse clothes
are equally to be shunned, for the one exhales pleasure, the other
vainglory." Therefore, since vainglory is a graver sin than the use
of pleasure, it would seem that religious who should aim at what is
more perfect ought to avoid coarse rather than fine clothes.

Obj. 3: Further, religious should aim especially at doing works of
penance. Now in works of penance we should use, not outward signs of
sorrow, but rather signs of joy; for our Lord said (Matt. 6:16):
"When you fast, be not, as the hypocrites, sad," and afterwards He
added: "But thou, when thou fastest, anoint thy head and wash thy
face." Augustine commenting on these words (De Serm. Dom. in Monte
ii, 12): "In this chapter we must observe that not only the glare and
pomp of outward things, but even the weeds of mourning may be a
subject of ostentation, all the more dangerous as being a decoy under
the guise of God's service." Therefore seemingly religious ought not
to wear coarse clothes.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 11:37): "They wandered
about in sheep-skins, in goat-skins," and a gloss adds--"as Elias and
others." Moreover it is said in the Decretal XXI, qu. iv, can. Omnis
jactantia: "If any persons be found to deride those who wear coarse
and religious apparel they must be reproved. For in the early times
all those who were consecrated to God went about in common and coarse
apparel."

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12), "in
all external things, it is not the use but the intention of the user
that is at fault." In order to judge of this it is necessary to
observe that coarse and homely apparel may be considered in two ways.
First, as being a sign of a man's disposition or condition, because
according to Ecclus. 19:27, "the attire . . . of the man" shows "what
he is." In this way coarseness of attire is sometimes a sign of
sorrow: wherefore those who are beset with sorrow are wont to wear
coarser clothes, just as on the other hand in times of festivity and
joy they wear finer clothes. Hence penitents make use of coarse
apparel, for example, the king (Jonah 3:6) who "was clothed with
sack-cloth," and Achab (3 Kings 21:27) who "put hair-cloth upon his
flesh." Sometimes, however, it is a sign of the contempt of riches
and worldly ostentation. Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rustico
Monach.): "Let your somber attire indicate your purity of mind, your
coarse robe prove your contempt of the world, yet so that your mind
be not inflated withal, lest your speech belie your habit." In both
these ways it is becoming for religious to wear coarse attire, since
religion is a state of penance and of contempt of worldly glory.

But that a person wish to signify this to others arises from three
motives. First, in order to humble himself: for just as a man's mind
is uplifted by fine clothes, so is it humbled by lowly apparel. Hence
speaking of Achab who "put hair-cloth on his flesh," the Lord said to
Elias: "Hast thou not seen Achab humbled before Me?" (3 Kings 21:29).
Secondly, in order to set an example to others; wherefore a gloss on
Matt. 3:4, "(John) had his garments of camel's hair," says: "He who
preaches penance is clothed in the habit of penance." Thirdly, on
account of vainglory; thus Augustine says (cf. Obj. 3) that "even the
weeds of mourning may be a subject of ostentation."

Accordingly in the first two ways it is praiseworthy to wear humble
apparel, but in the third way it is sinful.

Secondly, coarse and homely attire may be considered as the result of
covetousness or negligence, and thus also it is sinful.

Reply Obj. 1: Coarseness of attire has not of itself the appearance
of evil, indeed it has more the appearance of good, namely of the
contempt of worldly glory. Hence it is that wicked persons hide their
wickedness under coarse clothing. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom.
in Monte ii, 24) that "the sheep should not dislike their clothing
for the reason that the wolves sometimes hide themselves under it."

Reply Obj. 2: Jerome is speaking there of the coarse attire that is
worn on account of human glory.

Reply Obj. 3: According to our Lord's teaching men should do no deeds
of holiness for the sake of show: and this is especially the case
when one does something strange. Hence Chrysostom [*Hom. xiii in
Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John
Chrysostom] says: "While praying a man should do nothing strange, so
as to draw the gaze of others, either by shouting or striking his
breast, or casting up his hands," because the very strangeness draws
people's attention to him. Yet blame does not attach to all strange
behavior that draws people's attention, for it may be done well or
ill. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12) that "in
the practice of the Christian religion when a man draws attention to
himself by unwonted squalor and shabbiness, since he acts thus
voluntarily and not of necessity, we can gather from his other deeds
whether his behavior is motivated by contempt of excessive dress or
by affectation." Religious, however, would especially seem not to act
thus from affectation, since they wear a coarse habit as a sign of
their profession whereby they profess contempt of the world.
_______________________

QUESTION 188

OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider the different kinds of religious life, and under
this head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there are different kinds of religious life or only one?

(2) Whether a religious order can be established for the works of the
active life?

(3) Whether a religious order can be directed to soldiering?

(4) Whether a religious order can be established for preaching and
the exercise of like works?

(5) Whether a religious order can be established for the study of
science?

(6) Whether a religious order that is directed to the contemplative
life is more excellent than one that is directed to the active life?

(7) Whether religious perfection is diminished by possessing
something in common?

(8) Whether the religious life of solitaries is to be preferred to
the religious life of those who live in community?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 1]

Whether There Is Only One Religious Order?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one religious order. For
there can be no diversity in that which is possessed wholly and
perfectly; wherefore there can be only one sovereign good, as stated
in the First Part (Q. 6, AA. 2, 3, 4). Now as Gregory says (Hom. xx
in Ezech.), "when a man vows to Almighty God all that he has, all his
life, all his knowledge, it is a holocaust," without which there is
no religious life. Therefore it would seem that there are not many
religious orders but only one.

Obj. 2: Further, things which agree in essentials differ only
accidentally. Now there is no religious order without the three
essential vows of religion, as stated above (Q. 186, AA. 6, 7).
Therefore it would seem that religious orders differ not
specifically, but only accidentally.

Obj. 3: Further, the state of perfection is competent both to
religious and to bishops, as stated above (Q. 185, AA. 5, 7). Now the
episcopate is not diversified specifically, but is one wherever it
may be; wherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxlvi ad Evan.): "Wherever a
bishop is, whether at Rome, or Gubbio, or Constantinople, or Reggio,
he has the same excellence, the same priesthood." Therefore in like
manner there is but one religious order.

Obj. 4: Further, anything that may lead to confusion should be
removed from the Church. Now it would seem that a diversity of
religious orders might confuse the Christian people, as stated in the
Decretal de Statu Monach. et Canon. Reg. [*Cap. Ne Nimia, de Relig.
Dom.]. Therefore seemingly there ought not to be different religious
orders.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 44:10) that it pertains to the
adornment of the queen that she is "surrounded with variety."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 186, A, 7; Q. 187, A. 2), the
religious state is a training school wherein one aims by practice at
the perfection of charity. Now there are various works of charity to
which a man may devote himself; and there are also various kinds of
exercise. Wherefore religious orders may be differentiated in two
ways. First, according to the different things to which they may be
directed: thus one may be directed to the lodging of pilgrims,
another to visiting or ransoming captives. Secondly, there may be
various religious orders according to the diversity of practices;
thus in one religious order the body is chastised by abstinence in
food, in another by the practice of manual labor, scantiness of
clothes, or the like.

Since, however, the end imports most in every matter, [*Arist.,
_Topic._ vi 8] religious orders differ more especially according to
their various ends than according to their various practices.

Reply Obj. 1: The obligation to devote oneself wholly to God's
service is common to every religious order; hence religious do not
differ in this respect, as though in one religious order a person
retained some one thing of his own, and in another order some other
thing. But the difference is in respect of the different things
wherein one may serve God, and whereby a man may dispose himself to
the service of God.

Reply Obj. 2: The three essential vows of religion pertain to the
practice of religion as principles to which all other matters are
reduced, as stated above (Q. 186, A. 7). But there are various ways
of disposing oneself to the observance of each of them. For instance
one disposes oneself to observe the vow of continence, by solitude of
place, by abstinence, by mutual fellowship, and by many like means.
Accordingly it is evident that the community of the essential vows is
compatible with diversity of religious life, both on account of the
different dispositions and on account of the different ends, as
explained above.

Reply Obj. 3: In matters relating to perfection, the bishop stands in
the position of agent, and the religious as passive, as stated above
(Q. 184, A. 7). Now the agent, even in natural things, the higher it
is, is so much the more one, whereas the things that are passive are
various. Hence with reason the episcopal state is one, while
religious orders are many.

Reply Obj. 4: Confusion is opposed to distinction and order.
Accordingly the multitude of religious orders would lead to
confusion, if different religious orders were directed to the same
end and in the same way, without necessity or utility. Wherefore to
prevent this happening it has been wholesomely forbidden to establish
a new religious order without the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 2]

Whether a Religious Order Should Be Established for the Works of the
Active Life?

Objection 1: It would seem that no religious order should be
established for the works of the active life. For every religious
order belongs to the state of perfection, as stated above (Q. 184, A.
5; Q. 186, A. 1). Now the perfection of the religious state consists
in the contemplation of divine things. For Dionysius says (Eccl.
Hier. vi) that they are "called servants of God by reason of their
rendering pure service and subjection to God, and on account of the
indivisible and singular life which unites them by holy reflections,"
i.e. contemplations, "on invisible things, to the Godlike unity and
the perfection beloved of God." Therefore seemingly no religious
order should be established for the works of the active life.

Obj. 2: Further, seemingly the same judgment applies to canons
regular as to monks, according to Extra, De Postul., cap. Ex parte;
and De Statu Monach., cap. Quod Dei timorem: for it is stated that
"they are not considered to be separated from the fellowship of
monks": and the same would seem to apply to all other religious. Now
the monastic rule was established for the purpose of the
contemplative life; wherefore Jerome says (Ep. lviii ad Paulin.): "If
you wish to be what you are called, a monk," i.e. a solitary, "what
business have you in a city?" The same is found stated in Extra, De
Renuntiatione, cap. Nisi cum pridem; and De Regular., cap. Licet
quibusdam. Therefore it would seem that every religious order is
directed to the contemplative life, and none to the active life.

Obj. 3: Further, the active life is concerned with the present world.
Now all religious are said to renounce the world; wherefore Gregory
says (Hom. xx in Ezech.): "He who renounces this world, and does all
the good he can, is like one who has gone out of Egypt and offers
sacrifice in the wilderness." Therefore it would seem that no
religious order can be directed to the active life.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 1:27): "Religion clean and
undefiled before God and the Father, is this: to visit the fatherless
and widows in their tribulation." Now this belongs to the active
life. Therefore religious life can be fittingly directed to the
active life.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the religious state is
directed to the perfection of charity, which extends to the love of
God and of our neighbor. Now the contemplative life which seeks to
devote itself to God alone belongs directly to the love of God, while
the active life, which ministers to our neighbor's needs, belongs
directly to the love of one's neighbor. And just as out of charity we
love our neighbor for God's sake, so the services we render our
neighbor redound to God, according to Matt. 25:40, "What you have
done [Vulg.: 'As long as you did it'] to one of these My least
brethren, you did it to Me." Consequently those services which we
render our neighbor, in so far as we refer them to God, are described
as sacrifices, according to Heb. 13:16, "Do not forget to do good and
to impart, for by such sacrifices God's favor is obtained." And since
it belongs properly to religion to offer sacrifice to God, as stated
above (Q. 81, A. 1, ad 1; A. 4, ad 1), it follows that certain
religious orders are fittingly directed to the works of the active
life. Wherefore in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xiv, 4) the
Abbot Nesteros in distinguishing the various aims of religious orders
says: "Some direct their intention exclusively to the hidden life of
the desert and purity of heart; some are occupied with the
instruction of the brethren and the care of the monasteries; while
others delight in the service of the guesthouse," i.e. in hospitality.

Reply Obj. 1: Service and subjection rendered to God are not
precluded by the works of the active life, whereby a man serves his
neighbor for God's sake, as stated in the Article. Nor do these works
preclude singularity of life; not that they involve man's living
apart from his fellow-men, but in the sense that each man
individually devotes himself to things pertaining to the service of
God; and since religious occupy themselves with the works of the
active life for God's sake, it follows that their action results from
their contemplation of divine things. Hence they are not entirely
deprived of the fruit of the contemplative life.

Reply Obj. 2: The same judgment applies to monks and to all other
religious, as regards things common to all religious orders: for
instance as regards their devoting themselves wholly to the divine
service, their observance of the essential vows of religion, and
their refraining from worldly business. But it does not follow that
this likeness extends to other things that are proper to the monastic
profession, and are directed especially to the contemplative life.
Hence in the aforesaid Decretal, De Postulando, it is not simply
stated that "the same judgment applies to canons regular" as "to
monks," but that it applies "in matters already mentioned," namely
that "they are not to act as advocates in lawsuits." Again the
Decretal quoted, De Statu Monach., after the statement that "canons
regular are not considered to be separated from the fellowship of
monks," goes on to say: "Nevertheless they obey an easier rule."
Hence it is evident that they are not bound to all that monks are
bound.

