E-text prepared by Robert J. Hall



Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this
      file which includes the original illustrations.
      See 18213-h.htm or 18213-h.zip:
      (https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/8/2/1/18213/18213-h/18213-h.htm)
      or
      (https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/8/2/1/18213/18213-h.zip)





THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR

The War Begins
Invasion of Belgium
Battle of the Marne


VOLUME III







[Illustration: _King George V of Britain and King Albert of Belgium
inspecting Belgian troops. The youth is the Prince of Wales, and
beside him is Major General Pertab Singh of the Indian army_]





CONTENTS

PART I.--GREAT BATTLES OF THE WESTERN ARMIES

CHAPTER

       I. ATTACK ON BELGIUM
      II. SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF LIEGE
     III. BELGIUM'S DEFIANCE
      IV. CAPTURE OF LOUVAIN--SURRENDER OF BRUSSELS
       V. COMING OF THE BRITISH
      VI. CAMPAIGNS IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE
     VII. SIEGE AND FALL OF NAMUR
    VIII. BATTLE OF CHARLEROI
      IX. BATTLE OF MONS
       X. THE GREAT RETREAT BEGINS
      XI. FIGHTING AT BAY
     XII. THE MARNE--GENERAL PLAN OF BATTLE FIELD
    XIII. ALLIED AND GERMAN BATTLE PLANS
     XIV. FIRST MOVES IN THE BATTLE
      XV. GERMAN RETREAT
     XVI. CONTINUATION OF THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE
    XVII. CONTINUATION OF THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE
   XVIII. OTHER ASPECTS OF THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE
     XIX. "CROSSING THE AISNE"
      XX. FIRST DAY'S BATTLES
     XXI. THE BRITISH AT THE AISNE
    XXII. BOMBARDMENT OF RHEIMS AND SOISSONS
   XXIII. SECOND PHASE OF BATTLE OF THE AISNE
    XXIV. END OF THE BATTLE
     XXV. "THE RACE TO THE SEA"
    XXVI. SIEGE AND FALL OF ANTWERP
   XXVII. YSER BATTLES--ATTACK ON YPRES
  XXVIII. ATTACKS ON LA BASSEE AND ARRAS
    XXIX. GENERAL MOVEMENTS ON THE FRENCH AND FLANDERS FRONTS
     XXX. OPERATIONS AROUND LA BASSEE AND GIVENCHY
    XXXI. END OF SIX MONTHS' FIGHTING IN THE WEST

PART II.--NAVAL OPERATIONS

CHAPTER

   XXXII. STRENGTH OF THE RIVAL NAVIES
  XXXIII. FIRST BLOOD--BATTLE OF THE BIGHT
   XXXIV. BATTLES ON THREE SEAS
    XXXV. THE GERMAN SEA RAIDERS
   XXXVI. BATTLE OFF THE FALKLANDS
  XXXVII. SEA FIGHTS OF THE OCEAN PATROL
 XXXVIII. WAR ON GERMAN TRADE AND POSSESSIONS
   XXXIX. RAIDS ON THE ENGLISH COAST
      XL. RESULTS OF SIX MONTHS' NAVAL OPERATIONS

PART III.--THE WAR ON THE EASTERN FRONT

     XLI. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THEATRE OF WAR
    XLII. THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF RUSSIAN POLAND
   XLIII. AUSTRIAN POLAND, GALICIA, AND BUKOWINA
    XLIV. THE BALKANS--COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES
     XLV. THE CAUCASUS--THE BARRED DOOR

PART IV.--THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CAMPAIGN

    XLVI. SERBIA'S SITUATION AND RESOURCES
   XLVII. AUSTRIA'S STRENGTH AND STRATEGY
  XLVIII. AUSTRIAN SUCCESSES
    XLIX. THE GREAT BATTLES BEGIN
       L. FIRST VICTORY OF THE SERBIANS





LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

  KING GEORGE V REVIEWING THE ARMIES IN FRANCE

  GREAT SIEGE GUN IN ACTION BRIDGE
  DESTROYED BY THE BELGIANS AT LIEGE
  BELGIAN FIELD GUN IN ACTION
  FORTRESS TOWN OF NAMUR
  CITY OF MALINES, BELGIUM
  MACHINE GUN CREW IN A WHEAT FIELD
  HEAVY BELGIAN ARTILLERY IN ACTION
  BELGIANS INTRENCHED ALONG A RAILWAY

  OBSERVER IN A RUINED CHATEAU
  BAYONET CHARGE OF FRENCH INFANTRY
  BRITISH NAVAL BRIGADE AT LIERRE
  CITY OF LILLE UNDER FIRE
  WALL FALLING UNDER SHELL FIRE
  HOUSE-TO-HOUSE FIGHT AT YPRES
  FIGHT IN AN ARGONNE VILLAGE
  RALLY OF THE LONDON SCOTTISH

  GERMAN LOOKOUTS IN A TREETOP
  GERMAN PRISONERS IN CHAMPAGNE
  LOUVAIN LANCERS ON THE FRENCH COAST
  COMRADES AIDING A WOUNDED CUIRASSIER
  RED CROSS DOCTOR DRESSING AVIATOR'S WOUNDS
  NAVE AND CHOIR OF NOTRE DAME, RHEIMS
  RUINS OF NOTRE DAME
  FRENCH MARINES DINING ASHORE

  SEARCHLIGHTS ON A BATTLESHIP
  WALKÜRE, WRECKED AT PAPEETE
  SYDNEY, AUSTRALIAN CRUISER
  EMDEN AGROUND AFTER THE SYDNEY'S VICTORY
  RESCUING SAILORS AFTER THE FIGHT NEAR THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
  CANADIANS SHIPPING FIELD ARTILLERY
  INTERIOR OF A SUBMARINE
  WRECK OF THE BLÜCHER IN THE NORTH SEA BATTLE




LIST OF MAPS

  BELGIUM-FRANCO-GERMAN FRONTIER
  FRANCE, PICTORIAL MAP OF
  BELGIUM, BEGINNING OF GERMAN INVASION OF
  ALSACE-LORRAINE, FRENCH INVASION OF
  BATTLE OF MONS AND RETREAT OF ALLIED ARMIES
  BATTLE OF THE MARNE--BEGINNING ON SEPTEMBER 5, 1914
  BATTLE OF THE MARNE--SITUATION ON SEPTEMBER 9, 1914
  BATTLE OF THE MARNE--END OF GERMAN RETREAT AND THE INTRENCHED LINE
    ON THE AISNE RIVER
  LIEGE FORT, GERMAN ATTACK OF
  ANTWERP, SIEGE AND FALL OF
  FLANDERS, BATTLE FRONT IN
  GERMAN AND ENGLISH NAVAL POSITIONS
  WAR IN THE EAST--RELATION OF THE EASTERN COUNTRIES TO GERMANY
  THE BALKANS, PICTORIAL MAP OF
  SERBIAN AND AUSTRIAN INVASIONS




PART I--GREAT BATTLES OF THE WESTERN ARMIES

       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER I

ATTACK ON BELGIUM

The first great campaign on the western battle grounds in the European
War began on August 4, 1914. On this epoch-making day the German
army began its invasion of Belgium--with the conquest of France
as its ultimate goal. Six mighty armies stood ready for the great
invasion. Their estimated total was 1,200,000 men. Supreme over
all was the Emperor as War Lord, but Lieutenant General Helmuth
van Moltke, chief of the General Staff, was the practical director
of military operations. General van Moltke was a nephew of the great
strategist of 1870, and his name possibly appealed as of happy
augury for repeating the former capture of Paris.

The First Army was assembled at Aix-la-Chapelle in the north of
Belgium, within a few miles of the Dutch frontier. It was under
the command of General van Kluck. He was a veteran of both the
Austrian and Franco-Prussian Wars, and was regarded as an able
infantry leader. His part was to enter Belgium at its northern
triangle, which projects between Holland and Germany, occupy Liege,
deploy on the great central plains of Belgium, then sweep toward
the French northwestern frontier in the German dash for Paris and
the English Channel. His army thus formed the right wing of the
whole German offensive. It was composed of picked corps, including
cavalry of the Prussian Guard.

The Second Army had gathered in the neighborhood of Limbourg under
the command of General von Bülow. Its advance was planned down the
valleys of the Ourthe and Vesdre to a junction with Von Kluck at
Liege, then a march by the Meuse Valley upon Namur and Charleroi.
In crossing the Sambre it was to fall into place on the left of
Von Kluck's army.

The German center was composed of the Third Army under Duke Albrecht
of Württemberg, the Fourth Army led by the crown prince, and the
Fifth Army commanded by the Crown Prince of Bavaria. It was assembled
on the line Neufchateau-Treves-Metz. Its first offensive was the
occupation of Luxemburg. This was performed, after a somewhat dramatic
protest by the youthful Grand Duchess, who placed her motor car
across the bridge by which the Germans entered her internationally
guaranteed independent state. The German pretext was that since
Luxemburg railways were German controlled, they were required for
the transport of troops. Preparations were then made for a rapid
advance through the Ardennes upon the Central Meuse, to form in
order upon the left of Von Bülow's army. A part of the Fifth Army
was to be detached for operations against the French fortress of
Verdun.

The Sixth Army was concentrated at Strassburg in Alsace, under
General von Heeringen. As inspector of the Prussian Guards he bore
a very high military reputation. For the time being General von
Heeringen's part was to remain in Alsace, to deal with a possibly
looked for strong French offensive by way of the Vosges or Belfort.

The main plan of the German General Staff, therefore was a wide
enveloping movement by the First and Second Armies to sweep the
shore of the English Channel in their march on Paris, a vigorous
advance of the center through the Ardennes for the same destination,
and readiness for battle by the Sixth Army for any French force
which might be tempted into Alsace. That this plan was not developed
in its entirety, was due to circumstances which fall into another
place.

[Illustration: PICTORIAL MAP OF FRANCE]

The long anticipated _Day_ dawned. Their vast military machine
moved with precision and unity. But there was a surprise awaiting
them. The Belgians were to offer a serious resistance to passage
through their territory--a firm refusal had been delivered at the
eleventh hour. The vanguard was thrown forward from Von Kluck's
army at Aix, to break through the defenses of Liege and seize the
western railways. This force of three divisions was commanded by
General von Emmich, one of them joining him at Verviers.

On the evening of August 3, 1914, Von Emmich's force had crossed
into Belgium. Early on the morning of August 4, 1914, Von Kluck's
second advance line reached Visé, situated on the Meuse north of
Liege and close to the Dutch frontier. Here an engagement took place
with a Belgian guard, which terminated with the Germans bombarding
Visé. The Belgians had destroyed the river bridge, but the Germans
succeeded in seizing the crossing.

This was the first actual hostility of the war on the western battle
grounds. With the capture of Visé, the way was clear for Von Kluck's
main army to concentrate on Belgian territory. By nightfall, Liege
was invested on three sides. Only the railway lines and roads running
westward remained open.

[Illustration: BELGIUM AND THE FRANCO-GERMAN BORDER]


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER II

SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF LIEGE

A view of Liege will assist in revealing its three days' siege,
with the resulting effect upon the western theatre of war. Liege
is the capital of the Walloons, a sturdy race that in times past
has at many a crisis proved unyielding determination and courage.
At the outbreak of war it was the center of great coal mining and
industrial activity. In the commercial world it is known everywhere
for the manufacture of firearms. The smoke from hundreds of factories
spreads over the city, often hanging in dense clouds. It might
aptly be termed the Pittsburg of Belgium. The city lies in a deep,
broad cut of the River Meuse, at its junction with the combined
channels of the Ourthe and Vesdre. It stretches across both sides,
being connected by numerous bridges, while parallel lines of railway
follow the course of the main stream. The trunk line from Germany
into Belgium crosses the Meuse at Liege. For the most part the
old city of lofty houses clings to a cliffside on the left bank,
crowned by an ancient citadel of no modern defensive value. Whatever
picturesqueness Liege may have possessed is effaced by the squalid
and dilapidated condition of its poorer quarters. To the north
broad fertile plains extend into central Belgium, southward on the
opposite bank of the Meuse, the Ardennes present a hilly forest,
stream-watered region. In its downward course the Meuse flows out
of the Liege trench to expand through what is termed the Dutch
Flats.

Liege, at the outbreak of the war, was a place of great wealth and
extreme poverty--a Liege artisan considered himself in prosperity
on $5 a week. It was of the first strategic importance to Belgium.
Its situation was that of a natural fortress, barring the advance
of a German army.

The defenses of Liege were hardly worth an enemy's gunfire before
1890. They had consisted of a single fort on the Meuse right bank,
and the citadel crowning the heights of the old town. But subsequently
the Belgian Chamber voted the necessary sums for fortifying Liege
and Namur on the latest principles. From the plans submitted, the
one finally decided upon was that of the famous Belgian military
engineer Henri Alexis Brialmont. His design was a circle of detached
forts, already approved by German engineers as best securing a
city within from bombardment. With regard to Liege and Namur
particularly, Brialmont held that his plan would make passages of
the Meuse at those places impregnable to an enemy.

When the German army stood before Liege on this fourth day of August,
in 1914, the circumference of the detached forts was thirty-one miles
with about two or three miles between them, and at an average of
five miles from the city. Each fort was constructed on a new model
to withstand the highest range and power of offensive artillery
forecast in the last decade of the nineteenth century. When completed
they presented the form of an armored mushroom, thrust upward from
a mound by subterranean machinery. The elevation of the cupola in
action disclosed no more of its surface than was necessary for the
firing of the guns. The mounds were turfed and so inconspicuous that
in times of peace sheep grazed over them. In Brialmont's original
plan each fort was to be connected by infantry trenches with sunken
emplacements for light artillery, but this important part of his
design was relegated to the dangerous hour of a threatening enemy.
This work was undertaken too late before the onsweep of the Germans.
Instead, Brialmont's single weak detail in surrounding each fort
with an infantry platform was tenaciously preserved long after
its uselessness must have been apparent. Thus Liege was made a
ring fortress to distinguish it from the former latest pattern of
earth ramparts and outworks.

Six major and six minor of these forts encircled Liege. From north
to south, beginning with those facing the German frontier, their
names ran as follows: Barchon, Evegnée, Fleron, Chaud-fontaine,
Embourg, Boncelles, Flemalle, Hollogne, Loncin, Lantin, Liers,
and Pontisse. The armaments of the forts consisted of 6-inch and
4.7-inch guns, with 8-inch mortars and quick firers. They were
in the relative number of two, four, two and four for the major
forts, and two, two, one and three for the minor _fortins_, as
such were termed. The grand total was estimated at 400 pieces.
In their confined underground quarters the garrisons, even of the
major forts, did not exceed eighty men from the engineer, artillery
and infantry branches of the service. Between Fort Pontisse and
the Dutch frontier was less than six miles.

It was through this otherwise undefended gap that Von Kluck purposed
to advance his German army after the presumed immediate fall of
Liege, to that end having seized the Meuse crossing at Visé. The
railway line to Aix-la-Chapelle was dominated by Fort Fleron, while
the minor Forts Chaudfontaine and Embourg, to the south, commanded
the trunk line by way of Liege into Belgium. On the plateau, above
Liege, Fort Loncin held the railway junction of Ans and the lines
running from Liege north and west. Finally, the forts were not
constructed on a geometric circle, but in such manner that the
fire of any two was calculated to hold an enemy at bay should a
third between them fall. This was probably an accurate theory before
German guns of an unimagined caliber and range were brought into
action.

In command of the Belgian forts at Liege was General Leman. He had
served under Brialmont, and was pronounced a serious and efficient
officer. He was a zealous military student, physically extremely
active, and constantly on the watch for any relaxation of discipline.
These qualities enabled him to grasp at the outset the weakness
of his position.

If the Germans believed the refusal to grant a free passage for
their armies through Belgium to be little more than a diplomatic
protest, it would seem the Belgian Government was equally mistaken
in doubting the Germans would force a way through an international
treaty of Belgian neutrality. Consequently, the German crossing
of the frontier discovered Belgium with her mobilization but half
complete, mainly on a line for the defense of Brussels and Antwerp.
It had been estimated by Brialmont that 75,000 men of all arms
were necessary for the defense of Liege on a war footing, probably
35,000 was the total force hastily gathered in the emergency to
withstand the German assault on the fortifications. It included
the Civic Guard.

General Leman realized, therefore, that, without a supporting field
army, it would be impossible for him to hold the German hosts before
Liege for more than a few days--a week at most.

But he hoped within such time the French or British would march
to his relief. Thus his chief concern was for the forts protecting
the railway leading from Namur down the Meuse Valley into Liege--the
line of a French or British advance.

On the afternoon of August 4, 1914, German patrols appeared on
the left bank of the Meuse, approaching from Visé. They were also
observed by the sentries on Forts Barchon, Evegnée and Fleron.
German infantry and artillery presently came into view with the
unmistakable object of beginning the attack on those forts. The
forts fired a few shots by way of a challenge. As evening fell,
the woods began to echo with the roar of artillery. Later, Forts
Fleron, Chaudfontaine and Embourg were added to the German bombardment.
The Germans used long range field pieces with powerful explosive
shells. The fire proved to be remarkably accurate. As their shells
exploded on the cupolas and platforms of the forts, the garrisons
in their confined citadels began to experience that inferno of
vibrations which subsequently deprived them of the incentive to
eat or sleep. The Belgians replied vigorously, but owing to the
broken nature of the country, and the forethought with which the
Germans took advantage of every form of gun cover, apparently little
execution was dealt upon the enemy. However, the Belgians claimed
to have silenced two of the German pieces.

In the darkness of this historic night of August 4, 1914, the flames
of the fortress guns pierced the immediate night with vivid streaks.
Their searchlights swept in broad streams the wooded slopes opposite.
The cannonade resounded over Liege, as if with constant peals of
thunder. In the city civilians sought the shelter of their cellars,
but few of the German shells escaped their range upon the forts
to disturb them.

This exchange of artillery went on until near daybreak of August
5, 1914, when infantry fire from the woods to the right of Fort
Embourg apprised the defenders that the Germans were advancing to
the attack. The Germans came on in their customary massed formation.
The prevalent opinion that in German tactics such action was employed
to hearten the individual soldier, was denied by their General
Staff. In their opinion an advantage was thus gained by the
concentration of rifle fire. Belgian infantry withstood the assault,
and counter-attacked. When dawn broke, a general engagement was
in progress. About eight o'clock the Germans were compelled to
withdraw.

[Illustration: BEGINNING OF GERMAN INVASION OF BELGIUM]

The first engagement of the war was won by the Belgians. It was
reported that the Belgian fire had swept the Germans down in thousands,
but this was denied by German authorities. Up to this time the
German forces before Liege were chiefly Von Kluck's vanguard under
Von Emmich, his second line of advance, and detachments of Von
Bülow's army. On the Belgian side no attempt was made to follow
up the advantage. The reason given is that the Germans were seen
to be in strong cavalry force, an arm lost totally in the military
complement of Liege. The German losses were undoubtedly severe,
especially in front of Fort Barchon. This was one of the major
forts, triangular in shape, and surrounded by a ditch and barbed
wire entanglements. The armament of these major forts had recently
been reenforced by night, secretly, with guns of heavier caliber
from Antwerp. As they outmatched the German field pieces of the
first attack, presumably the German Intelligence Department had
failed in news of them. An armistice requested by the Germans to
gather in the wounded and bury the dead was refused. Thereupon
the artillery duel recommenced.

A hot and oppressive day disclosed woods rent and scarred, standing
wheat fields shell-plowed and trampled, and farm houses set ablaze.
The bringing of the Belgian wounded into Liege apprised the citizens
that their side had also suffered considerably. Meanwhile, the
Germans were reenforced by the Tenth Hanoverian Army Corps, from
command of which General von Emmich had been detached to lead Von
Kluck's vanguard, also artillery with 8.4-inch howitzers.

The bombardment on this 5th day of August, 1914, now stretched from
Visé around the Meuse right bank half circle of forts to embrace
Pontisse and Boncelles at its extremities. In a few hours infantry
attack began again. The Germans advanced in masses by short rushes,
dropping to fire rifle volleys, and then onward with unflinching
determination. The forts, wreathed in smoke, blazed shells among
them; their machine guns spraying streams of bullets. The Germans
were repulsed and compelled to retire, but only to re-form for a
fresh assault. Both Belgian and German aeroplanes flew overhead
to signal their respective gunners. A Zeppelin was observed, but
did not come within range of Belgian fire. The Belgians claim to
have shot down one German aeroplane, and another is said to have
been brought to earth by flying within range of its own artillery.

During the morning of August 5, Fort Fleron was put out of action
by shell destruction of its cupola-hoisting machinery. This proved a
weak point in Brialmont's fortress plan. It was presently discovered
that the fire of the supporting forts Evegnée and Chaudfontaine
could not command the lines forming the apex of their triangle.
Further, since the Belgian infantry was not in sufficient force
to hold the lines between the forts, a railway into Liege fell
to the enemy. The fighting here was of such a desperate nature,
that General Leman hastened to reenforce with all his reserve.

This battle went on during the afternoon and night of August 5,
into the morning of August 6, 1914. But the fall of Fort Fleron
began to tell in favor of the Germans. Belgian resistance perforce
weakened. The ceaseless pounding of the German 8.4-inch howitzers
smashed the inner concrete and stone protective armor of the forts,
as if of little more avail than cardboard. At intervals on August
6, Forts Chaudfontaine, Evegnée and Barchon fell under the terrific
hail of German shells. A way was now opened into the city, though,
for the most part, still contested by Belgian infantry. A party
of German hussars availed themselves of some unguarded path to
make a daring but ineffectual dash to capture General Leman and
his staff.

General Leman was consulting with his officers at military headquarters,
on August 6, 1914, when they were startled by shouts outside. He
rushed forth into a crowd of citizens to encounter eight men in
German uniform. General Leman cried for a revolver to defend himself,
but another officer, fearing the Germans had entered the city in
force, lifted him up over a foundry wall. Both Leman and the officer
made their escape by way of an adjacent house. Belgian Civic Guards
hastening to the scene dispatched an officer and two men of the
German raiders. The rest of the party are said to have been made
prisoners.

The end being merely a question of hours, General Leman ordered
the evacuation of the city by the infantry. He wisely decided it
could be of more service to the Belgian army at Dyle, than held in
a beleaguered and doomed city. Reports indicate that this retreat,
though successfully performed, was precipitate. The passage of it
was scattered with arms, equipment, and supplies of all kinds.
An ambulance train was abandoned, twenty locomotives left in the
railway station, and but one bridge destroyed in rear beyond immediate
repair. After its accomplishment, General Leman took command of the
northern forts, determined to hold them against Von Kluck until
the last Belgian gun was silenced.

Early on August 7, 1914, Burgomaster Kleyer and the Bishop of Liege
negotiated terms for the surrender of the city. It had suffered
but slight damage from the bombardment. Few of the citizens were
reported among the killed or injured. On behalf of the Germans it
must be said their occupation of Liege was performed in good order,
with military discipline excellently maintained. They behaved with
consideration toward the inhabitants in establishing their rule
in the city, and paid for all supplies requisitioned. They were
quartered in various public buildings and institutions, probably to
the number of 10,000. The German troops at first seemed to present
an interesting spectacle. They were mostly young men, reported as
footsore from their long march in new, imperfectly fitting boots,
and hungry from the lack of accompanying commissariat. This is proof
that the German's military machine did not work to perfection at the
outset. Later, some hostile acts by Belgian individuals moved the
German military authorities to seize a group of the principal citizens,
and warn the inhabitants that the breaking of a peaceful attitude
would be at the risk of swiftly serious punishment. Precautions to
enforce order were such as is provided in martial law, and carried
out with as little hardship as possible to the citizens. The Germans
appeared anxious to restore confidence and win a feeling of good
will.

For some days after the capitulation of the city the northern forts
continued a heroic resistance. So long as these remained uncaptured,
General Leman maintained that, strategically, Liege had not fallen.
He thus held in check the armies of Von Kluck and Von Bülow, when
every hour was of supreme urgency for their respective onsweep into
central Belgium and up the Meuse Valley. The Germans presently
brought into an overpowering bombardment their ll-inch siege guns.

On August 13, 1914, Embourg was stricken into ruin. On the same
day the electric lighting apparatus of Fort Boncelles having been
destroyed, the few living men of its garrison fought through the
following night in darkness, and in momentary danger of suffocation
from gases emitted by the exploding German shells.

Early in the morning of August 14, 1914, though its cupolas were
battered in and shells rained upon the interior, the commander
refused an offer of surrender. A little later the concrete inner
chamber walls fell in. The commander of Boncelles, having exhausted
his defensive, hoisted the white flag. He had held out for eleven
days in a veritable death-swept inferno.

Fort Loncin disputed with Boncelles the honor of being the last to
succumb. The experience of its garrison differed only in terrible
details from Boncelles. Its final gun shot was fired by a man with
his left hand, since the other had been severed. Apparently a shell
exploded in its magazine, and blew up the whole fort. General Leman
was discovered amid its débris, pinned beneath a huge beam. He was
released by his own men. When taken to a trench, a German officer
found that he was merely unconscious from shock.

When sufficiently recovered, General Leman was conducted to General
von Emmich to tender his personal surrender. The two had previously
been comrades at maneuvers. The report of their meeting is given
by a German officer. The guard presented the customary salute due
General Leman's rank. General von Emmich advanced a few steps to
meet General Leman. Both generals saluted.

"General," said Von Emmich, "you have gallantly and nobly held your
forts."

"I thank you," Leman replied. "Our troops have lived up to their
reputation. War is not like maneuvers, _mon Général_," he added
with a pointed smile. "I ask you to bear witness that you found
me unconscious."

General Leman unbuckled his sword to offer it to the victor. Von
Emmich bowed.

"No, keep it," he gestured. "To have crossed swords with you has
been an honor."

Subsequently the President of the French Republic bestowed on Liege
the Cross of the Legion of Honor. To its motto in this instance
might have been added appropriately: Liege, the Savior of Paris.
The few days of its resistance to an overwhelming force enabled
the Belgium army to improve its mobilization, the British to throw
an expeditionary army into France, and the French to make a new
offensive alignment. It will forever remain a brilliant page in war
annals. In a military estimate it proved that forts constructed on
the lastest scientific principles, but unsupported by an intrenched
field army, crumple under the concentrated fire of long-range,
high-power enemy guns.

The fall of the northern and eastern Liege forts released Von Kluck's
army for its march into central Belgium. Meanwhile the Belgian army
had been concentrated on a line of the River Dyle, with its left
touching Malines and its right resting on Louvain. Its commander,
General Selliers de Moranville, made his headquarters in the latter
city. The Belgian force totaled 110,000 men of all complements.
Whether this included the reinforcement by the Liege infantry is
uncertain.

During August 10 and 11, 1914, General Moranville threw forward
detachments to screen his main body in front of the German advance.
On the 11th a rumor that the French had crossed the Sambre, moved
General Moranville to extend his right wing to Eghezee, with the
hope of getting in touch with the Allies. That the French and British
were hastening to his support could not be doubted. They were already
overdue, but assuredly would come soon. That was the Belgian reliance,
passing from mouth to mouth among the Court, Cabinet Ministers,
General Staff, down to the factory toilers, miners, and peasants
on their farms. The Sambre report, like many others in various
places, proved unfounded.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER III

BELGIUM'S DEFIANCE

A view of the general situation in Belgium will assist in clearing
the way for swiftly following events. Germany had invaded Belgium
against the diplomatic and active protests of its Government. But
the German Government still hoped that the heroic resistance of
Liege would satisfy Belgian national spirit, and a free passage
of German troops now be granted. The German Emperor made a direct
appeal to the King of the Belgians through the medium of the Queen
of Holland. From the German point of outlook their victory could
best be attained by the march through Belgium upon Paris. The German
Government asserted that the French and British contemplated a
similar breach of Belgian neutrality. To their mind, it was a case
of which should be on the ground first. On the other hand, the
Allies pronounced the German invasion of Belgium an unprovoked
assault, and produced countertestimony. The controversy has continued
to this day. But the war as it progressed has seen many breaches of
neutrality, and a certain resignation to the inevitable has succeeded
the moral indignation so easily aroused in its early stages.

Let us now glance at the condition of Belgium when war was declared.
The Belgians were an industrial and not a militant people. They
had ample reason to yearn for a permanent peace. Their country had
been the cockpit of Europe from the time of Cæsar until Waterloo.
The names of their cities, for the most part, represented great
historic battle fields. Again and again had the ruin of conflict
swept over their unfortunately situated land. At all periods the
Belgians were brave fighters on one side or the other, for Belgium
had been denied a national unity. Doubtless, therefore, they welcomed
the establishment of their independent sovereignty and the era of
peace which followed. Historically, they had suffered enough, with
an abundance to spare, from perpetual warfare. Their minds turned
hopefully toward industrial and commercial activity, stimulated
by the natural mineral wealth of their soil. Thus the products
of their factories reached all countries, South America, China,
Manchuria, and Central Africa, especially of later years, where
a great territory had been acquired in the Congo. The iron and
steel work of Liege was famous, Antwerp had become one of the chief
ports of Europe and growing into a financial power. But owing to
the confined boundaries of Belgium, there grew to be a congestion
of population. This produced a strong democratic and socialistic
uplift which even threatened the existence of the monarchy. Also,
all that monarchy seemed to imply.

The Belgians, doubtless with memories of the past, despised and hated
the display of military. Consequently it was only with difficulty,
and in the face of popular opposition, that the Belgium Government
had succeeded with military plans for defense, but imperfectly
carried out. Herein, perhaps, we have the keynote to Belgium's
desperate resistance to the German invaders. In the light of the
foregoing, it is easily conceivable that the Germans represented
to the Belgians the military yoke. They were determined to have
none of it, upon any overtures or terms. But they relied on France
and England for protection, when common prudence should have made
the mobilization of an up-to-date army of 500,000 men ready for
the call to repel an invader on either of the frontiers, instead
of the practically helpless force of 110,000.

The German General Staff did not believe the Belgians intended
to raise a serious barrier in their path. But with the crisis,
democratic Belgium united in a rush to arms, which recalls similar
action by the American colonists at the Revolution. Every form of
weapon was grasped, from old muskets to pitchforks and shearing
knives. It was remarked by a foreign witness that in default of
properly equipped armories, the Belgians emptied the museums to
confront the Germans with the strangest assortment of antiquated
military tools.

As testimony of Belgian feeling, the Labor party organ "Le Peuple"
issued the following trumpet blast: "Why do we, as irreconcilable
antimilitarists, cry 'Bravo!' from the bottom of our hearts to
all those who offer themselves for the defense of the country?
Because it is not only necessary to protect the hearths and homes,
the women and the children, but it is also necessary to protect at
the price of our blood the heritage of our ancient freedom. Go,
then, sons of the workers, and register your names as recruits. We
will rather die for the idea of progress and solidarity of humanity
than live under a régime whose brutal force and savage violence
have wiped outright."

The Belgian General Staff, foreseeing dire consequences from such
inflaming press utterances, warned all those not regularly enlisted
to maintain a peaceful attitude. Disregard of this admonition later
met with heavy retribution.

On Wednesday, August 12, 1914, a German cavalry screen, thrown in
advance of the main forces, came in touch with Belgian patrols.
A series of engagements took place. The Germans tried to seize
the bridges across the Dyle at Haelen, and at Cortenachen on the
Velpe, a tributary of the former river, mainly with the object of
outflanking the Belgian left wing. The Belgians are said to have
numbered some 10,000 of all arms, and were successful in repulsing
the Germans.

On August 13, 1914, similar actions were continued. At Tirlemont
2,000 German cavalry swept upon the town, but were beaten off.
At Eghezee on the extreme Belgian right--close to Namur and the
historic field of Ramillies--another brush with the Germans took
place. Belgian cavalry caught a German cavalry detachment bivouacked
in the village. Sharp fighting through the streets ensued before the
Germans withdrew. In spite of the warning of the Belgian General
Staff, and similar advance German notices, the citizens of some
of these and other places began sniping German patrols.

Meantime, moving over the roads toward Namur, toiled the huge German
42-centimeter guns. The German General Staff had taken to mind
the lesson of Liege. Each gun was transported in several parts,
hauled by traction engines and forty horses. Of this, with the
advance of Von Kluck and Von Bülow, the Belgian General Staff was
kept in total ignorance by the German screen of cavalry. So ably
was this screen work performed that the Belgians were led to believe
the Germans had succeeded in placing no more than two divisions of
cavalry, together with a few detachments of infantry and artillery,
on Belgian soil. They, in fact, regarded the German cavalry skirmishing
as a rather clumsy offensive.

As we have seen, the resistance of Forts Boncelles and Loncin at
Liege held back the main German advance from seven to ten days.
Their fall released into German control the railway junction at
Ans. With that was included the line from Liege up the left bank
of the Meuse to Namur. Also, another line direct to Brussels.

On August 15, 1914, the cavalry screen was withdrawn, and four
German army corps were revealed to the surprised Belgian line.
In this emergency, clearly their only hope lay with the French.
In Louvain, Brussels, and Antwerp, anxious questions lay on all
lips. "Why do not the French hasten to our aid? When will they
come? Will the British fail us at the twelfth hour?"

Eager watchers at Ostend beheld no sign of the promised transports
to disembark a British army of support in the day of overwhelming
need. About this time some French cavalry crossed the Sambre to
join hands with the Belgian right wing near Waterloo. But it was
little more than a detachment. The French General Staff was occupied
with a realignment, and had decided not to advance into Belgium
until they could do so in force sufficient to cope with the Germans.
The Belgian General Staff saw there was no other course but to
fall back, fighting rear-guard actions until the longed-for French
army was heralded by the thunder of friendly guns.

The Belgian army was thus withdrawn from the River Gethe to hold
Aerschot on its left stubbornly through August 14, 1914. Diest,
St. Trond, and Waremme fell before the German tidal wave without
resistance. Von Kluck's main army endeavored to sweep around the
Belgian right at Wavre, but was checked for a brief space.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER IV

CAPTURE OF LOUVAIN--SURRENDER OF BRUSSELS

During August 17, 1914, the German center was hurled forward in
irresistible strength. The citizens of the villages in its path
fled precipitously along the roads to Brussels. At intersections
all kinds of vehicles bearing household effects, together with live
stock, blocked the way to safety. The uhlan had become a terror,
but not without some provocation. Tirlemont was bombarded, reduced,
and evacuated by the Belgian troops. The latter made a vigorous
defensive immediately before Louvain, but their weakness in artillery
and numbers could not withstand the overwhelming superiority of
the Germans. They were thrust back from the valley of the Dyle to
begin their retreat on Antwerp, chiefly by way of Malines. This
was to elude a successful German envelopment on their Louvain right.
They retired in good order, but their losses had been considerable.

This body was the Belgian right wing, which fell back to take up
a position before Louvain. Here it fought a well-sustained action
on August 19, 1914, the purpose of which was to cover the retreat
of the main army by way of Malines on Antwerp. The Belgian right
wing thus became a rear guard.

It withstood the German attack until the early morning of August
20, 1914, when, separated from the main body, the overpowering
number of German guns and men drove it back to a final stand between
Louvain and Brussels. If its losses had been heavy, the carrying away
of the wounded proved that it still maintained a fighting front.
The retreat of the main army on Antwerp was part of Brialmont's
plan for the defense of Belgium, since the position of Brussels
was not capable of a strong defense. By this time the main army
was safely passing down the valley of the Dyle to the shelter of
the Antwerp forts, leaving the right wing to its fate. Louvain
thus fell to the Germans.

Toward noon of August 20, 1914, the burgomaster and four sheriffs
awaited at one of the city gates, the first German appearance.
This proved to be a party of hussars bearing a white flag. They
conducted the burgomaster to the waiting generals at the head of the
advance column. In token of surrender the burgomaster was requested
to remove his scarf of office, displaying the Belgian national
colors. The German terms were then pronounced. A free passage of
troops through the city was to be granted, and 3,000 men garrisoned
in its barracks. In return, cash was to be paid for all supplies
requisitioned, and a guarantee given for the lives and property
of the inhabitants. The Germans further agreed to maintain the
established civil power, but warned that hostile acts by civilians
would be severely punished. These terms were in general in conformity
with the rules of war governing the military occupation of an enemy
city. In this respect emphasis should be laid on the fact that
under these rules the hostile act of any civilian places him in
the same position as a spy. His recognized sentence is death by
court-martial.

The Germans entered Louvain with bands playing, and singing in
a great swelling chorus: "Die Wacht am Rhein" and "Hail to the
War Lord." They marched to quick time, but in passing through the
great square of the Gare du Nord broke into the parade goose step.
In the van were such famous regiments as the Death's Head and Zeiten
Hussars. The infantry wore heavy boots, which, falling in unison,
struck the earth with resounding blows, to echo back from the house
walls. Thus cavalry, infantry, and artillery poured through Louvain
in a gray-green surge of hitherto unimagined military might. This,
for the latter part of the 20th and the day following.

At first the citizens looked on from the sidewalks in a spellbound
silence. Scarcely one seemed to possess the incentive to breathe
a whisper. Only the babies and very small children regarded the
awe-inspiring spectacle as something provided by way of entertainment.
For the rest of the citizens it was dumbfounding beyond human
comprehension. Cavalry, infantry, and artillery rolled on unceasingly
to the clatter of horses' hoofs, the tramp of feet, the rumble
of guns, and that triumphant mighty chorus. There was nothing of
aforetime plumed and gold-laced splendor of war about it, but the
modern Teutonic arms on grim business bent. Except for a curious
glance bestowed here and there, the German troops marched with
eyes front, and a precision as if being reviewed by the emperor.
A few shots were heard to stir instant terror among the citizen
onlookers, but these were between the German advance guard and
Belgian stragglers left behind in the city. Presently the side
streets became dangerous to pedestrians from onrushing automobiles
containing staff officers, and motor wagons of the military train.
General von Arnim, in command, ordered the hauling down of all
allied colors, but permitted the Belgian flag to remain flying above
the Hôtel de Ville. He promptly issued a proclamation warning all
citizens to preserve the peace. It was both placarded and announced
verbally. The latter was performed by a minor city official, ringing
a bell as he passed through the streets accompanied by policemen.

Toward evening of August 20, 1914, the cafés and restaurants filled
up with hungry German officers and men; every hotel room was occupied,
and provision shops speedily sold out the stores on their shelves.
The Germans paid in cash for everything ordered, and preserved
a careful attitude of nonaggression toward the citizens. But
subconsciously there ran an undercurrent of dread insecurity. At the
outset a German officer was said to have been struck by a sniper's
bullet. Somewhat conspicuously the wounded officer was borne on
a litter through the streets, followed by the dead body of his
assailant. Very promptly a news curtain was drawn down around the
city, cutting it off from all information of the world without.
Artillery fire was heard. Presumably this came from the last stand
of the Belgian rear guard in a valley of the hilly country between
Louvain and Brussels. With sustained optimism to the end, rumor
had it that the artillery fire was that of French and British guns
coming to the relief of Louvain. Toward nightfall one or two groups
of snipers were brought in from the suburbs and marched to the
place of execution.

The feeling of a threatened calamity deepened. Another warning
proclamation was issued ordering all citizens to give up their
arms. Further, everyone was ordered to bed at eight o'clock, all
windows were to be closed and all doors unlocked. A burning lamp
was to be placed in each window. On the claim that German soldiers
had been killed by citizens, the burgomaster and several of the
city officials were secured as hostages. A stern proclamation was
issued threatening with immediate execution every citizen found
with a weapon in his possession or house. Every house from which
a shot was fired would be burned.

This was on August 22, 1914. By the evening of that day the German
army had passed through Louvain, estimated to the number of 50,000
men. Only the 3,000 garrison remained in the city. Outwardly, the
citizens resumed their usual daily affairs as if with a sense of
relief, but whispers dropped now and then revealed an abiding terror
beneath. Some time during the next day or two the anticipated calamity
fell upon Louvain. The German officers insisted that sniping was
steadily going on, and the military authorities put into force their
threatened reprisal. The torch, or rather incendiary tablets were
thrown into convicted houses. Larger groups of citizens were led to
execution. Thereupon the "brute" passion dormant in soldiers broke
the bonds of discipline. Flames burst forth everywhere. Beneath the
lurid glow cast upon the sky above Louvain whole streets stood out
in blackened ruin, and those architectural treasures of the Halles
and the University, with its famous library, were destroyed beyond
hope of repair. Only the walls of St. Peter's Church, containing
many priceless paintings, remained.

Meanwhile, on the morning of August 20, 1914, the German army had
swept away the comparatively small Belgian rearguard force before
Brussels, and advanced upon the capital. On the previous 17th the
King of the Belgians removed his Government to Antwerp. The diplomatic
corps followed. Mr. Brand Whitlock, the American Minister, however,
remained. In his capacity as a neutral he had assisted stranded
Germans in Brussels from hasty official and mob peril. He stayed to
perform a similar service for the Belgians and Allies. His success
in these efforts won for him German respect and the gratitude of
the whole Belgian nation.

A lingering plan for defending Brussels by throwing up barricades
and constructing wire entanglements, to be manned by the Civic
Guard, was abandoned in the face of wiser counsel. It would merely
have resulted in a bombardment, with needless destruction of life
and property. Brussels was defenseless.

In flight before the German host, refugees of all classes were
streaming into Brussels--young and old, rich and poor, priest and
layman. Nearly all bore some burden of household treasure, many
some pathetically absurd family heirloom. Every kind of vehicle
appeared to have been called into use, from smart carriages drawn
by heavy Flemish horses to little carts harnessed to dogs. Over all
reigned a stupefied silence, broken only by shuffling footfalls.
Among them the absence of automobiles and light horses would indicate
all such had been commandeered by the Belgian military authorities.
Their cavalry was badly in need of good light-weight mounts. At
crossroads passage to imagined safety was blocked by farm live
stock driven by bewildered peasants.

On Thursday morning, August 20, 1914, the burgomaster motored forth
to meet the Germans. His reception and the terms dictated by General
von Arnim were almost identically the same as at Louvain. The
burgomaster was perforce compelled to accept. The scene of the
entry of the German troops into Louvain was repeated at Brussels.
There was the same stolidly silent-packed gathering of onlookers on
the sidewalks, the same thundering triumphant march of the German
host. Corps after corps, probably of those who had fought at Liege,
and subsequently passed around the city on the grand sweep toward
the French frontier. Moreover, huge bodies of German troops were
advancing up the valley of the Meuse and through the woods of the
Ardennes. As in Louvain, that night the hotels, restaurants, cafes,
and shops of Brussels were patronized by a rush of trade which
never before totaled such extent in a single day. Bills of purchase
were settled by the Germans in cash. The city was promptly assessed
a war indemnity of $40,000,000.

With the fall of Brussels, the first objective of the Germans may
be said to have been gained. But the right wing of Von Kluck's
army was still operating northward upon Antwerp. The Belgian army
had escaped him within the circle of Antwerp's forts, so that he
detailed a force deemed to be sufficient to hold the enemy secure.
Then he struck eastward between Antwerp and Brussels at Alost,
Ghent, and Bruges. In his advance he swept several divisions of
cavalry, also motor cars bearing machine guns. Beyond Bruges his
patrol caught their first glimpse of the North Sea, drawing in
toward another much-hoped-for goal on the English Channel.

But the Belgian army within security of Antwerp had not been routed.
It had retreated in good order, thanks to the resistance of its
right-wing rear guard. General de Moranville promptly reenforced it
with new volunteers to the extent of some 125,000 men. In addition,
he drew upon a fresh supply of ammunition, and new artillery well
horsed. His cavalry, however, were certainly no better and probably
worse than that with which his army had been complemented originally.

On August 23, 1914, obtaining information that the Germans were
in considerably inferior force at Malines, the Belgians began a
vigorous counteroffensive. General de Moranville drove the Germans
out of Malines on the day following. That was in the nature of a
master stroke, for it gave the Belgians control of the shortest
railway from Germany into West Flanders. Further, since Von Kluck
had reached Bruges, and reenforcements under General von Boehn
had passed across the Belgian direct line on Brussels, the great
German right wing was in danger of being caught in a trap. Von
Boehn, therefore, was hurriedly detached rearward to deal with
the Belgian counteroffensive. But this deprived Von Kluck of his
needed reenforcements to overcome 2,000 British marines landed
at Ostend, that, together with the Civic Guard, had beaten back
German patrols from the place. Had the British now landed an army
at Ostend, Von Kluck, between the Belgian and British forces, would
have been in serious danger of annihilation. With the German right
wing thus crumpled, the whole of their offensive would have broken
down. But the British did not come, and so the Belgians were left
to fight it out single handed. This fighting went on for three
weeks, with accurate details lacking. Mainly it was upon the line
Aershot-Dyle Valley-Termonde, with Antwerp for the Belgian base.

On August 24, 1914, a German Zeppelin sailed over Antwerp and dropped
a number of bombs. The Belgians thrust their right wing forward
and recaptured Alost. They advanced their center to a siege of
Cortenburg. Malines seemed secure. To the Belgians this was a historic
triumph. Famous for its manufacture of lace under the name of Mechlin,
almost every street contained some relic of architectural interest.
The Cathedral of St. Rombaut, the seat of a cardinal archbishop,
held upon its walls some of Van Dyck's masterpieces. Margaret of
Austria had held court in its Palais de Justice.

In this emergency, Von Boehn was heavily reenforced with the Third
Army Corps, reserves from the south, and 15,000 sailors and marines.
His army was now between 250,000 and 300,000 men. This placed
overwhelming odds against the Belgians. But for four days they fought
a stubborn battle at Weerde.

This was from September 13 to 16, 1914, and resulted in the capture
of the Louvain-Malines railway by the Germans. The Belgians had
now fought to the extremity of what could be expected without aid
from the Allies. The sole action left for them was to fall back for
a defense of Antwerp. Von Kluck's right wing of the whole German
offensive had completed its task on Belgian soil.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER V

COMING OF THE BRITISH

We now come to the arrival of the British on the Continent. In
using the term British, it, is expressly intended to comprise the
united forces of the British Isles.

On August 3, 1914, the British Government practically gave up hope
that war with Germany could be avoided, though it would appear to
have lingered until the ultimatum to Germany to vacate Belgian
soil remained unanswered. On that day the army was mobilized at
Aldershot.

On August 5, 1914, Lord Kitchener was recalled at the outset from
a journey to Egypt, and appointed Minister of War. No more fortunate
selection than this could have been made. Above all else, Lord
Kitchener's reputation had been won as an able transport officer.
In the emergency, as Minister of War, the responsibility for the
transport of a British army oversea rested in his hands. On August
5, 1914, the House of Commons voted a credit of $100,000,000, and
an increase of 500,000 men to the regular forces. Upon the same
day preparations went forward for the dispatch of an expeditionary
army to France.

The decision to send the army to France, instead of direct to a
landing in Belgium, would seem to have been in response to an urgent
French entreaty that Great Britain mark visibly on French soil
her unity with that nation at the supreme crisis. For some days
previously British reluctance to enter the war while a gleam of hope
remained to confine, if not prevent, the European conflagration,
had created a feeling of disappointment in France.

The British expeditionary army consisted at first--that is previous
to the Battle of the Marne--of two and a half army corps, or five
divisions, thus distributed: First Corps, Sir Douglas Haig; Second
Corps, General Smith-Dorien; Fourth Division of the Third Corps,
General Pulteney. The Sixth Division of the Third Corps and the
Fourth Corps under General Rawlinson were not sent to France till
after the end of September, 1914. It contained besides about one
division and a half of cavalry under General Allenby. A British
division varies from 12,000 to 15,000 men (three infantry brigades
of four regiments each; three groups of artillery, each having
three batteries of six pieces; two companies of sappers, and one
regiment of cavalry). The force totaled some 75,000 men, with 259
guns. The whole was placed under the command of Field Marshal Sir
John French, with Lieutenant General Sir Archibald Murray, Chief
of Staff.

Field Marshal French was sixty-two and was two years younger than
Lord Kitchener. His responsibilities were great, how great no one at
the beginning of the war realized his capabilities for the developing
scope of the task untried, but as a serious and courageous officer
he fully merited the honors he had already won.

By August 7, 1914, Admiral Jellicoe was able to guarantee a safe
passage for the British army across the English Channel. A fortunate
mobilization of the British Grand Fleet in the North Sea for maneuvers
shut off the German Grand Fleet from raiding the Channel. There was
nothing to criticize in the manner in which the Expeditionary Army
was thrown into France. Its equipment was ready and in all details
fully worthy of German military organization. From arms to boots--the
latter not long since a scandal of shoddy workmanship--only the
best material and skill had been accepted. Its transport proved
the genius of Lord Kitchener in that brand of military service.
The railways leading to the ports of embarkation, together with
passenger steamships--some of them familiar in American ports--were
commandeered as early as the 4th of August.

During the night of August 7, 1914, train after train filled with
troops steamed toward Southampton, and some other south-coast ports.
Complements were also embarked at Dublin, Avonmouth, and the Bristol
Channel. In the middle of the night citizens of small towns along
the route were awakened by the unceasing rumble of trains. They
had no conception of its import. They did not even realize that
war had actually burst upon the serenity of their peaceful lives.
Each transport vessel was placed in command of a naval officer,
and guarded in its passage across the channel by light cruisers and
torpedo destroyers. The transport of the whole Expeditionary Army
was completed within ten days, without the loss of a man and with
a precision worthy of all military commendation. But such secrecy
was maintained that the British public remained in ignorance of its
passage until successfully accomplished. American correspondents,
however, were not yet strictly censored, so that their papers published
news of it on August 9.

On Sunday, August 9, 1914, two British transports were observed
making for the harbor of Boulogne. The weather was all that could
be wished, the crossing resembled a bank-holiday excursion. For
some days previously the French had taken a gloomy view of British
support. But French fishermen returning from Scotland and English
ports maintained confidence, for had not British fishermen told
them the French would never be abandoned to fall a prey to the
enemy.

When the two advance British transports steamed into view, "Les
Anglais," at last everyone cried. At once a hugely joyful reversion
of feeling. The landing of the British soldiers was made a popular
ovation. Their appearance, soldierly bearing, their gentleness
toward women and children, their care of the horses were showered
with heartfelt French compliments. Especially the Scotch Highlanders,
after their cautious fashion, wondered at the exuberance of their
welcome. For the brave Irish, was not Marshal MacMahon of near-Irish
descent and the first president of the Third Republic? The Irish
alone would save that republic. Women begged for the regimental
badges to pin on their breasts. In turn they offered delicacies of
all kinds to the soldiers. For the first time in a hundred years
the British uniform was seen on French soil. Then it represented
an enemy, now a comrade in arms. The bond of union was sealed at
a midnight military mass, celebrated by English-speaking priests,
for British and French Catholic soldiers at Camp Malbrouch round
the Colonne de la Grande Armée. The two names recalled the greatest
of British and French victories--Blenheim, Ramillies, and Oudenarde,
Ulm, Austerlitz, and Jena.

Meanwhile, officers of the French General Staff had journeyed to
London to confer with the British General Staff regarding the camping
and alignment of the British troops. Meanwhile, also, the British
reserves and territorials were called to the colors. The latter
comprised the militia, infantry and artillery, and the volunteer
yeomanry cavalry, infantry and artillery. The militia was the oldest
British military force, officered to a great extent by retired
regular army men, its permanent staffs of noncommissioned officers
were from the regular army, and it was under the direct control of
the Secretary of State for War. The volunteer infantry, artillery,
and yeomanry cavalry were on a somewhat different basis, more nearly
resembling the American militia, but the British militia were linked
with regular-line battalions. The reserves, militia and volunteers,
added approximately 350,000 well-trained men for immediate home
defense.

On Sunday, August 17, 1914, it was officially announced that the
whole of the British Expeditionary Army had landed in France.
Conferences between the British and French General Staffs resulted
in the British army being concentrated first at Amiens. From that
point it was to advance into position as the left wing of the united
French and British armies, though controlled by their separate
commanders.

The French Fifth Army had already moved to hold the line of the
River Sambre, with its right in touch with Namur. Cavalry patrols
had been thrown forward to Ligny and Gembloux, where they skirmished
with uhlans. Charleroi was made French headquarters. It was the
center of extensive coal-mining and steel industry. Pit shafts
and blast furnaces dominated the landscape. Historically it was
the ground over which Blücher's Fourth Army Corps marched to the
support of the British at Waterloo. Now the British were supporting
the French upon it against their former ally.

On Thursday, August 20, 1914, the British took up their position on
the French left. Their line ran from Binche to Mons, then within the
French frontier stretched westward to Condé. From Mons to Condé it
followed the line of the canal, thus occupying an already constructed
barrier. Formerly Condé was regarded as a fortress of formidable
strength, but its position was not held to be of value in modern
strategy. Its forts, therefore, had been dismantled of guns, and its
works permitted to fall into disuse. But the fortress of Maubeuge
lay immediately in rear of the British line. In rear again General
Sordet held a French cavalry corps for flank actions. In front,
across the Belgian frontier, General d'Amade lay with a French
brigade at Tournai as an outpost.

Before proceeding to British headquarters, General French held
a conference with General Joffre, Commander in Chief of all the
French armies. Until the outbreak of the war, General Joffre was
practically unknown to the French people. He was no popular military
idol, no boulevard dashing figure. But he had seen active service
with credit, and had climbed, step by step, with persevering study
of military science into the council of the French General Staff.
As a strategist his qualities came to be recognized as paramount
in that body. A few years previously he had been intrusted with
the reorganization of the French army, and his plans accepted.
Therefore, when war with Germany became a certainty, it was natural
the supreme command of the French army should fall to General Joffre.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER VI

CAMPAIGNS IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE

The French staff apparently had designed a campaign in Upper Alsace
and the Vosges, but the throwing of a brigade from Belfort across
the frontier on the extreme right of their line on August 6 would
seem to have been undertaken chiefly with a view of rousing patriotic
enthusiasm. French aeroplane scouts had brought in the intelligence
that only small bodies of German troops occupied the left bank
of the Rhine. Therefore the opportunity was presented to invade
the upper part of the lost province of Alsace--a dramatic blow
calculated to arouse the French patriotic spirit. Since the Germans
had expended hardly any effort in its defense, leaving, as it were
an open door, it may have been part of the strategic idea of their
General Staff to draw a French army into that region, with the
design of inflicting a crushing defeat. Thus French resistance
in the southern Vosges would have been weakened, the capture of
Belfort, unsupported by its field army, a probability, and a drive
beyond into France by the German forces concentrated at Neubreisach
made triumphant. Doubtless the French General Staff fully grasped
the German intention, but considered a nibble at the alluring German
bait of some value for its sentimental effect upon the French and
Alsatians. Otherwise the invasion of Upper Alsace with a brigade
was doomed at the outset to win no military advantage.

On August 7, 1914, the French dispersed a German outpost intrenched
before Altkirch. Some cavalry skirmishing followed, which resulted
in the French gaining possession of the city. As was to be expected,
the citizens of Altkirch welcomed the French with enthusiasm. The
following morning the French were permitted an uncontested advance to
Mülhausen. That such an important manufacturing center as Mülhausen
should have remained unfortified within striking distance of the
French frontier, that the French entered it without being compelled
to fire a shot, was a surprise to everyone with the probable exception
of the German and French General Staffs.

The citizens of Mülhausen repeated the joyous ovation bestowed on
the French troops in Altkirch. The French uniform was hailed as the
visible sign of deliverance from German dominion, and the restoration
of the lost province to their kindred of the neighboring republic.
The climax of this ebullition was reached in a proclamation issued
by direction of General Joffre. "People of Alsace," it ran, "after
forty years of weary waiting, French soldiers again tread the soil
of your native country. They are the pioneers in the great work of
redemption. What emotion and what pride for them! To complete the
work they are ready to sacrifice their lives. The French nation
with one heart spurs them forward, and on the folds of their flag
are inscribed the magical names Liberty and Right. Long live France!
Long live Alsace!"

During August 8, 1914, some intermittent fighting went on in the
vicinity of Mülhausen, which seems to have given the French general
in command the impression that the Germans were not eager for a
counterattack. In turn the Germans may well have been puzzled that
a French brigade instead of an army was thrown into Upper Alsace
for the bait of Mülhausen. Possibly they waited a little for the
main body, which did not come.

Sunday, August 8, 1914, revealed the Germans in such overpowering
strength, that the French were left no other choice than to beat a
hasty retreat. They accordingly fell back upon Altkirch, to intrench
a few miles beyond their own border. Thus ended the French initial
offensive. In military reckoning it achieved little of value.

Meanwhile in the Ardennes on August 13, 1914, the German Crown
Prince, commanding the Fourth Army, advanced from Luxemburg into the
southern Ardennes and captured Neuf-château. His further objective
was to break through the French line somewhere near the historic
ground of Sedan. But at this point some change in the German plan
seems to have taken place. From the maze still enveloping the opening
events of the war, one can only conjecture a reason which would
move such an irrevocable body as the German General Staff to alter
a long-fixed plan. Probably, then, the unanticipated strength of
Belgian resistance foreshadowed the summoning of reenforcements
to Von Kluck's right wing of the whole German army. We have seen,
in fact, how he came to be near a desperate need at Bruges, and
only the heavy reenforcement of Von Boehn enabled that general
to deliver a final defeat to the Belgian field army at Weerde.
Whatever the cause of change of plan may have been, important forces
attached to or intended for the armies of the Duke of Württemberg
and the crown prince were withdrawn to support the armies of Von
Kluck and Von Bülow. These forces went to form a unit under General
von Hausen, a veteran of Sadowa. This change left the Saxon army
of the crown prince with hardly sufficient strength for a main
attack on the French line at Sedan, but still formidable enough
to feel its way cautiously through the Ardennes to test the French
concentration on the central Meuse's west bank. When the German
right had finally settled Liege, the Saxon army could then join
in the united great movement on Paris.

Early on the morning of August 15, 1914, a French detachment of
half an infantry regiment, thrown into Dinant, was surprised by
a mobile Saxon advance force of cavalry, infantry and artillery.
Dinant lies across the Meuse eighteen miles south of Namur. It is
a picturesque ancient town, the haunt of artists and tourists. In
the vicinity are the estates of several wealthy Belgian families,
particularly the thirteenth-century château of Walzin, once the
stronghold of the Comtes d'Ardennes. A bridge crosses the Meuse
at Dinant, which sits mainly on the east bank within shadow of
precipitous limestone cliffs. A stone fort more imposing in appearance
than modern effectiveness crowns the highest cliff summit overlooking
Dinant. The Germans came by way of the east bank to occupy the
suburbs. They presently captured the fort and hoisted the German
flag. Meanwhile the French took possession of the bridge, being
at a considerable disadvantage from German rifle fire from the
cliffs. The solid stone abutments of the bridge, however, enabled
the French to hold that position until strong reenforcements arrived
early in the afternoon. While French infantry cleared the environs
of Germans, their artillery bombarded the fort from the west bank.
Their shells played havoc with the old fort defenses, soon compelling
its evacuation by the Germans. One of the first French artillery
shells blew into shreds the German flag flying triumphantly over
the fort, thus depriving the French of the satisfaction of hauling
it down. Toward evening the Germans retreated toward the Lesse,
followed by the French. In previous wars the forces engaged were
of sufficient strength to designate Dinant a battle, but with the
vast armies of the present conflict it sinks to the military grade
of a mere affair. However, it is called by the French the Battle
of Dinant.

The troops which entered Alsace on August 7, 1914, to the number
of 18,000 to 20,000, belonged to the army of the frontier.

This first army, which was under the orders of General Dubail,
was intrusted with the mission of making a vigorous attack and
of holding in front of it the greatest possible number of German
forces. The general in command of this army had under his orders,
if the detachment from Alsace be included, five army corps and a
division of cavalry. His orders were to seek battle along the line
Saarburg-Donon, in the Bruche Valley, at the same time possessing
himself of the crests of the Vosges as well as the mountain passes.
These operations were to have as their theaters: (1) the Vosges
Mountains, (2) the plateau of Lorraine to the northwest of Donon,
and (3) the left bank of the Meurthe. This left bank of the Meurthe
is separated from the valley of the Moselle by a bristling slope
of firs, which is traversed by a series of passages, the defiles
of Chipotte, of the Croix Idoux, of the Haut Jacques d'Anozel, of
Vanemont, of Plafond. In these passes, when the French returned
to the offensive in September, 1914, furious combats took place.
The German forces opposed to this first army consisted of five
active army corps and a reserve corps.

The first French army, after a violent struggle, conquered the
passes of the Vosges, but the conquest was vigorously opposed and
took more time than the French had reckoned on. As soon as it had
become master of the Donon and the passes, the first French army
pushed forward into the defile of Saarburg. At St. Blaise it won
the first German colors, took Blamont and Cirey (August 15, 1914),
seized the defiles north of the canal of the Marne and the Rhine,
and reached Saarburg. Here a connection was established with the
army of Lorraine, which had commenced its operations on the 14th.
A violent battle ensued, known under the name of the Battle of
Saarburg. The left wing of the French army attacked August 19, 1914;
it hurled itself at the fortified positions, which were copiously
fringed with heavy artillery. In spite of the opposition it made
progress to the northwest of Saarburg.

On the 20th the attack was renewed, but from the beginning it was
evident that it could not succeed and that the duty intrusted to
the Eighth Army Corps of opening up the way for the cavalry corps
could not be accomplished. This army corps had gone through a trying
ordeal as a result of the bombardment by the heavy German artillery
established in fortified positions, covering distances all measured
in advance, with every group and French battery presenting a sure
target and the action of the French cannon rendered useless.

If the left wing of the First Army found itself checked, the center
and the right on the other hand were in an excellent position and
were able to advance. But at this point (August 21, 1914) the Second
French Army (the army of Lorraine) met a serious reverse in the
region of Morhange and was compelled to retreat. This retreat left
the flank of the First Army gravely unprotected, and as a consequence
this army was also obliged to fall back. This rear-guard movement
was accomplished over a very difficult piece of country down to
the Baccarat-Ban de Sapt-Provenchère line, south of the Col du
Bonhomme. It was found necessary to abandon the Donon and the Col
de Sapt.

The task committed to the Second Army, that of Lorraine under De
Castlenau, was to protect Nancy, then to transfer itself to the
east, advancing later to the north and attacking in a line parallel
to that taken by the First Army on the Dieuze-Château Salins front
in the general direction of Saarbrücken. Its mission was therefore
at once both offensive and defensive: to cover Nancy and continue
toward the west the attack of the First Army.

After having repulsed, August 10 and 11, 1914, the strong German
attacks in the region of Spincourt and of Château Salins the Second
Army took the offensive and went forward almost without stopping
during four days of uninterrupted fighting. Penetrating into Lorraine,
which had been annexed, it reached the right bank of the Selle, cut
off Marsal and Château Salins, and pushed forward in the direction
of Morhange. The enemy fell back; at Marsal he even left behind
enormous quantities of ammunition.

As a matter of fact, he fell back on positions that had been carefully
fortified in advance and whence his artillery could bombard at an
almost perfectly accurate range. August 20, 1914, made a violent
counterattack on the canal of Salines and Morhange in the Lake
district. The immediate vicinity of Metz furnished the German army
with a vast quantity of heavy artillery, which played a decisive
role in the Battle of Morhange. The French retreated, and during
this rear-guard movement the frontier city of Lunéville was for
some days occupied by the Germans.

Thus the First and Second Armies failed in their offensive and saw
themselves obliged to retreat, but their retreat was accomplished
under excellent circumstances, and the troops, after a couple of
days of rest, found themselves in a condition again to take the
offensive. The First Army gave energetic support to the Second
Army, which was violently attacked by the Germans in the second
week of August. The German attack, which was first arrayed against
Nancy, turned more and more to the east.

The battle, at first waged in the Mortagne basin, was gradually
extended to the deep woods on the left bank of the Meurthe and on
to Chipotte, Nompatelize, etc. The battles that have been named
the Battle of Mortagne, the Battle of the Meurthe, the Battle of
the Vosges, all waged by the First Army, were extremely violent
in the last week of August and the first two weeks of September.
These combats partly coincided with the Battle of the Marne; they
resulted, at the end of that battle, in the German retreat. The
Second Army renewed the offensive August 25, 1914; it decisively
checked the march of the German army and commenced to force it
back.

The instructions issued to General de Castelnau directed him everywhere
to march forward and make direct attacks. The day of August 25,
1914, was a successful day for the French; everywhere the Germans
were repulsed. From August 26 till September 2, 1914, the Second
Army continued its attacks.

At this point the commander in chief having need of important forces
at his center and at his right relieved the Second Army of much of
its strength. This did not prevent it from engaging in the great
Battle of Nancy and winning it. It was September 4, 1914, that this
battle began and it continued till the 11th, the army sustaining
the incessant assaults of the Germans on its entire front advanced
from Grand Couronne. The German emperor was personally present at
this battle. There was at Dieuze a regiment of white cuirassiers
at whose head it was his intention to make a triumphal entry into
Nancy. Heavy German artillery of every caliber made an enormous
expenditure of ammunition; on the Grand Mont d'Amance alone, one
of the most important positions of the Grand Couronne of Nancy,
more than 30,000 howitzer shells were fired in two days. The fights
among the infantry were characterized on the entire front by an
alternation of failure and success, every point being taken, lost
and retaken at intervals.

