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DIO'S ROME

An
Historical Narrative Originally Composed in Greek During the Reigns of
Septimius Severus, Geta and Caracalla, Macrinus, Elagabalus and
Alexander Severus:
And
Now Presented in English Form

by

HERBERT BALDWIN FOSTER,

A.B. (Harvard), Ph.D. (Johns Hopkins),
Acting Professor of Greek in Lehigh University

FIRST VOLUME

_Gleanings from the Lost Books_

I. The Epitome of Books 1-21 arranged by Ioannes Zonaras, Soldier and
Secretary, in the Monastery of Mt. Athos, about 1130 A.D.

II. Fragments of Books 22-35.







Troy New York
Pafraets Book Company
1905
Copyright 1905
Pafraets Book Company
Troy New York




_To

My Friend Teacher and Inspirer

Mr. Gildersleeve of Baltimore

Who Has Won to the Age of Greek Lore even as to the Youth of Greek
Life

I Offer a Redundant Tribute_




VOLUME CONTENTS


                                                              PAGE

Concerning the Translation                                     vii

Concerning the Original                                          1

  (a) The Writing                                                3

  (b) The Writer                                                33

A Select List of Dissertations on Dio                           43

Magazine Articles and Notes on Dio (1884-1904)                  49

Plan of the Entire Work (as Conjectured by A. von Gutschmid)    61

An Epitome of the Lost Books 1-21 (by Ioannes Zonaras)          67

Fragments of Books 22-35 (from various sources)                329

Fragment LXXIII                                                331

Fragment LXXIV                                                 332

Fragment LXXV                                                  332

Fragment LXXVI                                                 333

Fragment LXXVII                                                333

Fragment LXXVIII                                               334

Fragment LXXIX                                                 335

Fragment LXXX                                                  335

Fragment LXXXI                                                 336

Fragment LXXXII                                                337

Fragment LXXXIII                                               339

Fragment LXXXIV                                                340

Fragment LXXXV                                                 341

Fragment LXXXVI                                                342

Fragment LXXXVII                                               342

Fragment LXXXVIII                                              345

Fragment LXXXIX                                                345

Fragment XC                                                    346

Fragment XCI                                                   346

Fragment XCII                                                  347

Fragment XCIII                                                 349

Fragment XCIV                                                  349

Fragment XCV                                                   350

Fragment XCVI                                                  352

Fragment XCVII                                                 353

Fragment XCVIII                                                353

Fragment XCIX                                                  354

Fragment C                                                     354

Fragment CI                                                    357

Fragment CII                                                   359

Fragment CIII                                                  359

Fragment CIV                                                   360

Fragment CV                                                    361

Fragment CVI                                                   366

Fragment CVII                                                  366

Fragment CVIII                                                 368




CONCERNING THE TRANSLATION


Cassius Dio, one of the three original sources for Roman history to be
found in Greek literature, has been accessible these many years to the
reader of German, of French, and even of Italian, but never before has
he been clothed complete in English dress. In the Harvard College
Library is deposited the fruit of a slight effort in that direction, a
diminutive volume dated two centuries back, the title page of which
(agog with queer italics) reads as follows:


THE

HISTORY

OF

DION CASSIUS

ABBRIDG'D BY XIPHILIN

CONTAINING

The most considerable Passages under the _Roman_ emperors from the
time of _Pompey_ the Great, to the Reign of _Alexander Severus_.

       *       *       *       *       *

In Two Volumes

       *       *       *       *       *

Done from the _Greek_, by Mr. Manning

       *       *       *       *       *

Tametsi haudquaquam par gloria sequatur Scriptorem, & Authorem rerum,
tamen in primis arduum videtur res gestas scribere. Salust.

       *       *       *       *       *

_London_: Printed for _A._ and _J. Churchill_, in _Paternoster Row_,
1704.


Four hundred and seven small pages, over and above the Epistle
Dedicatory, are contained in Volume One. Really, however, this is not
the true Dio at all, but merely his shadow, seized and distorted to
satisfy the ideas of his epitomizer, the monk Xiphilinus, who was
separated from him by a thousand years in the flesh and another
thousand in the spirit. Of the little specimens here and there
translated for this man's or that man's convenience no mention need
here be made. Hence, practically speaking, Dio now for the first time
emerges in his impressive stature before the English-speaking public
after there has elapsed since his own day a period twice as long as
then constituted the extent of that history which was his theme.

The present version, begun while I was serving as Acting Professor of
Greek at St. Stephen's College, Annandale, N.Y., has been carried
forward during such intervals of leisure as I could snatch from an
overflowing schedule at the University of South Dakota. It has been my
companion on many journeys and six states have witnessed its progress
toward completion. In spite of the time consumed it seems in
retrospect not far short of presumptuous to have tried in three or
four years to put into acceptable English what Dio spent twelve in
writing down. Yet the task was not quite the same, for half of this
historian's books have been caught up and whirled away in the cyclone
of time; and who knows whether they still possess any resting-place
above or beneath the earth?

The text originally chosen as the basis for the translation was that
of Melber, the idea of the translator being that the Teubner edition
would be the most convenient and readily obtainable standard of
reference for any one who wished to compare the Greek and the English.
Hence the numbering of the Fragments is that of Melber (subdivisions
are distinguished by a notation simpler than that of the original
"sections"). Since no Teubner volumes beyond the second proved to be
forthcoming, the rest of the work followed the stereotyped Tauchnitz
edition, which also enjoys a large circulation. This text, however,
contained so many cases of corruption and clumsiness that it seemed
best to work over carefully nearly all of the latter portion of the
English and to embody as many as possible of the improvements of
Boissevain. Incidentally Boissevain's interior arrangement of all the
later books was adopted, though it was deemed preferable (for mere
readiness of reference) to adhere to the old external division of
books established by Leunclavius. (Boissevain's changes are, however,
indicated.) The Tauchnitz text with all its inaccuracies endeavors to
present a coherent and readable narrative, and this is something which
the exactitude of Boissevain does not at all times permit. In the
translation I have striven to follow a conservative course, and at
some points a straightforward narrative interlarded with brackets will
give evidence of its origin in Tauchnitz, whereas at others loose,
disjointed paragraphs betray the hand of Boissevain who would not
willingly let Xiphilinus and Dio ride in the same compartment. My main
desire through it all has been not so much to attain a logical unity
of form as to present a history which shall look well and read well in
English. For this reason also I have banished most of the Fragments
(which must have only a comparatively limited interest) to the last
volume and have replaced them in my first by portions of Zonaras
(taken from Melber) which have their origin in Dio and are at the same
time clear, comprehensible, and connected.

Should any person object that even so my text does not offer eye and
ear a pellucid field for smooth advance, I must reply that the
original is likewise very far from being a serene and joyous highway;
and it has not appeared to me necessary or desirable to improve upon
the form of Dio's record further than the difference in the genius of
the two languages demanded. I am reminded here of what Francisque
Reynard says regarding the difficulties of Boccaccio, and because of a
similarity in the situation I venture to quote from the preface of his
(French) version of the Decameron:

"Dans son admiration exclusive des anciens, Boccace a pris pour modèle
Cicéron et sa longue période académique, dans laquelle les incidences
se greffent sur les incidences, poursuivant l'idée jusqu'au bout, et
ne la laissant que lorsqu'elle est épuisée, comme le souffle ou
l'attention de celui qui lit.... Aussi le plus souvent sa phraséologie
est-elle fort complexe, et pour suivre le fil de l'idée première,
faut-il apporter une attention soutenue. Ce qui est déjà une
difficulté de lecture dans le texte italien, devient un obstacle
très sérieux quand on a à traduire ces interminables phrases en
français moderne, prototype de précision, de clarté, de logique
grammaticale.... Je sais bien qu'il y a un moyen commode de
l'éluder...: c'est de couper les phrases et d'en faire, d'une seule,
deux, trois, quatre, autant qu'il est besoin. Mais à ce jeu on change
notablement la physionomie de l'original, et c'est ce que je ne puis
admettre."

As is Boccaccio to Cicero, so is Cassius Dio, _mutatis mutandis_, to
Thukydides; and of course the imitator improves upon the model.
Imagine a man who out-Paters Pater when Pater shall be but a memory,
and you begin to secure a vision of the style of this Roman senator,
who accentuates every peculiarity of the tragic historian's packed
periods; and whereas his great predecessor made sentences so long as
to cause mediæval scholars heartily to wish him in the Barathron,
books and all, comes forward six hundred years later marshaling phrase
upon phrase, clause upon clause, till a modern is forced to exclaim:
"What, will the line stretch out to the crack of doom?" Now I have
dealt with these complexes in different ways; and sometimes I have
cleft and hacked and wrenched them out of all semblance of their
original shape, and sometimes I have hauled them almost entire, like a
cable, tangled with particles, out of the sea-bed of departed days.

This principle of inconsistency which I have pursued in varying the
rendering of long sentences, periodic or loose, according to external
modifying conditions, may be observed also in certain other features
of the book. For I have felt obliged to allow inconsistency of letter
in the hope of approaching a consistency of spirit. I suppose that the
ideal plan to follow in a translation would be to let a given English
word represent a given Greek word, so that "beautiful" should occur as
many times in the English version as [Greek: kalos] in the original,
and "strength" as many times as [Greek: rhômê]. Such a scheme,
however, is not feasible in a passage of any length, and its
impossibility simply goes to show what a makeshift translation is and
always has been, after all. Therefore single Greek words will be found
reproduced by various English terms, but with that color which seems
best adapted to the context.

Again, in spelling I have chosen a method not unknown to recent
historians, which consists in anglicising familiar proper names that
are household words, like Antony, Catiline, etc., but keeping the
classical Latin form for persons less well known, as Antonius the
grandfather of Mark Antony. To the names of gods I have given a Latin
dress unless a particular god happened to be named by a Greek on Greek
soil. Similarly in geographical or topographical designations the
translator of Dio must needs confront a more difficult situation than
did Dio himself. Greek reduces _all_ names to its own basis. In
English one must often select from the Latin form, Greek form, Native
form, or Anglicised form. Since Dio lived in Italy and was to all
intents and purposes a Roman I decided to make the Latin form the
standard, and admit rarely the Anglicised form, less often the Greek,
and least often the Native. As to the minutiæ of spelling I need
scarcely say that I have been tremendously aided by Boissevain's
exhaustive studies, briefly summarized in his notes. This painstaking
care, for which he feels almost obliged to apologize, will lend a
permanent lustre to his invaluable work.

That many errors must have crept into an undertaking of this magnitude
I have only too vivid forebodings, and this in spite of no
inconsiderable efforts of mine to avoid them: herein I can but beg the
clemency of my readers and judges and hope that such faults may be
found to be mostly of a minor character. And perhaps I can do no
better than to make common cause at once with Mr. Francis Manning
whose book I recently mentioned; for, in his Epistle Dedicatory "To
The | Right Honourable | CHARLES | Earl of Orrery", he voices as well
as possible the feelings with which I write on the dedication page the
name of Professor Gildersleeve:

"Your Lordship will forgive me for detaining you thus long with
relation to the Work I have made bold to present you with in our own
Tongue. How well it is perform'd, I must leave entirely to my Readers.
I assume nothing to myself but an endeavour to make my Author speak
intelligible _English_. I shall only add what my Subject leads me to,
and what for my Reader's sake I ought to mention: That as there are
but few Authors that can present any Book to your Lordship in most
other Languages, and on most of the Learned Subjects, but might wish
they had been assisted by your Lordship's Skill and Knowledge therein,
as well as Patronage and Protection; so the Translator of this _Greek_
Historian in particular must lament, that notwithstanding all his
Industry and Pains, he is faln infinitely short of that great
Judgment, Nicety and Criticism in the _Greek_ Language, which your
Lordship has in your Writings made appear to the World."

       *       *       *       *       *

Dio has long served as a source to writers treating topics of greater
or less length in Roman history. He is now presented entire to the
casual reader: his veracious narrative must ever continue to interest
the historical student, who may correct him by others or others by
him, the ecclesiastic, to whom is here offered so graphic a picture of
the conditions surrounding early Christianity, and the literary man,
who finds the limpid stream of Hellenic diction far from its source
grow turbid and turgid in turning the mill wheels for this dealer in
[Greek: onkos]. Dio's faults are patent, but his excellencies,
fortunately, are patent, too; and the world may rejoice that in an age
of lust and bloodshed this serious-minded magistrate bethought him to
record with religious exactness what he believed to be the truth
respecting the Kingdom, the Republic, and the Empire of Rome even to
his own day.

I desire in conclusion to express especial gratitude and appreciation
for assistance and suggestions to Professor C.W.E. Miller of Johns
Hopkins University, Professors J.H. Wright and A.A. Howard of Harvard
University, and to Mr. A.T. Robinson of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. Likewise I must acknowledge my obligations, in the
elucidation of particularly vexed and corrupt passages, to the
illuminative comments of Sturz, or Wagner, or Gros, or Boissée, or all
combined. Additional thanks are due to many others who have helped or
shall yet help to make Dio in English a success.

HERBERT BALDWIN FOSTER.

BETHLEHEM, PENNSYLVANIA,
     June, 1905.




CONCERNING THE ORIGINAL.




A.--THE WRITING.


Cassius Dio Cocceianus, Roman senator and prætor, when about forty
years of age delivered himself of a pamphlet describing the dreams and
omens that had led the general Septimius Severus to hope for the
imperial office which he actually secured. One evening there came to
the author a note of thanks from the prince; and the temporary
satisfaction of the recipient was continued in his dreams, wherein his
guiding angel seemed to urge him to write a detailed account of the
reign of the unworthy Commodus (Book Seventy-two), just ended. Once
again did Dio glow beneath the imperial felicitations and those of the
public. Inoculated with the bacillus of publication and animated by a
strong desire for immortality,--a wish happily realized,--he undertook
the prodigious task of giving to the world a complete account of Roman
events from the beginning to so late a date as Fortune might
vouchsafe. Forthwith he began the accumulation of materials, a task in
which ten active years (A.D. 200 to 210) were utilized. The actual
labor of composition, continued for twelve years more at intervals of
respite from duties of state, brought him in his narrative to the
inception of the reign of his original patron, the first Severus.--All
the foregoing facts are given us as Dio's own statement, in what is at
present the twenty-third chapter of the seventy-second book, by that
painter in miniature, Ioannes Xiphilinus.

It was now the year A.D. 223, Dio was either consul for the first time
(as some assert) or had the consular office behind him, the world was
richer by the loss of Elagabalus, and Alexander Severus reigned in his
stead. Under this emperor the remaining books (Seventy-three to
Eighty, inclusive) must have been composed, for Dio puts the finishing
touches on his history in 229. Since by that time he was nearly eighty
years of age and since he has written of no reign subsequent to
Alexander's, we may conclude that he did not survive his master, who
died in 235. The sum total of his efforts, then, as he left it,
consisted of eighty books, covering a period from 1064 B.C. to 229
A.D. At present there are extant of that number complete only Books
Thirty-six to Sixty inclusive, treating the events of the years 68
B.C. to 47 A.D. The last twenty books, Sixty-one to Eighty, appear in
fairly reliable excerpts and epitomes, but for the first thirty-five
books we are dependent upon the merest scraps and fragments. How and
by what steps this great work disintegrated, and in what form it has
been preserved to modern times, this it is to be our next business to
trace.

It seems that Dio's work had no immediate influence, but "Time brings
roses", and in the Byzantine age we find that he had come to be
regarded as the canonical example of the way in which Roman History
should be written. Before this desirable result, however, had been
brought to pass, Books Twenty-two to Thirty-five inclusive had
disappeared. These gave the events of the years from the destruction
of Carthage and Corinth (in the middle of the second century B.C.) to
the activity of Lucullus in 69. A like fate befell Books Seventy and
Seventy-one at an early date. The first twenty-one books and the last
forty-five (save the two above noted) seem to have been extant in
their original forms at least as late as the twelfth century. Which
end of the already syncopated composition was the first to go the way
of all flesh (and parchment, too,) it would not be an easy matter to
determine. It is regarded by most scholars as certain that Ioannes
Zonaras, who lived in the twelfth century, had the first twenty-one
and the last forty-five for his epitomes. Hultsch, to be sure,
advances the opinion[1] that Books One to Twenty-one had by that time
fallen into a condensed form, the only one accessible; but the
majority of scholars are against him. After Zonaras's day both One to
Twenty-one and Sixty-one to Eighty suffer the corruption of moth and
of worm.

[Footnote 1: Iahni Annales, vol. 141, p. 290 sqq.]

The world has, then, in this twentieth century, those entire books of
Dio which have already been mentioned,--Thirty-six to Sixty,--and
something more. Let us first consider, accordingly, the condition in
which this intact remnant has come down to the immediate present, and
afterward the sources on which we have to depend for a knowledge of
the lost portion.

There are eleven manuscripts for this torso of Roman History, taking
their names from the library of final deposit, but they are not all,
by any means, of equal value. First come Mediceus A (referred to in
this book as Ma), Vaticanus A, Parisinus A, and Venetus A (Va) of the
first class; then Mediceus B of the second class; finally, Parisinus
B, Escorialensis, Turinensis, Vaticanus B, and Venetus B, with the
mongrel Vesontinus, which occupies a position in this group best
designated, perhaps, as 2-1/2.

Vaticanus A has been copied from Mediceus A, and Parisinus A from
Vaticanus A, so that they are practically one with their archetype.
Venetus A is of equal age and authority with Mediceus A. One can not
now get back of these two codices. There is none of remoter date for
Dio save the parchment Cod. Vat. 1288, containing most of Books
Seventy-eight and Seventy-nine,--a portion of the work for the moment
not under discussion. Coming to the second class, Mediceus B is a
joint product of copying from the two principal MSS. just mentioned.
In the third class, Parisinus B is a copy of Mediceus B with a little
at the opening taken from Mediceus A. This was the version selected as
a guide by Robert Estienne in the first important edition of Dio ever
published (A.D. 1548). All the rest, Escorialensis, Turinensis,
Vaticanus B, and Venetus B are mere offshoots of Parisinus B. The
Vesontinus codex is derived partly from Venetus A and partly from some
manuscript of the third class.

The parchment manuscript to which allusion was made above is only some
three centuries later than the time of Dio himself. It covers the
ground from Book 78, 2, 2, to 79, 8, 3 inclusive (ordinary division).
It belonged to Orsini, and after his death (A.D. 1600) became the
property of the Vatican Library. It is square in shape and consists of
thirteen leaves, each containing three columns of uncials. In spite
of its age it is fairly overflowing with errors of every sort, many of
which have been emended by an unknown corrector who also wrote in
uncials; this same corrector would appear to have added the last leaf.
And there are a few additions in minuscules by a still later hand. The
leaves are very thin and in some places the ink has completely faded,
showing only the impression of the pen. For specimen illustrations of
this codex see Silvestre (Paléographie Universelle II, plate 7),
Tischendorf (cod. Sinait. plate 20) and Boissevain's Cassius Dio (Vol.
III).

The dates of these codices (centuries indicated by Arabic numerals)
are about as follows:

         I. Mediceus A-Ma-          (11)
         I. Venetus A-Va-           (11)
         I. Vaticanus A             (15)
         I. Parisinus A             (17)
        II. Mediceus B              (15)
       III. Parisinus B             (15)
       III. Venetus B               (15)
       III. Vaticanus B             (15)
I. and III. Vesontinus              (15)
       III. Turinensis              (16)
       III. Escorialensis            (?)
I. Codex Vaticanus græcus No. 1288 (5-6).

Mediceus A contains practically Books Thirty-six to Fifty-four, and
Venetus A Books Forty-one to Sixty (two "decades"). As they are both
the oldest copies extant and the sources of all the others, modern
editors would confine themselves to them exclusively but for the fact
that in each some gaps are found. In Mediceus A, for instance, two
quaternions (sixteen leaves) are lacking at the start, Leaf 7 is gone
from the third quaternion, Leaves 1 and 8 from the fourth; from the
thirty-first (now Quaternion 29) Leaf 1 has been cut, from the
thirty-third and last Leaf 5 has disappeared. Likewise in Venetus A
there are some gaps, especially near the end, in Book Sixty, where
three leaves are missing. Hence (without stopping to take up gaps and
breaks in detail) it may be said that the general plan pursued at the
present day is to adopt a reading drawn for each book from the
following sources respectively:

Book 36.          Mediceus A, with lacuna of chapters
                  3-19 incl., supplied by the
                  mutual corrections of Vaticanus
                  A and Parisinus B.

Books 37 to 49.   Mediceus A.

Books 50 to 54.   Vaticanus A (vice Mediceus A).

Books 55 to 59.   Venetus A.

Book 60.          Venetus A, except chapter 17, sections
                  7 to 20, and chapter 22,
                  section 3, to chapter 26, section
                  2,--two passages supplied by
                  Mediceus B.

What knowledge has the world of the first thirty-five books of Dio's
Roman History? To such a question answer must be made that of this
whole section the merest glimpse can be had. It is here that we
encounter the name of Zonaras, concerning whom some information will
now be in order. Ioannes Zonaras was an official of the Byzantine
Court who came into prominence under Alexis I. Comnenus in the early
part of the twelfth century. For a time he acted as both commander of
the body-guard and first private secretary to Alexis, but in the
succeeding reign,--that of Calo-Ioannes,--he retired to the monastery
of Mt. Athos, where he devoted himself to literary labors until his
death, which is said to have occurred at the advanced age of
eighty-eight. He was the author of numerous works, such as a Lexicon
of Words Old and New, an Exposition of the Apostolic and Patristic
Canons, an Argument Directed Against the Marriage of Two Nephews to
the Same Woman, etc.; but our special interest lies in his [Greek:
Chronikon] (Chronicon), a history of the world in eighteen books, from
the creation to 1118 A.D.,--this last being the date of the demise of
Alexis. The earlier portions of this work are drawn from Josephus; for
Roman History he uses largely Cassius Dio; Plutarch, Eusebius, Appian
also figure. But it has already been stated that Books Twenty-two to
Thirty-five perished at an indefinitely early date; hence it follows
that Zonaras has only Books One to Twenty-one at hand to use for his
account of _early_ Rome; besides these he has later employed Books
Forty-four to Eighty. Consequently it is possible to get many of the
facts related to Dio, and in some cases his exact words, by reading
Books VII to XII of this [Greek: Chronikon] or [Greek: Epitomê
Historiôn] by Zonaras. It is Books VII, VIII, and IX especially which
follow Books One to Twenty-one of Dio.

Parallel with this account of Zonaras and extending beyond it, even to
the extent of throwing a wire of communication across the yawning
time-chasm represented by Books Twenty-two to Thirty-five, are certain
excerpts and epitomes found in various odd corners and strangely
preserved to the present moment. These are: Excerpts Concerning
Virtues and Vices; Excerpts Concerning Judgments; Excerpts Concerning
Embassies. The so-called "Planudean Excerpts" which used to be
admitted to editions are rejected on good authority[2] by Melber, whom
I have followed. I shall attempt only a brief mention of those
excerpts, to show their pertinence.

[Footnote 2: Mommsen (Hermes VI, pp. 82-89); Haupt (Hermes XIV, pp.
36-64, and XV, p. 160); Boissevain (Program, Rotterdam, 1884).]

The _Excerpts Concerning Virtues and Vices_ exist in a manuscript of
the tenth century at the library of Tours, originally brought from the
island of Cyprus and sold to Nicolas Claude Fabre de Peiresc, who
lived from 1580 to 1637. Apparently it is a collection made at the
order of Constantine VII. Porphyrogenitus. It was first published at
Paris by Henri de Valois in 1634. The collection consists of
quotations from Polybius, Diodorus Siculus, Nicolas Damascenus,
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Appian, Dio, John of Antioch, and others.

The _Excerpts Concerning Judgments_ are found in a Vatican manuscript
known as Codex Vaticanus Rescriptus Græcus, N. 73. Angelo Mai first
published the collection at Rome in 1826. They consist of many
narrative fragments extending over the field of Roman History from
early to late times, but fall into two parts: between these two parts
there is a gap of six or more pages. That the former set of fragments
is taken directly from Dio all scholars are ready to allow. In regard
to the latter set there have been, and perhaps still are, diverse
opinions. The trouble is that on the one hand these passages do not
end with the reign of Alexander Severus, where Dio manifestly ended
his history, but continue down to Constantine and (since the
manuscript has lost some sheets at the close) possibly much farther:
and on the other hand the style and diction differ considerably from
Dio's own. It was once the fashion to say that as many of the
fragments as come before the reign of Valerian (A.D. 253)[3] came from
Dio's composition, but that the remainder were written by an unknown
author. Now, however, it is generally agreed that all the excerpts of
the second set were the work of one man, whether John of Antioch, or
Peter Patricius, or some third individual. Still, though not direct
quotations from Dio, they are regarded as of value in filling out both
his account and that of Xiphilinus. The words are different, but the
facts remain undoubtedly true.

[Footnote 3: This would give Dio a considerably longer life than is
commonly allowed him.]

The _Excerpts Concerning Embassies_ are contained in somewhat less
than a dozen manuscripts, all of which prove to have sprung from a
Spanish archetype (since destroyed by fire) that Juan Paez de Castro
owned in the sixteenth century. Many of the copies were made by
Andreas Darmarius. The first publisher of these selections was Fulvio
Orsini (= Ursinus), who brought them out at Antwerp in 1582. As their
name indicates, they are accounts of embassies sent either by the
Romans to foreign tribes or by foreign tribes to the Romans. Some of
them are taken from Cassius Dio; hence their importance here.

Now it was the custom of the earlier editors to arrange the (early)
fragments of Dio according to the groups from which they were taken:
(1) the so-called Fragmenta Valesia (pickings from grammarians,
lexicographers, scholiasts), edited by the same Henri de Valois above
mentioned; (2) the Fragmenta Peiresciana (= Excerpts Concerning
Virtues and Vices); (3) the Fragmenta Ursina (= Excerpts Concerning
Embassies); and finally, in the edition of Sturz[4] (4) Excerpta
Vaticana (= Excerpts Concerning Judgments and the now rejected
"Planudean Excerpts"). The above grouping has been abandoned and a
strictly chronological order followed in all the later editions,
including Bekker, Dindorf, Melber, Boissevain.

[Footnote 4: See p. 22.]

The body of Fragments preceding Book Thirty-six cites, in addition to
the collections mentioned, the following works or authors:

Anecdota Græca of Immanuel Bekker (1785-1871), a scholar of vast
attainments and profound learning in classical literature. These
Anecdota are excerpts made from various Greek manuscripts found in the
course of travels extending through France, Italy, England, and
Germany. There were three volumes, appearing from 1814 to 1821.

Antonio Melissa.--A Greek monk living between 700 and 1100 A.D. He
collected two books of quotations from early Christian Fathers (one
hundred and seventy-six titles) on the general subject of Virtues and
Vices.

Arsenius.--Archbishop of Monembasia: age of the Revival of Learning.

Cedrenus.--A Greek monk of the eleventh century who compiled a
historical work ([Greek: Synopsis historiôn]) the scope of which
extended from the creation to 1057 A.D. He gives no evidence of
historical knowledge or the critical sense, but rather of great
credulity and a fondness for legends. His treatise is, moreover,
largely plagiarized from the _Annals_ of Ioannes Scylitzes
Curopalates.

Cramer, J.A.--An Oxford scholar who published two collections of
excerpts (similar to those of Bekker) between 1835 and 1841. The
collection referred to in our text had its source in manuscripts of
the Royal Library in Paris. It was in three octavo volumes.

Etymologicum Magnum.--A lexicon of uncertain date, after Photius (886
A.D.) and before Eustathius. This dictionary contains many valuable
citations from lost Greek works. First edition, Venice, 1499.

Eustathius.--Archbishop of Thessalonica and the most learned man of
his age (latter half of the twelfth century). His most important
composition is his _Commentary on Homer's Iliad and Odyssey_ in which
he quotes vast numbers of authors unknown to us now except by name.
First edition, Rome, 1542-1550.

Glossary of C. Labbæus, the editor of Ancient Glosses of Law Terms,
published in Paris, 1606.

John of Antioch.--Author of a work called "Chronological History from
Adam" quoted in the _Excerpts Concerning Virtues and Vices_ (vid.
supra). Internal evidence indicates that the book was written after
610 and before 900 A.D.

John of Damascus.--A voluminous ecclesiastical writer belonging to the
reigns of Leo Isauricus and Constantine VII. (approximately from 700
to 750 A.D.). He was an opponent of the iconoclastic movement. The
best edition of his works was published at Paris in 1712. The passage
cited in our Fragments is from [Greek: peri Drakontôn], a mutilated
essay on dragons standing between a "Dialogue Between a Saracen and a
Christian" and a "Discussion of the Holy Trinity."

John Laurentius Lydus.--A Byzantine writer, born at Philadelphia (the
city of Revelation, III, 7), in 490 A.D. Although he was famed during
his lifetime as a poet, all his verses have perished. The work cited
in our Fragments,--"Concerning the Offices of the Roman Republic, in
Three Books,"--had a curious history. For centuries it was regarded as
lost, but about 1785 nine tenths of it was discovered by De Villoison
in a MS. in the suburbs of Constantinople. It was published in Paris,
1811.--Laurentius in the course of his career held important political
posts and received two important literary appointments from the
Emperor Justinian I.

Suidas.--A lexicographer of the tenth century, composer of the most
comprehensive Greek dictionary of early times. It is a manual at once
of language and of antiquities. Inestimable as its value is, the
workmanship is careless and uneven. The arrangement is alphabetical.

John Tzetzes.--A Greek grammarian of the twelfth century. His learning
was great but scarcely equaled his self-conceit, as repeatedly
displayed in passages of his works. Many of his writings are still
extant. One of these is called _Chiliades_ (or _Thousands_), a name
bestowed by its first editor, who divided the work into sections of
one thousand lines each. The subject-matter consists of the most
miscellaneous historical or mythological narratives or anecdotes,
absolutely without connection. Tzetzes copied these accounts from
upward of four hundred writers,--one of them being Cassius Dio. The
_Chiliades_ is written in the so-called _Versus politicus_, or
"political verse," which is really not verse at all, but a kind of
decadent doggerel.--A minor treatise by the same author is the
_Exegesis of the Iliad of Homer_, published by Hermann (Leipzig,
1812).

Isaac Tzetzes, who has attracted less attention than his brother John,
is best known as the author of a commentary on the _Cassandra_ of
Lycophron (a poem of 1474 iambic verses by a post-classical tragedian,
about 285 B.C., embodying the warnings of the royal prophetess and
couched in appropriately incomprehensible expressions). It was hardly
worth all the care that Tzetzes lavished upon it. From manuscript
evidence and various claims of John Tzetzes it seems that John worked
over, improved, and enlarged the commentary of his brother. Isaac's
name, however, still remains associated with this particular
exposition.

We are now at length placed in a position to consider the condition
of the ultimate portion of the work, i.e., the last twenty books,
Sixty-one to Eighty inclusive. In general it may be said that for this
section of the history we are thrown back upon an epitome of Ioannes
Xiphilinus, who lived about fifty years earlier than the Ioannes
Zonaras recently under discussion. To this general statement there are
two important exceptions. First, even as early as Xiphilinus wrote
(eleventh century) nearly two books of this last portion had perished.
Book Seventy, containing the reign of Antoninus Pius, was entirely
gone save a few miserable chapters, and Book Seventy-one had suffered
the same fate in its beginning, so that our account of the renowned
Marcus Aurelius begins practically with the year 172 instead of 161.
The gap thus created has been partially filled by extracts of every
conceivable quality and merit, from Suidas, from John of Antioch, even
from Asinius Quadratus. This on the side of loss: on the side of gain
there are numerous little excerpts (just as in the case of the early
books) that may serve to fill crevices or cover scars, and above all
there exists a parchment manuscript, known as Vaticanus 1288, older
than Mediceus A, older than Venetus A, and containing Books
Seventy-eight and Seventy-nine probably very much as Dio wrote them,
save that the account is mutilated at beginning and end.

Boissevain concludes (by comparing the Table of Contents found with a
remark of Photius) that this particular piece of salvage was
originally Books Seventy-nine and Eighty (instead of Seventy-eight and
Seventy-nine), that Book Eighty of Dio was really what is now
commonly called Seventy-nine _and_ Eighty, and that the so-called Book
Eighty (of only five chapters) was but a kind of epilogue to the whole
work. Whatever we may decide respecting the merits of his argument,
the important fact is that here for a short distance we have Dio's
original narrative, as in Books Thirty-six to Sixty, and are no longer
obliged to depend upon epitomes.

A word of explanation about Xiphilinus must come next. This Xiphilinus
was a native of Trapezos (Trebizond) and became a monk at
Constantinople. Here, at the behest of Michael VII. Ducas (1071-1078)
he made an abridgment of Books Thirty-six to Eighty of Dio; thus it is
his version of the lost books Sixty-one to Eighty on which we are
compelled to rely. His task was accomplished with an even greater
degree of carelessness than is customary in such compositions, and it
may be said that his ability or, at least, his good will is not nearly
so great as that of Zonaras. Yet he is largely a _pis aller_ for the
would-be reader of Cassius Dio.

Whereas the original was divided arbitrarily into books, Xiphilinus
divided his condensation into "sections," each containing the life of
one emperor. Readers must further note that the present division of
Books Seventy-one to Eighty dates only from Leunclavius (1592, first
edition) and is not necessarily correct. Improvements in arrangement
by Boissevain (latest editor of Dio entire) are indicated in the
present translation, though for convenience of reference the old
headlines are still retained.

Before speaking of the editions through which Dio's _Roman History_
has passed it seems desirable to summarize briefly the condition of
the whole as explained in the preceding pages. Here is a bird's-eye
view of the whole situation.

Books  1-21 exist in Zonaras and various fragments.
  "   22-35 exist in fragments only.
  "   36-54 exist in Dio's own words, and are
              found in universally approved MSS.
  "   54-60 exist in generally approved MSS.
  "   60-69 exist in Xiphilinus and excerpts.
Book     70 exists in fragments only.
Books 71-77 exist in Xiphilinus and excerpts.
  "  78, 79 exist in Dio's own words (oldest MS).
Book     80 exists in Xiphilinus.


EDITIONS.

A brief list of important editions of this author is appended; the
order is chronological.

1. N. Leonicenus.--Italian translation of Books 35 to 60. Venice,
1533. Free, and with many errors.

2. R. Stephanus.--Greek text of Books 35 to 60. Paris, 1548. Work well
done, but based on a poor MS.

3. Xylander.--Latin translation of Books 35 to 60, with a brief Latin
index. Basle, 1557. This version was made from No. 2.

4. Baldelli.--Italian translation of Books 35 to 60. Venice, 1562.

5. H. Stephanus.--A second edition of No. 2 with Latin translation of
No. 2 added. A few corrections have been made and the Latin index is a
little fuller. Paris, 1591.

6. Leunclavius.--A second edition of No. 3, somewhat emended, _and
with Books 61 to 80 (Xiphilinus) added_; also containing _Orsini's
Excerpts Concerning Embassies_ (in Greek and Latin), notes of
Leunclavius, and a still fuller Latin index. Frankfurt, 1592.

7. Leunclavius.--Posthumous edition. Text of Dio and of Xiphilinus
(the latter from Nero to Alexander Severus). Corrections of R.
Stephanus in Dio proper, and of Xylander in both Dio and Xiphilinus,
notes of Leunclavius on Dio, and notes of Orsini on _Excerpts
Concerning Embassies_. Same Latin index as in No. 6. Hanover, 1606.

8. REIMAR. (Important. All previous editions are taken from codex
Parisinus B. Reimar, assisted by Gronovius (father and son) and by
Quirinus, employed Mediceus A (the standard codex) together with
Vaticanus A and Vaticanus B.) Text of Dio and Xiphilinus (Books 36 to
80), the Xylander-Leunclavius Latin version, the _Excerpts Concerning
Virtues and Vices_, and fragments collected from various sources by
Henri de Valois. Reimar used not only the three MSS. mentioned above,
but three copies of previous editions,--one of No. 2 (with notes of
Turnebus and others), one of No. 5 (with, notes of Oddey), and one of
No. 7 (with notes of an unknown individual of much learning, cited by
Reimar and in this edition as _N_). Finally he gathered all possible
emendations from as many as fourteen scholars who had suggested
improvements in the text. Hamburg, 1750.

9. J.A. Wagner.--German translation in five volumes. Frankfurt, 1783.

10. Penzel.--German translation with notes. Four volumes. Leipzig,
1786-1818.

11. Morellius.--Fragments of Dio, with new readings of the same.
Emphasizes the importance of codex Venetus A and has some remarks on
Venetus B. Published in 1793.

12. Sturz.--New edition of Dio based on No. 8, improved by a new
collation of the Medicean manuscripts and with collation of the codex
Turinensis, besides emendations gathered from many new sources. Eight
volumes. Leipzig, 1824-5. (Volume IX in 1843, containing Mai's
_Excerpts Concerning Judgments_.)

13. Tauchnitz text.--Stereotyped edition, four volumes, Leipzig, 1829.
New impression, Leipzig, 1870-77. (Originally used as a basis for the
present translation after Book Fifty: later, wholesale revisions were
undertaken to make the English for the most part conform to the text
of Boissevain.)

14. Tafel.--German translation, three volumes. Stuttgart, 1831-1844.

15. J. Bekker.--Dio entire. (With new collation of the old MS.
containing most of Books Seventy-eight and Seventy-nine, and with many
new and brilliant conjectural emendations by the editor.) Two volumes.
Leipzig, 1849.

16. Gros-Boissée.--French translation together with the Greek text and
copious notes. (With new collation of the Vatican, Medicean, and
Venetian codices, besides use of Parisinus A and Vesontinus;
manuscripts of the Fragments, especially the Tours manuscript
(concerning Virtues and Vices) have been carefully gone over.) Ten
volumes. Gros edited the first four; Boissée the last six. Paris,
1845-1870.

17. Dindorf.--Teubner text. Dindorf was the first to perceive the
relation of the manuscripts and their respective values. He used
Herwerden's new collation of the Vatican palimpsest containing
_Excerpts Concerning Judgments_. From making fuller notes and
emendations he was prevented by untimely death. Five volumes. Leipzig,
1863-1865.

18. Melber.--Teubner text, being a new recension of Dindorf, with
numerous additions. To consist of five volumes. Leipzig, from 1890.
The first two volumes, all that were available, have been used for
this translation.

19. Boissevain.--The most modern, accurate, and artistic edition of
Dio. The editor is very conservative in the matter of manuscript
tradition. He personally read in Italy many of the MSS., and had the
aid of numerous friends at home and abroad in collating MSS., besides
the help of a few in the suggestion of new readings. In the later
portion of the text he makes a new division of books, and essays also
to assign the early fragments to their respective books. Three
volumes. Berlin, 1895, 1898, 1901. Vol. I, pp. 359 + cxxvi; Vol. II,
pp. 690 + xxxi; Vol. III, pp. 800 + xviii. The second volume contains
two phototype facsimiles of pages of the Laurentian and Marcian MSS.,
and the third volume three similar specimens of the Codex Vaticanus.
In the appendix of the last volume are found, in the order named, the
following aids to the study of Dio.

     1. The _entire_ epitome of Xiphilinus (Books 36-80).

     2. Vatican Excerpts of Peter Patricius (Nos. 1-38), compared
     with Dio's wording.

     3. Vatican Excerpts of Peter Patricius (Nos. 156-191),
     containing that portion of the Historia Augusta which is
     subsequent to Dio's narrative.

     4. Excerpts by John of Antioch, taken from Dio.

     5. The "Salmasian Excerpts."

     6. Some "Constantinian Excerpts," compared with Dio.

     7. The account of Dio given by Photius and by Suidas.

     8. Table of Fragments.

Boissevain's invaluable emendations and interpretations have been
liberally used by the present translator, and some of his changes of
arrangement have been accepted outright, others only indicated.


CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NARRATIVE.

The atmosphere of Dio's Roman History is serious to a degree. Its
author never loses sight of the fact that by his labor he is
conferring a substantial benefit upon mankind, and he follows,
moreover, a particular historical theory, popular at the time, which
allows little chance for sportiveness or wit. Just as the early French
drama could concern itself only with personages of noble or royal
rank, so Dio's ideal compels him for the most part to restrict himself
to the large transactions of governments or rulers and to diminish the
consideration that idiosyncrasies of private life or points of
antiquarian interest might otherwise seem to claim. The name of this
ideal is "Dignity" ([Greek: onkos] is the Greek), a principle of
construction which is opposed to a narration adorned with details.
However much it may have been overworked at times, its influence was
certainly healthful, for it demanded that the material be handled in
organic masses to prevent the reader from being lost in a confused
mass of minutiæ. Racy gossip and old wives' tales are to be replaced
by philosophic reflection and pictures of temperament. Instead of mere
lists of anecdotes there must be a careful survey of political
relations. Names, numbers, and exact dates may often be dispensed
with. Still, amid all this, there is enough humor of situation in the
gigantic tale and enough latitude of speech on the part of the acting
personages to prevent monotony and to render intellectual
scintillations of the compiler comparatively unnecessary.
Occasionally, for the sake of sharper focus on the portrait of some
leader, Dio will introduce this or that trivial incident and may
perhaps feel called upon immediately, under the strictness of his
self-imposed régime, to apologize or justify himself.

The style of the original is rendered somewhat difficult by a
conscious imitation of the involved sentence-unit found in Thukydides
(though reminiscences of Herodotos and Demosthenes also abound) but
gives an effect of solidity that is symmetrical with both the method
and the man. Moreover, one may assert of it what Matthew Arnold
declared could _not_ be said regarding Homer's style, that it rises
and falls with the matter it treats, so that at every climax we may be
sure of finding the charm of vividness and at many intermediate points
the merit of grace. It is a long course that our historian, pressed by
official cares, has to cover, and he accomplishes his difficult task
with creditable zeal: finally, when his Thousand Years of Rome is
done, he compares himself to a warrior helped by a protecting deity
from the scene of conflict. Surely it must have been one of the major
battles of his energetic life to wrest from the formless void this
orderly record of actions and events embroidered with discussion of
the motives for those actions and the causes of such events.

Dio has apparently equipped himself extremely well for his
undertaking. A fragment edited by Mai (see Fragment I) seems to make
him say that he has read every available book upon the subject; and,
like Thukydides, he is critical, he is eclectic, and often supports
his statements by the citation or introduction of documentary
testimony. His superstition is debasing and repellent, but works harm
only in limited spheres, and it is counterbalanced by the fact that he
had been a part of many events recounted and had held high
governmental offices, enjoying a career which furnished him with
standards by which to judge the likelihood of allegations regarding
earlier periods of Rome,--that, in a word, he was no mere
carpet-knight of History. He is honestly conscientious in his use of
language, attempting to give the preference to standard phrases and
words of classical Greek over corrupt idioms and expressions of a
decadent tongue; it is this very conscientiousness, of course, which
leads him to adopt so much elaborate syntax from bygone masters of
style. Finally,--the point in which, I think, Dio has come nearest to
the gloomy Athenian,--something of the matter-of-fact directness of
Thukydides is perceptible in this Roman History. The operator unrolls
before us the long panorama of wars and plots and bribes and murders:
his pictures speak, but he himself seldom interjects a word. Sometimes
the lack of comment seems almost brutal, but what need to darken the
torture-chamber in the House of Hades?

There are two ways of writing history. One is to observe a strictly
chronological order, describing together only such events as took
place in a single year or reign; and the other, to give all in one
place and in one narration the story of a single great movement,
though it should cover several years and a fraction,--or, again, to
sketch the condition of affairs in one province, or valley, or
peninsula for so long a time as the story of such a region seems to
possess unity of development. The first kind of writing takes the year
or the reign as its standard, whereas the second uses the matter under
discussion or some part of the earth in the same way: and they may
accordingly be called, one, the chronological method, and the other,
the pragmato-geographical. The difference between the two is well
illustrated by the varying ways in which modern works on Greek history
treat the affairs of Sicily.

The first plan is that which Dio follows, and his work would have been
called by the Romans _annales_ rather than _historiæ_. The method has
its advantages, one of which is, or should be, that the reader knows
just how far he has progressed; he can compare the relative
significance of events happening at the same time in widely separated
lands: he is, as it were, _living_ in the past, and receives from week
to week or month to month reports of the world's doings in all
quarters. On the other hand, this plan lacks dramatic force; there are
sub-climaces and one grand climax: and the interest is apt to flag
through being obliged to divide itself among many districts. The same
results, both good and bad, are observable in Thukydides, whom Dio
follows in constructive theory as well as style. It has already been
said that our historian sacrifices sharpness of dates to the Onkos,
depending, doubtless, on his chronological arrangements to make good
the loss. Usually it does so, but occasionally confusion arises.
Whether because he noticed this or not, he begins at the opening of
the fifty-first book to be accurate in his dates, generally stating
the exact day. Rarely, Dio lets his interest run away with him and
mixes the two economies.

If we read the pages closely, we find that by Dio's own statement his
work falls properly into three parts. The first consists of the first
fifty-one books, from the landing of Æneas to the establishment of the
empire by Octavianus. Up to that time, Dio says (in LIII, 19),
political action had been taken openly, after discussion in the senate
and before the people. Everybody knew the facts, and in case any
authors distorted them, the public records were open for any one to
consult. After that time, however, the rulers commonly kept their acts
and discussions secret; and their censored accounts, when made public,
were naturally looked upon by the man in the street with doubt and
suspicion. Hence, from this point, says the historian, a radical
difference must inevitably be found in the character of his account.

The second portion, opening with Book Fifty-two, ends at the death of
Marcus Aurelius (180 B.C.). In LXXI, 36, 4 Dio admits that the old
splendor ended with Marcus and was not renewed. His history, he says,
makes here a sheer descent ([Greek: katapiptei]) from the golden to
the iron age. It fades, as it were, into the light of common day in a
double sense: for the events succeeding this reign Dio himself was
able to observe as an intelligent eyewitness.

The third section, then, extends from the beginning of Book
Seventy-two to the end of the work. Here Dio breaks away oftener than
before from his servility to the Dignity of History, only to display a
far more contemptible servility to his imperial masters. According to
his own account he stood by and passively allowed atrocities to be
multiplied about him, nor does he venture to express any forceful
indignation at the performance of such deeds. Had he protested, the
world's knowledge of Rome's degenerate tyrants would undoubtedly have
been less complete than it now is; and Dio was quite enough of an
egotist to believe that his own life and work were of paramount
importance. If we compare him unfavorably with Epictetus, we must
remember that the latter was obscure enough to be ignored.

In both the second and the third parts, that is to say throughout the
entire imperial period, Dio is conceded to have committed an error in
his point of view by making the relations of the emperor to the senate
the leading idea in his narrative and subordinating other events to
that relation. Senator as he was, he naturally magnified its
importance, and in an impartial estimate of his account one must allow
for personal bias.

Our historian's sources for the earlier part of his work are not
positively known. He has been credited with the use of Livy, of
Coelius, of Appian, and of Dionysios of Halicarnassos, but the
traces are not definite enough to warrant any dogmatic assertion.
Perhaps he knew Tacitus and perhaps Suetonius: the portrait of
Tiberius is especially good and was probably obtained from an author
of merit. But there were in existence a great multitude of books
inferior or now forgotten besides the works of the authors above
mentioned; and Dio's History in general shows no greater evidence of
having been drawn from writers whom we know than from others whom we
do not know.

We have already noticed Dio's similarity to Thukydides in style,
arrangement, and emotional attitude. There remains one more bond of
brotherhood,--the speeches. Just as the sombre story of the
Peloponnesian conflict has for a prominent feature the pleas and
counterpleas of contending parties, together with a few independent
orations, so this Roman History is filled with public utterances of
famous men, either singly or in pairs. Dio evinces considerable
fondness for these wordy combats ([Greek: hamillai logôn]). About one
speech to the book is the average in the earlier portion of the work.
The author probably adapted them from rhetorical [Greek: meletai], or
essays, then in existence. He was himself a finished product of the
rhetorical schools and was inclined to give their output the greatest
publicity. The most interesting of these efforts,--some go so far as
to say the only one of real interest,--is the speech of Mæcenas in
favor of the establishment of monarchy by Augustus: this argument
undoubtedly sets forth Dio's own views on government. Like the rival
deliverance of Agrippa it shows traces of having undergone a revision
of the first draught, and it is more than probable that the two did
not assume their present shape until the time of Alexander Severus.




B.--THE WRITER.


Suidas, the lexicographer of the tenth century, who is profitable for
so many things, has this entry under "Dio":

     Dio--called Cassius, surnamed Cocceius (others
     "Cocceianus"), of Nicæa, historian, born in the times of
     Alexander son of Mammæa, wrote a Roman History in 80 books
     (they are divided by decades), a "Persia", "The Getæ",
     "Journey-signs", "In Trajan's Day", "Life of Arrian the
     Philosopher".

Photius, an influential Patriarch of Constantinople and belonging to
the ninth century, has in his "Bibliotheca" a much longer notice,
which, however, contains almost nothing that a reader will not find in
Dio's own record. This is about the extent of the information afforded
us by antiquity, and modern biographers usually fall back upon the
author's own remarks regarding himself, as found scattered through his
Roman History. Such personal references were for the first time
carefully collected, systematically arranged, and discussed in the
edition of Reimar; subsequently the same matter was reprinted in the
fifth volume of the Dindorf Teubner text.

Just a word first in regard to the lost works with which Suidas
credits Dio. He probably never wrote the "Persia": perhaps it belonged
to Dio of Colophon, or possibly Suidas has confused _Dion_ with
_Deinon_. It is certain that he did not write "The Getæ": this
composition was by his maternal grandfather, Dio of Prusa, and was the
fruit of exile. "Journey-signs" or "Itineraries" is an enigmatic
title, and the more cautious scholars forbear to venture an opinion
upon its significance. Bernhardy, editor of Suidas, says "Intelligo
_Librum de Signis_" and translates the title "De Ominibus inter
congrediendum." Leonhard Schmitz (in the rather antiquated _Smith_)
thinks it means "Itineraries" and that Dio Chrysostom very likely
wrote it, because he traveled considerably. Concerning "In Trajan's
Day" two opinions may be mentioned,--one, that the attribution of such
a title to Dio is a mistake (for, if true, he would have mentioned it
in his larger work): the other, that its substance was incorporated
in the larger work, and that it thereby lost its identity and
importance. The "Life of Arrian" is probably a fact. Arrian was a
fellow-countryman of Dio's and had a somewhat similar character and
career. It may be true, as Christ surmises, that this biography was a
youthful task or an essay of leisure, hastily thrown off in the midst
of other enterprises.

Coming to Dio's personality we have at the outset to decide how his
name shall be written. We must make sure of his proper designation
before we presume to talk about him. The choice lies between Dio
Cassius and Cassius Dio, and the former is the popular form of the
name, if it be permissible to speak of Dio at all as a "popular"
writer. The facts in the case, however, are simple. The Greek
arrangement is [Greek: Diôn ho Kassios]. Now the regular Greek custom
is to place the gentile name, or even the prænomen, _after_ the
cognomen: but the regular Latin custom (and after all Dio has more of
the Roman in his makeup than of the Greek) is to observe the order
_prænomen_, _nomen_, _cognomen_. It is objected, first, that the
Greeks _sometimes_ followed the regular Latin order, and, second, that
the Romans _sometimes_ followed the regular Greek order (e.g., Cicero,
in his _Letters_). But the Greek exception cannot here make Dio the
_nomen_ and Cassius the _cognomen_: we _know_ that the historian
belonged to the gens Cassia (his father was Cassius Apronianus) and
that he took Dio as cognomen from his grandfather, Dio Chrysostom. And
the Latin exception simply offers us the alternative of following a
common usage or an uncommon usage. The real question is whether Dio
should be regarded rather as Greek or as Roman. To be logical, we must
say either Dion Kassios or Cassius Dio. Considering the historian's
times and his _habitat_, not merely his birthplace and literary
dialect, I must prefer Cassius Dio as his official appellation. Yet,
because the opposite arrangement has the sanction of usage, I deem it
desirable to employ as often as possible the unvexed single name
_Dio_.

Dio's prænomen is unknown, but he had still another cognomen,
Cocceianus, which he derived along with the _Dio_ from his maternal
grandfather. The latter, known as Dio of Prusa from his birthplace in
Bithynia, is renowned for his speeches, which contain perhaps more
philosophy than oratory and won for him from posterity the title of
Chrysostom,--"Golden Mouth." Dio of Prusa was exiled by the tyrant
Domitian, but recalled and showered with favors by the emperor
Cocceius Nerva (96-98 A.D.); from this patron he took the cognomen
mentioned, Cocceianus, which he handed down to his illustrious
grandson.

Besides this distinguished ancestor on his mother's side Dio the
historian had a father, Cassius Apronianus, of no mean importance. He
was a Roman senator and had been governor of Dalmatia and Cilicia; to
the latter post Dio bore his father company (Books 49, 36; 69, 1; 72,
7). The date of the historian's birth is determined approximately as
somewhere from 150 to 162 A.D., that is, during the last part of the
reign of Antoninus Pius or at the beginning of the reign of Marcus
Aurelius. The town where he first saw the light was Nicæa in Bithynia.

The careful education which the youth must have had is evident, of
course, in his work. After the trip to Cilicia already referred to Dio
came to Rome, probably not for the first time, arriving there early in
the reign of Commodus (Book 72, 4). This monster was overthrown in 192
A.D.; before his death Dio was a senator (Book 72, 16): in other
words, he was by that time above the minimum age, twenty-five years,
required for admission to full senatorial standing; and thus we gain
some scanty light respecting the date of his birth. Under Commodus he
had held no higher offices than those of quæstor and ædile: Pertinax
now, in the year 193, made him prætor (Book 73, 12). Directly came the
death of Pertinax, as likewise of his successor Julianus, and the
accession of him whom Dio proudly hailed as the "Second
Augustus,"--Septimius Severus. The new emperor exerted a great
influence upon Dio's political views. He pretended that the gods had
brought him forward, as they had Augustus, especially for his work.
The proofs of Heaven's graciousness to this latest sovereign were
probably by him delivered to Dio, who undertook to compile them into a
little book and appears to have believed them all; Severus, indeed,
had been remarkably successful at the outset. Before long Dio had
begun his great work, which he doubtless intended to bring to a
triumphant conclusion amid the golden years of the new prince of
peace.

Unfortunately the _entente cordiale_ between ruler and historian did
not long endure. Severus grew disappointing to Dio through his
severity, visited first upon Niger and later upon Cæsar Clodius
Albinus: and Dio came to be _persona non grata_ to Severus for this
reason among others, that the emperor changed his mind completely
about Commodus, and since he had begun to revere, if not to imitate
him, what Dio had written concerning his predecessor could be no
longer palatable. The estrangement seems to be marked by the fact that
until Severus's death Dio went abroad on no important military or
diplomatic mission, but remained constantly in Italy. He was sometimes
in Rome, but more commonly resided at his country-seat in Capua (Book
76, 2). In a very vague Passage in Book 76, 16 Dio speaks of finding
"when I was consul" three thousand indictments for adultery inscribed
on the records. This leads most scholars to assume that he was consul
_before_ the death of Severus. Reimar thought differently, and
produces arguments to support his view. I do not deem many of the
passages which he cites entirely apposite, and yet some of the points
urged are important. I can only say that the impression left in my
mind by a rapid reading of the Greek is that Dio was consul while
Severus reigned; if such be the case, he probably held the rank of
_consul suffectus_ ("honorary" or "substitute"). All who refuse to
admit that he could have obtained so high an office at that time place
the date of his first consulship anywhere from 219 to 223 A.D. because
of his own statement that in 224 he was appointed to the (regularly
proconsular) governorship of Africa.

The son of Severus, Caracalla or Antoninus, drew Dio from his
homekeeping and took him with him on an eastern expedition in 216, so
that our historian passed the winter of 216-217 as a member of
Caracalla's retinue at Nicomedea (Book 77, 17 and 18) and joined there
in the annual celebration of the Saturnalia (Book 78, 8). Dio takes
occasion to deplore the emperor's bestial behavior as well as the
considerable pecuniary outlay to which he was personally subjected,
but at the same time he evidently did not allow his convictions to
become indiscreetly audible. Much farther than Nicomedea Dio cannot
have accompanied his master; for he did not go to the Parthian war,
presently undertaken, and he was not present either at Caracalla's
death (217) or at the overthrow of Macrinus (218). This Macrinus, one
of the short-time emperors, gave Dio the post of _curator ad
corrigendum statum civitatium_, with administrative powers over the
cities of Pergamum and Smyrna (Book 79, 7), and his appointee remained
in active service during much of the reign of Elagabalus,--possibly,
indeed, until the accession of Alexander Severus (see Book 78, 18,
end). Mammæa, the mother of the new sovereign, surrounded her son with
skilled helpers of proved value, and it was possibly due to her wisdom
that Dio was first sent to manage the proconsulate of Africa, and, on
his return, to govern the imperial provinces of Dalmatia and Upper
Pannonia. Somewhat later, in the year 229, he became consul for the
second time, _consul ordinarius_, as colleague of Alexander himself.
But Dio's disciplinary measures in Pannonia had rendered him unpopular
with the pampered Pretorians, and heeding at once his own safety and
the emperor's request he remained most of the time outside of Rome.
This state of affairs was not wholly satisfactory, and it is not
surprising that after a short time Dio complained of a bad foot and
asked leave to betake himself to Nicæa, his native place.

Here we must leave him. Whether his death came soon or late after 229
A.D. is a matter of some uncertainty. It would be difficult to make a
more complete record out of the available material, save to say that
from two casual references it is inferred that Dio had a wife and
children, and that in his career he often, sometimes with imperial
assistance, tried cases in court.




A LIST OF THE MORE RECENT DISSERTATIONS

ON

CASSIUS DIO.


A. Baumgartner.--_Über die Quellen des Cassius Dio für die ältere
römische Geschichte._ (1880.)

F. Beckurts.--_Zur Quellenkritik des Tacitus, Sueton und Cassius Dio._
(1880.)

J. Bergmans.--_Die Quellen der Vita Tiberii (Buch 57 der Historia
Romana) des Cassius Dio._ (1903.)

Breitung.--_Bemerkungen über die Quellen des Dio Cassius LXVI-LXIX._
(1882.)

H. Christensen.--_De fontibus a Cassio Dione in Vita Neronis enarranda
adhibitis._ (1871.)

A. Deppe.--_Des Dio Cassius Bericht über die Varusschlacht verglichen
mit den übrigen Geschichtsquellen._ (1880.)

P. Fabia.--_Julius Pælignus, préfet des vigiles et procurateur de
Cappadoce (Tacite, Ann. XII, 49; Dion Cassius LXI, 6, 6)._ (1898.)

R. Ferwer.--_Die politischen Anschauungen des Cassius Dio._ (1878.)

J.G. Fischer.--_De fontibus et auctoritate Cassii Dionis._ (1870.)

H. Grohs.--_Der Wert des Geschichtswerkes des Cassius Dio als Quelle
für die Geschichte der Jahre 49-44 v. Chr._ (1884.)

G. Heimbach.--_Quid et quantum Cassius Dio in historia conscribenda
inde a libro XI usque ad librum XLVII e Livio desumpserit._ (1878.)

F.K. Hertlein.--_Conjecturen zu griechischen Prosaikern._ (1873.)

D.G. Ielgersma.--_De fide et auctoritate Dionis Cassii Cocceiani._
(1879.)

E. Kyhnitzsch.--_De contionibus, quas Cassius Dio historiæ suæ
intexuit, cum Thucydideis comparatis._ (1894.)

E. Litsch.--_De Cassio Dione imitatore Thucydidis._ (1893.)

Madvig.--_Adversaria Critica._ (1884.)

J. Maisel.--_Observationes in Cassium Dionem._ (1888.)

J. Melber.--_Der Bericht des Dio Cassius über die gallischen Kriege
Cæsars._ (1891.)

J. Melber.--_Dio Cassius über die letzten Kämpfe gegen Sext. Pompeius,
36 v. Chr._ (1891.) In "Abhandlungen aus dem Gebiet der Klassichen
Alterthumswissenschaft, W. v. Christ zum 60. Geburtstag dargebracht
von seinen Schülern."

P. Meyer.--_De Mæcenatis oratione a Dione ficta._ (1891.)

M. Posner.--_Quibus auctoribus in bello Hannibalico enarrando usus sit
Dio Cassius._ (1874.)

E. Schmidt.--_Plutarchs Bericht über die Catilinarische Verschwörung
in seinem Verhältnis zu Sallust, Livius und Dio._ (1885.)

G. Sickel.--_De fontibus a Cassio Dione in conscribendis rebus inde a
Tiberio usque ad mortem Vitelii gestis adhibitis._ (1876.)

D.R. Stuart.--_The attitude of Dio Cassius towards epigraphic
sources._ (1904.)--In "Roman Historical Sources," etc., pp. 101-147.

H. van Herwerden.--_Lectiones Rheno-Traiectinæ._ (1882.) Pp. 78-95.

A. v. Gutschmid.--See _Kleine Schriften_, V, pp. 547-554. (1894.)

J. Will.--_Quæ ratio intercedat inter Dionis Cassii de Cæsaris bellis
gallicis narrationem et commentarios Cæsaris de bello gallico._
(1901.)




A LIST OF THE PRINCIPAL ARTICLES

ON

CASSIUS DIO

Found in Periodicals for the Twenty Years Preceding the Date of the
Present Translation (1884-1904).


1884.

---- A review of _R. Ferwer_. (Die politischen Anschauungen des
Cassius Dio.) (Bursian, Jhrb.)

H. HAUPT.--Dio Cassius. (Yearly Review, continued.) (Rh. Mus., Book
4.)

K. SCHENKL.--A general review of the advance made in the study of Dio
from 1873 to 1884. (Bursian, Jhrb. pp. 277-8; and also pp. 186-194 for
1883.)


1885.

U. PH. BOISSEVAIN.--De Cassii Dionis libris manuscriptis (with
author's stemma). (Mnemos., Vol. 13, Part 3. Also see Note on p. 456
of Part 4, same volume.)

H. HAUPT.--A review of _Grohs_ (Der Wert des Geschichtswerkes des
Cassius Dio als Quelle der Jahre 49-44 V.C.). (Philolog. Anzeiger.)

Id.--Dio Cassius. (Yearly Review, continued.) (Philol., Vol. 44, Book
1 and Book 3.)

