Produced by Steven Gibbs, William Flis, and the Online
Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net





THE MAJOR OPERATIONS OF THE NAVIES IN THE WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE


BY

A.T. MAHAN, D.C.L., LL.D.

CAPTAIN, U.S. NAVY

AUTHOR OF 'THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783,'
'THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE,
1783-1812,' 'THE RELATIONS OF SEA POWER TO THE WAR OF 1812,' 'NAVAL
STRATEGY' ETC.


_WITH PORTRAITS, MAPS, AND BATTLE PLANS_


LONDON
SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON & COMPANY, LIMITED
OVERY HOUSE, 100 SOUTHWARK STREET, S.E.


[Illustration: (frontispiece)]


_Copyright, 1913_, By A.T. MAHAN

_All rights reserved_


Published, October, 1913


THE UNIVERSITY PRESS, CAMBRIDGE, MASS., U.S.A.




PREFACE


The contents of this volume were first contributed as a chapter, under
the title of "Major Operations, 1762-1783," to the "History of the
Royal Navy," in seven volumes, published by Messrs. Sampson Low,
Marston, and Company, under the general editorship of the late Sir
William Laird Clowes. For permission to republish now in this separate
form, the author has to express his thanks to the publishers of that
work.

In the Introduction following this Preface, the author has summarized
the general lesson to be derived from the course of this War of
American Independence, as distinct from the particular discussion
and narration of the several events which constitute the body of the
treatment. These lessons he conceives to carry admonition for the
present and future based upon the surest foundations; namely, upon
the experience of the past as applicable to present conditions. The
essential similarity between the two is evident in a common dependence
upon naval strength.

There has been a careful rereading and revision of the whole text; but
the changes found necessary to be made are much fewer than might have
been anticipated after the lapse of fifteen years. Numerous footnotes
in the History, specifying the names of ships in fleets, and of their
commanders in various battles, have been omitted, as not necessary to
the present purpose, though eminently proper and indeed indispensable
to an extensive work of general reference and of encyclopædic scope,
such as the History is. Certain notes retained with the initials
W.L.C. are due to the editor of that work.

A.T. MAHAN.

DECEMBER, 1912.




CONTENTS


                           PAGE

  PREFACE     v

  LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS     xix

  LIST OF MAPS      xxi

  LIST OF BATTLE-PLANS       xxiii


INTRODUCTION

THE TENDENCY OF WARS TO SPREAD

  Macaulay quoted on the action of Frederick the Great       1

  Illustration from Conditions of the Turkish Empire       2

  Lesson from the Recent War in the Balkans, 1912-1913      2

  The War of American Independence a striking example of the
          Tendency of Wars to Spread        3

  Origin and Train of Events in that War, Traced        3

  Inference as to possible Train of Future Events in the History of
          the United States      4

  The Monroe Doctrine Simply a Formulated Precaution against the
          Tendency of Wars to Spread        4

  National Policy as to Asiatic Immigration         4

  Necessity of an Adequate Navy if these two National Policies are
          to be sustained       4

  Dependence on Navy Illustrated in the Two Great National Crises;
          in the War of Independence and in the War of Secession
          4

  The United States not great in Population in proportion to
          Territory       5

  Nor Wealthy in Proportion to exposed Coast-Line      5

  Special Fitness of a Navy to meet these particular conditions      5

  The Pacific a great World Problem, dependent mainly on Naval Power
          5

CHAPTER I

THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN

1775-1776

  Preponderant effect of Control of the Water upon the Struggle for
          American Independence        6

  Deducible then from Reason and from Experience       6

  Consequent Necessity to the Americans of a Counterpoise to British
          Navy      6

  This obtained through Burgoyne's Surrender      6

  The Surrender of Burgoyne traceable directly to the Naval
          Campaigns on Lake Champlain, 1775, 1776      7

  The subsequent Course of the War in all Quarters of the world due
          to that decisive Campaign      7

  The Strategic Problem of Lake Champlain familiar to Americans from
          the Wars between France and Great Britain prior to 1775
          8

  Consequent prompt Initiative by Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold
          8

  Energetic Pursuit of first Successes by Arnold      9

  Complete Control of Lake Champlain thus secured      9

  Invasion of Canada by Montgomery, 1775      9

  Arnold marches through Maine Wilderness and joins Montgomery
          before Quebec      10

  Assault on Quebec. Failure, and Death of Montgomery      10

  Arnold maintains Blockade of Quebec, 1776      10

  Relief of the Place by British Navy      11

  Arnold Retreats to Crown Point      12

  Arnold's Schemes and Diligence to create a Lake Navy, 1776      13

  Difficulties to be overcome      13

  Superior Advantages of the British      13

  The British by building acquire Superiority, but too late for
          effect in 1776      13

  Ultimate Consequences from this Retardation      14

  Constitution of the Naval Force raised by Arnold      14

  He moves with it to the foot of Lake Champlain      15

  Takes position for Defence at Valcour Island      15

  Particular Difficulties encountered by British      15

  Constitution of the British Lake Navy      16

  Land Forces of the Opponents      17

  Naval Forces of the Two at the Battle of Valcour Island      17

  Magnitude of the Stake at Issue      18

  Arnold's Purposes and Plans      18

  Advance of the British      19

  Arnold's Disposition of his Flotilla to receive Attack      20

  The Battle of Valcour Island      21

  The Americans Worsted      22

  Arnold Retreats by night Undetected      23

  Pursuit by the British      24

  Destruction of the American Vessels      25

  British Appreciation of the Importance of the Action, as shown
          26

  Criticism of the conduct of the Opposing Leaders      26

  Arnold's Merit and Gallantry      27

  End of the Naval Story of the Lakes      27

  Effect of the Campaign upon the Decisive Events of 1777      28


CHAPTER II

NAVAL ACTION AT BOSTON, CHARLESTON, NEW YORK, AND NARRAGANSETT
BAY--ASSOCIATED LAND OPERATIONS, TO THE BATTLE OF TRENTON

1776

  Necessity that Force, if resorted to, be from the first Adequate
          29

  Application to National Policy in peace      29

  To the Monroe Doctrine      29

  Failure of the British Government of 1775 in this respect      30

  Consequences of such failure      30

  General Howe evacuates Boston and retires to Halifax. Extent of
          his Command      30

  Dissemination of Effort by British Government      30

  Expedition against South Carolina      31

  Local Conditions about Charleston      32

  Description of Fort Moultrie      33

  Plan of British Naval Attack      33

  The Battle of Fort Moultrie      34

  Failure of the Attack. British Losses      36

  Comment upon the Action      37

  The Expedition retires to New York      38

  The Howes, Admiral and General, arrive in New York Bay      39

  Operations about the City      39

  Continuous and Decisive, but Inconspicuous, Part played by the
          British Navy      40

  Description of Local Conditions about New York      40

  American Preparations for Defence      41

  Crucial Weakness of the Scheme      42

  The Advance of the British      42

  Washington withdraws his Army from the Brooklyn side      43

  Success of this Withdrawal due to British Negligence      44

  Subsequent Operations, and Retreat of Washington to New Jersey
          45

  Retreat continued to Pennsylvania, where he receives
          reinforcements      46

  Slackness of Sir William Howe's actions      47

  The British take possession of Narragansett Bay. Importance of
          that position      48

  Washington suddenly takes the Offensive. Battle of Trenton      48

  He recovers most of the State of New Jersey      49


CHAPTER III

THE DECISIVE PERIOD OF THE WAR. SURRENDER OF BURGOYNE AND CAPTURE OF
PHILADELPHIA BY HOWE. THE NAVAL PART IN EACH OPERATION

1777

  British Object in Campaign of 1777 the same as that in 1776      50

  Part assigned to Burgoyne      50

  Slowness of his Progress at the beginning      51

  Sir William Howe, instead of coöperating, takes his Army to the
          Chesapeake      52

  Criticism of this Course      52

  Howe's Progress to Philadelphia, and Capture of that City      53

  Admiral Lord Howe takes the Fleet from the Chesapeake to the
          Delaware      53

  Surrender of Burgoyne and his Army      53

  British Naval Operations in Delaware Bay      54

  Brief Tenure--Nine Months--of Philadelphia by British      55

  The general Failure of the British Campaign determined by Howe's
          move to the Chesapeake      55

  General Results of the Campaign      56

  Part played by the British Navy. Analogous to that in Spain,
          1808-1812, and in many other instances      57


CHAPTER IV

WAR BEGINS BETWEEN FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN. BRITISH EVACUATE
PHILADELPHIA. NAVAL OPERATIONS OF D'ESTAING AND HOWE ABOUT NEW YORK,
NARRAGANSETT BAY, AND BOSTON. COMPLETE SUCCESS OF LORD HOWE. AMERICAN
DISAPPOINTMENT IN D'ESTAING. LORD HOWE RETURNS TO ENGLAND

1778

  France recognizes the Independence of the United States, and makes
          with them a defensive Alliance      58

  A French Fleet sails for America under Comte d'Estaing      59

  Unprepared condition of the British Navy      59

  Admiral Byron sails with a Reinforcement for America      59

  Ill effect of Naval Unreadiness upon British Commerce; and
          especially on the West Indies      60

  Admiral Keppel puts to Sea with the British Channel Fleet      61

  First Guns of the War with France      62

  Extreme Length of Byron's Passage      62

  He turns back to Halifax      62

  D'Estaing's slowness allows Howe to escape from Delaware Bay.
          Howe's Celerity      62

  Evacuation of Philadelphia by British Army, and its precipitate
          Retreat to New York      63

  Escape of both Army and Fleet due to d'Estaing's Delays      63

  Rapid Action of Lord Howe      64

  D'Estaing Arrives off New York      64

  Howe's elaborate Dispositions for the Defence of New York Bay
          65

  Statement of British and French Naval Force      66

  D'Estaing decides not to attempt Passage of the Bar, and puts to
          Sea      67

  Anchors off Narragansett Bay      69

  Forces the Entrance to Newport and Anchors inside the Bay      70

  The British garrison besieged by superior American and French
          forces      70

  Howe appears with his Fleet and anchors off the entrance, at Point
          Judith      71

  Sustained Rapidity of his action at New York      71

  D'Estaing Withdraws from Siege of Newport and puts to Sea      73

  Manoeuvres of the two Opponents      74

  D'Estaing quits the Field, and both Fleets are scattered by a
          heavy Gale      75

  Howe returns to New York and collects his Fleet      76

  D'Estaing calls oft Newport; but abandons the Siege finally,
          taking his Fleet to Boston      77

  Critical Condition of British garrison in Newport. D'Estaing's
          withdrawal compels Americans to raise the siege      77

  Howe follows d'Estaing to Boston      77

  Discussion of the Conduct of the opposing Admirals      78

  Howe gives up his Command and returns to England      80


CHAPTER V

THE NAVAL WAR IN EUROPE. THE BATTLE OF USHANT

1778

  Admirals Keppel and D'Orvilliers put to Sea from Portsmouth and
          Brest      82

  Instructions given to the French Admiral      83

  Preliminary Manoeuvres after the two Fleets had sighted one
          another      83

  The Battle of Ushant      84

  A Drawn Battle. The respective Losses      91

  The Significance of the Battle in the fighting Development of the
          British Navy      93

  The "Order of Battle"      93

  The Disputes and Courts Martial in Great Britain arising from the
          Battle of Ushant      94

  Keppel Resigns his Command      97


CHAPTER VI

OPERATIONS IN THE WEST INDIES, 1778-1779. THE BRITISH INVASION OF
GEORGIA AND SOUTH CAROLINA

  Influence of Seasonal Conditions upon Naval Operations in America
          98

  Commercial Importance of the West Indies      98

  The French seize Dominica      99

  D'Estaing Sails with his Fleet from Boston for Martinique      100

  A British Squadron under Hotham sails the same day for Barbados,
          with Five Thousand Troops      100

  Admiral Barrington's Seizure of Santa Lucia      101

  D'Estaing sails to Recapture it      102

  Rapidity and Skill shown in Barrington's Movements and
          Dispositions      102

  D'Estaing's attacks Foiled, both on Sea and on Shore      103

  He Abandons the attempt and Returns to Martinique      104

  Importance of Santa Lucia in Subsequent Operations      104

  Byron Reaches Barbados, and takes over Command from Barrington
          105

  D'Estaing Captures the British Island Grenada      105

  Byron goes to its Relief      106

  The Action between the two Fleets, of Byron and d'Estaing, July 6,
          1779      106

  Criticism of the two Commanders-in-Chief      110

  D'Estaing returns to Grenada, which remains French      112

  Byron returns to England. British North American Station assigned
          to Admiral Arbuthnot, Leeward Islands to Rodney      113

  British Operations in Georgia and South Carolina. Capture of
          Savannah      113

  Fatal Strategic Error in these Operations      114

  D'Estaing's attempt to Retake Savannah Foiled      115

  His appearance on the coast, however, causes the British to
          abandon Narragansett Bay      115

  D'Estaing succeeded by de Guichen in North America. Rodney also
          arrives      115


CHAPTER VII

THE NAVAL WAR IN EUROPEAN WATERS, 1779. ALLIED FLEETS INVADE THE
ENGLISH CHANNEL. RODNEY DESTROYS TWO SPANISH SQUADRONS AND RELIEVES
GIBRALTAR

  Spain declares War against Great Britain      116

  Delays in Junction of French and Spanish Fleets      116

  They enter the Channel. Alarm in England      117

  Plans of the French Government      118

  Their Change and Failure. The Allied Fleets return to Brest      119

  Criticism of the British Ministry      120

  Divergent views of France and Spain      120

  Prominence given to Gibraltar, and the resulting Effect upon the
          general War      121

  Exhaustion of Supplies at Gibraltar      121

  Rodney with the Channel Fleet Sails for its Relief, with ultimate
          Destination to Leeward Islands Command      121

  He Captures a large Spanish Convoy      122

  And Destroys a Second Spanish Squadron of Eleven Sail-of-the-Line
          123

  Distinction of this Engagement      124

  Gibraltar and Minorca Relieved      125

  Rodney proceeds to the West Indies      126

  The Channel Fleet returns to England      126


CHAPTER VIII

RODNEY AND DE GUICHEN'S NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN WEST INDIES. DE GUICHEN
RETURNS TO EUROPE AND RODNEY GOES TO NEW YORK. LORD CORNWALLIS IN THE
CAROLINAS. TWO NAVAL ACTIONS OF COMMODORE CORNWALLIS. RODNEY RETURNS
TO WEST INDIES

1780

  Rodney's Force upon arrival in West Indies      128

  Action between British and French Squadrons prior to his arrival
          129

  Rodney and de Guichen put to sea      130

  Action between them of April 17, 1780      131

  Cause of Failure of Rodney's Attack      133

  His Disappointment in his Subordinates      135

  His Expression of his Feelings      135

  Discussion of the Incidents and Principles involved      137

  The Losses of the Respective Fleets      140

  They Continue to Cruise      141

  The Action of May 15, 1780      142

  That of May 19, 1780      144

  The Results Indecisive      144

  Contrary Personal Effect produced upon the two Admirals by the
          encounters      145

  De Guichen asks to be Relieved      145

  Rodney's Chary Approval of his Subordinates in these two instances
          145

  Suspicion and Distrust rife in the British Navy at this period
          146

  Twelve Spanish Sail-of-the-Line, with Ten Thousand Troops, Arrive
          at Guadeloupe      147

  They refuse Coöperation with de Guichen in the Windward Islands
          147

  De Guichen Accompanies them to Haïti with his Fleet      147

  He declines to Coöperate on the Continent with the Americans, and
          sails for Europe      148

  Rodney Arranges for the protection of the Homeward West India
          Trade, and then proceeds to New York      149

  Effect of his coming      150

  The Year 1780 one of great Discouragement to Americans      151

  Summary of the Operations in the Carolinas and Virginia, 1780,
          which led to Lord Cornwallis's Surrender in 1781      151

  Two Naval Actions sustained by Commodore Cornwallis against
          superior French forces, 1780      153

  The Year 1780 Uneventful in European seas      157

  Capture of a great British Convoy      157

  The Armed Neutrality of the Baltic Powers      158

  The Accession of Holland to this followed by a Declaration of War
          by Great Britain      158

  The French Government withdraws all its Ships of War from before
          Gibraltar      158


CHAPTER IX

NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN WEST INDIES IN 1781. CAPTURE OF ST. EUSTATIUS BY
RODNEY. DE GRASSE ARRIVES IN PLACE OF DE GUICHEN. TOBAGO SURRENDERS TO
DE GRASSE

  Effects of the Great Hurricanes of 1780 in West Indies      159

  Rodney's Diminished Force. Arrival of Sir Samuel Hood with
          reinforcements      160

  Rodney receives Orders to seize Dutch Possessions in Caribbean
          160

  Capture of St. Eustatius, St. Martin, and Saba      161

  The large Booty and Defenceless state of St. Eustatius      161

  Effect of these Conditions upon Rodney      161

  Hood detached to cruise before Martinique      162

  De Grasse arrives there with Twenty Ships-of-the-Line      163

  Indecisive Action between de Grasse and Hood      164

  Criticism of the two Commanders      166

  Junction of Rodney and Hood      166

  De Grasse attempts Santa Lucia, and Fails      167

  He captures Tobago      168

  He decides to take his Meet to the American Continent      168


CHAPTER X

NAVAL OPERATIONS PRECEDING AND DETERMINING THE FALL OF YORKTOWN.
CORNWALLIS SURRENDERS

1781

  Summary of Land Operations in Virginia early in 1781      169

  Portsmouth Occupied      170

  A French Squadron from Newport, and a British from Gardiner's Bay,
          proceed to the Scene      170

  They meet off the Chesapeake      171

  Action between Arbuthnot and des Touches, March 16, 1781      171

  The Advantage rests with the French, but they return to Newport.
          Arbuthnot enters the Chesapeake      174

  Cornwallis reaches Petersburg, Virginia, May 20      175

  Under the directions of Sir Henry Clinton he evacuates Portsmouth
          and concentrates his forces at Yorktown, August 22
          175

  The French Fleet under de Grasse Anchors in the Chesapeake, August
          30      176

  British Naval Movements, in July and August, affecting conditions
          in the Chesapeake      176

  Admiral Graves, successor to Arbuthnot at New York, joined there
          by Sir Samuel Hood, August 28      177

  Washington and Rochambeau move upon Cornwallis      178

  The British Fleet under Graves arrives off the Chesapeake      179

  Action between de Grasse and Graves, September 5      179

  Hood's Criticism of Graves's Conduct      181

  The British, worsted, return to New York. De Grasse, reinforced,
          re-enters the Chesapeake, September 11      184

  Cornwallis Surrenders, October 19      184

  De Grasse and Hood Return to West Indies      185


CHAPTER XI

NAVAL EVENTS OF 1781 IN EUROPE. DARBY'S RELIEF OF GIBRALTAR, AND THE
BATTLE OF THE DOGGER BANK

  Leading Objects of the Belligerents in 1781      186

  The Relief of Gibraltar by Admiral Darby      186

  Capture of British Convoy with the spoils of St. Eustatius      188

  The French and Spanish Fleet under Admiral de Cordova again enters
          the English Channel      188

  Darby in inferior Force shut up in Tor Bay      188

  The Allies Decide not to attack him, but to turn their Efforts
          against British Commerce      189

  Minorca Lost by British      189

  The Battle of the Dogger Bank, between British and Dutch Fleets
          190


CHAPTER XII

THE FINAL NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST INDIES. HOOD AND DE GRASSE.
RODNEY AND DE GRASSE. THE GREAT BATTLE OF APRIL 12, 1782

  Capture and Destruction near Ushant of a great French Convoy for
          the West Indies opens the Naval Campaign of 1782      195

  Attack upon the Island of St. Kitts by de Grasse and de Bouillé
          197

  Hood sails for its Relief from Barbados      197

  His Plan of procedure      198

  Balked by an Accident      199

  He Succeeds in dislodging de Grasse and taking the Anchorage left
          by the French      200

  Unsuccessful Attempt by de Grasse to shake Hood's position      203

  St. Kitts nevertheless compelled to Surrender owing to having
          insufficient Land Force      205

  Hood Extricates himself from de Grasse's Superior Force and
          Retires      205

  Rodney arrives from England and joins Hood      205

  Project of French and Spaniards against Jamaica      206

  De Grasse sails from Martinique with his whole Fleet and a large
          Convoy      207

  Rodney's Pursuit      208

  Partial Actions of April 9, 1782      209

  British Pursuit continues      211

  It is favored by the Lagging of two Ships in the French Fleet,
          April 11      211

  An Accident that night induces de Grasse to bear down, and enables
          Rodney to force Action      212

  The Battle of April 12 begins      214

  A Shift of Wind enables the British to Break the French Order in
          three places      217

  Consequences of this Movement      218

  Resultant Advantages to the British      219

  Practices of the opposing Navies in regard to the Aims of Firing
          219

  Consequences Illustrated in the Injuries received respectively
          220

  Inadequate Use made by Rodney of the Advantage gained by his Fleet
          220

  Hood's Criticisms      220

  Hood's Opinion shared by Sir Charles Douglas, Rodney's
          Chief-of-Staff      222

  Rodney's own Reasons for his Course after the Battle      222

  His Assumptions not accordant with the Facts      223

  Actual Prolonged Dispersion of the French Fleet      224

  Hood, Detached in Pursuit, Captures a small French Squadron      224

  Rodney Superseded in Command before the news of the victory
          reached England      225

  The general War Approaches its End      226


CHAPTER XIII

HOWE AGAIN GOES AFLOAT. THE FINAL RELIEF OF GIBRALTAR

1782

  Howe appointed to Command Channel Fleet      227

  Cruises first in North Sea and in Channel      228

  The Allied Fleets in much superior force take Position in the
          Chops of the Channel, but are successfully evaded by Howe
          229

  The British Jamaica Convoy also escapes them      229

  Howe ordered to Relieve Gibraltar      229

  Loss of the _Royal George_, with Kempenfelt      229

  Howe Sails      229

  Slow but Successful Progress      230

  Great Allied Fleet in Bay of Gibraltar      230

  Howe's Success in Introducing the Supplies      231

  Negligent Mismanagement of the Allies      231

  Partial Engagement when Howe leaves Gibraltar      232

  Estimate of Howe's Conduct, and of his Professional Character
          232

  French Eulogies      232


CHAPTER XIV

THE NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE EAST INDIES, 1778-1783. THE CAREER OF THE
BAILLI DE SUFFREN

  Isolation characteristic of Military and Naval Operations in India
          234

  Occurrences in 1778      234

  Sir Edward Hughes sent to India with a Fleet, 1779      235

  The Years prior to 1781 Uneventful      235

  A British Squadron under Commodore Johnstone sent in 1781 to seize
          Cape of Good Hope      236

  A Week Later, a French Squadron under Suffren sails for India
          236

  Suffren finds Johnstone Anchored in Porto Praya, and attacks at
          once      237

  The immediate Result Indecisive, but the Cape of Good Hope is
          saved by Suffren arriving first      238

  Suffren reaches Mauritius, and the French Squadron sails for India
          under Comte d'Orves      239

  D'Orves dies, leaving Suffren in Command      240

  Trincomalee, in Ceylon, captured by Hughes      240

  First Engagement between Hughes and Suffren, February 17, 1782
          240

  Second Engagement, April 12      242

  Third Engagement, July 6      244

  Suffren captures Trincomalee      247

  Hughes arrives, but too late to save the place      247

  Fourth Engagement between Hughes and Suffren, September 3      248

  Having lost Trincomalee, Hughes on the change of monsoon is
          compelled to go to Bombay      251

  Reinforced there by Bickerton      251

  Suffren winters in Sumatra, but regains Trincomalee before Hughes
          returns. Also receives Reinforcements      251

  The British Besiege Cuddalore      252

  Suffren Relieves the Place      253

  Fifth Engagement between Hughes and Suffren, June 20, 1783      253

  Comparison between Hughes and Suffren      254

  News of the Peace being received, June 29, Hostilities in India
          cease      255


  GLOSSARY OF NAUTICAL AND NAVAL TERMS USED IN THIS BOOK      257


  INDEX      267




LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

  Remains of the _Revenge_, one of Benedict Arnold's Schooners on
  Lake Champlain in 1776. Now in Fort Ticonderoga.   _Frontispiece_

                                                    FACING PAGE

  Major-General Philip Schuyler      12

  Edward Pellew, afterwards Admiral, Lord Exmouth      12

  Benedict Arnold      27

  Attack on Fort Moultrie in 1776       33

  Richard, Earl Howe       78

  Charles Henri, Comte d'Estaing       78

  Admiral, the Honourable Samuel Barrington      104

  Comte de Guichen      144

  George Brydges, Lord Rodney      144

  François-Joseph-Paul, Comte de Grasse, Marquis de Tilly      204

  Admiral, Lord Hood      204

  Sir Edward Hughes, K.B.       254

  Pierre André de Suffren de Saint Tropez       254




LIST OF MAPS


                                        FACING PAGE

  Lake Champlain and Connected Waters       8

  New York and New Jersey: to illustrate Operations of 1776,
  1777, and 1778       40

  Narragansett Bay       70

  Leeward Islands (West Indies) Station       99

  Island of Santa Lucia       101

  Island of Martinique       164

  Peninsula of India, and Ceylon       234

  North Atlantic Ocean. General Map to illustrate Operations in
  the War of American Independence       280




LIST OF BATTLE-PLANS


                                                        FACING PAGE

  D'Orvilliers and Keppel, off Ushant, July 27, 1778

    Figure 1       86

    Figures 2 and 3      90

  D'Estaing and Byron, July 6, 1779      106

  Rodney and De Guichen, April 17, 1780, Figures 1 and 2      132

  Rodney and De Guichen, May 15, 1780      143

  Cornwallis and De Ternay, June 20, 1780      156

  Arbuthnot and Des Touches, March 16, 1781      172

  Graves and De Grasse, September 5, 1781      180

  Hood and De Grasse, January 25, 1782, Figures 1 and 2      201

  Hood and De Grasse, January 26, 1782, Figure 3      203

  Rodney and De Grasse, April 9 and 12, 1782

    Figures 1 and 2       210

    Figure 3      212

    Figures 4 and 5      215

    Figure 6      218

  Johnstone and Suffren, Porto Praya, April 16, 1781       237

  Hughes and Suffren, February 17, 1782       240

  Hughes and Suffren, April 12, 1782       243

  Hughes and Suffren, July 6, 1782       243

  Hughes and Suffren, September 3, 1782       249

       *       *       *       *       *




THE MAJOR OPERATIONS OF THE NAVIES IN THE WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE




INTRODUCTION

THE TENDENCY OF WARS TO SPREAD


Macaulay, in a striking passage of his Essay on Frederick the Great,
wrote, "The evils produced by his wickedness were felt in lands
where the name of Prussia was unknown. In order that he might rob
a neighbour whom he had promised to defend, black men fought on the
coast of Coromandel, and red men scalped each other by the Great Lakes
of North America."

Wars, like conflagrations, tend to spread; more than ever perhaps
in these days of close international entanglements and rapid
communications. Hence the anxiety aroused and the care exercised by
the governments of Europe, the most closely associated and the
most sensitive on the earth, to forestall the kindling of even the
slightest flame in regions where all alike are interested, though with
diverse objects; regions such as the Balkan group of States in their
exasperating relations with the Turkish empire, under which the Balkan
peoples see constantly the bitter oppression of men of their own blood
and religious faith by the tyranny of a government which can neither
assimilate nor protect. The condition of Turkish European provinces
is a perpetual lesson to those disposed to ignore or to depreciate
the immense difficulties of administering politically, under one
government, peoples traditionally and racially distinct, yet living
side by side; not that the situation is much better anywhere in the
Turkish empire. This still survives, though in an advanced state of
decay, simply because other States are not prepared to encounter the
risks of a disturbance which might end in a general bonfire, extending
its ravages to districts very far remote from the scene of the
original trouble.

Since these words were written, actual war has broken out in the
Balkans. The Powers, anxious each as to the effect upon its own
ambitions of any disturbance in European Turkey, have steadily
abstained from efficient interference in behalf of the downtrodden
Christians of Macedonia, surrounded by sympathetic kinsfolk.
Consequently, in thirty years past this underbrush has grown drier
and drier, fit kindling for fuel. In the Treaty of Berlin, in 1877,
stipulation was made for their betterment in governance, and we
are now told that in 1880 Turkey framed a scheme for such,--and
pigeonholed it. At last, under unendurable conditions, spontaneous
combustion has followed. There can be no assured peace until it is
recognised practically that Christianity, by the respect which it
alone among religions inculcates for the welfare of the individual,
is an essential factor in developing in nations the faculty of
self-government, apart from which fitness to govern others does not
exist. To keep Christian peoples under the rule of a non-Christian
race, is, therefore, to perpetuate a state hopeless of reconcilement
and pregnant of sure explosion. Explosions always happen
inconveniently. _Obsta principiis_ is the only safe rule; the
application of which is not suppression of overt discontent but relief
of grievances.

The War of American Independence was no exception to the general rule
of propagation that has been noted. When our forefathers began to
agitate against the Stamp Act and the other measures that succeeded
it, they as little foresaw the spread of their action to the East and
West Indies, to the English Channel and Gibraltar, as did the British
ministry which in framing the Stamp Act struck the match from which
these consequences followed. When Benedict Arnold on Lake Champlain by
vigorous use of small means obtained a year's delay for the colonists,
he compassed the surrender of Burgoyne in 1777. The surrender of
Burgoyne, justly estimated as the decisive event of the war, was due
to Arnold's previous action, gaining the delay which is a first object
for all defence, and which to the unprepared colonists was a vital
necessity. The surrender of Burgoyne determined the intervention of
France, in 1778; the intervention of France the accession of Spain
thereto, in 1779. The war with these two Powers led to the maritime
occurrences, the interferences with neutral trade, that gave rise to
the Armed Neutrality; the concurrence of Holland in which brought war
between that country and Great Britain, in 1780. This extension of
hostilities affected not only the West Indies but the East, through
the possessions of the Dutch in both quarters and at the Cape of
Good Hope. If not the occasion of Suffren being sent to India, the
involvement of Holland in the general war had a powerful effect upon
the brilliant operations which he conducted there; as well as at, and
for, the Cape of Good Hope, then a Dutch possession, on his outward
voyage.

In the separate publication of these pages, my intention and hope are
to bring home incidentally to American readers this vast extent of
the struggle to which our own Declaration of Independence was but the
prelude; with perchance the further needed lesson for the future,
that questions the most remote from our own shores may involve us
in unforeseen difficulties, especially if we permit a train of
communication to be laid by which the outside fire can leap step by
step to the American continents. How great a matter a little fire
kindleth! Our Monroe Doctrine is in final analysis merely the
formulation of national precaution that, as far as in its power
to prevent, there shall not lie scattered about the material which
foreign possessions in these continents might supply for the extension
of combustion originating elsewhere; and the objection to Asiatic
immigration, however debased by less worthy feelings or motives, is
on the part of thinking men simply a recognition of the same danger
arising from the presence of an inassimilable mass of population,
racially and traditionally distinct in characteristics, behind which
would lie the sympathies and energy of a powerful military and naval
Asiatic empire.

Conducive as each of these policies is to national safety and peace
amid international conflagration, neither the one nor the other can be
sustained without the creation and maintenance of a preponderant navy.
In the struggle with which this book deals, Washington at the
time said that the navies had the casting vote. To Arnold on Lake
Champlain, to DeGrasse at Yorktown, fell the privilege of exercising
that prerogative at the two great decisive moments of the War. To the
Navy also, beyond any other single instrumentality, was due eighty
years later the successful suppression of the movement of Secession.
The effect of the blockade of the Southern coasts upon the financial
and military efficiency of the Confederate Government has never
been closely calculated, and probably is incalculable. At these
two principal national epochs control of the water was the most
determinative factor. In the future, upon the Navy will depend the
successful maintenance of the two leading national policies mentioned;
the two most essential to the part this country is to play in the
progress of the world.

For, while numerically great in population, the United States is
not so in proportion to territory; nor, though wealthy, is she so in
proportion to her exposure. That Japan at four thousand miles distance
has a population of over three hundred to the square mile, while our
three great Pacific States average less than twenty, is a portentous
fact. The immense aggregate numbers resident elsewhere in the
United States cannot be transfered thither to meet an emergency, nor
contribute effectively to remedy this insufficiency; neither can a
land force on the defensive protect, if the way of the sea is open.
In such opposition of smaller numbers against larger, nowhere do
organisation and development count as much as in navies. Nowhere so
well as on the sea can a general numerical inferiority be compensated
by specific numerical superiority, resulting from the correspondence
between the force employed and the nature of the ground. It follows
strictly, by logic and by inference, that by no other means can safety
be insured as economically and as efficiently. Indeed, in matters of
national security, economy and efficiency are equivalent terms. The
question of the Pacific is probably the greatest world problem of
the twentieth century, in which no great country is so largely and
directly interested as is the United States. For the reason given it
is essentially a naval question, the third in which the United States
finds its well-being staked upon naval adequacy.




CHAPTER I

THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN 1775-1776


At the time when hostilities began between Great Britain and her
American Colonies, the fact was realised generally, being evident to
reason and taught by experience, that control of the water, both ocean
and inland, would have a preponderant effect upon the contest. It was
clear to reason, for there was a long seaboard with numerous interior
navigable watercourses, and at the same time scanty and indifferent
communications by land. Critical portions of the territory involved
were yet an unimproved wilderness. Experience, the rude but efficient
schoolmaster of that large portion of mankind which gains knowledge
only by hard knocks, had confirmed through the preceding French wars
the inferences of the thoughtful. Therefore, conscious of the great
superiority of the British Navy, which, however, had not then attained
the unchallenged supremacy of a later day, the American leaders early
sought the alliance of the Bourbon kingdoms, France and Spain, the
hereditary enemies of Great Britain. There alone could be found the
counterpoise to a power which, if unchecked, must ultimately prevail.

Nearly three years elapsed before the Colonists accomplished this
object, by giving a demonstration of their strength in the enforced
surrender of Burgoyne's army at Saratoga. This event has merited
the epithet "decisive," because, and only because, it decided the
intervention of France. It may be affirmed, with little hesitation,
that this victory of the colonists was directly the result of naval
force,--that of the colonists themselves. It was the cause that naval
force from abroad, entering into the contest, transformed it from
a local to a universal war, and assured the independence of the
Colonies. That the Americans were strong enough to impose the
capitulation of Saratoga, was due to the invaluable year of delay
secured to them by their little navy on Lake Champlain, created by the
indomitable energy, and handled with the indomitable courage, of the
traitor, Benedict Arnold. That the war spread from America to Europe,
from the English Channel to the Baltic, from the Bay of Biscay to the
Mediterranean, from the West Indies to the Mississippi, and ultimately
involved the waters of the remote peninsula of Hindustan, is
traceable, through Saratoga, to the rude flotilla which in 1776
anticipated its enemy in the possession of Lake Champlain. The events
which thus culminated merit therefore a clearer understanding, and
a fuller treatment, than their intrinsic importance and petty scale
would justify otherwise.

In 1775, only fifteen years had elapsed since the expulsion of the
French from the North American continent. The concentration of their
power, during its continuance, in the valley of the St. Lawrence, had
given direction to the local conflict, and had impressed upon men's
minds the importance of Lake Champlain, of its tributary Lake
George, and of the Hudson River, as forming a consecutive, though not
continuous, water line of communications from the St. Lawrence to
New York. The strength of Canada against attack by land lay in its
remoteness, in the wilderness to be traversed before it was reached,
and in the strength of the line of the St. Lawrence, with the
fortified posts of Montreal and Quebec on its northern bank. The
wilderness, it is true, interposed its passive resistance to attacks
from Canada as well as to attacks upon it; but when it had been
traversed, there were to the southward no such strong natural
positions confronting the assailant. Attacks from the south fell upon
the front, or at best upon the flank, of the line of the St. Lawrence.
Attacks from Canada took New York and its dependencies in the rear.

[Illustration]

These elements of natural strength, in the military conditions of the
North, were impressed upon the minds of the Americans by the prolonged
resistance of Canada to the greatly superior numbers of the British
Colonists in the previous wars. Regarded, therefore, as a base for
attacks, of a kind with which they were painfully familiar, but to be
undergone now under disadvantages of numbers and power never before
experienced, it was desirable to gain possession of the St. Lawrence
and its posts before they were strengthened and garrisoned. At this
outset of hostilities, the American insurgents, knowing clearly their
own minds, possessed the advantage of the initiative over the British
government, which still hesitated to use against those whom it styled
rebels the preventive measures it would have taken at once against a
recognised enemy.

Under these circumstances, in May, 1775, a body of two hundred and
seventy Americans, led by Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold, seized
the posts of Ticonderoga and Crown Point, which were inadequately
garrisoned. These are on the upper waters of Lake Champlain, where it
is less than a third of a mile wide; Ticonderoga being on a peninsula
formed by the lake and the inlet from Lake George, Crown Point on
a promontory twelve miles lower down.[1] They were positions of
recognised importance, and had been advanced posts of the British in
previous wars. A schooner being found there, Arnold, who had been a
seaman, embarked in her and hurried to the foot of the lake. The wind
failed him when still thirty miles from St. John's, another fortified
post on the lower narrows, where the lake gradually tapers down to
the Richelieu River, its outlet to the St. Lawrence. Unable to advance
otherwise, Arnold took to his boats with thirty men, pulled through
the night, and at six o'clock on the following morning surprised the
post, in which were only a sergeant and a dozen men. He reaped the
rewards of celerity. The prisoners informed him that a considerable
body of troops was expected from Canada, on its way to Ticonderoga;
and this force in fact reached St. John's on the next day. When it
arrived, Arnold was gone, having carried off a sloop which he found
there and destroyed everything else that could float. By such trifling
means two active officers had secured the temporary control of the
lake itself and of the approaches to it from the south. There being
no roads, the British, debarred from the water line, were unable to
advance. Sir Guy Carleton, Governor and Commander-in-Chief in Canada,
strengthened the works at St. John's, and built a schooner; but his
force was inadequate to meet that of the Americans.

The seizure of the two posts, being an act of offensive war, was not
at once pleasing to the American Congress, which still clung to the
hope of reconciliation; but events were marching rapidly, and
ere summer was over the invasion of Canada was ordered. General
Montgomery, appointed to that enterprise, embarked at Crown Point with
two thousand men on September 4th, and soon afterwards appeared before
St. John's, which after prolonged operations capitulated on the 3d of
November. On the 13th Montgomery entered Montreal, and thence pressed
down the St. Lawrence to Pointe aux Trembles, twenty miles above
Quebec. There he joined Arnold, who in the month of October had
crossed the northern wilderness, between the head waters of the
Kennebec River and St. Lawrence. On the way he had endured immense
privations, losing five hundred men of the twelve hundred with whom he
started; and upon arriving opposite Quebec, on the 10th of November,
three days had been unavoidably spent in collecting boats to pass the
river. Crossing on the night of the 13th, this adventurous soldier
and his little command climbed the Heights of Abraham by the same
path that had served Wolfe so well sixteen years before. With
characteristic audacity he summoned the place. The demand of course
was refused; but that Carleton did not fall at once upon the little
band of seven hundred that bearded him shows by how feeble a tenure
Great Britain then held Canada. Immediately after the junction
Montgomery advanced on Quebec, where he appeared on the 5th of
December. Winter having already begun, and neither his numbers nor
his equipments being adequate to regular siege operations, he very
properly decided to try the desperate chance of an assault upon the
strongest fortress in America. This was made on the night of December
31st, 1775. Whatever possibility of success there may have been
vanished with the death of Montgomery, who fell at the head of his
men.

The American army retired three miles up the river, went into
winter-quarters, and established a land blockade of Quebec, which was
cut off from the sea by the ice. "For five months," wrote Carleton to
the Secretary for War, on the 14th of May, 1776, "this town has been
closely invested by the rebels." From this unpleasant position it was
relieved on the 6th of May, when signals were exchanged between it and
the _Surprise_, the advance ship of a squadron under Captain Charles
Douglas,[2] which had sailed from England on the 11th of March.
Arriving off the mouth of the St. Lawrence, on the morning of April
12th, Douglas found ice extending nearly twenty miles to sea, and
packed too closely to admit of working through it by dexterous
steering. The urgency of the case not admitting delay, he ran his
ship, the _Isis_, 50, with a speed of five knots, against a large
piece of ice about ten or twelve feet thick, to test the effect. The
ice, probably softened by salt water and salt air, went to pieces.
"Encouraged by this experiment," continues Douglas, somewhat
magnificently, "we thought it an enterprise worthy an English ship of
the line in our King and country's sacred cause, and an effort due to
the gallant defenders of Quebec, to make the attempt of pressing her
by force of sail, through the thick, broad, and closely connected
fields of ice, to which we saw no bounds towards the western part of
our horizon. Before night (when blowing a snow-storm, we brought-to,
or rather stopped), we had penetrated about eight leagues into it,
describing our path all the way with bits of the sheathing of the
ship's bottom, and sometimes pieces of the cutwater, but none of the
oak plank; and it was pleasant enough at times, when we stuck fast,
to see Lord Petersham exercising his troops on the crusted surface
of that fluid through which the ship had so recently sailed." It took
nine days of this work to reach Anticosti Island, after which the ice
seems to have given no more trouble; but further delay was occasioned
by fogs, calms, and head winds.

Upon the arrival of the ships of war, the Americans at once retreated.
During the winter, though reinforcements must have been received from
time to time, they had wasted from exposure, and from small-pox,
which ravaged the camp. On the 1st of May the returns showed nineteen
hundred men present, of whom only a thousand were fit for duty. There
were then on hand but three days' provisions, and none other nearer
than St. John's. The inhabitants would of course render no further
assistance to the Americans after the ships arrived. The Navy had
again decided the fate of Canada, and was soon also to determine that
of Lake Champlain.

[Illustration]

When two hundred troops had landed from the ships, Carleton marched
out, "to see," he said, "what these mighty boasters were about." The
sneer was unworthy a man of his generous character, for the boasters
had endured much for faint chances of success; and the smallness of
the reinforcement which encouraged him to act shows either an extreme
prudence on his part, or the narrow margin by which Quebec escaped.
He found the enemy busy with preparations for retreat, and upon his
appearance they abandoned their camp. Their forces on the two sides of
the river being now separated by the enemy's shipping, the Americans
retired first to Sorel, where the Richelieu enters the St. Lawrence,
and thence continued to fall back by gradual stages. It was not until
June 15th that Arnold quitted Montreal; and at the end of June the
united force was still on the Canadian side of the present border
line. On the 3d of July it reached Crown Point, in a pitiable state
from small-pox and destitution.

Both parties began at once to prepare for a contest upon Lake
Champlain. The Americans, small as their flotilla was, still kept the
superiority obtained for them by Arnold's promptitude a year before.
On the 25th of June the American General Schuyler, commanding the
Northern Department, wrote: "We have happily such a naval superiority
on Lake Champlain, that I have a confident hope the enemy will not
appear upon it this campaign, especially as our force is increasing
by the addition of gondolas, two nearly finished. Arnold,
however,"--whose technical knowledge caused him to be intrusted with
the naval preparations,--"says that 300 carpenters should be employed
and a large number of gondolas, row-galleys, etc., be built, twenty or
thirty at least. There is great difficulty in getting the carpenters
needed." Arnold's ideas were indeed on a scale worthy of the momentous
issues at stake. "To augment our navy on the lake appears to me of the
utmost importance. There is water between Crown Point and Pointe au
Fer for vessels of the largest size. I am of opinion that row-galleys
are the best construction and cheapest for this lake. Perhaps it may
be well to have one frigate of 36 guns. She may carry 18-pounders on
the Lake, and be superior to any vessel that can be built or floated
from St. John's."

Unfortunately for the Americans, their resources in men and means were
far inferior to those of their opponents, who were able eventually
to carry out, though on a somewhat smaller scale, Arnold's idea of a
sailing ship, strictly so called, of force as yet unknown in inland
waters. Such a ship, aided as she was by two consorts of somewhat
similar character, dominated the Lake as soon as she was afloat,
reversing all the conditions. To place and equip her, however,
required time, invaluable time, during which Arnold's two schooners
exercised control. Baron Riedesel, the commander of the German
contingent with Carleton, after examining the American position at
Ticonderoga, wrote, "If we could have begun our expedition four weeks
earlier, I am satisfied that everything would have been ended this
year (1776); but, not having shelter nor other necessary things, we
were unable to remain at the other [southern] end of Champlain." So
delay favors the defence, and changes issues. What would have been the
effect upon the American cause if, simultaneously with the loss of
New York, August 20th-September 15th, had come news of the fall of
Ticonderoga, the repute of which for strength stood high? Nor was
this all; for in that event, the plan which was wrecked in 1777 by
Sir William Howe's ill-conceived expedition to the Chesapeake would
doubtless have been carried out in 1776. In a contemporary English
paper occurs the following significant item: "London, September 26th,
1776. Advices have been received here from Canada, dated August 12th,
that General Burgoyne's army has found it impracticable to get across
the lakes this season. The naval force of the Provincials is too great
for them to contend with at present. They must build larger vessels
for this purpose, and these cannot be ready before next summer. The
design _was_[3] that the two armies commanded by Generals Howe and
Burgoyne should coöperate; that they should both be on the Hudson
River at the same time; that they should join about Albany, and
thereby cut off all communication between the northern and southern
Colonies."[4]

As Arnold's more ambitious scheme could not be realised, he had to
content himself with gondolas and galleys, for the force he was to
command as well as to build. The precise difference between the two
kinds of rowing vessels thus distinguished by name, the writer has
not been able to ascertain. The gondola was a flat-bottomed boat,
and inferior in nautical qualities--speed, handiness, and
seaworthiness--to the galleys, which probably were keeled. The latter
certainly carried sails, and may have been capable of beating to
windward. Arnold preferred them, and stopped the building of gondolas.
"The galleys," he wrote, "are quick moving, which will give us a
great advantage in the open lake." The complements of the galleys were
eighty men, of the gondolas forty-five; from which, and from their
batteries, it may be inferred that the latter were between one third
and one half the size of the former. The armaments of the two were
alike in character, but those of the gondolas much lighter. American
accounts agree with Captain Douglas's report of one galley captured
by the British. In the bows, an 18 and a 12-pounder; in the stern, two
9's; in broadside, from four to six 6's. There is in this a somewhat
droll reminder of the disputed merits of bow, stern, and broadside
fire, in a modern iron-clad; and the practical conclusion is much the
same. The gondolas had one 12-pounder and two 6's. All the vessels of
both parties carried a number of swivel guns.

Amid the many difficulties which lack of resources imposed upon all
American undertakings, Arnold succeeded in getting afloat with three
schooners, a sloop, and five gondolas, on the 20th of August. He
cruised at the upper end of Champlain till the 1st of September, when
he moved rapidly north, and on the 3d anchored in the lower narrows,
twenty-five miles above St. John's, stretching his line from shore
to shore. Scouts had kept him informed of the progress of the British
naval preparations, so that he knew that there was no immediate
danger; while an advanced position, maintained with a bold front,
would certainly prevent reconnoissances by water, and possibly might
impose somewhat upon the enemy. The latter, however, erected batteries
on each side of the anchorage, compelling Arnold to fall back to the
broader lake. He then had soundings taken about Valcour Island, and
between it and the western shore; that being the position in which he
intended to make a stand. He retired thither on the 23rd of September.

The British on their side had contended with no less obstacles than
their adversaries, though of a somewhat different character. To get
carpenters and materials to build, and seamen to man, were the
chief difficulties of the Americans, the necessities of the seaboard
conceding but partially the demands made upon it; but their vessels
were built upon the shores of the Lake, and launched into navigable
waters. A large fleet of transports and ships of war in the St.
Lawrence supplied the British with adequate resources, which were
utilized judiciously and energetically by Captain Douglas; but to get
these to the Lake was a long and arduous task. A great part of the
Richelieu River was shoal, and obstructed by rapids. The point
where lake navigation began was at St. John's, to which the nearest
approach, by a hundred-ton schooner, from the St. Lawrence, was
Chambly, ten miles below. Flat-boats and long-boats could be dragged
up stream, but vessels of any size had to be transported by land; and
the engineers found the roadbed too soft in places to bear the weight
of a hundred tons. Under Douglas's directions, the planking and frames
of two schooners were taken down at Chambly, and carried round by road
to St. John's, where they were again put together. At Quebec he found
building a new hull, of one hundred and eighty tons. This he took
apart nearly to the keel, shipping the frames in thirty long-boats,
which the transport captains consented to surrender, together with
their carpenters, for service on the Lake. Drafts from the ships of
war, and volunteers from the transports, furnished a body of seven
hundred seamen for the same employment,--a force to which the
Americans could oppose nothing equal, commanded as it was by regular
naval officers. The largest vessel was ship-rigged, and had a battery
of eighteen 12-pounders; she was called the _Inflexible_, and was
commanded by Lieutenant John Schanck. The two schooners, _Maria_,
Lieutenant Starke, and _Carleton_, Lieutenant James Richard Dacres,
carried respectively fourteen and twelve 6-pounders. These were
the backbone of the British flotilla. There were also a radeau, the
_Thunderer_, and a large gondola, the _Loyal Convert_, both heavily
armed; but, being equally heavy of movement, they do not appear to
have played any important part. Besides these, when the expedition
started, there were twenty gunboats, each carrying one fieldpiece,
from 24's to 9-pounders; or, in some cases, howitzers.[5]

"By all these means," wrote Douglas on July 21st, "our acquiring
an absolute dominion over Lake Champlain is not doubted of."
The expectation was perfectly sound. With a working breeze, the
_Inflexible_ alone could sweep the Lake clear of all that floated on
it. But the element of time remained. From the day of this writing
till that on which he saw the _Inflexible_ leave St. John's, October
4th, was over ten weeks; and it was not until the 9th that Carleton
was ready to advance with the squadron. By that time the American
troops at the head of the Lake had increased to eight or ten thousand.
The British land force is reported[6] as thirteen thousand, of which
six thousand were in garrison at St. John's and elsewhere.

Arnold's last reinforcements reached him at Valcour on the 6th of
October. On that day, and in the action of the 11th, he had with him
all the American vessels on the Lake, except one schooner and one
galley. His force, thus, was two schooners and a sloop, broadside
vessels, besides four galleys and eight gondolas, which may be assumed
reasonably to have depended on their bow guns; there, at least, was
their heaviest fire. Thus reckoned, his flotilla, disposed to the best
advantage, could bring into action at one time, two 18's, thirteen
12's, one 9, two 6's, twelve 4's, and two 2-pounders, independent of
swivels; total thirty-two guns, out of eighty-four that were mounted
in fifteen vessels. To this the British had to oppose, in three
broadside vessels, nine 12's and thirteen 6's, and in twenty gunboats,
twenty other brass guns, "from twenty-four to nines, some with
howitzers;"[7] total forty-two guns. In this statement the radeau and
gondola have not been included, because of their unmanageableness.
Included as broadside vessels, they would raise the British
armament--by three 24's, three 12's, four 9's, and a howitzer--to a
total of fifty-three guns. Actually, they could be brought into action
only under exceptional circumstances, and are more properly omitted.

These minutiæ are necessary for the proper appreciation of what
Captain Douglas justly called "a momentous event." It was a strife of
pigmies for the prize of a continent, and the leaders are entitled
to full credit both for their antecedent energy and for their
dispositions in the contest; not least the unhappy man who, having
done so much to save his country, afterwards blasted his name by a
treason unsurpassed in modern war. Energy and audacity had so far
preserved the Lake to the Americans; Arnold determined to have one
more try of the chances. He did not know the full force of the enemy,
but he expected that "it would be very formidable, if not equal to
ours."[8] The season, however, was so near its end that a severe check
would equal a defeat, and would postpone Carleton's further advance
to the next spring. Besides, what was the worth of such a force as
the American, such a flotilla, under the guns of Ticonderoga, the Lake
being lost? It was eminently a case for taking chances, even if the
detachment should be sacrificed, as it was.

Arnold's original purpose had been to fight under way; and it was
from this point of view that he valued the galleys, because of their
mobility. It is uncertain when he first learned of the rig and battery
of the _Inflexible_; but a good look-out was kept, and the British
squadron was sighted from Valcour when it quitted the narrows. It
may have been seen even earlier; for Carleton had been informed,
erroneously, that the Americans were near Grand Island, which led him
to incline to that side, and so open out Valcour sooner. The British
anchored for the night of October 10th, between Grand and Long[9]
Islands. Getting under way next morning, they stood up the Lake with
a strong north-east wind, keeping along Grand Island, upon which their
attention doubtless was fastened by the intelligence which they had
received; but it was a singular negligence thus to run to leeward with
a fair wind, without thorough scouting on both hands. The consequence
was that the American flotilla was not discovered until Valcour
Island, which is from one hundred and twenty to one hundred and eighty
feet high throughout its two miles of length, was so far passed that
the attack had to be made from the south,--from leeward.

When the British were first made out, Arnold's second in command,
Waterbury, urged that in view of the enemy's superiority the flotilla
should get under way at once, and fight them "on a retreat in the main
lake;" the harbour being disadvantageous "to fight a number so much
superior, and the enemy being able to surround us on every side, we
lying between an island and the main." Waterbury's advice evidently
found its origin in that fruitful source of military errors of design,
which reckons the preservation of a force first of objects, making the
results of its action secondary. With sounder judgment, Arnold decided
to hold on. A retreat before square-rigged sailing vessels having a
fair wind, by a heterogeneous force like his own, of unequal speeds
and batteries, could result only in disaster. Concerted fire and
successful escape were alike improbable; and besides, escape, if
feasible, was but throwing up the game. Better trust to a steady,
well-ordered position, developing the utmost fire. If the enemy
discovered him, and came in by the northern entrance, there was a
five-foot knoll in mid-channel which might fetch the biggest of them
up; if, as proved to be the case, the island should be passed, and the
attack should be made from leeward, it probably would be partial and
in disorder, as also happened. The correctness of Arnold's decision
not to chance a retreat was shown in the retreat of two days later.

Valcour is on the west side of the Lake, about three quarters of a
mile from the main; but a peninsula projecting from the island at
mid-length narrows this interval to a half-mile. From the accounts,
it is clear that the American flotilla lay south of this peninsula.
Arnold therefore had a reasonable hope that it might be passed
undetected. Writing to Gates, the Commander-in-Chief at Ticonderoga,
he said: "There is a good harbour, and if the enemy venture up
the Lake it will be impossible for them to take advantage of
our situation. If we succeed in our attack upon them, it will be
impossible for any to escape. If we are worsted, our retreat is open
and free. In case of wind, which generally blows fresh at this season,
our craft will make good weather, while theirs cannot keep the Lake."
It is apparent from this, written three weeks before the battle, that
he then was not expecting a force materially different from his own.
Later, he describes his position as being "in a small bay on the west
side of the island, as near together as possible, and in such a form
that few vessels can attack us at the same time, and those will be
exposed to the fire of the whole fleet." Though he unfortunately gives
no details, he evidently had sound tactical ideas. The formation
of the anchored vessels is described by the British officers as a
half-moon.

When the British discovered the enemy, they hauled up for them.
Arnold ordered one of his schooners, the _Royal Savage_, and the
four galleys, to get under way; the two other schooners and the eight
gondolas remaining at their anchors. The _Royal Savage_, dropping
to leeward,--by bad management, Arnold says,--came, apparently
unsupported, under the distant fire of the _Inflexible_, as she drew
under the lee of Valcour at 11 A.M., followed by the _Carleton_, and
at greater distance by the _Maria_ and the gunboats. Three shots
from the ship's 12-pounders struck the _Royal Savage_, which then ran
ashore on the southern point of the island. The _Inflexible_, followed
closely by the _Carleton_, continued on, but fired only occasionally;
showing that Arnold was keeping his galleys in hand, at long
bowls,--as small vessels with one eighteen should be kept, when
confronted with a broadside of nine guns. Between the island and the
main the north-east wind doubtless drew more northerly, adverse to the
ship's approach; but, a flaw off the cliffs taking the fore and aft
sails of the _Carleton_, she fetched "nearly into the middle of the
rebel half-moon, where Lieutenant J.R. Dacres intrepidly anchored
with a spring on her cable." The _Maria_, on board which was Carleton,
together with Commander Thomas Pringle, commanding the flotilla, was
to leeward when the chase began, and could not get into close action
that day. By this time, seventeen of the twenty gunboats had come
up, and, after silencing the _Royal Savage_, pulled up to within
point-blank range of the American flotilla. "The cannonade was
tremendous," wrote Baron Riedesel. Lieutenant Edward Longcroft, of the
radeau _Thunderer_, not being able to get his raft into action, went
with a boat's crew on board the _Royal Savage_, and for a time turned
her guns upon her former friends; but the fire of the latter forced
him again to abandon her, and it seemed so likely that she might be
re-taken that she was set on fire by Lieutenant Starke of the _Maria_,
when already "two rebel boats were very near her. She soon after blew
up." The American guns converging on the _Carleton_ in her central
position, she suffered severely. Her commander, Lieutenant Dacres,
was knocked senseless; another officer lost an arm; only Mr. Edward
Pellew, afterwards Lord Exmouth, remained fit for duty. The spring
being shot away, she swung bows on to the enemy, and her fire was thus
silenced. Captain Pringle signalled to her to withdraw; but she was
unable to obey. To pay her head off the right way, Pellew himself had
to get out on the bowsprit under a heavy fire of musketry, to bear the
jib over to windward; but to make sail seems to have been impossible.
Two artillery boats were sent to her assistance, "which towed her off
through a very thick fire, until out of farther reach, much to the
honour of Mr. John Curling and Mr. Patrick Carnegy, master's mate
and midshipman of the _Isis_, who conducted them; and of Mr. Edward
Pellew, mate of the _Blonde_, who threw the tow-rope from the
_Carleton's_ bowsprit."[10] This service on board the _Carleton_
started Pellew on his road to fortune; but, singularly enough, the
lieutenancy promised him in consequence, by both the First Lord
and Lord Howe, was delayed by the fact that he stayed at the front,
instead of going to the rear, where he would have been "within their
jurisdiction."[11] The _Carleton_ had two feet of water in the hold,
and had lost eight killed and six wounded,--about half her crew,--when
she anchored out of fire. In this small but stirring business, the
Americans, in addition to the _Royal Savage_, had lost one gondola.
Besides the injuries to the _Carleton_, a British artillery boat,
commanded by a German lieutenant, was sunk. Towards evening the
_Inflexible_ got within point-blank shot of the Americans, "when five
broadsides," wrote Douglas, "silenced their whole line." One fresh
ship, with scantling for sea-going, and a concentrated battery, has an
unquestioned advantage over a dozen light-built craft, carrying one or
two guns each, and already several hours engaged.

At nightfall the _Inflexible_ dropped out of range, and the British
squadron anchored in line of battle across the southern end of the
passage between the island and the main; some vessels were extended
also to the eastward, into the open Lake. "The best part of my
intelligence," wrote Burgoyne next day from St. John's, to Douglas at
Quebec, "is that our whole fleet was formed in line above the enemy,
and consequently they must have surrendered this morning, or given us
battle on our own terms. The Indians and light troops are abreast
with the fleet; they cannot, therefore, escape by land." The British
squadron sharing this confidence, a proper look-out was not kept. The
American leader immediately held a conference with his officers, and
decided to attempt a retreat, "which was done with such secrecy,"
writes Waterbury, "that we went through them entirely undiscovered."
The movement began at 7 P.M., a galley leading, the gondolas and
schooners following, and Arnold and his second bringing up the rear
in the two heaviest galleys. This delicate operation was favoured by
a heavy fog, which did not clear till next morning at eight. As the
Americans stole by, they could not see any of the hostile ships. By
daylight they were out of sight of the British. Riedesel, speaking of
this event, says, "The ships anchored, secure of the enemy, who stole
off during the night, and sailing round the left wing, aided by
a favourable wind, escaped under darkness." The astonishment next
morning, he continues, was great, as was Carleton's rage. The latter
started to pursue in such a hurry that he forgot to leave orders
for the troops which had been landed; but, failing to discover the
fugitives, he returned and remained at Valcour till nightfall, when
scouts brought word that the enemy were at Schuyler's Island, eight
miles above.