Reply Obj. 3: A man may be in the world in two ways: in one way by
his bodily presence, in another way by the bent of his mind. Hence
our Lord said to His disciples (John 15:19): "I have chosen you out
of the world," and yet speaking of them to His Father He said (John
17:11): "These are in the world, and I come to Thee." Although, then,
religious who are occupied with the works of the active life are in
the world as to the presence of the body, they are not in the world
as regards their bent of mind, because they are occupied with
external things, not as seeking anything of the world, but merely for
the sake of serving God: for "they . . . use this world, as if they
used it not," to quote 1 Cor. 7:31. Hence (James 1:27) after it is
stated that "religion clean and undefiled . . . is . . . to visit the
fatherless and widows in their tribulation," it is added, "and to
keep one's self unspotted from this world," namely to avoid being
attached to worldly things.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 3]

Whether a Religious Order Can Be Directed to Soldiering?

Objection 1: It would seem that no religious order can be directed to
soldiering. For all religious orders belong to the state of
perfection. Now our Lord said with reference to the perfection of
Christian life (Matt. 5:39): "I say to you not to resist evil; but if
one strike thee on the right cheek, turn to him also the other,"
which is inconsistent with the duties of a soldier. Therefore no
religious order can be established for soldiering.

Obj. 2: Further, the bodily encounter of the battlefield is more
grievous than the encounter in words that takes place between counsel
at law. Yet religious are forbidden to plead at law, as appears from
the Decretal De Postulando quoted above (A. 2, Obj. 2). Therefore it
is much less seemly for a religious order to be established for
soldiering.

Obj. 3: Further, the religious state is a state of penance, as we
have said above (Q. 187, A. 6). Now according to the code of laws
soldiering is forbidden to penitents. For it is said in the Decretal
De Poenit., Dist. v, cap. 3: "It is altogether opposed to the rules
of the Church, to return to worldly soldiering after doing penance."
Therefore it is unfitting for any religious order to be established
for soldiering.

Obj. 4: Further, no religious order may be established for an unjust
object. But as Isidore says (Etym. xviii, 1), "A just war is one that
is waged by order of the emperor." Since then religious are private
individuals, it would seem unlawful for them to wage war; and
consequently no religious order may be established for this purpose.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Ep. clxxxix; ad Bonifac.), "Beware
of thinking that none of those can please God who handle war-like
weapons. Of such was holy David to whom the Lord gave great
testimony." Now religious orders are established in order that men
may please God. Therefore nothing hinders the establishing of a
religious order for the purpose of soldiering.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), a religious order may be
established not only for the works of the contemplative life, but
also for the works of the active life, in so far as they are
concerned in helping our neighbor and in the service of God, but not
in so far as they are directed to a worldly object. Now the
occupation of soldiering may be directed to the assistance of our
neighbor, not only as regards private individuals, but also as
regards the defense of the whole commonwealth. Hence it is said of
Judas Machabeus (1 Macc. 3:2, 3) that "he [Vulg.: 'they'] fought with
cheerfulness the battle of Israel, and he got his people great
honor." It can also be directed to the upkeep of divine worship,
wherefore (1 Macc. 3:21) Judas is stated to have said: "We will fight
for our lives and our laws," and further on (1 Macc. 13:3) Simon
said: "You know what great battles I and my brethren, and the house
of my father, have fought for the laws and the sanctuary."

Hence a religious order may be fittingly established for soldiering,
not indeed for any worldly purpose, but for the defense of divine
worship and public safety, or also of the poor and oppressed,
according to Ps. 81:4: "Rescue the poor, and deliver the needy out of
the hand of the sinner."

Reply Obj. 1: Not to resist evil may be understood in two ways.
First, in the sense of forgiving the wrong done to oneself, and thus
it may pertain to perfection, when it is expedient to act thus for
the spiritual welfare of others. Secondly, in the sense of tolerating
patiently the wrongs done to others: and this pertains to
imperfection, or even to vice, if one be able to resist the wrongdoer
in a becoming manner. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 27): "The
courage whereby a man in battle defends his country against
barbarians, or protects the weak at home, or his friends against
robbers is full of justice": even so our Lord says in the passage
quoted [*Luke 6:30: "Of him that taketh away thy goods, ask them not
again"; Cf. Matt. 5:40," . . . thy goods, ask them not again."] If,
however, a man were not to demand the return of that which belongs to
another, he would sin if it were his business to do so: for it is
praiseworthy to give away one's own, but not another's property. And
much less should the things of God be neglected, for as Chrysostom
[*Hom. v in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St.
John Chrysostom] says, "it is most wicked to overlook the wrongs done
to God."

Reply Obj. 2: It is inconsistent with any religious order to act as
counsel at law for a worldly object, but it is not inconsistent to do
so at the orders of one's superior and in favor of one's monastery,
as stated in the same Decretal, or for the defense of the poor and
widows. Wherefore it is said in the Decretals (Dist. lxxxviii, cap.
1): "The holy synod has decreed that henceforth no cleric is to buy
property or occupy himself with secular business, save with a view to
the care of the fatherless . . . and widows." Likewise to be a
soldier for the sake of some worldly object is contrary to all
religious life, but this does not apply to those who are soldiers for
the sake of God's service.

Reply Obj. 3: Worldly soldiering is forbidden to penitents, but the
soldiering which is directed to the service of God is imposed as a
penance on some people, as in the case of those upon whom it is
enjoined to take arms in defense of the Holy Land.

Reply Obj. 4: The establishment of a religious order for the purpose
of soldiering does not imply that the religious can wage war on their
own authority; but they can do so only on the authority of the
sovereign or of the Church.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 4]

Whether a Religious Order Can Be Established for Preaching or Hearing
Confessions?

Objection 1: It would seem that no religious order may be established
for preaching, or hearing confessions. For it is said (VII, qu. i
[*Cap. Hoc nequaquam; Cf. Q. 187, A. 1, Obj. 1]): "The monastic life
is one of subjection and discipleship, not of teaching, authority, or
pastoral care," and the same apparently applies to religious. Now
preaching and hearing confessions are the actions of a pastor and
teacher. Therefore a religious order should not be established for
this purpose.

Obj. 2: Further, the purpose for which a religious order is
established would seem to be something most proper to the religious
life, as stated above (A. 1). Now the aforesaid actions are not
proper to religious but to bishops. Therefore a religious order
should not be established for the purpose of such actions.

Obj. 3: Further, it seems unfitting that the authority to preach and
hear confessions should be committed to an unlimited number of men;
and there is no fixed number of those who are received into a
religious order. Therefore it is unfitting for a religious order to
be established for the purpose of the aforesaid actions.

Obj. 4: Further, preachers have a right to receive their livelihood
from the faithful of Christ, according to 1 Cor. 9. If then the
office of preaching be committed to a religious order established for
that purpose, it follows that the faithful of Christ are bound to
support an unlimited number of persons, which would be a heavy burden
on them. Therefore a religious order should not be established for
the exercise of these actions.

Obj. 5: Further, the organization of the Church should be in
accordance with Christ's institution. Now Christ sent first the
twelve apostles to preach, as related in Luke 9, and afterwards He
sent the seventy-two disciples, as stated in Luke 10. Moreover,
according to the gloss of Bede on "And after these things" (Luke
10:1), "the apostles are represented by the bishops, the seventy-two
disciples by the lesser priests," i.e. the parish priests. Therefore
in addition to bishops and parish priests, no religious order should
be established for the purpose of preaching and hearing confessions.

_On the contrary,_ In the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xiv, 4),
Abbot Nesteros, speaking of the various kinds of religious orders,
says: "Some choosing the care of the sick, others devoting themselves
to the relief of the afflicted and oppressed, or applying themselves
to teaching, or giving alms to the poor, have been most highly
esteemed on account of their devotion and piety." Therefore just as a
religious order may be established for the care of the sick, so also
may one be established for teaching the people by preaching and like
works.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), it is fitting for a
religious order to be established for the works of the active life,
in so far as they are directed to the good of our neighbor, the
service of God, and the upkeep of divine worship. Now the good of our
neighbor is advanced by things pertaining to the spiritual welfare of
the soul rather than by things pertaining to the supplying of bodily
needs, in proportion to the excellence of spiritual over corporal
things. Hence it was stated above (Q. 32, A. 3) that spiritual works
of mercy surpass corporal works of mercy. Moreover this is more
pertinent to the service of God, to Whom no sacrifice is more
acceptable than zeal for souls, as Gregory says (Hom. xii in Ezech.).
Furthermore, it is a greater thing to employ spiritual arms in
defending the faithful against the errors of heretics and the
temptations of the devil, than to protect the faithful by means of
bodily weapons. Therefore it is most fitting for a religious order to
be established for preaching and similar works pertaining to the
salvation of souls.

Reply Obj. 1: He who works by virtue of another, acts as an
instrument. And a minister is like an "animated instrument," as the
Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2 [*Cf. _Ethic._ viii, 11]). Hence if a
man preach or do something similar by the authority of his superiors,
he does not rise above the degree of "discipleship" or "subjection,"
which is competent to religious.

Reply Obj. 2: Some religious orders are established for soldiering,
to wage war, not indeed on their own authority, but on that of the
sovereign or of the Church who are competent to wage war by virtue of
their office, as stated above (A. 3, ad 4). In the same way certain
religious orders are established for preaching and hearing
confessions, not indeed by their own authority, but by the authority
of the higher and lower superiors, to whom these things belong by
virtue of their office. Consequently to assist one's superiors in
such a ministry is proper to a religious order of this kind.

Reply Obj. 3: Bishops do not allow these religious severally and
indiscriminately to preach or hear confessions, but according to the
discretion of the religious superiors, or according to their own
appointment.

Reply Obj. 4: The faithful are not bound by law to contribute to the
support of other than their ordinary prelates, who receive the tithes
and offerings of the faithful for that purpose, as well as other
ecclesiastical revenues. But if some men are willing to minister to
the faithful by exercising the aforesaid acts gratuitously, and
without demanding payment as of right, the faithful are not burdened
thereby because their temporal contributions can be liberally repaid
by those men, nor are they bound by law to contribute, but by
charity, and yet not so that they be burdened thereby and others
eased, as stated in 2 Cor. 8:13. If, however, none be found to devote
themselves gratuitously to services of this kind, the ordinary
prelate is bound, if he cannot suffice by himself, to seek other
suitable persons and support them himself.

Reply Obj. 5: The seventy-two disciples are represented not only by
the parish priests, but by all those of lower order who in any way
assist the bishops in their office. For we do not read that our Lord
appointed the seventy-two disciples to certain fixed parishes, but
that "He sent them two and two before His face into every city and
place whither He Himself was to come." It was fitting, however, that
in addition to the ordinary prelates others should be chosen for
these duties on account of the multitude of the faithful, and the
difficulty of finding a sufficient number of persons to be appointed
to each locality, just as it was necessary to establish religious
orders for military service, on account of the secular princes being
unable to cope with unbelievers in certain countries.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 5]

Whether a Religious Order Should Be Established for the Purpose of
Study?

Objection 1: It would seem that a religious order should not be
established for the purpose of study. For it is written (Ps. 70:15,
16): "Because I have not known letters [Douay: 'learning'], I will
enter into the powers of the Lord," i.e. "Christian virtue,"
according to a gloss. Now the perfection of Christian virtue,
seemingly, pertains especially to religious. Therefore it is not for
them to apply themselves to the study of letters.

Obj. 2: Further, that which is a source of dissent is unbecoming to
religious, who are gathered together in the unity of peace. Now study
leads to dissent: wherefore different schools of thought arose among
the philosophers. Hence Jerome (Super Epist. ad Tit. 1:5) says:
"Before a diabolical instinct brought study into religion, and people
said: I am of Paul, I of Apollo, I of Cephas," etc. Therefore it
would seem that no religious order should be established for the
purpose of study.

Obj. 3: Further, those who profess the Christian religion should
profess nothing in common with the Gentiles. Now among the Gentiles
were some who professed philosophy, and even now some secular persons
are known as professors of certain sciences. Therefore the study of
letters does not become religious.

_On the contrary,_ Jerome (Ep. liii ad Paulin.) urges him to acquire
learning in the monastic state, saying: "Let us learn on earth those
things the knowledge of which will remain in heaven," and further on:
"Whatever you seek to know, I will endeavor to know with you."

I answer that As stated above (A. 2), religion may be ordained to the
active and to the contemplative life. Now chief among the works of
the active life are those which are directly ordained to the
salvation of souls, such as preaching and the like. Accordingly the
study of letters is becoming to the religious life in three ways.
First, as regards that which is proper to the contemplative life, to
which the study of letters helps in a twofold manner. In one way by
helping directly to contemplate, namely by enlightening the
intellect. For the contemplative life of which we are now speaking is
directed chiefly to the consideration of divine things, as stated
above (Q. 180, A. 4), to which consideration man is directed by
study; for which reason it is said in praise of the righteous (Ps.
1:2) that "he shall meditate day and night" on the law of the Lord,
and (Ecclus. 39:1): "The wise man will seek out the wisdom of all the
ancients, and will be occupied in the prophets." In another way the
study of letters is a help to the contemplative life indirectly, by
removing the obstacles to contemplation, namely the errors which in
the contemplation of divine things frequently beset those who are
ignorant of the scriptures. Thus we read in the Conferences of the
Fathers (Coll. x, 3) that the Abbot Serapion through simplicity fell
into the error of the Anthropomorphites, who thought that God had a
human shape. Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi) that "some through
seeking in contemplation more than they are able to grasp, fall away
into perverse doctrines, and by failing to be the humble disciples of
truth become the masters of error." Hence it is written (Eccles.
2:3): "I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I
might turn my mind to wisdom and might avoid folly."