The struggle attained to especial violence in the Champenoux Forest.
On September 5, 1914, the enemy won Maixe and Remereville, which
they lost again in the evening, but they were unable to dislodge
the French from the ridge east of the forest of Champenoux. The
Mont d'Amance was violently bombarded; a German brigade marched
on Pont-à-Mousson. The French retook Crevic and the Crevic Wood.

On the 7th the Germans directed on Ste. Geneviève, north of the Grand
Couronne, a very violent attack, which miscarried. Ste. Geneviève
was lost for a time, but it was retaken on the 8th; more than 2,000
Germans lay dead on the ground. The same day the enemy threw themselves
furiously on the east front, the Mont d'Amance, and La Neuvelotte.
South of the Champenoux Forest the French were compelled to retire;
they were thrown back on the ridge west of the forest. On the 9th a
new bombardment of Mont d'Amance, a struggle of extreme violence,
took place on the ridge west of the forest of Champenoux, the French
gaining ground. General Castelnau decided to take the direct offensive,
the Germans giving signs of great fatigue. On the 12th they retired
very rapidly. They evacuated Lunéville, a frontier town, where they
left a great quantity of arms and ammunition. The French began
immediately to pursue them, the Germans withdrawing everywhere
over the frontier.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER VII

SIEGE AND FALL OF NAMUR

When the Germans occupied Brussels on August 20, 1914, we observed
that corps after corps did not enter the city, but swept to the
south. This was Von Kluck's left wing moving to attack the Allies
on the Sambre-Mons front. The forces which passed through Brussels
were Von Kluck's center, advancing south by east to fall in line
beside the right wing, which had mainly passed between Brussels
and Antwerp to the capture of Bruges and Ghent. The whole line
when re-formed on the French frontier would stretch from Mons to
the English Channel--the great right wing of the German armies.

Meanwhile, Von Bülow's second army had advanced up the valley of
the Meuse, with its right sweeping the Hisbaye uplands. Some part
of this army may have been transported by rail from Montmedy. Its
general advance in columns was directed chiefly upon the Sambre
crossings. As Von Kluck's wide swing through Belgium covered a
greater distance, Von Bülow's army was expected to strike the Allies
some twenty-four hours earlier. Its march, therefore, was in the
nature of an onrush.

But Von Bülow was now in the full tide of fighting strength--an
amazing spectacle to chance or enforced witnesses. Well may the
terrified peasants have stood hat in hand in the midst of their
ruined villages. Any door not left open was immediately broken
down and the interior searched. Here and there a soldier could be
seen carrying a souvenir from some wrecked château. But for the
most part everyone fled from before its path, leaving it silent
and abandoned. The field gray-green uniforms were almost invisible
in cover, in a half light, or when advancing through mist. No
conceivable detail seemed to have been overlooked. Each man carried
a complete equipment down to handy trifles, the whole weighed to
the fraction of an ounce, in carefully estimated proportions.

But this was not enough. Waiting for each column to pass were men
with buckets of drinking water, into which the soldiers dipped
their aluminum cups. Temporary field post offices were established
in advance, so that messages could be gathered in as the columns
passed. Here and there were men to offer biscuits and handfuls of
prunes. In methodical, machine-like progress came the ammunition
wagons, commissariat carts, field kitchens, teams of heavy horses
attached to pontoons, traction engines hauling enormous siege guns,
motor plows for excavating trenches, aeroplanes, carriages containing
surgeons, automobiles for the commanders, and motor busses in which
staff officers could be seen studying their maps. On some of these
vehicles were chalked Berlin-Paris. No branch of the service was
absent, no serviceable part if it overlooked--not even a complement
of grave diggers. It moved forward always at an even pace, as if on
parade, with prearranged signals passed down the line when there
was any obstacle, a descent or bend in the road.

The tramp of many thousands cast into the atmosphere clouds of
fine dust, but even those in rear marched through it as if their
lungs were made of steel. No permission was granted to open out
for the circulation of air, though it was the month of August. It
is safe to assert there was not a single straggler in Von Bülow's
army. At the first sign of it he was admonished with a vigor to
deter his comrades. Discipline was severely maintained. At every
halt the click of heels, and rattle of arms in salute went on down
the line with the sharp delivery of orders.

On Wednesday, August 12, 1914, the town of Huy, situated midway
between Liege and Namur, was seized. It possessed an old citadel,
but it was disarmed, and used now only as a storehouse. Some Belgian
detachments offered a slight resistance at the bridge, but were
speedily driven off. The capture of Huy gave the Germans control
of the railway from Aix-la-Chapelle to France, though broken at
Liege by the still standing northern forts. But they secured a
branch line of more immediate service, running from Huy into Central
Belgium.

On August 15, 1914, Von Bülow's vanguard came within sight of Namur.
Before evening German guns were hurling shells upon its forts. Began
then the siege of Namur. Namur, being the second fortress hope
of the Allies--the pivot upon which General Joffre had planned to
swing his army into Belgium in a sweeping attack upon the advancing
Germans--a brief survey of the city and fortifications will be
necessary. The situation of the city is not as imposing as that
of Liege. For the most part it sits on a hillside declivity, to
rest in the angle formed by the junction of the Sambre and Meuse.
It is a place of some historic and industrial importance, though
in the latter respect not so well known as Liege. To the west,
however, up the valley of the Sambre, the country presents the
usual features of a mining region--pit shafts, tall chimneys issuing
clouds of black smoke, and huge piles of unsightly débris. While
away to the north stretches the great plain of Central Belgium,
southward the Central Meuse offers a more picturesque prospect in
wooded slopes rising to view-commanding hilltops. Directly east,
the Meuse flows into the precipitous cut on its way to Liege.

But in Belgian eyes the fame of Namur lay to a great extent in its
being the second of Brialmont's fortress masterpieces. Its plan
was that of Liege--a ring of outer detached forts, constructed on
the same armor-clad cupola principle. At Namur these were nine in
number, four major forts and five _fortins_. The distance between
each fort was on the average two and a half miles, with between
two and a half to five miles from the city as the center of the
circumference.

Facing Von Bülow's advance, fort Cognlée protected the Brussels
railway, while the guns of Marchovelette swept the space between
it and the left bank of the Meuse. In the southwest angle formed
by the Meuse, forts Maizeret, Andoy and Dave continued the ring.
Again in the angle of the Sambre and Meuse forts St. Héribert and
Malonne protected the city. North of the Sambre, forts Suarlée
and Emines completed the circle.

In the emergency Namur possessed one advantage over Liege. The
resistance of Liege gave Namur due warning of the German invasion,
and some days to prepare for attack. General Michel was in command
or the garrison of Namur, which comprised from 25,000 to 30,000
men. Doubtless reports had come to him of the situation at Liege.
He immediately set to work to overcome the cause of the failure
of Brialmont's plan at Liege, by constructing trenches between
the forts, protected by barbed wire entanglements, and mines in
advance of the German approach. As his circumference of defense
was less than that of Liege, his force promised to be capable of
a more prolonged resistance.

Besides the Allies were close at hand. Only eighteen miles separated
him from strong detachments of French infantry and artillery at
Dinant. As we have seen French cavalry had been thrown forward
as far as Gembloux on the road to Brussels, but ten miles to the
northeast of Namur. Somewhere between that place and Charleroi
French Chasseurs d'Afrique had advanced to occupy outpost positions.
His position appeared by no means hopeless--considerably better than
the unsupported field army at Liege. The armor of his forts was
calculated to withstand the 36-lb. shells of the heaviest German
fieldpieces, but comparatively slight damage was anticipated from the
known heavier howitzers. If the Germans purposed to assault Namur
in mass formation, as they had done at Liege, General Michel had
every reason to feel confident he could repulse them with tremendous
losses.

But the Germans had learned a severely taught lesson at Liege. They
had no intention of repeating those tactics. Behind a remarkable
screen of secrecy, they managed to conceal from General Michel--as
they did from the Allies--the existence of their enormous siege
guns. Whether they brought into action at Namur their famous
42-centimeters, capable of throwing a shell of high explosive power
weighing 2,500 lbs., is uncertain. In fact, it is still doubtful
where they were first fired at the allied enemy. Two are said to
have assisted in the final destruction of the northern forts of
Liege, and two were seen rolling over the field of Waterloo. The
Germans remained silent upon the subject, and nothing definite
about their first discharge was disclosed. But unquestionably their
fire was capable of demolishing into ruin any fort on earth within
a short period. It is certain, however, the Germans brought against
Namur their 28-centimeter guns, and probably some of 21-centimeter
caliber. These artillery weapons were quite formidable enough to
reduce the Namur forts. The former threw a shell of 750 pounds
from a range of three miles--beyond the reach of the Namur guns.
The latter projected shells of 250 pounds. The Germans are said
to have employed thirty-two of the heavier caliber guns, and a
large number of 21-centimeter.

Thus Namur was doomed before the bombardment commenced. Von Bülow's
left wing advanced up the Meuse north bank from Huy, some part of
it crossing to the south bank at Ardenne, where it came in touch
with the Saxon army.

At sundown of August 20, 1914, Von Bülow was in position before
Namur, three miles from its defenses. Darkness fell upon a hot
and sultry August atmosphere. Presently the flashes and boom of
the German guns began a bombardment of the trenches between forts
Cognelée and Marchovelette. It continued through the night. But
the Belgian fortress guns were outranged. It would have been a mere
waste of ammunition to reply. Neither could the Belgian infantry
venture on a counterattack, for the Germans were clearly observed
in overwhelming strength. At the outset the Germans devoted their
efforts to clearing the trenches of the Belgian infantry, leaving the
forts for subsequent demolition. The unfortunate Belgian infantry,
therefore, could do nothing but fire intermittent rifle volleys,
without any effect upon the Germans. They bravely bore this storm
of shells for ten hours. Not a man who lifted his head above the
German machine gun-swept parapets but was not instantly killed or
wounded. Thus the majority of the officers were killed, and the
ranks within the trenches decimated.

Toward morning on August 21, 1914, the Belgians could stand the
tornado of death no longer. The demoralized troops fled from the
trenches, leaving the gap between forts Cognelée and Marchovelette
open. The Germans then opened fire on the forts. In comparison
with the new German siege howitzers, the old-fashioned Belgian
guns proved to be weak weapons. The tremendous pounding of the
German shells not only smashed the fort cupolas, and crumpled into
ruin the interior stone and steel protective armor, but quickly put
the Belgian guns out of action. Thus while fort Maizeret received
some 1,200 German shells at the speed of twenty to the minute, it was
able to reply with only ten shots. Forts Marchovelette and Maizeret
were the first to fall. Seventy-five men of the Marchovelette garrison
were found dead amid its ruins--nearly its total complement.

[Illustration: FRENCH INVASION OF ALSACE-LORRAINE]

Early on Friday morning of August 21, 1914, forts Andoy, Dave,
St. Héribert and Malonne were subjected to a similar furious
bombardment. After three hours of the cannonade Andoy, Dave and
St. Héribert surrendered. During the morning the Germans thrust
a force into the southern angle of the Sambre and Meuse. Here the
Belgian infantry offered a vigorous resistance. It was hoped that
the French at Dinant would hasten to their relief. But Dinant was
for the second time within a few days the scene of conflict. Some
6,000 French Turcos and artillery did arrive, but too late to be
of use in helping to save Namur. Shells now began to drop in the
city while aeroplanes flung down bombs. A thunderstorm rumbled in
combination with the continuous roar of the German guns. A panic
took hold of the citizens. Distracted men, women and children huddled
together in spellbound terror, or sought the shelter of their cellars.
The more superstitious pronounced this to be the end of all things,
from the eclipse of the sun which darkened the sky. Fort Malonne
succumbed sometime during the afternoon of August 21, 1914.

As at Liege, with General Leman, so in Namur General Michel foresaw
the city and forts' fate was imminent. Only the northwest forts
Suarlée, Emines and Cognelée held out. The Belgians and French
had been defeated by the Germans in the angle of the Sambre and
Meuse. The horizon revealed no sign of a French army advancing.
General Michel, therefore, decided upon the evacuation of the city
by the Belgian infantry. It was successfully accomplished, though
even more in the nature of a flight than at Liege. But General
Michel went with them, instead of remaining, like General Leman,
to fight the defense of his fortress to the last.

The retreating Belgians on August 22, 1914, had some adventurous
wandering before them. They had first to cut their way through
a body of German troops, then to become involved with a French
force near Charleroi. It took them seven days to reach Rouen by way
of Amiens. There they were embarked for sea transport to Ostend.
At Ostend, they joined the main Belgian army after its retreat
from Antwerp.

On Sunday morning, August 23, 1914, the Germans began the bombardment
of Fort Suarlée. This fort repeated the heroic resistance of Fort
Boncelles at Liege. It held out until the afternoon of August 25. It
was apparently then blown up by the explosion of its own magazine,
thus again repeating the end of Fort Loncin at Liege. Meantime the
Germans had succeeded in reducing Forts Cognelée and Emines.

The Germans entered Namur on the afternoon of August 23, 1914. There
seems to have been some oversight in the plan, for the advance guard
found themselves under fire of their own guns directed upon the citadel
and the Grande Place. This, however, was speedily rectified. Their
behavior was much the same as at Louvain and Brussels. They marched
in with bands playing and singing patriotic songs. Proclamations
were at once issued warning the citizens not to commit any hostile
act. The inhabitants were far too cowed to contemplate anything
but submission. Good discipline was preserved, and though the city
took fire that night there is nothing to show it was from German
design. The citizens were induced to come forth from their cellars
and hiding places to reopen the cafés and shops.

General von Bülow entered Namur on Monday morning August 24, 1914.
He was accompanied by Field Marshal Baron von der Goltz, recently
appointed Governor General of Belgium. Previous to the former Balkan
War he had been employed in reorganizing the Turkish army. An onlooker
in Namur thus describes the German Field Marshal:--"An elderly
gentleman covered with orders, buttoned in an overcoat up to his
nose, above which gleamed a pair of enormous spectacles."

General Michel attributed his defeat to the German siege guns. The
fire was so continuous upon the trenches that it was impossible
to hold them, and the forts simply crumpled under the storm of
shells. But back of General Michel's plea the allied Intelligence
Departments lacked efficiency or energy, or both, in not gaining
more than a hint, at any rate, of the enormous German siege guns
until they were actually thundering at the gates.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER VIII

BATTLE OF CHARLEROI

Toward the end of the third week of August, 1914, the atmosphere
of every European capital became tense with the realization that a
momentous crisis was impending. It was known that the French-British
armies confronted German armies of equal, if not of superior strength.
In Paris and London the military critics wrote optimistically that
the Germans were marching into a trap.

The British army had arrived at the front in splendid fighting
trim. It was difficult to restrain the impetuous valor of the French
soldiers. The skies were bright and there was confidence that the
Germans would unquestionably meet with a crushing defeat. Let us
glance at the line of the French and British armies stretched along
the Belgian frontier. It ran from within touch of Namur up the right
bank of the Sambre, through Charleroi to Binche and Mons, thence
by way of the coal barge canal just within the French frontier to
Condé. For the choice of a great battle ground there was nothing
particularly attractive about it in a military sense.

There is evidence to show in an official communiqué from General
Joffre published on August 24, 1914, that it was intended to be
merely the left wing of a gigantic French battle offensive--on
the adopted German plan--from Condé to Belfort. "An army," runs
the communiqué, "advancing from the northern part of the Woevre
and moving on Neufchâteau is attacking the German forces which have
been going through the Duchy of Luxemburg and are on the right bank
of the Samoy. Another army from the region of Sedan is traversing the
Belgian Ardennes and attacking the German forces marching between
the Lesse and the Meuse. A third army from the region of Chimay
has attacked the German right between the Sambre and the Meuse.
It is supported by the English army from the region of Mons."

These attacks comprised chiefly the battle of Dinant and cavalry
skirmishing, but the purpose of General Joffre was otherwise made
plain in throwing advance French troops across the Belgian frontier
into Ligny and Gembloux on the road to a recapture of Brussels.
This we have previously noted in another connection. The rout of
the French army in Lorraine, however, put an end to the grand
Condé-Belfort offensive.

Thus the Namur-Condé line became a main defensive position instead
of an offensive left wing sweep through Belgium upon Germany. As
such it was well enough--if its pivot on the fortress of Namur
held secure. Liege had already proved its vulnerability, but it
would seem that the French General Staff joined with General Michel,
the Commander of Namur, in believing the Namur forts would give
a better account. The French General Staff were informed of the
approximate strength of the advancing armies of Von Kluck and Von
Bülow, and had nothing to fear from inferiority in numbers. The
staff never gave out the strength of their forces, but there is
reason for believing the great armies were nearly equally matched
after mobilization--about 1,200,000 men.

Let us now see what was developing in the Ardennes away to the
French right. It has been established that woods, particularly
in summer, form the best cover from the observation or attacks
of airmen. The spreading, leafy boughs are difficult to penetrate
visually from a height of even a few hundred feet, at least to
obtain accurate information of what is transpiring beneath.

French air scouts brought in correct information that they had
seen the armies of the Duke of Württemberg and crown prince massed
along the southern Luxemburg and Belgian forest region. But under
the foliage there was another army unseen--that of General von
Hausen. The French moved their Fifth Army up to position on the
line of the Sambre. They advanced their Third Army, commanded by
General Ruffey, upon Luxemburg, and their Fourth Army under General
de Langle de Cary across the River Semois to watch the Meuse left
bank and gain touch with General Lanzerac. General de Cary came
from Sedan, throwing out detachments upon the Meuse left bank. These
operations were to confront the armies of the Duke of Württemberg
and crown prince.

But the French apparently knew nothing of the movements of the
army of General von Hausen. Their air scouts either could not
distinguish it from the armies of the Duke of Württemberg and the
crown prince, amid the forest of the Ardennes, or they did not
observe it at all. To the army of General von Hausen there clings
a good deal of mystery. When last noted by us, previous to the
minor battle of Dinant, it had been formed by forces drawn from
the armies of the Duke of Württemberg and crown prince. Ostensibly
at that time, it was destined to support, as a separate field force,
the armies of Von Kluck and von Bülow.

Possibly the Germans had begun to doubt how long Liege could hold
out. Von Kluck was compelled to mark time in his impetuous march
on Central Belgium. His losses had been heavy. Support in strength
seemed urgent. But this need passed as the Liege forts fell one
after the other under the fire of the German siege guns. General
von Hausen was released for action elsewhere. Thus we may assume,
he was ordered to follow the armies of the Duke of Württemberg
and crown prince down through the Ardennes to strike the Meuse
south of Namur. By this time he had been substantially reenforced.
Now under his command were the complete Twelfth and Nineteenth
Corps, and the Eleventh Reserve Corps. Also a cavalry division of
the Prussian Guard, with some other detachments of cavalry. His
Eleventh Reserve Corps were Hessians, the Twelfth and Nineteenth
Corps were Saxons. The latter two corps were regarded as among the
best in the German army. In the Franco-Prussian War they fought
with conspicuous bravery through every battle in which they were
engaged. They won the battle for Prussia at Gravelotte by turning
the French right and capturing St. Privat. They marched to Sedan
under the crown prince--subsequently the Emperor Frederick--to
occupy the first line in the hard fighting of the Givonne Valley.
During the siege of Paris they occupied a part of the German northern
line, finally to march in triumph into Paris. This infantry and
cavalry of the Prussian Guard stiffened Von Hausen's force into
an army of battle strength.

We have thus two factors to bear in mind with regard to the French
defensive position at Charleroi--the resisting power of the Namur
forts, and the unknown, to the French, proximity of Von Hausen's
army.

However substantial was the measure of reliance that the French
General Staff and General Michel placed on the Namur forts, evidently
General von Bülow regarded them as little more than passing targets
for his siege guns. He seemed to have made a comparatively simple
mathematical calculation of almost the number of shells necessary
to fire, and the hours to be consumed in reducing the Namur forts
to masses of débris.

We can picture General von Bülow as he sat in the motor car with
Marshal von der Goltz--the old gentleman with an overcoat buttoned
up to his nose in August, and huge spectacles. Doubtless discussion
ran mainly upon the impending attack of their Second Army on the
French right. Emphasis would have been laid on the positions of
the armies of the Duke of Württemberg and crown prince advancing
away to their left upon the forces of the French Generals Ruffey
and de Cary. But there was apparently a German gap here between
Von Bülow's army and the armies of the Duke of Württemberg and
crown prince, though we noticed previously Von Bülow's army came
in touch with Saxon troops half way between Huy and Namur, when a
detachment of Von Bülow's left wing was thrown across the Meuse at
Ardenne. This gap was faced by the French extreme right resting on
the southward Namur bend of the Meuse. It was possibly the "trap"
military critics of the moment foresaw for the Germans. Quite likely
the two German generals Von Bülow and Von der Goltz, chatting in
their motor car, referred to this gap, and it is hardly a stretch
of imagination to suggest a twinkle in the huge glasses of the
old gentleman in the August overcoat, when now and then the name
of Von Hausen was mentioned.

The German attack on the French right began early in the morning
of Friday, August 21, 1914. A party of German hussars crossed the
Meuse, rode through Charleroi, and trotted on toward the Sambre.
At first they were mistaken for a British cavalry patrol. Probably
the populace in Charleroi were not sufficiently familiar at that
time with the British hussar uniform to distinguish it from the
German. In all armies hussar uniforms bear a close resemblance. A
French officer, however, presently detected the situation. After
a skirmish the German hussars were driven off with the loss of a
few killed and wounded. But the raid evidently came out of the gap
as a surprise to the French. The citizens were promptly ordered to
their homes. Barricades were raised in the streets, and mitrailleuses
were placed in sweeping positions. An artillery engagement began at
Jemappe, nine miles above Namur on the left bank of the Sambre,
between Von Bülow's vanguard and the main French right. Later in
the day Von Bülow's vanguard artillery had advanced to open fire
on Charleroi and Thuin, seven miles beyond.

On Saturday, August 22, 1914, Von Bülow attacked Charleroi in full
strength. As we have seen, he had already practically settled with
Namur. Their main assault on Saturday was delivered on the Sambre
bridges at Chatelet and Thuin, below and above Charleroi, respectively.
Sometime on Saturday they succeeded in crossing to turn Charleroi
into one of the most frightful street battle grounds in history.
The conflict raged for the possession of iron foundries, glass
works, and other factories. The thoroughfares were swept by storms
of machine-gun fire. Tall chimneys toppled over and crashed to
the ground, burying defenders grouped near under piles of débris.
Desperate hand-to-hand encounters took place in workshops,
electric-power stations, and manufacturing plants. The normal whir
of machinery, now silent, was succeeded by the crack and spitting
of continuous rifle fire.

The French-Turco and Zouave troops fought with savage ferocity,
with gleaming eyes, using bayonets and knives to contest alleys
and passageways. House doors were battered in to reach those firing
from upper windows. Roofs and yard walls were scaled in chase of
fleeing parties. The Germans were driven out of Charleroi several
times, only to return in stronger force. Similarly with the French.
With each change of victors, the losing side turned to bombard
with a torrent of artillery shells the war-engulfed city.

At nightfall on August 22, 1914, Charleroi burst into flames. A
dread and significant glow fell upon the sky. Absent were the usual
intermittent flare of blast furnaces. The greater part of Charleroi
had become a heap of ruins. Those of its citizens still alive cowered
in holes or corners for shelter.

The battle of Charleroi went on throughout the night. Early on the
morning of Sunday, August 23, 1914, Von Hausen swept down through
the gap between the armies of Von Bülow and the Duke of Württemberg.
He crossed the Meuse, drove from before him the French detachments
watching it, and advanced to attack the rear of the French right.

Von Hausen took the French at Charleroi completely by surprise.
At the moment they could comprehend neither where he came from
nor the measure of his strength. But he was in army force.

The French were compelled to withdraw their right from Charleroi.
Von Hausen seized the advantage to hurl his forces upon their rear,
while Von Bülow thundered in assault more vigorously than ever on
the French front. A powerful force was hurled upon them from an
unexpected direction. Presently the retreat of the French Fifth
Army was threatened by the two Saxon corps of Von Hausen's army,
pressing on the French right flank and rear. In this emergency the
retirement of the French Fifth Army appears to have been undertaken
with spontaneous realization of utmost danger. It gave way before
the attacks of Von Bülow and Von Hausen to move southward, leaving
their British left wing without information of defeat.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER IX

BATTLE OF MONS

On Friday, August 21, 1914, the British force began to take position
on the French left, forming the line Binche-Mons-Condé. When finally
concentrated it comprised the First and Second Army Corps, and
General Allenby's cavalry division. The regiments forming the cavalry
division were the Second Dragoon Guards, Ninth Lancers, Fourth
Hussars, Sixth Dragoon Guards, with a contingent of the Household
Guards. The First Army Corps was given the right of the line from
Binche to Mons. It was commanded by Sir Douglas Haig. He was a
cavalry officer like the commander in chief, and a comparatively
young man for such a responsibility, but had seen active service
with credit. His corps was comprised of six guards' battalions.
The First Black Watch, Second Munster Fusiliers, The Royal Sussex,
North Lancashire, Northamptons, Second King's Royal Rifles, Third
West Surreys, The South Wales Borderers, Gloucesters, First Welsh
Regiment, Highland Light Infantry, Connaught Rangers, Liverpools,
South Staffords, Berkshires, and First King's Royal Rifles. The First
Irish Guards went into action for the first time in its history.

The second corps extended from Mons to Condé, commanded by Sir
Horace Smith-Dorrien. General Dorrien was a west of England man,
and turning fifty-six. He had seen active service in the Zulu War,
Egypt, Sudan, the Chitral Relief Force, and Tirah campaign. He had
occupied the positions of adjutant general in India, commander
of the Quetta division, and commander in chief at Aldershot. He
was recognized as a serious military student, and possessing the
approval and confidence of Lord Kitchener. The Second Corps was
composed of Royal Irish Rifles, Wiltshires, South Lancashires,
Worcesters, Gordons, Royal Scots, Royal Irish, Middlesex, Royal
Fusiliers, Northumberland Fusiliers, Royal Scots Fusiliers, Lincolns,
Yorkshire Light Infantry, West Kent, West Riding, Scottish Borderers,
Manchesters, Cornwalls, East Surreys, and Suffolks. To the rear
Count Gleichen commanded the Norfolks, Bedfords, Cheshires, and
Dorsets. On the left of the Second Corps was stationed General
Allenby's cavalry.

In passing we may note that the commander in chief of the British
forces was a cavalry officer, the commander of the First Army Corps
a cavalry officer, and that the cavalry was in comparatively ample
force. Von Mackensen of the German force came from that branch of
the service. Cavalry officers are excellent soldiers, but their
training as such is not promising for the command of modern armies,
mainly of infantry and artillery, with other complements. In war much
has changed since Waterloo, with the value of cavalry retreating
into the background as aeroplanes sweep to the front for scouting
and other purposes.

From Binche to Condé the line assigned to the British was approximately
twenty-five miles. Their force totaled some 75,000 men with 259 guns.
General French, therefore, had 2,500 men to the mile of front.
This was an insufficient force, as the usual fighting front for a
battalion of a thousand men in defense or in attack is estimated in
all armies at about 425 yards. The British brigade of four battalions
(4,000 rifles) covers a half-mile front. General French's Third
Army Corps having been utilized elsewhere, he was compelled to
use his cavalry in four brigades as reserve.

Previous to the German attack on Charleroi, General Joffre still held
to his plan of a left-wing attack, or rather a counter-attack after
the Germans were beaten. But battles were commencing on other fronts,
properly belonging to the general retreat, which made its execution
doubtful even in an hour of Victory. The capture of Charleroi, of
course, dissipated it as a dream. That General French realized
the superiority in numbers of Von Kluck's advancing army both in
infantry and artillery is nowhere suggested. His airmen had merely
brought in the information that the attack would be in "considerable
force." The French Intelligence Service were led to believe and
informed the British commander that Von Kluck was advancing upon him
with only one corps, or two at the most. Some of General French's
cavalry scouting as far toward Brussels as Soignes, during the 21st
and 22d, confirmed it. But the British proceeded to prepare for
attack immediately on taking position. They set to work digging
trenches.

While continuing their defensive efforts through Saturday, August
22, 1914, there floated to them a distant rumble from the eastward.
Opinions differed as to whether it was the German guns bombarding
Namur, or a battle in progress on the Sambre. For the most part
British officers and men had but a vague idea of their position, or
the progress of the fighting in the vicinity. Even the headquarters
staff remained uninformed of the desperate situation developing on
the French right at Charleroi.

The headquarters of the British army was at Mons. It lies within
what is known as "le Borinage," that is the boring district of
Belgium, the coal-mining region. In certain physical aspects it
much resembles the same territory of Pennsylvania. Containing one
or two larger towns such as Charleroi and Mons, it is sprinkled
over with villages gathered near the coal pits. Everywhere trolley
lines are to be seen running from the mines to supply the main
railways and barge canals.

Formerly the people were of a rough, ignorant and poverty toiling
type, but of late years have greatly improved with the introduction
of organized labor and education. Previous bad conditions, however,
have left their mark in a stunted and physically degenerate type of
descendants from the mining population of those times. In contrast
to later comers they resemble a race of dwarfs. The men seldom
exceed four feet eight inches in height, the women and children
appear bloodless and emaciated.

The output of the Borinage coal field exceeds twenty million tons
a year. Its ungainly features of shafts, chimneys, and mounds of
débris are relieved in places by woodlands, an appearance of a
hilly country is presented where the pit mounds have been planted
with fir trees. Apart from its mining aspect, Mons is a city of
historic importance. It contains a Gothic cathedral and town hall
of medieval architectural note. It also, cherishes a special yearly
fête of its own on Trinity Sunday, when in the parade of the Limaçon,
or snail, the spectacle of St. George and the Dragon is presented.
With great pride the citizens of Mons showed the British soldiers
of occupation an ancient cannon, claimed to have been used by their
forefathers as an ally of the English at Crecy.

Especially east of Mons, toward Binche, the British line ran through
this district. Several of the greatest European battles have been
fought in its vicinity--Ramilles, Malplaquet, Jemappe, and Ligny.

The night of Saturday, August 23, 1914, passed peacefully for the
British soldiers, still working on their trenches. But distant boom
of guns from the east continued to vibrate to them at intervals.
Of its portend they knew nothing. Doubtless as they plied the shovel
they again speculated over it, wondering and possibly regretting
a chance of their having been deprived of the anticipated battle.

Sunday morning, August 24, 1914, dawned brightly with no sign of
the enemy. In Mons and the surrounding villages the workmen donned
their usual holiday attire, women stood about their doors chatting,
children played in the streets. Church bells rung as usual summoning
to public worship. General French gathered his generals for an
early conference. General Joffre's message on Saturday morning,
assured General French of victory, and positively informed him
that Von Kluck was advancing upon him with no more than one or
two army corps. In testimony of it, General French thus wrote a
subsequent official dispatch.

"From information I received from French headquarters, I understood
that little more than one or at most two of the enemy's army corps,
with perhaps one cavalry division, were in front of my position,
and I was aware of no outflanking movement attempted by the enemy"
(Von Hausen's advance on the right). "I was confirmed in this opinion
by the fact that my patrols encountered no undue opposition in
their reconnoitering operations. The observations of my aeroplanes
seemed also to bear out this estimate."

To General French, therefore, his position seemed well secured.
In the light of it he awaited Von Kluck's attack with confidence.
Toward mid-day some German aeroplanes swept up above the woods
in front, and circled over the British line. British marksmen at
once fired on the bodies and hawklike wings of the intruders.

Some tense interest was roused among the men as British aeroplanes
rose to encounter the German aircraft. It was the first real battle
of the sky they had witnessed. General French's cavalry patrols now
brought information that the woods were thick with German troops,
some of them deploying eastward toward their right at Binche.

At twenty minutes to one the first shots swept from the woods upon
the British line. Presently, Von Kluck's main attack developed
with great rapidity. The German artillery was brought to the front
edge of the woods to hurl a storm of shells on the British trenches.
It was returned with equal vigor. But very soon it became apparent
to British commanders along the line that the German artillery
fire was in far greater volume than what might be expected from
two army corps, whose normal complement would be some 340 guns.
Instead it was estimated 600 German guns were shortly brought into
action.

The battle field was described by the Germans as "an emptiness."
The term is intended to emphasize that the old martial display and
pomp has completely gone. A grand advance upon each other, with
trumpets sounding, banners fluttering, brilliant uniforms, and
splendid cavalry charges, was impossible with long range weapons
hailing storms of bullets and shells of devastating explosive power.
Cover was the all important immediate aim of both attack and defense.
In this respect as we have seen, the German gray-green uniform
assisted by rendering them almost invisible within shelter of such
woods as those before Mons. On the other hand, the brown khaki
shade of the British field uniforms--originally designed for the
same purpose on the sandy wastes of Egypt and Northern India--became
conspicuous upon a green background.

As the battle of Mons developed, the British line of the Condé
Canal was swept with German shrapnel. German shells, also, began
bursting in the suburbs of Mons and in the near-by villages. Sir
Douglas Haig's right thus came under strong fire. German aeroplanes
assisted by dropping smoke bombs over the British positions to give
the angle of range for their artillery. Thereupon fights above
took place between British and German airmen, while the armies
beneath thundered shot and shell upon each other. The Germans came
on in massed formation of attack. The British were accustomed to
attack in open extended line, and their shooting from any available
cover was generally excellent. They could not understand the German
attack in such close order that they were mowed down in groups of
hundreds.

The German infantry rifle fire, breaking from the shelter of the
woods to encounter a stronger British fire than was anticipated,
was at first ineffective. As to the mass formation they depended
upon overwhelming reserves to take the places of those dead piled
in heaps before the British trenches. It was General Grant's "food
for powder" plan of attack repeated.

Thus the battle raged upon the entire length of the British line,
with repeated advances and retreats on the part of the Germans.
Now and then the bodies almost reached the British trenches, and
a breach seemed in certain prospect. But the British sprang upon
the invaders, bayonet in hand, and drove them back to the shelter
of the woods. The Irish regiments, especially, were considered
invincible in this "cold steel" method of attack, their national
impulsive ardor carrying them in a fury through the ranks of an
enemy. But at Mons always the Germans returned in ever greater
numbers. The artillery increased the terrible rain of shells. Pen
pictures by British soldiers vividly describe the battle somewhat
conflictingly.

"They were in solid square blocks, standing out sharply against the
skyline, and you couldn't help hitting them. It was like butting
your head against a stone wall.... They crept nearer and nearer,
and then our officers gave the word. A sheet of flame flickered
along the line of trenches and a stream of bullets tore through the
advancing mass of Germans. They seemed to stagger like a drunken
man hit between the eyes, after which they made a run for us....
Halfway across the open another volley tore through their ranks,
and by this time our artillery began dropping shells around them.
Then an officer gave an order and they broke into open formation,
rushing like mad toward the trenches on our left. Some of our men
continued the volley firing, but a few of our crack shots were
told off for independent firing.... They fell back in confusion,
and then lay down wherever cover was available. We gave them no
rest, and soon they were on the move again in flight.... This sort
of thing went on through the whole day."

From another view we gather that "We were in the trenches waiting
for them, but we didn't expect anything like the smashing blow
that struck us. All at once, so it seemed, the sky began to rain
down bullets and shells. At first they went wide... but after a
time... they got our range and then they fairly mopped us up....
I saw many a good comrade go out."

During the early part of the battle Von Kluck directed his main
attack upon the British right, with a furious artillery bombardment
of Binche and Bray. This was coincident with the crumpling of the
French right at Charleroi by the army of Von Bülow, and its threatened
retreat by that of Von Hausen. The retirement of the French Fifth
Army, therefore, left General Haig exposed to a strong flank attack
by Von Kluck. Confronted with this danger, General Haig was compelled
to withdraw his right to a rise of ground southward of Bray. This
movement left Mons the salient of an angle between the First and
Second British Army Corps. Shortly after this movement was performed,
General Hamilton, in command of Mons, found himself in peril of
converging German front and flank attacks. If the Germans succeeded
in breaking through the British line beyond Mons, he would be cut
off and surrounded. General Hamilton informed his superior, General
French, of this danger, and was advised in return "to be careful
not to keep the troops in the salient too long, but, if threatened
seriously to draw back the center behind Mons."

[Illustration: GERMAN HOSTS INVADE AND CONQUER BELGIUM.

SIEGE GUN. FORTRESSES OF LIEGE, NAMUR, MALINES. VALIANT RESISTANCE
BY THE BELGIANS

One of the great siege guns that destroyed the fortresses in Belgium
and northern France and made possible the first great drive of
the German armies]

[Illustration: This bridge over the Meuse at Liege was blown up by
the Belgians to delay the German advance. The German army crossed
on pontoon bridges]

[Illustration: Belgian gunners and field gun in action on the firing
line between Termond and St. Giles, Belgium]

[Illustration: The fortress town of Namur, Belgium, whose once
impregnable fortifications were shattered in a few days by the great
German siege guns]

[Illustration: The city of Malines Belgium, from which the inhabitants
fled as the Germans advanced from Brussels]

[Illustration: A Belgian machine-gun corps taking up their position
in a beet field at Lebbeke on learning of the approach of the German
invaders]

[Illustration: Belgian artillery replying to the fire of the Germans.
Though hidden by trees, this battery could be detected by aeroplane
scouts]

[Illustration: Belgian soldiers intrenched along a railway line.
The fine roads and railways of Belgium and France aided the rapid
advance of the invaders]

A little after General French had sent General Hamilton this warning,
he received a telegram from General Joffre which he describes as
"a most unexpected message." General Joffre's telegram conveyed
the first news to General French not only that the French Fifth
Army had been defeated and was in retreat--the first intimation
even that the French right at Charleroi under General Lanrezac was
in peril--but that at least three German army corps were attacking
the British. Doubtless the German smashing of General Joffre's
planned grand counterattack, after the Germans were to be beaten,
was disheartening as well as a sore disappointment.

General French possessed 75,000 men. It was now disclosed that
in front Von Kluck was hurling upon him 200,000 men, Von Bülow
was hammering on his right, Von Hausen in pursuit of the French
threatened his rear, while some 50,000 Germans were enveloping
his left. He had no option but to order a retreat.

Dealing with the combined action of the French and British in this
critical period a French military writer says:

"The French armies of the center--that is to say, the Third and
Fourth Armies--had as their mission the duty of attacking the German
army in Belgian Luxembourg, of attempting to put it to flight and
of crumpling it up against the left flank of the German main body
at the north. This offensive on the part of the French center began
on August 21, 1914. The Third Army (General Ruffey) followed from
the east to the west the course of the Semoy, a tributary on the
right of the Meuse. The Fourth Army operated between the Meuse
and the Lesse. The Germans occupied the plateau which extends from
Neufchâteau to Paliseul. It is uncertain territory, covered with
heaths and thick woods, and lends itself poorly to the reconnaissance
work of aviators or cavalry patrols. There are no targets for the
artillery. The Germans had strongly fortified the ground. The infantry
of the Fourth Army which hurled itself against these positions
was thrown hack; still fighting it fell back over the Meuse. The
pursuit by the Germans was punctuated by strong counterattacks,
which inflicted great losses on them. The Third Army was similarly
checked in its march on Neufchâteau by the superior forces of the
crown prince and was thrown back on the Semoy. Thus the offensive
actions undertaken by the armies of the French center miscarried.
Not only were they unable to lend their aid to the armies of the
left, but they saw themselves obliged to retreat.

"The situation could only be reestablished by a victory on the
part of the Fifth French Army operating in conjunction with the
army of General French. This army, however, found itself in the
presence of German forces of great strength, consisting of the
crack corps of the German army. On the 22d the Germans at the cost
of considerable losses succeeded in passing the Sambre, and General
Lanrezac fell back on Beaumont-Givet, being apprehensive of the danger
which threatened his right. On the 24th the British army retreated,
in the face of a German attack, on to the Maubeuge-Valenciennes
line. It appeared at first that the British had in front of them
at most an army corps, with perhaps a corps of cavalry. They were
apprised, however, about five o'clock in the evening that three
army corps were advancing against them, while a fourth was marching
against their left along the road from Tournai in a turning movement.
General French effected his retreat during the night behind the
salient of Mons. Threatened on August 24 by the strength of the
whole German army, he fled backward in the direction of Maubeuge."


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER X

THE GREAT RETREAT BEGINS

The German hosts now stood at the gates of France. It was a mighty
spectacle. The soldiery of the Kaiser which had swept their way into
Belgium, there to meet the unexpected resistance of the defenders
of King Albert, had reached their goal--the French frontier.

About the middle of August, 1914, General Joffre, assigned to the
British Expeditionary Force, commanded by Sir John French, the task
of holding Mons against the powerful German advance. The British
force formed the left wing of the line of front that stretched for
some two hundred miles close to the Belgian frontier. Extending
from Arras through the colliery towns of Mons and Charleroi, the
extreme western front of the armies was held by General D'Amade
at Arras, with about 40,000 reserve territorial troops; by General
French, with 80,000 British regulars, at Mons; by the Fifth French
Army of 200,000 first-line troops, under General Lanrezac, near
Charleroi; and by a force of 25,000 Belgian troops at Namur. The
total Allied troops in this field of battle were thus about 345,000
men.

Opposed to them, on the north, were about 700,000 German troops,
General von Kluck farthest to the west, Generals von Bülow and von
Hausen around the Belgian fortress of Namur, Grand Duke Albrecht
of Württemberg in the neighborhood of Maubeuge, and finally, on the
extreme left of the German line, the Army of the Moselle, under
Crown Prince Wilhelm.

The position of the Allied armies was based on the resisting power
of Namur. It was expected that Namur would delay the German advance
as long as Liege had done. Then the French line of frontier
fortresses--Lille, with its half-finished defenses; Maubeuge, with
strong forts and a large garrison; and other strongholds--would
form a still more useful system of fortified points for the Allies.

The German staff, however, had other plans. At Liege they had rashly
endeavored to storm a strong fortress by a massed infantry attack,
which had failed disastrously until their new Krupp siege guns
had been brought up. These quickly demolished the defenses. These
siege guns, therefore, which had thus fully demonstrated their
value against fortifications soon brought about the total defeat
of the French offensive, and compelled the Allies to retreat from
Belgium and northern France. The Germans lost no time in investing
Namur, and on Saturday, as noted above, August 22, 1914, the fortress
fell into the invaders' hands.

On the same day, August 22, 1914, the Fifth French Army, under
the lead of General Lanrezac, was enduring the double stress of
Von Bülow's army thundering against its front, and Von Hausen's two
army corps pressing hard upon its right flank and rear, threatening
its line of retreat. Against such terrific odds the French line at
Dinant and Givet broke, exposing the flank and rear of the whole
army; and by the evening of that day, August 22, the passages of
the River Sambre, near Charleroi, had been forced, and the Fifth
Army was falling back, contesting every mile of the ground with
desperate rear-guard action. The British, meanwhile, defending the
Mons position, were in grave danger of being cut off, enveloped,
and destroyed.

Sir John French had put his two army corps into battle array. He
had about thirty miles of front to defend, with Mons nearly in
the center.

On Sunday afternoon, August 23, 1914, the full weight of the German
onset fell for the first time upon the British.

All that night the British were under the fire of German artillery.

Sir John French realized the danger of his Maubeuge-Jenlain position,
and on Monday evening, August 23, 1914, realizing the importance
of putting a substantial barrier, such as the Somme or the Oise,
between his force and the enemy, gave orders for the retirement
to be continued at five o'clock the next morning, August 24, 1914.
He had decided upon a new position about the town of Le Cateau,
east of Cambrai. Before dawn, August 25, 1914, the southward march
over rough, hilly country was resumed, and toward evening of August
25, 1914, after a long, hard day's fighting march over the highroads,
in midsummer heat and thundershowers, the Guards Brigade and other
regiments of the Second Corps, wet and weary, arrived at the little
market town of Landrecies. From Landrecies, after an encounter with
a German column, they marched south toward Wassigny on Guise.

[Illustration: BATTLE OF MONS AND RETREAT OF ALLIED ARMIES]

While the night attack on Landrecies was raging, the Germans, taxing
their men to the uttermost, marched four other corps through the
tract of country between the west side of the forest and the road
from Valenciennes to Cambrai. These corps were in a position along
Smith-Dorrien's front before dawn of Wednesday, August, 26, 1914,
and in the earliest hours of the morning it became apparent that
the Germans were determined to throw the bulk of their strength
against the British battalions which had moved up to a position
south of the small town of Solesmes, extending to the south of
Cambrai. Thus placed, this force could shield the Second Corps, now
beginning its retreat under pressure of the German army advancing
from Tournai. These troops under General Snow were destined to
play an important part in the impending battle of Le Cateau.

By sunrise the guns of the four German corps were firing from positions
facing the British left, and gray-green masses of infantry were
pressing forward in dense firing lines. In view of this attack,
General Smith-Dorrien judged it impossible to continue his retreat
at daybreak. The First Corps was at that moment scarcely out of
difficulty, and General Sordêt--whose troops had been fighting
hard on the flank of the Fifth French Army, with General Lanrezac,
against General von Bülow's hosts--was unable to help the British,
owing to the exhausted state of his cavalry. The situation was full
of peril; indeed, Wednesday bade fair to become the most critical
day of the retreat.

As the day of August 26, 1914, wore on, General von Kluck, abandoning
frontal attacks, began to use his superior numbers in a great enveloping
move on both flanks, and some of his batteries secured positions
from which they could enfilade the British line. Smith-Dorrien,
having no available reserves, was thus virtually ringed by enemy
guns on one side and by hostile infantry on all sides. "It became
apparent," says Sir John French's dispatch, "that if complete
annihilation was to be avoided, a retirement must be attempted;
and the order was given to commence it about 3.30 p.m. The movement
was covered with the most devoted intrepidity and determination by
the artillery, which had suffered heavily, and the fine work done
by the cavalry in the farther retreat from the position assisted
materially in the completion of this difficult and dangerous operation.
The saving of the left wing could never have been accomplished
unless a commander" (Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien) "of rare coolness
had been present to personally conduct the operation."

This retirement foreshadowed the end of the battle. Worn out by
repeated repulses, the Germans had suffered too heavily to continue
their attacks or to engage in an energetic pursuit. According to
General French's estimate, the British losses during the trying
period from August 23 to August 26, 1914, inclusive, were between
5,000 and 6,000 men, and the losses suffered by the Germans in
their pursuit and attacks across the open country, owing largely to
their dense formation, were much greater. The Battle of Le Cateau
gave the Germans pause. Further retreat of the British could now
be resumed in orderly array; for by now General Sordêt with his
cavalry was relieving the pressure on the British rear, and General
D'Amade with his two reserve divisions from the neighborhood of
Arras was attacking General von Kluck's right, driving it back on
Cambrai. Disaster to the British forces was averted, though the
peril of German interposition between the Allied army and Paris
would soon compel still further withdrawals.

Covered by their gunners, but still under heavy fire of the German
artillery, the British began again to retire southward. Their retreat
was continued far into the night of August 26, 1914, and through
the 27th and 28th; on the last date--after vigorous cavalry
fighting--the exhausted troops halted on a line extending from the
French cathedral town of Noyon through Chauny to La Fère. There
they were joined by reenforcements amounting to double their loss.
Guns to replace those captured or shattered by the enemy were brought
up to the new line. There was a breathing space for a day, while
the British made ready to take part in the next great encounter.

This fourth week in August marked a decisive period in the history
of the Great War. All the French armies, from the east to the west,
as well as the British army, were in retreat over their frontiers.
To what resolution had the French commander in chief come? That
was the question on every lip. What at that moment was the real
situation of the French army? Certainly the first engagements had
not turned out as well as the French could have hoped. The Germans
were reaping the reward of their magnificent preparation for the
war. Their heavy artillery, with which the French army was almost
entirely unprovided, was giving proof of its efficacy and its worth.
The moral effect of those great projectiles launched from great
distances by the immense German guns was considerable. At such
great distances the French cannons of 75, admirable as they were,
could make no effective reply to the German batteries. The French
soldiers were perfectly well aware that they were the targets of the
great German shells while their own cannon could make no parallel
impression on the enemy.

The German army revealed itself as an extraordinary instrument
of war. Its mobility and accouterments were perfect. It had aver
a hundred thousand professional non-commissioned officers or
subofficers, admirably suited to their work, with their men marching
under the control of their eye and finger. In the German army the
active corps, as well as the reserve carps, showed themselves,
thanks to these noncommissioned officers, marvelously equipped.

In the French army the number of noncommissioned officers by profession
totaled hardly half the German figures. The German army, moreover,
was much more abundantly supplied with machine guns than the French.
The Germans had almost twice as many, and they understood how to
use them in defense and attack better than the French. They had
moreover, to a degree far superior to that of the French, studied
the use of fortifications in the field, trenches, wire entanglements,
and so on. The Germans were also at first better trained than the
French reservists; they had spent langer periods in the German
army, and their reserve carps were almost equal to the active carps.

In the French army, on the other hand, an apprenticeship and training
of several weeks were required to give to the divisions of reserve
their full worth. At the end of two weeks, nevertheless, thanks
to the marvelous elasticity of the French soldier and the warlike
qualities of the race, the training was completed. At the beginning
of the month of September the reserve divisions fought with the
same skill, the same keenness, and the same swing as the active
army carps.

Moreover, certain incompetencies had revealed themselves in the
French high command. These General Jaffre attended to without the
loss of an instant. Every general that appeared to him incapable
of fulfilling the task allotted to him was weeded out on the spot,
without considering friendships or the bonds of comradeship, or
intimacy that might be between them.

As things were seen in Paris, all may be summed up in this formula:
That the German army was better prepared for war than the French
army, for the simple reason that Germany had long prepared for the
war, because she had it in view, a thing which could not be said
of France. But the French army revealed right from the beginning the
most admirable and marvelous qualities. The soldiers fought with a
skill and heroism that have never been equaled. Sometimes, indeed,
their enthusiasm and courage carried them too far. It mattered
little. In spite of losses, in spite even of retreat, the morale
of the whole French army on the entire front from Alsace to the
Somme remained extraordinarily high.

The violation of Belgian neutrality and the passage of the German
armies through Belgium had been foreseen by the French General
Staff, but opinions differed in regard to the breadth of the turning
movement likely to be made by the German right wing in crossing
Belgian territory. Among French experts some were of opinion that
the Germans would confine themselves to the right bank of the Meuse,
while others thought that they would cross the Meuse, and make a much
vaster turning movement, thus descending on France in a direction
due north and south.

If the violation of Belgian neutrality was no surprise to the French
Staff, it was nevertheless hardly expected that the Germans would
be able to put in line with such rapidity at the outset all their
reserve formations. Each army corps was supported by its reserve
corps, which showed itself as quick in mobilization and preparation
as the active corps.

Germany, while maintaining sufficient forces on the Russian front,
was still able to put in the field for its great offensive against
France a more numerous body of troops than would have been believed
in France. This permitted them to maintain in Alsace, in Lorraine,
and in Belgian Luxembourg armies as numerous as those which faced
them on the French side, and at the same time to mass the major
part of their troops on the right so as to pour into the valley
of the Oise their chief invading forces.

This explains why the French left, which was exposed to the offensive
of the German right, was obliged to make a rapid retreat, permitting
the German armies of General von Kluck and General von Bülow to
advance with all speed in the direction of Paris.

The French military staff, as soon as they perceived the danger
that threatened, proceeded to a new alignment of forces. As long
as this alignment of forces could not be effected the retreat had
to continue. As soon as it was accomplished, as soon as General
Joffre had his armies well in hand and the situation of his troops
well disposed, he checked the retreat, gave the signal for the
offensive, and so followed the great Battle of the Marne.

The German plan consisted, therefore, in delivering the main blow
through the medium of the right wing of the German forces, consisting
of the army of Von Kluck, the army of Von Bülow, and the army of
Von Hausen, which were to march with all speed in the direction
of Paris.

What plan had the French staff in mind to oppose to this plan of
the Germans? Its plan aimed at checking and holding the greatest
possible number of Germans by a vigorous offensive in Alsace and
Lorraine so as to prevent them from joining the three first German
armies which threatened Paris. In support of this offensive of the
armies of Alsace and Lorraine, the central French armies attacked
in the direction of the Ardennes and Belgian Luxembourg with the
object of checking the center of the German armies and then turning
toward the west so as to cooperate in the offensive of the French
forces which, aided by the British army and the Belgian army, were
fighting in Belgium.

The French armies, which are numbered from the right to the left--that
is, from the east to the west--comprised: A detachment of the Army of
Alsace that was dissolved toward the end of the month of August; the
First Army (General Dubail); the Second Army (General de Castelnau);
the Third Army (General Ruffey, replaced at the end of August,
1914, by General Sarrail); the Fourth Army (General de Langle de
Cary); the Fifth Army (General Lanrezac, replaced in the last days
of August, 1914, by General Franche d'Espérey). At the right of this
army was stationed the British army under the command of General
French.

To what resolution did General Joffre, come? On that memorable
evening of the 24th, and on that morning of the 25th, two alternatives
presented themselves before him. Should they, rather than permit
the enemy to invade the soil of France, make a supreme effort to
check the Germans on the frontier?

This first apparent solution had the evident advantage of abandoning
to the enemy no part of the national soil, but it had some serious
inconveniences. The attack of the German armies operating on the
right (Generals von Kluck, von Bülow, von Hausen) were extremely
menacing. In order to parry this attack it was necessary considerably
to reenforce the French left, and for that purpose to transfer from
the right to the left a certain number of army corps. That is what
the military call, in the language of chess players, "to castle" the
army corps. But this movement could not be accomplished in a few
hours. It required, even with all the perfection of organization
shown by the French railways during this war, a certain number of
days. As long as this operation from the right to the left had
not been accomplished, as long as the left wing of the French army
and even the center remained without the reenforcement of elements
taken from the right, it would have been extremely imprudent, not
to say rash, for the French high command to attempt a decisive
battle. If General Joffre had risked a battle immediately he would
have been playing the game without all his trumps in hand and would
have been in danger of a defeat, and even of a decided disaster,
from which it might have been impossible to recover.

The second alternative consisted in drawing back and in profiting
from a retreat by putting everything in shipshape order to bring
about a new grouping of forces. They would allow the Germans to
advance, and when the occasion showed itself favorable the French
armies, along with the British army, would take the offensive and
wage a decisive battle.

It was to this second decision that General Joffre came. As soon as
on August 25, 1914, he had made up his mind as to what the French
retreat was going to lead he gave orders for a new marshaling of
forces and for preparations with a view to the offensive.

General Joffre has made no objection to the publication of his
orders in detail from that date, August 25, 1914, down to the Battle
of the Marne. They constitute an eloquent and convincing document.
The series of orders were contained in the "Bulletin des Armées
de la République Française," June 6, 1915, Sunday. The first of
these orders, dated August 25, 1914, runs as follows:

"The projected offensive movement not having been found possible
of execution, the consequent operations will be so conducted as
to put in line, on our left, by the junction of the Fourth and
Fifth Armies, the British army, and new forces recruited from the
eastern district, a body capable of taking the offensive while
other armies for the needed interval hold in check the efforts of
the enemy...."

The retreating movement was regulated so as to bring about the following
disposition of forces preparatory to an offensive:

"In the Amiens district a new grouping of forces, formed of elements
conveyed by rail (Seventh Corps, four divisions of reserve, and
perhaps another active army corps), brought together from August
27 to September 2, 1914. This body will remain ready to take the
offensive in the general direction of St. Pol-Arras or Arras-Bapaume."

The same general instructions of August 25, 1914, marks out the
zones of march, and says:

"The movement will be covered by the rear guards spread out at
favorable points of vantage so as to utilize every obstacle for
the purpose of checking, by brief and violent counterattacks in
which the artillery will play the chief part, the march of the
enemy or at least to retard it."

  (Signed) J. JOFFRE.

The object of this maneuver is thus already on August 25, 1914,
clearly indicated; it looked not to a defensive, but to an offensive
movement, which was to be resumed as soon as circumstances appeared
favorable. Much is made clear in these orders of General Joffre,
which are characterized by perspicuity, foresight, and precision.

The retreat was effected; but it was only a provisional retreat.
Whenever an occasion presented itself to counterattack the enemy
for the purpose of delaying his advance, that occasion was to be
taken advantage of. And that is, in fact, what took place.

Two days later, on August 27, 1914, General Joffre brought together,
using army corps and divisions recruited elsewhere, a supplementary
army, the Ninth Army, which was detailed to take its place between
the Fourth and Fifth Armies. He intrusted its command to a general,
who, while commanding the Twentieth Corps, had distinguished himself
by his brilliant conduct in Lorraine, General Foch.

The establishment of the army of Manoury on the left of the French
armies so as to fall on the right flank of the Germans when they
marched on Paris; the establishment of a strong army under one
of the best French generals at the center for the purpose of
encountering the main weight of the German army; such were the
two decisions of the French commander in chief, taken on August
25 and 27, 1914, which contained in germ the victory of the Marne,
waged and won two weeks later.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XI

FIGHTING AT BAY

The forces of France also had been fighting to protect their retreat
southward in these August days of 1914. After the passages of the
Sambre were forced, during the great Mons-Charleroi battle, the
Fifth French Army was placed in very perilous straits by the failure
of the Fourth Army, under General Langle, to hold the Belgian river
town of Givet. Hard pressed in the rear by General von Bülow's
army, and on their right by General von Hausen commanding the Saxon
Army and the Prussian Guard, the Fifth Army of France had to retire
with all possible speed, for their path of retreat was threatened
by a large body of Teutons advancing on Rocroi.

On August 23, 1914, holding their indomitable pursuers in check
by desperate rear-guard action, with their two cavalry divisions
under General Sordêt galloping furiously along the lines of the
western flank to protect the retiring infantry and guns, the Fifth
Army unexpectedly turned at Guise. At that point considerable
reenforcements in troops and material arrived, making the Fifth
Army the strongest in France. It now defeated and drove over the
Oise the German Guard and Tenth Corps, and then continued its
retirement. But the left wing of the French army was unsuccessful,
and Amiens and the passages of the Somme had to be abandoned to
the invaders.

On Sunday, August 23, 1914, the Fourth Army, operating from the
Meuse, was heavily outnumbered by the Saxon army around the river
town of Dinant. They fell back, after furious fighting for the
possession of the bridges, which the French engineers blew up as
the army withdrew southward to the frontier. Soon after, at Givet,
the Germans succeeded in wedging their way across the Meuse. Some
advanced on Rocroi and Rethel, and other corps marched along the
left bank of the Meuse, through wooded country, against a steadily
increasing resistance which culminated at Charleville, a town on
the western bank of the river. There a determined stand was made.

On August 24, 1914, the town of Charleville was evacuated, the
civilians were sent away to join multitudes of other homeless refugees,
and then the French also retired, leaving behind them several machine
guns hidden in houses, placed so that they commanded the town and
the three bridges that connected it with Mézières.

The German advance guards reached the two towns next day, August
25, 1914, which, as we know, witnessed the British retirement toward
Le Cateau. Unmolested, they rode across the three bridges into the
quiet, empty streets. Suddenly, when all had crossed, the bridges
were blown up behind them by contact mines, and the German cavalrymen
were raked by the deadly fire of the machine guns. Nevertheless,
finding their foes were not numerous, they made a courageous stand,
waiting for their main columns to draw nearer. Every French machine
gunner was silenced by the Guards with their Maxims; but when the
main invading army swept into view along the river valley, the
French artillery from the hills around Charleville mowed down the
heads of columns with shrapnel. Still the Teutons advanced with
reckless courage. While their artillery was engaged in a duel with
the French, German sappers threw pontoon bridges across the river,
and finally the French had to retire. Between Charleville and Rethel
there was another battle, resulting in the abandonment of Mézières
by the French.

The retreating army crossed the Semois, a tributary of the Meuse,
which it enters below Mézières, and advanced toward Neufchâteau;
but they were repulsed by the Germans under the Duke of Württemberg.
At Nancy on August 25, 1914, there was another engagement between
the garrison of Toul and the army of the Crown Prince of Bavaria;
after fierce onslaughts the garrison was compelled to yield and
retire. Finally, on August 27, 1914, at Longwy, a fortified town near
Verdun, the army of the German crown prince succeeded in bursting
into France after a long siege, and marched toward the Argonne.
Thus from the western coast almost to Verdun there was a general
Franco-British retreat.

On August 28, 1914, pressed by the German armies commanded by Von
Kluck on the west, by Von Hausen from Dinant and Givet, by Von
Bülow from Charleroi and Namur, the Allies were pushed back upon
a line stretching roughly from Amiens through Noyon-Le Fère to
Mézières; while their forces east of the Meuse between Mézières
and Verdun were retreating before Duke Albrecht of Württemberg,
and to the southeast of Verdun before the Bavarians. All northern
France was thus open to the invaders.

After the battle of Le Cateau, however, the Germans slackened their
pursuit for a very brief interval; partly because the terrific strain
of marching and fighting was telling upon them no less than upon
the Allies, partly because the engineers had blown up the bridges
over every river, canal, and stream, behind the retreating armies,
and partly because, under directions from the French commander in
chief, General Manoury was organizing a new force on the British
left, a new Sixth Army, mainly reserve troops, one corps of line
troops, and General Sordêt's cavalry. On the right of the British
were General Lanrezac's troops; then, between Lanrezac's Fifth
Army and the Fourth Army, came a Ninth Army, under General Foch,
formed of three corps from the south.

Counterattacks were ordered by the French general in chief, continued
during the entire retreat and had frequently brilliant results.

On August 29, 1914, a corps of the Fifth Army and of the divisions
of reserve attacked with success in the direction of St. Quentin
with the object of withdrawing the pressure on the British army.
Two other corps and a division of reserves joined issue with the
Prussian Guard and the Tenth Corps of the German army which debouched
from Guise. This was a very violent battle, known under the name
of the Battle of Guise. At the end of the day, after various
fluctuations in the fight, the Germans were thrown completely over
the Oise and the entire British front was relieved. The Prussian
Guard on that occasion suffered great losses.

August 27, 1914, the Fourth Army under General de Langle de Cary
succeeded likewise in throwing the enemy across the Meuse as he
endeavored to secure a footing on the left bank. The success continued
on the 28th; on that day a division of this army (First Division of
Morocco under the orders of General Humbert) inflicted a sanguinary
defeat on a Saxon army corps in the region of Signy l'Abbaye.

Thanks to these brilliant successes, the retreat was accomplished in
good order and without the French armies being seriously demoralized;
as a matter of fact, they were actually put to flight at no point.
All the French armies were thus found intact and prepared for the
offensive.

The right wing of the German army marched in the direction of Paris
at great speed, and the rapidity of the German onslaught obliged the
French General Staff to prolong the retreat until they were able
to establish a new alignment of forces. The new army established
on the left of the French armies, and intrusted to General Manoury,
was not able to complete its concentration in the localities first
intended. In place of concentrating in the region of Amiens it
was obliged to operate more to the south.

The situation on the evening of September 2, 1914, as a result
of the vigorous onward march of the German right, was as follows:

A corps of German cavalry had crossed the Oise and had reached Château
Thierry. The First German Army (General von Kluck), consisting of
four active army corps and a reserve corps, had passed Compiègne.
The Second Army (General von Bülow), with three active army corps
and two reserve corps, had attained to the region of Laon. The
Third German Army (General van Hausen), with two active army corps
and a reserve corps, had crossed the Aisne and reached Château
Porcin-Attigny.

Farther to the east the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh German
Armies, making about twelve active army corps, four reserve corps,
and numerous Ersatz companies, were in contact with the French
troops (Fourth and Fifth Armies) between Vouziers and Verdun, the
others from Verdun to the Vosges. Such was the situation.

It may be seen, if a map is consulted, that the Fifth French Army,
commanded from August 30 by General Franchet d'Espérey, would have
found itself in grave peril following on the backward bending of
the British and French forces operating on its left, if the French
had accepted the challenge of a decisive battle. The French commander
in chief resolutely chose the alternative that obviated such a
risk, that is, he decided on a postponement of the offensive and
the continuation of the retreat.

Already on September 1, 1914, he prescribed as the extreme limits of
the retreat the line running through Bray-sur-Seine, Nogent-sur-Seine,
Arcis-sur-Aube, Vitry-le-François, and the region north of Bar-le-Due.
That line would have been reached had it been necessary. On the
other hand, it was his intention to attack before it was reached if
the forces could be offensively arrayed, allowing of the cooperation
of the British army and the army of Manoury on the left, and on
the right that of the divisions of reserve that had been held on
the heights of the Meuse.