H. SCHILLER.--A review of _Grohs_ (same article). (B.P.W., Feb. 21.)

---- A review of U. Ph. Boissevain. (Program. On the Fragments of
Cassius Dio.) (Bursian, Jhrb.)


1886.

S.A. NABER.--Emendations in Dio XLII, 34, and XXXVI, 49. (Mnemos.,
N.S. 14, pp. 93 and 94.)

---- Mention of Haupt's Survey in Philol. 44. (See above. Bursian,
Jhrb.)

---- A review of _Grohs_. (Article cited above. Bursian, Jhrb.)

---- A review of _Grohs_. (Do. do.--Litt. Cbl., Jan. 16.)


1887.

---- A review of _C.J. Rockel_ (De allocutionis usu qualis sit apud
Thucydidem, Xenophontem, oratores Atticos, _Dionem_, Aristidem.).
(Jhrb. of I. Müller.)

---- Mention of H. Haupt's Survey in Philol. 44. (Jhrb. of I. Müller.)

BR. KEIL.--A criticism of _Rockel_. (Article above cited. W. Kl. Ph.,
May 4.)

W.F. ALLEN.--The Monetary Crisis in Rome, A.D. 33. (Containing
citations from Dio. Tr. A. Ph. A., Vol. 18.)

E.G. SIHLER.--The Tradition of Cæsar's Gallic Wars from Cicero to
Orosius. (Containing citations from Dio. Tr. A. Ph. A., Vol. 18.)

LIATYSCHEV.--(An article containing citations from Dio that contribute
to a knowledge of the location of the city of Olbia.--Journal
Ministerstva Narodnavo Prosvêschtscheniia, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4.)


1888.

W.F. ALLEN.--Lex Curiata de Imperio. (Containing citations from Dio
XXXIX, 19 and elsewhere.--Tr. A. Ph. A., Vol. 19.)

S.A. NABER.--Critical observations. (Including Dio XLVI, 15; LI, 14;
LV, 10; LXIX, 28; LXXVI, 14; LXXVII, 4. Mnemos., Vol. 16, part 1.)

---- A review of _L. Poetsch_. (Program. Bei.--träge zur Kritik der
Kaiserbiographien _Cassius Dio_, Herodian, und Ælius Lampridius auf
Grund ihrer Berichte über den Kaiser Commodus Antoninus.--Z. oest.
Gymn., 1888, Book 3.)


1889.

BREITUNG.--A review of _Maisel_ (Observationes in Cassium Dionem.).
(W. Kl. Ph., June 19.)

---- A review of _Maisel_. (Do. do.--The Academy, February.)

J. HILBERG.--A review of _Maisel_. (Do. do.--Z. oest. Gymn., 1889,
Book 3.)

H. KONTOS.--Critical note on Dio, XLIX, 12, 2. ([Greek: ATHÊNA], Vol.
1, parts 3-4.)

MELBER.--Contribution to a new order of the Fragments in Cassius Dio.
(Sitzb. d. philos.-philolog. u. hist. d. k. B. Akademie d. Wiss. zu
München, Feb. 9.)

NAUCK.--Analecta Critica. (Proposition to restore six fragments of
Cassius Dio to Dio Chrysostom.--Hermes, Vol. 24, part 3.)

ALEX RIESE.--Die Sueben (based upon Dio). (Rh. Mus., Vol. 44, part 3.)

SP. VASIS.--Passage of Dio applied to correct conclusions of Willems
on Cic. ad Att. 5, 4, 2. ([Greek: ATHÊNA], Vol. 1, parts 3-4.)

---- A review of _E. Cornelius_ (Quomodo Tacitus historiæ scriptor in
hominum memoria versatus sit usque ad renascentes litteras sæc. XIV et
XV.--Dio is indirectly involved.). (Jhrb. d. phil. Ver. zu. Berlin,
1889.)

---- A review of _C.J. Rockel_. (Title cited under 1887.--Jhrb. of I.
Müller.)


1890.

U. PH. BOISSEVAIN.--A misplaced fragment of Dio (LXXV, 9, 6). (Hermes,
Vol. 25, part 3.)

TH. HULTZSCH.--On Dio Cassius (relative to early alteration of the
text). (N. JB. f. Ph. u. Pä., Vol. 141, book 3.)

KARL JACOBY.--A review of _Maisel_. (Title cited under 1889.--B.P.W.,
Feb. 15.)

MELBER.--Regarding the chronological relocation of several fragments
of Dio. (Bl. f. d. Bayer. Gymn., Vol. 26, books 6 and 7.)

---- A citation of the Kontos note (see above) from [Greek: ATHÊNA].
(Rev. d. Et. Gr., Vol. 3, N. 9.)


1891.

BOISSEVAIN.--A review of _Melber_. (Text edition of Dio, Vol. I.)
(B.P.W., Jan. 24.)

BREITUNG.--A review of _Melber_. (Do. do.--W. Kl. Ph., June 24.)

B. KÜBLER.--A review of _Melber_. (Do. do.--Deutsche LZ., Nov. 28.)

Id.--Five conjectures in the (earlier portion of) text of Dio. (Rh.
Mus., Vol. 46, part 2.)

MELBER.--A review of _Maisel_. (Title cited under 1889.--Bl. f. d.
Bayer. Gymn., Vol. 27, books 6 and 7.)

Id.--A correction in Zonaras, IX, 5. (Bl. f. d. Bayer. Gymn., Vol. 27,
book 1.)

G.M. RUSHFORTH.--A review of _Melber_ (Dio, Vol. 1). (Cl. Rev., Vol.
5, Nos. 1 and 2.)

C. WACHSMUTH.--The pentad arrangement in Dio and others. (Rh. Mus.,
Vol. 46, part 2.)

---- Mention of an article on Dio (Cæsar's Gallic Wars) in Festgruss
des kgl. Max.-Gymn. zu München. (Phil. Rundsch., Dec. 5.)


1892.

U. PH. BOISSEVAIN.--On the spellings Callæci--Gallæci, etc. (Mnemos.,
N.S. Vol. 20, p. 286 ff.)

H. SCHILLER.--A review of _Meyer_ (De Mæcenatis oratione a Dione
ficta). (B.P.W., Sept. 17.)


1893.

BÜTTNER-WOBST.--An account of Dio in the Cod. Peir. (Berichte der kgl.
sächs. Gesellsch. d. Wissensch., part 3.)

C.G. COBET.--Emendations. (Mnemos. N.S., Vol. 21, p. 395.)

B. HEISTERBERGK.--An emendation in XLVIII, 12. (Philol., Vol. 50, part
4.)

J.J.H.--An emendation of LXVII, 12. (Mnemos., Vol. 21, part 4.)

MAISEL.--A review of _Melber_. (Dio, Vol. 1.--Phil. Rundsch., March
4.)

S.A. NABER.--Four emendations. (Mnemos., Vol. 21, part 4.)


1894.

K. BURESCH.--A comment on Dio, LIV, 30, 3. (W. Kl. Ph., Jan. 24.)


1895.

AD. BAUER.--Dio's account of the war in Dalmatia and Pannonia
(6-9 A.D.). (Archäologisch-Epigraphische Mittheilungen aus
Oesterreich-Ungarn, 17th year, book 2.)

U. PH. BOISSEVAIN.--A review of _Maisel_ (Beiträge zur Würdigung der
Hdss. des Cassius Dio). (B.P.W., Apr. 13.)

K. JACOBY.--A review of _Maisel_. (Do. do.--W. Kl. Ph., July 3.)

Id.--A review of _Melber_. (Dio, Vol. 2.--Ibid.)

TH. MOMMSEN.--The miracle of the rain on the column of Marcus
Aurelius. (Dio as a source.) (Hermes, Vol. 30, part 1.)

---- A review of _E. Kyhnitzsch_ (De contionibus quas Cassius Dio
historiæ suæ intexuit, cum Thucydideis comparatis). (Litt. Cbl., Oct.
26.)


1896.

U. PH. BOISSEVAIN.--A review of _E. Kyhnitzsch_. (Title just
above.--B.P.W., Jan. 18.)

P. ERCOLE.--A review of _M.A. Micallela_ (La Fonte di Dione Cassio per
le guerre galliche di Cesare). (Riv. di. Fil. e d'Istr. Class., 25th
year, part 1.)

PH. FABIA.--The statement of Dio about Nero and Pappæa shown to be
parallel with that of Tacitus (Hist. I, 13). (Rev. de Phil., de Litt.,
et d'Hist. anciennes, Vol. 20, part 1.)

K. KUIPER.--De Cassii Dionis Zonaræque historiis epistula critica ad
Ursulum Philippum Boissevain. (Mnemos., N.S. Vol. 24.)

B. NIESE.--Dio's contributions to the history of the war against
Pyrrhus. (Hermes, Vol. 31, part 4.)

F. VOGEL.--Dio worthless for facts regarding Cæsar's second expedition
into Britain. (N. JB. f. Ph. u. Pä., 1896, books 3 and 4.)

---- Dio LIII, 23, compared with inscription discovered at Philæ,
Egypt. (Philol., Vol. 55, part 1.)


1897.

D. DETLEFSEN.--Dio LIV, 32, as a sample of ancient knowledge in regard
to the North Sea. (Hermes, Vol. 32, part 2.)

PH. FABIA.--_Ofonius_ rather than _Sophonius_ (Dio MSS.) for the
gentile name of Tigillinus. (Rev. de Phil., de Litt., et d'Hist.
anciennes, Vol. 21, book 3.)

P. GAROFOLO.--A citation of Dio. (Jhrb. of I. Müller, 1897.)

B. KÜBLER.--A review of _Melber_. (Dio, Vol. 2.--Deutsche LZ., March
6.)

Id.--A review of _Boissevain_. (Edition of Dio.--B.P.W., May 15.)

---- A mention of three articles by _Melber_.
     1.) Der Bericht des Dio Cassius über d. gall.
         Kriege Cäsars.

     2.) Des Dio Cassius Bericht über d. Seeschlacht
         d. D. Brutus geg. d. Veneter.
     3.) Dio Cassius über d. letzten Kämpfe geg.
         S. Pompejus, 36 v. Chr.
     (Jhrb. of I. Müller, 1897.)

---- Mention of a rearrangement favored by _Boissevain_ ("Ein
verschobenes Fragment des Cassius Dio") who holds that a certain
fragment, old style LXXV, 9, 6, properly belongs to the year 116 A.D.
and to Trajan's expedition against the Parthians.


1898.

BÜTTNER-WOBST.--Dio corrected in regard to an episode in the siege of
Ambracia, 189 B.C. (Philol., Vol. 57, part 3.)

PH. FABIA.--An emendation and a change of order in Dio, LXI, 6, 6.
(Rev. de Phil., de Litt., et d'Hist. anciennes, 1898, book 2.)

J. KROMAYER.--Studies in the Second Triumvirate (Dio as a source).
(Hermes, Vol. 33, part 1.)

B. KÜBLER.--A review of _Boissevain_. (Dio, Vol. 2.--B.P.W., Nov. 26
and Dec. 3.)

J. VAHLEN.--Varia. (Dio LV, 6 and 7, for date of death of Mæcenas).
(Hermes, Vol. 33, part 2.)


1899.

WILH. CRÖNERT.-A study of 34 pp. on the transmission of the text of
Dio. (Wiener Studien, 1899, book 1.)

K. JACOBY.--A review of _Boissevain_. (Dio, Vol. 1.--W. Kl. Ph., March
22.)


1900.

WILH. CRÖNERT.--Criticism of Boissevain. (Rev. Crit., July 2.)

C. ROBERT.--On Dio LV, 10. (Hermes, Vol. 25, No. 4.)

---- On Dio XLVII, 17, 1. (Archiv. f. Papyrusforschung u. verw. Geb.,
vol. 2, book 1.)

---- Observationes. (Philol., Vol. 59, No. 2.)

---- Mélanges (including Dio XXXVIII, 50, 4). (Wiener Studien, 22nd
year, book 2.)

N. VULIC.--A note on Cassius Dio, XXXVIII, 50, 4. (Wiener Studien,
22nd year, book 2, p. 314.)


1901.

C. JULLIAN.--Dio's account of the surrender of Vercingetorix compared
with others. (Rev. des Et. Anc., Vol. 3, No. 2.)

H. ST. SEDIMAYER.--Apocolocyntosis, i.e. Apotheosis per Satiram (Dio,
LX, 35). (Wiener Studien, I, pp. 181-192.)


1902.

B. KÜBLER.--A review of _Boissevain_. (Dio, Vol. 3.--B.P.W., Dec. 20.)

---- Reference to portraiture in Dio. (Philol., Vol. 61, No. 3.)

---- Record of a new coin bearing the name of L. Munatius Plancus (cp.
Dio XLVI, 50). (Numismat. Zeitschr., Vol. 34.)


1903.

A. BOMER.--An opinion to the effect that [Greek: Elisôn] (Dio LIV, 33)
is a corrupt reading for [Greek: Stibarna] = Stever. (N. JB. f. d. kl.
Alt., Gesch., u. deut. Lit., 6th year, part 3.)

S.B. COUGEAS.--An account of a new MS. of Xiphilinus (No. 812 of the
Iberian monastery on Mt. Athos. It is incomplete and ends at L, 11, 3
of Dio). ([Greek: ATHÊNA], Vol. 15.)

H. PETER.--A review of _G.M. Columba_ (Cassio Dione e del guerre
galliche di Cesare.--B.P.W., Sept. 5).




THE ORIGINAL ARRANGEMENT

of

DIO'S ROMAN HISTORY

as conjectured by A. von Gutschmid (_Kleine Schriften_, V, p. 561).


A. Rome under the Kings (Two Books).
     Book I, B.C. 753-673.
     Book II, B.C. 672-510.

B. Rome under a Republic (Thirty-nine Books).

     a.) To the End of the Second Punic War (Fifteen Books.)

       1.) To the Beginning of the Second Samnite War (Five Books):
             Book III, B.C. 509.
             Book IV, B.C. 508-493.
             Book V, B.C. 493-449.
             Book VI, B.C. 449-390.
             Book VII, B.C. 390-326.

       2.) To the Beginning of the Second Punic War (Five Books):
             Book VIII, B.C. 326-290.
             Book IX, B.C. 290-278.
             Book X, B.C. 277-264.
             Book XI, B.C. 264-250.
             Book XII, B.C. 250-219.

       3.) To the End of the Second Punic War (Five Books):
             Book XIII, B.C. 219-218.
             Book XIV, B.C. 218-217.
             Book XV, B.C. 216-211.
             Book XVI, B.C. 211-206.
             Book XVII, B.C. 206-201.

     b.) From the End of the Second Punic War (Twenty-four Books).

       1.) To the Death of Gaius Gracchus (Eight Books):
             Book XVIII, B.C. 200-195.
             Book XIX, B.C. 195-183.
             Book XX, B.C. 183-149.
             Book XXI, B.C. 149-146.
             Book XXII, B.C. 145-140.
             Book XXIII, B.C. 139-133.
             Book XXIV, B.C. 133-124.
             Book XXV, B.C. 124-121.

       2.) To the Dictatorship of Sulla (Eight Books):
             Book XXVI, B.C. 120-106.
             Book XXVII, B.C. 105-101.
             Book XXVIII, B.C. 100-91.
             Book XXIX, B.C. 90-89.
             Book XXX, B.C. 88 (Happenings at Home).
             Book XXXI, B.C. 88 (Events Abroad) and
               87 (Happenings at Home).
             Book XXXII, B.C. 87 (Events Abroad)-84.
             Book XXXIII, B.C. 84-82.

       3.) To the Battle of Pharsalus (Eight Books):
             Book XXXIV, B.C. 81-79.
             Book XXXV, B.C. 78-70.
             Book XXXVI, B.C. 69-66.
             Book XXXVII, B.C. 65-60.
             Book XXXVIII, B.C. 59-58.
             Book XXXIX, B.C. 57-54 (= a.u. 700) (Happenings at Home).
             Book XL, B.C. 54 (Events Abroad)-50.
             Book XLI, B.C. 49-48.

C. Rome under Political Factions and under the Monarchy (Thirty-nine
   Books).

     a.) To the Death of Augustus (Fifteen Books).

       1.) To the Triumvirate (Five Books):
             Book XLII, B.C. 48-47.
             Book XLIII, B.C. 46-44.
             Book XLIV, B.C. 44.
             Book XLV, B.C. 44-43.
             Book XLVI, B.C. 43.

       2.) To the Bestowal of the Imperial Title upon Augustus (Five
           Books):
             Book XLVII, B.C. 43-42.
             Book XLVIII, B.C. 42-37.
             Book XLIX, B.C. 36-33.
             Book L, B.C. 32-Sept. 2, B.C. 31.
             Book LI, Sept. 2, B.C. 31-29 (= a.u. 725) (Events Abroad).

       3.) To the Death of Augustus (Five Books):
             Book LII, B.C. 29 (Happenings at Home).
             Book LIII, B.C. 28-23.
             Book LIV, B.C. 22-10.
             Book LV, B.C. 9-A.D. 8.
             Book LVI, A.D. 9-14.

     b.) From the Death of Augustus (Twenty-four Books).

       1.) To Vespasian (Eight Books):
             Book LVII, A.D. 14-25.
             Book LVIII, A.D. 26-37.
             Book LIX, A.D. 37-41.
             Book LX, A.D. 41-46.
             Book LXI, A.D. 47 (= a.u. 800)-59.
             Book LXII, A.D. 59-68.
             Book LXIII, A.D. 68-69
             Book LXIV, A.D. 69-70.

       2.) To Commodus (Eight Books):
             Book LXV, A.D. 70-79.
             Book LXVI, A.D. 79-81.
             Book LXVII, A.D. 81-96.
             Book LXVIII, A.D. 96-117.
             Book LXIX, A.D. 117-138.
             Book LXX, A.D. 138-161.
             Book LXXI, A.D. 161-169.
             Book LXXII, A.D. 169-180.

       3.) To Dio's Second Consulate (Eight Books).
             Book LXXIII, A.D. 180-192.
             Book LXXIV, A.D. 193.
             Book LXXV, A.D. 193-197.
             Book LXXVI, A.D. 197-211.
             Book LXXVII, A.D. 211-217.
             Book LXXVIII, A.D. 217-218.
             Book LXXIX, A.D. 218-222.
             Book LXXX, A.D. 222-229.




AN EPITOME

of

THE LOST BOOKS I-XXI OF DIO

as found in the

CHRONICON

of

IOANNES ZONARAS.


_(BOOK 1, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: FRAG. 1] VII, 1.--Æneas after the Trojan war came to the
Aborigines, who were the former inhabitants of the land wherein Rome
has been built and at that time had Latinus, the son of Faunus, as
their sovereign. He came ashore at Laurentum, by the mouth of the
river Numicius, where in obedience to some oracle he is said to have
made preparations to dwell.

The ruler of the land, Latinus, interfered with Æneas's settling in
the land, but after a sharp struggle was defeated. Then in accordance
with dreams that appeared to both leaders they effected a
reconciliation and the king beside permitting Æneas to reside there
gave him his daughter Lavinia in marriage. Thereupon Æneas founded a
city which he named Lavinium and the country was called Latium and the
people there were termed Latins. But the Rutuli who occupied adjoining
territory had been previously hostile to the Latins, and now they set
out from the city of Ardea with warlike demonstrations. They had the
support of no less distinguished a man than Turnus, a relative of
Latinus, who had taken a dislike to Latinus because of Lavinia's
marriage, for it was to him that the maiden had originally been
promised. A battle took place, Turnus and Latinus fell, and Æneas
gained the victory and his father-in-law's kingdom as well. After a
time, however, the Rutuli secured the Etruscans as allies and marched
upon Æneas. They won in this war. Æneas vanished, being seen no more
alive or dead, and was honored as a god by the Latins. Hence he has
come to be regarded by the Romans as the fountain head of their race
and they take pride in being called "Sons of Æneas." The Latin domain
fell in direct succession to his son Ascanius who had accompanied his
father from home. Æneas had not yet had any child by Lavinia, but left
her pregnant. Ascanius was enclosed round about by the enemy, but by
night the Latins attacked them and ended both the siege and the war.

As time went on the Latin nation increased in size, and the majority
of the people abandoned Lavinium to build another town in a better
location. To it they gave the name of Alba from its whiteness and from
its length they called it Longa (or, as Greeks would say, "white" and
"long").

At the death of Ascanius the Latins gave the preference in the matter
of royal power to the son borne to Æneas by Lavinia over the son of
Ascanius, their preference being founded on the fact that Latinus was
his grandfather. The new king's name was Silvius. Silvius begat Æneas,
from Æneas sprang Latinus, and Latinus was succeeded by Pastis.
Tiberinus, who came subsequently to be ruler, lost his life by falling
into a river called the Albula. This river was renamed _Tiber_ from
him. It flows through Rome and is of great value to the city and in
the highest degree useful to the Romans. Amulius, a descendant of
Tiberinus, displayed an overweening pride and had the audacity to
deify himself, pretending an ability to answer thunder with thunder by
mechanical contrivances and to lighten in response to the lightnings
and to hurl thunderbolts. He met his end by the overflow of the lake
beside which his palace was set, and both he and the palace were
submerged in the sudden rush of waters. Aventinus his son perished in
warfare.

So far the account concerns Lavinium and the people of Alba. At the
beginning of Roman history we see Numitor and Amulius, who were
grandsons of Aventinus and descendants of Æneas.


_(BOOK 2, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: B.C. 672 (_a.u._ 82)] VII, 6.--When Numa died leaving no
successor, Tullus Hostilius was chosen by the people and the senate.
He followed in the footsteps of Romulus, and both welcomed combats
himself and encouraged the people to do the same. The Albanians having
become the victims of a marauding expedition on the part of the the
Romans, both sides proceeded into battle; before they came into actual
conflict, however, they effected a reconciliation and both races
decided to dwell together in one city. [Sidenote: FRAG. 6^2] BUT AS
EACH CLUNG TO HIS OWN TOWN AND INSISTED THAT THE OTHER RACE SHOULD
REMOVE TO IT, THEY FAILED OF THEIR OBJECT. NEXT THEY DISPUTED ABOUT
THE LEADERSHIP. As neither one would yield it to the other, [Sidenote:
FRAG. 6^2] THEY ARRANGED TO HAVE A CONTEST FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY. They
did not care to fight with entire armies nor yet to let the decision
be made by a duel of champions. But there were on both sides brethren
born three at a birth, the offspring of twin mothers, of like age and
alike in strength: the Roman brethren were called Publihoratii and the
Albanian Curiatii. These they set into battle over against one
another, paying no heed to their relationship. So they, having armed
themselves and having arrayed themselves in opposing files in the
vacant space between the camps, called upon the same family gods and
cast repeated glances upward at the sun. Having joined issue they
fought now in groups, now in pairs. Finally, when two of the Romans
had fallen and all of the Albanians had been wounded, the remaining
Horatius, because he could not withstand the three at once, even were
he unwounded, gave way in order that in pursuing him they might be
scattered. And when they had become separated in the pursuit,
[Sidenote: FRAG. 6^2] ATTACKING EACH ONE he despatched them all. Then
he was given honors. But because he further killed his sister when she
lamented on seeing Horatius carrying the spoils of her cousins, he was
tried for murder; and having taken an appeal to the people he was
released.

The Albanians now became subjects of the Romans, but later they
disregarded the compact; and having been summoned, in their capacity
of subjects, to serve as allies, they attempted at the crisis of the
battle to desert to the enemy and to join in the attack upon the
Romans. They were detected, however, and punished: many (including
their leader, Mettius) were put to death, and the rest suffered
deportation; their city Alba was razed to the ground, after being
deemed for five hundred years the mother city of the Romans.

[Sidenote: FRAG. 6^4] NOW AGAINST THE ENEMY TULLUS WAS THOUGHT TO BE
VERY EFFICIENT, BUT HE NEGLECTED RELIGION. WHEN, HOWEVER, A PESTILENCE
WAS INCURRED AND HE HIMSELF FELL SICK, HE TURNED ASIDE TO A GODFEARING
COURSE. He is said to have reached the end of his life by being
consumed by lightning[5] or else as the result of a plot formed by
Ancus Marcius, who happened to be (as has been stated) a son of Numa's
daughter. He was king of the Romans thirty-two years.

[Footnote 5: The first alternative agrees with Plutarch, who, at the
end of his life of Numa (chapter 22), says that this death by
lightning of Tullus Hostilius caused many among the population at
large to revere that religion which their king had for so long a time
neglected.]

VII, 7.--When Hostilius died, Marcius succeeded to the kingdom,
receiving it as a voluntary gift from the Romans. And he was not
perfect in his arm, for he was maimed at the joint (or bend), whence
he got the title Ancus (bent arm). Though gentle he was compelled to
[Sidenote: FRAG. 7] CHANGE HIS HABITS and he turned his attention to
campaigns. For the rest of the Latins, on account of the destruction
of Alba and in fear that they themselves might suffer some similar
disaster, were angry at the Romans. As long as Tullus survived, they
humbled themselves, dreading his reputation for warfare: but thinking
that Marcius was easy to attack because of his peaceful disposition,
they assailed his territory and pillaged it. He, [Sidenote: FRAG. 7]
COMPREHENDING THAT PEACE COULD BE CAUSED BY WAR, attacked the
attackers, defended his position, and captured their cities, one of
which he razed to the ground, and treated many of the men taken as
slaves and transferred many others to Rome. As the Romans grew and
land was added to their domain, the neighboring peoples were
displeased and set themselves at odds with the Romans. Hence the
latter had to overcome the Fidenates by siege, and they damaged the
Sabines by falling upon them while scattered and seizing their camp,
and by terrifying others they got them to embrace peace even contrary
to inclination. After this the life-stint of Marcius was exhausted,
when he had ruled for twenty-four years, being a man that paid strict
attention to religion according to the manner of his grandfather Numa.

VII, 8.--The sovereignty was now appropriated by Lucius Tarquinius,
who was the son of Demaratus a Corinthian, borne to the latter by a
native woman after he had been exiled and had taken up his abode in
Tarquinii, an Etruscan city; the boy had been named Lucumo. And though
he inherited much wealth from his father, yet, because as an immigrant
he was not deemed worthy of the highest offices by the people of
Tarquinii, he removed to Rome, changing his appellation along with his
city; and he changed his name to Lucius Tarquinius,--from the city in
which he dwelt. It is said that as he was journeying to his new home
an eagle swooped down and snatched the cap which he had on his head,
and after soaring aloft and screaming for some time placed it again
exactly upon his head: wherefore he was inspired to hope for no small
advancement and eagerly took up his residence in Rome. Hence not long
after he was numbered among the foremost men. [Sidenote: FRAG. 8] FOR
BY USING HIS WEALTH QUITE LAVISHLY AND BY WINNING OVER THE NOBLES
THROUGH HIS INTELLIGENCE AND WIT HE WAS INCLUDED AMONG THE PATRICIANS
AND IN THE SENATE BY MARCIUS, WAS APPOINTED PRÆTOR, AND WAS ENTRUSTED
WITH THE SUPERVISION OF THE KING'S CHILDREN AND OF THE KINGDOM. HE
SHOWED HIMSELF AN EXCELLENT MAN, SHARING HIS MONEY WITH THOSE IN NEED
AND BESTOWING HIS SERVICES READILY IF ANY ONE NEEDED HIM TO HELP. HE
NEITHER DID NOR SAID ANYTHING MEAN TO ANY ONE. IF HE RECEIVED A
KINDNESS FROM PERSONS HE MADE MUCH OF THE ATTENTION, WHEREAS IF ANY
OFFENCE WAS OFFERED HIM, HE EITHER DISREGARDED THE INJURY OR MINIMIZED
IT AND MADE LIGHT OF IT, AND FAR FROM MAKING REPRISALS UPON THE MAN
THAT HAD DONE THE INJURY, HE WOULD EVEN BENEFIT HIM. THUS HE CAME TO
DOMINATE BOTH MARCIUS HIMSELF AND HIS CIRCLE, AND ACQUIRED THE
REPUTATION OF BEING A SENSIBLE AND UPRIGHT MAN.

But the aforesaid estimate of him did not continue permanently. For at
the death of Marcius he behaved in a knavish way to the latter's two
sons and made the kingdom his own. The senate and the people were
intending to elect the children of Marcius, when Tarquinius made
advances to the most influential of the senators;--he had first
sent the fatherless boys to some distant point on a hunting
expedition:--and by his talk and his efforts he got these men to vote
him the kingdom on the understanding that he would restore it to the
children when they had attained manhood. And after assuming control of
affairs he so disposed the Romans that they should never wish to
choose the children in preference to him: the lads he accustomed to
indolence and ruined their souls and bodies by a kind of kindness. As
he still felt afraid in spite of being so placed, he secured some
extra strength for himself in the senate. Those of the populace who
felt friendly towards him he enrolled (to the number of about two
hundred) among the patricians and the senators, and thus he put both
the senate and the people within his own control. He altered his
raiment, likewise, to a more magnificent style. It consisted of toga
and tunic, purple all over and shot with gold, of a crown of precious
stones set in gold, and of ivory sceptre and chair, which were later
used by various officials and especially by those that held sway as
emperors. He also on the occasion of a triumph paraded with a
four-horse chariot and kept twelve lictors for life.

He would certainly have introduced still other and more numerous
innovations, had not Attus Navius prevented him, when he desired to
rearrange the tribes: this man was an augur whose equal has never been
seen. Tarquinius, angry at his opposition, took measures to abase him
and to bring his art into contempt. So, putting into his bosom a
whetstone and a razor, he went among the populace having in his mind
that the whetstone should be cut by the razor,--a thing that is
impossible. He said all that he wished, and when Attus vehemently
opposed him, he said, still yielding not a particle: "If you are not
opposing me out of quarrelsomeness, but are speaking the truth, answer
me in the presence of all these witnesses whether what I have in mind
to do shall be performed." Attus, having taken an augury on almost the
very spot, replied immediately: "Verily, O King, what you intend shall
be fulfilled." "Well, then," said the other, "take this whetstone and
cut it through with this razor; this is what I have had in mind to
come to pass." Attus at once took the stone and cut it through.
Tarquinius, in admiration, heaped various honors upon him, accorded
him the privilege of a bronze image, and did not again make any change
in the established constitution, but employed Attus as a counselor on
all matters.

He fought against the Latins who had revolted, and afterwards against
the Sabines, who, aided by the Etruscans as allies, had invaded the
Roman country; and he conquered them all. He discovered that one of
the priestesses of Vesta, who are required by custom to remain virgins
all their life, had been seduced by a man, whereupon he arranged a
kind of underground chamber with a long passage, and after placing in
it a bed, a light, and a table nearly full of foods, he brought
thither the unchaste woman escorted by a procession and having
introduced her alive into the room walled it up. From his institution
this plan of punishing those of the priestesses that do not keep their
virginity has continued to prevail. The men that outrage them have
their necks inserted in cloven pillars in the Forum, and then are
maltreated naked until they give up the ghost.

However, an attack was made upon Tarquinius by the children of Marcius
because he would not yield the sovereignty to them, but instead placed
a certain Tullius, borne to him by a slave woman, at the head of them
all. This more than anything else displeased the patricians. The young
men interested some of the latter class in their cause and formed a
plot against the king. They arrayed two men like rustics, equipped
with axes and scythes, and made them ready to attack him. So these
two, when they did not find Tarquinius in the Forum, went to the royal
court (pretending, of course, to have a dispute with each other) and
asked for admission to his presence. Their request was granted and
they began to make opposing arguments, and while Tarquinius was giving
his attention to one of them pleading his cause, the other slew him.

VII, 9.--Such was the end that befell Tarquinius who had ruled for
thirty-eight years. By the coöperation of Tanaquil, wife of
Tarquinius, Tullius succeeded to the kingdom of Rome. He was the child
of a certain woman named Ocrisia, the wife of Spurius Tullius, a
Latin; she had been captured in the war and chosen by Tarquinius: she
had either become pregnant at home or conceived after her capture;
both stories are current. When Tullius had reached boyhood he went to
sleep on a chair once in the daytime and a quantity of fire seemed to
leap from his head. Tarquinius, seeing it, took an active interest in
the child and on his arriving at maturity had him enrolled among the
patricians and in the senate.

The murderers of Tarquinius were arrested and his wife and Tullius
learned the plan of the plot; but instead of making Tarquinius's death
known at once, they took him up and tended him (pretending that he was
still alive), and meantime exchanged mutual pledges that Tullius
should take the sovereignty but surrender it to Tanaquil's sons when
they became men. And when the multitude ran together and raised an
outcry, Tanaquil, leaning out of an upper story, said: "Be not afraid.
My husband both lives and shall be seen by you shortly. But in order
that he may regain health at leisure and that no hindrance to business
may arise from his being incapacitated, he entrusts the management of
the public weal for the present to Tullius." These were her words and
the people not unwillingly accepted Tullius: for he was thought to be
an upright man.

So, having been granted the administration of public affairs, he
managed them for the most part according to orders supposed to emanate
from Tarquinius. [Sidenote: FRAG. 9] BUT WHEN HE SAW THE PEOPLE
OBEYING HIM IN ALL POINTS, he brought the assassins of Tarquinius
before the senate, though, to be sure, only because of their plot; for
he was still pretending that the king was still alive. They were
sentenced and put to death, and the sons of Marcius through fear took
refuge among the Volsci. Then did Tullius reveal the death of
Tarquinius and openly take possession of the kingdom. At first he put
forward the children of Tarquinius as his excuse and caused it to be
understood that he was the guardian of their royal office, but
afterward he proceeded to pay court to the people, believing that he
could secure control of the multitude very much more easily than of
the patricians. He gave them money, assigned land to each individual,
and made preparations to free the slaves and adopt them into tribes.
As the nobles were irritated at this, he gave instructions that those
liberated should perform some services, in requital, for the men that
had liberated them. Now since the patricians were disaffected in the
matter of his aspirations and circulated among other sayings one to
the effect that no one had chosen him to hold the sovereignty, he
gathered the people and harangued them. And by the use of many
alluring statements he so disposed them toward himself that they at
once voted the kingdom to him outright. He in return bestowed many
gifts upon them and enrolled some of them in the senate. These
originally in most matters were at a disadvantage as compared with the
patricians, but as time went on they shared equally with the
patricians in everything save the office of interrex and the
priesthoods, and were distinguished from them in no respect except by
their shoes. For the shoes of the patricians were made ornate by the
addition of straps and the imprint of the letter, which were intended
to signify that they were descended from the original hundred men that
had been senators. The letter R, they say, either indicates the number
of the hundred men referred to or else is used as the initial of the
name of the Romans.

In this way Tullius gained control of the populace, but fearing that
some rebellion might take place he delivered the greater number and
the more important of the public positions to the care of the more
powerful citizens. Thus they became harmonious in their views and
transacted the public business in the best manner. He also conducted a
few wars against the Veians and against all the Etruscans, in the
course of which nothing was done worthy of record. Wishing to
affiliate the Latins still more closely with the Romans he persuaded
them to construct in Rome a temple out of common funds. This he
devoted to Minerva. But differences arose in regard to its
superintendence. Meantime a Sabine brought to Rome an exceedingly fine
cow, intending to sacrifice her to Minerva in accordance with an
oracle. The oracle said that he who should sacrifice her would enlarge
his country. One of the Romans learning this went to the man and told
him that it was requisite for the victim first to be purified in the
river, and by his talk persuaded him. Having persuaded him he took the
cow under the pretence of keeping her safe and having taken her he
sacrificed her. When the Sabine made known the oracle the Latins both
yielded the presidency of the shrine to the Romans and in other ways
honored them as superior to themselves.

This was the course these matters took. Now Tullius joined his
daughters in marriage with the Tarquins, and though he announced that
he was going to restore the kingdom to them he kept putting it off,
now on one excuse and now on another. And they were not at all
disposed to be complaisant, but were indignant. The king paid no heed
to them and urged the Romans to democracy and freedom. Then were the
Tarquins all the more disquieted. But the younger one, however ill at
ease he was, still endured it, until in the course of time he thought
he could bear Tullius no longer. And when he found that his wife did
not approve his attitude, nor did his brother, he put to death his own
wife [Sidenote: FRAG. 10^1] AND COMPASSED HIS BROTHER'S DEATH BY
POISON ADMINISTERED BY THE LATTER'S WIFE. Then, uniting his fortunes
with his brother's spouse, he plotted with her help against Tullius.
After persuading many of the senators and patricians whose reputations
were under a cloud to coöperate with him against Tullius he
unexpectedly repaired with them to the senate, his wife Tullia also
following him. He there spoke many words to remind them of his
father's worth and uttered many jests at the expense of Tullius. When
the latter on hearing of it hastily made his appearance and said a
word or two, the pretender seized him, and thrusting him out cast him
down the steps in front of the senate-house. So the king, bewildered
by the audacity of Tarquin and surprised that no one came to his
assistance, did not say or do anything more. Tarquin at once obtained
the kingdom from the senate, and sent some men who despatched Tullius
while he was on his way home. The latter's daughter, after embracing
her husband in the senate-house and saluting him as king, departed to
the palace and drove her chariot over the dead body of her father as
he lay there.

VII, 10.--Thus ruled Tullius and thus he died after a reign of
forty-four years. Tarquin, who succeeded to the kingdom, stationed
body-guards around him after the manner of Romulus, and used them both
night and day, at home and abroad. For, as a result of what he had
done to his father-in-law, and his wife to her father, they in turn
were afraid of other people. [Sidenote: FRAG. 10^2] AND WHEN HE HAD
EQUIPPED HIMSELF TO RULE OVER THEM TYRANNICALLY HE ARRESTED AND PUT TO
DEATH THE MOST POWERFUL MEMBERS OF THE SENATE AND OF THE REST,
EXECUTING PUBLICLY THOSE AGAINST WHOM HE WAS ABLE TO BRING A CHARGE,
AND OTHERS SECRETLY; SOME ALSO HE BANISHED. HE DESTROYED NOT MERELY
THOSE WHO WERE ATTACHED TO THE PARTY OF TULLIUS, BUT IN ADDITION THOSE
WHO HAD COÖPERATED WITH HIM IN SECURING THE MONARCHY, AND THUS HE MADE
AWAY WITH THE BEST PART OF THE SENATE AND OF THE KNIGHTS. HE
UNDERSTOOD THAT HE WAS HATED BY THE ENTIRE POPULACE; HENCE HE DID NOT
APPOINT ANY PERSONS WHATEVER TO TAKE THE PLACES OF THOSE WHO KEPT
PERISHING, BUT UNDERTAKING TO ABOLISH THE SENATE ALTOGETHER HE DID NOT
APPOINT A SINGLE NEW PERSON TO IT AND COMMUNICATED NO NEWS OF
IMPORTANCE TO THOSE WHO STILL WERE MEMBERS. HE CALLED THE SENATORS
TOGETHER NOT TO HELP HIM IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF ANY IMPORTANT
MEASURES, BUT IN ORDER THAT THEIR FEWNESS MIGHT BE MADE EVIDENT TO ALL
AND THEY BE CONSEQUENTLY DESPISED. MOST OF HIS BUSINESS HE CARRIED ON
BY HIMSELF OR WITH THE AID OF HIS SONS. IT WAS HARD TO APPROACH AND
HARD TO ACCOST HIM, AND HE SHOWED GREAT HAUGHTINESS AND BRUTALITY
TOWARD ALL ALIKE, AND HE AS WELL AS HIS CHILDREN ADOPTED A MORE
TYRANNICAL BEARING TOWARD ALL PERSONS. Hence he also cast eyes of
suspicion upon the members of his guard and secured a new body-guard
from the Latin nation, intermingling the Latins with Romans in the
ranks. He intended that the Latins by obtaining equal privileges with
the Romans should owe him gratitude therefor, and that the Romans
should cause him less terror, since they no longer had a place of
their own but bore arms only in association with the Latins.

He also joined battle with the people of Gabii and fared ill in the
conflict, but by treachery overcame them; for he suggested to his son
Sextus that he desert to their side. Sextus, in order to get some
plausible pretext for the desertion, [Sidenote: FRAG. 10^3] REVILED
HIS FATHER PUBLICLY AS A TYRANT AND FORESWORN, and the latter flogged
his son and took measures of defence. Then, according to arrangement,
the son made his treacherous desertion to the people of Gabii, taking
along with him money and companions. The enemy believed the trick on
account of the cruelty of Tarquin and because at this time the son
spoke many words of truth in abusing his father and by his conduct
seemed to have become thoroughly estranged from him. So they were very
glad to receive him, and in his company made many incursions into
Roman territory and did it no slight damage. For this reason and
because he privately furnished some persons with money and spent it
lavishly for public purposes he was chosen prætor by them and was
entrusted with the management of the government among them. At that he
secretly sent a man and acquainted his father with what had occurred,
asking him for his intentions with regard to the future. The king made
no answer to the emissary, in order that he might not, being equally
informed, either willingly or unwillingly reveal something; but
leading him into a garden where there were poppies he struck off with
a rod the heads that were prominent and strewed the ground with them;
hereupon he dismissed the message-bearer. The latter, without
comprehending the affair, repeated the king's actions to Sextus, and
he understood the sense of the suggestion. Therefore he destroyed the
more eminent men of Gabii, some secretly by poison, others by robbers
(supposedly), and still others he put to death after judicial trial by
contriving against them false accusations of traitorous dealings with
his father.

Thus did Sextus visit sorrow upon the men of Gabii and destroyed their
superior citizens, distributing their money among the crowd. Later,
when some had already perished and the rest had been cozened and
thoroughly believed in him, assisted by the Roman captives and the
deserters (many of whom he had gathered for his projects), he seized
the city and surrendered it to his father. The king bestowed it upon
his son, but himself made war upon other nations.

VII, 11.--The oracles of the Sibyl to the Romans he obtained even
against his will. A woman whom they called Sibyl, gifted with divine
inspiration, came to Rome bringing [Sidenote: FRAG. 10^4] THREE OR
NINE books, offered these to Tarquin for purchase, and stated the
value of the books. As he paid no attention to her, she burned one or
three of the books. When again Tarquin scorned her, she destroyed part
of the rest in a similar way. And she was about to burn up also those
still left when the augurs compelled him to purchase the few that were
intact. He bought these for the price for which he might have secured
them all, and delivered them to two senators to keep. As they did not
entirely understand the contents, they sent to Greece and hired two
men to come from there to read and interpret these things. The
dwellers in the vicinity, desiring to learn what was revealed by the
books, [Sidenote: FRAG. 10^4] MANAGED TO BRIBE MARCUS ACILIUS,[6] ONE
OF THE CUSTODIANS, AND HAD SOME STATEMENTS COPIED OUT. THE AFFAIR
BECAME PUBLIC AND MARCUS AFTER BEING THROWN INTO TWO HIDES SEWN
TOGETHER was drowned (and beginning with him this punishment has ever
since prevailed in the case of parricides), in order that earth nor
water nor sun might be defiled by his death.

[Footnote 6: Zonaras spells _Acillius_.]

The temple on the Tarpeian rock he constructed according to the vow of
his father. And the earth having yawned even to the substructure of
the foundations there appeared the head of a man freshly slain, still
with blood in it. Accordingly the Romans sent to a soothsayer of
Etruria to ask what was signified by the phenomenon. And he, desiring
to make the portent apply to Etruria, made a diagram upon the ground
and in it laid out the plan of Rome and the Tarpeian rock. He intended
to ask the envoys: "Is this Rome? Is this the Rock? Was the head found
here?" They would suspect nothing and agree in their assent, and so
the efficacy of the portent would be transferred to the place where it
had been shown in the diagram. This was his design, but the envoys
learned from his son what his device was, and when the question was
put to them, they answered: "The settlement of Rome is not here, but
in Latium, and the hill is in the country of the Romans, and the head
was found on that hill." Thus the design of the soothsayer was
thwarted and they learned the whole truth and reported it to their
fellow-citizens, to wit, that they should be very powerful and rule
very many people. So this was another event that imbued them with
hope. Then the hill was renamed by them "Capitolium": for _capita_ in
the Roman speech means "the head."

Needing money for the building of the temple Tarquin waged war upon
the inhabitants of Ardea; but from it he gained no money, and he was
driven out of the kingdom. Signs also came in his way that indicated
his expulsion. Out of his garden vultures drove the young of eagles,
and in the men's hall, where he was having a banquet with his friends,
a huge serpent appeared and caused him and his companions at table to
decamp. In consequence of this he sent his sons Titus and Aruns to
Delphi. But as Apollo declared that he should not be driven from his
domain till a dog should use human speech, he was elated with hopes
for the best, thinking that the oracle could never be fulfilled.

[Sidenote: FRAG. 10^5] NOW LUCIUS JUNIUS WAS A SON OF TARQUIN'S
SISTER; HIS FATHER AND BROTHER TARQUIN HAD KILLED. SO HE, FEARING FOR
HIS OWN PERSON, FEIGNED MADNESS, EMPLOYING THIS MEANS OF SAFETY AS A
SCREEN FOR HIS LIFE. HENCE HE WAS DUBBED BRUTUS, FOR THIS IS THE NAME
BY WHICH THE LATINS ARE ACCUSTOMED TO CALL IDIOTS. WHILE PRETENDING TO
BE MAD HE WAS TAKEN ALONG AS A PLAYTHING BY THE CHILDREN OF TARQUIN,
WHEN THEY JOURNEYED TO DELPHI. AND HE SAID THAT HE WAS CARRYING A
VOTIVE OFFERING TO THE GOD; THIS WAS A STAFF, APPARENTLY POSSESSING NO
POINT OF EXCELLENCE, so that he became a laughing stock for it all the
more. It furnished a kind of image of the affliction that he feigned.
For he had hollowed it out and had secretly poured in gold, indicating
thereby that the disesteem which he suffered for his madness served to
conceal a sound and estimable intelligence. [Sidenote: FRAG. 10^7] TO
THE QUERY OF THE SONS OF TARQUIN AS TO WHO SHOULD SUCCEED TO THEIR
FATHER'S SOVEREIGNTY THE GOD REPLIED THAT THE FIRST WHO KISSED HIS
MOTHER SHOULD OBTAIN THE POWER. AND BRUTUS, COMPREHENDING, FELL DOWN
AS IF ACCIDENTALLY AND COVERED THE EARTH WITH KISSES, RIGHTLY DEEMING
HER TO BE THE MOTHER OF ALL.

[Sidenote: FRAG. 10^8] THIS BRUTUS OVERTHREW THE TARQUINS, taking as
his justification the case of Lucretia, though these rulers were even
without that hated by all for their tyrannous and violent
characteristics. Lucretia was a daughter of Lucretius Spurius, a man
that was a member of the senate, and she was wife of the distinguished
Tarquinius Collatinus and was renowned, as it chanced, for her beauty
and chastity. [Sidenote: FRAG. 10^8] SEXTUS, THE SON OF TARQUIN, SET
HIS HEART UPON OUTRAGING HER, NOT SO MUCH BECAUSE HE WAS INSPIRED WITH
PASSION BY HER BEAUTY AS BECAUSE HE CHOSE TO PLOT AGAINST HER CHASTE
REPUTATION. SO, HAVING WATCHED FOR COLLATINUS TO BE AWAY FROM HOME, HE
CAME BY NIGHT TO HER AND LODGED AT HER HOUSE, SINCE SHE WAS THE WIFE
OF A RELATIVE. AND FIRST HE TRIED BY PERSUASION TO SECURE ILLICIT
PLEASURE FROM HER AND THEN HE RESORTED TO VIOLENCE. AS HE COULD NOT
SUCCEED, HE THREATENED TO CUT HER THROAT. BUT INASMUCH AS SHE DESPISED
DEATH, HE THREATENED FURTHERMORE TO LAY A SLAVE BESIDE HER AND TO KILL
THEM BOTH AND TO SPREAD THE REPORT THAT HE HAD FOUND THEM SLEEPING
TOGETHER AND KILLED THEM. THIS RENDERED LUCRETIA DISTRAUGHT, AND IN
FEAR THAT THIS MIGHT BE BELIEVED TO HAVE SO HAPPENED SHE SURRENDERED.
AND AFTER THE ACT OF ADULTERY SHE PLACED A DAGGER BENEATH THE PILLOW
AND SENT FOR HER HUSBAND AND HER FATHER. WHEN THEY CAME, ACCOMPANIED
BY BRUTUS AND PUBLIUS VALERIUS, SHE SHED MANY TEARS AND WITH MOANS
RELATED THE ENTIRE TRANSACTION. THEN SHE ADDED: "AND I WILL TREAT MY
CASE AS BECOMES ME, BUT DO YOU, IF YOU ARE MEN, AVENGE ME, YOURSELVES,
AND SHOW THE TYRANTS WHAT MANNER OF CREATURES YOU ARE AND WHAT MANNER
OF WOMAN THEY HAVE OUTRAGED." HAVING SPOKEN TO THIS EFFECT SHE
IMMEDIATELY DREW THE DAGGER FROM ITS HIDING PLACE AND KILLED HERSELF.


_(BOOK 4, BOISSEVAIN.)_

VII, 13.--The Sabines, however, because of wrath at their treatment,
did not keep quiet even through the winter, but overran Roman
territory and damaged the forces of Postumius when he was for the
second time consul. And they would absolutely have captured him, had
not Menenius Agrippa, his colleague, come to his aid. And assaulting
them they killed a number, with the result that the rest withdrew.
After this Spurius Cassius and Opiter Verginius as consuls made peace
with the Sabines. And capturing the city of Camerium they executed
most of the inhabitants; the remnant they took alive and sold, and
razed the city to the ground.

Postumius Cominius and Titus Larcius arrested and put to death some
slaves who were hatching a conspiracy to seize the Capitoline. Servius
Sulpicius and Marcus Tullius in their turn anticipated a second
conspiracy composed of slaves and some others that had joined them,
for it was reported to the consuls by certain men privy to the plot.
They surrounded and overpowered the conspirators and cut them down. To
the informers citizenship and other rewards were given.

When a new war was stirred up on the part of the Latins against Rome,
the people, demanding that a cancellation of debts be authorized,
refused to take up arms. Therefore the nobles then for the first time
established a new office to have jurisdiction over both classes.
Dictator was the name given to the person entitled to the position,
and he possessed all powers as much as had the kings. People hated the
name of king on account of the Tarquins, but being anxious for the
benefit to be derived from sole leadership (which seemed to exert a
potent influence amid conditions of war and revolution), they chose it
under another name. Hence the dictatorship was, as has been said, so
far as its authority went, equivalent to kingship, except that the
dictator might not ride on horseback unless he were about to start on
a campaign, and was not permitted to make any expenditure from the
public funds unless the right were specially voted. He might try men
and put them to death at home and on campaigns, and not merely such as
belonged to the populace, but also members of the knights and of the
senate itself. No one had the power to make any complaint against him
nor to take any action hostile to him,--no, not even the
tribunes,--and no case could be appealed from him. The office of
dictator extended for a period of not more than six months, to the end
that no such official by spending much time in the midst of so much
power and unhampered authority should become haughty and plunge
headlong into a passion for sole leadership. This was what happened
later to Julius Cæsar, when contrary to lawful precedent he had been
approved for the dictatorship.

VII, 14.--At this time, consequently, when Larcius became dictator,
the populace made no uprising but presented themselves under arms.
When, however, the Latins came to terms and were now in a quiescent
state, the lenders proceeded to treat the debtors more harshly and
the populace for this reason again rebelled and even came running in a
throng into the senate. And all the senators would there have perished
at the hands of the inrushing mob, had not some persons at this
juncture reported that the Volsci had invaded the country. In the face
of such news the populace became calm, not regarding this action,
however, in the light of clemency to the senate, for they felt sure
that that body would almost immediately be destroyed by the enemy.
Hence they did not take the trouble to man the walls nor render any
assistance until Servilius released the prisoners held for default of
payments and decreed a suspension of taxes for as long as the campaign
lasted and promised to reduce the debts. Then in consequence of these
concessions they proceeded against the enemy and won the day.
Inasmuch, however, as they were not relieved of their debts and in
general could obtain no decent treatment, they again raised a clamor
and grew full of wrath and made an uprising against both the senate
and the prætors.

But at the approach of another war the prætors decreed a cancellation
of debts: others opposed this measure: and so Marcus Valerius was
named dictator. He was of the kindred of Poplicola and was beloved by
the people. Then, indeed, so many gathered, animated with such zeal
(for he had promised them prizes, too), that they overran not only the
Sabines, but the Volsci and Æqui who were allied with them. As a
sequel, the populace voted many honors to Valerius, one of which was
their bestowal of the title Maximus. This name, translated into Greek,
signifies "greatest." And he, wishing to do the populace some favors,
made many addresses to the senate but could not get it to follow his
guidance. Consequently he rushed out of the senatorial assembly in a
rage, and after making to the populace a long speech against the
senate resigned his command. [Sidenote: FRAG. 16^4] AND THE POPULACE
WAS ALL THE MORE PROVOKED TO REVOLT. AS FOR THE MONEY-LENDERS, BY
INSISTING IN THE CASE OF DEBTS UPON THE VERY LETTER OF THE AGREEMENT
AND REFUSING TO MAKE ANY CONCESSION TO THOSE WHO OWED THEM THEY BOTH
FAILED TO SECURE THE EXACT AMOUNT AND WERE DISAPPOINTED IN MANY OTHER
HOPES. FOR POVERTY AND THE RESULTING DESPERATION IS A HEAVY CURSE, AND
IS, IF IT SPREADS AMONG A LARGE NUMBER OF PEOPLE, VERY DIFFICULT TO
COMBAT. NOW THE CAUSE OF MOST OF THE TROUBLES THAT BEFELL THE ROMANS
LAY IN THE UNYIELDING ATTITUDE ADOPTED AT THIS TIME BY THE MORE
POWERFUL TOWARD THEIR INFERIORS. For as the military contingent came
to be hard pressed by dint of campaigns and was baffled out and out in
frequent hopes frequently entertained, and the debtors were repeatedly
abused and maltreated by the money-lenders, the people became inflamed
to such a pitch of fury that many of the destitute abandoned the city,
withdrew from the camp, [Sidenote: FRAG. 16^5] AND LIKE ENEMIES
GATHERED THEIR SUBSISTENCE FROM THE COUNTRY.

WHEN THIS SITUATION HAD BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT, SINCE NUMBERS CAME
FLOCKING TO THE SIDE OF THE REVOLUTIONISTS, THE SENATORS, DREADING
THAT THE LATTER MIGHT BECOME MORE ESTRANGED AND THE NEIGHBORING TRIBES
JOIN THEIR REBELLION FOR PURPOSES OF ATTACK, MADE PROPOSITIONS TO THEM
IN WHICH THEY PROMISED EVERYTHING THAT THE SENATE WAS EMPOWERED TO DO
FOR THEM. BUT WHEN THEY DISPLAYED THE UTMOST AUDACITY AND WOULD ACCEPT
NO OFFER, ONE OF THE ENVOYS, AGRIPPA MENENIUS, BEGGED THEM TO HEARKEN
TO A FABLE. HAVING OBTAINED THEIR CONSENT HE SPOKE AS FOLLOWS. ONCE
ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE BODY BEGAN A CONTENTION AGAINST THE BELLY. AND
THE EYES SAID: "WE GIVE THE HANDS THE POWER TO WORK AND THE FEET THE
POWER TO GO." AND THE TONGUE AND THE LIPS: "THROUGH US THE COUNSELS OF
THE HEART ARE MADE KNOWN." AND THEN THE EARS: "THROUGH US THE WORDS OF
OTHERS ARE DESPATCHED TO THE MIND." AND THE HANDS: "WE ARE THE WORKERS
AND LAY UP STORES OF WEALTH." AND FINALLY THE FEET: "WE TIRE OURSELVES
OUT CARRYING THE WHOLE BODY IN JOURNEYS AND WHILE WORKING AND WHILE
STANDING." AND ALL IN A CHORUS: "WHILE WE LABOR SO, THOU ALONE, FREE
FROM CONTRIBUTION AND LABOR, LIKE A MISTRESS ART SERVED BY US ALL AND
THE FRUIT OF ALL OUR LABORS THOU THYSELF ALONE DOST ENJOY." THE BELLY
HERSELF ADMITTED THAT THIS WAS SO, AND SAID SHE: "IF YOU LIKE, LEAVE
ME UNSUPPLIED AND MAKE ME NO PRESENTS." THIS PROPOSITION SUITED, AND
THE MEMBERS VOTED NEVER MORE TO SUPPLY THE BELLY BY THEIR COMMON
EFFORT. WHEN NO FOOD WAS PRESENTED TO HER, THE HANDS WERE NOT NIMBLE
TO WORK, BEING RELAXED ON ACCOUNT OF THE FAILURE OF THE BELLY, NOR
WERE THE FEET POSSESSED OF STRENGTH, NOR DID ANY OTHER OF THE LIMBS
SHOW ITS NORMAL ACTIVITY UNINJURED, BUT ALL WERE INEFFICIENT, SLOW, OR
COMPLETELY MOTIONLESS. AND THEN THEY COMPREHENDED THAT THE PRESENTS
MADE TO THE BELLY HAD BEEN SUPPLIED NOT MORE TO HER THAN TO THEMSELVES
AND THAT EACH ONE OF THEM INCIDENTALLY ENJOYS THE BENEFIT CONFERRED
UPON HER.

[Sidenote: FRAG. 16^5] THROUGH THESE WORDS THE POPULACE WAS MADE TO
COMPREHEND THAT THE ABUNDANCE OF THE PROSPEROUS TENDS ALSO TO THE
ADVANTAGE OF THE POOR, AND THAT EVEN THOUGH THE FORMER BE ADVANTAGED
BY THEIR LOANS AND SO INCREASE THEIR ABUNDANCE, THE OUTCOME OF THIS IS
NOT HURTFUL TO THE INTERESTS OF THE MANY; SINCE, IF IT WERE NOT FOR
THE WEALTHY OWNING PROPERTY, THE POOR WOULD NOT HAVE IN TIMES OF NEED
PERSONS TO LEND TO THEM AND WOULD PERISH UNDER THE PRESSURE OF WANT.
ACCORDINGLY THEY BECAME MILDER AND REACHED AN AGREEMENT, THE SENATE
FOR ITS PART VOTING A REDUCTION IN THEIR DEBTS AND A RELEASE FROM
SEIZURE OF PROPERTY.

VII, 15.--They feared, however, that when their society had been
disbanded they might either find the agreements not effectual or might
[Sidenote: FRAG. 16^6] BE HARMED ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR SEPARATION, ONE
BEING PUNISHED ON ONE PRETEXT, ANOTHER ON ANOTHER, in constant
succession. So they formed a compact to lend aid to one another in
case any one of them should be wronged in any particular; and they
took oaths to this effect and forthwith elected two representatives
from their own number (and afterward still more) in order that by such
a partnership arrangement they might have assistants and avengers. And
this they did not only once, but the idea now conceived in this form
kept growing, and they appointed their representatives for a year, as
to some office. The men were called in the tongue of the Latins
_tribunes_ (the commanders of thousands are also so named) but are
styled _dêmarchoi_ in the Greek language. In order that the titles of
the tribuni might be kept distinct they added to the name of the one
class the phrase "of the soldiers" and to that of the other class the
phrase "of the people." These _tribunes of the people_, then, or
_dêmarchoi_ became responsible for great evils that befell Rome. For
though they did not immediately secure the title of magistrates, they
gained power beyond all the rest, defending every one that begged
protection and rescuing every one that called upon them not only from
private persons, but from the very magistrates, except the dictators.
If any one ever invoked them when absent, he, too, was released from
the person holding him prisoner and was either brought before the
populace by them or was set free. And if ever they saw fit that
anything should not be done, they prevented it, whether the person
acting were a private citizen or an official: and if the people or the
senate were about to do or vote anything and a single tribune opposed
it, the action or the vote became null and void. As time went on, they
were allowed or allowed themselves to summon the senate, to punish
whoever disobeyed them, to practice divination, and to hold court. And
in case they were refused permission to do anything, they gained their
point by their incontestable opposition to every project undertaken by
others. For they introduced laws to the effect that whoever should
obstruct them by deed or word, be he private citizen or magistrate,
should be "hallowed" and incur pollution. This being "hallowed" meant
destruction; for this was the name applied to everything (as, for
instance, a victim) that was consecrated for slaughter. The tribunes
themselves were termed by the multitude "sacrosanct", since they
obtained sacred enclosures for the shelter of such as invoked them.
For _sacra_ among the Romans means "walls", and _sancta_ "sacred".
Many of their actions were unwarrantable, for they threw even consuls
into prison and put men to death without granting them a hearing.
Nobody ventured to oppose them; or, in case any one did, he became
himself "hallowed." If, however, persons were condemned not by all the
tribunes, they would call to their help those who had not concurred in
the verdict, and so they went duly through the forms of court
procedure before the tribunes themselves or before some arbiters or
before the populace, and became the possession of the side that won.
In the course of time the number of the tribunes was fixed at ten,
[Sidenote: FRAG. 16^7] AND AS A RESULT OF THIS MOST OF THEIR POWER WAS
OVERTHROWN. FOR AS THOUGH BY NATURE (BUT REALLY, OF COURSE, BY REASON
OF JEALOUSY) FELLOW OFFICIALS INVARIABLY QUARREL; AND IT IS DIFFICULT
FOR A NUMBER OF MEN, ESPECIALLY IN A POSITION OF INFLUENCE, TO ATTAIN
HARMONY. No sooner did outsiders, planning to wreck their influence,
raise factional issues to the end that dissension might make them
weaker, than the tribunes actually attached themselves some to one
party, some to another. [Sidenote: FRAG. 16^7] IF EVEN ONE OF THEM
OPPOSED A MEASURE, he rendered the decisions of the rest null and
void.

Now at first they did not enter the senate-house, but sitting at the
entrance watched proceedings, and in case aught failed to please them,
they would show resistance. Next they were invited inside. Later,
however, the ex-tribunes were numbered with the senators, and finally
some of the senators actually were permitted to be tribunes, unless a
man chanced to be a patrician. Patricians the people would not accept:
having chosen the tribunes to defend them against the patricians, and
having advanced them to so great power, they dreaded lest one of them
might turn his strength to contrary purposes and use it against them.
But if a man abjured the rank given him by birth and changed his
social standing to that of a common citizen, they received him gladly.
Many of the patricians whose position was unquestioned renounced their
nobility through desire for the immense influence possible, and so
became tribunes.