Secondly, the study of letters is necessary in those religious orders
that are founded for preaching and other like works; wherefore the
Apostle (Titus 1:9), speaking of bishops to whose office these acts
belong, says: "Embracing that faithful word which is according to
doctrine, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to
convince the gainsayers." Nor does it matter that the apostles were
sent to preach without having studied letters, because, as Jerome
says (Ep. liii ad Paulin.), "whatever others acquire by exercise and
daily meditation in God's law, was taught them by the Holy Ghost."

Thirdly, the study of letters is becoming to religious as regards
that which is common to all religious orders. For it helps us to
avoid the lusts of the flesh; wherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad
Rust. Monach.): "Love the science of the Scriptures and thou shalt
have no love for carnal vice." For it turns the mind away from
lustful thoughts, and tames the flesh on account of the toil that
study entails according to Ecclus. 31:1, "Watching for riches*
consumeth the flesh." [*_Vigilia honestatis._ St. Thomas would seem
to have taken _honestas_ in the sense of virtue]. It also helps to
remove the desire of riches, wherefore it is written (Wis. 7:8):
"I . . . esteemed riches nothing in comparison with her," and (1
Macc. 12:9): "We needed none of these things," namely assistance from
without, "having for our comfort the holy books that are in our
hands." It also helps to teach obedience, wherefore Augustine says
(De oper. Monach. xvii): "What sort of perverseness is this, to wish
to read, but not to obey what one reads?" Hence it is clearly fitting
that a religious order be established for the study of letters.

Reply Obj. 1: This commentary of the gloss is an exposition of the
Old Law of which the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:6): "The letter killeth."
Hence not to know letters is to disapprove of the circumcision of the
"letter" and other carnal observances.

Reply Obj. 2: Study is directed to knowledge which, without charity,
"puffeth up," and consequently leads to dissent, according to Prov.
13:10, "Among the proud there are always dissensions": whereas, with
charity, it "edifieth and begets concord." Hence the Apostle after
saying (1 Cor. 1:5): "You are made rich . . . in all utterance and in
all knowledge," adds (1 Cor. 1:10): "That you all speak the same
thing, and that there be no schisms among you." But Jerome is not
speaking here of the study of letters, but of the study of
dissensions which heretics and schismatics have brought into the
Christian religion.

Reply Obj. 3: The philosophers professed the study of letters in the
matter of secular learning: whereas it becomes religious to devote
themselves chiefly to the study of letters in reference to the
doctrine that is "according to godliness" (Titus 1:1). It becomes not
religious, whose whole life is devoted to the service of God, to seek
for other learning, save in so far as it is referred to the sacred
doctrine. Hence Augustine says at the end of _De Musica_ vi, 17:
"Whilst we think that we should not overlook those whom heretics
delude by the deceitful assurance of reason and knowledge, we are
slow to advance in the consideration of their methods. Yet we should
not be praised for doing this, were it not that many holy sons of
their most loving mother the Catholic Church had done the same under
the necessity of confounding heretics."
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 6]

Whether a Religious Order That Is Devoted to the Contemplative Life
Is More Excellent Than on That Is Given to the Active Life?

Objection 1: It would seem that a religious order which is devoted to
the contemplative life is not more excellent than one which is given
to the active life. For it is said (Extra, de Regular. et Transeunt.
ad Relig., cap. Licet), quoting the words of Innocent III: "Even as a
greater good is preferred to a lesser, so the common profit takes
precedence of private profit: and in this case teaching is rightly
preferred to silence, responsibility to contemplation, work to rest."
Now the religious order which is directed to the greater good is
better. Therefore it would seem that those religious orders that are
directed to the active life are more excellent than those which are
directed to the contemplative life.

Obj. 2: Further, every religious order is directed to the perfection
of charity, as stated above (AA. 1, 2). Now a gloss on Heb. 12:4,
"For you have not yet resisted unto blood," says: "In this life there
is no more perfect love than that to which the holy martyrs attained,
who fought against sin unto blood." Now to fight unto blood is
becoming those religious who are directed to military service, and
yet this pertains to the active life. Therefore it would seem that
religious orders of this kind are the most excellent.

Obj. 3: Further, seemingly the stricter a religious order is, the
more excellent it is. But there is no reason why certain religious
orders directed to the active life should not be of stricter
observance than those directed to the contemplative life. Therefore
they are more excellent.

_On the contrary,_ our Lord said (Luke 10:42) that the "best part"
was Mary's, by whom the contemplative life is signified.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the difference between one
religious order and another depends chiefly on the end, and
secondarily on the exercise. And since one thing cannot be said to be
more excellent than another save in respect of that in which it
differs therefrom, it follows that the excellence of one religious
order over another depends chiefly on their ends, and secondarily on
their respective exercises. Nevertheless each of these comparisons is
considered in a different way. For the comparison with respect to the
end is absolute, since the end is sought for its own sake; whereas
the comparison with respect to exercise is relative, since exercise
is sought not for its own sake, but for the sake of the end. Hence a
religious order is preferable to another, if it be directed to an end
that is absolutely more excellent either because it is a greater good
or because it is directed to more goods. If, however, the end be the
same, the excellence of one religious order over another depends
secondarily, not on the amount of exercise, but on the proportion of
the exercise to the end in view. Wherefore in the Conferences of the
Fathers (Coll. ii, 2) Blessed Antony is quoted, as preferring
discretion whereby a man moderates all his actions, to fastings,
watchings, and all such observances.

Accordingly we must say that the work of the active life is twofold.
one proceeds from the fulness of contemplation, such as teaching and
preaching. Wherefore Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that the words
of Ps. 144:7, "They shall publish the memory of . . . Thy sweetness,"
refer "to perfect men returning from their contemplation." And this
work is more excellent than simple contemplation. For even as it is
better to enlighten than merely to shine, so is it better to give to
others the fruits of one's contemplation than merely to contemplate.
The other work of the active life consists entirely in outward
occupation, for instance almsgiving, receiving guests, and the like,
which are less excellent than the works of contemplation, except in
cases of necessity, as stated above (Q. 182, A. 1). Accordingly the
highest place in religious orders is held by those which are directed
to teaching and preaching, which, moreover, are nearest to the
episcopal perfection, even as in other things "the end of that which
is first is in conjunction with the beginning of that which is
second," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. vii). The second place
belongs to those which are directed to contemplation, and the third
to those which are occupied with external actions.

Moreover, in each of these degrees it may be noted that one religious
order excels another through being directed to higher action in the
same genus; thus among the works of the active life it is better to
ransom captives than to receive guests, and among the works of the
contemplative life prayer is better than study. Again one will excel
another if it be directed to more of these actions than another, or
if it have statutes more adapted to the attainment of the end in view.

Reply Obj. 1: This Decretal refers to the active life as directed to
the salvation of souls.

Reply Obj. 2: Those religious orders that are established for the
purpose of military service aim more directly at shedding the enemy's
blood than at the shedding of their own, which latter is more
properly competent to martyrs. Yet there is no reason why religious
of this description should not acquire the merit of martyrdom in
certain cases, and in this respect stand higher than other religious;
even as in some cases the works of the active life take precedence of
contemplation.

Reply Obj. 3: Strictness of observances, as the Blessed Antony
remarks (Conferences of the Fathers; Coll. ii, 2), is not the chief
object of commendation in a religious order; and it is written (Isa.
58:5): "Is this such a fast as I have chosen, for a man to afflict
his soul for a day?" Nevertheless it is adopted in religious life as
being necessary for taming the flesh, "which if done without
discretion, is liable to make us fail altogether," as the Blessed
Antony observes. Wherefore a religious order is not more excellent
through having stricter observances, but because its observances are
directed by greater discretion to the end of religion. Thus the
taming of the flesh is more efficaciously directed to continence by
means of abstinence in meat and drink, which pertain to hunger and
thirst, than by the privation of clothing, which pertains to cold and
nakedness, or by bodily labor.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 7]

Whether Religious Perfection Is Diminished by Possessing Something in
Common?

Objection 1: It would seem that religious perfection is diminished by
possessing something in common. For our Lord said (Matt. 19:21): "If
thou wilt be perfect, go sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast and give
to the poor." Hence it is clear that to lack worldly wealth belongs
to the perfection of Christian life. Now those who possess something
in common do not lack worldly wealth. Therefore it would seem that
they do not quite reach to the perfection of Christian life.

Obj. 2: Further, the perfection of the counsels requires that one
should be without worldly solicitude; wherefore the Apostle in giving
the counsel of virginity said (1 Cor. 7:32): "I would have you to be
without solicitude." Now it belongs to the solicitude of the present
life that certain people keep something to themselves for the morrow;
and this solicitude was forbidden His disciples by our Lord (Matt.
6:34) saying: "Be not . . . solicitous for tomorrow." Therefore it
would seem that the perfection of Christian life is diminished by
having something in common.

Obj. 3: Further, possessions held in common belong in some way to
each member of the community; wherefore Jerome (Ep. lx ad Heliod.
Episc.) says in reference to certain people: "They are richer in the
monastery than they had been in the world; though serving the poor
Christ they have wealth which they had not while serving the rich
devil; the Church rejects them now that they are rich, who in the
world were beggars." But it is derogatory to religious perfection
that one should possess wealth of one's own. Therefore it is also
derogatory to religious perfection to possess anything in common.

Obj. 4: Further, Gregory (Dial. iii, 14) relates of a very holy man
named Isaac, that "when his disciples humbly signified that he should
accept the possessions offered to him for the use of the monastery,
he being solicitous for the safeguarding of his poverty, held firmly
to his opinion, saying: A monk who seeks earthly possessions is no
monk at all": and this refers to possessions held in common, and
which were offered him for the common use of the monastery. Therefore
it would seem destructive of religious perfection to possess anything
in common.

Obj. 5: Further, our Lord in prescribing religious perfection to His
disciples, said (Matt. 10:9, 10): "Do not possess gold, nor silver,
nor money in your purses, nor script for your journey." By these
words, as Jerome says in his commentary, "He reproves those
philosophers who are commonly called Bactroperatae [*i.e. staff and
scrip bearers], who as despising the world and valuing all things at
naught carried their pantry about with them." Therefore it would seem
derogatory to religious perfection that one should keep something
whether for oneself or for the common use.

_On the contrary,_ Prosper [*Julianus Pomerius, among the works of
Prosper] says (De Vita Contempl. ix) and his words are quoted (XII,
qu. 1, can. Expedit): "It is sufficiently clear both that for the
sake of perfection one should renounce having anything of one's own,
and that the possession of revenues, which are of course common
property, is no hindrance to the perfection of the Church."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 184, A. 3, ad 1; Q. 185, A. 6,
ad 1), perfection consists, essentially, not in poverty, but in
following Christ, according to the saying of Jerome (Super Matth.
xix, 27): "Since it is not enough to leave all, Peter adds that which
is perfect, namely, 'We have followed Thee,'" while poverty is like
an instrument or exercise for the attainment of perfection. Hence in
the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. i, 7) the abbot Moses says:
"Fastings, watchings, meditating on the Scriptures, poverty, and
privation of all one's possessions are not perfection, but means of
perfection."

Now the privation of one's possessions, or poverty, is a means of
perfection, inasmuch as by doing away with riches we remove certain
obstacles to charity; and these are chiefly three. The first is the
cares which riches bring with them; wherefore our Lord said (Matt.
13:22): "That which was sown [Vulg.: 'He that received the seed']
among thorns, is he that heareth the word, and the care of this
world, and the deceitfulness of riches, choketh up the word." The
second is the love of riches, which increases with the possession of
wealth; wherefore Jerome says (Super Matth. xix, 23) that "since it
is difficult to despise riches when we have them, our Lord did not
say: 'It is impossible for a rich man to enter the kingdom of
heaven,' but: 'It is difficult.'" The third is vainglory or elation
which results from riches, according to Ps. 48:7, "They that trust in
their own strength, and glory in the multitude of their riches."

Accordingly the first of these three cannot be altogether separated
from riches whether great or small. For man must needs take a certain
amount of care in acquiring or keeping external things. But so long
as external things are sought or possessed only in a small quantity,
and as much as is required for a mere livelihood, such like care does
not hinder one much; and consequently is not inconsistent with the
perfection of Christian life. For our Lord did not forbid all care,
but only such as is excessive and hurtful; wherefore Augustine,
commenting on Matt. 6:25, "Be not solicitous for your life, what you
shall eat," says (De Serm. in Monte [*The words quoted are from De
Operibus Monach. xxvi]): "In saying this He does not forbid them to
procure these things in so far as they needed them, but to be intent
on them, and for their sake to do whatever they are bidden to do in
preaching the Gospel." Yet the possession of much wealth increases
the weight of care, which is a great distraction to man's mind and
hinders him from giving himself wholly to God's service. The other
two, however, namely the love of riches and taking pride or glorying
in riches, result only from an abundance of wealth.