The retreat of the Americans had been embarrassed by their injuries,
and by the wind coming out ahead. They were obliged to anchor on the
12th to repair damages, both hulls and sails having suffered severely.
Arnold took the precaution to write to Crown Point for bateaux, to tow
in case of a southerly wind; but time did not allow these to arrive.
Two gondolas had to be sunk on account of their injuries, making three
of that class so far lost. The retreat was resumed at 2 P.M., but the
breeze was fresh from the southward, and the gondolas made very
little way. At evening the British chased again. That night the wind
moderated, and at daybreak the American flotilla was twenty-eight
miles from Crown Point,--fourteen from Valcour,--having still five
miles' start. Later, however, by Arnold's report, "the wind again
breezed up to the southward, so that we gained very little either by
beating or rowing. At the same time the enemy took a fresh breeze from
northeast, and, by the time we had reached Split Rock, were alongside
of us." The galleys of Arnold and Waterbury, the _Congress_ and the
_Washington_, had throughout kept in the rear, and now received the
brunt of the attack, made by the _Inflexible_ and the two schooners,
which had entirely distanced their sluggish consorts. This fight was
in the upper narrows, where the Lake is from one to three miles wide;
and it lasted, by Arnold's report, for five glasses (two hours and a
half),[12] the Americans continually retreating, until about ten miles
from Crown Point. There, the _Washington_ having struck some time
before, and final escape being impossible, Arnold ran the _Congress_
and four gondolas ashore in a small creek on the east side; pulling to
windward, with the cool judgment that had marked all his conduct, so
that the enemy could not follow him--except in small boats with which
he could deal. There he set his vessels on fire, and stood by them
until assured that they would blow up with their flags flying. He then
retreated to Crown Point through the woods, "despite the savages;"
a phrase which concludes this singular aquatic contest with a quaint
touch of local colour.

In three days of fighting and retreating the Americans had lost one
schooner, two galleys, and seven gondolas,--in all, ten vessels out of
fifteen. The killed and wounded amounted to over eighty, twenty odd
of whom were in Arnold's galley. The original force, numbering seven
hundred, had been decimated. Considering its raw material and the
recency of its organisation, words can scarcely exaggerate the
heroism of the resistance, which undoubtedly depended chiefly upon the
personal military qualities of the leader. The British loss in killed
and wounded did not exceed forty.

The little American navy on Champlain was wiped out; but never had any
force, big or small, lived to better purpose or died more gloriously,
for it had saved the Lake for that year. Whatever deductions may be
made for blunders, and for circumstances of every character which made
the British campaign of 1777 abortive and disastrous, thus leading
directly to the American alliance with France in 1778, the delay, with
all that it involved, was obtained by the Lake campaign of 1776. On
October 15th, two days after Arnold's final defeat, Carleton dated
a letter to Douglas from before Crown Point, whence the American
garrison was withdrawn. A week later Riedesel arrived, and wrote that,
"were our whole army here it would be an easy matter to drive the
enemy from their entrenchments," at Ticonderoga, and--as has been
quoted already--four weeks sooner would have insured its fall. It is
but a coincidence that just four weeks had been required to set up the
_Inflexible_ at St. John's; but it typifies the whole story. Save for
Arnold's flotilla, the two British schooners would have settled the
business. "Upon the whole, Sir," wrote Douglas in his final letter
from Quebec before sailing for England, "I scruple not to say, that
had not General Carleton authorized me to take the extraordinary
measure of sending up the _Inflexible_ from Quebec, things could
not this year have been brought to so glorious a conclusion on Lake
Champlain." Douglas further showed the importance attached to this
success by men of that day, by sending a special message to the
British ambassador at Madrid, "presuming that the early knowledge of
this great event in the southern parts of Europe may be of advantage
to His Majesty's service." That the opinion of the government was
similar may be inferred from the numerous rewards bestowed. Carleton
was made a Knight of the Bath, and Douglas a baronet.

The gallantry shown by both sides upon Lake Champlain in 1776 is
evident from the foregoing narrative. With regard to the direction
of movements,--the skill of the two leaders,--the same equal credit
cannot be assigned. It was a very serious blunder, on October 11th, to
run to leeward, passing a concealed enemy, undetected, upon waters so
perfectly well known as those of Champlain were; it having been the
scene of frequent British operations in previous wars. Owing to
this, "the _Maria_, because of her distant situation (from which the
_Inflexible_ and _Carleton_ had chased by signal) when the rebels
were first discovered, and baffling winds, could not get into close
action."[13] For the same reason the _Inflexible_ could not support
the _Carleton_. The Americans, in the aggregate distinctly inferior,
were thus permitted a concentration of superior force upon part of
their enemies. It is needless to enlarge upon the mortifying
incident of Arnold's escape that evening. To liken small things to
great,--always profitable in military analysis,--it resembled Hood's
slipping away from de Grasse at St. Kitts.[14]

[Illustration]

In conduct and courage, Arnold's behavior was excellent throughout.
Without enlarging upon the energy which created the flotilla, and
the breadth of view which suggested preparations that he could not
enforce, admiration is due to his recognition of the fact--implicit
in deed, if unexpressed in word--that the one use of the Navy was to
contest the control of the water; to impose delay, even if it could
not secure ultimate victory. No words could say more clearly than do
his actions that, under the existing conditions, the navy was useless,
except as it contributed to that end; valueless, if buried in port.
Upon this rests the merit of his bold advance into the lower narrows;
upon this his choice of the strong defensive position of Valcour;
upon this his refusal to retreat, as urged by Waterbury, when the full
force of the enemy was disclosed,--a decision justified, or rather,
illustrated, by the advantages which the accidents of the day threw
into his hands. His personal gallantry was conspicuous there as at
all times of his life. "His countrymen," said a generous enemy of that
day, "chiefly gloried in the dangerous attention which he paid to a
nice point of honour, in keeping his flag flying, and not quitting his
galley till she was in flames, lest the enemy should have boarded, and
struck it." It is not the least of the injuries done to his nation in
after years, that he should have silenced this boast and effaced this
glorious record by so black an infamy.

With the destruction of the flotilla ends the naval story of the Lakes
during the War of the American Revolution. Satisfied that it was too
late to proceed against Ticonderoga that year, Carleton withdrew
to St. John's and went into winter-quarters. The following year the
enterprise was resumed under General Burgoyne; but Sir William Howe,
instead of coöperating by an advance up the Hudson, which was the plan
of 1776, carried his army to Chesapeake Bay, to act thence against
Philadelphia. Burgoyne took Ticonderoga and forced his way as far as
Saratoga, sixty miles from Ticonderoga and thirty from Albany, where
Howe should have met him. There he was brought to a stand by the army
which the Americans had collected, found himself unable to advance or
to retreat, and was forced to lay down his arms on October 17th, 1777.
The garrison left by him at Ticonderoga and Crown Point retired to
Canada, and the posts were re-occupied by the Americans. No further
contest took place on the Lake, though the British vessels remained
in control of it, and showed themselves from time to time up to 1781.
With the outbreak of war between Great Britain and France, in 1778,
the scene of maritime interest shifted to salt water, and there
remained till the end.

[Footnote 1: In customary representation of maps, North is upper,
and movement northward is commonly spoken of as up. It is necessary
therefore to bear in mind that the flow of water from Lake George to
the St. Lawrence, though northward, is _down_.]

[Footnote 2: Afterwards Captain of the Fleet (Chief of Staff) to
Rodney in his great campaign of 1782. _Post_, p. 222. He died a
Rear-Admiral and Baronet in 1789.]

[Footnote 3: Author's italics.]

[Footnote 4: _Remembrancer_, iv. 291.]

[Footnote 5: The radeau had six 24-pounders, six 12's, and two
howitzers; the gondola, seven 9-pounders. The particulars of armament
are from Douglas's letters.]

[Footnote 6: By American reports. Beatson gives the force sent out, in
the spring of 1776, as 13,357. ("Mil. and Nav. Memoirs," vi. 44.)]

[Footnote 7: Douglas's letters.]

[Footnote 8: Douglas thought that the appearance of the _Inflexible_
was a complete surprise; but Arnold had been informed that a third
vessel, larger than the schooners, was being set up. With a man of
his character, it is impossible to be sure, from his letters to his
superior, how much he knew, or what he withheld.]

[Footnote 9: called North Hero.]

[Footnote 10: Douglas's letter. The _Isis_ and the _Blonde_ were
vessels of the British squadron under Douglas, then lying in the St.
Lawrence. The officers named were temporarily on the lake service.]

[Footnote 11: Sandwich, First Lord of the Admiralty, to Pellew.]

[Footnote 12: Beatson, "Nav. and Mil. Memoirs," says two hours.]

[Footnote 13: Douglas's letters. The sentence is awkward, but
carefully compared with the copy in the author's hands. Douglas says,
of the details he gives, that "they have been collected with the most
scrupulous circumspection."]

[Footnote 14: _Post_, p. 205.]




CHAPTER II

NAVAL ACTION AT BOSTON, CHARLESTON, NEW YORK, AND NARRAGANSETT
BAY--ASSOCIATED LAND OPERATIONS UP TO THE BATTLE OF TRENTON

1776


The opening conflict between Great Britain and her North American
Colonies teaches clearly the necessity, too rarely recognised in
practice, that when a State has decided to use force, the force
provided should be adequate from the first. This applies with equal
weight to national policies when it is the intention of the nation to
maintain them at all costs. The Monroe Doctrine for instance is such
a policy; but unless constant adequate preparation is maintained also,
the policy itself is but a vain form of words. It is in preparation
beforehand, chiefly if not uniformly, that the United States has
failed. It is better to be much too strong than a little too weak.
Seeing the evident temper of the Massachusetts Colonists, force would
be needed to execute the Boston Port Bill and its companion measures
of 1774; for the Port Bill especially, naval force. The supplies for
1775 granted only 18,000 seamen,--2000 less than for the previous
year. For 1776, 28,000 seamen were voted, and the total appropriations
rose from £5,556,000 to £10,154,000; but it was then too late. Boston
was evacuated by the British army, 8000 strong on the 17th of March,
1776; but already, for more than half a year, the spreading spirit of
revolt in the thirteen Colonies had been encouraged by the sight
of the British army cooped up in the town, suffering from want
of necessaries, while the colonial army blockading it was able to
maintain its position, because ships laden with stores for the one
were captured, and the cargoes diverted to the use of the other. To
secure free and ample communications for one's self, and to interrupt
those of the opponent, are among the first requirements of war. To
carry out the measures of the British government a naval force
was needed, which not only should protect the approach of its own
transports to Boston Bay, but should prevent access to all coast ports
whence supplies could be carried to the blockading army. So far from
this, the squadron was not equal, in either number or quality, to the
work to be done about Boston; and it was not until October, 1775, that
the Admiral was authorized to capture colonial merchant vessels, which
therefore went and came unmolested, outside of Boston, carrying often
provisions which found their way to Washington's army.

After evacuating Boston, General Howe retired to Halifax, there to
await the coming of reinforcements, both military and naval, and of
his brother, Vice-Admiral Lord Howe, appointed to command the North
American Station. General Howe was commander-in-chief of the forces
throughout the territory extending from Nova Scotia to West Florida;
from Halifax to Pensacola. The first operation of the campaign was to
be the reduction of New York.

The British government, however, had several objects in view, and
permitted itself to be distracted from the single-minded prosecution
of one great undertaking to other subsidiary operations, not always
concentric. Whether the control of the line of the Hudson and Lake
Champlain ought to have been sought through operations beginning at
both ends, is open to argument; the facts that the Americans were back
in Crown Point in the beginning of July, 1776, and that Carleton's
13,000 men got no farther than St. John's that year, suggest that the
greater part of the latter force would have been better employed in
New York and New Jersey than about Champlain. However that may be, the
diversion to the Carolinas of a third body, respectable in point
of numbers, is scarcely to be defended on military grounds. The
government was induced to it by the expectation of local support from
royalists. That there were many of these in both Carolinas is
certain; but while military operations must take account of political
conditions, the latter should not be allowed to overbalance elementary
principles of the military art. It is said that General Howe
disapproved of this ex-centric movement.

The force destined for the Southern coasts assembled at Cork towards
the end of 1775, and sailed thence in January, 1776. The troops were
commanded by Lord Cornwallis, the squadron by Nelson's early patron,
Commodore Sir Peter Parker, whose broad pennant was hoisted on board
the _Bristol_, 50. After a boisterous passage, the expedition arrived
in May off Cape Fear in North Carolina, where it was joined by two
thousand men under Sir Henry Clinton, Cornwallis's senior, whom Howe
by the government's orders had detached to the southward in January.
Upon Clinton's appearance, the royalists in North Carolina had risen,
headed by the husband of Flora Macdonald, whose name thirty years
before had been associated romantically with the escape of the young
Pretender from Scotland. She had afterwards emigrated to America. The
rising, however, had been put down, and Clinton had not thought
it expedient to try a serious invasion, in face of the large force
assembled to resist him. Upon Parker's coming, it was decided to make
an attempt upon Charleston, South Carolina. The fleet therefore
sailed from Cape Fear on the 1st of June, and on the 4th anchored off
Charleston Bar.

Charleston Harbour opens between two of the sea-islands which fringe
the coasts of South Carolina and Georgia. On the north is Sullivan's
Island, on the south James Island. The bar of the main entrance was
not abreast the mouth of the port, but some distance south of it.
Inside the bar, the channel turned to the northward, and thence led
near Sullivan's Island, the southern end of which was therefore chosen
as the site of the rude fort hastily thrown up to meet this attack,
and afterwards called Fort Moultrie, from the name of the commander.
From these conditions, a southerly wind was needed to bring ships
into action. After sounding and buoying the bar, the transports
and frigates crossed on the 7th and anchored inside; but as it was
necessary to remove some of the _Bristol's_ guns, she could not follow
until the 10th. On the 9th Clinton had landed in person with five
hundred men, and by the 15th all the troops had disembarked upon Long
Island, next north of Sullivan's. It was understood that the inlet
between the two was fordable, allowing the troops to coöperate with
the naval attack, by diversion or otherwise; but this proved to be a
mistake. The passage was seven feet deep at low water, and there were
no means for crossing; consequently a small American detachment in
the scrub wood of the island sufficed to check any movement in that
quarter. The fighting therefore was confined to the cannonading of the
fort by the ships.

Circumstances not fully explained caused the attack to be fixed
for the 23d; an inopportune delay, during which Americans were
strengthening their still very imperfect defences. On the 23d the wind
was unfavourable. On the 25th the _Experiment_, 50, arrived, crossed
the bar, and, after taking in her guns again, was ready to join in
the assault. On the 27th, at 10 A.M., the ships got under way with a
south-east breeze, but this shifted soon afterwards to north-west, and
they had to anchor again, about a mile nearer to Sullivan's Island. On
the following day the wind served, and the attack was made.

In plan, Fort Moultrie was square, with a bastion at each angle. In
construction, the sides were palmetto logs, dovetailed and bolted
together, laid in parallel rows, sixteen feet apart; the interspace
being filled with sand. At the time of the engagement, the south and
west fronts were finished; the other fronts were only seven feet
high, but surmounted by thick planks, to be tenable against escalade.
Thirty-one guns were in place, 18 and 9-pounders, of which twenty-one
were on the south face, commanding the channel. Within was a traverse
running east and west, protecting the gunners from shots from the
rear; but there was no such cover against enfilading fire, in case
an enemy's ship passed the fort and anchored above it. "The general
opinion before the action," Moultrie says, "and especially among
sailors, was that two frigates would be sufficient to knock the town
about our ears, notwithstanding our batteries." Parker may have shared
this impression, and it may account for his leisureliness. When the
action began, the garrison had but twenty-eight rounds for each of
twenty-six cannon, but this deficiency was unknown to the British.

[Illustration]

Parker's plan was that the two 50's, _Bristol_ and _Experiment_, and
two 28-gun frigates, the _Active_ and the _Solebay_, should engage the
main front; while two frigates of the same class, the _Actæon_ and the
_Syren_, with a 20-gun corvette, the _Sphinx_, should pass the fort,
anchoring to the westward, up-channel, to protect the heavy vessels
against fire-ships, as well as to enfilade the principal American
battery. The main attack was to be further supported by a bomb-vessel,
the _Thunder_, accompanied by the armed transport _Friendship_, which
were to take station to the southeast of the east bastion of the
engaged front of the fort. The order to weigh was given at 10.30
A.M., when the flood-tide had fairly made; and at 11.15 the _Active_,
_Bristol_, _Experiment_, and _Solebay_, anchored in line ahead, in the
order named, the _Active_ to the eastward. These ships seem to have
taken their places skilfully without confusion, and their fire, which
opened at once, was rapid, well-sustained, and well-directed; but
their position suffered under the radical defect that, whether from
actual lack of water, or only from fear of grounding, they were too
far from the works to use grape effectively. The sides of ships being
much weaker than those of shore works, while their guns were much more
numerous, the secret of success was to get near enough to beat down
the hostile fire by a multitude of projectiles. The bomb-vessel
_Thunder_ anchored in the situation assigned her; but her shells,
though well aimed, were ineffective. "Most of them fell within the
fort," Moultrie reported, "but we had a morass in the middle, which
swallowed them instantly, and those that fell in the sand were
immediately buried." During the action the mortar bed broke, disabling
the piece.

Owing to the scarcity of ammunition in the fort, the garrison had
positive orders not to engage at ranges exceeding four hundred yards.
Four or five shots were thrown at the _Active_, while still under
sail, but with this exception the fort kept silence until the ships
anchored, at a distance estimated by the Americans to be three hundred
and fifty yards. The word was then passed along the platform, "Mind
the Commodore; mind the two 50-gun ships,"--an order which was
strictly obeyed, as the losses show. The protection of the work proved
to be almost perfect,--a fact which doubtless contributed to the
coolness and precision of fire vitally essential with such deficient
resources. The texture of the palmetto wood suffered the balls to sink
smoothly into it without splintering, so that the facing of the work
held well. At times, when three or four broadsides struck together,
the merlons shook so that Moultrie feared they would come bodily in;
but they withstood, and the small loss inflicted was chiefly through
the embrasures. The flagstaff being shot away, falling outside into
the ditch, a young sergeant, named Jasper, distinguished himself by
jumping after it, fetching back and rehoisting the colours under a
heavy fire.

In the squadron an equal gallantry was shown under circumstances which
made severe demands upon endurance. Whatever Parker's estimate of
the worth of the defences, no trace of vain-confidence appears in his
dispositions, which were thorough and careful, as the execution of
the main attack was skilful and vigorous; but the ships' companies,
expecting an easy victory, had found themselves confronted with a
resistance and a punishment as severe as were endured by the leading
ships at Trafalgar, and far more prolonged. Such conditions impose
upon men's tenacity the additional test of surprise and discomfiture.
The _Experiment_, though very small for a ship of the line, lost 23
killed and 56 wounded, out of a total probably not much exceeding 300;
while the _Bristol_, having the spring shot away, swung with her head
to the southward and her stern to the fort, undergoing for a long
time a raking fire to which she could make little reply. Three
several attempts to replace the spring were made by Mr. James
Saumarez,--afterwards the distinguished admiral, Lord de Saumarez,
then a midshipman,--before the ship was relieved from this grave
disadvantage. Her loss was 40 killed and 71 wounded; not a man
escaping of those stationed on the quarter-deck at the beginning of
the action. Among the injured was the Commodore himself, whose cool
heroism must have been singularly conspicuous, from the notice it
attracted in a service where such bearing was not rare. At one
time when the quarter-deck was cleared and he stood alone upon the
poop-ladder, Saumarez suggested to him to come down; but he replied,
smiling, "You want to get rid of me, do you?" and refused to move.
The captain of the ship, John Morris, was mortally wounded. With
commendable modesty Parker only reported himself as slightly bruised;
but deserters stated that for some days he needed the assistance of
two men to walk, and that his trousers had been torn off him by shot
or splinters. The loss in the other ships was only one killed, 14
wounded. The Americans had 37 killed and wounded.

The three vessels assigned to enfilade the main front of the fort did
not get into position. They ran on the middle ground, owing, Parker
reported, to the ignorance of the pilots. Two had fouled each other
before striking. Having taken the bottom on a rising tide, two floated
in a few hours, and retreated; but the third, the _Actæon_, 28,
sticking fast, was set on fire and abandoned by her officers. Before
she blew up, the Americans boarded her, securing her colours, bell,
and some other trophies. "Had these ships effected their purpose,"
Moultrie reported, "they would have driven us from our guns."

The main division held its ground until long after nightfall, firing
much of the time, but stopping at intervals. After two hours it had
been noted that the fort replied very slowly, which was attributed to
its being overborne, instead of to the real cause, the necessity for
sparing ammunition. For the same reason it was entirely silent from
3.30 P.M. to 6, when fire was resumed from only two or three guns,
whence Parker surmised that the rest had been dismounted. The
Americans were restrained throughout the engagement by the fear of
exhausting entirely their scanty store.

"About 9 P.M.," Parker reported, "being very dark, great part of our
ammunition expended, the people fatigued, the tide of ebb almost
done, no prospect from the eastward (that is, from the army), and no
possibility of our being of any further service, I ordered the ships
to withdraw to their former moorings." Besides the casualties among
the crew, and severe damage to the hull, the _Bristol's_ mainmast,
with nine cannon-balls in it, had to be shortened, while the
mizzen-mast was condemned. The injury to the frigates was immaterial,
owing to the garrison's neglecting them.

The fight in Charleston Harbour, the first serious contest in which
ships took part in this war, resembles generically the battle of
Bunker's Hill, with which the regular land warfare had opened a year
before. Both illustrate the difficulty and danger of a front attack,
without cover, upon a fortified position, and the advantage conferred
even upon untrained men, if naturally cool, resolute, and intelligent,
not only by the protection of a work, but also, it may be urged, by
the recognition of a tangible line up to which to hold, and to abandon
which means defeat, dishonour, and disaster. It is much for untried
men to recognise in their surroundings something which gives the unity
of a common purpose, and thus the coherence which discipline imparts.
Although there was in Parker's dispositions nothing open to serious
criticism,--nothing that can be ascribed to undervaluing his
opponent,--and although, also, he had good reason to expect from the
army active coöperation which he did not get, it is probable that he
was very much surprised, not only at the tenacity of the Americans'
resistance, but at the efficacy of their fire. He felt, doubtless,
the traditional and natural distrust--and, for the most part,
the justified distrust--with which experience and practice regard
inexperience. Some seamen of American birth, who had been serving in
the _Bristol_, deserted after the fight. They reported that her crew
said, "We were told the Yankees would not stand two fires, but we
never saw better fellows;" and when the fire of the fort slackened and
some cried, "They have done fighting," others replied, "By God, we are
glad of it, for we never had such a drubbing in our lives." "All the
common men of the fleet spoke loudly in praise of the garrison,"--a
note of admiration so frequent in generous enemies that we may be
assured that it was echoed on the quarter-deck also. They could afford
it well, for there was no stain upon their own record beyond the
natural mortification of defeat; no flinching under the severity of
their losses, although a number of their men were comparatively raw,
volunteers from the transports, whose crews had come forward almost
as one man when they knew that the complements of the ships were short
through sickness. Edmund Burke, a friend to both sides, was justified
in saying that "never did British valour shine more conspicuously,
nor did our ships in an engagement of the same nature experience
so serious an encounter." There were several death-vacancies for
lieutenants; and, as the battle of Lake Champlain gave Pellew his
first commission, so did that of Charleston Harbour give his to
Saumarez, who was made lieutenant of the _Bristol_ by Parker. Two
years later, when the ship had gone to Jamaica, he was followed on her
quarter-deck by Nelson and Collingwood, who also received promotion in
her from the same hand.

The attack on Fort Moultrie was not resumed. After necessary repairs,
the ships of war with the troops went to New York, where they
arrived on the 4th of August, and took part in the operations for the
reduction of that place under the direction of the two Howes.

       *       *       *       *       *

The occupation of New York Harbour, and the capture of the city were
the most conspicuous British successes of the summer and fall of 1776.
While Parker and Clinton were meeting with defeat at Charleston, and
Arnold was hurrying the preparation of his flotilla on Champlain, the
two brothers, General Sir William Howe and the Admiral, Lord Howe,
were arriving in New York Bay, invested not only with the powers
proper to the commanders of great fleets and armies, but also with
authority as peace commissioners, to negotiate an amicable arrangement
with the revolted Colonies.

Sir William Howe had awaited for some time at Halifax the arrival of
the expected reinforcements, but wearying at last he sailed thence
on the 10th of June, 1776, with the army then in hand. On the 25th
he himself reached Sandy Hook, the entrance to New York Bay, having
preceded the transports in a frigate. On the 29th, the day after
Parker's repulse at Fort Moultrie, the troops arrived; and on July 3d,
the date on which Arnold, retreating from Canada, reached Crown Point,
the British landed on Staten Island, which is on the west side of the
lower Bay. On the 12th came in the _Eagle_, 64, carrying the flag of
Lord Howe. This officer was much esteemed by the Americans for his own
personal qualities, and for his attitude towards them in the present
dispute, as well as for the memory of his brother, who had endeared
himself greatly to them in the campaign of 1758, when he had fallen
near Lake Champlain; but the decisive step of declaring their
independence had been taken already, on July 4th, eight days before
the Admiral's arrival. A month was spent in fruitless attempts to
negotiate with the new government, without recognising any official
character in its representatives. During that time, however, while
abstaining from decisive operations, cruisers were kept at sea
to intercept American traders, and the Admiral, immediately upon
arriving, sent four vessels of war twenty-five miles up the Hudson
River, as far as Tarrytown. This squadron was commanded by Hyde
Parker, afterwards, in 1801, Nelson's commander-in-chief at
Copenhagen. The service was performed under a tremendous cannonade
from all the batteries on both shores, but the ships could not
be stopped. Towards the middle of August it was evident that the
Americans would not accept any terms in the power of the Howes to
offer, and it became necessary to attempt coercion by arms.

[Illustration]

In the reduction of New York in 1776, the part played by the British
Navy, owing to the nature of the campaign in general and of the
enemy's force in particular, was of that inconspicuous character which
obscures the fact that without the Navy the operations could not have
been undertaken at all, and that the Navy played to them the part
of the base of operations and line of communications. Like the
foundations of a building, these lie outside the range of superficial
attention, and therefore are less generally appreciated than the
brilliant fighting going on at the front, to the maintenance of
which they are all the time indispensable. Consequently, whatever of
interest may attach to any, or to all, of the minor affairs, which
in the aggregate constitute the action of the naval force in such
circumstances, the historian of the major operations is confined
perforce to indicating the broad general effect of naval power upon
the issue. This will be best done by tracing in outline the scene of
action, the combined movements, and the Navy's influence in both.

The harbour of New York divides into two parts--the upper and lower
Bays--connected by a passage called the Narrows, between Long and
Staten Islands, upon the latter of which the British troops were
encamped. Long Island, which forms the eastern shore of the Narrows,
extends to the east-north-east a hundred and ten miles, enclosing
between itself and the continent a broad sheet of water called Long
Island Sound, that reaches nearly to Narragansett Bay. The latter,
being a fine anchorage, entered also into the British scheme of
operations, as an essential feature in a coastwise maritime campaign.
Long Island Sound and the upper Bay of New York are connected by a
crooked and difficult passage, known as the East River, eight or ten
miles in length, and at that time nearly a mile wide[15] abreast the
city of New York. At the point where the East River joins New York
Bay, the Hudson River, an estuary there nearly two miles wide, also
enters from the north,--a circumstance which has procured for it
the alternative name of the North River. Near their confluence is
Governor's Island, half a mile below the town, centrally situated to
command the entrances to both. Between the East and North rivers, with
their general directions from north and east-north-east, is embraced
a long strip of land gradually narrowing to the southward. The end of
this peninsula, as it would otherwise be, is converted into an island,
of a mean length of about eight miles, by the Harlem River,--a narrow
and partially navigable stream connecting the East and North rivers.
To the southern extreme of this island, called Manhattan, the city of
New York was then confined.

As both the East and North rivers were navigable for large ships,
the former throughout, the latter for over a hundred miles above its
mouth, it was evident that control of the water must play a large
part in warlike operations throughout the district described. With the
limited force at Washington's disposal, he had been unable to push the
defences of the city as far to the front as was desirable. The
lower Bay was held by the British Navy, and Staten Island had been
abandoned, necessarily, without resistance, thereby giving up the
strong defensive position of the Narrows. The lines were contracted
thus to the immediate neighbourhood of New York itself. Small detached
works skirted the shores of Manhattan Island, and a line of redoubts
extended across it, following the course of a small stream which then
partly divided it, a mile from the southern end. Governor's Island was
also occupied as an outpost. Of more intrinsic strength, but not at
first concerned, strong works had been thrown up on either side of the
North River, upon commanding heights eight miles above New York, to
dispute the passage of ships.

The crucial weakness in this scheme of defence was that the shore of
Long Island opposite the city was much higher than that of Manhattan.
If this height were seized, the city, and all below it, became
untenable. Here, therefore, was the key of the position and the chief
station for the American troops. For its protection a line of works
was thrown up, the flanks of which rested upon Wallabout Bay and
Gowanus Cove, two indentations in the shores of Long Island. These
Washington manned with nine thousand of the eighteen thousand men
under his command. By the arrival of three divisions of Hessian
troops, Howe's army now numbered over thirty-four thousand men, to
which Clinton brought three thousand more from before Charleston.[16]

On the 22d of August the British crossed from Staten Island to
Gravesend Bay, on the Long Island shore of the Narrows. The Navy
covered the landing, and the transportation of the troops was under
the charge of Commodore William Hotham, who, nineteen years later,
was Nelson's commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean. By noon fifteen
thousand men and forty field-guns had been carried over and placed on
shore. The force of the Americans permitted little opposition to the
British advance; but General Howe was cautious and easy-going, and
it was not till the 27th that the army, now increased to twenty-five
thousand, was fairly in front of the American lines, having killed,
wounded, and taken about 1,500 men. Hoping that Howe would be tempted
to storm the position, Washington replaced these with two thousand
drawn from his meagre numbers; but his opponent, who had borne a
distinguished part at Bunker's Hill, held back his troops, who were
eager for the assault. The Americans now stood with their backs to
a swift tidal stream, nearly a mile wide, with only a feeble line of
works between them and an enemy more than double their number.

On the morning of the 27th, Sir Peter Parker, with a 64-gun ship, two
50's, and two frigates, attempted to work up to New York, with a view
of supporting the left flank of the army; but the wind came out from
the north, and, the ebb-tide making, the ships got no nearer than
three miles from the city. Fortunately for the Americans, they either
could not or would not go farther on the following two days.
After dark of the 28th, Howe broke ground for regular approaches.
Washington, seeing this, and knowing that there could be but one
result to a siege under his condition of inferiority, resolved to
withdraw. During the night of the 29th ten thousand men silently
quitted their positions, embarked, and crossed to Manhattan Island,
carrying with them all their belongings, arms, and ammunition. The
enemy's trenches were but six hundred yards distant, yet no suspicion
was aroused, nor did a single deserter give treacherous warning. The
night was clear and moonlit, although a heavy fog towards daybreak
prolonged the period of secrecy which shrouded the retreat. When
the fog rose, the last detachment was discovered crossing, but a few
ineffectual cannon-shot were the only harassment experienced by the
Americans in the course of this rapid and dexterous retirement. The
garrison of Governor's Island was withdrawn at the same time.

The unmolested use of the water, and the nautical skill of the
fishermen who composed one of the American regiments, were essential
to this escape; for admirable as the movement was in arrangement
and execution, no word less strong than escape applies to it. By it
Washington rescued over half his army from sure destruction, and,
not improbably, the cause of his people from immediate collapse. An
opportunity thus seized implies necessarily an opportunity lost on the
other side. For that failure both army and navy must bear their share
of the blame. It is obvious that when an enemy is greatly outnumbered
his line of retreat should be watched. This was the business of both
commanders-in-chief, the execution of it being primarily the duty of
the navy, as withdrawal from the American position could be only
by water. It was a simple question of look-out, of detection, of
prevention by that means. To arrest the retreat sailing ships were
inadequate, for they could not have remained at anchor under the guns
of Manhattan Island, either by day or night; but a few boats
with muffled oars could have watched, could have given the alarm,
precipitating an attack by the army, and such a movement interrupted
in mid-course brings irretrievable disaster.

Washington now withdrew the bulk of his force to the line of the
Harlem. On his right, south of that river and commanding the Hudson,
was a fort called by his name; opposite to it on the Jersey shore was
Fort Lee. A garrison of four thousand men occupied New York. After
amusing himself with some further peace negotiations, Howe determined
to possess the city. As a diversion from the main effort, and to cover
the crossing of the troops, two detachments of ships were ordered to
pass the batteries on the Hudson and East rivers. This was done on
the 13th and the 15th of September. The East River division suffered
severely, especially in spars and rigging;[17] but the success of
both, following upon that of Hyde Parker a few weeks earlier, in his
expedition to Tarrytown, confirmed Washington in the opinion which he
expressed five years later to de Grasse, that batteries alone could
not stop ships having a fair wind. This is now a commonplace of naval
warfare; steam giving always a fair wind. On the 15th Howe's army
crossed under cover of Parker's ships, Hotham again superintending the
boat work. The garrison of New York slipped along the west shore of
the island and joined the main body on the Harlem; favored again,
apparently, in this flank movement a mile from the enemy's front,
by Howe's inertness, and fondness for a good meal, to which a shrewd
American woman invited him at the critical moment.

Despite these various losses of position, important as they were, the
American army continued to elude the British general, who apparently
did not hold very strongly the opinion that the most decisive factor
in war is the enemy's organised force. As control of the valley of
the Hudson, in connection with Lake Champlain, was, very properly, the
chief object of the British government, Howe's next aim was to loosen
Washington's grip on the peninsula north of the Harlem. The position
seeming to him too strong for a front attack, he decided to strike for
its left flank and rear by way of Long Island Sound. In this, which
involved the passage of the tortuous and dangerous channel called
Hell Gate, with its swift conflicting currents, the Navy again bore
an essential part. The movement began on October 12th, the day after
Arnold was defeated at Valcour. So far as its leading object went it
was successful, Washington feeling obliged to let go the line of the
Harlem, and change front to the left. As the result of the various
movements and encounters of the two armies, he fell back across the
Hudson into New Jersey, ordering the evacuation of Fort Washington,
and deciding to rest his control of the Hudson Valley upon West Point,
fifty miles above New York, a position of peculiar natural strength,
on the west bank of the river. To these decisions he was compelled
by his inferiority in numbers, and also by the very isolated and
hazardous situation in which he was operating, between two navigable
waters, absolutely controlled by the enemy's shipping. This conclusion
was further forced upon him by another successful passage before the
guns of Forts Washington and Lee by Hyde Parker, with three ships, on
the 9th of October. On this occasion the vessels, two of which were
frigates of the heaviest class, suffered very severely, losing nine
killed and eighteen wounded; but the menace to the communications of
the Americans could not be disregarded, for their supplies came mostly
from the west of the Hudson.

It was early in November that Washington crossed into New Jersey with
five thousand men; and soon afterwards he directed the remainder of
his force to follow. At that moment the blunder of one subordinate,
and the disobedience of another, brought upon him two serious blows.
Fort Washington not being evacuated when ordered, Howe carried it by
storm, capturing not only it but its garrison of twenty-seven hundred
men; a very heavy loss to the Americans. On the other hand, the most
explicit orders failed to bring the officer left in command on
the east of the Hudson, General Charles Lee, to rejoin the
commander-in-chief. This criminal perverseness left Washington with
only six thousand men in New Jersey, seven thousand being in New York.
Under these conditions nothing remained but to put the Delaware also
between himself and the enemy. He therefore retreated rapidly through
New Jersey, and on the 8th of December crossed into Pennsylvania
with an army reduced to three thousand by expiry of enlistments. The
detachment beyond the Hudson, diminishing daily by the same cause,
gradually worked its way to him; its commander luckily being captured
on the road. At the time it joined, a few battalions also arrived
from Ticonderoga, released by Carleton's retirement to the foot of
Champlain. Washington's force on the west bank of the Delaware was
thus increased to six thousand men.

In this series of operations, extending from August 22d to December
14th, when Howe went into winter-quarters in New Jersey, the British
had met with no serious mishaps, beyond the inevitable losses
undergone by the assailants of well-chosen positions. Nevertheless,
having in view the superiority of numbers, of equipment, and of
discipline, and the command of the water, the mere existence of the
enemy's army as an organised body, its mere escape, deprives the
campaign of the claim to be considered successful. The red ribbon of
the Bath probably never was earned more cheaply than by Sir William
Howe that year. Had he displayed anything like the energy of his two
elder brothers, Washington, with all his vigilance, firmness,
and enterprise, could scarcely have brought off the force, vastly
diminished but still a living organism, around which American
resistance again crystallised and hardened. As it was, within a month
he took the offensive, and recovered a great part of New Jersey.

Whatever verdict may be passed upon the merit of the military conduct
of affairs, there is no doubt of the value, or of the unflagging
energy, of the naval support given. Sir William Howe alludes to it
frequently, both in general and specifically; while the Admiral sums
up his always guarded and often cumbrous expressions of opinion in
these words: "It is incumbent upon me to represent to your Lordships,
and I cannot too pointedly express, the unabating perseverance and
alacrity with which the several classes of officers and seamen have
supported a long attendance and unusual degree of fatigue, consequent
of these different movements of the army."

The final achievement of the campaign, and a very important one, was
the occupation of Rhode Island and Narragansett Bay by a combined
expedition, which left New York on the 1st of December, and on the 8th
landed at Newport without opposition. The naval force, consisting
of five 50-gun ships and eight smaller vessels, was commanded by
Sir Peter Parker; the troops, seven thousand in number, by
Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Clinton. The immediate effect was to
close a haven of privateers, who centred in great numbers around an
anchorage which flanked the route of all vessels bound from Europe
to New York. The possession of the bay facilitated the control of the
neighbouring waters by British ships of war, besides giving them
a base central for coastwise operations and independent of tidal
considerations for entrance or exit. The position was abandoned
somewhat precipitately three years later. Rodney then deplored its
loss in the following terms: "The evacuating Rhode Island was the most
fatal measure that could possibly have been adopted. It gave up the
best and noblest harbor in America, capable of containing the whole
Navy of Britain, and where they could in all seasons lie in perfect
security; and from whence squadrons, in forty-eight hours, could
blockade the three capital cities of America; namely, Boston, New
York, and Philadelphia."

At the end of 1776 began the series of British reverses which
characterised the year 1777, making this the decisive period of the
war, because of the effect thus produced upon general public opinion
abroad; especially upon the governments of France and Spain. On the
20th of December, Howe, announcing to the Ministry that he had
gone into winter-quarters, wrote: "The chain, I own, is rather too
extensive, but I was induced to occupy Burlington to cover the county
of Monmouth; and trusting to the loyalty of the inhabitants, and the
strength of the corps placed in the advanced posts, I conclude the
troops will be in perfect security." Of this unwarranted security
Washington took prompt advantage. On Christmas night a sudden descent,
in a blinding snow-storm, upon a British outpost at Trenton, swept off
a thousand prisoners; and although for the moment the American leader
again retired behind the Delaware, it was but to resume the offensive
four days later. Cornwallis, who was in New York on the point of
sailing for England, hurried back to the front, but in vain. A series
of quick and well-directed movements recovered the State of New
Jersey; and by the 5th of January the American headquarters, and main
body of the army, were established at Morristown in the Jersey hills,
the left resting upon the Hudson, thus recovering touch with the
strategic centre of interest. This menacing position of the Americans,
upon the flank of the line of communications from New York to the
Delaware, compelled Howe to contract abruptly the lines he had
extended so lightly; and the campaign he was forced thus reluctantly
to reopen closed under a gloom of retreat and disaster, which
profoundly and justly impressed not only the generality of men but
military critics as well. "Of all the great conquests which his
Majesty's troops had made in the Jersies," writes Beatson, "Brunswick
and Amboy were the only two places of any note which they retained;
and however brilliant their successes had been in the beginning of
the campaign, they reaped little advantage from them when the winter
advanced, and the contiguity of so vigilant an enemy forced them to
perform the severest duty." With deliberate or unconscious humour
he then immediately concludes the chronicle of the year with this
announcement: "His Majesty was so well pleased with the abilities and
activity which General Howe had displayed this campaign, that on the
25th of October he conferred upon him the Most Honourable Order of the
Bath."

[Footnote 15: At the present day reduced by reclaimed land.]

[Footnote 16: Beatson's "Military and Naval Memoirs," vi. 44, give
34,614 as the strength of Howe's army. Clinton's division is not
included in this. vi. 45.]

[Footnote 17: Admiral James's Journal, p. 30. (Navy Records Society.)]




CHAPTER III

THE DECISIVE PERIOD OF THE WAR. SURRENDER OF BURGOYNE AND CAPTURE OF
PHILADELPHIA BY HOWE. THE NAVAL PART IN EACH OPERATION

1777


The leading purpose of the British government in the campaign of 1777
was the same as that with which it had begun in 1776,--the control
of the line of the Hudson and Lake Champlain, to be mastered by two
expeditions, one starting from each end, and both working towards a
common centre at Albany, near the head of navigation of the River.
Preliminary difficulties had been cleared away in the previous year,
by the destruction of the American flotilla on the Lake, and by the
reduction of New York. To both these objects the Navy had contributed
conspicuously. It remained to complete the work by resuming the
advance from the two bases of operations secured. In 1777 the
fortifications on the Hudson were inadequate to stop the progress of a
combined naval and military expedition, as was shown in the course of
the campaign.

The northern enterprise was intrusted to General Burgoyne. The
impossibility of creating a new naval force, able to contend with
that put afloat by Carleton, had prevented the Americans from further
building. Burgoyne therefore moved by the Lake without opposition to
Ticonderoga, before which he appeared on the 2d of July. A position
commanding the works was discovered, which the Americans had neglected
to occupy. It being seized, and a battery established, the fort had to
be evacuated. The retreat being made by water, the British Lake Navy,
under Captain Skeffington Lutwidge, with whom Nelson had served a
few years before in the Arctic seas, had a conspicuous part in the
pursuit; severing the boom blockading the narrow upper lake and
joining impetuously in an attack upon the floating material, the
flat-boat transports, and the few relics of Arnold's flotilla which
had escaped the destruction of the previous year. This affair took
place on the 6th of July. From that time forward the progress of the
army was mainly by land. The Navy, however, found occupation upon Lake
George, where Burgoyne established a dépôt of supplies, although he
did not utilise its waterway for the march of the army. A party
of seamen under Edward Pellew, still a midshipman, accompanied the
advance, and shared the misfortunes of the expedition. It is told that
Burgoyne used afterwards to chaff the young naval officer with being
the cause of their disaster, because he and his men, by rebuilding a
bridge at a critical moment, had made it possible to cross the upper
Hudson. Impeded in its progress by immense difficulties, both natural
and imposed by the enemy, the army took twenty days to make twenty
miles. On the 30th of July it reached Fort Edward, forty miles from
Albany, and there was compelled to stay till the middle of September.
Owing to neglect at the War Office, the peremptory orders to Sir
William Howe, to move up the Hudson and make a junction with
Burgoyne, were not sent forward. Consequently, Howe, acting upon
the discretionary powers which he possessed already, and swayed by
political reasons into which it is not necessary to enter, determined
to renew his attempt upon Philadelphia. A tentative advance into New
Jersey, and the consequent manoeuvres of Washington, satisfied him
that the enterprise by this route was too hazardous. He therefore
embarked fourteen thousand men, leaving eight thousand with Sir Henry
Clinton to hold New York and make diversions in favor of Burgoyne;
and on the 23d of July sailed from Sandy Hook, escorted by five 64-gun
ships, a 50, and ten smaller vessels, under Lord Howe's immediate
command. The entire expedition numbered about 280 sail. Elaborate
pains were taken to deceive Washington as to the destination of the
armament; but little craft was needed to prevent a competent opponent
from imagining a design so contrary to sound military principle,
having regard to Burgoyne's movements and to the well-understood
general purpose of the British ministry. Accordingly Washington wrote,
"Howe's in a manner abandoning Burgoyne is so unaccountable a matter,
that till I am fully assured of it, I cannot help casting my eyes
continually behind me." He suspected an intention to return upon New
York.

On the 31st of July, just as Burgoyne reached Fort Edward, where he
stuck fast for six weeks, Howe's armament was off the Capes of
the Delaware. The prevailing summer wind on the American coast is
south-south-west, fair for ascending the river; but information was
received that the enemy had obstructed the channel, which lends itself
to such defences for some distance below Philadelphia. Therefore,
although after occupying the city the free navigation of the river to
the sea would be essential to maintaining the position,--for trial had
shown that the whole army could not assure communications by land
with New York, the other sea base,--Howe decided to prosecute his
enterprise by way of the Chesapeake, the ascent of which, under all
the conditions, could not be seriously impeded. A fortnight more was
consumed in contending against the south-west winds and calms, before
the fleet anchored on the 15th of August within the Capes of the
Chesapeake; and yet another week passed before the head of the Bay was
reached. On the 25th the troops landed. Washington, though so long
in doubt, was on hand to dispute the road, but in inferior force;
and Howe had no great difficulty in fighting his way to Philadelphia,
which was occupied on the 26th of September. A week earlier Burgoyne
had reached Stillwater, on the west bank of the Hudson, the utmost
point of his progress, where he was still twenty miles from Albany.
Three weeks later, confronted by overwhelming numbers, he was forced
to capitulate at Saratoga, whither he had retreated.

Lord Howe held on at the head of the Chesapeake until satisfied that
his brother no longer needed him. On the 14th of September he started
down the Bay with the squadron and convoy, sending ahead to the
Delaware a small division, to aid the army, if necessary. The winds
holding southerly, ten days were required to get to sea; and outside
further delay was caused by very heavy weather. The Admiral there
quitted the convoy and hastened up river. On the 6th of October he was
off Chester, ten miles below Philadelphia. The navy had already been
at work for a week, clearing away obstructions, of which there were
two lines; both commanded by batteries on the farther, or Jersey,
shore of the Delaware. The lower battery had been carried by troops;
and when Howe arrived, the ships, though meeting lively opposition
from the American galleys and fire-rafts, had freed the channel for
large vessels to approach the upper obstructions. These were defended
not only by a work at Red Bank on the Jersey shore, but also, on
the other side of the stream, by a fort called Fort Mifflin, on Mud
Island.[18] As the channel at this point, for a distance of half a
mile, was only two hundred yards wide, and troops could not reach the
island, the position was very strong, and it detained the British for
six weeks. Fort Mifflin was supported by two floating batteries and
a number of galleys. The latter not only fought, offensively and
defensively, but maintained the supplies and ammunition of the
garrison.

On the 22d of October, a concerted attack, by the army on the works at
Red Bank, and by the Navy on Fort Mifflin, resulted disastrously. The
former was repulsed with considerable loss, the officer commanding
being killed. The squadron, consisting of a 64, three frigates, and
a sloop, went into action with Mud Island at the same time; but,
the channel having shifted, owing possibly to the obstructions, the
sixty-four and the sloop grounded, and could not be floated that day.
On the 23d the Americans concentrated their batteries, galleys, and
fire-rafts upon the two; and the larger ship took fire and blew up in
the midst of the preparations for lightening her. The sloop was then
set on fire and abandoned.

So long as this obstacle remained, all supplies for the British
army in Philadelphia had to be carried by boats to the shore, and
transported considerable distances by land. As direct attacks had
proved unavailing, more deliberate measures were adopted. The army
built batteries, and the navy sent ashore guns to mount in them; but
the decisive blow to Mud Island was given by a small armed ship, the
_Vigilant_, 20, which was successfully piloted through a channel on
the west side of the river, and reached the rear of the work, towing
with her a floating battery with three 24-pounders. This was on the
15th of November. That night the Americans abandoned Fort Mifflin.
Their loss, Beatson says, amounted to near 400 killed and wounded;
that of the British to 43. If this be correct, it should have
established the invincibility of men who under such prodigious
disparity of suffering could maintain their position so tenaciously.
After the loss of Mud Island, Red Bank could not be held to advantage,
and it was evacuated on the 21st, when an attack was imminent. The
American vessels retreated up the river; but they were cornered,
and of course ultimately were destroyed. The obstructions being now
removed, the British water communications by the line of the Delaware
were established,--eight weeks after the occupation of the city, which
was to be evacuated necessarily six months later.

While these things were passing, Howe's triumph was marred by the news
of Burgoyne's surrender on the 17th of October. For this he could
not but feel that the home government must consider him largely
responsible; for in the Chesapeake, too late to retrieve his false
step, he had received a letter from the minister of war saying that,
whatever else he undertook, support to Burgoyne was the great object
to be kept in view.

During the operations round Philadelphia, Sir Henry Clinton in New
York had done enough to show what strong probabilities of success
would have attended an advance up the Hudson, by the twenty thousand
men whom Howe could have taken with him. Starting on the 3d of October
with three thousand troops, accompanied by a small naval division of
frigates, Clinton in a week had reached West Point, fifty miles up
the river. The American fortifications along the way were captured,
defences levelled, stores and shipping burned; while an insignificant
detachment, with the light vessels, went fifty miles further up,
and there destroyed more military stores without encountering any
resistance worth mentioning. Certainly, had Howe taken the same line
of operations, he would have had to reckon with Washington's ten
thousand men which confronted him on the march from the Chesapeake to
Philadelphia; but his flank would have been covered, up to Albany, by
a navigable stream on either side of which he could operate by that
flying bridge which the presence and control of the navy continually
constituted. Save the fortifications, which Clinton easily carried,
there was no threat to his communications or to his flank, such as the
hill country of New Jersey had offered and Washington had skilfully
utilised.

The campaign of 1777 thus ended for the British with a conspicuous
disaster, and with an apparent success which was as disastrous as a
failure. At its close they held Narragansett Bay, the city and harbour
of New York, and the city of Philadelphia. The first was an admirable
naval base, especially for sailing ships, for the reasons given by
Rodney. The second was then, as it is now, the greatest military
position on the Atlantic coast of the United States; and although
the two could not communicate by land, they did support each other
as naval stations in a war essentially dependent upon maritime power.
Philadelphia served no purpose but to divide and distract British
enterprise. Absolutely dependent for maintenance upon the sea, the
forces in it and in New York could not coöperate; they could not even
unite except by sea. When Clinton relieved Howe as commander-in-chief,
though less than a hundred miles away by land, he had to take a voyage
of over two hundred miles, from New York to Philadelphia, half of
it up a difficult river, to reach his station; and troops were
transferred by the same tedious process. In consequence of these
conditions, the place had to be abandoned the instant that war with
France made control of the sea even doubtful. The British held it for
less than nine months in all.

During 1777 a number of raids were made by British combined land and
sea forces, for the purpose of destroying American dépôts and other
resources. Taken together, such operations are subsidiary to, and aid,
the great object of interrupting or harassing the communications of
an enemy. In so far, they have a standing place among the major
operations of war; but taken singly they cannot be so reckoned, and
the fact, therefore, is simply noted, without going into details.
It may be remarked, however, that in them, although the scale was
smaller, the Navy played the same part that it now does in the many
expeditions and small wars undertaken by Great Britain in various
parts of the world; the same that it did in Wellington's campaigns
in the Spanish peninsula, 1808-1812. The land force depended upon the
water, and the water was controlled by the Navy.

[Footnote 18: This was just below the mouth of the Schuylkill, a short
distance below the present League Island navy yard.]




CHAPTER IV

WAR BEGINS BETWEEN FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN. BRITISH EVACUATE
PHILADELPHIA. NAVAL OPERATIONS OF D'ESTAING AND HOWE ABOUT NEW YORK,
NARRAGANSETT BAY, AND BOSTON. COMPLETE SUCCESS OF LORD HOWE. AMERICAN
DISAPPOINTMENT IN D'ESTAING. LORD HOWE RETURNS TO ENGLAND.

1778


The events of 1777 satisfied the French government that the Americans
had strength and skill sufficient to embarrass Great Britain
seriously, and that the moment, therefore, was opportune for taking
steps which scarcely could fail to cause war. On the 6th of February,
1778, France concluded with the United States an open treaty of
amity and commerce; and at the same time a second secret treaty,
acknowledging the independence of the late Colonies, and contracting
with them a defensive alliance. On the 13th of March, the French
Ambassador in London communicated the open treaty to the British
government, with the remark that "the United States were in full
possession of the independence proclaimed by their declaration of July
4th, 1776." Great Britain at once recalled her Ambassador, and both
countries prepared for war, although no declaration was issued. On
the 13th of April, a French fleet of twelve ships of the line and five
frigates, under the command of the Count d'Estaing,[19] sailed from
Toulon for the American coast. It was destined to Delaware Bay,
hoping to intercept Howe's squadron. D'Estaing was directed to begin
hostilities when forty leagues west of Gibraltar.

The British ministry was not insensible of the danger, the imminence
of which had been felt during the previous year; but it had not got
ready betimes, owing possibly to confident expectations of success
from the campaign of 1777. The ships, in point of numbers and
equipment, were not as far forward as the Admiralty had represented;
and difficulty, amounting for the moment to impossibility, was
experienced in manning them. The vessels of the Channel fleet had to
be robbed of both crews and stores to compose a proper reinforcement
for America. Moreover, the destination of the Toulon squadron was
unknown, the French government having given out that it was bound to
Brest, where over twenty other ships of the line were in an advanced
state of preparation. Not until the 5th of June, when d'Estaing was
already eight weeks out, was certain news brought by a frigate, which
had watched his fleet after it had passed Gibraltar, and which had
accompanied it into the Atlantic ninety leagues west of the Straits.
The reinforcement for America was then permitted to depart. On the
9th of June, thirteen ships of the line sailed for New York under the
command of Vice-Admiral John Byron.[20]

These delays occasioned a singular and striking illustration of the
ill effects upon commerce of inadequate preparation for manning
the fleet. A considerable number of West India ships, with stores
absolutely necessary for the preservation of the islands, waited at
Portsmouth for convoy for upwards of three months, while the whole
fleet, of eighty sail, was detained for five weeks after it had
assembled; "and, although the wind came fair on the 19th of May, it
did not sail till the 26th, owing to the convoying ships, the _Boyne_
and the _Ruby_, not being ready." Forty-five owners and masters signed
a letter to the Admiralty, stating these facts. "The convoy," they
said, "was appointed to sail April 10th." Many ships had been ready
as early as February. "Is not this shameful usage, my Lords, thus to
deceive the public in general? There are two hundred ships loaded with
provisions, etc., waiting at Spithead these three months. The average
expense of each ship amounts to £150 monthly, so that the expense of
the whole West India fleet since February amounts to £90,000."

The West Indies before the war had depended chiefly upon their fellow
colonies on the American continent for provisions, as well as for
other prime necessaries. Not only were these cut off as an incident of
the war, entailing great embarrassment and suffering, which elicited
vehement appeals from the planter community to the home government,
but the American privateers preyed heavily upon the commerce of the
islands, whose industries were thus smitten root and branch, import
and export. In 1776, salt food for whites and negroes had risen from
50 to 100 per cent, and corn, the chief support of the slaves,--the
laboring class,--by 400 per cent. At the same time sugar had fallen
from 25 to 40 per cent in price, rum over 37 per cent. The words
"starvation" and "famine" were freely used in these representations,
which were repeated in 1778. Insurance rose to 23 per cent; and this,
with actual losses by capture,[21] and by cessation of American trade,
with consequent fall of prices, was estimated to give a total loss
of £66 upon every £100 earned before the war. Yet, with all this,
the outward West India fleet in 1778 waited six weeks, April 10th-May
26th, for convoy. Immediately after it got away, a rigorous embargo
was laid upon all shipping in British ports, that their crews might
be impressed to man the Channel fleet. Market-boats, even, were not
allowed to pass between Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight.

Three days after Byron had sailed, Admiral Augustus Keppel also put
to sea with twenty-one ships of the line, to cruise off Brest. His
instructions were to prevent the junction of the Toulon and Brest
divisions, attacking either that he might meet. On the 17th of June,
two French frigates were sighted. In order that they might not report
his force or his movements, the British Admiral sent two of his own
frigates, with the request that they would speak him. One, the _Belle
Poule_, 36, refused; and an engagement followed between her and the
British ship, the _Arethusa_, 32. The King of France subsequently
declared that this occurrence fixed the date of the war's beginning.
Although both Keppel's and d'Estaing's orders prescribed acts of
hostility, no formal war yet existed.

Byron had a very tempestuous passage, with adverse winds, by which his
vessels were scattered and damaged. On the 18th of August, sixty-seven
days from Plymouth, the flagship arrived off the south coast of Long
Island, ninety miles east of New York, without one of the fleet in
company. There twelve ships were seen at anchor to leeward (north),
nine or ten miles distant, having jury masts, and showing other signs
of disability. The British vessel approached near enough to recognise
them as French. They were d'Estaing's squadron, crippled by a very
heavy gale, in which Howe's force had also suffered, though to a
less extent. Being alone, and ignorant of existing conditions,
Byron thought it inexpedient to continue on for either New York or
Narragansett Bay. The wind being southerly, he steered for Halifax,
which he reached August 26th. Some of his ships also entered there.
A very few had already succeeded in joining Howe in New York, being
fortunate enough to escape the enemy.

So far as help from England went, Lord Howe would have been crushed
long before this. He owed his safety partly to his own celerity,
partly to the delays of his opponent. Early in May he received advices
from home, which convinced him that a sudden and rapid abandonment of
Philadelphia and of Delaware Bay might become necessary. He therefore
withdrew his ships of the line from New York and Narragansett,
concentrating them at the mouth of Delaware Bay, while the transports
embarked all stores, except those needed for a fortnight's supply
of the army in a hostile country. The threatening contingency of
a superior enemy's appearing off the coast might, and did, make it
imperative not to risk the troops at sea, but to choose instead the
alternative of a ninety-mile march through New Jersey, which a year
before had been rejected as too hazardous for an even larger force.
Thus prepared, no time was lost when the evacuation became necessary.
Sir William Howe, who had been relieved on the 24th of May by Sir
Henry Clinton, and had returned to England, escaped the humiliation of
giving up his dearly bought conquest. On the 18th of June the British
troops, twelve thousand in number, were ferried across the Delaware,
under the supervision of the Navy, and began their hazardous march to
New York. The next day the transports began to move down the river;
but, owing to the intricate navigation, head winds, and calms, they
did not get to sea until the 28th of June. On the 8th of July, ten
days too late, d'Estaing anchored in the mouth of the Delaware. "Had a
passage of even ordinary length taken place," wrote Washington, "Lord
Howe with the British ships of war and all the transports in the river
Delaware must inevitably have fallen; and Sir Henry Clinton must have
had better luck than is commonly dispensed to men of his profession
under such circumstances, if he and his troops had not shared at least
the fate of Burgoyne."

Had Howe's fleet been intercepted, there would have been no naval
defence for New York; the French fleet would have surmounted the
difficulties of the harbour bar at its ease; and Clinton, caught
between it and the American army, must have surrendered. Howe's
arrival obviated this immediate danger; but much still needed to be
done, or the end would be postponed only, not averted. A fair wind
carried the fleet and the whole convoy from the Delaware to Sandy
Hook in forty-eight hours. On the morning of the 29th, as Howe was
approaching his port, he spoke a packet from England, which not only
brought definite news of d'Estaing's sailing, but also reported that
she herself had fallen in with him to the southward, not very far from
the American coast, and had been chased by his ships. His appearance
off New York, therefore, was imminent.

Howe's measures were prompt and thorough, as became his great
reputation. To watch for d'Estaing's approach, a body of cruisers was
despatched, numerous enough for some to bring frequent word of his
movements, while others kept touch with him. The ships at New York
were ordered down to Sandy Hook, where the defence of the entrance
was to be made. Clinton, who had been hard pressed by Washington
throughout his march, arrived on the 30th of June--the day after Howe
himself--on the heights of Navesink, on the seacoast, just south
of Sandy Hook. During the previous winter the sea had made a breach
between the heights and the Hook, converting the latter into an
island. Across this inlet the Navy threw a bridge of boats, by
which the army on the 5th of July passed to the Hook, and thence was
conveyed to the city.

On the same day the French fleet was sighted off the coast of Virginia
by a cruiser, which reached Howe on the 7th; and two days later
another brought word that the enemy had anchored on the 8th off the
Delaware. There d'Estaing again tarried for two days, which were
diligently improved by the British Admiral, who at the same time
sent off despatches to warn Byron, of whose coming he now had heard.
Despite all his energy, his preparations still were far from complete,
when on the morning of the 11th a third vessel arrived, announcing
that the French were approaching. That evening they anchored outside,
four miles south of Sandy Hook. Howe, who during all these days was
indefatigable, not only in planning but also in personal supervision
of details, hastened at once to place his vessels according to the
disposition which he had determined, and which he had carefully
explained to his captains, thus insuring an intelligent coöperation on
their part.