Such was the growth of the domination of the tribunes. In addition to
them the people chose two ædiles, to be their assistants in the matter
of documents. They took charge of everything that was submitted in
writing to the plebs, to the populace, and to the senate, and kept it,
so that nothing that was done escaped their notice. This and the
trying of cases were the objects for which they were chosen anciently,
but later they were charged with the supervision of buying and
selling, whence they came to be called _agoranomoi_ ("clerks of the
market") by those who put their name into Greek.


_(BOOK 5, BOISSEVAIN.)_

VII, 16.--The first revolution of the Romans, then, terminated as
described. Many of the neighboring tribes had found in the revolution
a hostile incentive, and the Romans with a unified purpose after their
reconciliation conducted vigorously the wars which the latter waged,
and conquered in all of them. It was at this time that in the siege of
Corioli they came within an ace of being driven from their camp, but a
patrician, Gnæus Marcius, showed his prowess and repelled the
assailants. For this he received various tokens of renown and was
given the title of Coriolanus from the people which he had routed.
[Sidenote: FRAG. 17^2] FOR THE TIME HE WAS THUS EXALTED BUT NOT LONG
AFTERWARD HE WAS ANXIOUS TO BE MADE PRÆTOR AND FAILED, AND THEREFORE
GREW VEXED AT THE POPULACE AND EVINCED DISPLEASURE TOWARD THE
TRIBUNES. HENCE THE TRIBUNES (WHOSE FUNCTIONS HE WAS ESPECIALLY EAGER
TO ABOLISH) HEAPED UP ACCUSATIONS AGAINST HIM AND FIXED UPON HIM A
CHARGE OF AIMING AT TYRANNY AND EXPELLED HIM FROM ROME. HAVING BEEN
EXPELLED HE FORTHWITH BETOOK HIMSELF TO THE VOLSCI. The latter's
leaders and those in authority over them were delighted at his arrival
and again made ready for war; Attius Tullius urged this course upon
them all, but the people showed lack of enthusiasm. So when the nobles
neither by advice nor by intimidation could prevail upon them to take
up arms, they concocted the following scheme. The Romans were
conducting a horse-race, and the Volsci among other neighboring
peoples had gathered in a large body to behold the spectacle. Tullius,
as a pretended friend of the Romans, persuaded the Roman prætors that
they should keep watch on the Volsci, since the latter had made ready
to attack them unexpectedly in the midst of the horse-race. The
prætors, after communicating the information to the others, made
proclamation at once, before the contest, that all the Volsci must
retire. The Volsci, indignant because they alone of all the spectators
had been expelled, put themselves in readiness for battle. Setting at
their head Coriolanus and Tullius, and with numbers swollen by the
accession of the Latins, they advanced against Rome. The Romans, when
informed of it, instead of making a vigorous use of arms fell into
mutual recriminations, the popular party censuring the patricians
because Coriolanus, who was campaigning against his country, happened
to belong to their number, and the other party the populace because
they had been unjust in expelling him and making him an enemy. Because
of this contention they would have incurred some great injury, had not
the women come to their aid. For when the senate voted restoration to
Coriolanus and envoys had been despatched to him to this end, he
demanded that the land of which the Volsci had been deprived in the
previous wars be given back to them. But the people would not
relinquish the land. Consequence: a second embassy. [Sidenote: FRAG.
17^8] AND HE WAS EXCEEDINGLY ANGRY THAT THEY, WHO WERE IN DANGER OF
LOSING THEIR OWN COUNTRY, WOULD NOT EVEN UNDER THESE CONDITIONS
WITHDRAW FROM THE POSSESSIONS OF OTHERS. WHEN THIS SITUATION WAS
REPORTED TO THE DISPUTANTS, THEY STILL REFUSED TO BUDGE, NOR DID THE
DANGERS CAUSE THE MEN, AT LEAST, TO DESIST FROM QUARRELING. BUT THE
WOMEN, VOLUMNIA THE WIFE OF CORIOLANUS AND VETURIA[7] HIS MOTHER,
GATHERING A COMPANY OF THE REMAINING MOST EMINENT LADIES VISITED HIM
IN CAMP AND TOOK HIS CHILDREN ALONG WITH THEM. WHILE THE REST WEPT
WITHOUT SPEAKING VETURIA BEGAN: "WE ARE NOT DESERTERS, MY SON, BUT THE
COUNTRY HAS SENT US TO YOU TO BE, IF YOU SHOULD YIELD, YOUR MOTHER,
WIFE AND CHILDREN, BUT OTHERWISE YOUR SPOIL. AND IF EVEN NOW YOU STILL
ARE ANGRY, KILL US THE FIRST. BE RECONCILED AND HOLD NO LONGER YOUR
ANGER AGAINST YOUR CITIZENS, FRIENDS, TEMPLES, TOMBS; DO NOT TAKE BY
STORM YOUR NATIVE LAND IN WHICH YOU WERE BORN, WERE REARED, AND BECAME
CORIOLANUS, BEARER OF THIS GREAT NAME. SEND ME NOT HENCE WITHOUT
RESULT, UNLESS YOU WOULD BEHOLD ME DEAD BY MY OWN HAND." THEREUPON SHE
SIGHED ALOUD AND SHOWED HER BREASTS AND TOUCHED HER ABDOMEN,
EXCLAIMING: "THIS BROUGHT YOU FORTH, MY CHILD, THESE REARED YOU UP."
SHE, THEN, SAID THIS, AND HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN AND THE REST OF THE
WOMEN JOINED IN THE LAMENT, SO THAT HE TOO WAS MOVED TO GRIEF.
RECOVERING HIMSELF WITH DIFFICULTY HE ENFOLDED HIS MOTHER IN HIS ARMS
AND AT THE SAME TIME KISSING HER REPLIED: "SEE, MOTHER, I YIELD TO
YOU. YOURS IS THE VICTORY, AND TO YOU LET ALL ASCRIBE THIS FAVOR. FOR
I CANNOT ENDURE EVEN TO SEE THEM, WHO AFTER RECEIVING SUCH GREAT
BENEFITS AT MY HANDS HAVE GIVEN ME SUCH A RECOMPENSE, NOR WILL I ENTER
THE CITY. DO YOU KEEP THE COUNTRY INSTEAD OF ME, BECAUSE YOU HAVE SO
WISHED IT, AND I WILL DEPART." HAVING SPOKEN THUS HE WITHDREW. AND HE
DID NOT ACCEPT THE RESTORATION, BUT RETIRED AMONG THE VOLSCI AND THERE
AT AN ADVANCED AGE DEPARTED THIS LIFE.

[Footnote 7: Zonaras spells it _Veturina_.]

VII, 17.--Now the tribunes demanded that some land acquired by the
Romans from the enemy be apportioned among the people, and as a result
of their action much damage was incurred by the citizens both from the
enemy and from one another. [Sidenote: FRAG. 19^1] FOR THE NOBLES
BEING UNABLE TO RESTRAIN THEM IN ANY OTHER WAY STIRRED UP PURPOSELY
WARS AFTER WARS, IN ORDER THAT BEING BUSIED THEREWITH THEY MIGHT NOT
DISTURB THEMSELVES ABOUT THE LAND. But after a time some persons began
to suspect what was going on, and would not permit both of the consuls
(or prætors) to be appointed by the nobles, but themselves desired to
choose one of them from the patricians. Upon effecting this they
selected Spurius Furius, and campaigning with him accomplished with
enthusiasm all objects for which they had set out. But those who took
the field with his colleague, Fabius Cæso, not only displayed no
energy, but abandoned their camp, came to the city, and raised a
tumult until the Etruscans, learning of the affair, assailed them.
Even then, moreover, they did not leave the city until some of the
tribunes came to an agreement with the nobles. Still, they fought
vigorously and destroyed many of the enemy, and not a few of
their own number also were killed. One of the consuls likewise
fell,--Manlius[8]: the populace chose Manlius[9] prætor for the third
time.

[Footnote 8: This was probably one of the Manlii Cincinnati.]

[Footnote 9: The second "Manlius" is evidently an error of Zonaras.
The name should be _Fabius_.]

Again was a war waged against them by the Etruscans. And when the
Romans were in dejection and at a loss to know how they should
withstand the enemy, the Fabii came to their help. [Sidenote: FRAG.
20^1] THEY, THREE HUNDRED AND SIX IN NUMBER, WHEN THEY SAW THAT THE
ROMANS WERE DEJECTED, were not following profitable counsels, and were
on all points in desperation, took upon themselves the burden of the
war against the Etruscans, exhibiting readiness to carry on the
conflict by themselves with their persons and with their wealth. They
occupied and fortified an advantageous position from which as a base
they harried the entire hostile domain, since the Etruscans would not
venture to engage in combat with them, or, if they ever did join
issue, were decisively defeated. But, upon the accession of allies,
the Etruscans laid an ambuscade in a wooded spot: the Fabii, being
masters of the whole field, assailed them without [Sidenote: FRAG.
20^2] precaution, fell into the snare, were surrounded and all
massacred. And their race would have entirely disappeared, had not one
of them because of his youth been left at home, in whose descendants
the family later attained renewed renown.

After the Fabii had been destroyed as related the Romans received
rough treatment at the hands of the Etruscans. Subsequently they
concluded a peace with the enemy, but turning against one another
committed many deeds of outrage, the populace not even refraining
from attack upon the prætors. They beat their assistants and shattered
their fasces and made the prætors themselves submit to investigation
on every pretext, great and small. They actually planned to throw
Appius Claudius into prison in the very midst of his term of office,
inasmuch as he persistently opposed them at every point and had
decimated the partners of his campaign after their giving way before
the Volsci in battle. Now decimation was the following sort of
process. When the soldiers had committed any grave offence the leader
told them off in groups of ten and taking one man of each ten (who had
drawn the lot) he would punish him by death. At Claudius's retirement
from office the popular party straightway brought him to trial; and
though they failed to condemn him, they forced him, by postponing
their vote, to commit suicide. And among the measures introduced by
some of the tribunes to the prejudice of the patrician interests was
one permitting the populace to convene separately, and without
interference from the patricians to deliberate upon and transact as
much business as they pleased. They also ordained that, if any one for
any cause should have a penalty imposed upon him by the prætors, the
populace might thereupon have the case appealed to them and decide it.
And they increased the number of ædiles and of tribunes, in order to
have a large body of persons to act as their representatives.

[Sidenote: FRAG. 21^1] DURING THE PROGRESS OF THESE EVENTS THE
PATRICIANS OPENLY TOOK SCARCELY ANY RETALIATORY MEASURES, EXCEPT IN A
FEW CASES, BUT SECRETLY SLAUGHTERED A NUMBER OF THE BOLDEST SPIRITS.
NEITHER THIS, HOWEVER, NOR THE FACT THAT ON ONE OCCASION NINE TRIBUNES
WERE DELIVERED TO THE FLAMES BY THE POPULACE SEEMED TO RESTRAIN THE
REST. NOT ONLY WERE THOSE WHO SUBSEQUENTLY HELD THE TRIBUNESHIP NOT
CALMED, BUT ACTUALLY THEY WERE THE RATHER EMBOLDENED. [Sidenote: FRAG.
21^2] THIS WAS THE CONDITION INTO WHICH THE PATRICIANS BROUGHT THE
POPULACE. AND THEY WOULD NOT OBEY THE SUMMONS TO GO ON A CAMPAIGN,
THOUGH THE FOE ASSAILED, UNLESS THEY SECURED THE OBJECTS FOR WHICH
THEY WERE STRIVING, AND IF THEY EVER DID TAKE THE FIELD, THEY FOUGHT
LISTLESSLY, UNLESS THEY HAD ACCOMPLISHED ALL THAT THEY DESIRED. HENCE
MANY OF THE TRIBES LIVING CLOSE TO THEM, RELYING ON EITHER THE
DISSENSION OF THEIR FOES OR THEIR OWN STRENGTH, RAISED THE STANDARD OF
REVOLT. [Sidenote: FRAG. 22^1] AMONG THESE WERE ALSO THE ÆQUI, WHO,
AFTER CONQUERING AT THIS TIME MARCUS MINUCIUS WHILE HE SERVED AS
PRÆTOR, BECAME PRESUMPTUOUS. [Sidenote: FRAG. 22^2] THOSE AT ROME,
LEARNING THAT MINUCIUS HAD BEEN DEFEATED, CHOSE AS DICTATOR LUCIUS
QUINCTIUS, WHO WAS A POOR MAN AND HAD DEVOTED HIS LIFE TO FARMING, BUT
WAS DISTINGUISHED FOR HIS VALOR AND WISE MODERATION; AND HE LET HIS
HAIR GROW IN CURLS, WHENCE HE WAS NAMED CINCINNATUS.[10] He, being
selected as dictator, took the field that very day, used wariness as
well as speed, and simultaneously with Minucius attacked the Æqui,
killing very many of them and capturing the rest alive: the latter he
led under the yoke and then released. This matter of the yoke I shall
briefly describe. The Romans used to fix in the ground two poles
(upright wooden beams, of course, with a space between them) and
across them they would lay another transverse beam; through the frame
thus formed they led the captives naked. This conferred great
distinction upon the side that conducted the operation but vast
dishonor upon the side that endured it, so that some preferred to die
rather than submit to any such treatment. Cincinnatus also captured a
city of theirs called Corvinum[11] and returned: he removed Minucius
from his prætorship because of his defeat, and himself resigned his
office.

[Footnote 10: Zonaras spells _Cicinatus_.]

[Footnote 11: The town is called _Corbio_ by Livy (II, 39, 4).]

VII, 18.--The Romans, however, now got another war on their hands at
home, in which their adversaries were composed of slaves and some
exiles who moved unexpectedly by night and secured possession of the
Capitol. This time, too, the multitude did not arm themselves for the
fray till they had wrung some further concessions from the patricians.
Then they assailed the revolutionists and overcame them, but lost many
of their own men.

For these reasons, accordingly, and because of certain portents the
Romans became sobered and dismissed their mutual grievances and voted
to establish the rights of citizenship on a fairer basis. And they
sent three men to Greece with an eye to the laws and the customs of
the people there. Upon the return of the commission they abolished all
the political offices, including that of the tribunes, and chose
instead eight of the foremost men, and [Sidenote: B.C. 451 (_a.u._
303)] designated Appius Claudius and Titus Genucius prætors with
dictatorial powers for that one year. They empowered them to compile
laws and further voted that no case could be appealed from them,--a
latitude granted previously to none of the magistrates save the
dictators. These men held sway each for a day, assuming by turns the
dignity of rulership. They compiled laws and exposed the same to view
in the Forum. These statutes being found pleasing to all were put
before the people, and after receiving their ratification were
inscribed on ten tablets; for all records that were deemed worthy of
safekeeping used to be preserved on tablets.

[Sidenote: B.C. 450 (_a.u._ 304)] The above mentioned magistrates at
the expiration of the year surrendered their office, but ten more
chosen anew (for the overthrow of the State, as it almost seemed) came
to grief. They all held sway at once on equal terms and chose from
among the patricians some most brazen youths, through whom, as their
agents, they committed many acts of violence. At last, toward the end
of the year, they compiled a few additional statutes written upon two
tablets, all of which were the product of their own individual
judgment. From these not harmony, but greater disputes, were destined
to fall to the lot of the Romans.

The so-called twelve tablets were thus created at that time. But
besides doing this the lawgivers in question, when their year of
office had expired, still maintained control of affairs, occupying the
city by force; and they would not convene the senate nor the people,
lest, if they came together, they should depose them. And when the
Æqui and the Sabines now stirred up war against the Romans, these
officials by arrangement with their adherents gained their object of
having the conduct of the wars entrusted to them. Of the decemvirate
Servius Oppius and Appius Claudius remained at home: the other eight
set out against the enemy.

Absolutely all [Sidenote: FRAG. 22^3] THE INTERESTS, however, OF STATE
AND CAMP ALIKE WERE THROWN INTO CONFUSION, AND HENCE CONTENTION AGAIN
AROSE. The leaders of the force had invaded the land of the Sabines
and sent a certain Lucius Sicius, who was accounted a strong tower in
warfare and likewise one of the most prominent representatives of the
populace, with companions, avowedly to seize a certain position; but
they had the man slain by the party that had been sent out with him.
The report was brought into camp that the man with others had been
killed by the foe, and the soldiers went out to gather up the dead
bodies. They found not one corpse belonging to the enemy but many of
their own race, whom Sicius had killed in his own defence when they
attacked him. And when they saw that the dead were lying all around
him and had their faces turned toward him, they suspected what had
been done and furthermore raised a tumult.--There was still another
incident that had a bearing on the situation.

Lucius Virginius, a man of the people, had a daughter of surpassing
beauty whom he intended to bestow in marriage upon Lucius Icilius,[12]
a person of similar rank in society. For this maiden Claudius
conceived a passion, and not otherwise able to attain his ends he
arranged with certain men to declare her a slave: he was to be the
arbiter. The father of the girl accordingly came from the camp and
pled his case. When Claudius had given sentence against her and the
girl was delivered to those who had declared her a slave and no one
came to the rescue, her father wild with grief took a cleaver and
ended his daughter's life and, just as he was, rushed out to the
soldiers. They, who had been previously far from tractable, were so
wrought up that they straightway set out in haste against the city to
find Claudius. And the rest, who had gone on a campaign against the
Sabines, when they learned this abandoned their intrenchments, and,
joining with the rest, set at their head twenty men, determined to
accomplish something of importance. The remainder of the multitude in
the city likewise espoused their cause and added to the tumult.

[Footnote 12: Zonaras spells _Icillius_.]

Meanwhile Claudius in terror had hidden himself and Oppius convened
the senate; and sending to the populace he enquired what they wanted.
They demanded that Lucius Valerius and Marcus Horatius, two of the
senators who favored their cause, be sent to them, saying that through
these men they would make their reply. Owing to the fear of the ten
magistrates (for they were now all on the scene) that the people would
employ the two as leaders against them they were not sent, whereupon
the populace grew still more angry. As a consequence the senators were
inspired with no slight fear and against the will of the magistrates
they sent Valerius and Horatius to the people. By this means a
reconciliation was effected: the rioters were granted immunity for
their acts, and the decemvirate was abolished; the annual
magistracies, including that of tribunes, were restored with the same
privileges as they had formerly enjoyed. Virginius was one of the
magistrates appointed; and they cast into prison Oppius and Claudius
(who committed suicide before their cases were investigated), and
indicted, convicted, and banished the remainder of the board.

[Sidenote: B.C. 449 (_a.u._ 305)] VII, 19.--Now the consuls--it is
said that this is the first time they were known as consuls, being
previously called prætors; and they were Valerius and Horatius--both
then and thereafter showed favor to the populace and strengthened
their cause rather than that of the patricians. The patricians, though
subdued, would not readily convene and did not put matters entirely in
the power of the lower class, but granted the tribunes the right of
practicing augury in their assemblies: nominally this was an honor and
dignity for them, since from very ancient times this privilege had
been accorded the patricians alone, but really it was a hindrance. The
nobles intended that the tribunes and the populace should not
accomplish easily everything they pleased, but should sometimes be
prevented under this plea of augury. The patricians as well as the
senate were displeased at the consuls, whom they regarded as favorable
to the popular cause, and so did not vote a triumph to them--though
each had won a war--and did not assign to each a day as had been the
custom. The populace, however, both held a festival for two days and
voted triumphal honors to the consuls.


_(BOOK 6, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: B.C. 448 (_a.u._ 306)] When the Romans thus fell into
discord their adversaries took courage and came against them. It was
in the following year, when Marcus Genucius and Gaius Curtius were
consuls, that they turned against each other. The popular leaders
desired to be consuls, since the patricians were in the habit of
becoming tribunes by transference to their order, and the patricians
clung tenaciously to the consular office. They indulged in many words
and acts of violence against each other. But in order to prevent the
populace from proceeding to greater extremities the nobles yielded to
them the substance of authority though they would not relinquish the
name; and in place of the consuls they named military tribunes in
order that the honor of the title might not be sullied by contact with
the vulgar throng. It was agreed that three military tribunes be
chosen from each of the classes in place of the two consuls. However,
the name of consul was not lost entirely, but sometimes consuls were
appointed and at other times military tribunes. This, at all events,
is the tradition that has come down of what took place, with the
additional detail that the consuls nominated dictators, though their
own powers were far inferior to those appertaining to that office, and
even that the military tribunes likewise did so sometimes. It is
further said that none of the military tribunes, though many of them
won many victories, ever celebrated a triumph.

[Sidenote: B.C. 447 (_a.u._ 307)] It was in this way, then, that
military tribunes came to be chosen at that time: censors were
appointed in the following year, during the consulship of Barbatus and
Marcus Macrinus. Those chosen were Lucius Papirius and Lucius
Sempronius. The reason for their election was that the consuls were
unable, on account of the number of the people, to supervise them all;
the duties now assigned to the censors had until that time been
performed by the consuls as a part of their prerogatives. Two was the
original number of the censors and they were taken from the
patricians. They held office at first and at the last for five-year
periods, but during the intervening time for three half-years; and
they came to be greater than the consuls, though they had taken over
only a part of their functions. They had the right to let the public
revenues, to supervise roads and public buildings, to make complete
records of each man's wealth, and to note and investigate the lives of
the citizens, enrolling those deserving of praise in the tribes, in
the equestrian order, or in the senate (as seemed to fit the case of
each one), and similarly erasing from any class the names of those who
were not right livers: this power was greater than all those now left
to the consuls. They made declarations attested by oath, in regard to
every one of their acts, that no such act was prompted by favor or by
enmity but that their considerations and performances were both the
result of an unbiased opinion of what was advantageous for the
commonwealth. They convened the people when laws were to be introduced
and for other purposes, and employed all the insignia of the greater
offices save lictors. Such, at its inception, was the office of the
censors. If any persons did not register their property and themselves
in the census lists, the censors sold the property and the consuls the
men. This arrangement held for a certain time, but later it was
determined that a man once enrolled in the senate should be a senator
for life and that his name should not be erased, unless one had been
disgraced by being tried for the commission of a crime or was
convicted of leading an evil life: the names of such persons were
erased and others inscribed in their stead.

In the case of those who gave satisfaction in office principal honors
were bestowed upon dictators, honors of the second rank upon censors,
and third place was awarded to masters of horse. This system was
followed without distinction, whether they were still in office or
whether they had already laid it down. For if one descended from a
greater office to an inferior one, he still kept the dignity of his
former position intact. One particular man, whom they styled
_principa_ of the senate (he would be called _prokritos_ by the
Greeks) was preferred before all for the time that he was president (a
person was not chosen for this position for life) and surpassed the
rest in dignity, without wielding, however, any power.

VII, 20.--For a time they maintained peace with each other and with
the adjacent tribes, but then a famine mastered them, so severe that
some not able to endure the pangs of hunger threw themselves into the
river, and they fell to quarreling. The one class blamed the
prosperous as being at fault in the handling of the grain, and the
other class blamed the poorer men for unwillingness to till the soil.
[Sidenote: B.C. 439 (_a.u._ 315)] Spurius Mælius, a wealthy knight,
seeing this attempted to set up a tyranny, and buying corn from the
neighboring region he lowered the price of it for many and gave it
free to many others. In this way he won the friendship of a great many
and procured arms and guardsmen. And he would have gained control of
the city, had not Minucius Augurinus, a patrician, appointed to have
charge of the grain distribution and censured for the lack of grain,
reported the proceeding to the senate. The senate on receiving the
information nominated at once and at that very meeting Lucius
Quinctius Cincinnatus, though past his prime (he was eighty years
old), to be dictator. They spent the whole day sitting there, as if
engaged in some discussion, to prevent news of their action from
traveling abroad. By night the dictator had the knights occupy in
advance the Capitol and the remaining points of vantage, and at dawn
he sent to Mælius Gaius Servilius, master of the horse, to summon him
pretendedly on some other errand. But as Mælius had some suspicions
and delayed, Servilius fearing that he might be rescued by the
populace--for they were already running together--killed the man
either on his own responsibility or because ordered to do so by the
dictator. At this the populace broke into a riot, but Quinctius
harangued them and by providing them with grain and refraining from
punishing or accusing any one else he stopped the riot.

Wars with various nations now assailed the Romans, in some of which
they were victorious within a few days; but with the Etruscans they
waged a long continued contest. Postumius conquered the Æqui and had
captured a large city of theirs, but the soldiers neither had had it
turned over to them for pillage nor were awarded a share of the
plunder when they requested it. Therefore they surrounded and slew the
quæstor who was disposing of it, and when Postumius reprimanded them
for this and strove to find the assassins, they killed him also. And
they assigned to their own use not only the captive territory but all
that at the time happened to be found in the public treasury. The
uprising would have assumed even greater dimensions but for the fact
that war against the Romans was renewed by the Æqui. Alarmed by this
situation they became quiet, endured the punishment for the murders,
which touched only a few, and took the field against their opponents,
whom they engaged and conquered. For this achievement the nobles
distributed the plunder among them, and voted pay first to the
infantry and later also to the cavalry. Up to that time they were used
to undertaking campaigns without pay and lived at their own expense;
now for the first time they began to draw pay.

[Sidenote: B.C. 408 (_a.u._ 346)] A war arising between them and Veii,
the Romans won frequent victories and reduced the foe to a state of
siege as long as the latter fought with merely their own contingent:
but when allies had been added to their force they came out against
the Romans and defeated them. Meanwhile the lake situated close to the
Alban Mount, which was shut in by the surrounding ridges and had no
outlet, overflowed its banks during the siege of Veii to such an
extent that it actually poured over the crests of the hills and went
rushing down to the sea. The Romans deeming that something
supernatural was certainly signified by this event sent to Delphi to
consult the oracle about the matter. There was also among the
population of Veii an Etruscan who was a soothsayer. The Pythian
interpretation coincided with his; and both declared that the city
would be captured when the overflowing water should not fall into the
sea but be used up differently. The Romans consequently ordered
several religious services to be performed. But the Pythian god did
not specify to which of the divinities nor in what way they should
offer these, and the Etruscan appeared to have the knowledge but would
explain nothing. So the Romans who were stationed about the wall from
which he was wont to issue to consort with them pretended friendliness
toward him, permitted him to make himself at ease in every way, and
allowed him to come to visit them without interference. Thus they
succeeded in seizing him and forced him to give all the requisite
information. According to the indications he furnished they offered
sacrifices, tunneled the hill, and conducted the superfluous water by
a secret canal into the plain, so that all of it was used up there and
none ran down into the sea.


_(BOOK 7, BOISSEVAIN.)_

VII, 24.--A certain Marcus Fabius, a patrician, who chanced to be the
father of two daughters, betrothed the elder to a Licinius Stolo, much
inferior to him in rank, and married the younger to Sulpicius Rufus,
who belonged to his own class. [Sidenote: FRAG. 27^1] NOW WHILE RUFUS
WAS MILITARY TRIBUNE, ONCE WHEN HE WAS IN THE FORUM HIS WIFE HAD A
VISIT FROM HER SISTER. AT THE ARRIVAL OF THE HUSBAND THE LICTOR,
ACCORDING TO SOME ANCIENT CUSTOM, KNOCKED AT THE DOOR. THE CLATTER
STARTLED THE WOMAN, WHO WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THIS PROCEDURE:
THEREUPON BOTH HER SISTER AND THE OTHERS PRESENT BURST OUT LAUGHING
AND SHE WAS MADE FUN OF AS A SIMPLETON. SHE TOOK THE MATTER AS A
SERIOUS AFFRONT AND ROUSED HER HUSBAND TO CANVASS FOR OFFICE. Stolo,
accordingly, incited by his wife, confided his intentions to Lucius
Sextius, one of his peers, and both forced their way into the
tribuneship; they thus overturned the good order of the State to such
an extent that for four years the people had no rulers, since these
men repeatedly obstructed the patrician elections. This state of
affairs would have continued for a still longer time, had not news
been brought that the Celtæ were again marching upon Rome.

VII, 25.--It is related that after this a disaster befell Rome. The
level land between the Palatine and the Capitoline is said to have
become suddenly a yawning gulf, without any preceding earthquake or
other phenomenon such as usually takes place in nature on the occasion
of such developments. For a long time the chasm remained _in statu
quo_, and neither closed up in the slightest degree nor was to be
filled, albeit the Romans brought and cast into it masses of earth and
stones and all sorts of other material. In the midst of the Romans'
uncertainty an oracle was given them to the effect that the aperture
could in no way be closed except they should throw into the chasm
their best possession and that which was the chief source of their
strength: then the thing would cease, and the city should command
power inextinguishable. Still the uncertainty remained unresolved, for
the oracle was obscure. But Marcus Curtius, a patrician, young in
years, of a remarkably beautiful appearance, powerful physique, and
courageous spirit, conspicuous also for intelligence, comprehended the
meaning of the oracle. He came forward before them all and addressed
them, saying: "Why, Romans, convict the revelation of obscurity or
ourselves of ignorance? We are the thing sought and debated. For
nothing lifeless may be counted better than what has life, nor shall
that which has comprehension and prudence and the adornment of speech
fail of preference before what is uncomprehending, speechless and
senseless. What should any one deem superior to Man to be cast into
the earth-fissure, that therewith we might contract it? [Sidenote:
FRAG. 28^2] THERE IS NO MORTAL CREATURE EITHER BETTER OR STRONGER THAN
MAN. FOR, IF ONE MAY SPEAK SOMEWHAT BOLDLY, MAN IS NAUGHT ELSE THAN A
GOD WITH MORTAL BODY, AND A GOD NAUGHT ELSE THAN A MAN WITHOUT BODY
AND THEREFORE IMMORTAL, and we are not far sundered from divine Power.
This, to my mind, is the matter and I urge you also to adhere to this
view. May no one think that I shall have recourse to the lot or bid
maiden or lad lose a life. I myself willingly bestow myself upon you,
that you may send me this very day as herald and envoy to the cthonian
gods, to be your representative and helper forever." At the close of
these words Curtius proceeded to put on his armor and then mounted his
horse. The rest grew mad with grief and mad with joy; they came
flocking with adornments, and some adorned the man himself with them
as a hero, and others threw some of them into the chasm. Scarcely had
Curtius sprung into it fully mounted, when the earth-fissure was
closed and no one ever again beheld either the chasm or Curtius. This
is the way the story is related by the Romans. Should any person judge
it fabulous and not to be credited, he has the right to pay no
attention to it.

And again wars were waged against the Romans both by Gauls and by
other nations, but they repelled all invaders, voting now for consuls,
now for dictators. Whereupon somewhat of the following nature took
place. Lucius Camillus was named dictator, as the Gauls were
overrunning the environs of Rome. He proceeded against the barbarians
with the intention of using up time and not risking the issue in
conflict with men animated by desperation: he expected to exhaust them
more easily and securely by the failure of provisions. And a Gaul
challenged the Romans to furnish a champion for a duel. His opponent,
accordingly, was Marcus Valerius, a military tribune, a grandson of
the famous Maximus. The course of the battle was brilliant on both
sides: the Roman excelled in cleverness and an unusual mastery of his
art, and the Gaul in strength and daring. It was regarded as still
more marvelous that a crow lighted on the helmet of Valerius and
cawing all the time made dashes at the barbarian, confusing his sight
and impeding his onset until he finally received a finishing blow. The
Gauls, consequently, indignant at being beaten by a bird, in a rage
closed at once with the Romans and suffered a severe defeat. From the
incident of the crow's assistance Valerius obtained the further name
of Corvinus.

Thereafter, as the armies began to grow insubordinate and a civil war
threatened to break out, the insurgents were brought to terms by the
enactment of laws that no one's name should be erased from the lists
against his will, that any person who had served as tribune of the
soldiers should not be centurion, that both of the consuls might
belong to and be appointed from the people, and that the same man
should not hold two offices at the same time nor hold the same office
twice within ten years.

VII, 26.--Now the Latins, although under treaty with the Romans,
revolted and provoked a conflict. They were filled with pride for the
reason that they had an abundance of youthful warriors and were
practiced in the details of warfare as a result of the constant
campaigning with the Romans. The other side, understanding the
situation, chose Torquatus consul for the third time and likewise
Decius, and came out to meet them. They fought a fierce battle, each
party thinking that that day was a precise test of their fortune and
of their valor. A certain event seemed to give the battle added
distinction. The consuls, seeing that the Latins were equipped and
spoke like the Romans, feared that some of the soldiers might make
mistakes through not distinguishing their own and the hostile force
with entire ease. Therefore they made proclamation to their men to
observe instructions carefully and in no case to fight an isolated
combat with any of the antagonists. Most observed this injunction, but
the son of Torquatus, who was on the field among the cavalry and had
been sent to reconnoitre the enemy's position, transgressed it not
through wilfulness but rather through ambition. The leader of the
Latin horse saw him approaching and challenged him to a championship
contest; and when the youth would not accept the challenge on account
of the notice that had been served, the other provoked him, saying:
"Are you not the son of Torquatus? Do you not give yourself airs with
your father's collar? Are you strong and courageous against those
low-lived Gauls but fear us Latins? Where, then, do you find your
right to rule? Why do you give orders to us as your inferiors?"--The
Roman became frenzied with rage and readily forgot the injunction: he
won the combat, and in high spirits conveyed the spoils to his father.
The latter, after assembling the army, said: "Nobly you have fought,
my child, and for this I will crown you. But because you did not
observe the orders issued, though under obligation both as a son and
as a soldier to yield obedience, [Sidenote: FRAG. 32^2] FOR THIS
REASON I SHALL EXECUTE YOU, THAT YOU MAY OBTAIN BOTH THE PRIZE FOR
YOUR PROWESS AND THE PENALTY FOR YOUR DISOBEDIENCE." Having spoken
these words he at the same moment placed the garland on his head and
cut off the very head that bore it.

Soon after, a dream that appeared to both consuls the same night, of
identical import in each case, seemed to tell them that they should
overcome the enemy, if one of the consuls should devote himself.
Discussing the dream together in the daytime, they decided that it was
of divine origin, and agreed that it must be obeyed. And they disputed
with each other, not as to which should be saved, but as to which of
them preferably should devote himself: they even presented their
arguments before the foremost men in camp. Finally they settled it
that one should station himself on the right wing and the other on the
left, and that whichever of those two divisions should be defeated,
the consul stationed there should give up his life. There was so much
rivalry between them in regard to the self-devotion that each of the
consuls prayed that he might be defeated, in order to obtain the right
to devote himself and the consequent glory. After joining battle with
the Latins they carried on a closely contested fight for a long time,
but finally Decius's wing gave way before the Latins a little. On
perceiving this Decius devoted himself. Slipping off his armor he put
on his purple-bordered clothing. Some say that in this costume he
sprang upon a horse and rode toward the enemy and met his death at
their hands, others that he was slain by a fellow-soldier of his own
race. A short time after Decius had perished a decisive victory fell
to the lot of the Romans and the Latins were all routed, yet
certainly not on account of the death of Decius. [Sidenote: FRAG.
32^4] FOR HOW CAN YOU BELIEVE THAT FROM SUCH A DEATH OF ONE MAN SO
GREAT A MULTITUDE OF HUMAN BEINGS WAS DESTROYED ON THE ONE SIDE AND ON
THE OTHER WAS SAVED AND WON A CONSPICUOUS VICTORY? So the Latins in
this way were defeated, [Sidenote: FRAG. 32^6] AND TORQUATUS, THOUGH
HE HAD KILLED HIS SON AND THOUGH HIS COLLEAGUE HAD LOST HIS LIFE,
NEVERTHELESS CELEBRATED A TRIUMPH.

Once again did they subdue these very Latins, who had revolted, and
they subjugated in battle other nations, employing now consuls and now
dictators.


_(BOOK 8, BOISSEVAIN.)_

One of the latter was Lucius Papirius, also called Cursor from his
physical condition (he was a very fleet runner) and on account of his
practicing running. After this Papirius as dictator with Fabius Rullus
as master of the horse was sent out against the Samnites and by
defeating them compelled them to agree to such terms as he wished. But
when he had resigned his leadership they again arose in arms. They
were attacked anew by the dictator Aulus Cornelius, [Sidenote: FRAG.
33^3] AND BEING DEFEATED MADE PROPOSALS OF PEACE TO THE MEN AT ROME.
THEY SENT THEM ALL THE CAPTIVES THAT THEY HAD, AND ASCRIBED THE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR TO RUTULUS, A MAN OF INFLUENCE AMONG THEM.
HIS BONES, SINCE HE ANTICIPATED THEM IN COMMITTING SUICIDE, THEY
SCATTERED ABROAD. YET THEY DID NOT OBTAIN THEIR PEACE, BEING ACCOUNTED
UNTRUSTWORTHY; BUT THE VICTORS, THOUGH ACCEPTING THE PRISONERS, VOTED
FOR RELENTLESS WAR AGAINST THEM. [Sidenote: FRAG. 33^4] THE ROMANS,
THEN, EXPECTING IN THEIR EXTREME ARROGANCE THAT THEY SHOULD CAPTURE
THEM ALL AT THE FIRST BLOW, SUCCUMBED TO A TERRIBLE DISASTER. THE
SAMNITES, BEING BADLY FRIGHTENED AND THINKING THE REFUSAL TO MAKE
PEACE A CALAMITY, FOUGHT WITH DESPERATION; AND BY PLANTING AN
AMBUSCADE IN A NARROW SPOT RATHER CLOSELY HEMMED IN BY HILLS THEY BOTH
CAPTURED THE CAMP AND SEIZED ALIVE THE WHOLE FORCE OF THE ROMANS, ALL
OF WHOM THEY SENT UNDER THE YOKE.--What the operation of the yoke was
has already been described by me above.[13]--However, they killed not
a man but took away their arms and horses and everything else they had
save one garment, and released them thus stripped of possessions under
an agreement that they should leave Samnite territory and be their
allies on an equal footing. In order to insure the articles of the
agreement being ratified also by the senate, they retained six hundred
of the knights to serve as hostages.

[Footnote 13: Near the end of VII, 17.]

The consuls Spurius Postumius and Tiberius Calvinus with their army
immediately withdrew, and at night they and the most notable of the
rest of the force entered Rome, while the remaining soldiers scattered
through the country districts. [Sidenote: FRAG. 33^9] THE MEN IN THE
CITY ON HEARING OF THE EVENT DID NOT FIND IT POSSIBLE EITHER TO BE
PLEASED AT THE SURVIVAL OF THEIR SOLDIERS OR TO BE DISPLEASED. WHEN
THEY THOUGHT OF THE CALAMITY THEIR GRIEF WAS EXTREME, AND THE FACT
THAT THEY HAD SUFFERED SUCH A REVERSE AT THE HANDS OF THE SAMNITES
INCREASED THEIR GRIEF; WHEN THEY STOPPED TO REFLECT, HOWEVER, THAT IF
IT HAD COME TO PASS THAT ALL HAD PERISHED, ALL THEIR INTERESTS WOULD
HAVE BEEN ENDANGERED, THEY WERE REALLY PLEASED AT THE SURVIVAL OF
THEIR OWN MEN. But concealing for a time their pleasure they went into
mourning and carried on no business in the everyday fashion either at
once or subsequently, as long as they had control of affairs. The
consuls they deposed forthwith, chose others in their stead, and took
counsel about the situation. And they determined not to accept the
arrangement; but since it was impossible to take this action without
throwing the responsibility upon the men who had conducted the
negotiations, they hesitated on the one hand to condemn the consuls
and the rest who, associated with the latter in their capacity as
holders of certain offices, had made the peace, and they hesitated on
the other hand to acquit them, since by so doing they would bring the
breach of faith home to themselves. Accordingly they made these very
consuls participate in their deliberations and they asked Postumius
first of all for his opinion, that he might state separately his
sentiments touching his own case, and the shame of having disgrace
attach to all of them be avoided. So he came forward and said that
their acts ought not to be ratified by the senate and the people,
[Sidenote: FRAG. 33^11] FOR THEY THEMSELVES HAD NOT ACTED OF THEIR OWN
FREE WILL, BUT UNDER THE COMPULSION OF A NECESSITY which the enemy had
brought upon them not through valor but through craft and ambuscade.
Now men who had practiced deception could not, if they were deceived
in turn, have any just complaint against those who turned the tables
on them. When he had finished saying this and considerable more of the
same nature, the senate found itself at a loss how to act: but as
Postumius and Calvinus took the burden of responsibility upon their
own shoulders, it was voted that the agreements should not be ratified
and that these men should be delivered up.

Both the consuls, therefore, and the remaining officials who had been
present when oaths were taken were conducted back to Samnium.
[Sidenote: FRAG. 33^14] THE SAMNITES, HOWEVER, WOULD NOT ACCEPT THEM,
BUT DEMANDED BACK ALL THE CAPTIVES, AND INVOKED THE GODS AND CONJURED
THEM BY THE DIVINE POWER, AND FINALLY THEY DISMISSED THE MEN THAT HAD
BEEN SURRENDERED. The Romans were glad enough to get them back, but
were angry at the Samnites WHOM THEY ATTACKED IN BATTLE AND
VANQUISHED, AFTER WHICH THEY ACCORDED THEM A SIMILAR TREATMENT, FOR
THEY SENT THEM UNDER THE YOKE IN TURN AND RELEASED THEM without
inflicting any other injury. They also got possession of their own
knights, who were being held by the Samnites as hostages and were
unharmed.

VIII, 1.--After a long interval the Romans under the leadership of
Gaius Junius were again warring with the Samnites, when they met with
disaster. While Junius was pillaging the hostile territory, the
Samnites conveyed their possessions into the Avernian[14] woods,
so-called from the fact that on account of the closeness of the trees
no bird flies into them. Being there ensconced they set out some herds
without herdsmen or guards and quietly sent some pretended deserters
who guided the Romans to the booty apparently lying at their disposal.
But when the latter had entered the wood, the Samnites surrounded them
and did not cease from slaughter till they were completely tired out.
And though the Samnites fought on many other occasions against the
Romans and were defeated, they would not be quiet, but having acquired
the Gauls, besides others, as allies, they made preparations to march
upon Rome itself. The Romans, when they learned of it, fell into
alarm, for their original inclination to do so was augmented by many
portents. On the Capitol blood is reported to have issued for three
days from the altar of Jupiter, together with honey on one day, and
milk on a second--if anybody can believe it: and in the Forum a
bronze statue of Victory set upon a stone pedestal was found standing
upon the ground below, without any one's having moved it; and, as it
happened, it was facing in that direction from which the Gauls were
already approaching. This of itself was enough to terrify the
populace, who were even more dismayed by ill-omened interpretations
published by the seers. However, a certain Manius, by birth an
Etruscan, encouraged them by declaring that Victory, even if she had
descended, had gone forward, and being now settled more firmly on the
ground indicated to them mastery in the war. Accordingly, many
sacrifices, too, should be offered to the gods; for their altars, and
particularly those on the Capitol, where they sacrifice
thank-offerings for victory, were regularly stained with blood in the
midst of their successes and not in their disasters. From these
developments, then, he persuaded them to expect some fortunate
outcome, but from the honey to expect disease (because invalids crave
it) and from the milk famine; for they should encounter so great a
scarcity of provisions as to seek for food of native growth and
pasturage.

[Footnote 14: In Greek, _Birdless_.]

Manius, then, interpreted the omens in this way, [Sidenote: FRAG.
33^22] AND AS HIS PROPHECY TURNED OUT TO BE CORRECT, HE GAINED
THEREAFTER A REPUTATION FOR SKILL AND FOREKNOWLEDGE IN ALL MATTERS.
Now Volumnius was ordered to make war upon the Samnites; Fabius
Maximus Rullus and Publius Decius were chosen consuls and were sent to
withstand the Gauls and the other warriors in the Gallic contingent.
They, having come with speed to Etruria, saw the camp of Appius, which
was fortified by a double palisade; and they pulled up the stakes and
carried them off, instructing the soldiers to place their hope of
safety in their weapons. So they joined battle with the enemy.
Meanwhile a wolf in pursuit of a deer had invaded the space between
the two armies and darting toward the Romans passed through their
ranks. This encouraged them, for they regarded themselves as having a
bond of union with him, since, according to tradition, a she-wolf had
reared Romulus. But the deer ran to the other side and was struck
down, thus leaving to _them_ fear and the issue of disaster. When the
armies collided, Maximus quite easily conquered the foes opposed to
him, but Decius was defeated. And recalling the self-devotion of his
father, undertaken on account of the dream, he likewise devoted
himself, though without giving anybody any information about his act.
Scarcely had he let himself be slain, when the men ranged at his side,
partly through shame at his deed (feeling that he had perished
voluntarily for them) and partly in the hopes of certain victory as a
result of this occurrence, checked their flight and nobly withstood
their pursuers. At this juncture Maximus, too, assailed the latter in
the rear and slaughtered vast numbers. The survivors took to their
heels and were annihilated. Fabius Maximus then burned the corpse of
Decius together with the spoils and made a truce with such as asked
for peace.

The following year Atilius Regulus again waged war with the Samnites.
And for a time they carried on an evenly contested struggle, but
eventually, after the Samnites had won a victory, the Romans conquered
them in turn, took them captive, led them beneath the yoke, and so
released them. [Sidenote: FRAG. 33^23] THE SAMNITES, ENRAGED AT WHAT
HAD OCCURRED, RESORTED TO DESPERATE MEASURES WITH THE INTENTION OF
EITHER CONQUERING OR BEING UTTERLY DESTROYED, THREATENING WITH DEATH
HIM WHO SHOULD REMAIN AT HOME. So these invaded Campania: but the
consuls ravaged Samnium, since it was destitute of soldiers, and
captured a few cities. Therefore the Samnites abandoning Campania made
haste to reach their own land; and having come into hostile collision
with one of the consuls they were defeated by a trick and in their
flight met with terrible reverses, losing their camp and in addition
the fortress to the assistance of which they were advancing. The
consul celebrated a triumph and devoted to public uses the goods
gathered from the spoils. The other consul made a campaign against the
Etruscans and reduced them in short order: he then levied upon them
contributions of grain and money, of which he distributed a part to
the soldiers and deposited the rest in the treasuries.

However, there befell a mighty pestilence, and the Samnites and
Falisci began to bestir themselves; they entertained a contempt for
the Romans both on account of the disease and because, since no war
menaced, they had chosen the consuls not on grounds of excellence. The
Romans, ascertaining the situation, sent out Carvilius along with
Junius Brutus, and with Quintus Fabius his father Rullus Maximus, as
subcommanders or lieutenants. Brutus worsted the Falisci and
plundered their possessions as well as those of the other Etruscans:
Fabius marched out of Rome before his father and pushed rapidly
forward when he learned that the Samnites were plundering Campania.
Falling in with some scouts of theirs and seeing them quickly retire
he got the impression that all the enemy were at that point and
believed they were in flight. Accordingly, in his hurry to come to
blows with them before his father should arrive, in order that the
success might appear to be his own and not his elder's, he went ahead
with a careless formation. Thus he encountered a compact body of foes
and would have been utterly destroyed, had not night intervened. Many
of his men died also after that with no physician or relative to
attend them, because they had hastened on far ahead of the baggage
carriers in the expectation of immediate victory. Of a surety they
would have perished on the following day but for the fact that the
Samnites, thinking Fabius's father to be near, felt afraid and
withdrew.

[Sidenote: FRAG. 33^24] THOSE IN THE CITY ON HEARING THIS BECAME
TERRIBLY ANGRY, SUMMONED THE CONSUL, AND WANTED TO PUT HIM ON TRIAL.
BUT THE OLD MAN HIS FATHER BY ENUMERATING HIS OWN AND HIS ANCESTORS'
BRAVE DEEDS, BY PROMISING THAT HIS SON SHOULD MAKE NO RECORD THAT WAS
UNWORTHY OF THEM, AND BY URGING HIS SON'S YOUTH TO ACCOUNT FOR THE
MISFORTUNE, IMMEDIATELY ABATED THEIR WRATH. JOINING HIM IN THE
CAMPAIGN HE CONQUERED THE SAMNITES IN BATTLE, CAPTURED THEIR CAMP,
RAVAGED THEIR COUNTRY, AND DROVE AWAY GREAT BOOTY. A PART OF IT HE
DEVOTED TO PUBLIC USES AND A PART HE ACCORDED TO THE SOLDIERS. FOR
THESE REASONS THE ROMANS EXTOLLED HIM AND ORDERED THAT HIS SON ALSO
SHOULD COMMAND FOR THE FUTURE WITH CONSULAR POWERS AND STILL EMPLOY
HIS FATHER AS LIEUTENANT. THE LATTER MANAGED AND ARRANGED EVERYTHING
FOR HIM, SPARING HIS OLD AGE NOT A WHIT, YET HE DID NOT LET IT BE SEEN
THAT HE WAS EXECUTING THE BUSINESS ON HIS OWN RESPONSIBILITY, BUT MADE
THE GLORY OF HIS EXPLOITS ATTACH TO HIS CHILD.

[Sidenote: FRAG. 37] VIII, 2.--AFTER THIS, WHEN THE TRIBUNES MOVED AN
ANNULMENT OF DEBTS, THE PEOPLE, SINCE THIS WAS NOT YIELDED BY THE
LENDERS AS WELL, FELL INTO TURMOIL: and their turbulent behavior was
not quieted until foes came against the city.


_(BOOK 9, BOISSEVAIN.)_

Those to begin the wars were the Tarentini, [Sidenote: FRAG. 39^1] WHO
HAD ASSOCIATED WITH THEMSELVES THE ETRUSCANS AND GAULS AND SAMNITES
AND SEVERAL OTHER TRIBES. These allies the Romans engaged and defeated
in various battles, with different consuls on different occasions, but
the Tarentini, although they had themselves been the authors of the
war, nevertheless did not yet openly present an imposing array in
battle. [Sidenote: FRAG. 39^3] NOW LUCIUS VALERIUS WHILE ADMIRAL
WANTED TO ANCHOR WITH HIS TRIREMES OFF TARENTUM (BEING ON HIS WAY TO A
PLACE WHITHER HE HAD BEEN DESPATCHED WITH THEM), FOR HE DEEMED THE
COUNTRY FRIENDLY. [Sidenote: FRAG. 39^4] BUT THE TARENTINI, OWING TO
A GUILTY SENSE OF THEIR OWN OPERATIONS, SUSPECTED THAT VALERIUS WAS
SAILING AGAINST THEM, AND IN A PASSION SET SAIL LIKEWISE AND ATTACKING
HIM WHEN HE WAS EXPECTING NO HOSTILE ACT SENT HIM TO THE BOTTOM ALONG
WITH MANY OTHERS. OF THE CAPTIVES THEY IMPRISONED SOME AND PUT OTHERS
TO DEATH. WHEN THE ROMANS HEARD OF THIS, THEY WERE INDIGNANT, TO BE
SURE, BUT NEVERTHELESS DESPATCHED ENVOYS UPBRAIDING THEM AND DEMANDING
SATISFACTION. THE OFFENDERS NOT ONLY FAILED TO VOUCHSAFE THEM ANY
DECENT ANSWER, BUT ACTUALLY JEERED AT THEM, GOING SO FAR AS TO SOIL
THE CLOTHING OF LUCIUS POSTUMIUS, THE HEAD OF THE EMBASSY. AT THIS AN
UPROAR AROSE AND THE TARENTINI INDULGED IN CONTINUED GUFFAWS. BUT
POSTUMIUS CRIED: "LAUGH ON, LAUGH ON WHILE YOU MAY! FOR LONG WILL BE
THE PERIOD OF YOUR WEEPING, WHEN YOU SHALL WASH THIS GARMENT CLEAN
WITH YOUR BLOOD."

Upon the return of the envoys the Romans, learning what had been done,
were grieved and voted that Lucius Æmilius the consul make a campaign
against the Tarentini. He advanced close to Tarentum and sent them
favorable propositions, thinking that they would choose peace on fair
terms. Now they were at variance among themselves in their opinions.
[Sidenote: FRAG. 39^6?] The elderly and well-to-do were anxious for
peace, but those who were youthful and who had little or nothing were
for war. The younger generation had its way. Being timid for all that
they planned to invite Pyrrhus of Epirus to form an alliance, and sent
to him envoys and gifts. Æmilius, learning this, proceeded to pillage
and devastate their country. They made sorties but were routed, so
that the Romans ravaged their country with impunity and got possession
of some strongholds. Æmilius showed much consideration for those taken
prisoners and liberated some of the more influential, and the
Tarentini, accordingly, filled with admiration for his kindness, were
led to hope for reconciliation and so chose as leader with full powers
Agis, who was of kindred to the Romans. Scarcely had he been elected
when Cineas, sent ahead by Pyrrhus, planted himself in the pathway of
negotiations. [Sidenote: FRAG. 40^1] FOR PYRRHUS, KING OF THE
SO-CALLED EPIRUS, SURPASSED EVERYBODY THROUGH NATURAL CLEVERNESS AND
THROUGH THE INFLUENCE AND EXPERIENCE BESTOWED BY EDUCATION; AND HE HAD
MADE THE LARGER PART OF HELLAS HIS OWN, PARTLY BY BENEFITS AND PARTLY
BY FEAR. [Sidenote: FRAG. 40^2] ACCORDINGLY, CHANCE HAVING THROWN THE
ENVOYS OF THE TARENTINI IN HIS WAY, HE DEEMED THE ALLIANCE A PIECE OF
GOOD LUCK. FOR A CONSIDERABLE TIME HE HAD HAD HIS EYE ON SICILY AND
CARTHAGE AND SARDINIA, BUT NEVERTHELESS HE SHRANK FROM PERSONALLY
TAKING THE INITIATIVE IN HOSTILITIES AGAINST THE ROMANS. He announced
that he would lead the Tarentini, but in order that the motive of his
declaration might not be suspected (for reasons indicated) he stated
that he should return home without delay, and insisted upon a clause
being added to the agreement to the effect that he should not be
detained by them in Italy further than actual need required. After
settling this agreement he detained the majority of the envoys as
hostages, giving out that he wanted them to help him get the armies
ready: a few of them together with Cineas he sent in advance with
troops. As soon as they arrived the Tarentini took courage, gave up
their attempted reconciliation with the Romans, and deposing Agris
from his leadership elected one of the envoys leader. Shortly
afterward Milo, sent by Pyrrhus with a force, took charge of their
acropolis and personally superintended the manning of their wall. The
Tarentini were glad at this, feeling that they did not have to do
guard duty or undergo any other troublesome labor, and they sent
regular supplies of food to the men and consignments of money to
Pyrrhus.

Æmilius for a time held his ground, but when he perceived that the
Pyrrhic soldiers had come, and recognized his inability on account of
the winter to maintain an opposition, he set out for Apulia. The
Tarentini laid an ambush at a narrow passage through which he was
obliged to go, and by their arrows, javelins and slingshots rendered
progress impossible for him. But he put at the head of his line their
captives whom he was conveying. Fear fell upon the Tarentini that they
might destroy their own men instead of the Romans, and they ceased
their efforts.

Now Pyrrhus set off, [Sidenote: FRAG. 40^4] NOT EVEN AWAITING THE
COMING OF SPRING, taking a large, picked army, and twenty elephants,
beasts never previously beheld by the Italians. Hence the latter were
invariably filled with alarm and astonishment. While crossing the
Ionian Sea he encountered a storm and lost many soldiers of his army:
the remainder were scattered by the violent waters. Only with
difficulty, then, and by land travel did he reach Tarentum. He at once
impressed those in their prime into service alongside of his own
soldiers so as to make sure that they should not be led, by having a
separate company, to think of rebellion; he closed the theatre,
presumably on account of the war and to prevent the people from
gathering there and setting on foot any uprising; also he forbade them
to assemble for banquets and revels, and ordered the youth to practice
in arms instead of spending all day in the market-place. When some,
indignant at this, left the ranks, he stationed guards from his own
contingent so that no one could leave the city. The inhabitants,
oppressed by these measures, and by supplying food, compelled as they
were, too, to receive the guardsmen into their houses, repented, since
they found in Pyrrhus only a master, not an ally. He, fearing for
these reasons that they might lean to the Roman cause, took note of
all the men who had any ability as politicians or could dominate the
populace and sent them one after another to Epirus to his son on
various excuses; occasionally, however, he would quietly assassinate
them instead. A certain Aristarchus, who was accounted one of the
noblest of the Tarentini and was a most persuasive speaker, he made
his boon companion to the end that this man should be suspected by the
people of having the interests of Pyrrhus at heart. When, however, he
saw that he still had the confidence of the throng, he gave him an
errand to Epirus. Aristarchus, not daring to dispute his behest, set
sail, but went to Rome.

VIII, 3.--Such was the behavior of Pyrrhus toward the Tarentini.
[Sidenote: FRAG. 40^8] THOSE IN ROME LEARNING THAT PYRRHUS HAD COME TO
TARENTUM WERE SMITTEN WITH TERROR BECAUSE THE ITALIAN STATES HAD BEEN
SET AT ENMITY WITH THEM AND BECAUSE HE WAS REPORTED TO BE WITHOUT
DOUBT A GOOD WARRIOR AND TO HAVE A FORCE THAT WAS BY NO MEANS
DESPICABLE AS AN ADVERSARY. So they proceeded to enlist soldiers and
to gather money and to distribute garrisons among the allied cities to
prevent them from likewise revolting; and learning that some were
already stirred with sedition they punished the principal men in them.
A handful of those from Præneste were brought to Rome late in the
afternoon and thrown into the treasury for security. Thereby a certain
oracle was fulfilled for the Romans. For an oracle had told them once
that these people should occupy the Roman treasure-house. The oracle,
then, resulted this way: the men lost their lives.

Valerius Lavinius was despatched against Pyrrhus, the Tarentini, and
the rest of their associates, but a part of the army was retained in
the city. As for Lavinius, he at once set out on his march so that he
might carry on the war as far as possible from his own territory. He
hoped to frighten Pyrrhus by showing the latter those men advancing
against him of their own accord whom he had thought to besiege. In the
course of his journey he seized a strong strategic point in the land
of the Lucanians, and he left behind a force in Lucania to hinder the
people from giving aid to his opponents.

Pyrrhus on learning of Lavinius's approach made a start before the
latter came in sight, established a camp, and was desirous of using up
time while waiting for allies to join. He sent a haughty letter to
Lavinius with the design of overawing him. The writing was couched
thus: "King Pyrrhus to Lavinius, Greeting. I learn that you are
leading an army against Tarentum. Send it away, therefore, and come
yourself to me with few attendants. For I will judge between you, if
you have any blame to impute to each other, and I will compel the
party at fault, however unwilling, to grant justice." Lavinius wrote
the following reply to Pyrrhus: "You seem to me, Pyrrhus, to have been
quite daft when you set yourself up as judge between the Tarentini and
us before rendering to us an account of your crossing over into Italy
at all. I will come, therefore, with all my army and will exact the
appropriate recompense both from the Tarentini and from you. What use
can I have for nonsense and palaver, when I can stand trial in the
court of Mars, our progenitor?" After sending such an answering
despatch he hurried on and pitched camp, leaving the stream of the
river at that point between them. Having apprehended some scouts he
showed them his troops and after telling them he had more of them,
many times that number, he sent them back. Pyrrhus, struck with alarm
by this, was not desirous of fighting because some of the allies had
not yet joined his force, and he was constantly hoping that provisions
would fail the Romans while they delayed on hostile soil. Lavinius,
too, reckoned on this and was eager to join issue. As the soldiers had
become terrified at the reputation of Pyrrhus and on account of the
elephants, he called them together and delivered a speech containing
many exhortations to courage; then he busily prepared to close with
Pyrrhus, willing or unwilling. The latter had no heart to fight, but
in order to avoid an appearance of fearing the Romans he also in
person addressed his own men, inciting them to the conflict. Lavinius
tried to cross the river opposite the camp, but was prevented. So he
retired and himself remained in position with his infantry, but sent
the cavalry off (apparently on some marauding expedition) with
injunctions to march some distance and then make the attempt. In this
way both they assailed the enemy unexpectedly in the rear, and
Lavinius, in the midst of the foe's confusion, crossed the river and
took part in the battle. Pyrrhus came to the aid of his own men, who
were in flight, but lost his horse by a wound and was thought by them
to have been killed. Then, the one side being dejected and the other
scornfully elated, their actions were correspondingly altered. He
became aware of this and gave his clothing, which was more striking
than that of the rest, to Megacles, bidding him put it on and ride
about in all directions to the end that thinking him safe his
opponents might be brought to fear and his followers to feel
encouragement. As for himself, he put on an ordinary uniform and
encountered the Romans with his full army, save the elephants, and by
bringing assistance to the contestants wherever they were in trouble
he did his supporters a great deal of good. At first, then, for a
large part of the day they fought evenly; but when a man killed
Megacles, thinking to have killed Pyrrhus and creating this impression
in the minds of the rest, the Romans gained vigor and their opponents
began to give way. [Sidenote: FRAG. 40^12] PYRRHUS, NOTING WHAT WAS
TAKING PLACE, CAST OFF HIS CAP AND WENT ABOUT WITH HIS HEAD BARE; AND
THE BATTLE TOOK AN OPPOSITE TURN. Seeing this, Lavinius, who had
horsemen in hiding somewhere, outside the battle, ordered them to
attack the enemy in the rear. In response to this Pyrrhus, as a device
to meet it, raised the signal for the elephants. Then, indeed, at the
sight of the animals, which was out of all common experience, at their
bloodcurdling trumpeting, and at the clatter of arms which their
riders, seated in the towers, made, both the Romans themselves became
panic stricken and their horses, in a frenzy, either shook off their
riders or bolted, carrying them away. Disheartened at this the Roman
army was turned to flight and in their rout some soldiers were
destroyed by the men in the towers on the elephants' backs, and others
by the beasts themselves, which with their trunks and horns (or
teeth?) took the lives of many and crushed and trampled under foot no
less. The cavalry, following after, slew many; not one, indeed, would
have been left, had not an elephant been wounded, and by its own
struggles as a result of the wound as well as by its trumpeting thrown
the rest into confusion. Only this restrained Pyrrhus from pursuit and
only in this way did the Romans manage to cross the river and make
their escape into an Apulian city. Many of Pyrrhus's soldiers and
officers alike fell, so that [Sidenote: FRAG. 40^13] WHEN CERTAIN MEN
CONGRATULATED HIM ON HIS VICTORY, HE SAID; "IF WE EVER CONQUER AGAIN
IN LIKE FASHION, WE SHALL BE RUINED." THE ROMANS, HOWEVER, HE ADMIRED
EVEN IN THEIR DEFEAT, DECLARING: "I SHOULD ALREADY HAVE MASTERED THE
WHOLE INHABITED WORLD, WERE I KING OF THE ROMANS."