Meanwhile, late in the afternoon of August 29, 1914, the British
retirement began afresh, and 10,000 French troops also withdrew from
the Somme, blowing up the bridges as they went. Everywhere along
the roads were crowds of country folk and villagers with wagons and
carts piled high with household goods or carrying aged persons and
children, all in panic flight before the dreaded invaders, fleeing
for refuge in Paris. At various places these stricken multitudes
joined the army ambulances, taking the shortest routes. Rumors of
the coming of the uhlans ran along the straggling lines with tales
of the grievous havoc and ruin which these horsemen, vanguards
of the German columns, had wrought in the land. Hardly had the
retirement begun, when a body of uhlans entered Amiens and demanded
from the mayor the surrender of the town. This was formally given,
and the civilians were ordered, on pain of death, not to create the
slightest disturbance and not to take part in any action, overt
or covert, against the soldiery. Afterward, cavalry, infantry,
and artillery took possession of the town on August 30, 1914. On
the same day a German aeroplane dropped bombs on Paris.

While retiring from the thickly wooded country south of Compiègne,
the British First Cavalry Brigade were surprised while dismounted
and at breakfast in the early morning of September 1, 1914. Moving
figures on the distant skyline first attracted the attention of
those who had field glasses, but in the dim light their identity
was not at first revealed. Suddenly all doubt was resolved by a
rain of shells on the camp. Many men and a large number of horses
were killed. At once the order "Action front!" rang out, and the
remaining horses, five to a man, were hurried to cover in the rear,
while on the left a battery of horse artillery went into instant
action. The German attack was pressed hard, and the battery was
momentarily lost until some detachments from the British Third
Corps, with the guns of the artillery brigade, galloped up to its
support. Then they not only recovered their own guns, but also
succeeded in capturing twelve of the enemy's.

On the eventful day of September 3, 1914, the British forces reached
a position south of the Marne between Lagny and Signy-Signets. They
had defended the passage of the river against the German armies
as long as possible, and had destroyed bridges in the path of the
pursuers. Next, at General Joffre's request, they retired some
twelve miles farther southward with a view to taking a position
behind the Seine. In the meantime the Germans had built pontoon
bridges across the Marne, and were threatening the Allies all along
the line of the British forces and the Fifth and Ninth French Armies.
Consequently several outpost actions took place.

By the 1st of September, 1914, the day of the Russian victories
at Lemberg, Von Kluck's army had reached Senlis, only twenty-five
miles from Paris. Despite this imminent danger, the capital was
remarkably quiet and calm; every day, as fateful event crowded
upon event, seemed to renew the resolution and coolness of the
population. It seemed advisable, however, to transfer the seat of
government for the time being from Paris to Bordeaux, after assuring
the defense of the city by every means that could be devised.

The defenses of Paris consisted of three great intrenched camps,
on the north, east, and southwest, respectively. Of these the most
important is the last, which includes all the fortified area to
the south and west of the Seine. A railway over sixty miles in
length connects all the works, and, under the shelter of the forts,
it could not only keep them supplied with the necessary ammunition
and stores, but also it could be utilized to convey troops from
point to point as they might be needed. However, it was an open
secret that even the outer and newer defenses were not of any great
strength. If the Germans broke through the outlying circle of forts,
the inner line would be of small value, and the city itself would
be exposed to long-range bombardment.

Paris was not ready for a siege, and if attacked it would speedily
fall.

Early in the morning of September 3, 1914, President Poincaré,
accompanied by all the ministers, left Paris, and was followed
at noon by the members of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, and
the reserves of the Banque de France. The higher courts were also
transferred to Bordeaux. The municipal authority was constituted
by the president of the City Council, and the Council of the Seine
Department, who were empowered to direct civil affairs under the
authority of General Galliéni as military governor, the prefect
of Paris, and the prefect of police.

On his appointment to the command, Galliéni did what he could to
strengthen the defenses. Trenches were dug, wire entanglements
were constructed; and hundreds of buildings that had been allowed
to spring up over the military zone of defense were demolished in
order to leave a clear field of fire. The gates of the city were
barred with heavy palisades backed by sandbags, and neighboring
streets also were barricaded for fighting. Certain strategic streets
were obstructed by networks of barbed wire, and in others pits
were dug to the depth of a man's shoulders. The public buildings
were barricaded with sandbags and guarded with machine guns.

But while Paris was preparing for siege and assault the French
staff were concentrating their efforts on making a siege impossible
by a decisive stroke against the German advance.

Hardly had the Government left the city when tidings arrived that
instead of marching on Paris, General von Kluck had swung southeastward
toward the crossing of the Marne. This news was obtained by the
allied flying corps, which had made daring flights over the enemy's
line.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XII

THE MARNE--GENERAL PLAN OF BATTLE FIELD

On September 4, 1914, the bugler of Destiny sounded the "Halt!" to
the retreat of the armies of the Allies from the Belgian frontier.
The marvelous fighting machine of the German armies, perhaps the
most superb organization of military potency that has been conceived
by the mind of man, seemed to reach its limit of range. Success
had perched upon the German eagles, and for two weeks there had
been a steady succession of victories. Nevertheless the British
and French armies were not crushed. They were overwhelmed, they
were overpowered, and, under stern military necessity, they were
forced to fall back.

Day after day, under the swinging hammer-head blows of the German
drive, the flower of the forces of the Allies had been compelled
to break. A little less generalship on the part of the defenders,
or a little more recklessness behind that smashing offensive might
have turned this retirement into a rout. Even as it was, the official
dispatches reveal that, while occasional and local retirements had
been considered, such a sweeping retreat was far from contemplated by
Generals Joffre and French. German official dispatches bear testimony
to the intrepid character of the defenders sullenly falling back
and contesting every inch of the way, as much as they do to the
daring and the vivid bravery of the German attackers who hurled
themselves steadily, day after day, upon positions hastily taken
up in the retreat where the retirement could be partly repaid by
the heaviest toll of death.

The great strategical plan of the Germans, which had displayed
itself throughout the entire operations on the western theatre
of war from the very first gun of the campaign, came to its apex
on this September 3, 1914. If the allied armies could develop a
strong enough defense to halt the German offensive at this point,
and especially if they could develop a sufficiently powerful
counteroffensive to strike doubt into the confident expectations
of the armies of the Central Powers, then the strategical plan
had reached a check, which might or might not be a checkmate, as
the fortunes of war might determine. If, on the other hand, the
stand made by the Allies at this point should prove ineffective,
and if the counteroffensive should reveal that the German hosts
had been able to establish impregnable defenses as they marched,
then the original strategic plan of the attackers must be considered
as intact and the peril of France would become greatly intensified.

It is idle, in a war of such astounding magnitude, to speak about
any one single incident as being a "decisive" one. Such a term can
only rightly be applied to conditions where the opposing powers
each have but one organized army in the field, and these armies
meet in a pitched battle. None the less, the several actions which
are known as the Battles of the Marne may be considered as decisive,
to the extent that they decided the limit of the German offensive
at that point. The German General Staff, taking the ordinary and
obvious precautions in the case of a possible repulse, chose and
fortified in the German rear positions to which its forces might
fall back in the event of retreat. These prepared positions had
a secondary contingent value for the Germans in view of the grave
Russian menace that might call at any moment for a transfer of
German troops from the western to the eastern front.

The Battle of the Marne stopped the advance of the main German army
on that line, forcing it back.

[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE MARNE--BEGINNING ON SEPTEMBER 5, 1914]

The scene of the battle ground is one of the most famous in Europe,
not even the plains of Belgium possessing a richer historical
significance than that melancholy plain, the Champagne-Pouilleuse,
upon whose inhospitable flats rested for centuries the curse of a
prophecy, that there would the fate of France be decided, a prophecy
of rare connotation of accuracy, for it refrained from stating what
that fate should be. Yet the historic sense is amplified even more
by remembrance than by prophecy, for in the territory confronting
that huge arc on which 1,400,000 German and Austrian soldiers lay
encamped, awaiting what even the German generals declared to be
"the great decision," there lies, on the old Roman road running
from Chalons a vast oval mound, known to tradition as "the Camp of
Attila." In that country, a Roman general, Aetius, leading a host
of soldiers of whom many were Gauls, broke a vast flood wave of the
Huns as those savage Mongol hordes hurled themselves against Rome's
westernmost possession. On that occasion, however, the Visigoths,
under their King Theodoric, fought side by side with the Gauls.
Then, the dwellers on the banks of the Rhine and on the banks of
the Seine were brothers in arms, now, that same countryside shall
see them locked in deadly conflict.

The morale of tradition is a curious thing, and often will nerve a
sword arm when the most impassioned utterance of a beloved leader
may fail. There were few among the soldiers of France who forgot
that in the south of this same plain of Champagne-Pouilleuse was
the home of Joan of Arc, the Maid of Orleans, patriot and saint,
and more than one French soldier prayed that the same voices which
had whispered in the ear of the virgin of Domremy should guide
the generalissimo who was to lead the armies of France upon the
morrow. Here, tradition again found old alliances severed and new
ones formed, for the Maid of Orleans led the French against the
English, while in the serried ranks awaiting the awful test of
the shock of battle, English and French soldiers lived and slept
as brothers.

The topography of the region of the battle field is of more than
common interest, for modern tactics deal with vaster stretches
of country than would have been considered in any previous war.
This is due, partly, to the large armies handled, partly to the
terrific range of modern artillery, and also to what may be called
the territorial perceptiveness which aeronautical surveys make
possible to a general of to-day. While war has not changed, it is
true that a commander of an army in modern campaign is compelled
to review and to take into account a far larger group of factors. A
modern general must be capable of grasping increased complexities,
and must possess a synthetic mind to be able to reduce all these
complicating factors into a single whole. The first factor of the
battles of the Marne was the topographical factor, the consideration
of the land over which the action was to take place.

Let the River Marne be used as a base from which this topography can
be determined. The Marne rises near Langres, which is the northwest
angle of that pentagon of fortresses (Belfort, Epinal, Langres, Dijon,
and Besançon), which incloses an almost impregnable recuperative
ground for exhausted armies. From Langres the Marne flows almost north
by west for about fifty miles through a hilly and wooded country,
then, taking a more westerly course, it flows for approximately
seventy-five miles almost northwest, across the Plain of Champagne,
past Vitry-le-François and Châlons, thence almost due westward
through the Plateau of Sézanne, by Epernay, Château Thierry, La
Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and Meaux to join the Seine just south of Paris.
In the neighborhood of Meaux, three small tributaries flow into
the Marne--the Ourcq from the north, and the Grand Morin and Petit
Morin from the east. The Marshes of St. Gond, ten miles long from
east to west and a couple of miles across, lie toward the eastern
borders of the Plateau of Sézanne, and form the source of the Petit
Morin, which has been deepened in the reclamation of the marsh
country.

Once more considering the source of the Marne, near Langres, it
will be noted that the River Meuse rises near by, flowing north
by east to Toul, and then north-northwest past Verdun to Sedan,
where it turns due north, flowing through the Ardennes country
to Namur, in Belgium. To the east of the Meuse lies the difficult
forest clad hill barrier, known as the Hills of the Meuse; to the
east extends (as far as Triaucourt) the craggy and broken wooded
country of the Argonne, a natural barrier which stretches southward
in a chain of lakes and forests.

West of this impassible country of the Meuse and the Argonne lies
the plain of Champagne-Pouilleuse, which is almost a steppe, bare
and open, only slightly undulating, overgrown with heath, and studded
here and there by small copses of planted firs, naught but a small
portion of the whole being under cultivation. Between the Forest
of the Argonne and this great plain, which is over a hundred miles
long from north to south and forty miles in width, lies a short
stretch of miniature foothills, with upland meadows here and there,
but crossed in every direction by small ravines filled with shrubs
and low second-growth timber. Here lies the source of the Aisne, a
river destined to live in history; and on the farther side begins
the great plain.

On the west of the plain of Champagne rises, 300 feet, with a curious
clifflike suddenness, the Plateau of Sézanne. The effect is as
though a geological fault had driven the original plateau from
north to south throughout its entire length, and then as though
there had been a general subsidence of the plain, giving rise to
the clifflike formations known as Les Falaises de Champagne, at
the foot of which runs the road from La Fère-Champenoise to Rheims.

The disposition and arrangement of the German forces is next to
be considered. It can be assumed that their objective was Paris.
It is also worthy of remembrance that the German tactical method
has always favored the envelopment of the enemy's flanks rather
than a frontal attack aiming to pierce the enemy's center, which
latter was a favorite method of Napoleon I to reach decision.

The tactical method of envelopment demands great numerical superiority,
and on account of the extreme extension of front necessitated is apt
to become dangerous as perforce the center is left weak. Attempts
to envelop, with which the observer is confronted again and again
when considering the military movements of the Central Powers on
the western battle front, were revealed on the morning of September
3, 1914, in the position occupied by the German forces, and,
correspondingly, in the arrangement of the allied armies.

The German right, on September 3, 1914, and September 4, 1914,
at which time it was nearest to its desired goal of Paris, held
the banks of the Marne from Epernay to the banks of the little
tributary the Ourcq, which runs into the Marne from the north. This
extreme right comprised the Second Corps and the Fourth Reserve
Corps, encamped on the western bank of the little stream the Ourcq;
while the Fourth Corps was given the honor of the tip of the right,
being camped on the Marne at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, supported by
the Third Corps, the Seventh Corps and the Seventh Corps Reserve.
The Ninth Cavalry Division occupied an advanced position west of
Crécy and the Second Cavalry Division occupied an advanced position
near the British army, north of Coulommiers. These troops constituted
the First German Army, under the command of General von Kluck.

The Allies' left, confronting this position, held strong reserves,
and by the nature of the ground itself, was well placed to prevent
any enveloping movement, dear to the German school of military
tactics. It rested securely on the fortress of Paris, believed
by its constructors to be the most fully fortified city in the
world, and should the German right endeavor to encircle the left
wing of the Allies, should it develop a farther westerly movement,
it would but come in contact with the outer line of those defenses
and thence be deflected in such an enormous arc as to thin the line
beyond the power of keeping it strong enough to resist a piercing
attack at all points. Clearly, then, as long as the extreme left
of the Allies remained in contact with the defenses of Paris, an
enveloping movement was not possible on the easterly flank.

Facing the German extreme right, was the Sixth French Army, one
of the great reserves of General Joffre, which had been steadily
building up since August 29, 1914, with its right on the Marne
and its left at Betz, in the Ourcq Valley, encamped on the western
side of that stream, facing the Second and Fourth Corps of the
Germans. The strengthening of that army from the forces at Paris
was hourly, and while three or four days before it had been felt
that the Sixth French Army was too weak to be placed in so vital a
point--that it should have been supplemented with the Ninth Army--the
results justified the French generalissimo's plans and more than
justified his confidence in the British Army, or Expeditionary
Force, which faced the tip of the German right wing drive and was
encamped on a line from Villeneuve le Comte to Jouy le Chatel, the
center of the British army being at a point five miles southeast
of Coulommiers. This army was under the command of General Sir
John French.

The right center of the German line was held by General von Bülow's
army, consisting of the Ninth Corps, the Tenth Corps, the Tenth
Reserve Corps, and the Guard Corps. This army also was encamped
upon the Marne, stretching from the eastern end of General Von
Kluck's army as far as Epernay. This army thus held the Forests
of Vassy but was confronted by the marshes of St. Gand.

Confronting this right center was, first of all, General Conneau's
Cavalry Corps, which was in touch with the right wing of the British
army under Sir John French. Then, holding the line from Esternay
to Courtaçon lay the Fifth French Army under General d'Espérey.
Full in face of the strongest part of the German right center stood
one of the strongest or General Joffre's new reserves, the Ninth
Army under General Foch, with the marshes of St. Gond in front or
him, and holding a twenty-mile line from Esternay, past Sézanne
to Camp de Mailly, a remarkably well-equipped army, very eager
for the fray.

The hastily replenished corps, largely of Saxons, which had been
General von Hausen's army, lay next to General von Bülow, a little
north of Vitry, and as it proved, a weak spot in the German line.
The left center of the attacking force was under the command of
the Duke of Württemberg and extended across the whole southern
end of the plain of Champagne to the upper streams of the Aisne
south of St. Menhould. The extreme left of this advanced line was
the army of the Imperial Crown Prince, holding the old line on the
Argonne to the south of Verdun. In close relation to this advanced
line, but not directly concerned with the battles of the Marne, were
the armies of the Bavarian Crown Prince, encamped in the plateau
of the Woevre, engaged largely in the task of holding open the
various lines of communication, while far to the south, in the
vicinity of the much battered little town of Mulhouse, lay the
remains of the decimated army or the Alsace campaigns under General
von Heeringen.

Facing this left center came General Langle's Fourth French Army,
covering the southern side of the plain of Chalons, it lay south
of Vitry-le-François, and faced due north. On this army, it was
expected, the brunt of the drive would fall. At this point the French
battle line made a sharp angle, the Third French Army, commanded
by General Sarrail, occupying a base from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun.
It thus faced almost west, skirting the lower edge of the Forest
of Argonne. At the same time it was back to back with the Second
French Army, which covered the great barrier of forts from Verdun
to Toul and Epinal, while the First French Army held the line from
Epinal to Belfort.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XIII

ALLIED AND GERMAN BATTLE PLANS

So much for the actual disposition of the armies. The question
of preponderance of numbers, of advantages of position, and of
comparative fighting efficiency is the next factor with which to
be reckoned. The numbers were fairly evenly matched. About twelve
days before this fateful day of September 3, 1914, there were
approximately 100 German divisions as against seventy-five French,
British, and Belgian divisions. But, during those twelve days,
French and British mobilization advanced with hectic speed, while,
at the same time, Germany was compelled to transfer ten or perhaps
fifteen of her divisions to the eastern theater of war. It follows,
therefore, that there were about 4,000,000 soldiers in all the
armies that confronted each other in the week of September 3-10,
1914, of whom, probably, 3,000,000 were combatants.

An early estimate placed the German strength at 1,300,000 combatants,
and the Allies at about 1,700,000. A later French estimate put
the Germans at 1,600,000, with the Allies between 1,400,000 and
1,500,000. The preponderance of efficiency of equipment lay with
the Germans.

The plans of the German campaign at this time, so far as they can
be determined from the official orders and from the manner in which
the respective movements were carried out, were three-fold. The
first of these movements was the order given to General von Kluck
to swirl his forces to the southeast of Paris, swerving away from
the capital in an attempt to cut the communications between it and
the Fifth French Army under General d'Espérey. This plan evidently
involved a feint attack upon the Sixth French Army under General
Manoury (though General Pare took charge of the larger issues of
this western campaign), coupled with a swift southerly stroke and
an attack upon what was supposed to be the exposed western flank of
General d'Espérey's army. The cause of the failure of this attempt was
the presence of the British army, as has been shown in the alignment
of the armies given above, and as will be shown in detail later, in
the recital of the actual progress of the fighting. Important as
was this movement, however, it was the least of the three elements
in General von Moltke's plan for the shattering of the great defense
line of the Allies.

The second element in this plan was, contrary to Germany's usual
tactics, the determination to attack the center of the French line
and break through. Almost three-quarters of a million men were
concentrated on this point. The armies of General von Bülow, General
Hausen and the Duke of Württemberg were massed in the center of the
line. There, however, General Foch's new Ninth Army was prepared
to meet the attack. It will be remembered that, in the disposition
of the troops, these respective armies were facing each other across
the great desolate plain, the ancient battle ground. If the German
center could break through the French center, and if at the same
time General von Kluck, commanding the German right, could execute
a swift movement to the southeast, the Fifth French Army would
be between two fires, together with such part of the Ninth Army
as lay to the westward of the point to be pierced. This strategic
plan held high promise, and it would have menaced the whole interior
of France southward from the plain of Champagne, but even this
second part of the plan, important as it was, does not appear to
have been the crucial point in the campaign.

The glory of the victory, if indeed victory it should prove, as
the successes of the previous two weeks had led the Germans to
believe, was to be given to the crown prince. With a great deal
of trouble and with far more delay than had been anticipated, the
crown prince's army had at last managed to get within striking
distance of the forefront of the great battle line. His forces
occupied the territory north of Verdun to a southern point not
far from Bar-le-Duc. Here the German secret service seems to have
been as efficient, as it failed to be with regard to conditions
only fifty miles away. General Sarrail's army, which confronted
the army of the crown prince, was somewhat weak. It consisted of
about two army corps with reserve divisions. Nor could General Joffre
send any reenforcements. Every available source of reenforcements
had been drawn upon to aid the Sixth Army, encamped upon the banks
of the Ourcq, in order that Paris might be well guarded. No troops
could be spared from the Fifth and Ninth Armies, which had to bear
the brunt of the attack from the German center. General Sarrail,
therefore, had to depend on the natural difficulties of the country
and to avoid giving battle too readily against the superior forces
by which he was confronted. It was a part of the plan of the French
generalissimo, however, to feel the strength of the German center,
and if it proved that they could be held, to release several divisions
and send them to the aid of General Sarrail.

Subordinate to this contemplated attack by the crown prince, yet
forming a part of it, and, in a measure, a fourth element in the
campaign, was the double effort from the garrisons of Metz and
Saarbrucken, combining with the armies of the Bavarian Crown Prince
and the forces of General von Heeringen. The Second French Army,
therefore, could not come to the aid of the Third, except in desperate
need, for it was in the very forefront of the attack on Nancy. If the
German left could pierce the French lines at Nancy and pour through
the Gap of Lorraine, it would be able to take General Sarrail's army
in the rear at Bar-le-Duc, and would thus completely hem it in,
at the same time isolating Verdun, which, thus invested in the
course of time must fall, forming an invaluable advanced fortress
to the German advance.

[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE MARNE--SITUATION ON SEPTEMBER 9, 1914]

Before proceeding to the actual working out of this plan of campaign
it may be well to recapitulate it, in order that each development
may be clear. The German plan was to pierce the French line at
three places, at Meaux, at Bar-le-Duc and at Nancy. General von
Kluck, at Meaux, would cut off the Fifth and the Ninth Armies from
communication with their base at Paris, the Bavarian Crown Prince
would weaken General Sarrail's defense in the rear, and if possible
come up behind him, and thus the stage would be set for the great
onrush of the Imperial Crown Prince, who, with an almost fresh army,
and with a most complete and elaborate system of communications
and supplies, should be able to crush the weak point in France's
defense, the army under General Sarrail. Such a victory was designed
to shed an especial luster upon the crown prince and thus upon
the Hohenzollern dynasty, a prestige much needed, for the delays
in the advance of the crown prince's army had already given rise
to mutterings of discontent. From a strategical point of view the
plan was sound and brilliant, the disposition of the forces was
excellently contrived, and the very utmost of military skill had
been used in bringing matters to a focus.

The French plan, is the next to be considered. From official orders
and dispatches and also from the developments of that week, it is
clear that General Joffre had perceived the possibility of such
a plan as the Germans had actually conceived. He had brought back
his armies--and there is nothing harder to handle than a retreating
army--step by step over northern France without losing them their
morale. The loss of life was fearful, but it never became appalling.
The French soldiers had faith in Joffre, even as their faith in
France, and, while the Germans had victories to cheer them on,
the soldiers of the Allies had to keep up their courage under the
perpetual strain of retreat. The administration had evacuated Paris.
Everywhere it seemed that the weakness of France was becoming apparent.
To the three armies in the field, those commanded severally by
General Manoury, Sir John French, and General Lanrezac, the
generalissimo steadily sent reenforcements. But he informed the
French Government that he was not able to save the capital from a
siege. Yet, as after events showed, while these various conditions
could not rightly be considered as ruses upon General Joffre's
part to lure on the Germans, there is no doubt that he understood
and took full advantage of the readiness of the attacking hosts
to esteem all these points as prophetic of future victory. The
first feature of the French plan, therefore, was to lend color to
the German belief that the armies of the Allies were disheartened
and thereby to induce the attacking forces to join the issue quickly.

The second part of the French plan lay in General Joffre's decision
not to do the expected thing. With General Sarrail placed at the
extremest point of danger, it would have been a likely move to
transfer the entire British Expeditionary Force from the left wing
to the weak point at Bar-le-Duc. There is reason to believe that
General von Kluck believed that this had been done.

The third part of the defensive prepared by General Joffre was that
of a determination to turn the steady retreat into a counterdrive.
Time after time had the other generals implored their leader to
give them leave to take the offensive, and on every occasion a
shake of the head had been the reply. Sir John French had wondered.
But when the French officers found themselves in the region of the
Marne, close to the marshes of St. Gond, where in 1814 Napoleon
had faced the Russians, they were more content. It was familiar
as well as historic ground. Even the youngest officer knew every
foot of that ground thoroughly. It was, at the same time, the best
point for the forward leap and one of the last points at which a
halt could be made.

The fourth part of the plan was the holding fast to the point of
Verdun, for thereby the communication of the armies of the Central
Powers was seriously weakened. It is to be remembered that this actual
fighting army of more than a million men depended for food and for
ammunition supplies upon the routes from Belgium and Luxemburg by
way of Mézières and Montmédy, and the circuitous line to Brussels
via St. Quentin. Had Maubeuge fallen a little earlier the situation
of the Central Powers would have been less difficult, and both
commissariat and ammunition problems would have been easier of
solution. But Maubeuge held out until September 7, 1914, and by
that time the prime results of the battles of the Marne had been
achieved. To this problem Verdun was the key, for from Metz through
Verdun ran the main line, less than one-half the length of line
to the Belgian bases of supplies, and, owing to the nature of the
country, a line that could be held with a quarter the number of
men. But Verdun stood, and General Joffre held the two armies back
to back, converging on the point at Verdun.

Such was the country over which the battles of the Marne were fought,
such were the numbers and dispositions of the several armies on
each side, and such, as far as can be judged, were the plans and
counterplans of the strategic leaders in the great conflict.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XIV

FIRST MOVES IN THE BATTLE

The first movement in this concerted plan was taken by the German
extreme right. This was the closing in of General von Kluck's army in
a southeasterly direction. It was a hazardous move, for it required
General von Kluck to execute a flank march diagonally across the
front of the Sixth French Army and the British Expeditionary Force.
At this time, according to the dispatches from Sir John French, the
British army lay south of the Marne between Lagny and Signy-Signets,
defending the passage of the river and blowing up the bridges before
General von Kluck.

On September 4, 1914, air reconnaissances showed that General von
Kluck had stopped his southward advance upon Paris, and that his
columns were moving in a southeasterly direction east of a line
drawn through Nanteuil and Lizy on the Ourcq. Meanwhile the French
and British generals more effectually concealed their armies in
the forests, doing so with such skill that their movements were
unmarked by the German air scouts. All that day General von Kluck
moved his forces, leaving his heavy artillery with about 100,000
men on the steep eastern bank of the Ourcq and taking 150,000 troops
south across the Marne toward La Ferté Gaucher. He crossed the
Petit Morin and the Grand Morin, all unconscious that scores of
field glasses were trained upon his troops.

Probably believing that the British army had been hurried to the
aid of General Sarrail, General von Kluck advanced confidently.
Having concealment in view, the commanders of the French army and
the British army between them had left a wide gap between the two
armies. Through one of these apparently unguarded openings a strong
body of uhlan patrols advanced, riding southward until they reached
Nogent, south of Paris, and seemingly with the whole rich country
of central France laid wide open to a sharp and sudden attack.
Among the many strange features of this series of the battles of
the Marne this must certainly be reckoned as one. Though possessing
an unequaled military organization, though priding itself on its
cavalry scouts, though aided by aerial scouts, and though well
supplied with spies, yet the Allied armies, with the age-old device
of a forest, were able to cloak their movements from this perfectly
organized and powerful invading army. Much of the credit of this
may be assigned to the French and English aircraft, which kept
German scouting aircraft at a distance. But the Allied generals
were astounded at the result of their maneuver, which, as they
admitted afterward, was merely a military precautionary measure
against the discovery of artillery sites, and a device to keep
the enemy in general ignorance.

On Saturday, September 5, 1914, at the extreme north of the line
of the two armies facing each other across the Ourcq, an artillery
duel began. The offensive was taken by the French, and though in
itself it was not more striking than any of the artillery clashes
that had marked the previous month's fighting, it was significant,
for it marked the beginning of the battles of the Marne. The plans
of General Joffre were complete, but the actual point at which
the furious contest should begin was not yet determined. In the
northern Ourcq section, however, the realization by the French
that they were actually on the offensive at last, that the long
period of retreat was over, could not be restrained. The troops
were eager to get to work with the bayonet, and greatly aided by
their field artillery, in which mobility had been sacrificed to
power, they quickly cleared the hills to the westward of the Ourcq.
By nightfall of September 5, 1914, the country west of the Ourcq
was in French hands. But to cross that river seemed impossible.
General von Kluck's heavy artillery had been left behind to hold
that position, and every possible crossing was covered with its
own blast of death.

Here General von Kluck's generalship was successful. It might have
been regarded as risky to leave 100,000 men to guard a river confronted
by 250,000 picked and reenforced French troops. But General von Kluck's
faith in German guns and German gunnery was not ill-founded. This
was the first of the open-air siege conflicts, and the French army
had no guns which could be used against the German heavy artillery.
Hence it followed that the brilliant work of the Sixth French Army
on this first day of the battles of the Marne achieved no important
result, for the long-range hidden howitzers, manned by expert German
gunners and well supplied with ammunition, defied all attempts at
crossing the little stream of the Ourcq.

This first day's fighting on the Marne revealed one of France's
chiefest needs--heavy artillery. The French light quick-firing gun
was a deadly weapon, but France had neglected the one department
of artillery in which the Germans had been most successful--the
use of powerful motor traction to move big guns without slackening
the march of an army. General von Kluck's artillery was impregnable
to the French. Indeed, the Germans could not be dislodged from the
Ourcq until the British Expeditionary Force sent up some heavy
field batteries. It was then too late for the withdrawal from the
Ourcq to be of any serious consequence in determining the result
along the battle front.

The afternoon of that day, when the Zouaves were driving the Germans
across the Ourcq with the bayonet and were themselves effectually
stopped by the German wall of artillery fire, General Joffre and
Sir John French met. At last the British commander received the
welcome news from the generalissimo that retreat was over and advance
was about to be begun.

"I met the French commander in chief at his request," runs the
official dispatch, "and he informed me of his intention to take
the offensive forthwith by wheeling up the left flank of the Sixth
Army, pivoting on the Marne, and directing it to move on the Ourcq;
cross and attack the flank of the First German Army, which was
then moving in a southeasterly direction east of that river.

"He requested me to effect a change of front to my right--my left
resting on the Marne and my right on the Fifth Army--to fill the
gap between that army and the Sixth. I was then to advance against
the enemy on my front and join in the general offensive movement.
German troops, which were observed moving southeast up the left
bank of the Ourcq on the Fourth, were now reported to be halted and
facing that river. Heads of the enemy's columns were seen crossing
at Changis, La Ferté, Nogent, Château-Thierry, and Mezy.

"Considerable German columns of all arms were seen to be converging
on Montmirail, while before sunset large bivouacs of the enemy
were located in the neighborhood of Coulommiers, south of Rebais,
La Ferté-Gaucher, and Dagny.

"These combined movements practically commenced on Sunday, September
6, at sunrise; and on that day it may be said that a great battle
opened on a front extending from Ermenonville, which was just in
front of the left flank of the Sixth French Army, through Lizy on
the Marne, Maupertuis, which was about the British center, Courtaçon,
which was the left of the Fifth French Army, to Esternay and
Charleville, the left of the Ninth Army under General Foch, and
so along the front of the Ninth, Fourth, and Third French Armies
to a point north of the fortress of Verdun."

Sunrise on Sunday morning, on a summer day in sunny France, was
the setting for the grim and red carnage which should show in the
next five consecutive days that the German advance was checked,
that the southernmost point had been reached, and that for a long
time to come it would tax the resources of the invaders to hold
the land that already had been won. General Joffre had so arranged
his forces that the most spectacular--and the easiest--part fell to
the British, and it was accomplished with perfection of detail. But
the honors of the battles of the Marne lay with General Sarrail's
army and with the "Iron Division of Toul."

On the same morning, this special army order, issued by Sir John
French, was read to the British troops:

"After a most trying series of operations, mostly in retirement,
which have been rendered necessary by the general strategic plan
of the allied armies, the British forces stand to-day formed in
line with their French comrades, ready to attack the enemy. Foiled
in their attempt to invest Paris, the Germans have been driven to
move in an easterly and southeasterly direction with the apparent
intention of falling in strength upon the Fifth French Army. In
this operation they are exposing their right flank and their line
of communications to an attack from the combined Sixth French Army
and the British forces.

"I call upon the British army in France to now show the enemy its
power and to push on vigorously to the attack beside the Sixth
French Army.

"I am sure I shall not call upon them in vain, but that, on the
contrary, by another manifestation of the magnificent spirit which
they have shown in the past fortnight, they will fall on the enemy's
flank with all their strength and, in unison with the Allies, drive
them back."

As before, the day's fighting began with the efforts of the Sixth
French Army against the Ourcq. Before the Germans could be driven
from the east bank the few villages they occupied on the west bank
had to be taken, and as these were covered by heavy artillery from
the farther bank, the French loss of life was very severe. Yet
these several combats--of which there were as many as there were
villages--were stationary. In every case the Germans were compelled
to cross the river; in every case the artillery made it impossible
for the French to follow them.

At dawn also everyone of the French armies advanced, and within
two or three hours of sunrise found themselves engaged with the
German front. The spirited order to the troops issued that morning
by General Joffre had left no doubt in the minds of Frenchmen on
the importance of the issue. It read:

"At a moment when a battle on which the welfare of the country
depends is going to begin, I feel it incumbent upon me to remind
you all that this is no longer the time to look behind. All our
efforts must be directed toward attacking and driving back the
enemy. An army which can no longer advance must at all costs keep
the ground it has won, and allow itself to be killed on the spot
rather than give way. In the present circumstance no faltering
can be tolerated."

Yet in spite of the powerful efforts of the French armies they
were all held in check, and General Sarrail was beginning to give
way.

Though the fighting in the center had been stationary on this sixth
of September, 1914, it had been desperate. D'Espérey was facing
the 150,000 men of Von Kluck's army, and the effect of the British
attack on Von Kluck's flank had not yet been felt. He more than
held his own, but at great cost. General Foch, with the Ninth Army,
had a double problem, for he was wrestling with General von Bülow
to hold the southern edge of the Sézanne Plateau, while General von
Hausen's Saxon Army was trying to turn his right flank. A violent
attack, which, for the space of over two hours seemed likely to
succeed, was launched by the Duke of Württemberg against General
Langle and the Fourth Army. The attack was repelled, but the French
losses were proportionately great. There could be no denial that
many such attacks could break through the line. General Sarrail's
army, fighting a losing game, showed marvelous stubbornness and
gameness, but even so, it could not resist being pushed south of
Fort Troyon, itself unable to support the battering it might expect
to receive when the German siege guns should be brought into place.

[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE MARNE--END OF GERMAN RETREAT AND THE
INTRENCHED LINE ON THE AISNE RIVER]

At every point but one the Germans had a right to deem the day
successful. The only reversal had been a minor one before the forest
of Crécy. Yet, of all the generals on that front Von Kluck alone
was in a position to see the gravity of the situation. The British
had caught him on the flank as he tried to pierce the left wing
of General d'Espérey's army, and if he should now retreat, that
army could envelop him and thus catch him between two fires.

Next morning, Monday, September 7, 1914, another glorious summer
morning, saw a resumption of the battle along exactly the same
lines, with the same persistent attack and defense along the eastern
part of the front, and with the British making full use of the
blunder made by the German right. General von Kluck had realized
his plight, but, even so, he had not secured an understanding of
the size of the force that was threatening his flank, and he sent
as a reenforcement a single army corps which had been intrenched
near Coulommiers on the Grand Morin. The British had three full
army corps and were well supplied with cavalry and artillery. Yet
Coulommiers was Von Kluck's headquarters and actually, when the
Germans were driven back and the British troops entered the town,
Prince Eitel, the second son of the kaiser; General von Kluck and
his staff were compelled to run down to their motor cars and escape
at top speed along the road to Rebais, leaving their half-eaten
breakfast on the table, and their glasses of wine half emptied.
One of the most dramatic cavalry actions of this period of the
war took place shortly before noon, when one hundred and seventeen
squadrons of cavalry were engaged. In this action the British were
successful, but the German cavalry were tired and harassed, having
been severely handled the day before.

In this engagement between the British and the German right, all
the odds had been in favor of the British, and success meant merely
the grasping at opportunities that presented themselves. Still,
by constantly striking at General van Kluck's exposed flank, his
frontal attack of General d'Espérey was so weakened, that, toward
evening at the close of two days of continuous and very severe
fighting, the Fifth French Army was able to advance and hold the
position from La Ferté-Gaucher to Esternay. The ground gained was
valuable but not essential, yet it made a profound impression.

General d'Espérey's step forward was the Germans' step back. It
meant that the road to Paris was barred. How fully this was realized
may be seen from an order signed by Lieutenant General Tuelff von
Tschepe und Weidenbach and found in the house that had been occupied
by the staff of the Eighth German Army Corps when the victorious
French entered Vitry-le-François. The order was dated "September
7, 10:30 p. m." and it read as follows:

"The object of our long and arduous marches has been achieved.
The principal French troops have been forced to accept battle,
after having been continually forced back. The great decision is
undoubtedly at hand. To-morrow, therefore, the whole strength of
the German army, as well as all that of our Army Corps, are bound
to be engaged all along the line from Paris to Verdun. To save
the welfare and the honor or Germany I expect every officer and
man, notwithstanding the hard and heroic fights of the last few
days, to do his duty unswervingly and to the last breath. Everything
depends on the result of to-morrow."

Much did, indeed, depend on the result of the morrow, and for the
third day, again, it was General von Kluck's initial move that
brought disaster to the German side.

Why was it that Von Kluck, instead of marching directly on Paris,
as would have been expected, made a detour, having as his object
not the capital but the French army? It may be said in favor of it
that the decision taken by the German General Staff was in conformity
with the military doctrine of Napoleon. According to this doctrine,
a capital, whatever its importance, is never more than an accessory
object, geographical or political. What is of importance is the
strategical object. The strategical object is the essential, the
geographical object is only accessory. Once the essential object
is attained, the accessory object is acquired of itself. Once the
French armies had been beaten, thrown back, and dispersed, Von
Kluck could return to the capital and take it easily.

Conceive of him, on the other hand, attacking the capital with the
army of Manoury on his right, which constituted a serious menace
to his left, and in front or him the British army and the Fifth
French Army; he might have been caught as in a vise between these
forces while all his activity was being absorbed by his attack
on the intrenchments around Paris.

It has been said that if Von Kluck had won the French capital, as
it seemed he might, the French could not have gained the Battle of
the Marne, and the result of the war might have been very different.
It was, however, no mistake on the part of Von Kluck, no false
maneuver on his part, that determined the victory of the Marne.
Von Kluck did exactly what he ought to have done; the decision
taken by the German General Staff was exactly what it ought to
have taken, and what was foreseen during the whole course of the
war.

It was on September 4, 1914, in the morning, that the observations
made by the French cavalry, as well as by British aviators and
those of the army of Manoury and the military government of Paris,
made it clear that the German right (Von Kluck's army) was bending
its march toward the southeast in the direction of Meaux and
Coulommiers, leaving behind it the road to Paris.

At this moment the Fifth French' Army of the left was ready to
meet the German forces in a frontal attack, and it was flanked
toward the northwest by the British army and by General Manoury's
army to the northeast of the capital.

The disposition of forces aimed at in General Joffre's order of
August 25 was thus accomplished; the French escaped the turning
movement, and they were in a position to counter with an enveloping
movement themselves. The wings of the French forces found support
in their maneuvering in their contact with the strongholds of Paris
and Verdun. Immediately the commander in chief decided to attack,
and issued on the evening of September 4 the series of general
orders, given as an appendix to this volume, which announced the
big offensive and eventually turned the tide of battle.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XV

GERMAN RETREAT

That morning of the 8th, then, saw General von Kluck in full retreat.
His frontal attack on General d'Espérey had failed and the Fifth
French Army had advanced. The British were at his flank, and besides,
they had been able to spare some of their heavy artillery to send to
the Sixth Army under General Maunoury, to enable him to cross the
Ourcq. It is by no means certain that even with this assistance could
the Sixth Army have silenced the terrible fire of those howitzers,
but General von Kluck dared no longer leave his artillery there, it
must be taken with him on his retreat, or become valuable booty.
Leaving a few batteries to guard the crossings of the river, the
Ourcq division of the German right retreated in good order, to
rejoin their comrades who had been so unexpectedly mauled by the
British. The honor of this day was, curiously, not to the victorious,
but to the defeated army. Had General von Kluck done nothing other
than conduct his army in retreat as he did, he would have shown
himself an able commander. Sir John French and General d'Espérey
followed up their advantage. The artillery fire of the British
was good and in a running fight, such as this retreat, the light
field artillery of the French did terrible execution. The brunt of
the British fighting was at La Tretoire. General d'Espérey fought
steadily forward all day, driving the retreating army as closely
as he could, but proceeding warily because of General von Kluck's
powerful counterattacks. The fighting was continuous from the first
break of daylight until after dusk had fallen, and it was in the
twilight that the French Army at last carried Montmirail on the
Petit Morin, a feat of strategic value, since it exposed the right
flank of Von Bülow's army, exposed by the retreat of General von
Kluck.

From this review of the forced retirement of General von Kluck,
it will be seen that the German right was compelled to sustain an
attack at three points, from the Sixth French Army on the banks of
the Ourcq, from the British army in the region of Coulommiers and
from the Fifth French Army near Courtaçon. Each of these attacks
was of a widely different character. The result of this attack
lias been shown in the summary of the three days (four days on
the Ourcq) which resulted in the British capture of Coulommiers
and in the French capture of Montmirail. This was General Joffre's
counteroffensive, and it developed in detail almost exactly along
the lines that he had laid down.

The scene of the fighting across the west bank of the Ourcq was that
of a wide-open country, gently undulating, dotted with comfortable
farmhouses, and made up of a mosaic of green meadow lands and the
stubble of grain fields. The German heavy guns came into action
as soon as the French offensive developed. Tremendous detonations
that shook the earth, and which were followed by sluggish clouds
of an oily smoke showed where the high-explosive shells had struck.
Already, by the evening of the first day's fighting, there were
blazing haystacks and farmhouses to be seen, and the happy and
smiling plain showed scarred and rent with the mangling hand of
war. On the 6th, a sugar refinery, which had been held as an outpost
by a force of 1,800 Germans, was set on fire by a French battery.
The infantry had been successful in getting to within close range
and as the invaders sought to escape from the burning building,
they were picked off one by one by the French marksmen. The French
infantry, well intrenched, suffered scarcely any loss. It was in
brilliant sunshine that the fire broke out, and the conflagration
was so fierce that the empty building sent up little smoke. The
flames scarcely showed in the bright light, and to the onlooker, it
seemed as if some rapid leprous disease was eating up the building.
The situation was horrible for the Germans, either to be trapped and
to perish in the flames, or to face the withering French infantry
fire without any opportunity to fight back. Less than 300 of the
occupants of the refinery won clear.

Wherever the forces met, the slaughter was great and terrible.
In the excitement and the eagerness of the first offensive, the
French seemed to have forgotten the lessons of prudence that the
long retreat should have ingrained into their memory, and they
sought to take every village that was occupied by the Germans with
a rush. The loss of life was greatest at a point four miles east
of Meaux. There, on a sharp, tree-covered ridge, the Germans had
intrenched, and gun platforms had been placed under the screen
of the trees. An almost incessant hail of shrapnel fell on these
lines, and the French infantry charges were repulsed again and
again, with but little loss on the German line. But, meantime,
village after village had been attacked by the French and carried
with the bayonet, and on Sunday, September 6th, 1914, that part
of the battles of the Marne which dealt with the driving back of
the Germans to the line of the Ourcq, was in some of its feature
like a hand-to-hand conflict of ages long gone by. Yet, overhead
aeroplanes circled, on every side shells were bursting, the heavy
smell of blood on a hot day mingled with the explosive fumes, but
the Zouaves and the Turcos fought without ceasing and with a force
and spirit that went far to win for the French the cheering news
that village after village had been freed of the invaders.

When the night of that Sunday fell, however, on the line of the
Ourcq, the balm of darkness seemed to be almost as much a forgotten
thing as the blessedness of silence. There was no darkness that
night. As the Germans evacuated each village they set fire to it.
The invaders actually held their machine guns at work in the burning
village until the position was no longer tenable. The wind blew
gustily that night, and all the hours long, the Germans collected
their dead, built great pyres of wood and straw and cremated their
comrades who had fallen on the field of honor.

The next day, at this point, developed fighting of the same general
character. One of the most heroic defenses of General von Kluck's
army was that of the Magdeburg Regiment, which held its advanced post
ten minutes too long and consequently was practically annihilated.
Although the French had everywhere shown themselves superior with the
bayonet and at close infighting, even as the Germans had displayed
an incredible courage in advance under gunfire, and rightly held
their heavy artillery to be the finest in the world, in the mêlée
around the colors of the Magdeburg Regiment, there was nothing to
choose for either side. The lieutenant color bearer was killed, in
the midst of a ring of dead, and not until almost the whole regiment
had been killed under the impact of far superior numbers, were the
tattered colors taken into the French lines. It was on this day,
Tuesday, September 8, 1914, that the British army realizing that
it had turned the flank of General von Kluck's southern divisions
sent its heavy batteries to the pressure on the banks of the Ourcq.

A graphic picture of the artillery side of the fighting on the
Ourcq was given by one of the artillery officers detached from the
British force.

"Meaux was still a town of blank shutters and empty streets when
we got there this morning," he wrote, "but the French sappers had
thrown a plank gangway across the gap in the ruined old bridge,
built in A. D. 800, that had survived all the wars of France, only
to perish at last in this one.

"Smack, smack, smack, smack go the French guns; and then, a few
seconds later, four white mushrooms of smoke spring up over the far
woods and slowly the pop, pop, pop, pop, of the distant explosions
comes back to you. But now it is the German gunners' turn. Bang!
go his guns, two miles away; there is a moment of eerie and
uncomfortable silence--uncomfortable because there is just a chance
they might have altered their range--and then, quite close by, over
the wood where the battery is, come the crashes of the bursting
shells. They sound like a Titan's blows on a gigantic kettle filled
with tons of old iron.

"At Trilport there is a yawning gap, where one arch of the railway
bridge used to be, with a solitary bent rail still lying across
it. And, among the wreckage of the bridge below, lying on its side
and more than half beneath the water, is the smashed and splintered
ruin of a closed motor car.

"Beyond the town was a ridge on which the French batteries were
posted. We could see the ammunition wagons parked on the reverse
slope of the hill. More were moving up to join them.

"The village beyond, Penchard, was thronged with troops and blocked
with ambulance wagons and ammunition carts.

"Through the rank grass at the side came tramping a long file of
dusty, sweating, wearied men. They carried long spades and picks
as well as their rifles. They had come out of the firing line and
were going back to Penchard for food.

"Topping the next ridge... the hill slopes steeply down to the
hamlet of Chamvery, just below us. The battery which I mentioned
just now is in the wood on this side of it to our right. The Zouaves'
firing line is lying flat on the hillside a little way beyond the
village, and behind them, farther down the hill, are thick lines of
supports in the cover of intrenchments. It is a spectacle entirely
typical of a modern battle, for there is scarcely anything to see
at all. If it were not for those shells being tossed to and fro
on the right there, and an occasional splutter of rifle fire, one
might easily suppose that the lines of blue-coated men lying about
on the stubble were all dozing in the hot afternoon sun.

"Even when some of them move they seem to do it lazily, to saunter
rather than to walk.... It is only in the cinematograph or on the
comparatively rare occasions of close fighting at short range that
men rush about dramatically. For one thing, they are too tired to
hurry; and anyhow, what is the use of running when a shell may
burst any minute anywhere in the square mile you happen to be on?

"I walked with the company officers who were planning a fresh advance,
map in hand. They had gained the village in which we were that
morning, but at tremendous loss.

"'Out of my company of 220,' said one captain, 'there are only
100 left. It's the same story everywhere--the German machine guns.
Their fire simply clears the ground like a razor. You just can't
understand how anyone gets away alive. I've had men fall at my
right hand and my left. You can't look anywhere, as you advance,
without seeing men dropping. Of our four officers, two are wounded
and one dead. I am left alone in command.'"

This hand-to-hand fighting for the possession of villages on the
west bank of the Marne, this heavy loss to the French troops by
the German artillery, and this sudden check at the Ourcq itself,
until British heavy batteries were sent, marks the character of
what may be called the battle of the Ourcq, the westernmost of
the battles of the Marne. As General von Kluck had divided his
forces, in order to carry out the attempt to pierce the left of
General d'Espérey's army, the German forces in the battle of the
Ourcq were outnumbered almost three to one. In spite of these odds
against them, the extreme German right held for four days the position
it had been given to hold.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XVI

CONTINUATION OF THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

Remembering again the general outline of General von Kluck's plan,
that of executing a diagonal movement with 150,000 of his men to
attack the easternmost point of the Fifth Army, and possibly to
envelop it by a flank movement, the continuation of the Battle
of the Marne may be treated with more detail. This part is called
by some the Battle of Coulommiers.

In this battle there was as great a change in morale as in the
battle of the Ourcq. There, the French had been stirred to high
endeavor by the realization that the word to advance had at last
been given. This also operated in part on the British in the battle
of Coulommiers, but, in addition, there was another very important
factor.

The dawn of that Sunday summer morning, September 6, 1914, was
one of great exhilaration for the British forces. The offensive
was begun, the time for striking back had come, and every column
resounded with marching choruses. The countryside was lovely, as
had been all the countryside through which the retreating armies
had passed, gay with the little French homesteads, flower decked
and smiling, heavily laden orchards, and rich grain fields, some
as yet uncut, some newly stacked. Women and children, with here
and there an old man, ran along the line of march ministering to
the wants of their defenders. There was no need for language, as
courtesy and gratitude are universal, and the English were fighting
for "La Belle France." So the morning wore on.

Through the forested region of Crécy the British passed, and it has
been told hereinbefore how they surprised the two cavalry commands
thrust out as scouts by General von Kluck. But, as they reached
the land that had been occupied by the German hosts, the bearing
of the men changed, even as the country changed. The simple homes
of the peasants were in ashes, every house that had showed traces
of comfort had been sacked or gutted with fire. Between noon and
three o'clock in the afternoon of that day three burned churches
were passed. The songs stopped. A black silence fell upon the ranks.
Bloody business was afoot.

It was in the middle of the afternoon, a slumbrous harvest afternoon,
that a big gun boomed in the distance, and the shell shrieked dolefully
through the air, its vicious whine ceasing with a tremendous sudden
roar as it burst behind the advancing British lines. On the instant,
Sir John French's batteries almost wiped out the German cavalry,
and ten minutes had not elapsed before the full artillery on both
sides had begun a terrific fire that was stunning to the senses.
Under cover of their own fire, the British infantry advanced and
hurled themselves against the outer line of General von Kluck's
Second Army. The attack failed. The British were driven back, but
though the loss of life was sharp, it was not great, as the British
commander had but advanced his men to test out the invader's strength.
The British artillery was well placed, and under its cover the
British made a second advance, this time successful. The Germans
replied with a counterattack which was repulsed, but in that forty
minutes 10,000 men had fallen.

A dispatch has been quoted from a French soldier, showing the terrible
havoc caused by the German machine guns, and a letter from a German
officer, published in the "Intelligenzblatt" of Berne pays a like
tribute to the artillery of the Allies. Speaking of this very section
or the battle front, he wrote:

"We were obliged to retreat as the English were attempting a turning
movement, which was discovered by our airmen. [This refers to the
advance of the British First Army Corps under Sir Douglas Haig in
the direction of La Ferté-sous-Jouarra, which, if it could have
been successfully carried out, would have meant the entire loss
of General von Kluck's southern army.] During the last two hours
we were continually exposed to the fire of the enemy's artillery,
for our artillery had all either been put out of action or had
retreated and had ceased to fire. [This dispatch was evidently,
therefore, written toward the end of the second day, on Monday,
September 6, 1914, when General von Kluck realized that his forward
drive had failed and that he must fall back.]

"The enemy's airmen flew above us, describing two circles, which
means, 'there is infantry here.' The enemy's artillery mowed the
ground with its fire. In one minute's time I counted forty shells.
The shrapnel exploded nearer and nearer; at last it reached our
ranks. I quickly hugged a knapsack to my stomach in order to protect
myself as best I could. The shrieks of the wounded rang out on all
sides. Tears came to my eyes when I heard the poor devils moaning
with pain. The dust, the smoke, and the stench of the powder were
suffocating.

"An order rang out, and bending as low as possible, we started
up. We had to pass right in the line of fire. The men began to
fall like ninepins. God be thanked that I was able to run as I
did. I thought my heart would burst, and was about to throw myself
on the ground, unable to continue, when your image and that of
Bolli rose before my eyes, and I ran on.

"At last we reached our batteries. Three guns were smashed to pieces,
and the gun carriages were burned. We halted for a few seconds to
take breath. And all the time that whistling and banging of the
shells continued. It is a wonder one is not driven mad."

Admiration cannot be withheld from General von Kluck for his splendid
fight at the battle of Coulommiers. He was out-generaled, for one
thing, because of his plan--or his orders--to strike a southeasterly
blow; he was outmaneuvered by the presence of a vastly larger British
force than he had any reason to expect, and he was outnumbered
almost two to one.

Through the apple and pear orchards of La Trétoire the battle was
sanguinary; the British (reenforced on September 7, 1914, by some
French divisions) swept through the terrain in widely extended
lines, for close formation was not to be thought of with artillery
and machine guns in front. It was bitter fighting, and the German
right contested every inch of ground stubbornly. Once, indeed, it
seemed that General von Kluck would turn the tables. He rapidly
collected his retreating troops, and with unparalleled suddenness
hurled them back upon the advancing First Corps under Sir Douglas
Haig. Aeroplane scouts decided the issue. Had the British been
compelled to await the onset, or had they been forced to depend
on cavalry patrols, there would have been no opportunity to resist
that revengeful onslaught. But no sooner had the Germans begun
to re-form than Sir Douglas Haig moved his machine guns to the
front and fell back a few hundred yards to a better position. This
happened on September 8, 1914, and may be regarded as the last
offensive move made by General von Kluck's army in the west. On
that same day Coulommiers was invested and Prince Eitel compelled
to flee, and the battle of Coulommiers was won.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XVII

CONTINUATION OF THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

The third part of the battle of the Marne, called by some the Battle
of Montmirail, was not marked by special incident. General d'Espérey's
part was to hold firm, and this he did. Not only by reason of the
British assistance on the left, but also because the strong army
of General Foch to the right was a new army, of greater strength
than was known to General von Moltke and the German General Staff.
The battle of Montmirail was won by the steady resistance of the
Fifth Army to the hammer blows of the German right, and to the quick
advantage seized by General d'Espérey when the British weakened
the flank of the force opposing him. On September 8, 1914, General
d'Espérey had not only held his ground, but had driven General
von Kluck back across the Grand Morin River at La Ferté-Gaucher,
and also across the Petit Morin at Montmirail. Since the British
had butted the Germans back from the Petit Morin at La Trétoire,
these three days of fighting in the battles of Coulommiers and
Montmirail had won the Allies advanced positions across two rivers,
and had so weakened the German right that it was compelled to fall
back on the main army and forego its important strategic advantage
on the east bank of the Ourcq River.

These three battles, Ourcq, Coulommiers, and Montmirail, constitute
the recoil from Paris, and at the same time they constitute the defeat
of what was hereinbefore shown to be one of the four fundamentals of
the great German campaign plan. With the situation thus cleared,
so to speak, one may now pass to the details of the second part
of the German plan, which was to engage the powerful Ninth and
Fourth Armies, under the command of Generals Foch and Langle,
respectively, to break through them, if possible, but at all hazards
to keep them sufficiently menaced to disable General Joffre from
sending reenforcements therefrom to the army of General Sarrail,
on which the whole force of the army of the crown prince was to
be hurled.

The next section of the Allied armies, then, was General Foch's
Ninth Army, which encountered the German drive at Fère Champenoise,
and which resulted in the severe handling of General von Bülow's
forces. With characteristic perception of the difference between
a greater and a lesser encounter, General Foch called his share
of the battles of the Marne, the "Affair of the Marshes of St.
Gond." This did not culminate until Wednesday, September 9, 1914,
so that the German retreat there was one day later than the final
retreat of General von Kluck.

The clash between the armies of General von Bülow and of General
Foch began, as did the battle wrath along the whole front, at dawn
of that fateful Sunday, September 5, 1914. General Foch, a well-known
writer on strategy, had devised his army for defense. He was well
supplied with the famous 75-millimeter guns, holding them massed in
the center of his line. His extreme right and left were mobile and
thrown partly forward to feel the attack of the invading army. But,
in spite of all preparations, General Foch found himself hard-set to
hold his own on September 5, 6, 7, and 8, 1914. The battle continued
incessantly, by night as well as by day, for the artillerists had
found each other's range. There was comparatively little hand-to-hand
fighting at this point, General Foch only once being successful
in luring the Germans to within close firing range. The results
were withering, and General von Bülow did not attempt it a second
time. There seems reason to believe that General von Bülow had
counted upon acting as a reserve force to General von Kluck during
the latter's advance, and that, consequently, he did not think it
prudent to risk heavy loss of life until he knew the situation to
westward of him. There was some sharp "bomb" work at Fère Champenoise
on September 8, and then came the night of the 8th.

It will be remembered that at the close of the battle of Montmirail
on the evening of September 8, 1914, the western flank of Von Bülow's
army had been exposed by the advance of General d'Espérey and the
retreat of General von Kluck. Information of this reached Foch,
and despite the danger of the maneuver, he thrust out his mobile
left like a great tongue. That night the weather turned stormy,
facilitating this move. At one o'clock in the morning, the statement
has been made, word reached General Foch indirectly that air patrols
had observed a gap in the alignment of the German armies between
General von Bülow's left and General von Hausen's right.

During the darkness and the rain, therefore, General Foch had worked
two complete surprises on General von Bülow. He had enveloped the
German commander's right flank, and was safely ensconced there
with General d'Espérey's army behind him, since the latter had
by now advanced to Montmirail. At the same time he had thrust a
wedge between Von Bülow and General von Hausen, threatening General
von Bülow's left flank as well. The first was a seizure of an
opportunity, executed with military promptness, the second was a
bold _coup_, and its risk might well have appalled a less experienced
general.

Considering the westernmost of these movements first, it will be
seen at once how the enveloping action brought about the "Affair of
the Marshes of St. Gond." General von Bülow's army was stretched in
an arc around the marshes, which, it will be remembered, have been
described as a pocket of clay, low-lying lands mainly reclaimed, but
which become miry during heavy rains. It was General von Bülow's
misfortune, that, on the very night that his flank was exposed,
there should come a torrential downpour. These same marshes had
figured more than once before in France's military history, and
General Foch, as a master strategist, was determined that they
should serve again. When the rain came, he thanked his lucky stars
and acted on the instant.

When the morning of September 9, 1914, dawned, the left wing of
General Foch's army was not only covering the exposed flank of
General von Bülow's forces, but parts of it were two miles to the
rear. Under the driving rain, morning broke slowly, and almost
before a sodden and rain-soaked world could awake to the fact that
day had come, General Foch had nipped the rear of the flank of
the opposing army, and was bending the arc in upon itself. Under
normal circumstances, such an action would tend but to strengthen
the army thus attacked, since it brings all parts of the army into
closer communication. But General Foch knew that the disadvantages
of the ground would more than compensate for this, since the two
horns of General von Bülow's army could not combine without crossing
those marshes, now boggy enough, and growing boggier every second.
The task was harder than General Foch anticipated, for the same
rainy conditions that provided a pitfall for the Germans were also
a manifest hindrance to the rapid execution of military maneuvers.
But, in spite of all difficulties, by evening of that day, the
flank broke and gave way, and two entire corps from General von
Bülow's right were precipitated into the marshes. Forty guns were
taken--to that time the largest capture of artillery made by the
Allies--and a number of prisoners. Hundreds perished miserably,
but General Foch held back his artillery from an indiscriminate
slaughter of men made helpless in the slimy mud. Thus ended the
"Affair of the Marshes of St. Gond," which broke still further
the German right wing.

Thanks to General Foch's further activities, General von Bülow
had troubles upon his left wing. When dawn of this same day or
torrential rain, September 9, 1914, broke over the hill-road that
runs from Mareuil to Fère-Champenoise, at which point lay the left
of General von Bülow's army, it witnessed a number of 75-millimeter
guns on selected gun sites commanding the right flank of the German
right center. General Foch's daring, the success of the maneuver,
and the fact that the conduct of all the French armies on that
day and the day following seems to be with the full cognizance of
this venture, led inevitably to the conclusion that those brilliant
feats, conceived by General Foch, had been communicated to General
Joffre in time for the French General Staff to direct the French
armies to the right and left of General Foch to cooperate with
his action. Had General Foch been less ably supported, his wedge
might have proved a weak salient open to attack on both sides.
But General Foch's main army to the west kept General von Bülow
busy, and General Langle's army to the east fought too stubbornly
for the Duke of Württemberg to dare detach any forces for the relief
of General von Bülow. General von Hausen's Saxon Army was weak,
at best.

What were the forces that operated to make this particular point
so weak are not generally known. As, however, the divisions from
Alsace were much in evidence three or four days later, it is more
than probable that these divisions were intended for service at this
point, and also to reenforce General von Kluck's army, but that,
by the quick offensive assumed by General Joffre on the Ourcq, and,
owing to the roundabout nature of the German means of communication,
these expected reenforcements had not arrived. The German official
dispatches point out that General von Bülow's retreat was necessitated
by the retreat of General von Kluck. Of this there is no doubt, but
even military necessity does not quite explain why General von
Bülow bolted so precipitately. His losses were fearful, and the
offensive of General Foch rendered it necessary for the Germans
to fall back on the Aisne.

The armies of the Duke of Württemberg and of the crown prince may
be considered together, for they were combined in an effort to
pierce the French line near the angle at Bar-le-Duc. General Langle
held on desperately against the repeated attacks of the Duke of
Württemberg. Ground was lost and recovered, lost again and recovered,
and every trifling vantage point of ground was fought for with a
bitter intensity. Though active, with all the other armies, on
September 5 and 6, 1914, it was not until September 7 that General
Langle found himself strained to his utmost nerve. If he could
hold, he could do no more, and when night fell on September 7, no
person was more relieved than General Langle. Yet the next day was
even worse. Instead of slackening in the evil weather, the German
drive became more furious. The exhausted Fourth Army fought as though
in a hideous nightmare, defended their lines in a sullen obstinacy
that seemed almost stuporous, and countercharged in a blind frenzy
that approached to delirium. It was doubtful if General Langle's
army could hold out much longer. But, when General von Bülow was
compelled to retreat, when General Foch turned his attention to
General von Hausen's Saxon Army, and when General Joffre found
himself in a position to rush reenforcements and reserves to the
aid of General Langle, a new color was given to the affair. The
defense stiffened, and as rapidly as it stiffened, so much the
more did it become patent that the Duke of Württemberg could not
afford to be in an exposed position far in advance of all the other
attacking armies. Wednesday, September 9, 1914, revealed to the
German center the need of falling back on the crown prince's army,
which was the pivot on which the whole campaign swung.

Meantime, the crown prince's army had been steadily victorious.
The weak French army under General Sarrail had been pushed back,
yielding only foot by foot, back, back, along the rugged hill country
of the Meuse. A determined stand was made to protect the little
fort of Troyon, ten miles south of Verdun, for had the Germans
succeeded in taking this, Verdun would have been surrounded. No
army and no generalship could have done more than the Third Army
and General Sarrail did, but they could not hold their ground before
Troyon. On September 7, 1914, the way to Troyon was open, and the
army of the crown prince prepared to demolish it. Then came September
9, 1914, when the allied successes in the western part of the Marne
valley allowed them to send reenforcements. Thus the Third Army
was perceptibly strengthened and hope for Troyon grew. One day
more, certainly two days more, and nothing could have saved Troyon,
but with the whole German line in retreat, the army of the crown
prince could not be left on the advance.

Incredible though it may seem, when the army of the crown prince
besieging Troyon withdrew, that little fort was a mere heap of
ruins. There were exactly forty-four men left in the fort and four
serviceable guns. Even a small storming party could have carried
it without the least trouble, and its natural strength could have
been fortified in such wise as to make it a pivotal point from
which to harry Verdun.

At the extreme east, on that ring of wooded heights known as the
Grande Couronne de Nancy, and drawn up across the Gap of Nancy,
the Second French Army, under General de Castelnau, successfully
resisted the drive of the Crown Prince of Bavaria. Great hopes had
been placed on this attack, and on September 7, 1914, the German
Emperor had viewed the fight at Nancy from one of the neighboring
heights. Surely a victory for the German arms might come either at
the point where stood the German Emperor or where led the crown
prince. But the fortunes of war decided otherwise. Far from losing
at Nancy, the French took the offensive. After an artillery duel of
terrific magnitude, they drove the Bavarian army from the forests
of Champenous and took Amance. The line of the Meurthe was then
found untenable by the Germans, and on September 12, 1914, General
de Castelnau reoccupied the town of Luneville, which had been in
the hands of the Germans since August 22, 1914.

