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The New York Times

CURRENT HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN WAR

JANUARY 9, 1915.

What Americans Say to Europe







[Illustration: CHARLES W. ELIOT

_(Photo (c) by Paul Thompson.)_

_See Page 473_]

[Illustration: JAMES M. BECK

_See Page 413_]




In the Supreme Court of Civilization

Argued by James M. Beck.


THE NEW YORK TIMES _submitted the evidence contained in the official
"White Paper" of Great Britain, the "Orange Paper" of Russia, and the
"Gray Paper" of Belgium to James M. Beck, late Assistant Attorney
General of the United States and a leader of the New York bar, who has
argued many of the most important cases before the Supreme Court. On
this evidence Mr. Beck has argued in the following article the case of
Dual Alliance vs. Triple Entente. It has been widely circulated in
France and Great Britain._

Let us suppose that in this year of dis-Grace, Nineteen Hundred and
Fourteen, there had existed, as let us pray will one day exist, a
Supreme Court of Civilization, before which the sovereign nations could
litigate their differences without resort to the iniquitous and less
effective appeal to the arbitrament of arms.

Let us further suppose that each of the contending nations had a
sufficient leaven of Christianity to have its grievances adjudged not by
the ethics of the cannon or the rifle, but by the eternal criterion of
justice.

What would be the judgment of that august tribunal?

Any discussion of the ethical merits of this great controversy must
start with the assumption that there is an international morality.

This fundamental axiom, upon which the entire basis of civilization
necessarily rests, is challenged by a small class of intellectual
perverts.

Some hold that moral considerations must be subordinated either to
military necessity or so-called manifest destiny. This is the Bernhardi
doctrine.

Others teach that war is a beneficent fatality and that all nations
engaged in it are therefore equally justified. On this theory all of the
now contending nations are but victims of an irresistible current of
events, and the highest duty of the State is to prepare itself for the
systematic extermination, when necessary or expedient, of its neighbors.

Notwithstanding the clever platitudes under which both these doctrines
are veiled, all morally sane minds are agreed that this war is a great
crime against civilization, and the only open question is, which of the
two contending groups of powers is morally responsible for that crime?

Was Austria justified in declaring war against Servia?

Was Germany justified in declaring war against Russia and France?

Was England justified in declaring war against Germany?

As the last of these questions is the most easily disposed of, it may be
considered first.


England's Justification.

England's justification rests upon the solemn Treaty of 1839, whereby
Prussia, France, England, Austria, and Russia "became the guarantors" of
the "perpetual neutrality" of Belgium, as reaffirmed by Count Bismarck,
then Chancellor of the North German Confederation, on July 22, 1870, and
as even more recently reaffirmed in the striking fact disclosed in the
Belgian "Gray Book."

In the Spring of 1913 a debate was in progress in the Budget Committee
of the Reichstag with reference to the Military Budget. In the course of
the debate the German Secretary of State said:

     "The neutrality of Belgium is determined by international
     conventions, _and Germany is resolved to respect these
     conventions_."

To confirm this solemn assurance, the Minister of War added in the same
debate:

     "Belgium does not play any part in the justification of the
     German scheme of military reorganization. The scheme is
     justified by the position of matters in the East. _Germany
     will not lose sight of the fact that Belgian neutrality is
     guaranteed by international treaties._"

A year later, on July 31, 1914, Herr von Below, the German Minister at
Brussels, assured the Belgian Department of State that he knew of a
declaration which the German Chancellor had made in 1911, to the effect
"that Germany had no intention of violating our neutrality," and "that
he was certain that the sentiments to which expression was given at that
time _had not changed_." (See Belgian "Gray Book," Nos. 11 and 12.)

Apart from these treaty stipulations, which are only declaration of
Belgium's rights as sovereign nations, The Hague Conference, in which
forty-four nations (including Germany) participated, reaffirmed as an
axiom of international law the inherent right of a nation to the
sanctity of its territory.

It seems unnecessary to discuss the wanton disregard of these solemn
obligations and protestations, when the present Chancellor of the German
Empire, in his speech to the Reichstag and to the world on Aug. 4, 1914,
frankly admitted that the action of the German military machine in
invading Belgium was a wrong. He said:

     "We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no
     law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are
     already on Belgian soil. _Gentlemen, that is contrary to the
     dictates of international law._ It is true that the French
     Government has declared at Brussels that France is willing to
     respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as her opponent
     respects it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for
     invasion. France could wait, but we could not wait. A French
     movement upon our flank upon the lower Rhine might have been
     disastrous. So we were compelled to override the just protest
     of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. _The wrong--I speak
     openly--that we are committing_ we will endeavor to make good
     as soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is
     threatened as we are threatened, and is fighting for his
     highest possessions, can only have one thought--how he is to
     hack his way through."

This defense is not even a plea of confession and avoidance. It is a
plea of "Guilty" at the bar of the world. It has one merit, that it
does not add to the crime the aggravation of hypocrisy. It virtually
rests the case of Germany upon the gospel of Treitschke and Bernhardi,
that each nation is justified in exerting its physical power to the
utmost in defense of its selfish interests and without any regard to
considerations of conventional morality. Might as between nations is the
sole criterion of right. There is no novelty in this gospel. Its only
surprising feature is its revival in the twentieth century. It was
taught far more effectively by Machiavelli in his treatise, "The
Prince," wherein he glorified the policy of Cesare Borgia in trampling
the weaker States of Italy under foot by ruthless terrorism, unbridled
ferocity, and the basest deception. Indeed, the wanton destruction of
Belgium is simply Borgiaism amplified ten-thousandfold by the mechanical
resources of modern war.


This Answer Cannot Satisfy.

Unless our boasted civilization is the thinnest veneering of barbarism;
unless the law of the world is in fact only the ethics of the rifle and
the conscience of the cannon; unless mankind after uncounted centuries
has made no real advance in political morality beyond that of the cave
dweller, then this answer of Germany cannot satisfy the "decent respect
to the opinions of mankind." Germany's contention that a treaty of peace
is "a scrap of paper," to be disregarded at will when required by the
selfish interests of one contracting party, is the negation of all that
civilization stands for.

Belgium has been crucified in the face of the world. Its innocence of
any offense, until it was attacked, is too clear for argument. Its
voluntary immolation to preserve its solemn guarantee of neutrality will
"plead like angels, trumpet-tongued, against the deep damnation of its
taking off." On that issue the Supreme Court could have no ground for
doubt or hesitation. Its judgment would be speedy and inexorable.

The remaining two issues, above referred to, are not so simple.
Primarily and perhaps exclusively, the ethical question turns upon the
issues raised by the communications which passed between the various
Chancelleries of Europe in the last week of July, for it is the amazing
feature of this greatest of all wars that it was precipitated by
diplomats and rulers, and, assuming that all these statesmen sincerely
desired a peaceful solution of the questions raised by the Austrian
ultimatum, (which is by no means clear,) it was the result of
ineffective diplomacy and clumsy diplomacy at that.

I quite appreciate the distinction between the immediate causes of a war
and the anterior and more fundamental causes; nevertheless, with the
world in a state of Summer peace on July 23, 1914, an issue, gravely
affecting the integrity of nations and the balance of power in Europe,
is suddenly precipitated by the Austrian ultimatum, and thereafter and
for the space of about a week a series of diplomatic communications
passed between the Chancelleries of Europe, designed on their face to
prevent a war and yet so ineffective that the war is precipitated and
the fearful Rubicon crossed before the world knew, except imperfectly,
the nature of the differences between the Governments involved. The
ethical aspects of this great conflict must largely depend upon the
record that has been made up by the official communications which can,
therefore, be treated as documentary evidence in a litigated case.

A substantial part of that record is already before the court of public
opinion in the British and German "White Papers," the Russian "Orange
Paper," and the Belgian "Gray Paper," and the purpose of this article is
to discuss what judgment an impartial and dispassionate court would
render upon the issues thus raised and the evidence thus submitted.

Primarily such a court would be deeply impressed not only by what the
record as thus made up discloses, _but also by the significant omissions
of documents known to be in existence_.

The official defense of England and Russia does not apparently show any
failure on the part of either to submit all of the documents in their
possession, _but the German "White Paper" on its face discloses the
suppression of documents of vital importance, while Austria has as yet
failed to submit any of the documentary evidence in its possession_.

We know from the German "White Paper"--even if we did not conclude as a
matter of irresistible inference--that many important communications
passed in this crisis between Germany and Austria, and it is probable
that some communications must also have passed between those two
countries and Italy. Italy, despite its embarrassing position, owes to
the world the duty of a full disclosure. What such disclosure would
probably show is indicated by her deliberate conclusion that her allies
had commenced an _aggressive_ war, which released her from any
obligation under the Triple Alliance.

The fact that communications passed between Berlin and Vienna, the text
of which has never been disclosed, is not a matter of conjecture.
Germany admits and asserts as part of her defense that she faithfully
exercised her mediatory influence with Austria, but not only is such
mediatory influence not disclosed by any practical results of such
mediation, but the text of these vital communications is still kept in
the secret archives of Berlin and Vienna.

Thus in the official apology for Germany it is stated that, in spite of
the refusal of Austria to accept the proposition of Sir Edward Grey to
treat the Servian reply "as a basis for further conversations,"

     "we [Germany] continued our mediatory efforts to the _utmost_
     and advised Vienna to make any possible compromise consistent
     with the dignity of the Monarchy."

     [German "White Paper."]

This would be more convincing if the German Foreign Office in giving
other diplomatic documents had only added the _text_ of the advice which
it thus gave Vienna.

The same significant omission will be found when the same official
defense states that on July 29 the German Government advised Austria "to
begin the conversations with Mr. Sazonof." But here again _the text_ is
not found among the documents which the German Foreign Office has given
to the world. The communications, which passed between that office and
its Ambassadors in St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, are given _in
extenso_, but among the twenty-seven communications appended to the
German official defense it is most significant that not a single
communication is given of the many which passed from Berlin to Vienna
and only two that passed from Vienna to Berlin.

This cannot be an accident. Germany has seen fit to throw the veil of
secrecy over the text of its communications to Vienna, although
professing to give the purport of a few of them.

Until Germany is willing to put the most important documents in its
possession in evidence, it must not be surprised that the world,
remembering Bismarck's garbling of the Ems dispatch, which precipitated
the Franco-Prussian war, will be incredulous as to the sincerity of
Germany's mediatory efforts.


Austria's Case Against Servia.

To discuss the justice of Austria's grievances against Servia would take
us outside the documentary record and into the realm of disputed facts
and would expand this discussion far beyond reasonable length.

Let us therefore suppose _arguendo_ that our imaginary court would
commence its consideration with the assumption that Austria had a just
grievance against Servia, and that the murder of the Archduke on June
28, 1914, while in fact committed by Austrian citizens of Servian
sympathies on Austrian soil, had its inspiration and encouragement in
the political activities either of the Servian Government or of
political organizations of that country.

The question for decision would then be not whether Austria had a just
grievance against Servia, but whether having regard to the obligations
which Austria, as well as every other country, owes to civilization, she
proceeded in the right manner to redress her grievance.

On June 28, 1914, the Austrian Crown Prince was murdered at Serajevo.
For nearly a month there was no action by Austria, and no public
statement whatever of its intentions. The world profoundly sympathized
with Austria in its new trouble, and especially with its aged monarch,
who, like King Lear, was "as full of grief as years and wretched in
both."

The Servian Government had formerly disclaimed any complicity with the
assassination and had pledged itself to punish any Servian citizen
implicated therein.

From time to time, from June 28 to July 23, there came semi-inspired
intimations from Vienna that that country intended to act with great
self-restraint and in the most pacific manner. In his speech to the
French Chamber of Deputies, Viviani says that Europe had in the interval
preceding July 23 express assurances from Austria that its course would
be moderate and conciliatory. Never was it even hinted that Germany and
Austria were about to apply in a time of profound peace a match to the
powder magazine of Europe.

This is strikingly shown by the first letter in the English "White
Paper" from Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, dated July 20, 1914. It
is one of the most significant documents in the entire correspondence.
At the time this letter was written it is altogether probable that
Austria's arrogant and most unreasonable ultimatum had already been
framed and approved in Vienna, and possibly in Berlin, and yet Sir
Edward Grey, the Foreign Minister of a great and friendly country, had
so little knowledge of Austria's policy that he

     "asked the German Ambassador today (July 20) if he had any
     news of what was going on in Vienna with regard to Servia."
     The German Ambassador replied "that he had not, but Austria
     was certainly going to take some step."

Sir Edward Grey adds that he told the German Ambassador that he had
learned that Count Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Minister,

     "in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had
     deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but
     had said that it should be cleared up."

The German Minister then replied that it would be desirable "if Russia
could act as a mediator with regard to Servia," so that the first
suggestion of Russia playing the part of the peacemaker came from the
German Ambassador in London. Sir Edward Grey then adds that he told the
German Ambassador that he

     "assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything
     until they had first disclosed to the public their case
     against Servia, founded presumably upon what they had
     discovered at the trial,"

and the German Ambassador assented to this assumption.

[English "White Paper," No. 1.]

Either the German Ambassador was then deceiving Sir Edward Grey, on the
theory that the true function of an Ambassador is "to lie for his
country," or the thunderbolt was being launched with such secrecy that
even the German Ambassador in England did not know what was then in
progress.

The British Ambassador at Vienna reports to Sir Edward Grey:

     "The delivery at Belgrade on the 23d July of the note to
     Servia was preceded by a period of _absolute silence_ at the
     Ballplatz."

He proceeds to say that with the exception of the German Ambassador at
Vienna--note the significance of the exception--not a single member of
the Diplomatic Corps knew anything of the Austrian ultimatum and that
the French Ambassador when he visited the Austrian Foreign Office on
July 23 was not only kept in ignorance that the ultimatum had actually
been issued, but was given the impression that its tone was moderate.
Even the Italian Ambassador was not taken into Count Berchtold's
confidence.

[Dispatch from Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, dated Sept. 1,
1914.]

No better proof of this sense of security need be adduced than that the
French President and her Foreign Minister were thousands of miles from
Paris, and the Russian Minister had, after the funeral of the Austrian
Archduke, left Vienna for his annual holiday.

The interesting and important question here suggests itself whether
Germany had knowledge of and approved in advance the Austrian ultimatum.
If it did, it was guilty of duplicity, for the German Ambassador at St.
Petersburg gave to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs an express
assurance that

     "the German Government _had no knowledge of the text of the
     Austrian note before it was handed in and has not exercised
     any influence on its contents. It is a mistake to attribute to
     Germany a threatening attitude_."

[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 18.]

This statement is inherently improbable. Austria was the weaker of the
two allies and it was Germany's sabre that it was rattling in the face
of Europe. Obviously Austria could not have proceeded to extreme
measures, which it was recognized from the first would antagonize
Russia, unless it had the support of Germany, and there is a
probability, amounting to a moral certainty, that it would not have
committed itself and Germany to the possibility of a European war
without first consulting Germany.

Moreover, we have the testimony of Sir M. de Bunsen, the English
Ambassador in Vienna, who advised Sir Edward Grey that he had "private
information that the German Ambassador (at Vienna) knew the text of the
Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was dispatched and telegraphed it
to the German Emperor," and that the German Ambassador himself "indorses
every line of it." [English "White Paper," No. 95.] As he does not
disclose the source of his "private information," this testimony would
not by itself be convincing, but when we examine Germany's official
defense in the German "White Paper," _we find that the German Foreign
Office admits that it was consulted by Austria previous to the ultimatum
and not only approved of Austria's course but literally gave her a
carte blanche to proceed_.

This point seems so important in determining the sincerity of Germany's
attitude and pacific protestations that we quote _in extenso_. After
referring to the previous friction between Austria and Servia, the
German "White Paper" says:

"In view of these circumstances, Austria had to admit that it would not
be consistent either with the dignity or self-preservation of the
monarchy to look on longer at the operations on the other side of the
border without taking action. _The Austro-Hungarian Government advised
us of this view of the situation and asked our opinion in the matter. We
were able to assure our ally most heartily of our agreement with her
view of the situation and to assure her that any action that she might
consider it necessary to take in order to put an end to the movement in
Servia directed against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
would receive our approval._ We were fully aware in this connection that
warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary against Servia would bring
Russia into the question and might draw us into a war in accordance with
our duties as an ally."

Sir M. de Bunsen's credible testimony is further confirmed by the fact
that the British Ambassador at Berlin, in his letter of July 22 to Sir
Edward Grey, states that _on the preceding night_ (July 21) he had met
the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and an allusion was
made to a possible action by Austria.

     "His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on
     Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted that
     the question at issue was one for settlement between Servia
     and Austria alone, and that there should be no interference
     from outside in the discussions between those two countries."

He adds that while he had regarded it as inadvisable that his country
should approach Austria-Hungary in the matter, he had

     "on several occasions in conversation with the Servian
     Minister emphasized the extreme importance that
     Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper footing."

[English "White Paper," No. 2.]

Here we have the first statement of Germany's position in the matter, a
position which subsequent events showed to be entirely untenable, but to
which Germany tenaciously adhered to the very end, and which did much to
precipitate the war. Forgetful of the solidarity of European
civilization and the fact that by policy and diplomatic intercourse
continuing through many centuries a United European State exists, even
though its organization be as yet inchoate, he took the ground that
Austria should be permitted to proceed to aggressive measures against
Servia without interference from any other power, even though, as was
inevitable, the humiliation of Servia would destroy the status of the
Balkan States and even threaten the European balance of power.

No space need be taken in convincing any reasonable man that this
Austrian ultimatum to Servia was brutal in its tone and unreasonable in
its demands. It would be difficult to find in history a more offensive
document, and its iniquity was enhanced by the short shriving time which
it gave either Servia or Europe. Servia had forty-eight hours to answer
whether it would compromise its sovereignty, and virtually admit its
complicity in a crime which it had steadily disavowed. As the full text
of the ultimatum first reached the Foreign Chancelleries nearly
twenty-four hours after its service upon Servia, the other European
nations had barely a day to consider what could be done to preserve the
peace of Europe before that peace was fatally compromised.

[English "White Paper," No. 5; Russian "Orange Paper," No. 3.]

Further confirmation that the German Foreign Office did have advance
knowledge of at least the substance of the ultimatum is shown by the
fact that on the same day the ultimatum was issued the Chancellor of the
German Empire instructed the German Ambassadors in Paris, London, and
St. Petersburg to advise the English, French, and Russian Governments
that

     "the acts as well as _the demands_ of the Austro-Hungarian
     Government cannot but be looked upon as justified."

[German "White Paper," Annex 1B.]

How could Germany thus indorse the "demands" if it did not know the
substance of the ultimatum?

The hour when these instructions were sent is not given, so that it does
not follow that these significant instructions were necessarily prior to
the service of the ultimatum at Belgrade at 6 P.M. Nevertheless, as the
ultimatum did not reach the other capitals of Europe until the following
day, as the diplomatic correspondence clearly shows, it seems improbable
that the German Foreign Office would have issued this very carefully
prepared and formal warning to the other powers on July the 23d unless
it had not only knowledge of Austria's intention to serve the ultimatum
but also at least of the substance thereof.

While it may be that Germany, while indorsing in blank the policy of
Austria, purposely refrained from examining the text of the
communication, so that it could thereafter claim that it was not
responsible for Austria's action--a policy which would not lessen the
discreditable character of the whole business--yet the more reasonable
assumption is that the simultaneous issuance of Austria's ultimatum at
Belgrade and Germany's warning to the powers were the result of a
concerted action and had a common purpose. No court or jury, reasoning
along the ordinary inferences of human life, would question this
conclusion for a moment.

The communication for the German Foreign Office last referred to
anticipates that Servia "will refuse to comply with these demands"--why,
if they were justified?--and Germany suggests to France, England, and
Russia that if, as a result of such non-compliance, Austria has
"recourse to military measures," that "the choice of means must be left
to it."

The German Ambassadors in the three capitals were instructed

     "to lay particular stress on the view that the above question
     is one the settlement of which devolves solely upon
     Austria-Hungary and Servia, and one which the powers should
     earnestly strive to confine to the two countries concerned,"

and he added that Germany strongly desired

     "that the dispute be localized, since any intervention of
     another power, on account of the various alliance obligations,
     would bring consequences impossible to measure."

This is one of the most significant documents in the whole
correspondence. If Germany were as ignorant as her Ambassador at London
affected to be of the Austrian policy and ultimatum, and if Germany was
not then instigating and supporting Austria in its perilous course, why
should the German Chancellor have served this threatening notice upon
England, France, and Russia, that Austria must be left free to make war
upon Servia, and that any attempt to intervene in behalf of the weaker
nation would "bring consequences impossible to measure"?

[German "White Paper," Annex 1B.]

A few days later the Imperial Chancellor sent to the Confederated
Governments of Germany a _confidential communication_ in which he
recognized the possibility that Russia might feel it a duty "to take the
part of Servia in her dispute with Austria-Hungary." Why, again, if
Austria's case was so clearly justified? The Imperial Chancellor added
that

     "if Russia feels constrained to take sides with Servia in this
     conflict, she certainly has a right to do it,"

but added that if Russia did this it would in effect challenge the
integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that Russia would
therefore alone--

     "bear the responsibility if a European war arises from the
     Austro-Servian question, _which all the rest of the great
     European powers wish to localize_."

In this significant confidential communication the German Chancellor
declares the strong interest which Germany had in the punishment of
Servia by Austria. He says "_our closest interests therefore summon us
to the side of Austria-Hungary_," and he adds that

     "if contrary to hope, the trouble should spread, owing to the
     intervention of Russia, then, true to our duty as an ally, we
     should have to support the neighboring monarchy with the
     entire might of the German Empire."

[German "White Paper," Annex 2.]

In reaching its conclusion our imaginary court would pay little
attention to mere professions of a desire for peace. A nation, like an
individual, can covertly stab the peace of another while saying, "Art
thou in health, my brother?" and even the peace of civilization can be
betrayed by a Judas kiss. Professions of peace belong to the cant of
diplomacy and have always characterized the most bellicose of nations.

No war in modern times has been begun without the aggressor pretending
that his nation wished nothing but peace and invoking Divine aid for its
murderous policy. To paraphrase the words of Lady Teazle on a noted
occasion when Sir Joseph Surface talked much of "honor," it might be as
well in such instances to leave the name of God out of the question.

Let us, then, analyze the record as already made up; and for the sake of
clearness the events which preceded the war will be considered
chronologically.

Immediately upon the receipt of the ultimatum in St. Petersburg on July
24, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a formal communication
to Austria-Hungary, suggested that the abrupt time limit "leaves to the
powers a delay entirely insufficient to undertake any useful steps
whatever for the straightening out of the complications that have
arisen," and added:

     "To prevent the incalculable consequences, equally disastrous
     for all the powers, which can follow the method of action of
     the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems indispensable to us
     that, above all, the delay given to Servia to reply should be
     extended."

Sazonof further suggested that time should be given for the powers to
examine the results of the inquiry that the Austro-Hungarian Government
had made in the matter of the Serajevo assassination, and stated that if
the powers were convinced

     "of the well-groundedness of certain of the Austrian demands
     they would find themselves in a position to send to the
     Servian Government consequential advice."

He justly observes that

     "a refusal to extend the terms of the ultimatum ... would be
     in contradiction with the very bases of international
     relations."

[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 4.]

Could any court question the justice of this contention? The peace of
the world was at stake. Time only was asked to see what could be done to
preserve that peace and satisfy Austria's grievances to the uttermost
farthing.

Concurrently with Sazonof's plea for a little time to preserve the peace
of the world, Sir Edward Grey had seen the German Ambassador on July 24
and had suggested to him that the only method of preventing the
catastrophe was

     "that the four powers, Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves,
     (England,) should work together simultaneously at Vienna and
     St. Petersburg."

[English "White Paper," No. 11.]

Germany had only to intimate to Austria that "a decent respect to the
opinions of mankind," as well as common courtesy to great and friendly
nations, required that sufficient time be given not only to Servia, but
to the other nations, to concert for the common good, especially as the
period was one of Summer dullness and many of the leading rulers and
statesmen were absent from their respective capitals.

Under these circumstances was it not natural that Russia should announce
on July 24

     "that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Servia would
     not leave Russia indifferent,"

and that on the same day the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna
suggested to the Austrian Foreign Office

     "that the Austrian note was drawn up in a form rendering it
     impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that it was both
     unusual and peremptory in its terms"?

To which the only reply of the Austrian Foreign Minister was that their
representative in Servia

     "was under instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian
     demands were accepted in their integrity by 4 P.M. tomorrow."

[English "White Paper," No. 7.]

Austria's only concession then or subsequently to the cause of peace was
the assurance that Austria would not _after its conquest_ of Servia
demand any territory.

The action of Germany on this day, July 24, is most significant. Its
Ambassador in England communicated a note to Sir Edward Grey in which it
justified Austro-Hungarian grievances and ultimatum by saying that

     "under these circumstances the course of procedure and demands
     of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as
     equitable and moderate."

The note added:

     "The Imperial Government [Germany] want to emphasize their
     opinion that in the present case there is only question of a
     matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and
     Servia, and that the great powers ought seriously to endeavor
     to reserve it to those two immediately concerned."

[English "White Paper," No. 9.]

On July 25, probably to the great surprise of both Germany and Austria,
which had definitely calculated upon Servians non-compliance with the
ultimatum, the latter country, under the conciliatory advice of Russia
and England, made a reply in which, at some sacrifice of its
self-respect as a sovereign State, it substantially accepted all but one
of the demands of Austria, and as to that it did not, in terms, refuse
it, but expressed its willingness to refer it either to arbitration or
to a conference of the powers.

[English "White Paper," No. 39.]

No court would question for a moment the conclusion that the reply was a
substantial acquiescence in the extreme Austrian demands, nor indeed did
either Germany or Austria seriously contend that it was not. They
contented themselves with impeaching the sincerity of the assurances,
calling the concessions "shams," and of this it is enough to say that if
Germany and Austria had accepted Servians reply as sufficient, and
Servia had subsequently failed to fulfill its promises thus made in the
utmost good faith, there would have been little sympathy for Servia, and
no general war. Indeed, both Russia and England pledged their influence
to compel Servia, if necessary, to meet fully any reasonable demand of
Austria. The outstanding question, which Servia agreed to arbitrate or
leave to the powers, was the participation of Austrian officials in the
Servian courts. This did not present a difficult problem. Austria's
professed desire for an impartial investigation could have been easily
attained by having the neutral powers appoint a commission of jurists to
make such investigation.

On July 24 Sir Edward Grey also had asked the German Ambassador to use
his good influences at Vienna to secure an extension of time. To this
most reasonable request the answer and action of the German Government
was disingenuous in the extreme. They agreed to "pass on" the
suggestion, but the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs added
that as the Austrian Prime Minister was away from Vienna there would be
delay and difficulty in getting the time limit extended, and

     "he admitted quite freely that the Austro-Hungarian Government
     _wished to give the Servians a lesson and that they meant to
     take military action. He also admitted that the Servian
     Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian
     demands_."

He added that Germany did not want a general war and "he would do all in
his power to prevent such a calamity."

[English "White Paper," Nos. 11 and 18.]

Immediately on the issuance of the ultimatum the Austrian Foreign
Minister, Count Berchtold, had most inopportunely taken himself to
Ischl, where he remained until after the expiration of the time limit.
Access to him proved difficult, and the Russian Chargé at Vienna, having
lodged a pacific protest with the Acting Foreign Minister in order to
take no chances, telegraphed it to Berchtold at Ischl. Nevertheless,
Berchtold's apparently designed absence from the capital was Germany's
excuse for its failure to get the time limit extended.

If Germany made any communication to Austria in the interests of peace
the text has yet to be disclosed to the world. A word from Berlin to
Vienna would have given the additional time which, with sincerely
pacific intentions, might have resulted in the preservation of peace.
Germany, so far as the record discloses, never spoke that word.

Contrast this attitude with that of Russia, whose Foreign Minister on
the morning of July 25 offered

     "to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of
     England, France, Germany, and Italy."

[English "White Paper," No. 17.]

As Russia was the member of the Triple Entente most interested in the
fate of Servia, what proposal could have been more conciliatory or
magnanimous?

On July 25 Sir Edward Grey proposed that the four powers (including
Germany) should unite

     "in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross
     the frontier and to give time for the four powers, acting at
     Vienna and St. Petersburg, to try and arrange matters. If
     Germany will adopt this view I feel strongly that France and
     ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly
     co-operate."

[English "White Paper," Nos. 24 and 25.]

To this reasonable request the Imperial German Chancellor replied:

     "First and last, we take the ground that this question must be
     localized _by the abstention of all the powers from
     intervention in it_,"

but added that Germany would, if an Austro-Russian dispute arose,

     "co-operate with the other great powers in mediation between
     Russia and Austria."

[German "White Paper," Annex 13.]

This distinction is very hard to grasp. It attempts to measure the
difference between tweedledum and tweedledee. Russia's difference with
Austria was over the attempt of the latter to crush Servia. Germany
would not interfere in the latter, but would as an abstract proposition
mediate between Russia and Austria. For all practical purposes the two
things were indistinguishable.

How she "co-operated" we shall presently see.

All that Germany _did_ on July 25, so far as the record discloses, was
to "pass on" England's and Russia's requests for more time, but
subsequent events indicate that it was "passed on" without any
indorsement, for is it credible that Austria would have ignored its
ally's request for more time if it had ever been made?

The Austrian Foreign Minister, having launched the ultimatum, absented
himself from the capital, but the Russian Minister at Vienna, as already
stated, succeeded in submitting this most reasonable request verbally to
the Acting Foreign Minister, who simply said that he would submit it to
Count Berchtold, _but that he could predict with assurance a categorical
refusal_. Later on that day (July 25) Russia was definitely advised that
no time extension would be granted.

[Russian "Orange Paper," Nos. 11 and 12.]

Was ever the peace of the world shattered upon so slight a pretext? A
little time, a few days, even a few hours, might have sufficed to
preserve the world from present horrors, but no time could be granted.
A colossal snap judgment was to be taken by these pettifogging
diplomats. A timely word from the German Chancellor would have saved the
flower of the youth of Germany and Austria from perishing. It would be
difficult to find in recorded history a greater discourtesy to a
friendly power, for Austria was not at war with Russia.

Defeated in their effort to get an extension of time, England, France,
and Russia made further attempts to preserve peace by temporarily
arresting military proceedings until efforts toward conciliation could
be made. Sir Edward Grey proposed to Germany, France, Russia, and Italy
that they should unite in asking Austria and Servia not to cross the
frontier "until we had had time to try and arrange matters between
them," but the German Ambassador read Sir Edward Grey a telegram that he
had received from the German Foreign Office that "once she [Austria] had
launched that note [the ultimatum] Austria could not draw back."

[English "White Paper," No. 25.]

As we have seen, Germany never, so far as the record discloses, sought
in any way to influence Austria to make this or any concession. Its
attitude was shown by the declaration of its Ambassador at Paris to the
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, which, while disclaiming that
Germany had countenanced the Austrian ultimatum, yet added that Germany
approved its point of view,

     "and that certainly the arrow, once sent, Germany could not
     allow herself to be guided except by her duty to her ally."

This seemed to be the fatal fallacy of Germany, that its duties to
civilization were so slight that it should support its ally, Austria,
whether the latter were right or wrong. Such was its policy, and it
carried it out with fatal consistency. To support its ally in actual war
may be defensible, but to support it in times of peace in an iniquitous
demand and a policy of gross discourtesy offends every sense of
international morality.

On the following day Russia proposed to Austria that they should enter
into an exchange of private views, with the object of an alteration in
common of some clauses of the Austrian note of July 23. _To this Austria
never even replied._ The Russian Minister communicated this suggestion
to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs and expressed the hope that he
would "find it possible to advise Vienna to meet our proposal," but this
did not accord with German policy, for on that day the German Ambassador
in Paris called upon the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in
reply to a similar suggestion that Germany should suggest to Vienna to
meet Servia in the same conciliatory spirit which Servia had shown, the
Ambassador answered that that "was not possible in view of the
resolution taken not to interfere in the Austro-Servian conflict."

On the same day England asked France, Italy, and Germany to meet in
London for an immediate conference to preserve the peace of Europe, and
to this fruitful suggestion, which might have saved the peace of Europe,
the German Chancellor replied with the pitiful quibble that "it is
impossible to bring our ally before a European court in its difference
with Servia," although it affected to accept "in principle" the policy
of mediation.

Germany's acceptance "in principle" of a policy which she in practice
thwarted suggests the law-abiding tendencies of that Maine statesman who
was "for the Maine prohibition liquor law, but against its enforcement."

[English "White Paper," No. 46.]

Germany's refusal to have Servia's case submitted to the powers even for
their consideration is the more striking when it is recalled that the
German Ambassador at London quoted to Sir Edward Grey the German
Secretary of State as saying

     "that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia
     could hardly be expected to accept,"

thus recognizing that Austria's ultimatum was, at least in part, unjust.
Sir Edward Grey then called the German Ambassador's attention to the
fact that if Austria refused the conciliatory reply of Servia and
marched into that country

     "it meant that she was determined to crush Servia at all
     costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be
     involved."

He added that the Servian reply

     "should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and
     pause,"

and asked that the German Government should urge this at Vienna, but the
German Secretary of State on July 27 replied that such a conference "was
not practicable," and that it "would practically amount to a court of
arbitration," and could not, in his opinion, be called together "except
at the request of Austria and Russia."

[English "White Paper," Nos. 43 and 46.]

That this was a mere evasion is perfectly plain. Germany already knew
that Austria would not ask for such a conference, for Austria had
already refused Russia's request for an extension of time and had
actually commenced its military operations. Germany's attitude is best
indicated by the letter of the Russian Minister in Germany to the
Russian Foreign Office in which he states that on July 27 he called at
the German Foreign Office and asked it

     "to urge upon Vienna in a more pressing fashion to take up
     this line of conciliation. Jagow replied that he could not
     advise Austria to yield."

[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 38.]

Why not? Russia had advised Servia to yield, and Servia had conceded
nearly every claim. Why could not the German Foreign Office advise
Vienna to meet conciliation by conciliation, if its desire for peace
were sincere? All that Russia and England desired was that a little time
and consideration should be given, without prejudice to the rights or
claims of Austria, before the peace of the world was hopelessly
shattered.

Before this interview took place the French Ambassador had called at the
German Foreign Office on a similar errand and urged the English
suggestion that action should at once be taken by England, Germany,
Russia, and France at St. Petersburg and Vienna, to the effect that
Austria and Servia

     "should abstain from any act which might aggravate the
     situation at the present hour."

By this was meant that there should be, pending further parleys, no
invasion of Servia by Austria and none of Austria by Russia. _To this
the German Foreign Minister opposed a categorical refusal._

On the same day the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had "a long and earnest
conversation" with the Austrian Under Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs. He expressed the earnest hope that

     "something would be done before Servia was actually invaded.
     Baron Machio replied that this would now be difficult, as a
     skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the
     Servians had been aggressors."

The Russian Ambassador then said that his country would do all it could
to keep the Servians quiet,

     "and even to fall back before an Austrian advance in order to
     gain time."

He urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be
furnished with full powers to continue discussions with the Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs,

     "who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that could
     be fairly asked of her as an independent power."

The only reply to this reasonable suggestion was that it would be
submitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[English "White Paper," No. 56.]

On the same day the German Ambassador at Paris called upon the French
Foreign Office and strongly insisted on the "_exclusion of all
possibility of mediation or of conference_," and yet contemporaneously
the Imperial German Chancellor was advising London that he had

     "started the efforts toward mediation in Vienna, immediately
     in the way desired by Sir Edward Grey, and had further
     communicated to the Austrian Foreign Minister the wish of the
     Russian Foreign Minister for a direct talk in Vienna."

What hypocrisy! In the formal German defense, the official apologist for
that country, after stating his conviction

     "that an act of mediation could not take into consideration
     the Austro-Servian conflict, which was purely an
     Austro-Hungarian affair,"

claimed that Germany had transmitted Sir Edward Grey's further
suggestion to Vienna, in which Austria-Hungary was urged

     "either to agree to accept the Servian answer as sufficient or
     to look upon it as a basis for further conversations";

but the Austro-Hungarian Government--playing the rôle of the wicked
partner of the combination--"in full appreciation of our mediatory
activity," (so says the German "White Paper" with sardonic humor,)
replied to this proposition that, coming as it did after the opening of
hostilities, "_it was too late_."

Does any reasonable man question for a moment that, if Germany had done
something more than merely "transmit" these wise and pacific
suggestions, Austria would have complied with the suggestions of its
powerful ally or that Austria would have suspended its military
operations if Germany had given any intimation of such a wish?

On the following day, July 28, the door was further closed on any
possibility of compromise when the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs

     "said, quietly but firmly, _that no discussion could be
     accepted on the basis of the Servian note_; that war would be
     declared today, and that the well-known pacific character of
     the Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be
     accepted as a guarantee that the war was both just and
     inevitable; that this was a matter that must be settled
     directly between the two parties immediately concerned."

To this arrogant and unreasonable contention that Europe must accept the
guarantee of the Austrian Foreign Minister as to the righteousness of
Austria's quarrel the British Ambassador suggested "the larger aspect of
the question," namely, the peace of Europe, and to this "larger aspect,"
which should have given any reasonable official some ground for pause,
the Austrian Foreign Minister replied that he

     "had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to
     oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at
     territorial aggrandizement, and which could no longer be
     postponed."

[English "White Paper," No. 62.]

The private conversations between Russia and Austria having thus failed,
Russia returned to the proposition of a European conference to preserve
its peace. Its Ambassador in Vienna on July 28 had a conference with
Berchtold and pointed to the dangers to the peace of Europe and the
desirability of good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia.

To this Count Berchtold replied that he understood perfectly well the
seriousness of the situation and the advantages of a frank explanation
with the Cabinet at St. Petersburg.

     "He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian
     Government, which had only reluctantly decided upon the
     energetic measures which it had taken against Servia, _could
     now neither withdraw nor enter upon any discussion of the
     terms of the Austro-Hungarian note."_

[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 45.]

On the same day, July 28, the German Imperial Chancellor sent for the
English Ambassador and excused his failure to accept the proposal of
conference of the neutral powers, on the ground that he did not think it
would be effective,

     "because such a conference would in his opinion have the
     appearance of an 'Areopagus' consisting of two powers of each
     group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining powers."

After engaging in this pitiful and insincere quibble, and when reminded
of Servia's conciliatory reply, amounting to a virtual surrender,

     "his Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss the
     Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he
     agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian
     concern, _with which Russia had nothing to do_."

[English "White Paper," No. 71.]

At this point the rules of the countries intervened in the dispute. The
Kaiser, having returned from Norway, telegraphed the Czar, under date of
July 28, that he was

     "exerting all my influence to endeavor to make Austria-Hungary
     come to an open and satisfying understanding with Russia,"

and invoked the Czar's aid.

[German "White Paper," Annex 20.]

If the Kaiser were sincere, and he may have been, _his attitude was not
that of his Foreign Office_. Upon the face of the record we have only
his own assurance that he was doing everything to preserve peace, but
the steps that he took or the communications he made to influence
Austria _are not found in the formal defense which the German Government
has given to the world_. The Kaiser can only convince the world of his
innocence of the crime of his Potsdam camarilla by giving the world _the
text_ of any advice he gave the Austrian officials. He has produced his
telegrams to the Czar. _Where are those he presumably sent to Francis
Joseph or Count Berchtold? Where are the instructions he gave his own
Ambassadors or Foreign Minister?_

It is significant that on the same day Sazonof telegraphed to Count
Benckendorff:

     "My conversations with the German Ambassador confirm my
     impression that Germany is rather favorable to the
     uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria,"

and he adds, and history will vindicate him in the conclusion, that

     "the Berlin Cabinet, which might have been able to arrest the
     whole development of this crisis, seems to exercise no action
     on its ally."

[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 43.]

On July 29 Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed Sir Edward Grey that he had
that night seen the German Chancellor, who had "just returned from
Potsdam," where he had presumably seen the Kaiser. The German Chancellor
then showed clearly how the wind was blowing in making the suggestion to
Sir Edward Goschen that if England would remain neutral, Germany would
agree to guarantee that she would not take any French territory. When
asked about the French colonies, no assurance was given.

[English "White Paper," No. 85.]

Later in the day the German Chancellor again saw the English Ambassador,
and expressed regret

     "that events had marched too rapidly, and that it was
     therefore too late to act upon your [Sir Edward Grey's]
     suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of
     discussion."

[English "White Paper," No. 75.]

On the same day the Ambassador for Germany at St. Petersburg called upon
Sazonof and expressed himself in favor of further explanations between
Vienna and St. Petersburg, to which Sazonof assented. [Russian "Orange
Paper," No. 49.] On the same day Sir Edward Grey asked the German
Government

     "_to suggest any form of procedure_ under which the idea of
     mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the
     German Government in principle, _could be applied_."

To which the German Foreign Office replied that it could not act for
fear that if they made to their ally any suggestion that looked like
pressure it might "_cause them [Austria] to precipitate matter and
present a fait accompli_." [See letter of Sir Edward Goschen to Sir
Edward Grey, July 29--English "White Paper," No. 70.]

This was the last and worst of the quibbles put forth to gain time while
Austria was making progress toward Belgrade. It assumes that Austria
might not only fail to respect the wish in a matter of common concern of
its more powerful ally, but that it might act in disregard of Germany's
wish. This strains human credulity to the breaking point. Did the German
Secretary of State keep a straight face when he uttered this sardonic
pleasantry? It may be the duty of a diplomat to lie on occasion, but is
it ever necessary to utter such a stupid falsehood? The German Secretary
of State sardonically added in the same conversation that he was not
sure that the effort for peace had not hastened the declaration of war,
as though the declaration of war against Servia had not been planned and
expected from the first.

As a final effort to meet quibbles, the British Ambassador at Berlin
then suggested that after Austria had satisfied her military prestige,
the moment might then be favorable for four disinterested powers to
discuss the situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing
graver complications.

To this proposal the German Secretary of State seemingly acquiesced,
but, as usual, _nothing whatever was done_. [English "White Paper," No.
76.] It is true that on July 29 Sir Edward Grey was assured by the
German Ambassador that the German Foreign Office was

     "endeavoring to make Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at
     St. Petersburg the scope and extension of Austrian proceedings
     in Servia,"

but again the communications which the German Foreign Office sent to
Vienna on this point _have never yet been disclosed to the world_.

[English "White Paper," No. 84.]

In this same conference Sir Edward Grey

     "urged that the _German Government should suggest any method_
     by which the influence of the four powers could be used
     together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France
     agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating
     influence was ready to be put into operation _by any method
     that Germany could suggest_ if mine were not acceptable. In
     fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method
     that Germany thought possible, if only Germany would 'press
     the button' in the interests of peace."

[English "White Paper," No. 84.]

The difficulty was, however, that Germany never "pressed the button,"
although obviously it would have been easy for her to do so, as the
stronger and more influential member of the Double Alliance.

On the same day the Austrian Government left a memorandum with Sir
Edward Grey to the effect that Count Mensdorff said that the war with
Servia must proceed.

On the night of July 29 the British Ambassador at Berlin was informed
that the German Foreign Office "_had not had time to send an answer
yet_" to the proposal that Germany suggest the form of mediation, but
that the question had been referred to the Austro-Hungarian Government
with a request as to "what would satisfy them."

[English "White Paper," No. 107.]

On the following day the German Ambassador informed Sir Edward Grey that
the German Government would endeavor to influence Austria, after taking
Belgrade and Servian territory in the region of the frontier, to promise
not to advance further, while the powers endeavored to arrange that
Servia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria, but if
Germany ever exercised any such pressure upon Vienna, _no evidence of it
has ever been given to the world_. Certainly it was not very effective,
and for the reasons mentioned it is impossible to conclude that the
advice of Germany, if in good faith, would not have been followed by its
weaker ally.

From all that appears in the record, Austria made no reply to this most
conciliatory suggestion of England, but, in the meantime, the
irrepressible Kaiser made the crisis more acute by cabling to the Czar
that the mobilization of Russia to meet the mobilization of Austria was
affecting his position of mediator, to which the Czar made a
conciliatory reply, stating that Russia's mobilization was only for a
defense against Austria.

The Czar, to put at rest any anxiety of the Kaiser as to Russia's
intentions with respect to Germany, added:

     "I thank you cordially for your mediation which permits the
     hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically
     impossible to discontinue our military preparations which have
     been made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is far
     from us to want war. _As long as the negotiations between
     Austria and Servia continue, my troops will undertake no
     provocative action. I give you my solemn word thereon._ I
     confide with all my faith in the grace of God, and I hope for
     the success of your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our
     countries and the peace of Europe."

What more could Russia do? If Austria continued to mobilize, why not
Russia?

On this day, July 30, the German Ambassador had two interviews at St.
Petersburg with Sazonof, and it was then that Sazonof drew up the
following formula as a basis for peace:

     "If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Servia has
     assumed character of question of European interest, declares
     herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the points which
     violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, _Russia engages to
     stop all military preparations_."

[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 60.]

At this stage King George telegraphed Prince Henry of Prussia that

     "the English Government was doing its utmost, suggesting to
     Russia and France to suspend further military preparations, if
     Austria will consent to be satisfied with the occupation of
     Belgrade and neighboring Servian territory as a hostage for
     satisfactory settlement of her demands, other countries
     meanwhile suspending their war preparation."

The King adds a hope that the Kaiser

     "will use his great influence to induce Austria to accept
     this proposal, thus proving that Germany and England are
     working together to prevent what would be an international
     catastrophe."

[Second German "White Paper."]

This last proposition, however, was never accepted or declined, for the
impetuous Kaiser gave his twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia to demobilize,
and this was an arrogant demand which no self-respecting power, much
less so great a one as Russia, could possibly accept.

While this demand was in progress Sir Edward Grey was making his last
attempt to preserve peace by asking Germany to sound Vienna, as he would
sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the four
disinterested powers to offer to Austria that they would

     "undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her
     demands on Servia, provided they did not embarrass Servian
     sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory."

Sir Edward Grey went so far as to tell the German Ambassador that if
this was not satisfactory, and if Germany would make any reasonable
proposals to preserve peace and Russia and France rejected it, that

     "his Majesty's Government would have nothing to do with the
     consequences,"

which obviously meant either neutrality or actual intervention in behalf
of Germany and Austria.

On the same day the British Ambassador at Berlin besought the German
Foreign Office to

     "put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in
     the general interest to reassure Russia and to show themselves
     disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis."

And Sir Edward Goschen reports that the German Foreign Minister replied
that last night he had

     "begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that he
     had received a reply to the effect that the Austrian Minister
     for Foreign Affairs would take the wishes of the Emperor this
     morning in the matter."

_Again the text of the letter in which Germany "begged" Austria to be
conciliatory is not found in the record._

The excuse of Germany that the mobilization of Russia compelled it to
mobilize does not justify the war. Mobilization does not necessarily
mean aggression, but simply preparation. If Russia had the right to
mobilize because Austria mobilized, Germany equally had the right to
mobilize when Russia mobilized, but it does not follow that either of
the three nations could justify a war to compel the other parties to
demobilize. Mobilization is only a preparation against eventualities. It
is the right of the sovereign State and by no code of ethics a _casus
belli_. The demand of Germany that Russia could not arm to defend
itself, when Austria was preparing for a possible attack on Russia, has
few, if any, parallels in history for bullying effrontery. It treated
Russia as an inferior, almost a vassal, State.

It must be observed that, while Germany insisted that Russia should
demobilize, the Kaiser offered no reciprocal promise. On his theory
Germany and Austria were to be left free to complete their preparations,
but Russia was to tie her own hands and leave herself "naked to her
enemies." This is shown by the last telegrams which passed between the
Czar and Kaiser. The Czar telegraphed:

     "I have received your telegram. I comprehend that you are
     forced to mobilize, but I should like to have from you the
     same guaranty which I have given you, viz., that these
     measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to
     negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the
     universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid
     of God it must be possible to our long-tried friendship to
     prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence
     your urgent reply."

To this the Kaiser replied:

     "I thank you for your telegram. I have shown yesterday to your
     Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted.
     Although I asked for a reply by today noon, no telegram from
     my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of your
     Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilize my army.
     An immediate, clear, and unmistakable reply of your Government
     is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this
     reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the
     subject of your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that you,
     without delay, order your troops to commit, under no
     circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers."

This impetuous step of Germany to compel its great neighbor to desist
from military preparations to defend itself came most inopportunely, for
on Aug. 1 the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador _for the first time_ declared
to the Russian Government its willingness to discuss the terms of the
Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and it was then suggested that the form of
the ultimatum and the questions arising thereon should be discussed in
London. (Dispatch from British Ambassador at Vienna to Sir Edward Grey,
dated Sept. 1, 1914.) Sir Edward Grey at once advised the English
Ambassador in Berlin of the fact, and urged that it was still possible
to maintain peace

     "if only a little respite in time can be gained before any
     great power begins war,"

     [English "White Paper," No. 131.]

but the Kaiser, having issued the arrogant ultimatum to Russia to
demobilize in twelve hours, had gone too far for retreat, and, spurred
on by the arrogant Potsdam military party, he "let slip the dogs of
war." After the fatal Rubicon had been crossed and the die was cast the
Czar telegraphed King George:

"In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more I have done all in
my power to avert war."

Such will be the verdict of history.


The Judgment.

These are _the facts_ as shown by the record, and upon them, in my
judgment, an impartial court would not hesitate to pass the following
judgment:

1--_That Germany and Austria in a time of profound peace secretly
concerted together to impose their will upon Europe and upon Servia in a
matter affecting the balance of power in Europe. Whether in so doing
they intended to precipitate a European war to determine the mastery of
Europe is not satisfactorily established, although their whole course of
conduct suggests this as a possibility. They made war almost inevitable
by (a) issuing an ultimatum that was grossly unreasonable and
disproportionate to any grievance that Austria had and (b) in giving to
Servia, and Europe, insufficient time to consider the rights and
obligations of all interested nations._

2--_That Germany had at all times the power to compel Austria to
preserve a reasonable and conciliatory course, but at no time
effectively exerted that influence. On the contrary, she certainly
abetted, and possibly instigated, Austria in its unreasonable course._

3--_That England, France, Italy, and Russia at all times sincerely
worked for peace, and for this purpose not only overlooked the original
misconduct of Austria but made every reasonable concession in the hope
of preserving peace._

4--_That Austria, having mobilized its army, Russia was reasonably
justified in mobilizing its forces. Such act of mobilization was the
right of any sovereign State, and as long as the Russian armies did not
cross the border or take any aggressive action no other nation had any
just right to complain, each having the same right to make similar
preparations._

5--_That Germany, in abruptly declaring war against Russia for failure
to demobilize when the other powers had offered to make any reasonable
concession and peace parleys were still in progress, precipitated the
war._

6--_That Belgium as a sovereign State has as an inherent right the power
to determine when and under what conditions an alien can cross her
frontiers. This right exists independently of treaties, but is, in the
case of Belgium, reinforced by the Treaty of 1839 and The Hague
Convention, whereby the leading European nations (including Germany)
guarantee its "perpetual neutrality." The invasion of Belgium by Germany
was in violation of these rights, and England only respected its own
solemn covenant when, in defense of that neutrality, it declared war
against Germany._


In Conclusion.

The writer of this article has reached these conclusions with
reluctance, as he has a feeling of deep affection for the German people
and equal admiration for their ideals and matchless progress. Even more
he admires the magnificent courage with which the German Nation, beset
on every hand by powerful antagonists, is now defending its prestige as
a nation. The whole-hearted devotion of this great nation to its flag is
worthy of the best traditions of the Teutonic race. Nevertheless, this
cannot alter the ethical truth, which stands apart from any
considerations of nationality; nor can it affect the conclusion that the
German Nation has been plunged into this abyss by its scheming statesmen
and its self-centred and highly neurotic Kaiser, who in the twentieth
century sincerely believes that he is the proxy of Almighty God on
earth, and therefore infallible.

In visiting its condemnation, the Supreme Court of Civilization should
therefore distinguish between the military caste, headed by the Kaiser
and the Crown Prince, which precipitated this great calamity, and the
German people.

The very secrecy of the plot against the peace of the world and the
failure to disclose to the German people the diplomatic communications
hereinbefore quoted, strongly suggest that this detestable war is not
merely a crime against civilization, _but also against the deceived and
misled German people_. They have a vision and are essentially
progressive and peace-loving in their national characteristics, while
the ideals of their military caste are those of the Dark Ages.

One day the German people will know the full truth and then there will
be a dreadful reckoning for those who have plunged a noble and
peace-loving nation into this fathomless chasm of misfortune.

    "Though the mills of God grind slowly,
      Yet they grind exceeding small,
    Though with patience He stands waiting,
      With exactness grinds He all."




Critics Dispute Mr. Beck


_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

It is regrettable that President Wilson's admirable policy of strict
neutrality is not more sincerely and carefully observed by the press and
public of this country.

We are a cosmopolitan nation. Citizens of the five great warring
countries and their descendants, to a very great extent, constitute our
population. Partiality of any kind tends to destroy the elemental ties
which bind us together, to disrupt our Union, and to make us a house
divided against itself. James M. Beck's article in last Sunday's TIMES
is of the kind which, serving no good purpose, helps to loosen, if not
sever, our most vital domestic ties. While not for an instant doubting
Mr. Beck's sincerity, we must take issue with his inadvertently
ill-timed expression of opinion.

The article in question is based on the following statement: "Any
discussion of the ethical merits of this great controversy must start
with the assumption that there is such a thing as international
morality." How does Mr. Beck define "international morality"? How can he
assume that to exist which each of the contending nations by their
diverse actions prove to be non-extant? How can he claim that there is
an "international morality" of accepted form when each nation claims
that its interpretation must be accepted by the others?

Mr. Beck's allegation that the question "Was England justified in
declaring war against Germany?" is more easily disposed of than the
questions "Was Austria justified in declaring war against Servia?" and
"Was Germany justified in declaring war against Russia and France?"
proves two things--first, that his interest lies primarily in the
vindication of England; second, that he disregards the fundamental
causes and recognizes only the precipitating causes of the war.

The precipitating cause of the war between England and Germany is
verbosely if inadequately covered by his article. We must admit that a
treaty was broken by Germany, yet we contend that this broken agreement
was a pretext for a war fomented and impelled by basic economic causes.
At the outset, let us distinguish between a contract and a treaty. A
contract is an agreement between individuals contemplating enforcement
by a court of law; punishment by money damages in the great majority of
cases, by a specific performance in a very few. A treaty is an agreement
between nations contemplating enforcement by a court of international
public opinion; punishment by money indemnity in the great majority of
cases, by specific performance (i.e., force of arms) in a very few.


Germany's Existence Threatened.

Germany contends that her breach of treaty obligation is punishable by
the payment of money indemnity to the aggrieved party. This she has
offered to do in the case of Belgium, as she has already done in the
case of Luxemburg. Germany's existence was so seriously threatened that
her action seems justifiable, and there remains a sole moral obligation
to compensate any neutral country injured by her.

The mere fact that Belgium had made an unfortunate alliance with England
is deplorable in that Belgium has suffered terribly; but this suffering
is not attributable to Germany. When Japan violated Chinese neutrality,
China protested. Though she was entitled to a money indemnity, there is
no valid reason under the sun why the United States as a guarantor of
the integrity of China should declare war against Japan. England's
justification, in so far as there can be any justification for adding to
the toll of death, is the same as that of Germany, the preservation of
national sovereignty.

Further: "It seems unnecessary to discuss the wanton disregard of these
solemn obligations." There can be nothing wanton in a struggle for
existence, and that this European war is such a struggle is the only
possible explanation of its magnitude, ferocity, and vast possible
consequences. Then, too, though deplorable, treaty obligations are not
solemn, as Italy has proved to the complete satisfaction of so many.
Italy's contention that this is an aggressive war on the part of Germany
and Austria is as untenable as the German contention that it is an
aggressive war on the part of England. For this war was not an
aggressive war on the part of any nation, but an unavoidable war caused
by the simultaneous bursting of the long-gathering economic storm
clouds.

Again: "The ethical aspects of this great conflict must largely depend
upon the record that has been made up by the official communications."
This is similar to a contention that the ethical rights in a case in
court must depend upon the astuteness of counsel in summing up to the
jury. "A court would be deeply impressed ... by the significant
omissions of documents known to be in existence." A court of law, as our
former Assistant Attorney General of the United States surely knows,
compels no one to give testimony that tends to incriminate, and,
furthermore, does not construe failure to testify on the grounds that it
will tend to incriminate against the defendant. In the law the defendant
is entitled to every reasonable doubt. It is also conceivable that a
reasonable time for the defense to present its case would be granted
before passing judgment.

Passing on: "To discuss the justice of Austria's grievances against
Servia would take us ... into the realm of disputed facts." This seems a
delectable bit of humor. We respectfully submit that Mr. Beck's other
assertions might also be considered as "in the realm of disputed facts."
Mr. Beck admits that Austria had a just grievance against Servia, though
he questions her method of redress. Though we conceive that in the
unfortunate European tangle Austria relied on German support in the
event of international conflict, we submit that reliance on Russian
support was a bigger factor in encouraging little Servia to defy her big
neighbor than the remoter help that Germany would furnish Austria in the
event of the conflict spreading.

Austria, in the exercise of her right to engage in a punitive expedition
against Servia, guaranteed that she would do nothing to generalize the
conflict by her assurances to Russia and to the world that there would
be no annexation of Servian territory or annihilation of the Servian
Kingdom. Whether these assurances were genuine or not is impossible of
determination. We have no right to constitute ourselves arbiters of
their sincerity.


No European Solidarity.

Mr. Beck speaks of "the solidarity of European civilization and the fact
that by policy and diplomatic intercourse ... a United European State
exists, even though its organization be as yet inchoate." This
solidarity is conspicuous only by its utter non-existence. Whatever may
have been achieved by policy and diplomatic intercourse has been marred
and rendered useless by the lines of demarkation of the spheres of
influence of the great powers of Europe and by the racial and
temperamental incongruities of Europe's population.

We read: "Servia had forty-eight hours to answer; ... the other European
nations had barely a day to consider what could be done to preserve the
peace of Europe. Why should an Austro-Servian war compromise the peace
of Europe?" Was it not because of the tangled web of international
diplomacy, the Triple Entente as well as the Triple Alliance?

Referring to a German warning in regard to Austria's demands on Servia,
"the German Foreign Office anticipates that Servia 'will refuse to
comply with these demands'--why, if they were justified?" We grieve at
the shattered ideal of Mr. Beck, who, in the face of the international
calamity which has befallen the world, still can believe that all
justifiable demands are complied with.

Again, quoting German "White Paper," Annex 1B, Germany desired "that
the dispute be localized, since any intervention of another power, on
account of the various alliance obligations, would bring consequences
impossible to measure." The explanation of this statement is not--an
aggressor threatens his adversary, but, rather, a prudent man begs
opposing factions to keep cool.

Great space is devoted in the article in question to Germany's
unwillingness to place the Austro-Servian controversy in the hands of
France, England, Germany, and Italy. As Germany disavows all interest in
the controversy, if she speaks truly, it was not within her power to
dictate to her ally in a matter which she could in nowise control except
by force of arms. Furthermore, had she had the power, how could she be
expected to exert pressure on her ally to leave a vital controversy to a
court of four, two of whom were bound by alliances with Russia,
Austria's real antagonist, and a third, (Italy,) as subsequent events
have shown, Austria's natural, geographical, and hereditary enemy? At
best, had each power held to its treaty obligations, there would have
been a deadlock.

Further: "The Russian Minister ... called at the German Foreign Office
and asked it 'to urge upon Vienna ... to take up this line of
conciliation. Jagow replied that he could not advise Austria to yield.'"
Elsewhere in the article a statement is made that the Austro-Servian and
Austro-Russian questions "for all practical purposes ... were
indistinguishable." This inconsistency of having Servia in the light of
a principal and then again in the light of an agent is the greatest
stumbling block to a clear analysis of the precipitating cause of the
war. The logical explanation of Servia's position is that of Russia's
agent. Hence Germany could not be expected to exert the same pressure on
an allied principal that Russia could exert on her agent.

It is true that Germany engaged in many blundering diplomatic quibbles
in the final stages of preparation for the war; but it is also true that
England quibbled, though with greater diplomatic finesse; for instance,
"Sir Edward Grey went so far as to tell the German Ambassador that ...
if Germany would make any reasonable proposals to preserve peace, and
Russia and France rejected it, that 'his Majesty's Government would have
nothing to do with the consequences.'" Here it is apparent to every one
that the word "reasonable" begs the questions.


Slav and Teuton.

The German people were encouraged to relish the idea of a war against
Russia once that war became likely, for sooner or later it seemed
inevitable that Slav and Teuton would clash, and Germany felt confident
that at the present time she outmatched her enemy. The Russians, too,
were encouraged to desire the Slav provinces of Austria, which racially
are a part of the Russian domain. The English people were made to relish
this opportunity to strike their great commercial competitor, especially
when they could do so with little likelihood of unfavorable criticisms.
Finally, the impressionable French people were stirred to thoughts of
revenge and recovery of their lost provinces.

Sympathy with any country in this most disgraceful yet most inevitable
of wars brands the sympathizer as a party to the material and lustful
purposes of at least one of the combatants. There is no ethical
justification of this war from any standpoint. There is no justification
of this war from any standpoint. There is only an explanation of the war
from an economic standpoint. All these specious arguments on the
precipitating causes of the war can be but for the display of brilliant
forensic oratory and matchless diction. Let us thrust aside in these
dark moments of peril and horror all subterfuge.

England, overburdened with taxation, was on the verge of civil war.
Russia, whose masses were overridden roughshod by a bureaucracy
weighting down the peasants with onerous national burdens, expected
sooner or later the cataclysmic upheaval with which the Nihilistic
societies have long been threatening its tyrannical Government. France,
seriously financially embarrassed because of crop impoverishment and
bad foreign investments in Brazil, Russia, and the Balkans, was subject
to continued internal political upheavals, with ever-changing Ministries
and a growing Socialist Party.

Austria, "the ramshackle empire," was in danger of disintegrating from a
variety of causes, not the least of which was the infusibility of its
racially different elements. Germany, in a blind race for commercial
supremacy, suffered from industrial overproduction, thus creating an
unhealthy financial condition which fortified the Socialist Party to an
extent which threatened her imperialistic form of government itself.

So these monarchies whose days were numbered, because of dissatisfaction
at the waste and extravagance of a world gone mad with national excesses
committed in the name of civilization, in reality the price of our
modernization, in a final desperate effort to rally their waning
fortunes stampeded their awakening masses into a ruinous interracial war
in order to stave off the torch and the guillotine.

GEORGE E. BERNHEIMER.

New York, Oct. 30, 1914.




Russia to Blame


_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

Allow me to submit the following in answer to the article of James M.
Beck, entitled "Case of the Double Alliance vs. the Triple Entente,"
published in THE NEW YORK TIMES of Oct. 25, 1914:

The case of "Russian Mobilization vs. German Mediation." Q.--Upon whom
was the duty to yield?

Mr. Beck has spent considerable time and effort to prove, at least by
inference, that Germany must have been informed beforehand of the
Austrian ultimatum to Servia. Personally, I am convinced that the
ultimatum in question was sent with the full knowledge and consent of
Germany; and, whether this is true or not, I maintain that it was
Austria's duty to inform her ally before taking a step which was likely
to endanger the peace of Europe.

The concession of this point takes me immediately to the ultimatum
itself and to the question, "Was the tenor of the ultimatum justified?"
Mr. Beck, in his judgment, says: "The ultimatum is grossly unreasonable
and disappropriate to any grievance that Austria had." Perhaps Mr. Beck
is right, but I have good reasons to think that the tenor of the
ultimatum was fully justified, in view of Servia's former conduct.

Austria was dealing here with a Government the real spirits of which had
come into power by the commission of one of the most dastardly crimes of
modern times. A crime which, at the time of its commission, sent a shock
of horror through the entire civilized world, to wit, "the outrageous
murder of the former King and Queen of Servia," outrageous because it
was perpetrated by the so-called aristocracy of Servia. The
long-continued agitation carried on by Servia against Austria, at the
instigation of Russia, which finally culminated in another no less
outrageous assassination, that of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his
consort, to my idea fully justified Austria in making demands which
under ordinary circumstances might have been termed "unreasonable."

The question whether Austria was justified in going to war against
Servia is a debatable one, but I respectfully refer to the fact that our
own country, the United States, was only very recently on the verge of
precipitating war with a "much weaker" nation than ours, on account of
the latter's refusal to salute the American flag. Neither did we stop on
that occasion with the ultimatum, but we followed it up with dispatching
a fleet of warships, the landing of troops, and the seizure of Vera
Cruz.

From the time Austria's ultimatum was sent all the great powers seemed
to have professed a great eagerness for the preservation of peace. Mr.
Beck asserts that Germany was not sincere in its desire for peace and
could have avoided the war if it had seriously tried to exert its
influence over Austria. This finding is based on the inference drawn
from the fact that Germany failed to achieve any results.

To determine whether Mr. Beck is justified in finding as he does, it is
necessary, first of all, to examine the exact status of the powers at
the time the ultimatum was sent. We find that Austria had a just
grievance against Servia, for which it was seeking redress. An issue was
therefore raised between Austria and Servia. Germany, although Austria's
ally, immediately defined its attitude by declaring emphatically that
"the question at issue was one for settlement between Servia and Austria
alone."


Why Did Russia Mobilize?

I beg to ask Mr. Beck to answer the following question: By what
right--moral, legal, or equitable--did Russia make Servia's cause its
own? Did Russia have any alliance with Servia? I further ask: What
privity existed between Austria, Servia, and Russia?

Suppose Mr. Beck can justify the action of Russia, although a "rank
outsider," in taking Servia's part, how can he possibly justify the
positively unreasonable and, under the circumstances, most dangerous
step of "actual mobilization" on the part of Russia?

Mr. Beck has tried to justify the mobilization by quoting the Russian
excuse "that Russia's mobilization was only for a defense against
Austria." On close examination what does this amount to? It resolves
itself into a situation somewhat like this: A sends an ultimatum to B
seeking redress for a wrong committed by B upon A, whereupon C mobilizes
"for defense against A." I leave it to the average American of ordinary
intelligence to find a reason for C's mobilization "for defense against
A." Mr. Beck might as well try to justify a mobilization on the part of
Japan if the United States was preparing to invade Mexico for the
purpose of redressing an insult to the American flag. Does Mr. Beck
realize the seriousness of actual mobilization by Russia at that
critical moment? Not one of the other powers dared to take this one step
which among nations is regarded as tantamount to a declaration of war.

And what did the Kaiser do at this moment? He did the only thing he
could do, and, I dare say, the only thing our American Nation could have
done under the same circumstances. He wired the Czar and stated: "I am
willing to bring my influences to bear upon Austria, provided you agree
to cease mobilization." Was this demand unreasonable? What else could
Germany have done, I ask, with the Russian bear standing on the border
with the sword already drawn? This moment was the crucial and decisive
one in the prologue to this awful world drama.

The only question therefore and the all-important one to be submitted to
the Court of Civilization, is, Whose duty was it to yield? Was it
Russia's, with the sword already drawn against a country which had not
attacked it, not even threatened it, or was it Germany's, with the sword
in the sheath?

In his "conclusion," Mr. Beck speaks of Germany as "beset on every hand
by powerful antagonists." Does he really mean to deprive the German
Emperor of the right to demand as a condition precedent to mediation on
his part the discontinuance of mobilization by Russia?

Mr. Beck in his "judgment" under Paragraph 4 says "that Austria, having
mobilized its army, Russia was reasonably justified in mobilizing its
forces." The use of the qualifying word "reasonably" seems to indicate
that even Mr. Beck is not quite certain that Russia was in fact
justified in mobilizing its forces.

Is it reasonable, just, and fair of Mr. Beck to expect Germany, "beset
on every hand by powerful antagonists," to permit Russia to continue
mobilizing its 18,000,000 soldiers and have Germany believe that Russia
was sincere in its "peaceful intentions" in the face of actual
mobilization? At this moment the German Kaiser made a very reasonable
demand upon Russia to cease mobilization, and I ask every fair-minded
American, whether lawyer or layman, "whose duty it was to yield" at this
moment. The answer to this question will settle the much-disputed point
as to the actual cause of the war.

In conclusion, I beg to ask Mr. Beck: Why expect so much of Germany and
nothing of Russia, when Germany had not merely professed her peaceful
intentions, but actually maintained peace for over forty years, during
which period not a foot of territory had been acquired by her through
conquest? This is a fact.

Coming into a court of law supported by such a reputation, does Mr. Beck
really believe that the decision of the court would have been in favor
of Russia? Does Mr. Beck really believe that the decision would have
been against Germany, whose war lord was begging the Czar almost on his
knees to avoid the awful calamity by the discontinuance of mobilization?

Picture the United States about to invade Mexico to redress an insult to
the American flag. Picture England as the ally of the United States, and
Japan supporting Mexico, without any alliance existing between the two
latter countries. To make this example conform to the actual facts under
discussion, we must, of course, assume that both Japan and England are
situated in the North American Continent, and across the border from the
United States and England. Japan, with an army of 18,000,000 soldiers,
(assumed for the purpose of argument,) mobilizes her army, professedly
for defense against the United States. Could any fair-minded American
possibly expect England to intercede with her ally, the United States,
without first demanding the demobilization of Japan? Whose duty was it
to yield?

The actual fact is that Germany even then did not declare war against
Russia until Russian soldiers had actually crossed not the Austrian but
the German border.

I may add that in writing the above I am prompted only by the very
natural desire, viz., to impress upon the jury composed of the American
people the one fact which should be given the most careful consideration
in order to enable it to arrive at a just verdict in the case submitted,
and this fact is "the mobilization of Russia."

FRANK SEGGEBRUCH.

New York, Oct. 29, 1914.




In Defense of Austria


_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

Referring to your editorial, "The Evidence Examined," in your Sunday
edition, I wish to protest emphatically against your assertion that a
"Court of Civilization" must inevitably come to the conclusion that
Germany precipitated the war. There are still millions of civilized
people who see these things quite differently.

Mr. Beck makes out a case from the viewpoint of the accusing party--of
course, nobody will doubt the legal abilities of Mr. Beck--but before
the Supreme Court of Civilization there is also a law: audiatur et
altera pars. Mr. Beck, as he presents the case to the court, has not
mentioned very important points which, for the decision of the Supreme
Court, would be most vital ones.

At first the breach of Belgian neutrality, admitted and regretted by the
German Government, has nothing to do with the question--who precipitated
the war? It constituted only an action of the war itself. On the other
hand, you call in your editorial the Austrian ultimatum a savage one
and take it for granted that this ultimatum started the stone rolling
and brought finally the general clash in Europe about. This presumption,
when presented to the court, will have to be thoroughly proved, because
there are many people, fair and just, as you consider yourself, who are
convinced of the ample justification of this ultimatum.

It is hardly describable how many criminal acts have been committed by
Servians against the very existence of the Dual Monarchy for the last
six years, under the eyes of the Servian Government and approved by it,
by intriguing against Austria's right to cultivate her own territory,
Bosnia, spreading secret societies all over the empire, &c.

The awful crime, the assassination of the heir to the throne, was only
the finish of a long chain of like acts. These facts, which immediately
lead up to the ultimatum, ought to be considered in the first place by
judging Austria's justification for sending this ultimatum to Servia. A
just Judge in the Court of Civilization will, I am convinced, carefully
study the ante-history and in all probability arrive at the conclusion
that the ultimatum was amply justified and Servia fully deserved the
severest punishment possible.

Mr. Beck presents to the court the Russian interference with this
intended punishment and forgets to tell the Judge that Russia had not
the least right to this interference. No foreign power had.

Therefore, Austria was entirely within her right to decline any
negotiations with Russia about this punishment before its completion.
Nevertheless, the German Government brought these negotiations about,
and, while these negotiations proceeded satisfactorily, Russia
mobilized, mobilized all along her western frontier against Austria and
Germany, notwithstanding the fact that she had promised not to do so and
officials in Petrograd had pledged their words to the contrary.

Russia knew there could be no such thing as a war with Austria alone, as
well as Germany knew that a war with Russia meant a war with France. If
the laws of morality rule in the Court of Civilization, they should
above all be applied to the conduct of Servia and Russia. Austria was in
a state of self-defense, when she decided not to bear any longer
Servia's treacherous and murderous attacks against her existence; this
is entirely within the boundaries of the laws of morality. Russia,
however, without the slightest right, moral or legal, attacked Austria
from the back by interfering with Austria's own affairs.

Therefore I wish to point out that a careful student of the papers, by
considering the ante-history of the war, which, as you will admit, is
very essential, may come to a quite different conclusion and Mr. Beck as
State's attorney will have a hard stand against the counsel of the
defendant.

EDWARD PICK.

New York, Oct. 27, 1914.

[Illustration]




Defense of the Dual Alliance--A Reply

By Dr. Edmund von Mach.

     Instructor of Fine Arts, Harvard, 1899-1903; Instructor in
     History of Art, Wellesley College, 1899-1902; Lecturer in
     History of Art, Bradford Academy, Cambridge, Mass. Author of
     many books on Greek and Roman sculpture and the history of
     painting. Served in the German Army, 1889-91.


Hon. James M. Beck has eloquently argued the case of the Allies against
Germany and Austria-Hungary, and submitted his findings with confident
assurance of their acceptance by the Supreme Court of Civilization.
Carried away by his zeal he has at times used terms not warranted by the
evidence, such as "the irrepressible Kaiser," "stupid falsehood,"
"duplicity," and the like, but since the court can be trusted to
disregard such expressions no further attention will be paid to them.