[Sidenote: FRAG. 40^14] PYRRHUS, ACCORDINGLY, ACQUIRED A GREAT
REPUTATION FOR HIS VICTORY AND MANY CAME OVER TO HIS SIDE: THE ALLIES
ALSO ESPOUSED HIS CAUSE. THESE HE REBUKED SOMEWHAT ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR
TARDINESS, BUT GAVE THEM A SHARE OF THE SPOIL. VIII, 4.--The men of
Rome felt grief at the defeat, but they sent an army to Lavinius; and
they summoned Tiberius from Etruria and put the city under guard when
they learned that Pyrrhus was hastening against it. Lavinius, however,
as soon as he had cured his own followers of their wounds and had
collected the scattered, the reinforcements from Rome now having
arrived, followed on the track of Pyrrhus and harassed him. Finding
out that the king was ambitious to capture Capua he occupied it in
advance and guarded it. Disappointed there Pyrrhus set out for
Neapolis. Since he developed no power to accomplish anything at this
place either and was in haste to occupy Rome, he passed on through
Etruria with the object of winning that people also to his cause. He
learned that they had made a treaty with the Romans and that Tiberius
was moving to meet him face to face. (Lavinius was dogging his
footsteps.) [Sidenote: FRAG. 40^19] A DREAD SEIZED HIM OF BEING CUT
OFF ON ALL SIDES BY THEM WHILE HE WAS IN UNFAMILIAR REGIONS and he
would advance no farther. [Sidenote: FRAG. 40^20] WHEN, AS HE WAS
RETREATING AND HAD REACHED THE VICINITY OF CAMPANIA, LAVINIUS
CONFRONTED HIM AND THE LATTER'S ARMY WAS MUCH LARGER THAN IT WAS
BEFORE, HE DECLARED THAT THE ROMAN TROOPS WHEN CUT TO PIECES GREW
WHOLE AGAIN, HYDRA-FASHION. AND HE MADE PREPARATIONS IN HIS TURN, BUT
DID NOT COME TO THE ISSUE OF BATTLE. He had ordered his own soldiers
before the shock of conflict, in order to terrify the Romans, to smite
their shields with their spears and cry aloud while the trumpeters and
the elephants raised a united blare. But when the other side raised a
much greater shout, actually scaring the followers of Pyrrhus, he
no longer wanted to come to close quarters, but retired, as if he
found the omens bad. And he came to Tarentum. [Sidenote: FRAG.
40^21] THITHER CAME ROMAN ENVOYS TO TREAT IN BEHALF OF THE
CAPTIVES,--FABRICIUS AMONG OTHERS. THESE HE ENTERTAINED LAVISHLY AND
SHOWED THEM HONOR, EXPECTING THAT THEY WOULD CONCLUDE A TRUCE AND MAKE
TERMS AS THE DEFEATED PARTY. [Sidenote: FRAG. 40^22] FABRICIUS ASKED
THAT HE MIGHT GET BACK THE MEN CAPTURED IN BATTLE FOR SUCH RANSOM AS
SHOULD BE PLEASING TO BOTH. PYRRHUS, QUITE DUMFOUNDED BECAUSE THE MAN
DID NOT SAY THAT HE WAS ALSO COMMISSIONED TO TREAT ABOUT PEACE, TOOK
COUNSEL PRIVATELY WITH HIS FRIENDS, AS WAS HIS WONT, ABOUT THE RETURN
OF THE CAPTIVES, BUT ALSO ABOUT THE WAR AND HOW HE SHOULD CONDUCT IT.
Milo advised neither returning the captives nor making a truce, but
overcoming all remaining resistance by war, since the Romans were
already defeated: Cineas, however, gave advice just the opposite of
his; he approved of surrendering the captives without price and
sending envoys and money to Rome for the purpose of obtaining an
armistice and peace. [Sidenote: FRAG. 40^23] TO HIS DECISION DID THE
REST ALSO CLEAVE, AND PYRRHUS, TOO, CHANCED TO BE OF THIS MIND. HAVING
CALLED THE AMBASSADORS, THEREFORE, HE SAID: "NOT WILLINGLY, ROMANS,
DID I LATELY MAKE WAR UPON YOU, AND I HAVE NO WISH TO WAR AGAINST YOU
NOW. IT WAS MY DESIRE TO BECOME YOUR FRIEND. WHEREFORE I RELEASE TO
YOU THE CAPTIVES WITHOUT RANSOM AND ASK THE PRIVILEGE OF MAKING
PEACE."

[Sidenote: FRAG. 40^24] THESE WORDS HE HAD SPOKEN TO THE ENVOYS AS A
WHOLE AND HAD EITHER GIVEN OR FURNISHED THEM PROMISES OF MONEY, BUT IN
CONVERSATION WITH FABRICIUS ALONE HE SAID: "I WOULD GLADLY BECOME A
FRIEND TO ALL ROMANS, BUT MOST OF ALL TO YOU. I SEE THAT YOU ARE AN
EXCELLENT MAN AND I ASK YOU TO HELP ME IN GETTING PEACE." WITH THESE
WORDS HE ATTEMPTED TO BESTOW UPON HIM A NUMBER OF GIFTS. BUT FABRICIUS
SAID: "I COMMEND YOU FOR DESIRING PEACE, AND I WILL EFFECT IT FOR YOU,
IF IT SHALL PROVE TO OUR ADVANTAGE. FOR YOU WILL NOT ASK ME, A MAN
WHO, AS YOU SAY, PRETENDS TO UPRIGHTNESS, TO DO ANYTHING AGAINST MY
COUNTRY. NAY, I WOULD NOT EVEN ACCEPT ANY OF THESE THINGS WHICH YOU
ARE FAIN TO GIVE. I ASK YOU, THEREFORE, WHETHER YOU IN VERY TRUTH
REGARD ME AS A REPUTABLE MAN OR NOT. IF I AM A SCOUNDREL, HOW IS IT
THAT YOU DEEM ME WORTHY OF GIFTS? IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, I AM A MAN OF
HONOR, HOW CAN YOU BID ME ACCEPT THEM? BE THEN ASSURED THAT I HAVE
VERY MANY POSSESSIONS, THAT I AM SATISFIED WITH WHAT I NOW HAVE AND
FEEL NO NEED OF MORE. YOU, HOWEVER, EVEN IF YOU ARE EVER SO RICH, ARE
IN UNSPEAKABLE POVERTY. FOR YOU WOULD NOT HAVE CROSSED OVER TO THIS
LAND, LEAVING BEHIND EPIRUS AND THE REST OF YOUR POSSESSIONS, IF YOU
HAD BEEN CONTENT WITH THEM AND WERE NOT REACHING OUT FOR MORE."

After this conversation had taken place as recounted, the envoys took
the captives and departed. Pyrrhus despatched Cineas to Rome with a
large amount of gold coin and women's apparel of every description, so
that even if some of the men should resist, their wives, at least, won
by the appeal of the finery, might make them share in the prostitution
of principles. Cineas on coming to the city did not seek an audience
with the senate, but lingered about, alleging now one reason, now
another. He was visiting the houses of leading men and by his
conversation and gifts was slowly extending his influence over them.
When he had won the attachment of a number, he entered the
senate-chamber and spoke, saying; "King Pyrrhus offers as his defence
the fact that he came not to make war upon you, but to reconcile the
Tarentini, and in answer to their entreaties. Indeed, he has released
your prisoners, waiving ransom, and though he might have ravaged your
country and assaulted your city, he requests to be enrolled among
your friends and allies, hoping to gain much assistance from you and
to render you still more and greater benefits in return."

Thereupon the greater part of the senators evinced pleasure because of
the gifts and because of the captives: however, they made no reply,
but went on deliberating for several days more as to the proper course
to pursue. There was a deal of talk, but the disposition to accord a
truce predominated. On learning this Appius the Blind was carried to
the senate-house (for by reason of his age and his infirmity he was a
stay-at-home) and declared that the _modus vivendi_ with Pyrrhus was
not advantageous to the State. He urged them to dismiss Cineas at once
from the city and to make known to Pyrrhus by his mouth that the king
must first withdraw to his home country and from there make
propositions to them about peace or about anything else he wanted.
This was the advice Appius gave. The senate delayed no longer, but
forthwith unanimously voted to send Cineas that very day across the
borders and to wage an implacable war with Pyrrhus, so long as he
should abide in Italy. They imposed upon the captives certain
degradations in the campaigns and used them no longer against Pyrrhus
nor for any other project as a unit (out of apprehension that if they
were together they might rebel), but sent them to do garrison duty, a
few here, a few there.


_(BOOK 10, BOISSEVAIN)._

[Sidenote: B.C. 279 (_a.u._ 475)] VIII, 5.--During the winter both
sides busied themselves with preparations. When spring had now begun,
Pyrrhus invaded Apulia and reduced many places by force, many also by
capitulation. Finally the Romans came upon him near a city called
Asculum and pitched camp opposite. For several days they lingered,
rather avoiding each other. The Romans were not feeling confident
against men who had once beaten them, and the others dreaded the
Romans as persons animated by desperation. Meanwhile some were talking
to the effect that Decius was getting ready to "devote himself" after
the fashion of his father and grandfather, and by so doing they
terribly alarmed the followers of Pyrrhus, who believed that through
his death they would certainly be ruined. Pyrrhus then convened his
soldiers and discussed this matter, advising them not to be
disheartened nor scared out of their wits by such talk. One human
being, he said, could not by dying prevail over many nor could any
incantation or magic prove superior to arms and men. By making these
remarks and confirming his words by arguments Pyrrhus encouraged the
army under his lead. Also he enquired into the details of the costume
which the Decii had used in devoting themselves, and sent injunctions
to his men, if they should see anybody so arrayed, not to kill him,
but seize him alive. [Sidenote: FRAG. 40^28] AND HE SENT TO DECIUS
AND TOLD HIM THAT HE WOULD NOT SUCCEED IN ACCOMPLISHING THIS, EVEN IF
HE WISHED IT, AND THREATENED THAT IF HE WERE TAKEN ALIVE, HE SHOULD
PERISH MISERABLY. TO THIS THE CONSULS ANSWERED THAT THEY WERE IN NO
NEED OF HAVING RECOURSE TO SUCH A PROCEEDING AS THE ONE MENTIONED,
SINCE THEY WERE SURE TO CONQUER HIM ANYWAY. There was a river not easy
to ford running between the two camps, and they enquired whether he
chose to cross unmolested himself, while they retired, or whether he
would allow them to do it, the object being that the forces should
encounter each other intact and so from a battle with conditions equal
the test of valor might be made an accurate one. The Romans delivered
this speech to overawe him, but Pyrrhus granted them permission to
cross the river, since he placed great reliance upon his elephants.
The Romans among their other preparations made ready, as a measure
against the elephants, projecting beams on wagons, overlaid with iron
and bristling in all directions. From these they intended to shoot and
to withstand the animals with fire as well as by other means. When the
conflict began, the Romans forced the Greeks back, slowly to be sure,
but none the less effectually, until Pyrrhus, bringing his elephants
to bear not opposite their chariots but at the other end of the line,
routed their cavalry through fear of the beasts even before they had
come close. Upon their infantry, however, he inflicted no great
damage. Meantime some of the Apulians had started for the camp of the
Epirots and by so doing brought about victory for the Romans. For when
Pyrrhus sent some of his warriors against them, all the rest were
thrown into disorder and suspecting that their tents had been
captured and their companions were in flight they gave way. Numbers of
them fell, Pyrrhus and many commanding officers besides were wounded,
and later on account of the lack of food and of medical supplies they
incurred great loss. Hence he retreated to Tarentum before the Romans
were aware. As for the consuls, they crossed the river to fight, but
when they ascertained that all had scattered, they withdrew to their
own cities. They were unable to pursue after their foes on account of
wounds among their own following. Then the Romans went into winter
quarters in Apulia, whereas Pyrrhus sent for soldiers and money from
home and went on with other preparations. But learning that Fabricius
and Pappus had been chosen consuls and had arrived in camp, he was not
constant in the same intention.

[Sidenote: B.C. 278 (_a.u._ 476)] The aforesaid consuls were now in
the midst of their army, when a certain Nicias, one of those believed
to be loyal to Pyrrhus, came to Fabricius and offered to murder him
treacherously. Fabricius, indignant at this (for he wanted to overcome
the enemy by valor and main force, like Camillus), informed Pyrrhus of
the plot. This action of his moved the king so strongly that he again
released the Roman captives without price and sent envoys once more in
regard to peace. But when the Romans made no reply about peace, but as
before bade him depart from Italy and only in that event make
propositions to them, and since they kept overrunning and capturing
the cities in alliance with him, [Sidenote: FRAG. 40^29] HE FELL INTO
PERPLEXITY; till at length some Syracusans called on him for
aid--they had been quarreling, as it chanced, ever since the death of
Agathocles--and surrendered to him both themselves and their city.
Hereupon he again breathed freely, hoping to subjugate all of Sicily.
Leaving Milo behind in Italy to keep guard over Tarentum and the other
positions, he himself sailed away after letting it be understood that
he would soon return. The Syracusans welcomed him and laid everything
at his feet, so that in brief time he had again become great and the
Carthaginians in fright secured additional mercenaries from Italy. But
presently his prospects fell to the other extreme of fortune
[Sidenote: FRAG. 40^30] BY REASON OF THE FACT THAT HE EITHER EXPELLED
OR SLEW MANY WHO HELD OFFICE AND HAD INCURRED HIS SUSPICIONS. Then the
Carthaginians, seeing that he was not strong in private forces and did
not possess the devotion of the natives, took up the war vigorously.
They harbored any Syracusans who were exiled and rendered his position
so uncomfortable that he abandoned not only Syracuse, but Sicily as
well.

[Sidenote: B.C. 277 (_a.u._ 477)] VIII, 6.--The Romans on finding out
his absence took courage and turned their attention to requiting those
who had invited him. Postponing till another occasion the case of the
Tarentini they invaded Samnium with their consuls Rufinus and Junius,
devastated the country as they went along, and took several deserted
forts. The Samnites had conveyed their dearest and most valuable
treasures into the hills called the _Cranita_, because they bear a
large growth of cornel-wood (_crania_). The Romans in contempt for
them dared to begin the ascent of the aforementioned hills. As the
region was tangled with shrubbery and difficult of access many were
killed and many, too, were taken prisoners.

The consuls now no longer carried on the war together, since each
blamed the other for the disaster, but Junius went on ravaging a
portion of Samnium, while Rufinus inflicted injury upon Lucanians and
Bruttians. He then started against Croton, which had revolted from
Rome. His friends had sent for him, but the other party got ahead of
them by bringing a garrison from Milo, of which Nicomachus was
commander. Ignorant of this fact he approached the walls carelessly,
supposing that his friends controlled affairs, and suffered a setback
by a sudden sortie made against him. Then, bethinking himself of a
trick, he captured the city. He sent two captives as pretended
deserters into Croton; one at once, declaring that he had despaired of
capturing the place and was about to set out into Locris, which was
being betrayed to him; the other later, corroborating the report with
the further detail that he was on his way. That the story might gain
credence he packed up the baggage and affected to be in haste.
Nicomachus trusted this news (for his scouts made the same report),
and leaving Croton set off with speed into Locrian territory by a
somewhat shorter road. When he had got well into Locris, Rufinus
turned back to Croton, and escaping observation because he was not
expected and because of a mist that then prevailed he captured the
city. Nicomachus learning this went back to Tarentum, and
encountering Rufinus on the way lost many men. The Locrians came over
to the Roman side.

[Sidenote: B.C. 276 (_a.u._ 478)] The next year the Romans made
expeditions into Samnium and into Lucania and fought with the
Bruttians. Pyrrhus, who had been driven out of Sicily and had
returned, was now troubling them grievously. He got back the Locrians
(by their killing the Roman garrison and changing their rulers), but
in a campaign against Rhegium was repulsed, was himself wounded, and
lost great numbers. He then retired into Locris and after executing a
few who opposed his cause he got food and money from the rest and made
his way back to Tarentum. The Samnites, hard pressed by the Romans,
caused him to leave the shelter of that town: [Sidenote: B.C. 275
(_a.u._ 479)] but on coming to their assistance he was put to flight.
A young elephant was wounded, and shaking off its riders wandered
about in search of its mother; the latter thereupon became
unmanageable, and as all the rest of the elephants raised a din
everything was thrown into dire confusion. Finally the Romans won the
day, killing many men and capturing eight elephants, and occupied the
enemy's entrenchments. Pyrrhus accompanied by a few horsemen made his
escape to Tarentum, and from there sailed back to Epirus, leaving Milo
behind with a garrison to take care of Tarentum because he expected to
come back again. He also gave them a chair fastened with straps made
from the skin of Nicias, whom he put to death for treachery. This was
the vengeance, then, that he took upon Nicias, [Sidenote: FRAG.
40^32] AND HE WAS INTENDING TO EXACT VENGEANCE FROM SOME YOUTHS WHO
HAD RIDICULED HIM AT A BANQUET; BUT HE ASKED THEM WHY THEY WERE
RIDICULING HIM, AND WHEN THEY ANSWERED: "WE SHOULD HAVE SAID A LOT
MORE THINGS A GOOD DEAL WORSE, IF THE WINE HADN'T FAILED US", HE
LAUGHED AND LET THEM GO.

Now Pyrrhus, who had made a most distinguished record among generals,
who had inspired the Romans with great fear and left Italy in the
fifth year to make a campaign against Greece, not long afterward met
his death in Argos. A woman, as the story runs, being eager to catch a
sight of him from the roof as he passed by, made a misstep and falling
upon him killed him. The same year Fabricius and Pappus became
censors; and among others whose names they erased from the lists of
the knights and the senators was Rufinus, though he had served as
dictator and had twice been consul. The reason was that he had in his
possession silver plate of ten pounds' weight. This shows how the
Romans regarded poverty as consisting not in the failure to possess
many things but in wanting many things. Accordingly, their officials
who went abroad and others who set out on any business of importance
to the State received besides other necessary allowances a seal-ring
as a public gift.

Some of the Tarentini who had been abused by Milo attacked him, with
Nico at their head. Not accomplishing anything they occupied a section
of their own wall, and with that as headquarters kept making assaults
upon Milo. When they found out that the Romans were disposed to make
war upon them, they despatched envoys to Rome and obtained peace.

[Sidenote: FRAG. 41] [Sidenote: B.C. 273 (_a.u._ 481)] AND PTOLEMY
PHILADELPHUS, KING OF EGYPT, WHEN HE LEARNED THAT PYRRHUS HAD FARED
POORLY AND THAT THE ROMANS WERE GROWING, SENT GIFTS TO THEM AND MADE A
COMPACT. AND THE ROMANS, PLEASED WITH THIS, DESPATCHED AMBASSADORS TO
HIM IN TURN. THE LATTER RECEIVED MAGNIFICENT GIFTS FROM HIM, WHICH
THEY WANTED TO PUT INTO THE TREASURY; THE SENATE, HOWEVER, WOULD NOT
ACCEPT THEM, BUT ALLOWED THEM TO KEEP THEM.

[Sidenote: B.C. 272 (_a.u._ 482)] After this, by the activity of
Carvilius they subdued the Samnites, and overcame the Lucanians and
Bruttians by the hands of Papirius. The same Papirius quelled the
Tarentini. The latter, angry at Milo and subjected to abuse by their
own men, who, as has been told, made the attack on Milo, called in the
Carthaginians to their aid when they learned that Pyrrhus was dead.
Milo, seeing that his chances had been contracted to narrow limits, as
the Romans beset him on the land side and the Carthaginians on the
water front, surrendered the citadel to Papirius on condition of being
permitted to depart unharmed with his immediate followers and his
money. Then the Carthaginians, as representatives of a nation friendly
to the Romans, sailed away, and the city made terms with Papirius.
They delivered to him their arms and their ships, demolished their
walls, and agreed to pay tribute.

The Romans, having thus secured control of the Tarentini, turned their
attention to Rhegium, whose inhabitants after taking Croton by
treachery had razed the city to the ground and had slain the Romans
there. They averted the danger that was threatening them from the
Mamertines holding Messana (whom the people of Rhegium wanted to get
as allies), by coming to an agreement with them; but in the siege of
Rhegium they suffered hardships through a scarcity of food and some
other causes until Hiero by sending from Sicily grain and soldiers to
the Romans strengthened their hands and materially aided them in
capturing the city. [Sidenote: B.C. 270 (_a.u._ 484)] The place was
restored to the survivors among the original inhabitants: those who
had plotted against it were punished.

Hiero, who was not of distinguished family on his father's side and on
his mother's was akin to the slave class, ruled almost the whole of
Sicily and was deemed a friend and ally of the Romans. After the
flight of Pyrrhus he became master of Syracuse, and having a cautious
eye upon the Carthaginians who were encroaching upon Sicily he was
inclined to favor the Romans; and the first mark of favor that he
showed them was the alliance and the forwarding of grain already
narrated.

After this came a winter so severe that the Tiber was frozen to a
great depth and trees were killed. The people of Rome suffered
hardships and the hay gave out, causing the cattle to perish.

[Sidenote: B.C. 269 (_a.u._ 485)] VIII, 7.--The next year a Samnite
named Lolius living in Rome as a hostage made his escape, gathered a
band and seized a strong position in his native country from which he
carried on brigandage. Quintus Gallus and Gaius Fabius made a
campaign against him. Him and the rabblement with him, most of them
unarmed, they suppressed; on proceeding, however, against the Carcini
in whose keeping the robbers had deposited their booty, they
encountered trouble. Finally one night, led by deserters, they scaled
the wall at a certain point and came dangerously near perishing on
account of the darkness,--not that it was a moonless night but because
it was snowing fiercely. But the moon shone out and they made
themselves absolute masters of the position.

A great deal of money fell to the share of Rome in those days, so that
they actually used silver denarii.

[Sidenote: B.C. 267 (_a.u._ 487)] Next they made a campaign into the
district now called Calabria. Their excuse was that the people had
harbored Pyrrhus and had been overrunning their allied territory, but
as a fact they wanted to gain sole possession of Brundusium, since
there was a fine harbor and for the traffic with Illyricum and Greece
the town had an approach and landing-place of such a character that
vessels would sometimes come to land and put out to sea wafted by the
same wind. [Sidenote: B.C. 266 (_a.u._ 488)] They captured it and sent
colonists to it and to other settlements as well. While the
accomplishment of these exploits [Sidenote: FRAG. 42] RAISED THEM TO A
HIGHER PLANE OF PROSPERITY, THEY SHOWED NO HAUGHTINESS: ON THE
CONTRARY THEY SURRENDERED TO THE APOLLONIATIANS ON THE IONIAN GULF
QUINTUS FABIUS, A SENATOR, BECAUSE HE HAD INSULTED THEIR AMBASSADORS.
BUT THESE ON RECEIVING HIM SENT HIM BACK HOME AGAIN UNHARMED.

[Sidenote: B.C. 265 (_a.u._ 489)] In the year of the consulship of
Quintus Fabius and Æmilius they went on a campaign to the Volsinii to
secure the freedom of the latter, for they were under treaty
obligations to them. These people were originally a branch of the
Etruscans, and they gathered power and erected an extremely strong
rampart; they enjoyed also a government guided by good laws. For these
reasons once, when they were involved in war with the Romans, they
offered resistance for a very long time. When they had been subdued,
they deteriorated into a state of effeminacy, left the management of
the city to their servants and let those servants, as a rule, also
carry on their campaigns. Finally they encouraged them to such an
extent that the servants possessed both spirit and power, and thought
they had a right to freedom. In the course of time their efforts to
obtain it were crowned with success. After that they were accustomed
to wed their mistresses, to inherit their masters, to be enrolled in
the senate, to secure the offices, and to hold the entire authority
themselves. Indeed, it was usual, when insults were offered them by
their masters, for them to requite the authors of them with rather
unbecoming speed. Hence the old-fashioned citizens, not being able to
endure them and yet possessing no power of their own to repress them,
despatched envoys by stealth to Rome. The envoys urged the senate to
convene with secrecy at night in a private house, so that no report
might get abroad, and they obtained their request. The meeting
accordingly deliberated under the idea that no one was listening: but
a sick Samnite, who was being entertained as a guest of the master of
the house, kept his bed unnoticed, learned what was voted, and gave
information to those against whom charges were preferred. The latter
seized and tortured the envoys on their return; when they found out
what was on foot they killed the messengers and also some of the
foremost men.

The above were the causes which led the Romans to send Fabius against
them. He routed the body of the foe that met him, destroyed many in
their flight, shut up the remainder within the wall, and made an
assault upon the city. In that action he was wounded and killed,
whereupon gaining confidence the enemy made a sortie. They were again
defeated, retired, and had to submit to siege. When they began to feel
the pangs of hunger, they surrendered. The consul delivered to outrage
and death the men who had appropriated the honors of the ruling class
and he razed the city to the ground; the native inhabitants, however,
and many servants who had rendered valuable service to their masters
he settled on another site.


_(BOOK 11, BOISSEVAIN.)_

VIII, 8.--From that time the Romans began struggles oversea: they had
previously had no experience at all in naval matters. They now became
seamen and crossed over to the islands and to other divisions of the
mainland. The first people they fought against were the Carthaginians.
These Carthaginians were no whit inferior to them in wealth or in the
excellence of their land; they were trained in naval operations to a
great degree of accuracy, were equipped with cavalry forces, with
infantry and elephants, ruled the Libyans, and held possession of both
Sardinia and the greater part of Sicily: as a result they had
cherished hopes of subjugating Italy. Various factors contributed to
increase their self-conceit. They were especially delighted with their
position of independence: their king they elected under the title of a
yearly office and not for permanent sovereignty. Animated by these
considerations they were at the point of most zealous eagerness.

[Sidenote: FRAG. 43^1] THE REASONS ALLEGED FOR THE WAR WERE--ON THE
PART OF THE ROMANS THAT THE CARTHAGINIANS HAD ASSISTED THE TARENTINI,
ON THE PART OF THE CARTHAGINIANS THAT THE ROMANS HAD MADE A TREATY OF
FRIENDSHIP WITH HIERO. THE FACT WAS, HOWEVER, THAT THEY VIEWED EACH
OTHER WITH JEALOUSY AND THOUGHT THAT THE ONLY SALVATION FOR THEIR OWN
POSSESSIONS LAY IN THE POSSIBILITY OF OBTAINING WHAT THE OTHER HELD.
AT A TIME WHEN THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD EACH OTHER WAS OF THIS NATURE A
SLIGHT ACCIDENT THAT BEFELL BROKE THE TRUCE AND PROVOKED A CONFLICT
BETWEEN THEM. This is what happened.

The Mamertines, who had once conducted a colony from Campania to
Messana, were now being besieged by Hiero, and they called upon the
Romans as a nation of kindred blood. The latter readily voted to aid
them, knowing that in case the Mamertines should not secure an
alliance with them, they would have recourse to the Carthaginians; and
then the Carthaginians would sweep all Sicily and from there cross
over into Italy. For this island is such a short distance away from
the mainland that the story goes that it was itself once a part of the
mainland. [Sidenote: FRAG. 43^2] SO THE ISLAND THUS LYING OFF ITALY
SEEMED TO INVITE THE CARTHAGINIANS, AND IT APPEARED AS IF THEY MIGHT
LAY CLAIM TO THE LAND OVER OPPOSITE, COULD THEY BUT OCCUPY IT. AND THE
POSSESSION OF MESSANA GAVE TO ITS MASTERS THE RIGHT TO BE LORDS OF THE
STRAIT ALSO.

Though the Romans voted to assist the Mamertines, they did not quickly
come to their aid because of various hindrances that occurred. Hence
the Mamertines, under the spur of necessity, called upon the
Carthaginians. These brought about peace with Hiero both for
themselves and for the party that had invoked their help, so as to
prevent the Romans from crossing into the island; and under the
leadership of Hanno they retained the guardianship of strait and city.
[Sidenote: B.C. 264 (_a.u._ 490)] Meantime Gaius Claudius, military
tribune, sent in advance with a few ships by Appius Claudius, had
arrived at Rhegium. But to sail across was more than he dared, for he
saw that the Carthaginian fleet was far larger. So he embarked in a
skiff and approached Messana, where he held a conversation, as
extended as the case permitted, with the party in possession. When the
Carthaginians had made reply, he returned without accomplishing
anything. Subsequently he ascertained that the Mamertines were at odds
(they did not want to submit to the Romans, and yet they felt uneasy
about the Carthaginians), and he sailed over again. [Sidenote: FRAG.
43^3] AMONG OTHER REMARKS WHICH HE MADE TO TEMPT THEM HE DECLARED THAT
THE OBJECT OF HIS PRESENCE WAS TO FREE THE CITY, AND AS SOON AS HE
COULD SET THEIR AFFAIRS IN ORDER, HE SHOULD SAIL AWAY. HE BADE THE
CARTHAGINIANS ALSO EITHER TO WITHDRAW, OR, IF THEY HAD ANY JUST PLEA,
TO OFFER IT. NOW WHEN NOT ONE OF THE MAMERTINES (BY REASON OF FEAR)
OPENED HIS LIPS, AND THE CARTHAGINIANS SINCE THEY WERE OCCUPYING THE
CITY BY FORCE OF ARMS PAID NO HEED TO HIM, HE SAID: "THE SILENCE ON
BOTH SIDES AFFORDS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. IT SHOWS THAT THE ONE SIDE IS
IN THE WRONG, FOR THEY WOULD HAVE JUSTIFIED THEMSELVES IF THEIR
PURPOSES WERE AT ALL HONEST; AND THAT THE OTHER SIDE COVETS FREEDOM,
FOR THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN QUITE FREE TO SPEAK, IF THEY HAD ESPOUSED THE
CAUSE OF THE CARTHAGINIANS." AND HE VOLUNTEERED TO AID THEM. At this a
tumult of praise arose from the Mamertines. He then sailed back to
Rhegium and a little later with his entire fleet forced his passage
across. However, partly because of the numbers and skill of the
Carthaginians, but chiefly because of the difficulty of sailing and a
storm that suddenly broke [Sidenote: FRAG. 43^4] HE LOST SOME OF HIS
TRIREMES AND WITH THE REMAINDER BARELY SUCCEEDED IN GETTING BACK TO
RHEGIUM.

VIII, 9.--HOWEVER, THE ROMANS DID NOT SHUN THE SEA BECAUSE OF THEIR
DEFEAT. Claudius proceeded to repair his ships, [Sidenote: FRAG. 43^5]
WHILE HANNO, WISHING TO THROW THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR BREAKING THE
TRUCE UPON THE ROMANS, SENT TO CLAUDIUS THE CAPTURED TRIREMES AND
RESTORED THE CAPTIVES, URGING HIM TO AGREE TO PEACE. [Sidenote: FRAG.
43^6] BUT WHEN THE OTHER WOULD ACCEPT NOTHING, HE THREATENED THAT HE
WOULD NEVER PERMIT THE ROMANS EVEN TO WASH THEIR HANDS IN THE SEA.
Claudius now having become acquainted with the strait watched for a
time when the current and the wind both carried from Italy toward
Sicily, and under those circumstances sailed to the island,
encountering no opposition. [Sidenote: FRAG. 43^7] HE DISCOVERED THE
MAMERTINES AT THE HARBOR: HANNO HAD BEFORE BECOME SUSPICIOUS OF THEIR
MOVEMENTS AND HAD ESTABLISHED HIMSELF IN THE ACROPOLIS, WHICH HE WAS
GUARDING. THE ROMAN LEADER ACCORDINGLY CONVENED AN ASSEMBLY AND AFTER
SOME CONVERSATION WITH THEM PERSUADED THEM TO SEND FOR HANNO. THE
LATTER REFUSED TO COME DOWN, but filled with a subsequent fear that
the Mamertines might allege injustice on his part and revolt he did
enter the assembly. After many words had been spoken to no purpose by
both sides, one of the Romans seized him and, with the approval of the
Mamertines, threw him into prison.

Thus, under compulsion, Hanno left Messana entirely. The Carthaginians
disciplined him and sent a herald to the Romans bidding them leave
Messana and depart from all of Sicily by a given day; they also set
an army in motion. Since the Romans paid no heed, they put to death
the mercenaries serving with them who were from Italy, and made an
assault upon Messana, Hiero accompanying them. Then for a season they
besieged the city and kept guard over the strait, to prevent any
troops or provisions being conveyed to the foe. The consul was
informed of this when he was already quite close at hand, and found a
number of Carthaginians disposed at various points in and about the
harbor under pretence of carrying on trade. In order to get safe
across the strait he resorted to deception and did succeed in
anchoring off Sicily by night. His point of approach was not far from
the camp of Hiero and he joined battle without delay, thinking that
his appearance in force would be most likely to inspire the enemy with
fear. When they came out to withstand the attack, the Roman cavalry
was worsted but the heavy-armed infantry prevailed. Hiero retired
temporarily to the mountains and later to Syracuse.

When Hiero had retired, the Mamertines took courage because of the
presence of Claudius. He therefore assailed the Carthaginians, who
were now isolated, and their rampart, which was situated on a kind of
peninsula. For on the one side the sea enclosed it and on the other
some marshes, difficult to traverse. At the neck of this peninsula,
the only entrance and a very narrow one, a cross wall had been built.
In an attempt to carry this point by force the Romans fared badly and
withdrew under a shower of weapons. [Sidenote: FRAG. 43^9] THE
LIBYANS THEN TOOK COURAGE AND SALLIED OUT, PURSUING THE FUGITIVES, AS
THEY THOUGHT THEM, BEYOND THE NARROW STRIP OF LAND. THEREUPON THE
ROMANS WHEELED, ROUTED THEM, AND KILLED A NUMBER, SO THAT THEY DID NOT
ISSUE FROM THE CAMP AGAIN,--AT LEAST SO LONG AS CLAUDIUS WAS IN
MESSANA. He, however, not daring to attack the approach in force, left
a detachment behind in Messana and turned his steps toward Syracuse
and Hiero. He personally superintended the assault upon the city, and
now and then the inhabitants would come out to battle. Each side would
sometimes be victorious and sometimes incur defeat. One day the consul
got into a confined position and would have been caught, had he not,
before being surrounded, sent to Hiero an invitation to agree to some
terms. When the representative came with whom he was to conclude the
terms, he kept falling back unobtrusively, while he conversed with
him, until he had retired to safety. But the city could not easily be
taken, and a siege, on account of scarcity of food supplies and
disease in the army, was impracticable. Claudius accordingly withdrew;
and the Syracusans following held discussions with his scattered
followers and would have made a truce, if Hiero also had been willing
to agree to terms. The consul left behind a garrison in Messana and
sailed back to Rhegium.

[Sidenote: B.C. 263 (_a.u._ 491)] As Etruscan unrest had come to a
standstill and affairs in Italy were perfectly peaceful, whereas the
Carthaginian state was becoming ever greater, the Romans ordered both
the consuls to make an expedition into Sicily. Valerius Maximus and
Otacilius Crassus consequently crossed over and in their progress
through the island together and separately they won over many towns by
capitulation. When they had made the majority of places their own,
they set out for Syracuse. Hiero in terror sent a herald to them with
offers: he expressed a readiness to restore the cities of which they
had been deprived, promised money, and liberated the prisoners. On
these terms he obtained peace, for the consuls thought they could
subjugate the Carthaginians more easily with his help. After reaching
an agreement with him, then, they turned their attention to the
remaining cities garrisoned by Carthaginians. They were repulsed from
all of them except Segesta, which they took without resistance. Its
inhabitants because of their relationship with the Romans (they
declare they are descended from Æneas) slew the Carthaginians and
joined the Roman alliance.

VIII, 10.--On account of the winter the consuls embarked again for
Rhegium. The Carthaginians conveyed most of their army to Sardinia in
the intention of attacking Rome from that quarter. They would thus
either rout them out of Sicily altogether or would render them weaker
after they had crossed. Yet they achieved neither the one object nor
the other. The Romans both kept guard over their own land and sent a
respectable force to Sicily with Postumius Albinus and Quintus
Æmilius.[15] [Sidenote: B.C. 262 (_a.u._ 492)] On arriving in Sicily
the consuls set out for Agrigentum and there besieged Hannibal the son
of Gisco. The people of Carthage, when apprised of it, sent Hanno,
with a powerful support, to aid him in the warfare. This leader
arrived at Heraclea, not far from Agrigentum, and was soon engaged in
war. A number of battles, but not great ones, took place. At first
Hanno challenged the consuls to fight, then later on the Romans
challenged him. For as long as the Romans had an abundance of food,
they did not venture to contend against a superior force, and were
hoping to get possession of the city by famine; when, however, they
encountered a permanent shortage of grain, they displayed a zeal for
taking risks, but Hanno showed hesitation; their eagerness led him to
suspect that he might be ambushed. Everybody therefore was satisfied
to revere the Romans as easy conquerors, and Hiero, who once
coöperated with them sulkily, now sent them grain, so that even the
consuls took heart.

[Footnote 15: In Roman records these persons are known respectively as
L. Postumius L. F. L. N. Megellus and Q. Mamilius Q. F. M. N.
Vitulus.]

Hanno now undertook to bring on a battle, expecting that Hannibal
would fall upon the Romans in the rear, assailing them from the wall.
The consuls learned his plan but remained inactive, and Hanno in scorn
approached their intrenchments. They also sent some men to lie in
ambush behind him. When toward evening he fearlessly and
contemptuously led a charge, the Romans joined battle with him from
ambush and from palisade and wrought a great slaughter of the enemy
and of the elephants besides. Hannibal had in the meantime assailed
the Roman tents, but was hurled back by the men guarding them. Hanno
abandoned his camp and made good his escape to Heraclea. Hannibal then
formed a plan to escape as runaways from Agrigentum by night, and
himself eluded observation; the rest, however, were recognized and
were killed, some by the Romans and many by the Agrigentinians. For
all that the people of Agrigentum did not obtain pardon, but their
wealth was plundered and they themselves were all sold into servitude.

On account of the winter the consuls retired to Messana. The
Carthaginians were angry with Hanno and despatched Hamilcar the son of
Barca in his stead, a man superior in generalship to all his
countrymen save only Hannibal his son. [Sidenote: B.C. 261 (_a.u._
493)] Hamilcar himself guarded Sicily and sent Hannibal as admiral to
damage the coast sections of Italy and so draw the consuls to his
vicinity. Yet he did not accomplish his aim, for they posted guards
along both shores and then went to Sicily. They effected nothing
worthy of record, however. And Hamilcar, becoming afraid that his
Gallic mercenaries (who were offended because he had not given them
full pay) might go over to the Romans, brought about their
destruction. He sent them to take charge of one of the cities under
Roman sway, assuring them that it was in course of being betrayed and
giving them permission to plunder it: he then sent to the consuls
pretended deserters to give them advance information of the coming of
the Gauls. Hence all the Gauls were ambuscaded and destroyed; many of
the Romans also perished.

After the consuls had departed home Hamilcar sailed to Italy and
ravaged the land and won over some cities in Sicily. On receipt of
this information the Romans [Sidenote: B.C. 260 (_a.u._ 494)]
gathered a fleet and put one of the consuls, Gaius Duillius, in
command of it, while they sent his colleague, Gaius[16] Cornelius, to
Sicily. He, neglecting the war on land which had fallen to his lot,
sailed with the ships that belonged to him to Lipara, on the
understanding that it was to be betrayed to him. Through treachery it
had fallen into the hands of the Carthaginians. When, therefore, he
put into Lipara, Bodes the lieutenant of Hannibal closed in upon him.
As Gaius[17] made preparations to defend himself, Bodes fearing the
Romans' desperation invited them to discuss terms. Having persuaded
them to do so he took the consul and military tribunes, who supposed
they were to meet the admiral, on board his own trireme. These men he
sent to Carthage: the rest he captured without their so much as
lifting a weapon.

[Footnote 16: This name should in both cases be Gnæus.]

[Footnote 17: [See previous footnote.]]

VIII, 11.--Then Hannibal continued the ravaging of Italy, while
Hamilcar made a campaign against Segesta, where the Romans had most of
their infantry force. Gaius Cæcilius, a military tribune, wanted to
assist them, but Hamilcar waylaid him and slaughtered many of his
followers. The people of Rome learning this at once sent out the
prætor urbanus and incited Duillius to haste. On coming to Sicily he
learned the fact that the ships of the Carthaginians were inferior to
his own in stoutness and size, but excelled in the quickness of their
rowing and variety of movement. Therefore he fitted out his triremes
with mechanical devices,--anchors and grappling irons with long spikes
and other such things,--in order that by laying hold of the hostile
ships with these they might pin them fast to their own vessels; then
by crossing over into them they might have a hand to hand conflict
with the Carthaginians and engage them just as in an infantry battle.
When the Carthaginians began the fight with the Roman ships, they
sailed round and round them using the oars rapidly and would make
sudden dashes. So for the time the conflict was an evenly matched one:
later the Romans got the upper hand and sank numbers of crews,
retaining possession also of large numbers. Hannibal conducted the
fight on a boat of seven banks, but when his own ship became entangled
with a trireme, he feared capture, hastily left the seven banked
affair, and transferring to another ship effected his escape.

This was the way, then, that the naval battle resulted, and much spoil
was taken. [Sidenote: FRAG. 43^13] THE CARTHAGINIANS WOULD HAVE PUT
HANNIBAL TO DEATH ON ACCOUNT OF THE DEFEAT, IF HE HAD NOT IMMEDIATELY
ENQUIRED OF THEM WHETHER, GRANTED THAT THE BUSINESS WERE STILL
UNTOUCHED, THEY WOULD BID HIM RISK A SEA-FIGHT OR NOT. THEY AGREED
THAT HE OUGHT TO FIGHT, FOR THEY PRIDED THEMSELVES UPON HAVING A
SUPERIOR NAVY. HE THEN ADDED: "I, THEN, HAVE DONE NO WRONG, FOR
I WENT INTO THE ENGAGEMENT WITH THE SAME HOPES AS YOU. IT WAS THE
DECISION, BUT NOT THE FORTUNE OF THE BATTLE THAT HAPPENED TO BE
WITHIN MY POWER." So he saved his life, but was deprived of his
command.--Duillius after securing a reinforcement of infantry rescued
the people of Segesta, and Hamilcar would not venture to come into
close conflict with him. He strengthened the loyalty of the other
friendly settlements and returned to Rome at the close of autumn. Upon
his departure Hamilcar took forcible possession of the place called
Drepanum (it is a convenient roadstead), deposited there the objects
of greatest value and transferred to it all the people of Eryx. The
city of the latter, because it was a strong point, he razed to the
ground to prevent the Romans from seizing it and making it a base of
operations for the war. He captured some cities, too, some by force,
some by betrayal; and if Gaius Florus who wintered there had not
restrained him, he would have subjugated Sicily entire.

[Sidenote: B.C. 259 (_a.u._ 495)] Lucius Scipio, his colleague, made a
campaign against Sardinia and against Corsica. These islands are
situated in the Tyrrhenian sea only a short distance apart,--so short
a distance, in fact, that from a little way off they seem to be one.
His first landing place was Corsica. There he captured by force
Valeria, its largest city, and subdued the remainder of the region
without effort. As he was sailing toward Sardinia he descried a
Carthaginian fleet and directed his course to it. The enemy fled
before a battle could be joined and he came to the city of Olbia.
There the Carthaginians put in an appearance along with their ships,
and Scipio being frightened (for he had no infantry worthy the
mention) set sail for home.

These were the days when the Samnites with the coöperation of other
captives and slaves in the city came to an agreement to form a
conspiracy against Rome. Numbers of them had been brought there with
a view to their utilization in the equipment of the fleet. Herius
Potilius, the leader of the auxiliary force, found it out and
pretended to be of like mind with them, in order that he might fully
inform himself in regard to what they had determined. As he was not
able to give knowledge of the affair,--for all those about him were
Samnites,--he persuaded them to gather in the Forum at a time when a
senate meeting was being convened and denounce him with declarations
that they were being wronged in the matter of the grain which they
were receiving. They did this and he was sent for as being the cause
of the tumult; and he then laid bare to the Romans the plot. For the
moment they merely dismissed the protestants (after they had become
quiet) but by night all of those who held slaves arrested some of
them. And in this way the entire conspiracy was overthrown.

[Sidenote: B.C. 253 (_a.u._ 496)] The following summer the Romans and
the Carthaginians fought in Sicily and Sardinia at once. Somewhat
later Atilius Latinus[18] went to Sicily and finding a city named
Mytistratus being besieged by Florus he made use of the latter's
support. He made assaults upon the circuit of the wall which the
natives with the help of the Carthaginians at first withstood
vigorously, but when the women and children were moved to tears and
laments they abandoned resistance. The Carthaginians passed out
secretly by night and at daybreak the natives voluntarily swung the
gates wide open. The Romans went in and proceeded to slaughter them
all till Atilius made proclamation that the remainder of the booty
and the human beings belonged to him who might take them. Forthwith
they spared the lives of the remaining captives and after pillaging
the city burned it to the ground.

[Footnote 18: A. Atilius Calatinus is meant.]

VIII, 12.--Thence they proceeded heedlessly against Camarina and came
into a region where an ambuscade had already been set. They would have
perished utterly, had not Marcus Calpurnius, serving as military
tribune, matched the catastrophe by his cleverness. He saw that one
and one only of the surrounding hills had by reason of its steepness
not been occupied and he asked of the consul three hundred heavy-armed
men and with them he set out for that point. His purpose was to make
the enemy turn their attention to his detachment so that then the rest
of the Romans might make their escape. And so it happened; for when
the adversaries saw his project, they were thunderstruck and left the
consul and his followers as men already captured in order to make a
united rush upon Calpurnius. A fierce battle ensued in which many of
the opposing side and all the three hundred fell. Calpurnius alone
survived. He had been wounded and lay unnoticed among the heaps of
slain, being as good as dead by reason of his wounds; afterward he was
found alive and his life was saved. While the three hundred were
fighting, the consul got away; and after this escape he reduced
Camarina and other cities, some by force and some by capitulation.
Next Atilius set out against Lipara. But Hamilcar at night by stealth
occupied it in advance and by making a sudden sally killed many
Romans.

Gaius Sulpicius overran the most of Sardinia and filled with arrogance
as a result he set out for Libya. The Carthaginians, alarmed for the
safety of their home population, also set sail with Hannibal,
[Sidenote: FRAG. 43^14] BUT AS A CONTRARY WIND WAS ENCOUNTERED BOTH
LEADERS TURNED BACK. SUBSEQUENTLY ATILIUS[19] BROUGHT ABOUT HANNIBAL'S
DEFEAT THROUGH SOME FALSE DESERTERS who pretended that Atilius[20] was
going to sail to Libya again. Hannibal weighed anchor and came out
with speed, whereupon Sulpicius sailed to meet him and sank the
majority of his vessels, which, because of a mist, did not know for a
long time what was taking place and were thrown into confusion; all
that made their escape to land he seized, though minus their crews,
for Hannibal who saw that the harbor was unsafe abandoned them and
retired to the city of Sulci. There the Carthaginians engaged in
mutiny against their leader and he came forth before them alone and
was slain. The Romans in consequence overran the country with greater
ease, but were defeated by Hanno. This is what took place that year.
Also stones in great quantities at once, and in appearance something
like hail, fell from heaven upon Rome continually. It likewise came to
pass that stones descended upon Albanum and elsewhere.

[Footnote 19: Apparently a mistake for _Sulpicius_.]

[Footnote 20: [See previous footnote.]]

[Sidenote: B.C. 257 (_a.u._ 497)] The consuls on coming to Sicily made
a campaign against Lipara. Perceiving the Carthaginians lying in the
harbor below the height called Tyndaris they divided their expedition
in two. One of the consuls with half the fleet surrounded the
promontory, and Hamilcar thinking them an isolated force set sail.
When the rest came up, he turned to flight and lost most of his fleet.
The Romans were elated, and feeling that Sicily was already theirs
they left it and ventured to make an attempt on Libya and Carthage.
[Sidenote: FRAG. 43^16] THEIR LEADERS WERE MARCUS REGULUS AND LUCIUS
MANLIUS, PREFERRED BEFORE OTHERS FOR THEIR EXCELLENCE. [Sidenote: B.C.
256 (_a.u._ 498)] These two sailed to Sicily, settled affairs there,
and made ready for the voyage to Libya: the Carthaginians did not wait
for their hostile voyage to begin, but after due preparation hastened
toward Sicily. Off Heracleotis the opposing forces met. The contest
was for a long time evenly balanced but in the end the Romans got the
best of it. Hamilcar did not dare to withstand their progress,
[Sidenote: FRAG. 43^17] BUT SENT HANNO TO THEM PRETENDEDLY IN BEHALF
OF PEACE, WHEREAS HE REALLY WISHED TO USE UP TIME; HE WAS IN HOPES
THAT AN ARMY WOULD BE SENT TO HIM FROM HOME. WHEN SOME CLAMORED FOR
HANNO'S ARREST, BECAUSE THE CARTHAGINIANS HAD ALSO TREACHEROUSLY
ARRESTED CORNELIUS, the envoy said: "If you do this, you will be no
longer any better than Libyans." He, therefore, by flattering them
most opportunely escaped any kind of molestation: the Romans, however,
again took up the war. And the consuls sailed from Messana, while
Hamilcar and Hanno separated and studied how to enclose them from both
sides. Hanno, however, would not stand before them when they
approached, but sailed away betimes to the harbor of Carthage and
kept constant guard of the city. Hamilcar, apprised of this, stayed
where he was. The Romans disembarked on land and marched against the
city Aspis, whose inhabitants, seeing them approaching, slipped out
quietly and in good season. The Romans thus occupied it without
striking a blow and made it a base in the war. From it they ravaged
the country and acquired cities, some of their own free will and
others by intimidation. They also kept securing great booty, receiving
vast numbers of deserters, and getting back many of their own men who
had been captured in the previous wars.

VIII, 13.--Winter came on and Manlius sailed back to Rome with the
booty, whereas Regulus remained behind in Libya. The Carthaginians
found themselves in the depths of woe, since their country was being
pillaged and their vassals alienated; but cooped up in their
fortifications they remained inactive. [Sidenote: (FRAG. 43^18?)]
WHILE REGULUS WAS BESIDE THE BAGRADAS RIVER A SERPENT OF HUGE BULK
APPEARED TO HIM, THE LENGTH OF WHICH IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN ONE HUNDRED
AND TWENTY FEET. ITS SLOUGH WAS CARRIED TO ROME FOR EXHIBITION
PURPOSES. AND THE REST OF ITS BODY CORRESPONDED IN SIZE. It destroyed
many of the soldiers that approached it and some also who were
drinking from the river. Regulus overcame it by a crowd of soldiers
and hurling-engines. After thus destroying it he gave battle by night
to Hamilcar, who was encamped upon a high, woody spot; and he slew
many in their beds as well as many who had just risen. Any who escaped
fell in with Romans guarding the roads, who despatched them. In this
way a large division of Carthaginians was blotted out and numerous
cities went over to the Romans. [Sidenote: FRAG. 43^19] THOSE IN THE
TOWN BEING IN FEAR OF CAPTURE SENT HERALDS TO THE CONSUL TO THE END
THAT HAVING BY SOME SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENT INDUCED HIM TO GO AWAY
THEY MIGHT AVOID THE DANGER OF THE MOMENT AND SO ESCAPE. BUT WHEN MANY
UNREASONABLE DEMANDS WERE MADE OF THEM, THEY DECIDED THAT THE TRUCE
WOULD MEAN THEIR UTTER SUBJUGATION AND PREPARED RATHER TO FIGHT.

[Sidenote: B.C. 255 (_a.u._ 499)] Regulus, however, who up to that
time was fortunate, became filled with boastfulness and conceit, so
much so that he even wrote to Rome that he had sealed up the gates of
Carthage with fear. His followers and the people of Rome thought the
same way, and this caused their undoing. Allies of various sorts came
to the Carthaginians, among them Xanthippus from Sparta. He assumed
the general superintendence of the Carthaginians, for the populace was
eager to entrust matters to his charge and Hamilcar together with the
other officials stepped aside voluntarily. The new leader, then,
disposed things excellently in every way, and particularly he brought
the Carthaginians down from the heights, where they were staying
through fear, into the level country, where their horses and elephants
were sure to develop greatest power. For some time he remained
inactive until at length he found the Romans encamped in a way that
betokened their contempt. They were very haughty over their victorious
progress and looked down upon Xanthippus as a "Græcus" (this is a name
they give to Hellenes and they use this epithet as a reproach to them
for their mean birth); [Sidenote: B.C. 255 (_a.u._ 499)] consequently
they had constructed their camp in a heedless fashion. While the
Romans were in this situation, Xanthippus assailed them, routed their
cavalry with his elephants, cut down many and captured many alive,
among them Regulus himself. This put the Carthaginians in high
spirits. They saved the lives of the captives in order that their own
citizens previously taken captive by the Romans might not be killed.
All the Roman prisoners were treated with consideration except
Regulus, whom they kept in a state of utter misery; they offered him
only just food enough to maintain existence and they would repeatedly
lead an elephant close up to him to frighten him, so that he might
have peace in neither body nor mind. After afflicting him in this way
for a good while they placed him in prison.

The manner in which the Carthaginians dealt with their allies forms a
chapter of great ruthlessness in this story. They were not supplied
with sufficient wealth to pay them what they had originally promised,
and dismissed them with the understanding that they would pay them
their wages before very long. To the men who escorted the allies,
however, they issued orders to put them ashore on a desert island and
quietly sail away. As to Xanthippus, one story is that they drowned
him, attacking him in boats after his boat had departed: the other is
that they gave him an old ship which was in no wise seaworthy but had
been newly covered over with pitch outside, that it might sink quite
of itself; and that he, aware of the fact, got aboard a different
ship and so was saved. Their reason for doing this was to avoid
seeming to have been preserved by his ability; for they thought that
once he had perished the renown of his deeds would also perish.

VIII, 14.--The people of Rome were grieved at the turn of events and
more especially because they were looking for the Carthaginians to
sail against Rome itself. For this reason they carefully guarded Italy
and hastily sent to the Romans in Sicily and Libya the consuls Marcus
Æmilius and Fulvius Pætinus.[21] They after sailing to Sicily and
garrisoning the positions there started for Libya, but were overtaken
by a storm and carried to Cossura. They ravaged the island and put it
in charge of a garrison, then sailed onward again. Meanwhile a fierce
naval battle with the Carthaginians had taken place. The latter were
struggling to eject the Romans entirely from their native land, and
the Romans to save the remnants of their soldiers who had been left in
hostile territory. In the midst of a close battle the Romans in Aspis
suddenly attacked the Carthaginians in ships from the rear, and by
getting them between two forces overcame them. Later the Romans also
won an infantry engagement and took many prisoners, whose lives they
saved because of Regulus and those captured with him. They made
several raids and then sailed to Sicily. After encountering a storm,
however, and losing many of their number, they sailed for home with
the ships that remained.

[Footnote 21: Zonaras spells _Plætinus_.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 254 (_a.u._ 500)] The Carthaginians took Cossura and
crossed over to Sicily; and had they not learned that Collatinus[22]
and Gnæus Cornelius were approaching with a large fleet, they would
have subjugated the whole of it. The Romans had quickly fitted out a
first-class fleet, had made levies of their best men, and had become
so strong that in the third month they returned to Sicily. It was the
five hundredth year from the founding of Rome. The lower city of
Panhormus they took without trouble, but in the siege of the citadel
they fared badly until food failed those in it. Then they came to
terms with the consuls. [Sidenote: FRAG. 43^20] THE CARTHAGINIANS KEPT
WATCH FOR THEIR SHIPS HOMEWARD BOUND AND CAPTURED SEVERAL THAT WERE
FULL OF MONEY.

[Footnote 22: This is A. Atilius Calatinus again.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 253 (_a.u._ 501)] The next event was that Servilius
Cæpio and Gaius Sempronius, consuls, made an attempt upon Lilybæum
(from which they were repulsed) and crossing over to Libya ravaged the
coast districts. As they were returning homeward they encountered a
storm and incurred damage. Hence the people, thinking that the damage
was due to their inexperience in naval affairs, voted that they should
keep away from the sea in general but with a few ships should guard
Italy.

[Sidenote: B.C. 252 (_a.u._ 502)] In the succeeding year Publius
Gaius[23] and Aurelius Servilius[24] came to Sicily and subdued Himera
besides some other places. However, they did not get possession of any
of its inhabitants, for the Carthaginians conveyed them away by night.
After this Aurelius secured some ships from Hiero and adding to his
contingent all the Romans that were there he sailed to Lipara. Here
he left the tribune Quintus Cassius,[25] who was to keep a lookout but
avoid a battle, and set sail for home. Quintus, disregarding orders,
made an attack upon the city and lost many men. Aurelius, however,
subsequently took the place, killed all the inhabitants, and deposed
Cassius from his command.

[Footnote 23: A mistake for Gaius Aurelius and Publius Servilius, as
at the beginning of Chapter 16.]

[Footnote 24: [See previous footnote.]]

[Footnote 25: But Valerius Maximus (II, 7, 4) calls him P. Aurelius
Pecuniola.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 251 (_a.u._ 503)] The Carthaginians learned what the
Romans had determined regarding the fleet and sent an expedition to
Sicily hoping now to bring it entirely under their control. As long as
both consuls, Cæcilius Metellus and Gaius Furius, were on the ground,
they remained quiet; but when Furius set out for Rome, they conceived
a contempt for Metellus and proceeded to Panhormus. Metellus
ascertained that spies had come from the enemy, and assembling all the
people of the city he began a talk with them, in the midst of which he
suddenly ordered them to lay hold of one another. He was thus enabled
to investigate who each one was and what was his business and so
detected the enemy.--The Carthaginians now set themselves in battle
array and Metellus pretended to be afraid. As he continued this
pretence for several days the Carthaginians became filled with
presumption and attacked him rather recklessly. Then Metellus raised
the signal for the Romans. Forthwith they made an unexpected rush
through all the gates, easily overcame resistance, and enclosed the
enemy in a narrow place through which they could now no longer
retreat. Being many in number and with many elephants along they were
huddled together and thrown into confusion. Meanwhile the Libyan fleet
approached the coast and became the prime cause of their destruction.
The fugitives seeing the ships rushed toward them and made desperate
exertions to climb aboard; some fell into the sea and perished, other
were killed by the elephants, which got close to one another and to
the human beings, still others were slain by the Romans; many also
were captured alive, men as well as elephants. For since the beasts,
bereft of the men to whom they were used, became furious, Metellus
made a proclamation to the prisoners, offering preservation and
forgiveness to such as would check them: accordingly, some keepers
approached the gentlest of the animals, controlling them by the
influence of their accustomed presence, and then won over the
remainder. These, one hundred and twenty in number, were conveyed to
Rome, and they were ferried across the strait in the following way. A
number of huge jars, separated by pieces of wood, were fastened
together in such a way that they were neither detached nor yet did
they touch; then this framework was spanned by beams and on the top of
all earth and brush were placed and the surface was fenced in round
about so that it resembled a courtyard. The beasts were put on board
this and were ferried across without knowing that they were moving on
the water. Thus did Metellus win a victory: Hasdrubal, the
Carthaginian leader, though he got away safe on this occasion was
later summoned to trial by the Carthaginians at home and suffered
impalement.

[Sidenote: FRAG. 43^21] VIII, 15.--THE CARTHAGINIANS NOW BEGAN
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ROMANS ON ACCOUNT OF THE GREAT NUMBER OF THE
CAPTIVES (AMONG OTHER CAUSES); AND WITH THE ENVOYS THEY ALSO SENT
REGULUS HIMSELF, THINKING THAT THROUGH HIM THEIR OBJECT HAD
PRACTICALLY BEEN ALREADY GAINED BECAUSE OF THE REPUTATION AND VALOR OF
THE MAIN: AND THEY BOUND HIM BY OATHS TO RETURN WITHOUT FAIL. AND HE
ACTED IN ALL RESPECTS LIKE ONE OF THE CARTHAGINIANS; FOR HE DID NOT
EVEN GRANT HIS WIFE LEAVE TO CONFER WITH HIM NOR DID HE ENTER THE CITY
ALTHOUGH REPEATEDLY INVITED TO DO SO; INSTEAD, WHEN THE SENATE WAS
ASSEMBLED OUTSIDE THE WALLS, AS THEY WERE ACCUSTOMED TO DO IN TREATING
WITH ENVOYS OF THE ENEMY, and he was introduced into the gathering, he
said: "We, Conscript Fathers, have been sent to you by the
Carthaginians. They it was who despatched me on this journey, since by
the law of war I have become their slave. They ask, if possible, to
conclude the war upon terms pleasing to both parties or, if not, to
effect an exchange of prisoners." At the end of these words he
withdrew with the envoys that the Romans might deliberate in private.
When the consuls urged him to take part in their discussion,
[Sidenote: FRAG. 43^22] HE PAID NO HEED UNTIL PERMISSION WAS GRANTED
BY THE CARTHAGINIANS. For a time he was silent. Then, as the senators
bade him state his opinion, he spoke:


_(BOOK 12, BOISSEVAIN.)_

"I am one of you, Conscript Fathers, though I be captured times
without number. My body is a Carthaginian chattel, but my spirit is
yours. The former has been alienated from you, but the latter nobody
has the power to make anything else than Roman. As captive I belong to
the Carthaginians, yet, as I met with misfortune not from cowardice
but from zeal, I am not only a Roman, but my heart is in your cause.
Not in a single respect do I think reconciliation advantageous to
you."

After these words Regulus stated also the reasons for which he favored
rejecting the proposals, and added: "I know, to be sure, that manifest
destruction confronts me, for it is impossible to keep them from
learning the advice I have given; but even so I esteem the public
advantage above my own safety. If any one shall say: 'Why do you not
run away, or stay here?' he shall be told that I have sworn to them to
return and I would not transgress my oaths, not even when they have
been given to enemies. There are various explanations for this, but
the principal one is that if I abide by my oath I alone shall suffer
disaster, but if I break it, the whole city will be involved."