The narrow arm of land called Sandy Hook projects in a northerly
direction from the New Jersey coast, and covers the lower bay of New
York on the south side. The main ship-channel, then as now, ran nearly
east and west, at right angles to the Hook and close to its northern
end. Beyond the channel, to the north, there was no solid ground for
fortification within the cannon range of that day. Therefore such guns
as could be mounted on shore, five in number, were placed in battery
at the end of the Hook. These formed the right flank of the defence,
which was continued thence to the westward by a line of seven ships,
skirting the southern edge of the channel. As the approach of the
French, if they attacked, must be with an easterly wind and a rising
tide, the ships were placed with that expectation; and in such wise
that, riding with their heads to the eastward, each successive one,
from van to rear, lay a little outside--north--of her next ahead. The
object of this indented formation was that each ship might bring her
broadside to bear east, and yet fire clear of those to the east of
her. In order to effect this concentration of all the batteries in
an easterly direction, which would rake the approach of the enemy,
a spring[23] was run from the outer, or port quarter of every ship,
except the leader.[24] These springs were not taken to the bow cable
or anchor, as was often done, but to anchors of their own, placed
broad off the port bows. If, then, the enemy attacked, the ships, by
simply keeping fast the springs and veering the cables, would swing
with their broadsides facing east. If the enemy, which had no bow
fire, survived his punishment, and succeeded in advancing till abreast
the British line, it was necessary only to keep fast the cables and
let go the springs; the ships would swing head to the east wind, and
the broadsides would once more bear north, across the channel instead
of along it. These careful arrangements were subject, of course, to
the mischance of shot cutting away cables or springs; but this was
more than offset by the probable injury to the enemy's spars and
rigging, as well as hulls, before he could use his batteries at all.

Such was the main defence arranged by Howe; with which New York stood
or fell. In the line were five 64's, one 50, and an armed storeship.
An advanced line, of one fifty with two smaller vessels, was placed
just inside the bar--two or three miles outside the Hook--to rake
the enemy as he crossed, retiring as he approached; and four galleys,
forming a second line, were also stationed for the same purpose,
across the channel, abreast of the Hook.[25] The retreat of these was
secure into the shoal water, where they could not be followed. One 64
and some frigates were held as a reserve, inside the main line, to act
as occasion might require. The total available force was, six 64's,
three 50's, and six frigates. D'Estaing's fleet, in detail, consisted
of one 90-gun ship, one 80, six 74's and one 50. Great as was this
discrepancy between the opponents, it was counterbalanced largely by
Howe's skilful dispositions, which his enemy could not circumvent. If
the latter once got alongside, there was little hope for the British;
but it was impossible for the French to evade the primary necessity
of undergoing a raking fire, without reply, from the extreme range of
their enemies' cannon up to the moment of closing. The stake, however,
was great, and the apparent odds stirred to the bottom the fighting
blood of the British seamen. The ships of war being short-handed, Howe
called for volunteers from the transports. Such numbers came forward
that the agents of the vessels scarcely could keep a watch on board;
and many whose names were not on the lists concealed themselves in
the boats which carried their companions to the fighting ships. The
masters and mates of merchantmen in the harbour in like manner offered
their services, taking their stations at the guns. Others cruised off
the coast in small boats, to warn off approaching vessels; many of
which nevertheless fell into the enemy's hands.

Meanwhile d'Estaing was in communication with Washington, one of whose
aides-de-camp visited his flagship. A number of New York pilots also
were sent. When these learned the draught of the heavier French ships,
they declared that it was impossible to take them in; that there was
on the bar only twenty-three feet at high water. Had that been really
the case, Howe would not have needed to make the preparations for
defence that were visible to thousands of eyes on sea and on shore;
but d'Estaing, though personally brave as a lion, was timid in his
profession, which he had entered at the age of thirty, without serving
in the lower grades. The assurances of the pilots were accepted after
an examination by a lieutenant of the flagship, who could find nothing
deeper than twenty-two feet. Fortune's favors are thrown away, as
though in mockery, on the incompetent or the irresolute. On the 22d of
July a fresh north-east wind concurred with a spring tide to give the
highest possible water on the bar.[26]

    "At eight o'clock," wrote an eye-witness in the British fleet,
    "d'Estaing with all his squadron appeared under way. He kept
    working to windward, as if to gain a proper position for
    crossing the bar by the time the tide should serve. The wind
    could not be more favourable for such a design; it blew from
    the exact point from which he could attack us to the greatest
    advantage. The spring tides were at the highest, and that
    afternoon thirty feet on the bar. We consequently expected
    the hottest day that had ever been fought between the two
    nations. On our side all was at stake. Had the men-of-war been
    defeated, the fleet of transports and victuallers must have
    been destroyed, and the army, of course, have fallen with us.
    D'Estaing, however, had not spirit equal to the risk; at three
    o'clock we saw him bear off to the southward, and in a few
    hours he was out of sight."

Four days later, Howe, reporting these occurrences, wrote: "The
weather having been favourable the last three days for forcing
entrance to this port, I conclude the French commander has desisted."
It is clear that the experienced British admiral did not recognise the
impossibility of success for the enemy.

After the demonstration of the 22d, d'Estaing stood to the southward,
with the wind at east. The British advice-boats brought back word
that they had kept company with him as far south as the Capes of
the Delaware, and there had left him ninety miles from land. When
their leaving freed him from observation, he turned, and made for
Narragansett Bay, an attack on which, in support of an American land
force, had been concerted between him and Washington. On the 29th
he anchored three miles south of Rhode Island, and there awaited a
suitable moment for forcing the entrance.

Narragansett Bay contains several islands. The two largest, near
the sea, are Rhode Island and Conanicut, the latter being the more
westerly. Their general direction, as that of the Bay itself, is north
and south; and by them the entrance is divided into three passages.
Of these, the eastern, called Seakonnet, is not navigable above Rhode
Island. The central, which is the main channel, is joined by the
western above Conanicut, and thus the two lead to the upper Bay. The
town of Newport is on the west side of Rhode Island, four miles from
the main entrance.

On the 30th of July, the day after the French fleet had arrived, two
of its ships of the line, under command of the afterwards celebrated
Suffren, went up the western channel, anchoring within it near the
south end of Conanicut. One of them, as she passed, was hulled
twice by the British batteries. At the same time, two frigates and
a corvette entered Seakonnet; whereupon the British abandoned and
burned a sloop of war, the _Kingfisher_, 16, and some galleys there
stationed. The British general, Sir Robert Pigot, now withdrew his
detachments from Conanicut, after disabling the guns, and concentrated
the bulk of his force in the southern part of Rhode Island and about
Newport. Goat Island, which covers the inner harbour of the town, was
still occupied, the main channel being commanded by its batteries, as
well as by those to the north and south of it upon Rhode Island. On
the 5th of August, Suffren's two ships again got under way, sailed
through the western passage, and anchored in the main channel, north
of Conanicut; their former positions being taken by two other ships
of the line.[27] The senior British naval officer, seeing retreat cut
off both north and south, now destroyed those ships of war[28] which
could not enter the inner harbour, sinking two between Goat and Rhode
Islands, to prevent any enemy passing there. Five transports also
were sunk north of Goat Island, between it and Coaster's Harbour,
to protect the inside anchorage in that direction. These preliminary
operations cost the British five frigates and two sloops, besides
some galleys. Guns and ammunition taken from them went to increase
the defences; and their officers and crews, over a thousand in number,
served in the fortifications.

[Illustration]

On the 8th of August the eight remaining French ships of the line ran
the batteries on Rhode and Goat Islands, anchoring above the latter,
between it and Conanicut, and were rejoined there by the four
previously detached to the western passage. Ten thousand American
troops having by this time crossed from the mainland to the northern
part of Rhode Island, d'Estaing immediately landed four thousand
soldiers and seamen from the fleet upon Conanicut, for a preliminary
organisation; after which they also were to pass to Rhode Island
and join in the operations. For the moment, therefore, the British
garrison, numbering probably six thousand men,[29] was hemmed in
by vastly superior forces, by land and by water. Its embarrassment,
however, did not last long. On the following morning Lord Howe
appeared and anchored off Point Judith, seven miles from the entrance
to the Bay, and twelve from the position then occupied by the French
fleet. He brought a stronger force than he had been able to gather for
the defence of New York, having now one 74, seven 64's, and five 50's,
in all thirteen of the line, besides several smaller vessels; but he
still was greatly inferior to opponent, by any rational mode of naval
reckoning.

Howe's energies in New York had not been confined to preparations
for resisting the entrance of the enemy, nor did they cease with the
latter's departure. When he first arrived there from Philadelphia, he
had hastened to get his ships ready for sea, a pre-occupation which
somewhat, but not unduly, delayed their taking their positions at
Sandy Hook. Two, for instance, had been at the watering-place when the
approach of the French was signalled. Owing to this diligence, no time
was lost by his fault when the new destination of the enemy was made
known to him, on the 28th or 29th of July, by the arrival of the
_Raisonnable_, 64,[30] from Halifax. This ship narrowly escaped the
French fleet, having passed it on the evening of the 27th, steering
for Rhode Island. The _Renown_, 50, which on the 26th had reached New
York from the West Indies, had a similar close shave, having sailed
unnoticed through the rear of the enemy the night before. Besides
these two, Howe was joined also by the _Centurion_, 50, from Halifax,
and by the _Cornwall_, 74; the latter, which crossed the bar on the
30th, being the first of Byron's fleet to reach New York. The three
others belonged to Howe's own squadron. For the two Halifax ships
which helped to make this most welcome reinforcement, the Admiral was
indebted to the diligence of the officer there commanding, who hurried
them away as soon as he learned of d'Estaing's appearance on the
coast. The opportuneness of their arrival attracted notice. "Had
they appeared a few days sooner," says a contemporary narrative,
"either they must have been prevented from forming a junction with
our squadron, and forced again to sea, or we should have had the
mortification to see them increase the triumph of our enemy."

On the 1st of August, forty-eight hours after the _Cornwall_ had come
in from a stormy passage of fifty-two days, the squadron was ready for
sea, and Howe attempted to sail; but the wind hauled foul immediately
after the signal to weigh had been made. It did not become fair at the
hour of high water, when alone heavy ships could cross the bar, until
the morning of the 6th. "Rhode Island was of such importance," says
the narrator already quoted, "_and the fate of so large a portion
of the British army as formed the garrison was of such infinite
consequence to the general cause_, that it was imagined the Admiral
would not lose a moment in making some attempt for their relief."
He had learned of the detachments made from the French fleet, and
hoped that some advantage might be taken of this division. In
short, he went, as was proper and incumbent on him in such critical
circumstances, to take a great risk, in hope of a favourable chance
offering. On the 9th, as before stated, he anchored off Point Judith,
and opened communications with the garrison, from which he learned
the events that had so far occurred, and also that the enemy was well
provided with craft of all kinds to make a descent upon any part of
the Island.

As deGrasse at Yorktown, when rumour announced the approach of
a British fleet, was deterred only by the most urgent appeals of
Washington from abandoning his control of the Chesapeake, essential
to the capture of Cornwallis, so now d'Estaing, in Narragansett Bay,
was unwilling to keep his place, in face of Howe's greatly inferior
squadron.[31] The influence exerted upon these two admirals by the
mere approach of a hostile fleet, when decisive advantages depended
upon their holding their ground, may be cited plausibly in support
of the most extreme view of the effect of a "fleet in being;" but
the instances also, when the conditions are analysed, will suggest
the question: Is such effect always legitimate, inherent in the
existence of the fleet itself, or does it not depend often upon
the characteristics of the man affected? The contemporary British
narrative of these events in Narragansett Bay, after reciting the
various obstacles and the inferiority of the British squadron,
says: "The most skilful officers were therefore of opinion that
the Vice-Admiral could not risk an attack; and it appears by his
Lordship's public letter that this was also his own opinion: under
such circumstances, he judged it was impracticable to afford the
General any essential relief." In both these instances, the admirals
concerned were impelled to sacrifice the almost certain capture, not
of a mere position, but of a decisive part of the enemy's organised
forces, by the mere possibility of action; by the moral effect
produced by a fleet greatly inferior to their own, which in neither
case would have attacked, as things stood. What does this prove?

Immediately upon Howe's appearance, the French seamen who had landed
the day before on Conanicut were recalled to their ships. The next
morning, August 10, at 7 A.M., the wind came out strong at north-east,
which is exceptional at that season. D'Estaing at once put to sea,
cutting the cables in his haste. In two hours he was outside, steering
for the enemy. Howe, of course, retired at once; his inferiority[32]
did not permit an engagement except on his own terms. To insure these,
he needed the weather-gage, the offensive position of that day, which
by keeping south he expected to gain, when the usual wind from that
quarter should set in. The French Admiral had the same object, hoping
to crush his agile opponent; and, as the sea breeze from south-west
did not make that day, he succeeded in keeping the advantage with
which he had started, despite Howe's skill. At nightfall both fleets
were still steering to the southward, on the port tack, the French
five or six miles in the rear of the British, with the wind variable
at east. The same course was maintained throughout the night, the
French gradually overhauling the British, and becoming visible at 3
A.M. of the 11th. By Howe's dispatch, they bore in the morning, at an
hour not specified, east-north-east, which would be nearly abeam, but
somewhat more distant than the night before, having apparently kept
closer to the wind, which by this had steadied at east-north-east.

In the course of the day Howe shifted his flag from the _Eagle_, 64,
to the _Apollo_, 32, and placed himself between the two fleets, the
better to decide the movements of his own. Finding it impossible
to gain the weather-gage, and unwilling, probably, to be drawn too
far from Rhode Island, he now made a wide circle with the fleet
by a succession of changes of course: at 8 A.M. to south, then to
south-west and west, until finally, at 1.30 P.M., the ships were
steering north-west; always in line of battle. The French Admiral
seems to have followed this movement cautiously, on an outer circle
but with a higher speed, so that from east-north-east in the morning,
which, as the fleets were then heading, would be on the starboard side
of the British, abreast and to windward, at 4 P.M. the French bore
south-south-east, which would be somewhat on the port quarter, or
nearly astern but to leeward. At this time their van was estimated by
Howe to be two or three miles from the British rear, and, according
to his reading of their manoeuvres, d'Estaing was forming his line
for the same tack as the British, with a view of "engaging the British
squadron to leeward," whereby he would obtain over it the advantage
of using the lower-deck guns, the wind and sea having become much
heavier. As the French Admiral, in this new disposition, had put his
heaviest ships in the van, and his line was nearly in the wake of the
British, Howe inferred an attack upon his rear. He therefore ordered
his heaviest ship, the _Cornwall_, 74, to go there from the centre,
exchanging places with the _Centurion_, 50, and at the same time
signalled the fleet to close _to the centre_,--a detail worth
remembering in view of Rodney's frustrated manoeuvre of April 17th,
1780. It now remained simply to await firmly the moment when the
French should have covered the intervening ground, and brought
to action so much of his rear as d'Estaing saw fit to engage; the
conditions of the sea favoring the speed of the bulkier ships that
composed the hostile fleet. The latter, however, soon abandoned the
attempt, and "bore away to the southward, apparently from the state of
the weather, which, by the wind freshening much, with frequent rain,
was now rendered very unfavorable for engaging." It may be added that
the hour was very late for beginning an action. At sundown the British
were under close-reefed topsails, and the sea such that Howe was
unable to return to the _Eagle_.[33]

The wind now increased to great violence, and a severe storm raged on
the coast until the evening of the 13th, throwing the two fleets into
confusion, scattering the ships, and causing numerous disasters. The
_Apollo_ lost her foremast, and sprung the mainmast, on the night of
the 12th. The next day only two British ships of the line and three
smaller vessels were in sight of their Admiral. When the weather
moderated, Howe went on board the _Phoenix_, 44, and thence to the
_Centurion_, 50, with which he "proceeded to the southward, and on the
15th discovered ten sail of the French squadron, some at anchor in the
sea, about twenty-five leagues east from Cape May."[34] Leaving there
the _Centurion_, to direct to New York any of Byron's ships that
might come on the coast, he departed thither himself also, and on
the evening of the 17th rejoined the squadron off Sandy Hook, the
appointed rendezvous. Many injuries had been received by the various
ships, but they were mostly of a minor character; and on the 22d the
fleet again put to sea in search of the enemy.

The French had suffered much more severely. The flagship _Languedoc_,
90, had carried away her bowsprit, all her lower masts followed
it overboard, and her tiller also was broken, rendering the rudder
unserviceable. The _Marseillais_, 74, lost her foremast and bowsprit.
In the dispersal of the two fleets that followed the gale, each of
these crippled vessels, on the evening of the 13th, encountered singly
a British 50-gun ship; the _Languedoc_ being attacked by the _Renown_,
and the _Marseillais_ by the _Preston_. The conditions in each
instance were distinctly favourable to the smaller combatant; but both
unfortunately withdrew at nightfall, making the mistake of postponing
to to-morrow a chance which they had no certainty would exist after
to-day. When morning dawned, other French ships appeared, and the
opportunity passed away. The British _Isis_, 50, also was chased and
overtaken by the _César_, 74. In the action which ensued, the French
ship's wheel was shot away, and she retired;--two other British
vessels, one of the line, being in sight. The latter are not mentioned
in the British accounts, and both sides claimed the advantage in this
drawn action. The French captain lost an arm.

After making temporary repairs, at the anchorage where Howe saw them
on the 15th of August, the French fleet had proceeded again towards
Newport. It was in the course of this passage that they were seen by
Byron's flagship[35] on the 18th, to the southward of Long Island. The
_Experiment_, 50, which Howe had sent to reconnoitre Narragansett Bay,
was chased by them into Long Island Sound, and only reached New York
by the East River; being the first ship of the line or 50-gun ship
that ever passed through Hell Gate. On the 20th d'Estaing communicated
with General Sullivan, the commander of the American land forces on
Rhode Island; but it was only to tell him that in his own opinion,
and in that of a council of war, the condition of the squadron
necessitated going to Boston to refit. Whatever may be thought of the
propriety of this decision, its seriousness can be best understood
from the report sent by Pigot to Howe. "The rebels had advanced their
batteries within fifteen hundred yards of the British works. He was
under no apprehensions from any of their attempts in front; but,
should the French fleet come in, it would make an alarming change.
Troops might be landed and advanced in his rear; and in that case
he could not answer for the consequences." Disregarding Sullivan's
entreaties that he would remain, d'Estaing sailed next day for Boston,
which he reached on August 28th. On the 31st the indefatigable Howe
came in sight; but the French had worked actively in the three days.
Forty-nine guns, 18 and 24-pounders, with six mortars, were already
in position covering the anchorage; and "the French squadron, far
from fearing an attack, desired it eagerly."[36] The withdrawal of the
French fleet from Rhode Island was followed by that of the American
troops from before Newport.

Howe had quitted New York the instant he heard of d'Estaing's
reappearance off Rhode Island. He took with him the same number of
vessels as before,--thirteen of the line,--the _Monmouth_, 64, of
Byron's squadron, having arrived and taken the place of the _Isis_,
crippled in her late action. Before reaching Newport, he learned
that the French had started for Boston. He hoped that they would
find it necessary to go outside George's Bank, and that he might
intercept them by following the shorter road inside. In this he was
disappointed, as has been seen, and the enemy's position was now
too strong for attack. The French retreat to Boston closed the naval
campaign of 1778 in North American waters.

[Illustration]

The inability or unwillingness of d'Estaing to renew the enterprise
against Rhode Island accords the indisputable triumph in this campaign
to Howe,--an honour he must share, and doubtless would have shared
gladly, with his supporters in general. That his fleet, for the most
part two years from home, in a country without dockyards, should have
been able to take the sea within ten days after the gale, while their
opponents, just from France, yet with three months' sea practice, were
so damaged that they had to abandon the field and all the splendid
prospects of Rhode Island,--as they already had allowed to slip the
chance at New York,--shows a decisive superiority in the British
officers and crews. The incontestable merits of the rank and file,
however, must not be permitted to divert attention from the great
qualities of the leader, but for which the best material would have
been unavailing. The conditions were such as to elicit to the utmost
Howe's strongest qualities,--firmness, endurance, uninterrupted
persistence rather than celerity, great professional skill, ripened by
constant reflection and ready at an instant's call. Not brilliant in
intellect, perhaps, but absolutely clear, and replete with expedients
to meet every probable contingency, Howe exhibited an equable,
unflagging energy, which was his greatest characteristic, and which
eminently fitted him for the task of checkmating an enemy's every
move--for a purely defensive campaign. He was always on hand and
always ready; for he never wearied, and he knew his business. To
great combinations he was perhaps unequal. At all events, such are not
associated with his name. The distant scene he did not see; but step
by step he saw his way with absolute precision, and followed it with
unhesitating resolution. With a force inferior throughout, to have
saved, in one campaign, the British fleet, New York, and Rhode Island,
with the entire British army, which was divided between those two
stations and dependent upon the sea, is an achievement unsurpassed
in the annals of naval defensive warfare. It may be added that his
accomplishment is the measure of his adversary's deficiencies.

Howe's squadron had been constituted in 1776 with reference to the
colonial struggle only, and to shallow water, and therefore was
composed, very properly, of cruisers, and of ships of the line of the
smaller classes; there being several fifties, and nothing larger than
a sixty-four. When war with France threatened, the Ministry, having
long warning, committed an unpardonable fault in allowing such a force
to be confronted by one so superior as that which sailed from Toulon,
in April, 1778. This should have been stopped on its way, or, failing
that, its arrival in America should have been preceded by a British
reinforcement. As it was, the government was saved from a tremendous
disaster only by the efficiency of its Admiral and the inefficiency of
his antagonist. As is not too uncommon, gratitude was swamped by the
instinct of self-preservation from the national wrath, excited by
this, and by other simultaneous evidences of neglect. An attempt was
made to disparage Howe's conduct, and to prove that his force was even
superior to that of the French, by adding together the guns in all his
ships, disregarding their classes, or by combining groups of his small
vessels against d'Estaing's larger units. The instrument of the attack
was a naval officer, of some rank but slender professional credit, who
at this most opportune moment underwent a political conversion, which
earned him employment on the one hand, and the charge of apostasy on
the other. For this kind of professional arithmetic, Howe felt and
expressed just and utter contempt. Two and two make four in a primer,
but in the field they may make three, or they may make five. Not
to speak of the greater defensive power of heavy ships, nor of the
concentration of their fire, the unity of direction under one captain
possesses here also that importance which has caused unity of command
and of effort to be recognised as the prime element in military
efficiency, from the greatest things to the smallest. Taken together,
the three elements--greater defensive power, concentration of fire,
and unity of direction--constitute a decisive and permanent argument
in favor of big ships, in Howe's days as in our own. Doubtless,
now, as then, there is a limit; most arguments can be pushed to an
_absurdum_, intellectual or practical. To draw a line is always hard;
but, if we cannot tell just where the line has been passed we can
recognise that one ship is much too big, while another certainly is
not. Between the two an approximation to an exact result can be made.

On his return to New York on September 11th, Howe found there
Rear-Admiral Hyde Parker[37] with six ships of the line of Byron's
squadron. Considering his task now accomplished, Howe decided to
return to England, in virtue of a permission granted some time
before at his own request. The duty against the Americans, lately his
fellow-countrymen, had been always distasteful to him, although he
did not absolutely refuse to undertake it, as did Admiral Keppel.
The entrance of France into the quarrel, and the coming of d'Estaing,
refreshed the spirits of the veteran, who moreover scorned to abandon
his command in the face of such odds. Now, with the British positions
secure, and superiority of force insured for the time being, he
gladly turned over his charge and sailed for home; burning against the
Admiralty with a wrath common to most of the distinguished seamen of
that war. He was not employed afloat again until a change of Ministry
took place, in 1782.

[Footnote 19: Charles H., Comte d'Estaing. Born, 1729. Served in
India under Lally Tollendal, 1758. After having been taken prisoner at
Madras in 1759, exchanged into the navy. Commanded in North America,
1778-80. Guillotined, 1794. W.L.C.]

[Footnote 20: Grandfather of the poet.]

[Footnote 21: The Secretary of Lloyd's, for the purposes of this work,
has been so good as to cause to be specially compiled a summary of the
losses and captures during the period 1775-1783. This, so far as it
deals with merchantmen and privateers, gives the following results.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------
     |          BRITISH VESSELS        |          ENEMY'S VESSELS
     |---------------------------------+----------------------------------
     |  Merchantmen   |   Privateers   |  Merchantmen   |    Privateers
     |----------------+----------------+----------------+-----------------
     |       |Re-taken|       |Re-taken|       |Re-taken|       |Re-taken
     | Taken |or Ran- | Taken |or Ran- | Taken |or Ran- | Taken |or Ran-
     |  [22] | somed  |  [22] | somed  |  [22] | somed  |  [22] | somed
-----+-------+--------+-------+--------+-------+--------+-------+---------
1775 |  ---  |  ---   |  ---  |  ---   |  ---  |  ---   |  ---  |  ---
1776 |  229  |   51   |  ---  |  ---   |   19  |  ---   |    6  |  ---
1777 |  331  |   52   |  ---  |  ---   |   51  |    1   |   18  |  ---
1778 |  359  |   87   |    5  |  ---   |  232  |    5   |   16  |  ---
1779 |  487  |  106   |   29  |    5   |  238  |    5   |   31  |  ---
1780 |  581  |  260   |   15  |    2   |  203  |    3   |   34  |    1
1781 |  587  |  211   |   38  |    6   |  277  |   10   |   40  |  ---
1782 |  415  |   99   |    1  |  ---   |  104  |    1   |   68  |  ---
1783 |   98  |   13   |    1  |    1   |   11  |    2   |    3  |  ---
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

[Footnote 22: Including those re-taken or ransomed. W.L.C.]

[Footnote 23: A spring is a rope taken usually from the quarter (one
side of the stern) of a ship, to the anchor. By hauling upon it the
battery is turned in the direction desired.]

[Footnote 24: The leader, the _Leviathan_, was excepted, evidently
because she lay under the Hook, and her guns could not bear down
channel. She was not a fighting ship of the squadron, but an armed
storeship, although originally a ship of war, and therefore by her
thickness of side better fitted for defence than an ordinary merchant
vessel. Placing her seems to have been an afterthought, to close the
gap in the line, and prevent even the possibility of the enemy's ships
turning in there and doubling on the van. Thus Howe avoided the fatal
oversight made by Brueys twenty years later, in Aboukir Bay.]

[Footnote 25: It may be recalled that a similar disposition was made
by the Confederates at Mobile against Farragut's attack in 1864, and
that it was from these small vessels that his flagship _Hartford_
underwent her severest loss. To sailing ships the odds were
greater, as injury to spars might involve stoppage. Moreover, Howe's
arrangements brought into such fire all his heavier ships.]

[Footnote 26: A letter to the Admiralty, dated October 8th, 1779, from
Vice-Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot, then commander-in-chief at New York,
states that "at spring tides there is generally thirty feet of water
on the bar at high water."]

[Footnote 27: These four ships were among the smallest of the fleet,
being one 74, two 64's, and a 50. D'Estaing very properly reserved his
heaviest ships to force the main channel.]

[Footnote 28: _Flora_, 32; _Juno_, 32; Lark, 32; _Orpheus_, 32;
_Falcon_, 16.]

[Footnote 29: I have not been able to find an exact statement of the
number; Beatson gives eight regiments, with a reinforcement of five
battalions.]

[Footnote 30: It may be interesting to recall that this was the ship
on the books of which Nelson's name was first borne in the navy, in
1771.]

[Footnote 31: Troude attributes d'Estaing's sortie to a sense of
the insecurity of his position; Lapeyrouse Bonfils, to a desire for
contest. Chevalier dwells upon the exposure of the situation.]

[Footnote 32: For the respective force of the two fleets see pp. 66,
67, 71.]

[Footnote 33: This account of the manoeuvres of the two fleets is
based upon Lord Howe's dispatch, and amplified from the journal of
Captain Henry Duncan of the flagship _Eagle_ which has been published
(1902) since the first publication of this work. See "Navy Records
Society, Naval Miscellany." Vol. i, p. 161.]

[Footnote 34: At the mouth of Delaware Bay.]

[Footnote 35: _Ante_, p. 62.]

[Footnote 36: Chevalier: "Marine Française," 1778.]

[Footnote 37: Later Vice-Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, Bart., who perished
in the _Cato_ in 1783. He was father of that Admiral Sir Hyde Parker,
who in 1801 was Nelson's commander-in-chief at Copenhagen, and who in
1778 commanded the _Phoenix_, 44, in Howe's fleet. (_Ante_, pp. 39,
46.)]




CHAPTER V

THE NAVAL WAR IN EUROPE. THE BATTLE OF USHANT

1778


During the same two months that saw the contest between d'Estaing and
Howe in America the only encounter between nearly equal fleets in
1778 took place in European waters. Admiral Keppel, having returned
to Spithead after the affair between the _Belle Poule_ and the
_Arethusa_,[38] again put to sea on the 9th of July, with a force
increased to thirty ships of the line. He had been mortified by the
necessity of avoiding action, and of even retiring into port, with the
inadequate numbers before under his command, and his mind was fixed
now to compel an engagement, if he met the French.

The Brest fleet also put to sea, the day before Keppel, under the
command of Admiral the Comte d'Orvilliers. It contained thirty-two
ships of the line. Of these, three--64, a 60, and a 50--were not
considered fit for the line of battle, which was thus reduced to
twenty-nine sail, carrying 2098 guns. To these the British opposed an
aggregate of 2278; but comparison by this means only is very rough.
Not only the sizes of the guns, but the classes and weight of the
vessels need to be considered. In the particular instance the matter
is of little importance; the action being indecisive, and credit
depending upon manoeuvres rather than upon fighting.

The French admiral was hampered by vacillating instructions,
reflections of the unstable impulses which swayed the Ministry.
Whatever his personal wishes, he felt that he was expected to avoid
action, unless under very favourable circumstances. At the moment of
sailing he wrote: "Since you leave me free to continue my cruise, I
will not bring the fleet back to Brest, unless by positive orders,
until I have fulfilled the month at sea mentioned in my instructions,
and known to all the captains. Till then I will not fly before Admiral
Keppel, whatever his strength; only, if I know him to be too superior,
I will avoid a disproportionate action as well as I can; but if the
enemy really seeks to force it, it will be very hard to shun." These
words explain his conduct through the next few days.

On the afternoon of July 23d the two fleets sighted each other, about
a hundred miles west of Ushant, the French being then to leeward.
Towards sunset, they were standing south-west, with the wind at
west-north-west, and bore north-east from the enemy, who were
lying-to, heads to the northward. The British remaining nearly
motionless throughout the night, and the wind shifting, d'Orvilliers
availed himself of the conditions to press to windward, and in the
morning was found to bear north-west from his opponent.[39] Their
relative positions satisfied both admirals for the moment; for
Keppel found himself interposed between Brest and the French, while
d'Orvilliers, though surrendering the advantage of open retreat to his
port, had made it possible, by getting the weather-gage, to fulfil
his promise to keep the sea and yet to avoid action. Two of his ships,
however, the _Duc de Bourgogne_, 80, and a 74, were still to leeward,
not only of their own main body, but also of the British. Keppel
sent chasers after them, for the expressed purpose of compelling
d'Orvilliers to action in their support,[40] and it was believed by
the British that they were forced to return to Brest, to avoid being
cut off. They certainly quitted their fleet, which was thus reduced to
twenty-seven effective sail. From this time until July 27th the wind
continued to the westward, and the wariness of the French admiral
baffled all his antagonist's efforts to get within range. Keppel,
having no doubts as to what was expected of him, pursued vigorously,
watching his chance. On the morning of July 27th the two fleets [Fig
1, AA, AA], were from six to ten miles apart, wind south-west, both on
the port tack,[41] steering north-west; the French dead to windward,
in line ahead. The British were in bow-and-quarter line. In this
formation, when exact, the ships of a fleet were nearly abreast each
other; so ranged, however, that if they tacked all at the same time
they would be at once in line of battle ahead close to the wind,--the
fighting order.[42] Both fleets were irregularly formed, the British
especially so; for Keppel rightly considered that he would not
accomplish his purpose, if he were pedantic concerning the order of
his going. He had therefore signalled a "General Chase," which,
by permitting much individual freedom of movement, facilitated the
progress of the whole body. At daylight, the division commanded by
Sir Hugh Palliser--the right wing, as then heading--had dropped astern
[R]; and at 5.30 A.M. the signal was made to seven of its fastest
sailers to chase to windward, to get farther to windward by pressing
sail, the object being so to place them relatively to the main body,
as to support the latter, if an opportunity for action should offer.

At 9 A.M. the French admiral, wishing to approach the enemy and to
see more clearly, ordered his fleet to wear in succession,--to
countermarch. As the van ships went round (b) under this signal, they
had to steer off the wind (be), parallel to their former line, on
which those following them still were, until they reached the point to
which the rear ship meantime had advanced (c), when they could again
haul to the wind. This caused a loss of ground to leeward, but not
more than d'Orvilliers could afford, as things stood. Just after he
had fairly committed himself to the manoeuvre, the wind hauled to the
southward two points,[43] from south-west to south-south-west, which
favoured the British, allowing them to head more nearly towards the
enemy (BB). The shift also threw the bows of the French off the line
they were following, deranging their order. Keppel therefore continued
on the port tack, until all the French (BB), were on the starboard,
and at 10.15, being nearly in their wake, he ordered his own ships to
tack together (dd), which would bring them into line ahead on the same
tack as the French; that is, having the wind on the same side. This
put the British in column,[44] still to leeward, but nearly astern of
the enemy and following (CC). At this moment a thick rain-squall came
up, concealing the fleets one from another for three quarters of an
hour. With the squall the wind shifted back to southwest, favouring
the British on this tack, as it had on the other, and enabling them to
lay up for the enemy's rear after which (French BB) they were standing
and could now bring to action. When the weather cleared, at 11, the
French were seen to have gone about again, all the ships together,
and were still in the confusion of a partly executed manoeuvre (CC).
Their admiral had doubtless recognised, from the change of wind, and
from the direction of the enemy when last visible, that an encounter
could not be avoided. If he continued on the starboard tack, the van
of the pursuing enemy, whose resolve to force battle could not be
misunderstood, would overtake his rear ships, engaging as many of
them as he might choose. By resuming the port tack, the heads of the
columns would meet, and the fleets pass in opposite directions, on
equal terms as regarded position; because all the French would engage,
and not only a part of their rear. Therefore he had ordered his ships
to go about, all at the same time; thus forming column again rapidly,
but reversing the order so that the rear became the van.

[Illustration]

Keppel so far had made no signal for the line of battle, nor did he
now. Recognising from the four days' chase that his enemy was avoiding
action, he judged correctly that he should force it, even at some
risk. It was not the time for a drill-master, nor a parade. Besides,
thanks to the morning signal for the leewardly ships to chase, these,
forming the rear of the disorderly column in which he was advancing,
were now well to windward, able therefore to support their comrades,
if needful, as well as to attack the enemy. In short, practically the
whole force was coming into action, although much less regularly than
might have been desired. What was to follow was a rough-and-ready
fight, but it was all that could be had, and better than nothing.
Keppel therefore simply made the signal for battle, and that just as
the firing began. The collision was so sudden that the ships at first
had not their colours flying.

The French also, although their manoeuvres had been more methodical,
were in some confusion. It is not given to a body of thirty ships, of
varying qualities, to attain perfection of movement in a fortnight of
sea practice. The change of wind had precipitated an action, which one
admiral had been seeking, and the other shunning; but each had to meet
it with such shift as he could. The British (CC) being close-hauled,
the French (CC), advancing on a parallel line, were four points[45]
off the wind. Most of their ships, therefore, could have gone clear
to windward of their opponents, but the fact that the latter could
reach some of the leaders compelled the others to support them. As
d'Orvilliers had said, it was hard to avoid an enemy resolute to
fight. The leading three French vessels[46] (e) hauled their wind, in
obedience to the admiral's signal to form the line of battle, which
means a close-hauled line. The effect of this was to draw them
gradually away from the hostile line, taking them out of range of the
British centre and rear. This, if imitated by their followers, would
render the affair even more partial and indecisive than such passing
by usually was. The fourth French ship began the action, opening fire
soon after eleven. The vessels of the opposing fleets surged by under
short canvas, (D), firing as opportunity offered, but necessarily much
handicapped by smoke, which prevented the clear sight of an enemy, and
caused anxiety lest an unseen friend might receive a broadside. "The
distance between the _Formidable_, 90, (Palliser's flagship) and the
_Egmont_, 74, was so short," testified Captain John Laforey, whose
three-decker, the _Ocean_, 90, was abreast and outside this interval,
"that it was with difficulty I could keep betwixt them to engage,
without firing upon them, and I was once very near on board the
_Egmont_,"--next ahead of the _Ocean_. The _Formidable_ kept her
mizzen topsail aback much of the time, to deaden her way, to make the
needed room ahead for the _Ocean_, and also to allow the rear ships
to close. "At a quarter past one," testified Captain Maitland of the
_Elizabeth_, 74, "we were very close behind the _Formidable_, and a
midshipman upon the poop called out that there was a ship coming on
board on the weatherbow. I put the helm up,... and found, when the
smoke cleared away, I was shot up under the _Formidable's_ lee. She
was then engaged with the two last ships in the French fleet, and, as
I could not fire at them without firing through the _Formidable_, I
was obliged to shoot on."[47] Captain Bazely, of the _Formidable_,
says of the same incident, "The _Formidable_ did at the time of action
bear up to one of the enemy's ships, to avoid being aboard of her,
whose jib boom nearly touched the main topsail weather leech of the
_Formidable_. I thought we could not avoid being on board."

Contrary to the usual result, the loss of the rear division, in killed
and wounded, was heaviest, nearly equalling the aggregate of the two
others.[48] This was due to the morning signal to chase to windward,
which brought these ships closer than their leaders. As soon as the
British van, ten ships, had passed the French rear, its commander,
Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Harland, anticipating Keppel's wishes,
signalled it to go about and follow the enemy (Fig. 2, V). As the
French column was running free, these ships, when about, fetched to
windward of its wake. When the _Victory_ drew out of the fire, at 1
P.M., Keppel also made a similar signal, and attempted to wear (c),
the injuries to his rigging not permitting tacking; but caution was
needed in manoeuvring across the bows of the following ships, and it
was not till 2 P.M., that the _Victory_ was about on the other tack
(Fig. 2, C), heading after the French. At this time, 2 P.M., just
before or just after wearing, the signal for battle was hauled down,
and that for the line of battle was hoisted. The object of the latter
was to re-form the order, and the first was discontinued, partly
because no longer needed, chiefly that it might not seem to contradict
the urgent call for a re-formation.

At this time six or seven of Harland's division were on the weather
bow of the _Victory_, to windward (westward), but a little ahead, and
standing like her after the French; all on the port tack (Fig. 2).
None of the centre division succeeded in joining the flagship at once.
At 2.30 Palliser's ship, the _Formidable_ (R), on the starboard tack,
passed the _Victory_ to leeward, apparently the last of the fleet out
of action. A half-hour after this the _Victory_ had been joined by
three of the centre, which were following her in close order, the van
remaining in the same relative position. Astern of these two groups
from van and centre were a number of other ships in various degrees
of confusion,--some going about, some trying to come up, others
completely disabled. Especially, there was in the south-south-east,
therefore well to leeward, a cluster of four or five British vessels,
evidently temporarily incapable of manoeuvring.

This was the situation which met the eye of the French admiral,
scanning the field as the smoke drove away. The disorder of the
British, which originated in the general chase, had increased through
the hurry of the manoeuvres succeeding the squall, and culminated
in the conditions just described. It was an inevitable result of a
military exigency confronted by a fleet only recently equipped. The
French, starting from a better formation, had come out in better
shape. But, after all, it seems difficult wholly to remedy the
disadvantage of a policy essentially defensive; and d'Orvilliers'
next order, though well conceived, was resultless. At 1 P.M.[49] he
signalled his fleet to wear in succession, and form the line of battle
on the starboard tack (Fig. 2, F). This signal was not seen by the
leading ship, which should have begun the movement. The junior French
admiral, in the fourth ship from the van, at length went about, and
spoke the flagship, to know what was the Commander-in-Chief's desire.
D'Orvilliers explained that he wished to pass along the enemy's fleet
from end to end, to _leeward_, because in its disordered state there
was a fair promise of advantage, and by going to leeward--presenting
his weather side to the enemy--he could use the weather lower-deck
guns, whereas, in the then state of the sea, the lee lower ports could
not be opened. Thus explained, the movement was executed, but the
favourable moment had passed. It was not till 2.30 that the manoeuvre
was evident to the British.

[Illustration]

As soon as Keppel recognised his opponent's intention, he wore the
_Victory_ again, (d), a few minutes after 3 P.M., and stood slowly
down, on the starboard tack _off the wind_, towards his crippled ships
in the south-south-east, keeping aloft the signal for the line of
battle, which commanded every manageable ship to get to her station
(Fig. 3, C). As this deliberate movement was away from the enemy,
(F), Palliser tried afterwards to fix upon it the stigma of flight,--a
preposterous extravagancy. Harland put his division about at once
and joined the Admiral. On this tack his station was ahead of the
_Victory_, but in consequence of a message from Keppel he fell in
behind her, to cover the rear until Palliser's division could repair
damage and take their places. At 4 P.M. Harland's division was in the
line. Palliser's ships, as they completed refitting, ranged themselves
before or behind his flagship; their captains considering, as they
testified, that they took station from their divisional commander, and
not from the ship of the Commander-in-Chief. There was formed thus,
on the weather quarter of the _Victory_, and a mile or two distant, a
separate line of ships, constituting on this tack the proper rear of
the fleet, and dependent for initiative on Palliser's flagship (Fig.
3, R). At 5 P.M. Keppel sent word by a frigate to Palliser to hasten
into the line, as he was only waiting for him to renew the action, the
French now having completed their manoeuvre. They had not attacked, as
they might have done, but had drawn up under the lee of the British,
their van abreast the latter's centre. At the same time Harland was
directed to move to his proper position in the van, which he at
once did (Fig. 3, V). Palliser made no movement, and Keppel with
extraordinary--if not culpable--forbearance refrained from summoning
the rear ships into line by their individual pennants. This he at last
did about 7 P.M., signalling specifically to each of the vessels then
grouped with Palliser, (except his own flagship), to leave the latter
and take their posts in the line. This was accordingly done, but it
was thought then to be too late to renew the action. At daylight the
next morning, only three French ships were in sight from the decks;
but the main body could be seen in the south-east from some of the
mastheads, and was thought to be from fifteen to twenty miles distant.

Though absolutely indecisive, this was a pretty smart skirmish; the
British loss being 133 killed and 373 wounded, that of the French 161
killed and 513 wounded. The general result would appear to indicate
that the French, in accordance with their usual policy, had fired to
cripple their enemy's spars and rigging, the motive-power. This would
be consistent with d'Orvilliers' avowed purpose of avoiding action
except under favourable circumstances. As the smoke thickened and
confusion increased, the fleets had got closer together, and, whatever
the intention, many shot found their way to the British hulls.
Nevertheless, as the returns show, the number of men hit among the
French was to the British nearly as 7 to 5. On the other hand, it is
certain that the manoeuvring power of the French after the action was
greater than that of the British.

Both sides claimed the advantage. This was simply a point of honour,
or of credit, for material advantage accrued to neither. Keppel
had succeeded in forcing d'Orvilliers to action against his will;
d'Orvilliers, by a well-judged evolution, had retained a superiority
of manoeuvring power after the engagement. Had his next signal been
promptly obeyed, he might have passed again by the British fleet, in
fairly good order, before it re-formed, and concentrated his fire
on the more leewardly of its vessels. Even under the delay, it was
distinctly in his power to renew the fight; and that he did not do so
forfeits all claim to victory. Not to speak of the better condition
of the French ships, Keppel, by running off the wind, had given his
opponent full opportunity to reach his fleet and to attack. Instead
of so doing, d'Orvilliers drew up under the British lee, out of range,
and offered battle; a gallant defiance, but to a crippled foe.

Time was thus given to the British to refit their ships sufficiently
to bear down again. This the French admiral should not have permitted.
He should have attacked promptly, or else have retreated; to windward,
or to leeward, as seemed most expedient. Under the conditions, it
was not good generalship to give the enemy time, and to await his
pleasure. Keppel, on the other hand, being granted this chance, should
have renewed the fight; and here arose the controversy which set
all England by the ears, and may be said to have immortalised this
otherwise trivial incident. Palliser's division was to windward from
4 to 7 P.M., while the signals were flying to form line of battle, and
to bear down in the Admiral's wake; and Keppel alleged that, had these
been obeyed by 6 P.M., he would have renewed the battle, having still
over two hours of daylight. It has been stated already that, besides
the signals, a frigate brought Palliser word that the Admiral was
waiting only for him.

The immediate dispute is of slight present interest, except as an
historical link in the fighting development of the British Navy;
and only this historical significance justifies more than a passing
mention. In 1778 men's minds were still full of Byng's execution
in 1757, and of the Mathews and Lestock affair in 1744, which
had materially influenced Byng in his action off Minorca. Keppel
repeatedly spoke of himself as on trial for his life; and he had been
a member of Byng's court-martial. The gist of the charges against
him, preferred by Palliser, was that he attacked in the first
instance without properly forming his line, for which Mathews had been
censured; and, secondly, that by not renewing the action after the
first pass-by, and by wearing away from the French fleet, he had not
done his utmost to "take, sink, burn, and destroy." This had been the
charge on which Byng was shot. Keppel, besides his justifying reasons
for his course in general, alleged and proved his full intention to
attack again, had not Palliser failed to come into line, a delinquency
the same as that of Lestock, which contributed to Mathew's ruin.

In other words, men's minds were breaking away from, but had not
thrown off completely, the tyranny of the Order of Battle,--one of the
worst of tyrannies, because founded on truth. Absolute error, like a
whole lie, is open to speedy detection; half-truths are troublesome.
The Order of Battle[50] was an admirable servant and a most
objectionable despot. Mathews, in despair over a recalcitrant second,
cast off the yoke, engaged with part of his force, was ill supported
and censured; Lestock escaping. Byng, considering this, and being a
pedant by nature, would not break his line; the enemy slipped away,
Minorca surrendered, and he was shot. In Keppel's court-martial,
twenty-eight out of the thirty captains who had been in the line were
summoned as witnesses. Most of them swore that if Keppel had chased
in line of battle that day, there could have been no action, and
the majority of them cordially approved his course; but there was
evidently an undercurrent still of dissent, and especially in the rear
ships, where there had been some of the straggling inevitable in such
movements. Their commanders therefore had uncomfortable experience
of the lack of mutual support, which the line of battle was meant to
insure.

Another indication of still surviving pedantry was the obligation felt
in the rear ships to take post about their own admiral, and to remain
there when the signals for the line of battle, and to bear down in the
admiral's wake, were flying. Thus Palliser's own inaction, to whatever
cause due, paralysed the six or eight sail with him; but it appears
to the writer that Keppel was seriously remiss in not summoning those
ships by their own pennants, as soon as he began to distrust the
purposes of the Vice-Admiral, instead of delaying doing so till
7 P.M., as he did. It is a curious picture presented to us by the
evidence. The Commander-in-Chief, with his staff and the captain of
the ship, fretting and fuming on the _Victory's_ quarter-deck; the
signals flying which have been mentioned; Harland's division getting
into line ahead; and four points on the weather quarter, only two
miles distant, so that "every gun and port could be counted," a group
of seven or eight sail, among them the flag of the third in command,
apparently indifferent spectators. The _Formidable's_ only sign of
disability was the foretopsail unbent for four hours,--a delay which,
being unexplained, rather increased than relieved suspicion, rife then
throughout the Navy. Palliser was a Tory, and had left the Board of
Admiralty to take his command. Keppel was so strong a Whig that he
would not serve against the Americans; and he evidently feared that he
was to be betrayed to his ruin.

Palliser's defence rested upon three principal points: (1), that the
signal for the line of battle was not seen on board the _Formidable_;
(2), that the signal to get into the Admiral's wake was repeated by
himself; (3), that his foremast was wounded, and, moreover, found
to be in such bad condition that he feared to carry sail on it. As
regards the first, the signal was seen on board the _Ocean_, next
astern of and "not far from"[51] the _Formidable_; for the second, the
Admiral should have been informed of a disability by which a single
ship was neutralizing a division. The frigate that brought Keppel's
message could have carried back this. Thirdly, the most damaging
feature to Palliser's case was that he asserted that, after coming out
from under fire, he wore at once towards the enemy; afterwards he wore
back again. A ship that thus wore twice before three o'clock, might
have displayed zeal and efficiency enough to run two miles, off
the wind,[52] at five, to support a fight. Deliberate treachery is
impossible. To this writer the Vice-Admiral's behaviour seems that of
a man in a sulk, who will do only that which he can find no excuses
for neglecting. In such cases of sailing close, men generally slip
over the line into grievous wrong.

Keppel was cleared of all the charges preferred against him; the
accuser had not thought best to embody among them the delay to recall
the ships which his own example was detaining. Against Palliser no
specific charge was preferred, but the Admiralty directed a general
inquiry into his course on the 27th of July. The court found his
conduct "in many instances highly exemplary and meritorious,"--he
had fought well,--"but reprehensible in not having acquainted the
Commander-in-Chief of his distress, which he might have done either by
the _Fox_, or other means which he had in his power." Public opinion
running strongly for Keppel, his acquittal was celebrated with
bonfires and illuminations in London; the mob got drunk, smashed the
windows of Palliser's friends, wrecked Palliser's own house, and came
near to killing Palliser himself. The Admiralty, in 1780, made him
Governor of Greenwich Hospital.

On the 28th of July, the British and French being no longer in sight
of each other, Keppel, considering his fleet too injured aloft to
cruise near the French coast, kept away for Plymouth, where he arrived
on the 31st. Before putting to sea again, he provided against a
recurrence of the misdemeanor of the 27th by a general order, that
"in future the Line is always to be taken from the Centre." Had this
been in force before, Palliser's captains would have taken station by
the Commander-in-Chief, and the _Formidable_ would have been left to
windward by herself. At the same time Howe was closing his squadron
upon the centre in America; and Rodney, two years later, experienced
the ill-effects of distance taken from the next ahead, when the
leading ship of a fleet disregarded an order.

Although privately censuring Palliser's conduct, the
Commander-in-Chief made no official complaint, and it was not until
the matter got into the papers, through the talk of the fleet, that
the difficulty began which resulted in the trial of both officers,
early in the following year. After this, Keppel, being dissatisfied
with the Admiralty's treatment, intimated his wish to give up the
command. The order to strike his flag was dated March 18th, 1779. He
was not employed afloat again, but upon the change of administration
in 1782 he became First Lord of the Admiralty, and so remained, with a
brief intermission, until December, 1783.

It is perhaps necessary to mention that both British and French
asserted, and assert to this day, that the other party abandoned
the field.[53] The point is too trivial, in the author's opinion, to
warrant further discussion of an episode the historical interest of
which is very slight, though its professional lessons are valuable.
The British case had the advantage--through the courts-martial--of
the sworn testimony of twenty to thirty captains, who agreed that the
British kept on the same tack under short sail throughout the night,
and that in the morning only three French ships were visible. As far
as known to the author, the French contention rests only on the usual
reports.

[Footnote 38: _Ante_, pp. 61, 62.]

[Footnote 39: Testimony of Captains Hood, Robinson, and Macbride, and
of Rear-Admiral Campbell, captain of the fleet to Keppel.]

[Footnote 40: See note on preceding page.]

[Footnote 41: A vessel is said to be on the port tack when she has the
wind blowing on her port, or left side; on the starboard tack, when
the wind is on the right side. Thus with an east wind, if she head
north, she is on the starboard tack; if south, on the port.]

[Footnote 42: See also note; _post_, p. 200.]

[Footnote 43: Twenty-two degrees.]

[Footnote 44: Column and line ahead are equivalent terms, each ship
steering in the wake of its next ahead.]

[Footnote 45: Forty-five degrees.]

[Footnote 46: Chevalier says, p. 89, "The English passed out of range"
of these ships. As these ships had the wind, they had the choice of
range, barring signals from their own admiral. In truth, they were
obeying his order.]

[Footnote 47: This evidence of the captains of the _Ocean_ and the
_Elizabeth_ contradicts Palliser's charge that his ship was not
adequately supported.]

[Footnote 48: It was actually quite equal, but this was due to an
accidental explosion on board the _Formidable_.]

[Footnote 49: Chevalier. Probably later by the other times used in
this account.]

[Footnote 50: The Order of Battle was constituted by the ships "of
the line" ranging themselves one behind the other in a prescribed
succession; the position of each and the intervals between being taken
from the ship next ahead. This made the leading vessel the pivot of
the order and of manoeuvring, unless specially otherwise directed;
which in an emergency could not always be easily done. Strictly, if
circumstances favoured, the line on which the ships thus formed was
one of the two close-hauled lines; "close-hauled" meaning to bring the
vessel's head as "near" the direction of the wind as possible, usually
to about 70 degrees. The advantage of the close-hauled line was that
the vessels were more manageable than when "off" the wind.]

[Footnote 51: Evidence of Captain John Laforey, of the _Ocean_.]

[Footnote 52: "I do not recollect how many points I went from the
wind; I must have bore down a pretty large course." Testimony of
Captain J. Laforey, of the _Ocean_, on this point.]

[Footnote 53: "During the night (of the 27th) Admiral Keppel kept away
(_fit route_) for Portsmouth." Chevalier, "Marine Française," p. 90.
Paris, 1877. Oddly enough, he adds that "on the evening of the 28th
the French squadron, _carried eastward by the currents_, sighted
Ushant."]




CHAPTER VI

OPERATIONS IN THE WEST INDIES, 1778-1779. THE BRITISH INVASION OF
GEORGIA AND SOUTH CAROLINA


Conditions of season exerted great influence upon the time and place
of hostilities during the maritime war of 1778; the opening scenes
of which, in Europe and in North America, have just been narrated.
In European seas it was realised that naval enterprises by fleets,
requiring evolutions by masses of large vessels, were possible only
in summer. Winter gales scattered ships, impeded manoeuvres, and
made gun-fire ineffective. The same consideration prevailed to limit
activity in North American waters to the summer; and complementary
to this was the fact that in the West Indies hurricanes of excessive
violence occurred from July to October. The practice therefore was
to transfer effort from one quarter to the other in the Western
Hemisphere, according to the season.

In the recent treaty with the United States, the King of France had
formally renounced all claim to acquire for himself any part of the
American continent then in possession of Great Britain. On the other
hand, he had reserved the express right to conquer any of her islands
south of Bermuda. The West Indies were then the richest commercial
region on the globe in the value of their products; and France wished
not only to increase her already large possessions there, but also to
establish more solidly her political and military tenure.

[Illustration]

In September, 1778, the British Island of Dominica was seized by an
expedition from the adjacent French colony of Martinique. The affair
was a surprise, and possesses no special military interest; but it
is instructive to observe that Great Britain was unprepared, in the
West Indies as elsewhere, when the war began. A change had been made
shortly before in the command of the Leeward Islands Station, as it
was called, which extended from Antigua southward over the Lesser
Antilles with headquarters at Barbados. Rear-Admiral the Hon. Samuel
Barrington, the new-comer, leaving home before war had been declared,
had orders not to quit Barbados till further instructions should
arrive. These had not reached him when he learned of the loss of
Dominica. The French had received their orders on the 17th of August.
The blow was intrinsically somewhat serious, so far as the mere
capture of a position can be, because the fortifications were strong,
though they had been inadequately garrisoned. It is a mistake to build
works and not man them, for their fall transfers to the enemy strength
which he otherwise would need time to create. To the French the
conquest was useful beyond its commercial value, because it closed a
gap in their possessions. They now held four consecutive islands, from
north to south, Guadeloupe, Dominica, Martinique, and Santa Lucia.

Barrington had two ships of the line: his flagship, the _Prince of
Wales_, 74, and the _Boyne_, 70. If he had been cruising, these would
probably have deterred the French. Upon receiving the news he put
to sea, going as far as Antigua; but he did not venture to stay away
because his expected instructions had not come yet, and, like Keppel,
he feared an ungenerous construction of his actions. He therefore
remained in Barbados, patiently watching for an opportunity to act.

The departure of Howe and the approach of winter determined the
transference of British troops and ships from the continent to the
Leeward Islands. Reinforcements had given the British fleet in America
a numerical superiority, which for the time imposed a check upon
d'Estaing; but Byron, proverbially unlucky in weather, was driven
crippled to Newport, leaving the French free to quit Boston. The
difficulty of provisioning so large a force as twelve ships of the
line at first threatened to prevent the withdrawal, supplies being
then extremely scarce in the port; but at the critical moment American
privateers brought in large numbers of prizes, laden with provisions
from Europe for the British army. Thus d'Estaing was enabled to sail
for Martinique on the 4th of November. On the same day there left New
York for Barbados a British squadron,--two 64's, three 50's, and
three smaller craft,--under the command of Commodore William Hotham,
convoying five thousand troops for service in the West Indies.

Being bound for nearly the same point, the two hostile bodies steered
parallel courses, each ignorant of the other's nearness. In the
latitude of Bermuda both suffered from a violent gale, but the French
most; the flagship _Languedoc_ losing her main and mizzen topmasts. On
the 25th of November one[54] of Hotham's convoy fell into the hands
of d'Estaing, who then first learned of the British sailing. Doubtful
whether their destination was Barbados or Antigua,--their two chief
stations,--he decided for the latter. Arriving off it on the 6th of
December, he cruised for forty-eight hours, and then bore away for
Fort Royal, Martinique, the principal French depot in the West Indies,
where he anchored on the 9th. On the 10th Hotham joined Barrington at
Barbados.

Barrington knew already what he wanted to do, and therefore lost not a
moment in deliberation. The troops were kept on board, Hotham's convoy
arrangements being left as they were. On the morning of December 12th
the entire force sailed again, the main changes in it being in the
chief command, and in the addition of Barrington's two ships of the
line. On the afternoon of the 13th the shipping anchored in the Grand
Cul de Sac, an inlet on the west side of Santa Lucia, which is seventy
miles east-north-east from Barbados. Part of the troops landed at
once, and seized the batteries and heights on the north side of the
bay. The remainder were put on shore the next morning. The French
forces were inadequate to defend their works; but it is to be observed
that they were driven with unremitting energy, and that to this
promptness the British owed their ability to hold the position.

[Illustration]

Three miles north of the Cul de Sac is a bay then called the Carénage;
now Port Castries. At its northern extremity is a precipitous
promontory, La Vigie, then fortified, upon the tenure of which
depended not only control of that anchorage, but also access to the
rear of the works which commanded the Cul de Sac. If those works fell,
the British squadron must abandon its position and put to sea, where
d'Estaing's much superior fleet would be in waiting. On the other
hand, if the squadron were crushed at its anchors, the troops were
isolated and must ultimately capitulate. Therefore La Vigie and the
squadron were the two keys to the situation, and the loss of either
would be decisive.

By the evening of the 14th the British held the shore line from
La Vigie to the southern point of the Cul de Sac, as well as Morne
Fortuné (Fort Charlotte), the capital of the island. The feeble French
garrison retired to the interior, leaving its guns unspiked, and its
ammunition and stores untouched,--another instance of the danger of
works turning to one's own disadvantage. It was Barrington's purpose
now to remove the transports to the Carénage, as a more commodious
harbour, probably also better defended; but he was prevented by
the arrival of d'Estaing that afternoon. "Just as all the important
stations were secured, the French colours struck, and General Grant's
headquarters established at the Governor's house, the _Ariadne_
frigate came in sight with the signal abroad for the approach of an
enemy."[55] The French fleet was seen soon afterwards from the heights
above the squadron.

The British had gained much so far by celerity, but they still spared
no time to take breath. The night was passed by the soldiers in
strengthening their positions, and by the Rear-Admiral in rectifying
his order to meet the expected attack. The transports, between fifty
and sixty in number, were moved inside the ships of war, and the
latter were most carefully disposed across the mouth of the Cul de
Sac bay. At the northern (windward)[56] end was placed the _Isis_, 50,
well under the point to prevent anything from passing round her; but
for further security she was supported by three frigates, anchored
abreast of the interval between her and the shore. From the _Isis_
the line extended to the southward, inclining slightly outward; the
_Prince of Wales_, 74, Barrington's flagship, taking the southern
flank, as the most exposed position. Between her and the _Isis_ were
five other ships,--the _Boyne_, 70, _Nonsuch_, 64, _St. Albans_, 64,
_Preston_, 50, and _Centurion_, 50. The works left by the French at
the north and south points of the bay may have been used to support
the flanks, but Barrington does not say so in his report.