To a certain extent this article is not a reply but a continuation of
Mr. Beck's argument, for, wherever our personal sympathies may lie, we
are all equally interested in discovering the truth. In the final
settlement of peace American public opinion may, nay, will, have a
prominent voice. If it is exerted on the strength of a true
understanding of European events, it will contribute to the
establishment of a lasting peace.

As to the evidence submitted Mr. Beck seems to err in believing that
Governments are accustomed to publish in their various white, gray, or
orange papers "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth."
This is nowhere done, for there are many bits of information which come
to a Government through its diplomatic connections which it would be
indelicate, discourteous, or unwise to give to the public. The official
documents on American foreign relations and all white, gray, or orange
papers are "edited." They are understood to be so by Congress,
Parliament, the Reichstag, the Duma, &c., and no charge of dishonesty
can be maintained against the respective Governments on that score.

If the Chancellor says that Germany was using her good offices in
Vienna, this is as valuable a bit of evidence as the reprint of a
dispatch in the "White Paper," unless we wish to impugn his veracity,
and in that case the copy of a dispatch would be valueless, for he might
have forged it. The entire argument, therefore, against Germany and
Austria, based on what Mr. Beck calls the "suppression of vitally
important documents," is void, unless you will apply it equally to Great
Britain and the other countries.

In Sir Edward Grey's "White Paper" Mr. Beck has missed no important
documents because he looked at England's well-prepared case through
sympathetic eyes, and it did not occur to him to ask, "Where are all the
documents bearing on Italian neutrality?" Does he believe that England
was so little interested in the question whether she would have to fight
two or three foes, and whether her way to Egypt and India would be safe
or threatened? There are many dispatches to and from Rome included in
the "White Paper," but not a mention of Italy's position.

The first paper contains a letter to the British Ambassador in Berlin
concerning the Austro-Servian relations. Is it not probable that Sir
Edward Grey's attention was called to this question by his Ambassador in
Vienna? Where is his letter? Or, if Sir Edward thought of it himself,
why did he not mention his conversation also to Sir M. de Bunsen in
Vienna? Where is this note? Are we to assume that Sir M. de Bunsen made
his first report on July 23, although Sir Edward Goschen in Berlin had
an interesting report to make a day earlier?

We can thus go through the whole British "White Paper" and discover the
omission of many interesting documents.

No. 38 is a letter from Sir Rennell Rodd in Rome, dated on July 23 and
received on July 27. He had no doubt sent also a telegram. What did it
contain, and why was it not published under the date of its arrival
instead of the letter which had been delayed in transit?


Where Is No. 28?

In No. 29 Sir Edward Grey refers in a telegram to Sir R. Rodd to what "I
had said to the German Ambassador." Such a reference could have a
meaning for Sir R. Rodd only if he had been informed of this
conversation. There is no dispatch printed in the "White Paper"
containing this information. Possibly it was so entwined with other
instructions, which Sir Edward Grey did not care to have known, that it
could not be published. Was it perhaps sent to the printer first as No.
28, and removed at the last moment when it was too late to change the
subsequent numbers? Or, if this assumption is wrong, what was printed
originally as No. 28? Where is No. 28? There are other omissions, and
one especially noteworthy one between Nos. 80 and 106 which will be
discussed later.

Viewed in this light, the English "White Paper" loses much of the value
of a complete record, which it has had in the eyes of many. There is
absolutely no reason to doubt the accuracy of those dispatches which
have been printed, but it becomes incumbent upon the searcher after the
truth to inquire whether the existence of unprinted (in the case of the
German "White Paper" Mr. Beck uses the term "suppressed") papers may not
at times alter the interpretation which should be given to those that
are printed.

Since we have no published records anywhere concerning the advice given
to Italy by the Allies, and the gradual steps leading up to Italy's
decision to remain neutral; nor any hint as to the day when her decision
was communicated to England and the other powers, it would be futile to
speculate on this subject. Since, however, the Queen of Italy and the
wife of the Commander in Chief of the Russian forces are sisters, and
since it was in the interest of the Allies to keep Italy neutral, it is
not unreasonable to assume that an exchange of opinion took place
between Italy and the Allies concerning the conditions under which Italy
would remain neutral.

If the actual opening of hostilities could be so managed that Germany
could be called the aggressor, then Italy probably declared that she
would not enter the war. This is a very important phase of the case, and
the omission from Sir Edward Grey's "White Paper" of all dispatches
dealing with Italian neutrality is much to be regretted.

Since we are dealing with the Italian dispatches here, it may be
advisable to consider at once all the communications which are published
as having passed between Sir Edward Grey and the British Ambassador, Sir
Rennell Rodd, in Rome. They are numbered 19, (perhaps 28,) 29, 35, 36,
38, 49, 57, 63, 64, 80, 81, 86, 92, 100, and 106, of which the important
numbers are 38, 57, 64, 80, and 86.

On July 23 Sir Edward Grey was informed that "the gravity of the
situation lay in the conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that
it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many
disillusions which the turn of events in the Balkans has occasioned, to
score a definite success." (No. 38.)

Austria, in other words, believed that to let the murder of her
heir-apparent pass unpunished would have meant a deathblow to her
prestige, and consequently, as any one familiar with her conditions will
agree, to her existence. Russia, on the other hand, on July 25 said (see
No. 17, report from Sir G. Buchanan) that she could not "allow (note the
word) Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant power in the
Balkans, and if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face
all the risks of war."

These two dispatches to Sir Edward Grey tell the whole story in a
nutshell. Austria believed, rightly or wrongly, that it was a question
of life or death for her, while Russia claimed the right of preventing
Austria from becoming the predominate power in the Balkans, and actually
threatened war. Russia did not claim to be concerned with the justice of
Austria's demands on Servia.

No such definite word of Russia's intention was sent to Germany, for on
July 26 Sir M. de Bunsen reported Germany's confident belief that
"Russia will keep quiet during the chastisement of Servia." (No. 32.)

On the next day Sir Rennell Rodd reports from Rome (No. 57) that the
Minister of Foreign Affairs believes that "if Servia will even now
accept it (the Austrian note) Austria will be satisfied" and refrain
from a punitive war. He, moreover, believes--and this is very
important--that Servia may be induced to accept the note in its entirety
on the advice of the four powers invited to the conference, and this
would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to
Austria-Hungary alone. Since Italy was to be one of the four powers, the
Minister's belief was doubtless based on accurate information. There is
then as late as July 27 no claim made by Servia that Austria's demands
are unreasonable. She only hates to yield to Austria alone. Austria, in
the meanwhile, (No. 57,) repeats her assurance that she demands no
territorial sacrifices from Servia.

On the next day, July 28, Sir Rennell Rodd reports (No. 64) that "Servia
might still accept the whole Austrian note, if some explanation were
given regarding mode in which Austrian agents would require to
intervene." Austria, on her part, had explained that "the co-operation
of the Austrian agents in Servia was to be only in investigation, not in
judicial or administrative measures. Servia was said to have willfully
misinterpreted this." (No. 64.)

From these reports it appears that the differences between Austria and
Servia were on the way to a solution. Austria claimed that her demands
were just, and Servia did not deny this. Austria further claimed that
her prestige, her very existence, demanded the prompt compliance with
her requests by Servia. She explained in a satisfactory way the one
point on which Servia had taken exceptions, and Servia was on the point
of complying, and would have complied, if the powers had been willing to
let her do so. Such a conclusion of the incident would have strengthened
Austria's prestige and assured the punishment of the murderers of
Serajevo.


Russia's Remark About Austria.

The reason why Servia was not allowed to submit was Russia's remark,
quoted above, that she would not "allow" Austria to become the
predominant power in the Balkans. It was, therefore, Russia's task to
prevent Servia from accepting Austria's note. Since war was her
alternative, baldly stated to England from the first, she had to do
three things--first, to secure as many allies as possible; secondly, to
weaken her enemies, preferably by detaching from them Italy, and,
thirdly, to get as much of a start in her mobilization as possible.

The treaties between Russia, France, and Great Britain, unlike those
between Germany, Austria, and Italy, have never been published. Whatever
their wording may be, Russia was at first apparently not absolutely sure
of the support of France, (No. 17,) and France, it would seem, was
unwilling to tempt fate without the help of England. That England should
be willing to join such a combination for such a cause seemed so
preposterous to Germany that she did not believe it. Without England no
France, without France no war, for alone Russia could not measure
herself against Austria. Austria would not have attacked her of her own
free will, but if Russia had attacked Austria, the whole world knew from
the published treaties that Germany was bound to come to the assistance
of her ally. It would have been two against one, and the two could have
waited until Russia had finished her cumbersome mobilization. For even
if she had her whole army of many million men on the frontier, Austria
and Germany together were strong enough to stem her advance.

Russia's only chance, therefore, when Servia was on the point of
yielding, and Austria had almost re-established her prestige, was to
secure the help of France, but this meant also the promise of England.

The demands made on England by Russia, some of which are quoted in the
"White Paper," are too well known to deserve repetition. This was the
chief thing that counted, to get England's promise. The next was to
detach Italy from her allies, (but of this there are no documents
available,) and the third to gain time for her mobilization. All the
other suggestions and counter-suggestions which fill the English "White
Paper" are insignificant, as soon as the fundamental positions of
Austria and Russia are understood.

Germany has claimed that England promised her support to Russia and
France on July 30, or in the night of July 29, and, to prove it, has
published the letter from the Belgian Minister in St. Petersburg to his
Minister of Foreign Affairs, printed in translation in THE NEW YORK
TIMES on Oct. 7. This letter, which has not been officially denied by
the Allies, states that the promise of England's support gave the
Russian war party the upper hand and resulted in the order of complete
mobilization.


English "White Paper's" Testimony.

Strangely enough, and doubtless by an oversight, the English "White
Paper" contains two dispatches (Nos. 80 and 106) which seem to confirm
the accuracy of M. de l'Escaille's statement, viz., that England
promised the Russian-French combination her support.

On July 29 Sir Rennell Rodd wrote to Sir Edward Grey (No. 80) that the
Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs had told him "there seemed to be a
difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in earnest. As
Germany, however, was really anxious for good relations with ourselves,
if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France, he
thought it would have a great effect."

In a later dispatch of the same day (No. 86) he deprecates Russia's
partial mobilization, which he fears has spoiled the chances of
Germany's exerting any pressure on Austria.

But on the next day, July 30, these remarkable words occur: "He [the
Italian Minister] had reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to
give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that
we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid
issue with us." (No. 106.)

Readers of the "White Paper" will look in vain for an explanation of
such a change of heart on Germany's part. What does "now" mean in the
last letter? And why does Germany seem "convinced" that England will act
with Russia--if not that she has heard of the promise mentioned by M. de
l'Escaille, as given early on July 30 or late the 29th? The dates agree,
and unless Sir Edward Grey publishes further papers to explain the
change that had taken place between July 29 and July 30 one seems forced
to accept this explanation.

What is Germany's attitude? Does she rush into war? Not at all, for she
is "most anxious to avoid issue" with England. (No. 106.) Germany knew
that Russia had begun to mobilize. Every day, every hour counted; for
against the masses of Russia she had only her greater speed to match.
She knew that England had gone over to Russia, although she was probably
hoping that the alliance between the Saxon and the Slav was not yet
irrefragable. Still, the prospects were dark. But in spite of this the
efforts were renewed to see what could be done in Vienna.

The famous exchange of telegrams between royalty began in the evening of
July 29; and here it is wise to halt for a moment. On July 30 the Czar
telegraphed to the Emperor in reply to the Emperor's expression of
regret that Russia should be mobilizing, as follows: "The military
measures in force now were decreed five days ago." That is, according to
the Czar, the Russian mobilization had begun on July 25. On July 27,
however, the Russian Minister of War, M. Suchomlinow, had declared to
the German Military Attaché "on his word of honor" that no mobilization
order had been issued. July 25, however, it will be remembered, was the
day on which Sir G. Buchanan had reported from St. Petersburg that
Russia will "face all risks of war" if she can feel sure of the support
of France.

On July 31 Russia mobilized her entire army, which led to Germany's
ultimatum that Russia demobilize within twelve hours. No reply was
received to the request, and orders for the mobilization of the German
Army were issued at 5:15 P.M., Aug. 1, after the German Ambassador in
St. Petersburg had been instructed to declare that, owing to the
continued mobilization of the Russian Army, a state of war existed
between the two countries.


Kaiser Tried to Keep Peace.

In order to understand this step one should read the book "La France
Victorieuse dans la Guerre de Demain," ("France Victorious in the Next
War,") by Col. Arthur Boucher, published in 1911. Col. Boucher has
stated the case baldly and so simply that every one can understand it.
In substance his argument is this: "Alone France has no chance, but
together with Russia she will win against Germany. Suppose the three
countries are beginning mobilization on the same day. Germany finishes
first, France second, and Russia last. Germany must leave some of her
troops on her eastern frontier, the rest she throws against France. All
France has to do is to hold them for a few days. [Col. Boucher mentions
the exact number of days. This book is not at hand, and the writer
prefers not to quote from memory.] Then Russia comes into play, more
German troops will be needed in the East, the French proceed to an
attack on their weakened enemy, and La France sera victorieuse."

Everything hinges on just a couple of days or so. A couple of days! And
how much of a start had Russia? She had begun on July 25; on July 27
definite news of the Russian mobilization was reported in Berlin,
although the Minister of War denied it "on his honor." On July 30
England was understood to have promised her support to Russia, and the
Czar acknowledged that Russia had been mobilizing for the past five
days. Five days! And Col. Boucher, expressing the opinion of military
experts, had counted on victory on a much smaller margin!

Do the Judges of the Supreme Court of Civilization realize the almost
super-human efforts in the interest of peace made by the German Emperor?
Russia has a start of five days, and on July 31 a start of six days. Can
we not hear all the military leaders imploring the Emperor not to
hesitate any longer? But in the interest of peace the Emperor delays. He
has kept the peace for Germany through the almost thirty years of his
reign. He prays to his God, in Whom he has placed his trust through all
his upright life, with a fervor which has often brought him ridicule.
Also, he still believes in England, and hopes through her efforts to be
able to keep the peace. He waits another day. A start of seven days for
Russia! The odds against Germany have grown tremendously. At last he
orders mobilization. For a longer delay he would not have been able to
answer to his country. As it is, there are many people who blame him
severely for having waited so long.

But William II. was right, for when the world will begin to realize the
agonies through which he must have passed during these days of waiting,
and the sacrifices he made in his effort to preserve peace, it will
judge Germany rightly, and call the Emperor the great prince of peace
that he is.

But, it has been said, why did he not avoid war, either by forcing
Austria to yield to Russia, or, if she refused, by withdrawing from her?
In common with the whole of Germany, he probably felt that Austria's
position was right. Servia herself, as has been seen above, did not
claim that she was unjustly treated, whatever outsiders thought of
Austria's demands; and Austria was fully justified by past events in
believing that it was with her a question of life and death. Should
Germany sacrifice her faithful friend under such circumstances, and for
what? For the arrogance of Russia, who would not "allow" her to
re-establish her prestige in a righteous cause? The word "righteous" is
used advisedly, because in the early stages of the controversy nobody,
not even Russia nor Servia herself, denied the justice of Austria's
demands. The writer is informed that even the liberal English press
found no fault with the course taken by Austria, although it commented
adversely on the language used in the note.

What would have been the result of peace bought by Germany at such a
cost? It would have alienated her only faithful friend without laying
the foundations for a lasting friendship with her opponents. This at
least was Germany's honest belief. She may have been wrong. History more
probably will call her right. To desert Austria might have postponed the
war, but when it would have come Germany would have stood alone, and,
worse, she would have lost her self-respect.

This claim may sound strange in the ears of those who have just
witnessed and will never forget the suffering of that beautiful little
country, Belgium. They hold that, since Germany invaded Belgium, it is
Germany who broke a treaty and who is to blame.

Mr. Beck considers this to be so self-evident that he deems it
unnecessary to advance any proof. He quotes the Chancellor's speech,
and, moving for a quick verdict, declares his motion of guilty carried.
The matter, however, is not quite so simple for the man who is seeking
for the whole truth. Let us look at the facts.

Belgium was a neutral country, just as any country has the right to
declare itself neutral, with this difference: that in 1839 she had
promised to five powers--Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria, and
Prussia--that she would remain perpetually neutral. These five powers in
their turn had promised to guarantee her neutrality. She was, however, a
sovereign State, and as such had the undoubted right to cease being
neutral whenever she chose by abrogating the Treaty of 1839. If the
other high contracting parties did not agree with her, it was their
right to try to coerce Belgium to keep to her pledges, although this
would undoubtedly have been an infringement of her sovereignty.

The Treaty of 1839 contains the word "perpetual," but so does the treaty
between France and Germany, in which Alsace and Lorraine are ceded by
France to be perpetually an integral part of the German Empire. Does
this mean that France, if the Allies should win, could not retake these
provinces? Nobody probably will believe this.

The Treaty of 1839 was a treaty just like the Treaty of 1871, with this
difference, that the latter treaty was concluded between two powers, and
the earlier one between five powers on one side and Belgium and Holland
on the other. This gave certain rights to all the signatory powers, any
one of whom had the right to feel itself sufficiently aggrieved to go to
war if any other power disregarded the treaty.


Rights of Neutrals.

There was once another neutral State, the city and district of Cracow,
also established by a treaty to which Great Britain was a signatory.
Three of the signers considered the conditions developing in Cracow to
be so threatening that they abolished Cracow as an independent State.
Great Britain sent a polite note of protest, and dropped the matter.

Since that time, however, two Hague Conferences have been held and
certain rules agreed upon concerning the rights and duties of neutrals.
The Belgian status of inviolability rests on these rules, called
conventions, rather than on the Treaty of 1839. During the
Franco-Prussian War of 1870 Mr. Gladstone very clearly stated that he
did not consider the Treaty of 1839 enforceable. Great Britain,
therefore, made two new treaties, one with France and one with Prussia
(quoted and discussed in Boston Evening Transcript, Oct. 14, 1914) in
which she promised to defend Belgian neutrality, by the side of either
France or Prussia, against that one of them who should infringe the
neutrality.

These treaties were to terminate one year after peace had been
concluded between the contestants. A treaty, like the one of 1839,
however, which was considered unenforceable in 1870, can hardly be
claimed to have gained new rights in 1914. In calm moments nobody will
claim that a greater sanctity attaches to it than to the treaty in which
Alsace and Lorraine are ceded forever to Germany.

No, it is The Hague Conventions to which we must look. The first
convention (1899) contained no rules forbidding belligerents from
entering neutral territory. In the second conference it was thought
desirable to formulate such rules, because it was felt that in war
belligerents are at liberty to do what is not expressly forbidden. At
the request of France, therefore, a new set of rules was suggested, to
which Great Britain and Belgium offered valuable amendments. The rules
were finally accepted, and are today parts of international law. They
read; "Article I. The territory of neutral powers is inviolable. Article
II. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either
munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral power."

These articles, together with the whole convention called "Rights and
duties of neutral powers and persons in case of war on land," have been
ratified and therefore accepted as law by the United States of America,
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, and Russia and other minor
powers. Great Britain experienced a change of heart, and, although her
own delegates had moved these articles, she refused to ratify them, when
she ratified most of the other conventions on Nov. 27, 1909. (A table
showing the ratifications of conventions has been published by The World
Peace Foundation, Boston.)


The Case of Belgium.

Since Great Britain did not accept these articles as law, she was not
bound by them, for the principle of The Hague Conferences is that a
nation is bound only by those laws which it accepts. The remarkable
fact, therefore, appears that the only one of the big nations which had
refused to accept these articles, and which, therefore, might have moved
her troops across a neutral country and have claimed that she could do
so with a clear conscience because she broke no law which was binding on
her, was Great Britain. And the world now sees the spectacle of Great
Britain claiming to have gone to war because another power did what she
herself could have done, according to her own interpretation, with
impunity. Japan has broken the international law by infringing the
neutrality of China, but Great Britain can claim that she did not break
a law by doing exactly what Japan did.

It is not asserted here that the citizens of Great Britain are not
absolutely sincere in their belief of the causes which have allied them
with the Russians and the Japanese, and the Indians and the Zouaves, and
the negroes and the French and the Belgians against Germany. Their
Government, however, should have known that the presumption of
insincerity exists when one charges against others a crime which one
would have felt at liberty to commit one's self. Yet, more, the British
Government knew better than anybody else that Germany had not even
committed this crime; for, according to all laws of justice, no person
or nation can claim the inviolability of a neutral when he has committed
"hostile acts against a belligerent, or acts in favor of a belligerent."
(Article XVII. of The Hague Conference of 1907.)

The question, therefore, arises, "Did Belgium commit acts in favor of
one of Germany's opponents, if not actually hostile acts against
Germany?" In order to understand Germany's charge that Belgium had
committed such acts, attention must be directed to one of the most
unfortunate stipulations of the Treaty of 1839, which compelled Belgium
to maintain several fortresses. This meant that a small neutral people,
sandwiched in between two great powers, had to keep itself informed on
military affairs. Instead of being able to foster a peaceful state of
mind, which is the surest guarantee of neutrality, the Belgians were
forced to think military thoughts.

[Illustration: ANDREW CARNEGIE

_(Photo (c) by Underwood & Underwood.)_

_See Page 415_]

[Illustration: JACOB H. SCHIFF

_(Photo by American Press Assn.)_

_See Page 459_]

In the eighties and early nineties they suspected France of designs on
their integrity. Since then a change in the popular feeling has taken
place and in recent years the instruction of the Belgian artillery, for
instance, was intrusted to French officers in active service. These
officers were constantly at home and very properly concerned with
solving military problems such as a future war with Germany might
present. What was more natural than that these same officers, when they
were detached for a few months or years to Liège or Namur or Huy, taught
their Belgian charges to prepare against a German attack, and to look
upon the French as their friends and the Germans as their enemies? If
conditions had been different, and German officers had been in charge of
Belgian fortresses, the Belgian guns in practice would always have been
trained on imaginary French invaders.


French Officers in Belgian Forts.

If this is understood it will be seen that in the case of war the actual
neutrality of the Belgian garrisons would naturally be determined by the
position taken by that nation whose officers had been in charge of the
Belgian fortresses. And this might be entirely independent of the
professed wishes of the Belgian people or their Government. If French
officers in active service remained in the several fortresses, or even
only in one after the beginning of hostilities, and if the French
campaign plans contemplated an attack through Belgium, then Belgium had
committed an "act in favor of France" by not forcing the French officers
to leave, and had forfeited the rights and privileges granted by The
Hague Convention of 1907 to a neutral State.

Did French officers remain in Liège or in any other Belgian fortress
after hostilities had begun, and did France plan to go through Belgium?
Germany has officially made both claims. The first can easily be
substantiated by the Supreme Court of Civilization by an investigation
of the prisoners of war taken in Belgium. Until an impartial
investigation becomes possible no further proof than the claim made by
the German Government can be produced.

The second charge is contained in No. 157 of the English "White Paper"
in these words of instruction from the German Foreign Secretary to the
German Ambassador in London: "Please impress upon Sir Edward Grey that
German Army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which
was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information."

Sir Edward Grey has attacked Germany for invading Belgium, but has
nowhere denied that Germany had the unimpeachable evidence she said she
had, and which of course nullified any previous assurance from France.

It is not known whether Sir Edward Grey was shown this evidence or not,
but if the preservation of Belgian neutrality was Great Britain's chief
concern, why did she not offer to negotiate treaties with Germany and
France as she had done in 1870? It will be remembered that then she
bound herself to join with either of the contestants in defending
Belgian neutrality against the attacks of the other.

As the case stands today, on the evidence of Sir Edward Grey's own
"White Paper" and speeches, Great Britain is making war on Germany
because:

1. She broke the Treaty of 1839, although her own Gladstone had declared
this treaty to be without force, and although the status of neutral
States had been removed by The Hague Convention from the uncertainty of
treaties to the security of international law.

2. Great Britain makes war against Germany because Germany has broken
Articles I. and II. of Chapter 1 of The Hague Convention referring to
neutrals, although Great Britain herself has refused to recognize these
articles as binding upon her own conduct.

3. She makes war on Germany although she has never denied the
correctness of Germany's assertion that she had unimpeachable proof of
France's intentions of going through Belgium, which, together with the
sojourn of French officers in Belgium, constitutes the offense which,
according to The Hague Convention, deprives a so-called neutral State of
the privileges granted in Articles I. and II.

It is impossible to say here exactly what these proofs are which Germany
possesses, and which for military reasons she has not yet been able to
divulge. She has published some of them, namely, the proof of the
continued presence of French officers on Belgian soil, and has given the
names and numbers of the several army corps which France had planned to
push through Belgium.

The case then stands as follows:

1. Was the inviolability of Belgium guaranteed by Articles I. and II. of
The Hague Convention? Yes.

2. Had Germany ratified these articles? Yes.

3. Had Great Britain ratified these articles? No.

4. Would Belgium have forfeited the right of having her country held
inviolable if she had committed "acts in favor of France," even if these
acts were not actually hostile acts? Yes, according to Article XVII. of
The Hague Convention.

5. Did Belgium commit "acts in favor of France," and was Germany,
therefore, justified in disregarding the inviolability of her territory?


The Main Question.

This is the important question, and the answer must be left to the
Supreme Court of Civilization. The weight of the evidence would seem to
point to a justification of Germany. Yet no friend of Germany can find
fault with those who would wish to defer a verdict until such a time
when Germany can present her complete proof to the world, and this may
be when the war is over.

Throughout this argument the famous passage of the Chancellor's speech
in the Reichstag has been disregarded. It reads:

     Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are already on
     Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of
     international law. It is true that the French Government has
     declared at Brussels that France is willing to respect the
     neutrality of Belgium so long as her opponents respect it. We
     knew, however, that France stood ready for invasion. The
     wrong--I speak openly--that we are committing we will endeavor
     to make good.

This has been understood to mean that the Chancellor acknowledged that
Germany was breaking the Treaty of 1839 without warrant, and that
Germany, therefore, deserved the contempt of the world. May it not bear
another interpretation? Thus:

The Chancellor, like Gladstone in 1870, did not consider the 1839 Treaty
enforceable, but saw the guarantee for Belgium in The Hague Convention.
He did not wish to offend Belgium by announcing to the world that she
had lost her rights as a neutral because of her acts favorable to
France, for when he spoke he was still of the opinion that she would
accept the German offer which guaranteed to her both her independence
and integrity.

And just as Servia would have accepted Austria's note if Russia had
permitted her, so Belgium would not have resisted the German demand if
it had not been for England.

This can be proved by the British "White Paper," Nos. 153 and 155. In
the former the King of the Belgians appeals "to the diplomatic
intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of
Belgium," being apparently of the impression that Germany wished to
annex parts, if not the whole, of his country. The London reply advises
the Belgians "to resist by any means in their power, and that his
Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and
that his Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia
and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once
common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany
against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and
integrity in future years."

Has Mr. Beck really not noticed in this promise the omission of the word
neutrality? By the Treaty of 1839 Belgium enjoyed not only independence
and integrity, but also perpetual neutrality. Does Great Britain offer
to fight Germany for the enforcement of the Treaty of 1839? No! Because
hereafter the word neutrality is dropped from her guarantee, and since
she alone of all the great powers has not ratified the articles of The
Hague Convention concerning neutrals she alone will be able to disregard
the inviolability of Belgian soil, even though Belgium kept strictly
neutral in a future war.

And what, finally, does she guarantee her? Independence and integrity!
That is exactly the same that Germany had promised her. For this Belgium
had to be dragged through the horrors of war, and the good name of
Germany as that of an honest nation had to be dragged through the mire,
and hatred and murder had to be started, that Belgium might get on the
battlefield, from the insufficient support of Russia and France and
England, what Germany had freely offered her--independence and
integrity.

Casual readers would not miss the word neutrality from Sir Edward Grey's
guarantee, because they do not differentiate between the words
integrity, independence, and neutrality. Great Britain and her ally
Japan, marching through China into Kiao-Chau, may be said to have
violated China's neutrality, but not her independence, nor, so long as
they refrain from annexing any Chinese territory, her integrity.


Fixing the Blame.

Nobody familiar with the careful work of Sir Edward Grey can for one
moment believe that Sir Edward inadvertently dropped the word, just as
little as J. Ramsay Macdonald and other British leaders believe that he
inadvertently dropped one of the two remaining words, integrity and
independence, when he told Parliament of Germany's guarantee, and why
Great Britain should not accept it, but go to war.

When the blame for the horrors committed in Belgium are assessed these
facts must be remembered:

1. Belgium was by treaty bound to maintain fortresses.

2. France tempted her to commit "acts friendly" to herself, by which
Belgium forfeited her rights to the protection of The Hague articles
governing the rights and duties of neutrals.

3. England urged her to take up arms, when she had only asked to have
her integrity guaranteed by diplomatic intervention. (Nos. 153, 155.)

4. Germany promised her independence and integrity and peace, while
England, quietly dropping her guarantee of neutrality "in future years,"
promised her independence and integrity and war.

5. And Sir Edward Grey was able to sway Parliament, according to one of
the leaders of Parliament himself, only because he misrepresented
Germany's guarantee, and, having dropped, in his note to Belgium, the
word "neutrality," dropped yet another of the two remaining words,
integrity and independence.

This is the case as it appears on the evidence contained in the various
"White Papers." Austria was attending properly to her own affairs;
Servia was willing to yield; Russia, however, was determined to
humiliate Austria or to go to war. Germany proved a loyal friend to her
ally, Austria; she trusted in the British professions of friendship to
the last, and sacrificed seven valuable days in the interest of peace.
France was willing to do "what might be required by her interests,"
while Great Britain yielded to Russia and France, promising them their
support without which France, and therefore Russia, would not have
decided on war.

As to Belgium, Germany told Sir Edward Grey that she had unimpeachable
evidence that France was planning to go through Belgium, and she
published her evidence concerning the French officers who remained in
Belgium. Although Belgium had thus lost any rights attaching to her
state of neutrality, Germany promised to respect her integrity and
independence, and to pay for any damage done. She preferred, however, to
listen to Great Britain, who promised exactly the same except pay for
any damage done.

Unlike Mr. Beck, who in the same article pleads his case as the counsel
for the Allies and casts his verdict as the Supreme Court of
Civilization, the present writer prefers to leave the judgment to his
readers as a whole, and further still, to the whole American
people--yea, to all the peoples of the world. Nor is he in a hurry, for
he is willing to wait and have the Judges weigh the evidence and call
for more, if they consider insufficient what has already been submitted.

Snap judgments are ever unsatisfactory. They have often to be reversed.
The present case, however, is too important to warrant a hasty decision.
The final judgment, if it is based on truth, will very strongly
influence the nature of the peace, which will either establish good-will
and stable conditions in the world, or lead to another and even more
complete breakdown of civilization.




What Gladstone Said About Belgium

By George Louis Beer.

     Historian; winner of the first Loubat Prize, 1913, for his
     book on the origins of the British Colonial system.


In the course of his solemn speech of Aug. 8, 1914, in the House of
Commons Sir Edward Grey quoted some remarks made by Gladstone in 1870 on
the extent of the obligation incurred by the signatory powers to the
Quintuple Treaty of 1839 guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. Shorn
from their context as they were, these sentences are by no means
illuminating, and it cannot be said that their citation in this form by
Sir Edward Grey was a very felicitous one. During the paper polemics of
the past months these detached words of Gladstone have been freely used
by Germany's defenders and apologists to maintain that Great Britain of
1870 would not have deemed the events of 1914 a casus belli, and that
its entrance into the present war on account of the violation of
Belgium's neutrality was merely a pretext. During the course of this
controversy Gladstone's attitude has in various ways been grossly
misrepresented, Dr. von Mach of Harvard even stating in the columns of
THE NEW YORK TIMES that Gladstone had declared the Treaty of 1839 "to be
without force." But, apart from such patent distortions, Gladstone's
real position is apparently not clearly defined in the mind of the
general public, which is merely seeking for the unadulterated truth,
regardless of its effect upon the case of any one of the belligerents.

Shortly after the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870 the
Prussian Ambassador in London informed Gladstone, then Prime Minister,
that some time prior to the existing war France had asked Prussia to
consent to the former country's absorption of Belgium, and that there
was in the possession of the Prussian Government the draft of a treaty
to this effect in the handwriting of M. Benedetti, then French
Ambassador at Berlin. This communication was obviously made, as Lord
Morley tells us, with the object of prompting Gladstone to be the agent
in making the evil news public and thus of prejudicing France in the
judgment of Europe. Gladstone thought this "no part of his duty," and
very shortly thereafter, at the direct instance of Bismarck, this draft
treaty of 1866-7 was communicated by Baron Krause of the Prussian
Embassy in London to Delane, the editor of The Times. On July 25, 1870,
it was published in the columns of that paper and aroused considerable
anxiety in England.

It immediately became imperative upon the British Government to take
some action. As Gladstone wrote to Bright, the publication of this
treaty

     has thrown upon us the necessity of doing something fresh to
     secure Belgium, or else of saying that under no circumstances
     would we take any step to secure her from absorption. This
     publication has wholly altered the feeling of the House of
     Commons, and no Government could at this moment venture to
     give utterance to such an intention about Belgium. But neither
     do we think it would be right, even if it were safe, to
     announce that we would in any case stand by with folded arms
     and see actions done which would amount to a total extinction
     of the public right in Europe.


The Special Identical Treaties.

A simple declaration of Great Britain's intention to defend the
neutrality of Belgium by arms in case it were infringed seemed to
Gladstone not to meet the special requirements of the case as revealed
by the proposed Treaty of 1866-7 between Prussia and France. His main
object was to prevent the actual execution of such an agreement, by
means of which the two belligerent powers would settle their quarrels
and satisfy their ambitions at the expense of helpless Belgium. Hence,
on July 30, the British Government opened negotiations with France and
Prussia and within a fortnight had concluded separate but identical
treaties with each of these powers. According to these treaties, in case
the neutrality of Belgium were violated by either France or Germany,
Great Britain agreed to co-operate with the other in its defense. The
preamble of these treaties states that the contracting powers

     being desirous at the present time of recording in a solemn
     act their fixed determination to maintain the independence and
     neutrality of Belgium,

as provided in the Treaty of 1839, have concluded this separate treaty,
which,

     without impairing or invalidating the conditions of the said
     Quintuple Treaty, shall be subsidiary and accessory to it.

Article III. further provided that these Treaties of 1870 were to expire
twelve months after the conclusion of the existing war, and that
thereafter the independence and neutrality of Belgium would "continue to
rest, as heretofore," on the Treaty of 1839.

These documents tell a plain tale, which is amply confirmed by the
proceedings in Parliament in connection with this matter. On Aug. 5,
1870, while the negotiations leading to the above-mentioned treaties
were still pending, questions were raised in the House of Commons about
the recently published abortive Treaty of 1866-7 between Prussia and
France. In reply Gladstone stated that

     the Treaty of 1839 is that under which the relations of the
     contracting powers with Belgium are at present regulated;

and that, while he could not explain the intentions of the Government
"in a matter of this very grave character in answer to a question," he
hoped to be able to communicate some further information in an authentic
manner. Three days later, as these treaties with France and Prussia had
been virtually concluded, Gladstone was able to satisfy the anxiety of
the House and outlined their terms. He explicitly stated that, after
their expiration,

     the respective parties, being parties to the Treaty of 1839,
     shall fall back upon the obligations they took upon themselves
     under that treaty.

After Gladstone had finished speaking the leader of the opposition,
Disraeli, took the floor and pointed out that, as a general proposition,

     when there is a treaty guarantee so explicit as that expressed
     in the Treaty of 1839, I think the wisdom of founding on that
     another treaty which involves us in engagements may be open to
     doubt.

But he accepted Gladstone's statement

     as the declaration of the Cabinet, that they are resolved to
     maintain the neutrality and independence of Belgium, I accept
     it as a wise and spirited policy, and a policy, in my opinion,
     not the less wise because it is spirited.

Gladstone then replied, saying that the reason the Government had not
made a general declaration of its intentions regarding Belgium was that
much danger might arise from such a declaration and that inadvertently
they might have given utterance to words

     that might be held to import obligations almost unlimited and
     almost irrespectively of circumstances.

We had made up our minds, he continued, that we had a duty to perform,
and we thought a specific declaration of what we thought the obligations
of this country better than any general declaration. Referring to the
two treaties in process of ratification, he concluded:

     We thought that by contracting a joint engagement we might
     remove the difficulty and prevent Belgium from being
     sacrificed.

The policy of the Government continued, however, to be criticised,
mainly on the ground that the Treaty of 1839 amply covered the case. On
Aug. 10 Gladstone defended his policy in the House of Commons in a
speech pitched on a high moral plane, in which he dilated upon Belgium's
historic past and splendid present and on Great Britain's duty to this
little nation irrespective of all questions of its own self-interest.
With genuine fervor, he exclaimed:

     If, in order to satisfy a greedy appetite for aggrandisement,
     coming whence it may, Belgium were absorbed, the day that
     witnessed that absorption would hear the knell of public right
     and public law in Europe.... We have an interest in the
     independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we may
     have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in
     answer to the question whether under the circumstance of the
     case this country, endowed as it is with influence and power,
     would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the
     direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus
     become participators in the sin.


What Gladstone Had in Mind.

What Gladstone had in mind was the scheme of 1866-7, by which France was
to absorb Belgium, with Prussia's consent and aid. He distinctly stated
that the Treaties of 1870 were devised to meet the new state of affairs
disclosed by the publication of this incomplete treaty. It was in order
to prevent the revival of such a conspiracy that Gladstone made separate
and identical treaties in 1870 with France and Prussia. They were a
practical device to secure an effectual enforcement of the Treaty of
1839 under unforeseen and difficult circumstances. The agreement of 1870
was, as Gladstone said, a cumulative treaty added to that of 1839, and
the latter treaty

     loses nothing of its force, even during the existence of this
     present treaty.

During the course of this speech defending the Government's action
against those critics who claimed that the Treaty of 1839 adequately met
the situation, Gladstone made some general remarks about the extent of
the obligation incurred by the signatories to the Treaty of 1839:

     It is not necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into
     the complicated question of the nature of the obligations of
     that treaty, but I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of
     those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an
     assertion that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee
     is binding on every party to it, irrespectively altogether of
     the particular position in which it may find itself at the
     time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises.

It is, of course, impossible to state precisely what were those
unuttered thoughts that passed through Gladstone's mind as he spoke
these characteristically cautious words, but what in general they were
can be satisfactorily gleaned from a letter that he had written six days
before this to John Bright:

     That we should simply declare _we_ will defend the neutrality
     of Belgium by arms in case it should be attacked. Now, the
     sole or single-handed defense of Belgium would be an
     enterprise which we incline to think quixotic; if these two
     great military powers [France and Prussia] combined against
     it--that combination is the only serious danger; and this it
     is which by our proposed engagements we should, I hope, render
     improbable to the very last degree. I add for myself this
     confession of faith: If the Belgian people desire, on their
     own account, to join France or any other country, I for one
     will be no party to taking up arms to prevent it. But that the
     Belgians, whether they would or not, should go "plump" down
     the maw of another country to satisfy dynastic greed is
     another matter. The accomplishment of such a crime as this
     implies would come near to an extinction of public right in
     Europe, and I do not think we could look on while the
     sacrifice of freedom and independence was in course of
     consummation.




Fight to the Bitter End

AN INTERVIEW WITH ANDREW CARNEGIE.

     Retired ironmaster and philanthropist; builder of the Peace
     Temple at The Hague; founder of the Carnegie Institution at
     Washington; founder and patron of a chain of libraries in the
     United States and Great Britain, and benefactor of many
     societies and institutions.

By Edward Marshall.


Here is the report of a truly remarkable statement by Mr. Carnegie. He
is the world's most notable peace advocate, and in this interview he
voices the reflections suggested to him by the great European war.

They are unusual, and make this interview especially worthy of a place
upon the pages of the Christmas issue of THE TIMES, although it
principally deals with war, and Christmas is the festival of peace.

"Has war ever settled anything which might not have been settled better
by arbitration?" I asked Mr. Carnegie.

"No; never," he replied. "No truer inference was ever made than may be
found in Milton's query, penned three centuries ago and never answered:
'What can war but wars breed?'

"War can breed only war. Of course, peace inevitably must follow war,
but, truly, no peace ever was born of war. We all revere the memory of
him who voiced the warning: 'In time of peace prepare for war'; but, as
a matter of fact, we all know that when one nation prepares for war
others inevitably must follow its dangerous lead.

"Hence, and hence only, the huge armaments which have oppressed the
world, making its most peaceful years a spectacle of sadness--a
spectacle of men preparing and prepared to fight with one another.
Sooner or later men prepared to fight will fight; huge armaments and
armies mean huge battles; huge battles mean huge tragedies.

"This never has been otherwise, and never can be. Peace can come only
when mankind abandons warful preparation. And so I seem to have replied
to your inquiry with an answer with a tail to it; and the tail is more
important than the answer, for the answer merely says that war never
settled anything which might not have been settled better by
arbitration, while the tail proclaims the folly of a world prepared for
war."


How to Prevent War.

"Armament must mean the use of armament, and that is war. If we are to
prevent war we must prevent preparation for war, just as if we are to
prevent burglary we must prevent preparation for burglary by prohibiting
the carrying of the instruments of burglary. The only cure for war" [Mr.
Carnegie in speaking italicized the word "cure"] "is war which defeats
some one; but two men who are unarmed are certain not to shoot at one
another. Here, as in medicine, prevention is much better than cure.

"Plainly it must be through such prevention, not through such a cure as
victory sometimes is supposed to represent, that warfare can be stopped.
Warfare means some one's defeat, of course, and that implies his
temporary incapacity for further war, but it goes without saying that
all conquered nations must be embittered by their defeat.

"Few nations ever have fought wars in which the majority of at least
their fighting men did not believe the side they fought for to be in the
right. Defeat by force of arms, therefore, always has meant the general
conviction throughout conquered nations that injustice has been done."


Nations Like Individuals.

"In such circumstances nations must be like individuals under similar
conditions. The individual believing himself to have been in the right,
yet finding himself beaten in his efforts to maintain it, will not
accept the situation philosophically; he will be angry and rebellious;
he will nurse what he believes to be his wrong.

"To nurse a wrong, whether it be real or fancied, is to help it grow in
the imagination, and that must mean at least the wish to find some
future means of righting it, either by strategy or increased strength.

"There are two things which humanity does not forget--one is an injury,
and, no matter how strongly some may argue against the truth of this
contention, the other is a kindness.

"In the long run both will be repaid. And nations, like individuals,
prefer the coin which pays the latter debt. Military force never has
accomplished kindness. Kindness means industrial armies decked with the
garlands of peace; military armies, armed and epauletted, must mean
minds obsessed with the spirit of revenge or conquest, hands clenched to
strike, hearts eager to invade.

"Every military implement is designed to cut or crush, to wound and
kill. Nations at peace help one another with humanity's normal
tenderness of heart at times of pestilence, of famine, of disaster.
Nations at war exert their every ounce of strength to force upon their
adversaries hunger, destruction, and death. Starvation of the enemy
becomes a detail of what is considered good military strategy in war
time, just as world-embracing charity has become a characteristic of
all civilization during times of peace. Must we not admit flotillas
carrying grain to famine-stricken peoples to be more admirable than
fleets which carry death to lands in which prosperity might reign if
undisturbed by war?"

"But do you not admit that wars sometimes have helped the forces of
civilization in their conquest against barbarism?"

"War has not been the chief force of civilization against barbarism,"
Mr. Carnegie replied with emphasis. Then he continued more thoughtfully:

"That is one way of saying it. Another is, no effort of the forces of
civilization against barbarism is war in the true sense of the word.

"Such an armed effort is a part of the force pushing barbarism backward,
and therefore, in the last analysis, tends toward kindness and peace;
while, in the sense in which we use the word, war means the
retrogression of civilization into barbarism. It is usually born of
greed--greed for territory or for power.

"Such war as that of which we all are thinking in these days is war
between civilized men. One civilized man cannot improve another
civilized man by killing him, although it is not inconceivable that a
civilized man may do humanity a service by destroying human savages, for
with the savages he must destroy their savagery.

"But a war in civilized Europe destroys no savagery; it breeds it, so
that it and its spawn may defile future generations.

"There has been much balderdash in talk about unselfish motives as the
origin of warfare. It is safe to say that 99 per cent of all the
slaughter wrought by civilization under the cloak of a desire to better
bad conditions really has been evil. It is impossible to conceive of
general betterment through general slaughter. There have been few
altruistic wars."

"But how about our Spanish war?" I asked. "Surely it was not greed which
sent our men and ships to Cuba."

"No," said Mr. Carnegie, "that was not war, but world-police work.

"Our skirmish with Spain was a most unusual international episode. We
harmed none of the people of the land wherein we fought, but taught them
what we could of wise self-government and gave them independence. To
battle for the liberation of the slave is worthy work, and this of ours
was such a battle.

"Our Spanish war was not the outgrowth of our rivalry with any one or
any one's with us; it was the manifestation of our high sense of
responsibility as strong and healthy human beings for the welfare of the
weak and oppressed."


That Was Police Work.

"It did not make toward militarism on this continent, but the reverse;
in a few months it established permanent peace where peace had been a
stranger. It was police work on the highest plane, substituting order
for disorder."

"But did it not emphasize the need for the maintenance, even here, of a
competent and efficient naval and military force?" I asked.

Mr. Carnegie shook his head emphatically.

"That is the old, old argument cropping up again," said he, "the
argument that a provocative is a preventive. For us to maintain a great
army for the purpose of preventing war thereby would be as sensible as
for each of us to be afraid to walk about except with a lightning rod
down his back, since men have been struck by lightning. No nation wants
to fight us. We have friends throughout the world.

"Millions now resident in military nations are hoping that some day they
may be able to become citizens of our beloved republic, principally
because it now is not, nor is it every likely to be, military. Humanity
loves peace. Here peace abides, and, if we follow reason, will remain
unbroken.

"Note the advantages of our own position. Imagine what the task would be
of landing seventy thousand hostile soldiers on our shores! First they
would need to cross three thousand miles of the Atlantic or five
thousand miles of the Pacific.

"And what if they should come? My plan of operation would be to bid them
welcome as our visitors, considering them as men, not soldiers; to take
them to our great interior, say, as far west as Chicago, and there to
say to them:

"'Here we shall leave you. Make yourselves at home, if that thought
pleases you; fight us if it does not. If you think you can conquer us,
try it.'

"They would make themselves at home and, learning the advantages of
staying with us, would become applicants for our citizenship, rather
than our opponents in warfare.

"And if they tried to fight us, what would happen to them? Our nation is
unique in an important respect. Its individuals are the best armed in
the world. Not only, for example, are its farmers armed, but they can
shoot, which is far more than can be said of those of Britain or of any
other nation.

"The Governments of Europe cannot afford to give their citizenry arms,
and, as for the European citizenry, it not only cannot afford to
purchase arms, but cannot afford even to pay the license fees which
Government demands of those possessing arms with the right to use them.

"But ours? Most Americans can afford to and do own guns with which to
shoot, and, furthermore, most Americans, when they shoot, can hit the
things at which they shoot.

"Combine this powerful protective influence with the fact that thousands
of any army coming to invade us would not want to fight when once they
got here, but would want to settle here and enjoy peace, and we find
that we thus are protected as no nation in the world ever has been
protected or can be.

"Imagine the effect upon the European fighting man's psychology if he
found that an army transport had conveyed him to a land where one man's
privilege is every man's right! Learning this, it is not a joke to say,
but is a statement of the probable fact, that the invading soldiery
would not want to fire its first volleys, but would want to file its
first papers. They would not ask for cartridges, but for citizenship.

"America is protected by a force incomparable, which I may call its
peaceful militia, and the man who, above all other men, I most should
wish to see appointed to its command would be Gen. Leonard Wood were it
not for the fact that there would be some danger that in such an
eventuation his professional training would carry him beyond the rule of
reason.

"That is likely to be the most serious trouble with the trained soldier.
The doctor wants to dose, the parson to preach, and the soldier to
fight. Professional habit may make any of us dangerous.

"But if it came to fighting I do not consider it within the bounds of
possibility that we could lose. I once asked Gen. Sherman how the troops
which he commanded during the civil war compared for efficiency with
European troops. His answer was:

"'The world never has seen the army that I would be afraid to trust my
boys with, man for man.'"


Would Surprise the Enemy.

"That thought of welcoming an invading army appeals strongly to me. The
hostile General would be amazed by the ease with which he got his forces
in, but he would be more startled by the difficulty he would find if he
tried to get them out. If they once learned the advantages of our
liberties they would find it hard not to get away, but to go away. I
restrain my temper with difficulty when I contemplate the foolishness of
the people who discuss with gravity the possibility of a successful
invasion of these United States by a foreign foe. The thought always
arises when I hear these cries from our army and naval officers for a
greater armament: 'Are these men cowards?' I don't believe it. It is
their profession which makes them alarmists.

"Not only are the physical difficulties which would hamper an invasion
practically insuperable, but the reception enemies would get, if any of
them landed, would be wholly without parallel in the world's history.

"If our liberties really were threatened, every man, and very nearly
every woman, in our vast population would rise to their defense as never
any people yet has risen to any national defense. Americans, young and
old, en masse, would sweep to the protection of what they know, and what
the world knows, would be the cause of right and human liberty.

"I, myself, should wish to be invited to advance and meet invading
forces if they came. I would approach them without any weapons on my
person. I would not shoot at them. I would make a speech to them.

"'Gentlemen,' I would say, 'here's the chance of your life to win life's
chief prize. Now you are peasant soldiers. You have the opportunity to
become citizen kings. We are all kings here. Here the least of you can
take a rank much higher than that of any General in your army. He can
become a sovereign in a republic.'

"I think they would hurrah for me, not harm me, after they had heard my
speech.

"Striving for peace, we shall become so powerful that if war comes we
shall be invincible. Peace, not war, makes riches; the rich nation is
the powerful nation.

"Perhaps I was as much a peace man in my youth as I am now, but when I
was asked, during the civil war, to organize a corps of telegraph
operators and railroad conductors and engineers and take them to
Washington, I considered it the greatest of all privileges to obey the
order.

"I was the last man to get on the last train leaving Burkes Station,
after Bull Run, and, now, if the country ever should be invaded, I would
be, I hope, one of the first to rush to meet the enemy--but I think my
haste would be to convert, not to kill, him.

"The man who has done well in business, however, learns to abhor all
waste, and I must admit that it does pain me to see hundreds of millions
of our dollars spent on battleships which will but rust away, and
thousands of our able men vegetating on them or in an army.

"The men who urge this vast waste of our money and men mean well, no
doubt, but they do not know the nation of which they have the good
fortune to be citizens--they do not realize how very potent a force we
have become in the wide world, nor the fact that one of the great
reasons why we have become a force lies in the circumstance that our
national development has not been hampered by the vast expense of
militarism."

Mr. Carnegie paused.

Some weeks ago, in an interview granted me for publication in THE NEW
YORK TIMES, Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia
University, predicted that the present war would find its final outcome
in the establishment of the United States of Europe. I asked Mr.
Carnegie to express his view upon this subject.

"Nothing else could occur which would be of such immense advantage to
Europe," he replied.

"United we stand, and divided they fall. If the territory now occupied
by the homogeneous and co-operative federation known as the United
States of America were occupied instead by a large number of small,
independent competitive nations, that is, if each section of our
territory which now is a State were an independent country, America
would be constantly in turmoil.

"Europe has been set back a century because she substituted the present
war of nations for the promotion of a federation plan. The latter would
have meant peace and prosperity, the former means ruin.

"If in Europe this year such a federation as Dr. Butler regards as a
future probability had been a present actuality, 1914 would have left a
record very different from that which it is making.

"For instance, it would have been as difficult for the State of Germany
to fight the State of Russia, or the State of France, or that of
England, or all of them, and to trample neutral Belgium, as it now
would be, here, for the State of Pennsylvania to declare war on the
States of New York and Connecticut and to wreck New Jersey as she sent
her troops to the invasion.

"Originally we had thirteen States, and thirteen only, but there was
other territory here, and the attractive force of the successful union
of the thirteen States brought the other territory in as it was
organized.

"Thus we started right. Europe had begun before men had become so wise,
and, having begun wrong, has found herself, through the centuries,
unable to correct old errors."


A Federation of Europe.

"Certainly I hope that out of the great crime of this vast war some good
will come. The greatest good which could come would be a general
European federation. I do not believe that this will come at once; but
the world will be infinitely the better if it comes at length--if the
natural law of mutual attraction for mutual advantage draws these
nations now at war into a union which shall make such wars impossible in
future, as wars between our States, here, are impossible.

"But before this can come peace must come, and before peace can come one
or the other of the nations now at war must at least ask for an
armistice.

"If I were in the place of that great General, Lord Kitchener, and
should receive the news that such a request had been made by the
commander of the opposing forces, I should say: 'No armistice!
Surrender!'

"But, then, if the surrender should be made, I should say, in effect:

"'Gentlemen, we have made up our minds that these terrible explosions
must mark the end of war between our civilized nations. Our sacrifices
in this war have been too great to permit us to be satisfied with less
than this.

"'If we now cannot feel assured of such a federation of nations as will
result in the settlement of all future disputes by peaceful arbitration
at The Hague, then we shall keep on fighting till the day comes when we
can achieve that end.

"'Upon the other side of the Atlantic,' I should continue if I were Lord
Kitchener and should be confronted by such a situation, 'we see in the
United States of America an example which must satisfy us that world
peace now can be maintained.

"'There,' I should go on, 'thirteen States were banded into union in
1776. Their total population was less than the present population of
their largest city and their area has spread until it links two oceans
and offers homes in forty-eight States to one hundred millions, and the
population still increases rapidly. An experiment of world significance
was tried, and is a success, for the aggregated nation has grown and now
is growing in power more rapidly than any other nation on the surface of
the earth.'"


Would Mean World Peace.

"'It is plain to me and should be plain to all of us,' I should
continue, if I were Lord Kitchener, so placed, 'that we in Europe have
but to follow this example which America has set for us in order to
achieve an ultimate result as notably desirable. When we have
accomplished it world peace will be enthroned and all the peoples of the
earth will be able safely to go about the pleasant and progressive
business of their lives without apprehension of their neighbors.
Humanity, thus freed of its most dreadful burden, will be able to leap
forward toward the realization of its ultimate possibilities of
progress.'"

"And do you really think there is the immediate possibility of an
effective European league for permanent peace and general disarmament?"
I asked Mr. Carnegie.

"Naturally my mind has dwelt much on this problem," he replied. "The
culmination of the European situation in the present war is very
dreadful, but no good ever came out of crying over spilled milk.
However, it seems safe to conclude that a majority of the people of the
civilized world will presently decide that a step forward must be taken.

"Everywhere in Europe, when the present conflict ends, this fact will be
emphasized by shell-wrecked, fire-blackened buildings; by the vacant
chairs of sons and fathers who have fallen victims; by innumerable
graves and by a general impoverishment, the inevitable result of war's
great waste, which will touch and punish every man, every woman, every
child.

"In the face of such an emphasis no denial of the facts will be among
the possibilities, and I scarcely think that any even will be attempted.
If the federation Dr. Butler has predicted does not come about at once,
it will be admitted almost universally that future disputes occurring
between the Governments of Europe shall be settled, not by force of
fighting men, but by arbitration at The Hague.

"And now a serious question obtrudes itself. Must there not be a
carefully considered and cautiously worked out understanding, which may
be considered the preliminary of peace? Later on the foremost men of
every nation can meet in conference to consider with an earnestness
hitherto unknown the great problems which will be involved in the
permanent abolition of war and establishment of peace; but for this the
way must be prepared.

"Here, again, I think The Hague Tribunal is the proper body to assemble
for the purpose of devising means for the accomplishment of the great
end, which must be such legislation as will accomplish, at the end of
this war, the ending of all war among the nations.

"An important duty of the conference would be some arrangement for a
union of the forces of the nations now at war, charged with and
qualified to perform the duty of maintaining peace pending the
completion of the final comprehensive plan."


For One Purpose Only.

"It is possible and even probable that as a part of the accomplishment
of this it may be found to be desirable and even necessary to organize
and provide for the maintenance of a joint naval and military body of
strength sufficient to enforce world peace during the period necessary
for the preparation of a plan to be submitted to all powers. But if this
force is to be established, it must be done with the clear understanding
that it is designed for one thing only, the maintenance of peace, and
must not be used at any time for any other service.

"In the selection of the commanding officer to be intrusted with this
task, it will be conceded that the victors in this war, or those who
have a notable advantage at the time of the beginning of the armistice,
shall have the right of his appointment.

"No protest ever will arise from the mass of the people of Europe
against the abolishment of militarism. Even the people of Germany, as a
whole, have not found militarism attractive. It has been the influence
of the military aristocracy of Germany, the most powerful caste in the
world, which not only has encouraged the national tendency, but has
forced the Emperor, as I believe, to action against his will and
judgment.

"But a change was notable in Germany before the war began, and will be
far more notable after it has ended. The socialistic movement waxes
strong throughout the nation, and the proceedings of the Reichstag show
us that the nation is marching steadily, though perhaps slowly, toward a
real democracy.

"I believe the first election to follow peace will result in a demand by
the Reichstag that it, alone, shall be given power to declare war. It
will be argued, and it is evident that it then will be amply provable,
that it is the people who suffer most through war, and that, therefore,
their representatives should utterly control it.

"That itself would be a most important step toward peace, and I feel
certain that it is among the probabilities.

"As things stand in Germany, although the Reichstag has its powerful
influence in regard to war expenditure and might accomplish important
results by refusing to vote amounts demanded, the fact remains that
until it has been given the power of making or withholding declaration
of war the most important results cannot be accomplished."

"In Fried's volume," I suggested to Mr. Carnegie, "you are credited with
saying that Emperor William, himself and by himself, might establish
peace. Granting that that might have been the fact before this war
began, is it your opinion that he, or any other one man, could now
control the situation to that extent?"

"Assuming that the Germans should come out victorious," Mr. Carnegie
replied, "the Emperor would become a stronger power than ever toward the
maintenance of peace among the nations. At one time I believed him to be
the anointed of God for this purpose, and did not fail to tell him so.

"Even if his forces should be defeated in this present carnage, I am
sure he would be welcomed by the conference I have suggested as the
proposer of the great world peace, thus fulfilling the glorious destiny
for which at one time I considered that he had been chosen from on
high."

I asked Mr. Carnegie what part he thought this country, the United
States, should play in the great movement which he has in mind and
thoroughly believes is even now upon its way.

"The United States," he answered, "although, happily, not a party to the
world crime which is now in progress, seems entitled to preference as
the one to call the nations of the world to the consideration of the
greatest of all blessings--universal, lasting peace."




Woman and War

"SHOT. TELL HIS MOTHER."

By W.E.P. French, Captain, U.S. Army.


What have I done to you, Brothers,--War-Lord and Land-Lord and Priest,--
That my son should rot on the blood-smeared earth where the raven and
     buzzard feast?
He was my baby, my man-child, that soldier with shell-torn breast,
Who was slain for your power and profit--aye, murdered at your behest.
I bore him, my boy and my manling, while the long months ebbed away;
He was part of me, part of my body, which nourished him day by day.
He was mine when the birth-pang tore me, mine when he lay on my heart,
When the sweet mouth mumbled my bosom and the milk-teeth made it smart,
Babyhood, boyhood, and manhood, and a glad mother proud of her son--
See the carrion birds, too gorged to fly! Ah! Brothers, what have you
     done?

You prate of duty and honor, of a patriot's glorious death,
Of love of country, heroic deeds--nay, for shame's sake, spare your
     breath!
Pray, what have you done for your country? Whose was the blood that was
     shed
In the hellish warfare that served your ends? My boy was shot in your
     stead.

And for what were our children butchered, men makers of cruel law?
By the Christ, I am glad no woman made the Christless code of war!
Shirks and schemers, why don't you answer? Is the foul truth hard to
     tell?
Then a mother will tell it for you, of a deed that shames fiends in
     hell:--
Our boys were killed that some faction or scoundrel might win mad race
For goals of stained gold, shamed honors, and the sly self-seeker's
     place;
That money's hold on our country might be tightened and made more sure;
That the rich could inherit earth's fullness and their loot be quite
     secure;
That the world-mart be wider opened to the product mulct from toil;
That the labor and land of our neighbors should become your war-won
     spoil;
That the eyes of an outraged people might be turned from your graft and
     greed
In the misruled, plundered home-land by lure of war's ghastly deed;
And that priests of the warring nations could pray to the selfsame God
For His blessing on battle and murder and corpse-strewn, blood-soaked
     sod.
Oh, fools! if God were a woman, think you She would let kin slay
For gold-lust and craft of gamesters, or cripple that trade might pay?

This quarrel was not the fighters':--the cheated, red pawns in your
     game:--
You stay-at-homes garnered the plunder, but the pawns,--wounds, death,
     and "Fame"!
You paid them a beggarly pittance, your substitute prey-of-the-sword,
But, ye canny beasts of prey, they paid, in life and limb, for your
     hoard.
And, behold! you have other victims: a widow sobs by my side,
Who clasps to her breast a girl-child. Men, she was my slain son's
     bride!

I can smell the stench of the shambles, where the mangled bodies lie;
I can hear the moans of the wounded; I can see the brave lads die;
And across the heaped, red trenches and the tortured, bleeding rows
I cry out a mother's pity to all mothers of dear, dead "foes."
In love and a common sorrow, I weep with them o'er our dead,
And invoke my sister woman for a curse on each scheming head.

Nay, why should we mothers curse you? Lo! flesh of our flesh are ye;
But, by soul of Mary who bore the Christ-man murdered at Calvary,
Into our own shall the mothers come, and the glad day speed apace
When the law of peace shall be the law of the women that bear the race;
When a man shall stand by his mother, for the worldwide common good,
And not bring her tears and heart-break nor make mock of her motherhood.




The Way to Peace

AN INTERVIEW WITH JACOB H. SCHIFF.

     One of the leading American financiers and noted
     philanthropist; founder of Jewish Theological Seminary and of
     Semitic Museum at Harvard University; a native of Germany and
     member of the firm of Kuhn, Loeb & Co., bankers.

By Edward Marshall.


American as I am in every fibre, and in accord as I feel with every
interest of the country of my adoption, I cannot find myself in
agreement with what appears to be, to a considerable extent, American
opinion as to the origin and responsibility for the deplorable conflict
in which almost all of Europe has become involved.

For many reasons my personal sympathies are with Germany. I cannot feel
convinced that she has been the real aggressor; I believe that war was
forced upon her, almost as if by prearrangement among the nations with
whom she now contends; I cannot but believe that they had become jealous
and envious of her rapid and unprecedented peaceful development and had
concluded that the moment had arrived when all was favorable for a union
against her.

Although I left Germany half a century ago, I would think as little of
arraying myself against her, the country of my birth, in this the moment
of her struggle for existence, as of arraying myself against my parents.

But while I steadfastly believe this war to have been forced upon
Germany against her will, I also believe that circumstances which were
stronger than the Governments of England and France, her present
enemies, were necessary to overcome an equally definite reluctance upon
their part.

In other words, I cannot wholly blame the English Government, or the
French Government, any more than I can wholly blame the German
Government.

Let us see how the great tragedy came about. It is safe to pass rapidly
over the Servian-Bosnian-Herzegovinian-Austro-Hungarian complication
which served as the immediate precipitant of hostilities. It has been
detailed repeatedly in THE TIMES and other American publications.

It had reached a point at which the Austro-Hungarian Government felt
compelled to take extreme measures by means of which to safeguard the
integrity of the empire.

The firm but fatal ultimatum to Servia followed, the reply to which,
suffice it to say, was unsatisfactory to Austria, who could not accept
the suggestion of an investigation into the circumstances attending the
assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand through a commission or court on
which she was not represented.


Like Maine Case.

The situation really was analogous to that which existed between the
United States and Spain when the Maine was blown up in Havana Harbor. In
order to fix the responsibility for this dastardly affair we then
similarly demanded an investigation by Spain, to be carried out with the
assistance of representatives of this Government. Spain, too, then
offered to conduct an investigation, but she peremptorily declined to
allow us to take part in it.

This attitude on her part quickly brought about our declaration of war
against her. It is important that Americans should realize the
similarity in the two situations and the likeness of the Austrian action
of 1914 to that which our own Government took in 1898.

As soon as Austria had rejected as unsatisfactory Servia's reply to her
ultimatum she prepared to undertake a punitive armed expedition against
Servia, and Russia at once declared that she would rank herself as
Servia's protector.

Indeed, without any further parley, and to give effect to this threat,
Russia immediately mobilized her army. Since then it has been averred
that this mobilization had been in progress for several weeks previous
to Servia's rejection of the Austrian ultimatum.

This made it obligatory upon Germany to go to Austria's aid, under the
provisions of their treaty of alliance, although she was well aware that
such an action would bring France into the conflict under the terms of
her alliance with Russia. Indeed, an unsatisfactory reply had been
received from France as to the latter's intentions, but Germany
endeavored to secure at least an assurance of England's neutrality. This
proved to be impossible.

How the German Government could indulge for a moment in the hope that in
a war with Russia and France on the one side and Germany and Austria on
the other, England could be induced to remain neutral passes
comprehension, but that it did believe this seems a certainty.

The English Government, no doubt, correctly felt that without the aid of
its immense resources, and particularly without the operations of its
great navy against Germany and Austria, the latter nations would find it
not so very difficult a task to dispose of both Russia and France.

English statesmen very promptly must have become alive to the
probability that a Germany which had subdued Russia and France, and thus
had made itself master of the Continent, would be unlikely long to
tolerate a continuance of England's world leadership.

So, even if the neutrality of Belgium had not been violated, other
reasons would have been found by England for joining France and Russia
in the war against Germany, for England would not risk, without any
effort to protect them, the loss of her continued domination of the
high seas and her undisputed possession of her vast colonial empire.


Germany Fighting for Life.

I am not defending the violation of Belgian neutrality. This,
undeniably, was a most unjustifiable action, in spite of German claims
that she was forced into it by the necessities of the situation. But I
am explaining that, even had it not occurred, still England would have
gone to war.

That was the situation.

Germany is now fighting for her very existence, and I, who am not
without knowledge of German conditions, am convinced that never has
there been a war more wholly that of a whole people than is this present
conflict, as far as Germany is concerned.

Any one who has been in even superficial touch with German public
opinion and individual feeling in any part of the empire, since the war
began, must know that there is hardly a man, woman, or child throughout
the empire who would hesitate if called upon to sacrifice possessions or
life in order to insure victory to the Fatherland. Seventy million
people who are animated by unanimous sentiment of this sort cannot be
crushed, probably not subdued.

And England is confronted by the certainty that her world leadership is
the stake for which she is fighting; that her defeat would mean the end
of the vast dominance which she has exercised throughout the world,
since the time of the Armada, through the power of her great navy.

Is it not apparent, therefore, that these nations, if left to
themselves, inevitably must continue the war until one side or the
other, or both, shall become exhausted--an eventuation which may be
postponed not for mere months but for years?

In our own civil war Grant for almost two years stood within a hundred
or a hundred and fifty miles of Richmond, the heart of the Confederacy,
and was not able to sufficiently subdue Lee's forces to enable him to
get possession of the city until the complete exhaustion of the
Confederacy's resources in men and money had been accomplished.

[Illustration: VISCOUNT JAMES BRYCE

_(Photo from George G. Bain.)_

_See Page 477_]

[Illustration: DR. BERNHARD DERNBURG

_(Photo by Campbell Studios.)_

_See Page 487_]

[Illustration: DAVID STARR JORDAN

_See Page 502_]

[Illustration: JOHN GRIER HIBBEN

_(Photo by McManus.)_

_See Page 503_]

While that situation may not offer a true parallel in all respects to
that in which we find the belligerent forces in the present European
war, it nevertheless may be taken as a precedent proving that frontal
encounters of powerful opponents generally do not yield final results
until actual exhaustion compels one side or the other to abandon hope.

Such an exhaustion hardly can be expected within measurable time on the
part of either one or the other of the combatants in the existing
European conflict, and this means the probable continuation for a long
period of the merciless slaughter which has marked the last few months.
We hold up our hands in horror at the stories of human sacrifices in the
early ages when, after all, these were, perhaps, less brutal and less
appalling than the wholesale slaughter of the flower of these warring
peoples of which we now read almost daily.

As I see the situation there really are only three contestants in the
war--England, Russia, and Germany. France, Belgium, and Austria are
important auxiliaries, but they are playing to a certain extent
secondary rôles.

England's real object is the utter defeat of Germany--nothing more nor
less than that--and if this is accomplished England will have control of
Europe. It must be remembered that the English Government and English
people frequently have asserted that they would not be satisfied with
mere defeat of Germany's armed forces, but that her power must be
permanently paralyzed.

If England should accomplish this, with Germany, its army and its navy,
thus wholly out of the way, no one would be left for England to fear in
future upon the high seas.

That might be the chief significance of England's complete victory, and
its complete significance would be that every nation in the world would
have to do the British bidding, for should any one refuse she could
completely destroy its commerce and shut off its overseas supplies.

In the cases of most nations overseas supplies include material vital
to the continuance of life and happiness; to every nation, in these days
of a developed and habitual foreign trade, overseas supplies are
actually essential, even when they do not necessarily include meats and
wheat and other foodstuffs.

The effect upon the United States of such an English victory would be
most disastrous.

The alliance between England and Japan is likely to be permanent. That
is something which Americans cannot afford to forget for a moment.

England needs Japan in the Far East, especially as an ally in case of
need, which at some time is certain to arrive, against Russia; and Japan
for many reasons needs the strength of English backing, without which
her financial and political situation soon would become most dangerous,
if not collapse.

Such a permanent alliance would have this consequence upon us, that
without even the probability of difficulties with either England or
Japan--and, personally, I do not believe that such a probability need be
feared--we nevertheless year after year would be compelled to
increasingly prepare for what may be defined as the disagreeable
possibility of the eventuation of a disagreeable possibility.

Certainly we should be under the necessity of notably and, therefore,
very expensively, increasing our naval armament; we should be under the
necessity of large expenditures for coast defense.

Corollary military cost would be enormous and burdensome. The
preparation which would be imposed on us as a necessity by such a
permanent alliance would be sufficiently extensive and expensive to
burden our people heavily and handicap our national progress.

It might involve, perhaps, even a greater hardship in our case than
militarism has involved in Germany. It is improbable that the average
American realizes the part which absence of such burdens has played in
our national development so far; it would be difficult for the average
American who has not studied the whole subject carefully to estimate
accurately the part which the imposition of such a burden would be sure
to play in our future.

We have been measurably a free people. If we were under the necessity of
supporting vast military and naval establishments we should be that no
longer, no matter how completely we adhered to our democratic political
system and ideals. It is not Kings, but what they do, which burdens
countries, and the most burdensome, act of any King is to load his
country up with non-productive, threatening, and expensive war
machinery.


The Real Peril.

I fear that the American people as a whole have visualized only
slightly, if at all, the real peril involved in this contingency; but I
cannot feel otherwise than sure that soon they must awake to the great
danger that militarism and navalism may be imposed upon them through no
fault of their own.

American impulses trend away from armament toward peaceful development
along industrial lines, but even now political leaders in Washington
begin to see what may be coming. The propositions which already have
been made for considerable increases in our naval and military forces
may be regarded as only the forerunners of what is to be expected later.

My sympathies and interests, in other words my patriotic sentiments, are
definitely American. I must repeat that I am of German origin, and that
as regards the present struggle I am pro-German, yet it would be
impossible for me to say that I am anti-English, although I am
anti-Russian for reasons that are obvious.

I already have expressed the belief that the complete humiliation of
England would be disastrous to us. Now, it seems to me that if Germany
should be completely successful, if she should be able to wear out the
Allies, break down France, hold Russia in check, and cripple or even
invade England, (which many German leaders actually believe can be done,
incredible as it may seem to us,) Germany would acquire a position such
as never has been held by any nation since the beginning of history. Not
even the power of the Roman Empire would approach it.

The advance which has marked the development of every means of
communication, transportation, manufacturing, &c., since Rome's day
would give Germany, in the case of such an eventuation, a power which
would have been inconceivable to the most ambitious Roman Emperor. It
would make her a menace not only to her immediate neighbors, but to the
entire globe.

Could she be trusted with such power? Notwithstanding my personal
sympathies, which I have taken pains to clearly outline, I must admit
that I cannot think so. The German character is not only self-reliant,
which is admirable, but it readily becomes domineering, particularly
when in the ascendency.

In the rôle of a world conqueror Germany would become a world
dictator--would indulge in a domination which would be almost unbearable
to every other nation. Particularly would this be the case in respect to
her relations with the United States, a nation with which she always has
had and always must have intimate trade and commercial relations.

Should Germany make England impotent and France powerless we should
become more or less dependent upon German good-will, and it is highly
probable, indeed I regard it as a certainty, that before long, in such
an event, the Monroe Doctrine would cease to exercise any important
influence on world events. It would become a thing of the past--a "scrap
of paper."

You see that while I am not neutral to the extreme, while I fervently
hope and pray that Germany may not be wrecked and that she may emerge
from the war with full ability to maintain her own, I cannot believe
that it would be good for her or good for the world in general if she
found herself absolutely and incontrovertibly victorious at the end of
the great struggle. In other words, I wish Germany to be victorious, but
I do not wish her to be too victorious.

This brings us definitely to the question as to what can be done to stop
this war. Its continuance is infinitely costly of men and treasure; its
prosecution to the bitter end would mean complete disaster for one
contestant and only less complete destruction for the other, and it
would give to the victor, no matter what his sufferings and losses might
have been, a power dangerous to the entire world.

How shall it end? We do not want its end to mean a new European map.
Anything of the sort would include the seed of another European war, to
be fought out later and at even greater probable cost, with all the
world-disturbance implied in such an eventuation.

What the United States should desire and does desire is an understanding
between these nations, of just what they are fighting for, which I
almost believe they no longer know themselves, and a conference between
them now, a pause to think, which at least may help toward stimulating
each side to make concessions, before the ultimate of damage has been
done.