Nevertheless it makes a difference in this matter if riches, whether
abundant or moderate, be possessed in private or in common. For the
care that one takes of one's own wealth, pertains to love of self,
whereby a man loves himself in temporal matters; whereas the care
that is given to things held in common pertains to the love of
charity which "seeketh not her own," but looks to the common good.
And since religion is directed to the perfection of charity, and
charity is perfected in "the love of God extending to contempt of
self" [*Augustine, De Civ. Dei xiv, 28,] it is contrary to religious
perfection to possess anything in private. But the care that is given
to common goods may pertain to charity, although it may prove an
obstacle to some higher act of charity, such as divine contemplation
or the instructing of one's neighbor. Hence it is evident that to
have excessive riches in common, whether in movable or in immovable
property, is an obstacle to perfection, though not absolutely
incompatible with it; while it is not an obstacle to religious
perfection to have enough external things, whether movables or
immovables, as suffice for a livelihood, if we consider poverty in
relation to the common end of religious orders, which is to devote
oneself to the service of God. But if we consider poverty in relation
to the special end of any religious order, then this end being
presupposed, a greater or lesser degree of poverty is adapted to that
religious order; and each religious order will be the more perfect in
respect of poverty, according as it professes a poverty more adapted
to its end. For it is evident that for the purpose of the outward and
bodily works of the active life a man needs the assistance of outward
things, whereas few are required for contemplation. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that "many things are needed for
action, and the more so, the greater and nobler the actions are. But
the contemplative man requires no such things for the exercise of his
act: he needs only the necessaries; other things are an obstacle to
his contemplation." Accordingly it is clear that a religious order
directed to the bodily actions of the active life, such as soldiering
or the lodging of guests, would be imperfect if it lacked common
riches; whereas those religious orders which are directed to the
contemplative life are the more perfect, according as the poverty
they profess burdens them with less care for temporal things. And the
care of temporal things is so much a greater obstacle to religious
life as the religious life requires a greater care of spiritual
things.

Now it is manifest that a religious order established for the purpose
of contemplating and of giving to others the fruits of one's
contemplation by teaching and preaching, requires greater care of
spiritual things than one that is established for contemplation only.
Wherefore it becomes a religious order of this kind to embrace a
poverty that burdens one with the least amount of care. Again it is
clear that to keep what one has acquired at a fitting time for one's
necessary use involves the least burden of care. Wherefore a
threefold degree of poverty corresponds to the three aforesaid
degrees of religious life. For it is fitting that a religious order
which is directed to the bodily actions of the active life should
have an abundance of riches in common; that the common possession of
a religious order directed to contemplation should be more moderate,
unless the said religious be bound, either themselves or through
others, to give hospitality or to assist the poor; and that those who
aim at giving the fruits of their contemplation to others should have
their life most exempt from external cares; this being accomplished
by their laying up the necessaries of life procured at a fitting
time. This, our Lord, the Founder of poverty, taught by His example.
For He had a purse which He entrusted to Judas, and in which were
kept the things that were offered to Him, as related in John 12:6.

Nor should it be argued that Jerome (Super Matth. xvii, 26) says: "If
anyone object that Judas carried money in the purse, we answer that
He deemed it unlawful to spend the property of the poor on His own
uses,"    namely by paying the tax--because among those poor His
disciples held a foremost place, and the money in Christ's purse was
spent chiefly on their needs. For it is stated (John 4:8) that "His
disciples were gone into the city to buy meats," and (John 13:29)
that the disciples "thought, because Judas had the purse, that Jesus
had said to him: But those things which we have need of for the
festival day, or that he should give something to the poor." From
this it is evident that to keep money by, or any other common
property for the support of religious of the same order, or of any
other poor, is in accordance with the perfection which Christ taught
by His example. Moreover, after the resurrection, the disciples from
whom all religious orders took their origin kept the price of the
lands, and distributed it according as each one had need (Acts 4:34,
35).

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 184, A. 3, ad 1), this saying of
our Lord does not mean that poverty itself is perfection, but that it
is the means of perfection. Indeed, as shown above (Q. 186, A. 8), it
is the least of the three chief means of perfection; since the vow of
continence excels the vow of poverty, and the vow of obedience excels
them both. Since, however, the means are sought not for their own
sake, but for the sake of the end, a thing is better, not for being a
greater instrument, but for being more adapted to the end. Thus a
physician does not heal the more the more medicine he gives, but the
more the medicine is adapted to the disease. Accordingly it does not
follow that a religious order is the more perfect, according as the
poverty it professes is more perfect, but according as its poverty is
more adapted to the end both common and special. Granted even that
the religious order which exceeds others in poverty be more perfect
in so far as it is poorer, this would not make it more perfect
simply. For possibly some other religious order might surpass it in
matters relating to continence, or obedience, and thus be more
perfect simply, since to excel in better things is to be better
simply.

Reply Obj. 2: Our Lord's words (Matt. 6:34), "Be not solicitous for
tomorrow," do not mean that we are to keep nothing for the morrow;
for the Blessed Antony shows the danger of so doing, in the
Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. ii, 2), where he says: "It has been
our experience that those who have attempted to practice the
privation of all means of livelihood, so as not to have the
wherewithal to procure themselves food for one day, have been
deceived so unawares that they were unable to finish properly the
work they had undertaken." And, as Augustine says (De oper. Monach.
xxiii), "if this saying of our Lord, 'Be not solicitous for
tomorrow,' means that we are to lay nothing by for the morrow, those
who shut themselves up for many days from the sight of men, and apply
their whole mind to a life of prayer, will be unable to provide
themselves with these things." Again he adds afterwards: "Are we to
suppose that the more holy they are, the less do they resemble the
birds?" And further on (De oper. Monach. xxiv): "For if it be argued
from the Gospel that they should lay nothing by, they answer rightly:
Why then did our Lord have a purse, wherein He kept the money that
was collected? Why, in days long gone by, when famine was imminent,
was grain sent to the holy fathers? Why did the apostles thus provide
for the needs of the saints?"

Accordingly the saying: "Be not solicitous for tomorrow," according
to Jerome (Super Matth.) is to be rendered thus: "It is enough that
we think of the present; the future being uncertain, let us leave it
to God": according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xvi in the Opus Imperfectum,
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], "It is enough to endure the
toil for necessary things, labor not in excess for unnecessary
things": according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 17):
"When we do any good action, we should bear in mind not temporal
things which are denoted by the morrow, but eternal things."

Reply Obj. 3: The saying of Jerome applies where there are excessive
riches, possessed in private as it were, or by the abuse of which
even the individual members of a community wax proud and wanton. But
they do not apply to moderate wealth, set by for the common use,
merely as a means of livelihood of which each one stands in need. For
it amounts to the same that each one makes use of things pertaining
to the necessaries of life, and that these things be set by for the
common use.

Reply Obj. 4: Isaac refused to accept the offer of possessions,
because he feared lest this should lead him to have excessive wealth,
the abuse of which would be an obstacle to religious perfection.
Hence Gregory adds (Dial. iii, 14): "He was as afraid of forfeiting
the security of his poverty, as the rich miser is careful of his
perishable wealth." It is not, however, related that he refused to
accept such things as are commonly necessary for the upkeep of life.

Reply Obj. 5: The Philosopher says (Polit. i, 5, 6) that bread, wine,
and the like are natural riches, while money is artificial riches.
Hence it is that certain philosophers declined to make use of money,
and employed other things, living according to nature. Wherefore
Jerome shows by the words of our Lord, Who equally forbade both, that
it comes to the same to have money and to possess other things
necessary for life. And though our Lord commanded those who were sent
to preach not to carry these things on the way, He did not forbid
them to be possessed in common. How these words of our Lord should be
understood has been shown above (Q. 185, A. 6 ad 2; I-II, Q. 108, A.
2, ad 3).
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 188, Art. 8]

Whether the Religious Life of Those Who Live in Community Is More
Perfect Than That of Those Who Lead a Solitary Life?

Objection 1: It would seem that the religious life of those who live
in community is more perfect than that of those who lead a solitary
life. For it is written (Eccles. 4:9): "It is better . . . that two
should be together, than one; for they have the advantage of their
society." Therefore the religious life of those who live in community
would seem to be more perfect.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Matt. 18:20): "Where there are two or
three gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of them."
But nothing can be better than the fellowship of Christ. Therefore it
would seem better to live in community than in solitude.

Obj. 3: Further, the vow of obedience is more excellent than the
other religious vows; and humility is most acceptable to God. Now
obedience and humility are better observed in company than in
solitude; for Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rustic. Monach.): "In solitude
pride quickly takes man unawares, he sleeps as much as he will, he
does what he likes"; whereas when instructing one who lives in
community, he says: "You may not do what you will, you must eat what
you are bidden to eat, you may possess so much as you receive, you
must obey one you prefer not to obey, you must be a servant to your
brethren, you must fear the superior of the monastery as God, love
him as a father." Therefore it would seem that the religious life of
those who live in community is more perfect than that of those who
lead a solitary life.

Obj. 4: Further, our Lord said (Luke 11:33): "No man lighteth a
candle and putteth it in a hidden place, nor under a bushel." Now
those who lead a solitary life are seemingly in a hidden place, and
to be doing no good to any man. Therefore it would seem that their
religious life is not more perfect.

Obj. 5: Further, that which is in accord with man's nature is
apparently more pertinent to the perfection of virtue. But man is
naturally a social animal, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1).
Therefore it would seem that to lead a solitary life is not more
perfect than to lead a community life.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxiii) that
"those are holier who keep themselves aloof from the approach of all,
and give their whole mind to a life of prayer."

_I answer that,_ Solitude, like poverty, is not the essence of
perfection, but a means thereto. Hence in the Conferences of the
Fathers (Coll. i, 7) the Abbot Moses says that "solitude," even as
fasting and other like things, is "a sure means of acquiring purity
of heart." Now it is evident that solitude is a means adapted not to
action but to contemplation, according to Osee 2:14, "I . . . will
lead her into solitude [Douay: 'the wilderness']; and I will speak to
her heart." Wherefore it is not suitable to those religious orders
that are directed to the works whether corporal or spiritual of the
active life; except perhaps for a time, after the example of Christ,
Who as Luke relates (6:12), "went out into a mountain to pray; and He
passed the whole night in the prayer of God." On the other hand, it
is suitable to those religious orders that are directed to
contemplation.

It must, however, be observed that what is solitary should be
self-sufficing by itself. Now such a thing is one "that lacks
nothing," and this belongs to the idea of a perfect thing
[*Aristotle, _Phys._ iii, 6]. Wherefore solitude befits the
contemplative who has already attained to perfection. This happens in
two ways: in one way by the gift only of God, as in the case of John
the Baptist, who was "filled with the Holy Ghost even from his
mother's womb" (Luke 1:11), so that he was in the desert even as a
boy; in another way by the practice of virtuous action, according to
Heb. 5:14: "Strong meat is for the perfect; for them who by custom
have their senses exercised to the discerning of good and evil."

Now man is assisted in this practice by the fellowship of others in
two ways. First, as regards his intellect, to the effect of his being
instructed in that which he has to contemplate; wherefore Jerome says
(ad Rustic. Monach., Ep. cxxv): "It pleases me that you have the
fellowship of holy men, and teach not yourself." Secondly, as regards
the affections, seeing that man's noisome affections are restrained
by the example and reproof which he receives from others; for as
Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 23), commenting on the words, "To whom I
have given a house in the wilderness" (Job 39:6), "What profits
solitude of the body, if solitude of the heart be lacking?" Hence a
social life is necessary for the practice of perfection. Now solitude
befits those who are already perfect; wherefore Jerome says (ad
Rustic. Monach., Ep. cxxv): "Far from condemning the solitary life,
we have often commended it. But we wish the soldiers who pass from
the monastic school to be such as not to be deterred by the hard
noviciate of the desert, and such as have given proof of their
conduct for a considerable time."

Accordingly, just as that which is already perfect surpasses that
which is being schooled in perfection, so the life of the solitaries,
if duly practiced, surpasses the community life. But if it be
undertaken without the aforesaid practice, it is fraught with very
great danger, unless the grace of God supply that which others
acquire by practice, as in the case of the Blessed Antony and the
Blessed Benedict.

Reply Obj. 1: Solomon shows that two are better than one, on account
of the help which one affords the other either by "lifting him" up,
or by "warming him," i.e. giving him spiritual heat (Eccles. 4:10,
11). But those who have already attained to perfection do not require
this help.

Reply Obj. 2: According to 1 John 4:16, "He that abideth in charity
abideth in God and God in him." Wherefore just as Christ is in the
midst of those who are united together in the fellowship of brotherly
love, so does He dwell in the heart of the man who devotes himself to
divine contemplation through love of God.

Reply Obj. 3: Actual obedience is required of those who need to be
schooled according to the direction of others in the attainment of
perfection; but those who are already perfect are sufficiently "led
by the spirit of God" so that they need not to obey others actually.
Nevertheless they have obedience in the preparedness of the mind.