D'Estaing had twelve ships of the line, and two days after this was
able to land seven thousand troops. With such a superiority it is
evident that the British would have been stopped in the midst of their
operations, if he had arrived twenty-four hours sooner. To gain time,
Barrington had sought to prevent intelligence reaching Fort Royal,
less than fifty miles distant, by sending cruisers in advance of his
squadron, to cover the approaches to Santa Lucia; but, despite his
care, d'Estaing had the news on the 14th. He sailed at once, and, as
has been said, was off Santa Lucia that evening. At daybreak of the
15th he stood in for the Carénage; but when he came within range, a
lively cannonade told him that the enemy was already in possession.
He decided therefore to attack the squadron in the Cul de Sac, and
at 11.30 the French passed along it from north to south, firing, but
without effect. A second attempt was made in the afternoon, directed
upon the lee flank, but it was equally unavailing. The British had
three men killed; the French loss is not given, but is said to
have been slight. It is stated that that day the sea breeze did not
penetrate far enough into the bay to admit closing. This frequently
happens, but it does not alter the fact that the squadron was the
proper point of attack, and that, especially in the winter season, an
opportunity to close must offer soon. D'Estaing, governed probably by
the soldierly bias he more than once betrayed, decided now to assault
the works on shore. Anchoring in a small bay north of the Carénage,
he landed seven thousand men, and on the 18th attempted to storm the
British lines at La Vigie. The neck of land connecting the promontory
with the island is very flat, and the French therefore labored under
great disadvantage through the commanding position of their enemy.
It was a repetition of Bunker Hill, and of many other ill-judged
and precipitate frontal attacks. After three gallant but ineffectual
charges, led by d'Estaing in person, the assailants retired, with the
loss of forty-one officers and eight hundred rank and file, killed and
wounded.

[Illustration]

D'Estaing reëmbarked his men, and stood ready again to attack
Barrington; a frigate being stationed off the Cul de Sac, to give
notice when the wind should serve. On the 24th she signalled, and the
fleet weighed; but Barrington, who had taken a very great risk for an
adequate object, took no unnecessary chances through presumption. He
had employed his respite to warp the ships of war farther in, where
the breeze reached less certainly, and where narrower waters gave
better support to the flanks. He had strengthened the latter also by
new works, in which he had placed heavy guns from the ships, manned
by seamen. For these or other reasons d'Estaing did not attack. On the
29th he quitted the island, and on the 30th the French governor, the
Chevalier de Micoud, formally capitulated.

This achievement of Barrington and of Major-General James Grant, who
was associated with him, was greeted at the time with an applause
which will be echoed by the military judgment of a later age. There
is a particular pleasure in finding the willingness to incur a great
risk, conjoined with a care that chances nothing against which the
utmost diligence and skill can provide. The celerity, forethought,
wariness, and daring of Admiral Barrington have inscribed upon the
records of the British Navy a success the distinction of which should
be measured, not by the largeness of the scale, but by the perfection
of the workmanship, and by the energy of the execution in face of
great odds.

Santa Lucia remained in the hands of the British throughout the war.
It was an important acquisition, because at its north-west extremity
was a good and defensible anchorage, Gros Ilet Bay, only thirty miles
from Fort Royal in Martinique. In it the British fleet could lie, when
desirable to close-watch the enemy, yet not be worried for the safety
of the port when away; for it was but an outpost, not a base of
operations, as Fort Royal was. It was thus used continually, and from
it Rodney issued for his great victory in April, 1782.

During the first six months of 1779 no important incident occurred in
the West Indies. On the 6th of January, Vice-Admiral Byron, with ten
ships of the line from Narragansett Bay, reached Santa Lucia, and
relieved Barrington of the chief command. Both the British and the
French fleets were reinforced in the course of the spring, but the
relative strength remained nearly as before, until the 27th of June,
when the arrival of a division from Brest made the French numbers
somewhat superior.

Shortly before this, Byron had been constrained by one of the
commercial exigencies which constantly embarrassed the military
action of British admirals. A large convoy of trading ships, bound
to England, was collecting at St. Kitts, and he thought necessary to
accompany it part of the homeward way, until well clear of the French
West India cruisers. For this purpose he left Santa Lucia early in
June. As soon as the coast was clear, d'Estaing, informed of Byron's
object, sent a small combined expedition against St. Vincent, which
was surrendered on the 18th of the month. On the 30th the French
admiral himself quitted Fort Royal with his whole fleet,--twenty-five
ships of the line and several frigates,--directing his course for the
British Island of Grenada, before which he anchored on the 2d of July.
With commendable promptitude, he landed his troops that evening, and
on the 4th the island capitulated. Except as represented by one small
armed sloop, which was taken, the British Navy had no part in this
transaction. Thirty richly laden merchant ships were captured in the
port.

At daybreak of July 6th, Byron appeared with twenty-one sail of the
line, one frigate, and a convoy of twenty-eight vessels, carrying
troops and equipments. He had returned to Santa Lucia on the 1st,
and there had heard of the loss of St. Vincent, with a rumor that the
French had gone against Grenada. He consequently had put to sea on the
3d, with the force mentioned.

[Illustration]

The British approach was reported to d'Estaing during the night of
July 5th. Most of his fleet was then lying at anchor off Georgetown,
at the south-west of the island; some vessels, which had been under
way on look-out duty, had fallen to leeward.[57] At 4 A.M. the French
began to lift their anchors, with orders to form line of battle on
the starboard tack, in order of speed; that is, as rapidly as possible
without regard to usual stations. When daylight had fully made, the
British fleet (A) was seen standing down from the northward, close
inshore, on the port tack, with the wind free at north-east by east.
It was not in order, as is evident from the fact that the ships
nearest the enemy, and therefore first to close, ought to have been
in the rear on the then tack. For this condition there is no evident
excuse; for a fleet having a convoy necessarily proceeds so slowly
that the war-ships can keep reasonable order for mutual support.
Moreover, irregularities that are permissible in case of emergency,
or when no enemy can be encountered suddenly, cease to be so when the
imminent probability of a meeting exists. The worst results of the day
are to be attributed to this fault. Being short of frigates, Byron had
assigned three ships of the line (a), under Rear-Admiral Rowley, to
the convoy, which of course was on the off hand from the enemy, and
somewhat in the rear. It was understood, however, that these would be
called into the line, if needed.

When the French (AA) were first perceived by Byron, their line
was forming; the long thin column lengthening out gradually to the
north-north-west, from the confused cluster[58] still to be seen at
the anchorage. Hoping to profit by their disorder, he signalled "a
general chase in that quarter,[59] as well as for Rear-Admiral Rowley
to leave the convoy; and as not more than fourteen or fifteen of the
enemy's ships appeared to be in line, the signal was made for the
ships to engage, _and form as they could get up_."[60] It is clear
from this not only that the ships were not in order, but also that
they were to form under fire. Three ships, the _Sultan_, 74, the
_Prince of Wales_, 74, and the _Boyne_, 70, in the order named,--the
second carrying Barrington's flag,--were well ahead of the fleet (b).
The direction prescribed for the attack, that of the clustered ships
in the French rear, carried the British down on a south-south-west, or
south by west, course; and as the enemy's van and centre were drawing
out to the north-north-west, the two lines at that time resembled the
legs of a "V," the point of which was the anchorage off Georgetown.
Barrington's three ships therefore neared the French order gradually,
and had to receive its fire for some time before they could reply,
unless, by hauling to the wind, they diverged from the set course.
This, and their isolation, made their loss very heavy. When they
reached the rear of the French, the latter's column was tolerably
formed, and Barrington's ships wore (w) in succession,--just as
Harland's had done in Keppel's action,--to follow on the other tack.
In doing this, the _Sultan_ kept away under the stern of the enemy's
rearmost ship, to rake her; to avoid which the latter bore up. The
_Sultan_ thus lost time and ground, and Barrington took the lead,
standing along the French line, from rear to van, and to windward.

Meanwhile, the forming of the enemy had revealed to Byron for the
first time, and to his dismay, that he had been deceived in thinking
the French force inferior to his own. "However, the general chase
was continued, and the signal made for close engagement."[61] The
remainder of the ships stood down on the port tack, as the first three
had done, and wore in the wake of the latter, whom they followed; but
before reaching the point of wearing, three ships, "the _Grafton_,
74, the _Cornwall_, 74, and the _Lion_, 64 (c), _happening to be to
leeward_,[62] sustained the fire of the enemy's whole line, as it
passed on the starboard tack." It seems clear that, having had the
wind, during the night and now, and being in search of an enemy, it
should not have "happened" that any ships should have been so far to
leeward as to be unsupported. Captain Thomas White, R.N., writing as
an advocate of Byron, says,[63] "while the van was wearing ... the
sternmost ships were coming up under Rear-Admiral Hyde Parker....
Among these ships, the _Cornwall_ and _Lion_, from being nearer
the enemy than those about them (for the rear division had not
then _formed into line_), drew upon themselves almost the whole of
the enemy's fire." No words can show more clearly the disastrous,
precipitate disorder in which this attack was conducted. The
_Grafton_, White says, was similarly situated. In consequence, these
three were so crippled, besides a heavy loss in men, that they dropped
far to leeward and astern (c', c"), when on the other tack.

When the British ships in general had got round, and were in line
ahead on the starboard tack,--the same as the French,--ranging from
rear to van of the enemy (Positions B, B, B), Byron signalled for
the eight leading ships to close together, for mutual support, and
to engage close. This, which should have been done--not with finikin
precision, but with military adequacy--before engaging, was less
easy now, in the din of battle and with crippled ships. A quick-eyed
subordinate, however, did something to remedy the error of his chief.
Rear-Admiral Rowley was still considerably astern, having to make
up the distance between the convoy and the fleet. As he followed the
latter, he saw Barrington's three ships unduly separated and doubtless
visibly much mauled. Instead, therefore, of blindly following his
leader, he cut straight across (aa) to the head of the column to
support the van,--an act almost absolutely identical with that which
won Nelson renown at Cape St. Vincent. In this he was followed by the
_Monmouth_, 64, the brilliancy of whose bearing was so conspicuous to
the two fleets that it is said the French officers after the battle
toasted "the little black ship." She and the _Suffolk_, 74, Rowley's
flagship, also suffered severely in this gallant feat.

It was imperative with Byron now to keep his van well up with the
enemy, lest he should uncover the convoy, broad on the weather bow
of the two fleets. "They seemed much inclined to cut off the convoy,
and had it much in their power by means of their large frigates,
independent of ships of the line."[64] On the other hand, the
_Cornwall, Grafton_, and _Lion_, though they got their heads round,
could not keep up with the fleet (c', c"), and were dropping also to
leeward--towards the enemy. At noon, or soon after, d'Estaing bore
up with the body of his force to join some of his vessels that had
fallen to leeward. Byron very properly--under his conditions of
inferiority--kept his wind; and the separation of the two fleets, thus
produced, caused firing to cease at 1 P.M.

The enemies were now ranged on parallel lines, some distance apart;
still on the starboard tack, heading north-north west. Between the
two, but far astern, the _Cornwall, Grafton, Lion_, and a fourth
British ship, the _Fame_, were toiling along, greatly crippled. At 3
P.M., the French, now in good order, tacked together (t, t, t), which
caused them to head towards these disabled vessels. Byron at once
imitated the movement, and the eyes of all in the two fleets anxiously
watched the result. Captain Cornwallis of the _Lion_, measuring the
situation accurately, saw that, if he continued ahead, he would be
in the midst of the French by the time he got abreast of them. Having
only his foremast standing, he put his helm up, and stood broad off
before the wind (c"), across the enemy's bows, for Jamaica. He was
not pursued. The other three, unable to tack and afraid to wear, which
would put them also in the enemy's power, stood on, passed to windward
of the latter, receiving several broadsides, and so escaped to the
northward. The _Monmouth_ was equally maltreated; in fact, she had
not been able to tack to the southward with the fleet. Continuing
north (a'), she became now much separated. D'Estaing afterwards
reestablished his order of battle on the port tack, forming upon the
then leewardmost ship, on the line BC.

Byron's action off Grenada, viewed as an isolated event, was the most
disastrous in results that the British Navy had fought since Beachy
Head, in 1690. That the _Cornwall, Grafton_, and _Lion_ were not
captured was due simply to the strained and inept caution of the
French admiral. This Byron virtually admitted. "To my great surprise
no ship of the enemy was detached after the _Lion_. The _Grafton_ and
_Cornwall_ might have been weathered by the French, if they had kept
their wind,... but they persevered so strictly in declining every
chance of close action that they contented themselves with firing upon
these ships when passing barely within gunshot, and suffered them to
rejoin the squadron, without one effort to cut them off." Suffren,[65]
who led the French on the starboard tack, and whose ship, the
_Fantasque_, 64, lost 22 killed and 43 wounded, wrote: "Had our
admiral's seamanship equalled his courage, we would not have allowed
four dismasted ships to escape." That the _Monmouth_ and _Fame_ could
also have been secured is extremely probable; and if Byron, in order
to save them, had borne down to renew the action, the disaster might
have become a catastrophe.

That nothing resulted to the French from their great advantage
is therefore to be ascribed to the incapacity of their
Commander-in-Chief. It is instructive to note also the causes of the
grave calamity which befell the British, when twenty-one ships met
twenty-four,[66]--a sensible but not overwhelming superiority. These
facts have been shown sufficiently. Byron's disaster was due to
attacking with needless precipitation, and in needless disorder.
He had the weather-gage, it was early morning, and the northeast
trade-wind, already a working breeze, must freshen as the day
advanced. The French were tied to their new conquest, which they could
not abandon without humiliation; not to speak of their troops ashore.
Even had they wished to retreat, they could not have done so before
a general chase, unless prepared to sacrifice their slower ships.
If twenty-four ships could reconcile themselves to running from
twenty-one, it was scarcely possible but that the fastest of these
would overtake the slowest of those. There was time for fighting, an
opportunity for forcing action which could not be evaded, and time
also for the British to form in reasonably good order.

It is important to consider this, because, while Keppel must be
approved for attacking in partial disorder, Byron must be blamed for
attacking in utter disorder. Keppel had to snatch opportunity from
an unwilling foe. Having himself the lee-gage, he could not pick
and choose, nor yet manoeuvre; yet he brought his fleet into action,
giving mutual support throughout nearly, if not quite, the whole line.
What Byron did has been set forth; the sting is that his bungling
tactics can find no extenuation in any urgency of the case.

The loss of the two fleets, as given by the authorities of either
nation, were: British, 183 killed, 346 wounded; French, 190 killed,
759 wounded. Of the British total, 126 killed and 235 wounded, or two
thirds, fell to the two groups of three ships each, which by Byron's
mismanagement were successively exposed to be cut up in detail by
the concentrated fire of the enemy. The British loss in spars and
sails--in motive-power--also exceeded greatly that of the French.

After the action d'Estaing returned quietly to Grenada. Byron went
to St. Kitts to refit; but repairs were most difficult, owing to the
dearth of stores in which the Admiralty had left the West Indies. With
all the skill of the seamen of that day in making good damages, the
ships remained long unserviceable, causing great apprehension for the
other islands. This state of things d'Estaing left unimproved, as he
had his advantage in the battle. He did, indeed, parade his superior
force before Byron's fleet as it lay at anchor; but, beyond the
humiliation naturally felt by a Navy which prided itself on ruling the
sea, no further injury was done.

In August Byron sailed for England. Barrington had already gone home,
wounded. The station therefore was left in command of Rear-Admiral
Hyde Parker,[67] and so remained until March, 1780, when the
celebrated Rodney arrived as Commander-in-Chief on the Leeward Islands
Station. The North American Station was given to Vice-Admiral Marriot
Arbuthnot, who had under him a half-dozen ships of the line, with
headquarters at New York. His command was ordinarily independent of
Rodney's, but the latter had no hesitation in going to New York on
emergency and taking charge there; in doing which he had the approval
of the Admiralty.

The approach of winter in 1778 had determined the cessation of
operations, both naval and military, in the northern part of the
American continent, and had led to the transfer of five thousand
troops to the West Indies, already noted. At the same time, an
unjustifiable extension of British effort, having regard to the
disposable means, was undertaken in the southern States of Georgia and
South Carolina. On the 27th of November a small detachment of troops
under Lieutenant-Colonel Archibald Campbell, sailed from Sandy
Hook, convoyed by a division of frigates commanded by Captain Hyde
Parker.[68] The expedition entered the Savannah River four weeks
later, and soon afterwards occupied the city of the same name.
Simultaneously with this, by Clinton's orders, General Prevost moved
from Florida, then a British colony, with all the men he could spare
from the defence of St. Augustine. Upon his arrival in Savannah he
took command of the whole force thus assembled.

These operations, which during 1779 extended as far as the
neighbourhood of Charleston, depended upon the control of the water,
and are a conspicuous example of misapplication of power to the point
of ultimate self-destruction. They were in 1778-79 essentially of a
minor character, especially the maritime part, and will therefore be
dismissed with the remark that the Navy, by small vessels, accompanied
every movement in a country cut up in all directions by watercourses,
big and little. "The defence of this province," wrote Parker, "must
greatly depend on the naval force upon the different inland creeks.
I am therefore forming some galleys covered from musketry, which
I believe will have a good effect." These were precursors of the
"tin-clads" of the American War of Secession, a century later. Not
even an armored ship is a new thing under the sun.

In the southern States, from Georgia to Virginia, the part of the Navy
from first to last was subsidiary, though important. It is therefore
unnecessary to go into details, but most necessary to note that here,
by misdirection of effort and abuse of means, was initiated the fatal
movement which henceforth divided the small British army in North
America into two sections, wholly out of mutual support. Here Sir
William Howe's error of 1777 was reproduced on a larger scale and
was therefore more fatal. This led directly, by the inevitable logic
of a false position, to Cornwallis's march through North Carolina
into Virginia, to Yorktown in 1781, and to the signal demonstration
of sea power off Chesapeake Bay, which at a blow accomplished the
independence of the United States. No hostile strategist could
have severed the British army more hopelessly than did the British
government; no fate could have been more inexorable than was its own
perverse will. The personal alienation and official quarrel between
Sir Henry Clinton and Lord Cornwallis, their divided counsels and
divergent action, were but the natural result, and the reflection, of
a situation essentially self-contradictory and exasperating.

As the hurricane season of 1779 advanced, d'Estaing, who had orders
to bring back to France the ships of the line with which he had sailed
from Toulon in 1778, resolved to go first upon the American coast, off
South Carolina or Georgia. Arriving with his whole fleet at the mouth
of the Savannah, August 31st, he decided to attempt to wrest the city
of Savannah from the British. This would have been of real service
to the latter, had it nipped in the bud their ex-centric undertaking;
but, after three weeks of opening trenches, an assault upon the place
failed. D'Estaing then sailed for Europe with the ships designated
to accompany him, the others returning to the West Indies in two
squadrons, under de Grasse and La Motte-Picquet. Though fruitless
in its main object, this enterprise of d'Estaing had the important
indirect effect of causing the British to abandon Narragansett Bay.
Upon the news of his appearance, Sir Henry Clinton had felt that, with
his greatly diminished army, he could not hold both Rhode Island and
New York. He therefore ordered the evacuation of the former, thus
surrendering, to use again Rodney's words, "the best and noblest
harbour in America." The following summer it was occupied in force by
the French.

D'Estaing was succeeded in the chief command, in the West Indies and
North America, by Rear-Admiral de Guichen,[69] who arrived on the
station in March, 1780, almost at the same moment as Rodney.

[Footnote 54: The French accounts say three.]

[Footnote 55: Beatson, "Military and Naval Memoirs," iv. 390.]

[Footnote 56: Santa Lucia being in the region of the north-east trade
winds, north and east are always windwardly relatively to south and
west.]

[Footnote 57: To the westward. These islands lie in the trade-winds,
which are constant in _general_ direction from north-east.]

[Footnote 58: Admiral Keppel, in his evidence before the Palliser
Court, gave an interesting description of a similar scene, although
the present writer is persuaded that he was narrating things as they
seemed, rather than as they were--as at Grenada. "The French were
forming their line exactly in the manner M. Conflans did when attacked
by Admiral Hawke." (Keppel had been in that action.) "It is a manner
peculiar to themselves; and to those who do not understand it, it
appears like confusion. They draw out ship by ship from a cluster."]

[Footnote 59: That is, towards the ships at anchor,--the enemy's rear
as matters then were.]

[Footnote 60: Byron's Report. The italics are the author's.]

[Footnote 61: Byron's Report.]

[Footnote 62: Ibid. Author's italics.]

[Footnote 63: "Naval Researches." London, 1830, p. 22.]

[Footnote 64: Byron's Report.]

[Footnote 65: Pierre A. de Suffren de Saint Tropez, a Bailli of the
Order of Knights of Malta. Born, 1726. Present at two naval actions
before he was twenty. Participated in 1756 in the attack on Port
Mahon, and in 1759 in the action off Lagos. Chef d'escadre in 1779.
Dispatched to the East Indies in 1781. Fought a British squadron
in the Bay of Praya, and a succession of brilliant actions with Sir
Edward Hughes, 1782-83. Vice-Admiral, 1783. Killed in a duel, 1788.
One of the greatest of French naval officers.--W.L.C.]

[Footnote 66: Troude says that one French seventy-four, having touched
in leaving port, was not in the engagement.]

[Footnote 67: First of the name. Born 1714. In 1780, he fell under
Rodney's censure, and went home. In 1781, he commanded in the general
action with the Dutch, known as the Dogger Bank. In 1782, he sailed
for the East Indies in the _Cato_, 64; which ship was never again
heard from.]

[Footnote 68: Sir Hyde Parker, Kt. Second of the name, son of the
first. Born, 1739. Captain, 1763. Rear-Admiral, 1793. Vice-Admiral,
1794. Admiral, 1799. Died, 1807. Nelson's chief at Copenhagen, in
1801.]

[Footnote 69: Louis Urbain de Bouënic, Comte de Guichen. Born, 1712.
Entered the navy, 1730. Commanded the _Illustre_ with success in North
America in 1756. Second in command in the action off Ushant in 1778.
Thrice fought Rodney in the West Indies in 1780. Fought Kempenfelt off
the Azores in 1781. Died, 1790.--W.L.C.]




CHAPTER VII

THE NAVAL WAR IN EUROPEAN WATERS, 1779. ALLIED FLEETS INVADE THE
ENGLISH CHANNEL. RODNEY DESTROYS TWO SPANISH SQUADRONS AND RELIEVES
GIBRALTAR


In June, 1779, the maritime situation of Great Britain had become
much more serious by Spain's declaring war. At the same moment that
d'Estaing with twenty-five ships of the line had confronted Byron's
twenty-one, the Channel fleet of forty sail had seen gathering against
it a host of sixty-six. Of this great number thirty-six were Spanish.

The open declaration of Spain had been preceded by a secret alliance
with France, signed on the 12th of April. Fearing that the British
government would take betimes the reasonable and proper step of
blockading the Brest fleet of thirty with the Channel forty, thus
assuming a central position with reference to its enemies and
anticipating the policy of Lord St. Vincent, the French Ministry
hurried its ships to sea on the 4th of June; Admiral d'Orvilliers,
Keppel's opponent, still in command. His orders were to cruise near
the island of Cizarga, off the north-west coast of Spain, where
the Spaniards were to join him. On the 11th of June he was at the
rendezvous, but not till the 23d of July did the bulk of the Spanish
force appear. During this time, the French, insufficiently equipped
from the first, owing to the haste of their departure, were consuming
provisions and water, not to speak of wasting pleasant summer weather.
Their ships also were ravaged by an epidemic fever. Upon the junction,
d'Orvilliers found that the Spaniards had not been furnished with the
French system of signals, although by the treaty the French admiral
was to be in chief command. The rectification of this oversight caused
further delay, but on the 11th of August the combined fleet sighted
Ushant, and on the 14th was off the Lizard. On the 16th it appeared
before Plymouth, and there on the 17th captured the British 64-gun
ship _Ardent_.

Thirty-five ships of the Channel fleet had gone to sea on the 16th of
June, and now were cruising outside, under the command of Admiral Sir
Charles Hardy. His station was from ten to twenty leagues south-west
of Scilly; consequently he had not been seen by the enemy, who from
Ushant had stood up the Channel. The allies, now nearly double the
numbers of the British, were between them and their ports,--a serious
situation doubtless, but by no means desperate; not so dangerous for
sailing ships as it probably will be for steamers to have an enemy
between them and their coal.

The alarm in England was very great, especially in the south. On the
9th of July a royal proclamation had commanded all horses and cattle
to be driven from the coasts, in case of invasion. Booms had been
placed across the entrance to Plymouth Harbor, and orders were sent
from the Admiralty to sink vessels across the harbour's mouth. Many
who had the means withdrew into the interior, which increased the
panic. Great merchant fleets were then on the sea, homeward bound.
If d'Orvilliers were gone to cruise in the approaches to the Channel,
instead of to the Spanish coast, these might be taken; and for some
time his whereabouts were unknown. As it was, the Jamaica convoy, over
two hundred sail, got in a few days before the allies appeared, and
the Leeward Islands fleet had similar good fortune. Eight homeward
bound East Indiamen were less lucky, but, being warned of their
danger, took refuge in the Shannon, and there remained till the
trouble blew over. On the other hand, the stock market stood firm.
Nevertheless, it was justly felt that such a state of things as a
vastly superior hostile fleet in the Channel should not have been. Sir
John Jervis, afterward Earl St. Vincent, who commanded a ship in the
fleet, wrote to his sister: "What a humiliating state is our country
reduced to!" but he added that he laughed at the idea of invasion.

The French had placed a force of fifty thousand men at Le Havre and
St. Malo, and collected four hundred vessels for their transport.
Their plans were not certainly known, but enough had transpired
to cause reasonable anxiety; and the crisis, on its face, was very
serious. Not their own preparations, but the inefficiency of their
enemies, in counsel and in preparation, saved the British Islands
from invasion. What the results of this would have been is another
question,--a question of land warfare. The original scheme of the
French Ministry was to seize the Isle of Wight, securing Spithead as
an anchorage for the fleet, and to prosecute their enterprise from
this near and reasonably secure base. Referring to this first project,
d'Orvilliers wrote: "We will seek the enemy at St. Helen's,[70] and
then, if I find that roadstead unoccupied, or make myself master of
it, I will send word to Marshal De Vaux, at Le Havre, and inform him
of the measures I will take to insure his passage, which [measures]
will depend upon the position of the English main fleet [dèpendront
des forces supèrieures des Anglais]. That is to say, I myself will
lead the combined fleet on that side [against their main body], to
contain the enemy, and I will send, on the other side [to convoy],
a light squadron, with a sufficient number of ships of the line and
frigates; or I will propose to M. de Cordova to take this latter
station, in order that the passage of the army may be free and sure.
I assume that then, either by the engagement I shall have fought with
the enemy, _or by their retreat into their ports_, I shall be certain
of their situation and of the success of the operation."[71] It will
be observed that d'Orvilliers, accounted then and now one of the best
officers of his day in the French navy, takes here into full account
the British "fleet in being." The main body of the allies, fifty
ships, was to hold this in check, while a smaller force--Cordova had
command of a special "squadron of observation," of sixteen ships of
the line--was to convoy the crossing.

These projects all fell to pieces before a strong east wind, and a
change of mind in the French government. On the 16th of August, before
Plymouth, d'Orvilliers was notified that not the Isle of Wight, but
the coast of Cornwall, near Falmouth, was to be the scene of landing.
The effect of this was to deprive the huge fleet of any anchorage,--a
resource necessary even to steamers, and far more to sailing vessels
aiming to remain in a position. As a point to begin shore operations,
too, as well as to sustain them, such a remote corner of the country
to be invaded was absurd. D'Orvilliers duly represented all this, but
could not stay where he was long enough to get a reply. An easterly
gale came on, which blew hard for several days and drove the allies
out of the Channel. On the 25th of August word was received that the
British fleet was near Scilly. A council of war was then held, which
decided that, in view of the terrible increase of disease in the
shipping, and of the shortness of provisions, it was expedient not to
reënter the Channel, but to seek the enemy, and bring him to battle.
This was done. On the 29th Hardy was sighted, being then on his return
up Channel. With the disparity of force he could not but decline
action, and the allies were unable to compel it. On the 3d of
September he reached Spithead. D'Orvilliers soon afterwards received
orders to return to Brest, and on the 14th the combined fleet anchored
there.

The criticism to be passed on the conduct of this summer campaign by
the British Ministry is twofold. In the first place, it was not ready
according to the reasonable standard of the day, which recognised
in the probable coõperation of the two Bourbon kingdoms, France and
Spain, the measure of the minimum naval force permissible to Great
Britain. Secondly, the entrance of Spain into the war had been
foreseen months before. For the inferior force, therefore, it was
essential to prevent a junction,--to take an interior position. The
Channel fleet ought to have been off Brest before the French sailed.
After they were gone, there was still fair ground for the contention
of the Opposition, that they should have been followed, and attacked,
off the coast of Spain. During the six weeks they waited there, they
were inferior to Hardy's force. Allowance here must be made, however,
for the inability of a representative government to disregard popular
outcry, and to uncover the main approach to its own ports. This,
indeed, does but magnify the error made in not watching Brest betimes;
for in such case a fleet before Brest covered also the Channel.

With regard to the objects of the war in which they had become
partners, the views of France and Spain accorded in but one
point,--the desirability of injuring Great Britain. Each had its
own special aim for its own advantage. This necessarily introduced
divergence of effort; but, France having first embarked alone in the
contest and then sought the aid of Spain, the particular objects of
her ally naturally obtained from the beginning a certain precedence.
Until near the close of the war, it may be said that the chief
ambitions of France were in the West Indies; those of Spain, in
Europe,--to regain Minorca and Gibraltar.

In this way Gibraltar became a leading factor in the contest, and
affected, directly or indirectly, the major operations throughout the
world, by the amount of force absorbed in attacking and preserving
it. After the futile effort in the Channel, in 1779, Spain recalled
her vessels from Brest. "The project of a descent upon England was
abandoned provisionally. To blockade Gibraltar, to have in America and
Asia force sufficient to hold the British in check, and to take the
offensive in the West Indies,--such," wrote the French government to
its ambassador in Madrid, "was the plan of campaign adopted for 1780."
Immediately upon the declaration of war, intercourse between Gibraltar
and the Spanish mainland was stopped. Soon afterwards a blockade by
sea was instituted; fifteen cruisers being stationed at the entrance
of the Bay, where they seized and sent into Spanish ports all vessels,
neutral or British, bound to the Rock. This blockade was effectively
supported from Cadiz, but a Spanish force of some ships of the
line and many small vessels also maintained it more directly from
Algeciras, on the Spanish side of the Bay of Gibraltar. The British
Mediterranean squadron, then consisting only of one 60-gun ship,
three frigates, and a sloop, was wholly unable to afford relief. At
the close of the year 1779, flour in Gibraltar was fourteen guineas
the barrel, and other provisions in proportion. It became therefore
imminently necessary to throw in supplies of all kinds, as well as to
reinforce the garrison. To this service Rodney was assigned; and with
it he began the brilliant career, the chief scene of which was to be
in the West Indies.

Rodney was appointed to command the Leeward Islands Station on the
1st of October, 1779. He was to be accompanied there immediately by
only four or five ships of the line; but advantage was taken of his
sailing, to place under the charge of an officer of his approved
reputation a great force, composed of his small division and a large
fraction of the Channel fleet, to convey supplies and reinforcements
to Gibraltar and Minorca. On the 29th of December the whole body,
after many delays in getting down Channel, put to sea from Plymouth:
twenty-two ships of the line, fourteen frigates and smaller vessels,
besides a huge collection of storeships, victuallers, ordnance
vessels, troop-ships, and merchantmen,--the last named being the
"trade" for the West Indies and Portugal.

On the 7th of January, 1780, a hundred leagues west of Cape
Finisterre, the West India ships parted for their destination, under
convoy of a ship of the line and three frigates. At daylight on
the 8th, twenty-two sail were seen to the north-east, the squadron
apparently having passed them in the night. Chase was at once given,
and the whole were taken in a few hours. Seven were ships of war, one
64 and six frigates; the remainder merchant vessels, laden with naval
stores and provisions for the Spanish fleet at Cadiz. The provision
ships, twelve in number, were diverted at once to the relief of
Gibraltar, under charge of the Spanish sixty-four, which had been one
of their convoy before capture, and was now manned by a British crew.
Continuing on, intelligence was received from time to time by passing
vessels that a Spanish squadron was cruising off Cape St. Vincent.
Thus forewarned, orders were given to all captains to be prepared
for battle as the Cape was neared. On the 16th it was passed, and at
1 P.M. sails in the south-east were signalled. These were a Spanish
squadron of eleven ships of the line, and two 26-gun frigates. Rodney
at once bore down for them under a press of canvas, making signal for
the line abreast.[72] Seeing, however, that the enemy was trying to
form line of battle ahead on the starboard tack, which with a westerly
wind was with heads to the southward, towards Cadiz, a hundred miles
to the south-east, he changed the orders to a "General Chase," the
ships to engage as they came up; "to leeward," so as to get between
the enemy and his port, and "in rotation," by which probably was
meant that the leading British vessel should attack the sternmost of
the Spaniards, and that her followers should pass her to leeward,
successively engaging from the enemy's rear towards the van.

At 4 P.M. the signal for battle was made, and a few minutes later
the four headmost of the pursuers got into action. At 4.40 one of the
Spanish ships, the _Santo Domingo_, 80, blew up with all on board, and
at 6 another struck. By this hour, it being January, darkness had set
in. A night action therefore followed, which lasted until 2 A.M., when
the headmost of the enemy surrendered, and all firing ceased. Of the
eleven hostile ships of the line, only four escaped. Besides the
one blown up, six were taken. These were the _Fénix_, 80, flag of
the Spanish Admiral, Don Juan de Langara, the _Monarca_, 70, the
_Princesa_, 70, the _Diligente_, 70, the _San Julian_, 70, and the
_San Eugenio_, 70. The two latter drove ashore and were lost.[73] The
remaining four were brought into Gibraltar, and were ultimately added
to the Navy. All retained their old names, save the _Fénix_, which
was renamed _Gibraltar_. "The weather during the night," by Rodney's
report, "was at times very tempestuous, with a great sea. It continued
very bad weather the next day, when the _Royal George_, 100, _Prince
George_, 90, _Sandwich_, 90 (Rodney's flagship), and several other
ships were in great danger, and under the necessity of making sail to
avoid the shoals of San Lucar, nor did they get into deep water till
the next morning."

It was in this danger from a lee shore, which was deliberately though
promptly incurred, that the distinction of this action of Rodney's
consists. The enemy's squadron, being only eleven ships of the line,
was but half the force of the British, and it was taken by surprise;
which, to be sure, is no excuse for a body of war-ships in war-time.
Caught unawares, the Spaniards took to flight too late. It was
Rodney's merit, and no slight one under the conditions of weather and
navigation, that they were not permitted to retrieve their mistake.
His action left nothing to be desired in resolution or readiness. It
is true that Rodney discussed the matter with his flag-captain, Walter
Young, and that rumor attributed the merit of the decision to the
latter; but this sort of detraction is of too common occurrence to
affect opinion. Sir Gilbert Blane, Physician to the Fleet, gives
the following account: "When it was close upon sunset, it became a
question whether the chase should be continued. After some discussion
between the Admiral and Captain, at which I was present, the Admiral
being confined with the gout, it was decided to persist in the same
course, with the signal to engage to leeward." Rodney at that time
was nearly sixty-two, and a constant martyr to gout in both feet and
hands.

The two successes by the way imparted a slightly triumphal character
to the welcome of the Admiral by the garrison, then sorely in need
of some good news. The arrival of much-needed supplies from home was
itself a matter of rejoicing; but it was more inspiriting still to see
following in the train of the friendly fleet five hostile ships of
the line, one of them bearing the flag of a Commander-in-Chief, and
to hear that, besides these, three more had been sunk or destroyed.
The exultation in England was even greater, and especially at the
Admiralty, which was labouring under the just indignation of the
people for the unpreparedness of the Navy. "You have taken more
line-of-battle ships," wrote the First Lord to Rodney, "than had been
captured in any one action in either of the two last preceding wars."

It should be remembered, too, as an element in the triumph, that this
advantage over an exposed detachment had been snatched, as it were, in
the teeth of a main fleet superior to Rodney's own; for twenty Spanish
and four French ships of the line, under Admiral de Cordova, were
lying then in Cadiz Bay. During the eighteen days when the British
remained in and near the Straits, no attempt was made by Cordova to
take revenge for the disaster, or to reap the benefit of superior
force. The inaction was due, probably, to the poor condition of the
Spanish ships in point of efficiency and equipment, and largely to
their having uncoppered bottoms. This element of inferiority in the
Spanish navy should be kept in mind as a factor in the general war,
although Spanish fleets did not come much into battle. A French
Commodore, then with the Spanish fleet in Ferrol, wrote as follows:
"Their ships all sail so badly that they can neither overtake an enemy
nor escape from one. The _Glorieux_ is a bad sailer in the French
navy, but better than the best among the Spaniards." He adds: "The
vessels of Langara's squadron were surprised at immense distances
one from the other. Thus they always sail, and their negligence and
security on this point are incredible."

On approaching Gibraltar, the continuance of bad weather, and the
strong easterly current of the Straits, set many of Rodney's ships and
convoy to leeward, to the back of the Rock, and it was not till the
26th that the flagship herself anchored. The storeships for Minorca
were sent on at once, under charge of three coppered ships of the
line. The practice of coppering, though then fully adopted, had not
yet been extended to all vessels. As an element of speed, it was an
important factor on an occasion like this, when time pressed to get
to the West Indies; as it also was in an engagement. The action on the
16th had been opened by the coppered ships of the line, which first
overtook the retreating enemy and brought his rear to battle. In
the French navy at the time, Suffren was urging the adoption upon an
apparently reluctant Minister. It would seem to have been more general
among the British, going far to compensate for the otherwise inferior
qualities of their ships. "The Spanish men-of-war we have taken,"
wrote Rodney to his wife concerning these prizes, "are much superior
to ours." It may be remembered that Nelson, thirteen years later, said
the same of the Spanish vessels which came under his observation. "I
never saw finer ships." "I perceive you cry out loudly for coppered
ships," wrote the First Lord to Rodney after this action; "and I
am therefore determined to stop your mouth. You shall have copper
enough."

Upon the return of the Minorca ships, Rodney put to sea again on the
13th of February, for the West Indies. The detachment from the Channel
fleet accompanied him three days' sail on his way, and then parted
for England with the prizes. On this return voyage it fell in with
fifteen French supply vessels, convoyed by two 64's, bound for the
Ile de France,[74] in the Indian Ocean. One of the ships of war, the
_Protée_, and three of the storeships were taken. Though trivial, the
incident illustrates the effect of operations in Europe upon war in
India. It may be mentioned here as indicative of the government's
dilemmas, that Rodney was censured for having left one ship of the
line at the Rock. "It has given us the trouble _and risk_ of sending
a frigate on purpose to order her home immediately; and if you will
look into your original instructions, you will find that there was
no point more strongly guarded against than that of your leaving
any line-of-battle ship behind you." These words clearly show the
exigency and peril of the general situation, owing to the inadequate
development of the naval force as compared with its foes. Such
isolated ships ran the gantlet of the fleets in Cadiz, Ferrol, and
Brest flanking the routes.

[Footnote 70: An anchorage three miles to seaward of Spithead.]

[Footnote 71: Chevalier, "Marine Française," 1778, p. 165. Author's
italics.]

[Footnote 72: In line "abreast," as the word indicates, the ships are
not in each other's wake, as in line "ahead," but abreast; that is,
ranged on a line perpendicular to the course steered.]

[Footnote 73: Rodney's Report. Chevalier says that one of them was
retaken by her crew and carried into Cadiz.]

[Footnote 74: Now the British Mauritius.]




CHAPTER VIII

RODNEY AND DE GUICHEN'S NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN WEST INDIES. DE GUICHEN
RETURNS TO EUROPE, AND RODNEY GOES TO NEW YORK. LORD CORNWALLIS IN THE
CAROLINAS. TWO NAVAL ACTIONS OF COMMODORE CORNWALLIS. RODNEY RETURNS
TO WEST INDIES


When Rodney arrived at Santa Lucia with his four ships of the line, on
March 27, 1780, he found there a force of sixteen others, composed in
about equal proportions of ships that had left England with Byron in
the summer of 1778, and of a reinforcement brought by Rear-Admiral
Rowley in the spring of 1779.

During the temporary command of Rear-Admiral Hyde Parker, between
the departure of Byron and the arrival of Rodney, a smart affair had
taken place between a detachment of the squadron and one from the
French division, under La Motte-Picquet, then lying in Fort Royal,
Martinique.

On the 18th of December, 1779, between 8 and 9 A.M., the British
look-out ship, the _Preston_, 50, between Martinique and Santa Lucia
made signal for a fleet to windward, which proved to be a body of
French supply ships, twenty-six in number, under convoy of a frigate.
Both the British and the French squadrons were in disarray, sails
unbent, ships on the heel or partially disarmed, crews ashore for
wood and water. In both, signals flew at once for certain ships to
get under way, and in both the orders were executed with a rapidity
gratifying to the two commanders, who also went out in person. The
British, however, were outside first, with five sail of the line and
a 50-gun ship. Nine of the supply vessels were captured by them, and
four forced ashore. The French Rear-Admiral had by this time got
out of Fort Royal with three ships of the line,--the _Annibal_, 74,
_Vengeur_, 64, and _Réfléchi_, 64,--and, being to windward, covered
the entrance of the remainder of the convoy. As the two hostile
divisions were now near each other, with a fine working breeze, the
British tried to beat up to the enemy; the _Conqueror_, 74, Captain
Walter Griffith, being ahead and to windward of her consorts. Coming
within range at 5, firing began between her and the French flagship,
_Annibal_, 74, and subsequently between her and all the three vessels
of the enemy. Towards sunset, the _Albion_, 74, had got close up with
the _Conqueror_, and the other ships were within distant range; "but
as they had worked not only well within the dangers of the shoals of
the bay (Fort Royal), but within reach of the batteries, I called them
off by night signal at a quarter before seven."[75] In this chivalrous
skirmish,--for it was little more, although the injury to the French
in the loss of the convoy was notable,--Parker was equally delighted
with his own squadron and with his enemy. "The steadiness and coolness
with which on every tack the _Conqueror_ received the fire of these
three ships, and returned her own, working his ship with as much
exactness as if he had been turning into Spithead, and on every
board gaining on the enemy, gave me infinite pleasure. It was with
inexpressible concern," he added, "that I heard that Captain Walter
Griffith, of the _Conqueror_, was killed by the last broadside."[76]
Having occasion, a few days later, to exchange a flag of truce
with the French Rear-Admiral, he wrote to him; "The conduct of your
Excellency in the affair of the 18th of this month fully justifies the
reputation which you enjoy among us, and I assure you that I could not
witness without envy the skill you showed on that occasion. Our enmity
is transient, depending upon our masters; but your merit has stamped
upon my heart the greatest admiration for yourself." This was the
officer who was commonly known in his time as "Vinegar" Parker; but
these letters show that the epithet fitted the rind rather than the
kernel.

Shortly after de Guichen[77] took command, in March, 1780, he arranged
with the Marquis de Bouillé, Governor of Martinique, to make a
combined attack upon some one of the British West India Islands. For
this purpose three thousand troops were embarked in the fleet, which
sailed on the night of the 13th of April, 1780, intending first to
accompany a convoy for Santo Domingo, until it was safely out of
reach of the British. Rodney, who was informed at once of the French
departure, put to sea in chase with all his ships, twenty of the line,
two of which were of 90 guns, and on the 16th came in sight of the
enemy to leeward (westward) of Martinique, beating up against the
north-east trade-winds, and intending to pass through the channel
between that island and Dominica. "A general chase to the north-west
followed, and at five in the evening we plainly discovered that they
consisted of twenty-three sail of the line, and one 50 gun ship."[78]

As it fell dark Rodney formed his line of battle, standing still to
the north-west, therefore on the starboard tack; and he was attentive
to keep to windward of the enemy, whom his frigates watched diligently
during the night. "Their manoeuvres," he wrote, "indicated a wish to
avoid battle," and he therefore was careful to counteract them. At
daylight of April 17th, they were seen forming line of battle, on the
port tack, four or five leagues to leeward,--that is, to the westward.
The wind being east, or east by north, the French would be heading
south-south-east (Fig. 1, aa). The British order now was rectified by
signal from the irregularities of darkness, the ships being directed
to keep two cables'[79] lengths apart, and steering as before to
the northward and westward. At 7 A.M., considering this line too
extended, the Admiral closed the intervals to one cable (aa). The two
fleets thus were passing on nearly parallel lines, but in opposite
directions, which tended to bring the whole force of Rodney, whose
line was better and more compact than the enemy's, abreast the
latter's rear, upon which he intended to concentrate. At 8 A.M. he
made general signal that this was his purpose; and at 8.30, to execute
it, he signalled for the ships to form line abreast, bearing from each
other south by east and north by west, and stood down at once upon
the enemy (Fig. 1, bb). The object of the British being evident, de
Guichen made his fleet wear together to the starboard tack (bb).
The French rear thus became the van, and their former van, which was
stretched too far for prompt assistance to the threatened rear, now
headed to support it.

Rodney, baulked in his first spring, hauled at once to the wind on the
port tack (Fig. 1, _cc_), again contrary to the French, standing thus
once more along their line, for their new rear. The intervals were
opened out again to two cables. The fleets thus were passing once more
on parallel lines, each having reversed its order; but the British
still retained the advantage, on whatever course and interval, that
they were much more compact than the French, whose line, by Rodney's
estimate, extended four leagues in length.[80] The wariness of the
two combatants, both trained in the school of the eighteenth century
with its reverence for the line of battle, will appear to the careful
reader. Rodney, although struggling through this chrysalis stage
to the later vigor, and seriously bent on a deadly blow, still was
constrained by the traditions of watchful fencing. Nor was his caution
extravagant; conditions did not justify yet the apparent recklessness
of Nelson's tactics. "The different movements of the enemy," he wrote,
"obliged me to be very attentive, and watch every opportunity that
offered of attacking them to advantage."

[Illustration]

The two fleets continued to stand on opposite parallel courses--the
French north by west, the British south by east--until the flagship
_Sandwich_, 90, (Fig. 2, S^1) was abreast the _Couronne_, 80, (C), the
flagship of de Guichen. Then, at 10.10 A.M., the signal was made to
wear together, forming on the same tack as the enemy. There being some
delay in execution, this had to be repeated, and further enforced by
the pennant of the _Stirling Castle_, which, as the rear ship, should
begin the evolution. At half-past ten, apparently, the fleet was about
(Fig. 2, aa), for an order was then given for rectifying the line,
still at two cables. At 11 A.M. the Admiral made the signal to prepare
for battle, "to convince the whole fleet I was determined to bring the
enemy to an engagement,"[81] and to this succeeded shortly the order
to alter the course to port (bb), towards the enemy.[82] Why he
thought that any of the fleet should have required such assurance
cannot certainly be said. Possibly, although he had so recently
joined, he had already detected the ill-will, or the slackness, of
which he afterwards complained; possibly he feared that the wariness
of his tactics might lead men to believe that he did not mean to
exceed the lukewarm and indecisive action of days scarce yet passed
away, which had led Suffren to stigmatize tactics as a mere veil,
behind which timidity thinks to hide its nakedness.

At 11.50 A.M. the decisive signal was made "for every ship to bear
down, and steer for _her opposite in the enemy's line_, agreeable
to the 21st article of the Additional Fighting Instructions." Five
minutes later, when the ships, presumably, had altered their course
for the enemy, the signal for battle was made, followed by the message
that the Admiral's intention was to engage closely; he expecting,
naturally, that every ship would follow the example he purposed to
set. The captain of the ship which in the formation (aa) had been
the leader, upon whose action depended that of those near her,
unfortunately understood Rodney's signal to mean that he was to
attack the enemy's leader, not the ship opposite to him at the moment
of bearing away. This ship, therefore, diverged markedly from the
Admiral's course, drawing after her many of the van. A few minutes
before 1 P.M., one of the headmost ships began to engage at long
range; but it was not till some time after 1 P.M. that the _Sandwich_,
having received several broadsides, came into close action (S^2) with
the second vessel astern from the French Admiral, the _Actionnaire_,
64. The latter was soon beat out of the line by the superiority of
the _Sandwich's_ battery, and the same lot befell the ship astern of
her,--probably the _Intrépide_, 74,--which came up to close the gap.
Towards 2.30 P.M., the _Sandwich_, either by her own efforts to
close, or by her immediate opponents' keeping away, was found to be
to leeward (S^3) of the enemy's line; the _Couronne_ (C) being on her
weather bow. The fact was pointed out by Rodney to the captain of the
ship, Walter Young, who was then in the lee gangway. Young, going over
to look for himself, saw that it was so, and that the _Yarmouth_, 64,
had hauled off to windward, where she lay with her main and mizzen
topsails aback. Signals were then made to her, and to the _Cornwall_,
74, to come to closer engagement, they both being on the weather bow
of the flagship.

De Guichen, recognising this state of affairs, then or a little
later, attributed it to the deliberate purpose of the British Admiral
to break his line. It does not appear that Rodney so intended. His
tactical idea was to concentrate his whole fleet on the French rear
and centre, but there is no indication that he now aimed at breaking
the line. De Guichen so construing it, however, gave the signal to
wear together, away from the British line. The effect of this, in any
event, would have been to carry his fleet somewhat to leeward; but
with ships more or less crippled, taking therefore greater room to
manoeuvre, and with the exigency of re-forming the line upon them, the
tendency was exaggerated. The movement which the French called wearing
together was therefore differently interpreted by Rodney. "The action
in the centre continued till 4.15 P.M., when M. de Guichen, in the
_Couronne_, the _Triomphant_, and the _Fendant_, after engaging the
_Sandwich_ for an hour and a half, bore away. The superiority of fire
from the _Sandwich_, and the gallant behavior of the officers and men,
enabled her to sustain so unequal a combat; though before attacked
by them, she had beat three ships out of their line of battle, had
entirely broke it, and was to leeward of the French Admiral." Possibly
the French accounts, if they were not so very meagre, might dispute
this prowess of the flagship; but there can be no doubt that Rodney
had set an example, which, had it been followed by all, would have
made this engagement memorable, if not decisive. He reported that the
captains, with very few exceptions, had placed their ships improperly
(cc). The _Sandwich_ had eighty shot in her hull, had lost her
foremast and mainyard, and had fired 3288 rounds, an average of 73
to each gun of the broadside engaged. Three of her hits being below
the water line, she was kept afloat with difficulty during the next
twenty-four hours. With the wearing of the French the battle ceased.

In the advantage offered by the enemy, whose order was too greatly
extended, and in his own plan of attack, Rodney always considered this
action of April 17th, 1780, to have been the great opportunity of his
life; and his wrath was bitter against those by whose misconduct he
conceived it had been frustrated. "The French admiral, who appeared
to me to be a brave and gallant officer, had the honour to be nobly
supported during the whole action. It is with concern inexpressible,
mixed with indignation, that the duty I owe my sovereign and my
country obliges me to acquaint your Lordships that during the action
between the French fleet, on the 17th inst, and his Majesty's, the
British flag was not properly supported." Divided as the Navy was
then into factions, with their hands at each other's throats or at
the throat of the Admiralty, the latter thought it more discreet to
suppress this paragraph, allowing to appear only the negative stigma
of the encomium upon the French officers, unaccompanied by any upon
his own. Rodney, however, in public and private letters did not
conceal his feelings; and the censure found its way to the ears of
those concerned. Subsequently, three months after the action, in a
public letter, he bore testimony to the excellent conduct of five
of the captains, Walter Young, of the flagship, George Bowyer of
the _Albion_, John Douglas of the _Terrible_, John Houlton of the
_Montagu_, and A.J.P. Molloy[83] of the _Trident_. "To them I have
given certificates, under my hand," "free and unsolicited." Beyond
these, "no consideration in life would induce" him to go; and the
two junior flag-officers were implicitly condemned in the words, "to
inattention to signals, both in the van and rear divisions, is to be
attributed the loss of that glorious opportunity (perhaps never to
be recovered) of terminating the naval contest in these seas." These
junior admirals were Hyde Parker and Rowley; the latter the same who
had behaved, not only so gallantly, but with such unusual initiative,
in Byron's engagement. A singular incident in this case led him to a
like independence of action, which displeased Rodney. The _Montagu_,
of his division, when closing the French line, wore against the
helm, and could only be brought into action on the wrong (port) tack.
Immediately upon this, part of the French rear also wore, and Rowley
followed them of his own motion. Being called to account by Rodney, he
stated the facts, justifying the act by the order that "the greatest
impression was to be made on the enemy's rear." Both parties soon wore
back.

Hyde Parker went home in a rage a few weeks later. The certificates to
Bowyer and Douglas, certainly, and probably to Molloy, all of Parker's
division, bore the stinging words that these officers "meant well, and
would have done their duty had they been permitted." It is stated that
their ships, which were the rear of the van division, were going down
to engage close, following Rodney's example, when Parker made them a
signal to keep the line. If this be so, as Parker's courage was beyond
all doubt, it was simply a recurrence of the old superstition of the
line, aggravated by a misunderstanding of Rodney's later signals.
These must be discussed, for the whole incident is part of the history
of the British Navy, far more important than many an indecisive though
bloody encounter.

One of the captains more expressly blamed, Carkett of the _Stirling
Castle_, which had been the leading ship at the time the signal to
alter the course toward the enemy was made, wrote to Rodney that he
understood that his name had been mentioned, unfavourably of course,
in the public letter. Rodney's reply makes perfectly apparent the
point at issue, his own plan, the ideas running in his head as he made
his successive signals, the misconceptions of the juniors, and the
consequent fiasco. It must be said, however, that, granting the facts
as they seem certainly to have occurred, no misunderstanding, no
technical verbal allegation, can justify a military stupidity so great
as that of which he complained. There are occasions in which not only
is literal disobedience permissible, but literal obedience, flying in
the face of the evident conditions, becomes a crime.

At 8 in the morning, Rodney had made a general signal of his purpose
to attack the enemy's rear. This, having been understood and answered,
was hauled down; all juniors had been acquainted with a general
purpose, to which the subsequent manoeuvres were to lead. How he meant
to carry out his intention was evidenced by the consecutive course
of action while on that tack,--the starboard; when the time came, the
fleet bore up together, in line abreast, standing for the French rear.
This attempt, being balked then by de Guichen's wearing, was renewed
two hours later; only in place of the signal to form line abreast,
was made one to alter the course to port,--towards the enemy. As this
followed immediately upon that to prepare for battle, it indicated
almost beyond question, that Rodney wished, for reasons of the moment,
to run down at first in a slanting direction,--not in line abreast,
as before,--ships taking course and interval from the flagship. Later
again, at 11.50, the signal was made, "agreeable to the 21st Article
of the Additional Fighting Instructions, for every ship to steer
for her opposite in the enemy's line;" and here the trouble began.
Rodney meant the ship opposite when the signal was hauled down. He
had steered slanting, till he had gained as nearly as possible the
position he wanted, probably till within long range; then it was
desirable to cover the remaining ground as rapidly and orderly as
possible, for which purpose the enemy's ship then abreast gave each
of his fleet its convenient point of direction. He conceived that
his signalled purpose to attack the enemy's rear, never having been
altered, remained imperative; and further, that the signal for two
cables' length interval should govern all ships, and would tie them to
him, and to his movements, in the centre. Carkett construed "opposite"
to mean opposite in numerical order, British van ship against French
van ship, wherever the latter was. Rodney states--in his letter to
Carkett--that the French van was then two leagues away. "You led to
the van ship, notwithstanding you had answered my signals signifying
that it was my intention to attack the enemy's rear; which signal
I had never altered.... Your leading in the manner you did, induced
others to follow so bad an example; and thereby, forgetting that the
signal for the line was only at two cables' length distance from
each other, the van division was led by you to more than two leagues'
distance from the centre division, which was thereby not properly
supported."[84]

Carkett was the oldest captain in the fleet, his post commission
being dated March 12th, 1758. How far he may have been excusable in
construing as he did Fighting Instructions, which originated in the
inane conception that the supreme duty of a Commander-in-Chief was to
oppose ship to ship, and that a fleet action was only an agglomeration
of naval duels, is not very material, though historically interesting.
There certainly was that in the past history of the British Navy which
extenuated the offence of a man who must have been well on in middle
life. But since the Fighting Instructions had been first issued there
had been the courts-martial, also instructive, on Mathews, Lestock,
Byng, Keppel, and Palliser, all of which turned more or less on the
constraint of the line of battle, and the duty of supporting ships
engaged,--above all, an engaged Commander-in-Chief. Rodney perhaps
underestimated the weight of the Fighting Instructions upon a dull
man; but he was justified in claiming that his previous signals,
and the prescription of distance, created at the least a conflict of
orders, a doubt, to which there should have been but one solution,
namely: to support the ships engaged, and to close down upon the
enemy, as near as possible to the Commander-in-Chief. And in moments
of actual perplexity such will always be the truth. It is like
marching towards the sound of guns, or, to use Nelson's words, "_In
case_ signals cannot be understood, no captain can do very wrong if he
places his ship alongside that of an enemy." The "In Case," however,
needs also to be kept in mind; and that it was Nelson who said it.
Utterances of to-day, like utterances of all time, show how few
are the men who can hold both sides of a truth firmly, without
exaggeration or defect. Judicial impartiality can be had, and positive
convictions too; but their combination is rare. A two-sided man is apt
also to be double-minded.

The loss of men in this sharp encounter was: British, killed, 120,
wounded, 354; French, killed, 222, wounded, 537.[85] This gives
three French hit for every two British, from which, and from the much
greater damage received aloft by the latter, it may be inferred that
both followed their usual custom of aiming, the British at the hull,
the French at the spars. To the latter conduced also the lee-gage,
which the French had. The British, as the attacking party, suffered
likewise a raking fire as they bore down.

Rodney repaired damages at sea, and pursued, taking care to keep
between Martinique and the French. The latter going into Guadeloupe,
he reconnoitred them there under the batteries, and then took his
station off Fort Royal. "The only chance of bringing them to action,"
he wrote to the Admiralty on the 26th of April, "was to be off that
port before them, where the fleet now is, in daily expectation of
their arrival." The French represent that he avoided them, but as
they assert that they came out best on the 17th, and yet admit that he
appeared off Guadeloupe, the claim is not tenable. Rodney here showed
thorough tenacity of purpose. De Guichen's orders were "to keep the
sea, so far as the force maintained by England in the Windward Islands
would permit, without too far compromising the fleet intrusted to
him."[86] With such instructions, he naturally and consistently shrunk
from decisive engagement. After landing his wounded and refitting in
Guadeloupe, he again put to sea, with the intention of proceeding to
Santa Lucia, resuming against that island the project which both he
and De Bouillé continuously entertained. The latter and his troops
remained with the fleet.

Rodney meantime had felt compelled to return momentarily to Santa
Lucia. "The fleet continued before Fort Royal till the condition of
many of the ships under my command, and the lee currents,[87] rendered
it necessary to anchor in Choque Bay (Anse du Choc), St. Lucie, in
order to put the wounded and sick men on shore, and to water and
refit the fleet, frigates having been detached both to leeward and to
windward of every island, in order to gain intelligence of the motions
of the enemy, and timely notice of their approach towards Martinique,
the only place they could refit at in these seas." In this last clause
is seen the strategic idea of the British Admiral: the French must
come back to Martinique.

From the vigilance of his frigates it resulted that when the look-outs
of de Guichen, who passed to windward of Martinique on the 7th of
May, came in sight of Gros Ilet on the 9th, it was simply to find
the British getting under way to meet the enemy. During the five
following days both fleets were engaged in constant movements, upon
the character of which the writers of each nation put different
constructions. Both are agreed, however, that the French were to
windward throughout, except for a brief hour on the 15th, when a
fleeting change of wind gave the British that advantage, only to lose
it soon again. They at once used it to force action. As the windward
position carries the power to attack, and as the French were
twenty-three to the British twenty, it is probably not a strained
inference to say that the latter were chasing to windward, and the
former avoiding action, in favour, perhaps, of that ulterior motive,
the conquest of Santa Lucia, for which they had sailed. Rodney states
in his letter that, when the two fleets parted on the 20th of May,
they were forty leagues to windward (eastward) of Martinique, in sight
of which they had been on the 10th.