Such a conference might be called even without any interval in warfare
and induced without definite outside intervention from ourselves or any
one else. I believe it not to be beyond the bounds of possibility that
if this course could be brought about importantly enough, a way out of
this brutal struggle and carnage might be discovered even now, and I
know I am not alone in this belief.

The situation is unprecedented. No congress such as in former times more
than once has settled wars and brought about peace by the give-and-take
process could be of avail in the existing circumstances. Something far
higher than such a conference is needed. This peace must not be
temporary. It must mark not the ending of this war alone but the ending
of all war.

Some means must be devised and generally agreed to which, after the
re-establishment of peace, will do away with jealousies among European
nations, so that the continual increase of armament on land and sea no
longer will be necessary, and humanity will be freed from its tremendous
burden.

It is not at present possible to point out any concrete means by which
these things may be accomplished, but it is not impossible that, when
reason shall be returned to the Governments now at war, they themselves
may suggest to one another plans and ways and means how this may be
effectuated.

Toward this end America may help tremendously, and herein lies, it seems
to me, the greatest opportunity ever offered by events to the American
press.

Let the newspapers of America stop futile philosophizing upon the merits
and demerits of each case, let them measurably cease their comment upon
what each side has accomplished or failed to accomplish during the
tragic four months which have traced their bloody mark on history.

Let them begin to stimulate public opinion in favor of a rational
adjustment of the points at issue--such an adjustment as will leave each
contestant unhumiliated and intact, such an adjustment as will avoid, as
far as may be possible, the complete defeat of any one, such an
adjustment as will do what can be done toward righting wrongs already
wrought, and such an adjustment as will let the world return as soon as
may be to the paths of peace, productiveness, prosperity, and happiness.

In suggesting that America should regard this effort as an obligation I
am assuming for this country no rights which are not properly hers. We,
a nation of a hundred million people, laboring constantly for peace and
human progress, have a right to make our voice heard, and if we raise it
properly it will find listeners among those who can help toward the
accomplishment of what we seek. But if we would make it heard we must be
earnest, be honest, and be ceaseless in the reiteration of our demand.

Have we not the right to insist that the interests of neutral nations,
of whom, with our South American cousins, (for the better intercourse
with whom we have just spent several hundred millions upon the
construction of the Panama Canal,) we form so large a percentage, shall
before long be given some consideration by the nations whose great
quarrel is harming us incalculably?


Americans Should Speak Out.

The interruption of our economic development already has become marked
and the war's baneful influence upon moral conditions in our midst shows
itself through constantly increasing unemployment and, as a logical
consequence of that, the rapid filling of our eleemosynary and penal
institutions. May we not reasonably demand that this shall speedily be
brought to an end?

It probably is true that under the rules of the game the President of
the United States cannot offer his good offices again to the
belligerents without first being invited by one or the other side to do
this, but the people of the United States have a voice even more
powerful than his; if that of the people of South America should be
joined with it, and if the combined sound should be made unquestionably
apparent to the warring nations, it could not pass unheeded.

Public opinion in the United States should firmly seek to impress upon
the warring nations the conviction that nothing can secure a lasting
peace except assurance of conditions under which not mighty armies
and tremendous navies are held to be the factors through which
trade expansion and the conquest of the markets of the world are
to be obtained, but that this can be accomplished better and more
lastingly through rigid adherence to the qualities and methods which
generally make for success in commercial or any other peaceful
competition--fairness, thorough efficiency, and hard work.

The concentrated power of the American press and people would be
tremendous. I am sure that, in this instance, it is possible to
concentrate it for righteousness and the future good of all humanity.




Prof. Mather on Mr. Schiff

     Professor of Art at Princeton University; editorial writer for
     The New York Evening Post and Assistant Editor of The Nation,
     1901-06.


_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

It seems to me that the Belgian previous question ought to be moved with
all candid pro-Germans. Mr. Schiff is plainly candid, so I have framed
an open letter to elicit his opinion:

[_An Open Letter to Jacob H. Schiff._]

Mr. Jacob H. Schiff, New York.

My Dear Sir: The universal esteem which you enjoy in the country of your
adoption lends great weight to any utterance of yours on public matters.
Your interview on the war in THE TIMES of Nov. 22 will everywhere have
influence for its gravity and fineness of feeling. It is with
compunction that I call your attention to the fact that your statement
is ambiguous on precisely those issues of the conflict which your
fellow-citizens have nearest at heart.

Your general position may be described as a desire for prompt peace and
restoration of the former balance of power. More specifically you wish
"Germany to be victorious, but not too victorious." If this be merely an
instinctive expression of the residual German in you, an expression made
with no practical implications of any sort, no American will do
otherwise than respect such a sentiment. But if you deliberately desire
a moderate victory for Germany, with all that such moderate victory
practically implies, it behooves your fellow-citizens to judge your
views in the light of what these really call for.

An ever so slightly victorious Germany would presumably retain Belgium,
in whole or in part. Does such a conquest have your moral assent?

Or suppose the rather improbable event of a Germany driven out of
Belgium, but otherwise slightly victorious. In such case not a pfennig
of indemnity would come to Belgium. Do you believe that no indemnity is
morally due Belgium?

Knowing your reputation as a man and philanthropist, I can hardly
believe that your desire for a "not too victorious" Germany includes its
logical implication of a subjugated or uncompensated Belgium. But if
this be so, candor expects an avowal. Until you have made yourself clear
on the issue that most concerns your fellow-citizens they will remain in
doubt as to your whole moral attitude on the war. Does your pacificism
contemplate a German Belgium? I feel sure you will admit that no fairer
question could be set to any one who comments on the sequels of the war.
I am, most respectfully yours,

FRANK JEWETT MATHER, Jr.

Princeton University, Oct. 23, 1914.




The Eliot-Schiff Letters

     _On Nov. 22_ THE NEW YORK TIMES _printed this interview with
     Jacob H. Schiff on the European war reproduced above. Two days
     later Dr. Charles W. Eliot, President Emeritus of Harvard, who
     is an old friend of Mr. Schiff, wrote him a letter of comment
     on THE TIMES interview. This letter resulted in considerable
     correspondence between the two. At the time this
     correspondence was penned there was not the least thought in
     the mind of either of the writers of giving the letters to the
     public. It was simply an interchange of ideas between men who
     had long known each other. When they were convinced, however,
     that publication might serve a useful purpose in shaping
     public opinion, both Mr. Schiff and Dr. Eliot cordially
     assented to their being printed._


Dr. Eliot to Mr. Schiff.

CAMBRIDGE, Mass., Nov. 24, 1914.

Dear Mr. Schiff: It was a great relief to me to read just now your
interview in THE NEW YORK TIMES of Nov. 22, for I have been afraid that
your judgment and mine, concerning the desirable outcome of this
horrible war, were very different. I now find that at many points they
coincide.

One of my strongest hopes is that one result of the war may be the
acceptance by the leading nations of the world of the precept or
law--there shall be no world empire for any single nation. If I
understand you correctly, you hold the same opinion. You wish neither
Germany nor England to possess world empire. You also look forward, as I
do, to some contract or agreement among the leading nations which shall
prevent competitive armaments. I entirely agree with you that it is in
the highest degree undesirable that this war should be prolonged to the
exhaustion of either side.

When, however, I come to your discussion of the means by which a good
result toward European order and peace may be brought out of the present
convulsion I do not find clear guidance to present action on your part
or mine, or on the part of our Government and people. Was it your
thought that a congress of the peoples of North and South America should
now be convened to bring to bear American opinion on the actual
combatants while the war is going on? Or is it your thought that the
American nations wait until there is a lull or pause in the indecisive
fighting?

So far as I can judge from the very imperfect information which reaches
us from Germany, the confidence of the German Emperor and people in
their "invincible" army is not much abated, although it clearly ought to
be. It is obvious that American opinion has some weight in Germany; but
has it not enough weight to induce Germany to abandon her intense desire
for Belgium and Holland and extensive colonial possessions? To my
thinking, without the abandonment of that desire and ambition on the
part of Germany, there can be no lasting peace in Europe and no
reduction of armaments. Sincerely yours,

CHARLES W. ELIOT.

Jacob H. Schiff, Esq.


Mr. Schiff to Dr. Eliot.

NEW YORK, Nov. 25, 1914.

My Dear Dr. Eliot:

I am just in receipt of your thoughtful letter of yesterday, which it
has given me genuine pleasure to receive. While it is true that I have
not found myself in accord with many of the views to which you have
given public expression concerning the responsibility for this
deplorable conflict and the unfortunate conditions it has created, I
never doubted that as to its desirable outcome we would find ourselves
in accord, and I am very glad to have this confirmed by you, though as
to this our views could not have diverged.

As to the means by which a desirable result toward European order and
peace may be brought about out of the chaos which has become created, it
is, I confess, difficult to give guidance at present. What needs first,
in my opinion, to be done is to bring forth a healthy and insistent
public opinion here for an early peace without either side becoming
first exhausted, and it was my purpose in the interview I have given to
set the American people thinking concerning this. I have no idea that I
shall have immediate success; but if men like you and others follow in
the same line, I am sure American public opinion can before long be made
to express itself emphatically and insistently in favor of an early
peace. Without this it is not unlikely that this horrible slaughter and
destruction may continue for a very, very long time.

Yours most faithfully,

JACOB H. SCHIFF.

President Emeritus Charles W. Eliot, Cambridge, Mass.


Dr. Eliot to Mr. Schiff.

CAMBRIDGE, Mass., Nov. 28, 1914.

Dear Mr. Schiff:

I think, just as you do, that the thing which most needs to be done is
to induce Germany to modify its present opinion that the nation must
fight for its very life to its last mark and the last drop of its blood.
Now, every private letter that I have received from Germany, and every
printed circular, pamphlet, or book on the war which has come to me from
German sources insists on the view that, for Germany, it is a question
between world empire or utter downfall. There is no sense or reason in
this view, but the German philosophers, historians, and statesmen are
all maintaining it at this moment.

England, France, and Russia have no such expectations or desires as
regards the fate of Germany. What they propose to do is to put a stop to
Germany's plan of attaining world empire by militarism. Have you any
means of getting into the minds of some of the present rulers of Germany
the idea that no such alternative as life or death is presented to
Germany in this war, and that the people need only abandon their
world-empire ambitions while securing safety in the heart of Europe and
a chance to develop all that is good in German civilization? Sincerely
yours,

CHARLES W. ELIOT.

Jacob H. Schiff, Esq.


Mr. Schiff to Dr. Eliot.

The Greenbrier,
WHITE SULPHUR SPRINGS, W. Va.,
Dec. 1, 1914.

Dear Dr. Eliot:

I have received today your letter of the 28th ult., and I hasten to
reply to it, for I know of nought that is of more importance than the
discussion between earnest men of what might be done to bring to
cessation this horrible and senseless war.

I believe you are mistaken--though in this I am stating nothing,
absolutely, but my personal opinion--that Germany would not listen to
the suggestion for a restoration of peace until it has either come into
a position to dictate the terms or until it is utterly crushed. Indeed,
I rather feel, and I have indications that such is the case, that
England is unwilling to stop short of crushing Germany, and it is now
using all the influence it can bring to bear in this country to prevent
public opinion being aroused in favor of the stoppage of hostilities and
re-establishment of peace.

The same mail which brought your letter this morning brought me also a
letter from a leading semi-military man, whom I know by name, but not
personally. It is so fine and timely that I venture to inclose a copy
for your perusal. Why would not you, and perhaps Dr. Andrew D. White,
who--is it not a coincidence--has likewise written me today on the
subject of my recent TIMES interview, be the very men to carry out the
suggestion made by my correspondent?

Perhaps no other two men in the entire country are so greatly looked up
to by its people for guidance as you--in the first instance--and Dr.
White. You could surely bestow no greater gift upon the entire civilized
world than if now, in the evening of a life which has been of such great
value to mankind, you would call around you a number of leading, earnest
Americans with the view of discussing and framing plans through which
American public opinion could be crystallized and aroused to the point
where it will insistently demand that these warring nations come
together and, with the experience they have made to their great cost,
make at least an attempt to find a way out. I cannot but believe that
the Governments of England, France, and Germany--if not Russia--will
have to listen, if the American people speak with no uncertain voice.
Do it, and you will deserve and receive the blessing of this and of
coming generations! Yours most faithfully,

JACOB H. SCHIFF.


Dr. Eliot to Mr. Schiff.

CAMBRIDGE, Mass., Dec. 8, 1914.

Dear Mr. Schiff:

I thank you for your letter of Dec. 1 and its interesting inclosure.

Although every thoughtful person must earnestly desire that the waste
and destruction of this greatest of wars should be stopped as soon as
possible, there is an overpowering feeling that the war should go on
until all the combatants, including Germany, have been brought to see
that the Governmental régime and the state of the public mind in Germany
which have made this war possible are not consistent with the security
and well-being of Europe in the future.

Personally, I feel strongly that the war ought to go on so long as
Germany persists in its policies of world empire, dynastic rule,
autocratic bureaucracy, and the use of force in international dealings.
If the war stops before Germany sees that those policies cannot prevail
in twentieth-century Europe, the horrible wrongs and evils which we are
now witnessing will recur; and all the nations will have to continue the
destructive process of competitive armaments. If peace should be made
now, before the Allies have arrived at attacking Germany on her own
soil, there would result only a truce of moderate length, and then a
renewal of the present horrors.

I cannot but think that Europe now has a chance to make a choice between
the German ideal of the State and the Anglo-American ideal. These two
ideals are very different; and the present conflict shows that they
cannot coexist longer in modern Europe.

In regard to the suggestion which your correspondent made to you that a
conference of private persons should now be called in the hope of
arriving at an agreed-upon appeal to the combatants to desist from
fighting and consider terms of settlement, I cannot but feel (1) that
such a conference would have no assured status; (2) that the combatants
would not listen; and (3) that the effort would, therefore, be untimely
now, though perhaps useful later.

One idea might possibly bring about peace, if it fructified in the mind
of the German Emperor--the idea, namely, that the chance of Germany's
obtaining dominating power in either Europe or the world having already
gone, the wise thing for him to do is to save United Germany within her
natural boundaries for secure development as a highly civilized strong
nation in the heart of Europe. Surplus population can always emigrate
happily in the future as in the past.

The security of Germany would rest, however, on an international
agreement to be maintained by an international force; whereas, the
example which Germany has just given of the reckless violation of
international agreements is extremely discouraging in regard to the
possibility of securing the peace of Europe in the future.

Although this war has already made quite impossible the domination of
Germany in Europe or in the world, the leaders of Germany do not yet see
or apprehend that impossibility. Hence, many earnest peace-seekers have
to confess that they do not see any means whatever available for
promoting peace in Europe now, or even procuring a short truce.

I wish I could believe with you that the Governments of England, France,
Germany, and Russia would listen to the voice of the American people.
They all seem to desire the good opinion and moral support of America;
but I see no signs that they would take American advice or imitate
American example. President Wilson seems to think that this country will
be accepted as a kind of umpire in this formidable contest; but surely
we have no right to any such position. Our example in avoiding
aggression on other nations, and in declining to enter the contest for
world power, ought to have some effect in abating European ambitions in
that direction; but our exhortations to peace and good-will will, I
fear, have little influence. There is still a real contest on between
democracy and oligarchical methods.

You see, my dear Mr. Schiff, that I regard this war as the result of
long-continuing causes which have been gathering force for more than
fifty years. In Germany all the forces of education, finance, commercial
development, a pagan philosophy, and Government have been preparing this
war since 1860. To stop it now, before these forces have been
overwhelmingly defeated, and before the whole German people is convinced
that they are defeated, would be to leave humanity exposed to the
certain recurrence of the fearful convulsions we are now witnessing.

If anybody can show me any signs that the leaders of Germany are
convinced that there is to be no world empire for Germany or any other
nation, and no despotic Government in Europe, I shall be ready to take
part in any effectual advocacy of peace. Sincerely yours.

CHARLES W. ELIOT.

Jacob H. Schiff, Esq.


Mr. Schiff to Dr. Eliot.

NEW YORK, Dec. 5, 1914.

President Emeritus Charles W. Eliot, Cambridge, Mass.

Dear Dr. Eliot:

Your letter of Dec. 3 reached me this morning, and has given me much
food for thought.

I wish I could follow you in the position you have taken, for I like
nothing better than to sit at the feet of a master like you and be
instructed. But, much as I have tried, even before our recent
correspondence was begun, to get at your viewpoint as from time to time
published, I have not been able to convince myself that you occupy a
correct position. Please accept this as expressed in all modesty, for I
know were you not thoroughly convinced of the justice of the position
you have taken from the start you would not be so determined in holding
to it.

I am perfectly frank to say that I am amazed and chagrined when you say
that you feel strongly that the war ought to go on until the Allies
have arrived at attacking Germany on her own soil, which, if this is at
all likely to come, may take many months yet, and will mean sacrifice of
human life on both sides more appalling than anything we have seen yet
since the war began. So you are willing that, with all the human life
that has already perished, practically the entire flower of the warring
nations shall become exterminated before even an effort be made to see
whether these nations cannot be brought to reason, cannot be made to
stop and to consider whether, with the experience of the past four
months before them, it would not be better to even now make an effort to
find a way in which the causes that have led to this deplorable conflict
can be once and forever eradicated?

That it will be possible to find at this time any method or basis
through the adoption of which the world would become entirely immune
against war I do not believe, even by the establishment of the
international police force such as you and others appear to have in
mind.

The perpetual cessation of all war between the civilized nations of the
world can, as I see it, only be brought about in two ways, both Utopian
and likely impracticable, for many years to come. War could be made only
to cease entirely if all the nations of Europe could be organized into a
United States of Europe and if free trade were established throughout
the world. In the first instance, the extreme nationalism, which has
become so rampant during the past fifty years and which has been more or
less at the bottom of every war, would then cease to exist and prevail,
and in the second event, namely, if free trade became established
throughout the world the necessity for territorial expansion and
aggression would no longer be needed, for, with the entire world open on
equal terms to the commerce and industry of every nation, territorial
possession would not be much of a consideration to any peoples.

You continually lay stress upon the danger of the domination of Germany
in Europe and in the world. I believe I have already made myself quite
clear in my recent NEW YORK TIMES interview, which has called forth this
correspondence between us, that neither would I wish to have Germany
come into a position where it might dominate Europe, and more or less
the world, nor do I believe that the German Nation, except perhaps a
handful of extremists, has any such desires.

I believe I have also made myself quite clear in the interview to which
I have referred that my feelings are not anti-English, for I shall never
forget that liberal government and all forms of liberalism have had
their origin, ever since the Magna Charta, in that great nation whom we
so often love to call our cousins. But, with all of this, can you ignore
the fact that England even today, without the further power and prestige
victory in the present conflict would give her, practically dominates
the high seas, that she treats the ocean as her own and enforces her
dictates upon the waters even to our very shores? That this is true the
past four months have amply proved. I am not one of those who fear that
the United States, as far as can now be foreseen, will get into any
armed conflict with Great Britain or with Japan, her permanent ally, but
I can well understand that many in our country are of a different
opinion, and it takes no prophet to foresee that, with England coming
out of this war victorious and her and Japan's power on the high seas
increased, the demand from a large section of our people for the
acquisition and possession of the United States of an increased powerful
navy and for the erection of vast coast defenses, both on the Atlantic
and Pacific shores, will become so insistent that it cannot be
withstood. What this will mean to the American people in lavish
expenditures and in increased taxation I need not here further go into.

Yes, my dear and revered friend, I can see nought but darkness if a way
cannot be soon found out of the present deplorable situation as it
exists in Europe.

But even if the Allies are victorious it will mean, as I am convinced,
the beginning of the descent of England as the world's leader and the
hastened ascendency of Russia, who, not today or tomorrow, but in times
to come, is sure to crowd out England from the world's leadership. A
Russia that will have become democratic in its government, be it as a
republic or under a truly constitutional monarchy; a Russia in which
education will be as free as it is in our own country; a Russia in which
the people can move about and make homes in the vast territory she
possesses wherever they can find most happiness and prosperity; a Russia
with its vast natural resources of every kind fully developed, is bound
to be the greatest and most powerful nation on the earth.

But I am going too far into the future and I must return to the sad and
deplorable present. I only wanted to show how England's alliance with
this present-day Russia and its despotic, autocratic, and inhuman
Government may, if the Allies shall be victorious, prove possibly in the
nearer future, but certainly in the long run, England's Nemesis.

Before closing I want to correct the impression you appear to have
received that I have meant to suggest a conference of private persons
for the purpose of agreeing upon an appeal by them to the nations of
Europe to desist from fighting and consider terms of settlement. I know
this would be entirely impracticable and useless, but what I meant to
convey to you was my conviction that if you and men like you, of whom I
confess there are but too few, were to make the endeavor to rouse public
opinion in the United States to a point where it should insistently
demand that this terrific carnage of blood and destruction cease, it
would not be long before these warring Governments would take notice of
such sentiments on the part of the American people; and what should be
done at once is the stoppage of the furnishing of munitions of war to
any of the belligerents, as is unfortunately done to so great an extent
at present from this country.

We freely and abundantly give to the Red Cross and the many other relief
societies, but we do this, even if indirectly, out of the very profits
we derive from the war material we sell to the belligerents, and with
which the wounds the Red Cross and other relief societies endeavor to
assuage are inflicted. Yours most faithfully,

JACOB H. SCHIFF.


Dr. Eliot to Mr. Schiff.

CAMBRIDGE, Mass., Dec. 8, 1914.

Dear Mr. Schiff:

Your letter of Dec. 5 tells me what the difference is between you and me
in respect to the outcome of the war--I am much more hopeful or sanguine
of the world's getting good out of it than you are. Since you do not
hope to get any good to speak of out of it, you want to stop it as soon
as possible. You look forward to future war from time to time between
the nations of Europe and to the maintenance of competitive armaments.
You think that the lust of dominion must continue to be felt and
gratified, now by one nation and now by another; that Great Britain can
gratify it now, but that she will be overpowered by Russia by and by.

I am unwilling to accept these conditions for Europe, or for the world,
without urging the freer nations to make extraordinary efforts to reach
a better solution of the European international problem which, unsolved,
has led down to this horrible pit of general war.

I have just finished another letter to THE NEW YORK TIMES, which will
probably be in print by the time you get back to New York, so I will not
trouble you with any exposition of the grounds of my hopefulness. It is
because I am hopeful that I want to see this war fought out until
Germany is persuaded that she cannot dominate Europe, or, indeed, make
her will prevail anywhere by force of arms. When that change of mind has
been effected I hope that Germany will become a member of a federation
firm enough and powerful enough to prevent any single nation from
aiming at world empire, or even pouncing on a smaller neighbor.

There is another point on which I seem to differ from you: I do not
believe that any single nation has now, or can ever hereafter have, the
leadership of the world, whereas you look forward to the existence of
such leadership or domination in the hands of a single great power. Are
there not many signs already, both in the East and in the West, that the
time has past for world empire? Very sincerely and cordially yours,

CHARLES W. ELIOT.

Jacob H. Schiff, Esq.


Mr. Schiff to Dr. Eliot.

NEW YORK, Dec. 14, 1914.

Dear Dr. Eliot:

I have delayed replying to your valued letter of the 8th inst. until
after the appearance of your further letter to THE NEW YORK TIMES, to
which you had made reference, and, like everything emanating from you,
the contents of your last TIMES letter have evoked my deepest interest.

Had our recent correspondence not already become more extended than you
likely had intended it to become when you first wrote me on the subject
of my TIMES interview of some weeks ago, I should go into your latest
arguments at greater length. As it is, I shall only reiterate that I
find myself unable to follow you in your belief and hope, that world
empire and world leadership, as this now exists, is likely to cease as a
consequence of the present war, much as we all may desire this.

England has taken up arms to retain her world dominion and leadership;
and to gain it, Germany is fighting. How can you, then, expect that
England, if victorious, would be willing to surrender her control of the
oceans and the dominion over the trade of the world she possesses in
consequence, and where is there, then, room for the hope you express
that world leadership may become a thing of the past with the
termination of the present conflict?

I repeat, with all my attachment for my native land and its people, I
have no inimical feeling toward England, have warm sentiments for
France, and the greatest compassion for brave, stricken Belgium.

Thus, "with malice toward none," and with the highest respect for your
expressed views, I am still of the opinion that there can be no greater
service rendered to mankind than to make the effort, either through the
force of public opinion of the two Americas, or otherwise, to bring
these warring Governments together at an early moment, even if this can
only be done without stopping their conflict, so that they may make the
endeavor, whether--with their costly experience of the last five months,
with the probability that they now know better what need be done to make
the extreme armaments on land and sea as unnecessary as they are
undesirable in the future--a basis cannot be found upon which
disarmament can be effectively and permanently brought about.

This, at some time, they will have come to, in any event, and must there
first more human lives be sacrificed into the hundreds and hundreds of
thousands, and still greater havoc be wrought, before passions can be
made to cease and reason be made to return?

If, as you seem to think, the war need go on until one country is beaten
into a condition where it must accept the terms the victor chooses to
impose, because it can no longer help itself to do else, the peace thus
obtained will only be the harbinger of another war in the near or
distant future, bloodier probably than the present sanguinary conflict,
and through no compact which might be entered into will it be possible
to actually prevent this.

Twenty centuries ago Christianity came into the world with its lofty
message of "peace on earth and good-will to men," and now, after two
thousand years, and at the near approach of the season when Christianity
celebrates the birth of its founder, it is insisted that the merciless
slaughter of man by man we have been witnessing these last months must
be permitted to be continued into the infinite. Most faithfully yours,

JACOB H. SCHIFF.

President Emeritus Charles W. Eliot, Cambridge, Mass.




LA CATHEDRALE.

From Figaro.

By EDMOND ROSTAND.


    Ils n'ont fait que la rendre un peu plus immortelle.
    L'Oeuvre ne périt pas, que mutile un gredin.
    Demande à Phidias et demande à Rodin
    Si, devant ses morceaux, on ne dit plus: "C'est Elle!"

    La Forteresse meurt quand on la démantèle.
    Mais le Temple, brisé, vit plus noble; et soudain
    Les yeux, se souvenant du toit avec dédain,
    Préfèrent voir le ciel dans la pierre en dentelle.

    Rendons grace--attendu qu'il nous manquait encor
    D'avoir ce qu'ont les Grecs sur la colline d'or;
    Le Symbole du Beau consacré par l'insulte!--

    Rendons grace aux pointeurs du stupide canon,
    Puisque de leur adresse allemande il résulte
    Une Honte pour eux, pour nous un Parthénon!

       *       *       *       *       *

THE CATHEDRAL.

A Free Translation of Rostand's Sonnet.

By FRANCES C. FAY.

    "Deathless" is graven deeper on thy brow;
    Ghouls have no power to end thy endless sway.
    The Greek of old, the Frenchman of today,
    Before thy riven shrine are bending now.

    A wounded fortress straightway lieth prone,
    Not so the Temple dies; its roof may fall,
    The sky its covering vault, an azure pall,
    Doth droop to crown its wealth of lacework stone.

    Praise to you, Vandal guns of dull intent!
    We lacked till now our Beauty's monument
    Twice hallowed o'er by insult's brutal hand,

    As Pallas owns on Athens' golden hill,
    We have it now, thanks to your far-flung brand!
    Your shame--our gain, misguided German skill!




Probable Causes and Outcome of the War

By Charles W. Eliot.

     President Emeritus of Harvard University; Officer Legion
     d'Honneur (France); Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, first
     class (Japan); Royal Prussian Order of the Crown, first class;
     Grand Officer of the Crown of Italy; Member of the General
     Education Board, and an original investigator for the cause of
     international peace.

     _Following Is Reproduced a Series of Five Letters to_ THE NEW
     YORK TIMES _from Dr. Eliot, Together with the Comments Thereon
     by Eminent Critics._


DR. ELIOT'S FIRST LETTER.

_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

The American people without distinction of party are highly content with
the action of their National Administration on all the grave problems
presented to the Government by the sudden outbreak of long-prepared war
in Europe--a war which already involves five great States and two small
ones. They heartily approve of the action of the Administration on
mediation, neutrality, aid to Americans in Europe, discouragement of
speculation in foods, and, with the exception of extreme protectionists,
admission to American registery of foreign-built ships; although the
legislation on the last subject, which has already passed Congress, is
manifestly inadequate.

Our people cannot see that the war will necessarily be short, and they
cannot imagine how it can last long. They realize that history gives no
example of such a general interruption of trade and all other
international intercourse as has already taken place, or of such a
stoppage of the production and distribution of the necessaries of life
as this war threatens. They shudder at the floods of human woe which are
about to overwhelm Europe.

Hence, thinking Americans cannot help reflecting on the causes of this
monstrous outbreak of primitive savagery--part of them come down from
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and part developed in the
nineteenth--and wondering what good for mankind, if any, can possibly
come out of the present cataclysm.

The whole people of the United States, without regard to racial origin,
are of one mind in hoping that mankind may gain out of this prodigious
physical combat, which uses for purposes of destruction and death all
the new forces of nineteenth-century applied science, some new liberties
and new securities in the pursuit of happiness; but at this moment they
can cherish only a remote hope of such an issue. The military force
which Austria-Hungary and Germany are now using on a prodigious scale,
and with long-studied skill, can only be met by similar military force,
and this resisting force is summoned more slowly than that of
Austria-Hungary and Germany, although the ultimate battalions will be
heavier. In this portentous physical contest the American people have no
part; their geographical position, their historical development, and
their political ideals combine to make them for the present mere
spectators, although their interests--commercial, industrial, and
political--are deeply involved. For the moment, the best thing our
Government can do is to utilize all existing neutrality rights, and, if
possible, to strengthen or develop those rights, for out of this war
ought to come more neutral States in Europe and greater security for
neutralized territory.


The Need for Discussion.

The chances of getting some gains for mankind out of this gigantic
struggle will be somewhat increased if the American people, and all
other neutral peoples, arrive through public discussion at some clear
understanding of the causes and the possible and desirable issues of the
war, and the sooner this public discussion begins, and the more
thoroughly it is pursued, the sounder will probably be the tendencies of
public sentiment outside of the contending nations and the conclusions
which the peace negotiations will ultimately reach.

When one begins, however, to reflect on the probable causes of the
sudden lapse of the most civilized parts of Europe into worse than
primitive savagery, he comes at once on two old and widespread evils in
Europe from which America has been exempt for at least 150 years. The
first is secret diplomacy with power to make issues and determine
events, and the second is autocratic national Executives who can swing
the whole physical force of the nation to this side or that without
consulting the people or their representatives.

The actual catastrophe proves that secret negotiations like those
habitually conducted on behalf of the "concert of Europe," and alliances
between selected nations, the terms of which are secret, or at any rate
not publicly stated, cannot avert in the long run outrageous war, but
can only produce postponements of war, or short truces. Free
institutions, like those of the United States, take the public into
confidence, because all important movements of the Government must rest
on popular desires, needs, and volitions. Autocratic institutions have
no such necessity for publicity. This Government secrecy as to motives,
plans, and purposes must often be maintained by disregarding truth, fair
dealing, and honorable obligations, in order that, when the appeal to
force comes, one Government may secure the advantage of taking the other
by surprise. Duplicity during peace and the breaking of treaties during
war come to be regarded as obvious military necessities.

The second great evil under which certain large nations of
Europe--notably Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary--have long suffered
and still suffer is the permanent national Executive, independent of
popular control through representative bodies, holding strong views
about rights of birth and religious sanctions of its authority, and
really controlling the national forces through some small council and a
strong bureaucracy. So long as Executives of this sort endure, so long
will civilization be liable to such explosions as have taken place this
August, though not always on so vast a scale.

Americans now see these things more clearly than European lovers of
liberty, because Americans are detached from the actual conflicts by the
Atlantic, and because Americans have had no real contact with the feudal
or the imperial system for nearly 300 years. Pilgrim and Puritan,
Covenanter and Quaker, Lutheran and Catholic alike left the feudal
system and autocratic government behind them when they crossed the
Atlantic. Americans, therefore, cannot help hoping that two results of
the present war will be: (1) The abolition of secret diplomacy and
secret understandings, and the substitution therefor of treaties
publicly discussed and sanctioned, and (2) the creation of national
Executives--Emperors, Sultans, Kings, or Presidents--which cannot use
the national forces in fight until a thoroughly informed national
assembly, acting with deliberation, has agreed to that use.


Opposite Tendencies.

The American student of history since the middle of the seventeenth
century sees clearly two strong though apparently opposite tendencies in
Europe: First, the tendency to the creation and maintenance of small
States such as those which the Peace of Westphalia (1648) recognized and
for two centuries secured in a fairly independent existence, and,
secondly, a tendency from the middle of the nineteenth century toward
larger national units, created by combining several kindred States
under one executive. This second tendency was illustrated strongly in
the case of both Germany and Italy, although the Prussian domination in
Germany has no parallel in Italy. Somewhat earlier in the nineteenth
century the doctrine of the neutralization of the territories of small
States was established as firmly as solemn treaties could do it. The
larger national units had a more or less federative quality, the
components yielding some of their functions to a central power, but
retaining numerous independent functions. This tendency to limited
unification is one which Americans easily understand and appreciate. We
believe in the federative principle, and must therefore hope that out of
the present European horror will come a new development of that
principle, and new security for small States which are capable of
guaranteeing to their citizens "life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness"--a security which no citizen of any European country seems
today to possess.

Some of the underlying causes of the horrible catastrophe the American
people are now watching from afar are commercial and economic. Imperial
Germany's desire for colonies in other continents--such as Great Britain
and France secured earlier as a result of keen commercial ambitions--is
intense. Prussia's seizure of Schleswig in 1864-5 had the commercial
motive; and it is with visions of ports on the North Sea that Germany
justifies her present occupation of Belgium. The Russians have for
generations desired to extend their national territory southward to the
Aegean and the Bosphorus, and eastward to good harbors on the Pacific.
Later they pushed into Mongolia and Manchuria, but were resisted
successfully by Japan. Austria-Hungary has long been seeking ports on
the Adriatic, and lately seized without warrant Herzegovina and Bosnia
to promote her approach toward the Aegean, and is now trying to seize
Servia with the same ends in view. With similar motives Italy lately
descended on Tripoli, without any excuse except this intense desire for
colonies--profitable or unprofitable. On the other hand, the American
people, looking to the future as well as to the past, object to
acquisitions of new territory by force of arms; and since the twentieth
century opened they have twice illustrated in their own practice--first
in Cuba, and then in Mexico--this democratic objection. They believe
that extensions of national territory should be brought about only with
the indubitable consent of the majority of the people most nearly
concerned. They also believe that commerce should always be a means of
promoting good-will, and not ill-will, among men, and that all
legitimate and useful extensions of the commerce of a manufacturing and
commercial nation may be procured through the policy of the "open
door"--which means nothing more than that all nations should be allowed
to compete on equal terms for the trade of any foreign people, whether
backward or advanced in civilization. No American Administration has
accepted a "concession" of land in China. They also believe that
peaceable extensions of territory and trade will afford adequate relief
from the economic pressure on a population too large for the territory
it occupies, and that there is no need of forcible seizure of territory
to secure relief. It is inevitable, therefore, that the American people
should hope that one outcome of the present war should be--no
enlargement of a national territory by force or without the free consent
of the population to be annexed, and no colonization except by peaceable
commercial and industrial methods.


Aggressive Force a Failure.

One of the most interesting and far-reaching effects of the present
outbreak of savagery is likely to be the conviction it carries to the
minds of thinking people that the whole process of competitive
armaments, the enlistment of the entire male population in national
armies, and the incessant planning of campaigns against neighbors, is
not a trustworthy method for preserving peace. It now appears that the
military preparations of the last fifty years in Europe have resulted
in the most terrific war of all time, and that a fierce ultimate
outbreak is the only probable result of the system. For the future of
civilization this is a lesson of high value. It teaches that if modern
civilization is to be preserved, national Executives--whether imperial
or republican--must not have at their disposal immense armaments and
drilled armies held ready in the leash; that armaments must be limited,
an international Supreme Court established, national armies changed to
the Swiss form, and an international force adequate to deal with any
nation that may suddenly become lawless agreed upon by treaty and held
always in readiness. The occasional use of force will continue to be
necessary even in the civilized world; but it must be made not an
aggressive but a protective force and used as such--just as protective
force has to be used sometimes in families, schools, cities, and
Commonwealths.

At present Americans do not close their eyes to the plain fact that the
brute force which Germany and Austria-Hungary are now using can only be
overcome by brute force of the same sort in larger measure. It is only
when negotiations for peace begin that the great lesson of the futility
of huge preparations for fighting to preserve peace can be given effect.
Is it too much to expect that the whole civilized world will take to
heart the lessons of this terrible catastrophe and co-operate to prevent
the recurrence of such losses and woes? Should Germany and
Austria-Hungary succeed in their present undertakings, the whole
civilized world would be obliged to bear continuously, and to an
ever-increasing amount, the burdens of great armaments, and would live
in constant fear of sudden invasion, now here, now there--a terrible
fear, against which neither treaties nor professions of peaceable
intentions would offer the least security.

It must be admitted, however, that the whole military organization,
which has long been compulsory on the nations of Continental Europe, is
inconsistent in the highest degree with American ideals of individual
liberty and social progress. Democracies can fight with ardor, and
sometimes with success, when the whole people is moved by a common
sentiment or passion; but the structure and discipline of a modern army
like that of Germany, Austria-Hungary, or Russia, has a despotic or
autocratic quality which is inconsistent with the fundamental principles
of democratic society. To make war in countries like France, Great
Britain, and the United States requires the widespread, simultaneous
stirring of the passions of the people on behalf of their own ideals.
This stirring requires publicity before and after the declaration of war
and public discussion; and the delays which discussion causes are
securities for peace. Out of the present struggle should come a check on
militarism--a strong revulsion against the use of force as means of
settling international disputes.


America Cannot Be Indifferent.

It must also be admitted that it is impossible for the American people
to sympathize with the tone of the imperial and royal addresses which,
in summoning the people to war, use such phrases as "My monarchy," "My
loyal people," "My loyal subjects"; for there is implied in such phrases
a dynastic or personal ownership of peoples which shocks the average
American. Americans inevitably think that the right way for a ruler to
begin an exhortation to the people he rules is President Wilson's way:
"My fellow-countrymen."

It follows from the very existence of these American instincts and hopes
that, although the people of the United States mean to maintain
faithfully a legal neutrality, they are not, and can not be, neutral or
indifferent as to the ultimate outcome of this titanic struggle. It
already seems to them that England, France, and Russia are fighting for
freedom and civilization. It does not follow that thinking Americans
will forget the immense services which Germany has rendered to
civilization during the last hundred years, or desire that her power to
serve letters, science, art, and education should be in the least
abridged in the outcome of this war upon which she has entered so
rashly and selfishly and in so barbarous a spirit. Most educated
Americans hope and believe that by defeating the German barbarousness
the Allies will only promote the noble German civilization.

[Illustration: JOHN W. BURGESS

_(Photo by Alman & Co.)_

_See Page 507_]

[Illustration: WILLIAM M. SLOANE

_(Photo by Pach.)_

_See Page 515_]

The presence of Russia in the combination against Germany and
Austria-Hungary seems to the average American an abnormal phenomenon;
because Russia is itself a military monarchy with marked territorial
ambitions; and its civilization is at a more elementary stage than that
of France or England; but he resists present apprehension on this score
by recalling that Russia submitted to the "Concert of Europe" when her
victorious armies were within seventeen miles of Constantinople, that
she emancipated her serfs, proposed The Hague Conferences, initiated the
"Duma," and has lately offered--perhaps as war measures only--autonomy
to her Poles and equal rights of citizenship to her Jews. He also
cannot help believing that a nation which has produced such a literature
as Russia has produced during the last fifty years must hold within its
multitudinous population a large minority which is seething with high
aspirations and a fine idealism.

For the clarification of the public mind on the issue involved, it is
important that the limits of American neutrality should be discussed and
understood. The action of the Government must be neutral in the best
sense; but American sympathies and hopes cannot possibly be neutral, for
the whole history and present state of American liberty forbids. For the
present, thinking Americans can only try to appreciate the scope and
real issues of this formidable convulsion, and so be ready to seize
every opportunity that may present itself to further the cause of human
freedom, and of peace at last.

CHARLES W. ELIOT.

Asticou, Me., Sept. 1, 1914.




Appreciation from Lord Bryce

     Late Ambassador at Washington from Great Britain; Chief
     Secretary for Ireland, 1905-6; author of "The American
     Commonwealth," and of studies in history and biography.


It has been a great pleasure to see from your published letter, which
has just reached us, that you so clearly understand the motive and
feelings with which Great Britain has entered on the present war.
Neither commercial rivalry nor any fancied jealousy of Germany's
greatness has led us into it, and to the German people our people bear
no ill-will whatever. Along with many others I have worked steadily
during long years for the maintenance of friendship with Germany,
admiring the splendid gifts of the German race, and recognizing their
enormous services to science, philosophy, and literature. We had hoped,
as some thoughtful statesmen in Germany had also hoped, that by a
cordial feeling between Germany and Britain the peace of Europe might be
secured and something done to bring about permanently better relations
between Germany and her two great neighbors with whom we found ourselves
on friendly terms; and we had confidently looked to the United States to
join with us in this task. But the action of the German Government in
violating the neutrality of Belgium when France had assured us that she
would respect it, the invasion of a small State whose neutrality and
independence she and England had joined in guaranteeing, evoked in this
country an almost unanimous sentiment that the faith of treaties and the
safety of small States must be protected. There has been no war for more
than a century--perhaps two centuries--into which the nation has entered
with so general a belief that its action is justified. We rejoice to be
assured that this is the general feeling of the people of the United
States, whose opinion we naturally value more than we do that of any
other people.

Most persons in this country, including all those who work for peace,
agree with you in deploring the vast armaments which European States
have been piling up, and will hope with you that after this war they may
be reduced--and safely reduced--to slender dimensions. Their existence
is a constant menace to peace. They foster that spirit of militarism
which has brought these horrors on the world; for they create in the
great countries of the Continent a large and powerful military and naval
caste which lives for war, talks and writes incessantly of war, and
glorifies war as a thing good in itself.

It is (as you say) to the peoples that we must henceforth look to
safeguard international concord. They bear the miseries of war, they
ought to have the power to arrest the action of those who are hurrying
them into it.

To get rid of secret diplomacy is more difficult in Europe than in
America, whose relations with foreign States are fewer and simpler, but
what you say upon that subject also will find a sympathetic echo here
among the friends of freedom and of peace. I am always sincerely yours,

JAMES BRYCE.

Forest Row, Sussex, Sept. 17, 1914.




A Reply by Dr. Francke

     Professor of the History of German Culture at Harvard
     University and Curator of the Germanic Museum; author of works
     on German literature.


_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

In his letter of Sept. 1 President Eliot expresses the opinion that in
the present war "England, France, and Russia are fighting for freedom
and civilization." And he adds:

     It does not follow that thinking Americans will forget the
     immense services which Germany has rendered to civilization
     during the last hundred years, or desire that her power to
     serve letters, science, art, and education should be in the
     least abridged in the outcome of this war, upon which she has
     entered so rashly and selfishly and in so barbarous a spirit.
     Most educated Americans hope and believe that by defeating the
     German barbarousness the Allies will only promote the noble
     German civilization.

In other words, German military and political power is to be crushed in
order to set free the German genius for science, literature, and art. It
is interesting to contrast with such views as these the following words
of Goethe, uttered in 1813:

     I have often felt a bitter grief at the thought of the German
     people, which is so noble individually and so wretched as a
     whole. A comparison of the German people with other nations
     gives us painful feelings, which I try to overcome by all
     possible means; and in science and art I have found the wings
     which lift me above them. But the comfort which they afford
     is, after all, only a miserable comfort, and does not make up
     for the proud consciousness of belonging to a nation strong,
     respected, and feared. However, I am comforted by the thought
     of Germany's future. Yes, the German people has a future. The
     destiny of the Germans is not yet fulfilled. The time, the
     right time, no human eye can foresee, nor can human power
     hasten it on. To us individuals, meanwhile, is it given, to
     every one according to his talents, his inclinations, and his
     position, to increase, to strengthen, and to spread national
     culture. In order that in this respect, at least, Germany may
     be ahead of other nations and that the national spirit,
     instead of being stifled and discouraged, may be kept alive
     and hopeful and ready to rise in all its might when the day of
     glory dawns.

If I am not mistaken, these words of Germany's greatest poet express
accurately what the German people during the last hundred years has been
striving for--national culture and national pre-eminence in every field
of human activity. To advocate the reduction of Germany to a land of
isolated scientists, poets, artists, and educators is tantamount to a
call for the destruction of the German Nation.

KUNO FRANCKE.

Harvard University, Sept. 5, 1914.




DR. ELIOT'S SECOND LETTER

The Stout and Warlike Breed


_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

There is nothing new in the obsession of the principal European nations
that, in order to be great and successful in the world as it is, they
must possess military power available for instant aggression on weak
nations, as well as for effective defense against strong ones.

When Sir Francis Bacon wrote his essay on "The True Greatness of
Kingdoms and Estates" he remarked that forts, arsenals, goodly races of
horses, armaments, and the like would all be useless "except the breed
and disposition of the people be stout and warlike." He denied that
money is the sinews of war, giving preference to the sinews of men's
arms, and quoted Solon's remark to Croesus, "Sir, if any other come that
hath better iron than you, he will be master of all this gold"--a truly
Bismarckian proposition. Indeed, Sir Francis Bacon says explicitly "that
the principal point of greatness in any State is to have a race of
military men."

Goethe, reflecting on the wretchedness of the German people as a whole,
found no comfort in the German genius for science, literature, and art,
or only a miserable comfort which "does not make up for the proud
consciousness of belonging to a nation strong, respected, and feared."
Because Germany in his time was weak in the military sense, he could
write: "I have often felt a bitter grief at the thought of the German
people, which is so noble individually, and so wretched as a whole"; and
he longed for the day when the national spirit, kept alive and hopeful,
should be "ready to rise in all its might when the day of glory dawns."

"The day of glory" was to be the day of military power. Carlyle said of
Germany and France in November, 1870, "that noble, patient, deep, pious,
and solid Germany should be at length welded into a nation, and become
Queen of the Continent, instead of vaporing, vainglorious,
gesticulating, quarrelsome, restless, and oversensitive France, seems to
me that hopefulest public fact that has occurred in my time." How did
Germany attain to this position of "Queen of the Continent"? By creating
and maintaining, with utmost intelligence and skill, the strongest army
in Europe--an army which within six years had been used successfully
against Denmark, Austria, and France. Germany became "Queen" by virtue
of her military power.

In the same paper Carlyle said of the French Revolution, of which he was
himself the great portrayer: "I often call that a celestial infernal
phenomenon, the most memorable in our world for a thousand years; on the
whole, a transcendent revolt against the devil and his works, (since
shams are all and sundry of the devil, and poisonous and unendurable to
man.)" Now, the French Revolution was an extraordinary outbreak of
passionate feeling and physical violence on the part of the French
Nation, both at home and abroad; and it led on to the Napoleonic wars,
which were tremendous physical struggles for mastery in Europe.

In a recent public statement two leading philosophical writers of modern
Germany, Profs. Eucken and Haeckel, denounce the "brutal national
egoism" of England, which they say "recognizes no rights on the part of
others, and, unconcerned about morality or unmorality, pursues only its
own advantage"; and they attribute to England the purpose to hinder at
any cost the further growth of German greatness. But what are the
elements of that German greatness which England is determined to arrest
by joining France and Russia in war against Germany and Austria-Hungary?
The three elements of recent German greatness are the extension of her
territory; contiguous territories in Europe and in other continents
colonial possessions; the enlargement of German commerce and wealth, and
to these ends the firm establishment of her military supremacy in
Europe. These are the ideas on the true greatness of nations which have
prevailed in the ruling oligarchy of Germany for at least sixty years,
and now seem to have been accepted, or acquiesced in, by the whole
German people. In this view, the foundation of national greatness is
fighting power.

This conception of national greatness has prevailed at many different
epochs--Macedonian, Roman, Saracen, Spanish, English, and French--and,
indeed, has appeared from time to time in almost all the nations and
tribes of the earth; but the civilized world is now looking for better
foundations of national greatness than force and fighting.

The partial successes of democracy in Europe have much increased the
evils of war. Sir Francis Bacon looked for a fighting class; under the
feudal system when a Baron went to war he took with him his vassals, or
that portion of them that could be spared from the fields at home.
Universal conscription is a modern invention, the horrors of which, as
now exhibited in Germany, Austria-Hungary, and France, much exceed those
of earlier martial methods. There has never been such an interruption of
agricultural and industrial production, or such a rending of family ties
in consequence of war as is now taking place in the greater part of
Europe. Moreover, mankind has never before had the use of such
destructive implements as the machine gun, the torpedo, and the dynamite
bomb. The progress of science has much increased the potential
destructiveness of warfare.

Thinking people in all the civilized countries are asking themselves
what the fundamental trouble with civilization is, and where to look for
means of escape from the present intolerable conditions. Christianity in
nineteen centuries has afforded no relief. The so-called mitigations of
war are comparatively trivial. The recent Balkan wars were as ferocious
as those of Alexander. The German aviators drop aimless bombs at night
into cities occupied chiefly by non-combatants. The North Sea is strewn
with floating mines which may destroy fishing, freight, or passenger
vessels of any nation, neutral or belligerent, which have business on
that sea. The ruthless destruction of the Louvain Library by German
soldiers reminds people who have read history that the destroyers of the
Alexandria Library have ever since been called fanatics and barbarians.
The German Army tries to compel unfortified Belgian cities and towns to
pay huge ransoms to save themselves from destruction--a method which the
Barbary States, indeed, were accustomed to use against their Christian
neighbors, but which has long been held to be a method appropriate only
for brigands and pirates--Greek, Sicilian, Syrian, or Chinese.


What Is Wrong with Civilization?

How can it be that the Government of a civilized State commits, or
permits in its agents, such barbarities? The fundamental reason seems to
be that most of the European nations still believe that national
greatness depends on the possession and brutal use of force, and is to
be maintained and magnified only by military and naval power.

In North America there are two large communities--heretofore inspired
chiefly by ideals of English origin--which have never maintained
conscripted armies, and have never fortified against each other their
long frontier--Canada and the United States. Both may fairly be called
great peoples even now; and both give ample promise for the future.
Neither of these peoples lacks the "stout and warlike" quality of which
Sir Francis Bacon spoke; both have often exhibited it. The United States
suffered for four years from a civil war, characterized by determined
fighting, in indecisive battles, in which the losses, in proportion to
the number of men engaged, were often much heavier than any thus far
reported from the present battlefields in Belgium and France. There
being then no lack of martial spirit in these two peoples, it is an
instructive phenomenon that power to conquer is not their ideal of
national greatness. Much the same thing may be said of some other
self-governing constituents of the British Empire, such as Australia,
New Zealand, and South Africa. They, too, have a better ideal of
national greatness than that of military supremacy.

What are the real ambitions and hopes of the people of the United States
and the people of Canada in regard to their own future? Their
expectations of greatness certainly are not based on any conception of
invincible military force, or desire for the physical means of enforcing
their own will on their neighbors. They both believe in the free
commonwealth, administered justly, and with the purpose of securing for
each individual all the freedom he can exercise without injury to his
neighbors and the collective well-being. They desire for themselves,
each for itself, a strong Government, equipped to perform its functions
with dignity, certainty, and efficiency; but they wish to have that
Government under the control of the deliberate public opinion of free
citizens, and not under the control of any Prætorian Guard, Oligarchic
Council, or General Staff, and they insist that the civil authority
should always control such military and police forces as it may be
necessary to maintain for protective purposes.


True National Greatness.

They believe that the chief object of government should be the promotion
of the public welfare by legislative and administrative means; that the
processes of government should be open and visible, and their results be
incessantly published for approval or disapproval. They believe that a
nation becomes great through industrial productiveness and the resulting
internal and external commerce, through the gradual increase of comfort
and general well-being in the population, and through the advancement of
science, letters, and art. They believe that education, free intercourse
with other nations, and religious enthusiasm and toleration are means of
national greatness, and that in the development and use of these means
force has no place. They attribute national greatness in others, as well
as in themselves, not to the possession of military force, but to the
advance of the people in freedom, industry, righteousness, and
good-will.

They believe that the ideals of fighting power and domination should be
replaced by the ideals of peaceful competition in production and trade,
of generous rivalry in education, scientific discovery, and the fine
arts, of co-operation for mutual benefit among nations different in
size, natural abilities, and material resources, and of federation among
nations associated geographically or historically, or united in the
pursuit of some common ends and in the cherishing of like hopes and
aspirations. They think that the peace of the world can be best promoted
by solemn public compacts between peoples--not Princes or
Cabinets--compacts made to be kept, strengthened by mutual services and
good offices, and watched over by a permanent International Judicial
Tribunal authorized to call on the affiliated nations for whatever force
may be necessary to induce obedience to its decrees.

Will not the civilized world learn from this horrible European war--the
legitimate result of the policies of Bismarck and his associates and
disciples--that these democratic ideals constitute the rational
substitute for the imperialistic ideal of fighting force as the
foundation of national greatness? The new ideals will still need the
protection and support, both within and without each nation, of a
restrained public force, acting under law, national and international,
just as a sane mind needs as its agent a sound and strong body. Health
and vigor will continue to be the safeguards of morality, justice, and
mercy.

CHARLES W. ELIOT.

Asticou, Me., Sept. 14, 1914.




DR. ELIOT'S THIRD LETTER.

Why Is America Anti-German?


_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

The numerous pamphlets which German writers are now distributing in the
United States, and the many letters about the European war which
Americans are now receiving from German and German-American friends, are
convincing thoughtful people in this country that American public
opinion has some weight with the German Government and people, or, at
least, some interest for them; but that the reasons which determine
American sympathy with the Allies, rather than with Germany and
Austria-Hungary, are not understood in Germany, and are not always
appreciated by persons of German birth who have lived long in the United
States.

It would be a serious mistake to suppose that Americans feel any
hostility or jealousy toward Germany, or fail to recognize the immense
obligations under which she has placed all the rest of the world,
although they now feel that the German Nation has been going wrong in
theoretical and practical politics for more than a hundred years, and is
today reaping the consequences of her own wrong-thinking and
wrong-doing.

There are many important matters concerning which American sympathy is
strongly with Germany: (1) The unification of Germany, which Bismarck
and his co-workers accomplished, naturally commended itself to
Americans, whose own country is a firm federation of many more or less
different States, containing more or less different peoples; while most
Americans did not approve Bismarck's methods and means, they cordially
approved his accomplishment of German unification; (2) Americans have
felt unqualified admiration for the commercial and financial growth of
Germany during the past forty years, believing it to be primarily the
fruit of well-directed industry and enterprise; (3) all educated
Americans feel strong gratitude to the German Nation for its
extraordinary achievements in letters, science, and education within the
last hundred years. Jealousy of Germany in these matters is absolutely
foreign to American thought, and that any external power or influence
should undertake to restrict or impair German progress in these respects
would seem to all Americans intolerable, and, indeed incredible; (4) all
Americans who have had any experience in Governmental or educational
administration recognize the fact, that German administration--both in
peace and in war--is the most efficient in the world, and for that
efficiency they feel nothing but respect and admiration, unless the
efficiency requires an inexpedient suppression or restriction of
individual liberty; (5) Americans sympathize with a unanimous popular
sentiment in favor of a war which the people believe to be essential to
the greatness, and even the safety, of their country--a sentiment which
prompts to family and property sacrifices very distressing at the
moment, and irremediable in the future; and they believe that the German
people today are inspired by just such an overwhelming sentiment.

How is it, then, that, with all these strong American feelings tending
to make them sympathize with the German people in good times or bad, in
peace or in war, the whole weight of American opinion is on the side of
the Allies in the present war? The reasons are to be found, of course,
in the political and social history of the American people, and in its
Governmental philosophy and practice today. These reasons have come out
of the past, and are intrenched in all the present ideals and practices
of the American Commonwealth. They inevitably lead Americans to object
strongly and irrevocably to certain German national practices of great
moment, practices which are outgrowths of Prussian theories, and
experiences that have come to prevail in Germany during the past hundred
years. In the hope that American public opinion about the European war
may be a little better understood abroad it seems worth while to
enumerate those German practices which do not conform to American
standards in the conduct of public affairs:

(a) Americans object to the committal of a nation to grave measures of
foreign policy by a permanent Executive--Czar, Kaiser, or King--advised
in secret by professional diplomatists who consider themselves the
personal representatives of their respective sovereigns. The American
people have no permanent Executive, and the profession of diplomacy
hardly exists among them. In the conduct of their national affairs they
utterly distrust secrecy, and are accustomed to demand and secure the
utmost publicity.

(b) They object to placing in any ruler's hands the power to order
mobilization or declare war in advance of deliberate consultation with a
representative assembly, and of co-operative action thereby. The fact
that German mobilization was ordered three days in advance of the
meeting of the Reichstag confounds all American ideas and practices
about the rights of the people and the proper limits of Executive
authority.

(c) The secrecy of European diplomatic intercourse and of international
understandings and terms of alliance in Europe is in the view of
ordinary Americans not only inexpedient, but dangerous and
unjustifiable. Under the Constitution of the United States no treaty
negotiated by the President and his Cabinet is valid until it has been
publicly discussed and ratified by the Senate. During this discussion
the people can make their voice heard through the press, the telegraph,
and the telephone.

(d) The reliance on military force as the foundation of true national
greatness seems to thinking Americans erroneous, and in the long run
degrading to a Christian nation. They conceive that the United States
may fairly be called a great nation; but that its greatness is due to
intellectual and moral forces acting through adequate material forces
and expressed in education, public health and order, agriculture,
manufacturing, and commerce, and the resulting general well-being of the
people. It has never in all its history organized what could be called a
standing or a conscripted army; and, until twenty years ago, its navy
was very small, considering the length of its sea coasts. There is
nothing in the history of the American people to make them believe that
the true greatness of nations depends on military power.


Object to Extension by Force.

(e) They object to the extension of national territory by force,
contrary to the wishes of the population concerned. This objection is
the inevitable result of democratic institutions; and the American
people have been faithful to this democratic opinion under circumstances
of considerable difficulty--as, for example, in withdrawing from Cuba,
the rich island which had been occupied by American troops during the
short war with Spain, (1898,) and in the refusing to intervene by force
in Mexico for the protection of American investors, when that contiguous
country was distracted by factional fighting. This objection applies to
long-past acts of the German Government an well as to its proceedings in
the present war--as, for example, to the taking of Schleswig-Holstein
and Alsace-Lorraine, as well as to the projected occupation of Belgium.

(f) Americans object strenuously to the violation of treaties between
nations on the allegation of military necessity or for any other reason
whatever. They believe that the progress of civilization will depend in
future on the general acceptance of the sanctity of contracts or solemn
agreements between nations and on the development by common consent of
international law. The neutralization treaties, the arbitration
treaties, The Hague Conferences, and some of the serious attempts at
mediation, although none of them go far enough, and many of them have
been rudely violated on occasion, illustrate a strong tendency in the
civilized parts of the world to prevent international wars by means of
agreements deliberately made in time of peace. The United States has
proposed and made more of these agreements than any other power, has
adhered to them, and profited by them. Under one such agreement, made
nearly a hundred years ago, Canada and the United States have avoided
forts and armaments against each other, although they have had serious
differences of opinion and clashes of interests, and the frontier is
3,000 miles long and for the most part without natural barriers.
Cherishing the hope that the peace of Europe and the rights of its
peoples may be secured through solemn compacts, (which should include
the establishment of a permanent international judicial tribunal,
supported by an international force,) Americans see, in the treatment by
the German Government of the Belgian neutralization treaty as nothing
but a piece of paper which might be torn up on the ground of military
necessity, evidence of the adoption by Germany of a retrograde policy of
the most alarming sort. That single act on the part of Germany--the
violation of the neutral territory of Belgium--would have determined
American opinion in favor of the Allies, if it had stood alone by
itself--the reason being that American hopes for the peace and order of
the world are based on the sanctity of treaties.

(g) American public opinion, however, has been greatly shocked in other
ways by the German conduct of the war. The American common people see no
justification for the dropping of bombs, to which no specific aim can be
given, into cities and towns chiefly inhabited by non-combatants, the
burning or blowing up of large portions of unfortified towns and cities,
the destruction of precious monuments and treasuries of art, the
strewing of floating mines through the North Sea, the exacting of
ransoms from cities and towns under threat of destroying them, and the
holding of unarmed citizens as hostages for the peaceable behavior of a
large population under threat of summary execution of the hostages in
case of any disorder. All these seem to Americans unnecessary,
inexpedient, and unjustifiable methods of warfare, sure to breed hatred
and contempt toward the nation that uses them, and therefore to make it
difficult for future generations to maintain peace and order in Europe.
They cannot help imagining the losses civilization would suffer if the
Russians should ever carry into Western Europe the kind of war which the
Germans are now waging in Belgium and France. They have supposed that
war was to be waged in this century only against public, armed forces
and their supplies and shelters.

These opinions and prepossessions on the part of the American people
have obviously grown out of the ideals which the early English colonists
carried with them to the American wilderness in the seventeenth century,
out of the long fighting and public discussion which preceded the
adoption of the Constitution of the United States in the eighteenth
century, and out of the peculiar experiences of the free Commonwealths
which make up the United States, as they have spread across the almost
uninhabited continent during the past 125 years.

The experience and the situation of modern Germany have been utterly
different. Germany was divided for centuries into discordant parts, had
ambitious and martial neighbors, and often felt the weight of their
attacks. Out of war came accessions of territory for Prussia, and at
last German unity. The reliance of intelligent and patriotic Germany on
military force as the basis of national greatness is a natural result of
its experiences. Americans, however, believe that this reliance is
unsound both theoretically and practically. The wars in Europe since
1870-71, the many threatenings of war, and the present catastrophe seem
to Americans to demonstrate that no amount of military preparedness on
the part of the nations of Europe can possibly keep the peace of the
Continent, or indeed prevent frequent explosions of destructive warfare.
They think, too, that preparation for war on the part of Germany better
than any of her neighbors can make will not keep her at peace or protect
her from invasion, even if this better preparation include advantages of
detail which have been successfully kept secret. All the nations which
surround Germany are capable of developing a strong fighting spirit; and
all the countries of Europe, except England and Russia, possess the
means of quickly assembling and getting into action great bodies of men.
In other words, all the European States are capable of developing a
passionate patriotism, and all possess the railroads, roads,
conveyances, telegraphs, and telephones which make rapid mobilization
possible. No perfection of military forces, and no amount of previous
study of feasible campaigns against neighbors, can give peaceful
security to Germany in the present condition of the great European
States. In the actual development of weapons and munitions, and of the
art of quick intrenching, the attacking force in battle on land is at a
great disadvantage in comparison with the force on the defensive. That
means indecisive battles and ultimately an indecisive war, unless each
party is resolved to push the war to the utter exhaustion and
humiliation of the other--a long process which involves incalculable
losses and wastes and endless miseries. Americans have always before
them the memory of their four years' civil war, which, although
resolutely prosecuted on both sides, could not be brought to a close
until the resources of the Southern States in men and material were
exhausted. In that dreadful process the whole capital of the Southern
States was wiped out.


But One Possible Issue.

Now that the sudden attack on Paris has failed, and adequate time has
been secured to summon the slower-moving forces of Russia and England,
and these two resolute and persistent peoples have decided to use all
their spiritual and material forces in co-operation with France against
Germany, thoughtful Americans can see but one possible issue of the
struggle, whether it be long or short, namely, the defeat of Germany and
Austria-Hungary in their present undertakings, and the abandonment by
both peoples of the doctrine that their salvation depends on militarism
and the maintenance of autocratic Executives intrusted with the power
and the means to make sudden war. They believe that no human being
should ever be trusted with such power. The alternative is, of course,
genuine constitutional government, with the military power subject to
the civil power.

The American people grieve over the fruitless sacrifices of life,
property, and the natural human joys which the German people are making
to a wrong and impossible ideal of national power and welfare. The
sacrifices which Germany is imposing on the Allies are fearfully heavy,
but there is reason to hope that these will not be fruitless, for out of
them may come great gains for liberty and peace in Europe.

All experienced readers on this side of the Atlantic are well aware that
nine-tenths of all the reports they get about the war come from English
and French sources, and this knowledge makes them careful not to form
judgments about details until the events and deeds tell their own story.
They cannot even tell to which side victory inclines in a long,
far-extended battle until recognizable changes in the positions of the
combatants show what the successes or failures must have been. The
English and French win some advantage so far as the formation of public
opinion in this country is concerned, because those two Governments send
hither official reports on current events more frequently than the
German Government does, and with more corroborative details. The amount
of secrecy with which the campaign is surrounded on both sides is,
however, a new and unwelcome experience for both the English and the
American public.


German Ignorance of Events.

The pamphlets by German publicists and men of letters which are now
coming to this country, and the various similar publications written
here, seem to indicate that the German public is still kept by its
Government in ignorance about the real antecedents of the war and about
many of the incidents and aspects of the portentous combat. These
documents seem to Americans to contain a large amount of misinformation
about the attack of Austria-Hungary on Servia, the diplomatic
negotiations and the correspondence between the sovereigns which
immediately preceded the war, and the state of mind of the Belgian and
English peoples. American believers in the good sense and good feeling
of the common people naturally imagine, when an awful calamity befalls a
nation, that the people cannot have been warned of its approach, else
they would have avoided it. In this case they fear that the Emperor, the
Chancellery, and the General Staff have themselves been misinformed in
important respects, have made serious miscalculations which they are
proposing to conceal as long as possible, and are not taking the common
people into their confidence. American sympathies are with the German
people in their sufferings and losses, but not with their rulers, or
with the military class, or with the professors and men of letters who
have been teaching for more than a generation that might makes right.
That short phrase contains the fundamental fallacy which for fifty years
has been poisoning the springs of German thought and German policy on
public affairs.

Dread of the Muscovite does not seem to Americans a reasonable
explanation of the present actions of Germany and Austria-Hungary,
except so far as irrational panic can be said to be an explanation.
Against possible, though not probable, Russian aggression, a firm
defensive alliance of all Western Europe would be a much better
protection than the single might of Germany. It were easy to imagine
also two new "buffer" States--a reconstructed Poland and a Balkan
Confederation. As to French "revenge," it is the inevitable and
praiseworthy consequence of Germany's treatment of France in 1870-71.
The great success of Germany in expanding her commerce during the last
thirty years makes it hard for Americans to understand the hot
indignation of the Germans against the British because of whatever
ineffective opposition Great Britain may have offered to that expansion.
No amount of commercial selfishness on the part of insular England can
justify Germany in attempting to seize supreme power in Europe and
thence, perhaps, in the world.

Finally, Americans hope and expect that there will be no such fatal
issue of the present struggle as the destruction or ruin of the German
Nation. On the contrary, they believe that Germany will be freer,
happier, and greater than ever when once she has got rid of the
monstrous Bismarck policies and the Emperor's archaic conception of his
function, and has enjoyed twenty years of real peace. Your obedient
servant,

CHARLES W. ELIOT.

Asticou, Me., Sept. 28, 1914.




Dr. Dernburg's Reply to the Third Letter

     Late German Secretary of State for the Colonies; lived for
     several years in the United States as member of the banking
     firm of Ladenburg, Thalmann & Co., New York.


_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

Prof. Eliot is conferring a great favor on the exponents of the German
side in the present struggle in explaining to them what he thinks of the
so-called anti-German feeling in the United States. I am sure his views
will be read also in Germany with a great deal of attention, although he
will certainly not remain unchallenged in nearly all essential points.
The compliment that Prof. Eliot pays to the German people as a whole
must be specially appreciated, the more so as it comes from a scientist
whose great authority is equally recognized on both sides of the
Atlantic.

The anti-German feeling, according to Prof. Eliot, takes its source from
the American objection to the committal of a nation to grave mistakes by
a permanent Executive. But then, with the exception of France, all the
warring nations have permanent Executives, professional diplomatists;
all their affairs are conducted in secret, and all their rulers have the
power, including the President of France, to embroil their nations in
war. The German Emperor is in this respect certainly more restricted
than the other heads of State, and I have not read that the declaration
of war has been expressly sanctioned by the English Parliament, and
certainly the mobilization of the English fleet that took place in July,
and the mobilization of the Russian Army that took place at the same
time, have not even been brought to the knowledge of the respective
Parliaments. When, therefore, the same conditions prevail in all the
warring States, how can they be made the reason for such an anti-German
feeling?

The same objection holds good with the American antipathy against the
power of rulers to order mobilization or declare war in advance without
consultation of Parliament, to which I have only to say that the English
fleet was mobilized without consulting the English Parliament, while in
Germany the Bundesrat, the representatives of the Federal States, as
well as of the Federal Diets, has been duly consulted. I may add that
also the party leaders of the Reichstag, which could not be convoked
earlier than two days after the declaration of the war, have been
continuously informed and consulted.

Against the next paragraph, where Prof. Eliot complains of the secrecy
of European diplomacy and of international treaties and understandings,
the same objection must be made. The state described here as particular
to Germany prevails in all European countries, and neither the treaty of
the Russian-French alliance, nor the arrangements of the Triple Entente
have ever been submitted to the French or British Parliaments. As
regards the American attitude toward armaments, I purposely refrain from
adducing the American example into my argument, much as I could show
that with a very large part of the American Nation the idea of defending
the American coast against any invader and the maintenance of a strong
Pan-American policy, if need be by arms, is just as fixed a tenet as the
German idea that the Fatherland should be held safe from invasion or
destruction by the will and the strength of its people. England has
always held the same, if not through her army so through her navy, and
so did the rest of Europe; and there is no argument to be gotten from
that for an anti-German feeling.


No Seizure of Schleswig-Holstein.

Americans object to the extension of territory by force. Germany has
never done that, even if one goes back as far as Prof. Eliot wishes to
go. Mr. Eliot is absolutely mistaken as to the history of the
incorporation of Schleswig-Holstein into Prussia. Schleswig-Holstein was
a Dual-Dukedom that never belonged to Denmark, but having as its Duke
the King of Denmark as long as he belonged to the elder line of the
House of Oldenburg. This elder line was extinct when King Christian
VIII. died without male issue. His successor wanted to incorporate the
two German Dukedoms into Denmark. Then the people stood up and expressed
the desire to remain with the German Federation, to which it had always
belonged, and there it is now, of its own free will. The natural
dividing line between Denmark and Germany, however, is the River Eider.
There are about 30,000 Danes south of the Eider, who have been absorbed
against their will, a thing that can never be avoided, and that has
sometimes given Prussia a little trouble.


Alsace-Lorraine Originally German.

As to Alsace-Lorraine, the facts are known to be that it had belonged to
Germany until it had been taken, against the will of the people, by
France under Louis XIV., and it was returned to Germany as a matter of
right, more than three-quarters of the population being of German
descent and speaking the German language.

But let me ask in return, Mr. Eliot, when did ever in her political
career England consult the will of the people when she took a country?
Can he say that, when England tore the treaty of Majuba Hill, like a
"scrap of paper," and made war on the Boers? Did she consult the people
of Cyprus in 1878? Does he know of any plébiscite in India? Has she
consulted the Persians, or has France consulted the people of Morocco,
or of Indo-China, Italy the people of Tripoli? Since Germany has not
acted here in any other way forty years ago than all the other nations,
why does Dr. Eliot consider the American people justified in taking
anti-German views for reasons of such an old date, while he forgives the
nations of the party he favors for much more recent infringement of his
rule?

"Americans object to the violation of treaties." So do the Germans. We
have always kept our treaties, and mean to do so in the future. The fact
with Belgium is that her neutrality was very one-sided; that, as can be
proved, as early as the 25th of June, Liège was full of French soldiers,
that Belgian fortifications were all directed against Germany, and that
for years past it was the Belgian press that outdid the French press in
attacks against Germany. But I can give Mr. Eliot here some authority
that he has so far not challenged. When Sir Edward Grey presented the
English case in the House of Commons on the 3d of August he declared
that the British attitude was laid down by the British Government in
1870, and he verbally cited Mr. Gladstone's speech, in which he said he
could not subscribe to the assertion that the simple fact of the
existence of a guarantee was binding on every party, irrespective
altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the
time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. He called
that assertion a "stringent and impracticable" view of the guarantee and
the whole treaty a "complicated question." So Mr. Gladstone, and with
him Sir Edward Grey, has held the Belgian neutrality treaty not binding
on every party, when it was against the interest which the particular
situation dictated, when the war broke out. It was the interest of Great
Britain to maintain the treaty, and that is why she acted. It was
against German interest to maintain the treaty, and that is why she
broke it. That is the British and not the German theory, and I could
very well rest my case here. My theory is with the German Chancellor,
that I greatly regret the necessity of violating the Belgian neutrality,
after Belgium had chosen to repel the German overtures for a free
passage.

It is quite certain that the breach of the Belgian neutrality by Germany
was used in Great Britain as a powerful instrument to influence the
public sentiment. Every war must be borne by national unity, and it is
the duty of the nation's leaders to secure such unity by all practicable
means. But has it been forgotten that the attitude of Sir Edward Grey
caused such excellent men as Lord Morley, John Burns, and Sir John
Trevelyan to leave the Cabinet, where they were looked upon as the best
and most liberal members of the ruling combination? Bernard Shaw says of
Great Britain that she has never been at a loss for an effective moral
attitude. Such an attitude is a powerful weapon in diplomatical and
actual warfare, and it must be resorted to, if the necessity arises. But
that cannot blind us to the fact that the British Government allowed the
political interest to be the paramount consideration in this Belgian
neutrality matter. The German interest for not acting on the guarantee
was just as strong as the English to act for it.

The proof is found in the English "White Paper." I cite the famous
reprint of THE TIMES, (Dispatch No. 148 of Aug. 2 to Paris.) Here Sir
Edward Grey says: "We were considering ... whether we should declare
violation of Belgian neutrality to be a casus belli."