But the senate out of consideration for his safety showed a
disposition to make peace and to restore the captives. When he was
made aware of this, he pretended, in order that he might not be the
cause of their letting slip their advantage, that he had swallowed
deadly poison and was destined certainly to die from its effects.
Hence no agreement and no exchange of prisoners was made. As he was
departing in company with the envoys, his wife and children and others
clung to him, and the consuls declared they would not surrender him,
if he chose to stay, nor yet would they detain him if he was for
departing. Consequently, since he preferred not to transgress the
oaths, he was carried back. He died of outrages, so the legend
reports, perpetrated by his captors. They cut off his eyelids and for
a time shut him in darkness, then they threw him into some kind of
specially constructed receptacle bristling with spikes; and they made
him face the sun; so that through suffering and sleeplessness,--for
the spikes kept him from reclining in any fashion,--he perished. When
the Romans found it out, they delivered the foremost captives that
they held to his children to outrage and put to death in revenge.

[Sidenote: B.C. 250 (_a.u._ 504)] They voted that the consuls, Atilius
Gaius, brother of Regulus, and Lucius Manlius, should make a campaign
into Libya. On coming to Sicily they attacked Lilybæum and undertook
to fill up a portion of the ditch to facilitate bringing up the
engines. The Carthaginians dug below the mound and undermined it. As
they found this to be a losing game because of the numbers of the
opposing workmen, they built another wall, crescent-shaped, inside.
The Romans ran tunnels under the circle, in order that when the wall
settled they might rush in through the breach thus made. The
Carthaginians then built counter-tunnels and came upon many workers
who were unaware of what the other side was doing. These they killed,
and also destroyed many by hurling blazing firewood into the diggings.
Some of the allies now, burdened by the strain of the siege and
displeased because their superiors did not come down with their full
wages, made propositions to the Romans to betray the place. Hamilcar
discovered their plot but did not disclose it, for fear of driving
them into open hostility. However, he supplied their leaders with
money and in addition promised other supplies of it to the mass of
them. In this way he won their favor, and they did not even deny their
treachery but drove away the last envoys who returned. The latter then
deserted to the consuls and received from them land in Sicily and
other gifts.

The Carthaginians at home, hearing this, sent Adherbal with a very
large number of ships carrying grain and money to Lilybæum. The leader
waited for a time of storm and sailed in. Thereupon many others
likewise ventured to attempt a landing, and some made it, others were
destroyed.

As long as both the consuls were present, the conflicts were even.
Pestilence and famine, however, came to harass them and these caused
one of them with the soldiers of his division to return home. Hamilcar
then took courage and made sorties in which he would set fire to the
engines and slay the men defending them; his cavalry, starting from
Drepanum, prevented the Romans from getting provisions and overran the
territory of their allies; and Adherbal ravaged the shores now of
Sicily, now of Italy, so that the Romans fell into perplexity.
[Sidenote: B.C. 249 (_a.u._ 505)] Meantime, however, Lucius Junius was
making ready a fleet, and Claudius Pulcher made haste to reach
Lilybæum, where he manned ships of war. With these he overhauled Hanno
the Carthaginian as he was leaving harbor on a five-banked ship. The
prize craft served the Romans as a model in shipbuilding.

The interests of their fleet were so frequently endangered that the
Romans were disheartened by the constant destruction of their ships.
In these they lost numbers of men and vast sums of money. Yet they
would not give up; nay, they even executed a man who in the senate
opened his mouth about reconciliation with the Carthaginians, and they
voted that a dictator should be named. Collatinus[26] was therefore
named dictator and Metellus became master of the horse, but they
accomplished nothing worthy of remembrance. While Collatinus[27] was
being named dictator, Junius had won over Eryx, and Carthalo had
occupied Ægithallus and taken Junius alive.

[Footnote 26: _A. Atilius Calatinus_ once more.]

[Footnote 27: [See previous footnote.]]

[Sidenote: B.C. 248 (_a.u._ 506)] VIII, 16.--The next year Gaius
Aurelius and Publius Servilius took office and spent their time in
harrying Lilybæum and Drepanum, in keeping the Carthaginians off the
land, and in devastating the region that was in alliance with them.
Carthalo undertook many different kinds of enterprises against them,
but, as he accomplished nothing, he started for Italy with the object
of thus attracting the consuls to that country or, in any case, of
injuring the district and capturing cities. Yet he made no headway
even there and on learning that the prætor urbanus was approaching
sailed back to Sicily. His mercenaries now rebelled about a question
of pay, whereupon he put numbers ashore on desert islands and left
them there, and sent many more off to Carthage. When the rest heard
this, they became indignant and were on the point of an uprising.
Hamilcar, Carthalo's successor, cut down numbers of them one night and
had numerous others drowned. In the meantime the Romans had concluded
a perpetual friendship with Hiero and they furthermore remitted all
the dues which they were accustomed to receive from him annually.

[Sidenote: B.C. 247 (_a.u._ 507)] Next year the Romans officially
refrained from naval warfare because of their misfortunes and
expenses, but some private individuals asked for ships on condition of
restoring the vessels but appropriating any booty gained; and among
other injuries that they inflicted upon the enemy they sailed to
Hippo, a Libyan city, and there burned to ashes all the boats and many
of the buildings. The natives put chains across the mouth of their
harbor and the invaders found themselves encompassed but saved
themselves by cleverness and good fortune. They made a quick dash at
the chains, and just as the beaks of the ships were about to catch in
them the members of the crew went back to the stern, and so the prows
being lightened cleared the chains: and again, by their making a rush
into the prows, the sterns of the vessels were lifted high enough in
the air. Thus they effected their escape, and later near Panhormus
they conquered the Carthaginians with these ships.

Of the consuls Metellus Cæcilius was in the vicinity of Lilybæum, and
Numerius Fabius was investing Drepanum, with additional designs upon
the islet of Pelias. As this had been seized earlier by the
Carthaginians, he sent soldiers by night who killed the garrison and
took possession of the island. Learning this Hamilcar at dawn attacked
the party that had crossed to it. Fabius not being able to ward them
off led an assault upon Drepanum that he might either capture the city
while deserted or bring back Hamilcar from the island. One of these
objects was accomplished, for Hamilcar in fear retired within the
fortifications. So Fabius occupied Pelias, and by filling in the
strait (which happened to be shallow) between it and the mainland he
made a clear stretch of solid ground and thus conducted with greater
facility his hostile operations against the wall, which was rather
weak at that point. Incidentally the Carthaginians caused the Romans
excessive annoyance by undertaking circuitous voyages to Sicily and
making trips across into Italy.--They exchanged each other's captives
man for man; those left over (since the numbers were not equal) the
Carthaginians got back for money.

In the subsequent period various persons became consuls but effected
nothing worthy of record. The Romans owed the majority of their
reverses to the fact that they kept sending out from year to year
different and ever different leaders, and took away their office from
them when they were just learning the art of generalship. It looked as
if they were choosing them for practice and not for service.

The Gauls, who were acting in alliance with the Carthaginians and
hated them because their masters treated them ill, abandoned to the
Romans for money a position with the guarding of which they had been
entrusted. The Romans secured for mercenary service the Gauls and
other of the Carthaginian allies who had revolted from their service;
never before had they supported foreigners in their army. Elated at
this accession and furthermore by the ravaging of Libya on the part of
the private citizens who were managing the ships, they were no longer
willing to neglect the sea, and they again got together a fleet.

[Sidenote: B.C. 241 (_a.u._ 513)] VIII, 17.--And Lutatius Catulus was
chosen consul and with him was sent out Quintus Valerius Flaccus as
prætor urbanus. On coming to Sicily they assailed Drepanum both by
land and by sea and demolished a section of the wall. They would have
captured the town but for the fact that the consul was wounded and the
soldiers were wholly engrossed in caring for him. During the delay
which ensued they learned that a body of the enemy had come from home
with a huge fleet commanded by Hanno, and they turned their attention
to these new arrivals. When the forces had been marshaled in hostile
array, a meteor like a star appeared above the Romans and after rising
high to the left of the Carthaginians plunged into their ranks. The
naval combat was a vigorous one on the part of both nations, and for
several reasons; especially were the Carthaginians anxious to drive
the Romans into complete despair of naval success, and the Romans to
retrieve their former disasters. In spite of everything the Romans
carried off the victory, for the Carthaginian vessels were impeded by
the fact that they carried freight,--grain and money and other things.

Hanno escaped and hastened at once to Carthage. The Carthaginians,
seized with wrath and fear, crucified him and sent envoys to Catulus
regarding peace. And he was disposed to end the war since his office
was soon to expire and he could not hope to destroy Carthage in so
short a time; nor, again, did he care to leave his successors the
glory of his own efforts. Consequently they effected an armistice by
giving him money, grain, and hostages; these preliminaries secured
them the right of sending envoys to Rome and proposing as conditions
that they retire from Sicily entire, yielding it to the Romans, as
well as abandon all the surrounding islands, that they carry on no war
with Hiero, and pay an indemnity, a part at the time of making the
treaty and a part later, and that they return the Roman deserters and
captives free of cost, but ransom their own.

Such were the terms agreed upon. Hamilcar succeeded only in having the
disgrace of going under the yoke left out. After settling these
conditions he led his soldiers out of the fortifications and sailed
for home before the oaths were imposed. The people of Rome soon
learned of the victory and were greatly elated, feeling that their
superiority was indisputable. Upon the arrival of envoys they could no
longer restrain themselves and hoped to possess all of Libya.
Therefore they would not abide by the terms of the consul: instead,
they exacted from them a very much larger sum of money than had been
promised. They forbade them also to sail past Italy or allied
territory abroad in ships of war, or to employ mercenaries from such
districts.

The first war between the Carthaginians and the Romans, then, ended
this way in the twenty-fourth year. Catulus celebrated a triumph over
its conclusion. Quintus Lutatius became consul and departed for
Sicily, where with his brother Catulus he enforced order in all
communities; and he deprived the islanders of arms. Thus Sicily, with
the exception of Hiero's domain, was made a slave of Rome, and from
this time its people were on a friendly footing with the
Carthaginians.

Both soon were again involved in other wars outside. At Carthage the
remnant of their mercenary force and the slave population in the city
and a large proportion of their hostages (influenced by the disasters
of the State) joined in an attack upon it. The Romans did not heed the
invitations to aid the party that had assumed the offensive, but sent
envoys in turn for discussion; and when they found themselves unable
to reconcile the combatants, they released free of cost all the
Carthaginian captives they were holding, sent grain to the city and
permitted it to gather mercenaries from Roman allied territory. By
this action they were seeking to gain a reputation for fairness rather
than displaying a real interest in their own advantage, and this later
caused them trouble. For the great Hamilcar Barca, after he had
conquered his adversaries, did not dare to make a campaign against the
Romans, much as he hated them; but he started for Spain contrary to
the wishes of the magistrates at home.

VIII, 18.--This, however, took place later. At the time under
discussion the Romans entered upon war with the Falisci, and Manlius
Torquatus ravaged their country. In a battle with them his heavy
infantry was worsted but his cavalry conquered. In a second engagement
with them he was victorious and took possession of their arms, their
cavalry, their furniture, their slaves, and half their country. Later
on the original city, which was set upon a steep mountain, was torn
down and another one was built, easily reached by road. After this the
Romans again waged wars upon the Boii and upon the Gauls that were
neighbors of the latter, and upon some Ligurians. The Ligurians were
conquered in battle and otherwise injured by Sempronius Gracchus:
Publius Valerius in a conflict with the Gauls was at first defeated,
but soon, learning that troops had come from Rome to his assistance,
he renewed the struggle with the Gauls, determined either to conquer
by his own exertions or to die--he preferred that rather than to live
and bear the stigma of disgrace; and by some fortune or other he
managed to win the day.

[Sidenote: B.C. 238 (_a.u._ 516)] At this time these events befell the
Romans as described. They also secured Sardinia from the Carthaginians
and a new supply of money by charging them with harming Roman
shipping. The Carthaginians, not having yet recovered strength, feared
their threats.--Next year Lucius Lentulus and Quintus Flaccus made a
campaign against the Gauls; and as long as they remained together,
they were invincible, [Sidenote: B.C. 237 (_a.u._ 517)] but when they
began to pillage districts separately with the idea of getting greater
booty, the army of Flaccus fell into danger, being surrounded by
night. Temporarily the barbarians were beaten back, but having gained
accessions of allies they proceeded anew with a huge force against the
Romans. [Sidenote: B.C. 236 (_a.u._ 518)] When confronted by Publius
Lentulus and Licinius Varus, they hoped to overcome them by their
numbers and prevail without a battle. So they sent and demanded the
land surrounding Ariminum and commanded the Romans to remove from the
city since it belonged to them. The consuls on account of their small
numbers did not dare to risk a battle nor would they take the
responsibility of releasing any territory, and accordingly they
arranged a truce to confer with Rome. Gallic emissaries came before
the senate with the aforementioned representations. As none of their
demands was granted, the envoys returned to camp. There they found
their cause was ruined. Some of their allies had repented and
regarding the Romans with fear had turned upon the Boii, and many had
been killed on both sides. Then the remainder had gone home and the
Boii had obtained peace only at the price of a large portion of their
land.

The Gallic wars having now ceased, Lentulus conducted a campaign
against the Ligurians. He drove off the attacking parties and gained
possession of several fortresses.--Varus took Corsica as his objective
point, and inasmuch as he lacked the necessary ships to carry him
over, he sent a certain Claudius Clineas in advance with troops. The
latter terrified the Corsicans, held a conference with them, and made
peace as though he had full authority to do so. But Varus, paying no
attention to the covenant, fought against the Corsicans until he had
subjugated them. [Sidenote: FRAG. 44^2] THE ROMANS TO DIVERT THE BLAME
FOR BREAKING THE COMPACT FROM THEMSELVES SENT TO THE PEOPLE OFFERING
TO GIVE CLAUDIUS UP. WHEN HE WAS NOT RECEIVED, THEY DROVE HIM INTO
EXILE. [Sidenote: FRAG. 45^1] THEY WERE ON THE POINT OF LEADING AN
EXPEDITION AGAINST THE CARTHAGINIANS ALLEGING THAT THE LATTER WERE
COMMITTING OUTRAGES UPON THE MERCHANTS; BUT INSTEAD OF DOING THIS THEY
EXACTED MONEY AND RENEWED THE TRUCE. Yet the agreements were not
destined even so to be of long standing.--The case of the
Carthaginians was accordingly postponed and they made an expedition
against the Sardinians, who would not yield obedience, and conquered
them. Subsequently the Carthaginians persuaded the Sardinians to plan
a secret uprising against the Romans. Besides these the Corsicans also
revolted and the Ligurians did not remain at rest.

[Sidenote: B.C. 234 (_a.u._ 520)] The following year the Romans
divided their forces into three parts in order that all the rebels,
finding war waged upon them at once, might not render assistance to
one another; and they sent Postumius Albinus into Liguria, Spurius
Carvilius against the Corsicans, and Publius Cornelius, the prætor
urbanus, into Sardinia. And the consuls not without trouble, yet with
some speed, accomplished their missions. The Sardinians, animated by
an immoderate amount of spirit, were vanquished by Carvilius in a
fierce battle, for Cornelius and many of his soldiers had been
destroyed by disease. When the Romans left their country, the
Sardinians and the Ligurians revolted again. [Sidenote: B.C. 233
(_a.u._ 521)] Quintus Fabius Maximus was accordingly sent to Ligurian
territory and Pomponius Manius into Sardinia. The Carthaginians, as
the cause of the wars, were adjudged enemies, and they sent to them
and demanded money and ordained that they should remove their ships
from all the islands, since these ports were hostile to them. In
making known their attitude the Romans despatched to their rivals a
spear and a herald's staff, bidding them choose one, whichever they
pleased. But the Carthaginians without shrinking made a rather rough
answer and declared that they chose neither of the articles sent them,
but were ready to accept either that the challengers might leave
there. Henceforth the two nations hated each other but hesitated to
begin war.

[Sidenote: B.C. 232 (_a.u._ 522)] As there was again a hostile
movement of the Sardinians against the Romans, both the consuls took
the field, Marcus Malleolus and Marcus Æmilius. And they secured rich
spoils, which, however, were taken away from them by the Corsicans
when they touched at their island. Hence the Romans next turned their
attention to both. [Sidenote: B.C. 231 (_a.u._ 523)] Marcus Pomponius
harried Sardinia, but could not find most of the inhabitants, who, as
he learned, had slipped into caves of the forest, difficult to locate;
therefore he sent for keen-scented dogs from Italy and with their aid
he discovered the trail of both men and cattle and cut off many such
parties. Gaius Papirius drove the Corsicans from the plains, but in
attempting to force his way to the mountains he lost numerous men
through ambush and would have suffered loss of still more through lack
of water, had not water after a great while been found; then he
persuaded the Corsicans to come to terms.

VIII, 19.--About this time also Hamilcar the Carthaginian general was
defeated by the Spaniards and lost his life. For, on the occasion of
his being arrayed in battle against them, they led out in front of the
Carthaginian army wagons full of pine wood and pitch and as they drew
near they set fire to these vehicles, then hurried on with goads the
animals that were drawing them. Forthwith their opponents were thrown
into confusion, were disorganized and turned to flight, and the
Spaniards pursuing killed Hamilcar and a very great number of others.
He having reached the very highest pinnacle of fame thus met his end,
and at his death his brother-in-law Hasdrubal succeeded him. The
latter acquired a large portion of Spain and founded a city called
Carthage, after his native town.

As the Boii and the rest of the Gauls were continually offering for
sale many articles and an especially large number of captives, the
Romans became afraid that they might some day use the money against
them, and accordingly forbade everybody to give to a Gaul either
silver or gold coin.--[Sidenote: B.C. 230 (_a.u._ 524)] Soon after the
Carthaginians,[28] learning that the consuls Marcus Æmilius and Marcus
Junius had started for Liguria, made preparations to march upon Rome.
The consuls became aware of this and proceeded toward them in force,
whereupon the Carthaginians became frightened and met them with all
appearances of friendliness. The consuls likewise feigned that they
had not set out against them but were going through their country into
the Ligurian territory.

[Footnote 28: This is a mistake, due to the carelessness of Zonaras.
Some Gallic tribe is evidently meant.]

Now the Romans crossed the Ionian Gulf and laid hands upon the Greek
mainland. They found an excuse for the voyage in the following
circumstances. [Sidenote: FRAG. 47^1] ISSA IS AN ISLAND SITUATED IN
THE IONIAN GULF. ITS DWELLERS, KNOWN AS ISSÆANS, HAD OF THEIR OWN FREE
WILL SURRENDERED THEMSELVES TO THE ROMANS because they were angry with
their ruler Agro, king of the Ardiæans and of Illyrian stock.
[Sidenote: FRAG. 47^2] TO HIM THE CONSULS SENT ENVOYS. But he had
died, leaving a son as his successor who was still a mere child,
[Sidenote: FRAG. 47^2] AND HIS WIFE, THE BOY'S STEPMOTHER, WAS
ADMINISTERING THE DOMAIN OF THE ARDIÆANS. HER DEALINGS WITH THE
AMBASSADORS WERE CHARACTERIZED BY A LACK OF MODERATION, AND WHEN THEY
SPOKE FRANKLY SHE CAST SOME OF THEM INTO PRISON AND KILLED OTHERS.
IMMEDIATELY THE ROMANS VOTED FOR WAR AGAINST HER, HOWEVER, SHE WAS
PANIC-STRICKEN, PROMISED TO RESTORE THE AMBASSADORS THAT WERE LEFT
ALIVE, AND DECLARED THAT THE DEAD HAD BEEN SLAIN BY ROBBERS. WHEN THE
ROMANS DEMANDED THE SURRENDER OF THE MURDERERS, SHE DECLARED THAT SHE
WOULD NOT GIVE THEM UP AND DESPATCHED AN ARMY AGAINST ISSA. THEN SHE
AGAIN GREW FEARFUL AND SENT A CERTAIN DEMETRIUS TO THE CONSULS,
ASSURING THEM OF HER READINESS TO HEED THEM IN EVERY DETAIL. A TRUCE
WAS MADE WITH HER EMISSARY UPON THE LATTER'S AGREEING TO GIVE THEM
CORCYRA. YET WHEN THE CONSULS HAD CROSSED OVER TO THE ISLAND, SHE,
POSSESSING WOMAN-LIKE A LIGHT AND FICKLE DISPOSITION, FELT IMBUED WITH
NEW COURAGE, AND SENT OUT AN ARMY TO EPIDAMNUS AND APOLLONIA. AT THE
NEWS THAT THE ROMANS HAD RESCUED THE CITIES, THAT THEY HAD DETAINED
SHIPS OF HERS LADEN WITH TREASURE WHICH WERE SAILING HOME FROM THE
PELOPONNESUS, THAT THEY HAD DEVASTATED THE COAST REGIONS, THAT
DEMETRIUS AS A RESULT OF HER CAPRICIOUSNESS HAD TRANSFERRED HIS
ALLEGIANCE TO THE ROMANS BESIDES PERSUADING SOME OTHERS TO DESERT, SHE
BECAME UTTERLY TERRIFIED AND WITHDREW FROM HER SOVEREIGNTY. Demetrius
as destined guardian of the child was given charge of the ex-queen
also. The Romans were thanked by the Corinthians for this action and
took part in the Isthmian contest, Plautus winning the stadium race in
it. Moreover they formed a friendship with the Athenians and took part
in their government and in the Mysteries.

The name Illyricum was anciently applied to various regions, but later
it was transferred to the upper mainland, that above Macedonia and
Thrace, located this side of Hæmus and toward Rhodope: it lies between
these mountains and the Alps, also between the river Ænus and the
Ister, extending as far as the Euxine Sea,--indeed, its boundaries at
some points extend beyond the Ister.

[Sidenote: (FRAG. 48?)] AS AN ORACLE HAD ONCE COME TO THE ROMANS THAT
GREEKS AND GAULS SHOULD OCCUPY THE CITY, TWO GAULS AND A COUPLE OF
GREEKS, MALE AND FEMALE, WERE BURIED ALIVE IN THE FORUM, that in this
way destiny might seem to have fulfilled itself and they be properly
regarded, since buried alive, as possessing a part of the city.

After this the Sardinians, deeming it a calamity that a Roman prætor
was forever set over them, made an uprising. They were again enslaved,
however.

VIII, 20.--The Insubres, a Gallic tribe, having gained allies among
their kinsmen beyond the Alps turned their arms against the Romans,
and the latter accordingly made counter-preparations. The barbarians
plundered some towns, but at last a great storm occurred in the night
and they began to suspect that Heaven was against them. Consequently
they lost heart and falling into a panic attempted to entrust their
safety to flight. [Sidenote: B.C. 225 (_a.u._ 529)] Regulus pursued
them and brought on an engagement with the rear guards in which he was
defeated and lost his life. Æmilius occupied a hill and remained
quiet. The Gauls in turn occupied another one and for several days
were inactive; then the Romans through anger at what had taken place
and the barbarians from arrogance born of the victory charged down
from the heights and came to blows. For a long time the battle was
evenly contested, but finally the Romans surrounded them with their
horse, cut them down, seized their camp, and got back the spoils.
After this Æmilius wrought havoc among the possessions of the Boii and
[Sidenote: FRAG. 49^3] CELEBRATED A TRIUMPH, IN WHICH HE CONVEYED THE
FOREMOST CAPTIVES CLAD IN ARMOR UP TO THE CAPITOL, MAKING JESTS AT
THEIR EXPENSE FOR HAVING SWORN NOT TO REMOVE THEIR BREASTPLATES BEFORE
THEY HAD MOUNTED THE CAPITOL. The Romans now secured control of the
entire territory of the Boii and for the first time crossed the Po to
take the offensive against the Insubres; and they continued to ravage
their country.

Meanwhile portents had occurred which threw the people of Rome into
great fear. A river in Picenum ran the color of blood, in Etruria a
good part of the heavens seemed to be on fire, at Ariminum a light
like daylight blazed out at night, in many portions of Italy the
shapes of three moons became visible in the night time, and in the
Forum a vulture roosted for several days. [Sidenote: B.C. 223 (_a.u._
531)] Because of these portents and inasmuch as some declared that the
consuls had been illegally chosen, they summoned them home. The
consuls received the letter but did not open it immediately, since
they were just entering upon war: instead, they joined battle first
and came out victorious. After the battle the letter was read, and
Furius was for obeying without discussion; but Flaminius was elated
over the victory and pointed out that it had proved their choice to be
correct, and he went on with vehement assertions that it was because
they were jealous of him that the influential men were even
falsifying heavenly warnings. Consequently he refused to depart until
he had settled the whole business in hand, and he said he would teach
the people at home, too, not to be deceived by relying on birds or any
other such thing. So he was anxious to remain on the ground and made
repeated attempts to detain his colleague, but Furius would not heed
him. But since the men who were going to be left behind with Flaminius
dreaded lest in their isolation they might suffer some disaster at the
hands of their opponents and begged him to stay by them for a few
days, he yielded to their entreaties but did not take part in any
action. Flaminius traveled about laying waste the country, subjugated
a few forts, and bestowed all the spoils upon the soldiers as a means
of winning their favor. At length the leaders returned home and were
put on trial by the senate for their disobedience (on account of their
anger towards Flaminius they subjected Furius also to disgrace); but
the populace was against the senate and showed emulation in
Flaminius's behalf, so that it voted them a triumph. After celebrating
it they laid down their office.

[Sidenote: B.C. 222 (_a.u._ 532)] Other consuls, Claudius Marcellus
and Gnæus Scipio, chosen in their stead, made an expedition against
the Insubres, for the Romans had not complied with the latter's
requests by voting for peace. Together at first they carried on the
war and were in most cases victorious. Soon, learning that the allied
territory was being plundered, they severed their forces. Marcellus
made a quick march against those plundering the land of the allies,
but did not find them on the scene; he then pursued them as they fled
and when they made a stand overcame them. Scipio remained where he was
and proceeded to besiege Acerræ; he took it and made it a base for the
war, since it was favorably located and well walled. Starting from
that point they subdued Mediolanum and another village-town. After
these had been captured the rest of the Insubres also made terms with
them, giving them money and a section of the land.

[Sidenote: B.C. 221 (_a.u._ 533)] Thereafter Publius Cornelius and
Marcus Minucius made a campaign to the Ister regions and brought into
subjection many of the nations there, some by war and some on terms
agreed upon. [Sidenote: B.C. 220 (_a.u._ 534)] Lucius Veturius and
Gaius Lutatius went as far as the Alps and without any fighting
established Roman sovereignty over many people. The prince of the
Ardiæans, however, [Sidenote: FRAG. 51] DEMETRIUS, WAS, AS HAS BEEN
STATED ABOVE, HATEFUL TO THE NATIVES AND INJURED THE PROPERTY OF
NEIGHBORING TRIBES; AND IT APPEARED THAT IT WAS BY MISUSING THE
FRIENDSHIP OF THE ROMANS THAT HE WAS ABLE TO WRONG THOSE PEOPLES.
[Sidenote: B.C. 219 (_a.u._ 535)] AS SOON AS THE CONSULS, ÆMILIUS
PAULUS AND MARCUS LIVIUS, HEARD OF THIS THEY SUMMONED HIM BEFORE THEM.
WHEN HE REFUSED COMPLIANCE AND ACTUALLY ASSAILED THEIR ALLIES, THEY
MADE A CAMPAIGN AGAINST ISSA, WHERE HE WAS. And having received
advance information that he was lying secretly at anchor somewhere in
the vicinity of the landing-places they sent a portion of their ships
to the other side of the island to bring on an engagement. When the
Illyrians accordingly fell upon the reconnoitering party, thinking
them alone, the main body approached at leisure in their ships and
after pitching camp in a suitable place repulsed the natives, who,
angry at the trick, lost no time in attacking them. Demetrius made his
escape to Pharos, another island, but they sailed to that, overcame
resistance, and captured the city by betrayal, only to find Demetrius
fled. He at this time reached Macedonia with large amounts of money
and went to Philip, the king of the country. He was not surrendered by
him, but on returning to the Illyrians was arrested by the Romans and
was executed.


_(BOOK 13, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: B.C. 218 (_a.u._ 536)] VIII, 21.--In the succeeding year
the Romans became openly hostile to the Carthaginians, and the war,
though of far shorter duration than the previous one, proved to be
both greater and more baneful in its exploits and effects. It was
brought on chiefly by Hannibal, general of the Carthaginians. This
Hannibal was a child of Hamilcar Barca, and from his earliest boyhood
had been trained to fight against the Romans. Hamilcar said he was
raising all his sons like so many whelps to fight against them, but as
he saw that this one's nature was far superior to that of the rest, he
made him take an oath that he would wage war upon them, and for this
reason he instructed the boy in warfare above all else when only
fifteen years old. On account of this youthfulness Hannibal was not
able, when his father died, to succeed to the generalship. But when
Hasdrubal was dead, he delayed no longer, being now twenty-six years
of age, but at once took possession of the army in Spain and after
being acclaimed as leader by the soldiers brought it about that his
right to lead was confirmed also by those in authority at home. After
effecting this he needed a plausible excuse for his enterprise against
the Romans, and this he found in the Saguntines of Spain. These
people, dwelling not far from the river Iber and a short distance
above the sea, were dependents of the Romans, and the latter held them
in honor and in the treaty with the Carthaginians had made an
exception of them. For these reasons, then, Hannibal began a war with
them, knowing that the Romans would either assist the Saguntines or
avenge them if they suffered injury. Hence for these reasons as well
as because he knew that they possessed great wealth, which he
particularly needed, and for various other causes that promised him
advantages against the Romans he made an attack upon the Saguntines.

Spain, in which the Saguntines dwell, and all the adjoining land is in
the western part of Europe. It extends for a considerable distance
along the inner sea, beside the Pillars of Hercules, and along the
ocean; furthermore it occupies the upper part of the mainland for a
very great distance, as far as the Pyrenees. [Sidenote: FRAG. 53] THIS
RANGE, BEGINNING AT THE SEA CALLED ANCIENTLY THE SEA OF THE BEBRYCES
BUT LATER THE SEA OF THE NARBONENSES, REACHES TO THE GREAT OUTER SEA,
AND CONFINES MANY DIVERSE NATIONALITIES; IT ALSO SEPARATES SPAIN FROM
THE NEIGHBORING LAND OF GAUL. The tribes did not employ the same
language nor carry on a common government. This resulted in their not
having a single name. The Romans called them Hispanii, but the Greeks
Iberians, from the river Iber.

These Saguntines, then, being besieged sent to those near them and to
the Romans asking for aid. But Hannibal checked any local movement,
and the Romans sent ambassadors to him bidding him not come near the
Saguntines, and threatening in case he should not obey to sail to
Carthage at once and lay accusations against him. When the envoys
were now close at hand, Hannibal sent some of the natives who were to
pretend that they were kindly disposed to them and were instructed to
say that the general was not there but had gone some distance away
into parts unknown; they advised the enemy, therefore (they were to
say), to depart as quickly as possible and before their presence
should be reported lest in the disorder prevailing because of the
absence of the general they should lose their lives. The envoys
accordingly believed them and set off for Carthage. An assembly being
called some of the Carthaginians counseled maintaining peace with the
Romans, but the party attached to Hannibal affirmed that the
Saguntines were guilty of wrongdoing and the Romans were meddling with
what did not concern them. Finally those who urged them to make war
won the day.

Meanwhile Hannibal in the course of his siege was conducting vigorous
assaults. Many kept falling and many more were being wounded on
Hannibal's side. One day the Carthaginians succeeded in shaking down a
portion of the outer circuit and had been daring enough to enter
through the breach, when the Saguntines made a sortie and scared them
away. This gave the besieged strength and the Carthaginians fell back
in dejection. They did not leave the spot, however, till they had
captured the city, though the siege dragged on to the eighth month.
Many unusual events happened in that time, one of which was Hannibal's
being dangerously wounded. The place was taken in this manner. They
brought to bear against the wall an engine much higher than the
fortification and carrying heavy-armed soldiers, some visible, some
concealed. While the Saguntines, therefore, were quite strenuously
fighting against the men they saw, thinking them the only ones, those
hidden had dug through the wall from below and found their way inside.
The Saguntines overwhelmed by the unexpectedness of the event ran up
to the citadel and held a conference to see whether by any reasonable
concessions they might be preserved. But as Hannibal held out no
moderate terms and no assistance came to them from the Romans, they
begged for a cessation of the assaults until they should deliberate a
little about their position. During this respite they gathered
together the most highly prized of their treasures and cast them into
the fire; then such as were incapable of fighting committed suicide,
and those who were in their prime advanced in a body against their
opponents and in a desperate struggle were cut down.

VIII, 22.--For their sakes the Romans and the Carthaginians embarked
upon war. Hannibal after gaining numerous allies was hastening toward
Italy. The Romans on ascertaining this assembled in their senate-hall,
and many speeches were delivered. Lucius Cornelius Lentulus addressed
the people and said they must not delay but vote for war against the
Carthaginians and separate consuls and armies into two detachments,
and send the one to Spain and the other to Libya, in order that at one
and the same time the land of the enemy might be desolated and his
allies injured; thus neither would he be able to assist Spain nor
could he himself receive assistance from there. To this Quintus Fabius
Maximus rejoined that it was not so absolutely and inevitably
necessary to vote for war, but they could first employ an embassy, and
then if the Carthaginians persuaded them that they were guilty of no
wrong, they should remain quiet, but if the same people were convicted
of wrongdoing, they might thereupon wage war against them, "in order,"
he said, "that we may cast the responsibility for the war upon them."
[Sidenote: FRAG. 54^9] THE OPINIONS OF THE TWO MEN WERE SUBSTANTIALLY
THESE. THE SENATE DECIDED TO MAKE PREPARATIONS, TO BE SURE, FOR
CONFLICT, BUT TO DESPATCH ENVOYS TO CARTHAGE AND DENOUNCE HANNIBAL;
AND IF THE CARTHAGINIANS REFRAINED FROM APPROVING THE EXPLOITS, THEY
WOULD ARBITRATE THE MATTER, OR IF ALL RESPONSIBILITY WERE LAID UPON
HIS SHOULDERS, THEY WOULD DEMAND HIS EXTRADITION, AND IF HE WERE NOT
GIVEN UP, THEY WOULD DECLARE WAR UPON THE NATION.

The envoys set out and the Carthaginians considered what must be done.
And a certain Hasdrubal, one of those who had been primed by Hannibal,
counseled them that they ought to get back their ancient freedom and
shake off by means of money and troops and allies, all welded
together, the slavery imposed by peace, adding: "If you only permit
Hannibal to act as he wishes, the proper thing will be done and you
will have no trouble." After such words on his part the great Hanno,
opposing Hasdrubal's argument, gave it as his opinion that they ought
not to draw war upon themselves lightly nor for small complaints
concerning foreigners, when it was in their power to settle a part of
the difficulty and divert the rest of it upon the heads of those who
had been active in the matter. With these remarks he ceased, and the
elder Carthaginians who remembered the former war sided with him, but
those in robust manhood and especially all the partisans of Hannibal
violently gainsaid him. [Sidenote: FRAG. 54^10] INASMUCH, THEN, AS
THEY MADE NO DEFINITE ANSWER AND SHOWED CONTEMPT FOR THE ENVOYS,
MARCUS FABIUS THRUSTING HIS HANDS BENEATH HIS TOGA AND HOLDING THEM
WITH PALMS UPWARD SAID: "HERE I BRING TO YOU, CARTHAGINIANS, BOTH WAR
AND PEACE: DO YOU CHOOSE WHICHEVER OF THEM YOU WISH." UPON THEIR
REPLYING THAT THEY CHOSE NEITHER, BUT WOULD READILY ACCEPT EITHER THAT
THE ROMANS SHOULD LEAVE, HE IMMEDIATELY DECLARED WAR UPON THEM.

In this way, then, and for these reasons the Romans and the
Carthaginians became involved in war for the second time. And the
Divinity beforehand indicated what was to come to pass. For in Rome an
ox talked with a human voice, and another at the Ludi Romani threw
himself out of a house into the Tiber and was lost, many thunderbolts
fell, and blood in one case was seen coming from sacred statues
whereas in another it dripped from the shield of a soldier, and the
sword of another soldier was snatched by a wolf from the very midst of
the camp. Many unknown wild beasts went before Hannibal leading the
way, as he was crossing the Iber, and a vision appeared to him in a
dream. He thought that the gods once, sitting in assembly, sent for
him and bade him march with all speed into Italy and receive from them
a guide for the way, and that by this guide he was commanded to follow
without turning around. He did turn around, however, and saw a great
tempest moving and an immense serpent accompanying it. In surprise he
asked his conductor what these creatures were; and the guide said:
"Hannibal, they are on their way to help you in the sack of Italy."


_(BOOK 14, BOISSEVAIN.)_

VIII, 23.--These things inspired Hannibal with a firm hope, but threw
the Romans into a state of profound terror. The Romans divided their
forces into two parts and sent out the consuls,--Sempronius Longus to
Sicily and Publius Scipio to Spain. Hannibal, desiring to invade Italy
with all possible speed, marched on hurriedly and traversed without
fighting the whole of Gaul lying between the Pyrenees and the Rhone.
As far as the Rhone river no one came to oppose him, but at that point
Scipio showed himself although he had no troops with him. Nevertheless
with the help of the natives and their nearest neighbors he had
already destroyed the boats in the river and had posted guards over
the stream. Hannibal therefore used up some time in building rafts and
skiffs, some of them out of a single log of wood, but still with the
help of a large corps of workers had everything in readiness that was
needful for crossing before Scipio's own army could arrive. He sent
his brother Mago accompanied by the horsemen and a few light troops to
cross at a point where the river is scattered over considerable
breadth, with branches separated by islands; he himself, of course,
proceeded by way of the natural ford, his object being that the Gauls
should be deceived and array themselves against him only, while they
set their guards with less care at other points along the river. This
object was accomplished. Mago had already got across the river when
Hannibal and his followers were crossing by the ford. On reaching the
middle of the stream they raised a war cry and the trumpeters joined
with the blare of their instruments, and Mago fell upon their
antagonists from the rear. In this way the elephants and all the rest
were ferried safely over. They had just finished crossing when
Scipio's own force arrived. Both sides, then, sent horsemen to
reconnoitre, after which they entered upon a cavalry battle with the
same results as attended the war as a whole. The Romans, that is,
after first seeming to get the worst of it and losing a number of men
were victorious.

Then Hannibal, in haste to set out for Italy but suspicious of the
more direct roads, turned aside from them and followed another, on
which he underwent bitter hardships. The mountains there are
exceedingly precipitous and the snow falling in great quantities was
driven by the winds and filled the chasms, and the ice was frozen to a
great thickness. These things conspired to cause them fearful
suffering, and many of his soldiers perished through the winter cold
and lack of food; many also returned home. There is a story to the
effect that he himself would also have turned back but for the fact
that the road already traversed was longer and more difficult than the
portion left before him. For this reason he did not retrace his steps,
but suddenly appearing south of the Alps spread astonishment and
terror among the Romans.

So he advanced taking possession of whatever lay before him. Scipio
sent his brother Gaius[29] Scipio, who was serving as a lieutenant
under him, into Spain to either seize and hold it or bring Hannibal
back, but he himself marched against Hannibal. They waited a few days;
then both moved into action. [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^4] BEFORE BEGINNING
OPERATIONS, HANNIBAL CALLED TOGETHER THE SOLDIERS AND BROUGHT IN THE
CAPTIVES WHOM HE HAD TAKEN BY THE WAY: HE ASKED THE LATTER WHETHER
THEY CHOSE TO UNDERGO IMPRISONMENT AND TO ENDURE A GRIEVOUS SLAVERY,
OR TO FIGHT IN SINGLE COMBAT WITH ONE ANOTHER ON CONDITION THAT THE
VICTORS SHOULD BE RELEASED WITHOUT RANSOM. WHEN THEY ACCEPTED THE
SECOND ALTERNATIVE, HE SET THEM TO FIGHTING. AND AT THE END OF THE
CONFLICT HE ADDRESSED his own soldiers, encouraging them and whetting
their eagerness for war. Scipio also did this on the Roman side. Then
the contest began and looked at the outset as if it would involve the
entire armies: but Scipio in a preliminary cavalry skirmish was
defeated, lost many men, was wounded and would have been killed, had
not his son Scipio, though only seventeen years old, come to his aid;
he was consequently alarmed lest his infantry should similarly meet
with a reverse, and he at once fell back and that night withdrew from
the field.

[Footnote 29: Gnæus Scipio is meant whenever Zonaras writes this
form.]

VIII, 24.--Hannibal did not learn of his withdrawal till daybreak and
then went to the Po, and finding there neither rafts nor boats,--for
they had been burned by Scipio,--he ordered his brother Mago to swim
across with the cavalry and pursue the Romans, whereas he himself
marched up toward the sources of the river and commanded that the
elephants cross where the tributary streams converged. In this manner,
while the water was temporarily dammed and torn piecemeal by the
animals' bulk, he effected a crossing more easily below them. Scipio
overtaken stood his ground and would have offered battle but for the
fact that by night the Gauls in his army deserted. Embarrassed by this
occurrence and still suffering from his wound he once more broke up at
night and located his entrenchments on high ground. He was not
pursued, but subsequently the Carthaginians came up and encamped, with
the river between the two forces.

Scipio on account of his wound and because of what had taken place was
inclined to wait and send for reinforcements; and Hannibal after many
attempts to provoke him to battle, finding that he could not do this
and that he was short of food, attacked a fort where a large supply
for the Romans was stored. As he made no headway he employed money to
bribe the commander of the garrison, which thus came into his
possession by betrayal. He hoped also to attain his other objects,
partly by arms and partly by gold. Meanwhile Longus had entrusted
Sicily to his lieutenant and had come in response to Scipio's call.
Not much later influenced by ambition on the one hand and also by the
fact of a victory over some marauders he presented himself in battle
array. He lost the day by falling into an ambuscade, and when Hannibal
appeared upon the scene with his infantry and elephants the followers
of the Roman leader turned to flight and many were put to the sword,
many also heedless of the river fell in and were choked. Only a few
saved themselves with Longus. However, Hannibal though victorious was
not happy, because he had lost many soldiers and all of his elephants,
except one, as a result of the winter and from wounds.

Accordingly, they arranged an armistice without any desire for peace
implied and both sides retired to the territory of their allies and
passed the winter in the cities there. Plenty of provisions kept
coming to the Romans, but Hannibal, not satisfied with the
contributions of the allies, made frequent raids upon the Roman
villages and cities and sometimes would conquer, sometimes be
repulsed. Once he was beaten by Longus with the cavalry and received a
wound. Some of the Roman settlers encouraged by this came out by
themselves to oppose him when he assailed them. These would-be
warriors he destroyed and received the capitulation of the place,
which he razed to the ground. Of the captives taken he killed the
Romans but released the rest. This he did also in the case of all
those taken alive, hoping to conciliate the cities by their influence.
And, indeed, many of the Gauls as well as Ligurians and Etruscans
either murdered the Romans dwelling within their borders or
surrendered them and then transferred their allegiance.

As Hannibal was advancing toward Etruria Longus attacked him in the
midst of a great storm. Many fell on both sides and Hannibal entered
Ligurian territory and delayed some time. He was suspicious of even
his own men and was free to trust no one, but made frequent changes of
costume, wore false hair, spoke different languages at different times
(for he knew a number, including Latin) and both night and day he
would frequently make the rounds of his camp. He was always listening
to some conversations in the guise of an entirely different person
from Hannibal and occasionally he talked thus in character.

VIII, 25.--While this was going on in Italy the other Scipio, Gaius,
had sailed along the coast to Spain, and had won over, partly by force
and partly without opposition, all the districts to the Iber that
border on the sea and considerable of the upper peninsula. He had also
defeated Banno in battle and had taken him prisoner. Hasdrubal, the
brother of Hannibal, on learning this crossed the Iber and reduced
some of the rebels, but at Scipio's approach he fell back.

[Sidenote: B.C. 217 (_a.u._ 537)] The people of Rome again chose
Flaminius and Geminus consuls. Just after the advent of spring
Hannibal was apprised that Flaminius together with Servilius Geminus
would march against him with a large force, and he devoted his
attention to deceiving them. He pretended that he was going to spend
his time and meet the issue where he was, and when the Romans,
thinking that he was permanently located, began to show carelessness
in their line of march, he started just after nightfall, leaving his
cavalry behind at camp, noiselessly traversed the passes and hastened
on toward Aretium; and the cavalry, after he had got far ahead, set
out to follow him. When the consuls found out that they had been
tricked, Geminus stayed behind to harass the revolted districts and
prevent them from assisting the Carthaginians, and Flaminius alone
pursued, eager that his alone should be the credit of the expected
victory. He succeeded in occupying Aretium beforehand, for Hannibal in
taking a shorter road had encountered difficult marching, and had
lost numerous men, many pack animals, and one of his eyes. It was
late, then, before he reached Aretium and found there Flaminius, whom
he regarded with contempt. He did not give battle, for the situation
was unsuitable, but by way of testing his enemy's disposition he laid
waste the country. At this the Romans made a sally and he retired, to
give them the idea that he was afraid. During the night he broke up
and found a satisfactory spot for battle, where he remained. He
arranged that most of the infantry should form an ambush along the
mountain sides and ordered all the cavalry to lie in wait concealed
from view outside the pass; he himself encamped with a few followers
on the hilltop. Flaminius was in good spirits and when he saw him with
but a few men on the high ground he believed that the rest of the army
must have been sent to some distant point and hoped to take him easily
thus isolated. So he carelessly entered the mouth of the pass and
there (for it was late) pitched camp. About midnight, when they were
sleeping unguarded through scorn of their enemies, the Carthaginians
surrounded them on every side at once and by using from a distance
javelins, slings, and arrows they killed some still in their beds,
others just seizing their arms, without receiving any serious harm in
return. The Romans, having no tangible adversaries and with darkness
and mist prevailing, found no chance to employ their valor. So great
was the uproar and of such a nature the disordered alarm that seized
them, that they were not even aware of earthquakes then prevailing,
although many buildings fell in ruins and many mountains either were
cleft asunder or collapsed so that they blocked up ravines, and rivers
shut off from their ancient outlet sought another. Such were the
earthquakes which overwhelmed Etruria, yet the combatants were not
conscious of them. Flaminius himself and a vast number of others fell,
though not a few managed to climb a hill. When it became day, they
started to flee and being overtaken surrendered themselves and their
arms on promise of free pardon. Hannibal, however, recking little of
his oaths, imprisoned and kept under guard the Romans themselves, but
released their subjects and allies among all the captives he had in
his army. After this success he hastened toward Rome and proceeded as
far as Narnia devastating the country and winning over the cities,
save Spoletium; there he surrounded and slew the prætor Gaius
Centenius who was in ambush. He made an attack upon Spoletium, but was
repulsed, and as he saw that the bridge over the Nar had been torn
down and ascertained that this had been done also in the case of the
other rivers which he was obliged to cross, he ceased his headlong
rush upon Rome. Instead, he turned aside into Campania, for he heard
that the land was excellent and that Capua was a great city, and
thought that if he should first occupy these he might acquire the rest
of Italy in a short time.

The people of Rome when informed of the defeat were grieved and
lamented both for themselves and for the lost. They were in sore
straits and tore down the bridges over the Tiber, save one, and
proceeded hurriedly to repair their walls, which were weak in many
places. [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^9] WISHING TO HAVE A DICTATOR READY, THEY
HAD PROCLAIMED ONE IN ASSEMBLY. SATISFIED IF THEY THEMSELVES ONLY
SHOULD BE SAVED, THEY HAD DESPATCHED NO AID TO THE ALLIES. BUT NOW,
LEARNING THAT HANNIBAL HAD SET OUT INTO CAMPANIA, THEY DETERMINED TO
ASSIST THE ALLIES ALSO. To Hannibal they opposed the dictator Fabius
and the master of horse Marcus Minucius. These leaders set out in his
direction but did not come into close quarters with him. They followed
and kept him in view in the hope that a favorable opportunity for
battle might possibly befall. Fabius was unwilling to risk a conflict
with cowed and beaten soldiers against a greater number who had been
victorious. Furthermore he hoped that the more his foes should injure
the country, the sooner would they be in want of food. Calculating in
this way he did not defend Campania nor any other district. For these
reasons he confined hostilities entirely within Campania; unknown to
the enemy he had surrounded them on every side and now kept guard over
them. He himself secured an abundance of provisions both from the sea
and from the territory of allies, but the invaders, he knew, had only
the products of the land which they were devastating to depend upon.
Therefore he waited and did not mind the delay. Hence also he was
blamed by his fellow-citizens and was even given the name of The
Delayer.

VIII, 26.--When it came to be nearly winter and Hannibal could not
pass that season where he was owing to a lack of the necessities of
life and had been checked in many attempts to get out of Campania, he
devised a plan of this kind. He first slew all the captives, that no
one of them might escape and acquaint the Romans with what was being
done. Then he gathered the cattle which were in camp, affixed torches
to their horns, and went at nightfall to the mountains forming the
boundary of Samnium, where he lighted the torches and threw the cattle
into a fright. They, maddened by the fire and the driving, set fire to
the forest in many places and consequently rendered it easy for
Hannibal to cross the mountains. The Romans in the plain as well as
those on the heights dreaded an ambuscade and would not budge. Thus
Hannibal got across and made his way into Samnium.

Fabius, ascertaining the next day what had been done, gave chase and
routed those left behind on the road to hinder his men's progress,
afterward defeating also troops that came to the assistance of the
first party. He then encamped not far from the enemy, yet would not
come into conflict with them. However, he prevented them from
scattering and foraging, so that Hannibal in perplexity at first
started for Rome. As Fabius would not fight, but quietly accompanied
him, he again turned back into Samnium. [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^10] AND
FABIUS FOLLOWING ON CONTINUED TO BESIEGE HIM FROM A SAFE DISTANCE,
BEING ANXIOUS NOT TO LOSE ANY OF HIS OWN TROOPS, especially since he
could obtain necessities in abundance, whereas he saw that his foe
actually possessed nothing outside of his weapons and that no
assistance was sent to him from home. [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^11] FOR THE
CARTHAGINIANS WERE DISPOSED TO MAKE SPORT OF HIM IN THAT HE WROTE OF
HIS SPLENDID PROGRESS AND HIS MANY SUCCESSES AND IN THE SAME BREATH
ASKED SOLDIERS OF THEM AND MONEY. THEY SAID THAT HIS REQUESTS WERE NOT
IN ACCORD WITH HIS SUCCESSES: CONQUERORS OUGHT TO FIND THEIR ARMY
SUFFICIENT, AND TO FORWARD MONEY TO THEIR HOMES INSTEAD OF DEMANDING
MORE.

As long as Fabius was in the field, no disaster happened to the
Romans, but when he started for Rome on some public business, they met
with a setback. Rufus, his master of horse, was only a young man and
therefore full of empty conceit; he was not observant of the errors of
warfare and was wearied by the delays of Fabius: hence, when he once
held the leadership of the army alone, he disregarded the injunctions
of the dictator and hastened to bring on a set battle, in which at
first he seemed to be victorious, but was soon defeated. Indeed, he
would have been utterly destroyed, had not some Samnites arrived by
chance to aid the Romans and impressed the Carthaginians with the idea
that Fabius was approaching. When for this reason they retired he
thought that he had vanquished them and sent messages to Rome
magnifying his exploit and also slandering the dictator; he called
Fabius timorous and hesitating and a sympathizer with the enemy.

The people of Rome believed that Rufus had really conquered, and in
view of this unexpected encouragement they commended and honored him.
They were suspicious of Fabius both because of the outcome and because
he had not ravaged his own land in Campania, and it would have taken
but little to make them depose him from his command. However, as they
believed him useful, [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^14] THEY DID NOT DEPOSE HIM
BUT THEY ASSIGNED EQUAL POWER TO HIS MASTER OF HORSE SO THAT BOTH HELD
COMMAND ON AN EQUAL FOOTING. WHEN THIS HAD BEEN DECREED, FABIUS
HARBORED NO WRATH AGAINST EITHER THE CITIZENS OR RUFUS; BUT RUFUS, WHO
HAD NOT SHOWN THE RIGHT SPIRIT IN THE FIRST PLACE, WAS NOW ESPECIALLY
PUFFED UP AND COULD NOT CONTAIN HIMSELF. HE KEPT ASKING FOR THE RIGHT
TO HOLD SOLE SWAY A DAY AT A TIME, OR FOR SEVERAL DAYS ALTERNATELY.
FABIUS, POSSESSED WITH DREAD THAT HE MIGHT WORK SOME HARM IF HE SHOULD
GET POSSESSION OF THE UNDIVIDED POWER, WOULD NOT CONSENT TO EITHER
PLAN OF HIS, BUT DIVIDED THE ARMY IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY EACH, THE
SAME AS THE CONSULS, HAD A SEPARATE FORCE. AND IMMEDIATELY RUFUS
ENCAMPED APART, IN ORDER TO ILLUSTRATE THE FACT THAT HE WAS HOLDING
SWAY IN HIS OWN RIGHT AND NOT SUBJECT TO THE DICTATOR. Hannibal,
accordingly, perceiving this came up as if to seize a position, and
drew him into battle. He then encompassed him about by means of an
ambuscade and plunged him into danger, to such an extent, indeed, that
he would have annihilated his entire army, if Fabius had not assailed
Hannibal in the rear and prevented it.

After this experience [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^16] RUFUS ALTERED HIS
ATTITUDE, LED THE REMNANT OF THE ARMY IMMEDIATELY INTO FABIUS'S
QUARTERS AND LAID DOWN HIS COMMAND. HE DID NOT WAIT FOR THE PEOPLE TO
REVOKE IT, BUT VOLUNTARILY GAVE UP THE LEADERSHIP WHICH HE, A MERE
MASTER OF THE HORSE, HAD OBTAINED FROM HIS SUPERIOR. AND FOR THIS ALL
PRAISED HIM. AND FABIUS AT ONCE, NOTHING DOUBTING, ACCEPTED ENTIRE
CONTROL AND THE PEOPLE SANCTIONED IT. [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^17]
THEREAFTER AS HEAD OF THE ARMY HE AFFORDED GREATEST SECURITY, AND WHEN
ABOUT TO RETIRE FROM OFFICE SENT FOR THE CONSULS, SURRENDERED THE ARMY
TO THEM, AND ADVISED THEM VERY FULLY REGARDING ALL THE DETAILS OF WHAT
MUST BE DONE. AND THEY WERE NOT UNDULY BOLD, BUT ACTED ENTIRELY ON THE
SUGGESTION OF FABIUS, notwithstanding that Geminus had had some
previous success. He had seen the Carthaginian fleet at anchor off
Italy but not venturing to display any hostility because of the Roman
ability to meet it, and he had started on a retaliatory voyage, first
making sure the good conduct of the Corsicans and Sardinians by a
cruise past their coasts; he had then landed in Libya and plundered
the shore district. In spite of this achievement he was not so puffed
up by it as to risk a decisive engagement with Hannibal, but was
willing to abide by the injunctions of Fabius. One consequence was
that the cities were no longer found siding with the Carthaginians, as
they had done; for they feared that Hannibal would be driven out of
Italy and they themselves suffer some calamity at the hands of the
Romans since they were their kinsmen. The majority were engaged in
trying to read the future, but a few again espoused the Roman cause,
and some sent them offerings. And though Hiero often sent grain (and
also sent a statue of Victory), the Romans accepted it only once. Yet
they were in such hard straits for money that the silver coinage which
was previously unalloyed and pure was now mixed with copper.

IX, 1.--All this is what took place in Italy at that period. Some
slaves also formed a conspiracy against Rome, but were apprehended in
advance. And a spy caught in the city had his hands cut off and was
released that he might tell the Carthaginians his experience with his
own lips.--In Spain in a sea-fight near the mouth of the Iber Scipio
was victorious; for when the struggle proved to be too even, the sails
were cut down in order that the men being placed in a desperate
position might struggle more zealously. He also ravaged the country,
got possession of numerous fortresses and through his brother Publius
Scipio gained control of some Spanish cities. A Spaniard named Habelux
affecting loyalty to the Carthaginians but in reality in the Roman
service persuaded the Carthaginian guardian of the Spanish hostages to
send them to their homes, in order that they might use their influence
to bring their cities into friendly relations. Habelux naturally took
charge of them, inasmuch as he had been the one to suggest the idea,
but first sent to the Scipios and held a discussion about what he
desired; then, while he was secretly taking the hostages away by
night, he of course got captured. In this way it was the Romans who
obtained possession of these men and acquired control of their native
states by returning them to their homes.


_(BOOK 15, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: B.C. 216 (_a.u._ 538)] Though in these matters they were
fortunate, they encountered elsewhere a fearful disaster, than which
they never suffered one more terrible either earlier or subsequently.
It was preceded by certain portents and the solemn verses of the Sibyl
which had prophesied the disaster to them so many years before.
Remarkable was also the prediction of Marcius. He also was a
soothsayer and it was his rede that, inasmuch as they were Trojans of
old, they should be overthrown in the Plain of Diomed. This was in
Daunian Apulia and took its name from the settlement of Diomed, which
he made there in the course of his wanderings. In that plain is also
Cannæ, where the present misfortune occurred, close to the Ionian Gulf
and near the mouths of the Aufidus. The Sibyl had urged them to beware
of the spot, yet said it would avail them naught, even if they should
keep it under strictest guard.

Such were the oracular utterances: now what befell the Romans was
this. [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^21] THE COMMANDERS WERE ÆMILIUS PAULUS AND
TERENTIUS VARRO, MEN NOT OF SIMILAR TEMPERAMENT. FOR THE ONE WAS A
PATRICIAN, POSSESSED OF THE GRACES OF EDUCATION, AND ESTEEMED SAFETY
BEFORE HASTE: BUT TERENTIUS HAD BEEN BROUGHT UP AMONG THE RABBLE, WAS
PRACTICED IN VULGAR BRAVADO, AND SO DISPLAYED LACK OF PRUDENCE IN
NEARLY ALL RESPECTS, THINKING, FOR INSTANCE, THAT HE ALONE SHOULD HAVE
THE LEADERSHIP IN VIEW OF THE QUIET BEHAVIOR OF HIS COLLEAGUE. NOW
THEY BOTH REACHED THE CAMP AT A MOST OPPORTUNE TIME: HANNIBAL HAD NO
LONGER ANY PROVENDER; SPAIN WAS IN TURMOIL; THE AFFECTION OF THE
ALLIES WAS BEING ALIENATED FROM HIM; AND IF THEY HAD WAITED FOR EVEN
THE BRIEFEST POSSIBLE PERIOD, THEY WOULD HAVE CONQUERED. AS MATTERS
WENT, HOWEVER, THE RECKLESSNESS OF TERENTIUS AND THE SUBMISSIVENESS OF
PAULUS COMPASSED THEIR DEFEAT. Hannibal attempted to lead them into a
conflict at once, and with a few followers drew near their stronghold:
then, when a sortie was made, he purposely fell back to create the
impression of being afraid and so drew them the more surely into a set
battle. But, as Paulus restrained his own soldiers from pursuit,
Hannibal simulated terror and that night packed up as if to depart;
and he left behind him numerous articles lying within the palisade and
ordered the rest of the baggage to be escorted with a considerable
show of carelessness so as to make the Romans devote their attention
to plundering it and give him thereby a chance to attack them. He
would have translated his wish into fact, if Paulus had not held back
his soldiers, in spite of their reluctance, and held back Terentius as
well.

So Hannibal, having failed in this essay also, came by night to Cannæ,
and since he knew the place as one fit for ambuscades and for a
pitched battle, he encamped there. And first he ploughed the whole
site over, because it had a sandy subsoil and his object was to have a
cloud of dust raised in the conflict; the wind generally springs up
there in summer toward noon, and he contrived to get it behind his
back. The consuls seeing at dawn that his stockade was empty of men at
first waited, apprehending ambush, but later in the broad daylight
came to Cannæ. Each of the Roman leaders bivouacked apart beside the
river, for since they were not congenial they avoided association
together. Paulus remained quiet, but Terentius was anxious to force
the issue; when he saw, however, that the soldiers were rather
listless, he gave up the idea. But Hannibal, who was determined to
goad them into battle even against their will, shut them off from
their sources of water, prevented their scattering into small parties,
and threw the bodies of the slain into the stream above their
intrenchments and in plain sight, in order to disgust them with the
drinking supply. Then the Romans started to array themselves for
battle. Hannibal anticipating this movement had planted ambuscades at
the foot of the hills but held the remainder of his army drawn up. He
also ordered some men at a given signal to simulate desertion; they
were to throw away their shields and spears and larger swords but
secretly to retain their daggers, so that after his antagonists had
received them as unarmed, they might attack them unexpectedly.

The Romans having had in view since early morning the troops arrayed
about Hannibal were now arming themselves and taking their places. The
trumpets incited both parties, the signals were raised, and then
ensued the clash of battle and a contest which assumed a variety of
aspects. Until noon the advantage had not fallen distinctly to either
side. Then the wind came up and the false deserters were received as
men destitute of arms and got behind the Romans, alleging the very
natural reason that they wanted to be out of the way of the
Carthaginian attack. At this moment the men rose from ambush on both
sides, Hannibal with his cavalry charged the front ranks, the enemy
confused the Romans on every hand, the wind and the dust cloud
assailed their faces violently, causing perplexity, and interfered
with their breathing, which was already growing quick and labored from
exertion, so that deprived of sight, deprived of voice, they perished
in a wild mêlée, preserving no semblance of order. So great a
multitude fell that Hannibal did not even try to find out the number
of the common people, and in regard to the number of the knights and
members of the senate he did not write to the Carthaginians at home
but indicated it by the finger-rings; these he measured off by the
quart and sent away. Only the senators and the knights wore
finger-rings. Yet after all a number made good their escape even on
this occasion, among them Terentius; Paulus was killed. Hannibal did
not pursue nor did he hasten to Rome. He might have set out at once
for Rome with either his entire army or at least a portion of it and
have quickly ended the war; yet he did not do so, although Maharbal
urged him to do so. Hence he was censured as being able to win
victories but not understanding how to use them. Since they had
delayed this time, they could never again have an opportunity to make
haste. Therefore Hannibal regretted it, feeling that he had committed
a blunder, and was ever crying out: "Oh Cannæ, Cannæ!"