With General von Kluck in retreat on September 7, 1914, General
von Bülow hastening to the rear on September 8, 1914, with the
Duke of Württemberg falling back on September 9, 1914, and the
Imperial Crown Prince and the Bavarian Crown Prince retreating
to an inner ring of defense on September 10, 1914, the battles
of the Marne may, in a measure, be said to have concluded. As,
however, the new alignments were made mainly by reason of the
topographical relationships of the Marne and the Aisne Rivers and
the territory contiguous thereto, it is perhaps more in keeping
with the movement to carry forward the German retreat across the
Marne as a part of the same group of conflicts.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XVIII

OTHER ASPECTS OF THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

In dealing with a battle as important as that of the Marne points
of view are valuable. We therefore follow with an account of its
general course and description of its main features by a French
military writer, whose knowledge is based on information that is
largely official.

"Before the German armies," he says, "became engulfed in the vast
depression that stretches from Paris to Verdun, General Joffre with
admirable foresight had brought together a powerful army commanded
by General Manoury and having as its support the fortified camp of
Paris. As soon as General von Kluck, turning momentarily from the
road to the French capital and bending his march to the southeast,
laid bare his right wing, General Joffre vigorously launched against
his flank the entire army of General Manoury. The brilliant offensive
of this army achieved success from the beginning; it threw back the
German forces. Von Kluck perceived the danger that threatened him,
and the danger was serious, for it only required that Manoury should
advance a little further and he would have been almost totally
defeated. Resolutely, energetically, and with a sang-froid to which
homage must be rendered, Von Kluck proceeded to circumvent this
danger. He ordered back to the north two of his army corps, recrossed
the Marne, and threw himself with intrepidity on Manoury.

"But the retreat of these two army corps allowed General French
and General Franchet d'Espérey both to drive forward vigorously.
Something resembling the phenomenon of a whirlwind then took place
in the German ranks. The British army made progress toward the north,
the Fifth French Army, commanded by General Franchet d'Espérey,
did the same. General Manoury, assisted by all the troops that
General Gallieni was able rapidly to put at his disposal, made
headway against the furious onslaught of Von Kluck. Thus the entire
German right found itself in a most critical situation. It could
not overcome Manoury, who was threatening its communications, and
on the other hand it found itself powerless to resist the victorious
advance of Generals French and de Franchet d'Espérey.

"It was the critical moment of the battle. The German General Staff
decided that there was only one method of putting an end to it,
and that was to direct against the army of General Foch in the
center an offensive so violent that the center would be pierced
and the French armies cut in two. If this attack succeeded it would
free at once the German right and separate into two impotent parts
the entire French military force. During the 7th, 8th, and 9th of
September the Imperial Prussian Guard directed to the compassing
of that end all its energy and courage. All in vain. General Foch
not only checked the German onslaught, but drove it back. Thus the
French center was not pierced, Von Kluck was not relieved, and
he found himself in a position that grew more and more critical.
The general retreat of the German armies was the inevitable result.
To this decision the German General Staff came, and on the evening
of September 9 orders were given to all the armies of the right
and center to retire sixty kilometers to the rear. Thus the battle
of the Marne was won by the French."

The writer then goes on to say: "It was on September 5, toward
the end of the morning, that the general order of General Joffre,
leading to the great battle, reached the French armies. Each separate
army immediately turned and vigorously engaged in battle. The army
of Manoury, the first to get ready, sprang forward to the attack.
It thrust back the German forces which were at first inferior in
number, and it attained on the evening of the 5th the Pinchard-St.
Soulplet-Ver front; but Von Kluck threw two army corps over the
Marne and hurled himself on Manoury. He summoned from Compiègne
all the reenforcements at his disposal, and he placed all his heavy
artillery between Vareddes and May-en-Multien. During the day of
September 6th Manoury made headway toward the Ourcq. On the following
day he advanced at a lesser pace on its left bank, taking and then
losing the villages of Marcilly and Chambry--murderous struggles
maintained amid terrible heat. General Gallieni, who followed the
battle with the utmost attention, hurriedly came to the assistance
of Manoury; he sent to him on the 7th and 8th the Seventh Division,
which had just arrived at Paris, half of the division being transferred
by rail, the other half by means of thousands of automobiles
requisitioned for the purpose. General Joffre likewise sent to
Manoury the Fourth Army Corps, recruited from the Third Army, though
an almost entire division of it was called for by the British to
safeguard the junction of forces.

"The day of September 8 turned out the most arduous for Manoury;
the Germans, making attacks of extreme violence, won some success.
They occupied Betz, Thury-en-Vallois and Nanteuil-le-Haudouin. Yon
Kluck attacked all his force on the right, and it was at that time
he who threatened Manoury with an encircling movement. The Fourth
French Army Corps, sent forward at full speed by General Joffre and
arriving at the spot, had the order to allow itself to be killed
to the last man, but to maintain its ground. It maintained it. It
succeeded toward evening in checking the advance of the Germans. In
a brilliant action the army of Manoury took three standards. It
rallied the main body of its forces on the left and prepared for
a new attack.

"During this time the British army, following on the retreat of
part of the forces of Von Kluck, was able to make headway toward
the north. It was the same with the Fifth French Army. The British,
leaving behind it on September 6 the Rosoy-Lagny line, reached in
the evening the south bank of the Great Morin. On the 7th and 8th
they continued their march; on the 9th they debouched to the north
of the Marne below Château Thierry, flanking the German forces which
on that day were opposing the army of Manoury. It was then that the
German forces began to retreat, while the British army, pursuing
the enemy, took seven cannon and many prisoners and reached the
Aisne between Soissons and Longueval. The British army continued
till before Coulommiers, and after a brilliant struggle forced the
passage of the Little Morin. The Fifth French Army under General
Franchet d'Espérey made the same advance. It drove back the three
active army corps of the Germans and the reserve corps that it
found facing it. On September 7 it pressed forward to the
Courtacon-Cerneux-Monceaux-les-Provins-Courgivaux-Esternay line.
During the days that followed it reached and crossed the Marne,
capturing in fierce combats some howitzers and machine guns.

"General Foch showed admirable sang-froid and energy. At the most
critical moment, the decisive hour of the battle, he accomplished a
magnificent maneuver, which is known under the name of the _maneuver
of Fère Champenoise_. Foch noted a rift between the German army of
Von Bülow and that of Von Hausen. The German Guard was engaged
with the Tenth Division of the reserve in the region of the marshes
of St. Gond.

"On September 9 Foch resolutely threw into this rift the Forty-Second
Division under General Grossetti, which was at his left, and his
army corps of the left. He thus made a flank attack on the German
forces, notably the Guard which had bent back his army corps on
the right. The effect produced by the flank attack of Manoury on
the right of General von Kluck's army was renewed here. The enemy,
taken aback by this audacious maneuver, did not resist and made a
precipitate retreat. On the evening of the 9th the game was thus
lost to the Germans. Their armies of the right and of the center
were beaten and the retreat followed. The Imperial Guard left in
the marshes of St. Gond more than 8,000 men and almost all its
artillery. Victory henceforth began to perch on the Allied banners
over all the vast battle field."

Such was this battle of seven days in which almost 3,000,000 men
were engaged. If it is examined in its ensemble, it will be seen
that each French army advanced step by step, opening up the road
to the neighboring army, which immediately gave it support, and
then striking at the flank of the enemy which the other attacked
in front. The efforts of the one were closely coordinated with
the efforts of the other. A deep unity of ideas, of methods, and
of courage animated the whole Allied line.

[Illustration: FRENCH AND BRITISH ALLIES RALLY TO SAVE PARIS.

BRITISH INFANTRY AND LONDON SCOTTISH. DESTRUCTION AT YPRES, LILLE,
AND ANTWERP. FRENCH ARMIES

A military observer stationed in one of the many ruined chateaux
in northern France. The crumbling walls have been strengthened
by sand bags]

[Illustration: A remarkable photograph of an actual bayonet charge
by French soldiers typical of the gallantry and spirit they display
in action]

[Illustration: A British naval brigade, sent to aid in the defense
of Antwerp, holding a road at Lierre. They are supported by a Maxim
gun]

[Illustration: The city of Lille, France, under fire. During the
Great War this city has suffered bombardment by both Allies and
Germans]

[Illustration: A remarkable photograph taken during the bombardment
of Antwerp, showing the falling wall of a house that has been struck
by a German shell]

[Illustration: Drawn by R. Caton Woodville. Fighting from house to
house in Ypres, afterward but a ruin. Because of its strategic
position, Allies and Germans have battled repeatedly for its
possession. ]

[Illustration: Drawn by H. W. Koekkoek. A village in the Argonne,
occupied alternately by French and German troops in the autumn of
1914. The French finally reported "a slight advance in the Argonne"]

[Illustration: Drawn by R. Caton Woodville. The London Scottish
re-forming for a third charge, in which they succeeded in taking and
occupying Messines October 31, 1914]


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XIX

"CROSSING THE AISNE"

In order to gain a clear idea of what was involved in the feat of
"crossing the Aisne," which more than one expert has declared to
be the greatest military feat in river crossing in the history of
arms, it is well to look at the topography of that point, first in
its relation to the whole German line, and, second, in its relation
to possible attack in September, 1914.

The prepared positions on the Aisne to which the Germans fell back
after the battle of the Marne, were along a line of exceptionally
strong natural barriers. The line extends from a point north of
Verdun, on the heights of the Meuse, across the wooded country of
the Argonne and the plain of Champagne to Rheims, thence northwest
to Brimont, crossing the Aisne near its confluence with the Suippe,
and from thence proceeding to Craonne, whence it takes a westerly
course along the heights of the Aisne to the Forest of the Eagle,
north of Compiègne. The eastern end of this line has already been
described in connection with the battles of the Marne, and it is
the western section of this line which now demands consideration.
Just as the River Marne was taken as a basis for the consideration
of the topography of the battles that centered round the crossing
of the Ourcq, Grand Morin, Petit Morin, and the Marne, so the Aisne
is naturally the most important determinant in the problems of
its crossing.

The River Aisne rises in the Argonne, southwest of Verdun. Through
the Champagne region its banks are of gradual slope, but shortly
after it passes Rethel, on its westerly course, the configuration
changes sharply, and at Craonne the bluffs overlooking the river
are 450 feet high. It is easy to see what an inaccessible barrier
is made by such a line of cliffs. For forty miles this line of
bluffs continues, almost reaching to Compiègne, where the Aisne
enters the Oise. Not only are the banks of the Aisne thus guarded
by steep bluffs, but the character of those bluffs is peculiarly
fitted for military purposes. For long stretches along the north
side the cliffs stand sheer and have spurs that dip down sharply
to the valley. The ridge, or the top of the bluff, which looks
from below like the scarp of a great plateau, lies at an average
of a mile or more from the stream. Many of these spurs jut out in
such a way that if fortified they could enfilade up and downstream.
To add to the military value of such a barrier the edge of the scarp
is heavily wooded, while the lower slopes are steep and grassy,
with small woods at irregular intervals. Even from the high ground
on the south bank of the stream, the top of the plateau on the
north cannot be seen, and from below it is effectually cloaked.

Two tributaries are to be considered in this river valley which thus
forms so natural a post of defense. Both flow in from the south,
the Suippe, which joins the main stream at Neufchâtel-sur-Aisne and
the Vesle, on which stands the ancient city of Rheims. This river
joins the Aisne a little over seven miles east of Soissons, which
is itself twenty miles east of Compiègne.

The line taken by the German armies for their stand was not the
river itself, but the northern ridge. At no place more than a mile
and a half from the river, it was always within gunfire of any
crossing. Every place of crossing was commanded by a spur. Every
road on the north bank was in their hands, every road on the south
bank curved upward so as to be a fair mark for their artillery.
As the German drive advanced, a huge body of sappers and miners
had been left behind to fortify this Aisne line, and the system
developed was much the same along its entire distance.

There were two lines of barbed-wire entanglements, one in the bed
of the stream which would prevent fording or swimming, and which,
being under water, could not easily be destroyed by gunfire from
the southern bank. Above this was a heavy chevaux-de-frise and
barbed-wire entanglement, partly sunk and concealed from view; in
many places pitted and covered with brushwood. Above this, following
approximately a thirty-foot contour, came a line of trenches for
infantry, and fifty yards behind a second line of trenches, commanding
a further elevation of fifty feet. Two-thirds of the way up the
hill came the trench-living quarters, the kitchens, the bakeries,
the dormitories, and so forth, and the crest of the hill bristled
along its entire length with field guns, effectually screened by
trees. On the further side of the ridge, in chalk pits, were the
great howitzers, tossing their huge shells over the ridge and its
defenses into the river itself, and even on the south bank beyond.
Truly, a position of power, and one that the boldest of troops
might hesitate to attack.

It is quite possible that had the entire strength of the German
position been known, no attempt to cross would have been made,
but there was always a possibility that the counterchecks of the
German army were no more than the rear-guard actions of the three
or four days immediately preceding. Yet Sir John French seems to
have expected the true state of affairs, for he remarks in his
dispatches:

"The battles of the Marne, which lasted from the morning of the
6th to the evening of the 10th, had hardly ended in the precipitate
flight of the enemy when we were brought face to face with a position
of extraordinary strength, carefully intrenched and prepared for
defense by an army and staff which are thorough adepts in such
work."

Yet it was evident that if the armies of the Allies were to secure
any lasting benefit from the battles of the Marne, they must dislodge
the invading hosts from their new vantage ground. It was obvious
that the task was one of great peril and one necessarily likely
to be attended with heavy loss of life. Sir John French, knowing
the tactical value of driving a fleeing army hard, determined on
forcing the issue without delay.

Before proceeding to recount in detail the events of that six days'
battle of the Aisne, which little by little solidified into an
impasse, it might be well to trace the new positions that had been
taken by the respective armies engaged in the struggle for the
supremacy of western Europe. General von Kluck, still in charge
of the First German Army, was in control of the western section
from the Forest of the Eagle to the plateau of Craonne. He had
forced his men to almost superhuman efforts, and by midnight of
September 11 he had succeeded in getting most of his artillery
across the Aisne, at Soissons, and had whipped his infantry into
place on the heights north of the stream. That, with his exhausted
troops, he succeeded remains still a tribute to his power as a
commander. But the men were done. Further attack meant rout. His
salvation lay in his heavy field guns and howitzers, an arm of
the service in which the French army, under General Maunoury (and
General Pau, who had taken a superior command during the turning of
the German drive at the Marne), was notoriously weak. Still there
was little comfort there, for the British army was well supplied
with heavy artillery, and the Fifth French Army of General d'Espérey,
also coming up to confront him, was not entirely lacking in this
branch of the service.

General von Bülow's army was combined with that of General von
Hausen, who fell ill and was retired from his command. Against
this combined army was ranged the victorious and still fresh army
of General Foch, lacking two corps, which had been detached for
reserves elsewhere. One of these corps apparently went to the aid of
General Sarrail, whose stand was still a weak point in the Allies'
line. General Sarrail, however, was now better supported by the
movement of General Langle with the Fourth French Army, who advanced
toward Troyon and confronted the combined armies of the Imperial
Crown Prince and the Duke of Württemberg. This released General
Sarrail to his task of intrenching and enlarging the defenses about
Verdun, the importance of which had become more poignant than ever
before in the events of the past week. The far eastern end of the
line remained unchanged.

The credit for the crossing of the Aisne lies with the British
troops. The battles of the Marne had thrust Sir John French into a
prominent position, wherein he was able to achieve a much-desired
result without any great loss of life. But the battle of the Aisne
was different. It was a magnificent effort boldly carried out,
and, as was afterward learned, it could not have been successful
had the onset been delayed even one day.

General Maunoury's army, encamped in the forest of the Compiègne,
was again the first to give battle, as it had been in the battles
of the Marne. Using some heavy guns that had been sent on from
Paris, in addition to the batteries that had been lent him by the
British, he secured some well-planned artillery positions on the
south bank, and spent the morning in a long-range duel with the
German gunners near Soissons. The Germans had not all taken up
their positions on the north side of the Aisne on the morning of
September 12, 1914, and the heavy battery of the Fourth British
Division did good service early in the morning, dislodging some
of these before it wheeled in line beside the big French guns,
in an endeavor to shell the trenches and level the barbed-wire
entanglements, that an opportunity might be made to cross. But
the results were not encouraging of success, for the reply from
the further shore was terrific. General von Kluck's army might
be worn out, but the iron throats of his guns were untiring, and
he knew that huge reenforcements were on the way.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XX

FIRST DAY'S BATTLES

That first day of the battle of the Aisne, September 12, 1914,
which was indeed rather preparatory than actual, was also marked by
some unusually brilliant cavalry work in General Allenby's division.
The German line was on the farther side of the Aisne, but all the
hill country between the Marne and the Aisne had to be cleared of
the powerful rear guards of the retreating German army, or perhaps
it would be more correct to say the advance guards of the new German
line. Early in the morning the cavalry under General Allenby swept
out from the town of Braisne on the Vesle and harried in every
direction the strong detachments that had been sent forward, driving
them back to the Aisne. Over the high wooded ridge between the
Vesle and the Aisne the Germans were driven back, and the Third
Division, under General Hamilton, supported the cavalry in force,
so that, by the evening, General Hamilton's division was able to
camp below the hill of Brenelle, and even, before night fell, to
get their guns upon that height, from which they could reply to
the German batteries snugly ensconced upon the frowning ridge on
the northern bank of the Aisne.

The Fifth British Division, under Sir Charles Fergusson, found
itself in a tight place at the confluence of the Vesle and Aisne
Rivers, for at that point lay a stretch of flat bottomland exposed
to the German fire. By a ruse, which returned upon their own heads,
the Germans had preserved one bridge across the Aisne, the bridge at
Condé. This was done as a lure to Sir Charles Fergusson's forces,
but even more so it was intended as a sallying point as soon as
the German army deemed itself in a position to attack again. The
bridge was destined to figure in the events of the great conflict
when the grapple should come.

One of the most graphic of all the accounts of the fighting of that
day was from the pen of a major in the British field artillery,
and it presented in sharp and vivid colors how the field artillery
joined with the cavalry in clearing the German troops from the
hills between the Marne and the Aisne. He wrote:

"We got the order to go off and join a battery under Colonel ----'s
orders. We came en route under heavy shrapnel fire on the road. I
gave the order to walk, as the horses had hardly had any food for
a couple of days, and also I wanted to steady the show. I can't
say I enjoyed walking along at the head with old ---- behind me,
especially when six shrapnel burst right in front of us. We got
there just in time, rushed into action, and opened fire on a German
counterattack at short range, destroying the lot so far as I could
see.

"We then moved slightly to another position to take on a valley,
down which they were attacking, and were at it the whole day, firing
about 900 rounds into quantities of German attacks and counterattacks.
They cannot stand the shrapnel, and the moment I got one on them
they turned and bolted back to the wood.

"I got on to their trenches; one shell dropped in. [It would appear
from this that some of the advance guards of the new defense line
were either intrenching or occupying trenches made during the battles
of the Marne, probably the latter, or else the writer is speaking of
the actions of his battery on the 10th as well as the 12th before
the invaders had retreated across the Marne.] I was enfilading
them, and they tore out of the trenches, and so on, each trench in
turn, and fell in hundreds. Also, through the range finder, ----
saw I'd hit a machine gun, and they had abandoned it and another. So
it went all day, shells and bullets humming around, but only one of
my staff horses was hit. Our infantry advancing and retiring--others
advancing and coming back--Germans doing likewise, a hellish din
of shell fire, and me pouring in fire whenever I could see them.

"At last I got six shrapnel into a wood and cleared a heap of them
out and got into them with shrapnel. It was awful! The sergeant major
put his hand up to his head and said: "Oh, sir, it's terrible!" That
seemed to settle them, and at last we saw the infantry advancing
to their positions without resistance.

"Now was my chance. I determined to get those machine guns if I
could, as otherwise the infantry would. So I left ---- in command
and got the trumpeter, sergeant major, and six men with six rifles,
and went forward 'to reconnoiter,' as I reported to ---- after I
had gone. It was a weird ride, through thick black woods, holding
my revolver ready, going in front with the little trumpeter behind
and the others following some way in the rear. We passed some very
bad sights, and knew the woods were full of Germans who were afraid
to get away on account of the dreaded shell fire. We got in front
of our infantry, who were going to fire at us, but I shouted just
in time.

"At last we came to the edge of a wood, and in front of us, about
200 yards away, was a little cup-shaped copse, and the enemy's
trenches with machine guns a little farther on. I felt sure this
wood was full of Germans, as I had seen them go in earlier. I started
to gallop for it, and the others followed. Suddenly about fifty
Germans bolted out, firing at us. I loosed off my revolver as fast
as I could, and ---- loosed off his rifle from the saddle. They
must have thought we were a regiment of cavalry, for, except for
a few, they suddenly yelled and bolted. I stopped and dismounted
my lot to fire at them, to make sure that they didn't change their
minds.

"I waited for a lull, and mounted all my lot behind the bushes
and made them spring as I gave the word to gallop for cover to the
woods where the Welsh company was. There I got ----, who understands
them (the guns), and an infantryman who volunteered to help, and
---- and I ran up to the Maxims and took out the breech mechanism
of both and one of the belts, and carried away one whole Maxim.
We couldn't manage the other.

"We got back very slowly on account of the gun, and the men went wild
with excitement that we had got one gun complete and the mechanism
and belt of the other."

With such incidents the pursuit of the Germans across the Marne
and to the Aisne was replete, and so thoroughly did the advance
French and English troops scour that country that when the morning
of September 13, 1914, dawned there was scarcely a German soldier
left on the southern side of the Aisne, west of Rheims.

The administration of the German armies meanwhile had been markedly
changed. In the turning movement on the Marne the plan was clearly
outlined, each commander had his instructions, and that was all.
But with the need for changes of plan there was need for a directing
head, and Field Marshal van Heeringen was sent in a hurry to take
charge of the Aisne. This placed both General von Kluck and General
von Bülow into subordinate positions. Field Marshal von Heeringen
held a deserved reputation as one of the most brilliant as well
as one of the most iron-willed of the German military leaders.
He had been the backbone of the crown prince's movement against
Troyon, a movement which, given a day or two longer, might have
meant the capture of Verdun.

This was not the only factor that was framing up to give the German
armies a decided advantage. The essential factor of the Aisne was
the arrival of General von Zwehl and his guns. On September 13,
1914, at 6 a. m., Zwehl arrived in Laon, and in less than an hour
he was in action on the Aisne front. The story of General von Zwehl
and his guns is essential to an understanding of the causes that
rendered the British victory of the Aisne a barren and a fruitless
victory at best.

The week of September 5-12, 1914, witnessed the entire series of
the battles of the Marne, which drove the Germans across the Marne
and across the Aisne, as well as a German victory which exerted
almost as powerful an influence in favor of the invaders as the
check at the Marne did for the defenders. This victory was the
fall of Maubeuge. It is going too far to say--as several military
writers have done--that General von Zwehl saved Germany, and that
unless he had arrived as opportunely as he did the "German retreat
to the Aisne valley would have been changed into a disastrous and
overwhelming rout." But it is not going too far to say that the
successful holding of the Aisne line was due to the victor of Maubeuge.

General von Zwehl was one of the iron-jawed battle-scarred warriors
of 1870, a man with a will as metallic as his own siege guns, and
a man who could no more be deflected from his purpose than a shell
could be diverted in its flight. He had been set to reduce Maubeuge
and he had done so with speed and with thoroughness. Maubeuge was
not protected by open-air earthworks, but by a circle of armor-plate
concrete forts. To the mighty siege guns handled by General von
Zwehl, these were no trouble, for Von Zwehl had not only the heavy
batteries attached to the Seventh Army Reserve, but he also had a
number of Von Kluck's guns and the majority of General von Bülow's,
neither of whom was expected to need siege guns in the forward
drive where mobility was an essential. In addition to this, General
von Zwehl also had the great siege train that had been prepared
for the reduction of Paris. What chance had Maubeuge against such
a potency?

On September 8, 1914, word reached General von Zwehl that the forward
drive had failed, that the main armies had been beaten back and
that he was to bring up his guns as rapidly as possible to cover
the retreat. As rapidly as he could, to General von Zwehl, meant
but one thing--to get there! He collected 9,000 reserve troops,
which was almost immediately swelled by another 9,000, and with
a total of 18,000 troops he started his siege trains for the town
of Laon, where Field Marshal von Heeringen had taken up his
headquarters. The weather turned bad, rendering the heavy guns
extremely difficult to handle, but there could be no delay, no
explanations, to General von Zwehl. If a gun was to be brought it
was to be brought and that was all about it! Four days and three
nights of almost continuous marching is killing. The German commander
cared nothing for that. The guns must be kept moving. Could he get
them there on time? In the last twenty-four hours of the march,
his 18,000 troops covered 41 miles and they arrived in Laon at six
o'clock in the morning of September 13, 1914, and were in action an
hour later. The problem, therefore, before the English and French at
the Aisne, was not the carrying of the river against a disheartened
and retreating army, but the carrying of the river against a
well-thought-out and forceful plan--a plan, moreover, backed up
by the most powerful artillery that the world has ever seen.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXI

THE BRITISH AT THE AISNE

In the battles of the Marne, the brunt of the fighting had been
borne mainly by the French armies, but the major part of work of
the battle of the Aisne was borne by the British Expeditionary
Force. Sir John French wasted no time. Saturday night, September
12, 1914, was a night of labor for engineers and gunners. The bridge
trains belonging to the First and Second Army Corps were ordered
to the edge of the river at daybreak, and as soon as the first
gleam of dawn appeared in the sky, the heroic effort began.

At the risk of seeming a little detailed, in order to understand
the somewhat involved maneuvers by which the British won the crossing
of the Aisne, instead of dealing with the advance of the British army
as a unit, in the manner that was done in discussing the battles of
the Marne, their activities will be shown as army corps: the Third
Army Corps to the westward, under General Pulteney; the Second Army
Corps, under Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, and the First Army Corps
to the eastward, under Sir Douglas Haig, all, of course, under
the general direction of Sir John French.

The British had no means of knowing what was in front of them.
There was only one way to find out--a way, alas, often costly,
a way that in every campaign costs thousands of lives apparently
fruitlessly, and that is a frontal attack. Down over the slopes of
the southern bank, into the bright, smiling river valley, where the
little white villages in the distance were hiding their dilapidated
state, marched the British army. Not a sign of activity showed
itself upon the farther shore. A summer haze obscured objects at
a distance, but, shortly before nine o'clock, the German batteries
opened fire with a roar that was appalling.

The Third Army Corps, after a brief artillery duel, advanced on
Soissons to cover the work of the engineers who were building a
pontoon bridge for the French troops. The German fire was deadly,
yet though more than half their men fell, the engineers put the
pontoon bridge across. German howitzer fire, from behind the ridge,
however, soon destroyed the bridge. The Turcos crossed the river in
rowboats and had a fierce but indecisive struggle in the streets
of the medieval city. Meanwhile, with the failure of the pontoon
bridge at Soissons, General Pulteney struck to the northeast along
the road to Venizel. The bridge at that point had been blown up,
but the British sappers repaired it sufficiently to set the Eleventh
Brigade across, and even, despite the lurid hail of shot and shell,
four regiments gathered at Bucy-de-Long by one o'clock on that
Sunday, September 13, 1914. Over the heads of these courageous
regiments towered the great hill of Vregny, a veritable Gibraltar
of heavy guns with numerous machine guns along the wooded edge.
There was no protection, and no shelter against the terrible German
Maxim fire, so that the moment came when to attempt further advance
meant instant annihilation. Still, under cover of the success of the
Eleventh Brigade the engineers built a pontoon bridge at Venizel
and the Twelth Brigade crossed to Bucy-de-Long, with a number of
the lighter artillery. As there was absolutely no shelter, to storm
the height at that point was impossible, and to remain where they
were was merely to court sudden death, so the Twelfth Brigade worked
over the slopes to the ravine at Chipres, where they intrenched.

The task in front of the Second Army Corps was no less difficult.
The bridge at Condé was too strongly defended to be taken by assault,
as Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien speedily found out, so he divided his
forces into two parts, one of which was directed at the village
of Missy, two and one half miles west of Condé, while the other
concentrated its attack on a crossing at the town of Vailly, three
miles east of Condé. Both detachments made good their crossing,
but the regiments that found themselves near Missy also realized
that hasty, very hasty intrenchment was imperative, lest every
one of them should be blown into kingdom come before half an hour
had passed by. During the night some troops were rafted over, three
men at a time, and these encamped near Missy. It was a false move.
For sixteen days thereafter the British troops had to remain in
their dugouts, a large part of the time without food or water.
To show a head above the trench was sudden death.

The regiments that crossed the river at Vailly found themselves in
even a worse plight. No sooner had they crossed than the bombardment
began, and the Germans knew every range in the place accurately.
More than that, the line of trenches was open to enfilade fire from
a hidden battery, which did not unmask until the trench was filled
with soldiers. This Eighth Brigade had to retire in disorder.

The Fifth Brigade, attached to the First Army Corps under Sir Douglas
Haig, an Irish and Scotch group of regiments, were the most successful
of all. The bridge at Pont Arcy had been destroyed, but still one of
its girders spanned the stream. It would have been tricky walking,
even under ordinary circumstances, but nerve racking to attempt,
when from every hill and wood and point of land, Maxims, machine
guns and a steady rifle fire are concentrated on the man crossing
that one girder. By the afternoon, the engineers attached to the
First Army Corps had also established a pontoon bridge, and the
whole brigade crossed the river in the evening and dug itself in.

Late on Sunday afternoon, however, a weak spot showed itself in
the German line and Sir John French threw the First Division of the
First Army Corps across the river near Bourg. Some of the infantry
crossed by a small pontoon bridge and a brigade of cavalry started
to follow them. When they were in mid-stream, however, a terrific
storm of fire smote them. The cavalry pushed on, but could not
ride up the hill in the teeth of the bombardment. The infantry
were eager to go, but nothing was to be gained by the move, so
the cavalry returned over the pontoon, by a most extraordinary
occurrence not having lost a single member in the three hours it
had been scouting on the hostile side of the Aisne. The infantry
intrenched themselves solidly to await the morning.

The main forces of the First Division were especially lucky. Using
the canal aqueduct they made their way toward Bourg, and drove
the Germans back toward the main ridge.

More than three-quarters of the summit of the ridge had been won,
the entire Second Infantry Brigade was across, the Twenty-fifth
Artillery Brigade was across, ready to support, and General Bulfin,
instead of tiring his men by making them intrench there, ordered
them to rest, throwing their outposts in front of the hamlet of
Moulins.

This ended the first day's fighting on the battle of the Aisne.
Of the Third Army Corps, a small body of men had reached Chipres.
There they had been joined by a small force from the Second Army
Corps. In the First Army a strong detachment dug itself in not
far from Pont d'Arcy. The incomparably superior position of the
Germans, their huge numbers, their possession of innumerable guns,
made even this shaky tenure dangerous, though all held on. Sir
John French had tested and found out the German strength and the
result was not encouraging.

Although this repulse of the British army at every point was a
decided victory for the German gunners, Field Marshal von Heeringen
had been impressed by two things: the courage of the British attacking
army, and the destructiveness of the French artillery on the south
bank of the river. The German commander withdrew all his men from
the advanced trenches on between the ridge and the river, keeping,
however, strongly intrenched detachments of riflemen at all commanding
points with powerful artillery as their support.

Sunday night was a veritable pandemonium of destruction and tumult.
All night long, without cessation, the batteries of both sides,
knowing exactly their opponents' range, fired perpetually. All
night long searchlight bombs were thrown. All night long, golden
and red and yellow streams of flame or the sudden jagged flash
of an explosion lit up the black smoke of burning buildings and
fields in the valley, or showed the white puff-like low clouds of
the bursting shrapnel. Not for an instant did the roar diminish,
not for a second was the kindly veil of night left unrent by a
fissure of vengeful flame. Yet, all night long, as ceaselessly
as the great guns poured out their angry fury, so did men pour
out their indomitable will, and in that hell light of battle flame
engineers labored to construct bridges, small bodies of troops
moved forward to join their comrades in the trenches who had been
able to make a footing the day before, and all night long, those
ghastly yet merciful accompaniments of a battle field--the ambulance
corps--carried on their work of relief. The searchlights swept up
and down the valley, like great eyes that watched to give direction
to the venom of war.

At three o'clock in the morning of Monday, September 14, 1914,
two regiments were sent to capture a sugar factory strongly held
by the enemy. That sugar factory became a maelstrom. Three more
regiments had to be brought up and finally the guards, and even
thus heavily overpowered, the Germans successfully defended it
until noon. They sold their lives dearly--those defenders. That
sugar factory stood on that Monday as did Hogoumont at Waterloo. It
delayed the advance of the entire First Corps, but at four o'clock
in the afternoon, Sir Douglas Haig ordered a general advance. The
last afternoon and evening scored a distinct success for the English
arms, and when at last it grew absolutely too dark to see, that
corps held a position stretching from Troton to La Cour de Soupir.
Its chief importance, however, was that it gave the Allies a strongly
intrenched position on the plateau itself.

It was of this day's fighting that, almost a month later, Sir John
French was able to say in his official dispatches:

"The action of the First Corps on this day under the direction and
command of Sir Douglas Haig was of so skillful, bold, and decisive
a character that he gained positions which alone have enabled me
to maintain my position for more than three weeks of very severe
fighting on the north bank of the river."

The offensive of this entire movement was intrusted to the First
Corps. The artillery strength of the armies of General von Kluck
and Von Bülow was such that it was almost impossible for the Second
and Third British Army Corps to assail them by a charge up the
bluff. But, meantime, the French had not been idle. On September
13, 1914, General d'Espérey's Fifth Army crossed the Aisne east
of Bourg, and on the following day commenced the assault on the
Craonne plateau.

The next day, Tuesday, September 15, 1914, was a day of several
small victories for the Germans. General von Zwehl was a hard hitter
and a quick hitter. Having disposed of his artillery where he thought
it could be of the most use, he aided Field Marshal von Heeringen
with counsels of counterattack, counsels that the Field Marshal
fully indorsed. The Sixth French Army under General Manoury, at
the extreme west of the line, was the chief point of attack. Though
well placed on a strong position at Nampcel, the Germans drove
the French before them like clouds before the wind, recaptured
the spurs, forced the French backward through the Morsain ravine
and back to their original crossing place of the Aisne between
Viv and Fontenoy.

The Third Corps of the British suffered heavy loss of life without
any opportunity to retaliate, for it was too thoroughly and completely
dominated by the guns of Vregny.

The lull of Wednesday, September 16, 1914, was a foretaste of the
deadlock which was gradually forming. The French Fifth Army had
been compelled to abandon all idea of a direct attack upon the
Craonne plateau, the natural position being far too strong. The
Second and Third Corps of the British army could do nothing. Sir
John French, though eager to push the advantage, secured by his
position on the heights, was well aware that such a move was not
possible unless the entire French line was ready to cooperate with
him, for, if he tried to drive down upon the ridge of the Aisne,
or, for that matter, tried to flank it, the line of the Duke of
Württemberg would bend back upon him and nip him in a way which
would render escape difficult.

A sudden recrudescence of activity on the western front gave rise to
the hope that the deadlock might yet be avoided, that the two great
armies might come to handgrips again. Bolstered up by reenforcements,
General Manoury checked the German attack and regained all the
ground that had been lost. Concentrating on the need of driving
the invaders out of the quarries of Autreches, the French succeeded.
This eased the western end of the line, and the Second and Third
British Army Corps were left in peace.

Friday, September 18, 1914, is again a date of moment, not because
anything of importance was transacted, but because nothing was
transacted. It was a day of realizations. It was a day that convinced
the Allies that the German positions could not be broken down by
frontal attack, just as the battles of the Marne had convinced
the Germans that the road to Paris was not yet open. The six days
from September 12 to 18 had revealed beyond preadventure that the
German line along the ridge of the Aisne was not merely a convenient
halting place for a rear-guard action, but that it was formed of
lines of strong fortifications, almost impregnable and absolutely
beyond the hope of storming. The forces were too evenly balanced
for any concerted action to produce a desired effect, the possession
of air scouts eliminated any question of a surprise. In other words,
the conclusion was borne in upon the Allies with full force that,
much as the German plan had failed at Marne, so had the Allies'
plan failed at Aisne. The crossing of the Aisne, the winning of
the heights by Sir Douglas Haig were victories--not only that, but
they were full of that glory which goes with successful daring--yet
they led nowhere. The plan of the Allies must be abandoned and a
new one formed. This decision of a change of strategical plan,
then, closed the Allies' frontal attack upon the position of the
Central Powers on the ridge of the Maise, and marks the end of
the first phase of the battle of the Aisne.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXII

BOMBARDMENT OF RHEIMS AND SOISSONS

To be considered almost as a part of the advance upon the Aisne
were the bombardments of Soissons and of Rheims, the former being a
part of the first phase of the Aisne battles, the second belonging
to the second phase. Soissons, it will be remembered, lies at the
western end of the high bluffs that form a bank to the River Aisne
for over fifty miles. It is on the high road between Rheims and
Compiègne, and on the south side of the Aisne, and consequently
returned into French hands on September 13, 1914. No sooner did
the French armies enter the little town, however, than Soissons,
dominated by the twin towers of its ancient cathedral, became a
target for the concentrated fire of the Germans, whose artillery,
it will be remembered, had been supplemented that morning by the
huge guns brought on from Maubeuge by the magnificent forced marches
of General von Zwehl. By noon the lower half of that once lovely
city was in flames. On every hand walls collapsed as though they
had been made of pasteboard. Women and children were buried beneath
the ruins or blown to pieces as they fled into the streets. One
of the towers of the cathedral was damaged, and there was not a
corner of the town that was safe from fire. The French batteries
tried to cover the city and silence the batteries opposing them
on the north front of the river, but the odds were too great.

All day long, and throughout the greater part of every night, for
the first three days of the battle of the Aisne, September 13,
14, and 15, 1914, the bombardment of Soissons was continual, and,
in addition to being a wreck, the town became a shambles.

Closely allied to the Soissons bombardment, and occurring simultaneously
with the battle of the Aisne, was the series of engagements occurring in
the quarries around Autreches and Coucy-le-Château, fought by advanced
bodies in front of the right wing of the German army encamped on the
ridge of the Aisne. These engagements developed the illuminating
fact that during times of peace German capital had been invested in
these quarries and that the foresight of the Germans had led them
to fortify these quarries, so that they were veritable fortresses,
and indeed, formed a continuation of that line of defense the crowning
point of which was the Aisne cliff near the plateau of the Craonne.
During the days when the British First Army Corps, under Sir Douglas
Haig, was performing the astounding feat of crossing the Aisne
and holding the land thus gained against a veritable tempest of
counterattack, these stone quarries were taken and lost again every
few hours. The French infantry of General Manoury's army, far less
exhausted than the harassed regiments of General von Kluck's forces,
found little difficulty in forcing the Germans back from Autreches,
but, no sooner were they well established, than the roar of the
combined guns of General von Kluck and General von Zwehl would
make the position untenable, and under cover of that appalling
rain of death, the German infantry would creep back to reoccupy
the positions from which they had been ousted by the bayonets only
a few hours before. It was the German tactics of machine vs. men,
a direful and cruel battle plan to the opposing forces.

Upon the day that the advance of the British definitely stopped,
or, in other words, when General Joffre and Sir John French realized
that further effort against the defenses of the Germans on the
ridge beyond the Aisne would only mean loss of life to no gainful
purpose, the bombardment of Rheims began. The old city had suffered
severely during the German advance upon the Marne. Still, it had
not been pillaged, and when the Germans retreated across the Aisne
the old city held much of its glory unimpaired. Still the flawless
beauty of Rheims Cathedral stood guard over the ancient city.

Then on September 18, 1914, the shelling of the city began and
a bombardment of the most terrific character continued for ten
days. Rheims Cathedral, which the French declared was outside the
zone of direct fire and was used as a hospital with the Red Cross
flag flying, and which the Germans asserted to have been used for
a signal station and to have been surrounded by gun stations, was
said to have been demolished by the German guns. This act created
a sensation throughout the world, for Rheims Cathedral was like
a gem from Paradise, regarded by most art lovers as one of the
most beautiful buildings in the world. Every civilized country was
shaken with grief when the news of the disaster to Rheims Cathedral
was published.

It must be admitted that military necessity knows no law, and it
must also be admitted that human life has a valuation to be expressed
in terms far higher than any building however beautiful. In an
inspired article written by Major General von Ditfurth, in the
"Hamburger Nachrichten," this latter point is clearly brought out.
He wrote:

"It is of no consequence if all the monuments ever created, all
the pictures ever painted, and all the buildings ever created by
the great architects of the world were destroyed, if by their
destruction we promote Germany's victory over her enemies.... The
commonest, ugliest stone placed to mark the burial place of a German
grenadier is a more glorious and perfect monument than all the
cathedrals in Europe put together.

"Let neutral peoples and our enemies cease their empty chatter,
which is no better than the twittering of birds. Let them cease
their talk about the cathedral at Rheims and about all the churches
and castles of France which have shared its fate. These things do
not interest us."

Opinions have naturally differed concerning Von Ditfurth's appraisal
of the comparative values of Rheims Cathedral and the tombstone of
a German grenadier, but even the champions of military necessity
were glad to learn later that the cathedral still stood, though much
damaged. If Rheims were far away from the line of march, and if the
Germans had deliberately gone thither for the purpose of destroying
it--as some prejudiced accounts seem to state--then there would not
be room for two opinions. Wanton vandalism is vandalism largely
in the ratio that it is wanton. But, to be perfectly impartial,
it must be admitted that the second phase of the battle of the
Aisne made the bombardment of Rheims a military necessity. To make
this clear requires a setting forth of the new strategical plan
developed by Field Marshal von Heeringen upon the collapse of the
plan for the drive on Paris, which was foiled by the battles of
the Marne.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXIII

SECOND PHASE OF BATTLE OF THE AISNE

The second phase of the battle of the Aisne contained two factors.
One, the simplest, was the maintenance of that line of defense
against any force that could be brought up against it by the Allies.
It meant the ability to hold strongly fortified positions against all
odds. The history of the trenches that winter, of which more will
be said later, reveals the extent to which the Germans succeeded,
aided by the iron craft of the old Prussian fighter General von
Zwehl.

The other factor depended on the vexed question of means of
communication. There was no cross-country railway linking the eastern
German wing to the western German wing. As has been previously
remarked, all supplies and munitions had to come in a roundabout
way. Verdun was a desired goal, but Field Marshal von Heeringen
was wise enough to know that if the crown prince's effort against
General Sarrail had failed, if the Third French Army had secured
heavy reenforcement, and if it had been left unmolested for a week,
the outer ring of defenses around Verdun would, by that time, have
become so amazingly strengthened that direct or frontal attack
would be impossible, while the flanking attack had failed. It was
vain, therefore, at the present time, to hope that the establishment
of the direct communication between Metz and Verdun might pass
into the hands of the invaders.

On the other hand, there was a direct line of railway running through
Rheims, Rethel, Mezières to the great war depot, Coblenz on the
Rhine. A branch line from Metz, through Luxemburg, thus gave
communication to the eastern wing. All the links of this were in
German hands, except Rheims, and if that railroad center could be
secured, the importance to the German advance would be enormous.
Under such circumstances, it can scarcely be held that Rheims was
not necessarily a point, the attack of which was due to military
necessity.

The formation for this began on September 17, 1914. Crossing the
Aisne by the old ford of Berry-au-Bac, a powerful army under the
direct leadership of Field Marshal von Heeringen debouched upon
the open country between Berry-au-Bac and Suippes, east of Rheims.
It was at this point that the German commander in chief of this
section of the battle line intended to deliver a crushing blow
by which might be regained the prestige secured at Charleroi and
lost again at the Marne.

Surprise may be felt that so important a railway center as Rheims
should not have been a strongly fortified place. It had been so
once, though the fortifications were old-fashioned. But, instead of
bringing these points of natural defense up to the highest degree
of modern efficiency, the French had dismantled them entirely,
so as to make Rheims with its glorious cathedral an open town,
safe from bombardment. It was, according to the rules of war, safe
from bombardment, but only in the event of its not being defended.
General Foch did not dare to take this stand. He knew, as well as
did General von Heeringen, the strategic value of Rheims as railroad
center, and accepted the issue of battle.

In the falling back of the several German armies from the Marne
to the Aisne, the Germans had kept possession of the chief forts
of the district around Rheims. No strong effort had been made to
dislodge them, for the forward movement of the Allies had been
directed against the fortified heights of the Aisne, facing the
Soissons-Craonne defense. It will be remembered that the armies of
General Foch and Langle, especially the latter, had taken no part
in the first phase of the Battle of the Aisne, but had stubbornly
thrown back the armies of the Duke of Württemberg, which had combined
with those of the crown prince. The right wing of this large conjoined
army had held the fort sites around Rheims and especially they had
made full use of the chief fort on the wooded heights of Nogent
l'Abbesse, a trifle less than half a mile from the cathedral city
and therefore within easy destructive shelling range. The heavy
artillery was planted here, the infantry intrenched around it, and
strong defense trenches were established along the River Suippe
that runs into the Aisne near Berry-au-Bac.

On Friday, September 18, 1914, the first movement of the second
phase was begun, when the Germans launched a sharp counterattack
on the French center. This was the first German offensive movement
since their retreat from the Marne, and it was powerful and well
handled. General Foch fell back into defensive positions, but had
much ado to hold his own. He evaded giving battle around Rheims
and took up a position at Souain, which he held with the jaunty
obstinacy he had displayed so often in the retreat through northern
France. It was obvious that he could not hold out long, but by
clever generalship, and especially by an extraordinarily brilliant
use of the cavalry arm, he held off the army for that day. That
night strong reenforcements came to his aid, and on September 19,
1914, the balance of the forces was more nearly equal.

On September 19, 1914, therefore, the situation of the armies was
much as follows: The Germans, acting under the general command of
Field Marshal von Heeringen, controlled Rheims under the gunfire
of their heavy artillery from two points, the heights of Nogent
l'Abbesse to the southeast of Rheims, and the hill of Brimont a
little over half a mile to the northeast. Their right flank was
covered by the powerful defenses of the Aisne and the guns of the
Craonne plateau, their left flank was a series of intrenchments
along the river Suippe, which merged into the second line of defense
of the main army under the Duke of Württemberg.

On the other side of Rheims, or to the west of the cathedral city,
the Allies also held two heights, one at Pouillon, between the
Aisle and the Vesle, and therefore to the northwest of the city,
and the other on a sharp steep, known as the Mountain of Rheims,
near Verzenay, on the south side of the river. This was therefore
west and a little south of Rheims. But, and herein lies the question
that has so often arisen in the discussion of the comparative strength
of the two armies--especially without the British batteries--the
French lacked heavy long-range artillery. They had no such howitzers
as those of the German forces. Thus the Germans could shell Rheims
to their hearts' content, and the Allies could not silence that
gunfire from their own fortified positions. Once more, then, it
became a battle between infantry and artillery, between men and
machines.

This time, however, the advance was not favorable to the Germans.
Their heavy artillery commanded Rheims, but it did not command the
French line to the west of Rheims. The invaders performed prodigies
of valor. Again and again they hurled themselves against the French
line. But General Foch's troops were well supplied with that terrible
engine of destruction--the French 3-inch fieldpiece, known, as the
75-mm., an extremely powerful gun for its caliber.

In four successive night attacks on September 19-20, 1914, the
heaviest onset was made. Supported by a terrific gunfire, directed
with the long pointing fingers of searchlights, the German infantry,
invigorated by a week's rest; rolled up in gray-clad tidal waves
against the French line. General Foch had known how to post his
defense, and within twenty-four hours he had made the line between
Pouillon and the Mountain of Rheims almost as strong as the German
line between Brimont and Nogent l'Abbesse. Poor Rheims lay between,
wide open to the eruption of destruction that belched from the
throats of the German howitzers.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXIV

END OF THE BATTLE

After September 22, 1914, there was a lull in the fighting at Rheims,
and as afterward appeared, this was due mainly to another change
of plan on the part of the German Staff. But it was no part of
General Foch's intentions to leave the bombardment of the cathedral
unrevenged. He had, indeed, caused an unparalleled slaughter on the
night of September 19, 1914, as has been stated, but his troops
were avid for reprisal and the French strategist knew well how
dangerous it is to allow an army, eager for action and revenge,
to eat its heart out vainly. He was too wise to run the risk of
a countercharge, but four days later his opportunity came, and
he took advantage of it to the full.

At dawn on September 26, 1914, a detachment of 15,000 Germans,
including all that remained of the famous Prussian Guards Corps,
that same body that had fought so marvelously on many occasions,
and which had suffered the most cruelly in the affair of the marshes
of St. Gond, made a sortie from the base line at Nogent l'Abbesse to
destroy the railway line between Rheims and Verdun, this line was,
indeed, the principal link of communication to that all-important
fortress that protruded its bristling salient into the heart of
the German position. A French aviator, who had climbed into his
machine when it was yet dark, in order to do a little daybreak
scouting before the light should be sufficiently bright to make him
an easy target, saw this movement and reported it immediately to
General Foch. That commander, who knew how to use cavalry, ordered
a regiment at the gallop to occupy the village of Auberive, on
the Suippe, and there harry the advancing column sufficiently to
give him time to bring up the light artillery and to bring into
action a large body of infantry encamped at Jouchery, five miles
away.

Before six o'clock, the cavalry were in Auberive. The men worked
like fiends. The streets were rapidly barricaded, machine guns
hoisted to roofs and other points where they might command a wide
sweep of fire. Then the cavalry rode forward to meet the advancing
column. Not knowing what might be in front of him, the German commander
halted, awaiting reports from his air scouts. The halt was but
three-quarters of an hour, but that was of vast importance. The
scouts reported only a regiment of cavalry ahead, but a powerful
detachment of French artillery on the road from Jouchery. The German
leader detached 2,000 of the Death's Head Hussars, his crack cavalry,
to cut off, or at all events to delay, the French guns. He was
aware that the artillery would have no anticipation of this and,
in the surprise, the guns might be captured. Meantime, he hurried
his advance to Auberive, captured the village, though after another
hour's delay, caused by the resistance of the cavalry, who retreated
to St. Hilaire.

Meantime, at St. Hilaire, the surprise charge of the Death's Head
Hussars was launched. It was scarcely a question of minutes, it
was rather a matter of seconds. But the French artillery knew their
light fieldpieces as thoroughly as the Germans were masters of
the heavy guns. In less than two minutes the artillery teams were
unharnessed, the guns were in position and the gunners took their
places when the Hussars were so near the voices of their leaders
could be heard. Thirty seconds earlier, and the Hussars would have
been in among the guns and made a notable capture. There was just
time enough for a man to breathe twice, when the order came to
fire. The Hussars were at less than a hundred yards' range. As the
shrapnel burst, the front squadrons seemed to stumble and fall.
The ranks were so near that the change from living human beings
into mangled pieces of flesh and rags could clearly be seen. More
than one veteran gunner felt squeamish at the sight. But the rear
squadrons, though their horses' hoofs were squelching in the blood
of their comrades of a moment before, never blenched or faltered
but swept on at a thundering gallop. Again the guns spoke, and
again. That was all. Amid the vines, here and there a writhing
figure could be seen, or a wounded horse endeavoring to rise, and
here and there a straggler striving to escape. It was level open
country; twice again the guns roared, five rounds in all, and all
movement ceased. The engagement had lasted less than five minutes
and of those two thousand splendid horsemen not one escaped. The
French artillerists picked up the wounded and sent them back to
Rheims to receive nursing and care, and then hurried on to the
action whither they were bound when surprised by the Hussars.

The infantry of the Germans and of the French were now coming to
hand grips. A battalion of Zouaves was creeping round to attack
the advancing column in the rear. The German commander at Nogent
l'Abbesse learned from his air scouts what was happening. He saw
the peril of the advancing column, that it was almost surrounded,
and, he threw further columns into the fray, to cover the retreat.
The sortie on the railway had now become impossible. General Foch
had moved too quickly. But, even so, the peril was great, for the
German force was almost cut off. It meant the loss of 15,000 men
and artillery, or it meant the sacrifice of some one corps to cover
the retreat. The latter course was chosen.

Three thousand of the Guards Corps, the flower of the Prussian
Army, were sent like a catapult at the gap in the French line,
immediately in front of Rheims. Five times they charged, and with
such heroic daring and such penetrative energy that General Foch
did not dare break from his position. As they came up for the fifth
assault, a wild cheer of admiration broke out along the French line.
But the rifles spoke steadily, none the less for that. After the
fifth assault, barely a hundred men were left, nearly all wounded.
They reversed rifles, a sign of surrender, and in all honor they
were received by General Foch, who conducted them to the hospital
in the rear. They lived up to the full the most heroic traditions
of the old Prussian corps and they saved that whole German force
from destruction. Still, with the annihilation of the Death's Head
Hussars and the remainder of the Prussian Guards Corps on the same
day, the forces under General Foch felt that in part Rheims had
been avenged.

The other section of this second phase of the Aisne consisted of
the trench warfare, which solidified from September 19 to October 6,
1914, under conditions of extreme difficulty and more than extreme
discomfort. It was practically the establishment of a trench campaign
that lasted all winter, and revived the centuries-old fortress
warfare, applying it under modern conditions to field fortifications.
The French during that winter on the Aisne never quite succeeded
in rivaling the mechanical precision of the German movements; the
Germans, on the other hand, never showed themselves to possess
the emotional fervor of the French with the bayonet.

In many places German and Allies' trenches almost touched each
other. The first two weeks at the Aisne were one continual downpour,
and the foundation of that ground is chalk. On the sides of the
plateau of Craonne, after two weeks' rain, the chalky mud seemed
bottomless. "It filled the ears and eyes and throats of our men,"
wrote John Buchan, "it plastered their clothing and mingled generously
with their diet. Their grandfathers, who had been at Sebastopol,
could have told them something about mud; but even after India and
South Africa, the mire of the Aisne seemed a grievous affliction."
The fighting was constant, the nervous strain exhausting, and the
cold and wet were even harder to bear. There had as yet been no
time to build trenches with all conveniences, such as the Germans
possessed on the crest of the ridge, and the trenches of the Allies
were a chilled inferno of woe.

A stretch of waste ground lay between the trenches, and often for
days at a time the fire was too heavy to rescue the wounded or
bring in the dead. The men in the trenches, on either side, were
compelled to hear the groans of the wounded, lying in the open day
after day, until exhaustion, cold and pain brought them a merciful
release. In letters more than one soldier declared that the hardest
thing to bear was to hear a fellow comrade shrieking or groaning
in agony a few steps away for hours--even days at a time--and to
be able to do nothing to help. The stench from the unburied bodies
was so great that officially all the tobacco for the whole battle
front was commandeered and sent to the trenches under the plateau
of Craonne and on the hill to the westward, where the British First
Army Corps was placed. Such, for the two weeks between September
22, 1914, and October 6, 1914, was the trench warfare during the
second phase of the battle of the Aisne, a condition never after
repeated in the war, for such a feat as the crossing of the Aisne
could scarcely be duplicated. It was gallant, it was magnificent,
and it was costly--the British casualty list for September 12 to
October 6, 1914, being, killed, wounded and missing, 561 officers
and 12,980 men--but it was useless, and only served to give the
Allies a temporary base whereby General Foch was successful in
checking the German attempt to capture the Rheims-Verdun railway.
It was a victory of bravery, but not a victory of result.

During all these operations the Belgian army, now at Antwerp, had
harassed the German troops by frequent sorties. The capture of the
city was at once undertaken by the German Staff, following the
stalemate created by the operations at the Aisne.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXV

"THE RACE TO THE SEA"

The Germans, having failed in their first enveloping movement,
attempted a second after the battle of the Marne. They tried to
repeat their maneuver of August, endeavoring to overwhelm the French
left; while the French, on their side, tried to overwhelm the German
right. Each of these armies, by a converging movement, gradually
drew its forces toward the west. No sooner did the Germans bring
up a new corps on their right than the French brought up another
on their left. Thus the front of the battle ascended more and more
to the west and north until arriving at the sea it could go no
farther. This is what has been called by French military critics
"The Race to the Sea." In this race to the sea the Germans had a
great advantage over the French. A glance at the map is enough
to make it understood. The concave form of the German front made
the lines of transportation shorter; they were within the interior
of the angle, while the French were at the exterior. On the German
side this movement drew into the line more than eighteen army corps,
or twelve active corps, six reserve corps, and four cavalry corps.

On the French side it resulted in the posting of the army of Castelnau
on the left of Manoury's army, in the deployment of the army of
General de Maud'huy to the left of the army of Castelnau, in the
transference of the British army to the left of the army of Maud'huy,
in the relegation of the army of Urbal to the left of the British
army, the army of Urbal being later flanked by the Belgian army
which came out of Antwerp. In order to accomplish this new and
extended disposition of forces the French General Staff was compelled
to reduce to their extreme limits the effective strengths of the
armies of the east and of the Oise, and as a result to make the
maximum use of the means of transport. In this it succeeded. When
the great battle of Flanders was waged toward the end of October,
the Germans, trying to turn the French left and to pierce it, found
themselves facing considerable French forces, which, allied with the
British and Belgian armies, completely barred the passage against
them.

From the 15th of September, 1914, it was clear that the Germans
were making a great effort to try and overwhelm the French left.
General Joffre parried the attack, reenforcing at first the army
of Manoury by an army corps, then transferring to the left of the
army of Manoury the entire army of Castelnau that was in Lorraine.
A corps of cavalry and four territorial divisions commanded by
General Brugère received the order to establish itself on both banks
of the Somme and protect the detraining of the army of Castelnau.

From September 21 to September 26, 1914, all the French forces
that had newly arrived were engaged in the Lassigny-Roye-Péronne
region. They succeeded in withstanding, not without difficulty, the
German attack, but they could not advance. The Germans determinedly
and unweariedly continued to mass new forces on their right. On
the left of the army of Castelnau it was therefore necessary to
establish a new army. It was established on September 30, 1914,
under the command of General Maud'huy. From the first days of October
this army waged violent conflicts in the region of Arras and of
Lens. It found facing it two German cavalry corps, the Guard, four
active army corps, and two reserve corps.

General Joffre continued without intermission to send new forces
to the left. On October 4, 1914, he called on General Foch in the
north and charged him with the duty of coordinating the action of
all the armies in that region: those of De Castelnau, Maud'huy,
and the territorial divisions. At the beginning of October the
British army, which was posted on the Aisne, was transferred to
the left of the French armies and replaced by the armies of Manoury
and d'Espérey. The Belgian army, issuing from Antwerp on October 9,
1914, effected its retreat, covered by the British naval forces and
6,000 French marines. It took its place on the Yser Canal between
Nieuport and Dixmude.

The Germans continuing their efforts to turn the French left, it
was found necessary again to strengthen that left considerably;
and new French army corps were transferred to Flanders and Belgium.
It was a new French army that was established and the command of
it was intrusted to General d'Urbal. It consisted at first of two
divisions of territorials and four divisions of cavalry of the
corps of General de Mitry, along with a brigade of naval fusiliers.
But from October 27 to November 11, 1914, it received considerable
reenforcements.

During the second week in November the German attack revealing
its purpose more clearly, General Joffre sent four more battalions
of chasseurs and four more brigades of infantry. The reenforcements
sent to the French army of the north totaled as a result five army
corps, a division of cavalry, a territorial division, sixteen cavalry
regiments, and more than sixty pieces of heavy artillery.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXVI

SIEGE AND FALL OF ANTWERP

The siege of Antwerp began on September 29, 1914, and in less than
two weeks, October 10, 1914, this historic city, one of the most
important trade centers of the world and one of the strongest fortresses
in Europe, was forced to capitulate, though it had always been
believed to be impregnable.

During the latter part of September, 1914, the forces of the
belligerents were driving northward in that memorable race for the
Channel in which both sides had the same object; each was trying
to be the first to turn the other's front and crumble his line.

At the same time the German forces, then in the vicinity of Brussels,
under the command of General van Beseler, pushed toward Antwerp,
on which the Belgian army had fallen back to make its last stand.
This move was necessary in order to cut off all danger of rear
attacks which would menace General von Kluck's drive to the coast,
a movement which had reached Douai on October 1, 1914.

The German General Staff had decided to take Antwerp at all cost.
General von Beseler on the last day of September, 1914, reached
a point within range of Antwerp's farthest outer forts.

In order to understand the record of the following successive steps
in the siege of Antwerp, a description of this city's position and
the location of its double circle of forts is necessary. Antwerp
was considered one of the most formidable strongholds in the world.
The elaborate defenses of Antwerp evolved from the original
fortifications of thirty years ago through continual additions.
The location of the city offers very many natural advantages for
its defense, and the engineering genius controlling the work made
full use of these opportunities. From the north Antwerp has access
to the sea by the river Scheldt, of which the arm nearest to the
city is narrow, with six strong forts on each bank, including the
citadel.

Any armies approaching from the south must cross the rivers Rupel
and Nethe, which practically, in the shape of a semicircle, swing
around the city to the south at a distance varying from about six
to twelve miles. Within this circle of flowing water, and about two
miles from the city, is another circle, formed by twelve powerful
forts. At a point almost due east from the center of the city and
commanding the railroad to Holland, by way of Turnhout, is located
the first of eight forts, designated by numbers. From there they
swing to the south and west, with fort eight very close to the
Scheldt and directly south to the village of Hoboken. On the other
side of the river are Forts de Cruibeke and Zwyndrecht, the latter
commanding the railroad to Ghent. Further north and right on the
banks of the Scheldt are Forts St. Marie, la Perle, and St. Philip,
the first two on the left bank and the last on the right, all three
opposite the new harbor and docks. In the northeast Fort de Merkem
guards the railroad to Rotterdam. Outside of this circle and in the
south, outside of the Nethe-Rupel line, there is another complete
circle of nineteen even stronger forts, at a distance from the
city varying between five and ten miles. Starting again in the
east--due east from fort one--and swinging south, these forts are
named: Oeleghem, Broeckem, Kessel, Lierre, Koningshoyckt, Wavre
St. Catherine, Waelhem--the last two only a few miles north of
Malines--Breendonck, Liezel, Bornem, Rupelmonde, Haesdonck, Doel,
Blauwgaren--the last two guarding the Scheldt at the point of its
entrance into Holland, one on each bank--Stabroek, Ertbrand, Brasschaet,
Schooten, and Gravenwezel. Between these outer forts there were
redoubts of considerable strength, which were armed with 4-inch
guns. The forts of the inner ring are placed at regular intervals
of 2,200 yards and at a distance of about 3,500 yards from the
enceinte of the city, which itself had powerful defenses as well.

[Illustration: LIEGE FORTS, SHOWING GERMAN ATTACK]

[Illustration: SIEGE AND FALL OF ANTWERP]

Add to these defenses the important fact that the entire district
surrounding Antwerp was subject to inundation to such a depth that
all approach to the city could be made impracticable to an enemy
force with heavy cannon and ammunition. Military authorities held
Antwerp to be of incomparable strength and as nearly impregnable
as engineering genius could make it.

During the latter part of September, 1914, several of the outer
forts were subjected to bombardment, and many of these had become
useless as defenses.

General von Beseler's advance was still barred by the river Nethe,
upon the opposite bank of which the defense was concentrated. During
the engagements which now ensued the German aircraft kept the commanders
advised as to conditions behind the enemy's lines, now and then
dropping bombs, apparently doing considerable damage.

On October 2, 1914, General von Beseler scattered from "Taube"
aeroplanes a number of printed papers over the entire district.
These circulars contained a proclamation to the Belgian soldiers,
advising them to stop fighting for England and Russia and to return
home to their wives and children, as Germany was ready to help
and befriend them.

The Belgian Government, which had established itself in Antwerp
after the occupation of Brussels, decided to leave the city as soon
as possible. Two small steamers were ordered to be held in readiness.
The foreign legations also decided to go with the Government.

Throughout this day a steady fire was kept up on the nearest outer
forts, but the Belgian soldiers contested every inch of ground
against the German advance. This fighting continued throughout the
entire day following, during which two of the minor outer forts
were silenced.

Rapid progress by the Germans was very difficult owing to the peculiar
conformation of the course of the river Scheldt at the point of
attack. This made especially difficult the laying of concrete
foundations for the heavy guns.

The first detachment of British troops, numbering about 8,000 marines,
reached Antwerp on October 3, 1914. This buoyed up the spirits of
the Belgian soldiers and redoubled their efforts. Under cover of
the continuous fire of their guns, the Germans made determined
efforts to cross the river Nethe at Waelhem. Desperate fighting,
which lasted all night and until early in the morning of October
4, took place. This attempt, however, failed. Later in the day
the Germans succeeded in putting a pontoon bridge in place. Troops
in solid masses hurried across; but as they reached the other side
some well-directed shots from the Belgian guns blew the pontoon
bridge to pieces, killing many.