Reply Obj. 4: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19), "no one is
forbidden to seek the knowledge of truth, for this pertains to a
praiseworthy leisure." That a man be placed "on a candlestick," does
not concern him but his superiors, and "if this burden is not placed
on us," as Augustine goes on to say (De Civ. Dei xix, 19), "we must
devote ourselves to the contemplation of truth," for which purpose
solitude is most helpful. Nevertheless, those who lead a solitary
life are most useful to mankind. Hence, referring to them, Augustine
says (De Morib. Eccl. xxxi): "They dwell in the most lonely places,
content to live on water and the bread that is brought to them from
time to time, enjoying colloquy with God to whom they have adhered
with a pure mind. To some they seem to have renounced human
intercourse more than is right: but these understand not how much
such men profit us by the spirit of their prayers, what an example to
us is the life of those whom we are forbidden to see in the body."

Reply Obj. 5: A man may lead a solitary life for two motives. One is
because he is unable, as it were, to bear with human fellowship on
account of his uncouthness of mind; and this is beast-like. The other
is with a view to adhering wholly to divine things; and this is
superhuman. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1) that "he who
associates not with others is either a beast or a god," i.e. a godly
man.
_______________________

QUESTION 189

OF THE ENTRANCE INTO RELIGIOUS LIFE
(In Ten Articles)

We must now consider the entrance into religious life. Under this
head there are ten points of inquiry:

(1) Whether those who are not practiced in the observance of the
commandments should enter religion?

(2) Whether it is lawful for a person to be bound by vow to enter
religion?

(3) Whether those who are bound by vow to enter religion are bound to
fulfil their vow?

(4) Whether those who vow to enter religion are bound to remain there
in perpetuity?

(5) Whether children should be received into religion?

(6) Whether one should be withheld from entering religion through
deference to one's parents?

(7) Whether parish priests or archdeacons may enter religion?

(8) Whether one may pass from one religious order to another?

(9) Whether one ought to induce others to enter religion?

(10) Whether serious deliberation with one's relations and friends
is requisite for entrance into religion?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 1]

Whether Those Who Are Not Practiced in Keeping the Commandments
Should Enter Religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that none should enter religion but those
who are practiced in the observance of the commandments. For our Lord
gave the counsel of perfection to the young man who said that he had
kept the commandments "from his youth." Now all religious orders
originate from Christ. Therefore it would seem that none should be
allowed to enter religion but those who are practiced in the
observance of the commandments.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xv in Ezech., and Moral. xxii):
"No one comes suddenly to the summit; but he must make a beginning of
a good life in the smallest matters, so as to accomplish great
things." Now the great things are the counsels which pertain to the
perfection of life, while the lesser things are the commandments
which belong to common righteousness. Therefore it would seem that
one ought not to enter religion for the purpose of keeping the
counsels, unless one be already practiced in the observance of the
precepts.

Obj. 3: Further, the religious state, like the holy orders, has a
place of eminence in the Church. Now, as Gregory writes to the bishop
Siagrius [*Regist. ix, Ep. 106], "order should be observed in
ascending to orders. For he seeks a fall who aspires to mount to the
summit by overpassing the steps." [*The rest of the quotation is from
Regist. v, Ep. 53, ad Virgil. Episc.]. "For we are well aware that
walls when built receive not the weight of the beams until the new
fabric is rid of its moisture, lest if they should be burdened with
weight before they are seasoned they bring down the whole building"
(Dist. xlviii, can. Sicut neophytus). Therefore it would seem that
one should not enter religion unless one be practiced in the
observance of the precepts.

Obj. 4: Further, a gloss on Ps. 130:2, "As a child that is weaned is
towards his mother," says: "First we are conceived in the womb of
Mother Church, by being taught the rudiments of faith. Then we are
nourished as it were in her womb, by progressing in those same
elements. Afterwards we are brought forth to the light by being
regenerated in baptism. Then the Church bears us as it were in her
hands and feeds us with milk, when after baptism we are instructed in
good works and are nourished with the milk of simple doctrine while
we progress; until having grown out of infancy we leave our mother's
milk for a father's control, that is to say, we pass from simple
doctrine, by which we are taught the Word made flesh, to the Word
that was in the beginning with God." Afterwards it goes on to say:
"For those who are just baptized on Holy Saturday are borne in the
hands of the Church as it were and fed with milk until Pentecost,
during which time nothing arduous is prescribed, no fasts, no rising
at midnight. Afterwards they are confirmed by the Paraclete Spirit,
and being weaned so to speak, begin to fast and keep other difficult
observances. Many, like the heretics and schismatics, have perverted
this order by being weaned before the time. Hence they have come to
naught." Now this order is apparently perverted by those who enter
religion, or induce others to enter religion, before they are
practiced in the easier observance of the commandments. Therefore
they would seem to be heretics or schismatics.

Obj. 5: Further, one should proceed from that which precedes to that
which follows after. Now the commandments precede the counsels,
because they are more universal, for "the implication of the one by
the other is not convertible" [*Categor. ix], since whoever keeps the
counsels keeps the commandments, but the converse does not hold.
Seeing then that the right order requires one to pass from that which
comes first to that which comes after, it follows that one ought not
to pass to the observance of the counsels in religion, without being
first of all practiced in the observance of the commandments.

_On the contrary,_ Matthew the publican who was not practiced in the
observance of the commandments was called by our Lord to the
observance of the counsels. For it is stated (Luke 5:28) that
"leaving all things he . . . followed Him." Therefore it is not
necessary for a person to be practiced in the observance of the
commandments before passing to the perfection of the counsels.

_I answer that,_ As shown above (Q. 188, A. 1), the religious state
is a spiritual schooling for the attainment of the perfection of
charity. This is accomplished through the removal of the obstacles to
perfect charity by religious observances; and these obstacles are
those things which attach man's affections to earthly things. Now the
attachment of man's affections to earthly things is not only an
obstacle to the perfection of charity, but sometimes leads to the
loss of charity, when through turning inordinately to temporal goods
man turns away from the immutable good by sinning mortally. Hence it
is evident that the observances of the religious state, while
removing the obstacles to perfect charity, remove also the occasions
of sin: for instance, it is clear that fasting, watching, obedience,
and the like withdraw man from sins of gluttony and lust and all
other manner of sins.

Consequently it is right that not only those who are practiced in the
observance of the commandments should enter religion in order to
attain to yet greater perfection, but also those who are not
practiced, in order the more easily to avoid sin and attain to
perfection.

Reply Obj. 1: Jerome (Super Matth. xix, 20) says: "The young man lies
when he says: 'All these have I kept from my youth.' For if he had
fulfilled this commandment, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as
thyself,' why did he go away sad when he heard: Go, sell all thou
hast and give to the poor?" But this means that he lied as to the
perfect observance of this commandment. Hence Origen says (Tract.
viii super Matth.) that "it is written in the Gospel according to the
Hebrews that when our Lord had said to him: 'Go, sell all thou hast,'
the rich man began to scratch his head; and that our Lord said to
him: How sayest thou: I have fulfilled the law and the prophets,
seeing that it is written in the law: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as
thyself? Behold many of thy brethren, children of Abraham, are
clothed in filth, and die of hunger, whilst thy house is full of all
manner of good things, and nothing whatever hath passed thence to
them. And thus our Lord reproves him saying: If thou wilt be perfect,
go, etc. For it is impossible to fulfil the commandment which says,
Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, and to be rich, especially
to have such great wealth." This also refers to the perfect
fulfilment of this precept. On the other hand, it is true that he
kept the commandments imperfectly and in a general way. For
perfection consists chiefly in the observance of the precepts of
charity, as stated above (Q. 184, A. 3). Wherefore in order to show
that the perfection of the counsels is useful both to the innocent
and to sinners, our Lord called not only the innocent youth but also
the sinner Matthew. Yet Matthew obeyed His call, and the youth obeyed
not, because sinners are converted to the religious life more easily
than those who presume on their innocency. It is to the former that
our Lord says (Matt. 21:31): "The publicans and the harlots shall go
into the kingdom of God before you."

Reply Obj. 2: The highest and the lowest place can be taken in three
ways. First, in reference to the same state and the same man; and
thus it is evident that no one comes to the summit suddenly, since
every man that lives aright, progresses during the whole course of
his life, so as to arrive at the summit. Secondly, in comparison with
various states; and thus he who desires to reach to a higher state
need not begin from a lower state: for instance, if a man wish to be
a cleric he need not first of all be practiced in the life of a
layman. Thirdly, in comparison with different persons; and in this
way it is clear that one man begins straightway not only from a
higher state, but even from a higher degree of holiness, than the
highest degree to which another man attains throughout his whole
life. Hence Gregory says (Dial. ii, 1): "All are agreed that the boy
Benedict began at a high degree of grace and perfection in his daily
life."

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 184, A. 6) the holy orders
prerequire holiness, whereas the religious state is a school for the
attainment of holiness. Hence the burden of orders should be laid on
the walls when these are already seasoned with holiness, whereas the
burden of religion seasons the walls, i.e. men, by drawing out the
damp of vice.

Reply Obj. 4: It is manifest from the words of this gloss that it is
chiefly a question of the order of doctrine, in so far as one has to
pass from easy matter to that which is more difficult. Hence it is
clear from what follows that the statement that certain "heretics"
and "schismatics have perverted this order" refers to the order of
doctrine. For it continues thus: "But he says that he has kept these
things, namely the aforesaid order, binding himself by an oath
[*Referring to the last words of the verse, and taking _retributio,_
which Douay renders _reward,_ as meaning 'punishment']. Thus I was
humble not only in other things but also in knowledge, for 'I was
humbly minded'; because I was first of all fed with milk, which is
the Word made flesh, so that I grew up to partake of the bread of
angels, namely the Word that is in the beginning with God." The
example which is given in proof, of the newly baptized not being
commanded to fast until Pentecost, shows that no difficult things are
to be laid on them as an obligation before the Holy Ghost inspires
them inwardly to take upon themselves difficult things of their own
choice. Hence after Pentecost and the receiving of the Holy Ghost the
Church observes a fast. Now the Holy Ghost, according to Ambrose
(Super Luc. 1:15), "is not confined to any particular age; He ceases
not when men die, He is not excluded from the maternal womb." Gregory
also in a homily for Pentecost (xxx in Ev.) says: "He fills the boy
harpist and makes him a psalmist: He fills the boy abstainer and
makes him a wise judge [*Dan. 1:8-17]," and afterwards he adds: "No
time is needed to learn whatsoever He will, for He teaches the mind
by the merest touch." Again it is written (Eccles. 8:8), "It is not
in man's power to stop the Spirit," and the Apostle admonishes us (1
Thess. 5:19): "Extinguish not the Spirit," and (Acts 7:51) it is said
against certain persons: "You always resist the Holy Ghost."

Reply Obj. 5: There are certain chief precepts which are the ends, so
to say, of the commandments and counsels. These are the precepts of
charity, and the counsels are directed to them, not that these
precepts cannot be observed without keeping the counsels, but that
the keeping of the counsels conduces to the better observance of the
precepts. The other precepts are secondary and are directed to the
precepts of charity; in such a way that unless one observe them it is
altogether impossible to keep the precepts of charity. Accordingly in
the intention the perfect observance of the precepts of charity
precedes the counsels, and yet sometimes it follows them in point of
time. For such is the order of the end in relation to things directed
to the end. But the observance in a general way of the precepts of
charity together with the other precepts, is compared to the counsels
as the common to the proper, because one can observe the precepts
without observing the counsels, but not vice versa. Hence the common
observance of the precepts precedes the counsels in the order of
nature; but it does not follow that it precedes them in point of
time, for a thing is not in the genus before being in one of the
species. But the observance of the precepts apart from the counsels
is directed to the observance of the precepts together with the
counsels; as an imperfect to a perfect species, even as the
irrational to the rational animal. Now the perfect is naturally prior
to the imperfect, since "nature," as Boethius says (De Consol. iii,
10), "begins with perfect things." And yet it is not necessary for
the precepts first of all to be observed without the counsels, and
afterwards with the counsels, just as it is not necessary for one to
be an ass before being a man, or married before being a virgin. In
like manner it is not necessary for a person first of all to keep the
commandments in the world before entering religion; especially as the
worldly life does not dispose one to religious perfection, but is
more an obstacle thereto.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 2]

Whether One Ought to Be Bound by Vow to Enter Religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to be bound by vow to
enter religion. For in making his profession a man is bound by the
religious vow. Now before profession a year of probation is allowed,
according to the rule of the Blessed Benedict (lviii) and according
to the decree of Innocent IV [*Sext. Decret., cap. Non solum., de
Regular. et Transeunt, ad Relig.] who moreover forbade anyone to be
bound to the religious life by profession before completing the year
of probation. Therefore it would seem that much less ought anyone
while yet in the world to be bound by vow to enter religion.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Regist. xi, Ep. 15): Jews "should be
persuaded to be converted, not by compulsion but of their own free
will" (Dist. xlv, can. De Judaeis). Now one is compelled to fulfil
what one has vowed. Therefore no one should be bound by vow to enter
religion.

Obj. 3: Further, no one should give another an occasion of falling;
wherefore it is written (Ex. 21:33, 34): "If a man open a pit . . .
and an ox or an ass fall into it, the owner of the pit shall pay the
price of the beasts." Now through being bound by vow to enter
religion it often happens that people fall into despair and various
sins. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to be bound by vow
to enter religion.