IX, 2.--The Romans, who had been in such imminent danger of being
destroyed, won back their superiority through Scipio. He was a son of
the Publius Scipio in Spain, and had saved the life of his father when
the latter was wounded: [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^24] HE WAS AT THIS TIME
SERVING IN THE ARMY, HAD FLED TO CANUSIUM, AND LATER ACHIEVED RENOWN.
BY COMMON CONSENT OF THE FUGITIVES ASSEMBLED AT CANUSIUM HE RECEIVED
THE LEADERSHIP, SET IN ORDER AFFAIRS AT THAT PLACE, SENT GARRISONS TO
THE REGIONS IN PROXIMITY, AND BOTH PLANNED AND EXECUTED ALL MEASURES
WELL.

The people of Rome heard of the defeat but did not believe it. When
they at last came to believe it, they were filled with sorrow and met
in the senate-house, but were ready to break up without accomplishing
anything, when finally Fabius proposed that they send scouts to bring
a report of what had really happened and what Hannibal was doing. He
advised them not to lament but to go about in silence that the
necessary measures might be taken, and furthermore to collect as large
a force as they might and to call upon adjoining settlements for aid.
After this, upon learning that Hannibal was in Apulia and receiving a
letter from Terentius stating that he was alive and what he was doing,
they recovered a little of their courage. Marcus Junius was named
dictator and Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus master of the horse.
Immediately they enrolled not only those of the citizens who were in
their prime but also those even who were past the fighting age; they
added to their forces prisoners on promise of pardon and slaves on
promise of freedom and a brigand here and there; moreover they called
on their allies to help, reminding them of any kindness ever shown
them and promising in addition to give to some of them grain, to
others money, as they had never done before; they also sent emissaries
to Greece to either persuade or hire men to serve as their allies.

Hannibal, learning that the Romans had united their troops and were
engaged in preparations, still delayed at Cannæ despairing of a
capture by assault. Of the captives he released the allied contingent
without ransom as before, but the Romans he kept, hoping to dispose of
them by sale, since this would make him better off but the Romans
worse off. When no one came from Rome in quest of the captives, he
ordered them to send some of their number home after ransom, provided
they had first taken oath to return. When even then the Romans refused
to ransom them, he shipped those who were of any value to Carthage,
and of the rest he put some to death after maltreating them and forced
the others to fight as gladiators, pitting friends and relatives
against each other. Those who were sent for ransom returned in order
to be true to their oaths, but later fled. They were disfranchised by
the censors and committed suicide.

Hannibal sent his brother Mago to report the victory to the
Carthaginians and to ask them for money and troops. He on his arrival
counted over the rings and described the success naturally in even
more glowing terms than it deserved; everything that he asked was
voted and they would not listen to Hanno who opposed it and advised
them to end the war while they seemed to have the upper hand. However,
they never put their vote into effect, but delayed. Hannibal
meanwhile had advanced into Campania, had seized a Samnite fortress,
and marched upon Neapolis. He sent before him a few soldiers with the
booty and when the people of the city, thinking them alone, rushed out
upon them, he unexpectedly appeared in person and slew a large number.
He did not capture the city, nor did he lay siege to it for long. The
reason will presently be plain. Of the Campanian inhabitants of Capua
a part clung to Roman friendship, but others favored Hannibal. After
his success at Cannæ and when some of their men taken captive had been
released the populace was clamorous to revolt to Hannibal, but the men
of rank waited for some time. Finally the crowd made a rush upon them
as they were assembled in the senate-house and would have made away
with them all but for the action of some one of the crowd who saw how
great a misfortune this would be. This person denounced the senators
as by all means deserving to perish, but said that they ought first to
choose others to fill their places, for the State could not endure
without some men to concert measures for them. Having gained the
assent of the Capuan people he ejected each one of them from the
senate-house, asking the populace, as he did so, whom they chose in
his place. Thus, as they found themselves unable to choose others on
short notice, they let all the old senators go unharmed, because they
appeared to be necessary. Later they became reconciled with one
another and made peace with Hannibal. This is why he quickly retired
from Neapolis and came to Capua. He held a conference with the people
and made many attractive offers, among other things promising to give
them the supreme direction of Italy; for he was anxious that they
should be animated by hope and, feeling that they would be working for
themselves, develop greater zeal in the struggle.

At the revolt of Capua the rest of Campania also became restive, and
the news of the town's secession troubled the Romans. As for Hannibal,
he started on a campaign against the Nucerini. Under stress of siege
and owing to lack of food they thrust out that portion of the
population which was not available for fighting. Hannibal would not
receive them, however, and gave them assurance of safety only in case
they should go back to the city. [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^25] THEREFORE THE
REST ALSO AGREED TO LEAVE THE CITY CARRYING ONE CHANGE OF CLOTHING. AS
SOON, HOWEVER, AS HANNIBAL WAS MASTER OF THE SITUATION, HE SHUT THE
SENATORS INTO BATH-HOUSES AND SUFFOCATED THEM, AND IN THE CASE OF THE
OTHERS, ALTHOUGH HE HAD TOLD THEM TO GO AWAY WHERE THEY PLEASED, HE
CUT DOWN ON THE ROAD MANY EVEN OF THEM. A NUMBER OF THEM SAVED THEIR
LIVES ONLY BY TAKING REFUGE IN THE WOODS. THEREUPON THE REST BECAME
AFRAID AND WOULD NO LONGER COME TO TERMS WITH HIM, BUT RESISTED WHILE
THEY WERE ABLE. The people of Nola were planning to range themselves
under his banner, but when they saw what had been done to their
countrymen, they quietly let Marcellus in and later repulsed Hannibal
when he assaulted their city. Repelled from Nola he captured the
people of Acerræ by starving them out. [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^29] HE
MADE THE SAME TERMS WITH THEM AS WITH THE DWELLERS IN NUCERIA AND ALSO
ACCORDED THEM THE SAME TREATMENT. After that he directed his forces
against Casilinum in which Romans and about a thousand of the allies
had taken refuge. These put to death the native citizens who were
meditating how to betray them, repulsed Hannibal several times and
held out nobly against hunger. When food was failing them they sent a
man across the river on an inflated skin to inform the dictator. The
latter put jars filled with wheat into the river at night and bade
them keep their eyes on the current in the darkness. For a while he
thus supplied them with nutriment without being discovered, but
eventually a jar was dashed against some obstacle and shattered; then
the Carthaginians became aware of what was going on and put chains
across the river. After a number had perished of hunger and of their
wounds, they abandoned one half of the city, cut down the bridge, and
held out in the other half. They now threw turnip seed from the wall
upon a spot outside, doing this in order to alarm the enemy and make
them believe that they were likely to endure for a long time.
Hannibal, indeed, thinking that they must have plenty of food and
astonished at their endurance invited them to capitulate and released
them for money. The Romans outside were glad to ransom them, and more
than that they showed them honor.

IX, 3.--While these events took place the messengers returned from
Delphi saying that the Pythia admonished them to shake off sloth and
devote themselves to the war. Then they were filled with new
strength. They overtook Hannibal and encamped near him so as to watch
his movements. Junius the dictator ordered the Romans to do exactly as
the Carthaginians were commanded to do. So they took their food and
sleep at the same time, visited the sentries in the same manner, and
were doing everything else in similar fashion. When Hannibal
understood the situation, he waited for a stormy night and announced
to some of his soldiers a skirmish for after nightfall. Junius did the
same thing. Thereupon Hannibal ordered different detachments to attack
him in succession at different times in order that his opponent might
be involved in constant labor as a result of sleeplessness and the
storm. He himself rested with the troops not in action. When day was
about to break, he recalled the army, as was expected, and the Romans
put away their weapons and retired to rest; then all of a sudden he
attacked them, with the result that he killed a number and captured
the entrenchments, which were deserted.

Conditions in Sicily and Sardinia grew unsettled but did not receive
any consideration at the hands of the Romans. [Sidenote: B.C. 215
(_a.u._ 539)] The consuls chosen were Gracchus, previously master of
the horse, and Postumius Albinus. Albinus was ambuscaded and destroyed
with his entire army by the Boii as he was traversing a wooded
mountain. The barbarians cut off his head, scooped out the interior
and after gilding it used it for a bowl in their sacred
ceremonials.--Portents occurred at this time. A cow brought forth a
horse and fire shone out at sea. The consuls Gracchus and Fabius
encamped and kept watch of Hannibal while he stayed in Capua, to see
what he did. They spent their time in sending scouts in every
direction, defending the allies, trying to win back the revolted and
injuring their adversaries' interests. Hannibal, so long as he
obtained a barely sufficient supply of food at the cost of
encountering dangers, led a temperate life, as did his army; but after
they had taken Capua and wintered there in idleness with ample
provisions, they began to lose their physical strength by not laboring
and their intellectual force by tranquillity, and in changing their
ancestral habits they learned an accomplishment new to them,--that of
being defeated in battle.--When the work of war finally became
pressing, Hannibal transferred his quarters to the mountains and gave
the army exercise. But they could not get strong in a short space of
time. He was encouraged by the arrival of reinforcements from home,
especially in the matter of elephants. He now set out against Nola
intending to capture it or else to draw Marcellus, who was ravaging
Samnium, away from that region. As he could accomplish nothing, he
withdrew from the city and laid waste the country, until he suffered a
decisive defeat in battle,--an event which grieved him. Many Spaniards
and even many Libyans now forsook him and deserted to the Romans,--a
new experience for him. Consequently, despairing of his own and the
soldiers' prospects he abandoned that entire region and retired to
Capua. Afterward he left there also to take up a different position.

[Sidenote: B.C. 217 (_a.u._ 537)] The Scipios had crossed the river
Iber and were ravaging the country; they had secured control of
various cities and when Hasdrubal for this reason hastened to oppose
them, they had conquered him in battle. The Carthaginians learning
this thought that Hasdrubal needed more assistance than did Hannibal,
and fearing that the Scipios might attempt to cross into Libya also
they sent only a small body of troops to Hannibal, but despatched the
largest detachment with Mago to Spain with the utmost speed; and they
bade him after the reduction of Spain to remain to guard their
interests there, whereas Hasdrubal was to be sent with a body of
troops against Italy. [Sidenote: B.C. 216 (_a.u._ 538)] The Scipios,
made aware of the plan, no longer gave battle for fear that Hasdrubal
perhaps might win a victory and then hasten to Italy. However, as the
Carthaginians went on injuring the part of the country that was
friendly to the Romans, Publius engaged in a struggle with such of his
opponents as attacked him and won a victory; Gnæus intercepted the
enemy who were retiring from this battle and annihilated them. As a
result of this disaster and because numerous cities were transferring
their allegiance to the Romans and some of the Libyans had gone over
to their side, Hasdrubal remained there longer than he was intending.
The Scipios sent their accessions at once to Italy, and they
themselves continued to adjust affairs in Spain. They captured the
subjects of Saguntum who had caused them the war and their reverses,
and they tore down the hostile settlement and sold the men. After this
they took possession of Saguntum and restored it to its original
inhabitants. They were so scrupulous in regard to the plunder that
they sent nothing home. They allowed the partners of their campaign to
do so, but for themselves they sent only some jackstones to their
children. Hence the senate upon the request of Gnæus for leave of
absence that he might go home and borrow a dowry for his daughter, who
was of age to be married, voted that a dowry be given her from the
public funds.

IX, 4.--In the course of the same period both Sicily and Sardinia had
become openly hostile. But the disturbance in these regions soon
subsided. [Sidenote: B.C. 215 (_a.u._ 539)] Hasdrubal, who was aiding
them, was captured and Manlius Torquatus recovered almost the entire
island. For the time being affairs in Sicily were quiet, but afterward
disturbance reigned anew. King Philip of Macedonia showed himself a
most open partisan of the Carthaginians. In his desire to add Greece
to his possessions he made an agreement with Hannibal that they should
conduct the war in common, and that the Carthaginians should get Italy
but he should have Greece and Epirus together with the islands. The
agreement was made on this basis, but through the capture of the
herald who had been sent to Hannibal by Philip the Romans learned what
was taking place and forthwith despatched the prætor Marcus Valerius
Lævinus[30] against him. They intended to make him anxious about
internal affairs, so that he should stay at home. The plan worked.
[Sidenote: B.C. 214 (_a.u._ 540)] Philip had progressed as far as
Corcyca with the intention of sailing to Italy, but on learning that
Lævinus was already at Brundusium he returned home. When Lævinus had
sailed as far as Corcyca, Philip set out against the Roman allies; he
had captured Oricum and was besieging Apollonia. Lævinus made an
expedition against him anew, recovered Oricum and rescued Apollonia.
Then Philip after burning the ships which he had used retired
homewards overland.

[Footnote 30: Zonaras consistently spells this name _Lavinius_.]

The people of Rome chose Fabius and Marcellus consuls. Hannibal was
then traveling about in what is called Calabria and in adjacent
regions, and they assigned the care of him to Gracchus, who had held
office before them. The latter routed Hanno (who had come from
Bruttium and confronted him near Beneventum), and then going on he
watched Hannibal closely, kept ravaging the possessions of rebels and
won some cities safely back. The consuls themselves turned their steps
toward Campania, for they were anxious to subdue it and so leave no
element of hostility behind their backs when they should march against
Hannibal. They then divided forces. Fabius overran the districts of
Campania and Samnium. Marcellus crossed into Sicily and proceeded to
besiege Syracuse. The town had submitted to him, but then had revolted
again through the treachery of some men by the use of a false message.
He would have subdued it very speedily,--for he assaulted the wall by
both land and sea at once,--had not Archimedes with his inventions
enabled the citizens to resist an extremely long time. By his devices
he suspended stones and heavy-armed soldiers in the air whom he would
let down suddenly and soon draw up again. Even ships that carried
towers he would dash one upon another; he would pull them up and
[Sidenote: (FRAG. 56^31?)] LIFTING THEM HIGH WOULD LET GO ALL IN A
MASS so that when they fell into the water they were sunk by the
impact. At last in an incredible manner he destroyed the whole Roman
fleet by conflagration. By tilting a kind of mirror toward the sun he
concentrated the sun's beams on it; and as the thickness and
smoothness of the mirror coöperated to ignite the air from these beams
he kindled a great flame, all of which he directed upon the ships that
lay at anchor in the path of the fire, and he consumed them all.
Marcellus, therefore, despairing of capturing the city on account of
the inventiveness of Archimedes thought to take it by famine after a
regular investment. This duty he assigned to Pulcher while he himself
turned his attention to those who had participated in the revolt of
Syracuse. Any who yielded were granted pardon, but those who resisted
he treated harshly, and he captured a number of the cities by force,
some also by betrayal. In the meantime Himilco had come from Carthage
with an army, had occupied Agrigentum and Heraclea and had reached
Syracuse. There he was first defeated, then was in turn victorious,
and finally was beaten by a sudden assault on the part of Marcellus.

IX, 5.--Thereafter Marcellus was still investing Syracuse. Hannibal
was passing his time in Calabria. [Sidenote: B.C. 212 (_a.u._ 542)]
The Romans, moreover, had again experienced many and disagreeable
reverses. The consuls had received a setback near Capua, Gracchus had
died in Lucania, Tarentum and other cities had revolted, Hannibal,
previously cowed, remained in Italy and had marched upon Rome, and
both the Scipios had perished. Elated by these events Hannibal
undertook to render assistance to Capua. He went as far as Beneventum,
then, ascertaining that Claudius had returned from Samnium into
Lucania on account of the death of Gracchus, he became afraid that the
Romans might secure control of parts of it, and he advanced no farther
but turned to meet Claudius.--Upon the death of the Scipios the whole
of Spain was thrown into disorder. Some towns voluntarily went over to
the Carthaginians and others under compulsion, even if they did later
swing back to the Roman side.

Marcellus, finding that he was accomplishing naught by assault on
Syracuse, thought of the following scheme. There was a vulnerable spot
in the Syracusans' wall, which they called Galeagra; it had never
before been recognized as such, but the fact was at this time
discovered. He waited till the whole town of Syracuse celebrated an
all night festival to Artemis and then bade some soldiers scale the
wall at that point. After that some gates were opened by them and, as
soon as a few others had gone in, all, both inside and outside, at a
given signal raised a shout and struck their spears upon their
shields, and the trumpeters blew a blast, with the result that utter
panic overwhelmed the Syracusans, who were anyway somewhat the worse
for drink, and the city was captured with the exception of Achradina
and what is called the "island." Marcellus plundered the captured town
and attacked the portions not yet taken, and with time and labor but
after all successfully he conquered the remainder of Syracuse. The
Romans when they became masters of these districts killed many
persons, among them Archimedes. He was constructing a geometrical
figure and hearing that the enemy were at hand he said: [Sidenote:
(FRAG. 56^32?)] "Let them come at my head, but keep their distance
from my figure!" He was little perturbed when a hostile warrior
confronted him, and by his words, "Fellow, stand away from my figure,"
he irritated the man and was cut down.

[Sidenote: B.C. 211 (_a.u._ 543)] Marcellus for his capture of
Syracuse and his conciliation of most of the rest of Sicily received
high praise and was appointed consul. They had nominated Torquatus,
who once had put his son to death. He declined, however, saying:
[Sidenote: cp. FRAG. 32^6] "I could not endure your blunders, nor you
my punctiliousness," whereupon they elected Marcellus and Valerius
Lævinus.

IX, 6.--After Marcellus left Sicily, Hannibal sent a troop of cavalry
there and the Carthaginians despatched another. They won several
battles and acquired some cities. And if the prætor Cornelius
Dolabella had not come upon the scene, they would have subjugated all
Sicily.

Capua was at this time taken by the Romans. It availed nothing that
Hannibal marched upon Rome in order to draw away from Capua the forces
besieging it, although he traversed Latium, came to the Tiber, and
laid waste the suburbs of the city. The people of Rome were
frightened, but still they voted that one of the consuls[31] should
remain at Capua while the other defended them. It was Claudius who
remained at Capua, for he had been wounded: Flaccus hastened to Rome.

[Footnote 31: Possibly an error on the part of Zonaras for
_proconsuls_.]

Hannibal kept making raids all the time before their eyes and doing a
great amount of harm, but for some time they were satisfied to
preserve their possessions within the walls. When, however, he reached
the point of assaulting the city and their armies at once, they risked
the proverbial cast of the die and made a sortie. They were already
engaged in skirmishing when [Sidenote: (FRAG. 56^33?)] AN
EXTRAORDINARY STORM ACCOMPANIED BY AN INCONCEIVABLY STRONG WIND AS
WELL AS THUNDER, HAIL, AND LIGHTNING, BROKE FROM A CLEAR SKY, so that
both were glad enough to flee as if by mutual consent back to the
place from which they had set out. They were just laying aside their
arms when the sky became clear. Although Hannibal concluded that the
event mentioned, coming as it did precisely at the moment of conflict,
had not occurred without divine ordering, yet he did not desist from
his siege operations and even attempted again on a subsequent occasion
to force the issue. But when the same phenomena were met for the
second time, he became terrified. What added to his alarm was that
the enemy though in so great danger did not withdraw from Capua and
were getting ready to send both soldiers and a prætor into Spain, and
that being in need of funds they sold the spot where he was encamped,
which was a piece of public property. In despair he retired, often
crying aloud, "Oh, Cannæ, Cannæ!" And he no longer showed a
disposition to render aid to Capua.

The people of that city although in extremities were nevertheless
desperate, believing that they could not obtain pardon from the
Romans, and they therefore held out and sent a letter to Hannibal
begging him to assist them. The bearers of the letter were seized by
Flaccus (Claudius had before this time died of his wound) and had
their hands cut off. Seeing them the Campanians were terribly dismayed
and took counsel as to what they should do. After considerable talk a
certain Vibius Virius, one of the foremost men and most responsible
for the revolt, spoke, saying: "Our only refuge and freedom lies in
death. Escort me home. I have a poison made ready." So he took with
him those who were willing to accept his advice and with them
voluntarily gave up his life. The rest opened the gates to the Romans.
Flaccus took possession of all their arms and money, killed some of
the head men and sent others to Rome. The only ones that he left
unmolested were the survivors of the common people, and he spared them
only on condition that they receive a Roman governor, maintain no
senate, and hold no assembly.

Later they subjected themselves to other disabilities by daring to
accuse Flaccus. [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^34] THE CAMPANIANS UNDERTOOK TO
ACCUSE FLACCUS AND THE SYRACUSANS MARCELLUS, when the latter was
already consul. And Marcellus made a defence, refusing to perform any
of the duties of his office until he had defended himself. The
Syracusans when given a hearing were rather sparing of their remarks
and devoted themselves not to accusing Marcellus but to supplication
and defence, showing that they had not of their own free will revolted
from the Romans and begging that pardon be granted them. While
uttering these words they fell upon the ground and bewailed their lot.
When a decision was rendered, it was to the effect that Marcellus was
not guilty; that the Syracusans, however, were deserving of a certain
degree of kind treatment not for their acts but for their words and
supplications. As Marcellus asked to be excused from returning to
Sicily, they sent Lævinus. The Syracusans in this way obtained some
consideration: the Campanians, however, were led by stupidity to
deliver their accusation with too much audacity and were rebuked.
Flaccus was not present, but one of his ex-lieutenants conducted his
defence for him.

After the capture of Capua the other strongholds in the vicinity went
over to the Romans, with the exception of Atellanæ. The dwellers in
this town abandoned their city and went in a body to Hannibal. Also
the rest of Italy that favored the Carthaginian cause was being
gradually estranged and the consuls in their tours of the country were
taking possession of it. The Tarentini did not as yet openly avow
their allegiance to the Romans, but secretly they were getting tired
of the Carthaginians.


_(BOOK 16, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: FRAG. 56^35] THE ROMANS MADE PROPOSITIONS TO HANNIBAL THAT
BOTH SIDES SHOULD RETURN THEIR PRISONERS. THEY DID NOT EFFECT THE
EXCHANGE BECAUSE THEY WOULD NOT RECEIVE CARTHALO, AS BEING AN ENEMY,
INSIDE OF THEIR WALLS. AND HE REFUSED TO HOLD ANY CONVERSATION WITH
THEM, BUT IMMEDIATELY TURNED BACK IN A RAGE.

At this time, moreover, Lævinus made friends with the Ætolians, who
were allies of Philip; and when Philip had advanced as far as Corcyra
he scared him away again so that the king returned to Macedonia with
speed.

[Sidenote: B.C. 210 (_a.u._ 544)] IX, 7.--The people of Rome sent
Gaius Claudius Nero with soldiers into Spain. He followed the line of
the coast with his fleet as far as the Iber, where he found the
remainder of the Roman forces and confronted Hasdrubal before his
presence had been made known. He enclosed the Carthaginians securely
but was then cheated out of the advantage gained. Hasdrubal, seeing
that he was cut off, sent heralds to Nero proposing to give up the
whole of Spain and leave the country. Nero gladly accepted the offer
and his opponent postponed the settlement of the terms to the
following day. That night Hasdrubal quietly sent out a number of his
men to various parts of the mountains, and they got safely away
because the Romans, in expectation of a truce, were not keeping any
guard. The next day he held a conference with Nero but used up the
whole time without fixing upon anything definitely. That night he sent
off other men in like manner. This he did similarly on several other
days while disputing about some points in the treaty. When the entire
infantry had gone in advance, he himself at last with the cavalry and
elephants silently slipped away. He reached a place of safety and
managed to make himself a source of anxiety to Nero subsequently.

On learning this the people of Rome condemned Nero and voted to
entrust the leadership to somebody else. And they were at a loss whom
to send, for the situation required no ordinary man and many were
breaking away from allegiance on account of the untimely fate of the
Scipios. [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^37] THEREUPON THE FAMOUS PUBLIUS SCIPIO,
WHO SAVED HIS WOUNDED FATHER, OFFERED HIMSELF VOLUNTARILY FOR THE WORK
OF THE CAMPAIGN. HE SURPASSED IN EXCELLENCE AND WAS ALSO RENOWNED FOR
HIS EDUCATION. He was chosen forthwith, but his supporters not long
after regretted their action because of his youth (he was in his
twenty-fourth year) and because his house was in mourning for the loss
of his father and uncle. Accordingly he made a second public
appearance and delivered a speech; and his words put the senators to
shame, so that they did not, to be sure, release him from his command,
but sent Marcus Junius, an elderly man, to accompany him.

After these events matters progressed without catastrophes for the
Romans and gradually grew better. Marcellus after his acquittal before
the court had set out against Hannibal and was making nearly
everything safe, though he was afraid to risk an engagement with men
driven to desperation. At any time that he was forced into a combat he
came out victorious as the result of prudence mingled with daring.
Hannibal now undertook to inflict injury upon those regions which he
was unable to occupy, being influenced by the reasons aforementioned
as also by the fact that the cities in his alliance had either
abandoned him or were intending to do so, and by some other causes. He
hurt a great many and several towns deserted to the Romans for this
reason.

In the case of the city of Salapia the following incident occurred.
Two men managed affairs there and were hostile to each other.
Alinius[32] favored the Carthaginian cause, and Plautius[33] the
Roman; and the latter talked with Alinius about betraying the place to
the Romans. Alinius at once informed Hannibal of the fact and Plautius
was brought to trial. While Hannibal was deliberating with the
councilors as to how to punish him, Plautius dared in his presence to
speak again to Alinius, who stood near, about betrayal. The latter
cried out: "There, there, he's talking to me about this very matter
now." Hannibal distrusted him on account of the improbability of the
case and acquitted Plautius as a victim of blackmail. After his
release the two men became harmonious and brought in soldiers obtained
from Marcellus, with whose aid they cut down the Carthaginian garrison
and delivered the city to the Romans.

[Footnote 32: By comparing other authors the names Alinius and
Plautius are found to be the corruptions of some copyists for Dasius
and Blattius.]

[Footnote 33: [See previous footnote.]]

This was the state of Carthaginian interests in Italy. Not even Sicily
retained its friendliness for them, but submitted to the consul
Lævinus. The leader of the Carthaginians in Sicily was Hanno, and
Muttines was a member of his staff. The latter had been with Hannibal
formerly and owing to the latter's jealousy of his great deeds of
valor had been sent into Sicily. When there also he made a brilliant
record as commander of the cavalry, he incurred the jealousy of Hanno
as well, and as a consequence was deprived of his command. Deeply
grieved at this he joined the Romans. First he accomplished the
betrayal of Agrigentum for them and then he helped them in reducing
other places, so that the whole of Sicily came again under their sway
without any great labor.

[Sidenote: B.C. 209 (_a.u._ 545)] IX, 8.--Fabius and Flaccus subdued
among other cities Tarentum, which Hannibal was holding. They gave
orders to a body of men to overrun Bruttium in order that Hannibal
might leave Tarentum and come to its assistance. When this had
happened, Flaccus kept watch of Hannibal while Fabius by night
assailed Tarentum with ships and infantry at once and captured the
city by means of his assault aided by betrayal. Hannibal, enraged at
the trick, was eager to find some scheme for paying Fabius back. So he
sent him a letter, purporting to be from the dwellers in Metapontum,
looking to a betrayal of the city; for he hoped that Fabius would
advance carelessly in that direction and that he might set a trap for
him on the way. But the Roman leader suspected the truth of the case
and by comparing the writing with the letter which Hannibal had once
written to the Tarentini, he detected the plot from the similarity of
the two.

Scipio for the first part of the time, however much he may have longed
to avenge his father and uncle and however much he yearned for glory
in the war, nevertheless showed no haste on account of the multitude
of his opponents. But after he ascertained that they were passing the
winter at a considerable distance, he disregarded them and marched
upon Carthage,--the Spanish town. Moreover no one gained the slightest
knowledge of his march till he had come close to Carthage itself. And
by much exertion he took the city.

Following the capture of Carthage a very great [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^39]
MUTINY OF THE SOLDIERS came very near TAKING PLACE. Scipio had
promised to give a crown to the first one that set foot on the wall,
and two men, the one a Roman, the other belonging to the allies,
quarreled over it. Their continued dispute promoted a disturbance
among the rest as well and they became inflamed to the utmost degree
and were ready to commit some fearful outrage when Scipio settled the
trouble by crowning both men. [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^39] AND HE
DISTRIBUTED MANY GIFTS TO THE SOLDIERS, ASSIGNING MANY ALSO TO PUBLIC
USES; AND ALL THE HOSTAGES WHO WERE BEING DETAINED THERE HE GAVE BACK
FREELY TO THEIR RELATIVES. AS A RESULT MANY TOWNS AND MANY PRINCES
ESPOUSED HIS CAUSE, THE CELTIBERIAN RACE AMONG THE BEST. HE HAD TAKEN
AMONG THE CAPTIVES A MAIDEN DISTINGUISHED FOR HER BEAUTY AND IT WAS
THOUGHT THAT HE WOULD FALL IN LOVE WITH HER; BUT WHEN HE LEARNED THAT
SHE WAS BETROTHED TO ONE OF THE CELTIBERIAN MAGISTRATES, HE SENT FOR
HIM AND DELIVERED THE YOUNG GIRL TO HIM, BESTOWING UPON HIM
FURTHERMORE THE RANSOM WHICH HER KINSFOLK HAD BROUGHT FOR HER. BY THIS
PROCEDURE HE ATTACHED TO HIS CAUSE BOTH THEM AND THE REMAINDER OF THE
NATION.

Next he learned that Hasdrubal the brother of Hannibal was approaching
rapidly, still ignorant of the capture of the city and expecting to
meet no hostile force on his march. Scipio therefore confronted and
defeated him, and afterward bivouacked in his camp and got control of
many places in the vicinity. [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^40] FOR HE WAS CLEVER
IN STRATEGY, AGREEABLE IN SOCIETY, TERRIFYING TO OPPONENTS, AND
THOROUGHLY HUMANE TO SUCH AS YIELDED. AND ESPECIALLY THE RECOLLECTION
THAT HE HAD MADE A PREDICTION, SAYING BEFOREHAND THAT HE WOULD ENCAMP
IN THE ENEMY'S COUNTRY, CAUSED ALL TO HONOR HIM. THE SPANIARDS
ACTUALLY NAMED HIM "GREAT KING."

Hasdrubal, giving up all hope, was anxious to leave Spain for Italy.
[Sidenote: B.C. 208 (_a.u._ 546)] So after packing everything for the
march he started in winter. His fellow commanders held their ground
and kept Scipio busy so that he could not pursue Hasdrubal nor lighten
the burden of war for the Romans in Italy by going there, nor sail to
Carthage. But, although Scipio did not pursue Hasdrubal, he sent
runners through whom he apprised the people of Rome of his approach,
and he himself gave attention to his own immediate concerns. As he saw
that his opponents were spread over a goodly portion of the country,
he dreaded that whenever he should begin an engagement with them, he
should be the cause of their gathering in one place through a
necessity of aiding one another. Accordingly, he conducted in person a
campaign against Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, and sent Silanus into
Celtiberia against Mago, and also Lucius Scipio his brother into
Bastitania. Lucius occupied the district after hard fighting,
conquered Mago, kept close at his heels as he fled to Hasdrubal, and
came to Scipio before the latter had accomplished anything as yet.

Now that Mago had joined Hasdrubal and Lucius his brother Scipio, at
first they would make descents into the plain and fight strenuously
with their cavalry, and later they would array their whole army in
line of battle but did not do any fighting. This went on for several
days. When the clash finally came, the Carthaginians themselves and
their allies were defeated, their stronghold was taken by the Romans,
and the Romans made use of the provisions in it. This Scipio had
prophesied, as the story goes, three days before. For when materials
for food had failed them he predicted--by what prompting is unknown--:
"On such and such a day we shall make use of the enemy's
store."--After this he left Silanus to take care of the surviving
opponents and himself took his departure to the other cities, many of
which he won over. When he had brought order into the newly acquired
territory he took up his winter abode there. His brother Lucius he
despatched to Rome to report the progress made, to convey the captives
thither, and to investigate how the people of Rome felt toward him.

IX, 9.--The dwellers in Italy had suffered from disease and had
encountered hardships in battles, for some of the Etruscans had
rebelled. But what grieved them more than all else was the fact that
they had lost Marcellus. They had been making a campaign against
Hannibal, who chanced to be at Locri, and both the consuls had been
surrounded by an ambuscade, Marcellus perishing instantly and
Crispinus dying from a wound not long after. Hannibal found the body
of Marcellus and taking his ring with which Marcellus was accustomed
to seal his documents he would forward letters to the cities
purporting to come from him. He was accomplishing whatever he pleased
until Crispinus became aware of it and sent them a warning to be on
their guard. As a result of this the tables were turned upon Hannibal.
He had sent a message to the citizens of Salapia through a fictitious
deserter, and approached the walls in the guise of Marcellus, using
the Latin language in company with other men who understood it, in
order to be taken for Romans. The Salapini, informed of his artifice,
were artful enough in turn to pretend that they believed Marcellus was
really approaching. Then drawing up the portcullis they admitted as
many as it seemed to them they could conveniently dispose of and
killed them all. Hannibal withdrew at once on learning that Locri was
being besieged by the Romans, who had sailed against it from Sicily.

Publius Sulpicius assisted by Ætolians and other allies devastated a
large part of Achæa. But as soon as Philip the Macedonian formed an
alliance with the Achæans, the Romans would have been driven out of
Greece completely but for the fact that the helmet of Philip fell off
and the Ætolians got possession of it. For in this way a report
reached Macedonia that he was dead and a factional uprising took
place; Philip, consequently, fearing that he should be deprived of his
kingdom, hastened to Macedonia. Then the Romans stuck to their places
in Greece and conquered a few cities.

[Sidenote: B.C. 207 (_a.u._ 547)] The following year upon announcement
of Hasdrubal's approach the people of Rome gathered their forces,
summoned their allies, and chose Claudius Nero and Marcus Livius
consuls. Nero they sent against Hannibal, Livius against Hasdrubal.
The latter met him near the city of Sena but did not immediately open
engagement with him. For many days he remained stationary, and
Hasdrubal was in no hurry for battle, either, but remained at rest
awaiting his brother. Nero and Hannibal entered Lucania to encamp and
neither hastened to array his forces for battle, but in other ways
they had some conflicts. Hannibal kept constantly changing position
and Nero kept careful watch of him. As he constantly had the advantage
of him and ere long captured the letter sent to him by Hasdrubal, he
began to despise Hannibal, but fearing that Hasdrubal might overwhelm
Livius through mere numbers he ventured upon a hazardous exploit. He
left on the spot a portion of his force sufficient to check Hannibal
in case the latter should make any movement, and he gave the men
injunctions to do everything to create the impression that he was also
there. He selected the flower of his army and started out apparently
to attack some neighboring city, nor did any one know his true
intentions. He hastened on, then, against Hasdrubal, reached his
colleague at night, and took up his quarters in the latter's
entrenchments. Both made ready for a sudden attack upon the invader.
The situation did not go concealed, but Hasdrubal inferred what had
happened from the fact that the word of command was given twice; for
each consul issued orders to his own troops separately. Suspecting
therefore that Hannibal had been defeated and had perished,--for he
calculated that if his brother were alive, Nero would never have
marched against _him_,--he determined to retire among the Gauls and
there find out definitely about his brother and so carry on the war at
his convenience.

So after giving orders to the army to break up he started out that
night, and the consuls from the noise suspected what was going on, yet
they did not move immediately because of the darkness. At dawn,
however, they sent the cavalry ahead to pursue the enemy and they
themselves followed. Hasdrubal made a stand against the cavalry,
deeming them an isolated troop, but the consuls came up and routed him
and followed after the fugitives, of whom they slaughtered many. Even
the elephants were of no help to the Carthaginians. Inasmuch as some
of them that had been wounded did more harm to those in charge of them
than had been done by the enemy, Hasdrubal gave orders to those seated
upon them to slay the beasts as fast as they got wounded. And they
killed them very easily by piercing them with an iron instrument under
the ear. So they were destroyed by the Carthaginians, but the men by
the Romans. So many fell that the Romans became surfeited with
slaughter and did not wish to pursue the rest. They had destroyed
Hasdrubal along with many others, they had secured huge quantities of
spoil, they had found Roman captives to the number of four thousand in
the camp, and thought they had sufficiently retrieved the disaster of
Cannæ.

At the conclusion of these operations Livius stayed where he was, but
Nero returned to Apulia, reaching it on the sixth day; his absence up
to that time had not been detected. Some of the prisoners he sent into
Hannibal's camp to explain what had happened, and he fixed Hasdrubal's
head on a pole nearby. Hannibal, learning that his brother was
vanquished and dead, and that Nero had conquered and returned,
lamented bitterly, often crying out upon Fortune and Cannæ. And he
retired into Bruttium where he remained inactive.

[Sidenote: B.C. 206 (_a.u._ 548)] IX, 10.--Scipio was detailed to
superintend Roman interests in Spain till what time he should reach a
satisfactory adjustment of them all. First he sailed to Libya with two
quinqueremes, and it so happened that Hasdrubal son of Gisco landed
there at the same time as he did. Syphax, who was king of a portion of
Libya and had enjoyed friendly relations with the Carthaginians,
entertained them both and endeavored to reconcile them. But Scipio
said that he had no private enmity and he could not on his own
responsibility arrange terms for his country.

Accordingly he went back again and began a war against the
Iliturgitani because they had handed over to the Carthaginians the
Romans who took refuge with them after the death of the Scipios. He
did not make himself master of their city until he dared to scale the
wall in person and got wounded. Then the soldiers, put to shame and
fearing for his life, made a very vigorous assault. Having mastered
the situation they killed the whole population and burned down the
entire city. As a result of the fear thus inspired many voluntarily
ranged themselves on his side, whereas many others had to be subdued
by force. Some when subjected to siege burned their cities and slew
their kinsmen and finally themselves.

After subjugating the greater part of the country Scipio shifted his
position to Carthage and there instituted funeral combats in full
armor in honor of his father and his uncle. When many others had
contended, there came also two brothers who continued at variance
about a kingdom, though Scipio had made efforts to reconcile them. And
the elder slew the younger in spite of the superior strength of the
latter.

Subsequently Scipio fell sick, and that was the signal for a rebellion
of the Spaniards. One of Scipio's legions that was in winter quarters
near Sucro became restless. It had shown a lack of docility before
this, but had not ventured upon open rebellion. Now, however,
perceiving that Scipio was incapacitated and influenced further by the
fact that their pay had been slow in coming they mutinied outright,
drove away the tribunes, and elected consuls for themselves. Their
number was about eight thousand. The Spaniards on ascertaining this
revolted with greater readiness and proceeded to damage the territory
belonging to the Roman alliance. Mago, who had intended to abandon
Gades, consequently did not abandon it, but crossed over to the
mainland and wrought considerable mischief.

Scipio learning this wrote and sent a letter to apostate legion in
which he affected to pardon them for revolting on account of the
scarcity of the necessities of life, and did not seem to think it
proper to view them with suspicion but conferred praise upon those who
had accepted their leadership for the purpose of preventing any
outrage due to lack of government being either suffered or committed.
When Scipio had written to this effect and the soldiers had learned
that he was alive and was not angry with them, they made no further
demonstrations. Even after he recovered his health he did not use
harsh threats in dealing with them, but sent a promise to supply them
with food and invited them all to come to him either all together or
only a part at a time. The soldiers, not daring to go in small squads,
went in a body. Scipio arranged that they should bivouac outside the
wall--for it was nearly evening--and furnished them provisions in
abundance. So they encamped, but Scipio brought it about that the
boldest spirits among them should enter the city, and during the night
he overpowered and imprisoned them. At daybreak he sent forth all his
army as if to go on an expedition somewhere. Then he called the recent
arrivals inside the wall without their weapons in order to join his
undertaking after they had received their provision-money. As soon as
they had accordingly entered he signaled the men who had gone forth to
return just as they were. Thus he surrounded the rebels and heaped
upon them many reproaches and threats, saying finally: [Sidenote:
FRAG. 56^42] "YOU ALL DESERVE TO DIE: HOWEVER, I SHALL NOT PUT YOU ALL
TO DEATH BUT I SHALL EXECUTE ONLY A FEW WHOM I HAVE ALREADY ARRESTED;
THE REST I SHALL RELEASE." With these words he set the prisoners in
their midst, fixed them upon crosses, and after copious abuse killed
them. Some of the soldiers standing by grew indignant and raised an
outcry, whereupon he punished a number of them also. After this he
gave the rest their pay and conducted a campaign against Indibilis and
Mandonius. As they were too timid to offer him battle, he attacked and
was victorious.

Following their capitulation most of the rest of Spain was again
enslaved, Mago abandoned Gades, and Masinissa took the Roman side. The
Carthaginians at news of the death of Hasdrubal, Hannibal's brother,
had voted to give up Spain but to recover their prestige in Italy. And
they sent money to Mago that he might gather a force of auxiliaries
and lead a campaign against that country. He, setting out once more
for Italy, reached the Gymnasian islands. The larger one escaped his
grasp; the natives from a distance kept using their slings (in which
art they were masters) against the ships, so that he could not effect
a landing: but he anchored off the smaller one and waited there on
account of the winter. [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^44] THESE ISLANDS ARE
SITUATED CLOSE TO THE MAINLAND IN THE VICINITY OF THE IBER. THEY ARE
THREE IN NUMBER AND THE GREEKS AND THE ROMANS ALIKE CALL THEM THE
GYMNASIAN, BUT THE SPANIARDS THE BALEARES OR HYASOUSÆ,[34] or,
separately, the first Ebusus, the second the "Larger,"[35] and the
third the "Smaller,"[36] exceedingly well named.--Gades was occupied
by the Romans.

[Footnote 34: A corruption for Pityusæ.]

[Footnote 35: Or, in other words, Balearis Major and Balearis Minor.]

[Footnote 36: [See previous footnote.]]


_(BOOK 17, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: FRAG. 56^45] IX, 11.--MASINISSA RANKED AMONG THE MOST
PROMINENT MEN: IN FORCE AND IN PLANNING ALIKE HE DISPLAYED A
SUPERIORITY, AS IT CHANCED, where warlike deeds were concerned. He had
left the Carthaginians for the Romans as a result of circumstances now
to be related. Hasdrubal the son of Gisco was a friend of his and had
betrothed to him his daughter Sophonis. Hasdrubal, however, became
acquainted with Syphax and perceiving that he favored the Romans did
not keep his agreement with Masinissa any longer. He was so anxious to
add Syphax, who was lord of a very great power, to the Carthaginian
alliance that when his father about this time died he helped him to
take possession of his domain, which properly belonged to Masinissa,
and furthermore gave him Sophonis in marriage. [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^46]
SHE WAS CONSPICUOUS FOR BEAUTY, HAD BEEN TRAINED IN A LIBERAL LITERARY
AND MUSICAL EDUCATION, WAS OF ATTRACTIVE MANNERS, COY, AND SO LOVABLE
THAT THE MERE SIGHT OF HER OR EVEN THE SOUND OF HER VOICE VANQUISHED
EVEN A PERSON QUITE DEVOID OF AFFECTION.

Syphax for these reasons attached himself to the Carthaginians, and
Masinissa on the contrary took up with the Romans and from first to
last proved very useful to them. [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^47] SCIPIO AFTER
WINNING OVER THE WHOLE TERRITORY SOUTH OF THE PYRENEES, PARTLY BY
FORCE, PARTLY BY TREATY, EQUIPPED HIMSELF TO JOURNEY TO LIBYA. THE
PEOPLE OF ROME, HOWEVER, THROUGH JEALOUSY OF HIS SUCCESSES AND THROUGH
FEAR THAT HE MIGHT BECOME ARROGANT AND PLAY THE TYRANT SENT TWO OF THE
PRÆTORS TO RELIEVE HIM AND CALLED HIM HOME.

THUS HE WAS DEPOSED FROM HIS COMMAND. BUT SULPICIUS TOGETHER WITH
ATTALUS OCCUPIED OREUS BY TREACHERY AND OPUS BY MAIN FORCE. PHILIP WAS
UNABLE TO SEND THEM SPEEDY AID AS THE ÆTOLIANS HAD SEIZED THE PASSES
IN ADVANCE. BUT AT LAST HE DID ARRIVE ON THE SCENE AND FORCED ATTALUS
BACK TO HIS SHIPS. PHILIP, HOWEVER, WISHED TO CONCLUDE A TRUCE WITH
THE ROMANS. AND AFTER SOME PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION THE PEACE
PROPOSITION WAS WITHDRAWN, BUT HE MOVED THE ÆTOLIANS OUT OF THEIR
POSITION OF ALLIANCE WITH THE ROMANS AND MADE THEM HIS OWN FRIENDS
INSTEAD.

Hannibal for a time kept quiet, satisfied if he might only retain such
advantages as were already his. And the consuls thinking that his
power had slowly wasted away without a battle also waited.

[Sidenote: B.C. 205 (_a.u._ 549)] The succeeding year Publius Scipio
and [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^48] LICINIUS CRASSUS BECAME CONSULS. And THE
LATTER STAYED IN ITALY, but Scipio had received orders to leave there
for Sicily and Libya to the end that in case he should not capture
Carthage he might at least eventually draw Hannibal from Italy. He did
not succeed in securing an army of any real value nor in getting an
expenditure for triremes, because the honors accorded to his prowess
had made him an object of jealousy. The people would scarcely supply
him with the necessities. While he set out with the fleet of the
allies and a few volunteers drawn from the populace, Mago left the
island and after sailing along the Italian coast disembarked in
Liguria. Crassus was in Bruttium lying in wait for Hannibal. Philip,
however, had become reconciled with the Romans; for on ascertaining
that Publius Sempronius had reached Apollonia with a large force he
was glad to make peace.

[Sidenote: (FRAG. 56^50?)] Scipio the consul landed in Sicily and made
ready to sail to Libya, but he could not do so because he did not have
a complete force at his disposal and what he had was undisciplined.
Therefore he resided there for the entire winter, drilling his
followers and enrolling others in addition. As he was on the point of
making the passage, a message came to him from Rhegium that some of
the citizens of Locri would betray the city. Having denounced the
commander of the garrison and obtained no satisfaction from Hannibal
they were now ready to go over to the Romans. Accordingly he sent a
detachment there and with the aid of the traitors seized a good part
of the city during the night. The Carthaginians were huddled together
in the citadel and sent for Hannibal, whereupon Scipio also set sail
with speed and by a sudden sally repulsed Hannibal when the latter was
close to the city. Next he captured the acropolis and, after
entrusting the entire city to the care of the military tribunes,
sailed back again. He was unable, however, to consummate his voyage to
Libya. The Carthaginians so dreaded his advance that they despatched
money to Philip to induce him to make a campaign against Italy, and
sent grain and soldiers to Hannibal and to Mago ships and money that
he might prevent Scipio from crossing. The Romans, led by certain
portents to expect a brilliant victory, entrusted to Scipio the army
of Libya and gave him permission to enroll as large an additional
force as he should please. [Sidenote: B.C. 204 (_a.u._ 550)] Of the
consuls they set Marcus Cethegus over against Mago and Publius
Sempronius against Hannibal.

IX, 12.--The Carthaginians, fearing that Masinissa would join Scipio,
persuaded Syphax to restore his domain to him, the giver receiving
assurance that he would get the tract back again. Masinissa was
suspicious of the transaction, yet agreed to peace, in order to win
the confidence of the Carthaginians and so be able to plunge them into
some great catastrophe. For he was more enraged over Sophonis than
over the kingdom, and consequently worked for Roman interests while
affecting to be for the Carthaginians. Syphax, who was a Libyan
adherent, professed a friendliness for the Romans and sent to Scipio
warning him against crossing over. Scipio heard this as a piece of
secret information, and to prevent the knowledge of it from reaching
the soldiers he sent the herald back post-haste before he had had time
to meet anybody else. Then he called together the army and hastened
forward the preparations for crossing; he declared that the
Carthaginians were unprepared and that first Masinissa and now Syphax
was calling for them and upbraiding them for lingering. After this
speech he suffered no further delay but set sail. He brought his ships
to anchor near the cape called Apollonium, and [Sidenote: FRAG.
56^51] PITCHED HIS CAMP, DEVASTATED THE COUNTRY, MADE ASSAULTS UPON
THE CITIES AND CAPTURED A FEW. AS THE ROMANS WERE HARRYING THE
COUNTRY, HANNO THE CAVALRY COMMANDER, WHO WAS A SON OF HASDRUBAL SON
OF GISCO, WAS PERSUADED BY MASINISSA TO ATTACK THEM. SCIPIO
ACCORDINGLY SENT SOME HORSEMEN AND WAS PLUNDERING SOME DISTRICTS THAT
WERE SUITABLE FOR HIM TO OVERRUN, TO THE END THAT HIS MEN BY SIMULATED
FLIGHT MIGHT DRAW UPON THEM THE PURSUERS. SO WHEN THEY TURNED TO FLEE,
ACCORDING TO PREVIOUS ARRANGEMENTS, AND THE CARTHAGINIANS FOLLOWED
THEM UP, MASINISSA WITH HIS FOLLOWERS GOT IN THE REAR OF THE PURSUERS
AND ATTACKED THEM AND SCIPIO MAKING AN ONSET FROM HIS AMBUSH JOINED
BATTLE WITH THEM. AND MANY WERE DESTROYED, MANY ALSO WERE CAPTURED,
AMONG THEM HANNO HIMSELF. THEREFORE HASDRUBAL ARRESTED THE MOTHER OF
MASINISSA, AND AN EXCHANGE OF THE TWO CAPTIVES WAS EFFECTED. SYPHAX
NOW RENOUNCED EVEN THE APPEARANCE OF FRIENDSHIP FOR THE ROMANS AND
OPENLY ATTACHED HIMSELF TO THE CARTHAGINIANS. AND THE ROMANS BOTH
PLUNDERED THE COUNTRY AND RECOVERED MANY PRISONERS FROM ITALY WHO HAD
BEEN SENT TO LIBYA BY HANNIBAL AND THEY WENT INTO WINTER QUARTERS
WHERE THEY WERE.

[Sidenote: B.C. 203 (_a.u._ 551)] After this Gnæus Scipio[37] and
Gaius Servilius became consuls, and during their year of office the
Carthaginians, having got the worst of it in the struggle, felt a
desire to arrange terms of peace and furthermore both Hannibal and
Mago were driven out of Italy. It was the consuls who made a stand
against Hannibal and Mago, while Scipio was inflicting damage upon
Libya and assailing the cities. Meantime [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^52] HE
HAD CAPTURED A CARTHAGINIAN VESSEL, BUT RELEASED IT WHEN THEY FEIGNED
TO HAVE BEEN COMING ON AN EMBASSY TO HIM. HE KNEW, TO BE SURE, THAT IT
WAS ONLY A PRETEXT, BUT PREFERRED TO AVOID THE POSSIBILITY OF IT BEING
SAID AGAINST HIM THAT HE HAD DETAINED ENVOYS. AND IN THE CASE OF
SYPHAX, WHO WAS STILL ENDEAVORING TO NEGOTIATE A RECONCILIATION ON THE
TERMS THAT SCIPIO SHOULD SAIL FROM LIBYA AND HANNIBAL FROM ITALY, HE
RECEIVED HIS PROPOSITION NOT IN A TRUSTFUL MOOD, BUT TO THE END THAT
HE MIGHT RUIN HIM. For on the excuse afforded by the postponed truce
he sent various bodies of soldiers at various times into the
Carthaginian camp and into that of Syphax; and when they had carefully
inspected everything on the side of their opponents, he put aside the
treaty on a plausible pretext, which was the more readily found
because Syphax had been detected in a plot against Masinissa. And
Scipio went by night to where their two camps were located, not very
far apart, and secretly set fire to Hasdrubal's camp at many points at
once. It rapidly blazed up--for their tents had been made of
corn-stalks and leafy branches--and the Carthaginians fared badly. The
followers of Syphax in attempting to aid them encountered the Romans,
who closed in the place, and were themselves destroyed; and their own
camp was set on fire in addition, and in it many men and horses
perished. The Romans escaped injury during the rest of the night
following the exploit, but just after daylight Spaniards who had
lately arrived as an accession to the Carthaginian alliance fell upon
them unexpectedly and killed a large number.

[Footnote 37: Dio probably wrote _Cæpio_ here.]

As a result of all this Hasdrubal straightway retired to Carthage and
Syphax to his own country. Scipio set Masinissa and Gaius Lælius to
oppose Syphax while he himself marched against the Carthaginians. The
Carthaginians for their part sent ships toward the Roman stronghold,
which the enemy were using as winter quarters and as a storehouse for
all their goods. In this way they might either capture it or draw
Scipio away from themselves. Such also was the result. As soon as he
heard of the manoeuvre, he withdrew and hurried to the harbor, which
he placed under guard. And on the first day the Romans easily repulsed
their assailants, but on the next they had decidedly the worst of the
encounter. The Carthaginians even went so far as to take away Roman
ships by seizing them with grappling irons. They did not venture,
however, to disembark but finally sailed homewards, after which they
superseded Hasdrubal and chose a certain Hanno in his place. From this
time Hanno was the general, but his predecessor privately got hold of
some slaves and deserters whom he welded together into a fairly strong
force; he then quietly persuaded some of the Spaniards who were
serving in Scipio's army to help him and attempted one night to carry
out a plot against the Roman's camp. Something would have come of it,
had not the soothsayers, dismayed by the actions of birds, and the
mother of Masinissa, as a result of divinations, caused an
investigation of the Spaniards to be made. So their treachery was
anticipated and punished, and Scipio again made a campaign against
Carthage; he was engaged in devastating their fields [IX, 13.] while
Syphax was waging war upon the followers of Lælius. That prince
offered successful resistance for some time, but eventually the Romans
prevailed, slaughtered many, took many alive, and captured Syphax.
They also acquired possession of Cirta, his palace, without a contest
by displaying to the guardians within their king, now a prisoner.

It was there that Sophonis also was. Masinissa at once rushed toward
her and embracing her said: "I hold Syphax that snatched thee away. I
hold thee also. Fear not. Thou hast not become a captive, since thou
hast me as an ally." After these words he married her on the spot,
anticipating any action on the part of the Romans out of fear that he
might somehow lose her, were she reckoned among the spoil. Then he
assumed control of the rest of the cities of Syphax also. [Sidenote:
FRAG. 56^53] AND THEY BROUGHT TO SCIPIO ALONG WITH THE OTHER PROPERTY
SYPHAX HIMSELF. AND THE COMMANDER WOULD NOT CONSENT TO SEE HIM REMAIN
BOUND IN CHAINS, BUT CALLING TO MIND HIS ENTERTAINMENT AT THE OTHER'S
COURT AND REFLECTING ON HUMAN POSSIBILITIES HE LEAPED FROM HIS CHAIR,
LOOSED HIM, EMBRACED HIM, AND TREATED HIM WITH RESPECT. Once he asked
him: "What possessed you to go to war with us?" Syphax excused
himself skillfully and at the same time made himself secure against
Masinissa by declaring that Sophonis had been responsible for his
attitude. To please her father Hasdrubal she had ensnared him by
witchcraft against his will to espouse the Carthaginian cause. "At any
rate," he went on, "I have paid a proper penalty for being hoodwinked
by a woman, and in the midst of my evils have at least one
consolation,--that Masinissa has married her. For she will certainly
bring about his utter ruin likewise."

Scipio feeling suspicious about this action of Masinissa called him
and censured him for having so speedily married a woman taken captive
from the enemy without the commanding officer's consent, and he bade
him give her up to the Romans. Masinissa, thoroughly distracted,
rushed into the tent where Sophonis was and cried out to her: "If I
might by my own death ensure thee liberty and freedom from outrage, I
would cheerfully die for thee; but since this is impossible, I send
thee before me whither I and all shall come." With these words he held
out poison to her. And she uttered neither lament nor groan but with
much nobility made answer: "Husband, if this is thy will, I am
content. My soul shall after thee know no other lord: for my body, if
Scipio require it, let him take it with life extinct." Thus she met
her death, and Scipio marveled at the deed.

Lælius conducted to Rome Syphax and his son Vermina and some others of
the foremost men; and the citizens gave Syphax an estate at Alba,
where at his death they honored him with a public funeral, and
confirmed Vermina in the possession of his father's kingdom besides
bestowing upon him the captured Nomads.

[Sidenote: FRAG. 56^54] THE CARTHAGINIANS WHILE MAKING PROPOSITIONS TO
SCIPIO THROUGH HERALDS GAVE HIM MONEY AT ONCE AND GAVE BACK ALL THE
PRISONERS, BUT IN REGARD TO THE REMAINING MATTERS THEY DESPATCHED AN
EMBASSY TO ROME. HOWEVER, THE ROMANS WOULD NOT RECEIVE THE ENVOYS AT
THAT TIME, DECLARING THAT IT WAS A TRADITION IN THE STATE NOT TO ADMIT
AN EMBASSY FROM ANY PARTIES AND NEGOTIATE WITH THEM IN REGARD TO PEACE
WHILE THEIR ARMIES WERE STILL IN ITALY. LATER, WHEN HANNIBAL AND MAGO
HAD EMBARKED, THEY ACCORDED THE ENVOYS AN AUDIENCE AND VOTED THE
PEACE. But Hannibal and Mago departed from Italy not on account of the
tentative arrangements but through haste to reach the scene of war at
home.

The Carthaginians in Libya were not thinking seriously of peace even
before this and had made propositions about a truce only for the
purpose of using up time and with a view to securing Hannibal's
presence. When they heard that Hannibal was really drawing near, they
took courage [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^55] AND ATTACKED SCIPIO BOTH BY LAND
AND BY SEA. WHEN THE LATTER COMPLAINED TO THEM ABOUT THIS, THEY
RETURNED NO PROPER ANSWER TO THE ENVOYS AND ACTUALLY PLOTTED AGAINST
THEM WHEN THEY SAILED BACK; AND HAD NOT A WIND FORTUNATELY ARISEN TO
HELP THEM, THEY WOULD HAVE PERISHED. HENCE SCIPIO, THOUGH AT THIS TIME
THE VOTE REGARDING PEACE WAS BROUGHT TO HIM, REFUSED ANY LONGER TO
MAKE IT. So the Carthaginians sent Mago back to Italy, but deposed
Hanno from his command and appointed Hannibal general with full
powers. Hasdrubal they even voted to put to death, and finding that he
had by poison intentionally compassed his own destruction they abused
his dead body. Hannibal having secured complete leadership invaded the
country of Masinissa, where he proceeded to do mischief and made ready
to fight against the Romans. Counter-preparations were made by the
followers of Scipio.

IX, 14.--The people of Rome were regretting that they had not
prevented the return voyage of Hannibal, and when they learned that he
was consolidating the opposition in Libya, they were again terrified
beyond measure. [Sidenote: B.C. 202 (_a.u._ 552)] Accordingly they
sent Claudius Nero, one of the consuls, to attend to him, and allotted
to Marcus Servilius the protection of Italy. Nevertheless Nero was not
able to reach Libya, being detained in Italy by stormy weather and
again at Sardinia. After that he progressed no farther than Sicily,
for he learned that Scipio had proved the victor. Scipio, indeed, was
afraid that Nero might be so prompt as to appropriate the glory that
properly was the fruit of his own toils, and so, at the very first
glimmer of spring, he took up his march against Hannibal; he had
already received information that the latter had conquered Masinissa.
Hannibal, upon ascertaining the approach of Scipio, did not wait, but
went out to meet him. They encamped opposite each other and did not at
once come to blows, but delayed several days; and each commander
addressed words to his own army and incited it to battle.

When it seemed best to Scipio not to delay any further but to involve
Hannibal in conflict whether he wished it or not, he set out for
Utica, that by creating an impression of fear and flight he might gain
a favorable opportunity for attack; and this was what took place.
Hannibal, thinking that he was in flight and being correspondingly
encouraged, pursued him with cavalry only. Contrary to his
expectations Scipio resisted, engaged in battle and came out
victorious. After routing this body he directed his next attentions
not to pursuing them but to their equipment train, which chanced to be
on the march, and he captured it entire. This behavior caused Hannibal
alarm, an alarm increased by the news that Scipio had done no injury
to three Carthaginian spies whom he had found in his camp. Hannibal
had learned this fact from one of them, for the other two had chosen
to remain with the Romans. Disheartened and confused he no longer felt
the courage to carry on a decisive engagement with the Romans, but
determined to make efforts for a truce as quickly as possible, in
order that if this attempt should not be successful, it might at least
cause a temporary delay and cessation of hostilities. So he sent to
Masinissa, and through him as a man of the same stock asked for a
truce. And he secured a conference with Scipio, but accomplished
nothing. For Scipio avoided a definite answer as much as he did a
harsh one, but throughout pursued a middle course, albeit preserving
an agreeable tone, in order to lead Hannibal into careless behavior by
pretending a willingness to come to terms. Such was the result.
Hannibal now gave no thought to battle, but concerned himself with a
desire to change his camp to a more favorable location. Scipio,
gaining this information from deserters, broke up beforehand by night
and occupied the spot which was the goal of Hannibal's striving. And
when the Carthaginians had reached a depressed part of the road
unsuited for encampment he suddenly confronted them. Hannibal refused
to fight and in his efforts to locate a camp there and to dig wells he
had a hard time of it all night long. Thus Scipio forced the enemy,
while at a disadvantage from weariness and thirst, to offer battle
whether pleased or not.

Accordingly, the Romans entered the conflict well marshaled and eager,
but Hannibal and the Carthaginians listlessly and in dejection, a
dejection for which a total eclipse of the sun at this time was
largely accountable. From this combination of circumstances Hannibal
suspected that this, too, foreboded to them nothing auspicious. In
this frame of mind they stationed the elephants in front of them as a
protection. Suddenly the Romans emitted a great, bloodcurdling shout,
and smiting their spears against their shields advanced with
determination and on a run against the elephants. Thrown into a panic
by the onset most of the beasts did not await the enemy's approach,
but turned to flee and receiving frequent wounds wrought greater
turmoil among their keepers. Others entered the fray, and then the
Romans would stand apart and the animals ran through the spaces in
their ranks, getting struck and wounded from close at hand as they
passed along. For a time the Carthaginians resisted, but at length,
when Masinissa and Lælius fell upon them from the rear with horsemen,
they all fled. The majority of them were destroyed and Hannibal came
very near losing his life. As he fled, Masinissa pursued him at
breakneck speed, giving his horse free rein. Hannibal turned and saw
him in mad career; he swerved aside just slightly, [Sidenote: FRAG.
56^57] AND CHECKED HIS FORWARD COURSE: Masinissa rushed by and
Hannibal got behind and wounded him. Shortly after with a few
attendants the Carthaginian leader made good his escape.