Throughout the night of October 4, 1914, and the day and night
of October 5, the battle raged about Lierre with savage ferocity.
The British marines had by this time relieved the Belgians. The
German fire, however, compelled the defenders to draw back a
considerable distance.

At four o'clock in the morning of October 6, 1914, the Germans
succeeded in crossing the river in force, and now the defenders
were obliged to give way, as the outer forts had ceased to afford
them any protection. Late in the afternoon the members of the Belgian
Cabinet and their official families went aboard one steamer, while
the French and British Legations boarded another, both sailing
early on October 7.

The Belgian troops had begun to withdraw the evening before. All the
defending forces now hastened their retreat. The actual evacuation
had indeed begun. Time was taken, however, to put out of commission
some thirty steamships lying at their docks and to set afire all the
large oil tanks on the west side of the river Scheldt. The streets
in Antwerp presented scenes of almost indescribable confusion.
Even before the bombardment had been long in operation almost the
entire civil population became panic-stricken. Hither and thither,
wherever the crowd drifted, explosions obstructed their paths;
fronts of buildings bent over and fell into the streets, in many
cases crushing their occupants. Although the burgomaster had issued
a proclamation advising the people to remain calm--indoors, if
possible--nothing could stop the stampede.

The defending troops withdrawing through the city from the firing
line destroyed everything that might possibly be of use to the
enemy. The suburbs of Antwerp seemed to be ablaze in every direction;
the village of Waerloos had been burning for some days; Contich,
Duffel, and Lierre also, and Have, Linth, and Vieux Dieu had been
destroyed by shell fire. Mortsel was practically obliterated by
the Belgians clearing the range for the guns of the inner forts.
In the preparation for defense the Belgians destroyed upward of
ten thousand buildings within a radius of twenty miles.

The exodus of the civil population began in earnest on October
8, 1914. Some of the streets in the heart of the city were choked
with people, while other streets in the same vicinity were dead
and deserted. The withdrawal of the troops was well screened from
the German guns, but their retreat to the west had been cut off
to a great extent, and Holland was now the only refuge for many.
The Germans did not use their heaviest guns and high-explosive
shells in bombarding the city.

During this terrible time, in utter darkness and confusion, crowds
amounting to many thousands--men, and women with babies, and children
of all ages--streamed through the streets that led to the quays or
to the turnpike to Holland. All sorts of vehicles, from dogcarts
to motor trucks, the former drawn by dogs, men, and horses, carried
the belongings of the fugitives that could not be carried away in
person.

The bombardment continued with varying severity throughout October
8, 1914. As the Germans drew nearer to the city all the inner forts
on the south and east sides of the circle took part in replying
to the cannonade. Some of these forts--notably two, three, four,
and five--were badly battered. By afternoon the city seemed
deserted--nothing but débris of fallen buildings and wreckage met
the eyes, and a small remnant of the population was still struggling
for escape.

Along all the wayside immense crowds of men, women, and children
gathered. The railway stations were choked with struggling humanity.
Their condition was pitiable. These scenes continued all day and
throughout the entire night.

On the morning of October 9, 1914, the struggle to get away continued.
Long lines formed on the quay where it had been reported that two
boats would leave for Ostend by eleven o'clock, and all those that
could pay struggled to get their passage booked. There were between
35,000 and 40,000 people on the quays, every one buoyed up by the
hope that safety was in sight at last. But the boats failed to
sail and a murmur of disappointment rose from this vast multitude
of unfortunates.

However, there were other means of escape available, such as tugboats,
plying between Flushing, Rotterdam, and other adjacent points in
Holland. These tugs had no great accommodations for passengers
and comparatively few people escaped by this means. No trains were
scheduled to run and in despair the crowds started to cross the
bridge and make for the road to the Dutch frontier. Altogether
from 150,000 to 200,000 of the population of the city escaped by
one means or another.

During a continuous bombardment of twelve hours the cathedral stood
unharmed. The southern part of Antwerp was a desolate waste of ruins.
In some streets all the homes were ablaze, the flames leaping hither
and thither with the wind. The great oil tanks burning fiercely on
the opposite bank of the River Scheldt were fired upon by some
well-directed shots to check the blaze, a huge black volume of
thick smoke now rising from the flames. To add to the difficulties
and confusion the water supply had been cut off during the early
stages of the bombardment through the destruction of the city's
waterworks which were located in one of the suburbs to the south,
and the consequences threatened to become alarming. Everywhere
fires were burning.

This was the tragic scene when the German army entered the conquered
city of Antwerp on October 10, 1914. It is probable that a large
part of the city would have been burned, if the Germans had not
entered in time to check the conflagration. Without loss of time,
forces were put to work fighting the fires and clearing the streets,
propping up unsafe buildings and making order out of chaos, with
the usual Teuton efficiency. As soon as the bombardment had ceased
proclamations were pasted on walls and houses throughout the city
urging everyone to surrender any arms in their possession and begging
for a calm demeanor when the German troops pass through the streets.

About noon on October 10, 1914, a patrol of cyclist-mounted police
escorted the burgomaster to the gate of the city to receive the
German forces. When they entered order was restored without delay.
Soldiers were immediately detached from their special command and
formed into gangs under competent foremen and all put to work at
once each according to his trade, fitness or adaptability. The
forts that had been dismantled were hastily patched up and new guns
mounted for emergency use.

On October 11, 1914, Field Marshal van der Goltz, the Governor
General of Belgium, came from Brussels and made a tour of inspection
of the double girdle of forts. Upon examination it was found that the
actual damage done to the city by the bombardment was comparatively
slight.

During the last days of Antwerp's reign of terror fully 300,000
fugitives sought shelter in Bergan-op-Zoom about twenty-five miles
northward across the Dutch frontier. Most of these were in a condition
almost indescribable, ragged, travel-worn, shoeless, and bespattered
and hungry. Few had money; valuables or other resources. All they
owned they carried on their backs or in bundles. The little Dutch
town of Bergen-op-Zoom with but 15,000 inhabitants was swamped; but
the Hollanders did their best to meet this terrible pressure and
its citizens went without bread themselves to feed the refugees.
Slowly some sort of order was organized out of the chaos and when
the Dutch Government was able to establish refugee camps under
military supervision the worst was over. A majority of this vast
army was by degrees distributed in the surrounding territory where
tent accommodations had been completed. The good Hollanders provided
for the children with especial care and sympathy. They supplied milk
for the babies and children generally. Devoted priests comforted many;
but military organization prevailed over all. Among the thousands
of these poor refugees that crossed the frontier at Maastricht and
besieged the doors of the Belgian consul there was no railing or
declaiming against the horror of their situation. The pathos of
lonely, staring, apathetic endurance was tragic beyond expression.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXVII

YSER BATTLES--ATTACK ON YPRES

A large part of the Belgian forces with some of the English marines
were forced across the Dutch border, where they were promptly disarmed
and interned, while the remnants of these forces retreated toward
the west by way of St. Nicolas and reached Ostend on October 11
and 12, 1914, with greatly reduced numbers. Many were cut off and
captured by the German forces, which entered Ghent on October 12,
and pressed on to Ypres in one direction and to Lille in another.
Next day, the thirteenth, they approached Ostend, forcing these
Belgians who had managed to get through, to evacuate.

Bruges was occupied by the German forces on October 14, 1914, and
other detachments appeared in Thielt, Daume, and Esschen on the
same day, thus getting under their control the entire Kingdom of
Belgium, with the exception of the northwestern corner, north of
Ypres, to the coast of the channel. For Ostend, too, had fallen into
their hands by October 15, after the English and Belgian troops had
been taken away by an English fleet; the Belgians were transported
to France where they were re-formed while the English marines were
sent back to England.

In the meantime the Germans were drawing on reenforcements from
the Vosges and the Champagne districts and every day their numbers
increased. West Flanders was swarming with German cavalry, and
about this time they were as far west as Hazebrouck and Cassel,
and only twenty-five miles distant from Dunkirk.

By October 20, 1914, the allied line was in position from Albert
to the sea, a little short of 100 miles, eighty as the crow flies.
From south to north the allied front was commanded by General Maud'huy
from Albert to Vermelles; General Smith-Dorrien from Vermelles
to Laventie, opposite Lille; General Poultney, from Laventie to
Messines; General Haig from Messines to Bixschoote; General de
Mitry had French and Belgian mixed troops defending the line from
Bixschoote to Nieuport and the sea, supported by an English and
French fleet.

For days this fleet under the British Admiral Hood had shelled the
coast defenses under General von Beseler's command. As the naval
guns had a far better range than General von Beseler's artillery,
it was an easy matter to hold the coast at Nieuport Bains, and even
six miles inland without subjecting any of the ships to the fire
of the German guns.

On the German side General von Bülow held the front against General
Maud'huy, the Bavarian Crown Prince against General Smith-Dorrien,
while the Duke of Württemberg commanded the forces on the balance
of the line to the sea. It is estimated that upward of thirty army
corps covered the German front.

Throughout the balance of October, 1914, and well into November,
1914, a great many different actions and some of the heaviest fighting
of this period took place all along this line. On the 21st the new
German formations pressed forward in great force all along the
line. On the south of the Lys the Germans assaulted Violaines.
On the north of the Lys in the English center a fiercely contested
action took place near La Gheir, which village the Germans captured
in the morning. The German Twenty-sixth Reserve Corps pressed on
to Passchendale, where they met with stout resistance from the
English-Belgian forces.

On October 22, 1914, the Germans attacked from the La Bassée region
and gained several small villages. Both Allies and Germans suffered
immense lasses. Much of the slaughter was due to the point-blank
magazine fire and the intermittent shrapnel explosions from bath
sides.

The mast savage fighting was kept up all along the line, but no
advantage accrued ta either side until Friday, October 28, 1914,
when the Germans succeeded in crossing the Yser at St. George and
forcing their way two miles to Ramscapelle; retaken on the 30th by
General Grossetti. This was accomplished by General von Beseler's
troops, opposing the mixed troops of the Belgian and French. On
that night fourteen separate attacks were made by the Germans on
Dixmude and they were repulsed each time.

On October 24, 1914, about 5,000 German troops crossed the canal
at Schoorbakke and next day there were more to come, so for the
moment it looked as though the allied line on the Yser had been
broken. The struggle at this point continued until October 28,
during which time the Allies contested every inch of ground. The
kaiser was with the Duke of Württemberg on this day, expecting
every moment that his great design to break through the lines and
drive his forces to Dunkirk and Calais would be accomplished.

At the crisis the Belgians broke dawn the dykes and flooded the
country for miles around. Heavy rains during the last weeks had
swelled the Yser. The Belgians had dammed the lower reaches of
the canal; the Yser lipped over its brim and spread lagoons over
the flat meadows. Soon the German forces on the west bank were
floundering in a foot of water, while their guns were waterlogged
and deep in mud. The Germans did not abandon their efforts. The
kaiser called for volunteers to carry Ramscapelle--two Württemberg
brigades responded--and gained the place, but at terrible loss.

On the 30th of October, 1914, again the Württembergers advanced to
the attack. They waded through sloppy fields from the bridgeheads
at St. George and Schoorbakke, and by means of table taps, boards,
planks and other devices crossed the deeper dykes. So furious was
the attack pressed home that they won the railway line and held
their ground. They were to do some severe fighting, however, for
next day French-Belgian and African mixed troops fought fiercely
to drive the Germans back but failed.

Seeing their success in partially flooding the battle field, the
Belgians made more breaches in the dams, and, opening the sluices
in the canal, threw a flood of water greater still over the area
occupied by the Germans. In seething brown waves the water rose
up to the high ground at the railway near Ramscapelle. The Germans
were caught in this tide and scores of them were drowned. Many
escaped, some struggled to land on the Allies front and were made
prisoners.

Sir John French summarized part of the fighting in Flanders, after
the capture of Antwerp, in the following official report: "The Second
Corps under General Smith-Dorrien was opposed by overpowering forces
of Germans, but nevertheless advanced until October 18, 1914, when
the German opposition compelled a reenforcement. Six days later
the Lahore Division of the Indian Army was sent to support the
Second Corps. On October 16, Sir Henry Rawlinson, who had covered
the retreat of the Belgian army from Antwerp, with two divisions of
English cavalry and two divisions of French infantry, was stationed
on the line east of Ypres under orders to operate over a wide front
and to keep possession of all the ground held by the Allies until
the First Army Corps could reach Ypres.

"General Rawlinson was opposed by superior forces and was unable
to prevent the Germans from getting large reenforcements. With
four divisions holding a much wider front than their size justified
he faced a rather awkward situation, as the enemy was massed from
the Lys.

"The shattered Belgian army and the weary French troops advanced
to check the Germans--but in vain. Sir Douglas Haig with the First
Army Corps was sent to recapture Bruges on October 19, 1914, while
the Belgian army intrenched along the Yser Canal. General Haig
failed--owing to bad roads. October 21 brought the most severe
attack made on the First Corps at Ypres, in the checking of which
the Worcestershire Regiment did good work. This day marked the
most critical period in the battle which resulted in the recapture
of the village of Gheluvelt."

South of Dixmude is one of the most historic and quaintly attractive
cities of Belgium, Ypres. It is situated on a tributary of the Yser
called the Yperlee, and a railway runs through it from Roulers
to the main Lille-St. Ower line at Hazebrouck and a very important
canal runs from the Yser in the north to the Lys at Comines.

The allied lines were held by the British First and Third Corps
and several cavalry divisions, at this point all under the chief
command of General Haig, while the Bavarian Crown Prince directed
the movements of the German forces. On October 20, 1914, the allied
line stretched--a few miles to the northeast of Ypres--from Bixschoote
to the crossroads a mile and a half northwest of Zonnebeke. The
cavalry only were kept busy during this day, while the other forces
were making elaborate preparations for the main drive. The great
attack was delivered October 21 against the point of the salient
between Zonnebeke and Besselaere. The allied line on the left was
so much exposed that the Twenty-second Brigade was enfiladed by the
Germans at the very beginning, and in the center the Germans pierced
the line held by the Royal Scots Fusiliers, with the Yorkshires on
the extreme right. The fierce assaults from both sides ended in
a draw for this day.

On October 22, 1914, the fighting was most severe all day; but
later in the day the most violent assault of all was made by the
Germans upon the First Brigade on the left. There the trenches were
held by the Camerons, north of Pilkem on the Langemarck--Bixschoote
road. Here the Germans broke the line and succeeded in capturing
part of the Camerons--the famous Red Tartans. Further south, the
Royal Scots Fusiliers were obliged to give way. The Germans pressed
hard in the vicinity of Hollebeke which point opened a clear road
to Ypres; but here the allied forces stood their ground. Still
farther south the Essex Regiment and the Lancashire Fusiliers fought
savagely, but were driven back upon Armentierre when night fell.

[Illustration: BATTLE FRONT IN FLANDERS]

Early Friday morning, October 23, 1914, the Allies made a desperate
assault upon the trenches lost by the Camerons on the previous day.
The fighting culminated in a savage bayonet attack which resulted
in the recapture of these trenches by the British composed of the
King's Royal Rifles, the Royal West Surrey Regiment and the
Northamptons.

On October 24, 1914, the Germans advanced upon the allied extreme
left; but were successfully repulsed between Zonnebeke and Poelcapelle.
Later in the day the Germans renewed their attack and compelled
the allied troops to retire some distance.

The advance on the allied left was continued on Sunday, October
25, 1914. Repeatedly the Germans succeeded in piercing the allied
lines; but at one time, even though they had broken through, a
momentary lack of reserves compelled them to retreat to avoid capture.
A savage enveloping attack was made during the night, north of
Zandvoorde, where again the Germans broke through the allied lines,
but were unable to maintain their advantage through failure of
reenforcements to come up in time. The Leicester Brigade were shelled
out of their trenches and were obliged to fall back to the south
of the River Lys.

During the following three days--October 26, 27, 28, 1914--artillery
fire was resorted to and desultory fighting and skirmishes along
the entire line resulted in no noteworthy advantage to either
belligerent.

Thursday, October 29, 1914, opened with clear and bracing weather
which promised to continue throughout the day. The German attack
which had been preparing for the past three days now broke like
an irresistible wave upon the salient of the Gheluvelt crossroads,
where the British First Corps was stationed. The first division
was driven back from its trenches and after that the line swayed
forward and backward for hours, but by two o'clock in the afternoon
the position remained unchanged.

With the coming of the dawn on October 30, 1914, the fighting was
resumed with even more savage determination on both sides. The
hottest engagement centered about the ridge of Zandvoorde. German
artillery fire cleared the allied trenches, burying many of the
British soldiers alive under mountains of earth and débris. This
forced the line to retreat a full mile to Klein Zillebeke to the
north. The kaiser witnessed this engagement and by his presence
cheered the German soldiers on to the most desperate fighting.

On the following day October 31, 1914, the crisis came. The fighting
began along the Menin-Ypres road early in the morning and advanced
with great violence upon the village of Gheluvelt. The First and
Third Brigades or the First Division were swept back and the First
Coldstream Guards were wiped out as a unit. The whole division
was driven back from Gheluvelt to the woods between Veldhoek and
Hooge. The allied headquarters at Hooge were shelled. General Lomas
was wounded and six or the staff officers were killed.

The Royal Fusiliers who desperately stuck to their trenches fighting
savagely were cut off and destroyed. Out of a thousand but seventy
soldiers remained. Between two and three o'clock there occurred
the most desperate fighting seen in the battle of Ypres. At 2:30
o'clock in the afternoon the Allies recaptured Gheluvelt at the
point of the bayonet and by evening the Allies had regained their
position. Ypres had not been captured by the Germans by this time,
but they had secured their position in all the suburbs of Ypres
and had that city at their mercy, provided allied reenforcements
ordered up did not obstruct their path.

The fighting still continued for part of November, 1914, but for
the month of October no definite result was to be recorded.

At Ypres, on November 2, 1914, the Germans captured 2,300 English
troops and many machine guns. Dixmude was stormed by the Germans
on the 10th of November, and they crossed the Yser Canal, capturing
the Allies position west of Langemark, also driving them out of
St. Eloi. Snow and floods interfered with the fighting along the
battle front. Ypres was bombarded on several occasions and was
repeatedly set on fire.

November 11, 1914, was another day of severe fighting. At daybreak
the Germans opened fire on the allied trenches to the north and
south of the road from Menin to Ypres. After a furious artillery
fire the Germans drove their men forward in full force. This attack
was carried out by the First and Fourth brigades of the Prussian
Guard Corps which had been especially selected to capture Ypres if
possible, since that task had proved too heavy for the infantry of
the line. As the Germans surged forward they were met by a frontal
fire from the allied lines, and as they were moving diagonally across
part of the allied front, they were also attacked on the flank by the
English artillery. Though the casualties of the Germans were enormous
before they reached the English lines, such was their resolution and
the momentum of the mass that, in spite of the splendid resistance
of the English troops, the Germans succeeded in breaking through
the allied lines in several places near the road. They penetrated
some distance into the woods behind the English trenches, where
some of the bloodiest fighting of the entire war took place.

On November 12, 1914, comparative quiet reigned and with the exception
of artillery duels and some desultory fighting no results were
obtained on either side. The British report makes this comment on
this attempt upon Ypres: "Their (the Prussian Guard Corps') dogged
perseverance in pursuance of their objective claims wholehearted
admiration.

"The failure of one great attack, heralded as it was by an impassioned
appeal to the troops made in the presence of the emperor himself,
but carried out by partially trained men, has been only the signal
for another desperate effort in which the place of honor was assigned
to the corps d'élite of the German army.

"It must be admitted that the Guard Corps has retained that reputation
for courage and contempt of death which it earned in 1870, when
Emperor William I, after the battle of Gravelotte, wrote: 'My Guard
has formed its grave in front of St. Privat,' and the swarms of
men who came up bravely to the British rifles in the woods around
Ypres repeated the tactics of forty-four years ago, when their
dense columns, toiling up the slopes of St. Privat, melted away
under the fire of the French."

Ypres was now but a name. Nothing but a mass of ruins reminded
the world of its previous quaint splendor. For Ypres had been rich
in historic buildings and monuments of past days.

With the fall of Antwerp the Germans had made every effort to push
forward strong forces toward the west and had hastened to bring up
new army corps which had been hurriedly organized, their object
being to drive the Allies out of Belgium and break through to Dunkirk
and Calais. Altogether they collected 250,000 fresh men. Eventually
the Germans had north of La Bassée about fourteen corps and eight
cavalry divisions, a force of 750,000 men, with which to attempt
to drive the Allies into the sea. In addition there was immensely
powerful armament and heavy siege artillery, which also had been
brought up from around Antwerp. But in spite of these strong forces
it became clearly evident by the middle of November that the attempt
to break through to Calais had failed for the time being. The flooding
of the Yser marks the end of the main struggle for Calais. The battle
fronts had shifted. Between them there was a mile or two of mud and
water. The Belgians had lost a quarter of their effectives. The
Germans had evacuated the west bank of the Yser and were obliged
to return to the point from which they had started.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXVIII

ATTACKS ON LA BASSEE AND ARRAS

While the engagement on the Yser was in progress in October, 1914,
fierce fighting was kept up in the second section of the battle
front, pivoting on Givenchy to the south and running east to the
north of the La Bassée-Lille road. In this section the forces of
the Crown Prince of Bavaria opposed the troops under the command
of General Smith-Dorrien.

From October 1 to 3, 1914, considerable fighting went on in the
flats east of Arras between Lens and the River Scarpe. This resulted
in the retirement of the Allies on the 4th. The Germans began to
bombard Arras, keeping it up until the 6th, when their attempt to
take the city next day was successfully repulsed. On October 8,
the Germans, then holding Douai and Lens, were shelling Lille, then
held by the British territorials. For the next two weeks artillery
duels alternated with trench fighting and skirmishing.

The main attack at La Bassée covered fully ten days, lasting from
October 22, 1914, to November 2, 1914. The first severe fighting
came as has already been mentioned, on October 22, 1914. The British
were driven out of the village of Violaines, which is situated on
the road between Lorgies and Givenchy, and General Smith-Dorrien
was compelled to retreat to the village of Faugissant, to the south
of Lavantie.

On October 24, 1914, the Germans attacked heavily along the entire
line, and the First Gordon Highlanders were driven out of their
trenches. For three days the most savage fighting continued, resulting
in the capture of Neuve Chapelle by the Germans on October 27, which
was defended by East Indian troops. The fighting was desperate on
both sides and became much confused, as units here and there had
succeeded in breaking through their respective opponents' lines.
All of this day and the next, October 28, this struggle continued,
but the Germans maintained the ground they had won, forcing the
allied forces to retire in order to re-form their lines.

On October 29, 1914, the Germans attacked at Festubert, and gained
several of the allied trenches after a severe struggle lasting
throughout the day. Again the Germans maintained their new position,
compelling the Indian troops to retire to the defense of the La
Bassée gate, where they were joined by several British brigades
and the Second Corps Artillery.

October 30, 1914, was consumed in continuous artillery duels, which
held the lines while the troops enjoyed much needed rest.

On October 31, 1914, the Indian forces were again savagely attacked
by the Germans whose machine guns enfiladed them in their trenches.
This attack has become noted for the great loss of British officers
commanding the Hindus.

Concurrent with this fighting the Germans also made the most savage
onslaughts further south, with the object of capturing Arras. The
main attack against this important French city began on October
20, 1914, and lasted six days until the evening of October 26.
The Germans in having possession of Lens had a great advantage,
as they were thereby enabled to threaten the allied left center,
which was stationed to the west of Lens; for, just south from the
town, ran a railway which connected with the main line three miles
east of Arras, called the Arras-Douai-Lille line. This gave the
Germans a perfect system of lateral communications.

The German general, Von Bülow, commanding the Prussian Guard Corps
led the attack on October 24, 1914, when he pushed his forces,
fighting for every inch of the ground, to within gun range of the
city of Arras. All day the most desperate fighting continued and
had not General Maud'huy received the reenforcements which hurriedly
came up just when needed the northern gates of Arras would have
been gained by the Germans, who were held back in a position near
enough, however, to subject Arras to another bombardment and the
shell fire from this position rained upon Arras to the end of the
month and some six days into November.

From the date of the entry of the French into Alsace on August 7,
1914, the battle front in France extended from the Swiss frontier,
north through western Alsace, thence in a northwesterly direction to
a point where the line met the front of the German forces advancing
on Paris.

On October 1, 1914, this battle front extended in an unbroken line
from Switzerland to the city of Douai in northeastern France. The
Crown Prince of Bavaria commanded in the first section from Alsace
to midway between Nancy and Verdun; the Crown Prince of Prussia
directed the Verdun section reaching from west of Thiaucourt to
Montfaucon; the Duke of Württemberg to Massiges; General von Hausen
thence to Bery-au-Bac; General von Bülow to a point directly north
of Soissons; General von Kluck in a northwesterly direction to
a point west of Noyon and onward to the north and northeast to
Douai, which is about fifteen miles northeast of Arras, from which
point north the campaign has been described. The French army opposing
this German front was under the supreme command of General Joffre.
The commanding officers in the various sectors of this front were
being continually changed, making it difficult to name the commanders
in each sector, except when some more or less noteworthy engagement
had taken place along the line. The battle front here described
did not materially change throughout the months of October, 1914,
to February 1, 1915. Continual engagements took place along this
entire front--a gain of a few yards here balanced by a loss of
a like distance elsewhere.

Both belligerents had securely intrenched themselves. The pickax
and spade were far more in use than the rifle, so that now cold
weather coming on, the soldiers on both sides of the front were
able to make the trenches quite comfortable. In many instances
they laid down plank floors and lined the walls with boards, put up
stoves, constructed sleeping bunks and tables, stools and benches,
and even decorated the rooms thus evolved with anything suitable for
the purpose. Pictures and photographs from home were the favorite
decorations. All this was impossible for their brethren in the north
and in Flanders, where the activities of the conflict subjected
the soldiers to continual changes and removals.

The main objective of the Germans was the French fortresses Belfort,
Epinal, Toul, and Verdun, for these obstructed the march to Paris.
The continual onslaughts and counterassaults made upon this line
left it practically unchanged during the month of October, 1914,
in which time no engagements worthy of the name "battle" occurred.
The fighting in the north had been so desperate that it completely
obscured the activities on the entire line to the south.

The net gains during the months of October and November, 1914,
for either belligerent were practically nil. From Belfort in the
south to Arras in the north the advance or retreat in any given
section was but a matter of yards; a ridge, a farm, a hill, or
other choice gun position, the farther bank of a rivulet or stream
or canal occupied or captured--here by the French, there by the
Germans--generally proved to be but temporary possessions and wasted
efforts.

It was incidents such as these that made up the record of events
along this line. During all this time the military aeroplanes were
busy dropping explosives upon the enemy's lines, and extending
their operations far to the rear, circling above the larger towns
and cities, doing considerable damage in many places. But this was
not the only purpose of these daring sky pilots; for the principal
object in flying over the adversary's country was to make observations
and report movements of troops. In this respect the aeroplane had
done immense service throughout the campaign.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXIX

GENERAL MOVEMENTS ON THE FRENCH AND FLANDERS FRONTS

We have seen that at the end of November, 1914, Ypres was still
in the Allies' hands, though the Germans were exerting a fierce
pressure in that region, and were gradually, even if very slowly,
getting closer and closer to it.

At the beginning of December, 1914, the Germans drew their forces
close up to Ypres, so closely in fact that they could bring into
play their small-caliber howitzers, and before many hours Ypres
was in flames in many places. The allied forces fought fiercely
to compel the Germans to withdraw. Hand-to-hand fighting, bayonet
charges, and general confusion was the order of the day. Thousands
of men would creep out of their holes in the ground and crawl,
availing themselves of whatever covering presented itself, to some
vantage point and there stand up as one man and charge directly
into the adversary's ranks.

All this was part of the general scheme worked out miles from the
spot where the conflict was going on. There in some quaint little
town occupying some out-of-the-way house was the General Staff.
The rooms were filled with officers; the walls were hung with large
and small field and detail maps, upon which were plainly marked the
name of every commanding officer and the forces under his command.
Every detail of the armies' strength--names of the commanders, and
any other detail was plainly in view.

It was here decided to turn the entire command of the allied forces
along the Yser over to the British to avoid confusion. It was well
that this was done just at this time, for on December 3, 1914, the
Germans made a fierce onslaught along the entire front of thirteen
miles between Ypres and Dixmude, bringing into use a great number of
stanch rafts propelled by expert watermen, thus carrying thousands
of the German forces over and along the Ypres River.

Again the belligerents came to a hand-to-hand conflict, and so
well directed was the allied counterattack that no advantage to the
Germans was obtained. For three days this severe fighting continued.
The struggle was most sharp between Dixmude and the coast at Westende,
where the Germans hoped to break through the allied lines, and thus
crumple up their entire front, making a free passage.

On December 7, 1914, the French captured Vermelles, a minor village
a few miles southwest of La Bassée. This little village had been
the center of a continuous struggle for mastership for nearly two
months. At last the French occupied this rather commanding point,
important to the Allies, as it afforded an excellent view over
a wide stretch of country occupied by the Germans.

The German Staff headquarters were removed from Roulers, which is
about twelve miles distant from Ypres, on December 8, 1914, from
the vicinity of Ypres, while their own forces had been concentrated
upon Dixmude, twelve miles to the north. This town had suffered
severely before, but the allied forces using what shelter they
could improvise, were doing considerable damage from this point.
Therefore the Germans began to bombard the place.

On December 9, 1914, the Germans succeeded in gaining slightly
toward Ypres. Farther north they were by this time also in a position
to take Furnes under fire. This town lies on the frontier between
Belgium and France, in the path of some of the most savage onslaughts
on the part of the Germans to break through the allied lines in
order to reach the channel towns of Dunkirk and Calais.

On December 10, 1914, the allied forces made an ineffectual attack
on Roulers, which the German General Staff had just left. South
of Ypres the allied forces made a severe attack upon the town of
Armentières, about eight miles from Ypres, but gained no permanent
advantage.

During this time the Germans had also so far succeeded in consolidating
their positions in the neighborhood of Ostend, that they could
put their heavy guns in position near the shores of that famous
watering place. This was a very necessary precaution to meet the
attacks of English gunboats, and even larger cruisers that were
patrolling that coast.

On December 12, 1914, the severest fighting was along the Yser Canal,
which was crossed and recrossed several times.

On December 13, 1914, the Allies succeeded in repulsing the Germans
on the River Lys, where for three days the Germans had inaugurated
a hot offensive. These engagements were exact counterparts of the
fighting at other points in Flanders, where both opponents were
apparently well matched, and where advantages were won and lost
in rapid succession.

There was severe fighting also on December 14, 1914, extending
along the entire front in Flanders from Nieuport to below Ypres. In
the north the Germans made severe onslaughts, all more or less held
up or repulsed by the Belgians, French, and English. The fighting was
hottest near Nieuport, where the Allies made some small temporary
gains. Besides the three armies participating in the conflict,
the British fleet also took part in bombarding the German coast
positions. Three British barges equipped with naval machine guns
entered the River Yser in order to cooperate in the fighting. These
boats took the two villages Lombaertzyde and St. Georges.

In this action some of the heaviest fighting was done by the French
marines. Some slight advantages were also gained by the Allies in
the neighborhood of St. Eloi and Klein Zillebeke.

Following these minor successes, attack was made upon the German
lines on the west side of Wytschaete, a village which the Germans
had succeeded in holding during the great battle of Ypres. To the
west of this village is a wood called the Petit Bois, and to the
southwest is the Maedelsteed spur, an eminence on hilly ground.
From both of these places the Germans covered the village, prepared
to hold it against all comers.

Major Duncan, commanding the Scots, and Major Baird leading the
Royal Highlanders, attacked the Petit Bois, and in the flare of
terrible machine gun and rifle fire, carried a trench west of the
woods, while the Gordon Highlanders advanced upon the spur, taking
the first trench. They were, however, obliged to fall back to the
position from which they had started, with no advantage gained. This
engagement at Wytschaete gave a good illustration of the difficulty
of fighting in heavy, winter ground, devoid of cover, and so
water-logged that any speed in advance was next to impossible.
Just prior to the battle the ground had thawed, and the soldiers
sank deep into the mud at every step they took.

On December 15, 1914, the Germans attacked a little to the south
of Ypres, but no definite result was obtained. On the following
day the Allies replied by an onslaught at Dixmude with a similar
result. The Germans attempted to turn and strike at Westende the
next day.

Roulers was temporarily occupied by the Allies on December 18,
1914, and in another location, about twenty-five miles farther
southwest, in the neighborhood of Givenchy, the Allies' Indian
troops were put to the test. The attack was launched on the morning
of the 19th.

The Lahore and the Meerut divisions both took part. The Meerut
division succeeded in capturing a trench; but a little later on a
counterattack, launched by the Germans, forced the Indians back.
The Lahore division, including the First Highland Light Infantry
and the Fourth Gurkhas, took two lines of the enemy's trenches
with hardly any casualties. These captured trenches were at once
occupied, and when they were full to capacity, the Germans exploded
the previously prepared mines, and blew up the entire Hindu force.

At daylight on the morning of December 20, 1914, the Germans commenced
a heavy artillery fire along the entire front. This was followed
by an infantry charge along the entire line between Givenchy and
La Quinque Rue to the north. The defense of Givenchy was in the
hands of the India Sirhind Brigade, under General Brunker. At ten
o'clock the Sirhinds became confused and fled, enabling the Germans
to capture Givenchy. The Fifty-seventh Rifles and the Ninth Bhopals
were stationed north of La Bassée Canal and east of Givenchy, and
the Connaught Rangers were waiting at the south of the canal. The
Forty-seventh Sikhs were sent to support the Sirhind Brigade, with
the First Manchesters, the Fourth Suffolks, and two battalions
of French Provincials, the entire force being under command of
General Carnegy. All these mixed forces now essayed a combined
counterattack in order to recover the ground lost by the Sirhind
Brigade, but this failed.

The Allies called up reserves and re-formed the ranks broken by
that day's reverses. With the Seventh Dragoon Guards under the
command of Lieutenant Colonel Lemprière, they began another attack.
This, too, failed. When the Sirhind Brigade fell back, the Seaforth
Highlanders were left entirely exposed. The Fifty-eighth Rifles
went to the support of their left. Throughout the entire afternoon
the Seaforths had made strenuous efforts to capture the German
trenches to the right and left of their position. Upon the arrival
of the Fifty-eighth the fighting redoubled in ferocity, but no
advance was made. Finally word was given to retreat. The Allies
lost heavily in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

The First Brigade was detached, and by midnight it had reached
Bethune, about five miles west of Givenchy. Sir Douglas Haig was
ordered to move also, the entire First Division in support of the
exhausted Indian troops.

Action was begun on December 20, 1914, early in the afternoon by
a simultaneous attack, and was continued until nightfall without
important results. The next morning General Haig in person took
the command, but little ground was gained.

While this contest was in progress around Givenchy, the Germans
took possession of the city of Arras, ten miles to the south.

Between December 23 and 30, 1914, the Belgian army, strongly reenforced
by French troops, began a series of violent attacks upon the German
lines; but the Germans replied by a ceaseless bombardment of Nieuport,
which is about a mile inland. No results of importance were obtained
on either side.

The last week of December, 1914, bore a relieving holiday aspect,
for it seemed as though by general consent the carnival of mood was
to be considered not consonant with the solemnity of the season.
But for all that the French succeeded in blowing up some German
trenches with a new howitzer they were anxious to tryout, and the
Belgian-French forces retook St. Georges in northern Flanders.

St. Georges had been held by the Germans for some time; the village
stands on the right hand of the Yser, and it was the only position
they retained on that side of the river. It seems from the very
ease with which the village was taken that the Germans felt their
position there untenable, and withdrew to their own side of the
river in order to enjoy a quiet Christmas with their comrades,
whose singing of Christmas songs was forever being wafted over
that river of blood. Although the general action continued on both
sides, no serious battles are to be recorded in Flanders for the
balance of the year 1914.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXX

OPERATIONS AROUND LA BASSEE AND GIVENCHY

On the whole, the results obtained during the first days of 1915
on the Belgian battle front favored the Germans. Of this front the
Belgians held but three miles more or less, and the British were
defending a line of about twenty miles, while the French covered
the balance of about twelve miles, all of which included about the
entire front in Flanders from the dunes at Nieuport on the Channel
to Armentières in the south, a line--by no means straight--about
thirty-five miles in length.

Activities along the extended front in the Champagne district having
proved successful for the German forces to a considerable extent,
the General Staff turned its attention now to the La Bassée region.

There was good tactical reason for this move, because the British
were seriously threatening the position, straddling La Bassée Canal
where it flows between Cuinchy and Givenchy, and there was danger
that they might capture La Bassée, where the Germans held a salient
of considerable strategical importance, as it covered their line
of communication to the south.

Previous successful operations by the British at Richebourg and
Festubert north of Givenchy, and at Vermelles, south of Cuinchy,
evidently prompted the Germans to attempt a counterattack. Besides
it was desirable for the Germans to test the strength of the Allies
at this point, and to do this with some measure of success the
Germans massed a considerable force for this purpose.

Beginning about January 14, 1915, the British met with varying
and minor successes and defeats in this region, but no noteworthy
action had taken place for upward of ten days, until January 25,
under the eye of the German Kaiser, the principal attack, which
had been carefully planned, took place.

On the morning of January 25, 1915, a demonstration along the front
from Festubert to Vermelles and as far north as Ypres and Pervyse
was inaugurated.

The Germans began to shell Bethune, which was within the allied
lines about eight or nine miles west of La Bassée. An hour later,
in the neighborhood of nine o'clock, following up heavy artillery
fire, the Fifty-sixth Prussian Infantry and the Seventh Pioneers
advanced south of the canal, which runs eastward from Bethune,
where the British line formed a salient from the canal forward
to the railway near Cuinchy, and thence back to the Bethune and
La Bassée road where the British joined the French forces.

This salient was occupied by the Scots and the Coldstream Guards.
The Germans were obliged to advance by the road, as the fields
were too soft for the passage of the troops; even the roads were
in a terrible condition, deep ruts and thick, sticky mud greatly
retarding the onward march of the German forces. But the Allies
fared little better in this respect. In fact the entire engagement
was fought out in a veritable sea of mud and slush.

Well-directed artillery fire by the Germans blew up the British
trenches in this salient, and the Germans at once penetrated the
unsupported British line. The Germans also had the advantage of
an armored train, which they ran along the tracks from La Bassée
almost into Bethune, sufficiently close to throw considerable shell
fire into this town.

The Germans advanced in close formation, throwing hand grenades.
They came on so rapidly and with such momentum that the Guards,
trying in vain to stem the tide with the bayonet, were overwhelmed,
and the British, in spite of desperate resistance, were forced
back step by step.

At some points the distance between the trenches was so small that
it was utterly impossible to stop the onrush from one trench to
the other. The Germans swept and broke through the British lines,
treading their fallen opponents under foot as they advanced. At
this point the British turned and fled, as there was no hope of
successful resistance.

As the great momentum forced the German advance through the allied
lines into the open field beyond and was joined by a heavy column,
which had debouched from the vicinity of Auchy, British guns opened
a murderous fire and inflicted terrible slaughter upon these ranks.

The Coldstream and the Scots Guards retreated to their second line
of defense, where they joined others of their command held in reserve
there. Once again they turned to meet the oncoming Germans, and
again were forced to give way, leaving the Germans in possession
of all the ground previously gained. The remnants of the Guards
retreated until they were met by the London-Scottish regiment sent
to reenforce them. Here they halted while a counterattack was being
organized by the First Royal Highlanders, part of the Camerons,
and the Second King's Rifle Corps which also came up.

At one o'clock on January 25, 1915, and with the cooperation of
the French on their right, this rapidly improvised force moved
forward, making unobstructed progress on their wings by the canal
and the road. For some reason their center was delayed and held
back. When they did finally arrive and pressed forward with a rush
to meet the German forces, who were ready to receive them, the
impact was fearful, and the casualties on both sides enormous;
but no gains were made by the Allies, and the Germans held the
ground they had won. At the height of the battle the Second Royal
Sussex rushed into the fray in support of their hard-pressed comrades,
but all to no purpose, for these as the others were forced back
to the rear of their starting point with but a fraction of their
forces remaining to report the events of the day.

While this terrible slaughter was in progress, the French left
on the other side of La Bassée road, which separated the Allies
at this point, had been attacked by the right of the German line,
and driven back to a considerable distance, but not as far back as
the British, so that the French left was in advance of the British
right and badly exposed to flank attack from the northward.

This obliged the entire allied forces to retreat some distance
farther to the rear, and as night came on and the severity or the
action had ceased, the Allies had an opportunity to realign their
positions and somewhat strengthen the same by the First Guard Brigade
which now came up, showing the terrible suffering to which they
had been subjected. Finally, however, it was found advisable to
withdraw the Guard altogether and replace them by the First Infantry
Brigade.

Now the German tactical idea became clear. It was to force the
British to concentrate on the exposed line between Festubert and
Givenchy, north of the canal, and then to turn the British right
by the German forces in their new position just south of the canal,
thus calling for simultaneous action on both sides of the canal.

The Germans delivered an equally severe attack upon the allied
position in the village of Givenchy, about a mile north of the
canal, which bounded the scene of the attack just described. As
in the other attack, the Germans opened action by severe artillery
fire, using high-explosive shells, and after due preparation, at
about 8.15 in the morning, the infantry advanced, as is customary
with the Germans, in close formation. The British met this advance
by somewhat weak artillery fire, which, it was afterward explained
was due to continued interruption of the telephonic communications
between the observers and the batteries in the fight. However, as
it was, this fire, added to the machine gun and rifle fire from
the trenches, served to turn the German advance from their original
direction, with the result that they crowded together in the northeast
corner of Givenchy after passing over the first-line trenches of
the Allies' front. Their momentum carried the Germans far into the
center of the village, with remarkably few casualties considering
the murderous fire to which they had been subjected throughout
their impetuous advances.

In the village of Givenchy, however, the Second Welsh Regiment and
the First South Wales Borderers, which had been stationed there
and held in reserve, gave the Germans a warm reception, and when
the First Royal Highlanders came up they delivered a fierce
counterattack. In this they were supported by the fire of the French
artillery, which assistance, however, proved costly to the Allies,
as the French fire and bursting shells killed friend and foe alike.
Street fighting became savage, amid the explosions of shells sent
to enliven the occasion by the French. This concluded the action
for the day and when the smoke cleared away both sides found their
position comparatively little changed and nothing but the thinned
ranks of the combatants reminded the observer that the most severe
kind of fighting had taken place for the best part of a day.

The following day, January 26, 1915, the action was resumed, and
the attack opened along the Bethune and La Bassée road. This soon
died out, as though by general consent, each side reoccupying their
position of the previous evening.

But on Friday, January 29, 1915, early in the morning, the Germans
again opened with severe artillery fire which directed its attention
particularly to the British line, where the First Army Corps lay
between La Bassée Canal and the Bethune road near Cutchy. After an
hour's shelling the Germans sent one battalion of the Fourteenth
Corps toward the redoubt, and two battalions of the same corps
were sent to the north and south of this redoubt. Now upon this
point and to the north of it stood the Sussex Regiment and to the
south of it the Northamptonshire Regiment. The attack was severe,
but the defense was equal to it and the net results were summed up
in the casualty lists on both sides. An attack upon the French,
south of Bethune, on the same day met with like results. The great
German objective was to open another road to Dunkirk and Calais,
and had they been successful in the engagements of the past few
days it is probable that they would have succeeded.

To the north in the coast district the Belgians had succeeded in
flooding a vast area, which served for the time to separate the
combatants for a considerable distance, obliging the Germans to
resort to rafts, boats and other floating apparatus to carry on a
somewhat haphazard offensive and resulting in nothing more than a
change from gunfire slaughter to drowning. The immense inconvenience
attendant to this mode of warfare decided the Germans to drain
this area and they succeeded in doing this by the end of January,
1915.

On the other hand the Belgians captured two German trenches in
the north on January 17, 1915, and the British sent a force to
attack Lille on January 18. The Belgian trenches were reoccupied
by the Germans and the Lille attack was successfully repulsed.

Then, for a week, there was nothing of importance until January
23, 1915, when the Germans made a strong attack upon Ypres which
was repulsed. On January 24 the Germans recaptured St. Georges and
bombarded a few of the towns and villages harboring allied troops.

The Belgians continued in their endeavor to flood the German position
along the Yser, on January 25, 1915, and succeeded in obliging
their opponents to vacate for a time at least, and on the last
day of January allied forces consisting of Zouaves, Gurkhas and
other Indian companies made an attack upon the German trenches
upon the dunes at Lombaertzyde, gaining a temporary advantage at
an expense of considerable loss in casualties.

In reviewing the activities during the month of January, 1915, the
disagreeable state of the weather must be taken into consideration;
this resulted in terrible suffering, to which the battling forces
were subjected during the actual fighting and even more so while
at rest, either on the open field or in the questionable comfort
of an inhospitable and leaky trench.

While every effort was made by the respective General Staffs to
supply their fighting troops with such comforts as were absolutely
necessary to keep body and soul together and in trim for the next
day's work, little could be accomplished and it is a marvel how
these poor soldiers did withstand the rigorous weather which blighted
the prospect of victory, so dear to all who wear a uniform.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXXI

END OF SIX MONTHS' FIGHTING IN THE WEST

There were few military movements on the French battle front during
December, 1914, along the Aisne, the Oise and in the northern Champagne.
The fighting was mostly artillery duels and skirmishes by separate
units. In the Argonne, however, the Crown Prince of Germany was
active and there, as well as along the Moselle and on the heights
of the Vosges, many engagements were fought out resulting in varying
advantages to either opponent. Both sides had been strongly intrenched
and the ground was covered by snow to great depths, making progress
impossible except upon skis and snowshoes.

On December 3, 1914, the French captured Burnhaupt, a hill east of
Mülhausen in Upper Alsace, only to give up their advantage after
a German counterattack. On December 16 the Germans attacked in the
Woevre region and in Alsace; but were repulsed the following day.
On December 31, 1914, the French attacked Steinbach in Alsace, but
were driven out again.

The New Year of 1915 opened gently along the battle front in France
below Arras. The first large movement in 1915 began on January 8,
at Soissons. This city lies on both banks of the river Aisne and
was in the possession of the French. The French forces attacked
during a drenching rain, pushing up the rising ground to the north
with their heavy guns, regardless of the soft ground which rapidly
turned to deep mud and slush. They succeeded in carrying the first
line of German trenches on a front a mile wide, thus gaining the
top of the hill, which gave them an excellent position for their
artillery. The next day the Germans counterattacked, but failed
to dislodge the French.

Nothing occurred on Sunday, January 10, 1915, but on Monday, about
noon, January 11, the Germans came on with great force. The delay
on the part of the Germans was due to their awaiting reenforcements
then on the road to Soissons. For four days there had been a steady
downpour of rain which had not even stopped at this time. The River
Aisne was much swollen and some of the bridges had been carried
away, cutting off all supplies for the French, who were slowly
giving way but fighting desperately.

On January 12, 1915, and on the 13th the French were driven down
the slopes in a great rush. This predicament was a terrible one--the
onrushing Germans 500 feet in front of them and the swollen river
making successful retreat impossible, with the ground between almost
impassable with mud and slush. French reserves had improvised a
pontoon bridge across the Aisne at Missy, in the rear of their
now precarious position. This bridge was just strong enough to
carry the men and ammunition; but not the heavy guns. The retreat
turned into a rout--a general stampede for the bridge and river.

The slaughter was terrible, the river swollen as it was seemed
choked with floating soldiers. The few who safely got across the
bridge and those who were successful in reaching the farther bank
of the Aisne alive, reached Soissons eventually. The German gain in
prisoners and booty was enormous and their gain in ground advanced
their line a full mile, on a front extending five miles to Missy
and a little beyond. The Germans strongly intrenched their new
position without loss of time.

Farther along this front, in the neighborhood of Perthes, a less
important engagement took place. The Germans, under General von
Einem, opposed General Langle de Cary and his French forces. The
results of this engagement were negligible.

On January 18, 1915, a savage attack by the Germans was successfully
repulsed at Tracy-le-Val and on the 19th the French made an assault
upon the German position at St. Mihiél, in the Verdun section without
gaining any ground. Farther north on this section the French pressed
on and gained a little ground near the German fortress Metz; but
the very vicinity of this fortress counterbalanced this gain.

[Illustration: NÔTRE DAME OF RHEIMS RUINED BY GERMAN SHELLS.

SOLDIERS AND PRISONERS OF GERMANY. BELGIUM AND FRANCE. FIRST AID
TO THE WOUNDED

German lookouts, wearing the distinctive spiked German helmet, are
stationed in a treetop overlooking the battle front. The branches
aid in screening them]

[Illustration: A body of German prisoners on their way to Paris
under escort of French cuirassiers. The country people line the
roadway to see them pass]

[Illustration: Belgian soldiers--the famous Louvain Lancers, accompanied
by an aviation corps--coming up to take positions near the coast
in northern France]

[Illustration: Two cuirassiers--French cavalrymen who wear a cuirass
or breastplate--have dismounted to give aid to a wounded comrade]

[Illustration: An injured British aviator cared for by a Red Cross
doctor. Airmen who have been wounded often bring their machines
to a safe landing]

[Illustration: The choir and nave of Nôtre Dame, Rheims, before the
bombardment which destroyed its matchless carvings and stained-glass
windows]

[Illustration: The ruins of Nôtre Dame, the wonderful cathedral at
Rheims, which was shelled by the Germans. The statuary and carvings
remaining about the entrances are protected by timbers]

[Illustration: French sailors who have landed on the southwestern
coast of Belgium making a jovial feast of their dinner ashore]

On January 21, 1915, the Germans recaptured the Le Prêtre woods
near St. Mihiél, and next day the belligerents fought a fierce
engagement in the Vosges without advantage to either side. Prince
Eitel, the second son of the Kaiser, commanded an attack upon Thann in
Alsace on January 25, 1915, but was repulsed by the French defenders.

On January 28, 1915, the Germans made some gains in the Vosges
and in Upper Alsace, but in their attempt to cross the River Aisne
on the 29th they were unsuccessful.

January 30, 1915, brought some successes to the Germans in the
Argonne forest, where throughout the month the most savage fighting
was going on in thick underbrush and from tree tops.




PART II--NAVAL OPERATIONS

       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXXII

STRENGTH OF THE RIVAL NAVIES

Sea fights, sea raids, and the hourly expectation of a great naval
battle--a struggle for the control of the seas between modern
armadas--held the attention of the world during the first six months
of the Great War. These, with the adventures of the _Emden_ in the
waters of the Far East, the first naval fight off Helgoland, the
fight off the western coast of South America, the sinking of the
_Lusitania_, and the exploits of the submarines--held the world
in constant expectancy and threatened to involve neutral nations,
thus causing a collapse of world trade and dragging all the peoples
of the earth into the maelstrom of war.

This chapter will review the navies as they gather for action. It
will follow them through the tense moments on shipboard--the days
of watching and waiting like huge sea dogs tugging at the leash.
Interspersed are heroic adventures which have added new tales of
valor to the epics of the sea.

The naval history of the great European conflict begins, not with the
first of the series of declarations of war, but with the preliminary
preparations. The appointment of Admiral von Tirpitz as Secretary
of State in Germany in 1898 is the first decisive movement. It
was in that year that the first rival to England as mistress of
the world's seas, since the days of the Spanish Armada, peeped
over the horizon. Two years before the beginning of the present
century, Von Tirpitz organized a campaign, the object of which
was to make Germany's navy as strong as her military arm. A law
passed at that time created the present German fleet; supplementary
laws passed in 1900 and 1906 through the Reichstag by this former
plowboy caused the German navy to be taken seriously, not only
by Germans but by the rest of the world. England, jealous of her
sea power, then began her maintenance of two ships for each one
or her rival's. Germany answered by laying more keels, till the
ratio stood three to two, instead of two to one.

Two years before the firing of the pistol shot at Sarajevo, which
precipitated the Great War, the British admiralty announced that
henceforth the British naval base in the Mediterranean would be
Gibraltar instead of Malta. Conjectures were made as to the significance
of this move; it might have meant that England had found the pace
too great and had deliberately decided to abandon her dominance
of the eastern Mediterranean; or that Gibraltar had been secretly
reequipped as a naval base. What it did mean was learned when the
French Minister of Marine announced in the following September that
the entire naval strength of France would thereafter be concentrated
in the Mediterranean. This was the first concrete action of the
_entente cordiale_--the British navy, in the event of war, was
to guard the British home waters and the northern ports of France;
the French navy was to guard the Mediterranean, protecting French
ports as well as French and British shipping from "the Gib" to
the Suez.

What was the comparative strength of these naval combinations when
the war started?

From her latest superdreadnoughts down to her auxiliary ships, such
as those used for hospital purposes, oil carrying and repairing,
England had a total of 674 vessels. Without consideration of ages
and types this total means nothing, and it is therefore necessary
to examine her naval strength in detail. She had nine battleships
of 14,000 tons displacement each, built between 1895 and 1898--the
_Magnificent, Majestic, Prince George, Jupiter, Cæsar, Mars,
Illustrious, Hannibal_, and _Victorious_--with engines developing
12,000 horsepower that sent them through the water at 17.5 knots,
protected with from nine to fourteen inches of armor, and prepared
to inflict damage on an enemy with torpedoes shot from under and
above the water, and with four 12-inch guns, twelve 6-inch guns,
sixteen 3-inch guns, and twenty guns of smaller caliber but of
quicker firing possibilities.

Her next class was that of the _Canopus_--the _Goliath, Vengeance,
Ocean, Albion_, and _Glory_--2,000 tons lighter than the first
class named above, but more modern in equipment and construction,
having been built between the years 1900 and 1902. Their motive
power was heavier, being 13,500 horsepower, and their speed was
almost a knot faster. Increase in the power of naval guns had made
unnecessary any increase in the thickness of their armor, and
consequently ranged from 6 to 12 inches in thickness. Their armament
was about the same as that of the older class, but each carried
two more torpedo tubes.

[Illustration: GERMAN AND ENGLISH NAVAL POSITIONS]

Discussion in naval circles throughout the world turned then to
the question of whether it were better to build heavier ships with
heavier armament, or to build lighter and faster ships designed
to "hit and get away." The British authorities inclined toward
the former view, and between 1901 and 1904 the British navy was
augmented with the _Implacable, London, Bulwark, Formidable, Venerable,
Queen, Irresistible_, and _Prince of Wales_--each of the heretofore
unheard-of displacement of 15,000 tons. In spite of their size
they were comparatively fast, having an average speed of 18 knots;
they did not need, and were not equipped with heavier armor, having
plates as thin as 3 inches and as thick as 12. They were built to
"take punishment," and therefore they had no greater armament than
the vessels previously named. The naval program of 1903 and 1904
also included the _Duncan, Albemarle, Russell, Cornwallis_, and
_Exmouth_, each 1,000 tons lighter than the ships of the _Implacable_
type, but with the same equipment, defensive and offensive, and
of the same speed. And in the same program, as if to offset the
argument for heavier and stronger ships, there were included the
lighter and faster ships, _Swiftsure_ and _Triumph_, displacing
only 11,500 tons, but making 19 knots. Their speed permitted and
necessitated lighter armor--10 inches through at the thickest
points--and their armament was also of a lighter type, for their
four largest guns were capable of firing 10-inch shells.

Germany was becoming a naval rival worthy of notice, and the insular
position of England came to be a matter of serious concern by 1906.
Britain has never considered the building of land forts for her
protection--her strength has always been concentrated in floating
war machines. She now began to build veritable floating forts, ships
of 16,350 tons displacement. By the end of 1906 she had ready to give
battle eight ships of this class, the _King Edward VII, Commonwealth,
Dominion, Hindustan, Africa, Hibernia, Zealandia_, and _Britannia_.
Speed was not sacrificed to weight, for they were given a speed
of 18.5 knots, developed by engines of 18,000 horsepower. Their
thinnest armor measured 6 inches, and their heavy guns were protected
with plates 12 inches thick. The 12-inch gun was still the heaviest
piece of armament in the British navy, and these eight ships each
carried four of that measurement, as well as four 9.2-inch guns,
ten 6-inch guns, fourteen rapid-fire guns of 3 inches, two machine
guns, and four torpedo tubes.

Now that it was seen that ships of enormous displacement could also
be swift, England committed herself to the building of ships of even
greater size. In 1907 came the first of the modern dreadnoughts,
so-called from the name which was given to the original ship of
17,900 tons displacement. The _Dreadnought_ made the marvelous
speed (for a ship of that size) of 21 knots, which she was enabled
to do with turbine engines of 23,000 horsepower. Her armor measured
from 8 to 11 inches in thickness, and her great size enabled her
to carry as high as ten 12-inch guns. Her minor batteries were
strong in proportion.

Then, as if taking her breath after a stupendous effort, England in
the following year built two ships of 16,000 tons displacement, the
_Lord Nelson_ and the _Agamemnon_, with speed, armor, and armament
much lower than those of the _Dreadnought_. But having taken a
rest, Britain was again to make a great effort, launching in 1909
the _Temeraire, Superb_, and _Bellerophon_, monsters displacing
18,600 tons. With engines of 23,000 horsepower that could drive
them through the seas at 21 knots, ready to ward off blows with
armor from 8 to 11 inches thick, firing at the same time volleys
from ten 12-inch guns down to sixteen 4-inch rapid firers.

Naval architecture had now taken a definite turn, the principal
feature of which was the tremendous size of the destructive floating
machines. England, a leader in this sort of building, in 1910 built
the _Vanguard, Collingwood_, and _St. Vincent_, each displacing
19,250 tons. Nor were they lacking in speed, for they made, on an
average, 21 knots. The 20,000-ton battleship was then a matter of
months only, and it came in the following year, when the _Colossus,
Hercules_, and _Neptune_ were launched. It was only in the matter
of displacement that these three ships showed any difference from
those of the _Vanguard_ class; there were no great innovations
either in armament or armor. But in the same year, 1911, there
were launched the _Thunderer, Monarch, Orion_, and _Conqueror_,
each of 22,500 tons, and equipped with armor from 8 to 12 inches
thick, for the days of 3-inch armor on first-class warships had gone
forever. These had a speed of 21 knots, and were the first British
ships to have anything greater than a 12-inch gun. They carried as
a primary battery ten 13.5-inch guns, and sixteen 4-inch guns,
along with six more of small caliber as their secondary battery.

In 1912 and 1913 there was only one type of warship launched having
23,000 tons displacement with 31,000 horsepower, a half a knot
faster than previous dreadnoughts, and carrying, like the previous
class, ten 13.5-inch guns, along with some of smaller caliber. The
ships of this class were the _King George V, Ajax, Audacious_,
and _Centurion_.

The year 1914 saw even more terrible machines of death launched.
Two types were put into the water, the first that of the _Iron
Duke_ class, of which the other members were the _Benbow, Emperor
of India_, and _Marlborough_. They showed great improvement in every
point; their speed was 22.5 knots, their displacement 25,000 tons,
and their torpedo tubes five. Like their immediate predecessors,
they carried a primary battery of ten 13.5-inch guns, along with
the smaller ones, and their armor measured from 8 to 12 inches
in thickness. The second type of the year was that of the _Queen
Elizabeth_ and _Warspite_ class. They surpassed all the warships
when they were built. Their speed for their size was the greatest--25
knots. They had the largest displacement among warships--27,500
tons; they had the thickest armor, ranging from 8 to 13.5 inches;
they had the most improved form of engines--oil burners, developing
58,000 horsepower; and most marvelous of all was their primary
battery, which consisted of eight 15-inch guns. The largest gun
yet made had been the 16-inch gun, for use in permanent position
in land forts, and, with the German army, for a mobile force. It
now was shown that the modern warship could carry a gun as heavy
as any on land. There were in the course of construction when the
war broke out eight more such monsters, the _Malaya, Valiant_, and
_Barham_, sister ships of the _Queen Elizabeth_, and the _Royal
Oak, Resolution, Royal Monarch, Ramillies_, and _Renown_, each
of 29,000 tons displacement, but having the same armament as the
_Queen Elizabeth_. All of these were hastened to completion as
soon as war was declared.

At the time of the declaration of war England had, in addition
to these greatest ships, a number of supporting ships such as the
ten battle cruisers, _Indomitable, Invincible, Indefatigable,
Inflexible, Australia, New Zealand, Queen Mary, Princess Royal,
Lion_, and the _Tiger_. Their displacements ranged from 17,250
to 28,000 tons, and their speeds from 25 to 30 knots, the last
being that of the _Tiger_. Their speed is their greatest feature,
for their armament and batteries are much lighter than those of
the first-line ships.

Next, there were ready thirty-four high-speed cruisers of quite
light armament and armor. There were six of the _Cressy_ type,
four of the _Drake_ type, nine of the same type as the _Kent_, six
of the same class as the _Antrim_, six like the _Black Prince_,
three of the same class as the _Shannon_, together with seventeen
heavily protected cruisers, of which the _Edgar_ was the prototype.
The rest of the British navy needs no detailed consideration. It
consisted at the outbreak of the war of 70 protected light cruisers,
134 destroyers, and a number of merchant ships convertible into
war vessels, together with submarines and other small ships.

The navy of France stood fourth in the list of those of the world
powers at the time the war started. There were eighteen old vessels,
built between 1894 and 1909, including the _Carnot_ class (corresponding
to the British ship _Magnificent_), the _Charlemagne, Bouvet, Suffren,
République_, and _Democratie_ classes. The most modern of these
types displaced no more than 14,000 tons, made no more than 18
knots, and carried primary batteries of 12-inch guns.

Some improvement was made in the six ships of the _Danton_ class
which were built in 1911 and 1912. They displaced 18,000 tons,
had armor from 9 to 12 inches thick and carried guns of 12-inch
caliber. They correspond to the British ship _Temeraire_. In 1913
and 1914 were launched the _Jean Bart, Courbet, Paris_, and _France_
of the dreadnought type, but much slower and not so heavily armed
as the British ships of the same class. In eight ships which were
incomplete when war was declared the matter of speed received greater
attention, and they are consequently faster than the older vessels of
the same type. It is in the nineteen French armored cruisers--France
has no battle cruisers--that the French showed better efforts as
builders of speedy ships, for they made 23 knots or more. In the
list of French fighting ships there are in addition two protected
cruisers, the _D'Entrecasteaux_ and the _Guichen_, together with
ten light cruisers. But the French "mosquito fleet," consisting of
destroyers, torpedo boats and submarines, is comparatively large.
Of these she had 84, 135, and 78, respectively.

After the Russo-Japanese War the battle fleets of Russia were entirely
dissipated, so that when the present conflict came she had no ships
which might have been accounted worthy aids to the navies of England
and France. In so far as is known, her heaviest ships were the
_Andrei Pervozvannyi_ and the _Imperator Pavel I_, each displacing
only 17,200 tons, and of the design of 1911.

Against these fighting naval forces of the allied powers were ranged
the navies of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The former had, at the
outbreak of hostilities, 36 battleships, 5 battle cruisers, 9 armored
cruisers, and 43 cruisers. Instead of giving attention to torpedo boats
she gave it to destroyers, of which she had 130. And of submarines
she had 27.

In detail her naval forces consisted, first, of the _Kaiser Friedrich
III, Kaiser Karl der Grosse, Kaiser Barbarossa, Kaiser Wilhelm
II_, and _Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse_, all built as a result of
the first agitation of Von Tirpitz, between the years 1898 and
1901. They each displaced 10,614 tons, had a speed of 18 knots,
required 13,000 horsepower, were protected with from 10 to 12 inches
of armor, and carried four 9.4-inch guns, fourteen of 5.9 inches,
twelve of 3.4-inches, and twenty of smaller measurement. Roughly
they corresponded to the British ships of the _Canopus_ class,
both in design and time of launching.

Following this class came that of the _Wittelsbach_, including
also the _Wettin, Zähringen, Mecklenburg_, and _Schwaben_, built
between 1901 and 1903, displacing 11,643 tons, making 18 knots,
protected with from 9 to 10 inches of armor and carrying a primary
battery of four 9.4-inch guns, eighteen 5.9-inch guns, and a large
secondary battery. The similar type in the British navy was the
_Canopus_--for England was far ahead of Germany, both in the matter
of displacement and primary battery. During the same years England
had launched ships of the type of the _Implacable_.

In 1904 came the German ships _Hessen, Elsass_, and _Braunschweig_,
and in 1905 and 1906 the _Preussen_ and _Lothringen_. They were
well behind the English ships of the same years, for they displaced
only 12,097 tons, made 18 knots, carried armor of from 9 to 10
inches in thickness, and a primary battery of four 11-inch guns,
fourteen 6.7-inch guns, and twelve 3.4-inch guns, together with
rapid firers and other guns in a secondary battery. England at
this time was putting 12-inch guns in the primary battery of such
ships as the _King Edward VII_.