"Treaties Must Not Be Overrated."

I am an ardent believer in all international arrangements to prevent
difficulties and wars between nations, and I rejoice with the American
people in the signal success this policy is now having in this country.
But international treaties must not be overrated. There are questions
which cannot be settled by them. It is too difficult to explain just the
nature of such situations as arose in Europe, so I may be permitted for
once to ask this question: Does Prof. Eliot believe that the majority of
the American people think that the unwritten Monroe Doctrine could be
made the subject of arbitration, whether it had a right to exist or to
be enforced? I must emphatically say, No, it could not. It can be as
little arbitrated upon as a matter of religion or of personal morals.

Mr. Eliot thinks a happy result of the war would be that American
institutions should prevail in Germany thereafter. Why should Germany
only become a representative republic? Does he not demand the same
regarding Russia, England, Italy, Austria, and Japan? And if not, why
not?

From all this I fail to see the point in the reasons given by Prof.
Eliot why fair-minded Americans should side with the Allies because the
objections made against German procedure, down to the breach of the
Belgian neutrality, must be made against all other European States.
British history is just teeming with examples of broken treaties and
torn "scraps of paper." The chasing of German diplomatic representatives
out of neutral Egypt is a case in point.

I must insist that whatever anti-German feeling there is is not fully
explained by Prof. Eliot, and his article cannot be made a code by which
German behavior could be regulated in the future. Prof. Eliot is a
scholar; business interests do not come very near him. So he is
especially concerned with the ethical aspect of the matter. He believes
the Germans think that "might is right." This is very unjust. Our
history proves that we have never acted on this principle. We have never
got or attempted to get a world empire such as England has won, all of
which, with a very few exceptions, by might, by war, and by conquest.
The German writers who have expounded this doctrine have only shown how
the large world empires of England and France were welded together, what
means have been adopted for that purpose, and against what sort of
political doctrines we must beware.


Our Sympathy for the Under Dog.

As Dr. Eliot makes his remarks for the benefit of his German confrères,
may I be permitted to say to them what I consider the reason for the
American attitude? There is, in the first place, the ethical side.
Americans have a very strong sense of generosity, and are, as a rule,
very good sports. They think Belgium a small nation, brutally attacked
by a much bigger fellow; they feel that the little man stands up bravely
and gamely, and fights for all he is worth. Such a situation will always
command American sympathy and antagonism against the stronger. Then
there is the business side. Americans feel that this war is endangering
their political and commercial interests, so they are naturally angry
against the people who, they believe, have brought the war about.

As Germany has not had an opportunity to make herself heard as amply as
her adversaries, they think that it was Germany which set the world
afire, and that is what they resent, and in which they were justified,
if it were true. But the question of the hour is not the question of the
past, but of the present and of the future, and the people on this side
who will give Germany fair play because it is just in them will examine
the situation in the light of their interests. Then they will find that
Belgium had been in league with the Allies long before the conflagration
broke out, only to be left to its own resources when the critical hour
arose. They will further find that it is not Germany but England and her
allies that are throttling commerce, maiming cables, stopping mails,
and breaking neutrality and other treaties to further their aims; that,
finally, today England has established a world rule on the sea to which
even America must submit. They will then soon come to the conclusion
that, no matter what happened in the past, the peace of the world can
only be assured by a good understanding between Germany and the United
States as a sort of counterbalance against the unmeasured aggrandizement
of English sea power. Then the feeling toward Germany will be
considerably better, and I may add that even now it is not so very bad
after all.

I make these remarks with due respect to Prof. Eliot and his views, and
with great reluctance for being compelled to enter the field against a
personality whose undoubted superiority I wish to be the first to
acknowledge.

BERNHARD DERNBURG.

New York, Oct. 4, 1914.




Dr. Jordan's Reply to Dr. Dernburg

     Daniel Jordan is Assistant Professor of Roman Languages and
     Literature at Columbia University.


_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

President Eliot is as fair a judge of the present European situation as
can be found anywhere, and is well qualified to explain the almost
unanimous attitude of thoughtful Americans in regard to Germany. Dr.
Dernburg, on the other hand, has been officially sent from Germany to
expound the German official version; both his point of view and his
treatment of facts are essentially un-American.

He says: "Americans object to the extension of territory by force.
Germany has never done that." Apparently he believes that the Poles
asked Prussia to become her subjects. The facts are that they have
fought and begged for autonomy for nearly 150 years, and that at the
present time high German officials are members of the Anti-Polish
League.

Dr. Dernburg, when he comes to Schleswig-Holstein, states that 30,000
Danes south of the Eider River (this is in Holstein) have been absorbed
against their will, "a thing that can never be avoided, and that has
sometimes given Prussia a little trouble." But what about the Danes
north of the Eider River? Schleswig and Holstein are really two
provinces. Holstein is German, but the northern part of Schleswig, north
of Fiensburg, is inhabited by Danes who are longing to join Denmark and
who number about 200,000. Article 5 of the Treaty of Prague, signed on
Aug. 23, 1866, after Sadowa, between Prussia and Austria, states that
the inhabitants of Northern Schleswig shall be given a chance to join
Denmark, "if they should so express the desire by a free vote." Prussia
has not respected this solemn promise any more than former promises
concerning Schleswig. The frequently renewed protests of the annexed
Danes have remained unanswered. The best proof that Prussia's title to
Danish Schleswig was not considered as very substantial is that in
October, 1878, Prussia finally obtained from Austria the annulment of
Article 5 of the Treaty of Prague, which dealt with the taking of a
plébiscite in Danish Schleswig.

To decide the fate of a province without consulting the inhabitants
seems perfectly natural to German Kultur, but to Americans it is not;
the days of slavery have gone, and wherever slavery still exists it is
time to make a change.

As to Alsace-Lorraine, says Dr. Dernburg, "the facts are known that it
had belonged to Germany until it was taken by Louis XIV., against the
will of the people, and that it was returned to Germany as a matter of
right." Such an argument is mediaeval, and it might just as well be
argued that Germany should now belong to France, because Germany was
once conquered, civilized, and organized by inhabitants of France, led
by their Frankish King. And it is not sure that in 1648 Alsace was not
glad to become French, because Louis XIV., by the Treaty of Westphalia,
then granted perfect religious freedom to the Alsatians, who unlike
their neighbors, lived ever since without fear of religious
persecutions. Lorraine itself was not annexed by Louis XIV., nor by
force, as it was peacefully united to France at the death of Stanislas,
father of the Queen of France, Marie-Lesinzka. As for the inhabitants of
Metz, they were considered long ago as French. Metz was annexed to
France in 1552, with the full consent of the then allies of the French
King, Henri II., the German Princes, who recognized by the Treaty of
Cateau-Cambresis, (1559,) that Metz, Toul, and Verdun were French
cities, and could not be considered as a part of the German
Confederation. So there were at one time German Princes who accepted
the dogma of the consent of the governed!

Attacking the record of England in order to defend the record of
Germany, as Dr. Dernburg does, is no justification for the necessary
German aggression of today. Even granting that the English record is
poor, which is a matter open to discussion, two wrongs would not make
things right.

Dr. Dernburg also compares the policy of aggrandizement of Germany in
Schleswig, Alsace, &c., with that of other countries in Morocco,
Tripoli, &c. Even school children know that two things which are
entirely unlike must not be compared. Northern Africa had too long been
a den of pirates and brigands, and Latin Europe has rendered an immense
service to the world in establishing order there. Algeria has been
conquered in the same way as Morocco is now being conquered, and her
natives enjoy more genuine liberty than they ever did before; they are
even willing to fight as volunteers for the country they consider now as
their own. Neither Danish Schleswig nor Alsace-Lorraine, which were as
civilized as any other European country when they were last annexed, can
be compared to Morocco any more than to the Philippines. So this
comparison made by Dr. Dernburg also falls to pieces.

The case of the German point of view is not entirely without hope. In
THE TIMES of Oct. 5 Dr. Dernburg approves the annexation of Holstein
because the Germans of Holstein wanted to belong to Germany. This is a
sound conclusion, and Dr. Dernburg will doubtless acknowledge
later--better late than never--that the Alsatians and the Danish of
Schleswig should have had their say, just like the Germans of Holstein.
It cannot be possible that to him the wish of the inhabitants of a
province is the voice of God when it suits Germany and the voice of the
devil when it suits somebody else.

DANIEL JORDAN.

Columbia University, Nov. 6, 1914.




Dr. Irene Sargent's Reply to Dr. Dernburg

     Professor of the History of Fine Arts, Syracuse University.


_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

Contradicting Dr. Eliot, Dr. Bernhard Dernburg says:

     Schleswig-Holstein was a dual Dukedom that never belonged to
     Denmark; but, having as its Duke the King of Denmark, as long
     as he belonged to the elder line of the house of Oldenburg ...
     Frederick VII. wanted to incorporate the two German Dukedoms
     into Denmark.... Then the people stood up and expressed the
     desire to remain with the German Federation.

Such an assertion is a summary, inaccurate, and unfair manner of dealing
with perhaps the most complex series of diplomatic, legal, and racial
questions that arose in the nineteenth century. It would appear from the
best evidence that Schleswig was indissolubly united with the Crown of
Denmark. To maintain this principle Christian VIII. in 1846 issued
letters patent declaring that the royal line of succession (female) was
in full force, as far as Schleswig was concerned. As to Holstein, the
King stated that he was prevented from giving an equally clear decision,
and the reason of his hesitation lay in the assumption that the law of
the Salic Saxons excluding women from the throne would naturally prevail
in Holstein, where the Germans, their customs, and their language were
dominant. Two years later, Prussia sought to restore her prestige, lost
in the Revolution of 1848, by sending troops into the Duchies in order
to enforce the principle that this territory constituted two independent
and indivisible States, the government of which was hereditary in the
male line alone. The Prussian troops were afterward withdrawn by the
hesitating Frederic William, and there followed a succession of
protocols, constitutions, and compacts until the time of Bismarck, who,
in his "Reflections," Volume II., Page 10, in writing of the Duchies,
acknowledges:

"From the beginning I kept annexation steadily before my eyes."

The master of statecraft conquered. But did the people "stand up and
express their desire to remain with the German Federation," as Dr.
Dernburg asserts?

If his assertion be true, why were the Danish "optants" subjected to
domiciliary visits, perquisitions, arrest, and expulsion? And why--only
to mention one instance of espionage--did the Prussian police confiscate
the issue of a Danish newspaper published in Schleswig because it
contained a reference to that Duchy under its historic name of South
Jutland?

The truth stands that the whole Schleswig-Holstein question is one that
involves the modern principle of "nationality," and, as such, enters of
necessity into the present European crisis. It is broadly understood by
Dr. Eliot and willfully misapprehended by his critic.

Passing on to consider Alsace-Lorraine, Dr. Dernburg declares that "it
had belonged to Germany until it was taken, against the will of the
people, under Louis XIV."

In this statement, as in the treatment of the previous question, facts
are mutilated and wrong impressions are given. Alsace, it is well known,
was included within the confines of ancient Gaul, its original
population was Celtic, and it passed, late in the fifth Christian
century, under the rule of the Franks, one of whose chieftains, Clovis,
became the founder of the first French monarchy. In dealing with its
later history Dr. Dernburg confuses the Holy Roman (Germanic) Empire
with Germany, considered in its modern sense. He appears to forget that
the reign of Louis XIV. was an age of absolutism and not of plébiscites.

He also ignores that the most strenuous efforts on the part of Germany
to strangle the French nationality and language in the imperial
territory (Alsace-Lorraine) have proved useless, although they have been
exerted constantly for almost a half century.

IRENE SARGENT.

Professor of the History of Fine Arts.

Syracuse University, Nov. 3, 1914.




DR. ELIOT'S FOURTH LETTER.

Germany and World Empire


_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

Each one of the principal combatants in Europe seems to be anxious to
prove that it is not responsible for this cruelest, most extensive, and
most destructive of all wars. Each Government involved has published the
correspondence between its Chief Executive and other Chief Executives,
and between its Chancellery or Foreign Office and the equivalent bodies
in the other nations that have gone to war, and has been at pains to
give a wide circulation to these documents. To be sure, none of these
Government publications seems to be absolutely complete. There seems to
be in all of them suppressions or omissions which only the future
historian will be able to report--perhaps after many years. They reveal,
however, the dilapidated state of the Concert of Europe in July, 1914,
and the flurry in the European Chancelleries which the ultimatum sent by
Austria-Hungary to Servia produced. They also testify to the existence
of a new and influential public opinion, about war and peace, to which
nations that go to war think it desirable to appeal for justification or
moral support.

These publications have been read with intense interest by impartial
observers in all parts of the world, and have in many cases determined
the direction of the readers' sympathy and good will; and yet none of
them discloses or deals with the real sources of the unprecedented
calamity. They relate chiefly to the question who struck the match, and
not to the questions who provided the magazine that exploded, and why
did he provide it. Grave responsibility, of course, attaches to the
person who gives the order to mobilize a national army or to invade a
neighbor's territory; but the real source of the resulting horrors is
not in such an order, but in the Governmental institutions, political
philosophy, and long-nurtured passions and purposes of the nation or
nations concerned.


German Desire for World Empire.

The prime source of the present immense disaster in Europe is the desire
on the part of Germany for world empire, a desire which one European
nation after another has made its supreme motive, and none that has once
adopted it has ever completely eradicated. Germany arrived late at this
desire, being prevented until 1870 from indulging it, because of her
lack of unity, or rather because of being divided since the Thirty
Years' War into a large number of separate, more or less independent,
States. When this disease, which has attacked one nation after another
through all historic times, struck Germany it exhibited in her case a
remarkable malignity, moving her to expansion in Europe by force of
arms, and to the seizure of areas for colonization in many parts of the
world. Prussia, indeed, had long believed in making her way in Europe by
fighting, and had repeatedly acted on that belief. Shortly before the
achievement of German unity by Bismarck she had obtained by war in 1864
and 1866 important accessions of territory and leadership in all
Germany.

With this desire for world empire went the belief that it was only to
be obtained by force of arms. Therefore, united Germany has labored with
utmost intelligence and energy to prepare the most powerful army in the
world, and to equip it for instant action in the most perfect manner
which science and eager invasion could contrive. To develop this supreme
military machine universal conscription--an outgrowth of the conception
of the citizens' army of France during the Revolution--was necessary; so
that every young man in Germany physically competent to bear arms might
receive the training of a soldier, whether he wished it or not, and
remain at the call of the Government for military duty during all his
years of competency, even if he were the only son of a widow, or a
widower with little children, or the sole support of a family or other
dependents. In order to the completeness of this military ideal the army
became the nation and the nation became the army to a degree which had
never before been realized in either the savage or the civilized world.
This army could be summoned and put in play by the Chief Executive of
the German Nation with no preliminaries except the consent of the
hereditary heads of the several States which united to form the empire
in 1870-71 under the domination of Prussia, the Prussian King, become
German Emperor, being Commander in Chief of the German Army. At the word
of the Emperor this army can be summoned, collected, clothed, equipped
and armed, and set in motion toward any frontier in a day. The German
Army was thus made the largest in proportion to population, the best
equipped, and the most mobile in the world. The German General Staff
studied incessantly and thoroughly plans for campaigns against all the
other principal States of Europe, and promptly utilized--secretly,
whenever secrecy was possible--all promising inventions in explosives,
ordnance, munitions, transportation, and sanitation. At the opening of
1914 the General Staff believed that the German Army was ready for war
on the instant, and that it possessed some significant advantages in
fighting--such as better implements and better discipline--over the
armies of the neighboring nations. The army could do its part toward the
attainment of world empire. It would prove invincible.


A Great German Navy.

The intense desire for colonies, and for the spread of German commerce
throughout the world, instigated the creation of a great German navy,
and started the race with England in navy building. The increase of
German wealth, and the rapid development of manufactures and commercial
sea power after 1870-71, made it possible for the empire to devote
immense sums of money to the quick construction of a powerful navy, in
which the experience and skill of all other shipbuilding nations would
be appropriated and improved on. In thus pushing her colonization and
sea-power policy Germany encountered the wide domination of Great
Britain on the oceans; and this encounter bred jealousy, suspicion, and
distrust on both sides. That Germany should have been belated in the
quest for foreign possessions was annoying; but that England and France
should have acquired early ample and rich territories on other
continents, and then should resist or obstruct Germany when she aspired
to make up for lost time, was intensely exasperating. Hence chronic
resentments, and--when the day came--probably war. In respect to its
navy, however, Germany was not ready for war at the opening of 1914;
and, therefore, she did not mean to get into war with Great Britain in
that year. Indeed, she believed--on incorrect information--that England
could not go to war in the Summer of 1914. Neither the Government nor
the educated class in Germany comprehends the peculiar features of party
government as it exists in England, France, and the United States; and,
therefore, the German leaders were surprised and grievously disappointed
at the sudden popular determination of Great Britain and Ireland to lay
aside party strife and take strenuous part in the general European
conflict.

The complete preparation of the German Army for sudden war, the
authority to make war always ready in the hands of the German Emperor,
and the thorough studies of the German Staff into the most advantageous
plans of campaign against every neighbor, conspired to develop a new
doctrine of "military necessity" as the all-sufficient excuse for
disregarding and violating the contracts or agreements into which
Prussia or the new Germany had entered with other nations. To gain
quickly a military advantage in attacking a neighbor came to be regarded
as proper ground for violating any or all international treaties and
agreements, no matter how solemn and comprehensive, how old or how new.
The demonstration of the insignificance or worthlessness of
international agreements in German thought and practice was given in the
first days of the war by the invasion of Belgium, and has been continued
ever since by violation on the part of Germany of numerous agreements
concerning the conduct of war into which Germany entered with many other
nations at the Second Hague Conference.


Sanctity of National Contracts.

This German view of the worthlessness of international agreements was
not a cause of the present war, because it was not fully evident to
Europe, although familiar and of long standing in Germany; but it is a
potent reason for the continuance of the war by the Allies until Germany
is defeated; because it is plain to all the nations of the world, except
Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey at the moment, that the hopes of
mankind for the gradual development of international order and peace
rest on the sanctity of contracts between nations, and on the
development of adequate sanctions in the administration of international
law. The new doctrine of military necessity affronts all law and is
completely and hopelessly barbarous.

World empire now, as always, is to be won by force--that is, by conquest
and holding possession. So Assyria, Israel, Macedonia, Athens, Rome,
Islam, England, and France have successively believed and tried to
accomplish in practice. United Germany has for forty years been putting
into practice, at home and abroad, the doctrine of force as the source
of all personal and national greatness and all worthy human
achievements. In the support of this doctrine, educated Germany has
developed and accepted the religion of valor and the dogma that might
makes right. In so doing it has rejected with scorn the Christian
teachings concerning humility and meekness, justice and mercy,
brotherhood and love. The objects of its adoration have become Strength,
Courage, and ruthless Will-power; let the weak perish and help them to
perish; let the gentle, meek, and humble submit to the harsh and proud;
let the shiftless and incapable die; the world is for the strong, and
the strongest shall be ruler. This is a religion capable of inspiring
its followers with zeal and sustained enthusiasm in promoting the
national welfare at whatever cost to the individual of life, liberty, or
happiness, and also of lending a religious sanction to the extremes of
cruelty, greed, and hate. It were incredible that educated people who
have been brought up within earshot of Christian ethics and within sight
of gentle men and women should all be content with the religion-of-valor
plan. Accordingly, the finer German spirits have invented a supplement
to that Stone Age religion. They have set up for worship a mystical
conception of the State as a majestic and beneficent entity which
embraces all the noble activities of the nation and guides it to its
best achievements. To this ideal State every German owes duty,
obedience, and complete devotion. The trouble with this supplement to
the religion of valor is that it dwells too much on submission,
self-sacrifice, and discipline, and not enough on individual liberty and
self-control in liberty. Accordingly, when the valiant men got control
of the Government and carried the nation into a ferocious war, they
swept away with them all the devotees of this romantic and spiritual
State. The modern German is always a controlled, directed, and drilled
person, who aspires to control and discipline his inferiors; and in his
view pretty much all mankind are his inferiors. He is not a freeman in
the French, English, or American sense; and he prefers not to be.


What German Domination Would Mean.

The present war is the inevitable result of lust of empire, autocratic
government, sudden wealth, and the religion of valor. What German
domination would mean to any that should resist it the experience of
Belgium and Northern France during the past three months aptly
demonstrates. The civilized world can now see where the new German
morality--be efficient, be virile, be hard, be bloody, be rulers--would
land it. To maintain that the power which has adopted in practice that
new morality, and in accordance with its precepts promised Austria its
support against Servia and invaded Belgium and France in hot haste, is
not the responsible author of the European war, is to throw away memory,
reason, and common sense in judging the human agencies in current
events.

The real cause of the war is this gradually developed barbaric state of
the German mind and will. All other causes--such as the assassination of
the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, the sympathy of Russia with
the Balkan States, the French desire for the recovery of
Alsace-Lorraine, and Great Britain's jealousy of German
aggrandizement--are secondary and incidental causes, contributory,
indeed, but not primary and fundamental. If any one ask who brought the
ruling class in Germany to this barbaric frame of mind, the answer must
be Bismarck, Moltke, Treitschke, Nietzsche, Bernhardi, the German
Emperor, their like, their disciples, and the military caste.


Germany Never Dreaded Russia.

Many German apologists for the war attribute it to German fear of
Russia. They say that, although Germany committed the first actual
aggression by invading Belgium and Luxemburg on the way to attack France
with the utmost speed and fierceness, the war is really a war of
defense against Russia, which might desirably pass over, after France
has been crushed, into a war against Great Britain, that perfidious and
insolent obstacle to Germany's world empire. The answer to this
explanation is that, as a matter of fact, Germany has never dreaded, or
even respected, the military strength of Russia, and that the recent
wars and threatenings of war by Germany have not been directed against
Russia, but against Denmark, Austria, France, and England. In her
colonization enterprises it is not Russia that Germany has encountered,
but England, France, and the United States. The friendly advances made
within the last twenty years by Germany to Turkey were not intended
primarily to strengthen Germany against Russia, but Germany against
Great Britain through access by land to British India. In short,
Germany's policies, at home and abroad, during the last forty years have
been inspired not by fear of Russia, or of any other invader, but by its
own aggressive ambition for world empire. In the present war it thinks
it has staked its all on "empire or downfall."


Germany Should Be Defeated.

Those nations which value public liberty and believe that the primary
object of Government is to promote the general welfare by measures and
policies founded on justice, good-will, and respect for the freedom of
the individual cannot but hope that Germany will be completely defeated
in its present undertakings; but they do not believe that Germany is
compelled to choose between a life of domination in Europe and the world
and national death. They wish that all her humane culture and her genius
for patient and exact research may survive this hideous war and guide
another Germany to great achievements for humanity.

If the causes of the present immense catastrophe have been have
correctly stated, the desirable outcomes of the war are, no world empire
for any race or nation, no more "subjects," no Executives, either
permanent or temporary, with power to throw their fellow-countrymen
into war, no secret diplomacy justifying the use for a profit of all the
lies, concealments, deceptions, and ambuscades which are an inevitable
part of war and assuming to commit nations on international questions,
and no conscription armies that can be launched in war by Executives
without consulting independent representative assemblies. There should
come out from this supreme convulsion, a federated Europe, or a league
of the freer nations, which should secure the smaller States against
attack, prevent the larger from attempting domination, make sure that
treaties and other international contracts shall be public and be
respected until modified by mutual consent, and provide a safe basis for
the limitation and reduction of armaments on land and sea, no basis to
be considered safe which could fail to secure the liberties of each and
all the federated States against the attacks of any outsider or
faithless member. No one can see at present how such a consummation is
to be brought about, but any one can see already that this consummation
is the only one which can satisfy the lovers of liberty under law, and
the believers in the progress of mankind through loving service each to
all and all to each.

Extreme pacificists shrink from fighting evil with evil, hell with
hell, and advise submission to outrage, or at least taking the risk of
being forced into resigned submission. The believers in the religion of
valor, on the other hand, proclaim that war is a good thing in itself,
that it develops the best human virtues, invigorates a nation become
flaccid through ease and luxury, and puts in command the strong,
dominating spirit of a valid nation or race. What is the just mean
between these two extremes? Is it not that war is always a hideous and
hateful evil, but that a nation may sometimes find it to be the least of
two evils between which it has to choose? The justifiable and indeed
necessary war is the war against the ravager and destroyer, the enemy of
liberty, the claimant of world empire. More and more the thinkers of the
world see, and the common people more and more believe instinctively,
that the cause of righteous liberty is the cause of civilization. In the
conference which will one day meet to settle the terms of peace, and
therefore the future conditions of life in Europe, the example of the
American Republic in regard to armaments and war, the publicity of
treaties, and public liberty, security and prosperity may reasonably
have some influence.

CHARLES W. ELIOT.

Cambridge, Mass., Nov. 14, 1914.




DR. ELIOT'S FIFTH LETTER.

A Hopeful Road to Lasting Peace


_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

The great war has now been going on long enough to enable mankind to
form approximately correct views about its vast extent and scale of
operations, its sudden interference with commerce and all other helpful
international intercourse, its unprecedented wrecking of family
happiness and continuity, its wiping out, as it proceeds, of the
accumulated savings of many former generations in structures, objects of
art, and industrial capital, and the huge burdens it is likely to impose
on twentieth century Europe. From all these points of view, it is
evidently the most horrible calamity that has ever befallen the human
race and the most crucial trial to which civilization has been exposed.
It is, and is to be, the gigantic struggle of these times between the
forces which make for liberty and righteousness and those which make
for the subjection of the individual man, the exaltation of the State,
and the enthronement of physical force directed by a ruthless collective
will. It threatens a sweeping betrayal of the best hopes of mankind.

Each of the nations involved, horrified at the immensity of the
disaster, maintains that it is not responsible for the war; and each
Government has issued a statement to prove that some other Government is
responsible for the outbreak. This discussion, however, relates almost
entirely to actions by monarchs and Cabinets between July 23 and Aug.
4--a short period of hurried messages between the Chancelleries of
Europe--actions which only prove that the monarchs and Ministers for
Foreign Affairs could not, or at least did not, prevent the
long-prepared general war from breaking out. The assassination of the
Archduke and Duchess of Hohenberg on the 28th of June was in no proper
sense a cause of the war, except as it was one of the consequences of
the persistent aggressions of Austria-Hungary against her southeastern
neighbors. Neither was Russian mobilization in four military districts
on July 29 a cause of the war; for that was only an external
manifestation of the Russian state of mind toward the Balkan peoples, a
state of mind well known to all publicists ever since the Treaty of
Berlin in 1878. No more was the invasion of Belgium by the German Army
on Aug. 4 a true cause of the war, or even the cause, as distinguished
from the occasion, of Great Britain's becoming involved in it. By that
action Germany was only taking the first step in carrying out a
long-cherished purpose and in executing a judicious plan of campaign
prepared for many years in advance. The artificial panic in Germany
about its exposed position between two powerful enemies, France and
Russia, was not a genuine cause of the war; for the General Staff knew
they had crushed France once, and were confident they could do it again
in a month. As to Russia, it was, in their view, a huge nation, but
very clumsy and dull in war.

The real causes of the war are all of many years' standing; and all the
nations now involved in the fearful catastrophe have contributed to the
development of one or more of these effective causes. The fundamental
causes are: (1) The maintenance of monarchical Governments, each
sanctioned and supported by the national religion, and each furnished
with a Cabinet selected by the monarch--Governments which can make war
without any previous consultation of the peoples through their elected
representatives; (2) the constant maintenance of conscript armies,
through which the entire able-bodied male population is trained in youth
for service in the army or navy, and remains subject to the instant call
of the Government till late in life, the officering of these permanent
armies involving the creation of a large military class likely to become
powerful in political, industrial, and social administration; (3) the
creation of a strong, permanent bureaucracy within each nation for the
management of both foreign and domestic affairs, much of whose work is
kept secret from the public at large; and, finally, (4) the habitual use
of military and naval forces to acquire new territories, contiguous or
detached, without regard to the wishes of the people annexed or
controlled. This last cause of the war is the most potent of the four,
since it is strong in itself, and is apt to include one or more of the
other three. It is the gratification of the lust for world empire.

Of all the nations taking part in the present war, Great Britain is the
only one which does not maintain a conscript army; but, on the other
hand, Great Britain is the earliest modern claimant of world empire by
force, with the single exception of Spain, which long since abandoned
that quest. Every one of these nations except little Servia has yielded
to the lust for empire. Every one has permitted its monarch or its
Cabinet to carry on secret negotiations liable at any time to commit the
nation to war, or to fail in maintaining the peace of Europe or of the
Near East. In the crowded diplomatic events of last July, no phenomenon
is more striking than the exhibition of the power which the British
people confide to the hands of their Foreign Secretary. In the interests
of public liberty and public welfare no official should possess such
powers as Sir Edward Grey used admirably--though in vain--last July. In
all three of the empires engaged in the war there has long existed a
large military caste which exerts a strong influence on the Government
and its policies, and on the daily life of the people.

These being the real causes of the terrific convulsion now going on in
Europe, it cannot be questioned that the nation in which these complex
causes have taken strongest and most complete effect during the last
fifty years is Germany. Her form of government has been imperialistic
and autocratic in the highest degree. She has developed with great
intelligence and assiduity the most formidable conscript army in the
world, and the most influential and insolent military caste. Three times
since 1864 she has waged war in Europe, and each time she has added to
her territory without regard to the wishes of the annexed population.
For twenty-five years she has exhibited a keen desire to obtain colonial
possessions; and since 1896 she has been aggressive in this field. In
her schools and universities the children and youth have been taught for
generations that Germany is surrounded by hostile peoples, that her
expansion in Europe and in other continents is resisted by jealous
powers which started earlier in the race for foreign possessions, and
that the salvation of Germany has depended from the first, and will
depend till the last, on the efficiency of her army and navy and the
warlike spirit of her people. This instruction, given year after year by
teachers, publicists, and rulers, was first generally accepted in
Prussia, but now seems to be accepted by the entire empire as unified in
1871.

The attention of the civilized world was first called to this state of
the German mind and will by the triumphant policies of Bismarck; but
during the reign of the present Emperor the external aggressiveness of
Germany and her passion for world empire have grown to much more
formidable proportions. Although the German Emperor has sometimes played
the part of a peacemaker, he has habitually acted the war lord in both
speech and bearing, and has supported the military caste whenever it has
been assailed. He is by inheritance, conviction, and practice a
Divine-right sovereign whose throne rests on an "invincible" army, an
army conterminous with the nation. In the present tremendous struggle he
carries his subjects with him in a rushing torrent of self-sacrificing
patriotism. Mass fanaticism and infectious enthusiasm seem to have
deprived the leading class in Germany, for the moment, of all power to
see, reason, and judge correctly--no new phenomenon in the world, but
instructive in this case because it points to the grave defect in German
education--the lack of liberty and, therefore, practice in self-control.

The twentieth century educated German is, however, by no means given
over completely to material and physical aggrandizement and the worship
of might. He cherishes a partly new conception of the State as a
collective entity whose function is to develop and multiply, not the
free, healthy, and happy individual man and woman, but higher and more
effective types of humanity, made superior by a strenuous discipline
which takes much account of the strong and ambitious, and little of the
weak or meek. He rejects the ethics of the Beatitudes as unsound, but
accepts the religion of valor, which exalts strength, courage,
endurance, and the ready sacrifice by the individual of liberty,
happiness, and life itself for Germany's honor and greatness. A nation
of 60,000,000 holding these philosophical and religious views, and
proposing to act on them in winning by force the empire of the world,
threatens civilization with more formidable irruptions of a destroying
host than any that history has recorded. The rush of the German Army
into Belgium, France, and Russia and its consequences to those lands
have taught the rest of Europe to dread German domination, and--it is to
be hoped--to make it impossible.

The real cause of the present convulsion is, then, the state of mind or
temper of Germany, including her conception of national greatness, her
theory of the State, and her intelligent and skillful use of all the
forces of nineteenth century applied science for the destructive
purposes of war. It is, therefore, apparent that Europe can escape from
the domination of Germany only by defeating her in her present
undertakings; and that this defeat can be brought about only by using
against her the same effective agencies of destruction and the same
martial spirit on which Germany itself relies. Horrible as are the
murderous and devastating effects of this war, there can be no lasting
peace until Europe as a whole is ready to make some serious and
far-reaching decisions in regard to Governmental structures and powers.
In all probability the sufferings and losses of this widespread war must
go further and cut deeper before Europe can be brought to the decisions
which alone can give securities for lasting peace against Germany on the
one hand and Russia on the other, or to either of these nations, or can
give security for the future to any of the smaller nations of
Continental Europe. There can, indeed, be no security for future peace
in Europe until every European nation recognizes the fact that there is
to be no such thing in the world as one dominating nation--no such thing
as world empire for any single nation--Great Britain, Germany, Russia,
Japan, or China. There can be no sense of security against sudden
invasion in Europe so long as all the able-bodied men are trained to be
soldiers and the best possible armies are kept constantly ready for
instant use. There can be no secure peace in Europe until a federation
of the European States is established, capable of making public
contracts intended to be kept, and backed by an overwhelming
international force subject to the orders of an international tribunal.
The present convulsion demonstrates the impotence toward permanent
peace of secret negotiations, of unpublished agreements, of treaties and
covenants that can be broken on grounds of military necessity, of
international law if without sanctions, of pious wishes, of economic and
biological predictions, and of public opinion unless expressed through a
firm international agreement, behind which stands an international
force. When that international force has been firmly established it will
be time to consider what proportionate reductions in national armaments
can be prudently recommended. Until that glorious day dawns, no patriot
and no lover of his kind can wisely advocate either peace in Europe or
any reduction of armaments.

The hate-breeding and worse than brutal cruelties and devastations of
the war, with their inevitable moral and physical degradations, ought to
shock mankind into attempting a great step forward. Europe and America
should undertake to exterminate the real causes of the catastrophe. In
studying that problem the coming European conference can profit by the
experience of the three prosperous and valid countries in which public
liberty and the principle of federation have been most successfully
developed--Switzerland, Great Britain, and the United States.
Switzerland is a democratic federation which unites in a firm federal
bond three different racial stocks speaking three unlike languages, and
divided locally and irregularly between the Catholic Church and the
Protestant. The so-called British Empire tends strongly to become a
federation; and the methods of Government both in Great Britain itself
and in its affiliated Commonwealths are becoming more and more
democratic in substance. The war has brought this fact out in high
relief. As to the United States, it is a strong federation of
forty-eight heterogeneous States which has been proving for a hundred
years that freedom and democracy are safer and happier for mankind than
subjection to any sort of autocracy, and affords far the best training
for national character and national efficiency. Republican France has
not yet had time to give this demonstration, being incumbered with many
survivals of the Bourbon and Napoleonic régimes, and being forced to
maintain a conscript army.

It is an encouraging fact that every one of the political or
Governmental changes needed is already illustrated in the practice of
one or more of the civilized nations. To exaggerate the necessary
changes is to postpone or prevent a satisfactory outcome from the
present calculated destructions and wrongs and the accompanying moral
and religious chaos. Ardent proposals to remake the map of Europe,
reconstruct European society, substitute republics for empires, and
abolish armaments are in fact obstructing the road toward peace and
good-will among men. That road is hard at best.

The immediate duty of the United States is presumably to prepare, on the
basis of its present army and navy, to furnish an effective quota of the
international force, servant of an international tribunal, which will
make the ultimate issue of this most abominable of wars not a truce, but
a durable peace.

In the meantime the American peoples cry with one voice to the German
people, like Ezekiel to the House of Israel: "Turn ye, turn ye from your
evil ways; for why will ye die?"

CHARLES W. ELIOT.

Cambridge, Mass., Dec. 8, 1914.




THE LORD OF HOSTS.

By JOSEPH B. GILDER.


"He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh."

    The warring hosts that gather
      To ravage, burn, and slay,
    Turn first to that dread Father
      To whom the nations pray:

    "O God, our hearts Thou knowest,
      Our minds Thou readest clear;
    Where we go, there Thou goest--
      With Thee we have no fear.

    "The folk that harm and hate us--
      Thy enemies, O Lord--
    Thou knowest how they bait us:
      Make brittle their strong sword!

    "Against the foe that goaded
      We heed Thy call to fight:
    Our guns are primed and loaded,
      Our swords, how keen and bright!

    "Make strong our hearts to serve Thee,
      Uphold our lifted hands;
    Let no petition swerve Thee
      To succor alien bands.

    "So shall we burn and slaughter,
      Spread desolation wide,
    If still, by land and water,
      Thou fightest on our side."

    The Lord of Hosts had listened--
      Had heard the rivals' prayer,
    Upraised where bayonets glistened
      And banners dyed the air;

    And as His people waited
      An answer to their cry,
    Two bolts with lightning freighted
      Flashed from the angry sky.

    To left, to right they darted,
      Impartially they fell:
    The hosts in terror started
      As they envisaged hell.

    For wide their ranks were riven,
      Night blotted out the sky,
    As prostrate, dazed or driven,
      They caught their God's reply.

    Then, as the blinding levin's
      Twin bolts were buried deep,
    Who dwelleth in the heavens
      Was heard to laugh--and weep!




A War of Dishonor

By David Starr Jordan.

     Late President of Leland Stanford Junior University, now its
     Chancellor; Chief Director of the World Peace Foundation since
     1910.


_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

In this war what of right and what of wrong? Not much of right, perhaps,
and very much of wrong. But there are degrees in wrong, and sometimes,
by comparison, wrong becomes almost right.

The armed peace, the peace of guns and dreadnoughts and sabre rattlers,
has come to its predestined end. Its armaments were made for war. Its
war makers and war traders, the Pan-Germanists in the lead, have done
their worst for the last nine years. They have been foiled time after
time, but they have their way at last. Their last and most fatal weapon
was the ultimatum. If Servia had not given them their chance they would
have found their pretext somewhere else. When a nation or a continent
prepares for war it will get it soon or later. To prepare for war is to
breed a host of men who have no other business, and another host who
find their profits in blood.

When the war began it had very little meaning. It was the third Balkan
war, brought on, as the others were, by intrigues of rival despotisms.
The peoples of Europe do not hate each other. The springs of war come
from a few men impelled by greed and glory. Diplomacy in Europe has been
for years the cover for robbery in Asia or Africa. Of all the nations
concerned not one had any wish to fight, and Belgium alone could fight
with clean hands.

And this fact gave the war its meaning. The invasion of Belgium changed
the whole face of affairs. As by a lightning flash the issue was made
plain: the issue of the sacredness of law; the rule of the soldier or
the rule of the citizen; the rule of fear or the rule of law. Germany
stands for army rule. This was made clear when, a year ago, she passed
under the yoke at Zabern. However devious her diplomacy in the past,
Britain stands today for the rule of law. The British soldier is the
servant of the British people, not their master.

The highest conception of human relations is embodied in the word law.
Law is the framework of civilization. Law is the condition of security,
happiness, and progress. War is the denial of all law. It makes scrap
paper of all the solemn agreements men and nations have established for
their mutual good.

The rape of Belgium made scrap paper of international law. The sowing of
mines in the fairways of commerce made scrap paper of the rights of
neutral nations. The torture of the Belgian people made scrap paper of
the rights of non-combatants.

War may be never righteous, but it is sometimes honorable. In honorable
war armies fight against armies, never against private citizens. If
armies give no needless provocation, they will receive none. The sacking
of Malines, Aerschot, Dinant--these are not acts of honorable war. The
wreck of Louvain, historic Louvain, the venerable centre for 500 years
of Catholic erudition, at the hands of blood-drunk soldiers was an act
of dishonorable war. It marks a stain on the record of Germany which the
ages will not efface.

"A needed example," say the apologists for this crime. The Duke of Alva
gave the same "needed example" to these same people in his day. For
centuries the words "Spanish blood" struck terror into peoples' hearts
throughout the Netherlands. For centuries to come the word Prussian will
take its hated place.

The good people of Germany do not burn universities. Neither do they
make war for war's sake. They are helpless in the hands of a monster of
their own creation. The affair at Zabern a year ago testifies to their
complete subjugation. All the virtues are left to them, save only the
love of freedom. This the mailed fist has taken away.

The Germany of today is an anachronism. Her scientific ideals are of the
twentieth century. Her political ideals hark back to the sixteenth. Her
rulers have made her the most superb fighting machine in a world which
is soul-weary of fighting. For a nation in shining armor the civilized
World has no place. It will not worship them, it will not obey them. It
will not respect those who either worship or obey. It finds no people
good enough to rule other people against their will.

A great nation which its own people do not control is a nation without a
Government. It is a derelict on the international sea. It is a danger to
its neighbors, a greater danger to itself. Of all the many issues, good
or bad, which may come from this war, none is more important than this,
that the German people should take possession of Germany.

DAVID STARR JORDAN.

Berkeley, Cal., Sept. 19, 1914.




Might or Right

By John Grier Hibben.

     President of Princeton University; author of works on logic
     and philosophy.


_The address printed below was delivered by President Hibben at the
opening of the Laymen's Efficiency Convention in New York City, Oct. 16,
1914._

We are all of us sadly conscious of our failure to realize in any
adequate measure the standards of right conduct which we set for
ourselves. Attainment falls far short of purpose and desire. Through
want of courage, or it may be of inclination, or of sheer inertia, we
fail to obey perfectly the law of duty which we recognize as
imperatively binding upon us. There is, however, a more subtle kind of
failure as regards our moral endeavor and achievement which is due to
the unconscious shifting of these standards of right and wrong
themselves. It is not merely that we fail to do that which we know to be
right, but at times the very idea of right itself is strangely altered.
The good insensibly assimilates to itself certain elements of evil which
we allow and accept without full realization of the significance of this
moral alchemy to which the most fundamental of our ideas are often times
subjected. The idea of right no longer stands in its integrity, but is
compromised and even neutralized by conflicting thoughts and sentiments.
The things which at one time held first place in our estimate of life
become secondary. Our attitude toward men, and manners, and affairs
experiences a radical change. This in most cases takes place
unconsciously, or if conscious of it, we refrain from confessing it even
to ourselves.

There are some, however, who are both frank enough and bold enough to
announce their belief in the radical doctrine which demands a complete
transformation of essential values. For them, good is evil and evil
good, and they seem not ashamed to avow it. The conspicuous German
philosopher of later years, Nietzsche, with a naïve simplicity insists
that the great need of our modern civilization is that which he
designates as "the transvaluation of all values." By this he means the
complete transformation of certain ideas of supreme value into their
direct opposites. He declares, for instance, that the central virtues of
Christianity, such as those of self-sacrifice, pity, mercy, indicate an
inherent weakness of the human race, and that the strong man dissipates
his energies through the offices of kindness and helpfulness. Thus the
law which commands us to bear one another's burdens must be regarded as
obsolete. Every man should be strong enough to bear his own burdens. If
not, he is a drag to the onward progress of humanity, and to assist him
is to do evil and not good. If you help the weak, you so far forth
assist in perpetuating an inferior type of manhood.


Nietzsche's "Moralic Acid."

From this point of view, the definition of religion given in the Old
Testament should be revised, "Do justice, love mercy, and walk humbly
before thy God." In doing justice we must first be just to self; in
loving mercy it must not be at the expense of our own interests and
advantage, and we must not walk so humbly before our God as to give to
the world the appearance of weakness or lack of independence. As
Nietzsche insists, "The man who loves his neighbor as himself must have
an exceedingly poor opinion of himself." If the race is to be perfected,
everything and every person must be sacrificed in order to produce and
preserve the strong man at all hazards. There is a kind of "moralic
acid," as Nietzsche styles it, which is corroding the strength of
humanity in our modern day. We have discoursed too much of character,
too little of power; too much of self-sacrifice and too little of
self-assertion; too much of right, too little of might. Conscience not
only interferes with success, but also prevents the evolution of a
superior type of man, that superman who is not constrained by duty nor
limited by law, living his life "beyond good and evil."

The serious question which presents itself to our minds at this time is
whether our modern world has not been unconsciously incorporating these
ideas into its living beliefs--that is, those beliefs which reveal
themselves in actual living and doing, in daily purpose, in the
adaptation of means to ends, in the deeds which the world honors, and in
the achievements which it crowns with glory. There are many persons who
would not have the frankness of Nietzsche to say that might makes right,
and that a moral sense is the great obstacle to progress, and that in
"vigorous eras noble civilizations see something contemptible in
sympathy, in brotherly love, in the lack of self-assertion and
self-reliance." Our modern world may not explicitly subscribe to such
doctrines in their extreme and exaggerated expression, but nevertheless
may be unconsciously influenced by them. Our real opinions, however, are
to be tested by our sense of values as revealed by the things which we
crave, which we set our hearts upon, which we strive early and late to
gain, and sacrifice all else in order to secure. Have we not offered our
prayers to the God of might rather than the God of righteousness, to the
God of power rather than the God of justice, the God of mercy and of
love?

The time has come, in my opinion, for us to take account of the things
which we really believe, and of the God Whom we really worship. If we
have been following false gods, let us honestly endeavor to re-establish
fundamental and essential values, to discover anew what is of supreme
worth and set our faces resolutely toward its realization. The need of
our modern world today is the same as that of the ancient world at the
time of the coming of Christ. His message to the world as indicated by
His teaching, and His life was an arraignment of the ancient régime as
regards three crucial points.


The Brotherhood of Man.

First, the religious and moral beliefs of that age had become purely
formal. There was the letter of conviction, but not the spirit of it.
The creed, the ritual, the ceremony were there, but the life had
departed. And so today our beliefs have lost vitality to a large extent
because we have been content to indulge in formulas oft repeated, which
have ceased to have significance for our thoughts or for our feelings.
We have allowed ourselves to be betrayed by words which are mere sounds
without substance. We have verbalized our beliefs, and have
depotentialed them of vital significance. Take, for instance, the
phrases, "The fatherhood of God" and "The brotherhood of man." They have
been so often upon our lips as to become trite; their real meaning has
disappeared. It is easy to repeat the words, and to be satisfied with
the repetition, and nevertheless remain wholly insensible to their
profound import, and under no compulsion whatsoever to obey their
sublime command. We assent to the formula: but it does not become a
determining factor in our purposes and plans. There is perhaps no age in
the history of the world which has so emphasized the idea of the
brotherhood of man as our own, and never in all history has there been
such a denial of this idea as by the present European war. If the
brotherhood of man had been the living, dominant idea of our
civilization, could this present tragedy of the nations have occurred?
If the world had believed profoundly in the idea of God, would we now be
daily reading of the ghastly scenes where human life is no longer
sacred, where love gives place to hate, where the constructive forces of
the world are superseded by the destructive, and all the passions of
man's brute inheritance are given full play and scope?

Second--In the teachings of Christ there was a remarkable expansion of
the idea of God. Instead of the tribal God worshipped as the God of
Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, He substituted the idea of God, as the
God of all peoples and all races, the God of the Jew and Gentile, of the
Greek and barbarian, of the bond and the free. It was the great apostle
of the Gentiles who at the centre of Greek civilization announced this
fundamental conception of Christianity to the old world:

     God hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on
     all the face of the earth.

This was the sublime idea of the God of a united humanity. The God of
the tribe had given place to the God of the whole world. That conception
was very foreign to the popular religious notions current at the time
of Christ, and it seems still further away from our ideas of the present
day. It is a very narrow and circumscribed view of God to regard Him as
concerned merely for our little insular affairs, to regard Him simply as
a God of the individual or of the home, or even one's nation. He
transcends all these limitations of particular interests and particular
needs. He is not merely our God but the God of all mankind. The children
of Israel called Him the God of battle, the God of hosts, that is, the
one who would give victory to them in their battles, and who would prove
the leader of their hosts. But Christ came to the world in God's name to
universalize this narrow tribal idea of God, proclaiming peace on earth
and good will to men. It was the dawn of a new era, the Christian era.
That light which shone upon the old world is darkened by the cloud
hanging low over Europe at the present time. We cannot think, however,
that it is permanently extinguished. To that light the nations of the
earth must again return.


The Area of Moral Obligation.

Third--Christ gave to the world of His day an enlarged idea of the area
of moral obligation. He insisted most stoutly upon the expansion of the
scope of individual responsibility. This freeing of the idea of duty
from the limitations of race prejudice is a natural corollary to the
idea of the universality of God's relation to the world. Corresponding
to the tribal view of God there is always an accompanying idea of the
restricted obligation of the individual. To care for one's own family or
one's own clan or tribe and present a hostile front to the rest of
mankind has always been the characteristic feature of primitive
morality. It was peculiarly the teaching of Christ which brought to the
world the idea that the area of moral obligation is co-extensive with
the world itself. There are no racial or national lines which can limit
the extent of our responsibility. The world today needs to learn this
lesson anew, and it is evident that it must acquire this knowledge
through bitter and desperate experiences. We must interpret in this
large sense the great moral dictum of the German philosopher, Kant, that
every one in a particular circumstance should act as he would wish all
men to act if similarly circumstanced and conditioned. This is the
complete universalizing of our moral obligations--stripping our sense of
duty of everything that is particular and local and isolated. The
natural tendency of human nature is to particularize our relations to
God and bound our relations to our fellow-men; to narrow our relations
to God so as to embrace only our direst needs, and to circumscribe our
relations to man so as to include in the field of responsibility only
those who are our kin or our own kind. The time has certainly come for
us to take larger views of the world, of man, and of God.

After the great calamity of this present war is passed there must
necessarily follow a period of reconstruction. It will not be merely the
reconstruction of national resources and international relations, but
it must be also a reconstruction of our fundamental conceptions of man
and of the relation of man to man the world over, and of the relation
also of man to God. We must ask anew the question, Who is our neighbor?
In this great moral enterprise you will naturally play a large and
significant part, for you belong to the class of men who are expected to
have strong and decided opinions in the face of a great world crisis,
and are capable of leading others toward the goal of a regenerated
humanity. To know the right and to maintain it, to fight against the
wrong, to impart courage to the timid, strength to the weak, and hope to
the faint-hearted; to forget self in the service of others and extend a
human sympathy to the ends of the earth, this is your vocation. It is
the call of the world, it is the voice of one calling to you out of a
distant past across the nineteen Christian centuries; it is the "spirit
of the years to come," summoning you to establish the Kingdom of God
upon earth.




JEANNE D'ARC--1914.

By ALMA DURANT NICOLSON.


    Rise from the buried ages, O thou Maid,
    Rise from thy glorious ashes, unafraid,
    And wheresoe'er thy Brothers need thee most,
    Arise again, to lead thy tireless host.
    France calls thee as she called in days gone by!
    She calls thy spirit where her soldiers die;
    She knows thy courage and thy sacrifice,
    And wills today to pay the selfsame price,
    All-confident that when the work is done,
    She shall behold her Honor saved and Victory won.

    God calls thee, Maid, from out the Past--
    The Past of France where thy strange lot was cast--
    And bid'st thee fling about this fearful hour
    Thy dauntless Faith, that was thy magic Power.
    And Freedom calls, with all-impelling voice,
    She calls the Sons of France, and leaves no choice,
    No waver and no alternating will;
    Where Freedom calls, all other calls are still,
    All-confident that when her work is done
    Ye shall behold your Country saved and Victory won.




The Kaiser and Belgium

By John W. Burgess.

     Dean of the Faculties of Political Science, Philosophy, Pure
     Science, and the fine Arts at Columbia University; Roosevelt
     Professor of American History and Institutions at Friedrich
     Wilhelms University, Berlin, 1906-7; Visiting American
     Professor to Austrian Universities, 1914-15; Decorated, Order
     of Prussian Crown by the German Emperor and Order of the
     Albrechts by the King of Saxony.


FIRST ARTICLE.

It is often said by historians that no truly great man is every really
understood by the generation, and in the age, for which he labors. Many
instances of the truth of this statement can be easily cited. Two of the
most flagrant have come within the range of my own personal experience.
The first was the character of Abraham Lincoln as depicted by the
British press of 1860-64 and as conceived by the British public opinion
of that era. Mr. Henry Adams, son and private secretary of Mr. Charles
Francis Adams, our Minister Plenipotentiary to Great Britain during that
critical era in our history, writes, in that fascinating book of his
entitled "The Education of Henry Adams,"

     that "London was altogether beside itself on one point, in
     especial; it created a nightmare of its own, and gave it the
     shape of Abraham Lincoln. Behind this it placed another demon,
     if possible more devilish, and called it Mr. Seward. In regard
     to these two men English society seemed demented. Defense was
     useless: explanation was vain. One could only let the passion
     exhaust itself. One's best friends were as unreasonable as
     enemies, for the belief in poor Mr. Lincoln's brutality and
     Seward's ferocity became a dogma of popular faith."

Adams relates further that the last time he saw Thackeray at Christmas
of 1863 they spoke of their mutual friend Mrs. Frank Hampton of South
Carolina, whom Thackeray had portrayed as Ethel Newcome, and who had
recently passed away from life. Thackeray had read in the British papers
that her parents had been prevented by the Federal soldiers from passing
through the lines to see her on her deathbed. Adams writes that

     in speaking of it Thackeray's voice trembled and his eyes
     filled with tears. The coarse cruelty of Lincoln and his
     hirelings was notorious. He never doubted that the Federals
     made a business of harrowing the tenderest feelings of
     women--particularly of women--in order to punish their
     opponents. On quite insufficient evidence he burst into
     reproach. Had he (Adams) carried in his pocket the proofs that
     the reproach was unjust he would have gained nothing by
     showing them. At that moment Thackeray, and all London society
     with him, needed the nervous relief of expressing emotions;
     for if Mr. Lincoln was not what they said he was, what were
     they?

Mr. Lincoln sent over our most skillful politician, Thurlow Weed, and
our most able constitutional lawyer, William M. Evarts, and later our
most brilliant orator, Henry Ward Beecher, followed, for the purpose of
bringing the British people to their senses and correcting British
opinion, but all to little purpose. Gettysburg and Vicksburg did far
more toward modifying that opinion than the persuasiveness of Weed, the
logic of Evarts, or the eloquence of Beecher, and it took Chattanooga,
the March to the Sea, and Appomattox to dispel the illusion entirely.

Today we are laboring under a no less singular illusion than were the
English in 1862. The conception prevailing in England and in this
country concerning the physical, mental, and moral make-up of the German
Emperor is the monumental caricature of biographical literature. I have
had the privilege of his personal acquaintance now for nearly ten years.
I have been brought into contact with him in many different ways and
under many varying conditions, at Court and State functions, at
university ceremonies and celebrations, at his table, and by his
fireside surrounded by his family, when in the midst of his officials,
his men of science, and his personal friends, and, more instructive than
all, alone in the imperial home in Berlin and at Potsdam and in the
castle and forest at Wilhelmshöhe. With all this experience, with all
this opportunity for observation at close range, I am hardly able to
recognize a single characteristic usually attributed to him by the
British and American press of today.

In the first place, the Emperor is an impressive man physically. He is
not a giant in stature, but a man of medium size, great strength and
endurance, and of agile and graceful movement. He looks every inch a
leader of men. His fine gray-blue eyes are peculiarly fascinating. I saw
him once seated beside his uncle, King Edward VII., and the contrast was
very striking, and greatly in his favor.

In the second place, the Emperor is an exceedingly intelligent and
highly cultivated man. His mental processes are swift, but they go also
very deep. He is a searching inquirer, and questions and listens more
than he talks. His fund of knowledge is immense and sometimes
astonishing. He manifests interest in everything, even to the smallest
detail, which can have any bearing upon human improvement. I remember a
half hour's conversation with him once over a cupping glass, which he
had gotten from an excavation in the Roman ruin called the Saalburg,
near Homburg. He always appeared to me most deeply concerned with the
arts of peace. I have never heard him speak much of war, and then always
with abhorrence, nor much of military matters, but improved agriculture,
invention, and manufacture, and especially commerce and education in all
their ramifications, were the chief subjects of his thought and
conversation. I have had the privilege of association with many highly
intelligent and profoundly learned men, but I have never acquired as
much knowledge, in the same time, from any man whom I have ever met, as
from the German Emperor. And yet, with all this real superiority of mind
and education, his deference to the opinions of others is remarkable.
Arrogance is one of the qualities most often attributed to him, but he
is the only ruler I ever saw in whom there appeared to be absolutely no
arrogance. He meets you as man meets man and makes you feel that you are
required to yield to nothing but the better reason.


A Man of Warm Affections.

In the third place, the Emperor impressed me as a man of heart, of warm
affections, and of great consideration for the feelings and well-being
of others. He can not, at least does not, conceal his reverence for, and
devotion to, the Empress, or his love for his children, or his
attachment to his friends. He always speaks of Queen Victoria and of the
Empress Friedrich with the greatest veneration, and once when speaking
to me of an old American friend who had turned upon him he said that it
was difficult for him to give up an old friend, right or wrong, and
impossible when he believed him to be in the right. His manifest respect
and affection for his old and tried officials, such as Lucanus and zu
Eulenburg and von Studt and Beseler and Althoff, give strong evidence of
the warmth and depth of his nature. His consideration for Americans,
especially, has always been remarkable. It was at his suggestion that
the exchange of educators between the universities of Germany and of the
United States was established, and it has been his custom to be present
at the opening lecture of each new incumbent of these positions at
the University of Berlin, and to greet him and welcome him to his work.
He is also the first to extend to these foreign educators hospitality
and social attention. To any one who has experienced his hearty welcome
to his land and his home the assertion that he is arrogant and
autocratic is so far away from truth as to be ludicrous. Again I must
say that I have never met a ruler, in monarchy or republic, in whom
genuine democratic geniality was a so predominant characteristic.

[Illustration: FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS

_(Photo by the Misses Selby.)_

_See Page 526_]

[Illustration: RUDOLF EUCKEN

_See Page 534_]

But the characteristic of the Emperor which struck me most forcibly is
his profound sense of duty and his readiness for self-sacrifice for the
welfare of his country. This is a general German trait. It is the most
admirable side of German nature. And the Emperor is, in this respect
especially, their Princeps. I remember sitting beside him one day, when
one of the ladies of his household asked me if I were acquainted with a
certain wealthy ultra-fashionable New York social leader. I replied, by
name only. She pressed me to know why not more nearly, why not
personally. And to this, I replied that I was not of her class; that I
could not amuse her, and that I did not approve of the frivolous and
demoralizing example and influence of one so favorably circumstanced for
doing good. The Emperor had heard the conversation, and he promptly
said: "You know in Germany we do not rate and classify people by their
material possessions, but by the importance of the service they render
to country, culture, and civilization." One of his sons once told me
that from his earliest childhood his father had instilled into his mind
the lesson that devotion to duty and readiness for sacrifice were the
cardinal virtues of a German, especially of a Hohenzollern. His days are
periods of constant labor and severe discipline. He rises early, lives
abstemiously and works until far into the night. There is no day laborer
in his entire empire who gives so many hours per diem to his work. His
nature is manifestly deeply religious and, in every sentence he speaks,
evidence of his consciousness that the policeman's club cannot take the
place of religious and moral principle is revealed. His frequent appeal
for Divine aid in the discharge of his duties is prompted by the
conviction that the heavier the duty the more need there is of that aid.


His Passion for German Greatness.

He undoubtedly has an intense desire, almost a passion, for the
prosperity and greatness of his country, but his conception of that
prosperity and greatness is more spiritual and cultural than material
and commercial. More than once have I heard him say that he desired to
see Germany a wealthy country, but only as the result of honest and
properly requited toil, and that wealth acquired by force or fraud was
more a curse than a blessing, and was destined to go as it had come. His
conception of the greatness of Germany is as a great intellectual and
moral power rather than anything else. Its physical power he values
chiefly as the creator and maintainer of the conditions necessary to the
production and influence of this higher power. I have often heard him
express this thought.

And in spite of this terrible war, the responsibility for which is by so
many erroneously laid at his door, I firmly believe him to be a man of
peace. I am absolutely sure that he has entered upon this war only under
the firm conviction that Great Britain, France, and Russia have
conspired to destroy Germany as a world power, and that he is simply
defending, as he said in his memorable speech to the Reichstag, the
place which God had given the Germans to dwell on. For seven years I
myself have witnessed the growth of this conviction in his mind and that
of the whole German Nation as the evidences of it have multiplied from
year to year until at last the fatal hour at Serajevo struck. I firmly
believe that there is no soul in this wide world upon whom the burden
and grief of this great catastrophe so heavily rest as upon the German
Emperor. I have heard him declare with the greatest earnestness and
solemnity that he considered war a dire calamity; that Germany would
never during his reign wage an offensive war, and that he hoped God
would spare him from the necessity of ever having to conduct a defensive
war. For years he has been conscious that British diplomacy was seeking
to isolate and crush Germany by an alliance of Latin, Slav, and Mongol
under British direction, and he sought in every way to avert it. He
visited England himself frequently. He sent his Ministers of State over
to cultivate the acquaintance and friendship of the British Ministers,
but rarely would the British King go himself to Germany or send his
Ministers to return these visits. More than once have I heard him say
that he was most earnestly desirous of close friendship between Germany,
Great Britain, and the United States, and had done, was doing, and would
continue to do, all in his power to promote it; but that while the
Americans were cordially meeting Germany half way, the British were
cold, suspicious, and repellent.

I know that the two things which are giving him the deepest pain in this
world catastrophe, excepting only the sufferings of his own kindred and
people, are the enmity of Great Britain and the misunderstanding of his
character, feelings, and purposes in America. To remedy the first we
here can do nothing, but to dispel the second is our bounden duty; and I
devoutly hope that other evidence may prove sufficient to do this to the
satisfaction of the minds of my countrymen than was necessary to
convince the British Nation that the great-hearted Abraham Lincoln was
not a brute nor the urbane William H. Seward a demon of ferocity.




Reply to Prof. Burgess


_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

The Burgess Kaiser is a truly admirable person. Every right-minded man
will be only too glad to believe all that Prof. Burgess affirms of him.
To be sure, there is a lurking sense that the professor "doth protest
too much." But let that go. In the present topsy-turvy state of the
world it is refreshing to hear of a man who loves his wife and children
in the good, old way. But just now the world is not interested in the
private, personal, peculiarly German characteristics of the Kaiser. We
outsiders must take him as he is known to the international world. We of
course trust that he is an able, cultivated, attractive gentleman. There
are many such in the world. But this gentleman happens to be the head of
one of the great nations. Our interest in him centres in his relations
to his neighbor nations.

An English friend of mine was appointed to duty in a tribe of savages in
Africa. I dislike to call them savages after the testimony of my friend.
But they were just plain, naked folk, living in primitive simplicity in
their native land. The chief of this little tribe was, as my friend
asserts, a superior man, and, in spite of his undress, a good deal of a
gentleman. In physique he was superb. A sculptor's heart would have
leaped for joy at sight of him. My friend said to see him teaching his
young son to throw a spear was a sort of physical music. He himself
could throw a spear to an incredible distance with the precision of a
rifle shot. He ruled his little kingdom with surprising wisdom and
fairness. He was welcomed everywhere among his people as the friend and
counselor. His family relations were unimpeachable. The same was true
throughout the tribe. He was devoutly pious. In short, he was a Burgess
Kaiser in the small. But he was the war lord of all that region. He was
fiercely jealous of all the neighboring tribes. He kept his own people
armed and drilled to the top of efficiency, ready for attack or
defense. He was noted for his hatred and contempt for his people except
his own. His forays were marked by savage cruelty. His military
necessities stopped at nothing.

Need it be said that the surrounding tribes were in nowise interested in
this chief's physique or domestic virtues, or in his fidelity to his own
people? It is safe to affirm that the British Government did not ask
whether he had the body of a Michael Angelo's David or of a baboon from
the jungle. It did not ask whether he was good to his wife and children.
Most animals are. It did not care how devoted he was to his fetich. The
sole question was, What sort of public citizen is he? How does he stand
related to surrounding peoples? On what terms does he propose to live
with them? That precisely is what we want to know about the Kaiser.

Fortunately, we do not have to ask Prof. Burgess, or any group of
savants, or the German people. The Kaiser's record is known and read of
all men.

JAMES H. ECOB,

American Institute of Social Service.

New York, Oct. 21, 1914.




PROF. BURGESS'S SECOND ARTICLE.

The Guarantee of Belgian Neutrality


So much has been said about Belgian neutrality, so much assumed, and it
has been such a stumbling block in the way of any real and comprehensive
understanding of the causes and purposes of the great European
catastrophe, that it may be well to examine the basis of it and endeavor
to get an exact idea of the scope and obligation.

Of course, we are considering here the question of guaranteed
neutrality, not the ordinary neutrality enjoyed by all States not at
war, when some States are at war; the difference between ordinary
neutrality and guaranteed neutrality being that no State is under any
obligation to defend the ordinary neutrality of any other State against
infringement by a belligerent, and no belligerent is under any special
obligation to observe it. Guaranteed neutrality is, therefore, purely a
question of specific agreement between States.

On the 19th day of April, 1839, Belgium and Holland, which from 1815 to
1830 had formed the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, signed a treaty
of separation from, and independence of, each other. It is in this
treaty that the original pledge of Belgian neutrality is to be found.
The clause of the treaty reads: "Belgium in the limits above described
shall form an independent neutral State and shall be bound to observe
the same neutrality toward all other States." On the same day and at the
same place, (London,) a treaty, known in the history of diplomacy as the
Quintuple Treaty, was signed by Great Britain, France, Prussia, Austria,
and Russia, approving and adopting the treaty between Belgium and
Holland. A little later, May 11, the German Confederation, of which both
Austria and Prussia were members, also ratified this treaty.

In the year 1866 the German Confederation was dissolved by the war
between Austria and Prussia, occasioned by the Schleswig-Holstein
question. In 1867 the North German Union was formed, of which Prussia
was the leading State, while Austria and the German States south of the
River Main were left out of it altogether. Did these changes render the
guarantees of the Treaty of 1839 obsolete and thereby abrogate them, or
at least weaken them and make them an uncertain reliance? The test of
this came in the year 1870, at the beginning of hostilities between
France and the North German Union. Great Britain, the power most
interested in the maintenance of Belgian neutrality, seems to have had
considerable apprehension about it. Mr. Gladstone, then Prime Minister,
said in the House of Commons: "I am not able to subscribe to the
doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an
assertion that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is
binding on every party to it, irrespective altogether of the particular
position in which it may find itself when the occasion for acting on the
guarantee arises."


A One-Year Treaty.

Proceeding upon this view, the British Government then sought and
procured from the French Government and from the Government of the North
German Union separate but identical treaties guaranteeing with the
British Government the neutrality of Belgium during the period of the
war between France and the North German Union, the so-called
Franco-Prussian war, which had just broken out, and for one year from
the date of its termination. In these treaties it is also to be remarked
that Great Britain limited the possible operation of her military force
in maintaining the neutrality of Belgium to the territory of the State
of Belgium.

These treaties expired in the year 1872, and the present German Empire
has never signed any treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium.
Moreover, between 1872 and 1914 Belgium became what is now termed a
world power; that is, it reached a population of nearly 9,000,000
people, it had a well-organized, well-equipped army of over 200,000 men
and powerful fortifications for its own defense; it had acquired and was
holding colonies covering 1,000,000 square miles of territory, inhabited
by 15,000,000 men, and it had active commerce, mediated by its own
marine, with many, if not all, parts of the world. Now, these things are
not at all compatible in principle with a specially guaranteed
neutrality of the State which possesses them. The State which possesses
them has grown out of its swaddling clothes, has arrived at the age and
condition of maturity and self-protection, and has passed the age when
specially guaranteed neutrality is natural.

From all these considerations, I think it extremely doubtful whether, on
the first day of August, 1914, Belgium should have been considered as
possessing any other kind of neutrality than the ordinary neutrality
enjoyed by all States not at war, when some States are at war. In fact,
it remains to be seen whether Belgium itself had not forfeited the
privilege of this ordinary neutrality before a single German soldier had
placed foot on Belgian soil. A few days ago I received a letter from one
of the most prominent professors in the University of Berlin, who is
also in close contact with the Prussian Ministry of Education, a man in
whose veracity I place perfect confidence, having known him well for ten
years. He writes: "Our violation of the neutrality of Belgium was
prompted in part by the fact that we had convincing proof that there
were French soldiers already in Belgium and that Belgium had agreed to
allow the French Army to pass over its soil in case of a war between
France and us." Moreover, in the British "White Paper" itself, No. 122,
is to be found a dispatch from the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir E.
Goschen, to Sir Edward Grey, containing these words: "It appears from
what he [the German Secretary of Foreign Affairs] said that the German
Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been
committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a
consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo
already." The date of this dispatch is July 31, days before the Germans
entered Belgium.

But placing these two things entirely aside, as well as the new
evidence, said to have just been found in the archives at Brussels, that
Belgium had by her agreements with Great Britain forfeited every claim
to even ordinary neutrality in case of a war between Germany and Great
Britain, I find in the British "White Paper" itself, No. 123, not only
ample justification, but absolute necessity, from a military point of
view, for a German army advancing against France, not only to pass
through Belgium, but to occupy Belgium. This number of the "White Paper"
is a communication dated Aug. 1 from Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen,
British Ambassador in Berlin. In it Sir Edward Grey informed Sir E.
Goschen that the German Ambassador in London asked him "whether, if
Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, we, Great
Britain, would remain neutral," and that he [Grey] replied that he
"could not say that," that he did not think Great Britain "could give a
promise of neutrality on that condition alone"; further, Sir Edward Grey
says: "The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate
conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the
integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed. I said that I
felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on
similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free."


The Necessary Invasions.

After this Sir Edward Grey declared in Parliament, according to
newspaper reports, that Great Britain stood, as to Belgian neutrality,
on the same ground as in 1870. With all due respect, I cannot so
understand it. In 1870 Great Britain remained neutral in a war between
the North German Union and France, and, with the North German Union,
guaranteed Belgium against invasion by France, and, with France,
guaranteed Belgium against invasion by the North German Union. On Aug.
1, 1914, the German Empire asked Great Britain to do virtually the same
thing, and Great Britain refused. It is, therefore, Germany who stood in
1914 on the same ground, with regard to Belgium neutrality, as she did
in 1870, and it is Great Britain who shifted her position and virtually
gave notice that she herself would become a belligerent. It was this
notice served by Sir Edward Grey on the German Ambassador in London on
Aug. 1, 1914, which made the occupation of Belgium an absolute military
necessity to the safety of the German armies advancing against France.
Otherwise they would, so far as the wit of man could divine, have left
their right flank exposed to the advance of a British army through
Belgium, and there certainly was no German commander so absolutely
bereft of all military knowledge or instinct as to have committed so
patent an error.

Belgium has Great Britain to thank for every drop of blood shed by her
people, and every franc of damage inflicted within her territory during
this war. With a million of German soldiers on her eastern border
demanding unhindered passage through one end of her territory, under the
pledge of guarding her independence and integrity and reimbursing every
franc of damage, and no British force nearer than Dover, across the
Channel, it was one of the most inconsiderate, reckless, and selfish
acts ever committed by a great power when Sir Edward Grey directed, as
is stated in No. 155 of the British "White Paper," the British Envoy in
Brussels to inform the "Belgian Government that if pressure is applied
to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, his
Majesty's Government expects that they will resist by any means in their
power."

It is plain enough that Great Britain was not thinking so much of
protecting Belgium as of Belgium protecting her, until she could prepare
to attack Germany in concert with Russia and France. She was willing to
let Belgium, yea almost to command Belgium, to take the fearful risk of
complete destruction in order that she might gain a little time in
perfecting the co-operation of Russia and France with herself for the
crushing of Germany, and in order to hold the public opinion of neutral
powers, especially of the United States of America, in leash under the
chivalrous issue of protecting a weaker country, which she has done
little or nothing to protect, but which she could have effectively
protected by simply remaining neutral herself.

We Americans have been greatly confused in mind in regard to the issues
of this war. We have confounded causes and occasions and purposes and
incidents until it has become almost impossible for any considerable
number of us to form a sound and correct judgment in regard to it. But
we shall emerge from that nebulous condition. We are beginning to see
more clearly now, and it would not surprise me greatly if the means used
for producing our confusion would some day come back, if not to plague
the consciences, at least to foil the purposes of their inventors.




Reply to Prof. Burgess


_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

Prof. Burgess's amazing communication on Belgian neutrality omits an
essential piece of evidence. Granting, for the sake of argument, that
the German Empire might repudiate all treaty obligations of the earlier
German confederations, (very odd law, this;) granting also the still
more novel plea that Belgium had outgrown the need, and the privilege of
neutralization, Germany had agreed to treat all neutral powers under the
following provisions of The Hague Conventions of 1907 concerning the
rights and duties of neutral powers:

     1. The territory of neutral powers is inviolable.

     2. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or either
     munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral
     power.

       *       *       *       *       *

     5. A neutral power must not allow any of the acts referred to
     in Articles 2 to 4 to occur on its territory.

This pledge the German Empire had solemnly made only seven years ago. It
would seem that Prof. Burgess may accept the distinction ably made by
Prof. Münsterberg between "pledges of national honor" and mere "routine
agreements," placing Hague treaties in the latter category.

The allegation that France and England secretly did unneutral acts in
Belgium is as yet without proof of any sort, and must be interpreted by
the commonsense consideration that a neutral Belgium was a defensive
bulwark for France and England. To have tampered with her neutrality
would have been motiveless folly. How much more decent and moral than
Prof. Burgess's meticulous weighing of national reincorporation as a
means of evading national obligations is Chancellor Hollweg's robust
plea of national necessity! Prof. Burgess's whole moral and mental
attitude in this case seems to be that of a corporation lawyer getting a
trust out of a hole under the Statute of Limitations or by some
reorganizing dodge.

FRANK JEWETT MATHER, Jr.

Princeton, N.J., Nov. 4, 1914.




America's Peril in Judging Germany

By William M. Sloane.