During these days de Guichen, whose fleet, according to Rodney, sailed
the better, and certainly sufficiently well to preserve the advantage
of the wind, bore down more than once, generally in the afternoon,
when the breeze is steadiest, to within distant range of the British.
Upon this movement, the French base the statement that the British
Admiral was avoiding an encounter; it is equally open to the
interpretation that he would not throw away ammunition until sure of
effective distance. Both admirals showed much skill and mastery of
their profession, great wariness also, and quickness of eye; but it
is wholly untenable to claim that a fleet having the weather-gage
for five days, in the trade-winds, was unable to bring its enemy to
action, especially when it is admitted that the latter closed the
instant the wind permitted him to do so.

On the afternoon of May 15th, about the usual hour, Rodney "made a
great deal of sail upon the wind." The French, inferring that he was
trying to get off, which he meant them to do, approached somewhat
closer than on the previous days. Their van ship had come within long
range, abreast the centre of the British, who were on the port tack
standing to the south-south-east, with the wind at east (aa, aa). Here
the breeze suddenly hauled to south-southeast (wind b). The heads
of all the ships in both fleets were thus knocked off to south-west
(s, s), on the port tack, but the shift left the British rear, which
on that tack led the fleet, to windward of the French van. Rodney's
signal flew at once, to tack in succession and keep the wind of the
enemy; the latter, unwilling to yield the advantage, wore all together
(w), hauling to the wind on the starboard tack, and to use Rodney's
words, "fled with a crowd of sail" (a', a').

[Illustration]

The British fleet tacking in succession after their leaders, (t, t),
the immediate result was that both were now standing on the starboard
tack,--to the eastward,--the British having a slight advantage of the
wind, but well abaft the beam of the French (bb, bb). The result, had
the wind held, would have been a trial of speed and weatherliness.
"His Majesty's fleet," wrote Rodney, "by this manoeuvre had gained the
wind, and would have forced the enemy to battle, had it not at once
changed six points (back to east, its former direction,) when near the
enemy, and enabled them to recover that advantage." When the wind thus
shifted again, de Guichen tacked his ships together and stood across
the bows of the advancing enemy (cc, cc). The British leader struck
the French line behind the centre, and ran along to leeward, the
British van exchanging a close cannonade with the enemy's rear.
Such an engagement, two lines passing on opposite tacks, is usually
indecisive, even when the entire fleets are engaged, as at Ushant; but
where, as in this case, the engagement is but partial, the result is
naturally less. The French van and centre, having passed the head of
the enemy, diverged at that point farther and farther from the track
of the on-coming British ships, which from the centre rearwards did
not fire. "As the enemy were under a press of sail, none but the van
of our fleet could come in for any part of the action without wasting
his Majesty's powder and shot, the enemy wantonly expending theirs
at such a distance as to have no effect." Here again the French were
evidently taking the chance of disabling the distant enemy in his
spars. The British loss in the action of May 15th was 21 killed and
100 wounded.

[Illustration]

The fleets continued their respective movements, each acting as
before, until the 19th, when another encounter took place, of exactly
the same character as the last, although without the same preliminary
manoeuvring. On that occasion the British, who in the interim had
been reinforced by one 74 and one 50-gun ship, lost 47 killed and 113
wounded. The result was equally indecisive, tactically considered;
but both by this time had exhausted their staying powers. The French,
having been absent from Martinique since the 13th of April, had now
but six days' provisions.[88] Rodney found the _Conqueror, Cornwall_,
and _Boyne_ so shattered that he sent them before the wind to Santa
Lucia, while he himself with the rest of the fleet stood for Barbados,
where he arrived on the 22d. The French anchored on the same day
at Fort Royal. "The English," says Chevalier, "stood on upon the
starboard tack, to the southward, after the action of the 19th, and
the next day were not to be seen." "The enemy," reported Rodney,
"stood to the northward with all the sail they could possibly press,
and were out of sight the 21st inst. The condition of his Majesty's
ships was such as not to allow a longer pursuit."

By their dexterity and vigilance each admiral had thwarted the other's
aims. Rodney, by a pronounced, if cautious, offensive effort, had
absolutely prevented the "ulterior object" of the French, which he
clearly understood to be Santa Lucia. De Guichen had been successful
in avoiding decisive action, and he had momentarily so crippled a few
of the British ships that the fleet must await their repairs before
again taking the sea. The tactical gain was his, the strategic victory
rested with his opponent; but that his ships also had been much
maltreated is shown by the fact that half a dozen could not put to sea
three weeks later. The French admiral broke down under the strain,
to which was added the grief of losing a son, killed in the recent
engagements. He asked for his recall. "The command of so large a
fleet," he wrote, "is infinitely beyond my capacity in all respects.
My health cannot endure such continual fatigue and anxiety." Certainly
this seems a tacit testimony to Rodney's skill, persistence, and
offensive purpose. The latter wrote to his wife: "For fourteen days
and nights the fleets were so near each other that neither officers
nor men could be said to sleep. Nothing but the goodness of the
weather and climate would have enabled us to endure so continual a
fatigue. Had it been in Europe, half the people must have sunk under
it. For my part, it did me good."

Rodney stated also in his home letters that the action of his
subordinates in the last affairs had been efficient; but he gave
them little credit for it. "As I had given public notice to all my
captains, etc., that I expected implicit obedience to every signal
made, under the certain penalty of being instantly superseded, it
had an admirable effect; as they were all convinced, after their
late gross behaviour, that they had nothing to expect at my hands but
instant punishment to those who neglected their duty. My eye on them
had more dread than the enemy's fire, and they knew it would be fatal.
No regard was paid to rank: admirals as well as captains, if out of
their station, were instantly reprimanded by signals, or messages sent
by frigates; and, in spite of themselves, I taught them to be, what
they had never been before,--_officers_." Rodney told his officers
also that he would shift his flag into a frigate, if necessary, to
watch them better. It is by no means obligatory to accept these gross
aspersions as significant of anything worse than the suspiciousness
prevalent throughout the Navy, traceable ultimately to a corrupt
administration of the Admiralty. The latter, like the government of
1756, was open to censure through political maladministration; every
one feared that blame would be shifted on to him, as it had been on
to Byng,--who deserved it; and not only so, but that blame would
be pushed on to ruin, as in his case. The Navy was honeycombed with
distrust, falling little short of panic. In this state of apprehension
and doubt, the tradition of the line of battle, resting upon men who
did not stop to study facts or analyse impressions, and who had seen
officers censured, cashiered, and shot, for errors of judgment or of
action, naturally produced hesitations and misunderstandings. An order
of battle is a good thing, necessary to insure mutual support and to
develop a plan. The error of the century, not then exploded, was to
observe it in the letter rather than in the spirit; to regard the
order as an end rather than a means; and to seek in it not merely
efficiency, which admits broad construction in positions, but
preciseness, which is as narrowing as a brace of handcuffs. Rodney
himself, Tory though he was, found fault with the administration. With
all his severity and hauteur, he did not lose sight of justice, as is
shown by a sentence in his letter to Carkett. "Could I have imagined
your conduct and inattention to signals had proceeded from anything
but error in judgment, I had certainly superseded you, but God forbid
I should do so for error in judgment only,"--again an illusion, not
obscure, to Byng's fate.

In Barbados, Rodney received certain information that a Spanish
squadron of twelve ships of the line, with a large convoy of ten
thousand troops, had sailed from Cadiz on April 28th for the West
Indies. The vessel bringing the news had fallen in with them on the
way. Rodney spread a line of frigates "to windward, from Barbados to
Barbuda," to obtain timely warning, and with the fleet put to sea on
the 7th of June, to cruise to the eastward of Martinique to intercept
the enemy. The latter had been discovered on the 5th by a frigate,
fifty leagues east of the island, steering for it; but the Spanish
admiral, seeing that he would be reported, changed his course,
and passed north of Guadeloupe. On the 9th he was joined in that
neighbourhood by de Guichen, who was able to bring with him only
fifteen sail,--a fact which shows that he had suffered in the late
brushes quite as severely as Rodney, who had with him seventeen of his
twenty.

Having evaded the British, the allies anchored at Fort Royal; but the
Spanish admiral absolutely refused to join in any undertaking against
the enemy's fleet or possessions. Not only so, but he insisted on
being accompanied to leeward. The Spanish squadron was ravaged by
an epidemic, due to unsanitary conditions of the ships and the
uncleanliness of the crews, and the disease was communicated to their
allies. De Guichen had already orders to leave the Windward Islands
when winter approached. He decided now to anticipate that time, and
on the 5th of July sailed from Fort Royal with the Spaniards. Having
accompanied the latter to the east end of Cuba, he went to Cap
François, in Haïti, then a principal French station. The Spaniards
continued on to Havana.

At Cap François, de Guichen found urgent entreaties from the French
Minister to the United States, and from Lafayette, to carry his fleet
to the continent, where the clear-sighted genius of Washington had
recognised already that the issue of the contest depended upon the
navies. The French admiral declined to comply, as contrary to his
instructions, and on the 16th of August sailed for Europe, with
nineteen sail of the line, leaving ten at Cap François. Sealed orders,
opened at sea, directed him to proceed to Cadiz, where he anchored
on the 24th of October. His arrival raised the allied force there
assembled to fifty-one sail of the line, besides the ninety-five sugar
and coffee ships which he had convoyed from Haïti. It is significant
of the weakness of Great Britain in the Mediterranean at that time,
that these extremely valuable merchant ships were sent on to Toulon,
instead of to the more convenient Atlantic ports, only five ships of
the line accompanying them past Gibraltar. The French government had
feared to trust them to Brest, even with de Guichen's nineteen sail.

The allied operations in the Windward Islands for the season of
1780 had thus ended in nothing, notwithstanding an incontestable
inferiority of the British to the French alone, of which Rodney
strongly complained. It was, however, contrary to the intentions
of the Admiralty that things so happened. Orders had been sent to
Vice-Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot, at New York, to detach ships to
Rodney; but the vessel carrying them was driven by weather to
the Bahamas, and her captain neglected to notify Arbuthnot of his
whereabouts, or of his dispatches. A detachment of five ships of the
line under Commodore the Hon. Robert Boyle Walsingham was detained
three months in England, wind-bound. They consequently did not join
till July 12th. The dispositions at once made by Rodney afford a very
good illustration of the kind of duties that a British Admiral had
then to discharge. He detailed five ships of the line to remain with
Hotham at Santa Lucia, for the protection of the Windward Islands.
On the 17th, taking with him a large merchant convoy, he put to sea
with the fleet for St. Kitts, where the Leeward Islands "trade" was
collecting for England. On the way he received precise information as
to the route and force of the Franco-Spanish fleet under de Guichen,
of the sickness on board it, and of the dissension between the allies.
From St. Kitts the July "trade" was sent home with two ships of the
line. Three others, he wrote to the Admiralty, would accompany the
September fleet, "and the remainder of the ships on this station,
which are in want of great repair and are not copper-bottomed, shall
proceed with them or with the convoy which their Lordships have been
pleased to order shall sail from hence in October next." If these
arrived before winter, he argued, they would be available by spring as
a reinforcement for the Channel fleet, and would enable the Admiralty
to send him an equivalent number for the winter work on his station.

As de Guichen had taken the whole French homeward merchant fleet from
Martinique to Cap François and as the height of the hurricane season
was near, Rodney reasoned that but a small French force would remain
in Haïti, and consequently that Jamaica would not require all the
British fleet to save it from any possible attack. He therefore sent
thither ten sail of the line, notifying Vice-Admiral Sir Peter Parker
that they were not merely to defend the island, but to enable him to
send home its great trade in reasonable security.

These things being done by July 31st, Rodney, reasoning that the
allies had practically abandoned all enterprises in the West Indies
for that year, and that a hurricane might at any moment overtake the
fleet at its anchors, possibly making for it a lee shore, went to sea,
to cruise with the fleet off Barbuda. His mind, however, was inclined
already to go to the continent, whither he inferred, correctly but
mistakenly, that the greater part of de Guichen's fleet would go,
because it should. His purpose was confirmed by information from an
American vessel that a French squadron of seven ships of the line,
convoying six thousand troops, had anchored in Narragansett Bay on
the 12th of July. He started at once for the coast of South Carolina,
where he communicated with the army in Charleston, and thence,
"sweeping the southern coast of America," anchored with fourteen ships
of the line at Sandy Hook, on the 14th of September, unexpected and
unwelcome to friends and foes alike.

Vice-Admiral Arbuthnot, being junior to Rodney, showed plainly and
with insubordination his wrath at this intrusion into his command,
which superseded his authority and divided the prize-money of a
lucrative station. This, however, was a detail. To Washington,
Rodney's coming was a deathblow to the hopes raised by the arrival
of the French division at Newport, which he had expected to see
reinforced by de Guichen. Actually, the departure of the latter made
immaterial Rodney's appearance on the scene; but this Washington
did not know then. As it was, Rodney's force joined to Arbuthnot's
constituted a fleet of over twenty sail of the line, before which,
vigorously used, there can be little doubt that the French squadron in
Newport must have fallen. But Rodney, though he had shown great energy
in the West Indies, and unusual resolution in quitting his own station
for a more remote service, was sixty-two, and suffered from gout. "The
sudden change of climate makes it necessary for me to go on shore for
some short time," he wrote; and although he added that his illness
was "not of such a nature as shall cause one moment's delay in his
Majesty's service," he probably lost a chance at Rhode Island. He
did not overlook the matter, it is true; but he decided upon the
information of Arbuthnot and Sir Henry Clinton, and did not inspect
the ground himself. Nothing of consequence came of his visit; and on
the 16th of November he sailed again for the West Indies, taking with
him only nine sail of the line.

The arrival of de Ternay's seven ships at Newport was more than offset
by a British reinforcement of six ships of the line under Rear-Admiral
Thomas Graves which entered New York on July 13th,--only one day
later. Arbuthnot's force was thus raised to ten of the line, one
of which was of 98 guns. After Rodney had come and gone, the French
division was watched by cruisers, resting upon Gardiner's Bay,--a
commodious anchorage at the east end of Long Island, between thirty
and forty miles from Rhode Island. When a movement of the enemy was
apprehended, the squadron assembled there, but nothing of consequence
occurred during the remainder of the year.

The year 1780 had been one of great discouragement to the Americans,
but the injury, except as the lapse of time taxed their staying power,
was more superficial than real. The successes of the British in the
southern States, though undeniable, and seemingly substantial, were
involving them ever more deeply in a ruinously ex-centric movement.
They need here only to be summarised, as steps in the process leading
to the catastrophe of Yorktown,--a disaster which, as Washington said,
exemplified naval rather than military power.

The failure of d'Estaing's attack upon Savannah in the autumn of
1779[89] had left that place in the possession of the British as
a base for further advances in South Carolina and Georgia; lasting
success in which was expected from the numbers of royalists in those
States. When the departure of the French fleet was ascertained, Sir
Henry Clinton put to sea from New York in December, 1779, for the
Savannah River, escorted by Vice-Admiral Arbuthnot. The details of
the operations, which were leisurely and methodical, will not be
given here; for, although the Navy took an active part in them, they
scarcely can be considered of major importance. On the 12th of May,
1780, the city of Charleston capitulated, between six and seven
thousand prisoners being taken. Clinton then returned to New York,
leaving Lord Cornwallis in command in the south. The latter proposed
to remain quiet during the hot months; but the activity of the
American partisan troops prevented this, and in July the approach of a
small, but relatively formidable force, under General Gates, compelled
him to take the field. On the 16th of August the two little armies
met at Camden, and the Americans, who were much the more numerous, but
largely irregulars, were routed decisively. This news reached General
Washington in the north nearly at the same moment that the treason of
Benedict Arnold became known. Although the objects of his treachery
were frustrated, the sorrowful words, "Whom now can we trust?" show
the deep gloom which for the moment shadowed the constant mind of the
American Commander-in-Chief. It was just at this period, too, that
Rodney arrived at New York.

Cornwallis, not content with his late success, decided to push on into
North Carolina. Thus doing, he separated himself from his naval base
in Charleston, communication with which by land he had not force
to maintain, and could recover effective touch with the sea only in
Chesapeake Bay. This conclusion was not apparent from the first.
In North Carolina, the British general did not receive from the
inhabitants the substantial support which he had expected, and found
himself instead in a very difficult and wild country, confronted by
General Greene, the second in ability of all the American leaders.
Harassed and baffled, he was compelled to order supplies to be sent
by sea to Wilmington, North Carolina, an out-of-the-way and inferior
port, to which he turned aside, arriving exhausted on the 7th of
April, 1781. The question as to his future course remained to be
settled. To return to Charleston by sea was in his power, but to do so
would be an open confession of failure,--that he could not return by
land, through the country by which he had come--much the same dilemma
as that of Howe and Clinton in Philadelphia. To support him in his
distress by a diversion, Sir Henry Clinton had sent two successive
detachments to ravage the valley of the James River in Virginia.
These were still there, under the command of General Phillips; and
Cornwallis, in the circumstances, could see many reasons that thither
was the very scene to carry the British operations. On the 25th of
April, 1781, he left Wilmington, and a month later joined the division
at Petersburg, Virginia, then commanded by Benedict Arnold; Phillips
having died. There, in touch now with his fate, we must leave him for
the moment.

To complete the naval transactions of 1780, it is necessary to mention
briefly two incidents, trivial in themselves, but significant, not
only as associated with the greater movements of the campaign, but as
indicative of the naval policy of the States which were at war. The
two, though not otherwise connected, have a certain unity of interest,
in that the same British officer commanded on both occasions.

It will be remembered that in Byron's action off Grenada, in
July, 1779, the 64-gun ship _Lion_ received such injuries that her
commander, Captain Cornwallis, had been compelled to run down before
the trade-winds to Jamaica, in order to save her from capture.
Since that time she had remained there, as one of the squadron of
Vice-Admiral Sir Peter Parker. In March, 1780, still commanded by
Cornwallis, she was making an ordinary service cruise off the north
side of Haïti, having in company the _Bristol_, 50, and the _Janus_,
44. On the 20th of March, off Monte Christi, a number of sail were
sighted to the eastward, which proved to be a French convoy, on its
way from Martinique to Cap François, protected by La Motte-Picquet's
squadron of two 74's, one 64, one 50, and a frigate. The French
merchant ships were ordered to crowd sail for their port, while the
men-of-war chased to the north-west. La Motte-Picquet's flagship, the
_Annibal_, 74, got within range at 5 P.M., when a distant cannonade
began, which lasted till past midnight, and was resumed on the
following morning. From it the _Janus_ was the chief sufferer, losing
her mizzen topmast and foretopgallant mast. It falling nearly calm,
the _Bristol_ and _Lion_ got out their boats and were towed by them to
her support. The two other French ships of the line got up during
the forenoon of the 21st, so that the action that afternoon, though
desultory, might be called general.

The two opposing commodores differ in their expressed opinions as to
the power of the French to make the affair more decisive. Some of La
Motte-Picquet's language seems to show that he felt the responsibility
of his position. "The _Janus_, being smaller and more easily worked,
lay upon our quarter and under our stern, where she did considerable
damage. A little breeze springing up enabled us (the _Annibal_) to
stand towards our own ships, which did everything possible to come
up and cover us, without which we should have been _surrounded_." It
is easy to see in such an expression the reflection of the commands
of the French Cabinet, to economise the ships. This was still more
evident in La Motte-Picquet's conduct next day. On the morning of the
22d, "at daylight we were within one and a half cannon-shot, breeze
fresh at the east-north-east, and I expected to overtake the British
squadron in an hour, when we perceived four ships in chase of us.
At 6.30 A.M. three were seen to be men-of-war. This superiority of
force compelled me to desist, and to make signal to haul our wind
for Cap François." These three new-comers were the _Ruby_, 64, and
two frigates, the _Pomona_, 28, and _Niger_, 32. The comparison of
forces, therefore, would be: French, two 74's, one 64, one 50, and one
frigate, opposed to, British, two 64's, one 50, and three frigates.
La Motte-Picquet evidently did not wait to ascertain the size of
the approaching ships. His courage was beyond all dispute, and, as
Hyde Parker had said, he was among the most distinguished of French
officers; but, like his comrades, he was dominated by the faulty
theory of his government.

The captain of the _Janus_ died a natural death during the encounter.
It may be interesting to note that the ship was given to Nelson,
who was recalled for that purpose from the expedition to San Juan,
Nicaragua, one of the minor operations of the war. His health,
however, prevented this command from being more than nominal, and not
long afterward he returned to England with Cornwallis, in the _Lion_.

Three months later, Cornwallis was sent by Parker to accompany a body
of merchant ships for England as far as the neighborhood of Bermuda.
This duty being fulfilled, he was returning toward his station, having
with him two 74's, two 64's, and one 50, when, on the morning of
June 20, a number of sail were seen from north-east to east (a);
the British squadron (aa) then steering east, with the wind at
south-south-east. The strangers were a body of French transports,
carrying the six thousand troops destined for Rhode Island, and
convoyed by a division of seven ships of the line--one 80, two 74's,
and four 64's--under the command of Commodore de Ternay. Two of the
ships of war were with the convoy, the other five very properly to
windward of it. The latter therefore stood on, across the bows of the
British, to rejoin their consorts, and then all hauled their wind to
the south-west, standing in column (bb) towards the enemy. Cornwallis
on his part had kept on (b) to reconnoitre the force opposed to him;
but one of his ships, the _Ruby_, 64, was so far to leeward (b') that
the French, by keeping near the wind, could pass between her and
her squadron (b, b, b'). She therefore went about (t) and steered
southwest, on the port tack (c'), close to the wind. The French, who
were already heading the same way, were thus brought on her weather
quarter in chase. Cornwallis then wore his division (w), formed line
of battle on the same tack as the others (c), and edged down towards
the _Ruby_. If the French now kept their wind, either the _Ruby_ (c')
must be cut off, or Cornwallis, to save her, must fight the large
odds against him. De Ternay, however, did not keep his wind but bore
up,--yielded ground (cc). "The enemy," wrote Cornwallis, "kept edging
off and forming line, though within gunshot. At 5.30 P.M., seeing
we had pushed the French ships to leeward sufficiently to enable the
_Ruby_, on our lee bow, to join us, I made the signal to tack." As
the British squadron went about to stand east again (d), the French,
heading now west-south-west (cc), hoisted their colours and opened
fire in passing. The _Ruby_ kept on till she fetched the wake of the
British column (d'), when she too tacked. The French then tacked also,
in succession (d), and the two columns stood on for awhile in parallel
lines, exchanging shots at long range, the British to windward.
Cornwallis very properly declined further engagement with so superior
a force. He had already done much in saving a ship so greatly exposed.

[Illustration]

The account above followed is that of the British commander, but it
does not differ in essentials from the French, whose captains were
greatly incensed at the cautious action of their chief. A French
_commissaire_ in the squadron, who afterwards published his journal,
tells that de Ternay a few days later asked the captain of one of the
ships what English admiral he thought they had engaged, and received
the reply, "We have lost our opportunity of finding out." He gives
also many details of the talk that went on in the ships, which need
not be repeated. Chevalier points out correctly, however, that de
Ternay had to consider that an equal or even a superior force might be
encountered as Narragansett Bay was approached, and that he should
not risk crippling his squadron for such a contingency. The charge
of six thousand troops, under the then conditions, was no light
responsibility, and at the least must silence off-hand criticism now.
Comment upon his action does not belong to British naval history,
to which the firmness and seamanship of Captain Cornwallis added a
lasting glory. It may be noted that fifteen years later, in the French
Revolution, the same officer, then a Vice-Admiral, again distinguished
himself by his bearing in face of great odds, bringing five ships safe
off, out of the jaws of a dozen. It illustrates how luck seems in many
cases to characterise a man's personality, much as temperament does.
Cornwallis, familiarly known as "Billy Blue" to the seamen of his day,
never won a victory, nor had a chance of winning one; but in command
both of ships and of divisions, he repeatedly distinguished himself by
successfully facing odds which he could not overcome.

The year 1780 was uneventful also in European waters, after Rodney's
relief of Gibraltar in January. The detachment of the Channel Fleet
which accompanied him on that mission returned safely to England. The
"Grand Fleet," as it still was styled occasionally, cruised at sea
from June 8th to August 18th, an imposing force of thirty-one ships of
the line, eleven of them three-deckers of 90 guns and upwards. Admiral
Francis Geary was then Commander-in-Chief, but, his health failing,
and Barrington refusing to take the position, through professed
distrust of himself and actual distrust of the Admiralty, Vice-Admiral
George Darby succeeded to it, and held it during the year 1781.

The most notable maritime event in 1780 in Europe was the capture on
August 9th of a large British convoy, two or three hundred miles
west of Cape St. Vincent, by the allied fleets from Cadiz. As out of
sixty-three sail only eight escaped, and as of those taken sixteen
were carrying troops and supplies necessary for the West India
garrisons, such a disaster claims mention among the greater operations
of war, the success of which it could not fail to influence. Captain
John Moutray, the officer commanding the convoy, was brought to trial
and dismissed his ship; but there were not wanting those who charged
the misadventure to the Admiralty, and saw in the captain a victim. It
was the greatest single blow that British commerce had received in
war during the memory of men then living, and "a general inclination
prevailed to lay the blame upon some individual, who might be punished
according to the magnitude of the object, rather than in proportion to
his demerit."[90]

During the year 1780 was formed the League of the Baltic Powers, known
historically as the Armed Neutrality, to exact from Great Britain the
concession of certain points thought essential to neutral interests.
The accession of Holland to this combination, together with other
motives of dissatisfaction, caused Great Britain to declare war
against the United Provinces on the 20th of December. Orders were at
once sent to the East and West Indies to seize Dutch possessions and
ships, but these did not issue in action until the following year.

Towards the end of 1780 the French Government, dissatisfied with the
lack of results from the immense combined force assembled in Cadiz
during the summer months, decided to recall its ships, and to refit
them during the winter for the more extensive and aggressive movements
planned for the campaign of 1781. D'Estaing was sent from France for
the purpose; and under his command thirty-eight ships of the line, in
which were included those brought by de Guichen from the West Indies,
sailed on the 7th of November for Brest. Extraordinary as it may seem,
this fleet did not reach its port until the 3d of January, 1781.

[Footnote 75: Parker's Report.]

[Footnote 76: Ibid.]

[Footnote 77: _Ante_, p. 115.]

[Footnote 78: Rodney's Report. The French authorities give their line
of battle as twenty-two ships of the line. There was no 90-gun ship
among them--no three-decker; but there were two of 80 guns, of which
also the British had none.]

[Footnote 79: A cable was then assumed to have a length of 120
fathoms,--720 feet.]

[Footnote 80: A properly formed line of twenty ships, at two cables'
interval, would be about five miles long. Rodney seems to have been
satisfied that this was about the condition of his fleet at this
moment.]

[Footnote 81: Rodney's Report.]

[Footnote 82: Testimony of the signal officer at the court-martial on
Captain Bateman.]

[Footnote 83: Singularly enough, this officer was afterwards
court-martialled for misbehaviour, on the 1st of June, 1794, of
precisely the same character as that from all share in which Rodney
now cleared him.]

[Footnote 84: The words in Rodney's public letter, suppressed at the
time by the Admiralty, agree with these, but are even more explicit.
"I cannot conclude this letter without acquainting their Lordships
that had Captain Carkett, who led the van, properly obeyed my signal
for attacking the enemy, and agreeable to the 21st Article of the
Additional Fighting Instructions, bore down instantly to the ship
at that time abreast of him, instead of leading as he did to the van
ship, the action had commenced much sooner, and the fleet engaged in
a more compact manner...." This clearly implies that the _Additional_
Fighting Instructions prescribed the direction which Rodney expected
Carkett to take. If these Additional Instructions are to be found,
their testimony would be interesting.

Since this account was written, the Navy Records Society has published
(1905) a volume, "Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816," by Mr. Julian
Corbett, whose diligent researches in matters of naval history and
warfare are appreciated by those interested in such subjects. The
specific "Additional Instructions" quoted by Rodney appear not to have
been found. Among those given prior to 1780 there is none that extends
to twenty-one articles. In a set issued by Rodney in 1782 an article
(No. 17, p. 227) is apparently designed to prevent the recurrence
of Carkett's mistake. This, like one by Hawke, in 1756 (p. 217),
prescribes the intended action rather by directing that the line of
battle shall not prevent each ship engaging its opponent, irrespective
of the conduct of other ships, than by making clear which that
opponent was. Lucidity on this point cannot be claimed for either.]

[Footnote 85: Lapeyrouse Bonfils, "Histoire de la Marine Française,"
iii, 132. Chevalier gives much smaller numbers, but the former has
particularised the ships.]

[Footnote 86: Chevalier, "Marine Française," 1778, p. 185.]

[Footnote 87: A lee current is one that sets to leeward, with the
wind, in this case the trade-wind.]

[Footnote 88: Chevalier, p. 91.]

[Footnote 89: _Ante_, p. 115.]

[Footnote 90: Beatson, "Military and Naval Memoirs."]




CHAPTER IX

NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN WEST INDIES IN 1781. CAPTURE OF ST. EUSTATIUS BY
RODNEY. DE GRASSE ARRIVES IN PLACE OF DE GUICHEN. TOBAGO SURRENDERS TO
DE GRASSE


Rodney, returning to the West Indies from New York, reached Barbados
on December 6th, 1780. There he seems first to have learned of the
disastrous effects of the great October hurricanes of that year. Not
only had several ships--among them two of the line--been wrecked, with
the loss of almost all on board, but the greater part of those which
survived had been dismasted, wholly or in part, as well as injured
in the hull. There were in the West Indies no docking facilities;
under-water damage could be repaired only by careening or
heaving-down. Furthermore, as Barbados, Santa Lucia, and Jamaica,
all had been swept, their supplies were mainly destroyed. Antigua,
it is true, had escaped, the hurricane passing south of St. Kitts;
but Rodney wrote home that no stores for refitting were obtainable
in the Caribbee Islands. He was hoping then that Sir Peter Parker
might supply his needs in part; for when writing from Santa Lucia on
December 10th, two months after the storm, he was still ignorant
that the Jamaica Station had suffered to the full as severely as the
eastern islands. The fact shows not merely the ordinary slowness of
communications in those days, but also the paralysis that fell
upon all movements in consequence of that great disaster. "The
most beautiful island in the world," he said of Barbados, "has the
appearance of a country laid waste by fire and sword."

Hearing that the fortifications at St. Vincent had been almost
destroyed by the hurricane, Rodney, in combination with General
Vaughan, commanding the troops on the station, made an attempt
to reconquer the island, landing there on December 15th; but the
intelligence proved erroneous, and the fleet returned to Santa Lucia.
"I have only nine sail of the line now with me capable of going to
sea," wrote the Admiral on the 22d, "and not one of them has spare
rigging or sails." In the course of January, 1781, he was joined by a
division of eight ships of the line from England, under the command
of Rear-Admiral Sir Samuel Hood,--Nelson's Lord Hood. These, with four
others refitted during that month, not improbably from stores brought
in Hood's convoy of over a hundred sail, raised the disposable force
to twenty-one ships of the line: two 90's, one 80, fifteen 74's, and
three 64's.

On the 27th of January, an express arrived from England, directing the
seizure of the Dutch possessions in the Caribbean, and specifying,
as first to be attacked, St. Eustatius and St. Martin, two small
islands lying within fifty miles north of the British St. Kitts. St.
Eustatius, a rocky patch six miles in length by three in breadth,
had been conspicuous, since the war began, as a great trade centre,
where supplies of all kinds were gathered under the protection of
its neutral flag, to be distributed afterwards in the belligerent
islands and the North American continent. The British, owing to
their extensive commerce and maritime aptitudes, derived from such an
intermediary much less benefit than their enemies; and the island had
been jealously regarded by Rodney for some time. He asserted that
when de Guichen's fleet could not regain Fort Royal, because of its
injuries received in the action of April 17th, it was refitted to meet
him by mechanics and materials sent from St. Eustatius. On the other
hand, when cordage was to be bought for the British vessels after the
hurricanes of 1780, the merchants of the island, he said, alleged
that there was none there; although, when he took the island soon
afterwards, many hundred tons were found that had been long in stock.

Rodney and Vaughan moved promptly. Three days after their orders
arrived, they sailed for St. Eustatius. There being in Fort Royal four
French ships of the line, six British were left to check them, and
on the 3d of February the fleet reached its destination. A peremptory
summons from the commander of a dozen ships of the line secured
immediate submission. Over a hundred and fifty merchant ships were
taken; and a convoy of thirty sail, which had left the island two days
before, was pursued and brought back. The merchandise found was valued
at over £3,000,000. The neighbouring islands of St. Martin and Saba
were seized also at this time.

Rodney's imagination, as is shown in his letters, was greatly
impressed by the magnitude of the prize and by the defenceless
condition of his capture. He alleged these as the motives for staying
in person at St. Eustatius, to settle the complicated tangle of
neutral and belligerent rights in the property involved, and to
provide against the enemy's again possessing himself of a place now
so equipped for transactions harmful to Great Britain. The storehouses
and conveniences provided for the particular traffic, if not properly
guarded, were like fortifications insufficiently garrisoned. If they
passed into the hands of the enemy, they became sources of injury.
The illicit trade could start again at once in full force, with means
which elsewhere would have first to be created. There were a mile and
a half of storehouses in the lower town, he said, and these he must
leave at the least roofless, if not wholly demolished.

For such reasons he remained at St. Eustatius throughout February,
March, and April. The amount of money involved, and the arbitrary
methods pursued by him and by Vaughan, gave rise to much scandal,
which was not diminished by the King's relinquishing all the booty
to the captors, nor by the latters' professed disinterestedness. Men
thought they did protest too much. Meanwhile, other matters arose to
claim attention. A week after the capture, a vessel arrived from the
Bay of Biscay announcing that eight or ten French sail of the line,
with a large convoy, had been seen on the 31st of December steering
for the West Indies. Rodney at once detached Sir Samuel Hood with
eleven ships of the line, directing him to take also under his command
the six left before Fort Royal, and to cruise with them to windward
of Martinique, to intercept the force reported. Hood sailed February
12th. The particular intelligence proved afterwards to be false, but
Hood was continued on his duty. A month later he was ordered to move
from the windward to the leeward side of the island, and to blockade
Fort Royal closely. Against this change he remonstrated, and the event
showed him to be right; but Rodney insisted, saying that from his
experience he knew that a fleet could remain off Fort Royal for months
without dropping to leeward, and that there ships detached to Santa
Lucia, for water and refreshments, could rejoin before an enemy's
fleet, discovered to windward, could come up. Hood thought the
Admiral's object was merely to shelter his own doings at St.
Eustatius; and he considered the blockade of Fort Royal to be futile,
if no descent upon the island were intended. "It would doubtless
have been fortunate for the public," he remarked afterwards, "had Sir
George been with his fleet, as I am confident he would have been to
windward instead of to leeward, when de Grasse made his approach."

The preparations of the French in Brest were completed towards the end
of March, and on the 22d of that month Rear-Admiral de Grasse sailed,
having a large convoy under the protection of twenty-six ships of
the line. A week later six of the latter parted company, five under
Suffren for the East Indies and one for North America. The remaining
twenty continued their course for Martinique, which was sighted on the
28th of April. Before sunset, Hood's squadron also was discovered to
leeward of the island, as ordered by Rodney to cruise, and off the
southern point,--Pointe des Salines. De Grasse then hove-to for
the night, but sent an officer ashore both to give and to obtain
intelligence, and to reach an understanding for concerted action next
day.

The French fleet consisted of one ship of 110 guns, three 80's,
fifteen 74's, and one 64, in all 20 of the line, besides three armed
_en flûte_,[91] which need not be taken into account, although they
served to cover the convoy. Besides these there were the four in Fort
Royal, one 74 and three 64's, a junction of which with the approaching
enemy it was one of Hood's objects to prevent. The force of the
British was one 90, one 80, twelve 74's, one 70, and two 64's: total,
17. Thus both in numbers and in rates of ships Hood was inferior to
the main body alone of the French; but he had the advantage of ships
all coppered, owing to Rodney's insistence with the Admiralty. He also
had no convoy to worry him; but he was to leeward.

Early in the morning of the 29th, de Grasse advanced to round the
southern point of the island, which was the usual course for sailing
ships. Hood was too far to leeward to intercept this movement, for
which he was blamed by Rodney, who claimed that the night had not been
properly utilised by beating to windward of Pointe des Salines.[92]
Hood, on the other hand, said in a private letter: "I never once lost
sight of getting to windward, but it was totally impossible.... Had I
fortunately been there, I must have brought the enemy to close action
upon more equal terms, or they must have given up their transports,
trade, etc." Hood's subsequent career places it beyond doubt that had
he been to windward there would have been a severe action, whatever
the result; but it is not possible to decide positively between his
statement and Rodney's, as to where the fault of being to leeward lay.
The writer believes that Hood would have been to windward, if in any
way possible. It must be added that the British had no word that so
great a force was coming. On this point Hood and Rodney are agreed.

[Illustration]

Under the conditions, the French passed without difficulty round
Pointe des Salines, the transports hugging the coast, the ships of
war being outside and to leeward of them. Thus they headed up to the
northward for Fort Royal Bay (Cul de Sac Royal), Hood standing to the
southward until after 10, and being joined at 9.20 by a sixty-four
(not reckoned in the list above) from Santa Lucia, making his force
eighteen. At 10.35 the British tacked together to the northward. The
two fleets were now steering the same way, the French van abreast of
the British centre. At 11 the French opened their fire, to which no
reply was made then. At 11.20, the British van being close in with the
shore to the northward of the Bay, Hood tacked again together, and the
enemy, seeing his convoy secure, wore, also together, which brought
the two lines nearer, heading south. At this time the four French
ships in the Bay got under way and easily joined the rear of their
fleet, it having the weather-gage. The French were thus 24 to 18.
As their shot were passing over the British, the latter now began
to reply. At noon Hood, finding that he could not close the enemy,
shortened sail to topsails and hove-to, hoping by this defiance to
bring them down to him. At 12.30 the French admiral was abreast of
the British flagship, and the action became general, but at too long
range. "Never, I believe," wrote Hood, "was more powder and shot
thrown away in one day before." The French continuing to stand on,
Hood filled his sails again at 1 P.M., as their van had stretched
beyond his.

As the leading ships, heading south, opened the channel between Santa
Lucia and Martinique, they got the breeze fresher, which caused them
to draw away from the centre. Hood, therefore, at 1.34 made the signal
for a close order, and immediately afterwards ceased firing, finding
not one in ten of the enemy's shot to reach. The engagement, however,
continued somewhat longer between the southern--van--ships, where, by
the account of Captain Sutherland, who was in that part of the line,
four of the British were attacked very smartly by eight of the French.
The _Centaur_, _Russell_, _Intrepid_, and _Shrewsbury_ appear to have
been the ships that suffered most heavily, either in hull, spars, or
crews. They were all in the van on the southern tack. The _Russell_,
having several shot between wind and water, was with difficulty kept
afloat, the water rising over the platform of the magazine. Hood sent
her off at nightfall to St. Eustatius, where she arrived on the 4th of
May, bringing Rodney the first news of the action, and of the numbers
of the French reinforcement. During the 30th Hood held his ground,
still endeavouring to get to windward of the enemy; but failing
in that attempt, and finding two of his squadron much disabled,
he decided at sunset to bear away to the northward, because to the
southward the westerly currents set so strong that the crippled ships
could not regain Santa Lucia. On the 11th of May, between St. Kitts
and Antigua, he joined Rodney, who, after hurried repairs to the
_Russell_, had left St. Eustatius on the 5th, with that ship, the
_Sandwich_, and the _Triumph_.

It is somewhat difficult to criticise positively the conduct of Hood
and of de Grasse in this affair. It is clear that Hood on the first
day seriously sought action, though his force was but three-fourths
that of his foe. He tried first to take the offensive, and, failing
that, to induce his enemy to attack frankly and decisively. Troude
is doubtless correct in saying that it was optional with de Grasse
to bring on a general engagement; and the writer finds himself in
agreement also with another French authority, Captain Chevalier,
that "Count de Grasse seems to have been too much preoccupied with
the safety of his convoy on the 29th, Admiral Hood having shown
himself much less circumspect on that day than he was on the next.
Notwithstanding our numerical superiority, Count de Grasse kept
near the land until all the convoy were safe." He represents Hood as
fencing cautiously on the following day, keeping on the field, but
avoiding a decisive encounter. This differs somewhat from the version
of Hood himself, who mentions signalling a general chase to windward
at 12.30 P.M. of the 30th. The two statements are not irreconcilable.
Hood having coppered ships, had the speed of the French, whose
vessels, being partly coppered and partly not, sailed unevenly. The
British commander consequently could afford to take risks, and he
therefore played with the enemy, watching for a chance. Hood was
an officer of exceptional capacity, much in advance of his time. He
thoroughly understood a watching game, and that an opportunity might
offer to seize an advantage over part of the enemy, if the eagerness
of pursuit, or any mishap, caused the French to separate. From
any dilemma that ensued, the reserve of speed gave him a power of
withdrawal, in relying upon which he was right. The present writer
adopts here also Chevalier's conclusion: "Admiral Hood evidently had
the very great advantage over his enemy of commanding a squadron of
coppered ships. Nevertheless, homage is due to his skill and to the
confidence shown by him in his captains. If some of his ships had
dropped behind through injuries received, he would have had to
sacrifice them, or to fight a superior force." This means that Hood
for an adequate gain ran a great risk; that he thoroughly understood
both the advantages and the disadvantages of his situation; and that
he acted not only with great skill, but warily and boldly,--a rare
combination. The British loss in this affair was 39 killed, including
Captain Nott, of the _Centaur_, and 162 wounded. The French loss is
given by Chevalier as 18 killed and 56 wounded; by Beatson, as 119
killed and 150 wounded.

Rodney, having collected his fleet, proceeded south, and on the 18th
of May put into Barbados for water. Much anxiety had been felt at
first for Santa Lucia, which Hood's retreat had uncovered. As was
feared, the French had attacked it at once, their fleet, with the
exception of one or two ships, going there, and twelve hundred troops
landing at Gros Ilet Bay; but the batteries on Pigeon Island, which
Rodney had erected and manned, kept them at arms' length. The works
elsewhere being found too strong, the attempt was abandoned.

At the same time, two French ships of the line and thirteen hundred
troops had sailed from Martinique against Tobago. When de Grasse
returned from the failure at Santa Lucia, he learned that the British
were at sea, apparently bound for Barbados. Alarmed for his detachment
before Tobago, he again sailed with the fleet for that island on the
25th of May, accompanied by three thousand more troops. Rodney learned
at Barbados of the attempt on Tobago, and on the 29th dispatched a
squadron of six sail of the line, under Rear-Admiral Francis Samuel
Drake, to support the defence. On the 30th he heard that the French
main fleet had been seen to windward of Santa Lucia, steering south,
evidently for Tobago. On the same day Drake and de Grasse encountered
one another off the latter island, the French being to leeward,
nearest the land. Drake necessarily retired, and on the morning of
June 3d was again off Barbados, whereupon Rodney at once sailed for
Tobago with the whole fleet. On the 4th the island was sighted, and
next morning information was received that it had capitulated on the
2d.

The two fleets returning north were in presence of one another on the
9th; but no engagement took place. Rodney, who was to windward, having
twenty sail to twenty-three,[93] was unwilling to attack unless he
could get a clear sea. The strength of the currents, he said, would
throw his fleet too far to leeward, in case of reverse, into the foul
ground between St. Vincent and Grenada, thus exposing Barbados, which
had not recovered sufficiently from the hurricane to stand alone. He
therefore put into Barbados. De Grasse went to Martinique to prepare
the expedition to the American continent, which resulted in the
surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown. On the 5th of July he sailed from
Fort Royal taking with him the "trade" for France, and on the 26th
anchored with it at Cap François in Haïti, where he found a division
of four ships of the line which had been left the year before by de
Guichen. There also was a frigate, which had left Boston on the 20th
of June, and by which De Grasse received dispatches from Washington,
and from Rochambeau, the general commanding the French troops in
America. These acquainted him with the state of affairs on the
continent, and requested that the fleet should come to either the
Chesapeake or New York, to strike a decisive blow at the British power
in one quarter or the other.

[Footnote 91: This latter is applied to vessels, usually ships of war,
which are used as transports or supply ships, and therefore carry only
a part of their normal battery.]

[Footnote 92: Rodney said that Hood "lay-to" for the night. This is
antecedently incredible of an officer of Hood's character, and is
expressly contradicted by Captain Sutherland of the _Russell_. "At 6
P.M. (of the 28th) our fleet tacked to the north, and _kept moving_
across the bay (Fort Royal) for the right (_sic_), in line of battle."
Ekins, "Naval Battles," p. 136. The word "right" is evidently a
misprint for "night." Rodney's criticisms seem to the author captious
throughout.]

[Footnote 93: One French ship had left the fleet, disabled.]




CHAPTER X

NAVAL OPERATIONS PRECEDING AND DETERMINING THE FALL OF YORKTOWN.
CORNWALLIS SURRENDERS

1781


Having now brought the major naval transactions in the West Indies
to the eve of the great events which determined the independence of
the American States, it is expedient here to resume the thread of
operations, both sea and land, on the American continent, so as to
bring these also up to the same decisive moment, when the military
and naval blended and in mutual support forced the surrender of the
British army at Yorktown under Lord Cornwallis.

It has been said that, to support the operations of Cornwallis in the
Carolinas, Clinton had begun a series of diversions in the valley
of the James River.[94] The first detachment so sent, under General
Leslie, had been transferred speedily to South Carolina, to meet the
exigencies of Cornwallis's campaign. The second, of sixteen hundred
troops under Benedict Arnold, left New York at the end of December,
and began its work on the banks of the James at the end of January,
1781. It advanced to Richmond, nearly a hundred miles from the sea,
wasting the country round about, and finding no opposition adequate to
check its freedom of movement. Returning down stream, on the 20th
it occupied Portsmouth, south of the James River; near the sea, and
valuable as a naval station.

Washington urged Commodore des Touches, who by de Ternay's death had
been left in command of the French squadron at Newport, to interrupt
these proceedings, by dispatching a strong detachment to Chesapeake
Bay; and he asked Rochambeau also to let some troops accompany the
naval division, to support the scanty force which he himself could
spare to Virginia. It happened, however, that a gale of wind just then
had inflicted severe injury upon Arbuthnot's squadron, three of which
had gone to sea from Gardiner's Bay upon a report that three French
ships of the line had left Newport to meet an expected convoy. One
seventy-four, the _Bedford_, was wholly dismasted; another, the
_Culloden_, drove ashore on Long Island and was wrecked. The French
ships had returned to port the day before the gale, but the incident
indisposed des Touches to risk his vessels at sea at that time. He
sent only a sixty-four, with two frigates. These left Newport on
February 9th, and entered the Chesapeake, but were unable to reach
the British vessels, which, being smaller, withdrew up the Elizabeth
River. Arbuthnot, hearing of this expedition, sent orders to some
frigates off Charleston to go to the scene. The French division, when
leaving the Bay, met one of these, the _Romulus_, 44, off the Capes,
captured her, and returned to Newport on February 25th. On the 8th
of March, Arnold reported to Clinton that the Chesapeake was clear of
French vessels.

On the same day Arbuthnot also was writing to Clinton, from Gardiner's
Bay, that the French were evidently preparing to quit Newport. His
utmost diligence had failed as yet to repair entirely the damage done
his squadron by the storm, but on the 9th it was ready for sea. On the
evening of the 8th the French had sailed. On the 10th Arbuthnot knew
it, and, having taken the precaution to move down to the entrance of
the bay, he was able to follow at once. On the 13th he spoke a vessel
which had seen the enemy and gave him their course. Favoured by a
strong north-west wind, and his ships being coppered, he outstripped
the French, only three of which had coppered bottoms. At 6 A.M. of
March 16th a British frigate reported that the enemy were astern--to
the north-east--about a league distant, a thick haze preventing the
squadron from seeing them even at that distance (A, A). Cape Henry,
the southern point of the entrance to the Chesapeake, then bore
southwest by west, distant forty miles. The wind as stated by
Arbuthnot was west; by the French, south-west.

The British admiral at once went about, steering in the direction
reported, and the opposing squadrons soon sighted one another. The
French finding the British between them and their port, hauled to the
wind, which between 8 and 9 shifted to north by west, putting them
to windward. Some preliminary manoeuvres then followed, both parties
seeking the weather-gage. The weather remained thick and squally,
often intercepting the view; and the wind continued to shift until
towards noon, when it settled at north-east. The better sailing, or
the better seamanship, of the British had enabled them to gain so
far upon their opponents that at 1 P.M. they were lying nearly up in
their wake, on the port tack, overhauling them; both squadrons in line
of battle, heading east-south-east, the French bearing from their
pursuers east by south,--one point on the weather bow (B, B). The
wind was rising with squalls, so that the ships lay over well to their
canvas, and the sea was getting big.

As the enemy now was threatening his rear, and had the speed to
overtake, des Touches felt it necessary to resort to the usual parry
to such a thrust, by wearing his squadron and passing on the other
tack. This could be done either together, reversing the order of the
ships, or in succession, preserving the natural order; depending much
upon the distance of the enemy. Having room enough, des Touches
chose the latter, but, as fighting was inevitable, he decided also to
utilise the manoeuvre by surrendering the weather-gage, and passing to
leeward. The advantage of this course was that, with the existing sea
and wind, and the inclination of the ships, the party that had the
opponent on his weather side could open the lower-deck ports and use
those guns. There was thus a great increase of battery power, for the
lower guns were the heaviest. Des Touches accordingly put his helm up,
his line passing in succession to the southward (c) across the head
of the advancing British column, and then hauling up so as to run
parallel to the latter, to leeward, with the wind four points free.

[Illustration]

Arbuthnot accepted the position offered, stood on as he was until
nearly abreast of the French, and at 2 P.M. made the signal to wear.
It does not appear certainly how this was executed; but from the
expression in the official report, "the van of the squadron wore in
the line," and from the fact that the ships which led in the attack
were those which were leading on the port tack,--the tack before
the signal was made,--it seems likely that the movement was made in
succession (a). The whole squadron then stood down into action, but
with the customary result. The ships in the van and centre were all
engaged by 2.30, so Arbuthnot states; but the brunt of the engagement
had already fallen upon the three leading vessels, which got the first
raking fire, and, as is also usual, came to closer action than those
which followed them (C). They therefore not only lost most heavily
in men, but also were so damaged aloft as to be crippled. The British
Vice-Admiral, keeping the signal for the line flying, and not hoisting
that for close action, appears to have caused a movement of indecision
in the squadron,--an evidence again of the hold which the line then
still had upon men's minds. Of this des Touches cleverly availed
himself, by ordering his van ships, which so far had borne the brunt,
to keep away together and haul up on the other tack (e), while the
ships behind them were to wear in succession; that is, in column,
one following the other. The French column then filed by the three
disabled British vessels (d), gave them their broadsides one by one,
and then hauled off to the eastward, quitting the field (D). Arbuthnot
made signal to wear in pursuit, but the _Robust_ and _Prudent_, two
of the van ships, were now wholly unmanageable from the concentration
of fire upon them caused by des Touches's last movement; and the
maintopsail yard of the _London_, the only British three-decker, had
been shot away. The chase therefore was abandoned, and the squadron
put into Chesapeake Bay, for which the wind was fair (D). The French
returned to Newport. The respective losses in men were: British, 30
killed, 73 wounded; French, 72 killed, 112 wounded.

In this encounter, both sides had eight ships in line, besides smaller
craft. The advantage in force was distinctly with the British, who
had one three-decked ship, three 74's, three 64's, and a 50; while
the French had one 84, two 74's, four 64's, and the late British
_Romulus_, 44. Because of this superiority, probably, the action was
considered particularly discreditable by contemporaries; the more
so because several vessels did not engage closely,--a fault laid to
the British admiral's failure to make the signal for close action,
hauling down that for the line. This criticism is interesting, for
it indicates how men's minds were changing; and it shows also that
Arbuthnot had not changed, but still lived in the middle of the
century. The French commodore displayed very considerable tactical
skill; his squadron was handled neatly, quickly, and with precision.
With inferior force he carried off a decided advantage by sheer
intelligence and good management. Unluckily, he failed in resolution
to pursue his advantage. He probably could have controlled the
Chesapeake had he persisted.

His neglect to do so was justified by Commodore de Barras, who on the
10th of May arrived in Newport from France to command the squadron.
This officer, after pointing out the indisputable tactical success,
continued thus:--

    "As to the advantage which the English obtained, in fulfilling
    their object, that is a necessary consequence of their
    superiority, and, _still more_, of their purely defensive
    attitude. _It is a principle in war that one should risk much
    to defend one's own positions, and very little to attack
    those of the enemy._ M. des Touches, whose object was purely
    offensive, could and should, when the enemy opposed to him
    superior forces, renounce a project which could no longer
    succeed, unless, _contrary to all probability_, it ended
    not only in beating but also in _destroying entirely_, that
    superior squadron."

This exaltation of the defensive above the offensive, this despairing
view of probabilities, this aversion from risks, go far to explain the
French want of success in this war. No matter how badly the enemy was
thrashed, unless he were entirely destroyed, he was still a fleet "in
being," a paralysing factor.

The retreat of des Touches and the coming of Arbuthnot restored to
the British the command of Chesapeake Bay. Clinton, as soon as he
knew that the British and French squadrons had sailed, had sent off
a reinforcement of two thousand troops for Arnold, under General
Phillips. These arrived in Lynnhaven Bay on March 26th, ten days after
the naval battle, and proceeded at once to Portsmouth, Virginia. It is
unnecessary to speak of the various operations of this land force. On
the 9th of May, in consequence of letters received from Cornwallis,
it moved to Petersburg. There on the 13th Phillips died, the command
reverting momentarily to Arnold. On the 20th Cornwallis joined from
Wilmington, North Carolina,[95] and Arnold soon after returned to New
York.

Cornwallis now had with him about seven thousand troops, including the
garrison at Portsmouth; but a serious difference of opinion existed
between him and Clinton, the Commander-in-Chief. The latter had begun
the conquest of South Carolina, and did not welcome the conclusion of
his lieutenant that the conquest could not be maintained away from the
seaboard, unless Virginia also were subdued; for from there, a rich
and populous region, men and supplies supported the American cause
in the south. Cornwallis had tested the asserted strength of the
Royalists in the Carolinas, and had found it wanting. Offensive
operations in Virginia were what he wished; but Clinton did not
approve this project, nor feel that he could spare troops enough for
the purpose. Between October, 1780, and June, 1781, he said, seven
thousand seven hundred and twenty-four effectives had been sent from
New York to the Chesapeake; and he could not understand the failure
to cut off the greatly inferior force of the enemy in Virginia. This
at least did not indicate probable success for a renewed offensive.
The garrison of New York was now short of eleven thousand and could
not be diminished further, as he was threatened with a siege. In
short, the British situation in America had become essentially
false, by the concurring effect of insufficient force and
ex-centric--double--operations. Sent to conquer, their numbers
now were so divided that they could barely maintain the defensive.
Cornwallis therefore was ordered to occupy a defensive position which
should control an anchorage for ships of the line, and to strengthen
himself in it. After some discussion, which revealed further
disagreement, he placed himself at Yorktown, on the peninsula formed
by the James and York rivers. Portsmouth was evacuated, the garrison
reaching Yorktown on the 22d of August. Cornwallis's force was
then seven thousand troops; and there were with him besides about a
thousand seamen, belonging to some half-dozen small vessels, which
were shut up in the York by the arrival from Haïti of the French fleet
under de Grasse, which on August 30th, 1781, had anchored in Lynnhaven
Bay, inside of Cape Henry.

On July 2d Arbuthnot had sailed for England, leaving the command at
New York to Rear-Admiral Thomas Graves. Graves on the same day wrote
to Rodney by the brig _Active_, that intercepted dispatches of the
enemy had revealed that a large division from the West Indies was to
arrive on the American coast during the summer, to coöperate with the
force already in Newport. Rodney, on the other hand, dispatched to New
York on July 7th the _Swallow_ sloop, 16, with word that, if he sent
reinforcements from the West Indies, they would be ordered to make the
Capes of the Chesapeake, and to coast thence to New York. He asked,
therefore, that cruisers with information might be stationed along
that route. Two days later, having then certain news that de Grasse
had sailed for Cap François, he sent this intelligence to Sir Peter
Parker at Jamaica, and gave Sir Samuel Hood preparatory orders to
command a reinforcement of ships destined for the continent. This,
however, was limited in numbers to fifteen sail of the line, Rodney
being misled by his intelligence, which gave fourteen ships as the
size of the French division having the same destination, and reported
that de Grasse himself would convoy the trade from Cap François to
France. On the 24th instructions were issued for Hood to proceed on
this duty. He was first to convoy the trade from Jamaica as far as the
passage between Cuba and Haïti, and thence to make the utmost speed
to the Chesapeake. A false rumour, of French ships reaching Martinique
from Europe, slightly delayed this movement. The convoy was dispatched
to Jamaica with two ships of the line, which Sir Peter Parker was
directed to send at once to America, and requested to reinforce with
others from his own squadron. Hood was detained until the rumour could
be verified. On the 1st of August Rodney sailed for England on leave
of absence. On the 10th Hood left Antigua with fourteen ships of the
line, direct for the Capes. He had already received, on August 3d,
Graves's letter by the _Active_, which he sent back on the 8th with
his answers and with a notification of his speedy departure.

The _Swallow_ and the _Active_ should have reached Graves before Hood;
but neither got to him at all. The _Swallow_ arrived safely in New
York on the 27th of July; but Graves had sailed with all his squadron
on the 21st, for Boston Bay, hoping there to intercept an expected
convoy from France, concerning which a special caution had been sent
him by the Admiralty. The _Swallow_ was at once sent on by the senior
naval officer at New York, but was attacked by hostile vessels, forced
ashore on Long Island, and lost. The _Active_ was captured before she
reached New York. Graves, thus uninformed of the momentous crisis at
hand, continued cruising until the 16th of August, when he returned to
Sandy Hook. There he found the duplicates of the _Swallow's_ letters,
but they only notified him of the course a reinforcement would take,
not that Hood had started. On August 25th the latter, being then off
the Chesapeake, sent duplicates of the _Active's_ dispatches, but
these preceded by little his own arrival on the 28th. That evening
news was received in New York that de Barras had sailed from Newport
on the 25th, with his whole division. Hood anchored outside the Hook,
where Graves, who was senior to him, undertook to join at once. On
the 31st five sail of the line and a 50-gun ship, all that could be
got ready in time, crossed the bar, and the entire body of nineteen
ships of the line started at once for the Chesapeake, whither it was
understood now that both the French fleet and the united armies of
Washington and Rochambeau were hurrying.

Count de Grasse upon his arrival at Cap François had found that many
things must be done before he could sail for the continent. Measures
needed to be taken for the security of Haïti; and a large sum of
money, with a considerable reinforcement of troops, was required to
insure the success of the projected operation, for which but a short
time was allowed, as it was now August and he must be again in the
West Indies in October. It was not the least among the fortunate
concurrences for the American cause at that moment, that de Grasse,
whose military capacity was not conspicuous, showed then a remarkable
energy, politic tact, and breadth of view. He decided to take with him
every ship he could command, postponing the sailing of the convoys;
and by dexterous arrangement with the Spaniards he contrived to secure
both the funds required and an efficient corps of thirty-three hundred
French troops, without stripping Haïti too closely. On the 5th of
August he left Cap François, with twenty-eight ships of the line,
taking the route through the Old Bahama Channel,[96] and anchored
in Lynnhaven Bay, just within the entrance of the Chesapeake, on the
30th, the day before Graves sailed from New York for the same place.
The troops were landed instantly on the south side of the James River,
and soon reached La Fayette, who commanded the forces so far opposed
to Cornwallis, which were thus raised to eight thousand men. At
the same time Washington, having thrown Clinton off his guard, was
crossing the Delaware on his way south, with six thousand regular
troops, two thousand American and four thousand French, to join La
Fayette. French cruisers took position in the James River, to prevent
Cornwallis from crossing, and escaping to the southward into Carolina.
Others were sent to close the mouth of the York. By these detachments
the main fleet was reduced to twenty-four sail of the line.

On the 5th of September, at 8 A.M., the French look-out frigate,
cruising outside Cape Henry, made the signal for a fleet steering for
the Bay. It was hoped at first that this was de Barras's squadron
from Newport, known to be on its way, but it was soon evident from
the numbers that it must be an enemy. The forces now about to be
opposed, nineteen. British sail of the line to twenty-four French,
were constituted as follows: British, two 98's (three-deckers);
twelve 74's, one 70, four 64's, besides frigates; French, one 104
(three-decker),[97] three 80's, seventeen 74's, three 64's.