Still Germany kept up the race, and in 1906, 1907, and 1908 launched
the _Hannover, Deutschland, Schlesien, Schleswig-Holstein_, and
_Pommern_, with 12,997 tons displacement, 16,000 horsepower, a speed
of 18 knots, and only ll-inch guns in the primary batteries. Whereas
England, at the same time, was building ships of the dreadnought
type.

Next came four ships of the _Vanguard_ class--the _Westfälen, Nassau,
Rheinland_, and _Posen_, built in 1909 and 1910. Their heaviest
guns measured 11 inches, while those of the English ships of the
same class measured 12 inches. The displacement of these German
fighting ships was 18,600 tons. In point of speed they showed some
improvement over the older German ships, making 19.5 knots. Germany,
like England, was now committed to the building of larger and larger
ships of the line. The _Helgoland, Thüringen, Oldenburg_, and
_Ostfriesland_, which were put into the water in 1911 and 1912,
were consequently of 22,400 tons displacement, with a speed of
20.5 knots and carrying twelve 12-inch guns, fourteen 5.9-inch
rapid-fire guns, fourteen 3.9-inch rapid-fire guns, a few smaller
guns, and as many as six torpedo tubes.

While England was maintaining her "two to three" policy, and while
the United States stood committed to the building of two first-class
battleships a year, Germany, in 1913, put five of them into the
water. These were the _König Albert, Prinz Regent Luitpold, Kaiserin,
Kaiser_, and _Friedrich der Grosse_, each capable of speeding through
the water at a rate of 21 knots, displacing 23,310 tons and carrying
an armament of ten 12-inch guns, fourteen 5.9-inch guns, and a
large number of rapid-fire guns of smaller measurement. Their armor
was quite heavy, being 13 inches thick on the side and 11 inches
thick where protection for the big guns was needed.

The largest ships in the German navy which were launched, fitted,
and manned at the time that the war began, were those which were
built in 1914 and which had a displacement of 26,575 tons. These
ships were the _König, Grosser Kurfürst_, and the _Markgraf_. The
corresponding type in the British navy was that of the _Iron Duke_,
built in the same year. The British ships of this class were 1,000
tons lighter in displacement, a bit faster--making 22.5 knots to
the 22 knots made by the German ships--and their armament was not
so strong as that of the German type, for the German ships carried
ten 14-inch guns, whereas the English carried ten 13.5-inch guns.

In addition to these first-class battleships, Germany had certain
others, individual in type, such as the _Von der Tann, Moltke,
Goeben, Seydlitz, Derfflinger, Fürst Bismarck, Prinz Heinrich,
Prinz Adalbert, Roon_ and _Yorck, Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau,
Blücher, Magdeburg, Strassburg, Breslau, Stralsund, Rostock_, and
_Karlsruhe_. These may be reckoned as scout cruisers, for they
showed much speed, the fastest making 30 knots and the slowest
19 knots. The oldest dates from 1900, and the newest from 1914.
Germany had, also, thirty-nine more fast protected cruisers which
were designed for scout duty.

In destroyers she was well equipped, having 143 ready for service
when war was declared. Her twenty-seven submarines were of the most
improved type, and much about their construction and armament she
was able to keep secret from the rest of the world. It is probable
that even their number was greater than the intelligence departments
of foreign navies suspected. The best type had a speed on the surface
of 18 knots and could travel at 12 knots when submerged. The type
known as _E-21_, of the design of 1914, measured 213 feet 8 inches
in length and had a beam of 20 feet.

Austria, though not renowned for her naval strength, had certain
units which brought up the power of the Teutonic powers considerably.
She had nine first-class battleships, the _Erzherzog Karl, Erzherzog
Ferdinand Max, Erzherzog Friedrich, Zrinyi, Radetzky, Erzherzog
Franz Ferdinand, Teggethoff, Prinz Eugen_, and _Viribus Unitis_.
These, at the time Austria went to war, ranged in age from nine
years to one year, and varied in displacement from 10,000 tons
to 20,000 tons. The largest guns carried by any of them measured
12 inches, and the fastest, the _Prinz Eugen_, made 20 knots. Of
secondary importance were the battleships _Kaiserin Maria Theresia,
Kaiser Karl VI_, and _St. Georg_. The register of battleships was
supplemented with ten light cruisers of exceptionally light
displacement, the highest being only 3,966 tons. Scouting was their
chief function. Austria had, also, 18 destroyers, 63 torpedo boats,
and 6 submarines.

Such were the respective strengths of the opponents on that day
in July, 1914, when the Crown Prince of Austria-Hungary lost his
life. For ten years the officers of the navy created by the German
Admiral von Tirpitz had at all dinners come to their feet, waved
their wine glasses and had given the famous toast "Der Tag"--to
the day on which the English and German naval hosts would sally
forth to do battle with each other. "Der Tag" found both forces
quite ready, though the British naval authorities stole a march
on their German rivals in the matter of mobilization.

It had been the custom for years in the British navy to assemble
the greater part of the British ships during the summer at the
port of Spithead, where, decorated with bunting, with flags flying,
with visitors in holiday spirit, and with officers and men in smart
dress, the vessels were reviewed by the king on the royal yacht.

But in the eventful year of 1914, perhaps by accident, perhaps by
design, for the truth may never be known, the review had a different
aspect. There was no gaiety. The number of ships assembled this time
was greater than ever before--216 actual fighting ships passed
slowly before the royal yacht--there were no flags, no bunting,
no holiday crowds, no smart dress for officers and men. Instead,
the fleet was drawn up ready for battle, with decks cleared, guns
uncovered, steam up, and magazines replenished. During the tense
weeks in which the war clouds gathered over southern Europe this
great fighting force remained in the British home waters, and when,
at fifteen minutes after midnight on August 4, "Der Tag" had come,
this fleet sailed under sealed orders. And throughout the seven seas
there were sundry ships flying the Union Jack which immediately
received orders by cable and by wireless.

Of the disposition of the naval forces of Germany less was known.
Her greatest strength was concentrated in the North Sea, where the
island of Helgoland, the Gibraltar of the north, and the Kiel Canal
with its exits to the Baltic and North Seas, furnished excellently
both as naval bases and impenetrable protection. Throughout the rest
of the watery surface of the globe were eleven German warships,
to which automatically fell the task of protecting the thousands of
ships which, flying the German red, white, and black, were carrying
freight and passengers from port to port.

The first naval movements in the Great War occurred on the morning
of August 5, 1914. The British ship _Drake_ cut two cables off the
Azores which connected Germany with North and South America, thus
leaving these eleven German fighting ships without communication
with the German admiralty direct. And the war was not a day old
between England and Germany before the German ship _Königin Luise_
was caught sowing mines off the eastern English ports by the British
destroyer _Lance_.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXXIII

FIRST BLOOD--BATTLE OF THE BIGHT

The Germans had taken heed of the value of mines from lessons learned
at the cost of Russia in the war with Japan, and set about distributing
these engines of destruction throughout the North Sea. The British
admiralty knowing this, sent out it fleet of destroyers to scour
home waters in search of German mine layers.

About ten o'clock on the morning of August 5, 1914, Captain Fox,
on board the _Amphion_, came up with a fishing boat which reported
that it had seen a boat "throwing things overboard" along the east
coast. A flotilla, consisting of the _Lance, Laurel, Lark_ and
_Linnet_, set out in search of the stranger and soon found her. She
was the _Königin Luise_, and the things she was casting overboard
were mines. The _Lance_ fired a shot across her bow to stop her,
but she put on extra speed and made an attempt to escape. A chase
followed; the gunners on the British ship now fired to hit. The
first of these shots carried away the bridge of the German ship,
a second shot missed, and a third and fourth hit her hull. Six
minutes after the firing of the first shot her stern was shot away,
and she went to the bottom, bow up. Fifty of her 130 men were picked
up and brought to the English shore.

The first naval blood of the Great War had been drawn by Britain
on August 5, 1914. The _Königin Luise's_ efforts had not been in
vain. She had posthumous revenge on the morning of August 6, when
the _Amphion_, flagship of the third flotilla of destroyers, hit
one of the mines which the German ship had sowed. It was seen
immediately by her officers that she must sink; three minutes after
her crew had left her there came a second explosion, which, throwing
débris aloft, brought about the death of many of the British sailors
in the small boats, as well as that of a German prisoner from the
_Königin Luise_.

All the world, with possibly the exception of the men in the German
admiralty, now looked for a great decisive battle "between the
giants" in the North Sea. The British spoke of it as a coming second
Trafalgar, but it was not to take place. For reasons of their own the
Germans kept their larger and heavier ships within the protection
of Helgoland and the Kiel Canal, but their ships of smaller type
immediately became active and left German shores to do what damage
they might to the British navy. It was hoped, perhaps, that the
naval forces of the two powers could be equalized and a battle
fought on even terms after the Germans had cut down British advantage
by a policy of attrition.

A flotilla of German submarines on August 9 attacked a cruiser
belonging to the main British fleet, but was unable to inflict
any damage. The lord mayor of the city of Birmingham received the
following telegram the next morning: "Birmingham will be proud to
learn that the first German submarine destroyed in the war was
sunk by H. M. S. _Birmingham_." Two shots from the British ship
had struck the German _U-15_, and she sank immediately.

The German admiralty, even before England had declared war, suspected
that the greatest use for the German navy in the months to come
would be to fight the British navy, but they ventured to show their
naval strength against Russia beforehand. Early in August they
sent the _Augsburg_ into the Baltic Sea to bombard the Russian
port of Libau, but after doing a good bit of damage the German
ship retired. It is probable that this raid was nothing more than
a feint to remind Russia that she continually faced the danger
of invasion from German troops landed on the Baltic shores under
the cover of German ships, and that she must consequently keep
a large force on her northern shores instead of sending it west
to meet the German army on the border.

Among the German ships which were separated from the main fleet
in the North Sea, and which were left without direct communication
with the German admiralty after the cutting of the cables off the
Azores by the _Drake_, were the cruisers _Goeben_ and _Breslau_.
When England declared war these two German ships were off the coast
of Algeria. Both were very fast vessels, having a speed of 28 knots,
and they were designed to go 6,000 knots without needing replenishment
of their coal bunkers.

On the morning of August 5, after having bombarded some of the
coast cities of Algeria they found themselves cut off on the east
by a French fleet and on the west by an English fleet, but by a
very clever bit of stratagem they escaped. The band of the Goeben
was placed on a raft and ordered on a given moment to play the
German national airs after an appreciable period. Meanwhile, under
the cover of the night's darkness the two German ships steamed
away. After they had a good start the band on the raft began to
play. The British patrols heard the airs and immediately all British
ships were searching for the source of the music. To find a small
raft in mid-sea was an impossible task, and while the enemy was
engaged in it the two Germans headed for Messina, then a neutral
port, which they reached successfully. The Italian authorities
permitted them to remain there only twenty-four hours.

Before leaving they took a dramatic farewell, which received publicity
in the press of the whole world, and which was designed to lead the
British fleet commanders to believe that the Germans were coming
out to do battle. Instead, they headed for Constantinople. They
escaped all the ships of the British Mediterranean fleet with the
exception of the cruiser _Gloucester_. With this ship they exchanged
shots and were in turn slightly damaged, but they reached the Porte
in seaworthy condition, and were immediately sold to the Turkish
Government, which was then still neutral. The crews were sent to
Germany and were warmly welcomed at Berlin. The officers responsible
for their escape were disciplined by the British authorities.

Both Germany and England, the former by means of the eleven ships at
large, and the latter by means of her preponderance in the number of
ships, now made great efforts to capture trading ships of the enemy.
When England declared war there was issued a royal proclamation which
stated that up to midnight of August 14 England would permit German
merchantmen in British harbors to sail for home ports, provided
Germany gave British merchantmen the same privilege, but it was
specified that ships of over 5,000 tons would not receive the privilege
because they could be converted into fighting ships afterward. But
on the high seas enemy ships come upon were captured.

The German admiralty on August 1 had issued orders to German merchantmen
to keep within neutral ports, and by this means such important
ships as the _Friedrich der Grosse_ and the _Grosser Kurfürst_
eluded capture. In the harbor of New York was the _Kronprinzessin
Cecilie_, a fast steamer of 23.5 knots. She left New York on July
28 carrying a cargo of $10,000,000 in gold, and was on the high
seas when England declared war. Naturally she was regarded by the
British as a great prize, and the whole world awaited from day
to day the news of her capture, but her captain, showing great
resourcefulness, after nearly reaching the British Isles, turned
her prow westward, darkened all exterior lights, put canvas over
the port holes and succeeded in reaching Bar Harbor, Me., on the
morning of August 5.

Similarly the _Lusitania_ and the French liner _Lorraine_, leaving
New York on August 5, were able to elude the German cruiser _Dresden_,
which was performing the difficult task of trying to intercept
merchantmen belonging to the Allies as they sailed from America,
while she was keeping watch against warships flying the enemies'
flags. Still more important was the sailing from New York of the
German liner _Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse_. This ship had a speed of
22.5 knots and a displacement of 14,349 tons. During the first week
of the war she cleared the port of New York with what was believed to
be a trade cargo, but she so soon afterward began harassing British
trading ships that it was believed that she left port equipped as
a vessel of war or fitted out as one in some other neutral port.
The continued story of the German raids on allied trading ships
must form a separate part of this narrative. It was only a month
after the outbreak of hostilities that the fleets of the allied
powers had swept clean the seven seas of all ships flying German
and Austrian flags which were engaged in trade and not in warlike
pursuits.

The first naval battle of the Great War was fought on August 28,
1914. "A certain liveliness in the North Sea" was reported through
the press by the British admiralty on the 19th of August. Many
of the smaller vessels of the fleet of Admiral von Ingenohl, the
German commander, such as destroyers, light cruisers, and scouting
cruisers, were sighted. Shots between these and English vessels of
the same types were exchanged at long range, but a pitched battle
did not come for still a week. Meanwhile the British navy had been
doing its best to destroy the mine fields established by the Germans.
Trawlers were sent out in pairs, dragging between them large cables
which cut the mines from the sea-bottom moorings. On being loosened
they came to the surface and were destroyed by shots from the trawlers'
decks.

On the 28th of August came the battle off the Bight of Helgoland.
The island of Helgoland had been a British possession from 1807
till 1890, when it was transferred to Germany by treaty. It was
seen immediately by the Germans that it formed an excellent natural
naval base, lying as it does, thirty-five miles northwest of Cuxhaven
and forty-three miles north of Wilhelmshaven. They at once began to
augment the natural protection it afforded with their own devices.
Two Zeppelin sheds were erected, concrete forts were built and 12-inch
guns were installed. The scene of the battle which took place here
was the Bight of Helgoland, which formed a channel eighteen miles
wide some seven miles north of the island and near which lay the
line of travel for ships leaving the ports of the Elbe.

British submarines which had been doing reconnaissance work on the
German coast since August 24 reported to the British commander,
Admiral Jellicoe, that a large force of German light cruisers and
smaller craft were lying under the protection of the Helgoland
guns, and he immediately arranged plans for leading this force
away from that protection in order to give it battle. Briefly the
plans made provided that three submarines were to proceed on the
surface of the water to within sight of the German ships and when
chased by the latter were to head westward. The light cruisers
_Arethusa_ and _Fearless_ were detailed to run in behind any light
German craft which were to follow the British submarines, endeavoring
to cut them off from the German coast, and these two vessels were
backed by a squadron of light cruisers held in readiness should
the first two need assistance. Squadrons of cruisers and battle
cruisers were detailed to stay in the rear, still further to the
northwest, to engage any German ships of their own class which
might get that far.

It was at midnight on August 26 that Commodore Keyes moved toward
Helgoland with eight submarines accompanied by two destroyers.
During the next day--August 27--this force did nothing more than
keep watch for German submarines and scouting craft, and then took
up its allotted position for the main action. The morning of the
28th broke misty and calm. Under half steam three of the British
submarines, the _E-6, E-7_, and _E-8_ steamed toward the island
fortress, showing their hulls above water and followed by the two
detailed destroyers.

The mist thickened. Still more slowly and cautiously went the British
submersibles, and while they went above water, five of their sister
craft traveled under the surface. Here was the bait for the German
ships under Helgoland's guns. Would they bite?

The Germans soon gave the answer. First there crept out a German
destroyer which took a good look at the situation and then gave
wireless signals to some twenty more of her type, which soon came
out to join her. The twenty-one little and speedy German boats
bravely came out and chased the two British destroyers and three
submarines, while a German seaplane slowly circled upward to see
if the surrounding regions harbored enemies. Presumably the airman
found what he sought for he soon flew back to report to Helgoland. The
peaceful aspect of the waters to the east of the island immediately
changed, as a squadron of light cruisers weighed anchor and put
out after the retiring Britishers.

Before a description of the fighting can be given it is necessary
to understand the plan of the fight as a whole. Assuming that the
page on which these words are printed represents a map of the North
Sea and that the points of the compass are as they would be on an
ordinary chart, we have the island of Helgoland, half an inch long
and a quarter of an inch wide, situated in the lower right-hand
corner of this page, with about half an inch separating its eastern
side from the right edge of the page and the same distance separating
it from the bottom. The lower edge of the page may represent the
adjoining coasts of Germany and Holland, and the right-hand edge
may represent the coast of the German province of Schleswig and
the coast of Denmark.

At seven o'clock on the morning of August 28 the positions of the
fighting forces were as follows: The decoy British submarines were
making a track from Helgoland to the northwest, pursued by a flotilla
of German submarines, destroyers, and torpedo boats, and a fleet
of light cruisers. On the west--the left edge of the page, halfway
up--there were the British cruisers _Arethusa_ and _Fearless_
accompanied by flotillas, and steaming eastward at a rate that
brought them to the rear of the German squadron of light cruisers,
thus cutting off the latter from the fortress. In the southwest--the
lower left-hand corner of the page--there was stationed a squadron of
British, cruisers, ready to close in when needed; in the northwest--the
upper left-hand corner of the page--there were stationed a squadron
of British light cruisers and another of battle cruisers, and it
was toward these last two units that the decoys were leading the
German fleets.

The _Arethusa_ and _Fearless_ felt the first shock of battle, on
the side of the British. The German cruiser _Ariadne_ closed with
the former, while the latter soon found itself very busy with the
German cruiser _Strassburg_. For thirty-five minutes--before the
_Fearless_ drew the fire of the _Strassburg_--the two German vessels
poured a telling fire into the _Arethusa_, and the latter was soon
in bad condition, but she managed to hold out till succored by the
_Fearless_, and then planted a shell against the _Ariadne_ which
carried away her forebridge and killed her captain. The scouting which
had been done by the smaller craft of the German fleets showed their
commanders that there were other British ships in the neighborhood
besides the two they had first engaged, and it was thought wiser
to withdraw in face of possible reenforcement of the British,
consequently the _Strassburg_ and _Ariadne_ turned eastward to seek
the protection of the fortress. The _Arethusa_, a boat that had
been in commission but a week when the battle was fought, was in a
bad way; all but one of her guns were out of action, her water tank
had been punctured and fire was raging on her main deck amidships.
The _Fearless_ passed her a cable at nine o'clock and towed her
westward, away from the scene of action, while her crew made what
repairs they could.

The flotillas of both sides had meanwhile been busy. At the head
of the squadron of German destroyers that came out of the waters
behind Helgoland was the _V-187_. Without slacking speed she steamed
straight for the British destroyers, her small guns spitting rapidly,
but she was outnumbered by British destroyers, which poured such an
amount of steel into her thin sides that she went under, her guns
firing till their muzzles touched the water and her crew cheering as
they went to their deaths. A few managed to keep afloat on wreckage,
and during a lull in the fighting, which lasted from nine o'clock
till ten, boats were lowered from the British destroyers _Goshawk_
and _Defender_ to pick up these stranded German sailors.

The commanders of the German fleet, perceiving these small boats from
afar, thought that the British were resorting to the old principle
of boarding, and the German light cruiser _Mainz_ came out to fire
upon them. Two of the British small boats had to be abandoned as
their mother ships made off before the oncoming German. They were
in a perilous position, right beneath the guns of the fortress.
But now a daring and unique rescue took place. The commander of
the British submarine _E-4_ had been watching the fighting through
the periscope of his craft, and seeing the helpless position of
the two small boats, he submerged, made toward them, and then,
to the great surprise of the men in them, came up right between
them and took their occupants aboard his boat.

Repairs had been made on the _Arethusa_ which enabled her to go into
action again by ten o'clock. Accompanied again by two light cruisers
of ten four-inch guns and the _Fearless_, she turned westward in
answer to calls for assistance from the destroyers _Lurcher_ and
_Firedrake_, which accompanied the submarines and which reported
that they were being chased by fast German cruisers. Suddenly the
light cruiser _Strassburg_ again came out of the mist and bore
down on the British cruisers. Her larger guns were too heavy and
had too long a range for those of the British craft, and the latter
immediately sent out calls which brought into action for the first
time certain ships belonging to the squadron of British light cruisers,
which had been stationed to the northwest--the upper left-hand
corner of the page.

The vessels which answered the calls were the light cruisers _Falmouth_
and _Nottingham_ with eight eight-inch and nine six-inch guns
respectively, but before arriving the _Strassburg_ still had time
to inflict more damage on the _Arethusa_. The cruisers _Köln_ and
_Mainz_ joined the _Strassburg_, and the British vessels were having
a bad time of it when their commander ordered the _Fearless_ to
concentrate all fire on the _Strassburg_. This, and a concentrated
fire from the destroyers, proved too strong for her and she turned
eastward, disappearing in the mist off Helgoland. The _Mainz_ then
received the attention of all available British guns, including the
battle cruiser _Lion_, and soon fire broke out within her hold.
Next her foremast, slowly tottering and then inclining more and
more, crashed down upon her deck, a distorted mass. Following that
came down one of her funnels. The fire which was raging aboard her
was hampering her machinery, and her speed slackened; the moment to
strike with a torpedo had come, and one of these "steel fishes" was
sent against her hull below water. In the explosion which followed
one of her boilers came out through her deck, ascended some fifty
feet and dropped down near her bow; her engines stopped, and she
began to settle slowly, her bow going down first.

It was now noon. From behind the veil of the surrounding mist came
the _Falmouth_ and _Nottingham_, which with the guns in their turrets
completely finished the hapless _Mainz_, and their sailors openly
admired the bravery of her crew, which, while she sank, maintained
perfect order and sang the German national air.

There was yet the _Köln_ with which the _Arethusa_ had to do battle.
But by now the heavy British battle cruisers _Lion_ and _Queen
Mary_ had also come down from the northwest to take part in the
fighting, and letting the _Arethusa_ escape from the range of the
light cruiser _Köln_, they went for the German, which, overpowered,
fled toward Helgoland. While the chase was on the _Ariadne_ again
made her appearance and came to the aid of the _Köln_, but the
light cruiser _Ariadne_ carried no gun as effective in destructive
power as the 13.5-inch guns of the _Lion_, and she, too, had to
seek safety in flight. The British ships then finished the _Köln_;
so badly was she hit that when the British small boats sought the
spot where she quickly sank they found not a man of her crew afloat.
Every man of the 370 of her crew perished.

The afternoon came, and with its advent the mist, which had kept
the guns of Helgoland's forts out of action, had cleared off the
calm waters of the North Sea. By the time the sun had set only
floating wreckage gave evidence that here brave men had fought and
died. By evening the respective forces were in their home ports,
being treated for their hurts. The Germans had lost the _Mainz,
Köln_, and _Ariadne_, and the _Strassburg_ had limped home. The
loss in destroyers and other small craft in addition to that of
the _V-187_ was not known. The loss on the British side had not
entailed that of a large ship, but the _Arethusa_ when she returned
to her home port was far from being in good condition, and some
of the smaller boats were in the same circumstances.

Admiral von Ingenohl was committed more strongly than ever, as a
result of this engagement, to the belief that the best policy for
his command would be to keep his squadrons within the protection
afforded by Helgoland and that the most damage could be done to
the enemy by picking off her larger ships one by one. In other
words, he again turned to the policy of attrition. He immediately
put it into force.

On the 3d of September the British gunboat _Speedy_ struck a mine
in the North Sea and went down. It was only two days later that the
light cruiser _Pathfinder_ was made the true target of a torpedo
fired by a German submarine off the British eastern coast, and she,
too, went to the bottom. But the British immediately retaliated,
for the submarine _E-9_ sighted the German light cruiser _Hela_
weathering a bad storm on September 13 between Helgoland and the
Frisian coast. A torpedo was launched and found its mark, and the
_Hela_ joined the _Köln_ and _Mainz_. Up to this point the results
of attrition were even, but the Germans scored heavily during the
following week.

On September 22 the three slow British cruisers _Cressy, Hogue_,
and _Aboukir_ were patrolling the waters off the Dutch coast,
unaccompanied by small craft of any kind, when suddenly, at half
past six in the morning, the _Aboukir_ crumpled and sank, the victim
of another submarine attack. But the commander of the _Hogue_ thought
she had been sunk by hitting a mine, and innocently approached the
spot of the disaster to rescue such of the crew of the _Aboukir_ as
were afloat. The work of mercy was never completed, for the _Hogue_
itself was hit by two torpedoes in the next few moments, and she
joined her sister ship. The commander of the _Cressy_, failing to
take a lesson from what he had witnessed, now approached, and his
ship was also hit by two torpedoes, making the third victim of the
German policy of attrition within an hour, and Captain Lieutenant
von Weddigen, commander of the _U-9_, which had done this work,
immediately became a German hero.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXXIV

BATTLES ON THREE SEAS

So stood the score in the naval warfare in the North Sea at the
end of the second month of the Great War. But while these events
were taking place in the waters of Europe, others of equal import
had been taking place in the waters of Asia. On August 23, 1914,
Japan declared war on Germany and immediately set about scouring
the East for German craft of all kinds.

Japan brought to the naval strength of the Allied powers no mean unit.
Hers was the only navy in the world which had seen the ultramodern
battleships in action; the Russian navy which had had the same
experience was no more. Eight of her first-class battleships were,
at the time of her entrance into the Great War, veterans of the
war with Russia. The _Fugi, Asahi, Kikasa_, and _Shikishima_ had
gone into the former war as Japanese ships, and the remaining four
had gone into it as Russian ships, but had been captured by the
Japanese. These were the _Hizen, Sagami, Suwo_, and _Iwami_. Their
value was not great, for the _Fugi_ had been launched as far back
as 1896. Nevertheless she carried 12-inch guns and displaced 12,300
tons. But her speed was only 17 knots at the most. She had been
built in England as had the _Asahi_ and _Shikishima_, which were
launched in 1900 and 1901. They also carried 12-inch guns and had
a speed of 18.5 knots. Their tonnage was 15,000. Admiral Togo's
former flagship, the _Mikasa_, was also of the predreadnought type,
having been built in 1900, and carrying a main battery of 12-inch
guns. Her speed was 18.5 knots.

Of the former Russian ships the rechristened _Iwami_ was of French
build, protected with Krupp steel armor to the thickness of 7.5
inches. Her displacement was 13,600 tons, and her speed 18 knots.
Like the other ships of this class in the Japanese navy, she carried
a main battery of 12-inch guns. The _Hizen_ was an American product,
having been built by Cramps in 1902. Her displacement was 12,700
tons, made a speed of 18.5 knots, was also protected with Krupp
steel and carried four 10-inch guns. She was a real veteran, for
she had undergone repairs necessitated by having been torpedoed
off Port Arthur and had been refloated after being sunk in later
action there. The _Sagami_ and the _Suwo_ had been built in 1901
and 1902. They displaced 13,500 tons, had a speed of 18.5 knots,
and carried as their heaviest armament 10-inch guns.

In addition to these eight ships Japan had also nine protected
cruisers, all of the same type and all veterans of the war with
Russia. They were of such strength and endurance that the Japanese
admiralty rated them capable of taking places in the first line
of battle. These were the _Nisshin_ and _Kasuga_, purchased from
Italy and built in 1904, displacing 7,700 tons, and making a speed
of 22 knots; the _Aso_, French built and captured from the Russians,
and of the same design and measurements as the other two; and the
protected cruisers _Yakumo, Asama, Idzumo, Tokiwa, Aguma_, and
_Iwate_, built before the war with Russia, slightly heavier than
their sister ships but not as fast. None of this type has been
added to the Japanese navy since 1907. Japan has, instead, given
attention to scouting cruisers, with the result that she possessed
three excellent vessels of this class, the _Yahagi, Chikuma_, and
_Hirato_, with the good speed of 26 knots and displacing 5,000
tons. They were built in 1912. And not so efficient were the other
ships of similar design, the _Soya_, built in America, _Tone_ and
_Tsugaru_.

The veteran Japanese navy was supplemented with 52 destroyers and
15 submarines, all built since the war with Russia, and a number of
heavier vessels. Among the latter were the first-class battleships
_Kashima_ and _Katori_, completed in 1906, and displacing 16,400
tons. Their heavy guns measured 12 inches, and they made a speed
of 19.5 knots. There were also the vessels _Ikoma_ and _Tsukuba_,
individual in type, with corresponding kinds in no other navy,
and which might be called a cross between an armored cruiser and
battle cruiser. Though displacing no more than 13,766 tons, they
carried four 12-inch guns, and made the comparatively low speed
of 20.5 knots. In 1909 and 1910 the Japanese added two more ships
of this kind to their navy, the _Ibuki_ and _Kurama_, slightly
heavier and faster and with the same armament.

The dreadnought _Satsuma_ also came in 1910--a vessel displacing
19,400 tons, but making a speed of only 18.2 knots, and with an
extraordinarily heavy main battery consisting of four 12-inch guns
and twelve 10-inch guns. The _Aki_, launched in 1911, was 400 tons
heavier than the _Satsuma_, and was more than 2 knots faster, and
her main battery was equally strong. The dreadnoughts _Settsu_
and _Kawachi_, completed in 1913 and 1912 respectively, displaced
21,420 tons, but were able to make not more than 20 knots. At this
time the Japanese admiralty, perhaps on account of lessons learned
in the war with Russia, was building dreadnoughts with less speed
than those in the other navies, but with much heavier main batteries.
These two vessels carried a unique main battery of twelve 12-inch
guns, along with others of smaller measurement. What the dreadnoughts
lacked in speed was made up in that of four battle cruisers launched
after 1912. These were the _Kirishima, Kongo, Hi-Yei_, and _Haruna_,
with the good speed of 28 knots. Their displacement was 27,500
tons, and they carried in their primary batteries eight 14-inch
guns and sixteen 6-inch guns.

At the time Japan entered the war she had in building four
superdreadnoughts with the tremendous displacement of 30,600 tons.
These vessels, the _Mitsubishi, Yukosaka, Kure_, and _Kawasaki_,
had been designed to carry a main battery of the strength of the
U. S. S. _Pennsylvania_, and to have a speed of 22.5 knots.

The first move of the Japanese navy in the Great War was to cooperate
with the army in besieging the German town of Kiaochaw on the Shantung
Peninsula in China, but the operation was soon more military than
naval. Japanese warships captured Bonham Island in the group known
as the Marshall Islands, and, having cleared eastern waters of
German warships, scoured the Pacific in such a manner as to chase
those which escaped into the regions patrolled by the British navy.

The German vessels which made their escape were among the eleven
which were separated from the rest of Germany's navy in the North
Sea at the outbreak of hostilities. They were, with the exception of
the _Dresden_, the _Leipzig, Nürnberg, Scharnhorst_, and _Gneisenau_.
It was weeks before they were first reported--on September 22 at
the harbor of Papeete, where they destroyed the French gunboat
_Zelie_, and after putting again to sea their location was once
more a mystery.

On the evening of November 1 a British squadron consisting of the
vessels _Good Hope, Otranto, Glasgow_, and _Monmouth_, all except
the _Good Hope_ coming through the straits, sighted the enemy. The
British ships lined up abreast and proceeded in a northeasterly
direction. The Germans took up the same alignment eight miles to the
westward of the British ships and proceeded southward at full speed.
Both forces opened fire at a distance of 12,000 yards shortly after
six o'clock off Coronel near the coast of Chile. The _Gneisenau_ was
struck by a 9.2-inch shot from the _Good Hope_. The _Scharnhorst_
and _Gneisenau_ picked the _Good Hope_ as their first target, but
finding that they could do no damage at that range and that they
were safe from the fire of the British ship, they came to within
6,000 yards of her. Her fire in reply was augmented by that of
the _Monmouth_. Excellent aim on the part of the Germans soon had
the _Good Hope_ out of action, and fire broke out aboard her. Soon
after general action her magazine exploded.

The _Monmouth_ then received the brunt of the fire from the German
ships, and came in for more than her share of the destructive fire,
being put virtually out of action, and at the same time there occurred
an explosion on board the _Good Hope_ and she sank immediately,
carrying Admiral Cradock to his death.

There remained of the British force only the _Otranto_--a converted
liner and not really a battleship of the line--the _Glasgow_ and
the hopelessly disabled _Monmouth_ to continue the fight with an
efficient German force. The British commander ordered the former
two to get away by making speed, but the officer in charge of the
_Glasgow_, paying no heed to the order, kept in the fight.

Dusk was then coming on and the _Glasgow_ sought to take advantage
of it by getting between the German ships and the limping _Monmouth_,
concealing the latter from them with her smoke. But the Germans
had now come to within 4,500 yards. To escape possible attack from
torpedoes the German ships spread out their line, but perceiving
that such a danger was not present, they again closed in to finish
the crippled British ships. All of the German ships now went for
the _Glasgow_, and she had to desert the _Monmouth_, which first
sailed northward, in bad condition, and later made an attempt to
run ashore at Santa Maria, but was unable to do so.

The inevitable "if" played its part in the battle. When the British
fleet first went after the Germans it had as one of its units the
battleship _Canopus_. But her speed was not up to that of the other
ships, and she fell far to their stern. By the time the action was
on she was too distant to take part in it. No attempt was made to
go together owing to the slowness of the battleship. The _Canopus_
was never in the action at all, being 150 miles astern. Had Cradock
not desired to he need not have taken on the action but retired
in the _Canopus_. The setting of the sun also played its part;
if daylight had continued some hours more the British squadron
might have held out till the _Canopus_ brought up, for the almost
horizontal rays of the sun were in the eyes of the German gunners.
But as it dropped below the watery horizon it left the British
ships silhouetted against a clear outline. The _Canopus_ did not
get into the fight, and the greatest concern of the _Glasgow_ as
she steamed off was to warn the British battleship to keep off,
for of less speed than the German ships, and outnumbered by them,
her appearance meant her destruction. The _Glasgow_, later joined
by the _Canopus_, arrived in battered condition at the Falkland
Islands. The _Monmouth_, after the main action was over, was found
and finished by the German squadron and went down. Seventy shots
were fired at her when she lay sinking, on fire and helpless, and
unable to fire her guns. Germany had evened the score in the second
battle between fleets.

The _Dresden_ after the Falkland action took refuge in Fiordes
of Terra del Fuego and after being there for a couple of months
proceeded to the head of the Island of Juan Fernandez where she
was found by the _Glasgow, Kent_ and auxiliary cruiser _Orama_
and was destroyed.

Most remarkable had been the career of the German third-class cruiser
_Nürnberg_, which had joined the other German ships that went to
make up the German squadron which fought in this battle off Coronel.
This vessel, on the day after Germany and England went to war, was
lying near Yap, an island in the Pacific, that had been, until
captured by the Japanese, the wireless station of most importance
to the Germans in the Pacific Ocean. She immediately, after being
apprised that she was part of a navy engaged in a war, set sail
and was not reported again until the 7th of September, when she
appeared at Fanning Island, a cable station maintained by Britain,
and from which cables run to Vancouver to the east and Australia
to the west. Here she performed a clever bit of work by entering
the harbor flying the tricolor of France and appearing as though
she was making a friendly visit. Officials on the island, happy
to think they would have such a visitor, saw two cutters leave
the warship.

Great was the surprise of those watching events from the shore
when they saw the French flag lowered from the masthead of the
visitor and in its place the German naval ensign run up. The cutters
were just about reaching knee-deep water at the shore when this
surprise came, and it was augmented when, with the protection of
the guns of the vessel, the men in these cutters showed themselves
to be a hostile landing party.

Her presence was not reported to the rest of the world for the
good reason that she cut all cables leading from the island. All
the British men there were put under guard, and after damaging
all cable instruments she could find, the _Nürnberg_, accompanied
by a collier that had come with her, again took to the high seas.

She next turned up at the island of St. Felix, 300 miles west of
the Chilean coast, but did not come to the harbor. During the night
of October 14 the inhabitants of that island saw the flash and heard
the roar of an explosion miles out to sea, and for a number of
days later they picked up on their beach the wreckage of what must
have been a collier. As has been related in preceding paragraphs,
the _Nürnberg_ took part in that fight. The end of her career came
in the battle off the Falkland Islands, which will be dealt with
later.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXXV

THE GERMAN SEA RAIDERS

While British men-o'-war were capturing German merchant-men and
taking them to British ports, the German raiders which were abroad
were earning terrifying reputations for themselves because the
enemy merchantmen with which they came upon had to be destroyed
on the high seas, for there were no ports to which they could be
taken. Prominent among these was the _Königsberg_, a third-class
cruiser. When the war came she was in Asiatic waters and immediately
made the east coast of Africa her "beat." While patrolling it she
came upon two British merchant ships, and after taking from their
stores such supplies as were needed she sent them to the bottom.
On September 20, 1914, she made a dash into the harbor of Zanzibar
and found there the British cruiser _Pegasus_, which on account of
her age was undergoing a complete overhauling. She was easy prey
for the German ship, for besides the fact that she was stationary her
guns were of shorter range than those of her adversary. Shell after
shell tore into her till she was battered beyond all resemblance to
a fighting craft. But her flag flew till the end, for though it
was shot down from the masthead, two marines held it aloft, one
of them losing his life. And when the _Königsberg_, her task of
destruction complete, sailed off, the lone marine still held up
the Union Jack. The British ships in those waters made a systematic
hunt for her and located her at last, on the 30th of October. She was
hiding in her favorite rendezvous, some miles up the Rufigi River
in German East Africa. The ship which found her was the _Chatham_, a
second-class cruiser, with a draft much heavier than that of the
_Königsberg_, and the difference gave the latter a good advantage,
for she ran up the river and her enemy could not follow. Nor could
the English ship use her guns with much effect, for the gunners
could not make out the hull of the German ship through the tropical
vegetation along the river banks. All that the British ship could
do was to fire shells in her general direction and then guess what
effect they had. But to prevent her escape, colliers were sunk
at the mouth of the river. She had come to as inglorious an end
as her victim, the _Pegasus_.

The account of another raider, the _Kronprinz Wilhelm_, which left
New York on the evening that England declared war, with her bunkers
loaded with coal and other supplies for warships, has already been
related. The mystery concerning this sailing was cleared up when
she was caught coaling the _Karlsruhe_ in the Atlantic. Both ships
made off in safety that time, and soon after a British cruiser
reported that she had been heard in wireless communication with
the _Dresden_. Thereafter the fate of this ship remained a mystery
till she put in at Hampton Roads on April 11, 1915.

Most spectacular was the career of the _Emden_, a third-class cruiser,
which sailed from Japanese waters at the same time as the _Königsberg_.
Through the ability of her commander, Captain Karl von Müller, she
earned the soubriquet "Terror of the East," for by using a clever
system of supply ships she was able to raid eastern waters for
ten weeks without making a port or otherwise running the risk of
leaving a clue by which British ships might find her. Her favorite
occupation was that of stopping enemy merchantmen which she sank.
But her captain always allowed one--the last one--of her prizes to
remain afloat, and in this he sent to the nearest port the officers,
passengers, and crews of those that were destroyed. At times he
used prizes as colliers, putting them under command of his petty
officers.

By way of diversion, Captain von Müller steamed into the harbor
of Madras in the Bay of Bengal and opened with his guns on the
suburbs of the town, setting on fire two huge oil tanks there.
The fort there returned the fire, but the _Emden_ after half an
hour sailed away unharmed. She had been enabled to come near the
British guns on shore by flying the French flag, which she continued
to display until her guns began to boom. She then left the waters of
Bengal Bay, but not before she had ended the journey of $30,000,000
worth of exports to India, and had sent to the bottom of the sea
some $15,000,000 worth of imports. Twenty-one steamers had been
her victims, their total value having been about $3,250,000, and
their cargoes were worth at least $15,000,000. Very expensive the
British found her, and they were willing to go to any length to
end her career. They curtailed her activities somewhat when the
_Yarmouth_ captured the converted liner _Markomannia_, which was one
of her colliers, and recaptured the Greek freighter _Pontoporos_,
which had been doing the same duty. This took place off the coast
of Sumatra.

But Von Müller was undaunted, even though his coal problem was
becoming serious. He knew that the _Yarmouth_ had sailed from Penang
near Malacca and that she was not at that base, since she was searching
for his own vessel. He therefore conceived the daring exploit of
making a visit to Penang while the _Yarmouth_ was still away. He
came within ten miles of the harbor on the 28th of October, and
disguised his ship by erecting a false funnel made of canvas upheld
by a wooden frame, much like theatrical scenery. This gave the
_Emden_ four funnels, such as the _Yarmouth_ carried. Coming into
the harbor in the twilight of the dawn, she was taken by those on
shore to be the British ship, not a hostile gun ready for her.

Lying in the harbor was the Russian cruiser _Jemchug_ and three
French destroyers and a gunboat. The watch on the Russian ship
questioned her, and was told by the wireless operator on the _Emden_
that she was the _Yarmouth_ returning to anchor. By this ruse the
German ship was enabled to come within 600 yards of the Russian ship
before the false funnel was discovered. Fire immediately spurted
from the Russian guns, but a torpedo from the _Emden_ struck the
_Jemchug's_ engine room and made it impossible for her crew to get
ammunition to her guns. Von Müller poured steel into her from a
distance of 250 yards with terrible effect. The Russian ship's list
put many of her guns out of action, and she was unable to deliver
an effective reply. Another torpedo from the _Emden_ exploded her
magazine. Fifteen minutes after the firing of the first shot the
Russian had gone to the bottom.

Von Müller now put the prow of the _Emden_ to sea again, for he
feared that both the _Yarmouth_ and the French cruiser _Dupleix_
had by then been summoned by wireless. Luck was with him. Half an
hour after leaving the harbor he sighted a ship flying a red flag,
which showed him at once that she was carrying a cargo of powder. He
badly needed the ammunition, and he prepared to capture her. But
this operation was interrupted by a mirage, which caused the small
French destroyer _Mosquet_ to appear like a huge battleship. When
he discovered the truth, Von Müller closed with the Frenchman, who
came to the rescue of the _Glenturret_, the powder ship. Destroyer
and cruiser closed for a fight, the former trying to get close
enough to make work with torpedoes possible, but the long range
of the _Emden's_ guns prevented this, and the _Mosquet_ was badly
damaged by having her engine room hit. Soon she was in a bad way,
and Von Müller ordered his guns silenced, thinking the destroyer
would now give up the fight. But the Frenchman was valiant and
refused to do so; he let go with two torpedoes which did not find
their mark, and was immediately subjected to a withering fire,
which caused his ship to sink, bow first.

One of the destroyers which had been in the harbor now came out
to take issue with the _Emden_, but it was the business of the
latter to continue destroying merchant ships and not to run the
risk of having her career ended by a warship, so she immediately
put off for the Indian Ocean. A storm which then came up permitted
her to make a better escape.

It was not until the 9th of November that the world at large heard
more of her, and it proved to be the last day of her reign of terror.
There was a British wireless and cable station on the Cocos (Keeling)
Isles, southwest of Java, and Von Müller had determined to interrupt
the communication maintained there connecting India, Australia,
and South Africa. Forty men and three officers, with three machine
guns, were detailed by him as a landing party to destroy instruments
and cut the cables. But such a thing had been partially forestalled
by the British authorities, who had set up false cable ends. These
were destroyed by the deceived Germans. When the _Emden_ had first
made her appearance the news had been sent out by the wireless
operator on shore, not knowing what ships would pick up his calls.

This time luck was against Von Müller, for it so happened that a
convoy of troop ships from Australia was passing within one hundred
miles. They were accompanied by the Australian cruisers _Melbourne_
and _Sydney_. The latter was dispatched to go to the Cocos Islands,
and by getting up a speed of 26 knots she reached them in less than
three hours. Von Müller knew that escape by flight was impossible,
for his ship had been weeks at sea; her boilers were crusted, her
machinery badly in need of repair, and she had not too much coal.
He therefore decided to give battle, and went straight for the
_Sydney_ at full speed. His object was to meet her on even terms,
for her advantage was that her guns had much greater range than
those of the _Emden_. If he could get close enough he might be
able to use his torpedo tubes. But Captain Glossop of the _Sydney_
saw through this maneuver and maintained good distance between the
two ships. About the first shot from the _Emden_ killed the man
at the range finder on the fore bridge of the _Sydney_. Captain
Glossop was standing within a few feet of him at the time.

The replies from the Australian ship were fatal. The foremost funnel
of the _Emden_ crumpled and fell; her fire almost ceased, and then
she began to burn; the second funnel and the third fell also; there
was nothing left but to beach her, which Von Müller did, just before
noon. While she lay there helpless the _Sydney_ shot more steel
into her, leaving her quite helpless, and then went off to chase
a merchant ship which had been sighted during the fighting and
which, when caught, proved to be the British ship _Buresk_, now
manned by Germans and doing duty as collier to the _Emden_. Returning
to the latter, Captain Glossop saw that she still flew the German
flag at her masthead. He signaled her, asking whether she would
surrender, but receiving no reply after waiting five minutes he
let her have a few more salvos. The German flag came down and the
white flag went up in its place. The _Jemchug_ had been avenged,
and the terribly costly career of the _Emden_ brought to an end.
Von Müller was taken prisoner, and on account of his valor was
permitted to keep his sword. But the landing party, which had cut
the false cables, was still at large. The adventures of these three
officers and forty men form a separate story, which will be narrated
later.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXXVI

BATTLE OFF THE FALKLANDS

The defeat of the British squadron back in the first week of November
had sorely tried the patience of the British public, and the admiralty
felt the necessity of retrieving faith in the navy. Von Spee was
still master of the waters near the Horn, and till his ships had
again been met the British could not boast of being rulers of the
waves. Consequently Admiral Fisher detailed the two battle cruisers
_Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ to go to the Falkland Islands. They
left England November 11, 1914, and on the outward journey met
with and took along the light cruisers _Carnarvon, Kent_, and
_Cornwall_, the second-class cruiser _Bristol_, and the converted
liner _Macedonia_. The _Canopus_ and the _Glasgow_, now repaired,
all joined the squadron, which was commanded by Admiral Sturdee. The
vessels coaled at Stanley, Falkland Islands, and while so engaged
on December 8 were warned by a civilian volunteer watcher on a
near-by hill that two strange vessels had made their appearance
in the distance. British naval officers identified them and other
vessels which were coming into view as the ships of Von Spee's
squadron, the one which had been victorious off Coronel.

During the interval that had elapsed since that engagement these
German ships had not been idle. Von Spee knew that the _Glasgow_
had gone to the Falklands and that there were important wireless
stations there, but he put off going after those prizes and picked
up others. The _Nürnberg_ had cut communication between Banfield
and Fanning Islands. Two British trading ships had fallen victims
to the _Dresden_, and four more had met the same end at the hands
of the _Leipzig_. For coal and other supplies Von Spee had been
relying on the Chilean ports, but now came trouble between him and
the port authorities, for England was accusing the South American
nation of acting without regard to neutrality. It was for this
reason that Von Spee turned southward to take the Falkland Islands.
The world at large, and of course Von Spee, had no knowledge of
the ships which had set out from Plymouth for the Falklands on
the eleventh of the month, so he approached in full expectation of
making not only a raid but for occupation. He knew that he would
have to exchange shots with the _Glasgow_ and perhaps some small
ships, and he believed the islands weakly defended by forts, but
there was nothing in that to defer his attack. The result--the
lookout near Stanley had reported the oncoming warships _Gneisenau_
and _Scharnhorst_, followed by the rest of the German squadron.
German guns were trained on the wireless station, and great was
the surprise of the unfortunate Von Spee and his officers when
there was heard the booming of guns which they knew immediately
must be mounted on warships larger than their own. Their scouting
had been defective, and the presence of the _Inflexible_ and
_Invincible_ had till then not been discovered. They then reasoned
that these were the guns of the _Canopus_--a critical and fatal
error.

The _Canopus_ from behind the hills fired on the German ships in
an endeavor to protect the wireless station. Beyond the range of
her guns hovered the lighter German cruisers _Dresden, Leipzig_,
and _Nürnberg_ to await the outcoming of the _Glasgow_. Both the
_Gneisenau_ and _Scharnhorst_ concentrated their fire on the _Canopus_,
and when the _Glasgow_, accompanied by the _Carnarvon, Cornwall_, and
_Kent_, made her appearance it did not change the battle formation
of the Germans, for the _Canopus_ was still the only large vessel
they were aware of. Now the _Leipzig_ came nearer in order to take
up the fight with the lighter British ships. By nine in the morning
the German ships were drawn out in single file, running parallel
with the shore in a northeasterly direction. At the head of the
line was the _Gneisenau_, followed by the _Dresden, Scharnhorst,
Nürnberg_, and _Leipzig_, in that order. They thought that this
would entice what they believed to be the whole of the British
force present into coming out for a running fight, and in which
the old _Canopus_ would be left behind to be finished after the
lighter vessels were done for. But all this time the _Invincible_
and _Inflexible_ were silent with their guns, though there was
bustle enough aboard them while their coaling was being hurried.

By ten o'clock these two larger ships were ready with steam up
and decks cleared, and they came out from behind the hills. Von
Spee saw that discretion was the better part of valor and gave
orders for his ships to make off at full speed. For a time the
two squadrons kept parallel to each other at a distance of twelve
miles, with the British squadron--the _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_
leading--north of the German ships. The _Baden_ and _Santa Isabel_,
two transports that had been part of the German squadron, were
unable to keep up with the others and headed south, pursued by
the _Bristol_ and _Macedonia_. The two British battle cruisers
were faster than any other ships in either squadron, and while
pulling up on the German ships were in danger of pulling away from
their own ships. To avoid the latter, Admiral Sturdee kept down
their speed and was content with taking a little longer to get
within gun range of Von Spee's ships. By two o'clock the distance
between them was about 16,000 yards; the _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_
had now left the rest of the British squadron far behind and took
issue with the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ respectively. The
remaining British ships, with the exception of the _Carnarvon_,
gave attention to the three lighter German cruisers and the _Eitel
Friedrich_, which had broken from the first formation and were
now pointing southeast.

Von Spee ordered the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ to turn broadside
to the enemy. Shells were falling upon the German ships with fair
accuracy, but their return fire could do little damage to the British
ships, because the range was a little too great for the German
8.2-inch guns. Those of the _Inflexible_ and _Invincible_ were of
the 12-inch type.

All four ships were belching forth heavy black smoke that hung
low over the water after it left the funnels. A moderate breeze
carried it northward, and Von Spee moved his ships this way and
that till his smoke blew straight against the guns of the British
ships, making it almost impossible for the British gunners to take
aim and note effect. But the superior speed of the two British
battle cruisers stood them in good stead, and their commanders
brought them up south of the enemy--on their other side. It was
now the German gunners who found the smoke in their faces, and
the advantage was with the British.

By three o'clock in the afternoon fire had broken out on the
_Scharnhorst_ and Von Spee replied to Sturdee's inquiry that he
would not quit fighting, though some of his guns were out of action
and those which still replied to the Britisher did now only at
intervals. There was evidently something wrong with the machinery
that brought shells and ammunition to her guns from out of her
hold, the fire probably interfering with it. A 12-inch shell cut
right through her third funnel and carried it completely off the
ship. She turned so that she could bring her starboard guns into
action, and they did so feebly. The fire on board her grew worse
and worse, and it could be seen blood-red through holes made by
the shells from the _Invincible_ whenever her hull showed through
the dense clouds of escaping steam that enveloped her. Just at
four o'clock she began to list to port, thus having her starboard
guns put out of action, for they pointed toward the sky, and the
shells which came from them described parabolas, dropping into
the water at safe distance from the English ship. More and more
she listed, till her port beam ends were in the cold waters of the
South Atlantic, and while in that position she sank some fifteen
minutes later.

Meanwhile the duel between the _Gneisenau_ and _Inflexible_ had
been going on. A 12-inch shell from one of the British cruisers
struck one of the after gun turrets of the _Gneisenau_ and swept
it overboard. The German ship used the sinking _Scharnhorst_ as a
screen and tried to take on both British ships. Still she was able
to plant some effective shells against the _Invincible_ as a final
reply. By half-past five she was listing heavily to starboard and
her engines had stopped. The British ship, thinking she was surely
done for, ceased firing at her and watched her for ten minutes,
while a single gun on board of her fired at intervals. The three
ships _Carnarvon, Inflexible_, and _Invincible_ now closed in on
her and punished her till the flag at her stern was hauled down.
But the ensign at her peak continued to fly. Just at six o'clock,
with this color still in position, she suddenly heeled to starboard,
while the men of her crew made hastily up her slanting decks and
then climbed over on to the exposed part of her upturned port side.
Many of these unfortunate men had time to jump into the sea, but
others were caught when she suddenly disappeared beneath the surface.

There remained the task of picking up her survivors, but they were
not numerous, for the shock of the cold water killed a large number.
Having picked up those whom they could, the three British ships
signaled the news of their victories to the distant cruisers which
were fighting it out with the _Dresden, Leipzig, Nürnberg_, and
_Eitel Friedrich_.

These lighter German cruisers had left the line of battle and had
turned southward at just about the time that the action between
the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ and _Inflexible_ and _Invincible_
began. They started off with the _Dresden_ at the foremost point
of a triangle and with the other two at the two remaining points.
The _Glasgow, Cornwall_, and _Kent_ went after them, while the
_Carnarvon_, because her speed was not high enough to accompany
them, remained with the battle cruisers. The _Glasgow_ drew up
with the German ships first, and at three o'clock began to fire
on the _Leipzig_ at a distance of 12,000 yards. As in the other
action of that afternoon, the British ship took advantage of the
fact that her guns had longer range, and she drew back from the
German ships so that their guns could not reach her, though her
own shells began to fall upon their decks. It was her object to
keep them busy until she could be joined by her accompanying ships.

[Illustration: VICE ADMIRAL SIR DOVETON STURDEE'S ACTION OFF THE
FALKLAND ISLANDS. DEC 8, 1914.

This plan shows the track followed by H.M.S. INVINCIBLE (Flagship,
Capt. P.T.H. Beamish) and H.M.S. INFLEXIBLE (Capt. R.F. Phillimore)
during an action which started at 1.0 pm and finished at 6.0 pm
resulting in the sinking of the German armoured cruisers SCHARNHORST
(Flagship of Vice Admiral Count Von Spee) and GNIESNAU. The LEIPSIG
was engaged and sunk by H.M.S. CORNWALL (Capt. W.M. Ellerton) and
H.M.S. GLASGOW (Capt. John Luce) in the near vicinity, also the
Nurnberg by H.M.S. KENT (Capt. J.D. Allen). H.M.S. CARNARVON (Flagship
of Rear Admiral R.P. Stoddart. Capt. H.L. D'E. Skipwith) was also
engaged with SCHARNHORST and GNIESNAU.]

The _Cornwall_ by four o'clock was also near enough to the _Leipzig_
to open fire on her, and three hours later the German cruiser was
having a time of it with a large fire in her hold. British faith
in heavy armament with long range had again been vindicated. There
was something of human interest in this duel between the _Glasgow_
and the _Leipzig_. In their previous meeting, off Coronel, the German
ship had had all the better of it and now the men of the British
ship were out for revenge. Consequently the _Glasgow_ signaled to
the other British ships: "Stand off--I can manage this myself!" By
eight o'clock in the evening the _Glasgow_ had her in bad condition,
and the _Carnarvon_ came up to assist in raking her till there was
nothing left but a mass of wreckage on her decks. But her flag
was still flying and the British ships kept circling around her,
thinking she still wished to fight, but not coming near enough
to permit the use of her torpedo tubes. Miserable was the plight
of the _Leipzig_'s crew, for the two hundred men who were still
alive were unable to get to her flag on account of the fire aboard
her, and they had to remain inactive while the _Carnarvon_ and
_Glasgow_ poured round after round into their ship. Only twelve
remained alive at nine o'clock, when she began to list to port.
Slowly more and more of the under-water part of her hull showed
above the sea, and she continued to heel until her keel was right
side up. In this position she sank, a large bubble marking the
spot.

When the _Nürnberg_ left the line of German ships at one o'clock,
it was the British cruiser _Kent_ that went after her, a vessel
more heavily armed than the German ship, yet about a knot slower.
But by hard work on the part of the engineers and stokers of the
_Kent_ she was able, by five o'clock, to get within firing distance
of the _Nürnberg_. By a strange trick of fate the _Kent_ was sister
ship to the _Monmouth_ which had fallen victim to one of the
_Nürnberg's_ torpedoes in the battle off Coronel. Here, too, was
a duel with human interest in it. In their desire for revenge,
the men of the _Kent_ made fuel of even her furniture in order
to speed up her engines. Her 6-inch guns now began to strike the
German ship, and soon a fire broke out aboard her. She could have
ended the German vessel by keeping a fire upon her while remaining
too distant to be within range of the _Nürnberg's_ 4-inch guns,
but dusk was gathering and an evening mist was settling down upon
the water. Consequently the _Kent_ drew nearer to her adversary.
The firing of the _Nürnberg_ was then effective and more than twenty
of her shells took good effect on the British ship. It was only
through prompt action on the part of her crew that her magazine was
kept from exploding, for a shell set fire to the passage leading
to it.

By seven o'clock in the evening the _Nürnberg_ was practically
"blind," for the flames from the fire that was raging on her had
reached her conning tower. A member of her crew hauled down her
flag, and the _Kent_, thinking that the fight was over, came close
to her. While within a few hundred yards of her, however, she was
greeted with new firing from the German cruiser. But this ceased
under a raking from the _Kent's_ starboard guns, and once again
the flag of the _Nürnberg_, which had been run up on resumption
of shooting, was hauled down. Members of her crew then had to jump
into the sea to escape death from burning--the fire was quenched
only when she went down at half past seven. The overworked engineers
and stokers of the _Kent_ were rewarded for their hard work by being
permitted to come on deck to watch the _Nürnberg_ go down, and
all were soon engaged in helping to save the lives of the German
sailors in the water. Just as the red glow of the sinking _Nürnberg_
was dying down a large four-masted sailing ship, with all sails
set, came out of the mist, her canvas tinged red by the flames'
rays. Silently she went by, disappearing again into the mist, a
weird addition to an uncanny scene.

Chasing the various units of the broken line of German ships had
taken the British ships miles from each other, but after ten o'clock
they began to reach each other by wireless signals and all made
again for Stanley. It was not until the afternoon of the next day,
however, that word came from the _Kent_, for her pursuit had taken
her farther than any of the other British ships.

The _Bristol_ and _Macedonia_ had made good in their pursuit of
the _Santa Isabel_ and _Baden_, but in going after the _Dresden_
the _Bristol_ was not successful; the German ship got away in the
rainstorm which came up during the evening, and the _Bristol_, which
had hurried out of the harbor at Stanley not quite ready for battle,
was unable to keep on her trail. The fast _Eitel Friedrich_, which
as a merchant ship converted into a man-o'-warsman had greater
speed than any of the ships on either side, was able to get away
also. These two German ships now took up their parts as raiders
of allied commerce, and were not accounted for till months later.
There was now on the high seas no German squadron.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXXVII

SEA FIGHTS OF THE OCEAN PATROL

There were some minor naval operations in the waters of Europe which
have been neglected while larger actions elsewhere were recorded.
During the month of September, 1914, the British admiralty established
a blockade of the mouth of the River Elbe with submarines, and the
German boats of the same type were showing their worth also. On
August 28, 1914, the day after the raid on Libau by the German
cruiser _Augsburg_, the date of the battle of the Bight of Helgoland,
the two Russian protected cruisers _Pallada_ and _Bayan_, while
patrolling the Russian coast in the Baltic Sea, were attacked by
German submarines. Surrounded by these small craft, which made
poor targets, the two Russian ships sought to escape by putting
on full speed, but the former was hit by a torpedo and sank. The
other got away.

All of the Allies, with the exception of France, had by the beginning
of September, 1914, suffered losses in their navies. The navy of the
republic was engaged in assisting a British fleet in maintaining
supremacy in the Mediterranean, and kept the Austrian fleet bottled
up in the Adriatic Sea. French warships bombarded Cattaro on September
10, 1914, to assist the military operations of the Montenegrin
Government. These ships then proceeded to the island of Lissa and
there destroyed the wireless station maintained by Austria. The
Austrian navy made no appearance while the allied fleets scoured
the lower coast of Dalmatia, bringing down lighthouses, destroying
wireless stations, and bombarding the islands of Pelagosa and Lesina.
On the 19th of September, 1914, they returned to Lissa and landed
a force which took possession of it, thus establishing a new naval
base against the Central Powers' navies.

Duels between pairs of ships took place in various seas. The career
of the raider _Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse_, a fast converted liner,
was ended by the British ship _Highflyer_, a cruiser, near the Cape
Verde Islands, on August 27, 1914, after the former had sunk the
merchantman _Hyades_ and had stopped the mail steamer _Galician_.
The greater speed of the German vessel was of no advantage to her,
for she had been caught in the act of coaling. What then transpired
was not a fight, for in armament the two were quite unequal. She
soon sank under the _Highflyer's_ fire, her crew having been rescued
by her colliers.

The next duel took place between the _Carmania_ and _Cap Trafalgar_,
British and German converted liners, respectively. They met on
September 14, 1914, in the Atlantic off South America. In view of
the fact that at the beginning of the war these two ships had been
merchantmen and had been armed and commissioned after the outbreak
of hostilities, this engagement was something of the nature of those
between privateersmen in the old days. In speed, size, and armament
they were about equal. For nearly two hours they exchanged shots
between 3,000 and 9,000 yards, and markmanship was to determine
the victory. The shots from the _Carmania_ struck the hull of the
other ship near the water line repeatedly, and the British commander
was wise enough to present his stern and bow ends more often than
the length of the _Carmania's_ sides. At the end of the fight the
German ship was afire and sank. Her crew got off safely in her
colliers, and the British ship made off because her wireless operator
heard a German cruiser, with which the _Cap Trafalgar_ had been in
communication, signaling that she was hastening to the liner's
aid.

Only two days before this the British cruiser _Berwick_ captured
the converted liner _Spreewald_ in the North Atlantic, where she
had been trying to interrupt allied commercial vessels.

Germany kept up her policy of attrition by clever use of submarines
and mines. The British battleship _Audacious_, while on patrol
duty off the coast of Ireland in the early days of the war, met
with a disaster of some sort and was brought to her home port in
a sinking condition. The rigors of the British censorship almost
kept the news of this out of the British papers and from the
correspondents of foreign papers. It was reported that she had
struck a mine, that she had been torpedoed, and that she had been
made the victim of either a spy or a traitor who caused an internal
explosion. The truth was never made clear. Rumors that she had
gone down were denied by the British admiralty some months later,
when they reported her repaired and again doing duty, but this was
counteracted by a report that one of the ships that was completed
after the start of hostilities had been given the same name.

About the sinking of the _Hawke_ there was less conjecture. This
vessel had gained notoriety in times of peace by having collided
with the _Olympic_ as the latter left port on her maiden voyage
to New York. On the 15th of October, 1914, while patrolling the
northern British home waters she was made the target of the torpedo
of a German submarine and went down, but the _Theseus_, which had
been attacked at the same time, escaped.

Four German destroyers were to be the next victims of the war in
European waters. On October 17, 1914, the _S-115, S-117, S-118_, and
_S-119_ while doing patrol duty off the coast of the Netherlands,
came up with a British squadron consisting of the cruiser _Undaunted_
and the destroyers _Legion, Lance_, and _Loyal_. An engagement
followed, in which damage was done to the British small boats and
the four German destroyers were sunk. Captain Fox, senior British
officer, had been on the _Amphion_ when she sank the _Königin Luise_
and had been rescued after being knocked insensible by the explosion
of the mine that sent the _Amphion_ to the bottom.

The exploit of Lieutenant Commander Horton in the British submarine
_E-9_ when he sank the _Hela_ has already been narrated. The same
commander, with the same craft, during the first week of October,
1914, proceeded to the harbor of the German port of Emden, whence
had sailed many dangerous German submarines and destroyers that
preyed on British ships. He lay submerged there for a long period,
keeping his men amused with a phonograph, and then carefully came
to the surface. Through the periscope he saw very near him a German
destroyer, but he feared that the explosion of a torpedo sent against
her would damage his own craft, so he allowed her to steam off,
and when she was 600 yards away he let go with two torpedoes. The
second found its mark, and the _S-126_ was no more. He immediately
went beneath the surface and escaped the cordon of destroyers which
immediately searched for him. By October 7 the _E-9_ was back in
Harwich, its home port.

On the 31st of October, 1914, the cross-channel steamer _Invicta_
received the S. O. S. signal and went to rescue the crew of the old
British cruiser _Hermes_, which had been struck by two torpedoes
from a German submarine near Dunkirk. All but forty-four of her
men were saved.