     Late Seth Low Professor of History at Columbia University;
     ex-President National Institute of Arts and Letters and of the
     American Historical Association; was secretary of George
     Bancroft, the historian, in Berlin, 1873-5; author of works on
     French History.


The American public has been carefully trained to avoid entanglement
with foreign affairs. This European war was so unexpected, so entirely
unforeseen, that we were at first bewildered, and then exasperated, by
our unreadiness to meet our own emergencies.

In our effort to fix responsibility we then became partisan to the verge
of moral participation and had to be called to our senses by the wise
proclamation and warning of our Chief Magistrate.

Western Europe is a nearer neighbor than either Central or Eastern, and
what stern censors permit us to know is nicely calculated to arouse our
prejudice on one side or the other. Believing that, owing to cable
cutting and neutrality restrictions of wireless, as yet the plain truth
is not available, we ask for a suspension of judgment on both sides in
order that our Government may enjoy the undivided support of all
American citizens in its desire to secure a minimum of disturbance to
the normal course of our commercial, industrial, and agricultural life
by convulsions that are not of our making.

Fairness to ourselves means justice in the formation and expression of
opinion about not one or two but all the participants in a struggle for
European ascendency, with which we have nothing to do except as
overwhelming victory for either side might bring on a struggle for world
ascendency, with which, unhappily, we might have much to do. To
contemplate such a terrible event should sober us; the best preparation
for it is absolute neutrality in thought, speech, and conduct.

Our own history since independence is an unbroken record of expansion
and imperialism. Our contiguous territories have been acquired by
compulsion, whether of war, of purchase, of occupation, or of exchange.
We have taken advantage of others' dire necessity in the case of Great
Britain, France, Spain, Russia, and Mexico.

To rectify our frontier we compelled the Gladsden Purchase within the
writer's lifetime. As to our non-contiguous possessions, we hold them by
the right of conquest or revolution, salving our consciences with such
cash indemnity as we ourselves have chosen to pay, and even now we are
considering what we choose to pay, not what a disinterested court might
consider adequate, for the good-will of the United States of Colombia, a
good-will desired solely and entirely for an additional safeguard to the
Panama Canal and a prop to the policy or doctrine substituted by the
present Administration for the moribund Monroe Doctrine.

In no single instance of virtual annexation or protectorate have we
consulted by popular vote either the desires of those inhabiting the
respective territories annexed or The Hague Tribunal. In every case we
have had one single plea and one only--self-interest.

The entire American continent south of our frontier we have closed to
all European settlement, thereby maintaining for more than a century in
a magnificent territory an imperfect civilization which makes a sorry
use of natural resources which could vastly improve the condition of all
mankind if properly used.

This is the light in which European nations see us; our identity in
this policy from the dawn of our national existence onward they consider
a proof of our national character. It differs in no respect from their
own policies except in one.

But for them this exception is basic. We are a composite folk and they
are homogeneous, their blend being approximately complete. They have one
language, one tradition, one set of institutions and laws; a unity of
literature, habits, and method in life. Some European States are
composite, but each component part claims and cultivates its own style
and its own principles; each announces itself as a nationality with a
life to be maintained and a destiny to be wrought out somehow, either in
peace or in conflict.

With perhaps a single exception, they have an overflow of population,
due to natural generation, for the comfort and happiness of which they
seek either an expansion of territory or an improvement in the
productivity of their home lands; for those who must emigrate they
passionately desire the perpetuation of their nationality, with all it
implies.

In these respects they do not differ from us, except that perhaps we are
more determined and imperious. We cannot think politically in any other
terms than those of democratic government, either direct or
representative.

At the present hour we are engaged in the very dubious experiment of
direct popular legislation and administration. We are trying to change
our Government radically, discarding its representative form for that of
delegation. The remotest cause of this is the desire to amalgamate all
our elements into homogeneity. So far this policy has resulted in a
demand, not for equality of political and civil rights, but for its
overthrow, substituting laws intended to create social and economic
equality by means of class legislation.

These facts are not to the edification of other civilized States, and
subject us to harsh and contemptuous criticism.

It is likewise very interesting that apparently the American people
believe in a monarchical democracy. One of our typical first citizens
has recently expressed his antipathy to the phrases "My monarchy," "My
loyal people," "My loyal subjects," used by one of the German monarchs
in summoning the nation to war, as implying a dynastic or personal
ownership of men.


Averse from Militarism.

The American masses dislike the sound of supreme war lord, but gladly
admit their own Chief Magistrate to be Commander in Chief of the army
and navy. To our ears the three German words are offensive, and well
they may be, for in the treacherous literal translation they are willful
perversion; but the much stronger English words are a delight to our
democracy.

The phrases of monarchy are constantly used in Great Britain by its King
and its Emperor, but give no offense to his "loyal subjects," even the
most radical, who delight in them, as apparently do our people of
British origin. Why do they give such deep offense when employed by the
German Government through its King and Emperor? The social
stratification of Germany is not as marked as that of Great Britain; its
aristocracy is far less powerful; and Edward VII. proved that an adroit
and willful English monarch could involve his "loyal people" deeper in
harmful, secret alliances than William II., whose alliances and policies
were and are unconcealed.

One of our greatest historians has earned a brilliant reputation in the
conclusive proof that oceans are the world's highways, while its
continents are its barriers. To the term "militarism" we attach an
opprobrious meaning; militarism is the more infamous in exact proportion
to its efficiency. We have been at little pains to define it, and as to
certain of its aspects are curiously complacent.

The basic principle of our own nationality has long been the very vague
Monroe Doctrine, by the assertion of which we have prevented the
establishment on our nearest and remotest frontiers of strong military
powers, which might in certain events compel us to maintain a powerful
and numerous standing army, or even introduce the compulsory military
service of all voters, (women, of course, excepted.)

Yet we propose to fight if necessary in order to prevent fighting, and
to this end maintain the second strongest and, for its size, the most
efficient fleet in the world. This is our militarism; that of Great
Britain has been to maintain a fleet double our own or any other in
size, for it is her basic principle to maintain an unquestioned
supremacy on the highways of commerce. To this we have meekly assented,
while other nations absorb our carrying trade and our flag waves over a
fleet of perhaps a dozen respectable oceangoing trading and passenger
ships. It is under her rather patronizing protection that we fight our
foreign wars and by pressure from her that we manage the Panama Canal
with nice and honorable attention to her interpretation of a treaty
capable of quite a different one. Whether or not this be "militarism" of
the utmost efficiency by sea is not difficult to decide. But we have
never styled it infamous.

While I am writing, Germans, whose basic principle is the most efficient
"militarism" by land, are publishing all abroad that the "militarism" of
France must be forever stamped out, so that they may dwell at peace in
the lands which are their home.

Within a generation France has accumulated a colonial empire second only
to that of Great Britain, while she has incessantly demanded the
reintegration of German lands, and especially a German city which she
arbitrarily annexed and held by "militarism" for about five generations.
The "militarism" of a republic and a democracy which retains the
essential features of Napoleonic administration has been quite as
efficient as that of a monarchical democracy like Great Britain, and may
easily prove more efficient than that of a monarchy like Germany.

Why should it be more infamous or barbarous in one case than the other?
And with what is this efficient military democracy allied in the
closest ties?

With Russia, an Oriental despotism which by the aid of French money has
developed a "militarism" by land so portentous in numbers, dimension,
and efficiency that its movements are comparable to those of Attila's
Huns. Escaped Russians in Western lands are denouncing German
"militarism" as the incubus of the world.

Which of the two should Americans regard as the greater danger?


Menaces to Our Neutrality.

It has wrung our hearts to consider the violation of Belgian neutrality,
for which both France and eventually even Great Britain have long been
prepared, but the latter has with little or no protest arranged with the
"bear that walks like a man" to disregard contemptuously the neutrality
of Persia in arranging spheres of influence, exactly as Japan, another
ally, is contemptuously disregarding the neutrality of China, the new
"republic" we were in such haste to recognize that we had to use the
cable. And what about Korea? It is a Japanese province in contravention
of the most solemn guarantees of its integrity.

Leaving aside for the moment certain considerations like these, and they
might easily be indefinitely amplified, which should compel Americans to
unbiased consideration for others and preclude a dangerous partiality,
let us ask ourselves how in the event of mediation we could be an
impartial pacificator, behaving as we have hitherto done. The attitude
of our Government has been strictly neutral, neutral to the verge of
utter self-abnegation; and, as some regard it, timidity.

But rock-fast as any democratic magistrate may be, public opinion must
and does influence him. Rightly or wrongly his agents would be even more
completely dominated, and rightly or wrongly they would be suspect in
view of our terrific partisanship on both sides since the commencement
of hostilities.

The efficiency of Government organs in "producing the goods," the
terrific power of organization on one side and mass on the other, have
been considered a menace to world equilibrium.

Whichever way the decision falls, the scrutiny of Europe will be turned
to us. Unless observation and instinct be utterly at fault, we have for
more than a decade been, after Germany, the worst-hated nation of all
that are foremost.

It is pre-eminently our affair to mind our own business, as others have
minded theirs. Without cessation of noise and fury in America this is
impossible.

Indeed, our emotional storms have already furnished proof of how we are
incapacitated from either enforcing our rights as neutrals or seizing by
the forelock the opportunity afforded to us as neutrals and from
enjoying the unquestioned privileges of neutrality.

It is not altogether edifying to think that the close of the European
struggle, be it long or short, will probably find our ocean commerce
substantially where it was at the beginning, and that conflicts which
were not of our making will have been fought out before we are able to
secure our share of the world markets. Apparently the leaders in
commerce, industry, and trade, like the lawmakers and administrators,
are paralyzed by the imperative necessity of aiding panicstricken
tourists and panicstricken stay-at-homes. Apparently, too, our people
are suffering more in purse and general comfort than the actual
combatant nations.

Clamorous for American sympathy and cash, we have on our shores
embassies from the belligerents, pleading their respective virtues and
sorrows.

Why, after all, should our chiefest concern be with them? Surely we may
be good Samaritans without a total disregard of our own interests and a
blindness to opportunity verging on impotency. There is no immorality in
the proper play of self-interest. It is the conflict of interests which
creates morality. But the spectators, even the maddest baseball "fans,"
do not play the game nor train for it. It is high time we ceased wasting
our energies in emotions and vain babble.

At this writing the first line of defense against the Oriental deluge is
endangered. The Slav individually and in his primitive culture is
altogether charming. He is a son of the soil, picturesque in life and
creative; he is minstrel and poet, seer. But so far he is the carrier of
a low civilization, the prophet, priest, and king of autocracy and
absolutism. Never has there been a time in history when the higher
civilization was not in a savage struggle for existence. It is almost
the first time in three centuries that the highest civilizations were in
alliance with the lowest; not since the pugnacious Western powers of
Europe sued for favor at the Sublime Porte.


In Peril of the Whirlwind.

This ought to be a very sobering spectacle, but it seems to arouse the
delighted enthusiasm of an American majority. For such an aberration
there is but a single and efficient remedy: absorption in our own
affairs, the discriminating study of efficient methods to prevent our
being caught up by a whirlwind, even the outer edges of which may snatch
us into the vortex.

To change the metaphor, we revel in the pleasant propulsion of the
maelstrom's rim, unaware that every instant brings us closer to dangers,
escape from which would demand herculean effort. Irresponsible emotions
are, like those of the novel and the stage, when intensified to excess
utterly incompatible with action. And just such a paralysis seems for
six long weeks to have lamed the highest powers of America.

The proportionate increase in population among the European powers is
overwhelmingly in favor of the Slavs. Their rate of increase by natural
generation is nearly three times that of even the Germans, with the
result that by the introduction of enforced military service into
Eastern Europe, (excepting Hungary and perhaps Rumania,) the military
balance of power has been completely changed.

The wars among the Balkan States, including Turkey, have put on foot
armies of a dimension hitherto undreamed of among the South Slavs, and
the army of Russia is probably two and a half times larger than it
could have been thirty-five years ago.

The method by which Eastern Europe has succeeded in financing itself is
rather mysterious. We know, of course, that the original Franco-Russian
Alliance was based on reciprocal interests, and that large sums of
French money flowed into Russia, which partly developed the natural
resources of Russia and were partly in the shape of loans that in all
likelihood were used for war material.


Slavs in Germany.

The conflict between the Slavs and the Teutons all along the line on
which they border has therefore been in two ways intensified. In the
first place, just in proportion as Germany has become an industrial
State, the field work has been intrusted to immigrant Slavs, some of
whom come only for the season and return, but a very large number of
them--estimated at the present moment at close to a million--have
substantially settled within the borders of the German Empire. That is
to say, there is a constant injection of 1-1/2 per cent. of Slavic blood
into the territories of the German Empire.

Suppose now that Russia should succeed in establishing the protectorate
over all Slavs which she desires, and at the same time should press back
the Germans on that border line, something very closely approximating a
new migration of peoples in Europe will take place.

As far as I know the German feeling, expressed both privately and
publicly, officially and unofficially, they have hoped to maintain their
complete consanguinity, if not homogeneity, within the lands they regard
as their home; and their preparations for war, their increase of their
military strength, have been made, professedly at least, solely in the
interest of defense. Americans can simply not realize--it is impossible
for them to realize--the difference in the degree of civilization and
culture on either side of a purely artificial boundary line.

Very fortunately it has entered the minds of several people lately to
write to the newspapers about the unhappy confusion that comes from the
use of words in a meaning which at home they do not connote at all.
Take, for example, the whole question of militarism. As we see it, it is
a matter altogether of degree. For defense against what the German
considers the most terrible danger that he personally has to confront,
it has been necessary from time to time to change both the size and the
composition of his forces, whether offensive or defensive, and they
therefore have introduced compulsory military service, an idea which has
always been very offensive to Anglo-Saxons, but which in cases of dire
necessity they have been compelled to utilize themselves, as, for
example, during our own civil war, the abandonment of voluntary
enlistment and the introduction of the draft.

Now, the compulsory military service of the German means that every man
is for a period of his life drafted and trained as a soldier. Forty
years ago there were a great many men who escaped by reason of one or
another provision of the law. That number was steadily diminished until
within eighteen months, when finally it was proclaimed that every German
who could endure the severity of that training must undergo it, and that
was due to the fact that the military balance of power of which I spoke
had been so completely changed by the re-armament of Russia and by the
formation of the South Slav armies in the Balkan Peninsula.

As a parallel we might imagine, not one troublesome neighbor, but four.
We might imagine a tremendous military power developed in Canada, and we
might imagine a hostile military power on the Atlantic side and another
one on the Pacific side, in which case we would beyond a question have
to expand our inchoate militarism, just in proportion as we came to feel
the necessity for a strong physical defensive or offensive in the way of
a great standing army, and we probably would do it without any
hesitation.

Now, Germany has not any really bitter foe on the north, although there
is no love lost between the Germans and the Scandinavians; but it has an
embittered foe on the east, and another one on the west, and what has
proved to be an embittered foe upon the water and a very lukewarm
neutral State on the south, a State which had joined in alliance with
her.

Italy had joined what Italy considered a defensive alliance, but not an
offensive alliance, and chose to regard the outbreak of this war as an
offensive movement on the part of Germany, and for that reason has
refused to participate in the struggle.

I say for that reason because, having been accustomed to reading, all my
life, long diplomatic documents, really having been trained, you might
say, almost in the school of Ranke, who was the inaugurator of an
entirely new school of historical writing based on the criticism of
historical papers, I have come to realize that the dispatches of trained
diplomats are for the most part purely formal, and that while these
respective publications of Great Britain and of Germany have a certain
value, yet nevertheless the most important plans are laid in the
embrasures of windows, where important men stand and talk so that no one
can hear, or they are arranged and often times amplified in private
correspondence which does not see the light until years afterward, and
that the most important historical documents are found in the archives
of families, members of which have been the guiding spirits of European
policy and politics.

So that what the secret diplomacy of the last years may have been is as
yet utterly unknown, and certainly will not be known for the generation
yet to come and perhaps for several generations. The student in almost
any European capital is given complete access to everything on file in
the archives, including secret documents, only down to a certain date.
That date differs in various of these storehouses, but I think in no
case is it later than 1830.

If you ask why, there are the sensibilities of families to be
considered, there is the question of hidden policies which they do not
care to reveal, and then there is the whole matter of who the examining
student is. For instance, certain very important papers were absolutely
denied to me, as an American, in Great Britain--or at least excuses were
made if they were not absolutely denied--which were opened to an
Englishman who was working upon the same subject at about the same time.

The reason for such observations at the present hour is plain enough.
Public opinion is formed upon what the public is permitted to know, and
is not formed upon the actual facts which the public is not permitted to
know. And for that reason Americans, remote as we are from the sources
of information, and especially remote from that most delicate of all
indications, the pulse of public opinion in foreign countries, ought to
be extremely slow to commit themselves to anything.


Attack on Sir Edward Grey.

Now, we have just had a very interesting incident. THE NEW YORK TIMES
printed recently what the British call their "White Paper," as well as
the German "White Paper." The editors of our most important journals
announced that they had read and studied those papers with care, and
that on the face of those papers, beyond any peradventure, Germany was
the aggressor. German militarism had flaunted itself as an insult in the
face of Europe. Germany had violated neutrality, Germany had committed
almost every sin known to international law, and therefore the whole
German procedure was to be reprobated.

Within a very short time a Labor member of Parliament, J. Ramsay
Macdonald, rises in his place, able and fearless, and, on the basis of
the "White Paper," as published and put in the hands of the British
public, attacks Sir Edward Grey for having so committed Great Britain in
advance to both Russia and France that, in spite of the representations
of the German Ambassador, he dared not discuss the question of
neutrality. This member of Parliament manifestly belongs to the powerful
anti-war party of Great Britain, a party two of whose members, John
Burns and Lord Morley, resigned from the Cabinet rather than condone
iniquity; a party which before the outbreak of the war made itself
heard and felt, and protested against the participation of Great
Britain, desiring localization of the struggle.

Mr. Macdonald says that in his opinion this talk about the violation of
Belgian neutrality, from the point of view of British statesmen, is
absurd, because as long ago as 1870 the plans for the use of Belgium,
both by France and by Germany--in other words, the violation of its
neutrality--were in the British War Office, and that Mr. Gladstone rose
in his place and said he was not one of those whose opinion was that a
formal guarantee should stand so far in thwarting the natural course of
events as to commit Great Britain to war; and that has been the
announced and avowed policy of Great Britain all the way down since
1870, and that therefore talk about the violation of Belgian neutrality
is a mere pretext.

That is another instance of this secret agreement that goes on, which so
commits a man like Sir Edward Grey that in the pinch, when the German
Ambassador substantially proposed to yield everything to him and asked
him for his proposition, he cannot make any.

These facts are in the "White Paper." As far as I know, no editor in the
United States who claims to have studied thoroughly that "White Paper"
has ever brought this out, and they had not been published in that paper
at the time when Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith made their respective
speeches and committed the British Nation to the war.

Another unhappy use of language which has been noted in the public press
is due to the literal translation of words. Americans simply do not know
what the word Emperor means. To most of them it connotes the later Roman
Emperors, or the autocratic Czar of Russia, or the short-lived but
autocratic quality of Napoleon III., so that when we use the word
Emperor we are thinking of an absolutely non-existing personage, unless
it be the Czar of Russia.

We like very much to make sport of phrases from languages unfamiliar to
us, and we enjoy the jokes of ludicrous translations, and so we take
the term "Oberster Kriegsherr" and we translate it "Supreme War Lord."
What conception the average American forms of that is manifest. Whereas,
as a matter of fact--and this has already been pointed out both in
conversation and in public prints--the term means nothing in the world
but Commander in Chief of the German Empire, has not any different
relation whatsoever in the substance of its meaning than that which
Presidents of the United States have been in time of supreme danger to
the country. Mr. Lincoln was just as much an "Oberster Kriegsherr" at
one period of his term as the German Emperor could ever be; in fact,
rather more.


Sherman's March to the Sea.

In truth, the sense of outrage which Americans feel over the horrors of
war, while most creditable to them, is very often based upon an
ignorance of the rules and regulations of so-called civilized warfare,
and upon a sentimentality, which, though also very creditable, is
unfortunately not one of the factors in the world's work. It would not
hurt Americans occasionally to recall Sherman's march to the sea, during
which every known kind of devastation occurred, or to recall Gen.
Hunter's boast that he had made the Valley of Virginia such a desert
that a crow could not find sustenance enough in it to fly from one side
to the other, and yet at that time, in what we considered the supreme
danger to our country, the conduct of those men was approved, and they
themselves were almost deified for their actions.

While parallels are dangerous and the existence of one wrong does not
make another action right, yet at the same time a very considerable
amount of open-mindedness must be exercised in a neutral country when
regarding the passionate devotions of combatant nations to their
culture, to their safety, to their interest; and it should be recalled
that in the heats and horrors of war it is extremely difficult, however
trained or disciplined troops may be, to prevent outrages, and that so
far as we have gone in accurate information the least that can be said
is that it is slowly dawning upon us that horror for horror and outrage
for outrage there has been no overwhelming balance on either side.

The Allies (this interview was received Tuesday morning) firmly believe
that the struggle on the west is so indecisive up to this time that what
will count for them is the duration of the war. Lloyd George has just
said, not in the exact language, but virtually, what Disraeli said in
1878: "We don't want to fight; but, by jingo, if we do we have got the
ships, we have got the men, we have got the money, too." Those are the
words that brought into use the expression "jingoists."

Now, Lloyd George said the other day that it was the money which in the
long run would count and that Great Britain had that; and the meetings
that are held to induce Englishmen to enlist are addressed by speakers
who meet with lots of applause when they say: "We may not be able to put
the same number of men into the field immediately that Germany was able
to put or Russia was able to put, but in the long run, considering the
attitude of all the different parts of our empire, we will be able to
put just as many men, and therefore time is on our side both as regards
force in the field and money to sustain it." (The London Times confesses
that enlistment in Ireland is a failure.)

Lloyd George says that for a comparatively short time England's enemies
can finance themselves and be very efficient, but that as time passes
they unquestionably will exhaust not only their pecuniary means but
their resources of men as well. That is his position at this time.
Therefore, it does appear as if the long duration of the war was a thing
desired, at least in Great Britain, as being their hope of victory. Both
Great Britain and France are wealthy countries. Just how wealthy Germany
is I do not think they realize, nor do we know, nor what its ultimate
resources can be.

Now, looking at the allied line as a whole, we will suppose that the
German forces were overwhelmingly triumphant in France, and suppose,
likewise, which is by no means as strong a hypothesis, that Russia is
overwhelmingly victorious against Austria and the Eastern German Army;
then, of course, you have the situation in which that one of the Allies
which is triumphant will assert its leadership in the terms of peace
that will be reached, and would have the hegemony, as we call it, of all
Europe.


Russia's Position.

So that the defeat of the Allies in the west and their overwhelming
success in the east would compel the acceptance, in any peace that might
be made, of such terms as Russia chose to dictate. She would have to be
satisfied, otherwise there would only be one outcome of it; that is, of
course, if Great Britain and France could not accept those terms, there
would be a rupture, and stranger things have been seen than Germany,
France, and Great Britain fighting against Russia.

Stranger things than that have been seen; such changes in the alliances
between States have occurred at intervals from the seventeenth century
onward in Europe, a phase of the subject that is too lengthy to discuss
here, but which every student of history knows all about. And it is
thinkable that they might occur again.

Suppose, on the other hand, that the Germans should imitate Frederick
the Great, which is not so preposterous as appears on the face of it,
because of comparatively easy means of transportation, and should be
able to make successive victorious dashes, first in the east and then in
the west, backward and forward; leadership would be hers, and France
would be a minor power for years to come.

Probably peace might come more quickly if neither side should be
absolutely victorious than otherwise. But for the moment I think that
the agreement among the Allies is a very portentous thing, as far as the
duration of the war is concerned.

"Do you think that any secret agreement may exist; that France even now
may have made an agreement with Germany?" Mr. Sloane was asked.

I cannot think so. I think it very evident there is no such secret
agreement. If one existed it would be much more likely to be between
Russia and Germany. You remember the development of Prussia, which is,
of course, the commanding State in the German Empire, occurred by its
careful conservation of the policy which was laid down in the political
will of Frederick the Great, that of keeping friends with Russia.

The fact of the matter is, Prussia was saved in the Napoleonic wars by
the act of Gen. Yorck at Tauroggen, when he suddenly abandoned the
French and went over to the Prussians, and while Russia has within half
a generation become intensely bitter against Germany, yet it is true
that the Baltic Provinces, in which the gentry and the burghers are
Germans, have furnished most important administrators to the Russian
Empire, a fact that causes much of the jealousy in Russia on the part of
the native-born Russians against the Germans of the Baltic Provinces.
Nevertheless, self-interest is a very important thing, and if Russia
thought for a moment that France was going to abandon her I think she
would turn to Germany right away.

As time has developed the nations of today, it has come to be understood
by hard-headed statesmen that those who conduct their respective affairs
can have no other guiding principle than the interest of their own
State, no other.

There is a persistent feeling throughout the world that there is an
analogy between the individual man and organized society. There are
books written to show that States must and do pass through the various
stages through which an individual passes, namely, infancy, childhood,
youth, middle age, old age, decay. By a perfectly natural parallel the
majority of men apply the same morality to the State which they apply to
the individual, and they insist upon it that a State must be moral in
every respect; that it must have a conscience; that it must have virtue;
that it must practice self-denial; that it must not lay its hands on
what does not belong to it. In short, that it must as a State or as a
nation be "good," in exactly the same sense in which a person is "good."
In other words, they personify the State.

I have never heard of any speaker or writer who would not approve of
that as an ideal, and who would not desire that the millennium should
come upon earth now, and that exactly the same virtues that are held up
for personal ideals should be held up for national ideals.

I think we all believe that, but, as a matter of fact, in a world
constituted as ours is, the one test of a good Government, applied by
every individual, is the material prosperity of the people who live
under it, and for that reason if the people do not at first put in power
men who can give them material prosperity they will put such failures
out and try another set of rulers, and they will go on and on that way
until necessarily the policies of statesmen must be based upon the
interest of that State whose destinies are in their hands. So that the
only hope of relations between nations similar to those that exist
between good men and good women is that the individuals of that nation,
its population, its inhabitants, should consent to exercise the
self-denying virtues; and until that point is reached there can be no
good State in the sense in which there can be a good man. We ought all
to work for it, but it is not here now, and there are no signs on the
horizon of its approach.

In a war, therefore, every statesman studies the resources of his
nation, and when the time comes that it is manifestly his duty to put an
end to warfare, it is only by the public approval that he dares do it,
by showing that it is to their advantage to give up the things for which
they went to war, in greater or less degree.


Armed Peace Not Disarmament.

And the man of shrewd insight, who knows when that point is reached, is
the leader who saves the face, so to speak, of these nations and steps
in and says:

"Now, the whole moral force of the civilized world must be brought to
bear upon you to make a peace, the terms of which, if possible, shall
not discredit any of you, but at the same time shall be as elastic and
as proportionate to your respective gains and losses as will insure at
least a considerable period of peace, not an armistice, not an armed
armistice, though it may be an armed peace."

We see no signs anywhere in Europe that disarmament has any substantial
body of advocates in any nation. The basic principle hitherto of the
German people has been to have, not the largest, but the strongest army;
the basic principle of Great Britain, which sneers at militarism, has
been not only to have the most powerful fleet, but twice the most
powerful fleet.

And what is the basic principle of the United States? The Monroe
Doctrine, to have no armed neighbor which shall compel us to violate by
its presence our dislike for compulsory military service or to expend
great sums for armament.

These are basic principles in each of us. Now, we have been able to
maintain the Monroe Doctrine by simply showing our teeth, but whether we
could maintain it in the future without an armed force sufficient to
give it sanction I think is doubtful, and for that reason the Monroe
Doctrine has undergone quite a number of modifications which I do not
need to explain here.

But this basic principle of ours that from Patagonia to the Mexican
frontier we will suffer no armed nation of Europe to make permanent
settlement and endanger our peace is exactly the same sort of principle
that the German holds when he says, "We must have the strongest army,"
and the same which the Englishman holds when he says, "We must have the
strongest fleet."

I want it distinctly understood that I am not a partisan. I am not pro
this or pro that or pro anything except pro-American, and the principal
impulse I have in trying to clarify my mind is my hope that there may be
an end to these hysterical exhibitions of partisanship, in which
(throughout this neutral nation) men indulge who still hold too
strongly, as I think, to the glory, honor, dignity, and traditions of
the lands of their origin.




An Answer by Prof. Ladd

     Emeritus Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy at Yale
     University; Lecturer on Philosophy in India and Japan; has
     received numerous decorations in Japan, where he was guest and
     unofficial adviser of Prince Ito; ex-President of American
     Psychological Association.


_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

It seems strange to me that a student of history with the training and
acumen of Prof. Sloane should overlook or minimize the important
distinction that must hold the chief place in enabling us to understand
the issues and appreciate the merits of the war now raging in Europe.
This distinction is that between the German people and Germanic
civilization, on the one hand, and, on the other, the present
Constitution and cherished ambitions of the German Empire under the
dominance of Prussia. The German people, by genuine processes of
self-development, have worked out for themselves a veritable spiritual
unity which manifests itself in language, laws, customs, and a large
measure of substantial uniformity in moral and religious ideals.
Germanic civilization, with its love of order, its high estimate of
education, its notable additions to science, philosophy, and art,
constitutes one of the most noble and beneficent contributions to the
welfare of mankind.

But the case is not at all the same with the German Empire as at present
constituted. It is not a historical development, a truly national
affair, as are the Empire of Great Britain, the Republics of France and
the United States, or the Empires of Russia and Japan. It is a modern
combination of politically divergent unities, forced by the ruthless but
infinitely shrewd policy of Bismarck and his coadjutors, misdirected and
perhaps driven to ruin by the man and his entourage, who, even if he is
King of Prussia "by the grace of God," is only Emperor of Germany "by
the will of the Princes."

We are diligently given to understand that all these "Princes" and all
the German people have entered heart and soul into this war, and without
the slightest doubt as to its righteousness and as to the destiny of the
empire, this modern military autocracy, ultimately to be completely
victorious. This is hard to believe, although it must be admitted that
the cowardice of the Socialists and the obsession of the professors are
remarkable phenomena. As to the latter, however, we must remember their
dependence on the Government, not only for their information and their
"call" to speak, but also for their positions in the Government system
of education.

As to the significance of the two names most prominently quoted in this
connection, I am not at all impressed, as so many of my colleagues
appear to be. An intimate friend of mine some twenty years ago was
several weeks en pension in the same house where Haeckel had his
apartment, and even then he was notorious for his hatred of foreigners
and of women. Those of us who have followed closely his career know how
often he has written with more than German professorial virulence
against those who differed from his theory of evolution, and that he is
at present scarcely more abusive of England than he has several times
been of his own Government and of the State Church because his system
was not made a matter of compulsory teaching. As to Eucken, the reasons
for his obsession are quite different. In his case the feeling and the
utterance are due to intellectual weakness rather than to virulence of
passion.

After all, however, the temper of military and imperial Germany under
the dominance of Prussia has been essentially the same from the
beginning. In illustration of this, let me quote for your readers from a
poem of Heine, written as long ago as 1842. I do this the more readily
because I have recently seen, to my astonishment, Heine placed beside
Goethe as representing the better temper of the Germanic civilization as
opposed to the blinded judgment and immoral hatred of the modern German
Empire:

    Germany's still a little child,
      But he's nursed by the sun, though tender;
    He is not suckled on soothing milk,
      But on flames of burning splendor.

    One grows apace on such a diet;
      It fires the blood from languor;
    Ye neighbor's children, have a care,
      This urchin how ye anger!

    He is an awkward infant giant,
      The oak by the roots uptearing;
    He'll beat you till your backs are sore,
      And crack your crowns for daring.

    He is like Siegfried, the noble child,
      That song-and-saga wonder,
    Who, when his fabled sword was forged,
      His anvil cleft in sunder!

    To you, who will our Dragon slay,
      Shall Siegfried's strength be given;
    Hurrah! how joyfully your nurse
      Will laugh on you from heaven!

    The Dragon's hoard of royal gems
      You'll win, with none to share it;
    Hurrah! how bright the golden crown
      Will sparkle when you wear it!

But it would not be stranger than many other things which have happened
in human history if the defeat of German military imperialism should
result in restoring to Europe and spreading more widely over the world
the beneficent influence of Germanic civilization. Certainly they are
not the same thing, and they do not stand or fall together.

GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD.

Yale University, Oct. 20, 1914.




Possible Profits From War

INTERVIEW WITH FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS.

     Dr. Giddings is Professor of Sociology and the History of
     Civilization at Columbia University; author of many works on
     sociology and political economy; President of Institut
     Internationale de Sociologie, 1913.

By Edward Marshall.


No man in the United States is better entitled to estimate the probable
social and economic outcome of the present European debacle than Prof.
Franklin H. Giddings of Columbia, one of the most distinguished
sociologists and political economists in the United States.

"Today all Europe fights," he said to me, "but, also, today all Europe
thinks."

That is an impressive sentence, with which he concluded our long talk,
and with which I begin my record of it.

He believes that this thinking of the men who crouch low in the drenched
trenches and of the women who tragically wait for news of them will
fashion a new Europe.

He agrees with the remarkable opinions of President Butler, that that
new Europe will be marked by the rise of democracy.

He sees the probability of broadened individual opportunity in it,
accompanied by the breaking down of international suspicions; and he
thinks that all these processes, which surely make for peace, will
surely bring a lasting peace.

In the following interview, which Prof. Giddings has carefully reread,
will be found one of the most interesting speculative utterances born of
the war.

"The immediate economic cause of the war," said Prof. Giddings, "lay in
the affairs of Servia and Austria. Servia had been shut in. She had been
able to get practically nothing from, and sell practically nothing to,
the outside world, save by Austria's permission, while Austria, with
Germany professing fear of Slavic development, for years had been taking
every care to prevent the Balkan peoples from having free access to the
Adriatic.

"Some financial profit arose from this interning of the little States,
but it is probable that the desire for this was all along entirely
secondary to the fear of Balkan, especially Servian, political and
economic development.

"In the larger economic question Germany felt especial interest.

"In a comparatively few years she had made the greatest progress ever
made by any nation in an equal time, with the possible exception of that
made by the United States in a similar period after our civil war, and
it is probable that not even our own advance has equaled hers in
rapidity or extent, if all could be tabbed up.

"She had worked out a great manufacturing scheme, she had developed an
immense internal commerce by means of her railroads and her Rhine and
other waterways, she had built up an enormous trade with Eastern Europe,
Western Asia, South America, and the United States.

"She had highly specialized in and become somewhat dependent on the
production of articles like dyestuffs and the commodities of the
pharmacopoeia.

"Her shipping had advanced until it closely crowded England's; her
finances, on the whole, were well handled and her credit was excellent,
while her wonderful system of co-operation between the Government and
manufacturing producers and commercial distributers of all kinds had
become the admiration of all nations. The extent to which her Government
facilitated foreign trade through obtaining and distributing costly
information might well be taken as the world's model.

"Whatever claims be made or contested about her contributions to culture
and theoretical science, there can be no argument about her material
achievements."


German Achievements.

"Along every line her social organization of co-operation between the
Government and the people successfully handled problems feared by all
the outside world. While, as a result of the development of humane
feeling, England and the United States have been saying that ignorance,
vagabondage, and misery ought to be abolished, Germany has said, 'They
shall be!' And, saying it, she had actually commenced to abolish them.

"She had cut down enormous wastes of human energy and, for the first
time in the history of the world, had established an economic minimum
below which men and families were not permitted to sink.

"The cost of this was large; for insurance, colonies for tramps and
vagabonds, employment agencies, and the like; but Germany made it pay in
the creation of a nation built of loyal and efficient people. Both their
loyalty and their efficiency have been proved and reproved in the course
of the present struggle. They had accomplished marvels, they were ready
for amazing sacrifices.

"Now, one of the principal reasons why Germany was able to do these
things, although, she probably ignored it and possibly would deny it, is
to be found in the free-trade policy of England.

"At any time during the past twenty years England could have checked
German progress effectively by the establishment of a protective tariff
system designed to encourage her own colonies and other nations with
whom she had long been on friendly and influential terms, to the utmost
development of exclusive trade privileges designed to shut out Germany.
Except for the long-established English policy of commercial freedom
Germany could not have accomplished for herself what she has.

"Germany has been growing rapidly. Her birth rate has been high, but of
late it has been falling, and when the war began there were indications
that she soon would approach the low ratio of population increase
already characteristic of France, of New England and the Middle West in
the United States, and lately of England. But Germany's population was
still a growing one and, in a sense, a restive one.

"The Malthusian theory has not worked out in the civilized world as
Malthus supposed it would, for the application of science to
manufacturing, agriculture, &c., has prevented increasing populations
from pressing upon the means of subsistence; but in all parts of the
Western World the standards of living have been raised, the ambitions of
the average man and woman have expanded. They have lived better than
their parents lived, and they have wished their children to live better
still.

"However, we can place no limit upon the probable expansion of human
desires, and it is true that a population unchecked by the intelligent
action of the human will tends to increase at a rate more rapid than
that at which it is possible to raise the actual plane of human living.

"The speed of the working of the two rules is different, perhaps, but
both are dynamic, and the population of Germany tended to grow more
rapidly than betterment of conditions could be provided, even under the
nation's splendid governmental and commercial efficiency.

"The natural yearning of the nation, therefore, was toward colonial
expansion, and, although note that I make no charges against either the
German Government or German people, the nation probably has wished
sovereignty over Western Europe, through Belgium and Holland to the sea.
Its narrow outlet through Hamburg and Bremen was insufficient for its
needs.

"Of course, its trade and economic advance has sometimes conflicted
with that of other nations. It is natural for Germany to suppose that
England tried to block it. However, I think that all the evidence which
Germany has brought forward in proof of this is weak and improbable,
because England's great source of revenue has been her foreign trade,
and, above all, her carrying trade, and I am not partisan but stating
the obvious when I say that England prospers when the rest of the world
prospers, and that she has profited mightily through Germany's
commercial advance.

"These facts point to the conclusion that Germany really had everything
to gain by avoiding war and continuing her prosperous expansion along
commercial lines, increasing the strength of her grip in foreign
countries, as, for example, in South America."


Germany's Prosperous Commerce.

"In South America we Americans were not really competing with her. She
had studied the market and adopted the methods necessary to its
satisfaction; we had not. England was relatively losing her hold there.
In another twenty years Germany surely would have been one of the
greatest commercial and manufacturing nations which the world has ever
known. So it was not economic necessity, nor pressure approaching
economic necessity, which precipitated this war.

"I think the German people, as they professed to do, did become greatly
alarmed over a possibility, magnified into a probability, that Russia,
taking up the cause of the Balkan peoples, would obtain Constantinople,
that Servia would make her way to the Adriatic, and that all possibility
of the expansion of Germany to the southeast would be blocked, and
Germany probably became alarmed over England's intentions--there were
many indications of something close to panic in Germany after it was
generally understood that King Edward figured in the pact with France.

"I, for one, do not believe that the German fears of England were well
grounded; I do not believe that in the excitement the German mind worked
discriminatingly or that it is working with discrimination today. I
think that Germany has presented an extraordinary example of nation-wide
mobmindedness in a situation which offered nothing but ruin through war
and boundless advantages if she sat tight and waited for some one else
to strike the first blow, which, then, probably never would have been
struck.

"So, although I have outlined what I think may fairly be regarded as
some of the economic conditions contributing to the war, I do not think
that it is entirely to be explained by economic causes.

"They fail to account for the actual precipitation of the conflict. I
think that there is no explanation of that, short of recognition of an
abnormal reaction of the German mind to a situation the nature of which
was mistaken, or, at least, exaggerated.

"And, of course, there were other factors concerning which we shall not
know the truth for years, such as the personal influence of individual
minds in the German and other Governments. It will be long before the
complete history of the acts and negligence of diplomats and other
responsible Ministers will be written."

I asked Prof. Giddings if, in his opinion, the struggle is likely to
result in any wide and profound change in the economic life of the
world.

"Yes," he replied, "I think it is sure to. In the first place, for at
least half a generation, and perhaps longer, the producing capital of
the world will be much smaller than it was before the war.

"But in this speculation we must be cautious, because, so far, the
costly war material which has been consumed, such as fortresses
destroyed, guns worn out, ammunition consumed, soldiers' clothing, and
in general food, were principally accumulated and paid for long ago.
They have come out of the world's past production, and their cost
already has been written off.

"The real loss, the new waste, over and above the devastation of Belgium
and other lands, has been of labor, productive activity which would have
been carried on during the period of the war had the struggle been
avoided, the destruction of the lives of men in their economic prime,
the maiming of others to the depletion of their future usefulness and
the loss to European fatherhood.

"But if the war lasts a long time, necessitating the general renewal of
ships, fortresses, weapons, and stores, the waste will be enormous, for
the actual money expenditure will then come out of funds newly
accumulated or charged against the future, and not out of those set
aside in the past for war purposes."


One Great Change Occurring.

"Thus one great economic change already is occurring--the devastation
wrought, the destruction of hoarded funds and supplies and of useful
human life.

"There are others which are probable, but also problematical, although I
think we fairly may take them into account.

"Will the European nations, in settlement of their differences through
final terms of peace, simply endeavor to restore the old order, drawing
their lines of demarkation very strictly, enacting, for example, higher
tariffs, thinking that along that line will lie the easiest way of
re-establishing national finances?

"If so, the old contentions will be perpetuated. It will be the old
order of things over again.

"We shall again have the spirit of exclusiveness fostered and the old
suspicions bred. The old intense competition of nation with nation for
trade to the exclusion of other nations from the markets of the world
will return with its attendant inefficiency.

"But, on the other hand, the world will be an immense gainer through the
war if it is followed by a broad and rational review of the whole
situation and an adjustment of the map of Europe with due regard to the
ambitions and legitimate economic opportunities and capabilities of the
various peoples.

"This war may be the greatest good the world has ever known if it leaves
Europe in a mental state disposed to Broaden opportunity, to break down
suspicions, to eliminate barriers, and make commerce much freer than it
has been.

"Then Europe's economic recovery will be rapid, animosities will die
quickly away, and every nation which is now involved will progress with
a new speed, seeing that opportunity is created only through superiority
in fair competition.

"The next possibility, one far more nearly a probability, I think, than
the somewhat Utopian speculation in which I have just indulged, is that
after the war the world will have been deeply impressed by the
tremendous activity of Germany, whether she be victor or vanquished.

"What is the secret of her efficiency as manifested in the mobilization
of her vast army, in her use of science in new military devices, in her
holding of the elements of her national life together during the
struggle, in her keeping her industries going in the face of
unprecedented difficulties--all to a degree never before dreamed of?
will be a general query.

"Other nations will study the German plan, asking whether it is true, as
has been taught in America, that that Government is best which governs
least.

"It may be that this war will result, entirely apart from the urgency of
the labor problem which it will magnify, and wholly on the grounds of
general efficiency, in a general inquiry as to whether or not the time
has come for quasi-socialistic national developments.

"I think it unlikely that the war will give impetus to that proletarian
socialism which is founded on class consciousness and class struggle;
but it may urge forward a socialistic movement based upon the large and
fruitful idea that the best hope for the future is offered by the most
complete and highly organized co-operation of all elements, all
interests, all agencies which in their combination make up national
structures.

"As a matter of fact, I am an optimist, and I believe that this is about
what will come after this war ends.

"To put my theory in slightly different terms, I believe that the
conflict will greatly further the development of what perhaps may be
called 'public socialism,' and I mean by that the highest attainable
organization of whole peoples for the production of commodities, the
furtherance of enterprise, and the promotion of the general well-being.

"I think that when the world sobers up it will ask: 'How did Germany do
it?'

"Whether she wins or loses that must be the universal query, for whether
she wins or loses her achievement has been in many ways unprecedented.

"There can be but one answer to this query: She did it by an
organization which brought together in efficient co-operation the
individual, the quasi-private corporation, the public corporation, and
the Government upon a scale never before seen.

"The world is bound to take notice of this."


Will Fear Loss of Liberty.

I asked Prof. Giddings to go beyond economics and to consider the war's
probable results in their broader sociological aspects.

"If what I have predicted happens," he replied, "the democratic elements
of society in all nations will become apprehensive of the loss of
liberty.

"They will fear that in the interests of efficiency the perfected social
order will impose minute and unwelcome regulations upon individual life
and effort, and that a degree of coercive control will be established
which will end by making individuals mere cogs in the machine,
diminishing their importance, curtailing their usefulness and initiative
far more than is done by the great industrial corporations against which
the working classes already are protesting so loudly.

"And not only the working people but a large proportion of all other
classes will develop these fears, especially in those nations which,
during the last century, have built up popular sovereignty and
democratic freedom, as the terms are understood in England and America.

"We shall hear the argument that the loss of individual initiative and
personal self-reliance is too great a price to pay even for supreme
efficiency and the maximum production of material comforts.

"The problem which such a conflict of interests and opinions will
present may be speculatively defined as that of trying to find a way to
reconcile a maximum of efficiency organization with a maximum of
individual freedom.

"So stating it, we have to recognize that this has been the biggest
problem, in fact the comprehensive problem, that man, has faced
throughout human history, and the one which, really, he has been trying
to solve by the trial and error method in all his social experiments.

"It is the sociological as distinguished from the merely economic
problem.

"Human society exists because early in his career man discovered that
mutual aid, or team work, is, on the whole, in the struggle for
existence and the pursuit of happiness, a more effective factor than
physical strength or individual cleverness.

"Natural selection has acted not only upon individuals, but, in the
large sense, upon groups and aggregates of groups. The restrictions upon
individual life have developed in the interests of groups, or collective
efficiency.

"On the other hand, collective efficiency has no meaning, it serves no
purpose apart from the amelioration of individual life and the
development of individual personality.

"So long as groups fear one another and fight with one another the
restrictions upon individual liberty must be extreme in the interests of
the collective fighting efficiency of each group as a whole.

"All the possibilities of personal development, of individual freedom,
are involved in the larger possibilities of friendly relations between
nation and nation.

"Already the co-operative instinct has so grown that if war and the fear
of war could be eliminated, mankind would have relatively little
difficulty in working out ways and means of combining Governmental
action with individual initiative for purposes of economic production,
education, the promotion of the public health, and the administration
of justice.

"All those principles and rules which we call Morality are, in fact,
mere rules of the game of life. We play the game or do not play it; we
are fair or unfair.

"On the whole, most of us try to be fair because it has been found that
playing the game with a sense of fairness is the only way in which we
can succeed in working together for common ends without the necessity of
imposing upon ourselves coercive rules to hold our organization together
for possible mass attack upon the end in view.

"Social life, in this sense of playing the game fairly, has made man the
superior of the brutes he sprang from. There is nothing mysterious or
recondite about it.

"In order to work together men must understand one another. Therefore,
natural selection has picked out the intelligent for survival in the
social world; and in order to work together intelligent men must depend
on one another, abiding by their covenants.

"Therefore, again, natural selection has picked out what we call
Morality for survival in the social world. The whole further progress of
mankind would seem to hang upon the possibility that we can find a way
to limit and, if possible, to terminate wars between nations, for only
in that contingency can we hope to develop a social system in which a
supreme efficiency with a maximum of individual liberty can be combined
upon a working basis."


Application of the Facts.

"These are incontrovertible facts, and they find their application to
the existing European situation in various ways, the most important of
which will appear in the discovery that, valuable as conventions and
covenants of nation with nation may be, and intolerable as any violation
of them surely is, we cannot hope for general and unfailing observance
of them until the feeling of mankind and the whole attitude of the world
in respect to international as well as private conduct shall be that the
covenants and conventions shall become, in a degree, unnecessary.

"Already it is apparent that the entire world, including the peoples of
the nations at war as well as the peoples of the nations remaining
happily at peace, have, begun to think these thoughts and reflect upon
their momentous importance.

"Shocked and stunned as never before by a calamity for which we find no
measure in past human experience, mankind is bound to take at this
moment a more sober view, a broader and more rational view, of the
problems of responsibility and collective conduct than it hitherto has
been able even to attempt.

"The world is sure to ask what things make for sobriety of judgment and
integrity of purpose. It is sure in future more carefully to weigh
relative values, and will be disposed to count as unimportant many
things for which hitherto the armed men of nations have rushed into war.

"In a word, this war has made the whole world think as no one thing ever
has made it think before, and, after all, it is upon the habit of
thought that we must depend for all rational progress.

"Other wars and other great events have fostered sentiment, much of
which has been hopeful and useful; they have accomplished far-reaching
economic changes, many of them necessary.

"But the reactions of this war will surely go beyond all previous
experience. They already are and must be, in a far greater measure,
profoundly intellectual, and one of the consequences of this fact
inevitably will be the broadening and deepening of the democratic
current.

"When peace returns it will be seen that democracy has received a
hitherto unimagined impetus. Then it will be understood that democracy,
in one of its most important aspects, is popular thinking, that it is
the widest possible extension of the sense of responsibility.

"A democratic world will be, all in all, a peace-loving world.

"We may confidently expect far-reaching changes in the internal
political organization of the nations now involved. In every nation of
Europe the people are asking: What, after all, is this conflict all
about?

"They will ask this many times, and however they may answer it they
will, by consequence, follow the question with another: Shall we go on
fighting wars about the necessity, expedience, and righteousness of
which we have not been consulted?

"And to this query they will find only one answer--an emphatic negative.

"Sooner or later there will be a comprehensive political reorganization
of Europe, and when its day comes the rearrangement will be along the
lines of a republic rather than along the lines of any monarchy, however
liberal.

"Then international agreements will be unnecessary and there will be no
treaties to be broken--no 'scraps of paper' to be disregarded.

"Apparently Germany has been as successful in training her people to
think accurately along economic lines as she has been in training them
to work efficiently along such lines; and that accurate thought
undoubtedly is bearing startling fruit among the men today crouched in
the trenches on the firing lines."


Era of Individual Thought.

"England, on the other hand, and France have encouraged the free and
spontaneous life of democratic peoples. France and England, like the
United States, have been training their peoples to think efficiently of
and to appreciate and use liberty and initiative. And the men of these
two nations are, in turn, exercising that ability as they crouch in
their trenches.

"In other words, this war has precipitated an era of sober individual
thought about the individual's rights and responsibilities. It will
everywhere bring about a wider political organization of mankind, a
greater freedom of trade and opportunity, a more serious and thorough
education, a more earnest attention and devotion to the higher interests
of life, giving such thought preference above that overemphasis of
material comforts which has been so marked a feature of recent human
history.

"All these things will make for peace; and another and potent influence
will be the exhaustion of the weakened nations which will follow the
conflict. Because of that very weakness Europe will turn its unanimous
attention to the things of peace rather than to the things of war.

"The new Europe is being fashioned by those questioning men who now are
lying in the trenches.

"They are searching in the universe for answers to such inquiries as
they never dreamed about before, and the women, worrying at home--they,
too, are busy with a search for answers to hitherto undreamed-of
questions.

"They all are pondering great things for the first time. Their pondering
will be fruitful.

"Today all Europe fights, but, also, today all Europe thinks. And,
thinking, perhaps it may devise a better order, so that it may not ever
fight again."

[Illustration]




"To Americans Leaving Germany"

A FAREWELL WORD.


AMERICANS!

Citizens of the United States!

In this earnest moment in which you are leaving the soil of Germany and
Berlin, take with you from German citizens, from representatives of
trade and industry, who are proud to entertain friendly commercial
relations with the United States, a hearty farewell coupled with the
desire of a speedy return.

Together with this farewell we beg you to do us a favor. As our guests,
whom we have always honored and protected, we ask you to take this paper
with you as a memorial and to circulate the same among your authorities,
press, friends, and acquaintances.

For, we are well aware that the enemies of Germany are at work to make
you the instruments to lower Germany's people and army in the face of
the whole world in order to deceive foreign nations as to Germany's
policy and economical power. We ask you, as free citizens face to face
with free citizens, to circulate the real truth about Germany among your
people as compared to the lies of our enemies.

We beg you to take the following main points to heart:

     1. The German Emperor and the German Nation wanted peace. The
     cunning and breach of faith of our opponents have forced the
     sword into the hands of Germany.

     2. After war has been forced on us the German Nation, Emperor,
     and Reichstag have granted everything in the most brilliant
     unanimity for the war. No difference prevails in Germany any
     longer, no difference between party, confession, rank or
     position, but we are a united nation and army.

     3. Our military organization and our mobilization has
     proceeded with splendid precision. The mobilization was
     accomplished during the course of a few days. In addition to
     those who are compelled to serve, more than 1,200,000
     volunteers have offered their services. All civil
     organizations, from the head of industry and finance to the
     smallest man downward, vie with each other in works of
     voluntary aid and welfare.

     4. In the field German arms have had splendid successes in the
     first days of mobilization.

In the east the Russian enemy has been driven from the German frontier,
in numerous small fights by our troops in conjunction with those of the
Austro-Hungarian monarchy. By successful coup de mains our navy has been
successful in damaging and alarming our Russian opponent in her Baltic
naval ports. The Russian port of Libau has been burned down and in
Russian Poland revolution has already begun. Russian mobilization is a
long way from being accomplished, the troops are badly, poorly
nourished, and many deserters sell their weapons and horses.

In the west the German Army has gained imposing victories over Belgium
and France.

In Belgium, where the population unfortunately committed the most
barbarous atrocities against peaceful Germans before the war broke out,
comparatively weak German forces conquered the strong fortress of Liège
a few days after the mobilization, inflicting severe damage on the enemy
and opening up the way via Belgium to France.

Valuable victories have been obtained over France on the Alsatian
frontier toward the strong French fortress of Belfort as well as in the
direction of the fortress Lunéville. At Mülhausen one and a half French
Army divisions were overthrown and driven back over the frontier with
heavy losses.

The strong and effective German fleet is on the watch against the
English fleet.

England's risk is great in staking her reputation as the strongest
naval power on one throw against the German fleet. Further, England runs
the danger that her large colonies, such as India and Egypt, will seize
a moment that has been long desired to revolt.

It is for the United States to utilize the present moment to frustrate
by powerful initiative England's endeavors to keep down all nations,
including America, in the trade and traffic of the world.

Citizens of the United States! Take the conviction with you to your
homes that Germany will stake her last man and her last penny for
victory. Germany must conquer and will conquer.

Remember! That after a successful victory Germany will make new
political and economical progress, and that America, as a shrewd
businesslike State and as a friend of Germany, will participate in such
progress.

Today we beg you earnestly to convey to your fellow-citizens that the
German Nation, as the safe refuge of civilization and culture, has
always protected the loyal citizens of its enemies in every manner in
contrast to Russia, France, and Belgium. By circulating this short
memorial among your fellow-citizens you are likewise insuring that also
in the future the United States will learn the truth about Germany's
battles and victories. Your friends here will always do the best in
their power to supply you with genuine news. We wish you a happy voyage
toward your home, so appreciated by all Germans, and hope to see you
again in a victorious and prosperous Germany.

REPRESENTATIVES OF GERMAN INDUSTRY.

Berlin, Aug. 13, 1914.




German Declarations

By Rudolf Eucken and Ernst Haeckel.

     Dr. Eucken is Privy Councilor and Professor of Philosophy in
     the University of Jena; won the Nobel Prize for Literature in
     1908; has received many foreign honorary degrees and his
     philosophy has been expounded in English.

     Ernst Haeckel is Privy Councilor and late Professor of Zoology
     at the University of Jena; has written many works on evolution
     which have been translated into English.


The whole German world of letters is today filled with deep indignation
and strong moral resentment at the present behavior of England. Both of
us, for many years bound to England by numerous scientific and personal
ties, believe ourselves prepared to give open expression to this inward
revulsion. In close co-operation with like-minded English investigators
we have zealously exerted ourselves to bring the two great peoples
closer together in spirit and to promote a mutual understanding. A
fruitful reciprocal interchange of English and German culture seemed to
us worth while, indeed necessary, for the spiritual advance of mankind,
which today confronts such great problems. Gratefully we recall in this
connection the friendly reception which our efforts received in England.
So great and noble were the traits of English character which revealed
themselves to us that we were permitted to hope that in their sure
growth they would come to be superior to the pitfalls and seamy sides of
this character. And now they have proved inferior, inferior to the old
evil of a brutal national egotism which recognizes no rights on the
part of others, which, unconcerned about morality or unmorality, pursues
only its own advantage.

History furnishes in abundance examples of such an unscrupulous egotism;
we need recall here only the destruction of the Danish fleet (1807) and
the theft of the Dutch colonies in the Napoleonic wars. But what is
taking place today is the worst of all; it will be forever pointed at in
the annals of world history as England's indelible shame. England fights
in behalf of a Slavic, half-Asiatic power against Germanism; she fights
on the side not only of barbarism but also of moral injustice, for it is
indeed not forgotten that Russia began the war because she would permit
no radical reparation for a shameful murder.

It is England whose fault has extended the present war into a world war,
and has thereby endangered our joint culture. And all this for what
reason? Because she was jealous of Germany's greatness, because she
wanted to hinder at any price a further growth of this greatness. For
there cannot be the least doubt on this point that England was
determined in advance to cast as many obstacles as possible in the way
of Germany's great struggle for national existence, and to hinder her as
much as possible in the full development of her powers. She (England)
was watching only for a favorable opportunity when she could break out
suddenly against Germany, and she therefore promptly seized on the
necessary German invasion of Belgium in order that she might cover with
a small cloak of decency her brutal national egotism. Or is there in the
whole wide world any one so simple as to believe that England would have
declared war on France also if the latter had invaded Belgium? In that
event she would have wept hypocritical tears over the unavoidable
violation of international law; but as for the rest she would have
laughed in her sleeve with great satisfaction. This hypocritical
Pharisaism is the most repugnant feature of the whole matter; it
deserves nothing but contempt.

The history of the world shows that such sentiments lead the nations not
upward but downward. For the present, however, we trust firmly in our
just cause, in the superior strength and the unyielding victorious
spirit of the German people. Yet we must at the same time lament deeply
that the boundless egotism we have referred to has disturbed for an
immeasurable period of time the spiritual co-operation of the two
peoples which promised so much good for the development of mankind. But
they wished it so on their side--on England alone falls the monstrous
guilt and the historical responsibility.

RUDOLF EUCKEN.

ERNST HAECKEL.

Jena, Aug. 18, 1914.




A Second Appeal


_To the Universities of America:_

In a time when half of the world falls upon Germany full of hatred and
envy, we Germans derive great benefit from the idea of our being sure of
the friendly feeling of the American universities. If from any quarter
in the world, it must be from them that we expect the right
comprehension of the present situation and present attitude of Germany.
Numerous American scholars who received their scientific training at our
universities have convinced themselves of the quality and the peaceful
tendency of German work, the exchange of scientists has proved of
deepening influence on the mutual understanding, the lasting intercourse
of scholarly research gives us the feeling of being members of one great
community. This is why we entertain the hope that the scientific
circles of America will not give credit to the libels our enemies
propagate against us.

These libels, above all, accuse Germany of having brought about the
present war, she being responsible for the monstrous struggle which is
extending more and more over the whole world. The truth points to the
contrary. Our foes have disturbed us in our peaceful work, forcing the
war upon us very much against our desire. We are at a righteous war for
the preservation of our existence and at the same time of sacred goods
of humanity. The murder of Serajevo was not our work; it was the outcome
of a widely extending conspiracy pointing back to Servia, where for many
years already a passionate agitation against Austria had been carried
on, supported by Russia. It was Russia, therefore, that took the
assassins under her wings, and some weeks already before the war broke
out she promised her assistance to that blood-stained State. Nobody but
Russia has given the dangerous turn to the conflict; nobody but Russia
is to blame for the outbreak of the war. The German Emperor, who has
proved his love of peace by a peaceful reign of more than twenty-five
years, in face of the imminent danger, tried to intermediate between
Austria and Russia with the greatest zeal, but while he was negotiating
with the Czar Russia was busy with the mobilization of a large army
toward the German frontier. This necessitated an open and decisive
inquiry that led to the war. This only happened because Russia wanted it
so, because she wanted to raise the Muscovites against the Germans and
the Western Slavs and to lead Asia into the field against Europe.

France, too, might have kept the peace, the decision resting solely with
her. The security of Germany demanded that she should inquire what
France would do in the impending war; the answer of France unmistakably
betrayed her intention to join in the war. As a matter of fact, it was
not Germany but France who commenced the war.

England already before the war stood in close relations to France. From
the very beginning she has clearly shown that she by no means wanted to
keep absolutely neutral. From the very beginning she made endeavors to
protect France against Germany. Undoubtedly the German invasion in
Belgium served England as a welcome pretext to openly declare her
hostility. In reality, before the German invasion, already the
neutrality of Belgium had been given up in favor of the French. It has
been officially stated, e.g., that not only before but also after the
outbreak of the war French officers have been at Liège in order to
instruct the Belgian soldiers as to the fortification service. England's
complaints of the violation of international law, however, are the most
atrocious hypocrisy and the vilest Pharisaism. At all times English
politics have unscrupulously disregarded all forms of law as soon as
their own interest was touched. During the last few weeks the same
method has been quite sufficiently manifested in the unlawful capture of
the Turkish warships, and still more so in the instigation of the
Japanese to undertake the detestable raid upon the German territory in
China, which needs must end in strengthening the power of that Mongolian
nation at the costs of Europeans and Americans.

How it is possible for a nation that in such a way has betrayed precious
interests of Western culture as soon as it seems to benefit them, how is
it possible for these accomplices of the Japanese robbery to put on the
air of being the guardians of morality?

We Germans did not want this war, but as it has been forced upon us we
shall carry it on bravely and vigorously. In the face of all envy and
hatred, all brutality and hypocrisy, Germany feels unshakably conscious
of serving a righteous cause and of standing up for the preservation of
her national self as well as for sacred goods of humanity; indeed, for
the very progress of true culture. It is from this conviction that she
draws her unrelenting force and the absolute certainty that she will
beat back the assault of all her enemies. This conviction does not stand
in need of any encouragement from abroad; our country absolutely relies
upon itself and confides in the strength of its right.

Nevertheless, the idea of our American friends' thoughts and sympathies
being with us gives us a strong feeling of comfort in this gigantic
struggle. We both of us feel especially justified in pronouncing this as
being the conviction of all German scientists, as so many scientific and
personal relations connect us both with the universities of America.
These universities know what German culture means to the world, so we
trust they will stand by Germany.

RUDOLF EUCKEN.

ERNST HAECKEL.

Jena, Aug. 31, 1914.




The Eucken and Haeckel Charges

By John Warbeke.

     Professor of Philosophy and Psychology at Mount Holyoke
     College.

_A Letter to the Springfield Republican._


_To the Editor of The Springfield Republican:_

The approval of President Wilson for neutrality of language can hardly
be construed into complacency in the face of monstrous evil. If a
judicial attitude of mind be not jeopardized a discussion of the issues
raised by Profs. Eucken and Haeckel ought to help us in the attainment
of impartial judgment. A long acquaintance with both these men makes it
hard for the present writer to give expression to such negative
criticism as he is constrained to do. But his plea can be only this: Not
truth but only passion can separate, and truth is greater even than
friendship.

The charge of "brutal national egoism" is laid at England's door. She is
declared to be the instigator of the present world war. "Upon her alone
falls the monstrous guilt and the judgment of history." Such language
from two benevolent philosophers, one of them a winner of the Nobel
Peace Prize for Idealistic Literature, seems to suggest a lack of
information among the German people, including its most enlightened
exponents, of not only their own published "White Paper" dispatches, but
also of the events of the last two months. It seems hardly possible that
in the case of these two gentlemen a deliberate campaign of vituperation
could have been inaugurated with determination to blind themselves to
facts clearly stated in the reports of both contending parties--

First--That Servia, in reply to ten urgent demands on the part of
Austria, acquiesced in nine and proposed to submit the tenth, as
concerning her national integrity, to The Hague Tribunal. Austria,
nevertheless, declared war, with Germany's self-confessed assurances of
support.

Secondly--Germany was the second to declare war, the mobilization of
Russia being assigned as the reason for this step. The objection of
Germany's initial campaign, as shown by events, was not defense against
the confessedly slowly mobilizing Russians, however, but the humiliation
and subjugation of France. And the means employed to that end included
the treaty-breaking invasion, and more than invasion, of Belgium, who is
suffering because of this step "so necessary for Germany."

Thirdly--England, as is repeatedly demonstrated by the official
documents, of both sides, strained every means to bring about a common
understanding. The appeals of Sir Edward Grey for more time in the
Servian ultimatum and for a council of Ambassadors were met by the
Austrian and German Governments respectively with evasion. And England
was the last of the great powers to enter the conflict, her plea being
the moral obligation of supporting treaties in which she guaranteed the
integrity of a weak neighbor and undertook to defend her ally, France,
when attacked.


The Case of England.

We may justifiably ask, then, What basis is there for the charge that
England's "brutal, national egoism" provoked the world war? The answer
is a two-fold one. Historically, England has exhibited aggression in the
extension of her interests; morally, England supports the Russian
aggressor, who declined "to allow Austria the thoroughgoing punishment
of an ignominious murder," cloaking her real intentions behind the
mantle of a "contemptible sanctimoniousness" and "hypocrisy" concerning
treaty obligations.

The first charge against England is unfortunately true. History records
instances of British aggression in the extension of her interests and
the cases cited (destruction of the Danish fleet and the taking of Dutch
colonies) are good examples. The implication, however, involved in the
statement is that such aggression is not to be found in the history of
Prussia. This is clearly an error.

From the time of the Markgrafen even unto the Agadir incident it has
been characteristic of Prussia to extend her boundaries and interests
under the plea of military necessity. Aggression is the only word to
characterize Frederick's seizure of Silesia and part of Poland. South
and East Prussia were added by the same forcible means (1793-1795). In
the Napoleonic wars Swedish Pomerania fell as the booty of military
necessity. Schleswig-Holstein was filched from Denmark (1866) by the
same "extension of her greatness." Once more it was the plea in
Alsace-Lorraine--"so necessary for Germany."

Nor are we here urging immunity of criticism for ourselves. It is sadly
true that the history of many nominally Christian States, including that
of the United States, and not excluding the Papacy, includes chapters of
aggression. But the point involved, namely, the charge of England's
aggression in the present instance, is clearly an a priori one, based on
a presupposition of monopoly which lacks material support. No evidence
is presented to justify the statement, nor do the facts seem to allow of
any such construction.

The second argument, England's support of Russia's unwillingness to
permit the expiation of an ignominious murder, is a strange and
unfortunate commentary on how even in philosophic minds a preconceived
idea will distort the most unmistakable evidence. For Servia in her
reply to the Austrian demands agreed to have just punishment inflicted
upon the murderers, even going so far as to cause the arrest of those
perhaps unjustly suspected by the Austrian committee and to suggest an
international court. How, then, did Russia stand in the way of the
punishment? Austria declared war, with the self-confessed assurances of
German support, all too obviously for reasons other than the ones
mentioned in the ultimatum to which Servia acquiesced. The charge of
Russian mobilization in view of such a situation suggests the temper of
the man who, when caught in his own bear trap, tries to find his
neighbor at fault. Suppose Germany had remained on the defensive, would
war have been likely? Suppose Germany had not backed up the entirely
unjustifiable military movement of Austria, would the general war have
been probable?


Where Nietzsche Comes In.

It seems more likely when one passes in review the extant data that at
least one and a crucial cause for the present situation is the
"overwhelming power and unbending will to victory in the German people"
when confronted with an opportunity for the "further expansion of their
greatness." That such phrases should be in the mouths of our apologists
for the war is significant. And that the invasion of Belgium "so
necessary for the Germans" is treated by the spokesmen of morality
solely and confessedly from the standpoint of military expediency seems
to indicate the permeation of the Nietzsche superman into the very
stronghold of idealistic philosophy.

It would, of course, be as absurd to suppose Nietzsche a direct cause of
this war as it would be to regard the Serajevo murderers as the sole
cause. Nietzsche was and is an exponent of his time, as well as one
reciprocally fostering such movements as Bernhardi militarism and the
Crown Prince's war book. Perhaps it will not be inappropriate here to
cite from "War and the People of War," in "Also Sprach Zarathustra,"
(Pages 67-68,) the magnum opus of Nietzsche:

     You should love peace as a means to new war and brief peace
     more than a long one. Do you say, "It is a good cause by which
     a war is hallowed"? I say unto you, It is a good war which
     hallows every cause. War and courage have done greater things
     than the love of one's neighbor. "What, then, is good?" you
     ask. To be brave is good. Let young maidens say, "Good is to
     be pretty and touching." But you are hateful? Well, so be it,
     my brethren! Cast about you a mantle of the sublimely hateful.
     And when your soul has become great it will become wanton; in
     your greatness there will be malice, I know, and in malice the
     proud heart will meet the weakling.

This, we are told, is not to be taken literally--all is symbolism and
has a meaning other than the more direct one. But the fact remains, as
can be testified by the present writer from three years' residence as a
university student in Germany, that the rank and file as well as the
aristocracy--from laborers and small shopkeepers, petty officials, and
students to Judges of the Supreme Court and university professors who
have become "secret councilors" (Geheimrat)--not only in Berlin and Bonn
but in Munich and Heidelberg, all have become ominously full of the
doctrine of the survival of the fittest and the consequent expediency of
power, not only in intellectual rivalry but in Krupps and high
explosives.

The Nietzsche fire may, perhaps, serve a purpose on the hearthstone of
our inmost life if it be to rescue us from complacency and secure
inanity, but in the form of electrically connected lyddite stores and
gasoline bombs it drives those who believe in a supernation to a
literal interpretation of the above widely popular philosophy. And, as
demonstrated at Louvain and Rheims, it goes far to obliterate the
memorials of a past which Nietzsche thought so contemptible a check upon
the prowess of the "blonde Bestie" as he progressed toward--toward the
superman.

It was wide of the mark, therefore, to attribute that which bears the
stamp "made in Germany" to England. Bernhardi and the Crown Prince with
their thousands of officers and the multitudes in the ranks to whom
Nietzsche has become an inspiring motive are not to be construed as
English surely. Nor does the English "culture," so far as the present
writer is informed, contain a superman, unless it be Bernard Shaw!
English people have to import "beyond good and evil" philosophy, and as
historians of thought Profs. Eucken and Haeckel must know that it has
never had a foothold there. Had it been "brutal national egoism, knowing
no rights of others," which motivated Britain, she would not now have
gone to war--in order that she might profit finally by the inevitable
exhaustion of the Continent. And having taken the clear stand she has,
what but good-will and the consciousness of a just cause brought support
and sacrifice from the hands and lives of her grateful peoples all over
the earth? Would brutality have done it? The same question might be
asked concerning France's empire from which she derives chiefly the
consciousness of an extending civilization.


The Claims of German Culture.

A word more should be added concerning the condescending tone generally
of the exponents of German culture and more specifically that of the
distinguished writers of the circular letter. They had up to the present
continued to hope for growth in English literary and scientific
development. Before this dismal egoism got the upper hand the English
people really and truly possessed some noble traits and so forth. As for
Russian culture, supposedly including its science and literature, music,
architecture and the rest, it is all effaced by a single "barbarism"!
The implication of such an attitude and such words is that the Kremlin
or Rheims, Shakespeare and Rembrandt, Michaelangelo, Darwin, Spinoza and
the treasures of Louvain might be easily paralleled or surpassed by
German cathedrals, German sculpture, German paintings, German literature
and so forth. It is not our present purpose to dispute the claim, but
only to remind the Teutons that in France and Belgium they have declared
war, not indeed upon supermen, but upon many gentlemen and some worthy
fruits of their spirits, and that they have destroyed much which
formerly enriched the life of the world.

It is the claim of some objective German writers that a modicum of
modesty would prove the most substantial contribution to Teutonic
civilization. Defeat of German arms might, therefore, prove a blessing
to the self-lauded culture as well as call a halt to the brutal science
of Krupps. As instances of authors mentioned above, a passage from the
lamented Friedrich Paulsen's "System der Ethic" (Page 582) may, justly,
be cited: "Insolence still continues to impress the average German. The
spirit of English scientific intercourse forms a highly pleasing
contrast to the German habit. Take such writers as Mill and Darwin; they
speak to the reader as though he did them a favor by listening to them,
and whenever they enter upon a controversy, they do it in a manner
which expresses respect and a desire for mutual understanding. The
German scholar believes that it will detract from the respect due him if
he does not assume a tone of condescension or overbearing censure.
Examine the first scientific journal you may happen to pick up; even the
smallest anonymous announcement breathes the air of infinite
superiority."

A second passage is quoted from the great work of Wilhelm Scherer,
"Geschichte der Deutschen Litteratur" (Pages 20-21): "Recklessness seems
to be the curse of our spiritual development ... obstinacy in good and
in evil. Beauty we have not often served, nor long at a time." These
are, of course, not the judgments of the present writer.

Conviction does not flow from the argument concerning England's brutal
egoism and reckless immorality under the cloak of sanctimoniousness; nor
is there strength in the appeal for Teuton culture. All has the tone of
special pleading and makes doubly significant a sentence from Nietzsche
when he pleads for an overcoming of our ideals of veracity: "'I have
done this thing,' says my memory, 'I could not have done this thing,'
says my pride and remains inexorable. Finally memory yields." ("Beyond
Good and Evil," Page 94.)

JOHN WARBEKE.

Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, Sept. 23, 1914.

[Illustration: BRANDER MATTHEWS

_(Photo by Brown Bros.)_

_See Page 541_]

[Illustration: NEWELL DWIGHT HILL

_See Page 573_]




Concerning German Culture

By Brander Matthews.

     Professor of Dramatic Literature at Columbia University;
     author of many works on literature and the development of the
     drama.