The mouth of the Chesapeake is about ten miles wide, from Cape Charles
on the north to Cape Henry on the south. The main channel is between
the latter and a shoal, three miles to the northward, called the
Middle Ground. The British fleet, when the French were first seen
from it, was steering south-west for the entrance, under foresails and
topgallant sails, and it so continued, forming line as it approached.
The wind was north-north-east. At noon the ebb-tide made, and the
French began to get under way, but many of their ships had to make
several tacks to clear Cape Henry. Their line was consequently late in
forming, and was by no means regular or closed as they got outside.

At 1 P.M. Graves made the signal to form column on an east and west
line, which with the wind as it was would be the close-hauled line
heading out to sea, on the other tack from that on which his fleet
still was. In this order he continued to head in for the entrance. At
2 P.M. the French van, standing out, three miles distant by estimate,
bore south from the _London_, Graves's flagship, and was therefore
abreast of the centre of the British line. As the British van came
near the Middle Ground, at 2.13 P.M., the ships wore together. This
put them on the same tack as the French, Hood's division, which had
been leading, being now the rear in the reversed order. The fleet then
brought-to,--stopped,--in order to allow the centre of the enemy to
come abreast of the centre of the British (aa, aa.) The two lines
now were nearly parallel, but the British, being five ships fewer,
naturally did not extend so far as the rear of the French, which in
fact was not yet clear of the Cape. At 2.30 Graves made the signal
for the van ship (the _Shrewsbury_), to lead more to starboard
(l)--towards the enemy. As each ship in succession would take her
course to follow the leader, the effect of this was to put the British
on a line inclined to that of the enemy, the van nearest, and as the
signal was renewed three quarters of an hour later,--at 3.17,--this
angle became still more marked (bb).[98] This was the original and
enduring cause of a lamentable failure by which seven of the rear
ships, in an inferior force undertaking to attack, never came into
battle at all. At 3.34 the van was ordered again to keep still more
toward the enemy.

[Illustration]

At 3.46 the signal was made for ships to close to one cable, followed
almost immediately by that to bear down and engage the enemy,--the
signal for the line still flying. Graves's flagship, the _London_, 98
(f), which was hove-to, filled and bore down. Under the conditions,
the van ships of course got first under fire, and the action gradually
extended from them to the twelfth in the order, two ships astern of
the _London_. According to the log of the latter, at 4.11 the signal
for the line ahead was hauled down, that it might not interfere with
that for close action, but at 4.22 it was rehoisted, "the ships not
being sufficiently extended." The meaning of this expression may be
inferred from Beatson's account:--

    "The _London_, by taking the lead, had advanced farther
    towards the enemy than some of the ships stationed immediately
    ahead of her in the line of battle; and upon luffing up (f')
    to bring her broadside to bear, they having done the same
    thing, her second ahead (m) was brought nearly upon her
    weather beam. The other ships ahead of her were likewise too
    much crowded together."

As the ship on the _London's_ weather beam could not fire upon the
enemy unless she drew ahead, this condition probably accounts for the
flagship being again hove-to, while firing, as Hood says that she
was. The signal for the line was hauled down again at 4.27, by the
_London's_ log, that for close action being up, and repeated at 5.20,
when Hood (h) at last bore down with his division (h'), but the French
ships bearing up also, he did not near them. Firing ceased shortly
after sunset. The loss of the British was 90 killed, 246 wounded; that
of the French is given only in round numbers, as about 200 killed and
wounded.

Hood's statement introduces certain important qualifications into the
above account:--

    "Our centre began to engage at the same time as the van, at
    four, but at a most _improper_ distance, and our rear, being
    barely within random shot, did not fire while the signal for
    the line was flying. The _London_ had the signal for close
    action flying, as well as the signal for the line ahead at
    _half a cable_ was under her topsails, with the main topsail
    to the mast,[99] though the enemy's ships were pushing on."

As showing the improper distance at which the _London_ brought-to to
fire, he says:--

    "The second ship astern of her (of the _London_) received
    but trifling damage, and the third astern of her received no
    damage at all, which most clearly proves [at] how much too
    great a distance was the centre division engaged."

The day after the action Hood made a memorandum of his criticisms upon
it, which has been published. The gist of this is as follows. As the
French stood out, their line was not regular or connected. The van was
much separated from the centre and rear, and it appears also, from the
French narratives, that it was to windward of the rest of the fleet.
From these causes it was much exposed to be attacked unsupported.
There was, by Hood's estimate, "a full hour and a half to have engaged
it before any of the rear could have come up." The line of battle
on the port tack, with the then wind, was east and west, and Graves
had first ranged his fleet on it, as the French were doing; but
afterwards, owing to his method of approach, by the van bearing down
and the other ships following in its wake, the two lines, instead of
being parallel, formed an angle, the British centre and rear being
much more distant from the enemy than the van was. This alone would
cause the ships to come into battle successively instead of together,
a fault of itself; but the Commander-in-Chief, according to Hood,
committed the further mistake that he kept the signal for the
line of battle flying until 5.30 P.M., near to sunset. In Hood's
understanding, while that signal flew the position of each ship was
determined by that of Graves's flagship. None could go closer than the
line through her parallel to the enemy. Hence Hood's criticism, which
is marked by much acerbity towards his superior, but does not betray
any consciousness that he himself needed any justification for his
division not having taken part.

"Had the centre gone to the support of the van, _and the signal for
the line been hauled down_, or the Commander-in-Chief had set the
example of close action, _even with the signal for the line flying_,
the van of the enemy must have been cut to pieces, and the rear
division of the British fleet would have been opposed to those ships
the centre division fired at, and at the proper distance for engaging,
or the Rear-Admiral who commanded it[100] would have a great deal to
answer for."[101]

So much for the tactical failure of that day. The question remained
what next was to be done. Graves contemplated renewing the action, but
early in the night was informed that several of the van ships were too
crippled to permit this. He held his ground, however, in sight of the
French, until dark on the 9th, when they were seen for the last time.
They were then under a cloud of sail, and on the morning of the 10th
had disappeared. From their actions during this interval, Hood had
inferred that de Grasse meant to get back into the Chesapeake without
further fighting; and he implies that he advised Graves to anticipate
the enemy in so doing. Though some ships were crippled aloft, the
British batteries were practically intact, nor had men enough been
disabled to prevent any gun in the fleet from being fought. Could but
a single working day be gained in taking up an anchorage, a defensive
order could be assumed, practically impregnable to the enemy, covering
Cornwallis, and not impossibly intercepting the French ships left in
the Bay. In the case of many men such comment might be dismissed as
the idle talk of the captious fault-finder, always to the fore in
life; but in the case of Hood it must be received with deference, for,
but a few months later, when confronted with greater odds, he himself
did the very thing he here recommended, for an object less vital than
the relief of Cornwallis. Having regard to the character of de Grasse,
it is reasonable to believe that, if he had found the British fleet
thus drawn up at anchor in Chesapeake Bay, as he found Hood at St.
Kitts in the following January, he would have waited off the entrance
for de Barras, and then have gone to sea, leaving Washington and
Rochambeau to look at Cornwallis slipping out of their grasp.

On the 10th of September Graves decided to burn the _Terrible_, 74,
which had been, kept afloat with difficulty since the action. This
done, the fleet stood towards the Chesapeake, a frigate going ahead
to reconnoitre. On the 13th, at 6 A.M., Graves wrote to Hood that the
look-outs reported the French at anchor above the Horse Shoe (shoal)
in the Chesapeake, and desired his opinion what to do with the fleet.
To this Hood sent the comforting reply that it was no more than what
he had expected, as the press of sail the (French) fleet carried
on the 9th, and on the night of the 8th, made it very clear to him
what de Grasse's intentions were. He "would be very glad to send an
opinion, but he really knows not what to say in the truly lamentable
state [to which] we have brought ourselves."[102] On the 10th de
Barras had reached the Bay, where he was joined by de Grasse on the
11th, so that there were then present thirty-six French ships of the
line. Graves, therefore, returned to New York, reaching Sandy Hook
September 19th. On the 14th Washington had arrived before Yorktown,
where he took the chief command; and the armies closed in upon
Cornwallis by land as the French fleets had done already by water.
On the 19th of October the British force was compelled to surrender,
seven thousand two hundred and forty-seven troops and eight hundred
and forty seamen laying down their arms. During the siege the latter
had served in the works, the batteries of which were largely composed
of ships' guns.

After Graves's return to New York, Rear-Admiral the Hon. Robert Digby
arrived from England on the 24th of September, to take command of the
station in Arbuthnot's place. He brought with him three ships of the
line; and the two which Sir Peter Parker had been ordered by Rodney to
send on at once had also reached the port. It was decided by the land
and sea officers concerned to attempt the relief of Cornwallis, and
that it was expedient for Graves to remain in command until after this
expedition. He could not start, however, until the 18th of October,
by which time Cornwallis's fate was decided. Graves then departed for
Jamaica to supersede Sir Peter Parker. On the 11th of November Hood
sailed from Sandy Hook with eighteen ships of the line, and on the
5th of December anchored at Barbados. On the 5th of November de Grasse
also quitted the continent with his whole fleet, and returned to the
West Indies.

[Footnote 94: _Ante_, p. 153.]

[Footnote 95: See _ante_, p. 153.]

[Footnote 96: Along the north coast of Cuba, between it and the Bahama
Banks.]

[Footnote 97: The _Ville de Paris_, to which Troude attributes 104
guns. She was considered the biggest and finest ship of her day.]

[Footnote 98: This reproduced the blunder of Byng, between
whose action and the one now under discussion there is a marked
resemblance.]

[Footnote 99: _I.e._ she had stopped.]

[Footnote 100: Hood himself.]

[Footnote 101: Letters of Lord Hood, p. 32. Navy Records Society. My
italics. Concerning the crucial fact of the signal for the line of
battle being kept flying continuously until 5.30 P.M., upon which
there is a direct contradiction between Hood and the log of the
_London_, it is necessary to give the statement of Captain Thomas
White, who was present in the action in one of the rear ships. "If the
_London's_ log, or the log of any other individual ship in the fleet,
confirm this statement," (that Hood was dilatory in obeying the order
for close action), "I shall be induced to fancy that what I that
day saw and heard was a mere chimera of the brain, and that what I
believed to be the signal for the line was not a union jack, but an
_ignis fatuus_ conjured up to mock me." White and Hood also agree
that the signal for the line was rehoisted at 6.30. (White: "Naval
Researches," London, 1830, p. 45.)]

[Footnote 102: "Letters of Lord Hood." Navy Records Society, p. 35.]




CHAPTER XI

NAVAL EVENTS OF 1781 IN EUROPE. DARBY'S RELIEF OF GIBRALTAR, AND THE
BATTLE OF THE DOGGER BANK


In Europe, during the year 1781, the two leading questions which
dominated the action of the belligerents were the protection, or
destruction, of commerce, and the attack and defence of Gibraltar. The
British Channel Fleet was much inferior to the aggregate sea forces of
France and Spain in the waters of Europe; and the Dutch navy also was
now hostile. The French government represented to its allies that by
concentrating their squadrons near the entrance of the Channel they
would control the situation in every point of view; but the Spaniards,
intent upon Gibraltar, declined to withdraw their fleet from Cadiz
until late in the summer, while the French persisted in keeping their
own at Brest. The Channel Fleet was decisively superior to the latter,
and inferior to the Spaniards in numbers only.

No relief having been given Gibraltar since Rodney had left it
in February, 1780, the question of supplying the fortress became
pressing. For this purpose, twenty-eight ships of the line, under
Vice-Admiral George Darby, sailed from St. Helen's on the 13th of
March, 1781, with a large convoy. Off Cork a number of victuallers
joined, and the whole body then proceeded for Gibraltar, accompanied
by five ships of the line which were destined for the East Indies,
as well as by the West India and American "trade." These several
attachments parted from time to time on the way, and on the 11th of
April the main expedition sighted Cape Spartel, on the African coast.
No attempt to intercept it was made by the great Spanish fleet in
Cadiz; and on the 12th of April, at noon, the convoy anchored in the
Bay of Gibraltar. That night thirteen sail of the transports, under
charge of two frigates, slipped out and made their way to Minorca,
then a British possession. The British ships of war continued under
way, cruising in the Bay and Gut of Gibraltar.

As the convoy entered, the besiegers opened a tremendous cannonade,
which was ineffectual, however, to stop the landing of the stores.
More annoyance was caused by a flotilla of gunboats, specially built
for this siege, the peculiar fighting power of which lay in one
26-pounder, whose great length gave a range superior to the batteries
of ships of the line. Being moved by oars as well as by sails, these
little vessels could choose their distance in light airs and calms,
and were used so actively to harass the transports at anchor that
Darby was obliged to cover them with three ships of the line. These
proved powerless effectually to injure the gunboats; but, while the
latter caused great annoyance and petty injury, they did not hinder
the unlading nor even greatly delay it. The experience illustrates
again the unlikelihood that great results can be obtained by petty
means, or that massed force, force concentrated, can be effectually
counteracted either by cheap and ingenious expedients, or by the
coöperative exertions of many small independent units. "They were
only capable of producing trouble and vexation. So far were they from
preventing the succours from being thrown into the garrison, or from
burning the convoy, that the only damage of any consequence that
they did to the shipping was the wounding of the mizzen-mast of the
_Nonsuch_ so much that it required to be shifted."[103] On the 19th
of April--in one week--the revictualling was completed, and the
expedition started back for England. The fleet anchored again at
Spithead on the 22d of May.

While Darby was returning, La Motte Picquet had gone to sea from
Brest with six ships of the line and some frigates to cruise in the
approaches to the Channel. There, on the 2d of May, he fell in with
the convoy returning from the West Indies with the spoils of St.
Eustatius. The ships of war for the most part escaped, but La Motte
Picquet carried twenty-two out of thirty merchant ships into Brest
before he could be intercepted, although a detachment of eight sail
sent by Darby got close upon his heels.

After a long refit, Darby put to sea again, about the 1st of August,
to cover the approach of the large convoys then expected to arrive.
Being greatly delayed by head winds, he had got no further than the
Lizard, when news was brought him that the Franco-Spanish grand fleet,
of forty-nine ships of the line, was cruising near the Scilly Isles.
Having himself but thirty of the line, he put into Tor Bay on the 24th
of August, and moored his squadron across the entrance to the Bay.

This appearance of the allies was a surprise to the British
authorities, who saw thus unexpectedly renewed the invasion of the
Channel made in 1779. Spain, mortified justly by her failure even
to molest the intrusion of succours into Gibraltar, had thought to
retrieve her honour by an attack upon Minorca, for which she asked the
coöperation of France. De Guichen was sent in July with nineteen ships
of the line; and the combined fleets, under the chief command of the
Spanish admiral, Don Luis de Cordova, convoyed the troops into the
Mediterranean beyond the reach of Gibraltar cruisers. Returning thence
into the Atlantic, de Cordova directed his course for the Channel,
keeping far out to sea to conceal his movements. But though thus
successful in reaching his ground unheralded, he made no attempt to
profit by the advantage gained. The question of attacking Darby at
his anchors was discussed in a council of war, at which de Guichen
strongly advocated the measure; but a majority of votes decided
that Great Britain would be less hurt by ruining her fleet than
by intercepting the expected convoys. Even for the latter purpose,
however, de Cordova could not wait. On the 5th of September he
informed de Guichen that he was at liberty to return to Brest; and
he himself went back to Cadiz with thirty-nine ships, nine of which
were French. "This cruise of the combined fleet," says Chevalier,
"diminished the consideration of France and Spain. These two powers
had made a great display of force, without producing the slightest
result." It may be mentioned here that Minorca, after a six months'
siege, capitulated in February, 1782.

While Darby was beating down Channel in the early days of August,
1781, Vice-Admiral Hyde Parker, lately Rodney's second in command in
the West Indies, was returning to England convoying a large merchant
fleet from the Baltic. On the 5th of August, at daylight, a Dutch
squadron, also with a convoy, but outward bound, from the Texel to
the Baltic, was discovered in the south-west, near the Doggersbank.
Heading as the two enemies then were, their courses must shortly
intersect. Parker, therefore, ordered his convoy to steer to the
westward for England, while he himself bore down for the enemy. The
Dutch Rear-Admiral, Johan Arnold Zoutman, on the contrary, kept the
merchant vessels with him, under his lee, but drew out the ships of
war from among them, to form his order on the side towards the enemy.
Each opponent put seven sail into the line. The British vessels,
besides being of different rates, were chiefly very old ships, dragged
out from Rotten Row to meet the pressing emergency caused by the
greatly superior forces which were in coalition against Great Britain.
Owing to the decayed condition of some of them, their batteries had
been lightened, to the detriment of their fighting power. Two of them,
however, were good and new seventy-fours. It is probable that the
Dutch vessels, after a long peace, were not much better than their
antagonists. In fact, each squadron was a scratch lot, in the worst
sense of the phrase. The conduct of the affair by the two admirals,
even to the very intensity of their pugnaciousness, contributes a
tinge of the comic to the history of a desperately fought action. The
breeze was fresh at north-east, and the sea smooth. The Dutch, being
to leeward, awaited attack, forming line on the port tack, heading
south-east by east, a point off the wind, under topsails and
foresails, a cable's length apart. There is little room to doubt that
an adversary who thus holds his ground means to make a stand-up fight,
but Parker, although the sun of a midsummer day had scarcely risen,
thought advisable to order a general chase. Of course, no ship
spared her canvas to this, while the worse sailers had to set their
studdingsails to keep up; and the handling of the sails took the men
off from the preparations for battle. Parker, who doubtless was still
sore over Rodney's censure of the year before, and who moreover had
incurred the Admiralty's rebuke, for apparent hesitation to attack the
enemy's islands while temporarily in command in the West Indies, was
determined now to show the fight that was in him. "It is related that,
upon being informed of the force of the Dutch squadron in the morning,
he replied (pulling up his breeches), 'It matters little what their
force is; we must fight them if they are double the number.'" At 6.10
A.M. the signal was made for line abreast, the ships running down
nearly before the wind. This of course introduced more regularity, the
leading ships taking in their lighter sails to permit the others to
reach their places; but the pace still was rapid. At 6.45 the order
was closed to one cable, and at 7.56 the signal for battle was
hoisted. It is said that at that moment the 80-gun ship was still
securing a studding-sail-boom, which indicates how closely action trod
on the heels of preparation.

The Dutch admiral was as deliberate as Parker was headlong. An English
witness writes:--

    "They appeared to be in great order; and their hammocks,
    quarter-cloths, etc., were spread in as nice order as if for
    show in harbour. Their marines also were well drawn up, and
    stood with their muskets shouldered, with all the regularity
    and exactness of a review. Their politeness ought to be
    remembered by every man in our line; for, as if certain
    of what happened, we came down almost end-on upon their
    broadsides; yet did not the Dutch admiral fire a gun, or
    make the signal to engage, till the red flag was at the
    _Fortitude's_ masthead, and her shot finding their way into
    his ship. This was a manoeuvre which Admiral Zutman should not
    be warmly thanked for by their High Mightinesses; as he had
    it in his power to have done infinite mischief to our fleet,
    coming down in that unofficer-like manner. Having suffered
    Admiral Parker to place himself as he pleased, he calmly
    waited till the signal was hoisted on board the _Fortitude_,
    and at the same time we saw the signal going up on board
    Admiral Zutman's ship."

The British, thus unmolested, rounded-to just to windward of the
enemy. A pilot who was on board their leading ship was for some reason
told to assist in laying her close to her opponent. "By close," he
asked, "do you mean about a ship's breadth?" "Not a gun was fired
on either side," says the official British report, "until within the
distance of half musket-shot." Parker, whom an on-looker describes as
full of life and spirits, here made a mistake, of a routine character,
which somewhat dislocated his order. It was a matter of tradition for
flagship to seek flagship, just as it was to signal a general chase,
and to bear down together, each ship for its opposite, well extended
with the enemy. Now Parker, as was usual, was in the centre of
his line, the fourth ship; but Zoutman was for some reason in the
fifth. Parker therefore placed his fourth by the enemy's fifth. In
consequence, the rear British ship overlapped the enemy, and for a
time had no opponent; while the second and third found themselves
engaged with three of the Dutch. At 8 A.M. the signal for the line
was hauled down, and that for close action hoisted,--thus avoiding a
mistake often made.

All the vessels were soon satisfactorily and hotly at work, and the
action continued with varying phases till 11.35 A.M. The leading two
ships in both orders got well to leeward of the lines, the British two
having to tack to regain their places to windward. Towards the middle
of the engagement the Dutch convoy bore away, back to the Texel, as
the British had steered for England before it began; the difference
being that the voyage was abandoned by the Dutch and completed by
the British. At eleven o'clock Parker made sail, and passed with the
flagship between the enemy and the _Buffalo_, his next ahead and third
in the British order; the three rear ships following close in his
wake, in obedience to the signal for line ahead, which had been
rehoisted at 10.43.[104] A heavy cannonade attended this evolution,
the Dutch fighting gloriously to the last. When it was completed, the
British fleet wore and the action ceased. "I made an effort to form
the line, in order to renew the action," wrote Parker in his report,
"but found it impracticable. The enemy appeared to be in as bad a
condition. Both squadrons lay-to a considerable time near each other,
when the Dutch, with their convoy, bore away for the Texel. We were
not in a condition to follow them."

This was a most satisfactory exhibition of valour, and a most
unsatisfactory battle; magnificent, but not war. The completion of
their voyage by the British merchant ships, while the Dutch were
obliged to return to the port which they had just left, may be
considered to award success, and therefore the essentials of victory,
to Parker's fleet. With this exception the _status quo_ remained much
as before, although one of the Dutch ships sank next day; yet the
British loss, 104 killed and 339 wounded, was nearly as great as
in Keppel's action, where thirty ships fought on each side, or in
Rodney's of April 17th, 1780, where the British had twenty sail;
greater than with Graves off the Chesapeake, and, in proportion, fully
equal to the sanguinary conflicts between Suffren and Hughes in the
East Indies. The Dutch loss is reported as 142 killed, 403 wounded.
Both sides aimed at the hull, as is shown by the injuries; for
though much harm was done aloft, few spars were wholly shot away. The
_Buffalo_, a small ship, had 39 shot through and through her, and a
very great number pierced between wind and water; in the British van
ship as many as 14, another proof that the Dutch fired low.

With the rudimentary notions of manoeuvring evinced, it is not
surprising that Parker was found an unsatisfactory second by an
enlightened tactician like Rodney. The Vice-Admiral, however, laid his
unsuccess to the indifferent quality of his ships. George III visited
the squadron after the action, but Parker was not open to compliments.
"I wish your Majesty better ships and younger officers," he said. "For
myself, I am now too old for service." No rewards were given, and it
is asserted that Parker made no secret that none would be accepted,
if offered, at the hands of the then Admiralty. He voiced the protest
of the Navy and of the nation against the mal-administration of the
peace days, which had left the country unprepared for war. The gallant
veteran was ordered soon afterwards to command in the East Indies. He
sailed for his station in the _Cato_, which was never heard of again.

Though unfruitful in substantial results, Parker's action merits
commemoration; for, after all, even where skill does its utmost,
staunchness such as his shows the sound constitution of a military
body.

[Footnote 103: Beatson, "Military and Naval Memoirs," v. 347.]

[Footnote 104: Sir John Ross, in his "Life of Saumarez," who was
lieutenant in the flagship, says that the flagship only passed ahead
of the _Buffalo_, and that the rear ships closed upon the latter.
The version in the text rests upon the detailed and circumstantial
statements of another lieutenant of the squadron, in Ekins's "Naval
Battles." As Ekins also was present as a midshipman, this gives, as it
were, the confirmation of two witnesses.]




CHAPTER XII

THE FINAL NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST INDIES. HOOD AND DE GRASSE.
RODNEY AND DE GRASSE. THE GREAT BATTLE OF APRIL 12, 1782


The year 1781 closed with an incident more decisive in character than
most of the events that occurred in European waters during its course;
one also which transfers the interest, by natural transition, again to
the West Indies. The French government had felt throughout the summer
the necessity of sending de Grasse reinforcements both of ships and of
supplies, but the transports and material of war needed could not be
collected before December. As the British probably would attempt to
intercept a convoy upon which the next campaign so much depended,
Rear-Admiral de Guichen was ordered to accompany it clear of the Bay
of Biscay, with twelve ships of the line, and then to go to Cadiz.
Five ships of the line destined to de Grasse, and two going to the
East Indies, raised to nineteen the total force with which de Guichen
left Brest on the 10th of December. On the afternoon of the 12th, the
French being then one hundred and fifty miles to the southward and
westward of Ushant, with a south-east wind, the weather, which had
been thick and squally, suddenly cleared and showed sails to windward.
These were twelve ships of the line, one 50, and some frigates, under
Rear-Admiral Richard Kempenfelt, who had left England on the 2d of the
month, to cruise in wait for this expedition. The French numbers were
amply sufficient to frustrate any attack, but de Guichen, ordinarily
a careful officer, had allowed his ships of war to be to leeward and
ahead of the convoy. The latter scattered in every direction, as the
British swooped down upon them, but all could not escape; and the
French ships of war remained helpless spectators, while the victims
were hauling down their flags right and left. Night coming on, some
prizes could not be secured, but Kempenfelt carried off fifteen,
laden with military and naval stores of great money value and greater
military importance. A few days later a violent storm dispersed and
shattered the remainder of the French body. Two ships of the line
only, the _Triomphant_, 84, and _Brave_, 74, and five transports,
could pursue their way to the West Indies. The rest went back to
Brest. This event may be considered as opening the naval campaign of
1782 in the West Indies.

Kempenfelt, before returning to England, sent off express to Hood
in the West Indies the fireship _Tisiphone_, 8, Commander James
Saumarez,[105]--afterwards the distinguished admiral,--with news of
the French approach. Saumarez, having been first to Barbados, joined
Hood on the 31st of January, 1782, in Basse Terre Roads, on the lee
side of St. Kitts; a position from which Hood had dislodged de Grasse
six days before by a brilliant manoeuvre, resembling that which he
had contemplated[106] as open to Graves the previous September at
Chesapeake Bay for the relief of Cornwallis. The campaign for the year
1782 had opened already with an attack upon St. Kitts by the French
army and navy; and the French fleet was even then cruising close at
hand to leeward, between St. Kitts and Nevis.

The original intention of de Grasse and de Bouillé had been to capture
Barbados, the most important of the Eastern Antilles still remaining
to the British; but the heavy trade-winds, which in those days made
a winter passage to windward so long and dreary a beat, twice drove
them back to port. "The whole French fleet," wrote Hood, "appeared
off Santa Lucia on the 17th of last month, endeavouring to get
to windward, and having carried away many topmasts and yards in
struggling against very squally weather, returned to Fort Royal Bay
on the 23d, and on the 28th came out again with forty transports,
manoeuvring as before." On the 2d of January it disappeared from Santa
Lucia, and, after a short stay again at Martinique, proceeded on the
5th to St. Kitts, anchoring in Basse Terre Roads on the 11th. The
British garrison retired to Brimstone Hill, a fortified position at
the north-west of the island, while the inhabitants surrendered the
government to the French, pledging themselves to neutrality. The
adjacent island of Nevis capitulated on the same terms on the 20th.

On the 14th of January, an express sent by General Shirley, governor
of St. Kitts, had informed Hood at Barbados that a great fleet
approaching had been seen from the heights of Nevis on the 10th. Hood
at once put to sea, though short of bread and flour, which could not
be had, and with the material of his ships in wretched condition.
"When the _President_[107] joins," he wrote the Admiralty, "I shall be
twenty-two strong, with which I beg you will assure their Lordships
I will seek and give battle to the Count de Grasse, be his numbers
as they may." On the way a ship reached him with word that the French
fleet had invested St. Kitts. On the 21st he anchored at Antigua
for repairs and supplies, indispensable for keeping the sea in the
operations which he contemplated, the duration of which could not be
foreseen. About a thousand troops also were embarked, which, with the
marines that could be spared from the squadron, would give a landing
force of twenty-four hundred men.

St. Kitts being less than fifty miles from Antigua, Hood doubtless now
got accurate information of the enemy's dispositions, and could form
a definite, well-matured plan. This seems to have been carefully
imparted to all his captains, as was the practice of Nelson, who was
the pupil of Hood, if of any one. "At 9.15 A.M. the Admiral made the
signal for all flag-officers," says the log of the _Canada_; "and at
4 P.M. the Admirals and Commodore made the signals for all captains
of their divisions." At 5 P.M. of the same day, January 23d, the fleet
weighed and stood over for Nevis, round the southern point of which
Basse Terre must be approached; for, the channel between Nevis and St.
Kitts being impracticable for ships of the line, the two islands were
virtually one, and, their common axis lying north-west and south-east,
the trade-wind is fair only when coming from the south.

Basse Terre, where de Grasse then was, is about fifteen miles from the
south point of Nevis. The roadstead lies east and west, and the French
fleet, then twenty-four of the line and two fifties, were anchored
without attention to order, three or four deep; the eastern ships so
placed that an enemy coming from the southward could reach them with
the prevailing trade-wind, against which the western ships could not
beat up quickly to their support. This being so, we are told that
Hood, starting shortly before sunset with a fair, and probably fresh
wind, from a point only sixty miles distant, hoped to come upon the
French by surprise at early daybreak, to attack the weather ships,
and from them to sail along the hostile order so far as might seem
expedient. His column, thus passing in its entirety close to a certain
exposed fraction of the enemy, the latter would be cut up in detail by
the concentration upon it. The British then, wearing to the southward,
would haul their wind, tack, and again stand up to the assault, if the
enemy continued to await it.

This reasonable expectation, and skilful conception, was thwarted by
a collision, during the night, between a frigate, the _Nymphe_, 36,
and the leading ship of the line, the _Alfred_, 74. The repairs to
the latter delayed the fleet, the approach of which was discovered
by daylight. De Grasse therefore put to sea. He imagined Hood's
purpose was to throw succours into Brimstone Hill; and moreover the
position of the enemy now was between him and four ships of the line
momentarily expected from Martinique, one of which joined him on the
same day. The French were all under way by sunset, standing to the
southward under easy sail, towards the British, who had rounded the
south point of Nevis at 1 P.M. Towards dark, Hood went about and stood
also to the southward, seemingly in retreat.

During the following night the British tacked several times, to keep
their position to windward. At daylight of January 25th, the two
fleets were to the westward of Nevis; the British near the island,
the French abreast, but several miles to leeward. Foiled in his
first spring by an unexpected accident, Hood had not relinquished his
enterprise, and now proposed to seize the anchorage quitted by the
French, so establishing himself there,--as he had proposed to Graves
to do in the Chesapeake,--that he could not be dislodged. For such a
defensive position St. Kitts offered special advantages. The anchorage
was a narrow ledge, dropping precipitately to very deep water; and
it was possible so to place the ships that the enemy could not easily
anchor near them.

At 5.30 A.M. of the 25th Hood made the signal to form line of battle
on the starboard tack, at one cable interval.[108] It is mentioned
in the log of the _Canada_, 74, Captain Cornwallis, that that ship
brought-to in her station, fourth from the rear, at 7 o'clock. By 10
o'clock the line was formed, and the ships hove-to in it. At 10.45 the
signal was made to fill [to go ahead], the van ships to carry the same
sail as the Admiral,--topsails and foresails,--followed, just before
noon, by the order to prepare to anchor, with springs on the cables.
The French, who were steering south, on the port tack, while the
British were hove-to, went about as soon as the latter filled, and
stood towards them in bow and quarter line.[109]

[Illustration]

At noon the British fleet was running along close under the high land
of Nevis; so close that the _Solebay_, 28, one of the frigates inshore
of the line, grounded and was wrecked. No signals were needed, except
to correct irregularities in the order, for the captains knew what
they were to do. The French were approaching steadily, but inevitably
dropping astern with reference to the point of the enemy's line for
which they were heading. At 2 P.M. de Grasse's flagship, the _Ville
de Paris_, fired several shot at the British rear, which alone she
could reach, while his left wing was nearing the _Barfleur_, Hood's
flagship, and the vessels astern of her, the centre of the column,
which opened their fire at 2.30. Hood, trusting to his captains,
disregarded this threat to the rear half of his force. Signals flew
for the van to crowd sail and take its anchorage, and at 3.30 P.M. the
leading ships began to anchor in line ahead, (Fig. 1, a), covered as
they did so by the broadsides of the rear and the rear centre (b).
Upon the latter the French were now keeping up a smart fire. Between
the _Canada_ and her next astern, the _Prudent_, 64,--which was a
dull sailer,--there was a considerable interval. Towards it the
French admiral pressed, aiming to cut off the three rear vessels; but
Cornwallis threw everything aback and closed down upon his consort,--a
stirring deed in which he was imitated by the _Resolution_ and
_Bedford_, 74's, immediately ahead of him. De Grasse was thus foiled,
but so narrowly, that an officer, looking from one of the ships which
had anchored, asserted that for a moment he could perceive the _Ville
de Paris's_ jib inside the British line. As the rear of the latter
pushed on to its place, it cleared the broadsides of the now anchored
van and centre, (Fig. 2, a), and these opened upon the enemy, a
great part of whom were strung out behind the British column, without
opponents as yet, but hastening up to get their share of the action.
Hood's flagship, (f), which anchored at 4.03, opened fire again at
4.40 P.M. Thus, as the _Canada_ and her few companions, who bore the
brunt of the day, were shortening sail and rounding-to, (b), still
under a hot cannonade, the batteries of their predecessors were
ringing out their welcome, and at the same time covering their
movements by giving the enemy much else to think about. The _Canada_,
fetching up near the tail of the column and letting go in a hurry, ran
out two cables on end, and found upon sounding that she had dropped
her anchor in a hundred and fifty fathoms of water. The French column
stood on, off soundings, though close to, firing as it passed, and
then, wearing to the southward in succession, stood out of action on
the port tack, (c), its ineffectual broadsides adding to the grandeur
and excitement of the scene, and swelling the glory of Hood's
successful daring, of which it is difficult to speak too highly. Lord
Robert Manners, the captain of the _Resolution_, which was fifth
ship from the British rear, writing a week later, passed upon this
achievement a verdict, which posterity will confirm. "The taking
possession of this road was well judged, well conducted, and well
executed, though indeed the French had an opportunity--which they
missed--of bringing our rear to a very severe account. The van and
centre divisions brought to an anchor under the fire of the rear,
which was engaged with the enemy's centre (Fig. 1); and then the
centre, being at an anchor and properly placed, covered us while we
anchored (Fig. 2), making, I think, the most masterly manoeuvre I ever
saw." Whether regard be had to the thoughtful preparation, the crafty
management of the fleet antecedent to the final push, the calculated
audacity of the latter, or the firm and sagacious tactical handling
from the first moment to the last, Nelson himself never did a more
brilliant deed than this of Hood's.[110] All firing ceased at 5.30.

Naturally, an order taken up under such conditions needed some
rectifying before further battle. As the proper stationing of the
fleet depended in great measure upon the position of the van ship,
Hood had put a local pilot on board her; but when the action ceased,
he found that she was not as close to the shore as he had intended.
The rear, on the other hand, was naturally in the most disorder, owing
to the circumstances attending its anchorage. Three ships from the
rear were consequently directed to place themselves ahead of the van,
closing the interval, while others shifted their berths, according
to specific directions. The order as finally assumed (Fig. 3) was as
follows. The van ship was anchored so close to the shore that it was
impossible to pass within her, or, with the prevailing wind, even to
reach her, because of a point and shoal just outside, covering her
position. From her the line extended in a west-north-west direction
to the fifteenth ship,--the _Barfleur_, 98, Hood's flagship,--when it
turned to north, the last six ships being on a north and south line.
These six, with their broadsides turned to the westward, prevented a
column passing from south to north, the only way one could pass, from
enfilading the main line with impunity. The latter covered with its
guns the approach from the south. All the ships had springs on their
cables, enabling them to turn their sides so as to cover a large arc
of a circle with their batteries.

[Illustration]

At daylight on the following morning, January 26th, the ships began
changing their places, the French being then seven or eight miles
distant in the south-south-east. At 7 A.M. they were seen to be
approaching in line of battle, under a press of sail, heading for the
British van. The _Canada_, which had begun at 5 A.M. to tackle her
200-odd fathoms of cable, was obliged to cut, whereby "we lost the
small bower anchor and two cables with one 8-inch and one 9-inch
hawsers, which were bent for springs." The ship had to work to
windward to close with the fleet, and was therefore ordered by the
Rear-Admiral to keep engaging under way, until 10.50, when a message
was sent her to anchor in support of the rear. The action began
between 8.30 and 9 A.M., the leading French ship heading for the
British van, seemingly with the view of passing round and inside it.
Against this attempt Hood's precautions probably were sufficient; but
as the enemy's vessel approached, the wind headed her, so that she
could only fetch the third ship. The latter, with the vessels ahead
and astern, sprung their batteries upon her. "The crash occasioned by
their destructive broadsides was so tremendous on board her that whole
pieces of plank were seen flying from her off side, ere she could
escape the cool concentrated fire of her determined adversaries."[111]
She put her helm up, and ran along outside the British line, receiving
the first fire of each successive ship. Her movement was imitated by
her followers, some keeping off sooner, some later; but de Grasse in
his flagship not only came close, but pointed his after yards to the
wind,[112] to move the slower. As he ported his helm when leaving the
_Barfleur_, this brought these sails aback, keeping him a still longer
time before the British ships thrown to the rear. "In this he was
supported by those ships which were astern, or immediately ahead of
him. During this short but tremendous conflict in that part of the
field of battle, nothing whatever could be seen of them for upwards
of twenty minutes, save de Grasse's white flag at the main-topgallant
masthead of the _Ville de Paris_, gracefully floating above the
immense volumes of smoke that enveloped them, or the pennants of those
ships which were occasionally perceptible, when an increase of breeze
would waft away the smoke."[113]

[Illustration]

Though most gallantly done, no such routine manoeuvre as this could
shake Hood's solidly assumed position. The attempt was repeated in the
afternoon, but more feebly, and upon the centre and rear only. This
also was ineffectual; and Hood was left in triumphant possession of
the field. The losses in the several affairs of the two days had been:
British, 72 killed, 244 wounded; French, 107 killed, 207 wounded.
Thenceforth the French fleet continued cruising to leeward of the
island, approaching almost daily, frequently threatening attack, and
occasionally exchanging distant shots; but no serious encounter took
place. Interest was centred on Brimstone Hill, where alone on the
island the British flag still flew. De Grasse awaited its surrender,
flattering himself that the British would be forced then to put
to sea, and that his fleet, increased by successive arrivals to
thirty-two of the line, would then find an opportunity to crush the
man who had outwitted and out-manoeuvred him on January 25th and 26th.
In this hope he was deceived by his own inaptness and his adversary's
readiness. Hood was unable to succour Brimstone Hill, for want of
troops; the French having landed six thousand men, against which the
British twenty-four hundred could effect nothing, either alone or in
coöperation with the garrison, which was but twelve hundred strong.
The work capitulated on the 13th of February. De Grasse, who had
neglected to keep his ships provisioned, went next day to Nevis and
anchored there to empty the storeships. That evening Hood called
his captains on board, explained his intentions, had them set their
watches by his, and at 11 P.M. the cables were cut one by one, lights
being left on the buoys, and the fleet silently decamped, passing
round the north end of St. Kitts, and so towards Antigua. When de
Grasse opened his eyes next morning, the British were no longer to be
seen. "Nothing could have been more fortunately executed," wrote Lord
Robert Manners, "as not one accident happened from it. Taking the
whole in one light, though not successful in the point we aimed at,
nevertheless it was well conducted, and has given the enemy a pretty
severe check; and if you give him half the credit the enemy does, Sir
Samuel Hood will stand very high in the public estimation."

Hood's intention had been to return to Barbados; but on the 25th of
February he was joined, to windward of Antigua, by Rodney, who had
arrived from England a week earlier, bringing with him twelve ships of
the line. The new Commander-in-Chief endeavoured to cut off de Grasse
from Martinique, but the French fleet got in there on the 26th.
Rodney consequently went to Santa Lucia, to refit Hood's ships, and
to prepare for the coming campaign, in which it was understood that
the conquest of Jamaica was to be the first object of the allies.
An important condition to their success was the arrival of a great
convoy, known to be on its way from Brest to repair the losses
which Kempenfelt's raid and subsequent bad weather had inflicted in
December. Hood suggested to Rodney to halve the fleet, which then
numbered thirty-six of the line, letting one part cruise north of
Dominica, between that island and Deseada, while the other guarded
the southern approach, between Martinique and Santa Lucia. Rodney,
however, was unwilling to do this, and adopted a half-measure,--Hood's
division being stationed to windward of the north end of Martinique,
reaching only as far north as the latitude of Dominica, while the
center and rear were abreast of the centre and south of Martinique;
all in mutual touch by intermediate vessels. It would seem--reading
between the lines--that Hood tried to stretch his cruising ground
northwards, in pursuance of his own ideas, but Rodney recalled him.
The French convoy consequently passed north of Deseada, convoyed by
two ships of the line, and on the 20th of March reached Martinique
safely. De Grasse's force was thus raised to thirty-five of the line,
including two 50-gun ships, as against the British thirty-six. At the
end of the month Rodney returned to Santa Lucia, and there remained at
anchor, vigilantly watching the French fleet in Fort Royal by means of
a chain of frigates.

The problem now immediately confronting de Grasse--the first step
towards the conquest of Jamaica--was extremely difficult. It was to
convoy to Cap François the supply vessels essential to his enterprise,
besides the merchant fleet bound for France; making in all one hundred
and fifty unarmed ships to be protected by his thirty-five sail of the
line, in face of the British thirty-six. The trade-wind being fair,
he purposed to skirt the inner northern edge of the Caribbean Sea;
by which means he would keep close to a succession of friendly ports,
wherein the convoy might find refuge in case of need.

With this plan the French armament put to sea on the 8th of April,
1782. The fact being reported promptly to Rodney, by noon his whole
fleet was clear of its anchorage and in pursuit. Then was evident the
vital importance of Barrington's conquest of Santa Lucia; for, had the
British been at Barbados, the most probable alternative, the French
movement not only would have been longer unknown, but pursuit would
have started from a hundred miles distant, instead of thirty. If the
British had met this disadvantage by cruising before Martinique, they
would have encountered the difficulty of keeping their ships supplied
with water and other necessaries, which Santa Lucia afforded. In
truth, without in any degree minimizing the faults of the loser, or
the merits of the winner, in the exciting week that followed, the
opening situation may be said to have represented on either side an
accumulation of neglects or of successes, which at the moment of their
occurrence may have seemed individually trivial; a conspicuous warning
against the risk incurred by losing single points in the game of war.
De Grasse was tremendously handicapped from the outset by the errors
of his predecessors and of himself. That the British had Santa Lucia
as their outpost was due not only to Barrington's diligence, but also
to d'Estaing's slackness and professional timidity; and it may be
questioned whether de Grasse himself had shown a proper understanding
of strategic conditions, when he neglected that island in favour of
Tobago and St. Kitts. Certainly, Hood had feared for it greatly the
year before. That the convoy was there to embarrass his movements,
may not have been the fault of the French admiral; but it was greatly
and entirely his fault that, of the thirty-six ships pursuing him,
twenty-one represented a force that he might have crushed in detail
a few weeks before,--not to mention the similar failure of April,
1781.[114]

Large bodies of ships commonly will move less rapidly than small. By
2.30 P.M. of the day of starting, Rodney's look-outs had sighted the
French fleet; and before sundown it could be seen from the mastheads
of the main body. At 6 next morning, April 9th, the enemy, both
fleet and convoy, was visible from the deck of the _Barfleur_, the
flagship of Hood's division, then in the British van. The French bore
north-east, distant four to twelve miles, extending from abreast of
the centre of Dominica northwards towards Guadeloupe. The British had
gained much during the night, and their centre was now off Dominica to
leeward of the enemy's rear, which was becalmed under the island. Some
fourteen or fifteen of the French van, having opened out the channel
between Dominica and Guadeloupe, felt a fresh trade-wind, from east by
north, with which they steered north; and their number was gradually
increased as individual ships, utilising the catspaws, stole clear of
the high land of Dominica. Hood's division in like manner, first among
the British, got the breeze, and, with eight ships, the commander of
the van stood north in order of battle. To the north-west of him were
two French vessels, separated from their consorts and threatened to
be cut off (i). These stood boldly down and crossed the head of Hood's
column; one passing so close to the leading ship, the _Alfred_, that
the latter had to bear up to let her pass. Rodney had hoisted a signal
to engage at 6.38 A.M., but had hauled it down almost immediately,
and Hood would not fire without orders. These ships therefore rejoined
their main body unharmed. At 8.30 the French hoisted their colours,
and shortly afterwards the vessels which had cleared Dominica tacked
and stood south, opposite to Hood.

De Grasse now had recognised that he could not escape action, if
the convoy kept company. He therefore directed the two 50-gun ships,
_Expériment_ and _Sagittaire_, to accompany it into Guadeloupe, where
it arrived safely that day (Position 1, dd); and he decided that the
fleet should ply to windward through the channel between Dominica
and Guadeloupe, nearly midway in which lies a group of small islands
called Les Saintes,--a name at times given to the battle of April
12th. By this course he hoped not only to lead the enemy away from
the convoy, but also to throw off pursuit through his superior speed,
and so to accomplish his mission unharmed. The French ships, larger,
deeper, and with better lines than their opponents, were naturally
better sailers, and it may be inferred that even coppering had not
entirely overcome this original disadvantage of the British.

At the very moment of beginning his new policy, however, a subtle
temptation assailed de Grasse irresistibly, in the exposed position of
Hood's column (h); and he met it, not by a frank and hearty acceptance
of a great opportunity, but by a half-measure. Hood thoroughly
crushed, the British fleet became hopelessly inferior to the French;
Hood damaged, and it became somewhat inferior: possibly it would
be deterred from further pursuit. De Grasse decided for this second
course, and ordered part of his fleet to attack. This operation was
carried out under the orders of the Marquis de Vaudreuil, the second
in command. The ships engaged in it bore down from the windward,
attacked Hood's rear ships, stood along northward (f) on the weather
side of his column at long range, and, having passed ahead, tacked (t)
in succession and formed again in the rear, (f^2) whence they repeated
the same manoeuvre (Positions 1 and 2). Thus a procession of fifteen
ships kept passing by eight, describing a continuous curve of
elliptical form. They were able to do this because Hood was condemned
to a low speed, lest he should draw too far away from the British
centre (a) and rear (c), still becalmed under Dominica (Position 2).
The French, having choice of distance, kept at long gunshot, because
they were deficient in carronades, of which the British had many.
These guns, of short range but large calibre, were thus rendered
useless. Could they have come into play, the French rigging and sails
would have suffered severely. This first engagement (Position 1)
lasted, by Hood's log, from 9.48 to 10.25 A.M. It was resumed in
stronger force (Position 2) at 14 minutes past noon, and continued
till 1.45 P.M., when firing ceased for that day; Rodney hauling
down the signal for battle at 2. Between the two affairs, which were
identical in general character, Hood's column was reinforced, and
great part of the British centre also got into action with some of
the French main body, though at long range only. "Except the two rear
ships," wrote Rodney to Hood that night, "the others fired at such a
distance that I returned none."

[Illustration]

The injuries to the British ships engaged were not such as to compel
them to leave the fleet. The _Royal Oak_ lost her main topmast, and
that of the _Warrior_ fell two days later, not improbably from wounds;
but in these was nothing that the ready hands of seamen could not
repair so as to continue the chase. Rodney, therefore, contented
himself with reversing the order of sailing, putting Hood in the rear,
whereby he was able to refit, and yet follow fast enough not to be out
of supporting distance. This circumstance caused Hood's division to
be in the rear in the battle of the 12th. One of the French ships,
the _Caton_, 64, had been so injured that de Grasse detached her into
Guadeloupe. It must be remembered that a crippled ship in a chased
fleet not only embarrasses movement, but may compromise the whole
body, if the latter delay to protect it; whereas the chaser keeps
between his lame birds and the enemy.

During the night of the 9th the British lay-to for repairs. The next
morning they resumed the pursuit, turning to windward after the
enemy, but upon the whole losing throughout the 10th and the 11th. At
daylight of the 10th the French, by the logs of Hood and Cornwallis,
were "from four to five leagues distant," "just in sight from the
deck." During that night, however, the _Zélé_, 74, had collided with
the _Jason_, 64; and the latter was injured so far as to be compelled
to follow the _Caton_ into Guadeloupe. At sunset of that day Rodney
signalled a general chase to windward, the effect of which was to
enable each ship to do her best according to her captain's judgment
during the dark hours. Nevertheless, on the morning of the 11th
the French seem again to have gained, for Hood, who, it will be
remembered, was now in the rear, notes that at 10 A.M. twenty-two
French sail (not all the fleet) could be counted _from the masthead_;
Cornwallis, further to windward, could count thirty-three. Troude,
a French authority, says that at that time nearly all the French had
doubled The Saintes, that is, had got to windward of them, and it
looked as though de Grasse might succeed in throwing off his pursuer.
Unluckily, two ships, the _Magnanime_, 74, and the _Zélé_, 74, the
latter of which had lost her main topmast, were several miles to
leeward of the French main body. It was necessary to delay, or to drop
those vessels. Again, trivial circumstances conspired to further a
great disaster, and de Grasse bore down to cover the crippled ships;
so losing much of his hard-won ground, and entailing a further
misfortune that night. Rodney hung doggedly on, relying on the
chapter of accidents, as one who knows that all things come to him
who endures. To be sure, there was not much else he could do; yet
he deserves credit for unremitting industry and pluck. During the
afternoon, the signals noted in the British logs--to call in all
cruisers and for the fleet to close--attest mutely the movement of de
Grasse in bearing down,--coming nearer.

[Illustration]

During the night, at 2 A.M. of April 12th, the _Zélé_ and de Grasse's
flagship, the _Ville de Paris_, 110, crossing on opposite tacks, came
into collision. The former lost both foremast and bowsprit. It has
been stated by John Paul Jones, who by permission of Congress embarked
a few months later on board the French fleet as a volunteer, and
doubtless thus heard many personal narratives, that this accident
was due to the deficiency of watch-officers in the French navy; the
deck of the _Zélé_ being in charge of a young ensign, instead of
an experienced lieutenant. It was necessary to rid the fleet of the
_Zélé_ at once, or an action could not be avoided; so a frigate
was summoned to tow her, and the two were left to make their way to
Guadeloupe, while the others resumed the beat to windward. At 5 A.M.
she and the frigate were again under way, steering for Guadeloupe, to
the north-west, making from five to six miles (Position 3, a); but in
the interval they had been nearly motionless, and consequently when
day broke at 5.30 they were only two leagues from the _Barfleur_,
Hood's flagship, which, still in the British rear, was then standing
south on the port tack. The body of the French, (Position 3), was at
about the same distance as on the previous evening,--ten to fifteen
miles,--but the _Ville de Paris_ (c) not more than eight. Just before
6 A.M. Rodney signalled Hood, who was nearest, to chase the _Zélé_;
and four of the rearmost ships of the line were detached for that
purpose (b). De Grasse, seeing this, signalled his vessels at 6 A.M.
to close the flagship, making all sail; and he himself bore down to
the westward (cc'), on the port tack, but running free, to frighten
away Rodney's chasers. The British Admiral kept them out until 7
o'clock, by which time de Grasse was fairly committed to his false
step. All cruisers were then called in, and the line was closed to one
cable.[115] Within an hour were heard the opening guns of the great
battle, since known by the names of the 12th of April, or of The
Saintes, and, in the French navy, of Dominica. The successive losses
of the _Caton_, _Jason_, and _Zélé_, with the previous detachment of
the two 50-gun ships with the convoy, had reduced the French numbers
from thirty-five to thirty effective vessels. The thirty-six British
remained undiminished.

The British appear to have been standing to the south on the port
tack at daylight; but, soon after sending out the chasers, Rodney had
ordered the line of bearing (from ship to ship) to be north-north-east
to south-south-west, evidently in preparation for a close-hauled line
of battle on the starboard tack, heading northerly to an east wind.
Somewhat unusually, the wind that morning held at south-east for some
time, enabling the British to lie up as high as east-north-east on
the starboard tack (Position 3, d), on which they were when the battle
joined; and this circumstance, being very favourable for gaining to
windward,--to the eastward,--doubtless led to the annulling of the
signal for the line of bearing, half an hour after it was made, and
the substitution for it of the line of battle ahead at one cable. It
is to be inferred that Rodney's first purpose was to tack together,
thus restoring Hood to the van, his natural station; but the accident
of the wind holding to the southward placed the actual van--regularly
the rear--most to windward, and rendered it expedient to tack in
succession, instead of all together, preserving to the full the
opportunity which chance had extended for reaching the enemy. In the
engagement, therefore, Hood commanded in the rear, and Rear-Admiral
Drake in the van. The wind with the French seems to have been more to
the eastward than with the British,--not an unusual circumstance in
the neighbourhood of land.

As Rodney, notwithstanding his haste, had formed line from time to
time during the past three days, his fleet was now in good order, and
his signals were chiefly confined to keeping it closed. The French, on
the other hand, were greatly scattered when their Commander-in-Chief,
in an impulse of hasty, unbalanced judgment, abandoned his previous
cautious policy and hurried them into action. Some of them were over
ten miles to windward of the flagship. Though they crowded sail to
rejoin her, there was not time enough for all to take their stations
properly, between daylight and 8 A.M., when the firing began. "Our
line of battle was formed under the fire of musketry,"[116] wrote the
Marquis de Vaudreuil, the second in command, who, being in the rear
of the fleet on this occasion, and consequently among the last to be
engaged, had excellent opportunity for observation. At the beginning
it was in de Grasse's power to postpone action, until the order should
be formed, by holding his wind under short canvas; while the mere
sight of his vessels hurrying down for action would have compelled
Rodney to call in the ships chasing the _Zélé_, the rescue of which
was the sole motive of the French manoeuvre. Instead of this, the
French flagship kept off the wind; which precipitated the collision,
while at the same time delaying the preparations needed to sustain it.
To this de Grasse added another fault by forming on the port tack,
the contrary to that on which the British were, and standing southerly
towards Dominica. The effect of this was to bring his ships into the
calms and baffling winds which cling to the shore-line, thus depriving
them of their power of manoeuvre. His object probably was to confine
the engagement to a mere pass-by on opposite tacks, by which in all
previous instances the French had thwarted the decisive action that
Rodney sought. Nevertheless, the blunder was evident at once to
French eyes. "What evil genius has inspired the admiral?" exclaimed du
Pavillon, Vaudreuil's flag-captain, who was esteemed one of the best
tacticians in France, and who fell in the battle.

[Illustration]

As the two lines drew near to one another, standing, the French south,
the British east-north-east, the wind shifted back to the eastward,
allowing the French to head higher, to south-south-east, and knocking
the British off to north-north-east (Position 4). The head of the
French column thus passed out of gunshot, across the bows of Rodney's
leading vessel, the _Marlborough_, (m), which came within range when
abreast the eighth ship. The first shots were fired by the _Brave_,
74, ninth in the French line, at 8 A.M. The British captain then put
his helm up and ran slowly along, north-north-west, under the lee of
the French, towards their rear. The rest of the British fleet followed
in his wake. The battle thus assumed the form of passing in opposite
directions on parallel lines; except that the French ships, as they
successively cleared the point where the British column struck their
line, would draw out of fire, their course diverging thenceforth from
that of the British approach. The effect of this would be that the
British rear, when it reached that point, would be fresh, having
undergone no fire, and with that advantage would encounter the French
rear, which had received already the fire of the British van and
centre. To obviate this, by bringing his own van into action, de
Grasse signalled the van ships to lead south-south-west, parallel
with the British north-north-east (4, a). The engagement thus became
general all along the lines; but it is probable that the French van
was never well formed. Its commander, at all events, reached his post
later than the commander of the rear did his.[117]

At five minutes past eight, Rodney made a general signal for close
action, followed immediately by another for the leading ships to head
one point to starboard--towards the enemy--which indicates that he
was not satisfied with the distance first taken by the _Marlborough_.
The _Formidable_, his flagship, eighteenth in the column, began
to fire at 8.23;[118] but the _Barfleur_, Hood's flagship, which
was thirty-first, not till 9.25. This difference in time is to be
accounted for chiefly by the light airs near Dominica, contrasted
with the fresh trades in the open channel to the northward, which the
leading British vessels felt before their rear. De Grasse now, too
late, had realised the disastrous effect which this would have upon
his fleet. If he escaped all else, his ships, baffled by calms and
catspaws while the British had a breeze, must lose the weather-gage,
and with it the hope of evading pursuit, hitherto his chief
preoccupation. Twice he signalled to wear,--first, all together, then
in succession,--but, although the signals were seen, they could not
be obeyed with the enemy close under the lee. "The French fleet,"
comments Chevalier justly, "had freedom of movement no longer. A fleet
cannot wear with an enemy's fleet within musket-range to leeward."

The movement therefore continued as described, the opposing ships
slowly "sliding by" each other until about 9.15, when the wind
suddenly shifted back to south-east again. The necessity of keeping
the sails full forced the bows of each French vessel towards the enemy
(Position 5), destroying the order in column, and throwing the fleet
into _échelon_, or, as the phrase then was, into bow and quarter
line.[119] The British, on the contrary, were free either to hold
their course or to head towards the enemy. Rodney's flagship (5, a)
luffed, and led through the French line just astern of the _Glorieux_,
74, (g), which was the nineteenth in their order. She was followed
by five ships; and her next ahead also, the _Duke_ (d), seeing her
chief's movement, imitated it, breaking through the line astern of the
twenty-third French. The _Glorieux_, on the starboard hand of Rodney's
little column, received its successive broadsides. Her main and mizzen
masts went overboard at 9.28, when the _Canada_, third astern of
the _Formidable_, had just passed her; and a few moments later her
foremast and bowsprit fell. At 9.33 the _Canada_ was to windward of
the French line. The flagship _Formidable_ was using both broadsides
as she broke through the enemy's order. On her port hand, between her
and the _Duke_, were four French ships huddled together (c), one of
which had paid off the wrong way; that is, after the shift of wind
took her aback, her sails had filled on the opposite tack from that
of the rest of her fleet.[120] These four, receiving the repeated
broadsides, at close quarters, of the _Formidable_, _Duke_, and
_Namur_, and having undergone besides the fire of the British van,
were very severely mauled. While these things were happening, the
_Bedford_, the sixth astern of the _Formidable_, perhaps unable to
see her next ahead in the smoke, had luffed independently (b), and was
followed by the twelve rearmost British ships, whom she led through
the French order astern of the _César_, 74, (k), twelfth from the van.
This ship and her next ahead, the _Hector_, 74, (h), suffered as did
the _Glorieux_. The _Barfleur_, which was in the centre of this column
of thirteen, opened fire at 9.25. At 10.45 she "ceased firing, having
passed the enemy's van ships;" that is, she was well on the weather
side of the French fleet. Some of the rearmost of Hood's division,
however, were still engaged at noon; but probably all were then to
windward of the enemy.

[Illustration]

The British ships ahead of the _Duke_, the van and part of the centre,
in all sixteen sail, had continued to stand to the northward. At the
time Rodney broke the line, several of them must have passed beyond
the French rear, and out of action. One, the _America_, the twelfth
from the van, wore without signals, to pursue the enemy, and her
example was followed at once by the ship next ahead, the _Russell_,
Captain Saumarez. No signal following, the _America_ again wore and
followed her leaders, but the _Russell_ continued as she was, now
to windward of the French; by which course she was able to take a
conspicuous share in the closing scenes. At 11.33 Rodney signalled the
van to tack, but the delay of an hour or more had given the _Russell_
a start over the other ships of her division "towards the enemy" which
could not be overcome.

The effect of these several occurrences had been to transfer the
weather-gage, the position for attack, to the British from the French,
and to divide the latter also into three groups, widely separated
and disordered (Position 6). In the centre was the flagship _Ville de
Paris_ with five ships (c). To windward of her, and two miles distant,
was the van, of some dozen vessels (v). The rear was four miles away
to leeward (r). To restore the order, and to connect the fleet again,
it was decided to re-form on the leewardmost ships; and several
signals to this effect were made by de Grasse. They received but
imperfect execution. The manageable vessels succeeded easily enough
in running before the wind to leeward, but, when there, exactitude of
position and of movement was unattainable to ships in various degrees
of disability, with light and baffling side airs. The French were
never again in order after the wind shifted and the line was broken;
but the movement to leeward left the dismasted _Glorieux_, (g),
_Hector_, (h), and _César_, (k), motionless between the hostile lines.