[Sidenote: B.C. 201 (_a.u._ 553)] Scipio followed up his victory by a
rapid advance against Carthage and proceeded to besiege it by land and
sea at once. The Carthaginians at first set themselves in readiness as
though to endure the siege, but later, brought to the end of their
resources, [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^62] THEY MADE OVERTURES TO SCIPIO FOR
PEACE. Scipio accepted their proposals and discussed with them the
articles of the compact. THE TERMS AGREED UPON WERE: THAT THE HOSTAGES
AND THE CAPTIVES AND THE DESERTERS SHOULD BE GIVEN UP BY THE
CARTHAGINIANS, THAT ALL THE ELEPHANTS AND THE TRIREMES (SAVE TEN)
SHOULD BE DELIVERED OVER, AND THAT IN THE FUTURE THEY SHOULD NOT KEEP
ELEPHANTS NOR MORE SHIPS OF WAR THAN TEN, NOR MAKE WAR UPON ANY ONE
CONTRARY TO THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE ROMANS, and a few other
points.

WHEN AN AGREEMENT OF THIS NATURE HAD BEEN REACHED, THE CARTHAGINIANS
DESPATCHED AMBASSADORS TO ROME. [Sidenote: (FRAG. 56^63?)] SO THEY
WENT THEIR WAY, BUT THE SENATE DID NOT RECEIVE THE EMBASSY READILY;
INDEED, ITS MEMBERS DISPUTED FOR A LONG TIME, ONE PARTY BEING OPPOSED
TO ANOTHER. [Sidenote: FRAG. 56^64] THE POPULAR ASSEMBLY, HOWEVER,
UNANIMOUSLY VOTED FOR PEACE AND ACCEPTED THE AGREEMENT AND SENT TEN
MEN THAT IN CONJUNCTION WITH SCIPIO THEY MIGHT SETTLE ALL THE DETAILS.
AND THE TREATY WAS ACCEPTED, THE TRIREMES WERE GIVEN UP AND BURNED,
AND OF THE ELEPHANTS THE LARGER NUMBER WERE CARRIED OFF TO ROME, AND
THE REST WERE PRESENTED TO MASINISSA. THE ROMANS NOW ABANDONED LIBYA,
AND THE CARTHAGINIANS ITALY.

THE SECOND WAR, THEN, WITH THE CARTHAGINIANS RESULTED IN THIS WAY AT
THE END OF SIXTEEN YEARS. BY IT SCIPIO HAD BEEN MADE ILLUSTRIOUS, AND
HE WAS GIVEN THE TITLE OF AFRICANUS (AFRICA WAS THE NAME OF THAT PART
OF LIBYA SURROUNDING CARTHAGE), AND MANY ALSO CALLED HIM "LIBERATOR"
BECAUSE HE HAD BROUGHT BACK MANY CAPTIVE CITIZENS. HE THEREFORE
ATTAINED GREAT PROMINENCE BY THESE DEEDS, BUT HANNIBAL WAS ACCUSED BY
HIS OWN PEOPLE OF HAVING REFUSED TO CAPTURE ROME WHEN HE WAS ABLE TO
DO SO, AND OF HAVING APPROPRIATED THE PLUNDER IN ITALY. HE WAS NOT,
HOWEVER, CONVICTED, BUT WAS SHORTLY AFTER ENTRUSTED WITH THE HIGHEST
OFFICE IN CARTHAGE.

[Sidenote: FRAG. 57^1] IX, 15.--THE ROMANS NOW BECAME INVOLVED IN
OTHER WARS, which were waged against Philip the Macedonian and against
Antiochus.


_(BOOK 18, BOISSEVAIN.)_

As long as the struggle with the Carthaginians was at its height they
treated Philip with consideration even if his attitude toward them was
not one of friendliness; for they wished to prevent him from
consolidating with the Carthaginians or leading an expedition into
Italy. But when the previous hostilities had come to a standstill,
they did not wait a moment, but embarked upon open warfare with him,
which they justified by the presentation of many complaints.
Accordingly, the Romans sent envoys to him, and when he complied with
none of their orders, voted for war. They used his descent upon the
Greeks as a pretext, but their real reason was irritation at his
general behavior and a determination to anticipate him, so that he
should not be able to enslave Greece and conduct a campaign against
Italy after the fashion of Pyrrhus. [Sidenote: B.C. 200 (_a.u._ 554)]
As a consequence of their vote they made effective preparations in all
departments and they associated with Sulpicius Galba Lucius Apustius
as legatus in charge of the fleet. Galba after crossing the Ionian
Gulf was sick for some time; accordingly the aforementioned legatus
and the sub-lieutenant Claudius Cento assumed charge of his entire
force. The second of these with the aid of the fleet rescued Athens,
which was being besieged by the Macedonians, and sacked Chalcis, which
was occupied by the same enemy. Philip returned just then, having
finished his campaign against Athens, but Cento drove him back at his
first approach and repulsed him again on the occasion of a subsequent
assault. Apustius, while Philip was busy with Greece, had invaded
Macedonia, and was plundering the country as well as making garrisons
and cities subject. For these reasons Philip found himself in a
quandary, and for a time scurried about hither and thither, defending
now one place, now another. This he did until Apustius proved himself
a mighty menace to his country and the Dardanians were injuring the
part of Macedonia close to their borders [Sidenote: FRAG. 57^2] (THIS
PEOPLE DWELL ABOVE THE ILLYRIANS AND THE MACEDONIANS) and some
Illyrians together with Amynander king of the Athamanians, a
Thessalian tribe, though they had previously been his allies now
transferred themselves to the Roman side. In view of these events he
conceived a suspicion of Ætolian loyalty and began to fear for his
interests at home, and he hastened thither with the larger part of his
army. Apustius, apprised of his approach, retired, for by this time it
was winter.

Galba on recovering from his illness made ready a still larger force
and at the beginning of spring pushed forward into Macedonia. When the
two leaders drew near each other they [Sidenote: FRAG. 57^3] BOTH
PITCHED CAMP AND CONDUCTED SKIRMISHES OF THE HORSE AND LIGHT-ARMED
TROOPS. WHEN THE ROMANS TRANSFERRED THEIR CAMP TO A CERTAIN SPOT FROM
WHICH THEY COULD GET FOOD MORE EASILY, PHILIP DECIDED THAT THEY HAD
SHIFTED POSITION OUT OF FEAR OF HIM; THEREFORE HE ATTACKED THEM
UNEXPECTEDLY WHILE THEY WERE ENGAGED IN PLUNDERING AND KILLED A FEW OF
THEM. AND GALBA ON PERCEIVING THIS MADE A SORTIE FROM THE CAMP,
ATTACKED HIM AND SLEW MANY MORE IN RETURN. PHILIP, THEN, IN VIEW OF
HIS DEFEAT AND THE FACT THAT HE WAS WOUNDED, WITHDREW JUST AFTER
NIGHTFALL. GALBA, HOWEVER, DID NOT FOLLOW HIM UP BUT RETIRED TO
APOLLONIA. APUSTIUS WITH THE RHODIANS AND WITH ATTALUS CRUISED ABOUT
AND SUBJUGATED MANY OF THE ISLANDS.

About the same time [Sidenote: FRAG. 57^4] HAMILCAR, A CARTHAGINIAN
WHO HAD MADE A CAMPAIGN WITH MAGO IN ITALY AND REMAINED THERE
UNNOTICED, AFTER A TERM OF QUIET CAUSED THE GAULS AS SOON AS THE
MACEDONIAN WAR BROKE OUT TO REVOLT FROM THE ROMANS; THEN WITH THE
REBELS HE MADE AN EXPEDITION AGAINST THE LIGURIANS AND WON OVER SOME
OF THEM ALSO. THEY FOUGHT WITH LUCIUS FURIUS THE PRÆTOR, WERE
DEFEATED, AND SENT ENVOYS ABOUT PEACE. THE LIGURIANS OBTAINED THIS,
but it was not granted to the others. Instead, Aurelius the consul,
who was jealous of the prætor's victory, led a new campaign against
them.

[Sidenote: B.C. 199 (_a.u._ 555)] The succeeding year a great deal of
havoc was wrought by Hamilcar and the Gauls. They conquered the prætor
Gnæus Bæbius, overran the territory which was in alliance with the
Romans, besieged Placentia, and capturing it razed it to the ground.

IX, 16.--To return to the campaign in Greece and Macedonia--Publius
Villius the consul was encamped opposite Philip, who had occupied in
advance the passes of Epirus through which are the entrances to
Macedonia. Philip had extended a wall across the entire mountain
region in between and held a formidable position, [Sidenote: B.C. 198
(_a.u._ 556)] but the consul Titus Flamininus[38] at the conclusion
of winter got around the circumvallation with a few followers by a
narrow path. And appearing suddenly on higher ground he terrified
Philip, who thought that the whole army of Titus had come up through
the pass. Hence he fell back into Macedonia at once. The consul did
not pursue him, but assumed control of the cities in Epirus. He also
went into Thessaly and detached a good part of it from Philip and then
retired into Phocis and Boeotia. While he was besieging Elatea his
brother Lucius Flamininus in company with Attalus and the Rhodians was
subduing the islands. Finally, after the capture of Cenchrea, they
learned that envoys had been sent to the Achæans to see about an
alliance and they despatched some themselves in turn, the Athenians
associating in the embassy. And at first the opinions of the Achæans
were divided, some wanting to vote their alliance to Philip and some
to the Romans; eventually, however, they voted assistance to the
latter. And they joined in an expedition against Corinth, where they
succeeded in demolishing portions of the wall, but retired after
losses suffered through sallies of the citizens.

[Footnote 38: Zonaras consistently spells _Flaminius_.]

Then Philip, growing afraid that many cities might be taken, made
overtures to the consul regarding peace. The latter accepted his
representations and they and their allies met, but nothing was
accomplished except that permission was granted Philip to send envoys
to Rome. Nor was anything done there. For, when the Greeks insisted
that he depart from Corinth and Chalcis and from Demetrias in
Thessaly, the envoys of Philip said they had received no instructions
on this point and closed an ineffectual mission.

The people of Rome in voting to Flamininus the supreme direction in
Greece for another year also committed to his charge the case of
Philip as well. The Roman leader, since he was to remain at his post,
prepared for war, and the more so because the Lacedæmonian tyrant
Nabis, although a friend of Philip from whom he had received Argos,
had made a truce with him. The Macedonian monarch being unable to
administer many districts at once and fearing that the city might be
seized by the Romans had deposited it with Nabis to be restored again.

In a campaign of the consul Ælius Pætus against the Gauls many
perished on both sides in the stress of conflict and no advantage was
achieved. And the Carthaginian hostages together with the slaves
accompanying them and the captives who had been sold to various
persons had the hardihood to take possession of the several cities in
which they were living; and after slaughtering many of the native
population were overthrown by the prætor Cornelius Lentulus before
they had wrought any more mischief. The Gauls, however, elated by
their successes and aware of the fact that it was only a secondary war
the Romans were waging against them prepared as if to march upon Rome.
[Sidenote: B.C. 197 (_a.u._ 557)] The Romans consequently became
afraid and sent both the consuls, Cornelius Cethegus and Minucius
Rufus, against the Gauls. They parted company and individually ravaged
different tracts of country. The enemy accordingly also divided
forces to meet the consuls. One band under Hamilcar encountered
Cethegus and was defeated; the rest when made aware of this showed the
white feather and would no longer face Rufus; consequently the latter
overran the country at will. Those who had fought against Cethegus
then made peace; the remainder still continued under arms.

At this time Flamininus in company with Attalus reduced the whole of
Boeotia. Attalus expired of old age in the midst of a speech which
he was making to the people there. Flamininus went into Thessaly and
came into collision with Philip. It was only a cavalry skirmish in
which they engaged, for the ground was not suitable for a battle on a
vaster scale; hence both withdrew. And having reached a certain hill,
the top ridge of which is called Dog's Head (Cynoscephale), they
bivouacked, one on one side, the other on the other. Here also they
fought with their entire armies, and the outcome would have left both
with equal honors if the Ætolians had not made the Romans superior. So
[Sidenote: FRAG. 58] PHILIP WAS DEFEATED and fled, and afterward,
learning that Larissa and the cities surrounding it had chosen to
follow the fortunes of the victors, HE SENT HERALDS TO FLAMININUS. AND
HE MADE A TRUCE as soon as Philip had given money and hostages, among
them his own son Demetrius, and had sent out envoys to Rome in regard
to peace.

During the period of these transactions Androsthenes also had been
vanquished by the Achæans and had lost Corinth. And Lucius Flamininus
who was in charge of the fleet, when he could not persuade the
Acarnanians to refrain from allying themselves with Philip, besieged
and captured Leucas; later they became aware of Philip's defeat and he
secured their submission with greater ease.

Thus was the Macedonian war terminated and the people of Rome very
readily became reconciled with Philip upon the following terms. He
should restore the captives and deserters; give up the elephants and
triremes save five (including the flagship, a vessel of sixteen
banks), pay an indemnity, part at once, the rest in definite
installments; be king of Macedonia alone; not keep more than five
thousand soldiers, nor make war with any person outside his own
country. For the rest of the cities situated in Asia and Europe which
were previously subservient to him they let go free.

The consuls waged once more with the Gauls a war not unfraught with
difficulties, yet in spite of all they got the better of this people,
too.

[Sidenote: B.C. 195 (_a.u._ 559)] IX, 17.--Porcius Cato being chosen
consul won back Spain, which had been almost entirely alienated. He
was a man who surpassed those of his age in every virtue. Now after
the defeat inflicted upon the Romans at Cannæ a law had been passed to
the effect that women should not wear gold nor be carried in chairs
nor make use at all of variegated clothing; and the people were
deliberating as to whether they ought to abolish this law. And on this
subject Cato delivered a speech in which he made out that the law
ought to prevail, and finally he added these words: "Let the women,
then, be adorned not with gold nor precious stones nor with any bright
and transparent clothing, but with modesty, with love of husband, love
of children, persuasion, moderation, with the established laws, with
our arms, our victories, our trophies."--Lucius Valerius, a tribune,
spoke in opposition to Cato, urging that the privilege of the old-time
ornament be restored to the women. After speaking at length in this
vein to the people he then directed his discourse to a consideration
of Cato, and said: "You, Cato, if you are displeased at women's
ornaments and wish to do something magnificent and befitting a
philosopher, clip their hair close all around and put on them short
frocks and tunics with one shoulder; yes, by Jove, you go ahead and
give them armor and mount them on horses and, if you like, take them
to Spain; and let's bring them in here, so that they may take part in
our assemblies." Valerius said this in jest, but the women hearing him
(many of them were hanging about near the Forum inquisitive to know
how the affair would come out) rushed into the assembly denouncing the
law; and accordingly, as it was speedily repealed, they put on some
ornaments right there in the assembly and went out dancing.

Cato sailed away and reached Spain. There he learned that all the
dwellers as far as the Iber had united in order to wage war against
him in a body. After organizing his army he attacked and defeated them
and forced them to submit to him. They did so in the fear that
otherwise they might lose the cities at a single stroke. At the time
he did them no harm, but later when some of them incurred his
suspicion, he deprived them all of arms and made the natives
themselves tear down their own walls. Letters were sent in every
direction with orders that they should be delivered to everybody on
the same day; and in these he commanded the people to raze the circuit
of their fortifications instanter, threatening the disobedient with
death. Those occupying official positions when they had read them
thought in each case that the message had been written to them alone,
and without taking time for deliberation they all threw down their
walls.

Cato now crossed the Iber, and though he did not dare to contend with
the Celtiberian allies of the enemy on account of their number, yet he
handled them in marvelous fashion, now persuading them by a gift of
larger pay to change front and join him, now admonishing them to
return home, sometimes even announcing a battle with them for a stated
day. The result of it all was that they broke up into separate
factions and became so fearful that they no longer ventured to fight
with him.


_(BOOK 19, BOISSEVAIN.)_

IX, 18.--At this time Flamininus, too, made a campaign against Argos,
for the Romans seeing that Nabis was not loyal to them and was a
source of terror to the Greeks treated him as an enemy. With an
accession of allies from Philip Flamininus marched upon Sparta,
crossed Taygetus without effort and advanced toward the city, meeting
with no opposition. For Nabis, being afraid of the Romans and
suspicious of the natives, did not rouse himself to the point of
meeting Flamininus at a distance; but when the latter came nearer he
made a hostile excursion from the town, thinking lightly of his
opponent because of the fatigue of the journey and because Flamininus
was kept employed by the business of encamping; and he did cause a few
flurries. The next day he came out to face the Romans when they
assaulted, but as he lost large numbers he did not come out again. So
Flamininus, leaving a portion of his army there to prevent a warlike
demonstration anywhere, with the rest turned his attention to the
country districts; these he ravaged with the aid of his brother and
the Rhodians and Eumenes, son of Attalus. Nabis was consequently in
despair and despatched a herald to Flamininus about peace. The latter
listened to his proposals but did not immediately cease hostilities.
For Nabis did not dare to refuse the arrangements which he was asked
to make, nor yet would he consent to make them. And the populace
prevented him from coming to an agreement. So temporarily Nabis did
not come to terms, but when the Romans attacked again and captured
almost all of Sparta (it was in part destitute of a wall), he would
wait no longer, but made a truce with Flamininus and by sending an
embassy to Rome effected a settlement.

Flamininus hereupon set all the Greeks free; [Sidenote: B.C. 194
(_a.u._ 560)] later he convened them in session and after reminding
them of the benefits they had received urged them to maintain a kindly
attitude toward the Romans: he then withdrew all their garrisons and
departed with his entire army.

Upon the arrival of Flamininus at Rome Nabis rebelled. And straightway
the whole Greek world, so to speak, was thrown into a turmoil which
the Ætolians did their best to increase. They were making ready for
war and were sending embassies to Philip and Antiochus. They persuaded
the latter to assume a position of hostility to the Romans, promising
him that he should be king of both Greece and Italy. Roman interests
were so upset that they had no hope of overcoming Antiochus, but were
satisfied if they could preserve their former conquests. Antiochus was
regarded as a mighty personage both in the light of his own power,
through which he had performed distinguished exploits and above all
had subjugated Media, [Sidenote: B.C. 193 (_a.u._ 561)] and he loomed
far mightier still for having attached to his cause Ptolemy, king of
Egypt, and Ariarathes, monarch of Cappadocia, as a kinsman by
marriage.

Antiochus being so esteemed, the Romans as long as they were at war
with Philip were careful to court his favor, keeping up friendly
relations with him through envoys and sending him gifts. But when they
had vanquished their other enemy, they despised also this king whom
they had formerly feared. Antiochus himself crossed over into Thrace
and gained control of many districts. [Sidenote: B.C. 192 (_a.u._
562)] He helped colonize Lysimachia, which had been depopulated,
intending to use it as a base. It was Philip and Nabis who had invited
his assistance. Hannibal, too, had been with him and had caused him to
hope that he might sail to Carthage and from there to Italy, and
further that he could subjugate the races along the Ionian Gulf and
with them set out against Rome. Twice before, indeed, Antiochus had
crossed into Europe and had reached Greece. This time he learned that
Ptolemy was dead, and deeming it all important that he should obtain
the sovereignty of Egypt he left his son Seleucus with a force at
Lysimachia and himself set out on the march. He found out, however,
that Ptolemy was alive, and so kept away from Egypt and made an
attempt to sail to Cyprus. Baffled by a storm he returned home. The
Romans and he both despatched envoys to each other submitting mutual
complaints that they might get an excuse for the war and inspect
conditions on each side betimes.

Hannibal had obtained the most important office at Carthage and in his
tenure of it had offended the most powerful nobles and incurred their
hatred. Malicious reports about him were conveyed to the Romans to
the effect that he was rousing the Carthaginians to revolt and was
negotiating with Antiochus. Learning that some men from Rome were at
hand and fearing possible arrest he escaped from Carthage by night. He
came then to Antiochus and paved the way for his own restoration to
his native country and for war against the Romans by promising the
king that he would secure to him the rulership of Greece and Italy.
All went well until Scipio Africanus joined them. Scipio had been sent
to Libya as arbitrator between Masinissa and the Carthaginians, who
were at variance over some land boundaries, and had left their dispute
still hanging in the air that they might continue to quarrel and
neither of them be angry at the Romans on account of a definite
decision. From there he crossed into Asia nominally as an envoy to
Antiochus but in reality to smite both him and Hannibal with terror by
his appearance and accomplish what was for the advantage of the
Romans. After his arrival Antiochus no longer bestowed a similar
degree of attention upon Hannibal. He suspected him of secret dealings
with Scipio, and found him burdensome besides, because everybody
ascribed every plan to Hannibal and all placed in him their hope for
success in the war. For these reasons, then, he became both jealous
and afraid of Hannibal, dreading that he might change his demeanor,
should he get control of any power. So he neither supplied him with an
army nor sent one to Carthage; and he did not favor him very much
with audiences but made it a practice not to sanction any of his
proposals.

IX, 19.--The rumors about Antiochus occupied a large share of Rome's
attention and caused the Romans no small degree of uneasiness. The
name of Antiochus was in many mouths: some said that he already held
the whole of Greece, others talked to the effect that he was hastening
toward Italy. The Romans accordingly despatched envoys to Greece,
among them Flamininus, who was on intimate terms with the people, in
order to prevent them and Philip from creating any disturbance; and of
the prætors they sent Marcus Bæbius to Apollonia, in case Antiochus
should undertake to cross over into Italy that way, and Aulus Atilius
to attend to Nabis. The second of these had no work to do, for Nabis
had ere this perished, the victim of a plot on the part of the
Ætolians, and Sparta had been captured by the Achæans: Bæbius and
Philip confirmed the loyalty of many portions of Thessaly. The
Macedonian king was true to his agreement with the Romans principally
for the reason that Antiochus had attached some settlements belonging
to him in Thrace.

Flamininus went about Greece, and some he persuaded not to revolt,
others already revolted he won back, except the Ætolians and a few
towns elsewhere. The Ætolian league had bound itself to Antiochus and
was forming a union out of some states that were willing and others
that were unwilling. Antiochus in spite of the winter time hastened
forward to fulfill the hopes of the Ætolians, and this explains why
he did not bring along a respectable force. With what he had, however,
he took Chalcis and gained control of the rest of Euboea. Finding
some Romans among the captives he released them all. Then he entered
Chalcis to spend the winter, [Sidenote: FRAG. 59^1] WITH THE RESULT
THAT HE HIMSELF AND HIS GENERALS AND HIS SOLDIERS HAD THEIR MENTAL
ENERGIES RUINED BEFOREHAND; FOR BY HIS GENERAL INDOLENCE AND HIS
PASSION FOR A CERTAIN GIRL HE DRIFTED INTO LUXURIOUS LIVING AND AT THE
SAME TIME RENDERED THE BEST UNFIT FOR WARFARE.

The people of Rome learning that he was in Greece and had captured
Chalcis took up the war in earnest. [Sidenote: B.C. 191 (_a.u._ 563)]
Of the consuls they retained Scipio Nasica to guard Italy and sent
Manius Glabrio with a large army into Greece. Nasica conducted a war
against the Boii, and Glabrio drove Antiochus out of Greece. He also
went to Thessaly and with the help of Bæbius and Philip gained control
of many of the towns there. He captured Philip of Megalopolis and sent
him to Rome, and drove Amynander out of his domain, which he then gave
to the Macedonian ruler.

Antiochus meanwhile was staying at Chalcis and keeping quiet.
Afterward he entered Boeotia and at Thermopylæ withstood the Romans
who came to meet him. Considering the fewness of his soldiers he
thought it best to seek an ally in the natural advantages of his
position. And in order to avoid having himself such an experience as
the Greeks had met who were arrayed there against the Persian he sent
a division of the Ætolians up to the summit of the mountains to keep
guard there. Glabrio cared little for the location and did not
postpone a battle: however, he despatched his lieutenants Porcius Cato
and Valerius Flaccus by night against the Ætolians on the summit and
himself engaged in conflict with Antiochus just about dawn. As long as
he fought on level ground he had the best of it, but when Antiochus
fell back to a position higher up, he found himself inferior till Cato
arrived in the enemy's rear. Cato had come upon the Ætolians asleep
and had killed most of them and scattered the rest; then he hurried
down and participated in the battle going on below. So they routed
Antiochus and captured his camp. The king forthwith retired to
Chalcis, but learning that the consul was approaching went back
unobserved to Asia.

Glabrio at once occupied Boeotia and Euboea, and proceeded to
deliver assaults upon Heraclea, since the Ætolians were unwilling to
yield to him. The lower city he captured by means of a siege and
received the capitulation of those who had fled to the acropolis.
Among the prisoners taken at this time was found Democritus the
Ætolian general, who had once refused alliance to Flamininus, and when
the latter asked for a decree that he might send it to Rome, had said:
"Don't worry. I will carry it there with my army and read it to you
all on the banks of the Tiber."--Philip was engaged in besieging Lamia
when Glabrio came against it and appropriated both victory and booty.
Though the remainder of the Ætolians wanted to become reconciled,
still they made no truce because Antiochus sent them envoys and
money; and they set themselves in readiness for war. Philip affected
friendliness toward the Romans, but his heart was with Antiochus.
Meantime Glabrio was besieging Naupactus which belonged to the
Ætolians, and Flamininus coming to them persuaded the inhabitants to
make peace, for he was well known to them. They as well as the Epirots
despatched envoys to Rome. Philip for sending a triumphal crown to
Capitoline Jupiter received in return among other presents his son
Demetrius, who was living at Rome a hostage. A truce was not made with
the Ætolians, for they would not submit to any curtailment of
privilege.

[Sidenote: B.C. 190 (_a.u._ 564)] IX, 20.--The Romans set against
Antiochus the Scipios, Africanus and his brother Lucius. They granted
the Ætolians a respite for the purpose of once more conducting an
embassy to Rome regarding peace, and hurried on against Antiochus. On
reaching Macedonia they secured allies from Philip and marched on to
the Hellespont. After crossing into Asia they occupied most of the
coast districts which had previously been occupied by the Romans who
had gone there first, as well as by Eumenes and the Rhodians; the
latter had also conquered Hannibal in the region of Pamphylia, as he
was taking some ships out from Phoenicia. Eumenes and his brother
Attalus proceeded to injure the country of Antiochus, and cities kept
coming over, some under compulsion, some voluntarily, to the Romans,
with the ultimate result that Antiochus was obliged to abandon Europe
entirely and to recall his son Seleucus from Lysimachia. When this
son had accomplished the return journey, he sent him with troops
against Pergamum. Inasmuch, however, as his investment of the town
proved ineffectual and the Scipios soon reached his vicinity,
Antiochus lost no time in concluding a truce with them; for he
expected to obtain terms since [Sidenote: FRAG. 59^2] HE HAD GOT
POSSESSION OF THE SON OF AFRICANUS AND WAS ACCORDING HIM THE KINDEST
TREATMENT. AND FINALLY, THOUGH HE FAILED OF SECURING PEACE, HE
RELEASED HIM WITHOUT RANSOM. The peace project, however, came to
nothing, because Antiochus would not agree to accede to the Roman
demands.

Still, for a long time their attitude was marked by inaction. Finally
they fell to fighting again. The following may serve as a general
description of the contest. Antiochus put the chariots in front, with
the elephants next, and behind these the slingers and the archers. But
the Romans anticipated the charge of the chariots by a charge of their
own and with a great clamor they rushed straight at them and repulsed
them, so that most of these vehicles turned in the direction of the
elephants. In their backward career they threw their own contingent
into confusion,--for their erratic course terrified and dispersed the
men marshaled close to them,--and a heavy rain which now came up
rendered weak the detachment of archers and slingers. A heavy,
all-enveloping mist succeeded, which was of no hindrance to the
Romans, who had the upper hand and were fighting at close range; but
in the case of their opponents, who were in dread and employed
cavalry and archers for the most part, it made it out of the question
to see which way to shoot their arrows and caused them to stumble over
one another, like men in the dark. Nevertheless Antiochus developed
sufficient power, by means of his armored cavalry, to rout the
antagonists directly confronting him and to advance in pursuit of them
as far as their camp. Indeed, he would have taken it, had not Marcus
Æmilius Lepidus, who was charged with guarding it, killed the first
Romans that came in after they had refused to heed his exhortations to
check their flight. As a result the rest of the party turned back and
the commander himself made a sortie with members of the garrison who
were free from the prevailing demoralization, and their united efforts
repulsed Antiochus. While this action was taking place, Zeuxis had
assailed the ramparts in another quarter, had succeeded in getting
within them, and continued to pillage until Lepidus became aware of it
and came to the rescue of his own interests. At the same time Scipio
captured the camp of Antiochus, wherein he found many human beings,
many horses, baggage animals, silver and gold coins, elephants, and a
number of precious objects besides. Antiochus after this defeat at
once retired into Syria, and the Asiatic Greeks made common cause with
the Romans.

After this, upon overtures made by Antiochus, an armistice was
arranged. Africanus was well disposed toward him for his son's sake,
and the consul, too, did not want to leave the victory to be grasped
by his successor, now approaching; consequently they laid upon
Antiochus conditions no more severe than those they had originally
set, before the battle. [Sidenote: B.C. 189 (_a.u._ 565)] Indeed,
Gnæus Manlius who succeeded them in office was not pleased with the
agreement reached, and he made additional demands upon the king,
requiring him besides to give hostages, one of whom should be his son
Antiochus, and to deliver up all the deserters, among whom was
Hannibal. Antiochus reluctantly yielded obedience on all points: to
give up Hannibal, however, was out of his power, since that prince had
taken seasonable refuge with Prusias, king of Bithynia. On these terms
Antiochus was able to send envoys to Rome and effect a cessation of
hostilities. Lucius Scipio received praise for his victory, and it
gave him the title of Asiaticus in the same way as his brother had
been called Africanus for conquering Carthage, which had possessed the
most considerable power in Africa.

These brothers who had proved themselves men of such valor and as a
result of excellence had attained such a height of reputation were not
long afterward brought to court and handed over to the populace.
Lucius was condemned on the suspicion of his having appropriated no
inconsiderable share of the spoil, and Africanus nominally for having
made the conditions lighter out of gratitude for kindness shown his
son; (the true cause of his conviction was jealousy). [Sidenote: FRAG.
60] THAT THEY COULD NOT JUSTLY BE CHARGED WITH WRONGDOING IS MADE
PLAIN BOTH BY OTHER EVIDENCE AND MOST OF ALL BY THE FACT THAT WHEN THE
PROPERTY OF ASIATICUS WAS CONFISCATED IT WAS FOUND TO CONSIST MERELY
OF HIS ORIGINAL INHERITANCE, AND THAT THOUGH AFRICANUS RETIRED TO
LITERNUM AND ABODE THERE TO THE END, NO ONE EVER AGAIN PASSED SENTENCE
OF CONDEMNATION UPON HIM.

Manlius all this time was engaged in winning over Pisidia, Lycaonia,
and Pamphylia, and a large district of Galatia in Asia. For there
exists in that region too a race of Gauls which broke off from the
European stock. Years ago with their king, Brennus, at their head they
overran Greece and Thrace, and crossing thence to Bithynia they
detached certain portions of Phrygia, Paphlagonia, Mysia adjacent to
Olympus, and Cappadocia, and took up their residence in them; and they
constitute to-day a separate nation bearing the name of Gauls. This
people caused Manlius trouble, but he managed to overcome them too,
capturing their city Ancyra by assault and gaining control of the rest
of the towns by capitulation. This effected, he set sail for home
after he had received a large price for peace from Ariarathes, king of
Cappadocia.

IX, 21.--The Ætolians when they had sent ambassadors to Rome the
second time in regard to peace themselves raised the standard of
rebellion. Hence the Romans immediately dismissed the ambassadors and
referred the conduct of affairs in Greece to Marcus Fulvius. He set
out first for the large city of Ambracia (it had once been the royal
residence of Pyrrhus and was now occupied by the Ætolians) and
proceeded to besiege it. So the Ætolians held a conference with him
about peace, but finding him disinclined to a truce they sent a part
of their army into Ambracia. The Romans undertook to capture the town
by an underground passage and pushed their mine straight forward,
temporarily eluding the notice of the besieged party; but the latter
began to suspect the true state of affairs when the excavated earth
attained some dimensions. As they were not aware in what direction the
trench was being dug, they kept applying a bronze shield to the
surface of the ground all about the circuit of the walls. By means of
the resonance they found out the place and went to work in their turn
to dig a tunnel from inside and approached the Romans, with whom they
battled in obscurity. Finally they devised the following sort of
defence. They filled a huge jar with feathers and put fire in it. To
this they attached a bronze cover that had a number of holes bored in
it. Then, after carrying the jar into the mine and turning the mouth
of it toward the enemy, they inserted a bellows in the bottom, and by
blowing this bellows with vigor they caused a tremendous amount of
unpleasant smoke, such as feathers would naturally create, to pour
out, so that not one of the Romans could endure it. Hence the Romans
in despair of succeeding made a truce and raised the siege. When they
had agreed to treat, the Ætolians also changed their course and
secured an armistice. Subsequently they obtained a peace from the
People by the gift of considerable money and many hostages. Fulvius
induced Cephallenia to capitulate and reduced to order the
Peloponnesus, which was in a state of factional turmoil.

[Sidenote: B.C. 187 (_a.u._ 567)] After a little, in the consulship of
Gaius Flaminius and Æmilius Lepidus, Antiochus died and his son
Seleucus succeeded him. Much later, at the demise of Seleucus, the
Antiochus who spent some time as a hostage in Rome became king.
[Sidenote: B.C. 183 (_a.u._ 571)] And Philip had courage enough to
revolt because he had been deprived of some towns in Thessaly and of
Ænus and Maronea besides, but he was unable to do so on account of his
age and what had happened to his sons.--Some Gauls crossed the Alps
and desired to found a city to the south of the mountains. Marcus
Marcellus took away their arms and everything that they had brought:
the Romans in the capital, however, upon receiving an embassy from
them restored everything on condition that they should at once retire.

These years also saw the death of Hannibal. Envoys had been sent from
Rome to Prusias, monarch of Bithynia, and a part of their errand was
to make him give up Hannibal, who was at his court. The Carthaginian
had advance information of the facts and being unable to escape
committed suicide. [Sidenote: cp. FRAG. 64.] AN ORACLE HAD ONCE
ANNOUNCED TO HIM THAT HE SHOULD DIE IN THE LAND OF LIBYSSA, AND HE WAS
EXPECTING TO DIE IN LIBYA, HIS NATIVE COUNTRY, BUT, AS IT HAPPENED,
HIS DEMISE OCCURRED WHILE HE CHANCED TO BE STAYING IN A CERTAIN PLACE
CALLED LIBYSSA. Scipio Africanus also died at this time.


_(BOOK 20, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: B.C. 179 (_a.u._ 575)] IX, 22.--Philip, king of Macedonia,
had put to death his son Demetrius and was about to slay his other son
Perseus, when death overtook him. Because Demetrius had gained the
affection of the Roman people through his sojourn as hostage and
because he himself and the rest of the Macedonian people hoped that he
would secure the kingdom after Philip was done with it, Perseus, who
was his elder, became jealous of him and falsely reported him to be
plotting against his father. Thus Demetrius was forced to drink poison
and perished. Philip not long after ascertained the truth and desired
to take measures against Perseus; he did not, however, possess
sufficient strength and death overtook him. Perseus succeeded to the
kingdom. The Romans confirmed his claims to it and renewed the compact
of friendship enjoyed by his father.

In the period immediately following some events of importance took
place, yet they were not of so vital a character that one should deem
them worthy of record. Still later Perseus put himself in the position
of an enemy to the Romans, and in order to delay actual warfare until
he should reach a state of preparation he sent envoys to Rome
presumably to make a defence on the charges which were being pressed
against him. These messengers the Romans would not receive within the
wall, but they transacted business with them in the space before the
city; and no other answer was vouchsafed them than that they would
send a consul with whom he might confer on whatever topics he pleased.
They also caused them to depart the same day, having given them guides
to prevent their associating with anybody. And Perseus was forbidden
in the future to set foot on the soil of Italy.

The Romans next sent out Gnæus Sicinius, a prætor, with a small force
(they had not yet made ready their greater armament) and Perseus made
a tentative invasion of Thessaly in which he won over the greater part
of that country. [Sidenote: B.C. 171 (_a.u._ 583)] When spring opened
they sent Licinius Crassus against him as well as a prætor, Gaius
Lucretius, in charge of the fleet. The latter first encountered
Perseus near Larissa and was worsted in a cavalry skirmish: later,
though, he got the best of him and Perseus accordingly retreated into
Macedonia. As for Crassus, he assailed the Greek cities which were
held in subjection by Philip and was repulsed from the majority of
them, although he did get possession of a few. Some he razed to the
ground and sold the captives. When the inhabitants of Rome learned
these details, they became indignant and later they imposed a money
fine on Crassus, liberated the captured cities, and bought back from
the purchasers such of their inhabitants as had been sold and were
then found in Italy.

So fared the Romans in these undertakings, but in the war against
Perseus as a whole they suffered many great reverses and their
fortunes at many points were at a low ebb. Perseus occupied the
greater part of Epirus and Thessaly, having gathered a large body of
troops. As a measure of defence against the Romans' elephants he had
trained a phalanx of heavy-armed warriors whose shields and helmets he
had taken care should be studded with sharp iron nails. Also, in order
to make sure that the beasts should not prove a source of terror to
the horses he constructed images of elephants that were smeared with
some kind of ointment to give them a fearful odor and were frightful
both to see and to hear (for a mechanical device enabled them to emit
a roar resembling thunder); and he kept continually leading the horses
up to these representations until they took courage. Perseus, then, as
a result of all this had acquired great confidence and entertained
hope that he might surpass Alexander in glory and in the size of his
domain; the people of Rome [Sidenote: B.C. 169 (_a.u._ 585)] when they
learned this sent out with speed Marcius Philippus, who was consul.
He, on reaching the camp in Thessaly, drilled the Romans and the
allies so that Perseus, becoming afraid, remained quietly in Dium of
Macedonia and close to Tempe, and continued to keep watch of the pass.
Philippus, encouraged by this behavior of his, crossed the mountain
range in the center and occupied some possessions of Perseus. But as
he was progressing toward Pydna he fell short of provisions and turned
back to Thessaly. Perseus gained boldness anew, recovered the places
that Philippus had occupied, and with his fleet damaged the Romans at
numerous points. He also secured allies [Sidenote: FRAG. 65^1] AND
HOPED TO EJECT THE ROMANS FROM GREECE ALTOGETHER, BUT THROUGH HIS
EXCESSIVE AND INOPPORTUNE PARSIMONY AND THE CONSEQUENT CONTEMPT OF HIS
ALLIES HE BECAME WEAK ONCE MORE. SO SOON AS ROMAN INFLUENCE WAS
DECLINING SLIGHTLY AND HIS OWN WAS INCREASING, HE WAS FILLED WITH
SCORN AND THOUGHT HE HAD NO FURTHER NEED OF HIS ALLIES, AND WOULD NOT
GIVE THEM THE MONEY WHICH HE HAD OFFERED. THE ZEAL OF SOME ACCORDINGLY
BECAME BLUNTED AND OTHERS ABANDONED HIM ENTIRELY, WHEREUPON HE WAS SO
OVERWHELMED BY DESPAIR AS ACTUALLY TO SUE FOR PEACE. AND HE WOULD HAVE
OBTAINED IT THROUGH EUMENES BUT FOR THE PRESENCE OF RHODIANS ALSO IN
THE EMBASSY. THEY, BY ADOPTING A HAUGHTY TONE WITH THE ROMANS,
PREVENTED HIM FROM OBTAINING PEACE.

[Sidenote: B.C. 168 (_a.u._ 586)] IX, 23.--At this point the war waged
against him was entrusted to Æmilius Paulus, now for the second time
consul. He rapidly traversed the distance separating him from Thessaly
and having first set the affairs of the soldiers in order forced his
way through Tempe, which was being guarded by only a few men, and
marched against Perseus. The latter had ere this erected breastworks
along the river Elpeus which intervened, had occupied and rendered
impassable by means of stone walls and palisades and buildings all the
ground between Olympus and the sea, and was encouraged by the lack of
water in the place. Yet even so the consul sought to effect a passage
and found a means of overcoming the prevailing drought. By piercing
the sand bed at the foot of Olympus he found water that was delicious
as well as drinkable.--Meanwhile envoys of the Rhodians reached him
animated by the same insolence which they had displayed on their
former embassy to Rome. He would make no statement to them beyond
saying that he would return an answer in a few days, and dismissed
them.--Since he could accomplish nothing by direct assault, but
learned that the mountains were traversable here and there, he sent a
portion of his army toward that pass across them which was the more
difficult of approach, to seize opportune points along the route (on
account of its difficulty of access it had an extremely small guard);
and he himself with the remainder of his army attacked Perseus that
the latter might not entertain any suspicion which might lead to his
guarding the mountains with especial care. After this, when the
heights had been occupied, he set out by night for the mountains and
by passing unnoticed at some points and employing force at others he
crossed them. Perseus on learning it became afraid that his enemy
might assail him from the rear or even get control of Pydna before he
could (for the Roman fleet was simultaneously sailing along the
coast), and he abandoned his fortification near the river and
hastening to Pydna encamped in front of the town. Paulus, too, came
there, but instead of immediately beginning an engagement they delayed
for a number of days. Paulus had found out prior to the event that the
moon was about to suffer an eclipse, and after collecting his army on
the evening when the eclipse was due to occur gave the men notice of
what would happen and warned them not to let it disturb them at all.
So the Romans on beholding the eclipse looked for no evil to come from
it, but it made an impression of terror upon the Macedonians and they
thought that the prodigy had a bearing on the cause of Perseus. While
each side was in this frame of mind an entirely accidental occurrence
the next day threw them into a fierce conflict and put an end to the
war. One of the Roman pack-animals had fallen into the water from
which a supply was being drawn, and the Macedonians laid hold of him,
while the water-carriers in turn tightened their grasp. At first they
fought by themselves; then the remainder of the forces gradually
issued from the respective camps to the assistance of their own men
and everybody on both sides became engaged. A disordered but sharp
conflict ensued in which the Romans were victorious and pursuing the
Macedonians as far as the sea slaughtered numbers of them by their own
efforts and allowed the fleet, which was drawing inshore, to slay
numbers more. Not one of them would have been left alive but for the
timely succor of night (for the battle had raged during the late
afternoon).

Perseus consequently made his escape to Amphipolis, where he intended
to rally the survivors and reorganize the campaign; but as nobody came
to him save Cretan mercenaries and he learned that Pydna and other
cities had espoused the Roman cause, he removed thence, and after
putting aboard some vessels all the money that he was carrying he
sailed away by night to Samothrace. Before long he ascertained that
Octavius was approaching at the head of his fleet and that Paulus was
in Amphipolis; so he sent him a letter requesting permission to confer
about terms. Since, however, he described himself in the letter as
"king", he did not get any answer. Subsequently he despatched a letter
without any such appellation contained in it and was granted a
conference to consider the question of peace, but the victor declared
that he would not sanction any conditions that did not include
Perseus's surrender of his person and all his possessions to the
Romans' keeping. Hence they failed to come to an agreement. [Sidenote:
FRAG. 65^3] AFTER THIS A DEMAND WAS MADE UPON PERSEUS BY THE ROMANS
FOR THE SURRENDER OF ONE EVANDER, A CRETAN, WHO HAD ASSISTED HIM IN
MANY SCHEMES AGAINST THEM AND WAS MOST FAITHFUL TO HIM. THE PRINCE,
FEARING THAT HE MIGHT DECLARE ALL THE INTRIGUES TO WHICH HE HAD BEEN
PRIVY, DID NOT DELIVER HIM BUT SECRETLY SLEW HIM AND HAD IT RUMORED
THAT THE MAN HAD PERISHED BY HIS OWN HAND. THEN THE ASSOCIATES OF
PERSEUS, FEARING HIS TREACHERY (for they were not ignorant of what had
occurred), BEGAN TO DESERT HIS STANDARD. Perseus, then, being afraid
that he should be delivered up to the Romans tried one night to escape
by flight and might have taken himself away unobserved to Cotys, a
Thracian potentate, but for the fact that the Cretans abandoned him.
They placed the money in boats and weighed anchor for home. So he
remained there for some days with Philip, one of his sons, hidden from
sight, but on ascertaining that the rest of his children and his
retinue had fallen into the hands of Octavius [Sidenote: FRAG. 65^4]
HE ALLOWED HIMSELF TO BE FOUND. UPON HIS BEING BROUGHT TO AMPHIPOLIS
PAULUS DID HIM NO INJURY, BUT BOTH ENTERTAINED HIM AND HAD HIM SIT AT
HIS TABLE, KEEPING HIM, LIKEWISE, ALTHOUGH A PRISONER, UNCONFINED, AND
SHOWING HIM COURTESY. After this Paulus returned through Epirus to
Italy.

IX, 24.--About the same time Lucius Anicius, a prætor sent to conduct
operations against Gentius, both conquered those who withstood him and
pursued Gentius, when he fled, to Scodra (where his palace was
located) and shut him up there. The place was built on a spur of the
mountain and had deep ravines containing boiling torrents winding
about it, besides being girt by a steadfast wall; and so the Roman
commander's siege of it would have come to naught, if Gentius
presuming greatly upon his own power had not voluntarily advanced to
battle. This act gave the control of his entire domain to Anicius, who
then proceeded, before Paulus could arrive, to Epirus and tamed the
quarrelsome pride of that district as well.

The Romans of the capital by some vague report heard of the victory of
Paulus on the fourth day after the battle, but they placed no sure
confidence in it. Then letters were brought from Paulus regarding his
success and they were mightily pleased and plumed themselves not
merely upon having vanquished Perseus and acquired Macedonia but upon
having beaten the renowned Philip of old time and Alexander himself
together with all that empire which he had held. When Paulus reached
Rome many decrees in his honor were passed and the celebration of his
triumph proved a most brilliant event. He had in his procession all
the booty which he had captured, and he had also Bithys, the son of
Cotys, besides Perseus and his wife and three children altogether in
the garb of captives. Fearing that Heaven might wax envious of the
Romans on account of their excess of good fortune he prayed, as
Camillus had done before, that no ill to the State might result from
it all but rather to him if it should be unavoidable: and, indeed, he
lost two sons, one a little before the celebration and the other
during the triumphal festival itself. [Sidenote: FRAG. 66] HE WAS NOT
ONLY GOOD AT GENERALSHIP, BUT HE LOOKED DOWN UPON MONEY. OF THIS THE
FOLLOWING IS A PROOF. THOUGH HE HAD AT THAT TIME ENTERED FOR A SECOND
TERM UPON THE CONSULSHIP AND HAD GAINED POSSESSION OF UNTOLD SPOILS,
HE CONTINUED TO LIVE IN SO GREAT INDIGENCE THAT WHEN HE DIED THE DOWRY
WAS WITH DIFFICULTY PAID BACK TO HIS WIFE.

Of the captives Bithys was returned to his father without ransom, but
Perseus with his children and attendants was settled in Alba. There he
endured so long as he still hoped to recover his sovereignty, but when
he despaired of doing so he despatched himself. His son Philip and his
daughter also died shortly after: only the youngest son survived for a
time and served in the capacity of under-secretary to the magistrates
of Alba. Thus Perseus, who boasted of tracing his descent through
twenty kings and often had Philip and still oftener Alexander in his
mouth, lost his kingdom, became a captive, and marched in the
procession of triumph wearing chains as well as his diadem.

[Sidenote: FRAG. 67^1] THE RHODIANS, WHO IN THEIR EARLIER DEALINGS
WITH THE ROMANS DISPLAYED SELF-ESTEEM, NOW BEGGED THE LATTER NOT TO
BEAR ILL-WILL TOWARD THEM: [Sidenote: FRAG. 67^2] AND WHEREAS THEY HAD
PREVIOUSLY REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE TITLE OF ROMAN ALLIES, THEY WERE NOW
ESPECIALLY ANXIOUS TO SECURE IT; and they obtained the object of their
eagerness, but only after long delay. The Romans harbored resentment
against the Cretans, too, but in response to a number of embassies on
the part of this nation they eventually relaxed their anger. Their
behavior was similar [Sidenote: FRAG. 68] IN THE CASE OF PRUSIAS AND
EUMENES. THE FORMER CAME PERSONALLY TO THE CITY AND ENTERED THE
SENATE-HOUSE, COVERED THE THRESHOLD WITH KISSES, AND WORSHIPPED THE
SENATORS; THUS HE OBTAINED PITY and was held guiltless: Eumenes
through Attalus his brother secured himself against any continuation
of malice on their part.

At this time, too, the affairs of Cappadocia were settled in the
following manner. The monarch of that country, Ariarathes, had a
legitimate son Ariarathes. But since for a long time before she had
this son his wife had failed to conceive, she had adopted a child whom
she called Orophernes. When the true son was later born the position
of the other was detected and he was banished. Naturally after the
death of Ariarathes he headed an uprising against his brother. Eumenes
allied himself with Ariarathes, and Demetrius the king of Syria with
Orophernes. Ariarathes after sustaining a defeat found an asylum with
the Romans and was appointed by them to share the kingdom with
Orophernes. But the fact that Ariarathes had been termed "friend and
ally" by the Romans enabled him subsequently to make the entire domain
his own. Attalus soon succeeded Eumenes (who died) and drove
Orophernes and Demetrius out of Cappadocia altogether.

IX, 25.--Ptolemy, ruler of Egypt, passed away leaving two sons and one
daughter. When the brothers began to quarrel with each other about the
supreme office, Antiochus the son of Antiochus the Great sheltered the
younger, who had been driven out, in order that under the pretext of
defending him he might interfere in Egyptian politics. In a campaign
directed against Egypt he conquered the greater part of the country
and spent some time in besieging Alexandria. As the unsubdued sought
refuge with the Romans, Popilius was sent to Antiochus and bade him
keep his hands off Egypt; for the brothers, comprehending the designs
of Antiochus, had become reconciled. When the latter was for putting
off his reply, Popilius drew a circle about him with his staff and
demanded that he deliberate and answer standing where he was.
Antiochus then in fear raised the siege. The Ptolemies (such was the
name of both princes) on being relieved of foreign dread fell into
renewed disputing. Then they were reconciled again by the Romans on
the condition that the elder should have Egypt and Cyprus, and the
other one the country about Cyrene, which was likewise part of Egypt
at that time. The younger one was vexed at having the inferior portion
and came to Rome where he secured from the government a grant of
Cyprus in addition. Then the elder once more effected an arrangement
with the younger son by giving him some cities in exchange for Cyprus
and being rated to contribute money and grain.

[Sidenote: B.C. 164 (_a.u._ 590)] Antiochus subsequently died, leaving
the kingdom to a child of the same name whom the Romans confirmed in
possession of it and sent three men (with sufficient show of reason,
for he was a minor) to act as his guardians. They on finding elephants
and triremes contrary to the compact ordered the elephants all to be
slain and administered everything else in the interest of Rome.
Therefore Lysias, who had been entrusted with the surveillance of the
king, incited the populace to cast out the Romans and also kill
Gaius[39] Octavius. When these plans had been carried out Lysias
straightway despatched envoys to Rome to offer a defence for what had
been done. Demetrius the son of Seleucus son of Antiochus, who was
staying in Rome as a hostage at the time of his father's death and had
been deprived of the kingdom by his uncle Antiochus, asked for his
ancestral domain when he learned of the death of Antiochus, but the
Romans would neither help him to get it nor permit him to set out from
Rome. In spite of his dissatisfaction he remained quiet. But when the
affair of Lysias came up, he no longer delayed but escaped by flight
and sent a message to the senate from Lycia saying that his objective
was not his _cousin_ Antiochus (the children of brothers were so
termed by the ancients) but Lysias, and his purpose was to avenge
Octavius. Hastening to Tripolis in Syria he won over this town also,
pretending that he had been sent out by the Romans to take charge of
the kingdom. No one at this time had any idea of his secret flight,
and so after conquering Apamea and gathering a body of troops he
marched to Antioch. There he destroyed Lysias and the boy, who came to
meet him in the guise of friends (through fear of the Romans they had
offered no opposition), [Sidenote: B.C. 162 (_a.u._ 592)] and he
recovered the kingdom, whereupon he forwarded to Rome a crown and the
assassins of Octavius. The citizens, being enraged at him, would
accept neither the one nor the other.

[Footnote 39: This name is erroneously written by Zonaras for Gnæus.
(Cp. Polybius 28, 3, 2; 31, 12 (also 13, 19, and 20); 32, 4 to 7.)]

Next the Romans made a campaign against the Dalmatians. This race
consists of Illyrians who dwell along the Ionian Gulf, some of whom
the Greeks used to call Taulantii, and part of them are close to
Dyrrachium. The cause of the war was that they had been abusing some
of their neighbors who were in a league of friendship with the Romans,
and when the Romans joined an embassy in their behalf the Dalmatians
returned an answer that was not respectful, and even arrested and
killed the envoys of the other nations. [Sidenote: B.C. 155 (_a.u._
599)] Scipio Nasica subdued this race in a campaign against them. He
captured their towns and several times sold the captives.--Other
events, too, took place in those days,--not, however, of a kind to
deserve mention or historical record.


_(BOOK 21, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: B.C. 153 (_a.u._ 601)] IX, 26.--The rattling of dice in the
box of Circumstance now announced the final cast in the struggle with
Carthage,--the third of the series. The Carthaginians could not endure
their subordinate position, but contrary to the treaty were setting
their fleet in readiness and making alliances as measures of
preparation for war with the Nomads: [Sidenote: B.C. 152 (_a.u._ 602)]
and the Romans, having settled other questions to their own
satisfaction, did not remain at rest, but by the mouth of Scipio
Nasica their commissioner they charged their rivals with this breach
of faith and ordered them to disband their armament. The Carthaginians
found fault with Masinissa and on account of the war with him declined
to obey the command. The Romans then arranged terms for them with
Masinissa and prevailed upon him to retire from some territory in
their favor. [Sidenote: B.C. 150 (_a.u._ 604)] Since they showed
themselves no more tractable than before, the Romans waited a bit, and
as soon as information was received that the Carthaginians had been
worsted in a great battle by Masinissa they voted for war against
them. The Carthaginians, who were feeling the effects of their defeat,
became frightened on learning this and sent envoys to Rome to secure
an alliance; for other neighboring tribes were also beginning to
attack them. They feigned a readiness to yield to the Romans on all
points, and their very intention of not remaining true to their
agreements rendered them all the more ready to promise anything.

[Sidenote: B.C. 149 (_a.u._ 605)] When the senate called a meeting to
consider the matter, Scipio Nasica advised receiving the Carthaginian
embassy and making a truce with them, but Marcus Cato declared that no
truce ought to be arranged nor the decree of war rescinded. The
senators accepted the supplication of the envoys, promised to grant
them a truce, and asked for hostages as an earnest of these
conditions. These hostages were sent to Sicily and Lucius Marcius and
Marcus Manilius went there, took charge of them, and sent them on to
Rome. They themselves made haste to occupy Africa. After encamping
they summoned the magistrates of Carthage to appear before them. When
these officials arrived they did not unmask all their demands at once,
for they feared that if the Carthaginians understood them in season
they would plunge into war with resources unimpaired. So first they
asked for and received grain, next the triremes, and after that the
engines; and then they demanded the arms besides. They secured the
entire visible supply (but the Carthaginians had a great deal of other
equipment safely hidden) and at length ordered them to raze their city
and to build in its place an unwalled town inland, eighty stades
distant from the sea. At that the Carthaginians were dissolved in
tears, acknowledged that they were trapped, and bewailed their fate,
begging the consuls not to compel them to act as the assassins of
their country. They soon found that they could accomplish nothing and
had to face the repeated command either to execute the order or to
cast the die of war. Many of the people then remained there on the
Roman side, tacitly admitting their success: the remainder withdrew,
and after killing some of their rulers for not having chosen war in
the first place and after murdering such Romans as were discovered
within the fortification they turned their attention to war. Under
these circumstances they liberated all the slaves, restored the
exiles, chose Hasdrubal once more as leader, and made ready arms,
engines, and triremes. With war at their doors and the danger of
slavery confronting them they prepared in the briefest possible time
everything that they needed. They spared nothing, but melted down the
statues for the sake of the bronze in them and used the hair of their
women for ropes. The consuls at first, thinking them unarmed, expected
to overcome them speedily and merely prepared ladders, with which they
expected to scale the wall at once. As the assault showed their
enemies to be armed and they saw that they possessed means for a
siege, the Romans, before approaching close to the city again, devoted
themselves to the manufacture of engines. The construction of these
machines was fraught with danger, since Hasdrubal set ambuscades for
those who were gathering the wood and annoyed them considerably, but
in time they were able to assail the town. Now Manilius in his assault
from the land side could not injure the Carthaginians at all, but
Marcius, while delivering an attack from marshy ground on the side
where the sea was, managed to shake down a part of the wall, though he
could not get inside. The Carthaginians repulsed those who attempted
to force their way in, and at night issued through the ruins to slay
numerous men and burn up a very large number of engines. Hasdrubal and
the cavalry, however, did not allow them to scatter over any
considerable territory and Masinissa lent them no aid. He had not been
invited at the opening of the war, and, though he had promised
Hasdrubal that he would fight now, they gave him no opportunity of
doing so.

IX, 27.--The consuls in view of the outcome of their attempts and
because their fleet had been damaged by its stay in the lake raised
the siege. Marcius endeavored to achieve some advantage by sea or at
least to injure the coast districts, but not accomplishing anything he
sailed for home, then turned back and subdued Ægimurus: and Manilius
started for the interior, but upon sustaining injuries at the hands of
Himilco, commander of the Carthaginian cavalry, whom they called also
Phameas, he returned to Carthage. There, while the outside forces of
Hasdrubal troubled him, the people in the city harassed him by
excursions both night and day. In fact, the Carthaginians came to
despise him and advanced as far as the Roman camp, but being for the
most part unarmed they lost a number of men and shut themselves up in
their fortifications again. Manilius was particularly anxious to get
into close quarters with Hasdrubal, thinking that, if he could
vanquish him, he should find it easier to wage war upon the remainder.
His wish to get into close quarters with him was eventually realized.
He followed Hasdrubal to a small fort whither the latter was retiring,
and before he knew it got into a narrow passage over rough ground and
there suffered a tremendous reverse. He would have been utterly
destroyed, had he not found a most valuable helper in the person of
Scipio the descendant of Africanus, [Sidenote: FRAG. 69] WHO EXCELLED
IN APPREHENDING AND DEVISING BEFOREHAND THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS
MOVEMENTS, BUT EXCELLED ALSO IN EXECUTING THEM. IN BODILY FRAME HE WAS
STRONG; HE WAS AMIABLE, TOO, AND MODERATE; AND FOR THESE REASONS HE
ESCAPED ENVY. HE CHOSE TO MAKE HIMSELF LIKE TO HIS INFERIORS, NOT
BETTER THAN HIS EQUALS (he served as military tribune), AND WEAKER
THAN GREATER MEN. Manilius both reported what Scipio had done and sent
a letter to the people of Rome concealing nothing, but including among
other matters an account of the proceedings of Masinissa and Phameas.
These were as follows.

Masinissa on his death-bed was at a loss to know how he should dispose
of his kingdom, his dilemma being due to the number of his sons and
the variety of their family ties on their mothers' side. Therefore he
sent for Scipio to advise him, and the consul let Scipio go. But the
demise of Masinissa occurred before Scipio arrived, and he gave his
ring to his son Micipsa and delivered and committed all the other
interests pertaining to his kingdom to Scipio, so soon as the latter
should arrive. Scipio being aware of the preferences of Masinissa's
sons assigned the kingdom to no one of them singly; but whereas there
were three most distinguished, the eldest Micipsa, the youngest
Gulussa, and intermediate in age Mastanabal, he appointed these to
have charge of affairs, though separately. To the eldest, who was
versed in business and fond of wealth, he entrusted the fiscal
administration, to the second son, who possessed the critical faculty,
he granted the right to decide disputes, and to Gulussa, who chanced
to be of a warlike temperament, he delivered the troops. They had also
numerous brothers on whom he bestowed certain cities and districts. He
took Gulussa along with him and introduced him to the consul.

Now at the beginning of spring they made a campaign against the allies
of the Carthaginians and brought many of them to terms forcibly while
inducing many others to capitulate. Scipio was especially active in
the work. [Sidenote: FRAG. 70] WHEN PHAMEAS, DESPAIRING OF
CARTHAGINIAN SUCCESS, went over to the Romans and held a conference
with Scipio, then they all set out against Hasdrubal. For several days
they assailed his fortress, but as necessaries failed them they
retired in good order. During the siege Phameas had attacked them and
made a show of fighting, and in the progress of the action he had
deserted together with some of the cavalry. Then Manilius went to
Utica and remained quiet, while Scipio took Phameas back to Rome,
where he himself received commendation and Phameas was honored to the
extent of being allowed to sit with the senate in the senate-house.

IX, 28.--It was at this time, too, that the episode occurred in which
Prusias figured. The latter being old and of an irritable disposition
became possessed by a fear that the Bithynians would expel him from
his kingdom, choosing in his stead his son Nicomedes. So on some
pretext he sent his son to Rome, with orders to make that his home.
But since he plotted against the younger man even during the sojourn
in Rome and labored to kill him, some Bithynians made visits to Rome,
took Nicomedes away secretly and conveyed him to Bithynia, and after
slaying the old man designated him king. This act vexed the Romans,
but did not incense them to the point of war.

A certain Andriscus, who was a native of Atramyttium and resembled
Perseus in appearance, caused a wide area of Macedonia to revolt by
pretending to be his son and calling himself Philip. First he went to
Macedonia and tried to upheave the country, but as no one would yield
him allegiance he took his way to Demetrius in Syria to obtain from
him the aid which relationship might afford. Demetrius arrested him
and sent him to Rome, where he met with general contempt, both because
he stood convicted of not being the son of Perseus and because he had
no other qualities that were worthy of attention. On being released he
gathered a band of revolutionists, drew after him a number of cities,
and finally, assuming the kingly garb and mustering an army, he
reached Thrace. There he added to his army numbers of the independent
lands as well as numbers of princes who disliked the Romans, invaded
Macedonia (which he occupied), and setting out for Thessaly made not a
little of that territory his own.