_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

In the earnest and sincere appeals of various distinguished Germans,
Prof. Eucken, Prof. Haeckel, and the several authors of "The Truth About
Germany," we find frequent references to "German culture" as though it
was of a superior quality to the culture of every other nationality; and
we seem to perceive also a sustaining belief that Germany is not only
the defender of civilization, but its foremost exponent. We have no
right to question the good faith of scholars of the high character of
Eucken and Haeckel; and we cannot doubt their being honestly possessed
of the conviction that Germany is the supreme example of a highly
civilized State and the undisputed leader in the arts and sciences which
represent culture. It is plain that these German writers take this for
granted and that they would be indignantly surprised if it should be
questioned.

To an American who feels himself a sharer of the noble heritage of
English literature, and who has sat for more than forty years at the
feet of the masters of French literature, this claim cannot but come as
a startling surprise.

The most obvious characteristic of a highly civilized man is his
willingness to keep his word, at whatever cost to himself. For reasons
satisfactory to itself, Germany broke its pledge to respect the
neutrality of Luxemburg and of Belgium. It is another characteristic of
civilization to cherish the works of art which have been bequeathed to
us by the past. For reasons satisfactory to itself Germany destroyed
Louvain, more or less completely. It is a final characteristic of
civilized man to be humane and to refrain from ill-treating the
blameless. For reasons satisfactory to itself Germany dropped bombs in
the unbesieged City of Antwerp and caused the death of innocent women
and children. Here are three instances where German culture has been
tested and found wanting.


The Standard Bearer of Culture.

But it may be urged that war has its own exigencies and that these three
instances of uncivilized conduct partook of the nature of military
necessities. Turning from the outrages of war to the triumphs of peace,
let us make a disinterested attempt to find out just what foundation
there may be for the implicit assertion that Germany is the standard
bearer of civilization.

Perhaps it is too petty to point out that manners are the outward and
visible sign of civilization, and that in this respect the Germans have
not yet attained to the standard set by the French and the English. But
it is not insignificant to record that the Germans alone retain a
barbaric mediaeval alphabet, while the rest of Western Europe has
adopted the more legible and more graceful Roman letter; and it is not
unimportant to note that German press style is cumbrous and uncouth.
Taken collectively, these things seem to show German culture is a little
lacking in the social instinct, the desire to make things easy and
pleasant for others. It is this social instinct which is the dominating
influence in French civilization and which has given to French
civilization its incomparable urbanity and amenity. It is to the absence
of this social instinct, to the inability to understand the attitude of
other parties to a discussion, to the unwillingness to appreciate their
point of view, that we may ascribe the failure of German diplomacy, a
failure which has left her almost without a friend in her hour of need.
And success in diplomacy is one of the supreme tests of civilization.

The claim asserted explicity or implicitly in behalf of German culture
seems to be based on the belief that the Germans are leaders in the arts
and in the sciences. So far as the art of war is concerned there is no
need today to dispute the German claim. It is to the preparation for war
that Prussia has devoted its utmost energy for half a century--in fact,
ever since Bismarck began to make ready for the seizing of unwilling
Schleswig-Holstein. And so far as the art of music is concerned there is
also no need to cavil.

But what about the other and more purely intellectual arts? How many are
the contemporary painters and sculptors and architects of Germany who
have succeeded in winning the cosmopolitan reputation which has been the
reward of a score of the artists of France and of half a dozen of the
artists of America?


Since Goethe, Who?

When we consider the art of letters we find a similar condition. Germany
has had philosophers and historians of high rank; but in pure
literature, in what used to be called "belles-lettres," from the death
of Goethe in 1832 to the advent of the younger generation of dramatists,
Sudermann and Hauptmann and the rest, in the final decade of the
nineteenth century--that is to say, for a period of nearly sixty
years--only one German author succeeded in winning a worldwide
celebrity--and Heine was a Hebrew, who died in Paris, out of favor with
his countrymen, perhaps because he had been unceasing in calling
attention to the deficiencies of German culture. There were in Germany
many writers who appealed strongly to their fellow-countrymen, but
except only the solitary Heine no German writer attained to the
international fame achieved by Cooper and by Poe, by Walt Whitman and by
Mark Twain. And it was during these threescore years of literary aridity
in Germany that there was a superb literary fecundity in Great Britain
and in France, and that each of these countries produced at least a
score of authors whose names are known throughout the world. Even
sparsely settled Scandinavia brought forth a triumvirate, Björnsen,
Ibsen, and Brandes, without compeers in Germany. And from Russia the
fame of Turgenef and of Tolstoy spread abroad a knowledge of the heart
and mind of a great people who are denounced by Germans as barbarous.

It is probably in the field of science, pure and applied, that the
defenders of the supremacy of German culture would take their last
stand. That the German contribution to science has been important is
indisputable; yet it is equally indisputable that the two dominating
scientific leaders of the second half of the nineteenth century are
Darwin and Pasteur. It is in chemistry that the Germans have been
pioneers; yet the greatest of modern chemists is Mendeleef. It was Hertz
who made the discovery which is the foundation of Marconi's invention;
but although not a few valuable discoveries are to be credited to the
Germans, perhaps almost as many as to either the French or the British,
the German contribution in the field of invention, in the practical
application of scientific discovery, has been less than that of France,
less than that of Great Britain, and less than that of the United
States. The Germans contributed little or nothing to the development of
the railroad, the steamboat, the automobile, the aeroplane, the
telegraph, the telephone, the phonograph, the photograph, the moving
picture, the electric light, the sewing machine, and the reaper and
binder. Even those dread instruments of war, the revolver and the
machine gun, the turreted ship, the torpedo, and the submarine, are not
due to the military ardor of the Germans. It would seem as though the
Germans had been lacking in the inventiveness which is so marked a
feature of our modern civilization.

In this inquiry there has been no desire to deny the value of the German
contributions to the arts and to the sciences. These contributions are
known to all; they speak for themselves; they redound to the honor of
German culture; and for them, whatever may be their number, the other
nations of the world are eternally indebted to Germany. But these German
contributions are neither important enough nor numerous enough to
justify the assumption that German culture is superior or that Germany
is entitled to think herself the supreme leader of the arts and of the
sciences. No one nation can claim this lofty position, although few
would be so bold as to deny the superior achievement of the French in
the fine arts and of the English in pure science.

Nations are never accepted by other nations at their own valuation; and
the Germans need not be surprised that we are now astonished to find
them asserting their natural self-appreciation, with the apparent
expectation that it will pass unchallenged. The world owes a debt to
modern Germany beyond all question, but this is far less than the debt
owed to England and to France. It would be interesting if some German,
speaking with authority, should now be moved to explain to us Americans
the reasons which underlie the insistent assertion of the superiority of
German civilization. Within the past few weeks we have been forced to
gaze at certain of the less pleasant aspects of the German character;
and we have been made to see that the militarism of the Germans is in
absolute contradiction to the preaching and to the practice of the great
Goethe, to whom they proudly point as the ultimate representative of
German culture.

BRANDER MATTHEWS.

Columbia University in the City of New York, Sept. 18, 1914.




Culture vs. Kultur

By Frank Jewett Mather, Jr.


_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

Current discussion of the worth of German culture has been almost
hopelessly clouded by the fact that when a German speaks of Kultur he
means an entirely different thing from what a Latin or Briton means by
culture. Kultur means the organized efficiency of a nation in the
broadest sense--its successful achievement in civil and military
administration, industry, commerce, finance, and in a quite secondary
way in scholarship, letters, and art. Kultur applies to a nation as a
whole, implying an enlightened Government to which the individual is
strictly subordinated. Thus Kultur is an attribute not of
individuals--whose particular interests, on the contrary, must often be
sacrificed to it--but of nations.

Culture, for which nearest German equivalent is Bildung, is the opposite
of all this. It is an attribute not of nations as a whole but of
accomplished individuals. It acquires national import only through the
approval and admiration of these individuals by the rest, who share but
slightly in the culture they applaud. The aim of culture is the
enlightened and humane individual, conversant with the best values of
the past and sensitive to the best values of the present. The
open-mindedness and imagination implied in culture are potentially
destructive to a highly organized national Kultur. A cultured leader is
generally too much alive to the point of view of his rival to be a
wholly convinced partisan. Hence he lacks the intensity, drive, and
narrowness that make for competitive success. He keeps his place in the
sun not by masterfully overriding others, but by a series of delicate
compromises which reconcile the apparently conflicting claims. Moreover,
he has too great a respect for the differences between men's gifts to
formulate any rigid plan which, requires for its execution a strictly
regimented humanity. He will sacrifice a little efficiency that life may
be more various, rich, and delightful.

Hence nations with cultured leaders have generally been beaten by those
whose leaders had merely Kultur. The Spartans and Macedonians had
abundant Kultur; they generally beat the Athenians, who had merely very
high culture. The Romans had Kultur, and the Hellenistic world wore
their yoke. Germany unquestionably has admirable Kultur, and none of the
mere cultured nations who are leagued against her could hope to beat her
singly.


She Does Not Desire Culture.

On the other hand, Germany has singularly little culture, has less than
she had a hundred years ago, does not apparently desire it. She has
willingly sacrificed the culture of a few leading individuals to the
Kultur of the empire as a whole. Thus it is not surprising that Germany,
as measured by the production of cultured individuals, takes a very low
place today. Not only France and England, Italy and Spain, but also
Russia and America, may fairly claim a higher degree of culture. Here
the fetich of German scholarship should not deceive us. Culture--a
balanced and humanized state of mind--is only remotely connected with
scholarship or even with education. A Spanish peasant or an Italian
waiter may have finer culture than a German university professor. And in
the field of scholarship, Germany is in the main chiefly laborious,
accurate, and small-minded. Her scholarship is related not to culture,
but is a minor expression of Kultur. Such scholarly men of letters as
Darwin, Huxley, Renan, Taine, Boissier, Gaston Paris, Menendez y Pelayo,
Francis J. Child, Germany used to produce in the days of the Grimms and
Schlegels. She rarely does so now. Her culture has been swallowed up in
her Kultur.

The claim of Germany to realize her Kultur at the expense of her
neighbors is at first sight plausible. Her Kultur is unquestionably
higher than theirs. She has a sharply realized idea of the State, and
she has justified it largely in practice. In a certain patience,
thoroughness, and perfection of political organization her pre-eminence
is unquestionable. The tone of her apologists shows amazement and
indignation over the fact that the world, so far from welcoming the
extension of German Kultur, is actively hostile to that ambition. Yet,
even if it be conceded that Germany's Kultur is wholly good for
herself--surely a debatable proposition--it does not follow that it is
or would be a universal benefit. Nations may deliberately and
legitimately prefer their culture, with its admitted disadvantages, to
the Kultur which pleases Germany. England is often mocked for the way in
which she "muddles through" successive perils, yet she may feel that the
stereotyping of her people in a rigid administrative frame might be too
high a price to pay for constant preparedness. As for us Americans, we
have made a virtue, perhaps overdone it, of avoiding a mechanical
Kultur. We prefer the greatest freedom for the individual to the
perfectly regimented state. We will move toward culture and cheerfully
assume the necessary risks of the process.


Unlovely and Impressive.

In a broader view, the war may be regarded as a contest between the
metallic, half-mechanical Kultur of Prussianized Germany and the more
flexible civilizations of States that have inherited culture or aspire
to it. Germany herself has rejected the humane and somewhat hazardous
ideal of culture, so she cannot wonder or complain when she sees that
the culture of the world is almost unanimously hostile to her. There is
no quarrel with German Kultur itself; merely a feeling that it has its
drawbacks, that it is, on the whole, as unlovely as it is impressive,
that there is quite enough of it in the world already, and that its
broad extension would be disastrous.

Meanwhile the nations of culture have much to learn from Germany's
Kultur. Flexibility may mean weakness. The United States, for example,
could well have a standing army and an army reserve commensurate with
its history and prospects without incurring any danger of militarism.
There is, finally, some disadvantage in being merely a culture nation,
for such a nation can add a large measure of Kultur without belying
itself. On the contrary, so highly developed a Kultur nation as the
German Empire puts itself in a position where it is almost impossible to
acquire any considerable degree of culture. Culture is the enemy of such
a state--it must remain in the Spartan or Macedonian stage. Rome began
to decline as soon as Hellenistic culture got the ascendency over the
old Latin Kultur. Kultur, in short, galvanizes; culture liberates. A
survey of modern Germany hardly warrants a desire for her world
dominion.

If any reader is still unclear about the distinction between culture and
Kultur, let him examine his most-gifted friends as to their sympathies
in the present war, choosing, of course, persons who have no racial
reasons for taking sides. Almost without exception he will find they
fall into two sharply defined classes. The mental characteristics of his
pro-German friends will pretty certainly illustrate Kultur quite
concretely, while he may read the meaning of culture in his more-gifted
friends who favor the Allies.

FRANK JEWETT MATHER, Jr.

Princeton, Nov. 6, 1914.




The Trespass in Belgium

By John Grier Hibben.


_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

Some time ago I received with many others an appeal "To the Civilized
World!" from certain distinguished representatives of German science and
art. I at once wrote to Prof. Eucken, whom I know, and who is one of the
signers of this document. I wished to draw his attention particularly to
the second statement of this appeal, which is as follows:

     It is not true that we trespassed in neutral Belgium. It has
     been proved that France and England had resolved on such a
     trespass, and it has likewise been proved that Belgium had
     agreed to their doing so,

and I stated to him that "It is naturally to be expected of a group of
scholars that where reference is made to proof, some citation should be
given both of the sources of the proof and of its nature. I am sure you
will agree with me that it is of the very essence of scholarly method in
the treatment of any subject whatsoever that one should cite his
authority as regards every important and significant statement that is
made. No one of the distinguished group of scholars signing their names
to this letter would think of writing an article in his own specialty
and not add in the text or in a footnote the complete list of
authorities for his several assertions.

"In your appeal, however, the most important statement by far which you
make, and the one bearing most intimately upon the honor and integrity
of your nation, is left without even the attempt to support it, save the
bare assertion by you and your colleagues. In the interests of a fair
understanding of Germany's position, I feel that it is incumbent upon
you to give us who are under such a deep debt of gratitude to German
scholarship in our own lives the opportunity of a full knowledge of all
the facts which definitely bear upon this present situation."

At the time of writing Prof. Eucken, I also wrote to a friend of mine,
Dr. A.E. Shipley, the Master of Christ's College, Cambridge, England,
asking him if he could get for me some authoritative statement from the
British Foreign Office concerning the assertion that "it has been proved
that France and England had resolved on such a trespass, and it has
likewise been proved that Belgium had agreed to their doing so." I have
just received a letter from Mr. Shipley, stating that Lord Haldane had
prepared a statement in answer to this question. Thinking that your
readers would be interested in seeing this, I am sending it to you.
Faithfully yours,

JOHN GRIER HIBBEN.

Princeton, N.J., Nov. 24, 1914.

       *       *       *       *       *

     _(Inclosure from Lord Haldane to the Master of Christ's
     College, Cambridge.)_

     10 Downing St., Whitehall, S.W., Nov. 14.

     Dear Master of Christ's: The inclosed memoranda have been
     specially prepared for me by the Foreign Office in answer to
     your question. Yours truly,

     HALDANE.

       *       *       *       *       *

     (MEMORANDUM.)

     It is quite untrue that the British Government had ever
     arranged with Belgium to trespass on her country in case of
     war, or that Belgium had agreed to this. The strategic
     dispositions of Germany, especially as regards railways, have
     for some years given rise to the apprehension that Germany
     would attack France through Belgium. Whatever military
     discussions have taken place before this war have been limited
     entirely to the suggestion of what could be done to defend
     France if Germany attacked her through Belgium.

     The Germans have stated that we contemplated sending troops to
     Belgium. We had never committed ourselves at all to the
     sending of troops to the Continent, and we had never
     contemplated the possibility of sending troops to Belgium to
     attack Germany.

     The Germans have stated that British military stores had been
     placed at Maubeuge, a French fortress near the Belgian
     frontier, before the outbreak of the war, and that this is
     evidence of an intention to attack Germany through Belgium. No
     British soldiers and no British stores were landed on the
     Continent till after Germany had invaded Belgium and Belgium
     had appealed to France and England for assistance. It was only
     after this appeal that British troops were sent to France;
     and, if the Germans found British munitions of war in
     Maubeuge, these munitions were sent with our expedition to
     France after the outbreak of the war. The idea of violating
     the neutrality of Belgium was never discussed or contemplated
     by the British Government.

     The extract inclosed, which is taken from an official
     publication of the Belgian Government, and the extract from an
     official statement by the Belgian Minister of War, prove that
     the Belgian Government had never connived, or been willing to
     connive, at the breach of the treaty that made the maintenance
     of Belgian neutrality an international obligation. The moment
     that there appeared to be danger that this treaty might be
     violated the British Government made an appeal for an
     assurance from both France and Germany, as had been done in
     1870 by Mr. Gladstone, that neither of those countries would
     violate the neutrality of Belgium if the other country
     respected it. The French agreed, the Germans declined to
     agree. The appeal made by the British Government is to be
     found in our first "White Paper" after the outbreak of the
     war.

     The reason why Germany would not agree was stated very frankly
     by Herr von Jagow, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
     Sir Edward Goschen, our Ambassador in Berlin; and it is
     recorded in the second "White Paper" that we published. The
     attitude of the British Government throughout has been to
     endeavor to preserve the neutrality of Belgium, and we never
     thought of sending troops to Belgium until Germany had invaded
     it and Belgium had appealed for assistance to maintain the
     international treaty.

     We have known for some years past that in Holland, in Denmark,
     and in Norway the Germans have inspired the apprehension that,
     if England was at war with Germany, England would violate the
     neutrality of those countries and seize some of their harbors.
     This allegation is as baseless as the allegation about our
     intention to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and events
     have shown it to be so. But it seems to be a rule with Germany
     to attribute to others the designs that she herself
     entertains; as it is clear now that, for some long time past,
     it has been a settled part of her strategic plans to attack
     France through Belgium. A statement is inclosed, which was
     issued by us on Oct. 14 last, dealing with this point.

     This memorandum and its inclosures should provide ample
     material for a reply to the German statements.

     Foreign Office, Nov. 9, 1914.

       *       *       *       *       *

Belgian Official Denials.

Here is inclosed a copy of the note of Aug. 3 sent by M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, the
German Minister at Brussels, included in the Belgian "Gray Paper," and
printed in full in THE NEW YORK TIMES of Oct. 18 and reprinted in THE
TIMES'S pamphlet of the war's diplomatic papers. This is the note
expressing the "profound and painful surprise" caused to King Albert's
Government by the German invitation to it to abandon Belgian neutrality
and denying that France had, as alleged by Germany, manifested any such
intention.

A second inclosure gives this clipping from The London Times of Sept.
30:

     OFFICIAL STATEMENT.

     The German press has been attempting to persuade the public
     that if Germany herself had not violated Belgian neutrality,
     France or Great Britain would have done so. It has declared
     that French and British troops had marched into Belgium before
     the outbreak of war. We have received from the Belgian
     Minister of War an official statement which denies absolutely
     these allegations. It declares, on the one hand, that "before
     Aug. 3 not a single French soldier had set foot on Belgian
     territory," and, again, "it is untrue that on Aug. 4 there was
     a single English soldier in Belgium." It adds:

     "For long past Great Britain knew that the Belgian Army would
     oppose by force a 'preventive' disembarkation of British
     troops in Belgium. The Belgian Government did not hesitate at
     the time of the Agadir crisis to warn foreign Ambassadors, in
     terms which could not be misunderstood, of its formal
     intention to compel respect for the neutrality of Belgium by
     every means at its disposal, and against attempts upon it from
     any and every quarter."


The "Agreement" of 1903.

The third inclosure is this British official communiqué:

     14 October, 1914.

     The story of an alleged Anglo-Belgian agreement of 1906
     published in the German press, and based on documents said to
     have been found at Brussels, is only a fresh edition of a
     story which has been reproduced in various forms and denied
     on several occasions. No such agreement has ever existed.

     As the Germans well know, Gen. Grierson is dead and Col. (now
     Gen.) Barnardiston is commanding the British forces before
     Tsing-tau. In 1906 Gen. Grierson was on the General Staff at
     the War Office, and Col. Barnardiston was Military Attaché at
     Brussels. In view of the solemn guarantee given by Great
     Britain to protect the neutrality of Belgium against violation
     from any side, some academic discussions may, through the
     instrumentality of Col. Barnardiston, have taken place between
     Gen. Grierson and the Belgian military authorities as to what
     assistance the British Army might be able to afford to Belgium
     should one of her neighbors violate that neutrality. Some
     notes with reference to the subject may exist in the archives
     at Brussels.

     It should be noted that the date mentioned, namely, 1906, was
     the year following that in which Germany had, as in 1911,
     adopted a threatening attitude toward France with regard to
     Morocco, and, in view of the apprehensions existing of an
     attack on France through Belgium, it was natural that possible
     eventualities should be discussed.

     The impossibility of Belgium having been a party to any
     agreement of the nature indicated or to any design for the
     violation of Belgian neutrality is clearly shown by the
     reiterated declarations that she has made for many years past
     that she would resist to the utmost any violation of her
     neutrality from whatever quarter and in whatever form such
     violation might come.

     It is worthy of attention that these charges of aggressive
     designs on the part of other powers are made by Germany, who,
     since 1906, has established an elaborate network of
     strategical railways leading from the Rhine to the Belgian
     frontier through a barren, thinly populated tract,
     deliberately constructed to permit of the sudden attack upon
     Belgium, which was carried out two months ago.




Apportioning the Blame

By Arthur v. Briesen.

     Of the law firm of Briesen & Knauth; Doctor of Laws, New York
     University; philanthropist; has served the American public as
     head of important civic bodies and Governmental commissions.


_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

Having been requested by you to express my views with reference to the
war which is now lacerating Europe, I take pleasure to comply with your
desire.

As an American citizen I am, of course, under obligations to be neutral
and to send no ammunition to either belligerent. At the same time the
German blood in my veins naturally causes me to sympathize with Germany
in this conflict. But even if we leave out of consideration any matter
of sympathy, if we look upon the situation in an entirely unbiased
spirit, the conclusion which I propose to lay before you appears to be
irresistible.

The questions that seem to have agitated the American public mostly in
connection with this awful conflict have been:

     _First_--Who is to blame for bringing about this war, and,

     _Second_--Assuming that Germany was not to blame for beginning
     the war, is she to blame for violating the neutrality of
     Belgium?

If we should find the fault regarding the first question to lie
primarily with England and secondarily with Russia, we should at once
clear the German people and their Government from the charge that has
heretofore been brought against them for having incited the war. And if
we should find that the neutrality of Belgium was not binding upon any
country whose existence or whose interests were threatened by other
countries, that fact would then absolve either country from a charge
which thus far seems to have been brought against one of them.

_How was the war brought about?_ As far back as 1906 it is known, and
can be proved by the files of New York papers, to say nothing of
official correspondence now found in Brussels and elsewhere, that
measures were started by England to circumscribe or isolate the German
Empire, and treaties were entered between England, France, and Russia
(the Triple Entente) to insure joint action against Germany when
necessary.

Germany herself has been peaceful, progressive, and anxious to retain
her position as a nation undisturbed by others, as a nation that should
advance in art, in science, in population, and in all things that make
happiness through peace. What was the situation in other countries?

Since 1870 _France_ had cried for revenge (_revanche_). Its school
books, newspapers, public speakers, and political leaders were all
charged with the one great idea of seeking revenge against Germany for
having retaken Alsace and Lorraine in 1870, which France had wrongfully
occupied since the time of Louis XIV. Alsace and Lorraine had been
German for centuries before; they were wrested from Germany without even
a semblance of an excuse at the close of the seventeenth century, and
were largely German in language and in spirit in 1870. Goethe's studies
in Strassburg and his visits to Frederica von Sesenheim in the
eighteenth century show that he was living in a German country whenever
he was in Alsace. A _united_ Germany did not exist prior to 1870.
However, the cry for revenge was there, and France distinctly declared
it to be her policy to take her revenge as soon as opportunity offered.
France was, therefore, a pronounced enemy of Germany ever since 1870,
and when asked by the German Government on July 31, 1914, whether she
would remain neutral in a Russian-German war (Annex 25, German "White
Paper") she answered: "France would do that which might be required of
her _by her interests_." This answer was given on Aug. 1, 1914, (Annex
27, German "White Paper.") Today we may well ask France whether, since
Aug. 1, 1914, she has done that which was required by her interests.

_Russia_ may next be looked at. How did Russia become involved in this
contest? The little kingdom of Servia, which had familiarized itself
with the fine art of disposing of crowned heads by throwing its King and
Queen, Alexandra and Draga, out of the window of their castle, caused
through its officials and its followers to have the heir to the Austrian
throne and his wife cruelly assassinated on June 28, 1914. This
assassination was an act of enmity toward Austria and a step toward the
enlargement of Servia. Deeming her existence threatened and her national
dignity offended, Austria sent a rather sharp demand under date of July
23, 1914, to Servia, requiring prompt and thorough satisfaction for the
gross attack made upon her and her reigning family through Servia's
official directions.

Strange to say, however, the British "White Book" shows that three days
before, on July 20, 1914, Sir Edward Grey, (Paper 1, British "White
Book,") wrote to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, a letter
in which he states:

     In fact, the more Austria could keep her demand within
     reasonable limits, and the stronger the justification she
     could produce for making any demand, the more chance there
     would be of smoothing things over. _I hated the idea of a war
     between any of the great powers_, and that any of them should
     be dragged into a war by Servia would be detestable.

On July 24, 1914, the Austrian message to Servia became known to all
countries, and on the same day Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador
at St. Petersburg, wrote that he had been asked by Mr. Sazonof, Russian
Minister of Foreign Affairs, to meet him at the French Embassy to
discuss matters, as Austria's step clearly meant that war was imminent.
He wrote that Mr. Sazonof expressed himself as follows (British Paper
6):

     He hoped that his Majesty's Government would not fail to
     _proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France_. The French
     Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfill all
     the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if
     necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any
     diplomatic negotiations.

Later, on July 29, 1914, Sir George Buchanan wrote to Sir Edward Grey
(Paper 72, English "White Book") as follows:

     I made it clear to his Excellency that, _Russia being
     thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not be averted_ if
     Servia were attacked by Austria.

Sir George Buchanan would not have said that if he had not been
authorized to do so. He would not have said a "general war could not be
averted if Servia were attacked by Austria"; and by "general war" he
meant, and we all understand he meant, a war between England, France,
and Russia on one side and Germany and Austria on the other.

Servia's reply to the demand of Austria, which was dated July 25, 1914,
not being deemed satisfactory, Austria proceeded to a punitive
expedition against Servia, and she repeatedly asserted and assured all
the other powers that the expedition was merely punitive and that
neither the independence nor the territorial integrity of Servia were at
all involved or in any danger.

But all this had no effect upon Russia. In fact, when Russia was first
informed of the Austrian demand (Annex 4, German "White Book") Minister
of Foreign Affairs Sazonof made wild complaints on _July_ 24, 1914,
against Austria-Hungary. What he said most definitely was this:

     _That Russia could not possibly permit the Servian-Austrian
     dispute to be confined to the parties concerned._

This was the keynote of the Russian situation and of the Russian
intention. Russia wanted, of course, to expand its realm as far
westward as possible, and it wanted to take advantage of the opportunity
offered by the necessary consequences of the dreadful insult and cruelty
practiced by Servia on Austria, not only to prevent the punishment of
Servia, but also to proceed against Germany, for, as Paper 4 says:
"Russia could not possibly permit the Servian-Austrian dispute to be
_confined_ to the parties concerned."

Who, then, was to blame for not allowing the war to be confined, for not
permitting Austria to punish the murderers of her King, but utilizing
this opportunity for the purpose of bringing about the great war which
Russia and France had carefully prepared long ago? The great war which
should involve all the civilized nations in a conflict, and threaten to
extinguish Austria and to carry barbarism into the heart of Europe! She
_did_ not permit the Servian-Austrian dispute to be confined to the
parties concerned.

Again, in Paper 56, (English "White Book,") we find the English
Ambassador to Austria writing to Sir Edward Grey on July 27, 1914, the
following:

     If actual war broke out with Servia it would be _impossible_
     to localize it, for _Russia_ was not prepared to give way
     again.

Again, in Paper 72, (English "White Book,") dated July 28, 1914, from
the English Ambassador in Russia to Sir Edward Grey:

     I made it clear to his Excellency (German Ambassador) that,
     _Russia being thoroughly in earnest_, a general war could not
     be averted if Servia were attacked by Austria.

Paper 121, (English "White Book,") British Ambassador in Berlin to Sir
Edward Grey under date of July 31, 1914:

     He (the German Secretary of State) again assured me that both
     the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia,
     and the German Foreign Office had even up till last night been
     urging Austria to show willingness to continue
     discussions--and telegraphic and telephonic communications
     from Vienna had been of a promising nature--_but Russia's
     mobilization had spoiled everything_.

I could repeat, _ad infinitum_, quotations from these books to show
that Russia not only wanted this war if Austria wanted to punish Servia
for her misdeeds, but started it against the protest of Germany, and
started it, I sincerely believe, largely because encouraged by Great
Britain.

_England_: The letter written by the Belgian Chargé at St. Petersburg to
his Government on July 30, 1914, which letter was published in THE NEW
YORK TIMES on Oct. 7, 1914, and which letter, nearly a month before, had
been published abroad and never disavowed by the Belgian Government,
states distinctly on the part of Belgium:

     _What is incontestable is that Germany has striven here, as
     well as at Vienna, to find some means of avoiding a general
     conflict...._ M. Sazonof, Russian Foreign Minister, has
     declared that it would be impossible for Russia not to hold
     herself ready and to mobilize, but that these preparations
     were not directed against Germany. This morning an official
     communiqué to the newspapers announces that "the reserves have
     been called under arms in a certain number of Governments."
     Knowing the discreet nature of the official communiqué one can
     without fear assert that _mobilization is going on
     everywhere_.

     ... One can truly ask one's self whether the whole world does
     not desire war and is trying merely to retard its declaration
     a little in order to gain time. England began by allowing it
     to be understood that she did not want to be drawn into a
     conflict. Sir George Buchanan (British Ambassador) said that
     openly. Today one is firmly convinced at St. Petersburg--one
     has even the assurance of it--that England will support
     France. This support is of enormous weight, and _has
     contributed not a little to give the upper hand to the war
     party_.

The German Emperor during these times believed England to be really and
honestly striving to avoid the war; he went so far as to announce in one
of his letters published in the "White Book" that "he had shoulder to
shoulder with England tried to bring about a peaceful solution." It
certainly now appears that all this while England had made her
arrangements with France and with Russia, and had strengthened the war
party in Russia to such an extent that Russia's desire to set Europe
afire was rendered possible.

_Belgian neutrality._ It is charged that Germany violated an alleged
treaty with Belgium, which treaty is supposed to have guaranteed the
integrity of Belgium. When Germany found her efforts to maintain peace
frustrated, Russian troops having crossed the German frontier on the
afternoon of Aug. 1, while France opened hostilities on Aug. 2, she
announced to Belgium on Aug. 2, 1914, that she found herself under
obligation, to prevent a French attack through Belgium, to pass through
Belgian territory; she expressed her readiness to guarantee the
integrity of the kingdom and its possessions and to pay any damage
caused if Belgium would, in a friendly way, permit such a passage of
troops through it.

The English "White Book" contains, Paper 151, dated Aug. 3, 1914, which
paper we repeat in full:

(British Minister to Belgium to Sir Edward Grey.)

     French Government have offered through their Military Attaché
     the support of five French Army corps to the Belgian
     Government. Following reply has been received today: We are
     sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering
     eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, _we do
     not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the powers_. Belgian
     Government will decide later on the action which they may
     think it necessary to take.

In short, Belgium says in the foregoing notice to France, that she does
not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the powers.

Was Germany justified in disregarding any previous treaty which related
to Belgium if her interests required her so to do?

_United States Supreme Court:_ In its unanimous opinion in the Chinese
exclusion cases, reported on Pages 581 to 611 of Vol. 130 of United
States Reports, the Supreme Court of the United States had this very
question before it. A treaty had been entered into by the United States
and China, allowing Chinese subjects the right to visit and reside in
the United States and to there enjoy the same privileges that are
enjoyed by citizens of the United States. After that treaty an act of
Congress was passed in violation of the treaty, providing it to be
unlawful thereafter for Chinese laborers to enter the United States. The
question was, whether we had the right to violate a treaty solemnly
entered into with another country? On this subject the court said (Page
600):

     The effect of legislation upon conflicting treaty stipulations
     was elaborately considered in THE HEAD MONEY CASES, and it was
     there adjudged: "that so far as a treaty made by the United
     States with any foreign nation can become the subject of
     judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it is
     subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement,
     modification, or repeal," 112 U.S. 580, 599. This doctrine was
     affirmed and followed in WHITNEY v. ROBERTSON, 124 U.S. 190,
     195. It will not be presumed that the legislative department
     of the Government will lightly pass laws which are in conflict
     with the treaties of the country; _but that circumstances may
     arise which would not only justify the Government in
     disregarding their stipulations, but demand in the interests
     of the country that it should do so, there can be no question.
     Unexpected events may call for a change in the policy of the
     country._

In the same opinion the Supreme Court calls attention to an act passed
in 1798, declaring that the United States were freed and exonerated from
the stipulations of previous treaties with France. This subject was
fully considered by Justice Curtis, who held, as the Supreme Court says
(Page 602): "That whilst it would always be a matter of the utmost
gravity and delicacy to refuse to execute a treaty, the power to do so
was a prerogative of which no nation could be deprived without deeply
affecting its independence."

We observe, therefore, that under our own ideas of international law the
United States claims the right to disregard its stipulations if the
interests of the country should require it. And the same right we should
concede to other nations. Particularly to Germany in the present
instance, when we find her battling for her very existence against
enemies that seek to destroy her, against enemies that surround her on
all sides, against enemies that do not hesitate to bring troops into the
conflict from the wilds of Africa and Asia, and who do not hesitate to
drag Japan into this war, causing her to disregard Chinese neutrality in
her effort to capture a small settlement, lawfully occupied in China by
a handful of German soldiers.

In this connection I quote the British sentiment, as expressed by
Gladstone regarding Belgium neutrality in the year 1870:

     But I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who
     have held in this House, what plainly amounts to the assertion
     that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is
     binding to every party to it, irrespective altogether of the
     particular position in which it may find itself at the time
     when the occasion for _acting on the question arises_.

This shows that England herself reserved the right, whenever her
interests required her to do so, to act in violation of the treaty with
Belgium. That, at least, is my understanding of Gladstone's language.
England did not respect Danish neutrality a hundred years ago, when she
destroyed the Danish fleet at Copenhagen because her interests required,
and England does not now, through its Asiatic ally, and directly,
respect Chinese neutrality, claiming the right primarily to consult her
own interests. Should this right, asserted by our own Supreme Court, and
actually assumed by England and Japan, be denied to Germany? Finally, I
understand that The Hague Conference of 1907 drafted a convention which
reads:

     The territory of neutral powers is inviolable. Belligerents
     are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of
     war or supplies across the territory of a neutral power. Great
     Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy refused to sign
     it and did not sign it. Russia was not represented.

MILITARISM. There is one more subject which many people in this country
have failed to understand, and that is the matter of militarism. German
militarism is supposed to be something dreadful, and many good people
believe that it would be a great advance toward eternal peace if that
militarism could be wiped out. Well, now, let us see.

If Germany did not require every one of her sons to spend a year, or at
most two years, in the army, and if she had not provided for all these
men sufficient arms and accoutrements for immediate use in case of war,
what would have happened when Russia entered her territory, or when
France came on a like errand?

Any one who lives among enemies is expected to be sufficiently prepared
to defend himself should they attack him, be he ever so peaceful.

At the time the United States of America was born there was no such
thing as Germany. Every country around it had a slice of it. Napoleon
took the larger western part of Germany as his property, England held
Hanover, the former Kingdom of Poland held Saxony, Austria held Silesia,
and so there was no Germany. The Teutonic races had no home in which
they could develop and live without interference by others. To prevent
such interference Germany of all nations needed an army; to prevent
similar interference at sea England of all nations needed a navy. That
great British Navy bears precisely the same relation to the protection
of Great Britain at sea which the German Army bears to the protection of
Germany on land.

To sum up, what are the countries fighting for? Russia for her
enlargement; she has no grudge whatever against Germany except that it
exists. France for revenge; she has no grudge whatever against Germany
except that she wants revenge for 1870. What grudge has England against
Germany, except that Germany has grown commercially, financially, and
industrially to a position which threatens to crowd England into a
second rank? Jealousy appears to control the English attitude.

The position apparently assumed by England is best expressed by the King
of England in his telegram to Prince Henry of Prussia, dated July 30,
1914:

     My Government is doing its utmost, suggesting to Russia and
     France to _suspend further military preparations_ if Austria
     will consent to be satisfied with occupation of Belgrade and
     neighboring Servian territory as a hostage for satisfactory
     settlement of her demands, other countries meanwhile
     suspending their war preparations. Trust William will use his
     great influence to induce Austria to accept this proposal,
     thus proving that Germany and England are working together to
     prevent what would be an international catastrophe.

On July 31, the very next day, Sir Edward Grey wrote the telegram, No.
111, (English "White Book,") to the British Ambassador at Berlin, in
which we find the following:

     I would undertake to sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be
     possible for the four disinterested powers to offer to Austria
     that they would undertake to see that she obtained full
     satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided that they did
     not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian
     territory. _As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already
     declared her willingness to respect them._ (Established by
     Paper 3, July 24, and Paper 5, July 26, German "White Book.")

Hence, we find that all King George said he wanted had been granted, and
yet England entered into the war. Why? Probably because she thought, as
France had expressed it, that she acted in pursuance of her interests.

And what is Germany fighting for? Does she want anything from anybody?
She wants to be left alone; she always wanted to be left alone; she
prospered while she was left alone; she grew while she was left alone.
Not being left alone she has to defend herself. Hence, I bespeak for
Germany and for her side fair play, just judgment on behalf of the
American people.

ARTHUR v. BRIESEN.

New York, Oct. 17, 1914.




PARTING.

By LOUISE VON WETTER.


    Sodger lad, O sodger lad,
      The dawn will see ye marchin'--
    The nicht drag's on--its dark is out
      Wi' searchlichts, shiftin', archin'.

    Sodger lad, O sodger lad,
      D'ye mind our Summer meetin'?
    And noo, ye'll gang. The heather's dead ...
      I canna keep frae greetin'.

    Sodger lad, my sodger lad--
      D'ye mind, my time is nearin'?
    Alone--alone--wi'out yer hand!
      How shall I keep frae fearin'?

    Sodger lad, O sodger lad,
      Far, far awa' ye're goin'--
    I'll not dare count the leagues an' days--
      _Gude God! The cocks are crowin'!_

    Sodger lad, my luve, my dear,
      Awake! The morn is grayin'!
    E'en tho' my heart drags, sick wi' dread,
      I wouldna have ye stayin'.




French Hate and English Jealousy

By Kuno Francke.


It is easy to see why American public opinion should have condemned by
an overwhelming majority the diplomatic acts of Austria and Hungary
which have been the immediate occasion of the terrific explosion which
now shakes the foundations of the whole civilized world. Austria's break
with Servia and Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality--the one
leading to war between Russia and Germany, the other bringing England
into the fray--must appear to the uninitiated as reckless and
indefensible provocations and as wanton attacks upon the laws of
nations.

The thoughtful observer, however, should look beyond the immediate
occasion of this world conflict and try to understand its underlying
causes. By doing so he will, I believe, come to the conclusion that
fundamental justice is to be found on the German side, and that Germany
has been forced to fight for her life.

It is an unquestionable fact that the unification of Germany and the
establishment of a strong German Empire, half a century ago, were
brought about against the bitter opposition of France, and that the
defeat incurred by France in 1870, in her attempt to prevent German
unification, is at the bottom of the constant irritation that has
agitated Europe during the last forty-three years. Germany's policy
toward France during these forty-three years has been one of utmost
restraint and forbearance, and has been dictated by the one desire of
making her forget the loss of the two provinces, German until the
seventeenth century and inhabited by German stock, which were won back
from France in 1870. Whether the acquisition of these provinces was a
fortunate thing for Germany may be doubted. The possession of
Alsace-Lorraine has certainly robbed Germany of the undivided sympathy
of the world, which she otherwise would have had. But it is probably
true that from the military point of view Alsace-Lorraine was needed by
Germany as a bulwark against the repetition of the many wanton French
invasions from which Germany has had to suffer since the time of the
Thirty Years' War and the age of Louis XIV.


Sought to Heal the Breach.

However this may be, Germany has done her best during the last four
decades to heal the wounds struck by her to French national pride. She
abetted French colonial expansion in Cochin-China, Madagascar, Tunis.
She yielded to France her own well-founded claims to political influence
in Morocco. In Alsace-Lorraine itself she introduced an amount of local
self-government and home rule such as England has not accorded even now
to Ireland. While Ireland still is waiting for a Parliament at Dublin,
Strassburg has been for years the seat of the Alsace-Lorraine Diet, a
provincial Parliament based on universal suffrage. And even in spite of
the incessant and inflammatory French propaganda which last year led to
such unhappy counter-strokes as the deplorable Zabern affair, there can
be no reasonable doubt that the people of Alsace-Lorraine have been
gradually settling down to willing co-operation with the German
administration--an administration which insures them order, justice, and
prosperity. Nothing is a clearer indication of the peaceable trend which
affairs have lately taken in Alsace-Lorraine than the fact that the
Nationalists, i.e., French party, in the Strassburg Diet has never been
able to rise above insignificance, and that, on the other hand, a
considerable number of responsible officers in the civil administration,
including the highest Governmental positions, have been occupied by
native Alsatians.

While Germany has thus repeatedly shown her willingness and desire to
end the ancient feud, France has remained irreconcilable; and
particularly the intellectual class of France cannot escape the charge
that they have persistently and willfully kept alive the flame of
discord.

It surely cannot be said that the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine is a
vital necessity to France. Without Alsace-Lorraine France has recovered
her prosperity and her prestige in a manner that has been the admiration
of the world. It is a mere illusion to think that the reconquest of
Alsace-Lorraine would add to her glory. It would have been a demand of
patriotism for the intellectual class to combat this illusion. Instead
of this, every French writer, every French scholar, every French orator,
except the Socialists, year in and year out, has been dinning into the
popular ear the one word revenge.


France to Blame.

There can be little doubt that Prof. Gustave Lanson, the distinguished
literary historian, voiced the sentiments of the vast majority of his
countrymen when in a lecture, delivered some years ago at Harvard, he
stated that France could not and would not reorganize the peace of
Frankfurt as a final settlement, and that the one aim of the French
policy of the last forty years had been to force Germany to reopen the
Alsace-Lorraine question.

If there were people in Germany inclined to overlook or to minimize this
constantly growing menace from France, their eyes must have been opened
when in 1912 the French Government, having previously abolished the
one-year volunteers, raised the duration of active military service for
every Frenchman from two years to three, and, in addition to this,
called out in the Autumn of 1913 the recruits not only of the year whose
turn had come, namely, the recruits born in 1892, but also those born
in 1893. This was a measure nearly identical with mobilization; it was a
measure which clearly showed that France would not delay much longer
striking the deadly blow. For no nation could possibly stand for any
length of time this terrific strain of holding under the colors its
entire male population from the twentieth to the twenty-fourth year. No
wonder that the Paris papers were speaking as long ago as the Summer of
1912 of the regiments stationed in the Eastern Departments as the
"vanguard of our glorious army," and were advocating double pay for
them, as being practically in contact with the enemy.

The second foe now threatening the destruction of Germany is England.
Can it truly be said that England's hostility has been brought about by
German aggression? True, Germany has built a powerful navy; but so have
Japan, the United States, France, and even Italy. Has England felt any
menace from these? Why, then, is the German Navy singled out as a
specially sinister threat to England? Has German diplomacy during the
last generation been particularly menacing to England? Germany has
acquired some colonies in Africa and in the Far East. But what are
Kamerun and Dar-es-Salaam and Kiao-Chau compared with the colonial
possessions of the other great powers? Where has Germany pursued a
colonial aggressiveness that could in any way be compared with the
British subjugation of the South African republics or the Italian
conquest of Tripoli or the French expansion in Algiers, Tunis, and
Morocco, or the American acquisition of the Philippines?


Her Open-Door Policy.

Wherever Germany has made her influence felt on the globe she has stood
for the principle of the open door. Wherever she has engaged in colonial
enterprises, she has been willing to make compromises with other nations
and to accept their co-operation, notably so in the Bagdad railway
undertaking. And yet, the colonial expansion of every other nation is
hailed by England as "beneficial to mankind," as "work for
civilization"; the slightest attempt of Germany to take part in this
expansion is denounced as "intolerable aggression," as evidence of the
"bullying tendencies of the War Lord."

What is the reason for this singular unfairness of England toward
Germany, of this incessant attempt to check her and hem her in? Not so
much the existence of a large German Navy as the encroachment upon
English commerce by the rapidly growing commerce of Germany has made
Germany hateful to England. The navy has simply added to this hate of
Germany the dread of Germany. But if there had been no German Navy, and
consequently no dread of Germany, this hate of Germany might have come
to an explosion before now. For the history of the last 300 years proves
that England has habitually considered as her mortal enemy any nation
which dared to contest her commercial and industrial supremacy--first
Spain, then Holland, then France, and now Germany. As long as German
firms, by the manufacture of artificial indigo, keep on ruining the
English importation of indigo from India, and as long as the German
steamship lines keep on outstripping the prestige of the English boats,
there can be no real friendship between England and Germany. Although
England has repeatedly proposed to Germany naval agreements, these
agreements were avowedly meant to perpetuate the overwhelming
preponderance of England's fighting power, so that she would at any
moment be in a position to crush German commercial rivalry for all time.
She apparently thinks that this moment has now come.

That Germany's third implacable enemy, Russia, is clearly the aggressor,
and not the defender of her own national existence, need hardly be
demonstrated. She poses as the guardian of the Balkan States. But is
there any case on record where Russia has really protected the
independence of smaller neighboring countries? Has she not crushed out
provincial and racial individuality wherever she has extended her power?
Is it not the sole aim of her national policy to Russianize forcibly
every nationality under her sway?

In Finland she has gone back on her solemnly pledged word to maintain
the Finnish Constitution, and is ruthlessly reducing one of her most
highly developed provinces to the dead level of autocratic rule. In her
Baltic provinces she is trying to destroy, root and branch, whatever
there is left of German culture. Wherever the Russian Church holds
dominion intellectual blight is sure to follow.

To think, therefore, that Russia would promote the free development of a
number of independent Balkan States under her protectorate is to shut
one's eyes to the whole history of Russian expansion. No, Russian
expansion in the Balkans means nothing less than the extinction of all
local independence and the establishment of Russian despotism from the
Black Sea to the Adriatic.


Why Germany Supports Austria.

Not Russia, but Austria, is the natural protector of the equilibrium
between the existing States on the Balkan Peninsula and their natural
guardian against Russian domination. Austria is their nearest neighbor;
indeed, the possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina makes her a Balkan
State herself.

Being herself more than half of Slavic stock, she has every reason for
living on good terms with the various Slav kingdoms south of her. Being
herself forced, through the conglomerateness of her population, to
constant compromises in her internal affairs between conflicting
nationalities within her borders, she could not possibly absorb a large
additional amount of foreign territory. She is bound to respect the
existing lines of political demarkation in the Balkans, and her sole
object can be through commercial treaties and tariff legislation to open
up what used to be European Turkey to her trade and her civilizing
influence.

In this she must clearly be supported by Germany. For only if Austria is
left free to exercise her natural protectorate over the Balkan States
can the passage between Germany and the Near Orient, one of the most
important routes of German commerce, be kept open.

Russia's unwillingness, then, to allow Austria a free hand in her
dealings with Servia was an open menace to Germany, a challenge which
had to be accepted unless Germany was prepared to abdicate all her
influence in the Near Orient and to allow Russia to override the
legitimate claims and aspirations of her only firm and faithful ally.

This formidable coalition of the three greatest European powers,
threatening the very existence of Germany, has now been joined by Japan,
openly and boldly for the purpose of snatching from Germany her one
Asiatic possession.

If any additional proof had been needed to make it clear that, if
Germany wanted to retain the slightest chance of extricating herself
from this worldwide conspiracy against her, she had to strike the first
blow, even at the risk of offending against international good manners,
this stab in the back by Japan would furnish such proof.




Dr. Sanderson Replies


_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

Although I hate to enter into a controversy with Prof. Kuno Francke, who
was once my excellent friend, I cannot refrain from answering his
article which appeared in last Sunday's NEW YORK TIMES.

How can any one say, in all fairness, that Germany's policy toward
France during the last forty-three years has been one of the utmost
restraint and forbearance, and has been dictated by the one desire to
make her forget the loss of the two provinces? What are the facts? We
know that not once, but again and again, since 1878, Germany has tried
to provoke France into war. We know that on one occasion Queen Victoria
herself threatened the Kaiser with Great Britain's intervention if he
did not desist from his intended attack on France. And to cite only the
two most recent instances, the Agadir affair and the enforced
resignation of the French Premier, Delcassé! Would Germany have
swallowed such insults?

This may be the German conception of "utmost restraint and forbearance,"
but it appeared to the French, as it did to the rest of the world, that
it required their utmost restraint and forbearance to remain calm under
the affronts.

The fact that Alsace-Lorraine was German up to the seventeenth century,
and inhabited by German stock, cannot be brought forward today, after
more than 200 years, to justify the retaking of those provinces by the
Germans. The whole world would be in a state of continual warfare if
nations claimed provinces or States that belonged to them once upon a
time. Richelieu's idea was that the Rhine was the natural and
geographical frontier between France and Germany, and the war was
undertaken to carry out that plan. Since then the inhabitants have
become French, and the attempts to re-Germanize them have proved futile.
Prof. Francke may well doubt if the acquisition of these provinces was a
fortunate thing for Germany. It was undoubtedly the most unfortunate
thing not only for Germany but for France and the rest of Europe, for it
kept open a wound which might have been healed either by a return of the
lost provinces, with or without compensation, or by granting them
autonomy, or, better still, by leaving it to the inhabitants to choose
for themselves, as France did with Nice and Savoy.

The ruthless methods of a Bismarck are no longer of this age. They are
too odious, and the human conscience revolts at them. What a
preposterous idea, in this twentieth century, to compel by force
millions of people to renounce their traditions and even their
language! If Great Britain had followed the same method in dealing with
the French Canadians, instead of loyal subjects she would have made
rebels of them all.

It is neither right nor just nor truthful to say that Germany has done
her best during the last four decades to heal the wounds struck by her
to French national pride. On the contrary, Germany's attitude has been
all along one of studied provocation; and if the instances already
mentioned are not sufficient, many others could be added.

Germany abetted French colonial expansion. Well, by what right should
she have opposed it? And if she yielded to France in Morocco, it was
only after France had given Germany part of her African possessions
rather than go to war with her.

It will be news to the world to be informed that there can be no
reasonable doubt that the people of Alsace-Lorraine have been gradually
settling down to willing co-operation with the German administration.
Certainly such a statement is in violent contradiction with all we hear
and read and know of the state of mind, the feelings, and aspirations of
the inhabitants of those two provinces.

To argue that the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine is not a vital
necessity to France; that without these provinces she has recovered her
prosperity and her prestige, and that it is mere illusion to think that
the reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine would add to her glory is pure
sophistry. It is just as if you said to a man whom you had robbed of
some valuable property: "What does it matter? You are just as well off
without it." Yes, Prof. Larson did voice the sentiment of the vast
majority of his countrymen when he stated that France could not and
would not recognize the treaty of Frankfurt. If I have an enemy who
takes me by surprise and with revolver leveled at my head compels me to
sign a paper by which I despoil myself to his advantage, what is the
validity of such a document?

That is the way that all Frenchmen of all classes look upon the treaty
of Frankfurt, wrung from them under duress.

The term "revanche" is a slogan. It simply typifies in one word the
reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine; but it does not carry with it the idea of
willfully laying waste the enemy's country, burning and pillaging,
shooting inoffensive non-combatants, and cleaning banks of all the gold
they contain.

Another statement which is misleading in Prof. Francke's article is the
one which refers to the "growing menace from France," in which he speaks
of the increasing armament that has been going on in that country since
1912. But what is called in Germany "the menace from France" is called
in the latter country "the menace from Germany." Who started these
enormous armaments? Each time Germany increased her army France was
forced to do the same; and when France recently increased from two to
three years the duration of military service, it was her only way of
meeting Germany's increase of 500,000 men.

The attempt to change the rôles and present France to the world as the
aggressor, or even as premeditating an attack upon Germany, is futile.
It is a strange and yet not uncommon psychological fact that the hate of
the conqueror is often greater than that of the conquered; and it is
German, not French, hate which has forced Germany into this savage war.
France had recovered too rapidly from her disasters; she was too rich;
her colonies were too vast and too prosperous; she must be crushed. What
right had she to have large colonies when Germany, the superior nation,
had none worth mentioning? There you have the key to the Kaiser's
repeated provocations and to his final attack.

In regard to England and Russia, the writer will simply confine himself
to the statement that if the German Imperial Government can produce as
clean a bill of health as the "White Paper" of the British Foreign
Office, just published, it will do more to convince American public
opinion of the justice of its cause than anything that has yet been
written in the press by Germans and their sympathizers.

R.L. SANDERSON.

Yale University, New Haven, Conn., Sept. 5, 1914.




In Defense of Austria

By Baron L. Hengelmuller.

     Late Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to the United States.


_The following letter was written by Baron Hengelmuller to Col. Theodore
Roosevelt._

ABBAZIA, Sept. 25, 1914.

My Dear Mr. Roosevelt:

Our correspondence has suffered a long interruption. Your last letter
was from July of last year. I do not know whether you ever received my
answer, by which I thanked you for your preface to my book. You were in
Arizona when I wrote it, and soon after your return you started for
Brazil. At the occasion of your son's wedding I sent him a telegram to
Madrid, but I had no chance to write to you because I had no information
with regard to the length of your stay and your whereabouts in Europe.

Now I write to you at the time of a most momentous crisis in the world's
history, and I do so impelled by the desire to talk with you about my
country's cause and to win your just and fair appreciation for the same.
I wish I could address my appeal to the American people, but having no
standing and no opportunity to do so, I address it to you as to one of
America's most illustrious citizens with whom it has been my privilege
to entertain during many years the most friendly relations.

Since the outbreak of the war our communications with America are slow
and irregular. In the beginning they were nil. From the end of July to
the middle of August we received neither letters, telegrams, nor papers.
I suppose it was the same with you concerning direct news from us. Our
adversaries had the field all for themselves and they seem to have made
the most of it. To judge from what I have learned since and from what I
could glean in our papers, the New York press seem to have written about
us and Germany very much in the same tone and spirit as they did about
you during your last Presidential campaign. I have seen it stated that
The Outlook published an article in which Austro-Hungary was accused of
having brought about the war through her greed of conquest and the
overbearing arrogance of her behavior toward Servia. I do not know
whether I cite correctly, as I have not seen the article, and I am aware
that you have severed your connection with The Outlook after your return
from Brazil. I only mention the statement as an illustration of what I
have said above, for if a review of the standing of The Outlook opens
its columns to such a glaringly false accusation the daily papers have
certainly not lagged behind.

It is natural that our adversaries should be anxious to win the
sympathies of the American people. So are we. But it is not for this
purpose that I now write to you. Sympathy is a sentiment and, as a rule,
not to be won by argument. What I want to discuss with you are the
causes of this war and the issues at stake.


The Cause of the War.

Undoubtedly the war broke out over our conflict with Servia, but this
conflict was not of our seeking. We had no wish of aggrandizement or
extension of power at the expense of Servia, but Servia covets territory
which belongs to us, and for years has pursued her ends by the most
nefarious and criminal means. The assassination of our heir to the crown
and his consort was not an isolated fact, but only the most glaring
link in a long chain of plotting and agitating against us. This
attitude of Servia toward us dates back to the day when the gang of
officers who murdered their own King came to power, and when it became
their policy to keep a hold over their own people by exciting their
ambitions against us. This policy reached its first climax when we
declared the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which we had occupied
and developed for thirty years. You were in office then, and the events
of the time are familiar to you. The crisis ended then by Servia's
formal acknowledgment that our annexation violated none of her rights,
and by her promise to cultivate henceforth correct and friendly
relations with us. This promise was not kept. The plotting continued,
lies were disseminated about a pretended oppression of our South Slav
population, and associations were formed for the purpose of stirring
them to discontent and if possible to treason.

Things came to a second climax with the murder of Archduke Francis
Ferdinand. The plot for this crime was hatched in Servia, the bombs and
revolvers for its execution were furnished there, and Servian officers
instructed the murder candidates in their use. At last we could stand it
no longer. What we wanted from Servia was the punishment of the plotters
and accomplices and a guarantee for normal relations in the future. This
was the object of our ultimatum. Servia made a show of complying with
some of our demands, but in reality her answer was evasive.

These facts are exposed and authenticated in the note which we sent to
the powers after having presented our ultimatum in Belgrade and in the
memorandum which accompanied it. I do not know whether the American
papers published these documents at the time. Today they are outstripped
by greater events, but for the just appreciation of our proceedings in
regard to Servia they are indispensable.

In reality, however, our conflict with Servia was not the cause of the
great war now raging, but only the spark which brought the overloaded
powder barrel to explosion. Who talks of Servia today, and who believes
that France, England, and Japan are making war on Germany and on us
because of Servia? The war broke out because Russia decided to shield
Servia against the consequences of her provocations and because, owing
to preconcerted arrangements, the situation in Europe was such that the
action of one great power was bound to bring all or nearly all the
others into the field. And again those preconcerted arrangements were
the outcome of a mass of pent-up passions, of hatred, envy, and
jealousy, the like of which--all Hague conferences and pacific unions
notwithstanding--the world has never seen before.

We are fully aware of the danger which threatened us from Russia when we
formulated our demands in Belgrade. Russia's population is three times
as large as ours and it was not with a light heart that our Emperor-King
took his final resolution. But our national honor and our very existence
as a self-respecting power were at stake. We could not hesitate. Now we
are in a struggle for life or death and we mean to carry it through with
full confidence in the rightfulness of our cause and in the force of our
arms. In one respect events have already belied the calculations of our
enemies, who counted on internal dissensions within our own borders. I
am happy to say that Croatians, Slovenes, and a large majority of our
own Servians are fighting in our ranks with the same valor and
enthusiasm as Czechs, Rumanians, Poles, Magyars, and Germans.

But why did Russia decide to assail us? During the whole nineteenth
century she has shown herself a very shifty and unreliable protectress
of Servia. She made use of the smaller country when it suited her own
aggressive purposes against others, and she dropped it whenever it
served her ends. It was so at the time of the Turkish war of 1877 and of
the Berlin Congress, and it remained so until with the advent of the
present dynasty Servia offered a sure prospect of becoming and remaining
a permanent tool in Russia's hands and a thorn in our flesh.

Russia is an aggressive power. For 200 years she has extended her
dominions at the cost of Sweden first, of Poland and Turkey afterward.
Now she thinks our turn has come. Finding us to be in the way of her
ultimate aims in the Balkan Peninsula, she began to regard us as her
enemy. For years the propaganda for undermining the bases of our empire
has been carried on in the name of Pan-Slavism. It seems that she judged
that now the time had come to draw the consequences and to bring things
to a final issue. With what result remains to be seen.


Germany Bound to Aid Austria.

By the terms of our treaty of alliance Germany was bound to come to our
assistance if we were attacked by Russia. There was no secrecy about
that treaty. Its text had been made public long ago and its purely
defensive character brought to the knowledge of the world. No more than
we did Germany entertain hostile intentions or nourish hostile feelings
against Russia. There were no clashing interests to excite the first, no
historical reminiscences to justify the second. If it is otherwise in
Russia, it is because her present leaders find German power in the way
of their conquering aspirations against us. Germany, true to her
obligations, hastened to our side when she saw us menaced, and when she
declared war she did it because she had positive information that in
spite of formal and solemn assurances to the contrary Russia
mobilization was proceeding.

The terms of the Franco-Russian alliance have never been made public.
Whether it was concluded merely for defensive or also for offensive
purposes, and whether France was obliged by her treaty to draw the sword
in the present case, remains therefore a matter of surmise. But there is
no mystery about the feelings of France with regard to Germany, and no
doubt about the greed for revenge which during the last forty-four years
has swayed the overwhelming majority of her people and been the
dominant factor of her foreign policy. It was for this object that she
entered into her alliances and agreements, and it is for this cause that
she is fighting now.

It is simple hypocrisy to talk about German aggressiveness against
France. France stood in no danger of being attacked by Germany if she
had chosen to remain neutral in the latter's war with Russia. Asked
whether she would do so, she replied that her actions would be guided by
her interests. The meaning of this reply was clear, and left Germany no
choice. The formal declaration of war became then a mere matter of
political and military convenience, and has no bearing on the moral
issue of the case.

But why has England plunged into this war? Officially and to the world
at large she has explained her resolution by Germany's violation of
Belgian neutrality, and in the royal message to Parliament it was
solemnly declared that England could not stand by and passively tolerate
such a breach of international law and obligations.

No Austrian can read this declaration otherwise than with a mournful
smile. Its futility has been exposed by the question which Englishmen of
standing and renown have put to their Government, viz., whether they
would equally have declared war on France if that violation of
neutrality had first come from her side. In face of this question having
remained unanswered, and in face of what has come to light since about
French preparations in Belgium, there is no need to expiate on this
subject. All that there is to be said about it has been said by the
German Chancellor in open session of the Reichstag, and all that may be
added is the remark that, considering England's history and what she did
before Copenhagen in 1807, she of all nations should be the last to put
on airs of moral indignation over the application of the principle that
in time of war "salus reipublicae suprema lex est."

The existence of a convention binding England to France in case of war
has--as far as I know--never been admitted officially by England. As I
see now from manifestations of Englishmen disapproving of their
country's participation in the war, the belief exists nevertheless that
such a convention had been concluded. But whether England's declaration
of war was the consequence of previously entered obligations or the
outcome of present free initiative, the main fact remains that in the
last resort it sprang from jealousy of Germany's growing sea power and
commercial prosperity. This feeling was the dominant factor in English
foreign policy, just as greed for revenge was in France. It was the
propelling power for the agreements which England has made and for
others which she endeavored but did not succeed in bringing about.

England claims the dominion over the seas as her native right, and, what
is more, she holds it. Her title is no better and no worse than that of
the Romans when they conquered the world, or of the Turkish Sultans in
the days of their power. Like them, she has succeeded in making good her
claim. For three centuries the nations of Continental Europe have been
hating, fighting, and devastating each other for the sake of strips of
frontier land and a shadowy balance of power. These centuries were
England's opportunity, and she has made the most of it. That she should
mean to keep what she has and hold to her maritime supremacy as to the
apple of her eye is natural. Whether it is for the benefit of mankind
that it should be so, and whether the world in general would not be
better off if there existed a balance of power on sea as well as on
land, does not enter into the present discussion. What is more to the
purpose is that in reality England's sea power stood in no danger at
all. To any thinking and fair-minded observer it must be clear that
Germany, hemmed in by hostile neighbors in the east and west, and
obliged, therefore, to keep up her armaments on land, would not have
been able to threaten England's maritime superiority for generations to
come. If the issue has been thrown into the balance, it has been done so
by England's own doing.

But it is not only the nascent German Navy that excited the distrust
and envy of England. German colonies and every trading German vessel
seem equally to have become thorns in English eyes. The wish to sweep
those vessels from off the seas, to destroy all German ports, in one
word, to down Germany, has long been nourished and lately openly avowed
in England. Norman Angell's theories about the great illusion of the
profitability of modern warfare seem to have made mighty small
impression on his countrymen.

Russian lust of conquest, French greed of revenge, and English envy were
the forces at work in the European powder magazine. The Servian spark
ignited it, but the explosion was bound to come sooner or later. What
alone could have stopped it would have been England's stepping out of
the conspiracy. That she did not do so, in fact became its really
directing power, will forever remain a blot on her history.

About Japan's motives and methods I do not think it necessary to write.
American public opinion will hardly need any enlightenment on this
subject. America forced Japan out of the isolation in which she had
lived during centuries. I hope the day may not come when she will wish
that she had not done so.

The issues of the war stand in relation to its causes and the same
attempts have been made to distort and falsify them in the eyes of the
American public. I have seen it stated in a New York paper that this war
is a fight between civilization and barbarism, and I have seen a member
of the present English Cabinet quoted as having said that the issue was
one between militarism and freedom, civilization and freedom standing,
of course, in both cases on the side of our enemies.


Not a War for Civilization.

More idiotic rot--excuse the expression--I have never read in my life.
What has civilization to do with Servia's murderous plotting against
us? What with Russia's desire to shield her from the consequences
of her aggressions and to demonstrate to the world that we are of
no account in the Balkans and to establish her own--more or less
veiled--protectorate there? And if the case of civilization is advanced
by Japan's ousting Germany from Kiao-Chau, why should it not be equally
furthered if Japan did the same to England in Hongkong, Singapore, or,
if the opportunity offered, in India itself? And a person must be indeed
at his wits' end for arguments to proclaim Russia as a standard bearer
of freedom in her war against us. Compare her treatment of Poles, Finns,
Ukrainanians (small Russians) and Hebrews with the freedom which the
different nationalities enjoy in our empire! And England herself. Is it
for freedom's sake that she holds Gibraltar and that she subjugated the
Boers?

No! Civilization and freedom have nothing to do with the issues at stake
now, least of all in the sense that our enemies have drawn the sword for
their cause. It is a war for conquest and supremacy stirred up by all
the hateful passions in human nature, fully as much as any war that has
ever been waged before. But we did not stir it up. We are fighting for
our existence, right and justice are on our side, and so we trust will
victory be.

The causes of the war are clear. To make its issues still clearer,
imagine for a moment and merely for argument's sake the consequences of
our adversaries being successful. Russia, England, and Japan would
remain masters of the field. Is this a consummation any thinking
American can wish for?

These are the considerations I wished to lay before you, and I ask your
assistance to bring them before the American people. I ask for no reply,
no manifestation of feelings or opinion from you. What I ask you is to
publish this letter as an open letter addressed by me to you, signed
with my full name. How to do this I leave entirely to you. It goes
without saying that your private reply, if you favor me with one, will
be treated as such.

Hoping to meet you in better times, and sending our kindest regards to
Mrs. Roosevelt, believe me, yours most sincerely,

BARON L. HENGELMULLER.

Abbazia, Sept. 25, 1914.




Russian Atrocities

By George Haven Putnam.

     Publisher, Director of the Knickerbocker Press, Secretary
     American Copyright League; decorated with the Cross of the
     Legion of Honor, France.


_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

It is possible that the letter presented herewith from a German neighbor
(who is a stranger to me) may be of interest to your readers as an
example of a curious confusion of thought into which have fallen Germans
on both sides of the Atlantic in regard to the issues of the present
struggle and the conduct and the actions of the German Army. I am
inclosing a copy of my reply to Mr. Thienes.

GEORGE HAVEN PUTNAM.

New York, Nov. 4, 1914.


THE LETTER.

NEW YORK, Oct. 28, 1914.

Mr. George Haven Putnam.

DEAR SIR: Now that you have shown your "true" spirit of neutrality
toward Germany, would you not be kind enough to give us a similar piece
of your wisdom and describe in detail the way the Russians acted in East
Prussia during their short stay there, and how they murdered, tortured,
and assaulted women and girls, and cut children and infants to pieces
without even the provocation of "sniping"?

This, your new article in THE TIMES, I anticipate with the greatest
interest.

RUDOLF F. THIENES.


THE REPLY.

Rudolf F. Thienes, Esq.

MY DEAR SIR: Your letter of the 28th inst., intended as a rejoinder to a
letter recently printed by me in THE TIMES, is written under a
misapprehension in regard to one important matter.

The Americans, who are in a position to judge impartially in regard to
the issues of the war, have criticised the official acts which have
attended the devastation of Belgium, not because these acts were
committed by Germans, but because they were in themselves abominable and
contrary to precedents and to civilized standards.

If the Russians had, under official order, burned Lemburg, including the
university and the library, and executed the Burgomaster, they would
have come under the same condemnation from Americans that has been given
to Germans for the burning of Louvain and Aerschot and the shooting of
the Aerschot Burgomaster. I am myself familiar with Germany. I am an
old-time German student, and I have German friends on both sides of the
Atlantic, and I am in a position to sympathize with legitimate
aspirations and ideals of these German friends.

I am convinced, however, that no nation can secure in this twentieth
century its rightful development unless its national conduct is
regulated with a "decent respect to the opinions of mankind." The
references made in my TIMES letters were restricted to official actions;
things done under the direction of the military commanders acting in
accord with the instructions or the general policy of the Imperial
Government.

The misdeeds of individual soldiers are difficult to verify. While these
are always exaggerated, it remains the sad truth that every big army
contains a certain percentage of ruffians, and that when these ruffians
are let loose in a community, with weapons and with military power
behind them, bad things are done. It is my own belief that the material
in the German Army (which is the best fighting machine that the world
has ever seen) will compare favorably with that of any army in the
world, and that the percentage of wrongful acts on the part of the
German soldiers has been small. Such misdeeds, sometimes to be
characterized as atrocities, are the inevitable result of war, and they
bring a grave responsibility upon a Government which (to accept as well
founded the frank utterances of the leaders of opinion in Germany) has
initiated this war for the purpose of "crushing France and of breaking
up the British Empire."

You appear to think that it is in order for Germany to visit upon
unoffending Belgians reprisal for the misdeeds (as far as such misdeeds
may be in evidence) committed by Russians in East Prussia. I cannot see
that this contention is in accord with justice or with common sense.

GEORGE HAVEN PUTNAM.

New York, Oct. 28, 1914.




"The United States of Europe"

INTERVIEW WITH NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER.

     Dr. Butler is President of Columbia University; received
     Republican electoral vote for Vice President of the United
     States, 1913; President of American Branch of Conciliation
     Internationale; President American Historical Association;
     Trustee Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Commander
     Order of the Red Eagle (with Star) of Prussia; Commandeur de
     Legion d'Honneur of France.

By Edward Marshall.


The United States of Europe.

Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, firmly
believes that the organization of such a federation will be the outcome,
soon or late, of a situation built up through years of European failure
to adjust government to the growth of civilization.

He thinks it possible that the ending of the present war may see the
rising of the new sun of democracy to light a day of freedom for our
transatlantic neighbors.

He tells me that thinking men in all the contending nations are
beginning vividly to consider such a contingency, to argue for it or
against it; in other words, to regard it as an undoubted possibility.

Dr. Butler's acquaintance among those thinking men of all shades of
political belief is probably wider than that of any other American, and
it is significant of the startling importance of what he says that by
far the greater number of his European friends, the men upon whose views
he has largely, directly or indirectly, based his conclusions, are not
of the socialistic or of any other revolutionary or semi-revolutionary
groups, but are among the most conservative and most important figures
in European political, literary, and educational fields.

This being unquestionably true, it is by no means improbable that in the
interview which follows, fruit of two evenings in Dr. Butler's library,
may be found the most important speculative utterance yet to appear in
relation to the general European war.

Dr. Butler's estimate of the place which the United States now holds
upon the stage of the theatre of world progress and his forecast of the
tremendously momentous rôle which she is destined to play there must
make every American's heart first swell with pride and then thrill with
a realization of responsibility.

The United States of Europe, modeled after and instructed by the United
States of America! The thought is stimulating.

Said Dr. Butler:

"The European cataclysm puts the people of the United States in a unique
and tremendously important position. As neutrals we are able to observe
events and to learn the lesson that they teach. If we learn rightly we
shall gain for ourselves and be able to confer upon others benefits far
more important than any of the material advantages which may come to us
through a shrewd handling of the new possibilities in international
trade.

"I hesitate to discuss any phase of the great conflict now raging in
Europe. By today's mail, for example, I received long, personal letters
from Lord Haldane, from Lord Morley, from Lord Weardale, and from Lord
Bryce. Another has just come from Prof. Schiemann of Berlin, perhaps the
Emperor's most intimate adviser; another from Prof. Lamasch of Austria,
who was the Presiding Judge of the British-American arbitration in
relation to the Newfoundland fisheries a few years ago, and is a member
of the Austrian House of Peers. Still others are from M. Ribot, Minister
of Finance in France, and M. d'Estournelles de Constant. These
confidential letters give a wealth of information as to the intellectual
and political forces that are behind the conflict.

"You will understand, then, that without disloyalty to my many friends
in Europe, I could not discuss with freedom the causes or the progress
of the war, or speculate in detail about the future of the European
problem. My friends in Germany, France, and England all write to me with
the utmost freedom and not for the public eye; so you see that my great
difficulty, when you ask me to talk about the meaning of the struggle,
arises from the obligation that I am under to preserve a proper personal
reserve regarding the great figures behind the vast intellectual and
political changes which really are in the background of the war.

"If such reserve is necessary in my case, it seems to me that it also is
necessary for the country as a whole. The attitude of the President has
been impeccable. That of the whole American press and people should be
the same.

"Especially is it true that all Americans who hope to have influence, as
individuals, in shaping the events which will follow the war, must avoid
any expression which even might be tortured into an avowal of
partisanship or final judgment.

"Even the free expression of views criticising particular details of the
war, which might, in fact, deserve criticism, might destroy one's chance
of future possible usefulness. A statement which might be unquestionably
true might also be remembered to the damage of some important cause
later on.

"There are reasons why my position is, perhaps, more difficult than that
of some others. Talking is often a hazardous practice, and never more so
than now.

"The World is at crossroads, and everything may depend upon the United
States, which has been thrust by events into a unique position of moral
leadership. Whether the march of the future is to be to the right or to
the left, uphill or down, after the war is over, may well depend upon
the course this nation shall then take, and upon the influence which it
shall exercise.

"If we keep our heads clear there are two things that we can bring
insistently to the attention of Europe--each of vast import at such a
time as that which will follow the ending of this war.