It has been remarked, disparagingly, that the British fleet also
was divided into three by the manoeuvre of breaking the line. This
is true; but the advantage remained with it incontestably, in two
respects. By favor of the wind, each of the three groups had been able
to maintain its general formation in line or column, instead of being
thrown entirely out, as the French were; and passing thus in column
along the _Glorieux_, _Hector_, and _César_, they wrought upon these
three ships a concentration of injury which had no parallel among the
British vessels. The French in fact had lost three ships, as well as
the wind. To these certain disadvantages is probably to be added a
demoralisation among the French crews, from the much heavier losses
resultant upon the British practice of firing at the hull. An officer
present in the action told Sir John Ross[121] afterwards that the
French fired very high throughout; and he cited in illustration that
the three trucks[122] of the British _Princesa_ were shot away. Sir
Gilbert Blane, who, though Physician to the Fleet, obtained permission
to be on deck throughout the action, wrote ten days after it, "I
can aver from my own observation that the French fire slackens as we
approach, and is totally silent when we are close alongside." It is
needless to say that a marked superiority of fire will silence that of
the bravest enemy; and the practice of aiming at the spars and sails,
however suited for frustrating an approach, substantially conceded
that superiority upon which the issue of decisive battle depends. As
illustrative of this result, the British loss will be stated here. It
was but 243 killed and 816 wounded in a fleet of thirty-six sail. The
highest in any one ship was that of the _Duke_, 73 killed and wounded.
No certain account, or even very probable estimate, of the French loss
has ever been given. None is cited by French authorities. Sir Gilbert
Blane, who was favourably placed for information, reckoned that of
the _Ville de Paris_ alone to be 300. There being fifty-four hundred
troops distributed among the vessels of the fleet, the casualties
would be proportionately more numerous; but, even allowing for this,
there can be no doubt that the loss of the French, to use Chevalier's
words, "was certainly much more considerable" than that reported by
the British. Six post-captains out of thirty were killed, against two
British out of thirty-six.

Rodney did not make adequate use of the great opportunity, which
accident rather than design had given him at noon of April 12th. He
did allow a certain liberty of manoeuvre, by discontinuing the order
for the line of battle; but the signal for close action, hoisted at
1 P.M., was hauled down a half-hour later. Hood, who realised the
conditions plainly visible, as well as the reasonable inferences
therefrom, wished the order given for a general chase, which would
have applied the spur of emulation to every captain present, without
surrendering the hold that particular signals afford upon indiscreet
movements. He bitterly censured the Admiral's failure to issue this
command. Had it been done, he said:--

    "I am very confident we should have had twenty sail of the
    enemy's ships before dark. Instead of that, he pursued only
    under his topsails (sometimes his foresail was set and at
    others his mizzen topsail aback) the greatest part of the
    afternoon, though the _flying_ enemy had all the sail set
    their very shattered state would allow."[123]

To make signal for a general chase was beyond the competence of a
junior admiral; but Hood did what he could, by repeated signals to
individual ships of his own division to make more sail, by setting all
he could on the _Barfleur_, and by getting out his boats to tow
her head round. Sir Gilbert Blane unintentionally gives a similar
impression of laxity.

    "After cutting the French line, the action during the rest of
    the day was partial and desultory, the enemy never being able
    to form, and several of the [our] ships being obliged to lie
    by and repair their damages. As the signal for the line
    was now hauled down, every ship annoyed the enemy as their
    respective commanders judged best."[124]

For this indolent abandonment of the captains to their own devices,
the correctest remedy was, as Hood indicated, the order for a general
chase, supplemented by a watchful supervision, which should check the
over-rash and stimulate the over-cautious. If Hood's account of the
sail carried by Rodney be correct, the Commander-in-Chief did not
even set the best example. In this languid pursuit, the three crippled
French ships were overhauled, and of course had to strike; and a
fourth, the _Ardent_, 64, was taken, owing to her indifferent sailing.
Towards sunset the flagship _Ville de Paris_, 110,[125] the finest
ship of war afloat, having been valiantly defended against a host of
enemies throughout great part of the afternoon, and having expended
all her ammunition, hauled down her colours. The two British
vessels then immediately engaged with her were the _Russell_ and
the _Barfleur_, Hood's flagship, to the latter of which she formally
surrendered; the exact moment, noted in Hood's journal, being 6.29
P.M.

At 6.45 Rodney made the signal for the fleet to bring-to (form line
and stop) on the port tack, and he remained lying-to during the night,
while the French continued to retreat under the orders of the
Marquis de Vaudreuil, who by de Grasse's capture had become
commander-in-chief. For this easy-going deliberation also Hood had
strong words of condemnation.

    "Why he should bring the fleet to because the _Ville de Paris_
    was taken, I cannot reconcile. He did not pursue under easy
    sail, so as never to have lost sight of the enemy in the
    night, which would clearly and most undoubtedly have enabled
    him to have taken almost every ship the next day.... Had I
    had the honour of commanding his Majesty's noble fleet on the
    12th, I may, without much imputation of vanity, say the flag
    of England should now have graced the sterns of _upwards_ of
    twenty sail of the enemy's ships of the line."[126]

Such criticisms by those not responsible are to be received generally
with caution; but Hood was, in thought and in deed, a man so much
above the common that these cannot be dismissed lightly. His opinion
is known to have been shared by Sir Charles Douglas, Rodney's Captain
of the Fleet;[127] and their conclusion is supported by the inferences
to be drawn from Rodney's own assumptions as to the condition of
the French, contrasted with the known facts. The enemy, he wrote,
in assigning his reasons for not pursuing, "went off in a _close
connected body_,[128] and might have defeated, by rotation, the ships
that had come up with them." "The enemy _who went off in a body of
twenty-six ships of the line_,[128] might, by ordering two or three
of their best sailing ships or frigates to have shown lights at times,
and by changing their course, have induced the British fleet to have
followed them, while the main of their fleet, by hiding their lights,
might have hauled their wind, and have been far to windward by
daylight, and intercepted the captured ships, and the most crippled
ships of the English;" and he adds that the Windward Islands even
might have been endangered. That such action was in a remote degree
possible to a well-conditioned fleet may be guardedly conceded; but it
was wildly improbable to a fleet staggering under such a blow as the
day had seen, which had changed its commander just as dark came on,
and was widely scattered and disordered up to the moment when signals
by flags became invisible.

The facts, however, were utterly at variance with these ingenious
suppositions. Instead of being connected, as Rodney represents, de
Vaudreuil had with him next morning but ten ships; and no others
during the whole of the 13th. He made sail for Cap François, and was
joined on the way by five more, so that at no time were there upwards
of fifteen[129] French ships of the line together, prior to his
arrival at that port on April 25th. He there found four others of the
fleet. The tale of twenty-five survivors, from the thirty engaged on
April 12th, was completed by six which had gone to Curaçao, and which
did not rejoin until May. So much for the close connected body of the
French. It is clear, therefore, that Rodney's reasons illustrate the
frame of mind against which Napoleon used to caution his generals
as "making to themselves a picture" of possibilities; and that his
conclusion at best was based upon the ruinous idea, which a vivid
imagination or slothful temper is prone to present to itself, that
war may be made decisive without running risks. That Jamaica even
was saved was not due to this fine, but indecisive battle, but to the
hesitation of the allies. When de Vaudreuil reached Cap François, he
found there the French convoy safely arrived from Guadeloupe, and also
a body of fifteen Spanish ships of the line. The troops available for
the descent upon Jamaica were from fifteen to twenty thousand. Well
might Hood write: "Had Sir George Rodney's judgment, after the enemy
had been so totally put to flight, borne any proportion to the high
courage, zeal and exertion, so very manifestly shown by every captain,
_all_ difficulty would now have been at an end. We might have
done just as we pleased, instead of being at this hour upon the
defensive."[130]

The allies, however, though superior in numbers, did not venture
to assume the offensive. After the battle, Rodney remained near
Guadeloupe until the 17th of April, refitting, and searching the
neighbouring islands, in case the French fleet might have entered some
one of them. For most of this time the British were becalmed, but Hood
remarks that there had been wind enough to get twenty leagues to the
westward; and there more wind probably would have been found. On the
17th Hood was detached in pursuit with ten sail of the line; and a
day or two later Rodney himself started for Jamaica. Left to his own
discretion, Hood pushed for the Mona Passage, between Puerto Rico and
Santo Domingo, carrying studding-sails below and aloft in his haste.
At daybreak of the 19th he sighted the west end of Puerto Rico; and
soon afterwards a small French squadron was seen. A general chase
resulted in the capture of the _Jason_ and _Caton_, sixty-fours, which
had parted from their fleet before the battle and were on their way to
Cap François. A frigate, the _Aimable_, 32, and a sloop, the _Cérès_,
18, also were taken. In reporting this affair to Rodney, Hood got a
thrust into his superior. "It is a very mortifying circumstance to
relate to you, Sir, that the French fleet which you put to flight
on the 12th went through the Mona Channel on the 18th, only the day
before I was in it."[131] A further proof of the utility of pursuit,
here hinted at, is to be found in the fact that Rodney, starting six
days later than de Vaudreuil, reached Jamaica, April 28th, only three
days after the French got into Cap François. He had therefore gained
three days in a fortnight's run. What might not have been done by an
untiring chase! But a remark recorded by Hood summed up the frame of
mind which dominated Rodney: "I lamented to Sir George on the 13th
that the signal for a general chase was not made when that for the
line was hauled down and that he did not continue to pursue so as to
keep sight of the enemy all night, to which he only answered, 'Come,
we have done very handsomely as it is.'"[132]

Rodney stayed at Jamaica until the 10th of July, when Admiral
Hugh Pigot arrived from England to supersede him. This change was
consequent upon the fall of Lord North's ministry, in March, 1782, and
had been decided before the news of the victory could reach England.
Admiral Keppel now became the head of the Admiralty. Rodney sailed for
home from Port Royal on the 22d of July; and with his departure the
war in the West Indies and North America may be said to have ended.
Pigot started almost immediately for New York, and remained in
North American waters until the end of October, when he returned to
Barbados, first having detached Hood with thirteen ships of the line
from the main fleet, to cruise off Cap François. It is of interest to
note that at this time Hood took with him from New York the frigate
_Albemarle_, 28, then commanded by Nelson, who had been serving on the
North American station. These various movements were dictated by those
of the enemy, either actually made or supposed to be in contemplation;
for it was an inevitable part of the ill-effects of Rodney's most
imperfect success, that the British fleet was thenceforth on the
defensive purely, with all the perplexities of him who waits upon the
initiative of an opponent. Nothing came of them all, however, for
the war now was but lingering in its death stupor. The defeat of de
Grasse, partial though it was; the abandonment of the enterprise upon
Jamaica; the failure of the attack upon Gibraltar; and the success of
Howe in re-victualling that fortress,--these had taken all heart out
of the French and Spaniards; while the numerical superiority of the
allies, inefficiently though it had been used heretofore, weighed
heavily upon the imagination of the British Government, which now
had abandoned all hope of subduing its American Colonies. Upon the
conclusion of peace, in 1783, Pigot and Hood returned to England,
leaving the Leeward Islands' Station under the command of Rear-Admiral
Sir Richard Hughes, an officer remembered by history only through
Nelson's refusing to obey his orders not to enforce the Navigation
Acts, in 1785.

[Footnote 105: James Saumarez, Lord de Saumarez, G.C.B. Born, 1757.
Commander, 1781. Captain, 1782. Captain of _Russell_ in Rodney's
action, 1782. Knighted for capture of frigate _Réunion_, 1793. Captain
of _Orion_ in Bridport's action, at St. Vincent, and at the Nile (when
he was second in command). Rear-Admiral and Baronet, 1801. Defeated
French and Spaniards off Cadiz, July 12th, 1801. Vice-Admiral, 1805.
Vice-Admiral of England and a peer, 1831. Died, 1836.]

[Footnote 106: _Ante_, p. 183.]

[Footnote 107: Probably _Prudent_, 64. There was no _President_ in the
fleet.]

[Footnote 108: The times and general movements are put together from
Hood's Journal and the Log of the _Canada_, published by the Navy
Records Society. "Letters of Lord Hood," pp. 64, 86.]

[Footnote 109: When ships were in order of battle, or column, close
to the wind, if they all tacked at the same time they would still
be ranged on the same line but steering at an angle to it, on the
opposite tack. This formation was called bow and quarter line, because
each vessel had a comrade off its bow--to one side and ahead--and one
off its quarter--to one side but astern. The advantage of this, if
heading towards the enemy, was that by tacking again together they
would be at once again in column, or line ahead, the customary order
of battle.]

[Footnote 110: Illustrations of other phases of this battle can be
found in Mahan's "Influence of Sea Power upon History," pp. 470, 472.]

[Footnote 111: White, "Naval Researches."]

[Footnote 112: Sharp up by the starboard braces, the wind being on the
starboard quarter. This emptied the aftersails of wind, neutralizing
their effect, and, by causing the ship to move more slowly, kept her
longer abreast an anchored opponent.]

[Footnote 113: White, "Naval Researches."]

[Footnote 114: _Ante_, p. 164.]

[Footnote 115: Seven hundred and twenty feet. For ships of the line
of that day this would make the interval between each two about four
ships' length. At five knots speed this distance would be covered in
something over a minute.]

[Footnote 116: Probably not over one or two hundred yards from the
enemy.]

[Footnote 117: The position, in the French order, of the ships taken
in the battle, is shown by the crosses in Positions 4, 5, 6.]

[Footnote 118: _Canada's_ log, 8.15; reduced to Hood's times, which
are generally followed.]

[Footnote 119: _Ante_, p. 200 (note).]

[Footnote 120: This mishap occurred to three French vessels.]

[Footnote 121: Ross, "Life of Saumarez," i. 71.]

[Footnote 122: Circular pieces of wood which cap the top of the
masts.]

[Footnote 123: Letters of Lord Hood, p. 103. Navy Records Society.]

[Footnote 124: Mundy, "Life of Rodney," ii. 234.]

[Footnote 125: She is thus rated in the British Navy Lists published
between the time of her capture and the receipt of news of her loss;
but she seems to have carried 120 guns.]

[Footnote 126: Letters of Lord Hood, pp. 103, 104.]

[Footnote 127: See letter of Sir Howard Douglas, son to Sir Charles;
"United Service Journal," 1834, Part II, p. 97.]

[Footnote 128: Author's italics; Mundy, "Life of Rodney," ii. 248.]

[Footnote 129: Troude. Chevalier says sixteen, differing with. Troude
as to the whereabouts of the _Brave_.]

[Footnote 130: Letters of Lord Hood, p. 136.]

[Footnote 131: Letters of Lord Hood, p. 134.]

[Footnote 132: Ibid., p. 104.]




CHAPTER XIII

HOWE AGAIN GOES AFLOAT. THE FINAL RELIEF OF GIBRALTAR

1782


The fall of Lord North's Ministry, besides occasioning the recall
of Rodney, drew Lord Howe out of his long retirement, to command the
Channel Fleet. He hoisted his flag on the 20th of April, 1782, on
board the _Victory_, 100. Owing to the various directions in which
the efforts of Great Britain had to be made, either to defend her own
interests or to crush the movements of the many enemies now combined
against her, the operations of the Channel fleet were for some months
carried on by detached squadrons,--in the North Sea, in the Bay
of Biscay, and at the entrance of the Channel; Howe having under
him several distinguished subordinates, at the head of whom, in
professional reputation, were Vice-Admiral Barrington, the captor of
Santa Lucia, and Rear-Admiral Kempenfelt. In the North Sea, the Dutch
were kept in their ports; and a convoy of near 400 merchant ships
from the Baltic reached England unmolested. In the Bay of Biscay,
Barrington, having with him twelve of the line, discovered and chased
a convoy laden with stores for the fleet in the East Indies. One of
the ships of the line accompanying it, the _Pégase_, 74, surrendered,
after a night action of three hours with the _Foudroyant_, 80, Captain
John Jervis, afterwards Earl St. Vincent. Of nineteen transports,
thirteen, one of which, the _Actionnaire_, was a 64-gun ship armed
_en flûte_,[133] were taken; a weighty blow to the great Suffren,
whose chief difficulty in India was inadequate material of war, and
especially of spars, of which the _Actionnaire_ carried an outfit for
four ships of the line. After Barrington's return, Kempenfelt made a
similar but uneventful cruise of a month in the Bay.

Howe himself went first to the North Sea in the month of May. Having
there held the Dutch in check during a critical moment, he was
directed next to go to the entrance of the Channel, leaving only a
division in the Downs. Information had been received that an allied
fleet of thirty-two ships of the line, five only of which were
French, had sailed from Cadiz early in June, to cruise between Ushant
and Scilly. It was expected that they would be joined there by a
reinforcement from Brest, and by the Dutch squadron in the Texel,
making a total of about fifty of the line, under the command of the
Spanish Admiral, Don Luis de Cordova. The Dutch did not appear, owing
probably to Howe's demonstration before their ports; but eight ships
from Brest raised the allied fleet to forty. To oppose these Howe
sailed on the 2d of July with twenty-two sail, of which eight were
three-deckers. Before his return, in the 7th of August, he was joined
by eight others; mostly, however, sixty-fours. With this inferiority
of numbers the British Admiral could expect only to act on the
defensive, unless some specially favourable opportunity should offer.
The matter of most immediate concern was the arrival of the Jamaica
convoy, then daily expected; with which, it may be mentioned, de
Grasse also was returning to England, a prisoner of war on board the
_Sandwich_.

On its voyage north, the allied fleet captured on June 25th eighteen
ships of a British convoy bound for Canada. A few days later it was
fixed in the chops of the Channel, covering the ground from Ushant
to Scilly. On the evening of July 7th it was sighted off Scilly by
Howe, who then had with him twenty-five sail. The allies prepared for
action; but the British Admiral, possessing a thorough knowledge of
the neighbouring coasts, either in his own person or in some of his
officers, led the fleet by night to the westward through the passage
between Scilly and Land's End. On the following morning he was no more
to be seen, and the enemy, ignorant of the manner of his evasion, was
thrown wholly off his track.[134] Howe met the convoy; and a strong
gale of wind afterwards forcing the allies to the southward, both it
and the fleet slipped by successfully, and reached England.

Howe was ordered now to prepare to throw reinforcements and supplies
into Gibraltar, which had not received relief since Darby's visit, in
April, 1781. For this urgent and critical service it was determined
to concentrate the whole Channel Fleet at Spithead, where also the
transports and supply-ships were directed to rendezvous. It was while
thus assembling for the relief of Gibraltar that there occurred the
celebrated incident of the _Royal George_, a 100-gun ship, while
being heeled for under-water repairs, oversetting and sinking at her
anchors, carrying down with her Rear-Admiral Kempenfelt and about nine
hundred souls, including many women and children. This was on the 29th
of August, 1782. On the 11th of September the expedition started, one
hundred and eighty-three sail in all; thirty-four being ships of the
line, with a dozen smaller cruisers, the rest unarmed vessels. Of the
latter, thirty-one were destined for Gibraltar, the remainder being
trading ships for different parts of the world. With so extensive a
charge, the danger to which had been emphasised by numerous captures
from convoys during the war, Howe's progress was slow. It is told that
shortly before reaching Cape Finisterre, but after a violent gale of
wind, the full tally of one hundred eighty-three sail was counted.
After passing Finisterre, the several "trades" probably parted from
the grand fleet.

On the 8th of October, off Cape St. Vincent, a frigate was sent ahead
for information. It was known that a great combined force of ships
of war lay in Algeciras Bay,--opposite Gibraltar,--and that an attack
upon the works was in contemplation; but much might have happened
meantime. Much, in fact, had happened. A violent gale of wind on
the 10th of September had driven some of the allied fleet from their
moorings, one vessel, the _San Miguel_, 72, being forced under the
batteries of Gibraltar, where she had to surrender; but there still
remained the formidable number of forty-eight ships of the line,
anchored only four miles from the point which the relief ships must
reach. This was the problem which Howe had to solve. More important
still, though of less bearing upon his mission, was the cheering news
brought by the frigate, when she rejoined on October 10th, that the
long-intended attack had been made on the 13th of September, and had
been repelled gloriously and decisively. The heavily protected Spanish
floating batteries, from which success had been expected confidently,
one and all had been set on fire and destroyed. If Howe could
introduce his succours, the fortress was saved.

The admiral at once summoned his subordinate officers, gave them
full and particular instructions for the momentous undertaking, and
issued at the same time, to the masters of the supply-ships, precise
information as to local conditions of wind and currents at Gibraltar,
to enable them more surely to reach their anchorage. On the 11th of
October, being now close to its destination, the fleet bore up for
the Straits, which it entered at noon with a fair westerly wind. The
convoy went first,--sailing before the wind it was thus to leeward
of the fleet, in a position to be defended,--and the ships of war
followed at some distance in three divisions, one of which was led
by Howe himself. At 6 P.M. the supply-ships were off the mouth of
the Bay, with a wind fair for the mole; but, through neglect of the
instructions given, all but four missed the entrance, and were swept
to the eastward of the Rock, whither the fleet of course had to follow
them.

On the 13th the allied fleets came out, being induced to quit their
commanding position at Algeciras by fears for two of their number,
which shortly before had been driven to the eastward. During the
forenoon of the same day the British were off the Spanish coast, fifty
miles east of Gibraltar. At sunset the allies were seen approaching,
and Howe formed his fleet, but sent the supply-ships to anchor at
the Zaffarine Islands, on the coast of Barbary, to await events. Next
morning the enemy was close to land northward, but visible only from
the mastheads; the British apparently having headed south during the
night. On the 15th the wind came east, fair for Gibraltar, towards
which all the British began cautiously to move. By the evening of the
16th, eighteen of the convoy were safe at the mole; and on the 18th
all had arrived, besides a fireship with 1,500 barrels of powder, sent
in by the Admiral upon the governor's requisition. Throughout these
critical hours, the combined fleets seem to have been out of sight.
Either intentionally or carelessly, they had got to the eastward and
there remained; having rallied their separated ships, but allowed
Gibraltar to be replenished for a year. On the morning of the 19th
they appeared in the north-east, but the relief was then accomplished
and Howe put out to sea. He was not willing to fight in mid-Straits,
embarrassed by currents and the land; but when outside he
brought-to,--stopped, by backing some of the sails,--to allow the
enemy to attack if they would, they having the weather-gage. On the
following day, the 20th, towards sunset they bore down, and a partial
engagement ensued; but it was wholly indecisive, and next day was not
renewed. The British loss was 68 killed and 208 wounded; that of the
allies 60 killed and 320 wounded. On the 14th of November the fleet
regained Spithead.

The services rendered to his country by Howe on this occasion were
eminently characteristic of the special qualities of that great
officer, in whom was illustrated to the highest degree the solid
strength attainable by a man not brilliant, but most able, who gives
himself heart and soul to professional acquirement. In him, profound
and extensive professional knowledge, which is not inborn but gained,
was joined to great natural staying powers; and the combination
eminently fitted him for the part we have seen him play in Delaware
Bay, at New York, before Rhode Island, in the Channel, and now at
Gibraltar. The utmost of skill, the utmost of patience, the utmost of
persistence, such had Howe; and having these, he was particularly apt
for the defensive operations, upon the conduct of which chiefly must
rest his well-deserved renown.

A true and noble tribute has been paid by a French officer to this
relief of Gibraltar:[135]--

    "The qualities displayed by Lord Howe during this short
    campaign rose to the full height of the mission which he
    had to fulfil. This operation, one of the finest in the
    War of American Independence, merits a praise equal to
    that of a victory. If the English fleet was favoured by
    circumstances,--and it is rare that in such enterprises one
    can succeed without the aid of fortune--it was above all the
    Commander-in-Chief's quickness of perception, the accuracy of
    his judgment, and the rapidity of his decisions, that assured
    success."

To this well-weighed, yet lofty praise of the Admiral, the same writer
has added words that the British Navy may remember long with pride,
as sealing the record of this war, of which the relief of Gibraltar
marked the close in European and American waters. After according
credit to the Admiralty for the uniform high speed of the British
vessels, and to Howe for his comprehension and use of this advantage,
Captain Chevalier goes on:--

    "Finally, if we may judge by the results, the
    Commander-in-Chief of the English fleet could not but think
    himself most happy in his captains. There were neither
    separations, nor collisions, nor casualties; and there
    occurred none of those events, so frequent in the experiences
    of a squadron, which often oblige admirals to take a course
    wholly contrary to the end they have in view. In contemplation
    of this unvexed navigation of Admiral Howe, it is impossible
    not to recall the unhappy incidents which from the 9th to the
    12th of April befell the squadron of the Count de Grasse....
    If it is just to admit that Lord Howe displayed the highest
    talent, it should be added that he had in his hands excellent
    instruments."

To quote another French writer: "Quantity disappeared before quality."

[Footnote 133: That is, with a great part of her guns dismounted, and
below as cargo.]

[Footnote 134: Chevalier, following La Motte-Picquet's report,
ascribes Howe's escape to greater speed. ("Mar. Fran. en 1778," p.
335.) It must be noted that Howe's object was not merely to escape
eastward, up Channel, by better sailing, but to get to the westward,
_past_ the allies, a feat impracticable save by a stratagem such as is
mentioned.]

[Footnote 135: Chevalier, "Mar. Fran, dans la Guerre de 1778," p.
358.]




CHAPTER XIV

THE NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE EAST INDIES, 1778-1783. THE CAREER OF THE
BAILLI DE SUFFREN


The operations in India, both naval and military, stand by themselves,
without direct influence upon transactions elsewhere, and unaffected
also by these, except in so far as necessary succours were intercepted
sometimes in European waters. The cause of this isolation was the
distance of India from Europe; from four to six months being required
by a fleet for the voyage.

[Illustration]

Certain intelligence of the war between Great Britain and France
reached Calcutta July 7th, 1778. On the same day the Governor-General
ordered immediate preparations to attack Pondicherry, the principal
seaport of the French. The army arrived before the place on the 8th
of August, and on the same day Commodore Sir Edward Vernon anchored
in the roads to blockade by sea. A French squadron, under Captain
Tronjoly, soon after appearing in the offing, Vernon gave chase, and
on the 10th an action ensued. The forces engaged were about equal, the
French, if anything, slightly superior; a 60-gun ship and four smaller
vessels being on each side. As the French then went into Pondicherry,
the immediate advantage may be conceded to them; but, Vernon returning
on the 20th, Tronjoly soon after quitted the roads, and returned to
the Ile de France.[136] From that day the British squadron blockaded
closely, and on the 17th of October Pondicherry capitulated.

On the 7th of March, 1779, Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Hughes sailed
for the East Indies with a small squadron. The French also sent out
occasional ships; but in 1779 and 1780 these went no further than the
Ile de France, their naval station in the Indian Ocean. Hughes's force
remained unopposed during those years. The period was critical, for
the British were at war with Hyder Ali, Sultan of Mysore, and with the
Mahrattas; and all depended upon command of the sea. In January, 1781,
when Hughes was wintering at Bombay, the French squadron under Comte
d'Orves appeared off the Coromandel coast, but, despite Hyder Ali's
entreaties, it refused to coöperate with him. The different spirit of
the two commanders may be illustrated from contemporary documents.

    "We have advices from Fort St. George of a French squadron
    which appeared off that place on January 25, 26, and 27,
    consisting of 1 seventy-four, 4 sixty-fours, and 2 fifties.
    They proceeded south without making any attempt on five
    Indiamen then in the roads, with a number of vessels laden
    with grain and provisions; the destroying of which might have
    been easily accomplished, and would have been severely felt."

    "On December 8th, off Mangalore,"[137] writes Hughes, "I
    saw two ships, a large snow, three ketches, and many smaller
    vessels at anchor in the road with Hyder's flag flying; and,
    standing close, found them vessels of force and all armed for
    war. I anchored as close as possible, sent in all armed boats,
    under cover of three smaller ships of war, which anchored in
    four fathoms water, close to the enemy's ships. In two hours
    took and burned the two ships, one of 28 and one of 26 guns,
    and took or destroyed all the others, save one which, by
    throwing everything overboard, escaped over the bar into the
    port. Lost 1 lieutenant and 10 men killed, 2 lieutenants and
    51 wounded."

It is interesting to note these evidences of Hughes's conceptions of
naval warfare and enterprise, common though they were to the British
service; for their positive character brings into strong relief the
qualities of his next antagonist, Suffren, and his great superiority
in these respects over the average run of French officers of that day.

D'Orves returned to the Ile de France.

When war with Holland began, the British government decided to attempt
the capture of the Cape of Good Hope. For that object a squadron of
one 74, one 64, and three 50's, with numerous smaller vessels, under
Commodore George Johnstone, convoying a considerable body of troops,
sailed from England on the 13th of March, 1781, in company with the
Channel fleet under Vice-Admiral George Darby, then on its way to
relieve Gibraltar. The French government, having timely notice of the
expedition, undertook to frustrate it; detailing for that purpose
a division of two 74's, and three 64's, under the since celebrated
Suffren.[139] These ships left Brest on the 22d of March, with the
fleet of de Grasse. They also carried some battalions of troops.

On April 11th the British squadron reached Porto Praya, Cape de Verde
Islands. This bay is open to the southward, extending from east
to west about a mile and a half, and is within the limits of the
north-east trade-winds. Although aware that a French division was
on his track, and conscious, by the admissions of his report, that
protection could not be expected from the neutrality of the place,
Johnstone permitted his vessels to anchor without reference to attack.
His own flagship, the _Romney_, 50, was so surrounded by others that
she could fire only with great caution through intervals. On the
16th of April, at 9.30 A.M., the _Isis_, 50, which was the outermost
of the British squadron, signalled eleven sail in the north-east.
Fifteen hundred persons were then ashore engaged in watering, fishing,
embarking cattle, and amusing themselves. The strangers were Suffren's
division. The meeting was not expected by the French commander, whose
object in entering was simply to complete the water of the ships; but
he determined at once to attack, and hauled round the east point of
the bay in column, the two seventy-fours at the head, his own ship,
the _Héros_, leading with the signal for battle (line ab). Passing
through, or along, the disordered enemy until he reached the only
seventy-four among them, he there luffed to the wind, anchoring five
hundred feet from the starboard beam of this vessel (f) which by an
odd coincidence bore the same name--_Hero_. From this position he at
once opened fire from both broadsides. His next astern, the _Annibal_
(b), brought up immediately ahead of him, but so close that the
_Héros_ had to veer cable and drop astern (a), which brought her on
the beam of the _Monmouth_, 64[140] (m). The captain of the _Annibal_
had thought the order for battle merely precautionary, and had not
cleared for action. He was therefore taken unawares, and his ship did
no service proportionate to her force. The third French vessel (c)
reached her station, but her captain was struck dead just when about
to anchor, and in the confusion the anchor was not let go. The ship
drifted foul of a British East Indiaman, which she carried out to sea
(c' c"). The two remaining French (d, e) simply cannonaded as they
passed across the bay's mouth, failing through mishap or awkwardness
to reach an effective position.

[Illustration]

The attack thus became a mere rough and tumble, in which the two
seventy-fours alone sustained the French side. After three quarters
of an hour, Suffren, seeing that the attempt had failed, slipped his
cable and put to sea. The _Annibal_ followed, but she had been so
damaged that all her masts went overboard; fortunately, not until her
head was pointed out of the harbour. Johnstone, thus luckily escaping
the consequences of his neglect, now called his captains together to
learn the condition of their ships, and then ordered them to cut their
cables and pursue. All obeyed except Captain Sutton of the _Isis_, who
represented that the spars and rigging of his ship could not bear sail
at once. Johnstone then ordered him to come out anyhow, which he did,
and his fore topmast shortly went overboard. The disability of this
ship so weighed upon the Commodore that his pursuit was exceedingly
sluggish; and the French kept drawing him away to leeward, the
_Annibal_ having got a bit of canvas on a jury foremast. Night,
therefore, was falling as Johnstone came near them; the _Isis_ and
_Monmouth_ were two or three miles astern; the sea was increasing;
if he got much further to leeward, he could not get back; he had
forgotten to appoint a rendezvous where the convoy might rejoin; a
night action, he considered, was not to be thought of. Yet, if he
let the enemy go, they might anticipate him at the Cape. In short,
Johnstone underwent the "anguish" of an undecided man in a "cruel
situation,"[141] and of course decided to run no risks. He returned
therefore to Porto Praya, put the captain of the _Isis_ under arrest,
and remained in port for a fortnight. Suffren hurried on to the Cape,
got there first, landed his troops, and secured the colony against
attack. Johnstone arrived in the neighbourhood some time later, and,
finding himself anticipated, turned aside to Saldanha Bay, where
he captured five Dutch East Indiamen. He then sent the _Hero_,
_Monmouth_, and _Isis_ on to India, to reinforce Hughes, and himself
went back to England.

No accusation of misbehavior lies against any of the British
subordinates in this affair of Porto Praya. The captain of the _Isis_
was brought to a court-martial, and honourably acquitted of all
the charges. The discredit of the surprise was not redeemed by any
exhibition of intelligence, energy, or professional capacity, on the
part of the officer in charge. It has been said that he never had
commanded a post-ship[142] before he was intrusted with this very
important mission, and it is reasonably sure that his selection for
it was due to attacks made by him upon the professional conduct
of Keppel and Howe, when those admirals were at variance with the
administration.[143] His preposterous mismanagement, therefore, was
probably not wholly bitter to the Navy at large. In the British ships
of war, the entire loss in men, as reported, was only 9 killed, 47
wounded. Several casualties from chance shots occurred on board the
convoy, bringing up the total to 36 killed and 130 wounded. The French
admit 105 killed and 204 wounded, all but 19 being in the _Héros_ and
_Annibal_. Although precipitated by Suffren, the affair clearly was
as great a surprise to his squadron as to the British. Therefore, the
latter, being already at anchor and more numerous as engaged, had a
distinct advantage; to which also contributed musketry fire from the
transports. Nevertheless, the result cannot be deemed creditable to
the French captains or gunnery.

Suffren remained in the neighbourhood of the Cape for two months.
Then, having seen the colony secure, independent of his squadron, he
departed for the Ile de France, arriving there October 25th. On the
17th of December the whole French force, under the command of d'Orves,
sailed for the Coromandel coast. On the way the British 50-gun ship
_Hannibal_, Captain Alexander Christie, was taken. On the 9th of
February, 1782, Comte d'Orves died, and Suffren found himself at
the head of twelve ships of the line: three 74's, seven 64's and two
50's.[144] On the 15th Hughes's fleet was sighted, under the guns of
Madras. It numbered nine of the line: two 74's, one 68, five 64's, and
one 50. Suffren stood south towards Pondicherry, which had passed into
the power of Hyder Ali. After nightfall Hughes got under way, and also
steered south. He feared for Trincomalee, in Ceylon, recently a Dutch
port, which the British had captured on the 5th of January. It was a
valuable naval position, as yet most imperfectly defended.

[Illustration]

At daylight the British saw the French squadron twelve miles east (A,
A) and its transports nine miles south-west (c). Hughes chased the
latter and took six. Suffren pursued, but could not overtake before
sunset, and both fleets steered south-east during the night. Next
morning there were light north-north-east airs, and the French were
six miles north-east of the British (B, B). The latter formed line
on the port tack (a), heading to seaward; Hughes hoping that thus the
usual sea-breeze would find him to windward. The breeze, however, did
not make as expected; and, as the north-east puffs were bringing the
enemy down, he kept off before the wind (b) to gain time for his ships
to close their intervals, which were too great. At 4 P.M. the near
approach of the French compelled him to form line again, (C), on the
port tack, heading easterly. The rear ship, _Exeter_, 64 (e), was left
separated, out of due support from those ahead. Suffren, leading one
section of his fleet in person, passed to windward of the British
line, from the rear, as far as Hughes's flagship, which was fifth from
the van. There he stopped, and kept at half cannon-shot, to prevent
the four ships in the British van from tacking to relieve their
consorts. It was his intention that the second half of his fleet
should attack the other side of the English rear. This plan of
intended battle is shown by the figure D in the diagram. Actually,
only two of the French rear did what Suffren expected, engaging to
leeward of the extreme British rear; the others of the French rear
remaining long out of action (C). The figure C shows the imperfect
achievement of the design D. However, as the position of Suffren's
flagship prevented the British van from tacking into action, the net
result was, to use Hughes's own words, that "the enemy brought eight
of their best ships to the attack of five of ours." It will be noted
with interest that these were exactly the numbers engaged in the first
act of the battle of the Nile. The _Exeter_ (like the _Guerrier_
at the Nile) received the fresh broadsides of the first five of the
enemy, and then remained in close action on both sides, assailed by
two, and at last by three, opponents,--two 50's, and one 64. When the
third approached, the master of the ship asked Commodore Richard King,
whose broad pennant flew at her masthead, "What is to be done?" "There
is nothing to be done," replied King, "but to fight her till she
sinks." Her loss, 10 killed and 45 wounded, was not creditable under
the circumstances to the French gunnery, which had been poor also at
Porto Praya. At 6 P.M. the wind shifted to south-east, throwing all
on the other tack, and enabling the British van at last to come into
action. Darkness now approaching, Suffren hauled off and anchored at
Pondicherry. Hughes went on to Trincomalee to refit. The British loss
had been 32 killed, among whom were Captain William Stevens of the
flagship, and Captain Henry Reynolds, of the _Exeter_, and 83 wounded.
The French had 30 killed; the number of their wounded is put by
Professor Laughton at 100.

On the 12th of March Hughes returned to Madras, and towards the end
of the month sailed again for Trincomalee carrying reinforcements and
supplies. On the 30th he was joined at sea by the _Sultan_, 74, and
the _Magnanime_, 64, just from England. Suffren had remained on the
coast from reasons of policy, to encourage Hyder Ali in his leaning
to the French; but, after landing a contingent of troops on the 22d of
March, to assist at the siege of the British port of Cuddalore, he put
to sea on the 23d, and went south, hoping to intercept the _Sultan_
and _Magnanime_ off the south end of Ceylon. On the 9th of April
he sighted the British fleet to the south and west of him. Hughes,
attaching the first importance to the strengthening of Trincomalee,
had resolved neither to seek nor to shun action. He therefore
continued his course, light northerly airs prevailing, until the 11th,
when, being about fifty miles to the north-east of his port, he bore
away for it. Next morning, April 12th, finding that the enemy could
overtake his rear ships, he formed line on the starboard tack, at
two cables' intervals, heading to the westward, towards the coast
of Ceylon, wind north by east, and the French dead to windward (A,
A). Suffren drew up his line (a) on the same tack, parallel to the
British, and at 11 A.M. gave the signal to steer west-south-west all
together; his vessels going down in a slanting direction (bb'), each
to steer for one of the enemy. Having twelve ships to eleven, the
twelfth was ordered to place herself on the off side of the rear
British, which would thus have two antagonists.

In such simultaneous approach it commonly occurred that the attacking
line ceased to be parallel with the foe's, its van becoming nearer and
rear more distant. So it was here. Further, the British opening fire
as soon as the leading French were within range, the latter at once
hauled up to reply. Suffren, in the centre, wishing closest action,
signalled them to keep away again, and himself bore down wrathfully
upon Hughes to within pistol-shot; in which he was supported closely
by his next ahead and the two next astern. The rear of the French,
though engaged, remained too far distant. Their line, therefore,
resembled a curve, the middle of which--four or five ships--was
tangent to the British centre (B). At this point the heat of the
attack fell upon Hughes's flagship, the _Superb_, 74 (C, d), and her
next ahead, the _Monmouth_, 64. Suffren's ship, the _Héros_, having
much of her rigging cut, could not shorten sail, shot by the _Superb_,
and brought up abreast the _Monmouth_. The latter, already hotly
engaged by one of her own class, and losing her main and mizzen masts
in this unequal new contest, was forced at 3 P.M. to bear up out of
the line (m). The place of the _Héros_ alongside the _Superb_ was
taken by the _Orient_, 74, supported by the _Brillant_, 64; and when
the _Monmouth_ kept off, the attack of these two ships was reinforced
by the half-dozen stern chasers of the _Héros_, which had drifted into
the British line, and now fired into the _Superb's_ bows. The conflict
between these five ships, two British and three French, was one of the
bloodiest in naval annals; the loss of the _Superb_, 59 killed and 96
wounded, and of the _Monmouth_, 45 killed and 102 wounded, equalling
that of the much larger vessels which bore the flags of Nelson and
Collingwood at Trafalgar. The loss of the three French was 52 killed
and 142 wounded; but to this should be added properly that of the
_Sphinx_, 64, the _Monmouth's_ first adversary: 22 killed and 74
wounded. At 3.40 P.M., fearing that if he continued steering west he
would get entangled with the shore, Hughes wore his ships, forming
line on the port tack, heading off shore. The French also wore, and
Suffren hoped to secure the _Monmouth_, which was left between the two
lines; but the quickness of a British captain, Hawker, of the _Hero_,
ran a tow-rope to her in time, and she was thus dragged out of danger.
At 5.40 Hughes anchored, and Suffren did the same at 8 P.M. The total
British loss in men on this occasion was 137 killed and 430 wounded;
that of the French 137 killed, and 357 wounded.

[Illustration]

The exhausted enemies remained at anchor in the open sea, two miles
apart, for a week, repairing. On the 19th of April the French got
under way and made a demonstration before the British, inviting
battle, yet not attacking; but the condition of the _Monmouth_ forbade
Hughes from moving. Suffren therefore departed to Batacalo, in Ceylon,
south of Trincomalee, where he covered his own convoys from Europe,
and flanked the approach of his adversary's. Hughes, on the 22d of
April, got into Trincomalee, where he remained till June 23d. He then
went to Negapatam, formerly a Dutch possession, but then held by the
British. There he learned that Suffren, who meanwhile had captured
several British transports, was a few miles north of him, at
Cuddalore, which had surrendered to Hyder Ali on April 4th. On the 5th
of July, at 1 P.M., the French squadron appeared. At 3 P.M. Hughes
put to sea, and stood south during the night to gain the wind,--the
south-west monsoon now blowing.

Next morning, at daylight, the French were seen at anchor, seven or
eight miles to leeward. At 6 A.M. they began to get under way. One of
their sixty-fours, the _Ajax_, had lost her main and mizzen topmasts
in a violent squall on the previous afternoon, and was not in the
line. There were therefore eleven ships on each side. The action,
known as that of Negapatam, began shortly before 11, when both fleets
were on the starboard tack, heading south-south-east, wind south-west.
The British being to windward, Hughes ordered his fleet to bear up
together to the attack, exactly as Suffren had done on the 12th of
April. As commonly happened, the rear got less close than the van
(Position I). The fourth ship in the French order, the _Brillant_, 64
(a), losing her mainmast early, dropped to leeward of the line, (a'),
and astern of her place (a"). At half-past noon the wind flew suddenly
to south-south-east,--the sea-breeze,--taking the ships a little on
the port bow. Most of them, on both sides, paid off from the enemy,
the British to starboard, the French to port; but between the main
lines, which were in the momentary confusion consequent upon such
an incident, were left six ships--four British and two French--that
had turned the other way (Positions II and III).[145] These were the
_Burford_, _Sultan_ (s), _Worcester_, and _Eagle_, fourth, fifth,
eighth and tenth, in the British order; and the _Sévère_ (b), third
in the French, with the dismasted _Brillant_, which was now towards
the rear of the fight (a). Under these conditions, the _Sévère_, 64,
underwent a short but close action with the _Sultan_, 74; and with
two other British ships, according to the report of the _Sévère's_
captain. The remainder of the incident shall be given in the latter's
own words.

    "Seeing the French squadron drawing off,--for all the
    ships except the _Brillant_ had fallen off on the other
    tack,--Captain de Cillart thought it useless to prolong his
    defence, and had the flag hauled down. The ships engaged
    with him immediately ceased their fire, and the one on the
    starboard side moved away. At this moment the _Sévère_ fell
    off to starboard, and her sails filled. Captain de Cillart
    then ordered the fire to be resumed by his lower-deck guns,
    the only ones which remained manned, and he rejoined his
    squadron."

When the _Sévère's_ flag came down, Suffren was approaching with his
flagship. The _Sultan_ wore to rejoin her fleet, and was raked by the
_Sévère_ in so doing. The _Brillant_, whose mainmast had been shot
away in conflict with either the _Sultan_ or the _Burford_, both much
heavier ships, had at this later phase of the fight fallen under the
guns of the _Worcester_ and the _Eagle_. Her captain, de Saint-Félix,
was one of the most resolute of Suffren's officers. She was rescued by
the flagship, but she had lost 47 killed and 136 wounded,--an almost
incredible slaughter, being over a third of the usual complement of a
sixty-four; and Suffren's ships were undermanned.

These spirited episodes, and the fact that his four separated ships
were approaching the enemy, and being approached by them, caused
Hughes to give the orders to wear, and for a general chase; the flag
for the line being hauled down. These signals would bring all the main
body to the support of the separated ships, without regard to their
order in battle, and therefore with the utmost expedition that their
remaining sail power would admit. Two of the fleet, however, made
signals of disability; so Hughes annulled the orders, and at 1.30
formed on the port tack, recalling the engaged vessels. Both squadrons
now stood in shore, and anchored at about 6 P.M.; the British near
Negapatam, the French some ten miles north. The loss in the action
had been: British, 77 killed, 233 wounded; French, 178 killed, 601
wounded.

On the following day Suffren sailed for Cuddalore. There he received
word that two ships of the line--the _Illustre_, 74, and _St. Michel_,
60, with a convoy of supplies and 600 troops--were to be expected
shortly at Pointe de Galle, then a Dutch port, on the south-west side
of Ceylon. It was essential to cover these, and on the 18th he was
ready for sea; but the necessity of an interview with Hyder Ali
delayed him until the 1st of August, when he started for Batacalo.
On the 9th he arrived there, and on the 21st the reinforcement joined
him. Within forty-eight hours the supply-ships were cleared, and
the squadron sailed again with the object of taking Trincomalee.
On the 25th he was off the port, and, the operation being pushed
energetically, the place capitulated on the 31st of August.

It is difficult to resist the impression that greater energy on
Hughes's part might have brought him up in time to prevent this
mishap. He reached Madras only on July 20th, a fortnight after the
late action; and he did not sail thence until the 20th of August,
notwithstanding that he apprehended an attempt upon Trincomalee.
Hence, when he arrived there on the 2d of September, not only had
it passed into the hands of the enemy, but Suffren had reëmbarked
already the men and the guns that had been landed from his fleet.
When Hughes's approach was signalled, all preparations for sea were
hastened, and the following morning, at daybreak, the French came out.
Hughes had been joined since the last action by the _Sceptre_, 64,
so that the respective forces in the action fought off Trincomalee on
September 3d were twelve of the line to fourteen, viz.: British, three
74's, one 70, one 68, six 64's, one 50; French, four 74's, seven 64's,
one 60, two 50's. Suffren had also put into the line a 36-gun ship,
the _Consolante_.[146]

While the French were getting underway from Trincomalee, the British
fleet was standing south-south-east towards the entrance, close-hauled
on the starboard tack, a fresh south-west monsoon blowing. When
Hughes made out the hostile flags on the works, he kept away four
points,[147] and steered east-south-east, still in column, under short
canvas (A). Suffren pursued, being to windward yet astern, with his
fleet on a line of bearing; that is, the line on which the ships were
ranged was not the same as the course which they were steering. This
formation, (A), wherein the advance is oblique to the front, is
very difficult to maintain. Wishing to make the action, whatever the
immediate event, decisive in results, by drawing the French well to
leeward of the port, Hughes, who was a thorough seaman and had good
captains, played with his eager enemy. "He kept avoiding me without
taking flight," wrote Suffren; "or rather, he fled in good order,
regulating his canvas by his worst sailers; and, keeping off by
degrees, he steered from first to last ten or twelve different
courses." Hughes, on his part, while perfectly clear as to his
own object, was somewhat perplexed by the seeming indecision of an
adversary whose fighting purpose he knew by experience. "Sometimes
they edged down," he wrote; "sometimes they brought-to; in no regular
order, as if undetermined what to do." These apparent vacillations
were due to the difficulty of maintaining the line of bearing, which
was to be the line of battle; and this difficulty was the greater,
because Hughes was continually altering his course and Suffren's ships
were of unequal speed.

At length, at 2 P.M., being then twenty-five miles south-east of the
port, the French drew near enough to bear down. That this movement
might be carried out with precision, and all the vessels come into
action together, Suffren caused his fleet to haul to the wind, on the
starboard tack, to rectify the order. This also being done poorly and
slowly, he lost patience,--as Nelson afterwards said, "A day is soon
lost in manoeuvring,"--and at 2.30, to spur on the laggard ships,
the French admiral gave the signal to attack, (a), specifying
pistol-range. Even this not sufficing to fetch the delinquents
promptly into line with the flagship, the latter fired a gun to
enforce obedience. Her own side being still turned towards the
British, as she waited, the report was taken by the flagship's men
below decks to be the signal for opening fire, and her whole broadside
was discharged. This example was followed by the other ships, so that
the engagement, instead of being close, was begun at half cannon-shot.

[Illustration]

Owing to his measured and deliberate retreat, Hughes had his fleet
now in thoroughly good shape, well aligned and closed-up. The French,
starting from a poor formation to perform a difficult evolution,
under fire, engaged in utter disorder (B). Seven ships, prematurely
rounding-to to bring their broadsides to the enemy, and fore-reaching,
formed a confused group (v), much to windward and somewhat ahead
of the British van. Imperfectly deployed, they interfered with one
another and their fire consequently could not be adequately developed.
In the rear a somewhat similar condition existed. Suffren, expecting
the bulk of his line to fight the British to windward, had directed
the _Vengeur_, 64, and the _Consolante_, 36, to double to leeward
on the extreme rear; but they, finding that the weather sides of the
enemy were not occupied, feared to go to leeward, lest they should be
cut off. They attacked the rear British ship, the _Worcester_, 64 (w),
to windward; but the _Monmouth_, 64 (m), dropping down to her support,
and the _Vengeur_ catching fire in the mizzen top, they were compelled
to haul off. Only Suffren's own ship, the _Héros_, 74 (a), and her
next astern, the _Illustre_, 74, (i), came at once to close action
with the British centre; but subsequently the _Ajax_, 64, succeeding
in clearing herself from the snarl in the rear, took station ahead (j)
of the _Héros_. Upon these three fell the brunt of the fight. They not
only received the broadsides of the ships immediately opposed to them,
but, the wind having now become light yet free, the British vessels
ahead and astern, (h, s,) by luffing or keeping off, played also upon
them. "The enemy formed a semicircle around us," wrote Suffren's chief
of staff, "and raked us ahead and astern, as the ship came up and
fell off with the helm to leeward." The two seventy-fours were crushed
under this fire. Both lost their main and mizzen masts in the course
of the day, and the foretopmast of the flagship also fell. The _Ajax_,
arriving later, and probably drawing less attention, had only a
topmast shot away.

The British total of killed and wounded was very evenly distributed
throughout the fleet. Only the rear ship lost an important spar,--the
main topmast. It was upon her, as already mentioned, and upon the two
leading ships, the _Exeter_ and _Isis_, that fell the heaviest fire,
proportionately, of the French. From the position of the seven van
ships of the latter, such fire as they could make must needs be upon
the extreme British van, and the _Exeter_ was forced to leave the
line. The loss of the French that day was 82 killed and 255
wounded; of which 64 killed and 178 wounded belonged to the _Héros_,
_Illustre_, and _Ajax_. The British had 51 killed and 283 wounded; the
greatest number of casualties in one ship being 56. Singularly enough,
in such a small list of deaths, three were commanding officers:
Captains Watt of the _Sultan_, Wood of the _Worcester_, and Lumley of
the _Isis_.

At 5.30 P.M. the wind shifted suddenly from south-west to
east-south-east (C). The British wore together, formed on the other
tack, and continued the fight. It was during this final act, and at
6 P.M., that the mainmast of the French flagship came down. The van
ships of the French had towed their heads round with boats before
4, in order to come to the support of the centre, in obedience to a
signal from Suffren; but the light airs and calms had retarded them.
With the shift they approached, and passed in column (c) between their
crippled vessels and the enemy. This manoeuvre, and the failure of
daylight, brought the battle to an end. According to Hughes's report,
several of his fleet "were making much water from shot-holes so very
low down in the bottom as not to be come at to be effectually stopped;
and the whole had suffered severely in their masts and rigging."
Trincomalee being in the enemy's possession, and the east coast of
Ceylon an unsafe anchorage now, at the change of the monsoon, he
felt compelled to return to Madras, where he anchored on the 9th of
September. Suffren regained Trincomalee on the 7th of the month, but
the _Orient_, 74, running ashore at the entrance and being lost, he
remained outside until the 17th, saving material from the wreck.

The break-up of the south-west monsoon, then at hand, is apt to be
accompanied by violent hurricanes, and is succeeded by the north-east
monsoon, during which the east coasts of the peninsula and of Ceylon
give a lee shore, with heavy surf. Naval operations, therefore, were
suspended for the winter. During that season Trincomalee is the only
secure port. Deprived of it, Hughes determined to go to Bombay, and
for that purpose left Madras on the 17th of October. Four days later
a reinforcement of five ships of the line arrived from England,
under Commodore Sir Richard Bickerton, who at once followed the
Commander-in-Chief to the west coast. In the course of December the
entire British force was united at Bombay.

In Trincomalee Suffren had a good anchorage; but the insufficiency
of its resources, with other military considerations, decided him to
winter at Acheen, at the west end of Sumatra. He arrived there on
the 2d of November, having first paid a visit to Cuddalore, where the
_Bizarre_, 64, was wrecked by carelessness. On the 20th of December he
left Acheen for the Coromandel coast, having shortened his stay to the
eastward for reasons of policy. On the 8th of January, 1783, he was
off Ganjam, on the Orissa coast, and thence reached Trincomalee again
on the 23d of February. There he was joined on the 10th of March by
three ships of the line from Europe: two 74's and one 64. Under their
convoy came General de Bussy, with twenty-five hundred troops, which
were at once despatched to Cuddalore.

On the 10th of April Vice-Admiral Hughes, returning from Bombay,
passed Trincomalee on the way to Madras, The various maritime
occurrences, wrecks and reinforcements, since the battle of September
3d had reversed the naval odds, and Hughes now had eighteen ships
of the line, one of which was an eighty, opposed to fifteen under
Suffren. Another important event in the affairs of India was the death
of Hyder Ali, on the 7th of December, 1782. Although his policy was
continued by his son, Tippoo Saib, the blow to the French was serious.
Under all the conditions, the British authorities were emboldened
to attempt the reduction of Cuddalore. The army destined to this
enterprise marched from Madras, passed round Cuddalore, and encamped
south of it by the shore. The supply-ships and lighter cruisers
anchored near, while the fleet cruised to the southward. Being there
to windward, for the south-west monsoon had then set in, it covered
the operations against disturbance from the sea.

Towards the beginning of June the investment of the place was complete
by land and by water. Intelligence of this state of things was brought
on the 10th of June to Suffren, who by Bussey's direction was keeping
his inferior fleet in Trincomalee until its services should be
absolutely indispensable. Immediately upon receiving the news he left
port, and on the 13th sighted the British fleet, then at anchor off
Porto Novo, a little south of Cuddalore. Upon his approach Hughes
moved off, and anchored again five miles from the besieged place. For
the next two days the French were baffled by the winds; but on the
17th the south-west monsoon resumed, and Suffren again drew near.
The British Vice-Admiral, not caring to accept action at anchor,
got under way, and from that time till the 20th remained outside,
trying to obtain the weather-gage, in which he was frustrated by the
variableness of the winds. Meanwhile Suffren had anchored near the
town, communicated with the general, and, being very short of men at
the guns, had embarked twelve hundred troops for his expected battle;
for it was evident that the issue of the siege would turn upon the
control of the sea. On the 18th he weighed again, and the two fleets
manoeuvred for the advantage, with light baffling airs, the British
furthest from shore.

On the 20th of June, the wind holding at west with unexpected
constancy, Hughes decided to accept the attack which Suffren evidently
intended. The latter, being distinctly inferior in force,--fifteen
to eighteen,--probably contemplated an action that should be decisive
only as regarded the fate of Cuddalore; that is, one which, while not
resulting in the capture or destruction of ships, should compel his
opponent to leave the neighbourhood to repair damages. The British
formed line on the port tack, heading to the northward. Suffren ranged
his fleet in the same manner, parallel to the enemy, and was careful
to see the order exact before bearing down. When the signal to attack
was given, the French kept away together, and brought-to again on
the weather beam of the British, just within point-blank range. The
action lasted from shortly after 4 P.M. to nearly 7, and was general
throughout both lines; but, as always experienced, the rears were
less engaged than the centres and vans. No ship was taken; no very
important spars seem to have been shot away. The loss of the British
was 99 killed, 434 wounded; of the French, 102 killed, 386 wounded.

As the ships' heads were north, the course of the action carried them
in that direction. Suffren anchored next morning twenty-five miles
north of Cuddalore. There he was sighted on the 22d by Hughes, who had
remained lying-to the day after the fight. The British Vice-Admiral
reported several ships much disabled, a great number of his
men--1,121--down with scurvy, and the water of the fleet very short.
He therefore thought it necessary to go to Madras, where he anchored
on the 25th. Suffren regained Cuddalore on the afternoon of the 23d.
His return and Hughes's departure completely changed the military
situation. The supply-ships, upon which the British scheme of
operations depended, had been forced to take flight when Suffren first
approached, and of course could not come back now. "My mind is on the
rack without a moment's rest since the departure of the fleet," wrote
the commanding general on the 25th, "considering the character of M.
de Suffren, and the infinite superiority on the part of the French now
that we are left to ourselves."

[Illustration]

The battle of June 20th, 1783, off Cuddalore, was the last of the
maritime war of 1778. It was fought, actually, exactly five months
after the preliminaries of peace had been signed on January 20th,
1783. Although the relative force of the two fleets remained
unchanged, it was a French victory, both tactically and strategically:
tactically, because the inferior fleet held its ground, and remained
in possession of the field; strategically, because it decided the
object immediately at stake, the fate of Cuddalore, and with it,
momentarily at least, the issue of the campaign. It was, however, the
triumph of one commander-in-chief over another; of the greater man
over the lesser. Hughes's reasons for quitting the field involve the
admission of his opponent's greater skill. "Short of water,"--with
eighteen ships to fifteen, able therefore to spare ships by
detachments for watering, that should not have happened; "injury to
spars,"--that resulted from the action; "1,121 men short,"--Suffren
had embarked just that number--1,200--because Hughes let him
communicate with the port without fighting. Notwithstanding the
much better seamanship of the British subordinates, and their dogged
tenacity, Suffren here, as throughout the campaign, demonstrated again
the old experience that generalship is the supreme factor in war. With
inferior resources, though not at first with inferior numbers, by
a steady offensive, and by the attendant anxiety about Trincomalee
impressed upon the British admiral, he reduced him to a fruitless
defensive. By the seizure of that place as a base he planted himself
firmly upon the scene of action. Able thus to remain, while the
British had to retire to Bombay, he sustained the Sultan of Mysore
in his embarrassing hostility to the British; and in the end he saved
Cuddalore by readiness and dexterity despite the now superior numbers
of the British fleet. He was a great sea-captain, Hughes was not; and
with poorer instruments, both in men and ships, the former overcame
the latter.

On the 29th of June a British frigate, the _Medea_, bearing a flag of
truce, reached Cuddalore. She brought well-authenticated intelligence
of the conclusion of peace; and hostilities ceased by common consent.

[Footnote 136: Now Mauritius.]

[Footnote 137: On the Malabar--western--coast.]

[Footnote 139: See _ante_, p. 163.]

[Footnote 140: I infer, from the accounts, that the _Monmouth_ was
well east of the _Hero_, that the French had passed her first, and
that the _Héros_ was now on her port beam; but this point is not
certain.]

[Footnote 141: Expressions in Johnstone's Report.]

[Footnote 142: Charnock, however, says that in 1762, immediately after
receiving his post-commission, he commanded in succession the _Hind_,
20, and the _Wager_, 20. Moreover, before his appointment to the
expedition of 1781, he had been Commodore on the Lisbon Station. But
he had spent comparatively little time at sea as a captain.--W.L.C.]

[Footnote 143: See _ante_, pp. 79, 80.]

[Footnote 144: One being the captured British _Hannibal_, 50, which
was commissioned by Captain Morard de Galles, retaining the English
form of the name, Hannibal, to distinguish her from the _Annibal_, 74,
already in the squadron.]