The next victim of a German submarine was the gunboat _Niger_,
which, in the presence of thousands of persons on the shore at
Deal, foundered without loss of life on November 11, 1914. But one
of the German submarines was to go to the bottom in retaliation.
On the 23d of November the _U-18_ was seen and rammed off the Scotch
coast, and some hours later was again seen near by. This time she
was floating on the surface and carrying a white flag. The British
destroyer _Garry_ brought up alongside of lier and took off her
crew, just as she foundered.

Three days later the _Bulwark_, a British battleship of 15,000 tons
and carrying a crew of 750 officers and men, was blown up in the
Thames while at anchor at Sheerness. It was never discovered whether
she was a victim of a torpedo, a mine, or an internal explosion. It
is possible that a spy had placed a heavy charge of explosives
within her hull. Only fourteen men of her entire complement survived
the disaster.

It was in November, 1914, also, that the sometime German cruisers
_Goeben_ and _Breslau_, now flying the Turkish flag, became active
again. As units in a Turkish fleet they bombarded unfortified ports
on the Black Sea on the first day of the month. Retaliation for
this was made by the Allies two days later when a combined fleet
of French and English battleships bombarded the Dardanelles forts,
inflicting a certain amount of damage.

On the 18th of November, 1914, the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ engaged
a Russian fleet off Sebastopol. The composition of this Russian
fleet was never made public by the Russian admiralty, but it is
known that the Russian battleship _Evstafi_ was the flagship. She
came up on the starboard side of the two German ships and opened
fire on the nearer, the _Goeben_, at a distance of 8,000 yards.
The latter, hit by the Russian 12-inch guns was at first unable
to reply because the first shots set her afire in several places,
but she finally let go with her own guns and after a fourteen-minute
engagement she sailed off into a fog. Her sister ship the _Breslau_
took no part in the exchange of shots, and also made off. The damage
done to the _Goeben_ was not enough to put her out of commission;
the _Evstafi_ suffered slight damage and had twenty-four of her
crew killed.

While the daring exploits of German submarines were winning the
admiration of the entire world for their operations in the northern
naval theatre of war, the British submarine commander, Holbrook,
with the _B-ll_ upheld the prestige of this sort of craft in the
British navy. He entered the waters of the Dardanelles on the 13th
of December, 1914, and submerging, traveled safely through five
lines of Turkish mines and sent a torpedo against the hull of the
Turkish battleship _Messudiyeh_. The _B-ll_ slowly came to the
surface to see what had been the result of her exploit, and her
commander, through the periscope saw her going down by the stern.
It was claimed later by the British that she had sunk, a claim
which was officially denied by the Turks. Her loss to Turkey, if
it did occur, was not serious, for she was too old to move about,
and her only service was to guard the mine fields. The _B-ll_ after
being pursued by destroyers again submerged for nine hours and
came successfully from the scene of the exploit.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXXVIII

WAR ON GERMAN TRADE AND POSSESSIONS

With the exceptions of the deeds done by the German sea raiders
the remaining naval history of the first six months of the war had
to do for the most part with British victories. When Von Spee's
squadron, with the exception of the light cruiser _Dresden_, which
was afterward sunk at the Island of Juan Fernandez, was dispersed
off the Falkland Islands there was no more possibility of there
being a pitched fight between German and British fleets other than
in the North Sea.

England began then to hit at the outlying parts of the German Empire
with her navy. The cruiser _Pegasus_, before being destroyed by
the _Königsberg_ at Zanzibar on September 20, 1914, had destroyed
a floating dock and the wireless station at Dar-es-Salaam, and
the _Yarmouth_, before she went on her unsuccessful hunt for the
_Emden_, captured three German merchantmen.

As far back as the middle of August, 1914, the capture of German
Samoa had been planned and directed from New Zealand. On the 15th
of that month an expedition sailed from Wellington, and in order
to escape the _Gneisenau_ and _Scharnhorst_, went first to French
New Caledonia, where the British cruisers _Psyche, Philomel_, and
_Pyramus_ were met with. On the 23d of the month, this force, which
was augmented by the French cruiser _Montcalm_ and the Australian
battleships _Australia_ and _Melbourne_, sailed first for the Fiji
Islands and then to Apia on Upolu Island off Samoa. They reached
there on the 30th. There was, of course, no force on the island
to withstand that of the enemy, and arrangements for surrender
of the place were made by signal. Marines were sent ashore; the
public buildings were occupied, the telegraph and telephone wires
cut, the wireless station destroyed and the German flag hauled
down, to be replaced by the Union Jack. The Germans taken prisoners
were rewarded for the kind treatment they had accorded British
residents before the appearance of this British force, and were
sent to New Zealand.

The next German possession to be taken was that in the Bismarck
Archipelago. It was known that there was a powerful wireless station
at Herbertshöhen, the island known as New Pomerania. A small landing
party was put ashore on the island in the early morning of September
11, 1914, and made its way, without being discovered, to the town.
The surprised inhabitants were too frightened to do anything until
this party left to go further on to the wireless station. By that
time it met with some resistance, but overcame it. A few days later
another landing party had captured the members of the staff of the
governor of New Pomerania, together with the governor himself, at
Bougainville, Solomon Islands, whence they had fled. The wireless
stations on the island of Yap, in the Carolines, and on Pleasant
Island were destroyed during the following month.

Perhaps the strangest operations of naval character ever performed
were the inland "sea" fights in Africa. The great Nyassa Lake in
Africa was the scene of this fighting. With its entire western
shore in British possession and with a goodly part of its waters
within the territory of German East Africa, it was not unnatural
that fighting should take place there. Both countries maintained
small armed vessels on the lake. The British ship _Gwendolen_,
a 350-ton craft, had been built on the Clyde and had been sent
to Nyassa Lake in sections and there assembled and launched in
1898. During August she fought with a German ship and captured
it. The fighting on the lake could not, however, determine the
success of the military operations taking place in those regions.

The preponderance of British naval strength was beginning to tell
severely upon German trade by the end of 1914, and her boast that
through her navy she would starve out Germany aroused the German
Government greatly. In answer to these British threats, Grand Admiral
von Tirpitz, German Secretary of Marine, in an interview given
to an American newspaper correspondent, hinted that Germany's
retaliation would be a war on British merchant ships by German
submarines.

The interview at the time aroused but mild comment; the idea was
a new one, and the question immediately arose as to whether such
action would be within the limits of international law. For the
time being, however, Von Tirpitz's words remained nothing more
than a threat. It was not until months later that the threat was
made good, and the consequences must form a separate part of this
narrative, to be given in Volume III.

The seaplane, the newest naval machine at the time, and as yet an
untried factor, was to see maiden service first at the hands of
the British, when on the 25th of December a raid on Cuxhaven was
made. Seven naval seaplanes attacked a fleet of German cruisers and
destroyers lying off Schilling Roads near the German port. The men
who thus made history in aviation were Francis E. T. Hewlett, son
of the famous novelist, accompanied by seven pilots. A naval force
consisting of a light cruiser, a flotilla of destroyers and another
of submarines brought up near Helgoland during the morning. When
this naval force was first discovered by the lookouts on Helgoland,
there immediately appeared approaching from the German base two
Zeppelins and a number of German seaplanes, together with some
submarines. Meanwhile, from the decks of the British craft there
went up the seven British seaplanes.

In order to give them a place for landing after they returned from
their raid, it was necessary for the British ships to remain in
the vicinity for three hours. The _Undaunted_ and _Arethusa_, with
the rest of the British force, had to "dance" about, dodging the
submarines which were attacking them from beneath the surface of
the water and the aircraft hovering over them. Bombs dropped from
the latter failed to find their targets, and by swift maneuvering
the torpedoes shot at them were also caused to go far wide of the
mark.

The British airmen dropped their bombs on points of military importance
at Cuxhaven, but their effect was kept secret by the German authorities.
Six of the seven returned to the squadron and were picked up by
submarines. Three of the seaplanes were wrecked and had to be abandoned.
Fog not only prevented the British airmen from doing their best
work, but it kept the marksmen on the German aircraft also from
hitting the ships on the waters beneath them. This raid had been
made in answer to a great outcry that had gone up from the British
public after German warships had raided the eastern coast of England.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XXXIX

RAIDS ON THE ENGLISH COAST

During the first days of November, 1914, the Germans planned and
carried out a general surprise for the British navy. After the battle
in the Bight of Helgoland, back in August, the British thought that
Germany would continue to keep her navy within the protection of
her coast defenses, perhaps forever. But such was not her intention.

On the afternoon of November 2,1914, there gathered off some part
of Germany's northern shore a squadron consisting of the battle
cruisers _Von der Tann, Seydlitz_, and _Moltke_, the protected
cruisers _Kolberg, Strassburg_, and _Graudenz_, the armored cruisers
_Yorck_ and _Blücher_, together with some destroyers. The slowest
of these vessels could make a speed of 25 knots, and the fastest,
the _Graudenz_ and _Moltke_, could make 28 knots. The guns of the
_Blücher_ were the heaviest in the squadron, those of her primary
battery being 12-inch cannon. Ten-inch guns were on the decks of
the other ships.

The first that the rest of the world knew of the gathered force
was at evening, November 2, 1914, when a fleet of British fishermen
hailed them with friendly signs, thinking them British ships, not
far from Lowestoft some time after six o'clock. The fishermen started
at once for their home ports in order to apprise the British
authorities, but they had not gone far when the news was flashed to
the British admiralty office from the wireless room of the British
gunboat _Halcyon_. But only the first few words of the warning
were able to get through, for the wireless operators on the German
ships "jammed" their keys, and a few shots from the German guns
were sufficient to bring down the wireless apparatus of the gunboat
as well as one of her funnels. She turned off and made for her
home port to report the news some hours later.

It was only ten miles from the British shores that the _Halcyon_
had sighted the German ships, but they were able, nevertheless,
to elude all British warships in those regions and proceeded to
Yarmouth, firing at the wireless station, the naval yards, and the
town itself. Fearing mines near the coast, the German commander
did not attempt to come in too close, with the result that many
of the German shots fell short, and, in spite of the fact that
the bombardment lasted for nearly half an hour, the damage done
by them was not great.

The inhabitants of the towns of Lowestoft and Yarmouth were asleep
in the early hours of the morning when they first heard the booming
of the German guns. In the darkness of the British winter they
hurriedly went down to the water front, where, far out at sea,
they could make out faintly the hull of but one vessel, but the
red flashes from the booming guns showed that other ships were
present. The crowds on the shore watched two British destroyers
and two submarines, which had been lying in the harbor, put out
after the German force. The latter by that time had started off,
dropping in its wake a number of floating mines. This strategy
resulted in the loss of the submarine _D-5_, which hit one of the
mines and sank immediately. The German cruiser _Yorck_ was claimed
by the British to have hit a mine also, with the result that she
sank and carried down with her some 300 of her crew. This was denied
later by the German admiralty, and like all such controversies
must remain a secret with the officials of both Governments.

Judged by material effects, this raid was a failure. But in view of
the fact that the Germans had shown that a squadron could actually
elude the large number of British warships patrolling the North
Sea, and was actually able to strike at the British coast, it was
a moral victory for Germany.

"We must see clearly that in order to fight with success we must
fight ruthlessly, in the proper meaning of the word." These were the
words of Count Reventlow, when he heard the news of the defeat of
the German squadron commanded by Von Spee off the Falkland Islands.
As a result, and in revenge for this defeat, the German admiralty
planned a second raid on the coast towns of England. The towns chosen
for attack this time were Hartlepool, Scarborough, and Whitby. The
first of these was a city of 100,000 persons, and its principal
business was shipbuilding. Scarborough was nothing more than a
seaside resort, to which each summer and at Christmas were attracted
thousands of Englishmen who sought to spend their vacations near the
water. Whitby, though it had some attractions for holiday crowds,
such as a quaint cathedral, was at most nothing more than a home
port for a number of fishing boats.

It was claimed later by the Germans that these three towns, according
to the accepted definitions in international law, were fortified
ports, and consequently open to attack by hostile forces. In reply
the British claimed that there was nothing in any of the three
which could bring them into that category. This controversy is
still another which must remain undecided. There is, however, the
fact that the information which the German Government had obtained
about them, and which it made public, must necessarily have been
less comprehensive than that supplied to the world at large by
the British authorities. Guidebooks, as well as tourists who have
visited the place, reported that an old castle stood in Scarborough
which in past centuries had been a fort, but which at the outbreak
of the war was nothing more than a show place. The only gun in
place at the castle was an obsolete piece that had seen service
in the Crimean War. Whitby, in times of peace, at least, had not
even such "armament."

It was on the 16th of December, 1914, that this second raid took
place. Over the North Sea there hung a light mist. The German admiralty
did not afterward make public the names of the cruisers which
participated in this expedition, but they are believed to have been
the _Derfflinger, Blücher, Von der Tann, Seydlitz_, and _Graudenz_.
It was at eight o'clock in the morning that the residents of the
three English towns first heard the booming of the German guns,
and coast guards near by were able, with the aid of very strong
glasses, to make out the hulls of the attacking cruisers some miles
out to sea. It was not thought possible that the Germans could
again elude the British ships on patrol in these waters, and the
guards therefore thought that the firing came from ships flying the
Union Jack and tried to signal to them. But they came to realize
the truth when they received no answering signals.

As it was not known but that the Germans would make an attempt
to land, the guards in the obsolete fort at Hartlepool took their
positions and two small patrol boats in the harbor made ready to
give what resistance they could. These, the _Doon_ and the _Hardy_,
drew the fire of the German guns, and, seeing it was impossible to
withstand the German fire, they made off and escaped. This time
the Germans were better informed about the conditions they dealt
with, and evidently had no fear of mines, for they came to within
two miles of the shore. The forts on shore were bombarded and private
houses near by were hit by German shells, killing two women who
lived in one of them. The forts tried to reply to the German guns,
but those of the English battery were by no means modern, and firing
them only served to further convince the Germans that the place
was fortified; they inflicted no damage on the German ships.

The lighthouse was the next target chosen by the Germans, one of
their shells going right through it, but leaving it standing. Within
fifty minutes 1,500 German shells were fired into the town and harbor.
While two of the three cruisers which were engaged in bombarding
drew off further to sea and fired at Hartlepool, the third remained
to finish the battery on shore, but in spite of the fact that it
was subjected to long and heavy firing, it was not so terribly
damaged. Many of the shells from the other two ships went over
the towns entirely and buried themselves in the countryside that
heretofore had been turned up only by the peaceful plow. Other shells
did havoc in the business and residential sections of Hartlepool
and West Hartlepool, bringing down buildings and killing civilians
in them as well as on the streets.

At about the same hour the coast guards near Scarborough reported
the approach of foreign ships off the coast, and then telephoned
that the strangers were German cruisers and that they had begun
to bombard the town. A German shell destroyed the shed from which
the telephone message had come and the warnings from it ceased.
It was seen by those on shore that the attack here was being made
by four ships, two of them cruisers and two of them mine layers,
only 800 yards out in the water. This time they were not handicapped
by the fact that they had to stand out so far from shore, and it
was a surprise to the natives to see ships of such draft come so
close to land--a fact which convinced the British authorities that
spies had been at work since the first raid, sending to the German
admiralty either charts or detailed descriptions of the region.

The castle was badly damaged by their fire; the town itself came
next, the Grand Hotel coming in for its share of destruction. They
did little injury to a wireless station in the suburbs, but hit
quite a number of residences, the gas and water works.

Half an hour afterward the two cruisers which had fired upon Scarborough
appeared off Whitby and began to fire at the signal station there.
In the ten minutes that the bombardment of Whitby lasted some 200
shells fell into the place. This time the fact that the German
ships came close to the shore worked against them, for there are
high cliffs close to the water at the spot and it was necessary
for the German gunners to use a high angle, which did not give them
much chance to be accurate. The German ships next turned seaward
and made for their home ports.

The scenes enacted in the three towns during the bombardment and
afterwards were tragic. Considering the fact, however, that the
persons under fire were civilians, many of them women and children,
their coolness was remarkable. They did not know what should be
done, for the thought of bombardment was the last thing that had
come into the minds of the authorities when England went to war,
and as a result no instructions for such an emergency had been
issued by the authorities. Some thought it best to stay within
doors, some thought it best to go into the streets. In Hartlepool
a large crowd gathered in the railway station, some fully dressed,
some only in night clothes.

Many of the women carried babies in their arms and were followed
by older children who clung to their skirts. Policemen led this
crowd out of the station and started them along a street which
would bring them out into the country, but while they were passing
the library they were showered by the stone work as it fell when hit
by the German shells. One shell, striking the street itself, killed
three of the six children who were fleeing along it in company with
their mother. Many other persons met deaths as tragic either within
their own homes or on the streets. St. Mary's Catholic Church as well
as the Church of St. Hilda were damaged, as were the shipyards and
the office of the local newspaper. The destruction of the gas works
left the town in almost complete darkness for many nights afterward.
The authorities issued a proclamation ordering all citizens to
remain indoors for a time, and then began to count the number of
dead and injured. The first estimate gave the former as 22 and the
latter as 50, but subsequent reckoning showed that both figures
were too low.

In Scarborough most of the inhabitants were still in bed when the
bombardment started and for a few minutes did not become excited,
thinking the booming of the guns was the sound of thunder. But when
the shells began to drop on their houses they knew better. Many were
killed or wounded while they hastily got into their clothes. One
shell hit St. Martin's Church while communion was being held. Here,
too, the railway station was made the objective of many refugees,
and the police did what they could to send the women and children
out of range of fire by putting them on trains of extra length.
As in all such scenes there were humorous sides to it. One old
workman, while hurrying along a street was heard to say: "This is
what comes of having a Liberal Government." In all, about 6,000
people left the town immediately and did not return for some days.

Similar were the scenes enacted in Whitby when the turn of that
town came. Only two persons were killed in that town, while thirteen
casualties were reported from Scarborough.

The raid immediately became the subject for discussion in the newspapers
of every country on the globe. In England it was bitterly denounced,
and the term "baby killers" was applied to the men of the German
navy. In Germany it was justified on the ground that the German
admiralty had information and proof that the bombarded cities were
fortified, and therefore, under international law, subject to
bombardment. Nor did the German journalists lose the opportunity
to declare that Great Britain no longer ruled the waves nor to
show pride over the fact that their fleet had successfully left
the German coast and had successfully returned to its home port.
The war, they said--and truthfully--had been brought to England's
door.

The year 1914 ended gloomily for the British public; nothing could
have disappointed them more than the failure to catch the Germans.
Nor did the new year open brightly for Britain, for on the first
day of January, 1915, there came the news of disaster to the
_Formidable_, sister ship to the _Bulwark_. The lesson of the _Hogue,
Cressy_, and _Aboukir_ had not been learned, for this ship went
down under the same circumstances. While patrolling near Torbay
during a night on which there was a bright moon and a calm sea,
this ship, in company with seven other large ships unaccompanied by
a "screen" of destroyers, was hit by a torpedo fired from a German
submarine. Most of her crew were asleep when the torpedo struck and
damaged the engine room so much that no lights could be turned
on. In the darkness they hurried to the deck, which was slanting
from her list. In obedience to orders issued by the admiralty after
the sinking of the _Cressy_ and the ships with her, the rest of
the fleet immediately sailed away from the scene, so that no more
of them would be hit. Only a light cruiser stood by the sinking
_Formidable_. A second torpedo struck her and this had the effect
of letting water into her hold on the side which was slowly coming
out of the water. She took a position with even keel after that,
and this fact enabled most of her crew to get off safely before
she sank.

Once more the Germans were to attempt a raid on the coast cities
of England. The date of this third attempt was January 24, 1915.
This time the British were a bit better prepared, for a squadron
of battle cruisers, consisting of the _Lion, Tiger, Princess Royal,
New Zealand_, and _Indomitable_, put out from a port in the north
of England at about the same time that the Germans left their base.
All of these ships, with the exception of the last named, were
quite fast, having speeds of from 25 to 28.5 knots; they were at
the same time carrying heavy armament--13.5-inch guns in the main
batteries. In company with them went four cruisers of what is known in
England as the "town class"; these were the _Nottingham, Birmingham,
Lowestoft_, and _Southampton_, together with the three light cruisers
_Arethusa, Aurora_, and _Undaunted_, and a squadron of destroyers.
The German fleet which was engaged in this raid consisted of the
_Seydlitz, Moltke, Derfflinger_, and _Blücher_, in company with
a fleet of destroyers. The German ships were not quite as fast
as the English ships, nor did they carry guns of such range or
destructive power as their British opponents.

Early in the first hours of January 24, these two forces, unknown
to each other were steaming head on, the Germans taking a course
leading northwest and the English a course leading southeast. At
twenty minutes past seven in the morning the _Aurora_ first sighted
the enemy and engaged him immediately with her two 6-inch guns,
sending at the same time word of her discovery to Admiral Beatty.
Admiral Hipper, the German commander, as soon as he knew the enemy
had sighted him, turned about and started to steam in a southeasterly
direction.

In view of the results of this battle, it is best to go into the matter
of the tactics involved. Tactics may be of two kinds--spontaneous or
premeditated. When two hostile fleets meet on the high sea far from
the base of either, the object of each is the complete destruction of
the other, and the tactics employed are spontaneous. Such an action
was that off Coronel. But on a closed sea such as the North Sea
spontaneous tactics can rarely be used, for the reason that naval
bases are too near, and from these there may slyly come reenforcements
to one or the other or to both of the fighting fleets, making the
arrangement of traps an easy matter. This is particularly true
of the North Sea, on which it is possible for a fleet to leave
Cuxhaven early in the evening and to be at Scarborough early the
following morning. In addition, sailing is restricted because an
unusually large portion of its waters is too shallow to permit
of the passage of large ships.

The Germans on this occasion had arranged a trap. They knew that
after making two successful raids on the English coast the British
would keep even a closer watch for them. When they sailed from
their base, it was with the expectation of meeting a hostile force,
as was undoubtedly their expectation on the first two raids. But
they did not intend to fight matters out on high waters. What they
wanted to do was to get the British involved in a good running
engagement, steering a southeasterly course the while and luring
the British ships within striking force of a waiting fleet of
superdreadnoughts and perhaps land guns and mines. This explains
why Admiral Hipper turned stern as soon as he got into touch with
the enemy.

There was a distance of fourteen miles between the two fleets when
the _Lion_ got her heavy guns into action. The German line was off
her port (left) bow. At the head of that line was the _Moltke_,
and following her came the _Seydlitz, Derfflinger, Blücher_, and the
destroyers in the order given. At the head of the British line was
the _Lion_, followed by the _Tiger, Princess Royal, New Zealand_,
and _Indomitable_ in the order named. The other cruisers and the
destroyers of the British fleet brought up the rear. In the chase
which followed the Germans were handicapped by the fact that the
_Blücher_ was far too slow to be brought into action, which meant that
either the other ships must leave her behind to certain destruction
or that they must slow down to keep with her. They chose the latter
course, while her stokers did their best to increase her speed. In
the English fleet there was the same trouble with the _Indomitable_,
but inasmuch as the British were the pursuers and had a preponderance
in ships and in the range of their guns, this did not matter so
much to them. But the stokers of the _Indomitable_ worked as hard,
if not harder, than those of the _Blücher_.

By half past nine the two forces were seven miles apart and the
battle was on. It is necessary here to give certain facts about
gunnery on a large modern battleship. Firing at a range of seven
miles means a test of mathematics rather than of the mere matter of
pointing guns. At that distance the target--the ship to be hit--is
barely visible on the sky line on the clearest and calmest sea. If a
hole the size of the head of a pin be made in a piece of cardboard
and the latter he held about a foot and a half from the eye, the
distant ship will just about fill the hole.

The guns on the modern battleships are not "laid"; that is, they
are not aimed as were the cannon of past days or the rifle of today.
It is set toward its target by two factors. The first is known as
"traverse," which means how far to the left or right it must be
pointed in a horizontal plane. The second factor is "elevation"--how
far up or down it must be pointed in a vertical plane. The latter
factor determines how far it will throw its projectile, and up to
a certain point the higher the gun is pointed the further will
go the shell. A certain paradox seems to enter here. It is a fact
that a distant ship presents a target more easily hit if its bow
or stern is toward the gunner. If it presents a broadside there
is the danger that the shells will go either beyond the ship or
will fall short of it, for the greatest beam on a warship is not
much more than 90 feet. If the bow or stern is toward the gunner
he has a chance of landing a shell on any part of the 600 or more
feet of the ship's length. The first firing in a battle at a distance
is known as "straddling," by which is meant that a number of shots
are sent simultaneously, some falling short, some falling beyond
the target, and some hitting it.

The man who really "aims" the gun never sees what he is shooting at.
At some point of vantage on his ship one of the officers observes the
enemy and reports to the chief gunner the distance, the direction,
and the effect of the first shots. The gunnery officer then makes
certain calculations, taking into consideration the speed of his
own ship and the speed of the enemy ship. He knows that at a given
moment his target will be at a given point. He knows also just how
fast his shells will travel and makes calculations that enable him
to place a shell at that point at just the right second. In this
battle the shells of the British ship took about twenty seconds
to go from the mouths of the guns to the German hulls. And they
made a curve at the highest point of which they reached a distance
of more than two miles; and most wonderful of all was the fact
that at the beginning of the firing a man standing on the deck
of one of the German ships could not even see the ship which was
firing the shells at her, though the weather was very clear.

By a quarter to ten o'clock the _Lion_ had come up with and had
passed the slow _Blücher_, firing broadsides into her as she went
by. The _Tiger_ then passed the unfortunate German ship, also letting
her have a heavy fire, and then the _Princess Royal_ did likewise.
Finally the _New Zealand_ was able to engage her and later even
the slow _Indomitable_ got near enough to do so. By that time the
_Blücher_ was afire and one of her gun turrets, with its crew and
gun, had been swept off bodily by a British shell.

Meanwhile the _Lion, Tiger_, and _Princess Royal_ kept straight
ahead till they were able to "straddle" even the leading ship of
the enemy's line. The _Tiger_ and _Lion_ poured shells into the
_Seydlitz_, but were unable to do much damage to the _Moltke_.
While they were thus engaged the _Princess Royal_ singled out the
_Derfftinger_ for her target. The light British cruiser _Aurora,
Arethusa_, and _Undaunted_ were far ahead of the rest of the British
fleet and were firing at the _Moltke_, but thick black smoke which
poured from their funnels as their engines were speeded up got
between the gunners of the _Lion_ and their target, the _Moltke_,
completely obscuring the latter. As a result the three light British
cruisers were ordered to slow down and to take positions to the
rear.

By eleven o'clock there were fires raging on both the _Seydlitz_
and the _Derfftinger_, and Admiral Hipper decided to try to save
his larger ships by sacrificing the destroyers that accompanied
them. Consequently the German destroyers put their bows right toward
the large British ships and charged, but the fire which they drew
was too much for them and they gave up this maneuver.

The British destroyer _Meteor_, which had been maintaining a perilous
position between the battleships, then attempted to torpedo the
_Blücher_, which had fallen far to the rearward to be abandoned by
the rest of the German fleet. Badly damaged as the _Blücher_ was,
the crew of one of her guns managed to get in some final shots,
one of them nearly ending the career of the British destroyer. The
_Arethusa_ had also come up and prepared to launch a torpedo. Cruiser
and destroyer torpedoed her at about the same moment, and later,
while within 200 yards of the sinking German ship the _Arethusa_
sent another torpedo at her. She now began to list, although not
greatly damaged, on her port side till her keel showed. Her crew
showed remarkable bravery.

The men lined up as though at a review and began to sing the German
national airs, intending to go to their deaths in that formation. But
an officer on the _Arethusa_ shouted to them through a megaphone to
jump while they could to save their lives. This had a psychological
effect, and as the starboard side of her hull slowly came up her men
were seen scrambling on it from behind her taff rail and creeping
down toward her keel. Some of them almost walked into the water
while she was in that position. Her guns were pointing toward the
sky, one of them slowly revolving. Finally, when she was completely
upside down she went under. Many of her crew were picked up by
British small boats, and her captain, who was one of them, was taken
to England, where he died later from the results of this experience
and was buried with full naval honors.

The German destroyers had meanwhile come between their own cruisers
and those of the enemy and emitted volumes of heavy smoke, which
they hoped would form an effective screen between the former and
the gunners on the latter. Admiral Hipper then ordered all of his
ships to turn northward, in the hope of getting away behind this
screen, but the British admiral anticipated this maneuver and changed
the course of his ships so that he again had the German ships in
view after both fleets had driven through the smoke.

The _Lion_ of the British fleet was chosen as the target for the
German ships, and by keeping a concentrated fire upon her were
able to do considerable damage. One shell penetrated the bow of
the _Lion_ as it was partly lifted out of the water on account
of the great speed she was making; this shot hit her water tank
and made it impossible for her to use her port engine from that
time on. She slowed down. When she fell out of the line it was
necessary for Admiral Beatty to leave her, and he transferred his
flag to the destroyer _Attack_. But all of this took time and it
was quite long before he was able to rejoin his leading ships. By
twenty minutes past twelve he had got aboard the _Princess Royal_.

Rear Admiral Moore automatically took up command of the British
fleet while his senior officer was making these changes. It is
not known what Admiral Moore's orders had been, but it is known
that he suddenly ordered all ships to cease firing and allowed
the German warships to proceed without further engaging them. By
the time that Admiral Beatty was again on a battle cruiser the
action was virtually over. The _Indomitable_ passed a cable to the
crippled _Lion_ and towed the latter home, the rest of the British
fleet keeping to the rearward to be ready for possible resumption
of fighting.

Much criticism was made by the British press and by laymen on account
of the sudden termination of the fight, and there was great complaint
in England because the career of all the raiding German ships had not
been brought to an end. But when the engagement ended the opposing
fleets were within seventy miles of Helgoland, and the German admiralty
had ready a fleet of dreadnoughts and another of battle cruisers to
engage the British ships when they got within striking distance.
By ending the fight when he did the British commander chose not to
be led into this trap. Nor was there dissatisfaction in England
alone. In Germany the complaint was that the ruse had not worked,
and not long afterward Admiral von Ingenohl was replaced as commander
of the High Sea Fleet by Admiral von Pohl. None of the blame for
the failure was laid at the door of the officer who had actually
been engaged in the fighting--Admiral Hipper--which showed that
his senior officers had considered the engagement as part of a
larger action.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XL

RESULTS OF SIX MONTHS' NAVAL OPERATIONS

The first six months of naval operations in the Great War came to
a close without battle between the main fleets of the navies of
the warring nations. The British navy had kept open communication
with the Continent, allowing the Expeditionary Force, as well as
later military contingents, to get to the trenches in Flanders
and France. It had, in addition, made possible the transportation
of troops from Canada and Australia. The ports of France were open
for commerce with America, which permitted the importation of arms
and munitions, and the same privilege had been won for the ports
in the British Isles.

The northern ports of the Central Powers were closed to commerce
with all but the Scandinavian countries, and the oversea German
possessions, where they were accessible to naval attack, had been
taken from her. The German and Austrian flags had been swept from
the seven seas, with the exception of those on three or four German
cruisers that now and then showed themselves capable of sinking
a merchantman.

In the four engagements of importance which had been fought by the
end of January, 1915, the British had been the victors in three--the
battles of the Bight of Helgoland, the Falkland Islands, and the
third German raid of January 24, 1915--the Germans had been victors
in one--the fight off Coronel.

British and other allied ships were unable to inflict damage on
the coast defenses of Germany, but the latter in two successful
raids had been able to bombard British coast towns, offsetting
in a way the loss of over-sea dominions.

[Illustration: SEA FIGHTS AND THE CRUISES OF GERMAN RAIDERS

THE EMDEN AND THE SYDNEY. FALKLAND AND NORTH SEA BATTLES. SEARCHLIGHTS.
SUBMARINES. WRECKS. SHIPPING ARTILLERY

Among the modern inventions which insure a battleship's efficiency
is the searchlight, which must sweep not only the sea but the sky
to find the enemy]

[Illustration: The German steamer "Walküre" sunk in the harbor of
Papeete, Tahiti, when the German cruisers "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau"
shelled the town]

[Illustration: The Australian cruiser "Sydney" which caught and
destroyed the raider "Emden" near the Cocos Islands]

[Illustration: The famous German raider "Emden" beached on one of
the Cocos Islands after being wrecked by the "Sydney's" shells]

[Illustration: Rescuing drowning sailors after the naval battle
near the Falkland islands, in which the "Scharnhorst," "Gneisenau,"
"Nurnberg" and "Leipzig" were sunk]

[Illustration: Canadian soldiers shipping a rapid-fire gun, on
embarking at Montreal for England, to take their part in the Great
War]

[Illustration: The interior of a submarine, showing torpedo tubes
and batteries. The flooring which covers the batteries has been
removed]

[Illustration: The German cruiser "Blücher" turning on her side
as she sank in the North Sea battle of January 24, 1915. The other
vessels of the German squadron escaped]

Great Britain, after six months of naval warfare had lost three
battleships, the _Bulwark, Formidable_, and _Audacious_;[*] the
five armored cruisers _Aboukir, Cressy, Hogue, Monmouth_, and _Good
Hope_; the second-class cruisers _Hawke_ and _Hermes_; the two
third-class cruisers _Amphion_ and _Pegasus_; the protected scout
_Pathfinder_ and the converted liner _Oceanic_; losses in destroyers
and other small vessels were negligible.

[Footnote *: The British admiralty did not clear up the mystery
of her disaster.]

Germany had lost no first-class battleships, but in third-class
cruisers her loss was great, those that went down being the eleven
ships _Ariadne, Augsburg, Emden, Graudenz, Hela, Köln, Königsberg,
Leipzig, Nürnberg, Magdeburg, Mainz_, and the _Dresden_; she lost,
also, the four armored cruisers _Blücher, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau_,
and _Yorck_; the old cruiser _Geier_ (interned); the three converted
liners _Spreewald, Cap Trafalgar_, and _Kaiser Wilhelm_; and the
mine layer _Königin Luise_.

The German policy of attrition had not taken off as many ships
as had been lost by Germany herself, and, as England's ships so
far outnumbered her own, it may well be said that the "whittling"
policy was not successful. She made up for this by having still
at large the cruiser _Karlsruhe_ which damaged a great amount of
commerce, and by the exploits of her submarines, far outshining
those of the Allies.

Russia had lost the armored cruiser _Pallada_, and the _Jemchug_,
a third-class cruiser, and the losses of the French and Austrian
navies were not worth accounting. With regard to interned vessels
both sides had losses. While the Germans were unable to use the
great modern merchantmen which lay in American and other ports, and
had to do without them either as converted cruisers or transports,
the Allies were forced to detail warships to keep guard at the
entrance of the various ports where these interned German liners
might at any moment take to the high seas.

In naval warfare the number of ships lost is no determining factor in
figuring the actual victory--the important thing being the existence
or nonexistence of the grand fleets of the combatants after the
fighting is finished. Viewed from such an angle, the fact that
the Allies had left no German ships at large other than those in
the North Sea, cannot entitle them to victory at the end of the
first six months of war. So long as a German fleet remained intact
and interned in neutral ports, naval victory for the Allies had
not come, though naval supremacy was indicated.

The fact was apparent, moreover, that while the Central Powers
were being deprived of all their trade on the seas, the world's
commerce endangered only by submarines was remaining wide open
to the Allies.




PART III--THE WAR ON THE EASTERN FRONT

       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XLI

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THEATRE OF WARFARE

World war--the prophecy of the ages--now threatened the foundations
of civilization. Whether or not the modern era was to fall under
the sword, as did the democracy of Greece and the mighty Roman
Empire, was again to be decided on battle grounds that for seventy
centuries have devoured the generations. The mountain passes were
once more to reverberate with the battle cry--the roar of guns,
the clank of artillery, the tramp of soldiery. The rivers were
to run crimson with the blood of men; cities were to fall before
the invaders; ruin and death were to consume nations. It was as
though Xerxes, and Darius, and Alexander the Great, and Hannibal,
and all the warriors of old were to return to earth to lead again
gigantic armies over the ancient battle fields.

While the war was gaining momentum on the western battle grounds
of Europe, gigantic armies were gathering in the East--there to
wage mighty campaigns that were to hold in the balance the destiny
of the great Russian Empire; the empire of Austria, the Balkan
kingdoms-Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania, Bulgaria. The Turks were
again to enter upon a war of invasion. Greece once more was to
tremble under the sword. Even Egypt and Persia and Jerusalem itself,
the battle grounds of the Assyrians, the Babylonians, and the Trojans,
the bloody fields of paganism and early Christianity, were all to
be awakened by the modern trumpets of war.

Before we enter upon these campaigns in the East it is well to
survey the countries to be invaded, to review the battle lines and
travel in these pages over the fighting ground.

The eastern theatre in the first six months of the war, from August
4, 1914, to February 1, 1915, includes the scenes of the fighting
in the historic Balkans and in the Caucasus. But the eastern front
proper is really that region where the Teutonic allies and the
Russians opposed each other, forming a fighting line almost a thousand
miles long. It stretches from rugged old Riga on the shores of the
Baltic Sea in the far north, down through Poland to the Carpathian
Mountains, touching the warm, sunlit hills on the Rumanian frontier.
When the total losses of the Great War are finally counted it will
probably be found that here the heaviest fighting has occurred.

This is the longest battle line in the world's history. Partly on
account of its great length, and partly because of the nature of
the country, we see the two gigantic forces in this region locked
together in their deadly struggle, swaying back and forth, first
one giving way, then the other. This was especially the case in
the northern section, along the German-Russian frontier.

[Illustration: THE WAR IN THE EAST--THE RELATION OF THE EASTERN
COUNTRIES TO GERMANY]

As we view the armies marshaling along this upper section, along
the Baltic shore, southward, including part of East Prussia as well
as Baltic Russia, we look upon the ancient abode of the Lithuanians,
supposed to be the first of the Slavic tribes to appear in Europe.
Hardly any part of Europe has a more forbidding aspect than this
region. There the armies must pass over a flat, undulating country,
almost as low in level as the Baltic, and therefore occupied in large
part by marshes and lagoons through which they must struggle. In
all parts the soil is unproductive. At one time it was a universal
forest: thick, dark, and dank. A century ago, however, Catherine the
Great distributed large areas of this comparatively worthless land
among her favorites and courtiers. In this way a certain percentage
was reclaimed, and with the incoming of the sunlight more favorable
conditions for human life were established. Yet even now it is
very thinly settled.

Through this region the armies must cross big rivers: the Oder, Dvina,
Warthe, Vistula, Pregel, and Niemen, northward and northeastward.
Just above or eastward of that point, where the German-Russian
frontier touches the shore, the Baltic curls into a dent, 100 miles
deep, forming the Gulf of Riga. Near the southern extremity of
this gulf, eight miles from the mouth of the Dvina, is the city
of Riga, ranking second only to Petrograd in commercial importance
as a seaport, and with a population of about 300,000.

As the armies move across the frontier they come to a vast domain
projecting into this marsh country, like a great, broad tongue
licking the shore of the Baltic; this wide strip of German territory
is East Prussia--a country to be beleaguered. Not far below the
tip of this tongue, about five miles from the mouth of the Pregel
River in the Frische Haff, and about twenty-five miles from the
seacoast, is situated another embattled stronghold--the city of
Königsberg which, since 1843, has been a fortress of the first
rank. These two cities in the following pages will be the immediate
objectives of the enemy forces operating on this section of the
eastern front.

It will be obvious why the lines of battle were less permanently
fixed here than in the more solid and mountainous sections of northern
France. Railroads and fairly well-laid highways do indeed traverse
these swamps in various parts, especially in German territory,
but trenches could not be dug in yielding mire. In yet another
feature were the military operations hampered by the nature of the
terrain here; the use of heavy artillery.

We have seen that one of the chief causes of success attending
German attacks in the other theatres of the war has been their
use of heavy guns. But in the fighting before Riga, we shall see
when the Germans seemed on the point of taking that city their
heavy artillery was so handicapped that it was rendered practically
useless. Being restricted by the marshes to an attack over a
comparatively narrow front, they were compelled to leave their
heavy guns behind on firmer soil. The guns which they could take
with them were matched by the Russians; the fighting was, therefore,
almost entirely limited to infantry engagements, in which the Russians
were not inferior to the Germans. Thus, we shall find the German
advance on Riga was stopped before it could attain its object.

In studying the fighting in this part of the eastern front, it
will be seen why the Germans were more successful below Riga, and
why the Russians were compelled to evacuate Vilna. Here is a broad
rise, something like the back of a half-submerged submarine, which
seems to cross the country, where the land becomes more solid. The
armies must move, instead of through marshes, along innumerable
small lakes, most of the lakes being long and narrow and running
north and south, with a fairly thick growth of timber among them,
mostly pine and spruce and fir. In character this section is rather
similar to parts of Minnesota. There are two cities to be conquered
in this drier region, Dvinsk, and, further south, Vilna, once the
chief city or capital of the Lithuanians. We shall see the Russians
thrust back from Königsberg, and the heavy fighting shifted over
to this section; yet even here, where the huge guns of the Germans
could find footing, the terrain was not suited to trench warfare,
and every arrival of reenforcements on either side would swing
the lines back or forth.

In studying the military movements in a country of this character,
special attention must be paid to the railway lines. Railways, and
more especially those running parallel to the fronts, are absolutely
necessary to success. In looking, therefore, for a key to the object
of any particular movement, the first step must be a close study
of this railroad situation.

We find from Riga to the fortress of Rovno there is a continuous
line of railroad, running generally north and south and passing
through Dvinsk, Vilna, Lida, Rovno, and thence down through Poland
to Lemberg. Every effort of the Russian armies in the succeeding
chapters will be made to keep to the westward of and parallel to
this line, and for a very good reason.

Feeding into this great north and south artery are the branch lines
from Petrograd to Dvinsk; from Moscow to the junction at Baranovitschi;
from Kiev to Sarny. Aside from these three important branch lines,
there are a few other single-track offshoots, but from a military
point of view they are of no importance.

This line was the main objective (short of capturing Riga itself)
of the German operations. This line proves especially vital to
the Russians, for nowhere east of it is there another such line
which could be used for the same purpose.

If, in the campaigns to be described, this railroad falls into Russian
hands, it gives every facility for strengthening or reenforcing any
part of the Russian front where German pressure becomes excessive. It
is, in addition, a solution to the difficult problem of transportation
of supplies. To use a military term, it gives the Russian army a
mobility not possessed by the enemy because of a lack of similar
facilities.

But should this railroad be taken by the Germans, the advantage
would immediately be reversed. And if once the Russian lines were
driven back beyond the railroad, a division of their forces would be
forced upon them; their armies would be obliged to group themselves
beside the three east and west branches already mentioned, for only
by these three systems could their forces be supplied, lateral
communications being absolutely lacking. And this is the key to
the fighting, not only in the northern section of the front, but
all along the line, down to Galicia. Naturally, only the Russian
railroads need be considered, for in the first months of the war
the Germans are the invaders in the northern half of the eastern
front, except for a few short periods in the beginning. Compared
to the German railway lines near the frontier, the Russian lines
are very few.

There are two distinct railway lines running from Germany into
East Prussia, with innumerable branches leading to all points of
the Russian frontier, laid especially for military purposes. It
was along these that we shall witness the German forces rushed from
Belgium to drive back the first Russian advance. But, of course, the
moment the Germans enter Russian territory they have no advantage
over the Russians, since even their wonderful efficiency does not
enable them to build railroads as fast as an army can advance.
Hence, we observe their efforts to gain possession of the Russian
railroads.

We come now to the central part of the eastern front. Here, just
below East Prussia, Russian Poland projects into German territory
in a great salient, about 200 miles wide and 250 long, resembling
a huge bite in shape.

This land is a monotonous, wind-swept plain, slightly undulating,
its higher parts not even 500 feet above sea level. To the northward
and eastward it descends gradually into the still lower lands of
East Prussia and White Russia, but in the south it lifts into the
foothills of the Carpathian Mountains.

Gigantic armies are to move over this plateau, timbered in parts
with oak, beech, and lime, and in some sections deeply cut by small
rivers and streams forming fissures, some narrow and craggy, others
broad and sloping with marshy bottoms. Toward the south the soldiers
must cross narrow ravines in all directions, often covered with wild,
thick undergrowth. The chief river is the Vistula, which enters
by the southern boundary and flows first north, then northwest,
skirting the plateau region at a height of 700 feet, finally making
its exit near Thorn, thence on to the Baltic through East Prussia.
Its valley divides the hilly tracts into two parts: Lublin heights
in the east and the Sedomierz heights to the westward. Picture
in your mind the great armies approaching these ridges, the most
notable of which is the Holy Cross Mountains, rising peaks almost
2,000 feet above sea level.

The fighting forces in the northeast, where the plain slopes gradually
into the Suwalki Province, must pass over a country dotted with lakes
and lagoons, which farther on take on the character of marshes,
stagnant ponds, peat bogs, with small streams flowing lazily from one
to the other. Here and there are patches of stunted pine forests,
with occasional stretches of fertile, cultivated soil. Throughout
this section many rivers flow along broad, level valleys, separating
into various branches which form many islands and, during the rainy
seasons, flood the surrounding country.

Farther west the armies pass through broad valleys or basins, once
the beds of great lakes, whose rich, alluvial soil give forth abundant
crops of cereals. Here, too, flows the Niemen, 500 miles in length,
watering a basin 40,000 square miles in area and separating Poland
from Lithuania. It advances northward in a great, winding pathway,
between limestone hills covered with loam or amid forests, its
banks rising to high eminences in places, past ruined castles built
in the Middle Ages. In the yellowish soil along its banks grow
rich crops of oats, buckwheat, corn, and some rye. Naturally such
a section would be thickly populated, not only on account of the
fertile soil, but because the Niemen, like the Vistula, is one of
the country's means of communication and transportation. As many
as 90,000 men earn their livelihoods in navigating the steamers
and freight barges passing up and down this great waterway. At
Yurburg the Niemen enters East Prussia on its way to the Baltic.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XLII

THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF RUSSIAN POLAND

It is in the southern part of Russian Poland, among the foothills
of the Carpathians, that the armies come into possession of its
mineral resources, a fact which will have some influence on the
German military movements in this region. Up in the Kielce hills
copper has been mined for 400 years, though the value of these
mines has decreased on account of the much greater quantity found
in America. A hundred years ago the Kielce mines produced nearly
4,000 tons of copper a year. Brown iron ore is also found here
in deposits 40 per cent pure, while there are also veins of zinc
sometimes 50 feet thick, yielding ore of 25 per cent purity. Sulphur,
one of the ingredients for the manufacture of explosives, is found
at Czarkowa in the district of Pinczow. In the southwest, in Bedzin
and Olkuz, there are coal deposits about 200 square miles in area.
In the southern districts wheat is also grown in some abundance.

The military value of this country is further enhanced by political
conditions. Like the greater part of Galicia to the southward, it
is peopled by the Poles, who form one of the important branches
of the great Slavic family. At one time Poland was a kingdom whose
territory and possessions spread from the Carpathians up to the
Baltic and far into the center of Russia, ruling its subject peoples
with quite as much rigor as the Poles have themselves been ruled
by Russia and Germany.

Poland is a seat of conquest in the Great War. For not much over
a hundred years ago what remained of this old kingdom was divided
among the three great powers: Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Austria,
on the whole, has been much the best master. Germany tried in various
ways to Germanize her subjects in German Poland, thereby rousing
their bitter hatred. Russia was no less autocratic in attempting
to extinguish the spirit of nationality among the Poles under her
rule. But, naturally, the fact remains that between the Poles and
the Russians there are still ties of blood. In moving westward,
by this route Russia would be moving among a race who, in spite
of all they had suffered at the hands of the Czar, still would
naturally prefer Slav to Teuton.

We shall soon stand with the invading armies in the center of Russian
Poland, and enter the great city of Warsaw. This conquered citadel
with more than 400,000 inhabitants, is situated on the Vistula.
It was, next to Paris, the most brilliant city of Europe in the
early part of last century. But under Russian influence it became a
provincial town in spirit, if not in size. It once had the character
of prodigal splendor; within late years it became a forlorn, neglected
city, not the least effort being made by the Russian authorities to
modernize its appearance and improvement. From a sanitary point
of view it became one of the least progressive cities of Europe.
And yet, as the armies march into the capital, there are still
signs of the city's past glory: over thirty palaces rear their
lofty turrets above the tile roofs of the houses, among them the
palace of the long-dead Polish kings.

However, from a military point of view, Warsaw maintained great
importance in the Great War. It is at this time one of the strongest
citadels of Europe, and around it lies the group of fortresses
called the Polish Triangle. The southern apex is Ivangorod on the
Vistula; the eastern, Brest-Litovsk; the northern being Warsaw
itself. To the northwest lies the advanced fort of Novo Georgievsk.
This triangle is a fortified region with three fronts: two toward
Germany and one toward Austria, and the various forts are fully
connected by means of railroads.

It would appear, therefore, that Russian Poland would offer excellent
conditions for an army on the defensive. And this is quite true, the
Vistula, especially, serving as a screen against the attacking armies
from the west. As a matter of fact, it would have been extremely
difficult to take Warsaw by a frontal attack. Warsaw's weakness
lay in the north in the swamp regions.

One of the greatest dangers in all wars, against which a military
commander has to guard his army, is that of being flanked. The road
or roads leading from the rear to the base of supplies, along which
not only food supplies for the soldiers, but, quite as important,
ammunition, is brought up, either in wagons, automobiles, or in
railroad trains, are the most sensitive part of an army's situation.
Unless they are very short--that is, unless an army is very close
to its base of supplies--it is impossible to guard these lines
of communication adequately. Therefore, if the enemy is able to
break through on either side of the front, there is great danger
that he may swing his forces around and cut these lines of
communication. The army that is thus deprived of its sources of
supply has nothing left then but to surrender, sometimes even to
inferior forces. Sometimes, of course, if the army is within the walls
of a fortified city and is well supplied with food and ammunition,
it may hold out and allow itself to be besieged. This may even
be worth while, for the sake of diminishing the enemy's strength
to the extent of the forces required for besieging, usually many
times larger than the besieged force. But in the case of Warsaw
we shall see that that would not have been a wise plan; hardly
any food supply that could have been laid by would have maintained
the large civil population, and the big guns of the Germans would
soon have battered down the city's defenses.

This the Russians realized from the very beginning. As is well
known now, Russia had never intended to hold Poland against the
Teutons. Her real line of defense was laid much farther back. It was
only on account of the protest of France, when the two Governments
entered into their alliance, that any fortifications at all were
thrown up in Poland. A real line of defense must be more or less
a straight line, with no break. And the marshes in the north, as
well as the tongue of East Prussia projecting in along the shores
of the Baltic toward Riga made that impossible. Russia's real line
of defense was farther east, along the borders of Russia proper
and along the line of railroad already referred to. By studying
this territory east of Poland it will become obvious why Russia
should prefer this as her main line of defense against a German
invasion.

As we witness the armies moving along what was once the frontier
between Poland and Russia proper we shall find the plain of Poland
dips into a region which apparently was once a vast lake which
drained into the Dnieper, but the outlet becoming choked, this
stagnant water formed into those immense morasses known as the
Pripet Marshes, forming over two-fifths of the whole province of
Minsk and covering an area of over 600 square miles. Even when
more than 6,000,000 acres have been reclaimed by drainage, the
armies found some of these marshes extending continuously for over
200 miles. In the upper Pripet basin the woods were everywhere full
of countless little channels which creep through a wilderness of
sedge. Along the right bank of the Pripet River the land rises above
the level of the water and is fairly thickly populated. Elsewhere
extends a great intricate network of streams with endless fields
of bulrushes and stunted woods. Over these bogs hang unhealthy
vapors, and among the rank reeds there is no fly, nor mosquito,
nor living soul or sound in the autumn.

Not even infantry could pass over this region--not to consider
cavalry or artillery, save in the depth of a cold winter when the
water and mire is frozen. Even then it would be impossible to venture
over the ice with heavy guns. An invading army must, therefore,
split in two parts and pass around the sides, and nothing is more
dangerous than splitting an army in the face of the enemy. It is
behind these vast marshes that we shall find the Russians planned
to make their first determined stand.

Here, too, the Russians expected to have the advantage of being
surrounded by their own people, for this is the country of the
White Russians, so called on account of their costumes. Here the
purest Slavic type is preserved; they have not blended with other
stocks, as the Great Russians with the Finns and the Little Russians,
farther south, with the Mongols. For a while this territory was
subject to the kings of Poland, who oppressed its inhabitants most
barbarously, from the effects of which they have not even fully
recovered. To-day White Russia is one of the poorest and most backward
parts of the empire. And even yet the great bulk of the landlords
are Poles.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XLIII

AUSTRIAN POLAND, GALICIA AND BUKOWINA

Let us now pass ahead of the armies into the southern section of
the eastern front. Here we have to consider only Austrian Poland,
Galicia and Bukowina, for here there is much less swaying back and
forth, the Russians maintaining their lines much more steadily than
farther north. This section is an undulating terrace which slopes
down to the Vistula and the Dniester; behind rise the Carpathian
ranges, forming the natural frontier between the broad, fertile
plains of Hungary and Russia. Here the population is quite dense,
there being 240 inhabitants to the square mile. Nearly half of
the total area is in farm lands, about one-fourth woodland, and
the rest mostly meadow and pasture, less than a quarter of one
per cent being lake or swamp. Rich crops of barley, oats, rye,
wheat, and corn are grown here, while the mineral resources include
coal, salt, and petroleum, the latter especially being important in
modern warfare on account of the great quantities of fuel necessary
for motor carriages.

Here, in Galicia, we shall witness the conquests of the important
city of Lemberg--with its 160,000 population--fourth in size of
all Austrian cities, only Vienna, Prague, and Triest being larger.
Further in toward the mountains we shall see the storming of the
strongly fortified city of Przemysl (pronounced Prshemisel), also
important as the junction of the network of railroads that the
Austrians had built throughout the country, including several lines
passing over the Carpathians into Hungary. And farther west still we
shall look upon the invasion of the old Polish city of Cracow, also
strongly fortified. This section is especially rich in industries,
mines, and agriculture.

Here, too, are staged many of the battles of the rivers--parallel
with the mountain ranges flows the Dniester in a southeasterly
direction, into which, flowing down from the north and running
parallel with each other, empty the Gnila Lipa, the Zlota Lipa, and
the Stripa, all of which figure prominently in the war movements,
for each of these is crossed several times by both armies engaged
at bloody costs.

As will be noted by reading the chapters on the fighting on the
eastern front, here, as in East Prussia, the Russians make a determined
advance and actually succeed in conquering this territory from
the Austrians. At one time we find them even in possession of all
except one of the chief passes in the Carpathians and threatening
to overrun the plains of Hungary. To hold Russian Poland it was
necessary that they should have a firm grip of East Prussia and
Austrian Poland, thus protecting the flanks of their center. Had
they been able to hold their grip, then they could have straightened
out their entire line from north to south, and Warsaw would have
been safe. But we shall see both their extremities driven back;
therefore Warsaw was in danger, in spite of its fortifications.

That the Austrians should have allowed themselves to be thrust
back over the Carpathians is one of the surprises of the early
stages of the war. For these mountains are only second in size
in all Europe to the Alps themselves, forming the eastern wing
of the great European mountain system. They are about 800 miles
long and nearly 250 miles wide in parts. Some of the higher peaks
reach 8,000 feet above sea level.

Imagine the vision of an army marching along the roads from the
foothills to the mountains leading through mysterious, shadowy
spruce forests, where the soil is covered with rich carpets of
moss. Foaming streams ripple in among the moss-covered bowlders.
Then the paths emerge on the cheerful, emerald-green pastures of the
slopes, alive with the flocks of goats, sheep and cattle, attended
by their shepherds. A little farther and the whole scenery changes,
and the armies approach tremendous mountains of solid granite,
ominously dark, shining like hammered iron, rising abruptly from
the stone débris and black patches of mountain fir, and towering
bluffs and crags seem to pierce the sky with their sharp peaks,
bastions and jagged ridges, like gigantic fortresses. Clouds of white
mist, driven and torn by gusts of wind, cling to the precipitous
walls, and masses of eternal snow lie in the many fissures and
depressions, forming large, sharply outlined streaks and patches.

The Magyars inhabit the great central plains of Hungary which
constitutes ethnologically a vast island of Magyars in a sea of
Slavs. The Carpathian slopes on the Hungarian side of the ranges,
including the mounts of the Tatra--with the exception of the Zips
district, which is peopled with German-Saxon colonists--are inhabited,
in their western parts, by two million Slovaks, in the eastern
parts by half a million Ruthenians or Little Russians, and on the
Transylvanian side by nearly three million Rumanians. The border
lines between these Rumanians and the Magyars and between the
Hungaro-Slav groups (Slovaks and Ruthenians) and the Magyars lie
far down within the borders of the great central Hungarian plains.
This line at one point extends to within a few miles of the Hungarian
capital of Bupapest.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XLIV

THE BALKANS-COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

This survey of the fighting ground in eastern Europe brings us
now to the "cockpit of the war." From a military point of view, as
well as from the political, the Balkan theatre is of equal importance
with other big fronts in Europe. It is the gateway to the Orient
for central Europe. Here the armies engaged are numbered only by
the hundred thousands, none reach a million. But from the point of
view of human interest and political intrigue it is by far the most
picturesque. Here the hatred between the combatants is most bitter;
indeed so bitter that when it burst into flame a mad whirlwind of
passion swept over half the world. For here the great conflagration
began.

A map of the Balkan Peninsula is almost, on the face of it, a full
explanation of the causes of the war. The military campaigns, studied
in connection with their physical environment, explain all the
diplomatic intrigues of the past fifty years, for they are the intrigues
themselves translated into action.

Geographically speaking, the Balkan nations are those situated in
the big peninsula of southern Europe which lies below the Danube
River and the northern border of Montenegro. Some authorities,
however, include Rumania, and others even bring in Austria's Slavic
provinces, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The most noticeable feature of this vast war-ridden region is its
mountains. Those same Carpathian Mountains, which form the natural
boundary between the land of the Magyars and the Russian plains,
take a sudden turn westward at the Rumanian frontier, then sweep
around in a great semicircle, forming a shape resembling a scythe,
the handle of which reaches up into Poland, the blade curling around
within the Balkan Peninsula. Behind the handle, and above the upper
part of the blade, stretch the broad plains of Hungary, through
which flows the great Danube, the largest river in Europe next
to the Russian Volga--a river which flowed with blood during the
Great War. Just in the middle of the back of the blade this great
river bursts through the mountain chain, swirling through the famous
Iron Gate into the great basin within the curved blade. On the south
of its farther course to the Black Sea lie the plains of northern
Bulgaria.

The curving chain of mountains below the Iron Gate is the Balkan
Range. But excepting for the plains of Thrace, lying south of the
Balkans, over toward the Black Sea and above Constantinople, the rest
of the peninsula is almost entirely one confused tangle of craggy
mountains, interspersed throughout with small, fertile valleys and
plateaus. This roughness of surface becomes especially aggravated
as one passes westward, and over toward the Adriatic coast, from
Greece up into the Austrian province of Dalmatia, the country is
almost inaccessible to ordinary travelers.

What is the political value of this beleaguered domain? The broad,
significant fact is that any road from western Europe to the Orient
must pass through the Balkan Peninsula, and that these mountains
almost block that road. From north to south there is just one highway,
so narrow that it is really a defile.

This road stretches from the seat of the war at Belgrade on the
Danube down a narrow valley, the Morava, thence through the highlands
of Macedonia into the Vardar Valley to Saloniki, on the Ægean Sea.
At Nish, above Macedonia, another road branches off into Bulgaria
across the plains of Thrace and into Constantinople. This was the
road by which the Crusaders swarmed down to conquer the Holy Land.
This was the road by which, hundreds of years later, the Moslems
swarmed up into the plains of Hungary and overran the south of
Europe, until they were finally checked outside the gates of Vienna.
Nothing is more significant of the terror that these marching hosts
inspired than the fact that, with the exception of a few larger
towns, the villages hid themselves away from this highway in the
hills.

Bear clearly in mind that in the existence of this narrow way to
the Orient lies the key not only to the causes of the war, but to
the military campaigns that we shall follow in this region. For
it is the Teutons who would in the Great War, like the Crusaders
of old, pass down this highway and again conquer the East, though
in this case their object is trade, and not the Holy Sepulcher.

To secure the pathway through this strategic country it also is
necessary to have control of the territory on all sides, and this
is quite as true in a political as in a military sense. To secure
their pathway up into Europe the Turks once conquered all the peoples
in the Balkans, except those inhabiting the mountains over on the
Adriatic: the Montenegrins and a small city called Ragusa, just
above Montenegro in Dalmatia. It is not at all peculiar that just
here, in almost the same locality, the Teutons should meet with
the first and strongest resistance.

A study of the territory in which the first fighting of the war
occurred will explain the foregoing calculations. It will be observed
that Austrian territory runs down past the eastward turn in the
Danube, along the frontier of Montenegro, until it narrows gradually
into a tip at Cattaro, just below Cettinje, the Montenegrin capital.
This land is composed of the three provinces of Bosnia, Herzegovina
and Dalmatia. All this territory is inhabited by the same race
that peoples Serbia and Montenegro--the Serbs. In fact, the Slavic
population reaches up all along the coast to Trieste, and even a
little beyond. For this reason it is in this direction that we shall
see the Serbians and the Montenegrins invade Austrian territory,
after their initial success in repulsing the Austrian invasion.

The objectives of the brief campaign soon to be considered were
Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, and Ragusa, the famous little
seaport on the Adriatic. Ragusa is of especial interest on account of
its remarkable history. In the Middle Ages it was the most important
seaport in that part of the world. Its ships sailed over all the
Mediterranean and from them is derived the word "argosy," signifying
a ship laden with wealth. Again and again the Turks attempted to
conquer this little state, which was at that time a republic, but
always the Ragusans beat off the enemy. For the country about is
so rocky, so rough, that the city was easily defended, especially
in that time when nearly all fighting was hand to hand.

The first and foremost word in the Great War--the key word--is
Sarajevo. Here is the scene of the assassination of the Crown Prince
of Austria, which was at least the final cause of the war. As we
enter it we find a population of about forty thousand, half of
which are Mohammedans. It is a large, straggling town, situated
in a narrowing valley overtopped by steep hills on either side,
which close in a narrow gorge in the east and broaden into a plain
on the west. It was to the eastward, however, that we shall find
the heavy fighting along the Austro-Serbian frontier.

The armies along the Danube will soon command our attention. As
they follow the river toward Belgrade, the capital of Serbia, it
is no longer the "Blue Danube" of the famous German song. Here,
in fact, it is a broad, mud-colored river, dotted with a number
of low islands along its center. Belgrade, where the first shots
of the war were fired, is located on rather high ground, backed
by a semicircle of low hills in its rear. But opposite all is flat
and, in places, marshy. Modern guns could, of course, keep up an
effective fire across the river at this point, as in fact they
did before the actual invasion of Serbia began, but the conditions
for a crossing are not favorable. It was from the west, from the
Bosnian side, that the actual attack was made.

Just below Belgrade the river Save, shallower and narrower, empties
into the Danube, forming the frontier westward, past Shabatz, to
Ratcha, where the Drina, flowing down from the Macedonian highlands
northward, joins it, forming the western frontier between Bosnia
and Serbia.

The Drina, where much fighting occurs, is no ordinary waterway,
no mere mountain stream, though it lies in a mountainous country.
Before reaching its junction with the Save it is fed by many important
tributaries. Ever swift, often torrential, it has washed out a bed
of imposing width, and by a constant cutting out of new courses
has created a series of deltas. It was one of the largest of these
islands, that of Kuriachista, between Losnitza and Leschnitza,
that the Austrians chose as a base for their first invasion. From
this point up and around to Shabatz lies the bloody field of the
Austro-Serbian battles.

A description of this section, in brief at least, is necessary to
an understanding of the three Austrian invasions made here, and
all three of which failed disastrously. North and west of Shabatz
lies the great plain of Matchva, bounded on its east and north
by the Save and by the Drina on the west. It is a rich, fertile
land, but much broken up by woodland. To the southeast a rolling
valley is divided by the River Dobrava, while due south the Tzer
Mountains rise like a camel's back out of the plain and stretch
right across from the Drina to the Dobrava. The southern slopes of
Tzer are less abrupt than those on the north and descend gradually
into the Leschnitza Valley, out of which rise the lesser heights
of the Iverak Mountains. Both these ranges are largely covered
by prune orchards, intersected with some sparse timber.

This is a region of natural fortifications. Descending southward
again, the foothills of Iverak are lost in a chain of summits,
which flank the right bank of the Jadar River, that tributary of
the Drina River from which the first big battle takes its name.