"The first of these is the fact that race antagonisms die away and
disappear under the influence of liberal and enlightened political
institutions. This has been proved in the United States.

"We have huge Celtic, Latin, Teutonic and Slavic populations all living
here at peace and in harmony; and, as years pass, they tend to merge,
creating new and homogeneous types. The Old World antagonisms have
become memories. This proves that such antagonisms are not mysterious
attributes of geography or climate, but that they are the outgrowth
principally of social and political conditions. Here a man can do about
what he likes, so long as he does not violate the law; he may pray as he
pleases or not at all, and he may speak any language that he chooses.

"The United States is itself proof that most of the contentions of
Europeans as to race antagonisms are ill-founded. We have demonstrated
that racial antagonisms need not necessarily become the basis of
permanent hatreds and an excuse for war."


Hyphens Are Going.

"If human beings are given the chance they will make the most of
themselves, and, by living happily--which means by living at peace--they
will avoid conflict. The hyphen tends to disappear from American
terminology. The German-American, the Italio-American, the
Irish-American all become Americans.

"So, by and large, our institutions have proved their capacity to
amalgamate and to set free every type of human being which thus far has
come under our flag. There is in this a lesson which may well be taken
seriously to heart by the leaders of opinion in Europe when this war
ends.

"The second thing which we may press, with propriety, upon the attention
of the people of Europe after peace comes to them is the fact that we
are not only the great exponents but the great example of the success of
the principle of federation in its application to unity of political
life regardless of local, economic, and racial differences.

"If our fathers had attempted to organize this country upon the basis of
a single, closely unified State, it would have gone to smash almost at
the outset, wrecked by clashing economic and personal interests. Indeed,
this nearly happened in the civil war, which was more economic than
political in its origin.

"But, though we had our difficulties, we did find a way to make a
unified nation of a hundred million people and forty-eight
Commonwealths, all bound together in unity and in loyalty to a common
political ideal and a common political purpose.

"Just as certainly as we sit here this must and will be the future of
Europe. There will be a federation into the United States of Europe.

"When one nation sets out to assert itself by force against the will, or
even the wish, of its neighbors, disaster must inevitably come. Disaster
would have come here if, in 1789, New York had endeavored to assert
itself against New England or Pennsylvania.

"As a matter of fact, certain inhabitants of Rhode Island and
Pennsylvania did try something of the sort after the Federal Government
had been formed, but, fortunately, their effort was a failure.

"The leaders of our national life had established such a flexible and
admirable plan of government that it was soon apparent that each State
could retain its identity, forming its own ideals and shaping its own
progress, and still remain a loyal part of the whole; that each State
could make a place for itself in the new federated nation and not be
destroyed thereby.

"There is no reason why each nation in Europe should not make a place
for itself in the sun of unity which I am sure is rising there behind
the war clouds. Europe's stupendous economic loss, which already has
been appalling and will soon be incalculable, will give us an
opportunity to press this argument home.

"True internationalism is not the enemy of the nationalistic principle.

"On the contrary, it helps true nationalism to thrive. The Vermonter is
more a Vermonter because he is an American, and there is no reason why
Hungary, for example, should not be more than ever before Hungarian
after she becomes a member of the United States of Europe.

"Europe, of course, is not without examples of the successful
application of the principle of federation within itself. It so happens
that the federated State next greatest to our own is the German Empire.
It is only forty-three years old, but their federation has been notably
successful. So the idea of federation is familiar to German publicists.

"It is familiar, also, to the English, and has lately been pressed there
as the probable final solution of the Irish question.

"It has insistently suggested itself as the solution of the Balkan
problem.

"In a lesser way it already is represented in the structure of
Austria-Hungary."


America's Great Work.

"This principle of nation building, of international building through
federation, certainly has in it the seeds of the world's next great
development--and we Americans are in a position both to expand the
theory and to illustrate the practice. It seems to me that this is the
greatest work which America will have to do at the end of this war.

"These are the things which I am writing to my European correspondents
in the several belligerent countries by every mail.

"The cataclysm is so awful that it is quite within the bounds of truth
to say that on July 31 the curtain went down upon a world which never
will be seen again.

"This conflict is the birth-throe of a new European order of things. The
man who attempts to judge the future by the old standards or to force
the future back to them will be found to be hopelessly out of date. The
world will have no use for him. The world has left behind forever the
international policies of Palmerston and of Beaconsfield and even those
of Bismarck, which were far more powerful.

"When the war ends conditions will be such that a new kind of
imagination and a new kind of statesmanship will be required. This war
will prove to be the most effective education of 500,000,000 people
which possibly could have been thought of, although it is the most
costly and most terrible means which could have been chosen. The results
of this education will be shown, I think, in the process of general
reconstruction which will follow.

"All the talk of which we hear so much about, the peril from the Slav or
from the Teuton or from the Celt, is unworthy of serious attention. It
would be quite as reasonable to discuss seriously the red-headed peril
or the six-footer peril.

"There is no peril to the world in the Slav, the Teuton, the Celt, or
any other race, provided the people of that race have an opportunity to
develop as social and economic units, and are not bottled up so that an
explosion must come.

"It is my firm belief that nowhere in the world, from this time on, will
any form of government be tolerated which does not set men free to
develop in this fashion."

I asked Dr. Butler to make some prognostication of what the United
States of Europe, which he so confidently expects, will be. He answered:


Has Advanced Much.

"I can say only this: The international organization of the world
already has progressed much further than is ordinarily understood. Ever
since the Franco-Prussian war and the Geneva Arbitration, both
landmarks in modern history, this has advanced inconspicuously, but by
leaps and bounds.

"The postal service of the world has been internationalized in its
control for years. The several Postal Conventions have been evidences of
an international organization of the highest order.

"Europe abounds in illustrations of the international administration of
large things. The very laws of war, which are at present the subject of
so much and such bitter discussion, are the result of international
organization.

"They were not adopted by a Congress, a Parliament, or a Reichstag. They
were agreed to by many and divergent peoples, who sent representatives
to meet for their discussion and determination."


One of the Examples.

"In the admiralty law we have a most striking example of uniformity of
practice in all parts of the world. If a ship is captured or harmed in
the Far East and taken into Yokohama or Nagasaki, damages will be
assessed and collected precisely as they would be in New York or
Liverpool.

"The world is gradually developing a code for international legal
procedure. Special arbitral tribunals have tended to merge and grow into
the international court at The Hague, and that, in turn, will develop
until it becomes a real supreme judicial tribunal.

"Of course the analogy with the federated State fails at some points,
but I believe the time will come when each nation will deposit in a
world federation some portion of its sovereignty.

"When this occurs we shall be able to establish an international
executive and an international police, both devised for the especial
purpose of enforcing the decisions of the international court.

"Here, again, we offer a perfect object lesson. Our Central Government
is one of limited and defined powers. Our history can show Europe how
such limitations and definitions can be established and interpreted, and
how they can be modified and amended when necessary to meet new
conditions.

"My colleague, Prof. John Bassett Moore, is now preparing and publishing
a series of annotated reports of the international arbitration
tribunals, in order that the Governments and jurists of the world may
have at hand, as they have in the United States Supreme Court, reports,
a record of decided cases which, when the time comes, may be referred to
as precedents.

"It will be through graded processes such as this that the great end
will be accomplished. Beginning with such annotated reports as a basis
for precedents, each new case tried before this tribunal will add a
further precedent, and presently a complete international code will be
in existence. It was in this way that the English common law was built,
and such has been the admirable history of the work done by our own
judicial system.

"The study of such problems is at this time infinitely more important
than the consideration of how large a fine shall be inflicted by the
victors upon the vanquished."


The Chief Result.

"There is the probability of some dislocation of territory and some
shiftings of sovereignty after the war ends, but these will be of
comparatively minor importance. The important result of this great war
will be the stimulation of international organization along some such
lines as I have suggested.

"Dislocation of territory and the shifting of sovereigns as the result
of international disagreements are mediaeval practices. After this war
the world will want to solve its problems in terms of the future, not in
those of the outgrown past.

"Conventional diplomacy and conventional statesmanship have very
evidently broken down in Europe. They have made a disastrous failure of
the work with which they were intrusted. They did not and could not
prevent the war because they knew and used only the old formulas. They
had no tools for a job like this.

"A new type of international statesman is certain to arise, who will
have a grasp of new tendencies, a new outlook upon life. Bismarck used
to say that it would pay any nation to wear the clean linen of a
civilized State. The truth of this must be taught to those nations of
the world which are weakest in morale, and it can only be done, I
suppose, as similar work is accomplished with individuals. Courts, not
killings, have accomplished it with individuals.

"One more point ought to be remembered. We sometimes hear it said that
nationalism, the desire for national expression by each individual
nation, makes the permanent peace and good order of the world
impossible.

"To me it seems absurd to believe that this is any truer of nations than
it is of individuals. It is not each nation's desire for national
oppression which makes peace impossible; it is the fact that thus far in
the world's history such desire has been bound up with militarism.

"The nation whose frontier bristles with bayonets and with forts is like
the individual with a magazine pistol in his pocket. Both make for
murder. Both in their hearts really mean murder.

"The world will be better when the nations invite the judgment of their
neighbors and are influenced by it.

"When John Hay said that the Golden Rule and the open door should guide
our new diplomacy he said something which should be applicable to the
new diplomacy of the whole world. The Golden Rule and a free chance are
all that any man ought to want or ought to have, and they are all that
any nation ought to want or ought to have.

"One of the controlling principles of a democratic State is that its
military and naval establishments must be completely subservient to the
civil power. They should form the police, and not be the dominant factor
of any national life.

"As soon as they go beyond this simple function in any nation, then that
nation is afflicted with militarism.

"It is difficult to make predictions of the war's effect on us. As I see
it, our position will depend a good deal upon the outcome of the
conflict, and what that will be no one at present knows.

"If a new map of Europe follows the war, its permanence will depend upon
whether or not the changes are such as will permit nationalities to
organize as nations.

"The world should have learned through the lessons of the past that it
is impossible permanently and peacefully to submerge large bodies of
aliens if they are treated as aliens. That is the opposite of the mixing
process which is so successfully building a nation out of varied
nationalities in the United States.

"The old Romans understood this. They permitted their outlying vassal
nations to speak any language they chose and to worship whatever god
they chose, so long as they recognized the sovereignty of Rome. When a
conquering nation goes beyond that, and begins to suppress religions,
languages, and customs, it begins at that very moment to sow the seeds
of insurrection and revolution.

"My old teacher and colleague, Prof. Burgess, once defined a nation as
an ethnographic unit inhabiting a geographic unit. That is an
illuminating definition. If a nation is not an ethnographic unit, it
tries to become one by oppressing or amalgamating the weaker portions of
its people. If it is not a geographic unit, it tries to become one by
reaching out to a mountain chain or to the sea--to something which will
serve as a real dividing line between it and its next neighbors.

"The accuracy of this definition can hardly be denied, and we all know
what the violations of this principle have been in Europe. It is
unnecessary for me to point them out.

"Races rarely have been successfully mixed by conquest. The military
winner of a war is not always the real conqueror in the long run. The
Normans conquered Saxon England, but Saxon law and Saxon institutions
worked up through the new power and have dominated England's later
history. The Teutonic tribes conquered Rome, but Roman civilization, by
a sort of capillary attraction, went up into the mass above and
presently dominated the Teutons.

"The persistency of a civilization may well be superior in tenacity to
mere military conquest and control.

"The smallness of the number of instances in which conquering nations
have been able successfully to deal with alien peoples is extraordinary.
The Romans were unusually successful, and England has been successful
with all but the Irish, but perhaps no other peoples have been
successful in high degree in an effort to hold alien populations as
vassals and to make them really happy and comfortable as such.

"One of the war's chief effects on us will be to change our point of
view. Europe will be more vivid to us from now on. There are many public
men who have never thought much about Europe, and who have been far from
a realization of its actual importance to us. It has been a place to
which to go for a Summer holiday.

"But, suddenly, they find they cannot sell their cotton there or their
copper, that they cannot market their stocks and bonds there, that they
cannot send money to their families who are traveling there, because
there is a war. To such men the war must have made it apparent that
interdependence among nations is more than a mere phrase.

"All our trade and all our economic and social policies must recognize
this. The world has discovered that cash without credit means little.
One cannot use cash if one cannot use one's credit to draw it whenever
and wherever needed. Credit is intangible and volatile, and may be
destroyed over night.

"I saw this in Venice.

"On July 31 I could have drawn every cent that my letter of credit
called for up to the time the banks closed. At 10 in the morning on the
1st of August I could not draw the value of a postage stamp.

"Yet the banker in New York who issued my letter of credit had not
failed. His standing was as good as ever it had been. But the world's
system of international exchange of credit had suffered a stroke of
paralysis over night.

"This realization of international interdependence, I hope, will
elevate and refine our patriotism by teaching men a wider sympathy and a
deeper understanding of other peoples, nations, and languages. I
sincerely hope it will educate us up to what I have called 'The
International Mind.'

"When Joseph Chamberlain began his campaign after returning from South
Africa his keynote was, 'Learn to think imperially.' I think ours should
be, 'Learn to think internationally,' to see ourselves not in
competition with the other peoples of the world, but working with them
toward a common end, the advance of civilization."


A Note of Optimism.

"There are hopeful signs, even in the midst of the gloom that hangs over
us. Think what it has meant for the great nations of Europe to have come
to us, as they have done, asking our favorable public opinion. We have
no army and navy worthy of their fears. They can have been induced by
nothing save their conviction that we are the possessors of sound
political ideals and a great moral force.

"In other words, they do not want us to fight for them, but they do want
us to approve of them. They want us to pass judgment upon the humanity
and the legality of their acts, because they feel that our judgment
will be the judgment of history. There is a lesson in this.

"If we had not repealed the Panama Canal Tolls Exemption act last June
they would not have come to us as they are doing now. Who would have
cared for our opinion in the matter of a treaty violation if, for mere
financial interest or from sheer vanity, we ourselves had violated a
solemn treaty?

"When Congress repealed the Panama Canal Tolls Exemption act it marked
an epoch in the history of the United States. This did more than the
Spanish war, than the building of the Panama Canal, or than anything
else I think of, to make us a true world power.

"As a nation we have kept our word when sorely tempted to break it. We
made Cuba independent, we have not exploited the Philippines, we have
stood by our word as to Panama Canal tolls.

"In consequence we are the first moral power in the world today. Others
may be first with armies, still others first with navies. But we have
made good our right to be appealed to on questions of national and
international morality. That Europe is seeking our favor is the tribute
of the European nations to this fact."




A New World Map

By Wilhelm Ostwald.

     Late Visiting Professor to Harvard and Columbia Universities
     from the University of Leipsic.


_The following article is extracted from a letter written by Prof.
Ostwald to Edwin D. Mead, Director of the World Peace Foundation._

The war is the result of a deliberate onslaught upon Germany and Austria
by the powers of the Triple Entente--Russia, France, and England. Its
object is on the part of Russia an extension of Russian supremacy over
the Balkans, on the side of France revenge, and on the side of England
annihilation of the German Navy and German commerce. In England
especially it has been for several centuries a constant policy to
destroy upon favoring occasion every navy of every other country which
threatened to become equal to the English Navy.

Germany has proved its love of peace for forty-four years under the most
trying circumstances. While all other States have expanded themselves
by conquest, Russia in Manchuria, England in the Transvaal, France in
Morocco, Italy in Tripoli, Austria in Bosnia, Japan in Korea, Germany
alone has contented itself with the borders fixed in 1871. It is purely
a war of defense which is now forced upon us.

In the face of these attacks Germany has until now (the end of August)
proved its military superiority, which rests upon the fact that the
entire German military force is scientifically organized and honestly
administered.

The violation of Belgian neutrality was an act of military necessity,
since it is now proved that Belgian neutrality was to be violated by
France and England. A proof of this is the accumulation of English
munitions in Maubeuge, aside from many other facts.

According to the course of the war up to the present time, European
peace seems to me nearer than ever before. We pacificists must only
understand that unhappily the time was not yet sufficiently developed to
establish peace by the peaceful way. If Germany, as everything now seems
to make probable, is victorious in the struggle not only with Russia and
France but attains the further end of destroying the source from which
for two or three centuries all European strifes have been nourished and
intensified, namely, the English policy of world dominion, then will
Germany, fortified on one side by its military superiority, on the other
side by the eminently peaceful sentiment of the greatest part of its
people, and especially of the German Emperor, dictate peace to the rest
of Europe, I hope especially that the future treaty of peace will in
the first place provide effectually that a European war such as the
present can never again break out.

I hope, moreover, that the Russian people, after the conquest of their
armies, will free themselves from Czarism through an internal movement
by which the present political Russia will be resolved into its natural
units, namely, Great Russia, the Caucasus, Little Russia, Poland,
Siberia, and Finland, to which probably the Baltic provinces would join
themselves. These, I trust, would unite themselves with Finland and
Sweden, and perhaps with Norway and Denmark, into a Baltic federation,
which in close connection with Germany would insure European peace, and
especially form a bulwark against any disposition to war which might
remain in Great Britain.

For the other side of the earth I predict a similar development under
the leadership of the United States. I assume that the English dominion
will suffer a downfall similar to that which I have predicted for
Russia, and that under these circumstances Canada would join the United
States, the expanded republic assuming a certain leadership with
reference to the South American republics.

The principle of the absolute sovereignty of the individual nations,
which in the present European tumult has proved itself so inadequate and
baneful, must be given up and replaced by a system conforming to the
world's actual conditions and especially to those political and economic
relations which determine industrial and cultural progress and the
common welfare.

[Illustration: NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER

_See Page 565_]

[Illustration: ARTHUR VON BRIESEN

_See Page 548_]




The Verdict of the American People

By Newell Dwight Hillis.

     _Dr. Hillis, who occupies the pulpit of Plymouth Church,
     Brooklyn, made famous by the pastorate of the late Henry Ward
     Beecher, delivered the following remarkable sermon on the
     European War on Sunday, Dec. 20, 1914, choosing as his text
     the words: "From whence come wars? Come they not from your own
     lusts?"_


Nearly five months have now passed by since the German Army invaded
Belgium and France. These 140 days have been packed with thrilling and
momentous events. While from their safe vantage ground the American
people have surveyed the scene, an old régime has literally crumbled
under our very eyes. Europe is a loom on whose earthen framework
demiurgic forces like Frederick the Great, Bismarck, and Napoleon once
wove the texture of European civilization. Now the demon of war has,
with hot knife, shorn away the texture, and a modern Czar and Kaiser,
King and President, with Generals and Admirals, are weaving the warp and
woof of a new world. One hundred years ago the forces that bred wars
were political forces; today the collision between nations is born of
economic interests. The twentieth century influences are chiefly the
force of wealth and the force of public opinion. These are the giant
steeds, though the reins of the horses may be in the hands of Kings and
Kaisers. In Napoleon's day antagonism grew out of the natural hatred of
autocracy for democracy, of German imperialism for French radicalism.
Today Germany is not even interested in France's republican form of
Government, nor is France concerned with Germany's imperial autocrat.
But all Europe is intensely concerned with the question of economic
supremacy or financial subordination.

Ever since Oliver Cromwell's day England has been the mistress of the
seas, and Germany is envious and believes that she has a right to
supplant England in this naval leadership. France has long been the
banker of Europe, and Germany covets financial leadership. From whence
come wars? Come they not from men's lusts? Now that long time has
passed, it is quite certain that neither Napoleon nor Bismarck nor
William II. understood the future. It is a proverb that yesterday is a
seed, today the stalk, and tomorrow is the full corn in the ear.
Napoleon was a practical man, but he could not see the shock in the
seed. When Napoleon said, "One hundred years from now Europe will be all
republican or all Cossack"--Napoleon was quite wrong. Forty years ago
Bismarck said that he had reduced France to the level of a fourth-class
nation, and that henceforth France did not count; while as for the
Balkan States, "the whole Eastern question is not worth the bones of a
Pomeranian grenadier"--Bismarck was quite wrong. The present Kaiser has
no imagination. A man of any prevision of the future might have foreseen
that any attack upon England would settle the Irish question; that any
treaty with Turkey would force Italy, as Turkey's enemy in the late
Italian-Turkish war, to break with Germany; any man with the least
instinct for diplomacy might have known that the twentieth century man
is so incensed by an enemy's trespass upon his property, that Belgium
would have resisted encroachment, and so cost Germany the best three
weeks of the entire war. If the history of great wars tells us anything,
it tells us that the first qualification of the statesman and diplomat
is an intuitive knowledge of a future that is the certain outcome of the
present. There has been no foresight on the part of the makers and
advisers of this war. Years ago, when the Austrian Emperor visited
Innsbruck, the Burgomaster ordered foresters to go up on the mountain
sides and cut certain swaths of brush. At the moment the man with his
axe did not know what he was doing, but when the night fell, and the
torch was lifted on the boughs, the people in the city below read these
words written in letters of fire, "Welcome to our Emperor." Today the
demon of war has been writing with blazing letters certain lessons upon
the hills and valleys of Europe, and fortunate is that youth who can
read the writing and interpret aright the lessons of the times.

The people of the republic now realize for the first time what are the
inevitable fruits of imperialism and militarism. One of the perils of
America's distance from the scenes of autocracy is that our people have
come to think that the forms of government are of little importance. We
hear it said that climate determines government and that one nation
likes autocracy and another limited monarchy, that we like democracy
self-government, and that the people are about as happy under one form
of control as another. This misconception is based upon a failure to
understand foreign imperialism. Superficially, the fruits of autocracy
are efficiency, industrial wealth, and military power. But now, after
nearly five months of constant discussion, our people understand
thoroughly the other side of imperialism. The 6,000,000 of
German-Americans living in this country, with their high type of
character, millions who have left their native land to escape service in
the army, the burdens of taxation involved in militarism, and the law of
lèse majesté, should have opened our eyes long ago. During the last five
years I have lectured in more than one hundred cities on the New Germany
and the lessons derived from her industrial efficiency, with the
application of science to the production of wealth, but I did not
appreciate fully the far-off harvest of militarism. And, lest an
American overstate the meaning of militarism, let me condense
Treitschke's view. He holds that the nation should be looked upon as a
vast military engine; that its ruler should be the commander of the
army; that his Cabinet should be under Generals; that the whole nation
should march with the force of an armed regiment; that the real "sin
against the Holy Ghost was the sin of military impotence; that such an
army should take all it wants and the territory it needs and explain
afterward." Manufacturers are essentially inventors of cannons and guns
and dreadnoughts, incidentally self-supporting men. Bankers are here to
finance the army and incidentally to make money. Physicians are here to
heal the wounded soldiers. Gymnasiums are founded to train soldiers.
Women are here to breed soldiers, and militarism is the path that will
bring Germany to her place in the sun. The youth is first of all to be a
soldier and incidentally to be a man. No one has indicted Germany's
militarism in stronger language than the distinguished German-American,
Carl Schurz. In words that burn the great statesman expressed his hatred
of the imperialism and militarism against which he helped to organize a
revolution that led to his flight to this country. Of late Americans
have been asking themselves certain questions.


The American Ideal vs. the German.

What will be the result if Germany is allowed to seize any smaller State
whose territory and property she covets? Is all Europe to become an
armed camp? What is the meaning of this German professor's article in
The North American Review, written two or three years ago, in which he
says that once she is victorious the Monroe Doctrine will go and the
United States will receive the "thrashing she so richly deserves"? Must
we then go over to the military ideal? If Germany supports 8,000,000
soldiers out of 66,000,000, must we withdraw from productive industry
12,000,000 men for at least two or three of the best years of their
young life? Must we start in on a programme of ten dreadnoughts a year
instead of building ten colleges and universities for the same sum of
money? Of late Americans who love their country have been searching
their own hearts. Merchants hitherto busied with commerce are asking
themselves whither this country is drifting. Is Germany to compel us to
become a vast military machine? This military question is a subject of
discussion on the street cars and in the stores, at the dining room
table. No articles in paper and magazine are so eagerly read and
analyzed. The American ideal is not a military machine, but a high
quality of manhood. To make men free, with the gift of self-expression;
to make men wise through the public school and the free press; to make
men self-sufficing and happy in their homes, through freedom of
industrial contracts; to make men sound in their manhood through
religious liberty for Jew and Gentile and Catholic and Protestant--these
are our national ideals. America stands at the other pole of the
universe from imperialism and militarism. So far from being willing to
desert the political faith of the fathers, this war has confirmed our
confidence in self-government. Liberty to grow, freedom to climb as high
as industry and ability will permit, liberty to analyze and discuss the
views of President, Congress, Governor--these are our rights. In a
military autocracy there can be no liberty of the printing press. If a
man criticises the Kaiser, he goes to jail; in this republic, if Horace
Greeley criticises Abraham Lincoln, Abraham Lincoln does not send the
great editor to jail, but writes the latter, "My paramount object is to
save the Union," and vindicates himself at the bar of the nation. An
American editor or citizen would choke to death in Germany. He could not
breathe because of the mephitic gases of imperialism and militarism. For
a long time some of us did not realize what was involved, but now we do
realize the difference between the fruits of democratic self-government
and the fruits of military imperialism.

The last five months have brought a new realization to American citizens
as to the rights and liberties of small States. In the republic the sin
of trespass is one of the blackest of sins. Here we hold to the
sanctity of property. A man's home is his castle, a citadel that cannot
be invaded even by the power of the State. So deep is the American
hatred of trespass against property rights that imperialism finds it
impossible to understand this. Here the individual is a king of kings in
his native right, and takes out an injunction against the city that
wishes to trespass upon his property. This antagonism manifests itself
in the laws that safeguard the small shopkeeper against the big firm,
and the small manufacturer against any company with its billion dollars
of capital. This antagonism to the sin of trespass has lent a peculiar
sanctity to treaties between Canada and the United States. We have one
hundred millions of people, and Canada nine millions. We need many
things that Canada has, but it is intellectually unthinkable that "we
should take what we want and explain afterward," or that we should
violate our treaty guaranteeing neutrality to Canada. Our frontier line
is three thousand miles long. There is not a fort from Maine to
Victoria. If we adopted Germany's position we would have to build one
thousand forts, withdraw two million young men from the farm, factory,
store and bank, and load the working people with taxes to support them.
In a free land, and in God's world, there should be a place for the poor
man and for the small nation. In the olden time there was a king who had
herds and flocks, and a poor man who had one pet lamb. It came to pass
that a stranger claimed the right of hospitality at the rich man's
palace, and the king sent out and took the poor man's one lamb and gave
it for food to the stranger. And, soon or late, the time will come when
history will tell the story of Germany's taking little Belgium, and
conscience, like a prophet, will indict the militarism that seized the
one lamb that belonged to the poor man. This episode is not closed. The
German representative who says that Belgium is a part of Germany may be
right in terms of future government and war, but the incident has just
begun in the memory of the soldiers who never can forget that they first
broke their sacred treaty, and then, when the Belgian defended his home
as his castle, butchered the man, who died with a sacred treaty in his
hand. Why, all over this land, teachers, fathers, editors, authors, have
found it necessary to say to the young men and women of the republic,
"Do not sign your name to an obligation unless you intend to keep it."
Keep your faith. Remember that your word given should be as good as your
bond. "Swear to your own hurt, and change not." All this is inevitable,
as the result of Germany's trespass upon the property and the homes of
Belgium. In some European lands the State is everything and the
individual nothing. In this republic the individual is first, and the
State is here to safeguard his rights and see to it that no one
trespasses upon his property. The time will come when the nation that
breaks its treaties and sows to the wind shall of that wind reap the
whirlwind. It is an awful thing for a nation to make it inevitable that
hereafter when other people sign a treaty with that country, that our
representatives shall say: "Before we sign this treaty with you, we wish
to ask one question. Later, if it is to your interest to break this
treaty, is this document to be sneered at as a scrap of paper? Or does
this treaty mean the faith of a nation that will die rather than break
its word, given before the tribunal of civilized States?"


The Death of the Tribal God Idea.

This great war and one or two of the leaders thereof have killed the old
tribal idea of God. In the twentieth century it seems almost ludicrous
to find that the conception of the ancient Hebrews is still held by some
rulers. Be the reasons what they may, of late there has been a strange
recrudescence of the tribal God idea. This is the twentieth century, not
the tenth! Think of a man sending his soldiers into Belgium, saying,
"Make yourselves as terrible as the Huns of Attila, and the Lord our God
will give you victory." Just as if God were not the God of the whole
earth, a disinterested God, a God who makes His sun to shine and His
rain to fall upon all His children, without regard to race or clime or
color. Why, it is as artless as the way the old Hebrew peasant called on
God to blast his enemy's field, and drown his children with floods, and
smite his herds with the plague. The tribal idea of God belongs with the
ox cart, the medicine man, the cave dweller. This is an era of science.
Whatever is true is universal, not racial. If the heart beats and the
blood circulates in a German soldier's veins, the blood flows in the
veins of the people of England and France. If the earth goes around the
sun in Berlin, the earth goes around the sun in Petrograd and Edinburgh.
If there are seven rays in the sunbeam, why, the discussion is closed,
and it is a universal fact. And if Jesus was right when He said, "God is
our Father, and all the races are our brothers, and the world has been
fitted up by God as an Eden garden for His children," then no man or
ruler should ever adopt the view of the peasant and the cave man, and
try to make the Eternal God a tribal God. The unconscious humor in the
statements of one or two men as to their tribal God idea has added to
the gayety of nations. But when any view is laughed at, it is doomed.
From the very moment that the doctrine of election, that made God love a
few aristocrats and pass the non-elect by, became a matter of joke in
the comic papers, that theory was dead. Not otherwise is it with this
idea of a tribal God. When Barry Paine begins to say,

    Led by William, as you tell,
    God has done extremely well,

the tribal idea has been relegated to the theological scrap-heap. The
peasant's view must go. In this age men must be citizens of all
countries and of the universe. God is a sun Who shines for the poor
man's hut as truly as for the rich man's palace. The Judge of all the
earth is also the Father of all the races, and He will do men good and
not evil.

In view of the events of the last few months, all Americans now realize
as never before the futility of war as a means of settling disputes.
Indeed, it may be doubted whether any war has ever settled any question.
Defeat did not convince the South that they were wrong in their idea of
State rights or slavery. If the South has given up both ideas today it
is because time, events, and social progress have changed their view,
not because the sword convinced them. Bismarck's victory at Versailles
and von Moltke's at Sedan did not settle the dispute with France. To
keep one billion dollars of indemnity Germany must have spent five
billions on forts and armies in the government of Alsace and Lorraine.
Germany's apparent victory simply put Germany's trouble with France out
at compound interest, and left the next generation of Germans to pay
several billions of dollars of accrued debt through hatred. Plainly it
is folly not to reconstitute the map of Europe. The frontier lines of
the geographer should exactly coincide with the racial lines. The German
race, with their peculiar ideals, ought not to try to govern the French
race. It is an expensive experiment. It is an impossible experiment. The
plan is doomed to failure in advance. And when the day of payment comes
it is quite certain that the questions at issue will not have been
settled by regiments of soldiers. They must finally be settled by an
appeal to some court of arbitration that will do justice and love mercy;
that will insist upon the rights of the smaller States, and make it
impossible for the great ones of the earth to trespass upon the property
and the liberties of brave little peoples.


Imperialism Confuses Men's Judgments.

Out of the smoke of battle another lesson is written for all who have
eyes to read. In view of the mistakes made by men who have absolute
power it is now certain that exemption from criticism is a bad thing for
any man, and that endless adoration destroys the ruler's power to think
in straight lines. There never lived a man who was not injured by
perpetual compliments. Strong men are willing to pay cash for criticism.
Flattery will conceal the weakness, and they know that pitiless
criticism will expose the danger and perhaps save them. No man is so
unfortunate as the man who is put on a throne lifted up beyond the
reach of plain truth telling. It is doubtful if so many blunders were
ever made by statesmen and diplomats as were made at the beginning of
this war. Just think of one Government being wrong in all these
particulars at the same time! Lincoln said, "You can't fool all of the
people all of the time." Yes, that may be true in a republic, but you
certainly can fool all the diplomats and Generals and do it all the
time--during July and August, in any event. Call the roll of the
diplomatic blunders, and the list is long. First, England will be
neutral and Ireland will keep her from going to war; second, Italy will
be our ally; third, Belgium will be neutral and allow us to trespass
upon her property and her homes; fourth, France is unprepared and Paris
will fall within three weeks; fifth, an alliance with Turkey, despite
her polygamy and butcheries in Armenia and the civilized world's hatred
for her cruelties, will help us; sixth, Japan will hold Russia in check;
seventh, the Czar will be attacked by Bulgaria, Italy, and China. It
seems incredible that any ruler and group of diplomats could be so
entirely wrong, all the time, on every question, for a whole Summer! Was
there no man as diplomat who had the wisdom to see that an attack upon
England would end the disputes in Ireland? And bind together Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India into a new United States of
Great Britain? Was there no statesman with enough prevision of the
future, and with courage to tell the people in Wilhelmstrasse that the
certain result would be the United States of Balkany, to stand
henceforth as a barrier between Germany and the Bosphorus? Was there no
one to remind Berlin that Italy had just completed a war with Turkey and
that any treaty with Turkey meant inevitably the breaking of friendship
with Italy? Alas! for the man who is elevated to a throne, in whose
presence men burn incense, pour forth flattery that he may breathe its
perfume, sing songs of praise that he may slumber!

In concluding our survey of the nations and the stake of each country
in the war, there is one reflection that must be obvious to all thinking
men. This little fire of last August has become a world conflagration.
The nation that first sent out her armies was Germany. There is a
high-water mark of battle in every war, and after that, the invading
waves begin their retreat. The high-water mark of Napoleon's was
Austerlitz and the waves ebbed away at Waterloo. The high-water mark of
the civil war was Gettysburg, and the tide ebbed out at Appomattox.
Belgium's defense cost Germany the three most important weeks of the
war, and her high-water mark was when she was within twenty miles of
Paris. Occasional eddies and returns of the tide there may be, but
nothing is more certain than that there are ten nations and six hundred
millions of men that had rather die than have militarism imposed upon
themselves and their children. Americans who admire German efficiency,
the German people, and want to see German science preserved, and feel an
immeasurable debt to Martin Luther, do not want Germany destroyed. But
Germany will not listen to England, nor France, nor America. There is
only one voice that can reach Germany--it is the voice of the
German-Americans in this country. They are six million strong. They are
among the most honored and esteemed folk in American life. Their
achievements are beyond all praise. The Germans have built Milwaukee and
have done much for St. Louis. The Germans have been great forces in
Cincinnati and Chicago and New York. What wealth among their bankers!
What prosperity among German manufacturers! What solidity of manhood in
these German Lutherans! Was there ever a finer body of farming folk than
the German landowners of the Middle West? The republic owes the
German-American a great debt as to liberty through men like Carl Schurz.
Take Martin Luther and German liberty of thought out of the republic and
this land would suffer an immeasurable loss. Many of these
German-Americans own great estates and have investments in the
Fatherland. Today these six million German-Americans have the centre of
the world's stage. This war is a conflagration that will probably burn
itself out. But if the six million German-Americans organize themselves
and hold great meetings of protest in New York and Brooklyn and Chicago
and Milwaukee, in St. Louis and Cincinnati; if German-American editors
and bankers and business men united their voice, they would be heard.


German-American Man of the Hour.

And do they not owe something to this republic? Having come to the
kingdom for such a crisis as this, should they not use their influence
with the Fatherland? Having escaped conscription and years of military
service, with heavy taxation and enjoyed the liberty of the press;
having become convinced that militarism does not promote the prosperity
and manhood of the people, why should they not as one man ask the
Fatherland now to present their cause to arbitrators? To no body of
American citizens has there ever come a more strategic opportunity, or a
responsibility so heavy. Some of the most thoughtful men in this land
believe that the destiny of Germany rests now largely with the leaders
of the 6,000,000 German-Americans in our country. But no matter what the
outcome, let no man think that God and justice are not fully equal to
this emergency. The great vine of Liberty was planted by Divine hands in
the Eden garden. Just now men are feeding the blossoms of the tree of
life to their war horses and splitting the boughs of that tree into
shafts for their spears. The storm roars through the branches, but the
storm will die out. Better days are coming. It may be that the
convulsion of war will do for Europe what the earthquake did for the
rude folk of Greece--cracked the solid rock and exposed the silver veins
that gave the wealth with which rude men built Athens, with its art, its
literature, its law and its liberty. Take no counsel of crouching fear,
God is abroad in the world. With Him a thousand years are as one day.
When a long time has passed let us believe that self-government will be
found to be the most stable form of government, and that these golden
words, Liberty, Opportunity, Intelligence, and Integrity, will be the
watch-words not only of the republic, but of all the nations of the
earth.




Interview With Dr. Hillis

_From the Brooklyn Eagle._


A frank declaration that he was opposed to Germany in the present great
war was the answer returned today [Dec. 21, 1914] by the Rev. Dr. Newell
Dwight Hillis to the protests against his sermon at Plymouth Church last
night, in which he scored militarism and the Kaiser.

Not only did Dr. Hillis come out with the statement that he had said and
meant all to which exception was taken in his sermon, but, in an
interview today in his study, in the Arbuckle Institute, he asserted as
well that he had told but little of what he had come to believe about
Germany. This position, he said, was that America and all the world must
hope for German defeat, and must see that Germany was in the wrong.

"I was for Germany five months ago," said Dr. Hillis. "I have been
lecturing for five years about the lessons we might learn from Germany.
Five months ago, it may be remembered, I gave an interview, in which I
praised Germany and in which I took the part of the German people in the
dreadful war that had come.

"But I have changed my mind. I have seen that I was mistaken. Several
months ago I gave instructions to my lecture bureau to withdraw my
lecture, 'The New Germany,' from my list. That was about the middle of
September, and it was only then that I realized what a German success
would mean to the world--how there could be nothing else but a world of
armed camps, how we in this country, too, would have to adopt militarism
in order to live.

"Just prior to that time, in the first of my Sunday evening sermons in
this course, I had praised the Kaiser. I believed in the German ideals,
I believed in German progress, German inventions, German principles. But
I was wrong. I have now become convinced of what I never imagined
before--that in the German viewpoint the only sin against the Holy Ghost
is military impotency, and, to use Treitschke's words again, the only
virtue is militarism."

The pastor of Plymouth uttered this attack upon Germany with a
scornfulness which the printed word can hardly indicate. He was as
strongly against Germany--more strongly against Germany now than he had
before been in favor of Germany, he said. It was a position, he said, to
which everybody in the United States was turning, and it was inevitable
that Germany should find the world against her.

In his frank avowal of his position regarding Germany and the Kaiser,
Dr. Hillis admitted, too, that his sermon last night had contained more
than appeared on the surface. When he stated in the sermon that no man
or ruler should ever adopt the view of the peasant and the cave man, and
try to make the Eternal God a tribal God, he had the Kaiser in mind,
said Dr. Hillis. The sermon is published in full in today's sermon pages
of The Eagle.

In addition, Dr. Hillis said that while he believed that his sermon
could not be considered in any way a violation of President Wilson's
appeal for neutrality, yet, indirectly, the passages to which exception
had been taken could be rightly construed as an attack upon Germany and
the Kaiser.

"You believe that it is right for a minister to use the pulpit to
express his own views upon a subject like this?" was asked.

"I do not believe that it is right for a minister to air his peculiar
political views upon any subject--personal, social, or economic,"
answered Dr. Hillis, emphatically. "The church is a conservatory where a
warm, genial atmosphere should be created. My conception of the work of
a minister is that he is to create an atmosphere in the church on Sunday
so that the Republican with the tariff, the Democrat who believes in
free trade, and the Single Taxer can all grow and express their judgment
during the week.

"The sun and the Summer shine for all kinds of seeds and roots, and the
minister and the church should create an atmosphere in which all
temperaments and races and faiths can grow. It is quite true that there
were some of my German friends and members who rather protested against
my view last night. But they had the same right and liberty to protest
that I have. A German physician told me plainly that he thought that
within six months I would change my view, and with the new light go over
to the position of his native land, and even thought that I might
retract all my studies, that are apparently prejudiced in favor of the
republic and self-government and the liberty of the press. Well, if I do
change my views and am converted to his viewpoint, I certainly will
retract my statements. But I think this improbable. The task of
converting me should be let out as a Government contract--in piecemeal."

Dr. Hillis was reminded here that a number of people were said to have
left the church last night in the course of his sermon as a sign of
protest against the expression of his views. Asked if it were true, Dr.
Hillis answered:

"I did not see many leave," and then declared that it was impossible to
imagine that war should not be discussed in the churches as it was being
discussed everywhere else. He continued with the assertion that he
believed it was his duty as the minister of Plymouth Church to say what
he had, and then made this assertion with a vehemence that was almost
startling:

"Whenever the time comes that I have to add God and the devil together
and divide by two in the name of neutrality, I'll withdraw. I'm not
going to sacrifice my manhood for what some people call neutrality."

It was on this score that Dr. Hillis came out with his unequivocal
declaration that he was against Germany and against the Kaiser. He
asserted that the viewpoint of the German people would have to be
changed if they were to take the place in the world he had thought their
due, five months ago, and he stated there could be no doubt but that the
war was occasioned by Germany's lust for power--political, industrial,
economic.

"I believe that the real issue of this war is largely industrial,"
continued Dr. Hillis. "It is an industrial war and not a political war.
Some days ago I said that the real fight between Germany and the nations
opposed to her was a fight for the possession of the iron fields
recently discovered in Northern France. That statement regarding
Germany's iron deposits and the whole economic situation has been
challenged.

"Instead of modifying my position, I wish to reaffirm it. This is an age
of steel. Without hematite iron deposits Germany cannot build her
steamships, her cannon, her railways, her factories. German engineers
have been saying for five years that another five years will exhaust her
present iron supply. On Page 221 of the volume 'Problems of Power,' the
author says that within a generation 20,000,000 of Germany's people will
have to leave their native land. The pressure of iron and the call of
steel led to Germany's development of the Morocco situation, where there
are valuable iron mines. A short time ago French engineers discovered
the largest and richest body of iron ore in Europe. Fullerton, in his
book on the subject, expresses the judgment that one province has enough
hematite iron ore to last Europe for the next 150 years.

"This diplomat and author said plainly two years ago, in one of his
review articles, that Germany would go to war to obtain the iron
deposits in Northern France, and that if she loses the war, she will
fall behind in the manufacturing race, and that the French bankers and
French engineers will make France the great manufacturing force and the
richest people in Europe. The Napoleonic wars were wars between
political ideas. The collision was between autocracy and bureaucracy and
French democracy and radicalism. The new antagonism grows out of
economic conditions. Germany wants to supersede England upon the seas,
and Germany wants the iron mines of France, and this is the whole
situation in a nutshell.

"No, I am not sinning against the law of neutrality. I am trying to
freshen the old American ideals of self-government for the young men and
women in Plymouth Church. If the whole-hearted support of America's free
institutions involves indirectly a dissent from imperialism and
militarism, I am not responsible. I admit there is a necessary
condemnation of autocracy involved in the mere publication of the
Declaration of Independence. Ours is a Government of laws and not of
men, and I have been discussing the principles of self-government and
not rulers who represent imperialism.

"Neutrality does not mean the wiping out of conviction. There are some
men who think that neutrality means adding God and the devil together
and dividing by two. And there are some statesmen who seem to think that
neutrality means adding together autocracy and democracy, and halving
the result. I do not share that view. I believe it is the first duty of
the German-American and the native-born American to uphold the
fundamental principles of self-government, and of an industrial
civilization as opposed to a military machine, and if this means protest
and criticism, then that protest must be accepted."




TIPPERARY.

By JOHN B. KENNEDY.


     (At the other end of the long, long road.)

    Who is it stands at the full o' the door?
      Mary O'Fay, Mother O'Fay.
    An' what is she watching an' waiting for?
      Och, none but her soul can say.

    There's a list in the Post Office long an' black,
      With tidings bad, and woeful sad;
    The names of the boys who'll ne'er come back,
      An' one is her darling lad.

    We showed her the list; but she cannot read,
      So we told her true, yes, we told her true.
    Her old eyes stared till they'd almost bleed,
      An' she swore that none of us knew.

    She's waiting now for Father O'Toole,
      Till he goes her way at the noon of day.
    She's simperin' white--the poor old fool,
      For she knows what the priest'll say.

           *       *       *       *       *

    Who is it sprawls upon the sod
      At the break o' day? It's Mickey O'Fay;
    His eyes glare up to the walls of God,
      And half of his head is blown away.

    What is he doing in that strange place,
      Torn and shred, and murdered dead?
    He's singin' the psalm of the fighting race
      As his soul soars wide o'erhead.

    He killed three foemen before he fell
      (Och, the toll he'd take and the skulls he'd break!)
    And he shrieked like a soul escaped from Hell
      As he died for the Sassenach's sake.

    Who shall we blame for the awful thing--
      For the blood that flows and the heart-wrung throes?
    Kaiser or Czar; statesman or King?
      Och, leave it to Him Who Knows!




As America Sees the War

By Harold Begbie.


I.

     _In order to determine how American public opinion concerning
     the war is running, The London Daily Chronicle sent Mr. Begbie
     to this country. The two articles printed below appeared in
     The Chronicle_.

Every day of my sojourn in this country deepens the desire in my mind to
see an increasing unity of understanding between America and England. I
feel that the audacity of America, its passion for the Right Thing, and
its impatience with the spirit of muddling through are the finest
incentives for modern England, England at this dawn of her political
renascence. I feel, too, as Americans themselves most willingly
acknowledge, that Great Britain has something to give to America out of
the ancient treasury of her domestic experience. Finally, I like
Americans so heartily that I want to be the best of friends with them.

But it was only last night in this old and mighty city of Philadelphia
that the greatest of reasons for an alliance was brought sharply home to
my mind. I had thought, loosely enough, that since we speak the same
language, share many of the same traditions, and equally desire peace
for the prosperity of our trade, surely some alliance between us was
natural, and with a little effort might be made inevitable. The deeper,
more political, and far grander reason for this comradeship between the
two nations had never definitely shaped itself to my consciousness.

Enlightenment came to me in the course of conversation with two
thoughtful Philadelphians whose minds are centred on something which
transcends patriotism and who work with fine courage and remarkable
ability for the triumph of their idea.

One of these men said to me: "You speak of an alliance between England
and America; do you mind telling us what you mean by that term
alliance?"

I explained that I had no thought in my mind of treaties and tariffs;
that the word "alliance" meant nothing more to me than conscious
friendship, and that such a disposition between two nations thinking in
the same language, speaking and writing the same language, must result,
I thought, in an ever-multiplying volume of trade, to the great
advantage of both parties.


Thinks Little of Blood Ties.

Out of this explanation came the following statement, made by the second
Philadelphian: "I am as desirous as you are for such an understanding. I
desire it so greatly that I venture to offer you a warning on the
subject. It would be a mistake on your part, I am convinced, to advocate
any such friendship, any such understanding, any such alliance, if you
prefer that word, on the score of blood ties or a common speech. Believe
me, the American, to speak generally, thinks very little of such
matters. When America was far more English in its population than it is
now scarcely any country was more unpopular with us than your country.

"I can remember when hatred for England was a kind of gospel with
Americans. The Irish fanned that hatred. Your country had behaved badly
toward us, war had left its scar on our memories, we rejoiced that we
had thrown off a yoke which we felt to be definitely tyrannous. What,
then, has produced the change in America--America, whose population is
now made up from nearly all the nations of the earth? Have your people
thought why we are on their side in this present war? Have they asked
themselves that question? If so, and they have answered it with such a
phrase as 'blood is thicker than water,' I can assure you they give not
only a false answer but an answer which betrays amazing ignorance, if
you will forgive the word, of this country's population. Blood thicker
than water! Why, look at our names; our blood is world's blood.

"We're a nation of all the nations. The English element is only one
element. Our ancestors were French, Dutch, German, Spanish, Norwegian,
Russian, Danish, Irish, Greek, and Italian. The modern American citizen
is no more English than the Boers of South Africa are English. And yet
in overwhelming figures the American population is on the side of the
Allies, and particularly on the side of England. Why?"


England Stands for Democracy.

"It is," he continued, "because England of all the nations on the earth
stands for the democratic ideals which are the very breath of life to
America. Modern England is for us the greatest of democracies. You lead
the way to the rest of the world, if not in science and art, at any rate
here in the great business of humanity's social existence. We see that
the old England of privilege and obstinate prerogatives and bull-headed
conservatism is dead. All your best qualities, straight dealing,
honesty, fearless justice, and faith in the goodness of human nature are
devoted now to the only ideals which can save progress from rot and
decay. Your democracy is master. It has no overlords. And, from what we
can gather since this war broke out, it would seem that your aristocracy
is coming more and more into line with the democracy, making great
sacrifices, showing a deeper appreciation of the democracy and shedding
the worst of its prejudices in the common love of liberty and right.

"We hope that your aristocracy may render as great a service to the
extravagant plutocracy of this country as your democracy has rendered to
our democracy. To make life better, that's the work of all intelligent
people. That's what our democracy is after, and, because your democracy
is after the same thing, that's why we are on your side in this war.
Under all the sentiment on the subject this is the bedrock fact. We're
for England because we're for the ideals of democracy. That we speak the
same language is only an accident. It's your spirit we desire to share,
the spirit which desires to make life kinder, sweeter, better, more
beautiful, and more righteous. America believes in civilization. It
doesn't want culture in bearskin and top boots. It wants civilization,
and civilization means a culture that takes in the whole of a man's
being--his body, his mind, his spirit. Well, we think you're after the
same ideal; we believe that you're as conscious of humanity as we are,
and we begin to realize pretty acutely that in a world rather barbarous
on the whole, come to think of it, we can't afford to lose England."

The other man added: "Germany stands for nearly everything we Americans
are opposed to, tooth and nail. We just loathe militarism.
Conscription's a thing we abominate. And feudalism is more dead over
here than in any country in the world."

"But bear in mind," said the first, "we have few people in America
better than the Germans. The Germans are almost the most efficient of
our immigrants. They've taught us a lot. We owe them a mighty big debt.
Before their coming we were prodigals. We used up our natural resources
with a ruthless disregard for the future. We leveled our forests for
timber, and just scratched the top soil of the land for corn. Now we're
learning to farm scientifically and to conserve our wealth. And this is
due in no small degree to the Germans. The German, emancipated from
feudalism and kaiserism, is a pretty good citizen. In fact, among the
men who have most helped modern America we reckon Germans and Irishmen."

I told them this story: A man in New York was speaking the other day to
Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador. Count von Bernstorff was
endeavoring to prove to this important personage that England had forced
the war upon Germany out of jealousy of her trade competition. "Sir,"
said the American, "you really must not tell me that, and I advise you
not to tell such a tale to other Americans. For we know very well that
we are greater trade rivals of England than you are, and that, in spite
of that fact, here on this continent of America we have got 3,000 miles
of British frontier without a fort or a gun." He then said to the
Ambassador: "No, Sir; your mistake all through has been in making an
enemy of England when your best interest was to make friends with her.
If you had made friends with England, you would have got all you
wanted." To this accusation, I understand, the Ambassador made answer
that Germany had endeavored to make friends with England, but had been
repulsed. We have a different record in England. The American quietly
reminded the Ambassador of the fact that England admits German goods
free of tariff charges.


Germany Represents Autocracy.

The two Philadelphians perfectly agreed with the justice of this
accusation, and declared again that it was because Germany represented
all the perils and slavishness of autocracy, and because England
represented the freedom, the justice, and the passion for social welfare
which inspire all living democracies, that America was so absolutely on
the English side.

They spoke of Ireland, and expressed the hope that the Conservative
Party would do nothing to hinder that great settlement which has done so
much to increase American respect for England.

"We recognize over here," said one, "that the Liberal Party, in going to
the rescue of Belgium, sacrificed some of its greatest ideals on the
altar of national righteousness. War must have been a bitter draught for
Lloyd George. Your social programme will be checked for many years. But
if the Conservatives attempt to spoil the Irish settlement, that will be
worse than anything else. It will mean confusion for you at home and
loss of reputation abroad."

I spoke of what I had heard on this subject from Irish-Americans, and
they confirmed everything recorded in my former article. The three great
things, outside of increasing opportunities for intercourse, which have
drawn modern America toward England, they told me, are the social
legislation of the Liberal Party, the triumph of home rule, and
England's keeping her word to Belgium. By these three things, I was
assured, the old animosities against England have been destroyed, and a
spirit of enthusiasm for English ideals has been born among Americans.

I should like to say that, while many American women love England for
the beauty and repose of her social life, and most eloquently base their
affection on the assertion that blood is thicker than water, the men of
America are sometimes inclined, and not unnaturally, to disapprove of
this pleasing sentimentalism. I now begin to perceive that the men of
America are not jealous of England's social life, but anxious to put
their friendship on a more substantial foundation.

Liberalism not only uplifts democracy; it establishes England in the
affection of all vital democracies. If the Conservatives, so liberal and
charming in their private lives, combine with the Liberals after this
hideous war to reconstruct our national life and to consolidate the
empire, how great will be the harvest reaped by our children!

It is in the high and lofty name of civilization that the American
people are anxious to make friends with the people of Great Britain. We
have both got something to live for greater than patriotism and
imperialism, greater because it includes them both.


II.

Irish-American Feeling

Until I came to America I had not the least idea of the depth of hatred
which has existed among Irish-Americans toward England. Nothing that I
ever encountered in Ireland itself is comparable with this transatlantic
fury of unforgiving hate.

An Irishman who had held very high office in America, a well-educated, a
kindly, and a judicious man, told me that when war with Germany was in
the air he could not prevent himself from hailing this opportunity for
declaring his hatred, his undying hatred, of England. His father had
suffered frightfully in the great famine; every story he ever heard at
his mother's knee was a story of English tyranny, English brutality,
English rapacity; England, for him, stood at the rack centre, the
lustful and bestial slave driver, the cruel and merciless extortioner.

This man's good judgment, however, would not suffer him to approve of
German militarism, and as events moved forward he gave his support more
and more to the cause of the Allies.

"But I want you to know," he told me, striking the table with his hand
and watching me carefully, "that I was dead against John Redmond for
saying that Ireland must go to the aid of England. Ireland's call was to
go to the aid of civilization. If Germany had stood for civilization, I
should have been on Germany's side and dead against England.

"I tell you, at the beginning of this business I longed to see England
defeated, humiliated, broken to the dust. But civilization is of such
enormous consequence that I put my natural hatred of England on one
side. The violation of Belgium made me an anti-German. And with the vast
majority of Irishmen in America it was the same thing. The menace of
German militarism forced us into your camp.

"I am perfectly certain that but for the violation of Belgium there
would have been in this country among Irish-Americans an open movement
publicly proclaimed in favor of Germany. That is my fixed opinion. And I
happen to know what I am talking about."


No Hatred of England.

I gathered in the course of his conversation that Irish friendliness
toward England is a final manifestation of a change in the feeling of
all America toward England. It was not very long ago that President
Cleveland wanted war with England. Hatred of England was at one time as
fiercely handed down from generation to generation by Americans as by
Irish-Americans. We have to thank our English stars that America has
outgrown this historic hate and that Irish-Americans now show the new
and happier feeling of their compatriots.

I asked this Irishman, no one better able throughout America to express
a just opinion on the subject, what difference had been made in the
feeling toward England by the passing of the Home Rule bill.

"It was the passing of that bill," he replied, "which finished the work
begun by German militarism. Home rule has softened our feelings toward
England, particularly among the thousands of Irish-Americans who are
born over here and whose fathers have become too Americanized to
remember the sufferings of their ancestors.

"There is still some hatred of England, but not very much. It is a
sentimental, a poetic hatred, not a political hatred. One finds it among
a few individuals. What agitation is now going on is secret and
underground, a sure proof that it is unrepresentative. We ignore it. It
means nothing. No; the passing of the Home Rule bill has given balance
to the Irish mind.

"It has helped Irish-Americans to realize that the dreadful sins of
England are sins of a dead and gone England, and it has helped them to
see that the present England, so far as its democracy is concerned,
sincerely desires to make reparation for the past. In fact, the war and
the Home Rule bill together have produced such a transformation in the
Irish-American nature as I, for one, never expected and never hoped to
see."

He then warned me that this great change might suffer a dangerous
reaction if England allows the religious bigotry of Ulster to split
Ireland into two camps. To the Irish-American Ireland is a country, a
home, and a shrine, one and indivisible.

"Such a surrender," said my friend, "would not only be fatal to Ireland
but fatal to something even greater than Ireland, and that is the cause
of religion in an age of increasing paganism. For the world can only be
saved from the ruin of paganism, as we are beginning to see very clearly
in America, by a union of religious forces.

"I am a Catholic, but I say that any man who says 'Only through my door
can you enter into heaven' is a bad Christian. There are many doors into
heaven. What we have all got to do, Catholics and non-Catholics, is to
insist together that there is a heaven, that there is a life after
death, that there is a God. The more doors the better. No one has a
monopoly of heaven.

"And to Ireland is offered the opportunity, greater than politicians
appear to perceive, of presenting to the world an example of tolerance
and compromise in the supreme interests of religion which may have
incalculable results for the whole world. But what will happen if
England bows before the worst and the stupidest bigotry the modern world
can show? Not only will you strike a blow at Ireland and a blow at
Irish-American sympathy, but a blow at the vitals of religion.

"For it is only by sinking religious differences and making a common
advance against this universal paganism that religion can save the soul
of civilization. If you do not see the truth of that fact in England I
think you must be blind. The fullness of civilization hangs upon
religious union; religious dissension is the enemy."


Change in Ulster.

Another Irish-American who was present on this occasion, an accomplished
man of letters and a traveler, asked me what England felt about Ulster's
share in the responsibility for the present war.

"I myself have seen two letters from Ulster," he said, "in which the
phrase occurs, 'Rather the Kaiser than the Pope.' These letters were
written before the war. Ulster, no doubt, has now changed her tune. But
it was that spirit, surely, and the reports sent to Berlin by German
officers who visited Ulster and inquired into the military character of
Carsonism which persuaded Germany that England would not fight."

Irish-Americans are persuaded that Sir Edward Carson is in very great
measure responsible for all the ruin and death and bitter suffering of
the enormous catastrophe. He boasted that he would make civil war, and
such were his preparations that in any other country in the world civil
war would have been inevitable.

Germany counted on that civil war. The British Army was said to be
completely under the influence of Carsonism. The real catastrophe for
the diplomacy of Berlin was not India's loyalty and the vigorous
uprising of the young dominions, but the dying down of Ulster mutiny.

These Irish-Americans have hated the ruling classes in England, not only
for sins of the past but for the unworthy and most cruel opposition
offered by those ruling classes, in the name of religious intolerance,
to the ideals of the Irish Nation.

When Unionist politicians sneer at the subscriptions sent by Irish
servant girls in America to help the cause of Ireland they should
reflect that not only do they fail to make a good joke, not only do they
exhibit a horribly bad taste, but they spread hatred of England through
the thousands and thousands of people. For it is the loyalty of the
poorest of these Irish-Americans, the sacrifices perpetually made by
the humblest of them, which should move us to see, as it has certainly
moved the American people to see, that the cause of Irish liberty is
noble and undying.


Religious Education.

With all my heart I would beg Unionists in England to reflect
conscientiously upon this very significant state of affairs in America:

A non-Catholic Bible used to be read in the public schools of America
down to the year 1888. A Catholic agitation against this Bible reading
was begun in 1885, and in 1888 the custom was finally abolished. From
that date to this there has been no religious instruction of any kind in
the public schools of America.

Bigotry and intolerance won that victory. The Catholic Church, in its
folly, destroyed religious teaching in the schools of the country.
Catholics themselves are now looking back on that agitation with
religious repentance and political regret.

The result of this abolition is that Catholics and non-Catholics who
believe in the importance of religious instruction, and who see the
pagan effect of purely secular instruction, do not send their children
to the public schools.

"These schools, for which Christians are heavily taxed, are in the
possession of the Hebrews. If nothing is done to alter the existing
state of things Americans themselves assure me that in five-and-twenty
years America will be a pagan country. But a fight is to be made to
avert this disaster at the Constitutional Convention to be held next
month.

"What we have to do," my Irish friend told me, "Catholics and
non-Catholics alike, is to appeal for schools representing Catholic and
non-Catholic teaching. Instead of the various churches fighting against
each other they must fight together, helping one another to get the
schools they demand. Only in this way can we save civilization."

This is how the Irishman, breathing the free air of America, and in
America rising to positions of extraordinary power and responsibility,
views the foundational question of religion; while England allows
herself to be dragged at the heels of the frothing fanatic who has
actually dared to raise the unholy battle cry of "Rather the Kaiser than
the Pope."

Let the Unionist Party hesitate before it seeks to revive this hideous,
utterly irrational and most unchristianlike spirit at the very heart of
the British Empire. The sower of hate is the reaper of death.




TO MELOS, POMEGRANATE ISLE.

By GRACE HARRIET MACURDY.

     (Destroyed by Athens, 416 B.C., because of her refusal to
     break neutrality.--Thucydides V., 84-116; Euripides, "Trojan
     Women.")


    O thou Pomegranate of the Sea,
      Sweet Melian isle, across the years
    Thy Belgian sister calls to thee
      In anguished sweat of blood and tears.

    Her fate like thine--a ruthless band
      Hath ravaged all her loveliness.
    How Athens spoiled thy prosperous land
      Athenian lips with shame confess.

    Thou, too, a land of lovely arts,
      Of potter's and of sculptor's skill--
    Thy folk of high undaunted hearts
      As those that throb in Belgium still.

    Within thy harbor's circling rim
      The warships long, with banners bright,
    Sailed bearing Athens' message grim--
      "God hates the weak. Respect our Might."

    The flame within thy fanes grew cold,
      Stilled by the foeman's swarming hordes.
    Thy sons were slain, thy daughters sold
      To serve the lusts of stranger lords.

    For Attic might thou didst defy
      Thy folk the foeman slew as sheep,
    Across the years hear Belgium's cry--
      "O Sister, of the Wine-Dark Deep,

    "Whose cliffs gleam seaward roseate.
      Not one of all my martyr roll
    But keeps his faith inviolate,
      Man kills our body, not our soul."




What America Can Do

By Lord Channing of Wellingborough.

     Lord Channing, who makes the following suggestion to American
     statesmen, was born in the United States of the well-known
     Channings of Boston. His father was the Rev. W.H. Channing,
     Chaplain of the House of Representatives during the civil war
     and a close friend of President Lincoln. Lord Channing has
     been for twenty-five years a member of the British Parliament,
     and for the last three years a member of the House of Lords,
     having been created first Baron of Wellingborough in 1912. He
     is President of the British National Peace Congress.


To the Editor of The New York Times:

As a member of the British Legislature for a generation, and a lifelong
Liberal, and having also the closest ties of blood with America, and a
proud reverence for her ideals, I would wish, with the utmost respect,
to offer some comments on one specific aspect of present affairs, as
they affect America, which does not seem to have been marked off with
the distinctness its importance calls for.

This is the greatest crisis in the history of the world, and attention
concentrates itself on the attitude of the greatest neutral State.

It is unthinkable that America can divest herself of responsibility for
the final outcome. This seems as clearly recognized in America as in
Europe.

To us in England this war is a life or death struggle between two
principles--Pan-Germanism on the one side, with its avowed purpose to
impose its hegemony and its rigid system of ideas and organization on
the rest of the world, not by consent, but by irresistible military
force; on the other side the claim of the other nations, large and
small, to maintain inviolate their freedom and individuality, and to
think and work out for themselves their own political and economic
future in their own way.

The one principle would seem the flat contradiction of all that America
stands for, the other principle would seem to be precisely the essential
idea of free self-government and democratic evolution, in which are
rooted the very life and being of America.

For this reason there is instinctive and profound sympathy on the part
of the great majority of native Americans with the cause of England and
her allies.

This sympathy is not merely the tie of blood or the unity of ideals.
Reason has convinced Americans that the supreme principles and highest
interests of America will be best safeguarded if the Allies win.

They dread instinctively what might happen if Pan-Germanism absorbed the
smaller nationalities, crushed the great free countries like France and
England, and dominated the whole world with the "mailed fist," not only
Europe and the Far East, but South America and the Pacific. Perhaps the
hint of Count Bernstorff that Canada may be treated like Belgium, and
the Monroe Doctrine like other "scraps of paper," may also have thrown
some light for Americans on a "Germanized" future! And a cast-iron
system of commercial and industrial monopoly dictated by German needs
cannot attract.


America Can't Stand Apart.

That is one side that American statesmen have to consider. There is, of
course, another.

The United States visibly form the greatest force the world has yet seen
to bring together, to unite, to assimilate, in the development of their
vast territories, measureless resources, and complicated industries, all
that is best from all the other great nations, welding slowly but
surely, through free institutions, these new elements into instruments
for the fuller realization of the generous and noble ideals for which
America stands. Perhaps an eighteenth or even fifteenth part of the
population is of German origin, a percentage not far from equal to that
contributed by the United Kingdom and Canada.

There is thus not only the broad question of avoiding war with Germany,
whose people have so large a share in the life of America, a war doubly
unwelcome at all times because of the innumerable links of science,
invention, professional training, of commerce, and of personal
friendship; but there is also the local question of peace and good-will
in the daily work of America as between huge sections of her population.
These visible facts not unnaturally give great weight to the argument
for neutrality. No wise man on this side of the Atlantic will try to
ignore them, or take exception to the dignity and correctness with which
the American Executive has dealt with the grave problem before it.

Neutrality has, of course, its limits and conditions, logical and moral.
Those limits and conditions, the possibility of their infringement in
such a way as to make some change of policy imperative, are matters
solely for the United States.

The point the present writer wishes to press is on a different plane,
and is precisely this:

America does not and can not stand wholly apart from supreme European
decisions.

America is as responsible as Europe for the great extensions,
definitions, the strengthening and modification of international law.
America stands forth as the apostle of arbitration, to widen the area
within which disputed points may be determined amicably. America stands
also as the chief signatory of the great world conventions which have
settled new rules for the conduct of war, to mitigate its horrors,
especially for non-combatants.

America has taken a noble part in framing machinery for securing peace
and justice, and in moving forward the landmarks of civilization as
against savagery, and of human mercy as against cruel terrorism.

Can America safely or wisely divest herself of the duty thus placed upon
her, logically and morally, by her participation in this, the noblest
work of our age?

And is it wise or is it safe to indefinitely postpone the discharge of
this duty?

By the events of the last three months the whole of this new charter of
humanity has been challenged and is at stake.

Is it not sound policy as well as an imperative duty to take some step
here and now to "stop the rot" and to make good here and now as much as
we can of what we have won and wish to keep?


Belgium's Wrongs.

Admittedly a "guiltless and unoffending nation,"[1] whose neutrality and
independence had been solemnly guaranteed by treaty, to which the powers
concerned in the war were parties, has had her treaty rights violated by
one of these powers on the cynical plea that there is no right or wrong
as against national interest, that necessity obeys no law, and treaties
are "scraps of paper." This is not matter for inquiry or judicial
decision at some later date. It has been frankly avowed by the German
Government from the outset of this war.

[Footnote 1: Theodore Roosevelt.]

Again, this admitted wrong is not the sudden and unavoidable outcome of
events unforeseen and uncontrollable. It has been deliberately planned
years ahead, with elaborate preparation of railway and other facilities,
and with every invention and contrivance, to rush in irresistible
forces; to subvert and destroy the independent State that Germany was
herself pledged to defend.

Thirdly, this policy of absolute annihilation of Belgium, of its right
to live its own life, its right even to preserve those monuments of its
noble and beautiful history which had become treasured heirlooms of the
whole world, has been carried out with a ruthless barbarity to the
people, and especially the non-combatants, for which it is hard to find
a parallel in the worst incidents of the Thirty Years' War or of the
devastation of the Palatinate. To bring the actual guilt home to those
who actually did or ordered these deeds to be done in individual cases
is one thing. The broad fact that these barbarous deeds were done stands
manifest and insistent, and demands such instant action as can be taken
by a great and responsible people.

And, lastly, there is the undisguised adoption of the policy of
terrorizing non-combatants to submission by such acts as forcing women
and children to walk before the advancing enemy, the wholesale burning
of houses, shooting of hostages and other non-combatants, and the
dropping of bombs from aeroplanes not on forts or troops, but on places
where women and children can be killed or injured.

And all this tragic sweeping away of such good things as had been won
with worldwide consent, at the instance of the Czar in initiating The
Hague policy, has gone on, so far as it could go on, with equal horror,
throughout Northern France. Rheims and Senlis have suffered the fate of
Louvain and Termonde and Malines, and Paris has had her quota of women
and children wantonly slain by bombs, exactly like Antwerp.


The Threat to England.

And America knows, as we here in England know, from the open menace of
the German press, writing of England as the _one supreme enemy_, that it
is the full intention of Germans, if they can, to carry through England,
too, even more ruthlessly, the same policy.

We are fighting here, and are confident that we shall fight with
success, not only to protect our English homes and to guard the historic
buildings of this land but to make an end of this Prussian terrorism of
the world; to secure no national aggrandizement, but to secure a
permanent and solid peace, based on guaranteed liberties, and a rational
settlement of the question of armaments.

These questions touch us all the more because many of us have been the
most persistent friends of international peace and have specially
labored to promote happy and friendly relations with the German people.
The present writer, who was honored by election as President of this
year's National Peace Congress, has been associated with the work of men
like Lord Brassey, Sir John Lubbock, (later Lord Avebury,) as a member
of the Anglo-German Friendship League, and has repeatedly in Parliament
argued against any hostile or provocative attitude toward Germany. This
war is our answer and our reward!


America in the Settlement.

So far as can be judged from authoritative words of President Wilson and
ex-President Roosevelt, America does and will claim a right to share in
the final settlement of the terms of a permanent and stable peace.

If that claim is sound, if the efforts of America to create better
machinery for securing peace and for generously and humanely vindicating
the liberties and happiness of nations and of the individuals who make
them up do entitle America to a voice, and a potent voice, in the work
of mending and remaking the world after this terrific catastrophe, then
I would submit with all respect that it is really idle to wait till all
the recognized principles of what has been held to be right or wrong as
between nations, and what has been held to be right or wrong in the
methods of conducting war have gone overboard, without one word of
protest; we must save the world first, if we are to have a real chance
of remaking it on lines which are worth having.

Nothing but good could come from immediate action by the American
Executive to assert as they, best of all nations, could assert, now and
at once in terms uncompromising, unanswerable, that the ground taken up
by international consent in the past generation must be held now and
hereafter, and accepted as an essential basis of the final settlement.

Such a pronouncement now by America would make a landmark in
history--would render a measureless service to the whole world in
emancipation from the persistent degradation of the twin doctrines that
might makes right, and that necessity knows no law, and would bring to
America herself imperishable honor and glory in the fearless assertion
and eternal consecration of her own noblest ideals.

I would submit further that such a national declaration by America
involves no violation of neutrality, and is in no sense inconsistent
with the spirit of official utterances already made.

To take the latter first--we have had notable utterances from the
President and from the ex-President.

President Wilson seems to have given a sympathetic hearing to the
mission which laid the case of Belgium before him, both as to the
violation of Belgium's neutrality and as to the cruel treatment of the
non-combatant population and the wanton destruction of towns and
villages and of precious historical monuments. He is understood to have
promised an investigation, and it is gathered from the Indépendance
Belge this week that this investigation has been, and is being, carried
out by American Military Attachés in Belgium, and also at the London
Embassy of the United States.

Again, President Wilson's recent letter to the Kaiser, while confirming
neutrality in precise terms, went on to intimate that there must be a
"day of settlement" and that "where injustices have found a place
results are sure to follow, and all those who have been found at fault
will have to answer for them." If the "general settlement" does not
sufficiently determine this, there is the ultimate sanction of "the
opinion of mankind" which will "in such cases interfere." He would
apparently reserve judgment until the end of the war, but in no way
disclaims or surrenders American responsibility.

Mr. Roosevelt is not tied by official responsibility, and can speak with
less restraint and more freedom. In The Outlook he has substantially
accepted and indorsed all that is material in the Belgian case.

America should help in securing a peace which will not mean the
"crushing the liberty and life of just and inoffending peoples or
consecrate the rule of militarism," but which "will, by international
agreement, minimize the chances of the recurrence of such worldwide
disaster," and "will, in the interests of civilization, create
conditions which will make such action" as the violation of Belgian
treaty rights "impossible in the future."

Like President Wilson, he seems to think that the time for judicial
pronouncement on acts presumably guilty and wrongful will come at the
conclusion of the war. At the same time he surrenders no part of
America's responsibility, but reaffirms it with all the force of his
trenchant style.

But elsewhere, and later, he has insisted on the "helplessness"--the
"humiliating impotence created by the fact that our neutrality can only
be preserved by failure to help to right what is wrong."


Mr. Roosevelt's Remedy.

And he has gone on to adumbrate his practical remedy--"a world league"
with "an amplified Hague Court," made strong by joint agreement of the
powers, to secure "peace and righteousness," and to vindicate the just
decisions of such a court by "a union of forces to enforce the decree."
He adds that this might help to obtain a "limitation of armaments that
would be real and effective."

That so happy a plan may be capable of realization would be the hope of
all wise men.

But where I take exception with Col. Roosevelt is as to America's
present "impotence"--that nothing effectual can be done by America
without breaking her own neutrality.

That view I wholly traverse. It might conceivably be felt by America,
under certain grave eventualities, that neutrality must be broken.

But it is clear that the articles of The Hague Convention of 1907 amply
provide for the type of action here and now by the United States which
I have ventured to lay before American statesmen in this paper. And, in
my opinion, it is conceivable that more good might be achieved by
America taking that action, while maintaining her neutrality.

It goes without saying, it really needs no demonstration, that nearly
every international agreement embodied in The Hague Convention has been
broken, wholly or in part, in the letter and in the spirit, in the
proceedings of this unhappy year.