_On the contrary,_ It is written, (Ps. 75:12): "Vow ye, and pay to
the Lord your God"; and a gloss of Augustine says that "some vows
concern the individual, such as vows of chastity, virginity, and the
like." Consequently Holy Scripture invites us to vow these things.
But Holy Scripture invites us only to that which is better. Therefore
it is better to bind oneself by vow to enter religion.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 88, A. 6), when we were treating
of vows, one and the same work done in fulfilment of a vow is more
praiseworthy than if it be done apart from a vow, both because to vow
is an act of religion, which has a certain pre-eminence among the
virtues, and because a vow strengthens a man's will to do good; and
just as a sin is more grievous through proceeding from a will
obstinate in evil, so a good work is the more praiseworthy through
proceeding from a will confirmed in good by means of a vow. Therefore
it is in itself praiseworthy to bind oneself by vow to enter religion.

Reply Obj. 1: The religious vow is twofold. One is the solemn vow
which makes a man a monk or a brother in some other religious order.
This is called the profession, and such a vow should be preceded by a
year's probation, as the objection proves. The other is the simple
vow which does not make a man a monk or a religious, but only binds
him to enter religion, and such a vow need not be preceded by a
year's probation.

Reply Obj. 2: The words quoted from Gregory must be understood as
referring to absolute violence. But the compulsion arising from the
obligation of a vow is not absolute necessity, but a necessity of
end, because after such a vow one cannot attain to the end of
salvation unless one fulfil that vow. Such a necessity is not to be
avoided; indeed, as Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii ad Armentar. et
Paulin.), "happy is the necessity that compels us to better things."

Reply Obj. 3: The vow to enter religion is a strengthening of the
will for better things, and consequently, considered in itself,
instead of giving a man an occasion of falling, withdraws him from
it. But if one who breaks a vow falls more grievously, this does not
derogate from the goodness of the vow, as neither does it derogate
from the goodness of Baptism that some sin more grievously after
being baptized.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 3]

Whether One Who Is Bound by a Vow to Enter Religion Is Under an
Obligation of Entering Religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that one who is bound by the vow to enter
religion is not under an obligation of entering religion. For it is
said in the Decretals (XVII, qu. ii, can. Consaldus): "Consaldus, a
priest under pressure of sickness and emotional fervour, promised to
become a monk. He did not, however, bind himself to a monastery or
abbot; nor did he commit his promise to writing, but he renounced his
benefice in the hands of a notary; and when he was restored to health
he refused to become a monk." And afterwards it is added: "We adjudge
and by apostolic authority we command that the aforesaid priest be
admitted to his benefice and sacred duties, and that he be allowed to
retain them in peace." Now this would not be if he were bound to
enter religion. Therefore it would seem that one is not bound to keep
one's vow of entering religion.

Obj. 2: Further, no one is bound to do what is not in his power. Now
it is not in a person's power to enter religion, since this depends
on the consent of those whom he wishes to join. Therefore it would
seem that a man is not obliged to fulfil the vow by which he bound
himself to enter religion.

Obj. 3: Further, a less useful vow cannot remit a more useful one.
Now the fulfilment of a vow to enter religion might hinder the
fulfilment of a vow to take up the cross in defense of the Holy Land;
and the latter apparently is the more useful vow, since thereby a man
obtains the forgiveness of his sins. Therefore it would seem that the
vow by which a man has bound himself to enter religion is not
necessarily to be fulfilled.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 5:3): "If thou hast vowed
anything to God, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish
promise displeaseth him"; and a gloss on Ps. 75:12, "Vow ye, and pay
to the Lord your God," says: "To vow depends on the will: but after
the vow has been taken the fulfilment is of obligation."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 88, A. 1), when we were treating
of vows, a vow is a promise made to God in matters concerning God.
Now, as Gregory says in a letter to Boniface [*Innoc. I, Epist. ii,
Victricio Epo. Rotomag., cap. 14; Cf. can. Viduas: cause. xxvii, qu.
1]: "If among men of good faith contracts are wont to be absolutely
irrevocable, how much more shall the breaking of this promise given
to God be deserving of punishment!" Therefore a man is under an
obligation to fulfil what he has vowed, provided this be something
pertaining to God.

Now it is evident that entrance into religion pertains very much to
God, since thereby man devotes himself entirely to the divine
service, as stated above (Q. 186, A. 1). Hence it follows that he who
binds himself to enter religion is under an obligation to enter
religion according as he intends to bind himself by his vow: so that
if he intend to bind himself absolutely, he is obliged to enter as
soon as he can, through the cessation of a lawful impediment; whereas
if he intend to bind himself to a certain fixed time, or under a
certain fixed condition, he is bound to enter religion when the time
comes or the condition is fulfilled.

Reply Obj. 1: This priest had made, not a solemn, but a simple vow.
Hence he was not a monk in effect, so as to be bound by law to dwell
in a monastery and renounce his cure. However, in the court of
conscience one ought to advise him to renounce all and enter
religion. Hence (Extra, De Voto et Voti Redemptione, cap. Per tuas)
the Bishop of Grenoble, who had accepted the episcopate after vowing
to enter religion, without having fulfilled his vow, is counseled
that if "he wish to heal his conscience he should renounce the
government of his see and pay his vows to the Most High."

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 88, A. 3, ad 2), when we were
treating of vows, he who has bound himself by vow to enter a certain
religious order is bound to do what is in his power in order to be
received in that order; and if he intend to bind himself simply to
enter the religious life, if he be not admitted to one, he is bound
to go to another; whereas if he intend to bind himself only to one
particular order, he is bound only according to the measure of the
obligation to which he has engaged himself.

Reply Obj. 3: The vow to enter religion being perpetual is greater
than the vow of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, which is a temporal vow;
and as Alexander III says (Extra, De Voto et Voti Redemptione, cap.
Scripturae), "he who exchanges a temporary service for the perpetual
service of religion is in no way guilty of breaking his vow."

Moreover it may be reasonably stated that also by entrance into
religion a man obtains remission of all his sins. For if by giving
alms a man may forthwith satisfy for his sins, according to Dan.
4:24, "Redeem thou thy sins with alms," much more does it suffice to
satisfy for all his sins that a man devote himself wholly to the
divine service by entering religion, for this surpasses all manner of
satisfaction, even that of public penance, according to the Decretals
(XXXIII, qu. i, cap. Admonere) just as a holocaust exceeds a
sacrifice, as Gregory declares (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Hence we read in
the Lives of the Fathers (vi, 1) that by entering religion one
receives the same grace as by being baptized. And yet even if one
were not thereby absolved from all debt of punishment, nevertheless
the entrance into religion is more profitable than a pilgrimage to
the Holy Land, as regards the advancement in good, which is
preferable to absolution from punishment.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 4]

Whether He Who Has Vowed to Enter Religion Is Bound to Remain in
Religion in Perpetuity?

Objection 1: It would seem that he who has vowed to enter religion,
is bound in perpetuity to remain in religion. For it is better not to
enter religion than to leave after entering, according to 2 Pet.
2:21, "It had been better for them not to have known the way of
justice, than after they have known it to turn back," and Luke 9:62,
"No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for
the kingdom of God." But he who bound himself by the vow to enter
religion, is under the obligation to enter, as stated above (A. 3).
Therefore he is also bound to remain for always.

Obj. 2: Further, everyone is bound to avoid that which gives rise to
scandal, and is a bad example to others. Now by leaving after
entering religion a man gives a bad example and is an occasion of
scandal to others, who are thereby withdrawn from entering or incited
to leave. Therefore it seems that he who enters religion in order to
fulfil a vow which he had previously taken, is bound to remain
evermore.

Obj. 3: Further, the vow to enter religion is accounted a perpetual
vow: wherefore it is preferred to temporal vows, as stated above (A.
3, ad 3; Q. 88, A. 12, ad 1). But this would not be so if a person
after vowing to enter religion were to enter with the intention of
leaving. It seems, therefore, that he who vows to enter religion is
bound also to remain in perpetuity.

_On the contrary,_ The vow of religious profession, for the reason
that it binds a man to remain in religion for evermore, has to be
preceded by a year of probation; whereas this is not required before
the simple vow whereby a man binds himself to enter religion.
Therefore it seems that he who vows to enter religion is not for that
reason bound to remain there in perpetuity.

_I answer that,_ The obligation of a vow proceeds from the will:
because "to vow is an act of the will" according to Augustine [*Gloss
of Peter Lombard on Ps. 75:12]. Consequently the obligation of a vow
extends as far as the will and intention of the person who takes the
vow. Accordingly if in vowing he intend to bind himself not only to
enter religion, but also to remain there evermore, he is bound to
remain in perpetuity. If, on the other hand, he intend to bind
himself to enter religion for the purpose of trial, while retaining
the freedom to remain or not remain, it is clear that he is not bound
to remain. If, however, in vowing he thought merely of entering
religion, without thinking of being free to leave, or of remaining in
perpetuity, it would seem that he is bound to enter religion
according to the form prescribed by common law, which is that those
who enter should be given a year's probation. Wherefore he is not
bound to remain for ever.

Reply Obj. 1: It is better to enter religion with the purpose of
making a trial than not to enter at all, because by so doing one
disposes oneself to remain always. Nor is a person accounted to turn
or to look back, save when he omits to do that which he engaged to
do: else whoever does a good work for a time, would be unfit for the
kingdom of God, unless he did it always, which is evidently false.

Reply Obj. 2: A man who has entered religion gives neither scandal
nor bad example by leaving, especially if he do so for a reasonable
motive; and if others are scandalized, it will be passive scandal on
their part, and not active scandal on the part of the person leaving,
since in doing so, he has done what was lawful, and expedient on
account of some reasonable motive, such as sickness, weakness, and
the like.

Reply Obj. 3: He who enters with the purpose of leaving forthwith,
does not seem to fulfil his vow, since this was not his intention in
vowing. Hence he must change that purpose, at least so as to wish to
try whether it is good for him to remain in religion, but he is not
bound to remain for evermore.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 5]

Whether Children Should Be Received in Religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that children ought not to be received in
religion. Because it is said (Extra, De Regular. et Transeunt. ad
Relig., cap. Nullus): "No one should be tonsured unless he be of
legal age and willing." But children, seemingly, are not of legal
age; nor have they a will of their own, not having perfect use of
reason. Therefore it seems that they ought not to be received in
religion.

Obj. 2: Further, the state of religion would seem to be a state of
repentance; wherefore religion is derived [*Cf. Q. 81, A. 1] from
_religare_ (to bind) or from _re-eligere_ (to choose again), as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 3 [*Cf. De Vera Relig. lv]). But
repentance does not become children. Therefore it seems that they
should not enter religion.

Obj. 3: Further, the obligation of a vow is like that of an oath. But
children under the age of fourteen ought not to be bound by oath
(Decret. XXII, qu. v, cap. Pueri and cap. Honestum.). Therefore it
would seem that neither should they be bound by vow.

Obj. 4: Further, it is seemingly unlawful to bind a person to an
obligation that can be justly canceled. Now if any persons of unripe
age bind themselves to religion, they can be withdrawn by their
parents or guardians. For it is written in the Decretals (XX, qu. ii,
can. Puella) that "if a maid under twelve years of age shall take the
sacred veil of her own accord, her parents or guardians, if they
choose, can at once declare the deed null and void." It is therefore
unlawful for children, especially of unripe age, to be admitted or
bound to religion.

_On the contrary,_ our Lord said (Matt. 19:14): "Suffer the little
children, and forbid them not to come to Me." Expounding these words
Origen says (Tract. vii in Matth.) that "the disciples of Jesus
before they have been taught the conditions of righteousness [*Cf.
Matt. 19:16-30], rebuke those who offer children and babes to Christ:
but our Lord urges His disciples to stoop to the service of children.
We must therefore take note of this, lest deeming ourselves to excel
in wisdom we despise the Church's little ones, as though we were
great, and forbid the children to come to Jesus."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2, ad 1), the religious vow is
twofold. One is the simple vow consisting in a mere promise made to
God, and proceeding from the interior deliberation of the mind. Such
a vow derives its efficacy from the divine law. Nevertheless it may
encounter a twofold obstacle. First, through lack of deliberation, as
in the case of the insane, whose vows are not binding [*Extra, De
Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Sicut tenor]. The same applies
to children who have not reached the required use of reason, so as to
be capable of guile, which use boys attain, as a rule, at about the
age of fourteen, and girls at the age of twelve, this being what is
called "the age of puberty," although in some it comes earlier and in
others it is delayed, according to the various dispositions of
nature. Secondly, the efficacy of a simple vow encounters an
obstacle, if the person who makes a vow to God is not his own master;
for instance, if a slave, though having the use of reason, vows to
enter religion, or even is ordained, without the knowledge of his
master: for his master can annul this, as stated in the Decretals
(Dist. LIV, cap. Si servus). And since boys and girls under the age
of puberty are naturally in their father's power as regards the
disposal of their manner of life, their father may either cancel or
approve their vow, if it please him to do so, as it is expressly said
with regard to a woman (Num. 30:4).