The Romans at first scorned Andriscus and then they sent Scipio Nasica
to effect some peaceful settlement in those parts. On reaching Greece
and ascertaining what had occurred he despatched a letter to the
Romans explaining the case; then after collecting troops from allies
there he gave attention to the business in hand and advanced as far
as Macedonia. The people of Rome when informed of the doings of
Andriscus sent an army and Publius Juventius, a prætor. Juventius had
just reached the vicinity of Macedonia, when Andriscus gave battle,
killed the prætor, and would have annihilated his entire force but for
its withdrawal by night. Next he invaded Thessaly, damaged a very
great extent of it, and ranged Thracian interests on his side.
Consequently the people of Rome once more despatched a prætor, Quintus
Cæcilius Metellus, with a strong body of troops: he proceeded to
Macedonia and enjoyed the assistance of the fleet of Attalus. The
fleet inspired Andriscus with some alarm for the coast districts so
that he did not venture to advance farther but moved up to a point
slightly beyond Pydna. There he had the best of it in a cavalry
encounter but out of fear of the infantry turned back. His elation was
such that he divided his army into two sections, and with one remained
on the watch where he was, while he sent the other to ravage Thessaly.
Metellus in derision of the forces confronting him joined battle, and
by overpowering those with whom he first came into conflict he got
control of the remainder with greater ease; for they made terms with
him readily, inasmuch as they had erred. Andriscus fled to Thrace and
after assembling a body of fighters gave battle to Metellus as the
latter was advancing on his track. His vanguard, however, was routed
first; then his contingent of allies was scattered; and Andriscus
himself was betrayed by Byzes, a Thracian prince, and executed.

One Alexander, that also declared himself to be a son of Perseus and
collected a band of warriors, had occupied the country round about the
river which is called the Mestus:[40] but he now took to flight, and
Metellus chased him as far as Dardania.

[Footnote 40: Presumably an error for the _Nestus_, a well-known
stream.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 148 (_a.u._ 606)] IX, 29.--The Romans put Piso the
consul in the field against the Carthaginians. Piso did not try
conclusions with Carthage and Hasdrubal, but devoted himself to the
coast cities. He was repulsed from Aspis, captured and razed Neapolis,
and in his expedition against the town of Hippo merely used up time
without accomplishing anything. The Carthaginians took heart both for
the reasons indicated and because some allies had joined their cause.
Learning this the Romans in army and city alike had recourse to Scipio
and created him consul in spite of the fact that his age would not
properly let him hold the office. [Sidenote: Cp. FRAG. 71] His own
deeds and the excellence of his father Paulus and of his grandfather
Africanus implanted in the breasts of all a firm hope that through him
they should vanquish their enemies and utterly root out Carthage.

[Sidenote: B.C. 147 (_a.u._ 607)] While Scipio was en route to Libya,
Mancinus was sailing along the coast of Carthage. He noticed a point
called Megalia which was inside the city wall and was located on a
cliff having a sheer descent into the sea. This point was a long
distance away from the rest of the town and had but few guards because
of the natural strength of its position. Suddenly Mancinus applied
ladders to it from the ships and ascended. Not till he was safely up
did some of the Carthaginians hastily gather, but even so they were
unable to repulse him from his vantage ground. He then sent to Piso an
account of his exploit and a request for assistance. Piso, however,
being far in the interior, proved of no aid to Mancinus, but Scipio
happened along at nightfall just after the receipt of the news and
immediately sent him help. The Carthaginians would have either
captured or destroyed Mancinus, if they had not seen Scipio's vessels
skirting the shore: then they grew discouraged, but would not fall
back. So Scipio sent them some captives to tell them that he was at
hand, upon receipt of which information they no longer stood their
ground, but retired to send for Hasdrubal and fortify with trenches
and palisades the cross-wall in front of the residences. Scipio now
left Mancinus to guard Megalia and himself set out to join Piso and
the troops so as to have their support in his conduct of operations.
He made a rapid return journey with the lightest equipped portion of
the army and found that Hasdrubal had entered Carthage and was
attacking Mancinus fiercely. The arrival of Scipio put an end to the
attack. When Piso too had come there, Scipio bade him take up his
position outside the wall opposite certain gates, and he sent other
soldiers around to a little gate a long distance away from the main
force, with orders as to what they must do. He himself about midnight
took the strongest portion of the army, got inside the circuit (using
deserters as guides) and moving quietly to a point inside the little
gate he hacked the bar in two, let in the men who were on the watch
outside and destroyed the guards. Then he hastened to the gate
opposite which Piso had his station, routing the intervening guards
(who were only a few in each place), so that Hasdrubal by the time he
found out what had happened could see that nearly the entire body of
Roman troops was inside. For a while the Carthaginians withstood them:
then they abandoned the city, all but the Cotho and Byrsa, in which
they took refuge. Next Hasdrubal killed all the Roman captives in
order that his people in despair of pardon might show the greater
fortitude in resistance. He also made away with many of the natives on
the charge that they wanted to betray their own cause. And Scipio
encircled them with trench and palisade and intercepted them by a
wall, yet it was some time before he took them captive. The walls were
strong and the men within being many in number and confined in a small
space fought with vehemence. They were well off for food, too, for
Bithias from the mainland opposite the city sent merchantmen, amid
wind and wave into the harbor to them so often as there was a heavy
gale blowing. To overcome this obstacle Scipio conceived and executed
a startling operation, namely, the damming of the narrow entrance to
the harbor. The work was difficult and toilsome, for the Carthaginians
undertook to check them, yet he accomplished it by the number of
laborers at his disposal. Many battles took place in the meantime, but
the enemy were unable to prevent the filling of the channel.

IX, 30.--So when the mouth of the harbor had been filled up, the
Carthaginians were terribly oppressed by the scarcity of food; some of
them deserted, others endured it and died, and still others ate the
dead bodies. Hasdrubal, accordingly, in dejection sent envoys to
Scipio with regard to truce, and would have obtained immunity, had he
not desired to secure both preservation and freedom for all the rest
as well. After he had failed for this reason to accomplish his purpose
he confined his wife in the acropolis because she had made
propositions to Scipio for the safety of herself and her children, and
behaved in other ways more boldly on account of his despair. He,
therefore, and some others, mastered by frenzy, fought both night and
day; and sometimes they would be defeated and sometimes gain
advantage; and they devised machinery to oppose the Roman engines.
Bithias, who held a high-perched fortress and scoured wide stretches
of the mainland, did what he could to help the Carthaginians and
damage the Romans. Hence Scipio also divided his army, assigning one
half of it to invest Carthage while he sent the other half against
Bithias, placing at the head of it his lieutenant Gaius Lælius. He
himself spent his time in passing from one division to the other for
inspection. Then the fortress was taken, and the siege of Carthage was
once more conducted by an undivided force.

[Sidenote: B.C. 146 (_a.u._ 608)] The Carthaginians despairing
consequently of being any longer able to save both walls betook
themselves to the enclosure of the Byrsa, since it was higher up, at
the same time transferring thither all the objects that they could.
By night they burned the dockyard and most of the other structures in
order to deprive the enemy of any benefit from them. When the Romans
became aware of their action, they occupied the harbor and advanced
against Byrsa. Occupying the houses on each side of it some of the
besiegers walked straight along on top of the roofs by successively
stepping to those immediately adjacent, and others by digging through
the walls pushed onward below until they reached the very citadel.
When they had got so far, the Carthaginians offered no further
opposition, but all except Hasdrubal sued for clemency. He together
with the deserters (for Scipio would not grant them a truce) was
crowded into the temple of Æsculapius, as were also his wife and
children, and there he defended himself against assailants until the
deserters set fire to the temple and climbed to the roof to await the
last extremity of the flames. Then, beaten, he came to Scipio holding
the suppliant branch. His wife, who witnessed his entreaty, after
calling him by name and reproaching him for securing safety for
himself when he had not allowed her to obtain terms threw her children
into the fire and likewise cast herself in.

Thus did Scipio take Carthage, and he forwarded to the senate a letter
in these terms: "Carthage is taken. What are your orders?" This being
read they held a session to consider what should be done. Cato
advanced the opinion that they ought to raze the city and blot out the
Carthaginians, whereas Scipio Nasica still advised sparing the
Carthaginians. From this beginning the senate became involved in great
dispute and contention until some one said that if for no other reason
it must be considered necessary to spare them for the Romans' own
sake. With this nation for antagonists they would be sure to practice
excellence and not turn aside to pleasures and luxury; for if those
who were able to compel them to practice warlike pursuits should be
removed from the scene, they might become inferior from want of
practice, for a lack of worthy competitors. As a result of these words
all became unanimous in favor of demolishing Carthage, since they felt
sure that that people would never remain entirely at peace. The whole
town was therefore overthrown from pinnacle to foundation and it was
decreed that for any person to settle upon its site should be an
accursed act. The majority of the population captured were thrown into
prison and there perished, and some few (still excepting the very
foremost men) were sold. These leaders and the hostages and Hasdrubal
and Bithias lived to the end of their lives in different parts of
Italy as prisoners, yet free from bonds. Scipio secured both glory and
honor and was called Africanus not after his grandfather but from his
own achievements.

IX, 31.--This year likewise saw the ruin of Corinth. The head men of
the Greeks had been deported to Italy by Æmilius Paulus, whereupon
their countrymen at first through embassies kept requesting the return
of the men, and when their prayers were not granted some of the
exiles in despair of ever effecting a return to their homes committed
suicide. The Greeks took this situation with a very bad grace and made
it a matter of public lamentation, besides evincing anger at any
persons dwelling among them that favored the Roman cause; yet they
displayed no open symptoms of hostility until they got back the
remnants of those hostages. [Sidenote: B.C. 149 (_a.u._ 605)] Then
those that had been wronged and those that had obtained a hold upon
the goods of others fell into strife and began a real warfare.
[Sidenote: FRAG. 72] THE QUARREL BEGAN BY THE ACTION OF THE ACHÆANS IN
BRINGING CHARGES AGAINST THE LACEDÆMONIANS AS BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR
WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO THEM. THE MEDIATORS WHOM THE ROMANS DESPATCHED TO
THEM THEY WOULD NOT HEED: they rather set their faces toward war,
acting under the supervision of Critolaus. Metellus was consequently
afraid that they might lay hands on Macedonia,--[Sidenote: B.C. 148
(_a.u._ 606)] they had already appeared in Thessaly,--and so he went
to meet them and routed them.

At the fall of Critolaus the Greek world was split asunder. Some of
them had embraced peace and laid down their weapons, whereas others
had committed their interests to the care of Diæus and were still
involved in factional turmoil. [Sidenote: B.C. 146 (_a.u._ 608)] On
learning this the people of Rome sent Mummius against them. He got rid
of Metellus and gave his personal attention to the war. Part of his
army sustained a slight reverse through an ambuscade and Diæus pursued
the fugitives up to their own camp, but Mummius made a sortie, routed
him, and followed to the Achæan entrenchments. Diæus now gathered a
larger force and undertook to give battle to them, but, as the Romans
would make no hostile demonstration, he conceived a contempt for them
and advanced to a depressed piece of ground lying between the camps.
Mummius seeing this secretly sent horsemen to assail them on the
flank. After these had attacked and thrown the enemy into confusion,
he brought up the phalanx in front and caused considerable slaughter.
As a consequence Diæus in despair killed himself, and of the survivors
of the battle the Corinthians were scattered over the country, while
the rest fled to their homes. Hence the Corinthians within the wall
believing that all their citizens had been lost abandoned the city,
and it was empty of men when Mummius took it. After that he won over
without trouble both that nation and the rest of the Greeks. He now
took possession of their arms, all the offerings that were consecrated
in their temples, the statues, paintings, and whatever other kind of
ornament they had; and as soon as he could send his father and some
other men to arrange terms for the vanquished he caused the walls of
some of the cities to be taken down and declared them all to be free
and independent except the Corinthians. The dwellers in Corinth he
sold, and confiscated their land and demolished their walls and all
their houses besides, out of fear that some states might again unite
with them, since they constituted the greatest state. To prevent any
of them from remaining hidden and any of the other Greeks from being
sold as Corinthians he assembled everybody present before he had
disclosed his determination, and after having his soldiers surround
them in such a way as not to attract notice he proclaimed the
enslavement of the Corinthians and the liberation of the remainder.
Then he instructed them all to take hold of any Corinthians standing
beside them. In this way he arrived at an accurate distinction.

Thus was Corinth overthrown. The rest of the Greek world suffered
temporarily from murders and levies of money, but afterward came to
enjoy such immunity and prosperity that it used to be said: "If they
had not been taken captive as early as they were, they could not have
been preserved."

So this end simultaneously befell Carthage and Corinth, famous,
ancient cities: but at a much later date they received colonies of
Romans, became again flourishing, and regained their original
position.

The exploits of the Romans up to this point, found by me in ancient
books that record these matters, written by men of old time, I have
drawn thence in a condensed form and have embodied in the present
history. As for what comes next in order,--the transactions of the
consuls and dictators, so long as the government of Rome was still
conducted by these officials,--let no one censure me as having passed
this by through contempt or indolence or antipathy and having left the
history as it were incomplete. The gap has not been overlooked by me
through sloth, nor have I of my own free will left my task half
finished, but through lack of books to describe the events. I have
frequently instituted a search for them, yet I have not found them,
and I do not know whether the cause is that the passage of time has
destroyed them, and so they are not preserved, or whether the persons
to whom I entrusted the errand perhaps did not search for them with
sufficient diligence; for I was living abroad and passing my life on
an islet far from the city. And because it has not been my lot to gain
access to these books in this instance, my history turns out to be
only half complete for the acts of the consuls and even for those of
the dictators. Hence, passing over them, though reluctantly, I will
record the deeds of the emperors, with some brief introductory remarks
to make clear to those who shall read my history by what steps the
Romans passed from aristocracy (or democracy) to the rule of one man,
and to impart, in addition, coherence to the narrative.

       *       *       *       *       *

NOTE.--NO SUMMARY EXISTS OF THE MISSING BOOKS TWENTY-TWO TO
THIRTY-FIVE INCLUSIVE, AND WE ARE DRIVEN TO RELY ON SCATTERED AND
INCONSEQUENTIAL FRAGMENTS (THAT HAVE SOMEHOW ESCAPED THE WRECK OF
SEASONS) AS THE BASIS FOR WHATEVER MENTAL IMAGE WE MAY CHOOSE TO FORM
OF THE LOST NARRATIVE. THESE BITS POSSESS THE SAME VALUE FOR DIO'S
HISTORY AS DO THE UNRELATED PIECES OF MARBLE AND CLAY FROM EXCAVATIONS
IN ENABLING US TO GAIN A WIDER UNDERSTANDING OF ANTIQUE SCULPTURE AND
POTTERY. FOR AN ACCOUNT OF THE SOURCES OF THESE FRAGMENTS SEE THE
INTRODUCTION, UNDER THE CAPTION ENTITLED THE WRITING.

       *       *       *       *       *


_(BOOK 22, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXIII] ¶Viriathus was a Lusitanian, of very obscure
origin, as some think, who enjoyed great renown through his deeds, for
from a shepherd he became a robber and later on also a general. He was
naturally adapted and had trained himself to be very quick in pursuing
and fleeing, and of great force in a stationary conflict. He was glad
to get any food that came to hand and whatever drink fell to his lot;
he lived most of his life under the open sky and was satisfied with
nature's bedding. Consequently he was superior to any heat or any
cold, and neither was he ever troubled by hunger nor did he suffer
from any other disagreeable condition; since he found all his wants
met quite sufficiently by whatever he had at hand, which seemed to him
unexcelled. While he possessed such a physical constitution, as the
result of nature and training, he surpassed still more in spiritual
endowment. He was swift to perceive and do whatever was requisite,--he
could tell what must be done and at the same time he understood the
proper occasion for it,--and he was clever at pretending not to know
the most evident facts and to know the most hidden secrets.
Furthermore he was not only general but his own assistant in every
business equally, and was seen to be neither humble nor pompous, but
in him obscurity of family and reputation for strength were so mingled
that he seemed to be neither inferior nor superior to any one. And, in
fine, he carried on the war not for the sake of personal gain or
power nor through anger, but because of the opportunity for action;
therefore he was regarded as most thoroughly a lover of war and a
successful warrior. (Valesius, p. 614.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXIV] [Sidenote: B.C. 143 (_a.u._ 611)] 1.
¶Claudius, the colleague of Metellus, impelled by pride of birth and
jealousy of Metellus, when he had had Italy allotted to his command
and found no sign of war, was eager to secure by any means some
pretext for a triumph; hence without taking the trouble to lodge any
formal complaint he set the Salassi, a Gallic tribe, at war with the
Romans. He had been sent to reconcile them, because they were
disputing with their neighbors about the water necessary for the gold
mines, and he overran their entire country ... the Romans sent him two
of the ten priests. (Valesius, p. 617.)

2. ¶Claudius, even if he understood thoroughly that he had not
conquered, nevertheless even then displayed such arrogance as not to
say a word in either the senate or the popular assembly about the
triumph; but acting as if the right were indisputably his, even if no
one should vote to that effect, he asked for the requisite
expenditures. (Valesius, ib.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXV] [Sidenote: B.C. 142 (_a.u._ 612)] ¶As regards
character Mummius and Africanus differed vastly from each other in
every respect. The latter ruled with a view to the greatest
uprightness and with exactitude, not esteeming one influence above
another; he called to account many of the senators and many of the
knights, as well as other individuals. Mummius, on the other hand, was
more urbane and humane in his behavior; he imputed no dishonor to any
one, and abolished many of the regulations framed by Africanus, so far
as was possible. To such an extent of amiability did his nature lead
him, that he lent some statues to Lucullus for the consecration of the
temple of Felicitas (material for which he had gathered in the Spanish
war), and then, when that general was unwilling to return them on the
ground that they had been made sacred by the dedication, he showed no
anger, but permitted his own spoils to lie there offered up in
another's name. (Valesius, p. 618.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXVI] [Sidenote: B.C. 140 (_a.u._ 614)]
¶Pompeius[41] received many setbacks and incurred great disgrace.
There was a river flowing through the country of the Numantini that he
wished to turn aside from its ancient channel and let in upon their
fields; and after tremendous exertions he did accomplish this. But he
lost many soldiers, and no advantage from turning it aside came to the
Romans, nor harm to the enemy.... (Valesius, ib.)

[Footnote 41: This is Q. Pompeius A. F. Nepos (consul B.C. 141).]

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXVII] ¶Cæpio[42] effected nothing worthy of mention
against the foe, but brought much serious harm to his own men, so that
he ran the risk of being killed by them. He treated them all, but
especially the cavalry, with such harshness and cruelty that a vast
number of most unseemly jokes and stories passed current about him
during the nights; and the more he grew vexed at it, the more jests
did they make and endeavor to infuriate him. When what was going on
became known and no one could be found guilty--though he suspected it
was the doing of the cavalry--as he could fix the responsibility upon
no one single man he became angry at all of them, and commanded them,
six hundred in number, accompanied only by their grooms, to cross the
river by which they were encamped and bring wood from the mountain on
which Viriathus was bivouacking. The danger was manifest to all, and
the tribunes and lieutenants begged him not to destroy them. The
cavalry waited for a little to see if he would listen to the others,
and when he would not yield, they deemed it unworthy to supplicate
him, as he was most eager for them to do, but choosing rather to
perish utterly than to speak a respectful word to him, they started on
the mission assigned. The horsemen of the allies and other volunteers
accompanied them. They crossed the river, cut the wood, and threw it
in all around the general's quarters, intending to burn them down. And
he would have perished in the flames, if he had not fled away in time.
(Valesius, p. 618.)

[Footnote 42: _Q. Servilius Cæpio_ (consul B.C. 140).]

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXVIII] [Sidenote: B.C. 139 (_a.u._ 615)] ¶Popilius
so terrified Viriathus that the latter sent to him about peace
immediately and before they had tried any battle at all, killed some
of the leaders of the rebels whose surrender had been demanded by the
Romans--among these his father-in-law, though commanding his own
force, was slaughtered--and delivered up the rest, all of whose hands
the consul cut off. And he would have agreed to a complete truce, if
their weapons had not been demanded in addition: with this condition
neither he nor the rest of the throng would comply.[43] (Ursinus, p.
383.)

[Footnote 43: Adopting Reiske's conjecture [Greek: hypomeinai epsêsen]
in place of the MS. [Greek: hypomeinai epoiêses].]


_(BOOK 23, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXIX] [Sidenote: B.C. 136 (_a.u._ 618)] ¶The Romans
received the Numantine ambassadors on their arrival outside the walls,
to the end that their reception might not seem to imply a ratification
of the truce. However, they sent gifts of friendship notwithstanding,
not wishing to deprive them of the hope of possibly coming to terms.
Mancinus and his followers told of the necessity of the compact made
and the number of the saved, and stated that they still held all of
their former possessions in Spain. They besought their countrymen to
consider the question not in the light of their present immunity, but
with reference to the danger that then encompassed the soldiers, and
to think not what ought to have been done, but what might have been
the outcome. The Numantini brought forward many statements about their
previous good-will toward the Romans and considerable about the
latter's subsequent injustice, by reason of which they had been forced
into the war, and the perjury of Pompeius: and they asked for
considerate treatment in return for the preservation of Mancinus and
the rest. But the Romans both dissolved the truce and decided that
Mancinus should be given up to the Numantini. (Ursinus, p. 383.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXX] ¶Claudius[44] through his harshness would have
committed many outrageous acts, had he not been restrained by his
colleague Quintus.[45] The latter, who was amiable and possessed
exactly the opposite temperament, did not oppose him with anger in any
matter and, indeed, occasionally yielded to him, and by gentle
behavior so manipulated him that he found very few opportunities for
irritation. (Valesius, p. 621.)

[Footnote 44: These are the censors for the year B.C. 136, Ap.
Claudius Pulcher and Q. Fulvius Nobilior.]

[Footnote 45: See note, page 335.]

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXXI] ¶Furius[46] led out among his lieutenants both
Pompeius and Metellus though they were hostile both to him and to each
other; for, expecting to achieve some great success, he wished to have
in them sure witnesses to his deeds and to receive the evidence of his
prowess from their unwilling lips. (Valesius, ib.)

[Footnote 46: P. Furius Philus (consul B.C. 136).]


_(BOOK 24, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXXIII] 1. ¶Tiberius Gracchus caused an upheaval of
the Roman state,--and this in spite of the fact that he belonged to
one of the foremost families (his grandfather being Africanus), that
he possessed a natural endowment worthy of the latter, that he had
gone through a most thorough course of education, and had a high
spirit. In proportion to these great gifts of his was the allurement
that they offered to follow his ambitions: and when once he had turned
aside from what was best he drifted even involuntarily into what was
worst. It began with his being refused a triumph over the Numantini:
he had hoped for this honor because he had previously had the
management of the business, but so far from obtaining anything of the
kind he incurred the danger of being delivered up; then he decided
that deeds were estimated not on the basis of goodness or truth but
according to mere chance. And this road to fame he abandoned as not
safe, but since he desired by all means to become prominent in some
way and expected that he could accomplish this better through the
popular than through the senatorial party, he attached himself to the
former. (Valesius, p. 621.)

2. ¶Marcus Octavius on account of an hereditary feud with Gracchus
willingly made himself his opponent. [Sidenote: B.C. 133 (_a.u._ 621)]
Thereafter there was no semblance of moderation: striving and
quarreling as they were, each to survive the other rather than to
benefit the community, they committed many acts of violence as if they
were in a principality instead of a democracy, and suffered many
unusual calamities proper for war but not for peace. In addition to
their individual conflicts, there were many who, banded together,
instituted grievous abuses and battles in the senate-house itself and
the popular assembly as well as throughout the rest of the city: they
pretended to be executing the law, but were in reality making in all
things every effort not to be surpassed by each other. The result was
that the authorities could not carry on their accustomed tasks, courts
came to a stop, no contract was entered into, and other sorts of
confusion and disorder were rife everywhere. The place bore the name
of city, but was no whit different from a camp. (Valesius, p. 622.)

3. ¶Gracchus proposed certain laws for the benefit of those of the
people who served in the army, and transferred the courts from the
senate to the knights, bedeviling and disturbing all established
customs in order that he might be enabled to lay hold on safety in
some wise. And after he found not even this of advantage to him, but
his term of office was drawing to a close, when he would be
immediately exposed to the attacks of his enemies, he attempted to
secure the tribuneship also for the following year (in company with
his brother) and to appoint his father-in-law consul: to obtain this
end he would make any statement or promise anything whatever to
anybody. Often, too, he put on a mourning garb and brought his mother
and children, tied hand and foot, into the presence of the populace.
(Valesius, ib.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXXIII] [Sidenote: B.C. 129 (_a.u._ 625)] ¶Scipio
Africanus had more ambition in his makeup than was suitable for or
compatible with his general excellence. And in reality none of his
rivals took pleasure in his death, but although they thought him a
great obstacle in their way even they missed him. They saw that he was
valuable to the State and never expected that he would cause them any
serious trouble. When he was suddenly taken away all the possessions
of the powerful class were again diminished, so that the promoters of
agrarian legislation ravaged at will practically all of Italy. And
this seems to me to have been most strongly indicated by the mass of
stones that poured down from heaven, falling upon some of the temples
and killing men, and by the tears of Apollo. [Sidenote: B.C. 131
(_a.u._ 623)] For the god wept copiously[47] for three days, so that
the Romans on the advice of the soothsayers voted to cut down the
statue and to sink it in the deep. (Valesius, p. 625.)

[Footnote 47: In the original the word "wept" is repeated. Van
Herwerden thinks that the second one should be deleted, but Schenkl
prefers to substitute an adverb in place of the first. In the
translation I have used an adverb giving nearly the same force as the
repetition of the verb.]


_(BOOK 25, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXXIV] ¶Gracchus had a disposition like his brother;
only the latter drifted from excellence into ambition and then to
baseness whereas this man was naturally intractable and played the
rogue voluntarily and far surpassed the other in his gift of language.
For these reasons his designs were more mischievous, his daring more
spontaneous, and his self-will greater in all junctures alike. He was
the first to walk up and down in the assemblies while he harangued and
the first to bare his arm; hence neither of these practices has been
thought improper, since he did it. And because his speaking was
characterized by great condensation of thought and forcefulness of
words and he consequently was unable to restrain himself easily but
was often led to say what he did not wish, he used to bring in a
flute-player, and from him, playing a low accompaniment, he would take
his rhythm and time, or if even so he in some way fell out of measure,
he would stop. This was the sort of man that attacked the government,
and, by assuming no speech or act to be forbidden, in the briefest
time became a great power among the populace and the knights. All the
nobility and the senatorial party if he had lived longer[48] ...
[Sidenote: B.C. 121 (_a.u._ 633)] but as it was his great authority
made him envied even by the members of his faction, and he was ruined
by his own devices. (Valesius, ib.)

[Footnote 48: One may supply here, as Reiske suggests, "would have
been overthrown", "would have been humbled", or "would have been
brought low".]


_(BOOK 26, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXXV] [Sidenote: B.C. 114 (_a.u._ 640)] 1. ¶The
priestesses for the most part incurred destruction and shame
themselves, and proved the source of great evils to numerous others as
well, while the entire city because of them was thrown into an uproar.
For the people, in view of the fact that what was immaculate by law
and sacred by the dictates of religion and decent through fear of
vengeance had been polluted, were ready to believe that anything most
shameful and unholy might be done. For this reason they visited
punishment not only on the convicted, but also on all the rest who had
been accused, to show their hatred of what had occurred. Hence the
whole episode in which the women were concerned seemed now to be due
not so much to their feminine incontinence[49] as to a kind of madness
inspired by supernatural powers. (Valesius, p. 626.)

[Footnote 49: Reading [Greek: eti aselgeias] (Boissevain's emendation)
in place of the unintelligible [Greek: aitias algein] of the MS.]

2. ¶Three altogether had had intercourse with men; and of them Marcia
had acted individually, granting her favors to one single knight[50]
and would never have been discovered, had not the investigation into
the cases of the others spread and overtaken her besides. Æmilia and
Licinia had a multitude of lovers and carried on their wanton behavior
with each other's help. At first they surrendered themselves to some
few privately and secretly, telling each man that he was the only one
admitted. Later they themselves bound every one who could suspect and
inform against them to certain silence in advance by the price of
intercourse with them, and those who had previously enjoyed their
conversation, though they saw this, yet endured it in order not to be
detected by a show of vexation. So after holding commerce with many,
now singly, now in groups, now privately, now publicly, Licinia
enjoyed the society of the brother of Æmilia, and Æmilia that of
Licinia's brother. These doings were hidden for a great period of
time, and though many men and many women, both free and slaves, were
in the secret, it was hidden for a very long period, until one
Manius,[51] who seems to have been the first to assist and coöperate
in the whole evil, gave information of the matter because he had not
obtained freedom nor any of the other objects of his hope. He was,
indeed, very skillful not only at leading women into prostitution, but
also in slandering and ruining some of them. (Valesius, p. 626.)

[Footnote 50: Namely, L. Betutius Barrus.]

[Footnote 51: A slave of the aforesaid Barrus.]

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXXVI] [Sidenote: B.C. 112 (_a.u._ 642)] ¶This was
calculated to bring him [sc. Marcus Drusus] glory first of itself and
second in the light of Cato's disaster; and because he had shown great
amiability toward the soldiers and seemed to have made success of more
importance than truth, he also secured a renown greater than his deeds
deserved. (Valesius, p. 629.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXXVII] [Sidenote: B.C. 108 (_a.u._ 646)] 1. ¶When
Jugurtha sent to Metellus about peace the latter made separate demands
upon him as if each were to be the last, and in this way got from him
hostages, arms, the elephants, the captives, and the deserters. All of
these last he killed but did not grant a truce because Jugurtha,
fearing to be arrested, refused to come to him and because Marius and
Gnæus[52] prevented. (Ursinus, p. 385.)

[Footnote 52: Possibly an error for _Gaudas_.]

2. For he [sc. Marius] was in general seditious and turbulent, wholly
friendly to the rabble from which he had sprung and wholly ready to
overthrow the nobility. He risked with perfect readiness any
statement, promise, lie, or false oath in any matter where he hoped to
gain a benefit. Blackmailing one of the foremost citizens or
commending some rascal he thought child's play. And let no one be
surprised that such a man could conceal his villanies for a very long
time: for, as a result of his exceeding cunning and the good fortune
which he enjoyed all through his early life, he actually acquired a
reputation for virtue. (Valesius, p. 629.)

3. ¶Marius was the more easily able to calumniate Metellus for the
reason that the latter was numbered among the nobles and was managing
military concerns excellently, whereas he himself was just beginning
to come forward from a very obscure and doubtful origin into public
notice:--the populace was readily inclined to overthrow Metellus
through envy, and favored Marius increasingly for his promises:--of
great assistance, too, was the report that Metellus had said to Marius
(who was just then coming forward for election): "You ought to be
satisfied if you get to be consul along with my son" (who was a mere
lad). (Valesius, p. 630.)

4. ¶Gaudas was angry at Metellus because in spite of requests he had
received from him neither the deserters nor a garrison of Roman
soldiers, or else because he could not sit near him,--a privilege
ordinarily vouchsafed by the consuls to princes and potentates.
(Valesius, ib.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 107 (_a.u._ 647)] 5. ¶When Cirta was captured by
capitulation Bocchus sent a herald to Marius and first demanded the
empire of Jugurtha as the price for his defection, but later, as he
did not obtain it, simply asked him to make terms. So he sent envoys
to Rome, but Jugurtha while this was taking place retired to the most
desolate portions of his own territory. (Ursinus, p. 385.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 106 (_a.u._ 648)] 6. ¶Marius entertained the envoys of
Bocchus but said he would make no compact with him unless he should
receive Jugurtha's prisoners from his hands; and this was done.
(Ursinus, p. 386.)


_(BOOK 27, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXXVIII] ¶Tolosa, which was formerly at peace with
the Romans but had revolted, under the influence of hope in the
Cimbri, to the extent of imprisoning the garrison, was occupied by
them at night: they were admitted unexpectedly by friends and
plundered the temples, obtaining much other money besides, for the
place had been wealthy from of old, containing among other offerings
those of which the Gauls under the leadership of Brennus had once
despoiled Delphi. Nothing of importance, however, reached the Romans
in the capital, but the victors themselves confiscated the most of it.
For this a number were called to account. (Valesius, p. 630.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. LXXXIX] [Sidenote: B.C. 105 (_a.u._ 649)] 1.
¶Servilius by reason of his jealousy of his colleague[53] became the
cause of many evils to the army; for, though he had in general equal
powers, his repute was naturally diminished by the fact that the other
was also consul. And ... after the death of Scaurus[54] he [Manlius?]
sent for Servilius: but the latter replied that each of them ought to
keep his position. Then, apprehending that Manlius might gain some
success by his own resources, he grew jealous of him, fearing that he
might secure individual glory, and went to him: yet he did not bivouac
on the same ground nor make him the partaker of any plan, but took up
a distinct position with the evident intention of joining battle with
the Cimbri before him and winning all the glory of the war. At the
outset they still inspired the enemy with dread, as long as their
quarrel was concealed, so much so as to lead the foe to desire peace,
but when the Cimbri sent a herald to Manlius as consul Servilius
became indignant that they had not directed their embassy to him,
refused to agree to any reconciliation, and came near slaying the
envoys. (Valesius, p. 630.)

[Footnote 53: _Cn. Manlius Maximus_.]

[Footnote 54: _M. Aurelius Scaurus_ (consul suffectus B.C. 108).]

2. ¶The soldiers forced Servilius to go to Manlius and consult with
him about the emergency. But so far from coming into accord they
became as a result of the meeting even more hostile than before: they
fell into strife and abuse and parted in a disgraceful fashion.
(Valesius, p. 633.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. XC] [Sidenote: B.C. 104 (_a.u._ 650)] ¶After Gnæus
Domitius obtained leave to bring suit against Scaurus, one of the
slaves then came forward and offered to bring any damaging charges
against his master: but he refused to become involved in such
despicable business, and arresting the fellow delivered him over to
Scaurus. (Valesius, ib.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. XCI] 1. ¶Publius Licinius Nerva, who was prætor in
the island, on learning that the slaves were not being justly treated
in some respects, or else because he sought an occasion of profit (for
he was not inaccessible to bribes), circulated the announcement that
all who had any charges to bring against their masters should come to
him, for he would assist them. Accordingly, many of them banded
together, and some declared they were being wronged and others made
known some other grievances against their masters, thinking they had
secured an opportunity for accomplishing without bloodshedding all
that they wished. The freeborn, after consultation, resisted them and
would not yield to them on any point. Therefore Licinius, inspired
with fear by the united front of both sides and dreading that some
great mischief might be done by the defeated party, would not admit
any of the slaves but sent them away thinking that they would suffer
no harm or that at any rate they would be scattered and so could cause
no more disturbance. But they, fearing their masters because they had
dared to raise their voices at all against them, organized a force and
by common consent turned to robbery. (Valesius, p. 633.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 103 (_a.u._ 651)] 2. ¶The Messenians, believing that
they would suffer no abuse, had deposited in that place for safe
keeping all their most valuable and highly prized possessions.
Athenio, who as a Cilician held the chief command of the robbers, on
learning this attacked them while they were celebrating a public
festival in the suburbs, killed many of them as they were scattered
about, and almost took the city by storm. After building a wall to
fortify Macella,[55] a strong position, he did serious injury to the
country. (Valesius, p. 634.)

[Footnote 55: Possibly the modern _Macellaro_.]

[Sidenote: FRAG. XCII] [Sidenote: B.C. 102 (_a.u._ 652)] 1. ¶After the
defeat of the barbarians though many had fallen in battle some few
were saved. Whereupon Marius attempted to console these survivors and
to make amends by restoring to them all the plunder at a nominal
price, to prevent its being thought that he had bestowed favors
gratuitously upon any one. By this act Marius, who previously had been
the darling of the populace alone because sprung from that class and
raised to power by it, now won over even the nobles by whom he was
hated, and was praised equally by all. He received from a willing and
harmonious people a reëlection for the following year, to enable him
to subdue his remaining foes. (Valesius, ib.)

2. ¶The Cimbri when they had once halted lost much of their spirit and
consequently grew duller and weaker in both soul and body. The reason
was that in place of their former outdoor life they rested in houses,
instead of their former cold plunges they used warm baths, whereas
they were wont to eat raw meat they now filled themselves with richly
spiced dishes and relishes of the country, and they saturated
themselves, contrary to their custom, with wine and strong drink.
These practices extinguished all their fiery spirit and enervated
their bodies, so that they could no longer bear toils or hardships or
heat or cold or sleeplessness. (Valesius, ib.)


_(BOOK 28, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: FRAG. XCIII] [Sidenote: B.C. 99 (_a.u._ 655)] 1. ¶The son
of Metellus besought everybody to such an extent both in private and
in public to let his father return from exile that he received the
appellation _Pius_, i.e. dutiful. (Valesius, p. 638.)

2. ¶Furius had such enmity toward Metellus that when he was censor he
took his horse away. (Valesius, ib.)

3. Publius Furius,[56] indicted for his deeds committed in the
tribuneship, was slain by the Romans in the Comitia itself. He richly
deserved to die, for he was a seditious person and after first joining
Saturninus and Glaucia he veered about, deserted to the opposing
faction, and joined its members; it was not proper, however, for him
to perish in just this way. And this action seemed to be on the whole
justifiable. (Valesius, p. 637.)

[Footnote 56: He was tribune of the plebs, B.C. 99.]

[Sidenote: FRAG. XCIV] 1. For there were other factional leaders, but
the greatest authority was possessed by Marcius[57] over one group,
and by Quintus[58] over the other: these men were eager for power, of
insatiable ambition, and consequently greatly inclined toward strife.
Those qualities they possessed in common; but Drusus had the advantage
of birth, and of wealth, which he lavishly expended upon those who at
any time made demands upon him, while the other greatly surpassed him
in audacity, daring, the anticipation of plots, and malignity
suitable to the occasion. Hence not unnaturally, since they
supplemented each other partly by their likeness and partly by their
differences, they created an extremely strong factional feeling which
remained even after the death of both. (Valesius, p. 638.)

[Footnote 57: _M. Livius Drusus._]

[Footnote 58: _Q. Servilius Cæpio._]

2. ¶Drusus and Cæpio, formerly great friends and united by mutual ties
of marriage, became privately at enmity with each other and carried
their feud even into politics. (Valesius, ib.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. XCV] [Sidenote: B.C. 92 (_a.u._ 662)] 1. ¶Rutilius,
an upright man, was most unjustly condemned. He was brought to court
by a preconcerted plan of the knights on a charge of having been
bribed while serving in Asia as lieutenant under Quintus Mucius,[59]
and they imposed a fine upon him. The reason for this act was their
rage at his having ended many of their irregularities in connection
with the collecting of taxes. (Valesius, p. 637.)

[Footnote 59: The clause as found in the MS. gives no sense. The
translation here is on the basis of an emendation suggested by
Boissevain.]

2. ¶Rutilius made a very able defence, and there was no one of his
words which would not be the natural utterance of an upright man who
was being blackmailed and grieved far more for the conditions of the
State than for his own possessions: he was convicted, however, and
immediately stripped of his property. This process more than any other
revealed the fact that he had in no wise deserved the sentence passed
upon him. He was found to possess much less than the accusers had
charged him with having confiscated from Asia, and he could trace all
of his goods back to just and lawful sources of acquisition. Such was
his unworthy treatment, and Marius was not free from responsibility
for his conviction; a man so excellent and of such good repute had
been an annoyance to him. Wherefore Rutilius, indignant at the conduct
of affairs in the city, and disdaining to live longer in the company
of such a creature, withdrew, though under no compulsion, and went
even as far as Asia. There for a time he dwelt in Mitylene; then after
that place had received injury in the Mithridatic war he transferred
his residence to Smyrna and there lived to the end of his life nor
wished ever to return home. And in all this he suffered not a whit in
reputation or plenty. He received many gifts from Mucius and a vast
number from all the peoples and kings as well who had become
acquainted with him, till he possessed far more than his original
property. (Valesius, p. 637.)


_(BOOK 29, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: FRAG. XCVI] [Sidenote: B.C. 90 (_a.u._ 664)] 1. ¶Lupus,[60]
suspecting that the patricians making the campaign with him were
revealing his plans to the enemy, sent word about them to the senate
before he had any definite information,[61] and, as a consequence,
although they were in no case well disposed[62] toward each other
through factional differences, he set them still more at variance.
There would have been even greater disturbance, had not some of the
Marsi been detected mixing with the foraging parties of the Romans and
entering the ramparts under the guise of allies, where they took
cognizance of speeches and actions in the camp and reported them to
their own men. In consequence of this discovery they ceased to be
angry with the patricians. (Valesius, p. 641.)

[Footnote 60: _P. Rutilius Lupus_.]

[Footnote 61: There are two gaps in the MS. here. "Had ...
information" is a conjecture of Tafel and Gros; and "well disposed
toward each other" of Reiske, who compares Book Fifty, chapter 16, of
Dio.]

[Footnote 62: [See previous footnote.]]

2. ¶Marius suspected Lupus, although a relative, and through jealousy
and hope of being appointed consul even a seventh time as the only man
who could bring success out of the existing situation, bade him delay:
their men, he said, would have provisions, whereas the other side
would not be able to hold out for any considerable time when the war
was in their country. (Valesius, ib.)

3. ¶The Picentes subdued those who would not join their rebellion and
abused these men in the presence of their friends and from the heads
of their wives they tore out the hair along with the skin. (Valesius,
ib.)


_(REMAINS OF BOOKS 30-35, BOISSEVAIN.)_

[Sidenote: FRAG. XCVII] 1. ¶Mithridates, when the Roman envoys[63]
arrived, did not make the slightest move, but after bringing some
counter-charges and also exhibiting to the envoys the amount of his
wealth, some of which he had at that time spent on various objects
public and private, he remained quiet. But Nicomedes, elated by their
alliance and being in need of money, invaded his territory. (Ursinus,
p. 386.)

[Footnote 63: Their leader was M.' Aquilius.]

2. ¶Mithridates despatched envoys to Rome requesting them if they
deemed Nicomedes a friend to persuade him or compel him to act justly
toward him, or if not, to allow him (Mithridates) to take measures
against his foe. They, so far from doing what he wished, even
threatened him with punishment if he should not give back Cappadocia
to Ariobarzanes and remain at peace with Nicomedes. His envoys they
sent away the very day and furthermore ordered him never to send
another one unless he should render them obedience. (Ursinus, ib.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. XCVIII] [Sidenote: B.C. 89 (_a.u._ 665)] ¶Cato,[64]
the greater part of whose army was effeminate and superannuated, found
his power diminished in every direction: and once, when he had
ventured to rebuke them because they were unwilling to work hard or
obey orders readily, he came near being overwhelmed with a shower of
missiles from them. He would certainly have been killed, if they had
had plenty of stones; but since the site where they were assembled
was given over to agriculture and happened to be very wet, he received
no hurt from the clods of earth. The man who began the mutiny, Gaius
Titius,[65] was arrested: he was a low fellow who made his living in
the courts and was excessively and shamelessly outspoken; he was sent
to the city to the tribunes, but escaped punishment. (Valesius, p.
641.)

[Footnote 64: _L. Porcius Cato_ (consul B.C. 89).]

[Footnote 65: Properly _C. Titinius Sisenna_.]

[Sidenote: FRAG. XCIX] [Sidenote: B.C. 88 (_a.u._ 666)] 1. ¶All the
Asiatics, at the bidding of Mithridates, massacred the Romans; only
the people of Tralles did not personally kill any one, but hired a
certain Theophilus, a Paphlagonian (as if the victims were more likely
thus to escape destruction, or as if it made any difference to them by
whom they should be slaughtered). (Valesius, p. 642.)

2. ¶The Thracians, persuaded by Mithridates, overran Epirus and the
rest of the country as far as Dodona, going even to the point of
plundering the temple of Zeus. (Valesius, ib.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. C] [Sidenote: B.C. 87 (_a.u._ 667)] 1. ¶Cinna, as
soon as he took possession of the office, was anxious upon no one
point so much as to drive Sulla out of Italy. He made Mithridates his
excuse, but in reality wanted this leader to remove himself that he
might not, by lurking close at hand, prove a hindrance to the objects
that Cinna had in mind. He fairly distinguished himself by his zeal
for Sulla and would refuse to promise nothing that pleased him. For
Sulla, who saw the urgency of the war and was eager for its glory,
before starting had arranged everything at home for his own best
interests. He appointed Cinna and one Gnæus Octavius to be his
successors, hoping in this way to retain considerable power even while
absent. The second of the two he understood was generally approved for
his excellence and good nature, and he thought he would cause no
trouble: the other he well knew was an unprincipled person, but he did
not wish to antagonize him, because the man had some influence and was
ready, as he had said and declared on oath, to assist him in every way
possible. Sulla himself, though an adept at discovering the minds of
men and inferring correctly in regard to the nature of things, made a
thorough mistake in this matter and bequeathed a great war to the
State. (Valesius, p. 642.)

2. ¶Octavius was naturally dull in politics. (Valesius, ib.)

3. ¶The Romans, when civil war set in, sent for Metellus, urging him
to help them. (Ursinus, p. 386.)

4. ¶The Romans, at odds with one another, sent for Metellus and bade
him come to terms with the Samnites, as he best might: for at this
time they alone were still damaging Campania and the district beyond
it. He, however, concluded no truce with them. They demanded
citizenship to be given not to themselves alone but also to those who
had deserted to their side, refused to give up any of the booty which
they had, but demanded back all the captives and deserters from their
own ranks, so that even the senators no longer chose to make peace
with them on these terms. (Ursinus, p. 385.)

5. ¶When Cinna had put in force again the law regarding the return of
exiles, Marius and the rest of his followers who had been expelled
leaped into the city with the army left to them by all the gates at
once; these they shut, so that no one could make his escape, and
despatched every man they met, making no distinction, but treating
them all alike as enemies. They took special pains to destroy any
persons who had possessions, because they coveted such property, and
outraged their children and wives as if they had enslaved some foreign
city. The heads of the most eminent citizens they fastened to the
rostra. That sight was no less cruel than their ruin; for the thought
might occur to the spectators that what their ancestors had adorned
with the beaks of the enemy was now being deformed by the heads of the
citizens.

For, in fine, so great a desire and greed for slaughter possessed
Marius, that when he had killed most of his enemies and no one because
of the great confusion prevailing occurred to him whom he wished to
destroy, he gave the word to the soldiers to stab all in succession of
the passers-by to whom he should not extend his hand. For Roman
affairs had come to this, that a man had to die not only without a
trial and without having incurred enmity, but by reason of Marius's
hand not being stretched out. Now naturally in so great a throng and
uproar it was not only no object to Marius to make the gesture, but it
was not even possible, no matter how much he wished it, to use his
hand as he pleased. Hence many died for naught who ought certainly on
every account not to have been slain. The entire number of the
murdered is beyond finding out; for the slaughter went on five whole
days and an equal number of nights. (Valesius, p. 642.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 86 (_a.u._ 668)] 6. ¶While the Romans were offering
the New Year's sacrifice at the opening of the season and making their
vows[66] for their magistrate according to ancestral rites, the son of
Marius killed a tribune with his own hands, sending his head to the
consuls, and hurled another from the Capitol,--a fate which had never
befallen such an official,--and debarred two prætors from both fire
and water. (Valesius, p. 645.)

[Footnote 66: Reading [Greek: euchas] (Reiske, Boissevain) in place of
[Greek: archas].]

[Sidenote: FRAG. CI] 1. ¶The lieutenant of Flaccus, Fimbria, when his
chief had reached Byzantium revolted against him. He was in all
matters very bold and reckless, passionately fond of any notoriety
whatsoever and contemptuous of all that was superior. This led him at
that time, after his departure from Rome, to pretend an
incorruptibility in respect to money and an interest in the soldiers,
which bound them to him and set them at variance with Flaccus. He was
the more able to do this because Flaccus was insatiable in regard to
money, not being content to appropriate what was ordinarily left over,
but enriching himself even from the soldiers' allowance for food and
from the booty, which he invariably maintained belonged to him.
(Valesius, p. 650.)

2. ¶When Flaccus and Fimbria had arrived at Byzantium and Flaccus
after commanding them to bivouac outside the wall had gone into the
city, Fimbria seized the occasion to accuse him of having taken
money, and denounced him, saying that he was living in luxury within,
whereas they were enduring hardships under the shelter of tents, in
storm and cold. The soldiers then angrily rushed into the city, killed
some of those that fell upon them and scattered to the various houses.
(Valesius, ib.)

3. ¶On the occasion of some dispute between Fimbria and the quæstor
Flaccus threatened to send him back to Rome whether he liked it or
not, and when the other consequently made some abusive reply deprived
him of his command. Fimbria set out upon his return with the worst
possible will and on reaching the soldiers at Byzantium greeted them
as if he were upon the point of departure, asked for a letter, and
lamented his fate, pretending to have suffered undeservedly. He
advised them to remember the help he had given them and to be on their
guard; and his words contained a hidden reference to Flaccus, implying
that he had designs upon them. Finding that they accepted his story
and were well disposed toward him and suspicious of the general, he
went on still further and incited them to anger by accusing Flaccus of
various faults, finally stating that he would betray them for money;
hence the soldiers drove away Thermus, who had been assigned to take
charge of them. (Valesius, ib.)

4. ¶Fimbria destroyed many men not to serve the best ends of justice
nor to secure the greatest benefit to Rome but through bad temper and
lust of slaughter. A proof is that he once ordered many crosses to be
made, to which he was wont to bind them and wear out their lives by
cruel treatment, and then when these were found to be many more than
those who were to be put to death he commanded some of the bystanders
to be arrested and affixed to the crosses that were in excess, that
they might not seem to have been made in vain. (Valesius, p. 653.)

5. ¶The same man on capturing Ilium despatched as many persons as he
could, sparing none, and all but burned the whole city to the ground.
He took the place not by storm but by guile. After bestowing some
praise on them for the embassy sent to Sulla and saying that it made
no difference with which one of the two they ratified a truce (for he
and Sulla were both Romans) he thereupon went in among them as among
friends and performed these deeds. (Valesius, ib.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. CII] [Sidenote: B.C. 85 (_a.u._ 669)] 1. ¶Metellus
after being defeated by Cinna went to Sulla and was of the greatest
assistance to him. For in view of his reputation for justice and piety
not a few who were opposed to Sulla's policy decided that it was not
without reason that Metellus had joined him but that he chose what was
really juster and more advantageous for the country, and hence they
went over to their side. (Valesius, p. 653.)

2. ¶A thunderbolt fell upon the Capitol, causing the destruction of
the Sibylline books and of many other things. (Mai, p. 551.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. CIII] [Sidenote: B.C. 83 (_a.u._ 671)] ¶Pompey was a
son of Strabo, and has been compared by Plutarch with Agesilaus the
Lacedæmonian. Indignant at those who held the city he proceeded
absolutely alone to Picenum before he had quite yet come to man's
estate: from the inhabitants on account of his father's position of
command he collected a small band and set up an individual
sovereignty, thinking to perform some famous exploit by himself; then
he joined the party of Sulla. Beginning in this way he became no less
a man than his chief, but, as his title indicates, grew to be "Great."
(Valesius, p. 653.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. CIV] [Sidenote: B.C. 82 (_a.u._ 672)] ¶Sulla
delivered the army to a man[67] who was in no wise distinguished[68]
nor generally commended, in spite of the fact that he had many who had
been with him from the beginning superior in both experience and
action, whom up to that time he had employed in all emergencies and
treated as most faithful. Before he became victor he was accustomed to
make requests of them and use their assistance to the fullest extent.
But as he drew near his dream of absolute dominion, he made no account
of them any longer but reposed his trust rather in the basest men who
were not conspicuous for family or possessed of a reputation for
uprightness. The reason was that he saw that such persons were ready
to assist him in all his projects, even the vilest; and he thought
they would be most grateful to him if they should obtain even very
small favors, would never show contempt nor lay claim to either his
deeds or his plans. The virtuous element, on the other hand, would not
be willing to help him in his evil-doing but would even rebuke him;
they would demand rewards for benefits conferred, according to merit,
would feel no gratitude for them but take them as something due, and
would claim his actions and counsels as their own. (Valesius, p. 654.)

[Footnote 67: _Q. Lucretius Ofella._]

[Footnote 68: Supplying [Greek: mêt' epiphanei], with Reiske.]

[Sidenote: FRAG. CV] 1. ¶Sulla up to that day that he conquered the
Samnites had been a conspicuous figure, possessing a renown from his
leadership and plans, and was believed to be most devoted to
humaneness and piety, so that all thought that he had Fortune as an
ally because of his excellence. After this event he changed so much
that one would not say his earlier and his later deeds were those of
the same person. This probably shows that he could not endure good
fortune. Acts that he censured in other persons while he was still
weak, and others, far more outrageous even, he committed: it had
presumably always been his wish to do so, but he had been hindered by
lack of opportunity. This fact produced a strong conviction in the
minds of some that bad luck has not a little to do with creating a
reputation for virtue.[69] As soon as Sulla had vanquished the
Samnites and thought he had put an end to the war (the rest of it he
held of no account) he changed his tactics and, as it were, left his
former personality behind outside the wall and in the battle, and
proceeded to surpass Cinna and Marius and all their associates
combined. Treatment that he had given to no one of the foreign peoples
that had opposed him he bestowed upon his native land, as if he had
subdued that as well. In the first place he sent forthwith the heads
of Damasippus and the members of his party stuck on poles to Præneste,
and many of those who voluntarily surrendered he killed as if he had
caught them without their consent. The next day he ordered the
senators to assemble at the temple of Bellona, giving them the idea
that he would make some defence of his conduct, and ordered those
captured alive to meet at the so-called "public" field,[70] pretending
that he would enroll them in the lists. This last class he had other
men slay, and many persons from the city, mixed in among them,
likewise perished: to the senators he himself at the same time
addressed a most bitter speech. (Valesius, p. 654.)

[Footnote 69: Adopting Reiske's suggestion for filling out a lacuna in
the sense.]

[Footnote 70: The _villa publica_.]

2. ¶The massacre of the captured persons was going on even under
Sulla's direction with unabated fury, and as they were being killed
near the temple the great uproar and lamentation that they made, their
shrieks and wails, invaded the senate-house, so that the senate was
terrified for two reasons. The second of the two was that they were
not far from expecting that they themselves, also, might yet suffer
some terrible injury, so unholy were both his words and his actions:
therefore many, cut to the heart with grief at the thought of reality
and possibility, wished that they themselves belonged to the number of
men already dead outside, and so might secure a respite at last from
fear. Their cases, however, were postponed, while the rest were
slaughtered and thrown into the river, so that the savagery of
Mithridates, deemed so terrible, in slaughtering all the Romans in
Asia in one day, was now held to be of slight importance in comparison
with the number massacred and their manner of death. Nor did the
terror stop here, but the slaughters which began at this point as if
by a kind of signal occurred in the country district and all the
cities of Italy. Toward many Sulla himself showed hatred and toward
many others his companions did the same, some truthfully and some in
pretence, in order that displaying by the similarity of their deeds a
character similar to his and establishing him as their friend they
might not, by any dissimilarity, incur suspicion, seem to be reproving
him at all, and so endanger themselves. They murdered all whom they
saw to surpass them either in wealth or in any other respect, some
through envy and others on account of their possessions. For under
such conditions many neutral persons even, though they might have
taken neither side, became subject to some private complaint, as
surpassing some one in excellence or wealth and family. No safety was
visible for any one against those in power who wished to commit an
injustice in any case. (Valesius, p. 657.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 81 (_a.u._ 673)] 3. ¶Such calamities held Rome
encompassed. Who could narrate the insults to the living, many of
which were offered to women, and many to the noblest and most
prominent children, as if they were captives in war? Yet those acts,
though most distressing, yet at least in their similarity to others
that had previously taken place seemed endurable to such persons as
were away from them. But Sulla was not satisfied, nor was he content
to do the same as others: a certain longing came over him to far excel
all in the variety of his slaughters, as if there were some virtue in
being second to none even in bloodguiltiness, and so he exposed to
view a new device, a whitened tablet, on which he inscribed the names.
Notwithstanding this all previous atrocities continued undiminished,
and not even those whose names were not inscribed on the tablets were
in safety. For many, some living and others actually dead, had their
names subsequently inscribed at the pleasure of the slayers, so that
in this aspect the phenomenon exhibited no novelties, and equally by
its terror and its absurdity distressed absolutely every one. The
tablets were exposed like some register of senators or list of
soldiers approved, and all those passing by at one time or another ran
eagerly to it in crowds, with the idea that it contained some
favorable announcement: then many found relatives' names and some,
indeed, their own inscribed for death, whereupon their condition,
overwhelmed by such a sudden disaster, was a terrible one; many of
them, making themselves known by their behavior, perished. There was
no particle of safety for any one outside of Sulla's company. For
whether a man approached the tablets, he incurred censure for meddling
with matters not concerning him, or if he did not approach he was
regarded as a malcontent. The man who read the list through or asked
any question about anything inscribed became suspected of enquiring
about himself or his companions, and the one who did not read or
enquire was suspected of being displeased at it and for that reason
incurred hatred. Tears or laughter proved fatal on the instant: hence
many were destroyed not because they had said or done anything
forbidden, but because they either drew a long face or smiled. Their
attitudes were so carefully observed as this, and it was possible for
no one either to mourn or to exult over an enemy, but even the latter
class were slaughtered on the ground that they were jeering at
something. Furthermore many found trouble in their very names, for
some who were unacquainted with the proscribed applied their names to
whomsoever they pleased, and thus many perished in the place of
others. This resulted in great confusion, some naming any man they met
just as ever they pleased, and the others denying that they were so
called. Some were slaughtered while still ignorant of the fact that
they were to die, and others, who had been previously informed,
anywhere that they happened to be; and there was no place for them
either holy or sacred, no safe retreat, no refuge. Some, to be sure,
by perishing suddenly before learning of the catastrophe hanging over
them, and some at the moment they received the news, were fortunately
relieved of the terrors preceding death: those who were warned in
advance and hid themselves found it a very difficult matter to escape.
They did not dare to withdraw, for fear of being detected, nor could
they endure to remain where they were for fear of betrayal. Very many
of them were betrayed by their associates and those dearest to them,
and so perished. Consequently not those whose names were inscribed
merely, but the rest, as well, suffered in anticipation. (Valesius,
pp. 658-662.)

4. ¶The heads of all those slaughtered in any place were brought to
the Roman Forum and exposed on the rostra, so that as often as
proscriptions were issued, so often did the heads appear. (Valesius,
ib.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. CVI] [Sidenote: B.C. 74 (_a.u._ 680)] Lucullus said
that he would rather have rescued one Roman from danger than have
captured at one stroke all the forces of the enemy. (Mai, p. 551.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. CVII] 1. For titles do not change the characters of
men, but one makes titles take on new meanings according to one's
management of affairs. Many monarchs are the source of blessings to
their subjects,--wherefore such a state is called a kingdom,--whereas
many who live under a democracy work innumerable evils to themselves.
(Mai, p. 556. Cp. Frag. XII.)

2. For nothing leads on an army or anything else requiring some
control to better or worse like the character and habits of the person
presiding over it. The disposition and character of their leaders the
majority imitate, and they do whatever they see them doing, some from
real inclination, and others as a mere pretence. (Mai, p. 556.)

3. The subservient element is wont ever to shape itself according to
the disposition of its rulers. (Mai, p. 560, from Antonius Melissa, p.
78, ed. Tigur.)

4. For who would not prefer to be upright and at his death to lie in
the bosom of the State, rather than to behold her devastated? (Mai, p.
557.)

5. If any one were building a house for you where you were not going
to remain, you would think the undertaking a loss: do you now wish to
grow rich in that place from which you must depart repeatedly before
evening? (Mai, ib.)

6. Do you not know that we tarry in others' domains just like
strangers and sojourners? Do you not know that it is the lot of
sojourners to be driven out when they are not expecting or looking for
it? That is our case. (Mai, ib.)

7. Who would not choose to die from one blow, and that with no pain or
very little, instead of after sickness? Who would not pray to depart
from a sound body with sound spirits rather than to rot with some
decay or dropsy, or wither away in hunger? (Mai, ib.)

8. Things hoped for that fail of realization are wont to grieve some
persons more than the loss of things never expected at all. They
regard the latter as far from them and so pursue them less, as if they
belonged to others, whereas the former they approach closely, and
grieve for them as if deprived of rightful possessions. (Mai, p. 558.)

9. Expectation of danger, without danger, puts the person expecting in
the position of having made things secure beforehand through imagining
some coming unpleasantness. (Mai, p. 560, from Antonius Melissa.)

10. To be elated by good fortune is like running the stadium race on a
slippery course. (Mai, ib., also from Antonius.)

11. The same author [i.e., Dio the Roman] said: "Is it not an outrage
to trouble the gods, when we ourselves are not willing to do what the
gods deem to be in our power?" (Mai, p. 561, from the Anthology of
Arsenius.)

12. The same said: "It is much better to win some success and be
envied than to fail and be pitied." (Mai, ib., from Arsenius.)

13. The same said: "It is impossible for any one who acts contrary to
right principles to derive any benefit from them." (Mai, p. 562.)

[Sidenote: FRAG. CVIII] [Sidenote: B.C. 70 (_a.u._ 684)] The Cretans
sent an embassy to the Romans, hoping to renew the old truce and
furthermore to obtain some kindness for their preservation of the
quæstor and his fellow soldiers. But they, rather imbued with anger at
their failure to overcome the Cretans than grateful to the enemy for
not having destroyed them, made no reasonable answer and demanded back
from them all the captives and deserters. They demanded hostages and
large sums of money, required the largest ships and the chief men to
be given up, and would not wait for an answer from the envoys' country
but sent out one of the consuls immediately to take possession of
those things and make war upon them if they failed to give,--as proved
to be the case. For the men who at the outset, before any such demand
was made and before they had conquered, had refused to make terms
would naturally not endure after their victory the imposition of
exorbitant demands of such a character. The Romans knowing this
clearly and suspecting further that the envoys would try to corrupt
some persons with money, so as to hinder the expedition, voted in the
senate that no one should lend them anything. (Ursinus, p. 388.)