The violation of the territory of a neutral State by the transit of
belligerent troops and other acts of war is forbidden, (Articles 1, 2,
3, 4, &c.) It is the duty of the neutral State not to tolerate, (Article
5,) but to resist such acts, and her forcible resistance is not to be
regarded as an act of war, (Article 10.)


Interference with Neutrals.

That, of course, covers the case of Belgium completely and establishes
absolutely that there is, and need be, no breach of neutrality in
resistance thus legally sanctioned to illegal interference with neutral
rights.

It is hardly necessary to recapitulate the articles that have been torn
up. To refer to the most striking, there is the repeated bombardment of
undefended towns, pillage incessant throughout Belgium and Northern
France, (Articles 28 and 47;) the levying of illegal contributions,
(Articles 49 and 52;) the seizure of cash and securities belonging to
private persons, banks, and local authorities, (Articles 52 and 56;)
collective penalties for individual acts for which the community as a
whole are not responsible, (Article 50.) Articles 50 and 43 should have
made impossible the punitive destruction of Visé, Aerschot, Dinant, and
Louvain, and numberless villages; Article 56 should have preserved from
destruction institutions and buildings dedicated to religion, education,
charity, hospitals, &c. All these wrongful acts, committed everywhere,
have been prohibited by these articles.

The gradual introduction of the policy of terrorism has been ably traced
by perhaps the highest French authority on international law, Prof.
Edouard Clunet, formerly President of the Institute of International
Law, in a recent address.

"Bombardment par intimidation" was adopted by the Germans in 1870 and
used at Strassburg, Paris, Péronne, &c., shells being directed and
conflagrations spread in the inhabited parts of towns apart from the
fortifications. Germany herself assented to serious mitigations of this
practice at the Conference of Brussels in 1874 and at The Hague in 1907.

The worst evolution of the policy of terrorism has been in the throwing
from aeroplanes of bombs, explosive or incendiary. M. Clunet lays down
that, by the most recent decision of the institute, bomb throwing from
aeroplanes must follow the rules of bombardment by artillery. This would
prohibit such bombs without formal notice. But in Antwerp bombs were
dropped without notice over the Royal Palace, to the peril of the Queen
and her young children, and the number of peaceable inhabitants killed
or injured was thirty-eight, three children being mutilated in their
beds. In Paris, besides the bombs dropped on Notre Dame, bombs were
deliberately dropped in the public streets and a number of peaceable
victims killed or wounded. The dropping of bombs as an act of war on
fortresses, ammunition depots, Zeppelin sheds, &c., is, of course,
legal. But the bomb dropping adopted in Belgium and France, and
threatened in England, if the opportunity arises, is undisguised
terrorism, and not war.

It is important to note also that at Brussels in 1874 Antwerp addressed
a petition to the conference praying that any bombardment should be
limited to fortifications only. The commission of the conference, which
included three well-known German Generals and two professors, recognized
the justice of this plea and recommended Generals to conform to it.

But the one point that should appeal most strongly to the patriotism as
well as the idealism of America is the fact that the instructions of
1863 for armies in campaign, drawn up by the United States Government
in the height of the civil war, first codified the laws for the conduct
of war, and have been the source and starting point of all these later
international agreements.

And it should be remembered that both Germany and America signed the
Fourth Convention of The Hague with its annexed regulations as to sieges
and bombardments (Articles 22 to 28) and the further provision which may
even yet be applied punitively to the proceedings of the present war.
"The belligerent who shall have violated the provisions of the said
regulation shall be held liable for an indemnity."

And if it be thought that America can render no help in such a position
as the present without violating her neutrality, the answer is that by
Article 3 of Convention 1 of The Hague, 1907, neutral powers have the
right to offer their suggestions (bons offices) or their mediation, even
during the course of hostilities. And further: "The exercise of this
right must never be considered by one or the other of the parties to
the conflict as an unfriendly act."

With all submission, I earnestly urge on the leaders of American thought
to support this attempted interpretation of the supreme duty and the
noble opportunity the present position places before their country.

One more word. I referred to the possible benefit of neutrality being
maintained while this protest against wrong and appeal for right is at
the same time advanced.

Is it not more than probable that there is an immense section of
moderate though patriotic opinion in the great German people which at
heart deprecates the extreme doctrines of conquest and world supremacy
in pursuit of which the great, the wonderful achievements of the German
race in science, in industry, in the extension of commerce, are being
rashly risked?

CHANNING OF WELLINGBOROUGH.

40 Eaton Place, London S.W., Oct. 29, 1914.




TO A COUSIN GERMAN.

By Adeline Adams.


    My Hans, you say, with self-applausive jest,
      "When Albert gave his Belgians Caesar's name--
      'Bravest of all the Gauls'--surely 'twere shame
    The King, unthorough man, forgot the rest:

    "'Bravest because most far from all the best
      Provincial culture.'"[2] Friend, if now your aim
      Be that fine thoroughness your people claim,
    Read on: "Such culture's wares, it stands confest,

    "Oft weaken minds." And Caesar's word was just.
      If men, bedeviled under culture's star,
      Have left Louvain a void where flames still hiss,
    Speared babes, and stamped the world's own Rose to dust,
      God grant that Belgium's soul may dwell afar
    Forever, from a culture such as this!

[Footnote 2: "Propterea quod a cultu atque humanitute provinciae
longissime absunt."]




What the Economic Effects May Be

By Irving Fisher.

     Professor of Political Economy at Yale University; member of
     many scientific societies.


When the future historian chronicles the facts of the present great
world struggle and attempts to analyze its causes and effects the
economic losses, gains, shiftings, and dislocations will form an
important part of the story. It is, of course, quite impossible at this
time to know, in any detail, what all the economic results will be. Much
will depend on how long the war lasts, how many people and how much
property are destroyed, what financial devices are resorted to in order
to finance it, and which side is finally victorious.

The most palpable and the most fundamental effects will be a partial
stoppage of earnings in the nations directly concerned, i.e., a
reduction in the "real income," which consists of enjoyable goods. All
the other important results follow from this.

The cost, however reckoned, is sure to be stupendous. Prof. Richet is
quoted as reckoning it at $50,000,000 a day. This is probably more than
half the total income of all the inhabitants of the warring countries.
The highest estimates of the total income of the United Kingdom, France,
and Germany, estimates of Bowley, Laverge, and Buchel, respectively,
total up less than $70,000,000 a day. Russia and Austria are poor
countries per capita, and would scarcely bring the grand total to
$100,000,000 a day. Moreover, the loss of real income to Europe is, I
imagine, in reality much greater than Richet's estimate, chiefly because
he takes little account of the indirect costs, which may well be the
greatest of all. The cost to the fiscal departments of Government is
probably only a small part of the total cost which the people will have
to bear. The killing and disabling of the men engaged will cut off the
financial support of European families to the tune of hundreds of
millions of dollars per year. The physical destruction of capital
through the devastation of crops, the burning and demolishing of
merchant ships and buildings, the crippling of industry through the
sudden withdrawal of labor and raw materials, the introduction of new
trade risks, and the cutting off of transportation, both internal and
foreign, make up a sum of items which cannot be measured, but which may
exceed those which can. Last, but not least, is the impairment of that
subtle but vital basis of business, commercial credit.

In short, the central effect is a vast impairment of Europe's current
income and of the capital from which her future income will flow. It
means a veritable impoverishment of vast populations. The great burden
will bear heaviest, of course, on the poor. It will impinge very
unequally and will cause a great redistribution of wealth. As always
happens, some people, mostly lucky speculators, will come out of the
mêlée wealthier than before. This fact will not serve to lessen the
discontent of the masses, which their impoverishment is sure to create.
Food prices will be high, the earnings of labor will be low, and after
the war unemployment will be great, due to the impossibility of quick
absorption into the industrial system of returned soldiers, as well as
other maladjustments which the war is sure to bring.

The victor may secure indemnity for part of the loss, but not for all;
he will, in spite of himself, be a net loser. Taxes will be a crushing
burden, merely to secure funds with which to pay high interest on vast
new war debts, to say nothing of funds with which to purchase new
armaments--if again the nations are forced, by lack of international
control, to resume the stupendous folly of racing each other in military
equipments.


Bankruptcy and Revolution.

It may well be that among the economic consequences of the war there
will be some national bankruptcies, and that among the political
consequences will be revolutions. High prices, high taxes, low wages,
and unemployment make an ominous combination. We may be sure that
discontent will be profound and widespread. This discontent is pretty
sure to lead, especially in the defeated nations where there is no
compensating "glory," to strong revolutionary movements just as was the
case in Russia after her defeat by Japan. Whether or to what extent
these movements, in which "Socialism" in the various meanings of that
word is sure to play a part, will succeed, depends on the relative
strength of opposing tendencies which cannot yet be measured. One
possible if not probable result may be, as I suggested in THE TIMES two
weeks ago, some international device to secure disarmament and to
safeguard peace.

Though part of the losses to Europe will be permanent, her chief loss
will be coterminous with the war. She will, therefore, seek ways and
means to fill in this immediate hole in her income in order to "get by."
To do this she must borrow; that is, she must secure her present bread
and butter from us and other nations and arrange to repay later out of
the fruits of peace. She can stint herself, but not enough to meet the
situation. She must borrow. And in one way and another she will satisfy
this necessity by borrowing in the United States.

Most of the strange and unprecedented phenomena which we have witnessed
in the last month, in rapid succession, are due to this pressing
necessity of the belligerent peoples to cash in now and trust to good
fortune to pay later. As soon as the war became even probable Europe
tried to cash in on our securities. The pressure for our gold pushed it
toward Europe faster than it could move. Exchange jumped to the
gold-shipping point of $4.89 per pound sterling, and did not stop. In
some cases it reached $7. This was partly due to the desire to get our
gold and bolster up a credit structure, tottering before the deadly blow
of war; but it was also partly due to the need of ready money for
supplies of all kinds. This need applies not only to the Governments,
but to the individual people. To obtain this ready money they threw back
on us the securities they had purchased of us in former years. They
wanted us to take back these titles to future income and give them
instead titles to present income. Had they secured our gold their next
step would have been to spend part of it for supplies, and this would
have caused any foreign dealers to whom they applied to place orders
with us. The gold then might have turned the exchanges and have been
brought back to us in return for our wheat and other products.

This double transaction is in essence one--a barter of present income in
the form of our wheat to Europe for future income in the form of
investment securities. It was interfered with by the refusal of the
insurance companies to insure the gold and by the closing of Stock
Exchanges against the inundating flood of securities. The first
difficulty, as to transporting gold, has been largely removed by
arranging for drafts against stocks of it kept on both sides of the
Atlantic. This will save the need of sending it on risky voyages back
and forth, and any final net balances can be liquidated after the war.
The second obstacle, the closure of the Stock Exchanges, is more
formidable, but cannot completely or permanently prevent the
transactions which so many people on both sides are anxious to
consummate. Curb markets and limited cash sales on the Exchanges
themselves are doing some of this business, and, sooner or later, much
more will be done, whether the Exchanges are open or not. Europe needs
our wheat and cannot pay for it except with securities, partly because
her own industry is paralyzed, partly because ocean transportation is
difficult.


What Dumping Securities Means.

Few people seem to realize that the dumping of securities on our shores
and the efforts of foreign Governments, such as France and Switzerland,
to borrow money in our markets are at the bottom very much the same
thing. They are simply two forms of securing present supplies from
America in return for future supplies, the dividends and interest on
securities from Europe.

It does not much matter whether we buy Government bonds or other
securities. If we buy of French capitalists their holdings in American
railway securities we simply provide them with the wherewithal to take
the French Government loans themselves. They virtually become, without
our knowledge, the go-between through which we lend, as it were, to the
French Government, in spite of ourselves. It is doubtless well, as a
matter of policy, to refuse to loan directly to France, but we must not
for a moment conclude that France or any other nation will have to
finance the war without our aid. We shall not be consciously helping any
particular nation, but we shall be actually helping any nation which can
trade with us. Evidently England will get more of our help than any
other nation because her shores are more accessible. Germany is more
isolated. Unless she possesses a larger food stock than commercial
statistics indicate she will be pressing for our food supplies, which
may reach her indirectly, we selling to Holland and Holland to Germany;
also reversely, via Holland or via Austria and Italy, Germany may sell a
stream of securities the other end of which we receive. Whether directly
or by devious routes there will inevitably be, so far as I can see, a
vast exchange of commodities passing to Europe for securities coming
from Europe. In this interchange will be found the dominant economic
effect of the war on the United States.

Foreign nations will get their much-needed loans on better terms, even
if less promptly, by the circuitous process mentioned than if they
could borrow directly in our markets; for their own citizens will pay
higher prices than we would, even if, to get the money, they have to
sell their other investment securities to us at a considerable
sacrifice. England has sold Treasury bills for seventy-five millions of
dollars on as low a "basis" as 3-3/4 per cent.

In this virtual trade of this year's crops for titles to future years'
crops we shall get a high price for the former and pay a low price (in
present valuation) for the latter. Investment securities are, and will
be, a drug on the market. In other words, the rate of return to the
investor will be high; the rate of interest on long-time loans will be
high and stay high, that on short-time loans may fluctuate greatly. The
rise in the rate of interest on long-time investments is one of the most
vital and far-reaching effects of the war. At bottom, interest always
arises from the exchange of present and future goods. The rate of
interest, as I have tried to show in my book of that title, is simply
the crystallization, in a market rate, of the impatience of the human
race for its bread and butter. War has now produced such impatience in
populations of hundreds of millions. It is this impatience which dumps
the securities upon us, sends down their price, and sends up the rate of
interest. As Byron W. Holt has said, there is no moratorium for hunger.
The fall of securities in Europe produces the like fall in this and
other countries.

One of the consequences to America of being forced to play the rôle of
money lender and one of the consequences of the rise in the rate of
interest here, or what amounts to the same thing, the fall in the prices
of bonds, will be an increased difficulty of financing our own
enterprises. Only the most promising enterprises will be able to sell
their securities. This means that we shall be neglecting, to some
extent, our own enterprises, to finance the European war instead.

This general depreciation of investment securities will doubtless lead
to many bankruptcies, if not to a genuine crisis. It will also give
tempting opportunities to investors. The likelihood of a genuine panic
is lessened by the fact that every one recognizes the real cause of the
disturbance and that insolvency is not suspected. According to the best
commercial observers, the previous liquidation had been fairly well
completed. Unless they are mistaken, disaster will not be likely to
follow.

We repeat that since the necessities of Europe have forced her to buy
our food in return for her investments, it is evident that during the
war food prices will be high and security prices, especially bonds, will
be low. These are the two facts of greatest economic significance to us.
To the country as a whole they defer some of our pleasures till after
the war. Uncle Sam will cut down for the present on his eating and
drinking, his clothes, shelter, and amusements in order to share his
rations with Europe. Instead of the pleasures foregone he will
invest--not in new enterprises at home, but in old ones--American and
possibly European also--purchased of Europe. We can never have our cake
and eat it too. In this case we shall let Europe eat some of it on
condition that she in turn shares hers with us after the war. Moreover,
we shall trade off a relatively small piece of our present cake for a
relatively large piece of Europe's future cake. In other words, Europe
will fill up the great breach in her income now impending by inducing us
to make a small breach in ours. The result will be that the course of
our real income, that is, economic satisfaction or enjoyable
consumption, will imitate in some degree that of Europe. This is,
reduced to its lowest terms, the chief economic result of the war.

But to many the question is, do we gain or lose, as compared with what
might have been the case if there had been no war? I do not think any
one can answer that question with certainty. Europe is willing to
mortgage its future to us on terms very advantageous to us; but when the
future comes, the purchasing power of money will probably be so much
lessened as to have absorbed all our advantage. Probably we shall lose
slightly on the whole. But it is not economically impossible that there
will be a net gain. In either case the net effect will, I believe, be
small.

Of more importance will be the various effects on various classes.
Certain people will be greatly benefited by the rise in food prices and
the fall in security prices. The farming classes will profit by the
former; the investing classes by the latter. Those who have the good
fortune to belong to both classes will grow rich. The farmer who is in a
position to save money will both make more money to save and be able to
invest it more advantageously after he has saved it. If he lends to his
neighbors he will find the market rate of interest high. Even if he buys
more land the purchase price will be restrained from the great rise we
might expect from the prosperity of farming by the fact that the "number
of years purchase," as the phrase is in England, will be small, or, in
other words, that the interest basis, which enters into every land
price, will be high.


Labor Will Not Suffer Much.

On the other hand the general consumer of farm products will suffer from
another advance in that part of his cost of living, while the debtor
classes will suffer from the fall in bonds or rise in interest. Many
speculators on the Stock Exchange, those who have speculated for a rise,
are in effect undoubtedly ruined already, and many borrowers at banks on
collateral security will feel the pinch from the depreciation of their
property and the hard terms of renewing their loans.

And the laboring man, who forms the majority, what of him? It seems
improbable that he will be greatly affected, that is, on the average. He
will have to pay more for his food, and food constitutes more than a
third of his budget. But some articles he buys will probably fall and he
may secure higher wages because of the withdrawal of competing laborers.
Some labor may rise, especially in the industries benefited by the war,
such as, for instance, farming and other food industries, canning, flour
mills, sugar, &c., the automobile industry and perhaps ammunition and
steel. In other industries thrown out of gear for lack of foreign
markets or for lack of foreign raw material, the wage earner may lose in
wages and employment. In other words, labor will be dislocated in spots,
like the other parts of our industrial machinery.

Important dislocations will be felt in the fields of shipping and
banking. One consequence is that American enterprise has now the golden
opportunity to capture a good share of each. The outbreak of the war and
the simultaneous opening of the Panama Canal will tend to divert the
course of trade from Europe to South America. Probably our merchant
marine can be developed more successfully for this South American trade
than it could for the European trade. New York can largely take the
place of London as the world's exchange centre for Pan-American trade.
This opportunity is increased by the possibilities in the new Banking
act for the establishment of branch banks abroad.

With these opportunities and the rise of interest in Europe, the United
States will change to a great degree from a debtor to a creditor nation.

One of the dislocations of the war in the United States will be the
cutting off of imports of a large part of our dutiable commodities, and
therefore the loss of national revenue. There is an urgent need to
compensate for this loss by some other form of tax.

But it is well not to lose perspective, to remember that dislocations
are not necessarily losses, that, however loudly they are proclaimed in
news columns, they are small in extent, when considered in relation to
our whole trade, that this country of ours is a vast one, and that the
rank and file of Americans will be but slightly affected by the
war--especially by contrast with our friends, now fighting each other,
across the sea.

We are too nearly self-supporting to be prostrated. Our foreign trade is
and always has been a trifling matter compared with our internal
commerce. The internal commerce paid for by money and checks annually
in the United States amounts to nearly five hundred billions of dollars,
which is more than a hundred times as much as our combined exports and
imports.

Almost all of what has been said so far had grown out of the prospect
that the prices of foods and other materials needed in Europe will be
high, while the prices of securities which Europe does not need and
cannot afford will be low. Other prices will rise or fall according to
special circumstances. Like a bomb-shell, the effect of the war will be
to disperse or scatter prices at all angles of rises and falls. The
prices of luxuries will be lowered. The prices of chemicals will be
raised. The same article will fall in price in one country and rise in
another if the transportation from the former to the latter is
interfered with. This is true today of cotton.

There has already been a speculative movement to anticipate these
changes and arbitrarily to mark some prices up and some prices down. But
as this is guesswork, and will be subject to frequent revision, one of
the striking phenomena will doubtless be an increase in the variability
of prices. The general level of prices will tend to rise. The rise will
probably be greatest in little countries like Belgium, which are in the
war zone and largely dependent on foreign trade. The rise will be less
in England and in the United States than on the Continent. In fact, it
is conceivable that in England the hoarding of money and the shock to
credit, which is as predominant there as it is here, may actually lower
the general level of prices during the war, especially if we could
include in the index number the prices of securities, luxuries, and
articles of English internal trade. If any nation tries the old
experiment of paying its bills in irredeemable paper money, that
desperate expedient will have the same result that it did with us during
the civil war. Inflation of the currency will expel gold from that
country and raise its price level higher than elsewhere.

After the war is over prices will probably not retreat, but will move
upward even faster than before. There may then come the familiar "boom"
period, which may culminate in a commercial crisis in a few years after
the close of the war, as was true after the Crimean war, the American
civil war, and the Franco-Prussian war. The rebound will probably be
fastest in England. Statistical price curves of many nations usually
show an upward turn when war begins and another when it ends. The war
will thus aggravate a rise of prices already in prospect.

It would take considerable space to give, completely, the reasons for
these prognostications, but I have tried to justify them in a brief
addendum to a book to be issued this week on "Why Is the Dollar
Shrinking?"

The sudden lightning bolt of war produced as one of its first economic
effects a general dislocation of credit machinery in Europe and to some
extent in this country. We heard at once that letters of credit of
travelers in Europe were uncashable. Gold was hoarded everywhere. It is
estimated that about $30,000,000 in gold was hoarded in New York in the
first week in August. Runs on banks were frequent. Bank reserves were
depleted.

The moratorium was resorted to to avoid a general cataclysm of
bankruptcies which might have occurred--not from actual insolvency but
from mere insufficiency of cash.

To me one of the most striking phenomena was the promptness and
effectiveness of the co-operative actions by which, so far, any business
cataclysm has been avoided. The closure of Stock Exchanges perhaps saved
us from general financial panic. Most striking of all is the manner in
which the Governments of the world have come to the rescue of business.
Those of us who were brought up in the old laissez-faire school have to
rub our eyes. Had the world been guided by laissez-faire ideas, in this
emergency we should in all probability have witnessed by this time the
greatest collapse of credit the world has ever seen. Almost all the
large and effective measures to meet the many emergencies arising were
taken by Governments. The moratorium must be counted among the
Governmental acts which, so far at least, have saved the day for
business credits. In England the Government permitted suspension of the
Bank act, (not of the Bank, as many Americans seem to imagine.)


Improvised Accounting Methods.

The Bank of England has been enabled to rediscount a great mass of
acceptances by the guarantee of the British Government against loss in
so doing. These in the end will amount to several hundred millions of
dollars. Emergency notes were issued by Governmental authority on both
sides of the Atlantic, and in the arrangements made for special gold
funds in Canada and in France the Governments of England and France
played the important parts. Thus have been improvised methods of
international accounting by which the transportation of gold balances
may be deferred and largely dispensed with. Our own Government has
co-operated in the currency exchange and credit situation in many ways.
It made provision for sending gold to Europe for our stranded
countrymen. It promptly revised the banking and shipping laws.

Whether further instability will be found to need such bolstering we
cannot be sure. The present outlook is that business conditions are
fairly sound and stable. In which direction across the Atlantic the
title to gold will tend to change cannot as yet be foreseen. It will
depend largely on how much Europe wants our products and how large a
sacrifice she is willing to make in selling us her securities. It will
also depend on possible issues of paper money. Fortunately, we are the
happy possessors of over $1,500,000,000 in gold, and it is inconceivable
that any large part of this should flow out--unless we should be so
insensate as to inflate the currency.

If we keep our heads, we shall at the end of the war be in the proud
position of being the only great nation whose economic resources have
not even been strained.




Effects of War on America

By Roland G. Usher.

     Head of Department of History at Washington University; author
     of "Pan-Germanism," "The Rise of the American People," &c.

     _From The Boston Transcript, Sept. 2, 1914._


The events of the last few days of July, 1914, showed the Americans the
far-reaching effects of a state of war. There are now few who would say,
as used to be so common, that a European war would make no difference to
us. The closing of the New York Stock Exchange, the great shipments of
gold and its consequent scarcity in the United States, the closing of
the New England cotton mills, the cessation of export to Europe and of
transatlantic communication with the Continent were instantaneous
effects of a war 3,000 miles away obvious even to the apathetic and the
heedless. With these we have not here to do; such are already past
history. There is, however, a legitimate field for speculation as to the
probable effects on the United States of the continuation of the state
of war in Europe for months or years. The permanent results of a war
naturally cannot be predicted in advance, but in the light of the
history of the past, certain changes and developments in the United
States appear so probable if the war continues as to reach almost the
realm of certainty.

Needless to say, the European war will not involve the United States in
actual hostilities. It is highly improbable that either our army or our
navy will see service. We are too distant from the seat of war; too
entirely devoid of interests the combatants might seriously injure which
a resort to war could remedy; too completely incapable of aiding or
abetting one or the other in arms to cause them to assail us. Even were
we not as a nation of a peaceable disposition, even had we not a
President blessed with a singularly clear head and able to keep his
temper, we should still stand little chance of going to war. One
eventuality alone might affect us--Japan might attempt some measures of
aggression in the Far East which would interest us as possessors of the
Philippines, but that is practically foreclosed by her official
announcement that she will side with England. The effects of the war
upon the United States will be indirect effects; they will be economic
in character, though far-reaching and significant for every man, woman,
and child in the country.

The economic structure of the United States rests today upon the
assumption of the interdependence of international trade, upon an
international division of labor, where England makes some things,
Germany others, and we still more, all of which are exchanged. In a
sense each country manufactures and produces for the whole world, and in
turn expects the rest of the world to buy its products and to
manufacture and produce things for its consumption. While something of
this sort has always been true in international trade, the process
reached during the nineteenth century an unprecedented development which
actually made countries interdependent, or, if you will, actually
dependent for the necessities of life upon each other's prosperity and
continued activity. Hand in hand went the expansion of the international
credit structure, based upon public confidence in the mutual honesty of
merchants, until finally personal checks have begun to be exchanged
(between the United States and England at least) at par and without
investigation or previous indorsement by the banks on which they were
drawn.

With the outbreak of war a striking and artificial change, a totally
uneconomic and unnatural factor, came to transform the situation and
leave the United States for all practical purposes in contact with only
two of her really large customers. We have no merchant marine and cannot
therefore avail ourselves of our neutral status to trade with the
belligerents. We shall be compelled (for a time at least) to ship in
English bottoms to such ports as English ships can make--which will
practically be limited to England, France, Portugal, Spain, and the
Mediterranean ports. The ordinary commercial roads to Russia through the
Baltic are automatically closed by the location of the German fleet, and
probably England and France, deprived of other outlets for their own
trade, will nearly monopolize the trade with Russia through the
Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

On the other hand, the mobilization of armies and fleets in Europe will
draw millions of men from the field and factories where they have been
accustomed to make what we have usually bought. The war will vastly
diminish and in many cases stop altogether the stream of imports to the
United States. These millions of men in the field and on the sea will
not possess most of the economic wants they had in time of peace and
will become conscious of many which they usually did not feel. The war
will diminish and in many cases entirely stop the stream of ordinary
American exports to Europe. Because of the stoppage of the European
supply of things we have usually bought of them, and the cessation of a
European demand for things we have usually sold to them, the conditions
of the home market, both in regard to what we must buy in it, and to
what we must sell in it, will be vitally changed. When our present
supplies of European importations are exhausted, we shall be obliged to
make for each other and buy from each other the things which we happen
to be no longer able to import or export. A great readjustment of the
economic fabric in the United States will take place if the war lasts
longer than a comparatively short time.

How long a time that must be will depend entirely upon the sharpness of
the break in the economic life of Europe, and the amount of supplies
they have on hand, which, as they will not now need them at home, they
will be anxious to sell in the United States. Indeed, it would not be
surprising if there was for a short time a glut of English and French
manufactured goods in the United States market.


Europe May Depend On Us.

Of late years the commercial relationship between the United States and
Europe has changed very greatly. For centuries we were a debtor
community, buying largely from Europe, possessed only of crude staple
products for export, and scarcely able by a series of expedients and
exchanges to pay for what we bought. Tobacco for many decades, then
cotton, were the only commodities of which much was exported direct to
Europe. Then came, during the European famines of 1846, 1861, and 1862,
an enormous demand for American grain. Yet only during the last few
decades have we been able to export largely manufactured products or
been able to deal with Europe on an equality of terms. We are no longer
a debtor nation; we are no longer dependent upon Europe; the United
States is an integral and essential part of the interdependent
international economic fabric. Indeed, if the war continues ten years,
Europe may be dependent upon us.

In a sense we are not ready to meet the crisis. During the last ten or
fifteen years the exports of foodstuffs have fallen off greatly, and the
supply in this country has actually declined in proportion to
population. There has been also a most marked increase in the exports of
manufactured goods and a decided increase in the importation of raw
materials, including foodstuffs. Now will come an enormous demand from
Europe for the very things of which we have not produced so much and
exported little or nothing--bacon, eggs, butter, beef. The demand will
also be greatly increased for woolen cloth, raw leather, shoes, steel
in all its forms, railroad equipment of all sorts, automobiles and
machinery, and, in particular, coal and gasoline. To supply this demand
old industries will be expanded and new ones created, and a shift of
capital and labor will inevitably take place to the industries for which
a demand becomes clear in Europe, as soon as it seems reasonably certain
that the war will last, beyond the present year.


An American Merchant Marine.

Above all, an American merchant marine is likely to be seen again upon
the seas. There will be German ships in plenty for sale, in all
probability, unless Germany wins an immediate victory on the sea, and
the advantage of an unquestioned neutral status, easily obtained by a
bona-fide purchase, will be so great that American capital will probably
invest largely in freight steamers and ocean liners. It seems entirely
unlikely that England, while she remains mistress of the seas, should
recognize as valid the registration in the United States of vessels
actually owned by belligerents or regard as anything more than
masquerading their appearance under the American flag. England has never
recognized any one's "right" to do anything at sea in time of war which
did not accrue directly to her own benefit. It is scarcely necessary to
say that she will not allow trade with Germany or Austria while she can
prevent it. The only refuge will be the sale of the ship by the foreign
owner to Americans who will trade with England, her allies, and strictly
neutral nations. As always in time of war, privateering and smuggling
will be profitable, and trade with Germany, unless she is immediately
victorious at sea, will offer to the adventurous plenty of risk and the
certainty of huge profits. During the Napoleonic wars the flats and bars
of the German coast along the North Sea offered light vessels a great
opportunity and the pursuing warships great obstacles. A modern
motor-driven light craft will now have an enormous advantage over
destroyers or cruisers. Here, as a century ago, many an American will
find an opportunity to make a fortune.

The preoccupation of Europe with the war and the opening of the Panama
Canal will afford the United States an unrivaled opportunity to develop
trade with Canada, South America, Australia, New Zealand, India, China,
and the Far East in general. We have never bulked large in the eyes of
these countries and there has been much speculation as to the reasons
why the German succeeded so well in South America and why the Englishman
did so much business in China. Whether from sentiment or from a national
habit that prefers English goods, the English colonies have bought more
largely of the mother country than they have of us. But now that the war
has closed the German factories, called German commercial agents home,
and sent German ships racing to neutral harbors; now that the Panama
Canal brings us some thousands of miles nearer to Australia and New
Zealand than they are to London via Suez; now that England will be busy
manufacturing for Europe and will have less to sell her colonies, these
particular parts of the world will probably be compelled to look for
their manufactured goods to the United States. Indeed, if one were not
afraid of being accused of gross exaggeration, he might take heart and
proclaim his conviction that a long and really inclusive European war
would give the United States a practical monopoly of the South American
and Pacific trade, provided always that the United States acquire by
purchase a merchant marine and that the Panama Canal becomes feasible in
January for large ships.


Foreigners Leaving America

One other effect of the war has already begun to reveal itself in the
emigration from America of thousands of Servians, Austrians, Russians,
Germans, Frenchmen, going home to take their places in the ranks. While
many of these men are brave and honorable citizens, the fact that they
respond to such a call proves them not yet Americans. The war will tend
to remove a goodly part of the distinctly foreign element in the
country, the part not yet amalgamated, and therefore the part most alien
to our institutions and the most difficult to place in our social
structure. If the war continues, Europe will draw every able-bodied man
who can be influenced to go. Far more important, immigration will
probably become negligible not only during the war, but for some time
after it. Usually the reason for leaving home lies in the crowded
population of European States and the lack of opportunity for
advancement, plus the glib tongue of some agent of a contractor or of a
steamship company. In recent years those who have come have not been
desirable additions to our population because they came from nations
alien in blood, language, religion and institutions, and were not
therefore easily knit into our national structure and absorbed. There
will be little, if any, further immigration. The men are wanted for the
army and will not be allowed to leave during the war. After peace is
restored, they will be imperatively needed in the fields and factories
and every effort will be made to retain them. In fact, it does not take
any wild stretch of the imagination for one acquainted with the results
of the Thirty Years' War and of the Napoleonic wars to conceive that,
from the view of economic opportunity and rewards, Europe might become a
more favorable scene for the truly capable and ambitious than America is
today. The tendency of a war is to absorb the best of a nation and to
leave the dregs. For the power of organization and the fire of
initiative Europe will at no distant date be ready to pay well.


The Effect of Economic Readjustment.

Unquestionably the economic readjustment which the war will force upon
the United States will have an immediate and serious effect on
individuals. Some will profit largely and promptly. All who at present
possess large stocks of food, leather, oil, woolen cloth will be able to
dispose of them at enormous profits. From the greater volume of freight
the railroads will benefit directly. But while the farmers and
cattle-men, the steel and oil kings are rejoicing in the opportunity,
all industries which depend chiefly upon exportation or which
manufacture an amount beyond the normal American demand, will be closing
the factories or curtailing the output. For a time certain individuals,
perhaps a relatively large number of individuals, will suffer
inconvenience, loss, anxiety, and even privation. But the vast demand
for labor in other industries, and the almost certain extensive demand
for relatively unskilled labor ought not to make the period of
transition long or the amount of suffering considerable. After all, the
vast majority of the people of the United States are connected with
farming, with the manufacture or production of the very things for which
there will most likely be a great demand, or with the transportation and
distribution of both imports and exports to the rest of the community.
In certain industries, like the manufacture of cotton cloth, which is
localized in New England to such an extent that whole districts are
dependent upon it for a livelihood, the distress will be great, for the
factories closed upon the declaration of war and the workers are a long
distance from the Western fields, where laborers are only too scarce.
The cheapening of transportation, the rapidity of communication, the
superior mobility of the population today over ten years ago, make it
probable that these people will soon find new places.

Concomitant with the war came a rise of prices. Foodstuffs especially
advanced sharply and will certainly continue to rise until some material
increase of the supply is assured beyond a peradventure. The tendency in
England and above all on the Continent for the cities to buy great
supplies to guard against possible want will increase this tendency.
But, without question, should the war last, a rise in the whole level of
prices of everything, including labor, will take place in the United
States. It will affect some individuals adversely, but for most will be
in the long run almost negligible. For those who actually produce or
handle goods which advance in price the result will be a profit, because
the price of the commodity they have to sell will almost certainly
advance sooner and faster than the prices of the commodities they
themselves are compelled to buy. In time the two will equalize and they
will be precisely where they were before the war; they will pay out with
one hand what they take in with the other. In nearly all cases where the
individual produces or shares in the production of an actual commodity a
general rise in prices, even to the extent which this war threatens to
produce, will be to him only a temporary advantage or disadvantage.
True, wages and salaries in industrial pursuits will not quite keep pace
with the rise in foodstuffs, and factory workers and clerks will not
benefit to the same extent nor as soon as the farmers will. People whose
incomes are derived from stocks in the businesses which prosper will
probably receive much more than they pay by reason of the increased
prices of other commodities, and certainly cannot be worse off than
before.


America's Real Sufferers.

The real sufferers in America will be those who hold stock in the
enterprises which fail or cease to operate, and that far larger class
who are dependent on a fixed salary. Professors and teachers of all
sorts and grades; people living on annuities or small incomes derived
from bonds or real estate; those dependent on the rent derived from
leases for a term of years of dwelling houses, office buildings and the
like, these will lose a material amount, exactly in proportion to the
rise in prices. To that extent, the purchasing power of the stated
number of dollars they receive will depreciate and that much they will
lose beyond a peradventure. In time, some relief will be afforded by a
tardy rise in salaries, by the expiration of leases and the payment of
bonds, but the actual losses of the intervening years have never been in
any way refunded in like cases in the past.

For some individuals, then, the European war will spell strict economy;
for a comparatively few, let us hope, ruin. For the country as a whole,
considered as a social and economic unit, a long war will introduce an
era of astounding prosperity. Never before has the country had, and
certainly it will never again have, almost a monopoly of the world's
trade thrust into its hands. The United States will have only one real
competitor, England, and, should the English Navy prove itself less
capable than is expected, or should England and her colonies be forced
to order a general mobilization of their armies, the United States might
conceivably remain the only great mercantile community to which the
world could look for supplies. No such eventuality need be predicated to
prove that the continuation of this war or a series of wars will create
a demand for manufactured goods such as our merchants have never dreamed
of. And they will command war prices. It means employment with rich
reward for capital and labor alike--a vastly increased foreign market, a
much greater domestic market, high prices, and a steadily voracious
demand for the entire output. The result will be the rapid
diversification of industry in the United States, the creation of
industries never before possible because of European competition, the
invention of machines to meet new needs. The normal economic development
will be accelerated decades.

After the close of the European war, when manufacturing and production
are resumed, America will find herself overproducing and face to face
with another economic readjustment necessary to meet the new situation.
Then will ensue a commercial crisis with all its attendant suffering and
trouble such as the United States has probably never seen and which will
be violent and serious in proportion to the length of the war.




Germany of the Future

AN INTERVIEW WITH M. DE LAPREDELLE.

Exchange Professor from the University of Paris at Columbia University.

By Edward Marshall.


In the American press French views of the great war's significance have
been less common than British views and far less frequent than German
views. Therefore, this talk with M. de Lapredelle, Exchange Professor
from the University of Paris at Columbia, will have especial interest.

This very distinguished Frenchman, although but 43 years old, has won
high eminence in his native land, especially in the domain of
international law, which is his branch at the University of Paris. Also
he is Directeur de Recuel des Arbitrages Internacioneaux, he is the
editor of The International Law Review in Paris, he is a member of the
Committee on International Law for the French Department of Justice, he
is a member of the French Committee on Aerial Navigation, he is General
Secretary of the French Society of International Law, and he occupies
other important posts and bears other important scholastic honors.

He is a cautious conversationist, as might be expected of one who has so
deeply delved into the most cautious of all professions, but in the mind
of the thoughtful reader this should add to the value of his utterances,
which, as expressed in the following columns, were carefully revised by
him before going into type.

I asked M. de Lapredelle to estimate the great war's probable effect
upon education.

"Of course it is too early to guess intelligently," he replied, "for the
effect of the war will be dependent entirely upon the results of the
war, and, while we of the Allies have no doubt of our ultimate victory,
it is the fact that victory has not been won as yet by either side.

"In talking with you my impulse is to assume what I feel in my
heart--the certainty of German defeat, but I must not do that, although
all the letters which I get from the front and from Paris express a
growing confidence in the victory of the Allies.

"But it is too early to attempt intelligent detailed prophecy as to the
effect of the great struggle upon the world's philosophy, or upon any
other phase of its intellectual development.

"Almost certainly, however, a reaction against certain Germanic
influences will be apparent after the war ends, for the world will not
want ever to risk repetition of the horrors of this struggle, and it
will be plain that they were the inevitable fruit of Germany's attempt
at intellectual domination.

"This German assumption was due, largely, to their victory in 1870, but
it went far beyond the bounds of reason, far beyond the fields in which
German achievement really had established legitimate supremacy.

"The momentum of victory often has led humanity into excess. It led
Germany into excessive claims of social superiority and into an
excessive assumption of intellectual supremacy. Even in the eyes of
others it gave Germany an unwarranted intellectual prestige.

"Really, the German is not a big thinker; he is an immensely careful
thinker.

"Above everything, the German is an observer--a very diligent
observer--and his mental eyes are likely to be so close to the wall
that he sees only a single brick in it, wholly failing to get a
comprehensive view of the whole structure.

"Germans are very careful students. They attach a vast importance to
detail. I think it is not unfair to say that, with the German, the
smaller, the more minute the detail, the more it interests him. The
German loves to write a big book on a small subject, and, loving it, he
does it well.

"But there are more exalted tasks, as, for example, the writing of big
books upon big subjects, giving the world fresh visions of new and
far-flung vistas. The German loves to catalogue and catalogues almost
with genius; he loves to deliver long lectures upon microcosms.

"Cataloguing and the near-sightedness which may arise from intense study
of the atom, to the exclusion of the collective organism, whether that
collective organism be the human individual or the social mass, may
render immense service to the world, but it never will be the only
service necessary, and, if pursued to the exclusion of all other
investigations, such study is likely to produce an aggravated narrowness
of vision. Narrow vision is certain to eventuate in selfishness.

"The Germans became selfish after this fashion. The present struggle is
the war of selfishness against world advance.

"Innumerable, or at least many, individuals have furnished smaller
parallels to the course which Germany has taken as a nation. The
individual with the truly and exclusively scientific mind is likely to
go too far into abstractions, built from a possible misinterpretation of
minutiae.

"The ideal national intellectual development will combine both fact and
theory, will join rationalism to idealism, and will be far more like
that of certain nations which I shall not name than it will be like that
of Germany. These nations which I shall not name have both.

"In other words, it seems to be the fixed idea of the German that the
German civilization is the only civilization; but it is not the thought
of France or England that their civilizations are the only ones.

"This very lack of what may be defined as national egotism in France and
England enables these nations to work, as Germany does not, for world
science and world development--the growth of civilization as a whole.

"Germany's scientific work is for German science, she thinks
of civilization only as German civilization. The world's other
great nations--and may I say the world's great Latin nations
especially?--internationalize their science and their civilization."


Why the Philosopher Is Important.

"One must be struck by the fact that Germany's critical philosophy
formed the basis of her educational system and, therefore, the basis of
her social system, and that it had in it the basis of the war.

"It cannot be denied, I think, that her education, as well as her
politics and militarism, directly pointed to this great conflict.
Indeed, the industrialism, the politics, the philosophy of Germany all
find their logical expression in present events.

"Hegel was the first, in the beginning of the last century, to insist
upon the ideas which, already being paramount in him, quickly became
paramount in his followers, serving as the basis for the development of
Prussia. To him this represented all and everything; to him divinity on
earth was incarcerated in the State, and, therefore, the development of
the State, not justice, was, in his mind, the object of all law.

"Since this beginning that has been the consistent German viewpoint, and
increasingly so. The glorification of the State has included, of
necessity, the sacrifice of the individual, and this has been conducted
ruthlessly in Germany itself.

"Of course the State which considers it right to sacrifice the
individuals of its own citizenship will be sure to consider it right to
sacrifice the individuals of other nations' citizenships.

"That explains why international law never has been considered binding
by the German; it explains why international law was not considered
binding when Belgium stood in the path of Germany's march toward Paris.

"International law never has bound the German; it never will bind him
until he changes his national psychology.

"Ihering, one of Germany's greatest theoretical jurists and a scholar in
the matter of Roman law, declared, 'Right is the child of might.' He did
not say exactly that right is might, but he defined it as 'the child of
might.'

"That may be taken as the German keynote, for this man is of such great
influence in Germany that his utterances must have an enormous effect.

"Treitschke, the historian, in his teaching in Berlin, naturally drew
some of his inspiration from these two men. For him the State need
consider no law save that which will promote its own expansion.

"Moral law, he holds, need not and must not stand in the way of the
prosperity and growth of States, as it frequently must obstruct the
prosperity and growth of individuals.

"Under this theory the State has two functions--these are, inside the
country, to make law; outside the country, to make war. Germany denies
the right of an extraneous law to decide upon the details of right and
wrong within a country, and that is why Germany defies and even denies
international law.

"If it happens that a treaty which the State has entered into later
proves to be obstructive to some expansion which is thought to be a
necessity of the State's destiny, that treaty may be disregarded with
the full approval of Germany's national morality, although similar
conduct on the part of an individual in Germany would be considered
highly reprehensible.

"The State may bind itself to secure advantage, but, also, it may unbind
itself to secure advantage, and this without consultation with, or the
approval of, the other party or parties to the contract.

"This theory becomes confusing to the student reared in other nations
under different educational influences. It indicates beyond
contradiction that Germany feels no sense of duty toward other nations,
but only an obligation to further her own interests.

"Germany has immense patriotism but no humanitarianism. Her only duty is
to herself. Her national egotism can be characterized by no other word
than selfishness.

"It is a curious phenomenon that at a time when humanitarianism in its
broadest sense has become the keynote of all other of the great nations
it has not become at all the keynote of German civilization."


Teutonic Superexcitation.

"It is impossible that such pride, such a sense of arrogant national
superiority as that which marks Germany, should maintain among a
democratic people; it is possible only to a very aristocratic country.
What has happened is its logical outgrowth in the country which it has
infected.

"In Germany this sense of national pride, of intolerance of others, even
of contempt for others, has been developed until it amounts to
superexcitation. It not only affects Germany's relations to other
peoples, but it affects the relations of Germans to one another.

"Different classes of the German population continually exhibit it in
their dealings with one another.

"It is continually illustrated in those events which have been the
wonder of visiting foreigners--episodes of the contemptuous
ill-treatment of subordinate German soldiers by their superiors. It goes
beyond that, manifesting itself in the treatment of all civilians by the
lowest soldier, and, further still, in the attitude even of the lowest
civilian to all foreigners, even the highest.

"The German individual may not consider himself superior to all
individuals of other nationalities, but he will be sure to consider his
nation so far superior to every other that there can be no comparison
between it and them. His is a peculiar arrogance. It is not at all
personal; it is purely national; but none the less it is arrogance, and
all arrogance is dangerous.

"A hierarchy always exists in aristocratic countries; the hierarchical
idea has been developed further in Germany than elsewhere.

"This has given Germany an unfortunate impulse. If to this impulse we
add that other born of all her various victories since 1866, especially
those which were won while Germany was realizing Bismarck's dream of
triumph 'through fire and blood'--her industrial victories, her
scientific advance, her social progress--and consider the Germanic
tendency toward egotism, we do not find ourselves surprised when we
find, examine, and appraise exactly what we have today in Germany.

"The perversion of national sentiment into national arrogance has been
the definite, although, perhaps, unrealized and unintended, aim of every
educational influence which has been at work in Germany since 1870. It
has amounted to an unparalleled perversion of a nation's sentiment
toward all the outside world.

"This war marks the crisis of this German pride.

"Germany's course throughout has borne all the earmarks of a national
ego-mania. The whole German people, as a nation, not always, perhaps, as
individuals, have fallen victim to the most colossal attack of ego-mania
which the world ever has known.

"Combine this ego-mania with another delusion--the entirely unjustified
conclusion that Germany was the object of a worldwide persecution--and
it is unnecessary to search further for the causes of the war, just as
it is unnecessary to search further for reasons for the combination of
practically all other Europe against Germany.

"What would German victory mean to the world, if German victory came,
save the worldwide dominance of German egotism, imposed at the expense
of every other people? France would not escape, England would not
escape, and, I assure you, you, America, would not escape. German
victory would be far more than a European disaster--it would be a world
disaster.

"Of all the nations in the world perhaps the United States and France
have stood most notably for the ideas of international justice. This
really makes your interest in the outcome of the present war indirectly
as great as ours.

"I cannot see how the people of the United States can feel otherwise
than that not only their hearts but their reason demands victory for the
Allies, not because of any wish for the destruction of Germany, but
because of the wish for the preservation of the world.

"Indeed, it is inconceivable that victory for the Allies can mean
destruction for Germany. It can mean only the destruction of German
militarism, which has brought about the perversion of the German mind.

"No abler mind exists. Its release from the thralldom which has fettered
it would be a vast world service, would, indeed, be a vast benefit to
Germany herself. It is curious, but true, that I believe Germany's own
salvation depends upon her absolute defeat in this great war.

"A few weeks before the war began Prof. Schucking expressed regret that
Germany--that is, the German Government--should be so antagonistic to
international spirit. The fact that he made this expression shows that,
in spite of and beyond military Germany, the intellectual élite, the
cream of the élite in Germany, has remained faithful to the traditions
of the great philosopher, Kant.

"The intellectual élite--the cream of the élite--therefore may be
absolved from all responsibility. Loyalty to the teachings of Kant will
make it possible for the friends of humanity in all nations to join with
Germany for human advancement on the basis of universal justice.

"After the victory of the Allies a new Germany will appear; it will be a
liberal Germany, willing to renounce the narrow Prussian ideals, finding
again the old German ideal in its disinterested form, a Germany which
will be able to join hands with other nations, to help them in taking up
again the works of international civilization, which Prussian Germany
herself brutally brought to an end, with insolent scorn of right--an act
for which she is now paying and must pay the penalty."




Germany the Aggressor

By Albert Sauveur.

Professor of Metallurgy at Harvard University.


_To the Editor of The New York Times:_

German professors and editors and other German sympathizers in the
present struggle of nations have attempted the difficult task of
convincing the American public, first, that Germany was not the
aggressor, and, second, that she is conducting a war of civilization
directed primarily against Russia, that Europe may not fall under
Muscovite domination. The German Chancellor has made similar claims,
while in the German "White Paper," published in full in THE NEW YORK
TIMES of Aug. 24, it is likewise attempted to fasten the responsibility
for this war on Germany's opponents.

A close and impartial study of both the English and German "White
Papers" must suffice to convince the reader that Germany clearly was the
aggressor and that England made every possible effort first to prevent a
war between Austria and Servia and later to localize the conflict.
Germany, on the contrary, by insisting from the start that there should
be no intervention in the settlement of the dispute between Servia and
her ally, Austria, made a European war inevitable. The sophistry,
inaccuracies, and unwarranted conclusions of the German professors and
editors have not helped their cause. The irrefutable facts remain,
first, that Austria with the knowledge and approval of Germany presented
to Servia an ultimatum so worded that she knew that the conditions
imposed could not be complied with by any nation retaining a spark of
self-respect; second, that after Servia had accepted Austria's ultimatum
with the single exception of the most offensive clause, which she
proposed to submit to arbitration, Austria, with Germany's consent,
proclaimed herself unsatisfied and immediately declared war on Servia;
third, that Germany and Austria knew that a war with Servia meant a war
with Russia, and that a war with Russia meant a general European
conflagration; fourth, that Germany declared war on Russia, started the
invasion of France before declaring war, and, by refusing to respect the
neutrality of Belgium, to which she was solemnly pledged, forced both
Belgium and England into the war. In the face of so flagrant a violation
of all sentiments making for peace no sophistry will avail in attempting
to protect Germany from the odium of being responsible for the greatest
calamity the civilized world has ever seen.

We are told that Germany is conducting this war in the interest of
civilization, that her chief purpose is to protect Europe from the
domination of the Slav. And to ward off this Muscovite danger Germany is
at present making desperate efforts to crush England and France, the
standard bearers of democracy in Europe! In her war for civilization she
is employing the methods of barbarian tribes, methods condemned by
civilized nations and which have already horrified the world. It is
hardly conceivable that Russia, which the German Chancellor describes as
a semi-Asiatic, slightly cultured barbaric nation, could have committed
in Belgium the atrocities imputed to the Germans had she conquered that
country in similar circumstances.

It is manifest that Germany's supreme desire is to fasten Teutonic rule
on Europe, to crush Russia, to be sure, but also to crush France and
French civilization and to reduce England to the rank of a second-class
nation. It is obvious that this is a struggle between militarism and its
evils as represented by the Hohenzollern dynasty and democracy as
represented by England and France.

ALBERT SAUVEUR.

Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., Sept. 5, 1914.




Militarism and Christianity

By Lyman Abbott.

_A Letter to The New York Sun._

     Editor in Chief of The Outlook; author of numerous works on
     theology, religion, and democracy.


_To the Editor of The New York Sun:_

In answer to your request for a statement of the causes and meaning of
the European war I write with necessary brevity, both because of the
limits on my time and the limits on your crowded columns.

What is the cause of the explosion of a powder magazine? The gases
stored in the powder. The lighted match is the occasion, not the cause
of the explosion. The cause of the European war is the spirit of envy,
jealousy, selfishness and suspicion in the so-called Christian nations.
The assassination by a Servian of the Crown Prince of Austria was only
the lighted match which set the European combustibles in flame.

In the United States we recognize the truth that the interests of each
State are identical with the interests of the Union, and that no State
can permanently prosper by reason of the misfortune of its neighbor. In
the German Empire since its unification each principality similarly
recognizes that the interests of the German Empire and the interests of
the several principalities are essentially identical. But there is no
such recognition of the common interest binding the warring nations of
Europe together.

Each nation looks with envy on the prosperity of its neighbor and acts
upon the assumption that its neighbor is a rival, and that its own
commerce and wealth can be built up only at the expense of its rival.
New York is quite willing that the harbor of Boston should be improved.
Bremen is quite willing that the harbor of Hamburg should be improved.
The west coast of England does not object to harbor facilities on the
east coast of England. But Germany envies England's harbor facilities,
and England and Germany are both resolved to prevent if possible Russia
from getting harbor facilities on the Mediterranean Sea. Not every
individual German, Austrian, Frenchman, and Englishman holds this
opinion, but the policies of these nations are governed by this spirit
of international rivalry.

A striking illustration of this spirit, perhaps the most striking
illustration in modern international life, is furnished by the military
party in Prussia. Gen. Bernhardi, in a volume entitled "Germany and the
Next War," has given what may be regarded as a semi-official
interpretation of German militarism. He holds that life is a struggle
for existence, with a survival of the fittest, and the strongest is the
fittest; that a military organization constitutes the true strength of a
nation; that there is no higher power in human life, certainly none in
international life, than the power of physical force; that only the
strong nation has a right to exist, and he objects to international
arbitration because it recognizes the right to life of a small nation.
In this volume he calls on Germany to establish a "world sovereignty" by
force of arms, and he indicates what should be the twofold purpose of
Germany in the next war, namely, to crush France and to establish such
world sovereignty of Germany.


Militarism to Blame.

It was this spirit which led Germany into the present war; this spirit
which denied that Belgium had any rights which Germany was bound to
respect; this spirit which inspired the military party in Germany to
regard its treaty with France and England guaranteeing the neutrality of
Belgium as only a "scrap of paper," and this spirit which could not and
apparently still does not comprehend why Belgium should be bound in
honor to defend her neutrality, or why England, with no very direct and
immediate interests to protect, should feel herself bound to come to the
defense of her weaker neighbor.

The delay of the German Army, which is likely to prove disastrous to her
designs, has demonstrated in her own chosen field that there is a force
in national honor and national conscience which can put up a very
efficient resistance to Krupp guns.

It is a great mistake to suppose that all Germany is actuated by this
spirit of militarism. Frederick William Wile, for over seven years the
chief German correspondent of The London Daily Mail, in an article in
The Outlook recently said: "There are 66,000,000 Germans; 65,000,000 of
them did not want war; the other million are the war party." But he adds
that now Germany is absolutely united and that the Germans will not
stack arms "till the last among them capable of shouldering a rifle is
incapacitated, till the last copper pfennig capable of purchasing
ammunition of war has vanished from their impoverished grasp."

There is in this nothing extraordinary. Whoever is responsible for
bringing on the war, the interests, the welfare, and in some sense the
honor of Germany are apparently involved in it. And yet it may be true,
and I believe it is true, that the defeat of Germany will be its
salvation, for it will be the overthrow of the spirit of militarism
inherited from Frederick the Great, and this has been the bane of the
German Empire.

In our civil war there was at first only a minority in most of the
Southern States in favor of secession, but when the national troops
invaded Virginia the South was as united for State independence as the
North was for national union, and yet today it will be difficult to find
anywhere in the South an intelligent man who does not recognize the
truth that the defeat of secession and the emancipation of the slave
have been of inestimable benefit to the Southern States.

I make no attempt here to apportion the responsibility for this war
between the several powers engaged in it. However this responsibility
must be shared among them I can see but one meaning in the awful
campaign. The victory of Germany would mean the victory of Prussian
militarism. The defeat of Germany will mean the defeat of Prussian
militarism, the rehabilitation of Germany as a great industrial and
educational power in the world, and probably the practical overthrow of
military autocracy in all Western Europe.


Divine Right of Kings Obsolete.

The campaigns of Napoleon ended for Western Europe the Divine right of
Kings. The campaigns of the Allies will end for Western Europe the
Divine right of the armed man. The Russo-Japanese war gave to Russia its
first representative assembly, the Duma. It is not unreasonable to hope
that the present European war will result in greatly enlarging the
powers of the Duma and establishing true constitutional government in
Germany, a government in which the Ministry will be responsible not to
the Emperor but to the Reichstag; and the power both of the purse and
the sword will not be in the hands of an aristocratic oligarchy but in
the hands of the common people.

It is not strange that men should point to this, perhaps the greatest
war of history, as an evidence that Christianity is a failure. If
Christianity professed to be able by a miracle to transform human nature
at once, such a war would be fatal to its claim. But no such claim can
be made for Christianity. It is a great human movement, a phase of the
gradual evolution of man, governed by conscience and reason, out of the
brute, governed by appetite and passion.

Man as he is seen in the world to day is an unfinished product. He is in
the making. The best that can be said of a Christian is that he is
further along toward the goal of humanity than the barbarian.
Theological doctrines such as the Trinity, the Atonement, and the like
are not the essential doctrines of Christianity. The essential doctrine
is that life is a struggle for others as well as for self; that in this
struggle every one owes a duty to his neighbor, and the stronger he is
and the greater the need of his neighbor the more imperative is his
duty; that as the father and the mother care for, educate and govern
their child until he grows able to care for, educate and govern himself,
so always the strong men and women owe the duty of protection,
education, and, in some measure, government to the weaker of the human
race until they have outgrown the need for it.

In so far as autocracy is the rule of the few for the benefit of the few
it is paganism. In so far as democracy is the rule of the many for the
benefit of the many it is Christianity. He who believes this will
perhaps believe with me that in a true sense this is a religious war,
the war of conscience, honor, the moral sense against the rule of the
bayonet and the bullet.

The cynic who thinks this war demonstrates the failure of Christianity
should not forget such facts as the heroic struggle of Belgium to
maintain her neutrality, the resolve of England at every cost to
maintain her pledges to Belgium, the Red Cross following the armies in
the field and ministering to the sick, the wounded and the suffering,
regardless of their nationality, the general kind treatment to
prisoners, accentuated by some very horrible exceptions, and all this
contrasted with the enslaving, torturing, the crucifying, the flaying
alive of prisoners captured in war by barbaric nations before the dawn
of Christianity.

LYMAN ABBOTT.

Cornwall-on-Hudson, Sept. 17, 1914.




VIGIL

By HORTENSE FLEXNER.


I have waited with my mothers down the dim, uncertain ages,
I have waited in the cave and hut and tower,
  From the first dawn's nameless fear
  To the death-list posted here
I have slain my soul in waiting, hour by hour.

Under pelt of beast, trap-taken, or the leaves by chance winds blow,
Under tunic, peasant hemp, or cloth of gold,
  By the fire, in low flame burning,
  I have crouched in silence, yearning,
And as now, my helpless heart has waited cold.

Ancient is the part I play--like a cloak of heavy mourning,
I take it, bending, from a million women's hands.
  They have worn it, they have torn it,
  Agonizing, they have borne it,
And its folds are dark with heart-break of all lands.

Oh, the woman figure standing, with the face toward the horizon,
Oh, the hand above the eyes to ease the strain!
  Gaunt and barren, stricken, lonely,
  With the empty memories only,
We have stood, the dry-eyed sentries of our pain.

Nothing we can do to stop them, nothing we can say to hold them;
Taking sunlight, laughter, youth, they swing away,
  And the things they leave grow strange,
  House and street and voices change,
But the women and the burdened hours stay.

I have waited with my mothers down the dim, uncertain ages,
While my children die, I pray the centuries through,
  And I wonder in my fear
  At the death-list posted here
If God has left the women waiting, too!




Nietzsche and German Culture

By Abraham Solomon.

_A Letter to The New York Evening Post._


Sir: Those who trace the German militaristic doctrines to Nietzsche's
influence commit Pastor Mander's sin when he told Mrs. Alving to bar
from her library a book which he had never read. Nietzsche was an
inveterate enemy of efficiency, astigmatic with regard to practical
life, and he never worked out a philosophy in the accepted sense of the
term. He was a lyric poet who wrote psychology when he failed to sustain
the poetic mood. In the Engadine and at Sils-Maria, brooding in a rocky
void wherein he touched the sharp edge of infinity, he sang a Dionysian
hymn to life against the melancholy products of German learning and
against those Nihilistic snares which he thought lurked in Christian
doctrine. There he worked out the mystic idea of "Eternal Recurrence"
and his song of Zarathustra with the bell strokes of noon.

What he knew of history he used for an analysis of values, and not for
State polity. He shrank from the irritations of reality, and he had
little patience with the national mania cultivated after Sedan, warning
his country that their victory was not one of a superior culture, that
Germany had no style but a barbaric mixture of many styles; and he
pointed out the essential difference between culture and erudition.

His unfinished work, "The Will to Power," was an attempt to house his
lyric passions in an architectural frame. The façade of the structure,
as posthumously revealed to us, is an indication that he was really
engaged in building a Tower of Babel. Power, Affirmation, Yea-Saying he
considered the attributes of life, and he found in them recompense for
his weakness and his lack of capacity for happiness. He was a master of
the exquisite nuances of vision, but since he touched real life at the
circumference, and not at the centre, his philosophical valuations are
bizarre, and have only a literary value.

It is superficial to make Treitschke and Bernhardi his disciples, as
some American writers have made Roosevelt his disciple. Treitschke is a
heavy-footed historian who raised the axiom of self-preservation into a
philosophy of force. Von Bernhardi's book, though extreme in its
expression, is based on the fundamental truth that if Germany desired a
just proportion of oversea territories (a proportion denied her by
England) she would have to gain it by force of arms. In the development
of this idea he makes many generalizations calculated to dazzle the
multitude and to imbue it with the courage to expansion. Treitschke
would have rested in obscurity but for the war; Bernhardi does not
pretend to talents as a philosopher.

The real origin of Germany's policy in the last forty years may be
derived from the eminently practical and direct mind of Bismarck. From
reading of history he learned that chicane and force had been utilized
as the roads to power, of which fact he found ample demonstration in the
histories of England and Russia. He proved himself a true adept by using
chicane and force to achieve German unity, after the theorists had
failed.

Those who glibly condemn a lyric philosopher in order to make out a case
against Germany reveal the weakness of their position. It is strange
that these lantern-eyed critics haven't cited Heine as an enemy of
democracy because he adored Napoleon. Was it because Heine lived for
years in Paris on the adulation of advanced feminines?

ABRAHAM SOLOMON.

New York, Oct. 13, 1914.




Belgium's Bitter Need

By Sir Gilbert Parker.


_Sir Gilbert Parker, M.P., went to Holland at the request of the
American Committee for the Relief of Belgium a week ago to inquire into
the work of the committee and the needs of the Belgians._

_Sir Gilbert visited frontier towns and the camps of the refugees for
the purpose of making a personal investigation into the conditions. That
he is deeply impressed by the desperate need of the Belgians may be
gathered from the following graphic statement and appeal, dated Dec. 5,
1914, to the American people:_

Since the beginning of the war the hearts of all humane people have been
tortured by the sufferings of Belgium. For myself the martyrdom of
Belgium had been a nightmare since the fall of Liège. Whoever or
whatever country is to blame for this war, Belgium is innocent. Her
hands are free from stain. She has kept the faith. She saw it with the
eyes of duty and honor. Her Government is carried on in another land.
Her King is in the trenches. Her army is decimated, but the last
decimals fight on.

Her people wander in foreign lands, the highest and lowest looking for
work and bread; they cannot look for homes. Those left behind huddle
near the ruins of their shattered villages or take refuge in towns which
cannot feed their own citizens.


Abyss of Want and Woe.

Many cities and towns have been completely destroyed; others, reduced or
shattered, struggle in vain to feed their poor and broken populations.
Stones and ashes mark the places where small communities lived their
peaceful lives before the invasion. The Belgian people live now in the
abyss of want and woe.

All this I knew in England, but knew it from the reports of others. I
did not, could not, know what the destitution, the desolation of Belgium
was, what were the imperative needs of this people, until I got to
Holland and to the borders of Belgian territory. Inside that territory I
could not pass because I was a Britisher, but there I could see German
soldiers, the Landwehr, keeping guard over what they call their new
German province. Belgium a German province!

There at Maastricht I saw fugitives crossing the frontier into Holland
with all their worldly goods on their shoulders or in their hands, or
with nothing at all, seeking hospitality of a little land which itself
feels, though it is neutral, the painful stress and cost of the war.
There, on the frontier, I was standing between Dutch soldiers and German
soldiers, so near the Germans that I could almost have touched them, so
near three German officers that their conversation as they saluted me
reached my ears.

I begin to understand what the sufferings and needs of Belgium are. They
are such that the horror of it almost paralyzes expression. I met at
Maastricht Belgians, representatives of municipalities, who said that
they had food for only a fortnight longer. And what was the food they
had? No meat, no vegetables, but only one-third of a soldier's rations
of bread for each person per day. At Liège, as I write, there is food
for only three days.

What is it the people of Belgium ask for? They ask for bread and salt,
no more, and it is not forthcoming. They do not ask for meat; they
cannot get it. They have no fires for cooking, and they do not beg for
petrol. Money is of little use to them, because there is no food to be
bought with money.

Belgium under ordinary circumstances imports five-sixths of the food she
eats. The ordinary channels of sale and purchase are closed. They
cannot buy and sell if they would. Representatives of Belgian
communities told me at Maastricht yesterday that the crops were taken
from their fields--the wheat and potatoes--and were sent into Germany.


No Work, but Taxes Continue.

There is no work. The factories are closed because they have not raw
material, coal, or petrol, because they have no markets.

And yet war taxes are falling with hideous pressure upon a people whose
hands are empty, whose workshops are closed, whose fields are idle,
whose cattle have been taken, or compulsorily purchased without value
received.

In Belgium itself the misery of the populace is greater than the misery
of the Belgian fugitives in other countries, such as Holland, where
there have come since the fall of Liège one and a half million of
fugitives. To gauge what that misery in Belgium is, think of what even
the fugitives suffer. I have seen in a room without fire, the walls
damp, the floor without covering, not even straw, a family of nine women
and eight children, one on an improvised bunk seriously ill. Their home
in Belgium was leveled with the ground, the father killed in battle.

Their food is coffee and bread for breakfast, potatoes for dinner, with
salt--and in having the salt they were lucky--bread and coffee for
supper. Insufficiently clothed, there by the North Sea, they watched the
bleak hours pass, with nothing to do except cling together in a vain
attempt to keep warm.

Multiply this case by hundreds of thousands and you will have some hint
of the people's sufferings.

In a lighter on the River Maas at Rotterdam, without windows, without
doors, with only an open hatchway from which a ladder descends, several
hundred fugitives spend their nights and the best parts of their days in
the iron hold, forever covered with moisture, leaky when rain comes,
with the floor never dry, and pervasive with a perpetual smell like the
smell of a cave which never gets the light of day. Here men, women, and
children were huddled together in a promiscuous communion of misery,
made infinitely more pathetic and heartrending because none complained.

At Rosendaal, at Scheveningen, Eysden, and Flushing, at a dozen other
places, these ghastly things are repeated in one form or another.
Holland has sheltered hundreds of thousands, but she could not in a
moment organize even adequate shelter, much less comforts.

In Bergen-op-Zoom, where I write these words, there have come since the
fall of Antwerp 300,000 hungry marchers, with no resources except what
they carry with them. This little town of 15,000 people did its best to
meet the terrible pressure, and its citizens went without bread
themselves to feed the refugees. How can a small municipality suddenly
deal with so vast a catastrophe? Yet slowly some sort of order was
organized out of chaos, and when the Government was able to establish
refugee camps through the military the worst conditions were moderated,
and now, in tents and in vans on a fortunately situated piece of land,
over 3,000 people live, so far as comforts are concerned, like Kaffirs
in Karoo or aborigines in a camp in the back blocks of Australia. The
tents are crammed with people, and life is reduced to its barest
elements. Straw, boards, and a few blankets and dishes for rations--that
constitutes the ménage.

Children are born in the hugger mugger of such conditions, but the good
Holland citizens see that the children are cared for and that the babies
have milk. Devoted priests teach the children, and the value of military
organization illuminates the whole panoply of misery. Yet the best of
the refugee camps would seem to American citizens like the dark and
dreadful life of an underworld, in which is neither work, purpose, nor
opportunity. It is a sight repugnant to civilization.

The saddest, most heartrending thing I have ever seen has been the
patience of every Belgian, whatever his state, I have met. Among the
thousands of refugees I have seen in Holland, in the long stream that
crossed the frontier at Maastricht and besieged the doors of the
Belgian Consul while I was there, no man, no woman railed or declaimed
against the horror of their situation. The pathos of lonely, staring,
apathetic endurance is tragic beyond words. So grateful, so simply
grateful, are they, every one, for whatever is done for them.


None of the Refugees Begs.

None begs, none asks for money, and yet on the faces of these frontier
refugees I saw stark hunger, the weakness come of long weeks of famine.
One man, one fortunate man from Verviers, told me he could purchase as
much as 2s. 8d. worth of food for himself, his wife, and child for a
week.

Think of it, American citizens! Sixty-six cents' worth of food for a
man, his wife, and child for a whole week, if he were permitted to
purchase that much! Sixty-six cents! That is what an average American
citizen pays for his dinner in his own home. He cannot get breakfast, he
can only get half a breakfast, for that at the Waldorf or the Plaza in
New York.

This man was only allowed to purchase that much food if he could,
because if he purchased more he would be taking from some one else, and
they were living on rations for the week which would represent the food
of an ordinary man for a day. A rich man can have no more than a poor
man. It is a democracy of famine.

There is enough food wasted in the average American household in one day
to keep a Belgian for a fortnight in health and strength. They want in
Belgium 300,000 tons of food a month. That is their normal requirement.
The American Relief Committee is asking for 8,000 tons a month,
one-quarter of the normal requirements, one-half of a soldier's rations
for each Belgian. The American Committee needs $5,000,000 a month until
next harvest. It is a huge sum, but it must be forthcoming.

Of all the great powers of the world the United States is the only one
not at war or in peril of war. Of all the foremost nations of the world
the United States is the only one that can save Belgium from starvation
if she will. She was the only nation that Germany would allow a foothold
for humanity's and for Christ's sake in Belgium. Such an opportunity,
such responsibility, no nation ever had before in the history of the
world. Spain and Italy join with her, but the initiative and resources
and organization are hers.

Around Belgium is a ring of steel. Within that ring of steel are a
disappearing and for ever disappearing population. Towns like
Dendermonde, that were of 10,000 people, have now 4,000, and in
Dendermonde 1,200 houses have fallen under the iron and fire of war.
Into that vast graveyard and camp of the desolate only the United States
enters with an adequate and responsible organization upon the mission of
humanity.

No such opportunity was ever given to a people, no such test ever came
to a Christian people in all the records of time. Will the American
Nation rise to the chance given to it to prove that its civilization is
a real thing and that its acts measure up with its inherent and
professed Christianity?

I am a profound believer in the great-heartedness of the United States,
and there is not an American of German origin who ought not gladly and
freely give to the relief of people who, unless the world feeds them,
must be the remnant of a nation; and the world in this case is the
United States. She can give most.

The price of one good meal a week for a family in an American home will
keep a Belgian alive for a fortnight.

Probably the United States has 18,000,000 homes. How many of them will
deny themselves a meal for martyred Belgium? The mass of the American
people do not need to deny themselves anything to give to Belgium. The
whole standard of living on the American Continent, in the United States
and Canada, is so much higher than the European standard that if they
lowered the scale by one-tenth just for one six months the Belgium
problem would be solved.

I say to the American people that they cannot conceive what this strain
upon the populations of Europe is at this moment, and, in the cruel
grip of Winter, hundreds of thousands will agonize till death or relief
comes. In Australia in drought times vast flocks of sheep go traveling
with shepherds looking for food and water, and no flock ever comes back
as it went forth. Not in flocks guided by shepherds, but lonely,
hopeless units, the Belgian people take flight, looking for food and
shelter, or remain paralyzed by the tragedy fallen upon them in their
own land.

Their sufferings are majestic in simple heroism and uncomplaining
endurance. So majestic in proportion ought the relief to be. The Belgian
people are wards of the world. In the circumstances the Belgian people
are special wards of the one great country that is secure in its peace
and that by its natural instincts of human sympathy and love of freedom
is best suited to do the work that should be done for Belgium. If every
millionaire would give a thousand, if every man with $100 a month would
give $10, the American Committee for the Relief of Belgium, with its
splendid organization, its unrivaled efficiency, through which flows a
tide of human sympathy, would be able to report at the end of the war
that a small nation in misfortune had been saved from famine and despair
by a great people far away, who had responded to the call, "Come over
and help us!"

GILBERT PARKER.




A CORRECTION.


Under the head of "Russia's 'Little Brother,'" on Page 364 of this
magazine history, in its issue of Dec. 26, 1914, appeared a statement
taken from The New York Sun of Oct. 12, 1914, and attributed to George
Bakhmeteff, Russian Ambassador at Washington. Our attention has been
called to the following editorial paragraph printed by The Sun on Oct.
14, embodying the Russian Ambassador's denial of its authenticity:

     The Sun on Monday printed in good faith what it believed to be
     an authorized statement of the views and sentiments of Mr.
     George Bakhmeteff, Russian Ambassador to the United States.
     Ambassador Bakhmeteff telegraphs to us from Washington as
     follows:

     "I most emphatically deny having spoken one single word to the
     reporter who published an interview with me in your paper. I
     have not even seen one, and must insist on your publishing
     this very categorical and direct statement."

     Of course, we publish the Ambassador's denial not less in
     justice to our readers and to ourselves than to him, at the
     same time expressing our extreme regret that The Sun should
     have been led to believe that it was presenting the Russian
     case as viewed by Mr. Bakhmeteff with his full acquiescence.

We add our cordial regret to that of The Sun that this repudiated
statement should have gained further circulation.--Editor.




[English Cartoon]

Certainly Not!


[Illustration: _--From The Sketch, London._

TURKEY, THE OFFICE BOY (to his master): Please, Sir, can I have a day
off?]