Accordingly if before reaching the age of puberty a child makes a
simple vow, not yet having full use of reason, he is not bound in
virtue of the vow; but if he has the use of reason before reaching
the age of puberty, he is bound, so far as he is concerned, by his
vow; yet this obligation may be removed by his father's authority,
under whose control he still remains, because the ordinance of the
law whereby one man is subject to another considers what happens in
the majority of cases. If, however, the child has passed the age of
puberty, his vow cannot be annulled by the authority of his parents;
though if he has not the full use of reason, he would not be bound in
the sight of God.

The other is the solemn vow which makes a man a monk or a religious.
Such a vow is subject to the ordinance of the Church, on account of
the solemnity attached to it. And since the Church considers what
happens in the majority of cases, a profession made before the age of
puberty, however much the person who makes profession may have the
use of reason, or be capable of guile, does not take effect so as to
make him a religious (Extra, De Regular., etc. cap. Significatum
est.).

Nevertheless, although they cannot be professed before the age of
puberty, they can, with the consent of their parents, be received
into religion to be educated there: thus it is related of John the
Baptist (Luke 1:80) that "the child grew and was strengthened in
spirit, and was in the deserts." Hence, as Gregory states (Dial. ii,
3), "the Roman nobles began to give their sons to the blessed
Benedict to be nurtured for Almighty God"; and this is most fitting,
according to Lam. 3:27, "It is good for a man when he has borne the
yoke from his youth." It is for this reason that by common custom
children are made to apply themselves to those duties or arts with
which they are to pass their lives.

Reply Obj. 1: The legal age for receiving the tonsure and taking the
solemn vow of religion is the age of puberty, when a man is able to
make use of his own will; but before the age of puberty it is
possible to have reached the lawful age to receive the tonsure and be
educated in a religious house.

Reply Obj. 2: The religious state is chiefly directed to the
atta[in]ment of perfection, as stated above (Q. 186, A. 1, ad 4); and
accordingly it is becoming to children, who are easily drawn to it.
But as a consequence it is called a state of repentance, inasmuch as
occasions of sin are removed by religious observances, as stated
above (Q. 186, A. 1, ad 4).

Reply Obj. 3: Even as children are not bound to take oaths (as the
canon states), so are they not bound to take vows. If, however, they
bind themselves by vow or oath to do something, they are bound in
God's sight, if they have the use of reason, but they are not bound
in the sight of the Church before reaching the age of fourteen.

Reply Obj. 4: A woman who has not reached the age of puberty is not
rebuked (Num. 30:4) for taking a vow without her parents' consent:
but the vow can be made void by her parents. Hence it is evident that
she does not sin in vowing. But we are given to understand that she
binds herself by vow, so far as she may, without prejudice to her
parents' authority.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 6]

Whether One Ought to Be Withdrawn from Entering Religion Through
Deference to One's Parents?

Objection 1: It would seem that one ought to be withdrawn from
entering religion through deference to one's parents. For it is not
lawful to omit that which is of obligation in order to do that which
is optional. Now deference to one's parents comes under an obligation
of the precept concerning the honoring of our parents (Ex. 20:12);
wherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:4): "If any widow have children
or grandchildren, let her learn first to govern her own house, and to
make a return of duty to her parents." But the entrance to religion
is optional. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to omit
deference to one's parents for the sake of entering religion.

Obj. 2: Further, seemingly the subjection of a son to his father is
greater than that of a slave to his master, since sonship is natural,
while slavery results from the curse of sin, as appears from Gen.
9:25. Now a slave cannot set aside the service of his master in order
to enter religion or take holy orders, as stated in the Decretals
(Dist. LIV, cap. Si servus). Much less therefore can a son set aside
the deference due to his father in order to enter religion.

Obj. 3: Further, a man is more indebted to his parents than to those
to whom he owes money. Now persons who owe money to anyone cannot
enter religion. For Gregory says (Regist. viii, Ep. 5) that "those
who are engaged in trade must by no means be admitted into a
monastery, when they seek admittance, unless first of all they
withdraw from public business" (Dist. liii, can. Legem.). Therefore
seemingly much less may children enter religion in despite of their
duty to their parents.

_On the contrary,_ It is related (Matt. 4:22) that James and John
"left their nets and father, and followed our Lord." By this, says
Hilary (Can. iii in Matth.), "we learn that we who intend to follow
Christ are not bound by the cares of the secular life, and by the
ties of home."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 101, A. 2, ad 2) when we were
treating of piety, parents as such have the character of a principle,
wherefore it is competent to them as such to have the care of their
children. Hence it is unlawful for a person having children to enter
religion so as altogether to set aside the care for their children,
namely without providing for their education. For it is written (1
Tim. 5:8) that "if any man have not care of his own . . . he hath
denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel."

Nevertheless it is accidentally competent to parents to be assisted
by their children, in so far, to wit, as they are placed in a
condition of necessity. Consequently we must say that when their
parents are in such need that they cannot fittingly be supported
otherwise than by the help of their children, these latter may not
lawfully enter religion in despite of their duty to their parents.
If, however, the parents' necessity be not such as to stand in great
need of their children's assistance, the latter may, in despite of
the duty they owe their parents, enter religion even against their
parents' command, because after the age of puberty every freeman
enjoys freedom in things concerning the ordering of his state of
life, especially in such as belong to the service of God, and "we
should more obey the Father of spirits that we may live [*'Shall we
not much more obey the Father of Spirits, and live?']," as says the
Apostle (Heb. 12:9), than obey our parents. Hence as we read (Matt.
8:22; Luke 9:62) our Lord rebuked the disciple who was unwilling to
follow him forthwith on account of his father's burial: for there
were others who could see to this, as Chrysostom remarks [*Hom. xxvii
in Matth.].

Reply Obj. 1: The commandment of honoring our parents extends not
only to bodily but also to spiritual service, and to the paying of
deference. Hence even those who are in religion can fulfil the
commandment of honoring their parents, by praying for them and by
revering and assisting them, as becomes religious, since even those
who live in the world honor their parents in different ways as befits
their condition.

Reply Obj. 2: Since slavery was imposed in punishment of sin, it
follows that by slavery man forfeits something which otherwise he
would be competent to have, namely the free disposal of his person,
for "a slave belongs wholly to his master" [*Aristotle, Polit. i, 2].
On the other hand, the son, through being subject to his father, is
not hindered from freely disposing of his person by transferring
himself to the service of God; which is most conducive to man's good.

Reply Obj. 3: He who is under a certain fixed obligation cannot
lawfully set it aside so long as he is able to fulfil it. Wherefore
if a person is under an obligation to give an account to someone or
to pay a certain fixed debt, he cannot lawfully evade this obligation
in order to enter religion. If, however, he owes a sum of money, and
has not wherewithal to pay the debt, he must do what he can, namely
by surrendering his goods to his creditor. According to civil law
[*Cod. IV, x, de Oblig. et Action, 12] money lays an obligation not
on the person of a freeman, but on his property, because the person
of a freeman "is above all pecuniary consideration" [*Dig. L, xvii,
de div. reg. Jur. ant. 106, 176]. Hence, after surrendering his
property, he may lawfully enter religion, nor is he bound to remain
in the world in order to earn the means of paying the debt.

On the other hand, he does not owe his father a special debt, except
as may arise in a case of necessity, as stated above.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 7]

Whether Parish Priests May Lawfully Enter Religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that parish priests cannot lawfully enter
religion. For Gregory says (Past. iii, 4) that "he who undertakes the
cure of souls, receives an awful warning in the words: 'My son, if
thou be surety for thy friend, thou hast engaged fast thy hand to a
stranger'" (Prov. 6:1); and he goes on to say, "because to be surety
for a friend is to take charge of the soul of another on the surety
of one's own behavior." Now he who is under an obligation to a man
for a debt, cannot enter religion, unless he pay what he owes, if he
can. Since then a priest is able to fulfil the cure of souls, to
which obligation he has pledged his soul, it would seem unlawful for
him to lay aside the cure of souls in order to enter religion.

Obj. 2: Further, what is lawful to one is likewise lawful to all. But
if all priests having cure of souls were to enter religion, the
people would be left without a pastor's care, which would be
unfitting. Therefore it seems that parish priests cannot lawfully
enter religion.

Obj. 3: Further, chief among the acts to which religious orders are
directed are those whereby a man gives to others the fruit of his
contemplation. Now such acts are competent to parish priests and
archdeacons, whom it becomes by virtue of their office to preach and
hear confessions. Therefore it would seem unlawful for a parish
priest or archdeacon to pass over to religion.

_On the contrary,_ It is said in the Decretals (XIX, qu. ii, cap.
Duce sunt leges.): "If a man, while governing the people in his
church under the bishop and leading a secular life, is inspired by
the Holy Ghost to desire to work out his salvation in a monastery or
under some canonical rule, even though his bishop withstand him, we
authorize him to go freely."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3, ad 3; Q. 88, A. 12, ad 1),
the obligation of a perpetual vow stands before every other
obligation. Now it belongs properly to bishops and religious to be
bound by perpetual vow to devote themselves to the divine service
[*Cf. Q. 184, A. 5], while parish priests and archdeacons are not, as
bishops are, bound by a perpetual and solemn vow to retain the cure
of souls. Wherefore bishops "cannot lay aside their bishopric for any
pretext whatever, without the authority of the Roman Pontiff" (Extra,
De Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Licet.): whereas
archdeacons and parish priests are free to renounce in the hands of
the bishop the cure entrusted to them, without the Pope's special
permission, who alone can dispense from perpetual vows. Therefore it
is evident that archdeacons and parish priests may lawfully enter
religion.

Reply Obj. 1: Parish priests and archdeacons have bound themselves to
the care of their subjects, as long as they retain their archdeaconry
or parish, but they did not bind themselves to retain their
archdeaconry or parish for ever.

Reply Obj. 2: As Jerome says (Contra Vigil.): "Although they," namely
religious, "are sorely smitten by thy poisonous tongue, about whom
you argue, saying; 'If all shut themselves up and live in solitude,
who will go to church? who will convert worldlings? who will be able
to urge sinners to virtue?' If this holds true, if all are fools with
thee, who can be wise? Nor will virginity be commendable, for if all
be virgins, and none marry, the human race will perish. Virtue is
rare, and is not desired by many." It is therefore evident that this
is a foolish alarm; thus might a man fear to draw water lest the
river run dry. [*St. Thomas gives no reply to the third objection,
which is sufficiently solved in the body of the article.]
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 8]

Whether It Is Lawful to Pass from One Religious Order to Another?

Objection 1: It seems unlawful to pass from one religious order to
another, even a stricter one. For the Apostle says (Heb. 10:25): "Not
forsaking our assembly, as some are accustomed"; and a gloss
observes: "Those namely who yield through fear of persecution, or who
presuming on themselves withdraw from the company of sinners or of
the imperfect, that they may appear to be righteous." Now those who
pass from one religious order to another more perfect one would seem
to do this. Therefore this is seemingly unlawful.

Obj. 2: Further, the profession of monks is stricter than that of
canons regular (Extra, De Statu Monach. et Canonic. Reg., cap. Quod
Dei timorem). But it is unlawful for anyone to pass from the state of
canon regular to the monastic state. For it is said in the Decretals
(XIX, qu. iii, can. Mandamus): "We ordain and without any exception
forbid any professed canon regular to become a monk, unless (which
God forbid) he have fallen into public sin." Therefore it would seem
unlawful for anyone to pass from one religious order to another of
higher rank.

Obj. 3: Further, a person is bound to fulfil what he has vowed, as
long as he is able lawfully to do so; thus if a man has vowed to
observe continence, he is bound, even after contracting marriage by
words in the present tense, to fulfil his vow so long as the marriage
is not consummated, because he can fulfil the vow by entering
religion. Therefore if a person may lawfully pass from one religious
order to another, he will be bound to do so if he vowed it previously
while in the world. But this would seem objectionable, since in many
cases it might give rise to scandal. Therefore a religious may not
pass from one religious order to another stricter one.

_On the contrary,_ It is said in the Decretals (XX, qu. iv, can.
Virgines): "If sacred virgins design for the good of their soul to
pass to another monastery on account of a stricter life, and decide
to remain there, the holy synod allows them to do so": and the same
would seem to apply to any religious. Therefore one may lawfully pass
from one religious order to another.

_I answer that,_ It is not commendable to pass from one religious
order to another: both because this frequently gives scandal to those
who remain; and because, other things being equal, it is easier to
make progress in a religious order to which one is accustomed than in
one to which one is not habituated. Hence in the Conferences of the
Fathers (Coll. xiv, 5) Abbot Nesteros says: "It is best for each one
that he should, according to the resolve he has made, hasten with the
greatest zeal and care to reach the perfection of the work he has
undertaken, and nowise forsake the profession he has chosen." And
further on he adds (cap. 6) by way of reason: "For it is impossible
that one and the same man should excel in all the virtues at once,
since if he endeavor to practice them equally, he will of necessity,
while trying to attain them all, end in acquiring none of them
perfectly": because the various religious orders excel in respect of
various works of virtue.