[Footnote 145: In the plan, Positions II and III, the second position
is indicated by ships with broken outlines. These show the two
lines of battle in the engagement until the wind shifted to
south-south-east. The results of the shift constituted a third
position, consecutive with the second, and is indicated by ships in
full outline.]

[Footnote 146: Previously the British East Indiaman, _Elizabeth_.]

[Footnote 147: Forty-five degrees.]




GLOSSARY

OF NAUTICAL AND NAVAL TERMS USED IN THE TEXT


(_This glossary is intended to cover only the technical expressions
actually used in the book itself._)


ABACK. A sail is aback when the wind blows on the forward part tending
to move the vessel astern.

ABAFT. Behind, towards the stern.

ABEAM.   }
ABREAST. } See "Bearing."

AFT. See "Bearing."

AHEAD. See "Bearing."

ASTERN. See "Bearing."


BEAM. The width of a vessel, so used because of the cross timbers,
called beams.

BEAR, to. To be in a specified direction from a vessel.

BEAR, to. To change the direction of a vessel's movement.

  To bear _down_, to move towards; to bear _up_, or _away_, to move
  away, from the wind or from an enemy.

BEARING. The direction of an object from a vessel; either by compass,
or with reference to the vessel itself. Thus, the lighthouse bears
north; the enemy bears abeam, or two points off the port bow.

BEARING, Line of. The compass bearing on which the vessels of a fleet
are ranged, whatever their bearings from one another.

BEARINGS, with reference to the vessel.

  Abeam.   }
  Abreast. } Perpendicular to the vessel's length.

  Aft.     } Directly behind.
  Astern.  }

  Ahead.   Directly before; forward.

  Abaft the beam, starboard or port, weather or lee. To the rear of
  abeam, to the right or left, to windward or to leeward.

  Before (or forward of) the beam (as above). Ahead of abeam, etc.

  Broad. A large angle of bearing, used ordinarily of the bow. "Broad
  off the bow" approaches "before the beam."

  On the bow, starboard or port, weather or lee. To one side of
  ahead, to right or left, to windward or to leeward.

  On the quarter, starboard or port, weather or lee. To one side of
  astern; to right or left, to windward or to leeward.

BEARINGS, by compass. The full circle of the compass, 360 degrees,
is divided into thirty-two _points_, each point being subdivided into
fourths. From north to east, eight points, are thus named: North;
north by east; north-northeast; northeast by north; northeast;
northeast by east; east-northeast; east by north; East.

  From East to South, from South to West, and from West to North, a
  like naming is used.

BEAT, to. To gain ground to windward, by successive changes of
direction, called tacks.

BOOM. See "Spars."

BOW, or head. The forward part of a vessel, which is foremost when in
motion ahead.

  On the Bow. See "Bearing." To head "bows-on": to move directly
  towards.

BOW AND QUARTER LINE. See pp. 84, 200.

BOWSPRIT. See "Spars."

BRACES. Ropes by which the yards are turned, so that the wind may
strike the sails in the manner desired.

BRING-TO. To bring a vessel's head as near as possible to the
direction from which the wind blows; usually with a view to
heaving-to, that is, stopping. See heave-to and luff.

BROADSIDE. The whole number of guns carried on one side of a vessel;
starboard or port broadside, weather or lee broadside.


CABLE. The heavy rope which was attached to the anchor, and held the
ship to it. Cables are now chains, but in the period of this book
were always hemp. To veer cable, to let more out, to let the ship
go farther from the anchor. To slip the cable, to let it all go
overboard, releasing the vessel. Cable's length: 120 fathoms.

CHASE, General. A chase by a fleet, in which, in order to more rapid
advance, the places of the vessels in their usual order are not to be
observed.

CLOSE-HAULED. See "Course."

COLUMN. See "Line Ahead."

COME UP. A ship comes up, when her bow comes more nearly to the
direction of the wind. Used generally when the movement proceeds from
some other cause than the movement of the helm. See "Luff."

CONVOY. A body of unarmed or weakly armed vessels, in company with
ships of war.

CONVOY, to. To accompany a number of unarmed vessels, for their
protection.

COURSE. The direction of a vessel's movement, with regard to the
compass or to the wind.

  Compass course. The point of the compass towards which the vessel heads.

  Wind courses:

    Close-hauled. As nearly in the direction from which the wind blows as
    is compatible with keeping the sails full; for square-rigged vessels
    six points. (See "Bearings by Compass.") For a north wind, the
    close-hauled courses are east-northeast and west-northwest.

    Free. Not close-hauled.

    Large. Very free.

    Off the wind. Free.

    On (or by) the wind. Close-hauled.

COURSES. The lowest sails on the fore and main masts.

CRUISE, to. To cover a certain, portion of sea by movement back and
forth over it.

CRUISER. A general term for armed ships, but applied more specifically
to those not "of the line," which therefore are more free and wider in
their movements.

CURRENT.

  Lee Current. One the movement of which is away from the wind.

  Weather Current. One which sets towards the wind.


EBB, ebb-tide. See "Tide."


FAIR, wind. A wind which allows a vessel to head her desired compass
course.

FALL OFF. A vessel falls off, when, without the action of the helm,
her head moves away from the wind. See "Come up."

FILL. } Sails are said to fill, or to be full, when the wind
FULL. } strikes the rear side, tending to move the vessel ahead.

FLOOD, flood tide. See "Tide."

FORE AND AFT. In classification of vessels, indicates those whose
sails, when set, stretch from forward aft; more nearly lengthwise than
across. Opposite to square-rigged.

FOREMAST, fore-topmast, etc. See "Spars."

FORESAIL, fore-topsail, etc. See "Sails."

FOUL, to. To entangle, to collide. A foul anchor, when the cable gets
round the anchor.

FOUL, wind. A wind which prevents the vessel heading the desired
compass course, compelling her to beat.

FREE, wind. A wind which allows the vessel to head the course
desired. The amount to spare from the close-hauled course is sometimes
designated. E.g., the wind four points free; the wind would allow the
vessel to come four points nearer the wind than her course requires.

FRIGATE. See "Vessel."


GAGE, weather and lee. A vessel, or fleet, is said to have the weather
gage, when it is to windward of its opponent. Lee is opposite to
weather.


HAUL, to. To haul (to) the wind is to change the course to that
nearest the direction whence the wind comes.

  To haul down the colors: to strike, to surrender.

HEAVE DOWN. To incline a vessel on one side, by purchases at the lower
mastheads.

HEAVE-TO. (HOVE-TO.) To bring-to, (which see), and then to lay some
sails aback, in order to keep the ship without movement ahead or
astern.

HEEL, to. To incline a vessel on one side by shifting the weights on
board, such as guns. "On the heel": to be thus inclined.

HELM. The tiller, or bar, which like a handle turns the rudder, and
thus changes the course of the vessel.

  Port the helm. To put the tiller to port, which turns the vessel's
  head to the right; to starboard the helm is the reverse.

  Helm down. Tiller to leeward, vessel's head to windward; helm up,
  the reverse. See "Rudder."

HULL. The body of a vessel, as distinguished from the spars, or
engines.

HULL, to. (HULLED.) A cannon ball striking the hull of a vessel is
said to hull her.


JIB. See "Sails."

JIB-BOOM. See "Spars."


KEEP, to. To keep off, or away, is to change course away from the wind
or from an enemy. See "To bear up."


LARGE. See "Course."

LEE. The direction toward which the wind blows. "Under the lee of,"
protected from wind and sea by land, or by a vessel, interposed.

  Lee Tide. See "Tide."

LEECH. The vertical side of a square sail. The upper and lower sides,
horizontal, are called head and foot.

LEEWARD (pronounced looard). Direction of movement, or of bearing,
opposite to the wind.

LIE-TO, to. To bring the vessels head on, or near, the wind, and
remain nearly stopped. Usually in heavy weather, but not always.

LINE ABREAST. See p. 122.

LINE AHEAD. See p. 85.

LINE OF BATTLE. In the line of battle the vessels are ranged on the
same straight line, steering the same course, one behind the others,
so that all the broadsides are clear to bear upon an enemy. The
line preferred is one of the close-hauled lines, because on them the
movement of a vessel in the line is more easily regulated by backing,
or shaking, some of the sails.

LINE OF BEARING. See "Bearing, line of."

LINE, Ship of the. A vessel fitted by its force for the line of
battle. Opposite generically to "cruiser." The modern term is
"battleship."

LUFF, to. The movement of changing the course to nearer the direction
whence the wind comes, by using the helm.


MAIN.  }
MIZZEN.} See "Spars" and "Sails."

MAST. See "Spars." "To the mast." A sail is said to be so when aback.

MONSOON. A trade wind, in the China and Indian seas, which blows
uniformly from the northeast in winter, and from southwest in summer.


NEAP. See "Tide."


OFF--the wind. See "Course."

ON--the wind. See "Course."


PENNANT. A flag, indicating either the rank of the senior officer on
board, or a signal applicable to a particular vessel.

POINT. See "Bearings, by Compass."

PORT. To the left hand, or on the left side, of a vessel, looking from
aft forward. Opposite to Starboard.

PORT, to. Applied to steering. To move the tiller, or helm, to the
left, which moves the rudder to the right and causes the vessel to
change course towards the right hand.


QUARTER. Either side of the after part of a vessel;--as starboard
quarter, port quarter; weather quarter, lee quarter. Quarter deck:
one side of the after upper deck, reserved for the officer exercising
command, and for ceremonial purposes.

QUARTERS. A crew is at quarters when at the stations for battle.


RAKE, to. To fire the broadside from ahead or astern of an antagonist,
so that the shot may sweep the length of the vessel, which at the
period of this book was about four times the width.

RANDOM SHOT. The extreme range to which a gun could send its shot,
giving very uncertain results.

REEF, to. To reduce the surface of a sail.

RUDDER. A solid framework, pivoted at the stern of a vessel, which
being turned to one side deflects her course. See "Helm" and "Wheel."


SAILS. Sails are of two kinds: square, and fore and aft. Square sails
spread more across the vessel, in the direction of her width. Fore and
aft sails more in the direction of the length. Square sails are better
for a free wind; and also for large vessels, because they can be more
readily subdivided. Fore and aft sails trim nearer to the wind, and so
are convenient for coasters, which generally are smaller.

  Vessels carrying square sails are called square-rigged. They have
  always two masts, usually three; each carrying three or four sails,
  one above the other. These are named from the mast on which they are
  carried (see "Spars"); e.g., _main_ sail, _fore_ topsail, _mizzen_
  topgallant-sail; and also from their positions on the same mast.
  Thus, from lowest up, main sail, main topsail, main topgallantsail;
  and main royal, if there be a fourth. The fore and main sails are
  called also courses.

  The topsails were the chief battle sails, because the largest, except
  the courses, and more manageable than the courses.

  All square-rigged vessels carry fore and aft sails, three cornered,
  stretched between the bowsprit and jib-booms, and the fore topmast.
  These sails are called jibs.

  Fore and aft vessels also carry jibs; but on each upright mast they
  have one great sail, the size of which makes it less easily handled
  in an emergency, therefore less fit for fighting. Above the big sail
  they have a small, light, three-cornered topsail, but this is merely
  a fair weather sail, useless in battle.

  Vessels of war were almost all square-rigged, with three masts.

SAILS, STUDDING. Light square sails, for moderate weather, extended
beyond the other square sails, to increase the normal spread of
canvas. Set only with a free wind, and never in battle.

SCANTLING. The size, and consequent weight and strength, of the
timbers of a vessel's hull.

SCHOONER. See "Vessel."

SHAKE, to. So to place a sail that the wind blows along it, neither
filling nor backing. The sail is thus neutralized without taking in.

SHARP-UP. A yard is sharp-up, when turned by the braces as far as the
rigging of the mast will allow. A close-hauled course requires the
yards to be sharp-up, in order that the sails may be full.

SHIP. See "Vessel."

SLIP. See "Cable."

SLOOP. See "Vessel."

SPARS. A spar is a long piece of timber, cylindrical, tapering, in
masts, towards one end, and in yards towards both. Spars serve for
spreading the several sails of a vessel.

  The names of spars vary with their use and position. Chiefly, for
  ships of war, they divide into masts, yards, and booms.

  A mast is an upright, and is in three connected pieces: the lower
  mast, the topmast, and the top-gallant-mast. Most ships of war had
  three such masts: fore, near the bow; main, near the centre; mizzen,
  near the stern.

  The bowsprit is also a mast; not upright, but projecting straight
  ahead from the bow, approaching horizontal, but inclining upwards.
  Like the masts, it has three divisions: the lower, or bowsprit
  proper, the jib-boom, and the flying-jib-boom.

  Across the masts, horizontal, are the yards, four in number, lower,
  topsail, topgallant, and royal. Yards are further designated by the
  name of the mast to which each belongs; e.g., foreyard, main topsail
  yard, mizzen topgallant yard, main royal yard.

  The bowsprit formerly had one yard, called the spritsail yard. This
  has disappeared. Otherwise it serves to spread the three-cornered
  sails called jibs. These sails were useful for turning a vessel,
  because their projection before the centre gave them great leverage.

  Fore and aft vessels had no yards. See "Sails."

SPRING. See p. 65, note.

SQUARE-RIGGED. See "Sails" and "Spars."

STAND, to. Used, nautically, to express movement and direction, e.g.,
"to stand toward the enemy," "to stand out of harbor," "to stand
down," "to stand south." The underlying idea seems to be that of
sustained, decided movement.

STARBOARD. TO the right hand, or on the right side, of a vessel,
looking from aft forward. Opposite to Port.

STEER, to. To control the course by the use of the helm and rudder.

STERN. The extreme rear, or after, part of a vessel.

STRATEGY. That department of the Art of War which decides the
distribution and movements of armies, or of fleets, with reference to
the objects of a campaign as a whole.

STRIKE, to. Applied to the flag. To haul down the flag in token of
surrender.


TACK. A vessel is on the starboard tack, or port tack, according as
the wind comes from the starboard or port hand. See p. 84, note.

TACK, to. When a vessel is close-hauled, with the wind on one side,
to tack is to turn round towards the wind, in order to be again
close-hauled, with the wind on the other side.

  To wear is to attain the same object by turning away from the wind.
  Wearing is surer than tacking, but loses ground to leeward.

  To tack, or wear, _in succession_, the leading vessel tacks, and
  those which follow tack, each, as it arrives at the same point; the
  order thus remaining the same. To tack, or wear _together_, all
  tack at the same moment, which reverses the order.

TACTICS. That department of the Art of War which decides the
disposition and movements of an army, or of a fleet, on a particular
field of battle, in presence of an enemy.

TIDAL CURRENTS.

  Ebb tide, the outflow of the water due to the tides.

  Flood tide, the inflow of the water due to the tides.

  Lee tide, the set of the current to leeward.

  Weather tide, the set of the current to windward.

TIDE. The rise and fall of the water of the oceans under the influence
of the moon. Used customarily, but inaccurately, to express the
currents produced by the changes of level.

  High tide, or high water, the two highest levels of the day.

  Low tide, or low water, the two lowest.

  Neap tide: the least rise and fall during the lunar month.

  Spring tide: the greatest rise and fall during the same, being soon
  after full and change of moon.

TRADE, the. A term applied to a body of merchant vessels, to or from a
particular destination.

TRADE WIND. A wind which blows uniformly from the same general
direction throughout a fixed period. In the West Indies, from the
northeast the year round. See also "Monsoon."


VEER. See "Cable."

VESSEL. A general term for all constructions intended to float upon
and move through the water. Specific definitions applicable to this
book:

  Ship, a square-rigged vessel with three masts.

  Brig, a square-rigged vessel with two masts.

  Schooner, a fore and aft rigged vessel with two or more masts.

  Sloop, a fore and aft rigged vessel with one mast. See pp. 9, 15, 17.

VESSELS OF WAR. Ship of the Line. A ship with three or more tiers of
guns, of which two are on covered decks; that is, have a deck above
them. See "Line of Battle Ship."

  Frigate. A ship with one tier of guns on a covered deck.

  Sloop of War. A ship, the guns of which are not covered, being on
  the upper (spar) deck.

  Sloops of war were sometimes brigs, but then were usually so styled.


WAKE. The track left by a vessel's passage through the water. "In the
wake of": directly astern of.

WAY. Movement through the water. "To get underway": to pass from
stand-still to movement.

WEAR, to. See under "Tack."

WEATHER. Relative position to windward of another object. Opposite to
Lee. Weather side, lee side, of a vessel; weather fleet, lee fleet;
weather gage, lee gage (see "Gage"); weather shore, lee shore.

WEATHER, to. To pass to windward of a vessel, or of any other object.

WEATHERLY. The quality of a vessel which favors her getting, or
keeping, to windward.

WEIGH, to. To raise the anchor from the bottom. Used alone; e.g., "the
fleet weighed."

WHEEL. So called from its form. The mechanical appliance, a wheel,
with several handles for turning it, by which power is increased, and
also transmitted from the steersman on deck to the tiller below, in
order to steer the vessel.

WIND AND WATER, between. That part of a vessel's side which comes out
of water when she inclines to a strong side wind, but otherwise is
under water.

WINDWARD. Direction from which the wind blows.


YARD. See "Spars."




INDEX


  Algeciras, in Gibraltar Bay, station of Franco-Spanish Fleet
          supporting the Siege of Gibraltar, 121, 230, 231.

  Arbuthnot, Marriott, British Admiral, commands North American
          Station, 1779, 113, 148;
    anger at Rodney's intrusion on his command, 150;
    supports the attack on Charleston, 1780, 151;
    station in Gardiner's Bay, 151, 170;
    action with French squadron under des Touches, 1781, 171;
    regains command of Chesapeake Bay, 174;
    superseded, 1781, 176.

  _Arethusa_, British frigate. Encounter with French frigate _Belle
          Poule_ marks beginning of War of 1778 with France, 62, 82.

  Armed Neutrality, The, of 1780, 3, 158.

  Arnold, Benedict, American General. Effects following his action
          on Lake Champlain in 1776, 3, 4, 7, 25;
    with, Ethan Allen, seizes Ticonderoga and Crown Point, 1775, 8;
    captures or destroys all hostile shipping on Lake Champlain, 9;
    traverses Maine forests, and joins Montgomery before Quebec, 10;
    maintains blockade of Quebec till arrival of a British squadron,
          10;
    retreats to Crown Point, and destitution of his troops, 11;
    schemes for maintaining command of Lake Champlain, 12;
    his force, and its character, 14, 15, 17;
    compelled by shore batteries to abandon lower Narrows of the
          Lake, 15;
    selects Valcour Island as position for defence, 15;
    decision to risk destruction of force rather than retire, 18, 19;
    sound strategic and tactical ideas, 20;
    Battle of Valcour Island, 21;
    successful withdrawal after defeat, 23;
    overtaken and flotilla destroyed, 25;
    effect of his resistance in delaying British advance, 25;
    conduct, courage, and heroism throughout, 27;
    his subsequent treason, 18, 27, 152;
    commands British detachment in Virginia, 153, 169, 170, 174.

  Asiatic Immigration, Danger involved in, 4.

  Barbados, West India Island, headquarters of British Leeward
          Islands Station, 99;
    advantage of Santa Lucia over, 104, 144, 207;
    notably for crippled ships, 144;
    devastated by hurricane, 1780, 159.

  Bartington, Samuel, British Admiral, commands Leeward Islands
          Station, 99;
    capture of Santa Lucia by, 100-102;
    successfully resists d'Estaing's effort to recapture, 103, 104;
    superseded in chief command by Byron, 105;
    share in Byron's action with d'Estaing, 107, 109;
    goes home wounded, 112;
    refuses command-in-chief of the Channel Fleet, 1780, 157;
    serves in it under Howe, 227;
    captures a French convoy for East Indies, 227.

  Basse Terre, St. Kitts, Operations around, 1782, 196-205;
    character of anchorage at, 199.

  Battle, Order of, defined, 93 (note), 200 (note).

  Battles, Naval, Valcour Island, October 11, 1776, 19-23.
    Charleston Harbor, June 28, 1776, 33.
    D'Estaing and Howe, August 10 and 11, 1778, 73-75.
    Ushant, July 27, 1778, 84-91.
    Barrington and d'Estaing, Santa Lucia, December 15, 1778, 102-104.
    Byron and d'Estaing, Grenada, July 6, 1779, 105-112.
    De Langara and Rodney, Cape St. Vincent, January 16, 1780, 123.
    De Guichen and Rodney, off Martinique, April 17, 1780, 131-135.
    De Guichen and Rodney, May 15, 1780, 143, 144.
    De Guichen and Rodney, May 19, 1780, 144.
    Cornwallis and La Motte-Picquet, off Haiti, March 20, 1780, 153.
    Cornwallis and de Ternay, June 20, 1780, 155-157.
    De Grasse and Hood, off Martinique, April 29, 1781, 163-167.
    Arbuthnot and des Touches, off Cape Henry, March 16, 1781,
          171-173.
    De Grasse and Graves, off Cape Henry, September 5, 1781, 179-183.
    The Doggers Bank, August 5, 1781, 189-193.
    De Grasse and Hood, St. Kitts, January 25 and 26, 1782, 199-204.
    De Grasse and Rodney, near Dominica, April 9 and 12, 1782,
          207-221.
    Howe with Franco-Spanish Fleet near Gibraltar, October 20, 1782,
          231, 232.
    Johnstone and Suffren, Porto Praya, Cape Verde Islands, April
          16, 1781, 236-238.
    Hughes and Suffren, Coromandel Coast, February 17, 1781, 240-242.
    Hughes and Suffren, off Ceylon, April 12, 1782, 242-244.
    Hughes and Suffren, off Nega-patam, July 6, 1782, 244-246.
    Hughes and Suffren, off Trincomalee, September 3, 1782, 247-251.
    Hughes and Suffren, off Cuddalore, June 20, 1783, 253.
    N.B. Naval Battles end here.

  _Belle Poule_, French Frigate. Encounter with British _Arethusa_
          marks beginning of War of 1778 with Great Britain, 61, 82.

  Blane, Sir Gilbert, Physician to British Fleet under Rodney,
          quoted, 124, 219, 220, 221.

  Burgoyne, Sir John, British General, 3, 6, 14, 23, 27, 28, 50-53,
          55;
    decisive effect of American control of Lake Champlain, in 1776,
          upon his expedition, in 1777, 3, 9, 13, 14, 25;
    his surrender at Saratoga, 53;
    it determines France to intervene, 6, 58.

  Byng, John, British Admiral, influence of his execution, in 1756,
          upon the minds of naval officers, 93, 139, 146.

  Byron, John, British Admiral, ordered to North American Station,
          1778, 59;
    delayed by heavy weather, and puts into Halifax, 62;
    Howe superseded by, 80;
    goes to West Indies, 105;
    action with D'Estaing off Grenada, 105-111;
    comments upon course of, 110-112;
    returns to England, 112.

  Canada, Strength of, against attack from southward, 7;
    its advantage in this respect over New York, 8;
    comprehension of these facts by Americans of 1775, from the old
          French Wars, 8;
    attempt to utilize, by British, frustrated by Arnold's
          promptitude, 9;
    invasion of, under Montgomery, ordered by American Congress,
          1775, 9;
    failure of the attempt, decided by British Navy, 10-12;
    British advance from, under Carleton, 1776, 15-26;
    Burgoyne's advance from, 1777, 51-53.

  Cap François (now Cap Haitien), French naval station on north side
          of Haiti, 147-149, 153, 154, 168, 176, 178, 206, 223, 225.

  Carkett, Robert, British Naval Captain, misunderstanding of
          Rodney's orders by, causes failure of British attack of
          April 17, 1780, 133;
    Rodney's censure of, 137-139.

  Carleton, Sir Guy, Governor and Commander-in-Chief, in Canada,
          1775-6, 9;
    besieged and blockaded in Quebec by Americans, 10-12;
    relieved by British Navy, 11;
    takes the offensive, 17;
    delayed decisively by Arnold's preparations on Lake Champlain,
          13, 18;
    battle of Valcour Island, 20-23;
    successfully eluded by Arnold, 23;
    honored by Government for the campaign, 26.

  Carolinas, North and South, supposed British sympathies in, 31,
          exaggerated, 175;
    expedition against Charleston, and battle of Charleston Harbor,
          1776, 31-38;
    operations against, and against Georgia, renewed, 1779, 113-115,
          and 1780, 151-153;
    disastrous consequences to British operations, 114, 152, 174-176.

  Champlain, Lake, Decisive effect of naval operations upon, 3, 4,
          7, 13, 14, 25, 26;
    strategic importance of, 7;
    naval campaign upon, 1775-1776, chapter i;
    remains in naval control of British throughout the war, 28.

  Charleston, South Carolina, attack upon by British squadron, 1776,
          32-37;
    siege and capture of, by the British, 1780, 114, 151.

  Chesapeake Bay, naval command of, by French, 1781, accomplishes
          independence of United States, 4, 114, 184;
    Sir William Howe moves by way of, against Philadelphia, 1777, 52;
    operations in and near, 1781, 169-174, 177-185;
    British control of, in 1781, prior to arrival of de Grasse, 174;
    de Grasse reaches, 1781, 178.

  Clinton, Sir Henry, British General, commands land force employed
          in Carolinas, 1776, 31, 32;
    in seizure of Narragansett Bay, 48;
    left in command at New York by Howe, 1777, 52;
    advance up the Hudson River, 1777, 55;
    relieves Howe as Commander-in-Chief in North America, 56, 63;
    evacuates Philadelphia, and retreats upon New York, 1778, 63;
    narrowness of his escape, 63, 64;
    evacuates Narragansett Bay, 1779, 115;
    operations of, in South Carolina, and capture of Charleston, 151;
    leaves Cornwallis in command in Carolina, and returns to New
          York, 152;
    sends detachments to Virginia, for diversion in favor of
          Cornwallis, 1781, 153, 169;
    serious difference of opinion between, and Cornwallis, 115, 175;
    orders of, to Cornwallis, which result in position at Yorktown,
          1781, 175.

  Commerce, effects upon, through inadequate naval preparation,
          59-61, 117, 126, 158;
    table of losses of British, 61 (note).

  Convoys, effect of, upon naval action, strategic or tactical, 105,
          106, 109, 122, 126, 130, 148, 155-157, 158, 166, 176, 188,
          189, 193, 199, 206-209, 227-229, 229-231, 235, 236-238,
          240, 246.

  Cornwallis, Charles, Earl, British General, accompanies expedition
          against Charleston, 1776, 31;
    hurried to Trenton, after Washington's victory there, 49;
    professional quarrel with Sir H. Clinton, 115, 175;
    at siege and capture of Charleston, 152;
    left in command of southern department, 1780, 152;
    defeats Gates at Camden, 1780, 152;
    pushes on to North Carolina, 152;
    embarrassments there, 152;
    enters Virginia, and joins Arnold at Petersburg, 1781, 153, 174;
    ordered by Clinton to occupy a defensive position which should
          cover anchorage for a fleet, 175;
    evacuates Portsmouth, and takes position at Yorktown, 175;
    French cruisers bar his retreat towards the Carolinas, and
          occupy York River, 179;
    enclosed by French fleet and French and American armies, 184;
    compelled to surrender, 185.

  Cornwallis, Sir William (brother of Lord), British naval captain,
          share in action between Byron and d'Estaing, 1779,
          108-110, 153;
    in command of a squadron, action with La Motte-Picquet, 1780, 153;
    action with de Ternay's squadron, 155-157;
    characteristics, and nickname of, 157;
    distinguished part in Hood's action with de Grasse, 1782, 201;
    share in Rodney's victory, 217;
    quoted, 156, 198, 200, 203, 211.

  Crown Point, military post on Lake Champlain, 8;
    seized by Benedict Arnold and Ethan Allen, 1775, 8;
    General Montgomery embarks at, to invade Canada, 1775, 9;
    Arnold retreats to, in 1776, after reverses in Canada, 12;
    part in campaign of 1776, 24;
    recovered by British, 25;
    reoccupied by Americans after Burgoyne's surrender, 28.

  Cuddalore, British post in India, on Coromandel Coast, besieged by
          Hyder Ali and Suffren, 242;
    taken by Hyder Ali, 244;
    British attempt to retake, 252;
    relieved by Suffren, 252-254.

  Darby, George, British Admiral, commands  Channel Fleet, 1780, 157;
    relief of Gibraltar by, 1781, 186-188;
    blocked in Torbay by Franco-Spanish fleet, 1781, 188-189.

  Delaware, Naval Operations in the, 1777, 52-55;
    in 1778, 59, 62-64.

  De Barras, French Commodore, commands squadron in Newport, 1781,
          174;
    opinion concerning des Touches' conduct, 174;
    junction with de Grasse in Chesapeake Bay, 1781, 184.

  De Bouille, French General, governor of Martinique, 1780, concerts
          with de Guichen an attack on British West Indies, 130;
    project against  Barbados, 1782, 197;
    capture of St. Kitts, 197-205.

  De Cordova, Spanish Admiral, commands in allied fleet under
          d'Orvilliers, 1779, 118, 119;
    in chief command, at Cadiz, 125;
    in Channel, 1781, 188;
    in 1782, 228;
    at Algeciras, during Howe's relief of Gibraltar, 230-232.

  D'Estaing, Comte, French Admiral, in chief command, in 1778, of
          first French fleet sent to America, 59;
    biographical summary of, 59 (note);
    Government instructions to, 59;
    slowness of movements of, 62-64;
    failure to attack Howe at Sandy Hook, 66-68;
    professional inefficiency of, 67, 79, 111, 112;
    proceeds to Newport, R.I., 69, and enters the harbor, 70;
    joins Americans in siege of the town, 70;
    abandons it on Howe's appearance and puts to sea, 73;
    manoeuvres against Howe, 73-75;
    fleet scattered by gale, 75;
    refuses to renew siege of Newport, and goes to Boston, 77, 78;
    outgeneralled throughout by Howe, 78;
    goes to West Indies, 1779, 100;
    fails to recover Santa Lucia, 102-104;
    captures Grenada, 105;
    action with Byron, 106-112;
    fails in attempt to retake Savannah, 115;
    returns to Europe with ships of his original command, 115;
    sent to Cadiz, in 1780, to bring back to Brest French contingent
          of Allied Fleet, 158.

  De Grasse, Comte, French Admiral, exercises the decisive effect in
          obtaining American Independence, 4;
    sails to take chief command in America, 1781, 162;
    action with Hood off Martinique, 163-165;
    Chevalier's comment on conduct of, 166;
    abortive attempt against Santa Lucia, 167;
    capture of Tobago by, 168;
    goes to Cap François, 168, 176, and there prepares for
          expedition against Cornwallis, 178;
    on this occasion shows energy and foresight unusual to him, 178;
    anchors in Chesapeake Bay, 178;
    action with Graves, 179-184;
    regains Chesapeake, 184;
    returns to West Indies after Cornwallis's surrender, 185;
    expedition against St. Kitts, 1782, 197-205;
    outgeneralled by Hood, 201, 204, 205;
    St. Kitts surrenders to, 205;
    Hood escapes from, 205;
    returns to Martinique, 206;
    expedition against Jamaica, plan of, 206;
    puts to sea, 207;
    transactions from April 8 to April 12, 207-212;
    defeated in great battle of April 12, 213-221, and captured with
          flagship, 221;
    professional character of, illustrated, 166, 178, 184, 198, 205,
          207, 209, 214, 215, 216.

  De Guichen, Comte de, succeeds d'Estaing in North American
          command, 1780, 115, 130;
    biographical summary of, 115 (note);
    project of against Barbados, 130;
    frustrated by Rodney, 130;
    action of April 17, with Rodney, 130-135;
    orders of French Government to, 141;
    consequent conduct of, 141-145;
    actions with Rodney, May 15, 142, and May 19, 144;
    broken down by responsibility, 145;
    under orders, accompanies Spanish squadron to Cap François, 147;
    there refuses to coöperate with Americans, 147;
    returns to Europe, 148;
    commands French contingent to Allied Fleet under de Cordova,
          1781, 188;
    advises attack upon British Fleet in Tor Bay, 189;
    loses great part of West India military convoy entrusted to his
          charge, 196.

  De Langara, Spanish Admiral, squadron under command of, defeated,
          and himself captured by Rodney, 122, 123;
    inefficiency of, 125.

  D'Orves, Comte, French Admiral, commands in East Indies, 1781,
          235, 236;
    joined by Suffren, 239;
    sails for Coromandel Coast, 240;
    dies, and succeeded by Suffren, 240.

  D'Orvilliers, Comte, French Admiral, commander-in-chief of Brest
          Fleet, 1778, 82;
    puts to sea, 82;
    Government instructions to, 83;
    encounter with British Fleet under Keppel, 83;
    manoeuvres of, and action of July 27, 83-91;
    comment upon, 92, 97;
    summer cruise of, 1779, 116-120;
    hampered by instructions, 119;
    returns to Brest unsuccessful, 120.

  De Suffren, Bailli, French Captain and Admiral, with d'Estaing in
          Narragansett Bay, 1778, 69;
    in the action with Byron off Grenada, 111;
    his comment upon d'Estaing's conduct, 111;
    biographical summary of, 111 (note);
    sails for East Indies, 1781, 163, 236;
    effect upon operations of, in India, by capture of a French
          convoy in Bay of Biscay, 228;
    attacks British squadron in Porto Praya, 236-238;
    saves Cape of Good Hope, 238;
    arrives Ile de France, 239;
    succeeds to chief command in East Indies, 240;
    five battles with British squadron, 240, 242, 244, 247, 253;
    captures Trincomalee, 1782, 247;
    relieves Cuddalore, 252-254;
    estimate of, 254, 255.

  De Ternay, French Commodore, commands squadron with convoy, from
          Brest for Newport, R.I., 155;
    action with British squadron under Cornwallis, 1780, 155-157;
    comment, favorable and unfavorable, 156;
    death of, 1781, and succeeded by des Touches, 170.

  Des Touches, French Commodore, succeeds de Ternay in command at
          Newport, 1781, 170;
    sails to enter Chesapeake Bay, to check British operations in
          Virginia, 170;
    pursued by Arbuthnot, 171;
    action between the two squadrons, 171-173;
    gains tactical advantage, but leaves the field to the British,
          174;
    justified by de Barras, who arrives and supersedes him, 174.

  De Vaudreuil, Marquis, French Admiral, second to de Grasse in
          1782, 209;
    commands-in-chief partial attack on Hood's division, 209;
    quoted, 214;
    succeeds to chief command upon de Grasse's surrender, 222;
    condition of his command after the battle, 223;
    pursued by Rodney, but reaches Cap François, 225.

  Doggers Bank, Battle of the, 1781, 189-194.

  Dominica, British West India Island, captured by French, 1778, 99;
    battle of, 208, 209, 210, 213, 215.

  Douglas, Sir Charles, British naval captain, commands squadron
          which relieves Quebec, 1776, 10;
    quoted, 11, 14, 17, 18, 22, 25, 26;
    energetic preparations by, to regain control of Lake Champlain,
          15-17;
    force created by, 17;
    made a baronet for his services at this time, 26;
    captain of the fleet to Rodney, 1782, 222;
    opinion as to Rodney's conduct cited, 222.

  Farragut, at Mobile, cited in illustration, 66 (note).

  Fighting Instructions, Additional, point in, bearing upon the
          failure of Rodney's plan of attack, April 17, 1780, 133,
          138, 139 (and note).

  "Fleet in Being," 73, 174;
    how regarded, apparently, by D'Orvilliers in 1779, 119.

  France, intervention of France in the American quarrel determined
          by Burgoyne's defeat, and leads to Spanish intervention,
          3, 58, 116;
    vacillating naval instructions of Government of, 83, 118, 119,
          141, 154;
    divergence of views between Spain and, 120, 121, 147, 158, 186,
          188, 189.

  France, Ile de (now Mauritius), French naval station in Indian
          Ocean, 126, 234, 236, 239.

  Gardiner's Bay, east end of Long Island, station of British fleet
          under Arbuthnot, watching French at Newport, 151, 170.

  Gates, Horatio, American General, defeated by Cornwallis at
          Camden, 152.

  George, Lake, a link in consecutive water communications from New
          York to Canada, 7, 51.

  Gibraltar, d'Estaing ordered to commence hostilities when forty
          leagues west of, 59;
    capture of, a leading object with Spanish Government, 120;
    this desire affects the major operations of Allies throughout
          the war, 121, 186;
    blockade of, by land and sea, 121;
    Rodney's relief of, 1780, 121-126, 157;
    Darby's relief of, 1781, 186, 188;
    Howe's relief of, 1782, 229-233.

  Glossary, of technical terms used in this book, 257.

  Grant, James, British General, share of in capture of Santa Lucia,
          102-104.

  Graves, Sir Thomas, British Admiral, brings reinforcement of
          vessels to New York, 151;
    relieves Arbuthnot in command of North American Station, 1781,
          176;
    difficulties of, owing to interception of communications, 177;
    joined by Hood off New York, 177;
    sails for the relief of Cornwallis, 178;
    action of, with French fleet under de Grasse, 179-184;
    conduct of, criticized by Hood, 181, 182, 184;
    returns to New York, 184;
    relieves Sir Peter Parker in Jamaica command, 185.

  Great Britain, feeble hold of, upon Canada, 1775, 10;
    shown by rewards for saving the colony, 26;
    inadequate provision of force by, 1774-1776, 29, 30, 59, 62, 79,
          82, 99, 112, 116, 117, 120, 127, 148, 189, 193, 226;
    improper dispersion of effort by, 30, 31, 48, 52, 56, 62, 63,
          72, 113-115, 151-153, 175;
    distrust of Government of, among naval officers, 79, 81, 93, 95,
          97, 99, 135, 146, 157, 158, 193;
    alarm in, produced by Allied fleets in Channel, 1779, 117;
    declares war against Holland, 1780, 158.

  Grenada, British West India Island, captured by French, 105;
    naval battle off, 105-112.

  Haiti, French West India Island, 147, 148, 168 (see "Cap François");
    squadron action off north coast of, 153-155.

  Hardy, Sir Charles, British Admiral, commands Channel Fleet, 117,
          119.

  Holland, brought into War of American Independence by concurring
          in Armed Neutrality of Baltic Powers, 1780, 3, 158, 236;
    colonial possessions of, 3, 158, 160-162, 236, 240, 246;
    St. Eustatius, St. Martin, and Saba, West India Islands of,
          taken by Rodney, 160-162;
    battle of Doggers Bank, 189-193;
    fleet of, held in check by Howe, 1782, 228;
    Cape of Good Hope menaced by British, saved by Suffren, 236-238;
    Trincomalee, in Ceylon, taken by British, 240, recaptured by
          Suffren, 247.

  Hood, Sir Samuel (afterwards Lord), British Admiral, arrives in
          West Indies, 1781, with reinforcements for Rodney, 160;
    sent to cruise off Martinique, to intercept de Grasse, 162;
    action between, and de Grasse, 163-167;
    exceptional ability of, 166, 184;
    French tribute to, 167;
    sent by Rodney with fourteen ships-of-the-line to reinforce
          North American station, 176;
    under command of Admiral Graves, sails for Chesapeake, 177;
    part of, in action between Graves and de Grasse, 180-183;
    criticisms of, upon Graves's conduct, 181, 182, 184;
    returns to West Indies, 185;
    in chief command there for two months, 196-205;
    brilliant operations of, at St. Kitts, 197-205;
    superseded by Rodney's return, 205;
    part of, in action of April 9, 1782, 208-210;
    in battle of April 12, 212-221;
    de Grasse's flagship strikes to, 221;
    censures passed by, upon Rodney's course after the battle, 220,
          222, 224, 225;
    detached in pursuit, captures a small French squadron, 224;
    returns to England after the peace, 226.

  Hotham, William, British naval Captain, in operations against New
          York, 1776, 42;
    convoys reinforcement of troops to West Indies, 100;
    left in West Indies in temporary command, by Rodney, 148.

  Howe, Richard, Earl, British Admiral, appointed to command North
          American Station, 1776, 30;
    invested also with powers as peace commissioner, 39;
    arrives at New York, 39;
    failure of peace negotiations, 39;
    operations at and about New York, 39, 42-47;
    tribute of, to force under his command, 47;
    accompanies army expedition to Chesapeake Bay, 52;
    operations in the Delaware, 53-55, and coastwise, 56;
    purpose of d'Estaing to intercept, in Delaware, 59;
    serious exposure of, through inadequate force, 62, 66;
    "extricates himself by rapid movements, 62-64;
    preparations to defend entrance to New York, 65-68;
    inferiority of force to d'Estaing, 66;
    follows French Fleet to Narragansett Bay, 70, and by his
          presence there induces d'Estaing to abandon siege of
          Newport, and put to sea, 73;
    manoeuvres of, with inferior force, 73-75;
    fleet of, scattered by gale, 75;
    returns to New York, 76, and again follows French Fleet to
          Boston, 77;
    admirable qualities of, as illustrated in this campaign, 78;
    futile contemporary criticism of, 79;
    relinquishes command, and returns to England, 1778, 81;
    not employed again, until change of Ministry, 1782, 81, 227;
    appointed to command Channel Fleet, 1782, and primary operations
          there, 227-229;
    successful evasion of very superior Franco-Spanish Fleet, 229;
    skilful conduct of relief of Gibraltar by, 1782, 229-231;
    engagement with Allied Fleet, 232;
    special qualities of, again illustrated, 232;
    French eulogy of, 232, and of force under his command, 233.

  Howe, Sir William (brother of Earl), British General, failure of
          to support Burgoyne, 1777, 28, 51, 52;
    evacuates Boston, 1776, and retires to Halifax, 29, 30;
    extent of regions under his command-in-chief, 30;
    appointed peace commissioner, jointly with Lord Howe, 39;
    goes from Halifax to New York, 39;
    fruitless peace negotiations, 39;
    reduction of New York by, 42-45;
    subsequent operations of, to Battle of Trenton, 45-49;
    constitutional sluggishness of, 45, 47;
    occupies Narragansett Bay, 48;
    injudicious extension of front of operations, 48;
    small results after New York, 49;
    rewarded with the Order of the Bath, 49;
    takes the greater part of his force to Chesapeake Bay, 52;
    effect of this upon Burgoyne's operations, 52, 53, 55;
    occupies Philadelphia, 53;
    this success worse than fruitless, 56;
    relieved in command by Clinton, and returns to England, 56, 63.

  Hudson River, a link in the chain of water communications from
          Canada to New York, 7, 30, 45;
    mentioned, 28, 41, 44, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51, 53;
    alternative name, North River, 41;
    Washington retreats across, into New Jersey, 45;
    British advance up valley of, 1777, 55.

  Hughes, Sir Edward, British Admiral, commander-in-chief in East
          Indies, 1779, 235;
    enterprise of, 235;
    engagements with French Fleet under Suffren, 240, 242, 244, 247,
          253;
    loses Trincomalee, 247, and compelled thereby to leave
          Coromandel coast for Bombay, 251;
    reinforced by Bickerton, 251;
    contrasted with Suffren, as a general officer, 254.

  Hughes, Sir Richard, succeeds to West India command at peace of
          1783, 226;
    subsequent controversy with Nelson, 226.

  Hyder, Ali, Sultan of Mysore, at war with British, 1779, 235;
    French Admiral d'Orves refuses coöperation with, 235;
    Suffren acts with, 240, 242;
    captures Cuddalore, 1782, 244;
    death of, 1782, 252;
    succeeded by Tippoo Saib, 252.

  _Inflexible_, British cruiser built by Sir Charles Douglas on Lake
          Champlain, 1776, 16;
    in herself sufficient to control the lake, 17.

  Jamaica, British West India Island, 38, 110, 149, 153, 159, 176,
          177, 185, 224, 226;
    conquest of, intended by France and Spain, 1782, 206;
    attempt leads to defeat of de Grasse by Rodney, 208, 209;
    Rodney repairs to, after his victory, 225.

  Japan, significance of contrast of population of, to square mile,
          with that of the United States, 5.

  Johnstone, George, British Commodore, commands squadron despatched
          to take Cape of Good Hope from Dutch, 236;
    attacked by Suffren in Porto Praya Bay, 237;
    arrives at Cape too late, Suffren having strengthened it, 238;
    returns to England, 238;
    professional capacity of, 239;
    attacks made by, upon professional conduct of Howe and Keppel,
          239. (See also p. 80.)

  Jones, John Paul, American naval captain, serves as a volunteer in
          French Fleet, 1782, 212.

  Kempenfelt, Richard, British Admiral, captures in Bay of Biscay
          great part of French convoy going to West Indies, 1781,
          195, 196;
    commands a division in Channel Fleet under Howe, 1782, 227, 228;
    lost in sinking of the _Royal George_, 229.

  Keppel, Augustus, British Admiral, refuses to serve against
          Americans, 81;
    commander-in-chief of Channel Fleet, 1778, 61, 82;
    encounter with French Brest Fleet, 83-91;
    comments on the conduct of, 92, 97;
    controversy with Palliser, third in command under, 95;
    returns to port with fleet, 96;
    court martial upon, 93;
    and cited from, 87, 88, 95;
    resigns command, 97;
    becomes first Lord of the Admiralty, 97, 225;
    quoted, 107 (note).

  La Motte Picquet, French Commodore, 115;
    action with a British division off Martinique, 1779, 128;
    encounter with squadron under Cornwallis, 1780, 153-155;
    captures great part of a British convoy returning from West
          Indies, 1781, 188;
    quoted, 229 (note).

  Leeward Islands Station, extent of, 99;
    under command of Barrington when war begins, 1778, 99;
    Byron succeeds to command, 1779, 105;
    held temporarily by Hyde Parker, 1779, 113;
    Rodney takes command, 1780, 121, 128;
    Hood in temporary charge of, 1782, 177, 185, 196-205;
    Rodney relieved by Pigot, 225.

  Les Saintes, small West India Islands, between Dominica and
          Guadeloupe, scene of Rodney's battle with de Grasse, 209,
          211, 213.

  Manners, Lord Robert, British naval captain (killed in the battle
          of April 12, 1782), encomiums of, upon Hood, quoted, 202,
          205.

  Martinique, French West India Island, 99, 104, 128, 130, 140, 141,
          142, 144, 147, 149, 153, 167, 206, 207;
    principal French depot in West Indies, 100;
    action off, between de Grasse and Hood, 162-167.

  Mathews, Thomas, British Admiral, Influence in British Navy of
          court martial upon, in 1744, 93, 139.

  Minorca, Mediterranean Island in British possession, Byng's action
          off, 1756, 93, 94;
    recovery of, a primary object with Spain, 120;
    supplied by Rodney, 1780, 125, 126;
    by Darby, 1781, 187;
    attack upon by France and Spain, 1781, 188;
    capitulates, 1782, 189.

  Mobile, Farragut's attack in entering, cited in illustration, 66
          (note).

  Monroe Doctrine, in last analysis is the formulation, in terms, of
          a purpose to prevent the propagation to the American
          continents of wars arising elsewhere, 4;
    recognition of same danger in unchecked Asiatic immigration, 4;
    necessity of adequate force in order to maintain, 29.

  Montgomery, Richard, American General, sent by the Congress to
          conduct invasion of Canada, 9; killed in assault on
          Quebec, 10.

  Moultrie, Fort, Description of, 33.

  Moultrie, William, American officer, commands Fort Moultrie when
          attacked by British squadron, 32-36.

  Narragansett Bay, occupation of by British, 1777, 47;
    value of, 47, 56;
    Rodney's opinion of, 48, 115;
    description of, 69;
    military and naval situation in, 1778, 72, 73;
    abandonment of, by British, 1779, because of improper dispersion
          of their army, 113, 114, 115;
    occupied by French squadron and troops, 1780, 149, 150, 155-157;
    Rodney neglects to attack, 150;
    French division in, watched by British from Gardiner's Bay, 151,
          170;
    but starts, 1781, for Chesapeake Bay, 170;
    returns to, unsuccessful, 173;
    sails again from, 177, and joins main fleet in the Chesapeake,
          184.

  Navy, and Navies, Washington's remark that to them belonged "the
          casting vote" in the War of American Independence, 4, 147;
    exercised on two decisive occasions, by Arnold on Lake
          Champlain, 1776, and by de Grasse at Yorktown, 1781, 4, 7,
          9, 168, 176, 178, 179, 184;
    decisive influence also in American War of Secession, 4;
    present and future dependence upon, of Monroe Doctrine and of
          question of Asiatic Immigration, 4, 5;
    military explanation for this "casting vote," 5;
    Pacific question essentially one of, 5;
    military reasons for general dominant effect of, in War of
          Independence, 6, 114;
    British, saves Canada for Great Britain, 12;
    specific effect, on ultimate result of the general war, exerted
          by American, on Lake Champlain, 1776, 12, 13, 14, 25;
    inadequacy of British, to demands upon it, 29, 30, 59, 62, 79,
          82, 99, 116, 117, 120, 127, 148, 189, 193, 226;
    British, in operations at New York, 1776, 40, 44, 47;
    in Burgoyne's advance, 1777, 51;
    misuse of British, to divide the land forces, 51, 52, 114, 115,
          152;
    subsidiary operations of British, 56, in the Carolinas, 151, in
          Virginia, 170;
    under Howe, though inadequate, saves Army under Clinton, 63, 64,
          and also New York, 64-68, and subsequently Narragansett
          Bay with army division at Newport, 72, 77;
    tone of French, as indicated by Government instructions, and
          action of officers, 83, 89, 91, 92, 166, 235;
    effect of seasonal conditions upon operations of, in Europe and
          in America, 98, 100, 113, 115, 147, 149, 159;
    in East Indies, 251;
    inefficiency of Spanish, 116, 125, 147, 189, 231, 232.

  Nelson, mentioned or quoted, 38, 39, 109, 126, 132, 140, 155, 160,
          202, 225, 226, 243.

  New Jersey, Washington crosses from New York into, 45;
    operations in, 1776, 46-49;
    impracticable to British, in 1777, and consequent effect upon
          Howe's course, 51, 52, 56;
    retreat of British from Philadelphia through, 1778, 63, 64.

  Newport, Rhode Island, taken possession of by British, 47;
    importance of, 48;
    siege of, by Americans and French, 70, 73, 77;
    abandoned by British, 115;
    occupied by French, 150, 155, 170, 173, 174, 179. See
          Narragansett Bay.

  New York, water communications between St. Lawrence and, 7, 8;
    British occupy harbor of, 1776, 38;
    operations around, 1776, 39-46;
    harbor, approaches, and fortifications about, 40-42;
    Washington abandons, 45, 46;
    British occupy, 45;
    British forces in, unable to coöperate with those in
          Philadelphia, 56, 63;
    Lord Howe's preparations to defend, 64-67;
    d'Estaing's failure to attack, 67, 68;
    Rodney goes from West Indies to, 150, 152, 159.

  Order, of Battle, 93 (and note), 137-140, 191;
    comparison between Keppel's, off Ushant, and Byron's, off
          Grenada, 112;
    Graves', off Cape Henry, 179-183, criticized by Hood, 181, 182;
    Hood's at anchor off St. Kitts, 202, 203.

  Palliser, Sir Hugh, British Admiral, third in command at Battle of
          Ushant, 84, 87, 90, 91, 93-96;
    court of inquiry upon, 95-97.

  Parker, Sir Hyde, (1) British Admiral, left in temporary command
          at New York by Howe, 1778, 80 (and note);
    in like position in Leeward Islands by Byron, 1779-1780, 113, 128;
    biographical summary of, 113;
    quoted, 129, 130;
    nickname of, 130;
    implied censure of, by Rodney, in battle of April 17, 1780, 136;
    returns to England, 136;
    commands at Battle of the Dogger Bank, 189-193;
    his reply to George III, 193;
    ordered to East Indian command, and lost at sea, 194.

  Parker, Hyde, (2) British Naval captain (afterwards Admiral Sir
          Hyde), in operations about New York, 1776, 39, 44, 46;
    in expedition against Savannah, 1778, 113, 114;
    biographical summary of, 113 (note). (In 1801,
          commander-in-chief over Nelson, at Copenhagen, 39, 80,
          note).

  Parker, Sir Peter, British Admiral, commands naval force in
          expedition against Charleston, 1776, 31;
    attack of, upon Fort Moultrie, 33-38;
    gives promotion to Nelson, Collingwood, and Saumarez, 38;
    at operations around New York, 38, 43, 45, and at Narragansett
          Bay, 48;
    commands Jamaica Station, 149, 153, 155, 159, 176, 177, 185;
    superseded at Jamaica by Graves, 1781, 185.

  Pellew, Edward, (afterwards Admiral Lord Exmouth), British
          midshipman, at Lake Champlain, 1776, 22;
    in Burgoyne's advance to Saratoga, 1777, 51.

  Philadelphia, occupation of, by British, 52-55;
    brief tenure of, 55;
    inutility of, to British, 56;
    evacuation of, by British, and hazardous retreat from, to New
          York, 63, 64.

  Quebec, attack upon by Americans, under Montgomery, 1775, 9, 10;
    blockade of, by Arnold, 1776, 10, 11;
    relieved by British navy, 10-12;
    utility of, to British preparations to control Lake Champlain,
          15-17, 26.

  Raids, by British navy, 56, 114.

  Rhode Island, 47, 48, 69, 70, 72, 77, 78, 79, 115, 150, 155. See
          Narragansett Bay.

  Riedesel, Baron, commander of German troops in Canada, 1776;
          testimony of, to effects of delay by Arnold's flotilla on
          Lake Champlain, 13, 25;
    quoted, 21, 23.

  Rochambeau, French general, commanding forces in America, requests
          coöperation of de Grasse against Cornwallis, 168.

  Rodney, Sir George (afterwards Lord), British Admiral, appointed
          to command Leeward Islands Station, 1779, 115, 121;
    sails to relieve Gibraltar, 122;
    on the way, destroys two Spanish squadrons, 122-125;
    relieves the place, and sails for West Indies, 125, 126;
    actions with de Guichen, April and May, 1780, 130-135, 142-144;
    censures officers of the fleet, 135-139, 145; further
          proceedings in West Indies, 1780, 146-150;
    takes fleet to New York, 150, and turns to West Indies, 159;
    capture of Dutch islands, 1781, 160;
    proceedings of, at St. Eustatius, 161, 162;
    sends Hood off Martinique to intercept de Grasse, 162;
    successes of de Grasse against, 167, 168;
    sends Hood to New York with fleet, 176, 177, and returns to
          England on leave, 177;
    returns to West Indies, 1782, and rejoins Hood, 205;
    pursuit of French armament against Jamaica, 207-212;
    victory of, in battle of April 12, 213-220;
    failure of, to improve his success, 220-225;
    superseded by Pigot, and returns finally to England, 225.

  Rowley, Joshua, British Admiral, brilliant conduct of, in Byron's
          action, 106, 107, 109;
    implicitly censured by Rodney, 136.

  Sandy Hook, at entrance to New York Harbor, 52, 63, 64, 65, 66,
          76, 113, 150, 177, 184, 185;
    Lord Howe's preparations at, for defence of New York, 1778, 65,
          66.

  Santa Lucia, French West India Island, capture of, by British,
          1778, 100-102;
    d'Estaing's ineffectual attempt to retake, 103, 104;
    military value of, 104, 207;
    de Guichen seeks to retake, 142;
    mentioned, 105, 106, 128, 141, 144, 148, 165, 167, 168, 206.

  Saratoga, surrender of Burgoyne at, why decisive, 3, 6;
    capitulation there, determined by Arnold's defence of Lake
          Champlain, 3, 7, 13, 14, 25;
    Burgoyne's surrender at, 28, 50-53.

  Saumarez, James (afterwards Lord de), British naval officer,
          midshipman at attack upon Fort Moultrie, 1776, 35, 38;
    lieutenant at the battle of the Dogger Bank, 1781, 192 (note);
    captain in West Indies, 1782, 196;
    biographical summary of, 196 (note);
    in Rodney's victory, 1782, 218, 221.

  Savannah, capture of, by British, 1778, 113;
    disastrous effect of operations thus initiated upon the British
          position in America, 114, 115, 151-153, 175-178, 184;
    failure of d'Estaing's attempt to retake, 115, 151.

  Schuyler, Philip, American General, commanding Northern
          Department, 1776; quoted, 12.

  Seasons, effect of, upon naval operations, 98, 113, 115, 145, 149,
          159, 251.

  Spain, induced to enter the war, 1779, 3, 116;
    cruise of fleet of, in conjunction with French, 1779, 116-121;
    divergence of views between France and, 120, 121, 147, 158, 186;
    two squadrons of, dispersed or destroyed by Rodney, 122-126;
    inefficiency of navy of, 125, 126, 147, 158, 187-189;
    fruitless cruise of fleet of, in conjunction with French, 1781,
          188, 189;
    projected conquest of Jamaica, 206.

  St. Eustatius, Dutch West India Island, capture of, by British,
          1781, 160-162;
    a great trade centre in the war, prior to capture, 160.

  St. Kitts, British West India Island, attacked by French, 1782, 196;
    naval operations of Hood and de Grasse about, 196-205;
    capitulates to French, owing to lack of British land force, 205.

  St. Lawrence, River, the centre of French power in Canada, 7;
    strength of, as a military line, 7, 8; as a naval line of
          communications, closed by ice, 10, 11, but at other
          seasons controlling, 11, 12;
    relations, to the decisive naval campaign on Lake Champlain,
          1776, 15-17, 25-26.

  Ticonderoga, strong post at head of Lake Champlain, 8, 9, 13, 18,
          20, 27, 28, 46, 50;
    saved from capture in 1775, and 1776, by Arnold's naval action
          on Lake Champlain, 9, 13, 25;
    taken by British, 1777, but reoccupied by Americans after
          Burgoyne's surrender, 28.

  Tiller. See "Helm."

  Tippoo Saib, Sultan of Mysore, in India, succeeds his father,
          Hyder Ali, 1782, and continues his policy, 252.

  Tobago, British West India Island, taken by French, 167, 168.

  Trenton, battle of, 48.

  Trincomalee, harbor in Ceylon, a Dutch possession in 1780,
          captured by British, 1782, 240;
    importance, and imperfect defences, of, 240, 242, 244, 251, 252,
          255;
    taken by French, 1782, 247;
    naval battle off, between Hughes and Suffren, 247-251.

  Ushant, battle of, 83-93.

  Valcour, Island in Lake Champlain, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24;
    selected by Arnold as the position in which to await British
          advance, 1776, 15;
    description of, 19, 20;
    battle of, 20-23;
    American retreat from, 23-25.

  Washington, George, commander-in-chief of the American armies,
          expression of, that the navies had "the casting vote" in
          the War of Independence, 4, 151;
    arrangements of, for defence of New York City, 1776, 41-43;
    withdraws the exposed division on Brooklyn Heights, 43, 44;
    successive retirements of, to Harlem River, to New Jersey, and
          across Delaware River, 44-46;
    wins battle of Trenton, 1776, and recovers great part of New
          Jersey, 48, 49;
    comment of, on Howe's sailing from New York, 1777, 52;
    disputes, unsuccessfully, Howe's advance on Philadelphia, 53, 55;
    skilful strategic position of, in New Jersey hills, 56;
    comment of, upon effects of d'Estaing's long passage out, 1778,
          63;
    hot pursuit by, of Clinton in retreat from Philadelphia to New
          York, 64;
    disappointment of, at failure of French naval assistance, 1780,
          150, 152;
    comment of, on Arnold's treason, 152;
    with Rochambeau, asks coöperation of de Grasse, 1781, 168;
    movement of, against Cornwallis at Yorktown, 178, 184;
    surrender of Cornwallis to, 185;
    mentioned incidentally, 67, 72.

  Washington, Fort, commanding Hudson River, 1776, 44, 46;
    Washington orders evacuation of, 45;
    stormed by British, and garrison taken, 46.

  West Indies, dependence of, upon American continent, 60;
    seasonal conditions in, affecting naval operations, 98, 115,
          149, 159;
    commercial importance of, 98;
    naval battles in, 103, 106-112, 129, 130-135, 142-144, 153,
          163-167, 198-205, 207-220.

  White, Thomas, British naval author serving during War of American
          Independence, quoted, 108, 183 (note), 204.

  Yorktown, series of events which brought Cornwallis to, 152, 153,
          169, 170, 174, 175;
    naval actions affecting control of waters around, 170-173,
          179-184;
    Cornwallis shut up in, 176;
    French navy in force before, 184;
    French and American armies arrive before, 184;
    surrender of Cornwallis at, 185.

  Zoutman, Johan A., Dutch Admiral, commands the squadron at the
          battle of the Dogger Bank, 189-193.

[Illustration]