From the left bank of the Jadar, from its junction with the Drina
to Jarebitze, a great rolling level stretches south until the high
Guchevo Mountains, stretching in southeasterly direction, rise
abruptly and hide the Bosnian hills from view. From there, southward,
the country is extremely mountainous, even the highways being blasted
out of the sides of the precipitous mountains along the innumerable
ravines through which run watercourses which, though almost dry
in summer, burst into torrential streams after the snows begin
to melt in the higher altitudes.

Naturally in such a country roads are of prime importance in military
operations. A few built and maintained by the state are in excellent
condition and practicable in all sorts of weather. But for the
rest communications consist of bridle paths and trails over the
mountains.

As has been stated, the great highway from Belgrade to Saloniki
is the key to all military operations in the Balkans; nor is this
case any exception. A study of the map will show how this big,
underlying fact entered into the plans of the first three attempts
at invading Serbia. Naturally, had facilities been convenient at
Belgrade, that would have been the point from which to advance.
The next possible point was over the Drina, because it was not
so wide or so deep.

Bosnia and Herzegovina at the beginning of the war were sparsely
served by railroads. But for the purpose of an invasion of Serbia
the lines running to Tuzla in the north and to Vishegrade and Uvatz
in the south were of much strategic importance. Moreover, unlike the
Hungarian plain opposite Belgrade, the country is so mountainous
and well wooded that great bodies of troops could be moved about
without being observed. We now come to the main reason why this
point was chosen, next to Belgrade. Though we shall see that they
did not reach it at their first attempt, there is no doubt that
the main objective of the Austrians was the little town of Valievo,
lying some distance back from the Jadar and the field of battle.
For at Valievo is the terminus of a light railway which joins with
the main line running from Belgrade down to Saloniki. The Teutons
were in a hurry to open this highway, for it meant opening a means
of communication with the Turks, who were to become, and later
did become, their active allies. These are political matters of
significance here insomuch as they explain the special importance
of the railway from Belgrade south along the ancient highway of
the Crusaders.

Before following this route farther south, a few words should be
devoted to Montenegro. Between Serbia and Montenegro lies the Sanjak
of Novibazar. This small territory nominally belonged to Turkey
before the Balkan War, but it was in fact garrisoned by Austrian
troops, the civil administration being left to the Turks. Austria
had gone to special trouble to establish this arrangement, so that
it might have a wedge between the territories of the two little
Serb nations. Anticipating this war long ago, Austria had counted
on having a large enough force in Novibazar to prevent a union of
the two armies. But, when it actually came, she was in no position
to prevent it, so much of her strength being required to meet the
Russians.

Montenegro is the natural refuge of the Serbs. Whenever in the
past they were especially hard pressed by the Turks, they would
flee to the mountain fastnesses of Tzherna Gora, the Black Mountain,
for here military operations, even in this day of modern artillery,
are absolutely impossible, and when it came to mountain guerrilla
fighting, the Turks were no match for the Serbs. Thus it was that
the Serbs were able to preserve their old traditions, their language
and the best blood of their race. And it may be said that to a
slightly lesser extent Ragusa served the same purpose.

The Montenegrins are born fighters and die fighters. From one end
to the other Montenegro is one wilderness of mountain crags and
towering precipices, traversed only by foot trails. Here and there
a shelf of level soil may be found, just enough to enable people
to grow their own necessities. The capital of this rocky domain,
high up among the crags and overlooking the Adriatic, is Cettinje,
which was to be stormed and conquered by the Teutons. The main
street, about 150 yards long, comprising two-thirds of the town,
is so broad that three or four carriages may be driven abreast
down the length of it. It is composed entirely of one and two story
cottages. A few short streets branch off at right angles, and in
these is all of Cettinje that is not comprised in the main street.
The king inhabited a modest-looking, brown edifice with a small
garden attached. Overlooking the capital is Mt. Lovcen, on top
of which the Montenegrins planted guns to defend any attack that
might be made against them.

South of Montenegro and north of Greece lies another country of
instinctive fighters. It is similar in physical aspect, but very
different in its population. This is the land of the Albanians,
whom the Turks conquered by force of arms, like all the rest of
the Balkan peninsula. They are a distinct race by themselves; it
is supposed that they are the descendants of the ancient Illyrians,
those wild tribes of whom the ancient Greeks wrote. Nor is this
unlikely, for in such a country as theirs the inhabitants are most
likely to remain pure from generation to generation.

Returning for a few moments to Belgrade, we now may resume our
course down the ancient highway toward Saloniki. Down the Morava
Valley passes the railroad, after which it passes within a few
miles of the Bulgarian frontier, near Kustendil; dangerously near
the frontier of a possible enemy, but especially perilous in this
war in which the Serbians would naturally endeavor to retreat toward
her ally, Greece.

Just below Vranya the railroad enters what was, before the two
Balkan Wars, the Turkish territory of Macedonia. This region down
to within sixty miles of Saloniki was reconquered from the Turks by
the Serbs, having been Serb inhabited since early in the Christian
era as shown by historical record. As early as 950 Constantin
Porphyrogenitus writes of its inhabitants as Serbs, from whom,
he says, the town of Serbia on the Bistritza River near Saloniki
took its name. Throughout this region there are so many mountain
ranges that it would be impossible to name them all. Nowhere has
blood been more continuously shed than here, and nowhere in Europe
is the scenery more beautiful.

Especially impressive is that section around Monastir, toward the
frontier of Albania and away from the main line of the railroad.
Here, not more than a day's walk from the city of Monastir, or
Bitolia, as its Slavic inhabitants call it, is Lake Prespa, a small
sheet of crystal-clear water in which are reflected the peaks and
the rugged crags of the surrounding mountains. Through a subterranean
passage the waters of this mountain lake pass under the range that
separates it from the much larger lake, Ochrida, the source of
the bloody Drina.

The people of these mountains are Serbs, almost to Saloniki. Uskub,
whose ancient Serb name is Skoplya, was the old Serb capital, and
there the Serb ruler Doushan was crowned emperor in 1346.

For the past five hundred years these Macedonians have been used to
all the ways of guerrilla fighting. Roaming through their mountains
in small bands they have harassed the Turkish soldiers continuously.

The Bulgarian ruler Ferdinand had through many years by means of
committees and church jugglery striven to Bulgarize this population,
preparatory to the contemplated seizure of the territory which he has
now been able with the help of the Germanic powers to accomplish.
But in reality the Bulgar population in what was European Turkey was
found only eastward of the Struma in Thracia including Adrianople.
Those regions formed the ample and legitimate field of ambition
for the unification of the Bulgars.

When hostilities broke out in 1914, when Serbia was defending herself
against the Austrians, King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, the secret ally
by treaty of Austria, did everything possible to forward his designs
against the Serbs and sent armed Bulgar bands into Serb Macedonia.

Shortly below the city of Monastir in the west begins the Greek
frontier, running over eastward to Doiran, where it touches the
Bulgarian frontier. Here the railroad, coming down along the Vardar
River, emerges into the swamp lands and over them passes into the
city of Saloniki.

Here is the old territory of Philip of Macedon, the father of the
conqueror. For some forty or fifty miles these swamps stretch out
from Saloniki, overshadowed by Mt. Olympus on their southern edge.
While not quite so extensive as the Pinsk Swamps, they are quite
as impassable, from a military point of view. In the center of
this region of bulrushes and stunted forests is an open sheet of
shallow water, Lake Enedjee.

Nearly all this swamp land is submerged, but here and there are
small islands. For some years the Turkish soldiers garrisoned these
islands during the mild winter months, living on them in rush huts.
In the summer they would withdraw into the near-by foothills. But
one summer several hundred Comitajis descended into the swamps
and took possession.

The stunted forests and the bulrushes here are traversed by a maze
of narrow waterways, just wide enough for a punt to pass along.
When the soldiers returned in the fall, they started out for their
islands in strings of punts. Presently they were met by volleys of
bullets that seemed to come from all directions out of the bulrushes.
Some, in their panic, leaped out into the shallow water and sunk
in the mire. The rest retired.

For years the Turkish soldiers attempted to drive the Comitajis
out of the swamp. First they surrounded it, watching all possible
landing places, but the outlaws had supplies smuggled in to them
by the peasants. Then the Turks began bombarding with heavy cannon,
which, of course, was futile, since they could not distinguish
the points at which they were firing. And finally they gave up
molesting the Comitajis, who continued making the swamps their
headquarters until the Young Turks came into power. Then, believing
that a constitutional Macedonia was finally to be granted them,
all the Comitajis laid down their arms.

It is a peculiar fact that Saloniki, one of the largest cities
on the peninsula, with a population considerably over a hundred
thousand, should represent none of the national elements of the
country. For though Bulgars, Turks, Greeks, and Serbs may be found
there, an overwhelming majority, nearly 90,000 of the people, are
Spanish Jews.

Walking along the streets, it would be easy to imagine oneself in
Spain or in Mexico; on all sides the shouts of peddlers, the cries
of cabmen, the conversation of pedestrians, are in Spanish. With
a knowledge of that language the stranger may make his way about
as easily as in his own native country. These are the descendants
of the Jews who were driven out of Spain by Torquemada and his
Spanish Inquisition and were so hospitably received by the Sultan
of Turkey.

Saloniki, where we shall witness severe battles, is situated at the
head of the gulf by the same name, an inlet of the Ægean Sea. It
is a well-fortified city, built on the water's edge, but surrounding
it is high land commanding the surrounding country. Added to that,
the swamp region is another protection from an enemy coming from
inland. Its seaward forts, however, are, or were, obsolete and
would probably crumble before the fire of modern naval guns.

Stretching down the eastern shore of the Gulf is a peninsula on
which is the famous Mt. Athos, that very peculiar community of
celibate monks. Here, in the Holy Mountain, as the Slavs call it,
there are monasteries representing all the various denominations of
the Greek Orthodox Church: Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian, and Russian,
each swarming with hundreds of monks, who pass their time in idleness.
Not only are women forbidden to enter this domain, but even female
dogs or cats are kept out.

Across this upper end of the Ægean, from Mt. Athos, is the Bulgarian
port, Dedeagatch, to which runs a branch of the main railway from
Sofia to Constantinople. The country here is low and swampy, the
port itself being little more than a boat landing.

Just below this point, across the Gulf of Saros, is the peninsula
of Gallipoli, where a critical phase of the war was fought. It is
somewhat like the blade of a scimitar, covering the entrance to
the Sea of Marmora. Between this strip of land and the coast of
Asia Minor is a narrow strait, the outer mouth of which is called
the Dardanelles, the inner gateway being the famous Hellespont.
Here it was that Xerxes crossed over on a bridge of boats at the
head of his Persian army to invade Greece, only to meet disaster
at Thermopylæ, and here Alexander of Macedonia crossed over to
begin his march of conquest which was to extend his power as far
as India. And about this narrow strait is centered the ancient
Greek myth about Hero and Leander, which inspired Byron to swim
across from Asia to Europe.

How well the Turks have fortified this approach to their capital
is well enough indicated in the story of the operations of the
allied fleets in their attempt to force the passage.

From the Hellespont to Constantinople is a sail of forty miles,
along a coast steep and rugged, destitute of any harbor or even a
beach where a boat might land. Nor is there a more beautiful sight
than that which is presented on approaching the Turkish capital
from this direction, especially of an early morning. Against the
dawn in the East are silhouetted the minarets and domes and the
palace roofs of the city; then, as the light increases, the white
buildings are distinguished more clearly through a purple mist
that rises from the waters, until the ship enters the Bosphorus,
gliding past the shipping and the boat traffic along the shore of
the harbor. The beauties of the Bosphorus have been described in
every book of travel that has ever included this section of the
world in its descriptions: it is undoubtedly the most beautiful
waterway that may be found in any country.

Emerging into the Black Sea from the Bosphorus, one strikes the
Bulgarian coast not far above that neck of land on which Constantinople
is built. Along this stretch of coast up to the mouth of the Danube
there are two harbors, Varna and Burgas. Each is terminus of a
branch railroad leading off from the Nish-Sofia-Constantinople
line. Behind Burgas lie the level tracts of Eastern Rumelia, or
Thrace, as that part of the country is still called. But Varna
is above the point where the Balkan Range strikes the coast, all
of which is steep and rocky.

Above Varna begins the Delta of the Danube, up which steamers and
heavily laden barges sail continuously, but here also begins the
neutral territory of Rumania, the Dobruja, the richest section of
the Danube basin, which was ceded to Rumania by Bulgaria after
the Second Balkan War.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XLV

THE CAUCASUS--THE BARRED DOOR

We now come to that section of the eastern theatre of the war which
received the least extended notice in printed reports--the barred
doorway between Europe and Asia--the Caucasus. Not because the
fighting there was less furious, but because the region was less
accessible to war correspondents. The struggle was in fact quite
as bloody and even more savage and barbarous here than elsewhere,
for on this front Russ meets Turk, Christian meets Moslem, and
where they grapple the veneer of chivalry blisters off.

Here again, as in Galicia, we come to a natural frontier, not only
between two races, but between two continents. For here, crossing
the isthmus between the Black Sea and the Caspian, stretches a
mountain range over seven hundred miles in length, rising abruptly
out of the plains on either side. These are the Caucasus Mountains,
forming the boundary between Europe and Asia.

The higher and central part of the range (which averages only from
sixty to seventy miles in width) is formed of parallel ridges,
not separated by deep and wide valleys, but remarkably connected
by elevated plateaus, which are traversed by narrow fissures of
extreme depth. The highest peaks are in the most central chain;
Mt. Elburz, attaining an elevation of 18,000 feet above the sea,
while Mt. Kasbeck reaches a height of more than 16,000 feet, and
several other peaks rise above the line of perpetual snow. The
outlying spurs and foothills of this chain of lofty mountains are
of less extent and importance than those of almost any other mountain
range of similar magnitude, subsiding, as they do, until they are
only 200 feet high along the shores of the Black Sea. Some parts
are almost entirely bare, but other parts are densely wooded and
the secondary ranges near the Black Sea are covered by magnificent
forests of oak, beech, ash, maple, and walnut.

This range is an almost impassable wall across the narrow isthmus
which joins Europe and Asia, and the Gorge of Dariel is the gateway
in this wall through which have come almost all the migrating races
that have peopled the continent of Europe. As is well known, the
white peoples of Europe have been classified as the Caucasian race,
because they were all supposed to have passed through this gateway
originally. Apparently each of these oncoming waves of barbaric
humanity, bursting through the great gateway, must have left behind
some few remnants of their volume, for nowhere in the world, in so
limited an area, is there such a diversity and mixture of peoples.
In the words of one writer, who speaks with authority on this region,
the Caucasus is "an ethnological museum where the invaders of Europe,
as they traveled westward to be manufactured into nations, left
behind samples of themselves in their raw condition."

Here may be found the Georgians, who so long championed the Cross
against the Crescent, the wild Lesghians from the highlands of
Daghestan; the Circassians, famed for the beauty of their women;
Suanetians, Ossets, Abkhasians, Mingrelians, not to enumerate dozens
of other tribes and races, each speaking its own tongue. It is said
that over a hundred languages are spoken throughout this region;
seventy in the city of Tiflis alone.

The scenery of the mountains themselves is unparalleled in grandeur
except by the Himalayas and offers many a virgin peak to the ambitious
mountain climber. Here may be found the ibex, the stag, the wild
boar, the wild bull and an infinite variety of feathered game. The
animal life of the mountains has, in fact, become more abundant
of late years on account of the high charges for hunting licenses
fixed by the Russian Government. Wolves are so plentiful that in
severe winters they descend to the lowlands in great packs and
rob the flocks before the very eyes of the shepherds.

The most important mineral resources of the region are the oil
wells; here, in fact, around Batum, are situated some of the most
important oil fields in the world. Of manganese ore, an essential
of the steel industry, the Caucasus furnishes half of the world's
supply, which is exported from the two ports of Poti and Batum. Its
mineral wealth seems to be practically unlimited, copper, zinc, iron,
tin, and many other metals being found throughout the region, in
most cases in exceedingly rich deposits. The agricultural resources
are not so important, especially from a military point of view,
though vast quantities of sheep are raised in the highlands in the
spring and summer, the flocks being driven down into the plains
to the south in winter.

One of the outstanding features of Russian occupation is the great
Georgian military road which has been built across the mountains of
recent years and maintained by the Government. Its engineering is
masterly; here and there it passes close to or under vast overhanging
lumps of mountainside. Everywhere the greatest care has been taken
of this most important military highway, Russia's avenue into that
country she coveted and fought for so long. Beginning at Vladikavkaz,
it runs through Balta, Lars, thence through the famous Gorge of
Dariel, the "Circassian Gates," the dark and awful defile between
Europe and Asia. The gorge is what the geologists call a "fault,"
for it is not really a pass over the mountain chain, but a rent
clear across it. Seventy years ago it was almost impassable for
avalanches or the sudden outbursts of pent-up glacial streams swept
it from end to end, but the Russians have spent over $20,000,000
on it and made it safe. In 1877, during the Russo-Turkish War,
nearly all the troops and stores for carrying the war into Turkey
and Asia came by this road.

Its importance has since been lessened to a certain degree, for
there is now direct railway communication from Moscow to Baku,
at one end of the Trans-Caucasian Railway, and therefore to Kars
itself, via Tiflis; and equally from Batum to Kars at the other
end to which military steamers can bring troops and supplies from
Odessa and Novorossik in the Black Sea.

The most important city in this region is Tiflis, the "city of
seventy languages." It may, indeed, be called the modern Babel. As
seen from the mountains, it lies at the bottom of a brown, treeless
valley, between steep hills, on either side of the River Kura.

It is a point of great importance to modern Russia. It forms, to
begin with, the end of the great military road across the mountains
which, in spite of the railways, is still the quickest way to Europe
for an army as well as for travelers, and all the mails come over
it by express coaches. From Tiflis a railway runs to Kars, a strong
frontier on the Persian frontier.

Tiflis has been much developed under the Russian Government. In
the modern section of the city the streets are wide and paved and
lighted by electricity and the stores are large and handsome while
electric railways run in all directions. In the older parts of the
city, however, the houses remain as they were built centuries ago,
divided out into the many quarters devoted to the residences of the
many races and nationalities that compose the population of Tiflis.
Between most of them is bitter enmity and prejudice, even among those
of the two great religious faiths, Christians and Mohammedans. It
is this diversity of interests, which extends throughout all the
section down into Persia, which has so complicated the situation
on this front. For not only are the two military forces fighting
here, but wherever governmental authority is momentarily relaxed,
there these mutual animosities flare up into active expression and
the most barbarous features of warfare take place, such as the
massacres of the Armenians by the Mohammedans. Neither Turkey nor
Russia has been especially eager to suppress these bitter feuds,
even in time of peace. In time of war there is nothing to restrain
them, and the whole region is swept by carnage infinitely more
hideous than legitimate warfare.

We have now passed over the entire theatre of the battles on the
Eastern frontiers of the war in Europe. The battle grounds are
familiar to us. In the succeeding chapters we will follow the armies
over this war-ridden dominion and watch the battle lines as they
move through the war to its decisive conclusion.




PART IV--THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CAMPAIGN

       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XLVI

SERBIA'S SITUATION AND RESOURCES

The first great campaign on the southeastern battle grounds of
the Great War began on July 27, 1914, when the Austrian troops
undertook their first invasion of Serbia. They crossed the Serbian
border at Mitrovitza, about fifty miles northwest of Belgrade,
driving the Serbians before them. The first real hostilities of
the war opened with the bombardment of Belgrade by the Austrians
on July 29, 1914--six days before the beginning of the campaigns
on the western battle fields.

We are now familiar with the theatre of war as described in the
preceding chapters, and will now follow the first Austrian armies
into Serbia.

A stubborn fight excites the admiration of all observers, regardless
of the moral qualities of the combatants. So, wherever our sympathies
may lie, considering the war as a whole, there can be no doubt
that the defense which the Serbians made against the first efforts
of the Austrians to invade their country will stand out in the
early history of the war as one of the most brilliant episodes
of that period of the general struggle. Like a mighty tidal wave
from the ocean the Austrian hosts swept over the Serbian frontier
in three furious successive onslaughts, only to be beaten back
each time. Naturally, there were material and moral causes, aside
from the mere valor of the Serbians, which combined to create this
disaster for the Austrian forces, but enough of the human element
enters into the military activities of these campaigns to make
them easily the most picturesque of the early period of the war.

Before entering into a description of the actual events in 1914,
it is well to consider the forces engaged. From a material point of
view the Serbians entered into these campaigns greatly handicapped.
They had lately been through two wars. In the First Balkan War they
had not, it is true, been severely tested; the weight of the fighting
had been borne by the Bulgarians in Thrace. The real test, and the
great losses, came only with the second war, when the Serbian army
threw every fiber of its strength against the Bulgarians in the
Battle of the Bregalnitza, one of the most stubborn struggles in
military history. The result was a Serbian victory, but it was very
far from being a decisive and conclusive victory. The Bulgarians
were forced back some fifteen miles into their own territory, but
had it not been for the intervention of Rumania there can be no
doubt that the Serbs would have entered Sofia. Here it was that
the Serbians lost 7,000 killed and 30,000 wounded of their best
men, as against 5,000 killed and 18,000 wounded in the whole war
with Turkey; a total loss that was bound to be felt a few months
later when the struggle was to be against so powerful an adversary
as Austria-Hungary. The two previous wars had, without exaggeration,
deprived the Serbian fighting forces of one-tenth their number--a
tenth that was of the very best of first-line troops.

[Illustration: PICTORIAL MAP OF THE BALKANS]

Added to this was another serious handicap, possibly even more
serious. Serbia had, indeed, emerged victorious from the two wars,
with a large stretch of conquered territory at her backdoor. But
this acquired territory, practically all of Macedonia that had
not gone to Greece, was peopled by Serbs. For twenty-five years
these Macedonians had been organized into revolutionary fighting
bands, the "Macedonian Committee" for the liberation of Macedonia
and Albania from the Turks, and had struggled, not only against the
Turks, but against foreign armed bands of propagandists. Some eight
years subsequently to the foundation of the Macedonian Committee of
native origin, the Bulgars founded in 1893 their committee which
was called the Macedo-Adrianople Committee. During the First Balkan
War these experienced guerrilla fighters were valuable allies to
the Serbian forces operating against the Turks.

But even before the First Balkan War the Serbians had very distinctly
given the Macedonians to understand that they were to remain Serbian
subjects. This action on their part had had not a little to do
with rousing the Bulgarians to precipitate the Second Balkan War.
And when finally Serbia conquered all this territory, confirmed
to her down to Doiran by the treaty of Bucharest, King Ferdinand
of Bulgaria began at once a fiery anti-Serb propaganda throughout
the world, and took measures through provocatory agents and Bulgar
bands crossing from Bulgaria into Macedonia to create disturbances.

When the Great War broke out in July, 1914, this Bulgarian activity
in Serb Macedonia grew more intense. Thus it was that when the
Austrians attacked the Serbians on their front the Serbians had
still to detach enough of their forces to guard the Serbo-Bulgar
border to prevent the crossing into Serb Macedonia of Bulgar bands.
And added to this was the danger from Bulgaria herself. The Serbians
knew that the opportune moment had only to come and Bulgaria, too,
would hurl herself on the Serbian eastern flank. Thus another large
percentage of the Serbian fighting forces had also to be stationed
along the Bulgarian frontier to guard against possible attack from
that quarter.

Offsetting these handicaps, however, and more than equalizing them,
was the moral strength of the Serbian fighting units. They had
just emerged through two victorious wars; they had triumphed so
completely that there was small wonder if the Serbian farmers had
come to believe themselves invincible and their leaders infallible.
Practically every man in the Serbian army was a seasoned veteran;
he had had not only his baptism of fire, but he had been through
some of the bloodiest battles of modern times. He had got over
his first fright; he was in that state of mind where danger and
bloodshed no longer inspired either fear or horror. And even the
warlike savage trembles on entering his first battle. Finally, he
was now defending his country, his home, his very fireside and
his family against foreign invasion. And it is generally admitted
that a man fighting in that situation is equal to two invaders,
all other things being equal.

The Serb army opposing the Austrian invasions was composed of ten
divisions of the First Ban and five divisions of the Second Ban.
Five of the divisions of the First Ban and the five of the Second
came from the kingdom as it was prior to the two Balkan wars, but the
second five divisions of the First Ban were new creations recruited
from Serb Macedonia.

The principles on which the organization of the Serbian army was
based were very simple. The former kingdom was divided into five
territorial divisional districts--Nish, Valievo, Belgrade, Kragujevatz,
and Zaitchar. Each of these territorial divisional districts was
subdivided into four regimental recruiting districts, each of which
provided one infantry regiment of four battalions and one depot
battalion. The battalion numbered about a thousand men, so that the
war strength of the divisional infantry amounted to about 16,000 men.
Attached to each division was a regiment of artillery, consisting of
three groups of three 6-gun batteries; in all, 54 guns. The divisional
cavalry, existing only in war time, consisted of a regiment of
four squadrons, from men and horses previously registered. To each
division was also attached its own technical and administrative
units, engineers, and supply column, and its total strength amounted
to 23,000 officers and men of first-line troops.

In addition to these five divisions of the First Ban, there was
also a regiment of mountain artillery, made up of six batteries, six
howitzer batteries and two battalions of fortress artillery. Then
there was a separate cavalry division composed of two brigades, each
of two regiments. Its war strength was 80 officers and 3,200 men.
Attached to the cavalry division were two horse artillery batteries,
of eight guns each. All told, this first-line army numbered about
200,000, with about 5,200 sabers and 330 guns.

[Illustration: SERBIAN AND AUSTRIAN INVASIONS]

The Second Ban, or reserve, much inferior in armament to the first
line, brought the strength up to about 280,000 men. But this figure
is probably an underestimate. Volunteers were enrolled in immense
numbers. Some of them were men who had been exempted in the first
conscription; others were Serbs from Austrian territory. The United
States sent back thousands of Austrian and Macedonian Serbs who
had emigrated there. It is probable, therefore, that the total
strength of the Serbian forces shortly after the war broke out
was at least 280,000, if not a trifle more. To this must be added
the Montenegrin army which, though operating in a separate field,
contributed its share in driving the Austrians back; another 40,000
men of first-class fighting ability and experience.

Finally, there was the third reserve, another 50,000 men, but they
could be used for fighting only in the gravest emergency.

The infantry of the First Ban was armed with excellent Mauser rifles,
caliber 7 mm., model 1899. The Second Ban carried a Mauser, the
old single loader, to which a magazine was fitted in the Serbian
arsenals; while the Third Ban had the old single-loader Berdan
rifle. The machine gun carried was the Maxim, of the same caliber
as the new Mauser.

In artillery the Serbians were perhaps not so well off. Their cannons
had seen a great deal of service in the Balkan wars, and the larger
a piece of artillery the more limited is the number of rounds it
can fire. It is extremely doubtful that there had been time to
replace many of these worn-out pieces.

The field gun was of French make; it was a 3-inch quick firer with
a maximum range for shrapnel of 6,000 yards, a little over 3-1/2
miles. The Second Ban was armed with old De Bange guns of 8 cm.
caliber. The heavy guns, which had done much service outside Adrianople,
were of Creuzot make, and included 24 howitzers of 15 cm. and some
mortars of 24 cm. As for the aviation wing, there was none.

The Serbian army was under the superior command of the Chief of the
General Staff, Voivode (Field Marshal) Putnik. Unlike his younger
colleagues, his military education was entirely a home product;
he had never studied abroad. His father was one of those Serbs
born on Austrian soil; he had emigrated from Hungary to Serbia
in the early forties where he had followed the vocation of
school-teacher. In 1847 the future general was born. After passing
through the elementary schools, young Putnik entered the military
academy at Belgrade. He had already attained a commission when
the war of 1876 with Turkey broke out, through which he served as
a captain of infantry. His next experience was in the unfortunate
war with Bulgaria, in 1885, in which the Serbians were beaten after
a three days' battle. At the outbreak of the war with Turkey, in
1912, General Putnik was made head of the army and received the
grade of voivode (field marshal), being the first Serbian to enjoy
that distinction. The grade of field marshal was created in the
Serbian army during the First Balkan War.

With him worked Colonel Pavlovitch, the son of a farmer, who had
won a series of scholarships, enabling him to study in Berlin. He
had directed the military operations in the field against Turkey
and Bulgaria, and he was to do the same thing under his old chief
against the Austrians.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XLVII

AUSTRIA'S STRENGTH AND STRATEGY

Let us now review the Austrian forces that participated in the
invasions of Serbia. In number they were practically unlimited; at
least they far outnumbered the Serbian forces that met them in the
field. Their armament was of the best and their equipment as complete
as boundless resources could make it. They were, however, partly made
up of the peoples of the Slavic provinces of Austria--Bohemians,
Croatians, Dalmatians, and Bosnians. Naturally there could be but
little enthusiasm in their attacks on their brother Slavs, and while
there are many mutual animosities between these various branches
of the Slavic race, such feelings are, at any rate, secondary to
the general dislike of the "Schwabs," as the German-Austrians are
called, and the Magyars. Possibly this had much to do with the
Austrian defeats. The Hungarian, or Magyar, regiments were probably
in the majority. But the Magyars from the interior of Hungary have
no special reason to hate the Serbians, and, aside from that, they
were attacking on foreign soil.

At the head of the Austrian campaigns against Serbia was General
Potiorek, generally described as a textbook strategist. But just
how much his failures were due to his own inefficiency and how
much to the inefficiency of those under him will probably never
be determined; he had in the end to suffer for both.

These were the two great contending forces that were set in motion
by the departure of Baron Giesl, the Austro-Hungarian Minister,
from Belgrade, on July 25, 1914. On the same day the Prince Regent
Alexander signed a decree ordering the general mobilization of the
Serbian army. Three days later, on July 28, 1914, Austria declared
war. By that time Serbia was in the midst of her mobilization.

That the Austrians, who had the advantage of having taken the
initiative, and who had presumably chosen their own time for the
opening of hostilities, did not immediately take full advantage of
their favorable situation has caused much surprise among impartial
military critics. On the same day that they declared war they had
the opportunity to hurl their troops across the Danube and take
Belgrade with practically no opposition. Apparently they were not
ready; from that moment the difficulties that would have attended
such a movement increased hourly.

A force of 20,000 men was raised almost immediately for the defense
of Belgrade. To meet this opposition the Austrians had, on the
evening of the day war was declared, July 18, 1914, only one division
concentrated between Semlin and Pancsova, opposite Belgrade--a force
that was hardly sufficient to take the Serbian capital. Two days
later an army corps would have been needed for the enterprise, for
by this time the Serbian army had begun concentrating considerable
numbers within striking distance of the capital. Thus the first
opportunity was lost by the tardiness of the Austrians to act.

It is presumed that the reader has already studied the description
of this theatre of the war presented elsewhere in this work. Aside
from that, the movements that follow should only be traced with
the aid of a map. Written words are inadequate to give a concrete
picture of the field of operations.

The Austrian General Staff realized the difficulties of crossing
the Danube. Its general plan, probably prepared long before,
contemplated a main attack that should begin from another quarter.

The Austro-Serbian frontier, almost 340 miles in extent, is formed
on the north by the Save as well as by the Danube, and on the east
and southeast by the Drina River. These two smaller streams abound
in convenient fords, especially in summer. To many of these points on
the northeastern frontier Austria had already constructed strategic
railways. Moreover, the Austrian territory throughout this section is
so mountainous and well timbered that large forces of troops could
be well screened from observation, whereas the country opposite
Belgrade is fiat and bane.

It was from this direction that the Serbian General Staff expected
the first advance of the enemy. And yet there were dozens of other
points where an attack in force was possible. Each must be covered
with a force at least strong enough to hold the enemy back long
enough to enable the forces stationed at the other points to come
up to support. Here was the great advantage that the Austrians
had to begin with; an advantage which the attacking army always
enjoys. The attacking general alone knows where the first battle
shall be fought.

The Serbians, therefore, could not count on meeting the Austrians in
full force before they could enter Serbian territory. They realized
that they must give way at the first contact; that the Austrians would
undoubtedly advance quite some distance within Serbian territory
before enough Serbian forces could be brought up against them to
make the opposition effective.

Realizing this, it was decided to place fairly strong advance guards
at all probable points of invasion with orders to resist as long
as possible; until, in fact, defensive tactics could be adapted
to the situation and the main Serbian army could be brought up
to offer battle.

However, two points stood out as the most probable. These were the two
already mentioned; the north, along the line from Obrenovatz to Belgrade
and to Semendria; or, the front Obrenovatz-Ratza-Losnitza-Liubovia.
The first possibility had the advantage to the Austrians of offering
the shortest route to the center of the country--the Morava Valley,
their natural objective. But it also necessitated a difficult crossing
of the Danube, which would have had to be preceded by the building
of pontoon bridges. This would have given the Serbians time to move
up their main forces. The second alternative, an invasion from
the east, would have entailed a longer journey, but the advantage
of natural covering and easy crossing made it a sounder plan.

On July 28, 1914, the Serbians concentrated their forces in anticipation
of either event. The outpost forces were stationed at or near Losnitza,
Shabatz, Obrenovatz, Belgrade, Semendria, Pozarevatz and Gradishte.
But their principal armies were centrally grouped along the line
Palanka-Arangelovatz-Lazarevatz, while weaker, though important,
detachments were stationed in the vicinity of Valievo, a branch
railroad terminus, and Uzitze. This narrowed the field down to
such limits that it was possible to march the troops from point
to point, while the few railway facilities available were utilized
for food and ammunition supplies.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XLVIII

AUSTRIAN SUCCESSES

On the morning of July 29, 1914, the day after war had been declared,
the residents of Belgrade were startled by a deep roar, followed
by the whistling shriek of a huge body hurtling through the air,
and a shell burst over the battlements of the old Turkish citadel,
doing no damage. Immediately there came another deep shock; the
Serbian guns were responding. Thence on the cannonading along the
Danube front continued for week after week, with only now and then
a lull.

The Austrian batteries bombarded not only Belgrade, but Semendria,
Gradishte and a number of other points along the river bank. Next
they were seen building a pontoon bridge out to one of the little
islands in the river, opposite the city and barges were towed alongside
the landings on the opposite shore, presently to be crowded with
black masses of Austrian troops. Naturally, the Serbian gunners
made these objects the targets of their fire. But these were mere
bluffs, such feints as the skilled boxer makes when he wants to get
behind the guard of his opponent. If anything, these demonstrations
only served to deepen the conviction of General Putnik that the
real danger was not from this quarter.

But where was the first great blow to strike? Naturally, not only
the General Staff, but the whole army and population waited in
deep anxiety. This tension lasted over the last days of July, into
the first week of August, 1914.

Then, on August 6, 1914, some Bosnian peasants, Serbs, appeared
and reported that they had seen great bodies of soldiers moving
along the mountain roads toward Syrmia, in northeastern Bosnia. Two
days later, early in the morning, two Austrian aeroplanes whirred
over the River Save and circled over Krupani, Shaoatz and Valievo.
The last doubts were then dispelled; the attack was coming from
the east.

And finally, on August 12, 1914, the message flashed over the wires
that the outposts had seen boats in movement, full of soldiers,
behind an island on the Drina, opposite Loznitza. Near that town,
and in fact along the whole lower course of the Drina, the river
has frequently changed its channel, thus cutting out numerous small
islands, which would serve as a screen to the movements of troops
contemplating a crossing. Pontoon bridges could be built on the
farther side of almost any of these islands without being observed
from the other shore. This was exactly what the Austrians were
doing.

Suddenly, on August 12, 1914, there came a burst of rifle fire
and the boom of heavy field guns, and a fleet of barges, under
cover of this fire, emerged from around both ends of one of these
islands and made for the Serbian shore. The two battalions of Third
Reserve Serbians, stationed there as an outpost, trained their
old De Bange field guns, of which they had two batteries, on the
oncoming swarms and began firing. But the Austrian fire became
heavier and heavier; a blast of steel pellets and shells swept
through the cornfields and the plum orchards, tearing through the
streets of the village and crumpling up the houses. The breastworks
of the small Serbian detachment were literally the center of a
continuous explosion of shells.

When a full tenth of their number lay dead or disabled, the Serbians
began retiring across the cornfields and up the slopes leading
to the heights behind Losnitza. There, on higher ground, which
offered more effective shelter, they made a determined stand and
continued their fire on the Austrian masses.

Having crossed the river, the Austrians threw up defensive breastworks
and dug elaborate trenches, thus fortifying their crossing. Next
they built a pontoon bridge, and then the main Austrian army poured
across; a whole army corps and two divisions of a second.

Meanwhile, on the same day, August 12, 1914, a similar event was
happening at Shabatz, on the Save, where that river takes a sharp
southward turn and then swings up again before joining the Danube
at Belgrade. Here the country is a level plain, really the southern
limit of the great plain which stretches up to the Danube, past
Belgrade and so into Hungary. Here, too, the Austrians screened
themselves behind an island in the river, then hurled their forces
across, driving the feeble detachment of Third Reserve Serbian troops
back across the plain up into the hills lying to the southeast
of Shabatz. Then the advance guard of the Austrian Fourth Army
occupied the town, strongly fortified it and built a pontoon bridge
across the river from their railroad terminus at Klenak.

Further passages of a similar nature were forced that day, August
12, 1914, at other points by smaller forces; one at Zvornik and
another at Liubovia. In addition the Austrians also threw bridges
across the river at Amajlia and Branjevo. Thus it will be seen
that the invasion covered a front of considerably over a hundred
miles and that six strong columns of the enemy had crossed, all of
which naturally converged on Valievo. For Valievo was the terminus
of a small, single track railroad which joined the main line at
Mladenovatz. Thus the Austrians would have a convenient side door
open into the heart of Serbia which was, of course, their main
objective. To this Belgrade was merely incidental. With this line
of transport and communication in Austrian hands, Belgrade would
fall of itself.

From Losnitza, where the main column of Austrians crossed the Drina
to Valievo, runs the River Jadar, along a level valley, which narrows
as it nears Valievo. On the left-hand side of the Jadar Valley rise
the southern slopes of the Tzer Mountains, covered with cornfields,
prune orchards, with here and there a stretch of thick timber.
Continuing southward, slightly to the eastward, up the Jadar Valley
another range rises, slightly smaller than the Tzer Mountains,
forming a smaller valley which branches off eastward. Along this
runs the River Leshnitza, parallel with the Jadar until it makes
an independent junction with the Drina. Still farther up the valley
the foothills of the Iverak ridges are lost in a series of fairly
important summits which closely flank the Jadar River.

To the south of the Jadar River the valley stretches into a rolling
plain, which rises abruptly into the giant Guchevo Mountains. It is
this range, converging with the Tzer and Iverak Mountains toward
Valievo, and forming the plain of the Jadar Valley, which was presently
to become the center of the first great battle between the Serbians
and Austrians.

A military movement against Valievo, therefore, demanded complete
possession of these two ridges, which overlooked the line of march.
This the Austrians knew well enough, even before the first of their
troops had crossed the Drina. As is well known, the best maps, not
only of Serbia but of all the Balkan countries, have been made by
Austrian engineers. There was probably not a spur, not a fissure,
certainly not a trail, of these mountains that had not been carefully
surveyed and measured by engineers of the Austrian staff.

The Austrians knew the country they were invading quite as well
as did the native Serbians. All through it may be said that it was
not through want of accurate knowledge that the Austrians finally
met disaster. Rather was it because they misjudged the relative
values of their facts. And one of their first mistakes was in
overestimating the effects of the two Balkan Wars on the efficiency of
the Serbian army. First of all, as was obvious from the leisureliness
with which they proceeded to occupy the two mountain chains in
question, that they vastly misjudged the capacity of the Serbian
troops to make rapid movements. Even as the first shots were being
fired across the Drina at Losnitza, the Serbian forces were on
the move, westward. Two army corps were at once rushed toward the
Valley of the Jadar; part of a third was sent to block the advance
of the Austrians from Shabatz. Meanwhile the Austrians took their
time. For two days they busied themselves fortifying the bridge
at Losnitza.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER XLIX

THE GREAT BATTLES BEGIN

On August 14, 1914, began the first battle of the Serbian campaign.
The Austrians proceeded to storm the heights from which the small
outpost detachments had all the time been bombarding them with
its old-fashioned guns. The Serbians, though few in number, made
a desperate resistance. It was their business to hold back the
enemy as long as possible, even until the reenforcements should
arrive.

Early in the morning of August 14, 1914, the Austrians advanced
in a great mass, then charged up the hillsides toward the Serbian
position. The Serbians waited until they were well up the steep
slopes and the rush of the enemy had subsided to a more toilsome
climb. Then they sent down volley after volley from every available
weapon.

The Austrian soldiers, who had until then never experienced anything
more warlike than field maneuvers, lost their nerves; the first
line broke and ran at the first fire. However, that was likely
to happen to any troops under fire for the first time. Down in
the plain they formed again, and again they swept up the slopes.
This time they did not turn at the first volley. On they came,
with fixed bayonets. And presently the first line reached the top
of the heights, and the fighting was hand-to-hand. For a moment the
Serbians, overwhelmed by numbers, were on the point of fleeing. But
these same men had been through many a hand-to-hand encounter with
both Turks and Bulgars; that experience stood them in good stead.
And again they swept back the attacking masses of Austria-Hungary.

By evening, August 14, 1914, the Austrians had not yet taken the
heights. But the Serbians, most of them middle-aged and old men,
had spent their vitality. As the dark night lowered over the scene,
they fell back, until, at Jarebitze, they met the first advance
guards of the oncoming Serbian main army. And here they halted, and
the united forces proceeded to dig a trench on a ten-mile front,
extending from north to south, through the town and clear across
the Jadar Valley. Nor did the Austrians then attempt to follow up
this first success. Thus the Serbians were allowed to intrench
themselves unmolested until, next day, August 15, 1914, they were
joined by the balance of their forces.

Now, by studying the map, it will be seen at a glance that it was
only the Tzer Mountains which separated the Austrian column crossing
the Drina at Losnitza and the column which had crossed the Save and
had occupied Shabatz. Should the Austrians from over the Drina get
possession of the Tzer ridges, they would thus effect a junction
with the forces in Shabatz, and so form a line that would cut off a
large portion of northwestern Serbia. Aside from that, they would
have a solid front. But should the Serbians possess themselves
of the Tzer ridges first, then they would have driven a wedge in
between their two main forces. This would make it difficult for
either to advance, for then they would be exposing a flank to the
enemy, who would also have a great advantage in position. Moreover,
the Serbians would be in a position to turn immediately toward either
of the Austrians' columns, whichever might need most attention.

Meanwhile, the Serbian cavalry had made a reconnaissance toward
Shabatz. They immediately sent back reports of overwhelming forces
occupying the town. It was out of the question to make any attack
there for the present.

It was now learned, for the first time, that another of the enemy's
columns had crossed the Drina far down in the south, and was marching
on Krupanie, just below the Guchevo Mountains and on the way to
the upper part of the Jadar Valley. However, as the first report
seemed to indicate that this was only a minor force, a small force
of third reserve men was detached to hold this force back and prevent
its entrance into the main field of operations.

During the day and night of August 15,1914, the two opposing forces
were moving into position for battle: setting the pawns for the
game of strategy that was to be played. The Austrians at Losnitza
were advancing up the mountain slopes and took possession of the
Tzer and Iverak ridges, straddling the Leshnitza Valley.

Up in Shabatz, Austrian troops were pouring across the pontoon
bridges. A flanking column, coming from the Drina, had arrived
at Slepehevitch. Another force was stationed with its left and
center on Krupani, its right spread out into the mountains north
of Liubovia.

On the Serbian side the right wing of the Second Army, screened
by the cavalry division, were preparing to cut off the Austrian
forces in the north from their juncture with those advancing along
the Tzer ridges; the center and left was marching on the enemy on
the Iverak ridges, in conjunction with the right of the Third Army,
then north of Jarebitze. The center of the Third held the positions
south of Jarebitze, while its left, split into small detachments,
had been directed to oppose the invasion toward Krupanie and the
advance from Liubovia.

Such were the positions of the various forces as dawn broke brightly
on the morning of August 16, 1914. As the growing light made objects
visible, the extreme right division of the Serbian front, which
was creeping northward to cut off Shabatz, discovered a strong
Austrian column moving along the lower spurs of the Tzer Mountains.
Obviously this body was clearing the ground for a general descent of
the forces up along the ridges; a whole army corps. This movement
threatened to become a serious obstacle to the Serbian plan of
separating the Austrians in Shabatz from those farther south. But
the situation was saved by one of those incidents which sometimes
stand out above the savagery of warfare and give to it a touch
of grandeur.

A young artillery officer, Major Djukitch, of the Fourth Artillery
Regiment, asked permission to go out and meet this body of advancing
Austrians with but a single cannon. He would create a diversion which
would give the Serbians time to adapt themselves to the changed
conditions, though the chances were very largely in favor of his
losing his life on this mission. Permission was granted. Calling
on volunteers from his command, he advanced with his single cannon
and took up a position in the path of the approaching enemy. The
moment he opened fire the Austrians, naturally not realizing that
only one cannon was opposing them, and believing that a large Serbian
force had surprised them, broke into a panic. Half an hour after he
had opened fire, the Serbian field commander sent a messenger to
Major Djukitch, ordering him to retire. In reply he sent a message
to the commander, describing the confusion he had created in the
Austrian ranks, and instead of retiring, he asked for reenforcements.
The balance of his own battery, a detachment of infantry, and a
cavalry division was sent him. The result was that the Austrian
column was temporarily driven back into the mountains. Hastily
re-forming, the Austrians now massed along a line extending from
Belikamen to Radlovatz, while the Serbians deployed along a front
running from Slatina through Metkovitch to Gusingrob.

At 11 a. m., August 16, 1914, the two opposing forces opened fire
in earnest, up and down the line. All day the cannon roared and
the rifles and machine guns crackled; now and again the Austrians
would shoot forth from their line a sharp infantry attack, but these
were repulsed, with more and more difficulty as the day advanced,
for the Serbians were much inferior in numbers. Toward evening their
situation became very critical. Yet every part of the line held
out desperately, knowing that reenforcements were being hurried
forward from the rear as fast as men could move.

And just before dark, along the roads from the eastward, came the
distant cheers from the advancing columns. An officer dashed up
on horseback shouting encouragement to the battered men in the
trenches. A cheer arose, which rolled up and down the line. Again
it rose, then, even before it had died out, with wild yells the
Serbians sprang over their breastworks and swept madly across the
intervening space to the Austrian lines; smashing through cornfields,
over rocks, through the tall grass of orchards. At their heels
followed the reenforcing soldiers, though they had that day marched
nearly sixty miles. Over the Austrian breastworks they surged,
like an angry wave from the sea, their bayonets gleaming in the
sunset glow. It was the kind of fighting they knew best; the kind
that both Serbians and Bulgars know best, the kind they had practiced
most.

Small wonder if the inexperienced peasants from the plains of Hungary,
unused till then to any sight more bloody than a brawl in the village
inn, trembled before this onslaught. Their officers shouted
encouragement and oaths, barely audible above the mad yells of
the Serbians. Nevertheless, they gave way before the gleaming line
of bayonet blades before them. Some few rose to fight, stirred by
some long-submerged instinct generated in the days of Genghis Khan.
But the majority turned and fled, helter-skelter, down the sides of
the mountains toward the valleys, leaving behind guns, ammunition,
and cannon. One regiment, the Hundred and Second, stood its ground
and fought. As a result it was almost completely annihilated. The
same fate befell the Ninety-fourth Regiment. But the majority sought
and found safety in flight. By dark the whole Austrian center was
beaten back, leaving behind great quantities of war material.


       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER L

FIRST VICTORY OF THE SERBIANS

The Serbians had made their first move successfully on that day of
August 16, 1914. More important than this mere preliminary defeat
of the enemy was the fact that the Austrians in Shabatz were now
definitely cut off from any possible juncture with the Austrians
in the south. For the present they were debarred from entering
the main field of operations. This freed the Serbian cavalry for
action elsewhere. Meanwhile a portion of the right wing of the
Serbian line was detached to keep the Austrians inside Shabatz.

Farther to the south the Serbians were not so decidedly successful.
The center of the Serbian Second Army, that directed against the
southern slopes of the Tzer Mountains and the Iverak ridges, had
arrived at Tekerish at midnight.

As dawn broke on August 16, 1914, they perceived a strong Austrian
column descending from above, coming in the same direction.
Unfortunately the Serbians were in the midst of bald, rolling foothills,
while the Austrians were up among the tall timber which clothes the
mountain slopes at this point. The Serbians deployed, extending
their line from Bornololye through Parlok to Lisena, centering their
artillery at Kik. The Austrians made the best of their superior
position.

For some hours there was furious firing, then, at about eight o'clock
the Austrian gunners got the range of the Serbian left flank with
their field pieces, which was compelled to fall back. But just
then timely reenforcements arrived from the rear, and the Serbians
dug themselves in. By evening the Serbians had lost over a thousand
men, though they had succeeded in taking 300 prisoners and several
machine guns from the Austrians.

The left wing of the Second Army had, in the meantime, arrived
against Iverak. That this division was able to arrive at such a
timely juncture was due to its having made a forced march of fifty-two
miles over the mountain roads during the previous day. Yet before
dawn on the morning of August 16,1914, it was ready to continue
its march to Poporparlok. But then came the news that the Austrians
had driven back the left wing of the Third Army from that position
and had occupied it.

The situation in which this division found itself was by no means
clear. Nothing had been heard from Shabatz. The division operating
along the Tzer ridges had been badly hammered. The Third Army had
lost Poporparlok. The commander decided to stay where he was and
simply hold the ground against any advance of the enemy from Iverak.
This division was, therefore, intrenched along a line from Begluk
to Kik, and a strong advance was thrown out toward Kugovitchi.
During the morning this advance guard made a strong attack against
Kugovitchi, drove the Austrians out, and established themselves
there.

At dawn, August 16, 1914, the left flank of this division, at Begluk,
was shelled by the Austrian artillery, which was followed by infantry
attacks. These were easily repulsed during the day. But then the
enemy was reenforced, and late that night they came on again in great
masses. The Serbians allowed them to almost reach their trenches:
then, emptying the magazines of their rifles at them, they piled
themselves over their breastworks and into them with bayonets and
hand bombs. This was too much for the Austrians; they fled in wild
disorder.

Least encouraging was the experience of the Serbian Third Army,
which was defending the territory south of the Iverak Mountains.
Here the Austrians developed a vigorous and persistent offensive,
hoping to turn the Serbian left and thus capture the road to Valievo.

The attack on the positions at Jarebitze commenced at daybreak on
August 16, 1914. Here the Serbians held good ground: rocky summits,
but so limited in extent that there was room only for a few companies
at a time. On the other hand the ground before them was broken up
into hollows screened by growing corn. This enabled the Austrians
to deploy their lines beyond the Serbian flanks unseen. They did
execute just such a movement, and attempted to circle around toward
the Serbian rear.

At the same time the Serbians here were attacked from in front
by another hostile column which had come from across the plain on
the south side of the Jadar valley, where hollows, sunken roads,
and fields of corn again formed ample screening. However, in spite
of all these movements, the Serbians were able to hold their own.
The Austrian attacks were all beaten back. Their position might
have been held indefinitely, but developments to the south were
taking on a threatening form.

It will be remembered that an Austrian force had been reported
approaching from the south, moving on Krupanie, and that it had
seemed so insignificant that a small detachment of third reserve
troops had been sent to hold it back. But this enemy force now
developed into three mountain brigades.

Reenforcements of infantry and mountain artillery were hurried
down to support the retaining force, but the Austrians were able to
force their way on toward Zavlaka. Seeing Valievo thus threatened,
the Serbians retired from their position at Jarebitze and took up
a new position along a line from Marianovitche to Schumer, thus
enabling them to face both the enemy columns. This retreat was
fortunately not interfered with by the Austrians, though in executing
it the Serbian artillery, which had been in position on the right
bank of the Jadar, was obliged to pass along the Austrian front
in single file, in order to gain the main road.

Early the next morning, August 17, 1914, the Serbians were in position
and had extended their line to Soldatovitcha, whence the detachment
from Krupanie had retired. Summing up the day's fighting, and
considering it as a whole, it will be seen that the Austrians had
pretty well held their own, except on their extreme left, where
they had failed to get in touch with their forces in Shabatz.

After the defeat of the Austrians at Belikamen on August 16, 1914,
the cavalry division was reenforced by some infantry and artillery,
then sent on the delicate mission of driving a wedge in between
the Austrians in Shabatz and those along the Drina. Spreading out
across the Matchva plain, its left wing up against the slopes of
the Tzer Mountains, and its right wing within reach of Shabatz,
it advanced as far as Dublje in the north. At the same time it
was able to assist the column advancing along the Tzer ridges by
playing its artillery on the Austrian position in the mountains at
Troyan. Throughout all the fighting this cavalry division rendered
notable service by its dismounted action.

On the morning of August 17, 1914, the extreme right of the Serbian
front now turned toward Shabatz. Though only half the number of the
forces they were proceeding to engage, they continued onward. But
on closer approach it became apparent that they could do nothing more
than hold the Austrians inside the town. So well and so thoroughly
had the Austrians fortified themselves that it was hopeless for
so small a force to attempt an attack. Thus this section of the
Serbian front settled down to wait for reenforcements.

The center and left of the Second Army now prepared to advance
along the Tzer and Iverak ridges. The Austrians in this section,
who had suffered so severely the day before at Belikamen, were
now concentrated around Troyan, the most easterly and the second
highest peak of the chain.

At dawn on August 17, 1914, the Serbians located the Austrians.
Immediately they began a heavy artillery fire on this position,
then proceeded to infantry attack. Two regiments hurled themselves
up the slopes, and with bayonets and hand bombs drove the Austrians
back. After that no further progress was possible that day, the
Serbians having to wait for their artillery to come up. The Austrians
now began intrenching themselves on the heights of Kosaningrad,
the loftiest portion of the Tzer range.

Along the Iverak ridges the Austrians made a determined advance.
The situation of the Serbian troops in this section, the left wing
of the Second Army, was extremely dangerous, for their left flank
was becoming exposed by the continued retreat of the Third Army.
The only hopeful aspect of their situation was that the Austrians
were also having their left flank exposed by the retreat of the
Austrians along the Tzer ridges. Evidently the opposing forces
realized this fact, for they made a fierce attempt to drive back
the Serbians opposing them, so that their danger from the north
might be lessened. Half an hour later they were severely repulsed.
But heavy reenforcements came up to the Austrians just then, and
again they attacked, this time more successfully.

By noon, August 17, 1914, the Austrians had extended their line
over to the Serbian right wing.

Unfortunately, at about that time the Third Army again called for
assistance, and this hard-pressed division was compelled to send
it. The result was that it was compelled to withdraw gradually to
the heights of Kalem. The retirement was executed in good order,
and the Austrians satisfied themselves with occupying Kugovitchi.
Intrenching themselves in their new position, the Serbians awaited
further attacks. Only an ineffectual artillery fire was maintained
by the enemy. Meanwhile came the good news of the success of the
Serbians along the Tzer ridges, so preparations were made for another
advance on the following day, August 18, 1914.

As has already been stated, the extreme south wing of the Serbian
front, the Third Army, had retreated the day before so that it
could present a solid front against not only the forces opposing
it, but also another column coming up from the south, whose advance
had been inadequately covered by third reserve men. Here the Austrians
attempted to pierce the Serbian line in the extreme south and come
out at Oseshina. But though vastly outnumbered, the Serbians held
their ground stoutly until late afternoon, when, as already shown,
they were compelled to ask the division operating along Iverak for
assistance. When this help came they were able to resume their
defense.

Thus ended the second day of the general battle. On the whole the
Austrians had suffered most, but the general situation was still
somewhat in their favor. The Austrian center, along the Tzer ridges,
had been pushed back. To retrieve this setback the logical course
for the Austrian commander in chief was to curl his wings in around
the Serbian flanks. That he appreciated this necessity was obvious,
to judge from the furious onslaughts against the Serbian Third Army
in the extreme south. But to weaken the Serbian center by these
tactics it was also necessary to free the Austrians in Shabatz, or,
at least, it was necessary that they should assume a strong offensive
against the extreme right of the Serbians, and, if possible, flank
them.

But the Serbians anticipated the plans of the Austrians. Additional
reenforcements were sent to the extreme right with orders to spare
no sacrifice that would keep the Austrians inclosed within their
fortifications around Shabatz.

And true enough, next morning, August 18, 1914, shortly after the hot
summer sun had risen over the eastern ridges, the Austrians emerged
from Shabatz and attacked the Serbians. The Austrian onslaught was
furious, so furious that, step by step, the Serbians, in spite of
their reenforcements, were driven back. Fortunately toward evening
the Austrian offensive began losing its strength, and that night
the Serbians were able to intrench along a line from Leskovitz
to Mihana.

This obliged the cavalry division, which had been cooperating with
the Serbian center and was driving the Austrians toward Leshnitza,
to retire along a line from Metkovitch to Brestovatz. Naturally the
advance of the Austrians from Shabatz was endangering its right
flank. Moreover, a reenforced column of Austrians also appeared
before it. But this opposing force did not press its advance.

Meanwhile, on the same day, August 18, 1914, the Austrians were
reenforcing their position on the Tzer ridges. They had also strongly
fortified the height of Rashulatcha, which lay between the heights
of Tzer and Iverak, whence they could direct an artillery fire
to either field of activities.

But the difficulties which the Serbians operating along the Iverak
ridges were meeting also hampered the Serbians who were attempting
to sweep the Austrians back along the Tzer ridges. If they advanced
too far they would expose their flank to the Austrians over on
Iverak. As a general rule, it is always dangerous for any body of
troops to advance any distance beyond the general line of the whole
front, and this case was no exception. However, though delayed,
this division did advance. Oxen were employed in dragging the heavy
field pieces along the trails over the rocky ridges.

With savage yells the Serbian soldiers leaped over the rocks, up
the jagged slopes of Kosaningrad. Again they had fallen back on
their favorite weapons, bayonets and hand bombs. The Austrians
put up a stout resistance, but finally their gray lines broke,
then scattered down the slopes, followed by the pursuing Serbians.
Having gained possession of Kosaningrad Peak, the Serbian commander
next turned his attention to Rashulatcha, which, in conjunction
with the Serbians over on Iverak, could now be raked by a cross
artillery fire. He had previously left a reserve force behind at
Troyan. This he now ordered to reenforce his left, which had been
advancing along the southern slopes of the Tzer range. This force he
now directed against the heights, but the movement was not vigorously
followed up.

Over on Iverak the Serbians had succeeded in making some headway.
Forming into two columns, this wing marched out and attacked the
Austrians at Yugovitchi and succeeded in driving them from their
trenches. But immediately the Austrian artillery on Reingrob opened
fire on them, and they were compelled to dig themselves in. And
late that night, August 18, 1914, the Austrians delivered a fierce
counterattack. But night fighting is especially a matter of experience,
and here the Serbians with their two Balkan campaigns behind them,
proved immensely superior. They drove the Austrians back with their
bayonets.

During that same day, August 18, 1914, the Austrians had renewed
their pressure on the Third Army and the Third Ban men. Soldatovitcha
was their first objective. During the day reenforcements arrived
and the commanding general was able to hold his own, retaking
Soldatovitcha after it had once been lost. Thus ended the day of
August 18, 1914, the third day of the battle.

Early next morning, on August 19, 1914, the Austrians in Shabatz
renewed their efforts to penetrate the Serbian lines to the southward.
So determined was their effort that finally the Serbians in this
sector were driven back over on to the right bank of the River
Dobrava. All day the fighting continued, the Serbians barely holding
their position, strong as it was.

This success of the Austrians hampered the cavalry division, which
had not only to secure its flank, but had also to keep between the
Shabatz Austrians and the Serbians operating on Tzer, whom they
might have attacked from the rear.

Along the Tzer ridges, however, things were going well for the
Serbians. At noon they had taken Rashulatcha, which left the column
free to continue its pursuit of the fleeing Austrians along the
ridges. From the heights above the Serbian guns fired into the
retreating Austrians down along the Leshnitza River, turning the
retreat into a mad panic. By evening the advance guard of this
division had arrived at Jadranska Leshnitza.

In the early morning, August 19, 1914, the Serbians over on the
Iverak ridges had attacked in deadly earnest. Naturally the huge
success and rapid advance of the Serbians over on the Tzer ridges
were of great importance to them. Here the Austrians were put to
rout too. At 11 a. m. the Serbians stormed Velika Glava and took
it, but here their progress was checked by a strong artillery fire
from the west of Rashulatcha. Then rifle firing broke out along
the whole line from Velika Glava to Kik. Near Kik the Austrians
were massing in strong force, and the Third Army was reported to
be again in danger, this time from a hostile turning movement.
Fortunately general headquarters was able to come to the rescue with
reenforcements. This lessened the danger from Kik. Whereupon the
advance along Iverak was continued. By the middle of the afternoon,
when the Austrians were driven out of Reingrob, the Serbians controlled
the situation. The defeat of the Austrians was complete.

The Third Army was again in trouble during this day, August 19,
1914. Its left flank continued its advance from Soldatovitcha, but
the Austrians attempted to pierce their center. But finally this
sorely tried section of the Serbian front emerged triumphant. Before
evening the Austrians were driven back in scattered disorder, leaving
behind them three hospitals filled with wounded, much material,
and 500 prisoners.

Here ended the fourth day of the bloody struggle--August 19, 1914.
In the north around Shabatz the Austrians had made some advance, but
all along the rest of the line they had suffered complete disaster.
The two important mountain ridges, Tzer and Iverak, which dominated
the whole theatre of operations, were definitely in the hands of
the Serbians. And finally, the Third Army had at last broken down
the opposition against it.

Next morning, August 20, 1914, dawned on a situation that was thoroughly
hopeless for the Austrians. Even up around Shabatz, where they
had been successful the day before, the Austrians, realizing that
all was lost to the southward, made only a feeble attack on the
Serbians, who were consequently able to recross the Dobrava River
and establish themselves on the right bank.

The cavalry division, whose left flank was not freed by the clearing
of the Tzer ridges, hurled itself against the Austrians in the
plains before it and threw them into wild disorder. First they
shelled them, then charged. The panic-stricken Magyars fled through
the villages, across the corn fields, through the orchards.

"Where is the Drina? Where is the Drina?" they shouted, whenever
they saw a peasant. A burning, tropical sun sweltered over the
plain. Many of the fleeing soldiers dropped from exhaustion and
were afterward taken prisoners. Others lost themselves in the marshy
hollows and only emerged days later, while still others, wounded,
laid down and died where they fell.

In the Leshnitza similar scenes were taking place. From the ridges
above the Serbian guns roared and poured hurtling steel messages
of death down into the throngs of retreating Austrians. Some few
regiments, not so demoralized as the others, did indeed make several
attempts to fight rear-guard actions, to protect their fleeing
comrades, but they again were overwhelmed by the disorganized masses
in the rear pouring over them.

In the Jadar valley another disorganized mob of Austrians was fleeing
before the Serbians up on the Iverak ridges, who also were pouring
a hot artillery fire into their midst. Presently the Third Army
joined in the mad chase. And now the whole Austrian army was wildly
fleeing for the Drina River.

There remained only one exception during the early part of the
day, August 20, 1914. This was the Austrian forces on Kik, to the
northwest of Zavlaka. The Serbian reenforcements which, it will
be remembered, had originally been directed toward Marianovitche,
had been afterward sent westward, and at dawn on August 20 they
approached Kik in two columns. The left column occupied Osoye without
resistance, but in descending from that position, the Austrian
artillery opened fire on it.

An hour later the right column came up and opened an artillery
fire, and under cover of this bombardment a Serbian regiment reached
the foot of the mountain. As was afterward learned, the Austrians
at this point had had their machine guns destroyed by the Serbian
artillery fire, and by this time their own artillery had been sent
back, in preparation for the retreat. Consequently they were only
able to receive the Serbian attack with rifle fire.

At the height of this skirmish the extreme left of the Serbians
on Iverak, which had remained to guard against attack from this
quarter, moved over against the Austrians. The cross-fire was too
much for them; they turned and fled, leaving behind over six hundred
dead, the Serbians in this affair losing only seven killed. Jarebitze
was now occupied; the rest of the Serbians joined in the general
pursuit.

That night, August 20, 1914, the Austrians swarmed across the Drina,
fleeing for their lives. By the next day the whole river bank was
cleared of them. Serbian soldiers lined the whole length of the
frontier in this section. There remained now only the Austrians
in Shabatz to deal with. The whole Serbian army was now able to
concentrate on this remaining force of the enemy left in Serbian
territory.

Early on August 21, 1914, the attack began, and the Austrians here
fought stoutly. Indeed, all that day they held the Serbians off
from behind their intrenchments. On August 22, 1914, the Serbians
made a general assault. Fortunately they found a weakness in the
fortifications on the western side of the town. To create a diversion,
the Austrians delivered a counterattack along the road toward Varna.

By the morning of August 24, 1914, the Serbians had brought up a
number of heavy siege guns. But when the general bombardment had
already commenced, it was found that the Austrians had evacuated
the town during the night, and retreated across the river. And
so the first Austrian invasion of Serbia came to its disastrous
end.