Nevertheless one may commendably pass from one religious order to
another for three reasons. First, through zeal for a more perfect
religious life, which excellence depends, as stated above (Q. 188, A.
6), not merely on severity, but chiefly on the end to which a
religious order is directed, and secondarily on the discretion
whereby the observances are proportionate to the due end. Secondly,
on account of a religious order falling away from the perfection it
ought to have: for instance, if in a more severe religious order, the
religious begin to live less strictly, it is commendable for one to
pass even to a less severe religious order if the observance is
better. Hence in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xix, 3, 5, 6)
Abbot John says of himself that he had passed from the solitary life,
in which he was professed, to a less severe life, namely of those who
lived in community, because the hermetical life had fallen into
decline and laxity. Thirdly, on account of sickness or weakness, the
result of which sometimes is that one is unable to keep the
ordinances of a more severe religious order, though able to observe
those of a less strict religion.

There is, however, a difference in these three cases. For in the
first case one ought, on account of humility, to seek permission: yet
this cannot be denied, provided it be certain that this other
religion is more severe. "And if there be a probable doubt about
this, one should ask one's superior to decide" (Extra, De Regular. et
Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Licet.). In like manner the superior's
decision should be sought in the second case. In the third case it is
also necessary to have a dispensation.

Reply Obj. 1: Those who pass to a stricter religious order, do so not
out of presumption that they may appear righteous, but out of
devotion, that they may become more righteous.

Reply Obj. 2: Religious orders whether of monks or of canons regular
are destined to the works of the contemplative life. Chief among
these are those which are performed in the divine mysteries, and
these are the direct object of the orders of canons regular, the
members of which are essentially religious clerics. On the other
hand, monastic religious are not essentially clerics, according to
the Decretals (XVI, qu. i, cap. Alia causa). Hence although monastic
orders are more severe, it would be lawful, supposing the members to
be lay monks, to pass from the monastic order to an order of canons
regular, according to the statement of Jerome (Ep. cxxv, ad Rustic.
Monach.): "So live in the monastery as to deserve to become a
cleric"; but not conversely, as expressed in the Decretal quoted
(XIX, qu. iii). If, however, the monks be clerics devoting themselves
to the sacred ministry, they have this in common with canons regular
coupled with greater severity, and consequently it will be lawful to
pass from an order of canons regular to a monastic order, provided
withal that one seek the superior's permission (XIX, qu. iii; cap.
Statuimus).

Reply Obj. 3: The solemn vow whereby a person is bound to a less
strict order, is more binding than the simple vow whereby a person is
bound to a stricter order. For if after taking a simple vow a person
were to be married, his marriage would not be invalid, as it would be
after his taking a solemn vow. Consequently a person who is professed
in a less severe order is not bound to fulfil a simple vow he has
taken on entering a more severe order.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 9]

Whether One Ought to Induce Others to Enter Religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that no one ought to induce others to
enter religion. For the blessed Benedict prescribes in his Rule
(lviii) that "those who seek to enter religion must not easily be
admitted, but spirits must be tested whether they be of God"; and
Cassian has the same instruction (De Inst. Caenob. iv, 3). Much less
therefore is it lawful to induce anyone to enter religion.

Obj. 2: Further, our Lord said (Matt. 23:15): "Woe to you . . .
because you go round about the sea and the land to make one
proselyte, and when he is made you make him the child of hell twofold
more than yourselves." Now thus would seem to do those who induce
persons to enter religion. Therefore this would seem blameworthy.

Obj. 3: Further, no one should induce another to do what is to his
prejudice. But those who are induced to enter religion, sometimes
take harm therefrom, for sometimes they are under obligation to enter
a stricter religion. Therefore it would not seem praiseworthy to
induce others to enter religion.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 26:3, seqq. [*St. Thomas quotes
the sense, not the words]): "Let one curtain draw the other."
Therefore one man should draw another to God's service.

_I answer that,_ Those who induce others to enter religion not only
do not sin, but merit a great reward. For it is written (James 5:20):
"He who causeth a sinner to be converted from the error of his way,
shall save his soul from death, and shall cover a multitude of sins";
and (Dan. 12:3): "They that instruct many to justice shall be as
stars for all eternity."

Nevertheless such inducement may be affected by a threefold
inordinateness. First, if one person force another by violence to
enter religion: and this is forbidden in the Decretals (XX, qu. iii,
cap. Praesens). Secondly, if one person persuade another simoniacally
to enter religion, by giving him presents: and this is forbidden in
the Decretal (I, qu. ii, cap. Quam pio). But this does not apply to
the case where one provides a poor person with necessaries by
educating him in the world for the religious life; or when without
any compact one gives a person little presents for the sake of good
fellowship. Thirdly, if one person entices another by lies: for it is
to be feared that the person thus enticed may turn back on finding
himself deceived, and thus "the last state of that man" may become
"worse than the first" (Luke 11:26).

Reply Obj. 1: Those who are induced to enter religion have still a
time of probation wherein they make a trial of the hardships of
religion, so that they are not easily admitted to the religious life.

Reply Obj. 2: According to Hilary (Can. xxiv in Matth.) this saying
of our Lord was a forecast of the wicked endeavors of the Jews, after
the preaching of Christ, to draw Gentiles or even Christians to
observe the Jewish ritual, thereby making them doubly children of
hell, because, to wit, they were not forgiven the former sins which
they committed while adherents of Judaism, and furthermore they
incurred the guilt of Jewish perfidy; and thus interpreted these
words have nothing to do with the case in point.

According to Jerome, however, in his commentary on this passage of
Matthew, the reference is to the Jews even at the time when it was
yet lawful to keep the legal observances, in so far as he whom they
converted to Judaism "from paganism, was merely misled; but when he
saw the wickedness of his teachers, he returned to his vomit, and
becoming a pagan deserved greater punishment for his treachery."
Hence it is manifest that it is not blameworthy to draw others to the
service of God or to the religious life, but only when one gives a
bad example to the person converted, whence he becomes worse.

Reply Obj. 3: The lesser is included in the greater. Wherefore a
person who is bound by vow or oath to enter a lesser order, may be
lawfully induced to enter a greater one, unless there be some special
obstacle, such as ill-health, or the hope of making greater progress
in the lesser order. On the other hand, one who is bound by vow or
oath to enter a greater order, cannot be lawfully induced to enter a
lesser order, except for some special and evident motive, and then
with the superior's dispensation.
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 189, Art. 10]

Whether It Is Praiseworthy to Enter Religion Without Taking Counsel
of Many, and Previously Deliberating for a Long Time?

Objection 1: It would not seem praiseworthy to enter religion without
taking counsel of many, and previously deliberating for a long time.
For it is written (1 John 4:1): "Believe not every spirit, but try
the spirits if they be of God." Now sometimes a man's purpose of
entering religion is not of God, since it often comes to naught
through his leaving the religious life; for it is written (Acts 5:38,
39): "If this counsel or this work be of God, you cannot overthrow
it." Therefore it would seem that one ought to make a searching
inquiry before entering religion.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 25:9): "Treat thy cause with
thy friend." Now a man's cause would seem to be especially one that
concerns a change in his state of life. Therefore seemingly one ought
not to enter religion without discussing the matter with one's
friends.

Obj. 3: Further, our Lord (Luke 14:28) in making a comparison with a
man who has a mind to build a tower, says that he doth "first sit
down and reckon the charges that are necessary, whether he have
wherewithal to finish it," lest he become an object of mockery, for
that "this man began to build and was not able to finish." Now the
wherewithal to build the tower, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Laetum
ccxliii), is nothing less than that "each one should renounce all his
possessions." Yet it happens sometimes that many cannot do this, nor
keep other religious observances; and in signification of this it is
stated (1 Kings 17:39) that David could not walk in Saul's armor, for
he was not used to it. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to
enter religion without long deliberation beforehand and taking
counsel of many.

_On the contrary,_ It is stated (Matt. 4:20) that upon our Lord's
calling them, Peter and Andrew "immediately leaving their nets,
followed Him." Here Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Matth.): "Such
obedience as this does Christ require of us, that we delay not even
for a moment."

_I answer that,_ Long deliberation and the advice of many are
required in great matters of doubt, as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
iii, 3); while advice is unnecessary in matters that are certain and
fixed. Now with regard to entering religion three points may be
considered. First, the entrance itself into religion, considered by
itself; and thus it is certain that entrance into religion is a
greater good, and to doubt about this is to disparage Christ Who gave
this counsel. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. c, 2): "The
East," that is Christ, "calleth thee, and thou turnest to the West,"
namely mortal and fallible man. Secondly, the entrance into religion
may be considered in relation to the strength of the person who
intends to enter. And here again there is no room for doubt about the
entrance to religion, since those who enter religion trust not to be
able to stay by their own power, but by the assistance of the divine
power, according to Isa. 40:31, "They that hope in the Lord shall
renew their strength, they shall take wings as eagles, they shall run
and not be weary, they shall walk and not faint." Yet if there be
some special obstacle (such as bodily weakness, a burden of debts, or
the like) in such cases a man must deliberate and take counsel with
such as are likely to help and not hinder him. Hence it is written
(Ecclus. 37:12): "Treat with a man without religion concerning
holiness [*The Douay version supplies the negative: 'Treat not . . .
nor with . . .'], with an unjust man concerning justice," meaning
that one should not do so, wherefore the text goes on (Ecclus. 37:14,
15), "Give no heed to these in any matter of counsel, but be
continually with a holy man." In these matters, however, one should
not take long deliberation. Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. and Paulin.
liii): "Hasten, I pray thee, cut off rather than loosen the rope that
holds the boat to the shore." Thirdly, we may consider the way of
entering religion, and which order one ought to enter, and about such
matters also one may take counsel of those who will not stand in
one's way.

Reply Obj. 1: The saying: "Try the spirits, if they be of God,"
applies to matters admitting of doubt whether the spirits be of God;
thus those who are already in religion may doubt whether he who
offers himself to religion be led by the spirit of God, or be moved
by hypocrisy. Wherefore they must try the postulant whether he be
moved by the divine spirit. But for him who seeks to enter religion
there can be no doubt but that the purpose of entering religion to
which his heart has given birth is from the spirit of God, for it is
His spirit "that leads" man "into the land of uprightness" (Ps.
142:10).

Nor does this prove that it is not of God that some turn back; since
not all that is of God is incorruptible: else corruptible creatures
would not be of God, as the Manicheans hold, nor could some who have
grace from God lose it, which is also heretical. But God's "counsel"
whereby He makes even things corruptible and changeable, is
imperishable according to Isa. 46:10, "My counsel shall stand and all
My will shall be done." Hence the purpose of entering religion needs
not to be tried whether it be of God, because "it requires no further
demonstration," as a gloss says on 1 Thess. 5:21, "Prove all things."

Reply Obj. 2: Even as "the flesh lusteth against the spirit" (Gal.
5:17), so too carnal friends often thwart our spiritual progress,
according to Mic. 7:6, "A man's enemies are they of his own
household." Wherefore Cyril expounding Luke 9:61, "Let me first take
my leave of them that are at my house," says [*Cf. St. Thomas's
Catena Aurea]: "By asking first to take his leave of them that were
at his house, he shows he was somewhat of two minds. For to
communicate with his neighbors, and consult those who are unwilling
to relish righteousness, is an indication of weakness and turning
back. Hence he hears our Lord say: 'No man putting his hand to the
plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God,' because he
looks back who seeks delay in order to go home and confer with his
kinsfolk."

Reply Obj. 3: The building of the tower signifies the perfection of
Christian life; and the renunciation of one's possessions is the
wherewithal to build this tower. Now no one doubts or deliberates
about wishing to have the wherewithal, or whether he is able to build
the tower if he have the wherewithal, but what does come under
deliberation is whether one has the wherewithal. Again it need not be
a matter of deliberation whether one ought to renounce all that one
has, or whether by so doing one may be able to attain to perfection;
whereas it is a matter of deliberation whether that which one is
doing amounts to the renunciation of all that he has, since unless he
does renounce (which is to have the wherewithal) he cannot, as the
text goes on to state, be Christ's disciple, and this is to build the
tower.

The misgiving of those who hesitate as to whether they may be able to
attain to perfection by entering religion is shown by many examples
to be unreasonable. Hence Augustine says (Confess. viii, 11): "On
that side whither I had set my face, and whither I trembled to go,
there appeared to me the chaste dignity of continency . . . honestly
alluring me to come and doubt not, and stretching forth to receive
and embrace me, her holy hands full of multitudes of good examples.
There were so many young men and maidens here, a multitude of youth
and every age, grave widows and aged virgins . . . And she smiled at
me with a persuasive mockery as though to say: Canst not thou what
these youths and these maidens can? Or can they either in themselves,
and not rather in the Lord their God? . . . Why standest thou in
thyself, and so standest not? Cast thyself upon Him; fear not, He
will not withdraw Himself that thou shouldst fall. Cast thyself
fearlessly upon Him: He will receive and will heal thee."

The example quoted of David is not to the point, because "the arms of
Saul," as a gloss on the passage observes, "are the sacraments of the
Law, as being burdensome": whereas religion is the sweet yoke of
Christ, for as Gregory says (Moral. iv, 33), "what burden does He lay
on the shoulders of the mind, Who commands us to shun all troublesome
desires, Who warns us to turn aside from the rough paths of this
world?"

To those indeed who take this sweet yoke upon themselves He promises
the refreshment of the divine fruition and the eternal rest of their
souls.

To which may He Who made this promise bring us, Jesus Christ our
Lord, "Who is over all things God blessed for ever. Amen."